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NEIL D BULLEYMENT

WHAT WERE THE EFFECTS OF THE POST-COLONIAL EXPERIENCE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY ON UK FORCES IN SOUTHERN IRAQ? WERE THE LESSONS ABSORBED AND IMPLEMENTED?

PHD THESIS

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Abstract

Keywords: British, Counterinsurgency, Post-Colonial, Lessons, Effects, Iraq, Northern Ireland, Oman.

This thesis examines the British army and its legacy of counterinsurgency from the 20th century. It analyses the effects of post-colonial counterinsurgency and the army's ability to learn from previous counterinsurgency conflicts to create new doctrine from earlier examples that could have had lessons for the UK forces in southern Iraq.

Doctrine (both official and unofficial) ranges from endorsed army field manuals to theory written by experts while on defence fellowships. The army's ability to create new doctrine from previous campaigns lessons and how it is diffused across the armed forces is also assessed.

The conflicts used as post-colonial counterinsurgencies scrutinise Oman and Northern Ireland. These two case studies provide mixed lessons, that should advance and expand British counterinsurgency theory and models. The previous historical occurrences of counterinsurgency have created a British approach which has established a four-pillar framework which encompasses minimum force, civil-military co-operation, use of intelligence and tactical flexibility. This approach could identify lessons for a modern British army deployed to Iraq.

If lessons and previous outcomes are analysed to create new doctrine, strategy and tactics that encompass the four pillars framework, what went wrong in southern Iraq? Could lessons from earlier campaigns have assisted British efforts?

Acknowledgements

The idea for this thesis came to life in my mind during my year of studies for the Master's degree in Security and terrorism at the University of Leeds. My former Bachelor's thesis supervisor, Professor Paul Rogers from Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, was giving a guest lecture at Leeds on international security. We caught up after the talk and then by email. It was here that I was encouraged to think about the possibility of a PhD (thanks Paul). My initial area was to focus on peace support operations, but this changed quickly to counterinsurgency looking at why things went to so badly wrong in Iraq.

During my long-project of this PhD, I have had the generous encouragement and support of Professor Paul Rogers and my initial second supervisor, Dr Nick Ritchie (now of the University of York). Dr David Harris who took me on after Paul's retirement has been a kind, patient and keen supporter of this project throughout his involvement. I have spent many hours discussing theory, practice and the design of how to do this thesis. The encouragement and assistance from Paul, Nick and David have been exemplary.

My thanks must also go to the varying libraries and archives at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) and the National Army Museum with its archive. Here many unobtainable texts were viewed for their value to the thesis (and if they should be pursued and procured). Also, thanks should extend to Dr Paul Dixon, whom I met at the 'Butcher or Bolt' conference in

2012. He studied at Bradford and generously supplied me with electronic copies of his work if useable.

The support and forbearance of my family; Linda (my wife) and our children Katherine and Alexander go without question. Many hours of restricting the children's access to the home PC went on during this process. Linda, over many years, has gotten used to my absences from home while researching this thesis. My major regret is that both my wife's parents and my own departed during the completion of the PhD, our parents would have loved to see it completed. Finally, without the encouragement of academics, friends', and family this thesis would have stalled without them, thank you all.

Contents

Glossary

Adoo	Omani word for enemy
AO	Area of Operations
BANNER	Name of the British Army operation in Northern Ireland
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff (UK)
CGS	Chief of the General Staff (UK)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (US)
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CR	Critical Realism
CSAF	Commander, Sultans Armed Forces (Oman)
DAC	Division Action Committees (Northern Ireland)
DCDC	Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (UK)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DGD&D	Directorate General of Development and Doctrine
DLF	Dhofar Liberation Front
DoD	Department of Defense (US)

FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOC	General Officer Commanding (UK)
HMG	Her Majesty's Government (UK)
INLA	Irish National Liberation Army
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IDF	Israeli Defence Forces
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISG	Iraq Survey Group
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JAM	Jaish al-Mahdi
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JWS	Jungle Warfare School (Malaya)
LXE	Lessons Exploitation Centre
MND:SE	Multi-National Division: South East
MoD	Ministry of Defence (UK)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NI	Northern Ireland

NIRTT	Northern Ireland Reinforcement Training Team
NITAT	Northern Ireland Training and Advisory Team
NSC	National Security Council (US)
OIRA	The 'Original' Irish Republican Army
ORHA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
PDRY	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PEC	Province Executive Committee
PFLOAG	Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (until 1971)
	Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (after 1971)
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PDRY	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSNI	Police Service Northern Ireland
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
RAF	Royal Air Force (UK)
RN	Royal Navy (UK)
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies
SAS	Special Air Service (UK)

SAF	Sultans Armed Forces (Oman)
SBS	Special Boat Squadron (UK)
SCIRI	The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labour Party
SEP	Surrendered Enemy Personnel (Oman)
SLR	Self-Loading Rifle (UK L1A1 7.62mm Rifle)
SOAF	Sultan of Oman's Air Force
SOCOM	Special Operations Command (US)
SON	Sultan of Oman's Navy
SRR	Special Reconnaissance Regiment
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TELIC	Name of British Army operation in Iraq
UDA	Ulster Defence Association
UDR	Ulster Defence Regiment
UFF	Ulster Freedom Fighters
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
UU	Ulster Unionists
UVF	Ulster Volunteer Force

UWC	Ulster Workers Council

Chapter One

Introduction

Throughout the twentieth century, Britain acquired experience in counterinsurgency when faced with nationalist rebellions and insurgencies while administering former imperial holdings or undergoing decolonisation. These examples, including Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden, were where the British developed their 'specialism' in counterinsurgency operations. It is worth noting that these operations have been political successes first and military successes second; most, if not all, insurgencies are political in composition. As any skill withers without practice, the British counterinsurgency capability has exhibited a weakened ability in this area. This thesis is troubled with this transformation of former knowledge, with a specific orientation to the experiences of UK forces in southern Iraq.

This change in 'specialism of counterinsurgency' began following the decolonisation of Western powers with foreign territory and with the evolved modern style of journalism, both photo and film. During the 1990s, the development of live television news reporting and the embedding of journalists with deployed troops allowed current news events associated with conflicts such as Northern Ireland and Iraq to be witnessed and reported. The further development of modern media, especially with the internet, has created a real-time gateway on what was happening in overseas deployments and how the armed forces were operating and existing in these theatres. Iraq (as witnessed by many) proved problematic for the British army for many reasons. The British military has doctrine and considerable experience in counterinsurgency.

This thesis analyses and other post-colonial experiences to find lessons and good practices that could have been employed or attempted in Iraq.

Thesis Conception

This thesis came to life following the British deployment in 2003 to support the US invasion of Iraq. The situation in Basra and surrounding areas post-invasion deteriorated into violence, somewhat akin to an insurgency. Older veterans have previously described the experience of insurgency that I have met at British Legion events which had survived Dhofar and Malaya. When coupled with my understanding of Northern Ireland, I questioned what went wrong in Iraq, knowing of the army's history with counterinsurgency. Discussions with former service personnel brought this thesis to life, seeking lessons that could have been used in Iraq.

As an ex-soldier (a life experience that does change the perspectives of many recruits in their viewpoint of life), this simple change in outlook has impacted how this thesis was written.

Two tours of Northern Ireland happened during my career; the first lasted four months, primarily based at Moscow camp in Belfast with other temporary accommodation found for us elsewhere at police stations or within the city's observation towers. The tour had three objectives; maintain the peace, provide aid to the civil power (patrolling the city with the RUC), and gather intelligence within an urban setting. The tour significantly increased my awareness of the complexities of the sectarian conflict and

how multi-faceted and historical the conflict was. The animosity conveyed for the Provisional IRA is a default position for a soldier indoctrinated from an institutional perspective. The animosity between the loyalist and nationalist communities and the British soldiers was unique and terrifying for many soldiers to witness first-hand.

The second tour was at Crossmaglen, in South Armagh. The area known as Bandit country is within five miles roughly from the Republic of Ireland's border. Therefore, the PIRA could 'shoot and scoot' over the land border, reaching safety from UK security forces. This tour's objectives differed; to assist the civil power, maintain a presence in rural communities and deny PIRA freedom of movement across the border. By this second tour, my knowledge of Northern Ireland as a significant political hot potato and a military problem had developed.

The strategic outlook is rarely divulged to junior officers or senior non-commissioned officers. Therefore, the significant picture aspect gathered by intelligence is seldom known. The difference is in the tactical picture; of how local PIRA units with the often-active support of the Nationalist communities are observable. Their behaviours, associations, and functionality can be observed, recorded, reported, and provide potential learning and intelligence.

Pre-deployment training concentrated on tactics and the specific battle drills employed for the environment we patrolled, in the urban, rural and mixed areas. Assistance from the Northern Ireland training unit provided doctrine that covered most eventualities ranging from when it was suitable to return enemy fire to vehicle drills and how to

operate on-foot and vehicle checkpoints. Those with specialist roles, such as being part of the battalion search team, have specific training to find explosive devices and hidden arms caches and are trained in subject observation to identify individuals associated with terrorist groups.

My experience of Northern Ireland has ranged from the perspective of a section's second in commands (on my first tour) to a platoon serjeant (on the second). My experience on both tours as an experienced search unit member became invaluable for the battalion and brigade in having extra eyes capable of providing both eyes-on assessments of search unit deployments and an additional asset on the ground. This role led to a greater awareness of our tactical ability, how lessons gathered from a search unit are transferred, and PIRA's methods in its operations and resources are observed. I knew the tactical position while on both tours. The difference was missing the big-picture regarding intelligence and how effective the overall strategy was. While on my second tour, the worst experience of Northern Ireland is when you come under 'somewhat effective' enemy fire. When PIRA ambush an army patrol at a great distance in a rural environment, you cannot return fire until the shooter is accurately located.

This experience has developed within me an ability to react well under pressure and take a relaxed, professional approach, especially to events and their effects beyond personal control. But at the time, my mindset was greatly influenced by events in and around Belfast. Having witnessed the aftermath of three sectarian shootings, one pub bombing on the first tour, and an increase in violence targeted at the British army (the

piggie in the middle) during the loyalist marching season. My second tour was significantly quieter but not calmer. It increased my respect and awareness of the ability of trained snipers and how isolated and surrounded the British army can feel with the Crossmaglen RUC station. Our base of operations is predominantly surrounded by beautiful countryside with a Nationalist majority population.

After the first tour, the NITAT units sought out any new lessons gathered from experience or tactical adaptation. These lessons would be collected from written patrol and log submissions that would lead to visits from the local Northern Ireland training team members to gather detailed information from debriefings to potentially evolve operational methods and tactics that could immediately improve the welfare of the security forces and the civilian population. The NITAT teams were very patient and diligent in gathering even the tiny aspects from changes that have worked. After a short attachment to the Small Arms School to teach the fieldcraft skills developed in Northern Ireland, I became an instructor with the Northern Ireland Reinforcement Training Team (NIRTT), known within army slang as NITAT. Here I taught two skills sets, rural and night movement skills and the search unit experience.

Post-Banner, the battalion would often return to Sir John Moore barracks at Winchester. The army provided negligible support for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that still existed during the 1990s but came into a much greater focus around Iraq. Many soldiers who had problems would self-medicate predominantly with alcohol. If someone medically reported or was identified as having issues, it would be kept very quiet and dealt with under the wire (in-section or platoon with the support

kept quiet to avoid damage to a career). Many suffered in silence or would quit army life, which created difficulties down the line.

The long-term personal experience of Northern Ireland has created some personal difficulties. It has caused nightmares though these have diminished over time. I strongly dislike crowded, noisy areas, whether outside or indoors and still find it challenging to sit in a public building with my back to any door. I never sought any form of professional help or supposed that I have needed it. Still, this position could be considered short-sighted as the experience has changed my personality and, therefore, how I mentally process or think. The final chapter on my mental health still awaits final disclosure, but I feel generally balanced.

Being in Northern Ireland has motivated how this thesis has been written. A part of myself has always felt that Northern Ireland needed to be included and has partially framed the methodological approach in allowing case studies for contrast.

There is institutional blindness created by the army to initially believe the army's situation first, though this has been significantly eroded by experience, cynicism and academic interest. A military background and academia are an unusual mix. It took about three years of exposure to academia to force a form of limited mental, academic separation to allow me to think of a position, not from just a military viewpoint. I believe I have succeeded in mentally distancing myself from just a military response to one where I am more independent (although the default setting with a cynical spin still crops up now and again). The awareness of not being privy to the higher, cerebral

levels of command with a fuller detail reflects on this thesis and how it is written. It greatly scrutinises the tactical level but not the political or high command element that examines the decisions often made behind closed doors that impact the chosen strategy.

The experience amongst many of my peers is that Northern Ireland has had a profound effect. The experience gave each of us specific lessons which at the time are not regarded as relevant for the individual soldier beyond testing our courage and ability. We as individuals have no prospect of being capable to change events at any significant level while on the ground at the time. Perhaps the writing of this thesis and the experience of Banner upon people who were there may provoke change for future conflict where it acknowledges that it significantly transformations its soldiers for the future too. By later self-examination, understanding and greater knowledge on the writings and analysis of these particular campaigns perhaps events and experiences thrust upon us may create lessons providing change for future conflicts.

Thesis Title and Structure

The thesis is 'What were the effects of the post-colonial experience of counterinsurgency on UK forces in southern Iraq? Were the lessons absorbed and implemented?' and looks predominantly at two post-colonial conflicts of a very different political situation, environment and exposure to journalistic and world opinion that took place within the same decade, the 1960s. These are Dhofar, Oman and Northern Ireland. These two insurgencies will be studied for their experience of counterinsurgency and/or internal security positions to identify what lessons or

influence that they either had or could have provided in Iraq to the British during 2003-2009. The two campaigns may have held valuable operational guidelines and lessons of counterinsurgency or internal security transferable to Iraq.

Chapter two of the thesis is the methodology, which covers how this thesis is written and what has affected both the thesis and the author in how it was written. It looks at counterinsurgency literature examining the work of six pivotal theorists or theorists/practitioners along with an analysis that looks at the work of the historical four in a modern perspective. It considers the selected insurgencies; Dhofar and Northern Ireland. The choice of Critical Realism as the thesis philosophical standpoint allows for the use of observation, comparison and contrast as a function with the thesis for a detailed examination of the four pillars framework. These have a long association with the British model of counterinsurgency bringing together four analytical tools for analysis of the case studies.

Chapter three examines the definitions and terminology of post-colonial and insurgency and examines British doctrine, tradition and how the British army has developed as a learning institution. The non-official doctrinal writers are mentioned within this chapter, though further detailed and critical analysis on their work is discussed in chapter two's literature review. Also examined is how success in counterinsurgency is defined.

The fourth chapter looks at Dhofar, Oman, predominantly between 1965 and 1975. It follows how the conflict escalated and evolved, as did the response of the Omani state.

Oman had guidance from the UK with counterinsurgency. While this was technically not a pure British led counterinsurgency effort, the British held significant influence with Oman's leadership and provided military direction. Dhofar and its campaign were for the author the great unknown. Being aware of both Omani campaigns did not mean detailed knowledge. This campaign provided many research surprises, mainly from the few books written about it (most of which I have since obtained) and the rest from journal articles. New books on this particular campaign are rare, and the older texts are difficult to obtain. This campaign proved thought-provoking especially with the transition of Iraq and Afghanistan becoming insurgencies which has augmented the literature in this field as counterinsurgency has had a limited resurgence in military and academic circles.

The academic sources were diverse; the vast majority provided the research with former forces personnel from the UK, Omani and UK civil servants and even former enemy combatants. The written sources by former British forces personnel often contrasted well with one another and were about the campaign, holding equally derisive feelings of its failure during phase one and the opposite in its changes during phase two of the insurgency. These forces sources ranged from the British Commander of the Sultan of Oman's armed forces to platoon, company and battalion commanders that proved insightful to the conflict's politics both internally and in the region of the Persian Gulf with many states having influence and combatants. The influence of the greater Cold War in the region also played its role in whom supported who. This insurgency evolved from nationalism to one of ideology.

The fifth chapter looks at Operation Banner, the conflict in Northern Ireland, an area of the United Kingdom. This emergency was not technically an insurgency but certainly shared aspects during the conflict's early years (1969-1975). The British have had a long deployment on Banner, lasting 38 years. The differences in sources between books, journals and personal statements for other books often paint a stressful picture of the emergency. It varies in the political context depending on the writer, whether pro-IRA, pro-Ulster, or even the BBC correspondents. The most damning and honest viewpoints on this conflict from the inside often come from the soldiers and police who lived, survived and lost comrades during the Troubles' history.

The depth of my ignorance over the whole Northern Ireland conflict was a surprise. All three sides' almost total hard-line political stance, the violence perpetrated on the civilian population and the details regarding operations, the bombings, and the sometimes nearly programmed reactions by the army to IRA activity was a revelation. History, politics, tribalism and nationalist ideology (for both Loyalist and Nationalist communities) were supported by other Cold War ideologies. Additional support came from sources as diverse as the pro-Irish republican community within the USA and Libya. They supported republican revolutionaries (both the INLA and IRA) against the British state in a multi-faceted campaign that had no simple answers. Many wide-ranging factors influenced Northern Ireland, some historical and some modern political creation.

Chapter six looks at Iraq and Operation Telic. This chapter looks at the deployment that ran from 2003 to 2009. The area controlled by the British led Multi-national

Division: South East (MND-SE) division was initially responsible for the governorates of Al Muthanna, Maysan, Basra, and Dhi Qar. The chapter does allow for comparison between the US and British led efforts to reduce the violence throughout Iraq. Here, the reality surrounding the British administration of MND-SE becomes apparent, along with several factors across a broad spectrum that affected British administrative efforts. At the start of the thesis, little had been published or was readily available, other than books or journals written during the initial months after the invasion, often by academics and journalists. This has changed as time has passed.

Chapter seven looks at why Iraq went wrong, mainly for the British and the US and its military. It begins by looking at the vision for a post-invasion Iraq and the shortcomings of US-led strategic planning, both for post-conflict reconstruction and its security. The decisions made by the US and the CPA that affected Iraq nationally regarding infrastructure, civil governance and rebuilding Iraqi security forces are also examined to see how this impacted the British administrated areas. It further assesses what mistakes and choices made by the US and the British affected their efforts. This chapter also considers the Chilcot Inquiry that began in 2009 and published its finding in 2016. The level of detail in the testimony and written answers of the Inquiry panel runs to twelve volumes (plus one as an executive summary). This report is not used within the thesis because its remit is predominantly political rather than the military context involving counterinsurgency.

Chapter eight is the discussions/conclusions section of the thesis. The analysis has taken a full observance of doctrine (official or unofficial), the British army's learning

and has then utilised the four pillars framework to look at Oman and Northern Ireland. These case studies determine the effects of post-colonial counterinsurgency on UK forces in southern Iraq.

Without pre-empting the methodology chapter, I wanted to briefly explain why I chose southern Iraq and UK forces as the centre point for this thesis. Southern Iraq is Islamic, predominantly Shia rather than Sunni, and the British were welcomed as liberators (for a little while). With all the lessons and experience gathered through its long history of both counterinsurgency and peace support operations from the twentieth century, through choices made by politicians or military leadership, the British army struggled in Iraq. It was the search for what had gone awry and what impacted upon them that took my initial interest, along with knowledge of previous insurgencies, that led to this thesis taking shape (though it took careful steering toward the final title). The reasons for why Northern Ireland and Oman were selected is simple; they both started at similar times (the 1960s), in two completely different theatres of the Middle East and Europe (Britain's back garden – it being part of the UK) along with differing levels of press attention, Oman had very little, whereas Northern Ireland had much more. Both conflicts experienced difficulties during the early years, and both campaigns evolved to reach a satisfactory outcome for both nation-states. They also contain 'hard-won' lessons and counterinsurgency doctrine that could have aided the British in Iraq if the British army is a learning organisation with suitable methods to transfer lessons from one campaign to another.

This thesis during its writing has undergone multiple changes, it has been extended to broaden aspects that examine the British army as a learning institute creating a significant overall scrutinisation of the British army regarding its developments, especially in counterinsurgency during and after Iraq.

The contribution to the knowledge of this thesis is that it is a theoretical thesis rather than an empirical one; interview material proved challenging to obtain with Governmental restrictions. The research addresses future necessities required of counterinsurgency, especially in gathering, transmitting experience or learning for yet to come conflicts. The employ of the four pillars structure establishes a theoretical framework of analysis that takes the foremost British approaches associated with counterinsurgency from both past and recent official or non-official doctrine.

This thesis relies heavily upon secondary sources rather than primary aside from the Chilcot Inquiry, which is predominantly political in aspect rather than military. The thesis is unique; it looks at the British military's performance in Iraq and then establishes if both Oman and Northern Ireland had lessons or techniques not tried in southern Iraq. This thesis is unique in that it compares one middle eastern counterinsurgency, Oman, with another that developed in Iraq, with the lessons gathered from British ‘success’ in Northern Ireland.

The experience of a counterinsurgency campaign in a Muslim country that provided much of its own security forces personnel could have possessed lessons transferrable to Iraq. Lessons also from Northern Ireland should have been adapted and attempted

in Iraq. Britain's situation in Iraq was difficult; lessons could have been attempted if the British army and if any local security force presence had been more numerous and capable. The political and military situation in Iraq also added their own unique difficulties too.

The next chapter contains the methodology that examines multiple aspects related to a thesis; the literature, philosophical standpoint, analytical framework and methodological approach.

Chapter Two

Methodology

Introduction

The thesis has the research question of 'What were the effects of the post-colonial experience of Counterinsurgency on UK forces in southern Iraq. Were the lessons absorbed and implemented?' This question would not be out of place in either military history or international relations-based texts, as it is a subject that bridges both academic subjects. The subject also has powerful lessons for future conflict during the 21st century from a peace studies aspect, of the difficulties of planning, engaging, fighting and creating solutions for military and political campaigns amongst a predominantly civilian population situated in either a rural or urban based environment.

This chapter will contain a broad spectrum of academic tasks based on explaining the structure and approach of the thesis. It contains:

- Thesis Originality
- The choice of methodological approach: case study thesis
- The thesis structures
- Literature review, including;
    - i. Charles Callwell
    - ii. Charles Gwynn
    - iii. Robert Thompson
    - iv. Frank Kitson

v. Modern Thoughts

vi. Robert Egnell

vii. Andrew Mumford

- Further sources
- Philosophical standpoint and overview
- Counterinsurgency and Critical Realism
- The four pillars framework

Thesis Originality

The thesis question is: What were the effects of the post-colonial experience of Counterinsurgency on UK forces in southern Iraq? Were the lessons absorbed and implemented? This thesis is original as it compares Iraq to both Oman and Northern Ireland to identify if the experience of either conflict had lessons for Iraq. The research question remains original in its content, as other counterinsurgency research that has appeared during the timescale of this thesis tends to have varied in slightly different directions such as doctrine. In contrast, this research focuses on the post-colonial experience and Iraq. Many theses have utilised Malaya whereas this uses Oman and Northern Ireland as its two post-colonial conflicts (both with significant differences – more in their chapters). Finally, this work looking at counterinsurgency will remain for much of the 21st century as a tool that nation-states will employ or avoid when it comes to fighting against irregular, guerrilla, and insurgent forces. These forces, wanting political change within a state are not easily identifiable by traditional means, such as uniforms and structures associated with a traditional military force.

Methodological Approach: The Comparative Case Study Thesis

This thesis is qualitative in design and utilises written journals, eye-witness testimony of veterans, official documents and academics that provide written descriptions of events within the selected campaigns. These sources were selected to create a bigger picture of the campaigns where both aspects of quantitative and qualitative approaches could be used. A thesis, however, cannot avoid using data, charts and numbers to interpret and quantify results on whether a counterinsurgency campaign has been successful or not. Here, both aspects can provide analysis of the chosen campaigns where these figures will work much closer with the case studies.

International Relations has had a long history of a symbiotic relationship with the comparative case study approach. Landman (2008:4) describes four main reasons to employ a comparative approach; classification, contextual description, hypothesis-testing and theory building and lastly, prediction. The comparative approach is definable (therefore creating a method with which you can compare case studies), flexible (both in its approach to what you can select as a case study but also in how they connect) and lastly, the approach allows for the use of almost opposing methods of description and classification in a managed and flexible approach (so long as it is clearly defined).

The comparative approach to case studies does not need to employ a single, positive method of measure when comparing examples; it can also be deployed as a tool for empirical relationship or within this thesis, counterinsurgency success or failure. It is for this reason that it was chosen.

The main difficulty with other methods of comparison would be finding the lessons from previous counterinsurgency successes and failures. The comparative nature of case studies intends to offer an empirical means of understanding and organising the context of 'success or failure' in British counterinsurgency. As described in the previous chapter, the narrative surrounding the British experience in counterinsurgency also must recognise the difficulty that the British army has with learning from previous examples and using lessons learnt from earlier campaigns.

Landman (2008:10) concedes that any research requires four main components with a comparative study; contextual description of cases, units of analysis, variables, and observations. Landman (2008:18) further explains that cases are places or events with counterinsurgency that are the basis for study. Units of analysis are the objects 'in which a scholar collects data,' variables shift slightly depending on what can be measured, whose values can also shift. Lastly, observations set the values of variables for each campaign.

In this thesis, the case studies selected are Dhofar, Oman (1965-1975) from the early Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) days of nationalist conflict through a necessary change of Sultan, eventually leading to a full cessation of violence by the insurgents that had evolved into a new identity the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG - which later also changed its name slightly).

The second case study in Northern Ireland, which extensively looks at the period of initial deployment (1969) until Ulsterisation (1976) where strategy and later tactics shifted from counterinsurgency to internal security methods until Operation Banner ended in 2010. The final case study in Iraq looks into the British experience in Iraq with the multi-faceted array of difficulties thrust upon the British.

In the selected case studies, the units of analysis comprise the diverse magnitudes of counterinsurgency, the actors associated with the campaign and the international influence. The variables analyse both the insurgent military forces, their political methods and their organisation. It is the author's primary observation drawn from experience and multiple academic examples of British counterinsurgency, that efforts during the early years of each campaign demonstrate slow lesson learning from earlier insurgencies and uptake for these lessons in each campaign.

These cases were chosen for their importance to the British development of counterinsurgencies such as doctrine, military and political growth in this area where it has impacted the British in how they further evolved counterinsurgency development to suit each campaign. Nevertheless, with initial research in these areas, it is clear that the British as a learning and developing military with a supposed long history with counterinsurgency retains an inability to rapidly share lessons gained by hard experience from an earlier insurgency or conflict to a current one. When Oman and Northern Ireland are all examined, the initial observation from the earlier paragraph being one primary unit of analysis easily found in these case studies is that the structural slowness of the military to change its military operational preparedness from

warfighting or peace support to one of counterinsurgency requires significant improvement.

The initial design of this thesis was to include detailed interviews of veterans of Northern Ireland and Iraq to provide greater detail and further analysis of these conflicts. The interviews were to include senior commissioned and non-commissioned officers who had served in either or both conflicts; unfortunately, many of the Oman veterans who had senior command have since died. Many who were now retired, were happy to talk on the record with caveats. Difficulties arose with still serving personnel; having to obtain the necessary permission from the Ministry of Defence about the guidelines barring military personnel from officially conversing about conflicts they were part of. Unfortunately, due to many issues (one being my health) interviews were not an available option for this thesis and were not used.

Thesis Structure

A fuller description of the thesis structure is found in the introduction chapter, but briefly, the thesis organisation is:

- Chapter One; Introduction
- Chapter Two; Methodology
- Chapter Three; British army learning, doctrine and counterinsurgency
- Chapter Four; British counterinsurgency in Dhofar, Oman
- Chapter Five; Operation Banner, Northern Ireland
- Chapter Six; Operation Telic: Iraq, Basra and the South

- Chapter Seven; Iraq: Problematic for the US and the UK
- Chapter Eight; Discussions and conclusions

Literature Review

Initially, during the thesis design and planning, primary sources were scarce, aside from published doctrine and policy papers often released by the UK government or army. The published Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Counter Insurgency Operations is one of the pivotal primary sources that acted as a signpost for others. Later, publications released by the UK government to the Chilcot Enquiry helped. Other good sources have been the often-discussed post-conflict reports on the case studies selected released by the UK House of Commons Defence Select Committee.

Secondary sources started quite slow in number and then vastly increased as Iraq and Afghanistan continued. These sources debate all of the case studies selected to different levels of thoroughness in increasing number ranging from conference papers, journal articles and independent analysis of the Iraq campaign as it went on. Secondary sources range from journals such as *Small Wars and Insurgencies* to the Royal United Services Institute *Journal* and the International Institute of Strategic Studies along with many more. The list of journal articles and their sources would run out too many pages. In a majority of cases, the ones that were selected for use were highly detailed and brought a new level of detail often before the larger books were written on these subjects.

Following the Iraq invasion of 2003, its later violence led to counterinsurgency becoming popular within Western militaries as a means of fighting a campaign 'amongst the people.' Following its disputed 'failure' in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterinsurgency has decreased in both popular and military literature. Nevertheless, it remains a tool in the background that no doubt will see a re-examination of counterinsurgency for future conflicts between state and non-state actors that are not easily identifiable by simple identifiers such as a uniform or national flag.

Counterinsurgency texts which initially appeared after the start of the Iraq war were mainly journalistic pieces or academic journal articles. These quickly gave way to an increasing number of books looking at both counterinsurgencies from a military perspective and looking at late British examples of counterinsurgency through the US, Russian and Israeli examples. The subject of counterinsurgency with its use in Iraq has drastically increased examination of the subject which peaked in number circa 2014. The reality is that since many western powers have announced that a large 'boots on the ground' military campaign are unlikely again for another generation, counterinsurgency. Three excellent examples of 'generalist' books on counterinsurgency are Newsinger (2015), Rid and Keaney (2010) and Marston and Malkasian (2010).

Six authors of significance for the thesis have been selected for literature review, four of whom have strong historical relevance to the British approach to counterinsurgency but remain relevant due to their singular and collective position of still being relevant as they in both minor or major ways are still compared to modern concepts on the

subject. The latter two, Egnell and Mumford have modern interpretations and observations on both counterinsurgency theory, previous British campaigns and what has happened in the last two, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The four authors highlighted below have had a close association with the British armed forces but have never been official doctrinal writers for the British military establishment regarding counterinsurgency. Their respective texts have become essential reading by their peers and those that came after them. The four have been selected because they are regarded by other counterinsurgency theorists such as Alderson, Egnell, Mumford and Newsinger along with the author of this thesis as having the most significant influence on British counterinsurgency related matters from these personal, unofficial texts across much of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

The first three of the four main theorists of British counterinsurgency doctrine write from a military background are Colonel Charles E. Callwell, *Small Wars*, Major General Sir Charles Gwynn, *Imperial Policing* and General Sir Frank Kitson, *Low-Intensity Operations.* These three wrote from a perspective of being serving officers that translate their experience and understanding of this asymmetrical warfare as possible approaches for the future. The fourth, Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, was a civil administrator in Malaya who emphasised the pre-eminence of governmental policy, over a pure military solution. These writings, despite their unofficial origins, are according to Mockaitis (1995:136), the 'really useful' literature on counterinsurgency which was generated outside of official institutions. This position of being 'on the outside' can face argument due to the four having strong links to either

the British military establishment or the Colonial Office. However, in the case of Frank Kitson, he wrote *Low-Intensity Operations* on a defence scholarship at Oxford following a vast experience of counterinsurgency in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and Oman. Following the scholarship, Kitson became a Brigade command in Northern Ireland, who later imparted his concepts on later counterinsurgency doctrine when he became the Commandant (head) of the School of Infantry.

The reality is that these four writings did not start as official army documents but have had a profound influence on later official doctrine, theory and practice. Their recognition of counterinsurgency and asymmetric warfare has increased. As Malkin (2019:661) describes ‘the genealogy of the British way of counterinsurgency is associated with the classic works in the field of Charles Edward Callwell, Sir Charles William Gwynn, Sir Robert Thompson and Frank Kitson.’

Charles Callwell

Colonel Charles Callwell, who wrote about the small wars in the late 19th century, especially the South African wars, soberly noted on small wars that 'such campaigns are most difficult to bring to a satisfactory conclusion (Beckett 2001:36).' Callwell for many years remained the principal guide for officers in guerrilla warfare and small wars. Although not doctrinal in any formal sense, the publication of Callwell's *Small Wars* is generally agreed to be the starting point of British small wars writing on the subject. Callwell first published his works in 1896 and identified and addressed the problems to be faced by a modern army when dealing with an irregular enemy. These difficulties were poor intelligence, designing a strategy and applying current tactical

thinking, operational art, logistics, communications, and security into a region not best suited for deploying an army usually reinforced by artillery and cavalry.

Callwell gathered much of his experience while fighting against the Boers and his framework for irregular warfare involved the division of previous sectors into smaller parcels of land which could be easily held by strongpoint's involving the blockhouse design along with mobile, well-armed columns able to operate independently in these areas against the enemy. Alderson (Rid and Keaney 2010:32) claims that Callwell's framework can be recognised in later campaigns in the Frontier Provinces of India, Malaya, Oman, Northern Ireland and now Afghanistan.

Callwell states that when a campaign takes the form of suppressing an insurrection, that 'the object is not only to prove to the opposition who is the stronger but to also inflict punishment upon those who have taken up arms,' but to recognise that there must be a 'limit to the amount of licence in the destruction which is expedient.' (Callwell 1906: 41) This is not the early formation of a notion of minimum force or even the idea that his forces, when fighting an irregular force should be exemplary, in fact, the opposite. Callwell acknowledges that in small wars, 'the operations are sometimes limited to committing havoc which the laws of regular warfare do not sanction' (1906:42). Callwell mentions little in maintaining the peace after expeditions are sent in to suppress an uprising.

Callwell's implications are clear; small wars and conventional wars are somewhat different and require different rules for the pursuit of objectives. Callwell has remained

a popular author with British officer cadets at Sandhurst since publishing this work and with the other writers has remained on the current reading list. Though *Small Wars* was first published in the nineteenth century, it considers the difficulties that contemporary military faces when dealing with irregular conflict; inferior intelligence, little strategic direction and immediate political direction in the direction of how the conflict should be contested. According to Alderson (Rid and Keaney 2009:32 'not much has changed.'

Innes-Robbins (2016:132) refers to Callwell as the 'Clausewitz of colonial warfare' and that his book became a comprehensive synthesis of the lessons of experience in colonial warfare, and those lessons were here not just for the British but from many other nations too. Callwell assimilated the experiences of other armies and chose his many examples from many different periods. Callwell distinguished between small colonial wars and regular campaigns against organised conventional armies. He recognised the importance of vigorous leadership, good intelligence and maintaining a strong public opinion.

Whittingham (Mumford and Reis 2014:22) describes Callwell as being 'very much a product of his time.' Callwell advocated the support of approaches such as scorched earth tactics, the seizure of livestock and the destruction of crops and villages. Despite these nineteenth-century ideals many of Callwell's observations of conflicts of these types have remained pertinent. Whittingham (Mumford and Reis 2014:23) observes one of Callwell's conclusions that '*small wars of the future may involve very difficult operations*.' Under the 1990 edition of Small Wars, it was further entitled a 'tactical

textbook for imperial soldiers.' This sub-title suggests the book is a tactical manual only, but Callwell had a broad strategic framework that positioned him from other nineteenth-century theorists.

Callwell was very much of the colonial period, he failed to fully realise the negative impact of the harsh tactics, and counter-productive implications of some of these techniques such as collective punishments and punitive actions against civilians. They may have been of its time, but Callwell's influence has undergone a rediscovery according to Whittingham (Mumford and Reis 2014:30) that has ‘noticed his contribution was significant enough to justify his inclusion in the line of succession of British irregular warfare theorist-practitioners.’

Charles Gwynn

Major General Sir Charles Gwynn wrote *Imperial Policing* in 1934, and according to Alderson, 'is a gem of analysis and informal doctrine' (Alderson, cited in Rid and Keaney 2010:33). This publication was one of the first to attempt to juggle the challenges of the new minimum force policy following the massacre at Amritsar in Punjab perpetrated by General Dyers in 1919. The ideals of discrimination and proportionality for the use of force run throughout the text, and are analysed by Gwynn with ten examples of conflicts between 1919 and 1931 'to illustrate military action achieving its results with the minimum exercise of force,' according to Gwynn (1934:7).

Gwynn's text could be described as 'being of its time,' when it was written; Britain maintaining an empire at the height of its power but *Imperial Policing* does contain lessons and an emphasis upon military/civil policy, with civil policy being more important. It also looks at the difficulties the soldier faces when fighting a deepening insurgent conflict which according to Alderson (Rid and Keaney 2010:33) has civil policy being more 'conciliatory than confrontational' which has contemporary relevance. This position is further developed by the four principles that Gwynn believes should direct the army's actions (in a counterinsurgency situation) along with 'methods it could legitimately and effectively use to support the civil police and the civil administration (Gwynn 1934:12-14).' These four methods are first, that policy should remain in the hands of the civil power, not the military. Second, the amount of force should be proportionate to the given situation on the ground. Third, the required operations which need to be carried out are implemented at the correct time for the right reason. The fourth being that the relation between the civil power and military units should be of a close co-operative relationship, but that military power cannot restore order alone without civil support. These four methods and this text by Gwynn may be argued as being years ahead of their time. The current situation in Afghanistan is being driven by a counterinsurgency policy that closely resembles these four methods. Kitson, nearly forty years later, also exemplifies many of these points' development; civil aid and infrastructure rebuilding are crucial to counterinsurgency success (Kitson 1973:58-61).

The final reason for Gwynn’s inclusion as one of the four leading theorists of British counterinsurgency operations is that the text is both of its time when written and being current due to the critical analysis he gives to the ideal of minimum force, a contentious

and challenging juggling act even in today's current counterinsurgency operations. Gwynn carefully examines each of the ten case studies contained within *Imperial Policing* and uses each to magnify a situation with an important dilemma where it 'balances the use of force against longer-term consequences' (Rid and Keaney 2010:33). This, Gwynn (1934:22) argues, is pivotal in gaining the support of friendly or neutral populations to not only create a situation where 'they provide detailed information to the security forces' but create a space for the 're-establishment of normal conditions and governmental authority.'

Innes-Robbins (2016:141) states that Gwynn continued to overlook the critical importance of political factors in overcoming an insurgency. He continued and built upon the work of Callwell as he summed up admirably the traditional strengths of imperial policing, use of minimum force, maintaining the rule of law, and civilian control of the militarily which formed the core of British counterinsurgency theory from 1945. However, Innes-Robbins (2016:141) claims that Gwynn ignored the more brutal realities of actual practice on the ground and instead emphasised civil, military and police cooperation with good intelligence while overlooking the increasingly political nature and importance of guerrilla warfare. Gwynn also carefully avoids the Ireland conflict of 1919-21. His work according to Malkin (2019:661) also faces the somewhat limited criticism of 'being reduced to a piece of writing about colonial management' with a strong leaning towards minimum force. The reality was far from the criticism levelled towards his *Imperial Policing.*

Gwynn held multiple roles not just as a serving military officer but within the British establishment ranging from the Commissioner of Abyssinian and East Africa Boundary Commission to Commandant of the Staff College at Camberley. One of Gwynn's most unheralded roles was as a Geographic intelligence officer within the War Office. These experiences made Gwynn unique in having had roles where he had an understanding of the army's duties within the empire and as a colonial civil servant. Here, Gwynn had access to both sides of the colonial desk along with a mind having had intelligence training.

Military aid to the civil power remained the role of the armed services between the world wars. Gwynn's work became semi-official when the official instructions and manuals became 'No longer consistent with the requirements of the day.' (Malkin 2019:665). Gwynn held the opinion that the army held three major roles within the empire; firstly, to observe the differences between 'revolutionary movements.' Secondly, to support the security forces upholding law and order (where *Imperial Policing* supports official doctrine) and thirdly, to 'restore colonial order' where the army according to Malkin (2019:666) 'is seen in a role closer to practical counterinsurgency after 1945.'

Gwynn remains of interest, not just for his thinking on observing differences in revolutionary movements but because Gwynn stressed that imperial policing is an intelligence war. Gwynn makes imperative interpretations on the enemy, the political and guerrilla movements that can only be made by using intelligence. Malkin

(2019:669) declares ‘Gwynn considers intelligence to be the core, the backbone of successful counterinsurgency.

Gwynn's interest was not just military, his education at the London School of Economics also meant that Gwynn could understand the economic (and therefore primary political objective) drive that would enable differences between the British and local government.

Gwynn’s placement within modern counterinsurgency writings has been mixed. The book entitled ‘Imperial Policing’ creates the wrong impression. His work is looking at the employ and use of British armed forces (army, navy and air force) in support of small wars (usually in aid to the civil power). Where it is of note, is that Gwynn’s wide-ranging experience across the British establishment along with his ‘expert’ knowledge of military and economic matters in conflicts later described as counterinsurgency when coupled with his civil colonial experience and intelligence training in coordinating these efforts. His work almost straddles the fence between fighting small wars and expert knowledge in post-World War Two counterinsurgency.

Robert Thompson

Sir Robert Thompson wrote his book *Defeating Communist Insurgency* in 1966 with an update following his work with the Americans in Vietnam in 1970. His work outlined the lessons of his experience as a civil administrator with security responsibilities during the Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960 with the Malayan civil service. *Defeating*

Communist Insurgency outlines five basic principles for counterinsurgency operations which are listed as:

- The government must have a clear political aim.
- The government must function within the law
- The government must have an overall plan
- The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas.
- In the guerrilla phase of an emergency, it must secure its base first.

These principles had an extensive influence on a basic framework for the conducting of counterinsurgency. Like another great 20th century scholar of French colonial warfare and counterinsurgency, Colonel David Galula (a French officer who served in Algeria during the Algerian war for Independence, 1956-58), Robert Thompson and David Galula shared two major beliefs. Firstly, the idea of protecting the population first, not just killing the enemy and its supporters. The second was that political power had to have primacy over military power, Galula (1964:89) claims ‘Political power is the undisputed boss is a matter of both principle and practicality. What is at stake is a country’s political regime, and to defend it is a political affair.’

Thompson emphasised the importance of politics in counterinsurgency, and invented the term 'clear and hold,' a tactical approach that has been used many times since in Aden, Northern Ireland and Oman by the British. This tactical approach has been

revised by the US since into 'Clear, hold and build' which has been employed in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

'Clear and hold' as a tactical approach worked 'for clear operations' where the first essential component is to saturate the disputed area with joint military and political forces. This will either force the insurgent units to disperse or withdraw into surrounding areas. Clear operations will, however, be a waste of time unless the government is ready to follow them up immediately with 'hold' operations.

The objective of a 'hold operation' is to restore government authority in the area and establish a solid security framework. If there is no follow up, Thompson (1966:112-113) claims a hold operation becomes nothing more than a general sweep through the area. Finally, Thompson believes in government control of the military, of close co-operation between military and civil powers and that political control is of greater importance. His work under General Briggs and later Field-Marshal Templar led to greater development and coordination of intelligence methods used in the Malayan Emergency. His work was pivotal for combatting Maoist-influenced insurgents, and Thompson himself was appointed an advisor to the US military mission in Vietnam for counterinsurgency.

Thompson's fourth principle is the government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas. By this Thompson also advocated the robust use of intelligence gathered both by the military and by civil agencies to provide security. Here Thompson also joins his 'British counterinsurgency' contemporaries

such as Callwell, Gwynn and Kitson. When it has not worked well, the use of intelligence and its reaction according to Pritchard and Smith (2010:75) quote a former Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannett that 'it's rather like prodding the lion who was otherwise kipping in the corner, minding his own business.' The reaction can also have unexpected results.

Mumford (2010:178) describes Thompson's work at counterinsurgency as 'a return to first principles,' in that it represents a 'synthesis of his tactical and strategic insights into the political conduct of counterinsurgency.' Thompsons works is consistently about the government doing something i.e., it is 'politically oriented and should not be interpreted as guidelines for military commanders' (Mumford 2010: 179).

Thompson's work according to Pritchard and Smith (2010:66) 'has become an established template for understanding counterinsurgency.' His ideas that revolve around the above five principles are in reality 'an exercise in post-event rationalisation, rather than a basis of policy at the time.' (Pritchard and Smith 2010:67) It is because of this post-conflict assessment that Thompson has gained a place in the informal doctrine that has been associated with the British counterinsurgency legacy. Beckett (2009:34) notes that Thompson's work was 'undeniably influential in the British army's belated recognition of the need to codify its counterinsurgency practice given the increasing prevalence of the global insurgent challenge since 1945.'

In many respects, Thompson asserts that government and politics remain at the core of his five principles that also reinforces the basic counterinsurgency reasoning that

an insurgency is eighty percent political in character. Mumford (2010: 192), Pritchard and Smith (2010:86) loosely agree that his five principles are 'multi-faceted,' and were 'never meant as a theory to be solely military in type,' and may provide potential political solutions gathered from experience in these conflicts.

Thompsons four principles were incorporated into official doctrine within the 1969 edition of *Counter-Revolutionary Operations*. Thompsons approaches of ‘clear, hold, winning, won’ continue to be seen as they were also written into the British 2001 *Counter-Insurgency Operations* with; build a base, establish a firm forward operational base, secure a controlled area, consolidate the controlled areas and continue the expansion of the controlled areas (Rid and Keaney 2009:34).

Frank Kitson

General Sir Frank Kitson wrote *Low-Intensity Operations* in 1971 following a military fellowship to Oxford University when he had stepped down as a battalion commander in which he was asked to undertake the application for the scholarship from a senior officer who had identified Kitson as an expert in this field due to his field experience in Kenya, Malaya, Oman and Cyprus. Kitson later saw service in Northern Ireland as a brigade commander.

Kitson was incredibly well-read for a soldier, and his work identified many of the same issues within counterinsurgency as Major General Sir Charles Gwynn (author of *Imperial Policing)* and Sir Robert Thompson (*Defeating Communist Insurgency)* but in

a greater level of detail, often written explicitly for the modern soldier at the tactical level on these types of duty. Kitson, unlike Callwell and Thompson, explained the importance and role of intelligence collection and training for the troops involved in counterinsurgency. Marston and Malkasian (2008:15) articulate that 'Kitson is the first to recognise that intelligence gathering is key to any success' rather than it being an unstated aspect of other counterinsurgency tools.

Kitson according to Bennett and Cormac (Mumford and Reis 2014:106) is 'arguably the most influential and important warrior-scholar in the British tradition' associated with counterinsurgency. Most warrior-practitioners mix their experience of counterinsurgency and then theorise on the subject. Or, theorise and then practice counterinsurgency. Kitson has been in both positions. His experience across four theatres of counterinsurgency operations and then an academic break (where *Low-Intensity Operations* was written), followed by an operational command in Belfast, Northern Ireland.

Aspects of Kitson's work from his previous experience especially in the area of intelligence (and counter-gang operations) have provided depth in certain areas not generally found in other warrior-scholars as Kitson in Kenya (despite lacking formal training or experience) was appointed as a District Military Intelligence officer. It was in Kenya that Kitson tried earlier tactics with 'a twist' for the current campaign such as employing pseudo-gangs with 'turned' Mau Mau and security officers to patrol areas looking for insurgent units. His efforts in Kenya brought success 'in the field' but not with his peers and senior officers (the exception being Erskine, the Commander-in-

Chief). His superiors believed in traditional tactics, Bennett and Cormac (Mumford and Reis 2014:108) mention that Kitson 'believed his methods were the most effective in defeating the Mau Mau, and that conventional operations were failures.'

Kitson (1971:95) gives a chapter of *Low-Intensity Warfare* to the use of the handling of information as a tactic, 'If it is accepted that the problem of defeating the enemy consists very largely of finding him, it is easy to recognise the importance of good information.' In this chapter, which covers the use and handling of intelligence, Kitson outlines how the troops can best gather intelligence about insurgents as well as the civilian population.

This tactic was one he employed when commanding 39 Brigade in Belfast where the intelligence reforms he set in motion for troops in Northern Ireland not only gathered information upon suspects but also on the everyday movements and behaviours of all civilians both on foot or in motor vehicles within their area of operations. The information is then split into two areas, and Kitson (1971:96) states that 'the two separate functions are therefore involved in putting troops into contact with insurgents (both aggressively and passively), the first of collecting background information and the second involves developing it into contact information,' creating a fuller, broader picture of the ground and its inhabitants. This contact information gathering came about from Kitson's experience in Malaya where it was found that intelligence was lacking for the army working at reducing insurgent numbers. Kitson notes (Mumford and Reis 2014:110) that 'the army was the primary user with responsibility for developing background information into contact intelligence.'

This information, according to Kitson (1971:97), is ‘best organised not by an intelligence agency but by the operational commander and intelligence specialists,’. Essentially, the system involves a commander in collecting all the background information he can get from a variety of sources including the intelligence organisation, analysing it very carefully to narrow down the possible whereabouts of the enemy, the purpose being to make deductions which will enable him (or her) to employ the troops with some hope of success as opposed to using them at random in the hope of making contact. Kitson also believed in the rule of law and the military being placed in support of police units. In 1977, Kitson (1977:289) wrote ‘that everything done by a government and its agents in combating an insurgency must be legal.’

Kitson wrote *Low-Intensity Operations* on a year's scholarship at Oxford during 1969, his work examined 'means of for preparing the army to face possible subversion, insurrection and peacekeeping operations,' (Mumford and Reis 2014:112). It is the case put forward by Bennett and Cormac that Kitson wrote his text at Oxford rather than at a military educational institute to distance his book from being published within the military structure allowing Kitson to critically reflect on his experience and to theorise on future developments (Mumford and Reis 2014:112-113). The result from publication was met with approval both within the army and without although Kitson's work did not escape criticism, many who read it believed he had written a book to constrain the British population should the troubles in Northern Ireland spread to the mainland.

The political left in the 1970s viewed Kitson's philosophy and activities in Northern Ireland in the context of Britain at the time. This is because he believed that there was a strong possibility that the breakdown in law and order in Northern Ireland could be mirrored in the rest of Britain and that the tactics employed there would be required on the mainland. The country which Kitson was serving in the late 1960s and the 1970s was severely challenged by a range of maladies that threatened to get out of hand. The loss of empire and a sense of economic malaise, represented by the devaluation of the pound, elevated levels of unemployment and a militant trade union movement which some influential people believed was being guided by a 'communist Trojan Horse', all contributed to a growing pessimism on the part of certain influential members of the Establishment that Britain was bedevilled by ineffective governance and on the brink of economic collapse. The fact that Kitson had written about his expectation that the British army would be involved with counter-subversion, Bennett and Cormac (Mumford and Reis 2014:107) noted led to 'much concern.'

Bennett and Cormac (Mumford and Reis 2014:106-107) note that ‘Kitson had a notorious reputation’ and that his writings placed him in the British tradition alongside other theorist-practitioners such as Thompson and Paget, where ‘the morality of counterinsurgency operations and accusations of British atrocities and human rights abuses’ (Mumford and Reis 2014:107) are not considered.

During the late 1970s, a new counterinsurgency doctrine was developed by the army, much of it supporting the ideals of civil, police and military coordination; ideas similar to Kitson. His influence remained when between 1978-1980, Kitson became the

Commandant of the army staff college where the official doctrine was created and revised. His final posting as Commander-in-Chief, United Kingdom Land Forces also would have given him great access to officers and senior NCOs alike.

Despite these criticisms, Kitson's work according to Dixon (2009:2-3) were 'highly influential principles for fighting counterinsurgencies and was probably more widely read than the official army counterinsurgency doctrine.' *Low-Intensity Operations* remained ‘the mainstay of the army’s counterinsurgency education and staff training for the next twenty years’ (Mumford and Reis 2014:112).

Modern Thoughts

Regarding the four authors, above, at a recent conference in 2011 at University College London entitled ‘Butcher and Bolt’ or ‘Hearts and Minds’, Professor David French described three of the authors in the following way. Callwell is the first British counterinsurgency author but his text completely ignores the political aspects of counterinsurgency operations. At the time of his first edition in the 1890s, Callwell was not seen as relevant, especially in India where plains warfare experience was next to useless in fighting mountainous campaigns. Callwell is interested in conquest only, and his influence was felt until the 1920s.

David French argued that Gwynn was the first to heavily promote the idea of minimum force not because it is overtly wrong, but that it is a tool for consolidation, in that Gwynn is interested in maintaining the British Empire especially after it was enlarged after the

First World War where the British were trying to maintain the status quo often on a shoestring budget.

Sir Robert Thompson, according to David French, did two tasks. The first was to change the turgid language often used by the British army in its official publications and writings to one of English. The second was that the driving force behind his writing was to prepare whoever was the controlling state that it was time to seek a political solution and be prepared in the long run ‘to give’ regarding the objectives of the insurgents.

Regarding Kitson, the academic board felt divided; some felt his influence was significant as Kitson later in his career also was responsible for the staff college and its direction on this subject. The others merely commented that some of the darkest days for Northern Ireland happened during Kitson's time.

The four main theorists of the British way of counterinsurgency have remained part of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries academic and practical counterinsurgency doctrine because they wrote from a background of theory and then practice (or the reverse) or in Kitson's case, both. These four fundamental theorists on the British way of counterinsurgency have created a branch of un-official literature and doctrine on the subject that has evolved across the twentieth century.

This doctrine was written for the British army of their time but contain tactical, strategic and operational lessons both for the military but especially with Thompson for the perspective of a government too. These four continue to influence the modern discussions on counterinsurgency theorists such as Nagl with *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* that looks at the lessons from Malaya and David Petraeus with the *U.S. Army U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (aka 3-24)* of which the lessons were then tried with Iraq.

Robert Egnell

Two texts written or co-written by Egnell will be used with the thesis. His work looks at UK counterinsurgency operations when compared with the US in Iraq in both books *Complex Peace Operations and Civil-Military Relations: Winning the Peace* and *Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare* (co-written with David Ucko) hold great relevance for the thesis. The value of these texts is that they are well researched, hold similar areas of interest to the thesis and have some areas of analysis of a similar vein. Egnell's work is current both for the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns. His work has a level of detail on both the US and UK militaries and governments regarding the start of the Iraq campaign that brings multiple sources together well. However, some of the conclusions raised by Egnell in both texts diverge from his work to this thesis. About the thesis, by importantly incorporating the Dhofar insurgency as a case study this thesis uses Egnell's work but at the same time also

finds a significant gap in the literature between the two aforementioned texts which fails to observe the findings and potential lessons from this campaign.

Egnell explores three main spheres of note with *Complex Peace Operations,* first, the civil-military methods and formation between the US and UK governments and militaries. Second, how the US and UK mounted their operations in support of a complex peace support operation which ultimately took on the visage of a counterinsurgency campaign. Third, the book provides Egnell with a theoretical framework for analysis for civil-military relations between the US and UK with Iraq. *Complex Peace Operations* significantly bring many wide-ranging sources together that examine and contrast the US/UK position before the Iraq invasion concerning military and civil planning for a post-invasion Iraq but also look at the approaches used by these two military forces in the methods of military conduct when deployed.

The second book, *Counterinsurgency in Crisis* has a cross-over with the first text but in detail examines the British model of counterinsurgency and then looks at both Iraq and Afghanistan especially with their difficulties and domestic political problems. It also looks importantly forward at the future of British involvement with counterinsurgency and whether there will be a future for it again. During the 1980s and 1990s counterinsurgency was a subject only taught to the UK military establishment at the Staff College; is counterinsurgency to be consigned to the history books as a political and military strategy that is too costly in blood and treasure to be effectively deployed by a western military in support of another partner nation.

Egnell and Ucko (2013:145-166) in *Counterinsurgency in Crisis* argue that counterinsurgency needs four things; first, an ability to recognise an insurgency and implement a suitable strategy. Second, that counterinsurgency is not cheap in both blood and military equipment to maintain until an insurgency can be adequately 'solved.' Thirdly, that any insurgency must be identified as something that is political first and military second. A great effort in providing civil and political reforms targeted at the root causes of an insurgency without significant expenditure will fail whatever happens on either a security or military position. Fourth, that strategy, policy and an operational plan are needed to combat an insurgency with clearly defined objectives that would let the counterinsurgent be able to reduce their military, civil or economic 'footstep.'

These two texts, both look at Iraq (the second also at Afghanistan) but consider the usual tenets of the 'British model of counterinsurgency' the ideals found within this thesis framework of those associated with the four pillars; minimum force, civil-military cooperation, use of intelligence and tactical flexibility.

Egnell and Ucko in *Counterinsurgency in Crisis* also provide potential future thoughts on what will happen to British involvement with counterinsurgency. These thoughts range from firstly; a limited future involvement with anything closely associated with counterinsurgency for the British military where the army no longer assists a third party with an insurgency, a type of 'strategic abstinence.' (Ucko and Egnell 2013: 148) Here, the British army would try to retain some presence on the world stage with limited involvement (similar to some NATO members during Afghanistan). The second option,

to adopt an aversion policy with counterinsurgency – with no policy to partake in these types of operations. Egnell and Ucko do mention the Dhofar campaign briefly as a means for future choices for the British, in their idea that Dhofar was not a British counterinsurgency mission but an assistance mission. Here the authors and the thesis break path, without the direct intervention of the British in Oman the campaign was on a road to a slow failure before the re-equipping of the SAF and the overthrow of the Sultan.

Andrew Mumford

The two main texts written or edited by Andrew Mumford used within this thesis are *The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare* and *The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare: Warrior-Scholarship in Counter-Insurgency*.

The first, the *Counter-Insurgency Myth* looks at the British experience of irregular warfare. Here some area-wide similarities with areas of traditional British counterinsurgency associated with the British model appear as do descriptions and events associated with conflicts such as Iraq and Northern Ireland. Mumford also includes other experiences of British counterinsurgency such as Malaya, Kenya and Southern Arabia. The campaign of Dhofar in Oman gets no mention in either his book looking at counterinsurgency or his PhD thesis upon which much of the work in this text is somewhat loosely based. This book brings new and fresh interpretations on the campaigns covered by Mumford that provide both new insights on these campaigns but also give a slightly new variance on the success of these campaigns.

Much of the work associated with *the Counter-Insurgency Myth* is associated with his previous PhD thesis from the University of Warwick. This model for Mumford's theory that looks at British counterinsurgency is significantly different from this thesis with the four pillars model. Mumford uses the tri-partite model which includes aspects of the British model of counterinsurgencies such as minimum force and civil-military cooperation but then differs by looking at the political aspect of each of the campaigns he chose along with aspects specific to his model looking at the local and international support for insurgents and counterinsurgents. Mumford's PhD model examines the interaction between the political, military and intelligence aspects to focus on insurgent tactics and strategy along with the inclusion of the international dimension of indigenous support for the counterinsurgents along with the external support also given to the insurgent groups.

These unique choices of Mumford create a specific and wide difference between the two works of Mumford in his PhD thesis and that of the Counter-Insurgency Myth and this thesis. The four pillars model differs by having each aspect of the British model; minimum force, civil-military cooperation, use of intelligence and tactical flexibility being identified as separate ingredients of a counterinsurgent soup that comes together to underline an operational and strategic direction for how to quell an insurgency. An analysis of the four pillars to determine if they have 'worked or not worked' creates a significant between the authors thesis and Mumford's.

The second text (edited by Mumford) is *The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare: Warrior-Scholarship in Counter-Insurgency* brings a wide range of authors that

construct and deconstruct the development of modern counterinsurgency throughout the late nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries. These counterinsurgents range from Callwell, Gwynn, Galula, Kitson, Kilcullen to Petraeus.

Each warrior-scholar has their chapter or shared chapter written by different academics but this combined text brings a modern look at each that has been given a deep examination of their position, political viewpoint and influence with the work that they have done. This book brought a few new insights into the light on the British school participants of Callwell, Gwynn and Kitson but has had an impact by providing this modern interpretation of what may have influenced these warrior-scholars. Much of what is written about them is not new but the aspect of the fundamental positioning of each theorist has clicked with much that was said at a conference attended in 2012.

It is the differences in approaches between Mumford's *Counter-Insurgency Myth* and this thesis that proves a diverse parting of how counterinsurgency specifically for this thesis is examined. The lessons from Northern Ireland and Dhofar are different from a range of motives briefly encompassing different types of theatre, environment and level of public knowledge and press attention. The lessons from Dhofar could have been used in conjunction with the examples from Northern Ireland to attempt to create something purpose-built for southern Iraq.

Further Sources

The final sources for information came from four institutions, the Royal United Services Institute and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. They both have thorough libraries in the field of counterinsurgency or land warfare who were both excellent at directing a stressed PhD student into the correct areas of the library to find what was sought. The third was the National Army Museum Templar study centre and archive in London, and lastly, the Society of Army Historical Research whom also gave comprehensive access to their entire database, which was also enlightening.

Counterinsurgency was once referred to as the 'dark art' of warfare and was taught only at the Staff and Command college in the UK (before Iraq) but became mainstream when platoon and company level commanders had to learn the significance of counterinsurgency for military or political action to be taken against the activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries.

Philosophical Standpoint and Overview

The theory that is focussed on is that of Critical Realism. It was chosen by simple elimination of other philosophical theories to find an approach suitable for observation and analysis that would work within a greater framework, the four pillars. Critical realism is not just a single stand-alone theory but is often a term that describes the merging of other theories such as critical theory with realism (of which there are many) by Roy Bhaskar who created a theory he called transcendental realism. The term critical theory, according to Stevenson (2002:228), was coined in 1937 by the Frankfurt school. The two terms, realism and critical theory, were combined by other authors to

form the umbrella term critical realism. Critical realism is chosen for the following reasons. The first reason is the position that critical realism holds in the philosophical spectrum of theories; it captures the middle ground. According to Sayer (2000:2), claims there is a world independent of our knowledge of it and Bhaskar (1998:5) further establishes that our world or reality is multi-dimensional, stratified, open and differentiated - therefore totally separate; with a place for humanity in nature.

Bhaskar's critical realism provides an alternative to the usual methodological or philosophical positions which had problems of their own. It can create a compromise capable of working between empiricism (with a robust observational aspect) and positivism (with its particular scrutiny and criticism).

Sayer (2000:2-3) perceives critical realism as a functional alternative to other previous philosophical approaches. It challenges common conceptions in natural and social science by being flexible in method and methodology and that it can be fallible in how it attains results or successful or a mixture of both. It is a foundational approach in the way it is used, and another fundamental belief of critical realism is that knowledge is transitory - it will change over time. It is this reason why it has been chosen to use it with counterinsurgency that must examine and analyse counterinsurgency theory which have demonstrated mixed success, both in outcomes and the lessons in that what works for one insurgency will not function as well in a different campaign.

Critical realism does not seek to simply create laws or to document the unique though it has an agenda for documenting analysis and seeking change which will work for the

social scientist whether their research is a quantitative and/or qualitative piece of research. My work contains an element of both but is predominantly quantitative and requires a particular position which critical realism will closely work with to both states the positive and negative aspects of any analysis or observation of counterinsurgency theory to be critical of the theory. The approach allows the researcher to use the broadest range of tools or methods to seek answers in the hunt for knowledge which according to Greetham (2006:7) is to 'not simply tread in the footsteps of others,' although it is recommended by Nagl (2002:6) for counterinsurgency students ‘to indeed learn from the past mistakes of others.' It retains flexibility according to Sayer (1992:257) 'it is important that we choose a methodology which is easy to understand by others.' Critical realism can be simplistic and also flexible, countless others have used it, and I will hopefully choose methods that are not opposing in their approach or philosophical standpoint which could weaken the decision to choose this approach.

Counterinsurgency and Critical Realism

This section will indicate the methods from critical realism to look at the three case studies of Northern Ireland, Oman and Iraq to compare and contrast these three case studies. Throughout the thesis, there are many different methods associated with both qualitative methods such as the use of figures and statistics through the use of observation, written testimony and personal recollection related to quantitative approaches. The philosophical standpoint of critical realism will allow for the use of these tools of compare and contrast, which in this thesis are that that of observation and analysis.

Despite the case studies being of a similar field of theory, they are also unique in military and counterinsurgency concepts e.g., overall strategy, policy, operational approaches and rules of engagement but also levels of military involvement (in personnel) and public scrutiny. These differences especially between Oman and Northern Ireland are greatly revealed within the discussions/conclusion of the thesis but of these two conflicts they differ. Oman is clearly an insurgency whereas Northern Ireland has aspects (especially during the early stages of Banner) where it was partially treated as something akin to an insurgency but that eventually altered. These two campaigns were of a similar timeframe but when compared are uniquely different.

Critical realism has a flexibility that will allow for all essentials associated with UK military doctrine and learning with counterinsurgency theory to be examined along with the case studies of Northern Ireland, Oman and Iraq.

Critical realism is something that exists and happens which according to Sayer (2000:2-3) that is 'independent of our knowledge,' this description fits well with counterinsurgency as both a strategy and as doctrine; in that it can be altered, amended and rewritten as real-world circumstances force an institutional rethinking to transmit the lessons both in theoretical and practical doctrine.

A personal perspective of having served within the British army, having been deployed into Northern Ireland and then academically researching the subject has changed personal opinions on the effectiveness of the British army as a structure and in its ability to rapidly learn lessons and how to implement them.

Critical realism can provide further deconstruction to permit for a more in-depth analysis of counterinsurgency to avoid organisational or political bias that can significantly tweak the alignment of truth or failure to a position of the simple facts and the reality – a situation much associated with critical realism. Critical realism seemed the most logical choice in its flexibility to augment counterinsurgency because it is both fallible and can accommodate dialogue and academic discussion.

The Four Pillars Framework

The four pillars framework came into existence on a coffee break with an old comrade. We discussed the significant elements of British counterinsurgency; such as minimum force, civil-military coordination and tactical flexibility. The use of the four pillars was explained to me as being the four pillars that hold a bathtub that is full of water. Each counterinsurgency campaign needs each of the four pillars to pull its weight, or the stability of the water will tip over. The pillars were developed from unofficial and official publications or doctrine and are not new, but it is how they function and inter-operate that is important as they can work independently but need to come together as a collective.

A Very British Framework for Counterinsurgency: The Four Pillars

These four pillars are developed into a model from the writings of official and unofficial doctrine along with lessons and ideals long held by the British Military establishment:

The four pillars are:

- Minimum force
- Civil-Military Co-operation
- Use of Intelligence
- Tactical flexibility

The ideals are not new for they exist as separate identifiable areas in counterinsurgency literature, but they function best when employed in unison. The four pillars require to some degree joint and separate group analysis when it comes to determining if success or not has been reached in any one counterinsurgency campaign. There will always be mitigating circumstances that will change the method of analysis within the four pillars and how they directly interact. The thesis question looks at what the effects of post-colonial counterinsurgency on UK forces in southern Iraq were, only by looking at post-colonial experiences and what effects it could have had on Iraq. The pillars provide a stable analysis tool from which the strategy, operational tactics, development of doctrine and success in counterinsurgency in Iraq can be compared against experience to determine if the British army had learned lessons from the past, employed them or failed due to an 'unawareness' of counterinsurgency and had to 'wing' the entire experience.

Pillar One: Minimum Force

The first pillar is the maintenance and upholding of the ideal of the use of minimum force against insurgents. This policy of restraint came into being for imperial policing and Small Wars during the 19th century due to Victorian societal and educational pressures associated with the ideal of Christianity and service to the Empire. It has

been further enhanced by military experience following the Amritsar massacre in 1919 in India (under General Dyer) and post-World War Two counterinsurgency in that the response must be proportionate to the enemy challenge faced. A bad example of this was the post-Vietnam US doctrine of overwhelming firepower; useful in warfighting, disastrous in counterinsurgency, as seen in Iraq post-2003 Invasion.

The definition of minimum force as directed by *Counter-Insurgency Operations* (2001) explains that 'no more force may be used that is necessary to achieve a legal aim, the amount used must be reasonable and it must not be punitive. Directly after the aim is achieved, no more force may be used' (B-3-1-4). This does not mean, 'do not use force', because not utilising military force in defence of its interests will fail to protect the soldiers, police or citizens that the state is trying to protect, whereas using too much force may be illegal under various international conventions, especially in modern conflicts. The use of small arms and support weaponry, i.e., airstrikes, armour and artillery support, can be tactically sound in defence of ground personnel but the potential cost in civilian injuries and deaths can enhance and reinforce the position of the insurgents.

This section will review how the principle of minimum force has evolved from a societal, ethical trait that has become coupled with a practical, pragmatic position for maintaining an empire that the British had to administer effectively. It will consider how it has evolved, which weapons have threatened and even created further change with the minimum force approach into a system effectively employed by the British Military establishment.

Amritsar and the Principle of Minimum Force

Despite many claiming that the concept of minimum force came about after the infamous Amritsar massacre in Punjab, India on the 13th April 1919, the concept of minimum force in operations dates back even further, to the 1912 edition of the *Manual of Military Law* with the concept having earlier roots in Victorian society.

The actions of General Dyer forced clarification of minimum force. He believed he faced an insurrection and that he was justified in utilising deadly force at Amritsar in India. The situation in Amritsar escalated from a gathering of local tribespeople into a riot, displeased at local administration with Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, the only British officer present, ordering Baluchi and Punjabi troops to open fire on a crowd of 10,000 unarmed Sikh protesters which he believed was an uprising, killing 379. The Hunter Committee Report which investigated Amritsar castigated Dyer for his use of excessive force. The clear message – both from official sources and from the public – was that if force was to be used in maintaining control in the Empire, it should only be the minimum necessary. Dyer, according to the Hunter Report, had gone too far, and his actions had repercussions which can be argued as having both beneficial and harmful effects for future counterinsurgency operations. The Amritsar massacre was important at refining the concept of minimum force though it had been part of the organisational culture for several decades. According to Thornton (2004:86), Amritsar was so shocking an experience for the British military establishment because it was a departure from accepted practice.

The view of British counterinsurgency operations, according to some is that the United Kingdom 'seems less intent on using or applying all force at its disposal,' according to Mockaitis (1995:117). This has been directly contested by other academics such as French (2011:35-6) who argues that the British have shown little restraint in employing the necessary force when needed. The previous long-held opinion held that the British approach was very low-key. In contrast, the American approach before 2006 very much used high technology in counterinsurgency operations with concentrated, heavy firepower which is suitable for traditional warfighting but tends to create high casualty figures amongst a civilian population in counterinsurgency operations.

The long-held view of British restraint in the use of minimum necessary force can be seen in modern conflicts such as Bosnia where the British were involved in the first United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. The British were involved in delivering humanitarian aid and required access to cross the frontlines into both combatants' territories. This access required a framework of trust and confidence according to Thornton (2004: 84) along with 'enormous restraint, the results from employing heavy weapons such as artillery or mortars are far from precise.' Thornton continues (2004:85) that this very restraint in employing minimum force was first developed from the long history that the British have in policing its former Empire and from the troubles in Northern Ireland which from 1969 were very much in the glare of the world's media.

The British army minimum force philosophy has evolved from its operational role as an imperial police force which owes much to two significant positions which require

further detail. Firstly, that of the British (or English) Protestant and Victorian values and ethics which impregnated the British army, and the second, a matter of pragmatism; that a small island state of twenty million could not hope to rule an empire by force alone. Therefore, at its simplest definition, minimum force is an amalgam of ethical values and pragmatism.

Victorian Values in Minimum Force

At the heart of Victorian values are the same ethical principles which are responsible for the basis of British liberalism, that the individual along with his/her viewpoint and legalities was above the collective, that of the unified state hereby grounding a position fixed in British law of innocence until proven guilty. This continued the tradition after 1707 when the British state after the union with Scotland did not produce a constitution but instead imposed a system based upon the rule of law based upon legal precedent established over time. This system gave the individual rights as long as they were mindful of their actions against strangers. This point is vital for British soldiers who had to be mindful of their actions, as this law also covered their actions both individually and as a collective. Their actions when on counterinsurgency operations meant they had to complete the mission but be mindful of the extent of their actions and the force with which they employ as Mockaitis (1990: 23) points out in a quote from the 1923 Army Manual, *Duties in Aid of the Civil Power,*

British soldiers have constantly been reminded that their task was 'not the annihilation of an enemy but the suppression of a temporary disorder, and therefore the degree of force to be employed must be directed to that which is necessary to restore order and

never exceed it.' The same restraint had to be used whether the army was dealing with strikes in Britain or riots in the colonies.

The increase in public or fee payable schools during the early Victorian period was to form a backbone of support with Christian (later British) gentlemen who would 'embody the virtues and values of character, service, civilisation and a strong sense of duty, perfect for service in the Victorian British army, policing an empire without undue cruelty or excess,' according to Thornton (2004: 89-91). This later transition from Christian gentlemen to British gentlemen came about due to the later tag of fairness and even-handedness being applied to the social classes which the British army officer corps and colonial service tended to attract.

Pragmatism and Minimum Force

The imposition of imperial authority was never to be maintained indefinitely by military muscle, as witnessed by previous attempts at Empire building such as the early Roman Empire. Consent to rule was the key, whether this was found by economic, social, political or mixed methods; this was crucial for a small island that ruled or managed around 24% of the world's population and territory. As Mockaitis (1995:64) states 'the yoke of foreign rule, therefore, had to be as light as possible.' Winston Churchill saw these difficulties, according to Thornton (2004:95), when he was Colonial Secretary in 1920 declaring that 'attempting to rule through the use of violence would be fatal.'

Gwynn (1934:5) in *Imperial Policing* wrote that government forces must display the power and resolution of their forces but not display ‘excessive’ severity when employing this military force which may antagonise the neutral or loyal element within that society or culture which can add to the numbers of rebels and leave a lasting feeling of resentment and bitterness. When military or security forces are deployed, a balance must be struck; care must be taken to use what is necessary and not beyond it. The more modern spin to this type of operation is to maintain a ‘presence’, a force that has been deployed on patrols in their area of operation that can be deployed, if necessary, for other tasks but only as a last resort. Foot patrolling in operational deployments such as Iraq, Northern Ireland and Cyprus are mostly performed in densely populated urban environments is a means of creating this 'presence.'

This pragmatism has been contested by the continuing development of weapon design and lethality, especially where weapons lack the discrimination over whom they injure and kill. The three primary weapons and associated use which have troubled a pragmatic approach are the machine gun, the armoured vehicle and the use of airpower. A greater, more detailed list should include the use of heavy artillery, infantry employed mortars and wide-area suppression munitions such as cluster bombs and traditional anti-personnel mines.

The first of these, the machine gun was slow in adoption by the British army in an infantry role for imperial policing because its substantial amounts of firepower were unnecessary as ‘great destructive power is seldom required when dealing with mobs’ (Gwynn 1934:14) The slower firing rifle had more discrimination at picking out the

important targets. The machine gun was largely ignored until 1945 when it was deemed light enough to be effectively carried on long-range patrols where they did not need a crew to maintain and deploy them (due to lighter ammunition and a single operator).

The armoured car had a variable history with their effective use in Palestine, Iraq and on the North-West Frontier of India but mainly in rural emergencies. When deployed in urban environments, the armoured cars became isolated, easily surrounded by the mobs and due to their simple designs, made non-functional by being tampered with. Tactically, the use of armoured cars and more modern armoured vehicles all suffer from similar constraints; lack of vision due to the armour, the inability to negotiate crowded situations without running civilians down (with potentially fatal injuries which do not discriminate) and a tendency to mount heavier than required weapons onto these mobile platforms.

It has been argued by Thornton (2004:95) that the British focus on imperial policing by infantry 'slowed the development of the armoured vehicle and tank development in the field of counterinsurgency' where a greater tactical improvement of a mechanised armoured infantry could have been developed. The first vehicles were lightly armoured cars armed with machine guns as the main armament. Due to this enhancement of existing vehicles, progress to develop a heavier variant of car or tank outside of the European theatre for imperial policing ceased due to shipping, logistics and changes in strategic thinking due to airpower and its influence. Thornton (2004:97-98) claims

the ‘British required lighter and cheaper equipment for low-intensity operations where a vast, destructive capability was not needed.’

The armoured vehicle has undergone various changes, their use in counterinsurgency remains; but in a slightly different role from just being a mobile weapons platform, they now support the infantry in providing cover, mobile roadblock capability and heavy weapon support if needed. Their use in Northern Ireland started with the Humber Pig through to the snatch land rover, meaning that troops could deploy for more extended periods onto the streets of Ulster. The second bonus to an armoured vehicle, the vehicle could provide both protection and somewhere to resupply and rest.

Airpower when compared to armoured cars had speed, power, cost-effectiveness and range. It was an alternative to the infantry soldiers which needed regular logistical support to continue operations, and it was importantly cheap for the UK treasury and the colonial administrations. Winston Churchill, as Colonial Secretary was unimpressed by airpower, his initial position was ‘that air power could not be substituted for ground troops,’ but Churchill changed his position by June 1921 according to Townshend (1986:95).

Iraq was where the British army tested airpower following the expansion of the British Empire after it attained further territorial gains after World War One. Churchill was convinced of airpower’s success after found through careful tests and observation, remarks Townshend (1986:96) that ‘any disturbances can be checked or prevented from arising by aircraft, and that unless, which is improbable, a rebellion was to arise

in every corner at once, the sudden arrival of aeroplanes on several days should act as a preventative.'

Sir Arnold Wilson, the former High Commissioner for Mesopotamia (Iraq) held similar sentiments to Churchill's position according to Townshend (1986:97) that 'the effect of airpower would enable the local governments (soon to be protected by air power) to dispense with all ground forces except the local levies' reducing colonial expenditures.'

The major problem with airpower at the command level created a difference of opinion between the two-armed services; the army had responsibility for policing duties previously and the new Royal Air Force who was to suppress any uprising from above. The army argued according to Thornton (2004:97) 'that to counter an uprising it needed a presence, on the ground, whereas an aircraft after delivering its payload went home.' The army maintained their way was better than an air response. It was a clear case of pragmatism; Thornton (2004:98) claims the army was trying to 'defend its turf and budgets' but also continued that airpower according to the army was 'indiscriminate, unsporting, inhuman and unjust' (Thornton 2004:98).

Townshend (1986:97) in this army/air force debate recognised that there were objections to airpower with the supporters of the army in its traditional role were 'circling the wagons,' to protect their service from potential cuts and loss of seniority to the Royal Air Force. Churchill's successor at the Colonial Office, Worthington-Evans, noted the use of force open to the RAF to a quell a potential uprising was that of 'the

machine gun and bomb, targeting women and children in the villages,' according to Townshend (1986:97).

For imperial policing and later counterinsurgency, the new 20th-century triad of force multiplication: the machine gun, armoured vehicles and airpower all became tools for use in these types of theatres. Mockaitis (1990:101-104) suggests 'the Brits gave up the military advantages of airpower to preserve the principle of minimum force.' The principle of minimum force has seen criticism from Amritsar to Afghanistan but continues to attempt to adhere to the principle of minimum force. This principle requires the other tools of intelligence, civil-military co-operation and tactical flexibility to function which Kitson (1973:2) notes 'that it is useless to rely on sheer weight of numbers to put right mistakes made because of a lack of proper preparation (or co-ordination).' This thesis looks at minimum force in counterinsurgency but does not seek to answer if the position is one of selective force, or necessary force or one of minimum force.

Pillar Two: Civil-Military Co-operation

Civil-military co-operation is a massive area that covers a multitude of dynamic areas such as physical and economic development, the implementation of access to the political infrastructure, the rule of law (with police primacy) and physical security.

The state drive for political, economic, legal and security resources to be invested into a contested area, could provide the necessary division of the insurgents (and their

political parties) from their support mechanism; the people they aim to represent (even with violence). Initially, this investment will be tilted most probably in the direction of military or security resources to create a suitable safe area for the civil, legal and political infrastructure reconstruction to begin. It is widely recognised that the military is unable to provide a solution on its own as politics is also unable to provide a single solution if there is no security.

The function of politics within an insurgent state also has a critical role. The political mechanisms also need to be continually keeping a focus upon the fact that their state has an ongoing insurgency and needs to review how it goes about this business periodically. The state needs to be visibly seen as the only legitimate provider of governance, security, political authority, day to day support and the principal wielder of all other state functions for all its population, even the insurgencies supporters, however diverse.

This pillar can be argued as the most important, around which the other pillars must be seen to support for without political support, both locally and nationally the efforts will likely fail, as Kilcullen (2006a:8) notes 'counterinsurgency is armed social work; an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at.'

As a tool for analysis, it must look at the effect of how areas previously disputed are made secure for its civilian population. It must consider the political situation with its appointed (and hopefully later) elected officials and how effective reconstruction efforts in the important areas of health, education, welfare and the economy are affecting the

targeted population. As the situation in a locality returns towards one of normality, the speed and effectiveness of civilian political leaders and the impartiality but professionalism of the police and local security forces will validate state effectiveness.

This effectiveness must also include the impartial ideal of rule of law; how honest and legitimate the courts of justice especially in the area associated the trials of insurgents and combatants are held. This must extend to how they are treated as prisoners and how they are administratively dispatched through the legal and prison system of the state. It must show that the civilian system has control over all the states security forces which needs to be 'visibly seen as a legal system adequate to the needs of the moment,' according to Alderson (Rid and Keaney 2010:35) to be seen as being in charge of the military in support of the civil power during counterinsurgency operations.

While the military threat needs to be dealt with, the population will inevitably demand political representation by their representatives. Making political provisions for the mainstream ethnic and religious groups has long been a reality in the British counterinsurgency model as it lends the broader campaign a degree of legitimacy. It ensures that it is seen to be both constructive (in terms of building new institutions and improving the infrastructure) and as well as destructive (in terms of eradicating the insurgent threat militarily).

Illegitimate or mismanaged political control of a counterinsurgency campaign will inevitably escalate an insurgency leading to deterioration in the security situation. An example of this was how the extended political control of the Coalition Provisional

Authority (CPA) in Iraq under Paul Bremer in the wake of Saddam's downfall quickly turned notions of the coalition troops as liberators into that of occupiers.

Close civil-military relations are vital for ensuring that a coordinated and coherent combined counterinsurgency strategy is implemented efficiently and effectively. Britain's historical experiences, notably stemming from Malaya during the 1950s, have demonstrated the need for close civil-military liaison. This reflects the inescapably political nature of counterinsurgency and ensures that the military campaign is commensurate with overarching political objectives. Therefore, it is at the level of civil-military relations that the two primary planks of any counterinsurgency strategy, the political situation and the security operation, combine, with the merging of the two providing the efficiency proving to be vital. The widely-acknowledged reality is that counterinsurgency campaigns are not won by outright military force alone (of which the 2009 Sri Lankan army repression of the Tamil Tigers stands as an anomaly) but requires significant civilian input into building governance structures and undertaking reconstruction plans. As Kilcullen (2006:8) puts it: 'counterinsurgency is armed social work.' This requires, therefore, both civilian and military unity of effort. If force is used overwhelmingly and crushes a population into a position of utter defeat, the resentment against the state will diminish while in this weakened form but will fester and re-awaken.

However, such unity of effort cannot be achieved unless adequate resources are provided to civilian counterinsurgency work if the non-kinetic instruments of influence, such as reconstruction and development projects, are to prove effective.

The civilian role in counterinsurgency should not be reduced simply to development-oriented work, designed to make the life of the military easier by being a friendly follow-on force or as a civil service alone. It should be seen as the primary provider of state services for essential counterinsurgency tenets such as building population resistance to insurgent narratives and strengthening host nation governance structures, as well as the obvious need to improve the material well-being of indigenous communities via local reconstruction work.

Close civil-military relations, based on common goals, effective communication and good working relationships, are therefore at the heart of a security development package, particularly when assessing the civilian input into a counterinsurgency campaign, from reconstruction to humanitarian work, from central political leadership to on-the-ground diplomacy. The spectrum of such civilian involvement in irregular or asymmetric warfare shows its importance. A counterinsurgency campaign does blur the traditional lines of authority but in the British case, does not seem to create many obstacles, that in times of regular warfare have suppressed civilian leadership. Nevertheless, this challenge to redefine civil-military relations within the context of irregular warfare is one that the British have not entirely conquered. Consistent restrictions on military resources by civilian politicians have proven to be a significant thorn in the side of cohesive CIMIC relations, especially due to Treasury constraints and that in the past colonial emergencies, the colonies had to find much of the funding for counterinsurgency efforts from their budgets.

The two primary traditional schools of thought regarding civil-military relations are around two of the scholars to first theorise on the topic, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. These two pioneers in this field retained an essentially domestic quality to their understanding of civil-military relations, defining it primarily in terms of the military's relation to the state as a political entity, and not necessarily as an assessment of working relations between the military and civilian workers in counterinsurgency emergencies.

The Huntington school separates the military from the political sphere, denying a link between military means for political ends. Huntington (1957:23) depicts members of the military as 'subordinate servants of the political state and argues for an explicit distinction between the way political decisions on matters of conflict are reached and how those decisions are carried out by the armed forces.' There should be minimal political encroachment on military affairs. This is maintained, argues Huntington (1957:39-40), because the military's 'inherent sense of professionalism and its outlook of conservative realism,' allows for a separate military sphere to develop.

Conversely, the Janowitzean School promotes the position that the military establishment includes political sensitivity into their professional outlook. Consequentially, Janowitz argues, military understanding of overarching political imperatives would be achieved via the integration of political and military leadership. In Janowitz's more sophisticated interpretation, the military retains close links with the state whom they serve and the society whom they protect. This is reflected according to Janowitz (1960:78) in the 'transition of western militaries in the twentieth century

into highly professional forces whose application of kinetic activity is now tightly controlled, in part due to political necessity.'

CIMIC is the need for political, economic and security (often military) resources to be invested into a region or area to reduce the influence of insurgents and to reduce the support by the population for the insurgent groups. The military is unable to provide a solution to an insurgency by purely military or security means as demonstrated by the French in Algeria and that politics is also unable to provide a single solution.

The British Method

The British method for using civil-military cooperation is diverse; the method overlays everything from population control to law enforcement. However, the main emphasis is upon the rule of law and the cooperative use and control of all security forces, including the military to aid the police in their operations. Gwynn and Kitson both agree upon the civil government is in firm control of policy and therefore overall command.

It is necessary for political, economic, legal and security resources to be invested into a contested area, therefore, providing the necessary division of the insurgents and their political parties from their support mechanism; the people the insurgents aim to represent through violence. Initially, this investment will be tilted most probably in the direction of military or security/police resources to create a suitable safe area for the civil, legal and political infrastructure reconstruction to begin. It is widely recognised

that the military is unable to provide a solution on its own as politics is also unable to provide a single solution without a functional judiciary and police force.

Cassidy (2005:56) states that the British would bring in the army and its soldiers to back up the police, but the soldiers were always aiding the civil power; the police and judiciary. In Northern Ireland, the civilian officials were in control of the army and were responsible for the political strategy and the propaganda that came from it. The army operated under civilian command, it adopted its much-vaunted but arguable minimum force concept and generated new tactics with eventual close relations with the police that left the tactical control of the troops on the ground to its military commanders despite the police having primacy.

Pillar Three: The Use of Intelligence

The use of intelligence is a separate pillar, but to effectively employ intelligence, it must intertwine the others. Without intelligence, a state will be acting blind and using luck to guide its counterinsurgency operations. Operations used against the Crater population in Aden in 1966 are a good example of where an entire community is collectively punished by neighbourhood-sized cordon and search operations rather than being targeted at the insurgents responsible for specific actions. Without intelligence co-operation, both police and military operations suffer, as demonstrated by the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern Ireland, whose Special Branch initially refused to share intelligence over a fear of losing its unique position and prestige. The British method of intelligence sharing has been to usually set up a joint intelligence committee for each area of operations, thus reducing duplication, expense and

operational mismanagement while increasing the efficient and speedy use of intelligence

In counterinsurgency operations, the most useful intelligence is human and can come from sources both top-down and bottom-up in insurgent command structures. Many tiny pieces of intelligence, when combined, can create a full depiction of insurgent activity. The range of intelligence gathering can vary significantly from the use of foot patrol (as seen in Northern Ireland) in gathering basic movement intelligence on the population using the states own human intelligence, through to the use of penetration agents and informers. These last two are the most difficult to recruit and operationally maintain; however, it has become more apparent that it is only by employing good intelligence of all types (including all electronic surveillance techniques) that both military/security-based operations and political direction are most effective when the intentions or movements of insurgents or their political sections are best understood.

All aspects of military operations require the use of intelligence. In standard warfighting theatres, the gathering of intelligence usually covers the areas of troop numbers, deployments, equipment, morale, quality of training, quality of leadership and likely ability to fight back when attacked. In a counterinsurgency campaign, the use of intelligence is of greatest importance to plan and coordinate efforts at reducing an insurgency. '*If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.*' – Sun Tzu (The Art of War)

The gathering of intelligence can come from multiple sources; human intelligence, signals intelligence (any method employing electronic devices from radio messages, telephones and internet or email use), imagery intelligence (especially after satellite use was effective) and measurement and signatures intelligence (a method of identifying, recording and analysing the movement of intelligence targets).

The idea is that good intelligence is a necessary tool for conducting a successful counterinsurgency strategy. It is not new but has required that it be brought out of the box of counterinsurgency tools and be given a fresh investigation. This re-awakening of intelligence usefulness matches the position of the four semi-doctrinal writers heavily involved with British counterinsurgency (Callwell, Gwynn, Thompson and Kitson). When employed poorly, the view is that intelligence was weak and 'unable to answer fundamental questions,' and was 'only marginally relevant to overall strategy' according to Grob-Fitzgibbon (2011:72). Grob-Fitzgibbon (2011:72) further suggests that what was needed was a system with teams acting locally, on the ground sending information back to a civilian-led intelligence organ which would create 'absolute interagency co-operation' which could 'collect, collate, analyse and ultimately distribute integrated and timely intelligence to those in command.'

This view, as stated earlier, is not new. Other classic counterinsurgency theorists/practitioners such as Galula emphasised the centrality of intelligence. The modern use of intelligence is compared to the British method of obtaining a joint police and military intelligence organ such as those used in colonial Ireland, Malaya and later, Northern Ireland. Even more modern practitioner/theorists who have studied the

classic counterinsurgency works of the twentieth century such as General David Petraeus know that counterinsurgency is an intelligence-driven endeavour as he stated in a speech to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London in March 2011. In a counterinsurgency operational theatre, the use of human intelligence becomes even more necessary. The enemy wears no uniform or identifying marks to stand out from anyone else in society until they fire their weapons.

The conventional use of human intelligence in a traditional theatre of operations is limited to the interrogation of prisoners. In counterinsurgency, the essential detail that is gathered from human intelligence (HUMINT) is collected by the soldiers on the ground who have the most familiarity with both the people and the ground on which they operate. An example of this was the on-the-ground intelligence reforms brought in by Frank Kitson, as a British Brigade commander in Northern Ireland; in that he encouraged every member of every patrol to note all movements of the ordinary civilian population by foot and vehicle and to especially note the movements of those people of interest to build up a more detailed picture of the 'ground'. Kilcullen (2010:30) a current practitioner/theorist holds a similar argument nearly forty years after Kitson's reforms with the advice that soldiers must 'know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district.'

Grob-Fitzgibbon (2011:73) notes that if force is employed without good intelligence, it will often do more harm than good. This situation has seen many attempts, especially by the British military and colonial establishments, to reverse this situation. One of the

first efforts took place in post-World War One Ireland which led to the amalgamation of various military and police force units to create an integrated intelligence machine that was becoming effective in operation but was too late in implementation to prevent the collapse of that campaign for the British. It set a blueprint for future British counterinsurgency intelligence operations if adequately constituted, which Grob-Fitzgibbons (2011:74-75) argues 'had a spotty history especially with Palestine' despite many of the intelligence operators previously employed in Ireland having been transferred there. Earlier efforts in Malaya also lacked a certain level of intelligence coordination between military and police units until the reforms brought in by the Briggs plan.

Simply put, with the best blueprint and a certain level of flexibility to allow the reforms to succeed, intelligence reform efforts may take two years before any results from the reforms begin to show, even if the climate in financial, cultural and professional means for a relationship can be effective in situ. One example of this was the vast amounts of monies paid out to former Communist insurgents in Malaya who were then placed in modern villages with excellent infrastructures to reside. This propaganda, though subtlety performed can demonstrate how the state (or a former colonial power) would use methods ranging from word of mouth to targeted leaflet drops in the Malayan jungle.

The main point of note with intelligence in counterinsurgency is that it is all about the people; both in receiving intelligence and in whom to watch. The insurgents may be invisible to the military intelligence eye, but their support network is not. People need

to provide food, living space, places to operate and to strike from which requires a vast indirect support mechanism of supporters who are not active insurgents. Kilcullen (Rid and Keaney 2010: 143) states that the focus of intelligence has not significantly changed since Callwell in that in a conventional war, the focus is the enemy, but in counterinsurgency, it is more problematic, it should be population focussed which bring its problems. He describes how the entire situation of civil relationships during counterinsurgency become fluid, where allies may shift positions both slightly or widely to best suit their bargaining position or eventual place in the new society after the insurgency is suppressed. An insurgent force can be reduced in their mission ineffectiveness as Kilcullen (Rid and Keaney 2010: 144) describes when 'a population is secured, governed and won over.'

Pillar Four: Tactical Flexibility

Tactical flexibility can be analysed in how quickly both official doctrine and training methods are changed to suit the current emergency or theatre of operations. This can be seen in how the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) has replaced the older counterinsurgency manual with a new one which contains lessons from previous tours of Iraq and Afghanistan with new principles, lessons and guidelines for current operations in theatre. Many of the DCDC documents are released onto the MoD's website where interested parties such as scholars regularly comment on the work. The flexibility and therefore the ability to disseminate the lessons both from the ground up and from doctrine at the top-down need to be communicated in a method best suited for the army such as the use of Northern Ireland training teams (NITAT) or

the Afghan village built in Thetford as training tools before deployment to enable lessons to be passed on.

Tactical flexibility simply implies that a strategy that has been implemented, which is operational flexibility and can work with other tools or mechanisms often creates a simple pathway for lessons and developments in tactical approaches to be shared significantly quicker than through doctrine. These developments which are created often by experience at the tactical level are then filtered back through the command structure to enhance future operations in theatre but to be communicable quickly enough to assist with next day developments.

The term tactical flexibility according to Alderson, a former head of the British army's team on counterinsurgency and a leading doctrinal writer on the subject states that 'it is a broad category with a function of adaptability and learning especially in how an army adapts itself to changing circumstances and learns from experience is greatly determined by the army's approach to education and training especially in counterinsurgency' (Rid and Keaney 2010:28-29).

Flexibility both tactically and strategically in training the military to operate and respond not as a military unit in its traditional role but as a military unit on counterinsurgency ops is crucial in adapting and learning to the situation on the ground. A military solution will not work alone; there must be any type of police or local security element to maintain a low-level tactical presence that does not cause civilian casualties. This is done in two ways; the first is to plan the operations to avoid civilian areas which

ultimately creates no-go zones for the government security forces as was tried during the initial stages of the Northern Ireland conflict, or to train them to react in a fashion which does not use overwhelming force and therefore does not alienate a civilian population against the security forces. Efforts such as this were first tried in areas of Malaya with mobile, but highly armed soldiers that began to patrol into difficult areas such as rain forest jungle which had to be done previously by large formations of troops.

Training such as what was provided by the Jungle Warfare School in Malaya (JWS) and the NI Training and Advisory Teams (NITAT) have been beneficial in these areas by removing the need for heavily armed, large troop columns which carry out cumbersome search operations. Smaller units can move and deploy in fluid tactical situations such as when under enemy fire in tight quarters, e.g., the jungle bush or housing estates. Flexibility allows lessons to be created, tested over time and maintained with a method of training that involves both theory and practical experience along with official doctrine that needs to go beyond the usual pamphlet or occasional official document.

Traditionally the British army has used regimental tradition to teach particular skill-sets, but this requires a swiftness to allow potential doctrinal changes to be implemented almost immediately. These changes, however, are limited to the serving 'life' of the veterans. Once they retire or die, the experience is gone. Training and education in all areas of counterinsurgency, not just the military skills are needed to preserve these skills.

The British army has often been characterised as a learning institution with a remarkably successful track record with counterinsurgency. This question of learning and therefore adaptation has given rise to a debate on the British army's ability to learn and adapt to new situations especially since scholars are torn on a definition of learning in its relationship to counterinsurgency. It is worth defining the distinction between bottom-up adaptation and top-down learning, according to Ucko and Egnell (2013:13). Bottom-up adaptation is here defined as 'changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures implemented on the ground and through contact with an unfamiliar operating environment, whereas top-down learning involves the institutionalisation of these practices through changes in training, doctrine, education, and force structure.' The learning provides a foundation of knowledge, but adaptation allows the troops in theatre to mould the prescribed approach to the situation on the ground.

The British were willing to set aside their experiences in conventional war and delve into their official and unofficial doctrinal literature on the unconventional and draw if needed upon personal experience. They would extensively garner experience from colleagues who had been there during previous tours (such as the author did with Northern Ireland). On a personal level and in small groups, this filtering of experience has indeed been passed on (often with the blackest of humour), but has the counterinsurgency knowledge been shared at higher levels such as at the command of battalion, brigade or division?

Training for Northern Ireland as an example became regimented; taught by experts within the army with the latest intelligence to teach changes in tactical behaviours.

Before deployment, a battalion was trained to face the multitude of threats being faced and further encouraged to maintain a training programme even when on operational duties. Re-training at the grassroots level took place immediately upon a patrol's return, and experiences were evaluated, lessons learned, and tactics adopted accordingly. The British army system of debriefing a patrol allows each patrol member to have a say in how that patrolling unit went about its duties. The thoroughness of the training programme, the willingness to adapt tactics, and the emphasis upon flexibility and individual initiative, have all been a marked feature of British operations, particularly since Malaya. Lessons gathered from earlier deployments have since been taught by the military establishment such as NITAT the Northern Ireland Training and Tactics teams.

According to Cassidy (2005:55), the British in counterinsurgency had an advantage in addition to its Low-intensity warfare experience, in a tradition of flexibility based upon the fact that throughout the colonial policing campaigns of the past they had been forced to make do with only limited resources.

Conclusions

This chapter has looked at originality, the choice of methodological approach, the literature review that takes into account six of the main theorists associated with the thesis. It greatly reviews the contribution of the four main non-official doctrinal writers associated with the British model of counterinsurgency being Callwell, Gwynn, Thompson and Kitson (much of the detail of these four are included here rather than in chapter three to reduce repetition).

Other sources from which information has been gathered from is identified within this chapter along with an explanation of the authors philosophical standpoint and chosen theory; critical realism. It is because of critical realisms wide approach that observation with compare and contrast can function with the four pillars framework as the thesis principal instrument of analysis, which is also copiously described.

What follows is chapter three which examines the British history of counterinsurgency, the development of its doctrine, both official and non-official, what other methods it uses to learn, and how it has developed as a learning organisation and looks at defining success in counterinsurgency.

Chapter Three

British Army Learning, Doctrine and Counterinsurgency

'The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity. At the same time, there is no such thing as a wholly political solution either, short of surrender, because the very fact that a state of insurgency exists implies that violence is involved which will have to be countered to some extent at least by the use of force.'

General Sir Frank Kitson (Rid and Keaney, 2010:30)

Introduction

This chapter will accomplish many tasks associated with the thesis question 'What was the effects of the post-colonial experience of Counterinsurgency on UK forces in southern Iraq? Were the lessons absorbed and implemented' by defining what is meant by the terms involved in the question, such as post-colonial and counterinsurgency. The chapter includes the following;

- Historical learning
- The modern development of counterinsurgency doctrine
- Non-official doctrine
- Learning by tradition and historical experience
- Modern development in capacity to assemble and learn from lessons

- 21st-century British counterinsurgency policy
- Measuring success and failure in counterinsurgency
- British successes

The chapter within the thesis provides scrutinisation of the British armed forces in counterinsurgency and how doctrine, official or not (the non-official doctrinal writers associated with the British school of counterinsurgency, Callwell, Gwynn, Thompson and Kitson who are examined in detail in the literature review). It looks at tradition and experience of how the army learns to function with counterinsurgency. The chapter also looks at the difficulty in how success in counterinsurgency is determined and briefly argues why this is not a clear-cut situation.

Despite the current, modern approach to counterinsurgency being of a multi-agency process with clear national and political interests and direction, the British military continues to learn from past counterinsurgency experience from a perspective attached to a doctrine where the majority of this expertise is 'centred upon the army, primarily due to its land warfare role,' according to Rigden (2008:5).

Historical Learning

'The better performance of the British army in learning and implementing a successful counterinsurgency doctrine in Malaya (as compared to the American army's failure to learn and employ successful counterinsurgency doctrine in Vietnam) is best explained

by the differing organisational cultures of the two armies; in short, that the British army was a learning institution and the American army was not (Nagl 2002: xiv).

The British military establishment, according to Strachan (2006:115), has had 'a sustained experience of counterinsurgency operations;' these operations have been called imperial policing, small wars, asymmetric or low-intensity warfare, internal security emergencies or counterinsurgencies. These 'wars' have been the norm for the British army for nearly every year of the twentieth century. He argues that the very organisation of the typical British Regiment with two battalions enabled the British to have one battalion at home and another overseas on deployment. However, this argument of the British exemplifying this type of conflict is becoming blunted by academics like Mumford (2009:1), who disputes this reasoning with evidence of the British being slow to learn from previous counterinsurgency conflicts sluggish to when one develops.

Other academics such as French (2011:64) argue that the idea of minimum force which has been hailed as a significant historical method in how the British have countered insurgencies, is only an aspiration and is wrong, in that the British have used force but from behind a veneer of legality such as Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) often employing necessary force rather than minimum force. Examples of this are where the British have used vast cordon and search operations, mass detention without trial, and forcible population resettlement such as those carried out in Malaya and Kenya. Despite the recent criticism, the British have had a long history of countering insurgency. It is worth noting that many scholars do not dispute the

extensive British experience of this type of warfare but now question its long-held reputation and successes.

Insurgency is defined (as by the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst in the United Kingdom of Great Britain) as 'the actions of a minority group within a state who are intent on forcing political change employing a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change. It is an organised armed political struggle, the goals of which may be diverse. Some insurgencies aim for a straightforward seizure of power through a complete revolutionary takeover. In contrast, others attempt to break away from state control and establish an autonomous state within traditional ethnic or religious bounds' (Counter Insurgency Operations 2001: A-1-1).

An insurgency can have many different forms of origin or cause, such as nationalist, ethnic, cultural, tribal or religious movements that have solid motivational feelings which become blurred and separate to the normalised methods of exploring and contesting these differences in a nation-state by ordinary political means (if able, due to the design of the state) to pursue this avenue of redress and complaint. Other common causes for an insurgency can be political hang-overs from colonialism, such as economic neo-colonialism, where critical sectors of the economy are controlled by a foreign business or where former colonial powers have achieved political settlement to maintain garrisons under unpopular treaties that can offend the nationalist sentiment. Other causes can include political maladministration and corruption, especially where there are extremes between the wealthy and poor, or discrimination

between civic or religious groups and political repression to maintain a minority people in power. The final reason is the unfulfilled expectations of the middle classes of a nation where the people expect a change in the way of life, especially if educated and employed in state-run or private enterprises.

Insurgencies can be deterred and defeated by many different means or methods but never by a pure military solution. These methods may have been employed before and have worked successfully in other counterinsurgency operations. Still, there are never any guarantees that they may work in every conflict, even if similar in ideological construction or terrorist campaign being faced.

The current British army field manual on counterinsurgency defines insurgency but not counterinsurgency. Other scholars, such as Kilcullen (2010:1), a modern theorist/practitioner, comments that counterinsurgency is 'the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.'

The second area requiring definition within the thesis is the term 'post-colonial.' The period this thesis covers are the operations after 1968, the year after the British gave independence to Aden (Yemen). This period marked another change in British Military thought and deployment with a shift from operations based upon supporting Imperial possessions to working with allies within Europe and NATO (the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation) to combat a potential threat from the Soviet Union. By 1968 most former British colonies had undergone decolonisation.

As designated by the July 2001 Army Field Manual, *Counter Insurgency Operations* (Army Code 71749), the British counterinsurgency model signifies the primary three fundamental areas of British counterinsurgency as minimum force, civil-military co-operation and tactical flexibility. A fourth basic principle of British counterinsurgency is that of the use of intelligence, which according to Alderson (Ris and Keaney 2010:29), is 'is one of the greatest battle winning factors in counterinsurgency.' These areas are thoroughly examined in the 'four pillars' approach contained within the previous methodology chapter.

The Modern Development of Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Despite a long history in counterinsurgency operations, the British have only had an official teaching method since the mid-1990s with the development of the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre since renamed the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). Before this was established, general counterinsurgency training only occurred for specific conflicts with units such as the Northern Ireland Training and Advisory Team (NITAT) for the many battalions rotated into Ulster and the Jungle Warfare School for the campaign in Malaya. Before these developments in specialised training depots for these two aforementioned theatres of operations, there were three routes to knowledge; the primary method was to read the official Army Field manuals, which contained the current doctrine, the second, to rely upon regimental tradition and history and the third, to look at the texts of critical authors with a keen military/academic interest in counterinsurgencies such as Charles Callwell (1906), Charles Gwynn (1936), Robert Thompson (1966), and Frank Kitson (1973). Greater

detail on the writings of these authors is found in the literature review in the previous chapter looking at the methodology.

According to the Ministry of Defence, the first of these approaches, the Army Field manuals or the doctrine (Rid and Keaney 2010:30), is defined as 'the fundamental principles by which a military force uses to guide their actions in support of objectives and operations. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.'

Doctrine articulates an approach based on firm principles, which result from rigorous analysis and therefore should hold. It is more than the simple definitions found in publications according to Alderson (2007:7) 'it is the how-to think, not the what to think. It is a guide, something which is flexible, not rigid.' The surprise with doctrine is that there has been 'no official publication on counterinsurgency or on a British theory based upon its experiences' (Rid and Keaney 2010:28).

Despite its long history and experience, counterinsurgency has 'no general antidote to the problem of insurgency' (Counter Insurgency Operations 2001: B-2-1). This fits with the current US thought on counterinsurgency according to Kilcullen (2010:1), who argues that 'insurgencies, like cancers, exist in thousands of forms, and there are dozens of techniques to treat them, hundreds of different populations in which they occur and several significant schools of thought on how best to deal with them. The idea that there is a single silver bullet or grand plan for how best to deal with insurgency is as unrealistic as a universal cure for cancer.'

The official documentation was published by the War Office and later the Ministry of Defence on counterinsurgency before the creation of the army's think tank, the Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, which was created in Shrivenham in 1998 to expand upon British military thinking and doctrine can be best described as mixed. One of the earliest doctrinal texts that conveyed how the army should fight a small war was defined in *The Manual of Military Law* in 1914 and later in the 1934 pamphlet, *Notes on Imperial Policing*. The updated version *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power* (1949) was the last version to include the term imperial. The terminology changed from that point onwards, and the document was entitled *Keeping the Peace* (1957).

Before the Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre was created, doctrine on anything related to counterinsurgency was limited to official documents only, such as *Keeping the Peace* (*Duties in Support of the Civil Power*) in 1957 and the later 1963 version, which included many lessons from the Malayan emergency and Kenya. These publications were slow to be reassessed and updated every ten years. Alderson (Rid and Keaney 2010:28), who was part of the Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, notes that 'general doctrine (on counterinsurgency) had to wait until the 1990s.'

The lessons and information gathered from counterinsurgency campaigns were scattered amongst other doctrinal texts, including the 1952 release of *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya* or the 1954 *Handbook of Anti-Mau Mau Operations.* These texts were seldom seen beyond their theatre of operations. The

problem with this type of written text was that according to Mockaitis (1995:134), the 'useful information did not rise to the top of the military hierarchy from whence it could be distributed,' as they were created for local use within these specific emergencies. This fragmentation of doctrinal texts and the availability of lessons from campaigns far from the traditional role of the army led Colonel Richard Iron (Ledgwidge 2011:147) to claim 'the British army has a post-war existence as almost two separate armies, the army in Germany to face the Soviets and the post-colonial army that fought our small wars.' Regiments and battalions (many of them not being infantry) rotated between a part of the Germany based land army and the forces deployed to Northern Ireland.

A new doctrinal volume released in 1969 superseded *Keeping the Peace* with the *Land Operations* series with an entire volume on *Counter-Revolutionary Operations*. This volume contained much of the lessons gained from Kenya and Malaya into the general doctrine that had a wide distribution within the British army. The *Land Operations* series also contained strong intellectual lessons from previous British contemporaries, Callwell, Gwynn and Thompson (Kitson would have been included, but his written texts came later – his work was incorporated into the 1977 edition of *Land Operations* while Kitson was the Commandant of the School of Infantry). This 1977 edition of *Land Operations,* according to Mockaitis (1995:136), had been 'expanded specifically in the area of counterinsurgency containing a lengthy discussion on the causes of the insurgency, including everything from corruption to underdevelopment.'

The first modern revision on counterinsurgency was the work carried out by Brigadier Gavin Bullock, who wrote and produced *Counter Insurgency Operations* (1995), then a publication of the Directorate General of Development and Doctrine (DGD&D) based at Upavon. This work by Bullock was revised and later became the 2001 Army Field manual *Counter Insurgency Operations* which, according to Alderson (2013:284), combined 'lessons drawn from Northern Ireland with colonial lessons identified by Kitson.' This responsibility for the doctrine was split in 2005, with strategic and joint service doctrine going to a newly created Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) and the tactical doctrine going to the Land Warfare Centre at Warminster.

In April 2006, the Directorate General of Development and Doctrine and the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre merged into one organisation, the Developments Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). Dixon (2012:73) argues 'this reform was unpopular, with its work being disrupted by the merger.'

The idea of counterinsurgency warfare being a non-speciality area and therefore part of general military education has since been reversed with the Directorate General of Development and Doctrine producing the 2001 edition of the *Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines).* Revisions to this were carried out by the new Developments Concepts and Doctrine Centre with *British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency* (2009), which explicitly detailed counterinsurgency operations for a modern British army. The reforms of the organisations responsible for carrying out doctrinal revisions following the mergers described in the previous paragraph argues

Dixon (2012:74) 'why the next counterinsurgency edition came later than needed.' On a practical note, Alderson (2010:13) found that when British army officers became aware of their deployment into a conflict zone which had become a counterinsurgency related struggle, ‘they would take books on the subject with them’ for counterinsurgency was a subject not generally on the Sandhurst syllabus or taught until attending the Command and Staff College.

This new doctrine was planned and written according to Alderson (2007:7), with 'current doctrine articulating an approach based on firm principles, which result from rigorous analysis.' The 'how to think' needs to be valid if it is derived from practical experience, and it must have broad acceptance. Doctrine to be effective notes Alderson (2007:7) 'must meet the needs of the practitioner,' in this case, the British army. This doctrine must have general acceptance within the army and be readily taught to new units before deployment, and be relatively up to date with its content. Finally, the level of the doctrine must be targeted at an audience that can want to read and understand the message. The general level at which the doctrine was designed to quote the then Director-General, Brigadier Charles Grant, responsible for doctrine in the late 1990s, was targeted at 'a reasonably intelligent sixteen-year-old (Alderson 2007: 7).'

This area is best analysed at how quickly education, doctrine and pre-deployment training is shaped to how the situation is evolving on the ground. An example of this is the Afghani village built at Bridge Carr on the Stanford Training Area near Thetford, where battalions due to deployment to Afghanistan received immersion training. It

included typical structures enacting situations with typical 'civilians' previously encountered by other infantry battalions and based upon their contact and intelligence reports.

Non-Official Doctrine

Sources of non-official doctrine are typically associated with military practitioner theorists for the British counterinsurgency model as being Charles Callwell with *Small Wars*, Charles Gwynn with *Imperial Policing*, Robert Thompson with *Defeating Communist Insurgency* and Frank Kitson with *Low-Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping.*

The list of non-official doctrine is not limited to just the above authors as there are modern writers with influence in the field of counterinsurgency, such as David Kilcullen (as one example). Further detailed information on the four authors is mentioned in chapter two, the methodology (specifically the literature review section). The significance of Callwell, Gwynn, Thompson and Kitson still retain value and remain as part of the discussion on the British model of counterinsurgency as their work is still discussed in military and academic circles that analyse insurgencies.

Learning by Tradition and Historical Experience

The second approach that of sharing counterinsurgency knowledge by regimental tradition and history gather a warning from both Alderson (Rid and Keaney 2010:28) and Gwynn (1934:6) that 'in the absence of literature on the subject, tradition becomes

the only means of broadcasting experience and tradition is apt to be based upon experience limited to a small number of cases, and it has its dangers.' Two of the major factors affecting this regimental tradition have been the reorganisation and merging of British regiments since 1968, and the ability to retain the practical knowledge gathered by the senior non-commissioned and junior and middle rank commissioned officers. With the merging of battalions, some regimental history and practices are changed to 'fit' a new battalion, often with a change of personnel affecting what tactical lessons are passed to new soldiers.

This regimental tradition in which this means of learning is passed revolves around the regiment being at its centre, which is generally responsible according to Egnell (2009:119-120) 'for recruitment, training and administration, creating unit cohesion.'

The system has strengths and weaknesses; unlike the rank and file, the officers are recruited nationally (though there may be a family connection with a particular regiment). Most recruits often come from the traditional recruitment areas associated with past histories, such as the Scottish regiments recruiting predominantly from Scotland (though there is a dodgy historical London connection with the Scots Guards where about a third of soldiers have a London accent). This local tradition holds battalions and regiments together in that soldiers, NCOs, and officers will serve their entire careers with one regiment. Egnell (2009:120) notes, 'the regimental system ensures the retention of experience is thanks to its non-commissioned officers who usually serve together for about fifteen years.'

This practical knowledge that has been uncovered is essentially an aspect of tactical flexibility, which is a pivotal part of the four pillars. Alderson (Rid and Keaney 2010:28-29) comments that 'how an army learns from experience and adapts to changing circumstances is determined to a great extent by its general approach to education and training.'

Modern Developments in Capacity to Assemble and Learn from Lessons

This section examines the development of the British armed forces to create a system that uses its experience to provide lessons that can provide direction for a new doctrine for faster tactical fixes. With Iraq and Afghanistan, the detail and lessons gathered from these campaigns were examined by the current system, the Lessons Exploitation Centre (LXC), created from earlier establishments within the British army but holds a greater ability to deliver its message.

The army lessons process before Iraq was developed according to Dyson (2020:78) during Operation Banner, which was an informal process to learn from mistakes witnessed by company command level officers (Captains and Majors) to reduce the repeat of these mistakes while on operations. Efforts such as this took time to finish and report back to the army despite a close working with the Northern Ireland Training and Advisory Team. The finished report did not reach its 'high water mark' (Dyson (2020:78) that it wished, the operational tempo was scaling down after the 1998 Belfast Agreement. Significantly, Dyson (2020:78) claims that 'institutional memory was not recorded and lost.' This institutional learning can also be best described as the type of learning associated with traditional and historical experience in

developments of tactical flexibility and how to conduct operations on the ground. Much of this learning has been lost.

The events and incidents associated with the Iraq war created another effort in creating a permanent lessons-based establishment to identify and resolve the lessons associated with it. Created under the Commander-in-Chief, United Kingdom Land Forces called the Lessons Process with standing order 1118. Unfortunately, this text never got widely distributed across the army, which according to Alderson (2010:13), would have created more problems than solutions.

In 2006, the Mission Support Group was created within the Warfare Development group within the British army's Land Warfare centre. The starting point of the Mission Support Group had three tasks. First, to improve joint coordination or air and land assets in 'effectively coordinating force and jointness between different services (Dyson 2020:78-79). Secondly, to improve the army's record on health and safety, with recognition notes Dyson (2020:79) that equipment failures had created 'instances where soldiers had died or suffered injury due to poor equipment,' along with the reputational loss attributed to the army. The third was the recognition that the 'army hierarchy that it was failing to identify lessons' (Dyson 2020:79) and the US forces already had a system in place to identify lessons and that Dyson (2020:79) notes would 'enabled it to effectively translate adaptation in the field into organisational change.' The Mission Support Group gathered its findings for potential lessons by being dependent upon a heavy flow of intelligence, accessing weekly Brigade after-action reports through direct contact with officers serving in Iraq and gathering detailed

commentaries on enemy activity and tactics from its personnel attached to the current Telic mission.

In 2008, the Mission Support Group was replaced by a newer organisation, the Lessons Exploitation Centre (LXE), created by the Directing General of Land Warfare. According to Alderson (2010:11), it became 'a think tank with teeth' with greater resources to look into lessons than the previous Mission Support Group as it, according to Dyson (2020:80), 'faced an unrealistic workload and lacked the authority to push an effective lessons process.'

The Lessons Exploitation Centre was given a significant boost in its ability to work and provide direction. In 2009, the Executive Committee of the Army Board created a new structure replacing much of the old land warfare structure with the Force Development and Training Command. According to Alderson (2010:10), this new structure brought personnel responsible for army doctrine, training, force development, concepts, equipment and capability development into a single command structure. It gave the Lessons Exploitation Centre g greater voice by placing it on an equal position in force development and training command within the overall Land Warfare Development Group that answers to the Chief of the General Staff.'

The findings from these lessons were to amend current doctrine to provide consistent updates. The reality, according to Dyson (2020:81), was some of the new lessons and its subsequent doctrine when an update in 2010 for Afghanistan was to be released

'was not deemed necessary,' as the view from frontline officers was not much had changed and the updated doctrine was late in being published.

The change from the Mission Support Group into the Lessons Exploitation Centre only came about due to the new commander of the Force Development and Training Command attempting transferred lessons from the US military. This officer Dyson (2020:81) notes had spent time with the US military spending a year as ‘the Chief of Defence Staff’s Liaison Officer to the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs at the Pentagon in 2003 watching how the US lesson learning process took place.’ Foley (Dyson 2020:81) notes ‘in essence the ability to learn from frontline experience was elevated in status and given greater resources, and its further development established as a key priority.’

The earlier organisations, such as the Mission Support Group, simply did not have enough teeth and voice to push through necessary changes. Creating an organisation with equal footing in Force Development and Training Command gives the Learning Exploitation Centre a potential ability to drive changes from lessons forward in accessible doctrine.

Alas, the Force Development and Training Command was also abolished in 2014. The entire role of providing and coordinating knowledge transformation within the army was given back to the Land Warfare Centre. According to Dyson (2020:153), this creates 'one focal point for all aspects inherent to change.' Its abolishment was due to one major hindrance associated with obtaining senior replacement officers with the

relevant experience to fill placements within the lessons team rather than continue with the normal command rank path. Dyson (2020:152) suggests that 'some senior officers in the army hierarchy were trying to clip the wings of the lessons team, kicking the Army Organisational Learning Strategy into the long grass.

Created to replace the Force Development and Training Command, the Defence Organisational Learning Strategy (DOLS), the current incarnation of British army learning has attempted ‘to reverse the lack of investment in the army brain by reworking the army’s ability to adapt and undertake longer-term strategic and tactical planning.’ (Dyson 2020:153)

The Defence Organisational Learning Strategy has further assistance from an academic organisation, the Army Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, established in 2013. Although it is associated and based in the same location as the new Joint Command and Staff College, it is a civilian academic institute that is vital according to Dyson (2020:1530 in having another set of eyes for 'redeveloping the army's higher tactical and operational research, to provide work to the General Staff on strategy, concepts, capabilities and operations.'

Twenty-First Century British Counterinsurgency Policy

The recent release of the British Army Field Manual Volume 1, Part 10 entitled *Countering Insurgency* (2009) is the latest official 'bible' on counterinsurgency for UK armed forces. This new manual came into being with a lengthy review that started in

2006 with the lessons gathered by lessons from two and a half years of fighting in Iraq. Alderson (2007:6) notes, 'those in the field in Iraq were demonstrating tactical adaptability and agility by making the necessary adjustments to tactics and procedures.' Therefore, changes in the threat and the experience from Iraq meant it underwent further review for each new Telic deployment.

After release, the British efforts to assist with tactical adaptation for Iraq detailed many areas such as definitions, principles, frameworks for operations and how to plan, execute and successfully manage a counterinsurgency campaign with examples. The US Army and Marines did something similar in creating *Counterinsurgency FM 3-24* that grounded both its theory and examples of best practice from current US doctrinal sources in Iraq. It also mentions the British counterinsurgency campaigns of Malaya and Kenya.

As a taught subject, counterinsurgency underwent a revival during the campaigns of Iraq and Afghanistan, with it being included from 2005 on the Sandhurst syllabus. At the British army's Advanced Command and Staff College during the 1990s, schooling on counterinsurgency had significantly declined. Previously counterinsurgency was a three-week civil-military exercise and academic module sharing the experience with the Police Staff College members. After the Joint Services Command and Staff College replaced the single-service academies, the time allotted to Land Warfare (of which counterinsurgency is one part) according to Ucko and Egnell (2013:40) was 'condensed from three terms to one, leaving counterinsurgency as part of 'other operations,' one of three topics to be discussed and examined in a single module of

three days.' The absence of a formal counterinsurgency doctrine was not supporting the teaching, which according to Alderson (2009:263), 'had no basic set of agreed-upon counterinsurgency principles.' Lastly, the British army was put under pressure with the Iraq Inquiry of 2016 in that it was 'critical of learning processes' (Dyson 2020:147) though the Inquiry was vague on how it might reverse this lack of learning. Fortunately, processes and a reorganisation were changing the direction and quality in this area.

Measuring Success and Failure in Counterinsurgency

A counterinsurgent campaign needs to have a reliable method of measuring the current campaign's success, especially for a Ministry of Defence who must maintain the morale of its soldiers involved and for the politician who is attempting to keep public acceptance for an ongoing campaign.

Furthermore, the measurements should be made by an impartial organisation, authoritative, and recognised by the broadest consensus of concerned populations and actors. Degrees of success and failure can be measured by displacement and rehabilitation of populations and former combatants, violent incidents, economic growth, individual freedoms upheld, improvement of infrastructure, the successful functioning of schools, hospitals, and the restoration of urban facilities such as participation in both local, regional and national political activity. From the perspective of the counterinsurgency commander, this system of measurements will communicate both good and unwelcome news.

In national counterinsurgency campaigns, government and security forces had (and still have) the luxury of editing and obfuscating the statistics of success and failure to present the best image for their operations. In a multinational campaign, the leader of a coalition force is denied this option for many reasons; above all, the proliferation of independent news observers connected to an abundance of independent means of reliable, fast communication makes the concealment of grave news in a 24/7 world almost impossible.

Coalition politicians and military leaders who strive to establish transparency as part of the coalition's program must also live and politically die by transparency. In future campaigns, the coalition must identify a single, universally recognised authority to measure the success of a counterinsurgency intervention. This requirement imposes a change of approach at the outset regarding the transparent handling of all negative information vis-à-vis the virtual dimension and the use of spin by coalition leadership. It also requires a more educated home electorate and news media. Success or failure in counterinsurgency is seldom a knock-down victory. Leaders often have to alter their short-term expectations because counterinsurgency continues to be a long journey of evolvement and discovery to reach a negotiated political settlement.

British Success?

The subject of British success is, in short, a compromise as many political settlements are. Often, best case outcomes achieve what is realistically attainable once a campaign is underway rather than attempting to meet the idealised targets created in advance. Alderson (Rid and Keaney 2010:40) notes that ‘insurgency and

counterinsurgency are essentially about the battle to win and hold popular support, both at home and in the theatre of operations.'

Asymmetric warfare is fluid and complex, rendering concepts of success as defined in regular warfare entirely nebulous. Campaign success will, of course, boil down to the question of whether insurgent violence has been curtailed sufficiently. It is possible to defeat an insurgency militarily yet compromise significantly on the political arena to maintain a balanced outcome accepted by all sides in a counterinsurgency campaign.

Nevertheless, several factors impinge on the qualitative nature of such success, particularly time, political goal-post shifting and altered public expectation of what success looks like.

Taking these issues into consideration, success in counterinsurgency campaigns during the imperial era of the British Empire was mixed in its timeframe and outcome. Malaya took twelve years to achieve – a timeframe almost unthinkable in today's media-intensive world. Success against the Mau Mau came at the price of 'indiscriminate detention and heavy-handed policing' and, according to Bennett (2013:279), also had 'security forces maintaining a competition between themselves over the number of arrests.' This 'heavy-handedness' was an aberration of minimum force (the principle the British have tried to maintain as one of the central pillars in its 'hearts and minds'-oriented campaigning). However, it is not a single example of a failure to follow this constraint.

There was no success to talk of in Aden or South Arabia, according to Cassidy (2005:89) despite 'a willingness to fight using stealth and cunning when artillery and airpower would fail.' Given the speed of this politically-dictated withdrawal from Aden, the army's riot control techniques failed to avoid unnecessary shooting and the depth of security constraints, according to Cassidy (2008:90), ‘led to failure.’ As the British army retreated to Aden's main population centres, the army had already signalled its failure to suppress insurgent violence. Alderson (Ris and Keaney 2010:39) comments that in Aden, 'there was no unified civil-military command and no effective intelligence'. In contrast, Alderson further quotes Brigadier Jeffries (the final British brigade commander in Aden) as commenting that 'no internal security operations have been carried out with so little operational support, no formalised pre-employment training and from 1966 only the bleak prospect of withdrawal to look forward to' (Rid and Keaney 2010:39).

When exploring the three case studies, the idea of success becomes a lesson in observing the conflict outlook from an opposite standpoint. Success for the three case studies varies at different timescales associated with these conflicts. Some periods clearly highlight aspects of counterinsurgency success, where others significantly do not.

Success during Phase one of Dhofar in Oman could be described as ‘mixed’ at best or a near loss at worst, with the Sultans Armed Forces essentially ignoring counterinsurgency strategy and performing punitive strikes on the Jebel as ordered by

Sultan Said. In phase two, success becomes a long-term strategy with clear objectives for how to reach it.

Success concerning Northern Ireland is to couch it heavily in terms of compromise and viewpoint. The IRA was never militarily defeated but was brought close on two occasions; once, during the early 1970s following Internment and British imposed direct rule and during the early 1990s where the military under a Conservative government had used intelligence and special forces assets to practically disarm the Provisional IRA by limiting weapon movements into the provinces and by observing many of the terrorist weapon dumps. The British government had obtained a containment of the violence in the provinces to an 'acceptable level of violence,' but this only came about after thirty years of experience after 'things went from bad to worse' in the early 1970s notes Cassidy (2008:90).

Iraq began as an achievement for the British quickly shedding heavy weapons and helmets altering from a warfighting ethos to another closely associated with peace support operations. This success soured when the increase in violence aimed at coalition forces due to a multitude of reasons ranging from politics to militia infiltration was not correctly identified as a conflict akin to insurgency. Efforts to remedy this position became more difficult with reducing British troop levels.

The political acceptance of the unavoidability of decolonisation led to a political exit strategy for many British colonial holdings. The context under which the British army managed campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s contrasts sharply to the French

experience in Indo-China and Algeria, for example, where the French aggressively opposed the process of decolonisation. Due to a limited military and little acceptable choice of political strategy and later counterinsurgency planning, that could only entail an outright military defeat of the insurgency without a political managed withdrawal. According to Trinquier (1964:3), the French army 'failed to adapt,' which was the reason French forces were defeated in Indochina and Algeria.

Unlike regular warfare, there is no discernable point of enemy surrender, no victory ceremony, no official declaration of peace. Merely an end to operations that may be low intensity but are often as deadly and as nerve-racking as traditional warfighting. The political achievement of counting the number of attacks carried out against security forces, the number of civilian deaths or the number of newly trained security forces may provide quantitative comfort for commanders and politicians with great media soundbites for public consumption (as was the case with the US forces in Vietnam). However, reliance on figures does not answer the impact that counterinsurgency tactics are having on the real-world causes or the motives that created the insurgency in the first place.

It is easy to mistake action for progress with counterinsurgency. Success in counterinsurgency, therefore, is constructed of a subjective interpretation of eradication of insurgent violence; however, this is often the result of overt political compromise, which questions whether success is, therefore, the right word to describe a strategic outcome. Does success mean that learning happens for future counterinsurgency campaigns? To fully understand how or why learning (or

adaptation) can provide success in an insurgency, Cassidy (2008:127) cites a dictum attributed to Otto Von Bismarck in that 'fools say they learn from experience. I prefer to learn from the experience of others.' Learning can occur from both good and bad examples found with counterinsurgency; it is often the ability to adapt an old lesson to a new conflict that can create one area of potential success.

Conclusion

Official doctrine created for the British army for counterinsurgency or assisting the civil power dates back many decades. The doctrine for irregular warfare, generally covering small wars and imperial policing right through to counterinsurgency, was published in Army Field manuals or texts specific for certain conflicts such as Kenya and is best described as intermittent in how often it's published and has had only limited distribution and dissemination throughout the army.

Learning took place beyond reliance on doctrine with regimental experience and history, also providing lessons from deployments, especially in tactical flexibility and operations. The non-official doctrine has also been shown to semi-educate the army in this subject. The four authors, Callwell, Gwynn, Thompson and Kitson, were not the sole counterinsurgent authors of their time but remain important because elements of their work often based upon on-the-ground observations still have validity today. They all kept a level of influence long after their publications were released.

The development and evolution of a lessons-based process that started with Banner through Telic in the reforms of the army's institutions to find lessons and answers have also created revisions for the army in counterinsurgency. There remains a current doctrine on counterinsurgency, even if planning and training for counterinsurgency have somewhat gone out of fashion within military strategy and planning. Counterinsurgency is no longer is seen as an add-on for general training; the previously stated opinion within the 2001 *Counter Insurgency Operations* was the thought ‘the army has an approach to operations which, with careful reflection and imagination, can be readily adapted.’ (2001: B-2-2)

With a welcomed focus by some army generals, Dyson (2020:158) notes, with a return to traditional activities, there remains a need to have the 'full spectrum' of tools available for an army in that it can carry out peace support operations and counterinsurgency. Continuing with a lessons process that allows for learning creates 'the capacity for the military to adapt, emulate and innovate at pace in a broad range of military activities' (Dyson 2020:158).

The next chapter looks at Dhofar, Oman. It encompasses various characteristics, including history, development of the insurgency and an analysis of the campaign with the four pillars framework.

Chapter Four

British Counterinsurgency in Dhofar, Oman

"If your path is blocked by a snake and a Dhofari, kill the Dhofari first."

-Northern Omani saying. (Ladwig III 2008:64)

Introduction

According to counterinsurgency experts such as Beckett (Marston and Malkasian 2008:175), Newsinger (2002:132) and Mockaitis (1995:93), the campaign fought by the Omanis with British assistance could have had enormous repercussions for the West, especially for the British, should they have failed in their efforts in assisting Oman to counter the insurgency. The above authors regard the resulting success as a shining example of a model counterinsurgency campaign (although the campaign planners and the tactical situation did create errors). Indigenous forces technically fought the campaign with British technical assistance, oversight and leadership. Often overlooked as a successful counterinsurgency effort, Mockaitis (1995:72-95) notes it 'did replace the Malayan Insurgency as the taught example at the Joint Command and Staff College as a model counterinsurgency campaign.' Oman had limited outside support from a greater power (the UK), and that the Oman state did most of the heavy lifting with regional allies (Jordanian, UAE and Iranian personnel), its indigenous peoples and seconded or contract personnel (predominantly from the UK).

This chapter follows the development of British doctrine, other learning methods, and the British army as a learning institution. It contains details on the insurgency, and an analysis of the Dhofar counterinsurgency will take place by the four pillars analytical

tool. Dhofar in Oman is one of the two case studies of a post-colonial conflict before Iraq. This case study will present examples of evolving tactical flexibility and lessons learned from the campaign into a methodology employed in Oman, which changed after five years of limited progress which evolved and ultimately succeeded (after another five years) in ending the insurgency.

The chapter will examine;

- Geography and History
- Start of the insurgency
- The Sultans Armed Forces: Initial operations
- The coup and strategic transformation
- The four pillars framework;
    - i. Minimum force
    - ii. Civil-military cooperation
    - iii. Use of intelligence
    - iv. Tactical flexibility

The Dhofar counterinsurgency campaign, previously overlooked in the modern world except during the ten years of interest in counterinsurgency around 2005-2015, has, during this period, been deconstructed. The Dhofar insurgency may have produced many lessons which could have been transplanted and used for the recent campaign by the British in Iraq.

Oman was and is a Muslim country, and the local security forces were mainly indigenous. However, they had specialist support from the UK forces, and after a build-

up of local, regional and national resources such as personnel, training and intelligence gathering, they began to do much of the tasks for themselves. These lessons should have been effectively learned, re-examined, and, where necessary, adjusted to have been allowed to run their course in Iraq with a tailored, long-term strategy for the British controlled sectors of Iraq using lessons from Oman applied to another Muslim country of Arabic background. This is not to say that any strategy should be blindly allowed to run without constant oversight and be adjusted or replaced by brigade and divisional commanders. Unlike Oman, the strategy in Iraq was re-adjusted when UK battle groups and their senior officers were replaced with each new tour for Operation Telic in Iraq so senior officers could put their stamp of action in these areas. Having a limited time on the ground (six months) with a change of personnel at the operational and strategic levels would not leave a massive amount of time for the new strategies to firmly take place before being replaced. In Oman, the Commander of the Sultans Armed Forces would be a two to three-year posting, and any attached personnel were on twelve-month deployments.

Geography and History

The campaign took place in the Dhofar province of the then-named Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. This became Oman after 1970. The province of Dhofar was isolated from the rest of Oman and had close tribal and societal links with clans based in the neighbouring state of South Yemen, which after independence following the withdrawal of British forces from Aden became the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen (PDRSY). Dhofar covers an area about the same size as Wales with a small population of 30,000 and was fought in an area of mountainous desert inhabited by two clans; one of which is made up of semi-nomadic kinfolk from the Bait Kathir,

Mahra and Hinawi clans (with many further subsects)[1]. These people lived as cattle and goat herders upon the plateau known as the Jebel and numbered about 10,000. The second group of people lived in a coastal area some 37 miles long by 9 miles deep, which contained the majority of the states somewhat limited state infrastructure and facilities with a population of 20,000. The Sultan of Oman, Said bin Taimur ruled the state from 1932.

Socially, the Sultan, bin Taimur feared the effect of Western modernisation and its influence upon the Omani people. The state ruled by bin Taimur (also spelt as Taymur) had minimal state-run facilities. In the entire country, there existed only one hospital, run under sufferance by an American charity, and educationally, the state provided only three state-run schools for selected male children that educated its pupils to the primary school level of education. The state denied its people the right to relocate either regionally in Oman or legally leave the country except in rare cases (Newsinger 2002:132-135). To further reduce the effect of Western influence, simple things such as spectacles, medical drugs, radios, bicycles, cigarettes, trousers and dancing were banned as signs of modernity. The Sultan, according to John Newsinger (2002:133), never ruled by naked terror; his style of rule was more 'tyranny of indifference to want and suffering backed up by a very genuine threat of punishment if people complained.' The Sultan used a lack of education and impoverishment to deliberate and calculated political and social control. In a 1950s interview with a western officer attached to his armed forces, the Sultan commented that 'if he provided schools and hospitals, the

[1] The Bait Kathir sections include the Masahala, with the sub-clans being the Bait Mohsin, al Tair, Samhan, Raba'at and Amreet. Also, the ShaiShai, the Bait Gidad, the Bait al Ahmar, the Bait Ghuwas and the Bait Musan. Other Kathir clans are the Al Kathir, which include the Bait Ali bin Badr, the Bait Hamed bin Ahmed, the Shanafir of al Hafa and the Maraheen and Baith Ruwas of Salalah. These are all Hinawi factions (Fiennes 1975: 207)

numbers of the poor would increase creating more social unrest, and as for education…. that's why you lost India' (Newsinger 2002:133).

The Sultan, a Muslim state ruler, was Western-educated and would often be seen staying the summers in the best London hotels paid for by diverting income from the nation's oil wealth into his bank accounts.

Insurgency in Oman was not a new development; various attempts at uprisings against the state had happened since 1945 with varying degrees of failure inflicted upon them due to many reasons ranging from successful state security efforts to apathy (Hughes 2009: 280-281). The Oman insurgency became an armed conflict 1963-1965, with its roots associated with earlier failed uprisings.

This insurgency came about for many reasons; the location of the Dhofar region due to its location, 500 miles away from the rest of the Omani population where most of the 1.4 million inhabitants resided, the conditions imposed upon its people by the Sultan, Said bin Taimur and the Oman government, and by the regional situation specifically South Yemen. The lack of state organs, as mentioned previously, left the Dhofari population feeling neglected.

The significant reasons for the increased anti-governmental feeling remained the Omani taxation policy, aimed at the Dhofaris in particular, which were, according to White (2008: 66-68) 'extortionate.' The import taxes for the Dhofar population were 300% higher than the rest of Oman. Adding to this additional regional tax that affected local trades-people were local taxes such as fishermen having to pay a daily tax on

catches and cattle herders having to pay both a monthly and annual tax on their animal populations. White continues that the origins of this latest uprising are 'seen in the emigration of both the Jebalis and townsfolk seeking education and employment outside of the country (2008: 66-68).'

Outside Oman, by 1962, opposition groups founded by the expatriate community had begun to emerge with a staunch nationalist, anti-Sultan Said ideology (DeVore 2012:146). These expatriate groups were responsible for the formation of the Dhofar Liberation Front (the DLF) under a former disgruntled employee (a gardener) of the Sultan, Mussalim bin Nufl of the Al Kathiri tribe (a sub-tribe of the Bait Kathir). During these early years, the Saudi Arabian monarch, King Faisal, provided financial support for the opposition groups, which funded the new DLF.

Also, it is a similar view held by DeVore (2011:441) that the Dhofar conflict had internal origins, based upon tribal and economic reasons but was also closely related to the situation which developed with Oman's neighbour, South Yemen (known hereafter as Yemen). The Dhofar province had closer ethnic and tribal links with Yemen than with the rest of Oman and Dhofar had only one road to link the province to the capital. Following the Yemenis 'successful campaign' against the British, which concluded with their independence, the new People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) began to supply arms to the Jebel’s inhabitants along its interconnected border.

The Start of the Insurgency

The DLF or adoo (Arabic for the enemy) began a low-level campaign of sabotage against western interests in Dhofar, attacking primarily the oil companies working in

the province with limited attacks in number and success against the Sultan's Armed Forces. The situation escalated when the DLF was supported through Yemen.

The conflict on the international stage following the British withdrawal from Aden attracted many outside sources of support against the Oman state. States such as China, the Soviet Union, North Korea and East Germany provided reinforcements in terms of arms, supplies, ideological and military training, and in the case of the PDRY, direct military support and a secure base from which to operate at Hauf in the PDRY border area with Dhofar. Elements from the DLF were sent for further training, such as advanced guerrilla training in Iraq. During this period, where support from outside sources was involved, the DLF underwent multiple identity changes. In August 1968, the DLF was renamed the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG).

Regional support from Saudi Arabia disappeared following an attempt on the Sultans life in 1965. The Saudi support waned for two reasons; firstly, was the worry by Saudi authorities at the attempt on a ruling monarch (on the fact it could succeed) and secondly due to the political efforts to normalise relations between Saudi Arabia and Oman that were proving successful. Things looked bleak for the DLF as the majority of their supporters based in Saudi Arabia, but this was turned around following the withdrawal of British troops from Aden in the newly independent state of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in November 1967 was to provide the DLF with all manner of support. The propaganda employed by anti-British elements often portrayed the British withdrawal as a victory for the Yemeni people.

With a secure headquarters and a haven for the DLF within Yemen with Soviet and Chinese allies providing modern weaponry, training and a strong ideology for the insurgency, this led to a massive change in the DLF. The newly created army of ideologically committed rebels supplied with modern, reliable small arms led to a massive change in the makeup of the DLF under Massalim bin Nufl and his supporters in that they were quickly but quietly side-lined or ousted from leadership positions changing the conflict from one of nationalism to one of an ideology based upon the Chinese revolutionary doctrine of Mao. This change of position, according to DeVore (2011:441), shifted the insurgency from one of nationalism to another Cold War proxy war where the Omani and British states were defending the Gulf States and their oil from the spread of Communism and Soviet/Chinese influence.

Following the initial attacks made by the DLF in 1965 against oil company assets and the security forces in the province, the DLF became more professionally led and organised after outside assistance. The DLF separated Dhofar into three zones; East, West and Centre, with an under-strength regiment of fighters in each zone. The basic adoo operational unit consisted of 100 regular fighters, which after 1968 saw them armed with the latest communist supplied weaponry of Kalashnikovs, RPD machine guns and 60mm and 81mm mortars. In later years (phase 2), they were supplied with Soviet weapons such as the RPG-7 rocket launchers and a limited supply of 122mm Katyusha rockets and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles to counter the SAF (DeVore 2011:440).

During the later stages of the insurgency (known as phase 2 between 1970-1975/6), when regional support for the Oman state increased, the PFLOAG was again renamed

in 1971 as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (confusingly still the PFLOAG). This new variation also became a casualty of the conflict when Oman's State civil/military successes changed the dynamic in August 1974, with the adoo becoming the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), dropping any regional aspirations and continuing with their ideological position but resurrecting the nationalist identity. Its new manifesto called for the breaking of tribalism, the ending of western imperialism and its proxies (the oil companies) and the founding of a Marxist republic (Marston and Malkasian 2010: 178).

The Sultans Armed Forces: Initial Operations

The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman obtained wealth from the state's oil fields but had limited security and defence systems. The senior officer of the Oman military, due to its close links with Britain, was either a seconded or retired British Colonel (or higher rank) known as the Commander, Sultans Armed Forces (CSAF). This individual would be responsible for all areas of defence policy and leadership while being responsible to the Sultan, though this was not always easy. During the early years of the insurgency, known as Phase 1 (1965-1970), the CSAF requested funding to increase and modernise the Sultans Armed Forces (SAF). Despite many requests from the CSAF to modernise the SAF, who mentioned earlier religious and tribal uprisings as historical examples were in vain until the military situation and its fragility was carefully explained to the Sultan. New equipment and weaponry were grudgingly ordered in 1969 from the UK.

Previous to this restructure, the state of the SAF during the early 1960s consisted of two battalions of troops, the Muscat Regiment and the Northern Frontier Regiment;

both organised and commanded by either seconded or contracted British officers since 1958. Most SAF soldiers were multinational; either Makran Buluchs recruited from Gwadur and Baluchistan in Pakistan (a province once belonging to the Sultan but sold to Pakistan for a million pounds in 1958) and from local troops raised from the Omani Arab population in the north. Both groups were generally illiterate, would receive limited technical training, have limited promotion prospects. If any presented themselves as potential officer material, they could only advance as far as lieutenant rank, for the Sultan did not trust native officers but instead preferred British leadership.

Despite significant and increasing insurgent efforts, the SAF under Sultan Said struggled against the adoo threat. The SAF did not have a permanent presence in Dhofar before 1964, according to Ladwig III (2008:69), as security for the province of Dhofar was split amongst two groups neither belonging to the SAF or under military command; the Dhofar Force and the Gendarmerie. The Dhofar force was a company-sized private bodyguard force commanded by a Pakistani Lieutenant Colonel (about 200 strong) who also had to guard the Sultan who partly lived in the Dhofar province. The second unit, the local Gendarmerie, was a police unit numbering fifty responsible for an area the size of Wales. Ladwig (2008:68-70) notes that when the insurgency started taking root, these units were somewhat outnumbered and vastly under-equipped in their ability to act against the adoo in such a large area. They had neither numbers nor much in the way of current military-grade equipment.

The SAF at the start of phase one of the insurgency were poorly equipped, armed with World War two era weapons, incorporating the Lee Enfield Rifle, Bren Light Machine Gun, 3-inch mortars and 5.5-inch artillery pieces, though, at this time, the adoo/DLF

were similarly armed, this did not remain the case. The medical support to the SAF proved to be somewhat imperfect; they had one Pakistani military surgeon, inadequate medical facilities at RAF Salalah and no system for medical evacuation of casualties that took place either on the plains or the Jebel area of Dhofar. The air support to the SAF was limited, both in number and quality by the Sultan of Oman's Air Force (SOAF) based at RAF Salalah, again comprising seconded and contract (former) British Royal Air Force personnel. The formation of the SOAF began in the mid-1950s with old and daylight only capable ground-attack aircraft. During phase two, the SOAF was equipped with modern Strikemaster jets, Skyvan transport planes and assorted helicopters, which the elder Sultan did not like, the most numerous of which were the Bell UH-1 Huey helicopter of Vietnam fame.

Following the attack on his life, the SAF under bin Taimur’s orders began collectively punishing the Dhofaris. According to Beckett (Marston and Malkasian 2008:177), these punishments included the SAF blockading the Jebel, capping wells, and cutting off the Jebel inhabitants from the coastal markets and the income which they could gather from these markets. Arguably these reprisals drove the people further into the hands of the DLF and their supporters.

The SAF did gain from the failed attempt on the Sultans life. It led to the creation of a third battalion, the Desert Regiment, raised in 1966. Still, the SAF, according to DeVore (2011: 442), 'remained immobile and unable to significantly disrupt the DLF due to the SAF's limited numbers of deploying one battalion to Dhofar.' When the military began operations in Dhofar, it did so without a single soldier from Dhofar. Dhofari people struggled to join the SAF, most chose not to, and when they did, they

were severely limited in where they could serve and in what role. The adoo thrived in this power vacuum by infiltrating the Gendarmerie unit in Salalah. The SAF did not understand the people, its geography or the Jebel except what it gathered from tribal hearsay, employing decades-old maps and even accounts from explorers and oil company prospectors. The Jebel, a mountainous area, reached 5000 feet in places with areas pockmarked with caves, gullies and other obstacles that would, according to White (2008: 2), 'restrict any cross-country tactical movement in the province.'

Non-military efforts attempting at the same time to contain the insurgents also failed. The CSAF, Colonel Anthony Lewis, suggested policies to ease tensions and begin a hearts and minds campaign with the Dhofaris failed. The Sultan rejected an amnesty for enemy combatants, refused to fund civil development projects both on the plains strip and Jebel in Dhofar, and only agreed to buy more equipment and modern weapons when military failure in 1969/1970 looked certain. The CSAF, having served in Malaya, was certain a limited battle of 'hearts and minds' would have slowed the adoo, but the Sultan was determined to continue with a punishment regime against those who were against his rule. The military leadership of Oman (mainly British educated) knew by previous experience of small wars that a military campaign alone would not succeed.

During phase one, the SAF were outnumbered by the DLF, who, according to Beckett (Marston and Malkasian 2008:178), numbered around 2,000 active insurgents organised into death squads called the idaarat. These were further supported by up to 3,000 part-time militia members who by late phase one had observers that reported upon movements by the SAF in Dhofar. The insurgents continued to attack the SAF

with increased success and a more daring ability to strike at the somewhat limited civil system that bin Taimur had in place. The number of contacts between the SAF and the DLF began at one or two per week and, towards the end of 1968, numbered two or three per day (Marston and Malkasian 2008:178). The next CSAF, Brigadier Corin Purdon, attempted operations with the SAF to break up these operational regiments of insurgents into smaller groups by spreading SAF influence across the region, which had some limited success (the SAF could not remain in place year-round), but without further concessions from the Sultan to entice enemy combatants to give up the struggle, a military campaign on its own would not succeed. This was the view held by the British, 'who discussed the matter in both the Ministry of Defence and at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (DeVore 2011: 449-450).' The outcome of these meetings was that 'If Sultan Said would not invest heavily in development projects, the United Kingdom would assist in removing the Sultan, and install a ruler who would' (DeVore 2011:450).

The Coup and Strategic Transformation

The most significant change to alter the course of the insurgency took place in 1970 with the almost bloodless overthrow of the Sultan, Said bin Taimur, replaced by his son Qaboos (also known as Qabus), a thirty-year-old, Sandhurst trained, westernised man who had served with the British army in West Germany. Qaboos had been held under house arrest by his father since 1963 due to him being 'too western' in his outlook. Almost bloodless refers to three bodyguards being injured, and the Sultan, bin Taimur, shot himself in the foot with his pistol. The British were instrumental in supporting the coup. This became known when documents were released under the 30-year rule.

Qaboos understood and accepted the principle that military action alone would not defeat the PFLOAG. The new Sultan began long-needed political reorganisations, which were, according to Beckett (Marston and Malkasian 2010: 179), 'a new beginning' with an Interim Advisory Council which invited former exiles and the new Sultan's uncle, a former exiled citizen, to become Prime Minister. The restrictions on movements within and without the state were removed. A development plan began with the release of political prisoners and a reconstruction effort to build new wells, schools, clinics and housing for the whole of Oman funded by the country's oil revenues.

Following the coup, the new Sultan, who had the experience of modern warfare, realised the weakness of the SAF and ordered a policy of expansion and reorganisation. This led to the creation within months of a separate command, the Dhofar Brigade with a British Brigadier commanding it, an increase in recruitment and new equipment on top of what his father had ordered before his removal and his brief exile in London. The elder Sultan died in 1972.

The Four Pillars Framework

Minimum Force

Whether by design or default, much of the campaign and its battles (during phase one) with the insurgents were fought with small arms. The SAF had limited artillery or airpower. Most of the Sultans Armed Forces were armed with weapons from an earlier era, and the adoo were similarly armed until they received outside assistance. The insurgents, when supplied, 'outgunned' the SAF with more modern weaponry and training that they received from Soviet, Chinese, East German and Cuban trainers.

The adoo made massive tactical successes against a thinly spread single battalion across an area the size of Wales that, according to Ladwig (2008: 69), 'had never seen any element of the SAF deployed into Dhofar before 1964/5.'

Although the British 'common law' of minimum force worked in every British emergency in its former Colonies and possessions, it had been employed through emergency laws for each counterinsurgency action which did not apply in Oman since it was already an independent state. According to Mockaitis (1995:89), the British did understand the role of the military in these situations. Unlike previous emergencies, each killing in Oman did not require a police report. The SAF/British authorities understood indiscriminate killings would cost the SAF/Omani state any potential support within the Jebel population. Mockaitis (1995:89) defined that minimum force in Dhofar meant 'selective force.'

The former Sultan, following gains by the adoo in territory, training, and weapons, had ultimately been persuaded by the CSAF to order modern weapons and to increase the ability of the Sultan’s Air Force and the SAF artillery capability from the UK. However, the bulk of these orders did not materialise until Sultan Said was removed from power in 1970. The only element of the orders to be received quickly was the introduction of the L1A1 7.62mm Self Loading Rifle (known by their users as the SLR).

The SAF, following increases in the oil price and its value to Oman's GDP, significantly increased in numbers after Sultan Qaboos took power. Before these changes, movements by the SAF battalions in Dhofar were limited due to its equipment, access to water and vehicle limitations.

Tactical deployment errors or mistakes in phase one, with the employment of force against the civilian population in Dhofar, came into being after the failed attempt on the life of the Sultan. These reprisal attacks were solely ordered by the Sultan (Said bin Taimur) and were targeted against villages that supported the adoo and the Jebel population living within them. According to Mockaitis (1995:93), these attacks would involve blowing up wells (or poisoning them), burning out villages, setting crops alight, shooting herds, destroying food stores, and cutting all food supplies.

Late in phase one, the first night of an operation in December 1969 against the Jebel population started with the SAF shelling an area populated with a civilian population for 45 minutes that attempted to flush out enemy combatants. This was to try and force the population to leave the area and go to safer areas. This type of punishment operation persisted during Operation Final Fling, which witnessed the destruction of 1 in 5 houses in villages where incriminating evidence of support for the PFLOAG was found. Newsinger (2002:145) claims this policy was one of an all-out attack on the population that supported the DLF/PFLOAG on the orders of Sultan Said bin Taimur. This is not to say that orders of punishment strikes were limited to the original Sultan and phase one. On becoming Sultan, his son, Qaboos, also tried using the SOAF to bomb tribal areas that were slow to accept his rule two years after becoming Oman's ruler. Crop burning persisted in depriving food for the PFLOAG during 1971-2.

During phase one, the Jebel population feared the non-selective use of force by the SAF. The DLF, later the PFLOAG, offered an alternative to the punishment operations, although this situation later changed when the ideology of the PFLOAG became more

revolutionary and less Islamic. By 1969, the PFLOAG had controlled two-thirds of the Dhofar province.

Before 1970, according to Ladwig (2008:72), the entire SAF numbered 3,000, but by 1972, this had drastically increased to 10,000 personnel, peaking at 12,000. This situation came into being after much analysis of the campaign. It was decided that the SAF needed to be expanded and have the quality of its personnel training increased. This was done by deploying a training cadre sourced from the UK, which according to Ladwig (2008: 72), consisted of an experienced Training Officer and eight Non-Commissioned Offices seconded from UK duty and attached to the SAF. Ladwig (2008:73) also claims that this long-term attachment allowed the training cadre to increase their language skills and meant they could tailor their training regime to fit the conditions in Dhofar, which led to the training and development of the SAF Training Regiment.

Devore and Ladwig argue that the greatest improvement supplied to the SAF in 1970 was the introduction of the Special Air Service. The SAS arrived before the coup against Bin Taimur, but Ladwig (2008: 72) states that they were provided to Oman for training purposes only. The formulation of a long-term strategy (known as the five-point Watts plan) became known to the newly installed Sultan, who approved its use in Oman.

To defend and resupply fixed SAF positions in Dhofar, the Sultan of Oman's Air Force (SOAF) during phase one according to Ladwig (2008: 69-70) consisted of ten RAF officers on secondment with four Beaver cargo planes (which had a capacity of less

than a tonne) and several obsolete strike aircraft. In simple terms, the employment of a systematic air support system for the infantry in Dhofar did not exist. Newer aircraft such as the Strikemaster was ordered from the UK and were deployed in early phase two.

Even by late phase one, in 1968-9, the adoo had realised the benefit that an inferior air force was providing the SAF in Dhofar and routinely attacked RAF Salalah with mortar fire. DeVore (2012: 150) recognises that steps were needed to reduce these attacks and to also free up the SAF units (usually a company in the strength of two hundred) from garrisoning the airfield and having to accede to Sultan Said's orders when retributive action was to take place. A squadron of the RAF Regiment, the RAF's infantry responsible for patrolling the areas around airbases, meant that it had a professional force to learn the area and guard its perimeter. The only dispute is when it took these duties on. DeVore (2012:150) claims it was 1968, and Hughes (2009:280) in 1969. This difficulty is explained by this specialist deployment having an official start date and a trial period.

It is worth noting that the campaign was limited to air and ground forces and involved the Sultan of Oman's Navy (SON). The SON contributed to the campaign by interdicting supplies and manpower that the adoo tried to bring into Dhofar by sea. After 1973, the Iranians supplied a Naval Taskforce, which vastly improved the understated efforts of the SON. These naval efforts forced the PFLOAG to transport its troops and logistics by a land route that came from Hauf in Yemen.

The SAS, after the development of the Watts plan, deployed a troop into Oman and began working on setting up and running troops of local forces gathered from clans on the Jebel and from former adoo soldiers that changed sides following doctrinal and strategic changes in their own organisations following the influence of outside forces such as the Soviet Union and the Chinese. Mockaitis states (1995:89-90) that the first task of the SAS with its new firqat allies was to protect the indigenous people from insurgent atrocities. The firqats were lightly armed and equipped when compared to SAF soldiers. The firqats main strengths were in knowing the local geography and peoples. With a SAS presence living on the Jebel, often with the firqat with an insurgency being predominantly rural, the advantages of having light, mobile soldiers with modern weapons could operate better than most SAF units.

The first joint SAS/firqat force operation took the town of Sudh in February 1971. The assault, according to Hughes (2009:284), was tightly controlled and well-executed. Following this success and the efforts by the mainstream SAF in operation Jaguar, the next move was to establish a permanent base on the Jebel at Jibjat known forever after amongst the British element of the SAS and SAF as White City. This base allowed the SAF and firqat to patrol further out onto the Jebel, increasing the influence of security forces and the Sultan's government and allowing civil affairs work to begin.

The efforts by the SAF to create new Jebel bases among the Dhofari population did not always work. Hughes (2009:284) describes the efforts of Operation Simba, where an airfield and rudimentary base was built at Sarfait in April 1972. This location was strategically sound in that it was close to the Yemen/Dhofar border and could observe the land caravans where supplies, weapons and troops that reinforced the adoo could

be halted. The problem was that it was built on high ground with only limited transport routes. It was defensible against ground attack but very exposed to artillery, which could be targeted on this base from inside the Yemen border. Due to this exposure, any observable movements would trigger enemy artillery strikes. This meant that the SAF efforts to stop the adoo resupply effort became immobile.

The SAF tried a new strategy to build the Hornbeam line between December 1973 and June 1974. This line ran from the coast near Mughsayl onto the Jebel at Najd. This line encompassed fortified positions for troops to operate from with deep defences to restrict PFLOAG movements by employing barbed wire fences and minefields between these positions. This line was porous in places but severely limited the enemy's freedom of movement in this no-man's land. As an example of counterinsurgency strategy, these control lines, which were introduced with the Hornbeam line and further developed by the Hammer line and the Davamand line, are examples of the 'clear and hold' approach to counterinsurgency, according to Hughes (2009:285).

During 1973, the Iranians supplied a Battle Group to the Omani state, which came with helicopters, medics, heavy weapons and support specialists, such as engineers, which greatly assisted Oman in the creation of new security lines but also added valuable manpower for garrisoning these lines of control. According to Mockaitis (1995:93), the Dhofar Brigade claimed that 'the Iranians were heavy-handed in their operational approach,' alienating the local population. They had to be side-lined to an area of the Western Jebel that was sparsely populated but, once in place, were excellent in the static forts and positions along the security lines.

The PFLOAG were not afraid of using terror as a weapon against the indigenous peoples on the Jebel to maintain control. Hughes (2009:291) details atrocities against the clans, such as torture and murder. This was increased against the very devout sections of the Muslim faith when the Chinese-trained guerrillas were trying to break the religious stranglehold of the faith by abducting the children of leading families to further the communist cause. Mockaitis (1995:89) also gives examples of 'where tribal leaders and religious figures were also molested and killed.' He also claims that this behaviour also worked against the PFLOAG and their control on the Jebel. The adoo used other tactics to counter governmental influence in tribal areas by removing tribal food stores and by slaughtering cattle that could be future food sources for SAF troops.

To 'counter' the terror tactics of the PFLOAG, the British trained a guerrilla force named Operation Dhib in November 1972. This force included Mahra clan members exiled from the PDRY/South Yemen. The guerrillas had orders to disrupt PFLOAG logistics and harass the South Yemen authorities. According to Hughes (2009:294-295), the British government wanted complete deniability of this group and its actions. It had its own SAS trainers who worked closely with this irregular force but had orders that limited the SAS to operating with them inside the Omani border only. This became a moot point as Hughes (2009:295) states, 'one SAS officer was disciplined for operating behind the Yemeni border' (he wanted to destroy with explosives a Yemeni fort 50 miles behind the border). Hughes (2009:295) claims that the then CSAF, Creasey, reported in the minutes of a document that these irregulars were formed 'as a way to appease the Sultan Qaboos who wanted action taken against South Yemen for its actions in supporting the adoo and by providing fire support across the border at Sarfait.'

Although not supporting the use of force in politics unless as a final method, Newsinger (2002:144) does state that 'hearts and minds' campaigns are not just soft-hearted excuses. Alongside Sultan Qaboos reforms and concessions, the use of force can focus the 'peoples' minds.

Civil-Military Cooperation

Before the coup in 1970 that removed the Sultan, bin Taimur for his son, Qaboos, the SAF had an overall purely military objective according to Ladwig (2008: 70): To kill the enemy. The only option open to the adoo was an unconditional surrender; therefore, the Sultan ordered no political or civil aid to be used in the conflict. None of the established civil measures for counterinsurgency existed:

- No police or special branch.
- No resettlement of the population
- Scant food control or central organisation
- No surrender or amnesty terms
- No psyops or propaganda effort
- No hearts and minds campaign targeted towards the civilian population to achieve a change of support by the people
- No civil government on the Jebel
- Comparatively limited intelligence

During the later years of phase one (1969-1970), the UK government provided only limited support for the bin Taimur Sultanate. This changed following the coup, where requests for support that had previously been stonewalled were approved. The UK did not want to deploy regular formations such as entire Battalions into Oman though

according to Ladwig (2008:70-71), this would be unlikely as Northern Ireland and West Germany was a constraint on the MoD's manpower. Ladwig found plans which demonstrated the UK had plans for troops to be deployed into Oman if things went badly. This position changed following the removal of Said as Sultan by his son, Qaboos. The new Sultan, aided by the British Foreign Office and Special Air Service planners (who were in danger of being axed and therefore needed a role), quickly instituted a broad five-point plan created by Colonel Watts (Ladwig III 2008: 72)

- Offering a general amnesty to all those of his subjects who had opposed the Sultan.
- Ending the archaic status of the Dhofar province and its full incorporation into the state of Oman.
- Opposing those insurgents who did not accept the general amnesty offer by conducting effective military operations.
- Improving the lives of the population through a vigorous nationwide development program.
- A diplomatic initiative with two aims: a). Having Oman recognised as an Arab state with a legal form of government. B). Isolating the insurgents from the support it was receiving from other Arab states.

Qaboos had strong British support and also supported the British. With a campaign to change the state's identity; internationally, regionally and domestically, by seeking membership of the United Nations and the Arab League, which was achieved in 1972 (despite efforts by Yemen to deny the Omani efforts). In Oman, the government expanded with four new ministries; Education, Health, Interior and Justice.

The British did supply units for defence for its facilities and to assist the Omani state by deploying two squadrons of the SAS under the pseudonym the British Army Training Team (BATT). The remainder were seconded, contracted officers or small units doing specialist operational roles.

Ladwig (2008:71) states that the assistance to Oman from the British state was to be used in four areas;

- Assistance to plan for victory
- Training and expanding the SAF and SOAF
- Providing experienced leadership and technical skills
- Providing (at cost) the equipment for the security forces with counterinsurgency operations

According to Beckett (Marston and Malkasian 2010:180-181), the British and Omani interests were synonymous, though they differed in pace. The British wanted to win the war safely (due to obvious international and regional constraints), and the new Sultan wanted to win quickly. During the early stages of the insurgency and when the situation was deteriorating, the Labour Government under Harold Wilson did not want to be embroiled in what could be seen by other world states as a neo-colonial enterprise. This situation continued under the new Conservative government of Edward Heath, which was elected one month before the coup and was more likely, according to Ladwig III (2008: 62-88), to have intervened. The British at this time were unable or politically unwilling to provide direct, overt support for the Sultan with massive troop numbers due to economic worries and the newly deteriorating situation in Northern Ireland. The British government, under the newly elected Conservative

party, had shown no interest to maintain involvement in the Gulf. However, the growing importance of Oman as the protector of oil routes through the Straits of Hormuz could not be ignored. British involvement was to continue in limited means by providing advisors and specialists.

Initially, the development of the Five-point Watts Plan (Ladwig III 2008:72) created a short-term plan to alleviate the situation on the Jebel and surrounding Dhofar region for long term planning and civil development.

- A medical campaign to provide basic medical and dental care to Dhofaris, including those living on the Jebel
- A veterinary campaign to increase health and agricultural yields in cattle stock and to provide fresh water for livestock
- To create an organised intelligence operation
- To create an information campaign to counteract Communist propaganda and to provide suitable means which can persuade rebels to change sides
- To recruit and train Dhofari soldiers to fight for the Sultan

At the national level, the name of the state was shortened to Oman, thus creating a single national identity, removing Muscat from the official title. The Sultan in 1972 formed the National Defence Council with powers and direct responsibility for conducting the campaign, developing and controlling the long-term development plan for Dhofar.

Regionally, things moved somewhat faster. Qaboos established the Dhofar Development Committee (DDC) in Salalah, which according to Beckett (Marston and

Malkasian 2010:181), had the SAF, police and civil agencies all under the chairmanship of the Wali of Dhofar, Sheikh Braik bin Hamoud to spend £218 million on services and utilities previously unknown to the Dhofaris such as roads, schools, medical and veterinary clinics, mosques and new wells. This committee comprised the Wali (who controlled both the local gendarmerie force; the askars and the local sheikhs responsible for the conduct of affairs in their tribal areas), the Commander of the Dhofar Brigade, the Chief of Police, the heads of the separate Development, Intelligence, and Civil Aid agencies/departments with the Salalah town clerk. These weekly Sunday meetings would review the past week and plan future projects. This joint committee was a good example of civil-military cooperation. Beckett (Marston and Malkasian 2010:181) argues that policy discussions and decisions could be taken quickly without the need to refer them to the central government.

A critical tool of civil-military cooperation can be clearly understood with the development of radio Dhofar. The radio station had four significant purposes:

- To give up-to-date news and information about events and people in the Sultanate.
- To make honest government announcements.
- To give news of important events in Oman and elsewhere in the world.
- To gain a widespread and regular audience amongst the population of the Jebel and amongst the insurgent forces.

The Watts plan incorporated short-term development needs for the Jebel population, giving time for the longer, more difficult development plans to be built within these

communities, which were challenging to reach and because of the lack of already existing infrastructure, which was costly to fund.

Despite the ongoing military campaign against the adoo or PFLOAG, the civil efforts became more people-centric, a change much heralded for future counterinsurgency operations according to Mockaitis (1995:77) with a strengthening military security element but also with a hearts and minds campaign aimed at the tribe's people living in and on the Jebel, with the objective of rallying the people around the new Sultan. By this time, the DLF had become the PFLOAG which was now ideologically driven, and planners used this element after the defection of twenty-four adoo (former DLF) with targeted propaganda that shifted the campaign to one of Communism versus Islam, with the Sultan being the Defender of the faith. The state dropped large numbers of pamphlets onto population centres on the Jebel. It sold cheap state-subsidised transistor radios in rebel areas where the state-employed Radio Dhofar was used as a propaganda tool using former enemy combatants (usually from the non-communist DLF) to discuss the new civil programmes and new farming and medical techniques and methods for treating people and cattle (Ladwig III 2008: 74-75).

In 1973 and 1975, two further military interventions also changed the conflict from one of an internal security campaign with British assistance to one of an Arabian Internal Conflict following successful international and regional diplomatic efforts. In 1973, the Jordanians provided civil engineers for the civil efforts, and the Iranians provided a 1,200-1,500 strong Imperial Iranian Battle Group. Later in 1975, the Jordanian 91st Special Force Battalion also deployed to Oman. Problems of command and control with the Iranians became apparent (as with most foreign military assistance forces),

and the use of Iranians had to be cleared with Iran both at the military and political level. However, with the support of the Shah, the Iranians forced the Chinese to cease their support for the PFLOAG, another reason why they changed their regional aspirations to one of nationalism. Ladwig (2008: 76) stated that the British would not provide ground troops except under exceptional circumstances and claimed that 'this regional support was the only option open to Oman.'

Other states also showed their solidarity with Oman. In 1973, a battalion of the Abu Dhabi Defence Force of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was stationed in the relatively safe area of the north of Oman, which allowed the SAF to move troops from other regiments to the south.

The civil campaign continued throughout the early and mid-1970s with the creation of Civil Aid Teams (CATs), initially run by the SAS with other British support to create a bridge with the Omani state facilities to assist with health and veterinary services. Local defence plans were drafted to utilise loyal supporters and former insurgents to be formed into units of firqat. Beckett (Marston and Malkasian 2010: 184) states that these local fighters as local defence irregulars were experts at knowing their area of operations and that the Omani state planned to create multi clan firqat forces. These were scrapped after difficulties with deploying firqat into other traditional tribal areas. Each firqat was clan-based, locally raised, and deployed from this point onwards.

In medical terms, at RAF Salalah, a field surgical team with two surgeons, one anaesthetist, and a team of nurses and technicians not only saw to the medical requirements and needs of the soldiers but also ran a clinic at a new public hospital

opened in Dhofar (Ladwig 2008:74). The Omanis lacked engineers (due to the former Sultans position on education), which Ladwig (2008:75) argues required a Royal Engineer detachment to assist in building government facilities. This position changed by 1975 with locals trained in this role and by help from regional allies such as Jordan.

The five steps of the Watts plan developed and became a ten-point plan of how to execute a joint operation on the Jebel, which Ladwig (2008:77) demonstrates was a joint emphasis on civil-military planning. This plan followed these ten simple steps:

- A SAF led operation in strength is supported by a firqat unit which secures a position of their choice that dominates the area.
- Combat engineers build a track for road and foot access where possible and also create an airstrip.
- A Civil Aid Team organises a well to be bored for local civilians with a shop, clinic, and mosque to be built.
- Water is pumped to the surface and into a local distribution system prepared by engineers for storing water both for human and animal consumption.
- SAF security forces thin out to a minimum needed for security.
- Civilians, when entering these government facilities, are talked to by firqat, SAF and government officials. They are told that the water supply and government assistance stop if the adoo attack these facilities, which discourage the adoo from attacking.
- Clans should return to their original locations in the surrounding area, informing the insurgents that they should not interfere in what is a good thing.
- The enemy, dependent upon civilian support, ceases aggressive action and either withdraws or goes to ground.

- When the local group areas are secured, the police are deployed into safe areas supported by the firqat.
- The SAF is withdrawn.

In 1973 the Omanis transformed the SAS led Civil Aid Teams (CATS) into the new Civil Aid Department under Martin Robb (a former SAF senior officer) who devised a strategy where, following an area becoming secured by the SAF, pre-fabricated buildings and staff would be either flown or driven into the areas to build the schools, clinics and shops. By November 1974, civil efforts had created 11 permanent wells dug on the Jebel, which by June 1975 had increased to 35. The area now had 150 miles of new roads and tracks (Marston and Malkasian 2010:185). By 1974, the Omanis had taken over responsibility for medical and veterinary work both in the province's lowlands and on the Jebel, which operated a regular flying doctor service advertised on the radio. The efforts by the CATs during the war led, according to DeVore (2012:162), a total of twenty-four government created centres on the Jebel with an additional fifty seasonal wells.

An early success in civil development was Operation Taurus, an organised and escorted cattle drive from the early-on secured areas of the Jebel highlands to the cattle market in Salalah. DeVore (2012:155) claims this type of operation brought the Jebel population into an economic relationship with the lowland government in controlled urban areas. Furthermore, the Oman government had an amnesty programme created to encourage DLF/PFLOAG guerrillas to defect. According to Hughes (2009:283), it assisted with 797 former fighters changing sides.

Use of Intelligence

When the SAF began operations in the Dhofar region, it had virtually no intelligence support from the local population or organisational concept on creating a working apparatus. After Colonel Watts visited in 1970 and instituted his five-point plan, the SAS deployed small numbers of intelligence-trained soldiers into the largest towns around the province. These 25 SAS intelligence personnel went onto the Jebel and began to cultivate the necessary contacts needed with the native inhabitants to create information sources later.

When these friendships began to bear fruit, the information gathered was fed back to two SAS Non-commissioned officers with a talent for running a coordination unit. As Ladwig claims (2008:74), within months, the intelligence led to details being provided upon an enemy order of battle showing units names, operational boundaries, personalities of the leaders and the men and resupply routes for these operational units.

This intelligence further increased when the firqats began to be raised and operated in tribal areas with a dubious affiliation. The intelligence and its detail expanded with their presence. Lastly, as a further development to increase the SAF into these circles, the SAS would train local SAF personnel to take over this responsibility.

The British psyop experts developed a campaign against the communist vision for Dhofar by creating a message that emphasised the civil development efforts of the Qaboos government while also maintaining the strong linkage between the people and Islam, and also pointing out the hostility of the PFLOAG to the Dhofaris' faith.

Radio Dhofar (something which would never have happened under Bin Taimur) broadcast the news to the people about the civil development efforts of the Omani state and concentrated upon Dhofar first. It employed former DLF/PFLOAG rebels to get the message to the people, which was aided by the state, who firstly distributed free radios to various communities and later sold commercial radio sets at a state-subsidised price in the markets across Dhofar.

DeVore (2012:153) states that the slogan 'Islam is our way, freedom is our aim' was developed by the Omani Wali of Dhofar and Salim Mubarak, who was an early defector from the DLF when it became apparent that the newly formed PFLOAG was keen to move the conflict from one of nationality to one with a strong anti-Muslim ideology; that of Communism. This powerful slogan was used to conclude broadcasts by Radio Dhofar and to adorn propaganda leaflets and posters.

By British advice, Radio Dhofar broadcast news that was without military or political spin. It broadcast Oman's news and tried to counter the PFLOAG radio station broadcast from Hauf in Yemen. Following these broadcasts, and allowing time for their influence to spread amongst the population, the Senior Qadi or religious leader who had sat out of getting involved in the conflict became involved, especially when the PFLAOG were identified as a threat to Omani Islam, by declaring on Radio Dhofar in 1971 (a first for the religious leader) that the government campaign against the adoo was a holy war.

The British Secret Intelligence Service ran the Oman Intelligence Service (OIS) until 1974, where it was deemed by Hughes (2009:292) capable of 'running itself' after joint

UK-Omani training in a similar vein as the SAF had British officers. After the handover, it was renamed the Oman Research Department, where collecting information fell as a responsibility to the firqat who were local, spoke the local sub-dialects and knew the clans and sub-clan social system (many having relatives in these areas who would be allied to both factions). This situation would also encourage the adoo to defect, thus complimenting the surrendered enemy personnel programme (SEP) that further increased firqat numbers.

In 1973, the Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces (CSAF), Major General Timothy Creasey, requested support from the UK army intelligence corps to provide specialist help in the area of interrogation. Hughes (2009:293) states that this request was a tricky one for the UK MoD due to difficulties with its own interrogators in Northern Ireland having been assailed by the international press over suspected use of harsh methods of interrogation and treatment of prisoners. To avoid another entanglement with media and human rights groups, the then Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, asked the CSAF if it could sub-contract the interrogation of the Omani insurgents to Saudi Arabian or Iranian personnel.

This request also became difficult to fulfil. When made aware of the situation in Oman, the British Ambassador, David Hawley, sent reports to the FCO that claimed (later proven right) that the Saudis and Iranians were also employers of interrogation bad practice and were notorious for its sustained use. Hughes (2009:294) continues 'that the Iranian Savak secret police were as likely to torture PFLOAG suspects as the Saudis.'

To achieve deployment of British personnel as interrogators, the MoD ordered that it be very secretive; it sent the Intelligence Corps out as the BATT Radio Detachment. Despite being highly secretive, the MoD wanted transparency in the operations of these army interrogators, should their actions become public knowledge, and they were deployed with new guidelines on handling detainees, which were introduced for Northern Ireland. Hughes (2009:294) states that 'these new guidelines were not breached, and no evidence of this happening exists.'

Tactical Flexibility

Tactical flexibility is not just the ability to adjust a force's tactics when facing the enemy but also the ability for lessons learned from earlier skirmishes to be employed to gain the upper hand. Nagl (2002:92) stated that 'there is no place for a rigid mind. … Although the principles of war generally remain the same, the ability to adapt and improvise is essential.'

Tactical flexibility at the start of the Oman campaign in phase one was somewhat limited due to the then troop status, numbers, equipment and organisation. As previously mentioned, the SAF circa 1964/5 were equipped to fight the Second World War without any local troops from Dhofar serving with SAF ranks.

Despite the efforts of British and contract officers after hostilities began, the SAF was facing the adoo who were armed initially in a similar fashion with older equipment. The adoo had one greater advantage, the ability to move freely on both the Jebel but also on the Dhofari lowland. The SAF needed truck and Land Rover support to supply rations, water and ammunition for most operations, whereas the adoo would travel

between water-holes, transport ammunition and any wounded to their own aid stations or to local help in these areas. When casualties happened, the SAF had no facilities within Dhofar except for what they built, and casualties had a harrowing journey without proper medical support before being treated at RAF Salalah, which could take many hours to reach.

During early phase one, the SAF comprised three battalions of troops without any experience of having set foot in Dhofar. Lessons from each of the early deployments were indeed passed on from each tour in the province, but these lessons were hard-learned and fought against an enemy that knew the terrain. Tactical flexibility requires that changes on the ground that affect major developments are passed on through the use of contact and after-action reports as soon as possible. This was not often the case during the early years of phase one (1965-1967).

A further area of tactical constraint was the language barrier between the often white seconded or contract officers and their non-commissioned officers (NCOs). These troops were of a different faith, with tribal differences; the SAF soldiers came from areas such as Muscat or Baluchistan with their own cultural identities. Despite many early 'slips' in the language (which the Omanis proved to be good-natured with), the officers had to actively engage with their troops in Arabic. In phase one, the British sent their selected officers to the Foreign Office school for languages to provide competence in Arabic. This rapid on-the-ground training was effective for the British officers, but it did not go both ways. They found language 'loopholes' where Omani senior NCOs were not able to communicate in English with SOAF pilots and other

British-loaned personnel when officers were injured, especially over radio communication nets.

The development of the NCO culture was increased when the British army sent a small detachment of trainers during phase two to ‘professionalise’ these essential soldiers. This, coupled with an initially British-led but them Oman-led training team for its soldiers, also created a professional military force that was increasing its numbers.

Oman provided the majority of the soldiers for its own operations both in uniform as the Army, Navy and Air Force and as irregulars with the local defence forces, the firqat. The firqat were locally raised from specific tribal areas and from surrendering enemy personnel that operated in the areas from which they originated. These units of irregular troops did not work well with the SAF at first but did with the British SAS. The firqats were difficult to control at specific times of the religious and farming calendars and would refuse to enter another tribal area belonging to another clan. These units were able to move as freely as the PFLOAG in these areas, knowing the locations of the best travel routes and watering holes.

The addition of regional allies during phase two provided special forces from Jordan and a brigade of infantry with its own air mobility from Iran. These forces had to adapt to function in Oman.

Conclusion

The Oman campaign, which officially ended in late 1975, continued with very minor and singular skirmishes until 1979. The conflict produced lessons for both the Omani state and the British establishments that could have also provided examples for future campaigns such as Iraq.

The lessons from Oman that could have been transferred was the British example of mentoring and training, where British officers and NCOs assisted with training and deploying the new units of the SAF into Dhofar. The professionalising of the Oman NCO cadre and a basic training course for all SAF soldiers created a skilled, deployable army. The British provided specialist support to build up the Sultan of Oman's Air Force by training its new pilots and with similar guidance for the Sultan of Oman's Navy. Very specified assistance was also given to cultivating an intelligence service that could function on the Jebel and in the rest of Oman. The British lessons include language and culture immersion within a Muslim state working alongside indigenous troops that provided ninety-nine percent of Omani forces.

The Omani crisis would have been correctly identified by counterinsurgency writers such as Trinquier, Galula and Kitson as one requiring a political solution to the social and economic factors that sparked the initial nationalist uprising. His son Sultan Qaboos with British advisors, implemented to gradually alleviate the social and economic dilemmas. The SAF, which became a larger, more capable professional army, was able during phase two to militarily respond to the PFLOAG and its foreign supporters.

The influence of the firqats cannot be ignored. These militia forces, when motivated, knew the Jebel, its inhabitants and its ways better than the Oman state and its SAF. Many of the firqat were surrendered enemy personnel who knew the PFLOAG, their movements and safe geographical locations. The firqat units were not the easiest to work with (a common complaint of the SAF), but when induced to carry out a patrol or raid on the PFLOAG, their strengths outweighed these difficulties.

The state-led direction of the conflict changed from a reactionary military response in phase one, which was weakening the state under Said, into a response under Qaboos that took all areas of counterinsurgency onboard with a full civil-military effort.

During phase two, the total number of British personnel was less than five hundred. Oman's regional neighbours, Iran and Jordan, provided military assistance. Oman, unlike other previous colonial conflicts, provided most of the troops during the military campaign and, in phase two, through their oil wealth, funded their own civil development efforts. It is an example of a third-party nation-state utilising assisting with planning and coordination for a counterinsurgency strategy without needing great numbers of non-native troops.

Oman under Qaboos embraced the wealth of its oil, creating a strategy of civil, economic and political change in Dhofar (and Oman) to begin a system of modernisation which the PFLOAG, cut off from the support of the clans with an increased SAF, could not match. Economic and technological investment in Oman

provided improved communications, industry and modern methods in farming, medicine and increased the measure of autonomy and local control by the Dhofaris. State propaganda, civil reform and a joint civil-military plan reduced civilian support for the PFLOAG.

Beckett (1994:17) notes the ’popularity of the insurgency against the Sultan' eroded as the Omani state deployed into PFLOAG areas. Omani state apparatus arrived and stayed on the Jebel, providing modern services not previously offered to the Oman state as a whole. Building the Leopard, Hornbeam, and later Damavand lines denied the PFLOAG freedom of movement that militarily reduced supplies to its personnel.

The next chapter scrutinises Operation Banner in Northern Ireland that examines many features of the campaign, including the background to the troubles, political last efforts and the strategic transformation from counterinsurgency to internal security.

Chapter Five

Operation Banner: Northern Ireland

Introduction

Benest (Strachan 2006:115) states that asymmetric or low-intensity warfare was the norm for the British army for nearly every year of the twentieth century, despite recent assertions that it is a hallmark of the twenty-first century too.

The longest example of this type of warfare fought by the British was seen during the conflict in Northern Ireland, which officially started in 1969 and lasted until 2007, though the conflict in Ireland as a larger entity has gone on for centuries. This long conflict, known as Operation Banner, has lasted 38 years which has seen one of the few conflicts fought on British soil since the Jacobite Rebellion between its own inhabitants.

This chapter follows the Dhofar insurgency, which unmistakably can be perceived as a different type of insurgency or internal security situation with a new set of difficulties not faced in Oman, such as regular press scrutiny, the deployment of regular soldiers to a part of Britain, and finally the similarity of a land border between the two Irish states providing sanctuary for enemy combatants.

This chapter scrutinises Operation Banner, the British army's longest operational deployment. The chapter looks at:

- Background to the troubles
- Politics, control and strategy

- The Irish Republican Army and the Provisionals
- The British Army Reaction
- Internment, Intelligence Failures and Bloody Sunday
- Conflict Entrenchment, Direct Rule and Secret Talks
- Political Last Efforts
- Strategic Transformation from Counterinsurgency to Internal Security
- Northern Ireland: Post-1976
- The four pillars framework;
    i. Minimum force
    ii. Civil-military cooperation
    iii. Use of intelligence
    iv. Tactical flexibility

A major perspective for an army being deployed for counterinsurgency, according to Thompson (1966:50-62), 'must be adhering from the moment of deployment to the basic commandments of counterinsurgency' by recommended five basic rules.

- The government must have a clear political aim
- The government must function within the law
- The government must have an overall plan
- The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas
- In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first

A clear political objective operating with the rule of law that employs an overall plan which uses political, military and civil elements together in an effective strategy to counter an insurgency can reduce the grassroots complaints which started the protest becoming an armed uprising. A significant lack of the coordination of command and control within political, civil and military spheres of influence will achieve little apart from creating mistakes which can be indeed argued as having led to the increased social and political separation of both the Catholic and Protestant communities and their respective political and paramilitary forces which in turn has lengthened the duration of the conflict.

Modern theorist/practitioners such as Kilcullen, identified as the architect of the Iraqi surge during 2007, agrees in principle to many scholar/academics such as Galula, Trinquier and Kitson within the field of counterinsurgency theory that 'a broad school of basic counterinsurgency concepts and insurgency strategy does exist' (Kilcullen 2010:1), and that many counterinsurgency theorists have assessed Northern Ireland. Kilcullen (2010:1) maintains that any planned strategy must be fluid and goes further stating that 'insurgencies, like cancer, exist in thousands of forms, and there are dozens of techniques to treat them, hundreds of different populations in which they occur and several major schools of thought on how best to deal with them. The idea that there is a single silver bullet or grand plan for how best to deal with insurgency is as unrealistic as a universal cure for cancer.'

This ties into the long historical experience that the British have of low-intensity warfare. However, in the case of Northern Ireland (NI), it can be argued that by lacking guidance and oversight from senior officers and political masters that were supposedly

in control over the army and its operational policy, they may have blundered. This blunder can be as simple as overconfidence; it could also be troops that are ill-equipped, trained and supported (especially in the long game) to deal with future developments without further resources which can be flexible enough to shift both tactically and strategically with any political change or movement by politicians or insurgents/paramilitaries.[2]. Furthermore, without explicit orders, official doctrine, and strategy, things will remain muddled.

The army in Northern Ireland was given a mission by its political masters, but the strategy and the execution of that mission required research and planning rather than a simple deployment of soldiers onto the streets of NI. These plans then need tailoring and work, as the situation on the ground changed due to evolving dynamics in the conflict, which adjust to intelligence and the opponent's decisions and movements.

Background to the 'Troubles'

The Northern Ireland conflict was borne out of the civil rights movement, which crossed the Atlantic during the 1960s from the United States to Ulster, finding resonance and a cause amongst the minority Catholic population of Northern Ireland who had been denied equality in politics, health, employment, housing and education (Marston and Malkasian 2008:157-158).

[2] This chapter specifically refers to an enemy; that of nationalist paramilitary groups. Both sides in the conflict eventually developed their own terrorist groups. The author wishes to make it clear that during the period covered by this chapter that the majority of terrorist acts aimed at destabilising the army and the politicians were from nationalist paramilitaries, which is why they receive the bulk of the attention here.

Politically, the majority Protestant community-maintained control even in areas such as Derry/Londonderry.[3] Where the Catholic community were the majority population, by gerrymandering the electoral boundaries in their favour, the Ulster and pro-British politicians retained control of city councils and the national Stormont assembly where elected MPs both served there and at Westminster.

The introduction of the civil rights movement faced a backlash from Loyalist politicians and violence from Protestant extremists with clashes, beatings and the eventual destruction of Catholic housing by fire-bombing, forced the displaced to take refuge within their own community, thus isolating and solidifying the ethnic/religious divide. These ‘buffer areas’ of burnt-out homes created a clear divide between Loyalist and Nationalist housing estates. The violence between the two communities should have been adequately policed, but the police were also having difficulties, most of whom were Protestant Northern Ireland citizens.

Any political and operational control over the Northern Ireland police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and its reserve force, the Ulster Special Constabulary (also known as the 'B Specials') who were majority Protestant in make-up, as an impartial service, was quickly lost. The RUC was the only UK police force that was routinely armed and had a unique, dual quasi-military role in terms of providing security for the six counties. Thornton (2007:74-75) states the RUC had to have a reserve force from which to call upon, its regular police numbered 3,000, and its reservists numbered 10,000, unlike

[3] The original name of the city was Derry which was changed by the Scottish Protestant immigrants to express their allegiance to the Crown. Londonderry is the official name, Derry being the Irish and Catholic name. Many squaddies utilised the Derry name due to it being shorter and having two fewer syllables.

the mainland police forces who could call for assistance from neighbouring forces, the RUC could not.

During the early period of the conflict (1969-1970), the RUC and its reserve force, the B-specials, were 'seen to be supporting the Protestant cause and to be anti-Catholic (Marston and Malkasian 2008:158). They were accused of standing aside and doing nothing when the violence took place between the two communities or, at worst, was 'actively escalating' the fighting, according to Taylor (2001:18-30). This led to retaliatory attacks on the police, and for the Catholic communities, the creation of barricaded, no-go areas for the police and thus Stormont's political authority and its ability to police its own territory. The picture portrayed depicts the entire RUC as being pro-Protestant and non-impartial, which as an entire service, it was not.

It was against this backdrop of violence and massive public disorder that the British army was deployed as military aid to the Civil Authority Provision. Phase one of the army deployment happened without significant fanfare in early August 1969, allowing for use of the garrisoned troops in the province to be used on the streets of Belfast and Londonderry in minor support roles such as assisting the RUC in the dismantling of temporary barricades, and providing a presence (Taylor 2001:20-24). As far as the British army was concerned, before the troubles erupted, the provinces were known by its officer class as 'sleepy hollow,' a prime location for hunting, fishing and shooting (Taylor 2001:9).

The second phase, authorised by the Labour Home Secretary, James Callaghan at 15.10hrs on the 15th August 1969, began with the mainland Spearhead standby

battalion, the 3rd Battalion of the Light Infantry.[4] Deploying into Northern Ireland in support of civilian authorities in a 'limited operation to restore law and order'. A Westminster spokesperson, according to Taylor (2001:23), stated that 'the troops would be back in barracks by the weekend.' Northern Ireland's contingent of soldiers finally returned to barracks 38 years later.

Initially, the troops were deployed into urban areas of the greatest violence, Belfast and Londonderry, to act as a buffer between the two communities. When the troops were deployed, the loyalist element thought the troops were 'on their side' and were there to assist in administering further punishment upon the mainly-Catholic Nationalist community. The Nationalist community opinion was initially similar, but it was surprised when the British army turned out to be a temporary guardian for the Nationalist community. The army, according to former soldiers and academics (Taylor 2001:33,36), were suitably rewarded by the local Catholic communities with tea, home-baking, magazines and cigarettes.

In the no-go areas of Belfast and Londonderry, the army, rather than the RUC, began to police these areas, leaving the police to take a back seat and begin a slow but much-needed set of reforms to its own service. The General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland (GOC: NI) Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Freeland was told by political masters in London that in addition to his military role, that he was to command and task the RUC, which was undergoing an internal reform (and also being disarmed of

[4] The 3rd Battalion, the Light Infantry, known as 'the heavies' (given such a divisional name for its ability to employ brute force and ignorance and to muddle through practically anything). The author served with the battalion. According to academic sources like Taylor (2001:26), the battalion 'had to buy maps after getting off the ferries from petrol filling stations outside Belfast' due to the rapidness of their deployment with a lack of planning in supplying up-to-date maps.

heavy weapons). These reforms saw the reserve unit (the B specials) being stood down and eventually replaced by the Ulster Defence Regiment. The orders for General Freeland to command the police, according to Thornton (2007:76) was later altered to read that he only had powers to 'coordinate' efforts between the police and the military more effectively until a replacement chief constable for the RUC could be found, leaving policing to the RUC and not the military.

This situation with the British army being the Catholic community saviours would change with two developments in 1970; the first being a change in UK national government, and the second being the involvement of the yet to be formed Provisional Irish Republican Army, the PIRA.

Politics, Control and Strategy

The Labour Home Secretary, James Callaghan, wanted the army when deployed to Northern Ireland to remain impartial by insisting on tight political control over security policy for Northern Ireland, but this may have been an aspiration according to Thornton (2007:76-77). This situation changed when the Conservative Party under Edward Heath took power in 1970. The new Home Secretary, Reginald Maudlin, wanted 'as little to do with it (Northern Ireland) as possible and to leave the Unionists to put their own house in order' (Newsinger 2002: 159-161). Security policy control over the province reverted into Stormont's hands with the British General Officer Commanding being responsible to many chiefs; the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff and its structure, and also the Home Office (because GOC Freeland was initially tasked to command the RUC – thus in control of a British police force). It also meant that General Freeland had to work with Stormont due to its control over Northern Ireland security

policy. In reality, he was technically independent of Stormont but had to work closely with the Protestant politicians who controlled the council authorities. Therefore, the Republican movement had the false illusion of the British army in the province, according to Newsinger (2002:161) ‘as the strong-arm of the Stormont Regime.’ Callaghan had initially wanted the Stormont authority to have no sway in military matters (Thornton 2007:77) and not have any authority over the troops being deployed.

Westminster based politicians and the MoD did not want the Stormont assembly to be in a position where senior Protestant politicians could give senior army officers orders; they feared that the orders would be to merely punish the Catholic community (Thornton 2007:76). The plan for the Westminster based politicians like Callaghan to have ultimate control over the army's deployment and orders faced one major problem; that the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont was a democratically elected government with its own Prime Minister, which could not be ignored since regular consultations on the use of the army in NI could not happen without some form of communication between ministers based at Westminster and Stormont. The view for why Westminster did not try direct rule at this earlier point was that it would have caused an outright rebellion (Thornton 2007:76). Thus, the idea of the unity of command, with a simple to follow structure of the chain of command for both military, economic and civil actions which need to be coordinated in a manner that supports the entire strategic, long-ranging goals of an operation to deploy troops in support of civil authority, failed to materialise in the early stages of this operation.

The problems faced by the military were further compounded by a lack of guidance by the politicians who had the ultimate ability to determine the strategy. The awful truth, according to Taylor (2001:48), was the army being told to 'sort the bloody mess out'. With this imbalance of a large number of political and military masters with input upon General Freeland, there remained an ominous silence on what and how any strategy should be planned and enacted. The consensus was the army 'knows best' and that the line of least resistance was one of passing the buck, to 'leave it to the army'. Even the politicians who should have been directly involved in the day to day running of an operation such as this, being the Home Secretary, James Callaghan, and the Minister of Defence, Denis Healey, 'could not agree on a strategy' (Thornton 2007:77) thus leaving a political void between objectives. Freeland had to answer for the operations he planned, not just to a Prime Minister in Stormont but to the Ministry of Defence and Home Office (due to the policing reform) in London.

This void of strategy and understanding by the politicians led to the situation between 1970 and 1975. The majority-Protestant controlled Stormont assembly would countenance any agreements with the Nationalist community. The RUC underwent massive root and branch reform, leaving an army to muddle through this period. There was no direct capability by Westminster for any contingency planning or plan for NI, and the United Kingdom did not need the support of Stormont.

The Westminster government view was that the army was supposedly used to dealing with trouble spots from its previous colonial commitments. However, the army was unused to being operationally deployed in a part of the UK without support from a

functional police authority that had neither the passive support of the local population nor civil cooperation from the local government.

The army, when it was sent into these Nationalist communities, was the lead, and only agency, acting in a peace support role keeping two partially belligerent communities apart. Local initiatives to woo the community were organised and run by the army (at brigade and battalion level) and were successful, but these efforts ran into difficulty due to a lack of both political and economic resources. These initiatives were helping to run community centres, putting discos on for the youth element, organising trips to the countryside for children within these deprived areas, and the school crossing patrols can be seen as the start of a colonial-styled 'hearts and minds' campaign which can relate to the work of Thompson, Gwynn and Callwell.

These local initiatives, when coupled with the role of defending the Nationalist community from incursions into their areas from the Loyalist areas, almost made an ally out of the IRA (pre-split) and even bore fruit according to Thornton (2007:77-78) and Taylor (2001:30-36), where talks with local community leaders about organising local peace accords 'gave the army good local intelligence on the movers and shakers' in these closed-to-the-RUC communities. These initiatives were possibly the only direct contact many Nationalist communities had with any agency of the British government. General Freeland, according to Thornton (2007:79), was 'muzzled' by the MoD when he made well-meaning comments about increasing government investment into Nationalist areas making improvements and his position in Northern Ireland easier. He realised that the army could not maintain its good relations forever

in the absence of some political changes which would support what the troops were doing at the tactical level.

The eventual lack of support both in resources and political support meant an end to these local initiatives during 1970. This investment which may have improved the situation (Thornton 2007:79), meant the army could not maintain the good relations it had without real political and economic support from the Protestant government at Stormont. It would have to ‘change its position and thus put resources into a Catholic area’ (Thornton 2007: 78-79).

The British army was on its own in these areas of Belfast and Londonderry, where its behaviour became the standard – the only standard – by which the British presence was judged and for how future developments both concerning the IRA and how the population would judge the presence and behaviour of the British soldiers. The reality of the situation was bleak, even by 1975, the 250,000 occupants of Catholic West Belfast had little interface ability with any type of civil governmental agency or ministry except for six sub-post offices, two Police Stations, four Civil Affairs Advisers (two in any army fort and two in the Springfield Road Police Station), a public cleansing yard in the Whiterock Road, a welfare office in the Iveagh School, and a Housing Executive Repair Yard in Turf Lodge, where Newsinger (1995:95) states this is where the Nationalists 'fell out of contact with civil government'.

The Irish Republican Army and the Provisionals

The Nationalist community, following the attacks on its communities during August 1969, was content with British army protection. Even the traditional IRA movement

and its members were not keen to react against the violent element of the Protestant community, whereas the army in its defensive role had no inhibitions, which when attacked, reacted against Loyalist aggressors. Due to this change in the army's behaviour, the IRA selected not to attack the British army, its long-term enemy, from earlier confrontations. According to Taylor, even when visited by Westminster politicians, 'the Nationalist community turned out to thank them' (2001:41-42).

In defence of Nationalist areas, during October 1969, the army came into conflict with the Loyalist community and became the main target of Loyalist violence due to its defence of Nationalist areas. The response to a particular riot outside an enclave of Catholic housing near the Shankill area of Belfast was met by three battalions of troops, who faced being fired upon by the Loyalists for the first time. They received during the entire riot upwards of a thousand rounds of ammunition fired at them. Ironically, the army did not initially return fire, despite being legally allowed. They felt constrained by the British doctrinal policy of minimum force and the fact they were deployed in the UK. This position changed after three hours of being shot at, bricked, bottled, and petrol-bombed[5], killing two gunmen. The situation was the first heavy confrontation with the Loyalist community in defence of a mainly-Catholic area which also increased support from Nationalists for the presence of the British army in these communities. This led to problems within the IRA.

The Official Irish Republican Army, under the command of Cathal Goulding, felt they could not as Marxists intercede between two working-class groups, no matter the level

[5] The author notes that this situation eventually became a normal situation for British soldiers deployed in Northern Ireland. These attacks could happen quickly and develop into further riots with more of the same.

and degree of violence being perpetrated. Despite a past of military/terrorist action, the 'Official IRA' following its unsuccessful campaign to mobilise support from the Nationalist community during the 1956-62 effort, had embraced their Maoist methods and had chosen, according to Newsinger (2002:157), to 'abandon the armed struggle in favour of political action.' Following the violence of August 1969, the IRA was taken by surprise, with Nationalists claiming their initials stood for 'I Ran Away' (Newsinger 2002:158). The IRA membership did not fully implement this policy, and many would follow their own strategy, which would lead to the organisational divide, which in turn, would lead to the breakaway Provisional IRA.

The IRA mission in the eyes of its followers should be that the leadership allow attacks upon the forces of imperialism – in this case, the British army – but it could not due to the army's defence of Nationalist areas. Despite the best efforts of the Goulding leadership, the army, claims Thornton (2007:80) became necessary and popular; thus, it was safe from IRA attack. This lack of violence and passivity against both the army and the Protestant community is what led to the split of the IRA into the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA. The conservative hardliners within the IRA chose to break away from the Goulding leadership of the 'Official IRA' in Dublin and became the Provisional IRA on the 28th December 1969, a right-wing, traditional group with strong supporters which reasserted militarism and the armed struggle.

After forming, the PIRA had to wait before action could be taken. PIRA realised that the army was popular both on the streets and with the Nationalist community on both sides of the border because it was defending the weaker population. Like true insurgents, Thornton (2007:81) claims the PIRA were not at that stage in their

campaign of wanting a confrontation with the British army. PIRA was patient; it was slowly building its own strength and influence while working on reducing the power of the OIRA and waiting for the British army to make operational mistakes. This strategy had the army's mistakes at its core, waiting for over-reaction.

PIRA would create their strategy around the idea that they must provoke the army from its position of peacekeeping into acting like an army, where it will react with violence. This PIRA strategy was not one of defensive methods only (Smith 1995:94-95). Action was taken by PIRA to provoke and prod the army into acting with some form of heavy-handedness which would get the army to alienate itself from the people and gather local support for its own actions. Thornton (2007:81) and Smith (1995:88) both agree that the army fell into this trap shortly after the Heath Conservative victory at Westminster when violence flared at Ballymurphy at the start of the RUC 'get tough campaign' noted Taylor (2001: 44-45).

The army deployed the Scots Guards into Ballymurphy, who used a non-lethal but devastating, non-discriminating weapon of internal security, CS gas. The army in this one deployment used 104 canisters of CS gas. Its use, according to the Sunday Times, created a common reaction among its victims, 'creating solidarity where none had existed before' (Thornton 2007: 83). The use of CS gas during riots became more commonplace when the violence escalated. It would affect both rioters and non-rioter alike, covering vast areas, especially in areas of tight terraced housing.

After attaining popular support within their own community and having successfully side-lined the OIRA of Goulding (which later declared a total ceasefire in 1972), PIRA

launched their military campaign in 1970 with the objective of a destabilising strategy aimed, according to Newsinger (2002:164), at creating chaos, exploding 100 devices by mid-September 1970. London saw this violence as a ‘mere bump on the road to disengagement’ (Neumann 2003:53).

The British Army Reaction

The year 1970, with its increases of occurrence in the PIRA campaign and their influence and the start of more extensive military operations such as in the Falls Road, began a rapid change for the role of the British army. Initially, the powers at Westminster, especially the MoD, reduced troop numbers on the ground to the level that they were before the August 1969 mobilisation (Neumann 2003:53). Brigade level strength was reduced from 7 battalions down to 4 in January 1970 and continued until the back end of 1970 (Thornton 2007:82). The British army's Commander of Land Forces did not recognise that the army faced 'a prolonged campaign of counterinsurgency' until November 1970 (Neumann 2003:53-54). After 1970, troop figures increased.

Significant pressure was exerted by the Unionist government of Northern Ireland, who controlled security policy, in ordering the army to 'crackdown' on the Catholic community, who were accused of sheltering gunmen and bombers. Westminster was undergoing an election which led to a conservative administration ordering its own get-tough policy be enacted by General Freeland. Taylor (2001:45) notes the result of these changes reversed the position of the last six months. This placed the army on a path of direct conflict with the Catholic working class, changing the position of the army as defenders, which, according to Labour politicians like Callaghan and some

academics like Taylor and Newsinger, resulted in the army acting as recruitment officers for the PIRA by ‘forcing the Catholic community into their arms, and by having nowhere else to turn for support’ (Newsinger 2002:162).

During late 1970 and early 1971, the British army responded to the situation on the ground with a strategy for Northern Ireland that drew upon experience gathered in earlier emergencies such as Cyprus and Aden. The 1960s classical 'Hearts and Minds' counterinsurgency theory developed by the British had four steps which are similar to the five stages associated with Thompson.

- The local government with national support could demonstrate the political will required to defeat the insurgency.
- It was important to maintain the battle for the hearts and minds of the affected civilian population.
- To prove that the police and legal system had primacy, that the army was a temporary buffer force that operated beyond any temporary period in a support role to the police.
- The importance of civil-military coordination between political masters, the army, national and local level civil governance structures to bring all aspects of a counterinsurgency strategy together to be effective. (Dixon 2009:445)

This strategy in NI was to face three major initial problems. Firstly, a lack of consistent political direction (from Westminster and Stormont); secondly that such a counterinsurgency strategy had not proven to be successful in dealing with an urban insurgency rather than rural, and thirdly, according to the British government, it would

be impossible to introduce the necessary emergency measures in what was part of the United Kingdom (Newsinger 2002:163).

Newsinger (2002, 164) claims many counterinsurgency methods of emergency measures or control which were widely employed in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden were not utilised in NI; if they had, possible methods might have utilised the following tactics:

'*If South Armagh was in a province in Malaya, many of its Catholic inhabitants would have had their homes burnt down and either forcibly resettled into a 'protected area' or would have been deported'*.

Other emergency measures included curfews, bans on marches, internment, collective punishments, and reprisals for attacks, identity cards, forced resettlements, in-depth interrogations, and a relaxed attitude towards the use of firearms by security forces.

By the very nature of the conflict, many of the historical causes for the troubles were outside of the control of the army. One of these, according to Tim Pat Coogan, states, 'the set piece for hostilities to commence was that infamous cause in Northern Ireland, 'the march' (Thornton 2007:82). The army specifically saw a rapid change in their status and popularity after the political failures at Stormont of not banning the 1970 Orange Order marches. These errors were further compounded, especially when the troops who had to watch these marches had simple difficulties such as in what way should they face; towards the marchers or the angry Nationalist community. This simple choice gave either community the feeling of the troops being for or against them

merely in the way they stood between the two groups. According to Thornton (2007:83), astute battalion commanders were deploying their troops in a staggered formation, facing in alternate directions.

The major problem was in traditional military training, the troops generally looked outward for trouble, and this ultimately gave the Nationalists the wrong idea about the presence of the army on these marches, which PIRA jumped upon, and Thornton (2007:82-83) notes this was used as propaganda by PIRA for its own purposes.

The continuing presence of barricades and no-go areas for the police and army meant that PIRA could recruit and train its recruits in these areas of Belfast without interference from either the RUC or the British army, who also had less manpower available. This reduction in numbers also restricted the availability of troops for operations and peacekeeping but ultimately began to impede the idea of minimum force. As one former army Brigadier, K Perkins puts it, ‘minimum force requires maximum numbers’ (Thornton 2007:83). Thus, the use of CS gas continued, and the introduction of baton rounds and water cannon were also deployed.

As earlier stated, the new Conservative government of Edward Heath, which came to power in Westminster, wanted little to do with the province despite a long-time friendship with the Protestant political parties at Stormont. Heath's government tried to give General Freeland a 'freer hand,' according to Thornton (2007:83), allowing him greater freedom of action with fewer 'back seat drivers', but the government did institute a get-tough policy. This 'get tough' policy led to a change in tempo, with military operations ordered by Freeland with little political or senior input by the

Stormont assembly dominated by Protestant politicians. One major operation carried out by Freeland was in the Falls Road, which led to further controversy.

This operation, which started life on 3rd July 1970, acted upon a tip-off that weapons were being stored in the Falls Road area, which was to be used against the police and the army. The estate contained around fifty narrow back-to-back terrace streets, which also sat behind partial barricades erected for community defence. After initial searches were carried out on just the targeted property within the community, which were suspected (and later found) to be storing the weapons, the violence escalated. The troops were soon surrounded by the local community, especially with the rabbit-warren design of the estate. The initially deployed troops and the later reinforcements had to request further back up as they were also cut off and surrounded. It was at this point, according to Thornton (2007:85-86), that the army responded with CS gas. The escalating violence in the area also had a new element, that of the OIRA and the PIRA both firing upon the troops (as separate entities). PIRA moved gunmen into the area as the Falls Road, though it was controlled by the OIRA and not PIRA, who were 'outsiders' according to Thornton 2007:88.

Reports by journalists like Geraghty (1998:33) notes that when the violence was suppressed, the GOC put the entire area of the Falls Road under a curfew which lasted for 34 hours; from the 3rd July to 5th July 1970. It allowed a short break in the curfew to allow the women in the area to gather necessary supplies on the Saturday tea-time (Taylor 2001:50). This curfew was executed without political control, and permission was not asked from any of his political or military masters. Westminster would have

said no, and Hamill (1985:37) states that even the Stormont executive would more than likely have refused, 'it was a huge step to take.'

With the streets of the Lower Falls area clear, the British army used a traditional, time-honoured internal security/counterinsurgency tactic of systematic cordon and search operations. All homes were searched, and according to Thornton (2007:87), 'not gently'. They were subjected to intensive and often ugly house to house searches for arms and explosives by troops moved into the province on the 'get-tough' edict ordered by the Conservative government and were moved into the Falls Road area when initial reinforcements were stopped in their task. One such reinforcement battalion was the Royal Scots regiment.

These widespread searches, a colonial tool often used as a punishment for whole communities, were employed not just on the guilty or suspicious but on the entire community as an act of domination. One leading journalist, Edgar O'Ballance, at the time claimed that 'the lower Falls area was a psycho-social target, that the tactic of searching the entire area was designed as much to intimidate the population as to uncover illegal arms and explosives' (Thornton 2007:87).

At its conclusion, Nationalists were dead, four by gunshots, one by road traffic accident (crushed by an armoured car) with the entire area deluged with CS gas, totalling 1600 canisters used (Thornton 2007:87). The residents of the Falls Road complained that the ‘army wrecked and looted their homes’ (Newsinger 2002: 161-162). Tony Geraghty, with the *Sunday Times,* wrote, ‘the army behaved as if it was in the rebellious Crater district of Aden Colony’ (Geraghty 1998: 33-37).

One possible explanation for this was down to the deployment of a Scottish regiment, The Royal Scots, who were the primary search battalion for the Brigade in the area. These troops were mostly staunch Scottish Presbyterians and Rangers football club fans who took delight in 'accidentally' destroying statues of the Madonna and anything associated with the Celtic football club, a club followed by many Catholics in this area (Geraghty 1998:33-37). Local opinion of the troops was further reduced in the eyes of the Nationalist community by a tour of the area given by the army in its Land Rovers to two radical Protestant ministers from Stormont, which Thornton (2007:88) argued further incited community hatred.

An observer of the Falls Road operation and later a Lieutenant Colonel, Michael Dewar (a NI veteran), said 'it can be argued that the failure to ban the 1970 Orange parades and the massive arms searches and curfew in the Lower Falls area which followed the violence was the last chance to avoid the catastrophe that has since engulfed Ulster. The Lower Falls operation changed everything,' claims Newsinger (2002:162). This view was not universal; Neumann (2003:53) counter claims that the operation in the Falls Road was but 'an aberration rather than an indication of a change in military policy' and its control had not been removed from Westminster to Stormont, but the army had reacted to the situation in the Falls Road after months of minor, low-level abuse from both communities and violence, which Neumann claims led to this degree of over-reactionary, institutional behaviour by the British army (Neumann 2003:53-54).

During the period of the Falls Road operation, there was a definite absence of political control and guidance for the army between 18th June and 5th July due to the change of administration at Westminster. Thornton (2007:87-88) claims that this three-week

period, which started with the Heath government 'get tough' policy which saw the first use of CS gas in Ballymurphy and during the Falls Road operation, setting a pattern for future violence against the security forces and military operations for the following years. The Falls Road curfew can be seen as a military success, but it can also be seen as a counterinsurgency/political failure because it built up active resentment against political authority and, according to Hamill (1985:39), 'was not a benchmark for success.'

Internment, Intelligence Failures and Bloody Sunday

Northern Ireland security policy continued (though not by design) in alienating the Catholic community in its widespread use of area-wide search operations targeted at both branches of Republican paramilitary forces. The strategy employed against the deteriorating situation by the British army drew upon counterinsurgency experience and related strategy from earlier colonial emergencies. However, these strategies were neither harsh nor repressive enough to defeat either the Original IRA or the Provisional IRA because the British government could or would not justify the use of colonial tactics in the United Kingdom's back garden, especially with a heavy popular press which was interested in Northern Ireland. The current strategy instead created a culture of antagonism, according to Newsinger (2002:163).

By the beginning of 1971, PIRA was now strong enough to authorise attacks on the British army, coming out as opponents of both the Stormont regime and the forces of the Crown. The pressure from prominent Protestant politicians at Stormont and their supporters at Westminster was also increasing for something to happen. The army still had a problem of strategy according to Neumann (2003:56), which was coupled

with a lack of intelligence, 'little was gained through the use of foot patrols, and very few people would come forward to volunteer information due to reprisals on those who did or were suspected of doing so'.

The RUC Special Branch still smarted at the usurpation of their role, which dealt with intelligence and was reluctant to hand intelligence to anyone outside of their organisation. With PIRAs campaign coming into full swing during late 1970, they were now fully armed with the legitimacy it needed from its own supporters and from the wider Republican community, which by early 1971 had them employing, on average, five explosive devices per night (Smith 1995:93). Strategically, the campaign involved heavy bombing and was aimed and designed at making the province as ungovernable as possible for both Stormont and for Westminster.

Tactically, on the ground, it was successful in tying up the resources of both the army and the RUC, which had to respond to bomb threats (real or not) that had to expend resources before and after each explosion and by reducing the army's ability to roam at will on the ground where explosive devices are suspected. Between the start of the bombing campaign in October 1970 and the end of the year, 153 bombs had gone off. The following year, the figure was 1515 (Thornton 2007:89).

With the terrorist/insurgent campaign in full flow, the army lacked a comprehensive response plan which was coupled with the politicians' desire to find a solution for the provinces. To this end, the Stormont assembly, in consultation with Westminster, looked at historical precedent, the use of internment. This had been used with some success during the 1950s when the Official IRA last employed violence against the

Northern Irish state. Internment at that time happened on both sides of the border in conjunction with the government of the Republic of Ireland in suppressing the IRA threat (Thornton 2007:91).

Internment was brought into emergency law for Northern Ireland on the 9th August 1971[6]. Its main aim was to bypass the one major fundamental problem of tackling the IRA; the intimidation of witnesses. Anyone who tried to give evidence would face a harsh lesson in their community, and the number of potential witnesses after an incident would dry up. Internment got rid of the legal niceties involved, and the Protestant ministers at Stormont felt it was the only solution. Internment was also used as a means of quid pro quo, of getting the Protestant ministers to agree to ban all the marches by the orange order that year (Thornton 2007: 91).

Internment and the associated army operations started badly with Operation Demetrius, an army-led operation to forcibly detain and arrest 445 people on a supplied RUC Special Branch intelligence list. Out of the 342 who were picked up by the security forces (SF), 116 were released within two days. Very few had any link with the PIRA; most were connected to the OIRA and had not been operational for years. Demetrius proved that the intelligence held by the RUC's Special Branch was out of date and operationally unreliable. Efforts to rectify this deficiency were led by the new commander of the 39 Brigade, who had responsibility for Belfast, Brigadier Frank Kitson.[7].

[6] Internment briefly is the arrest and detention without trial of people suspected of being members of illegal paramilitary groups.

[7] Kitson had written a very recent book (1971) entitled Low-Intensity Warfare, detailing his theory of how to deal with subversion, insurgency and peacekeeping based upon his experience of Kenya and Malaya with counterinsurgency.

When he arrived, the situation in Belfast was primarily one of civil disorder, but he recognised, according to Taylor (2001:55), the possibility of it slipping into an outright insurgency. From his own experience of Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Oman, Kitson tried to implement ideas such as Divisional Action Committees, successful in Kenya in providing an interface between the civilian population, the police and the army. These committees would discuss everything from repairing street lighting, no-go areas, almost anything, which would allow for an increase in the normalisation of civil/police/army community efforts leading up to new methods to diffuse conflicts between interested parties and the authorities.

Kitson's intelligence reforms meant an end to the sole reliance upon the RUC Special Branch as the only source for intelligence; the army had to generate its own. The Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Michael Carver in London, gave the go-ahead on increased intelligence gathering, as 'there was no alternative' (Newsinger 2002:168). Kitson improved operational intelligence by ordering:

- The use of foot patrols to gather contact information to build up a detailed, comprehensive profile of the area (which went beyond what had gone before, creating detailed lists and profiles) and its inhabitants.
- The routine stopping and questioning of the population on foot, vehicle checks, and house searches on these patrols created local intelligence.

These reforms meant every member of every patrol became part of the intelligence machinery of Northern Ireland. Small details gathered while out patrolling an area began to fill in the larger picture of such an area's population by recording and

observing items such as the number of pints of milk being delivered to a house being an indication of numbers within a household, or movements such as timings when people left for work. These details, when submitted in these reports, were collated at Lisbon, the army headquarters in Northern Ireland. From small beginnings with minor details, the intelligence gathering spread. A total of 250,000 house searches were carried out between 1971 and 1976, and four million vehicle searches in one year. Newsinger (2002:168) describes that from these humble intelligence beginnings, which included the intelligence from on-the-street searches and the questioning of civilians, along with documents and vehicle checks turned into a greater picture of intelligence life. This was then employed in planning future operations.

Kitson further developed the use of covert operations and surveillance, not a new strategy, for it was a feature of most counterinsurgency campaigns, but Kitson expanded their focus and number according to Newsinger (2002:169). Due to these changes, PIRA found their movements curtailed. Kitson became for the republican movement, and elements within the political left of the UK, according to Taylor (2001:55-56), a symbol of repression in Northern Ireland, as 'Kitson was our deadliest enemy in the North.'

Kitson, according to Newsinger (2002:170) in his own area of responsibility, ordered the cutting-off of any further negotiations between both OIRA/PIRA and his officers in the Belfast area; his philosophy was 'we beat the terrorist before we negotiate with them.' Surprisingly, Kitson's operational area, Belfast, for 39 Brigade 'seemed to quieten down' according to Thornton (2007:96) when the numbers of attacks on British troops were compared with other Brigade numbers.

Despite reforms in intelligence, and the general feeling that something needed doing in the province, the military establishment and there on the ground commanders, did not want internment at that time. Thornton (2007:92) states that the army 'felt that the time was not right' (Kitson was totally against its use). Its Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Michael Carver, only wanted internment 'as a last resort', and the new GOC: NI, Lieutenant General, Sir Harry Tuzo was also opposed to its deployment (due to the reaction of the Catholic community where soldiers were still operating).

Commanding officers of regiments 'on tour' in Northern Ireland were 'furious' about internment (Hamill 1985:63). The army was told that it had to come up with an alternative policy to internment, according to Thornton (2007:92), or Faulkner (the NI Prime Minister) would 'have his way with internment'. General Tuzo replaced Vernon Erskine-Crum as GOC, whereas Erskine-Crum was the replacement for Ian Freeland. Erskine-Crum died only after a few weeks in the role.

Before internment introduction, a former army officer and later a Foreign Officer Minister in Westminster, according to Thornton (2007:92), tried to warn the establishment against using internment. He claimed that 'from the military point of view, mass internment makes the gathering of intelligence even more difficult, although much information can be gained by a well-planned programme of interrogation after internment.

Internment provoked unrest and violence, especially from the Catholic community and its new self-imposed protectors, the PIRA. In the four months before internment, four soldiers and four civilians had been killed by terrorist action. In the four months after

its introduction, the violence had escalated, leaving thirty soldiers and eleven RUC and Ulster Defence Regiment personnel (UDR) dead with seventy-three civilian deaths (Newsinger 2002:165).

One commanding officer (of the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment) went on the record in an interview with the *Sunday Times*, saying, 'It was a complete disaster. It turned large numbers of the Nationalist population, who at that time had been firmly on our side and very sensibly so, against us. The Nationalist population didn't trust the security forces anymore and, to my mind, in any internal security operation – and that's what Northern Ireland was – hearts and minds are the most important part of it. And internment destroyed it' (Taylor 2001:67). The final shreds of army support within the Nationalist community were removed by internment. Newsinger (2002:165) claims it succeeded in uniting Catholic support in angry solidarity with the people held behind the wire at Long Kesh.

It is worth mentioning the difference in the civil and military situation and violence between the two big cities of Northern Ireland: Belfast and Londonderry. The situation between the army and the paramilitary groups was vastly different according to Thornton, with the IRA (either faction) in Londonderry having less support in practical and tangible terms (Thornton 2007: 96). This did not mean that Londonderry was not without violence, sectarianism and rioting, but it seemed to be of a different kind, possibly due to the Catholic community being in the majority here.

The army had a different, less aggressive approach of working within the city and its communities with more police-like mannerism where relations with OIRA/PIRA had

proven to be reasonable. The no-go areas were an accepted and respected fact which the army did not stray into. The incident known as 'Bloody Sunday' changed the dynamic difference between Belfast and Londonderry forever. It shifted the opinion of the Catholic community, which Taylor (2001:95) claims 'moved the army as the enemy.'

Bloody Sunday was an incident on 30th January 1972 in the Bogside area of Londonderry, where twenty-six possibly (most likely probably) unarmed civil rights protesters and bystanders were shot by soldiers from the British army while on a Civil Rights Association march. The soldiers involved with the majority of the shootings were the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, an elite regiment with a focus on aggression and physical presence. They were sent to Londonderry from Belfast after having played a big part in 39 Brigade (Belfast) efforts to contain the OIRA/PIRA. Army HQ at Lisburn, according to Thornton (2007:98), sent the troops to 8 Brigade (Londonderry) to take the tough line which had worked in Belfast into Londonderry. Charles Townshend (1986:71) claims that the use of the Parachute Regiment in an urban policy role, deployed in day-to-day employment for self-conscious, macho elite units, would lead to an escalation and to, therefore, disastrous results.

Despite the many versions, opinions and truths surrounding the march; the simple facts remain that the march became violent, and at some point, whether by PIRA strategy, reaction to effective enemy fire or by deploying the wrong type of soldier at the march, elements of the army which were deployed for crowd control did not respond with minimum force. Thirteen males died immediately or soon after, with another dying later of wounds attributed to the injuries he received on that day.

An enquiry by the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Widgery in 1972 in the immediate aftermath of the shootings and published barely three months later was dismissed by Nationalists as a ‘whitewash’ and was written according to Taylor (2001:103) to largely absolve the soldiers of responsibility for the incident. The Provisionals were greatly enhanced by public perceptions of the day increasing recruitment, funding and its status, especially after the Widgery Report. The army was now truly separated from the Nationalist, mainly Catholic community into which it was once the protector.

A further inquiry into Bloody Sunday, known as the Saville Inquiry, was established in 1998. It took place after a successful campaign by the relatives of the dead and was a tribunal headed by Lord Saville of Newdigate, a former Justice of the Supreme Court for the UK. The report was published on 15th June 2010. It started according to Leahy (2020:21) by acknowledging that ‘the original Widgery report was a whitewash,’ and the report recognises that the paratroopers had fired the first shot, had fired on fleeing unarmed civilians, and shot and killed one man who was already wounded. A formal apology from the UK Prime minister followed.

Further investigations on the actions of the Parachute Regiment personnel involved have led to formal charges over the actions of individual soldiers on that day.

Conflict Entrenchment, Direct Rule and Secret Talks

British counterinsurgency doctrine and theory found in the official doctrine known as Land Operations 3: *Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1969)* did not suggest that the army could defeat the PIRA through military action alone. Instead, it was to 'hold the

ring,' reducing or containing violence until a political settlement could be found. It became, according to Dixon (2009:448), the new Northern Ireland bible, which could only function as one part of the machine; it also needs civil and political efforts to succeed, which were unlikely to appear from the majority Protestant regime at Stormont.

The political situation in the province continued to deteriorate, eventually forcing Westminster to dissolve the Stormont Assembly and to enact direct rule on the 24th March 1972, and creating a new post, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who would oversee all political activity. This move was argued as the distancing of the British from the Unionists and taking control in response to the increased campaign of the PIRA.

The new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, William Whitelaw, led efforts in brokering both political and paramilitary peace efforts which led to secret talks with the PIRA during the summer of 1972, for which the PIRA announced a ceasefire. The army also similarly adopted a 'low profile' approach in Nationalist areas to facilitate a political initiative. PIRA went to the talks believing that the British were preparing for withdrawal and were seeking a way out. PIRA saw their campaign as one of an anti-imperialistic movement, forcing Britain's withdrawal from Empire as seen in previous cases with Cyprus, Malaya and Aden. Martin McGuinness, one of the PIRA negotiators at the talks, totally rejected power-sharing with Unionist politicians and argued that violence would remove the British from Ireland 'as proven all over your Empire. You will get fed up and go away.' (Dixon 2009:453)

The talks, which started on 7th July, broke down; they were not going anywhere with two widely opposed sides. This did not, however, restrict the PIRA, claiming 1972 as their 'year of victory.' They ceased using this claim by 1977 (Smith 1995:135). Following the talks' failure, the PIRA upped its game with 'Bloody Friday' on 21st July 1972. Bloody Friday was the PIRA spectacular effort using paramilitary means instead of political activity to coordinate attacks on one day. It witnessed 26 bombs going off in Belfast, killing two soldiers and nine civilians, leaving one hundred and thirty civilians injured and devastating the centre of Belfast.

The increase in PIRA's campaign arguably played into the hands of the army, which according to Thornton (2007:103), had the army committing the population of NI to accept a more significant military presence and response to the terrorist casualties. The army had a response to Bloody Friday with a planned but not enacted operation on 31st July; Operation Motorman was the biggest British military operation since the Suez. It involved 30,000 troops to remove the barricades from the Catholic no-go areas in Belfast and Londonderry. The army deployed Centurion tanks (in Derry), with vast numbers of armoured personnel carriers and bulldozers to clear the barricades. PIRA was deprived of its safe no-go areas. A large number of troops meant they met 'minimal resistance' (according to Newsinger (2002:171-172). The PIRA response on the same day was three car bombs in the village of Claudy, killing nine civilians. This operation was used to send a message that the British army was in control, not the Provisional IRA. Politicians at Westminster were very fearful of this operation and hoped the PIRA did not utilise the Catholic community as a living barrier which, according to Newsinger (2002:171), would have civilians lying in the road, obstructing the advance of the armoured vehicles and bulldozers.

Motorman as an operation against the PIRA was not decisive, but it was successful in military terms; it took the no-go areas away. It created a means for the police and army to 'fort up' in these areas in either new strong, defensive positions with areas such as Andersontown in Belfast receiving nine such police and military installations or by reinforcing old police and military positions within Republican areas.

Political Last Efforts

A brief final political solution for the 1970s was attempted in a power-sharing effort between the Ulster Unionists and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), brokered at Sunningdale in Berkshire, during December 1973. This power-sharing executive, who took office on the 1st January 1974 under the leader of the Ulster Unionist (UU) leader Brian Faulkner, was disrupted by internal political wrangles within his own party and from a heavy external Protestant pressure, fearful of the situation in Ulster resulting in a series of strikes and where its politicians would be in a power-sharing executive with Nationalists.

The lack of popular Protestant support for the power-sharing effort was recognised following strikes across the province led initially by the power and utility companies in a coalition called the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) with unsolicited support from the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), which was the loyalist element of armed extremists. The UDA was an umbrella group representing both the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), the two loyalist paramilitary groups.

The industrial action escalated from simple striking to groups forming road blockades and street protests where the RUC simply 'stood by' awaiting orders from a new but failing Stormont assembly, according to Newsinger (2002:173). Much of Belfast and the industrial heartland of Northern Ireland ground to a halt due to these blockades and protests.

The power-sharing did not last more than a couple of days when the Ulster Unionist council rejected the Sunningdale agreement, forcing Faulkner to resign and form his own pro-Sunningdale party, which tried to hold power until Heath, who was also embroiled in domestic problems, called a general election. This election on both sides of the Irish sea saw a new Labour government under Harold Wilson take office, and in NI, the pro alliance Sunningdale party polled only 13% of total votes cast (Newsinger 2001:173).

Direct rule was implemented again with the failure of the power-sharing, which led to a long period of direct rule. This period was punctuated with continued violence and further back-channel talks, with more short-term PIRA ceasefires. The Official IRA, as a separate paramilitary group, had ceased to be a problem officially for government forces after May 1972 when the organisation formally declared a ceasefire. The talks between PIRA and the British government came to nought when it became clear to the PIRA that the British had no intention of withdrawing from NI.

Strategic Transformation from Counterinsurgency to Internal Security

At the end of 1974 and through 1975, the UK government, in conjunction with the army, began work to consider changes to the security policy stance for Northern

Ireland. It would replace the policies hastily sought from colonial experience such as internment and attempt to bridge political diversions both in Westminster and Stormont. The old security policy changed into an internal security strategy of Ulsterisation.

The new security policy, entitled 'The Way Ahead' (Newsinger 2002: 179), was to change the policy from counterinsurgency strategies derived from colonial experience to a three-part domestic, internal security strategy which included primacy of the police, normalisation and criminalisation. The policy favoured the police and the judicial process, therefore criminalising the terrorist/insurgent element. This policy was also seen as a way for the Wilson government in Westminster to downsize its security commitment to Northern Ireland. The policy sought to redress the conflict into one of criminality, removing the political connection from the judicial process, treating the PIRA as prisoners to change perceptions of the conflict from that of a perceived colonial campaign to one combating criminal gangs. It also highlighted the long-time objective of all counterinsurgency strategies that civil power has primacy, in this case, the Royal Ulster Constabulary. During 1976, operational control was reworked, passing from the army to the police. The role of the army now became one of supporting civil power. This was the message to the Nationalist communities that their security was not provided by an army but by the police. It was hoped the change in policy and in how the troops would act in support of the RUC would not further alienate the Nationalist community, therefore reducing the number of volunteers for the IRA. It placed the military as a support mechanism for the civil-led powers redressing the balance, which was missing when the army was first called to serve on the streets of Northern Ireland.

Ulsterisation or normalisation, as some academics like Neumann call the slow process of change, began by beginning further reforms of the RUC and the UDR into full-time organisations; allowing their reserves to remain but building the numbers of these indigenous security forces to step up their patrolling and operational roles to help reduce the visual use of British soldiers on the streets. This type of initiative was tried in Malaya, Kenya and Saudi Arabia. The Wilson government was looking at this process enabling two objectives; a reduction in cost for the use of the British army in Northern Ireland and to reduce the resentment of British troops being seen on armed patrol within the United Kingdom. The new RUC Chief Constable Kenneth Newman saw this security change to rejuvenate his police force while reining in the security situation, 'The RUC would remain hard but sensitive…. Maintaining law and order simply by giving people the freedom to conduct their own lives' (Mumford 2012:109). By late 1976, it was identified that the RUC and military had a 'poorly defined working relationship' according to Mumford (2012:109) in the use of command and control. Intelligence and planning for operations were rarely shared unless necessary despite the creation of a devolved organisational structure meant to mould the RUC and military into working together. The Province Executive Committee (PEC), a senior-level security committee, tried to steer strategic and operational direction (though in an initial ad-hoc method). It had teething troubles but began to work by having the committee chaired by the deputy RUC Chief Constable with the Commander, Land Forces (NI) in attendance. Mumford argues that it was through the use of this committee and further developed Division Action Committees (DAC) that by sharing intelligence, it enabled the security forces to have a targeted purpose.

The process nearly worked, but there remained problematic difficulties in how to radically recruit Nationalists into the RUC and the UDR. Both remained staunchly Protestant in cultural make-up. The second problem was the use of specialist units like the Special Air Service (SAS) and a rumour of a shoot-to-kill policy. Despite these problems, the initial context of containment and reduction of violence began to show progress with a reduction in casualties and attacks by the end of 1976.

Northern Ireland: Post-1976

The killings and injuries resulting from all kinds of attacks still took place, whether sectarian, army, RUC, UDR or civilian. Despite increases in the use, effectiveness and methods by the Security Forces, the British army remained on duty in the province; 13,311 in total (Mumford 2012:122). This was further augmented by 8,684 UDR (mainly part-time) and 6,110 police officers. The seventies remained the bloodiest decade with little movement or political thirst to seek a compromise between all the parties involved in NI. The 1970s finished with two PIRA 'spectacular' attacks, three of which took place one day, the 27th August 1979 against Earl Mountbatten (and friends), a second against the Parachute Regiment, and the other made against the then shadow Northern Ireland Secretary for the Conservative Party, Airey Neave (a friend of future Prime Minister Thatcher). The situation on the ground remained volatile in the eighties, where attacks could take place with little warning. It was during the 1980s that PIRA began a greater number of attacks on the British mainland. Its most prominent and boldest attack was made against the UK government of Margaret Thatcher and her government by bombing the Grand Hotel in Brighton while the conservative party was at its annual conference in October 1984. The next year, Thatcher and Garrett FitzGerald signed the Anglo-Irish agreement, which aimed to

help bring an end to the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Away from politics, the situation on the ground remained complex. The police and army maintained the ideal of containment. It became apparent to both sides that by 1990 the UK could not defeat PIRA, and around a similar time, Sinn Fein/PIRA realised that the gun would not win out in Northern Ireland.

Secretive talks persisted, and movement in the NI political arena took steps to reduce Sein Finn's influence (linked and associated with PIRA), beginning with efforts to increase the SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party) as the nationalist voice. Efforts persisted through the 15th December 1993 signing of the Downing Street Declaration and later Tony Blair's efforts to bring about the Belfast Accords or Good Friday Agreement which reconstructed the entire political arena of Northern Ireland and began NI home rule at Stormont with power-sharing between Unionists and Nationalists.

The Four Pillars in Northern Ireland

The four pillars on the first examination may have been already in place; a somewhat functioning police service (the RUC), a Northern Ireland government seeking to calm the troubles (before the direct rule and somewhat biased), the rule of law, military forces employed in aid of the civil power at Stormont in the provinces and lastly a supposedly aware RUC special branch to provide intelligence. As seen by earlier sections of the chapter, these were in place but had their own substantial difficulties.

Minimum Force

Despite an army being mobilised onto the streets of a part of the UK, it can be recognised that the army did have some type of institutional restraint. In many cases where it was reported that the army over-reacted to the situation on the ground, it can be argued that there are many unreported cases where the army displayed restraint.

Bad examples of colonial thinking and tactics are easily seen with the Falls Road incident of 3rd July 1970. Curfews, limits to the civilian movements and often 'enthusiastic' house searches took place with the widespread use of CS gas on a civilian population.

Good examples can be argued as Operation Motorman, which took place on 31st July 1970. Motorman deployed numbers of troops, vehicles and tanks into no-go areas to remove the barriers with little in the way of death or injuries. Other good examples of where the army has tried to structure for how it uses force are seen in the use of the yellow card. The MoD brought the yellow card into Northern Ireland to be issued to each soldier explaining rules for the use of force. It covered areas such as rules of engagement with suspected PIRA members and declared that using a weapon to open fire was the last resort. The yellow card was a benchmark that the British troops used as a yardstick for sound principles, though incidents like Bloody Sunday, which are seen as a high-profile mistake, still happened. The yellow card was not perfect, but it gave all ranks from privates upward a clearly defined set of rules.

A final good example is that the army did train its personnel for operations in NI from the mid-seventies with the Northern Ireland Training Advisory Teams. These NITAT

units often provided young soldiers with a warts-and-all feel for NI with teaching in riot procedures, evacuation skills to get civilians away from a potential bomb site, urban infantry skills (as non-infantry regiments were sent) and instruction on the yellow card. Final pre-deployment training would also cover changes in rules of engagement and training specific to the area in which the troops were to be deployed (some urban/some rural).

On police reforms for the RUC, many of the heavier weapons previously held were removed from use except by specialist units. They were given new rules of engagement regarding firearm use and would be internally investigated over their use.

PIRA could also have employed some aspect of minimum force during 'the Troubles;' they would give telephone warnings about bombs being set. Even if the bomb warnings were a hoax, the disruption in a city centre to normal life was vast. These calls to the police or newspapers could have been an attempted method to reduce civilian deaths while still sending a political message.

Civil-Military Cooperation

There are examples in the chapter of bad CIMIC efforts. When the army deployed into republican areas, they were providing services for the population, which would have lasted longer and had a more significant impact if the Stormont assembly and municipal councils were providing these services. In 1976 the situation was reversed; the province was under direct rule from Westminster, the police had undergone massive reforms with a small but useful increase in Nationalist recruits, and the police had primacy with the army being in its support role ‘in aid to the civil power.’ Though

the situation for civilians living in NI remained tense, Ulsterisation or normalisation efforts at least tried to minimise the number of deaths with police primacy, and therefore criminalising the conflict, taking away the special status of republican terrorists by treating terrorist acts as an act of criminality.

Direct military/police cooperation is described as sketchy at best throughout the 1970s. The relationship between the RUC chief constable and the GOC in Northern Ireland, especially around the time of the Warrenpoint attacks, was at its lowest point. The RUC chief constable Kenneth Newman took over when police primacy became policy and was at the RUCs helm between 1976 until 1980. His military counterpart for much of this time was Lieutenant-General Sir Timothy Creasey, who had a great deal of small wars experience, including being the Commander, Sultan's Armed Forces in Oman between 1972 and 1975. He aimed to get quick results, and his belief that a military solution could be found to the problem put him at odds with Newman. This dispute peaked in 1979 after 18 soldiers were killed in the Warrenpoint ambush when Creasey demanded the army take over control of policing. However, he had a good working relationship with Roy Mason, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. According to Taylor (2001:224-226), the friction felt between these two figures filtered down to the middle and low levels of both organisations threatening to undo all the work the reforms of the RUC and the army had accomplished. Creasey's posting concluded in 1979 and Newman's in 1980, where new army and RUC chiefs began to repair the damage. It later transpired that much of the friction came about due to the RUC not sharing its new intelligence sources with the army. One significant reform brought about by the Creasey/Newman dispute was a Northern Ireland Chief Intelligence Co-ordinator in the form of Sir Maurice Oldfield, the former head of MI6

from 1965 to 1977. Taylor (2001:226) describes his role as being close with the Permanent under-secretary for Northern Ireland; ‘he was supposed to ensure that the combined resources of intelligence gathering of the police and of the army and their subsequent operations were effectively integrated.’ By lessening the friction between the two top chiefs of the uniformed services, it created an atmosphere where civil elements could begin to take root.

The reality was this took nearly another fifteen years before the SDLP and Ulster Unionists would take a gamble in creating a political climate where civil development where a joint power-sharing assembly and containment of the violence would eventually lead to a cessation of violence.

Use of Intelligence

The 1970s saw an increase throughout the decade in the amount of collection, analysis, dissemination and use of intelligence material by the RUC and by the army. It is claimed that by the end of the decade, one in eight British soldiers were involved in intelligence operations in Northern Ireland (Mumford 2012:110). Kitson's early efforts in his Belfast brigade area led to NI command wide reforms on intelligence gathering by the army when the RUC special branch intelligence was found to be lacking during Operation Demetrius.

This situation led to a turf war between the RUC, the army, MI5 and MI6, over whom should be responsible for intelligence. Before Sir Maurice Oldfield's appointment at the end of the decade to oversee all intelligence operations, the efforts before were muddled. The intelligence war, according to Mumford (2012:110), was essentially

effective but controversial and mismanaged. It had, however, by the end of the decade, identified the PIRA leadership, penetrated the cell structure favoured by the PIRA as a tactic to reduce possible infiltration but had several services performing intelligence with overlapping duties without pooling their resources. Oldfield saw this change by recommending that MI6 reduce its role (handing it to MI5). The Security Services (MI5), after gaining intelligence primacy, concentrated almost exclusively on strategic intelligence leaving tactical and operational intel to others.

The collection of tactical and operational intelligence was originally the role of the army until police primacy took root after 1975. The army maintained and later expanded its effort with RUC blessing with 14 Intelligence Company. 14 Int or 'the det' developed out of Frank Kitson's work with the Mobile Reconnaissance Force (MRF) and worked in all areas of Northern Ireland. Not to be outdone by the army, the RUC created its own specialist observation unit known as Bronze Section and its own elite, undercover observation unit E4A to undertake mobile and static operations.

The employment and use of the Special Air Service in NI can also be best described as an intelligence asset and as an elite shock unit. They very rarely took prisoners, and it was from operations like these that the press began to question if there was a shoot to kill policy for security forces in Northern Ireland.

As the troubles continued, the evolvement of the intelligence war with its successes, reforms, streamlined efforts and later discovered mistakes was one useful factor in ending violence. Intelligence efforts did come to undermine PIRA.

Tactical Flexibility

Good examples of on-the-ground tactical flexibility were demonstrated with the rapid changes in operation deployments when the multiple ceasefires were often started where the operational tempo of the troops would slightly ease, giving them a much-needed rest from 24-hour operations.

The input from the lowliest private would filter its way up the ranks quickly to be eventually taught to new units deploying to NI with the pre-deployment training through the NITAT teams. The riot training was brutal, harsh and very realistic but also taught the much-needed skills of staying together when first facing a demonstration which often would turn ugly when encountering the opposing community in many Northern Irish towns and cities.

Egnell (2009:99-100) states ‘that the operations in Northern Ireland perpetuated the British army's experiences and attitudes about low-intensity conflict. Despite the traditional operations in the Falklands and the Gulf War, the operations in Northern Ireland have greatly influenced the British army's training, movement, deployment, logistics and morale. It has shaped British soldiers' lives. Not only have the British had the chance to perfect their urban patrolling, civil-military cooperation, and counter-terrorist techniques, they have been forced to do so under the close scrutiny of the British legal system as well as the media. Northern Ireland has, therefore, often been referred to as the perfect training ground for units bound for the complex peace operations of the 1990s and after.’

Conclusion

The governments of Westminster and Stormont, along with the British army, were not ready for what happened in Northern Ireland. Errors were made at all levels within the military and political structures. The GOC, Freeland, was given two hats to wear, that of being the senior army commander and of being in some muddled position of responsibility for policing when the RUC underwent reform.

The army was deployed into Nationalist areas without strategic or operational guidance for an undetermined time scale. The strategy was confused before 'The Way Ahead,' as it contained elements associated with colonial counterinsurgency. The British army now operated with rifles and armoured cars on UK streets, facing terrorist violence against the public and its own personnel with worldwide press attention on all its activities.

Independent occurrences hampered efforts, the speed at which the IRA split and a continued ongoing lack of political will between Northern Irish politicians constrained containment efforts. The UK government had switched administrations in Westminster that also left a void of control, leaving the muddled strategy for Northern Ireland in place.

It has been argued that both Westminster and Stormont were leaving the army to get on with the job without political oversight. Oversight would and should have led to the cancelling of operations which would have caused detrimental public and community relations, especially against the Nationalist community after operations such as the Falls Road operation. With strong political and military oversight, with intelligence-led

operations that functioned with a long-term strategy, the fallout of not-so-successful operations during the first years of 'the Troubles' may have been different.

There remained a void of civil and political control, which affected the Nationalist communities for many years, which the British army identified by being deployed for months, almost living in these communities. The army helped to run local projects such as meals on wheels as just one example. If the local councils had worked with the army in supporting these projects, Dixon (2012:78) argues, 'the results might have assisted in improving inter-community relations if these activities had been built upon.'

If these low-level, minor triumphs were built upon and used to help formulate civil-military cooperation, these ideas with state funding and political support could have reduced support for the Provisional IRA.

The lack of a joined-up military strategy and operational guidelines created differences between the deployed units and their operations between brigade commands. 39 Brigade in Belfast and 8 Brigade in Londonderry had different ways of working. Belfast under Kitson took a more robust line with the paramilitaries; in Londonderry, the situation was less toxic, with a reduced amount of violence and a lower paramilitary presence. A military theatre-wide strategy with flexible but robust operational guidelines for all of Northern Ireland based units may have avoided significant mistakes such as Bloody Sunday.

The use of CS gas by the army was seen as a solution to the massed violence first seen in Ballymurphy, where it was employed as an alternative to the use of live

ammunition. The PIRA strategy was to up-the-ante with the security forces, to get them to react as a basic tenet of any counterinsurgency campaign is that it is according to Kilcullen (2010:2) ‘reactionary by its very design; the insurgents nearly always determine the level of response by the security forces, by their use of violence.

Eventually, the choice of strategy was revolutionised to one of internal security in 1976 with ‘The Way Ahead’ or ‘Ulsterisation,’ where the RUC had primacy and the British army was to aid the civil power.

On a positive note, the Nationalist community of Northern Ireland during the time of the Troubles must have noticed a significant increase in the quality of living standards for their community. Changes in the political situation also began to trickle through to affect job chances, wages for workers, education access, an increase in better housing stock and legal rights. Despite the 38-year deployment of British soldiers in the provinces, slow and steady social and economic emancipation took place for the Nationalist community.

Violence continued throughout Operation Banner, both at security forces and at each community’s civilian population. Much of this changed on 10th April 1998, with the Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreement. The agreement created a multi-party accord between the Northern Ireland political parties and the second between the UK and Republic of Ireland governments.

The main lessons gathered from Northern Ireland, especially between 1969 and 1976, are often gathered from the reverse position of examining what went wrong, creating

lessons to avoid future mistakes. These start with strategy and operational guidance; both are required for any army beyond short-term deployments. Pre-training for all units rotating into Banner would have at least provided the rules of engagement for all soldiers and would have allowed lessons associated with the widespread use of tear gas to be avoided. A standardised set of procedures for property searches and patrolling with the RUC would also have avoided mistakes when facing PIRA ‘come-ons.’

At midnight on 31st July 2007, the Union Flag was finally lowered from the flag pole inside Thiepval Barracks in Lisburn, finally declaring that the army which had been deployed onto the streets of Belfast with the view of it would 'be back in barracks by the weekend,' had finally managed it.

The next chapter examines the efforts made by the British and its allies in administering Basra and the southern provinces of Iraq. The chapter scrutinises the invasion, post-invasion phase, politics and disruption and transformation of the south.

Chapter Six

Operation Telic: Iraq, Basra and the South

Introduction

The 2003 invasion of Iraq started on the 19th March 2003, and for the British, according to the Nation Audit Office, the operation involved the deployment of significant military capabilities from all three-armed services. These included some 46,000 personnel, 19 Royal Navy warships, 14 Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels, 15,000 vehicles, 115 fixed-wing aircraft and nearly 100 helicopters. Telic (all mission variants), the invasion and the occupation cost up to 2010 a total of 9.24 billion pounds with 179 British casualties.

This chapter will look at Iraq, specifically the area administered by the British around Basra and its surrounding districts or areas of Amarah, Nassiriya and Samawah. The British were not the only troops in what became Multi-National Division (South East) or MND-SE. This divisional command contained troops of Dutch, Norwegian, Italian, Japanese, Australian, New Zealand, Romanian, Danish, Portuguese, Czech and Lithuanian nationalities.

The chapter will look at many areas of the British involvement in Iraq. It includes:

- The Invasion
- The Military Policy: Post-Invasion
- British Withdrawal
- Politics: Disruption in the South

- Problematic Transformation in the South
- The four pillars framework;
    i. Minimum force
    ii. Civil-military cooperation
    iii. Use of intelligence
    iv. Tactical flexibility
- The Iraq Inquiry

It is fair to state that the British in southern Iraq experienced difficulties both of their making and others imposed upon them. This chapter fits in the thesis following British efforts in Oman and Northern Ireland by scrutinising UK efforts in Iraq to query if earlier campaign lessons were utilised. The use of British Special forces in Iraq is covered in the next chapter.

Many problems affected the British in southern Iraq. These problems vary across military and civil matters, both in Iraq and from the UK and US. Some of these complications were of the coalition's own making in a post-invasion occupation with too little post-war reconstruction and planning for Iraq by both the US and UK. National directives from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the effect of UK domestic politics and the security situation that quickly developed during 2003 all impacted UK decisions. Later, the effects of Iraqi national politics (after 2005) on Basra and its provinces and the effects of local politics and their associated militia groups jockeying for power, influence and position also significantly impacted British efforts.

Problems persisted for the British with a lack of Iraqi infrastructure to work with, such as a functional civil service or security forces (police service, interior ministry security and armed forces), of which most were fired following the CPA directives, number 2 and 5. During the British occupation, there remained an influence upon the region by Iran, primarily on Basra, in the support it gave to political and militia factions in this area.

Massive logistical shortcomings remained with the administrative damage inflicted upon reconstruction efforts by the UK military by its own government with troop cuts, financial backing withheld by the UK Treasury, a lack of civilian-led reconstruction and redevelopment led by the FCO and DFID and finally because contracts for such reconstruction was controlled by the US in terms of which company or organisation was selected for supplying goods and services. Lastly, there was the loss of security and the shortcomings of a downsized UK military where senior commanders were not deployed long enough to maintain a singular strategy on the ground with enough combat ability which could be adequately trained for what became a counterinsurgency effort. Despite all the complications above, the south, since the Iraqi government took full control, has become an area of greater stability and economic success than it had under British administration, though a strong Iranian influence remains. Across the rest of Iraq, many areas since 2010 have faced massive increases in violence and have broken away from Iraq's central government. The influence of modern post-al Qaeda terrorist groups such as ISIS managed to gain control over some territory in Iraq during 2014. The Iraqi state, with assistance (mainly from US and UK advisors and special forces), has reversed this situation, and ISIS no longer hold any territory in Iraq.

Lastly, the chapter will look at successes and failures of counterinsurgency in Iraq, especially with the addition of the four pillars counterinsurgency tool concerning minimum force, civil-military cooperation, the role of intelligence and tactical flexibility.

The Invasion

At the time of the invasion, the coalition troops numbers, according to Murray and Scales (2005:45-87), were 177,194 service personnel. About 130,000 were from the US alone, with about 46,000 British soldiers, 2,000 Australian soldiers, and 194 Polish soldiers.

What follows is a brief chronology of the Iraq Invasion and after:

- On 20th March 2003, the land invasion of Iraq took place; Royal Marines launched an amphibious assault on the al-Faw peninsula in southern Iraq.
- 30th March 2003, Operation James: the object to take the Abu al-Khasib suburb of Basra begins.
- 1st April 2003, a tank battle between the 7th (UK) Armoured Brigade (desert rats) and up to 120 Iraqi tanks took place outside Basra.
- 6th April 2003, British troops advance into Basra, Iraq's second city. Small armoured columns entered the city to gain intelligence. By use of this tactic, heavy civilian casualties are reduced, showing the British to be in control. Use of Special forces (D squadron, SAS) also in Basra. Ba'ath party headquarters cleared during the Basra takeover. 7th Armoured brigade fought more than 300 militia at the College of Literature for 3 hours, eventually securing it, breaking the back of the Fedayeen resistance in Basra.

- The British created a presence in the city of Basra by deploying into; Basra Palace, Shat al-Arab hotel and Basra Airport.
- 9th April 2003, US troops advance in Baghdad.
- May 1st 2003, Mission Accomplished speech by President George W Bush on USS Abraham Lincoln just off the Californian coastline.
- June 2003 onwards, British efforts to increase levels of policing and security in Basra continue. These famously become infiltrated by the militias and criminal elements within Basra. The worst of these is the 'Serious Crimes Unit' that took two Special Forces personnel captive in 2005 (and had to forcibly shut down).
- 7th August 2003, Jordanian Embassy bombed. Seventeen killed, embassy compound then ransacked by a mob.
- 19th August 2003, The Canal Hotel bombing in Baghdad, Iraq. It killed 22 people, including the United Nations' Special Representative in Iraq, Sérgio Vieira de Mello.
- Autumn 2003, riots break out in Basra over failure to repair damage to the power grid and provide municipal services for the city. The violence begins to increase throughout the following years until it becomes an insurgency.
- On 21st April 2004, a series of bomb blasts ripped through the city, killing 74 people.
- On 3rd September 2007, the British retreat from inner-city Basra to Basra Airport after months of heavy attacks on British positions. The British shut down six operational bases at; the Old State Building, the Shatt al Arb Hotel, the Shaibah Logistics Base, the Provincial Joint Command Centre, and Basra Palace. The Basra Airport remains the final fortified base for all British forces.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 took place from the British perspective as being a supporting ally of the United States with whom we stood ‘shoulder to shoulder’ following the 9/11 attacks. The military planning initially had the British invading and occupying the Northern or Kurdish part of Iraq. This changed following Turkey’s objection and denial of the use of their territory as a jump-off point for the northern invasion. Plans changed with Britain providing a division, changing to the British being in the administration of Basra and its surrounding area. The British had support with US military assistance in the form of a small contingent of the United States Marine Corps.

Following the invasion and occupation of Iraq, Saddam Hussein was eventually captured, its previous regime toppled, but according to Mumford (2012:125), 'there remained a Pandora's box of ethnic, religious and nationalist insurgent violence.' The reality and an academic view on something such as a nation-state deploying to a foreign country and administering part of a nation have presented nuanced viewpoints of many difficult situations in Iraq in itself. However, the reality, according to many academics like Thornton, Alderson, Wither and Rangwala, is mixed at best and disconcerting if Iraq proves to be the culmination of sixty years of counterinsurgency doctrine and lesson-learning associated with this type of warfare.

The British deployed 46,000 troops of Operation TELIC that participated in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. The 1st Armoured Division was deployed to the Gulf and commanded British forces in the area. On 21st March 2003, the US and UK crossed the border into Iraq. US V (5th) Corps and the Marine Expeditionary force carried out a pincer

(enclosing attack) around Basra which then moved towards Baghdad. The UK 1st Armoured Division seized the oil-rich Faw Peninsula, which in turn led to the taking of Basra International Airport on 24th March.

A British decision was made not to enter Basra immediately with heavy armour and troops but to carry out long-range reconnaissance, which led to troops taking and patrolling Az Zubayr, a small town in Basra province. This long-range reconnaissance became a difficult test for British strength; Basra city, with a population of about 1.25 million, would have most likely put-up heavy resistance to the British causing their advance to come to a halt. Therefore, British forces did not hasten 'to crack the nut' but instead commenced the siege of the city by creating a loosely formed cordon around it. Between the 23rd and 31 March, the siege of Basra almost took the form of a stand-off. The British waited and watched, gathered information and infiltrated the city with small units of special forces (from D squadron SAS). It was the Iraqi troops led by Ali Hassan al-Majid, a.k.a. 'Chemical Ali' who lost their patience first and sought to provoke a British attack by launching completely unsuccessful sorties out of the cities with tanks and armoured vehicles as well as mortaring the British positions. The British commander after 31st March had a clear enough intelligence picture to start moving larger units into Basra. These units destroyed Baathist positions added to the division's stock of intelligence and allowed specialist teams such as Special Forces and snipers to enter into the city unmolested.

This cautious approach to Basra was actively criticised by US officers at the time. The British avoided a heavy-handed alternative in its approach used on Basra according

to Ledwidge (2011:18-19), 'became an excellent demonstration of the use of minimum force in a major war environment' This deliberate 'light-touch' British approach to Basra under Major General Brims became an example of dominating the physical and psychological battlespace. Senior US generals sought similar results during the final push to Baghdad. This British use of minimum force, however, paid dividends, British troops eventually entered a relatively intact city, and by using targeted reconnaissance, there were few casualties, aside from low-level Iraqi resistance (around 300 militia defending the Ba'ath Party Headquarters and a tank battle one within the city and one without - often overlooked) the takeover of Basra took place with little opposition.

Much of the total 46,000 personnel in Iraq were mainly soldiers (26,000), but it included some 5,000 Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary sailors, 4,000 Royal Marines, and 8,100 Royal Air Force service personnel. This number after the invasion was drastically reduced many times over the remaining six years. As for the invasion stage, the British, according to Keegan (2005:182), had led a campaign that was 'an undoubted success.' The British had secured all their objectives – the Faw peninsula, the Shatt al-Arab waterways, the oil terminals and Basra (Iraq's second city) – quickly and at minimal cost in both Iraqi and British lives. They had also conducted their war in a fashion that appeared to leave them as the representatives of the coalition on good terms with the southern population of defeated Iraq. The inhabitants of Basra made it clear to the British soldiers who took possession of their city that they were glad to be rid of both the representatives of Saddam's regime and of the foreign fighters who supported it. If a new Iraq were to be created from the ruins of the old, Basra seemed the most promising point at which to start.

The British were given transitional control over Basra province, Maysan, Dhi Qar and al-Muthana. Initially, the British were welcome in Basra. The United Nations Security Council with resolution 1483 gave the US and the UK some legal status in May 2003 which according to Ucko and Egnell (2013:48) that the UN 'recognised the US/UK and other partners as occupying powers in Iraq 'therefore making explicit their 'specific authorities, responsibilities and obligations under appropriate international law.'

The differences between the four areas economically are quite diverse, not unique for Iraq. Basra is a city and province is located on the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Basra is also Iraq's main port, although it does not have deep water access, which is handled at the port of Umm Qasr slightly further down the coastline. Basra is the economic capital of Iraq. Maysan is made up of a Shia Arab majority and a small population of Manichaeans. It is covered in the south by many Mesopotamian marshes and has traditionally been home to many marsh Arabs. Maysan is also the industrial region of Iraq and has had a Sadrist governor since 2005. Dhi Qar is one of the poorest provinces in Iraq. As an area of Mesopotamian marshes, Dhi Qar was the heartland of the ancient Iraqi civilisation of Sumer and included the ruins of Ur, Eridu, Lagash, Larsa, Girsu, Umma, and Bad-tibira. A mixed province Islamically, al-Muthana is also known as Al Muthanna and is a province in Iraq, named after the 7th-century Arab general al-Muthanna ibn Haritha. It is in the south of the country, bordering Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Its capital is the city of Samawah. Again, it is a poor rural area but with history and archaeology. Samawah is very close to the ancient Sumerian-Babylonian city of Uruk.

However, the responsibility for post-war reconstruction belonged to the US with its Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which in itself was replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority head by Paul Bremer after the ORHA was found to have difficulties due to its small organisational size and its newness. The CPA assumed legislative, executive and judicial authority and created the CPA South Region into which Basra, Maysan, Dhi Qar and al-Muthana fell.

Initial efforts carried out by the British to create security and begin initial reconstruction within Basra were bearing short-term fruit. The Iraqi Naval Academy was in Basra, which previously had close links with the Royal Navy (before 1989). Efforts to quickly stabilise the academy were effective due to the staff and instructors keeping the academy locked down as a military base. After the British took Basra, this meant that the small corps of naval officers, instructors and the classes attending the academy were willing to assist in maintaining an element of security for both their families in Basra and Iraq's waterways. Similar efforts with local policing also led to a 2,000-strong police and security forces being 'stood up.' The United Nations had witnessed, according to Ucko and Egnell (2013: 48), the security situation as being 'permissive' by 22nd April 2003. These efforts were ordered by the US CPA to be discontinued.

Ucko describes in Lessons from Basra (2010:134) that three factors constrained British efforts:

- The armed forces misinterpretation of their legacy, especially when dealing with counterinsurgency.
- The absence of civilian support and assistance to the military effort in reconstruction.

- A lack of strategic guidance from Whitehall and the UK government.

Ucko (2010:137) comments that after the invasion, the services and utilities began to break down across Basra. The garbage in Basra began to pile up, and electricity outages were frequently creating additional problems with little-working sewage systems coupled with infrequent water supplies that led to a cholera outbreak in the city.

Three efforts were rapidly executed by the British within days of securing Basra, the first effort, where the British formed a thirty-strong Iraqi council headed by Sheikh Muzatim al-Tamimi. This council did not last long as it was ordered by the CPA to be broken up. The second effort, to begin immediate repairs, 1st Armoured Division spent £10 million on quick reconstruction projects to alleviate initial problems such as access to medicine, food and clean water supplies. The third effort to create security and stabilisation to Basra was also stopped by the US in early May 2003. The US was informed of local initiatives between the British, the Iraqi Naval Academy and Basra's police. The CPA, according to Newsinger (2015:222), ordered the British to cease with its arrangements. The British have a history associated with counterinsurgency of working with local security forces and have over time usually reformed these forces to function within the British system. When it needed to put reconstruction and development into Basra, the army found that due to a lack of security, it was to be the lead agency despite the national strategy directed by the US in Baghdad.

Following the first Iraqi elections, political efforts in and around Basra to create an administration (that could work with the British) became quickly murky and confusing. Basra has its own Governor and an elected assembly, but the on-the-ground situation was affected by local, regional and national political groups. Each of these had its own armed militias, which contested for resources and contracts. This became worse after the armed chaos degenerated into the insurgency. In later years, this would evolve into organisations with political or militia influence gaining government contracts in areas such as Customs, Policing and control of Public Works.

An unarticulated political objective of the UK in Iraq was to support the US. Another aim was to provide security for the United Kingdom by fighting terrorism well away from the shores of Britain. On 20th March 2003, the British Defence Secretary in the Houses of Parliament stated according to UK MoD (2003c) that the objectives for the military campaign in Iraq were:

- Overcome the resistance of Iraqi security forces
- Deny the Iraqi regime that the use of weapons of mass destruction now and in the future.
- Remove the Iraqi regime given its clear and unyielding refusal to comply with the UN Security Council demands.
- Identify and secure the sites where weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery were located.
- Secure essential economic infrastructure, including utilities and transport, from sabotage and the wilful destruction by Iraq
- Deter wider conflict both inside Iraq and in the region

What of reconstruction in Iraq? According to Ledwidge (2011:35), there were a small number of civilian officials in Basra belonging to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID) that rarely got outside the wire after 2004. There was little in the way of a long-term plan or strategy for post-war Basra, especially with the British seeming to be involved with a plan of short-termism, meaning that commanding generals and the troops associated with those brigades were on six-monthly rotations and were only interested in 'achieved' results that happened on their tour. Ledwidge (2011:35) states that the British Member of Parliament and former soldier Adam Holloway observed correlations between the optimism found at the end of the six-monthly tours and their summaries - 'Every six months there was a little spike of hope upwards this reflected the departures of senior officers out of Basra at the end of their six-month tours as it had been left on a high note as they presented the place in a better condition at the end of better than at the beginning.' The reality noticed by Holloway was somewhat different.

Every British soldier knows the routine well: soldiers spend two months learning the job and its area of responsibility, two months doing the job and two months counting the days down until the end of the tour. Ledgwidge (2011:35) continues that this is a legacy left over from the days of Northern Ireland and its short deployments.

Wither (2009:613) also claims that British government finance for infrastructure repair in Basra was ‘typical for the British.’ It was often late in coming and fiscally tight for its approved tasks. British policy for peace support operations stresses the importance of the comprehensive approach, a coordinated effort in planning and execution across

relevant government departments where this approach was not implemented in Iraq. This meant that funding, civilian support, troop protection and the means to deliver a project had to be adequately planned. This position has been criticised by Lieutenant-Colonel John Nagl (Withers 2009:614), an author in counterinsurgency and, at the time of Iraq, an operations officer with the first battalion, 34th armour regiment, part of the US first infantry division. Nagl has opposing views where he both criticises and praises the British effectiveness in counterinsurgency in its operations on the ground and argues the view that the British army is an effective learning organisation in its counterinsurgency delivery.

The civilian officials attached to the FCO and DFID were on short-term contracts (for being in Iraq), and the usual civil-military coordination that has taken place between British government officials and the military were found to be organisationally lacking. Priority tasks such as the rebuilding for the provision of water or electricity never took place in the first few years of the British occupation of southern Iraq. Electricity substations were finally surveyed in 2009, but more straightforward technical tasks such as rubbish collection were not done until Iraqis took over these tasks themselves.

When faced with problems that the army had little experience or resources of, the typical situation, in this case, was to rely upon the army's reservists, some of whom may have had highly skilled trades and may be experts in these matters. The first US general to have 'Got It', according to Ledgwidge (2011:36), was General Peter Chiarelli. Chiarelli gathered officers from the first cavalry division and sent them to Austin, Texas, to learn about such tasks as sewerage control, trash collection and

electrical substation repair. In comparison, little had been prepared by the British to run Iraq's second city.

Regarding the quality of post-conflict planning for southern Iraq, the main issue is the fact that the UK was the junior partner in a coalition. The British rightly or wrongly had assumed that the senior partner, the US, had done sufficient planning for post-war Iraq and that it had taken place in parallel to combat operations as mentioned in an MoD report (UK MoD 2003a). The US did not plan effectively for the post-conflict phase of the occupation of Iraq. Egnell (2009:131) continues that the military campaign may have been designed explicitly with the coalition's post-conflict objectives in mind, for example, that offensive operations were carefully targeted to ensure that they had the least possible impact on Iraqi infrastructure. In practice, and due to the need for both speed and to avoid conflict between the FCO and DFID because of changes associated with the British invasion plans for Iraq having shifted from Kurdistan to southern Iraq, the plans had to change. The contingency planning for post-war Basra was taken on by the Cabinet Office initially. As this area of responsibility grew, this work was transferred to the FCO and was consequently centralised in the Iraq Planning Unit (IPU).

Many have often criticised the presidential style and limited committee work of Prime Minister Tony Blair during the run-up to and including the invasion of the Iraq war. Blair tended to work through smaller morning meetings, all with his war cabinet instead of a full regular Cabinet committee meeting. According to Hennessy (2005:5), the preference for Tony Blair to use these smaller war cabinets may have come about due

to the demand for stricter agreements regarding policy within the committees and cabinet, and it allowed for the recruitment of cabinet ministers who were generally considered compliant. The work of these cabinet committees was limited due to the different sources of information and ideas generally collected within these weekly working groups. They remain valid, for they sometimes produce alternative views to the cabinet ministers.

The British committee system of interagency cooperation certainly was not employed at the capability and capacity that it had been in the past during previous counterinsurgencies. Despite an overall lack of post-war strategic planning, the British did publish a paper at the onset of the campaign that looked into the immediate military priorities for the coalition following a potential takeover of Basra and the south. These are very similar to the points which were raised following the invasion in a speech to the House of Commons by the Defence Secretary. (UK MoD 2003c)

- To provide for the security of friendly forces.
- To contribute to the creation of a secure environment so that normal life can be restored
- to work in support of humanitarian organisations to mitigate the consequences of hostilities and, in the absence of such civilian humanitarian capacity, provide relief where it is needed
- to work with such United Nations agencies such as UNMOVIC and the IAEA in assisting Iraq to be rid of their weapons of mass destruction and their methods of delivery

- to provide and facilitate remedial action where environmental damage has occurred due to the conflict and the construction of Iraq's WMD's
- to allow for reconstruction and recommissioning of essential infrastructure within Iraq for the political and economic benefit of the Iraqi people
- And to lay plans for the reform and rebuilding of Iraq's security forces.

Coalition lack of planning for post-war operations in Iraq from the British perspective was highlighted, and this lack of information was passed up the chain of command. A British internal memo complained in advance of a Cabinet meeting held on 23rd July 2002. The memo stated that military planning action against Iraq is proceeding apace; however, little thought has been given to the aftermath and how to shape Iraq. The memo continues that the post-war occupation of Iraq, according to Egnell (2009:132), would be 'protracted and costly as a nation-building exercise.'

The Military Policy: Post Invasion

Wither (2009:614), in his article entitled 'Basra is not Belfast' states 'British government finance, and its policy for peace support operations stresses the importance of the comprehensive approach - a coordinated effort in planning and execution across relevant government departments such as the MoD, FCO and DFID.' This approach may have been the plan for Iraq but ran into difficulties with implementation.

Very shortly after the invasion phase, the UK government and the MOD reduced troop figures in southern Iraq to 10,500 from its total peak of 46,000. When compared as a

ratio of security forces personnel to previous counterinsurgency campaigns, the numbers required to provide adequate security and reconstruction within and around Basra were not high enough for this requirement. Wither (2009:623-4) looked at the analysis provided onwards from 1995 by James Quinlivian, who looked at Northern Ireland and Malaya in terms of a close analysis of security forces personnel numbers and population ratios. The average number for Malaya and Northern Ireland equated out to 20 security personnel per 1000 head of population, a ratio of 50 to 1. Looking at the British situation in southern Iraq, the population figures versus security forces personnel as a ratio differ wildly. In 2003 after the invasion, the ratio was 370 to 1. By 2007 when British personnel had been further reduced, the totals were 4000 UK service personnel to 2.5 million head of population, making a ratio of 625 to 1. These figures included military regular soldiers, police forces and local troops. Fidler**,** writing in *The Financial Times,* (2007:20th August) looked at British rapid troop reductions, where he quotes Nick Clissitt, a former Brigadier with experience of Iraq, claiming that British soldiers are a symbolic show of support for Washington and the Iraqi Government 'and that's pretty expensive, and it's not sustainable.' The initial invasion force of 46,000 by May 2003 had been reduced to 26,000, and by July 2003, it had fallen again to 9,000. Fidler (2007: 20th August), in a Financial Times article, quoted General Sir Mike Jackson (Chief of the General Staff at the time) about the rapid reductions. Jackson told the FT that 'You cannot sustain such a large force in theatre for long periods of time.'

The early success that the British had in Basra may have reinforced doctrinal complacency and that the impact of training and doctrine has been exaggerated according to Colonel Richard Iron (Wither 2009:618), who states 'in his experience

most British offices in contrast to their US counterparts neither read publications nor books on counterinsurgency.' Colonel Iron's claims that most senior British officers in Iraq lacked counterinsurgency education and training was despite a US military historian, Daniel Marston, teaching counterinsurgency at Sandhurst Military Academy. Failings in counterinsurgency education could be explained by an absence of recent, relevant operational experience before Iraq – the last being Northern Ireland.

The United Kingdom was the junior partner and had little influence on decisions taken by the US authorities that impacted British military operations. The two decisive policies which were implemented by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which had a significant impact upon the British, were the two decisions by order of Paul Bremer. The first enacted on 15th May 2003, Dissolution of Entities. This banned any Ba'ath party members from any public employment in Iraq (which included most medics, scientists, managers and civil servants as party membership was a requirement for advancement). The ban, according to Newsinger (2015:216-217), not only affected committed Baathist's members but thousands of people whose party membership had mainly been nominal, including teachers and doctors as well as junior civil servants. Nearly 80,000 people were affected.

Ambassador Bremer was warned that the policy would have disastrous effects by the CIA, the US military and the British but to no avail. The CIA station chief in Baghdad told him that 'the measure would drive 30,000 to 50,000 Baathists on the ground to the militias and in six months you'll really regret this' (Newsinger 2015: 216-7). A week later, on 23rd May 2003, Bremer ordered the dissolution of the Armed Forces, which

numbered 385,000 and of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, which included the police and other security agencies that together numbered 280,000 individuals. Bremer put about half of a million military personnel, security officers and police officers out of a job (with their associated pensions) which would later provide the future insurgents with a massive number of men with experience of military service (Iraq had national service) trained in the use of modern arms. This also meant that much of the police files held on Iraq's civilian population on whom to watch was also lost.

Another example of an Iraqi national policy that impacted profoundly upon the British South was how US forces and the US administration dealt with Moqtada al Sadr. Bremer shut down the Sadrist newspaper on 2nd April 2004 and the very next day issued an arrest warrant for its leader. This provoked a Sadrist uprising that engulfed the British in the south. The British had been given no warning over the arrest of Moqtada al Sadr, and its militia, the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), took to the streets across the south attacking and holding town centres to target the British. In Basra, the British were attacked about 70 times in an hour and a half period with multiple shootings and bombings. This uprising, according to Newsinger (2015:224), meant that the town of Amarah in Maysan province saw the greatest number of concerted assaults on a British battalion since the Korean war. The Princess of Wales regiment was attacked 658 times in a seven-month period which at its height during a three-week period saw their British headquarters being mortared or rocketed every day. On one occasion, these British troops ran out of ammunition and had to fix bayonets. Amarah became the epicentre of the Mahdi uprising in the British occupied zone.

Militarily, the British were deployed on the ground for six-month-long tours of duties, whereas the US deployed their troops for between 12 to 15 months. Crawshaw (2008:17) states that this left little time to adjust to the situation on the ground, encouraged short-term thinking, changes in strategy frequently happened with each new incoming brigade and divisional commanders who were also on six-month tours. Past British deployments tended to last for about a year.

These shortened tours meant it left little time for professional relationships with Iraqi officials and security forces to be effectively built up. The US approach facilitates a more consistent approach and conveys a greater sense of commitment to the area in which they were deployed. Wither (2009:619) claims the Iraq campaign revealed gaps and outdated aspects in British counterinsurgency. It was very different from Northern Ireland, and the 2006 Operation Telic review (UK MoD 2006) revealed 'gaps and outdated aspects' in the thinking of commanders. The review identified several strategic and operational factors that needed addressing with the new doctrine. It also found an acknowledged problem in preparing for the reality of what is known as a three-block war problem with changing the necessary mindset to deal with rapidly changing roles of high-intensity combat, policing and nation-building tasks. Could these gaps in capability and outdated aspects also be identified due to modern leaders and commanders critiquing themselves in an after-tour debriefing?

Wither (2009:619) notes that the deficiency of British learning from previous British army counterinsurgency efforts and current characteristics with contemporary campaigns has resulted from poor understanding coming through as deficient

doctrine. It is worth it to note that the inclusion of British counterinsurgency principles in the US Army/Marine Corps publication FM 3-24 suggested the US found little wrong with the traditional British approach if the basic counterinsurgency principles were implemented. Counterinsurgency required planning and training in its operations along with an understanding of theory and an understanding of the recent history of the conflict to allow the two to work effectively, something that should have happened in later Telic deployments after 2003

A Human Rights Watch Report (Wither 2009:620) states that the report writers expressed surprise at the British unpreparedness to perform large-scale security duties by having woefully inadequate numbers of combat troops, military police, interpreters and bilingual officials. The British army doctrinal report of 2006 (UK MoD 2006) acknowledged that 'what was lacking in southern Iraq was simple, there was no civil police force left functional for which the army to work with.' In May 2005, the then chief of police in Basra, according to Rangwala and Wither (2009:620-621), reported a 'loss of control over three-quarters of the police to sectarian militias.' As has been the case in most previous British counterinsurgency campaigns, there has at least been a functional police service on the ground with which to work since police and local security forces are usually the primary means of fighting insurgents.

The British army, in terms of political support, was left in an ambiguous position after the coalition handover to a new Iraqi National assembly following elections to the national parliament and governorate seats in 2005. The assembly was to write a new constitution for Iraq and exercise legislative functions until the constitution became

law. Locally, politicians associated with Shi'ite Islamists decisively won the seats of Basra province, Maysan, Dhi Qar and Muthana. This created a situation where these state governors were politically part of the national government but did not support the UK. The majority of Arab Sunni Muslims boycotted the vote.

The news of two events against Iraqis by the British did not help with maintaining any political support. The supposed 'abuse' against Iraqi looters taken into British custody and then reports of British soldiers being tried for the death of Nadhem Abdullah on 11th May 2003 eroded support. Despite this, there was little in the way of coordinated unity of effort in the classic counterinsurgency sense. It became a sort of political flip-flop, where one politician or Governor would align to the British position one week, providing support for the UK operations if it affected their political adversary and the next week, they would not if their own interests were to be affected.

The British army in Iraq, following troop reductions, was not powerful enough to demonstrate largesse. In evidence given by Sir Jock Stirrup, the CDS to the House of Commons Select Committee for Defence (UK HC SCD 2007) concluded that UK forces tended to be spectators, occasionally protagonists and rarely the centre of power and legitimacy. David Kilcullen, an Australian specialist in counterinsurgency, gave a speech on 20th March 2008 to the George C Marshall faculty where he described the British approach as being ‘too timorous and better suited to peace support operations than the emerging situation on the ground.’ It is suggested that the British army was not ready for the hybrid character of the campaign in Iraq; troops needed to be capable of mounting large-scale conventional urban assaults and

conducting peace support activities (Holmes 2007:112-113). This required adequate combat-capable troops.

In comparison, Wither (2009:623) compares Basra in 2007 to the situation in Northern Ireland in 1972 before 'Operation Motorman'. The tenuous comparison between Northern Ireland and Iraq was recognised when the Sadr-orientated militias mounted a large-scale and concerted attack on a small garrison in the provincial coordination centre in central Basra. The British garrison came close to being overrun, a situation similar to some of the failed but closely run attacks by the Provisional IRA on RUC police stations and border sangers. The British army in Belfast had greater military resources and political backing to reassert the government authority, whereas in southern Iraq, the situation was reversed, where resources seemed to be lacking. Wither (2009:624) states the under-resourced British army could only mount very occasional raids to try and contain militia led violence and criminality. This situation became apparent, especially after 2006, when the British deployed into Helmand, Afghanistan causing a great squeeze on the army both in personnel and equipment.

Counterinsurgency is essentially about battling to win and hold popular support, domestically and internationally. In southern Iraq, the British failed on the ground to achieve this because they could not provide a stable, secure environment that protected ordinary Iraqis from intimidation by criminal and militia gangs, while at the same time allowing for the development of representative political institutions and economic reconstruction of the city and provinces.

One of the last large-scale military offensive operations to be carried out by the British around Basra was known as 'Operation Sinbad', which took place on 27th September 2006. It involved 1000 troops, 2300 Iraqi army personnel, and it involved barricading off whole districts of Basra. The stated goal of the operation was to cordon off militias, locate and detain corrupt police officers, seize illegal weapons and arrest suspected terrorists and criminals. Once these police stations were purged of militias, there would be immediate local reconstruction projects taking place in these districts. Wither (2009:624) argues that it was ‘too little too late,’ when security forces left a particular district or area, the militias came back reasserting their own influence.

The original objectives of 'Operation Sinbad' were to confront the militias, establish security and enable the handover of districts to loyal and trained Iraqi security forces. This would allow the UK to kick-start economic reconstruction in the city. The combined UK and Iraqi troops launched a search and cordon operation across the province and city, implementing these quick impact reconstruction efforts. This was to have been followed by 28 days of increased patrolling with continued reconnaissance work, which itself would lead to investigations into local police forces led by a British transition team to reduce corruption and criminality with the police to create a lull in violence for the city. The operation went well, but the British forces quickly found themselves under fire while finishing these projects. Soon after the purges in the police stations, the militia's influence soon returned. This operation was planned at an earlier date with higher numbers of UK and Iraqi troops, which was quickly cancelled due to a lack of support by both governments.

Wither (2009:625) further argues that the upsurge in violence in 2007 was compared to Aden, wherein in both cases, there were no incentives to support the British army and one where the UK government had already committed itself to withdraw from the territory.

Wither takes the view that Iraq (on its own) did not break the British army, and there were many factors (UK, Iraqi and US) influencing what happened on the ground. The war was unpopular at home, placing domestic burden and constraints on New Labour. General Sir Rupert Smith had an axiom 'without the political will and leadership to create and sustain the force and direct it to achieve its objectives come what may, no military force can triumph in the face of the more determined adversary' (Wither 2009:627).

The results, according to Ucko (2010:142), were disheartening for both the British government and its armed forces. When operations were planned, the Basra Regional Provincial Council, where the militias were represented, used their political power in Baghdad to force the Iraqi prime minister Malaki to limit the British offensive operation of Sinbad. It was during this operation that the British evacuated the civilian staff from within Basra Palace due to safety concerns. These civilians were never to return to Basra; they remained at the airport. Despite efforts to maintain some sort of presence in the city, on the last day of 'Operation Sinbad' it was announced by Prime Minister Tony Blair that the numbers of British military personnel in and around Basra were to be reduced by 1600 troops leaving the total number of 5500 (Ucko 2010:142-3).

The British army in Basra did not live up to its reputation for small wars, which Wither (2009:628) argues was based on 'a selective and superficial reading, in that the British army has always had mixed results at the start of major counterinsurgency operations, with poor bad planning, outdated doctrine and training for counterinsurgency and fixation upon peace support operations.

Limited approaches had been used in Basra to create imperfect security solutions on the ground, which had been employed in the Balkans and Northern Ireland. With Iraq, there was no secure environment for the people of Basra and the other southern regions of Iraq, and finally, the British army was not adequately reinforced by the UK government. It could not recover from early setbacks and, following the invasion, was vastly reduced in size. Did the British army, through the government, deploy enough material and personnel to maintain effective control and to enable its counterinsurgency principles to be put into place? A senior officer interviewed by Knights and Williams (2003:7) in September 2005 supports this view 'for far too long we have struggled with a brigade-sized force which is farcically small for the task it has been given.'

British Withdrawal

It was following Operation Sinbad that the British Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Air Marshal Jock Stirrup decided to remove the British presence from Basra altogether. 80% of attacks were made and targeted against UK forces. He believed that withdrawing them from the city would free Basra from its cycle of violence; Stirrup commented 'the British presence was creating a spurious but tangible legitimacy for

violence and Iranian's interference in support of such violence. To free Basra from its cycle of violence, it was necessary to withdraw our permanently based forces from Basra city' (Ucko 2010:142). Therefore, the British went from six operational bases at the Old State Building, the Shatt al Arb Hotel, the Shaibah Logistics Base, the Provincial Joint Command Centre and Basra Palace retreating to their last base at the contingency operating base at Basra Airport outside the city. The first round of withdrawals did not stem the violence or number of attacks made against British forces during April 2007. The average number of attacks increased from 45 per week, while in June and July that year, they increased on average to between 80 to 90 attacks per week according to Ucko 2010:143. Attacks upon civilians also did not drop and averaged about thirty per week.

Another stated objective of Stirrup was that handing Basra back to the Iraqis would force them to have to deal with the Sunni-Shia problem and also to confront the issue of Iranian involvement. The vast majority of attacks were carried out by the Badr and Sadr militias, mainly Shia, not Sunni. There was not a significant al Qaeda presence in the south of Iraq, and much of the influence over these two large militias was Iranian.

During this time, it is noteworthy to recognise that security sector reforms regarding the local police, customs service and security for the oil wells, along with stabilisation for reconstruction and development, ground to a halt, leaving a budget of £744 million unspent. The final British departure from Basra was agreed in a secret deal between British government representatives and Ahmed al-Fartusi (an imprisoned Jaish al Mahdi leader). The militia promised cessation of violence if UK forces withdrew and if

they released 120 JAM prisoners. Al-Fartusi also promised a stabilising exit strategy that would continue to bring peace to the whole province along with Basra. The peace did not hold. Colonel Richard Iron, a mentor for senior Iraqi army commanders, describes (Ucko 2010:144) that 'when we moved out, lawlessness took over……. We thought if we moved out, we would remove the source of the problems that actually the JAM had been fighting is because we were the only obstacle to their total control of Basra.'

The British government never formally acknowledged the deal, but they did move out, whether unilaterally or as part of a deal; whichever it was, the results were the same. Attacks on British and coalition forces did indeed drop though attacks made against civilians and the general population did not. The result was the Iraqi troops based in Basra had not gained the ability to maintain security for either the city or the province because the 10th Iraqi division was underequipped, not combat-ready, and it was also split by factionalism associated with religion and politics. From a British perspective, the transitioning of control to Iraqi forces had two significant flaws; the unchanged number in casualty rates and the Iraqi security forces' ineffectiveness to stand on their own.

Despite there being high hopes for a cessation of violence in Basra**,** it never quite took root, and the JAM had its own problems. The leader, Sadr, was losing political support, and many of the previously loyal militia members were turning into criminal gangs or renegade units operating under the Sadr banner without direction from above. The situation on the ground in Basra was still shocking. Opposing militias and religious

zealots operated freely in the city, often murdering political opponents or those violating supposedly religious edicts, e.g., women who were behaving in irreligious manners were often punished in the street. Ucko (2010: 146) describes how at the start of the British occupation of Basra, women freely walked the streets wearing Western garb. This started to change very quickly from 2004 onwards. Following the rise of the JAM in Basra, they too struggled to control many of the smaller but well-armed militias or quasi-religious groups.

Politics: Disruption in the South

The political situation in Basra and its surrounding areas for the British did not experience a honeymoon period. Efforts to install a thirty-strong council collapsed rapidly. Rangwala (2009:498) comments that the British were unable to hold any political consistency; four governors were installed in 21 months with differing agendas and from different parties, with no stability or political direction. After 'free' elections in 2005, things changed dramatically. According to Fidler (2007:20th August), the British were operating against a background of a struggle for power among three Shia Islamists political groupings; SCIRI and two Sadr associated parties. During the 2005 elections, the Dawa party (Sadr associated) and other Islamists secured 38 out 41 seats in Basra's elections and 35 out of 41 in Maysan.

Maysan was a problematic area for British control; it was electorally dominated by the party of Muqtada al Sadr, who chose one of its paramilitary commanders as its first provincial Governor. In Basra, the first Chief of Police to be appointed was a SCIRI/Badr brigade commander, that did not get on with Maysan's Governor. Basra's

police chief used the police in Basra (both the new recruits and old elements of the police previously associated with the Hussein government) against the Sadrist orientated officials of the Basran Governor. The police in Basra often harassed the Governor's appointed officials and even detained him at one stage, according to Rangwala (2009:500). By mid-2005, the political situation had changed from local control (with militia assistance) to one with political parties at the national level that was now influencing national, regional, and local events. The local politicians still had militia connections.

Economically since the rioting in late 2003 and militia attacks of 2004, the Northern oil pipeline was completely shut down. Most of the Iraqi oil revenue came through the Basran oilfields. According to Rangwala (2009:501), almost 90% of the national government's revenues came from the four southern provinces and were administered by British forces. Hence the stability and development required by Iraq were very much dependent on there being stability in the south. With the jockeying for political position and power, there was a relationship that went hand-in-hand with activity by militias and criminal gangs aligned with political groups. The political will to support the British ebbed and flowed.

The best example of this was the capture of two British special operations soldiers on a surveillance mission in Basra. In 2005 the Fadila party installed a new governor (a Sadrist) who attempted to inhibit British efforts to curtail the criminal and paramilitary efforts of Muqtada al Sadr supporters. It was this Fadila / Sadr affiliated police that held the soldier's captive. The Fadila party also wanted total control of all elements of

the Basra police force. The British were unable to persuade the Governor to support them; the Governor did order the release of these two soldiers without success. Therefore, the British had to lay on an operation to release their men. It is interesting to note that at the national level, the British were successful in affecting support by the SCIRI dominated interior ministry but who at this time had very little local influence with the police who were heavily infiltrated and associated by Sadr associated militias.

Following the operation to successfully rescue the two special forces soldiers, the provincial council and the city governor suspended relations with the British forces for eight months, according to Rangwala (2009:509). He further notes that the political, military and police control often changed with the ongoing political situation, sometimes completely turning the situation into opposing angles for the British. As a result, there was not a reliable partner in counterinsurgency doctrine to work with, to provide a local security force presence as the Basra police chief was a Sadrist supporter.

With little local consistent support by the Basra governor who could wobble, both resisting and overturning British actions in Basra - with a police force that could be orientated towards one faction or another - they would not comply with any program (either British, locally structured or created by Iraqi national politics in nature). It has been argued by Rangwala (2009:510) on 23rd April 2005 that the only real thing the British could plan for was their exit from Basra and the south.

On a more positive note, from a British perspective, the British role by 2007, after the withdrawal from Basra city, was the training of the Iraqi national army and the border police, both of which withstood and survived the local effects of Iraqi politics and its associated militia infiltration attempts.

The fragmentation of the Iraqi governmental machine did not fit into a British counterinsurgency theory. There was no local existing police structure with any influence, force projection or ability to defend themselves in the area. British forces often had to watch factional disputes between national politics and provincial politics. In these cases, the British chose not to support either but often had to operate in this vacuum of power. The 'residual strategy' of the British was to 'support the growing national government' and, according to Rangwala (2009:511), almost became an agent of Iraqi re-centralisation since 2006. It is worth noting that Iranian influence in the south was to supply arms to many opposing groups, maintaining the chaos.

Following the self-removal of British forces from Basra in 2007 to a 'position of over-watch,' the Iraqi national government recognised that the 10th Iraqi infantry division was facing difficulties. Therefore, they swapped out the 10th with the 14th. The 14th division, which was underequipped and understaffed, had performed well in its previous area of operation. It was deployed immediately to Basra, thus creating an Iraqi presence in the main streets and squares of the city. Basra was in a bad way following the militia's presence after the change of role of the British army. Following this change of command and units in Basra, the Prime Minister of Iraq Nouri al-Maliki,

launched an operation to retake Basra from the militias and political groups called 'Operation Charge of the Knights' in March 2008.

The first phase of Operation Charge of the Knights created uncertainties because local security forces (both the British training force and Iraqi army) were caught unaware of the entire operation. Further inadequacies of the Iraqi security forces came to light during the initial deployment into Basra. Two brigades of the 14th division, when challenged by the JAM, melted away, disappearing into the city. On the policing front, one-third of the police force stood their ground when the operation started. The only British elements on the ground at the start of the operation were involved with the mentoring scheme with the 14th division. Usually, this small number of trainers would ordinarily deploy on the ground along with the troops with whom they are training; in this case, something went amiss, the British training team did not initially deploy. When they were eventually allowed to deploy by the British UK military commanders' events and occurrences on the ground were vastly improved. Ucko (2010:146) wondered if this was a reason why the two Iraqi brigades had significant difficulties, in that these units did not have British trainers with them when the operation started and therefore took the decision upon themselves to remove their presence from the battlefield. With the US and later UK supporting assets, the tide in Basra turned towards the security forces. It is worth noting that the two brigades of 14th Iraqi that went amiss had also faced combat difficulties with the militias but had remained 'combat effective' despite removing themselves for several hours.

A ceasefire was agreed upon in Tehran, and the province of Basra meant the JAM ceased their operations against the Iraqi security forces. Following this, reconstruction was carried out in many of the areas as per the plan for Operation Sinbad, complete with neighbourhood patrols. Twenty thousand troops remained in Basra, taking responsibility for patrols of the city and also occupying the only port in Iraq, therefore, controlling potential customs revenues (taking it off the militia appointed by a previous governor). The Charge of the Knights, according to Ucko (2010:148), was important; it was an Iraqi led effort involving an entire Iraqi army corps bringing in US Army and Marine Corps assets in a support role such as unarmed aerial vehicles and attack helicopters. Later this involved an element of the British infantry mentoring team.

Whitehall made three changes to the British military transition teams following Operation Charge of the Knights; the first was that senior commanders committed the teams to accompany Iraqi security forces on operations rather than just being limited to isolated bases or training areas. This partnering continued with the UK deploying 1000 personnel in various teams of between 20 to 30 trainers, usually led by a Lieutenant-Colonel or Major with a small force protection unit for their own defence. These trainers would include forward air controllers, medics, communication support personnel, and interpreters. This close work, according to Ucko (2010:148), provided oversight effectiveness and allowed for the sharing of coalition intelligence, surveillance and air assets which it lacked. The second change was where British military assets participated in establishing joint security stations throughout Basra, where they integrated Iraqi police and Iraqi military for coordinated operations and to enhance counterinsurgency capability for both units. The third step, what with the new security gains, enabled the British government to take new steps in infrastructure and

economic developments by returning their civilian agencies such as the Department for International Development and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office to new offices on the ground. A final joint effort between the UK military and Iraqi security forces led to an effort to clear the rubbish and deliver essential services on the ground in Basra, especially after the UK government established the Basra investment commission.

The change of circumstances meant that the UK government could try a new strategy for the remaining 4500 troops (House of Commons Defence Committee 2008:7)

- To complete the training of the Iraqi 14th infantry division.
- To return Basra Airport to Iraqi civilians.
- To set conditions for provincial elections.
- To boost economic development in the south - and then leave.

By February 2009, these tasks were deemed complete, and the control of Basra Airport was handed back to local control. Elections were held, and unemployment in the province dropped to 17%. Port revenues were up, and there was an increasing trade. To quote Ucko (2010:149), the '14th division were maturing nicely.'

The British relearnt some aspects of counterinsurgency during the Charge of the Knights operation, especially when the British approach is compared both before and after this specific event. Basra undermined the British ideal and concept of their ability in counterinsurgency. The soft approach, according to Ucko (2010:151), did not work, though it might have been done over time with proper resourcing and troop numbers,

its junior partner status also constrained Britain and therefore could not set policy even for its area of operations. The British had no decision over currency, economy or consequences of national politics with stark consequences for the provinces administered by MND: SE. Claims by Ucko (2010:151) that the British had a lack of strategic vision; the strategic direction in Basra was, therefore in part, an outgrowth of the problems affecting the United States' own, largely improvised approach to nation-building. A lack of civilian partners, both UK and Iraqi civilian left the army isolated and therefore becoming the sole enabler for reconstruction and redevelopment with its dwindling military resources. The Charge of the Knights aftermath provided the British evidence of a strong ability to perform in support of a partner such as the Iraqi security forces if they were of sufficient number with mentoring support. Ucko (2010:152) concludes that 'the local political situation was not good but was better than it had been for years.'

Problematic Transformation in the South

Iraq, following the 2003 invasion, especially in the southern areas, mainly comprised Shia Arabs with a Sunni minority. Chin (2008:121) claims British counterinsurgency strategy evolved during the Cold War and was mainly based on combating the Maoist model of the revolutionary war. Later development of this model made by the British that worked successfully in Oman raised profound scepticism in British counterinsurgency circles that they would work in Iraq (Chin 2008:120). Were the 'lessons' of Oman even discussed, let alone attempted in Iraq?

Insurgent tactics had moved from a rural environment to attacks taking place in both urban and rural environments, according to Chin (2008:122). Almost 70% of Iraqis lived in towns and cities. The conflicts between religion, culture and ethnicity in Iraq had been papered over under Saddam Hussein. During the post-invasion years, often, the conflict between the Iraqis was described as Shia versus Sunni versus Kurd.

Chin (2008:122-123) argues that insurgents often made use of new technology such as mass communications, the internet, cheaper transport and the easy transfer of money across the globe, which provides insurgents with easy propaganda, finance and a support mechanism. He further argues that stability in the British controlled areas or MND: SE depended on four key goals.

- Establishment of a viable economy
- the provision of essential services
- stability and security (a lack of violence or at least containing it)
- governance

Chin notes (2008:122) that failure in one area of counterinsurgency strategy would potentially lead to strategic failure in the others. Two failures immediately following the invasion laid the groundwork for potential strategic failure. The first was that there was little US interest in developing the four southern provinces by the United States of America. Its British commanders were broadly under the direction of US commanders in Baghdad while coordinating supposedly civil efforts with the Jay Garner's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (OHRA) and forerunner to the CPA under Paul Bremer, which were both Baghdad-centric organisations. The second

immediate problem was trying to get the British civil agencies such as the DFID and the FCO to deploy and coordinate efforts on the ground with military units.

The first real indication that things were going wrong for the British in Basra became apparent with the rioting on August 9th and 10th, 2003. This was down to a failure of the British to restore essential services and utilities, and Chin (2008:124) said that this 'should've been highlighted as major warning bell.' The military was left doing tasks providing security, governance, reconstruction and the long-term development of Basra and its surrounding provinces without the support and expertise of UK civilian government departments.

The military tried to buy time with a series of quick impact projects funded by the commanders' emergency response fund. However, these, according to Chin (2008: 125-126), were nothing more than a sticking plaster being applied to a wound. By the time Telic 2 took place in July to December 2003, senior officers were not briefed on nation-building and at this point, there was still little interaction between the UK military and civilian experts with the FCO or DFID.

The US CPA also had, by this time, found its efforts in reconstruction difficult. The CPA had little in the way of skilled personnel for reconstruction work, and when it started, efforts in the south had to use the British army to provide military engineers for its works. Chin (2008:126) argues that the environment was challenging; defeat was not inevitable. The efforts and errors of the British and the Americans in their decision-making were avoidable. The environment of the south did not help the US or UK to

succeed in its efforts as the environment has been harsh for everyone, including Saddam Hussein.

These are most of the problems besetting the British (and the US) in Iraq. The following sections look at the four analytical framework areas of minimum force, CIMIC, use of intelligence and tactical flexibility predominantly from a British perspective (although some examples do show where the US make the same mistakes).

The Four Pillars Framework

Minimum Force

Minimum force in southern Iraq can be seen across multiple Telic deployments of the British timeline while administering Basra and the south. A good example is where Britain employed minimum force when it chose not to move into the centre of Basra immediately after the invasion but instead chose to carry out close target reconnaissance, i.e., finding out the capability and number of opposing forces on the ground within Basra city limits. Ledwidge (2011:18-19) notes that this level of restraint was typical of the British approach to counterinsurgency.

Immediately following the takeover of Basra by the British, the armed forces took the decision to patrol Basra in a light, non-threatening manner, i.e., little in the way of body armour, heavy weapons, assault equipment, and chose to wear regimental berets instead of a combat helmet. The British also took the decision not to employ at that stage (the post-invasion honeymoon period) heavily armoured vehicles such as the

Warrior armoured personnel carrier but instead used the snatch Land Rover which was used with much aplomb in Northern Ireland.

A further example could be where the number of British troops in the south was cut dramatically from 46,000 to only 10,500 within three months of the invasion. This, according to Newsinger (2015:220), was pretty much a guarantee of disaster. The wind of change had 'struck' according to Ledwidge (Newsinger 2015:221), the 'era of soft hats was gone'. With a mere 10,500 troops, the British had to control an area of some 60,000 square miles, including 600 miles of border with Iran, which included 30 miles of coastline. The entire population of the four provinces was 4.6 million: one British soldier for every 438 civilians.

The now infamous coalition provisional authority order, which banned Baathists and dissolved the Iraqi army and police, left a situation of despondency and disbelief in the British South, according to a British officer who spoke to Newsinger (2015: 221). Just regarding force protection, General Sir Mike Jackson, the CGS, identified the problem according to Newsinger (2015:221) as 'troop numbers.' From the very beginning, troop levels in the south were only appropriate if the British had been in a support role and acting with a reliable local security force partner such as the police. Mike Jackson goes on to explain, 'At the height of the troubles in Northern Ireland, for example, we had 20,000 or more soldiers in the province to keep the peace, and even then, we were unable to suppress terrorism altogether. Northern Ireland has only around 5% of Iraq's population a similar presence would thus equates to 400,000 soldiers, but the coalition struggled to reach half that number. Furthermore, in Northern Ireland the army was

working alongside a highly competent police force, which doesn't yet exist in Iraq. On the contrary, many of the Iraqi police are corrupt and making matters worse.' Newsinger (2015:221)

By employing minimum force, the British hoped to avoid the situation where the negative impact of excessive force tends to drive the population away from the administration and towards extremist positions. Some level of force is necessary to restore order and achieve a breathing space, but when used correctly, it can also act as a deterrent against further action. Kitson (1971:84,87) also states that the principle of minimum force should be based on an understanding of the overall political objectives within the operation and how they should relate to the actions of all soldiers at all levels of command. It goes back to the crucial principles of political understanding and cultural sensitivity, especially in southern Iraq. The British in Basra and other areas such as Muthanna, Maysan and Thi Qar found force projection and force protection (a significant factor for all military operations) difficult in areas 'amongst the people.'

The original British idea was to have a significant presence in and around Basra. Located in the older Basra Palace and other significant structures, this signalled a change of administration and occupation amongst the Basra population. The reality towards the end of the British period of control in Basra was that units had been under siege, and because there was little security, they had distanced themselves from the local population. Eventually, the British moved by retreating to fortified areas such as the camp that they had at Basra Airport. Without a fully implemented

counterinsurgency strategy that covers all aspects such as an integrated strategy incorporating civil-military cooperation, employment of minimum force, use of significant local intelligence gathering and, on-the-ground, tactically flexible security forces, deficiencies in one area causes problems in some if not all of the others.

Newsinger (2015: 222) sets the example of minimum force in Iraq which follows the severe fighting that took place in the town of Majar al Kabir in the Maysan province on 24th June 2003, where 200 Iraqis were either killed or severely wounded. This episode culminated in the deaths of six military policemen who, according to Newsinger (2015:223), were 'left unsupported in the town.' These deaths showed a good indication of the different approaches taken by both the British and the Americans; the British did not attempt to storm and occupy the town (effectively, the town was abandoned). The American approach in Fallujah, where four US military contractors belonging to the Blackwater private security company were killed on 31st March 2004, was different in its response. The US response culminated in full-scale military assaults on the town on 5th April and 18th November 2004 that left much of the town in ruins. The British often sought a different method, such as reaching an accommodation of sorts with the pro-Iranian Shia faction, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and their associated Badr brigade and were prepared to cooperate with them.

If the British had maintained significant troop numbers in southern Iraq, the possibility of maintaining the principle of minimum force in conjunction with other counterinsurgency tools such as economic development could have eventually

eliminated the militia problem in and around Basra with an increase in regular paid employment.

Ledwidge (2011:174) explains that the ideals of minimum force are 'in essence an expression of the international law of the use of force.' All British personnel are required as part of their mandatory annual training to receive a lecture on this simple aspect of humanitarian law. It is considered as essential as a soldier's weapon training and basic medical drills. Soldiers were taught that force might only be used if four conditions are satisfied: necessity, humanity, distinction (ensuring that civilians are not targeted) and proportionality. Ledwidge (2011:174), also a veteran of Iraq, quotes the British Second World War combat infantry veteran who famously said, 'the Geneva Convention is a dangerous piece of stupidity because it leads people to believe that war can be civilised. It can't.'

The minimum force approach is a sensible and rational tool associated with the small war approach of ‘hearts and minds.’ Ledgwidge (2011:174-175) argues that the taking of Basra in April 2003 does stand as a lasting example of how to take a city with minimum damage and casualties to all concerned with the Geneva Convention rules largely observed. The early period in and around Basra displays the ethos of minimum force effectively utilised.

During the later era of British control in the South of 2005, this employment of minimum force is described as ‘schizophrenic’ by a senior officer interviewed by Ledwidge (2011:176), who had it put to him: ‘The British army’s formative experience in the late

20th century was Northern Ireland, and by 1990 we were masters at what we did, including minimum force. We carried this ethos/habit with us to the Balkans where we were equally restrained. We opened up in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but very soon returned back to where we had been (beret wearing etc). The rest of the Basra campaign was a schizophrenic experience veering between use of exemplary violence and minimum force.'

If the use of force is misused, Mumford (2012:7) claims that excessive use of force by security forces or the army such as torture or 'shoot to kill' policies very quickly gain media attention and in contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns only serve to generate the 3R's, 'resentment, resistance and revenge.'

Egnell (2009:146) praises the British methods of waging war with the more far-reaching political aims such as post-conflict reconstruction in mind. He praises the British for their understanding and restraint in the use of force, even in open battles such as the battle for Basra, where they showed patience and respect for civilian lives and property. This continues through the tactical use of hearts and minds operations involving the minimum use of force and tactical flexibility in being able to de-escalate situations. This quality of operational methods and soldiering continued throughout the British occupation and administration of southern Iraq with the possible exceptions of the two examples; one by The Black Watch regiment and the second involving the detention of two UK special forces soldiers by a section of the Basran police.

Operation Tobruk was where the Black Watch conducted an extensive search operation in a volatile area south of Baghdad. This operation stands out as 'very un-British' due to the methods of how the soldiers stormed what they considered an insurgent stronghold by bursting into houses arresting large numbers of people. The results, according to Newsinger (2015:73), were 'very reminiscent of early Northern Ireland mistakes' as this operation involved 700 soldiers in over 100 vehicles, many of which were armoured, that operationally lasted for 12 hours. These tactics did lead to the arrest of more than 100 men who were suspected armed criminals with no casualties to either side. The second example was the forced liberation of two British special forces soldiers from an Iraqi jail in Basra in September 2005. These two soldiers belonging to both the Special Reconnaissance Regiment and the SAS under 'Operation Hathor' had been on surveillance duty watching an Iraqi police commander who was then captured by his police sub-division, the known to be corrupt, serious crimes unit for Basra. This Basran police unit refused to release the special forces personnel they detained at the Al Jameat police station, even when Basra's governor ordered their release.

Following special forces deployed from Baghdad and the use of the Operation Hathor quick reaction force, the 1st Battalion the Staffordshire Regiment, they decided to assault the police station at night. The infantry advanced into the area surrounding the police station and used armoured vehicles supported by attack helicopters to contain and surround the area (to contain the area, which in turn led to localised rioting). It is this incident that caused the local governor of the Basra province to break off of contacts with the British during 2005. Knickmeyer and Finer (2005) state that the governor of Basra, Mohammed Walli, called the British response 'barbaric, savage

and irresponsible.' Efforts in safeguarding their troops put the British against a Sadr supporting Basra Governor and Basra chief of police.

In conclusion, the British use of force is at best defined as mixed in its deployment but minimal in its use against civilians when contrasted to the use of force by the US military. Thornton (2005), in his report to the House of Commons Defence Committee, states that restraint in not resorting to indiscriminate force, i.e., the use of artillery, airstrikes by fast jets, helicopter gunships or crew-served weapons such as heavy machine guns, thus avoiding civilian casualties.

Thornton (2005) and Egnell (2009:139) continues that despite criticism levelled at the British army and the UK's special forces in its use of force (both good and bad). While in Basra, the British held intelligence on 400 insurgents with an ability 'to take them out if we wanted to.' The British chose instead a strategy which was to wait it out, something akin to trying to manage the violence. Any significant form of military operation would escalate the violence, increasing the risk of civilian casualties; therefore, by doing nothing, they kept civilian casualties down, providing less ammunition for the insurgent recruiting sergeant.

Civil-Military Cooperation

The broad principles of British counterinsurgency operations are that civil-military cooperation cannot stand on its own as a separate function, whereas some of the others can for a limited time. Mockaitis (1999: 56) claims that civil-military cooperation

is a bottom-up approach that starts with cooperation at the very lowest levels, usually between soldiers that are forced to adapt to the needs of civilians on the ground. As an administrative tool, it requires that officials coordinate intelligence operations with the principle of minimum force, therefore, finding the right hammer for the right job, in the right place, at the right time. Without intelligence, restraint on the correct amount of force and an understanding of culture, religion and social-economic factors, all efforts will eventually go awry if there is also no learning for future encounters.

Civil-military cooperation as a policy can be described by Egnell (2009:17) as 'provides a nexus for relevant services and agencies to pull together providing reconstruction, development and economic management for affected regions whilst at the same time providing for security force reform or build-up while protecting multiagency assets essential for reconstruction.' In reality, it can be somewhat lacking, for, without an understanding of religion, culture and all other factors of what makes an understanding of a population that feels it needs an insurgency, all efforts will fail. However, this can only be solved by a proper structure to provide oversight for military, but also civilian, operations to maximise the effort. The earlier insurgencies of Oman and Northern Ireland also took time to analyse and then provide the necessary development to bring about cessation or containment of violence.

Post-war planning for the British in Iraq initially fell upon the Cabinet Office, but after discussion and an effort to minimise disruption between agencies such as DFID and the FCO, it was centralised within the FCO in the Iraq Planning Unit (IPU). Efforts by the US, who was the senior coalition partner, to effectively plan for the post-conflict

reconstruction of Iraq proved to be shockingly lacking and limited. The British were concerned, and they complained internally in a memo written in advance of a Cabinet meeting held about Iraq on 23rd July 2002. Pincus (2005) records in his Washington Post article that the memo 'noted militarily planning action against Iraq is proceeding apace,' but adds that little thought has been given to the aftermath and how to shape it. In reality, US military plans were virtually silent on this point, especially when the memo further warns that a post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise, a situation the US wanted to avoid.

Both Ucko and Egnell (2013:112) state that the British had a slow response in Basra after the invasion and saw no need to reform efforts. This, however, was significantly changed following the decisions by the CPA to essentially dismantle the entire Iraqi civil service and security forces. Following this CPA order, the weakness of the military's civilian partners was perceived as the campaigns 'missing link' (Ucko and Egnell 2013:113).

An administrative body was set up in 2004 with the sole purpose of providing some sort of cooperation between government departments operating in southern Iraq called the post-conflict reconstruction unit (PCRU). This unit was created where glaring inadequacies had been found, and it hoped that this unit would provide a means of interdepartmental success allowing the military to concentrate upon other tasks such as patrols, raids and security.

On paper, the PCRU showed fantastic promise as it was owned jointly by DFID, the FCO and MoD, which, according to Ucko and Egnell (2013:113), was meant to mandate and to develop a strategy for post-conflict stabilisation and to plan, implement and manage the UK's contribution. The PCRU had a significant problem - a joint organisation being multiagency but with no master, thus no one at the helm of it. The staff associated with the PCRU came from all three departments and had conditions attached to their deployment, such as rules for their safety and how they operate on the ground.

The immediate post-war priorities for the coalition, according to the UK Ministry of Defence (UK MoD 2003c), were to:

- provide for the security of friendly forces
- contribute to the creation of a secure environment so that normal life can be restored
- work in support of humanitarian organisations to mitigate the consequences of hostilities and, in the absence of such civilian humanitarian capacity, provide relief where it is needed
- work with UNMOVIC/IAEA to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery
- facilitate remedial action where environmental damage has occurred
- enable reconstruction and recommissioning of essential infrastructure for the political and economic benefit of the Iraqi people
- lay plans for the reform of Iraq’s security forces

Previous local efforts attempted by the British such as the raising of local security forces in May 2003, where the British military created a police force of 900 unarmed Iraqi police officers, were found to be not only too weak to function against the militias but were unable to provide simple assistance with tasks such as public security or traffic control. Public security under Saddam Hussein was a task shared by the Interior Ministry aided by the police, army and intelligence services. Due to a shortfall in numbers and a weakness in the area of security sector reform, the British had to shelve the idea of establishing a competent security force until 2004.

It is worth noting that during 2004 the militias began to infiltrate the police despite British efforts to build up police numbers and efficiency by providing police mentoring and equipment. The three main groups of militias that faced off against the British were; SCIRI (Iranian backed), the Sadr backed JAM, and Hizb al-Fadhila al-Islamiya (a smaller but well-armed militia of former Iraqi service-personnel). The three competed between one another over three main assets; access to public institutions, control over local security forces, and control and trafficking of oil.

For much of 2004 in the Basra region, Fadhila controlled the oil infrastructure, SCIRI the intelligence sector, Sadr the local police, the port authority, and unit known as facilities protection service (a force to protect local government infrastructure), and lastly, Hizballah (a minor force not related to its Lebanese namesake) in control of the customs police force. Therefore, Ucko and Egnell (2013:58) state British efforts at security sector reform would have required delicate negotiations with four strongly

independent militia groups, which would have been unlikely since the militia were often 'jockeying for position'.

Efforts to repair the infrastructure in Basra started in a particularly bad place due to neglect imposed upon the province under Saddam Hussein. Following the invasion, reconstruction and development activities were found to be particularly hampered due to the devastation after the looting. The British initially had the idea to work very closely with the Iraqi civil service and so were severely hampered following the de-Ba'thification order delivered by the CPA.

Chin (Ucko and Egnell 2013:55) states that what was needed was a head of the CPA who had the experience of running a sizeable municipal area and experts in the provision of public services and management of utilities, but such expertise was virtually non-existent. In the case of the British, expertise in this field of knowledge was lacking. In earlier peace support operations, the army could work around these areas of difficulty. In Kosovo, under General Sir Mike Jackson (2007:166), who later became CGS at the time of Iraq's invasion (2003), the British 'should have had access to personnel that could supply experienced personnel in a wide range of areas.'

Jackson (2007:166-167), continues that 'it was crucial to get to the infrastructure working as soon as possible, that it should be in place and started within the first one hundred days.' In the case of Kosovo, many of the Serb civil engineers who made everything work, such as keeping the water supply or the electricity pumps working, withdrew from the province. Jackson (2007:167), further notes that 'he sent the army

signallers in to sort out the telephone exchange, put army medics into the hospitals and allocated army engineers to suit reconstruction projects just to keep as much as possible functioning until the UN civil administration took over.' In the case of the older Serb power stations, the British army in Kosovo cheated slightly when a squadron commander of the Royal Engineers called his uncle, who worked for the UK's electricity generating board in how to start a less than a state-of-the-art power station.

Another area of significant note that at the time of Kosovo was that the Territorial army had what was known as a 'railway gang' of trained personnel that could repair tracks and signals, enabling a railway to up and running again. In Iraq, this quality of personnel for reconstruction and rebuilding never seemed to be in place even though Britain had specific legal responsibilities with being an occupying power.

Politically the early British efforts to create a stable ruling council in Basra province was formed within days of securing Basra. The council of thirty Iraqis headed by Sheikh Muzatim al-Tamimi lasted only six weeks. Rangwala (2009:498) claims that the British were unable to hold any political consistency despite their best efforts; four governors for just the Basra province were installed in 21 months with differing associations, agendas, and levels of supporting militias.

Following free elections in 2005, the Sadr associated Dawa party, and other Islamists secured 38 out of 41 potential seats in Basra and 35 out of 41 in Maysan. These results meant it became an uphill struggle for the British to create a stable political environment within which it could enhance security and promote rebuilding efforts. The

militias associated with their politician would not only fight coalition control but each other and would vote to support or drop any motion put forward by the ruling council.

Egnell (2009:132) simply states that the British committee system of interagency cooperation was not employed to its fullest capacity in the planning process for the occupation of Iraq. This view, however, goes against an MoD (UK MoD 2003a) report on the future in Iraq, which described the detailed planning for the post-conflict phase as 'taking place in parallel with the contingency planning for combat operations.' This is the report that states explicitly that military campaign planning had been designed with post-conflict objectives in mind to ensure that they had the least possible impact on Iraq's civil infrastructure.

Further to this, the House of Commons Defence Committee report (2005 HCDC) argued the obvious points, 'the post-conflict situation with which the coalition was faced did not match the pre-conflict expectations.' The defence committee listed five key planning misjudgements. First, a population that was not amenable or grateful but instead sought to take advantage of the power vacuum following the combat phase. Second, the coalition underestimated the insurgency or its potential. Third, little thought had been given to what to do with the Iraqi military and security forces infrastructure. Fourth, the coalition had not planned adequately for the reconstruction task that lay before it or how inadequate the remaining infrastructure was. Fifth and finally, the coalition, and especially the British, underestimated the number of troops required to meet the challenges of Iraq post-conflict.

The Defence Committee had asked questions such as estimates on the size and scope of a possible insurgency, and the reply from the MoD was 'at that time the prospects for a major insurgency were not the main focus of the military's attention due to limited relevant intelligence' (HCDC 2005). It was only by 2007 that the British set up a provincial reconstruction team made up of all the usual government departments to start reconstruction. The PRT was predominantly civilian and therefore required an element of force protection which still created a barrier between the Basra civilians and UK officials.

Egnell (2009:146) states the British ‘failed to draw upon the complete set of national instruments of power’ in southern Iraq. At a strategic level, the interagency committee system was not utilised to its full potential, creating planning of operations in Iraq that were of low quality as it seriously underestimated the post-conflict phase of the campaign and consequently did not produce an effective plan for reconstruction. This has been argued partly as not being purely the fault of the British, as they were the junior partners in the coalition and therefore not solely responsible for strategic and operational planning. The cooperation between different agencies involved in British civil-military operations was substantially limited, and because of this, efforts during the honeymoon period in and around Basra, which could have made a significant difference. Instead, during the immediate months following the invasion, the UK failed in grasping the reconstruction tasks needed to win over the Basra population.

Use of Intelligence

One of the most recent military terms to describe this role concerning military or combat operations is known as intelligence preparation of the battlefield or IPB. Ledwidge (2011:216) finds that before every military campaign, the land forces elements will undergo a process of carefully examining the battlefield on which they will be fighting. This process is a rigorous and efficient way of knowing your enemy. Ledwidge continues that in Malaya and Northern Ireland, the army became quite successful at recognising the crucial elements of the intelligence battle, especially with identifying experts that could employ intelligence, such as Kitson. This is not to say, however, that they were experts who did not face difficulties with new ideas and theories. In Kitson's case, his ideas of civil-military cooperation, which is detailed in the Northern Ireland chapter, faced great difficulties but often were successful and created policy for that campaign.

Mumford (2012:154) claims the striking feature of British experience is that each campaign, whether counterinsurgency or occupation, begins with a familiar tale concerning intelligence capabilities; 'from Malaya to Iraq, British military and civilian intelligence has failed to foresee and has woefully unprepared for the outbreak of an insurgency.' In the case of Iraq and Basra, there are apparent difficulties in cultivating human intelligence (HUMINT) due to difficulties associated with cultural differences or with militias and terror groups which are essentially a closed segment of society, very difficult to operationally penetrate. A significant difficulty found in Basra was Order Five from the CPA, which barred members from the Ba'ath party, including former security

officials, police and intelligence officers whose roles it was to maintain a watch upon the population from assisting the British in any official capacity.

Ledwidge (2011:25) notes that intelligence weakness in Iraq led to officers not knowing 'good areas from bad ones,' and in this void of intelligence, the British understandably 'fell back' upon what they knew; what had worked in Northern Ireland; its technical expertise. What was needed was something similar to the system Kitson brought into his brigade area of Belfast in 1971, which was quickly enacted across the entire Northern Ireland area; a system that 'took account of life, promoted acute local awareness and maintained accurate records of, for example vehicle ownership.' Ledgwidge (2011:25) claims, 'the British had very little idea of what was actually happening on the streets and in the buildings of the city.' This situation slowly evolved during 2005 when the British began to recruit paid informers from the militias.

The next concern of British intelligence in Iraq during 'Operation Telic' was not in Basra but was based alongside the British military command at Baghdad in the fortified green zone. A major source of information from a technical perspective was the American intelligence services. However, due to a bureaucratic error, most of the data held by US intelligence was classified as NOFORN, meaning that no foreign access could access this intelligence even if it had been supplied initially by the British. This situation was eventually resolved and required the direct action of Tony Blair to resolve this problem by going to President George W Bush in 2004. Unfortunately, the problem persisted that Ledwidge (2011:27) continued with the Pentagon essentially foot-dragging, ensuring that this initiative was not efficiently enacted.

Despite difficulties with inter-coalition intelligence sharing, the British aimed to garner a sizeable and accurate intelligence picture of the situation on the ground in the areas administered by the British before and after the insurgency as they would be using their own equipment, training and capabilities. Other than technical methods of intelligence gathering such as listening to mobile phone communications, they relied heavily upon interviews undertaken by UK intelligence personnel with Iraqi detainees. This information was gathered for five primary reasons, according to Mumford (2012:138). Firstly, for the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) to gather intelligence about 'supposed' weapons of mass destruction and those who had information upon the Iraq military weapon systems. Secondly, to interrogate those with information on forces who were resisting the coalition military presence. Thirdly, to identify different types of possible weapons of mass destruction and where produced. Fourth, the location of these weapons and fifth, to improve the overall intelligence picture of southern Iraq regarding the disposition of political characters, their militias and regional alliances. This last item ostensibly is a counterinsurgency intelligence function which, according to Mumford (2012:139), came to dominate British intelligence capabilities after work finished for the ISG, which gave them a picture of who worked for whom even if the British could not act on the information promptly.

An example of an intelligence-led operation with untoward outcomes took place on 24th June 2003 in the town of Majar al-Kabir, which for decades had had a particular reputation for violent resistance to outsiders (this went as far back as the Saddam Hussein regime). British paratroopers conducted sweeps through the town looking for weapons using search dogs inside residential homes. This use of dogs was an insult to the Muslim faithful as dogs are seen as unclean, which was regarded by Ledwidge

(2011:25) as 'nothing less than provocative.' There was a shootout in the town, and the paratroopers retreated. It was at this time that six British military policemen were left behind; neither the paras nor the RMP unit knew the other was there; the incensed Iraqi protestors killed the military police, who were only lightly armed.

Cockburn (Ledwidge 2011:25) was told when visiting local leaders in Iraq that, ‘if Saddam Hussein could not take away our weapons, why should we allow the British to do so?’ He further comments that if the army had really learned any lessons in Northern Ireland about not provoking local communities, they had largely forgotten the lessons ‘gained by experience’ somewhere between Belfast and Al Amara.

Wither explains (2009:621) that if there are no functional local police or security force, there is little or no local intelligence, either of electronic capability or human intelligence. Technical intelligence is available, especially with the ease of use and purchase of mobile phones and laptop computers which are targetable by intelligence specialists. The British were found wanting. They had limited personnel with language skills and any knowledge of local history. The force was structured for warfighting, not stability operations, and they were experiencing a shortage of these specialists, especially linguists, as the Army Reserve, which typically has experienced soldiers with these skills, had not been reactivated yet. With sinister echoes of Northern Ireland, the British military justified using a form of internment for suspected insurgents in southern Iraq by arguing that it was 'necessary for maintaining security' according to Mumford (2012:139).

The British established a divisional temporary detention facility at the Shaibah logistics base, where at its peak, it could hold up to 140 prisoners. The average length of detention during the 2004 period was 198 days. It was not until September 2006 that the British began including local Iraqi officers to sit on the review and release board to assess the cases of these internees.

It is worth mentioning that the use of local translators aiding the British military efforts in administering Iraq's southern sectors also was one of the best sources of intelligence that the British had. Mumford (2012:137) states that British intelligence, since the first Gulf War in the early 1990s, had undertaken efforts to cultivate a potential intelligence network in Basra due to its proximity to Iran and Kuwait. He further states that during the invasion phase of Basra in March 2003, the SAS and SBS used these intelligence networks to provide a picture of Iraqi army strongholds and levels of militia support in Basra.

Ledwidge (2011:221) states that the systems of intelligence gathering that were used in Northern Ireland were found to be particularly unhelpful in Iraq. Efforts such as tracking vehicles using number plates where there is no central database or where operators spoke not one word of the local dialect can prove to be a difficult problem to solve. He further goes on to comment that an obvious fact that was missed in southern Iraq was that the British were an occupying force, and as such, facilities of a centralised surveillance record-keeping system and access to a working government (or a local security force) was absent. Ledwidge (2011:221-222) further continues that the occupation of Iraq often was compared to Northern Ireland, although most officers

had little or no experience or knowledge of counterinsurgency theory especially applicable to Basra and the south. Therefore, the British fell back onto a 'light approach' which tended to have a soft footprint in the area, meaning few checkpoints, light weapons only and minimal contact (that had a meaningful response from an intelligence point of view) with the local population. This lighter approach became 'lighter' with fewer boots on the ground.

Following the initial post-invasion phase, the British had taken the view that the real enemy in the south were shadowy former regime loyalists, Ba'athists with a grudge. Missions were launched regularly in Basra to take down these largely illusionary Ba'athist terrorists, according to Ledwidge (2011:26), who took part in one of these strike missions. In the early stages of the occupation, many former regime loyalists were picked up by British security forces where most of them were found not to be a significant threat. Ledwidge (2011:26) recalls a bad intelligence operation that ‘tipped off’ a group of 600 suspected insurgents. After surveillance and their arrest, they proved to be a group of second-hand car dealers. It was alleged that they were involved in attempts to shoot down British aircraft at Basra Airport, but it soon became apparent that the information for this raid had been supplied by a rival group of car dealers, using the British as a means to remove inconvenient business opposition. The British became the ‘useful idiots’ acting as an armed intermediate in commercial, tribal or gang rivalry. This pattern continued when the armed militias began carving up Basra and the south into their own territories of control.

From a security aspect, Basra was a nightmare in which to achieve security. There were no indigenous security forces or police for the British to work with; therefore, trust and intelligence, especially from the Basra population itself, was, according to Mumford (2012:139-140), of a 'complicated nature.' The vast majority of intelligence was local, ground-level intelligence such as tipoffs picked up on patrol regarding arms caches or insurgent meeting points. Initially, the British were able to collect intelligence from people on the streets of Basra, but this became much more difficult when the militias started executing people that were seen to collaborate with the British. This included families of interpreters working with the British at the time.

Efforts to gather large-scale intelligence activities akin to Northern Ireland were more problematic; infiltration of insurgent groups was difficult due to cultural difficulties, and eventually, intelligence officers along with their military counterparts were soon to appreciate the nuanced nature of insurgency in southern Iraq. Some of the ground-based intelligence would be based upon one militia leaking information to the British regarding the activities of an opposing militia group or simply obtaining cash by reporting on another group's activities. This playing of one militia off against another worked well for the British, the information shared by one militia on another's movements and activities. Mumford (2012:138) states that the British aimed to garner as sizeable and accurate an intelligence picture of the insurgency that the UK could, using its own assets with UK ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance). On technical intelligence, the British had tried and tested capabilities, where it lacked was human intelligence.

The unfortunate truth for gathering intelligence in southern Iraq was that the culture became almost indecipherable. Intelligence during the early years was highly sought-after and used, but the very nature of modern insurgency meant that traditional methods such as cultivating human intelligence became difficult in Iraq. The vast number of people with webcams or internet access meant that technical methods usually associated with computers and mobile phone usage became problematic at finding specific targets. This was due to the high number of electronic devices that were available to the public, the militias, and the insurgents (domestic, regional or international). The use of internment then became almost an own goal for the British as it created poor public relations with the Iraqi population in southern Iraq.

Tactical Flexibility

A joint UK Ministry of Defence and US Department of Defence report looked at British approaches to low-intensity operations. This, according to Egnell (2009:140), noted that British forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2005, 'benefited from an ability to engage with the local population, escalate force rapidly when needed, and then re-engage with the local population almost immediately.' This ability is described as a classic component of the British 'hearts and minds' approach with the modern vernacular, 'smile, shoot, smile'. However, While the ability of British soldiers may not be in question, the restrictions on how they act when deployed are open to significant wide-ranging opinion.

British troops in Iraq initially displayed severe shortcomings in terms of cultural understanding for the region. The British had even less recent institutional experience

in the Middle East than the US military, and the UK civilian civil-military assets such as the FCO and DFID, which were explicitly trained for the Middle East, were delayed in deploying to Basra.

The civil-military assets within the British armed forces had much emphasis on the tactical and operational lessons from Northern Ireland, with its strong western bias on culture and language. It is this deficiency that resulted in a poor understanding of local culture. The case mentioned above of when British soldiers went looking for weapons and conducted house-to-house searches with search dogs (which in the Muslim faith, the dog is seen as an unclean animal) is one such example of such poor understanding. Varhola (2004:14) states that local leaders, clerics, and residents complained the British were not sensitive to local customs, and the use of dogs in Arab homes was perceived as a grave insult. Training for a level of cultural sensitivity or religious awareness of Islam would mean that these mistakes could be avoided.

This view of poor cultural awareness by British soldiers was rectified by adding this specific training on subsequent troop rotations (from Telic 3 onwards). Garfield (2006:28) argues the opposite; that the British showed excellent adaptability when faced with tactical difficulties and initial deployment shortcomings. The reality shows British its nuances and context, where each new conflict presents a unique set of challenges. If Garfield's position was correct, the mistakes made in deploying dogs or utilising the snatch land rover would have never been made. Here the mistake of placing too much importance on benefits and experience gained from Northern Ireland

and the former Yugoslavia, such as dogs and light armoured vehicles, highlights a top-down doctrinal approach.

The army's future operations in the context of Iraq were underestimated and therefore not adequately planned for before the invasion. To counter this bleak viewpoint, the House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC 2005) argues that British forces showed 'considerable success in adapting to changing circumstances.' The committee claims (HCDC 2005) that 'suppleness and pragmatism' were at the heart of British forces professionalism. It is worth remembering that during the 12 months following the invasion, the British troop numbers declined from 46,000 to 8,600 by May 2004. Of this roughly 8600 personnel, about 1500 would be combat troops. Therefore, the defence committee report enunciates 'that British troops had no option but to apply a softly-softly approach, keeping a low profile and handing over local security responsibility to indigenous forces when able.'

In contrast, this position is strongly opposed by a Human Rights Watch report (Egnell 2009:143) of 2003, which presented a somewhat bleaker view of British post-conflict operations in the Basra area. It claims extensive looting and civil unrest took place following the immediate aftermath of the fall of Basra. Many residents of the city were convinced that the British failed to respond to this civil unrest and looting, therefore 'believing that security was not a priority.'

By whichever use of measurement was employed, the statistical difference in the UK's area of responsibility was less hostile than many of the areas which were occupied by US forces. Garfield (2006:30) compares the two and suggests that the British

approach to stability and reconstruction differs significantly from that of the US. British areas achieved some success in ‘greater stability, fewer casualties, less alienation and more rapid reconstruction’ (until the massive Sadr uprising of summer 2004).

An example of top-down adaptability took place in December 2007; British forces handed over the responsibility of Basra to the Iraqi security forces and withdrew from Basra. This reduced their role to one of over-watch, mentoring and training Iraqi forces while providing reconstruction through the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). Egnell (2009:143) finds this withdrawal receives multiple criticisms and, at best, is described as 'not graceful' and potentially created a security vacuum in southern Iraq by leaving security to the Iraqis. Beaumont (2007) continues that the opposite happened regarding security after the British withdrew to Basra airport; this reorganisation and re-siting of British troops outside Basra meant that indigenous Iraqi security forces had to stand alone. Militia violence against the British in Basra dropped after this withdrawal.

The image of a successful British transition in Basra greatly suffered from the launch of the 'Charge of the Knights' operation. The British, after withdrawing from the city, had reduced their ability to be adaptable to a tactical situation by having surrendered movement with their retreat to the Basra airbase. This operation, which was ordered by Iraq's Prime Minister Malaki in response to criminality and militia violence, included significant new Iraqi military forces (not from the area) and was supported primarily by the US rather than UK forces. The ironic part of this operation is that a British colonel, Richard Iron, initially planned it. He had witnessed a failed operation known as

Salamanca that was not supported by the Iraqi army or the British government. It failed to get off the drawing board due to a lack of British and Iraqi military capability (elements of Salamanca were adapted into Operation Sinbad, but by the time of Sinbad, British troop numbers had dwindled).

No amount of tactical flexibility, learning or adaptability can replace a significant military capability. In southern Iraq, the British tried soft power as a replacement for 'a significant military capability' due to a minimal number of troops, which failed to establish what Smith (2006:272) calls a 'condition in which the political objective can be achieved by other means and in other ways.' Tactically, the British displayed an ability to conduct hearts and minds operations involving the minimum use of force, where they displayed the capability to adjust from fighting in the invasion phase to post-conflict, soft approach patrolling of built-up areas such as Basra and Al Amarah.

Following significant incidents such as the operations by the Black Watch (in support of US operations in Fallujah), these incidents could be described as over-reaction by British troops. The British normally show restraint in response and de-escalate these incidents (Egnell 2009: 146). The difference in Basra, according to Ucko and Egnell (2013:57), is that earlier campaign missteps of Northern Ireland were acknowledged, but this did not happen in Basra. After mid to late 2005, when violence surged, and despite the severity of challenges on the ground, the British government did not increase the military, which could have been effective in reducing militia violence for future years. Dodge (2007:92) argued that with the finest soldiers available, 'Britain

has never had the forces in Iraq needed to make a sustained difference to law and order, and meaningful reconstruction in the south is almost non-existent.'

One major element of tactical flexibility and adaptability that was a success is when its armed forces are 'contacted' coming under effective enemy fire. British infantrymen are trained, according to Ledwidge (2011:180), in a similar way for many decades to identify the threats and apply controlled, effective, but suppressing firepower to the target.

In how they fight, it is the duty of any patrol or mission commander as part of the orders process to remind the troops of the rules of the current campaign of engagement which can differ from theatre to theatre. As a form of doctrinal and legal assistance to all soldiers, in Northern Ireland, soldiers were issued a laminated card in yellow with the rules of engagement printed upon it. The guidelines for Iraq were white. The response against effective enemy fire tended to remain professional throughout the various Telic missions. The British trained to vary its response but not to change the outcome that according to Ledwidge (2011:181) for British infantry, 'the default overall tactical approach in circumstances such as these – contact- is to close with and destroy the enemy, using overwhelming violence. That is as it should be.' Violence on this scale was displayed by the US, whereas the 'British approach' was lighter in the initial response. Such shootings are scrutinised by commanding officers, military police shooting investigation teams and then by legal advisers usually attached to a Brigade headquarters. Soldiers are reminded throughout their tour that they will be held accountable for mistakes, although 'extensive allowances are made, in practice, for the heat of battle' (Ledwidge 2011:181).

In many of the counterinsurgency campaigns of the ‘classic’ period, heavy weapons have never been used like the extent to which they have been in Iraq. This has led to almost every patrol having a vast range of heavy support weaponry within a British section or American squad to use. These included assault rifles for most troops and two machine gunners per section/squad. Additional weapons such as hand grenades, light anti-armour rockets, shotguns (with shredder rounds that open doors) could all be included in a section’s standard kit. With a radio call, artillery, and air support (either fast-jet or helicopter gunship is available). These weapons and tactics described here by Ledwidge (2011:183) were designed for a high-intensity European armoured war, where the British have been trained to employ these weapons systems and are therefore highly likely to use them. Ledwidge asks the question as a commander at the Theatre level, why units in a supposed 'counterinsurgency' have been armed with heavy artillery and strategic bombers. The answer to this is quite simple, the question of medals and their underlying cultural function of displaying courage and, therefore, professional competence is tied up together with the objective of the institution (the army) in getting more gongs and promotions. Ledwidge (2011:181) comments that the view within the military is 'if you don't get a medal, it's not that you weren't exceptional, it's that you weren't adequate.' Medals are won by demonstrating decisive, aggressive action. This notion, especially regarding Iraq, does not sit happily with any idea of courageous restraint utilising minimum force. This view requires significant change if the military viewpoint of courageous restraint, especially in low-intensity warfare, is to take hold, therefore proving that minimum force, de-escalation or restraint is to gain a similar notion of institutional success amongst an armed force.

Colonel John Wilson, the retired editor of the British Army Review, makes a significant comment on this subject of tactical flexibility in Ledwidge (2011:183 – 184); he believes 'the time has come for a shift in the way that the army trains to conduct itself on operations.' Wilson had long term experience ranging from the 60s to the 90s, especially within Northern Ireland. He rejects the long-term held belief that soldiers trained for big mobile battles should find it easier to step down to low-intensity conflict. It is accepted now that the demands of low-level operations are more demanding than general war. Wilson comments that responsibilities for junior officers have 'increased and deepened,' junior officers cannot avoid combat and need to show more aggression. Northern Ireland had a tradition of the opposite, where units would deploy to Northern Ireland with an organisational level of thinking to avoid a simple reaction, to ‘not react’ like a trained soldier.

Ledwidge (2011:184) quotes Wilson summarising, 'it is remarkable how restrained most units and soldiers were in Northern Ireland…… Patrols were ambushed and did not return fire despite taking casualties because there were no identifiable targets. The provisional IRA killed six soldiers for every IRA volunteer killed in combat. This ratio is probably reversed in modern conflicts such as Iraq. It was not because the army in Northern Ireland was poor, it was the nature of the conflict.' It is the case that poor management of soldiers, policies and training for contact with the enemy can undoubtedly increase the level of activity in an insurgency, especially in 'wars amongst the people' where over-zealous reactions in employing firepower can be disastrous. In an environment that requires finesse and judgement, where sometimes 'doing nothing' is, in every possible sense of the word, is the most courageous option. The prevailing ethos of the army remains 'one of combat', and the prevailing culture remains

aggressive and 'decisive' with the concept of 'cracking on' at its core. In counterinsurgency, these trained responses need to be tempered with forethought and new training for operations in a whole new area.

Lessons often hard learnt, can indeed pass both up and down the military learning tree, but without the required amount of ‘boots on the ground’; specifically, combat troops, this tends to find that soldiers will fall back upon earlier lessons by employing heavy weapons to compensate for a disparity of numbers. The army during the invasion phase fought the kind of operation for which it was configured, a fast-moving armoured manoeuvre war, which then startled the US military when it did something different in how it took Basra. This went against what the troops had trained for over the decades and brought criticism from US Generals. This ‘approach’ was then borrowed by the US in taking Baghdad.

The armoured, manoeuvre war was precisely the type of warfare the British army wanted to fight; according to Ledgwidge (2011:186), what it got was different. The British made great steps of tactical flexibility when they almost ignored modern land forces doctrine and training. Mistakes were made in Basra when UK troops came under fire in that the situation on the ground would become muddled (especially fighting in built-up areas). Force has been applied in an 'uncoordinated way' according to Ledwidge (2011:170), who declares that 'the British added to the chaos and uncertainty contingent to Basra, rather than controlling it. In Clausewitzian terms, increasing the level of violence and friction by failing to secure the city of Basra, from the key threats to both themselves and the Basran people.'

The Iraq Inquiry

The Chilcot report started taking evidence on the 24th November 2009 and finished receiving fresh evidence on 2nd February 2011. The final report was released nearly seven years after its start on 6th July 2016. The report was 2.6 million words and 12 volumes (Iraq Inquiry Report:2016). The report is mentioned in this chapter of the thesis as the Chilcot report also looks in some detail at Iraq. Here the thesis and the report diverge; the thesis looks predominantly at the military situation in Basra and the south, the decisions and problems that impacted upon British administration. The Chilcot enquiry is primarily political, with similar questions for the UK military but from the political aspect.

The report spans almost a full decade of UK government policy, with the run-up to Iraq covering the period between 2001 and 2009. The report looks at the background and government decision to go to war, how properly prepared the troops were, how the conflict was fought and how the future for Iraq was planned in its aftermath (which became a period of intense violence).

The report examined the following areas:

1. Military action
2. Weapons of Mass Destruction
3. The Legal case
4. Military preparedness
5. Iraq's aftermath
6. Lessons to Learn

For each of these areas, the Iraq War enquiry took detailed evidence from many different sources. What follows is an abridgement of the executive summary of the Inquiry's report.

For military action, the UK chose to join with the US for the invasion of Iraq, where military action is identified as not the last resort before all attempts at disarmament had not been tried. There was little threat from Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Iraq was contained, and the UN Security Council could have supported further inspections and monitoring. Famously, Tony Blair chose to join the US, assuring Bush he would be with him 'whatever.'

With weapons of mass destruction, Iraq created uncertainty; for many of the world's powers, the severity of a WMD threat from Iraq was 'not justified.' The report also finds that various intelligence sources and agencies failed to establish whether the Iraq regime continued to produce chemical and biological agents. The report also questioned official documentation from the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) over its truthfulness over whether Iraq constituted a threat and if it continued to produce non-nuclear WMD. It found that the JIC had used flawed intelligence, which was never challenged within Britain's intelligence organs when it should have been.

Concerning the legal case, the report found that a legal basis and framework for an invasion was 'far from satisfactory.' The government 'advice' on the legality of an invasion with UN sanction came very late in the day (13th March) when the invasion began on the 20th March. This decision, according to the report analysis, found no

formal records on the legal decision and its precise grounds on what made that choice. Through this choice, the UK challenged and therefore weakened the UN security council and its charter. It claimed it was acting for the international community though it did not have a majority for action when the security council voted. Domestically the UK government chose not to question the Attorney General (Lord Goldsmith) with little discussion or questioning of the legal argument surrounding its legality.

The report looked at military preparedness, finding little time was allocated to prepare the UK armed forces for deployment in Iraq. These shortfalls consisted of equipment unavailability in areas such as armoured vehicles, helicopter support, and reconnaissance assets. Along with this came an intelligence shortfall. The MoD was found to have little structure for those who had responsibility for organising these shortfalls and remedying the situation. When these deficiencies were identified, the delays in providing armoured vehicles (as a replacement for the snatch land rover) and providing intelligence and reconnaissance assets much needed in administering the South-East Division should 'not have been tolerated.' This report also found shortfalls in equipping troops before and during the occupation.

The report further found that post-war reconstruction and planning was ‘wholly inadequate.’ The goals set by the UK government were never reached, Mr Blair’s influence with the US was overestimated and that both the military and civilian organisations of the UK government deployed to Iraq needed adequately funding and equipping. Finally, the report considered the political failings of Iraq. It found that the UK support of the US should never have been unconditional.

The decision not to use the detailed inquiry report was taken not just to avoid having to read a behemoth text but was to determine (almost at the unconscious level) if other sources of information would return a similar long answer to what went wrong in Iraq. The domestic political situation between 2001 and 2009 alone would have been worthy of study.

Conclusion

The circumstances for the British in southern Iraq was one where the British were juggling hot potatoes, two at a time. After the invasion, the US-directed national security policy for Iraq, even where the British had laid the foundations for local security initiatives in Basra with the Iraqi Naval Academy and the Basran police. The decisions implemented by the Coalition Provisional Authority influenced efforts to stabilise the entirety of Iraq, not just Basra and its surrounding provinces. Its early directives to 'de-Baath' the Iraqi state essentially stood down the police, internal security forces, the armed forces and the entire civil service. The quality of post-war reconstruction was found to be 'thin' in its quality and 'know-how' by the US and British. Efforts to rebuild was hampered by the British authorities' lack of funding of its own and the monies promised by the US to reconstruct the south not being delivered quickly enough to avoid an escalation in violence aimed at the British over its lethargy in rebuilding civil utilities around Basra.

The British displayed restraint with their tactical approach on how they chose to assault and occupy Basra. This light-handed approach also encompassed their technique in

patrolling the city. These approaches did gather criticism from the Americans, but the US saw the benefits and used a similar tactic in how they took Baghdad.

The force deployed to Iraq in 2003 was quickly and heavily reduced in numbers, year on year. These reductions meant that the situation further deteriorated following rioting and criminality in late 2003. Efforts to reduce violence in 2004 began an uprising against the Americans, which impacted the British in the south. This violence continued to evolve into what became a full-blown insurgency against coalition occupation. The British efforts faltered without sufficient numerical military personnel to effectively control its areas of responsibility.

There was a lack of local Iraqi security forces after the CPA directives; the police and army were recruited and retrained. When the violence took root, much of the Iraqi army was still in training, and political or religious militias had severely penetrated the policing units across the south. This situation was not unique to the British; the US had similar situations develop in their areas of control that required a fresh perspective on how to counter this situation.

Civil-military cooperation in the south-east started with the British FCO and DFID providing expertise with reconstruction. As the criminality, militia and then insurgent violence increased, the efforts by these civilian entities were severely curtailed as it was not a secure environment in which to work.

Political efforts after elections to the national assembly in 2004 and Iraqi parliamentary elections of 2005 failed to provide any assistance to British-led forces in reducing militia and criminal violence. An armed group supported most politicians; their militias were contesting with the British and one another for supremacy, especially in Basra. The much-reduced yearly British military presence limited the ability of the army to operate across the south.

These efforts to work around regional politicians, militias and national politics created a ‘mixed and confused’ position for the British. Political direction and support for the British would change as the situation on the ground also changed. Each group would support the British when it suited them, leaving an environment of political inconsistency. A formidable influence over much of the south was Iranian that provided support for the Badr brigades.

Intelligence across the provinces was mixed, with good technical intelligence ability and poor human intelligence assets. When information was not available, they had to rely upon paid or questionable informants. Other intelligence came about through interrogation of prisoners held by the coalition internment, although this became an uncomfortable subject following the reports of 'suspected abuses' by US and UK forces on confined detainees. The use of local translators working with the military and civil elements not only provided language and cultural knowledge but also provided a local source of intelligence on criminals, security threats and the general feeling of conditions affecting the civilian populace. This work was risky for the translators and their families.

The British could have brought the historical experience of counterinsurgency to Iraq. This would have required modern or recent learning on the subject with training in both operations and theory to search for lessons from previous insurgencies. The British lessons first utilised in Iraq came from two sources; Northern Ireland and from the former Yugoslavia (where the UK performed peace support operations). Tactical and operational mistakes were made, significantly in cultural and religious awareness during operations in the Samawah area of the Muthanna province. Training that focussed on local culture and Islam was taught to all Iraq serving UK forces personnel after 2004. Operations that involved property searches also evolved to restrict the use of dogs while on search missions. The British army learned to restrict the use of the armoured 'snatch' land rover as the increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) caused its removal from theatre as it was not protective enough. The knowledge of IEDs and the methods in their utilisation significantly increased the safety and removal of such devices.

The British had to answer to Whitehall, the UK government and all the departments operating in Iraq, the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority, its own military hierarchy, the local politicians to maintain cooperation and the US military. Many decisions and changes forced upon the British were outside of British direction or control.

Operation Telic started on the 19th March 2003 and for much of the UK armed forces ceased on 30th April 2009.

The next chapter looks at how problematic Iraq was for not just the British but for the US too. This chapter examines the aftermath of the invasion from both perspectives,

the political change within Iraq and examines Britain's miscalculations in Iraq and Britain's counterinsurgency legacy and lessons learned after Iraq.

Chapter Seven

Iraq: Problematic for the US and the UK

Introduction

This analysis chapter will look at how and why Iraq produced problems for the world's leading superpower, the United States of America, and its closest military ally, the United Kingdom, after its occupation of Iraq in 2003. This chapter within the thesis persists with further analysis of Iraq and significantly looks at the US experience as the US also had problems with Iraq and had to make strategic changes to face an increasing insurgency.

This chapter will investigate:

- The Bush administration and its policy
- The Aftermath of the Invasion.
- Political change in Iraq.
- The post-invasion military situation.
- The use of Special Forces in Iraq.
- British miscalculation in Iraq.
- Security sector reform.
- US and UK spending in Iraq.
- Britain’s counterinsurgency legacy and lessons. The US-led coalition vision for Iraq after the Saddam Hussein government.

This thesis was written to provide potential answers to the question of 'what were the effects of the post-colonial experience of counterinsurgency on UK forces in southern Iraq? Were the lessons absorbed and implemented?' The outcome of the insurgency in Iraq (that happened for multiple reasons) goes beyond the analysis tool of the four pillars framework. The invasion, despite a pure military success, then led to failures and consequences in the occupation and rebuilding of Iraq. The invasion created further devastation upon a country that had been facing hardship with sanctions since the 1990/91 Gulf War. The invasion and occupation were meant to create a democratic country in the Middle East with a free-market economy as a representative message for other neighbouring states, but it failed. The powerful US military (and its allies) indeed won the military phase of the invasion but could not provide the security that Iraq had sought for many years. The consequences have had previously unseen long-term effects on Iraq, its security and its national political composition.

As a country, Iraq was invaded by the US and its coalition partners, of which the UK was the second-largest contributor. The invasion ravaged Iraq; its military faced off against superior technological forces of the US and UK in equipment many generations behind. The Iraq state was entirely occupied on 15th April 2003. It left the state unable to function without the US and coalition support for many years, costing 111,759 civilian deaths, according to Iraq Body Count (26th July 2020). Many Iraqis were left with life-changing injuries in a state barely functional, which has during the last ten years, had to fight ISIS who took a significant area of territory from Iraqi central political control. If Iraq had gone better for the UK and the US, would Iraq have been better able to endure on its own after the coalition left?

The invasion began with a military campaign that quickly and efficiently took its objectives in Iraq. It proved later, with the post-conflict reconstruction, to face difficulties that arose from many aspects, each with its own problems. The chapter closes by examining the analysis found within the thesis and the case studies that mistakes were made both by the British and American militaries and civilian administrations with reconstruction and planning for Iraq's future.

The Bush Administration and its Philosophy

The consensus regarding Iraq was that it could be done easily. The prospect of invading Iraq was seen as 'business left unfinished from the Gulf War of 1991 and with the consensus gathered from the US election of 2000 with a Bush victory and the Republican party in control over both Houses of Congress. US foreign and security policy from the late 1990s had, according to Rogers (2010:137) 'an increasingly conservative agenda.' This, when coupled with the Republican realist position and the right-leaning think-tank 'The Project for the New American Century' founded in 1997, which became a sounding board for Republican views along with other right-leaning think-tanks, indicated a strong direction in the way that the Bush administration would go. This became more apparent when people like Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz (supporters of neo-conservatism and the New American Century) we appointed by the White House. The neo-conservative view associated with the Bush administration has historical links to the American-Jewish Committee and with the realist position which the Republican Party of the 1960s and the late 1990s had become attached to.

The New American Century asked with its statement of principles (Rogers 2010:138) '*Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favourable to American principles and interests?'* This further means it is necessary to accept America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to American security, prosperity and its principles.

The belief was that the 21st century was going to be, according to Rogers (2010:138-139), 'an American century' where the US had a historic mission; to be a civilising force for world affairs and promote the idea that the American way of life is dominant. In this is the shared ideas of democracy and free-market thinking to promote a shaping of the world through indirect control by the US government and business.

US Difficulties in Iraq: Pre-Invasion

The planning for what would become 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' started on 27th November 2001, and that the future military operations in Iraq were said to have focused on achieving eight specific objectives (Rumsfeld 2003).

- To end the regime of Saddam Hussein by striking with force on its scope and scale that makes clear to Iraqis that he and his regime are finished.
- Next, to identify, isolate and eventually eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, production capabilities and distribution networks.
- To search for, capture, and drive out terrorists who have found safe harbours in Iraq.

- To collect such intelligence as we can find related to terrorist networks in Iraq and beyond.
- To collect such intelligence as we can find related to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction activity.
- To end sanctions and to immediately deliver humanitarian relief, food and medicine to the displaced and to the many needy Iraqi citizens.
- To secure Iraq's oilfields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people, and which they will need to develop their country after decades of neglect by the Iraqi regime.
- To help the Iraqi people create the conditions for a rapid transition to representative self-government that is not a threat to its neighbours and is committed to ensuring the territorial integrity of that country.

The problem, unfortunately, was that many of these aims are political and included a great deal more than what could be translated into military objectives and activities. Following the invasion, the situation on the ground in Iraq quickly developed into a security vacuum. US troops were not trained for policing considerable urban areas of Iraq, often with large populations.

The US administration of George W Bush chose through circumstance to disregard the advice of experts on Iraq, with nation-building, and military operations, which would require troops to be geared towards providing security following the invasion. Bush, his Vice President; Dick Cheney and others such as Donald Rumsfeld (the US Secretary of Defence) decided despite warnings from individuals such as the US Army

Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki that Iraq would 'require hundreds of thousands of troops to police post-war Iraq' (Elliott 2015:104). This analysis of Shinseki was based upon historical troop figures used in Post-World War 2 Japan and Germany when he testified to the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services on 25th February 2003.

The US staging for the Iraq invasion began in Kuwait by slowly building troop numbers and equipment rather than requiring the rapid deployment of vast numbers of transport aircraft and naval cargo vessels. This deployment of US personnel did not reach the numbers that Shinseki was planning for a build-up that needed 250,000 troops which never happened. Egnell (2009:70) cites 'the invasion phase of the campaign in Iraq not only displayed a known technological superiority of the American military but also in operational and tactical flexibility that took the world by surprise.' Changing tactic, the US military initially displayed military innovation utilising surprise tactics, pinpoint targeted firepower and speed to overcome known Iraqi army positions, whereas the US doctrine usually would have involved heavy artillery bombardments, air attacks and frontal armour attacks on fixed enemy defensive positions.

It has been argued by Murray (2005:17) that ‘with Iraq, the US government tended to be ‘narrow-sighted’ suggesting that the functional imperative of US forces became too narrowly defined for post-war operations.’ This becomes further mired by thoughts from Mahnken and Keaney (2007:140) that ‘the US government contains a lot of expertise on many post conflict reconstruction issues, but lacks an effective mechanism turning it into an effective coherent approach.’ Consequently, the US

never committed adequate resources to accomplish either its original lofty aspirations for Iraq or even its more modest goals when it came to reconstruction and nation-building. The US refused to believe its own intelligence from 'many sources' (Mahnken and Keaney 2007:140), especially when it contradicted its own studies views and doggedly insisted that reality would have to conform to its wishes.

Planning for the post-invasion stage, the US administration's senior leadership, Vice President Cheney, SecDef Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz (who were the main proponents of US strategy) simply did not believe that a major effort requiring reconstruction and nation-building was necessary. The idea was that the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), the military command responsible for the execution of the war, would prepare for humanitarian contingencies such as refugees but little else (Bensahel 2006:455-458). The official line according to the CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks and the Office of the Secretary of Defence were both of a similar mind that they wanted to reduce the American military presence in Iraq as swiftly as possible and that should there be any serious efforts at nation-building to be made that the US military were not the ones to be doing it.

It had been noted by Feith (2003:22) that the UK government found during 2002 and 2003 that the planning process of phase 4 operations, such as post-conflict reconstruction, was 'running both late and without direction.' The UK had found that little was being done within US defence circles for the post-invasion phase. Usually, the lead US agency for such work would be the State Department, often working closely with the military. The UK found was that it was purely being run out of the DoD.

Feith (2003:23) cites the US Under-secretary of Defence, ‘we have noted that post-conflict reconstruction requires a balance of efforts in the military sphere and the civil sphere, therefore, both have been involved at day one.’

The US State Department was one of the agencies that had a reputation for being able to carry out post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building. However, it was found to have been politically sabotaged according to Feith (2003:21-22), due to the rivalry between Donald Rumsfeld (the Secretary of Defence) and Colin Powell (the Secretary of State) causing the State Department (and its officials) to be excluded from many meetings by the US Department of Defence (DoD), the Office of the Vice President, and the National Security Council (NSC). The reality was that the State Department's capacity to handle the post-war reconstruction and nation-building probably would have also proven inadequate without significant co-operation from other agencies like the DoD and possible outside international non-governmental organisations such as the United Nations (UN). However, the State Department's magnitude was probably significantly more than what the DoD possessed in this area. Further, the US Department of State could seek solutions for reconstruction by bringing other nations and organisations onboard.

Objectively, Walter Pincus, a national security journalist, noted that the British complained internally about the lack of planning for a nation-building process in a memo written in advance of the Downing Street meeting on Iraq held on 23rd July 2002. The civilian objectives were seen in the US, according to Pincus (2005), as to 'be vague at best and non-existent at worst.' These became a subject of a US

congressional hearing held on 11th February 2003 explicitly looking at post-conflict reconstruction. The results of the hearing were unusual; officials gave vague objective outlines as answers which were presented to Congress without any detail or specifics on how to achieve them.

Aftermath of the Invasion

The US Department of Defence created a small team of around 200 personnel under a retired Lieutenant General, Jay Garner, to handle post-war reconstruction-at least temporarily until significant and greater assets could be applied to Iraq. Garner received little in the way of support and inter-agency co-operation from planners within Central Command (CENTCOM) on the run-up to the invasion, and his requests for key personnel that he was trying to select (who were experts in this field) were 'being denied' according to Ricks (2006:109). The reality was that the deck had been stacked against the efforts by Jay Garner. Senior military commanders had decided that the DoD would be initially responsible for post-war reconstruction and then changed their minds, passing it to Jay Garner. The new organisation, The Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), had scarcely two months to prepare before the invasion. Garners team were forced by the DoD to deploy late into Iraq, arriving in Baghdad on 21st April and chose to locate ORHA's headquarters away from US Central Command.

Garner's ORHA moved into Saddam Hussein's Republican Palace (barely a shelter only in name with little working amenities. Philps (2003) refers to the situation of ORHA

being separate from US CENTCOM as a 'complete mess.' This separation prevented ORHA and the DoD from interacting directly with each other to allow civilian and military planners to rebuild infrastructure. By being separate and isolated, ORHA were unable to access US military and civilian intelligence to plan their efforts.

The planning for a post-Saddam Hussein government in Iraq commenced within the US Department of State in April 2002 with the launch of 'The future of Iraq project'. The project developed many working groups covering governmental rebuilding through political reform. It also included practical planning for Iraq after the invasion, where each group brought between 10 to 20 Iraqi experts to plan for what could be done to improve the lives of the Iraqi people.

The Pentagon completely neglected the project despite it taking over the planning process until it decided to hand it to the ORHA. 'The Future of Iraq Project' ran out to 15 volumes of detailed information on Iraq, including information about the various states of the functionality of Iraqi infrastructure. It raised significant warnings within its text regarding the elevated potential risk of post-conflict looting and disorder. This report was handed to the civilian administrative staff within the Pentagon, where the Office of the Secretary of Defence, according to Ricks (2006:77), effectively steamrollered the report, its findings and anyone attached to it.

The US planning for post-war Iraq was mishandled. Some organisations were better than others at potentially doing the job, others in trying to avoid it. General Franks,

when interviewed by Ricks (2006:79), thought that the planning for phase 4 operations (post-conflict reconstruction) was someone else's job. The result was there was much discussion and endless PowerPoint briefings, but there would not be a real plan for post-war Iraq that could be implemented by commanders and soldiers on the ground.

The invasion and Bush's declaration of an end-of-military-operations was not the conflict; it was merely the beginning. The pre-war planning guidance handed down from the civilian chiefs in the US DoD dictated that the military forces on the ground had specific tasks to complete, which required rules limiting what they could or could not do. The mistaken assumptions and the inadequate planning for post-war Iraq began to make themselves known when combat units found themselves in charge of large urban areas surrounded by increasing criminality and looting where they had received little in the way of orders or training to prevent this outbreak of lawlessness. This criminality resulted in the massive physical destruction of property and governmental capability, which could have increased the pace of reconstruction. The decision to step aside and do nothing was a stunning psychological blow to the Iraqi's confidence in the United States military. The US forces' inability to act as a police force in Iraq and to be a force for good with reconstruction should not have been a surprise, as Nagl (2002:18) claims the US 'does not adapt well to changed situations unless they are within the parameters of the kind of war it has defined as its primary mission – conventional warfare.'

What followed in Iraq was a power vacuum that quickly created an environment that had problems of security and governance. Iraq quickly became a failed state, in place

of the state-run by Saddam Hussein, that used state-led violence and fear to control and hold Iraq politically together. With this new vacuum of power within Iraq and little governance, it allowed during 2004 various insurgencies to take hold, especially in the Sunni tribal communities of western Iraq where the Sunnis felt disempowered from being the previous ruling elite under Saddam. At the same time, in the Shi'a communities, new political and tribal militias and organised crime rings also took hold. Where the two major denominations of Islam, Shi'a and Sunni, had co-existed, the Shi'a's now faced religious violence from a disempowered, bitter Sunni community. To further stir the Iraq pot, these aforementioned developments went in parallel with the foundation of al Qaeda in Iraq under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who wanted to remove western occupation and create a Sunni Islamist regime.

These factors coupled with the Iraqi political stalemate across the country and the CPA proclamations caused the US and UK greater complications that prevented the restructuring of governmental institutions capable of providing Iraqis with essential services such as clean water, sanitation, electricity and therefore the means for a minimal functioning economic market capable of generating and supporting some basic level of employment across Iraq. Greater prioritisation of economic factors along with political change could have prevented much of the 2004 insurgency, but importantly, religion also played an element. The traditional Sunni/Shia schism in Iraq had previously been suppressed by Saddam Hussein's state-run apparatus, but following the invasion, this sectarianism became violent. When you further add into the mix, the CPA decrees in mid-2003 that discharged the armed forces, police (and security services), dissolved the Iraqi civil service management (pending de-Ba'thification). This caused the dismissal of the top four ranks within the Ba'ath party

but also affected many other sectors of government and the Iraq health service, where most of the managers had to become Ba'ath party members to progress in their chosen occupation. Ricks (2006:190-191) claims these edicts 'helped spur the insurgency by providing almost unlimited sources of recruitment in the form of disenfranchised former Ba'ath party members and unemployed but armed former soldiers.' Many militias would offer payment incentives for every wounded or killed coalition soldier.

These significant problematic factors were technically beyond the ability of the US to solve on its own. The US administration under George W Bush took many steps that discouraged non-US institutions or NGOs capable of political, economic, and security solutions from functioning to their maximum ability in Iraq by imposing conditions on their involvement such as secrecy, no-press contact and an almost US-first approach, all to be paid by Iraqi oil revenues. Washington insisted that an American effort head the reconstruction and that any assistance sought by the United Nations and international non-governmental organisations be integrated into the American efforts. The reality was the UN and the international NGOs disliked the Bush administration and found themselves unable to work in these conditions. It is worth noting that the United Nations, to its credit, sent to Iraq Sergio Vieira de Mello, known and widely respected as an outstanding international administrator who had successfully stabilised efforts in East Timor. De Mello was killed in August 2003 by a truck bomb attack on the UN headquarters at Canal House in Baghdad. Following this, the UN Secretariat immediately reduced its presence in Iraq to little more than a skeleton crew and had a minimal role in any of the future reconstruction efforts. The UN was defended by the coalition troops, and the motive for bombing the UN was to remove

the UN from Iraq but also to separate the US and its partners from outside support. Three separate terrorist groups operating in Iraq claimed the UN bombing as its work.

The US administration's chose for reconstruction and nation-building in Iraq that contracts went to US companies first and then other providers. This also imposed restrictions upon the undertakings UN and other NGOs. It failed to recognise the importance of the expertise brought by the participation of the international community in the future reconstruction of Iraq. The United Nations, with its various agencies, was able to call upon a network of both personnel and resources vital to various aspects of nation-building, such as utilities and infrastructure repair. The UN had vast experience with teams of people with skills gathered from areas such as Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan on standby to provide assistance. A UN face to the rebuilding effort would have provided a face to the Muslim Middle East as being one that was neither American nor purely a Western European effort. The ability of the US to tap into such an extensive network of people with desperately needed skills was lost following the lack of security and withdrawal of the United Nations and its staff.

The security situation and the upsurge in criminality following the initial widespread outbreak after the invasion created problems for the US administration where its efforts with reconstruction quickly ran into reality - who to work with and where?

Resistance within Iraq came from many avenues, from members of the former regime, religious groups, their associated militias, and imported fighters associated with groups such as al Qaeda in Iraq. Following the invasion, Iraq's governmental apparatus had largely collapsed; the people working for the state had gone home and had not been reporting for work. Many of the buildings had been looted, if not destroyed. Moreover, much in the way of equipment had been stolen or destroyed. Police stations were looted, and many of the files which allowed the state to function had been destroyed, stolen, or acquired for nefarious purposes. An example of this was found through Egnell (2009:76-77) where a comprehensive survey was undertaken by the new Iraqi Minister of Water, who took office in late 2003, and found that 'the ministry had lost over 60% of its equipment, from pencils to massive dredgers, in the looting.' Decrees from the CPA also meant that most party-supporting managers were unable to provide support for reconstruction efforts though some wanted to help.

Cordesman (2003:4) found when analysing US civil-military relations that the 'most effective inter-agency structure for the post-conflict planning' was already in place within the US National Security Council. Due to the competitive and distrustful cultural climate inherent within the US political system, access to the NSC was difficult. The National Security Council failed to consider other planning alternatives or to answer requests from CENTCOM and Jay Garner's ORHA; therefore, stonewalled planning for the post-conflict phase. Ricks (2006:109) also notes the Iraq campaign's military planners with their competition culture and 'lacking of expertise' led to a situation where the post-invasion planning was 'stove-piped' and its command dispersed, where other agencies with some experience in these matters were according to Cordesman (2003:498) 'dropped, ignored or given low priority.'

Political change within Iraq

The US plan sought to pass any reconstruction and nation-building efforts back to the Iraqi state as quickly as possible and to hand the reins of power to individuals and interim governments such as Achmed Chalabi and the Iraqi national council. They were initially seen as a possible Iraqi government in exile and had worked with the US State Department on the run-up to the invasion. This relationship between exiles and the US continued after the creation of the Bremer-led CPA.

The US found that the reality regarding the new Iraqi national council was it neither was able to draft the personnel that was required from its followers or to attract significant support outside of its group's membership; from the Iraqi people within the previous existing regime. The US also found it was unable to provide personnel with the expertise to step in and fill the void left by the UN and NGOs as many pulled out of operations within Iraq following the Canal House truck bombing.

Even before the invasion, elements within the military structure of the US felt displeasure at the future efforts in planning for post-conflict reconstruction. Ricks (2006:96-98) found that politics was also playing an unsightly game when discussing post-conflict stabilisation within the Pentagon. One US general, Shinseki, famously broke ranks voicing concern over the future security situation of Iraq. Shinseki, the senior US Chief of Staff of the Army (and a student of military history), was publicly reprimanded for addressing the concerns over not enough troops to be deployed to

provide security in Iraq. This silenced many military officers who also had private worries to keep publicly quiet though their unhappiness concerning Iraq ran deep.

Garners ORHA had come into life on the 20th January 2003, staffed with active-duty military personnel where civilian staffers were 'very slowly' transferred from existing civilian organisations notes Bensahel (Mahnken and Keaney 2011:133). Two months after its creation, the Iraq invasion took place, and Garner wanted ORHA to follow the military into Iraq to 'capitalise on reconstruction as quickly as possible' (Mahnken and Keaney 2011:133), but only half his staff were in Kuwait three days before the invasion. ORHA was 'too little, too late' according to Bensahel; it struggled to get qualified personnel throughout its short-lived existence and then struggled to get them deployed. The organisation had eight weeks to prepare for its mission in Iraq, whereas the US military had 15 months.

Following the invasion, Garner had to personally appeal to General Franks of CENTCOM to be allowed to enter Iraq. They arrived in Baghdad on 21st April. It was the same day that administration experts in Washington began to blame Jay Garner and his team for not being up to the task of post-war reconstruction (despite the fact he had been significantly hamstrung by most of the agencies that would have been able to help). Jay Garner was relieved of his duties on 11th May and replaced as ORHA director by Lewis Paul Bremer, who had been an ambassador to the Netherlands during the 1980s. Garner had been made aware (by telephone call) of the decision that Bush had phased the ORHA out of existence on the 24th April, three days after arriving in Iraq, according to Bensahel (Mahnken and Keaney 2011:134)

What followed was the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which replaced the ORHA of Garner's design. The CPA also had manifest problems in Iraq, ranging from looting and anarchy through persistent insurgent attacks coupled with a lack of progress in restoring essential services. The ORHA had been designed to serve as a temporary organisation to assist an Interim Iraqi government, something that Garner believed in. Whereas the CPA, according to Bensahel (Mahnken and Keaney 2011:134), was 'an occupying authority that possessed indefinite control of the Iraqi government.'

The effects that the CPA had on Iraq nationally, however, also had significant implications upon the British southern sectors, especially Basra. The CPA order number two, the dissolution of entities, essentially ordered the breakup of the civil service, the Iraqi police service and the Iraqi military in its entirety. Efforts such as the British working party with the Iraqi naval Academy in Basra, who were looking at creating a security framework plan for Basra in April 2003, suddenly had the carpet pulled out from underneath them, leaving a politically created void of security in southern Iraq where British forces were no better prepared than the US forces to act as police.

One of many decisions of the CPA which was made in 'the summer of panic' in 2003 was the decision to create an Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which laid the foundations for many of Iraq's current political problems; that of religious and tribal identity within Iraqi politics (Egnell 2009:76). The experience of many with nation-building experience was that it is a process that could not be rushed in Iraq. Iraqi leaders with any

charisma, capability or stature had been effectively decapitated, removed or exiled, leaving a large swathe of the population with little in the way of a crop of new leaders that could emerge and demonstrate their ability to lead in a new political system for Iraq. Rather than creating a top-down approach, those with experience of nation-building, such as personnel from the State Department and some US military officers (with service in the Balkans or with the UN and other NGOs), began establishing local governing councils. This took place across many parts of Iraq in a bottom-up approach of building, according to Egnell (2009:79), a 'limited but local governance capacity,' which would then lead to provincial and national governance. The approach brought many interested parties on board, but many brought their own armed militia groups.

The seeds of a great many of Iraq's political problems lay in the arrangements of how the CPA set up the first 25-member Iraqi Governing Council. Many of the council members were entirely unknown to the Iraqi populace, and a great many used their presence on the IGC as a 'golden ticket' to political power, according to Bensahel (Mahnken and Keaney 2011:134). Many of the council were corrupt and set the tone for later Iraqi governments, particularly the transitional governments of Ayad Allawi and Ibrahim Jaafari that followed. Examples of abuses of power not only included theft from the public treasury, corruption or the formation of larger militias loyal to a specific political figure but also as a blunt political tool to influence their political rivals preventing their gaining any economic, military or political power. An example of this was Ahmed Chalabi, who gained control of the de-Ba'thification program and used the newly written Iraqi constitution to exclude Sunnis from participating in the new Iraqi government (Mahnken and Keaney 2011:136).

The unfortunate truth was the administration's pre-war assumptions meant that General Franks and his command did not need or see the potential for having to stabilise a country, create a political system from anew and solve problems of infrastructure while balancing problems created by the organisation that was meant to rebuild Iraq - the Coalition Provisional Authority. Many of the CPA's rulings created further problems that influenced what came after, the problem of insurgency. Bremer's CPA wrote the order for de-Baathification after it took over from Jay Garner's ORHA. Garner remained in Baghdad to assist Bremer but soon found the CPA did not require his voice or help. The order for de-Baathification, when shown to the CIA Head of Station in Iraq according to Ricks (2006:159), commented, 'By nightfall, you'll have driven 30,000 to 50,000 Baathists underground and in six months you will really regret this.'

De-Baathification also meant that many of the heavily industrialised areas of Iraq, such as the Anbar province meant that many of the engineers and managers of businesses had to depart their workplace, causing many to shut down as they were often the technical specialists. This also covered many of the ministries responsible for transportation, water, sanitation and power. Head of the CPA, Bremer, according to Ricks (2006:159), was told that the de-Baathification order had 'just cleaned out the ministries, we (being the US) can't run them now.' The reality was that the US solution for post-war reconstruction and rebuilding of Iraq by the ORHA under Garner (initially) and the CPA under Bremer (secondly) was not looking good 'for future Iraq rebuilding efforts' (Egnell 2009:75-76). The two agencies were meant to provide for a future Iraq but ran into problems of a lack of infrastructure due to their organisation's limitations coupled with difficult inter-agency political friction. Both organisations suffered from a

lack of available intelligence on Iraq, and neither had a working relationship with the US military, which was necessary as the military provided resources and protection for them to work outside of the green zone in Iraq. This is not to say the British had the situation under control either in southern Iraq, and decisions taken by the CPA did not help British efforts.

The Post-Invasion Military Situation

The United States faced a multifaceted myriad of problems when it came to the military situation. The Bush administration in 2004-2005 claimed that the problems were not as great as the critics claimed and that the problems were simple and straightforward from a military standpoint. The reality was that the reconstruction had turned out to be more demanding than they had anticipated. The politicians had convinced themselves that Iraq's problems did not require any significant increase in economic, political or military resources and no matter how much the evidence from the soldiers that were working the streets and cities of Iraq provided, the US politicians remained somewhat blind to the situation on the ground. US authorities predominantly believed that the problems besetting Iraq were entire of an Iraqi-based insurgency, driven purely by al Qaeda and former figures from the Iraqi Ba'athist regime. Politically imposed limits, imposed by Secretary Rumsfeld's intervention in the post-conflict planning phase regarding the number of troops sent to Iraq, meant that, as the Hussein regime fell, there simply was not enough boots on the ground to provide the necessary security and stabilisation required to hold the ground, let alone provide an adequate security forces presence for the essential supply routes. Egnell (2009:78) notes that the false

assumptions of the political and military leadership did influence the planning process, which led to dire consequences.

Another major political blow to the Bush administration was the decision taken by the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, on 15th July 2003. Vajpayee refused to send the 15,000 peacekeepers requested by the US to assist in providing security. These troops would have joined Denmark, the Czech Republic, Poland, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Romania, New Zealand and Lithuania in providing a presence with 'boots on the ground.' The addition of an Indian force would have added an Asian presence to the occupation. These Indian troops would, according to the Wall Street Journal (Egnell 2009:81), have been deployed into the northern Kurdish sector. This refusal to send troops was defended as being in India's best interests, according to Shuja in News Weekly (2003). If the Indian BJP party of Vajpayee had a majority, the troops would have deployed to Iraq.

The US concentrated its efforts in the wrong places and on the wrong problems. It became hamstrung after the CPAs judgment to dismantle the Iraqi military, police and security services along with the entire Iraqi civil service. This purge of a million Iraqis meant that many personnel formally associated with the Saddam regime lost all money and benefits (often from long service such as pensions). These people suddenly found themselves without employment or a means of making money. This left a group of people (about a million strong) with little or no employment or access to money but had previously experienced some form of national service with the Iraqi armed forces.

The US army would have required somewhat greater numbers of troops to hit the historical ratio of 20 security personnel per thousand head of population to achieve an adequate security blanket across the country. It never had these numbers at the invasion stage and fewer afterwards. This model is referred to as the Quinlivian model for security.

It is worth noting that the United States was left with a decision to make concerning counterinsurgency. The choice was between concentrating the troops that they had available in areas of intense insurgent activity, to seek a military solution to the insurgency, or to concentrate their forces in and around Iraqi population centres to create a secure zone against insurgents and criminals, such as the Indians employed against their Maoist-influenced insurgency problem in India.

The US chose to go on the offensive, whereas most counterinsurgency theory would have stipulated that it would have been best to have remained on the defensive, protecting the population and creating a safe space for political and economic reform with reconstruction. From a military perspective, the US had little current experience of fighting a modern counterinsurgency type campaign but had two allies with more recent experience than the US had in the Middle East; the British and the Israelis. The US chose the Israelis for advice and assistance but also studied the British efforts too.

The standard response from the US military to enemy fire was to employ the manoeuvre warfare tool, according to Rogers (2006:126) of 'overwhelming advantage in firepower.' This approach, when deployed on a battlefield, used a mobile military

force made up of main battle tanks, armoured vehicles and infantry was created to fight similar formations. Without space to manoeuvre and to deploy the larger weapons platforms, these formations were not so good at operating in built-up areas.

Insurgents would use civilians to hide amongst and operate from civilian areas, making manoeuvre warfare obsolete in counterinsurgency. Following civilian casualties in Iraq, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) called upon the experience of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) with its substantial experience gathered from operations in the Occupied Territories and Lebanon. This exchange of tactics for use in Iraq, along with personnel, training methods and equipment (both weapons and observation apparatus), 'made sense for the US military' according to Rogers (2006:127). When this joint US/Israeli programme went public, it further added to anti-US sentiment and a worry that the Israelis were becoming involved in the Iraq War, something the US governments of Bush (Senior and Junior) had actively avoided since the 1990-91 Gulf War where Iraq had targeted Israel with Scud missiles hoping to break up the coalition amassed against Saddam Hussein at that time.

The chain of command within US forces in Iraq was also found to be slightly confusing for both military insiders and non-military outsiders. The US army and marines would report to their immediate superior officers, but when it went higher, it could bewilder who was reporting to whom. The Commanding General with the title, The Combined Joint Task Force Commander, would answer to the Commander of US Central Command, who in turn would report to the Secretary of Defence. The command tree, which determines which officer is wherein the military hierarchy, had problems within

Iraq, famously, Ricks in *Fiasco* (2006:179) interviewed a general who chose wisely to remain anonymous, for he described the US command structure as 'muddled' due to its complexity and numbers of troops. The interviewed General is quoted as saying, "*if you held a gun to my head and ordered me, 'tell me what the chain of command is for your people in Baghdad', well I'd just be babbling.*"

At the tactical level, both the chain of command at Brigade level and below and its military units operating on the ground were not geared towards any form of coordinated civil-military co-operation. Little was handled in the way of providing policy and direction for the civil affairs unit that was divided amongst the combat brigades; therefore, little synchronisation happened nationwide. Similar to the British effort, the US found that there was significant confusion between military and civilian efforts even when they were both Pentagon based agencies within the DoD. Different views about how to stabilise, reconstruct and democratise Iraq continued throughout the first two years of Iraqi occupation, meaning frequent strategic and verbal conflicts between military and civilian leaders such as Franks, Garner and later Bremer.

After having been removed as OHRA director, Garner became the first Chief Executive of the CPA under Bremer until Bremer fired him. Garner said publicly during an interview that his preference was to put the Iraqi people in charge as soon as possible and to do it with some form of election. Instead, the US government had begun a process of de-Baathification which Garner 'reportedly' had refused to implement, and this decision led directly to his dismissal.

Feith (2003) claims that the relationship between US military and civilian planners was 'stormy.' This led to confusion and friction before the invasion in planning for phase 4, but when combined with the on-the-ground situation of ORHA under Jay Garner having refused to locate their headquarters to a facility shared with the military (possibly due to this fractious relationship). This distance did not equate to achieving greater coordination and provided force protection, transport and personnel for their initial efforts. The CPA under Paul Bremer also chose to remain somewhat separated from the US military. This also left the CPA in a position where it remained out of touch with the conditions in the field, adding to the lack of expertise and experience with peace-making and nation-building.

The tactical behaviour of the US military regarding its operations on the ground quickly found that the situation had transitioned into something that involved complex irregular warfighting, which in turn led to counterinsurgency. Egnell (2009:82) found that the legitimacy of US military operations had been harmed by heavy-handed tactics, limited cultural understanding, bad press for US operations by the local media coverage and a worsening in relations with the local Iraqi communities by not being able to provide security in an area after significant military operations. One area of alienation that quickly developed was Fallujah. General Mattis (Ricks 2006:6) describes attacks and killings of US private security contractors in Fallujah as a classic example of insurgency doctrine as ‘a come-on,’ orchestrated to evoke a disproportionate military response in its use of firepower. Similar to mistakes made by the British army in Northern Ireland.

The US approach associated with manoeuvre warfare-based platforms (tanks, APCs and AFVs) is that they rely on heavy firepower to suppress the enemy (winning the firefight), usually employing artillery and airstrike capabilities. These approaches tend not to be discerning between combatants and non-combatants alike. Aylwin-Foster (2005:6) recognises the fact that under emotional duress and faced with life-or-death decisions, many within the military will revert to type, a kinetic response with overwhelming firepower.

A major difference in how the British and the US patrol their areas of operations is that the US found that available armoured vehicle resources limited the number of patrols that it planned. This would limit how often patrols could go out as these vehicles provided force protection for foot patrols. Doctrine on how to patrol was replaced as these vehicles took priority. Tactical behaviour for a patrol on foot is to establish the 'ground truth,' a situation where the soldiers 'read their patrol.' Kitson (1977:43), who was brigade commander for 39 Brigade in Northern Ireland, liked foot-patrols especially for intelligence gathering as 'nothing beats the Mark one eyeball.'

A US report (Egnell 2009:84) entitled 'Army Lessons Learned' written in December 2003 for the US military found that the greatest intelligence assets were soldiers on foot patrol (something Kitson instituted during his command of 39 Brigade in Northern Ireland). However, force protection – defending the US troops from attack – took priority over effectiveness in tactical behaviour. The US military became preoccupied with force protection and would move their forces into large camps outside the cities, thereby distancing themselves from the local population, a situation later followed by

the British when they pulled out of Basra. The US Centre for Army Lessons Learned, reported by Graff (2004:60) that US soldiers tended to patrol in full body armour, wraparound glasses and loaded weapons which were pointed at people (an insult to Islamic males) that created the illusion of a physical barrier between the military providing security and the Iraqi populace with which they need to interact. There are certain situations in which a posture of complete militarily readiness should be maintained, but only when it is necessary. When it is maintained indefinitely regardless of current events and surroundings, it indicates not only a lack of situational understanding but also a lack of trust, as well as signalling a lack of general security. 'If security forces do not feel secure, should the population have reason to fear?' (Graff 2004:60)

It is worth noting that the level of civil-military co-operation between civilian agencies and military forces for both the US and UK could have been improved. The coordination between them and earlier planning before the invasion was short on detail. It failed to plan for future outcomes such as an insurgency and was lacking in policy and strategic direction to achieve a successful outcome for a return to a functional civilian government. The military forces struggled with a political direction, which ultimately affected the planning and conduct of tactical operations in the field concerning occupying Iraq and providing security in population centres made up of different tribes and religious sects. With considerably greater planning and coordination along with necessary oversight from both the US and UK governments, greater inter-agency co-operation may have led to an Iraq in which the US desired to be a beacon of democracy and free-market economy within the Persian Gulf.

The planning situation remained muddled and disorganised that Egnell (2009:80) states 'a combination of a failure in the planning process in Washington along with a lack of constructive dialogue between civilian and military sides of the Pentagon, failed to provide comprehensive analysis and plans for a future occupation of Iraq.' It was not until 2006 that the US military acknowledged that they had made strategic and tactical blunders in dealing with the Iraqi insurgency. It is worth mentioning that the insurgency was not just local in makeup but had regional influences for its creation, especially Iran in the South and East of Iraq. Blame for the failure of Britain's army in southern Iraq has been compared to that of the US Army from 2003 to 2006. The US military did not shine in its ability to deal with a developing insurgency within Iraq. The US took time to adjust to this new development and received new doctrine to guide their forces.

During the surge of 2007, the US chose to deploy extra troops to Iraq to help face the increased violence. For the British, the doctrine technically was in place (although seldom used) from 2001, but the doctrine had had little circulation amongst the troops, but the numbers of UK troops had been reduced, possibly too far to be effective.

The Use of Special Forces in Iraq

In contrast to other problems, one area of robust, durable cooperation and integration between the US and UK in Iraq was in the deployment of special forces under General Stanley McChrystal with the deployment of Task Force 145. Rogers (2016:3-4) states 'Under General Stanley McChrystal, the US Joint Special Operations Command

(JSOC) developed a network-centric model which used four highly trained and well-armed Special Forces groups to seek out and destroy elements of AQI [al-Qaida in Iraq, the precursor to IS] and related groups across central and north-western Iraq. Commonly known as Task Force 145, the four Task Force groups each had a regional focus, with the personnel drawn from three US formations - SEAL Team 6, a Delta Squadron and a Ranger battalion - and a SAS squadron from the UK.

These task forces had access to a wide range of intelligence but operated with considerable independence from coalition military command. They undertook up to 300 raids a month to kill or capture suspected insurgents, the latter frequently subject to intense physical interrogation in order to gain information leading to further raids. AQI leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi himself was killed in June 2006, and over a three-year period to late 2007, some thousands of suspected insurgents were killed and tens of thousands detained, 20,000 of them in Camp Bucca near Basra.' The naming and numbering of the special forces task forces changed periodically to maintain security and anonymity.

The view from the Pentagon was that Joint Special Operations Command operations and the establishment of Sunni militias opposed to Zarqawi's brutal activities, coupled with a surge of US forces in 2007, were the core factors that led to an easing of the war by 2008. Following Zarqawi's death, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) began to change into the Islamic State (IS), but what is now clear is that the surviving military leadership of IS, was heavily dependent on Iraqi paramilitary survivors from that period. This US/UK

special forces relationship was not new; it was created during the 1960s and has continued through previous joint campaigns.

British Miscalculations in Iraq

'Iraq is unquestionably one of the world's most difficult countries to govern … Few other countries are so seriously divided in language and religion, with no natural majority. Few have such a powerful system of local, clan and family loyalties still flourishing beneath the formal political and administrative structures. Hardly any have so deeply entrenched a tradition of violent intrigue at every level…'

Gwynne Dyer in 'World Armies', 1979[8]

The initial plan for the British was to support a 20,000 strong invasion force to be deployed from Turkey and to invade the Kurdish areas of Iraq. Fairweather (2011:13) states this 'was the plan' according to Admiral Michael Boyce (the CDS). Boyce wanted to deploy a limited force into northern Iraq from Turkey, but plans had to change when this fell through on the 24th of December 2002 due to the Turkish government giving their refusal for British use of Turkish territory. What followed was what Fairweather (2011:14) calls 'a scramble' to deploy British troops to Kuwait, creating further setbacks in planning and preparation for the invasion and what would happen after that. The army demanded a more prominent role for the Iraq invasion, so the UK government opted to supply a division (roughly 15,000 personnel in a dozen battlegroups), with its final number amongst all the services it reached 46,000. When the British entered Iraq, they were not alone. The Polish army was attached to the

[8] Quoted by Dr Niall Barr in a lecture to the Joint Services Command and Staff Course at the Defence Academy, the 16th of April 2013

British units (deployed to rear units for their protection). The Poles numbered 2,000 soldiers, making them the fourth largest military contributor to the invasion.

The erroneousness decisions made by the British in administering southern Iraq fall into the following broad categories:

- Its general light-handed techniques for employing force.
- An inability due to the post-invasion environment to create or structure an Iraqi political assembly in the south that was able to operate with the British and other political entities.
- A general year-by-year reduction of British boots on the ground, especially front-line troops, to provide sufficient security forces for the area administered by British forces.
- Inadequate levels of funding for major undertakings and projects by the US/Iraqi central government and the UK meant little long-term investment commenced.
- Failure to begin significant, long-standing reconstruction in British controlled sectors backed up by Iraqi political and local security support.
- The British were the junior partner in a coalition with the US occupying Iraq, where the US set national decisions impacting upon British sectors.
- Insufficient reliable local security forces (Iraqi police or military).
- Failure to learn important lessons in counterinsurgency and recognise when a conflict evolves and associated political/civil methods from earlier British campaigns available to de-escalate further engagements.

The British errors in Iraq, when first scrutinised, are similar to the Northern Ireland experience of Operation Banner. Banner operations at its best are described as being 'light-handed', which was how the army's methods utilised for patrolling in Basra was labelled. In Northern Ireland, the British army often sought a situation where the level of violence being perpetrated could be controlled and minimised to bring about a political solution that would, in its own ends, bring about a final and total cessation of violence. Aside from specific military operations such as Operation Motorman during Banner (a good example), which took place on the 31st of July 1970, and the Falls Road curfew (a bad example), which took place on the 3rd of July 1970, barely a month apart; the military tended to have a light touch. This light touch would involve foot patrols, vehicle checkpoints and a presence on the streets of Northern Ireland of British soldiers who at all times were acting in aid to the civil power, more so after Ulsterisation in 1976. Troop numbers after the Iraq invasion after the first reduction numbered less than was available in Northern Ireland.

In Oman, the primary patrolling activity of the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) was to be a presence of the Sultans forces in and around Dhofar, but as a means of depriving the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) or the People Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG -name dependent on the timeframe as it changed meaning) from having free movement within Dhofar. The forces deployed within Oman during phase two did have advantages available to them, such as artillery and air support (also for Telic in Iraq). These were not available for Northern Ireland. Post-1972, ground and the underlying factors contributing to the insurgency was being taken from PFLOAG. The SAF increased their patrolling ability and began making efforts that improved security within tribal areas with local irregular troops from

defecting PFLOAG fighters and locally raised irregulars. This method of patrolling with a 'lighter touch' in tribal areas, especially when formerly held by the enemy, was used to increase the level of defections within an increasingly unpopular Soviet or Chinese backed insurgent force.

These 'light touches' or further displays of minimum force is just one of several lessons that had been transferred and attempted in Iraq from both Northern Ireland and Oman. Early attempts of this were seen during the earlier occupation of Basra, where British soldiers would be patrolling the streets with berets instead of helmets, without heavy weapons. However, even with flexible tools found within the counterinsurgency package, there still requires there to be a significant security presence that can project force when needed. The circumstances of southern Iraq very quickly changed from one of enough troops to possibly provide security to one that could not. The British, which suffered an annual numerical decline, lacked the ability to protect itself and provide the security required on the ground for the people of Basra. The light touch changed somewhat when British patrols came under regular fire from potential insurgents and militias in response to the occupation of the south. The tactical change meant larger patrols took place with the use of heavier weaponry with armoured vehicles. The approach of the army was one of 'been-there-done-that' with Northern Ireland. It may have had experience and learning from an internal security role, but this initial swagger soon found that it closed doors for senior British Generals and officials with their US counterparts when the insurgency took root across Iraq.

During Northern Ireland 'troubles,' the UK deployed between 13,000 to 16,000 troops a year into the provinces. During the Oman insurgency, the Sultan's Armed Forces started with about 2,000 troops and had to increase their number to 12,000. Troop numbers in Iraq, especially for the US, have fluctuated between 100,000 to 150,000 year-on-year apart from 2007 with the surge. The security surge of 2007 was President George W Bush's drive to improve security in the country, especially in the capital Baghdad by providing an extra 30,000 troops to General Petraeus. Following the invasion phase of Iraq, the British very quickly reduced troop numbers from 46,000 ground troops in March 2003 to under 10,000, which went down year-on-year.

Date	**Number of Ground Personnel**
May 2003	18,000
May 2004	8,600
May 2005	8,500
May 2006	7,200
May 2007	5,500
May 2008	4,100
May 2009	4,100
January 2010	150
November 2011	44

Table: BBC report on Iraq (first published the 14th of December 2011)

The three first geographical differences between Northern Ireland and Oman are that Oman is predominantly desert once away from the coastline and the fertile areas. Northern Ireland is mixed, large rural farming areas and then heavily urbanised towns and cities such as Belfast and Londonderry. In Oman, the area held by the PFLOAG varied; it mostly consisted of villages on the Jebel, safe routes and passages from Yemen, and areas where their soldiers could be safely ensconced amongst the population on the Jebel with access to a water supply. The adoo before 1970 had the upper hand on intelligence and movements of the SAF much the same as the Republican community in Northern Ireland that acted as the eyes and ears for the provisional IRA watching out for British army troop movements. In Iraq, the ground also varied from built-up (Basra) to open areas of desert and salt marsh with its own watchers of the British (akin to the DLF watching the SAF in Oman). The difference is that the Iraqi militias had mobile phones to provide an almost real-time movement intelligence on British army deployments.

From a military perspective, the campaign in Oman compared to Northern Ireland had many significant factors often supporting the Sultan of Oman's Armed Forces, such as little or no press attention on the operations and techniques used by the SAF and that heavy artillery and combat aircraft providing air strike capability could be employed whereas in Northern Ireland the British army was there in support of the civil power. Trying to employ heavy weapons was out of the question. The use of heavy weapons by troops rumoured to support the mainly Protestant led government at Stormont would have handed the moral victory to PIRA. It is worth noting when looking at the Northern Ireland chapter that heavy-handed overreactions by the British army often played directly into the hands of the provisional IRA during its earlier campaign. PIRA

would often provoke the British army into doing specifically what it was trained to do, which is to react as an armed force.

Politically the differences between Northern Ireland, Oman and Iraq are vast; Northern Ireland is a democratic part of the United Kingdom, Oman being an area controlled by a hereditary ruler (with most of the state power residing with the Sultan) supported by a ruling council and provincial leaders. Iraq's circumstance had a national parliament, regional executive councils and local executives placed in charge of major built-up areas such as Basra. The three levels of government are significantly different in the political design, but all three share similar characteristics such as differences in cultural make-up, political leaning and often an inability to work with other political parties. The positions regionally and locally could be held by political opponents.

It is this last point and difficulty in where the British have significantly, through politics have been able to create over a long time the components for a political settlement. These settlements work by reducing violence to an acceptable level to allow for a longer-term political solution to be hashed out between the politicians. Within the Oman political system, all power flows from the Sultan, and any positions within the government are generally filled by professional capability, loyalty to the Sultan and political dependency. In Northern Ireland, many of the politicians before 1998 may have done little at Stormont, as a direct rule from Westminster was often the case. They could take their seats as MPs at Westminster but could do little without some form of power-sharing between the Northern Irish political parties.

Concerning Northern Ireland and Oman, Iraq held greater complications for the British regarding any political solution by being the junior partner in the coalition where the senior partner, the Americans, defined the direction of Iraqi national political structures and strategy. This situation could overrule local efforts such as the British and Iraqi Naval Academy to bring about a level of security for the city and surrounding waterways. This work was undone in a single pen stroke following the decision to stand down the entire Iraqi military when ordered by the CPA.

After 2005 the British government made a decision changing priority for the British army, with Afghanistan taking the lead as the conflict to be primarily resourced. Iraq and the troops deployed there were still supported and financed, but the focus was on Helmand province, Afghanistan.

Security Sector Reform

Although there are no direct comparisons to the US efforts in security sector reform, there are similarities between training models and later effectiveness reports on Iraqi police and military units. They are mentioned here because part of the British mission in the south was to build and train Iraqi security forces, both police and military units.

The British, soon after the invasion, started Security Sector Reform (SSR). This building of local security forces, police and military units is nothing new to British civil-military cooperation. The circumstances around Basra went somewhat differently. British troops, according to the House of Commons Defence Committee (2005), have

'suppleness and pragmatism at their heart of their professionalism especially within the training environment.'. With limited numbers, the British had to implement a softly-softly approach in its operations and had to begin a rapid build-up of local security forces to hand over some security duties to local Iraqi security authorities. Due to the weakness of these formations, they were quickly infiltrated by local militias and criminals.

Police units were structured, equipped, and trained by UK police mentors. These, too, were infiltrated by militias or came under the influence of strong personalities who then created their own empire of control in Basra. A famous example of this control is where the Basra Governor ordered the police service to return two UK special forces personnel who were arrested while on a surveillance operation back to the British. The police refused, and the British had to use armoured fighting vehicles to break into the police station. Instances of police corruption like this led to Operation Sinbad, which was meant to remove the corrupt element of the police. By the time of the operation, British troop levels were deemed unacceptably low to carry out an operation of the size that Sinbad originally was planned to do. The infiltration of the Basra police and efforts in general at SSR created a situation according to Hills (2003:31) that was ‘in the eyes of the local population not enough to provide the sense of individual security that was necessary to create or maintain support for the occupation.’

The reliability of troops trained by the British also was questioned. During Operation Sinbad of September 2006 and March 2007, the jointly conducted operation between the British and the Iraqi Security Forces did improve the situation on the ground. On

the military side of SSR, the British army did train the Iraqi 10th Division, which from the spring of 2007 took over security within Basra and did it with limited support from the US/UK coalition. The Iraqi 10th Division during late 2007 had to be transferred elsewhere in Iraq due to worries over its effectiveness.

After 2006, the British army had become bunkered down in various locations around Basra, and the security situation on the ground meant that officials from civilian organisations such as the FCO, DFID or other NGOs were unable to do anything meaningful further for the civilian security sector reform especially with the earlier problems of infiltration of the police in Basra.

An anonymous senior British officer (Royle 2005), who served in Basra in providing training to local Iraqi troops declared the British brigade-sized force for the south 'farcically small for the task' and with security sector reform that 'we've done some bloody good things, but the truth is that we also had to turn a blind eye to an awful lot of iffy behaviour from the militias – assassinations, graft, vote-fixing and so on.' Results, according to Royle (2005), 'should have possibly been different with greater numbers of boots on the ground and reliable security partners to work with.'

US and UK Spending on Iraq

The spending levels in Iraq, according to the Congressional research service estimates of July 2010, including pending requests for funding just for the US funding of operations in Iraq, have run out to a total of $801.9 billion. This funding, according

to other sources (BBC report dated the 14th of December 2011) such as the Noble Laureate Economist Joseph Stiglitz and Harvard University's Linda Bilmes, puts the actual cost of the Iraq war and the occupation at somewhere close to $3 trillion when the impact on the US budget and the economy is taken into account. When further costs are added, such as the costs for long term physical and mental health rehabilitation and support for veterans, this could also run into vast billions. This varies quite dramatically when the levels of funding that the UK government spent upon the war in Iraq are considered, where the same report above put the cost of British funding of the Iraq conflict at $14.32 billion or £9.24 billion. The fiscal scale of the war and the funding required for both the conflict and post-war phase have figures that vary wildly, especially before the long-term costs add to the final figure.

The UK Treasury had two principal roles in regard to spending in Iraq; the first was helping other parts of the government plan for the economic reconstruction in Iraq after the conflict, and secondly, to provide economic expertise to support the UK's post-conflict reconstruction efforts on the ground.

According to the witness statement of Sir Nicholas MacPherson, the permanent secretary to her Majesty's Treasury (report entitled HM Treasury involvement in Iraq dated the 15th of January 2010), there were three main funding streams for the UK's involvement in Iraq. The first was to assist with the additional costs of military operations, and this was funded through the Treasury reserve. The second was the special reserve (which was created specifically for this purpose in 2002). The last was the increased funding to the MoD, DFID and the FCO to cover the costs of diplomatic

and reconstruction activity; these costs were funded through baseline settlement spending levels for relevant departments (in this case, the FCO and DFID). These three could also have been further supplemented through the FCO/DFID joint conflict pool (previously called the global conflict prevention pool).

To defeat an insurgency, economic investment for employment, reconstruction and the simple financial means to eradicate the basic causes that have manifested into an insurgency along with the burden of costs for security forces are required.

Britain's Counterinsurgency Legacy and Lessons

This section reviews Britain's legacy and lessons gathered from its counterinsurgency experience; it does not look at the US legacy of counterinsurgency or where the US got its examples of good practice from for its doctrinal *book The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* 2007 (FM 3-24) as the US have their own history with counterinsurgency.

Recently scholars such as Ucko and Egnell have noticed the British army's apparent inability to transmit lessons learned from one campaign to another. Given the British army's historical and frequent practice at counterinsurgency since 1945, the army has had new doctrine since 1995 with further new doctrinal upgrades researching and learning lessons from earlier and current insurgencies to determine triggers for the conflicts and to determine if lessons can be transplanted to make them work with a current conflict. Past solutions could hold key ideas for new problems. These British

experiences of counterinsurgency, such as its previous imperial conflicts, and policing and the Troubles in Northern Ireland in some respects should have created a system within the British army for understanding and managing these particular types of political violence and how to defeat these insurgencies.

As mentioned earlier in chapter three, the counterinsurgency principles and approaches derived from the British experience has never had formal teaching in the subject at military academies until Iraq was nearly over and Afghanistan was ongoing. This teaching at Sandhurst has since ceased, as according to Dixon (2012:354) is ‘deemed unlikely to be further pursued.’ The teaching of counterinsurgency before this was only found at the Command and Staff College and only as ‘a dark art’ of military science often referred to as the post-graduate military science course. This will likely remain the case for the near future.

A somewhat fractured model of British counterinsurgency has proven to be informally taught within regiments with counterinsurgency experience and has sadly been far less consistent or uniform throughout the colonial era and the postcolonial experience after that. Much of this informal training and experience has been lost due to regiments restructuring and due to the long-time between its deployments in this field, mainly due to the retirement of its NCOs and officers. Even with informal teaching and training on the subject by 'interested parties', they find conflicts with similar triggers, reactions and outcomes.

The army since 2006 has, with the creation of the Mission Support Group and its latest incarnation, the Lessons Exploitation Centre, created an organisation capable of finding lessons from past experience and then transferring the knowledge through doctrine or other means.

The early years of insurgencies in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Northern Ireland have been marked by errors and mistakes in the British approach according to Edwards (2009:1-2) in the fields of 'intelligence, tactics, command and control, civil-military cooperation and the ability to adapt to these new insurgencies.' Edwards (2009:2) further notes 'why is the British army so forgetful at learning from previous examples.' It has been noted that the British army's regimental system often acts against systematic learning along these lines by attempting to centralise learning tendencies along with military training and doctrinal systems, which have been often found to be thoroughly inefficient at disseminating lessons learned from low-intensity operations, especially when the army has been prepared for conventional warfare in Europe rather than low-intensity conflict. This situation may be slowly reversing, but as the subject of counterinsurgency has become unpalatable in military circles after Iraq (and Afghanistan), it is unlikely to be seen as an important military discipline.

By relying on previous experience (from Northern Ireland and the Balkans), the British army fell into a vicious circle of overconfidence in their ability to control civil disorder, criminality and rioting that initially started over a lack of utilities and reconstruction around Basra. The British, due to annual troop reductions, had limited combat-capable troops able to support civil agencies with long-term reconstruction projects by being

unable to provide security across the south. When this violence escalated into an insurgency, there was little institutional or formal training in theory or operations to fall back on for counterinsurgency from informal regimental success or historical context from previous conflicts. The doctrine existed but was not widely circulated.

Significant strength and flexibility were demonstrated by the British army when Basra fell to the British on the 6th of April 2003 in that they quickly adjusted from a combat role to one of a peace support operation. The British were congratulated on their ability to move into this phase by very quickly removing heavy weapons, combat armour and replacing helmets for berets to convey a more benign role when patrolling the streets of Basra. According to Egnell and Ucko (2016:56), claims of an innate talent within the British army for being somehow superior in combating an insurgency has fortunately rarely been put into writing; instead, it is much like an urban legend, where the narrative builds on an oral tradition rather than written tradition.

In respect of Iraq, the British army has been found wanting in its ability to draw lessons from previous British counterinsurgency experience, especially with the specific few campaigns that could provide promising lessons, tools and examples of counterinsurgency principles that could and should have been attempted in southern Iraq. Due to its most recent history, the lessons learned from Northern Ireland have often been promoted as a good example despite there being another counterinsurgency experience such as Dhofar, which has been crowded out. It is often the case that the discussion of British counterinsurgency is regularly dominated by the larger insurgencies such as what happened in Northern Ireland and Malaya, which in

turn creates a disproportionate focus on just these two campaigns, often ignoring powerful and significant lessons from other smaller less well-known experiences.

It is worth noting that the institutional neglect of counterinsurgency within British doctrine until 1995 had been dismissively lumped together, called 'operations other than war'. Alderson (2010:94) describes how the British army failed to publish or update counterinsurgency doctrine for the British army until 1995. He explains that it was 'neither studied not taught, and that the subject fell into decline especially where the focus within the British army's Advanced Command and Staff Course also somewhat decreased in this field.'

Nagl (Withers 2009:614), an American counterinsurgency practitioner/scholar, has opposing views of both praise and criticism for British effectiveness in counterinsurgency. He specifically argues the view that the British army is an effective learning organisation. Many examples of good counterinsurgency practice put into FM 3-24, the US Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrinal book came from the British experience.

Conclusion

In closing, the assumption of superiority for dealing with counterinsurgency situations by the British army did lead to a level of institutional overconfidence in counterinsurgency that very quickly the British situation in southern Iraq failed to live up to. There are multiple reasons for this failure, some of British control, others not.

Any and all of the following reasons could be why; such as a breakdown of regimental tradition and learning within battalions, to a failure of circulation of military doctrine, to not having a required level of trusted local security forces, not enough British troops within Iraq, to the financial and time price associated with counterinsurgency operations and insufficient investment into southern Iraq.

The domestic political system and US administration of Iraq, along with the manoeuvring of expectation that Afghanistan, which by 2005/2006 became a much higher priority for the British than Iraq. Not all the mistakes were British, and the US military also did not stand out as a shining example of military might and counterinsurgency prowess during Iraq's occupation, the US at least changed their entire doctrine and strategy with FM 3-24 and General Petraeus leading 'the surge' operations.

The British had experience, doctrine (although difficult to access), and lessons, but it did not have an official organisation within the British army to assist with promoting the concept of lessons until 2006 with the creation of the Mission Support Group. Some learning in the field of counterinsurgency took place at Sandhurst and across battalions with academics gathered from the Military Academy were flown into Iraq to provide teaching on counterinsurgency theory and practice. The initial mistakes were assuming that the experience of Northern Ireland or Bosnia would transfer to Iraq. Despite counterinsurgency becoming a 'dark art' or the 'post-graduate military science course', it will need constant refinement for use which is highly likely across the twenty-first century.

In the next chapter, the conclusions and discussion cover a wide range of subjects in completing the thesis. They look at the final analysis taken from the four pillars framework to assist in identifying lessons.

Chapter Eight

Discussions and Conclusions

postcoloniae ab experientia ad finem insurgencies

This chapter in the thesis is its final component, in that it will resolve the statement of 'What were the effects of the post-colonial experience of counterinsurgency on UK forces in southern Iraq? Were the lessons absorbed and implemented?' The response will have to be looked at from the experience of the two campaigns of Northern Ireland and Oman, along with the analytical tool of the four pillars, which has had a long association with British counterinsurgency experience. Considering Iraq, the observations will be scrutinised to see if any of the Oman and Northern Ireland lessons and their laws were attempted in southern Iraq.

Contained within this chapter are the following topics:

- The separate conclusions from the earlier chapters.
- The final analysis of the four pillars framework;
    - i. Minimum force in Oman, Northern Ireland and Iraq
    - ii. Civil-military co-operation in Oman, Northern Ireland and Iraq
    - iii. Use of Intelligence in Oman, Northern Ireland and Iraq
    - iv. Tactical flexibility in Oman, Northern Ireland and Iraq
- Lessons potentially valid and transferable
    - i. Oman
    - ii. Northern Ireland
- The conclusion

- Significance, implication and contribution: the future of counterinsurgency?
- Future research

The Latin phrase 'postcoloniae ab experientia ad finem insurgencies' translates as the end of the post-colonial experience of insurgencies, with two meanings; one as an ending for this thesis and the other also questioning whether counterinsurgency and its previous incarnations, if observed and analysed, can provide lessons and solutions to future military practitioners and theorists seeking lessons to aid a future conflict.

At the beginning of this conclusion, it is worth mentioning the influence of the Chilcot Inquiry that published its findings on the 7th of July 2016. The Inquiry ran to 13 volumes (one acting as the executive summary). The report looked at the political dimensions of Iraq, its build-up and preparation, the execution of the invasion and the political decisions taken by the UK government during the occupation. This thesis primarily chose to scrutinise the military aspect and not the political phase (which is secondary). Given its detail and wide-ranging facets, the report has been mentioned but has not been greatly utilised.

The Separate Conclusions

Each chapter has its own conclusion that has been investigated using the four pillars. It explores doctrine, learning, lessons and the case studies of Oman and Northern Ireland, then looks at Iraq with a penultimate chapter scrutinising broader areas of analysis.

Methodology

The second chapter explained the reasoning behind the thesis and its originality. It then examined why Northern Ireland and Oman were chosen as the case studies for this thesis. This chapter has looked at the methodological approach, the literature review (and its chosen six theorists/authors). It considers other sources from which information has been gathered and explains the authors' philosophical standpoint and chosen theory, critical realism. The four pillars framework will compare each campaign to assess the strengths and weaknesses identified from this analysis structure.

British Army Learning, Doctrine and Counterinsurgency

Official doctrine created for the British army for counterinsurgency or assisting the civil power dates back many decades, often published in Army field manuals or campaign-specific texts. Revision of this work is intermittent, with limited distribution and dissemination throughout the army. Bulloch's *Counter Insurgency Operations*, the 2001 revision of counterinsurgency doctrine, had comparable problems. Between doctrine and experience, Kitson (1973:40-41) identified that officers needed to be educated in the demands of planning, conducting and training for counterinsurgency.

Learning went beyond reliance on doctrine with regimental experience and history, providing lessons from deployments for tactical flexibility and operations. The non-official doctrine has influenced education in this subject. The four authors, Callwell, Gwynn, Thompson and Kitson, published work from their experience, which remains important because it still has validity today. They all kept a level of influence on counterinsurgency long after publication.

A lessons process that has evolved and developed from Northern Ireland through Iraq is trying to reform the army's institutions to find lessons and revisions for the army in counterinsurgency. Current doctrine on counterinsurgency exists, even if counterinsurgency has gone out of fashion within military circles. Counterinsurgency is no longer is seen as an add-on for general training; the previously stated opinion within the 2001 *Counter Insurgency Operations* was the thought 'the army has an approach to operations which, with careful reflection and imagination, can be readily adapted.' (2001: B-2-2) The reality has since Iraq has reversed this position.

Lessons could have been extracted from campaigns with both favourable and not-so-favourable outcomes for the British army and still attempted in a different campaign which could have led to a favourable outcome. There remains the opinion, according to Dyson (2020:158), a need for the ability to have the 'full spectrum' of tools available for an army in that it can carry out peace support operations and counterinsurgency.

Dhofar, Oman

The Oman campaign is analysed by the four pillars in terms of the positive and negatives within each of the pillars. It has two distinctly different phases of the conflict (connected to the two separate Sultans ruling Oman) in that the Dhofar insurgency officially ended in 1976. However, small isolated skirmishes continued until 1979. Its own chapter's conclusion correctly identifies that the Dhofar insurgency was primarily of social and economic factors.

Here the lessons from Oman are identified as a nation-state that provided most of its security apparatus and fighting units (with some British officers either on loan or hired by the Oman state). Oman utilised allies within the region to assist with combat and non-combat roles to provide security and development. In phase two, the state-led development efforts reduce the support within Dhofar's rural population for the insurgents.

These services delivered by Civil Action Teams would move into a district and build new facilities and infrastructure. The state utilised radio (dropping free radios into Dhofar), which aided it when the insurgency evolved into communism against Islam. This was a further development after the insurgency changed its character from nationalism to communism during the 1960s. Oman's insurgency lasted 12-15 years.

Operation Banner, Northern Ireland

The Northern Ireland conflict known as Operation Banner began in 1969 until its official end on the 31st of July. During the initial deployments of troops onto the streets of Northern Ireland, mistakes were made at many levels, political, strategic and operational. After Banner's deployment, the General Officer Command Northern Ireland was ordered to be the commanding general and to oversee the RUC undergoing organisational reforms. The IRA underwent a schism and split in 1970, creating the Provisional IRA. This all coupled with strong sectarian violence between the Ulster supporting 'Loyalists' and the Republican, mainly Nationalist community.

The army deployed into Nationalist areas to initially buffer the two communities and found conditions for soldiers from the north of England akin to home. The local councils did the barest minimum to provide amenities in these areas. As mentioned in the main chapter, post offices, employment exchanges, and council offices were often the total exposure some Nationalist communities had to local governance and services in their areas. The army undertook limited civil developmental projects in these areas funded by the army from battalion and brigade funds. The local councils and the Stormont assembly could have significantly changed the political direction of the conflict by increasing employment, investment and educational training within these communities.

The provisional IRA managed to get an army operating without significant strategy or political guidance from both Westminster and Stormont to react like an armed military force, with violence when provoked. The army responded with crowd-control techniques of CS gas and baton (non-lethal) rounds to break up riots and disturbances.

The lack of a joined-up strategy with a military operations training package for Northern Ireland would have given each brigade and battalion posted in-country guidelines on operating in their area with detail on tactics, protocol and limitations. This lack of leadership, policy and command oversight led to events such as the Falls Road operation in 1970 would never have taken place.

The objective of PIRA was to make it too difficult to control and administer Northern Ireland and hoped that the British would retreat, as Marxist thinking claimed the British had done at the end of the empire. This involved a campaign of terror involving shootings, attacks on soldiers, and bombing military or civilian economic targets. Throughout 'the troubles' a level of sectarian violence was perpetrated by both communities' terror groups on the others civilian population, often randomly killing people according to where they lived.

There were spectacular failures during the early years, such as Operation Demetrius (an attempt to use RUC special branch intelligence) and the use of internment, where suspected or known terrorists were imprisoned without a judicial trial. Internment lasted until 1975 and, rather than reducing violence, inflamed it. In order to reduce jury tampering, non-jury Diplock courts were established to try terrorist suspects legally.

In 1976, The Way Ahead or Ulsterisation was a plan that reformed the security forces' function in Northern Ireland, giving the RUC primacy as a police force with the military providing 'aid to the civil power.' The four pillars framework identifies those changes in strategy, political direction, operational guidelines and training for deployment in Northern Ireland was important.

Operation Telic, Iraq

Following the invasion of Iraq on the 19th of March 2003, US, British, Australian and Polish forces occupied the country, and it was then split into divisional army districts,

the British commanding Multi-National Division (South East). The British had displayed restraint in how they planned and executed their attack on Basra by employing a 'light-handed' approach which initially garnered criticism from the US military. The US then employed similar techniques in taking Baghdad. What followed was a short 'honeymoon period' in the south, where the British patrolled Basra without heavy weapons or combat helmets. These foot-patrols were reminiscent of British efforts in the former Yugoslavia, in a peace support role.

This situation did not last for long, and multiple decisions made by a plethora of governments and organisations such as the USA and the British (including military, political and administrative choices by both nations) affected the British in the south. When you include the presence of Iraqi politics (and their militias in a post-Saddam Iraq), difficulties in creating reliable Iraqi Security forces (both police and military) to work with the British, and the influence of other regional actors such as Iran and al-Qaeda created further complications.

Britain was the junior partner with the US. The US determined national policy for Iraq (in all areas); the British had to follow their lead. What became apparent was a lack of post-conflict planning for reconstruction by both the US and Britain. The UK had previous experience with reconstruction efforts but had left this to the US as the British proficiency in this area was 'outdated.' The US had expertise within the State Department, but due to US inter-departmental politics, the Pentagon had side-lined the State Department, leaving it to a new short-lived organisation created by the DoD, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) which itself was

soon replaced after it faced on-the-ground problems getting deployed to Iraq. Its replacement, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), made similar mistakes as ORHA had and was also mired by organisational problems and separation from the US military similar to its predecessor.

The British made efforts, following the invasion, by creating temporary solutions to the security situation in Basra with a local arrangement with the Iraqi Naval Academy staff and naval students, but this had to be abandoned when the CPA set new national policies across Iraq that forced a change in this security plan. CPA directives such as the de-Baathification policy of the 15th of May 2003 removed all Ba'ath party members from positions of authority and management across all sections of Iraqi governmental and civil service. This was followed by other changes such as the 23rd of May 2003 CPA directive, dissolving the Iraqi armed forces and interior ministry (all the police and internal security apparatus). This removed all elements of local security forces available to the British, and rebuilding the police and military soon found they were susceptible to infiltration.

The UK government of Tony Blair began to downsize the military in the south by significant numbers soon after the 2003 invasion. This decline in numbers continued during the following years that simply meant that the British were meant to 'soldier on' with fewer troops to hold Basra and its surrounding areas, let alone provide adequate security for reconstruction, allowing civil reconstruction to operate or support the security sector reform.

James Quinlivian found by comparing Malaya, Northern Ireland and other emergencies that a ratio of 50:1 or 20 security personnel per 1000 head of population was required to provide a level of security. In 2003, post-invasion, the ratio was 370 to 1. By 2007 the ratio had increased to 625 to 1. The conflict had proven to be unpopular in Britain due to the politics behind the UK joining the American invasion and the reasons why it took place. In protest against a war that had barely been classified as legitimate, millions marched in demonstrations against the Iraq war. Despite these protests, support for the armed forces held steady.

In Iraq, after the 'honeymoon period,' British efforts in reconstruction halted after rioting and violence in Basra. These events were the responses of the Basran people where little had been achieved by the British in delivering reconstruction. The British plan was to employ the FCO and DFID with military support to be able to boost repairs and begin development. Unfortunately, the security situation had become hazardous for British civilians to work without a strong military escort; therefore, it became a circle of decline with violence that began about limited British reconstruction efforts ceasing reconstruction efforts due to the security instability. The British had insufficient numbers to provide security singularly, but it had no reliable local security forces of Iraqi makeup either police or military (they had to recruit and rebuild the police and military) to support reconstruction projects and provide the necessary protection.

Basra and the surrounding districts had political parties associated with many diverse groups such as religious groups through tribal affiliations to influence from Iran. Many of these groupings then had their own armed militias. This made political support for the British difficult, especially when dealing with diverse political objectives from

multiple sources. This affiliation with the British would change depending on realpolitik, what could be provided for whichever faction and by whom. Efforts to create security forces, either police, special police or military, had equal difficulties, with tribal, religious, militia and Iranian penetration becoming common. Control over the separate police units operating in Basra, such as the Basran police, the Special Crimes Units and Port Police, would often be held in the hands of different politicians and their militias.

Basra and the south became complex and tangled for the British. With limited military resources (often being downsized every year) and with diminished political support (both locally and at home) with rising financial costs, the military carried on with its mission. The UK had to follow the US lead when it set the national strategy until an Iraq assembly took power through 2004, which became a constitutional government in 2005.

This Iraqi parliament was barely functional, and the security and reconstruction efforts slowed not only under US and UK control but also under the new Iraqi administration. In 2005-2007 the security situation deteriorated further, with attacks on coalition forces but also against civilians with sectarian violence, a situation reminiscent of Northern Ireland. With no reliable local police and an untested military division to work with and reducing numbers of British combat troops to administer an area with 2.5 million people, the UK military decided to withdraw from Basra and provide overwatch from Basra airport, handing the city over to the largest militia. After it pulled out of the city

as it was unable to perform any role in the city effectively, its troops remained under siege at the airport, and any convoy needed armoured support to get into the city.

The Analysis Chapter

This chapter looked at how the US and the UK did things differently in Iraq and overcame (or not) the violence that progressed into an insurgency after the invasion. The errors made by the British in administering southern Iraq fall into several broad categories (mentioned further in this chapter); British strategy for the south, choice of military tactics and operational guidelines, political difficulties both in the south and in the UK, funding difficulties, limited military forces, no significant local security forces, the UK status in the coalition and finally, a slowness in evolving to a strategy of counterinsurgency and its inability to even attempt to transfer lessons from other post-colonial counterinsurgency experience.

Many of the early mistakes made in Iraq tended to gravitate towards operational and tactical errors transplanted from Northern Ireland (as the UK's last major use of similar doctrine). The lessons of utilising lighter vehicles with a 'soft-touch' to avoid the use of heavier armoured vehicles while patrolling led to the mistake of using the lightly armoured snatch land rover, which did not have enough protection for its occupants. The British always had significant troop numbers in Northern Ireland; in Iraq, they reduced every year. By not having enough boots on the ground (a situation that happened only once in Northern Ireland following a PIRA ceasefire), the British were unable to exert a strong military presence controlling much of the south, let alone garrisoning and controlling the ground.

The British were not the only coalition partners to make mistakes; the US military made their own, ranging from reliance on overwhelming firepower through an inability to provide foot patrols in built-up areas (over-reliance on vehicles and heavy weaponry). The US had a similar military doctrine on counterinsurgency. They re-evaluated theirs during 2004/5 and went to the Israeli Defence Forces for up-to-date know-how in counterinsurgency that provided greater direction through the release of a joint US Army/Marine corps field manual. This field manual, FM 3-24, almost ignores British efforts though it states 'in the twentieth century, Great Britain sanctioned tactics that would not pass moral muster today' according to *The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (2007: xxxiv) and further claims that these British tactics magnify their effects in an urban environment.

Directed by this new doctrine and a new commander of US forces in Iraq with an interest in counterinsurgency, General David Petraeus, the US deployed extra troops during 2006/2007 for 'the surge' that did reduce violence between religious communities and armed militias. The US found it needed assistance with counterinsurgency in Iraq but found answers much quicker than the UK did. It provided troops, training, financial funding and assistance with counterinsurgency doctrine, allowing planning for counterinsurgency operations.

Four Pillars Framework

Minimum Force

When looking at Oman, Northern Ireland and Iraq, events happened that did not follow the British ideal of minimum force. Considerations that, either limited or not, the employ

of minimum force was influenced by such factors as press attention. Oman witnessed orders passed from the Sultan to the SAF in phase one commanding punitive punishment strikes, and with Northern Ireland, over-reaction by a military unit, when faced with violence, will often resort to its default position, when under sustained attack; of using firepower to suppress an enemy force.

Oman

In the case of Oman, it received little press attention, especially during the reign of the first ruler during the insurgency, Sultan Said. The campaign only gathered slightly more press attention during phase two, after the presence of British troops in Oman was reported upon. Minimum force in Oman during phase one depended on the orders of the patrols of the then small SAF and by the limits imposed upon the troops with their weapons (usually with World War Two era weaponry). By early phase two, modern weapons, better training and a significant increase in the size of the SAF (1,000 troops to 12,000) meant that they were able to cover and hold greater ground in Dhofar along with the new support of air-strike and artillery capability. Minimum force in Dhofar meant selective force during phase one as the Sultan would order punishment strikes on communities (and their wells) that supported the adoo on the Jebel. By phase two, these strikes had been replaced with targeted operations and later the development of security and control lines to deny the enemy freedom of action in and around the Jebel.

Northern Ireland

In Northern Ireland, minimum force became part of doctrine and training with a set of rules for engaging the enemy known as ‘the yellow card’ carried by all ranks. Any incident of ‘live-fire’ came with the knowledge that you would be visited by the military police to account for every round you fired. The army investigated every shooting after 1976.

Before 1976 mistakes were made, such as the Falls Road, the widespread use of CS gas and baton rounds. These were counted by successes such as Operation Motorman that removed barricades from nationalist estates, but the incidents of the army employing CS gas or firing live weapons became own-goals, providing support for the PIRA, which is how they orchestrated events - to get the army to react.

Following the widespread use of CS gas in built-up areas, guidance eventually came down to creating procedures for its utilisation along with similar constraints on baton round usage. These rubber bullets were supposedly non-lethal, but having operated these devices multiple times, the author is fully aware of its ability, if employed incorrectly, can lead to serious injury and death. Massive incidence of over-reaction led to these events becoming 'recruiting incidents' for terrorist groups. Minimum force for the various terrorist organisations is derisory. All military, police and civil buildings and personnel (along with family and friends) became targets. With the sectarian killings – between both religious and political communities' – even their own civilian population, if they were caught in bombings or shooting (often with regret by the perpetrating group), anyone was a target. Northern Ireland had its grim news reporting

into homes on the nightly news for all interested parties across the globe. The significance between previous British counterinsurgency campaigns and Northern Ireland was that it was not a developing country but part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Iraq

In Iraq, the British displayed good use of minimum force with its 'light-touch' on both how it took Basra and continued to patrol the city after it fell into British occupation. A linear improvement between Oman, Northern Ireland, and Iraq in how the press reported events is noticeable. Since the mid-1990s and the development of 24-hour satellite news, any news outlet not authorised by either the UK MoD or US DoD could still transmit live pictures of fire-fights out for the world to see without a military censor. Incidents of attacks, acts of heroism and loss became part of the minute-by-minute news cycle, although great efforts were expended to notify relatives of casualties before the press could.

This reporting would enable both the good and the bad stories to be related; when reports of over-exuberance or abuse against civilians and prisoners became news, these incidents created global shock aimed at either the US or British forces (or both). This was similar to the Northern Ireland conflict in those incidents of over-reaction created more support for radical groups or militias providing enormous propaganda. Iraq, over Oman and Ireland, had greater exposure to 24-hour news and had to face the influence of new regional news outlets and variants, often spinning the story to fit one agenda or another. It also had faced the effects of its actions with amateur footage

published by anyone with cell phones or cameras able to promote various causes over the internet and provide support for groups combating the UK and US with its allies.

Civil-Military Coordination

Oman

It was not until phase two of operations in Dhofar under the new ruler, Sultan Qaboos, that any political efforts to quell the insurgency or restructure the government took place. By use of civil development and economic investment, the government began to build amenities and services that were some of the grass-roots factors that started the insurgency.

The Sultan throughout phase one, Said, refused to spend money on developing Dhofar. His son, who deposed Said in 1970 (with British backing), was a former officer serving with the British army who understood that development was required to alleviate the poor conditions that many who lived on the Jebel and within wider Dhofar. Qaboos used Oman's newly valuable vast oil-generated wealth to provide facilities for Dhofar, improving the living and economic conditions for its inhabitants by building wells, clinics (for both humans and animals) and connecting the Jebel to the rest of Oman. By doing this, in time, the root causes for supporting the insurgents dwindled, especially after the insurgency evolved from its origin of being one of nationalism to another that became ideological and communist which attempted to convert the Dhofari Jebel population from Islam. This change in ideology was counted by a governmental policy positioning the Sultan as Islam's protector. This ideological doctrine pushed many locals from the PFLOAG to support the Oman government.

The local Dhofar gendarmerie was reorganised to be more effective as a policing unit with security within tribal areas allied with Oman to be provided by a newly formed local militia force known as the firqats. These firqats, many of whom were former surrendered enemy personnel, provided local knowledge of the PFLOAG. The firqats provided a presence in remote tribal areas that did not require garrisoning SAF troops in these communities initially. The firqats were a solution but had difficulties with interacting with the SAF (many of whom were former adoo fighters) and were notoriously difficult to manage at certain religious or tribal calendar times of the year. The firqats experience meant they became the eyes and ears of the state around their tribal areas. These were fit, lightly armed (but with modern weaponry) locals that knew their areas which were able to operate independently of the SAF as an irregular force that had training from both the SAF and the British SAS.

The use of British officers (whether contracted or loan officers) with loaned senior non-commissioned officers allowed for the training of the SAF during phase two into a modern force capable of operating and patrolling in the Dhofari landscape. This, in some ways, is an earlier form of mentoring and training as seen later in Iraq and Afghanistan, where UK and US forces have mentored and trained local police and military units.

Northern Ireland

The nationalist areas (and to a much lesser extent the loyalist areas) of the major built-up areas of Belfast and Londonderry during 1968/69 had faced violent struggles, rioting, fire-bombings (meant to drive sections of one community out) and massive

disruption to normal life in these areas. Routine council services of bin-collection or amenities such as meals-on-wheels or visits by the social services did not take place in the nationalist areas because the state and its organisations often did not have access. The police service of Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), was perceived as being incapable of impartiality and therefore had restricted access to nationalist communities unless they deployed in force, often using their own reserve force, the B specials. When the army was deployed in 1969 and put into these areas, they found that the army had the support of these communities, and they took over many civil tasks while they were in these areas. Little local council or national development took place in these areas until post-1975, leaving damaged estates in the hands initially of the army until late 1970. The army reacted to the IRA and then PIRA in the methods associated with a military force. These communities, after events such as the Falls Road incidents and then later Bloody Sunday, meant that they became safe communities for terrorist groups where RUC and army patrols felt like outsiders.

After the army withdrew from these estates following violence against them, they became initially closed no-go areas with barricades to stop the RUC from effectively policing these areas. In some cases, before Operation Motorman, the military operation to remove the barricades, local deals were made to remove barricades in return for the normalisation of usual council-led services. Most of the usual council services available anywhere else in the UK was available across the provinces; however, the often Protestant and loyalist leaning councils would prioritise spending elsewhere in their boroughs. Many of the large employers in Northern Ireland were Protestant, and the majority, Catholic and republican citizens, suffered massive

discrimination in job opportunities. The economic situation changed around the late nineties with the signing of the Belfast Agreement (1998).

Following the Ulsterisation of the troubles in 1976, the policy gave the police primacy with the army giving support to the civil power. By this time, internment had been stopped (a policy of 1971 to hold terrorist suspects without trial), and problems with the Diplock court system (where trial by jury is done by a panel of judges instead) had been smoothed out.

Efforts were made throughout the seventies and eighties to create additional employment and educational opportunities for all in Northern Ireland with direct rule from Westminster. Economic investment into Northern Ireland also improved job prospects for both communities, with an army presence continuing to suppress the violence to a minimum.

Following the political agreement signed on the 10th of April 1998, the inhabitants of Northern Ireland could hold a UK and/or Irish passport. This cleverly maintained UK 'ownership' of the north while allowing the republican presence to align with the south without having to move to a new country, maintaining a joint UK-Irish relationship where people could identify as one or both. The Belfast Agreement was a political end to the circle of violence which forced all sides to deal and compromise their own positions to accommodate others that created a somewhat successful power-sharing between parties at the Stormont Assembly with some unusual success between individuals such as Paisley and McGuiness being First Minister and Deputy First

Minister, who were known for their friendship late in life (known as the Stormont chuckle brothers). The two individuals were diametrically polarised characters during the long duration of the troubles but changed when sharing a political office at Stormont. The PIRA never truly disarmed but put the majority of its weapons beyond any immediate use.

Iraq

The British took the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID) with the military into Basra. Hopes for reasonable development in Basra by the British was derailed when the scope of difficulties pre-dated the invasion as there was a left-over legacy of under-investment by Saddam Hussein in and around the south, possibly left this way when areas of the south rebelled at the end of the Gulf War in 1991. This led to a quickly deteriorating security situation that began to unravel when criminals and militias found that British troop numbers were steadily being reduced and found room to operate within the south. To further create difficulties, the number of tribal, religious or militia groups associated with many different political organisations within the south members were augmented following CPA decisions which significantly increased the number of unemployed.

The differences in the political arena around Basra varied greatly with the situation in Oman and Northern Ireland, although the strength of opposition by Iraqi political parties to one another would have been at home in the Stormont assembly until the Belfast Agreement. Iraq had national and regional elections and local executives (Mayors). When elected, each of these posts could be filled by individuals from

different political parties or be related to Iranian Badr or Sadrist religious militias. Support for the British would wax and wane depending on what the British could supply to Basra and to the politicians.

Security sector reform and the quality of training of military units varied. British police trainers helped form the municipal police and the serious crimes unit for Basra. The serious crimes unit then went 'rogue' and then became influenced by the Sadr militias and then had to be forcibly shut down by the British. Great efforts were made with the UK military to stifle infiltration by militias into Iraqi military units; this remained a problem until the Iraqi government moved most locally raised forces elsewhere, where the troops in these areas had little influence. When the British pulled out of Basra in 2007, security was turned over to the Iraqi military, some of which maintained a presence, whereas others merely disappeared into the populace. British efforts mentoring Iraqi military units later bore fruit during Operation Charge of the Knights with successful Iraqi deployments.

Use of Intelligence

Oman

When operations began in Dhofar, the Omani state had virtually no intelligence support from the local population or organisational concept on creating a working apparatus. The SAF spent little time deployed in the area except to patrol, and the Oman gendarmerie was often behind their walls despite being the lead policing unit for Dhofar. During phase two, Watts instituted his five-point plan, and the SAS deployed small numbers of intelligence trained personnel into the province. These

twenty-five SAS intelligence personnel went to the ground and began to cultivate the essential contacts with the local inhabitants. This information was fed back to two SAS NCOs with an aptitude for overseeing an intelligence coordination organisation. This led to details being provided upon an enemy order of battle showing units names, operational boundaries, personalities of the leaders and the men and resupply routes for enemy units. This intelligence quality increased when the firqats began to be raised with further surrendering enemy personnel choosing to switch sides and operated in their own tribal areas, which created strong local intelligence links and knowledge on the PFLOAG. The intelligence and its detail expanded with their presence, as many were former Jebel farmers knowledgeable of the Jebel geography and lived in these areas where the PFLOAG conducted their operations. These returnees who changed sides also could demonstrate to former comrades that they were living a better life, spreading this positive propaganda, especially after the PFLOAG attempt to convert their fighters away from Islam.

Northern Ireland

Much of the initial intelligence utilised by the army came from the RUC Special Branch. This was famously found to be out of date and incorrect when employed on Operation Demetrius to arrest IRA personnel. Kitson, the commander of the 39 Belfast Brigade in 1971, made intelligence gathering part and parcel of a soldier's patrolling system. All information that could be gathered from foot patrols ranging from the amount of milk being delivered to a house through the number of cars parked outside, would be documented. Kitson also directed further observation and surveillance attempts creating the Mobile Reconnaissance Force (MRF), which created a fictional dry-

cleaning company with vans for mobile surveillance. Kitson's troops also recorded suspects social circles when people were stopped and questioned on the street.

Penetration of terrorist units was almost non-existent at the start of Banner, but with efforts by MI5, MI6 and Special Branch, that by late summer 1973, most brigade formations of PIRA and the IRA had informants working for British intelligence or the RUC. By the end of the seventies, one in eight British soldiers was deployed onto intelligence operations in Northern Ireland. When this penetration of both the IRA and PIRA was suspected and uncovered, PIRA famously changed organisation and went to a smaller cell-based structure, meaning contacts beyond each cell was handled by a specific individual responsible for singular tasks, e.g., quartermaster (knowing where arms dumps were), cell commanders being in contact with the PIRA army council and those within city cells responsible for maintaining security. These cells were as susceptible to intelligence penetration, but their structure meant the information gathered was no longer organisation-wide.

The collection of tactical and operational intelligence was originally the role of the army until police primacy took root after 1975. Specialist units started under Kitson that later developed into 14 Intelligence Company that continued their existence after police primacy. Not to be outdone by the army, the RUC created its own specialist observation unit known as Bronze Section and its own elite, undercover observation unit E4A to undertake mobile and static operations. Most infantry battalions posted to Ireland had their own COP unit (close observation platoon), which would move into a location for up to a week observing an area, the inhabitants and traffic movements.

The use of the Special Air Service in NI can also be best described as an intelligence asset and as an elite shock unit; they very rarely took prisoners and often killed all the terrorists involved with their operation. Many COP units ‘found out’ while in a hide and then forced out by the PIRA were often confused with SAS units due to their attire and equipment.

Another version of human intelligence was the use of human observers that specialised in remembering human faces associated with the known or suspected terrorist mug shot books. Personnel utilised in observation towers in city centres would pull suspected people from crowds, often leaving the suspect bewildered for how they were identified.

Technical intelligence amounted to phone tapping, household, and vehicle bugs. These provided useful information, but the majority came from human intelligence. These sources often lived and worked in their communities and faced being killed and mutilated as 'examples' if found. PIRA worked hard to penetrate the Special Branch to find these people. The intelligence 'game' played in Northern Ireland has since PIRA gave up violence not ceased. With the 'spin-off' groups of the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA, often their operations are disrupted due to strong intelligence operations.

Iraq

Like Northern Ireland, the army, due to Iraq's differences in religion, culture and language, had little or no network initially for human intelligence. The vast majority

came from technical sources and observers (usually the Special Reconnaissance Regiment – SRR). CPA order five that stood the Interior ministry down also took down the security people responsible for internal security under Saddam Hussein. Many interior ministry buildings were ransacked, destroying files. In this void, the British fell back upon lessons from NI, what was needed was something similar to the system Kitson brought into his brigade area of Belfast in 1971; a system that 'took account of life, promoted acute local awareness and maintained accurate records of, for example vehicle ownership' (Newsinger 2015:145). During 2005, the British began to recruit paid informers from the militias, sometimes with mixed results, mistaking taxi drivers for insurgents (who had been wanting to expand their legitimate businesses and had instead been maliciously informed upon by competitors to the British as being possible insurgents). Sometimes the militias would inform the British about other militia groups to create confusion and the competition down.

A famous mistake in how intelligence was handled between the US and UK led to organisational confusion between the two. An administrative error meant that all intelligence in all its forms held by the US was classified and stamped NOFORN, meaning no foreign national could access the intelligence, even if an ally had supplied it in the first place. This took political pressure from the UK Prime Minister to remedy.

Technical efforts returned cell phone data and locations which were widely used by special forces in raids when calls and finances were exchanged that kept insurgent cells functional. A massive local source of intelligence was the employ of local Iraqis as interpreters that worked with the British, often at risk if their identities became

known. These people provided rich and detailed local intelligence on persons of interest and geographic areas either associated with criminals or potential insurgents, as much of this information was lacking from other human intelligence sources.

Tactical Flexibility

Oman

This most sought-after skill was hard-won in Oman during phase one, as it came about by experience, that of surviving combat with the adoo. Initially, the experience of the SAF had little formal training for operations in Dhofar. It operated far away from reinforcements and medical support with a generation of weapons from a previous era which created somewhat mixed results during phase one. This experience by phase two, along with formal training, helped to create both a professional NCO cadre amongst the SAF and an increase in basic training for SAF recruits. With experience, training went both up and down the chain of command as units began to slowly garrison the Jebel during the second phase.

The SAF became equipped with modern weapons, requiring changes in its battle drills but along with British assistance, began formal training to create the future SAF NCOs. Training of army units meant they were able to use fire support from aircraft and artillery but could also benefit from possible medical evacuation. The ability of the SAF by phase two meant that patrols were able to coordinate efforts between multiple units such as firqat, the SAS and other SAF units. This training became invaluable with the formation of the lines of control from 1973 (Hornbeam, Hammer and Damavand) involved triple concertina barbed wire lines mixed with anti-personnel mines and

constructed along a line of fortified structures for the SAF and allies to patrol from. These lines were set up to restrict movements of the PFLOAG. Eventually, with a much later line, Simba, they cut access to Yemen, disrupting enemy reinforcements. When the Iranians sent a brigade (with its own helicopters) to assist the Omanis, these reinforcements and their mobility quickened the end of the conflict.

Northern Ireland

In Northern Ireland, this meant strict adherence to the yellow card and operational orders. With pre-deployment training, lessons passed on through the regiments and the 'old soldiers' who had been out on tour before, in many respects, British soldiers by the mid-seventies were better trained to deal with the intricacies and dangers in Northern Ireland. With this historical or experienced learning and the assistance of the Northern Ireland training teams and training facilities like 'Tin City' (that would duplicate the feeling and effect of NI streets), the army, by the shift in strategy around 1976, was better prepared than previous years. This training would cover the legalities such as when to return fire through drills to suppress rioting (the training included real petrol bombs) that covered most eventualities.

Egnell (2009:99-100) states "*that the operations in Northern Ireland perpetuated the British army's experiences and attitudes about low-intensity conflict. Despite the traditional operations in, the Falklands and the Gulf War, the operations in Northern Ireland have greatly influenced the British army's training, movement, deployment, logistics and morale. It has shaped British soldiers' lives. Not only have the British had the chance to perfect their urban patrolling, civil-military co-operation, and counter-*

terrorist techniques, they have been forced to do so under the close scrutiny of the British legal system as well as the media. Northern Ireland has, therefore, often been referred to as the perfect training ground for units bound for the complex peace operations of the 1990s and after."

If the ability of the UK had been 'honed' in Northern Ireland, had the peace since 1998 led to atrophy in this tactical flexibility and education? Training and education, especially amongst infantry battalions and regiments, have had to face two quite distinct problems with Iraq, such as frequent deployments both abroad and at home, where it has been found difficult to create the extra time required for learning in these areas to be maintained and formally taught. With post-tour leave, training courses, promotions and pre-deployment training, the army calendar left little time for anything else. Simply, the British army often faces the old problem of overstretch. Mistakes were made with tactical flexibility in how to deal with everything from map reading (that saw many a patrol during the early seventies being found across the Republic border) to lessons learned in how to drive unmarked vehicles around Belfast while remaining safe.

Iraq

A joint US/UK report looked at the British approaches to low-intensity operations, according to Egnell (2009:140) noted that British forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2005 'benefited from an ability to engage with the local population, escalate force rapidly when needed, and then re-engage with the local population almost immediately'. Connecting this with the traditional approach of the 'hearts and minds, the modern

vernacular in Iraq became, 'smile, shoot, smile.' This learning came from Northern Ireland with the army's vast experience of patrolling the streets and fields of the provinces. The report above failed to recognise that Britain's gentle approach only lasted until late 2003 when Basra faced regular, ongoing violence aimed at the British, its army, and its various civilian organisations unable to function in and around Basra because security and reconstruction had stalled.

Britain made mistakes; the FCO and DFID, who had the training, language and cultural skills to operate in the south, had been held back due to insecurity. The decisions created by the CPA and its directives impacted many Iraqi livelihoods and financial security, causing significant region-wide unemployment - forcing many into the militias' arms.

Much of the British army's recent experience was either from its experience of Northern Ireland, the peace support operations in the former Yugoslavia or assisting with the civil collapse of central authority and the increase of criminality in Sierra Leone. Northern Ireland is best defined as internal security, and Yugoslavia is predominantly a peace support operation. Sierra Leone was somewhat between the two positions. The impression reported by a Human Rights Watch (Egnell 2009:143) regarding British efforts to maintain control was that it ‘believed that security was not a priority.’

The number and occurrence of violent attacks on UK and US forces also varied. According to Garfield (2006:30), the explanation for this difference was that the British

approach to stability and reconstruction differed significantly from that of the US. The British areas achieved initial success in providing greater political stability, with fewer casualties, less alienation and more rapid reconstruction. After the upsurge in violence against British efforts, the British reconstruction became limited to fast, easily managed projects funded from military sources and budgets only. The US had put much of the south's reconstruction effort out to formal tender, inviting the US approved companies to bid for contracts.

Ultimately, no tactical flexibility can replace the number of boots available on the ground. Here the British drawdown of troop numbers did affect security both for troops and civilians involved in security and development/reconstruction.

Four Pillars Overview

Doctrine, Learning and Development

Despite not examining a specific counterinsurgency campaign, the development of the military subject of counterinsurgency is an ever-evolving theory as it develops around people. Within chapter three, learning associated with the British army comes from multiple sources; doctrine, tradition, history, experience, the non-official doctrine written by theorists or practitioners, and lessons from after-action reviews.

The British army has had to change to best collate and learn lessons from past deployments (especially with counterinsurgency). The British army created the Mission Support Group in 2006, an organisation well placed to promote learning within

the army. The learning and lessons will tailor the doctrine for current campaigns by being flexible for the here and now. Learning found that lessons that could influence future campaigns may also be developed from counterinsurgency campaigns that are highly subjective in overall success or failure, approaches or operational. However, the lessons or examples are still relevant because it has multiple facets.

With counterinsurgency and a lessons-based process, sometimes the treading in others footsteps can create new doctrine and tactical approaches. The new methods could equally be formed by not just relying on the positive lessons that worked from favourable ending campaigns. A reassessment of what lessons can be learned from past failures and successes can provide tools within a counterinsurgent toolkit.

Doctrine can and has evolved, but Dyson (2020:115) noted 'a tendency among officers to perceive doctrine as a template to apply already learned lessons rather than as a basis for critical thought to see beyond the doctrine.'

Dhofar, Oman

This campaign was a 'true' insurgency with political, social, economic and military aspects. The real-world events and the laws found from the Oman campaign note that the conflict started between 1963 and 1965 and was one of nationalism that became magnified upon the world stage with a regional element (South Yemen) and then an ideological perception with the Soviet Union and China assisting the Dhofari insurgents.

The insurgency was nearly lost during phase one, as the PFLOAG were on the cusp of winning the military campaign during 1969. This situation meant that the SAF needed re-equipping and re-training to be an effective modern military force with a change in strategy desperately required. Political change at the top of the Omani government was needed to change the entire campaign; this meant a coup against Sultan Said was investigated, planned (assisted by the British) and successfully carried out, installing his son, Qaboos, as the new Sultan.

The new Sultan changed the Omani state apparatus to ease political, social and economic constraints previously to control the population. With an increase in oil values and the associated revenues, state spending was consumed, funding civil aid teams on the Jebel that could function alongside an expanding, professional SAF that, with civil, economic and societal reform, began to gain a foothold and presence in insurgent areas.

During phase two, the enticement and employment of surrendered enemy personnel to Omani control began to swell the ranks of local firqats (militia units), meaning that there was an indigenous fighting force with local knowledge of the PFLOAG on the Jebel. The expansion of the SAF now required some form of basic training to standardise the training regime. This was further complemented with a British training team that professionalised the SAF officer and NCO cadres, creating leaders with experience operating in these areas and trained in the latest techniques of operating on the Jebal.

Oman chose to connect to the world stage regionally by joining the Arab League and internationally by joining the United Nations. With advice, Oman also sought regional partners with Jordan and Iran that also had vested interests in stopping a PFLOAG/communist victory in Oman, supplying military assistance and resources to end the campaign.

The pivotal moments of 1970 were the decisions taken to support the coup against the previous Sultan (Said) and the much-needed changes (after the coup) in military and political strategy to bring about economic, social and military reform to successfully end the insurgency. The British had identified that Qaboos was the best option for significant change and took efforts to support a change of Sultan. Qaboos rapidly sought advice in bringing about change for Oman, creating the total package of reforms to restore the country.

The Dhofar insurgency could have provided lessons for Iraq. The simple premise of working in a Muslim country that provides much of the personnel with a British element that assists with the strategic position, training and other specialisms may have failed but should have been tried.

Northern Ireland

The army functioned in Northern Ireland for nearly six years without a clearly defined strategy until 1975/1976. This change meant it was no longer struggling without military doctrine; the role it was given was of being military aid to the civil power.

That difficulties within the split of the province's communities meant that political development and civil-military cooperation was hindered, especially within nationalist areas due to the sectarian political divide. The start of the conflict created a schism within the IRA, creating a splinter Provisional IRA. The Provisional IRA carried out operations against the army to provoke a response from the army as an army, to react with a violent response. These incidents provided great publicity for the Nationalist position. PIRA was criminalised, changing the perception of the conflict, though it remained highly politicised with its political wing Sinn Fein.

Some of the army's early operations during 1970/71 did employ heavy-handed tactics; curfews, CS-gas, searches and the wide use of unsuitable armoured vehicles in built-up areas. The development of pre-deployment training for all units by the Northern Ireland Training and Advisory Teams (NITAT) in areas within the UK and West Germany in various 'Tin Cities,' meant military techniques were improved, reducing casualty numbers with the security forces. These tin-cities provided a level of tactical training at the patrol, platoon and company organisational levels with lessons learned (LL). These ranged from patrolling (foot movement) patterns, reaction to effective fire (in urban environments), when the use of force both with and without firearms was legally justified and how to do a wide range of tasks depending on the area in which the unit was to be located (some tasks taught to both, others were area specific).

Other changes, especially in political decisions, also hindered the army and its operations, with internment, the perception and status of PIRA prisoners in jail and Westminster imposing direct rule. After Operation Demetrius, Intelligence gathering

across the provinces was unified and re-organised as previously its responsibility belonged to the RUC Special branch. The army also had new rules of engagement; the introduction of the 'yellow card' created a legal framework for the employ of force as a response to paramilitary and illegal activity.

With a change of the army's direction from 1975/76, The Way Ahead or Ulsterisation changed the role of the tactics it employed. The tactics shifted from a muddled position of an almost counterinsurgency-lite/colonial era situation to one of internal security. Significantly, the police (the RUC) were given primacy with the army providing assistance to civil power.

The evolvement of doctrine with operational guidelines was institution-wide and kept its security forces alive and functional while providing a legal structure for its operations against PIRA while keeping violence to a minimum in an area which is part of the United Kingdom which had greater scrutiny than other conflicts overseen by the military especially when compared to Oman. Without the change to 'The Way Ahead' or Ulsterisation, one possibility is that a political/security/military muddle may have remained in place for longer that could have lengthened the violence and the duration of the conflict.

Iraq

The Iraq invasion and its immediate military situation thereafter meant the British army could undergo operational change, and it had to change its role from a war-fighting position to something akin to both peacekeeping and internal security.

The US, following the invasion and the Iraqi surrender, was solely in control of Iraqi national security and strategy for all aspects affecting reconstruction, funding, national policy through security (just to name a few), and the British was the junior partner in this relationship. The change in initial US reconstruction efforts after the invasion by replacing the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led to confusion and delays in reconstruction efforts. The CPA directives derailed early UK security efforts in Basra. CPA directives also dissolved the Iraqi police, security agencies, military and civil services. By attempting to 'clean-house,' efforts to de-Ba'ath the Iraqi governmental apparatus left senior managers, officers and civil servants with knowledge and expertise unavailable to use.

UK forces were drastically reduced by UK governmental choosing after the invasion. These figures continued to further decline across the years. Efforts to create new police and local security forces were problematic due to widespread infiltration by militias associated with either the Iraqi political parties, religious influenced groups (such as the Sadrists), Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI or Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn) parties or Iranian influenced organisations (such as the Badr brigades).

Financial and technical efforts to aid the reconstruction (both UK provided and US/Iraqi supplied) were either slow in commencing operations or had difficulties in functioning with an emerging hostile security climate to foreign troops and civilian contractors working in southern Iraq. The violence aimed at the British was in response to a slow effort in significant reconstruction efforts.

The political situation in Iraq was split on many levels, between Sunni and Shia influenced political groups then with further divisions with politicians associated with tribal, Iranian or other local militia support. As the political spectrum had elements at national, regional and local levels of political organisation, this led to a system that was difficult to effectively work with since it had to work with the British.

British military strategy did not evolve quickly enough to recognise that southern Iraq was developing into a situation akin to counterinsurgency without any functional local security forces to work with the British. Iraq created the most difficult of positions for the British army. The mixed position of being the junior partner, with a reduced year by year number of troops and with little civil assistance due to the deteriorating security situation in southern Iraq, creates a difficult juggle. The delays in identifying that the security situation had developed into an insurgency and that the British army had to change its role somewhat to face this also created real-world positions that are difficult to change.

Lessons Potentially Valid and Transferable

This section reviews both Oman and Northern Ireland, listing the lessons possibly transferable from these two earlier conflicts that have been identified by the four pillars framework.

Oman

- If the training of Iraqi troops had happened early after the invasion with CPA approval, there would have been a larger number of trained Iraqi soldiers for duty, especially if the troops ‘stood down’ by the CPA were available for re-training and deployment elsewhere in Iraq to remove the possibility of outside influence upon these soldiers. The ‘vetting’ of these troops could have been done while they were usefully deployed, preferably elsewhere.
- That the UK had operated successfully within an Islamic country and could do it again if it had identified that UK forces needed cultural and religious understanding of Iraq. The UK could provide assistance, however short in duration, as a legally defined occupier working (as it had in the past) with existing infrastructure, advising and attempting to modernise forces and civil structures where needed.
- That a nation's coffers – both the occupier and (in this case - Iraq's), if invested wisely and correctly (with oversight), could provide most of what a state needs to reconstruct, rebuild and re-arm (if needed).
- That local security efforts such as the firqats of Oman could have been replicated with officers from the Interior Ministry and police, using their experience and intelligence to suppress criminality and maintain the status quo. These officers could be re-trained on the job (something done by the British before in counterinsurgency) and utilised their numbers and intelligence to suppress potential violence before it magnified. The US surge took many militia groups onto the state payroll during the surge of 2007, thus reducing the number of militia groups creating chaos.

- That the use of UK officers and soldiers in either a seconded, loaned or contracted role as used in Oman could be described as an early type of mentoring and training that should have been installed with the fledgling Iraqi security services.
- The employment of former enemy fighters cum firqat meant that local intelligence was current and useable. The closest the British had in Iraq was the use of local interpreters who were local sources of intelligence.

Northern Ireland

- That operational planning and pre-deployment training that exploited lessons gathered from earlier tours of the provinces by the British army provided consistency. The level of preparedness for deployment for Iraq needed not just operational and tactical planning but needed advancement to allow troops to break the language barrier and provide education at all levels of command with a greater understanding of Iraqi customs (that varied depending on tribal area) and especially Islam that could have avoided many potential difficulties.
- Northern Ireland had prepared the army with some basic elements of urban and rural operational instruction with an awareness of counter-terrorism training. In Iraq's case after 2004, the pre-training and doctrine used in Iraq needed to be identified to utilise the correct doctrine which existed on counterinsurgency but was little known or available. Similar to Northern Ireland, the training for Iraq needed a refresh with both urban and rural environments, also requiring training in both counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency.
- Lessons and effectiveness in counter-terrorism improved by experience in explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) and in the intelligence gathered through

technical and electronic methods in analysing these devices. Tactics to keep the bomb disposal officers for EOD also underwent rapid development in Iraq to keep them alive as militia and insurgent groups greatly targeted these individuals.

- That Northern Ireland nearly always had circa 13,000 troops in both local Ulster Defence Regiment and British army regiments either on a four-month or two-year posting. This number did not include the police (RUC). The southern Iraq area was larger than Northern Ireland, and the British had less personnel that continued to decline annually.

Conclusions

Detailed below are various, but not all of the mistakes either made by the British or by Iraq's condition that impacted upon British areas of responsibility.

- The lack of a stable political structure in the south meant the British found it difficult to create consistency in attaining political objectives between local political entities.
- A general lack of boots on the ground, especially in numbers of combat troops, meant that the British forces were unable to provide sufficient forces on their own to maintain security.
- Derisory levels of funding provided from the US/Iraqi central government and the UK treasury meant that finances were not available for long-term reconstruction of the south.
- That failure to begin significant any long-term reconstruction to Basra and major towns in British controlled sectors created the initial violent outbreaks.

- The British had the lesser position of being the junior coalition partner in Iraq. The US decided all national decisions impacting upon British sectors.
- The British army failed to recognise when Iraq's conflict evolved from peace support to one akin to counterinsurgency.
- The conflict had little support at home by the UK populace to keep British forces in Iraq. Casualty numbers and a later found out deceitful intelligence assessment from the UK government eroded encouragement for Telic.
- Afghanistan in 2006 became the focus for the British government as a campaign it could ‘win.’

The British army throughout the twentieth century had a long association with counterinsurgency. Its most current experience of something close was Northern Ireland and the peace support operations in the Balkans. The official doctrine, therefore, utilised Northern Ireland and had been drafted after 1995 but officially released in 2001 with *Counter Insurgency Operations.* Its influence and distribution across the army were, therefore, slight. It became the position according to Ledwidge (2011:4) for both Bosnia and Iraq 'to overlay every political and military problem with Northern Irish analogies.' Training, planning and using counterinsurgency doctrine that went beyond modern combat operations did not happen until 2005, whereas the violence had evolved into the insurgency by late 2004.

For the British, the experience of Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia remained within the regimental 'toolkit' of recollecting lessons and facts gathered by experience that could be passed on by the senior officers and NCOs within a battalion that had

this first-hand experience. The lessons and experiences of Oman, however, had many years before 'passed out' from the regimental 'toolkit' as the few who served in Oman had long-since retired (although Jock Stirrup, later the CDS while Iraq was ongoing had been a pilot in Oman).

Alderson (2009:261) notes a substantial difference between the US and Britain in how it creates new doctrine. He found 'one army (the British) had both relevant experience and a published (though little known) doctrine on which to draw, the other (the US) had a published doctrine but no recent experience of counterinsurgency. The organisational responses were very different. Even before the Petraeus-led reformation or US counterinsurgency doctrine, the US army had learnt from and adapted to conditions in Iraq; the British had learnt tactical adaptation but strained in its ability with reductions of deployed personnel. The UK government response was to reduce its military presence, which ran counter to its doctrine for counterinsurgency.

Kitson (1973:24) noted, 'with a detailed doctrine, if efforts are not taken to train and practice operations, any knowledge of counterinsurgency becomes a book-learning exercise only.'

Each Telic deployment and commander had their own 'targets' with little planning or objective continuance between one Telic tour to the next. Even when Iraq had become an insurgency, little pre-deployment with later Telic missions specialised in counterinsurgency. British officers commanding platoons and companies never received formal training specific for counterinsurgency, although it had appeared on

the Sandhurst syllabus by 2005. Counterinsurgency was taught at the Command and Staff College only; otherwise, it was a forgotten military 'dark art.' The US officers in regard to counterinsurgency were better read on the subject, with US Divisional commanders arranging formal training for counterinsurgency.

Much of the British army training for Iraq focused at the tactical level learning realised in evolving tactics, techniques and procedures for the British 'order of battle.' Following British failures around Basra, the supposed 'British counterinsurgency expertise' when preached to US counterparts was referred to by Ledgwidge (2011:5) as 'more British tripe.' The 2006 creation of the Mission Support Group was a starting point to improve three areas; first, to improve joint co-ordination or air and land assets, secondly, to improve the army's record on health and safety in regard to equipment failures that harmed reputational loss for the army, and third, was the army chain of command had identified that it was failing to recognise lessons. The mission support group was to identify these lessons and publish regular doctrinal updates across the army.

Egnell and Ucko (2016:56) find that claims of an innate talent within the British army for being somehow superior 'controlling and managing an insurgency' has fortunately in recent times (the last 25 years) was rarely put into writing outside of the army journal. Much like an urban legend, whereas the narrative builds on an oral tradition rather than the written tradition. This written tradition, both in promoting British ability and discussing other counterinsurgency examples, continues although the number of available academic and official or not doctrinal publications. Oman has had relatively few books published about Dhofar, whereas Northern Ireland has had many books

published about it, and until 2009/10, the subject of Iraq was not significantly covered. A larger number of books on Oman, Northern Ireland and other counterinsurgency emergencies have appeared while counterinsurgency has had a revival in military and academic circles during the 2003-2013 period.

Institutional blindness to counterinsurgency in British military circles most certainly did not help efforts for the British in Basra. Before 1995, counterinsurgency had been published within army doctrine, lumped together into 'Operations Other Than War.' Alderson (2010:94) describes how the British army failed to publish or update counterinsurgency doctrine for the British army until it was revised in 1995 by Gavin Bullock. By reducing access to counterinsurgency doctrine, thus reducing knowledge of the subject outside of staff college meant training or planning on the subject for civilian and military planners that needed guidance from doctrine (official or not) was not easy to access.

Success in Northern Ireland conceivably skewed the analysis of troop numbers needed for Iraq. The British never went below 13,000 troops in Northern Ireland, but in Iraq, the deployed number of troops fell immediately after the invasion to far below what had ever been deployed to Northern Ireland. In March 2003, troops involved with the invasion numbered around 46,000, one year after it was 8,600 (data from the previous chapter).

The effect of the post-colonial experience of counterinsurgency had little effect on the UK forces in Iraq. The lessons derived from previous conflicts provided guidance with

tactics and methods such as the light-handed approach employed by the British during the annexation and occupation of Basra that reduced casualties. Due to the successful reconnaissance by the British, only the Basran Ba'ath party headquarters and two armoured columns (one in the city and one outside) required direct military engagement. This minimised civilian casualties and damage to the city.

Following the occupation, if the efforts planned for reconstruction in Basra had taken place, it would have removed some of the roots associated with later problems targeted at the UK administration. Basra was just one of the four provinces under UK occupation. To fund 'real' reconstruction, which had not happened under Saddam Hussein, was possibly one financial bridge or utility too far for just the UK treasury to endure.

Despite Basra and many towns and cities in surrounding districts of the south being urban, the Iraqis collectively were people of different schools of Islam, culture and language who lived in a society previously held together by the state which had employed the threat of and use of real violence to maintain Iraq's sovereignty. Despite this, Iraq had every function of a state, including transport, education and a public health system that functioned (even with UN sanctions affecting it).

Ignorance of the Iraqi cultural difference meant that UK forces made mistakes during some of its operations in 2003. The British utilised search dogs on patrols of homes in villages and towns, where dogs in the Islamic faith as seen as unclean. The British also tried to disarm the Iraqis living in the south, where most households had access

to firearms, and most males had undergone military conscription. This level of available weapons was added to when many of the arms held by the Iraqi army and its irregular units that were meant to be used to continue the fight after Iraq's surrender disappeared after the invasion and Iraq's surrender.

The British had limited numbers of available troops to provide security in an area the size of Wales. This constrained all efforts, thus denying civil and military assistance in reconstruction and rebuilding to take place effectively. The UK had cultural, language and infrastructure specialists in the DIFD and the FCO; however, security was lacking, and these staffs were therefore not able to be effectively deployed.

The British model of counterinsurgency policy advocates working with what existing systems of police and local government functions. This failed when much of the middle and senior management structures of every Iraqi ministry and its civil service or division of infrastructure was unable to work. With no armed forces, interior ministry or police service to work with, the coalition had to rebuild these organisations from the ashes. The previous policy would reform these organisations over time, similar to the Oman and Northern Ireland situation. With CPA directives, these hundreds of thousands of people were not just unemployed, but it also took their pensions and means of support for their families. Interestingly, the militias began a recruitment drive following these orders where they offered cash incentives to attack and injure or kill coalition personnel.

Errors in administering the area of Multi-National Division: South East were to be expected. What made the situation unique was the efforts to be planned by the British were at the mercy of US planners. Two efforts to stabilise security in Basra fell foul to CPA orders; one utilised the Iraqi Naval Academy staff and naval personnel to assist in securing Basra (a local security effort straight from the counterinsurgency playbook). The second was to utilise a section of the former Basra Police that was to be unarmed but would provide assistance with traffic and policing duties around the city. When US commanders and the new CPA in Baghdad found out about these British proposals, they were stopped.

Coalition efforts could also directly affect one another. The US attempted to decrease violence in US sectors during 2003/early 2004 by the Badr brigades (of Iranian influence) and the large militia controlled by Muqtada al-Sadr in Sadr City (and Basra). US efforts to raid these compounds and arrest al-Sadr led to a direct response of his militia upon the British. This violence was targeted at MSD: SE personnel.

After 2006 the UK governmental focus shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan, reinforcing operations in Helmand at the disadvantage of southern Iraq. Following the British military pulling out of Basra, it fell mainly into the hands of various militias. Britain neither had the troop numbers to defeat the political subversion of Shia extremists or neutralise the insurgents in Basra. Despite British operations to increase and train new Iraqi security forces, their effectiveness when tested in 2007 proved to be a disappointment. The 10th Iraq Division was found to be infiltrated by Shia militias, and

its military competence was mixed with some platoons and entire companies disappearing and going to ground in Basra.

In 2007, the British pulled out of Basra, a major realisation that troop figures had dwindled to the point where it could no longer defend itself over three locations. Therefore, there was no controlled zone in Basra, where the Iraqi government could function or where Iraqi security forces had a presence maintaining security until an Iraqi national government ordered Operation Charge of the Knights in 2008 to retake Basra from the militias.

The primary compounding principle that undid British efforts was a failure in identifying the shift in both the level and character of the violence that an understanding or analysis from lessons gathered by past experience with current doctrine could have identified. The lessons from earlier campaigns were there to have been possibly attempted. They just needed rethinking and given a modern concept of the most basic of concepts; security was possible with significant troops numbers.

Significance, Implication and Contribution: The Future of Counterinsurgency?

The uncertainty around the future of counterinsurgency is evident according to multiple defence and counterinsurgency specialist writers. Their views mainly converge on the main fact that 'wars amongst the people' is the perception of conflict for the twenty-first century and that counterinsurgency will be employed as a strategy. It is unlikely

to utilise a large, state-led military power as an occupying force or even in a coalition following Iraq and Afghanistan.

Significance defines as the quality of being worthy of attention, of importance. The significance of the thesis was not to identify that the British had previous experience of counterinsurgency but if it could employ this experience; to find lessons from its historical and traditional learning methods to adapt the knowledge from another conflict for duty in Iraq. Lessons from both Northern Ireland and Oman beyond simple operational concepts, tactics and use of equipment were not tried and did not happen in Iraq.

This thesis being reliant on secondary sources (rather than primary sources), is unique; it compares two conflicts (Oman and Northern Ireland) that happened during the same era, the 1960s, within Iraq in the early 2000s. The thesis utilises the four pillars framework with its long-held principles of minimum force, civil-military cooperation, use of intelligence and tactical flexibility to examine the experience of the British army in Iraq.

For many reasons discussed above, the lessons learned from Oman or Northern Ireland was not transplanted to Iraq. It is clear that to attempt to transfer lessons, insight into these past conflicts takes into account many factors such as history and politics before trying to coordinate what may be employed in the current action. When analysing previous British counterinsurgency efforts, each has its own distinct cultural and religious complexity that can also deny the transferal of lessons from older

operations to modern-day actions. It is hoped that the significance of this thesis can lead readers of it to identify that each occurrence of counterinsurgency should be unique with its own plethora of security, political, social and economic problems. With experience and knowledge of counterinsurgency that reflects its fundamental rules with a careful analysis of the current campaign, efforts to utilise lessons and learning from older campaigns may be exercised. The lessons should not always be from favourable outcome examples of counterinsurgency as unsuccessful attempts may also provide useful lessons.

The implications for future counterinsurgency are a feasible disinclination to attempt counterinsurgency utilising a state's military forces as a primary power with force-primacy. The way conflict has varied since World War One has seen greater civilian casualties during fighting between states or in internal conflicts. This will remain the case for many years. The implication is defined as the conclusion that can be drawn from something, although it is not explicitly stated. Here, it is the long, historical legacy the British have associated with counterinsurgency, even with its vaunted legacy has failed. The reasons are numerous and nuanced. The British were not alone in having failed; the US needed to react, rethinking its doctrine, strategy and operational guidelines for Iraq as it too faced great difficulties. The British did not.

The contribution gathered from the thesis will neither persuade nor dissuade policymakers from utilising counterinsurgency. It can provide a viewpoint that another examination of past counterinsurgency experience can provide lessons for future conflicts. Without guidance, training and understanding on a subject that is both

massively broad and deep (with many inconsistencies) can potentially provide faulty analysis. Finally, the definition of contribution considers the part played by a person or entity in bringing about a result or helping something to advance. Here it is to remind the interested that they must go beyond surface knowledge and think-out-of-the-box to find solutions that may be available from past counterinsurgency campaigns to be applied to current ones.

This thesis was undertaken with the initial objective to interview the prominent and available military, civilian and political minds associated with Iraq and counterinsurgency. Restrictions on being able to speak on or off the record by personnel within the employ of the MOD, FCO and DFID made this problematic. Interviews for this thesis would have provided greater detail of what happened in Iraq, especially in preparedness and awareness of counterinsurgency and Britain's ability to adapt to it. Further advancement within the interviews may have uncovered if counterinsurgency was totally remiss from UK military planning when the violence escalated.

Following the difficulties associated with Iraq, has British counterinsurgency, its legacy, history and varied lessons, has its reputation been tarnished due to Iraq and Afghanistan? It is interesting to note that examples of British counterinsurgency were identified by the US during the Iraq war as good practice in both doctrine and newly published academic books used by the US forces in Nagl's *Learning to eat soup with a knife* (2002) and work led by Petraeus and Amos in creating their doctrinal text of *The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (2007). Future

examination of British counterinsurgency when compared to other examples will also create enlightenment on its strengths and weaknesses, especially if contrasted with a similar Western military force operating under similar legal, political and theatre affecting constraints.

Future Research

Counterinsurgency has declined in both academic and military circles as a subject. Will it be used during future conflicts in its current form, or has it gone beyond needing a significant presence of 'boots-on-the-ground? Will future counterinsurgency deployments of a similar occurrence require that counterinsurgency relearning be required all over again? Has the military gone beyond needing a significant presence and can use force multipliers such as drone technology, special forces or third-party elements such as private military companies or another state to provide assistance with future wars among the peoples? The names may change, but insurgency and a state's response to one are thousands of years old and are unlikely to disappear during the twenty-first century.

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