Implementing the UN Action Programme for Combating the Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

Here�s your text with all extra line breaks removed and the flow kept intact: Revised version (no extra line breaks): Historically, UN conferences have been criticised for resulting more in compromises than in commitments to real change, a charge also levelled against the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN Small Arms Conference). The consensus?based approach adopted throughout the negotiations had the advantage of binding all participating States to all aspects of the agreed Programme of Action (PoA), but it also ensured that achieving a sufficiently rigorous and comprehensive agreement on all measures required to tackle the trafficking, proliferation, and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW) would be difficult. Therefore, despite the efforts of many governments and NGOs, the UN Small Arms Conference did not reach sufficiently robust agreements in several areas. Nonetheless, it was a valuable and productive process. The resulting PoA includes a reasonably comprehensive set of key principles and commitments that provide a basis for action at national, regional, and global levels. The PoA was agreed by more than 100 participating States, each politically bound to adopt and implement it. Given that the UN Small Arms Conference was the first of its kind, its achievement in generating political will and momentum for efforts to control SALW is significant. Although many commitments are weaker and less comprehensive than hoped for by many governments and organisations, it is notable that the PoA contains at least some important commitments in all but two of the core issue areas raised by States. The exceptions relate to transfers to non?State actors and to civilian trade, possession, and use of SALW�restrictions strongly opposed by the USA. Human?rights?related issues were also notably absent from the PoA. While the process began with a far?reaching draft PoA in December 2000 (A/Conf.192/L.4), most comments submitted during the second Preparatory Committee in January 2001 came from countries seeking to weaken its commitments. The subsequent draft (A/Conf.192/L.4/Rev.1) was therefore weaker, leaving progressive States with an uphill task in strengthening its provisions. The next draft emerged at the UN Small Arms Conference itself as a third draft (A/Conf.192/L.5). Although still limited in key areas�such as export criteria and transparency�it went further than L.4/Rev.1 in several respects and included specific international commitments, including on brokering and tracing lines of supply. However, this proved too ambitious for a small group of States, and the final document adopted by consensus (A/Conf.192/L.5/Rev.1) represented a lower?level compromise. Despite the challenges of agreeing on a consensus?based PoA, the process leading to the agreement was perhaps as important as the agreement itself. The UN Small Arms Conference marked the first time all UN Member States met to discuss the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects with the aim of agreeing on a comprehensive set of measures to address the problem. Although many commitments in the PoA are phrased in equivocal language that allows States considerable flexibility, it is clear that the Conference contributed to a much better understanding among all stakeholders of the nature of the illicit trade in SALW and the particular concerns and priorities of different countries and sub?regions. It is also clear that while the PoA provides minimum standards and commitments for all States, it encourages further action from those willing to adopt more stringent commitments and stronger programmes. Several States are willing to build upon the PoA and take more concrete and far?reaching measures at national, sub?regional, regional, and international levels, such as specific arrangements for tracing cooperation or mechanisms to coordinate efforts to improve stockpile security or weapons destruction. This briefing provides a critical assessment of key provisions in the UN Small Arms Conference PoA. Section 1 measures the overall outcomes of the conference against those that the Biting the Bullet (BtB) project proposed as optimal conclusions and suggests ways to put the PoA commitments into practice. Section 2 assesses the implementation and follow?up commitments in the PoA and identifies ways to promote the implementation of Sections III and IV, as well as options for maximising the Biennial Meetings of States and the 2006 Review Conference. Section 3 examines funding and resourcing possibilities for the PoA, including identifying needs, mobilising resources, and matching needs with resources. The final section focuses on the way forward, particularly on how implementation of the PoA could build on existing regional initiatives and develop common international approaches to controlling SALW proliferation, availability, and misuse. It also examines how action to prevent and combat the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects can be advanced at sub?regional and regional levels in conjunction with major stakeholders, including civil society, in the period leading up to the first Review Conference. If you want this tightened, made more formal, or edited for clarity, I can refine it further.

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/10454/4273

Version

Published version

Citation

Clegg E, Crowley M, Greene O et al (2001). Implementing the UN Action Programme for Combating the Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. London: British American Security Information Council (BASIC), International Alert and Saferworld. Biting the Bullet Briefing Papers, No 15.

Link to published version

http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/cics/publications/bullet/briefing/

Type

Briefing paper