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Application of the People, Context, Deal and Opportunity (PCDO) Model for Entrepreneurship Advancement in Africa

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Introduction

The chapter postulates that the legal and institutional framework of the African Union (AU) is inadequate to tackle the current crisis and conflict-ridden situations in most African countries to provide an enabling environment for entrepreneurship advancement in Africa. The chapter proposes the application of the people, context, deal and opportunity (PCDO) model by African countries in order to ensure the safety and security of people and create the right context and to leverage entrepreneurial opportunities in Africa. The proposal is founded on Aspirations 4 and 6 of Agenda 2063 by which the AU aspires to become an integrated, peaceful, progressive, safe and secure Africa by the year 2063 with development programmes that are led by African people.

While Africa is on the road map to entrepreneurial advancement like the rest of the world, there are certain challenges that the continent continues to grapple with, such as conflicts, crisis, corruption, insecurity and instability. In view of these challenges, this chapter examines whether the African Union (AU) can adequately tackle the problems and ensure peace, security and stability in Africa. Arguably, institutional environmental conditions and

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entrepreneurship are inseparable because entrepreneurship advancement is fostered by the right institutional environment. Security is identified as a foremost context or environment in which entrepreneurship can thrive. It is argued that there are widespread patterns of insecurity in most African countries, and that entrepreneurship advancement in Africa is dependent upon stable, peaceful and secure environment where the rule of law is upheld, and rights are guaranteed. It is proposed that stable, safe and secure environment will in turn shape the local attitudes and cultural context favourable for entrepreneurship advancement in Africa.

The influence of institutional environment on the level and types of entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurial activities is well established. Writing within the context of entrepreneurship education and training (EET) in Ghana, Kenya and Mozambique, Robb et al. (2014) postulated that among the barriers to entrepreneurship advancement in Africa were local attitudes and cultural disincentives. The local attitudes include the pervasive fear of venturing into self-employment when there are family financial obligations, which make it difficult, for example, to deny goods or services to extended family members because of fear that they are unlikely and genuinely unable to pay for them (Robb et al., 2014, 34). Indeed, in most African countries, such as Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there are negative cultural perceptions of entrepreneurship (Robb et al., 2014, 39). Cultural disincentives refer to factors associated with local perceptions. Accordingly, Robb et al. observed that the cultural belief stems from the lack of wide acceptance of entrepreneurship as a respected career path (Robb et al., 2014, 39). Other barriers include corruption, conflicts and crisis, poverty and dysfunctional leadership.

The chapter proceeds in four sections. The introductory section is followed by an examination of the prevailing pattern of insecurity, crisis and conflicts in a few African countries and its consequence for decent life and entrepreneurship advancement. Incidences of crisis, conflicts and wanton killing of African people in Central African Republic (CAR), Nigeria and Sudan are highlighted to suggest that if these patterns are not dealt with, entrepreneurship advancement would remain underdeveloped in these and other African countries that face similar security and instability problems. The second section analyses entrepreneurship in general and the nature of the social and commercial entrepreneurship, in particular. It also analyses bricolage concept as it applies to the African continent. The third section examines the legal and institutional framework for entrepreneurship advancement within the African Union (AU) including the Peace and Security Council

(PSC) which is responsible for conflict prevention, resolution and management. Analysis of Aspirations 4 and 6 of Agenda 2063 and the 'Kagame Report' shows that the continent continues to aspire to achieve an inclusive Africa and an Africa whose development is driven by its people.

The application of the people, context, deal and opportunity (PCDO) model to Africa is the focus of the fourth section. The section highlights the need for a shift in the AU's institutional reform framework that is currently focused on policies, rules, regulations and the proliferation of organs to one that includes cognitive elements. It argues for the reforms that are people and context centred to ensure the creation of safe and secure environment. The chapter concludes with the proposal of a decentralised AU to allow individual African countries to implement entrepreneurship advancement that is built around people informed by the PCDO model.

Circumstances of Africa's Conflict-Ridden Countries

Africa consists of 55 countries and it is the second largest continent in the world, both in area and population, behind Asia. The countries in Africa are diverse in geography, politically, socio-culturally and economically. Most African countries were previously under the subjugation of colonial powers. The 1960s and 1970s marked African countries' emancipation, as individual African countries gained independence from their colonial masters. The impact of the years of colonisation, the negotiations leading up to independence, the people and contexts differ from one African country to another. Such historical and contextual differences could be seen in their levels of development. Therefore, it is erroneous and misleading to discuss Africa as a country, hence a contextual analysis of the continent through the prism of the Africa Union (AU) is undertaken. This means that discussions about Africa should encompass or at least contemplate all 55 countries and their varying stages of socio-cultural, political and economic developments in view of promoting entrepreneurship in Africa.

Although only three countries are used as case study due to space constraints, discussions in this section reveals a pattern of conflict and crisis in most African countries. It is argued that for effective entrepreneurship advancement in Africa, the conditions of Africa's conflict-ridden countries must be confronted and transformed to peaceful, secure and stable Africa. With the adoption of the theme 'silencing the guns' in Africa by 2020, the African Union (AU) aimed to achieve a peaceful, safe and secure Africa.

Formulating such a theme highlights the fact that conflicts and crisis have been a major part of most African countries' trajectories post-independence by experience. The countries under focus, namely, the Central African Republic, Nigeria and Sudan are identified as a few of Africa's remaining conflict hotspots, for which reason the AU devised the theme with the hope that the guns will truly be silenced. Regrettably, the theme was not achieved. Instead, there have been more instances of violence both in these countries and others such as Somalia, Mali and Libya. Coffey (November 2019) listed CAR, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan as some of the most dangerous countries in the world.

The Central African Republic

The population of Central African Republic (CAR) continues to be depleted due to civil wars since its independence in 1960. It is reported that the insurgency led by the *Seleka* (alliance in Sango) a coalition of armed Muslim groups resulted in the severe depletion of the country's security infrastructure and heightened ethnic tensions. In 2012, the *Seleka* forces launched an offensive against the CAR government (BBC News 18 December 2012). In response, the *anti-balaka* group (invincible in Sango) coalitions of Christian fighters carried out reprisal against the *Seleka* forces (Violence in Central Africa Republic, 14 January 2021). Since September 2013, both forces have continued widespread attacks against each other that plunged the CAR into atrocities resulting in hundreds of thousand deaths, thousands of refugees, while hundreds are displaced and dispersed in neighbouring countries such as Cameroon and Democratic Republic of Congo (United Nations Human Rights, CAR: Mapping Human Rights Violations 2003–2015; CAR Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, 31 December 2020).

Reports from human rights groups and United Nations agencies suggest that crimes committed by both the *Seleka* and *anti-balaka* groups constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity. Consequently, in April 2014, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established a peacekeeping force in Bangui. However, due to the inability of the CAR government to stop the crisis, there has been escalation and several deaths were recorded as the two recognised groups in 2014 increased to about fourteen armed factions with hundreds of allied groups outside the country (Dukhan, 2017). Therefore, Baddorf (2017) noted that despite the peace agreement signed in June 2017, and the United Nations establishment of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in Bangui in April 2018, the end to the atrocities in CAR is still not in sight.

The priority task of the MINUSCA was to ensure the protection of civilians and disarm militia groups (United Nations Peacekeeping: MUNISCA). Regrettably, with over fifteen thousand peacekeepers operating in CAR, MINUSCA appears unable to fulfil its mandate as they continue to face significant challenges (Global Conflict Trackers, 14 January 2021). Also, the United Nations documents several attacks against UN peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, noting that fifteen peacekeepers were killed in CAR in 2017, while six others were killed by various armed groups in 2018 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 31 October 2018).

Significantly, the crisis in CAR has been referred to the ICC twice. Both were self-referrals. Self-referrals are situations referred to the ICC by the government of the country in which the crimes occur or where the alleged perpetrators are nationals of the country. In 2004 and 2014, the government of CAR referred situations in its country to the ICC, resulting in Situations and Cases CAR I and II, respectively, at the ICC. Details of the crisis in CAR and the rationale for self-referrals cannot be undertaken here. The CAR ratified the Rome Statute on 3 October 2001 and in line with the complementarity regime of the ICC, the government of CAR should be able to investigate and prosecute international crimes that occur in its territory (Imoedemhe, 2017, 23). However, being supposedly overwhelmed with renewed violence in 2012, the government again referred the situation to the ICC in May 2014, exactly a decade after the first referral (Human Rights Watch, CAR: ICC Sets Trial 28 July, 2020). Self-referral depicts not only the inability or unwillingness of a government to act, but it also demonstrates weak institutions and arguably misdirected priorities. According to Keppler (2021) the people of CAR 'suffered unspeakable atrocities and horrors during the civil conflict that began in 2012'.

Nigeria

There are repeated patterns in most African countries where incidences of grave injustices and violations of human rights are propagated either directly or indirectly by some African governments. Admittedly in Nigeria, the insurgence of the group called Boko Haram (Western education is sinful) has been on for decades, therefore, both rebel groups and government forces are responsible for the violence and violations of human rights. News is replete with accounts of killings and kidnappings of people, including men, women, children and young adults, so much so that Nigeria was named the 'global capital of kidnapping' (Al Okoli, 2019). This notorious distinction that placed Nigeria as the 'kidnap-for-ransom capital' meant that Nigeria

accounted for a quarter of globally reported kidnap cases (Imoedemhe, 2017, 183).

The Nigerian government is partly responsible for the state of affairs, due to its apathy and failure to act. Jatto (2018, 85) documents several atrocities and unlawful killings in Nigeria, which have risen to heightened proportion and have attracted the international community as allegedly constituting crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of genocide. Yet the Nigerian government has done little to nothing to stop the atrocities. Abraham Jatto (2018) documented statistically how Muslim Fulani Herdsmen mostly from the Northern part of Nigeria have consistently and systematically killed innocent Nigerians who are predominantly in the Southern and other parts of Nigeria, destroying farmlands and thereby making the entire country insecure and unsafe.

Human security is lacking in Nigeria. Human security means the 'protection of fundamental freedoms which define human lives, in the process protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations through the usage of processes that build on people's strength and aspirations' (Human Security Centre, 2010, 205). This implies that the protection, preservation of lives and ensuring individual freedom are components of human security. Human Rights Watch document several killings in the Northern and Southern parts of Nigeria noting that Boko Haram, Fulani Herdsmen and the Nigerian Military have committed unimaginable atrocities against men, women and children, yet nobody is being held to account (Roth, Human Rights Watch [HRW] World Report, 2020).

Like a few other African governments, the Nigerian government appears complicit in the atrocities. According to Imoedemhe (2017, 184–185) Nigeria is susceptible to being a failed state due to the inability of the government to ensure security and safety of people and property. Since 2010, Nigeria has been under preliminary examination by the International Criminal Court (ICC). In the 11 December 2020 report, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC Fatou Bensouda noted among others that both Boko Haram and the Nigerian Security Forces (NSF) have committed acts constituting crimes against humanity and war crimes. Consequently, Bensouda requested authorisation by the Judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC to open investigations in Nigeria (Statement of the Prosecutor, 11 December 2020). The ten-year long preliminary examination is certainly not the fault of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), whose lean resources have been and continues to be overstretched due to the increasing demands placed on it. Rather, it is the failure of the Nigerian government who, being a party to

the Rome Statute of the ICC since 2000, failed to take responsibility for its complementarity role (Imoedemhe, 2017, 19–20).

Sudan

For decades, Sudan remained the largest country in Africa in terms of land mass. However, with the secession of South Sudan in July 2011, it has become the third largest country behind Algeria and the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) who rank first and second, respectively. Conflicts in Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile have been recorded by Human Rights Watch (HRW, World Report 2020). Succinctly, the conflicts have been between the government forces and rebel groups. The conflicts between the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM) and the *Janjaweed* (militia men on horseback) in Darfur from 2003 to 2005 resulted in several deaths and displacements of several Sudanese (Gardner, 2020). This also culminated in the first warrant of arrest issued by the ICC against a sitting president—Former President of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir in 2009 and 2010 (Imoedemhe, 2015, 89). The situation in Darfur Sudan had been referred to the ICC by Resolution 1593 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in March 2005, being the first referral by the UNSC to the ICC.

Omar al-Bashir is charged with genocide, accused of ethnic cleansing, by which he allegedly attempted to wipe out three non-Arab ethnic groups (Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa) in the Darfur region where more than 200,000 people have died since 2003. Despite being the only sitting president faced with genocide charges, Omar al-Bashir travelled freely and was re-elected in April 2015. Nevertheless, conflicts in Sudan continued unabated resulting in several deaths, internal displacements and gross human rights violations. In April 2019, President Omar al-Bashir was ousted after being president for over 30 years. Roth (HRW, 2020) reports that several conflicts between the groups, as well as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) a paramilitary force, continued in Khartoum, Darfur and other regions. By an agreement between the African Union and the United Nations Security Council, the African Union/United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was established to stop human rights abuses and ensure the protection of civilians in Sudan. UNAMID's mandate has been extended for another one-year period.

In summary, the pattern of insecurity, wanton killings, displacement of people and destruction of properties highlighted in CAR, Nigeria and Sudan is replete in most African countries. Jalloh (2009, 475) labelled the continent the most conflict-ridden in the world. As argued by Imoedemhe (2015, 85), this assertion appeared justified because 10 out of the 24 most war-ridden

countries recorded between 1980 and 1994 were in Africa. The question is how African countries can ensure entrepreneurship advancement in an atmosphere or environment that is devoid of peace, safety and security. The chapter argues for African governments to safeguard the rule of law, uphold the sanctity of life and ensure safety and security of its citizens. The African context—partly crisis-ridden, less secure, politically, and economically volatile as well as with less developed institutions, requires context-tested approaches, of which the PCDO model may be considered appropriate for adoption by African countries.

Entrepreneurship: Social and Commercial

The aim of entrepreneurship is wealth creation through innovation and creativity. The word entrepreneur is taken from the French word *enterprendre,* which means 'to undertake' (Singh & Belwal, 2008). Accordingly, an entrepreneur is an individual who is driven by ideas and who takes steps to bring together the finances, people, equipment and facilities to establish and manage a business enterprise in order to achieve his goals and ambitions (Singh & Belwal, 2008). Entrepreneurial activity necessarily involves people, resources and the appropriate environment.

Broadly, two types of entrepreneurship could be identified: social and commercial. Social entrepreneurship refers to innovative, value creating activity that occur within or across the non-profit, business or government sectors (Austin et al., 2006). The underlying objective of social entrepreneurship is to create social values, rather than personal wealth. Thus, social entrepreneurship is entrepreneurial activity with social purpose embedded in it, as it addresses social needs that are not met by commercial enterprises (McMullen, 2011). Also, Desa (2012, 734) observed that, unlike traditional commercial entrepreneurships that have the goal of financial return, social entrepreneurs have goals of providing mission-related social outcomes, as well as market-based outcomes.

Conversely, the focus of commercial entrepreneurship is the creation of profitable business operations that results in private gain and brings financial returns to investors or shareholders (Austin et al., 2006). These authors also suggest that commercial entrepreneurship tends to focus on breakthroughs and meeting needs, whereas social entrepreneurship focuses on serving basic needs more effectively through innovative approaches. This implies that for commercial enterprise to flourish, there are gaps in the social sphere that must be bridged. Therefore, the challenge or failure of commercial entrepreneur

presents as an opportunity for the social entrepreneur to facilitate social change through innovative approaches that satisfy unmet needs (Nicholls, 2008).

In terms of bottom lines, Sahasranamam and Nandakumar (2020, 104) made a useful distinction saying that social enterprises reinvest their profits towards the achievement of their social mission while commercial enterprises divide the profits among investors or stakeholders. The inability of social entrepreneurship to redistribute profits further results in social enterprises being placed in potentially precarious competitive disadvantaged position when compared to commercial enterprise (Austin et al.). There seems to be a fine line because social entrepreneurial activities reflect economic realities and economic activities do generate social value. Thus, the parameters for measuring organisational performance are different. Commercial enterprises use conventional performance measures, such as market share, return on assets or stock market returns, whereas social enterprises use qualitative indicators, which are at times, difficult to measure as well as quantitative measures on outreach and social service delivery.

Furthermore, Desa (2012), Sahasranamam and Ball (2016, 2018), Sahasranamam and Raman (2018) assert that due to the limited financial gains, social enterprises often depend on bricolage approaches, volunteers and social alliances for mobilisation. These two types of entrepreneurship are discussed because, in relation to the application of the PCDO model, it is believed that African countries would benefit from both types. Moreover, the social sphere or environment within which all commercial entrepreneurships develop and flourish needs to be safeguarded. Therefore, rather than draw the strain distinctions, it is proposed that both commercial and social entrepreneurship are mutually inclusive, interdependent and mutually beneficial to each other and to society at large. Significantly, the African context seems to accommodate and facilitate the use of bricolage approaches.

Bricolage

Bricolage approaches can be constructively applied in the African context to enhance entrepreneurship advancement because Africa being the second largest continent in the world is blessed with huge potentials in labour, materials, skills and unharnessed natural resources. African countries are also rated as developing third world states with weak institutions and emerging economies. Desa (2012, 742) found that in the face of weak, uncertain or evolving regulatory and technological institutions, the results indicate that social entrepreneurs move towards bricolage activity. Bricolage describes the

process of using whatever tools and processes that are immediately available to achieve a construction work or arts. It is about making do with pre-existing resources and creating new products from the tools and materials at hand (Desa, 736).

Shane (2003) identified three distinct dimensions of bricolage, namely, materials, labour and skills. Further analysis by Desa (2012, 736) demonstrates that material bricolage refers to forgotten, discarded, worn-out, or presumed 'single-application' materials with new use. Labour bricolage involves customers and suppliers that provide free on-site work on projects and that bricoleurs usually permit and encourage the use of self-taught skills on the job. Regardless of their suitability, 'making do with whatever is at hand' is a commonality among all dimensions of bricolage. To some degree, most entrepreneurial activities, such as necessity entrepreneurship or entrepreneurs operating in resource-constraint environments employ the use of bricolage. Similarly, both commercial and social entrepreneurship often rely on bricolage approaches.

In addition to the bricolage approaches, there are factors at multiple levels both internal and external that can influence and ensure the protection of new business creation processes. They include individual-level, national-level, regional-level and international-level contextual factors (Bhagavatula et al., 2010; Bowen & De Clercq, 2018; Davidson & Honig, 2003). The interaction between the individual-level and the country-level contexts makes it impossible to examine entrepreneurship through the individual level alone without the broader context in view. Within the African continent, the significance of the broader contextual environment for entrepreneurial advancement is brought to the fore by Aspiration 6 of Agenda 2063, which leans towards achieving development that is led by African citizens. Therefore, similar ideals of individual and country-level interactions highlighted in Agenda 2063 support elements and structures for entrepreneurship advancement in Africa. An evaluation of Aspirations 4 and 6 of Agenda 2063 and how the PCDO model can be deployed for their attainment is critical but first, a highlight of the PCDO model is in order.

Introducing the People, Context, Deal and Opportunity (PCDO) Model

This section introduces the elements of people, context, deal and opportunity model. The Sahlman's (1996) people, context, deal and opportunity (PCDO) framework further developed by Austin et al. (2006, 3–4) have elements

that are interdependent and context-dependent. These elements are discussed below.

'People' refers to those who actively participate in or who bring resources to the venture. They include those within and outside the organisation who contribute to the success of the project. Implicitly, the skills, attitudes, knowledge, contacts, goals and values acquired by the people provide the resource-blend, which contributes to the overall success of the business.

'Context' refers to the environment and the cultural context in which the business operates; it includes the external elements that are outside the control of the entrepreneur that influence success or failure. Contextual factors include the macroeconomy, tax and regulatory structure and socio-political environment. Economic environment, tax policies, employment levels, technological advances and social movements, such as those involving labour, religion and politics are examples of specific contextual factors that can frame the opportunities and risks that new ventures grapple with (Austin et al., 2006, 5). It is imperative to define those contextual elements that must be consciously dealt with, and those that can simply play out as they will and at their time. Thus, according to Austin et al., attention to everything means attention to nothing. Conversely, leaving out a single critical contextual element can be the precursor to failure. A critical contextual element in Africa is security i.e. ensuring a safe, peaceful and stable environment for entrepreneurship to thrive and hence the proposal for the application of the PCDO model to African countries for entrepreneurship advancement within the continent. Not only are African governments expected to ensure the development of the people, but the contextual environment must also be free of conflicts, crises and insecurity for the safety of people generally to enhance entrepreneurship advancement.

'Deal' is the substance of the bargain that defines who gives what, who gets what, and when deliveries, supplies and receipts occur in a venture (Austin et al.). Each transaction delivers a bundle of values, such as economic benefits, social recognition, autonomy and decision rights, satisfaction of deep personal needs, social interactions, fulfilment of generative and legacy desires and delivery on altruistic goals (Austin et al.).

'Opportunity' is defined by Sahlman (1996, 140) as 'any activity requiring the investment of scarce resource in hopes of a future return'. Thus, opportunity is the desired future state that is different from the present that motivates commercial and social entrepreneurs to invest scarce resources, with the hope and belief that the achievement of a better future state and returns on investment are possible (Austin et al., 7). Therefore, change is motivated by the

vision of the future that is better for the decision-maker, and by the credibility of the path presented to that desired future state. One of the difficulties surrounding entrepreneurial study is that the definition of opportunity is not necessarily shared by the multiple constituencies who must work together to create change. Often, change affects power relations, economic interests, personal networks and even self-image. A critical factor that creates motivation for joint action arises when people create a common definition of opportunity that can be shared (Austin et al., 5). The successful application of the PCDO elements requires the understanding of the wider context of legal and institutional environment in view of advancing entrepreneurship in Africa. The next section analyses the legal and institutional framework for entrepreneurship advancement in Africa.

Legal and Institutional Framework for Entrepreneurship in Africa

The question may be asked whether the African Union (AU) is regionally situated with legal and institutional framework that promotes entrepreneurship advancement in the continent. Birthed in July 2002, the African Union (AU) replaced the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The OAU focused on the struggles and fight against apartheid, colonialism and worked towards the attainment of political independence for countries in the continent. Arguably, the focus of the OAU on the political independence of individual states and holding assiduously to the principles of non-interference with the political and territorial integrity of states accounted for some of the reasons for the AU's replacement of the OAU (Amao, 2020, 20; Imoedemhe, 2015, 86).

The AU was established by means of a multilateral treaty—the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2002), which was opened to ratification and accession by other emerging countries within the continent. Olivier (2015) observed that guided by a common vision for an integrated Africa, the AU's agenda was driven by efforts towards economic cooperation, as well as a new political emphasis on democratisation, human rights, good governance and the rule of law. The Constitutive Act also created nine (9) bodies or organs through which the AU functions (Olivier, 2015; 518). They include the Assembly of States of the AU, the Executive Council, The Pan African Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Commission, the Permanent Representatives' Committee, the Specialised Technical Committees, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council and the Financial Institutions (Constitutive Act, 2002; art

5). Udombana (2020, 4–5) notes that the AU emerged from a 'refurbished regional organisation… to Africa's inter-governmental institution for political security and economic governance'.

Legal framework refers to instruments such as laws, rules and regulations and specifically in the regional context, it also includes treaties, policies and decisions adopted for the purpose of promoting peace, prosperity and entrepreneurship advancement in Africa. Significantly, institutions are conceptualised to include not just organs, structures, formal and informal laws, but also cultural frames and behavioural patterns that are prevalent among a people. According to North (1990, 2001, 321), institutions are the rules of the game that structure human interactions in a society. Therefore, institutional framework should transcend the proliferation of organs and bodies, to include normative and cognitive institutions, which are the less formal and the 'taken-for-granted' but ingrained belief system, customs and norms that shape behaviours in society. National cultures could positively or negatively influence the proliferation of entrepreneurship in given countries (Dheer, 2017; Vershinina et al., 2018). Although it could be erroneous to discuss Africa as a country, a contextual analysis of the continent was done through the prism of the AU and taking the conflict-ridden three countries as representative cases. The AU's construct of legal and institutional framework almost always referred to laws, policies and decisions of the AU, including its founding treaty—the Constitutive Act. The chapter argues that the people, local attitudes and cultural context among others are important components of institutional framework that can shape and promote entrepreneurship advancement. These conditions are taken care of by the PCDO model as discussed later on.

Agenda 2063 Aspirations

The AU's primary objective is the emergence of an 'integrated peaceful and prosperous Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena' (Agenda, 2063). The AU's more specific vision for conflict management reflects an awareness that the precondition for achieving this overarching goal is security and stability on the continent. The peace and security architecture establishes a long list of tasks related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflict across Africa. The strategic elements of this vision have been endorsed by the supreme organ of the AU the Assembly of Heads of State and Government composed of the 55 AU member states. The Assembly convenes only twice a year, making it unsuitable to oversee the day-to-day conflict management. Therefore, the Peace and

Security Council (PSC) a fifteen-member organ manages strategic and operational decisions about where, when and how to manage conflicts (Williams, 2011).

In May 2013, the AU launched Agenda 2063, by which Africa began to rigorously pursue seven (7) aspirations with the aim of attaining the common goal of an integrated, peaceful and prosperous continent in the 'Africa we want' by 2063. The idea is that 50 years from 2013, the continent would have achieved peaceful, prosperous, secure, stable and an integrated Africa with development agenda and programmes championed by African people. Critically, Aspirations 4 and 6 of Agenda 2063 read thus:

> Aspiration 4: A peaceful and secure Africa: A stable and peaceful Africa with Institutional Structure for AU Instruments on Peace and Security
>
> Aspiration 6: An African whose development is people driven, relying on the potential offered by African people, especially its women and youth and caring for children. Full Gender Equality in all spheres of life, removing all forms of discrimination against women and girls and ensuring women, youth and girls' empowerment

Arguably, among the seven aspirations of the AU's Agenda 2063, attaining a peaceful and secure Africa appears the most significant for several reasons. First, a people-driven development agenda must first ensure the safety and security of the people who are primarily dependent on for the development. Second, as it relates to entrepreneurship advancement, the necessity for a peaceful and secure environment, including political and economic stability cannot be overemphasised. Therefore, having begun the pursuit of a peaceful and secure Africa since 2013, it is important to examine how the AU ensures that these aspirations are not only achieved, but sustained in the long run.

Critically, seven years after the launch of Agenda 2063, the AU formulated the theme for 2020 as the year of 'silencing the guns' in the continent. Arguably, this was in pursuit of the attainment of Aspiration 4 of Agenda 2063, which declares 'A Peaceful and Secure Africa' with the goal to attain a stable and peaceful Africa. Priority areas for the achievement of the aspiration were institutional structure for AU instruments on peace and security, maintenance and preservation of peace and security and ensuring defence, security and peace. Aspiration 4 Goal 1 further requires that peace, security and stability should be preserved throughout the continent. Although the need to strengthened governance, accountability and transparency as foundational mechanisms for strengthened security and peace have been listed under Aspiration 4 Goals 2&3, there seems to be no concrete mechanism

or strategies to ensure that these aspirations become Africa's reality, as policy rhetoric and reality do not match. It is therefore not surprising that 2020 passed without the actualisation of 'silencing the guns' in Africa.

Given the highly fragmented institutions of the AU with many focussed areas, The AU felt that a strengthened mechanism for the attainment of Agenda 2063 was through institutional reforms. With repeated patterns of crisis and conflicts, collective Africa acknowledged 'the need for radical transformation at all levels and in all spheres' in order to accelerate development and meet the aspirations of citizens (Agenda, 2063, para 66b). In Agenda 2063, the AU pledged to use the lessons from past and present development efforts and challenges to forge an African-centred approach to transformation (Agenda, 2063, para 3). However, Udombana (2020, 33) postulates that chronic remorse is also an undesirable thing. There are mistakes, which humanity has made and repented of so often that there is no excuse for repeating them. Consequently, in July 2016, the Assembly of Heads of States mandated President Paul Kagame of Rwanda to lead a process of institutional reforms with a pan-African advisory team of nine members (Assembly/AU/Dec.606 (XXVII)).

The Paul Kagame Report (2017; 4) reiterated 'the urgent need to act' for the integrated peace and prosperity of Africa. However, analysing the 'Kagame Report', Turianskyi and Gruzd (2019, 24) noted that 'some of the Kagame's reforms have already met with resistance, while others have been changed substantially and they risk getting mired in the AU's notorious politicised bureaucracy'. This implies that so far, the AU's only mechanism for accomplishing Agenda 2063 Aspirations, which is the Kagame Report may end up being different from the original proposal due to the myriad of the national interests of 55 countries at play.

Furthermore, Aspiration 6 of Agenda 2063, envisions an 'Africa whose development is people driven, relying on the potential offered by African people, especially its women, youth, and caring for children'. The goals include to achieve full gender equality in all spheres of life, to engage and empower youth and children, priority areas include women, youth and girls' empowerment, as well as bringing violence and discrimination against women and girls to an end. This implies that Africa's development must be driven by African people. Therefore, reliance is placed on the potentials of African people, especially women, youth and children. Within this aspiration, Africa is meant to promote a culture of inclusivity where nobody is discriminated against on grounds of age, sex, gender, locality, religion, ethnic or political affiliations. In order to guarantee gender equality, Aspiration 6 Goals 1&2 propose the elimination of all forms of discrimination and the

actualisation of an Africa in which all citizens are empowered to engage and actively participate in decision-making at all levels.

It is proposed that while African governments must continue to take responsibility to protect African people in line with the aspirations, the application of the people, context, deal and opportunity (PCDO) model may be of great value to Africa's entrepreneurship advancement. The next session will analyse the PCDO model in detail and how African leaders may adopt or adapt it to actualise Agenda 2063 aspirations.

The Application of the PCDO Model in Achieving Agenda 2063

As noted earlier, Agenda 2063 has seven aspirations. Analysis in this chapter focuses on two, Aspirations 4 and 6 together with their goals and priority areas, which include, achieving a peaceful, safe and secure Africa and an Africa whose development is driven by African people. Similar to other continents of the world, Africa engages in efforts to advance and promote entrepreneurship. The AU's legal and institutional framework are reflected in its laws, policies and decisions, including its Constitutive Act and its organs. However, institutions transcend laws and organs to include cognitive and cultural frames that shape people's interactions in society and determine development. Thus, although the AU's legal and institutional framework may have encouraged a few pouches of entrepreneurial activities in certain African countries, there needs to be a change in focus areas to achieve Aspirations 4 ad 6 for cohesive advancement.

Significantly, in December 2017, a few African policy-makers came together under the aegis of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Rwanda Development Board (RDB), the Rwanda Convention Bureau (RCB) and the Global Entrepreneurship Network (GEN) in Kigali Rwanda (Africa Entrepreneurship Policy Forum, 2017). Formulating what may be termed 'best practices' for entrepreneurship advancement, the gathering developed strategies on how to implement national entrepreneurship policies based on the entrepreneurship policy framework (EPF), methodology and good practices of the UNCTAD in Africa. It is commendable that integrating entrepreneurship in the broader sustainable development agenda was devised, as well as incorporating entrepreneurship education into schools' curricula, such as in Botswana, Rwanda and Tanzania. The Empretec model and the Tony Elumelu Entrepreneurship Programme (TEEP) in Nigeria are programmes

geared towards the transformation, reorientation of mindsets and development of entrepreneurship skills (Africa EPF, 2017).

Nevertheless, the analysis of conflicts and crisis in Central African Republic (CAR), Nigeria and Sudan, reveals that Africa's main challenges are reflected in the lack of security, safety and stability. These challenges in turn constitute a bane to development generally and specifically to entrepreneurship advancement. It is argued that suitable environment in terms of political and economic stability, safety and security of individuals, property, are precursors to entrepreneurship advancement. Where these are lacking, there is so much that the AU or any of its organs could do for all 55 African countries to realise the objectives of Agenda 2063, even when these have been rhetorically legislated in policy documents as ideals and aspirations.

The values and ideals of Aspiration 4 include that a stable and peaceful Africa with institutional structure for AU instruments on peace and security would supposedly be achieved by the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC is AU's decision-making organ that is saddled with the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the continent. It is a collective security and early warning arrangement intended to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. However, the PSC together with its key pillar, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)—a framework to promote peace, security and stability, has not been able to curtail crisis in the continent, as the organ seems overwhelmed with the series of continuing conflicts and crisis, some of which have resulted in several deaths, displacements and referrals to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

People

Applying the 'People' concept in the PCDO model to Africa, people are the greatest resource of any country. Therefore, to ensure entrepreneurship advancement in the continent, safety and security of the people and property, as well as people development must be prioritised by the respective African governments. Arguably, due to weak institutions, uncertainties and insecurity, Africa's entrepreneurship development is currently based on the bricolage concept of 'making do with' whatever is available. A decentralised AU by which individual African government takes the responsibility to protect the people, ensure safety and security and engage in deliberate programmes for the development of its people, including the youths, women and children is recommended. The protection of and investment in people should be

country-specific with individual government's recognition and respect for the sanctity of life and the protection of human rights and dignity.

The requirement that both human and capital inputs are essential to entrepreneurship advancement underscores the importance of the need for a decentralised application of the PCDO model. This is because entrepreneurs are people who must consider people, such as managers, employees, funders and other organisations and talents that are critical to their success. In other words, the success or failure of an entrepreneur is determined and dependent on the people. Sahlman (1996), Hart, AQ articulated two critical determinants of a successful entrepreneur. They are (1) an entrepreneur must have an awareness and in-depth knowledge of the industry and (2) the entrepreneur must be known by others for the people, abilities, skills that they possess and are willing to deploy to customers and the industry at large. The people and potentials of individual African countries should be discovered, developed and deployed towards entrepreneurship advancement and the starting point is to ensure the protection and safety of the people.

The challenges of crisis, conflicts, insecurity and instability prevalent in most African countries implies that the legal and institutional framework currently available to the AU may seem plausible, but inadequate. A paradigm shift from a framework that is based on laws, policies, structures and organs, to an inclusive framework that is founded on cognitive pillars, which include the change of mindsets of the people and the imbibing of right values, customs and belief systems is recommended. These values have been highlighted in the different aspirations of Agenda 2063, nevertheless, no concrete mechanisms or strategies are in place to attain them. It is proposed that by adopting the People pillar in the PCDO model, African development would be people-focused and the respective African governments would be able to ensure safety and security within their territories and communities to achieve Aspirations 4 and 6 of Agenda 2063, which will in turn ensure entrepreneurship advancement. The different entrepreneurship efforts and advancements in a few African countries reveal that focus is on the development of youth and women. For example, the symposium organised by the Department of Trade and Industry of the African Union Commission provided an avenue for the exchange of ideas and experiences related to Youth Entrepreneurship. It provided a platform for how public and private partners should collaborate to address some challenges, such as the challenges of youth and women unemployment (African Union and Digital Entrepreneurship, 2018).

Context

Arguably Aspiration 6 Agenda 2063 mirrors the context pillar of the PCDO model, as it strives for Africa's development in a context that promotes women, youth and children empowerment, eliminates all forms of discrimination and ensures equality at all levels. Context is everything insofar as entrepreneurship advancement is concerned. No business thrives amidst chaotic, insecure or unstable environment. Context relates to the environment and culture that are the determining factors for the success or failure of all entrepreneurial activities. Although context relates broadly to laws, regulatory structures, technological advancements and socio-political environment, the focus here is on security. This is because the objective of laws, policies and regulatory structures is to promote peaceful, safe and secure environment, which will in turn ensure a context of technological advancement that facilitates exchanges, innovativeness and competitiveness. As noted by Austin et al. (2006), social movements such as labour, religious and political associations are examples of specific contextual factors in society. Thus, focus on the social environment and specifically on security is because every government must guarantee the safety and security of lives and property, as a basic need for life itself, from which all other human endeavours including entrepreneurship can flow and flourish.

Although there are pouches of developments in some African countries, the institutional environmental context necessary for nurturing and developing entrepreneurship seems inadequate in Africa. Admittedly, a few African Union (AU) developments through various policies and institutional frameworks, such as the various AU infrastructure, organs and institutions and the availability of rich resources in different African countries suggest that the AU could ensure the right context for development. For example, the 'one million by 2021' initiative articulated by the African Union Entrepreneurship (2020), aimed to ensure transformation of institutional environmental conditions necessary for entrepreneurial growth and development in the continent. The initiative was designed to promote interconnectivity and inclusivity among young African entrepreneurs across the continent and in the diaspora, as well as build affiliations with business leaders and international entrepreneurship networks. This implies that youth entrepreneurship and start-up developments are central to national development strategies. Therefore, policies that provide sustainable infrastructures, build human capital and improve the business environment must be prioritised at all levels.

Nevertheless, as noted earlier, institutional environment transcends policies and organs to include belief systems, attitudes and mindsets that shape

interactions and behaviours in society. Austin et al. posited that attention to everything means attention to nothing. Conversely, leaving out a single critical contextual element can be the precursor to failure. In Tanzania for example, it was reported that despite positive development such as the launch of the National Entrepreneurship Strategy, the business environment is considered unfriendly especially because it fails to promote youth employment (AU and Digital Entrepreneurship, 2018, 3). Thus, Tanzania has consistently ranked above 100 among 195 economies in the 'Annual World Bank Doing Business Reports'. Furthermore, the African Digital Entrepreneurship Cairo Report (2018; 3) noted that about 90% of businesses in Tanzania are informal and the private sector complains about complexity, multiplicity, unpredictability and high cost of the regulatory requirements. Similarly, the World Bank's ease of doing business ranking of 190 countries for 2018, benchmarked to June 2017, has no African country among the first top twenty. (World Bank Ease of Doing Business, October 2020). Virtually all the countries at the bottom are from Africa. South Africa and Nigeria, two of Africa's leading economies were ranked at 82 and 145, respectively, Mauritius ranked 25 and Rwanda 41 (Udombana, 2020; 30).

African countries need to improve the business environment along peace and security in order to foster entrepreneurship and social and economic development. It is argued that the context pillar in the PCDO model could be applied to ensure safety and security of individuals, cultural mindsets and attitudinal changes on a country-by-country basis. It is anticipated that such changes would translate to the creation of the needed stable and predictable environment for entrepreneurship advancement in Africa.

Deal

Deal relates to the market, competitive, technological, regulative contexts. The functioning market allows exchanges, contracts enforcement, and formalisation of businesses. Non-functioning market does have an opposing effect; contract enforcement and property rights also have legal connotations and pre-suppose functional legal system. Attainment of a peaceful and secure Africa whose development is driven by African people would require advancements in technological, regulative and functional legal systems. This means that the deal pillar would have to be adapted to individual African countries' legal systems.

How entrepreneurs engage the deal quadrant differ by context, crisis-ridden or peaceful? For social and profit-oriented entrepreneurship, context is important because a peaceful and friendly environment will always attract

the right people, investments and deals. Deals are the implicit and explicit contractual relationships between the venture and all resource providers (Chaulagain, 2020). Deals also relate to the contractual relations among the parties, it involves the allocation of resources, cash and risk and therefore it affects the venture's value. Examples of deals include investment contracts, terms of employment for managers, deals with customers and vendors. Two critical questions to ask are whether the deals are legal, comprehensive and coherent, and to what degree do the deals make sense given the people involved, the nature of the opportunity and the context? (Harvard Business School, 2017). Value transactions differ in entrepreneurships in terms of kind, consumers, timing, flexibility and measurability.

Thus, deals involve the exchange of value. As regards the kind of value involved in exchanges, social entrepreneurs rely on creative strategies to offset limited financial rewards and incentives with nonfinancial incentives to recruit, retrain and motivate staff, volunteers and funders. Also, social entrepreneurs provide value to more diverse stakeholders than commercial entrepreneurs. Similarly, social entrepreneurs' relationships with consumers have little economic capability with few alternatives. Thus, consumers of social entrepreneurs' goods and services have little economic power to exercise in transactional relationships. Nevertheless, beneficiaries of social entrepreneurship may not have a bargaining power, but they could be considered as clients or consumers of their services. Lack of transaction does not necessarily imply they are no customers. Funders are key stakeholders, but the general public could also consume the services and products of the social enterprises as the revenue generated helps to fund social and charitable activities.

With respect to timing and flexibility, deal differs significantly, as commercial entrepreneurs have wide discretion to deploy capital towards activities that they think would add the most value to the business. Social entrepreneurs do not have this luxury of discretion. Therefore, they spend most of their time on ongoing operational activities, which come with restrictions and varied expectations of accountability. The ongoing evaluation leads to the challenge of complexity associated with measurability. While it is easy for commercial entrepreneurs to focus on gains, return on investment and equity distribution of the deal, there are uncertainties in the deal framework with investors in social entrepreneurship due to the lack of factors, such as profit or return on investment that align the interests and actions of the various parties involved. This makes the precise measurement of social impact complicated because of the nature of social phenomenon, multicausality of underlying factors, and lengthy temporal manifestations (Austin et al.).

Due to the diversity in the levels of development, cultural and political contexts, it would be challenging measuring the deal element across the 55 African countries. Therefore, a generic application of the deal model, could at best, result in lopsided analysis. In formulating the deal necessary to launch and sustain a venture, social entrepreneurs have the responsibility to balance the costs to attain various resources with the potential benefits that accrue to the organisation and its clients on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, deal must be country-, as well as situation-specific. It is proposed that rather than hide under the aegis of the AU's legal and institutional framework, the 55 constituent member states of the AU must identify the deal in the PCDO model in their specific localities in order to create the environment necessary for entrepreneurship advancement.

Opportunity

The resource context, market context, entrepreneurship development policies ongoing in Africa combined are factors that provide opportunities to create integrated peaceful, safe and secure environment in the continent. Opportunity at individual level could be identified or created. Opportunities are identified from the environment, where entrepreneurs intend to venture into new businesses, such as seeing unmet demands, observing changes in technology, government incentives, availability of markets for the products, etc. (Woldesenbet et al., 2012). From the effectuation and bricolage perspectives, opportunities could be created. The African environment, especially due to crisis and conflict, tend towards effectuation or bricolage to foster entrepreneurship development.

Austin et al.'s articulation of the opportunity framework refers to a future that is better than the present. This implies that opportunity presents a future that is usually fundamentally different given the underlying generative effect of market failure. Certainly, contextual forces impinge on other variables and are applicable to all forms of entrepreneurship, albeit to varying degrees. Thus, what might be deemed unfavourable contextually to commercial entrepreneurship could be an opportunity for social entrepreneurship and vice versa. Application of the opportunity framework implies that the AU's desired future for an Africa that is greater and better than the present; a peaceful, prosperous, stable, safe and secure Africa was the motivation for the launch of Agenda 2063 in May 2013. Similar to opportunities in the commercial and social sectors that make entrepreneurs to invest scarce resources with the hope of future returns, African leaders certainly see a great future in the 'Africa we want' in which Africa would be the cynosure of the

world. Therefore, change is motivated by the vision of the future that is better for the decision-maker, and by the credibility of the path presented to that desired future state.

Again, akin to the lack of general acceptance of what constitute opportunity in entrepreneurial study, the AU continues to grapple with diversities of interests because its legal and institutional framework and reforms are not necessarily shared by the multiple constituencies in African countries who must work together to create change. This presents African countries as both negative and positive opportunity; negative because, entrepreneurship advancement would be slow or non-existent without cohesion or consensus of interests. However, this also presents as a positive opportunity because African leaders could potentially turn the current situation around by adopting the PCDO model to effect a change for the great future that they want. Change affects power relations, economic interests, national cultures, and communities' cultural contexts play vital roles in promoting entrepreneurship initiatives in different countries. Critically, motivation for joint action arises when people share common vision and goals. Regrettably, the sharing of common vision and goal between the AU and all 55 member states seems far-fetched. Therefore, a decentralised application of the PCDO model is advocated. While the AU is poised to effect institutional reforms and pursue the aspirations of Agenda 2063, a few of its member states seems divided, some are contending with crisis and conflicts, while others continue to grapple with poverty, corruption and insecurity. Arguably the lack of consensus acts as constraints to entrepreneurship advancements in Africa.

Instances of the lack of consensus among AU member states are replete and documented in the operations of the AU. Specifically, The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement of 2018 established the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) to provide the institutional framework for a code of conduct that reduces tariffs and other barriers to trade and eliminates discrimination in trade relations among AU member states (AfCFTA, 2018; art 3). The AfCFTA Agreement entered into force on 30 May 2019 for the 24 countries that had deposited their instrument of ratification with the African Union Commission (AUC) Chairperson (AfCFTA; art 23&24). The AfCFTA advances the Pan African Vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa enshrined in Agenda 2063 (Udombana, 2020; 33–34). However, only 28 states have ratified the AfCFTA Agreement, representing 51% of the 55 AU member states. Twenty-seven states are yet to ratify the AfCFTA Agreement (AfCFTA, Ratification Status). The AU Rules prescribe two-thirds, which is 37 states of the total AU membership for the Assembly sessions to form a quorum. This means that the Assembly will need at least

nine additional member states to form a quorum for any proposed deliberation and decision on the CFTA (AU Assembly Rules of Procedure, R.6) as it has potential to increase entrepreneurial and trade opportunities.

Arguably, the lack of consensus applies to Agenda 2063, because not all 55 African countries are at one with the aspirations as some countries have other priorities areas, such as the fight against poverty, corruption, which are far removed from Agenda 2063 aspirations. Therefore, having formulated and begun the 50-year journey towards the transformed 'Africa we want', and despite the resistance to the implementation of the 'Kagame Report, it may be beneficial for ongoing AU reforms to transcend mere reforms on paper to include the adoption of the PCDO model. Although AU continues to hold its place as a rallying point, a decentralised approach is advocated whereby individual African governments adapt and implement the PCDO at the country levels, first by ensuring safety and security of people and property. The positive application of the opportunity quadrant in the PCDO model to Africa, means that CAR, Nigeria and Sudan and indeed other African governments can take advantage of current negative crisis and conflicts situations as an opportunity to create a better and bigger future for the African people to actualise aspirations of Agenda 2063. Therefore, what might seem unstable, unfavourable, insecure and unpredictable Africa today might well be translated to the peaceful, secure, integrated, inclusive and economically developed Africa of the future.

Conclusion

As Aspiration 6 highlights, the future of Africa is in the hands of African people, Africa's development must be driven by its own citizens. The question is how? The chapter has analysed that with respect to general development and specifically, entrepreneurship advancement, the AU structures, legal and institutional framework are inadequate. Therefore, a decentralised method by which the AU continues to be the umbrella and central regional organisation, while individual countries take ownership of Agenda 2063 for national implementation will be a blessing. This is imperative because the diverse challenges a few African countries continue to grapple with mean that a one-size-fit all policy may not be the answer. Custom policies are needed. Undoubtedly, the attainment of an inclusive and integrated Africa includes development in all spheres of endeavours including in the field of entrepreneurship advancement. For the people of Africa to take ownership of their development, their

safety must first be guaranteed. In the varying stages and levels of development in African countries, there is scope for innovation, creativity, expansion and advancements. Therefore, in addition to the AU legal and institutional framework and reforms, it is proposed that the PCDO model should be adopted by the AU and individual member states for implementation and actualisation of Agenda 2063. The application of the PCDO model should be country and situation-specific rather than a generic application.

The PCDO framework is a combination of interconnected factors. They are factors that cannot be applied in isolation. Certainly, Africa is bestowed with abundant resources and opportunities. Therefore, the question that individual African government should ask is whether the countries have the right 'context' that guarantee the rule of law, security and safety of lives. People do matter, and entrepreneurship is people-centric. People's experience of enterprising can be positive or negative depending on mindsets, the training they have been exposed to, and the environment in which they live and interact. The capabilities, experiences and expertise of individuals are context-dependent. The importance of the total wellbeing of African people is highlighted in all Aspirations of Agenda 2063. However, the reality is a far cry due to crisis and conflicts that have culminated in several deaths and displacements. This negative pattern must be addressed at country levels supported by right institutions at national and continental levels.

The proposal that the PCDO model should be applied to Africa does not imply that other reform initiatives are less important. Rather, it is recommended that the PCDO model should be specifically adopted as focused reforms parameters for individual African countries alongside other ongoing AU legal and institutional reforms towards the attainment of Agenda 2063. The limited scope of the analysis in this chapter provides opportunity for further research, to evaluate how the PCDO model could be implemented in practical terms and on a country-by-country basis first for the actualisation of Agenda 2063 and then to enhance entrepreneurship advancement in Africa.

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