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## The African Century: What Can the Rest of the International Community Do to Support Sustainable Peace and Security in Africa?

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# **The African Century: What Can the Rest of the International Community Do to Support Sustainable Peace and Security in Africa?**



## **Report of One Day Seminar**

**Organised by  
the Commission for Africa  
&**

**Africa Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies,  
University of Bradford**

**On Thursday, 18 November 2004  
At 1 Palace Street, DFID, London**



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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

At a time when the rest of the world is experiencing rapid economic growth, social progress and relative political stability, Africa remains the world's poorest and most conflict-torn region, with depressing socio-economic and development indicators.

Despite this depressing contemporary history, the past few years have witnessed some bold strides to effect positive change in Africa by the combined efforts of African peoples and some sections of the international community. For instance, there are presently far fewer wars and violent conflicts in Africa compared to the 1990s. Many African countries today have some form of democratic government, as opposed to the military dictatorships and the one-party authoritarian rule that characterised much of post-independent Africa. The African Union and other regional organisations such as ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD are providing new and unprecedented political leadership in conflict management and regional peacekeeping deployments. In addition, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and its Peer Review Mechanism, demonstrates some level of political transformation in terms of governance, accountability and transparency.

The wind of political change and the potential opportunities and optimism in Africa's future, has meant the imperative is to put Africa at the centre of the international development agenda, and to take concerted and collective actions to support sustainable peace, security and long-term development on the continent.

Established by Prime Minister Tony Blair in February 2004, in the run up to Great Britain's assumption of office as chair of the European Union (EU) and the G8, the Commission for Africa (CfA) is specially tasked to recommend to the EU, G8 and other rich countries a strong programme of action that will provide a powerful impetus to support successful African development. Among other things, the Commission will focus on how the international community can give strong and practical support to African governments and initiatives, to AU and NEPAD, and to implementation of international commitment towards Africa. The Commission's mandate comprises a number of specific thematic assignments, including governance,

human development, economy, natural resources, culture and participation, peace and security.

The one-day seminar specifically focused on the theme of peace and security and was jointly organised by the Africa Centre in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford and the Commission for Africa Division on Peace and Security. 34 participants attended the seminar and were drawn from UK civil society, academics, NGOs and INGOs, and development and humanitarian assistance agencies. The aim of the seminar was to provide a consultative forum for experts, practitioners and activists to share ideas about the future of peace and security in Africa, by focusing on the problems, challenges and opportunities faced by Africa in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The consultative forum was designed to build on the work of the Commission, and was organised around - but by no means restricted to - the consultation paper published after the second commissioners' meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in October 2004.

The seminar was organised around six syndicate group sessions, in order to critically engage with the problems, challenges, opportunities and future prospects relevant to the following sub-themes: resource management and conflicts in Africa; international intervention in African conflicts; media, conflict early warning and early response; small arms and light weapons; AU and regional peacekeeping and conflict management capacity-building; and post-conflict peacekeeping and reconstruction.

The following are the key recommendations that emerged from the seminar plenary and syndicate group sessions:

1. **Support to the AU and regional economic communities:** should not override or undermine African leadership in the planning and execution of externally funded projects and operations. External actors have been known to occasionally undermine African leadership and capacity by making bilateral interventions. African organisations need to be able to set the agenda and a partners' forum should be used to co-ordinate external support, programme implementation and monitoring.

2. **Capacity-building in the area of African peace and security:** should essentially be based on African needs, identified by Africans at all levels of society - regional, national and local. The international community should aim to develop constructive partnerships with African states, organisations and communities to address African priority needs and to explore modalities for strengthening African institutional, technical and manpower capacities at various levels.
3. **Transparency and accountability:** are key factors in the management of a state's resources. Domestic accountability is not fully developed, particularly in the extractive industries, with oil, diamonds and forestry as prominent examples. Capacity-building to ensure the expansion of resource development and management skills, as well as transparency and accountability, is required in Africa. A practical approach would be the setting up of an *African Centre of Excellence in the Extractive Industry*, committed to building up African technical capacity for the management and governance of the continent's resources. This was recommended as a strategy for civil society empowerment to translate transparency into accountability.
4. **Preventive action:** (e.g. mediation) is cheaper than peacekeeping but the strategy lacks serious investment. There is considerable scope for greater investment in the mediation capacity of regional organisations, such as the AU. The G8 should, for instance, support capacity building and training of a pool of African mediators at various levels (regional and international organisations like ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, AU and UN).
5. **Environmental protection legislation:** in most African states is not well developed and in some aspects, is practically non-existent. This contributes to the rise in the rate of environmental conflicts. The international community (including transnational corporations) should support programmes aimed at the development and streamlining of legislation and agencies for environmental protection, as well as measures that strengthen the capacity of

the state to enforce legislation. Related to this is the recognition that governance is a key element in the effective management of environmental and natural resources and the mitigation of conflicts. There is the need to promote reforms and policies that encourage the devolution of powers over management of environmental and natural resources and revenues to community levels.

6. **External conditionalities and sanctions:** there is the need to take a critical look at the role of external conditionalities and sanctions, or lack of them, in the process of conflict prevention. Depending on how they are applied, external conditionalities and sanctions including aid, could positively or negatively affect mediation and prevention.
7. **Early warning and early response to conflicts:** require well-trained journalists who should be close to civil society and grassroots populations. But these critical actors are lacking in most parts of Africa. Effective media monitoring and journalistic reporting can be an invaluable instrument in providing early warning. Some formal early warning systems, such as that of IGAD have shown a good measure of success. The lessons and merits of successful mechanisms need to be synthesised, strengthened and institutionalised. A strong recommendation was that early warning should be accompanied by early action.
8. **Training of local journalists to enhance early warning capacity:** there is the need for sustained education and training of journalists and for the expansion of their access to professional support and resources. Such training and support should be able to fill existing pedagogic, technical and institutional gaps and could more appropriately be organised through professional associations at regional levels and along lines already practiced in East Africa, with the support of the Nation Media Group, and in West Africa, with the help of International Alert.

9. **Civil society groups and early warning:** there are increasing numbers of civil society groups, including human rights and pro-democracy NGOs, with an interest in supplying and disseminating information about violent and potential conflicts. FM radio stations have also proved useful in many countries. To be more effective, these organisations generally need to be supported by adequate resources and human resources development training.
  
10. **Improving and regulating African mass media fiction:** provision of financial and technical support through North-South partnerships to improve the quality of African mass media fiction, especially the fast-developing video movie industry, and strengthening the regulatory and oversight capacity of the relevant government agencies to guard against abuses and dysfunctional influences.
  
11. **Small arms and light weapons (SALW):** there is an urgent need for control of small arms and light weapons. Opportunities for control could be explored through promoting an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and effective regulation of brokers (territorial and extra-territorial) and transporters, codifying existing regulations and treaties on brokering, addressing the demand side of SALW, and domestic implementation of existing international and municipal laws. The 2006 UN small arms review conference presents an ideal platform to promote negotiations for an ATT. The CfA should aim to influence the G8 and EU governments (or key supporting states) to support the development of comprehensive national action plans for small arms control as a key priority. In addition, the utility and role of other initiatives (e.g. Transfer Control Initiative, marking and tracing), how to take forward an arms control agenda by, for instance, working in partnership with other central stakeholders, could also be explored.

12. **SALW and post-conflict situations:** SALW programmes and sensitivity must be part of post-conflict stabilisation, reconstruction and peacebuilding programmes. Of primary concern would be the collection and reliable destruction of weapons, capacity-building for effective law enforcement, sensitisation programmes regarding laws and norms governing the use and trading of arms, alternative skill enhancement training and job creation programmes for ex-combatants, and rehabilitation and reintegration of child soldiers. Weapons buy-back programmes should be carefully assessed within a regional framework prior to implementation.
  
13. **Arms reduction and land mines:** the establishment of an international flexible funding mechanism for the destruction of surplus weapons could prove a valuable programme for controlling small arms proliferation in Africa. This could be complemented by a revitalisation of the international land mines campaign, which has suffered considerable UN politicisation and setback in recent years. Consequently, donor agencies should finance and facilitate creation of an annual arms trade register for SALW. Such a register was deemed useful to (1) hold governments and arms companies accountable and (2) name/shame those breaking applicable legal agreements.
  
14. **Millennium Peace and Security Goals:** it would be useful to develop and internationally agree upon a ‘Conflict Millennium Development Goals’ or a ‘Millennium Peace and Security Goals’ to complement the Millennium Development Goals of the UN.
  
15. **AU peace and security architecture:** it is important for donors to look at the scope, challenges, and opportunities of the AU peace and security architecture, including the African Standby Force, early warning, Peer Review Mechanism, the Peace and Security Council.
  
16. **African experience in peace-support operations:** African countries have acquired a vast range of experience in the course of conducting their own

peace-support operations and also from participation in UN operations. More efforts should be made to further develop and utilise the “best practice” emerging from these experiences and also to draw relevant lessons from any correlated shortcomings and failures.

17. **Viable alternatives to violence and vulnerable populations:** viable alternatives to violence should be provided for young men and women previously engaged in conflicts, but also to young people in general, as they are most likely to become involved in future violent conflicts. Job creation should be prioritised, but the focus should be wider than just job creation to include access to assets and livelihood opportunities more generally, while the means should creatively explore other avenues and opportunities beyond donor-driven programmes and the formal economy. Provision must be made for individuals who previously made their living off the land but who were displaced or lost the entitlement to their land as a result of conflict. A regional approach would be required to deal with the issue of displaced persons, regional migration and refugee flows.
  
18. **Security sector reform (SSR):** should be context-specific, but needs to go beyond the military and the police, to also include the justice and penal systems and, in situations where violence has been “informalised”, it should extend to private and security agents, such as civil militias/civil defence forces. In some cases, creation rather than reform of the security sector may be needed (e.g. Somalia) – this requires special focus from donors. In many instances, the creation of security itself, not a security sector, is what should be prioritised.
  
19. **Transitional justice approaches:** should be tough on cases of crimes against humanity and those that behaved with impunity during wartime, as a deterrent mechanism. In addition, it would be useful to explore the potential for educating young people in peace and reconciliation. Special consideration must be given to questions of redistributive versus reconciliatory justice, and

balancing traditional systems of justice with the international criminal justice systems.

20. **Post-conflict reconstruction:** any post-conflict reconstruction programmes should pay special attention to the political economy of conflict and the implications of activities associated with the war economy. This includes activities that would be illegal in “normal” societies but which become a way of life in countries at war, such as drugs, arms and the trade in conflict goods.
21. **Post-conflict peacebuilding:** programmes should not have a short-term focus but need to incorporate long-term solutions to the underlying causes of conflict. It is important to adopt a strategic, holistic approach rather than one based on quick-fix, short-term and exit strategy oriented. Providing support for conflict prevention and Education for Peace programmes should be part of longer-term steps to engender peace. Longer-term steps should also include constructive macro-economic and political reforms.
22. **The Prime Minister’s Initiative:** in establishing the Commission for Africa must not end up like other international initiatives on the Global South, such as the Brandt and Brundtland Commissions. It was recommended that the Commission for Africa should generate a continental movement for sustainable peace, security and development in Africa. The proposed movement (be it ideological, political or socio-cultural) should be “owned” by Africans and practically linked to the new thinking on the African Century and the emerging ethos on Afro-Responsibility.

## OFFICIAL OPENING AND PLENARY



What happens to Africa depends on Africans . . .  
The Commission can support concrete African-led initiatives . . .  
Our focus is how to move from rhetoric to concrete action.  
We expect explicit political commitments from leaders on  
issues such as small arms, conflict goods, etc,  
on which we can hold leaders accountable.

Commissioner Tidjane Thiam

The Peace and Security Theme Manager of the Commission for Africa, Ms Claire Hickson, officially opened the seminar and offered some welcome remarks. Ms Hickson emphasised that the seminar is part of a series of consultations that the Commission embarked upon since its inauguration in February 2004 for provide opportunities for relevant stakeholders to contribute to the framing of a viable agenda for addressing the challenges of achieving sustainable peace, security and development in Africa.

In his brief remarks, the Director of Africa Centre and adviser to the Commission on Peace and Security, Dr David Francis, noted that the Commission for Africa provides a unique opportunity to translate political message and rhetorics about Africa's future into practical and assertive action. Dr Francis stated that the Commission was uniquely placed to achieve at least two important things: firstly, suggest and develop concrete and practical programmes on peace and security in Africa; and secondly, provide opportunity to influence and shape the international thinking and approach to conflict, peace and security in Africa.

Mr Tidjane Thiam, Commissioner for Peace and Security, followed with a presentation entitled "Commission for Africa: Vision, Challenges and Opportunities". Commissioner Thiam outlined the origin, broad thematic focus and rationale for the Commission for Africa, highlighting the imperative of conflict prevention, including the mitigation of the humanitarian and developmental costs of violent conflicts, as one of the key reasons for the establishment of the Commission. The Commission, he observed, focuses on how the international community can give strong and practical support to African governments and initiatives, to the AU and NEPAD, and to the implementation of international commitments towards Africa. Furthermore, the Commission, he emphasised, will inform more substantive G8 response to NEPAD, building on initial response of the Kananaskis G8 Summit of 2002. Among the critical areas identified by the Commissioner to be of urgent concern to the Commission under the peace and security theme were:

- Emphasising conflict prevention by addressing the root causes (e.g. poverty, governance, natural resource management) and strengthening the capacity to prevent.

- Supporting African leadership and capacity in early warning and early action, mediation and peacekeeping (AU, NEPAD, sub-regionals).
- Small arms and conflict goods.
- Supporting more effective post-conflict peacebuilding.

Commissioner Tidjane Thiam's presentation was followed by plenary discussions and response to some of the issues raised. Laurie Nathan of the 'Crisis State Group' at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) observed that one of the most critical problems in Africa is that most African states are institutionally weak and, therefore, what we should address in the seminar is how to strengthen the state and reduce factors that weaken it, including the things that developed countries do to weaken the state in Africa. Nathan argued: "The point is to stop asking ourselves as G8 what good we can do for Africa, but rather to start asking ourselves what harm we could stop doing to Africa". Nathan further stressed that despite being beleaguered and marked by weak institutions, Africa has markedly excelled in the area of mediation, as exemplified by the successful regional mediation efforts in countries such as South Africa, Zambia, Angola, Namibia, etc. Ironically, these success stories have hardly been acknowledged by scholars, activists and policy practitioners who tend to largely characterise Africa as a continent bedevilled by violent conflicts. All countries, Nathan concluded, are characterised by some kind of conflict, and as such, there is strictly no such thing as post-conflict society, as many scholars and practitioners have characterised some African countries.

Prof. Lionel Cliffe of the Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) at the University of Bradford cautioned that conflict prevention was such an ambiguous terminology and difficult phenomenon and, therefore, he disagreed with Nathan on the question about post-conflict situation, which he sees as an analytically useful category. Hence, as opposed to prevention, Cliffe suggested that we stand to achieve better results by focusing on post-conflict recovery and reconstruction.

Patricia Daley of Oxford University, made a case for a more inclusive state in Africa, stressing that politics of exclusion was one of the causes of conflicts in Africa and that a large number of peacebuilding measures implemented in Africa have hardly

addressed the issue of forging an inclusive state in a systematic way. Consequently, the civil society and grassroots elements have always been marginalised by the state and its institutions.



In his contribution, Robert Picciotto of Kings College London, perceived Tony Blair's assumption of the presidency of both the EU and G8 as an unique opportunity, and in view of that, he argued that the Commission should articulate the position that it was in the interest of the global North to change its policies towards the South by developing more favourable trade, agriculture and conflict-sensitive strategies at the global level. This new approach, he said, would help the North to stem the growing problems of migration and international crime from the South.

Specific operational and procedural questions were raised by Lulsegg Abebe, Josephine Hazeley and Funmi Olonisakin. Abebe, of International Alert, queried if there were specific issues the Commission was looking for in peace and security that they wanted the meeting to consider. Hazeley of Focus on Africa, BBC World Service sought to find out how much goodwill the EU and G8 showed to the Commission. Olonisakin of King's College London raised a question concerning how much collaboration the Commission already had with the AU.

Responding to the questions and other issues, Commissioner Thiam observed *inter alia* that the dominant mindset in the west was one that puts African countries into a "cell" and conceives African problems as too difficult to understand or solve. He therefore encouraged participants to use the present seminar and the Commission to make African problems more intelligible and to present the case of the continent in such a way that it would be easy to understand and address. On responses of the G8 and EU to the Commission, the Commissioner remarked that there had been mixed reactions. Whilst the strong and genuine commitments of the UK government were not in doubt, other western countries have mixed responses and a 'wait-and-see' attitude. We therefore have to rely on Prime Minister Blair's ability to sell the Commission and its programmes, as well as on how we are able to make the case for the Commission's motives, programmes and strategies, especially through its expected report.

Regarding collaboration with the AU, Commissioner Thiam said that the Commission was very much engaged with the AU and had held consultations with the

regional body. Generally, the Commissioner agreed with the observation by Patricia Daley that there has been a systematic disenfranchisement and disengagement of grassroots populations, from the political processes in many African states, and that there was the need to empower civil society within African states to the degree that they could bring pressure on their governments to be more responsible.



The point is to stop asking ourselves as G8 what good we can do for Africa, but rather to start asking ourselves what harm we could stop doing to Africa.

Laurie Nathan

## THEMATIC SESSIONS

It would be unrealistic to expect that the Commission for Africa will solve all of Africa's problem. Realistically, however, the Commission provides a unique forum to see the many problems and challenges facing Africa as an opportunity to do something meaningful about poverty, long-term peace and sustainable security.

David Francis



The morning syndicate group sessions focused on ‘Understanding the Problems and Challenges to Peace, Conflict and Security in Africa’.

### **Syndicate Group A-I: Conflict Prevention: Problems and Challenges**



Presentation:

Title: ‘Resource Management and Conflict in Africa: Key Problems and Challenges’

Speaker: Oliver Furley, Visiting Professor, African Studies Centre, Coventry University

Rapporteurs: Oliver Furley, Jill Shankleman and Patricia Daley

This syndicate group comprised Oliver Furley, Innocent Balemba, Patricia Daley, Robin Luckham, Jill Shankleman, Robert Picciotto, Hester LeRoux and David Francis.

It was agreed by the group that the quest for resources was seldom the primary or sole cause of conflicts in Africa, but often it was a major conflict instigating factor.

The key points and recommendations included:

- 1 Transparency was crucial to effecting a positive change in government management and use of national wealth and resources, ultimately laying a good foundation for conflict prevention. However, transparency as promoted by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), only captures part of the picture of the resource misallocation, corruption and mismanagement that takes place in the public spheres. Hence, for transparency to be more functional and effective, it should go beyond the EITI to include macro-economic management issues, such as revenue allocation at all levels (subnational, national, regional), accountability, participation and empowerment. Because of the many conflicts that lootable natural resources have generated in recent years in many African countries, it might be helpful to set up a register of “conflict goods”, backed by an international consensus and regime on how to police such goods.
- 2 Economic sanctions (against regimes, exports, foreign investments) have rarely worked in conflict-ridden countries and this is because of the difficulties in regulating and sanctioning all economic actors, especially powerful business interests and underground transactions. Nevertheless, sanctions can have a wider symbolic effect (if backed by sufficient international pressure) in signalling unacceptable behaviour and policies by state actors and MNCs. This remains a potentially useful intervention instrument in conflict situations.
- 3 Several African economies depend heavily on the extractive industries (oil and minerals), but lack the requisite technical capacity, skills and personnel to meet the challenges of regulating and managing investments and production in this sector. The Commission should aim to establish (and also encourage donor agencies to follow suit) a Centre of Excellence in Extractive Industries

committed to building up African technical capacity, awareness and skills for the management of the continent's vast extractive industry. In addition, bilateral and multilateral partnerships with African governments, with the objective of providing specialist training for African policy makers, international negotiators (e.g. in trade, oil and solid mineral products, credits, debt, etc), journalists, and civil society activists, should also be encouraged.

- 4 Environmental protection legislation in most African states is not well developed and in some aspects, is practically non-existent. This contributes to the rise in degradation and environmental conflicts. The international community should support programmes aimed at the development and streamlining of legislation and agencies for environmental protection, as well as measures that strengthen the capacity of the state to enforce the legislation. Related to this is the recognition that governance is a key element in the effective management of environmental and natural resources and the mitigation of conflicts. There is the need to promote reforms and policies that encourage the devolution of powers over management of environmental and natural resources and revenues to community levels.

## Syndicate Group A-II: Intervention in African Conflicts, peace and Security: Problems and Challenges



### Presentation:

Title: 'Problem and Challenges of International Intervention in African Conflicts'

Speaker: Laurie Nathan, Senior Research Fellow, Crisis States Programme, Development Research Centre, LSE and Former Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, South Africa.

Rapporteur: Claire Hickson

This syndicate group comprised Laurie Nathan (lead speaker/moderator), Lionel Cliffe, Ian Woodmansey, Martin Kasirye, Alex Ramsbotham, Phil Vernon, Andy McLean, Claire Hickson and Mohammed Faal.

Laurie Nathan's presentation focused mainly on the external actor's role in supporting 'African solutions to African problems and some of the correlated harms'. He argued the external actors too often tended to push their own models upon African partners, a typical example being equating the AU to the EU. Furthermore, some external actors,

in particular, states and inter-state organisations tend to act like ‘overlords’ when they engage in operations with African partners. He highlighted the arms trade as another area where some external actors are doing harm to Africa. The moderator further highlighted what he perceived as the danger of the international community hiding behind the ‘pretext’ of ‘the need for development of African solutions for African problems’.

The group discussion focused on the division of responsibility between African organisations, such as the AU and regional economic communities, and the UN; the drivers of and constraints on change in external donor behaviour; the role of the G8; and the need to support preventive capacity, including mediation.

The key points and recommendations included:

- 1 The ideas and policies to improve the international community’s support of peace and security are already there – e.g. the Development Action Committee’s (DAC) guidelines on security sector reform – but there are constraints on effectively implementing them because of ‘structural causes’ that drive donors’ behaviour, such as the short-term focus of most external interveners and pressure to spend funds.
- 2 Support for the AU and regional economic communities should not override or undermine African leadership in the planning and execution of externally funded projects and operations. External actors have been known to occasionally undermine African leadership and capacity by making bilateral interventions. African organisations need to be able to set the agenda and a partners forum should be used to co-ordinate external support.
- 3 The international community needs to provide resources more efficiently, especially in emergency situations. In places like Darfur, for instance, financing has been slow and unco-ordinated. There is also the need to commit

long-term resources that cover all aspects of African organisations' capacity, not just peacekeeping.

- 4 The AU needs to be clearer on what it needs from external partners.
- 5 Preventive action (e.g. mediation) is cheaper than peacekeeping but lacks serious investment. There is considerable scope for greater investment in the mediation capacity of regional organisations, such as the AU. The G8 should, for instance, support the training of a pool of African mediators at various levels (regional and international organisations like ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, AU, and UN).
- 6 There is the need to take a critical look at the role of external conditionalities and sanctions, or lack of them, in the process of conflict prevention. Depending on how they are applied, external conditionalities and sanctions in the disbursement of aid, for instance, could positively or negatively affect mediation and prevention. In some cases, such as the pre-military intervention in Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda, the "unconditionality" of aid was part of the problem of the descent into and escalation of conflict.
- 7 The international community should not ignore the non-peace and security dimensions of the AU.
- 8 The Commission for Africa (CfA) should promote a Millennium Development Goal (MDG) on peace and security.
- 9 There is a need to recognise the role of UN sanctions in intervention – the CfA report should make clear reference to their role.
- 10 There is a need to recognise the role of traditional authorities in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, e.g. in Somaliland. In particular, how to utilise

traditional institutions and societal resources for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

- 11 The participants did not come to a final conclusion on the division of labour between the UN and regional organisations. It was suggested that primary responsibility for conflict prevention lies with regional bodies, with the lead on peace enforcement with the UN. Overall, it was felt the CfA report should reaffirm the UN's role and respond to the conclusions of the UN high-level panel on threats, challenges and change. It should also promote more effective G8 interaction with and support for the UN on African Peace and Security issues.

### **Syndicate Group A-III: Resolution & Peacebuilding: Problems and Challenges**



**Presentation:**

**Title:** 'Media, Conflict Early Warning and Early Response'  
**Speaker:** Josephine Hazeley, Deputy Editor, Focus on Africa Programme, BBC World Service, London.

**Rapporteur:** Michael Medley

The syndicate group comprised Josephine Hazeley (lead speaker/moderator), Patrick Orr, Tanja Schümer, Nicora Woods, Rohon Reynolds, Lulseged Abebe, Carolyn Hayman, Amina Dikedi, Funmi Olonisakin, Frances Harding and Kenneth Omeje.

Josephine Hazeley's presentation covered a range of thematic issues that informed the subsequent group discussions. She observed that despite the importance of early warning systems in Africa, many local journalists in various African countries are not properly trained to report on conflicts. African journalists are also highly vulnerable, given that they are not well paid and, as such, many of them could easily be bribed by influential political actors to tailor reports to their interests. Journalists, Hazeley observed, are scarcely told the truth, especially in conflict situations. Hence, it is important to the journalist to build special relationships with the civil society, grassroots agents, and the police to be able to 'dig out' the facts of a case and also to ensure his/her personal security in volatile places. Another issue raised by the moderator is that most African media are government-owned and as such there was the need to promote independent and private media in Africa.

The key points and recommendations included:

### ***News Media***

- 1 Early warning and early response to conflicts require well-trained journalists who should be close to civil society and grassroots populations in all parts of Africa. Effective media monitoring and journalistic reporting could be an invaluable instrument in providing early warning.
- 2 There was a need to educate journalists on how to report violent conflicts and related issues, including the institutional processes and failures that usually lead up to violent conflicts, such as government abuse of power and the rule of law, and "divide-and-rule politics".

- 3 The proposed education necessarily requires sustained training of journalists and access to professional support and resources. Such training and support could more appropriately be organised through professional associations at regional levels and along lines already practiced in East Africa with the support of the Nation Media Group, and in West Africa with the help of International Alert.
- 4 North-South partnerships in manpower development could also be effective, as exemplified by the BBC's training of radio station personnel in Africa with funding from DFID.

### ***Fiction Media***

- 5 The video movie industry is developing fast in Africa, and may be very influential through the kinds of images and messages it sends. A growing number of African video movies, such as those coming out of Nigeria and Kenya, are very violent and cynical. Radio fiction is also important. More support could, for instance, be provided through North-South partnerships to improve the quality of African mass media fiction and strengthen the regulatory and oversight capacity of the relevant government agencies.

### ***Civil Society***

- 6 There are an increasing number of civil society groups, including human rights and pro-democracy NGOs, with an interest in supplying and disseminating information about violent and potential conflicts. FM radio stations have proved useful in many countries. These organisations generally need to be supported with adequate resources and training, so they are more effective.

### ***Formal Early Warning Systems***

- 7 Some formal early warning systems, such as that of IGAD have shown a good measure of success. The lessons of the successful mechanisms need to be drawn together.

### ***Strategy and Co-ordination***

- 8 There was a deficit in overall strategising and co-ordination, particularly in linking media with civil society groups and service sectors such as education, health and agriculture. Greater efficiency in use of funds could be achieved by making focused investments to improve media content, facilities and training resources, and through careful consideration of targets and points of entry for external actors.
- 9 There was, however, a caveat to this – strategic co-ordination could create unhealthy concentrations of power, which can limit media freedom. There must be sensitivity in the type of intervention. A NEPAD-style Peer Review Mechanism seems a promising way of balancing power within the frameworks of North-South, and public-private systems.

The Afternoon Sessions focused on the theme of ‘Opportunities and Future Prospects for Peace, Conflict and Security: What Can the International Community Do and How?’

### **Syndicate Group B-1: Conflict Prevention: Opportunities and Future Prospects**



Presentation:

Title: ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Regulation’

Speaker: Owen Greene, Director, Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS), University of Bradford.

Rapporteurs: Tanja Schümer & Owen Green

This syndicate group comprised Owen Green (lead speaker/moderator), Jill Shankleman, Ian Woodmansey, Robert Picciotto, Andy McLean, Tanja Schümer, David Francis and Kenneth Omeje.

Owen Green kicked off the discussion by observing that proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) generally complicate, escalate, intensify and prolong conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. “Where do these weapons come from?” “From a range of sources”, he remarked. In the last twenty years, a large proportion

of weapons have been sourced from former Cold War allies, recycled weapons, and from second hand weapons that come from within and outside Africa. Moreover, Owen Green highlighted that there are growing patterns of misuse and flows of weapons from organised militia groups to private sources. Hence, when violent conflicts come to an end, the weapons are normally diverted to other purposes and this contributes to extended frontiers of conflicts. The issue of control and decommissioning of arms from ex-combatants, voluntary collection from citizens, destruction of collected weapons and stockpiles, have been essentially problematic.

The key points and recommendations included:

- 1 There was an urgent need for control of SALW. Opportunities for control could be explored through promoting an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), codifying existing regulations and treaties on brokering, effective regulation of transporters, addressing the demand side of SALW, and domestic implementation of existing international and municipal laws. The utility and role of other initiatives (e.g. Transfer Control Initiative, marking and tracing), how to take forward an arms control agenda by, for instance, working in partnership with other central stakeholders, could also be explored.
- 2 The CfA's analysis and priority setting (promoting an ATT and regulation of brokers (territorial and extra-territorial) and transporters) were welcomed by participants, who further stressed the necessity for enforcing existing laws and arms control agreements.
- 3 In addition to promoting development of an international ATT, the CfA was urged to influence or encourage the G8 and EU governments (or key supporting states) to support the development of comprehensive national action plans for small arms control as a key priority. The suggested national action plans should make a strong case for the appropriateness of and need for an ATT on the basis of existing international laws (the assumption was that

most states have already agreed to control regulations but not all were aware of their content).

- 4 Agreeing on a common, and perhaps expanded, definition of brokering would be useful (e.g. transporters of arms could be defined as brokers in circumstances where they unwittingly collude in the movement of arms). In addition, framing of comprehensive national and regional legislation on arms control (including brokering) was strongly recommended for various states and regional organisations.
- 5 SALW sensitivity/programmes must be part of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding programmes. Of primary concern would be the collection and reliable destruction of weapons, capacity-building for effective law enforcement, sensitisation programmes regarding laws and norms governing the use and trading of arms, alternative skill enhancement training and job creation programmes for ex-combatants, and the rehabilitation and reintegration of child soldiers. Weapons buy-back programmes should be carefully assessed within a regional framework prior to implementation.
- 6 An ATT should not be limited to SALW but rather extended to arms in general. There tends to be a compelling need and momentum for an international agreement on arms control in general.
- 7 The proposed ATT needs to be supported by the UN, as this would lend it considerable moral and political authority. It was generally asserted that the 2006 UN small arms review conference presents an ideal platform to promote negotiations for an ATT, albeit care had to be taken to ensure that such a major initiative does not hijack or undermine the UN small arms review process.

- 8 The task of galvanizing support and momentum behind the development of an ATT does not necessarily require the establishment of a new international institution or agency. The creation of SALW agencies under regional organisations, such as the newly created SALW unit within the African Union, have not been significantly helpful in mainstreaming SALW into national and international legal policy frameworks. Hence, it might be more helpful to address the problem of SALW and armed conflict from a holistic perspective. In addition, donors need to ensure greater strategic co-ordination. While it was useful for the CfA to prioritise certain aspects, effective control of SALW could only be achieved if both the demand and supply sides were addressed. In particular, the domestic legal and governance situations, it was strongly advocated, desperately need attention. Governments need to be specially encouraged to develop and implement national action plans for addressing the issue of arms. Consequently, capacity-building for relevant government institutions and law enforcement agencies was considered highly important. On the issue of governance, states need to be more responsive to their obligations of providing security for all and alternative employment opportunities for the critical populations most vulnerable to gun violence.
- 9 The establishment of an international flexible funding mechanism for the destruction of surplus weapons could prove a valuable programme. This could be complemented by a revitalisation of the international land mines campaign, which has suffered considerable UN politicisation and setback in recent years.
- 10 The TCI, some participants pointed out, was useful in order to build support for an ATT. While clarity was required as to how such initiatives were linked to the ATT, it was agreed that they should not be dropped.
- 11 Some participants advocated that donors should finance and facilitate the creation of an annual arms trade register for SALW. Such a register was

deemed useful to: (1) hold governments and arms companies accountable; and, (2) name/shame those breaking applicable legal agreements.

12 Participants agreed that it was important to urge governments to strictly enforce existing regulations regarding transporters, aviation companies and insurance requirements. Some participants suggested this debate could be linked to the ongoing terrorism debate.

13 The group reasoned that it would be useful to develop and internationally agree upon some “Millennium Peace and Security Goals” to complement the Millennium Development Goals of the UN.

### **Syndicate Group B-2: Peace, Security and Conflict Intervention: Opportunities and Future Prospects**



## Presentation:

Title                   ‘AU and Regional Organisations Peacekeeping and Conflict Management Capacity Building: How to Target investment in African Solutions to African Problems’

Speaker:               Funmi Olonisakin, Director: Conflict, Security and Development Group, Kings College, London.

Rapporteur:          Alex Ramsbotham

This syndicate group comprised Funmi Olonisakin (lead speaker/moderator), Alex Ramsbotham, Oliver Furley, Carolyn Hayman, Martin Kasirye, Josephine Hazeley, Laurie Nathan, Amina Dikedi, Lulseged Abebe, Ciru Mwaura, Tim Cole, David Francis.

Funmi Olonisakin in her brief presentation stated that the starting point for capacity-building for African peace and security architecture was Africa’s evident needs, identified by Africans at the continental, regional, national and local levels. The African Union (AU) and other relevant bodies should present coherent, phased strategic plans for the capacity-building process that donors and other key partners could engage with. However, African institutions may lack capability (particularly qualified personnel) able to deliver this, not least, due to preoccupation with complex political emergencies, such as Darfur. The means of delivering this capacity should be explored. Serious thought should be given on how to achieve a better balance between long-term capacity-building and short-term emergency response capability.

The key points and recommendations included:

- 1 Capacity-building in the area of African peace and security should essentially be based on African needs, identified by Africans at all levels of society - regional, national and local levels. The international community should aim to develop constructive partnerships with African states, organisations and communities to address African priority needs and to explore modalities which

strengthen African institutional, technical and manpower capacities at various levels.

- 2 It is important to explore and project the types of conflict scenario/environment that African institutions would likely be addressing as the capacity-building process progresses over the next five – ten years.
- 3 The CfA should think creatively about the focus of its report, in particular not duplicating or undermining some well-focused African proposals on how the African peace and security architecture should develop.
- 4 The Commission’s key objective was to recommend to the G8 and other donors, ways to “get their house in order” regarding how assistance could be delivered most effectively to support African needs. However, this must be balanced with the recognition of African shortcomings in order to maintain credibility with – and hence the support of – donors. For instance, Africans should demonstrate more commitment to building their own institutions, such as through the provision of quality personnel.
- 5 It was important to look at the scope of the AU peace and security architecture, including the African Standby Force, but also early warning, the Panel of the Wise, the Peace and Security Council etc. However, peace and security are only one aspect of the AU’s work.
- 6 The AU’s peace and security agenda was too big for donors to respond to everything at once. The AU, in collaboration with the Commission, should prioritise key areas for urgent capacity development and present to both the G8 and EU.
- 7 More thought, effort and resources should be given to the transition from the peacekeeping to peacebuilding phases of a peace operation, especially in circumstances of co-deployment. There is the need to carefully delineate “which” body is likely to do “what” operationally. The present models

suggest a UN force taking over from an African force as the security situation sufficiently stabilises to enable the peacebuilding phase to develop, but there is the need for more thoughtful streamlining of spheres of jurisdiction, operation and cooperation.

- 8 Human resource capability in African institutions was seriously weak. Young African professionals should be better utilised as a cost-effective means of addressing this. This approach also has long-term capacity-building benefits.
- 9 Security sector reform, and other initiatives to build security capacity (e.g. police-military reforms) at the national level, have important conflict prevention benefits in the long-term and, therefore, should be encouraged.
- 10 It is important to concentrate peacebuilding efforts at all levels of society, including the local sphere, where a variety of often neglected informal conflict resolution skills exist.
- 11 Donors need to take cognisance of (sub-)regional differential developments on the ground, such as the fact that different Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa progress at different paces, and therefore demonstrate flexibility in adjusting their assistance accordingly. Similarly, recommended capacity-building schemes and projects should also match the realities, and needs on the ground.
- 12 G8 assistance must be managed and co-ordinated more effectively in line with African priorities.
- 13 African countries have acquired vast experience in the course of conducting their own peace-support operations and also from participation in UN operations. More efforts should be made to further develop and utilise the “best practices” emerging from these experiences and also to draw relevant lessons from any shortcomings and failures.

## Syndicate Group B-3: Resolution and Peacebuilding: Opportunities and Future Prospects



### Presentation:

Title                   ‘Opportunities for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Reconstruction in Transition Societies in Africa’

Speaker:             Malcolm Chalmers, Deputy Director, Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) and Assistant Dean, School of Social and International Studies, University of Bradford

Rapporteur:         Hester Le Roux

This syndicate group comprised Malcolm Chalmers (lead speaker/moderator), Hester Le Roux, Robin Luckham, Michael Medley, Patrick Orr, Innocent Balemba, Patricia Daley, Mohammed Faal, Lionel Cliffe and David Francis.

Malcolm Chalmers started the group session by identifying two dominant characteristics of post-conflict societies in the global south. First, it is well known that post-conflict (PC) countries are most at risk from experiencing violent conflict in the future. Second, donors tend to flood PC countries with aid in the immediate aftermath of war, but this funding tends to dry up relatively soon, increasing the risk of and vulnerability to renewed conflict.

Against this background, and recognising the particular fragility of transition states, syndicate discussion was arranged around three main headings/areas that require specific attention, namely: providing young men with viable alternatives to fighting; reforming the security sector; and reducing the “footprint” of the international community in PC countries.

The key points and recommendations included:

### ***Young Men:***

- 1 Viable alternatives to violence should be provided for young men and women previously engaged in conflict, but also to young men in general, as they are most likely to become involved in future violent conflict. Job creation should be prioritised, but the focus should be wider than just job creation, to include access to assets and livelihood opportunities more generally. Alternatives to the usual donor-driven programmes must be considered; creative thinking was needed to come up with new solutions; and options outside the formal economy should be considered. This could include “non-productive” forms of work, which could deliver some benefits. Strategies may include public work programmes and food-for-work programmes, although the group generally favoured pay-for-work programmes for those able to work. Rather than merely providing jobs, such programmes should facilitate skills creation and transfer, and aim to engender a sense of self-worth and meaning.

- 2 Specific provision may need to be made for vulnerable and marginalised groups, and those unable to work, including, for example, those incapacitated by war. Work programmes may have to be accompanied by direct welfare transfers, including pensions for the aged and possibly for war veterans and the injured. Provision must be made for individuals who previously made their living off the land but who were displaced or lost the entitlement to their land as the result of conflict. A regional approach will be required to deal with this issue of displaced persons, regional migration and refugee flows.

### ***Security Sector Reform:***

- 3 Security sector reform (SSR) is extremely important and known to be a highly political issue, the details of which depend entirely on the specific situation in each country. “Security sector” should extend to private sector security agents, and to civil militias in situations where violence has been “informalised”. In some cases, creation rather than reform of the security sector, may be needed (e.g. Somalia) – this requires special focus from donors. Indeed, in many instances the creation of security itself, not a security sector, was what should be prioritised.
- 4 SSR should be context-specific, but there are certain key elements. It should go beyond the military and the police, to also include the justice and penal systems. Furthermore, the focus should not only be on the *process* of SSR (e.g. on creating accountability, transparency and civil society participation) but also on the *content* of SSR, namely the training of personnel, and provision of equipment and vehicles and facilities. Donors tend to be reluctant to engage in the latter as it is harder to do, although critical. It is important to give governments ownership and a stake in the SSR process.
- 5 The group cautioned against allowing ex-rebels to be “mopped up” (i.e. integrated into the army), resulting in expansion of the defence force beyond

reasonable need and efficiency. The problem of creating viable alternatives to violence for young men, discussed above, should not be resolved this way, as it creates a new set of challenges.

- 6 Along with SSR, justice must be seen to be done in cases of crimes against humanity and those that behaved with impunity during wartime. A clear message must be sent that war crimes are unacceptable, and that African lives are valuable and that human rights matter. An effort should be made to restore “punity” with a view to avoiding similar acts in future. How this could be done would vary from country to country – South African-style Truth and Reconciliation Committees are not always the best model. It was suggested that it would be useful to explore the potential for educating young people in peace and reconciliation. Special consideration must be given to questions of redistributive versus reconciliatory justice, and balancing traditional systems of justice with the international criminal justice system.

### ***The “Footprint” of the International Community:***

- 7 Donor and (international) NGO involvement tends to peak in post-conflict countries. Although such donor involvement could have positive impact, such as job creation, it sometimes has unintended consequences which could contribute to vulnerability. The group focused specifically on the problem of differentiated pay for expatriate and local employees of NGOs and donor organisations in conflict-torn countries. Their visible good fortune serves further to de-motivate much-needed public sector employees, many of whom are poorly paid, if at all. This phenomenon needs to be studied in greater depth to get a better understanding of the dynamics, so that negative effects could be minimised. One way of addressing the problem would be by looking at public sector pay policies and the prioritisation of public sector reform to ensure that valuable employees are retained. It was acknowledged that this might, in some cases of extreme resource scarcity, imply a trade-off between

this objective and other pro-poor policies. Staff should be motivated to stay not only through wages but also through being given access to equipment, supervision, training and leadership.

- 8 Any post-conflict reconstruction programmes should pay special attention to the political economy of conflict and the implications of activities associated with the war economy. This included activities that would be illegal in “normal” societies but which become a way of life in countries at war, such as drugs, arms and the trade in conflict goods.
  
- 9 The group felt it was vital that post-conflict peacebuilding programmes should not have a short-term focus but should incorporate long-term solutions to the underlying causes of conflict. It is important to adopt a strategic, holistic approach rather than one, which focuses only on specific problems. The subject of Education for Peace (e.g. through the UN-affiliated University for Peace Africa Programme) was raised in the context of longer-term steps to engender peace. It was suggested that donors could assist, in strengthening the capacity of such institutions, to teach and train conflict resolution and peace. Longer-term steps should also include macro-economic reforms and may require an “anthropological” approach to questions around the role of authority in traditional societies.

## **SYNDICATE GROUP REPORT PRESENTATIONS AND CLOSING PLENARY**

This session was chaired by Professor Malcolm Chalmers who reiterated the significance of the CfA and the London seminar in the articulation of an agenda that will contribute to moving Africa forward in the new millennium. The rapporteurs of the various syndicate groups were then asked to present their group reports. A robust plenary debate and suggestions on how to ultimately frame the CfA report followed the group presentations.

A number of commentators, including Jill Shankleman, Owen Green, Robert Picciotto and Laurie Nathan, stressed the view that the principal advantage of the Commission was its link with the G8 and EU and argued that the Commission should sell, in non-idealistic terms, why this African project matters to the G8 and the global North. Laurie Nathan emphasised that Britain's impending chair of the EU and G8 provided an historic opportunity for the Commission to aim to influence the thinking and policies of these countries to advance positive change in Africa. If this was successfully done, the EU and G8, Owen Green argued, could solidly back conflict prevention programmes developed by the AU and African regional organisations.

Robin Luckham, Robert Picciotto and Malcolm Chalmers highlighted the need for the Commission to think strategically in broad terms – exploring and addressing the interface between peace and security on the one hand, and developmental concerns on the other. Such a strategic approach would facilitate a paradigm shift. Picciotto observed the importance of strengthening good practices emerging from Africa, especially in the area of conflict prevention.

Alex Ramsbotham and Josphine Hazeley stressed the importance of wide ranging consultations with Africans, African ownership of the emerging projects and long-term strategic planning to guarantee programme continuity and sustainability beyond the Labour government of Tony Blair. Many participants emphasised the need to articulate and prepare the Commission's final report in clear and simple English,

capable of making sense to all and standing the test of time. All participants reiterated the importance of the Prime Minister's initiative to establish CfA and the potential opportunities for supporting, in particular, sustainable peace and long-term security in Africa. However, there was the general agreement that the Blair initiative should not end up like other projects such as the Brandt and Brundtland Commissions. A practical way of achieving this was to link the CfA to a continental movement for peace, security and development in Africa owned by Africans.

David Francis of the Africa Centre welcomed the participants' concern on how to frame and 'package' the Commission's report and further stated that the vision of the CfA should be to ignite a movement linked to the African century debate.

In her response, Claire Hickson of the CfA remarked that the Commission would not relent in its efforts to achieve the largest possible scope of consultation with Africans at various levels, beginning with the local community sphere regional organisations. The Commission has consulted governmental and non-governmental organisations, inside and outside Africa. Several forums have already been designed and are being implemented in Africa to achieve broad-based consultations. In her closing remarks, Ms Hickson thanked the participants for their enthusiasm and unreserved contributions to the success of the London seminar.



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# **APPENDICES**

## **I.**

**CONCEPT PAPER FOR THE ONE-DAY SEMINAR ORGANISED BY THE  
COMMISSION FOR AFRICA AND THE AFRICA CENTRE FOR PEACE AND  
CONFLICT STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD**

*‘I want to look ahead to a year when Africa will be in the spotlight of international attention. And I want to set out how I think that international attention can be turned into international action, to help Africa beat poverty and end conflict. . . . The price for failure will be disaster for Africa. The prize for success will be an Africa standing proud in its own right in the international community. . . . the rest of the world cannot stand by and watch Africa left behind. Because we cannot afford to. Because what happens in Africa, affects the rest of the world.’*

**Prime Minister Tony Blair. Addis Ababa, October 2004**

*‘We are running on a threadbare, hand-to-mouth existence, and if the plight of these people in Darfur is as important to the international community as it seems to be, then we would have expected more long-term support. Its amazing that we still can’t seem to get the money that is required.’*

**David Nabarro. Head, WHO Health Crisis Group, Darfur, September 2004**

## **Introduction & Justification**

The ‘worst humanitarian disaster’ perpetuated by the pro-government Arab militias, the *Janjaweed* in the Darfur region of Western Sudan, is the latest tragedy within the myriad of complex problems and challenges facing Africa with the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Despite the teething problems and recurrent challenges, it is important to begin to perceive Africa as an opportunity to eliminate poverty, underdevelopment, violent conflicts and unjust socio-political relations. This evolving international community approach, – perceiving Africa in a positive light and as an opportunity, is the first step in the collective action for a peaceful, strong and prosperous continent.

This is the spirit and philosophy that has informed the establishment of the Commission for Africa. But the establishment of the Commission has provoked both positive and negative reactions from a diverse group of interests and stakeholders involved with and committed to the progressive development of Africa. Some are dismissive of the initiative on the grounds that Africa’s problems and challenges are well known but that it is the lack of commitment and political will on the part of the international community that has failed Africa. In particular, that the Commission is yet another ‘blueprint’ prescribed for Africa, without proper consultation with Africans. On the other hand, some see the Commission’s initiative as a unique opportunity to firmly put Africa on the international agenda and mobilise international support and commitment to undertake practical programmes and sustained investment to support successful peace and security initiatives in the continent.

Despite the different reactions and perspectives of diverse groups, there is common agreement on the imperative to engage with the Commission for Africa as a way of inputting into and influencing the outcomes of the commission's central conclusions.

This one-day seminar, therefore, capitalises on this common agreement to engage with the commission by providing a neutral forum for extensive discussions and consultations with a variety of stakeholders including African academics, policy research institutes, policy and development practitioners, the private sector, UK-based civil society, NGOs and INGOs, development and humanitarian assistance agencies working in and involved with Africa, and intergovernmental institutions involved in Africa such as the EU, UNDP etc.

It is evident that it would be far too ambitious to attempt to address all the peace, conflict and security problems, challenges and opportunities facing Africa in just one day. In addition, though the thematic focus is on peace and security, we also have to consider the interface with and impact of this focus on the other principal areas of the Commission, such as the economy, natural resources, governance, human development, culture and participation.

To facilitate a comprehensive and substantive discussion, and to agree on key central conclusions by the end of the seminar, we have decided on three broad themes with sub-thematic focuses:

## **1. Prevention**

*Conflict prevention and the elimination of violent wars and armed conflict.*

- How to develop capacity for conflict early warning and early response
- Specific evaluation of conflict prevention efforts that have worked and those that have not worked, and how to learn from the experiences.
- Role of civil society and grassroots social movements in conflict prevention. Capacity building needs and evident deficits.
- Private sector and conflict prevention
- Women and conflict prevention
- Resources (resource abundance and resource scarcity) and conflict
- Investment in conflict analysis
- Role of media and conflict prevention
- Small arms proliferation, landmines and conflicts
- Investment in African indigenous/endogamous approaches and institutions for conflict prevention, management and peacebuilding

## **2. Intervention**

*Conflict stabilisation, containment and management both operational and structural intervention: From negotiated civil war peace settlement to post-war peacebuilding.*

- Resourcing/investment in African approaches/solutions for African problems (both military and non-military interventions)
- Intervention in African conflicts and complex political emergencies: who should intervene, under what conditions and how?
- How to resource and strengthen African peacekeeping deployments and conflict management capacity:
  - i. African Union's peacekeeping/rapid deployment standby force, and conflict intervention
  - ii. Regional Organisations' peacekeeping/peace enforcement, and conflict management capacity building, e.g. ECOWAS / ECOMOG, SADC –AAF and IGAD
- Specific challenges for intervention and conflict stabilisation in complex political emergencies with reference to:
  - i. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) of ex-combatants and child soldiers
  - ii. Security Sector Reforms
- Resourcing and strengthening capacity for democratic governance and accountability through NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism.
- Need for holistic to approach to facilitating/mediating peace processes
- How to contain and eliminate the impact of 'spoiler' on peace agreements
- Identifying the particular roles and division of labour in conflict intervention by UN, EU and AU.

### **3. Resolution, post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding**

*From Intervention to building the foundations for sustainable peace and security.*

- Investment in progressive and accountable leadership
- How to link peace, security and regional economic intergration
- How to facilitate and mainstream private sector investment in peacebuilding
- Investment in education for peace and people-centred empowerment: How to ensure and empower people to participate in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, peace education and basic conflict mediation and resolution skills for schools, vocational institutions and universities
- Challenges and opportunities for rebuilding collapsed states and reconciling bitterly divided societies
- How to secure the sustained support and commitment of the international community beyond humanitarian emergencies
- Media and peacebuilding: problems, challenges and opportunities
- Women, civil society and peace building
- HIV/AIDS and Conflict

These three broad areas are united by the fact that they are cross-cutting issues, multi-dimensional and interdisciplinary in focus. Progress in one area affects the other areas, hence there is need for a comprehensive policy approach and co-ordination in implementation and intervention strategies. In addition, it is important to recognise the heterogeneity of Africa, and that some key strategies developed and applicable in one region, may not necessarily be desirable in another region. Furthermore, the three areas reflect the problems, challenges and opportunities for peace and security faced by transition societies, including conflict-prone countries, war-torn societies and post-conflict countries. The prevention-intervention-resolution/peacebuilding approach could best be seen as a continuum, requiring comprehensive policy approach and co-ordination.

Conceptually, these three broad areas highlight the difficulty in making a clear distinction between ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘conflict intervention’. Conflict prevention by definition, simply means all efforts and strategies used to prevent the pursuit of incompatible differences and interests to degenerate or escalate into armed conflict or violence. This involves a whole range of conflict intervention measures and strategies, and is linked to peacebuilding. Peacebuilding, on the other hand, simply conveys the notion of efforts and interventions to prevent relapse into further war or violence after political settlement and the end of war. These two notions of conflict prevention, i.e. before outbreak of violence, and after the end of armed hostilities or war, have made it difficult to neatly separate these critical issues into prevention, intervention and resolution. Despite this challenge and for the purposes of this seminar, – using the language of ‘Development Speak’ – we have decided to settle for the above three broad categorisations for the following reasons:

1. They provide a handy approach, for those involved in development and conflict intervention, to prioritise responses to conflict, peace and security issues
2. For donor countries and global governance institutions, with the mindset of ‘quick-fix, short-term and exit strategy-oriented’, these categorisations provide useful pointers as to what level and which specific areas they could intervene with multiplier effects.

Therefore the one-day seminar will bring together experts from diverse UK-based African interest groups and practitioners to provide a unique opportunity to share ideas about the future of peace and security in Africa, by focusing on the problems, challenges and opportunities faced by Africa in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The consultative forum will build on the work of the Commission, and will be organised around the consultation paper of the second commissioners’ meeting in October 2004, but will not be restricted by this focus.

## Aims and Objectives

- ‘Listening to Africans and Africanists’: Provides a forum for discussion and consultation with UK-based African interest groups and stakeholders on Africa’s future, relating to peace, conflict and security issues
- Development of concrete action plans and strategies for implementation of programmes, relating to peace, security, conflict management, resolution and peacebuilding in Africa
- Provision of an opportunity to reflect the African realism into the commission’s emerging conclusions and thematic focus

## Strategy for Implementation

The one-day seminar will be organised around thematic group discussions and plenary sessions. Each Syndicate Group will start with a five minute presentation by an expert, to kick-off the discussion. In all, six group sessions will be organised, focusing on the following:

1. **Conflict Prevention:** Problems, Challenges, Opportunities and Future Prospects
2. **Intervention:** Problems, Challenges, Opportunities and Future Prospects
3. **Resolution and Peacebuilding:** Problems, Challenges, Opportunities and Future Prospects

Three syndicate groups will be organised in the morning session focusing on the **Problems and Challenges** relating to conflict prevention, intervention, and conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The afternoon session will continue with the same format of three syndicate groups, focusing on the opportunities and future prospects relating to conflict prevention, intervention, and conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

An estimated 35-40 participants will be invited from the following UK-based target groups; academics, policy research institutions, policy and development practitioners, NGOs, INGOs and civil society involved in and working on African issues, African diaspora organisations, intergovernmental institutions such as UNDP, Commonwealth, EU etc, and the private sector.

The Africa Centre will be responsible for all the organisation and management of the one-day seminar. The Commission will provide the resources for the seminar.

## **Expected Outcomes**

- Extensive consultation with an estimated 30-45 UK-based African interests groups and stakeholders, aimed to develop the ethos of African ownership and partnership
- Opportunity to input and influence the central conclusions of the commission – conclusions that would affect ‘real issues’ and ‘real people’ in Africa
- Additionally, opportunity to deflect the criticism that the commission has not undertaken extensive consultations with Africans and institutions working in Africa
- An estimated 40-60 copies of the one-day seminar entitled *The Commission for Africa and the African Century: What can the international community do to support sustainable peace and long-term security in Africa*
- The one-day seminar report will not only serve as background reading material for the Commission, but will also provide documentary evidence of the level of extensive consultation

## **II.**

### **SEMINAR AGENDA**

9:00 – 9:45 Arrival of Participants, Registration

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**Plenary:**  
**Commission for Africa and the African Century: Mobilising for the  
‘Big Push’ for Africa’s Successful Conflict Prevention and  
Peacebuilding**

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- 10:00am – Welcome Address:  
**Ms. Claire Hickson. Theme Manager, Peace & Security,**  
Commission for Africa.
- 10:05am- Objective and format of Seminar:  
**Dr. David Francis. Director, Africa Centre,** Department of Peace  
Studies, University of Bradford.
- 10:10am- Commission for Africa: Vision, Challenges and Opportunities for  
Peace and Security in Africa:  
**Commissioner Tidjane Thiam, Peace & Security.**
- 10:30am Questions and Discussions
- 11-00am **Refreshments**

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**11:30am – 1:00pm: Group Sessions A:  
Understanding the Problems and Challenges to Peace, Conflict and  
Security in Africa**

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**SYNDICATE GROUP A - I**  
**Conflict Prevention: Problems and Challenges**

Title: 'Resource Management and Conflict in Africa: Key Problems and Challenges'  
Speaker: Prof. Oliver Furley, Visiting Professor, African Studies Centre, Coventry University

**SYNDICATE GROUP A - II**  
**Intervention in African Conflicts, peace and Security: Problems and Challenges**

Title: 'Problem and Challenges of International Intervention in African Conflicts'  
Speaker: Laurie Nathan, Senior Research Fellow, Crisis States Programme, Development Research Centre, LSE and Former Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, South Africa

**SYNDICATE GROUP A - III**  
**Resolution & Peacebuilding: Problems and Challenges**

Title: 'Media, Conflict Early Warning and Early Response'  
Speaker: Josephine Hazeley, Deputy Editor, Focus on Africa Programme, BBC World Service, Bush House, London

1:00pm      **LUNCH**

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**2:00pm-4:00pm - Group Sessions B:  
Opportunities and Future Prospects for Peace, Conflict and Security:  
What Can the International Community Do and How?**

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**SYNDICATE GROUP B - 1**

**Conflict Prevention: Opportunities and Future Prospects**

Title                    ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Regulation’  
Speaker:                Dr. Owen Greene, Director, Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS), University of Bradford.

**SYNDICATE GROUP B - 2**

**Peace, Security and Conflict Intervention: Opportunities and Future Prospects**

Title                    ‘AU and Regional Organisations Peacekeeping and Conflict Management Capacity Building: How to Target investment in African Solutions to African Problems’  
Speaker:                Dr. Funmi Olonisakin, Kings College, London.

**SYNDICATE GROUP B - 3**

**Resolution and Peacebuilding: Opportunities and Future Prospects**

Title                    ‘Opportunities for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Reconstruction in Transition Societies in Africa’  
Speaker:                Prof. Malcolm Chalmers, Centre for International and Security (CICS), University of Bradford

4:00pm-                Refreshments

4:15pm – **Presentation of Group Reports**

### **III.**

#### **BRIEF NOTES ABOUT THE ORGANISERS**

## **Commission for Africa**

Established by Prime Minister Tony Blair in February 2004, the Commission for Africa is tasked to recommend to the EU, G8 and other rich countries a strong programme of action that will provide a powerful impetus in support of successful African development. The Commission, among other things, focuses on how the international community can give strong and practical support to African governments and initiatives, to AU and NEPAD, and to implementation of international commitments towards Africa. The Commission's mandate comprises a number of specific thematic assignments, including governance, human development, economy, natural resources, culture and participation, peace and security. Overall, the Commission will help to promote and fashion a new relationship between the rich world and Africa; one of mutual respect of core values, common objectives and partnership in action.

The Commission is working closely with a wide range of African and international organisations and institutions, including the private sectors, civil society, grassroots associations, states, intergovernmental organisation. The aim of this wide range consultation and collaboration is to create a robust agenda with clearly defined goals, strategies, roles and modals for tackling the challenges of sustainable development, peace and security in Africa. In particular, the Commission for Africa aims to give the African agenda a decisive push with effect from 2005 through such special international opportunities as the proposed UN Millennium Summit to assess progress on the MDGs, as well as the G8 and the EU, both of which are expected to come under the UK presidency. The proposals of the Commission will support and, in some respect, lay the foundation for a new relationship between the rich countries and Africa. The Commission has 17 Commissioners, 9 of whom are Africans and its secretariat is based in London.

For more information about the Commission for Africa:

<http://www.commissionforafrica.org/>

E-mail: [Africa\\_Secretariat@dfid.gov.uk](mailto:Africa_Secretariat@dfid.gov.uk)

## **The Africa Centre**

Established in August 2002, the Africa Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (Africa Centre) is based at the world-renowned Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK.

The objectives of the Africa Centre include:

- ❖ To contribute to the development of a rigorous, proactive and empirical understanding of the nexus of conflict, peace, security, and development in contemporary Africa. A core emphasis of this process is on the interface between the theory and practice of these inter-related concerns
- ❖ To develop and execute an international research, teaching and practical training specialism on various African concerns to complement and strengthen the existing African programme and expertise of the Department of Peace Studies at Bradford.
- ❖ To develop the Africa Centre in the long-term into a leading policy research institute with a reputable research-publication profile and the capacity to influence international policy directions, processes and responses in Africa

Based within an academic institution in Europe, the Africa Centre is strategically located to contribute meaningfully to processes both in the global North and in Africa. The Africa Centre is guided by the following principles:

- ❖ The Africa Centre is committed to influencing and shaping the debates on international policy, development and crisis intervention in Africa
- ❖ The Africa Centre emphasises the primacy of African institutions, agencies and the civil sector in the ownership of conflict prevention, management, resolution and peacebuilding processes in African countries
- ❖ The Africa Centre's partnerships with other institutions and bodies are based on equal and mutually beneficial collaboration

For more information:

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# Africa

