Stabilization and the aftermarket prices of initial public offerings
Mazouz, Khelifa Agyei-Ampomah, S. Saadouni, B. Yin, S.
Mazouz, Khelifa
Agyei-Ampomah, S.
Saadouni, B.
Yin, S.
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2012
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The paper examines the determinants of stabilization and its impact on the aftermarket prices. We use a unique dataset to relax several assumptions in the stabilization literature. We find that underwriters support IPO prices shortly after listing, particularly in cold markets and when demand is weak. We also show that stabilized IPOs are more common amongst reputable underwriters. This finding suggests that stabilization may be used as a mechanism to protect the underwriter’s reputation. It also implies that reputable underwriters may possess private information and price IPOs closer to their true values (i.e., higher than those indicated by the weak premarket demand). Consistent with the latter view, we show that stabilized IPOs are offered at higher prices and suffer less underpricing than those indicated by the premarket demand, firm characteristics and market-wide conditions. The post-IPO performance results indicate that stabilized IPOs are unlikely to be mispriced as their prices do not exhibit any significant reversal after the initial stabilization period. We conclude that stabilization may be superior to underpricing as it protects investors from purchasing overpriced IPOs, benefits issuers by reducing the total money “left on the table” and enhances the overall profitability of underwriters.
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Mazouz, K., Agyei-Ampomah, S., Saadouni, B., Yin, S. (2012) Stabilization and the aftermarket prices of initial public offerings. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 41 (3), 417-439.
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