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**A Critical Evaluation of the 2009 Niger Delta Amnesty
Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration
Programme**

Solomon Inuwa

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Doctor of Philosophy**

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Development**

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Abstract

Solomon Inuwa

A Critical Evaluation of the 2009 Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme

Keywords: Nigeria, Niger-Delta, Amnesty, Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reinsertion, Reintegration, Neopatrimonialism, State, Patronage.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) have become a key component of the postconflict peacebuilding orthodoxy. Therefore, this study evaluates the efficacy of Amnesty, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (ADDR) in conflict prevention and resolution using the 2009 Niger Delta ADDR programme as a case study. The study evaluated the effectiveness of the programme using the *minimalist* and *maximalist* framework advanced in the DDR literature. The key findings and conclusions of the Study were that a minimalist DDR would only achieve security stabilisation and return ex-combatants to the status quo- ante society with all the pre-conflict grievances unaddressed thereby bequeathing a high potential of relapse to violence. Furthermore, for DDR to be an effective conflict prevention and resolution mechanism and postconflict peacebuilding force, its conceptualisation, design and implementation must be *maximalist* in nature with a transformative agenda that aims to address the roots causes of violence.

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my late mother and the oppressed and marginalised people of Niger Delta.

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Glossary

ADDR	Amnesty, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
AIGP	Assistant Inspector- General of Police
AOR	Area of Operational Responsibility
BIO	Brigade Intelligence Officer
C&C	Command and Control
CAFFs	Children Associated with Fighting Forces
CBA	Community-Based Approaches
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CDS	Chief of Defense Staff
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DDR	Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration
DPKOs	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSS	Department of State Service
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group.
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
EITI	Extractive Industry Transparency International
EMIROAF	Ethnic Minority Rights Organisation of Africa
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FMLN	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
GAFFs	Girls Associated with Fighting Forces
GMoU	General Memorandum of Understanding
HR	Human Resource
ICPC	Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission
IDDRS Standards	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
IFIs	International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGOs	International Nongovernmental Organisations
IT	Information Technology
IYC	Ijaw Youth Council
JTF	Joint Task Force
LIMUP	Liberation Movement for the Urhobo People

M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MA	Master of Art
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MNOCs	Multinational Oil Companies.
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
NA	Nigerian Army
NDAP	Niger Delta Amnesty Programme
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
NEITI	Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
NGO	Nongovernmental Organisation
NIGP	Nigerian Inspector-General of Police
NIMASA	Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency
NLNG	Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas
NN	Nigerian Navy
NOSCP	National Oil Spill Contingency Plan
NOSDRA	National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency
NOSDRA	National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency
NYCOP	National Youth Council of Ogoni People
OCDST	Ogoni Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal
OGIF	Oil and Gas Industry Foundation
OMPADEC	Oil and Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission
OPRC	Oil Pollution Preparedness Response and Co-operation
PAPC	Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee
PIND	Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SC	Security Council
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
SPDC	Shell Petroleum Development Company
SSG	Secretary to the State Government
SSS	State Security Service.
TCND	Technical Committee on the Niger Delta
TOR	Terms of Reference

TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNPO	Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization
WAFFs	Women Associated with Fighting Forces

Chapter One

Introduction

1. Genesis of the Research

My interest in the Niger Delta conflict was as far back as 2004-2007 when I served at the Headquarters of the 34th Artillery Brigade of the Nigerian Army (NA), Owerri, Imo state South Eastern Nigeria. The period coincided with when the Niger Delta conflict escalated to an insurgency. Consequently, the 34th Brigade to which I was deployed was involved in the protection of oil facilities located within the state. Against this backdrop, my initial interest and involvement in the Niger Delta conflict was from a purely military point of view. In 2008, I was admitted to the United Nations mandated University for Peace in Costa Rica to undertake a Master of Art (MA) degree in International Peace Studies and I eventually wrote my MA thesis on the Niger Delta conflict.

When I returned to Nigeria in August 2009, the then Nigerian president, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, had already initiated a peace process aimed at ending and resolving the conflict. The initiative eventually led to the implementation of an Amnesty, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (ADDR) programme. Consequently, in 2011, having been admitted to the University of Bradford's doctoral programme in Peace Studies, I decided to expand my MA dissertation to a doctoral thesis.

1.1. Introduction and Background to the Research Questions

The conflict between the people of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) and the Nigerian State over control of oil resources, environmental degradation, lack of infrastructure and general underdevelopment has remained both protracted and intractable (Ahonsi, 2011: 28-41). The conflict can be traced to 1957 when the people of the Niger Delta region made a submission to the Willinks Commission set up by the departing British colonial administration to investigate their grievances. Unfortunately, the commission's failure to adequately address the grievances led to the abortive Niger Delta secessionist revolt led by Isaac Adaka Boro (Simbine, 2006: 47). Thereafter,

agitations in the region assumed a pattern of nonviolent and violent resistance. Past Nigerian governments, both military and civilian failed to pay attention to the fundamental sources of the agitations but resorted to the use of military force to suppress even the most peaceful protests (Ibid.: 47). Nevertheless, successive Nigerian governments have made some efforts at resolving the conflict through the implementation of various developmental programmes but without any major success due to lack of consultation with the people of the Niger Delta region, as well as corruption and inept bureaucracy (Adeyemo & Olu-Adeyemi, 2010: 46-48 and Ogundiya 2011: 22).

On assuming power in 2007, President Yar'adua resolved to end the conflict by setting up the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND) (Ogundiya, 2011: 24). The TCND was to examine all past recommendations made towards resolving the conflict and come up with a roadmap for the resolution of the conflict. In June 2009, the president accepted one of the key recommendations of the TCND, which was the implementation of an ADDR programme in the Niger Delta region. Despite the euphoria that accompanied the programme, commentators have expressed dissenting views regarding the extent to which the ADDR programme has succeeded in bringing lasting peace, stability and development to the Niger Delta.

1.2. Research Questions

According to Blaikie (2010: 58-59), research questions help to define the nature and scope of a study. Furthermore, 'good research questions ask about things that are particularly relevant to the aims of the research- things that are likely to provide information that will offer some new insight relating to the aims of the research' (Denscombe, 2012: 74-75). Against such a background, this evaluative case study was guided by the following primary and secondary research questions.

1.2.1. Primary Research Questions

- (i). How successful was the Niger Delta ADDR programme in achieving its statutory objective?
- (ii). How has the way Niger Delta ADDR programme was conceptualised, negotiated, planned and implemented affected its success or otherwise?

1.2.2. Secondary Research Questions

- (i). What is the principal source of the Niger Delta conflict?
- (ii). How has the Nigerian State tried to manage the Niger Delta conflict since its inception and how effective have the state's intervention measures proven to be?

1.3. Significance of the Case Study

DDR has become an integral part of the post-conflict peacebuilding orthodoxy; yet its efficacy and role in conflict prevention remains a contested issue (Muggah, 2005: 1-5; Verkoren *et al*, 2010: 2; Giustozzi, 2012: 2 and Stankovic, 2015: 691). Therefore, by engaging in this evaluative case study, I shall primarily be making a significant and original contribution to the current academic and policy debates and literature on the role of DDR in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, particularly the efficacy of the maximalist approach to DDR. This is because lessons identified will be relevant to the future conduct of DDR; for as Jennings (2008: 5) rightly noted '... examining how DDR plays out on the ground would likely enable future programming to be formulated and implemented more effectively, improving outcomes and mitigating potential unintended and harmful consequences.' Additionally, this case study is significant because it will contribute to the DDR literature in a unique way because the Niger Delta case study represents a nationally owned DDR programme, while current DDR case studies in the literature are mainly internationally driven and implemented under the supervision of the United Nations (UN). Overall, this research represents a significant contribution to the field of DDR in peacebuilding. Additionally, at the secondary level, I shall be contributing to the literature on the political economy of armed conflict by testing its empirical and analytical validity as well as the specific literature on the political economy of the Niger Delta conflict and Nigerian State. Also, at the empirical level, this dissertation will be making an original contribution to the current policy literature on the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict.

1.4. Overview of Research Methodology and Methods

This section presents the theoretical orientations that underpinned this research and the systematic procedures followed to answer the study's research questions.

1.4.1. Researcher's Broader Theoretical Framework: Liberalism

In this section, I present my broader theoretical framework that informs my analysis of the sources and drivers of conflict in the Niger Delta. This section also introduces the conceptual framework for evaluating the Niger Delta DDR programme. The goal of the theoretical framework is to provide a broader perspective for understanding the origins of the Niger Delta conflict. Therefore, this thesis largely draws on liberalism as its broader theoretical framework for explaining the roots of the Niger Delta conflict. Nevertheless, applying Liberalism as my theoretical framework, this thesis is not concerned with contributing to the broader theoretical debates in International Relations (IRs) between Liberalism, Realism, Marxism and Social Constructionism etc. I am cognizant of the fact that, there are varieties of Liberalism both in theory and empirical context, nonetheless irrespective of the varieties they have some common universals (Mahon, 2008: 342-361). Consequently, Liberalism as understood in this study is within the context of 'Social Liberalism' which is predicated on the contention that 'the state now had a positive role, creating the conditions for all to develop to their full potential, even if this involved measures to counteract the impact of market forces' (Ibid.: 344). Therefore, the essence of the state from the Social Liberal point of view is to guarantee the wellbeing and unfettered development of its citizenry.

Against this background, Burchill (2009: 57) argues that liberalism is the most lasting and significant theoretical perspective that developed from the era of European Enlightenment (Hegre, 2005: 17; Pugh, 2005: 2; Gat, 2005: 73; Russet, 2013:95; Navari, 2013: 33 and Dunne, 2014: 116). It is against this perspective that this thesis will evaluate the operationalisation and effectiveness of DDR in general and the Niger Delta ADDR in particular. Similarly, according to Burchill (2009: 57) liberals posit that the solution to war and violent conflict is democracy and free trade, in which democratic processes and institutions would curb the power of public office holders, their excesses and propensity for violence both at the global and domestic levels. He also maintains that commerce at both the international and domestic levels limit the barriers between individuals and unite them into one community, and likewise nations of the world can be united through international commerce. Burchill (2009: 57) asserted that 'liberal states, founded on individual rights such as equality before the law, free speech and civil liberty,

respect for private property and representative government, would not have the same appetite for conflict and war' (also see Brown and Ainley, 2009: 20). Similarly, as espoused by one of its proponents, liberalism:

...calls for freedom from arbitrary authority, often called "negative freedom," which includes freedom of conscience, a free press and free speech, equality under the law, and the right to hold, and therefore to exchange, property without fear of arbitrary seizure. Liberalism also calls for those rights necessary to protect and promote the capacity and opportunity for freedom, the "positive freedoms." Such social and economic rights as equality of opportunity in education and rights to health care and employment, necessary for effective self-expression and participation, are thus among liberal rights. A third liberal right, democratic participation or representation, is necessary to guarantee the other two. To ensure that morally autonomous individuals remain free in those areas of social action where public authority is needed, public legislation has to express the will of the citizens making laws for their own community (Doyle, 1983: 206-207).

The liberal core values highlighted above have given rise to the 'democratic peace theory,' often referred to as 'democratic peace thesis' (Hegre, 2005: 18; Gat, 2005: 73; Pugh, 2005: 2; Owen, 1998: 139; Paris, 2004: 40-42 and Navari, 2013: 40). The 'democratic peace theory or thesis' postulates that societies that are organised based on liberal democratic systems of governance, hardly go to war with each other. Thus, in line with this, Hagre (2005: 18) argues that '... there is a strong tendency *for domestic* [my italics] and international peace to follow when the large majority of individuals in a society... have control over decisions in both political and economic issues.' Therefore, within the framework of liberalism, the panacea for inter and intra-state conflict is to ensure that societies are organised based on the liberal democratic systems of governance and a free market economy. As Owen (1998: 145) argues 'liberal democracies are believed reasonable, predictable, and trustworthy because they are governed by their citizens' true interests, which harmonize with all individuals' true interests around the world.' Furthermore, liberal democracies can lessen the potential for conflict because they provide structural and normative constraints on the conduct of governing elites. Structural constraints refer to institutional frameworks for regulating the behaviour of leaders while normative constraints are universally held values that regulate the conduct of leaders and individuals in society (Owen, 1998: 140).

To fully comprehend the association between democratic peace theory, global and domestic peace, and stability, Galtung and Scott's (2008: 16-31) theory of democracy is pertinent. Galtung and Scott identified three characteristics of democracy that are essential to the attainment of peace and stability, be it at the domestic or international level. As they argued, the number one essence of democracy is to rule by consent of the people; this implies that those who rule must do so based on the legitimacy given to them by the ruled, which makes those that rule accountable to the ruled. In other words, 'democracy is rule with the consent of the ruled according to rules that make the rulers accountable to the ruled' (Ibid.: 25). Consent can be achieved through a plebiscite or indirectly (for example representatives in an assembly could do so through voting). Legitimacy achieved by consent ensures that '... what the ruled want sets limits to what the rulers do...' (Ibid: 17), thereby ensuring that leaders are accountable to those that they rule. The second essence of democracy as theorised by Galtung and Scott is that of the 'nonviolent conflict resolution' (Ibid: 19), which implies that incompatible goals between different groups or parties are to be resolved through nonviolent means such as dialogue and negotiation. The third essence of democracy as they argue is the provision of 'basic human needs, basic human rights' (Ibid.23). They posit that 'democracy... has as an ultimate goal to satisfy the basic human needs for all, particularly for the neediest (sic)...' This ensures that society's basic human needs are provided for all to live with dignity (Ibid.).

Liberals also argue that transparency and accountability in governance is an important prerequisite for a peaceful democratic society. And as rightly noted by Fox (2007: 664) '... transparency and accountability are key to all manner of 'good governance', from anti-poverty programmes to corporate responsibility, participatory budgeting, and NGO management.' For instance, regarding transparency Hollyer *et al.*, (2011: 1192-1193) argue that it connotes 'government's willingness to disseminate policy-relevant data... [and] in its broadest sense may pertain to all factors that affect information flow in a polity...' As further noted by Fox (2007: 663) 'the right to information is increasingly recognised as a fundamental democratic right...'. For transparency to engender accountability, the government must engage in proactive dissemination of information regarding its activities and performance to the public as well as

creating the enabling environment for demand-driven access to information; a situation of deliberate ‘...institutional commitment to respond to citizens’ request for specific kinds of information or documents...’ (Ibid.: 665). In the same vein, for transparency to engender accountability, information disseminated by the government must go beyond ‘opaque or fuzzy transparency’ to clear transparency. ‘Opaque or fuzzy transparency involves the dissemination of information that does not reveal how institutions actually behave in practice, whether in terms of how they make decisions or the results of their actions. The term also refers to information that is divulged only nominally, or which is revealed but turns out to be unreliable (Ibid.: 667). On the other hand, ‘clear transparency refers both to information access policies and to programmes that reveal reliable information about institutional performance, specifying officials’ responsibilities as well as where public funds go’ (Ibid.). Accountability is achieved when by access to clear information citizens are empowered to question the actions or inactions of public individuals and institutions or to make them answerable for their actions or inactions (Hale, 2008: 75-76).

Against this background, as I will demonstrate in this case study, the roots of the Niger Delta conflict are predicated on the fact that the Nigerian state is not governed based on a liberal democratic ethos of good governance thereby failing in its social liberal functions of ensuring the wellbeing and unfettered development of its citizenry. Thus, I argue that substituting a liberal democratic ethos with a neopatrimonial mode of governance was what created the social conditions of alienation and frustration that snowballed into violent conflict not just in the Niger Delta but other parts of Nigeria.

As I earlier noted I shall also be presenting my theoretical framework for evaluating the Niger Delta DDR programme. In this regard, Muggah (2009: 14) and Özerdem (2013: 225-236) have argued that every DDR programme is anchored on minimalist or maximalist philosophical assumptions. That is conceptualised and implemented as security stabilization project or as an opportunity for development where the broader issues of community development, human security and development will be addressed to reduce the risk of violent conflict. Muggah posited that there are two contending approaches with concomitant implications for the kind of impact and end-state that DDR will bequeath:

Conventional DDR can be envisioned on a continuum that extends from a narrow minimalist (establishing security) to a broad maximalist (an opportunity for development) perspective. More traditional security – oriented entities such as DPKO tend to adopt the former perspective. Their focus is on removing weapons, cantoning ex-soldiers and fulfilling the terms of peace agreement to the letter. Their strategic goals include a reduction of the likelihood of war recurrence while their micro imperatives are more specifically oriented toward de-linking the command and control of armed groups. By way of contrast, ostensibly ‘development’ agencies including the UNDP and the World Bank tend to endorse interventions that call for much broader ambition and scope. They aim to rehabilitate ex – combatants and provide for dependents, children and the infirm so that they can assume productive roles in (civil) society while also reinforcing public institutions and their legitimacy by promoting markets, infrastructure and property rights in areas of (re)integration (Muggah, 2009: p. 14).

Consequently, this study will evaluate the Niger Delta DDR programme from the minimalist and maximalist perspectives developed by Muggah. This study argues and demonstrate that the failure of the Niger Delta DDR programme to adopt a maximalist approach to DDR implies that its conflict resolution and prevention potential was limited in important ways. Conversely, lasting peace in the Niger Delta would have been furthered by the adoption of an approach based on maximalist assumptions about DDR and social liberal democratic ethos. The decision to adopt a minimalist approach in the conceptualisation, design and implementation of the programme ultimately suggests that the ADDR programme would only achieve a short-term and fragile peace that left neopatrimonialism, underdevelopment and the grievances of Niger Delta communities unaddressed.

1.4.2. Overall Research Strategy- the Case Study Approach

The research questions for this study were investigated within the framework of evaluative case study research. According to Thomas (2009: 115), a case study entails an in-depth investigation into one single case or possibly a small number of cases. Thus, as an approach to research, ‘case study is a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context using multiple sources of evidence’ (Robson, 2011: 136). This implies that in case study research, data is collected using a variety of methods of data collection to get a complete picture of the topic being investigated. There are several types of case study research in the literature, one of which is the evaluation case study that Thomas succinctly asserted as follows:

Evaluation is framed by the expectation that you are doing the research to see how well something is working or has worked. Something has been changed or a new idea introduced and evaluative research is carried out to find out what the change has led to. Have things got better or worse or just stayed the same? (Thomas, 2012: 99).

Therefore, this evaluative case study critically examined to what extent the 2009 Niger Delta ADDR programme succeeded in achieving its statutory objective of conflict prevention. Additionally, the study also examines how sustainable the relative peace achieved via the programme is, and to what extent the programme has positively impacted the developmental wellbeing of the Niger Delta region and its citizens.

1.4.3. Justifications for Adopting the Case Study Method

The case study method was adopted in this study because of the rich and in-depth nature of the data it enabled me to generate, along with the analytical insight it permitted (Creswell, 2007: 73; Bryman, 2008: 53; Thomas, 2009: 115-117; Blaikie, 2010: 189-191; Kumar, 2011: 126-127; Thomas, 2012: 17-23). The advantage gained in utilising this method is further buttressed by Merriam (1988: 1) who contended that 'case studies illuminate the reader's understanding of the phenomenon under study. They can bring about the discovery of new meaning, extend the reader's experience, or confirm what is known.' Furthermore, engaging in an in-depth and holistic study of the 2009 Niger Delta ADDR programme enables me to gain knowledge with '... wider implications and, importantly, that would not have come to light through the use of a research strategy that tried to cover a large number of instances...' (Denscombe, 2010: 53).

However, despite the advantages associated with the case study approach, I am conscious of its inherent limitations. For example, Willis *et al.* (2007: 239) argue that 'the case study has been the most criticised and most used form of social science research.' Against this backdrop, four major issues have been raised against case study research (see Yin (2009: 14-16 and Bryman, 2008: 391-392). For example, according to Bryman, the lack of methodological rigour that characterises case study research strategy is a primary concern. He explains that case study researchers hardly comply with laid down systematic procedures. Consequently, they can hardly absolve themselves of the tendency to be biased,

as the entire research process, findings and conclusions are often tailored to confirm or disprove a preconceived position. This is supported by the assertion that 'case studies are sometimes carried out in a sloppy, perfunctory, and incompetent manner and sometimes even in a corrupt, dishonest way' (Bromley, 1986: xiii). This makes it very difficult for case studies to be replicated (Bryman, 2008: 391). Nonetheless, I will argue that the question of complying with methodological rigour and objectivity is not unique to the case study, but applicable to all research methods. Furthermore, I am of the opinion that compliance or non-compliance with methodological rigour, has nothing to do with the research strategy, but the personal integrity of the researcher. In other words, both qualitative and quantitative researchers are liable to '*cut corners*' or exhibit '*lack of transparency*' in the conduct of their work, depending on the researcher's integrity.

The second pitfall raised against the case study approach is that '...they provide little basis for scientific generalization' (Yin, 2009: 15). Similarly, other scholars such as Creswell (2007: 4-75), Blaikie (2010: 191-197), Robson (2011: 137) and Thomas (2012: 17-19) have all expressed doubt about the possibility for case study findings to be generalised to the larger research population thereby denigrating its quality of being a scientific approach to conducting investigation. On the other hand, Yin has responded to this critique by arguing that '...case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes' (Yin, 2009: 15). Thus, as I pointed out earlier, part of the significance of this study lies in its potential to contribute to theory building and elaboration in the field of DDR and political economy of armed conflict. Similarly, Myers (2000: 1-2) has debunked the contention that findings of case studies are not generalisable when she notes that 'I suggest that while... [case] studies are not generalizable in the traditional sense of the word, nor do they claim to be...partial generalizations may be possible to similar populations...'. Thus, findings from case studies can be generalisable to other cases with similar characteristics.

The third argument against case study research is that the rising popularity of 'true experiments' which establish causal relationships within events (Yin, 2009: 16) has diminished its usefulness. However, my view is that in social science investigation, it is practically impossible to establish with mathematical finality

causal relationships between events. Additionally, human beings being the subject of social research can hardly be subjected to real experimental research as obtainable in the natural sciences.

The fourth criticism raised against the case study method is that it does get prolonged, leading not only to high financial cost but the acquisition of voluminous and often unreasonable data, which becomes difficult to manage (Yin, 2009:15). I do acknowledge the validity of this weakness because, my field work lasted between September 2013 and January 2014, with huge financial implications in terms of logistics for transportation and hotel accommodation, during which large volumes of primary and secondary information were gathered. However, reasonable financial arrangements before going to the field, inner will, motivation and commitment enabled me to overcome this challenge.

1.4.4. Research Methods and Procedures

This section presents the specific steps followed to generate the data for this case study and how the data was analysed. It also presents the research delimitations and limitations as well as the challenges I experienced in the field and how they were resolved or mitigated.

1.4.5. Sample Size, Method and Access to Research Participants

Credibility is an important consideration in the selection of respondents in any research (Brouneus, 2011: 134). This implies that I needed to recruit credible respondents that would enable me to gather reliable and valid information for the study (Rubin & Rubin, 2005: 65). Therefore, as suggested by Rubin & Rubin, I ensured that the respondents in this study were experienced and knowledgeable in different aspects of my research (Ibid.). To achieve this, I initially applied the purposive method of sampling to recruit the study's respondents. In purposive sampling, 'researchers use their special knowledge or expertise about a group to select subjects who represent this population' (Berg, 2004: 36). My knowledge of potential participants with the requisite information on my case study is not exhaustive; therefore, I complemented purposive sampling with snowball sampling. Snowball sampling is '...the process of selecting a sample using networks' (Kumar, 2011: 208). In this case, I benefited immensely from the process whereby a reliable and competent respondent offered to introduce me to

another reliable and competent respondent. In total 53 respondents drawn from the categories of persons shown in table 1.1 were interviewed for this case study.

Table 1.1: Categories and Number of Respondents Interviewed and held Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with

Serial No.	Category of Respondents	No. of Respondents Interviewed
1	Ex-MEND Commanders	4
2	Community leaders	3
3	Members of the Nigerian security forces serving/retired	3
4	Members of the Technical Committee of the Niger Delta (TCND)	2
5	Members of the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee	3
6	Senior staff of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme and NIMASA office	2
7	Members of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee	5
8	Members of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs)	20
9	Government policy makers serving/retired	2
10	Community development chairperson of an oil producing community	1
11	Niger Delta academic experts	8
12	Total	53
13	2 x Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)	7 and 5 participants in each group

Furthermore, ‘trust is usually a crucial element in gaining access to potential research participants in conflict situations, yet that trust is often difficult to secure’ (Norman, 2009: 71). Consequently, to access some of the respondents, I relied on the help of credible *gatekeepers* who are described by Brouneus (2011: 134)

as ‘... people in a state, bureaucracy or organisation in a society or community who decide who can or cannot have access to a specific community.’ Two persons served as my gatekeepers, one of whom was a staff member of a nongovernmental organization, who was instrumental in facilitating my access to all the nongovernmental organisations’ respondents interviewed for this study. A retired military colleague of mine and an indigene of the Niger Delta assisted by two of his friends facilitated my interviews with former militants’ commanders, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with former militants’ soldiers and visits to selected oil producing communities.

1.4.6. Methods of Data Collection

I utilised qualitative methods of data collection in conducting this case study. Qualitative methods of data collection emphasise the need to comprehend the social world from the perspectives and interpretations of the various social actors (Bryman, 2008: 266). This implies that the qualitative method ‘...focuses on how people perceive their worlds and how they interpret their experiences’ (Rubin & Rubin, 2012: 3). Therefore, the primary data for this study was collected using semi-structured in-depth interviews and FGDs. Additionally, these two methods were combined with secondary sources of data.

1.4.7. Semi-Structured In-Depth Interviews

Generally, ‘*interviews* are a method for collecting data in which selected participants (the interviewees) are asked questions to find out what they do, think or feel’ (Collis & Hussey, 2009: 144). Furthermore, according to Arksey & Knight (1999: 2) when it is used, the goal is to generate from the research respondents ‘data on understandings, opinions... attitudes, feelings and the like, that people have in common’ regarding an issue or issues. In an in- depth semi-structured interview ‘the researcher has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be covered, often referred to as an *interview guide*...’ (Bryman, 2008: 438). The interview guide served as my reference guide while conducting interviews as it was carefully designed to capture and reflect the study’s research questions (see Brouneus, 2011: 132). Different sets of interview guides were used to interview different categories of respondents depending on which aspects of my case study research questions they were knowledgeable on.

One of the factors that informed my decision to use the semi-structured, in-depth interview approach is the flexibility that characterises this method (Bryman, 2008:

438-439) because 'in qualitative interviewing, 'rambling' or going off on tangents is often encouraged; it gives insight into what the interviewee sees as relevant and important...' The method gave me the advantage of probing my interviewees' responses to get the maximum information I could from them.

However, despite the strength of in-depth interviewing, I am conscious of its associated challenges, of which Robson (2011: 281) has identified a number. Some of these challenges with which I was confronted were administrative and logistical in nature; coupled with the difficulty in securing appointments, permission, and the sometimes-unanticipated cancellation of such appointments. Finally, it is argued that in semi-structured in-depth interviewing 'biases are difficult to rule out' (Robson, 2011; 281). In this regard, Collis & Hussey (2009: 147) warn that as a researcher asks questions and the respondent replies, she or he needs '...to be aware of the potential for inadvertent class, race or sex bias.' Consequently, Brouneus (2011: 135) suggested that qualitative researchers should try to understand the motives of their respondents. Conscious of this, I took judicious notice of possible biases from my interviewees and reflected on my own biases during and after the interview process.

1.4.8. Focus Group Discussions

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) are usually held with a select number of people or with small groups focusing on a definite topic with the aim of investigating issue or issues (Bryman, 2008: 473 and Bowling, 2011: 424). It is, therefore '...a research technique that collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher' (Morgan, 1997: 6). In this study, I conducted 2 FGDs, one in Yenagoa, Bayelsa state and another in an oil producing community in the state with a group of ex-militants, each group comprised of 7 and 5 members respectively. All the participants in the 2 FGDs were male, in their mid-twenties and early thirties and were formerly under the command and control (C&C) of different commanders. In terms of ethnicity, they were all from the Ijaw ethnic nationality and educationally they have not gone beyond secondary school level. The FGDs enabled me to explore their motivations for going into militancy, the nature of life during militancy and their general opinions on the DDR programme. One of the main advantages gained in using this method was the depth of information I gathered during the two sessions. However, I could not hold

FGDs with community members as I discussed in the research delimitations and limitations section below.

1.4.9. Secondary Sources

In this study, in-depth semi-structured interviews and FGDs were complemented with secondary sources of information. This include journal articles, books and reports from the office of the Special Adviser to the Nigerian President on Niger Delta Affairs, the Amnesty quarterly news magazine, International Crisis Group's reports on the Niger Delta conflict. Also consulted are a variety of credible Nigeria-based newspapers, both in print and electronic form; such as Punch newspaper, Vanguard newspaper, Leadership newspaper, the Nation newspaper and Premium Times Online newspaper. Also used was information posted on the official websites of the Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme (NDAP), the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the Federal Ministry of Environment, the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) and the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA). Other secondary sources used include reports and commentaries from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other credible internet sources and reports written by nongovernmental organisations. Secondary sources were highly valuable in this research because they provided me with high-quality data with little logistical and financial commitment. But beyond that, where access to primary data was impossible, secondary sources became the only alternative means of getting information (see section on research delimitation and limitations). However, as Kumar (2011: 163-164) pointed out, when using secondary sources one needs to critically evaluate the validity and reliability of such information because of possible biases. One of the methods I used to test the veracity of secondary information obtained was to compare the consistency of what several sources said on the same issue and by crosschecking with data obtained through primary sources.

1.5. Research Delimitations and Limitations

Every research has its delimitations and limitations (Rakotsoane, 2012: 13) and this study is no exception. Generally, in research '... the delimitations of a project are self-imposed boundaries decided upon by the researcher and are therefore distinct from 'limitations', which arise from factors beyond the control of the

researcher' (Denscombe, 2012: 69). Consequently, according to Denscombe delimitations set out the followings:

- Boundaries to the literature that will be reviewed.
- Things that will be *done* in the research and things that will not be *done* and why.
- Items or people that will be *included* in the research and those that will not- and why.
- Factors that will be *looked* at in the research and those that will not- and why.
- The time span to be *covered*- and why (Ibid).

Three important issues in terms of delimitations or scope are involved in this study. One of which is in terms of literature coverage. The literature examined in Chapter two principally covers the theoretical and policy-related literature on first generation DDR, often referred to as conventional DDR and for which the *United Nations Integrated, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards* (UN IDDRS 2006) serves as its framework of implementation. However, the practice and conduct of DDR have evolved over time in response to the contemporary conflict environments that DDR is being conducted in and which do not fit into the first generation theoretical and practitioner literature. Indeed, it was in recognition of, and response to, this changing DDR environment that the United Nations (UN) in 2010 developed a new DDR operational guideline document titled ***Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) practices in Peace Operations***. In line with the above, Muggah and O'Donnell highlighted the new kind of armed groups that DDR practitioners are dealing with in the field:

Many organizations operating in war zones (and also outside of them) are struggling to identify ways of 'disengaging' Al Shabaab in Somalia or northern Kenya, Jihadi fighters in Syria or Iraq, Taliban remnants in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or Boko Haram militia in Nigeria... (Muggah and O'Donnell, 2015: 2).

Therefore, it is sufficient to say that this study has focused less on second generation DDR literature. This decision was taken because the 2009 Niger Delta ADDR programme was conducted within the framework of traditional DDR and

so its analysis can only be achieved within the context of first generation DDR literature. However, where relevant, second generation DDR literature was consulted.

The second delimitation is in terms of the scope of what is to be covered in the case study. In this case, the Niger Delta conflict started as far back to the period immediately after independence, characterised by several dynamics which makes it practically impossible to cover everything and which necessitated my use of periodisation to summarise and cover the entire conflict history. Also, in the management of the conflict several ad hoc intervention measures were implemented by the Nigerian government which are too numerous to be covered. Consequently, only the most important and non ad-hoc interventions were covered in this study. The last delimitation of this study has to do with the period covered in terms of the evaluation of the DDR programme, which is 2009-2013. Accordingly, developments and occurrences that occurred beyond 2013 have only been referred to buttress and corroborate certain arguments and claims made in the analysis.

As already noted 'limitations are matters and occurrences that arise in a study which is out of the researcher's control. They limit the extensity to which a study can go, and sometimes affect the result and conclusions that can be drawn' (Simon and Goes, 2013: 1). Suffice to point out that this case study was affected by certain factors which were essentially beyond my control, and in this vein, four important cases are worthy to be mentioned here. One was the uncooperative response I received from the office of the Presidential Adviser to the President on the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme. All my initial efforts to secure an interview and have access to official documents regarding the implementation of the ADDR programme proved abortive. This situation only slightly changed when a military colleague of mine linked me up to his friend who was part of the senior management staff in the Adviser's office. The senior management staff eventually granted me an interview and gave me a report written for the members of the Nigerian parliament regarding the programme's implementation from 2009 to December 2011. The report and information contained in the three years' anniversary edition of the *Amnesty News* an in-house news publication of the Special Adviser's Office and a transcribed live television interview with a staff

member in the Adviser's office served as my major source of reliable information. These were the invaluable sources of reliable statistics and reference regarding the programme's implementation that I used in this study. However, my findings and analyses were still limited to some extent by the lack of access to current data on the exact number of ex-militants demobilised, provided with reintegration training, job opportunities or business start-up capital and the government's budgetary spending on the programme between 2009-2013.

Likewise, my effort to secure interviews with officials of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) proved abortive. For example, at the NDDC, the promise of an interview was changed to providing me with a published report on the Commission's activities; which at the end of the day was not fulfilled. Consequently, the only choice I was left with was to rely on relevant information I could get from their various websites.

In the same vein, my effort to get the response of MNOCs on certain issues by interviewing a designated senior staff of Shell Petroleum proved abortive; the bureaucratic conditions set for me could not be met during the 4 months' period earmarked for my fieldwork (September, October, November and December 2013). Equally, follow-up efforts and email communications requesting to have the interview done via telephone did not yield any positive outcome. Thus, against my wish, the study was concluded without the opportunity to speak to any staff of MNOCs.

Finally, the last limitation was my inability to conduct FGDs with members of oil producing communities as originally planned in the study's design. The huge financial cost of holding it hindered the plan. However, many Niger Delta based civil society organisations' respondents and individual community leaders interviewed helped to mitigate the effect of not being able to hold FGDs with grassroots communities.

1.6. Method of Data Analysis

Data collected in this study was analysed using thematic content analysis procedures. More than just a single technique, content analysis is a set of

methods for analysing the symbolic content of any communication. The basic idea is to reduce the total content of a communication (e.g., all of the words or all of the visual imagery) to a set of categories that represent some characteristic of research interest. Thus, content analysis may involve the systematic description of either verbal or nonverbal materials (Singleton Jr. & Straits, 1999: 383).

The analytic procedure I observed in analysing the data obtained is as outlined by Marshall & Rossman (2006: 151-167). Some of the procedures involved are concurrent in nature:

- (a) **Organising the Data.** The first activity I observed was to organise the information collected by sorting and tagging it to indicate names, dates, time and places where the interviews were held. This process made matching of the transcribed interviews to the appropriate respondent easy.
- (b) **Immersion in the Data.** The second critical process in analysing the data was immersing myself in the data. This involved the act of reading and re-reading through all the transcribed interview data sets. This process was iterative in nature because I had been listening to the audio recording of the interviews while still in the field. This enabled me to get myself fully acquainted and familiar with the responses of various respondents and the entire data in general which also enabled me to start seeing the emerging pattern of explanations to the study's research questions.
- (c) **Generating Themes/Categories.** Having successfully acquainted and familiarised myself with the data, I developed the themes used in coding the data. Descriptive themes are topical issues relating to the research questions and which also show a pattern in the data. The themes had direct bearing to the research questions. Accordingly, the following themes that linked the data with the research questions were developed:
 - (i). Opinions and insights about the sources and drivers of the Niger Delta conflict.
 - (ii). Opinion and insights about how the Nigerian government has managed the conflict and how effective the management was.
 - (iii). Opinions and insights regarding how the programme was conceptualised, designed and implemented and the effect these factors have had on the programme's success or otherwise.

(iv). Opinions and insights regarding the extent to which the programme has achieved its objectives or not.

- (d) **Coding the Data.** At this stage of the analysis, I carried out the actual coding of the information according to the themes identified in c (i- iv) above. Again, it is important to point out that in the process of coding the data I took due cognizance of manifest and latent content in the data. Berg (2004: 269-270) posits that manifest data are those apparent categories or themes that are obvious in the data and can easily be identified and coded while latent are hidden content or meanings contained in the data that require serious analytical thinking and reflection to identify and interpret them.
- (e) **Writing Analytic Memos/Marginal Notes.** At this stage, I began to develop marginal notes that reflected my deeper analytical thinking, reflections and interpretations of the issues contained in the coded portions of the data being analysed in relations to my research questions. However, drawing analytic memos and marginal notes was a continuous process that I commenced while in the field and listening to the recorded interviews.
- (f) **Offering Interpretations.** At this stage, I began extrapolating; in terms of providing interpretations of the coded data through inferences and deductions. The process at this stage involved comparing and contrasting various portions of the information being analysed.
- (g) **Searching for Alternative Understandings.** At this stage of the analysis, I offered a self-critique of the deductions, inferences, findings and conclusion reached in (f) above. To achieve the most refined and plausible meanings and interpretations of the data, I applied triangulation. Willis *et al* (2007:218) have argued in support of the application of triangulation at the level of data interpretation. As they note, 'in qualitative research there is a...concept called triangulation. It is often used as a qualitative equivalent of validity and reliability. The essential idea of triangulation is to find multiple sources of confirmation when you want to draw a conclusion'. Therefore, the analytical value of multiple points of view in the field of political economy of armed conflict, the DDR literature and social science,

in general, were applied in the process of comprehending the data and different events and occurrences derived from the field. Furthermore, throughout the analysis I resorted to **extracting**, a technique which ‘... emphasizes “pulling” out some section of a source material for purposes of quotation especially direct quotations’ (Amajirionwu, 1987:30) to support and buttress my assertions and conclusions.

- (h) **Writing the Final Report of the Case Study Research.** As stated in the significance of this study, the final report of this case study will make a substantial contribution to existing academic debates on the role of DDR in conflict prevention, the sub-field of the political economy of armed conflict, the literature on the Niger Delta conflict and the Nigerian State. Similarly, at the empirical level, it will provide insights for better future DDR design and implementation.

1.7. Ethical Considerations

The highest premium was given to ethical issues while conducting this study. First, all respondents involved in this study did so voluntarily based on informed consent. All respondents were adequately informed about what the research was about, the kind of information sought, why I needed the information and participation was voluntary (Kumar, 2011: 244). As part of the process of securing informed consent, all the respondents were issued with a comprehensive information brief about the study which clearly explained their rights and privileges should they agree to participate. A sample of the respondents’ information brief is in appendix 1. This enabled them to make an informed decision regarding their participation. Furthermore, before the commencement of any interview, the issue of informed consent was reiterated to every participant. A sample of the respondents’ consent form is in appendix 2. Importantly, I sought the approval of each respondent before his or her voice was recorded on tape.

A critical ethical consideration was adherence to the principle of anonymity and confidentiality. In this context, anonymity is ‘the degree to which the identity of message source is unknown and unspecified; thus, the less knowledge one has about the source and the harder it is to specify who the source is among possible options, the more anonymity exists’ (Scott, 2005: 243). Achieving and ensuring anonymity is important because ‘it is unethical to identify an individual respondent

with the information provided by him/her' (Kumar, 2011: 246). In view of the sensitive nature of my case study topic, respondents were accorded anonymity in the entire thesis chapters, which means that their identity is concealed in the research report (Oliver, 2003:77). Similarly, confidentiality has to do with practical steps taken to safeguard the information collected from unauthorised access (Whelan, 2007: 3). All information collected was reasonably protected from unauthorised access by storing the data in a secured computer and used strictly for the purpose collected.

1.8. Challenges in the Field

Wood (2006: 373) argued that 'field research in conflict zones is challenging...' One of the key field challenges that I had to cope with was the general insecurity that pervades the Niger Delta in terms of crimes particularly robbery, kidnapping and piracy in the Delta coastal waterways. To mitigate security risk, I had to charter a private speed boat during my visit to oil producing communities in the creeks of Bayelsa state which increased the financial cost of the field work. This decision was taken based on feedback from an informant who suggested that it was safer to travel to the creeks with a registered charter speed boat because there was a mutually beneficial gentleman's agreement between the boat drivers and the youth engaged in piracy. Registered chartered speed boats were less likely to be attacked by pirates compared to other public passenger boats.

However, the challenges experienced in Abuja and Port Harcourt were less enormous. In Abuja, the biggest difficulty was securing interviews with government officials, long waiting or the sudden cancellation of appointments. In Port Harcourt, the chaotic traffic situation coupled with poor conditions of the motorways and the high cost of hiring taxi drivers were the main challenges I experienced.

1.9. Problematising the Niger Delta and Niger Delta Conflict

The use of concepts or terms is critical in academic debate and research. In this regard, Ramsbotham *et al.* (2011: 30) contend that even in the same academic field, concepts are often confusing and contested because the same concepts are used by scholars to connote different meanings. The significance of defining and clarifying concepts in research is important because it enables the researcher to identify his key concepts, what he understands them to be and how he intends to use them (Denscombe, 2012: 68).

It is thus pertinent to conceptualise and clarify unfamiliar concepts that have been recurrently used in this thesis for readers to have an unambiguous understanding of their meaning. Therefore, unacquainted terms like the Niger Delta and Niger Delta conflict are hereby problematised and clarified.

1.9.1. *Problematising the Niger Delta*

‘The terms “Niger Delta” and Niger Delta Region” have usually been used interchangeably to refer to the oil-rich zone of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’ (George-Ukpong, 2012: 9). However, a pertinent issue here is that the existing literature on the Niger Delta tends to present it as a monolithic homogeneous geopolitical region comprising of different but united minority ethnic groups occupying Nigeria’s south-south geopolitical zone. However, such a portrayal does not reflect the region’s contemporary empirical reality and lacks any strong analytical utility. For instance, Ebeku (2006: 22) has argued that though the Niger Delta Region may have common interests and problems ‘there is abundant evidence that the Niger Delta people are not a homogeneous entity...’. Therefore, to achieve a more nuanced understanding of the Niger Delta in the context of this thesis, it is fundamental to appropriately problematize it. One important contemporary representation of the Niger Delta in the literature is that of Azaiki who defines the Region from a geographical perspective. According to him:

The Niger Delta is the largest wetland in Africa, and third in the world. It covers an area of 70,000km² and consists of a number of ecological zones-sandy coastal ridge barrier, brackish or saline mangroves, freshwater, permanent and seasonal swamp forests and lowland rain forests. The whole area is traversed and criss-crossed by a large number of rivers, streams, rivulets, creeks and twenty estuaries-Forcados, Escravos, Benin and Ramos in the western flank and Dodo, Pennington Digotoru, Middleton, Koluama, Fishtown, Sangana, Nun, Brass, St Nicholas, San Barbara, San Bartholomew, New Kalabari, Andoni, and Opobo (Azaiki, 2003: 39).

The above conceptualisation of the Niger Delta emphasises its peculiar terrain as the defining feature of the region, and to a reasonable extent, the definition is relevant because the unique nature of the region’s terrain highly influences its development and environmental challenges as well (Ibid.: 19). Nevertheless, I argue that the definition falls short of bringing to the fore the complexities that characterise the region in terms of its complex ethnic composition and the concomitant inter-ethnic and clan contestation among the various ethnic

nationalities occupying the region. In line with this George-Ukpong (2012: 12), observes that 'the definition of the Niger Delta (region) has since gone beyond the traditional 70,000 square [s]... [kilometres], oil-rich region...' He further contends that 'for political reasons, the Niger Delta region has been variously defined to suit particular interests at various times. Today the political Niger Delta is known to be synonymous with the oil-producing states of Nigeria.' In line with that Ebeku (2006: 19) maintains that 'in recent times, ... other definitions of the Niger Delta have emerged to distort the geographical definition of the region.' He, therefore, contends that 'a further variant of the political definitions is even more sweeping, as it considers the Niger Delta to be synonymous with oil-producing areas' (Ibid: 20). This perspective of the Niger Delta was further reinforced and complicated by the 2000 Niger Delta Development Commission's enabling act (Ugwoha, 2010: 12), which brought in states geographically outside the region as part of the Niger Delta because of their oil producing status. This perspective was further advanced by the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, which defines the Niger Delta as the oil producing states of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers states (Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, n.d.). The Map of Nigeria showing the 9 Oil Producing States is in figure 1.1.



Figure 1.1: Map of Nigeria Showing the 9 oil Producing States

Source: Aniefiok, E. I., Udo, J. I., Margaret, U. I. and Sunday, W. Petters. (2013). (Online). 'Petroleum exploration and production: past and present environmental issues in Nigeria's Niger Delta, *American Journal of Environmental Protection*, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 78-90. Available at: <http://pubs.sciepub.com/env/1/4/2> (Accessed: 03 January 2015).

However, as argued by Akpan (2011: 3) such a conceptualisation has been contested by many on the basis that oil should not be the yardstick for inclusion or exclusion of an area as part of the Niger Delta but rather geographical peculiarities. In the same vein, Ebeku (2006: 21) has argued that a major problem with the above definition is that it makes the boundaries of the Niger Delta region indeterminate. For example, if oil is eventually found in any of the northern states, such a state can clamour for it to be included as one of the constituent beneficiaries of the Niger Delta Development Commission's development programmes; yet geographically such a state does not fall within the region.

There is also the identity construct definition, whereby reference to the Niger Delta evokes a sense of minority ethnic groups who have been marginalised and subjugated by the majority ethnic groups in Nigeria as far back as the pre-

independence era. For example, Omeje (2006: 32) argues that apart from Abia, Imo and Ondo states which form part of the Niger Delta, 'the rest of the States are populated by varying sizes of minority ethnic groups.' However, the minority identity label attached to the Niger Delta Region gives it the image of an ethnically monolithic and homogenous region. Conversely, existing evidence shows that the various ethnic groups in the region are very much engaged in inter-ethnic rivalry. For instance, Adeotun (2005:47) described the Niger Delta as a divided society by contending that 'the Niger-Delta...is a complex one, with each of the region's ethnic groups fighting its neighbours. They are seemingly all enemies, with no two groups being able to unite in friendship.' Corroborating this position, Imobighe (2002: 36-52) demonstrated how the Ijaw, Urohobo and Itsekiri, three major ethnic groups from the Niger Delta region engaged in a destructive war of supremacy regarding who among them is the original owner of Warri, regarded as the second largest city in the region.

Again, the dispute over ownership of oil wells between the states of Cross River and Akwa Ibom (Azuakola, 2012: 1-2) and those of Rivers and Bayelsa (Pointblanknews.com, 2012: 1-5) illustrates the high level of contestation over the control of oil resources amongst the various states that make up the Niger Delta region. Lastly, a major shortcoming of the minority construct definition of the Niger Delta is the tendency to overlook certain ethnic nationalities that see themselves as minorities within the region. Such ethnic nationalities accuse major ethnic nationalities within the Niger Delta of marginalisation. This inevitably gives rise to the construct of minorities within minorities and appellations like 'core Niger Delta states or ethnic groups'. For instance, many have argued that the Ijaw ethnic nationality, given their numerical strength in the region, tends to see the Niger Delta as synonymous to Ijaw; therefore whatever decision is to be taken in respect of the region must reflect Ijaw views and interests, irrespective of the other ethnic nationalities in the region.¹ Against these contending perspectives, within the context of this thesis, an integrated definition will be adopted whereby both the geographical, political and minority definitions of the Niger Delta will be employed. This implies that the Niger Delta Region will be construed in this work as a geographical region within Nigeria, which, while home to a substantial

¹. Respondent 018-Niger Delta academic expert, November 2013.

number of the nation's minority ethnic groups (relative to the majority ethnic groups) in relation to majority ethnic groups boasts a distinctive terrain and is the consortium of Nigeria's oil producing states and communities. Nevertheless, it is important to note that even though the recurrent use of the term in this study may give the semblance of an ethno monolithic region, it is not in any way so; neither is it devoid of inter-ethnic rancour.

1.9.2. *Problematizing the Niger Delta Conflict*

According to Oguniye (2011: 11-49) the genesis of the Niger Delta conflict dates back to the colonial period and over the years it has gone through a historical process of mutation (changing dynamics). Therefore, a reference to it may likely produce different understandings and so there is a need to problematize it. More importantly, Omeje (2006: 16) argues that despite the plethora of academic research on the Nigerian oil conflict (Niger Delta conflict) much of it focuses on an examination of the conflict's causes, dynamics and remedial solutions without proffering a precise definition of what the conflict is all about. This lack of a clear-cut definition has prevented an in-depth understanding of the conflict of which the concomitant implication is the temptation for scholars and researchers to engage in extreme generalisations that elevate the conflict to Nigeria's crises of post-independence state-making (Ibid.: 17). Against this backdrop, Omeje problematizes the conflict in this way:

At the heart of the conflict is crude oil-its exploration, extraction, distribution, sale, allocation and use of the accruable revenues, and perhaps most decisively, the politicization of the overall processes. There are three dominant parties to the conflict. These include firstly, the oil bearing communities, which are mostly ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta area represented by diverse community-based organizations (CBOs), as well as sub-and pan- ethnic bodies. Secondly, there is the oil industry, responsible for generating petro-resources on which... the entire system of rentier accumulation is based... The third is the state, predominantly (but not exclusively) an unstable coalition of some ethnic majority elites (Omeje, 2006: 16).

Following this problematisation, Omeje further argues that:

...one can operationally define the Nigerian oil conflict as the gamut of conflicts, both open and latent, related to oil extraction, transportation, and distribution activities, as well as the politics concerning the disposition, appropriation and utilisation of financial resources and opportunities derived or perceived as deriving from oil resources in the country (Omeje, 2006: 17).

A similar argument was advanced by Ojatorotu (2008: 92) who maintains that the conflict in the Niger Delta may be attributed to several key issues: exclusion and marginalisation in terms of access to oil revenue, demand for resource control, environmental despoliation and unacceptable human right violations. Ojatorotu re-echoes Omeje's representation of the conflict by contending that the conflict in the Niger Delta is reflective of the contradictions of environmental governance and oil politics in Nigeria (Ibid).

Within the context of the above definition of the conflict, Osaghae, *et al* (2008: 31-32) argue that three dimensions of the conflict can be deciphered within the larger Niger Delta conflict, namely Federal Government-Community conflicts which take two forms; one, the entire Niger Delta region versus the Nigerian federal state. This revolves around obnoxious laws and policies pertaining to oil exploitation, production and the distribution of revenue arising from it. In other words, it is largely triggered by the fear of domination on the part of the minority by the majority ethnic groups and further reinforced by the contention over resource allocation which later metamorphosed to absolute resource control agitations. The second dimension has to do with the conflict between specific Niger Delta oil bearing communities and the Federal Government over its excessive application of force to protect the assets of MNOCs, as in the case of Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the Nigerian State. There is also community versus oil company conflicts, which have to do with disagreement over compensation to communities' due to environmental degradation they have suffered. The last are inter and intra-community conflicts, this centred around struggles between and within communities and clans over the ownership of land endowed with oil. Therefore, the works of Omeje, Ojatorotu and Osaghae have provided an in-depth analytical problematization of the Niger Delta conflict which to a reasonable extent conforms to the conflict's historical trajectory and dynamics over the years. However, the current state of the conflict is that it has mutated into a youth-led armed rebellion against the state. The youth claimed to have resorted to armed struggle because of the Nigerian State's failure to respond to non-violent agitations from the Region. Therefore, the current phase of the conflict fits into Agbiboa's (2014: 51) problematization in which he argues that 'a distinguishing characteristic [of the conflict] has been the rise of ethnic

militias claiming to represent the interests of the oil-bearing communities in their struggle for survival.’

However, despite the analytical and empirical usefulness of such problematization of the conflict, two major weaknesses can be identified. As earlier pointed out, one is the tendency to assume that the Niger Delta region is a monolithic homogenous entity as far as the conflict is concerned and second is the tendency to gloss over the role of the Niger Delta ruling elite in furthering the marginalisation and underdevelopment of the region. A situation whereby the Niger Delta ruling elites replicate in the region the same type of injustice they accuse the hegemonic Nigerian federal state of perpetrating against them. For instance, while political elites from the Niger Delta region continue to clamour for increased revenue allocation from the federal government, such revenue only serves the prebendal accumulation of the Niger Delta ruling elite instead of being used to address the pressing development needs of the region. This is particularly the case since the return of Nigeria to democratic governance, as rightly noted in this assertion:

The denial of democratic dividends is most pronounced in the Niger Delta, where governors and chairmen of local government councils have plundered the treasuries to enrich themselves and their cronies, while the population is left to squalor in abject poverty, neglect, and want. While we strongly condemn the federal government for its gross neglect of the Niger Delta, it would be irresponsible of us to condone the policies of the Niger Delta governors and chairmen of local government councils that have equally marginalized and impoverished the population. Thus [,] the Niger Delta state governors and chairmen of local government councils lack the moral authority to criticise the federal government when their policies have equal if not more debilitating effects on the population (Natufe, 2006: 3).

Corroborating the above contention, Osaghe *et al*, (2008: 21) argue that one of the key actors in the Niger Delta Conflict were the so-called elders/elites which they describe as comprising of businessmen, retired civil servants and military generals, traditional and political leaders who control the socioeconomic and power structures in the region. This category of elites draws their prominence and wealth from their role as interlocutors between the masses of the region, the state and MNOCs, and use their privileged intermediary position as a means of prebendal accumulation. According to them:

Through their role as intermediaries they are able to build-up great prestige and wealth with which they have established region-wide client networks. The Niger-delta elite provides a classic example of the phenomenon of 'Straddling' with one and the same person simultaneously occupying the key posts in political, economic and traditional spheres of public life in the Niger-delta, making of (sic)the Niger-delta elite a very powerful person (Ibid.).

What this suggests is that the connection between the Niger Delta political elite, particularly the governors and militancy in the region, intersect personal and group interest; hence his contention that the conflict today 'is driven by collective, personal and opportunistic interest' (Ako, 2011: 47). Therefore, one could argue that the Niger Delta conflict is a struggle between elites from minority ethnic nationalities, whose land by accident of geography has the oil deposit, and elites from the majority ethnic nationalities who have dominated the sharing of oil rents over the years.

Against this backdrop, a reference to the Niger Delta conflict in this thesis is premised on Omeje's and Osaghae's problematization of the conflict, notwithstanding their inadequacies. However, readers of this work should also understand that there is a replication of the politics of neopatrimonialism at the regional level by political elites from the Niger Delta Region that further marginalises the masses of the Region, thereby reinforcing their underdevelopment and predicaments.

1.10. The Structure of the Thesis and Synopsis of Chapters

This thesis is divided into six chapters, and each chapter is further subdivided into sections addressing different themes and arguments. Therefore, it is apposite to provide a structural outline of the chapters and the principal arguments and issues they addressed.

Chapter One, being the introductory chapter provides a background introduction to the thesis. It also highlights the significance of the research, the methodology, methods of data collection and analysis that underpinned the study. Equally, the chapter problematizes the Niger Delta and Niger Delta conflict and provides the structural outline and synopsis of the thesis chapters.

Chapter Two reviews some of the relevant theoretical, empirical and policy-related literature on amnesty and DDR in the context of the transition from an

authoritarian to democratic dispensation and war to peace transition. The literature review is structured around the thematic debates in the DDR literature. Furthermore, the approach to the literature review adopted is critical in nature, highlighting some of the apparent gaps and weaknesses in the debates. Also, the chapter sets the background for the analysis of the Niger Delta ADDR programme by signposting some of the theoretical and empirical arguments to be examined in subsequent chapters of the thesis.

Chapter Three critically examines the historical origins, dynamics and Nigerian State management of the Niger Delta conflict prior to the introduction of the ADDR programme. The chapter is divided into three parts, and the first part unpacks the conflict by advancing the thesis's framework for explaining the conflict's origin, its changing dynamics and how the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta's era of the conflict became the most violent phase. The second part of the chapter provides a periodisation of the conflict's historical trajectory, while the third part analyses its management by the Nigerian State. In terms of contribution to knowledge and the existing literature on the conflict, the historical analysis of the conflict carried out in this chapter reveals that a substantial body of scholarly work located the conflict in decades of relative deprivation, poverty, environmental degradation and general underdevelopment etc. On the other hand, there are scholarly works that locate the conflict and its changing dynamics in the very nature and character of the Nigerian State. However, empirical and secondary evidence analysed in the chapter provided convincing theoretical corroboration and affirmation of the perspective that trace the conflict to the dysfunctional nature and character of the Nigerian rentier-neopatrimonial state. The analysis revealed that grievances of marginalisation, relative deprivation, poverty and general underdevelopment that underlay the conflict are symptoms of the crisis and contradictions of a rentier and neopatrimonial state system that resulted in the Nigerian State failing in its core functions. Likewise, current literature on the political economy of armed conflict is replete with criticisms of Collier's greed theory of conflict and feasibility hypothesis. However, despite the validity of these criticisms, secondary and empirical data analysed in the chapter has demonstrated that even though Collier's greed theory of conflict and civil war feasibility hypothesis may not be a valid explanation for conflict *onset*, evidence adduced in this chapter corroborate the fact that their explanatory potency in

terms of nuancing the dynamics of conflict cannot be underestimated or completely renounced.

Chapter Four is subdivided into three main sections. The first section examines the ADDR's programme's conceptualisation, negotiation and planning as well as implementation. Based on this examination, the second part highlights the challenges and problems that characterised the implementation process. The third section is the conclusion which summarises the main argument of the chapter. In terms of contribution to knowledge, existing DDR literature is bifurcated between those that argue for a minimalist or maximalist DDR. Those that advocate for a minimalist DDR insist that it should only aim at restoring security and stability in the aftermath of violent conflict. On the other hand, those that advocate for maximalist DDR argue that unless a DDR programme is framed as an opportunity for development that aims at addressing the underlying sources of conflict and the concomitant security challenges it produces; its potential to contribute to lasting peace will be minimal. Accordingly, empirical and secondary data analysed in this study corroborates and affirms the position of those that advocate for maximalist DDR. Similarly, the current literature reveals that DDR can be initiated through a comprehensive peace agreement (peace accord) as an outcome of negotiated settlement amongst the conflicting parties. It can also be initiated in the aftermath of absolute military defeat by the victorious party. Alternatively, it can be initiated through 'coercive disarmament' as a form of peace enforcement. However, a modest knowledge discovery and contribution to the literature in the chapter is that the Niger Delta ADDR was achieved neither through negotiated settlement, the absolute military defeat of the militants by the Nigerian military nor was it a clear case of coercive disarmament. In contrast, empirical evidence analysed, revealed that it is best described as a pseudo-compellence negotiated settlement. A DDR negotiation process that simultaneously integrates the features of a negotiated settlement, military enforcement and monetary patronage as inducement. Hence it straddles peace enforcement and negotiated settlement. Thus, it represents an alternative way of negotiating DDR. Similarly, is the concept of executive amnesty, a not too common concept in the literature that emerged from the chapter. An executive amnesty represents an amnesty that was not a product of robust engagement with all the relevant stakeholders but more of a unilateral imposition by the state.

Furthermore, the concept of purchased renunciation of militancy which denotes buying the peace that emerged from the chapter represents another modest knowledge discovery. It means the commodification of peace; a situation whereby peace has become a commodity that can be purchased instead of nurturing.

Chapter Five examines the extent to which the ADDR programme succeeded in achieving its statutory objectives. The chapter is subdivided into two main sections, and the first section evaluates it as a security stabilisation programme while the second section examines it from the perspective of an all-inclusive DDR recommended by the TCND. The chapter also juxtaposes the implementation of the TCND's recommendation with that of the maximalist DDR. The last section of the chapter summarises the main arguments of the chapter. In terms of contribution to knowledge and literature, the resort to amnesty in the peace process has been heavily criticised as rewarding impunity. Nonetheless, both empirical and secondary evidence examined in this study proved that irrespective of these criticisms, amnesty would continue to be relevant and a strong motivation in wooing combatants particularly those of second generation militias to disarm and remain committed to a peace process. Furthermore, the existing literature suggests that the success of a disarmament programme and its potential to contribute to peace depends on the quantity of weapons recovered. However, an interesting discovery in this study is the fact that oftentimes the immediate improvement in security is not the function of how many weapons are recovered but the symbolic significance of the exercise to the conflict parties and other stakeholders. In the same vein, this case study equally discovered that irrespective of how disastrously the disarmament programme was conducted, its confidence building potential was still notable. A significant contribution to knowledge and existing DDR literature that emerged from this chapter was concerning the focus of existing case studies of DDR in the literature. They focus on internationally driven DDR programmes which were implemented within the framework UN IDDRSs. However, this case study provides a unique contribution to knowledge because it represents a case of a nationally owned peacetime DDR programme undertaken by a dysfunctional rentier neopatrimonial state, which was designed and implemented based on the normative standard of a rentier neopatrimonial state. Thus, the neopatrimonial ethos and standard that informed the conduct of the DDR explained why the Nigerian State resorted to

the use of *patronage and exclusion*. Targeting some selected top militant commanders with the manifest capacity to unleash violence and threaten the operations of MNOCs and flow of oil rents to the state to keep in check other less powerful commanders. The Niger Delta ADDR programme, therefore, represents a case of neopatrimonial DDR and hence a new conceptual addition to existing literature.

Chapter Six is the concluding chapter and demonstrates the extent to which the case study succeeded in answering its central research question. The chapter also highlights the study's theoretical and policy contributions. It also suggests potential research question for future research on the Niger Delta.

Chapter Two

Review of Relevant Literature: Amnesty, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

2. Introduction

This chapter reviews relevant empirical, theoretical and policy literature in the field of Amnesty, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (ADDR). Some of the key issues examined in the literature review include the role of amnesty in the transition from authoritarian to democratic systems of governance and from war to peace and the controversy between the advocates of amnesty and those against its application in peace process. Those in support of amnesty argue that, oftentimes, it must be used to facilitate the transition from authoritarianism to democracy and from war to peace. On the other hand, those opposed to it contend that it encourages impunity by shielding perpetrators of human rights' violations and those that take arms against the state from being prosecuted.

The review also raises some key theoretical and empirical issues regarding the planning and implementation of disarmament, most especially the factors planners need to consider when preparing for disarmament, and the possible challenges that can undermine it. Equally, the review identifies key implementation challenges highlighted in the literature such as the economic agendas of fighters and conflict 'profiteers' as potential 'peace spoilers'. An important theoretical debate in the literature concerns the kind of incentives that should be offered to motivate fighters to disarm. In this case, some scholars have emphasised the need to offer economic incentives due to the strong economic agendas that inform and drive contemporary civil wars. In contrast, some scholars maintain that the primary concern of fighters during the disarmament and demobilisation process is whether their security will be guaranteed during and after the process; while others argue that the best way to address the security concerns of ex-combatants is to give them a stake in post-war political power arrangements. The debates in the literature concerning conventional and nonconventional approaches to demobilisation were also examined. The conventional approach contends that disarmed fighters must properly demobilise

and disband both their military organisation and command and control structures and be freed from the control of their commanders. In contrast, some scholars have questioned this conventional assumption and approach to demobilisation and argue that the absolute breakup of command and control structures is impossible and oftentimes their retention can play a positive role in the process of reintegration. Similarly, some scholars have argued that cantonment is essential in the process of demobilisation while others contend that it tends to reinforce the command and control structures that it is meant to destroy.

The reintegration of ex-combatants has been identified in the literature as the most critical stage of the DDR process; nevertheless, it is the least funded. The debate regarding the reintegration of ex-combatants and DDR, in general, is premised on minimalist and maximalist conceptualisations. The minimalist perspective views ex-combatants as a potent security threat and potential 'peace spoilers'; thus, it approaches DDR as a security stabilisation project aimed at appeasing and engaging ex-combatants so that they do not pose any future security threat. Consequently, all reintegration support programmes are skewed in their favour, ironically jeopardising their prospects of successful reintegration because it triggers resentment against them.

In contrast, the maximalist perspective approaches DDR as an opportunity for development and therefore sees ***certain category*** of ex-combatants as a potential repository of human resource that can be galvanised to jumpstart the political economy of peace if the security threat label attached to them is de-emphasised. Equally, the perspective sees the reintegration phase of DDR as an avenue for addressing the root causes of conflict such as the human security and development challenges of the larger post-conflict society. This is achieved by engendering a process of state transformation that will significantly reduce the sources of structural violence as the roots of violent conflict. Furthermore, the tendency for international agencies that fund DDR programmes to impose their preferences on the benefiting societies, has been a source of friction that undermines the process of reintegration and the DDR process in general, motivating some scholars to clamour for national ownership and participatory approaches to DDR. Similarly, the lack of proper coordination and working at cross-purposes among funding agencies and DDR stakeholders at local and international levels has been a major setback to the process of reintegration. It

has become a theatre of unequal power relations between international funding agencies, national governments and ex-combatants all of which undermines the DDR process.

An important debate in the literature is how to measure success in DDR given the different motives of the various funding agencies and their lack of a universal benchmark for determining success or failure. Those from the minimalist perspective measure success in terms of the number of weapons collected, ex-combatants demobilised, activities of spoilers successfully curtailed and the restoration of the state's prerogative of the legitimate use of force. Conversely, those from a maximalist perspective use a wider yardstick to measure success by looking at the extent to which the underlying sources of conflict have been significantly addressed and the level of improvement in human security and development indices recorded. Accordingly, the maximalist approach to DDR is often referred to in the literature as a transformative or all-inclusive/holistic approach.

In terms of structure, this chapter is divided into three main parts, the first of which explores amnesty and attempts an empirical review of its application in the transition from authoritarian to democratic systems of governance, the war to peace transition and its relation to DDR. The second part of the chapter examines DDR as an important component of the post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction orthodoxy. It highlights the mutually reinforcing connection between its three phases as provided in the *United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards* (UN IDDRS, 2006) and reviews relevant academic and policy literature in the area. The third and concluding part of the chapter summarises the key arguments in the review.

2.1. Conceptualising Amnesty, Review of Empirical Application and Nexus with DDR

This section begins by conceptualising amnesty, followed by an empirical review of its application in the process of transition from authoritarianism to democracy and from war to peace. Specifically, it examines the nexus between amnesty and DDR and the contending arguments for and against its application in peace processes.

2.1.1. Conceptualising Amnesty

Amnesty has been applied in different political contexts and granted to different political actors (Olsen *et al.*, 2010: 2). For example, according to Naqvi (2010: 76) amnesties for war crimes and crimes of an international nature are mostly resorted to by states transitioning from dictatorial military regimes to democratic systems of governance or from war to peace. States that find themselves in such situations are likely to explore the possibility of granting amnesty for certain offences and categories of persons (*Ibid.*). The use of amnesty laws became prominent in the 1970s and 1980s in Latin American countries where military juntas ceding power to democratically elected governments, granted amnesties to themselves or compelled the new government to do so in view of the egregious human rights violations they committed while in power (*Ibid.*: 79). Equally, countries undergoing violent conflict often resort to amnesty as a means of wooing adversarial parties to the negotiating table and to support the commencement of demobilisation, reintegration and reconciliation (*Ibid.*: 84). Indeed, it has been asserted in the literature that:

Amnesty is the most common mechanism contained within peace [agreements] concluded between 1980 and 2006, appearing in 30 of the 77 cases [peace agreements]. In 22 of these cases [peace agreements], general amnesties covered all individuals and all violations or crimes (including violations of international human rights law) (Vinjamuri and Boesenecker (2007: 16).

Several scholars and practitioners such as Francis (2000: 361-367), Cobban (2007: 4-5), Mallinder (2008: 4), Ikelegbe (2010: 6-7), Bois-Pedain (2007: 6) and Lessa and Payne (2012: 4) have conceptualised amnesty in different ways; some in an explicit manner and others, implicitly. Nevertheless, Freeman (2011: 12) observes that a major problem associated with most definitions of amnesty is that, they are context specific and consequently cannot be generalised to other contexts. In contrast, Freeman provides a precise definition with universal application irrespective of the political environment and character of the amnesty granted which this study will adopt as its working definition:

... an extraordinary legal measure whose primary function is to remove the prospect and consequences of criminal liability for designated individuals or classes of persons in respect of designated types of offenses irrespective of whether the persons concerned have been tried for such offenses in a court of law (Freeman (2009: 13).

Generally, about four different categories of beneficiaries of amnesty have been identified in the literature; armed non-state actors, members of state forces, members of domestic political opposition accused of human right violations and state agents accused of extreme repression against non-state agents (Olsen *et al.*, 2010: 36).

2.2. Amnesty: Review of Empirical Application and Relationship to Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration

Amnesty has been resorted to in different contexts to facilitate the process of transition from authoritarianism to a democratic system of governance and from war to peace. For example, Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala and El Salvador exemplify countries where amnesty was resorted to, to facilitate the process of transition from authoritarianism to a democratic system of governance while in the case of South Africa from a racist minority rule (apartheid) to an all-inclusive democratic society.

Brazil provides an interesting and successful example of the application of amnesty law when compared with other countries within its region. The Brazilian version of amnesty was fundamentally different from its conventional meaning, it is described as freedom from prosecution for crimes committed mostly by totalitarian regimes against their citizens as well as reparations (Abrao and Torelly, 2012: 152). In the Brazilian context, amnesty was conceived and implemented as '...freedom and reparations' (Ibid.). The Brazilian military junta that ruled the country from 1964-1985, while still in power promulgated an amnesty law which provided cover for all politically motivated crimes, as well as the opportunity for those whose rights had been violated by the state to claim reparation (Abrao and Torelly, 2012.: 153). The amnesty law which was reviewed over time and its scope widened, received popular support and therefore laid a solid foundation for Brazil's transition to a democratic dispensation (Ibid.: 153). The main reason advanced for the success of the Brazilian amnesty law was because its promulgation was in response to a demand from a broad spectrum of Brazilian civil society organisations instead of being an executive imposition (Ibid.: 153). The Brazilian amnesty law was notable because it considered the interest of both the perpetrators and victims of human rights' abuses.

Conversely, Argentina provides an example of amnesty law whose content was controversial and its implementation characterised by interruptions due to changing political dynamics and actors (Engstrom and Pereira, 2012: 97). A combination of dwindling economic fortunes, strikes, domestic pressure and military incompetence compelled the Argentine military junta to initiate a process of relinquishing power by conducting democratic elections on 30 October 1983 (Ibid.: 99). The military junta at its twilight enacted a blanket self-amnesty law that covered all individuals that perpetrated politically motivated and criminal offences between 1973-1982 (Engstrom and Pereira, 2012: 99). The amnesty law prohibits civil proceedings from being brought against those covered by it.

However, the self-amnesty law was soon declared null and void as it was resisted by human rights organisations, thus the new Alfonsín government, with the support of the Argentine Supreme Court, eventually commenced the prosecution of members of the ex-military junta (Ibid.). However, the reversal of the self-amnesty law and the subsequent trial of the military threatened the stability of Argentina's democratic transition process particularly towards the end of 1985 because the military revolted which compelled the democratic government to limit the scope of the trials (Ibid.: 103-104).

Guatemala and El Salvador are two central American countries that also experienced a long history of military dictatorship and insurgencies against the state (Braid and Roht-Arriaza, 2012: 183). In the case of Guatemala, the country went through a devastating thirty-six-year conflict that started in the 1960s, leading to the death of about 200,000 persons, the disappearance of several others and acts of genocide perpetrated against persons of Mayan origin (Ibid.: 183-184). In El Salvador 75, 000 persons were estimated to have been killed during the twelve-year war that started in 1979 (Ibid.). In both countries, amnesty laws were resorted to strengthen the process of transition from military dictatorship to a civilian democratic government.

In Guatemala, a United Nations-mediated peace accord ended the armed conflict that culminated in the signing of a peace treaty on December 12, 1996 (Ibid.: 185). However, six days before the signing of the peace accord, the 1996 National Reconciliation Law, which provided the legal basis for the reintegration of former insurgents into society, was promulgated (Ibid.). An important feature

of the law was ‘... “extinguishing criminal responsibility” for crimes committed by members of the military, civil patrollers, and politicians between the start of the armed conflict and the date of the law’s passage’ (Braid and Roht-Arriaza, 2012: 185). The Guatemalan amnesty was not a blanket one. For instance, article 8 of the Law states that ‘exemption from criminal responsibility will not apply to crimes of genocide, torture and forced disappearance’ (Ibid. 186). Nevertheless, there were attempts to challenge the legitimacy of the law by various human rights organisations but without success as the Guatemalan courts justified its promulgation (Ibid.).

In El Salvador, a United Nations-supervised peace process that lasted for two years led to the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accord on January 16, 1992, which ended the country’s twelve-year civil war (Braid and Roht-Arriaza, 2012: 196). To address the atrocities of the past, the peace accord established two commissions, one of which was the Ad Hoc Commission charged with the responsibility of screening officers that perpetrated human rights violations (Ibid.). In the same vein, Article 5 of the peace accords empowers the government to ‘...clarify and stop impunity...’ (Ibid.: 196-197). Consequently, a Truth Commission was established and mandated to investigate all alleged atrocious crimes and human rights violations committed during the war (Stahn, 2002: 191-192). The findings and recommendations of the Truth Commission were far reaching.

Regrettably, despite the UN’s support and funding of the commission’s work and its endorsement of the report, it was overwhelmingly rejected by the Government of El Salvador because it was considered prejudicial and unfair to top military commanders and government officials (Popkin, 2001: 13). Given the apprehension generated by the report, the then President of El Salvador, Alfredo Christiani, proclaimed a blanket amnesty for all crimes committed by the military and insurgents through the enactment of the 1993 General Amnesty Law for the Consolidation of Peace (Popkin, 2002: 13; Stahn, 2002: 193; Aguilera, 2012: 1-2; Braid and Roht-Arriaza, 2012: 197).

Similarly, South Africa’s transition from a racist to a democratic all-inclusive society, was built on a political deal that gave amnesty for genuinely proven cases of politically motivated offences, within the framework of a Truth and

Reconciliation Commission (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, n. d and Bois-Pedain, 2007: 6). South Africa's amnesty is a relatively successful example of amnesty law in political transition that can serve as a model for other societies facing similar challenges (Bois-Pedain, 2007: 7 and 2012: 238). As Sarkin (2008: 1) noted the 'South Africa's version of an amnesty has been identified as legally the most stringent and politically the most legitimate of amnesties granted in transitions to democracy...'. The legal basis for the enactment of South Africa's amnesty law can be traced to the negotiated transitional constitution that ended the apartheid regime. The constitution provided that conditional amnesty is granted for all politically motivated offences committed during the apartheid era. Not only that, it also empowered the country's democratically elected parliamentarians to work out the modalities for its implementation (Bois-Pedain, 2007: 17).

Consequently, in 1995 the post-apartheid parliament established the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with a mandate to unravel all cases of politically motivated human rights' violations that occurred throughout the apartheid era (Cobban, 2007: 97; Bois-Pedain, 2012: 238; Omar, n. d. and United States Institute of Peace, n. d.: 1-2). The TRC was empowered to thoroughly examine the causes, character, nature and extent of human rights' violations committed during the apartheid era, and to determine and recommend which cases merit amnesty (Cobban, 2007: 97; Bois-Pedain, 2007: 19 and Grange, 2014: 2).

The TRC in the execution of its mandate was subdivided into the committees of Human Rights violations, Amnesty, Reparation and Rehabilitation, and a supportive investigation team (Cobban, 2007: 99; Bois-Pedain, 2007: 19 and Grange, 2014: 2). The amnesty subcommittee was to deal with all cases covering the period from 01 March 1960-10 May 1994 (Bois-Pedain, 2007: 20). Amnesty was conditional or subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions by the supposed beneficiaries. These conditions included submitting an individual or personal application for amnesty, the disclosure of the identity of the offender and the full disclosure of the offence committed which had to be in pursuit of a political objective or official responsibility on behalf of the state (Cobban, 2007: 109; Bois-

Pedain, 2007: 21 and Bois-Pedain, 2012: 239-240 and University of the Witwatersrand, n.d.: 1-3).

Despite its acclaimed success, the legitimacy of the South Africa's amnesty law was challenged in court, but without success, while victims and their families have viewed it as an unjust way of responding to the violence meted to them (Bois-Pedain, 2007: 29-33). Despite this, one can argue that the law has positively contributed to South Africa's process of reconciliation and healing in the post-apartheid era. South Africa's amnesty experience is unusual because the granting of individual conditional amnesty based on full disclosure constitutes a form of accountability (Bois-Pedain, 2012: 2578-258).

Contrary to the above examples, most cases of amnesties offered in other African countries, were in the context of destructive civil wars between different non-state armed groups or non-state armed groups challenging the legitimacy of the state, of which Mozambique and Sierra Leone are two classic examples worth examining. In both contexts, amnesty was resorted to as an enticement to assuage the security concerns of the insurgents prior to disarmament and demobilisation, thereby smoothing the process of transition from war to peace. In the case of Mozambique, it went through a destructive civil war that lasted for fifteen years (Cobban, 2007:), but peace talks between the government of Mozambique and Mozambique National Resistance rebel forces led to the signing of a peace accord in Italy that ended the civil war on 4 October 1992 (Igreja, 2012: 10 & 2015: 1-2). Ten days after the peace accord, the Mozambican government promulgated an amnesty law for all crimes committed during the war (Ibid.). However, unlike South Africa where a conditional amnesty was offered, Mozambique granted a blanket or unconditional amnesty that covered all crimes committed by all parties to the conflict (Cobban, 2007:). The goal of the amnesty in Mozambique was to put 'a veil of silence' and 'intentional forgetting' (Ibid.: 5) over all forms of crimes and human rights violations committed during the war. It is arguable that the conduct of a United Nations-funded DDR of about ninety thousand former Mozambique's combatants may not have been possible without the amnesty offer (Igreja, 2012: 10 & 2015: 1-2). Indeed, any attempt to prosecute perpetrators of alleged war crimes and egregious cases of human rights

violations may well have derailed the implementation of the 1992 peace accord (ibid.).

In the case of Sierra Leone, after a protracted civil war, the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front rebel forces signed the Lome Peace Accord in 1999, which granted a blanket amnesty to all the Revolutionary United Front fighters (Francis, 2000: 364-368; African Union Panel of the Wise, 2013: 35-36 and Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies Peace Accords Matrix, n.d.). The insertion of the blanket amnesty clause in the peace accord was because prosecution would have deterred the Revolutionary United Front fighters from signing the peace agreement (African Union Panel of the Wise, 2013: 36).

The resort to amnesty in the context of war to peace transition raises the question of the relationship between amnesty and DDR. My overview of the literature is that it is a necessity that oftentimes cannot be avoided to motivate combatants to disarm and demobilise, however, others see the linkage as a negative one because it shields combatants and other human rights violators from facing justice (Mallinder, 2008: 1). For instance, pointing to its necessity Francis contends that 'power sharing and amnesty are often parts of political settlements reached in polities bedevilled by civil conflict and military intervention' (Francis, 2000: 364). Again, Freeman (2010: 1- 4) reiterates Francis's position by arguing that amnesty receives a positive welcome among DDR practitioners because combatants will always be motivated to disarm and demobilise when they are not likely to be prosecuted. Thus, oftentimes amnesty is the only option for achieving an immediate end to armed conflict (ibid.). Other scholars who argue in support of the positive linkage between amnesty and DDR include Scharf (1999: 507-512), Naqvi (2010:587), Penman (2007: 8-13), Mallinder (2008: 2), Oluborode (2008) and Sriram & Herman (2009: 463). However, others have expressed the view that amnesty in the long-term, shields human rights violators from accounting for their actions, thereby encouraging further impunity and violations. For instance, Mallinder (2008:1) notes that amnesty has been criticised by the human rights community for accommodating impunity in order to foster political stability; while Pensky (2008: 10-40) and Penman (2007: 8-13) posit that domestic amnesties reward impunity, impede accountability and is not consonant with international law. It is against this background that the International Centre for Transitional Justice (2009: 1-2) advised that 'amnesty must not equal

impunity'. Whether the Niger Delta militants would have agreed to disarm and demobilise without the offer of amnesty will be explored further in this case study. Nevertheless, the principal focus of this study is on the conflict prevention impact of DDR in the Niger Delta rather than the question of amnesty.

2.3. Conceptualising Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Review of Relevant Literature

This section examines the concepts of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). It also reviews relevant theoretical and policy-related literature in the field of DDR.

2.3.1. Conceptualising Disarmament, Demobilisation and reintegration

Disarmament

According to Lewis *et al.*, (1999: 129), after the official termination of war, one of the principal issues to be tackled is the demobilisation of the various armed or militia groups. A further challenge is to ensure that surplus weapons are removed from circulation and ideally destroyed (Shibuya, 2012: 24). Furthermore, there is the need to restore security and stability in order to avert the resurgence of violence and safeguard basic societal functions (Jeong, 2005: 39; World Bank Social Development Department- Conflict, Crime and Violence, 2009: 1). In the aftermath of an armed conflict, combatants and militia groups could be dangerous if left unattended to, as they could 'spoil' and undermine the peace process (Alden *et al.*, 2011: 14). According to the United Nations, Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (UN IDDRS), 1. 10 2006: 1) 'the objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin'. This is supported by Spear who contends that there are two reasons to embark on a DDR programme in the aftermath of a violent conflict:

First, to remove the means by which civil wars have been prosecuted and thus prevent re-ignition of conflict. Second, to provide an environment in which a degree of stability has been achieved and through this to add to the process of confidence and security building (Spear, 2007: 2).

Suffice to say that the UN IDDRS (2006) and Spear's conceptualisation of the goal of DDR amounts to a minimalist perspective of DDR which will be explored

further in this study. According to Knight (2012: 17) 'the most comprehensive contemporary tools for defining DDR [Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration] are the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (UN IDDRS)'. These understand disarmament as:

...collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management (UN IDDRS, 1. 10. 2006: 2).

Two types of disarmament have been conceptualised in the literature; either based on command or consent (coercive and co-operative) (Berdal, 1996: 24-38, Spear, 2007: 2 & Shibuya, 2012: 32-37). Both Berdal and Shibuya concur that coercive disarmament is the use of force, or threat of force, to compel combatants to submit to the process of disarmament. While in consent based disarmament, the parties willingly agree to disarm. According to Spear (2007: 2), co-operative disarmament is associated with negotiated peace settlements, where there is no clear victor among the warring parties while coercive disarmament is enforced by a victorious party or intervention force. Commonly cited examples of successful co-operative disarmament include El Salvador and Mozambique; Angola represents a failed case while India in Sri Lanka and US forces in Somalia exemplified disarmament enforced by a foreign intervention force (Ibid). Tanner (1996: 169-204) goes a step further to argue that:

Consensual weapons control can be defined as the voluntary action that opposing parties agree to take in the aftermath of an armed conflict with the purpose of dismantling or constraining their military capabilities. The parties explicitly agree to the presence of peace support forces. These forces are to monitor, supervise or assist the implementation of such disarmament arrangements. Consensual weapons control operations are carried out in most cases under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Tanner, 1996: 171).

In contrast to the above, he argues that:

Coercive weapons control or disarmament means that the external forces are authorized to use force, if necessary, to implement their mandates. This definition does not imply straightforward military intervention, but rather the forceful response to non-compliance of parties to live up to weapons control commitments. Coercive weapons control or disarmament may primarily be used for the disarming of individuals, bandits and renegade armed units operating within the confines of a peacekeeping

operation. In practice, most coercive weapons control operations have been taking place under Chapter VII authority of the UN Charter (Ibid.).

Demobilisation

Disarmament is immediately followed by demobilisation as the second phase in the DDR process. According to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2000: 7) this is the process whereby members of government armed forces or factional forces reduce their numbers or totally disband in the aftermath of armed conflict. However, the UN IDDRS (2006) provides a more comprehensive definition when it asserts that:

Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion (United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards, 1. 10. 2006: 2).

Demobilisation, as the definition infers, involves a series of interrelated activities that need to be carried out and which will finally culminate in the controlled discharge or total disbandment of government forces or factional armed groups. These activities may include massing of troops at designated locations, documentation, medical screening, profiling, briefing and payment of a *reinsertion* support allowance before the combatants are finally transported to their preferred places of resettlement.

Reinsertion

An important concept and activity that needs to be further defined and explained is reinsertion. According to the UN IDDRS (2006):

Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate

needs, and can last up to one year (United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards, 1: 10. 2006a: 2).

Reinsertion is vital to the overall success of the DDR process because it takes care of the vacuum created by the sudden loss of income on the part of combatants after their demobilisation and before reintegration, and as provided by the UN IDDRS (2006). One can argue that while it is very explicit from the above definition that reinsertion is part and parcel of demobilisation, nonetheless it sounds contradictory because demobilisation usually takes a short time to complete while the above definition clearly states that reinsertion support can last up to one year. My general overview of the literature shows that scholars and DDR practitioners are divided in their opinions as regard to the actual place of reinsertion in the DDR process. Porto *et al.*, (2007: 19) give credence to my contention as they argue that, oftentimes in the literature, reinsertion and reintegration are conflated. On the contrary, Hazen (2011: 110) notes that ‘the R of DDR has in practice represented “reinsertion” not “reintegration”’. Consequently, while from the point of view of the UN IDDRS (2006) reinsertion is an integral part of demobilisation and therefore not a separate phase other scholars, however, contend that it is, or should be, a phase and possibly the last in the DDR process or part of reintegration (Civic and Miklaucic, 2011: xix).

Supporters of the above position argue that it will enable the delinking of reintegration from the DDR process and in this case reintegration will be concerned with the wider issues of post-conflict peacebuilding (Hazen, 2011: 121- 123). Looking at the practice of DDR today, I will argue that it may be inappropriate to regard reinsertion as an activity within demobilisation, given the fact that payment of reinsertion allowance can last up to one year. Meanwhile, when demobilisation and reinsertion are compared; demobilisation is a much more limited time frame activity. Consequently, for a more effective and result oriented DDR, I concur with the school of thought that argues for reinsertion becoming the terminal phase of the DDR process while reintegration should be made a separate programme focusing on the broader developmental issues and challenges confronting post-conflict societies (Ball & Goor, 2006: 3).

Reintegration

Reintegration is the last phase of the DDR process. The UN IDDRS (2006) defines it as follows:

Reintegration is the processes by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance (UN IDDRS, 1. 10. 2006: 2).

The current literature shows that reintegration has social, economic and political dimensions. Colleta *et al.*, for example, assert that:

Social and political reintegration is broadly defined as the acceptance of an ex-combatant and his or her family by the host community and its leaders. Economic reintegration implies the financial independence of an ex-combatant's household through productive and gainful employment (Colleta *et al.*, 1996: 18).

It is worth noting that reintegration is a complex multidimensional issue posing more daunting challenges than disarmament and demobilisation. On the other hand, I am of the strong opinion that the standard linear approach to DDR as the UN IDDRS tends to portray it, undermines its effectiveness by making it appear like a technical programme instead of a process thereby weakening the mutually reinforcing linkages between the different phases of the DDR process. My opinion is supported by Hazen (2011: 112) who posits 'early versions of DDR tended to emphasize the process as linear...' thereby failing to emphasise the mutually reinforcing connection between its different phases. Perhaps, it is in cognizance of this that the United Nations Security Council (UN SC) (2000: 2) later observed that DDR should not be a mere series of occurrences, but rather, a continuum of mutually reinforcing and overlapping activities whereby the success of each phase depends on, and impacts, on the other.

Before I conclude, an important concept in the DDR debate is demilitarisation. Demilitarisation involves a continuing decrease in the numerical size/strength, and domineering power and influence of the military in state and society affairs; a reduction in the allocation of scarce financial resources to the military sector; and its application to civilian needs (Lamb, 2000: 121; Batchelor & Kingma, 2004: 4 and Porto *et al.*, 2007: 11). Demilitarisation is equally carried out to entrench a

culture of peace and a nonviolent approach to resolving conflict (Batchelor & Kingma, 2004: 4). It is a difficult concept to operationalize because it has both quantitative and qualitative values or dimensions. The quantitative value and dimension have to do with the process of reduction in budgetary allocation and spending on the military sector in the long term and the numerical downsizing of the military which can be measured over time (Ibid.: 5). The qualitative value or dimension is more cultural and ideological in nature, such as a reduction in violent approaches to resolving conflict (Ibid.).

In my view, the key discerning issue in defining demilitarisation is that its implementation may or may not be part of post-conflict peacebuilding orthodoxy. Which implies that it can be implemented not necessarily in the aftermath of a violent conflict. It aims to right-size the armed forces of a given country with a view to cutting down the financial allocation to the military sector and redirecting it to human security needs, and taming the overbearing influence of the military in state and society affairs. Demilitarisation is not always detrimental to military capability and effectiveness when size reduction is intended to contribute to improving combat efficiency. However, the connection between DDR and demilitarisation is tricky. This is because oftentimes it is tempting to equate DDR to demilitarisation even though the successful completion of the technical stages of DDR may not be sufficient to result in meaningful demilitarisation in the true sense of it. This is particularly the case when DDR involves the merger of forces or reintegration of demobilised ex-combatants into the national army which may even result in a bloated military force.

It is also important that the term **ex-combatant** is properly conceptualised in view of its analytical relevance, utility and the recurrent manner it will be used in this study. Particularly, as argued by McMullin (2013:20) the way the term 'ex-combatant' is used in the DDR literature portrays a homogenous collection of former fighters or soldiers. Conversely, he contends that ex-combatants represent a heterogeneous group of ex-fighters or soldiers. According to him:

...the term itself describes a heterogeneous collective of former fighters from very different contexts and who differ from one another in key respects as well, such as rank, type of military organization in which they fought, combat role, political ideology, age, gender, extent of post-war disability, ethnicity, and level of educational or professional attainment and experience. Literature and practice have coalesced around the conclusion

that some ex-combatants are more 'vulnerable' than others... (Mcmullin, 2013: 20).

Consequently, the heterogeneous nature of the group informs the need to properly conceptualise it. In this regard, Engeland (2011: 30) defines ex-combatants in relation to the definition of combatant in Article 4a of the Third Geneva Convention (GCIII) and 43 API. The convention defines combatants as:

1. Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a party to the conflict and operating in or outside their territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
 - (a). That of being commanded by the person *responsible* for his subordinates.
 - (b). That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.
 - (c). That of carrying arms openly.
 - (d). That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war (*ibid.*).

Similarly, according to Engeland (2011: 30) Article 43 API defines armed forces and therefore provides further insight about who a combatant is:

1. The armed forces of a party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct... [of] its subordinates...
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict... are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate in hostilities.
3. ... [When] a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall... [be granted the status of combatant].

Against this background, within the context of this study, the above definition of combatant will be used while the appellation *ex-combatant* will be applied to denote combatants that have relinquished their combatant status, and have undergone or are in the process of undergoing DDR.

It is also pertinent to further conceptualise the term *militia* given the recurrent manner it features in the definition of who a combatant is. On their part Ikelegbe and Okumu suggest that:

A militia is an armed force of ordinary persons... engaged in combat or fighting or that resorts to violence to attain certain objectives. This presupposes first that it is a civil force or a privately organised group of

armed persons and second that it is largely an informally organised force whose structures, hierarchies, commands, procedures and processes are usually not fixed and rigid. Third, it is generally mobilised voluntarily on the basis of some common identity challenges or general concerns and threats (Ikelegbe and Okumu, 2010: 4).

The key characteristics of a militia group include being an irregular force or not part of the regular military force, informal, private in nature, illegal, illegitimate, and clandestine in nature (Ibid). While in terms of purpose and goals, militias usually aim at ‘...projecting or protecting, and fighting for and defending certain private, group, communal, ethnic, religious, sectional, regional, national, regime or related interest that may concern power and resources struggles, security and safety’ (Ikelegbe and Okumu, 2010: 4). However, in my view, Francis (2005: 1) provided a more insightful conceptual definition of militia with more empirical and analytical relevance for this study when he argues that ‘civil militias have emerged as the most vexing security problem faced by contemporary Africa. The problems, challenges and implications posed by civil militias have converted them into Africa’s intractable security menace’ (Ibid.). Francis categorises militias into two, First Generation and Second-Generation militias. According to him:

The First Generation definition of militias presents the view that these are an organised group of citizens mobilised to provide military service; that they are trained as soldiers, but not part of a regular army, and are regarded as a supplementary force or reserve army organised by the state or government (my emphasis). In addition, they are composed of non-professional soldiers, retired, expelled or trained soldiers, often called upon in cases of emergency or crisis, or to protect government or communities. As an irregular or reserve force, their role is to undertake an emergency support task, often of a military nature (Francis, 2005: 2).

Francis argues that the above conceptualisation of First Generation Militias suggests certain things; firstly that ‘enlistment is voluntary’ even though he acknowledges the fact that in some states such as the United States the constitution empowers the state to call physically abled civilians eligible by law for military service. But more importantly he posits that:

Secondly, it assumes that since militias are established by states, they are, therefore, regulated and accountable to the state, implying that the state has monopoly over... threat, or the use, of force within its territory. Thirdly, since they are established by the state for a specific purpose, civil militias are based on a state-centric interpretation of security, with the state as the

primary security provider with militias never intended to usurp the role of the regular forces, or contest the dominance of the state (Ibid).

Suffice to say that Francis's conceptualisation of First Generation militias clearly suggests that they do not pose any threat to state legitimacy and its monopoly of force. Conversely, Francis posits that the above traditional or First Generation understanding of militias does not fit into '... the context of complex political emergencies and conflict-prone and weak states in Africa and other developing regions of the world' (Ibid). In other words, 'the changed conflict and international security environment of the post-Cold War period limits the applicability of the traditional interpretation of militias' (Ibid). Thus, giving rise to the new concept of Second Generation militias. The main feature of the Second-Generation militias is that '...it is context specific and applies to conflict-prone, war-torn societies, post-conflict or transition societies, and in general weak and failed state' (Ibid). Consequently, he argues that:

The Second Generation militias comprise citizens, including young people and unemployed youths, marginalised and dissatisfied with the prebendal state. Civil militias... are organised by a diverse group of interest and stakeholders, including governments or regimes in power, mostly with no constitutional provision or legislation legalising their existence. This type of militia could be categorised as state or government sponsored. Other diverse interests include non-state and sub-national group militias (sometimes referred to as ethnic militias) ...Whilst those specifically established as pro-government auxiliary or reserve forces have some form of military training, those organised by other interest groups often do not have any military training provision, and even when they do have, it takes the form of basic training sometimes limited to the use of small arms and light weapons. These types of militias mushroom in weak, failed and collapsed states, where the authority and legitimacy of the government or the state is contested, and where the state does not have control or monopoly of the threat or the use of force...The demonstrable efficacy of some of these civil militias in crime and war fighting has led to the situation whereby they usurp the security provision of the state and even undermine the effectiveness of the security functions of the state (Francis, 2005: 2-3).

Suffice to say that when carefully analysed, Akaruese (2003: 218), Ikelegbe and Okumu (2010: 4) conceptualisations of militias is in tandem with Francis's typology and conceptualisation of Second Generation militias. Consequently, the concept of militias will be applied in this study in line with the definition provided by Francis, and what empirical implication the concept has for the DDR process

and indeed the Niger Delta DDR programme will be explored further in subsequent chapters of this study.

2.4. Review of Relevant Disarmament Literature

Disarmament is the first phase in the DDR process (Özerdem, 2009: 14) and is accorded the most priority, most likely because post-conflict societies are in a state of what Hayes and Sands (1997: 819) defined as a complex humanitarian emergency that requires urgent intervention in terms of security stabilisation. The disarmament phase of the DDR process comprises of four main activities, namely, the collection of information and operational planning, weapons collection operations, stockpile management and destruction (UN IDDRS, 2006). A lot of scholarly and policy-related work on disarmament focus on planning considerations and challenges to disarmament while others pay attention to the kind of incentives that can be used to motivate ex-combatants to disarm and the methods by which the weapons collected are to be handled or disposed of. Thus, the review here is structured around these key themes.

2.4.1. Disarmament: Planning Considerations and Implementation Challenges

One important study in this area is Berdal (1996: 9-23) who argues that DDR planners should take due cognizance of the environmental context in which disarmament is to take place. He asserts that 'only with a clear appreciation of the context of such attempts at disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration can some of the 'features' that have made success so 'inherently difficult' be identified and their negative influence on a peace process be mitigated' (Berdal, 1996: 9). A key contextual issue Berdal raises is whether disarmament is to be undertaken in an environment of fragmented political authority or near condition of a failed state (Berdal, 1996: 10-11). Disarmament in this context will be difficult and may require an international intervention force with enforcement capacity if it is to succeed. Others have highlighted the challenges involved when DDR is undertaken in a domestic environment characterised by a security dilemma, thus making securing cooperation between warring parties in the DDR process extremely difficult (Jervis, 1978: 167-214 and Nalbandov, 2010: 49).

Related to this is the question of whether disarmament is to be undertaken in an environment of protracted violent communal and ethnoreligious conflict characterised by deep-seated issues such as identity, horizontal inequality and

power asymmetry among the various conflicting parties (Berdal, 1996: 9-18). As Berdal notes, this type of context can undermine the smooth conduct of disarmament because it makes the cultivation of mutual trust and confidence difficult to achieve between the various armed groups, and even when achieved, sustaining it remains a serious challenge. Equally, Berdal maintains that it becomes more difficult to implement disarmament if the armed forces to be disarmed and the national government were involved in the perpetration of human rights violations against each other, making their reintegration into a new armed force very difficult (Ibid.).

A further contextual issue he notes is that of the economies of conflict that develop during a conflict. Berdal postulates that 'viewed as an 'alternative system', war and organised violence can powerfully benefit certain groups and interests while a transition to peace is likely adversely to affect their privileged status' (Berdal, 1996: 15). This type of environment serves as a disincentive to armed groups to submit to disarmament and demobilisation as the key beneficiaries work towards sustaining the war. Berdal's assertion is reiterated by Keen (1998: 12) who argues that 'increasingly, civil wars that appear to have begun with political aims have mutated into conflicts in which short-term economic benefits are paramount.' Consequently, in this kind of environment 'persuading combatants, and also civilians, to give up their arms is often difficult, not least because weapons possession can often be valued for ... economic... [and] security purposes...' (Ginifer *et al.*, 2004: 3).

The implication of these assertions is that it is necessary when planning for a DDR to decipher the economic agendas or motivations that underpin combatants' will to fight and devise ways of adequately responding to them, as failure to do that could be counterproductive to such an effort. Likewise, it is important to note the interest of other beneficiaries of the conflict economy who can act as spoilers to undermine the DDR process. This raises the important question of to what extent the Niger Delta DDR programme considered 'illegal oil bunkering' (oil theft) in the region, which the International Crisis Group (2006: i) asserted is the major economy that sustains the conflict by providing militants and criminal syndicates the money to procure arms.

Furthermore, when planning for disarmament, cognizance should be taken of the extent of arms proliferation, which refers to weapons abundance, circulation and

the ease with which they can be obtained from the *local, regional and international environment* (Berdal, 1996: 18 and Spear, 2007: 11-14). Berdal contends that disarmament will be ineffective when planners fail to investigate the sources of arms proliferation, develop and enforce measures to checkmate it. Most often it is difficult to enforce measures against proliferation because of the enormous logistical, financial, and political commitment required. Other factors that militate against efforts at controlling arms proliferation are the decentralised nature of arms manufacturing and trade with over three hundred companies spread over fifty countries across the globe all engaged in arms production (Berdal, 1996: 18).

However, apart from the planning stage of disarmament, even at the level of execution the environment still presents an important challenge. Important studies by Spear (2002: 150-153) and (2007: 11-14) identify different levels of the environment and how each one can constitute a serious challenge to the success of disarmament and demobilisation. According to Spear (2002: 150-151):

Analysis of the implementation environment must include several levels: individual (the psychological impact that the civil war has had upon both combatants and non-combatants), local, national, regional and international. In many ways these levels are interconnected, as a failure at one level can impact the pursuit of implementation at another level. For example, a re-ignition of conflict at the local level might result in withdrawal of support for a settlement by regional sponsors and international donors.

Against this backdrop, Spear argues that the cultural role that guns play in the *local environment* can undermine the success of disarmament. Particularly she contends that pastoral and hunting societies tend to place a high premium on gun ownership. Likewise, Kingma (1997: 157), Spear (2007: 3) and Stibbe (2012: 2) all reiterate the fact that disarming a civilian population can be hindered if gun possession is viewed as a cultural right or norm. Consequently, implementing an ambitious disarmament programme in such societies is particularly challenging. Thus, according to Shibuya (2012: 28) both at the level of planning and execution, the following pertinent question ‘what “value” does the weapon have in the cultural context of the combatants and the larger population...’ must be taken into consideration by DDR practitioners.

In my view, to enhance the prospects of successful disarmament where it is confirmed that gun ownership is deeply rooted in a society’s culture, a process of

public enlightenment should be pursued concurrently alongside disarmament. A similar suggestion is offered by Shibuya (2012: 53) when he argues that 'a more conscious understanding of notions of masculinity and the aspects that can be emphasized to reduce violence rather than glorify it would greatly enhance the effectiveness of any disarmament program'. In my opinion, public education could be complemented with gun control laws that restrict carrying arms to public places in order to enhance public safety.

At the level of the *national environment*, the instability that characterised the national environment in which disarmament and demobilisation are conducted is another important consideration (Spear, 2002: 151). According to Spear, in the aftermath of war, two dimensions of the national implementation environment are critical to disarmament and demobilisation. One, it could be a situation where a negotiated settlement has been achieved between the warring parties leading to the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement; in this case, there is no clear victor. In this type of setting, Spear maintains that power is dispersed, with the state very weak and its prerogative of the legitimate use of force contested and challenged by several splinter armed groups (Spear, 2007: 12).

In my view, such an environment poses a serious challenge and difficulty for planners to determine and enforce the inclusion and exclusion criteria for entry into the DDR process. This was aptly demonstrated in the Liberian DDR process where the criterion was strict at the beginning but later weakened in order to accommodate more entrants (Paes, 2005: 254; Jennings, 2007: 207-209 & Jennings, 2008: 329-330).

Likewise, at the level of *regional security and environment*, several studies have demonstrated how regional dynamics can undermine disarmament and demobilisation programmes. An important study in this regard is Colleta *et al.*, who argue that regional security situations can positively enhance or endanger the process of disarmament and demobilisation as experiences in Africa have shown:

...regional security developments can promote or undermine a DRP [demobilization and reintegration program]. For example, the deterioration in relations between Sudan and Eritrea has delayed completion of the demobilisation process in the latter. Similarly, increasing security concerns on Uganda's northern border have forced the remobilization of some Ugandan ex-combatants into home guards and local defense units, and

conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone are linked by armies that know no borders (Colleta *et al.*, 1996: 7).

On her part, Spear (2002: 152-153) argues that the result of disarmament will be more effective and sustainable if there is a strong regional cooperation that ensures that arms will not be supplied to warring parties for them to rearm and remobilise. This is because '...the market for light weapons is very permissive, and without the support of regional...players for an embargo on light-weapons supplies into the state undertaking the peace settlement, disarmament efforts may be undermined...' (Spear, 2002:153).

In another vein, a study by Pugh *et al.*, (2004: 24-35) demonstrates how the regional dimensions of conflict can produce a regional war economy and insecurity which can undermine the process of post-conflict transformation. Pugh *et al.*, also argue that endemic conflict at a wider regional level can produce regional conflict complexes and networks of multidimensional activities that in the long run can constitute obstacles to the process of post-conflict transformation. In their analysis, Pugh *et al.*, assert that the regional elements of conflict complexes have four mutually reinforcing interlocking elements, namely, economic networks, military networks, political networks and social networks. Indeed, Funmi and Alao (2005: 244) demonstrate the potency of the above argument by showing how regional conflict complexes in the Mano River Union countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire) created a regional political economy of arms, transnational criminal gangs and the crisscrossing of combatants that undermined the DDR process in the region, a position also supported by Özerdem (2009: 143-144).

The international environment has been an important challenge to the conduct of successful disarmament, and in this regard, Colleta *et al.*, (1996: x) argue that critical to achieving demilitarisation in Sub-Saharan Africa is the need to contain the extent to which destructive weapons flow into the region from the international system. Colleta *et al.*, also suggest that 'world suppliers of arms continue to sell large quantities of military hardware to Sub-Saharan Africa, and this could be an obstacle to a rapid transition to peace' (Colleta *et al.*, 1996: x). Similarly, Spear (2002: 153) posits that 'the failure of the international community to adopt and abide by an arms embargo may undermine a peace process.' Spear cites the

case of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel forces who despite being placed under an arms embargo continued to have access to sophisticated weapons (Ibid).

Apart from environmental considerations, basic information is required for the planning and conduct of successful disarmament (UN IDDRS, 2006). The contention here is that prior to the launching of a disarmament programme, a pre-disarmament census/verification of existing armed groups, their strength, place of deployment, weaponry and the various sites they are kept is of critical importance. Beyond that, this information is needed to evaluate whether targets have been met after disarmament and demobilisation have been concluded. For instance, the UN SC (2000: 3) asserts that the success of DDR is dependent on the accuracy of information collected from the various parties regarding the size and location of their personnel and weapons. The UNSC's position is further supported by Shibuya (2012: 26-27) who insists that 'disarmament is ineffective without proper information collection.' The veracity of this assertion is demonstrated by Asuni's (2011: 159) examination of a DDR programme initiated in the Rivers state Niger Delta region of Nigeria in 2004. The study revealed that the absence of reliable data on the various armed groups to be disarmed undermined the effectiveness of the programme and eventually resulted in the resurgence of violence in the state. Consequently, one pertinent issue to be examined in this thesis is the extent to which the current DDR intervention in the Niger Delta has guarded against such an error? However, oftentimes the possibility of conducting accurate verification and census prior to disarmament may be a near impossibility due to the precarious security situation of war-torn societies as was the case in Sierra Leone's DDR (Özerdem, 2009: 130).

An important planning consideration is the need to determine appropriate eligibility criteria for acceptance into the DDR process. This has to do with the evidence that combatants should be required to present in order to be accepted into the DDR process. According to Colleta *et al.*, (1996: 8) the criteria should be non-discriminatory in nature so as not to deliberately exclude some armed groups based on their ethnicity, region and gender which can, in turn, jeopardise the entire peace process. A further challenge in designing eligibility criteria is the issue of child soldiers that emanates from the lack of a common acceptable

definition. Wessels (2006: 5-7) points out that the concept of the child soldier has cultural relativity and therefore lacks universal definition which can result in the exclusion of children and female soldiers from entering the DDR process. My overview of the literature shows that agreeing on eligibility criteria has always been a serious challenge for DDR planners, and the failure to get it right has often produced a problem in the subsequent phases of the DDR process as in the case of Liberia (Jennings, 2008: 329-330). Consequently, the question that this raised for the study is how the planners of the Niger Delta DDR programme arrived at the eligibility criteria and how these criteria impacted upon the subsequent phases of the programme?

A peace agreement is a key requirement for undertaking a successful traditional disarmament and demobilisation programme (Spear, 2007: 9 & Özerdem, 2009: 16). Berdal (1996: 9-10) on his part contends that since 1989 most disarmament and demobilisation programmes were implemented as part of a comprehensive peace agreement usually negotiated with the support of the international community and spearheaded either by the UN or the party that achieved military victory. Ong (2012: 55-56) argues that a peace agreement contributes to successful disarmament because it lays the framework and strategy for achieving appropriate results; identifying the armed groups to be disarmed; the extent of coverage and eligibility criteria; and the time frame and institutional mechanisms for execution. However, the viability of a peace agreement to contribute to successful disarmament and demobilisation depends on how inclusive it is in terms of addressing the key concerns of the warring parties, the degree of political commitment and compliance to the agreement by warring parties, the ability to manage 'spoilers', the level of international support and the availability of resources amongst others (Kingma, 1997: 158-163). Oftentimes, despite all the arguments in favour of a peace agreement as a precondition for traditional DDR, the seeds for unsuccessful disarmament are in the very peace agreement that produces it due to the several conceptual ambiguities contained within it. An example of this is the disarmament and demobilisation experience in Mozambique (Spear, 2002: 148-149). However, beyond the existence of a peace agreement, the success of disarmament and demobilisation very much depends on the extent of political will demonstrated by parties that are signatories to the agreement (Kingma, 1997: 158 and Knight, 2008: 46).

This suggests that irrespective of how comprehensive a peace agreement is, what matters, in the long run, is the will and determination of warring parties to go through with it. As Colleta, *et al.*, (1996: 1-2) contend 'strong political will and leadership, expressed in terms of commitment, realism, and pragmatism, are crucial factors for successful programme implementation.' Political will is pertinent because the implementation of a disarmament and demobilisation programme is characterised by several unforeseen circumstances, which can weaken and put to test the commitment of the various warring parties. In line with this, Spear (2002: 155-156) emphasises that 'if there is a will for peace, problems at other points in the implementation process, for example, resources constraints and minor instances of cheating, can be overcome.' Similarly, the UNSC (2000: 1) asserts that 'the foundation of a successful disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration is the political will of the parties to commit themselves to peace.' In response to some of these conundrums, Toft (2010a: 7-36 and 2010b: 1-4) reasons that disarmament and demobilisation are more likely to succeed when there is an adequate balance of carrots and sticks in the peace agreement. Consequently, for a peace agreement to engender successful disarmament and demobilisation it must be explicit in terms of the 'mutual benefit and mutual harm' to warring parties that may comply or fail to comply (Toft, 2010b: 1). In this light, Toft advocates for a new strategic framework for ending civil wars and achieving disarmament and demobilisation; a hybrid strategy that concurrently integrates the elements of negotiated settlement and military victory (Ibid.: 4). Supporting Toft's position, Stankovic argues that:

DDR programs are often designed to induce combatants' participation and as such rely mainly on providing benefits to ex-combatants. An optimal DDR program, however, must ensure not only combatants' participation but also their compliance with program requirements. To meet these objectives, it is essential that DDR programs employ robust strategies that include both benefits and sanctions. While benefits are efficient in ensuring participation, sanctions are crucial in preventing noncompliance (Stankovic, 2015: 704).

The extent to which peace agreement if any has influenced the Niger Delta ADDR programme will be explored in subsequent chapters of this thesis.

Finally, a growing body of literature claims that maximising the gains of disarmament and demobilisation is contingent on developing a synergy between DDR and security sector reform (SSR). Indeed, the linkage between SSR and

DDR becomes more important when the state armed forces and other security institutions need to be reconstituted and re-professionalised, to enable them to face the challenge of providing security in the post-conflict era or if some of the demobilised ex-combatants are to be reintegrated into the armed forces and other state security services. Some of the leading advocates of maximising synergy between SSR and DDR are Bryden (2007: 3) and Bryden and Scherrer (2012: 3-27) who argue that DDR and SSR share the common goal of re-establishing security and stability in post-conflict societies. Consequently, taking full advantage of the likely synergy between DDR and SSR is indispensable to the restoration of peace, security and stability in post-conflict states (Bryden, 2007: 3).

In a similar vein, McFate (2010: 1-15), posits that DDR and SSR are premised on the same objective of restoring and strengthening of the state's monopoly of force and rule of law. Indeed, Bryden and Scherrer (2012: 3) maintain that '... failure to account for the nexus between DDR and SSR can yield negative consequences for security more generally.' Surprisingly, planners of DDR and SSR often work in isolation and as a result, the two interventions can be implemented without proper and adequate coordination between them. Whenever one succeeds and the other fails, the goal of establishing security and stability will be jeopardised as the experience in Afghanistan has illustrated (Mcfate, 2010: 2-3). This clearly suggests that while DDR may succeed in retrieving arms from militias; the failure of the security sector to provide adequate security to the citizenry in the face of a security dilemma could trigger a process of re-armament and re-militarisation.

2.4.2. Incentives and Motivations in Disarmament

This section of the review focuses on the kind of incentives to be offered to combatants in order to serve as an adequate motivation for them to disarm and sustain their commitment to peace and not return to violence. According to Douglas, *et al* (2004: 41) weapons for food/goods, weapons for development and the exchange of weapons for cash are the common incentives used in DDR.

Similarly, an approach known as *weapons in competition for development*² is being suggested (Ibid.) However, among these incentives, a commonly applied one that has gained popularity has been ‘the weapon buyback’ in other words weapons for cash programme. According to Tanner (1996: 185) and Isima (2004: 3) it is an approach whereby economic incentive, particularly cash payments are extended to combatants in order to encourage them to undergo the process of disarmament and demobilisation.

Berdal (1996: 33) has suggested that the practice is premised on the assumption that ‘... weapons usually have an economic as well as security value’. As a result, monetary compensation should be given to motivate combatants to renounce violence and commit to the disarmament and demobilisation process. Its efficacy was tested with reasonable success in El Salvador where cash was given in exchange for guns (Jeong, 2005: 51). Recent examples of arms buy-back disarmament programmes in Africa (albeit not as successful as in the case of El Salvador) include Liberia in 2003 and Cote d’Ivoire in 2004 (Omach, 2012: 89). Other forms of economic inducement applied include the food for guns’ programme implemented in Somalia which recorded a clear success (Tanner, 1996: 185). As earlier mentioned, another economic inducement mechanism highlighted in the literature is the ‘weapons for development programme’ which was implemented in Mali in the middle of 1997; whereby the locating of community development projects and the distribution of goods and services were traded for weapons after the signing of a peace pact between the government and rebel forces (Ibid.: 89).

Suffice to say that it is important to take into cognizance the underlying economic agendas of warring parties in conflict when determining the appropriate economic inducement to be offered to them to disarm. In line with this, Spear (2006a: 168-189 and 2006b: 63-80) identifies three different levels of combatants with varying economic motives behind their involvement in armed violence. The first group is the *leadership* who presides over large fighting groups with numerous commanders under their control and engages in high-level economic predation in cahoots with national, regional and international criminal networks. The second

² According to Douglas *et al*, (2004: 41) *weapons in competition for development*, ‘...targets two communities of similar size and divides the funds available for development proportionally between them, according to the percentage of weapons handed in by each community.’

group is the middle-level officers heading fighting units, who exercised command and control over fighting forces and so benefit immensely from the war and its booty. While the last category is that of the individual fighters (foot soldiers) whose motive many argue is often predatory as witnessed during the civil wars in Sierra-Leone and Liberia. Wennmann (2011: 24-24) also argues that armed violence is lucrative and provides a steady means of living for insurgents and so they are less likely to respond positively to a ceasefire that does not offer high rewards relative to the option of continuing fighting. Wennmann further argues that the basis of initiating any engagement with insurgents to demobilise is not the acclaimed 'mutually *hurting* stalemate, but a mutually *profitable* stalemate' (Ibid.: 24). Therefore, both Spear and Wennmann are of the contention that disarmament and demobilisation are more likely to succeed if reasonable economic incentives are offered, commensurate to the economic benefits accruing to the various levels of fighters/leadership in an insurgent movement. The debate on economic incentives raises the pertinent question of the extent to which the Niger Delta DDR programme adequately attended to the underlying economic motives of the various categories of fighters in the conflict. To what extent has the economic dividend of peace in the Niger Delta outweighed the temptation of returning to violence as a means of livelihood? This question will be explored further in this thesis.

At the same time, though, the effectiveness of economic incentives such as 'arms buy back' during disarmament and demobilisation has been contested. According to Douglas *et al*, (2004: 41) 'the effects of buy-back programmes are short-term and not sustainable.'. Indeed, the UN IDDRS posits that:

Recent field report indicates that 'Buy-back' schemes rarely have the desired effect; instead, old and unserviceable weapons are often submitted to allow combatants to enter the demobilisation phase while commanders hold on to serviceable weapons as protection in case of the failure of the peace process (UN IDDRS, 4. 20. 2006: 5).

Also, Ginifer *et al.*, (2004: 4); Willibald (2006: 325) and Knight (2008: 47) all argue that cash payments to ex-combatants during disarmament tends to lift them above other victims of conflict in society, thereby creating resentment against them which jeopardises their reintegration. Consequently, Knight suggests that:

... it is probably better to utilize in-kind assistance or other forms of material support that would also have benefits for the community at large

and not just for the ex-combatant. When monetary incentives are considered necessary, they should be made in small payments over a longer period to assure a peaceful resettlement (Knight, 2008: 47).

Other scholars have contested the undue emphasis on monetary inducement during disarmament and demobilisation. A leading voice is Walter (1997: 335-364; 1999: 129-130 and 2002: 3-43) who argues that whenever combatants are called to demobilise in the context of a negotiated war to peace transition they are confronted with a security dilemma, which revolves around the fact that:

...civil war opponents are asked to do what they consider unthinkable. At a time when no legitimate government and no legal institutions exist to enforce a contract, they are asked to demobilize, disarm, and disengage their military forces and prepare for peace. But once they lay down their weapons and begin to integrate their separate assets into a new united state, it becomes almost impossible to either enforce future cooperation or survive attack. In the end, negotiations fail because civil war adversaries cannot credibly promise to abide by such dangerous terms (Walter, 1997: 335-336).

In other words, warring factions fear that as they ‘...hand in their weapons, and surrender occupied territory, they become increasingly vulnerable to a surprise attack’ (Walter, 2002: 21). What Walter suggests in all these assertions is that the combatants’ main concern, when asked to demobilise and disarm, is whether their personal security can be guaranteed in the absence of a legitimate authority. Consequently, Walter contends that given this circumstance, the greatest incentive and primary concern for warring parties to disarm and demobilise is, if their personal security will be assured during the treacherous demobilisation period. According to Walter, ‘the first and most critical is a third-party security guarantee to protect against a surprise attack during demobilization’ (Walter, 2002: 26). She further explains that ‘third party guarantors can change the level of fear and insecurity that accompanies treaty implementation and thus facilitate settlement... Third parties, ...can guarantee that groups will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, and promises will be kept...’ (Walter, 1997: 340). Lending credence to Walter’s assertion, Nilsson posits that:

It ...is essential to ensure the physical security of ex-combatants when they return to civilian life. If this is not done, it will not only be difficult to persuade combatants to disarm, there is also a high probability that already disarmed and demobilised combatants will rearm themselves (Nilsson, 2005: 40).

In a related argument, Hill (1999: 57-82) explains that while the resolution of the security dilemma is essential, it is not the only incentive needed to woo combatants to disarm and demobilise. Instead, the ability of the United Nations to ensure the simultaneous implementation of a twin track approach to a peace accord is far more significant. The first dimension of the twin track peace accord ‘...involves overcoming their [referring to the combatants] security dilemmas ...’ (Hill, 1999: 62), while the second track ‘...addresses the political and economic aspirations of the parties, so as to ameliorate to the greatest extent possible the root causes of the conflict’ (ibid.). What this implies is that the greatest incentive to disarmament and demobilisation is to guarantee the security of the ex-combatants’ as well as resolving the underlying socio-economic and political grievances that led to the conflict. On the other hand, Hoddie and Hartzell (2003: 303-320) argue that the best way to address the security dilemma that discourages ex-combatants from disarming and demobilising is to ensure that the peace accord provides for institutional power sharing arrangements in the post-war military, political and economic institutions. This will give all the warring parties a near equal stake in the post-war political, military and economic power dispensation, and so warring parties will feel more secure if all of them have a stake in the post-war power equation (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2005: 21-40; 2006: 155-167 & Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007: 3).

However, power sharing as a solution to the security dilemma has been criticised on the basis that it only empowers ethnic elites or warlords to the detriment of the low-ranking members of the warring parties; in essence, it only consolidates elites’ power dominance in post-war societies (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005: 28-82). Corroborating this position, Jennings (2008: 340) argues that appointing elite or middle-level commanders into lucrative positions in government and the state security apparatus is often a compromise used as an inducement during disarmament. However, it undermines the genuine reintegration of foot soldiers because ‘the “big men” in command before or during the war continue to assert authority and enrich themselves, generating cynicism while reinforcing the message already implicit in DDR that conflict is rewarding, especially for those at the top’ (Jennings, 2008: 340). Sriram (2008: 1) provides a further critique of the supposed motivating and stabilising effect of power sharing by arguing that it has the potential to lead to instability instead of stability because ‘... power-sharing

and similar incentives can often reify existing cleavages in societies, increasing rather than decreasing the risk of conflict.’ Thus, a pertinent question that will be explored further in this thesis is to what extent did the Niger Delta DDR programme address the militants’ security concerns as well as the underlying grievances that led to the conflict?

2.4.3. Management and Handling of Weapons Collected During Disarmament

According to Muggah (2006: 190-205) not much priority is given to the safe custody of the weapons collected during disarmament. Reiterating Muggah’s assertion, Ginifer *et al.*, (2004: 4) point out that ‘when SALW have been collected during DDR programmes they have frequently not been stored in secured and safe facilities. Thus, collected arms have often been reclaimed, stolen or recycled into criminal networks and militias.’ This has serious implications for security because criminal syndicates tend to cash in on the situation, giving credence to Muggah’s assertion that the implementation of peace agreements, DDR and weapons reduction programmes do not necessarily result in a direct improvement in civilian security in the post-conflict era. Furthermore, Shibuya (2012: 42-47) contends that disarmament usually results in the concentration of large stockpiles of weapons collected in one place, making them a target for potential peace spoilers and criminally minded groups in society. Consequently, one way to ensure security and confidence during disarmament is the use of the “double key” technique (Shibuya, 2012: 43). This is a method whereby the armoury is locked with two different keys and two different individuals one from the ex-combatants’ commander’s side and government or international observers each holding a key. This method ensures that no party can have access to the armoury without the other.

Several alternative options for handling weapons collected have been suggested in the literature, one of which is transferring them to newly formed armed forces, as exemplified by the 1992 UN Mission in Mozambique (Ibid.: 42). Another method of handling weapons collected is for them to be publicly destroyed which is highly symbolic in terms of confidence building and restoring a sense of security amongst the stakeholders and citizenry (Ibid.: 42-43). Generally, thirteen different methods of destroying weapons with varying degree of advantages and

disadvantages have been identified in the literature (Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004: 37-38). Consequently, the extent to which adequate measures were taken to ensure that weapons collected during the Niger Delta ADDR programme did not get into the hands of unscrupulous persons in society will be explored further in this study.

2.5. Review of Relevant Literature Demobilisation

In this part of the review, the debate on demobilisation will be synthesised according to the following theme: conventional versus nonconventional perspectives on demobilisation, demobilisation with or without cantonment and the payment of reinsertion allowance during demobilisation.

2.5.1. Conventional Versus Nonconventional Perspectives on Demobilisation

In conventional DDR practice; after combatants are disarmed, they must formally demobilise by disbanding their military organisation and existing command and control structures, as well as release from the command and control of their commanders (Berdal, 1996: 39; Özerdem, 2009: 18-19; Muggah, 2009: 131-132; Alden *et al.*, 2011: 14; Omach, 2012: 90). These scholars maintain that failure to disband and break the command and control structures could undermine the peace process because the ex-combatants could constitute themselves into 'spoilers' by remobilising with the aim of returning to arm violence. Therefore, within the framework of conventional DDR, the empirical conduct of demobilisation must always aim at achieving absolute disbandment of all existing armed groups as well as discharging individual ex-combatants to their respective communities. Achieving this is fundamental to the attainment of stability particularly when the DDR participants are largely members of Second Generation militias as earlier conceptualised in this chapter.

However, a crucial aspect that is neglected during demobilisation is the psychosocial dimension which has to do with demilitarising the mindset of the ex-combatants. In line with this, Hansen (2000: 42) argues that demilitarisation '... comprises a psychological dimension that aims at reversing the development towards a culture of violence.' This is equally supported by Malan (2000: 10-11) who argues that when it comes to demobilisation, there is undue emphasis on

the quantitative dimension. Consequently, Malan stresses the need to transform the psychological thinking of former combatants from violent ways of doing things instead of focusing on weapons collection and dismantlement of the command and control structure and retrieval of military accoutrements. Demilitarising the mindset is critical to achieving stability because it is not the number of weapons in circulation or finger behind the trigger that determines the level of violence but the mindset. Thus, my contention is that; if ex-combatants continuously consider violence as a viable means of resolving conflict the possibility of re-mobilisation will be much easier even after existing command and control structures have been successfully dismantled. This suggests that commensurate emphasis should also be accorded to the psychological dimension of demobilisation during DDR by de-militarising the mindset of ex-combatants.

On the other hand, from the nonconventional perspective, some scholars have also questioned the assumption inherent in conventional (traditional) DDR that demobilisation must aim at the absolute breakup of the combatants' military command and control (C&C) structures. This is because oftentimes their retention can enhance the process of their reintegration, as some of the social connections established during combat can be helpful in achieving the goal of reintegration. For example, Vries and Wiegink (2011: 38-51) contend that the insistence on breakup at all costs does not take into cognizance the empirical reality of the motivations and processes of recruitment into militia groups. Vries and Wiegink contend that the process of militia mobilisation and the motives behind it are multifaceted and varies from voluntary mobilisation to conscription, while for others, they are mobilised or motivated for security, economic and psychological reasons or considerations. Moreover, given that some of the militia groups have never gone beyond the frontiers of their local community, it becomes an aberration to insist that they must absolutely break up their C&C structures. Even if ex-combatants are brought from different communities or backgrounds, their years of shared combat experience tends to nurture a strong bond that goes beyond any family or community connections (Ibid.: 41-42). Therefore, Vries and Wiegink argue that 'with this bond between individuals enforced by the experience of war, it is not surprising that after demobilisation many ex-combatants choose to stay together' (Ibid: 42), thus contemplating absolute breakup becomes an unrealistic goal. According to Vries and Wiegink, the cases

of demobilised ex-combatants in Burundi and Sierra Leone exemplified this situation as many of them after their demobilisation chose to live together. Also, security considerations due to the fragile nature of transitional states are a strong factor in ex-combatants deciding to stay together after demobilisation. They posit that 'if violence may resurge at any time, it makes sense not to lose touch with your (formerly) armed friends; you may need them for protection someday' (Vries and Wiegink, 2011: 42). Another related issue is that there are strong economic incentives and social security reasons to encourage the maintenance of ex-combatants' C&C structures after demobilisation. According to them:

Most of the countries in which DDR programmes occur suffer from high unemployment and poverty. The future is uncertain, and ex-combatants are one group among many struggling for livelihoods. The absorptive capacities of communities of return may be very limited: there may not be enough land to provide food for returning fighters, and there may simply be no jobs around (Vries and Wiegink, 2011: 42).

Thus, in view of the above reality ex-combatants might have no option than to retain their C&C structures after demobilisation. The Mozambican National Resistance personnel who collectively sought land in the same location they had their encampment for demobilisation represents a good example of ex-combatants choosing to live together after demobilisation for obvious social and economic reasons (Ibid.: 42-43). Ex-combatants may also prefer to stay together and remain connected after their demobilisation because of the networks of patronage that develop after the conflict which provides social, economic and political benefits to the ex-combatants (Ibid.: 43). This has been the case in Afghanistan where former militia group commanders maintain strong links with their former soldiers (Vries and Wiegink, 2011: 43). They also argue that a major determinant of whether ex-combatants may want to retain their C&C structures or not is how viable and promising a DDR programme is (Ibid.). This suggests that when a given DDR programme holds little or no promise, ex-combatants may decide to evade formal demobilisation to take care of their problems, thereby encouraging the retention of the C&C structures. In view of all these realities they conclude that it may be difficult to achieve an absolute breakup of C&C structures through demobilisation.

In a related study, Themner (2011: 1-9) concluded that even after supposed successful demobilisation, '...ex-combatants often continue to live quasi-

militarized lives [sic] long after demobilizing' (Ibid.: 3). Themner explains that the identity formation ex-combatants went through during years of combat makes it near impossible to achieve an absolute disbandment of their former C&C structures, hence ex-combatants of the same military background in most cases live together even after being demobilised. He, therefore, contends that it is more rewarding for ex-combatants to remain together than each one going his way:

Hanging out together, even living in close proximity to each other, means that ex-fighters that fought for the same side often constitute a distinct social group in society-or an *ex-combatant community* (all the former fighters that used to belong to the same armed faction and who share common, horizontal identity based on shared war-and peacetime experiences) (Themner, 2011: 3).

The finding from the study equally demonstrates that due to their shared experiences, ex-combatants enter the post-conflict period with a unique identity that they have acquired and internalised during the war which gets reinforced by the dynamic and complex reality of the post-conflict society based on *in-group and out-group interaction*. The *in-group* articulates the views that ex-combatants hold about others in society while the *out-group* articulates the stereotypes that the larger society attributes to ex-combatants, all of which tend to support the retention of former command and control structures. Beyond that, the wartime acquired identity functions as a coping mechanism when confronted with the varied challenges of social integration in the post-conflict era (Ibid.: (2011: 4).

A study by Hazen (n.d.: 1-11) lends further credence to the difficulty in breaking the C&C structures of fighting groups. Hazen argues that the social milieu of the war environment is characterised by the disintegration of the larger societal social fabric but with a corresponding integration into what she refers to as the 'war family' (Ibid.). Hazen (n.d. 4) asserts that demobilisation becomes challenging because '... leaving this familiar setting is both threatening and scary to combatants, even those who would prefer to stop fighting, because the "war family" is seen as a source of security.' Thus, Hazen has clearly demonstrated that combatants for several reasons may find it very difficult to completely break away from their 'war family.' I do concur to some extent with the view that wartime acquired bonds and identity will subsist beyond demobilisation and may positively contribute towards the process of reintegration particularly if the ex-combatants comprised of what Gleichmann *et al.* (2004: 29) refer to as members of

conventional armed forces or statutory forces which I earlier defined at the beginning of this chapter. I argue so because based on my personal experience, the C&C structures of members of conventional armed forces or statutory forces do remain although not in the classical sense of it. Instead C&C structures get transformed into informal structures and relationships. For example, as observed in Nigeria it is a common practice for ex-military (demobilised) personnel to reside and pre-dominate an area of a city or community and become regular members of certain informal relaxation centres. Similarly, most retired senior military commanders tend to employ their former ex-soldiers as domestic and personal staffs, such as cooks, cleaners, drivers, private secretaries or personal assistants and in some cases managing their businesses. Consequently, through these networks and interactions wartime C&C structures are sustained in an informal and nonconventional way and could indeed be supportive towards successful reintegration.

Clearly therefore, the question of whether to aim at retaining or destroying the C&C structures in absolute terms is a tricky issue. For instance, in my opinion given Francis's (2005: 1-3) conceptualisation that Second-Generation militias challenge the State and contest its legitimacy, absolute disbanding of their C&C structures is preferable. This is because in the context of Francis's conceptualisation, Second-Generation militias are by their very nature a threat to State stability and therefore failure to break their C&C structures would lead to the likelihood that the ex-commanders can remobilise and undermine the transition process and the new postconflict state if they so desire. Thus, in a DDR programme with a caseload of Second-Generation militias as the main participants, demobilisation must essentially aim at dismantling their C&C structures both horizontally and vertically. This is in order to fundamentally weaken their capacity to remobilise and undermine the process of war to peace transition or to challenge the legitimacy of the new postconflict state. In another dimension, one can argue that the decision to retain or destroy the C&C structures should depend on whether the type of armed group being demobilised is predatory or community-based. This is when viewed against the backdrop of Reno's (2007: 324-342) characterisation of armed groups as predatory and community-based, whereby predatory armed groups engage in predatory activities such as pillaging of their communities while their community-based

counterparts are protective of their communities. In this case, if the armed groups being demobilised are predatory in nature, breakup of the C&C structures will be necessary while in the case of community-based armed groups; retaining of the structures may not be inimical to State stability and peace consolidation. Yet, in another way, given the dynamic nature of conflict and the unpredictable nature of human behaviour; whereby conflict that starts because of genuine grievance could over time mutate to greed, one could argue that there is no guarantee that community-based armed groups will not mutate to predatory armed groups if their C&C structures are left intact, thereby making their retention tricky and dicey. Therefore, when all these perspectives are juxtaposed, I will argue that for a guaranteed and secured postconflict state irrespective of whether an armed group is predatory or protective of the community, demobilisation should aim at breaking/destroying of the C&C structures. This is pertinent so long as the armed group conforms to and can be categorised as Second-Generation militias as earlier conceptualised. As for where First-Generation militias stand regarding the dismantling of C&C structures, in line with Francis's (2005: 1-3) conceptualisation, they are essentially not a threat to State legitimacy but supportive of it. Therefore, the argument for retaining C&C structures in the case of First-Generation militia may all other things being equal be stronger. The question of where the Niger Delta militants fall in the classification of combatants and whether it is necessary to break up or not their C&C structures will be explored further in Chapter Five.

2.5.2. Demobilisation with or Without Cantonment

In conventional demobilisation, after successful disarmament and prior to being released to their respective communities, members of the armed forces, whether of the government or of the opposition forces, are assembled in a location for a series of activities that will adequately prepare them for civilian life (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations UN DPKO, 2000: 15). Within conventional DDR practice such a location is known as cantonment, oftentimes referred to as encampments sites, assembly areas or barracks (Ibid).

According to Colleta *et al.*, (1996: 12), demobilisation consists of cantonment or quartering during which activities such as '... pre-discharge orientation, discharge, transportation, and post-discharge orientation' are undertaken.

Cantonment may also become a necessity when there are large caseloads of ex-combatants to deal with, allowing for their phased demobilisation, as well as providing the receiving communities ample time to prepare for the arrival of each cohort of the ex-combatants (Özerdem, 2009: 27-28). Again, cantonment may be required because some combatants at the time of demobilisation do not readily have a community to return to because some of them were abducted as children and so cannot remember their communities, or are scared of returning to them because of the atrocities they committed against them during conflict (see Kingma, 2002: 183; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2009:59 and Özerdem, 2009: 28). Similarly, cantonment will be inevitable in a demobilisation process that has large caseloads of child soldiers and female combatants because of the need to separate them from adult soldiers so as to attend to their unique needs (Fusato, 2003: 3-7; Douglas *et al*, 2004: 52 and Özerdem, 2009: 28). Suffice to say that when demobilisation by cantonment involves women, it is important to ensure that ‘...cantonment sites [are] women-friendly... [for example,] are women’s training needs, their need for childcare, their safety, their need for specific sanitary facilities and specialized healthcare, including nutritional needs for nursing or pregnant women, recognized [and provided] at the outset?’ (Farr, 2003: 5).

Given the centrality of cantonment in the demobilisation process, the UN DPKO (2000: 36-37) and Gleichmann (2004:53) point out that care must be taken in selecting and constructing the cantonment sites. This is because their suitability or otherwise could hinder or enhance the success of the demobilisation process; it, therefore, identifies ‘accessibility, security, general amenities, storage facilities/armoury and communications infrastructure’ as essential factors to be considered and provided when selecting a cantonment site (Ibid.). The above suggests that the location of cantonment should not be too far from where troops have been concentrated immediately after their disarmament and should be in contiguity to major means of transportation such as roads, railways, rivers and air transport. The cantonment site location and its entire environs should be well secured in order to assure the ex-combatants of their safety and security. The location should also be equipped with standard and properly secured armoury for the temporary storage of weapons (Ibid.). Likewise, the location must be equipped with adequate and reliable communication in order to guarantee

constant communication between the various stakeholders in the demobilisation process both vertical and horizontal (Ibid.).

In my view, cantonment is the gateway to civilian life; therefore, how friendly, memorable and rewarding the experience is to ex-combatants could go a long way in determining the success of the DDR process. It is my contention that a rewarding cantonment experience could serve as a morale booster to ex-combatants, to seriously aspire to return to civilian life while a nasty experience could dampen their morale. In line with this, Shibuya (2012: 66) argues that if the conditions are oppressive it may lead to the resurgence of violence, all of which could lead to the temporary suspension of the programme. Furthermore, in some extreme cases, poorly planned and equipped cantonment locations can cause combatants to evade formal demobilisation and to self-demobilize. This, in turn, can have serious negative security implications, particularly where disarmament and demobilisation are coalesced into one activity. This is because self-demobilisation in this context implies ex-combatants absconding home with their weapons and military accoutrements (Douglas, *et al*, 2004: 48). However, despite the necessity of a suitable cantonment environment, caution should be taken to ensure that the extent of conduciveness does not encourage the ex-combatants to turn it into a permanent place of abode (Shibuya, 2012: 66).

In terms of activities to be carried out during cantonment, Colleta *et al.*, (1986: 8-13) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, n.d. 3) have identified screening for identifying those eligible for demobilisation as one key activity. However, when disarmament precedes demobilisation, such preliminary screening ought to have been carried out; it only needs to be properly reviewed at this stage (Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) Ghana, 2015).³ The screening should be transparently done to eliminate ghost soldiers and ensure that fake or non-ex-combatants do not get registered as combatants which could inflate budgetary requirements (Colleta *et al.*, 1986: 8-13 and UNDP, n.d. 3). Where family members and dependents of ex-combatants are also going to be beneficiaries, the screening should include them (Ibid.).

³. Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) Ghana (2015). *Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration foundation course lecture 9-20 February*.

For reintegration planning, information is needed in three key areas; the supply side, the demand side and the social environment (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.: 43 and Colleta *et al.*, 1986: 9). The supply side refers to information pertaining to the characteristics, needs, future aspirations and labour market potentials of the ex-combatants (Colleta *et al.*, 1986: 16; Jensen & Stepputat, 2001: 12-13; Porto *et al.*, 2007: 16 and Edloe, 2007:16-17). The demand side has to do with information on existing opportunities and challenges in the labour market while the social environment is the community as a social milieu that the ex-combatants are returning to (Colleta *et al.*, 1986: 16). Therefore, the cantonment period provides the most appropriate opportunity for this information to be collected through surveys. In addition, having spent several years in military life and disconnected from civilian life, the cantonment period provides an opportunity for ex-combatants to be adequately educated about the realities of civilian life that they are about to enter (Ibid.). Against this backdrop, Colleta *et al.* described the significance of pre-discharge information as follows:

Predischarge information and orientation sessions about what they can expect on their return to civilian life have proved beneficial. Such sessions should give ex-combatants (and, if present, their partners) information about the program in general, health issues, and civil society. In particular, ex-combatants should be briefed about their benefits and how these are to be provided and about banking and financial matters, civic and community duties, training and employment opportunities, access to land and credit, income-generating activities, and family and health issues (especially AIDS/HIV) (Colleta *et al.*, 1986: 13).⁴

Similarly, concurring with the above Gleichmann *et al.*, (2004: 56) point out that pre-discharge information should include economic information, accommodation information, political and legal information, social information, health information such as HIV/AIDs awareness and lastly crisis prevention and reconciliation information. Nevertheless, the need for all these activities to be carried out should not be an excuse to overextend the duration of cantonment (Colleta *et al.*, 1986: 12). After the successful completion of cantonment activities, ex-combatants and their dependants will need to be transported to their respective communities of choice (Colleta *et al.*, 1986: 14). Two options that could be used to transport ex-

⁴. See 'potential support to ex-combatants during assembly and discharge' in Ball. N. (1997). 'Demobilizing and reintegrating soldiers: lessons from Africa,' in Krishna, K. (ed.). *Rebuilding societies after civil war: critical roles for international assistance*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 85-105. Also, see Banholzer, L. (2014) 'When do disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes succeed?' p. 13. Available at: (Accessed

combatants have been advanced in the literature; either they are transported centrally or payment is given to them to sort out their movement individually (Ibid.). However, as Colleta *et al.*, point out when arranging transportation for ex-combatants, care should be taken to ensure that it does not lead to sudden increases in the cost of public transport in the local area, as this could lead to resentment against the returning ex-combatants by the locals. Finally, cantonment activities are assumed to have been concluded with the successful arrival of ex-combatants to their respective destinations and the provision of post-discharge orientation and briefings (Colleta *et al.*, 1986: 14).

However, despite the apparent centrality of cantonment during demobilisation, several critical views have been advanced against it. Özerdem (2009: 29) maintains that while the entire DDR process aims at the total disbandment of the armed groups C&C structures; cantonment tends to be a drawback because it reinforces them instead of eliminating them. On his part, Shibuya (2012: 67) argues that the central issue in demobilisation is about changing the mindset of combatants. According to him '...demobilization is about the *psychological* break from the militarized mentality stemming from membership in an armed group' (Ibid.). The critical question in his view is: to what extent can the period of cantonment succeed in changing the combatant's violent mindset? According to Shibuya, the possibility that demobilisation will succeed depends on whether the demobilising troops have experienced what he refers to as *war fatigue*:

...where the parties over time have become exhausted with fighting. (More critically, the parties are exhausted with the *lack of achievement* of their objectives via military means.). In this situation, the parties may begin to look for alternative ways to end the conflict, given that military solutions are not viable (Shibuya, 2012: 64).

This suggests that the goal of demobilisation will be difficult to realise if combatants think that they can still achieve victory militarily over their opponents. However, demobilisation can also be undertaken without cantonment and an alternative option is the use of mobile demobilisation centres, where former combatants will be required to report to a centre and register before going to their communities. Thereafter, they will be reporting to accomplish the remaining tasks in the demobilisation process (Ibid.: 30). According to Özerdem (2009: 30), there

is consensus in the literature that mobile demobilisation is best suited when dealing with the following conditions:

First, the caseload is formed by disciplined and recognizable units. In the second scenario combatants are already based with their communities, therefore, it would not make sense to move them from their communities to cantonment areas, and then back to their communities. Finally, in environments where combatants are scattered over a big area and the majority of them are unwilling to demobilize, then such mobile demobilization centres can provide an additional advantage to encourage all combatants to demobilize (Özerdem, 2009: 30).

Mobile cantonment shortens the duration of time required for demobilisation and is less costly because it is logistically less demanding and is most preferred by vulnerable groups that suspect their security will be threatened by staying for a very long period at cantonment locations (Ibid.). Mobile demobilisation centres are not regimented and coercive in nature and so hasten the breakup of the C&C structures of the combatants. However, demobilisation without cantonment has some drawbacks when juxtaposed against the numerous advantages of cantonment highlighted above. For instance, cantonment provides a rare opportunity for ex-combatants that missed surrendering their weapons during disarmament to do so. A major disadvantage linked to mobile demobilisation is the apparent political and security risk involved in releasing ex-combatants to the larger society without gauging their level of commitment to the peace process (Ibid.). In the absence of cantonment, it will be difficult to *comprehensively* accomplish routines such as health and voluntary HIV/AIDS screening, counselling and other relevant briefing offered to combatants at cantonment sites. Finally, I do concur with Özerdem that cantonment has the potential of reinforcing vertical and horizontal dimensions of C&C structures that demobilisation is supposed to dismantle, especially when the DDR participants are comprised of mainly Second-Generation militias. The extent cantonment affected the DDR process in the Niger Delta will be explored further in this thesis.

2.5.3. Payment of Reinsertion Assistance During Demobilisation

The provision of reinsertion supports to demobilising combatants, is critical to the overall success of the DDR process; this is because after demobilisation and prior to reintegration, ex-combatants are left without any means of income to take care of themselves, families and dependants (Jensen & Stepputat, 2001: 13-14;

Özerdem, 1999: 31). Consequently, the provision of reinsertion support becomes handy as a safety net that helps ex-combatants to cope with the challenges of transiting from conflict as a source of livelihood. Such assistance can last up to six to twelve months and should cover their basic needs including families and dependants (Colleta *et al.*, 1996: 15 and Kostner, 2001: 1).

In the immediate aftermath of war, ex-combatants and their dependants' needs can be classified into two broad areas, namely; 'household consumption, such as food, clothes, healthcare and children's education; and household investment, such as shelter, agricultural tools and kitchen utensils' (Özerdem, 2009: 32). The debate in the literature on reinsertion revolves around whether ex-combatants should be supported in cash or in material form, or a combination of the two. Özerdem *et al* (2008: 10) argue in support of both when they observe that 'reinsertion benefits involve a mix of material and monetary assistance to the families of the ex-combatants easing the transition to civilian life; it includes food supplements, indemnity payments and cash allowances.' Ball (1997: 89) and Ball (2006: 16) provided a comprehensive list of 'potential support to ex-combatants during assembly and discharge'.⁵

According to, Colleta *et al.*, (1996: 15), whether cash or material reinsertion is decided is contingent on certain conditions ranging from the relative cost of the transaction, the financial capacity of the banking or postal system, and the overall logistics capability of the agency responsible for implementation. According to Knight and Özerdem (2004: 511):

...five primary issues must be addressed when planning cash reinsertion assistance: the mobilization of funds, differentiation criteria, the amount of allowance, financial education and the development of a non-corruptible identification system. Alongside the overall challenge for the DDR process in general, mobilization of the necessary funds for financial reinsertion assistance is obviously the first obstacle to be overcome in this process.

If financial reinsertion support is to be provided, then efforts must be made to mobilise adequate funding so that it can be sustained throughout the stipulated

⁵. According to Ball potential support to ex-combatants during assembly includes: 'food, shelter, clothing, sanitation, medical exams, basic education, leisure activities, orientation on adjusting to civilian life, including financial counselling, health counselling, civic duties, income generation (for soldiers and spouses, assistance to child soldiers, census, discharge and documentation'. During discharge potential support include 'short-term food supplements, transport, orientation on conditions in district of residence and first tranche of reinsertion benefits'.

period. This is because any sudden stoppage could trigger a negative reaction on the part of the ex-combatants. The eligibility criteria for determining who should benefit from reinsertion support should be transparently decided to avoid discrimination, particularly against female and child combatants (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 511). Another conundrum that needs to be resolved is the correct amount to be paid to ex-combatants; that is, are they to be treated homogeneously or differently? I am of the view that the hierarchy of the ex-combatants and the distance of their respective communities of resettlement will warrant the payment of different amounts. Nevertheless, irrespective of these considerations the disparity should not be too much so that it will not trigger resentment within the ex-combatants which could undermine the demobilisation process and the DDR programme in general. Generally, the golden rule is that the amount to be paid should not be too high to discourage the ex-combatants from seeking alternative sustainable sources of income (Berdal, 1996: 47 and Özerdem, 2009: 33-34). Berdal and Özerdem also maintain that it should not be far above the general income level in the local community the ex-combatants are returning to as it would potentially lead to resentment against them (Berdal, 1996: 47). In Uganda, a uniform method known as '*egalitarian differentiation*' was applied; a situation whereby 'it was the same for all former combatants, irrespective of their rank, age or years of service' (Özerdem, 2009: 33). Conversely, in Ethiopia, the yardsticks for determining the amount to be paid were years of service, intended location of settlement whether urban or rural and the level of disability (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 511). Closely related to the question of how much to pay is whether the amount to be paid should be given in bulk payment or instalments. Some argue that ex-combatants lack the financial experience to prudently manage and utilise bulk amounts paid to them at once (World Bank, 1993: 59-68). Given this challenge, for financial reinsertion support to be meaningful, payment should preferably be made by instalments, while during cantonment a series of financial education lectures and counselling should be given to ex-combatants (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 512 and Özerdem, 2009: 34). Furthermore, to guarantee against impersonation, it will be appropriate for beneficiaries, once they have been registered, to be issued with non-transferable identification card with his or her individual picture embossed on the card (Özerdem, 2009: 35).

Several advantages and disadvantages associated with cash payments have been identified; in terms of advantages, cash reinsertion support tends to be flexible, reduce overhead costs, is more amenable to transparent handling, and is accountable and responsive to the needs of ex-combatants (Fusato, 2003: 7). It also has a positive psychological effect because ex-combatants see it as a form of empowerment (Ibid.: 7).

However, some drawbacks associated with cash payments include their potential to encourage ex-combatants to turn the cantonment site into a permanent place of abode and become nonchalant towards becoming self-sustaining in life (Isima, 2004: 5). Cash payments may be susceptible to fraudulent abuse and corruption, particularly where a good system of accountability is not in place (Ibid.). It is equally argued that cash payments to ex-combatants may potentially open a floodgate of demands on their part, and when unmet can induce frustration leading to protest and ultimately remobilisation (Willibald, 2006: 325). Additionally, when payment of cash is made at disarmament and demobilisation centres, it has the potential to produce a cash for weapon perception, and this, in turn, will trigger corruption, insecurity and regional weapons proliferation (Willibald, 2006: 331). In addition, when payment of cash in the entire DDR process is targeted at the ex-combatants, be it at disarmament or reinsertion stages to the exclusion of other victims of conflict in society, it may potentially encourage ex-combatants to perceive themselves as a special group of people that must be appeased. This, in turn, can potentially generate resentment against them which may jeopardise their reintegration (Ibid.: 332).

My contention, notwithstanding the evidence in support of cash reinsertion support, is that; it should not be considered in complete isolation from material support (Özerdem, 2009: 35). In this regard, Colleta *et al*, (1996: 16-18) identify three major forms of material reinsertion support that are critical to the stabilisation of ex-combatants. Specifically, ex-combatants need to be assisted with basic building materials, such as roofing sheets, cement etc., in order to fast-track, the process of owning their own shelter (Ibid.). Similarly, in the initial period of their settlement, ex-combatants need to be provided with medical services and educational support for their children (Ibid.).

2.6. Review of Relevant Literature: Reintegration

Reintegration is the third phase of the DDR process, as contained in the UN IDDRS (2006) and the most important and critical phase in the process (Kingman, 2000: 28 and Shibuya, 2012: 85), yet it is the least funded. Buttressing this point further, Shibuya (2012: 85) argues that 'it is the point where everything comes together, placing the former combatants and the larger community on the path to long-term peace.' This suggests that reintegration is the phase when the achievements recorded during the disarmament and demobilisation phases of the DDR process are consolidated. As argued by Özerdem (2009: 21); it is a long-term process during which the entire DDR process coalesces with a country's broader national development agenda. Regrettably, Ginifer *et al* observe that:

The development component of DDR (reintegration) has tended to be relatively short-term and under-resourced. There tends to be disjunction between the 'security' phase of DDR (disarmament/demobilisation) implemented primarily by the military and well-funded, and the reintegration phase funded from voluntary contributions and implemented by international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and development agencies with considerably less resources (Ginifer, 2004: 5).

The review section on reintegration will be structured around minimalist and maximalist perspectives on reintegration, the conventional conception and approach to reintegration and the nonconventional views. Likewise, the question of funding and ownership of the reintegration phase of the DDR process and the dilemma of measuring success will also be examined.

2.6.1. *Minimalist and Maximalist Perspectives on Reintegration*

In the conceptualisation of DDR, two divergent schools of thought have emerged about how DDR and in particular the reintegration phase has been problematised; either as a minimalist agenda of improving security or maximalist agenda of an opportunity for development and reconstruction (Özerdem *et al.*, 2008: 4-5 and Özerdem, 2009: 45). Muggah expounded the two perspectives in this way:

In addition to competing definitions of various aspects of DDR...there are also deeply rooted philosophical differences associated with the objective of DDR itself. Very generally, DDR can be viewed on a continuum: from a *minimalist* (improving security) to a *maximalist* (as an opportunity for development and reconstruction) perspective (Muggah, 2004: 27).

Similarly, for Jennings (2008:6) the minimalist DDR approach aims to give former fighters something to do after being demobilised while the maximalist tends to have a transformative agenda of addressing underlying sources of conflict and pre-conflict grievances. Therefore, when a reintegration process is premised on *minimalist* assumptions, it will largely focus on managing ex-combatants as a security threat and potential 'spoilers' and obstacles to peace and stability, who immediately after their demobilisation must be provided with vocational skills and jobs so as to keep them busy (Muggah, 2006: 200 and Jennings, 2008: 6-7). Conversely, if it is conceived as an avenue for development, reintegration will be premised on a socioeconomic transformative agenda that seeks to address the underlying sources of conflict in which ex-combatants and their dependants will be regarded as a potential source of human capital that can positively contribute to the post-conflict peacebuilding process (Ibid.). According to Özerdem (2008: 4-5) and Muggah (2009: 14), organisations such as the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKOs) subscribe to the *minimalist* perspective of DDR, while others such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Bank advocate for a more *maximalist* approach.⁶ Accordingly, the above conflicting perspectives on reintegration has led to conflicting operationalisation and ambiguity in the current practice of reintegration across different DDR programmes which Jennings (2008: 327-345) has demonstrated using the Liberian reintegration experience as an empirical case study. Jennings argues that, in Liberia, the reintegration literature was replete with phrases that suggest a maximalist agenda but in practical terms, it was implemented as a minimalist project that aimed to achieve security stabilisation. Suffice to say that my evaluation of the Niger Delta ADDR programme will disentangle which perspective; minimalist or maximalist informed its conceptualisation, implementation and why.

⁶. Muggah referred to the World Bank as advocating for a maximalist oriented DDR. However, the kind of development agenda it implements which generally falls under the liberal peacebuilding agenda and neoliberal market reforms have been heavily criticised as counterproductive to the basic needs of societies emerging from violent conflict. See for example 1. Paris, R. (2004). *At war's end: building peace after civil conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Sad-Filho, A. and Johnston, D. (2005). *Neoliberalism: a critical reader*. (ed.). London: Pluto Press. 3. Newman, E. Paris, R. and Richmond, O. P. (2009). *New perspective on liberal peacebuilding*. (ed.) New York: United Nations University Press.

Given my earlier conceptualisation of combatants and militias, I will argue that the question of whether ex-combatants are regarded as a security threat and potential spoilers of the peace process or as possessing human resource capital that can positively contribute to postconflict peacebuilding depend on what type of combatants constitute the DDR caseload. In this case, it is my contention that if the DDR caseload mainly consists of militias of the Second-Generation type (see Francis, 2005: 1-3) then there is a high potential that they may constitute a security threat by becoming spoilers of the peace process and transition. This is because they generally have more limited human capital skills beyond weapon handling that can easily be transferrable to the civilian economy thereby making their reintegration into the civilian economy very difficult. However, there may be less security threat and the possibility of spoiling or undermining the peace process if the caseload consists of combatants from conventional armed forces or statutory forces as conceptualised by Gleichmann (2004: 29). I argue so because beyond weapon handling skills members of conventional armed or statutory forces tend to have more human capital potentials that can easily be transferable to the civilian economy thereby making it easy for them to reintegrate into the civilian economy.

At this juncture, it suffices to point out that the minimalist versus maximalist perspectives of DDR can be subsumed into the broader theoretical debates between *traditionalist and wideners* in the field of security which eventually led to a paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of security and the emergence of the concept of *human security*. This, in turn, triggered a new debate regarding the nexus between security and development both at the academic and policymaking level. At the policymaking level, there was an increasing concern about ‘... [how] war’s destructive impact undermined development in both the short and long term and the roles of economic and social factors in conflict...’ (Fukuda-Parr, 2010: 19). This development signalled the merging of security and development in both academic and policy arenas.

Hitherto, the *traditionalists’* conception and understanding of security dominated the field of security during the Cold War era. In this perspective security was understood as ‘freedom from any objective threat to the state survival...’ (Sulovic, 2010:2). However, *wideners’* canvassed for the broadening of the security

agenda and the understanding of threats to national security to include economic, political, social and environmental threats (Ullman, 1983: 129-153; Mathews, 1989: 162-177; Jones, 1990: 3-7; Booth, 1991: 313-326; Booth, 1997: 83-119; Ayoob, 1997: 121-146; Wilkin, 2002: 633-645; Landman, 2006: 21; Tigerstrom, 2007: 1-5; 7-26; Gromes & Banacker, 2007: 2; Biswas, 2011: 1-22 and Spear & Williams, 2012: 11-16 and Dannreuther, 2013: 1-11& 47-48). The broadening of the definition of security and security agendas was reflected in the emergence of the concept of human security popularised by the United Nations Development Programme's 1994 Human Development Report which defined human security as '... freedom from fear... [and] freedom from want' (Ibid.: 24). The report further identifies economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security as the significant threats to human security. In this case, freedom from fear suggests '... a condition of existence in which human dignity is realized, embracing not only physical safety but going beyond that to include meaningful participation in the life of the community, control over one's life and so forth' (Thomas, 2007: 108-109). It also connotes '... freedom from domination/exploitation...' (Ibid.). Similarly, '... human security as freedom from want describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which there is a reasonable expectation that protection will be afforded during any crisis or downturn-natural or man-made- so that survival is not threatened' (Ibid.).

The above suggests that contemporary sources of threat to security are not necessarily military in nature but equally development based. The aftermath of this dynamism in the field of security studies and the consequent consensus on the reconceptualization of security and security agendas was the merging of security and development which reinforces the strong nexus between security and development both in theory and practice. In other words, it resulted in the coalescing of security and development both in academic and policy arenas and the recognition of the fact that development can only take place when there is security and then development will, in turn, reinforce security (see Stewart, 2004: 261-288). For instance, in buttressing this contention, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1997: 1) asserts that 'wars have set back development severely in many countries, including in some of the poorest; excessive military

expenditures have too often taken priority over more productive public investments...’ Similarly, on its part, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (2005: 7) has observed that ‘...development agencies cannot ignore the impact that security threats at all levels-local, national and global-have on poor people. At the same time, the world community cannot ignore the critical role of poverty and inequality in increasing risks for us all’. This implies that dysfunctional security systems can undermine the possibility of achieving peace, social and economic development and vice-versa (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001: 37). Thus, increasingly recognition is being given to the reciprocal role and interaction between development and security in both academic and policy arenas (Ibid.) Accordingly, the overall contention here is that:

Peace is essential for development, and vice versa: development is essential for lasting and sustainable peace. Without peace we will not win the fight against poverty. Without peace the Millennium Development Goals will be... unrealistic promises. Violent conflict leads to and exacerbates poverty, and poverty is often a cause of violent conflict. (Also) conflicts are a serious threat to development... (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004: 10).

Overall, my contention is that the paradigm shift in the re-conceptualisation of security has elevated and brought to the front burner the need to prioritise the security of individuals, families and communities as against State security. Nevertheless, some scholars have expressed critical opinions against the securitisation of development in the Global South by external actors from the Global North (McGrew, 2007: 12). Similarly, many have interrogated the concept of human security both as a theoretical and empirical concept. For instance, Woods (2005: 394) contends that security concerns have always been a prime consideration in rendering development aid, but with the securitisation of development ‘new security concerns have rapidly come to dominate foreign policy since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001’. This suggests that the moral underpinning behind aid and development assistance has been displaced by security considerations. The consequence of this displacement is that ‘donors may hijack foreign aid to pursue their own security objectives rather than those which would help the poorest’ (Ibid: 393).

In the same vein, Duffield (2007: 2) argues that the way multilateral development organisations and bilateral donors direct and coordinate their activities aiming them at regions of conflict and volatility in the Global South suggests that human security has become one of the '... technologies in securing the Western way of life'. This connotes that, human security is exported to the Global South as an antidote to conflict and insecurity for a secured Global North instead of being a genuine response to the development concerns of the Global South. Similarly, McGrew (2007: 13) observes that one apparent danger of securitisation is that it '... may provoke a covert, and sometimes overt, process of militarization'. This suggests the likelihood that securitisation can undermine the goal of human security by providing justification for external intervention under the pretext of advancing the goal of human security. As he notes:

Securitization also harbours the potential risk that legitimate rationales or pretexts for, and modes of, external intervention in the domestic affairs of developing states are expanded. In this regards the progressive notion of human security, or protective security... which is conceived as an alternative to orthodox or realist discourses of security, may unintentionally widen the parameters of legitimate interventionism. Framing development in terms of human security, as is currently the dominant progressive view, paradoxically may expose its subject to new insecurities (Ibid.).

Furthermore, even as a theoretical and empirical concept, human security has come under heavy criticism. Paris's (2001: 87-102) seminal article titled '*Human security: paradigm shift or hot air?*' argues that 'human security does not appear to offer a particularly useful framework of analysis for scholars or policymakers' (Ibid.: 96). Consequently, he doubts if the concept of human security can serve as a meaningful practical guide both for academic inquiry or at the level of governmental policymaking (Ibid.: 88). Indeed, part of the problem he contends is that:

... the concept lacks a precise definition... everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means. Existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied (Ibid.).

Nonetheless, irrespective of the myriad of criticisms against human security both as a theoretical and empirical concept and the potential of its abuse by global

hegemonic powers the case for a paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of security and a broadening of security agendas is quite compelling. This is because contemporary threats to State security are largely due to lack of human security and development rather than to external military threats. For instance, Nickels in a paper presented at the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (2014: 1) argues that Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram all ‘... emerged from conditions of relative deprivation and perceived marginalization of specific communities... each group exploited local grievances as well as the inability by central government to address the sources of social, political and economic exclusion’. So also, Salam (2012:150-151) argues in the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Consequently, to what extent the conceptualisation, planning and execution of the Niger Delta ADDR programme take due cognisance of the coalescing of security and development will be explored throughout this thesis.

2.6.2. Minimalist Perspective and Assumptions on Reintegration and Counter Views

Within the framework of a minimalist approach to DDR, reintegration is conceptualised and operationalised as a security project aimed at ensuring that ex-combatants acquire civilian status by reintegrating into their communities of choice as well as gaining sustainable means of livelihood. A major implication of the minimalist conceptualisation and approach to DDR is the securitisation of reintegration (Buzan *et al.*, 1988: 23-24). And in my contention, the securitisation of reintegration involves two things. Foremost, in the post conflict era, ex-combatants may be identified and framed as a potent threat (existential threat) to peace and security which therefore requires that extraordinary attention is paid to them in order to mitigate the potential threat they pose. Thus, postconflict peace and security have become the referent object to be preserved from a potential outburst by ex-combatants. Additionally, reintegration is essentially implemented as a security project that aims to mitigate these threats through the provision of vocational jobs’ skills to ex-combatants. An important example of this securitised view of demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants is Collier (1994: 343-351), who argues that failure to achieve successful economic reintegration of the ex-combatants might trigger micro and macro insecurity challenges in the post-conflict era. Collier also argues that macro insecurity

challenges might arise because the failure to provide ex-combatants with sustainable job opportunities could trigger frustration. Consequently, ex-combatants would resort to predatory activities on their fellow citizens. This may also happen because ex-combatants are highly skilled in the use of arms, which gives them a comparative advantage in criminal activities. As Collier notes:

There are two reasons to expect that demobilization might increase crime. Demobilized soldiers are not placed into employment and so start their civilian life as unemployed. It is likely that the lack of an income source increases the propensity to commit crimes. Additionally, soldiers tend to be unskilled, except in the use of weapons, and so might have a comparative advantage in criminal activities (Collier, 1994: 344).

On macro-insecurity, Collier states that demobilised but unemployed ex-combatants are likely to be frustrated and so might at the slightest opportunity vent their frustration against the State that represents their source of frustration. He contends that 'demobilisation might affect macro-insecurity through two routes. Firstly, demobilized ex-combatants poorly integrated into the economy, and therefore disaffected, constitute a pool of potential recruits for a subsequent military challenge to the state' (Collier, 1994: 348). Taking the debate further in support of the securitisation of reintegration, Colleta *et al.*, (1996: 18) argue that '...failure to achieve reintegration can lead to considerable insecurity at the societal and individual levels, including rent-seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun'. Thus, 'successful economic reintegration of ex-combatants has become crucial to improve security and stability...' (Cartagenaddr.org, 2009: 60-61).

The long-term implication of this securitised conceptualisation and approach to reintegration is the recurrent security threat label attached to all ex-combatants notwithstanding their heterogeneous nature as I earlier conceptualised in the beginning of this chapter (see McMullin, 2013: 20). Thus, whether ex-combatants would constitute a threat to postconflict peace and security depends on the nature of the ex-combatants. For example, demobilising ex-combatants of *conventional armed forces and statutory military forces* who possess immense human resource capabilities may not necessarily constitute a source of instability in the aftermath of demobilisation. For instance, immediately after the transition from military dictatorship to a democratic system of governance in 1999, Nigeria carried out a massive demobilisation of members of its armed forces as a way of depoliticising and re-professionalising the Nigerian armed forces. However, the

demobilisation process did not result in any micro or macro security threats neither did the demobilised personnel undermine the process of democratic transition and consolidation. Indeed, the demobilised officers and soldiers did not find any problem reintegrating into society because of the enormous human resource potentials they possessed which made it easier for them to fit into the civilian economy and public service bureaucracy. More so, demobilised ex-combatants of *conventional armed forces and statutory military forces* are economically secured to some extent because they are entitled to *gratuity and pension payments* for the military service they rendered to the State.

Similarly, McMullin (2012: 1-30) takes the concerns about the representation of ex-combatants further by positing that the current discourse that informs the practice of DDR is replete with narratives of ex-combatants as a security threat. The threat and resentment narratives are two narratives that McMullin found to be consistently mentioned and which have turned out to be counterproductive to reintegration. Citing the Liberian reintegration experience, McMullin argues that a consistent sweeping generalisation was made about ex-combatants as common criminals, troublesome and greedy which led to a rigid generalised perception of them as the most potent security threat in post-conflict Liberia. Equally, the resentment narratives presented ex-combatants as perpetrators of violence while the community as a victim and thus the ex-combatants as undeserving of any reintegration assistance. Consequently, these reintegration narratives reified the dichotomy between ex-combatants and community to the level of *in-group and out-group* distinction which in turn further stigmatised, estranged and widened the gap between them and the community while the goal is to close it (McMullin, 2012: 29). In line with McMullin's position, I do not support the sweeping generalisation narratives in the DDR literature that portrays an over deterministic and negative world view of all categories of ex-combatants as unreformed criminals reminiscent of the classical criminological theories of natural born criminals with little possibility of being reformed (see Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990: 47-63 and Haralambos & Holborn, 1991: 582-583 on the natural born criminal). This is because such narratives fail to critically interrogate the role of the state, existing power structures and relations in society and inequality in triggering violent conflict (see Francis, 2006: 34-37 & Williams, 2011: 55-71). Yet, I am also of the contention that to some extent the validity of the securitised

narrative about ex-combatants cannot be completely disputed or taken for granted. This is particularly the case when dealing with a large caseload of ex-combatants of the Second-Generation type of militias who as Francis (2005: 1-3) argues tend to undermine and contest the legitimacy of the state and its monopoly of force and lack the skills and human resource potentials to easily reintegrate into mainstream society and economy. The above being the case, one could argue that the extreme securitisation of Liberian ex-combatants in the DDR literature as pointed by McMullin was not completely out of place because they represented archetypal Second-Generation militias.

Equally important, Nubler (2000: 45-77) arguing from a human resources perspective, criticises the securitised perception of ex-combatants, by contending that demobilisation and reintegration provide post-conflict societies with a window of opportunity to tap into the enormous human resource capabilities of ex-combatants for development purposes. This is because demobilisation and reintegration release massive human resource potentials hitherto held up in military service. Nubler portrays a positive view of ex-combatants against the securitised world-view that sees them as a source of destabilisation and insecurity that must be kept busy through the mere provision of vocational jobs. In Nubler's contention, ex-combatants are potential key drivers of the socioeconomic and political transformation of the postconflict society that can immensely contribute to the process of jumpstarting the economy of peace. As he notes:

The ultimate objective of demobilization and reintegration efforts should be to improve the welfare of people. At the same time, people and their capabilities are considered an important means and instrument in achieving the various economic, social and political objectives of demobilization and reintegration. Demobilization of combatants frees human potentials that can contribute to achieving these objectives if available skills and competence are used effectively and if people without any skills, or with only few, are endowed with useful skills and qualifications (Nubler, 2000: 45).

Again, to some extent I agree with the position advanced by Nubler that demobilised members of *conventional armed forces and statutory military forces* have great potential to contribute to socio-economic development, given the enormous wealth of experience and training they have acquired during their years of military service of which some are transferable to civilian economy. For

instance, demobilised military engineers easily reintegrate into the construction industry. Hence, labelling them as a security risk does not reflect the true reality about them. To buttress this, the Ghana Armed Forces (n.d.) revealed on its website that the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College is ‘... a world class college and a regional training centre, not only in Defence and Military Studies, but also in Governance and Leadership, International Politics, Administration and Management, as well as Crisis and Conflict Management’. Suffice to say that a critical look at these courses shows that the knowledge and skills to be obtained from the courses can be applied in post-service life. Similarly, the British Army (n.d.) stated on its website that:

The Army is committed to ensuring that serving personnel have opportunities to continue their personal development throughout their Army careers. There is a wide range of courses available to serving personnel and they are at different education and skills’ levels, from basic computers to distance-learning degrees... The gaining of qualifications is an on-going process that spans... [the entire] career. Many of the Army qualifications that can be gained are matched to civilian qualifications (or accredited), improving... prospects when leaving the Army (The British Army Website, n. d).

The above clearly suggests that ex-combatants of *conventional armed forces and statutory military forces* have enormous transferable human capital skills that can fit into the civilian economy and public service after being demobilised. Indeed, this explains why it is possible for one to complete his or her military career, retire and become an academic, politician or tycoon; yet difficult for one to retire from an academic career and become a military officer. However, while I concur with Nubler’s position in the case of ex-combatants of conventional armed forces and statutory military forces his position may not be all that correct when dealing with ex-combatants of the Second-Generation militias type who in most cases lack formal education and military training. This is because as Francis (2005: 1-3) pointed they ‘... do not have any military training provision, and even when they do have, it takes the form of basic training sometimes limited to the use of small arms and light weapons’. Similarly, as pointed out by Ikelegbe and Okumu (2010: 4) ‘a militia is an armed force of ordinary persons’ which suggests that most of them are likely to be uneducated, without formal skills and therefore have very little transferable skills that could contribute to socio-economic development beyond the subsistence level. Thus, the likelihood for them to resort to rent-seeking behaviours by the barrel of a gun.

In another vein, the conventional approach and practice to reintegration is also founded on certain taken for granted assumptions which are inherently faulty and which often results in defective programming and implementation as demonstrated by Vries and Wiegink (2011: 46). For instance, in the conventional approach, 'it seems to be an underlying assumption of DDR programmes that former combatants want to go home after demobilisation' (Ibid.). But this assumption has been contested by Kingma (2002: 181-201) who maintains that not all ex-combatants will want to return to their former communities for various reasons such as their skills having more relevance elsewhere, the villages from which they come from have been destroyed or because of the atrocities they committed against their communities during war. Expounding on this, Shibuya (2012: 89) argues that the assumption that ex-combatants will want to return to their former communities gives the impression of a socially functional society waiting for ex-combatants to return while in actual reality most post-conflict societies are fragile and dysfunctional in nature.

Thus, against the backdrop of these assertions, Vries and Wiegink (2011: 44) raised the all-important question of *reintegration into what?* Arguing further, Vries and Wiegink (2011: 46) maintain that even after ex-combatants returned to their communities, their successful reintegration is not automatically guaranteed but contingent on certain factors. For example, the kind of attitudes they exhibit in their various localities and expectations their communities and families harbour about them will determine whether they will be socially reintegrated or not (Ibid). Ex-combatants that return home as benevolent and humble persons reaching out to everyone in the community can easily be socially reintegrated (Ibid). But those that return with the perception that they have been battle-tested, and hence have come of age, and so will not subordinate themselves to traditional authority will find it difficult to socially reintegrate and therefore stand the risk of being rejected. Vries and Wiegink (2011: 46) contend that in most cases ex-combatants are contemptuous of traditional authority which makes it difficult for them to reintegrate. In a similar vein, Hazen's (n.d.: 10) contend that the successful reintegration of ex-combatants depends on the level of contrition they show and commitment towards the development and growth of society. Failure to demonstrate these attributes will lead to friction and frosty relations between the ex-combatants and their communities.

In another vein, Reno (2007: 324-342) argues that non-state armed groups can be classified into two, namely, predatory or community-based. Predatory armed groups tend to prey on their fellow citizens and in the process, perpetrate gross human rights violations and war crimes, as experienced during the war in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Conversely, community-based armed groups are essentially protective of their people and therefore do not commit violence against their community members (Ibid.). Drawing insight from Reno's postulation, Podder (2012: 186-202) in reference to Liberia debunks the assumption that once ex-combatants successfully return to their communities their reintegration is a foregone conclusion and argues that what determines whether they will successfully reintegrate or not is highly dependent on the kind of violence they perpetrated against their communities during war. Similar conclusions were drawn by Humphreys and Weinstein (2005: 20) in their study of ex-combatants' reintegration in Sierra Leone in which they noted that 'a combatant's experience of the war – in particular, the extent to which he or she engaged in abusive practices – is the most important determinant of acceptance.' Consequently, the extent to which the type of violence perpetrated by ex-militants of the Niger Delta impacts on their reintegration process will be further explored in this study.

More generally, in view of the conceptual ambiguity, programming and implementation conundrum that characterises the minimalist reintegration approach, a call has been made for its re-evaluation. As argued by Özerdem (2012: 51-73), existing literature on reintegration prioritises economic reintegration at the expense of social and political because '...reintegration assistance is seen as a way of contributing to the establishment of post-conflict security. Therefore, the assistance package often incorporates mainly economic rehabilitation and skills training programmes' (Ibid.: 58). Thus, in Özerdem's contention, it falls short of genuine reintegration but serves as a palliative that merely assists ex-combatants to kick-start their post-conflict lives (Ibid.: 59), hence he terms all ex-combatant-based rehabilitative activities as the *reinsertion approach*. Given the inadequacy of the approach, he suggests a new re-conceptualised model of reintegration that focuses on ex-combatants as members of the community whereby their needs and that of the community are concurrently addressed instead of treating them in isolation.

I am therefore in accord with Özerdem's suggestion for a re-conceptualised approach to reintegration because it has the potential to transform the practice of reintegration in a more positive way towards the attainment of lasting peace. Again, it can also hasten and enhance the extent to which ex-combatants can be accepted by their communities. Similarly, Özerdem's advocating of treating ex-combatants needs simultaneously with that of the community means treating their grievances together with that of the wider community. This implies empowering ex-combatants and other victims of conflict *concurrently*.

2.6.3. The Funding and Ownership of DDR

One of the current issues that have engaged the attention of academics and DDR experts, is the financing and ownership of DDR programmes. The contention revolves around whether those that fund DDR programmes, in general, such as the UN and its agencies, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) and other donor agencies should arrogate to themselves the right and power to conceive, design and determine the implementation of DDR and reintegration programmes. This is in line with the dictum that says, 'he who pays the piper calls the tune'. Alternatively, should the benefiting societies be given the opportunity to take ownership of the DDR process particularly the reintegration phase while international agencies provide the necessary funding and advice. Accordingly, Colleta *et al.*, (1996: 30) state that the reintegration phase of DDR has remained a contested terrain due to incompatible agendas between the recipient societies and donors who want to impose their agendas,

Similarly, Shibuya (2012: 123) maintains that 'every DDR project faces several levels of leadership challenges. First, any DDR program with international involvement has to deal with the "international vs. domestic" leadership problem.' This implies a possible clash of interest between the national government and international partners. It is against this backdrop that Özerdem (2009: 48) asks the rhetorical question; is reintegration only meant for the international community? He contends that '...the current practice indicates that... the importance of communities is still not adequately recognised by donors, nor is it incorporated into their undertakings' (Ibid.: 48). In the same vein, Özerdem argues that what in most cases is adduced as community-based reintegration

programmes, are largely planned and implemented by external financiers and donors without any inputs from the beneficiaries; hence they can best be described as *community-located approaches* rather than *community-based* (Özerdem, 2012: 59). According to Berdal (1996: 48), this approach ignores the fact that reintegration training opportunities that directly involved beneficiaries in the process of planning and implementation has the greatest probability of succeeding as experience has demonstrated in Somaliland and Eritrea.

Furthermore, the implementation of DDR and other post-conflict peacebuilding programmes is funded by numerous multilateral and independent funding agencies with each of the agencies focused on a different aspect of the DDR process in line with its mandate. Consequently, Muggah (2006: 190-205) asserts that their commitment to funding is determined by their different mandates and agendas. Muggah also posits that while disarmament and demobilisation are usually funded by the assessed budget of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations the budget does not take care of reintegration. Conversely, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) limit their funding to demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants and the broader postconflict peacebuilding and reconstruction processes (Muggah, 2006: 200). According to Muggah this results in '...poor appreciation among donors of the various dimensions of DDR and weapons reduction programs' (Ibid.: 200). Consequently, agencies such as the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations focus on security and stabilisation, while the World Bank and IMF concentrate on broader issues of development (Ibid: 200). Ginifer (1997: 7) corroborates this by arguing that, a major challenge to United Nations Peace Missions has been the lack of policy coordination between the Secretariat and Bretton Woods's institutions, resulting in the pursuit of contradictory policies.

Thus, the conflicting agendas of the various funding agencies, lack of coordination and rivalry amongst them can undermine the goals of DDR. Castillo (2008: 1-47) buttresses this position by arguing that the main reason for DDR and post-conflict reconstruction is political; which is to achieve security and stability to avoid a relapse into war. This implies that the political objective is paramount and overrides any other consideration such as economic objectives, particularly during the immediate post-conflict transition period. This connotes that whenever there is a conflict between the political and economic objectives, the political

objective must take precedence. Nevertheless, Castillo argues that the kind of development priorities that funding agencies such as the World Bank and IMF implement are often diametrically opposed and contradictory to the political objective of reintegration and DDR in general as experience in El Salvador has shown. She contends that in El Salvador, the United Nations Observer Mission (ONUSAL) succeeded in implementing a disarmament programme for the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) combatants based on its mandate. However, the demobilisation and reintegration process was almost jeopardised because it was undermined by financial constraints imposed by the IMF, the leading financier of the reconstruction programme for fear that over budgetary spending on demobilisation and reintegration would trigger inflation (Castillo, 2008: 42). This clearly demonstrates the extent to which international agencies that fund DDR programmes and post-conflict reconstruction, can work at cross-purposes and end up undermining the goal of the intervention.

It is sufficient to point out that the trend of events highlighted above regarding the funding and ownership of reintegration process and DDR in general, is summative of the unequal power relations that exist between the financiers of interventions and the beneficiaries. This trend, in my view, succinctly conforms to Hay's (2002: 168-182) conceptualisation of the three faces of power, namely, power as decision making, agenda setting and preference shaping. Against the backdrop of Hay's three faces of power theorisation, Özerdem (2009: 49-50) postulates that it is replicated in the politics of DDR and postconflict reconstruction between the international community, ex-combatants and the larger postconflict society. Özerdem contends that power as domination over others and its zero-sum conception informs the relationship between ex-combatants and the International Community. Özerdem argues that the international community perceives ex-combatants and post-conflict societies as a potent threat to international peace and security. Consequently, they must be rehabilitated in conformity with the standard and overall interest of the international community. Regarding power as agenda setting, Özerdem maintains that the international community, being the financier, sets the agenda for DDR and post-conflict reconstruction. As he asserts, 'with the funding dependence on external actors [sic], the agenda for the process is often set by international actors, leaving almost no room for the involvement of national and

local authorities, and of former warring sides' (Özerdem, 2009: 49). Concerning power as preference shaping, Özerdem argues that while implementing DDR programmes, the international community imposes certain options on ex-combatants regarding vocational trades and skills acquisition on the pretext of lack of resources and time constraints regardless of the preferences of the ex-combatants.

In this circumstance, the ex-combatants have no option than to accept the imposed options offered to them, given their condition of powerlessness. However, as previously argued, the unequal power relations that characterise the politics of DDR processes and post-conflict reconstruction has been called into question, and in its place national ownership and participatory approaches are often advocated. For example, Castillo contends that national governments should be the key driver of the DDR process and post-conflict reconstruction while the international community represented by the UN, its agencies and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) should serve as facilitators and coordinators as well as providing technical and funding support:

Thus, we envisaged war-to-peace transitions in which the *sovereign government* [my italics] would be in the front seat designing and implementing policies, with the UN system and the IFIs in the back seat, facilitating, coordinating, and monitoring the international community's technical and financial support (Castillo, 2008: 13).

Castillo's position is supported by studies by Dzinesa (2006: 39-43), Kilroy (2014: 275-308) and Kilroy (2015: 37-41); all of which demonstrate that participatory approaches to DDR and indeed, war to peace transition that involves the international community, national government and local communities working together is more effective and can potentially lead to better outcomes. In other words, participatory approaches envision a situation whereby a broad-spectrum of DDR stakeholders are given the opportunity to actively participate in its conceptualisation, design and implementation. In line with this, the United Nations pointedly highlights the risk involved in DDR funding agencies alienating other stakeholders in the design and implementation process when it notes that:

One of the reasons why DDR operations have failed in the past is a *lack of local ownership* [my italics] resulting in the perception that DDR is imposed from outside. The participation of a broad range of stakeholders in the development of a DDR strategy is essential to its success, as it

provides a basis for effective dialogue among national and local authorities, community leaders, and former combatants, and helps define a role for all parties in the decision making process. These actors should be fully involved in planning and decision making from the earliest stages. A participatory approach will significantly improve the DDR programme... (United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards, 4. 30. 2006: 11-12).

It is apposite to point out that the above discussions show the nature of power asymmetry that characterises internationally driven DDR programmes. However, in terms of how the Niger Delta ADDR programme fits into this debate; I will argue that it is *supposedly* an example of a nationally owned DDR programme fully driven by the Nigerian State beginning from conceptualisation, design, implementation and funding. I argue that it is *supposedly* because a fundamental component of national ownership is missing in the programme's conceptualisation process which was the failure to give the ordinary DDR participants and impacted communities the opportunity to fully participate and be drivers of the conceptualisation, design and implementation process. Thus, this type of *national ownership* can best be described as a '*neopatrimonial elite nationally owned DDR programme*'. In this case, one could argue that the neopatrimonial Nigerian State assumed the position of the international community and an external securitising actor in relation to the Niger Delta. Consequently, just as the international community securitised development in the global south so also the Nigerian State securitised development in the Niger Delta. Thus, development efforts in the region were carried out not as a response to the genuine development needs and concerns of the region but as a response to the security repercussions that its absence could result in for the Nigerian rentier neopatrimonial state.

2.6.4. Measuring Success in DDR

A growing body of research in the literature focuses on measuring success in DDR and the benchmark to be used to adjudge it as successful or not. An important work in this area is by Muggah (2005: 1-2) and Muggah (2006: 190-205) who argues that there is no consensus with regards to what exactly constitutes success in DDR because success is defined differently by the various stakeholders based on their mandates and primary motives for engaging in it. As Muggah notes 'success is often defined differently because the objectives (and

motives) of numerous actors are widely divergent and even contradictory during the post-conflict period.’ (Ibid.: 198). For example, from the perspective of military and government stakeholders, success is likely to be defined in terms of the number of weapons collected and their symbolic destruction, and the number of former ex-combatants demobilised and successfully reintegrated into society. Also, important in their view is the extent to which the state prerogative of the legitimate use of violence is restored and potential spoilers adequately checked. If these indices are rated high, military and government stakeholders are likely to adjudge DDR as a huge success.

Conversely, development agencies evaluate success in DDR not only in terms of the extent to which it has addressed micro and macro-insecurity challenges but also in the way root causes of the conflict are substantially addressed, resulting in a significant improvement in human security and development indices. A leading advocate of this perspective is Cockell (2000: 20) who argues that any post-conflict peacebuilding intervention should be judged in terms of how it has engendered the processes that will lead to the transformation of the hitherto socioeconomic and political structures that triggered conflict in society. In a similar vein, Shibuya (2012: 120) maintains that DDR has remained a contested field between the advocates of security and development when he points out that ‘the “security vs. development” debate in DDR is a chronic one in the literature.’ In my view, the issue of an appropriate yardstick for measuring success in DDR once again re-echoes Muggah’s (2004: 27) and Jennings’s (2008: 6-7) minimalist (security) and maximalist (development) perspectives that inform the practice of DDR earlier highlighted at the beginning of the reintegration debates. That is, should DDR aim at achieving security stability in the immediate aftermath of conflict or should it incorporate development and transformative agendas by aiming to address the underlying sources of conflict and pre-war grievances. Suffice to say that I identify with the maximalist perspective and this shall be demonstrated in the succeeding chapters of this study.

2.7. Conclusion

In this review of relevant literature, I adopted a thematic approach to examine both academic and policy-related literature in DDR. Regarding amnesty, the current debate about the relationship between amnesty and DDR revealed that it

has a positive impact on DDR because combatants will be more willing to disarm and demobilise if there is an assurance that they will not be put on trial for the infractions they committed against the state. Thus, the argument is that amnesty responds to the security dilemma pertaining to combatants' personal security when asked to disarm and demobilise. However, human rights organisations contend that amnesty rewards impunity by shielding criminals and violators of human rights from prosecution, thereby encouraging further impunity. Therefore, the extent to which amnesty responded to the security dilemmas of the Niger Delta militants and motivated them to disarm and demobilise will be explored further in Chapter Five of this study.

Disarmament is the first stage in the DDR process, and it is aimed at retrieving the means through which violence is perpetrated. The long-term goal of this is the prevention of a relapse into violence and promotion of a stable post-conflict environment of which two types have been highlighted in the literature; consensual and coercive. A consensual disarmament is always preceded by a peace agreement, and its overall success depends on the willingness of the parties to commit themselves to the process by providing adequate information regarding their strength, location of weapons cache and sources. However, in coercive disarmament, some level of force is required to ensure compliance.

There is a consensus in the literature, that various planning and implementation factors need to be taken into consideration when conducting disarmament. These include different levels of the environments where the disarmament is to take place, the level of cooperation secured from the various actors and stakeholders in the environment, the kind of economic agendas driving the conflict and inducement offered to the combatants. Oftentimes, weapons for cash programmes, or arms buy back, is a common form of inducement, the application of which can be counterproductive as the literature has demonstrated. Finally, adequate mechanisms must be put in place to ensure the safety of weapons collected, so that they do not fall again into the hands of unscrupulous elements.

In the case of the Niger Delta, the extent to which the disarmament phase succeeded in substantially retrieving the weapons in possession of the militants, and stabilising the security situation in the region will be explored further in this thesis. Also, to be studied is the degree to which the planning of the disarmament phase significantly complied with planning and implementations factors examined

in the literature. Likewise, the kind of incentives offered to the militants and their impact on the success of the programme will be assessed.

Demobilisation is essentially aimed at breaking the existing vertical and horizontal command and control structures of armed groups thereby neutralising their capacity to remobilise and return to violence. There is also the contention that breaking the structures will be insufficient to prevent a relapse into violence without demilitarising the *mindset* of the ex-combatants. Likewise, the current practice of demobilisation has been through the use of cantonment, which again has been criticised as reinforcing the command and control structures it is meant to destroy. Consequently, the extent to which the demobilisation of the Niger Delta ex-militants succeeded in breaking the existing command control structures will be examined in Chapter Five of this study.

Reintegration is the final stage in the DDR process and how successful it is will determine whether society can witness lasting peace or a relapse to violence. Generally, the debate about reintegration revolves around minimalist and maximalist approaches. The minimalist approach argues that if not provided with economic opportunities in terms of jobs, ex-combatants will constitute a source of micro and macro-insecurity in the immediate post-conflict era. Thus, in line with the security perception attached to them, all reintegration support is skewed in their favour. In contrast, the maximalist perspective rejects the sweeping generalisation and perception of ex-combatants as security threat, seeing them instead as potential social capital that can contribute positively to the process of post-conflict peacebuilding. Similarly, this perspective advocates that DDR should be approached as a process of socio-economic and political transformation, aimed at significantly reducing the fundamental sources of grievances that originally gave rise to the conflict. In this perspective, the needs of the ex-combatants should be taken care of concurrently with that of their family members, dependents, and local community within the broader framework of post-conflict peacebuilding. Given these contending perspectives, evaluating the impact of DDR has also become a contested issue whereby some rely on its security and stabilisation impacts to measure its success while others focus on the extent to which it has addressed the pre-war grievances that led to the conflict. Ultimately, the question of which of the two perspectives, minimalist or maximalist

informed the conceptualisation, design and implementation of the Niger Delta DDR will be further explored in Chapter Four of this study.

Overall, the literature review has demonstrated that DDR has become a critical component of the post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction orthodoxy. It is in this regard that this study has as its overarching research focus the evaluation of the extent to which the 2009 Niger Delta ADDR programme succeeded in accomplishing its statutory objective, particularly in terms of contributing to conflict resolution/prevention in the Niger Delta.

Chapter Three

The Origin, Dynamics and Nigerian State Management of the Niger Delta Conflict

3. Introduction

Oil in commercial quantity was first discovered in Nigeria at Oloibiri (present day Bayelsa state) in 1956 (Omeje, 2006: 33; Kashi & Watts, 2008:36; Gilbert, 2010: 60-61; Obi & Rustad, 2011:4). This discovery marked a turning point in Nigeria's economy (Ibaba *et al*, 2012:1) as the country assumed the status of an oil producing country. This development transformed Nigeria from an agricultural based economy to a rentier state largely dependent on oil rents (Obi & Rustad, 2011: 4). The rentier status of the Nigerian State is illustrated by the fact that over 80% of its official revenues and 90% of export earnings come from oil (Ibid.).

The Niger Delta region is the oil producing part of Nigeria (Akpan, 2011: xliv) and so it is very critical to the political economy of Nigeria and global energy supplies because it accounts for 75% of Nigeria's oil production and exports to the global energy market (Obi & Rustad (2011: 4). Consequently, the Niger Delta has become one of the critical fault lines in the political economy of the Nigerian State given that it holds the country's main oil reserves (Aghalino, 2009: 57).

However, even though the Niger Delta region is very rich in oil resources and strategic to the Nigerian economy, it remains a paradox, characterised by marginalisation, high level of poverty, lack of basic infrastructure, environmental degradation, pollution and high degree of youth unemployment (Douglas, 2005: 241-242; Aghalino, 2009: 58; Ojatorotu & Gilbert, 2010: 7-19; Omotola, 2010: 91; Obi & Rustad, 2011: 7; Obi, 2011: 65-79; Ogundiya, 2011:11-12; Ukiwo, 2011:17-27; Ako, 2011:42-54; Ibaba, 2012: 1- 4; Watts, 2013: 56). As the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Niger Delta Human Development Report (2006: 9) noted 'in reality, the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict.' This unfortunate situation has led to a violent confrontation between the people of the region particularly youth; MNOCs and the Nigerian security forces (Ojatorotu &

Gilbert, (2010: 7). For example, the intense conflict situation prompted the International Crisis Group to title its Africa Report No 115 (2006) '*The swamps of insurgency: Nigeria's Niger Delta Unrest*'. According to Adetoun, violent agitation by the people of the Niger Delta region over oil started with the abortive Isaac Adaka Boro's secessionist revolt in the 1960s:

It was in 1965 that the late Isaac Boro and his group took up arms to fight for a separate nation for the region. The region became more restive after 1965, but the situation reached the boiling point in 1990 when the region's elite and its youth formed various organizations to protest against the marginalization, neglect, oppression, and exploitation of their people and resources. Since 1990, the crisis has been violent and militant, often resulting in the loss of human lives and properties (Adetoun, 2005: 47).

To understand the origin and dynamics of the oil conflict in the Niger Delta, a critical understanding of the nature and character of the contemporary Nigerian State is essential. But to fully comprehend this issue, we need to grasp the history behind its evolution which dates to when the various regions that made up the present-day Nigerian State were forcibly integrated into the orbit of the international capitalist system (Omotola, 2006: 6). This process transformed into colonialism which produced negative legacies for the contemporary Nigerian State (Larry, 1988: 25).

Similarly, to explain the changing dynamics of the conflict over time, we equally need to locate it within the framework of the nature and character of the Nigerian State. Additionally, to explain why the MEND phase of the conflict represented the era of sustained armed rebellion against the Nigerian State and MNOCs we need to locate it within the political economy of armed conflict literature and debates particularly the greed theory of civil war and feasibility hypothesis articulated by Collier and Hoffer.

Consequently, the chapter is organised into three main parts. In the first part, I advance my theoretical framework for explaining the origin and dynamics of the Niger Delta conflict. Specifically, the theoretical framework analyses three main issues; the root cause of the conflict, the key drivers of the conflict's changing dynamics and why the MEND phase of the conflict represents the most sustained youth-led violent revolt against the Nigerian State and MNOCs. In the second part of the chapter, I provide a periodisation of the conflict's life cycle while in the third part I examine the Nigerian State's management of the conflict prior to the

introduction of the ADDR programme. The conclusion summarises the main issues and arguments examined in the Chapter as well as raising some critical questions to be discussed in subsequent chapters of the thesis.

3.1. Theoretical Framework of Analysis: Explaining the Origin and Dynamics of the Niger Delta Conflict

3.1.1. The Precolonial and Colonial Foundation of the Contemporary Niger Delta Oil Conflict

In this section, I will examine the pre-colonial and colonial foundations of violent conflict in the Niger Delta region. This will be achieved by showing how the historical process of integrating the region into the international capitalist system through the Trans-Atlantic slave trade and so-called legitimate trade influenced the evolution of the contemporary Nigerian State and violent conflict in the Niger Delta region.

3.1.2. Pre-colonial Foundations of Violent Conflict in the Niger Delta

Sesay (2006: 134) has aptly demonstrated the positive correlation between weapons proliferation and violent conflict in the Niger Delta region. However, this dynamic relationship should be understood within the 'historical realities, conditions and experiences of the region' (Ukeje, 2006: 1-2). According to Ukeje, this is critical for two reasons:

First, placing the proliferation of weapons in the proper historical perspective makes it easier to decipher the many underlying factors and dynamics driving the phenomenon in the Niger Delta both past and present. Second, such rich insights from history can help demonstrate the point that small arms and light weapons proliferation have firm roots in past circumstances and conditions... (Ibid.: 2).

Similarly, Akpan (2011: 35) posits that the history of crises and conflicts in the Niger Delta region dates back to the pre-colonial period when the region was incorporated into the international capitalist system via the Trans-Atlantic slave and legitimate trade. While Ukeje (2006: 11) argues that 'in tracing the proliferation of firearms in the Delta region, it should be borne in mind that guns and ammunition were historically major articles of trade in exchange for slaves, and much later, palm oil'. Therefore, within this period, the proliferation of guns becomes a significant feature of the Niger Delta slave economy as arms were

either used to acquire slaves through invasion or as deterrence against attacks for the purpose of slave acquisition (Akpan, 2011: 17). The trade had significant implications for weapons acquisition, proliferation and conflict in the Niger Delta because it introduced an epoch of intercommunal violence among the various Niger Delta ethnic groups and communities for the purpose of capturing slaves by the various slave merchants and local chiefs.

However, following the banning by Britain of its citizens from engaging in the international slave trade in 1807 and efforts to prohibit citizens of other nations in 1815, palm oil within a very short time supplanted slaves as the region's main economic export (International Crisis Group, 2006: 3). Consequently, the Niger Delta region became a major supplier of palm oil to Europe, and 'on account of the large tonnage of the products lifted from the region, it was called the *Oil Rivers Coast* (my italics)' (Akpan, 2011: xvi). But then the era of legitimate trade further heightened arms proliferation and the cycle of violence in the Niger Delta region because European trading companies engaged in monopolistic practices to gain absolute control of the trade which eventually led to violent conflict between them and the palm oil trading merchants and traditional chiefs of the Niger Delta region. The resistance by the region's traders and community leaders led to the application of direct violence such as *deposition*⁷, forceful exile or outright attacks on recalcitrant traditional leaders' and traders as a means of enforcing compliance. The experience of two prominent Niger Delta community leaders Jaja of Opobo and Nana Olomu of Itsekiri who were lured into signing protection and trade treaties with Britain is a case in point (Tamuno, 1965, 271-294; Osha, 2007: 62-63 and Falola, 2009: 39). This development was further captured by Falola and Heaton as follows:

Even Ja Ja signed a treaty, although warily and with reservations. In 1885, Hewett declared the setting up of the *Oil Rivers Protectorate* (my emphasis) in the name of the United Kingdom. When Ja Ja later violated the terms of the treaty of protection by continuing to deny British traders access to his hinterland markets, he was deposed and exiled to the West Indies as a warning to other local rulers of the consequences of insubordination. A similar fate met Nana, the Itsekiri governor of the river Benin, who was deposed and deported in 1894 after refusing British traders access to the Urhobo market of his hinterland (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 98).

⁷. Deposition is to forcibly remove a person from office, power or position of authority.

A Niger Delta academic expert reiterated the above view by contending that ‘first of all the slave trade and the imposition of the new legitimate trade all had their own cycle of violence’⁸ in the region. He additionally explained that violent conflict in the region did not start with the contemporary oil conflict in the Niger Delta, it only represents a phase in the trajectory of violent conflicts that the region has been enmeshed in over time. While the respondent’s point of view espouses a kind of historical determinism, I would contend that the contemporary conflict over petroleum resources and complaints of marginalisation over benefits accruing from it certainly echoes the past conflict and resistance over the control of palm oil trade. The latter certainly helped shape and influence a long-standing culture of using armed violence to resist outside exploitation. The precolonial conflict history of the Niger Delta has continued to resonate in the contemporary oil conflict in other ways too. For example, former Niger Delta militant commanders, particularly Asari Dakubo have constructed a meta-narrative of the current armed struggle as a replication of the one waged by early Niger Delta chiefs against European conquest and domination in the 19th century. For instance, according to Asari Dokubo:

The arms struggle has been the tradition of Ijaw people. It is in built in us because if you read Ijaw history... the Ijaws were the only people in Africa that fought the British and defeated the British. No other people in this part of Africa... fought, but it was only the Ijaws that fought the Akasa battle when the Royal Niger Company was given concessionary right by the British Crown...⁹

3.1.3. Colonial Foundations of the Niger Delta Conflict

The Nigerian State was created through colonial fiat after many brutal battles of conquest and resistance were fought between the British hegemonic imperialist forces and various territories that were forcibly brought together in 1914 to form the entity called Nigeria (Osaghae, 1998: 4; Graf, 1988: 7 & Dibua, 2006: 54; Falola and Heaton, 2008: 85-109). Prior to the successful imposition of colonial rule, what constitutes Nigeria today was made up of different independent polities ranging from centralised kingdoms mostly in the Northern part of Nigeria, the

⁸. Respondent 045, December 2013.

⁹. Quoted from a transcription of a live television interview with Asari Dokubo on TVC News titled ‘*Straight Talk with Asari Dokubo*’. Available at: <http://www.tvcnews.tv/?q=article/straighttalk-asari-dokubo> (Accessed: 03 September 2015).

powerful kingdoms of today's Western Nigeria and the mostly Igbo, Ijaw and Efik acephalous societies of contemporary Eastern Nigeria (Dibua, 2006: 54). Therefore, as Dibua noted, the period 1900 to 1914 was significant in the creation of the Nigerian State by British imperialist forces:

The period is crucial because it marked the historical beginnings of the factors that shaped Nigeria's history throughout the colonial period into the postcolonial period. It was during this period that various administrative, economic, and social institutions that significantly affected Nigeria's history were put in place. This period also marked the historical roots of the modernization project in Nigeria. By 1906, the territory that eventually became Nigeria comprised the Lagos Colony, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria inclusive of the Niger Delta and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. In 1906, the Lagos Colony and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria were merged with Lagos as capital (sic). This development was largely based on economic considerations, as the funds from the larger and more endowed Southern protectorate were needed for the construction of infrastructures like harbours and railways, which were crucial for the exploitation of Nigeria's resources. In January 1914, the Southern and Northern Protectorates were amalgamated to form a single country under the administration of a governor-general. Again, economic considerations provided the primary motive for the amalgamation (Dibua, 2006: 57).

An important issue that can be deduced from Dibua's assertion with significant implications for the contemporary petroleum oil conflict in the Niger Delta was the contention that the 1914 amalgamation was essentially informed by the need to use resources from the resource endowed Southern Protectorate which the Niger Delta was part of to construct the urgently needed colonial infrastructures. It is notable that this kind of political economy is still present as today's petroleum oil resources from the Niger Delta region are being appropriated to develop infrastructure in other parts of the country particularly northern Nigeria¹⁰ (Adetoun, 2005: 50).

Colonialism has fundamental implications for the evolution and development of conflict in contemporary Nigeria and precisely the oil conflict in the Niger Delta in several ways. One such implication was the lopsided geographical and ethno numerical composition of the Nigerian State (Osha, 2007:24). For instance, as noted by Osaghae, one of the strong legacies of colonialism in connection to the propensity for conflict in Nigeria was the vastness of the Northern region in terms

¹⁰. This view was equally reiterated by respondent 037.

of geographical size and population in comparison to the other two regions that made up the Nigerian State at independence. Thus, in Osaghae's contention, the geographical size and population of Northern Nigeria conferred on it undue political advantages that paved the way for it to politically dominate and marginalise the other two regions in the post-independence era. In particular:

... granting the Northern region 50 per cent of the seats in the House of Representatives (this was later increased to 52 per cent) and leaving intact its preponderant size and population which were more than those of the Southern regions put together, meant that the region could single-handedly obtain the dominant position under the majoritarian system the country inherited at independence (Osaghae, 1998: 6).

Similarly, Naanen (1995:46-78) noted that the Niger Delta predicament is a consequence of ethnic minority domination and marginalisation within the larger context of the lopsided Nigerian postcolonial state imposed by the forces of colonial imperialism. He further adds that the Northern region and other favoured ethnic group (s) emerged at independence as hegemonic giving rise to what he termed *internal colonialism*:

Internal colonialism began in Nigeria, not through economic domination...but through political penetration deriving from a skilful pursuit of political control, aided crucially by numerical preponderance. This power was then used to transfer resources from the numerically weaker groups to develop the dominant areas, creating in the process an economically advantaged and powerful core and an impoverished and weak periphery (Naanen, 1995: 49-50).

Therefore, one of the enduring legacies of colonialism's crafting of the Nigerian State is the creation of *internal colonialism*. A situation whereby elites from hegemonic ethnic groups control the contemporary Nigerian State and manipulate the distribution of benefits accruing from petroleum resources derived from the homelands of ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta in their favour. This imbalance in power was compounded by the balkanisation of Southern Nigeria into two administrative divisions prior to independence while the Northern region was left intact (Dibua, 2006: 62). This structural division was further consolidated by the 1946 Richards Constitution that broke Nigeria into three administrative regions, namely, North, West and East with serious implications for conflict as noted by Dibua:

...the internal administrative division fostered ethnic particularism by ensuring that people from the same ethnic group were brought under one region while each region was controlled by one of the three dominant ethnic groups in the country. The bulk of the Igbo were in the Eastern region, the bulk of the Yoruba were in the Western region and the bulk of the Hausa-Fulani were in the Northern region (Dibua, 2006: 62).

Thus, one of the significant repercussions of the balkanisation was that in all the regions there is a hegemonic ethnic group that holds sway with a motley of minority ethnic groups under its tutelage (Obi, 2002: 104). The subjugation of minority ethnic groups by the hegemonic ones heightens minority consciousness, resentment and agitation thereby increasing the potentials for conflict as Osaghae has noted:

The other problematic structural feature of colonial rule was the problem of minorities. This derived from the anomalous constitution of the regions whereby each had a core major ethnic group-Igbo (Eastern region), Yoruba (Western region), and Hausa/Fulani (Northern region) and 'periphery' of numerical minorities...These minorities, which make up the bulk of the country's 250 or more ethnic groups, occupied distinct territories apart from the majority groups, and this encouraged the development of separatist agitations... These demands were based on claims of discrimination, neglect and political as well as cultural domination by the majority groups... (Osaghae, 1998: 10).

This ethnic minority consciousness has become a mobilising factor in the contemporary petroleum oil conflict because by sheer coincidence of geography oil in commercial quantities was discovered in the homeland of the Niger Delta minority ethnic groups in the then Eastern region. Consequently, the development further intensified ethnic minority consciousness and resentment in the Niger Delta against the Igbo hegemonic ethnic group that is politically dominant in the Eastern region.

The nexus between colonialism and contemporary Niger Delta petroleum oil conflict also lies in the fact that the distinct nature and character of the contemporary Nigerian State is deeply rooted in its colonial history and heritage. In particular, the repressive and authoritarian nature and character of the colonial state was replicated in the post-colonial state. Osaghae also reiterated the same argument by contending that:

The basic points about the post-colonial state in Nigeria are that it originated under colonial rule, and that the perceptions and attitudes which

attended the latter subsist in disturbing ways in the post-colonial period... The post-colonial state, like its colonial progenitor, is primarily a law and order state, and this has remained its most abiding attribute... This law and order orientation underlies the reliance on instruments of coercion to sustain state power, and authoritarian tendencies on the part of rulers... (it should be remembered that the colonial state was an authoritarian one *par excellence* (Osaghae, 1998: 19).

This, in part, explains why violence has formed part and parcel of the way in which the Nigerian State has responded to agitations from the Niger Delta region and indeed other conflicts. Additionally, Osaghae maintains that an attribute of the Nigerian colonial state that subsists in the post-colonial era is the negative perception of the state by the citizenry. The colonial state he argues was perceived as 'alien', superimposed from Europe and designed to serve the interest of the colonialist. Consequently, even after independence, this perception persisted because the state was still largely seen by most of the citizenry '...as an instrument of accumulation and patron-client ties ... mode of political relations' (Osaghae, 1998: 19-20). Graf (1988:11-12) also highlights another perspective on the negative perception of the Nigerian postcolonial state and its alienation from the majority populace by positing that the system of education introduced by colonialism succeeded in nurturing two distinct social classes namely *the ruling class and the ordinary masses*. Graf (1998: 11-12) likewise contends that members of the ruling class negotiated for independence from the colonial ruling elite but the independence they negotiated was for the handover of privileges from the colonial elites to the indigenous ones, with a commitment on the part of the indigenous ruling elite to maintain the existing privileges and structures of capitalist accumulation through unrestricted transfer of profit to the metropolis. The long-term consequence of this negative development was the replication of the entire colonial superstructures in the post-colonial era:

...nationalist movement could not be mobilised through a popular revolutionary struggle nor motivated by unifying ideological slogans of 'equality' or 'social justice'. Instead, independence largely amounted to a negotiated settlement a gentlemen's agreement-between the colonial elite and the emergent Nigerian elites. The wishes, involvement or long-term interests of the masses scarcely played a role in the movement...Independence, then, entrenched the ruling structure produced under the colonial regime and further sharpened the already well-developed distinction between the elites and the masses (Graf, 1988: 11-12).

Thus, the crystallisation process of the Nigerian State as an instrument of accumulation and patron-client ties as the main type of political relation has its roots in both colonialism and the actors of the early post-colonial state. Similarly, the rentier nature and character of the contemporary Nigerian State has its roots in the colonial economy. First and foremost, as a producer and exporter of primary agricultural commodities and later petroleum oil and gas. This was because petroleum as a commodity was discovered when Nigeria was still under British colonial domination and so as a commodity it was meant to serve the interests of the colonial state and MNOCs (Azaiki, 2003: 85).

The British hegemonic colonial state centralised and monopolised the production and distribution of oil as a commodity through the promulgation of the colonial Minerals Ordinance Edict in 1945 which provided that 'the...control of all minerals and mineral oil, in, under, or upon any land in Nigeria, and of all rivers, streams, and watercourses throughout Nigeria, is and shall be vested in the CROWN' (Omoruyi, 2001: 2). The CROWN here refers to Britain but personified in this context by the British colonial state in Nigeria and when the contemporary Nigerian State became the successor to the colonial state on 1 October 1960, such mineral rights were automatically transferred to the Nigerian post-colonial state. Indeed, the post-colonial state built on its predecessor's role as a source of accumulation:

To facilitate its regulatory and *extractive roles* [my italics], the post-colonial state centralises the 'production' and distribution of national resources, and in the context of state capitalism this encourages the perception of the state as an instrument of accumulation and patron-client ties as the dominant mode of political relations (Osaghae, 1998: 19-20).

To conclude the discussion on the colonial foundation of the Niger Delta conflict, the origin of the rentier neopatrimonial nature and character of the Nigerian State is rooted in its colonial past. The contemporary crisis and contradictions of rentier neopatrimonial accumulation, in turn, produced the condition of relative deprivation such as poverty, environmental degradation, underdevelopment and the resultant frustration that manifested in violent conflict in the Niger Delta region. Similarly, the violent way the contemporary Nigerian State responded to the conflict replicates the way the colonial state violently dealt with those that resisted it.

3.1.4. *The Contemporary Nigerian State and the Roots of the Niger Delta Conflict*

In the preceding section, I demonstrated the various ways that colonialism formed the basis of the evolution of the contemporary Nigerian State and the Niger Delta conflict. In this section, I will examine its contemporary nature and character. At independence, the Nigerian State emerged both in nature and character as a rentier neopatrimonial state, whereby the state has been constructed as a means of private accumulation by an indigenous neopatrimonial ruling elite that negotiated independence from the colonialist (Graf, 1988: 11-12). The concept of the rentier state was first theorised by Mahdavy (1970: 428) and its critical discerning feature as he asserts is the stupendous amount of foreign exchange it generates from the exports of its natural resources. According to Mahdavy:

Rentier States are defined here as those countries that receive on a regular basis substantial mounts (sic) of external rent. External rents are in turn defined as rentals paid by foreign individuals, concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or governments of a given country...oil revenues received by the governments of the oil exporting countries can also be external rents (Mahdavy, 1970: 428).

Thus, in an oil rentier State, other sectors of the economy are virtually dormant in terms of income generation because 'oil revenues received by the governments of the oil exporting countries have very little to do with the production processes of their domestic economies' (Mahdavy, 1970: 429). As Mahdavy further argues most rentier states are generally confronted by poor economic growth indices despite the enormous resources at their disposal. As he notes:

Perhaps one of the more crucial problems that needs to be studied is to explain why the oil exporting countries, in spite of the extraordinary resources that are available to them, have not been among the fastest growing countries in the world. For most underdeveloped countries, lack of savings or shortage of foreign exchange constitute some of the major constraining factors in economic growth. No such limitations beset Rentier States (Mahdavy, 1970: 432-434).

Beblawi (1990:85) advances the rentier concept further by arguing that rent is 'the income derived from the gift of nature,' of which oil is a classic example. Beblawi further postulates that an oil rentier state shows the dynamic interaction between oil, state and society by identifying four fundamental characteristics of the rentier state. Thus, according to Beblawi a rentier state is one:

...where rent situation predominates....a rentier economy is an economy which relies on substantial external rent...in a rentier ...economy-only few are engaged in the generation of this rent (wealth), the majority being only involved in the distribution or utilisation of it ...in a rentier state the government is the principal recipient of the external rent in the economy (Beblawi, 1990: 87-88).

He further posits that a rentier economy creates a rentier social class which he conceptualises in this way:

A rentier is thus more of a social function than an economic category and is perceived as a member of a special group who, though he does not participate actively in the economic production, receives nevertheless a share in the produce and at times a handsome share. The distinguishing feature of the rentier thus resides in the lack of or absence of a productive outlook in his behaviour (Beblawi, 1990: 86).

The implications of Beblawi's assertion are many, one of which is that the rentier elites do not see any need to engage in productive investments and ventures in order to reduce over-dependence on external rents but rather prefer to preside over the distribution of rent through profligate ventures and projects. Second, the rentier mentality connotes a state of mind on the part of the elites which is characterised by a lacklustre attitude to productivity and development (Yates, 1996: 21). This suggests that members of the rentier ruling elite prefer sharing state resources (rents) through contract awards between patrons and clients (prebendal accumulation). Consequently, given that the rentier state is controlled by the ruling elites, it then means that they will continue to appropriate the rents for their own personal needs at the expense of the greater majority in society.

In another vein, a pertinent character of the contemporary Nigerian State is its characterisation as neopatrimonial. Regarding neopatrimonial state, Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 61) contend that in African states 'authority is entirely personalized, shaped by the ruler's preferences rather than any codified system of laws'. Similarly, Williams (2011: 55-71) postulates that it is a complex network of state-society relations whereby the modern bureaucratic state is infused with traditional ideas about patronage and clientelism:

Neopatrimonialism regimes are hybrid, uncertain, unstable and usually authoritarian systems of governance. They are a hybrid mix of legal-rational bureaucracy and personalized systems of power involving clientelism and patronage. They produce a significant degree of

uncertainty over which of these two systems will dictate the decision-making process in any given situation (Williams, 2011: 56).

The key discerning issue here regarding neopatrimonialism as argued by Williams is that the leader administers the modern bureaucratic state based on his personal wishes and desires. There is no clear distinction between the personal interest of a leader and the state. Thus, as Clapham notes neopatrimonialism is:

...a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organizations with powers which are formally defined, but exercise those powers...as a form...of private property (Clapham, 1985: 48).

Put simply, a neopatrimonial system represents a modern state where public and private interests are intertwined (Gazibo, 2012: 3). It is on this basis that Sandbrook (2000: 59) attributes Africa's crisis of underdevelopment to 'the private appropriation of the state's powers'. He further posits that 'neopatrimonial rule inhibits economic development by subordinating economic objectives to short-run exigencies of political survival...' (Ibid: 2000: 97). In a related argument, Evans (1994:84) has posited that a neopatrimonial state becomes predatory when it becomes an obstacle to development in society because of the rapacious character of the ruling elites who personalise the state machinery and transform it into a despotic institution for accumulation. The predatory state is more effective in repression and brutalisation of its citizenry than in the provision of the dividend of good governance (Evans, 1995: 43). Evans goes further to compare the predatory state and developmental state and asserts as follows:

Juxtaposing "predatory" and "developmental" states focuses attention on variation defined in terms of developmental outcomes. Some states extract such large amounts of otherwise investable surplus while providing so little in the way of "collective goods" in return that they do indeed impede economic transformation. Those who control these states plunder without any more regard for the welfare of the citizenry than a predator has for the welfare of its prey (Evans, 1995: 44).

Bach (2011: 279) advances a similar position by contending that in a neopatrimonial predatory type of state, the state, its institutions and resources have been so personalised to the extent that it produces an institutional failure or de-formalisation of the State. The predatory neopatrimonial state is therefore

characterised by ‘...the absence of a public space, and of any capacity to produce ‘public’ policies. Indeed, the privatisation of the public sphere is carried to such an extreme that it becomes conducive to its dissolution...’ (Ibid.). This is comparable to the criminalisation of the state in Africa theorised by Bayart *et al*, (1999: 1-25-31), a situation whereby the state machinery has been personalised for the purpose of perpetrating criminality for personal gain by the elites that control it. And in line with that, Reno (1999: 2) argues that the criminalisation of the state has led in some cases to the emergence of a ‘shadow state’, a strong informal system within the state system that revolves around patronage and illegality and which in turn suffocates and holds the ideal bureaucratic state captive making it highly dysfunctional.

Against the backdrop of this theoretical exposition, I contend that the Nigerian State is an archetype rentier, neopatrimonial state which has subsequently degenerated into a predatory one. I argue so, because, since the discovery of oil, Nigeria became an oil-dependent state almost solely reliant on oil rents to finance its developmental activities. In consonance with my assertion, Ibeanu (2000: 21) notes that in Nigeria ‘...petroleum provides over eighty percent of government revenues annually. This makes oil production very central to the survival of state officials as most public works contracts [sic] and the continued functioning of government agencies depend on it’. Omeje provides an apt description of the Nigerian rentier neopatrimonial state that expounds on Ibeanu’s assertion when he posits that:

Nigeria has a mono-economy in which oil rent plays a dominant part...Based on the nature of its political economy, Nigeria is described as a ‘rentier state’, largely dependent on oil mining rents, taxes and royalties paid by transnational oil-producing companies (TNOCs), and on profits from its equity stakes in the TNOCs investment...A self-serving hegemonic elite, whose interests in rent seeking and ‘prebendal accumulation’ determine a range of state policies... and institutional practices, dominates most rentier states such as Nigeria. Prebendalism is a political tradition in which states offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by office holders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups (Omeje, 2006:212).

One could further argue that given the current state of affairs in the Niger Delta and Nigeria, in general, it is apparent that the Nigerian State has gone beyond

being a rentier neopatrimonial state to a predatory one just as Lewis has asserted:

As a special form of political and economic domination, predatory rule should be distinguished from the prebendal relations traditionally prevalent in Nigeria, in which patron-client links were more diffuse and individual authority comparatively limited (sic). Predation embodies a reconfiguration of neo-patrimonial rule, towards more despotic and rapacious control (Lewis, 1996: 99).

This suggests that the Nigerian State has become an institution of personal accumulation by a rapacious ruling elite resulting in the alienation of its citizens as well as becoming an obstacle to their human security development. As Okonjo-Iweala notes:

The years of military rule were politically and economically disastrous for Nigeria. Institutions of states were severely undermined as meritocracy gave way to mediocrity. Corruption, already burgeoning under the early politicians, became entrenched under military rule, and a kleptocratic elite with a very limited vision of the future of the country came into being. That elite remains largely intact today, even under democracy, and may constitute one of the biggest stumbling blocks in the way of Nigeria's progress. (Okonjo-Iweala, 2012: 2).

Contextualising Okonjo-Iweala's assertion to the Niger Delta, Watts (2013: 56-57) argues that '... the kleptocratic and venal system of state politics has stolen and squandered what many in the Delta felt to be their rightful heritage' In my view, what can be deduced from all these assertions is that, empirically the Nigerian State has become a vehicle through which the ruling elites engage in massive looting of state resources (kleptocracy). Bishop Mathew Hassan Kukah echoes the same when he contends that:

I have said it over and over, we have to have a country before these cowboys *can have access to loot the treasury* [my emphasis] and head to Dubai for their sickening orgies. Tragically, we have no political class. All we have are men and women who are out like vultures circling around the *carcass* [my emphasis] of the Nigerian State (Aworinde, 2014: 4).

Both established and alleged cases of corruption can be cited to buttress the credibility of such postulations. For example, Human Rights Watch (2012:1-64) reports that ten nationally prominent political figures were charged by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)¹¹ between April 2003 and

¹¹. EFCC, is the acronym for Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, an agency established by an act of the Nigerian parliament. 'The Act mandates the EFCC to combat financial and

December 2007, another four were charged between January and June 2008 and sixteen were charged between June 2008 and July 2011. It further reported that the EFCC secured a conviction on Tafa Balogun a former Nigerian Inspector General of Police (NIGP) whose assets, worth over \$150 million, were seized by the state (Human Rights Watch (2012:1-64). In another case, when Diepreye Alamieyeseigha former governor of Bayelsa state (one of the nine oil producing states and the epicentre of militancy) but highly impoverished was arrested by the British authorities in London, the Metropolitan Police discovered £1million cash at his home and consequently charged him with money laundering (Ibid). While on bail he escaped to Nigeria but subsequently was impeached as governor and charged with embezzling about \$55 million of public funds (Ibid). Similarly, Lucky Igbinedion, a former Edo state governor (one of the Niger Delta States) was charged by the EFCC and convicted for syphoning more than \$25 million of public funds (Ibid.).

Pertinent is the case of James Ibori, two-term former governor of Delta state (one of the nine oil producing states and a hotbed of militancy) against whom the EFCC brought 170 criminal charges (Ibid). Particularly, 'one count of the indictment alleged that Ibori had given then EFCC chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, a \$15 million bribe in an attempt to get the case against him dropped. Nuhu Ribadu, in turn, handed \$15 million in cash over to the Central Bank of Nigeria for safekeeping as evidence... [sic]' (Human Rights Watch, 2012: 38). Ibori escaped to Dubai and was subsequently extradited to London where he was tried for money laundering and jailed for thirteen years by a Southwark Crown Court London in 2012 (*BBC News*, 2012). Judge Pitts while sentencing Ibori, observed that 'it was during those two terms that you turned yourself in short order into a multi-millionaire through corruption and theft in your powerful position as Delta State Governor' (Ibid.). Additionally, *BBC News* (2012) reported that Ibori bought the following properties from the proceeds of his corrupt dealings:

A house in Hampstead, north London, for £2.2m. A property in Shaftesbury, Dorset, for £311,000.00. A £2m mansion in Sandton, near

economic crimes. The Commission is empowered to prevent, investigate, prosecute and penalise economic and financial crimes and is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of other laws and regulations relating to economic and financial crimes, including: Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Establishment act (2004). (Information sourced from: <https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/index.php/about-efcc/the-establishment-act>).

Johannesburg, South Africa. A fleet of armoured Range Rovers valued at £600,000.00. A £120,000.00 Bentley. A Mercedes Maybach for 407,000.00 euros that was shipped directly to his mansion in South Africa.¹²

All these pieces of evidence buttress why the enormous oil revenue that accrued to the Nigerian State over the years has not been translated into proportionate improvements in the material well-being of the citizenry because so much of it has been frittered or stolen and stashed away by rapacious ruling elites and bureaucrats. As Campbell (2011: xv) contends the grim reality of underdevelopment and grievances against the Nigerian State by people of the Niger Delta region reflects the fact that ‘...the population has benefited little from billions of dollars produced by oil...’ A situation Hill (2012: 16) refers to as the ‘...failure of governance, the unwillingness of political leaders and regimes to provide all of their citizens, rather than a fortunate few, with the public goods they have a reasonable right to expect’.

In conclusion, the nature and character of the Nigerian State and its contradictions is what gave rise to the *functional failure* of its core functions to its citizens and the Niger Delta oil-producing minorities, which in turn generated the relative deprivation and frustration that eventually resulted in a rebellion against the state. Functional failure suggests that even though the Nigerian State exists as a sovereign geopolitical entity and is accorded diplomatic recognition in the global community of nations it is nevertheless at the domestic level failing in the performance of its core functions as a state to its citizenry (Naanen and Nyiayaana, 2013:112). All this lends credence to the contention by the former Nigerian Central Bank governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi that:

The fundamental character of the Nigerian State is that, for decades, since we found oil it has existed not to serve the people but as a site for rent extraction to serve a tiny minority in the country’s political power. And it doesn’t matter where this group comes from-whether it is north or south or Muslim or Christian or military or civilian. The state has always been a site for rent seeking... (Uko, 2014: 5).

¹². See same story by SJ- The Street Journal titled ‘Judgement day: Ibori bags 13 years’ imprisonment’. Available at; <http://the-streetjournal.org/2012/04/judgement-day-ibori-bags-13-year...> (Accessed: 08 September 2015).

Thus, as I will later demonstrate in this study my position is in consonance with the TCND's assertion that 'the failure of development in the Niger Delta is largely as a result of the absence of good governance frameworks that can effectively strengthen the use of political power and resources' (Movement for Survival of Ogoni People, 2009:65).

3.2. Theorising the Changing Dynamics, Post-Kaiama Declaration and MEND's Era of the Niger Delta Conflict

Now that I have provided the historical backdrop to the Niger Delta conflict, I shall attempt to explain two key issues in the final part of this section. These are the drivers and accelerators of the changing dynamics in the Niger Delta's petroleum oil conflict and why the post-Kaiama declaration and MEND's era of the conflict constitute the most sustained period of violent revolt against the Nigerian State and MNOCs.

3.2.1. Changing Dynamics of the Niger Delta Conflict

Again, I argue that the key driver and accelerator of the conflict's changing dynamics lie in the nature and character of the Nigerian State which I have highlighted in the previous section. In view of the rentier and neopatrimonial nature and character of the Nigerian State, oil has been securitised (Buzan *et al*, 1998: 23-24) and elevated to the status of a national asset that must be safeguarded from any act capable of undermining its steady flow. It is apposite to argue that this character of the Nigerian State not only led to but accentuated contradictory perceptions and understandings of security between the Nigerian State and oil-producing communities of the Niger Delta which ceaselessly exacerbated and aggravated the conflict (Ibeanu, 2000: 25-26; Onuoha & Ezirim, 2012: 38). As noted by Ibeanu, these contradictory understandings of security revolve around the fact that:

At the heart of conflicts in the Niger Delta, therefore, are different meanings of security attached to crude oil. For oil-bearing communities, security means the maintenance of the carrying capacity of the fragile Niger Delta environment. It is the realization that an unsustainable exploitation of crude oil, with its devastation of farmland and fishing waters, threatens resource flows and livelihoods for both individuals and communities as

collectives...To state officials and petrobusiness, security is defined as an uninterrupted production of crude oil at “competitive” costs...their concern is to boost state revenues and company profits, irrespective of environmental consequences and indeed, irrespective of long-term economic irrationality (Ibeanu, 2000: 25-26).

A member of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND) reiterates the conflicting understanding of security between the Nigerian State and the oil producing communities when he notes that:

Now you will also find one thing...I always talk about...when the people are saying look the exploitation of oil resources is done in a manner that is killing me, it is affecting my means of livelihood. Government response is that wait, we cannot develop you unless there is peace and so you need to wait. Now people are not hearing themselves. The people are saying no a situation of peace for them is a situation in which...their means of livelihood is guaranteed. But they now hear what government is saying, look wait...let me kill you more...before I come to develop you. So even though they are all talking of peace, they are not saying...the same thing...this misconception of peace...appears to be a fundamental issue that I have found all through.¹³

Consequently, given the above conflicting meaning of security between the two parties, the Nigerian State has consistently viewed every threat to oil production in the Niger Delta as a threat to its very existence as rightly noted in this assertion:

... government sees the activities of the protesting oil communities and the armed militias as acts of economic sabotage on the main source of national revenues and a challenge to its power in the Niger Delta. The activities of some of the armed groups are also interpreted as acts of criminality as well as a threat to national stability and security...any act capable of resulting in the disruption of oil production is perceived as a threat to the *survival and wellbeing of the country* (my emphasis) (Obi, 2009: 107).

Thus, given the nature and character of the Nigerian State, petroleum became securitised and elevated to the level of a referent object that must be protected (Buzan *et al*, 1998: 23-24), a situation the above member of the TCND refers to as a false construct of what national security is.¹⁴ This explains why the Nigerian State over-relied on the use of military force to protect oil production and assets. The over-reliance on violence by the Nigerian State led to the spiralling of the conflict in line with the *conflict spiral model* of escalation articulated by Pruitt &

¹³. Respondent 008, October 2013.

¹⁴. Ibid.

Kim (2003: 96). In the context of the Niger Delta, this suggests that 'state violence leads to resistance by targeted groups, which leads to more state violence and more resistance' (Ibeanu, 2000: 25). In consonance with the above assertions a member of the Ogoni Solidarity Forum noted that:

I think the key trigger number one is because government's responses to agitations or demands has always been violent ones (sic). Ken Saro Wiwa did not carry arms yet they militarised the area, chased people into the bush, shooting and killing people at site. You will see buses with people travelling they will just stop the bus... hey every Ogoni young man come down and they will execute everybody, for what? So, people now said ok since they now speak the language of gun it was better that we are also armed, so that was exactly why people started carrying guns because government's response has always been violent.¹⁵

Another factor responsible for the spiralling of the conflict and which also revolves around the neopatrimonial nature and character of the Nigerian State was the alleged massive corruption that undermined the effectiveness of all past and present development intervention agencies established to develop the Niger Delta region. Several respondents shared the consensus that if the agencies had been effective, the Niger Delta conflict would not have escalated to the level it did in 2009 when the Nigerian State was compelled to embark on an ADDR programme.¹⁶

3.2.2. Theorising the Post-Kaiama Declaration and the Sustained Armed Rebellion by MEND against the Nigerian State

The last issue I will be addressing in the theoretical debates section is to advance an explanation as to why the post-Kaiama declaration and MEND phase of the Niger Delta conflict represented an era in which the conflict intensified in terms of weaponry and sustained violent revolt against the Nigerian State predominantly championed by Ijaw youth. Cesarz *et al.* capture the new sophistication that characterises the post-Kaiama declaration and MEND's era as follows:

...militants have displayed new lethal capacities, and a willingness and skill in using them. They acted swiftly, with astute timing... They brought to the confrontation new assets: rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47s, machine guns, satellite phones, and speedboats. They demonstrated a willingness, and ability, to kill oil company and Nigerian military personnel

¹⁵. Respondent 015, November 2013.

¹⁶. Respondent 032, November 2013. Reiterated by respondent 004 and 005.

and credibly threaten oil sector infrastructure. Quickly, they proved their dominance of Delta waterway and ability to impede the passage of security agents (Cesarz *et al.*, 2003: 2).

It is therefore important to theoretically comprehend and explain this fundamental escalation in the conflict. To comprehend the escalation of the conflict and the prolonged armed rebellion experienced during the MEND's era, I will use Collier and Hoeffler greed theory of conflict and Collier's theorisation on the economic causes of conflict as my explanatory framework. However, it is apposite to say that I am conscious of the controversy and critiques that the work of Collier and Hoeffler have generated and which indeed compelled them to subsequently re-examine and shift their original position. Nevertheless, I contend that as important as these criticisms are, they do not completely invalidate the theory's analytical and explanatory potency. Furthermore, in using the theory as an explanatory framework to elucidate the dynamics of the MEND's era of the conflict, I am not in any way elevating it to an explanatory framework for the *onset* of the Niger Delta conflict. However, it is my view that irrespective of the apparent flaws in the greed theory, discarding it in its entirety means '*throwing the baby out with the bathwater*'. Consequently, I shall discuss the theory, the criticisms against it and thereafter demonstrate its relevance in understanding the dynamics of the MEND era of the conflict using both secondary and primary evidence resulting from my fieldwork.

Collier and Hoeffler (1998: 563-573), Collier (2000: 91-111), Collier and Hoeffler (2002: 1-38), Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 563-595), Collier (2006a: 1-24), Collier *et al.*, (2009: 1-39) greed theory of conflict was perhaps one of the most controversial theories of conflict. In their greed theory, Collier and Hoeffler debunked the contention that conflict is informed by grievance, by arguing that they have investigated on a global level, large scale armed conflicts using statistical methods but did not find any direct positive correlation between grievance and the occurrence of civil war. Rather, what they found was that economic agendas were more central in terms of causation. They therefore arrived at the conclusion that, civil wars and armed conflicts were not caused by grievance emanating from social conditions of relative deprivation and denial of basic human needs but were because of greed or direct desire to capture and

control the exploitation of lootable natural resources such as diamonds, timber and drugs. In elaborating the greed theory or explanation for civil war or rebellion, Collier develops quantifiable proxies as a measurement of greed. The most important proxy he argues is the exports of primary commodities which is measured in terms of the level of primary commodity exports as a proportion of gross domestic product (Collier, 2006b: 5). Other proxies for greed related rebellion is the youth bulge-measured in terms of many uneducated and unemployed youth (Ibid.: 6). Collier contends that the combination of these proxies in a primary commodity based export economy can trigger armed rebellion because uneducated and unemployed youth can easily be motivated to join rebellion. Collier argues that he reached this conclusion because having correlated the proxies for greed to that of grievances such as ethnic or religious hatred, economic inequality or lack of political rights as the causes of civil war, the evidence was overwhelmingly convincing that greed rather than grievance was more important in the causation of rebellion. As Collier noted:

I have investigated statistically the global pattern of large-scale civil conflict since 1965, expecting to find a close relationship between...grievances and the incidence of conflict. Instead, I found that economic agendas appear to be central to understanding why civil wars start. Conflicts are far more likely to be economic opportunities than by grievance. If economic agendas are driving conflict, then it is likely that some groups are benefiting from conflict and that these groups therefore have some interest in initiating and sustaining it (Collier, 2000a: 91).

Consequently, Collier posits that the narrative of grievance as motivation for armed rebellion is only a cover for the real reasons behind armed rebellion because 'rebel organisations have to develop a discourse of grievance to function and succeed. Grievance is to a rebel organisation what image is to a business (Collier, 2007:199). Thus, rebel organisations will naturally wrap their greed motive within a powerful narrative of grievance as a way of legitimising their rebellion. However, as I earlier noted, Collier's straitjacket single factor explanation of conflict attracted heavy criticisms which compelled a shift in the argument.

Therefore, a new theory of civil war '*feasibility hypothesis*' (Collier *et al*, 2009: 2) was advanced which investigated and tested a comprehensive range of factors

that predisposes a country to rebellion as against focusing on a single hypothesis that centres on rebels' greed motive. In this regard, Collier argues that 'the two most obvious material conditions for rebellion are financial and military' (Ibid.: 4). Thus, he argues that 'regardless of why the organization is fighting, it can only fight if it is financially viable during the conflict' (Collier, 2006a: 3). In buttressing this assertion, Collier drew an analogy on two militia organisations when he notes that:

The Michigan Militia, which briefly threatened to menace peace in the USA, was unable to grow beyond a handful of part-time volunteers, whereas the FARC in Columbia has grown to employ around 12,000 people. The factors which account for this difference between failure and success are to be found not in the 'causes' which these two rebel organizations claimed to espouse, but in their radically different opportunities to raise revenue. The FARC earns around \$700m per year from drugs and kidnapping, whereas the Michigan Militia was probably broke (Collier, 2006a: 1).

In another vein, Collier and Sambanis (2005: xiii) contend that '... it is not political and social grievance per se that leads to civil war, but rather, for given levels of grievance, it is the opportunity to organize and finance a rebellion that determines if a civil war will occur or not'. Consequently, one important risk factor for rebellion is primary commodity dependence and availability; which when captured will provide rebels with a steady source of income to start and fund a rebellion.

Suffice to say that both the greed motivation and the feasibility hypothesis explanation of conflict and rebellion have provided us with valuable analytical insights to comprehend conflict. In particular, the pure greed explanation of armed rebellion and the *feasibility hypothesis* put forward by Collier and Hoeffler to some extent enhances our understanding of the dynamics of contemporary armed rebellion and how greed can undermine conflict resolution efforts and post-conflict peacebuilding. This is when war making becomes a business venture and ending violence and making peace on the part of insurgents become less attractive. Nonetheless, the works of Collier & Hoeffler and their associates have been highly criticised by other scholars.

Some of the criticisms raised against the theory centres on methodological flaws while others argue that the theory lacks analytical validity and utility. I will first

focus on the criticisms that address the analytical flaws in the theory followed by those on methodological flaws. Regarding analytical flaws, I am of the contention that Collier and his co-travellers failed to do enough to distinguish between conflict instigating factors and factors that escalate and complicate conflict. This is because often conflict can start based on genuine and objective conditions of relative deprivation but greed motives among rebel leaders can later predominate and complicate the dynamics of the conflict. In some cases, there may be complete goal displacement, a situation whereby rebel leaders completely derail from their original reasons for fighting to the pursuit of pure economic agendas (Malone and Nitzschke, 2005: 6). Malone and Nitzschke also note that contrary to Collier and Hoeffler's findings, economic motivations or opportunity does not provide sufficient explanation for the onset of the conflict. Instead, they argue that:

... the onset of violent conflict was triggered by the interaction of economic motives with long-standing grievances over the mismanagement or inequitable distribution of resource wealth, exclusionary and repressive political systems, inter-group disputes, and security dilemmas exacerbated by unaccountable and infective states... (Malone and Nitzschke, 2005: 6).

On their part, Ballentine and Sherman (2003: 4) kicked against an extreme emphasis on economic agendas above all other causes of rebellion arguing that 'while there is a growing agreement that economic factors matter to conflict dynamics, there is little consensus as to how they matter, how much they matter, or in what ways'. And in line with the above, Pugh *et al.*, (2004: 45-89) demonstrated in the case of Afghanistan that war economies are complex in nature. In the case of Afghanistan, they argue that war economies have different dimensions such as combat, shadow and coping economies of which not all are driven by greed as Collier and co sweepingly generalised in their greed theory of conflict. They state that in the case of Afghanistan many were engaged in war economies nevertheless not all were motivated by greed. Thus, they argued that:

There is a tendency to assume that those who have been involved in Poppy farming or the opium trade are either "greedy" entrepreneurs or profit maximising farmers. In fact, for the majority, involvement in the opium economy is motivated by the need to cope or survive in adverse circumstances (Pugh *et al.*, 2004: 66).

Also, debunking Collier's sweeping generalisations, Cramer (2006: 134) contends that conflict involves a complex interaction between grievance and greed. He argues that a sharp distinction between grievance and greed as advanced by Collier will not permit us to have a nuanced understanding of conflict because the two are not necessarily independent of each other. According to Cramer:

While some leaders and soldiers may be essentially greedy, their prospects of satisfying greed depend on the participation of many others driven by grievance, resentment and rage or desperation. Second grievance may be at the origin of many people's interest in fighting a war but then may elide with greed as opportunities become available. Third, greed and grievance may be internally related, inseparable motivations. Greed may in other words be a product of grievance and might not exist without that grievance. And the grievance, in turn, is likely to be relational... (Cramer, 2006: 134).

Consequently, all these clearly suggest that determining how much of greed or personal economic agendas are involved, particularly in explaining the onset of a conflict is a complex task and depends on the dimension of the conflict economy in question and not a straitjacket issue of greed as Collier and co posited. Similarly, the interaction between the two is complex. Ballentine and Sherman raise further issues regarding Collier's straitjacket economic explanation of rebellion including the claim that:

... Limiting the inquiry to the predatory activity of rebel groups yields a partial view that not only risks casting all insurgencies as an extreme form of common criminality, but effectively forecloses examination of the conflict-promoting effects of corruption and rent-seeking on the part of state agents and other important actors (Ballentine and Sherman, 2003: 7).

Ballentine and Nitzschke have similarly criticised Collier for being overly rebel centric in his analysis of rebellion by deliberately failing to analyse the role of other actors in armed conflict. According to them:

... much of the early research, and explicitly that of Collier, was overlay "rebel centric", neglecting the role of the state both as an actor and institution in causing or prolonging conflict. The unexplored assumption was that "rebels-not state actors cause conflict", leading to a pro-state bias in analysis and policy action... Neglecting an analysis of state behaviour may in fact legitimise repressive and corrupt state elites who may also

profit from war at the expense of the population (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005:4).

Corroborating Ballentine and Nitzschke assertion, Kandeh (2005: 84-106) has debunked the greed theory using the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) insurgency in Sierra Leone as a case study. Kandeh maintains that the elite's greed of primitive accumulation precipitated a near collapse in Sierra Leone, which triggered an insurgency based on widespread grievance and resentment against the state. However, the intrusion of greed motives among the rebel leaders later led to the criminalisation of the insurgency. In another vein, Ballentine and Sherman (2003: 8) note that by its very nature, conflict is dynamic and highly fluid which suggests that '... conflicts transform, mutate, degenerate, or consolidate. The longer the conflict, the more likely that it has evolved through many stages and more likely that the factors that sustain it are different from those that provided the initial trigger'. They also contend that in the long run when the economic dimensions of armed conflict are taken into cognizance in relation to state capacity it is '... the relative capacity of the state to perform core functions, including the provision of security, effective governance throughout its territory, and the equitable distribution of public goods...' (Ibid.: 9) that determines whether a country can descend into violence. This suggests that what leads to conflict is the existence of natural resources in a *weak and failing state* and not their mere availability in any kind of state. In another vein, Stewart (2008: 3) has demonstrated in her work that grievance based rebellion cannot be discounted particularly where there are objective horizontal inequalities which she conceptualised as '... inequalities in economic, social, or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups'. As she further noted '...horizontal inequalities are inequalities between culturally defined groups or groups with shared identities... These identities may be formed by religion, ethnic ties or racial affiliations, or other salient factors which bind groups of people together... (Ibid.: 12-13). Against this background, Stewart identified four dimensions of horizontal inequalities such as discrimination in terms of political participation, economic exclusion, social inequality in terms of lack of access to education, health, water and sanitation while cultural status inequality is measured in terms of how cultural groups are recognised or discriminated against or not in society (Ibid.: 13). Langer *et al* have also argued that:

... an important underlying cause of violent conflict is the presence of horizontal inequalities... or group-based inequalities in access to political power and economic resources. Severe His can provoke feelings of frustration and discontent, which may cause violent group mobilization and conflict along ethnic, religious, or regional lines... Support for this view has been provided by numerous case studies that document the importance of socio-economic and political His in provoking violent conflict... (Langer, *et al.*: 2012: 1).

Another pertinent question that Collier and his associates fail to answer convincingly is if natural resource dependent countries are more likely to descend into an armed rebellion then how do we account for armed rebellion in non-natural resources dependent countries? Conversely, why is it that not all countries endowed with natural resources experience violent conflict or armed rebellion in their development history? In this regard, Wennmann (2007: 430) observes that '... resource abundance and scarcity are neither a necessary nor sufficient criteria for conflict. There are resource abundant countries (Botswana, Norway, Australia) ... that develop without experiencing armed conflict'. Consequently, Wennmann observes that '...what matters is not whether natural resources are simply present, but how they are managed' (*Ibid.*). Keen also raise several cogent criticisms based on methodological and operationalisation flaws he identified in Collier's approach:

... Collier's conclusions-though appearing on the surface very scientific because of the numbers and the algebra... sometimes rest on very shaky foundations. For example, in the work suggesting that 'greed' was a much more important cause of civil wars than 'grievance', the proxies for greed and grievance were questionable. Lack of access to education is taken as a proxy for greed. But we know from many countries, including Sierra Leone, that a key grievance motivating many fighters has been lack of access to education (Keen (2012: 761).

Keen further notes that Collier and his associates use low per capita income and slow economic growth as proxies for the feasibility of rebellion but these '... might equally or better be seen as proxies for grievance. Of course, if you change the meaning of proxies, you get a completely different conclusion' (*Ibid.*: 762). Keen has also taken issue with Collier's assertion that when it comes to the risks of civil war, countries of the bottom billion are largely too small to be States and therefore stand the risks of experiencing civil war. This is suggesting that large size is a

recipe for peace and stability and vice-versa. However, before we embrace such a faulty conclusion Keen observes that:

And before we rush to embrace large size as a recipe for peace, we might also want to consider the disastrous civil wars in Nigeria, Ethiopia and Angola, to say nothing of the large-scale violence in Algeria, and South Africa. Conversely, before we rush to dismiss small states as unviable and a source of civil war, we should consider the relatively peaceful paths of Botswana, Mauritius, Ghana and Gambia, among many others (Keen, 2012: 762).

On his part, Tar (2008: 43) faults Collier's use of 'arbitrary language and measurement tools'. This is because:

...a restrictive tool is used in defining largely contested concepts such as 'conflict' 'war' and 'violence'. For instance, conflict is quantitatively described by the existence of 1,000 or more battle-deaths in a year... this effectively excludes lower but significant figures (e.g. 999!) (Tar, 2008: 43).

Tar contends that this raises serious questions about how to empirically operationalise Collier's concept of war. For example, how would a war with 999 battle-recorded deaths which is 1 death less Collier's measurement of what can be regarded as conflict be classified? Tar also points out that Collier's greed theory is characterised by 'misleading configuration of variables' (Ibid.: 43). Tar posits that the greed theory is based on two fundamental variables- civil wars (dependent variable) and natural resources (causal). This type of analysis completely neglected '... the role of intervening variables such as corruption, predation, prebendalism, lack of fiscal discipline, [and] lack of rule of law, etc'. (Ibid.).

However, even though the work of Collier and co have generated a lot of criticisms they are not the only ones to have highlighted the important role economic agendas play in conflict. For instance, according to Kaldor, new wars are '...characterized by a rise in crime, so that often it is difficult to distinguish between criminal and political violence. Hostage-taking, kidnapping, smuggling, loot and pillage are all ways in which political violence is financed, and, at the same time, political causes provide a cover for purely criminal acts' (Kaldor, 2006: viii-ix). Kaldor further asserts that the new wars '...involves a blurring of the distinctions between war and crime...' (Ibid.). Similarly, Reno (2011:163-205) contends that a new feature of violent conflicts in Africa in the 1990s and early

2000s in places such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d' Ivoire and Gunea-Bissau as well as in Congo and Somalia was the emergence of warlord rebels etc. In this type of situation warlord rebels violently capture state power under the pretence of correcting the ills of the society. However, in actual reality, these warlord rebels do not have any clear agenda of political transformation (Ibid.). Instead, when they succeed in capturing political power they constitute a bunch of greedy, oppressive and violent politicians. According to Reno:

A key feature of warlord rebel leaders is that they were products of the systems of political authority that they fought. Even as they fought to overthrow regimes to become their country's new political leaders, there was little that was even vaguely reformist in their public agendas. As they fought, they just appropriated the existing instrument of political power and used them in even more intensive ways at the expense of building bureaucratic institutions (Ibid.: 164).

Similarly, Collier's feasibility thesis was equally advanced by Wennmann (2011: 5) but in a subtle way, he posited that individuals or groups aspiring for armed rebellion or conflict must overcome certain primary challenges such as recruitment, control, and financing of which financing is the most formidable one. In a similar vein, in her book '*What rebels want: resources and supply networks in wartime*' Hazen (2013: 53- 59) identified military resources such as arms, ammunitions, logistics training and manpower, the financial means to sustain the war effort and political resources such as support from political patrons as key resources needed to sustain any rebellion. Additionally, she argues that military and economic resources are the most important ones and in particular economic resources are key to the acquisition of military resources which suggests that Hazen concurs with Collier's postulation that financial viability is essential to the emergence and success of any rebellion.

As I earlier argued, the greed/feasibility theory may not have provided a valid theoretical explanation for explaining the *onset* of the Niger Delta conflict, it nonetheless can serve as a valid theoretical framework for understanding the behaviour of MEND commanders or actors and the overall dynamics of the conflict in that phase. I therefore contend that both primary and secondary evidence emanating from this study adequately supports the fact that the MEND era of the conflict can best be explained by Collier and Hoeffler greed /feasibility hypothesis. In other words, MEND commanders were from the onset primarily

motivated by the pursuit of personal economic agendas. Nevertheless, these personal economic agendas were embedded and wrapped in a powerful and captivating narrative of grievance publicised through skilled media campaigns that legitimised MEND's violence against the Nigerian State. Supporting the view that MEND actors were mainly driven by greed, a military officer that served with the Joint Task (JTF) deployed in the Niger Delta notes that during the MEND era of the conflict:

It was like a business arrangement, you decide an area, set up your own camp, buy your arms or acquire arms however, get your own boys... whatever oil installations was within that locality was deemed under your control. So, you could decide now to either by direct intimidation, extortion...directly go and sabotage... or anything that could be seized by way of hijack of tankers you know and ransom payment... anything that you could do within that territory to raise money you know...¹⁷

Additionally, the prominence of greed as a motivating force during the MEND era was further corroborated by Edward Udowei, an ex-militant commander who lamented how his income drastically dropped after the renunciation of militancy. Edward Udowei complained that:

When I was in the forest, I made more than three million naira (\$20,000) per month. I can call the oil companies 'Hey My boys are hungry, bring two million naira', and they will answer me quick quick...What I am now being paid per month is what I spend in two or three hours in the bush on my boys...In the bush, I enjoy better than this. I get more money than this. The N65, 000 is too small for me as a leader (*SomaliPress.com*, 2010: 1).¹⁸

Edward Udowei's lamentation clearly suggests that the pursuit of a grievance may not be his main motivation for joining the rebellion against the Nigerian State but rather monetary gain which the rebellion offers him. Perhaps, the prominence of greed as the driving motivation suggests why MEND remained a coalition of several militia commanders with independent camps across the creeks of the Niger Delta instead of being a highly-structured rebel movement under one unified command structure. It is apposite to say that if the various commanders were really motivated by shared political grievance, forming a structured rebel movement would have been easier for them and could have provided a more effective rebellion against the Nigerian State. In addition, a former staff member

¹⁷. Respondent 009, October 2013.

¹⁸. SomaliPress.Com is an open access online news platform.

of the Foundation for Partnership Initiative in the Niger Delta suggests that if the grievance was genuinely the motivation behind the MEND led rebellion, then the rebellion ought to have escalated to a more ferocious dimension now.¹⁹ This is because the grievances still persist and indeed have even worsened in comparison to the pre-MEND era of the conflict and ADDR programme and more so the ADDR programme did not address the grievances MEND claimed to be fighting for.²⁰ This suggests that other motives may be responsible for MEND actors acquiescing to disarm and demobilise even when the grievances they claimed to be fighting for remain unaddressed (see chapter 5). Correspondingly, a member of the Ogoni Solidarity Forum expressed the opinion that MEND commanders were essentially motivated by greed instead of development based grievance:

... if they were struggling I will see what they were struggling for. So, what were they fighting for, if it was a struggle...? So, what have you received that is making you drop the arms? (sic) So they were just fighting for their stomachs as far as I know. Because just show me one thing (sic). I can show you that Shell is not taking oil in Ogoni because of that struggle. Just show me one thing that you were fighting for, that you got that made you to drop the guns (sic). So, it was just a struggle for the stomach, when they settle you, they give you one pipeline contract, they give you maritime contract, they give you this or that contract... No more resource control. We are no more even hearing about the resource control struggle.²¹

Again, what this respondent suggests is that if the MEND struggle was primarily to attract development to the Niger Delta and not for personal gain, then the conflict ought to have escalated because the ADDR programme has not brought any tangible development to the Niger Delta. Evidence from the current literature also reinforces the view that the conflict during the MEND era mutated from grievance to a loot seeking rebellion (greed). For instance, Gilbert (2007 cited in Ojatorotu 2008) notes that:

Regardless of its original justification, the current militancy in the Niger Delta appears to have been perverted, misdirected and criminalized by opportunists. It appears that the recent upsurge and attraction to armed conflict and violence by ethnic militias, may have been motivated by crass economic opportunism and profiteering, through hostage taking for

¹⁹. Respondent 028, November 2013.

²⁰. Ibid.

²¹. Respondent 015, November 2013.

ransom and through illegal oil bunkering with external commercial networks (Gilbert, 2007 cited in Ojakorotu, 2008: 3).

Reinforcing Gilbert's position, Ikelegbe (2011: 134) argued that 'the kidnapping and abduction for ransom of expatriates and Nigerian staff of non-oil companies such as Michelin in 2007 and Julius Berger in 2008 were clearly criminally bent, as these companies are not oil MNCs' but are companies contributing to the economic development of the Niger Delta region. However, one of the most convincing argument affirming the fact that the Niger Delta conflict mutated from primarily grievance-based to greed-driven rebellion was Collier who argues that:

I do not want to overstate... [that]... the disputes in the delta started out as justified environmental protests by people living in a region that was bearing the brunt of damage without seeing the benefits of oil revenues. But over time the situation has evolved...Grievance has evolved over the course of a decade, into greed (Collier, 2008:31).

Similarly, in line with Collier's *feasibility hypothesis* earlier discussed, MEND's ability to maintain and sustain a prolonged military campaign against the Nigerian State can be explained from the point of view of conflict financing denoting the ability to mobilise adequate finance for the procurement of arms, uniforms, sustenance and the upkeep of fighters. MEND's ability to generate funds to finance its operations in terms of procurement of sophisticated weapons, recruit able-bodied foot soldiers, pay them a salary, feed and provide them with uniforms and other logistics was responsible for MEND's long confrontation with the Nigerian State and not a reflection of grievance. The ability of MEND to generate this funding was made possible by the conflict economy that flourished in the Niger Delta, particularly illegal oil bunkering (Onuoha & Ezirim, 2012: 39; Watts, 2013: 58) and the kidnapping of oil workers for ransom and imposition of taxes (Wennmann, 2011: 5). Mr Seriake Dickson the governor of Bayelsa state demonstrates the connection between illegal oil bunkering, small arms and light weapons proliferation and conflict financing in the Niger Delta when he states that:

Let me tell you that all the violence, brigandage and criminality that we experience in the Niger Delta states, particularly Bayelsa where I know more, have their roots in the activities in the creeks. It is from there they have easy funds to recruit followers; it is from these activities of crude oil theft and illegal refining that people are able to sustain such large numbers

of youths and put them into various cult groups. What is going on has direct effect on the proliferation of small and light weapons because they need an army of youths to protect their territories, to be able to withstand the onslaught of legitimate security personnel (*Premium Times*, 2013: 2).²²

The positive correlation between illegal oil bunkering, exponential increase in arms proliferations and armed militancy in the Niger Delta particularly during the MEND era has also been well researched and documented by Human Rights Watch (2005: 8); International Crisis Group (2006: 8); Joab-Peterside (2007:13-15); Asuni (2009a: 10); Asuni (2009b: 1-19; Watts, 2013: 58). But beyond that, a key leader of MEND interviewed provided further insight that reinforces the connection between conflict financing and the ability of MEND to sustain its prolonged military campaign against the Nigerian State. The MEND leader noted that:

What was actually happening then, my place...camp 5...is a channel to ships and vessels and some other boats. In fact, is the opening to Nigeria; the escavor estuary...So first and foremost, what we did was to get a fee from those ships, so as we are getting the fee from them we are able to feed. Secondly... there are some rich people that bring in vessels to load in crude oil and in the process our people will go to them just because we are with arms and they are able to give us some money to feed and arrange ourselves...²³

Similarly, another MEND commander while responding to a question on how he was able to fund his operations notes that:

Like I said earlier...If you raise arms against these oil companies that is when they will pay attention to you, you understand. So, by the time we came together and come up with the idea of raising arms against the oil companies they pay attention to us, they give us whatever thing we demand from them.²⁴

Clearly, the above array of evidence suggests that the degree of grievance may not be an adequate explanation of why MEND could engage in a prolonged and sustained rebellion against the Nigerian State. Rather, it was their financial capability which derives from the opportunities to engage in predatory activities such as illegal oil bunkering, kidnapping for ransom and imposition of illegal tolls

²². *Premium Times* is a private Nigerian online open access news platform with an expertise in investigative journalism.

²³. Interview with respondent 038, November 2013.

²⁴. Interview with respondent 039, November 2013.

which the conflict offers. However, this does not completely discount the fact that there are genuine grievances in the Niger Delta region which gave some level of community legitimacy and protection to MEND actors (See figure 3.1).




Figure 3.1: Phases/Periodisation in the Niger Delta Conflict and the Corresponding Drivers of the Conflict

Source: Developed by Researcher

However, at this juncture, it is pertinent to highlight an interesting similarity between the Nigerian State and MEND; as representing two-sides of the same coin in the conflict because both survive on rent collection using violence in different ways. While the Nigerian State relies on the use of violence to safeguard MNOCs and oil installations thereby guaranteeing the continuous flow of oil rents, MEND uses violence to extort rents from MNOCs, ransomed kidnapped oil workers and international vessels. Thus, MEND mirrors the Nigerian rentier neopatrimonial state and both represent two sides of the same coin.

Against this backdrop, it is appropriate to consider why the Niger Delta conflict, a violent rebellion against a rentier-neopatrimonial state ended up as a replica of the same state it was originally meant to confront. In other words, why did the conflict whose original goal was premised on genuine political grievances mutate during the MEND era to a loot seeking rebellion where all and sundry became preoccupied with pecuniary gains. Boas (2011: 116) contends that the Niger Delta conflict and the emergence of MEND is a product of the crisis and contradictions of a dysfunctional neopatrimonial system as manifested in the region's experiences of long years of poverty, corruption, abuse of power and office. Drawing insight from his argument one could posit that the mutation suggests that MEND commanders have been infected by the vices of the same dysfunctional society that produced it and the conflict in general. This argument is apt when viewed against the fact that there is hardly any Nigerian institutional setting (micro and macro) that is not affected by these neopatrimonial vices.

In another vein, the mutation could be explained from the dynamics of violent conflict or rebellion which makes it very difficult for conflict and conflict actors to keep to their declared political grievance or ideological commitment; which clearly fits into the contention that 'increasingly civil wars that appear to have begun with political aims have mutated into conflicts in which short-term economic benefits... [become more] paramount' (Keen, 1998: 12). Additionally, as Collier argues the possibility of grievance resulting in armed rebellion depends on access to funding, and in the case of MEND since there is no record of diaspora support the only option is to resort to criminal avenues for raising funds with illegal oil bunkering, kidnapping for ransom and illegal tolls readily becoming viable options.

In addition, as argued by Ross (2012: 147-153), the oil industry is 'extortion' friendly for three reasons. First, they operate in areas of high-security risks where the national government is unable to provide adequate security. Secondly, the oil companies have a strong tendency to remain in operation despite the level of security risks and thirdly because oil companies have money, they can afford the security cost to their business. Therefore, this makes oil companies '...more willing to strike deals with the military or insurgents...' (Ibid: 152). Therefore, given that all these variables empirically fit the Niger Delta situation, they provide a strong explanation as to why the conflict mutated from grievance to greed during the MEND era. This is because one could argue that from the onset MEND commanders as rational greedy actors have gauged and were convinced of the fact that MNOCs would always be willing to strike deals.

3.2.3. Summary of Theoretical Arguments

In conclusion, the origin of the Niger Delta conflict is linked to the crisis and contradictions of a dysfunctional rentier-neopatrimonial state which Nigeria exemplifies. However, understanding the contemporary nature of the Nigerian State as well as the conflict in the Niger Delta requires a nuanced understanding of the region's precolonial history and the colonial foundation of the Nigerian State. In terms of pre-colonial linkages, I argued that the contemporary conflict over petroleum resources has similarities with the precolonial conflict between the Niger Delta region and foreign palm oil merchants that resulted in a violent confrontation with local chiefs and palm oil dealers. Here, the principal difference is that petroleum has become the source of contestation while European merchants have now been replaced by MNOCs. Similarly, the Niger Delta region as a regional block, together with insurgent youths have replaced former local chiefs as a party to the conflict. Likewise, conflict over ownership and control of oil is part of a longer history of conflict in the region that stretches back to the precolonial intercommunal conflict between Niger Delta communities for the acquisition of slaves. This then morphed into violent resistance by local chiefs in the Niger Delta against European domination and manipulation of the palm oil trade that still resonates in the legitimising narratives of contemporary militants' commanders in the region particularly Asari Dokubo. Similarly, the rentier neopatrimonial character of the Nigerian State and its violent tendencies and

responses to the conflict are both a product of colonialism and partly responsible for the escalation of the conflict.

The emergence of MEND and its ability to confront the Nigerian State could be attributed to its capacity to acquire the military, economic and political resources to confront the Nigerian State and not simply a function of grievance. However, the mutation of the conflict from grievance to greed and other loot seeking behaviour during the MEND era of the conflict reflects the extent to which the movement has been infected by the pathologies of the dysfunctional neopatrimonial state that produced the conflict generally. Nonetheless, the mutation of the conflict during the MEND era also shows the complex and dynamic nature of the interaction between grievance and greed and vice versa in explaining the causation and dynamics of conflict.

3.3. Genesis and Periodisation in the Niger Delta Conflict

In this second part of the chapter, I shall examine the historical stages of the conflict in the Niger Delta. Specifically, I will consider the extent to which the genesis and dynamics of the conflict fit into the framework highlighted above.

3.3.1. The Pre-independence Agitation of Minorities of the Niger Delta

At independence, the British colonialists bequeathed a Nigerian State that was highly susceptible to conflict and instability in a number of ways. For instance, the vast geographical size of the northern region and its population size in comparison to the western and eastern regions gave the northern region the leverage to politically dominate the Nigerian State. Apart from that, the Nigerian State was created in such a way that in each of the three regions there was a hegemonic ethnic group that dominated the politics of the region amidst several marginalised minority ethnic groups (Oyerinde, 1998: 59-63). Particularly pertinent to the Niger Delta conflict was the emergence of the Igbos as the politically hegemonic ethnic group in the eastern region which conferred on them political dominance over the Niger Delta oil-producing minorities.

Considering the above, the first manifestation of the conflict was during the pre-independence era when fear of ethnic domination and marginalisation was expressed by the Niger Delta and other minority ethnic groups against the hegemonic ethnic groups that dominated the incipient Nigerian rentier

neopatrimonial state. During this era, Harold Dappa Biriye, a Niger Delta minority rights activist led a delegation of ethnic minorities from the Niger Delta region and other parts of Nigeria to a London pre-independence constitutional conference to express their fears of domination and marginalisation in the emerging post independent Nigerian State (Simbine, 2006: 47; Etemike, 2009: 154-156; Epelle, 2010: 24; Adeyemo & Olu-Adeyemi, 2010: 46; Ojakorotu, 2010: 109; Ibaba et al., 2012: 1-2). The demand of the Niger Delta minorities at this stage revolved around having a state of their own in order to avert the obvious political domination and plundering of their resources by the Igbo hegemonic ethnic group that was politically dominant in the Eastern region. The Niger Delta minorities' delegation to the conference made a case for the creation of Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers state from the then eastern region and the right to control their resource (Epelle, 2010: 26). Thus, the whole gamut of pre-independence minority agitation of the Niger Delta (and which equally persisted even in the immediate post-independence period) revolved around these issues:

The logic of...minority agitations in Nigeria runs as follows: access to power determines personal and group enrichment. Possession of power itself is determined by numerical superiority. Political mobilization for capturing state power is rooted in ethnicity. Majority ethnic groups have used their numerical superiority to corner political power in the country. With such power, they have expropriated economic resources that naturally belong to ethnic minorities. With their numerical inferiority, minority groups will never get their hands on the levers of political power...Without a fundamental restructuring of the country, political power will always accrue to the ethnic majorities since the game of political numbers is in their favour, Thus, with ethnic minorities' numerical disadvantage, they will continue to be marginalized (Agbese, 2003: 245-246).

The above minority consciousness was further heightened in the Niger Delta after the discovery of petroleum in commercial quantities by Shell-BP in Oloibiri (present day Bayelsa state) in 1956 (Obi & Rustad, 2011: 5). However, the fact that the conflict continued to spiral upward demonstrates that the issues in contention were not adequately addressed either by the departing British colonial regime or the immediate post-colonial Nigerian State (Ojakorotu, 2008: 94).

3.3.2. *The 1967 Insurrection (the Twelve Days' Revolution)*

The unaddressed pre-independence minority grievances reverberated a few years after Nigeria's independence in the 1960s, when Isaac Adaka Boro from

the Ijaw ethnic group and leader of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) led an armed insurrection known as the twelve days revolution that declared the Niger Delta region a sovereign Republic (Azaiki, 2003: 80; Obi & Rustad, 2011: 6). The revolt was significant because it signalled the first violent attempt by youth from the Niger Delta region to reject their marginalisation and exploitation by the Nigerian State (controlled by hegemonic ethnic groups). It also signified an attempt by the Ijaw segment of the Niger Delta minorities to assert the region's rights to self-determination and control over petroleum resources found in their land (Azaiki, 2003: 80; Obi, 2010: 225 & Obi & Rustad, 2011: 6). Adaka Boro encapsulated the reasons for the insurrection as follows:

Today is a great day, not only in your lives, but also in the history of the Niger Delta Perhaps it will be the greatest day for a very long time. This is not because we are going to bring heavens down, but because we are going to demonstrate to the world what and how we feel about oppression...Therefore, remember your seventy-year-old grandmother who still farms before she eats; remember also your poverty stricken people; remember too your petroleum which is being pumped out daily from your veins (sic); and the fight for your freedom (The Adaka Boro Centre, n. d.: 2).

Boro's speech clearly suggests that beyond the quest for self-determination, poverty and fear of marginalisation and underdevelopment, the control of petroleum resources discovered in the region had now become a major issue of contention. However, the fact that the attempted revolt was militarily crushed and the grievances not dealt with lends credence to my argument that the postcolonial Nigerian State, like its colonial progenitor, was primarily a law and order state that relied on the instrument of coercion to sustain itself and suppress grievances instead of constructively addressing them. Even though it was short-lived, Boro's revolution has left one enduring legacy in the trajectory of minority struggle in the Niger Delta as a model after which the Kaiama Declaration and MEND phases of the conflict were framed. A Niger Delta academic expert observed that 'if you go to a typical Niger Delta activist home you... [will] see a photograph of Saro Wiwa and the photograph of Adaka Boro because they are regarded as heroes of the Niger Delta struggle'.²⁵

²⁵. Respondent 032, November 2013.

3.3.3. The Era of Community Based Agitations 1970s- 1980s

In the aftermath of the successful military crushing of Adaka Boro's revolt in 1967, the period from the 1970s up to the late 1980s was characterised by a shift in the tactics of agitation adopted by ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta. For instance, according to Osaghae (1995: 332) within this period '...the main redressive mechanisms for oil-producing communities in their demand for improved conditions and better treatment have been petitions and delegations to the federal and state government as well as the oil companies [sic]'. Agitations were equally pursued by socio-cultural groups, community leaders and elders who usually negotiated the resolution of grievances with MNOCs on behalf of their communities, as well as with state and federal governments (Osaghae *et al.*, 2008: 21-23).

The tactics adopted during this period included sending a delegation to the government and MNOCs to negotiate, the calling of press conferences and the issuing of press statements highlighting the region's grievances. The demand by oil producing communities at this stage centred on the need for the payment of compensation for community property destroyed in the process of oil exploration activities, environmental despoliation caused by oil spillage, gas flaring and their negative effect on and destruction of agricultural and aquatic sources of livelihood as well as demand for the provision of social amenities (Ibaba *et al.*, 2012: 2). The slow and inadequate response of the MNOCs often caused communities to resort to peaceful blockades of oil flow stations and roads leading to the stations (Ibid.). Most times this development angered the MNOCs who in turn resorted to repressive actions by inviting members of the security forces to disperse the peaceful crowds of agitators instead of engaging them in constructive dialogue. For instance, in the 1980s the people of Umuechem community in Rivers State organised a peaceful protest against Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) demanding compensation for damages incurred and provision of infrastructure such as electricity and roads but were brutally dispersed and repressed by security personnel resulting in several deaths and destruction of property (Mochizuki, 2009: 214).

The fact that community-based peaceful agitations continued until the late part of the 1980s means that the conflict entered a period of de-escalation. One reason

for this that can be deduced from the literature was that, following the crushing of Isaac Adaka Boro's revolt, he and his compatriots were charged and tried for treason and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Aguiyi Ironsi led military government. However, they were later granted amnesty by the military junta led by General Yakubu Gowon, a Northern minority military officer. The same regime, in order to weaken the Eastern region's secessionist revolt, created new states with Rivers state specifically created for the Niger Delta oil-producing minorities (which was one of their longstanding demands). These two gestures by the Nigerian State within a short span of time may have given the Niger Delta minorities a new ray of hope that the Nigerian State was beginning to be genuinely committed to addressing their grievances. However, a Niger Delta academic expert argues that the seeming calmness recorded was because the creation of Rivers State co-opted Niger Delta minority elites into the broader Nigerian rentier neopatrimonial State ruling class coalition.²⁶ Likewise, a member of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND) argues that the tempo of Boro's violent revolt could not be sustained because it was not based on a community-wide grassroots mobilisation but was a sporadic reaction against the failure of the Nigerian State in the Niger Delta, driven by a combination of grievances, youthful exuberance and displays of bravery.²⁷ Additionally, the member of the TCND argues that it could not be sustained because the separatist vision of the Niger Delta was limited to the current Ijaw speaking Bayelsa state instead of the broader geographic Niger Delta as conceptualised in Chapter One.²⁸ Thus, the revolt did not draw its support base from the numerous ethnic nationalities that made up the Niger Delta region.

3.3.4. *The 1990s Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP)*

The repressive way the Nigerian State responded to nonviolent community-based agitations provided the basis in the early 1990s for the formation of a Niger Delta ethnic minorities social movements such as MOSOP against the Nigerian State and MNOCs (Ibaba, *et al.*, 2012: 3). MOSOP '... [was] a nonviolent, peaceful, and humane, environmental rights and cultural organization aimed at organizing and educating the Ogoni nationals on their rights, the need to

²⁶. Respondent 014, October 2013.

²⁷. Respondent 008, October 2013.

²⁸. Ibid.

zealously demand for them, and also serving as a model for other oppressed minorities' (Ikari, 2006: 56). The formation of MOSOP, and Ken Saro-Wiwa's role as its leader in the 1990s marked an important turning point in the history of the Niger Delta conflict and struggle by oil producing minorities (Osaghae, 1995: 326; Azaiki, 2003: 81; Okonta, 2008: 179; Epelle, 2010: 25; Adeyemo & Olu-Adeyemi, 2010: 41). The Ogoni are a minority ethnic group in Rivers state, scattered across three local government councils, and endowed with about fifty oil wells and host to Nigeria's first oil refinery at Lesa Eleme (Osaghae, 1995: 327-329). MOSOP as a social movement was able to '...transform Ogoni from an ethnic group-in-itself to an ethnic group-for-itself' (Ibid: 329). This suggests the conscientisation of the Ogoni ethnic group from a mass ethnic nationality to a highly politically conscious one that was prepared to fight the decades of marginalisation and underdevelopment it had been subjected to by the Nigerian State and MNOCs. As noted by Osaghae in the mid-90s:

For the oil producing ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta and especially the Goonish of Rivers state, it was time to confront the federal state on fundamental issues of the injustice of 'killing the goose that lays the golden egg'. For a long time, these communities have had serious grievances which have not been well addressed. Foremost is that although the bulk of crude oil, the country's main source of revenue, is derived from their lands, they belong to the ranks of the most backward, and politically marginalized groups in the country. Their leaders attribute this injustice to the fact that they are minorities, and accuse the ethnic majority groups of using oil wealth to develop their areas at the expense of the areas from which oil is derived. Another is that several years of oil exploration and the hazards of spillage and gas flaring which accompany it has degraded their environments (sic) and left their communities desolate. Not only having (sic) farming and fishing, the major occupations of these mostly riverine minorities been decimated, their territories have continuously lacked basic infrastructure and amenities-electricity, roads, schools, hospitals, potable water and so on (Osaghae, 1995: 325).

In terms of tactics and strategies of engagement with the Nigerian State, MOSOP conducted massive grassroots sensitisation campaigns that raised the level of consciousness and awareness of Ogoni people to the state of injustices, deprivations and environmental degradation they had been subjected to over the years by the Nigerian State and MNOCs (Ibid.). In pursuit of the Ogoni struggle MOSOP collaborated with the National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP) and the Ethnic Minority Rights Organisation of Africa (EMIROAF), two other Ogoni grassroots organisations that shared a common perspective on the

predicament of the Ogoni people (Osaghae, 1995: 333 and Raji, 1998: 117). Naanen elaborates on MOSOP tactics and strategies of engagement when he posits that:

...the whole Ogoni people had to be mobilised in order to eradicate the spirit of despondency and fatalism which decades of perceived exploitation and psychological pressure had imposed on them. The people had to be made to know their rights and realise that these would not be conceded to them without a struggle. The struggle had to be a non-violent one in the tradition of the 1960s American civil rights movement. It was apparent that armed struggle would get nowhere, except perhaps to bring about the extermination of the Ogoni...alienate potential local and international support. Second, to make the Ogoni case an international concern since it involves fundamental issues of human rights and the environment (Naanen, 1995: 68-69).

The declaration and presentation of the 'Ogoni Bill of Rights' in October 1990 to the government and people of Nigeria and the international community marked MOSOP's first passive resistance and contentious engagement with the Nigerian State (Naanen, 1995: 69; Osaghae & 1995: 335). The Ogoni Bill of Rights, which summarises the grievances of the Ogoni people against the Nigerian State and MNOCs was considered highly confrontational by the state and MNOCs, (Okonta, 2008: 180-188). The Ogoni Bill of Rights summarised the essential grievances of the Ogoni people as follows:

WE, the people of Ogoni...numbering about 500,000 being a separate and distinct ethnic nationality within the Federal Republic of Nigeria, wish to draw the attention of the Governments and people of Nigeria to the undermentioned facts:

- ...That oil was struck and produced in commercial quantities on our land in 1958 at K. Dere (Bomu oilfield) ... (sic).
- That in over 30 years of oil mining, the Ogoni nationality have provided the Nigerian nation with a total revenue estimated at over 40 billion Naira (N40billion) or 30 billion dollars.
- That in return for the above contribution, the Ogoni people have received NOTHING (sic).
- That today, the Ogoni people have:
 - (i) No representation whatsoever in ALL (sic) institutions of the Federal Government of Nigeria;
 - (ii) No pipe-borne water;
 - (iii) No electricity;
 - (iv) No job opportunities for the citizens in Federal, State, public sector or private sector companies;
 - (v) No social or economic project of the Federal Government...
- That the Ethnic policies of successive Federal and State Governments are gradually pushing the Ogoni people to slavery and possible extinction...

- That the search for oil has caused severe land and food shortages in Ogoni one of the most densely populated areas of Africa...
- That neglectful environmental pollution laws and substandard inspection techniques of the Federal authorities have led to the complete degradation of the Ogoni environment, turning our homeland into an ecological disaster
- That Ogoni people lack education, health and other social facilities.
- That it is intolerable that one of the richest areas of Nigeria should wallow in abject poverty and destitution.
- That successive Federal administrations have trampled on every minority right enshrined in the Nigerian constitution to the detriment of the Ogoni and have by administrative structuring and other noxious acts transferred Ogoni wealth exclusively to other parts of the Republic (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), 1991: 4-5).

Apart from highlighting their grievances, the Ogoni Bill of Rights further articulated some key demands to the Nigerian State as a precondition for lasting peace in Ogoni land:

...That the Ogoni people be granted POLITICAL AUTONOMY (sic) to participate in the affairs of the Republic as a distinct and separate unit by whatever name called, provided that this autonomy guarantees the following:

- (i) Political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people;
- (ii) The right to the control and use of a fair proportion of OGONI economic resources for Ogoni development;
- (iii) Adequate and direct representation as of right in all Nigerian national institutions...
- (iv) The right to protect the OGONI environment and ecology from further degradation (Ibid: 5-6).

Furthermore, the year following the declaration was characterised by a series of press conferences and communiqué that mobilised the broad-spectrum of Nigerian pro-democracy groups towards supporting the Ogoni struggle (Osaghae, 1995: 336). Within the same period, MOSOP issued a 30-day ultimatum via a letter to MNOCs operating in its homeland asking them to attend to their demands or risk having their operations disrupted through mass action. As Osaghae notes:

...in December 1992 MOSOP leaders wrote to Shell, Chevron and NNPC, the three oil companies operating in Ogoni land, demanding: (1) payment of US \$6 bn for accumulated rents and royalties for oil exploration since 1958; (2) payment of US \$4 bn for damages and compensation for environmental pollution, devastation and ecological degradation; (3) immediate stoppage of environmental degradation and in particular gas flaring in Yorla, Korokoro and Bomu; (4) immediate covering of all exposed high pressure oil pipelines; (5) initiation of negotiations with Ogoni people 'with a view to reaching meaningful and acceptable terms for further and

continued exploration and exploitation of oil from Ogoniland and to agree on workable and effective plans for environmental protection of the Ogoni people (Osaghae, 1995: 336).

The failure of the MNOCs to meet the above demands triggered a major demonstration on January 4 1993 that expressed the Ogoni's resentment against the Nigerian State and Shell (Naanen, 1995: 69). The demonstration was initially preceded by a series of activities such as a memorial service and a visit to the graveside of Paul Birabi, a prominent hero of the Ogoni struggle during which fiery speeches were made by various Ogoni activists to justify the struggle (Naanen, 1995: 69 and Raji, 1998:117). In addition to the January demonstrations, MOSOP arranged a mass vigil on 13 March 1993 during which prayers were offered to God to intervene in the predicaments confronting the Ogoni people and which ended with a procession during which respondents chanted demanding the liberation of Ogoni people from the shackles of the Nigerian State (Osaghae, 1995: 337). The zenith of the Ogoni's contentious engagement with the Nigerian State was the total boycott of June 12, 1993, Nigerian presidential election by the entire Ogoni people (Naanen, 1995: 70).

From 1991, contentious engagements with the Nigerian State were pursued side by side with a global campaign to draw the attention of the international community to the precarious situation in Ogoni land (Naanen, 1995: 70 and Obi, 1997: 144). MOSOP engaged the international community by maximising every opportunity available to it particularly '...the highly favourable international climate for the success of democratic forces over authoritarianism' (Osaghae, 1995: 339). MOSOP succeeded in making presentations to international organisations such as the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva in 1992 and the United Nations Human Rights Conference held in Vienna 1993 (Naanen, 1995: 70-71). Through these constructive international engagements, MOSOP brought the plight of the Ogoni people and Niger Delta to global attention.

The robust international engagement by MOSOP yielded several positive impacts to the extent that 'at its 43rd session, held in Geneva in August 1993, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination appointed a special rapporteur on Ogoni after the Ogoni delegation presented its case' (Naanen, 1995: 70). Also, 'a crucial factor in the international campaign...[was] the admission of Ogoni in January 1993 to The Hague-based Unrepresented

Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO)' (Ibid: 70-71). Subsequently, the UNPO mobilised global support for the Ogoni people by embarking on a massive and sustained international media enlightenment campaign that attracted human and environmental rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace to join the Ogoni international campaign. Specifically, the coming of Greenpeace into the Ogoni global environmental campaign resulted in considerable publicity and attention being given to the Ogoni situation in the ecology media (Ibid. 71). The campaign prompted several international environmental rights organisations such as the London Rainforest Action Group to embark on a field visit to Ogoni land which resulted in pressure on the Nigerian State to respect the right of the Ogoni people to self-determination (Obi, 1997: 144-145). The global campaign in support of the Ogoni also attracted the attention of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group. The Group chairman wrote to Shell and the British Government drawing their attention to several cases of alleged human rights violations in Ogoni land and imploring them to take adequate steps to ensure that the situation did not degenerate into full blown violent conflict (Osaghae, 1995: 337 & Naanen, 1995: 7). According to Naanen a positive impact of MOSOP's global engagement was 'the publicity given to the Ogoni cause in the wider international press...' (Naanen, 1995: 71).

The significance of the MOSOP era in the Niger Delta struggle can be seen in several ways. First, at the domestic level, it was able to mobilise pro-democracy movements, academics and media to join in the non-violent crusade and advocacy to salvage the Ogoni people and the Niger Delta. Second, according to Obi (1997: 145), the activities of MOSOP succeeded in crippling the operations of MNOCs in Ogoni land. In an affirmation of Obi's assertion, a member of the Ogoni Solidarity Forum noted that MOSOP succeeded in sending Shell Petroleum out of Ogoni land.²⁹ Third, the organisation also succeeded in internationalising the plight of the Ogoni people and the entire Niger Delta region. The achievement recorded by MOSOP can be attributed to several factors one of which was the recalcitrant attitude exhibited by the Nigerian government and the MNOCS to their plight. This recalcitrant attitude emboldened the Ogoni people to mobilise against the state and MNOCs (Osaghae, 1995: 333). Another

²⁹. Respondent 015, November 2013.

factor had to do with the quality of leadership Ken Saro Wiwa provided in MOSOP and its affiliates (Ibid.).

Finally, the success MOSOP achieved in the international arena is largely attributed to the global tempo of emerging discourses on issues of human, environmental rights as well as minorities' right to self-determination (Obi, 1997: 145). Reiterating this same view, a staff member of the Africa Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility argues that MOSOP was successful because 'this was when the issue of the environment was becoming important, human rights discourse was upscale, democracy, minority rights and everything... [sic].³⁰ This sudden development was because the end of the cold war paved the way for western liberal ideas to become influential and the MOSOP leadership was able to strategically connect these discourses to generate international support and sympathy for the predicament of Ogoni people.

However, MOSOP came to a sudden end in the mid-1990s due to a few reasons, one of which was the violent way the Nigerian State responded to the struggle. The state responded using military might, a situation exacerbated by the fact that Nigeria was at that time governed by a military junta. The second factor was the conflict over strategy among its key leadership. One of the ways this manifested itself was the debate between the hardliners who insisted on MOSOP maintaining an extremely radical and uncompromising stand in its engagement with the Nigerian State and MNOCs while the moderates pushed for flexibility and compromise where necessary. According to Okonta this internal dissension within the MOSOP's leadership cadre became apparent to the extent that:

During the crucial Abuja negotiations from February through May 1993, Saro-Wiwa adopted a hard-line position, insisting that an "Ogoni State" and at least 50 percent of the oil revenue from the Ogoni oil wells were the irreducible minimum that would be acceptable to his people...Garrick Leton, Edward Kobani, Albert Badey, and Bennett Birabi were, on the other hand, considered the "moderate" wing of the MOSOP negotiating team. They were prepared to be flexible with respect to the Ogoni core demands as outlined in the Ogoni Bill of Rights (Ibid.).

Unfortunately, the dispute resulted in a failure by the two groups to reach a consensus concerning how much compensation Shell Petroleum and Wilbros

³⁰. Respondent 044, November 2013.

were to pay in order to resume pipeline work in Ogoni land (Okonta, 2008: 223). The moderates argued that One Million Naira was enough compensation but Ken Saro-Wiwa insisted that it was inadequate and claimed to have negotiated a One Million-Dollar compensation from Wilbros International in the US (Ibid.). The leadership conflict in MOSOP reached a climax when the hardliners and the moderates could not reach a consensus on whether the people of Ogoni should participate in the June 12, 1993, presidential election or not (Naanen, 1995: 70; Osaghae, 1995: 337; Osha, 2007: 89; Osha, 2006: 32 & Okonta, 2008: 225). At the end of the day, the disagreement was put to a vote and the hardliner's faction of the expanded MOSOP steering committee, mostly youth loyal to Ken-Saro Wiwa defeated the moderates, which resulted in the boycott of the June 12, 1993, presidential election by the entire Ogoni people (Okonta, 2008: 225). This development further deepened the polarisation within the Movement which snowballed into the killing of four members of the moderates during a meeting at the palace of the traditional ruler of Giokoo by youth allegedly loyal to Ken-Saro Wiwa on 21 May 1994 (Ibid: 229). While on the surface, this might suggest the collapse of MOSOP can simply be attributed to irreconcilable differences over strategy within the leadership cadre, my contention is that the incentive behind the difference emanated from perceived pecuniary gain on the part of both the moderates and hardliners.

Following the tragic killing of the moderates, the late General Sani Abacha-led military regime established the Ogoni Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal (OCDST) in October 1995 to try Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others for murder. They were found guilty and executed by hanging on 10 November 1995 (Okonta, 2008: 229). Thus, one could argue that the state hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other leaders of the Movement marked the end of the Ogoni Social Movement. Yet, 'after his execution...he became an international symbol for the rights of all indigenous peoples in the Niger Delta' (Yates, 2015: 69). Similarly, his execution became a turning point in the Niger Delta struggle because it convinced the ethnic minorities of the region that a nonviolent approach would not attract the requisite government attention to their grievances.

3.3.5. The Kaiama Declaration and Ijaw Youth Council (IYC)

As argued above, the repressive and violent way the Nigerian State responded to the Ogoni phase of the Niger Delta nonviolent resistance movement convinced other ethnic nationalities in the region that the state would not condone any nonviolent threat to its monopoly control and access to oil rents in the region (Obi, 2010:228 & Ibaba *et al.*, 2012: 3). Consequently, the nature of the state response and the excruciating effect of poverty inspired youth from the Ijaw ethnic group to take up the challenge of confronting the Nigerian hegemonic state in a more assertive way. In December 1998, youth from the Ijaw minority ethnic group drawn from 40 clans across six different states in the Niger Delta assembled in Kaiama (the hometown of Isaac Adaka Boro, martyr of the Ijaw struggle) to establish the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and issue the Kaiama Declaration (Onduku, 2008: 267; Obi, 2010: 228; Obi & Rustad, 2011: 8; Ibaba *et al.*, 2012: 3). This declaration, signed by Felix Tuodolo and Timi Ogoriba, signified the emergence of a generational power shift in the Niger Delta resistance movement from local chiefs and elites to youth (Obi & Rustad, 2011: 3). It also took the Niger Delta struggle to a new and violent dimension (Onduku, 2008: 267). Therefore, one could argue that the Kaiama Declaration catapulted the conflict to a new dimension by practically changing the conflict dynamics to a militarised one (Thovoethin & Yusuf, 2010: 5).

The Kaiama Declaration reflects the opinion held by Ijaw youth regarding decades of marginalisation, relative deprivation, underdevelopment and the environmental degradation of their homeland as follows:

That the quality of life of Ijaw people is deteriorating as a result of utter neglect, suppression and marginalisation visited on Ijaws by the alliance of the Nigerian State and transnational oil companies. That the political crisis in Nigeria is mainly about the struggle for the control of **oil mineral resources** (sic) which accounts for over 80% of GDP, 95% of national budget and 90% of foreign exchange earnings (sic). From which 65%, 75% and 70% respectively are derived from within the Ijaw nation. Despite these huge contributions, our reward from the Nigerian State remains avoidable deaths resulting from ecological devastation and military repression...That the degradation of the environment of Ijawland by transnational oil companies and the Nigerian State arises mainly because Ijaw people have been robbed of their natural rights to ownership and control of their land and resources through the instrumentality of undemocratic Nigerian State legislations...That the principle of Derivation in Revenue Allocation has been consciously and systematically obliterated

by successive regimes of the Nigerian State...(See Sources of Niger Delta Studies in Journal of ND Studies, 2000: 65).

In a similar vein, the IYC in the declaration went on to state that:

All land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory belong to Ijaw communities and are basis of our survival. We cease to recognise all undemocratic decrees that rob our peoples/communities of the right to ownership and control of our lives and resources, which were enacted without our participation and consent...We demand the immediate withdrawal from Ijawland of all military forces of occupation and repression by the Nigerian State. Any oil company that employs the services of the armed forces of the Nigerian State to "protect" its operations will be viewed as an enemy of the Ijaw people. Family members of military personnel stationed in Ijawland should appeal to their people to leave the Ijaw area alone. Ijaw youths in all the communities in Ijaw clans in the Niger Delta will take steps to implement these resolutions beginning from the 30th of December, 1998, as a step towards reclaiming the control of our lives. We, therefore, demand that all oil companies stop all exploration and exploitation activities in the Ijaw area. We are tired of gas flaring; oil spillages, blowouts and being labeled (sic) saboteurs and terrorists ...we advice (sic) all oil companies staff and contractors to withdraw from Ijaw territories by the 30th December, 1998 pending the resolution of the issue of resource ownership and control in the Ijaw area of the Niger Delta...We agreed to remain within Nigeria but demand and work for Self Government and resource control (See Sources of Niger Delta Studies in Journal of Niger Delta Studies, 2000: 65-66).

The Kaiama declaration marked a turning point in the historical trajectory of the Niger Delta conflict because it signalled the beginning of a new era of violent confrontation between Ijaw youth, the Nigerian military and the MNOCs. In its pre-violent confrontation stage, the IYC mobilised Ijaw youth in December 1998 to embark on Operation Climate, which was a non-violent protest aimed at peacefully enforcing its earlier declaration that all MNOCs must vacate the Niger Delta before the end of December 1998 (Obi, 2010: 228). However, the Nigerian State responded in a militarised manner by declaring a state of emergency in the Niger Delta and then proceeding with a massive deployment of armed security forces to protect oil installations and disperse the protesting IYC members (Obi, 2006: 96; Joab-Peterside, 2007: 17-18; Ibaba, 2008:14; Onduku, 2008: 268; Arowosegbe, 2009: 584; Obi, 2010: 228; Obi & Rustad, 2011: 8).

The Nigerian State's penchant for a militarised response to agitations was demonstrated in 1999 when its military personnel, conveyed in Chevron Texaco helicopters, allegedly fired and killed two protesters at one of its oil platforms (Obi, 2006: 96). Yet another case was the razing of Odi town (an Ijaw community in

Bayelsa state) by military personnel while searching for criminals alleged to have murdered seven policemen. During the invasion over two thousand residents were reported to have died and several others wounded (Ibid.). Such events affirmed the Nigerian State's readiness to apply ruthless deterrence to checkmate any likely threat to oil and non-oil interests in the Niger Delta region (Obi, 2006: 96 and Omeje, 2006: 154). In reaction to this militarization, youth from the region resorted to armed confrontation (Joab-Peterside, 2007: 18). Thus, the Kaiama Declaration heralded the contemporary tactic of violent resistance and the demand by Niger Delta minorities for control over oil resources exploited from their homeland (Ebienfa, 2011: 639). It is therefore not surprising that the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta emerged in 2006.

3.3.6. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)

According to Ploughshares (2009) 'a new rebel faction, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), emerged in early 2006 and seeks independence for the region's 14 million Ijaw people. Its favoured tactics reportedly include sabotaging oil production in the Delta region as well as kidnapping foreign workers.' MEND succeeded in escalating the Niger Delta conflict to a new dimension by crippling oil production and revenue (Ikelegbe, 2010: 40) with devastating consequences for the Nigerian rentier state and MNOCs. MEND further claimed to be fighting for the liberation of the Niger Delta region from over 50 years of political and economic slavery, given that the region had peacefully expressed its grievances for several years without any positive response (Kashi, 2008: 27). MEND in an electronic mail communication with Ross asserted its grievances, objectives and tactics in this way:

The Movement for the Emancipation of the ND [Niger Delta] (MEND) is an amalgam of all arm bearing groups in the ND fighting for the control of oil revenue by indigenes of the ND who have had relatively no benefits from the exploitation of our mineral resources by the Nigerian government and oil companies over the last fifty years...We are spread across the 6 states of the ND ... Our aim on inception was to attract international attention to the plight of the people of the delta and the injustice the world has been turning a blind eye to...we have progressed to the next stage of our campaign which is limited attacks on oil installations and administrative facilities...we are now considering the next phase which will be a more ruthless approach to our objective (Ross, 2007: 1).

In terms of organisational structure, Oriola argues that MEND ‘...operates as an amorphous, multifaceted amalgam of insurgent groups and displays an unprecedented precision in executing its intentions. MEND’s major ambition is to cripple the capacity of the Nigerian rentier petro-state to produce crude oil’ (Oriola, *et al.*, 2013: 70). Thus, the MEND’s era marked a fundamental shift from the MOSOP era in terms of tactics of engagement with the Nigerian State from passive resistance to violent resistance. MEND, through kidnapping, hostage taking of expatriate and non expatriate oil workers and the bombing of oil installations attracted global attention to the plight of Ijaw (Obi, 2010: 230) and by implication the entire Niger Delta. According to Duffield (*BBC News*, Lagos, 2010) through its activities MEND ‘...cut Nigeria’s oil production by one-third causing spikes in the global oil price’.

The MEND era further internationalised the Niger Delta conflict that started during the MOSOP era albeit in different ways. For instance, Oriola *et al.*, (2013: 75) argue that among the factors which contributed to MEND’s success was its robust media engagement which extended to both domestic and international media organisations. A point reiterated by Duffield (*BBC News*, Lagos: 2010) who argues that ‘the group was successful, partly because of a sophisticated media strategy’. However, unlike MOSOP, MEND’s mode of interface with the international system was not through direct engagement at international forums but through massive propaganda using the internet to reach out to as wide an audience as possible (including internationally reputable electronic and print media organisations).³¹

3.4. Comparing the Impact of the MOSOP and MEND Eras of the Niger Delta Conflict

The MOSOP and MEND eras of the Niger Delta conflict were very significant and so it is pertinent to compare the impact of the two organisations both at the international and domestic level. At the international level, MOSOP succeeded in attracting global attention through its robust engagement in international fora. MOSOP was more effective because it adopted a constructive intellectual and nonviolent approach to pursuing its grievances, which was compatible with the

³¹. Respondents 001- member disarmament and demobilisation Committee, October 2013 and 038-former MEND commander, November 2013.

global democratic and environmental rights discourses of the time and also coincided with the UN declaration of the International Year of the World's Indigenous People.³² Consequently, it attracted more positive global attention and sympathy for the Niger Delta oil-producing minorities as seen in the number of international nongovernmental human and environmental rights organisations that became concerned about the plights of the Niger Delta oil-producing minorities.

In terms of MEND, one could argue that it was also successful at the international level albeit in a different way. MEND, though faceless at international fora attracted global attention to the Niger Delta through its skilful use of information and communication technology to make known its alleged grievances as well as through its destructive activities on oil production infrastructure which sent leading buyers of Nigerian crude oil panicking.

However, while the global attention MOSOP attracted was positive and supportive of its cause the international attention MEND attracted was negative. For instance, former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown informed journalists at the 2008 G8 Summit held in Japan that the UK would assist Nigeria to 'deal with lawlessness' in the Niger Delta (*BBC News*, 2008) while Ploughshares, (2009: 2) reported that 'the US government was reportedly providing military training as well as technical assistance to the distressed Delta region'. This suggests that unlike MOSOP, the global attention that MEND attracted was counterproductive to its cause. Similarly, at the domestic level, MOSOP succeeded in bringing the Niger Delta's predicament to the front burner of the Nigerian development discourse and attracted the attention of Nigerian academics and non-governmental organisations. I would also argue that one positive enduring legacy of MOSOP's struggle at the domestic level was that it contributed to the return of Nigeria to a democratic system of governance. I argue so because the global pressure and sanctions imposed on Nigeria because of the execution of Ken

³². The United Nations General Assembly decided that the International Day of the World's Indigenous People shall be observed on 9 August every year. The goal was to strengthen international cooperation for solving problems faced by indigenous people in such areas as human rights, the environment, development, education and health (United Nations, n.d. <http://www.un.org/en/events/indigenousday/background.shtml>). A group is regarded indigenous if they are inhabitants of a place prior to colonial invasion, maintain close tie to their land economically and culturally and suffers economic and political marginalisation due to their minority status.

Saro-Wiwa and others helped in compelling the Nigerian military junta to return the country to democratic rule.

On the other hand, MEND could be adjudged as successful to the extent that it succeeded in crippling the operations of MNOCs, general economic activities in the Niger Delta region and flow of oil rents to the Nigerian rentier-neopatrimonial state, prompting the Nigerian federal government to embark on an ADDR programme (Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Amnesty Programme, 2011: 22). Particularly, the government had to extend a hand of patronage to the top commanders and a reintegration support package to the foot soldiers (see chapter 4). Thus, within the context of a dysfunctional neopatrimonial state where corruption and self-enrichment are virtues highly celebrated and cherished, MEND could be regarded as extremely successful. However, measured in terms of having the original grievances that triggered the Niger Delta conflict addressed by attracting development to the Niger Delta, current realities in the region suggest that MEND has been a failure because the only legacy it has left is the relics of communities destroyed during clashes with security forces.

Overall, the impact of the MEND insurgency was felt in three spheres, namely, loss of oil production, human impact and lost opportunity (Ibid.). In terms of lost production, as of May 2009, Nigeria was recording a shortfall of over one million barrels per day in relation to projected daily production; while the Shell Petroleum Development Company declared a *force majeure*³³ of 0.25 million barrels per day (Ibid.). It was further asserted that within the same period (2009), Nigeria was losing 8.7 billion naira daily (58 million US dollars), while in 2008 Nigeria lost over twenty billion US dollars due to the MEND oil insurgency (Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, 2011: 22). Similarly, the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) company recorded a loss of over two billion dollars in 2009, representing 53 percent of its installed capacity (Ibid.). In terms of human impact, 128 people were reportedly kidnapped from January 2008 to January 2009, with over one thousand people killed in 2008 (Ibid.).

In terms of lost opportunity, construction work on the East-West road a major road project in the Niger Delta was abandoned for two years due to insecurity while

³³. Declaring Force majeure suggests that Shell Petroleum reported an unintended compulsory drop in its daily production capacity due to the prevailing security situation caused by the activities of MEND.

Michelin had to fold up its activities in the region and lay off its 1,500 staff, ditto for Julius Berger and Wilbros (Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, 2011: 22.). In the same vein, small and medium enterprises also pull out from the Niger Delta with critical oil and gas pipelines infrastructure damaged (Ibid.). Similarly, given the high security risk involved for cargo ships coming to the Niger Delta, about 90 million dollars' premiums was being charged per annum to insure ships sailing to Nigeria, while MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta Region were spending 3 billion dollars for protecting their facilities and installations (Ibid.). The above reflected the empirical reality in the Niger Delta region as at June 2009 when President Umaru Musa Yar'adua officially proclaimed an ADDR programme as a national response strategy to the protracted Niger Delta conflict.

In conclusion, it is apparent that MEND represented the most organised and ferocious phase of the Niger Delta conflict. However, the ability of MEND to engage the Nigerian State in a prolonged and sustained military campaign was not a reflection of the intensity of grievance per se but the pursuit of personal economic agendas by its actors combined with the feasibility of a rebellion financed by oil and kidnapping of oil workers for ransom. Thus, the conflict economy, more than the verbalised grievances were what provided the motivation and resources for MEND to execute the most prolonged and sustained military campaign against the Nigerian State and MNOCs in the historical trajectory of the Niger Delta conflict. Ikelegbe described the conflict economy in this way:

An economy of conflict has emerged [in the Niger Delta] characterised with an intense, violent and bloody struggle for the appropriation of oil resources and benefits from the oil economy and a thriving market of illegal trading and smuggling of arms, crude and refined oil (Ikelegbe, 2005: 209).

3.5. The Management of the Niger Delta Conflict by the Nigerian State

Tamunosaki (2012: 10-14) has contended that at the early stage of Nigeria's independence (1960s), its popular strategy of managing the conflict was 'avoidance and confrontation' a situation Obi (2002: 99) describes as '...to sweep the complaints of the ethnic minorities under the carpet'. This suggests that the Nigerian State failed to recognise or constructively engage the people of the Niger

Delta region over their grievances but rather pretended there were no agitations at all. Tamunosaki contends that the frustration triggered by the state avoidance approach was what led to Adaka Boro's revolt in 1966, approximately six years after independence. Tamunosaki's view was corroborated by Albert who argues that the Nigerian State generally prefers the *avoidance and confrontation approach* as a way of managing conflict which resulted in the proliferation of various forms of community and governance related conflicts in Nigeria:

The proliferation of community and governance conflicts in Nigeria stems from the fact that... [Nigeria] generally favour avoidance as a style of conflict management. At community and national levels, groups that feel aggrieved about certain issues complain very loudly about their predicaments but hardly get listened to by their adversaries or those that have the statutory responsibility to give them attention. The ignored groups soon take to violence...Once a community becomes violent in Nigeria the first thing government does ...is to deploy some policemen to keep peace in the area (Albert, 2004: 37).

The above assertion clarifies why the Nigerian State resorted to violence in crushing the first revolt by Adaka Boro and subsequent ones in the Niger Delta instead of negotiation. Subsequently, I will argue that the management of the conflict was premised on minimalist and maximalist perspectives. The maximalist perspective recognises the fact that the grievances that led to agitations in the Niger Delta region are rooted in its underdevelopment and difficult topography, which makes it a special development challenge because as George-Ukpong (2012: 56) observes 'the Niger Delta region is indeed a peculiar region of Nigeria. The peculiarities lie in the...problem of naturally imposed harsh environmental conditions...'. A member of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND) refers to the situation as the classic Niger Delta problem.³⁴ This perspective has its root in the submission of the Willinks Commission of 1958 (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, 2009: 15-16). Conversely, the minimalist perspective views the Niger Delta oil-producing minorities' agitations as a threat to national stability and security (Ikelegbe, 2010: 39). From the minimalist perspective, the situation, if left unchecked could undermine the stability of the Nigerian State, hence the need to coercively deal with it using military deterrence as summarised below:

³⁴. Respondent 008, October 2013). By classic Niger Delta problem, the respondent implies that apart from the region being marginalised and underdeveloped the difficulties of its terrain poses an additional development challenge.

...the crisis in the Niger Delta does pose a threat to the security, unity and territorial integrity of the Nigerian State, the lives and property of the residents of the region and the booming petro-business which has direct link or bearing with the national economy (sic) (Emmanuel & Maurice, 2012: 166).

The two perspectives of the conflict have given rise to a carrot and stick approach as the dominant strategy used by the Nigerian State to manage the conflict (Mustapha, 2010: 122). The carrot and stick approach is premised on the assumption that a cessation of violence will be achieved by responding to some of the grievances that informed the agitation (Ekpo, 2004: Omeje, 2006: 147-153; Ogundiya, 2011: 15-17; Adeyemo & Olu-Adeyemi; 2010: 46-55 and Ibaba, 2012: 1-4) while concurrently applying deterrence measures. Emmanuel and Maurice (2012: 167) elaborate on the carrot component of the strategy in this way:

Apart from this military option, government has at some other times employed a developmental approach to solving the problem. Thus, various development intervention agencies [have been created] such as the Niger Delta Development Board, River Basin Development Authority, Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission and recently, the Niger Delta Development Commission set up in 2001 by the Obasanjo administration...The aim has been to use these agencies for the development of the region (Emmanuel and Maurice, 2012: 167).

The development agencies highlighted above were purposely set up to address the state of underdevelopment, infrastructural decay and environmental despoliation prevalent in the Niger Delta (Ibaba, 2012: 1-4). The first was the Niger Delta Development Board in the 1950s which metamorphosed into the Niger Delta Basin Development Authority in the 1980s (Ekpo, 2004: 65-69). The most recent creation was the Ministry of Niger Delta in 2008 (Ministry of Niger Delta Website, n. d.). Also, as part of the carrot approach, additional states and local governments in the Niger Delta were created as part of a strategy to bring governance and development closer to the people and to integrate indigenes of the Niger Delta into mainstream Nigerian politics, national leadership and public service (Agbese, 2003: 254, Omotola, 2006: 16-17 and Ogundiya, 2011: 16). In addition to the above, an increase in revenue allocation from the federation account to the Niger Delta states has been implemented (notably the granting of 13% derivation to the oil producing states) as a way of enhancing their capacity

to execute development programmes (Amnesty International, 2005: 32-33; Omotola, 2006:16-17; Ibaba, 2012: 1- 4).

On the other hand, in conformity with the *stick* component of the management approach, the Nigerian State has consistently applied deterrence (violence) to neutralise agitations from the Niger Delta region through the massive deployment of security forces. Moreover, while the Nigerian State's development approach was haphazard and lacking coordination, it appears to be consistent and diligent in its application of deterrence. For instance, Adaka Boro and his fellow compatriots who staged the first revolt in the region were militarily countered, arrested, tried and found guilty of treason and sentenced to death (Azaiki, 2003: 80; Obi, 2009: 118). Similarly, MOSOP which took the Niger Delta struggle to the next phase through its non-violent agitation '...was literally crushed largely through the use of state military force, and the hanging after a controversial trial and verdict, of nine of its leading members, including...Ken Saro Wiwa...' (Obi, 2009: 119). In response to the Kaiama Declaration by the IYC, the Nigerian State responded swiftly by declaring a state of emergency in the region, deploying several troops and anti-riot policemen to protect oil installations and disperse the riotous Ijaw youth, which resulted in several deaths (Arowosegbe, 2009: 584). The application of the stick reached a crescendo in 1999 when the Nigerian State deployed battle-ready soldiers to Odi town in Bayelsa state in search of Ijaw youth alleged to have killed seven policemen deployed to the town (Omeje, 2004: 432). Thereafter, the Nigerian State declared 'Operation Hakuri II' with a mandate to protect lives and property, oil platforms, flow stations, oil pipelines and refineries in the Niger Delta region (Ibid.).³⁵ Subsequently, Operation Hakuri II mutated into a composite Joint Task Force (JTF) thereby further strengthening the stick approach. The JTF since its establishment has been engaged in countless violent encounters with MEND fighters. For instance, while the ADDR programme was proclaimed in the month of June 2009, the JTF in May launched a well-coordinated attack and aerial bombardment on Gbaramatu kingdom and communities such as Okerenkoko, Oporoza, Kurutie, Kokodiagbene and Kunukuma with the aim of capturing or killing some of the MEND ringleaders (Obi & Rustad, 2011: 203).³⁶

³⁵. Respondent 043, December 2013.

³⁶. The attack by JTF on Gbaramantu kingdom and communities within it was equally confirmed by respondent 048 in an interview (December 2014). The respondent viewed the attack as a

The effectiveness of the 'carrots and sticks' conflict management approach was undermined because the Nigerian State failed to equitably balance between the 'carrots and sticks' in empirical application, as it over-relied on the use of threat and military force to subdue every agitation from the Niger Delta. Moreover, regarding the provision of carrots, a respondent in this study argues that the question that needed to be answered is 'how adequate was the carrot given in response to the demand for it.'³⁷ Therefore, the management approach failed because even though it was anchored on the interplay of development and security in a concurrent manner, the entire process was lopsided towards the provision of security, law and order and the marginalisation of the development component. Consequently, the human security and development dimensions of the conflict were neglected with the conflict regarded and treated as primarily a security problem. However, the over-reliance on a military solution to the conflict was in tune with the previously highlighted law and order nature and character of the Nigerian State.

Furthermore, a Niger Delta academic expert contends that development agencies such as the Oil and Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs set up as part of the 'carrots' component were ineffective because they were superimposed from above and lacked any input from those whose grievances led to their establishment.³⁸ The expert further contends that they were also underfunded and mired in corruption because funds allocated for development were syphoned through political patronage.³⁹ The agencies eventually became a means of prebendal accumulation by the Niger Delta minority elites co-opted into the coalition of the national ruling class and appointed to manage them as noted by an academic expert who contends that the development agencies set up for the Niger Delta were a façade and a way of:

Creating opportunities for elites of the Niger Delta to benefit more...there was the Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority but it never really

deliberate sabotage by the military to undermine the ND peace process given that the attack was carried out within the same period that the President announced the setting up of the amnesty planning Committee.

³⁷. Respondent 014, October 2013.

³⁸. Respondent 004, October 2013 and 037, November 2013.

³⁹. Ibid.

did anything with all the money that went into it and it was run by elite of the Niger Delta mainly; so, it was a way of accommodating them...⁴⁰

Similarly, Okonta and Douglas (2003: 32-36) describe OMPADEC as the cult of corruption while a staff member of the Nigerian Office of the Search for Common Ground concurs with the above opinions and argues that despite the enormous budgetary allocation to the NDDC, it is unable to effectively execute its statutory mandate of bringing development to the Niger Delta because its budget is usually treated as a slush fund.⁴¹ According to the respondent the main reason for the non-performance of NDDC was because monies budgeted for projects execution are diverted for other purposes and into the private accounts of political elites and bureaucrat manning the commission.⁴² Ultimately, agencies such as the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and NDDC have been undermined by a rapacious bureaucracy and elected governing elites. For example, according to Daniel (2015) a former minister for Niger Delta Affairs and two accountants of the ministry are being investigated in connection with the illegal withdrawal of ₦1.5 billion cash from the ministry's account with the Central Bank of Nigeria. Also, Olorok (2015) reported that the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) arraigned five ex-directors of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs for alleged ₦670m fraud. In a similar vein, Udo (2015) reported that a special audit report by the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation established that the NDDC allegedly diverted the sum of ₦183bn meant for the development of the Niger Delta region. According to Udo (2015) the alleged indictments were contained in three special reports covering the period 2008-2012. The reports established the following misappropriations:

- a. The total of ₦183.7 billion discovered missing during the period covered by the audit report.
- b. About ₦70.4 billion paid as mobilisation to various contractors who never showed up at the project site.
- c. ₦90.4 billion was discovered to be illegal extra-budgetary expenditure for unauthorised sub-heads.

⁴⁰. Respondent 045, December 2013.

⁴¹. Respondent 010, October 2013.

⁴². Ibid.

- d. ₦10 billion was recorded as tax deducted but without evidence of remittance to the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS).
- e. ₦5.8 billion paid to contractors for jobs not done.
- f. ₦1.2 billion taxes not deducted from contractors.
- g. ₦785 million out of ₦1.1 billion for the supply of furniture to various schools in Delta state paid for without any evidence of being supplied.

In addition, Daniel and Nwagbuhiogu (2015: 9) alleged that ‘...the sum of ₦1.3 billion was approved and released for NDDC Christian Fellowship and NDDC Children and Disabled families end of the year parties. While the Christian Fellowship reportedly received ₦500 million, the NDDC children and disabled families got ₦800 million, an expenditure clearly outside the commission’s mandate. They further report that a few weeks from the 2015 general elections ‘the Commission is also said to have inexplicably moved the sum of ₦100 billion from its Access Bank account on Agip Road branch to an undisclosed location...’ (ibid.) fuelling suspicion that the money was used to fund the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) campaign for the 2015 national elections in the Niger Delta.

Creating more states and local governments as a means of bringing governance closer to ethnic minorities and integrating them into Nigeria’s mainstream politics has been criticised as merely serving the interests of privileged minority elites. This was because it only serves as a means of co-opting them into the national neopatrimonial ruling elites to the detriment of masses from the region. This is because as Suberu (2013: 79) argues ‘...the fragmentation of Nigeria into ...subnational state and local governments has vastly expanded and multiplied the access points and conduits for the individual and sectional appropriation of public power and resources.’ Thus, the exercise only provided more avenues for prebendal accumulation for the privileged minority elites co-opted into the national neopatrimonial ruling elite coalition.

3.6. Conclusion

This chapter is central to this study because to critically interrogate the effectiveness of the Niger Delta ADDR programme as a conflict prevention strategy, an understanding of the conflict's origins, dynamics and management by the Nigerian State is necessary. The central arguments I advanced in the chapter is that the origin of the Niger Delta conflict is fundamentally rooted in the dysfunctional rentier neopatrimonial nature and character of the Nigerian State which over time became predatory. The nature and character of the Nigerian State gave rise to crisis and contradictions of accumulation which produced a conflict of security between the Niger Delta oil-producing minorities and the Nigerian State. Whilst the Nigerian State defines security in the Niger Delta as the protection of oil installations and MNOCs; the people of the region described security as improvement in their material condition and a healthier environment. The coercive nature of the Nigerian State underscored the violent way it responded to the conflict which in turn became one of the main drivers of the conflict's changing dynamics. The mutation of the conflict from grievance to greed and the concomitant intrusion of economic agendas into the conflict during the MEND era enabled it to execute a prolonged violent revolt against the Nigerian State and MNOCs.

As I argued in the chapter, this thesis is an evaluative case study that aims to interrogate the effectiveness of the Niger Delta ADDR programme as a national response to the conflict. The goal of the chapter was to provide an understanding of the historical origins and dynamics of the conflict and its management prior to the implementation of the ADDR programme. Consequently, in the first part of the chapter, I advanced a framework for explaining the origin and dynamic of the Niger Delta conflict. Specifically, the framework addressed two main issues; (i) the origin of the conflict, (ii) its changing dynamics and why and how the post-Kaiama and MEND era of the conflict represented the most organised and violent revolt by Niger Delta youth against the Nigerian State and MNOCs. The second part of the chapter examined the periodisation in the conflict life cycle while the third and final part addresses the Nigerian State management of the conflict prior to the implementation of the ADDR programme.

The management of the Niger Delta conflict was based on carrots and sticks. Nevertheless, given the nature and character of the Nigerian State it was unable to balance the application of carrots and sticks to the extent that the state over-relied on the use of violence (sticks) as a conflict containment strategy. Similarly, the effectiveness of development agencies established to ameliorate the crisis of underdevelopment in the region was hamstrung by corruption as they became avenues of prebendal accumulation.

Thus, the nature and character of the Nigerian State vis-à-vis its role as a primary source and driver of conflict in the Niger Delta as well as other underlying issues that underpinned the conflict raises the all-important question of the extent to which an ADDR programme can serve as an effective national response. Consequently, the extent to which the ADDR programme effectively addressed the realities that underpinned the conflict will form the basis of my analysis in Chapter Five.

Chapter Four

The Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme: Conceptualisation, Negotiation, Planning and Implementation

4. Introduction

This chapter examines to what extent the politics of conceptualisation, planning and implementation of the Niger Delta Amnesty, Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (ADDR) programme affected its success or otherwise. This will be achieved by looking at how the conceptualisation, negotiation, planning and implementation conformed to the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (UN IDDRS 2006) and the broader Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) theoretical and policy literature. The chapter is central to the overall study because, to evaluate the extent to which the programme has achieved its objectives, a thorough understanding of the politics that underpinned its conceptualisation, design and implementation are necessary.

The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate the contention that the politics of how a DDR programme is conceptualised, negotiated, planned and implemented can have serious implications for its overall outcome. The main argument I advance is that the conceptualisation of the Niger Delta ADDR programme was informed by conflicting conceptual perspectives and understandings of the conflict, which gave rise to security versus development agendas for the ADDR programme, but eventually it was the security agenda that informed the entire conceptualisation, negotiation, planning and implementation process. In terms of negotiation, I argue that the ADDR programme was achieved neither through negotiated settlement or outright military defeat of the militants but through a peace deal that combines the features of both peace enforcement and negotiated settlement, whereby top militant commanders with a high capacity to perpetrate violence and undermine oil production formed the nucleus of the negotiation. I equally assert that the conceptualisation and negotiation of the ADDR programme were influenced by the nature and character of the Nigerian State and its interest. I likewise contend that the planning and implementation of the programme did not

conform to the basic benchmarks provided in the UN IDDRS (2006) and the broader DDR theoretical and policy literature. I also argue that the implementation of the programme was undermined by four factors (i) the nature and character of the Nigerian State which revolves around its two distinguishing characteristics namely rentier-neopatrimonialism and its law and order nature (ii) the dysfunctionality of the Nigerian State (iii), competition between leading security agencies of the Nigerian State (military, police and state security service) and (iv) geographical impediment. Structurally, the chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section examines the conceptualisation, negotiation, planning and implementation of the Niger Delta ADDR programme; the second section highlights the problems and challenges that characterised the process that can serve as lessons for future DDR programming and implementation. The concluding section summarises some of the main arguments in the chapter.

4.1. The Niger Delta amnesty, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme and the Politics of Conceptualisation

As I noted in the introduction, the conceptualisation of the Niger Delta ADDR programme was premised on development versus security understandings of the conflict which resulted in the development versus security and stability agendas of the programme. The development perspective and understanding of the conflict, as well as the agenda of the ADDR programme, can be traced to the report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND) set up by the Nigerian government. The TCND contended that:

A fundamental perspective on resolving the Niger Delta crisis is governance. The failure of development in the Niger Delta is largely as a result of the absence of good governance frameworks which can effectively strengthen the use of political power and resources...The Committee is of the view that a crucial factor in resolving the Niger Delta crisis is dealing with the problem of militancy within a governance framework. It notes that when the principle of good governance is undermined, it precipitates opposition, alienation, resistance and disillusionment. Similarly, bad governance has allowed for the growth in violent behaviours and restiveness... (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, 2008: 65).

In the light of the above, the TCND suggested that the Nigerian government should grant amnesty to all genuine militants as a prelude to a successful

disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme. Consequently, it recommended that the following steps should be taken:

1. Establish a credible and authoritative DDR institution and process, involving international negotiators to plan, implement, and oversee the DDR programmes [sic] at regional, state and local government levels.
2. Provide for open trial and release on bail (with a view to eventual release) of Henry Okah⁴³ and others involved in struggles relating to the region.
3. Grant amnesty to all Niger Delta militants willing and ready to participate in the DDR programme.
4. Address short-term issues arising from amnesty to militants, by promoting security for ex-militants and rebuilding communities destroyed by military invasion.
5. Work out *long-term strategies for human capacity development* [my italics] and reintegration for ex-militants.
6. Reflect on a timeline with adequate funds for the DDR programme.
7. Stop the illegal demands put on youths by prosecuting the suppliers of small arms and light weapons and those involved in oil bunkering, instead, the government should identify highly placed persons in and outside of government who are engaged in sponsoring violence for economic and political reasons.
8. Exclude from amnesty, but criminalise those militants not committed to the DDR process and unwilling to surrender their arms.
9. Ensure that signatories to the DDR programme show a clear commitment to the entire process (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, 2008: 66).

As can be seen, the TCND clearly recognised the fact that the Niger Delta conflict is essentially rooted in the crisis of bad governance and neopatrimonialism which precipitated underdevelopment with all its ramifications that eventually resulted in disillusionment, alienation and resistance. Consequently, in the eyes of the TCND if DDR was to contribute to lasting peace it had to incorporate the governance reforms highlighted above. In other words, it must be framed on a maximalist/transformational perspective (Muggah, 2004: 27; Özerdem *et al.*, 2008: 4-5 & Jennings, 2008:6).

However, beyond the TCND's recommendation, other members of the Nigerian State security architecture also recommended an ADDR programme to the Nigerian government even though not in the all-inclusive way the TCND did. The ADDR programme recommended by members of the Nigerian security architecture was to be implemented as a security stabilisation or containment

⁴³. Henry Okah is one of the founders and leaders of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

strategy. For instance, one of the members revealed that at the peak of the insurgency he wrote a *position paper* to President Yar'Adua on the imperative of granting amnesty to the Niger Delta militants as a strategy for ending the security challenges brought about by militancy.⁴⁴ Prior to writing the position paper he held preliminary discussions with Ateke Tom leader of the Niger Delta Vigilante regarding his intention to recommend amnesty for Niger Delta militants to the President.⁴⁵ According to him during one of the meetings he had with Ateke Tom he explained to him that:

I want to propose amnesty to the government but amnesty can have no meaning unless you yourself agree to it. He said what does amnesty mean? I say lay down your weapons and government will compensate you... he said it is ok. If I lay down my arms what of the boys, I said, the government will look after your boys (sic).⁴⁶

Similarly, a member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee traced the programme to the position paper submitted to the President and National Security Adviser by the then Chief of Defence Staff. According to the respondent:

... a lot of people had suggested that option but I think it did not go down well with the National Security Adviser, so not much of it came out of the suggestions and writings that people had made until the then Chief of Defence Staff said that he has to intervene, he had to do something, pick one option and see how it works. So he too was sold on the idea of disarmament, wrote a paper which he now took to the President, which the President now worked on. So I would say a lot of people will tell you that they wrote, that it was their paper that was important, but I can tell you categorically: it was the paper and the push given to the paper by the Chief of Defence Staff, Air Marshall Paul Dike that resulted to the amnesty programme.⁴⁷

Against this background, the recommendation of the TCND and that of the members of the Nigerian State security architecture clearly suggest that the conceptualisation of the Niger Delta ADDR programme was premised on two different and conflicting perspectives. Firstly, as I said, the TCND viewed the conflict and the resultant insecurity in the Niger Delta as a consequence of the

⁴⁴. Respondent 049- former member of the Nigerian security architecture, January 2014.

⁴⁵. Ibid.

⁴⁶. Ibid.

⁴⁷. Respondent 042-member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, December 2013.

lack of human security, development and good governance and so recommended the implementation of a holistic DDR as an opportunity to simultaneously address the development and security challenges confronting the Niger Delta region. It also suggested that the ADDR should conform to the basic normative standards provided in the UN IDDRS (2006). Thus, the TCND notes that 'the need to provide an international perspective to the DDR requires that international standards on DDR as described in the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) are applied' (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, 2009:66).

On the other hand, members of the Nigerian State security architecture viewed militancy as a security challenge and therefore pushed for an ADDR programme that prioritised security over development with scarce attention to the underlying human security and development issues that led to the conflict. Similarly, neither conforming to the basic tenets of the UN IDDRS (2006) or the normative standards in the broader DDR literature. The primary concern was to implement a DDR programme that responded to the emergency imperative of security stabilisation in the Niger Delta. As noted by one of the Committee members 'the amnesty was not to solve the problem of the Niger Delta... the amnesty was a containment strategy, it was to contain the situation.'⁴⁸ Thus, when the two perspectives are compared, it was evident that members of the Nigerian State security architecture in their conceptualisation did not demonstrate a deeper understanding of the complex nexus between development, conflict and security (also see Tschirgi, *et al.*, 2010:1-6). Alternatively, they deliberately failed to appreciate this relationship and the fact that the 21st Century is characterised by the merging of security and development or the securitisation of development and developmentisation of security (see Chapter Two paragraph 2.6.1). Thus, their understanding of DDR is characterised by a bifurcation between security and development.

Therefore, in line with the debates between traditionalists and wideners in security studies and the merging of security and development (securitisation of development and developmentisation of security) examined in Chapter Two, I will argue that the stand of the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee (PAPC)

⁴⁸. Respondent 050- member of the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, January 2014.

reflects the traditionalist's school that pushed against the broadening of the sources of security threats. While the TCND's recommendations mirror the widener's position who are canvassing for a broader understanding of threats to security and the ultimate merging of security and development. Arising from the above discussion is that while internationally driven DDR implies the securitisation of development by external actors in post-conflict societies an interesting dimension of this case study is the securitisation of development by an internal/external actor, namely the Nigerian State. In this case, the Nigerian State arguably an internal but external actor to the Niger Delta has succeeded in securitising development in the region. This suggests that the provision of development in the Niger Delta is increasingly tied and linked to its security implications or the consequences that its absence may trigger; which as I previously argued raises the moral question of whether the Niger Delta deserves not to be developed if not for the security consequences that its absence will result in.

Thus, from the perspective of the PAPC, the primary concern of the ADDR programme was to achieve the restoration of the Nigerian nation's capacity for the legitimate application of force (Muggah, 2010: 221) in the Niger Delta. This was a necessary condition for restoring oil production and rents accumulation which had been undermined by militancy as noted by a member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee:

... because of the increasing militancy in the Niger Delta... solutions had to be found; and people thought one of the easiest ways or one of the options available to government is to grant amnesty to the militants, you know, so that we can get them out of the creeks, disarm them, reduce the arms in circulation, and move on from there because... the militancy was virtually crippling the Nigerian economy: oil production fell to about as low as eight hundred thousand barrels a day from [a] peak of about two point four million barrels per day. So it was... very necessary that resolution is found to the militancy at that time (sic).⁴⁹

The above conflicting understandings of the concept and agenda of DDR to be implemented in the Niger Delta was again exacerbated at the level of planning because the PAPC was dominated by members of the Nigerian State security architecture, and protagonists of a minimalist DDR. The Committee understood

⁴⁹. Respondent 042, December 2013.

the conflict from a security perspective and threat to oil production. This eventually resulted in a conceptual somersault that led to the abandoning of the idea of a maximalist/transformational DDR as an opportunity for development in favour of a minimalist DDR programme that focused on security stabilisation. As one member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation, Implementation Committee noted, the PAPC members ‘... concentrated mainly on the disarmament [aspect of the DDR programme].’⁵⁰ However, it is my contention that, a broader and more nuanced DDR process could have been achieved if the conceptualisation and planning had been premised on the recommendations of the TCND. Thus, as will be substantiated in Chapter Five, the conceptualisation of the Niger Delta ADDR programme had serious implications for its overall success.

The conflicting understandings that informed the ADDR conceptualisation process has led to differing judgements on its outcome. For instance, academic experts on the Niger Delta as well as environmental rights and development based civil society organisations (CSOs) tend to evaluate the programme from the perspective of the TCND’s conceptualisation and judge it as a failure. This is because fundamental grievances that underpinned the conflict have not been addressed, communities destroyed have not been reconstructed or victims rehabilitated, except those that perpetrated violence.⁵¹ Conversely, members of the Nigerian State security architecture tend to see the programme as a huge success having reduced the level of threat to the Nigerian State’s legitimate application of force in the Niger Delta which resulted in a phenomenal increase in oil production. As noted by a member of the PAPC:

But hostilities stopped; did it not stop? As at you [As you are] interviewing me now, is there any hostility in the Niger Delta region? So if anybody says amnesty did not succeed, that person is an idiot; he doesn’t know what he’s saying; because by the time amnesty was offered them, all the expatriates had left the Niger Delta region ... Oil production had dropped from ... to seven hundred thousand barrels a day; and by the time I left as [Mike of Delta]... in March 2010 oil production had shot back to two point one million barrels a day; kidnapping had stopped; in fact it had reduced to the barest minimum in the entire Niger Delta region.⁵²

⁵⁰. Respondent 042- December 2013.

⁵¹. Respondent 032- Niger Delta expert, November 2013.

⁵². Respondent 050, January 2015.

It is appropriate to explain why and how the Niger Delta ADDR programme found itself in this conceptual conundrum. One reason for this can be extrapolated from the very nature and character of the Nigerian State. For instance, the country's over-dependence on oil rents (Omeje, 2006: 212) and the crippling of its production by militancy made the Nigerian economy comatose⁵³. Consequently, in view of the obvious menace that militancy posed to the survival of the Nigerian rentier state, it was stampeded into proclaiming an ADDR programme in order to checkmate the threat it constituted to oil production. Thus, the ADDR programme was premised and driven by the need to stabilise security in the Niger Delta in order to restore oil production and the flow of oil rents to the state. As one Niger Delta, academic expert observes:

First and foremost, I do not think that the intention of the government for introducing the Amnesty was to solve the Niger-delta crisis, far from it. That was not the intention, and if that was the intention then the operational framework of the policy was faulty. There was violence, oil production had dwindled and it affected both states and federal government. The state governments...and federal government were losing revenues so there was convergence of interest that look if this continue[s] like this we may not have money to fund our activities let's see if we can end violence, so the amnesty was to end violence to ensure that attacks on our oil infrastructure will cease and oil production will rise...⁵⁴

The respondent's position is credible when viewed against a comment made by the Special Adviser to the President on the Niger Delta and Coordinator of the Amnesty Programme regarding the programme's achievements. The adviser maintains that the ADDR programme has saved the Nigerian economy from imminent collapse:

The amnesty programme is on course. It has recorded huge success. Violence has been stopped to a large extent in the Niger Delta region and this is having positive effects on the economy of the nation. Oil production came down to about 700,000 barrels per day before the amnesty programme was initiated. It was so difficult to finance the budget then because of this. But from the midnight of October 4, 2009, when the programme ended, oil production has risen from 700,000 barrels per day to around 2.5 million barrel (sic) per day (Makinde, 2013: 18).

⁵³. Respondent 042, December 2013.

⁵⁴. Respondent 032, November 2013.

A second possible reason for the conundrum was provided by a military officer serving with the JTF, who posited that the problem of conflicting conceptualisation arose because those involved in the process were appointed, based on political expediency and not necessarily because they had any expert technical and theoretical knowledge of DDR.⁵⁵ This was further corroborated by a former staff member of the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta who argues that when the Nigerian government finally decided to embark on an ADDR programme in the Niger Delta ‘...there was never an attempt to learn from a country with best practices and experience in this regard’.⁵⁶

A third possible explanation was the apparent lack of continuity in terms of membership of the TCND and the PAPC, more so there was no effort by the PAPC to reach out to the TCND members during the planning process.⁵⁷ Similarly, the report of the TCND did not in any way serve as a framework for the Planning.⁵⁸ This clearly suggests that there was no conceptual congruity between the TCND and the PAPC.

Fourthly, the non-inclusion of local communities, members of civil society organisations (CSOs) and academics further re-enforced the conceptual dichotomy that characterised the Niger Delta ADDR programme.⁵⁹ For the ADDR programme to have maintained its initial development agenda, all relevant stakeholders ought to have been involved in the conceptualisation process. Indeed, a participatory approach⁶⁰ to its conceptualisation should have been adopted, whereby local communities, CSOs, academics and other relevant stakeholders are given the opportunity to actively participate in the process. However, this was not the case, as explained by a community leader and member of the Oloibiri Traditional Council of Chiefs in Bayelsa state:

⁵⁵. Respondent 012, October 2013.

⁵⁶. Respondent 028, November 2013.

⁵⁷. Respondent 008, October 2013.

⁵⁸. Respondent 050- member Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, January 2014. He disclosed that though he was privileged to see the TCND’s report but it was not in any way officially given to the Planning Committee as a framework for the ADDR planning.

⁵⁹. Respondent 004- Niger Delta academic expert, October 2013.

⁶⁰. Participatory Action Research (PAR) is an approach to research that emphasizes communities’ participation and action. It seeks to identify, understand and find solutions to problem in a collective and collaborative way. It is concerned with finding solution to real life situation and in the process, those affected by the problem are mobilised to take an active role in it (see Carroll, 2004: 276- 280.)

But say as a community...the community does not ...even know what the ...whole thing is all about. We don't know and...government agencies...have not come to discuss with the community and say, look because of this struggle we want to do this or do that for your ...children who were in the struggle. But we know ... we are reading from the paper that there are amnesty programmes, disarmament ... all that and all that, but as a community, we are not feeling the impact (sic).⁶¹

His explanation was corroborated by a staff member of a home-based nongovernmental organisation (NGO), who asserted that they 'were not carried along.'⁶² When further probed, she emphasised that 'there was, in fact, no involvement, there was no involvement... So the active civil society organisations here just sat behind and watched the drama go on in Abuja [sic].'⁶³ The exclusion of these critical stakeholders in the conceptualisation process strengthened the security cum stabilisation agenda of the ADDR programme. Overall, the PAPC's understanding of the conflict, as well as its concept of security and DDR is compatible with the Nigerian State's concept of peace in the Niger Delta which in turn is synonymous with the absence of threat to the optimal operations of MNOCs and flow of oil rents. Overall, the security stabilisation conceptualisation of the ADDR programme underplayed the fundamental issues that led to the conflict which was emphasised by the TCND. As one academic respondent noted, the Nigerian government by securitising the DDR '... succeeded at sweeping a lot of things under the carpet [sic].'⁶⁴

4.2. The Niger Delta ADDR Negotiation

There are conflicting accounts regarding how the Nigerian government negotiated the Niger Delta ADDR programme. One of the members of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee pointed out that the negotiation was based on a framework known as the Stakeholder Matrix.⁶⁵ He contends that negotiations were carried out with selected top militant commanders based on their relative power and interest in the conflict and the

⁶¹. Respondent 029-November 2013.

⁶². Ibid.

⁶³. Ibid.

⁶⁴. Respondent 045, December 2013.

⁶⁵. Respondent 001, October 2013.

extent of influence and credibility they commanded within the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Accordingly, the matrix categorised the militant commanders into groups *A* and *B*. Group *A*, he asserts, was comprised of top militant commanders with characteristics such as high power, high interest and high credibility. In contrast, those in group *B* were commanders considered to have low power, low interest and low credibility. The negotiation was predominantly carried out with commanders in group *A* who were regarded as the topmost and most influential in MEND, which also suggests that the Group *A* commanders were believed to have the manifest capability to threaten oil production. Likewise, the most capacity to deliver on any deal.

A military officer serving with the Joint Task Force (JTF) corroborated this when he clarified that, during the negotiations, the ‘government only picked key leaders who they think at that material time can solve the problems [sic].’⁶⁶ Again, ‘problems’ here is construed by the respondent in the sense of ‘threats to oil production’. A former aide to president Yar’ Adua corroborated this when he noted that ‘[There were negotiations]. But the negotiations were with the commanders not with the foot soldiers.’⁶⁷ However, a conflicting account was given by two other members of the same PAPC. The first one asserts that:

There was no negotiation, negotiating with what for what?... I was one of those who believed we don’t need to negotiate; they take it or they leave it. We never negotiated with anybody. Amnesty was proclaimed they gave us time to go out and talk to them; advise them [to] take this amnesty. You only have six weeks to take it, after that you will be a criminal. We did not negotiate, negotiate with who for what.⁶⁸

The second member of the Committee spoke in the same vein by positing that as far as the ADDR programme was concerned:

It was a unilaterally ...determined program; that is; the government decided they were going to give amnesty... It is not as if ... it is a typical disarmament thing where ... like you have in Rwanda; where there would be negotiations, terms of surrender or terms of this ...no ... this is a unilateral thing. The President just got up and said, ok, those of you who want to surrender your arms, we are ready to give you amnesty; although you have carried arms against the state, with these implications, we are

⁶⁶. Respondent 012, October 2013.

⁶⁷. Respondent 048, January 2014.

⁶⁸. Respondent 047, member Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, December 2013.

going to waive all those infringements and even assist you to return to normal life. So, it was unilateral, there's no prior discussions and written agreement or whatever; it is take it or leave it; and with it there was a ninety-day window, you have to take it within those ninety days' window, and after that ninety days' window, the window closes and the options available to government ...would be exercised; namely military options ... you know, there were a lot of options that the government was considering (sic).⁶⁹

Interestingly, Berdal (1996: 9-10) maintains that, in armed conflict, there are three ways, but not mutually exclusive, through which DDR can be initiated. Firstly, DDR programmes can emerge out of a comprehensive peace agreement (peace accord), a form of negotiated settlement between conflicting parties in most cases supervised by the UN. In the second instance, he states that DDR can be initiated by a victorious party⁷⁰ in an armed conflict, and thirdly it can be initiated through 'coercive disarmament' a form of peace enforcement as was the case in Somalia in 1993 (Ibid.). Arguing on the same lines, Tanner (1996:169-173) maintains that disarmament can be initiated through *consensual or coercive* means. A consensual disarmament is when adversarial parties voluntarily commit to a disarmament process, while coercive means results in parties being forced or threatened to undergo the process. While in the context of the UN IDDRS (2006), a peace agreement remains the most appropriate means of achieving DDR.

Consequently, in the light of these theoretical positions and evidence from the field, it is my contention that the process of negotiating the Niger Delta ADDR programme was achieved neither through negotiated settlement nor absolute military defeat of the militants by the Nigerian State. Rather, the negotiation process integrates the features of both negotiated settlement and military enforcement, giving rise to what I will term in this study a *pseudo compellence-negotiated type of DDR*, one that straddles peace enforcement and negotiated settlement nonetheless tilting more towards compellence. As one Niger Delta, academic expert noted, prior to the commencement of negotiations, the Nigerian State inflicted maximum violence on the Niger Delta militants by attacking Camp 5 at Oporoza, Gbaramantu Kingdom of Delta state and the headquarters of Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). He contends that

⁶⁹. Respondent 042- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, November 2013.

⁷⁰. In an armed conflict, victorious party refers to the party that succeeded in defeating its opponent.

even though the attack did not successfully crush the MEND's headquarters, it compelled the militants to bargain with the state which resulted in the amnesty. According to the academic expert compellence was applied as a prelude to negotiation in this way:

What the government did was this, similar to what is happening in the North now. First, was to bring violence to the people like what happened in the Gbaramantu area. Now, the government did that as a way of creating the condition for the people to *unwillingly* [my italics] accept the offer of amnesty, which in their view will lead to the cessation of violence. So that was the first step the state did, and then the amnesty was announced ... Thereafter, stakeholders all came on board and move from one major camp to another to talk with the militants' leaders to explain to them the need to accept the amnesty for the interest of Nigeria and particularly to avoid the reoccurrence of the kind of violence the state visited several communities in the region...and then of course money was dangled and people saw the money they could make...⁷¹

A former personal aide to President Yar' Adua corroborated the above position. According to him, the military force exerted on the militants was impactful because 'it brought them [militants] to the negotiating table, for it shows very clearly... [to them] that if force is what they wanted the military was able to deal with the situation.'⁷²

These submissions strengthen the suggestion that a form of negotiation did take place, but it was not a mutually cooperative process. Rather, it was a one-way traffic whereby the Nigerian Government imposed its non-negotiable options on the militants in a charged and intimidating atmosphere. This suggests that the programme was an *executive amnesty*; a form of imposition by the Nigerian State (see Ogundiya, 2011:6-32), reminiscent of the Argentine government executive amnesty discussed in Chapter Two. In other words, the Niger Delta amnesty mirrors and shares certain common features with Argentine government executive amnesty as both were a unilateral declaration. The only difference was that in the case of Argentina, the outgoing military junta granted amnesty to itself while in the case of the Niger Delta the Nigerian State enforced amnesty on militant youth that challenged the basis of its survival; the flow of oil rents and monopoly of violence in the region. Thus, in both Argentina and the Niger Delta

⁷¹. Respondent 032, November 2013.

⁷². Respondent 048, January 2014.

the amnesty was not an outcome of a robust engagement with all the relevant stakeholders.

However, despite the executive nature of the amnesty and the highly charged and intimidating atmosphere of the so-called negotiation, the government also used huge monetary inducements to mollify selected top militants' commanders. For instance, Joab-Peterside *et al.*, (2012: 12), provided figures of the monetary patronage extended to some of the top commanders. According to them 'the breakdown showed that Governor Ekpumopolo received the lion's share of \$22.5 million yearly, while former warlord, Dokubo Asari, collects \$9million every year to keep his estimated 4000 soldiers at bay. Ateke Tom and Ebikabowei Boyloaf Victor Ben each collect \$3.5million apiece.' Eventually, the pseudo-compellence form of negotiation and monetary inducement applied led to a '*purchased renunciation of militancy.*' At the end of the day, the whole process culminated in an individualised signing of renunciation of a militancy bond that paved the way for the ADDR programme. The fact that the process neither conforms to the basic tenets of negotiated settlement, or outright military defeat, but integrates both elements lends credence to the position expressed by a key member of the PAPC that the entire process '...was original to Nigeria; we didn't read it in any book; what we wanted to do was to restore peace.'⁷³

However, the most auspicious way of initiating DDR is through a peace agreement, which should set the timing and scope for carrying out disarmament, the proportion of forces to be disarmed and the manner for disposing of the arms (UN IDDRS, 2006 and Özerdem (2009: 16). By implication, it seems necessary that the peace agreement preceding any DDR should be all-inclusive or comprehensive in nature. Indeed, to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement, there is '...the need to invite the widest possible spectrum of parties to the negotiation table...' (Dudouet, 2008: 13). Steenkamp reiterated the same position when he argued that for a peace agreement to lead to an effective DDR, it must be comprehensive in nature:

⁷³. Respondent 050, January 2014. The respondent's reference to peace is in the minimalist sense of the absence of war.

...the accord has to include at least the main protagonist in the conflict and generally be as inclusive as possible in terms of its respondents, and address the resolution of the substantive, root causes of the violent conflict. Its ultimate aim is to create the framework for the substantial and comprehensive economic, social and political overhaul of society in order to create conditions that allow for future conflict to be dealt with peacefully (Steenkamp, 2009: 5).

However, the process of negotiating the Niger Delta ADDR fell significantly short of being all-inclusive or comprehensive, because it did not include all the key stakeholders whose participation was critical to the resolution of the conflict. For example, a member of the PAPC revealed that 79 militant commanders were identified prior to the commencement of the negotiation, but only 10 of them formed the nucleus of the negotiation.⁷⁴ Similarly, communities were completely sidelined in the process even though durable resolution of the conflict is far more difficult to achieve without their active involvement.⁷⁵ A military officer serving with the JTF asserted that even the opinion leaders from the Niger Delta involved in the process merely served as intermediaries between the Nigerian government and top militant commanders.⁷⁶ Thus, the negotiation fits into what Lederach (1997: 44-45) has described as a *top-down* approach to peacebuilding which revolves around the idea that ‘...the primary responsibility for achieving peace resides with the representative leaders of the parties to the conflict. If these leaders can agree, that sets the stage, the framework, and the environment for delivering the rest of society in the implementation of the agreement that will end the war.’

Focusing on selected top militants’ commanders for negotiation clearly demonstrated a lack of understanding or disregard for the horizontal and vertical inequality that exists between and within the Niger Delta top militant commanders, groups and camps. I argue so because the Niger Delta militants do not constitute a monolithic and homogeneous movement, but operate a highly segmented, loose and fluid structure (Oriola *et al.*, 2013: 67-96). Their flexible command and control structure explained why each commander operated as a

⁷⁴ . Respondent 047, December 2013.

⁷⁵ . Respondent 029- community elder and member Oloibiri Traditional Council of Chiefs, November 2013. And respondent 031- community Development Chairman Southern Ijaw Local Government Council, November 2013.

⁷⁶ . Respondent 012, October 2013.

self-independent 'general' with his own fighters and closely protected area of operational supremacy.⁷⁷ A member of the PAPC corroborated this when he noted that:

Intelligence at our disposal in the course of planning revealed that they [the militants] operated in clusters; they did not have a common front; although they were agitators but each had his own camp; they had their own groupings; each wanted to be recognized.⁷⁸

Therefore, the negotiation completely side-lined the less powerful top commanders and middle-level commanders as well as the foot soldiers. However, the failure posed serious implications for the overall outcome of the DDR particularly when viewed against the backdrop of Spear's (2006a:70-77 and 2006b: 169-172) typology of hierarchies within an insurgent group or movement. In her work, Spear categorises insurgents into three: individual fighters, middle-level officers heading fighting units and leaderships with *each of the layers* critical to the success of DDR and the entire peace process.

Negotiating with a few selected top generals would inevitably have a negative impact on the DDR process. This is because there is no assurance that the top generals can guarantee the commitment of their middle-level commanders and soldiers to the peace deal given that in the Niger Delta DDR programme much of the peace dividend went to the top commanders. Keen (1998: 46) lends credence to this in his analysis of 'conditions for bottom-up violence' when he argues that amongst other reasons, those from the bottom can trigger violence when the government cannot guarantee them economic security, or when they are marginalised. Therefore, given that the process marginalised them and the dividend of the peace deal favoured top commanders, it was likely that it would trigger the emergence of 'peace spoilers' from the bottom or middle-level commanders that would undermine the process. Analysis of how this omission affected the overall outcome of the ADDR programme will form part of the discussion in Chapter Five.

⁷⁷. Respondent 009-military officer serving with JTF, October 2013. According to this respondent to become a militant commander, what you need to do was to buy arms, recruit boys and set up your own camp. What makes you a top commander is the number of boys, sophisticated weapons you have and the vastness of the area you control operationally.

⁷⁸. Interview with respondent 050, January 2014.

Notwithstanding, the apparent lapse in the way the peace deal was accomplished, it could be argued that the way the Niger Delta ADDR programme was negotiated represented something of an innovation when compared to the standard approaches recommended in the literature on peace processes and DDR negotiation. In the context of the Niger Delta, one may also argue that it had an unintended positive consequence. For instance, a member of the PAPC noted that the non-signing of a peace agreement with the militants was what led to the quick restoration of peace because ‘... if we did, [if the PAPC had signed a peace agreement with the militants] implementation of the amnesty, and restoration of immediate peace would have been difficult.’⁷⁹ Additionally, the PAPC member explained that ‘If we had signed a document [peace agreement] the agitation would have continued now; President Jonathan would have been in trouble now...’⁸⁰ What this implies is that, if a peace agreement had been signed, failure by the Nigerian government to implement its provisions could trigger violence. In other words, one thing that has contributed to sustaining the peace up to now is that there is no concrete agreement that the ex-militants can hold on to and accuse the government of non-implementation. Nevertheless, the government had succeeded in compelling them individually (using coercion and patronage) to sign a renunciation of militancy bond that made them liable to prosecution in the event of a violation.

4.3. The Planning and Implementation of the Niger Delta ADDR Programme

In the preceding paragraphs, I examined how the ADDR programme was negotiated by the Nigerian State. In this section, I shall examine how the planning and implementation took place. The main purpose of this section is to show to what extent the planning and implementation conformed to the UN IDDRS (2006) and the best practices advocated in the DDR literature and how that has impacted on the overall success of the programme or otherwise. The key argument I advance here is that the planning and implementation failed to conform with the provisions of the UN IDDRS (2006) and the broader DDR theoretical and policy

⁷⁹. Respondent 050, January 2015.

⁸⁰. Ibid.

literature, particularly the approach recommended in the maximalist/transformationalist literature on DDR.

4.3.1. The Planning Process of the Niger Delta ADDR Programme

Prior to the formal creation of the PAPC, Adeniyi states that ‘the initial preparations were done by the NSA [National Security Adviser] who co-opted the service chiefs into the committee as they worked out the plans and logistics towards the entire process’ (Adeniyi, 2011: 71). This was further evidence that security stabilisation had taken centre stage in the ADDR programme design. Thus, the formal planning of the ADDR programme commenced immediately after President Yar’Adua established an ad hoc⁸¹ committee known as the PAPC.⁸²

The original members of the PAPC, as contained in the convening authority, were 18 with a retired major-general appointed as chairman. However, in order to facilitate its work the panel co-opted seven other members.⁸³ A critical examination of the list shows that the members of the main committee were drawn from key government establishments, with a stake in the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict and representatives from the 7 Niger Delta states affected by the crisis.⁸⁴ Other members of the Committee included the then Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), Nigerian Inspector-General of Police (NIGP), and an Assistant Inspector- General of Police (AIGP)⁸⁵ as well as representatives from the State Security Service (SSS). Out of the seven co-opted members, four were serving senior military officers and a retired colonel. This again clearly shows an over-militarisation of the PAPC and process, and the complete exclusion of Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs), local governments, home-based nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), and community-based organisations (CBOs) who had been engaged in the Niger Delta conflict for a very long time. The composition of the PAPC strengthened the fact that the programme

⁸¹. The ad hoc committee refers to the committee set up by the President to plan the ADDR programme instead of a more stable National DDR Commission.

⁸². Sourced from the executive summary of the report of the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee.

⁸³. Ibid.

⁸⁴. Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

prioritised security stabilisation over human development challenges in the Niger Delta region.

Even though some of the members of the Committee were known to be seasoned serving or retired members of the Nigerian State security, it was not known in the public domain if any of them had any cogent experience or background in DDR. A Lieutenant-Colonel serving with the JTF posits that ‘the fact that you are a military officer is not enough for you to understand DDR. You have to go through a process because DDR is a systematic procedure that requires specialist training.’⁸⁶ This is another proof that the planning process deviated from the recommendation of the TCND that a DDR commission should be established to plan and implement the ADDR programme.⁸⁷ Apart from that, it also did not conform to the UN IDDRS (2006) which requires the national government to establish a National DDR Commission for policy direction and to also coordinate the implementation process.⁸⁸ While it is apparent that the planning committee represents the Nigerian equivalent of a DDR commission and to some extent functions like one; establishing a statutory DDR commission would have made a difference because the enabling law establishing it would stipulate the qualification and experience required of the key personnel that would head the commission. In this case, a National DDR commission headed and staffed by technocrats would have been more likely to plan the DDR in a more systematic way than a spontaneous impromptu planning committee comprising of non-DDR experts. Similarly, a DDR commission should be responsible for planning and implementation of the entire phases of the DDR programme as well as implementation instead of having separate committees for planning and implementation. The extent to which the absence of a properly constituted National DDR Commission undermined the implementation of the reintegration training of the ex-Niger Delta militants in 2015 will be examined in the last section of this chapter.

⁸⁶. Respondent 012, October 2013.

⁸⁷. Respondent 008- key member of the TCND, October 2013.

⁸⁸ . See OG 3. 30: National Institutions for DDR in Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (2014: 79-85).

4.3.2. The PAPC Terms of Reference and the Planning Process

The PACP was tasked with the following terms of reference⁸⁹:

- ✓ To prepare a step by step framework for amnesty and complete DDR in the Niger Delta with appropriate timelines.
- ✓ To ensure that those with criminal records do not take advantage of the amnesty.
- ✓ To work out the cost to the government of DDR of the ex-militants.

To facilitate its work, the PAPC divided itself into the following sub-committees, each with sub-terms of reference: amnesty, disarmament and demobilisation, publicity and liaison, rehabilitation and reintegration.⁹⁰ The amnesty sub-committee terms of reference (TOR)⁹¹ included defining and operationalising amnesty within the provision of the Panel's TOR. It was also to determine the categories of people to be granted amnesty. Additionally, it was to define the exact procedure for the granting of amnesty, identify and recommend reporting and screening centres. It was also to recommend a mechanism for the establishment of a comprehensive database of militants that could be accessed for planning purposes.

The disarmament and demobilisation sub-committee was assigned the responsibilities for recommending procedures for disarming all the militants that would accept the amnesty offer. It was also to recommend procedures for demobilisation, documentation, storage and disposal of arms and ammunition to be recovered and the location of holding camps for the militants after they had been disarmed.⁹² The publicity sub-committee was to liaise with government agencies and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), engage in activities relevant to the panel's terms of reference (TOR) as well as identify and liaise with all relevant stakeholders including oil and gas majors. It was also to develop a framework for liaison with all media agencies, both private and government-owned particularly those in the Niger Delta. The publicity sub-committee was to

⁸⁹. This information was sourced from the executive summary of the report of the PAPC made available by a former aide to let President Yar'Adua.

⁹⁰. Ibid.

⁹¹. Ibid.

⁹². This information was sourced from the executive summary of the report of the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee made available by the Media spokesman to President Yar'Adua.

provide maximum publicity for the Panel's activities and respond to negative media coverage as well as recommend who should be appointed as the overall media spokesperson for the Amnesty Planning Committee.⁹³ Accordingly, the Committee maintained that for the DDR to be successful, a positive perception must be cultivated in the hearts and minds of the militants and other segments of the Nigerian society. To achieve this, a member of the PAPC pointed out that the Committee needed to 'mount a very powerful hearts and minds campaign'⁹⁴ the aim was to mobilise public support for the programme even before its implementation.⁹⁵

The subcommittee on rehabilitation and reintegration was to work out the modalities for the rehabilitation and reintegration of the ex-militants, and liaise with, and collate the views of NGOs on how best to implement the reintegration of the ex-militants. It was also to identify vocational centres where ex-militants could acquire skills.⁹⁶ Although the PAPC was granted six weeks to develop the ADDR action plan it completed and submitted its report to the President within four weeks.⁹⁷ Overall, the report was in two parts, one of which focused on the modalities for implementing the ADDR, while the other recommended an alternative course of action to restore peace to the Niger Delta were the ADDR programme to fail which the respondent said he would not divulge to me for security reasons.⁹⁸ However, based on the interview I had with a former presidential aide to late President Yar'Adua, the unrevealed alternative course of action referred to was military action against the militants.⁹⁹

The PAPC observed that a successful DDR in the Niger Delta could not be achieved if the means of procuring arms were not permanently blocked, which it linked to illegal oil bunkering. It therefore suggested that effective monitoring through adequate policing and law enforcement would checkmate illegal oil bunkering. The report further argued that this strategy was fundamental to achieving arms control and conflict prevention in the Niger Delta.¹⁰⁰ The PAPC

⁹³. Ibid.

⁹⁴. Respondent 050, January 2013.

⁹⁵. Ibid.

⁹⁶. Ibid.

⁹⁷. Respondent 050 –member Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, January 2014.

⁹⁸. Ibid.

⁹⁹. Respondent 048-former aide to President Yar'Adua, January 2014.

¹⁰⁰. This information was sourced from an executive summary of the report of the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee made available by a former aide to President Yar'Adua.

also emphasised the need to adequately equip the Nigerian Navy (NN) and the JTF to effectively discharge their statutory responsibilities in the Niger Delta.¹⁰¹ The PAPC's reference to the nexus between illegal oil bunkering and arms proliferation in the Niger Delta suggests that it had taken due cognizance of the economy of conflict that sustained the Niger Delta crisis.

Furthermore, at the commencement of planning, the Committee tried to generate basic intelligence information necessary for proper planning and the conduct of disarmament. In this regard, the Department of State Service (DSS) performed the task, which initially revealed the existence of 35 militant camps. Further investigation revealed the existence of 75 camps and 79 leaders.¹⁰² One issue that confronted the committee was the number of militants expected to undergo the ADDR process, which a key member of the PAPC explained was decided based on extrapolation of a minimum of 2000 militants per the six Niger Delta states affected by militancy albeit this figure could be more or less.¹⁰³

The above disclosure clearly demonstrates that the planning process did not conform to the basic requirements of DDR planning in terms of proper pre-DDR screening and verification to determine the numerical strength of genuine combatants and their sources of weapons (Spear, 2002: 156; Özerdem, 2009:16-17 and Operational Guideline to the IDDRS, 2014:44-45). Another issue was that the PAPC developed a renunciation of militancy form which effectively substituted for a comprehensive peace agreement (see appendix 3). A member of the PACP explains that by signing the renunciation of militancy form, each militant committed not to engage in any further act of aggression against the federal government of Nigeria and agreed that violation would result in forfeiting any rehabilitation opportunity that was available and the amnesty granted¹⁰⁴

The PAPC also established 10 reporting centres to serve as disarmament centres and to be manned by majors of the Nigerian Army.¹⁰⁵ The Committee also earmarked all state hospitals as potential collection centres because it anticipated

¹⁰¹. Ibid.

¹⁰² Respondent 001- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, October 2013.

¹⁰³. Respondent 050, January 2014.

¹⁰⁴. Ibid.

¹⁰⁵. Ibid.

that some of the militants would surrender with injuries given that they might have been fired at and wounded in the process of confrontation with the military.¹⁰⁶ The signing of the renunciation of militancy form was to be observed by all militants at each of the collection centres while the weapons and ammunitions collected were to be properly documented and transported to the Headquarters of 82 Division of the Nigerian Army Enugu, the disarmament phase operational coordinating headquarters.

In addition, the PAPC ensured that the ADDR programme was not internationalised both at the level of planning and implementation. For instance, efforts by international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) such as Doctors Without Borders to provide medical support were rejected by the Committee.¹⁰⁷ A member of the PAPC observed that he ‘... had the onerous advantage of ensuring that it was not internationalised’¹⁰⁸ which suggests that inputs from international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) with DDR expertise and experience were not sought or were rejected when offered.

It is difficult to establish a definitive explanation as to why outside support was rejected, albeit, certain explanations can be suggested. First, Nigeria’s leadership role in the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the 90s (Obi, 2009: 120-122; Elizabeth, 2013: 41-49; Hamman *et al*, 2013: 42), as well as its position as a leading Troop Contributing Country (TCC) to United Nations Peacekeeping operations (Sule, 2013: 1-30 and Adeniyi, n. d.) could have led to an overbearing sense of self- confidence on the part of the PAPC. In other words, there was a belief that Nigeria could handle its DDR without international expert assistance. This is further strengthened by the fact that Nigeria in the 1960s successfully undertook its post-war reconstruction without any foreign assistance (Jeong, 2005: 1-2).¹⁰⁹ Moreover, unlike the 1960s demobilisation, which was undertaken after a major civil war, the Niger Delta conflict and ADDR programme

¹⁰⁶. Ibid.

¹⁰⁷. Respondent 050, member Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, January 2014.

¹⁰⁸. Ibid.

¹⁰⁹. See publication on Nigeria’s post-war demobilisation and reintegration by Ojeleye, O. (2010). *The politics of post-war demobilisation and reintegration in Nigeria*. Surrey. Ashgate Publishing Limited.

can be equated to a peacetime DDR programme ‘... where there is a clear authority in power...it is peace time or there is only a small scale internal conflict...’ (Özerdem, 2009: 3). Thus, unlike in post-war Liberia for example, where state authority had become dysfunctional or collapsed (Sherif, 2008: 26), there was relative state capacity in Nigeria to undertake the programme without any foreign assistance.

The reluctance to seek foreign assistance may also be connected to Nigeria’s concern to guard its sovereignty. In the same vein, Nigeria’s decision may have been informed by its experience in the 1990s, when the international community displayed open sympathy for minority agitations and movements from the Niger Delta region particularly the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (see section on periodisation in Chapter Three). Thus, there may have been a fear that allowing the international community to influence the Niger Delta peace process could result in a peace accord that favoured the militants.

Another possible explanation was that Nigeria was confident that it was capable of mobilising the requisite financial resources to run its own DDR programme. Therefore, it could be argued that the decision not to internationalise the programme was more a function of economic capability whereby it was confident that it did not need funding from donor countries and agencies in order to execute the DDR programme. The salience of this argument was reinforced by an official in the Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta who argued that after disarmament, and with the rapid increase in oil production, the entire annual budget of the ADDR programme was equivalent to one day of oil production lost.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, a Niger Delta scholar contended that, irrespective of the possible reasons behind rejecting foreign assistance ‘... people will still tell you that were the UN, were more groups, more experienced in doing... [DDR] have been brought in, we would have had an improved result from the process’.¹¹¹ However, as an alternative to allowing for full participation, the PAPC

¹¹⁰. This view was expressed in a live TV programme by Mr Lawrence Pepple, Technical Assistant on the Presidential Amnesty Program & Head Reintegration Department Office of the Special Adviser to the President on ND. The interview was titled ‘ND presidential amnesty program assessment: the journey so far’. The interview was anchored by Femi Adefila. (Accessed:25 December 2014 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7BSWte1Oidg>).

¹¹¹. Respondent 014-November 2013.

in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a briefing session for heads of diplomatic corps' and missions in Nigeria.¹¹²

4.4. The Implementation of the Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme

The implementation of the Niger Delta ADDR programme commenced after the Council of State¹¹³ approved the Committee's recommendation on 25 June 2009, which culminated in the amnesty proclamation by the President (Adeniyi, 2011: 72-73): While proclaiming the amnesty, the president asserted that:

The offer of amnesty is predicated on the willingness and readiness of the militants to give up all illegal arms in their possession, completely renounce militancy in all its ramifications unconditionally, and depose to an undertaking to this effect... The offer of amnesty is open to all militants for a period of sixty days.¹¹⁴

The phases of the DDR programme and key activities to be undertaken and time frame for delivery is shown in Table 4.1.

¹¹². Respondent 050- member Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, January 2014.

¹¹³. The Council of State is an advisory body to the Nigerian President on major national and policy issues. It was established under section B Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.

¹¹⁴. Quoted from 'Remarks by His Excellency, President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, GCFR at the proclamation of amnesty for Niger Delta militants on 25 June 2009.

Table 4.1: Phases of the DDR Programme and Key Activities to be Carried out

DISARMAMENT	DEMOBILIZATION/ REHABILITATION	REINTEGRATION
Duration: Aug 6 – Oct 4, 2009	Duration: 6 to 12 Months	Duration: Up to 5 Years
Key Activities	Key Activities	Key Activities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collection of Arms and Ammunition, explosives, etc. • Documentation and Biometrics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ex-Militants Report to Camp • Verification and Documentation • Transformational Training • Peace building & conflict resolution • Counselling • Career Guidance • Wellness Assessment • Reintegration classification • Education and Vocational placement • Graduation & Demobilization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge and Skills Acquisition • Financial Empowerment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Placement Programs ◦ Micro-credit • Education • Reconciliation with local community • Conflict Resolution Framework/ Mechanism • Monitoring and Evaluation • Exit of Amnesty
Key Enablers	Key Enablers	Key Enablers
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disarmament Camps • Massive Campaign 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transformational Training Centres • Rehabilitation Camps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partnering Government Agencies, NGOs and Private Organizations, OIGs • Tracking and Support • Framework

Source: Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme website. Available at: www.nigerdeltaamnesty.org (Accessed: 10 August, 2015).

4.4.1. The Implementation of the Disarmament Phase

To successfully execute the disarmament and demobilisation phases of the programme, a separate disarmament and demobilisation committee was established, headed by a major general with representatives from other Nigerian security services.¹¹⁵ Immediately the amnesty was proclaimed, announcements filled the airwaves, using both the federal and state media agencies calling on the Niger Delta militants to report to the nearest disarmament centre to their camp locations to surrender.¹¹⁶ However, according to a member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, the smooth take off of the disarmament process was stalemated because, after the proclamation, the president suddenly fell ill, resulting in a delay in the release of funds.¹¹⁷ Consequently, the ten collection centres earmarked by the Planning Committee could not be utilised, necessitating the use of all the Federal Government Colleges across the Niger Delta as alternative centres.¹¹⁸ At each of the collection centres, the military coordinator superintended arms collection, documentation, movement and general security; while his civilian counterpart handled the issues of food and accommodation.

However, the sudden changing of the collection centres seriously undermined the disarmament process because some of the militant commanders and their soldiers learned about the new locations through the electronic media which created a state of anxiety and confusion regarding where to submit their weapons. A member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee explains that it got to the extent that 'some of the militants were coming with their arms into towns from the creeks... [Saying,] you said you are giving us amnesty here we are come and collect your arms...'¹¹⁹

One of the immediate tasks undertaken by the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee after the amnesty proclamation was a sensitisation

¹¹⁵. Respondent 042- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, December 2013.

¹¹⁶. Respondent 050- member Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, January 2014.

¹¹⁷. Respondent 042-December 2013.

¹¹⁸. Respondent 042- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, December 2013.

¹¹⁹. Respondent 042-December 2023.

visit to all the Niger Delta State Governors, some of whom were becoming uncooperative towards the programme.¹²⁰ Several explanations have been offered for the Governors' behaviour. One was their unsuccessful effort to hijack the programme in their respective states.¹²¹ Perhaps, this is because most of the Niger Delta governors had direct links to most of the militant groups and so many of them wanted to use the programme to favour those that were loyal to them. A Niger Delta academic expert explains that many of the ex-militants started as political thugs and were used by the Niger Delta governors to help rig elections before mutating into militants.¹²² Another possible reason was the unnecessary competition and rivalry that existed between the federal and state government, whereby, instead of the federal government and the states working in unity to achieve mutually beneficial goals they engaged in unhealthy competition.¹²³ Indeed, at one point, the governors threatened to withdraw their cooperation because they believed that the then Minister of petroleum, Dr Rilwanu Lukman (a northerner) was working against the interest of the Niger Delta, given his alleged plan to relocate the proposed University of Petroleum from Effurun in Delta State, to Kaduna State in north western Nigeria (Adeniyi, 2011:75).¹²⁴ Similarly, their action was likely informed by the belief that the Federal Government lacked a clearly articulated post-amnesty action plan (Ibid.).

The disarmament process was carried out in three phases¹²⁵ and the number of militants disarmed, quantity of weapons, ammunitions, unexploded ordinance (UXO), D-caps, dynamites and magazines recovered during the phase 1 of disarmament that lasted from 6 August-4 October 2009 is shown in Table 4.2. Although no disarmament programme succeeds in withdrawing all the illegal weapons in circulation (Muggah (2005: 239-252), and not all the Niger Delta militants were engaged in direct combat roles, it is naïve to believe that the number of weapons recovered from the Niger Delta militants was in any way a

¹²⁰. Ibid.

¹²¹. Respondent 001, September 2013- member Disarmament, Demobilisation Implementation Committee, October 2013.

¹²². Respondent 032-November 2013.

¹²³. Respondent 045- Academic expert, December 2013.

¹²⁴. The establishment of the Petroleum University is not part of the ADDR programme. However, the people of the region view it as part of the broader efforts of bringing development to the region as well as giving the people of the region sense of belonging.

¹²⁵. Respondent 001- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, October 2013.

significant representation of what was in their holding and used in the stand-off with the Nigerian military.

Table 4.2: Number of militants Disarmed and Quantity of Weapons, Ammunitions, Unexploded Ordinance (UXO), D-caps, Dynamites and Magazines Recovered 6 August-4 October 2009

State	Registered ex-militant	Weapons Collected	Ammunition	UXO, D-Caps & Dynamite	Magazines
Bayelsa	6,961	951	130, 877	54	1,585
Imo	300	149	7, 758	0	299
NDDC Ex-militants	600	0	0	0	0
Delta	3, 361	449	52,958	1,556	414
Rivers	6,997	1,009	82,406	102	1,048
Ondo	1,200	198	9,725	0	0
Edo	450	82	722	77	29
Akwa Ibom	163	51	959	5	41
Cross River	160	20	9,748	59	38
Total	20, 192	2,909	295,153	1, 853	3,454

Source: Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: assessing the dynamics of the Niger Delta amnesty programme-a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, 2011: 32.

The low level of arms collected could be a function of several factors; the mistrust between the Nigerian State and the militants earlier highlighted in this chapter and lack of pre-DDR verification by the PAPC. It could also be due to how the programme was exploited as a means of extending patronage by politicians to their supporters who were never militants (Joab-Peterside *al.*, 2011: xxii).¹²⁶

The second leg of disarmament took place in 2010, during which 6,166 militants¹²⁷ were supposedly disarmed. While in the third round which happened

¹²⁶. Also, reiterated by respondent 014- Niger Delta academic expert, November 2013.

¹²⁷. Interview with respondent 001- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, September 2013. Also, corroborated in a commentary written by Murphy Ganagana in a special report titled 'Three Years of Amnesty Implementation: The Facts, The Figures' contained in a quarterly newsletter Published by the Presidential Amnesty Office Vol. 1 No. 3. An anniversary edition of the quarterly newsletter published by the Presidential Amnesty Office.

in late 2012, a total of 3,642 militants purportedly surrendered their weapons¹²⁸ bringing the total number of militants that disarmed in the entire programme to 30,000. The final figure is 18,000 above the estimated 12,000 by the PAPC, and this could be attributed to the manipulation of the process by officials and militant commanders and the failure to carry out pre-DDR verification highlighted above. However, suffice to say that all my efforts to ascertain the quantity of weapons and ammunitions recovered during the second and third phases proved abortive. The phase two and three disarmament programme became necessary because of two reasons. One, a few of the militants refused to disarm during the first phase because they suspected the government was going to kill them after surrendering their weapons.¹²⁹ Consequently, few of them that disbelieved chose to *self-demobilise*.¹³⁰ A situation whereby some of them absconded into the community with their weapons. However, when they were eventually convinced of their safety and security, they embarked on a series of protests and threats of returning to the creeks if the government refused to grant them the opportunity to enlist in the programme, and in order to prevent them from becoming peace spoilers the Nigerian government capitulated to their demands.¹³¹ A former staff member of a nongovernmental organisation Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta corroborated this by suggesting reasons why some of the militants chose to self-demobilise in this way:

... as a matter of fact many of the core militants didn't return their arms. The reason being that, I have spoken to a lot of them one-on-one when I went to the creeks; a lot of them were skeptical about the honesty of the Nigerian government. They thought it was a ploy to capture them, kill and prosecute them. Based on this anxiety it was only a few of the militants that handed over their arms.¹³²

¹²⁸. Murphy Ganagana- 'Three Years of Amnesty Implementation: The Facts, The Figures' contained in a quarterly newsletter Published by the Presidential Amnesty Office Vol. 1 No. 3. An anniversary edition of the quarterly newsletter published by the Presidential Amnesty Office.

¹²⁹. Respondent 043-senior management staff Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta, December 2013. The respondent reiterated that the possibility of this category of militant to undermine the peace process compelled the Nigerian Government to reconsider its decision which resulted in the second and third phases of disarmament.

¹³⁰. As defined by Douglas, *et al.* (2004: 48) this is '... when combatants demobilise themselves. In this scenario, armed forces disband in a disorderly fashion after a defeat, and the ex-combatants, with no command structures in place, try to return to their home regions. Many flee to neighbouring countries in fear of pursuit'.

¹³¹. *Ibid.*

¹³². Respondent 028, November 2013.

The above explanation was corroborated in a Focus Group Discussion held with some ex-militants who explained that ‘... a lot of the groups were very reluctant and careful in joining [the programme] ... Because we were always doing comparative analysis of our course.’¹³³ This suggests that a few of them refused to disarm until after a careful assessment of the government’s sincerity and commitment as well as the assurance and conviction that they would not be harmed. The second reason was that the third phase was allegedly carried out due to political expediency in order to satisfy a major ethnic group in the Niger Delta region who complained that its youth were completely excluded from the programme in favour of youth from a particular ethnic group in the region¹³⁴ Hence, a figure was approved for the ethnic nationality by the president.¹³⁵ This again provides another possible explanation for the low number of weapons recovered despite a large number of persons registered in the programme purportedly as militants. Precisely, this is because the inclusion criterion used in the third phase was not strictly based on weapon surrender but being nominated by the concerned unified ethnic nationality association. All these issues suggest that in the long-term, the pseudo-compellence negotiated settlement adopted was counterproductive to the ADDR programme. The various ways in which the lack of inclusion, the use of inducement and the emergence of peace spoilers impacted on the ADDR Programme will be fully examined in Chapter Five. Other activities carried out during disarmament included documentation and capturing of the militants’ biometrics.¹³⁶ All weapons collected were finally destroyed on 25 May 2011, and¹³⁷ table 4.3 shows the top militant groups that disarmed during the first phase which lasted from 6 August-4 October 2009.

¹³³. FG Discussion held with ex-militants of the third phase of the ADDR Programme, November 2013.

¹³⁴. Respondent 043-senior management staff office of the Coordinator Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, December 2013.

¹³⁵. Ibid.

¹³⁶. See report titled ‘Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: assessing the dynamics of the Niger Delta amnesty programme-a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta’, 2011: 26-34.

¹³⁷. Respondent 042- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, December 2013.

**Table 4.3: Names and Locations of high-profile Militants' Groups Disarmed
6 August-4 October 2009**

Highlight of Major Militant Groups Disarmed - August 6th to October 4th, 2009			
S/N	Militant Group	Location	Date Disarmed
1.	• Soboma George	Port Harcourt, Rivers State	August 13, 2009
2.	• Kenneth Opusinji (<i>kula Community</i>)	Port Harcourt, Rivers State	August 22, 2009
3.	• Kile Selky Torughedi (<i>a.k.a. Gen. Young Shall Grow</i>)	Azuzuama, Bayelsa State	September 6, 2009
4.	• Ezekiel Akpasibewei (Deadly Underdogs)	Warri, Delta State	September 28, 2009
5.	• Franklin Duduku (<i>a.k.a. Gen Franklin</i>)	Bakassi, Cross River State	September 25, 2009
6.	• Ebikabowei Victor Ben (<i>aka Gen. Boyloaf</i>) • Africa Ukparasia • Paul Ezizi (<i>a.k.a. Comdr. Ogunbos</i>) • Pastor Reuben Wilson • Joshua Macaiver	Yenagoa, Bayelsa State	August 22, 2009
7.	• Chief Ateke Tom • Farah Dagogo • Ferdinand Amaibi (<i>a.k.a. Busta rhymes</i>) • Tamunegiyeifori Proby (<i>a.k.a. Egbele</i>)	Port Harcourt, Rivers State	October 3, 2009
8.	• Bonny Gawei • Aboy Muturu • Nabena John	Ogbotobo, Delta State	August 15, 2009
9.	• Government Ekpemupolo (<i>a.k.a. Gen. Tompolo</i>) • Chief Bibopre Ajube (<i>a.k.a. Shoot Aside</i>)	Gbaramantu, Delta State Arugbo, Ondo State	October 4, 2009
10.	• Henry Binidodogha (<i>Egbema 1</i>)	Ofiniam, Edo State	August 28, 2009

Source: Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: assessing the dynamics of the Niger Delta amnesty programme, a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 31.

4.4.2. The Implementation of the Demobilisation Phase

In the original plan, demobilisation was envisioned to commence immediately after disarmament, at the various disarmament centres and to last for 30 days.¹³⁸ As elaborated by a member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, the plan informed why military and civilian coordinators with equal status were assigned in each of the camps:

And the intention was after the disarmament, the military component is supposed to be stood down, and then the civilian coordinators are supposed to continue. So I put in that structure so that there would be continuity: you don't bring fresh people and they don't know where we are; these people know right from the day these people were disarmed and they could even start knowing the militants by name right from day one instead of just using the military, we finish, and it is time for the second phase and you bring in civilian and they...are not even familiar with the way the militants behave (sic).¹³⁹

However, this initial plan did not work because the camps were in a poor condition owing to inadequate logistics arrangements as encapsulated in this assertion:

So because of this...lack of logistics support to put it generally, you know, a lot of the things that we would do, we couldn't do, we couldn't do. So we... kept... improvising, improvising, improvising just...what do we do with that respect? People came; they were supposed to be in camp, there were no camps... there were no camps; so what do we do? We collected the weapons, and we said, ok, you guys should go back to your villages...¹⁴⁰

A military officer serving with the Joint Task Force explained that the poor conditions in the camps led to their abandonment by the disarmed militants, necessitating the indefinite suspension of the demobilisation programme, which ultimately led to a series of protests by the militants both at the regional level and in Abuja.¹⁴¹ The officer further claimed that after the abandonment, the few recreational facilities provided at the centres were carted away, or vandalised, by members of the public and personnel coordinating the amnesty programme.¹⁴²

¹³⁸ . Respondent 042- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, November 2013.

¹³⁹ . Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ . Respondent 042-member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, December 2013.

¹⁴¹ . Respondent 012- military officer serving with the JTF, October 2013.

¹⁴² . Ibid.

Another attempt at demobilisation commenced in June 2010 at Obubura, the Cross Rivers State National Youth Service Corps permanent orientation camp.¹⁴³ Thus, demobilisation was effectively delayed for about eight months, due to the lack of a clear institutional framework to coordinate its planning and implementation. A staff member of a nongovernmental organisation testified to the compartmentalised and unintegrated way the programme was planned as partly responsible for this ugly situation:

... and again, it was... we're going to do a disarmament but without any plan of what happens next ... and like I said to you ... when I attended this training in Holland we knew how long it took to plan out a proper DDR process so you don't start one part of it until the other part is planned otherwise you get exactly what you got here...¹⁴⁴

The demobilisation programme first covered the 20,192 militants that disarmed during the first phase of disarmament;¹⁴⁵ but as of December 2011, a total of 23,358 militants had been demobilised.¹⁴⁶ This consisted of 20,192 militants from the first phase of disarmament and another 3,166 from the 6,166 that disarmed during the second phase.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, these figures contradict the submission of a key member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, which suggested that only the 20,192 militants that disarmed during the first phase successfully went through the process of demobilisation and were officially issued with a signed certificate of demobilisation.¹⁴⁸ The respondent further asserted that the Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta Amnesty allegedly insisted that the entire 30,000 disarmed militants had been successfully demobilised.¹⁴⁹ If the

¹⁴³. Respondent 001-member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, October 2013.

¹⁴⁴. Respondent 027, November 2013.

¹⁴⁵. Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: assessing the dynamics and sustainability of the Niger Delta amnesty programme- a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 2011: 55.

¹⁴⁶. I arrived at this figure by adding up the number of those that demobilised in phase 1 which is 20, 192 and in phase 2 which is 3,166 as provided in the report 'Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: assessing the dynamics and sustainability of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme- a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 77.

¹⁴⁷. Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: assessing the dynamics and sustainability of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme- a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 2011: 77:

¹⁴⁸. Interview with respondent 001- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, October 2013.

¹⁴⁹. Ibid.

respondent is correct, the implication is that either 9,808 disarmed militants are yet to be demobilised, or had skipped demobilisation and progressed to the reintegration phase. It could also be that they have been illegally substituted. Alternatively, if the figure of 23,358 provided by the programme as at December 2011 were to be taken as the correct number of those that demobilised, it then means that 6,642 from the 30,000 that disarmed have not officially demobilised or have progressed to reintegration without undergoing demobilisation. This conflicting information was reinforced during a Focus Group Discussion held with some ex-militants who claimed that they were yet to demobilise and were not sure if they would be allowed to do so. They were also unsure whether they would benefit from reintegration training opportunities before the programme's alleged 2015 exit date.¹⁵⁰ All these contradictory submissions plainly reflect the muddled manner in which the programme was implemented.

During demobilisation, the ex-militants were taken through a series of activities comprising the following:¹⁵¹

- ✓ Verification and documentation.
- ✓ Wellness assessment.
- ✓ Transformational nonviolence training.
- ✓ Peacebuilding and conflict resolution.
- ✓ Counselling and career guidance.
- ✓ Reintegration classification.
- ✓ Graduation and demobilisation.

The demobilisation of members of the first batch of 20,192 disarmed militants was conducted in batches 1-17 from June 2010-September 2011 and is displayed in table 4.4. However, a record of when the demobilisation of those that disarmed in phases 2 and 3 took place was not readily available at the time of my fieldwork in 2013, which further lends credence to earlier suggestion that only members of the first phase of the ADDR programme officially demobilised. Meanwhile, a staff member of a nongovernmental organisation that served at the demobilisation

¹⁵⁰. Views expressed during a Focus Group Discussion with held with ex-militants that disarmed in the third phase of the ADDR, November 2013.

¹⁵¹. Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme-assessing the dynamics and sustainability of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 2011: 44.

camp suggested that the camp has remained closed since September 2010.¹⁵² On the whole, 38 not for profit agencies and organisations performed various roles at the demobilisation camp.¹⁵³ A nongovernmental organisation, known as Foundation for Ethnic Harmony in Nigeria (FEHN) was contracted to handle the nonviolence training and transformational aspects of the demobilisation and rehabilitation process.¹⁵⁴

Table 4.4: The demobilisation of 20, 192 militants that disarmed during the first phase of disarmament held from 6 August – 4 October 2009

Transformation Camp Details (Phase 1) - Batch 1-17

Batch	States	Duration	Classification Data
Batch 1	All 9 states from the Niger delta region	28 th June 2010 to 10 th July 2010	1785
Batch 2	Delta, Edo, Ondo and Imo states	1 st August 2010 to 10 th August 2010	687
Batch 3	Bayelsa state	14 th August 2010 to 25 th August 2010	1003
Batch 4	Rivers state	1 st September 2010 to 12 th September 2010	999
Batch 5	Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Edo and Ondo States	15 th September 2010 to 27 th September 2010	1045
Batch 6	Delta State	4 TH October 2010 to 17 th October 2010	1200
Batch 7	Bayelsa and Ondo States	19 th October 2010 to 31 st October 2010	1199
Batch 8	Rivers State	2 ND November 2010 to 12 th November 2010	1196

¹⁵². Respondent 020, November 2013.

¹⁵³. The statistic was provided by respondent 045 during an interview, December 2013.

¹⁵⁴. This information is available at Foundation for Ethnic Harmony in Nigeria (FEHN) website http://www.fehnnigeria.org/Highlights_%20Presidential%20Amnesty%20Programm.html (Accessed 29 December 2014).

Batch9	Bayelsa State	14 th November 2010 to 24 th November 2010	1200
Batch 10	Delta State	28 th November 2010 to 8 th December 2010	1299
Batch 11	Females (Niger delta states and NDDC)and Males	11 th December 2010 to 21 th December 2010	1344
Batch 12	Rivers State and NDDC	26 February 2011 to 11 March, 2011	1219
Batch 13	Bayelsa State	3 rd May 2011 to 16 th May, 2011	1200
Batch 14	Rivers State	23 rd June,2011 to 5 th July, 2011	1200
Batch 15	Bayelsa State	30 th July 2011 to 12 th August 2011	1500
Batch 16	Rivers State	15 th August 2011 to 27 th August 2011	1500
Batch 17	Bayelsa State and Females	18 th September 2011 to 25 th September 2011	616
			20,192

Source: Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: assessing the dynamics of the Niger Delta amnesty programme- a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 73.

4.4.3. The Implementation of the Reintegration Phase

According to a member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, the reintegration of the Niger Delta militants was not given adequate priority at the level of planning because the focus of the Planning Committee was on disarmament.¹⁵⁵ Additionally, a key issue that is glaring in the planning was that it was not based on a synergy between all the critical stakeholders that are essential for realising a successful reintegration of the ex-militants. The focus of the reintegration planning was on providing vocational skills and educational advancement opportunities to the ex-militants, a situation Jennings (2011: 159-172) refers to as the securitisation of reintegration. This revolves around the contention that idleness is a cause of youth involvement in insurgency and

¹⁵⁵. Respondent 042, December 2013.

therefore keeping them occupied becomes the ultimate solution to militancy. Again, the securitisation of reintegration in the Niger Delta suggests that reintegration lacks any maximalist/transformational development agenda in terms of addressing the fundamental grievances that led to the conflict beyond providing vocational and educational opportunities to the ex-militants. Similarly, despite the securitisation of reintegration, a Niger Delta scholar observed that the planning did not pay attention to where the trained ex-militants would apply their newly acquired skills. According to him:

... like I said to you, I think if ...we are developing man-power [reintegration programme] ... generally ... you [will] also want to create the opportunities for them to come back to; and my sense is that I don't think we've done enough of that. What I expected was that, yes the amnesty is a federal government project, but the amnesty office ought to have worked with state governments... ... [For example,] Rivers State... [is] training X number of pilots; we are training Y number of this ... what can we do together to create some kind of expanded opportunities so that when these people come [they can be absorbed] ... amnesty is a federal project but the reintegration will happen in the states... So we ought to have created... not a federal amnesty programme, but a national amnesty programme where you have the states as part of ... in fact what I would have set up is a body with some kind of governing structure that includes the states so that they are constantly having discussions about... what will happen ... that is, how to reintegrate. The people will not be reintegrated in Abuja they will be reintegrated in Rivers, in Bayelsa, and so on; have we had that kind of conversation?... the communities will be critical because that's where they will reintegrate. The oil companies that are going to lead the expansion of these opportunities are they part of these discussions? And so on ... So to that extent the reintegration has a big question mark for me...¹⁵⁶

Nevertheless, during demobilisation the ex-militants were provided with information regarding existing opportunities in various vocations and career areas that could help them make the best-informed career choice that matched their abilities and preferences.¹⁵⁷ The career aspirations and preferences of the ex-militants were to be met through education, vocational skills acquisition and entrepreneurship as shown in figure 4.1.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶. Respondent 045- December 2013.

¹⁵⁷. Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme-assessing the dynamics and sustainability of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 60.

¹⁵⁸. Ibid. 73.

The Reintegration Framework Caters for the Various Aspirations of Participants




Figure 4.1: Key areas of Meeting Career Aspirations of the Demobilised Militants

Source: Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta amnesty programme: assessing the dynamics of the Niger Delta amnesty programme, a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 73.

As of 2011, a total of 8,169 demobilised¹⁵⁹ militants have been sent to training institutions both home and abroad, out of which 2,547 were in local institutions¹⁶⁰ and another 5,622 deployed¹⁶¹ or about to be deployed to imminent offshore

¹⁵⁹. Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta amnesty programme-assessing the dynamics and sustainability of the Niger Delta amnesty programme: a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 81.
¹⁶⁰. Ibid.
¹⁶¹. Ibid.

destinations¹⁶² shown in table 4.5. In summary, as of December 2011, a total of 91 local training centres and 59 foreign ones had been contracted to participate in the reintegration training of the demobilised militants.¹⁶³

Table 4.5: Foreign Countries where Demobilised Ex-militants were Deployed or about to be Deployed for Reintegration Training as of December 2011

Global spread of offshore centres		
CONTINENT	COUNTRIES DEPLOYED TO	IMMINENT OFFSHORE DESTINATIONS
AFRICA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Benin Republic • Ghana • South Africa 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Namibia • Zambia • Mauritius • Kenya
AMERICA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USA • Trinidad & Tobago 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brazil • Canada
ASIA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • India • Malaysia • Philippines • UAE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vietnam • China • South Korea
EUROPE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia • Cyprus • Poland • Israel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greece • Belarus • Italy • Romania • Republic of Ireland • Germany

Source: Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta amnesty programme: assessing the dynamics of the Niger Delta amnesty programme, a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 84.

As at June 2013, three years after the commencement of reintegration training, the number of ex-militants undergoing training in both formal and vocational skills at local and foreign institutions had increased to 14,029 while the number of

¹⁶². Imminent offshore destination- suggests countries where the process of deploying ex-militants for reintegration training has reached an advanced stage as at December 2011 but not yet deployed.

¹⁶³. Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty programme-assessing the dynamics and sustainability of the Niger Delta amnesty programme: a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 81.

foreign countries contracted had also significantly increased.¹⁶⁴ The summary of all these and other major achievements recorded in the reintegration training of the demobilised ex-militants as at June 2013 is presented in table 4.6 below.

Table 4.6: Quick Facts on Reintegration as at June 2013

Enlistment	A total of 30,000 enlisted in the first, second, and final phases of the Presidential Amnesty Programme [ADDR Programme]. 822 female delegates.
Deployment	14,029 delegates have been deployed to local and foreign training centres for skills acquisition programmes and formal education.
Skills Acquisition	4,608 delegates undergoing training onshore and offshore ranging from marine technology, heavy duty operations, welding, diving, agriculture, boat building, oil and gas technicians (sic), automobile technology, and aviation. 690 female delegates placed in specialised centres for training in Fashion Designing, Hotel & Catering, Cosmetology, and Hair Dressing.
Formal Education	2,500 delegates studying Law, Political Science, Business Management, Mass Communication, International Relations, Public Administration, Medicine, Engineering, Applied Sciences, Building and Construction, Information and Communications Technology, among other courses in onshore and offshore universities and colleges.
Graduation	A total of 11,700 delegates have graduated in various fields such as Agriculture (239), Automobile (207), Welding and Fabrication (2,204), Entrepreneurship (2,798), Carpentry and Plumbing (298), Oil Drilling and Marine related courses (964), Electrical Installation (89), ICT (273), Crane and Heavy Duty Operations (1030), Boat Building (299), Pipeline Fitting (250), Entertainment (60) and others (618). 50 delegates at the

¹⁶⁴. Sourced from an article written by Murphy Ganagana, Coordinator of the Amnesty News Team titled 'Three years of amnesty implementation: the facts, the figures.' Contained in Amnesty News, Vol. 1. No. 3, Amnesty Programme @3 Anniversary edition of the quarterly newsletter published by the Presidential Amnesty Office.

	<p>Petroleum Training Institute in Effurun, Delta state, made history as the first persons to be trained in terminal operations as a specialised area in Nigeria's oil industry.</p> <p>17 delegates have graduated as Commercial Licensed Pilots while 106 are in training in South Africa, Dubai, Greece and Jordan.</p>
Direct Employment	222 delegates have been offered direct employment in various public and private establishments within Nigeria and abroad.
Empowerment	2000 delegates are currently being empowered with business start-up packages as part of the programme's post-training entrepreneurship and empowerment initiative.

Source: The information inputted in this table was adopted verbatim from a commentary titled 'Three years of amnesty implementation: the facts, the figures' written by Murphy Ganagana Coordinator of the Amnesty News Team and featured in Amnesty News, Vol. 1. No. 3, pp. 5-9. a quarterly newsletter published by the Presidential Amnesty Office. This edition was published as part of the three years' anniversary of the Amnesty Programme.

It is pertinent to note that during demobilisation women registered in the programme indicated an interest in pursuing various skills acquisition programmes including further education.¹⁶⁵ Notwithstanding, the skills acquisition column in Table 4.6 indicates that 690 female delegates (83.94%) of the 822 registered¹⁶⁶ in the programme were placed in specialised centres for training in Fashion Designing, Hotel & Catering, Cosmetology, and Hair Dressing as at June 2013. While three years after, there is no evidence to show what kind of training opportunities have been offered to the remaining 132 (16.06%) registered female delegates. When compared to the different kinds of opportunities given to former male ex-militants it suggests a lack of gender mainstreaming and inclusiveness in terms of access to training opportunities. Thus, one of the unintended consequences of the reintegration programme was that it worked to reinforce existing gender binaries in the Niger Delta.

¹⁶⁵. Federal Government of Nigeria Amnesty programme -assessing the dynamics and sustainability of the Nigerian Amnesty Programme: a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 71.

¹⁶⁶. Federal Government of Nigeria Amnesty programme -assessing the dynamics and sustainability of the Nigerian Amnesty programme: a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 65.

To facilitate the implementation of the reintegration phase of the programme, state amnesty offices were established.¹⁶⁷ These offices were to monitor, evaluate and provide community relations and communications. They were also to provide general support and mental health services.¹⁶⁸ The Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the states' offices were to develop a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework,¹⁶⁹ conduct periodic field visits to inspect programme implementation, analyse performance, develop remedial actions and issue periodic reports. The Community Relations and Communications Department was to develop a community outreach strategy and plan, implement as well as ensure programme implementation and reporting.¹⁷⁰ The Reintegration Support Department was to establish job banks, provide support in job placement for the trained ex-militants, support those interested in establishing their business, personal and business mentoring.¹⁷¹

The Referrals and Mental Health Services Department had as its major function the development and monitoring of up-to-date data on the health status of ex-militants and monitoring the level of progress of those undergoing medical treatment.¹⁷² The Referrals department was also to provide referrals for health and wellness assessments when necessary, especially with reference to women, children and disabled ex-militants.¹⁷³ Finally, the Support Services Department was to generate and maintain a database of all ex-militants, maintain a helpdesk and caseload management, provide registration services as well as administration, human resource (HR), logistics and information technology (IT) support.¹⁷⁴

However, all efforts to trace the state's amnesty offices in Port Harcourt and Yenagoa - capital cities of Rivers and Bayelsa states respectively - proved abortive. The state amnesty offices may theoretically exist but in reality, they

¹⁶⁷. Ibid.: 100.

¹⁶⁸. Ibid.: 100.

¹⁶⁹. Ibid.: 100

¹⁷⁰. Ibid.: 100

¹⁷¹. Ibid.: 100

¹⁷². Federal Government of Nigeria amnesty programme -assessing the dynamics and sustainability of the Nigerian Amnesty Programme: a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: p. 100.

¹⁷³. Ibid.: p. 100.

¹⁷⁴. Ibid.: p. 100

appear to be non-existent which strengthens the opinion expressed by a Niger Delta academic expert that the failure of the ADDR programme to have functional offices at the state and local government levels where the ex-militants were expected to reintegrate undermined the prospect of their successful reintegration.¹⁷⁵

4.5. Summary of Key Arguments: Conceptualisation, Negotiation, Planning and Implementation

In the first part of this chapter, I examined the politics that underpinned the conceptualisation, negotiation, planning and implementation of the Niger Delta ADDR programme with a view to understanding the extent to which it affected the success or otherwise of the programme. I used the UN IDDRS (2006) and the DDR theoretical and policy literature as a framework for analysis. Evidence derived from the field and secondary sources analysed, show that the conceptualisation of the Programme was initially premised on two conflicting perceptions of the conflict; which eventually gave rise to the security stabilisation versus development agendas of the ADDR programme. However, in the long run, the security stabilisation agenda which reflects the rentier character and interests of the Nigerian State dominated the entire process. The peace process that resulted in the ADDR programme was achieved through a pseudo-compellence negotiated settlement, which integrated the elements of both negotiated settlement and peace enforcement as well as the use of patronage. The planning and implementation process was not holistic but compartmentalised as each segment of the ADDR programme was planned in isolation from each other, and much emphasis placed on disarmament. Thus, the conceptualisation, negotiation, planning and implementation of the programme did not conform in fundamental ways to the provisions of the UN IDDRS (2006) and the broader DDR theoretical and policy literature thereby resulting in several challenges and problems that negatively undermined the overall success of the programme. The analysis of some of these challenges and problems will be the next focus of this chapter.

¹⁷⁵. Respondent 045, December 2013.

4.6. Challenges, Problems and Lessons to be Learned from the Niger Delta ADDR Programme

In the history of DDR, every case is characterised by challenges and problems associated with its design and implementation, which illuminate lessons to be learned for future DDR best practice (Jennings, 2008: 5). Thus, in this section, I will examine some of the key challenges and problems experienced in the Niger Delta ADDR programme that could serve as useful lessons for future DDR programmes. Understanding these challenges and problems is important against the backdrop of the call by Governor Kashim Shetima of Borno State¹⁷⁶ for a similar programme for Boko Haram insurgents' presently unleashing havoc in the north-eastern part of Nigeria (*Daily Trust*, 2015: 49).

As I argued in the introductory section of this chapter, the challenges and problems that undermined the effectiveness of the Niger Delta ADDR programme can be subsumed under 4 explanatory frameworks which are not mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, they are adopted because they explain particular challenges and problems. I am therefore cognisance of the fact that there is a degree of overlap in my conceptual categorisation of the challenges and factors that undermined the programme. Generally, the challenges and problems can be explained in terms of: (i) the nature and character of the Nigerian State; which revolves around its two discerning features rentier-neopatrimonialism and its law and order nature (ii) the dysfunctionality of the Nigerian State, (iii), competition between leading security agencies of the Nigerian State (military, police and state security service) and (iv) geographical impediment.

¹⁷⁶. Borno state with its capital in Maiduguri is the original base of the Boko Haram terrorists and remains the epicentre of their activities.

4.6.1. Challenges and Problems due to the Nature and Character of the Nigerian State (Rentier Neopatrimonialism and Law and Order Nature of the Nigerian State)

In Chapter Three I argued that the contemporary Nigerian State is essentially a rentier neopatrimonial state. I asserted that as a rentier neopatrimonial state, petroleum has become a referent object (national asset) that must be safeguarded from any threat that can undermine its production in the Niger Delta. Thus, the very nature and character of the Nigerian State led to a conflicting understanding of security between the Nigerian government and the Niger Delta communities (Ibeanu, 2000: 25-26). For example, a scholar with expertise on the Niger Delta summarises the Nigerian State concept of security in the Niger Delta in this way:

... the state, rather than subscribe to the security of the people, subscribed to the security of the transnational oil companies. The security of the people did not matter, what mattered was that the oil companies were there, and they continued to produce. So they privileged oil production and the safety of the oil companies that produced oil above the communities.¹⁷⁷

Against this backdrop, the rentier nature and character of the Nigerian State principally explained why the Niger Delta ADDR programme was conceptualised, designed and implemented as a security stabilisation project without any serious concern regarding the underlying issues that gave rise to the conflict. The rentier interest of the Nigerian State overrode the developmental needs of the Niger Delta communities in the conceptualisation process. This explains why another Niger Delta academic expert noted that '...the DDR stopped short of addressing wider socio-economic and political issues [affecting Niger Delta communities], instead focussing in the narrow threats posed by militants to oil production'.¹⁷⁸

Furthermore, the security stabilisation agenda of the ADDR programme produced additional challenges and problems that undermined the programme. One of these challenges was in the area of determining eligibility criteria for entry into the programme. The determination of eligibility criteria is critical to the success of DDR (Özerdem, 2009: 14). According to Özerdem the criteria must be all

¹⁷⁷. Respondent 040, November 2013

¹⁷⁸. Respondent 053- Niger Delta academic expert, November 2013.

inclusive, which in essence means it should not be discriminatory in terms of sex, race, religion, nationality and ethnicity. Similarly, it should not be too strict to the extent of excluding eligible persons, neither should it be too relaxed which could result in its abuse or manipulation by parties to the conflict (Ibid.). For instance, one of the PAPC's terms of reference states that it is 'to ensure that those with criminal records do not take advantage of the amnesty.'¹⁷⁹ However, in view of the overriding goal of security stabilisation in the Niger Delta, the Planning Committee recommended the relaxation of eligibility criteria to include all known criminals in the Niger Delta, who were in possession of arms and willing to surrender them. As revealed by a key member of the Planning Committee:

All those who committed crimes and were on police watch list known by... [Mike Oskar]¹⁸⁰ and presented... were included in the grant of amnesty... all of them and Mr. President agreed... late President agreed that all of them including known criminals because we wanted to restore law and order. So everyone who came, surrendered his weapon, signed that form was granted amnesty (sic).¹⁸¹

The over relaxation of the eligibility criteria in order to advance the goal of security stabilisation led to an exaggerated number of disarmed militants which in turn resulted in serious complications for demobilisation and reintegration because no commensurate logistics planning was made for encampment and reintegration training. For instance, while Table 4: 4 indicates that demobilisation officially ended on 25 September 2011, some militants who disarmed still complained during a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) that they were yet to be called to camp for demobilisation, and had no idea of when or if they will be given the opportunity to attend. According to them:

Another worrisome aspect of the programme is that our batch is just coming and it is said that our fate would be decided by the next coming administration at the Federal Government level... There would be deliberation on whether to stop or proceed on the third phase of these agitators, which my group belongs to. Because we have just been documented... and the programme only allotted two years' period for training and adoption into full employment for all candidates. The question then is that can they (government) take us to training, bring us back and provide jobs for us within the space of time available?¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹. See the terms of reference of the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee in this Chapter.

¹⁸⁰. This is a pseudo name to provide anonymity.

¹⁸¹. Respondent 050, January 2014.

¹⁸². Focus Group discussion held with ex-militants, November 2013.

Another issue emanating from the over relaxation of the eligibility criterion was that given the inadequate intelligence on the militants' numerical strength, easy access to arms and the high rate of youth unemployment, the ADDR programme effectively became a free-for-all Niger Delta youth joblessness intervention programme. Ironically, this meant that many Niger Delta youth with no previous criminal records manoeuvred to get enlisted into the programme as substantiated by a key member of the TCND.¹⁸³ The over relaxation of the eligibility criterion clearly demonstrates the securitised goal of the programme which was essentially to remove the instruments of violence used in threatening the operations of MONCs rather than addressing the causes of grievances that led to the conflict. This was also the case in Liberia whereby in order to advance the goal of security stabilisation the eligibility criteria were relaxed in order to capture as many idle males as possible given the perception that male idleness was a cause of insecurity in Liberia (Paes, 2005: 254 and Jennings, 2009: 475-494). Eventually, the relaxation undermined the reintegration phase of the programme (Ibid.). However, in the case of the Niger Delta ADDR programme, the fact that youth with no criminal record tried to get enlisted suggests that the programme may have had some unintended positive consequence if assessed as a job creation initiative.

Furthermore, in DDR programme design, it is important that women associated with fighting forces (WAFF), girls associated with fighting forces (GAFFs) and children associated with fighting forces (CAFFs) or as victims of conflict are adequately catered for (Knight, 2008:44-45). However, throughout the planning phase of the Niger Delta ADDR programme, reference was scarcely made to women and children.¹⁸⁴ The framing of the eligibility criteria marginalised women, girls and children and other victims of conflict because the possession of a weapon was the criterion for eligibility for the programme. This may explain why women constituted only 822 out of the 30,000 militants that disarmed in the entire programme, which translates to 2.74%. A female civil society respondent noted that the majority of women '... didn't carry arms or adopt violent methods ... [and so] because the women didn't carry arms, the government didn't include them in

¹⁸³. Respondent 008-November 2013.

¹⁸⁴. Respondent 032-Niger Delta academic expert, November 2013.

the whole amnesty project...'¹⁸⁵ In Liberia, Sherif (2003: 28) revealed that, WAFFs and GAFFs 'altogether... comprised 30-40% of all fighting forces, or approximately 25,000-30,000 in number' captured in the Liberian DDR Programme. But notwithstanding the number, Jennings (2009: 475-494) presents an appalling gender critique of the Liberian DDR programme. Jennings argued that it privileged men both by design and content because it was premised on the assumption that male idleness was equivalent to instability, so men's participation in the DDR was considered far more vital to the restoration of peace in Liberia. However, if the number of females captured in the Liberian DDR programme is taken as a benchmark it suggests that the Niger Delta case may represent one of the worst cases of the marginalisation of women in DDR. As in Liberia, this marginalisation was not accidental but a consequence of the security stabilisation agenda of the ADDR programme which emanated from the very nature, character and interest of the Nigerian State. In the security stabilisation agenda of the Niger Delta ADDR programme women were not seen as a potent threat but men and so their participation was considered more critical to the restoration of stability. Similarly, even though the use of child soldiers in the Niger Delta conflict was not given any prominence by academic researchers (Oriola *et al*, 2013: 87-88), it is very likely that children have been used as informants, spies and errand boys in the various camps. Oddly enough, throughout the entire planning and implementation process, no reference was made to children which obviously means that they were denied access to the programme and the empowerment opportunities offered to its participants. Once again, the marginalisation of children was not accidental but predicated on the fact that they were not seen as constituting any threat to security capable of undermining the operations of MNOCs and flow of oil rents to the state.

In a neopatrimonial state like Nigeria, Joseph (1987: 55-58) argues that the state and political elites very much rely on the use of patronage to achieve political legitimacy and stability. Therefore, it is a common practice for such a state to use patronage to suppress or placate contentious social forces threatening its stability. And in line with this, a fundamental challenge that undermined the effectiveness of the ADDR programme was the way the Nigerian government

¹⁸⁵. Respondent 025-November 2013.

resorted to the use of patronage as inducement which a member of the PAPC described as a policy of patronage and exclusion.¹⁸⁶ This may be better described as neopatrimonial DDR. The patronage was extended to selected top militant commanders with high capacity to undermine the operations of MNOCs and flow of oil rents to the state.¹⁸⁷ However, as I will demonstrate in Chapter Five, the policy was counterproductive to the goal of demobilisation because it helped in the perpetuation of the command and control structures that demobilisation is supposed to destroy.

Furthermore, extending patronage to selected powerful commanders with high capacity to threaten MNOCs' operations and flow of oil rents to the state sent a negative message that violence pays (incentivise violence). The emergence of Kelvin Ibruvwe in 2013 as the leader of Liberation Movement for the Urhobo People (LIMUP) an ethnic nationality in Delta state was a clear case of how patronage sowed the seeds of further conflict and instability in the Niger Delta by encouraging youth to resort to violence as a means of drawing government's attention (Orosewotu, 2013: 2). Kelvin claimed that this was what youth from the Ijaw ethnic nationality did to secure patronage from the Nigerian government. Again, a Niger Delta human rights activist noted that patronage contributed to arms proliferation in the Niger Delta by strengthening the economy of conflict because disgruntled ex-militants who felt marginalised and excluded from the patronage resorted to illegal oil bunkering and refining as a means of enhancing their income or ventilating their frustration against the state.¹⁸⁸ He further noted that nonviolent youth who felt cheated also resorted to illegal oil bunkering and refining.¹⁸⁹ Overall, the patronage applied in the programme reinforced the economy of conflict that drives the Niger Delta conflict. Consequently, a great lesson coming out of this is '*how not to use inducement in DDR*' and how the lack of understanding of the economic agendas of all the different categories of combatants can undermine the goal of DDR and generate the potential for further conflict and instability. Similarly, another important lesson coming from this study

¹⁸⁶. Respondent 047, December 2013.

¹⁸⁷. Respondent 028- Former staff member of the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta, November 2013. Interview with respondent 027-member Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, December 2013.

¹⁸⁸. Respondent 017, November 2013.

¹⁸⁹. Ibid.

is the fact that *neopatrimonial DDR* cannot lay the foundation of lasting peace but short-term panacea.

Another problem with its roots in the neopatrimonial nature and character of the Nigerian State and which undermined the programme was how the ADDR programme turned into a battlefield for high-level politicking between leading politicians in the Niger Delta particularly in Bayelsa State which almost scuttled the ADDR process in the state. For instance, Adeniyi observed that:

But because Alaibe was a prominent person within the Niger Delta equation, the president appointed him an honorary special adviser with a mandate to act as his representative on the amnesty issue. While this was a strategic move designed to help in the coordination of the amnesty process, it was not well received by the governor of Bayelsa, who apparently saw Alaibe as a potential future gubernatorial opponent, who should not be given any visible role (Adeniyi, 2011: 77-78).

Similarly, the neopatrimonial nature and character of the Nigerian State where governance has become synonymous to prebendalism is certainly perceived by many to have undermined the effectiveness of the ADDR programme. In particular, there have been widespread allegations of corruption such as illegal substitution of candidates,¹⁹⁰ short payment of candidates¹⁹¹ and outright denial of reintegration opportunities for some demobilised militants.¹⁹² Indeed, a member of the Nigerian Anti-Corruption Network suggested that not only was corruption the root cause of the Niger Delta conflict, but the effectiveness of the ADDR programme was undermined by corruption.¹⁹³ For example, funds budgeted for the programme were allegedly diverted into private pockets, while the award of contracts and hiring of service providers and foreign experts at a very high premium has raised doubts about how transparently such contracts were awarded and determined. As noted by one civil society respondent:

Oh...we talked before about the corruption in this country, and it is absolutely the same thing with the amnesty program... I've been told that about two-thirds of the money for the amnesty program is actually going

¹⁹⁰. This view was a recurrent opinion expressed by all CS members, academic experts and researchers on the Niger Delta and members of the TCND interviewed.

¹⁹¹. Ibid.

¹⁹². Respondent 039- Ex-MEND commander, November 2013.

¹⁹³. Respondent 005, October 2013.

to the organizers and the contractors who benefit and not to the boys themselves.¹⁹⁴

It is pertinent to acknowledge that hard evidence to demonstrate how corruption has undermined the effectiveness of the Niger Delta ADDR programme was difficult to come by, and perception does not necessarily represent empirical reality. Nevertheless, when these allegations of corruption are viewed against the backdrop of established cases of corruption in Nigeria earlier highlighted in this study such an allegation cannot be completely ignored.

As I argued in chapter three the Nigerian State is equally a law and order state; and like its colonial progenitor is authoritarian in nature. Accordingly, the above character of the Nigerian State informed the *pseudo-compellence* nature of the Niger Delta ADDR programme 'negotiations' whereby the ADDR programme was launched without any ceasefire or peace agreement in place. It also explains the myopic nature of the conceptualisation and negotiation style of the ADDR programme which was bereft of any robust engagement with the underlying issues that led to the conflict beyond mollifying the militants to surrender their weapons. Thus, disarmament was launched and undertaken in an atmosphere of mutual distrust between the Nigerian Government and the Niger Delta militants. A former staff member of a nongovernmental organisation Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta explains that the nature of the peace process and the tension that characterised it and the concomitant mistrust the militants had with regard to the Nigerian Government explains why many of them initially refused to participate in the programme.

4.6.2. Challenges and Problems Due to the Dysfunctionality of the Nigerian State (Incompetent/Ineffective Nature of the Nigerian State)

I argued in Chapter Two that Nigeria as a neopatrimonial state has become predatory in nature and which I also contended is the worst form of neopatrimonialism. Similarly, Bach (2011: 279) posited that in a neopatrimonial predatory state, the state is highly dysfunctional because public resources have been personalised by the political elites to the extent that the state lacks the

¹⁹⁴. Respondent 028, November 2013.

capacity to produce and implement basic public policies. Consequently, the Nigerian State has become ineffective in terms of producing and executing basic policies and programmes for the well-being of its citizenry. In line with this, a Niger Delta academic expert explains that the dysfunctional nature of the Nigerian State became an impediment to the ADDR programme in terms of the inefficiency that characterised the whole process. According to him:

Has the Nigerian State been very efficient? Has the Nigerian State been very effective in its projects, in its programming...has it been successful? Have there been...problems about corruption and all that in the amnesty? Is it not characteristic of the Nigerian State? Then look at the initial period of the amnesty there was...absolute lack of coordination and all that between the federal government and the states ...¹⁹⁵

In a similar vein, another Niger Delta scholar maintains that the Nigerian State is a highly in-disciplined one that lacks policy consistency and the tenacity to execute a given programme in a thorough manner and to its logical conclusion irrespective of whether the policy is good or bad.¹⁹⁶ He maintains that in most cases policies are halfway implemented irrespective of how well conceived they are.¹⁹⁷ This description was reflected in the lack of adequate planning that characterised the ADDR process as noted by a military officer serving with the Joint Task Force:

Well it was well intended but it was wrongly planned, haphazardly implemented or it was rushed. The planning was rushed and of course, if you rush a thing you make mistakes and some of the mistakes will be to such an extent that it should not have even started in the first instance ...The whole thing, success or failure is hinged on detailed planning and sincerity of purpose. We did it the Nigerian way and it served us for the time it served. Whether it will continue to serve, I don't know¹⁹⁸

This was exemplified by the way Disarmament was planned and implemented without any concrete plan for demobilisation and reintegration.¹⁹⁹ Indeed, a member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee revealed that the first batch of the demobilisation programme was carried out for political expediency, and not necessarily because the Obubura camp was

¹⁹⁵. Respondent 040, November 2013.

¹⁹⁶. Respondent 045, December 2013.

¹⁹⁷. Ibid.

¹⁹⁸. Respondent 012, October 2013.

¹⁹⁹. Ibid.

operationally ready. There were no facilities and security in place, resulting not only in a camp riot but an attack on the Special Adviser (SA) to the President on the Amnesty Programme while on an official visit to the camp.²⁰⁰ Again, the obvious reasons that triggered the camp riot was evidence that the DDR programme was kick-started without adequate logistics arrangements in place, which is clearly in contrast to the provisions of the UN IDDRS (2006) and the DDR theoretical and policy literature which all argue that the successful implementation of any DDR programme is a function of adequate logistics planning. The disarmament and demobilisation phases of the programme were also marred by the problem of funding. However, a member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee explained that the funding problem, to some extent, was accidental because the President became sick immediately after he proclaimed the amnesty, which made it difficult for the Committee to access the necessary funds for the conduct of disarmament. As explained by the Committee member:

...it was like the president just announced the amnesty and his health just continued to deteriorate, deteriorate, deteriorate. So we now had the problem of even getting access to him, getting feedback from him; even applying ... releasing funds was a problem. You know...when the amnesty was announced there was a six-week window for me to get ready to start operating. By the ...fourth week, no kobo had been given to me; no money had been released, you know, so it was so frustrating, so... to get funds we had to do things that I would say off the record...²⁰¹

Nevertheless, a competent and effective state would have been able to deal with the problem of the president's ill-health. A further indicator of the ineffective nature of the Nigerian State was the lack of adequate planning that characterised the programme whereby it was launched not based on sound and reliable intelligence information, particularly the disarmament phase. For instance, estimates of the number of militants to be disarmed were based on extrapolation, and initially put at 12,000 militants²⁰²; whilst 30,000 militants were eventually disarmed under the programme.²⁰³ A member of the Disarmament and

²⁰⁰. Respondent 001, November 2013.

²⁰¹. Respondent 042, December 2013.

²⁰². Respondent 050, member Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, January 2014. The respondent revealed that the Planning Committee had no means of having a near accurate estimate of militants to be disarmed so it resorted to extrapolation.

²⁰³. Respondent 001, member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, October 2013.

Demobilisation Implementation Committee attested that 'from what I could see, nobody really knew who the armed groups were; and so nobody knew whether the real groups were being disarmed or not.'²⁰⁴ This was further buttressed by a military officer serving with JTF who explains that:

So when it comes to the issue of knowing how many militants each person had, how many arms were collected I want to say that government may not have had any say over it because it was a matter of what they brought.²⁰⁵

For example, at the initial planning stage, the State Security Service (SSS) confirmed the existence of 35 militants' camps and leaders;²⁰⁶ while the planning Committee claimed to have identified 75 militants' camps and 79 leaders' during its pre-disarmament fact finding.²⁰⁷ Suffice to say that the problem of conflicting and unreliable intelligence that characterised the conduct of the ADDR programme was a further evidence of the failure to conduct an in-depth pre-DDR stocktaking to generate the needed data for the programme which is a necessary precondition for successful DDR (Spear, 2002:149; Asuni, 2011: 159; Shibuya, 2012: 28 and Ong, 2012: 15-22). A further indication of the incompetent nature of the Nigerian State was that stock-taking and verification that should have been done at the planning stage was rather left for the implementation Committee. For instance, a member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee noted that my:

...strategy of executing the mandate was, within the ninety-day period, we were to engage with the militant leaders in their camps: we would go there, we would take the statistics of the personnel that they had, we would take the statistics of the weapons they had, and we would transfer those weapons away from the camp. So, we would know that, ok, we are dealing with Ateke Tom and by so and so date we are going to disarm Ateke Tom in his camp; before that day of official disarmament, we have got all the data regarding the arms, the ammo, the personnel, the fighters, the non-fighters, and the cooks ... So ...by the time we start collecting their arms all the necessary documentation as to renunciation of violence, we have all these forms that we have designed, you know, that they were supposed to do; we would have done it camp by camp; not the way it turned out eventually, *because, eventually, we couldn't do that...*(sic).²⁰⁸

²⁰⁴. Respondent 042, December 2013.

²⁰⁵. Respondent 009, October 2013.

²⁰⁶. Ibid. 001.

²⁰⁷. Respondent 001-member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, October 2013.

²⁰⁸. Respondent 042- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, December 2013.

The Committee member further observed that it became extremely difficult to ascertain whether or not those that disarmed were truly militants and if they had surrendered all the arms in their possession. The Committee member noted:

Even they themselves will tell you that they couldn't bring everything. So...some of the leaders voluntarily came to me that they know where the arms ...have been hidden they are ready to show it to me but that I should give them... some *welfare*²⁰⁹

Another serious challenge of implementation and also a reflection of the dysfunctional nature of the Nigerian State and which manifested in the inadequate planning that characterised the ADDR programme was that disarmament which was initially planned to take place at static collection centres had to be combined with mobile collection.²¹⁰ The combination of static and mobile collection simultaneously means that some commanders and their fighters surrendered at the designated collection centres, while others were disarmed in their various camps. In some cases, the militants pulled out from camps to surrender at the nearest collection centre.²¹¹ The chaotic way the militants surrendered made it extremely difficult to verify what they brought. Additionally, given that a pre-DDR census was not conducted, the militant commanders had the liberty to determine the quantity and quality of weapons they surrendered which may explain the low percentage of weapons recovered in the first phase of disarmament (see Table 4: 2). Suffice to point out that the Operational Guide to the UN IDDRS (2014: 126) provides that disarmament can be conducted as static, mobile or a combination of both. However, whichever is adopted, the decision must be based on sound planning and careful assessment of the suitability of the option adopted to the DDR environment. In the case of the Niger Delta ADDR programme, the decision to combine the two was unplanned and not based on any informed interrogation of the pros and cons.

²⁰⁹. Respondent 042- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, December 2013.

²¹⁰. Respondent 001-member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, October 2013.

²¹¹. Ibid.

According to Muggah (2002: 156), DDR and weapons reduction programmes are not the magic bullet they are construed to be, especially in terms of their ability to maximally retrieve all illegal arms from circulation in one disarmament programme. This was particularly the case in the Niger Delta where the programme was based on inadequate planning. This means that arms mop up should be carried out immediately after the official completion of disarmament in order to retrieve those arms not captured during the official process of disarmament. A key member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee revealed that it was agreed in the main plan that, a mop up exercise will be carried out immediately after disarmament is completed. But as he noted this did not take place:

...immediately after disarmament, after ninety days, of course the military has to take over the all those camps and establish presence in those camps and mop up whatever it is that is left there whether their boats or whatever that they didn't bring... So, follow up actions... were not done, were not done.²¹²

Another challenge arising from the inept nature of the Nigerian State was reflected in the prolonged delay between disarmament and demobilisation. The first phase of disarmament ended in October 2009 but demobilisation did not start until June 2010²¹³ leading to a series of protests during which militants blocked the Lokoja - Abuja express road as a way of demonstrating their frustration against the Nigerian government.²¹⁴ Others reportedly returned to petty illegal oil bunkering and sundry criminal activities as a way of sustaining themselves.²¹⁵ Consequently, 'some of the militants lost faith in the process, and there were open complaints and...threats of going back to the creeks...'²¹⁶ Apart from the delayed commencement of demobilisation, the haphazard manner in which the demobilisation was carried out was another problem that undermined the effectiveness of the ADDR programme. A staff of a nongovernmental organisation that served at the Obubura demobilisation camp notes that '...initially, they were staying up to two weeks; but they kept cutting down ... ten

²¹². Respondent 042, December 2013.

²¹³. Respondent 001-member Disarmament, Demobilisation Implementation Committee, October 2013.

²¹⁴. Respondent 012-military officer serving with the JTF, October 2013.

²¹⁵. Respondent 032, November 2013 and respondent 017, November 2013.

²¹⁶. Respondent 040, November 2013.

days ... nine days ...'²¹⁷ Hence, the time allotted to some of the batches was too short to achieve any meaningful transformation and for them to reasonably appreciate the importance of nonviolent resolution of conflict. Thus, the psychological dimension of demobilisation which Shibuya (2012: 63) described as 'mental demobilisation' was hardly achieved. In addition, the timing for demobilisation did not take into cognisance the educational qualifications and ability of the ex-militants to assimilate within a short time, because many of them were school dropouts without effective learning skills. A staff of a nongovernmental organisation involved in the psychosocial counselling and profiling of the ex-militants' soldiers contended that of those she interviewed '90% of them managed to finish secondary school but could not read nor write.'²¹⁸ As rightly noted by one Niger Delta scholar, 'merely putting people in a classroom, some could not write, people of different levels of education, you put them in the same classroom and train them to become nonviolent would certainly not achieve the objective it should have achieved'.²¹⁹

The role of information and education both to participants and beneficiaries in a DDR programme is very necessary if success is to be achieved. In particular, the success of a DDR programme can be undermined by poor 'management of expectations' (Muggah, 2008: 199). As Muggah notes 'if DDR or weapons reduction are undertaken without an effective communication or public awareness strategy, the consequences can be disastrous' (Ibid.). Also, the International Peace Academy reiterated the fact that:

For successful implementation of DDR programs, it is crucial to seek a balance between managing the often very high expectations of ex-combatants and addressing resentment of "favouritism" among the rest of the population. Flexible programming and an effective public information campaign are key in achieving this goal (International Peace Academy, 2002: 1).

However, a major challenge in the Niger Delta ADDR programme was that information management was poorly handled, as key stakeholders such as militants and Niger Delta communities were not well informed and educated about what the programme was all about. A member of the Disarmament and

²¹⁷. Respondent 020, November 2013.

²¹⁸. Respondent 020, November 2013.

²¹⁹. Respondent 032, November 2013.

Demobilisation Implementation Committee explained that with the over-militarisation of the planning process, the media subcommittee was suppressed and not given the liberty to function²²⁰ which resulted in a serious communication gap with participants and beneficiaries. During a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) held with some disarmed militants it became very clear that they were not properly educated about what the ADDR process entailed, as issues such as duration and exact entitlements were not properly explained to them, for example, many of them were not well informed of the programme's exit date. They were also ignorant of the exact termination date of the reinsertion allowance they are being paid. However, when it was made known to them that information gathered from the Amnesty Office in Abuja suggested that the programme would terminate in 2015 they all clamoured for its extension beyond the 2015 exit date. For instance, one of their key submissions during the Focus Group Discussion was for:

...government to...continue with the amnesty programme beyond 2015, even if it would be giving the programme another name entirely. Because as it has started already, a man who has been given for instance ₦1.00 today cannot afford to stay hungry tomorrow. ²²¹

Their submission supports Muggah's (2006: 201) warning that without adequate education and enlightenment, 'there is a persistent danger that DDR and weapons reduction schemes will continue to be viewed exclusively as an 'entitlement' for former soldiers, instead of as a mechanism to improve the security of, and the level of development in, traumatized communities.' A careful analysis of the Niger Delta ADDR programme indicates that it suffered from bloated expectations on the part of the ex-militants because of poor information management. The dashing of these expectations poses serious implications for longer-term security stabilisation in the Niger Delta.

The ineptness of the Nigerian State was also reflected in its launching of the programme without a clear established national institutional framework for its implementation. In contrast, for instance, the UN IDDRS (3. 30. 2006: 9) recommends that a national DDR Commission consisting of all stakeholders

²²⁰. Respondent 001, October 2013.

²²¹. Focus Group Discussion, November 2013.

should be established to superintend the planning and implementation of a DDR programme. However, in this case, the programme was superintended by a political adviser to the president instead of a DDR commission manned by DDR experts. As noted by a staff member of a nongovernmental organisation:

And then ask yourself, why is the amnesty a committee, not a commission? Or an agency? Or a council? ... So you could see the ad hoc nature and unsustainability of some of the structures. Even look at the leadership crisis: amnesty started effectively in 2009; 2009 to 2013 give or take is four years? In four years they've had three leaders Godwin Abbey, Timi Alaibe and now Kuku, which means an average of one chairman per annum. And why is it that you wanted to do something on amnesty, you consistently choose politicians to head it when it is supposed to be a technical professional show.²²²

The importance of expertise highlighted above strengthens the contention that 'the success and sustainability of a DDR programme depends on the ability of...expertise to complement and support a nationally led process' (UN IDDRS (3. 30. 2006: 1). Thus, assigning a politician who is not an expert on issues concerning DDR, and whose tenure is linked to that of the president undermines the effectiveness of the programme. For instance, following the transition of power from President Goodluck Jonathan to President Muhammadu Buhari after the 2015 national elections the tenure of Mr Kingsley Kuku the Special Adviser to the former President on Niger Delta Affairs and coordinator of the programme ended on 29th May 2015. From May – July 2015 the ADDR Programme was without leadership which led to the stoppage of payment of monthly allowance of the ex-militants while some overseas training institutions temporarily stopped their reintegration training due to none payment of tuition fees.²²³ While money was available in the Amnesty account, there was no signatory to the account because the former adviser's tenure had legally ended with that of the former president on 29th May 2015.²²⁴ This could have been averted if a properly constituted DDR commission was in place because the tenure of the headship would not be determined or depend on that of the president.²²⁵

²²². Respondent 044, December 2013.

²²³. See story in Vanguard titled 'Boro's appointment has averted crisis in the N/Delta-Clark' available at: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/05/boro-hs-appointment-has-aver...> (Accessed: 12 August 2015).

²²⁴. Ibid.

²²⁵. Ibid.

4.6.3. Challenges and Problems due to Competition Between Leading Security Agencies of the Nigerian State

The conduct of DDR involves and requires serious coordination, collaboration and synergy among multiple agencies and departments (Knight, 2008:46-47). However, coordination of the Niger Delta ADDR programme was a major challenge because it was characterised by interagency rivalry and egotism among the leading security agencies of the Nigerian government as they tried to outwit each other, particularly in the disarmament phase. A key member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee explains the situation like this:

.. a lot of organisations felt that they had been in contact with these militants all this while, that naturally...they should be allowed to participate ... not bringing ... [Papa Tango]²²⁶ an innocent bystander as far as they are concerned, being a new person, into it; they had been involved, they should be the ones to do this (sic)... Even when [Papa Tango] was appointed... [and] was trying to set up... staff and ... needed people from SSS, but before they could release staff to [Papa Tango] ... it was a problem. And when they grudgingly released one... they refused to give him the information that they have concerning the militants... So we virtually [the Committee] had to circumvent the system, the channel, to get the information that we wanted... So you could see the rivalry, police want to take some credit for it, SSS want to take credit for it ... the army, they think that... they are the ones to do it not an [Alpha Foxtrot Officer]²²⁷ so the army people were even antagonistic to [Papa Tango]!²²⁸

Likewise, a staff member of Search for Common Ground (SFCG) in Nigeria posits that a negative consequence of this rivalry was the early hijacking of the programme by the Nigerian military which shifted the focus of the DDR programme to disarmament at the expense of demobilisation and reintegration:

Different people wanted to grab it. The military grab it and that they were doing the disarmament (sic), but the issue is that DDR is more than disarmament, it means demobilisation, and it means reintegration or rehabilitation. But they grabbed it and dominated it...²²⁹

The various leading security agencies even attempted to carry out separate disarmament. For instance, the above key member of the Disarmament and

²²⁶. Papa Tango is used to guarantee anonymity to the respondent.

²²⁷. Alpha Foxtrot Officer is used to guarantee anonymity to the respondent's organisation.

²²⁸. Respondent 042, December 2013.

²²⁹. Respondent 010, October 2013.

Demobilisation Implementation Committee revealed that '.... [Whisky Oskar]²³⁰ went to Warri and collected some arms from some people... I don't know where he took the arms to...SSS disarmed some and the arms are with them, you know.'²³¹ This unhealthy competition undermined the conduct of disarmament and the ability to properly account for the arms collected from the militants.

4.6.4. Challenges and Problems due to Geographical Impediment

Shibuya (2012: 26-27) argues that previous DDR experiences revealed that how porous a country's borders are has serious implications for arms inflows and the overall success of disarmament. Similarly, Jeong (2005: 51) argues that disarmament will be futile in the absence of an arms embargo managed by tight border control enforced by statutorily authorised security agencies in a state. In consonance with Shibuya's position, the PAPC suggested that 'the JTF should equally be empowered to checkmate and control the proliferation of light weapons in the Niger Delta before and after the proclamation of amnesty'.²³² However, respondents from this study have demonstrated that disarmament was conducted amidst continued arms inflows due to the porous nature of the Nigerian maritime border. A retired military general noted that, even as weapons were being retrieved, new ones were being smuggled into the region, which posed a serious challenge to the disarmament process. According to the retired military general:

Even as weapons are being collected more are still coming in because a lot of people are engaged in illegal activities; a lot of oil bunkering is taking place with ships that bring in arms that are exchanged for illegal oil. Also, our maritime domain is vast and I don't think the Nigerian Navy can singlehandedly monitor it and the Air Force cannot also give adequate cover to the Navy...Until there is adequate policing of our waters arms would continue to find its way into our communities and affect the overall success of the amnesty programme. A lot of arrests have been made over the years and on a daily basis too of ships involved in oil bunkering on Nigerian waters, efforts should be made to make it unprofitable in order to stop arms proliferation.²³³

Therefore, Nigeria's vast and porous maritime border and difficult terrain would certainly have posed a significant natural impediment to any effort at retrieving illegal weapons coming into the Niger Delta notwithstanding other factors

²³⁰. Whisky Oskar is used to guarantee anonymity for the person being referred to in the quote.

²³¹. Respondent 042, December 2013.

²³². This was part of the recommendation of the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee.

²³³. Respondent 002- retired military general, October 2013.

highlighted above. These include the rentier-neopatrimonial, law and order nature and character of the Nigerian State, its dysfunctionality and the competition among its leading security agencies. However, as the above respondent suggests much success might have been achieved if there were adequate policing of the border and equipping of the security forces and synergy between the Nigerian Navy and Air Force as a way of checkmating illegal arms proliferation in the Niger Delta. Thus, given the natural impediment to efforts at checkmating arms proliferation in the Niger Delta, the concern of the Nigerian government should have been to maximally reduce the socio-economic and political conditions that encourage the demand for weapons and violent behaviour. This means that a more realistic approach would have been to implement a maximalist DDR as recommended by the TCND which would radically ameliorate the socio-economic and political factors that induce armed conflict or social unrest that motivate individuals and groups to acquire weapons. A maximalist DDR could then be complemented with improvement on existing policing capacity in the Niger Delta.

4.7. Conclusion

This chapter examined the politics of how the 2009 Niger Delta ADDR programme was conceptualised, negotiated, designed and implemented by the Nigerian government. The chapter is based on the assumption that to evaluate the extent to which the ADDR programme has achieved its objective requires a thorough understanding of how it was conceptualised, designed and implemented. I argued in the chapter that the conceptualisation was premised on a security versus development understanding of the conflict, which gave rise to the development and security stability agendas of the ADDR programme. However, in line with the rentier neopatrimonial nature, character and interest of the Nigerian State, which prioritised the security of MNOCs instead of the security of communities, the security stability agenda of the programme became the overriding goal of the programme as well as its design and implementation. I also argued that the ADDR programme was achieved neither through negotiated settlement nor outright military defeat of the militants but via a *pseudo-compellence negotiated settlement*; a peace deal that combined the features of peace enforcement, negotiation and the use of patronage. Top militant

commanders who had a high capacity to undermine rents accumulation formed the nucleus of negotiation which eventually resulted in an individual signing of a renunciation of militancy bond form by each militant. Consequently, the process defies existing frameworks for negotiating traditional first-generation DDR as provided in the UN IDD-RS (2006) and the broader DDR theoretical and policy literature, but nevertheless added a new amateur yet innovative approach to DDR and peace processes. In terms of its planning and implementation too, I argued that the ADDR programme did not conform to the UN IDDRS (2006) and the DDR theoretical and policy literature. Overall, the conceptualisation, planning and implementation of the programme reflect the interest of the Nigerian State. Similarly, the way the Niger Delta ADDR programme was conceptualised, negotiated, designed and implemented was also marred by several challenges and problems. These challenges and problems emanated from the inherent nature and character of the Nigerian State, the dysfunctionality (incompetent/ineffectiveness) of the Nigerian State, competition among leading Nigerian security agencies, and natural impediment due to the porous nature of the Nigerian maritime boundary. Overall, I argued that the conceptualisation, design and implementation of the ADDR programme had serious limitations that negatively undermined its goal. However, the question of whether the programme succeeded in achieving its statutory goals will form the subject of a more detailed discussion in Chapter Five.

Chapter Five

The Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme and Goal Accomplishment

5. Introduction

In Chapter Four, I examined how the Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (ADDR) programme was conceptualised, designed and implemented. In this chapter, I critically evaluate the extent to which it has accomplished its statutory objectives. As I argued in the preceding chapter, the programme was premised on two conflicting conceptualisations. The TCND conceptualized a maximalist Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme that aimed to address the crisis of militancy within a broader framework of socioeconomic transformation while in contrast, the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee conceptualised, designed and implemented a minimalist DDR that aimed at security stabilisation. Consequently, this resulted in a conceptual somersault whereby security stabilisation instead of security and development became the programme's main statutory objective. As noted in this statement from the government, 'the DDR provision approved by the Federal Government of Nigeria under the Amnesty programme was... conceived as a national response to stabilise security conditions in the Niger Delta... (Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, 2011: 24).

The main argument I advance in this chapter is that the amnesty/disarmament phase of the programme succeeded in stabilising the deteriorated security situation in the Niger Delta in the short-term. However, there is a high capacity to remobilise and activate vertical and horizontal command and control structures amongst the Niger Delta militants; because the demobilisation process failed to ensure the breakdown of C&C structures. The high capacity to remobilise was reinforced by the failure to economically reintegrate the ex-militants by providing them with legitimate employment opportunities after training. Consequently, the risk that militants will return to rents seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun

remains high and has been further worsened by the failure to address the grievances of underdevelopment that gave rise to the conflict.

The chapter is structured into three main sections; the first section evaluates the programme as a security stabilisation intervention in the Niger Delta and the second part examines the programme from the perspective of a maximalist all-inclusive DDR recommended by the TCND as well as the maximalist DDR literature. The third section summarises the key arguments advanced in the chapter.

5.1. The Niger Delta ADDR Programme and Security Stabilisation

As I pointed out in the previous section, the main statutory goal of the programme was to stabilise the security situation in the Niger Delta. Consequently, in this section, the role of amnesty and each phase of the DDR programme will be examined in terms of how it has achieved or contributed to the attainment of this goal in the Niger Delta region. This approach is adopted because each phase of the DDR process has a distinct but mutually reinforcing role to play towards the accomplishment of security stabilisation.

5.1.1. Amnesty and Security Stabilisation in the Niger Delta

Varied mechanisms can be adopted by societies undergoing violent conflicts to end violence and stabilise the security situation. Oftentimes amnesty is resorted to when DDR is contemplated in the absence of military defeat. For instance, Walter (1997: 335-364 and 2002: 3-43) posits that the primary concern of warring parties, when asked to disarm, is not the question of how to reach a consensus over land, power sharing or the underlying grievances that led to the war but instead the fear of whether their personal security will be guaranteed during and after demobilisation. Walter's assertion was further supported by Scharf (1999: 508-509). In line with this, Freeman (2009: 37) posits that 'amnesties are usually seen as one of the key incentives or preconditions for a successful DDR program.' Accordingly, a top MEND commander noted that without being offered amnesty they would not have agreed to go through the DDR process because of the significant risk it posed to their lives. According to him:

...at some point, we got fed up that we could not even continue again. But another point too [was that] even though we are bored and tired of the struggle there is no way we can just keep the arms or throw them away

and...walk in the communities or come to Warri and walk ...as free men... [For] somebody like Tompolo...any day... [the government] get him they won't even be going to court they have to kill him the way they killed Yusuf that Boko Haram guy...so how can such a person leave the struggle and come [out from the creeks]. It was just to continue until one day when God have something good for us...²³⁴

What this response illustrates is that even though the Niger Delta militants were war fatigued they were not willing to go through disarmament and demobilisation without the safety of their lives guaranteed. The recourse to amnesty has certainly been criticised by organisations such as the Amnesty International (n. d.: 2008a and 2008b), Human Rights Watch (2008: 1-3) and the International Criminal Court (Obura, 2011: 19-20 and Laplante, n.d: 935). Nevertheless, evidence from this case study suggests that in the context of negotiated settlement amnesty may be a necessary evil needed to navigate the war to peace transition in war-torn societies.

5.1.2. Disarmament and Security Stabilisation in the Niger Delta

This section interrogates the extent to which the disarmament phase of the ADDR programme contributed to security stabilisation in the Niger Delta. Essentially, 'disarmament should achieve the removal of the means by which civil wars have been executed and lead to the creation of a stable environment, thus strengthening confidence and security building among combatants, the government and the population' (Alden, *et al*, 2011: 14). A point also reiterated by Meek and Malan (2004: 23). However, a vivid account of how the disarmament phase was conducted in the Niger Delta provided by a military officer serving with the Joint Task Force (JTF) demonstrates that it fell far below the minimum standards of disarmament highlighted in Chapter Two. According to him:

What... took place was that prior to the amnesty programme, leaders of each camp...were identified, they were now told to compile names of people that were under their supervision. So it is possible that a lot of sharp practices might have taken place... they were just at liberty to submit whatever names they wanted... The veracity of the names they submitted as their boys would be in dispute because no one knew, whatever I tell you was the size of my camp is [what] you take because you weren't there. So that also might have affected the quantity of arms that were recovered. Even after the amnesty, there were still insinuations that look what they recovered in terms of arms wasn't even up to half of what the holdings of these boys were... So when it comes to the issue of knowing how many

²³⁴. Respondent 038, November 2013.

militants each person had, how many arms were collected I want to say that government may not have had any say over it because it was a matter of what they brought...So I think it was just a matter of good faith, bring your arms and they brought it...²³⁵

Corroborating the above, a retired military general that participated in the disarmament and demobilisation processes argues that due to Nigeria's porous maritime boundary which the Niger Delta region occupies, even as disarmament was going on, small arms and light weapons were continually being smuggled into Nigeria.²³⁶ Therefore, given the way the disarmament phase was handled and the quantity of weapons recovered as shown in Table 4: 2 it would be difficult for it to have led to any measure of security stability in the region. But, despite the observed irregularities, a Niger Delta academic expert noted that the disarmament phase succeeded in '...reducing tension in the region by way of de-escalation of violence which has brought peace²³⁷ to most people and made people to feel safer in some respects'.²³⁸

Therefore, my contention is that the improvement in security was more a consequence of the symbolic significance of the amnesty proclamation and disarmament ritual than the number of weapons recovered. This is because the pseudo-compellence negotiated settlement reached signified an informal social contract between the militants and the Nigerian State. This informal social contract symbolically ushered in an era of fragile trust between the Nigerian State and the Niger Delta militants. In this case, the Nigerian State granted forgiveness to the militants and promised to rehabilitate and empower them as well as address the crisis of underdevelopment in the region. On their part, the militants renounced militancy and affiliations to any militant group and committed to faithfully support, protect and defend the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by respecting all constituted authorities.²³⁹ This, in my contention, explains why even though the Niger Delta region was still littered with hidden arms caches, the security condition was tremendously improved in the immediate aftermath of the disarmament programme. Additionally, the fact that the granting of amnesty emboldened the militants who hitherto were in the creeks to come out

²³⁵. Respondent 009, October 2013.

²³⁶. Respondent 002, October 2013.

²³⁷. Defined as the absence of violence.

²³⁸. Respondent 014- Niger Delta expert, October 2013.

²³⁹. See appendix 3 Renunciation of Militancy oath.

as freemen strengthened the symbolic significance of the programme in terms of stabilising the security situation in the Niger Delta region.

This case study therefore suggests that oftentimes security stabilisation in the short-term may not always be the direct consequence of how successful a disarmament programme was or the number of weapons recovered. It can also depend on the symbolic meaning and significance of the exercise to the participants, beneficiaries and other stakeholders involved in the process and affected by the conflict. Therefore, in the context of the Niger Delta ADDR programme, irrespective of how disastrously the disarmament phase was conducted, its confidence building significance in terms of contributing to security stabilisation in the short-term cannot be underrated.

5.1.3. Demobilisation and Security Stabilisation in the Niger Delta

As a recap of the DDR conceptual debate in Chapter Two, the UN IDDRS (1. 10 2006: 2) explains that demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of combatants from active service whether from the armed forces or any armed group, and its main objective is to reduce or totally break up the armed forces or armed group. Likewise, Alden *et al* (2011: 14) and Vries and Wiegink, (2011: 40) argue that demobilisation is aimed at breaking the command-and-control structures under which combatants operate thereby making it difficult for them to return to armed rebellion. This suggests that for demobilisation to contribute to security stabilisation in the Niger Delta it must lead to the dismantlement of the command and control structures and personal loyalties existing between the top generals, middle-level commanders and foot soldiers and also relations between foot soldiers as peers so that the capacity to re-mobilise will be significantly neutralised. Suffice to say that, breaking the C&C structures of the Niger Delta militants was a critical prerequisite for achieving security stabilisation because theoretically and empirically they exemplify Second Generation militias which Francis (2005: 1-3) refers to as Africa's intractable security menace. However, despite this necessity, opinions expressed by several respondents in this study suggest that demobilisation has not successfully achieved this primary objective mainly because of the miscalculation of paying the foot soldiers through their former commanders. A Niger Delta specialist notes that as far as the command and control structure is concerned:

It is intact, nothing has changed; the structures are intact. By design... you pay the followers through their leaders so if I am a leader and I have three hundred boys you pay the boys through me. What does that mean; those boys are still loyal to me. So the structures are intact it is just that now they are dormant they can be activated if they decide to (sic).²⁴⁰

Another member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Committee corroborates this statement:

In a demobilisation programme, the whole idea is to return the individual... to his individuality; go back to the way you were... [But] you see right now what we are doing is dangerous, and I fear because down the road the government is... paying the boys through their leaders... So if you keep paying them through their leaders it means you did not demobilise them...²⁴¹

The above respondent further elaborates on the logical consequence of paying the ex-militants through their former commanders:

...the so-called militants that they had demobilised still form a body of militants under command of their former leaders. So you have not demobilised them; so tomorrow now, all they will need; it's just... get a few arms now, say, 'boys let's start again', you know... those leaders are still in control and if you [want to] see them, all you have to do is go to social occasions that these militants' leaders attend and see the kind of crowd that follows them.²⁴²

The failure to successfully achieve the goal of demobilisation means that the mutually reinforcing connection between disarmament and demobilisation critical for long-term security stabilisation was missed in the Niger Delta DDR process. Furthermore, another explanation why demobilisation could not achieve its supposed goal centres on the manner *inducement* was applied in the ADDR process. Generally, incentive is meant to encourage and sustain the commitment of combatants to the DDR process and the overall peace process to the extent of not contemplating a return to violence. As a recapitulation of the debates on incentives in Chapter Two, Özerdem (2009: 26) posits that within the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKOs) DDR framework, incentive is understood as '...methods of bargaining for, or trading in, weapons'. As he pointed out, such thinking led to the doctrine of weapons for cash

²⁴⁰. Respondent 032, November 2013.

²⁴¹. Respondent 042, December 2013.

²⁴². Respondent 042, December 2013.

programmes as one of the popular method of inducement applied by the UN, a situation whereby combatants exchanged their weapons for cash. Examples of DDR programmes where this doctrine was applied include El Salvador, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Somalia (Tanner, 1996:169-204 and World Bank, 1993: 1-101). However, some fundamental issues need to be determined when cash is used as an inducement in disarmament particularly the amount to be offered per weapon (Özerdem, 2009: 26). In this regard, Faltas (2001: 211-230) recommends that the price to be paid per weapon need not be the exact market value of the weapon but reasonable enough to motivate the combatants to submit their weapons.

However, in the context of the Niger Delta ADDR programme, inducement was applied in such a crude way that it became counterproductive to the goal of effective demobilisation. This was because the Nigerian government resorted to the selective distribution of monetary incentives to some select powerful commanders instead of a reasonable monetary inducement distributed across the board to all the top militant commanders. Consequently, what the Nigerian State did was to identify and concentrate on key commanders with the largest followers of foot soldiers and high capacity to threaten oil production and offer them huge monetary compensation through contract awards²⁴³ which empowered them economically. A retired federal permanent secretary and a key member of the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee described the doctrine of inducement used by the Nigerian government as a policy of patronage and exclusion.²⁴⁴ She pointed out that the government limited its sharing of payoffs to selected powerful militant commanders while those considered less powerful were completely excluded and alienated from the patronage distribution. Consequently, the less powerful and middle-level commanders with their foot soldiers were left to survive on the monthly cash reinsertion allowance of sixty-five thousand naira (an amount that falls within the range of \$450-500 as per the rate naira exchanged to a dollar in late 2009). A former staff member of the

²⁴³. The mode of distributing the ADDR patronage was through the award of mulita-million-dollar security contracts for pipelines surveillance as pay-offs to the top militants' commanders. For instance, Joab-Peterside et al., (2012: 12), provided figures of the monetary patronage extended to some of the top commanders. According to them 'the breakdown showed that Government Ekpumopolo received the lion's share of \$22.5 million yearly, while former warlord, Dokubo Asari, collects \$9million every year to keep his estimated 4000 soldiers at bay. Ateke Tom and Ebikabowei Boyloaf Victor Ben each collect \$3.5million apiece.'

²⁴⁴. Respondent 047, December 2013.

Foundation for Partnership Initiatives (PIND) in the Niger Delta opines that the assumption behind this policy was that the powerful commanders would gag the less powerful ones and their soldiers.²⁴⁵ According to him:

... what the government seemed to have done was to settle the real powerful people so that they can hold the others to ransom and checkmate them. The government had done this through dishing out of undue contracts to these powerful people.²⁴⁶

However, before analysing how counterproductive the policy of patronage and exclusion was to the DDR process, it is pertinent to note that it represents the extending of neo-patrimonial logic into the DDR process given rise to what I refer to as neopatrimonial DDR. Indeed, the manner in which patronage defined the relationship between the militants and the Nigerian State actually reinforced the existing politics of patron-clientelism that propels the Nigerian State. Also, it mirrors the character of a rentier-neo-patrimonial state that relies on the use of patronage and co-optation to preserve the existing status quo, suppress and placate contentious social forces that threaten its stability instead of genuinely addressing the issues in contention. It also reflects a crude understanding of the economic agendas propelling the different levels of fighters in the Niger Delta militancy. A Niger Delta academic expert argues that the designers of the programme conceived the foot soldiers as merely paid employees of the 'top generals' without any personal agenda of their own and therefore saw no need for any inducement to be paid to them beyond the reinsertion allowance.²⁴⁷

One consequence of this on demobilisation as noted by an expert on the region, was the likelihood that the relative security stability achieved in the Niger Delta was not a direct consequence of a successful demobilisation in the normal sense of the term but of the *neopatrimonial DDR approach* adopted which ensured that patronage was extended to the 'top generals'.²⁴⁸ The second implication was that it strengthened the economic dependence of the so-called demobilised foot soldiers on their former commanders for coping. This was because the reinsertion allowance was too inadequate to sustain their previous standard of living that the

²⁴⁵. Respondent 028, November 2013. PIND is a non-profit and nongovernmental organisation funded by Chevron working to improve the quality of life in the Niger Delta communities. Its website is at: <http://www.pindfoundation.org/>

²⁴⁶. Respondent 028, November 2013.

²⁴⁷. Respondent 014, October 2013.

²⁴⁸. Respondent 032, November 2013.

war economy provided them. A former staff member of the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta noted:

If you are able to go to the creeks and the camps, you will be able to understand that the life of a militant is much more lucrative to venturing into any kind of business. This is because the market that fuels this militancy is oil bunkering. And at the moment the only market that is more lucrative in the world today than oil bunkering is cocaine. This is understandable because you are not buying the products you are selling. You just get into the pipelines, tap or burst it and start pumping what is supposed to be for the masses and start making billions of naira! So for a logical individual, why should he leave the seamless millions he is earning for a meagre salary of monthly N50,000.00 per month? You just don't have any reason to do so. Furthermore, during elections, these people (the militants) are those relied upon to do the rigging of elections. So they are perpetually in control of power and are more influential in the region. So, there is more carrot in being a militant than coming to participate in the amnesty programme.²⁴⁹

According to this respondent, the foot soldiers disarmed and demobilised into relative impoverishment while some selected 'top generals' were economically empowered, facilitating their co-option into the neo-patrimonial economic and political power elites. Consequently, the only way for those excluded from the ADDR patronage to mitigate and cope with the effect of a sudden fall in their standard of living was to continually depend on their commanders which strengthened the existing line of command and control structures and loyalties between them. What this implies is that the selected 'top generals' militants' camps may have been disbanded but the command and control structures remain intact. In the long-term, this suggests a serious threat to security stabilisation in the Niger Delta because it offers the selected 'top generals' a high capacity to remobilise. A Niger Delta academic expert reiterated that the selective application of patronage ensured the existence of 'networks that can be reactivated at very short notice...So when people say, oh if something doesn't happen in the Niger Delta we will go back...they are not joking. They are not joking because they know that the networks are still intact.'²⁵⁰

In fairness to the reinsertion allowance paid to the less powerful commanders, middle-level commanders and foot soldiers, the International Crisis Group Africa Report No 231 (2015: 3) notes that '...the 65,000-naira monthly stipend paid to

²⁴⁹. Respondent 028, November 2013.

²⁵⁰. Respondent 046, December 2013.

the ex-militants is well above the 18,000 naira (\$90. 50) national minimum wage and most entry-level salaries...’ in Nigeria. Thus, in comparison to the monthly earning of an average Nigerian worker the stipend still looks fairly generous for those excluded from the DDR patronage system. However, the practice of channelling the payment of the less powerful commanders, middle-level commanders and foot soldiers through their former top commanders, who in turn short-changed them in the process further reinforced a sense of exclusion and frustration on the part of the middle-level commanders and foot soldiers. It is important to highlight the fact that the Operational Guide to the UN IDDRS (2014: 27) asserts that ‘special packages for commanders may be necessary to secure their buy-in to the DDR process...’ However, the Niger Delta ADDR programme has applied the concept of commanders’ special packages to the extreme with serious negative implications for the demobilisation process and the long-term goal of stability in the Niger Delta. While demobilisation failed in the long-term due to the paying of the ex-militants through their former commanders and the way the ADDR patronage was applied, it nonetheless served the needs of the Nigerian rentier neo-patrimonial state in the short-term, by keeping the militants in checked thus resulting in the immediate restoration of oil production and revenue to the state. Thus, the Niger Delta ADDR represented a *neopatrimonial approach to DDR* and how that can engender long-term stability in the Niger Delta will be explored further.

Despite the failed demobilisation and the high capacity to remobilise on the part of the top commanders one can argue that the ADDR patronage and peace dividend has produced an unintended positive consequence that reduces the potential for conflict recurrence in the Niger Delta constructed around the narrative of regional grievance. This is because the manner in which the ADDR patronage or peace dividend goes to the top commanders and excludes local communities, victims of the conflict and nonviolent youths has exposed the fact that the original motive of Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) commanders was to pursue their personal economic agendas under the cover of regional grievance. This again lends credence to my contention that irrespective of criticisms, Collier’s greed thesis provides a potent explanatory framework for understanding the behaviour of MEND actors and dynamics of the conflict during that era. Hence, it would be difficult for them to re-mobilise and

gain community support in the future. Similarly, it has potentially deprived likely future rebel commanders of the same legitimacy among communities as there was during the MEND era when they were seen as heroes of the Niger Delta struggle. In this regard, the view expressed by a member of the TCND is pertinent:

...but one of the things that you have seen is that there is more of an increasing awareness in the Niger-Delta that these people are doing what they are doing for themselves... what has happened now is that there is a partnership between those individuals, the criminals [militants but specifically the top commanders] and the government [while] the communities are left, so when you come back and you want to construct this thing as a community issue you don't get that sort of feeling [support] that you had yesterday of a [from the] community... Many people in that area [Niger Delta] felt these boys are standing up to those who are cheating us that was the dominant view but they have seen that you [the militants particularly the top commanders] are taking the benefits and we are getting nothing. Instead it is you [militants but specifically the top commanders] and those people [Nigerian government] who are now in bed...²⁵¹

Beyond sustaining the C&C structures; the policy of patronage and exclusion was counter-productive to security stabilisation in several other ways. Foremost, the way the DDR patronage was applied led to the emergence of peace spoilers. Stedman (1977: 8) posits that spoilers can be from inside or outside the peace process. He maintains that an insider spoiler usually signs a peace agreement indicating his/her willingness to comply with the terms of the agreement but reneges on the entire or key provisions of the agreement. Insider spoilers are likely to comply with the terms of the settlement and remain committed to it so long as the peace process continues to benefit them. Alternatively, 'outside spoilers are parties who are excluded from a peace process or who exclude themselves and use violence to attack the peace process' (Ibid: 8).

The exclusive nature of the Niger Delta ADDR patronage system gave rise to *insider-outsider spoilers*. In this case, mostly among middle-level commanders who originally were part of the peace process and signed the renunciation of militancy bond but because of being marginalised and alienated in the course of time they reneged on their renunciation of militancy thereby becoming *insiders turned outsider spoilers*. Such peace spoilers re-mobilised to the creeks

²⁵¹. Respondent 008-November 2013.

established new camps and recruited their own foot soldiers reigniting fresh violence. A pertinent example was the case of John Togo a field commander under 'Government Ekpemupolo alias General Tompolo'. 'General Tompolo' was the overall MEND commander but John Togo was his field combat commander and the ADDR patronage was exclusively given to Tompolo with John Togo completely left out.

Meanwhile, all efforts by John Togo to access some patronage from the state were blocked by 'General Tompolo' which prompted him to return to violence. A military officer serving with the JTF observes that:

Asari Dokubo...became very vocal almost wanting to assume that Tompolo is given more prominence than some of them and that is why some of them decided to... go back to their creeks (sic). John Togo did the same, but understanding John Togo's angle is different from those ones. John Togo was the General or the so-called war commander of Tompolo...Tompolo...was more of a spiritual leader than of a fighter so Togo was his actual commander the head of the foot soldiers for the prosecution of the conflict but they gave recognition to Tompolo and he felt cheated because he asked for a share which from what I heard, Tompolo refused to give him. Even when he asked for a contract from Governor Oduaghan of Delta state, Tompolo will use some people to go and block him because he is very close to the government. So, John Togo now said if this is it and the whole thing started from the creek well I am going back to the creek. I am going back to go and get my own share. I think in the process, he killed soldiers and he was of course taken out.²⁵² (Also see Amaize, 2011).

Clearly, the case of John Togo demonstrates a typical case of an insider who later became an outsider peace spoiler due to the grievance of exclusion and marginalisation. Similarly, the ADDR patronage became counterproductive to security stabilisation because it resulted in the formation of several breakaway factions as noted by a Port Harcourt-based female civil society respondent:

...some of them were also not adequately rewarded and these led to gangs breaking away from each other. So if you are not satisfied with the way your Oga²⁵³ has treated you and you think you have the muscle, you break away from him. That's why we have rival gangs shooting from time to time.²⁵⁴

²⁵². Respondent 012, October 2013.

²⁵³. Oga is a terminology in Nigerian Pidgin English which refers to one's boss or superior.

²⁵⁴. Respondent 023, November 2013.

However, the problem of peace spoilers was not limited to the rank of former middle-level commanders but even among the foot soldiers. For example, a key member of the TCND asserted that some of them that ‘...were not caught in the web of this distribution of patronage...’²⁵⁵ felt cheated and undermined the relative peace in the Niger Delta by attacking their former bosses. A pertinent case was the report by Okhomina (2013) titled ‘*Gunmen kill 13 policemen in Bayelsa state*’. The reporter revealed that some disgruntled foot soldiers formerly under the command of ex-MEND South Wind commander, Kile Selky Torughedi alias General Young Shall Grow attacked and killed thirteen policemen deployed to provide security during the internment of the ‘general’s’ late mother at Azuzuama Sothern Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa state.²⁵⁶ The reporter further alleged that the boys were aggrieved because the General abandoned them despite having hugely benefitted from government patronage and being appointed Senior Special Adviser to the Bayelsa state governor on Marine Waterways Security (Okhomina, 2013).

As further revealed by the member of the TCND the high level of disgruntlement among former foot soldiers and the threat it posed to the safety of the former commanders explains why the top ex-commanders are always surrounded by a large retinue of state armed security personnel. As he noted:

One of them came to see me some days ago, the number of Mobile Police he was carrying was more than a minister, now who is he hiding from, he is not hiding from the government, he is hiding from his boys. One of them came to Port Harcourt and he changed four hotels a night because he is being hunted by his people because they are seeing them as the people who have benefitted.²⁵⁷

In another vein, the manner in which the ADDR patronage was offered to militants also sent a wrong signal that taking arms against the state was a lucrative enterprise. Thus, an academic expert contends that it incentivised violence:

...the biggest danger really is that the way...the amnesty program addressed combatants ... but there were also communities that went through all those difficulties... they bore it, they did not join the armed

²⁵⁵. Respondent 008, October 2013.

²⁵⁶. The report by Okhomina was also confirmed by the ‘general’ during the interview I had with him.

²⁵⁷. Respondent 008, October 2013.

struggle and so on ... now the danger is that people are seeing that 'oh, actually it pays... to be a combatant, to take up arms,' and so on...²⁵⁸

While another regional expert says 'it now motivates people to become violent because if you go round Yenagoa the best buildings are owned by former militants, so violence now pays, that's the message it has sent to the younger ones precisely.'²⁵⁹ Indeed, ADDR has provided an impetus for the emergence of certain latent militant groups which, during the peace process, were considered inconsequential but emerged to threaten the relative peace achieved in the Niger Delta. In other words, the ADDR patronage system also encouraged the emergence of *outright outsider peace spoilers*, a situation Greenhill and Major (Winter 2006/07: 10) describe as '...dogs that did not originally bark may later emerge, threatening...'. For example, the emergence of Kelvin Ibruvwe who in 2013 proclaimed himself as the leader of *Liberation Movement for the Urhobo People (LIMUP)* an ethnic nationality in Delta state attests to the veracity of these assertions. Kelvin Ibruvwe and his followers took up arms against the state declaring that:

We are giving this ultimatum because the cheating is too much, the federal and state governments had neglected us for so long and now we want them to hear us because for over 50 years now, they have been drilling oil from our community which is the second best oil in this country, yet we have nothing to show for it. There is hunger everywhere; graduates have no jobs. So we want the government to listen to us and that is why we are giving them 60 days' ultimatum to listen to us or else we will shut down all the well heads in the area. If they like, they should bring soldiers. When we want to strike, no amount of security can stop us ... *When the Ijaws and Itsekiris [were]... agitating with arms, we the Urhobo youths chose to be peaceful, but what did we get? We are rather left out completely in the amnesty programme [my emphasis]. Is it not the same oil that the Ijaws and Itsekiris produce that is also produced in Kokori, which has the second best oil in Nigeria? So what is our crime (sic)?* (Orosewotu, 2013: 2).

The emergence of Kelvin illustrates the fact that if not carefully planned and implemented, DDR can establish the roots of further conflict and instability. Equally important is that the emergence of Kelvin raises an important theoretical issue that strengthens the empirical and analytical relevance of Kaldor's (2006: vii-ix and 2015: 90) new wars thesis whereby alleged political grievances are

²⁵⁸. Respondent 045, December 2013. See International Crisis Group Africa Report No 231, 2015: 4-5.

²⁵⁹. Respondent 032, November 2013.

used as a cover for the pursuit of criminal agendas. This is because while Kelvin portrayed his action as driven by genuine political grievances, the Nigerian police adduced criminal evidence and declared him the ‘most wanted kidnapper and robbery kingpin’ (Amaize and Ahon, 2013) in Delta state as at that time. Furthermore, the selective application of patronage has reinforced aspects of the conflict economy that centred on illegal oil bunkering. According to Ledum Mitee, the Chairman of the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) there are three dimensions of illegal oil bunkering:

First is the small scale pilfering of crude (and sometimes condensates and refined products) through pipeline vandalization for use in artisanal or illegal refineries. Although this is generally referred to as small scale but considering the fact that recent studies have shown that it now engages (employs) some 450,000 mostly youths with a GDP that is more than twice the national average shows its depth and extent. The second is the large scale theft of crude oil through very skilled and sophisticated processes involving attachments to pipelines, illegal tank farms, barges and international maritime tankers transported for international market. The third (sic) which is the excess lifting of crude oil beyond the licensed quantity (Mitee, 2013: 2).

The data on the numbers of arrests made in connection to illegal oil bunkering that I collected from different security agencies operating in the Niger Delta shows that the first and second dimensions remained a recurrent phenomenon during the year 2013. For example, the Nigerian Navy (NN) destroyed a total of 1,669 illegal²⁶⁰ refineries and arrested 1,806 suspected perpetrators of the act between January and October 2013. Likewise, it arrested twenty-eight²⁶¹ vessels in connection to illegal oil bunkering during the same period. The JTF reveals that:

From January to date, the Joint Task Force Op Pulo Shield conducted a total of 1,025 anti-illegal oil bunkering patrols, while over 1,951 illegal refineries have been destroyed. Also scuttled were 81 barges, 1,117 Cotonou boats, 82 tanker trucks, 1,873 surface tanks and 1,857 suspects were arrested. Additionally, 39,760 drums of illegally refined products, 570 pumping machines and 75 outboard motor engines used as apparatus to facilitate oil theft were seized and destroyed. Forty-six vessels of various sizes and capacities were also arrested during the period under review. ²⁶²

²⁶⁰. These figures were extracted from Nigerian Navy 2013 report titled ‘Nigerian Navy efforts at curbing crude oil theft and pipeline vandalization: facts behind the figures’ reference number NHQ: 011/67/93/OPS/VOL 11/ November 2013.

²⁶¹. Ibid.

²⁶². This information was extracted from a report titled ‘Media brief on the operational activities of Joint Task Force (Operation Pulo Shield) for the year 2013 by Major General BA Debiro’ dated 24 December 2013.

In 2013 the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria threatened to shut down its operations due to colossal crude oil theft and illegal bunkering. Its Managing Director, Mr Mutiu Sunmonu attests to this:

We have now witnessed a significant upsurge in the activities of crude oil thieves. The situation in the last few weeks is unprecedented. The volume (of crude oil) being stolen is the highest in the last three years. Over 60,000 barrels per day from Shell alone. So, that, for me, is a great concern. Over time, this whole crime has got a lot more sophisticated and you could see that the perpetrators are now setting up barge building yards; they are setting up storage facilities; they are setting up tank farms for storing the crude oil, prior to shipping out (Olaniyi, 2013).²⁶³

Several respondents alluded to the crude way patronage was applied in the ADDR programme as responsible for the significant increase in illegal oil bunkering and local refining in a number of ways. Specifically, the exclusion of middle-level commanders and foot soldiers from the ADDR patronage system and the rapid decline in their standards of living encouraged some of them to fall back again to illegal oil bunkering and local refining as a strategy to maintain their previous living standards and ventilate their grievance against the state in a nonviolent way for excluding them. The member of the TCND noted that many of those excluded felt that:

Ok since you people in Abuja feel that you only know these people ok stay there now we will make some money out of what we know best, we cut these pipes and then we do our own refinery. That is why I said that these are the linkages that we are not able to make... You see, you picked up the leaders, made them rich, what I called the...militants are not covered who feel aggrieved by the process... They are now seeing their bosses...rich, buying houses everywhere living in Abuja and they don't see them. So it is now like through my own this thing you have now made all this money. So because of that people now say ok, fine, this oil we can make money out of it so that we get something also out of...our struggle together (sic).²⁶⁴

Similarly, when youth who refused to participate in militancy witnessed how those that took up arms against the state were handsomely rewarded, many felt cheated and resorted to the business of oil theft. Again, a member of TCND narrated his personal encounter with a youth from his local community who had

²⁶³ . See *Tell* editorial titled 'Why Jonathan must stop oil theft' dated November 18, 2013 No. 46.

²⁶⁴. Respondent 008, October 2013.

not originally been a member of the Niger Delta militants or involved in illegal oil bunkering:

I can give you an example in my village. Last Christmas I went home, one of the boys who comes around and beg me money, when I arrived there he came to me and say Oga what would you drink? I said you in my house asking me what I would drink. He said Oga levels have changed. I said what is levels have changed? He said he is a proud owner of three refineries and he has bought a car outside and he wanted me to come and see it.²⁶⁵

The respondent explained that the youth was part of those who were aggrieved because of the huge patronage extended to the 'top generals' without any provision for those that refused to participate in militancy.

The manner in which the ADDR patronage system was applied suggests that it created a serious backlash that strengthened militarisation in the Niger Delta as can be deduced from a statement made by the Shell Petroleum Development Company Managing Director Mutiu Sunmonu. According to Mutiu Sunmonu 'this (oil theft/illegal bunkering/illegal refining) is beyond communities. This is well-funded... heavily-armed gangs. What type of collaboration with communities will help you against people carrying guns, people who are very well armed?' (Olaniyi, 2013). Suffice to say that the militarised nature of illegal oil bunkering will motivate individuals to acquire arms thereby reinforcing arms proliferation.

In another dimension, the practical method through which demobilisation was achieved via cantonment helped to sustain existing horizontal links among foot soldiers as colleagues in combat. Horizontal demobilisation seeks to destroy the psychological bonding that developed among combatants as colleagues and comrades during their combat life. However, the manner in which cantonment was carried out was inimical to achieving horizontal demobilisation. To achieve horizontal demobilisation, the original plan was that militants from the same state, camp and commander were to be encamped separately. However, given that this plan was not followed through combat fraternities were extended to the Obubura demobilisation camp. As one member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee noted:

...what we wanted to do was take some people from Bayelsa, take some people from Ondo state, some from Delta, some from Akwa-Ibom state to

²⁶⁵. Respondent 008, October 2013.

form a team... and take those ones to Jos; form another group and take them to Taraba... so that it is not all of them from one particular set that would go to one camp and continue with their contacts and relationships; they should see fresh people that they didn't know..., you know, because the whole idea is to turn them to individuals again; because they always think in terms of 'I am from camp this ... I'm from Ateke Tom, I'm from this ... so the whole idea there is to separate them totally; at the end of the day, when we take them back to society...they are now on their own... but ... all those things, because of the way things went we were unable to do them properly; so I don't think we've been able to achieve ... the demobilisation in the real sense...²⁶⁶

Also, certain routines observed during cantonment were contrary to the goal of demobilisation. For example, the militants' militarised mindset was supposed to have been demilitarised during demobilisation. However, a female staff member of a nongovernmental organisation noted that some of the routines observed during cantonment tended to reinforce these attributes instead of demilitarising them. According to her:

What happened during the camp was that they had some kind of military training... it was like a military camp, they march, they [come] came out for morning exercises, there were military people everywhere in the camp...for some of us it was funny! We know that in their camps they had such military formations and even while they were in camp they still recognize that military line of communication that they had when they were in the creeks... some boys were forced to be respectful...And we warned that if those people had this kind of military training as militants and you are saying that you are demobilizing them...it really didn't make any sense to us...²⁶⁷

The above evidence was further buttressed by an audio-visual²⁶⁸ of the various activities observed at the demobilisation camp that I watched. In the audio-visual, the demobilisation closing ceremony of every cohort was marked with a military passing out parade as was the case in the military, police or paramilitary training institutions. In my view, this practice amounted to reinforcing the militants' combat mindset and sense of regimentation that was supposed to be neutralised during demobilisation. A Niger Delta expert contended that more time should have been used to engage the ex-militants in nonviolence training.²⁶⁹ Again, the routines observed during the cantonment highlighted why a female staff of a nongovernmental organisation contended that the situation at Obubura

²⁶⁶. Respondent 042, December 2013.

²⁶⁷. Respondent 020, November 2013.

²⁶⁸. Sourced from key informant.

²⁶⁹ Respondent 032- Niger Delta researcher, November 2013.

demobilisation camp was such that 'lines of command were high, were still in order...and it is still in order, I don't think it has been ... [dismantled].' This lends credence to Özerdem's (2009: 29) assertion that '...the cantonment of combatants reinforces the command structures that the process is intended to dissolve'.

In conclusion, it is my contention that the symbolic significance of amnesty and disarmament as an informal social contract helped to provide immediate relative stability in the Niger Delta. Nevertheless, demobilisation failed to successfully consolidate the short-term stability achieved by ensuring that existing vertical and horizontal C&C (Command and Control) structures among the ex-militants were broken. Instead, the manner in which inducement was crudely applied in the form of ADDR patronage resulted in a *neopatrimonial DDR* that ensured their perpetuation, thereby strengthening the capacity to remobilise on the part of the 'top generals' which suggests that the potential for the Niger Delta region to relapse into violence remains very high. That notwithstanding, I also argued that the use of patronage has produced some unintended but positive consequence that tends to diminish and undermine the capacity of the former top commanders to remobilise. Most notably, it has undermined their credibility as actors claiming to use violence to redress grievances of the wider Niger Delta community.

5.1.4. Reintegration and Security Stabilisation in the Niger Delta

Reintegration is the final phase in the DDR process as outlined in the UN IDDRS (2006). While according to Berdal (1996: 39) reintegration consists of ‘...medium- and long-term programmes, including ‘cash compensation, training or income generation meant to increase the potential for the economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants and their families.’ More specifically, Kingma identifies three dimensions of reintegration when he asserts that:

Social reintegration is...the process through which the ex-combatant and his or her family feel part of and are accepted by the community. One should thus not only consider the ex-combatants and their families, but also the attitude of the communities towards the ex-combatants... *Political reintegration* refers to the process through which the ex-combatant and his or her family become a full part of decision-making processes. *Economic reintegration* is the process through which the ex-combatant’s household builds up its livelihood, through production and other types of gainful employment (Kingma, 2000: 28).

It is the critical phase of the DDR process because its success determines whether ex-combatants and society at large can return to the path of long-term peace (Shibuya, 2012: 85). Therefore, it is key to the restoration of security and stability in the aftermath of a violent conflict and also the benchmark for measuring the overall success of any DDR programme. Against this background, the extent to which reintegration can contribute to security stabilisation in the Niger Delta depends on the degree to which the ex-militants’ are socially, politically and economically reintegrated into society.

5.1.4.1. Social Reintegration and Reconciliation

After being demobilised, ex-combatants are confronted by a number of personal challenges such as their separation from and the destruction of the social network they relied on during the war, which Hazen (n. d.: 1-11) refers to as the war family. Likewise, they are also confronted with stigma and rejection by family and community members (Operational Guide to the UN IDDRS, 2014: 172). This implies that ‘an ex-combatant who has economic opportunities but who is socially isolated or excluded cannot be considered as successfully reintegrated’ (Ibid.) All these underscore the importance of ex-combatants achieving social reintegration. Equally, social reintegration should incorporate reconciliation and trust building among and between different groups and communities affected by

conflict (Ibid.). Indeed, it is against this background that Özerdem (2013: 225-236) contends that successful social reintegration is a fundamental precondition for the economic and political reintegration of ex-combatants.

In light of the above, a key question is to what extent the Niger Delta ex-militants were successfully reintegrated into the societal social milieu and how were they being perceived by the broader members of society. Were they perceived as perpetrators of violence or new advocates of peace? This question is pertinent because Niger Delta ex-militants oftentimes engage in predatory activities against their people. For example, a Port- Harcourt based female civil society member observes that even though the Niger Delta militants were not at war with their communities some of them perpetrated violence such as rape, kidnapping, murder and destroyed peoples' property during the course of the conflict.²⁷⁰

Thus, if the ex-militants are to be socially accepted and reintegrated, a genuine process of social reconciliation must be pursued to change the negative community perception about them. Conversely, several respondents interviewed shared the consensus that the ex-militants, particularly the foot soldiers, are still grappling with the challenge of social reintegration. This is because the reintegration phase of the DDR programme lacked any social reconciliation agenda. In line with this a female staff member of a nongovernmental organisation contends that:

There should have been a kind of sensitisation on the amnesty programme because... the amnesty programme is actually giving them pardon and if the Federal government has given them pardon it means that their communities also should forgive them for whatever they had done...and that was what ...should have been done... there should have been some sessions of healing or some form of restorative justice...to prepare the community, to say that this person actually did all these things but he is a different person now and we should accept him. That was not done, that was not done.²⁷¹

Also, a Niger Delta development activist argues that the social reintegration of the Niger Delta militants was not given any priority during the planning of the ADDR programme because local communities were not considered a critical stakeholder that needed to be carried along in the process. According to him 'it is obvious... everybody was not carried along. The community was not even

²⁷⁰. Respondent 025, November 2013.

²⁷¹. Respondent 020, November 2013.

thought [of,] it was not even remembered as a critical sector of the entire amnesty that has a role to play.²⁷² The obvious implication of neglecting a social reconciliation agenda in the reintegration process is that many of the communities to which the ex-militants were expected to return still harbour negative perceptions of them. This has generated a general apathy on the part of the communities expected to receive the ex-militants particularly the foot soldiers. This suggests why most of the ex-foot soldiers are settling in the capital cities of their states instead of their local rural communities.²⁷³ Residing in cities makes it easier for them to conceal their identity as former ex-militants and so escape societal negative perception about them. However, the above Niger Delta development activist contends that this could have been mitigated ‘...if the amnesty had...carried the communities along in the dialogue, in the discussion and all that...’.²⁷⁴

A staff member of a nongovernmental organisation points out that it was in recognition of the clear gap in the social reintegration of the foot soldiers that the Oil and Gas Industry Foundation (OGIF) selected a number of the ex-militants and organised them into clusters with funding to execute community development projects in selected communities.²⁷⁵ The aim was to create a positive social perception about them as reformed persons and agents of change, thereby serving as a springboard for their social reconciliation and reintegration into society.²⁷⁶ However, this approach did not succeed because as elaborated by the respondent above, ‘the problem with the clustering was that you have people coming from different areas by that you put them together the first problem is where the project will be sited’²⁷⁷ The second challenge was the reluctance on the part of communities to accept such a gesture of goodwill from ex-militants who were still negatively perceived. Again, the female respondent asserts that:

...because some of these people you are asking these communities to take back have killed loved ones of people in the community, some of them have raped, looted, have burnt people’s houses and you think by getting them to build a primary school will make the community see them in a different light. I mean that doesn’t make any sense to me.²⁷⁸

²⁷². Respondent 022, November 2013.

²⁷³. Personal observation during field work

²⁷⁴. Ibid.

²⁷⁵. Respondent 020, November 2013.

²⁷⁶. Ibid.

²⁷⁷. Ibid.

²⁷⁸. Respondent 020, November 2013.

Her position was corroborated by a Niger Delta academic expert who notes that:

Some of them [ex-militants] started as sea pirates, some started as warlords in intra-communal conflicts or inter-communal conflicts and had killed people, community members before they transformed to become militants, how do you reintegrate such a man back into his community? The man who loss his father because of him, will he receive him?²⁷⁹

Consequently, such negative perceptions have undermined the social reintegration of the ex-militants' soldiers. Yet, a better way of achieving it would have been to adopt community-based approaches. As asserted by Haider (2009: 4) 'community-based approaches (CBA) seek to empower local community groups and institutions by giving the community direct control over investment decisions, project planning, execution and monitoring, through a process that emphasises inclusive participation and management.' He further argues that agencies that can be used to achieve community-based peacebuilding include association, cooperative, civil association, community-based organisation, village leadership (Ibid.). This suggests that grassroots civil society organisations (CSOs), community and opinion leaders, community age grades', the media and churches in the Niger Delta ought to have been fully involved in the ADDR process from its conceptualisation, design and implementation. These networks of partners could, in turn, have educated and mobilised the receiving communities as well as contribute to transforming their negative perception of the ex-militants. As a member of the Ogoni Solidarity Forum points out, some of the local communities strongly believe that the ex-militants have committed sacrilegious offences and acts and therefore must undergo spiritual cleansing.²⁸⁰ This again suggests that, where necessary, traditional mechanisms of social reintegration could have been explored, as its efficacy has been tested in the reintegration of child soldiers in places like Liberia, Angola and Northern Uganda (Verhey, 2001:18).

Undisputedly, the failure of the OGI Foundation initiative demonstrates that without achieving social reconciliation and reintegration the political and economic reintegration of the ex-Niger Delta militants is likely to be jeopardised. Conversely, this study discovered that it was comparatively easier for the 'top

²⁷⁹. Respondent 032, November 2013.

²⁸⁰. Respondent 015, November 2013.

generals' to socially reintegrate into society compared to the foot soldiers. This was because the state patronage extended to them empowered them economically to purchase social respect and recognition. A Niger Delta expert observes that their social reintegration was more a consequence of the patronage they gave out not because the perception held about them had fundamentally changed. According to him:

A few of them are well accepted, but not because people see that they are new creatures but because some of them still have money to patronize their communities. They still have money...they pay school fees for people and all that. See like there were some of them during militancy they took over the functions of government, they were providing water, scholarships ok so those were the heroes of their communities and they are still heroes they are still received by their people. So the reception or what appear to be that they are reintegrated is not because those persons have new orientation but simply because of some patronage that exist between them and their people (sic).²⁸¹

Consequently, unless the negative perception of the ex-militants is transformed, their social reintegration will be difficult to realise. Likewise, while it appears that the ultimate goal of the social reintegration of the ex-Niger Delta militants was to achieve their reintegration into the community, in terms of operationalization the entire DDR process was combatant centred instead of community-based. As noted by Özerdem (2012: 58) in the community-based approach to reintegration '... the target caseload would be considered as part of their family and community within the wider framework of development challenges in the peace-building context.' This is to say that ex-combatants' grievances would be addressed simultaneously with that of the community. But, in this context reintegration support was strictly provided to the ex-militants excluding their expected communities of return and other victims of the conflict. The practice above reinforces what Özerdem and Podder (2015: 63) described as an "us" and "them" type of distinction which generates the resentment that inhibits the assimilation of the ex-militants into their local communities' socio-economic and political milieu. This, at the end of the day, becomes counterproductive to the political and economic reintegration of the ex-militants particularly the foot soldiers.

²⁸¹. Respondent 032, November 2013.

5.1.4.2. Political Reintegration

Conceptually the political reintegration of ex-combatants has remained an under-theorised and researched area (Söderström, 2013: 1 and 2015: 6; Özerdem and Podder, 2015: 56). Söderström, (2013: 10-13 and 2015: 6-17) argues that the political reintegration of ex-combatants can be subsumed under three main areas. One, the transformation of former military elites into a political elites whereby former warlords and military commanders succeed in becoming elected representatives in the post-war re-formed state. Two, transformation of an armed group into a political party or civil society organisation whereby it becomes a platform for advancing the resolution of the conflict through democratic means. Three, the individual rank and file of former combatants becoming democratic citizens, understood in terms of ‘...the process whereby political channels are increasingly seen as viable for handling societal problems for the individual ex-combatant’ (Söderström, 2015: 14). In other words, political reintegration is concerned with ‘...*the extent to which democratic norms and ideals are embraced by ex-combatants*’ (Ibid). The quality of political values voiced by ex-combatants and the extent they feel they have a voice and can express it freely, all constitute indicators of the political reintegration of the rank and file of the ex-combatants (Ibid). Furthermore, Söderström argues that the transformation of an armed group into a political party depends on its internal cohesion, the degree of popular support and legitimacy accorded to it by the international community as well as its economic viability (Söderström, 2013: 11 and Söderström, 2015: 13).

The political reintegration of the Niger Delta ex-militants and their family members was not given any priority in the reintegration process. Nonetheless, one way to achieve this was for MEND to have transformed into a political party or civil society organisation thereby becoming a platform for advancing the resolution of the conflict through democratic means. Respondents attributed the failure of MEND to metamorphose into a political party to different reasons. For example, an expert on the Niger Delta argues that such an idea was not given any priority by the Nigerian State and was therefore never contemplated as an inducement to be extended to MEND while negotiating the ADDR programme, neither was it demanded by the Movement.²⁸² He also points out that MEND was

²⁸². Respondent 032, June 2015.

not a cohesively structured organisation but a conglomeration of self-independent commanders collaborating together to advance the course of the Niger Delta violent struggle.²⁸³ Thus, MEND lacked the internal cohesion needed to successfully transform into a political party. Another Niger Delta academic expert argues that the peace process that led to the ADDR programme did not provide an enabling environment for MEND to undergo this kind of transformation because the ADDR programme was not a product of a formally negotiated settlement²⁸⁴ and as Högladh (2012: 45) points out, successful cases of armed groups transforming into a political party have been achieved within the framework of negotiated peace agreement.

It is also arguable that political reintegration did not form a component of the reintegration process of the Niger Delta ex-militants because MEND has never articulated any clear agenda of political transformation or indicated interest in acquiring direct political power as a means of effecting genuine political transformation. For instance, even though MEND had clamoured for absolute resource control to be granted to the Niger Delta region they have never demonstrated how that would translate into concrete development of the region within the context of the rentier-neo-patrimonial character of the Nigerian State where public office has become a means of prebendal accumulation by political elites and state bureaucrats as well as an avenue for extending patronage to their cronies.

The failure of MEND to articulate any transformative agenda suggests that we can categorise its leaders as representing what Reno (2011: 164) described as warlord rebels which I earlier highlighted in this work. In the case of MEND, as they challenged the Nigerian State there was nothing reformist in their narratives or actions. Arguably too, the Nigerian government may have deliberately decided not to give any priority to the formal political reintegration of the Niger Delta ex-militants because it interpreted MEND actors as loot-seeking opportunists masquerading as freedom fighters. Indeed, the above lends credence to my theorisation of MEND actors as essentially motivated and driven by greed, albeit greed wrapped up in a strong narrative of community grievance.

²⁸³. Respondent 032, June 2015.

²⁸⁴. Respondent 040, June 2015.

However, some of the 'top generals' of the Movement are truly getting mainstreamed into the Nigerian political landscape through the informal neo-patrimonial system, particularly in Delta and Rivers states.²⁸⁵ For instance, the elected deputy governor of Delta State during the 2015 governorship election is said to be a cousin of the ex-MEND commander 'General Tompolo' who played a key role in the politicking and lobbying that led to his emergence as the deputy governor of the state.²⁸⁶ Similarly, in Rivers State, a former top commander Farah Dagogo won an elected seat in the state parliament during the 2015 national assembly election.²⁸⁷ Also, a Niger Delta development activist asserted that during the run off to the 2015 general election, Ateke Tom one of the former militant commanders in Rivers state openly expressed interest in contesting the governorship office in the State, and circulated campaign posters all over the state.²⁸⁸ Therefore, even though the Niger Delta DDR programme does not have any formal process of political reintegration as argued in the literature, the mainstreaming of the 'top generals' into the Nigerian political landscape is evidently being successfully realised informally through their co-optation into the neo-patrimonial political economy of the Nigerian State. This was made possible via the ADDR patronage system which catapulted them into the league of regional neo-patrimonial ruling elites.

In contrast, an expert on matters relating to the Niger Delta observed that the political reintegration of ex-militant rank and file is tenuous because they lack the resources to extend patronage, which could have paved the way for them to exercise some level of influence in the decision-making process of their local communities.²⁸⁹ Another respondent, a Niger Delta development activist, argues that the major obstacle to their political reintegration is the lack of proper reorientation and attitudinal change on their part.²⁹⁰ Many of them, he argues, lack courtesies; display unruly behaviour and abuse drugs, a situation he blamed on the poor psychosocial support and counselling given to them during demobilisation and thereafter.²⁹¹ This suggests that the political reintegration of

²⁸⁵. Respondent 040, June 2015.

²⁸⁶. Ibid.

²⁸⁷. Respondent 045- senior management staff office of the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta, June 2015.

²⁸⁸. Respondent 022, June 2015.

²⁸⁹. Respondent 032, November 2013.

²⁹⁰. Respondent 022, June 2015.

²⁹¹. Ibid.

the ex-foot soldiers into the decision-making process of their local communities is not being achieved. However, this contrasts with the conflict era where in some communities, the militants imposed the agenda for decision making through the barrel of a gun, thus it is clear that for many ex-militants, the new era offers relative powerlessness and marginalisation.

5.1.4.3. Economic Reintegration

As asserted by Kingma (2000: 28) economic reintegration is the process through which ex-fighters and their households build up new livelihoods by engaging in productive activities and gainful employment. Therefore, the failure to achieve economic reintegration ‘...can lead to considerable insecurity at the societal and individual levels, including rent-seeking behaviours through the barrel of a gun’ (Colleta *et al*, 1996: 18). Supporting this position, Collier (1994: 343-351) argues that failure to adequately cater for ex-combatants’ economic wellbeing will trigger an avalanche of micro and macro security challenges. In line with conventional practice in DDR, the economic reintegration of the Niger Delta ex-militants was prioritised. For instance, a documentary titled ‘*Presidential amnesty programme Niger Delta 2014*’ provided insight on the achievements being recorded in economic reintegration of the ex-Niger Delta militants. The transcript of the documentary testifies as follows:

...out of ... 30,000 persons enlisted in the first, second and third phases of the Presidential Amnesty programme an appreciable number of them totalling 5,000 are currently undergoing training spread across... 104 universities and 22 skilled acquisition centres in 28 countries and 19 training institutions in 8 states of the country. About 1,000 of them in the oil and gas sector have graduated and currently in training (sic), 29 have graduated in... engineering in France. Over 13,000 delegates have graduated from local and foreign training centres in various skills acquisition programmes. At a ceremony in Lagos recently...The Chief Host and President Goodluck Jonathan’s Special Adviser on Amnesty Matters Honourable Kingsley Kuku introduced to the public 65 youths who trained and qualified as commercial pilots and 61 youths who trained and qualified as aircraft maintenance engineers. The training was carried out by world-class aviation companies like Boeing and Lufthansa.²⁹²

²⁹². This information was sourced from a transcription of the commentary of a documentary titled ‘Presidential amnesty programme Niger Delta 2014’ available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ap8OJh-AIG8> and accessed

Furthermore, the Head of the Reintegration Department at the Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta revealed the successes being recorded in the area of human resource development of the ex- Niger Delta militants. As he noted:

...some of them now are in Lufthansa, doing what we call type rating to move from one level of being a pilot to the top most level of what we call the end level new generation level. Some of them, six amongst those people and the deprived communities, six of them are distinction holders from UK universities from a post-graduate programme, 14 of them are pursuing PhD, of course, you know that 19,000 more of them are currently in training... is the only DDR programme that is training somebody to be a PhD holder, is the only DDR programme in the world that is not targeted at training artisans... it is succeeding...because we have people who will fly planes, we have people who are already flying and earning money, we have instructors from the programme teaching in institutions including flying institutions...currently... we have over 16,000 graduates. And now we have taken it to a new level we are collaborating with Schneider in France to train people in power generation...²⁹³

However, it is pertinent to point out that for economic reintegration to contribute to security stabilisation in the context of DDR certain fundamentals about it must be right. First, it is necessary that the genuine ex-combatants are given priority in the training opportunities being offered. Contrariwise, evidence from this study suggests that many of the ex-militants had been short-changed. A female staff member of a nongovernmental organisation observed that many of the ex-militants were frustrated because:

...they feel that they had been sold out...some of them complain that the reintegration aspect of it (sic), all the promises the government made that they were going to give them skills, send them to skills acquisition centres, they were going to get them back to school... most of those promises have not been fulfilled, and what most of them complain is that those that are close to power have used that opportunity to send their siblings, their cronies... their relatives who never fought, who didn't know what was going-on to foreign Universities... send them out of the country for one thing or the other (sic).²⁹⁴

Corroborating the above submission, a former MEND commander testifies that:

²⁹³. This information was sourced from a transcription of a live television interview held with Mr Lawrence Peple, Head of the Reintegration Department at the Office of the Special Assistance to the President on Niger Delta Amnesty Programme. The live interview programme was titled 'Niger Delta Presidential Amnesty program assessment-The Journey So Far'. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7BSWte1Oidg>.

²⁹⁴. Respondent 020, November 2013.

Most of these boys...our boys they have not gone to even Obubura till the Obubura stopped. And they have not even gone to the so-called abroad or whatever you understand. And these are the main boys, these are key people, they have their original amnesty identity card, the Federal Government Amnesty Identity Card they have it but they have not gone to the training in Obubura until that one stopped. Then at the same time they have not call them for this other training again. So these are the boys that are falling back to the river to do all these things because they don't have hope.²⁹⁵

This suggests that the possibility of economic reintegration to contribute to security stabilisation in the Niger Delta has been undermined because a lot of the genuine ex-militants have been substituted. Furthermore, for economic reintegration to enhance security stabilisation the trained ex-combatants must also have access to gainful employment or financial capital to start up small scale business. Judging from the response of a Niger Delta female respondent, a lot of those trained are yet to be gainfully employed:

...though they said they are teaching some people work, but I know some group of boys that have finished learning the job they are back home doing nothing...yes, yes, they are back home they have finished training them but they are not engaged. So you discover that after some years the trade even they have learnt will no longer be useful. Although they said they don't owe them the responsibility of engaging them but if it must be sustainable I think one of the things is that as you train them in their trade, also engage them for sustainability. But now they are back at home, and an idle hand is the devil's workshop. After sometimes when this free money will stop I think those boys will carry up arms again...²⁹⁶

In the same vein, a community leader of an oil producing community in Bayelsa state concurs with the above response and asserts that:

During the introduction of amnesty programme most of our boys...went as far as to embrace in the first phase and the second phase. But according to them few were sent to courses and since when they returned they have not been employed. Like some of them who did...sea welding... Imagine, these boys here who did this welding...are not employed but they bring some boys from down, down, down not from Niger-Delta, they bring some experts from foreign lands to come and work here...you send them to course when they come back they are not employed...They are awarded certificates... but these certificates are just useless, somebody who is certificated is supposed to be employed, so what is the use of the certificate then.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵. Respondent 039, November 2013.

²⁹⁶. Respondent 025, November 2013.

²⁹⁷. Respondent 033, November 2013.

Likewise, another former MEND commander contends that ‘... the rehabilitation process was very successful. But the other area that is yet to be successful even up to ... today is the creation of jobs.’²⁹⁸ In a similar vein, the latest information disclosed by the Special Coordinator of the Amnesty Programme revealed that 11,768 of the ex-militants are yet to be empowered.²⁹⁹ Consequently, it is pertinent to say that the failure to absorb several of the trained ex-militants into gainful employment raises the fundamental question as to what extent the training was truly based on a realistic survey of existing labour market and business opportunities in the country. The rationale behind this practice is questioned by a Niger Delta academic expert:

... I did not see any reason why you send several persons to go and learn to become pilots when you don’t have a viable aviation industry what would they come and do? I did not see any reason why you send several persons to go and learn and become crane caterpillar operators when you do not have several construction firms and even the ones that you have how many of them have cranes and caterpillars for people to ride [sic]. I don’t know if you understand the point [I]am making. You send someone to go and learn welding then he comes and there is no electricity, he needs patronage to live if there is no patronage he cannot live...³⁰⁰

Suffice to argue that a discernible issue from the above response is the question of mismatch between the kind of training offered and existing opportunities in the Nigerian labour market. Certainly, sending the ex-militants for training abroad without adequate absorption capacity at home served as a useful quick fix for stabilising the Nigerian rentier neo-patrimonial state whose survival had been threatened by the militants’ attacks on oil and gas facilities. However, the fact that so many are returning to unemployment may be storing up longer-term potentials for the resurgence of violence.

Furthermore, the huge resources being expended on training opportunities abroad that could be done by competent national institutions in Nigeria has prompted the International Crisis Group Africa Report No 231 (2015: 3) to observe that ‘... the very expensive program has drawn criticism...’. Consequently, while the idea of providing quality training to the ex-militants is a

²⁹⁸. Respondent 041, November 2013.

²⁹⁹. See story titled ‘Amnesty Office yet to empower 11,768 ex-militants-Boroh’. Available at: <http://theeagleonline.com.ng/amnesty-office-yet-to-empower-11768-ex-militants-boroh/> (Accessed 26 July 2016).

³⁰⁰. Respondent 032, November 2013.

laudable one, the manner in which implementers of the programme resorted to expensive overseas training was in defiance of the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee's position that the programme should not be internationalised.³⁰¹ One could argue that the internationalisation of the training is suggestive of two things. One, it fits into the rentier state culture characterised by a high level of extravagance; because conducting such training in Nigeria could have conserved huge resources that could be used in addressing some of the pressing development needs in the Niger Delta such as the provision of health facilities and clean water. Two, while it is arguable that conducting the training in Nigeria could have made it susceptible to corruption, taking them abroad provided a leeway for implementers of the programme to manipulate the process for personal enrichment. As revealed by an informant within the amnesty office, officials engaged in frivolous frequent foreign trips in the name of monitoring of trainees and in search of overseas training centres.

Similarly, the recent Economic and Financial Crimes Commission's (EFCC) arrest of eight contractors to the programme for alleged cases of corruption as reported by Isine (2015) lends credence to the allegations that the programme was characterised by corruption. Similarly, a regional scholar on the Niger Delta also makes the allegation that taking the training overseas makes it difficult for the Nigerian media and members of the public to access information about the programme.³⁰² Notwithstanding, the allegations of corruption and the obvious hitches that characterised the economic reintegration of the ex-militants, it represents one of the most comprehensive human resource capacity development programmes for youth in the Niger Delta which many of them believe is the only means of transforming their lives as rightly noted in this assertion:

Now, there is a problem. We are currently facing a situation where every unemployed, uneducated or un-empowered youth in the states in the Niger Delta believes that his only ticket to a better future is the Amnesty Programme... For the past two years we have in press conferences and statements as well as in several meetings with critical stakeholders been making this point: that the Amnesty Programme cannot be for all unemployed, untrained and un-empowered youths in the Niger Delta. I regret to inform you that we have not succeeded in dissuading thousands

³⁰¹. Respondent 050-key member of the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, January 2014.

³⁰². Respondent 032, November 2013.

of hapless Niger Delta youths from agitating for inclusion in the Amnesty Programme (Alli, 2013).

Nevertheless, the failure to engage those trained portends serious risk for sustaining the current relative stability achieved in the Niger Delta region. This is because the training triggered a revolution of rising expectations of job opportunities and a better life (International Crisis Group African Report No 231, 2015: 3). But regrettably, such expectations were dashed due to lack of opportunities for gainful employment. Evidently, the above failure reinforces the conditions for further grievance and frustration and the potential to resort to rent-seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun on the part of the ex-militants. This is because in the past the excuse for not being offered jobs in the oil and gas sector was the lack of relevant qualifications and skills but now the youth are qualified the jobs are still not obtainable. Consequently, as in the case of demobilisation, economic reintegration has failed to consolidate the relative security stability achieved via the grant of amnesty and disarmament.

5.2. The Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme from the Perspective of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta

In the previous section, I evaluated the extent to which the Niger Delta ADDR programme has succeeded in achieving its statutory goal of security stabilisation in the Niger Delta region. However, in this section, I evaluate the programme as recommended by the TCND, which membership comprised of a broad spectrum of stakeholders and members of civil society organisations from the Niger Delta region. My aim is to demonstrate how the implementation of a maximalist DDR that aims to achieve security stabilisation and development³⁰³ concurrently could have been a better alternative to the securitised one that was implemented.

³⁰³. See Özerdem (2009: 45-48 and 2013: 226-227) on security and development approaches in DDR and Muggah (2004: 27) minimalist and maximalist conceptualisation of DDR.

5.2.1. Overview of the Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme as Recommended by the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta

The TCND's recommendation for an all-inclusive DDR was premised on the contention that the basis for a long-term solution to the crisis of militancy in the Niger Delta was to address the roots of the conflict. Consequently, it asserts that:

...the Committee believes that for the Federal Government to effectively overcome the barriers to the Region's development, it has to set in place institutions and mechanisms that effectively contain the brazen abuse and misuse of public funds in the Region in particular and the country as a whole...In response to the above; the Committee... proposes actions to address the challenges of governance, militancy, the rule of law and corruption within and outside the Region, including tackling the non-transparent and unacceptable practices of oil and gas companies (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, 2009: 65).

The TCND further posited that reversing the trend of underdevelopment in the Niger Delta region which is at the root of militancy '...demands good governance, stronger anti-corruption procedures, credible and better elections...' (Ibid: 69). The TCND also identified key development challenges which it encapsulated into three broad areas; governance reforms, regional development and human capital development. On regional development, the TCND maintained that 'the crisis in the Niger Delta was strongly linked to the absence of physical development and the inadequate access to resources' (Ibid: 76). Consequently, it suggested a comprehensive regional development plan that addressed the infrastructural deficit in the region, environmental degradation and sustainability, etc. (Ibid). On Human Capital Development (HCD), the TCND recommended that DDR should be implemented together with '... massive and well-targeted investments in areas such as health, education and MDGs related matters' (Ibid: 87).

5.2.2. Evaluating the Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme as Conceptualised by the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta

This section evaluates efforts at addressing the core issues that formed the TCND's recommendation for a holistic/maximalist DDR. These include the lack of good governance which breeds corruption and the need for legislative reforms. The second issue is regional and infrastructural development, environmental remediation, MNOCs and host community relationships and human capital development.

5.2.2.1. Lack of Good Governance and Corruption

The TCND posited that the Niger Delta conflict is rooted in the long years of lack of good governance in the Niger Delta region and Nigeria in general. Accordingly, it asserted that the absence of these fundamental principles of good governance and the consequent corruption it breeds were responsible for the state of underdevelopment that gave rise to militancy in the Niger Delta region. The TCND then posited that a long-lasting solution to the crisis of militancy in the Niger Delta depended on the extent to which bad governance which breeds corruption is addressed in Nigeria:

The Committee is of the view that a crucial factor in resolving the Niger Delta crisis is dealing with the problem of militancy within a governance framework...Whilst it is true that paucity of funds have affected the development efforts of the Region, the Committee observes that had available funds been judiciously used, it would have gone a long way to address the development challenges in the Region. The implications of corruption for Nigeria as a whole are wide and multiple and even more grave for the Region...the Committee believes that for the Federal Government to effectively overcome the barriers to the Region's development, it has to set in place institutions and mechanisms that effectively contain the brazen abuse and misuse of public funds in the Region in particular and the country as a whole. (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, 2009: 65).

However, the views expressed by respondents clearly suggest that neither concurrently with the DDR programme nor in its immediate aftermath was any effort made by the Nigerian government to address the problem of the lack of good governance and the brazen corruption that permeates the Nigerian State, particularly the Niger Delta oil-producing states. A member of the TCND

expresses his frustration concerning the lack of commitment on the part of the Nigerian government:

...that is why I feel scandalized in the sense that we took pains to look at the whole issue even the issue of governance, and if you see our recommendations we tied it to the fact that you cannot even do this without looking at some governance issues even in the Niger-Delta. You cannot just throw money at things. There are governments that have gotten a whole lot of money. Look at River state for instance, if you calculate how much money that has come in the hands of the government, how comes that the lives of the people are still worse than it was. With all the resources, they have money more than some countries in Africa... So we thought that even the EFCC will be restructured to have a section that will focus on government in these areas from the local government and all that... because... you cannot look this only from the federal side, almost all the members... lamented that even though we are Niger-Delta people we cannot close our eyes... We cannot close our eyes... that corruption in this area is also there...³⁰⁴

Likewise, a respondent from the Nigerian Anti-Corruption Network argues that 'except we tackle corruption there cannot be proper development in the Niger Delta, and once there is no proper development in the Niger Delta there can never be peace in the Niger Delta'.³⁰⁵ Yet he notes that the ADDR was carried out without any effort to address the problem of corruption. While another Niger Delta academic expert asserts that not only was corruption not addressed but the DDR as a solution to the conflict was undermined by wide allegations of corruption; he exclaimed that 'people have become billionaires through the amnesty programme'.³⁰⁶ Furthermore, given that addressing the Niger Delta conflict hinges on addressing the problem of corruption in the Nigerian oil and gas sector, I investigated whether the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) was part of any such government effort. A key statutory responsibility of NEITI is to tackle the problem of corruption as well as ensure transparency in the oil and gas sector. However, a high-ranking official of NEITI that I interviewed stated: 'No, I don't think we've been in contact with them whatsoever and we've not... [had] any role to play with them'.³⁰⁷ This suggests that the DDR implementation agency is not involved in any form of collaboration with NEITI as part of a broader effort to address the roots of militancy in the Niger Delta of which

³⁰⁴. Respondent 008, October 2013.

³⁰⁵. Respondent 005, October 2013.

³⁰⁶. Respondent 032, November 2013.

³⁰⁷. Respondent 046, December 2013.

corruption and issues of transparency in the Nigerian oil and gas sector is an essential component. This further suggests that the solution to insecurity in the Niger Delta was pursued in complete isolation from the real underlying issues that produced it. This contrasts with Hill's (1999: 57-82) suggestion that for DDR to contribute to lasting peace it must have a two-pronged objective; addressing the security dilemma and the root causes of conflict. Whilst it was not possible for me to access hard facts regarding corruption and of course, perception may not always correspond to empirical reality; when the evidence of corruption adduced in Chapter Three is taken into account the above opinions cannot be wished away. Overall, the failure to address the critical issue of good governance shows that the fundamental source of the conflict remains unaddressed as an expert on the region asserts:

These are the things we should have addressed...look at ... [it] in totality. Look!, the point is this, when once there is good governance this conflict will stop, but for as long as we have bad governance, for as long as people in government steal money, for as long as the rural populace did not feel [the impact of] government, for as long as there is injustice... for as long as there is no one to complain to, for as long as parents are so impoverish or they cannot take care of their children, no social security, these conflicts will continue all we are doing is to postpone it. That is the key, that is the most critical factor, governance. If you say it is because Niger-Delta people are minority, the major groups oppress them, the only reason it could have happened was because there was a lack of good governance, that's all. Then you said give them 13%, the money comes and their own people are also wasting the money. It is the lack of good governance, so once you institute good governance and once the institutions are strong... these issues will begin to take care of themselves.³⁰⁸

5.2.2.2. Legislative Reforms

Within the broader governance reforms, was the need to review or abrogate certain obnoxious laws that were inimical to the interests of Niger Delta minorities. One such law recommended by the TCND was the revenue allocation formula. As I argued in Chapter Three, the Niger Delta ethnic minorities maintain that they are negatively affected by the environmental consequences of oil exploration and production activities, yet the sharing of the revenue is skewed in favour of the hegemonic ethnic groups that control the Nigerian State. A further issue concerns

³⁰⁸. Respondent 032-November 2013.

the legislation³⁰⁹ that completely dispossessed the Niger Delta minorities of their land and resources and transferred such rights to the Nigerian State. Therefore, within the framework of an all-inclusive DDR such laws were to be reviewed or abrogated. However, laws such as the revenue allocation formula and other obnoxious laws pertaining to land tenure still remain intact. One Niger Delta academic expert interviewed posits that ‘...the derivation funds³¹⁰ have not been addressed’.³¹¹ This was confirmed by another Niger Delta academic expert who contends that:

... perhaps much more importantly, there is no demonstration of the fact that the government is addressing the fundamentals which led to its abinitio. The laws are still the same, the policies are the same, nothing has changed, what has changed, what has changed, derivation is still 13%., the channel for distribution is still the same corrupt structure, it has not changed. The oil laws that the people were asking should be changed are the same, the attitudes of the oil companies have not changed...³¹²

The failure to review, amend or abrogate most of these laws implies that the structural issues that are at the root of the Niger Delta conflict still persist despite the semblance of relative stability achieved. It also means that the ex-Niger Delta militants are being reintegrated into the status quo ante society with the fundamental pre-conflict grievances unresolved.

5.2.2.3. Regional and Infrastructural Development

Another dimension of the all-inclusive DDR as conceived by the TCND was the need for a comprehensive regional development plan to address the multifaceted issues of infrastructural development including environmental decay occasioned by oil exploration activities in the Niger Delta. Yet, the general consensus among respondents was that despite the acclaimed promise by the Federal Government to engage in massive infrastructural development there was no corresponding effort to match the promise with practical commitment. Affirming this, a military

³⁰⁹. Appendix 6 to TCND report contains a list of all the laws negatively impacting the Niger Delta Region.

³¹⁰. According to Iledare, W. and Suberu, R. (2010) the derivation rule allocates 13% of natural resources’ revenues accruing to the federation back to the constituent units or states of origin. It is a constitutional arrangement for compensating oil producing states by paying them 13% portions of the centrally collected oil revenues based on the principle of derivation or unit of origin basis (the derivation principle stipulates that the 13% to be paid to each oil producing state is to be determined based on the amount of oil revenue it is contributing to the federation account).

³¹¹. Respondent 040, November 2013.

³¹². Respondent 032, November 2013.

officer that served with the JTF argues that he had travelled widely in the Niger Delta region but was yet to see any commitment on the part of the Nigerian State towards addressing the problem of infrastructural deficit in the region. According to him:

...as I speak, I have not really seen any radical steps that have been taken to address those critical issues that the *genuine agitators* of the militancy advanced as their reasons. For instance, I have not seen the establishment of industries or any major government intervention that will provide jobs for the teeming unemployed youth in the place... The genuine agitators talked about the lack of infrastructures, they say there were no good roads in the Niger Delta; are there good roads now? My answer is no! ...They talked about the absence of sustainable environment in Niger Delta... are those things there now? No! I would not say they are there now.³¹³

Beyond demonstrating the government's lack of commitment to infrastructural development, the respondent's reference to 'genuine agitators' and implicitly 'non-genuine agitators' has important implications that need to be highlighted. The respondent's comment suggests that the ADDR was launched at a time when the conflict had metamorphosed to a phase that agitators were principally driven by personal economic agendas under the pretext of regional struggle. This lends credence to my argument that the MEND era of the conflict was fundamentally driven by greed. Alternatively, grievance had largely mutated into greed.

However, returning to the earlier discussion on the government's failure to address the issue of regional development and infrastructural challenges in the Niger Delta, a community development chairman of an oil producing community in the Southern Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa state corroborated the previous respondent's remarks when he noted that:

... if you talk about infrastructural development, from the promises of the government we have not seen any infrastructural development per se...And then on the area of construction of roads: construction of roads was also promised by the government that there will be an inter-linked road - they call it coastal link road – of all the villages that are located in the river basin – that was how it was promised; but no one construction have been done by the federal government; yes, we have not seen any road network.³¹⁴

³¹³. Respondent 009, October 2013.

³¹⁴. Respondent 031, November 2013.

In addition to the above, the TCND recommended the immediate execution of some infrastructural projects that had the capacity to restore confidence between the Niger Delta region and the Nigerian State. A member of the TCND refers to these projects as 'quick impact yielding projects.'³¹⁵ One such project recommended was the dualisation of the East-West road from Calabar to Lagos to be completed by June 2010 (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, 2009: 61). However, the head of a Port Harcourt based environmental nongovernmental organisation observed that the failure by the Nigerian State to complete the East-West road indicates the government's lack of commitment to the infrastructural development of the Niger Delta. He noted that:

...The amnesty process was supposed to be accompanied by all the other recommendations of the Technical Committee, one of them...giving us a road called an East-West road so that the Niger Delta is connected to all parts of the country. Now, you have travelled around here, you have been to Warri, haven't you? Have you travelled from Warri down here? That East-West road till today is only about 35% completed... we want to travel, we cannot travel because our roads are all broken-up...and everybody who passes this road accident are occurring ...at least one major road crossing East to West in the Niger Delta, you cannot do it, how can you say that, meanwhile you are building places in Abuja like Maitama ... Why can't you replicate another Maitama in the Niger Delta, why can't you replicate another similar place here in the Niger Delta...³¹⁶

Equally, as revealed by a key member of the TCND even as at July 2015 none of the quick impact yielding projects including the East-West road recommended by the TCND and being constructed by the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs had been completed.³¹⁷ Also, commenting on the East-West road and the general performance of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs created to fast-track infrastructural development in the Niger Delta, the International Crisis Group observed that '... the ministry has had little impact' (International Crisis Group (2015: 8). More worrisome was that the latest information released by the current minister in charge of the ministry under the President Buhari administration

³¹⁵. Respondent 008, October 2013.

³¹⁶. Respondent 021, November 2013.

³¹⁷. Respondent 008, June 2015.

indicates that since its establishment eight years ago, the ministry has completed only one project, a cassava processing plant in Ondo state.³¹⁸

Likewise, the Niger Delta Action Plan³¹⁹ an all-inclusive action plan for the infrastructural and social sector development of the Niger Delta was yet to be implemented despite its potential to engender peace by addressing the key drivers of the conflict.³²⁰ However, despite the lacklustre performance of the Federal Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and the Niger Delta Development Commission they are still involved in the implementation of various development projects in the region as part of their statutory responsibilities. For instance, according to the former minister in charge of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs during the former President Jonathan Administration, apart from the ongoing construction of the 388 kilometre East-West road, the ministry as of 2014 was executing 16 different projects across the region which included building skills acquisition centres in nine states of the Niger Delta, women and youth empowerment programmes, and 9 housing estates comprising of 40 housing units (Onabu, 2014).³²¹ Also, the Niger Delta Development Commission in its official website page-News and Events³²² presented information on different development projects both infrastructural and others it executed across the Niger Delta from 2011-2015. However, commenting on the performance of both the Federal and State Government's development efforts in the Niger Delta a member of the Environmental Rights Action and Friends of the Earth Nigeria observed that '...the states may be trying their best but such efforts have not been good enough'.³²³ What this suggests is that the federal and state governments' performance in the Niger Delta region does not match the extent of empirical development deficit and the expectations of people from the region.

³¹⁸ See story titled 'Eight years after creation, Niger Delta Ministry completed only one project-Minister' in *Premium Times*. Available at: <http://www.premiumtimes.com/news/top-news/208270-eight-year...> (Accessed 18 September 2016).

³¹⁹. For more details, please see Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs Federal Republic of Nigeria (December 2012) publication titled 'Niger Delta action plan: design and formulation of the Niger Delta infrastructure and social sector investment action plan'.

³²⁰. Respondent 006, July 2015.

³²¹. Details can be found in the report titled 'Niger Delta Ministry's mandate beyond East-West road, says Oru'. Available at: <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/niger-delta-ministry-s-mandate...> (Accessed: 14 July 2015).

³²². Details of various NDDC's projects executed or at various stages of completion from 2011-2015 are Available at: <http://www.nddc.gov.ng/newsandevents.html> (accessed: 14 July 2015).

³²³. Respondent 026, June 2015.

As I already emphasised, the implementation of development projects by the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and Niger Delta Development Commission is not done within the framework of a holistic/maximalist DDR recommended by the TCND but as part of their statutory mandate. Consequently, the implementation is not in harmony with the timeline recommended by the TCND for their accomplishment. In line with that, a member of the Stakeholder Democracy Network nongovernmental organisation asserts that even in the post ADDR era the activities of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and Niger Delta Development Commission do not signify any serious commitment by the Nigerian State to address development needs in the region because the agencies are never provided with the necessary funding as stipulated in the law that established them.³²⁴ Furthermore, he argues that contracts for project implementation are given to political cronies as part of the larger Nigerian patronage system and so the agencies are tools in the hand of politicians.³²⁵ His assertion on the lack of adequate funding was corroborated by the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs who asserted that ‘since August 2014, we have not received any capital per head. So, a lot of our projects are being stalled and we don’t want abandonment of projects [sic]’ (Adetayo, 2015).

Moreover, as the International Crisis Group’s (Africa Report No 231, 2015: 7) has noted, performance of the Niger Delta Development Commission has been hampered by ‘recurrent internal power struggles and distrust among principal officers, compounded by board-management politics’ and the fact that they have become a ‘... conduit through which funds are pumped into the pockets of politically connected individuals [rather] than a vehicle for the region’s development.’ Overall, the general expectation was that in the post ADDR era the agencies would be fully reinvigorated by the Nigerian State to confront the development deficit in the Niger Delta instead they are being confronted by the same challenges that undermined their effectiveness prior to the ADDR programme.

³²⁴. Respondent 037, June 2015.

³²⁵. Ibid.

5.2.2.4. Environmental Remediation

A critical aspect of the regional development component of the DDR as recommended by the TCND was the need to carry out environmental remediation in the Niger Delta and enforce the culture of environmental sustainability. This was to be achieved by ensuring that MNOCs comply with environmental best practices in their operations. Accordingly, the TCND recommended that the Nigerian State should:

Establish by 2010, regulations that compel oil companies to have insurance bonds against environmental pollution, strengthen independent regulation of oil pollution and work towards an effective E.I.A mechanism. Make the enforcement of critical environmental laws a national priority. Expose fraudulent environmental clean ups of oil spills and prosecute polluters. End gas flaring by December 31st 2008 as previously ordered by the Federal Government (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, 2009: 61).

Nonetheless, opinions expressed by respondents suggest that the DDR programme was implemented without any regard to the state of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta. Communities in the Niger Delta region continued to experience a lack of sensitivity as well as poor or slow responses from the Federal Government and MNOCs to issues of oil spills both during and after the DDR. According to a member of the Ogoni Solidarity Forum:

...how do you explain that there was an oil explosion in Koloma, Koloma is in Bayelsa state, for weeks running into months that the president was begged to even visit, he did not...how do you explain that the Niger Delta president³²⁶ is unable to implement UNEP³²⁷ report on Ogoni environment how do you explain that?³²⁸

The respondent contends that the failure by the President to visit the site of the Bayelsa oil spill and implement the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) report for the remediation of Ogoni land demonstrates clearly the Nigerian government lack of sensitivity and commitment to the environmental

³²⁶ . What the respondent infers by 'the Niger Delta President' is that the Nigerian President at the time the interview was conducted hailed from the Niger Delta region.

³²⁷. Based on a Nigerian government request the United Nations Environmental Programme conducted an independent assessment of the environment and public health impacts of oil contamination in Ogoniland in the Niger Delta and recommended strategies for remediation (Additional information is available at: <http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/CountryOperations/Nigeria/EnvironmentalAssessmen tofOgonilandreport/tabid/54419/Default.aspx>).

³²⁸. Respondent 015, November 2013.

issues confronting the Niger Delta. Also, an academic expert on the Niger Delta argues that MNOCs have continued to violate the principle of environmental sustainability in their operations because up to now ‘gas flaring is still going on in the Niger Delta, oil spillage is still going on in the Niger Delta, destruction of the ecosystem is still going on in the Niger Delta...’.³²⁹ Thus, ‘environmental conditions, which have not improved and may have further deteriorated, are another source of tension’ (International Crisis Group Africa Report No 231, 2015: 9). For example, a cassava farm flooded with oil in 2011 is shown in figure 5.1.



Figure 5.1: Cassava Farm in Bayelsa state Flooded with oil as at 12/11/2011

Source: Environmental rights activist Yenagoa Bayelsa state.

My effort to ascertain how the MNOCs have been responding to issues of oil spills and adhering to principles of environmental sustainability by interviewing Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) senior management staff was unsuccessful as explained in my earlier discussion of fieldwork challenges in

³²⁹. Respondent 004-academic expert on the Niger Delta, October 2013 & Respondent 032, November 2013.

Chapter One.³³⁰ Nevertheless, members of environmental rights civil society organisations (CSOs) who have been monitoring the situation responded to my investigation. A member of the Environmental Rights Action and Friends of the Earth Nigeria expressed the opinion that ‘one cannot completely rule out accidents in the oil industry, but what is not normal is the impunity with which oil companies address oil spills; with clear disregard for the environment.’³³¹ A staff member of a nongovernmental organisation also posited that environmental degradation started and continued until now because the Nigerian State lacked the capacity to enforce the relevant environmental best practice laws. According to the staff member, ‘I was meeting with the Safety Engineer from Chevron one time and he said do you know we can get away with things here [more] than we can get away with things anywhere else in the world.’³³² Equally, a coalition of twenty civil society groups in the Niger Delta working to address the persistent environmental degradation linked to oil spills, gas flares and illegal oil bunkering in the Niger Delta maintains that the Niger Delta environment remains one of the most degraded in the world to-day (National Coalition on Gas Flaring and Oil Spills in the Niger Delta, 2015). The Nigerian State has created an agency known as the Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) which is:

... vested with the responsibility to coordinate the implementation of the National Oil Spill Contingency plan (NOSCP) for Nigeria in accordance with the international convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness Response and Co-operation (OPRC) 1990, to which Nigeria is a signatory. NOSDRA is also mandated to play the lead role in ensuring timely, effective and appropriate response to oil spills, as well as ensuring clean up and remediation of all impacted sites to all best practical extent. It shall also identify high risk/priority areas in the oil-producing environment for protection as well as ensure compliance of oil industry operators with all existing environment for operators with all existing environmental legislations in the petroleum sector (Federal Ministry of Environment Website, n.d.)

However, a Nigerian staff member of the Stakeholder Democracy Network contended that the agency is dysfunctional because it lacks the resources and technical capacity to function effectively.³³³ In terms of financial resources, he

³³⁰. My decision to interview its official on this issue was informed by the fact that Shell Petroleum Development Company is the oldest and has the largest portion of onshore oil fields in the Niger Delta.

³³¹. Respondent 026, June 2015.

³³². Respondent 027, November 2015.

³³³. Respondent 037, June 2015.

argues that over the years there has not been any increase in the agency's budgetary allocation while in terms of technical equipment NOSDRA does not have helicopters and speed boats to access spill sites but relies on the goodwill of MNOCS to do so.³³⁴ This was also corroborated by an Amnesty International (2103: 15) report on the state of oil spill investigations in the Niger Delta.

In my opinion, all these suggest two things. one, the post ADDR response and compliance to environmental sustainability principles by MNOCs in the Niger Delta remains as it was in the pre-ADDR era. Secondly, the Nigerian government remains inept in its response capacity and ability to enforce compliance with environmental sustainability principles by MNOCs. Against this backdrop, a Niger Delta academic expert observed that as far as the ADDR programme is concerned '...the environmental consequences of oil production were never addressed.'³³⁵

5.2.2.5. MNOCs and Host Communities' Relationships

I investigated if the adversarial relationships between the MNOCs and their host communities had been transformed into a harmonious one based on mutual respect. However, an ex- MEND commander expressed the view that as far as the MNOCs is concerned 'if they want to work in the community they will park like four, five, six gunboats to the area.'³³⁶ Also, a community youth leader from Southern Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa State observed that despite the implementation of the ADDR programme 'the relationship between host communities and oil companies... without mincing words... is still the same, if not worse'.³³⁷ While a member of the Environmental Rights Action and Friends of the Earth Nigeria observes that the MNOCs with the clear support of the Federal Government '...use the Joint Task Force as a tool for intimidating community folks who are bold enough to challenge the prevailing situation.'³³⁸

Furthermore, one way of measuring improved harmony between MNOCS and host communities is the process through which a General Memorandum of

³³⁴. Ibid.

³³⁵. Respondent 032- academic expert on Niger Delta, November 2013.

³³⁶. Respondent 039- an ex- MEND commander, November 2013.

³³⁷. Respondent 03, November 2013.

³³⁸. Respondent 026, June 2015.

Understanding (GMoU) is arrived at and the extent of compliance to it by the MNOCs. GMoU is a form of written agreement signed between oil companies and clusters of oil producing communities in the Niger Delta. It harmonizes mutual objectives, obligations and time frames for executing them. It also makes provision for arbitration in the event of its violation. However, as a nongovernmental organisation Shareholders Alliance for Corporate Accountability noted; most stakeholders in the Shell Petroleum Development Company operational locations in Bayelsa State ‘...insist that the GMoU agreement was foisted on them, that it was a case of ‘take it or leave it’. They lament that the agreements were designed by SPDC alone and though they contested different sections [of the GMoU] it fell on deaf ears.’ (Shareholders Alliance for Corporate Accountability, 2014: 3).

A staff member of the Nigeria Stakeholder Democracy Network maintains that there has been no general change of behaviour by MNOCs towards their host communities.³³⁹ According to him, their pattern of behaviour has been entrenched to the level of a culture.³⁴⁰ Nevertheless, he notes that sometimes at the national headquarters of the MNOCs there is some commitment and intention to change the way of doing things but due to vested interests and lack of will among the top and middle-level management staff in Nigeria, such intentions are stifled from becoming a reality.³⁴¹ He maintains that the only single positive development in terms of MNOCs and host communities’ relationship in the post ADDR era was Shell’s payment of compensation to the Bodo Community in Ogoni land of Rivers State over an oil spill.³⁴² However, he is quick to point out that this was an isolated case that cannot be used as a basis for generalisation across the Niger Delta States and in addition the spill site has not been cleaned.³⁴³

Similarly, the head of a Port Harcourt based environmental nongovernmental organisation equally cited the same payment as a positive sign of improved relationship by asserting that ‘as I informed you the relationship between communities and companies has improved a good deal since we last spoke...in 2013. The one between SPDC and Bodo Community in Ogoni is a good example,

³³⁹. Respondent 037, June 2015.

³⁴⁰. Respondent 037, June 2015

³⁴¹. Ibid.

³⁴². Ibid.

³⁴³. Ibid.

and we in Civil Society believe that will be a good example that will be referenced in the future, and one that is worth emulating by other companies in similar situations'.³⁴⁴ However, he concurs with the contention that this development cannot be generalised across the Niger Delta. Indeed, the fact that a single case of compensation is being used as an indication of improved relationship is suggestive of the extent to which the relationship between MNOCs and their host communities has still to be repaired.

5.2.2.6. Human Capital Development

One of the integral components of comprehensive DDR, as recommended by the TCND, was the need to pursue human capital development in the Niger Delta. '*Human capital*' is the term economists often use for education, health, and other human capacities that can raise productivity when increased' (Todaro and Smith, 2006: 369). In consonance with the above conceptualisation, the TCND's 'recommendation touching on...human development approach aims to improve the human capital of the Niger Delta through massive and well-targeted investments in areas such as health, education, and MDGs related matters' (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, 2008: 87). The TCND's recommendation on human capital development was premised on the fact that youth in the Niger Delta were in the past denied employment opportunities by MNOCs due to lack of or limited educational qualifications and vocational skills relevant to the oil and gas industry.³⁴⁵ This position was supported by a youth leader from the Southern Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa State who argued that:

...we are not employed because... we are less educated... When ...you go to companies, they will say: 'ah, you don't have this qualification. Because you are not educated they will not employ you... So what can our people achieve? Those that are not educated.'³⁴⁶

Equally, a field investigation report on the current state of health facilities in rural communities of Bayelsa state noted that 'most communities have no health centre and those that have can hardly benefit from them because they are either

³⁴⁴. Respondent 021, June 2015.

³⁴⁵. Respondent 008, October 2013.

³⁴⁶. Respondent 031, November 2013.

abandoned or a shadow of what they should represent in the actual fact.³⁴⁷ However, in the area of educational development, the Nigerian government has recorded some level of success in terms of the development of human resource capacity among youth in the Niger Delta. Even though these educational development efforts are not being implemented as part of the holistic DDR recommended by the TCND they reflect what the TCND has recommended. For instance, the Niger Delta Development Commission foreign scholarship programme has so far sponsored 1,021 graduates to attend masters and doctorate programmes in the field of engineering, sciences and medicine while 3,000 candidates were shortlisted for the 2015/2016 academic year award aptitude test (Niger Delta Development Commission, 2015).

Similarly, the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) is a parastatal of the Nigerian government established 'to achieve safe, secure shipping, cleaner oceans and enhanced maritime capacity in line with the best global practices for Nigeria's economic development' (Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, (n. d.)). Therefore, it has been engaged in human resource capacity development in the Nigerian maritime sector for the country's youth. In doing this, some degree of priority is given to qualified youth from the Niger Delta which occupied the major segment of the Nigerian maritime landscape.³⁴⁸ One such capacity building programme is the Nigerian Seafarers Development Programme in which 2,500 Nigerian youth have so far been sponsored to attend different institutions in the United Kingdom, Egypt, Romania, India and Philippines. As of July 2014, 23 qualified seafarers have graduated from the Arab Academy for Science and Technology and Maritime Transport Egypt with 14 of them graduating with first class honours.³⁴⁹ Similarly, part of this human resource capacity development effort was the establishment of the Nigerian Maritime University and Shipbuilding and Repair at Gbaramantu Kingdom of Delta State. The institution is aimed at producing multifaceted indigenous high-level manpower needed by the sector, while the Shipyard/dockyard facility also provides practical training opportunities for

³⁴⁷. Quote from a field investigation report titled 'A report relating to an investigation into some oil company built health facilities and their operations in Bayelsa State' conducted by a field staff of Environmental Rights Action /Friends of the Earth Nigeria dated 08 June 2015.

³⁴⁸. Respondent 051- senior management staff of NIMASA, June 2015.

³⁴⁹. Sourced from the speech delivered by Ziakede Patrick Akpobolokemi, Director General NIMASA at the World Press Conference held on Wednesday July 23, 2014 at Eko Hotel Lagos (Online). Available at: <http://www.nimasa.gov.ng/press.php?id=7> (Accessed 21 July 2015).

students of the university.³⁵⁰ As of May 2015 over 32,600 students had benefitted from NIMASA's scholarship scheme programme.³⁵¹ NIMASA has equally established a Science and Technical College at Okoloba in Delta State for the enhancement of maritime science and technology, and the development of middle-level manpower capacity for the sector.³⁵²

In an interview, a senior staff member of NIMASA confides that while the Seafarers Development Programme appears to be working smoothly, placement opportunities for the trained seafarers remains a pressing challenge.³⁵³ He argues that the huge resources invested in the programme may be a wasted investment because the certificates issued are time bound.³⁵⁴ This implies that candidates must have the opportunity to practice the skills acquired within a certain period of time as failure to do so means that the candidates must undergo another training to be certificated again.³⁵⁵ Similarly, the senior staff member revealed that the process is not free of corruption as fees paid for services are often inflated.³⁵⁶ His insinuation of corruption becomes credible in view of the reported investigation of the sacked NIMASA director general by EFCC for paying ₦13 billion for the acquisition of land for the Nigeria Maritime University permanent site in Delta state (Ibekwe, 2015).

As I earlier argued in my analysis of economic reintegration, the Nigerian government has prioritised the equipping of Niger Delta youth with the needed skills to take advantage of opportunities in the oil, gas and maritime sectors of the Nigerian economy. However, the challenge remains that the employment opportunities are not forthcoming. This means that trainees are adding up to the teeming number of unemployed graduates searching for white-collar jobs thereby creating a market of trained but unemployed youth which in turn reinforces the

³⁵⁰. Sourced from the speech delivered by Ziakede Patrick Akpobolokemi, Director General NIMASA at the Ground-Breaking Ceremonies of the Nigeria Maritime University, NIMASA Shipyard/dockyard and the Flag-Off of activities at the Kurete temporary campus of the university Gbaramantu Kingdom Delta State (Online). Available at: <http://www.nimasa.gov.ng> (Accessed 21 July 2015).

³⁵¹. Sourced from NIMASA's press release titled 'Maritime Varsity to generate over \$6bn-Mr Patrick Ziakede Akpobolokemi (Online). Available at: <http://www.nimasa.gov.ng/press.php?id=7> (Accessed 21 July 2015).

³⁵². See NIMASA Vision and Mission statement (Online). Available at: <http://www.nimasa.gov.ng/nstc/about.php> (Accessed: 21 July 2015).

³⁵³. Respondent 051- senior management staff of NIMASA, June 2015.

³⁵⁴. Ibid.

³⁵⁵. Respondent 051- senior management staff of NIMASA, June 2015.

³⁵⁶. Ibid.

conditions for grievance and frustration. Nevertheless, the fact that Niger Delta youth are scampering for such training opportunities suggests that in the short-term such initiatives may have a positive effect on the teeming despondent youth in the region.

5.3. The Implementation of the TCND's Recommendations, Liberalism and the Maximalist Perspective to DDR

I argued in Chapter Four that the TCND viewed the Niger Delta conflict and the resultant militancy as the long-term consequence of human security, development and good governance deficits and this, therefore, informed its recommendation for a maximalist DDR that aimed to address the development and security challenges confronting the Niger Delta region simultaneously. In other words, the ADDR programme should be used as an opportunity for development. Consequently, in the previous section I evaluated the implementation of the ADDR programme against the backdrop of the TCND's recommendations. Accordingly, in this section, I shall interrogate the implementation of the TCND's recommendations by juxtaposing it with my broader theoretical orientation and the maximalist DDR literature I examined in Chapter Two. The aim is to demonstrate that the implementation of a maximalist/transformational DDR as recommended by the TCND instead of a securitised one skewed in favour of the militants would have laid a solid foundation for lasting peace in the Niger Delta. Equally, the aim is to further reinforce my argument that unless a DDR programme is conceptualised, planned and implemented from the maximalist/transformational perspective of an opportunity for development its potential to contribute to lasting peace and to serve as an effective conflict prevention mechanism will remain minimal and questionable. Similarly, the discussion in this section is also aimed at reinforcing the explanatory potency of my broader theoretical framework-liberalism. Nonetheless, a brief recapitulation of liberalism and the maximalist/transformational perspective of DDR is necessary.

To recapitulate, liberalism holds strongly that the foundation of peace and conflict in any society is predicated on whether society is founded on the ethos of democracy, good governance, participation, rule of law, transparency and accountability, responsiveness, consensus, equity, and inclusiveness (Burchill, 2009: 57; Brown and Ainley, 2009: 20; Doyle, 1983: 206-207 and Owen, 1998:

145). Societies where such elements are absent or of poor quality are less likely to deliver effective, inclusive and sustainable human development and security. This, in turn, has the potential to exacerbate factors such as alienation and frustration that provide a breeding ground for conflict. This concurs with the position of the TCND that the roots of conflict in the Niger Delta are anchored in the lack of good governance and accountability which in turn generate the social conditions of alienation and frustration in the region (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, 2009: 65).

This implies that for lasting peace to be achieved in the Niger Delta region governance reforms must be embedded in the ADDR programme. Similarly, from the maximalist/transformational perspective; Muggah (2004: 27) and Muggah and Batchelor (2002: 37) argue that unless a DDR programme is conceptualised, planned and implemented as an opportunity for development and reconstruction, its potential to contribute to peace is limited to security stabilisation. This is because the fundamental grievances of underdevelopment which are social, political and economic in nature and which are the root causes of the conflict may not be addressed. Reconstruction in this context goes beyond returning the postconflict society to its former pre-war status quo ante but to a better-regenerated society where the pre-war grievances are substantially addressed or are being addressed. For instance, Muggah (2009: 2) observes that 'a failure to effectively and comprehensively address the immediate and underlying causes of armed conflict meant that the embers smouldered, waiting for the next spark to reignite open collective violence following an end to formal hostilities'. This suggests that unless a DDR programme is premised on a maximalist agenda of an opportunity for development it would not be an effective conflict prevention mechanism. In a similar vein, Jennings (2008: 331) contends that reintegration within the framework of maximalist DDR must go beyond the short-term goal of mollifying ex-combatants to engendering fundamental social change '... by addressing substantive grievances...' that led to the conflict, which suggests that it must have a transformational agenda of changing the social conditions that lead to the violent conflict. On his part, Cocker (2000: 20) contends that the impact of any form of postconflict intervention such as DDR is to be measured in terms of how it has contributed to the transformation of existing socio-economic and political structures that generate violent conflict in society. However, some may

argue that expecting a maximalist DDR to bring about the wholesale transformation of the Nigerian neopatrimonial state is unrealistic and over-ambitious, nonetheless, it is my contention that it can serve as a platform to kick-start the process. Conversely, the evidence adduced in the previous section suggests that this is far from being realised.

Against this background, it is my contention that if the TCND's recommendation for a maximalist DDR were implemented the conditions for lasting peace in the Niger Delta would have been more effectively laid. However, the TCND's maximalist/transformational framework was jettisoned for a securitised DDR skewed in favour of the ex-militants. Consequently, both the immediate and underlying sources of the conflict remain intact, and as Muggah argued these can easily spark and reignite another conflict. Indeed, the latest development in the Niger Delta with the emergence of a group known as *Niger Delta Avengers*³⁵⁷ lends credence to Muggah's assertion. The group which has begun wanton destruction of oil facilities in the Niger Delta states has so far rejected all entreaties for dialogue and gestures of reconciliation by the Nigerian State. The Group stated on its official website that:

The Niger Delta Avengers are not Boko Haram, we are not ISIS, all we are asking for is a better living [condition] for the people of the Niger Delta and self-determination ... to govern ourselves. We will soon raise our flag and name our interim ruling Council.³⁵⁸

This clearly demonstrates that despite the acclaimed success of the ADDR programme in terms of the number of ex-militants disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated or in the process of being reintegrated there is the high potential for a relapse into violence because the fundamental grievances that led to the conflict remained intact. This was because the ADDR programme was implemented not based on a maximalist/transformational agenda of achieving security stability and development simultaneously but a minimalist agenda of achieving security stabilisation. Thus, evidence from the Niger Delta ADDR programme once again reaffirmed the efficacy of maximalist/transformational over

³⁵⁷. Additional information on the Niger Delta Avengers and what they stand for can be obtained from the Group's website-[http:// www.nigerdeltaavengers.com/](http://www.nigerdeltaavengers.com/) (Accessed: 27 April 2016). The Group has so far rejected all entreaties for dialogue and gestures of reconciliation by the Nigerian State and has continued to sabotage oil facilities in the region.

³⁵⁸. Ibid.

the minimalist approach to DDR in terms of contributing to lasting peace and stability and as an effective conflict prevention mechanism.

5.4. Conclusion

As I noted at the onset, this thesis is an evaluative case study that seeks to interrogate the extent to which the Niger Delta ADDR programme has achieved its stated objective. As I argued throughout in this study, the Niger Delta ADDR programme was premised on two conflicting conceptualisations. First, the TCND recommended a maximalist DDR that aimed to address the crisis of militancy and underdevelopment in a concurrent manner while the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee designed and implemented it as a security stabilisation programme. Consequently, in the first part of the chapter, I assessed the programme in terms of the extent to which it has accomplished the goal of security stabilisation in the Niger Delta while in the second part I examined it against the backdrop of the all-inclusive maximalist DDR recommended by the TCND.

In terms of accomplishing security stabilisation, the main contention I advanced in the chapter was that the amnesty/disarmament phase of the ADDR programme succeeded in stabilising the security situation in the Niger Delta in the short-term. However, the relative stability achieved was not consolidated by successful demobilisation and reintegration. This was because instead of demobilisation to dismantle the existing vertical and horizontal command and control structures of the various militants' commanders; it further reinforced and strengthened the structures. As a result, the obvious outcome of the demobilisation process is a legacy of high capacity to remobilise on the part of the former top commanders. The failure to dismantle existing command and control structures indicates the fragility of the current stability and the potential for the Niger Delta region to relapse to violence as seen in the emergence of *Niger Delta Avengers*. The high capacity to remobilise and the potential for a return to violence was further reinforced by the failure to achieve economic reintegration of the less powerful commanders, middle-level commanders and foot soldiers. Furthermore, the effectiveness and potential for economic reintegration to contribute to peace consolidation was undermined by the lack of access to reintegration training opportunities by many of the ex-militants and the inability to secure jobs by those already trained due to a mismatch between the types of training offered to them and existing opportunities in the Nigerian labour market. Thus, this has increased

the number of trained youth for non-existent jobs and has, in consequence, strengthened the conditions for further grievance and frustration which in turn may increase the risk of a return to violence in the future or the resort to extra-legal means to secure economic livelihood. This conclusion is appropriate when noted against Collier's (1994: 345-351) postulation that failure to achieve economic reintegration of ex-combatants particularly those that fall under the category of Second Generation militia can result in micro and macro security threats or insecurity at the societal and individual levels, as well as rent-seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun (Colleta *et al*, 1996: 18). Beyond that, the potential for a return to violence is further reinforced by the fact that fundamental grievances that led to the conflict have not been addressed despite the window of opportunity provided by the relative security stability achieved in the region.

The current situation suggests that the Niger Delta region is oscillating between peace and violence, an atmosphere of no war, no peace. However, whether the region will gravitate into complete violence once again and what form the renewed violence will take depends on certain variables which would be part of my suggestion for future research in the Niger Delta in Chapter six.

Chapter Six

General Conclusion

6. Introduction

This chapter is the concluding part of this thesis and therefore aims to establish the extent to which the study has succeeded in answering its primary research question. The chapter also highlights the study's theoretical and policy contribution in the field of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), the theoretical and policy literature on the Niger Delta conflict as well as the Nigerian State. It also raises some important and valid concerns and potential areas of future research on the Niger Delta.

In terms of structural outline, the first section restates the thesis's primary research question and outlines how it has been answered including the main empirical findings relating to the question. The second section highlights the study's theoretical and empirical contributions while the last section suggests some important and valid issues for future research on the Niger Delta.

6.1. Main Research Question and Empirical Findings

This thesis is an evaluation case study that critically examines the extent to which the 2009 Niger Delta ADDR programme as the Nigerian government's most recent response to the conflict in the Niger Delta has succeeded in achieving its goal. To explore the research question, I interviewed 53 respondents including ex-militant commanders, community leaders, members of the Nigerian Security Forces, members of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND) and the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee. Others interviewed included members of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, members of nongovernmental organisations, government policy makers, academic experts on the Niger Delta and a community development chairman of an oil producing community and a youth leader. Two Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were also held with ex-militant soldiers of the ADDR programme. Overall, semi-structured interviews, FGD and secondary sources were the methods of

data collection used in this case study. Data collected from respondents were analysed using the content analysis technique as outlined by Marshall and Rossman (2006: 151-167) and in order to achieve an informed interpretation of the data, triangulation was applied at the level of data analysis (Bryman, 2008: 379).

The primary research question for this study was ‘how successful was the Niger Delta amnesty disarmament demobilisation and reintegration programme in achieving its statutory objective?’ In this regard, evidence analysed in this study revealed that the programme was informed by conflicting conceptual perspectives and understandings of the conflict, which gave rise to security versus development agendas for the ADDR programme. The TCND recommended a maximalist DDR programme that would simultaneously address the security challenges confronting the Niger Delta within a broader framework of socio-economic transformation (maximalist DDR). However, a conceptual somersault took place at the level of design. This was when the government planned the DDR as mainly a security stabilisation programme. It was clearly stated by the government that the objective of the programme was to respond to the security conditions in the Niger Delta. This was to create the enabling environment for development to subsequently take place (Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, 2011: 24). Consequently, I argued that the securitisation of development in the Niger Delta and the conceptual somersault was not accidental but reflected the rentier nature and character of the Nigerian State. Its main concern was to restore security and stability in the Niger Delta because the continuing conflict undermined the operations of Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) and the flow of oil rents to the government. Therefore, given the conceptual somersault that occurred, I initially evaluated the programme foremost in terms of the extent to which it succeeded in achieving the goal of security stabilisation in the Niger Delta and thereafter the efforts by the Nigerian government to address the development challenges that underpinned the conflict in line with the all-inclusive maximalist DDR recommended by the TCND.

As a security stabilisation programme, evidence from this study demonstrated that despite the irregularities that characterised the amnesty/disarmament phase of the programme, it succeeded in restoring relative security and stability in the

short-term both at the level of perception and in empirical terms. At the level of perception, it relatively deescalated the level of psychological tension amongst the residents of the Niger Delta, with many people feeling relatively safer in the immediate aftermath of the programme. Consequently, public confidence about safety and security in the region was restored relative to the situation prior to the launching of the ADDR programme. This was because the successful completion of the amnesty/disarmament phase and the fact that the hitherto masked MEND commanders and fighters now move freely in the region produced a compelling psychological effect in the minds of the participants, beneficiaries and all stakeholders that a new era of improved security had returned to the Niger Delta region.

At the empirical level, the ADDR programme also succeeded in stabilising the security situation by ending hostilities between the militants and the Nigerian security forces which resulted in a significant decline and reduction in the kidnapping of oil workers. Evidence that the programme had succeeded in stabilising the Niger Delta security situation can be seen in the fact that oil production that had declined to 700,000 barrels per day prior to the amnesty and disarmament phase of the programme jumped to 2.5 million barrels per day as at 04 October 2009 when the first phase of the amnesty and disarmament was concluded (Makinde, 2013: 18).

Moreover, the pseudo-compellence negotiated settlement that led to the ADDR programme signified an informal social contract between the militants and the Nigerian State which symbolically ushered in an era of fragile trust between the Nigerian State and the Niger Delta militants. In this informal social contract, the Nigerian State granted forgiveness to the militants and promised to rehabilitate and empower them as well as address the crisis of underdevelopment in the region. On their part, the militants renounced militancy and affiliations to any militant group and committed to faithfully support, protect and defend the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by respecting all constituted authorities. The symbolic significance and impact of this pseudo-social contract significantly contributed to the relative stability achieved in the Niger Delta region even though it is still littered with hidden arms.

On the other hand, even though evidence from this case study revealed that the amnesty and disarmament phase of the programme helped to stabilise the Niger

Delta security situation, the demobilisation process failed to successfully consolidate the stability achieved. This is because as demonstrated in the literature examined in this case study; for demobilisation to contribute to the goal of security stabilisation specifically when dealing with combatants of Second Generation militia category it must ensure that their existing command and control structures both vertical and horizontal are destroyed thereby making it difficult for them to remobilise (Alden *et al.*, 2011: 14). However, findings from this study clearly show that the demobilisation process in the Niger Delta has not succeeded in breaking the existing command and control structures of the various top militants' groups and reducing their capacity to remobilise. Rather, evidence from this case study demonstrated that paying the demobilised ex-militants' foot soldiers through their commanders has ensured that they are continually loyal to, and dependent on their former commanders even after their so-called demobilisation.

The second reason why demobilisation failed to break existing command and control structures is related to the way inducement was applied in the form of ADDR patronage which became counterproductive to the goal of demobilisation. As I argued in the thesis, what the Nigerian government did was to adopt a *neopatrimonial approach to DDR*. This is by concentrating on key commanders with the largest number of foot soldiers and a high capacity to threaten oil production and offer them huge monetary payment through contract awards which empowered them economically. However, the patronage system excluded the less powerful and middle-level commanders, including foot soldiers who were only left with the reinsertion allowance of sixty-five thousand Naira, which means that unlike the top commanders, they demobilised into impoverishment when compared with their previous living standards during the conflict. Thus, one way for them to deal with the realities of life after demobilisation in terms of the sudden fall in their income was to continually depend on their commanders which again strengthened and kept intact former command and control structures thereby affording the commanders a high capacity to remobilise.

Furthermore, evidence from the case study also revealed that the exclusive manner in which patronage was applied, exposed the Niger Delta to further instability by creating the enabling environment for conflict reoccurrence in a number of ways. Foremost, it gave rise to the emergence of insider and outsider

types of peace spoilers. In the first instance, as an insider peace spoiler former middle-level commander John Togo who had signed the renunciation of militancy bond felt marginalised and cheated, and consequently remobilized reigniting another cycle of violence in the Niger Delta (Amaize, 2011). In the second instance, it encouraged the emergence of outsider peace spoilers claiming to be agitating for development on behalf of their ethnic nationality to emerge. Kelvin Ibruvwe emerged as an outsider peace spoiler who, in 2013 proclaimed to be the leader of the Liberation Movement for the Urhobo People (LIMUP) one of the ethnic nationalities in the Niger Delta. These two incidents attest to the counterproductive effect of *neopatrimonial DDR* (patronage) in the Niger Delta.

The ADDR patronage system also exposed the Niger Delta to further instability by reinforcing aspects of the conflict economy that sustains the conflict. Evidence that emerged from this study demonstrated that many of the former middle-level commanders and foot soldiers that were excluded from the ADDR patronage decided to fall back on illegal oil bunkering as a strategy of maintaining their previous standard of living while in the creeks. Likewise, nonviolent youth who also felt cheated for not being considered in the entire ADDR process decided to demonstrate their anger and frustration against the government by going into illegal oil bunkering. The evidence adduced on the sudden increase in the rate of illegal oil bunkering after the ADDR programme was completed lends credence to this finding.

However, despite the obviously failed nature of the Niger Delta demobilisation process, the use of the ADDR patronage and the concomitant peace dividend that favoured only the top commanders did produce an unintended but positive consequence that has potentially diminished the capacity for conflict reoccurrence in the Niger Delta. This is because it has exposed the selfish agenda of those masquerading as freedom fighters for the purpose of advancing their personal economic agendas. Thus, in the future securing community legitimacy which is critical for the Niger Delta oil insurgency to flourish may be difficult.

As argued in the literature examined in this case study, security stabilisation can only be attained if ex-combatants are reintegrated into society at the social, political and economic levels. However, evidence from this study demonstrated

that social reintegration was largely sidelined in the reintegration process of the ex-militants, while political reintegration in the case of some of the top commanders was achieved through informal neopatrimonial co-optation via the ADDR patronage. Nevertheless, achieving political reintegration through neopatrimonial cooptation of some of the top commanders has in the short-term produced a positive consequence in terms of reducing the potentials for conflict occurrence in the Niger Delta, because given their newly acquired status, these top commanders will be more interested in maintaining stability than returning to violence.

As for economic reintegration, it was highly prioritised in line with the practice in most DDR programmes. Economic reintegration as argued in the literature is the process whereby ex-fighters and their households build up new livelihoods by engaging in productive activities and gainful employment. The prioritisation of economic reintegration over the social and political dimensions of reintegration is in line with the security stabilisation agenda of the ADDR programme which theorised youth idleness as a cause of militancy in the Niger Delta. However, for economic reintegration to contribute to security stabilisation, certain fundamentals about the process must be right. One, it is necessary that genuine ex-combatants are given priority in the job training opportunities. Two, having been successfully trained, they must have access to gainful employment or financial capital to start up small scale businesses. However, evidence from this study demonstrated that, even though significant achievement was recorded in terms of providing them with skills acquisition and educational advancement opportunities both at home and abroad, there were several cases of alleged demobilised militants who had been short-changed. For those short-changed, there is a risk that they may return to rent seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun, producing what Collier refers to as micro and macro security threats. Also, even though the process of economic reintegration is still ongoing and to some extent the number of the interviews I conducted are limited in number to allow one to make a far-reaching claim; evidence from this study suggests that a tentative claim can be made that many of the ex-militants have yet to be absorbed into paid employment, or provided with sufficient capital to start up their private

businesses.³⁵⁹ Consequently, the failure to provide job opportunities for the trained ex-militants reinforces the potential for further grievances and frustrations to develop. Therefore, as in the case of demobilisation, economic reintegration of the ex-Niger Delta militants is yet to impact positively in terms of consolidating the relative stability achieved through the amnesty and disarmament phase of the ADDR programme.

However, as I argued, despite the short-changing of many of the ex-militants the programme has produced some unintended and positive consequences in terms of enhancing security stabilisation in the short-term. One, the massive jobs trainings, irrespective of the lack of absorption capacity responded to one of the age-long demands of the Niger Delta people and one of the identified drivers of militancy in the region. Secondly, it may be that those already trained or are undergoing training would be more interested in ensuring some level of stability when they return with the hope that they can get better jobs in the course of time. However, whether such a commitment to maintaining stability will hold in the long-term in the absence of jobs or empowerment opportunities is a debatable issue.

Generally, the security stabilisation achieved in the Niger Delta was generally undermined by the Nigerian government's lack of commitment to address the fundamental source of underdevelopment as recommended by the TCND and which centred on the crisis of neo-patrimonial system of governance in Nigeria. Therefore, in terms of addressing the source of underdevelopment and its various ramifications and dimensions in the Niger Delta, the evidence adduced confirmed that the state of underdevelopment in the region remained largely the same prior to the launching of the ADDR programme. Indeed, in some cases, some of the dimensions and indices of underdevelopment such as environmental degradation have increased from what it used to be prior to the ADDR programme. This means that within the context of the maximalist perspective to DDR which this study aligned itself with, pre-conflict grievances in the Niger Delta remain the

³⁵⁹. As of July 24 2016, the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta and the Chairman of the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) revealed that 11,768 ex-militants out of the 30,000 disarmed and demobilised in the ADDR Programme are yet to be economically empowered (see report titled '*Amnesty Office yet to empower 11, 768 ex-militants-Boroh*' (Available at: <http://guardian.ng/news/anesty-office-yet-to-empower-11768-exmi...> Accessed: 13 August 2016).

same. Thus, the ex-militants are being reintegrated into the pre-conflict *status quo ante* which suggests that the possibility of relapse into violence remains high.

Overall, the failure to ensure the breakdown of existing horizontal and vertical command and control structures, the denial of reintegration training opportunities to some of the ex-militants and the lack of job opportunities for many of those trained shows the fragile nature of the current stability achieved in the Niger Delta. The high capacity to remobilise, and the fact that the fundamental sources and drivers of the conflict remained intact means that the Niger Delta today straddles between negative peace and the potential to return to violence. This attests to the fact that a minimalist DDR can only lead to the attainment of negative peace and not long-term sustainable peace. Nonetheless, the relative stability achieved has provided the Nigerian government with a window of opportunity to address the fundamental sources and drivers of the conflict assuming there is the political will to do so. However, at the moment this appears a rather large assumption.

6.2. Theoretical and Empirical Contributions

As I stated in Chapter One, a key significance of this study is its contribution to current academic debates in the field of DDR, and the political economy of armed conflict. I also claimed that at the empirical level, the study will contribute to current policy literature on the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict. Against this backdrop, in terms of contribution to the field of DDR, evidence from this case study has corroborated and strengthened the veracity of the theoretical positions advanced by the likes of Muggah (2004: 27), Jennings (2008: 6-7), Özerdem (2009: 45-48) and Özerdem (2013: 226-227). These scholars posit that; in order for DDR to serve as an effective conflict prevention mechanism, its conceptualisation, design and implementation should be anchored on a maximalist perspective that sees DDR as an opportunity for development. Evidence that emerged from this study has clearly demonstrated that the failure to conceptualise, design and implement the Niger Delta ADDR programme along the maximalist perspective recommended by the TCND explains why even though relative peace in terms of reduced physical violence was achieved in the short-term there remains a high potential for a return to violence because the fundamental sources and drivers of the conflict remain intact.

A key issue in the literature on DDR is the contention that a comprehensive peace agreement provides the most auspicious environment for the conduct of traditional DDR (first generation DDR). Prominent advocates of this position include UN IDDRS (2006), Spear (2007: 9), Ong (2012: 55-56), Özerdem (2009:16). However, some scholars contest such a position and argue that absolute military defeat instead of a peace agreement provides the best enabling environment for DDR and a perfect guarantee that a country will not experience a relapse into war. Specifically, Walter (2004: 374) posits that wars that end in decisive military victory for one side are more likely not to result in a return to violence. However, evidence from this study corroborates the validity of the theoretical position which argues in support of a peace agreement as an ideal framework for achieving traditional (first generation) DDR. This is because the pseudo-compellence nature of the peace deal that led to the ADDR programme kept the militants in doubt about the Nigerian government's sincerity regarding their safety and security which compelled many of them to self-demobilise.

Another important theoretical and empirical issue has been the criticism by human rights organisations against the use of amnesty in peace processes arguing that it encourages impunity. However, the findings from this study have clearly confirmed that without the offer of amnesty the Niger Delta militants would never have contemplated surrendering their weapons. Therefore, irrespective of the argument that amnesties encourage impunity, evidence from this study suggests that it is a necessary evil that will continue to be relevant in war to peace transitions.

Further to the above, an important theoretical contribution to the literature on peace process negotiations emanating from this case study is my claim that the Niger Delta ADDR programme was neither achieved through clear military victory or negotiated settlement but through a process that incorporated both elements as well as the use of patronage. Thus, the Niger Delta ADDR negotiation is better conceptualised as a *pseudo-compellence-negotiated* type of peace settlement (a peace negotiation that integrates elements of peace enforcement, negotiation and the use of patronage as an inducement). To my knowledge the only theoretical resemblance to this in the literature is Toft (2010b: 1-4) who advocates for a hybrid strategy that integrates elements of negotiated settlement and military defeat and Muggah and O'Donnell (2015: 1-12) who postulate the concept of a

'*stick then carrot*' strategy as one of the twenty-first century newest approaches to peace processes particularly in dealing with extremist non-state armed groups such as the Boko Haram, Al-Shabab and Islamic States in Iraq and the Syria (ISIS). Therefore, the concept of pseudo compellence-negotiated settlement represents a modest addition to the literature on peace processes and DDR negotiations.

The theoretical literature that analyses DDR from a political economy perspective argues that apart from security, weapons have an economic value to combatants. Indeed, Berdal (1996: 33) postulates that weapons also have a security value, so monetary compensation should be given as an incentive to motivate combatants to renounce violence and commit to disarmament and demobilisation. Likewise, Isima (2004: 3) reiterates that for DDR secured through a peace agreement to be successful cash payment as an inducement is necessary. Equally, the UN IDDRS (2006) suggested the idea of '*commanders' incentive*' as a way of pacifying top commanders to commit to disarmament and demobilisation. Likewise, Spear (2006a: 168-189) contends that combatants are stratified in hierarchies and each hierarchy has its underlying economic agenda for engaging in violence. Therefore, appropriate incentives must be worked out commensurately to their economic agenda for them to demobilise and commit to a nonviolent way of pursuing livelihoods. However, while evidence from this study did corroborate the validity of these theoretical assertions at the same time it reveals that the use of monetary incentives should be applied with caution. In particular, it should not be elevated to the level of state patronage as in *neopatrimonial DDR* which will become counterproductive to the goal of DDR. Even though it engendered a short-term commitment to peace on the part of the top-level commanders it nevertheless over empowered and positioned them with a high capacity to remobilise and to threaten peace and stability if they so wish. Likewise, this study has shown that when inducement is elevated to the level of state patronage it can potentially reinforce pre-conflict grievance bequeathing a combustible condition for conflict recurrence.

Evidence from this study clearly shows that a major challenge in the literature and DDR policy documents is their lack of preciseness on what constitutes appropriate inducement or how to arrive at an appropriate incentive.

Consequently, DDR practitioners must tread with caution when deciding on the appropriate amount of inducement to be offered to combatants.

Likewise, in the subfield of the political economy of armed conflict, this study has made some modest contribution that corroborates or challenges the assumptions of some of the existing theories in the field. Particularly, the evidence adduced in Chapter Three has proven that despite the validity of the numerous criticisms advanced against Collier and co's *greed theory and feasibility thesis*, at least in certain circumstances the theories still have potent explanatory validity and relevance. For instance, evidence from this study showed that while Collier and co's greed theory of conflict and feasibility hypothesis may not be a valid explanation for conflict *onset* they do provide an explanation for conflict dynamics; what led to escalation and the process of conflict mutation particularly as seen in the Niger Delta conflict. For instance, in line with Collier's *feasibility thesis*, there is unanimity of opinion amongst respondents in this study including militant commanders that their ability to sustain a prolonged armed rebellion against the Nigerian State was fundamentally linked to their ability to generate funding from several sources. Similarly, evidence from this study corroborates the supposition advanced by Mary Kaldor's *new wars* thesis, because the dynamics of the MEND era of the conflict clearly fits into it. This is because the MEND's era clearly shows the use of political grievances as a cover for perpetrating criminality as also claimed by Collier *et al.* In other words, MEND actors were very much engaged in criminality yet verbalising a powerful metanarrative of regional grievance which provided moral legitimacy and cover for their actions.

This study has also contributed to the theoretical literature on the Niger Delta conflict. The existing scholarly works on the Niger Delta conflict show that the literature is bifurcated between those that attribute the conflict to the long years of relative deprivation, environmental degradation, marginalisation and lack of basic human needs etc. leading to frustration and aggression. Others attribute it to the nature and character of the Nigerian State. Those that subscribe to this perspective maintain that understanding the root of the Niger Delta conflict requires the unpacking of the nature and character of the Nigerian State which as I argued in this thesis is fundamentally rentier-neopatrimonial (oftentimes refers to as prebendal state). This thesis, therefore, came as a strong validation

and contribution to the literature that locates the conflict within the context of the nature and character of the Nigerian State.

Likewise, in terms of the theoretical literature that interrogates the Nigerian State, this study has provided further elaboration that corroborates and reaffirms the enduring explanatory potency and analytical relevance of the theoretical positions that interrogates the Nigerian State from the political economy point of view. For example, evidence from this case study aptly showed that Richard Joseph's (1987) seminal work titled '***Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria: the rise and fall of the Second Republic***' remains a potent theoretical framework for understanding the nature and character of the Nigerian State, as well as the origin of violent conflict not just in the Niger Delta but Nigeria at large.

At the level of empirical contribution, Jennings (2008: 5) argues that studying how DDR is practically designed and carried out can help in enhancing effective future programme design and implementation that can improve outcomes as well as mitigate possible undesirable consequences. In this respect, at the empirical level, this study has demonstrated that DDR design and implementation must conform to some basic benchmarks such as adequate planning and the failure to meet these can result in undesirable consequences. Thus, this study corroborates the validity and continued relevance of the various empirical planning considerations examined in Chapter Two.

In another vein, the consensus in the existing literature is that the extent to which a disarmament programme can contribute to stability depends on how successful it was and this is measured in the number of weapons recovered. However, this case study has shown that often times the restoration of peace in the short-term may not be the direct outcome of the number of weapons recovered but the symbolic significance of the exercise to the participants, beneficiaries and other stakeholders. This study has also buttressed the fact that oftentimes, irrespective of how haphazard a disarmament programme is, its short-term confidence-building potentials can still be relatively positive.

6.3. Potential Concerns for Future Research

This study has demonstrated how a neopatrimonial DDR successfully restored stability in the Niger Delta in the short-term but in the long-term ensured the survival of existing vertical and horizontal command and control structures among the Niger Delta top militant commanders as well as reinforcing the conflict economy that sustains the conflict. Consequently, in the long-term, there is a high capacity to remobilise on the part of the top Niger Delta militant commanders. This was further compounded by the failure to provide reintegration training opportunities to many of those that demobilised, and jobs for many of those that have been trained. All this underpins the fragile nature of the relative stability achieved in the Niger Delta and the high potential for a return to violence which therefore raises some important concerns for future research in the Niger Delta and in the field of DDR. First and foremost, it would be useful to undertake further research to identify instances where neopatrimonial DDR has been adopted as an approach and how successful it was. Secondly, what may be the post ADDR pattern of violence in the Niger Delta? Will former top commanders who have been co-opted into the Nigerian neopatrimonial state system decide to make real their high capacity to remobilise? Will their former soldiers respond if remobilised? Or are new commanders likely to emerge? Furthermore, in the event of a return to violence, can the new commanders secure community legitimacy? Investigating these questions will enrich state capacity to determine appropriate and adequate response to the post ADDR programme emerging security challenges and violence in the Niger Delta.

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Appendix 1



Information Brief for Prospective Participants in a PhD Research Work Department of Peace Studies University of Bradford, United Kingdom

I am Mr Solomon Inuwa, a PhD Research candidate from the Department of Peace Studies University of Bradford, United Kingdom. I do hereby invite you to participate in a research study titled “***A critical evaluation of the 2009 Niger Delta amnesty, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (ADDR) programme***” which I am conducting as part of the requirements for the award of a PhD in Peace Studies. The research is aimed at evaluating the efficacy of *DDR* as a conflict prevention and resolution mechanism using the 2009 Niger Delta *ADDR* programme as an empirical case study. The research primarily seeks to examine to what extent and how effective has the Niger Delta *ADDR* programme is, in achieving its fundamental objectives. You are selected to participate in the study either because of your in-depth knowledge of the conflict, involvement in the peace process that led to the offer of amnesty to freedom fighters in the Niger Delta or the process of implementing the component elements of the amnesty programme. Please kindly spare a little time to go through this information brief as it contains information regarding what you need to know and is expected of you if you agree to participate. Please feel free to ask questions or request additional information as you deem fit. Thank you for taking your time to read through.

Contact details of the researcher:

Mr Solomon Inuwa

University of Bradford
Department of Peace Studies
United Kingdom (UK)

What you will be asked to do if you agree to take part

In the event you agree to participate, I will ask you certain questions pertaining to the DDR process in a face to face interaction. The discussion is expected to last for approximately 1 hour. Please note that there is no right or wrong answer to the questions but all I want is your honest opinion.

How is confidentiality of information going to be guaranteed?

Whatever information I shall obtain from you shall be strictly used for academic purposes. Consequently, every effort will be made to guarantee the maximum confidentiality of all information to be collected by storing it in a dedicated computer to which only I will have access. Similarly, the information provided will not be released to any person or group of persons.

Where is the interview going to be conducted?

The interview will be conducted in a safe place to be consensually agreed between me and you.

Is the product of this research going to be published?

The product of this research will be submitted as a thesis for the award of a PhD in Peace Studies by the University of Bradford. Subsequently, it may be released to the public domain either in the form of journal articles or presentation at conferences.

Right to participate and disengage from participating

Your decision to participate should be voluntary, and even when you decide to participate you are free to withdraw your consent and disengage from the interview process at any point in time without providing any reason for withdrawing. You are also free to request the retrieval of the information you provided in case you wish to do so.

Will my responses be recorded on tape?

Yes, please kindly note that with your kind authorization your responses will be audio recorded for accuracy and clarity purposes. However, you are free to grant or decline the request without providing any explanation. In the event you do not want your voice to be recorded, I would appreciate your kind permission take handwritten notes as you speak.

Who is supervising this research?

This research is being supervised and guided by ***Professor R. Neil Cooper*** of the department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. In case you need further information, he can be contacted as follows:

Professor R. Neil Cooper

Associate Dean for Graduate Research
School of Social and International Studies
University of Bradford
Richmond Road,
Telephone: +44 (0) 1274 234776
Email: r.n.cooper@bradford.ac.uk

Appendix -2



Consent Form

I.....do hereby agree to participate in a research study titled “***A critical evaluation of the 2009 Niger Delta amnesty, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme***”. I wish to state that the purpose and nature of the study have been fully explained to me in writing/verbally as has this consent form and have in turn understood it.

I also had the opportunity to ask the researcher questions regarding the project and what is expected of me as a participant.

I understand that my decision to participate is voluntary and that I can withdraw at any time without any repercussion.

I understand that information to be gathered in this study will form part of a thesis to be submitted to the University of Bradford.

I understand that the confidentiality of the information I am going to provide as well as my anonymity in the final report, publications and presentations emanating from the information will be guaranteed.

.....

Participant’s Name

Signature

Date:.....

Appendix 3

RESTRICTED



PPA/NDR/09
DATED: AUGUST 2009

RENUNCIATION OF MILITANCY

I.....residing at
of State an indigene of in
..... State. Formerly engaged in militant activities in the
Niger Delta region of Nigeria, do solemnly swear (affirm) that I hereby
renounce all my previous acts of militancy, including my affiliations and
allegiance to any militant group and/or organisation; and that I will
henceforth faithfully support, protect and defend the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria and respect every constituted authority;
and that I shall never again engage in any act of militancy in the Niger
Delta region of Nigeria or anywhere whatsoever; and that I will in like
manner, abide by; and faithfully and lawfully support every effort being
made by the Federal, State and Local Governments and their agencies for
the overall development of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

DEPONENT

BEFORE ME;

COMMISSIONER FOR OATHS

RESTRICTED