A Strategic Public Diplomacy Framework for Enhancing Implementation of Public Diplomacy Practice in the Diplomatic Field of Qatar

A Strategic Public Diplomacy Framework for Enhancing Implementation of Public Diplomacy Practice in the Diplomatic Field of Qatar

N.A.J. AlHAMAR

PHD

2023

A Strategic Public Diplomacy Framework for Enhancing Implementation of Public Diplomacy Practice in the Diplomatic Field of Qatar

Nasser Ahmad Jassim Alhamar

Submitted for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Management, Law and Social Sciences

Unitersity of Bradford

2023

Abstract

Nasser Ahmad Jassim Alhamar

A Strategic Public Diplomacy Framework for Enhancing Implementation of Public Diplomacy Practice in the Diplomatic Field of Qatar

Keywords: Public Diplomacy, foreign policy, strategic frameworks, conflict reconciliation, diplomatic siege, PD empowerment.

The role of Public Diplomacy (PD) in conducting foreign relations has emerged as a critical component for modern statecraft, foreign policy and arguably for the state's global existence. With the world now more interconnected than ever before, public diplomacy has taken on new meaning and new importance. However, despite these marked shifts, public diplomacy remains under-researched and under-utilised both as a concept and as a vital activity. The complexities that underscore the development and evolution of public diplomacy within a dynamic international milieu therefore warrant renewed attention. The benefits and opportunities that accompany public diplomacy are equally complicated by a number of challenges to its practice.

This research identifies and advances a critical understanding of public diplomacy through a theoretically rigorous perspective that accounts for the fluid environment in which it operates, the evolving nature of stakeholders and audiences involved in shaping it, the sweeping impact of global information and communications development, the persistence of cultural divides and conflicts of interests and how they contribute to the lack of strategic frameworks in place to advance public diplomacy practice.

This thesis investigates Qatar as a case study due to its international stature and influence despite it being a small geographical state. Renowned for its international role as a leading actor in conflict reconciliation and commended for its contributions to international humanitarianism, the ambitious, forward-looking and steadfast foreign policy of Qatar has faced increased pressure in recent years. Qatar has encountered significant challenges in the form of the Nepali workers' crisis that ensued following its selection as host for FIFA World Cup 2022 and with the diplomatic siege against it by a number of Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC) states. This study critically analyses Qatar's public diplomacy practice considering these pressing developments and advances an original strategic public diplomacy framework that can assist Qatar in managing and mitigating the effect of these crises on its global image and reputation.

This research contributes to enhancing public diplomacy practice within the diplomatic context of statecraft and foreign policy by developing a nuanced and original framework that can be utilised by Qatar and other states to manage and mitigate modern public diplomacy challenges. The thesis utilises a mixed-methods research approach that includes literature reviews, media analyses, interviews and questionnaires. The study contributes to knowledge and practice by advancing research in an understudied field and by developing and implementing an original strategic PD empowerment framework.

Acknowledgements/ Dedications

I would like to thank my supervisor Dr Afshin Shahi for his continuous support for the completion of this project. I could not finish this project without the support and understanding of my wife, my father and the wider family who never hesitated to help me to realise my lifelong dream of obtaining a doctoral degree.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Since the turn of the century, governments have increasingly engaged in the strategic activity of communicating directly with international populations; this has led to a new form of diplomacy called public diplomacy (hereafter referred to as PD). In his authoritative and informative account, leading PD scholar Nicholas J. Cull, establishes PD as an international actor's effort to manage the international environment by focusing on the foreign publics (Cull, 2009). Melissen (2005) and Bishop (2014) respectively expand upon this definition by emphasising the importance of national image in PD. For the purposes of this thesis, public diplomacy entails a narrow but encompassing concept of influencing publics through a public image at home and abroad on issues pertaining to foreign affairs. These issues are increasingly data-driven, audience-focused and seek to evaluate strategic engagement initiatives in a dynamic, collaborative and digital environment. This definition is utilised because it emphasises and sets out the general operational activities of public diplomacy without encroaching or relegating itself to contention with ministries or agencies that engage in elements of public diplomacy such as cultural outreach (Fitzpatrick, 2010).

National image can influence the approaches of others in relation to a vast number of sectors, including tourism, economics and national security (Melissen, 2005; Bishop, 2014). Leonard, Stead and Smewing (2002, p.9) further assert that "PD can nourish off the overall image of a country either positively or negatively". Accordingly, an increasing number of governments have realised the importance of PD in promoting their country's image abroad through targeting foreign audiences (Anholt, 1998; Ayad and Copeland, 2009; Ayad, 2010; Lending, 2000).[1]

Following the collapse of the bipolar international order in the early 1990s, Joseph S. Nye (1991) introduced the seminal concept of "soft power" as an alternative to traditional "hard power". Ayad and Marshall (2000) point out that during this period, PD came to be widely regarded as a method to adopt soft power as a new paradigm of diplomacy. Indeed, Nye (2004) as well as Leonard and Alakeson (2004) confirm that many governments began weighing the shift from military and coercive power into soft power and PD. The paradigmatic shift noted by Ayad and Marshall (2000) was accompanied by heightened emphasis on reliability, accountability, honesty, transparency, morality, and humanitarianism as essential elements in projecting and promoting a country's image in national and international affairs (Doxey and Marshall, 1998; Gilboa, 2001; Leonard, 2003). However, while PD can be regarded to exert soft power, the two concepts are not mutually dependent. For instance, some states engage in PD but not soft power, while others utilise soft power with minimal emphasis on PD. Nye (2004) has demonstrated that despite the

[1] N.b. The terms states, countries and nations are used interchangeably in this thesis.

benefits of soft power in gaining peoples' support and solidarity, governments would be well served to pay attention to PD practice and national security. This is due to the fact that the value of PD actions can contribute to enhancing a country's soft power (Nye, 2004; Melissen, 2005). Hence, PD has become indispensable for a nation's global success, with states recognising the importance of managing foreign relations through PD practice alongside traditional methods (Cull, 2009). Consequently, this research endeavours to critically illustrate PD in nations as a means of exerting soft power.

Diplomatic practise between states is supported through the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). Such practice is controlled, monitored and navigated nationally and internationally via the Ministry or Department of Foreign Affairs of respective states (MOFA) which is entrusted with primary diplomatic tasks and responsibilities.

MOFA sets the trajectory of foreign policy priorities based on the state's political agenda and applies policy across the state's diplomatic network (Dickie, 1992; Hocking, 1999; Jonsson and Hall, 2005; Berridge, 2015). According to Hocking (1999, p.4), "the foreign ministry and the national diplomatic systems handle traditional diplomacy and PD based on the VCDR by managing and monitoring the communications between the national and international policy atmospheres". Hocking (1999) further observes that MOFA serves as the key platform in facilitating PD practice. Indeed, since MOFA typically carries out PD functions alongside associated diplomatic networks, this research seeks to examine PD in a diplomatic frame, and in particular through MOFA.

A number of prominent scholars (Melissen, 2011; McClellan, 2004; Van Ham, 2005) have highlighted the difficulty in establishing the practice of PD. This is due to the dynamic nature of PD activities and the widespread nature of possible contributors and audiences (Gallop, 2007). On the one hand, this has led Melissen (2011) to assert that the value and role PD ought to remain dynamic based (i) the instantly principal political necessities and welfares, (ii) along with the prospects of the foreign publics, the different audiences to which messages are delivered and (iii) the available means of communication. As a result, McClellan (2004) and Van Ham (2005) therefore argue that that there is no single approach for PD given that the approaches are contingent upon the proposed objective and the targeted audience. The dynamic environment in which PD operates means that there are many variables, elements and challenges that can contribute to shaping PD activities: content focus, competing objectives, a wide spectrum of activities and platforms as well as potential results anticipated from PD practice. These complexities have motivated the researcher to focus on improving the PD practice within the diplomatic frame for nations through a timely reconnaissance that critically considers PD challenges and advances a framework to control them.

Given that PD practice operates beyond the confines of conventional state borders, it naturally faces the challenges of a dynamic and disruptive global environment. These challenges, which are addressed by a slew of scholars (Leonard, 2002; Melissen, 2005; Sharp, 2005, de Gouveia and Plumridge, 2005; Hocking, 2005; Henriksen, 2005, Leonard, Small and Rose, 2005; Cull, 2009), include but are not limited to: responding to a challenging and changing geopolitical environment, the increased influence of non-state actors, the massive developments in digital communication, the instantaneousness of real-time information, cultural divides, conflict of interest between actors and a lack of strategic approach for PD practice. In this study, the researcher will primarily emphasise addressing a lack of strategic approach for PD practice as this is one variable that modern statecraft can better control.

There are equally a plethora of environmental and external factors which reflect the on-going development of PD and thus must be taken into consideration. These factors include a hyper-connected, interdependent global environment wherein domestic and foreign policy converge to influence the behaviour of international relations, the massive communication development and unprecedented digital disruption, the exponential explosion of new media sources and the proliferation of non-state actors in either progressing or hindering a state's strategic foreign policy interests (Ross, 2003; Morgan and Lennon, 2005; Leonard, Stead, and Smewing, 2002; Melissen, 2005 and 2011; Hocking, 2005).

Although these challenges have to be considered in combination to improve the PD practice for nations, Cull (2006) and Henrikson (2006) argue that the primary challenge of PD is that it must be understood in a strategical and systematic way, wherein the practice is clearly defined so as to ensure the transfer of suitable messages to the public, thereby generating satisfactory public environment and defining backgrounds for policy conventions. Melissen (2011) adds that the absence or lack of strategic PD can result in significant challenges for the state to advance its identity, values and image. In this regard, a number of scholars (Holbrooke, 2001; Hocking, 2005; Cull, 2006; Melissen, 2007; Zaharna, 2009) are in consensus insofar as that improperly and inadequate PD can result in a credibility deficit since the information supplied may be regarded by foreign publics as propaganda. Whereas PD is viewed as open and transparent communication with audiences that aims to deliver a desirable effect through persuasion, propaganda tends to be accompanied by the absence of dialogue and may thus produce undesirable and unintended effects.

Melissen (2011) and Chitty (2007) are therefore of the opinion that there is a need to build a strategic PD which reflects the state's foreign policy objectives and can cope with contemporary

challenges and changes in the international environment. Indeed, it is plausible to advance the notion that PD can be practiced successfully in any state, when there is a strategic plan for its practice by taking into consideration the potential challenges to PD alongside its elements, methods, principles and role in attaining the state's foreign policy goals efficiently. It thus goes without saying that strategically planned PD has the potential to perform a vital and progressive role in supporting a nation's foreign policy and improving its identity, values and image in the targeted foreign nations (Melissen, 2011; Chitty, 2007; McClellan, 2004). Hence, a well-versed strategy must be regarded as the main principle to ensure that PD is effective (Henrikson, 2006; Cull, 2006; Leonard, Small and Ross, 2005).

As Zaharna (2007) and Henrikson (2004) state, building relationships is a central aim of PD and it is therefore reliant on effective communications based on cooperation, collaboration and exchange. In this regard, Kurbalija (1998) demonstrates the influence of Information Technology (IT) on diplomatic practice and finds that the development of IT has had profound impact on global society in the way that it has revolutionised the way most people live and work due to its lower costs, improved performance power, ease of use, portability, convenience and availability anywhere and anytime. A number of key studies (Nye, 2004; Hocking, 2005; Melissen, 2005) further unravel the sweeping impact of public perceptions, as facilitated by IT, in influencing the development and pursuit of foreign policy and shaping international policy. Hocking (2005, p.30) in particular finds that "all of the communication developments offer the opportunity for the redefinition of PD in terms of an active role for public rather than as passive objects of government foreign policy strategies". Consequently, in order to achieve strategic outcomes, governments must now innovatively work outside the channels of traditional diplomacy by actively engaging in strategic and effective communication with foreign publics to engage them to a greater extent than ever (Henrikson, 2006). Indeed, a number of seminal scholars (e.g. Nye, 2004; Hocking, 2005; Melissen, 2005; Henrikson, 2006) maintain that foreign publics ought to constitute the primary concern for diplomacy practitioners.

Hence, strategic communication is an essential factor which affects PD, and it should be carefully planned to ensure it attains the strategic PD and foreign policy goals (Henrikson, 2006; Cull, 2006). It is why McClellan (2004) advances a conceptual framework consisting of five layers of strategic communication: (1) generating awareness, (2) emerging interest, (3) knowledge, (4) advocacy, and (5) action. Each of these layers contributes to attaining a PD communications approach that can potentially assist in achieving strategic PD based on the trustworthiness of the government's faith and values when there is no conflict between their words and their actions. PD practitioners must therefore consider and perform according to the foreign policy strategies deployed by their state. For strategic PD to be effective, PD practitioners and diplomats must play

a leading role in transmitting a state's strategy worldwide, and this can only be the case if they are well-acquainted with their state's PD and foreign policy and when the practice is guided through an effective and outward-looking strategic PD framework associated to the state's foreign policy, which must be cognisant and proactive in rapidly responding to possible challenges that are likely to occur in today's challenging international environment.

Hence, the problem which this research seeks to address is the lack of strategic PD within the diplomatic framework of nations, and in particular MOFA. In order to address this problem, the researcher first engages in a holistic theoretical literature review on PD to unravel and succinctly define the research gap (see Chapters 2 and 4) prior to developing a novel and innovative strategic PD framework that can help improve the PD practice in the diplomatic frame.

1.1 RESEARCH SCOPE & CASE STUDY

This research critically addresses one of the leading challenges facing PD practice: the lack of strategic PD. In doing so, this study aims to develop a strategic PD framework that can be utilised by the diplomatic field in MOFA. The proposed framework innovatively builds upon leading PD theories which aim to provide a standardised governance PD structure for nations. The objective of the proposed framework is to contribute towards strategic policy measures that can effectively and efficiently improve a nation's PD practice and therefore boost its national image amongst foreign publics.

Given the vast scope of PD, this research utilises Qatar as a case study. Qatar has been selected as a result of several important factors that render it an intriguing and fruitful case for a study on strategic PD. These factors mainly include (i) the limited literature on PD in the Gulf Cooperation Council region (GCC) and in particular Qatar, (ii) Qatar's influence in the region due to its large political and social presence globally despite constituting a small geographic state, (iii) Qatar's eff0rts in resolving major political issues through effective diplomatic mediations, e.g. in Lebanon, Sudan, and many other countries and actors, and (iv) its contested role in a number of important national, regional and international issues that have garnered global attention and impacted its PD practice. The vigour and at times controversial nature of Qatar's political and diplomatic activities in this region and beyond, has led to a number of criticisms facing Qatar's foreign policy due to its political decisions, actions and foreign policy direction. These criticisms include conflict within the ruling family overpower, the use of Al-Jazeera to principally reflect Qatar's foreign policy, concern about Qatar's foreign policy since the succession of the new Emir, controversial issues surrounding mediation efforts during the pursuit of Qatar's foreign policy, and the alleged abuse of human rights and corruption charges. Qatari foreign policy has also faced heightened criticism over its involvement in the Arab Spring and for its support of Islamist

organisations in Syria and Egypt.

These accusations have led to two main PD crises facing Qatar, first, the abuse of Nepal workers and second, the Qatar Siege by a collection of Gulf Countries resulting in a blockade and regional diplomatic crisis. In this study, the researcher investigates Qatar's diplomatic crises in order to unravel the strategic role of PD during the crisis in restoring the country's image and delivering the country's message to the foreign publics. Hence, Nepal workers and the present Qatar Siege crises were selected for investigation in order to provide a comparative analysis of the PD role in dealing with the crisis, and the alterations in Qatar PD in the past and the present. Accordingly, suggestions and a framework for improving PD practice in the diplomatic frame of Qatar are provided. The recency of these developments is reflected by the scarcity of literature available on them. Thus, this research endeavours to study the role of Qatar's PD in addressing these crises with the aim of advancing a nuanced understanding of its strategic shortcomings and how to deliver strategic PD that can improve its diplomatic practice. A critical discussion and in-depth analysis of these crises is provided in Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis.

Since each State has its own foreign policy, country-factors, culture and values; PD strategy and practice is inevitably bound to differ from one State to another. Therefore, in the case study of Qatar, Qatar PD is investigated to define the extent of PD practice in the diplomatic frame and whether the state has a strategic PD and to discuss the main PD opportunities and challenges, regionally and internationally. Furthermore, the researcher investigated the role of Qatar's PD in dealing with the two-main crises which have impacted the state's image, i.e., the reported abuse of Nepalese labourers in Qatar, and the Qatar siege crisis and provided recommendations for PD empowerment in Qatar diplomatic frame. Finally, the researcher proposes the need for strategic PD framework for the diplomatic context to tackle the challenge of lack of strategic PD, which will help to improve Qatar PD practice and image abroad.

1.2 THESIS RESEARCH AIM

This thesis aims to address the issue of lack of strategic PD in the diplomatic frame of nations and propose a strategic PD Framework to help improve PD practice for Qatar. Various individuals including diplomas, experts, political analysts and academics have contributed in the investigation stage of this research as well as in the development of the framework. The strategic framework is intended to enhance the PD practice of nations.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on the thesis aim, the following research questions were selected in order to define the research scope and to help set the research boundary.

Q1: What are the key elements of PD practice used in the diplomatic frame and the available methods or framework to improve PD practice?

Q2: What research methodologies can be adapted to help achieve the research objectives?

Q3: What opportunities and challenges does PD face in Qatar, and how might such challenges be addressed?

Q4: What are the roles of PD during the Nepalese workers' crisis and Qatar Siege crisis, and how can strategic PD maintain Qatar's image and improve its PD practice?

Q5: What are the main components of the proposed strategic PD framework, and will it assist in prompting Qatari government's PD practice?

1.4 THESIS OBJECTIVES

In order to attain the research aim, the following objectives were set out to be achieved:

Objective 1: **To conduct a literature review on PD and related topics.**

The research will start by reviewing the literature in the field of PD, e.g., the importance of PD, background knowledge on diplomacy, general concepts in the field of PD and the main challenges of PD. The results of this activity assist in discerning the research gap in the literature in terms of PD practice in the diplomatic frame and the available PD methods or theoretical framework to help improve PD practice. Moreover, the findings from this activity serve to formulate the theoretical framework of this research based on suitable PD methods.

Objective 2: **To investigate and define suitable research methodologies to help conduct the research studies in order to achieve the research objectives.**

In order to help define the research methodology for this thesis, a literature review will be performed. Performing this review enables the researcher to understand and adopt appropriate research methods that can help attain the objectives of the research. As a result, multiple methods

were used to attain the research objectives including literature review, archival research, case study, interviews, surveys and focus group.

Objective 3: **To investigate whether Qatar has a strategic PD, the extent of PD role in the diplomatic frame and discovers the opportunities and challenges of PD in Qatar.**

A literature review, semi-structured interviews and media analysis will be performed to gain an in-depth knowledge of Qatar's foreign policy and PD and available critiques of Qatar's foreign policy. The adoption of Qatar's PD and the extent of PD practice in Qatar's diplomatic frame and the main challenges facing their PD practice will also be explored. The findings from the studies help to establish whether Qatar has a strategic PD, PD role in the diplomatic frame and discover the opportunities and challenges which face PD in Qatar.

Objective 4: **To explore through case studies, the role of PD during the main crises faces Qatar's image worldwide, i.e., the issue of the Nepalese workers' security and the current Qatar Siege crises.**

The fourth objective of this thesis is to investigate the two diplomatic crises that occurred in Qatar. Both crises are analysed through multiple methods including media analysis, surveys and interviews with diplomats well versed in the issues. This enables a robust understanding of the events to emerge so as to more accurately assess the PD role during the crises, whether the Qatari government practises PD efficiently in practice as well as the potential challenges faced during PD practice. This objective further allows the researcher to critically unpack the dimensions of the crises, analyse how Qatar has strategically addressed them and whether PD has played a vital role in mitigating or exacerbating the crises.

Objective 5: **To propose and evaluate an effective strategic PD framework for the diplomatic context for the aim to address the challenge of lack of strategic PD and improve the understanding and practice of PD.**

Based on the outcomes of Objectives 1, 3 and 4, the first part of this objective proposes a strategic PD framework for the diplomatic context to improve PD practice. The purpose of this objective is to evaluate the strategic PD framework in relation to the selected case studies. Relevant stakeholders, e.g., diplomas and experts, will partake in the study to help evaluate the usefulness and effectiveness of the PD Framework in building a strategic PD and improve Qatar's image worldwide.

1.5 THESIS METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW

The present study investigates the challenges posed by the lack of strategic PD within the diplomatic frame of Qatar. As a result, this study develops a mixed-methods approach that utilises both qualitative and quantitative research to strengthen the framework and increase the validity and reliability of the findings. The study further advances a combination of both inductive and deductive research approaches. It employs the former due to the fact that this study commences by building a theory, i.e. a strategic framework and then assess the effectiveness of the framework. The deductive approach will be adopted to help analyse the study data by performing thematic analysis (Braun. and Clarke 2006).

As a result of the unavailability of official documents pertaining to Qatari PD strategy and activities due to sensitivity and security issues the sources of data in this research are primarily derived from the media, internationally reputable peer-reviewed journals and primary data gathered from interviews with PD experts, diplomats and related entities such as academics and political analysts. Additionally, questionnaire surveys exploring the domestic and foreign publics image on Qatar following the Nepal crisis was undertaken with 300 Nepalese workers and Qatari employers. Primary data was also gathered with the PD section of the Qatar embassy in London and a focus group was conducted with selected PD experts, diplomats and academics to unravel nuanced details and insights. Given the wide scope of PD, a case study approach is utilised to concentrate on evaluating the effectiveness and usefulness of implementing the proposed strategic framework in the diplomatic frame of Qatar. The research methodology adhered to in this thesis is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3., and more explanation for the methods adopted to help achieve the thesis objectives will be provided in their subsequent chapters.

1.6 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

This study contributes to academic research on PD; in particular, it proposes a novel strategic framework that can help to effectively facilitate and improve strategic PD. Moreover, as there is limited PD literature on Qatar and GCC countries, this research contributes directly to advancing an understanding of PD strategies in the Gulf region. This research equally contributes to policy by providing governments, diplomats and politicians with a tangible framework to improve their PD practice in the diplomatic frame by advancing recommendations for PD empowerment based on the PD challenges and opportunities available to states. The research provides an advanced strategic framework that can deliver a consistent governance PD structure for the government. Although the state of Qatar is the case study, other governments with similar country profiles, including in the GCC, could benefit from the result of the research.

Although some researchers have investigated the importance of strategic PD in improving PD practice, most existing research does not sufficiently investigate the several levels which build-up strategic PD, or provide enough guidance for strategic PD practice, e.g. when and how each method should be employed and the strategic communications required. In addition, very limited research has placed PD within a contextual framework to facilitate its practice (see Chapter 4).

Leading literature on PD has supported the argument that PD has to reflect a country's foreign policy perspective. This has motivated the researcher to explore PD strategy as a vital instrument for a state's foreign policy and develop an original framework for strategic PD for the diplomatic frame, thereby filling a gap in the current literature in terms of addressing one of the main challenges facing PD practice, i.e., lack of strategic PD, deficiency of strategic PD framework for the diplomatic frame to enhance PD practice and the lack of literature investigating Qatar's PD. As a whole, this research contributes to knowledge by proposing PD empowerment recommendations and a strategic PD framework within a diplomatic context, which will assist in improving the PD practice of States.

1.7 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

This thesis consists of eleven chapters. It is structured as follows and the flow of chapters is depicted in Figure 1: **Chapter 2** presents a literature review on various PD practice, the importance of PD and its potential challenges. **Chapter 3** develops an overview of the methodology, research approaches and research design used to attain the research objectives. **Chapter 4** engages in a literature review on established PD theories and frameworks which could help improve PD practice and overcome its challenges mainly focusing on the lack of strategic PD. **Chapter 5** advances a critical review of related literature on Qatar's foreign policy and PD, the parameters of Qatar's PD and its usage by the government of Qatar and finally, a discussion on the available critiques of Qatar's foreign policy. **Chapter 6** provides expert findings on PD practice in Qatar's diplomatic frame and identify the key challenges facing PD practice with the ultimate aim of improving the practice of PD. **Chapters 7 and 8** present two-diplomatic crises that occurred in Qatar namely, Nepalese workers crisis and the current Qatar siege as case studies. These case studies investigate how Qatar's response to the challenges posed by the crises and to what extent PD played a significant role in dealing with the crises and and in improving Qatar image. **Chapter 9** proposes an original strategic PD framework for Qatar's diplomatic frame that can assist in building strategic PD and improve Qatar's image. **Chapter 10** presents the evaluation of the framework proposed in this thesis as a means to assess its effectiveness in practice. **Chapter 11** provides a summary of the research thesis, outline its contribution to knowledge in detail, discusses its research limitations and identifies areas for future work.

TABLE 1: MAPPING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS WITH THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND THESIS CHAPTERS

Research Question	Research Objectives	Chapters
Q1: What are the various elements of PD practice used in the diplomatic frame and the available methods or framework to improve PD practice?	**Objective 1**	**Chapter 2** **Chapter 4** **Chapter 5**
Q2: What research methodologies can be adopted to help achieve the research objectives?	**Objective 2**	**Chapter 3**
Q3: What opportunities and challenges does PD face in Qatar, and how might such challenges be addressed?	**Objective 3**	**Chapter 6**
Q4: What are the roles of PD during the Nepalese workers' crisis and Qatar Siege crisis and how can strategic PD maintain Qatar image and improve PD practice?	**Objective 4**	**Chapter 7** **Chapter 8**
Q5: What are the main components of the proposed strategic PD framework and will it assist in prompting Qatari government's PD practice?	**Objective 4**	**Chapter 9** **Chapter 10**



FIGURE 1: SEQUENCE OF THESIS CHAPTERS

1.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY

An introduction to the context of the thesis was provided in this chapter. The research aims and research questions, research objectives, a brief overview of the research methodology and the outline of the thesis were also presented. A literature review on PD research and related topics will be given in the next chapter and it will investigate the gap in the literature in the field of PD.

2. CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents a comprehensive and critical review of the key literature that shapes the field of PD. The literature review defines establishes the key debates and currents that shape PD and sheds light on the gap in existing literature. The chapter commences with an introductory background on diplomacy and then illustrates the general concepts in the field of PD including Hard and Soft Power, Propaganda, Nation Branding and Foreign Policy, the main PD challenges, digital diplomacy, online influences and finally, the importance of persuasion in diplomatic communication. In reviewing the literature and identifying research gaps available in the field of PD, this chapter identifies the research problem and helps achieve the thesis research aim.

2.1 DIPLOMACY

Denza (1961) describes diplomacy as the mechanisms organised by a global actor, whether a state, multi-national corporation, international association or non-governmental institute to manage the international environment. This definition follows the 1961 Congress of Vienna which introduced the proper regulation practice of diplomacy vis-a-vis the International Law Commission which as a body of the United Nations (UN) established a comprehensive law of diplomacy, the 'Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations' (VCDR) (Denza, 2008). As Denza (1961) points out, the success of the VCDR is contingent entirely on the engagement and adherence of states to the law in their diplomatic practice for the aim of protecting the state interests. In this regard, the International Law Commission has provided added stability for states to comply with the VCDR and practice diplomacy with heightened efficiency. Although diplomatic mission activities have altered and amended the agreement over time, the practice remains consistent and in line with the unchanged basic functions proposed by the VCDR which seek to safeguard bilateral relations and protect state interests. States have predominantly abided by the clauses and their maneuverability for innovation of practice. The practise of diplomacy is held together by the exchange agreements between states to launch missions and facilitate cooperation. Generally, there is a massive acceptance and adherences to VCDR by most states; in contrast, Denza (2008) observes that the conflicting interest by a limited number of states is negligible. Three years following its adaptation, the VCDR was enforced internationally in 1964. The VCDR was ratified as a universal international law and the vast majority of states involved in the U.N are signatories to it.

Indeed, the VCDR is still very much applicable to today's diplomatic practice since it defines the basis for the diplomatic network and practice, including the roles of diplomatic missions, the privileges and the communication method as well as requirements for removal or violation of a diplomatic mission in case issues come to light between the sending and receiving states.

Furthermore, the VCDR agreement outlines the primary features of traditional diplomatic practice which encompasses and includes the welfare of citizens of the sending state within the margins of the receiving state as well as amicable relations and cooperation to establish a mutual exchange between the two countries in various fields (Denza, 1961).

As a whole, the VCDR delivers a general platform for governments to manage diplomatic practice between states (Denza, 2008). Langhorne (1992) and Denza (2008) describe the platform as one which seeks to transcend differences in linguistic, culture, and welfare and supports commonalities and intercultural cooperation. Accordingly, the VCDR accords an important space for PD to be performed as a part of acknowledged diplomatic practice since it improves diplomatic relations based on exchange and discussions with foreign publics. Indeed, exchange activities remain very successful and are extensively deployed by states in the development of successful and sustainable relationships based upon commonality within the society of states. The diplomatic practice between states, as permitted through the VCDR, is controlled and monitored within the universal and national perspectives via the Ministry or Department of Foreign Affairs of the state (MOFA) which constitutes the chief diplomatic arm of states. Moreover, a number of scholars (Dickie, 1992; Hocking, 1999; Jonnson and Hall, 2005; Berridge, 2015) assert that it helps the state to improve foreign policy priorities based on today's political outline and in applying the policy mainly across the diplomatic network.

According to Hocking (1999), the foreign ministry and the national diplomatic systems handle traditional diplomacy based on VCDR through the active management and monitoring of communications between the national and universal policy atmospheres. Hocking (1999) adds that the development of PD falls within the scope of MOFA's responsibility.

Although MOFA delivers support for the diplomatic network, it also supports the process of strategic and foreign policy improvement through strategic implementation of policy through diplomatic networks. Within the performance of MOFA, a number of priorities have developed over time based on geographic representations (e.g., Europe, Middle East, America) as well as operative outlines, such as treaty law, protocol, media or PD. Dickie (1992) points out that the directives of MOFA are closely related to the broader developments within the foreign policy space, taking into account the national interest. In this regard, it can be stated that the primary functions of MOFA concern enhancing state interests within foreign policy priorities and implementing them via diplomatic practice. A number of prominent scholars (Berridge, 2015; Jonnson and Hall, 2005) maintain that the central elements of diplomatic practice – formality and protocol, economic concerns and negotiations and the development of PD practice are developed in line with the clauses set out in the VCDR.

Diplomatic representatives and MOFA deploy formal communication between states using a specific language, which might be extraordinarily flowery and imprecise. Woolcott (2003), Broinwski (2009), and Fletcher (2016) all separately find that State missions, and in particular, embassy officials use formality in their everyday operation particularly through diplomatic communiques. This further extends to the encouragement of economic interests through recorded observations of commercial developments within the receiving state as well as the negotiation of commercial terms to protect and improve both states economies. States use mutual communications to gauge interest in and establish drivers for being innovative at the multilateral level. Although it has been argued that diplomatic practice favours privileged political communications at the expense of economic relations (Woolcott, 2003; Broinowski, 2009), the VCDR nevertheless advances economic interest as the backbone of diplomatic discussions. Lee and Hudson (2004) support this conception by contending that economic diplomacy is the basis of traditional and modern diplomacy. The emphasis on economic diplomacy as a main driver of political decisions raises the argument of the interconnection between economics and politics within diplomacy practice. As a result, the researcher has emphasised the importance of critically unravelling the power of the economic platform within diplomatic practice and in particular in PD and in building nation branding. Additionally, an investigation into the power of the economic platform as it relates to Qatar's Foreign Policy and PD in undertaken in Chapter 5. Although the existing literature focuses on economic diplomacy there is a clear shortage on key interrelated platforms of diplomacy including military, human, cultural and media. These aforementioned platforms will be incorporated into the discussion in Chapter 5 in order to address their important impact on political diplomacy.

Finally, as distinguished in the VCDR, PD represents one of the key areas of diplomatic practice due to the central importance of image projection and reputation management. Berridge (2015) asserts that this is due to the fact that the practice of diplomacy involves cultural and educational exchanges that focus on foreign audiences. The researcher is in agreement with Berridge's assertion that PD plays an impactful role and further postulates that it is critical to restoring, refining and advancing a nation's image abroad. Moreover, the researcher goes on to develop the argument that in to avoid any conflict of interest in PD role, PD should be controlled by MOFA since it is the leading entity for managing foreign affairs of the state. Although MOFA usually carries out PD functions, other entities are also responsible for performing PD activities such as the cultural attaché. Therefore, there should be effective communication and collaboration between MOFA and all related entities to ensure that the PD activities are effectively performed as planned. This has led the researcher to suggest MOFA governance over PD to control the PD activities. As a result, this requires ensuring MOFA dominance in PD and ensuring PD empowerment in diplomatic missions abroad, believing that PD is an extension of diplomacy. As

a result, Qatar's MOFA was the main emphasis on investigation for PD practice; this required research methods in order to define the extent of PD practice in diplomatic missions abroad and its challenges (see Chapter 3).

2.2 FOREIGN POLICY

Generally speaking, foreign policy provides a basis for an in-depth discussion of the PD system. Hogwood and Gunn (1984) have specified that policy which is related to the PD decisions, must – to some degree – have been generated within the framework of governmental processes that result in foreign policy formulation. Althaus, Bridgman and Davis (2012) have described the policy as a persuasive response to a public matter, which requires decision-making. In turn, the leading literature on PD (Hocking, 2005; Henrikson, 2006; Melissen, 2005) all emphasise the inexorable connection between PD and foreign policy.

Melissen (2005) describes PD as an essential concept that assumes a leading role in determining the state's position in the world and in producing concrete policy. Similarly, Hocking (2005) asserts that PD serves as a key method for attaining foreign policy objectives and that it is a crucial element in engaging with public audiences and constructing soft power. Naturally, PD must reflect foreign policy objectives and aim to deliver government message to the world through effective communication with the foreign publics if it is to be successful. Nevertheless, there are additional factors that are crucial to PD and should therefore be considered alongside the foreign policy of the state. From the researcher's point of view, PD literature ought to be expanded to better incorporate an in-depth understanding of state interests, identity and country-specific factors. By doing so, it is possible to develop a more detailed and intricate understanding of PD practice and how it tends to vary among states. Hence, this research seeks to holistically investigate the MOFA dominance in PD through a critical lens that carefully considers the foreign policy of the state, the state interest and country-specific factors. Therefore, the researcher endeavours to investigate state foreign policy, state interests and country-specific factors for the aim to consider them in the PD role to assess the extent to which existing PD activities reflect these factors and how they impact the effective attainment of PD objectives.

Furthermore, leading scholarly literature (Henrikson, 2006, Leonard, 2002; and Melissen, 2005) on PD has supported the argument that PD must better reflect policy perspectives, and that those perspectives must strategically and intentionally adapt PD in their provision of long-term foreign policy objectives. In this regard, Henrikson (2006) and Melissen (2005) recognise the primary strategic considerations and tools employed by governments through PD. Both authors correctly assert that PD should consider the foreign policy process and should have strategic direction to extend the effectiveness of PD for the state. This has motivated the researcher to understand

strategic PD as an instrument of foreign policy and to attempt to associate it with main foreign policy strategies described below. Having said that, Henrikson (2006) and Melissen (2005) stop short of proposing any practical steps on how to build strategic PD. Instead, they focus mainly on defining the need for strategic PD as it constitutes one of the main challenges surrounding PD practice. They further emphasise the need for government deployment to PD to ensure that it reflects the foreign policy strategy of the state. This well-supported acknowledgment has led the researcher to excavate the central role governance over PD in ensuring that strategic PD is established and controlled by a government entity, which is MOFA in regard to this research. This will ensure that strategic PD is established, measured and controlled, and it effectively reflects the foreign policy strategy of the state, the state interest as well as accounting for country-specific factors.

Henrikson (2006) outlines five main foreign policy strategies apparent in foreign relations, which are relevant to PD activity and strategic policy objectives. The foreign policy strategies highlighted by Henrikson consist of (1) consolidation; (2) containment; (3) penetration; (4) enlargement; and (5) transformation. Henrikson's foreign policy strategies are well-developed and comprehensive in capturing the various possible foreign policy strategies depending on state direction and its political decisions. However, Henrikson does not explore in-depth the relation between his proposed foreign policy strategies and PD practice. As a result, these strategies and their related PD events may intersect, or be applied simultaneously, depending on the context, external impacts and anticipated results. In this research, Henrikson's seminal foreign policy strategies will be applied to the two case studies: Nepal and siege political crises. The analysis of the two crises will investigate the choice of suitable foreign policy strategies for each crisis and how the foreign policy strategies can be alter based on the current state political condition in particular in crisis. Each strategy is critically considered below prior to the introduction of a new strategy: diversion.

2.2.1 CONSOLIDATION

According to Henrikson (2006), consolidation is the political practice of enhancing the understanding and approving the support for a state within the scope of the state's partners. Consolidation attempts to form or strengthen the logic of interrelation in shared purpose or values within the alliance towards attaining an effective outcome. Henrickson (2006) asserts that within this strategy, the domestic audience is considered as the core community. As a result, consolidation involves PD activities that aim to shape and confirm state identity and image –

bearing in mind that PD attempts to connect national publics with foreign publics and across internal and external policy objectives.

With regards to PD practice, Melissen (2005) finds that the importance of engaging domestic audiences is an essential part of the consolidation strategy. When applied through effective PD it can cultivate support and encourage country incorporation in a manner that serves to consolidate an identity. Melissen's observation is important if we consider that PD primarily tends to overlap noticeably with public affairs and transfers outside national boundaries into international perspectives. Henrickson (2006) asserts that these international perspectives often extend to cultural exchanges and economic alliances which are essential for states since these alliances can influence multilateral policy directions and combat significant worldwide concerns. For instance, high-level conferences, groupings and events with nations, which share commonalities serve as important examples wherein alliances impact policy direction (e.g., OPEC, APEC ASEAN). The extent of these alliances is incredibly diverse and there are many groupings and consolidations between nations around the world; some are based on economic commonality (e.g. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); others are based on geographical grouping (e.g. ASEAN, League of Arab States, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), EU and finally many are based on religious grouping such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). It can therefore be argued that cultural exchange is a vital instrument for consolidation through PD. For example, the EU has supported the European Children's Cultural Exchange by involving teenage students from the European Union countries (EU) in a three-year art program (ECCE, 2014). It is argued that efforts such as the aforementioned are reflective of the desire of states to utilise cultural exchange to establish networks, strengthen relationships between nations, encourage integration and consolidate an identity.

Henrikson (2006) insists that the most crucial strategy is consolidation since it tends to attain optimistic results and offers a basis for other targeted strategies. He further postulates that the government, which has developed and strengthened its place with its local community, and with commonalities, is more likely to engage in other foreign policy strategies. One the one hand, it is true that consolidations between nations can potentially open up avenues for the states to develop strategic relations between them based on political, economic, geographical or religious commonality and partnerships factors. Yet, on the other, it is important to study consolidation from multiple sites and divergent angles to ensure that the state is benefiting from its joined consolidations. For instance, once a state observes that its drawbacks are more than the advantages of being part of this grouping consolidation, then the state may attempt to leave this consolidation. The UK is an example; the country joined the European Union since 1973. However, based on the results of (BREXIT) referendum which took place on 23 June 2016, the UK formally declared its intention to leave the European Union on 31 October 2019. The result of the referendum revealed that 51.9% of the domestic public agreed that the UK should leave the EU (The UK

Electoral Commission 2016). Ultimately, the UK was successful in achieving its divorce from the EU and breaking with the consolidation pact. According to a survey conducted by British Social Attitude (BSA), 73% of the public were worried about anti-immigration sentiment rather than disappointment with politics (Independence, 2017). In this research, the researcher will address the consolidation strategy of the state of Qatar and the available commonality groups, in particulate the GCC. This raises the question whether Qatar might decide to leave the GCC as well, especially after the current siege crisis and to build new commonality groups and partnerships.

2.2.2 CONTAINMENT

Containment strategies represent a protective and responsive though intended to limit the spread of influences to avoid debilitating or undesired outcomes (Henrikson, 2006). As such, containment can viably be carried out through efficient PD as a means to advance foreign policy objectives. Over the last several decades, containment strategies have been utilised by many nations. For instance, former U.S President Harry Truman, established a new foreign policy strategy to combat and counter the spread of Soviet Communism, which involved a long-term, stable and attentive containment of expansive Soviet tendencies. Taking Truman's lead, consecutive American presidencies actively focused on gradually weakening Soviet power, not only through military force but also through the use of psychological war with overt propaganda and secret actions (Kennan and Lukacs, 1997). More recently, America has used a containment strategy against a rising China (Henrikson, 2006) by engaging it in trade wars.

The policy of containment intimately relates to PD activities that seek to articulate a broader understanding intended for targeted foreign audiences. Joseph S. Nye (2004) states that depending upon the containment needs, different PD methods may be utilised including the media, a more extended strategic campaign, advocacy as well as relationship building. Moreover, education and cultural exchange with targeted publics can serve to cultivate shared associations and promote opportunities for negotiation and influence. For instance, during the Cold War, America enacted a strategy to fund foreign radio broadcasts through Voice of America (VOA) to build ideological support for democracy and curtail the spread of communist ideology amongst foreign publics. Hence, it is apparent that containment strategy can be achieved effectively via the PD role. However, the suitable PD method and mechanism must be based on the containment requirements that the state has defined. Therefore, the researcher has raised an argument that strategic containment requires strategic PD governance to ensure the plan and practice of PD is achieving the containment objectives of the state strategy. In this research, in the case study of Qatar, the researcher will further investigate the role of the PD in performing the containment strategy during the two-political crises: Nepal workers issue and the siege crisis.

2.2.3 PENETRATION

Penetration is a comparably restricted strategy which aims to develop a network of self-assurance and power within particular sets of foreign leaders who may embrace some basis of effect in their government which could be helpful in times of crisis and could improve the political or commercial direction. As Henrikson (2006) points out, the term penetration has been used in business as well as in international relations. In the business world, penetration of a product or service normally entails strategies such as price-cutting, improved advertising and distribution (Arkolakis, 2010). By contrast, penetration in foreign policy requires PD activities that actively seek to construct relationships. For effective penetration, PD activities could include educational and cultural exchange and the use of Internet and media (e.g., TV, radio). These strategies were performed efficiently through an intelligence role by the U.S against the previous Soviet Union throughout the Cold War to limit the extent and impact of communalism and to support democratic values (Henrikson, 2006). Yet, as Richmond (2003) cogently observes, following the Cold War, penetration strategy underwent a marked change and evolved into various cultural exchange programmes between America and the Soviet Union. These programmes were designed to increase Western impact amongst the Soviet Union intelligentsia, and thus have an effect on the development of the policy of the Soviet Union. In this regard, this research advances the sentiment that penetration strategy could be useful in political crises and in improving political relationships. It is however argued that penetration strategy is often associated with containment strategy rather than deployed in isolation.

2.2.4 ENLARGEMENT

Enlargement strategy reflects the development of the ideological, commercial and political domain of a country and its allies (Henrikson, 2006). For example, U.S. foreign policy strategy has moved from a strategy of containment during the Cold War into the strategy of enlargement owing to the brief status of America as the world's only true superpower following the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, numerous multilateral economic initiatives were established to support the enlargement strategy, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), APEC, and the Group of Seven (G-7) (Brinkley, 1997). The essential principle of the U.S enlargement strategy was to avoid military interventions, to prioritise enlargement mainly in economic power and to spread western ideology rooted in liberalism and democratic principles. However, as Henrikson (2006) notes, enlargement strategy usually incorporates elements of consolidation, containment and penetration strategy rather than operate in isolation.

At its core, enlargement requires a commitment to an overarching vision and an abundance of complementary activities involving strategic communications to secure and maintain lasting

relationships (Henrikson, 2006; Lancaster, 1975). The United Nations (UN) and multilateral organisations offer chances for tracking enlargement strategy. One such an example of the recent enlargement strategy concerns the diplomatic rise of China as an accountable actor in international relations (Hooghe, 2007). As a means to respond to worldwide uncertainty pertaining to its enlargement strategy, China has engaged PD to clarify that its growth will not be threatening, but it will be peaceful. This was illustrated, in part, through PD activities involving cultural exchange through the establishment of the Confucius Institutes, which attempts to spread China's culture and language to the foreign publics (Hooghe, 2007). The examples of the United States and China reflect that Henrikson's enlargement strategy may be effective for larger global powers as they have the strength to influence other states to spread a specific intended message to the world. This would require effective and sustained communications to build lasting relationships with other states. It however appears that the main challenge of enlargement strategy is the cultural differences between states which have to be considered in order to effectively attain the desired outcome that accompanies an enlargement strategy. The enlargement strategy was used in both cases to deliver different messages to the world. In the case of USA, the enlargement strategy aims to deliver a message to the world that America and liberal democracy are the world's best system to facilitate political and economic drive. In China's case, the enlargement strategy was used to deliver a message to the world that Chinese growth will not be threatening to the world.

Since Qatar is a small state which does not have a long historical presence, it has applied the enlargement strategy after gaining its dependence in 1971, and specifically in 1995 after Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa came to power. The strategy was applied to establish an independent yet united entity through its cultural and religious features alongside the Islamic world and the GCC.

2.2.5 TRANSFORMATION

The transformation strategy was entirely expressed by the former U.S Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice in 2006, as it is the approach which attempts to form and support democratic systems. Under Rice's direction, this strategy was the driving force behind American foreign policy. Rice believed this strategy should be delivered through a corporation with recipient states and not through authoritarian attitudes (U.S Department of State, 2006).

Fukuyama (2006) has illustrated that such activity sought to spread the influence American soft power and develop their image abroad by incubating a fourth wave of democracy. Therefore, transformation is a significant development from the enlargement strategy, since it reflects the acknowledgement of the dangers facing US national security and wealth of states where democratic values and institutions are lacking. Furthermore, Henrikson (2006) declared that to provide the proposed changes needed by the transformation strategy; there is a need for

fundamental alteration to the political system and repositioning of diplomats to form a strong, trained and adaptable diplomatic power for that approach. He added the development of technology had assisted the role of diplomatic networks, offering more flexibility and accessibility through virtual presence posts and digital meetings.

The critical tools of the transformation strategy revolve around engaging foreign audiences, especially those with a specific demographic. It might require constant, directed and appropriate communications with audiences over the media and the Internet. Hence, transformation strategy would involve to some degree elements of all of the foreign policy strategies (Henrikson, 2006). Although transformation could expand the power of the state, it might result in critics when there is any uncertainty on the moral standing of the cause (e.g., some researchers are critics of the U.S. transformation strategy declaring that it is simply imperialistic and interventionist). The researcher found transformation strategy as a diversion to a new direction to the state, usually derived from a specific incident or crisis the state encountered. This would require a shift in the state strategy in order to resolve the crisis and reduce its negative impact. This research will study whether transformation strategy was used in the crises of either the Nepal workers or siege for the aim to restore Qatar's image, which has been affected after both crises. The researcher agreed with Henrikson's assessment that transformation is a decision of change to enhance the strength and the power of the state; such change could be derived from crisis or incidents affecting the state.

2.2.6 DIVERSION

As a result of the transformation strategy, a new strategy referred to as diversion has appeared. The strategy was first presented by the former Under Secretary for PD and Public Affairs at the US Department of State and accentuated the necessity for diversion strategy called anti-terrorism to direct new generations into productive behaviour such as sport and technology to move them away from violent behaviour and terrorism (Glassman, 2008). The diversion strategy is extremely dedicated to its audience; for example, young people were targeted since they were considered at danger of turning to extremism. The new technologies have assisted in engaging young people through the Internet and social networks, so a government that resists the new Internet techniques would encounter problems in delivering their policy to the public (Glassman, 2008).

Therefore, diplomatic activities have focused on gathering public opinion through social networking and new technologies. For example, social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, which has become a popular tool for a political organisation and it was used widely in the US presidential elections (Lewin, 2008), and in Iranian elections in 2009 where people organise protests against the election results (CNN, 2009). Furthermore, social media has been powerful in recent years in the Arab revolution and social change (Leonard, 2003; Anholt &

Hildreth, 2005; Rose, 2010). As a result, many Arab governments have recently paid attention to the public; recognising that ordinary citizens form public opinion and can affect the foreign policy decision-making of their governments (Leonard, 2003). The researcher believed that the new technologies, in particular, social media have played a substantial role in engaging audiences and even changing a country's future; therefore, it should be considered in PD discussions.

It can be argued that Glassman's (2008) opinion on diversion is similar to Henrikson's opinion on transformation strategy. On the one hand, both seek to deliver a positive change to the state, which could be in a different field: economic, political or otherwise. The diversion could therefore be a turnover to the strategy, which might completely differ from the regular form. It thus appears that the terms are similar and, in many ways, reflective of the transformation strategy proposed by Henrikson. Nevertheless, the researcher believes that Henrikson's strategies differ in that they are dedicated to an audience and appear to consider public opinion alongside new technologies in communications, including social media.

Depending on the nation's circumstances and its intended PD outcome, each nation would decide to either alter or remain firm to its foreign policy strategies. This has raised a question on the current foreign policy strategies for the state of Qatar and whether its strategies have changed during the recent crises the state has encountered – and in particular the siege crisis which teetered towards a war of attrition until a symbolic resolution in January 2021 (see Chapter 8).

2.3 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

With the Internet revolution and the exceptional flexibility of populations, the potential for interpersonal and international communication has rapidly increased. Although international competitiveness and the liberty of a nation depend mainly on military and economic power, state image and reputation have now become critically important to the wealth and wellbeing of all states. In turn, there has been a significant shift with many states now engaging in the active maintenance of their image and reputation vis-à-vis foreign audiences and publics. This shift has been accompanied by the rise of PD to support traditional diplomacy by creating an optimistic, approachable attitude in foreign countries. As Cull (2009) notes, PD is an international actor's effort to manage the international environment by focusing on foreign publics. Indeed, the public diplomacy of a country is founded on the belief that the country's image and reputation are public benefits that can either produce an empowering or restricting setting for individual activities. Leonard (2002) finds that by working on specific issues, PD will feed off and reflect on the country's overall reputation in both positive and negative ways. Figure 2 below depicts the public diplomacy loop. For Instance, Qatar's reputation in providing international aid in the region can

serve to inspire aid campaigners to use Qatar as an example in their campaigns which in turn would also enhance the reputation of Qatar as a country of international aid provider.



FIGURE 2: THE CIRCLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADAPTED FROM (LEONARD, 2002)

Existing scholarly literature on PD has demonstrated different perspectives in regard to its contemporary application. Gregory (2008) and Cull (2006) approach PD through a chronological review of PD development. Their respective approaches provide key insights on PD, including on its origins, development, as well as thorough definitions of the main PD principles, and its overarching connection the foreign policy. Nevertheless, their work is primarily descriptive, and does not empirically investigate the several levels which build-up PD. It also it does not emphasise the effective practices of PD. A number of additional researchers (McClellan, 2004; Sharp, 2005; Zaharna, 2008; Rasmussen, 2009; and Sharp and Duluth, 2009) have also considered PD approaches and methods. However, their concepts mainly provide guidance about when specific methods should be employed in order to achieve an intended outcome. Their research is useful since it transitions from being descriptive into proposing methods of practising PD as a tangible means to attain foreign policy goals. Despite their contributions, there remains a notable of literature that explores strategic PD and how to attain it by strategically practising PD effectively to attain a defined goal that reflects the foreign policy of the state. There has been a significant shift in PD practice in recent years due to the exponential rise of non-traditional international including Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). This shift further encompasses the move to real-time technologies such as social media to communicate with publics; and the rise of new PD which utilises nation branding, soft power and relationship building, instead of top-down messaging and the old concepts of propaganda (Melissen, 2005; Cull, 2009). However, in PD, there is mutual communication between the actor and a foreign audience, and this communication could be assisted by the actor, to manage or influence the international environment.

In 2005, Lord Cole described British PD as: ‘work aimed at informing and engaging individuals and organisations around the world in order to increase awareness of and enhance influence for

the United Kingdom in line with the government's medium and long-term objectives' (Cull, 2009, p.16). This implies that the practice of PD should attend the policy goals of the state. As a result, PD has become essential for a nation's global life, since governments recognise the importance of managing foreign relations through PD practice, alongside traditional methods. In this regard, Ambassador Laurence Pope has described PD as an olden method (Bishop, 2014). Melissen (2005) supports this view through an analogy that describes PD as old wine in a new bottle, pointing to the soft power value of PD actions, believing that other nation's images of us impact their approaches towards us concerning many sectors, including our tourism, economic investment and even the national security.

In many regards, PD is therefore a government's open system of collaborating with foreign publics to understand better a nation's goals, thoughts, policies and culture. It was initially used in Europe through the procedure of agreement to the EU and to NATO, which has assisted European countries in reforming their global image and in encouraging their citizens of the need of PD processes. Consequently, the significance of multilateral diplomacy and alliances with governments or non-state actors has flourished with PD becoming an instrument for constructing a favourable public environment to follow specific interests (Cull, 2009).

The researcher acknowledges and agrees with Cull's view that PD has the prospective to promote a nation's image through influencing its national and foreign publics, particularly through new media. In this research, the researcher will therefore focus on the role of PD in influencing on the foreign publics to improve nations image abroad through the frame of MOFA's dominant PD practice abroad. To reiterate, as a definition, public diplomacy constitutes a narrow by encompassing concept wherein PD seeks to influence publics through a public image at home and abroad on issues pertaining to foreign affairs. Accordingly, it is a data-driven, audience-focused attempt to facilitate strategic engagement initiatives in the modern dynamic, collaborative and digital environment.

An emergent component of PD is what Nye (2004) describes as soft power – the formulation of a state image globally that promotes a nation's interests and values. The term 'Soft Power' was introduced at the end of the Cold War by Joseph Nye. 'Soft Power' is defined as the ability of a player to achieve status in the international environment from the attention of its culture rather than its military and economic power (Nye, 2004). However, Cull (2013) correctly observes that soft power is not understood consistently through all cultures since every country has its specific characteristics and cultural preferences. Consequently, while trying to implement soft power, Cull (2013) asserts that countries must consider the importance of their audience's opinion and not their own opinion. They must look at their country from a foreigner's standpoint and be able to move outside their cultural backgrounds (Cull, 2013). The researcher strongly agrees with the

perspective that in attaining on soft power in delivering a nation's message to the public, only if it considers the nation's foreign policy, the cultural and the country-specific factors and audience opinion as well.

Although PD can be seen to exert soft power the two concepts are not mutually inclusive. Indeed, some states engage in PD but not soft power, while others utilise soft power with minimal emphasis on PD. Over the course of modern history, PD has demonstrably impacted the soft power of states. For instance, it served as a crucial element in America winning the Cold War. Soft power is the capability of influencing others, to attain the required aim by attraction rather than pressure or coercion. A state's soft power depends on its cultural assets, political values and foreign policy's legality and moral authority. Nye (2004) asserts that despite the benefits of soft power in gaining people's support and solidarity, governments must pay attention to PD practice and national security. Moreover, Nye (2004) argues that an aggressive and myopic agenda that lacks tact in international discussions can prove to be counterproductive. Thus, he maintains that nations need to listen as well as to promote their point of view (Nye, 2004). There is therefore an important need to balance between public and national perceptions and the nation's intention to promote their views effectively without enforcing or interfering on public view especial in foreign publics. Indeed, it is pertinent that nations seek to deploy PD without infringing on public freedom and the expression of opinion.

In the fight against transnational terrorism, states have mainly relied on hard power. However, a mixture of both hard power and soft power is necessary to solve the complexities and social dynamics that underlie this major issue and to convincingly win people's hearts and minds. In this regard, Smart PD which constitutes a dynamic mixture of hard power and soft power ought to be utilised as such an approach necessitates engagement with reliability, civil society and self-criticism (Nye, 2004).

Nye is correct to suggest that the balance between both hard and soft power serves to create smart PD, which is the most effective PD process. However, smart PD poses an inherent challenge for less endowed nations that are likely to have a more difficult task in achieving a steady equilibrium. The choice of soft, hard, or smart PD is contingent on state characteristics, interests and the method which it politically deems to be most suitable. Qatar's PD will be further investigated later in this chapter. Figure 3 shows a visual display of public diplomacy, soft power and hard powder.



Figure 3: Public Diplomacy Dimensions (SZONDI, 2008)

Impact variable	Indicators (changes produced in the subjects)	Goal
Familiarity with the country	Think about the country Update images about the country Turn around unfavorable opinions	
Appreciation of the country	Create positive perceptions Develop a shared perception of important global issues	
Engagment with the country	Strengthen ties in diverse domains such as education reform or scientific cooperation Develop attractiveness of the country as a destination for tourism, work or learning Make people buy the country's products Get people to understand and subscribe the country's values	Getting foreign companies to invest in one's country Getting foreign publics to back one's positions Getting foreign politicians to turn to one's country as a favored partner

FIGURE 4: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY VARIABLES, INDICATES AND GOALS (ORDEIX-RIGO, E AND DUARTE, J 2009)

2.4 PD AND PROPAGANDA

Lasswell (1937) defines the term “propaganda” as the approach of convincing and influencing human action or delivery of disruptive or inventive methods. Usually, propagandists exaggerate their approaches to a topic or situation to encourage their views. This approach is taken to prevent aggressive actions by the public and to achieve the status that propagandists are seeking. Furthermore, they work to change human perceptions and views, to clarify disadvantages taken on behalf of the people and they endeavour to engrain their ideology to upcoming generations with what is called ‘social inheritance’, so that future generations will have similar opinions to their predecessors (Lasswell, 1937).

Historically, propaganda has served as a crucial strategic tool in both domestic and international politics. Many countries, including the USA have engaged in propaganda wherein it was used as early as the American Revolution when requested external provision for its battle of independence from Great Britain. Likewise, throughout the course of World War I, England succeeded to influence the USA to breakdown diplomatic relations with Germany through forming an efficient propaganda campaign in the USA against Germany. The campaign attempted to distribute scheming data across the Allied militaries and impartial countries to attain support for British actions (Bruntz, 1938). (Taylor, 1983) has stated that the engagement of propaganda in modern war has been used to alter its value into something rather more sinister (Taylor, 1983).

Cull (2013) therefore cautions that countries should apply soft power carefully and tactfully; otherwise, their intended audience might become suspicious of their true intentions. According to Brown (2003), most anti-propagandists criticise propaganda because of its unsuitability with democracy as it uses deceit, violence, spreads aversion and seeks to alter history and facts. Although both concepts serve a country's welfare, each nevertheless uses different methods. On the one hand, PD delivers honest and open-ended discussion, clarification of a country's foreign policy and serves as a method of transparently presenting state accomplishments abroad. On the other hand, Brown (2008) implies that propaganda attempts to force its messages on audiences; glorifies the state; simplifies complicated matters, and intentionally lies and distorts the facts.

Conversely, former U.S. State Department official, Richard Holbrooke, equates propaganda with PD (The Washington Post, 2001). Holbrooke (2001) stated that some governments called it PD, public affairs, psychological warfare and some desire to be blunt and called it propaganda. This leads Berridge (2015, pp. 126-127) to maintain that no there is no adequately clear distinction between PD and Propaganda. Berridge (2015) therefore defines PD as propaganda since both forms of political promotion are intended to impact a foreign government's external policy. Although there is an overlapping interconnection between these two activities in terms of holding

shared features, they are different. A number of key researchers in PD (Lippman, 1953; Holbrooke, 2001; Hocking, 2005; Cull, 2006; Melissen, 2007; Zaharna, 2009) suggest that the line between PD and Propaganda is quite blurred, but that they can represent two different aspects. For instance, Alex Belida, a former senior advisor of Voice of America and correspondent in Africa, Europe, the White House and Pentagon, has recognised that there are an unclear outline, shades and lack of understanding between Propaganda and PD, adding that Propaganda has a negative implication and loses audiences in contrast to PD, which positively conveys to audiences. Nonetheless, he pointed out that the phrase 'public diplomacy' is just a replacement for propaganda (PDC, 2014).

Melissen (2007, pp.18) highlights the critical differences between propaganda and contemporary PD by emphasising the purpose and process of communication. Melissen (2007) states that PD attempts to widen the audience's perceptions and choices through information and education; where propaganda aims to reduce perspectives and options (Zaharna, 2009, pp.89-90; Nye, 2004, pp.49-50). On the other hand, an effective contemporary PD includes encouragement through a two-way communication method, which attempts to occupy the audience in an open discussion and establish long-term relationships that will build trust with them (Nye, 2004; d'Hooghe, 2007). Similarly, Welch (1999, pp. 24-26) describes propaganda as the deliberate effort to influence audience opinion through one way or closed communication of thoughts and values for an explicit purpose that serves either directly or indirectly the welfare of the propagandists and their political leaders. Naturally, there is bound to be a level of overlap between PD and propaganda however it is maintained that the two concepts are distinct and differ in terms of the way to deliver a nation's messages and its implications to audiences. PD predominantly involves two-way communication and persuasion to deliver a nation's message. In contrast, propaganda involves one-way communication from nation to public and results in negative implication and loss of audiences. The researcher acknowledges Cull's recommendation to apply soft power; however, the researcher argues that by forcefully overstating a state's positive features, a state may run the risk of having its intended messages not be well received and interpreted negatively since their PD might shift into propaganda.

Moreover, propaganda often lacks credibility since it attempts to distribute a single message which serves the propagandists' values; examples can be found in messages of authoritarian regimes including North Korea, Iran, Russia and China. However, Nye (2004) finds that most states, even those that claim to have western democracy and liberalism, engage in propaganda at times. This presents a challenge for governments in steering their PD programmes away from the propaganda, and in operating beyond traditional political frameworks and recognising the purpose of containment through PD.

To state it in different terms, soft power primarily utilises PD principles of credibility and transparency whereas propaganda teeters toward being immoral and often involves lies. However, the critical aspect that differentiates the two concepts is rooted in the perception of honesty. In terms of the psychological perspective, when PD audiences sense a mesh between the message and its intents, it is more likely to be considered as truthful. By contrast, in the most revealing examples of propaganda, audiences sense a conflict between the message and its intents; resulting in it to be regarded as dishonest. Conversely, States may claim to use PD to attract audiences, but in reality, if they use propaganda and a single lie is exposed, the entire movement will be vulnerable to be perceived as dishonest (Lasswell, 1937). According to Zaharna, propaganda is possibly the oldest and most noticeable method that political bodies use with publics. However, due to negative historical mechanism of propaganda through the Second World War and Cold War, it was expected of states to expose control and dishonesty of foreign and national publics (Zaharna, 2009, pp.89-90). This required further investigation to identify the state's decision on either employing PD or propaganda; as is illustrated in section 3.6.

2.5 PD AND NATION BRANDING

It is widely acknowledged in existing literature (Anholt, 2002; Olins 2005; Yan, 2003) that nation branding has its origins in concepts related to the marketing field. In contrast, PD is mainly related to the state's foreign policy and at the connection of international relations and communication. However, it can be argued that both concepts are concerned with developing national image irrespective of whether the intention is economic or political. Moreover, both are interlinked to serve the national interest and values and therefore reflect components of the national foreign policy (Anholt 2002; Kotler and Gertner 2002; Olins 2002, 2005; Yan 2003). PD could be affected by the history and culture of nations whereas nation branding is a more constant notion.

According to Fan (2006), nation branding focuses on employing branding and marketing to promote a nation's image. Gudjonsson (2005) expands on this notion by pointing out that the nation acts as an originator of its brand by participating with other parties or organisations in changing the nation's image through developing nation branding. However, other researchers were uncertain on the relating of branding theory to nations (O'Shaughnessy and O'Shaughnessy, 2000). Comparatively speaking, PD has to consider several extents: both domestic and foreign, the relationship between states, the type of power they will deploy whether soft, hard or smart and finally the method of communication whether one-way (monologue), two-way (dialogue) or collaboration of relationships towards change people's perspective image on the state. The domestic public can be involved in the PD process through understanding the nation's foreign

goals and contribute to them by designing the nation's foreign policy. However, this tends to rarely be the case as states often seek to utilise PD to target foreign publics for the benefit of improving national image, influencing a foreign state and its citizens and ultimately benefitting the domestic public through economic, social and human outcomes which would be visible for domestic citizens and part of state development vision (Malone, 1985; Nye, 2004; Bátora, 2005; Melissen, 2005).

It is agreed that all of the above dimensions would be important to consider by states before adopting PD depends on the state decision to perform a symmetrical PD or asymmetrical PD relaying on their intentions at building a common understanding between states and the way of communications. As a whole, the literature on PD has defined the primary objectives of PD as the projection of a positive national image aboard, which is also the chief purpose of nation branding. It shows moving PD perspective from attaining interactive goals to intellectual goals which are nation mage and shifting from information delivery into negotiations and influence to building the relationship, and from controlling publics to involvement with publics towards creating effective integration and holistic approach between PD and nation branding it is essential to get the government involved to create controls on both aspects, however, it is useful to collaborate with reliable stakeholders, including NGOs.

Szondi (2008) has argued that the relationship between PD and nation branding is still subjective and unclear. Therefore, he attempts to define the connections between PD and nation branding by proposing five different models of integration. The first defines that there is no relation between PD and nation branding. However, this is questionable as both concepts share a number of attributes as established above. The other models show diverse levels of integration between PD and nation branding either by illustrating nation branding to be the part of PD or the opposite. Furthermore, the final model describes that both concepts are synonyms. These five models were powerful in defining the approach of nations on employing PD; this is mainly depending on nation choice on the appropriate model based on whether the dominance is PD or nation branding or both. In this research, Szondi's proposal on the possible relationships between nation branding and PD will be used. However, the choice of the right relationship between both terms will be further investigated in the case study of Qatar to define the holistic approach for PD based on nation's foreign policy directions (see chapter 9).

Dinnie (2008) has defined that there is a mutual part between PD and nation branding, which is culture, identity, image and values. Moreover, building relationships is the ultimate aim of both concepts, which according to Zaharna (2007) and Hankinson (2004) can be attained through effective communications based on collaboration and exchange. According to Henderson and McEwen (2005), a nation's values and identity ought to reflect the history, traditions, symbols

and political fundamentals of that nation. They further emphasise the significance of a nation's values in shaping and supporting national identities, since values describe the general concept of national identity and a nation's culture and people as what makes that nation unique. Gonesh and Melissen (2005) support these findings by asserting that that a nation's image is simply the projection of identity.

At the same time, there are important differences of interpretation of identity, concepts and values in PD research. According to Jung and Fordham (1971), psychology, values and identity are wrapped together to form the national image. The national image may be expressed through all activities applied in PD, through the media, Internet, publications, cultural demonstrations, conferences and the performance of people. Furthermore, national image, identity and values are the foundation on which nations shape their soft power. Leonard et al. (2002) has stated that PD can nourish off the overall image of a country either positively or negatively. Thus, although PD has become an essential part of the MOFA structure, it is suggested to be actively empowered by MOFA and presented in PD or brand departments in vital state embassies abroad. This research maintains that there is a pressing need to investigate further the integration between both concepts for creating effective collaboration and improve the theoretical and practical bases between both concepts for the aim to provide a holistic approach or framework that combine both national branding and identity, considering the shared attributes between both aspects and believing that economics is the main driver for politics and both should collaborate for the aim to improve nation image and not working separately. A comparison between public diplomacy and nation branding is presented in Figure 5.

	Public diplomacy	Nation branding
Goal	Promoting political interest	Promoting (mostly) economic interest
Context	Politicised, focus and priorities may change with change of government	De-politicised, general agreement among actors and political parties (but in some cases it is politicised)
	Identity driven	Image driven
	Driven by international relations and culture	Driven by marketing and consumerism
Targeted at	Publics/stakeholders who are active	Mass/consumers who are passive
	Citizens	Consumers (of images, products, places)
	Targeted at key geopolitical countries	Applicable to any countries, more universal
Direction	Foreign publics	Both foreign and domestic audiences. Without the consent of domestic audiences it is doomed to fail
Role of government	Initiator as well as sender of messages → government has more control over message	Government could be the initiator but rarely the sender (danger of propaganda) → less or no government control
Actors	State and non-state actors Government, governmental organizations, embassies, Ministry of Culture; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cultural	National tourist boards, travel agencies; investment promotion and export agencies; trade boards, chambers of commerce, multinational organisations,

Figure 5: Comparing Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding (SZONDI, 2008)

2.6 QATAR'S PD

According to Henriksen (2005), there are two types of strategies employed by small states, which are often used as a way to earn more support in the international platform are 'Public Diplomacy' and 'Nation Branding'.

In the case of a small country like Qatar, Rockower (2014) notes that the state employs PD and national branding elements as part of its strategic tools to achieve a presence in the international arena and to create a defensive system. The model advanced by Qatar on the level of PD through soft activity in the global community was observed through its role as a mediator in regional conflicts (Cooper and Momani, 2011). Accordingly, Qatar had reaped the benefits of this role and had turned it into diplomatic gains, enhancing its role in the troubled territory. Doherty (2010)

supports this finding by arguing that it is through its role as an international mediator that Qatar has managed to emerge onto the international scene.

Qatar had used the wealth of mineral resources as a means not only to strategically ensure influence but also to advance its PD and to strengthen its position and role in mediation. It has used this aid as a tool for PD to build relationships and soften the positions of its opponents. Examples of the use of financial aid to improve PD are the financial and in-kind assistance provided by Qatar to the besieged Gaza Strip after the 2008 war and the humanitarian, economic and logistical assistance provided to the National Transitional Council in Libya in 2011 (George, 2008, Janardhan, 2010). Other tools used by Qatar in the context of PD efforts include entering into partnerships with regional bodies and hosting critical international conferences, including hosting the World Trade Organization (WTO) and events in 2001 and the summit of the Organization-of the Islamic Conference in 2003 (Janardhan, 2010). Qatar's use of PD may be seen as an outcome of its desire to expand its sphere of influence and to increase external awareness of its importance worldwide.

Overall, Qatar's PD possesses the following three parameters (MOFA, 2013):

- Assuring the rights of sovereignty and state, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and avoidance of the policy of axes.
- Obligation to abide by the rules of international legitimacy and keep abreast of new developments and global developments or adapt to them.
- Adoption of the philosophy of diplomatic realism, which involves the achievement of peace and refuses to force in resolving disputes.

Qatar’s diplomacy is characterised officially as (MOFA, 2013):

1. Proactive and bold, this makes Qatar take positions and actions for others.
2. Not linked to ideology, which could limit its activities.
3. Not seeking to acquire new territories.
4. Dependent on tools and methods of soft power, so it does not utilise threats or agendas-to extend Qatari influence.

Although there is a scarcity of literature on Qatar PD, the researcher has drawn the inference from the available research that Qatar does not use the propaganda concept. Instead, it uses PD based on soft power believing that hard power could be used in case of the need to defend the homeland and in emergencies. Qatar also focuses on building nation branding and national identity through the PD role. Qatar believes that national branding will contribute to the economic prosperity of the state and will strengthen its strategic and political power and its right to sovereignty and decision-making per the interests of the state. Qatar’s interest in promoting national identity is

derived from the principles of the state in preserving the national identity in the light of globalisation. At the same time, it also stems from its desire achieve sustainability in all sectors and engage with other nations with accepting the differences in cultures and religions. Qatar employs persuasion and grooming tools and actively avoids pressure and intimidation in the management of international relations. Its methods include PD tools and employing cultural, educational and creative dimensions or using economic and humanitarian aid and scholarships in the management of external relations.

2.7 PD CHALLENGES

While there are many benefits and opportunities for PD there nevertheless are a number of challenges and limitations that accompany PD practice. Through analysis of current literature, the main PD challenges were identified as follows: (1) responding to a challenging environment, (2) cultural divides, (3) conflict of interest between actors and, (4) a lack of strategic approach for PD practice.

2.7.1 RESPONDING TO A CHALLENGING ENVIRONMENT

According to Melissen (2005) international negotiations concerning PD have provided diplomatic choices to tackle international environment challenges. The appearance of PD is affected by global changes such as the growing effect of non-state players in permitting foreign policy and the influence of significant and unanticipated international events (e.g., the terrorist attacks against the U.S in 2001) (de Gouveia and Plumridge, 2005). The spread of terrorist attacks has formed a global shockwave across the political, media and academic platforms in the international arena to focus on PD for consideration and discussion (Snow and Taylor, 2008; Hocking, 2005; Melissen, 2005; Morgan and Lennon, 2005). Following such a threatening event, many states such as the U.S, UK, Spain and China have assessed and updated their method of PD and involve further learning and knowledge relating to the practice of PD and awareness of the role of PD in attaining planned outcomes in an altering international environment (Riordan, 2004; Hocking, 2005, p.28-33; Melissen, 2005; p. 6-10).

Numerous studies (e.g., Melissen, 2005; Sharp, 2005, de Gouveia and Plumridge, 2005; Hocking, 2005) have pointed to the leading environmental changes, which have inspired the return of PD. Furthermore, there are other environmental and external factors which reflect the ongoing development of PD and necessitates additional attention, including highly connected, inter-dependent environment due to the impacts of globalisation in which foreign and domestic policy merge and influence in the behaviour of international relations; the massive communication development, media explosion which increased influence of non-state actors and rising global NGOs individuals, groups and institutes in either progressing or destroying a state's strategic

foreign policy interests (Ross, 2003; Morgan and Lennon, 2005; Leonard, Stead, and Smewing, 2002; Melissen, 2005 and 2011; Hocking, 2005).

2.7.1.1 INCREASED INFLUENCE OF NON-STATE ACTORS

Due to a number of ongoing deviations and disruptions in the international environment, PD activities have to consider the various layers of audiences, the current environmental changes and events occurred within national and international spheres, as well as the adaption to the numerous channels of communication. Non-state bodies, including NGOs, have engaged and influenced foreign audiences on concerns of a domestic and foreign policy aiming at altering government policy outcomes (Henriksen, 2005, p.70; Hocking, 2005, p.30-31). Moreover, rogue states and terrorist groups such as 'al-Qaeda' and Daesh have utilised global networks and connected through the media and the Internet to spread their main messages and communication between their members (Sharp, 2005, p.117-121).

Remaining cognisant of the aforementioned, this research nevertheless narrows the discussion of PD to those events produced by the state to involve foreign audiences in the interest of the state's foreign policy purposes. There have to be a variety of events performed by state and non-state bodies to effect foreign audiences in such activity which may reflect the maturity of the state's PD. Leonard (2002) has illustrated the importance of cooperation with NGOs since they have a connection with campaigners, specialists, and foreign representatives and can use them to apply pressure in a given policy area through organising street protests and sustained lobbying campaigns. NGOs can offer to both the domestic and foreign publics audience advantages of reliability, capability and suitable networks, which then can result in more significant impact over a public that may be sceptical of its regime. While not all NGOs have a positive reputation and can be deemed trustful, public audiences might trust some of them such as Amnesty International more than governments. Similarly, the public usually trusts groups such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which are vital to carrying out humanitarian relief and social works. Progressively, governments are recognising the power of NGOs in the provision and improvement of domestic public policy and the significance of developing partnerships with NGO actors under the PD scope.

2.7.1.2 CULTUAL DIVIDES & THE MASSIVE COMMUNICATION DEVELOPMENT

An equally essential factor, which reflects the ongoing development of PD concerns cultural divides and the growing power of foreign and domestic publics. The public around the world is comprised of progressive information hungry and technologically savvy consumers. For example, the seminal work of Nye (2004, p.30) postulates that technological development and globalisation are affecting the world in an unparalleled manner. Melissen (2005, p.31) expands on this assertion by recognising that the public has become a very complicated challenge for foreign governments since nowadays; they have become very critical in affecting domestic and global perspectives. The development of information technology has offered the chance for many individuals to communicate and gather people around the globe and create unions which are connected continually through smart and mobile technologies. Kurbalija (1998) has demonstrated the influence of IT on diplomatic practice. Indeed, Kurbalija (1998) finds that IT development has changed the way most people live, which can be attributed to lower costs, improved performance power, ease of use, portability, convenience and availability anywhere and anytime.

This finding is supported by several studies (Nye, 2004; Hocking, 2005; Melissen, 2005) that observe the influence of public views empowered by IT in influencing the development and pursuit of foreign policy and shaping international policy. More specifically, Hocking (2005, p.30) argues that 'all of these trends point to the possibility of redefining PD in respect of an active role for the public rather than a passive target of government foreign policy strategies.' This leads Leonard (2002) to conclude that PD should be considered a leading action that is executed within numerous scopes and allies. However, the rising function of foreign publics and non-state actors in international relations creates a significant challenge for traditional societies since they are accustomed to bypassing public audiences and non-state actors. Accordingly, Henrikson (2006) claims that PD becomes an influential factor since it relates to the conception of soft power, which performs communication of thoughts and information to engage the public. Thus, in order to achieve strategic outcomes governments now have to work outside traditional diplomatic channels by actively interacting and engaging with the foreign publics to a greater extent than ever. Many academics and diplomacy practitioners (Nye, 2004; Hocking, 2005; Melissen, 2005; Henrikson, 2006) insist that foreign publics have become the primary concern of diplomacy practitioners.

Another significant challenge in the field of PD relates to the contemporary communication and the efficiency of diplomats in offering their states' policies to the foreign and domestic publics through effective communication, and also the relations between diplomats and media, with their frequent interactions. Therefore, training of diplomats has become more complicated and more important than ever before as a means to ensure they have enough knowledge and expertise in deploying PD effectively and presenting their states' policies, especially to the public.

2.7.2 CONFLICT OF INTEREST

According to Cull (2009), the primary problem of the new PD which is remains unresolved is the conflict between the attention of the new PD actors such as NGOs, IOs and the consideration of the government. As a result, these newcomers might be failures as international actors, and their PD activities since their effort are to manage the international environment for their benefits rather than the government benefits to which they have been factually associated. As a result, a government might discover that their associations with these new players will be minimal compared to their particular internal PD arrangements and with associated states with shared ideological interests. However, relations with allied states are expected to fade when a conflict of interest between states appeared.

2.7.3 LACK OF STRATEGIC PD

One of the main difficulties of PD resides in its relative inability understood strategically and systematically – where the practice is defined clearly and ensures the transfer of relevant messages to the public, generating satisfactory public environment and defining backgrounds for policy conventions. Ultimately, policy implementers have to develop better mechanisms to recognise that the overall values of negotiation, acceptance and shared trust affect parties, challenge and change the standard of modern societies and its approaches. The rise of national and individual values and interests, led by governmental and non-state actors alike, have signalled a shift to an international collaboration system replete with a bevy of new stakeholders. This implies that strategic PD has to consider the main principle for effective PD and the main elements determining PD (Henrikson, 2006; Cull, 2006; Leonard, Small and Ross, 2005).

Hence, strategic communication is an essential factor which affects PD and should therefore be carefully planned to ensure it attains the strategic PD and foreign policy goals. McClellan (2004) has demonstrated the four layers of strategic communication, which are: (1) generating awareness; (2) emerging interest, (3) knowledge and advocacy; and finally, (4) action. Each of these layers contributes to attaining a strategic communication which therefore could help in achieving strategic PD which is based on the trustworthiness of the government faith and values where there

is no conflict between their words and actions. Moreover, PD practitioners have to consider and perform according to the foreign policy strategies deployed by their state. For strategic PD, PD practitioners and diplomats should play an active and leading role in translating a state's strategy worldwide. This can however only happen if they are cognisant of their state's PD and foreign policy and when practice is guided through an effective framework associated to the state's foreign policy, bearing in mind that possible challenges could occur in the challenging international environment.

Accordingly, this research will endeavour to tackle the challenge of the absence of strategic PD since it has been observed that providing strategic PD can result in building a foundation for PD knowledge and successful practice. Moreover, it can invariably assist in planning and overcoming other possible PD challenges such as cultural divides and communication developments. Since each state has its foreign policy, country-factors, culture and values; PD practice is bound to differ from one state to another and practice also would be different between states, depending on many factors such as relationships, groupings and agreements between the states. Although there are many challenges facing PD practice worldwide, each country is facing different PD challenges. In the case study of Qatar, the PD challenges will be addressed for the aim to tackle them by proposing valuable recommendation and comprehensive strategic PD framework to overcome the challenge of lack of strategic PD and to boost the deliberation and understanding of PD (see Chapter 9). As the literature review shows a shortage of research on PD in the state of Qatar, there was no literature which discusses in particular PD challenges. Therefore, this research will address and investigate the main PD challenges facing the state of Qatar through effective research methods, including interviews with diplomats and experts in the field (see Chapter 6).

2.8 DIGITAL PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

One significant element that has influenced diplomacy in this new era is the upsurge in information and communication technologies (ICTs). ICTs have transformed the manner in which individuals interact and share knowledge, transforming political, social and economic environments around the world (Adesina, 2017). This shift in ICT has also caused profound improvements in the conduct of diplomacy internationally. For example, for nations such as Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen, social media has become a platform for users to unabatedly share uncensored public information. While the conventional method of conducting diplomacy, i.e., collaborations among representatives of independent nations are still vital, in today's interconnected world, people and organisations not just nations perform a more significant role in international affairs. As a result, what is known as digital diplomacy has emerged. Practitioners and researchers have presented, identified, and interpreted digital diplomacy in a variety and yet similar ways. (Sotiriu, 2015). Digital diplomacy, according to Manor and Segev (2015), refers

mainly to a country's growing use of social networking platforms to attain its foreign policy goals and proactively manage its image and reputation. Manor and Segey (2015) point out that digital diplomacy occurs at two stages: (i) the foreign ministry and (ii) embassies across the globe. Through working on these two stages, countries should adapt their foreign-policy and nation-branding communications to the characteristics of particular domestic viewers, including history, culture, values and traditions which make it easier to embrace their foreign policy and the picture they strive to encourage.

It has been argued that digital diplomacy developed from the term public diplomacy. For instance, a number of related terms such as e-diplomacy (Hocking, Melissen, Riordan, Sharp, 2012), cyber-diplomacy (Barston, 2014), Diplomacy 2.0 (Harris, 2013) and twiplomacy (Sandre, 2012) have been used interchangeably with digital diplomacy. There is mixed reaction among diplomats and world leaders regarding the use of social media and the Internet for diplomatic purposes. Some diplomats embraced the idea and used it for talks and interact directly to the audience they want to sway. In contrast, others believe that it is dangerous to conduct international relations in this manner (Adesina, 2017). Many foreign ministries worldwide are engaged in e-diplomacy activities. For example, the US State Department was among the first to create an e-diplomacy office to enhance communication and knowledge sharing, among others. Other countries have followed US footsteps, including the UK, which is involved in a wide range of e-diplomacy activities. Likewise, Sweden is seeking to promote e-diplomacy whereas France has demonstrated that its soft power implementation depends on digital technologies. Adesina (2017) observes that Germany has also turned to ICT applications to collect opinion and new ideas from the public, and this was used in their 2014 foreign policy review. As it pertains to Qatar, digital diplomacy is not a new concept in its diplomatic practice. Qatar is benefiting and will continue to benefit if it strives to improve its digital diplomacy. Qatar was among the first to introduce e-government systems in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the MOFA of Qatar has created a common e-transformation model for the area aimed at maximising the use of digital networks (Adesina, 2017).

The literature on digital diplomacy has outlined how it can help improve the diplomatic practice of states, e.g., increase collaboration between diplomats working in various region or nations and engage with more audiences as it is less expensive than face-to-face communication. However, for digital diplomacy to be successfully implemented, it is crucial for states to consider and address certain factors that may impact its implementation. In the study by (Hamad Al-Muftah et al. 2018), examples of these factors were identified by interview participants through an exploratory study. The authors conducted interviews with professionals from the US, the UK and Qatar. The key factors are discussed below (see Table 5).

TABLE 2: FACTORS THAT IMPACT DIGITAL DIPLOMACY ADAPTED FROM (HAMADAL-MUFTAH ET AL. 2018).

Factors	Discussion
Organisational aspects	Decision-making and resource distribution may be adversely impacted by bureaucracies and increasingly advanced organisational frameworks, which in turn influence the efficacy of digital diplomacy. Therefore, organisational structure and its management can act either as a force for progress or a barrier. Therefore, for effective digital diplomacy, the state needs to investigate and mitigate factors that are delaying decision making and the allocation of resources.
Political elements	In applying digital diplomacy, political issues can also pose challenges. It is more difficult for ambassadors from politically troubled countries to carry out their duties. For others, political uncertainty is leading to limitations on the usage of digital services, while dependency on conventional measures continues to grow. For example, in the case of siege crisis, it may be challenging to apply digital diplomacy due to the blockade on Qatar since most of the usual communication mediums between the countries involved may not be accessible. Digital diplomacy may be vital in such situations because it is a faster method and happen in near real-time.
Language barrier	Language plays a significant role in the failure of approaches to digital diplomacy. Language barriers can impair the ability of diplomats to effectively communicate with their counterparts in a different region or country. In the case of Qatar, diplomats may find it challenging to communicate with non-Arabic speaking diplomats effectively. This can be mitigated by implementing training programmes on widely spoken foreign languages and highlighting certain gestures and phrases to avoid in certain cultures, which could help enhance Qatar's diplomats' communication abilities and help them carry out their duties for the benefit of the state. For the Nepal crisis, adopting a language that everyone can relate to and directly engaging with workers through social media to gather their opinion and suggestions on things affecting their everyday life and how to improve their plight could be beneficial.

Confidence/Trust	Users' confidence or trust in something can help predict whether it is going to succeed. Concerning e-diplomacy, confidence means that digital diplomacy users believe it is useful and would supports the diplomatic process to a great extent and will lead to the achievement of strategic goals. Confidence can either positively or negatively impact the application of digital diplomacy. For instance, its implementation can be negatively affected when diplomats are not confident that adopting social media platform/s would be useful in their day-to-day communication.
Culture and tradition	The influence that cultural factors can have on the implementation of e-diplomacy depends on the quality of the diplomas. Security issues are considered by others to be part of the cultural considerations that they need to be resolved, and this may influence their decisions on digital diplomacy implementation. Compared to those countries that might allow social media or other digital application use, cultures that prohibit their use make it difficult to introduce digital diplomacy.

2.8.1 ADVANTAGES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

Although digital diplomacy may not serve as a substitute for conventional diplomacy, it can enhance the state's work in international affairs and foreign policy through higher efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Hence, digital diplomacy is a compelling and opportune complement to conventional diplomacy when appropriately used, which can assist a nation develop its foreign policy objectives, expand international scope, and influence individuals who might otherwise never step foot embassy (Lowy Interpreter, 2015). Digital technology can be especially helpful in public diplomacy in the fields of information gathering and analysis, consular operations, and emergency and disaster communications. International experience demonstrates that professional use of technologies for digital diplomacy can provide significant benefits for those who invest in it (Adesina, 2017). In the study by (HamadAl-Muftah et al. 2018), a significant advantage and consequently, an important source for implementing e-diplomacy has been the power to reach audiences that are not able to come together in person.

2.8.2 RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

There are however risks that accompany digital diplomacy, including information leakage, hacking, and Internet user privacy (Adesina, 2017). For example, diplomatic rivals could attempt

to break into government networks and gather information for their use (Westcott, 2008). Furthermore, an additional risk associated with digital diplomacy is the risk of anonymity on the Internet where people can be whom they want to be; people can talk to or even target everyone (Yakovenko, 2012). Anyone may imitate or deliberately attempt to cause trouble and pretend to be someone else. Interestingly, even supporters of digital diplomacy and professionals often make mistakes in their use (Adesina, 2017).

2.9 ONLINE INFLUENCERS

Kaneya (2011) states that audiences often build their impressions of a nation centered on what the government conveys through its communications campaigns on various media outlets, via its actions in the international space, or via its historical, cultural, and natural environment. Similarly, Sevin (2017) finds that digital media messages, generated by either states or non-state users, may influence the visual and verbal expressions of a country and prioritise certain behaviours over others. These digital experiences, therefore, can substantially alter the manner in which a country is globally perceived. As public diplomacy is a method of building mutual relations, especially with the aid of digital technologies, it could be considered as another tool for non-state actors to help any country's public relations strategy (Zhong and Lu, 2013).

Non-state actors such as celebrities, including actors, chefs, sportsmen and women, artists and authors could play a significant role in improving the reputation of a nation in the global state. Such individuals can be used as a tool for public diplomacy as cultural architects. Before the birth of social media, the field of public diplomacy had grown, with the admission of actors such as NGOs, scholars, opinion leaders and multinational businesses (Seib and Çevik, 2015; Cull 2009). These actors may be entrusted by the state, to support their ideologies or legitimise their strategies, or they might even choose to do so autonomously. In the digital media era, every influencer can directly communicate with their various supporters on global or local issues. Celebrity social media accounts can contribute to digital diplomacy and may be used as a strategic medium of communication (Vatanartıran, 2020). For example, in the study by (Vatanartıran, 2020), fans reaction on a famous actor's social media account showed that they could learn and understand about the country through the actors' post. As social media influencers can instantaneously create and share their content, states need to employ persuasive means and be careful about what policies and ideologies they want the influencer to share with their supporters rather than trying to influence what information they shared online.

The way celebrities communicate digitally with their global audience and the feedback they receive in various contexts might provide an opportunity to understand whether this platform and its celebrity users have the ability to be used as a tool for digital diplomacy. Indeed, the digital

engagement of global citizens has affected how public diplomacy has been approached. Audiences on celebrity accounts react to whatever they post online whether social, cultural or political issues this can improve their knowledge about a particular culture and also honestly display their positions on social issues raised. As Fitzpatrick (2007) stated, "relationship management" is essential in public diplomacy, and online diplomatic activities on celebrity accounts provide an opportunity to establish successful relationships with international audiences in this context.

2.10 PERSAUSION IN DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION

Diplomatic activities are intended to promote national interests through the practice of persuasion (Smith, 1999). Governments now increasingly seek to influence and shape the views and positions of the public internationally, through knowledge and persuasion, in order to build pressure on politicians and influence their governments' decisions and actions per priorities and interests (Gruban, 2002). Persuasion constitutes a dynamic, ongoing interpersonal procedure, in which the communicator is trying to convince the communication partner, to embrace the suggested positions and behaviours, the convinced one has to extend or alter his / her views of global events (Ifimes, 2014). The most compelling theme of diplomatic communication is social confidence. In the sense of public diplomatic relations, it can be referred to as a redesign of persuasive sharing techniques and capturing the heart of the international community, which is crucial to developing a model of persuasion (Gultekin and Gultekin, 2016). In particular, when engaged with other national, international and transnational actions, persuasive diplomacy is not only often capable of making a difference, but it is often even capable of demonstrating a vital final action.

Melissen (2005) refers to this process as persuasion by dialogue, which is based on a liberal notion of contact with international audiences. Campaigns that are coordinated within foreign grounds and organisations serve as the core component of persuasive diplomacy. In a persuasive diplomatic outreach campaign, a clear context needs to be crafted and communicated. In a campaign that advances diplomatic messages; clear context provides leeway for governments to navigate the audience. It is therefore significant for governments to be aware of what persuasive models to adopt and in what situation, for them to be able to influence their counterparts adequately. In the sense of message production, persuasive communication should be strategically considered as an important element of PD.

2.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The analysis in this chapter advances the enduring importance of PD in international relations and in managing the international environment through engagement with foreign publics. Furthermore, as Bishop (2014) notes PD constitutes a long-standing concept that now carries with it significant soft power value through PD actions that ultimately enable PD to influence a country's soft power (Nye, 2004; Melissen, 2005). As a result, the researcher seeks to focus on illustrating soft power PD to highlight this as a primary area and task of the research, particularly in connection with the more specific case study of the Nepalese and siege crises in Qatar.

It was further uncovered and illustrated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) primarily carries out PD functions and associated diplomatic networks. Hocking (1999) has focused on the MOFA effort on PD and the need to provide a platform to assist MOFA to facilitate PD practice. Furthermore, the literature review demonstrated the difficulty in establishing the practice of PD due to the dynamic nature of PD activities and the widespread nature of possible contributors and audiences (Gallop, 2007). This has prompted the researcher to develop a framework for MOFA to enhance the understanding and practice of strategic PD, considering that strategically planned PD should adhere to a state's foreign policy goals and strategies and could play a vital role in encouraging a state's identity, values and image.

Although there are many benefits of and opportunities for PD, some challenges and limitations appear to negatively influence PD practice. This has underlined some of the contemporary trends in technology and the international environment, which PD must consider. The growth of the network society and non-state actors could create more opportunities for PD when it is deployed correctly through cooperation and building relationships. However, these same trends could be a source of fear for governments, primarily when a conflict of interest arises with PD actors, for either states or non-states. Most importantly, lack of strategic PD would create a major challenge for the state to maintain its value, identity and interest. PD, which is not properly planned, may lead to a lack of credibility, since the information supplied may be looked upon as propaganda. Therefore, there is a need to define the suitable foreign policy strategy for the current state and build accordingly a strategic PD which reflects the state's interest, values and the country-specific-factors which can cope with contemporary challenges and changes in the international environment. Certainly, PD could be practised successfully in any state, when there is a strategic plan for its practice, taking into consideration the potential challenges to PD alongside its elements, methods, principles and role in attaining the state's foreign policy goals efficiently.

In this research, the state of Qatar was selected as the case study due to its diplomatic situation and the considerable, at times controversial and intriguing, role that this small country has recently played in international politics. As a result, this research will explore PD in this area, assess its possible challenges and propose a strategic PD framework to reduce the challenge of lack of strategic PD and therefore enhance PD practice among foreign policy officials and diplomats of the State of Qatar. Furthermore, a historical overview on Qatar and its foreign policy, will be advanced, reviewed and critiqued in Chapter 5. In doing so, this research will apply Henrikson's foreign policy strategies with the objective of devising a suitable foreign policy strategy for each Qatar crisis: Nepal and Siege. The study additionally utilises Szondi's method on the possible relationships between nation branding and PD for the aim to define the suitable relationship between PD and nation branding based on the foreign policy strategy chosen for each crisis (Chapters 7 and 8). The following chapter will therefore introduce the research methodology, the methods for data collection and data analysis.

3. CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter introduces the methodology used in this thesis and provides the rationale behind each of the methods selected. It reviews the possible and suitable research philosophies, research approach and research design for the achievement of the research aim and objectives defined in Chapter 1. It then advances a discussion on the adopted data collection techniques and data analysis and interpretation methods.

3.1 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHIES

All research must be developed in accordance with a specific philosophical viewpoint. Indeed, research philosophies serve as the foundation for illustrating the research design and unravelling the different possibilities that could lead to the adoption of a suitable philosophy to underly the research study (Crossan, 2003). Information systems research (IS) is research which deals with information exchange within an organisation (Orlikowski and Bardoudi 1991; Galliers 1992; Powell, 1993). The main research philosophies in IS research, whether in natural or social sciences are Positivist/positivism and anti-positivist/ interpretivism (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991; Galliers, 1992, p.29). The suitability of these philosophies is discussed in the forthcoming subsections.

3.1.1 POSITIVISM

The majority of researchers assert that a positivist approach is prevalent in IS research (Galliers, 1992; Powell, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). Positivism manages to gather data objectively and studies reality independently from individuals' opinions through independent observations, experiments, measurements, and examinations (Popper, 1959; Galliers, 1992; Myers, 1997; Crossan, 2003). It is mainly suitable for science research, where the research deals with confirmed facts, such as mathematics, physics and chemistry. Herein, positivism seeks to objectively verify and confirm results.

3.1.2 INTERPRETIVISM

In comparison to positivism, interpretivism is prevalent in social research. Interpretivism entails studying a topic through empirical observations and social communications with the public (Powell, 1993; Walsham, 1995; Myers, 1997). The data is primarily gathered subjectively through mainly interviews and surveys and lead to defining a clarification to the social phenomena in question (Galliers, 1992; Powell, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Myers, 1997; Pather and Remenyi, 2004). Nevertheless, the researcher has to account for the subjective views and beliefs of others while accounting for the fact that such views do not necessarily reflect their own

opinions or beliefs. Therefore, in social research, it is hard to predefine the dependent and independent variables due to its fluid nature where researchers can gain completely different outcomes for the same subject (Kaplan and Maxwell, 1994). As a whole, interpretivism can help in unravelling the complexities of social phenomena and help the researcher gain deeper insight.

3.1.3 SELECTION OF RESEARCH PHILOSOPHIES

Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1987) have claimed the significance of both philosophies. However, a number of researchers (Kaplan and Duchon, 1988; Breu and Peppard, 2001; Arnott and Pervan, 2005; Howcroft and Trauth, 2005) have defined the value of joint philosophies in achieving excellence in research, especially when facts and social perspective are a control variable.

As a result, interpretivism was selected and deemed to be a suitable philosophy for this research since it is a form of social science research, which aims to enhance the understanding and practice of PD subjectively through empirical studies conducted in the state of Qatar. Furthermore, it studies human performance, in particular practitioner's actions, knowledge and performance of PD, to limit the gap between PD theory and practice. Although the researcher aims to understand PD in Qatar to help develop an effective framework, also it discovers further the practice of PD, public opinion on Qatar foreign policy and challenges facing Qatar PD through an empirical data collection and engagement of social actions such as interviews, surveys and focus group.

3.2 RESEARCH APPROACH

Research approaches assist in planning the research methodology (Myers, 1997). According to Iivari (1991), three main research approaches are available first, is constructive which involves the development of a framework, second, nomothetic, which involves mathematical and laboratory examination and third, idiographic which involves case study.

The constructive research is concerned with defining and improving frameworks through theoretical and practical processes (Cornford and Smithson, 1996). On the other hand, nomothetic research is concerned with objectively outlining natural science subjects through measurements, data analysis and experiments (Iivari, 1991). Finally, idiographic research concerned with subjectively defining social research through empirical studies presented in the form of case studies, which can deliver efficient outcomes (Cornford and Smithson, 1996). With regards to case study approach, many researchers have defined the case study as a common qualitative technique used in research (e.g. Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991; Alavi and Carlson 1992; Yin, 1994).

Moreover, the two main research approaches are empirical and non-empirical methods. The non-empirical approach focuses on revising current literature in the field of study as a reference for the research. In contrast, the empirical approach focuses on investigations, analysis, and observations in the fieldwork. Many researchers have pointed to the significance of applying empirical approach in any research (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe, 2001; Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Research by Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe (2001) has demonstrated the different techniques of the empirical approaches as qualitative/quantitative, deductive/inductive and subjective/objective.

3.3 QALITATIVE/QUANTITATIVE

A vast number of researchers have highlighted the importance of qualitative and quantitative approaches (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Myers, 1997; Darke, Shanks and Broadbent, 1998; Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). Myers (1997) defines a quantitative approach as mainly used in natural science research to examine the subject by analysing the collected data statistically through surveys or experiments. By contrast, qualitative methods are commonly applied in social science research to assess or study social and human behaviours by analysing the collected data qualitatively through case studies and interviews (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).

Moreover, Dedrick and West (2003) suggest applying a qualitative approach as a means to define an efficient theory and framework whereas Creswell (2003) recommends the use of quantitative methods for examining and proving a particular theory. Miles and Huberman (1994) and Creswell (2003) further advocate on the efficiency of having mixed approach involving both quantitative and qualitative approach in the research to deliver an in-depth analysis of the subject.

3.4 INDUCTIVE/DEDUCTIVE

A deductive research approach commences from the general to the particular subject; for example, it begins by reviewing theory and outlining hypotheses prior to moving towards approving the theory (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Perry, 2001). By contrast, the inductive approach starts from the particular and moves outwards towards the general concept, for example, it could begin from specific observations to outlining hypotheses and determining conclusions (Hussey and Hussey, 1997, p.13). Some researchers have suggested the use of both approaches (Cavaye, 1996, p.236; Perry, 2001). Figure 6 below depicts the research process of both approaches.



Figure 6: Pure Deductive and Inductive Research Processes (Adopted from: KOVÁCS AND SPENS 2005)

3.4.1 SUBJECTIVE/OBJECTIVE

According to Myers (1997), subjective research is based on fieldwork, which has a control on the research conclusion. While objective research is independent of the fieldwork and conclusions are obtained from the analysis of facts and measurements. As defined earlier, interpretivism predominantly utilises a subjective approach (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe, 2001, p. 27).

3.5 CHOICE OF APPROACH

In this research, a combination of both constructive and idiographic research is applied subjectively for the aim of developing conceptual and practical frameworks for PD through the involvement of a case study of Qatar PD. The study utilises both empirical and non-empirical approaches with the non-empirical approach outlines the basis of the research since it includes a literature review on the related subject and then it demonstrates the empirical research activities towards filling the discovered gap in the literature, which is lack of a clear framework for PD to facilitate its practice. This is due to its dynamic nature, in relation to a foreign policy of the country and diversity of its practice based on each event, incident or country factors. Furthermore, mixed a method approach, i.e., qualitative and quantitative are applied to increase the validity and reliability of the study on Qatar PD as well as to focus on examining the practice of PD by diplomats through various methods that seek to achieve triangulation through a diverse combination of interviews, focus groups and survey data. Moreover, both deductive and inductive approaches are applied in this research since the research attempt to develop a framework and

then assess its effectiveness. This was supported by Perry (2001), who claims that some research starts from theory building into theory inspection.

3.6 RESEARCH DESIGN

Research design represents the plan and procedure of the research data collection using applicable methodologies, which would help to achieve a reliable and excellence in research (Gallier, 1992). It should be carefully premeditated in a logical sequence to ensure the attainment of research aims and objectives (Yin, 1994; Bouma, 1996).

Various researchers have acknowledged different research designs such as field study, surveys, experiments and grounded theory (Galliers, 1992; Alavi, 1994; Cavaye, 1996; Remenyi and Williams, 1996; Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). A summary of various research design is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 3: RESEARCH DESIGN SUMMARY

Research Design	Description
Field Work	The investigator would observe the work field through specific data collection methods towards attaining the outlined research objectives.
Action Research	The investigator would observe and contribute to the organisation in the work filed through shared partnerships, which could have control over variables for the aim to explore and resolve the research phenomena. It could be applied through different ways, Participation, Practical, Change and Cyclical Process (Rapoport, 1970; Denscombe, 2002).
Ethnographic Research	The investigator will explore the research phenomena by focusing on understanding and observing patterns of society and human behaviours in order to help define a conclusion from their behaviours and views. In this research, surveys and interviews are used in data collection.
Case Study	The investigator attempts to examine current phenomenon embedded within a particular context through several techniques, including experiments, interviews, surveys, and archival analysis (Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead, 1987; Yin, 1989).
Surveys	Surveys are considered as a common technique of data gathering, involving questionnaires or interviews with a representative sample of

	the population (Harris, Weisberg, and Bowen, 1977; Sekaran, 1992; Creswell, 2003). Surveys will pass through several phases, including identifying survey sample and questions; carrying out the survey and analysing the data collected qualitatively and/or quantitatively and lastly define a conclusion from the analysis.
Experiment	An experiment is a common technique used to study a certain subject, theory or phenomenon. It involves practical procedures and measurements applied under specific conditions.
Modelling	The investigator attempts to produce and/or examine a particular model for the aim to improve it, develop its performance or attain valuable outcomes.
Grounded Theory	The investigator attempts to define a theory, based on an in-depth analysis of a mixture of all findings gathered from different techniques, which would contribute to building a reliable theory.
Operational Research	This research is commonly used in economics, where it is based on the investigation of operational actions for the aim to improve them (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).
Archival Research	The investigator attempts to analyse archival data collected from historical actions or databases during a particular period for the aim to investigate a specific subject.
Focus Group	Kitzinger (1996) has defined a focus group as pre-arranged discussions focus on exploring a specific subject. According to Morgan (1996) and Powell, Single and Lloyd (1996) it is a group of people chosen carefully by the researcher to debate on a specific subject. The outcome of such an approach depends on the communication and negotiation within the group.

3.6.1 CHOICE OF RESEARCH DESIGN

In this research, a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods will be employed. These methods are appropriate for this research to help attain the research aim and objectives. The research is based on a case study of PD in the state of Qatar, and to examine this case, more than one research design will be used. This includes field study, survey including interviews and

questionnaires with specific and representative participants, focus group discussions on the research topic, grounded theory which will gather all of the findings collected from different data gathering techniques for the aim to define PD challenges and develop the intended framework to assist PD understanding and practice. Furthermore, archival research was used to investigate the crises of Qatar siege and Nepal workers in Qatar and its association with Qatar PD and image worldwide. The archival research was performed through media analysis, which involves the analysis of archival data gathered from media during and after the occurrence of the crisis.

In addition, the research received support from responsible and authorised organisations, such as Qatar MOFA and the Qatar PD office in London for the development of the framework and in evaluating it, and if possible, to implement it in reality in one of the Qatar embassies since it is difficult to implement it in all of Qatar's political missions abroad due to the sensitivity and the confidentiality of such a process. Therefore, a demonstration of the framework will be used to inspect the effectiveness of the proposed framework for improving PD practice and understanding. Hence, different research designs were used to achieve the research objectives, as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 4:RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH DESIGN AND EXPECTED OUTCOME

Research Objectives	Research Design	Research Outcome
1. To conduct a literature review on PD and related topics	**Review** literature on the field of PD including its principles, challenges, debates and theories for the aim to define the literature gap and the theoretical framework for this research. Also, the research will **review** available literature on Qatar PD in particular since it's the case study of the research.	Background knowledge in this research area and a discussion on the available PD theories and frameworks for PD practice and identify suitable theories that can be utilised in this research.
2. To investigate and define suitable research methodologies to help conduct the research studies in order to achieve the research objectives.	**Review** literature on research methodologies that can be adopted in social science research.	A discussion on various philosophies, research approach, research design and research process adopted by this research.
3. To investigate whether Qatar has a strategic PD, the extent of PD role in the diplomatic frame and discovers the opportunities and challenges of PD in Qatar.	**Interviews** will be held with Qatari PD practitioners diplomats, ambassadors, academics, political analysts and experts in PD field for the aim to assess PD knowledge and practice and whether there is strategic PD in the diplomatic frame of Qatar.	An indication of Qatari diplomats and politicians' lack of knowledge in the field of PD and lack of strategic PD in Qatar's diplomatic frame. Also PD opportunities, challenges and

		limitations which face Qatar PD were discovered for the aim to overcome those challenges and utilise the available opportunities.
4. To explore through case studies, the role of PD during the main crisis and Qatar's image worldwide, i.e. the issue of the Nepalese workers' security and the current Qatar Siege crisis.	**The Case study** of Nepal crisis which happens in the past was discovered through **questionnaires** with the public **and interviews** with diplomats in Qatar and Nepal and other institutes involved in the crisis. Also, **archival research** was performed through media analysis and literature review related to the issue of Nepal workers abuse, its association to FIFA world cup, actions performed to solve the issue and how it has affected Qatar image worldwide. Similarly, the recent Qatar siege crisis will be analysed through media analysis and interviews with related parties to discover in-depth the dimension of the crisis and how Qatar has dealt with it and whether PD has played a vital role in the crisis.	Assessment of the role of PD during the crises and a comparative analysis of the two crises which happen in the past and at present.
5. To propose and evaluate an effective strategic PD framework for the diplomatic context for	Focus group was performed with PD office of Qatar in London to assess the performance of the office in reality in improving	PD empowerment framework for the Qatar's PD practise.

the aim to address the challenge of lack of strategic PD and improve the understanding and practice of PD.	Qatar PD and the nation image, especially during the siege crisis. **Grounded theory** was used to combine and examine the conclusion of all earlier techniques to finally define recommendations for PD empowerment in Qatar diplomatic frame and establish a strategic PD empowerment framework to enhance the practice of PD and to deliver strategic PD for the Qatar diplomatic frame. **Moreover, focus group** discussion with PD experts and practitioners is used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed strategic PD framework in providing strategic PD and improving PD practice.	

3.7 DATA SAMPLING METHOD

Data should be collected from a representative sample of the population to achieve reliable research. Hence, it is important to outline the suitable data sampling technique for the research. Sekaran (1992) has categorised sampling techniques into probability and non-probability sampling. This research utilises both probability and non-probability sampling throughout the data collection processes. In particular, stratified random sampling where samples are defined based on specific criteria and area sampling where samples are based on region were used. On the other hand, convenience and purposive sampling were used in interviews and focus groups with specific and predefined participants such as diplomats, PD practitioners and academics, to ensure the required information is achieve from reliable, responsible and knowledgeable sources.

3.8 RESEARCH PROCESSES

As there is a scarcity of literature on PD in Qatar, there was a need to determine a strategic research methodology to achieve the research objectives. The research process began by defining the research aims and objectives, then defining the theoretical concepts of the research by reviewing the literature in the field of PD and its related theories, which is an iterative process throughout the research. In turn, an appropriate research methodology was defined to ensure filling the gap in the literature and achieving the research aim and objectives. Subsequently, a literature review on the historical overview of Qatar PD was conducted. Then an investigation of the adaptation of PD in Qatar diplomatic frame was defined through interviews with Qatari PD practitioners, academics, political analysts and experts in PD field to assess PD knowledge and practice and define the main opportunities and challenges facing Qatar PD.

This was subsequently followed by an analysis of the two main political Qatar crises which were discovered to be the Nepal worker abuse in Qatar and the current Qatar siege. The two crises were selected with the aim to investigate the crises and the role of PD during the crisis and how it helped improved Qatar's image worldwide.

Investigation of the crises involves multiple research methods including archival research through media analysis on the two crises, interviews with related parties and diplomats involved and questionnaire with relative focused sample from the public to help discover their opinion on the crisis and their opinion on the actions performed by the government of Qatar to solve the crises. This served to assess the effectiveness of Qatar PD in delivering the government's message on a certain crisis to the targeted foreign publics for the aim to improve Qatar image worldwide. The case study provides an overview of the main deficiencies in Qatar PD and the potential challenges and limitations facing PD during the crisis and in the practice of PD.

Furthermore, an investigation was performed with Qatar PD office in London to discuss the

adaptation of PD in Qatar diplomacy, the role and practice of PD especially during crisis and the potential challenges and limitations. The findings from the investigation were used to develop the main research contributions, i.e., recommendations for empowering strategic PD in the diplomatic frame of Qatar and strategic PD framework for Qatar to assist its practice. Finally, the framework was assessed and evaluated through a group of PD experts and practitioners to ensure its effectiveness in improving PD practice in Qatar diplomatic frame. Figure 6 depicts the research processes outlined above.

The research methodology is specified to meet the research objectives; a summary of each approach is given below.

3.9 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The literature review focused on examining and engaging with the relevant literature in PD field and highlighting both the significance and the shortcomings of existing studies with the aim to define the existing principles in the PD field, including in diplomatic practice, propaganda, soft power, foreign policy and PD methods and challenges. Moreover, it focused on reviewing PD theories and frameworks which can potentially help enhance PD practice and overcome the main PD challenges. This will lead to a summary of previous research in PD field and discover the existing gaps in literature, and the suitable PD theories for this research which will be considered to help create the research contribution.

3.10 HISTORETICAL OVERVIEW

Before addressing any situation, it is important to first explain that the situation exist and then show the significance of the need to find appropriate solutions. Case studies are a popular method of gathering information (Myers, 2002). According to Gall et al. (1996) 'Researchers usually do case studies for one of three reasons (i) to produce thorough accounts of the phenomenon, (ii) to establish potential explanations for it, and (iii) to assess the phenomenon'. As a result, this study begins by demonstrating that one of the most significant problems facing PD in Qatar is a shortage of strategic PD, which is to suggest that despite its achievements as a subtle power it requires more engagement with PD to convincingly influence publics through its public image at home and abroad. Qatar has been selected as a case study because it is a fast-developing nation that wields substantial political clout internationally despite receiving little attention in this respect.

Therefore, the research has focused on investigating the available literature review of Qatar PD. The review aimed to investigate in-depth Qatar PD, foreign policy; its critiques for the aim to define whether there is strategic PD defined for PD practice in the diplomatic frame of Qatar (see Chapter 5). Qatar foreign policy critiques have caused two major diplomatic crises to Qatar, the

Nepal crisis and Qatar siege, which is going on. It was chosen as an interesting case study, which requires further investigation in the third research process (see Chapters 7 and 8).

3.11 ADAPTATION OF PD IN QATAR GOVERNMENT

Although the previous research process shows a shortage of information and literature regarding Qatar PD, it also exposed a lack of strategic PD, which therefore requires more investigation. As a result, investigations were carried out in the available literature and due to shortcomings in the literature. Moreover, interviews were used to unravel and expand on the results of the literature. Due to the lack of research evidence, it was essential to gather further information from interviews with Qatari diplomats, PD experts, academics and politicians to assess whether there is strategic PD, the extent of PD practice in Qatar diplomacy framework and to further define the challenges facing the practice of Qatar PD in reality.

The aim of the qualitative research interview is to explain and understand the context of the topic in the subjects' everyday lives (Kvale, 1996). Interviews are most useful for learning about the context of a participant's experiences, and the interviewer looks for in-depth information on the topic (McNamara, 1999). Structured and semi-structured interviews were used in this research. Both of these are commonly use interviewing methods. The interviewer is restricted to a collection of questions for the interview participants in formal interviews, which makes the assessment process simpler for the interviewer (Campion, 1994; Hollowitz and Wilson, 1993). Semi-structured interview, on the other hand, accord the researcher more versatility by enabling the interview to resemble more of an open dialogue while also assisting interviewers in tailoring their questions to the interview context and the answers of the interviewee (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002; Kumar, 1996). To make the interview process easier, an interview protocol with a collection of questions was developed. While a common set of topics and questions was developed for all interviews, some interviewees might be asked questions in a different way base on their backgrounds (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002,p. 195; Foddy, 1993).

The majority of the interviews were conducted face-to-face, with some conducted via e-mail at the request of the interviewees. The majority were conducted in English, but some were conducted in Arabic at the request of the interviewees. The method of recording interview data was by taking notes. Planning, scheduling, interviewing, transcribing, analysing, and sharing the results were all part of the interview process (McNamara, 1999). Table 4 below provides a brief overview of these stages.

TABLE 5: INTERVIEW PROCESS AND SHORT DESCRIPTION

Interviews Stages	Brief Description
Planning	Plan the interviews, including interview type, method, set main topics to discuss, among others.
Preparing	Contact interviewees for permission to conduct the interview, collect information about the interviewees or their organisation, and prepare interview questions, among other things.
Interviewing	Perform the interviews.
Transcribing data	Organise interview data for analysis. Create initial codes, assess codes for similarities, create themes, review themes in relation to literature, produce analyse.
Analysing and discussion findings	Employ qualitative thematic (Braun and Clarke, 2006) analysis and discuss the results.

In most cases, domain experts were interviewed, in particular, politicians, PD practitioners, academics, diplomats, and political analysts. Interviews with a diverse range of Qatari politicians were conducted in order to obtain a comprehensive and inclusive views. Also, interviews were conducted with diplomats in Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), domain experts and academics from Qatar, Middle East, and the UK, in the field of foreign policy, PD and diplomats training. Domain experts were chosen based on their prior experience in diplomacy, especially in the areas of foreign policy and/or public diplomacy. The interviewees were selected based on their work titles and responsibilities. Purposive sampling was used to ensure that only those who make strategic or foreign policy decisions and actions on PD were interviewed.

3.12 QATAR PD CRISES

There was insufficient literature available, which specifically consider Qatar crisis in particular Nepal workers abuse and the current siege crisis, so the primary source of information was archival research from media and analysis of multiple data collected in the region, including interviews with relevant parties involved in the crisis and questionnaires with a sample of the public related and affected by the crisis. In essence, the media analysis culminated in the development of a survey questionnaire and interview tool. The survey was used not only to explore the case study of Nepal workers and Qatar siege but also to investigate further the

adaptation of PD in Qatar in reality and the role of PD in crisis and in improving Qatar image for the aim to improve PD practice.

In the investigation of each crisis, multiple semi-structured and structured interviews were held with relevant parties involved in the crisis from Qatar diplomats, Nepalese diplomats, and other political analysts in the GCC region. Furthermore, two questionnaires were developed to investigate further public opinion on the crisis and on Qatar actions to solve the crisis. Sample of participants was randomly selected according to a defined criterion, i.e., Nepal workers in Qatar and Qatari employers. Additionally, in order to increase the reliability of findings, another questionnaire was applied to outline public view on Qatar siege crisis were sample of Qatari citizens were involved in the questionnaire and a sample of the foreign publics from the UK to provide a reliable comparative view on the effectiveness of Qatar PD role in both crisis and the effectiveness of actions performed by the government of Qatar to solve the crisis. The findings from this study will help indicate whether the government message/s had been delivered to the targeted public properly and relatively has changed national image positively in the foreign and domestic public.

The questionnaires were designed in multiple languages, i.e., English, Arabic and Nepalese. However, respondents were given a choice to choose the language that suits them. The questionnaires were created using easy language and basic questions. A cover letter detailing the aim of the study, and the target group was attached to each questionnaire (see Chapter 6). The questionnaires have benefited from the researcher's interaction with the targeted organisations, as well as Qatar MOFA's support for communication with other organisations, and Qatar diplomatic missions abroad and Nepal embassy in Qatar. All of the questionnaires were first reviewed by academics, then pilot-tested with 10 individuals of various ages and degree of education with the aim to create a useful and comprehensible final questionnaire.

3.13 DEVELOPMENT OF PD FRAMEWORK

In this process a study with PD section in Qatar embassy in London was performed which involve a real assessment to PD role, practice and the challenges encountered in the Qatar embassy in London for the aim to developing a strategic and practical process for PD practice. The study has concluded with valuable outcomes regarding the suitable PD paradigm, model and theory and the main challenges facing PD practice.

This phase demonstrates analyses and conclusion from data previously collected, which will identify the need for an effective framework for Qatar PD as an essential tool for enhancing the

adaptation of PD practice. Moreover, it seeks to define the main components of the framework based on Qatar foreign policy; this would lead to the definition of effective recommendation for PD empowerment in the diplomatic frame of Qatar. The formation of a coherent framework for Qatar PD can serve to assist Qatar's government and practitioners in understanding and practising PD more efficiently and strategically.

3.14 EVALUATION OF PD FRAMEWORK

It is essential to investigate the adaptability of the PD framework in reality, and its feasibility in addressing the PD challenges to ensure the proposed framework is effective in delivering strategic PD and improving the PD practice.

Many researchers have defined a focus group in different ways. Kitzinger (1996) described it as organised discussions while Powell et al. (1996) and Morgan (1996) defined focus group as a group of people selected carefully by the researcher to discuss on a topic. The purpose of using focus groups in this research is to better develop the proposed PD framework in terms of its effectiveness in improving PD practice in the diplomatic frame of Qatar and its practicability and applicability in reality.

The focus group was held with a selection of participants based on their expertise, experience in the field and their ability to be present to participate in a discussion. Participants included the head of media office in MOFA, an academic, a political analyst, cultural attaché assistance in London, the head of Qatar PD office in London and two diplomats from PD office in London. The opinion and valuable discussions between the focus group participants were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed framework and help improve the framework (see Chapter 10)



FIGURE 7: THESIS CHAPTERS AND RESEARCH METHODS

3.15 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION

From the definition of the research problem to the presentation and dissemination of the research results, consideration of ethics needs to be a vital part of the arrangement of the research process (Williams, 2003). Informed consent is one of the foundations of present-day social science ethics. Informed consent covers a range of processes that must be implemented when human subjects are included in the study. The study participants were required to sign the letter of informed consent distributed by the researcher before their involvement in the study. The informed consent letter should include the following details (Williams, 2003):

1. The nature and aim of the study.
2. Any possible risks and the actions the researcher will take to mitigate any risks that might occur is the research study.
3. Information about how the study data would be used.
4. The level of participants' confidentiality.
5. How participants' involvement can relate to the objectives of the study, among others.

Before commencing each research activity, the researcher prepared an ethics form, and this form was then sent for approval. The form was completed following the university's ethical guidelines and recommendations. Hence, for each study conducted. All ethics approval request for this study was granted. Moreover, all the data gathered from the studies was anonymised and protected.

3.16 CHAPTER SUMMARY

After reviewing several possible research philosophies, approaches and designs, the researcher has selected interpretivism philosophy as most appropriate for these research aims and objectives. Relevant also are the following methods: field study, survey, focus group, and archival research through media analysis applying discourse analysis tools and which form the methods of this study. A representative sampling will be chosen for the research to ensure attaining reliable data. Lastly, the data gathered will be analysed qualitatively and quantitatively to develop a valuable and efficient outcome.

Due to limited literature on Qatar's PD, consideration had to be given to a strategic research methodology to achieve the research objectives. The research process begins with outlining theoretical concepts, research aims and objectives, then moves into in-depth literature on PD and the appropriate research methodology. Subsequently, a case study of the use of PD by Qatar will be applied, along with a media analysis to investigate the crisis of Nepalese workers in Qatar and Qatar siege, the subsequent actions performed by the Qatari government, and the impact the situation had on Qatar's PD and its image worldwide.

The research methods involve a qualitative interview, focus group discussions with experts in the PD field, quantitative questionnaire to study the outlined concept on a focused sample and research action with PD section in Qatar embassy in London. A combination of data collection methods will help to explore the role of PD and the diversity of PD practice in each country which help towards defining a coherent framework that is compatible to enhance PD practice in the diplomatic framework of Qatar, which can be effectively implemented in most Qatari missions. Afterwards, the grounded theory will be used to gather all of the findings after the qualitative and quantitative analysis then define PD challenges and develop the intended framework for PD empowerment. Finally, the proposed framework will be assessed and evaluated through a group of PD experts and practitioners to ensure its effectiveness in improving PD practice. The next chapter will illustrate in detail the theoretical framework of this research by reviewing PD theories.

4. CHAPTER 4: THEORETHICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter commences with a review the existing PD theories and frameworks which could be used in this research to enhance PD practice and overcome the PD challenges, in particular the lack of strategic PD. The critical review of the findings then demonstrates the need for defining strategic PD framework for the diplomatic frame to enhance the understanding and practice of strategic PD. The findings enable the researcher to narrow the suitable theories that can be utilised to advance the research objectives of this study. This chapter explores viable theoretical approaches to investigate PD theories, including PD principles, models and theories, paradigms, frameworks, mechanisms and dimensions.

4.1 RESEARCH METHOD OVERVIEW

In this chapter, a literature review was conducted on the following, (i) PD theories and models, (ii) PD paradigms, (iii) PD frameworks and (iv) PD principles. In addition to searching peer-reviewed journal articles and conference papers in these fields, the researcher performed an online search using Google Scholar and a number of leading digital libraries for terms including 'public diplomacy and theories', 'public diplomacy theories', 'frameworks of public diplomacy', 'public diplomacy and frameworks', 'principles of public diplomacy', 'public diplomacy and paradigms' and so forth. The review was not intended to be a systematic analysis of the literature, but rather a comprehensive review of leading theories and frameworks associated with PD.

4.2 PD PRINCIPLES

Leading contemporary PD researchers (Henrikson, 2006; Cull, 2006; Leonard, Small and Ross, 2005) define the key PD principles as credibility; discussion and partnerships. A review on these principles is therefore developed in the forthcoming subsections.

4.2.1 CREDIBILITY

Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2009, p.4) have considered that "accuracy and credibility are essential to provide efficient PD strategies, and the eventual delivery of effective foreign policy, especially when dealing with an associated, knowledgeable and interested public audience". They further find that credibility is critical in determining approaches towards foreign policy since credibility abroad can have a considerable influence on public opinion and foreign policy in the foreign country visited. Nevertheless, credibility should be sustained; if it has been diminished, the negative criticism rises (Henrikson, 2006; Cull, 2006; Leonard, Small and Ross, 2005). Accordingly, Leonard (2002) illustrates that attempts to mislead the facts can generate heightened suspicion of governments. PD effort therefore has to be consistent and reliable while spreading messages to its target audience (Ross, 2003b). The researcher supported the literature on the

importance of the credibility of the PD role since it will create trust with the government and lasting relationships with other nations which are based on honesty and not propaganda.

4.2.2 DISCUSSION

Nye (2004) has declared that the capability to create lasting relationships and partnerships is initiated through trust, engagement and two-way communication which involve listening and talking. Accordingly, the delivery of message in PD is significant, as well as how it is received and whether it is understood. The traditional approach of engaging with the audience through media resources without any chance for dialogue is no longer sufficient. Nye (2004) further argues that the most efficient approach of engagement and positive dialogue is face-to-face communication and exchange. Another effective and targeted communication method is the Internet, especially the instant mutual communication obtainable over social networks.

Although in the past, discussion with the local audience on foreign policy was unfavorable by bureaucratic regime, nowadays, it becomes a significant aspect of effective PD (Nye, 2004). The researcher strongly supports Nye's argument on the importance of discussion and delivering the PD message to target audiences. It is preferable to have effective and strategic communication through different communication channels, including social media and other formal communications within the diplomacy channel. However, the debate is a double-edged sword where it can have a positive effect, i.e., changing ideas and believes or a negative effect, i.e., delivering the wrong messages due to ineffective communication and unknowledgeable PD practitioners. Therefore, it is importance to empower PD practitioners, in particular in the diplomatic frame to handle effective discussion through effective communication and interaction with target groups taking into consideration their culture and country-specific factors alongside national foreign policy objectives.

4.2.3 PARTNERSHIP

The concept of partnership represents a novel in the improvement and distribution of any state's foreign policy globally. For example, the UK compact agreement aims to provide an efficient partnership between the Government and NGOs to assist in achieving a strong, diverse, independent and equal civil society as a means to contribute to providing efficient policies, programs and public services (HM government, 2010). Such agreements aim to create an encouraging atmosphere for partnership, promote shared responsibility amongst all involved parties and provide robust supervisory frameworks where all parties are employed to achieve the shared outcome for the society.

This partnership concept aligns with the fluid nature of PD, and its attempts to support the need for a strategic approach for the whole government (Briggs, 2005; Gallop, 2007). Three main stages lead to partnerships development: (1) networking; (2) coordinating and (3) cooperation with each respective stage requiring some time to build trust between partners (Gallop, 2007). In relation to this point, Henrikson (2006, p.33) states that "the benefit of partnerships in PD in assisting governments to pass their messages more efficiently and creatively to a broader audience in international range whilst involving fewer resources". Moreover, it allows cooperation between several governments and NGOs within a state or various states to produce a specific and coherent message. Thus, the concept of the partnership serves to support the strategic approach of PD to move from the discussion and delivering specific message to targeting groups into building long-term relationships with parties either government or NGOs. These partnerships typically involve bilateral agreements between nations and can sometimes lead to commonalities between nations sharing the same interests. At the same time, there is a possibility that such partnerships might be ineffective or opposing the state's interest.

In this research, Nye's PD principles are considered to ensure the effectiveness of the PD process based on the three reference principles which are credibility, discussion and partnerships. However, there might be other PD principles that should be considered for each country based on government-specific principles such as transparency, reliability and fairness. Therefore, in the case study of Qatar, further investigation will be conducted in order to better define the PD principles for the Qatar government based on their specific foreign policy objectives.

4.3 PD PARADIGM

Generally, a paradigm of PD could be valuable for the accumulative study. There are few studies which focus on defining PD paradigm, and it can be argued that the paradigmatic method may not necessarily be the supreme effective means to establish the PD approach. Brown (2012) proposes four PD paradigms, i.e., PD is an extension of diplomacy, and PD is a matter of national projection, external communication for cultural relations and external communication as political warfare. These paradigms were mapped onto governmental arenas to provide a better understanding of the national PD approach (Knoke 2001). The paradigms also inspect the external communications method of four countries, namely France, UK, Germany and the US with a substantial history through grouping paradigms and governments. The paradigms developed by Brown (2012) are seminal in emphasising the pressing need for governments to choose a suitable paradigm based on their foreign policy and their PD vision. However, the researcher believed that PD paradigms could change based on crises and incidents. In that case, the state could choose a specific PD paradigm approach to handle the crisis effectively. Therefore, in the case study of this

research, the researcher will discover the suitable PD paradigm used for the two Qatar crises, Nepal and siege.

4.4 PD MODELS AND THEORIES

A review of the literature revealed less consideration to the theoretical aspect of PD, with most of the literature mainly focused on the history of PD, and only a few which investigated PD theories, models, case studies, and comparative analysis (Henrikson, 2004; Gilboa, 2008). Moreover, much of the literature studied PD and deployed case studies of PD practice especially in Europe and America. As Potter (2002) points out however, there is a growing need for heightened attention on PD power in developing states, including the Middle East region.

Although PD is associated with the social behaviour of people, nations have to define a suitable PD model with the intention to motivate and influence foreign publics (Durkheim, 1994). In international relations and foreign policy studies, there are numerous models which focus on defining behaviour: the realist, liberal, and the constructivist. Most studies have used these international relations paradigms whereas only a few have proposed particular models for PD (Gilboa, 2008). Rasmussen (2009) argues that there is a need for independent theory for PD. In this regard, Rasmussen (2009) contributes to filling the gap in the literature by developing a quantitative method to assess the elements that drives states to practice PD based on three models, i.e. rational, idealistic, and non-rational as well as the social tendency. However, the study does not construct a complete process for PD. Instead, it focuses on defining the state drivers to PD based on the three models. This requires an investigation of the state drivers for PD practice to define the specific or a combination of PD models.

Given that the ultimate aim for PD is to enhance the state's international image, it is quite challenging to persuade other states to accept a state's national values and interests. Hence, Rasmussen (2009) has proposed a rational model which focuses on delivering national interests based on tangible benefits such as financial profits, boosted tourism, trade and investments. This model however presents a PD credibility issue, which is one of the main principles of PD. In comparison, the idealistic model considers the PD principle of credibility and aims to improve freedom and influence in foreign publics which relatively will influence its state. However, the main critiques to the idealistic model are that states tend to dislike the attempts of other states to influence their public, hence the non-rational model is developed which is based on social tendency through the feast of thoughts and norms. Although this model seems to be favourable to most states, it is hard to perceive whether this social tendency is rooted in a rationalist or idealist foundation. Although Rasmussen (2009) has focused on the rational model as motivation for PD, it appears that the social trend is more desirable but has to be adapted carefully by considering

the sociological, constructivist theories which focus on developing operative civilisations and building trust within and across societies.

Nevertheless, Rasmussen's three models are useful, since each of them preserves specific interest, whether tangible benefits or spread principles and values or views and norms. Although there were some criticisms on each model, the motivations for PD practice whether it is based on rational, idealistic or non-rational, is ultimately the state's decision to make. Thus, in this study the researcher will apply Rasmussen's model and will investigate the suitable model used in each political crisis, in particular the Nepal and siege crises in Qatar. This will assist in assessing whether each crisis has applied different PD models based on state interest and foreign policy strategies.

Moreover, there were several PD models and theories, including Grunig (1993) which has defined PR models and claimed that it could be used for PD, this model comprised of press agency, public information, two-way asymmetrical, and two-way symmetrical. The author modified the model into a four-tiered framework, comprising direction, purpose, channels and ethics (Grunig, 1997). Similarly, a PD model was proposed by Entman (2004) known as the cascading activation model which is arguably the most intricate method to bond policy, media and public opinion. Additionally, Gilboa (2008) defines the main variable for PD, which are mainly players, initiators, purposes, types of media, and methods. Using these variables, Gilboa (2008) proposes PD models called The Basic Cold War model, the Nonstate Transnational model, and the Domestic PR model. Although the proposed models are useful PD insofar as that they consider policy, media, public opinion, and communications ultimately these models cannot not be used in this research since they are irrelevant to the research.

Moreover, as it pertains to theories, Zhang and Benoit (2004) proposed Image Restoration Theory which claims that there are five choices for nations and organisations to repair their image, these are denial, evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification. This theory was used by Saudi Arabia in the US to restore their image after 9/11 terrorist attacks. Zhang and Benoit's theory would be considered in this research for the aim to restore Qatar's image, especially after the current siege crisis, which alleges that Qatar is supporting terrorist around the world. However, the suitability of Zhang and Benoit's theory and Rasmussen's model for Qatar PD would be investigated in each crisis: Nepal and siege (see Chapters 7 and 8).

4.5 PD FRAMEWORK

The literature shows a lack of theoretical research on PD, especially in proposing a comprehensive PD framework. Research by Gilboa (2008) has proposed a framework for comparative analysis based on time band and emphasis in terms of PD's mechanisms and government participation.

Another study by NATO (2013) has developed a framework for strategic PD, based on the logic model and theory of change. The framework consists of six processes. Five out of the six processes relate to planning, and the last one is monitoring and evaluation of the definite outcomes. Although this framework provides a starting point for strategic PD by defining strategies, planning activities, designing and finally evaluating, the researcher found that NATO's framework was well-structured and defined in a graphical vision showing the inter-links between the processes. That being said, the researcher observed a lack of governance over the PD processes. Therefore, the researcher has called for a comprehensive PD framework that provides new perceptions and guidance for the diplomatic frame of the states. This serves as the main contribution in this research which is to propose a comprehensive framework for building strategic PD for the diplomatic frame of nations to provide governance over PD and a standardised guideline for states to deploy strategic PD architecture and ultimately enhance PD practice. The proposed framework is developed and applied in Qatar as the case study to provide a practical paradigm for this framework (see Chapter 9).

4.6 PD MECHANISMS

Cull (2009) defines PD's fundamental mechanisms as listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, international broadcasting and psychological warfare. The researcher has supported Cull's PD mechanism but advances the argument on the readability of PD when using psychological warfare mechanism to deliver specific PD message for the foreign publics. In this research, Cull's PD mechanism will be applied to ensure delivering PD goals effectively. However, the suitable dimension will be defined according to the Qatar foreign policy strategy and PD objectives. The PD actor does not regularly communicate with foreign audience in a straightforward manner nor attempt to affect the foreign publics opinion instantly. Usually, the PD actor constitutes educated and influential individuals within the target audience to promote an idea (e.g., global collaboration on climate change) instead of relating that idea to the image of the international actor. Furthermore, PD is responsive to foreign publics and changes its method or policy accordingly (Cull, 2009). As a result, the literature argues that PD should be strategically designed to achieve its desired outcome. Pamment (2012) states that it should attempt to understand foreign public's mind and then employ foreign policy objectives with more attention to that foreign public's mentality, history, culture, and behaviour. VCDR has noted explicitly that diplomatic relations would support the improvement of approachable relationships between states regardless of their differences (Denza, 2008). Thus, through PD, a nation's values can be linked directly to the development of foreign policy strategy (see Chapter 9).

Melissen (2011) builds upon this by recognising that the value and role of the practice of PD remain dynamic depending upon the instantly principal political necessities and welfares, along

with the prospects of the foreign publics and the available means of communication. Hence, PD practice has moved beyond conventional borders; it faces the challenges of the contemporary environment, which accordingly affects international affairs. Strategically planned PD has the prospective to perform a vital role in improving a nation's identity, values and image. These components are considered as the main features of soft power.

Elsewhere, Melissen (2005) argues that PD is changing, and its activities are becoming extensive. A number of studies have provided a clear connection between PD activities and the progression of foreign policy (McClellan, 2004; Chitty, 2007; Melissen, 2005). In particular, McClellan (2004) has defined PD as the method of initiating foreigners to the interests and values of another state. Furthermore, he finds that PD involves strategic planning as well as the performance of cultural and educational agendas by a state to create an environment in a target country and to support a country's foreign policy. Likewise, Chitty (2007, p.12) supports McClellan's claims by adding that PD is an approach which uses different techniques in order to win national and foreign publics opinion, relative to a nation's foreign policy.

The difficulty in establishing the practice of PD is due to the dynamic nature of PD activities, the widespread extent of possible providers to a PD program and the different audiences to which messages are delivered. Leading scholars on PD (McClellan, 2004; Melissen, 2005; and Van Ham, 2005) have concluded that there is no single approach for PD; the approaches in each case will rely upon the proposed objective and the targeted audience. Therefore, many elements are considered to form PD activities, including content focus, objective, types of activities and potential results attempted from PD practice. The researcher supported the majority of the literature on the dynamic nature of PD, which makes its practice hard to be defined or measured. Therefore, the need for the strategic planning of PD and defining the suitable mechanism of practising PD is paramount, which involves strategic communication through different platforms to ensure the PD message is delivered to the targeted group or groups.

McClellan (2004) defines three main platforms of PD activities: culture, information and education, which could be employed to persuade the foreign publics in order to build a nation’s image for positive foreign policy. When outlining PD practice, McClellan (2004) stated that PD activities have to be clear, feasible and assessable. For example, the Canadian government has defined that their PD comprises cultural, educational, tourism and commercial exchange (IPS, 2005). This was also defined by (Hooghe, 2007), who discusses operative tools for China’s PD, which are the media, the Internet, events, projects and publications.

The researcher agrees with McClellan, and IPS views on the main platforms of PD activities which are culture, education, information, tourism and commercial exchange. However, the

researcher asserts that additional platforms are also useful in delivering PD message, including political, economic, military, media and sport. These platforms would be further investigated in this research in the historical overview of Qatar (see Chapter 5). However, in case of a crisis, the state would define a specific strategy to restore its image, and this would require applying specific PD mechanisms based on the mechanisms by Cull (2009) to achieve the state foreign policy strategy and vision.

4.7 PD DIMENSIONS

Nye (2004, p.107) has recognised that "the constant streams of information, education and culture should have relevance across three dimensions that shape PD practice: daily communications; strategic communication; and elaboration of permanent relationships with strategic parties". Nye's dimensions of PD are explored further below.

4.7.1 DAILY COMMUNICATION

In daily communication, the government has to interconnect to both the domestic and foreign publics, and the communication should reflect the choices made on a daily basis. Therefore, the government seeks to establish a positive relationship with the media, specifically universal media to ensure that a clarification of national politics reaches foreign publics.

Within the daily communication of PD activities, there is an essential need for observing vital international media and consequently reacting promptly to deceptive or destructive information reported which may harm the nation's image. Correspondingly, Henrikson (2006, p.20) has declared that this activity is mainly intended to confront rumours instead of revealing the truth. The US has been an expert in this field; where it established a 24-hour media watch for fast, informative reactions to media as part of the PD method. Hence, daily communications management is a significant element of PD practice, which could affect establishing longer-term relationships with foreign audiences and maintain the state's image worldwide.

4.7.2 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Strategic communication entails the development of an approach involving a set of subjects, which might be concentrated through precise policy enterprises (Nye, 2004). States have considered strategic communication in their PD practice, including the US, a leader in this activity, since it defines PD platforms which aim to encourage a positive image of the US in the

Muslim world as an effort to combat terrorism, especially after 9/11 terrorist attack on the US, which has dramatically affected the US PD approach (US Department of State, 2007).

As part of their strategic communication, some states have developed a direct connection with foreign journalists and have supported them for the purpose to broadcast their ideas, foreign policy and improve their country's image internationally. Furthermore, Nye (2004) has pointed out the importance of cultural diplomacy as one of the elements of strategic communication to promote shared sympathetic between states. Similarly, McClellan (2004) advances five layers of strategic communication, his so-called 'communication pyramid', of which the author stated that each layer represents a step for PD towards actions that would develop the strategic interests of the advocate nation. These layers are forming awareness; emerging interest and knowledge; rising advocacy; and action.

This research references McClellan's strategic communication pyramid since it is relevant to the research which is building a strategic PD which require strategic communication based on a state's foreign policy and interest. The aforementioned five layers of communication will be applied in the case study of Qatar's crises to access its effectiveness in delivering strategic PD and therefore improving Qatar's image. Although McClellan outlined an effective method for strategic communications, his method does not provide clarification on the practice of strategic communications between relevant parties whether through symmetrical and asymmetrical communications on different channels. This will therefore be focused on in this research which is defining strategic communications for Qatar PD crises based on McClellan's strategic communication pyramid (see Chapters 7 and 8).

4.8 PERMANENT RELATIONSHIPS

Nye (2004, pp.109) describes this activity involves "the evolution of long relationships with necessary parties throughout grants, exchanges, education, discussions, and contact with media networks". These relationships are pursued and established mainly through people connections and relations, which could produce an essential and long-term trust between states. Moreover, lasting relationships within the host country may be formed through diplomats' daily work; however, diplomats have to consider that in traditional diplomacy, relationships are established through formal approaches between governments. As such, one of the main opportunities for PD is to benefit the goodwill, public relationships and networks made through formally supported personal contacts.

Ultimately, Melissen (2007) demonstrates the need for a long-term horizon to build lasting relations. Likewise, Zaharna (2009, p.92) has outlined "the factors that could measure the success of lasting relationships, which are the duration of lasting relationships, the relationship power and

the observed satisfactions between the states". At the same time though, it is critical that states consider that the actions required to establish lasting relations are entirely different for crisis response compare to strategic communications.

As defined by Nye (2004), cultural diplomacy proposes the most tangible form of PD since it simplifies the understanding and engagement of foreign audiences which has an effect in influencing foreign audiences' views on a specific nation and could be relevant in countering security threats. It is also a powerful tool in building and sustaining lasting relationships and pursuing a national interest in a smart, persuasive and cost-effective way (Zaharna, 2009). Moreover, Zaharna (2009) has pointed out that few researchers, such as Melissen (2007), express the effect of relationship building on leading more cultural and educational exchange between states. On the other hand, some researchers (Rose and Wadham-Smith, 2004; Melissen, 2007; and Schneider, 2007) argue the need to consider cultural relations separately as an activity within the scope of PD and declare that both PD and cultural diplomacy overlap.

Melissen (2007) asserts that cultural diplomacy has a significant effect on engaging the foreign publics and obtaining their trust and long-stable relationships among nations. This leads Schneider (2007, p.147) to argue that "cultural exchange has spread across traditional boundaries and attracts natural audiences to include a state's intellectual, research, journalism, and national discussion since it comprises the sharing of enjoyable ideas and engagement in creative expressions". Similarly, Lending (2000) has described culture as an open window into the currencies of soft power involving a nation's value and identity. As defined by Nye (2004), the elements of soft power are the values, culture and policies of the nation. Henrikson (2006, p.27) has stated that cultural diplomacy has assisted in delivering a shared relationship for cooperation and might support attaining international strategic priorities such as international security. As a result, cultural diplomacy programmes should focus on improving soft power capabilities and benefit the state's foreign policy when it effectively considers the requirement of a nation's foreign policy objective.

All of the reviewed PD dimensions by Nye are effective to be considered while practising PD; however, delivering his dimensions was the main focus in this research. Although daily communication and permanent relationships are essential for PD dimension, the primary intension in this research is to deliver strategic communication which will provide guidelines for building strategic PD and effective PD practice. As a result, McClellan's strategic communication pyramid was applied in this research in particular in Qatar crises to investigate how strategic communication would help in improving Qatar's image. Also, strategic communication was

defined to be reliable and determined based on technology and through collaboration with foreign publics, state and non-state entities for the aim to build partnership through strategic PD. Such collaboration will be investigated in this research.

4.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY

Through theoretical analysis of the literature on PD theories, it was observed that most researchers had studied PD through a chronological lens of the development of PD principles, challenges, theories and methods. The literature addressed the PD challenges and pointed out the lack of strategic PD as one of the main challenges for PD practice. However, literature that considered how to overcome the challenge of lack of strategic PD and define a framework of guidance to deliver a strategic PD in the diplomatic context is limited. This has encouraged the researcher to investigate the issue of lack of strategic PD in the diplomatic frame of the states with aim to tackle this issue by proposing a strategic PD framework to provide a clear vision on PD in a strategic manner for the aim to help improve the PD practice in the diplomatic frame of the state.

Although there were several PD theories available, suitable theories for this research consisted of four PD paradigms, i.e., (1) PD is an extension of diplomacy, (2) PD is a matter of national projection, (3) external communication for cultural relations and (4) external communication as political warfare (Brown, 2012). Moreover, the PD models advanced by Rasmussen (2009) and Zhang and Benoit (2004) were critically considered. Nye's (2004) PD principles, dimensions and key mechanisms of PD were closely examined in this research based on the state foreign policy and country-specific factors. Likewise, the strategic communication pyramid by McClellan (2004) was used in this research to form strategic PD communication. However, the suitable choice of paradigm, model, theory, mechanism and PD principles for the diplomatic frame of Qatar will be investigated based on specific factors, country vision and its PD direction and strategy in the current state.

The development of the framework was based on suitable debates on PD principles, models, theories and mechanisms and the state's decision on its PD direction and strategy (see Chapter 9). Since the researcher has chosen Qatar as the case study of this research, the next chapter will outline the historical overview of Qatar's foreign policy and its critiques which has raised the two famous Qatar crises: Nepal and the current diplomatic siege.

5. CHAPTER 5: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

This chapter builds upon the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 4. While the emphasis in the previous chapter was to conceptualise and advance a theoretical understanding of relevant public diplomacy frameworks to assist in a nation's PD practice, this chapter alternatively develops a historical overview of Qatar's foreign policy and public diplomacy. Herein, the argument is advanced that although Qatar's public diplomacy efforts such as its mediation of conflicts have garnered positive attention, its overall foreign policy nevertheless does not appear to be crafted around a clear and grounded political strategy. The lack of coherence has meant that Qatari public diplomacy has encountered challenges – particularly since the Arab Spring when it overstepped its traditional strategy as a diplomatic mediator and embraced change by supporting transitioning states (Ulrichsen, 2014). According to Roberts (2017), this decision served to sow division and discord within the region. The inability of Qatar to optimise its public diplomacy and foreign policy strategy has thereby arguably made Qatar vulnerable to regional and international sources of instability. It is postulated that this approach has been in direct contradiction to the protection of its security and stability and thus to a key pillar of Qatari foreign policy. This chapter therefore places emphasis on examining existing literature on Qatar's foreign policy and public diplomacy in order to discern the parameters of Qatar's PD and its deployment as a strategic foreign policy tool for the Qatari government.

In this chapter, the researcher aims to engage with key literature and media analyses to discern the debates that shape international perspectives on Qatar's foreign policy. The chapter critically considers a wide variety of platforms that have been historically utilised by Qatar and carefully considers them in contradistinction to Qatari foreign policy since the Arab Spring. In this regard, the chapter presents leading issues to facilitate a discussion on the ways in which Qatar may choose to address various critiques of their foreign policy by mapping PD models and theories more succinctly into the government's political decisions and strategies. The historical overview presented in this chapter serves to discern and delineate assiduous avenues through which Qatar can manage and mitigate critiques concerning its foreign policy.

5.1 RESEARCH METHOD OVERVIEW

In this chapter, the researcher has undertaken an extensive historical literature review that delves into regional and international developments that reflect Qatar's foreign policy and public diplomacy strategy. The scope of the literature review was confined by addressing the following primary research questions: "What are they various elements of PD practice used in the diplomatic frame" and consequently "what are the available methods or frameworks that can improve Qatar's PD practice? The literature that is developed and discussed in the forthcoming subsections is therefore intimately linked within the above frame by emphasising focus on public diplomacy and the PD theories and frameworks that were presented in Chapter 4. In doing so, the objective is to advance nuanced knowledge on the various platforms utilised by Qatar's foreign policy in relation to critiques that have emerged in literature concerning the state's strategies and responses to various political developments. The advancement of such an understanding is rooted in better discerning how existing PD theories and frameworks can be applied by policy-makers to potentially enhance Qatari PD practice and foreign policy.

In addition to consulting and critically considering key existing literature on Qatar foreign policy, the researcher has undertaken a manual search to gather and assess additional materials for review. Accordingly, an online search was applied using various peer-reviewed journals and Google Scholar. Additionally, a search on government reports, non-governmental reports, organisational reports and an analysis of media were performed. Given that the chapter entails a historical framework the time frame was extensive, however, particular emphasis was placed on procuring sources over the course of the last decade due to the heightened level of issues that have impacted Qatari foreign policy and public diplomacy. The review was conducted systematically, commencing with a background enquiry into the political history of Qatar. This was followed by a search and analysis of the major pillars of Qatar's foreign policy platforms. These pillars include its historical platform, geopolitical platform, human platform, political platform, economic platform, military platform and its media platform. In turn, a search concerning critiques on Qatar's foreign policy was conducted. The inclusion criteria for the search included combinations of keywords associated with PD models and theories. For example, 'Qatar political history'; 'Qatar politics'; 'foreign policy and platforms'; 'foreign policy pillars'; foreign policy critiques'; and 'public diplomacy critiques' were utilised in conjunction with Qatar. An analysis was only undertaken after a sufficient number of reputable literature sources and reports were gathered and assessed. After critically reviewing and analysing the collected literature and reports, the researcher endeavoured to map the identified critiques of Qatar's foreign policy in relation to the PD theories and frameworks that were presented in the previous chapter. This discussion is presented in the final subsection of this chapter.

In the first quarter of 1968, the British announced their intention to relinquish their power and retreat from the Qatar, Bahrain and the Trucial States by 1971 (Roberts, 2017). The announcement officially signalled not only the culmination of Britain as a superpower but also the end of the long-standing security arrangements that the Gulf Sheikhdoms maintained under the protectorate-protégé model (Onley, 2009). Qatar, Bahrain and the Trucial States of the Gulf littoral had long established a tradition of fostering security arrangements with foreign powers as a result of their inadequate militaristic ability to independently defend their domain in a region rife with competition over scarce resources (Onley, 2009). The presence of the British as a protector of the region, in its earliest instance, dated back to 1829 when the former superpower assumed responsibility for the defence of Oman. Amongst the Sheikdoms of the Gulf littoral, Qatar was the last to receive protectorate status from the British in 1916 (Onley, 2009).

There were naturally a number of advantages and disadvantages that accompanied protectorate status from the British. On the one hand, the alliance with a superpower accorded the rulers of each sheikhdom the autocratic authority to reinforce and enhance their position as well as the political status and security of their respective sheikdoms within the regional political system (Onley, 2009). On the other hand, it presented issues such as the 'duality of authority' wherein British intervention in the internal affairs of the sheikhdoms created dilemmas concerning competing interest between the local polity and the imperial power of Britain (Khuri, 1980; Zahlan, 1979; Smith, 2004). Nevertheless, as Roberts (2017) cogently observes, the British declaration of its intention to abdicate in 1971 resulted in heightened trepidations amongst the Sheikhdoms of the Gulf littoral. Firstly, the announcement came in the still fresh and humiliating aftermath of the six-day Arab-Israeli war of 1967, in which the former was embarrassed. Concurrently, the shocking embarrassment of Arab forces during the six-day war internally raised concerns regarding the deficient militaristic capabilities of the Gulf Sheikdoms.

This was further exacerbated due to the fact that the spectre of independence heightened fears of the looming presence and irredentism of regional powers in Saudi Arabia and Iran (Roberts, 2017; Kamrava, 2015; Onley, 2009). The possibility of a potential land grab posed a realistic threat considering that Iraqi forces were quick to advance on Kuwait following its independence from Britain in 1961. Nevertheless, despite initially providing reassurances to Qatar, Bahrain and the Trucial States, Prime Minister Harold Wilson ultimately set in motion a plan to withdraw British forces in what many, including the Americans, deemed to be abandonment and betrayal (Onley, 2009). The precarious security situation was further impacted by the inability of the Gulf Sheikdoms to unify under a single federal arrangement stemming from a long-standing rivalry

between Qatar and Bahrain. As a result, the two respective states along with the Trucial States pursued their independence separately (Roberts, 2017).

Qatar opted to pursue its own statehood and upon officially receiving its independence in September 1971, its leader Emir Ahmed bin Ali al-Thani inaugurated the state whilst being abroad. The decision to administer the state from abroad would however set the stage for a bloodless coup the following the year. The Emir, whilst absent as a result of a hunting trip in Iran, would come to be unseated as a result of a communique issued by his cousin, Khalifa bin Hamad-al-Thani announcing his ascendence to power. Khalifa would quickly come to be accepted as the legitimate and rightful leader of Qatar by the polity (Kamrava 2009; Roberts, 2017). Upon taking power, Emir Khalifa Al-Thani would craft a pragmatic and practical foreign policy that revolved around safeguarding the security vulnerabilities of the newly minted state. Irredentist contestation of lands by regional hegemons in Saudi Arabia and Iran wholly factored into this decision. Although Iran would officially concede its claims over Bahrain at the United Nations, it took an aggressive approach in occupying Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands, contested by the United Arab Emirates (Roberts, 2017). Under these conditions, Qatar emphasised local development whilst adopting an inconspicuous foreign policy agenda that willingly placed itself within the sphere of Saudi interests (Roberts, 2016).

As Kamrava (2009) and Roberts (2016; 2017) observe, alignment with and acquiescence to Saudi foreign policy positions would not last especially as the emergence of Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, the son of Emir Khalifa Al Thani took root. Roberts (2016) notes that Hamad managed to influentially create inroads across the mid-1980s and that by the end of the decade he came to be considered as the de facto leader across diplomatic circles within Qatar. Upon officially assuming power in 1995, similarly through a bloodless coup, Hamad doubled down on strategic efforts to distinguish Qatar (Kamrava, 2009; 2015). Rathmell and Schulze (2002) observe that since 1995, Qatar's reforms have focused around three subjects, (i) promoting the economy's private sector, (ii) freedom of speech and (iii) introducing democratic principles. These changes followed shortly after Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani took power and economic reforms commenced. The Doha stock market was founded in July 1995 with the express goal of opening the way to privatise state resources and improve the position of private company investors (Qatar Stock Exchange, 2020). In regard to strengthening freedom of speech, a significant shift forward was taken when the Ministry of Information was abolished in March 1998. Additionally, the founding of Al-Jazeera, a Doha-based satellite TV channel that has become popular across the Arab world for its commitment to illuminating contentious political, social and religious issues, marked another step. Additionally, there have also been major steps towards democratising Qatar's political system, and the expansion of political participation, particularly among women. In July

1998, the Emir formed the basis for a 29-member municipal government Council to be elected by universal suffrage and through which any Council would be elected. Through this reform, it became possible for all citizens over the age of 25, including women, to stand on the ballot (Rathmell and Schulze, 2006).

The emergence of Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani also resulted in a number of important external developments that effectively signalled an unambiguous departure from Qatar's previous foreign policy approach which earned it the association of being a Saudi vassal (Kamrava, 2009). Emboldened by financial stability and ambition, Sheikh Hamad set out in the early 1990s to thaw icy relations with Iran through the pursuit of a pipeline deal to import fresh water into Qatar (Roberts, 2017). He further capitalised on the Israeli-Palestinian détente marked by the Oslo Accords by seeking improved relations with Israel, which ultimately culminated with the eventual launch of an Israeli trade office in Doha (Roberts, 2016). These unilateral and controversial decisions were markedly pronounced and viewed as provocative in comparison to the foreign policy strategies of neighbouring Gulf states towards Iran and Israel. Although Qatar's decision to engage with Iran and Israel immediately drew the ire of Saudi Arabia and served to antagonise relations between the two states, Sheikh Hamad remained undeterred in pursuing his ambitious agenda even in light of border skirmishes and an alleged Saudi-led counter-coup that sought to return Khalifa Al-Thani to power (Roberts, 2017). These relations were further exacerbated by the launch of Al Jazeera – however, this shall be discussed in further detail in section 5.3.6 of this chapter.

Ultimately however, the bold policy pursuits of Sheikh Hamad were greatly aided by the 1992 defence pact with the United States of America. As Roberts (2017) observes, the defence agreement included the deployment of the American military to the Al Udeid Air Base and provided Qatar with its first sense of security post-independence. However, having learned important historical lessons from over-relying on a single superpower, Sheikh Hamad would then diversify Qatari dependence by investing and integrating its economic (Kamrava, 2009) and diplomatic resources across a wide-range of socioeconomic frontiers that simultaneously bolstered Qatari soft power and enmeshed its economy with that leading foreign states including the United Kingdom, China and Japan (Roberts, 2017). It was from this platform that Qatar would thus forge its emergence as a viable international political player.

In the decades that have followed, Qatar has increasingly garnered attention from international society and international media for its geopolitical and economic relevance (Taylor, Ni and Derudder, 2012). Kamrava (2009; 2015) asserts that the modernisation efforts that took shape under Sheikh Hamad purposively sought to appeal to a wider range of Qataris as well as to the international community as a means to compensate for his narrow support base from within the

ruling Al Thani family. Moreover, his ambitious policies benefitted by coinciding with increased revenues in gas and oil which enabled the state to streamline its ability to successfully pursue a diverse range of policies among its domestic and international agenda. Although Sheikh Hamad's platform may have been rooted in consolidating power it nevertheless managed to pay dividends in terms of Qatar's international reputation and soft power. This has facilitated the emergence of Qatar as an influential geopolitical player as well as a leader in the mediation of conflicts. Qatar's foray into international mediation and peace-making have been described by Kamrava (2011) as capable, unique, proactive and largely driven by the state's penchant for prestige and its desire to position itself as a neutral peacemaker. Since the 2000s, mediation has come to reflect a central pillar of Qatari foreign policy, which shall be the explored in further detail in the next subsection. As a whole, under the direction of Sheikh Hamad, the young state of Qatar consolidated its security and cultivated its foreign policy by carving out a modern state with a global reputation and powerful international allies (Roberts, 2017).

In the first three decades, the leadership of Qatar successfully boosted its international presence and gained recognition as an important geopolitical player in the region and beyond. An analysis of more recent developments under the direction of Emir Tamim Al-Thani has follow in appropriate subsections that deal with the current, as opposed to historical, political history of Qatar. That being said, it was under the leadership of Sheikh Hamad that Qatar cultivated its contributions to a plethora of international scenes and forums (MOFA, 2013). Today, Qatar remains actively committed to improving its international reputation through international cooperation – and this is noticeably evident in Qatar's National Vision 2030.

'The National Vision aspires to turn Qatar into a developed country capable of sustaining its growth and ensuring a high standard of living for all its citizens and for future generations' (GSDP, 2008). The Vision calls for growth through four interconnected pillars: economic development, social development, human and environmental development. The role of international cooperation was outlined in the social development pillar as follows: (GSDP, 2008).

- To expand Qatar's regional economic, political, and cultural position, primarily within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, and the Islamic Cooperation Organization.
- To support the discussion of civilisations, interfaith, and co-existence amongst several cultures.
- To participate to the attainment of global security and peace through political leads and humanitarian aid.

Qatar maintains peaceful relations with many countries worldwide and aims to build its nation's image, identity and good reputation through its foreign policy and PD practice around the world. The following sections will therefore discuss Qatar's foreign policy, its PD and review the foreign policy critiques Qatar has recently faced due to its recent political decisions, its actions and their overall impact on Qatar's foreign policy and image.

5.3 QATAR FOREIGN POLICY

The following section draws upon existing literature, geopolitical events and the fundamentals of Qatari foreign policy as laid out in Qatar's official document, entitled Qatar's Foreign Policy. The document was first published in 2005 and subsequently updated in 2014 (Al-Thani, 2005; Abdullah, 2014). The aforementioned document outlines Qatar's foreign policy platforms as consisting of the following fundamental pillars: historical, geopolitical, human, political, economic, military and media. The proceeding subsections thus encompass critical engagement with each of the respective headings. The pillars are encountered and explored through critical analysis that juxtaposes them with geopolitical events that have impacted Qatari foreign policy and public diplomacy. The successes, miscues and missteps of watershed geopolitical moments are gauged to advance understanding on how Qatar's public diplomacy platform can adjust and adapt moving forward.

5.3.1 HISTORICAL PLATFORM

As highlighted and emphasised in Section 5.2, Qatar officially received its independence from Britain in September 1971. Herein it was demonstrated that the modernisation of Qatar owes primarily to the efforts of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani. By contrast, the direction of the state's foreign policy has faced considerable challenges under the leadership of Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, who assumed power in June 2013 (Ulrichsen, 2014). However, prior to delving into the emergence of Sheikh Tamim Al-Thani and his impact of Qatar's foreign policy, it is useful to expand in more detail the trajectory of Qatari foreign policy at the turn of the 21st century. According to Ulrichsen (2014), the internationalisation of Qatar during the rule of Emir Hamad Al-Thani effectively established Qatar as a dynamic regional actor and served to alleviate some of its vulnerabilities as a small state surrounded by regional powers. Fuelled by its large LNG reserves and rising prices, Qatar savvily invested in linking the security of its resources to powerful and diverse international actors on the world stage. LNG production which took off in the mid-1990s has resulted in Qatar becoming the second largest distributor in the world at 77.1 million tonnes per annum (MEI, 2022). By doing so, Qatar not only overhauled its energy economics (Roberts, 2016), but it also semi-secured tacit assurances in being able to navigate an ambitious and activist foreign policy more freely by ensuring that its security and prosperity are

interdependently connected to a wide range of prominent states that amongst others include several permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (Roberts, 2016). As Roberts (2016b) points out, these developments were particularly noteworthy given that prior to the millennium, Qatar was associated with being "known for being unknown".

Qatar's rise to international recognition in the 21st century has been complemented by its deliberate efforts to project itself as a regional and international peacemaker (Kamrava, 2011). In an otherwise volatile and violent region, Qatar has strategically allocated mediation and peace-making as a pillar of foreign policy. As Ulrichsen (2014, p.7) observes, in 2003 Article 7 was introduced as part of Qatar's constitution. The specific article mandates that Qatari foreign policy must be derived from the principle of "strengthening international peace and security" and in efforts that encourage the "peaceful resolution of international disputes". The ratification of Article 7 as a pillar of Qatari foreign policy is emblematic of the efforts of Qatar to carve out an international image and reputation as a neutral peacemaker in a region rarely, if ever, associated with peace. Dubbed as the Switzerland of the Middle East, Qatar has mediated several conflicts to varying degrees of success including Lebanon, between Sudan and Chad, Djibouti and Eritrea and Yemen (Kamrava, 2011). More recently, it has played an integral role in mediating efforts between the United States, former Afghan officials and the Taliban (US Department of State, 2020). According to Ulrichsen (2014) and Kamrava (2011) the mediation efforts of Qatar are characterised by its desire to assert its autonomy in light of being a small state and to simultaneously globally project its ability to steer successful outcomes in resolving international conflict.

The Qatari emphasis on ensuring success has led the state to carefully select conflicts to mediate on the basis of belief that positive outcomes can be achieved (Kamrava, 2011). The focus on success has been further confounded by what Ulrichsen (2014) describes as the lack of diplomatic capacity of Qatar. This issue of capacity is rooted in the natural limitations of Qatar's ability to develop a large diplomatic corps due to its small demographics. These limitations have forced Qatar to adopt a high level and personalised mediation style that tend to directly involve Qatari leadership and a small circle of elite policymakers alongside a readily available influx of financial resources. Kamrava (2011) and Barakat (2012) note that the personalised engagement and centralised high-level approach to mediation efforts highlight the limitations of Qatar's mediation objectives. In other words, the mediation efforts are primarily limited to addressing and resolving surface level divisions rather than tangibly addressing structural issues at the core of the conflict. As a result, Kamrava (2011) asserts that while Qatar excels in mediation it paradoxically suffers in actual conflict resolution that can produce long-term peace and recovery in part because it lacks the human resources and diplomatic capacity to monitor the post-negotiation phases of

implementing mediated agreements.

Accordingly, the limitations that Qatar faces in its mediation efforts are broadly emblematic of the juxtaposition between its foreign policy platform and its ambitious policy objectives. The former consists of and is operated by a limited and elite circle of policymakers that face virtually no domestic political constraints. The latter is hindered by structural conditions and the availability of sufficient diplomatic resources to complement vast financial investments. Although the above description bears clear resemblance to the experience in some neighbouring Gulf States, what sets Qatar aside is its deviated policy positions that have unilaterally produced markedly different conditions concerning the trajectory of its foreign policy. This has notably been evident in its formulation of Al-Jazeera and the dissemination of information that accompanies it; its political positions during the Arab Spring; and the complications that ensued as a result of the Blockade. However, while these issues do not entirely inform us on the historical platform (and are therefore re the subject of discussion in subsection 5.3.4) of Qatari foreign policy there are nevertheless a number of important takeaways.

Firstly, as it concerns Al Jazeera and the precarious positions that Qatar adopted during the Arab Spring, David Roberts (2014) points out that historically speaking, the Muslim Brotherhood were involved in shaping and staffing parts of Qatar's early bureaucracies but did not gain serious inroads because Qatar more than adequately provided the civil and social services that the Brotherhood strived on in order to gain popularity. Nevertheless, at the outset of the Arab Spring, Qatar's support for Political Islamists reflected its political calculation and belief that Islam should maintain an active role in Arab politics (Roberts, 2017b). Roberts (2019) further asserts that given the military/security agreement between Qatar and America in 1992, Qatar has historically fallen within the sphere of American foreign policy. Thus, in order to disassociate itself to a degree from American military actions in the region, Qatar purposively pursued relationships with Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah to mitigate belief in the Muslim world that it constituted an American pawn (Roberts, 2019). Elsewhere, Ulrichsen (2014) finds that the upheavals caused by the Arab Spring led Qatar to embrace a direction of change by supporting political Islamists as a continuation of its long-standing policy of pragmatically offering refuge to Islamists as well as dissidents. This was, of course, aided by the fact that domestic political demands from the Qatari polity were non-existent at the outset of the Arab Spring due to its limited population (300,000) and its astronomical GDP per capita ($440,000) (Ulrichsen, 2014). Thus, by the time that Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani officially took power in June 2013, his father's policies reflected the nation's fabric (Roberts, 2017b) and thereby left limited room for manoeuvrability, at least initially.

5.3.2 GEOPOLITICAL & ECONOMIC PLATFORM

Qatar's geopolitical platform is reflective of its ambitions, aspirations as well as its limitations. Despite being a small state, Qatar has excelled in cultivating a diplomatic niche for itself within the geopolitical arena (Kamrava, 2019). This is despite its geographic and demographic characteristics: it is a tiny country that measures only 11,5000 square kilometres; has a naturalised population of approximately 300,000 (Roberts, 2017b) and is surrounding by much larger and more powerful regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. Its ability to establish itself as an important geopolitical player thus suggests that Qatar has defied its status as a small by craftily creating a platform for itself that has prevented it from being relegated to the periphery of international politics (Kamrava, 2017). The platform that Qatar has created can be understood as existing in the four stages of its foreign policy, which David Roberts (2016b) describes as: emergence, evolution, revolution and post-revolution. It is prominently argued by a number of leading experts (Roberts, 2017; Kamrava, 2017; Ulrichsen, 2014) that Qatar's ability to gain international influence despite its inherent limitations as a small state are derivative of the strategic geopolitical platform it created for itself under the rule of Emir Hamad and his foreign minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim.

The emergence of Qatar's geopolitical and economic platform is perhaps best understood in relation to the development of its energy-security nexus. Although oil and natural gas were discovered in large quantities in 1971, they did not initially play a significant role given that Qatar's emerging foreign policy following independence aligned itself by band wagoning regional hegemon Saudi Arabia. The transformation of the energy-security nexus would only take shape in the early 1990s and onwards. As Sheikh Hamad's power grew in the late 1980s so too did his desire to break Qatar free from its association as a Saudi vassal. The pursuit intensified following a critical event that led Qatar to question the viability of its security under the Saudi power umbrella. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait highlighted the incapability of Saudi Arabia to safeguard and ensure the regional security of smaller Gulf states. In fact, Saudi Arabia implored its western allies to intervene as a means to resolve the conflict (Roberts, 2016; Ulrichsen, 2014). With little confidence in the ability of Saudi Arabia to guarantee the security of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad, as de facto leader, sought to branch out and away from the Saudi security umbrella. As mentioned in Section 5.2., this process included signing a defence agreement with America in 1992 and the development and diversification of the energy sector so as to make it interdependent with powerful external economies (Kamrava, 2009; Roberts, 2017).

Ulrichsen (2014) observes that Qatar shifted gears to develop and protect its LNG infrastructure and reserves. In 1995, coinciding with the official ascension to power of Sheikh Hamad, Qatar exported its first LNG cargo and within a decade it established itself as the largest exporter of

LNG in the world (Ulrichsen, 2014). The rapid production and exportation of LNG enabled Qatar to forge interdependencies and key partnerships. Indeed, Roberts (2016b) cogently observes that by establishing itself as a major supplier of gas, Qatar has come to play an important role in many of the world including Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, India, Japan, South Korea, Kuwait, Mexico, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, the UAE, the UK, and America. The development and diversified distribution of LNG to these countries has intimately and acutely linked Qatar to many of the above countries. The reliance of some of these powerful states on the energy supplied by Qatar has meant that the security and stability of Qatar are directly linked to their own prosperity and wellbeing (Roberts, 2016). The rapid development and distribution of LNG has thus enabled Qatar to diversify its international partnerships and build in diversified safeguards to its existential security.

Qatar occupies a unique global economic position on the Arab and international stage. Indeed, globalisation has become the dominant feature of Qatar's economy. Several factors, including the abundance of oil and natural gas, have fuelled this development. With the discovery of oil, Qatar has been transformed from being from a Bedouin republic of traditional society to becoming a modern state. However, this huge shift created a gap between the generations and consequently, it has lost some traditional values, mainly amongst the younger generation (BTI, 2016). Qatar has proven oil reserves of up to 25.4 billion barrels (Duleymi, 2012). It has the world's third-largest natural gas reserves estimated at 896 trillion cubic feet, and it has one of the primary sources of LNG (liquid gas) in the world. Liquefied gas revenues accounted for nearly 70% of the government's revenue in 2013 (Ahmad, 2013). As a result, Qatar recorded the highest economic growth in 2012. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasted that the country's general budget would result in a surplus of about 7.16 billion U.S dollars (IMF, 2012). Qatar follows a policy of free economy with the passing of laws and regulations which are updated to support open economic relations with all countries of the world. Qatar has a strong financial sector, which manages investments worth a trillion U.S. dollars.

Qatar also enjoys strong commercial ties with the world's leading economies, such as the US, European Union and Japan. The Qatar Investment Authority has assets worth 70 billion U.S dollars invested in the largest companies in the world. Perhaps, in the past, the most striking elements of attraction for foreign investment is the political and social stability, the constancy of the exchange rate and freedom of currency exchange (Qatarneh, 2012). It has the highest per capita revenue in the world (WorldAtlas, 2017). There is, therefore, no state tax for individuals in Qatar and both health and education are free for all Qataris (QSA, 2016; CIA, 2016). According to the World Economic Forum rankings of 2010, Qatar has been ranked 17th on the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) due to its stable economic environment and influential market.

Development therefore constitutes a continuous process in Qatar with the former Emir of Qatar, Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani stating, "we are on the threshold of a new epoch overlooking the 21st century where we aspire to attain the status befitting us" (Emiri Diwan, 2015). Despite the considerable economic, health and educational development, Qatar has developed rapidly in all sectors, including human rights and politics. As a result of this vast development, the government departments were established to meet the requirements of social and commercial development (BTI, 2016). However, despite these impressive feats, we shall encounter some of the limitations that the ambitious geopolitical and economic platform of Qatar has produced following the Arab Spring. These limitations will be discussed in more detail in section 5.3.4.

5.3.3 HUMAN PLATFORM

The human resources of a state constitute an integral component of national power as well as the trajectory and reach of a nation's foreign policy. According to QSA (2016), Qatar's population crossed the miniscule threshold of two million in 2016 of which only 300,000 constitute native Qataris. The native Qatari population comprises roughly 11 per cent of the overall population and thus only a fraction of the total national workforce in comparison to non-nationals (Hroub, 2014). However, from a foreign policy perspective, the scant population of native Qataris has proven to be both beneficial as well as challenging. The primary benefit of the small native population in a resource-rich nation such as Qatar is that it has enabled the autocratic state to pursue its national and foreign agenda unencumbered. As noted earlier, the astronomical gross domestic product per capita (Ulrichsen, 2014) of Qatar has meant that the state has encountered almost no meaningful challenges within the domestic sphere of politics. For instance, Shaikh Hamad did not face tangible domestic resistance in introducing an American model of education that marked a discernible departure from the conservative Saudi model nor did he encounter public opposition in openly engaging and cooperating with foreign actors of varied religious denominations (Roberts, 2016). The acceptance and general approval of these practices thus fuelled the foreign policy directions of engaging with various actors as well as political Islamists prior to and during the initial stages of the Arab Spring.

However, at the foreign policy level, the limitations of the human platform have been evident especially in Qatar's quest to carve out a diplomatic niche. Kamrava (2011) as well as Ulrichsen (2014) have observed that the inherent limitations of the Qatari diplomatic corps have prevented it from achieving sustainable results in peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Qatar, which only has 26 diplomatic missions, has meant that Qatar has had to strategically pursue its free-spirited approach to foreign policy within the glaring limitations of its lack of human resources. In this regard, Kamrava (2017, p.95) asserts that the source of Qatari influence abroad has neither been rooted in military nor cultural power but through a careful and selective mix of "marketing,

domestic politics, regional diplomacy and, through strategic use of its sovereign wealth fund, increasing access to and ownership over prized commercial resources". Although this approach proved successful in reducing the vulnerability of the small state and in providing it with stability the continuation of the free-wheeling approach (particularly towards Islamists during the Arab Spring) has meant that Qatar is in need of recasting its dynamic diplomatic strategy to better account for the inherent limitations posed by its lack of human resources amidst heightened regional backlash.

5.3.4 POLITICAL PLATFORM

Article 60 of the Qatari Permanent Constitution identifies that the scheme of government is grounded on the separation of powers of three authorities: the Shura Council and executive power vested by the Emir and aided by the Council of Ministers and the judiciary and by courts (SJC, 2005). In 1976, many political relations and trade unions were established, and in 1999 the first municipal election was held to choose the 29 members of the Central Municipal Council. This was the first time that women had been permitted to vote and nominate (Khalaf and Luciani, 2008). Qatar has been a party to the VCDR since 1986, following its joining of the UN in 1971 (MOFA, 2012).

A prominent domestic political development occurred in 2013 when Emir Hamad decided to relinquish power and peacefully transfer it to his son, Crown Prince Sheikh Tamim. The transition was announced in a televised speech in which the outgoing Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani reasserted Qatar's commitment to the values and principles of peace, international cooperation and respect for human rights (BBC, 2013). From a contextually standpoint, the announcement and transition occurred at a juncture marred by regional upheaval and political turbulence. Ulrichsen (2014) intimates that following an initial period of caution concerning the Arab uprisings, Qatar committed itself to the contours of the popular political upheavals across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Qatar's decision to intervene in the uprisings reflected its decision to embrace the possibility of sweeping regional changes. Its position thereby differentiated and ultimately alienated it from its GCC counterparts (Ulrichsen, 2014). Yet, as Roberts (2014; 2016b) states, Qatar's decision to intervene and engage with moderate Islamists should not necessarily be understood as an active partisan choice. Instead, the decision to intervene is better understood as both pragmatic and opportunistic insofar as that it was informed by the popular appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region and Muslim world but also by the glaring lack of absence of other legitimate viable actors (secular, liberal, or otherwise) during the uprisings.

Nevertheless, the Arab Spring signalled a perceptible shift in Qatari foreign policy insofar as that its previous neutral approach to engaging with all sides and all regional actors was suspended in favour of providing financial, media and material support to a set of specific actors with Islamist links in Syria, Libya and Egypt (Roberts, 2017). To reiterate however, the diplomatic, financial and media support provided by Qatar was neither rooted in the belief nor support to actualise the political rise of Islamists in the form of an inevitable and impending change to regional politics. Instead, the support provided by Qatar constituted a political gamble that its leadership deemed to be a beneficial risk in the events that Islamists eventually came to play an active role in the politics of the region (Roberts, 2016). To an extent, this approach complemented the existing belief of Emir Sheikh Hamad and Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani that offering selective support to moderate Islamists constituted a "reasonable approach to politics" (Roberts, 2017b). This may be because of Qatar's long-standing engagement with Islamists that it offered refuge to between the 1950s to 1980s. Over the course of these three decades, Qatar provided refuge and exile to members of different Muslim Brotherhood branches from Egypt and Syria. In doing so, it developed and diversified its ties with regional branches of Ikhwan (Ulrichsen, 2014) under the tacit understanding that the activities of the latter would be directed at the regional rather than domestic sphere (Haykel, 2013).

However, despite this engagement, Roberts (2017) cogently points out that Qatar's gamble to engage and support moderate Islamists did not sufficiently account for the rising difficulties in managing the seemingly exponential number of Islamist intermediaries and groups that become involved as the Arab Spring mutated over time. This marked a turn in events compared to the onset of the Arab Spring when Qatar had championed itself as a proponent of the West by campaigning for humanitarian intervention in Libya and a political solution in Yemen (Barakat, 2012). While Qatar was relatively successful in Libya in promoting its image as a champion of human rights through its commitment to providing military and financial support to remove Qaddafi, it eventually turned to developing links with Islamist militias including the Tripoli Brigade and the al-Sallabi brothers. The military and financial support provided to anti-Qaddafi coalitions were exacerbated by a lack of coordination with other intervening parties, including the United Arab Emirates thereby resulting in the splintering of the coalition and the emergence of a rivalry between Qatar and the UAE (Ulrichsen, 2014).

In Syria, a similar situation unfolded with rivalries emerging amongst regional actors and the Arab League over which actors to support. As the conflict worsened and the number of rebel groups exponentially increased, Qatar adopted a hard stance against the Syrian government and threw its support behind rebel forces that were aligned with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (Ulrichsen, 2014). Similarly, Saudi Arabia and others also participated in selecting potential winners and

provided support to other factions. The earlier calls for an Arab solution to an Arab problem thus exacerbated the unity of a coalition capable of putting an end to the Syrian civil war. By comparison, in Tunisia and Egypt, Qatar committed extensive financial offerings to support the struggling economies. In the case of the latter, the exorbitant financial commitment offered to the Muslim Brotherhood government fuelled regional scepticism concerning Qatar's motives. As a result of these interventions, Qatar came under increasing pressure from its neighbours in Saudi Arab and the United Arab Emirates. The respective states accused Qatar of encouraging the spread of dangerous ideological movements that posed an existential threat to the long-term stability of the region. The direct support that Qatar provided to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt particularly served to ignite tensions with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Even with the eventual toppling to the Brotherhood government in July 2013, Qatar utilised Al Jazeera to extensively air content against the Sisi government (Roberts, 2017). On the one hand, the failed gamble during the Arab Spring resulted in strained relations that resulted in a blockade against Qatar. On the other, the attempts of Qatar reflect its foreign policy apparatus' reliance on informal contacts to gain influence and capitalise on political opportunism (Roberts, 2019).

The emergence of Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani thus arrived at a time wherein Qatar found itself in heightened regional political turmoil as witnessed by the subsequent events of the blockade which are extensively considered in Chapter 8. Upon assuming power, Sheikh Tamim did not alter Qatar's position towards the region as it would have been immensely difficult to do following the impressive achievements of his father who transformed Qatar into a modern state (Roberts, 2017). Although it has been suggested that Sheikh Hamad has continued to operate the country from behind the scenes, both Roberts (2017) and Ulrichsen (2014) state that such conspiracies have no basis, and that Hamad would have simply retained power if he so desired. Instead, they postulate that the abdication served to demonstrate the peaceful transition of power. The decision to not shift away from the policies of his father eventually culminated with the announcement of a blockade against Qatar by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates on 5 June 2017 (Roberts, 2017b). The blockade accused Qatar of supporting terrorism sowing discord in the region through its media mouthpiece in Al Jazeera. It further called for a land, air and sea blockade to stifle the robust Qatari economy. Moreover, it put forth 13 impossible to meet demands that included reparations and audits on Qatar's foreign spending (Roberts, 2017b). An extensive analysis of the blockade and the demands are presented in Chapter 8 of this thesis. Nevertheless, although it can be argued that Sheikh Tamim has undertaken a more pragmatic approach following his ascension to power, he did not abandon the policies of established by his father. As Roberts (2019) observes, following the blockade Qatar increased its reliance on its relationships with its western partners which included buying fighter jets, expanding the Al Udeid airbase and signing agreements concerning counter-terrorism financing

whilst continue to leverage its Islamist soft power by engaging with groups such as Hamas and the Taliban.

In some ways, the ability of Sheikh Tamim and Qatar to continue along a similar albeit protracted foreign policy agenda owes to the fact that the state continues to possess a robust economy and energy-security that provides the state with a range of diverse options and opportunities to continue to pursue international influence. For instance, Qatar has been recognised as playing a progressively vital role in the global economy (Taylor, Ni, and Derudder, 2012). Firstly, Qatar's Sovereign Wealth Fund, managed by the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), has obtained numerous stakes in European banks such as Barclays and Credit Suisse, and automobile giants such as Volkswagen and Porsche. Also, Qatar owns several British assets, including the Olympic village, Harrods and Sainsbury's (Robertson, 2017). It has also been actively investing in property in Europe and Africa through its controlled Qatari Dinar, the Premier Property Company in the state of Qatar (Fernandes, 2012; Ebrahimi, 2013). In 2015, a Qatari-led consortium purchased Canary Wharf in London, expanding Qatar's portfolio of London assets, including stakes in the Savoy Hotel in London, the Shard skyscraper, the Olympic Village and the HSBC tower. Qatar's UK investments are not only confined to real estate (Arabian Business, 2017). The QIA (the biggest investor in the country's stock market) is the biggest shareholder in J Sainsbury Plc, with a 22 per cent stake. In 2012, a 20 per cent stake in London Heathrow airport was bought by the country's sovereign fund, and Qatar Airways increased its stake in British Airways owner IAG SA to 20 per cent last year. In 2012, Mayhoola for Investments SPC, a company funded by Qatari investors, purchased the Italian luxury brand Valentino Fashion Group SpA from private equity firm Permira Advisers LLP for approximately EUR 700 million, while former Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim purchased a 10 % stake in Spain's El Corte Ingles SA, the biggest department store owner in Western Europe, in 2015 (Arabian Business, 2017). Qatar is also partnering with South Africa to establish a terminal for LNG. Both countries have also been engaged in negotiations concerning direct ties between their ports. Total and a number of other oil companies in South Africa, Mozambique, Morocco, and Kenya have recently acquired stakes in LNG exploration blocks (Tsukerman, 2020). As a result of these actions, Qatar has established key interdependencies with leading states in the world that enable it to pursue its foreign policy despite the regional issues that have emerged in the past decade.

Qatar continues to concentrate on boosting international collaboration and joining international and regional organisations such as the UN, the Arab League, the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council and the Islamic Cooperation Organization. These actions were aimed towards Qatar, becoming recognised internationally as a new state that has attained a vast development in a short time. Accordingly, their political expertise has built up from their contributions in many international

scenes and forums (MOFA, 2012). Moreover, during the past few decades, Qatar had developed in terms of international cooperation and built bilateral relations with countries worldwide. Moreover, Qatar has developed multilateral cooperation through membership of several international, Arab, and regional organisations and bodies. It has maintained diplomatic relations with all countries and has 70 diplomatic missions worldwide. Within the performance of Qatar MOFA, priorities have developed and evolved over time with some being based on geographic representations (e.g. Europe, Middle East, America) or operative outlines, such as treaty law, protocol, media or PD (MOFA, 2012).

Qatar has based its practices on several political strategies such as good neighbourliness and strategic regional and international alliances and strategy formation of nation branding to build a unique position. These actions were believed to be caused by several factors, including Qatar's security concerns. The national ambition for Qatar remains a key driver towards the quest to build a unique international stature (Peterson, 2006). Whilst Qatar has been an ally of the USA, in an attempt to explain Qatari policy, the US Ambassador to Doha, Joseph LeBaron 2009 said: "I think that Qatar occupies space in the centre of the ideological spectrum in the Islamic world and the aim is to keep the doors open for all the players in this spectrum. Qatar has the resources to implement its vision, but this rarely happens" (Blanchard, 2012). In conclusion, in the past, the political underpinnings of Qatari strategies have been good neighbourliness, regional and international alliances, and building a unique international stature along with the political leadership needed to achieve this status. As these strategies have come under increasing pressure Qatar must find new strategies and ways to pragmatically pivot towards novel means to retain its subtle power.

5.3.5 MILITARY PLATFORM

The Qatari military workforce consists of roughly 12,000 personnel making it the second smallest military force in terms of numbers in the Middle East. The development and presence of a robust national military force has not however been a leading concern of Qatar following its independence. Initially, upon gaining independence the state turned immediately to a centuries old practice of outsourcing its security under the Saudi security umbrella. However, a number of developments that followed the rise of Sheikh Hamad contributed to the evolution of Qatari security. Sheikh Hamad’s deviation from Saudi foreign policy resulted in heightened tensions between the states and even produced a number of border skirmishes (Roberts, 2017). This development was simultaneously exacerbated by the inability of Saudi Arabia to mitigate the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and which therefore firmly led Qatar to pursue other means to safeguard its

existential security (Roberts, 2017). As mentioned earlier in this chapter this resulted in Qatar signing a defence agreement with America to be stationed at the Al Udeid Air Base commencing in 1992. While Qatar participated in the Gulf war against Iraq in 1990 it abstained from military conflicts again until 2011 when it intervened in the Libyan civil war alongside NATO forces (Ragab, 2012).

The Qatari participation in the Libyan civil war was justified under the auspices of humanitarian intervention (Ulrichsen, 2014). Qatar supplied arms and equipment to Libyan rebels along with military, military and logistical support and was able to do so freely due to its own security guarantees from housing the US Al Udeid Air Force base (Roberts, 2011). It also continued to aid rebel forces by exporting refined petroleum products to the country and delivered 6 Mirage fighter jets despite not conducting any airstrikes itself (Khatib, 2013). Qatar's use of political, economic as well as direct and indirect military support during the onset of the Libyan civil war has been described by Ulrichsen (2016) as both unprecedented and a shift in Qatari foreign policy. However, Ulrichsen (2016) and Roberts (2017) also point out that the initial success of Qatar in Libya did not translate in Syria wherein it overestimated and overplayed its hand in attempting to influence regional structures and outcomes.

The participation of Qatar in Libya and Syria have meant that its military expenditure has greatly increased in the last decade. According to SIPRI (2019), prior to 2010, Qatar's military expenditure was estimated at approximately $1.9 billion US dollars, which amounted to roughly 1.5 per cent of its GDP. In the years that have followed its interventions in Libya and Syria, SIPRI finds that public data suggest Qatar has increased its number of arms contracts with foreign suppliers, with an estimated $50 billion spent between 2014-2018. Moreover, between the years of 2009-2013 and 2014-2018, Qatari arm imports increased by a mammoth 225 per cent. The largest suppliers were the United States followed by Germany and the purchases included air and missile defence systems, tanks as well as short-range ballistic missiles. During the period in question, Qatar also signed multiple contracts for its armed forces and ordered several different combat aircrafts from the US, UK and France (SIPRI, 2019). While it appears total expenditures have drastically decreased ($11.6 billion in 2021) the overall military spending still reflects a 434 per cent increase from 2010 – which is in line with Roberts (2019) observation that since the Arab Spring and Blockade, Qatar has doubled down on its security relationship with America and its other Western partners.

5.3.6 MEDIA PLATFORM

The nature of the foreign policy of a state is to some extent reflected in its national media. Qatar has acquired media represented in the following units: Qatar Media Corporation, which was

founded in 2009, Qatar news agency founded in 1975 and the Al-Jazeera Network founded in 1996. Al-Jazeera began broadcasting from Doha in 1996. It is the first Arab satellite channel specialising in news, and it aims to transmit news at a professional level that competes with foreign news channels (Raya, 2012). As Roberts (2017) states, the channel was primarily founded to develop and project Qatar's soft power and to further serve as an asymmetric tool to retaliate against Saudi Arabia's foreign policy. The channel, which has long remained a thorn in the side of Saudi Arabia, has since its inception frequently given a platform to dissidents to discuss and question Saudi Arabia's leadership (Roberts, 2017).

The 24-hour news channel receives its support from the Qatari government, which has and continues to finance the channel despite considerable monetary losses. According to Roberts (2016b), although the infamous news station has incurred monetary losses on an annual basis it continues to serve as an important source of projecting Qatar's soft power. The political leadership in Qatar has utilised the channel to express its policy across by shedding light on news in the region, in organising political dialogues and conducting opinion polls around a specific topic (Blanchard, 2012). According to Hroub (2014), Al-Jazeera has succeeded in creating a new platform for political freedom, which was presented in its explicit support of the Arab revolutions. The channel acts as a spokesman for the Emir of Qatar; therefore, it is an integral part of the national identity of Qatar and its ambitions in the field of foreign policy. It is for this very reason that the channel has served as a source of contention between Qatar and other regional powers including Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. Indeed, Ulrichsen (2014) finds that Al Jazeera has served as a source of contention even with Qatar's strongest ally America, which has claimed that the station propagates quasi-terrorist propaganda. The contentious nature of the content on the station led Saudi Arabia in 2002 to recall its ambassador for six years due to the channel's coverage of the Kingdom (Roberts, 2017). The platform that it has provided to dissidents has created controversies and confrontations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt alleging that Al Jazeera actively set out to undermine the Sisi government (Roberts, 2017). Ulrichsen (2014) and Roberts (2016b; 2017; 2019) further find that during the Arab Spring Al Jazeera sought to shape emerging narratives by giving Islamists and extremists such as Qaradawi and Jabhat Al Nusra's Abu Mohammed Al-Jolani a vocal platform and although it was receptive to critiques of regional states it refused to change its politics towards the region until small concessions were made in 2019 by evicting a handful of Muslim Brotherhood members and shutting down its 24 hour Egyptian news channel. Moreover, external pressure to shutter the station, following the Riyadh agreement in 2014 and the subsequent Blockade were ineffective in cajoling Qatar into abandoning its approach. In fact, the resolution of the Blockade in 2021 did not require Qatar to meet any of the 13 demands made against it including the shuttering of Al Jazeera.

Al-Jazeera's capability to affect public opinion across the region is a significant source of influence of Qatar; it is also used to improve relations with other countries. Al-Jazeera is one of the means of soft power and one of the most effective diplomacy tools for the Qatar government. Al-Jazeera has been known to use targeted public opinion in order to put governments under pressure and influence the government to change its position (Qatarneh, 2012). It has also used the news station to project its image as a mediator with success. As Kamrava (2011) notes, the station's coverage of the 2006 war between Lebanon and Israel allowed Qatar to accumulate good will alongside its provisions of aid and investment to Lebanon.

Moreover, Qatar has identified its foreign policy objectives as follows:

- Maintaining state security with security services.
- Achieving regional and international stature.
- Working on equalising demographic imbalance.
- Investing money obtained from the country's resources and providing resources that are needed.

Qatar's foreign policy tools are a combination of official diplomatic actions, PD, investment and foreign aid, engagement in alliances and unions and military. Abdullah (2014) suggests that the key foreign policy strategies used by Qatar's government are (i) establishing an alliance with major and middle powers (including the USA, its closest ally and France), (ii) employment of an effective neighbourly strategy, (iii) building a positive image of the state and (iv) constructing a multilateral strategy through political, economic, sport, education and media.

Qatar's main foreign policy attributes were stated as follows (Abdullah, 2014):

- A high level of engagement in international affairs.
- A determination to develop the elevated potential for investment and economic capabilities to achieve political gains.
- A commitment to diplomatic mediation.
- An independent Qatari foreign policy from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
- An undertaking to support Islamist organisations.
- A mission to use media to achieve foreign policy goals.
- An emphasis on international principles and international law and values.

Overall, it can be argued that Qatar's foreign policy shows precision, boldness and a determination to take advantage of opportunities even if they prove to be contentious and unconventional in nature. However, there have been severe inconsistencies and, more recently, retractions, in the

application of that policy. The marked leaning towards Islamist parties in the Middle East and the armed intervention with troops or supplies in such conflicts as those in Libya, Syria, and Yemen have been in stark contradiction with its declared peaceful and soft power. Kamrava (2017) finds that this is partially the result of the changing environment of information technology which has transformed international politics into a phenomenon that is more complex and volatile.

5.4 CRITIQUES OF QATAR'S FOREIGN POLICY

After the analysis of core historical events in Qatar's foreign policy history, a variety of concerns appears in the literature which criticises the country's foreign policy. These include a power conflict within the ruling family, the use of Al-Jazeera to principally reflect Qatar's foreign policy, concern about Qatar's foreign policy since the succession of the new Emir, controversial issues surrounding mediation efforts during the pursuit of Qatar's foreign policy and reported abuse of human rights and corruption charges.

5.4.1 CONFLICT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF POWER

In 1995, the present Emir's father, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani assumed power in a peaceful coup against his father. Since the ascension of Sheikh Hamad, Qatari foreign policy has shifted to emphasise its presence nationally and internationally. Sheikh Hamad pursued a diverse set of policies and tactics that would certify the acknowledgement of this new period after several years of following the Saudi narrative (Roberts, 2015; Roberts, 2017; Kamrava, 2015; Ulrichsen, 2014). Thus, Qatar moved to establish a shared gas field with Iran, to strengthen its power in the region and to be independent of the Saudi narrative, which considers Iran as an existential threat and enemy to the GCC. Furthermore, it established long-lasting relationships, becoming allies with international powers such as the US, which established the largest American military base in the region in Al Udeid (Roberts, 2017). Although Saudi Arabia has been considered as the leading regional power in GCC, the Qatari shift away from Saudi power has served to enhance its independence, diversify its allies and enable it to raise its recognition in the international community and the international audience through various diplomatic initiatives as covered in the early sections of this chapter (Kamrava, 2015; Roberts, 2015; Roberts, 2017; Eldar, 2013). While this has created a rift with Saudi Arabia and more recently other regional states, the interdependencies that Qatar has created through its energy-security nexus have enabled it to manoeuvre its foreign policy freely.

5.4.2 SUPPORT OF ISLAMIC ORGANISATIONS

While Qatar's has encouraged peace based on negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, it has also endorsed a sectarian Islamic agenda, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, by assisting

armed groups in Syria, Palestine and Egypt (Ulrichsen, 2014). As a result, Qatari relations with Israel have passed through variations. In 1996, Qatar has established a trade office with Israel which was closed down by authorities in 2000 (Roberts, 2015). In 2010, Qatar proposed to restore the trade relations and permit the reestablishment of the Israeli mission in Doha, on condition that Israel authorises Qatar to support Gaza in rehabilitating infrastructure, and that Israel should state recognition for Qatar's role in the region. However, this offer was rejected by Israel, which feared that Qatari materials could be used by Hamas to build shelters (Ravid, 2010; Kamin, 2013). Consequently, Israeli leaders severely criticised Qatar's diplomatic and financial funding of Hamas and considered it as a major supporter of terrorism (Miller, 2014).

In 2015, Qatar stated that it does not distinguish the sovereignty of Israel and that there are no full diplomatic relations between the nations. However, when Qatar was granted the right to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup, Qatar specified that Israel would be allowed to compete in the world cup (Walid, 2009). Nevertheless, still, the official communications between Qatar and Israel formally remain blocked, but there is some communication still opened (Kamin, 2013). This was evident when the Qatari government in 2015 mediated deliberations between Israel and Hamas in Doha to discuss a possible five-year ceasefire between both parties (Lazareva, 2015; Aldardari, 2021).

5.4.3 USE OF AL-JAZEERA TO REFLECT QATAR FOREIGN POLICY

Although Qatar is a small state, it has vast oil and gas assets and other resources, including foreign investments. The state's soft power is presented through the Al-Jazeera news network, which plays a massive role in promoting its regional power and foreign policy since its establishment in 1996 (Roberts, 2015; Gergawi, 2013). The current Emir's father, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, has defined the worth and weight of Al-Jazeera as a credible and independent news agency which presents truth around the world (Gergawi, 2013). However, Mazaid (2018) asserts that the subsidiary channels of Al Jazeera have damaged Qatar’s political relations with neighbouring states of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Indeed, this is reflective of the political currents that resulted in the Riyadh Agreement and the subsequent Blockade against Qatar, wherein it was demanded that Al Jazeera cease its operations and biased coverage of Egypt (Ulrichsen, 2017; Ulrichsen, 2018). It has further been argued that Al-Jazeera has played a functional role in encouraging the uprisings in Arab countries, including Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen and assisted in influencing Arab citizens to Qatar foreign policy approach (Gergawi, 2013; Pourhamzavi and Pherguson, 2015; Patel, 2012). Furthermore, WikiLeaks cables stated that Al-Jazeera had filtered their newscast to be appropriate to Qatari foreign policy, but Al-Jazeera still insisted that it is editorially independent (Booth, 2010). The US ambassador, Joseph LeBaron, reported that Al-Jazeera's is a

powerful tool for Qatar's politics and has been used to spread their vision and restore relations with other states (The Guardian, 2010).

5.4.4 CONCERN AFTER THE NEW EMIR

Research by Nader (2013) has discussed the concern about Qatari foreign policy since the new Emir Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani has taken power. Nader claimed that Qatar's key advantage in the international arena was its economic power, as it holds the world's third-largest strategic natural gas stockpile. Qatari policies recently have faced criticism due to its involvement in the Arab spring and its support and funding of Islamist organisations in Syria and Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood. It has therefore been alleged that Qatar has specifically disrupted the existing regional stabilities. Although the Qatari policy provided the state with a massive part in international relations and permitted it to solve the stalemate in specific crises, these policies put the country under increased pressure (Nader, 2013). Gergawi (2013) has stated that Qatar is demonstrating that its foreign policy is built on a vision to develop a Muslim Brotherhood league of states.

Currently, the Middle East stability is in a risk, with the rising Sunni-Shiite conflict and the conversion of the Syrian crisis into an open regional war. As a result of this high-tension policy, Qatar's new Emir was forced to make adjustments to international affairs and to progressively move into the fold of the GCC and Arab consent to comprise the current risks (Nader, 2013). This was clear in Sheikh Tamim's first speech, where he spoke about Qatar's independent behaviour and its support for Arab citizens against tyranny and humiliation. He has prohibited dividing Arab communities on religious or sectarian lines, and that Qatar's foreign policy would be focused on relationships with states rather than organisations. This policy, which was believed to be forced by the international and Arab consensus, has been translated as an attempt to distance Qatar from Islamist movements. However, Qatar's new Emir had been expected to keep on his father's path concerning Qatar's foreign policy, Qatari independence and its regional significance. Nevertheless, due to significant powers involved and the pending absolute confrontation Nader (2013) argues that the Emir needs to adjust policy to strengthen his rule.

The transfer of power to Emir Tamim Al-Thani in June 2013 was accompanied by high hopes in Saudi Arabia and the UAE that the new leader would seek to reorganise and recalibrate Qatar’s foreign policy towards regional politics and affairs (Ulrichsen, 2017). Yet, as Roberts (2017) observes did not seek to alter Qatar’s foreign policy and would have faced immense struggles in doing so immediately given the impact left on the state by his father. However, in the coming months, reports would surface in American media outlets that the Muslim Brotherhood was regrouping in Qatar. This led Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to summon Emir Tamim wherein he was

presented with an ultimatum to calibrate Qatari foreign policy towards regional issues in line with the GCC. The Emir was also presented with the Riyadh Agreement which established a loose security framework that mandated non-interference in the internal affairs of other GCC states (Ulrichsen, 2017). The agreement however did little to assuage the tensions and in the following year Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE moved to withdraw their ambassadors from Qatar (Roberts, 2017). Ultimately, negotiations would ensue, and another short-lived agreement would be reached in the third quarter of 2014 (Roberts, 2017).

Qatari participation in the Saudi and UAE led military campaign in Yemen initially indicated that relations between Qatar and the GCC were improving. However, as Roberts (2019) notes, it is believed that Qatar continued to pursue its regional policy of engaging with moderate Islamists and its reluctance to disengage led Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt to pursue unprecedented action (due to the perceived threats that each state faces from Islamists) in the form of a diplomatic, land, air and sea blockade (Roberts, 2017). The reluctance of Qatar even under Tamim to disengage from the informal networks they have formed with Islamists should be understood as being rooted in its pragmatic approach to promote the moderation of actions and conducts of Islamists. Qatar has however by all means failed to explain the logic of why it believes that moderate Islamists should be accorded a role in regional politics and affairs (Roberts, 2017). Instead of clarifying its approach to its policy towards such groups, Tamim and Qatar has sought to double down on its security relationship with America in an effort to build up its military assets, to expand the Al Udeid base so as to make it even more indispensable and to create more transparency in the efforts to disrupt Islamist financial networks (US Department of the Treasury, 2021). The impact of Emir Tamim's approach and reaction to the events of the blockade are discussed in Chapter 8.

5.4.5 MEDIATION EFFORTS ON QATAR FOREIGN POLICY

Research by Akpınar (2015) has examined the role of mediation as an instrument of foreign policy throughout the Arab Spring by observing the negotiation efforts of Turkey, Qatar and Iran. Akpinar's work further pointed out that the practices of mediation by these players were consistent with their foreign policy priorities. During the Arab spring, mediation was effective in solving minor issues (e.g., hostage crises) more than major ones (e.g., conflict between regimes and oppositions). He further observes that the effectiveness of mediation efforts based on their obligation and dependability as mediators.

Contrastingly, The UN describes mediation as 'a method in which a third party helps two or more parties, with their consent, avoid, handle, or settle a dispute by assisting them in developing

mutually satisfactory agreements' (United Nations, 2012). Whereas some researchers (Zubek et al., 1992, p.546; Faget, 2011, p.3) underline the significance of unpaid mediation others emphasise the non-binding nature of the practice where power and influence of the mediator should not be applied (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille, 1991, p.3-8; Kleiboer, 1996, p. 360; Wall, Stark, and Standifer, 2001, p. 370–391; Zartman, 2008, p.155).

Akpınar (2015) asserts that mediation could be taken as a standard of Qatari foreign policy. Qatar mediation has altered from an instrument of confirming steadiness to an instrument of promoting change. Qatar, as a small regional power, has helped to tackle some crises by acting as a mediator. However, it has failed in mediation attempts between Hamas and Israel due to the limitation of its power capabilities. He concludes that the use of mediation is relevant within the country's foreign policy and that regional powers could be useful to act as a mediator in complex conflicts (Akpınar, 2015).

According to Barakat (2012), the lilliputian state of Qatar risen to prominence by creating a role for itself as a neutral international mediator. Similarly, the seminal work of Kamrava (2011) argues that Qatar has proven to be one of the most proactive states in mediating conflicts since the mid-2000s. He further asserts that Qatar has been able to facilitate success through its promotion of itself as an unbiased actor and by utilising its immense financial resources to host mediations and incentivise the peace process (Kamrava, 2011). The combination of this approach has been accompanied by a personalised diplomatic approach that primarily relies on a closed circle of Emirati elites and policymakers directly engaging with disputants. The mediation efforts of Qatar therefore constitute a niche form of diplomacy that has come to constitute the foreign policy of Qatar insofar as that it operates as a framework of strategic action to shape the conduct of domestic and international political relations (Touval, 2003). Kamrava (2011) further notes that Qatar's vast resources place it at a potential advantage given that financial incentivisation appears likely to result in the de-escalation of conflict. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, both Kamrava (2011) and Ulrichsen (2014) find Qatar is selective in choosing which conflicts it chooses to mediate for two reasons: it places emphasis on successful mediation, and it does not possess the diplomatic and human resources to engage more thoroughly in the process. Prior to the Arab Spring, Qatar gained relative success in mediating conflict in Sudan, Lebanon and Yemen to varying degrees. However, Kamrava (2011) is correct to point out that mediation of conflicts does not necessarily guarantee the sustainability of conflict resolution.

Barakat (2012) considers the image of Qatar as an impartial mediator in light of its interventions at the onset of the Arab Spring. He finds that the shift to declaring one-sided support and actively intervening in conflicts has meant that Qatar was cognisant of the emerging state of affairs and the need for military involvement. The success of its intervention in Libya must however be

understood in relation to its active cooperation with global powers. Even in instances where it cooperates with global powers however, success is not guaranteed. The mediation role of Qatar between the United States and the Taliban has produced what appear to be less than ideal results following the departure of America (Wu, 2022). Qatar appears to have extended its policy towards engaging with Islamists with the aim of moderating the behaviour of the Taliban, akin to its efforts with Hamas in Palestine (Wu, 2022). It is possible that these developments could stoke new regional tensions and further associate Qatar with Islamists if it fails to clarify the pragmatic roots of its mediation efforts.

5.4.6 ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The abuse of human rights was presented in the misuse of Nepalese workers in Qatar to complete construction for the World Cup in 2022; this crisis was discussed heavily in media and is therefore critically considered in the case study of this research. Babar and Vora (2022) observe that since securing the 2022 World Cup bid, Qatar has spent billions to develop adequate infrastructure but that in doing so it has drawn on a policy of short-term job contracts that racialised certain workers as more biddable and more likely to tolerate the erosion of their labour rights. They further note that this policy is rooted in the *kalafa* worker-sponsorship programme that promotes practices that result in the control of labour and mobility (Babar and Vora, 2022). Al-Thani (2021) by comparison argues that the scrutiny from human rights concerns has not prevented the World Cup from being celebrated as a sign of development, peace and good for the region.

The country's previous Foreign Minister, Khalid Bin Mohammed Al-Attiyah, has confirmed an assurance to sovereign action and stated, ‘Heavy criticism is always the price of taking a firm stand on your views and owning them; however, for those who disagree with us, the independence of Qatar's foreign policy is clearly non-negotiable’ (Ryan, 2014). Al Thani (2021) asserts that in response to the criticisms linked to human rights violations, authorities have introduced reform initiatives to improve the rights and working conditions of labourers including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These covenants legally require Qatar to protect the rights of its entire populace and to provide safe working conditions and fair wages. The present study will further critique and contest such assertions since inflexibility is at odds with claims of soft power and the fundamental principles of diplomacy in general.

5.5 DISCUSSION

In Qatar, public sentiment is seldom a deterrent to any initiative that foreign policy decision-makers wish to take (Abu Suliab, 2017). Foreign policy decision-makers have the room to pursue a bold foreign policy due to political stability in the country. Despite Qatar's engagement in an

ever-growing foreign policy that has seen an unprecedented increase in the regional and global profile of the state, its foreign policy has faced various critiques in the literature. The analysis of the literature revealed six key areas in which critiques of Qatar's foreign policy are centred, as discussed in the section above. The classification of the critiques on the Qatar's foreign policy could provide a foundation and reference for the policymakers to re-visit and modify strategies. Such classification would enable the mapping of the critiques with the PD models and theories reviewed and discussed in Chapter 4, which can be used to help policymakers reduce such critiques. Below, the researcher presents a mapping of the PD models and theories presented in Chapter 4 with the critiques on Qatar's foreign policy centred on the literature review findings and the researcher's knowledge.

- Mediation efforts on Qatar foreign policy-related critiques

Qatar's mediator role is a fundamental aspect of its foreign policy. While Qatari negotiation has usually been addressed as an accomplishment, a closer look indicates that its impacts are predominantly restricted to the short term. Examples of Qatar's mediation outcome that lived short term include negotiation between the government of Yemen and the Houthis did not lead to a permanent ceasefire in both sides in 2007 and also the 2008 Doha Accords in Lebanon. All these elements could ultimately damage the credibility of Qatar's foreign policy and its intended goals. Meanwhile the PD principles of credibility and discussion are known for creating trust, long-term partnership and delivery PD messages to the right audience (Horiuchi, 2009, Nye, 2004), policymakers could reduce the critiques on mediation efforts by applying these principles into their mediation activities. Credibility is a key element which can determine how other nations perceived Qatar. When the impact of Qatar's mediation outcome survived in the long term, their credibility in the eyes of other states could increase.

Policymakers of PD could therefore apply PD models and theories to help reduce the critiques on the state's mediation efforts in both regional and international communities. To generate knowledge, models are required because they concentrate on the most important variables and the relationships between them (Gilboa, 2016). Since the idealistic model aims to increase freedom and influence in international communities which comparatively will influence its state (Rasmussen 2009), it could be a potential model for Qatar's policymakers to apply here to help enhance their regional and international influence. Also, the policymakers could apply PD principles of partnership which involve networking with relevant stakeholders, coordinating efforts and cooperating to achieve the desire mediation goal (Gallop, 2007). This could potentially assist in improving Qatar's track records in its mediation outcome, particularly in areas where they have limited power to execute their mediation activities.

- Abuse of human rights-related critiques

Concerning the critiques on abuse of human rights abuse, policymakers could apply the Image Restoration Theory to its foreign policy to help restore the state's image on both regional and global platforms. Employing this theory and its available options would enable Qatar to restore its image (Gilboa, 2016). It is up to the state to identify and analyse suitable options that they would like to implement. In the case of Saudi Arabia, three out of the five options, i.e., "denial, attacking accusers and bolstering" were found to be effective in their image restoration activities (Gilboa, 2016, p.66). Also, for any conflict or crisis resolution, the various parties need to adopt effective communication methods (see Chapter 4). In the case of human rights abuses concerning the Nepal workers, policymakers could apply the PD principle of discussion to the strategies put in place for the crisis, see Chapter 4 for detail explanation on this principle. Additionally, since the rational model is known for delivering national interests based on tangible benefits (Rasmussen 2009), policymakers could apply this model to help bring financial gain in terms of trade, investment and tourism.

- Use of Al-Jazeera to reflect Qatar's foreign policy related critiques

A major critique of Qatar is that it is heavily reliant on Al-Jazeera media platform to promote Qatar's foreign policy. The concerns raised were around the role of Al-Jazeera in influential international public opinion and in inspiring the Arab countries uprising. Since strategic communication defines PD platforms which aim to boost a positive image of the state (US Department of State, 2007), PD policymakers could apply the PD dimension of strategic communication, e.g., the two-way symmetrical model, which allows communications on various channels to help reduce this critique. Policymakers could also potentially apply the PD non-rational and idealistic models.

- Support to Islamist organisations related critiques

The literature review findings indicated that assisting armed individuals in the Muslim Brotherhood is one of the primary critiques regarding Qatar's support to Islamist organisation. The PD principle of discussion, strategic communication and PD mechanisms such as listening and cultural diplomacy are known for encouraging dialogue, restoring and improving the image of the state (Cull, 2009), and for this reason, policymakers could apply them to help mitigate the negative effects this critique. The two-way asymmetric strategic communication could be applied to the cultural diplomacy activities between the states involved.

- Conflict on the establishment of power-related critiques

Here, the critiques mainly focus on Qatar's goal of establishing power both nationally and internationally by moving away from the Saudi narrative and collaborating with countries such as Iran and international superpowers such as the US. Critiques about the establishment of power

could be reduced by employing PD principles of discussion and partnership, PD realistic model and strategic communication.

TABLE 6: MAPPING CRITIQUES OF FOREIGN POLICY WITH PD MODELS AND THEORIES

Critiques	PD theories, models, principles, mechanisms and dimensions
Mediation efforts on Qatar foreign policy	PD principles of credibility, discussion and partnership, PD idealistic model.
Use of Al-Jazeera to reflect Qatar's foreign policy	Strategic communication (2-way symmetrical model), PD non-rational model, sociological and constructivist theories.
Concern on after the new Emir	Image Restoration Theory, PD idealistic model, strategic communication, PD principles of partnership.
Conflict on establishment of power	Strategic communication, PD principles of discussions and partnership.
Abuse of human rights.	Image Restoration Theory, PD principle of discussion, PD rational model, PD mechanisms, for example, listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, global broadcasting, strategic communication.
Support to Islamist Organisations	PD principle of discussion, strategic communication, PD mechanisms, for example, listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, global broadcasting.

5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY

Woertz (2012) finds that Qatar's foreign policy has a reputation for being hyperactive. With substantial resources at their disposal, a select group of decision-makers guides policy without the limitations that come with more complex political structures (Ulrichsen, 2012). The limited foreign policy infrastructure allows for quick decisions but slows execution, highlighting the lack of skilled capacity to carry them out (Khatib, 2013). Soft power is vital to understanding Qatar's foreign policy initiative. Peterson (2006) argues that Qatar has employed soft power to further its

prestige and define its nation branding. Qatar's subtle power is dependent on military security, wealth, and branding and active diplomacy (Kamrava, 2015). Therefore, a small state like Qatar can become noticeable in their influence and power through a variety of ways which will be investigated further in the formation of the PD framework.

There were some available critiques on Qatar foreign policy based on media analysis, which are: conflict on the establishment of power, support to Islamist organizations, use of Al-Jazeera to reflect Qatar foreign policy, concern on Qatar foreign policy after taking over the new Emir, Meditation efforts on Qatar foreign policy, and abuse to Humanitarian right. Ultimately, one of the critiques which are an abuse of human rights was chosen for further investigation as a case study which is demonstrated in the crisis of Nepal workers in Qatar for the aim to discuss the role of PD in such a crisis, the negotiations and actions performed to resolve the issue and maintain Qatar reputation and image. Other critiques were the reason for neighbouring countries to execute siege on Qatar in 2017; those two crises were discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. The next chapter will investigate the adoption of Qatar PD in the diplomatic frame in terms of knowledge and practice.

6. CHAPTER 6: ADOPTION OF PD IN QATAR'S DIPLOMATIC FRAME

As evidenced in the literature, there are opportunities as well as challenges in public diplomacy practice. Despite the relative achievements of the State of Qatar in public diplomacy and foreign policy, e.g., mediation effort in the sub-region, there are challenges and limitations that have emerged as a result of its PD practice. These include responding to a challenging environment, cultural divides, conflict of interest and lack of strategic PD. The challenges that States' experience is bound to differ since they inevitably have different interests and therefore different foreign policy strategies. Many states have devised measures in response to such challenges affecting their PD practices. For example, concerning responding to a challenging environment such as the increased influence of non-state actors, states are increasingly acknowledging the influence of non-state actors such as NGOs and working with them because this group can have a significant impact on the publics receptiveness to foreign policy. To reiterate, the primary focus of this thesis is the challenge relating to the lack of strategic PD. The need for a strategic PD is to help improve the understanding and practise of their PD. Having a strategic PD would support mitigating potential challenges of PD, e.g., cultural divides between states.

Strategic PD involves several elements, including developing strategic communication, adopting strategic communication that can help to facilitate positive communication between different parties and establish strategic cooperation and convergence that can achieve long-term results. To ensure it meets the strategic PD and foreign policy targets, the communication should be planned carefully and can employ persuasive messaging style (Wimbush, 2009). Thus, it can be seen that decision-making in foreign policy requires a set of processes (Ahmed, 2020). Therefore, a state risks to lose its position and respect in international affairs if it fails to craft a well-developed foreign policy as it would inevitably be unable to achieve its goals and fundamental national interests.

Hence, in this chapter, the researcher aims to first investigate Qatar's PD in the diplomatic context through interviews for the aim to examine the adoption of PD in Qatar's diplomatic frame; second, it defines PD strategy and mechanism, PD opportunities, challenges and limitations. Herein, the objective is to help enhance Qatar's PD practice through the provision of a framework which can reduce the effect of lack of strategic PD. Ultimately, this chapter will investigate if there is strategic PD defined for the practice of PD in the diplomatic context and will define the main challenges facing PD practice for the aim to consider them to improve the practice of PD. Based on the interview findings, the researcher developed mind maps to represent the opportunities and challenges associated with Qatar PD. It is maintained that the findings of this chapter can be useful to Qatar's foreign policymakers and people working in the public diplomacy sector, e.g.,

diplomats and PD practitioners to recognise the PD challenges face by the state and implement the recommendations on how to enhance the challenges where necessary.

6.1 RESEARCH METHOD OVERVIEW

Due to the shortage of literature on Qatari PD; a combination of data collection methods was used to support and elaborate the study of Qatar PD, including interviews, questionnaires, and case studies. In this chapter, the researcher aims to investigate through a collection of interviews, the knowledge and practice of Qatar PD, its role and challenges. The interviews aimed to investigate Qatar's PD and how it is practised in Qatar diplomatic missions around the world and also to discover the challenges and limitations facing Qatar PD. The main interview objective was to determine a clear picture of Qatar PD strategy, the extent of knowledge and practice of Qatar PD in diplomatic missions, the opportunities, challenges and limitations, which face PD in Qatar and suggestions for improving Qatar PD practice.

McNamara (1999) has defined the interviews as a useful technique to consider the contextual behind the area of research. Some interviews were pre-arranged to be face-to-face, and for some, interview questions were e-mailed, depending on the interviewees' availability. As a result, a combination of structured e-mailed and semi-structured interviews was performed. Semi-structured interviews enable the interviewer to have an open-ended dialogue where the interviewees were provided greater flexibility to expand upon their views. Moreover, it created an opportunity for the interviewer to raise new questions, not in the interview plan based on interviewee's responses. It should be noted that structured interviews are strict to the interview questions which makes it easier for the interviewer to analyse the interview data (Campion, Campion, and Hudson, 1994; Hollowitz and Wilson, 1993; Kumar, 2005; Lindlof and Taylor, 2010). Almost all interviews were in Arabic, but some were conducted in English, depending on the interviewee's preferred language. The interviewees' responses were recorded using the notetaking and coding method. The questions were designed to reflect the interviewees' job position and expertise and the interviewees were allowed to express further their views and remarks (Foddy, 1994).

This research has applied McNamara (1999) interviews process which begins with planning and preparing interviews; into interviewing and recording and finally analysing and deliberating the main findings from the interviews. For interview participants' recruitment, the researcher has taken advantage of his contacts as well as Qatar MOFA support in facilitating the communication with Qatar diplomatic missions abroad.

Interviews were conducted with three classes of interviewees: Qatari diplomats who are the main

PD practitioners, academics and political analysts, and other related experts from Qatar MOFA to a define complete and representative opinions on Qatar PD. Domain experts were chosen according to their respective experience in diplomacy practice, their job titles and responsibilities. Only those who are specialised or can make strategic decisions and actions on PD or foreign policy were interviewed.

Interviewees were purposively sampled and selected according to their availability and willingness to support the research. In several embassies' ambassadors were willing to participate in the research; however, the majority of interviewees chosen were diplomats who have more than five years of experience in the diplomacy field. The interview questions were based on three thematic axes: the strategy of Qatar PD, the mechanism of Qatar PD and the available opportunities, challenges and limitations facing Qatar PD. First, the researcher conducted and analysed 11 interviews with diplomats and ambassadors. Then two political analysts, two academics and three MOFA experts were interviewed see Table 7 and 8. The main outcomes from the interviews which assess PD knowledge and practice were summarised and analysed qualitatively through the stages of the content analysis. The interviews lasted around one hour. The number of interviews were deemed sufficient due to the expert status of the participants. All ethical considerations were put in place and observed in accordance with the University's procedures. Prior to arranging interview dates, all those who participated in the studies were informed about the study goals and asked for their permission to take part in the studies.

TABLE 7: DIPLOMAT PARTICIPANTS

Participants	Role	Years of Experience	Region
P1	The Ambassador of the Embassy of Qatar in Hellenic Republic	10	Europe
P2	First Secretary Embassy of Qatar in the Kingdom of Belgium	7	Europe
P3	Minister Plenipotentiary in the Embassy of Qatar in the United Kingdom	6	Europe
P4	Third Secretary in the Embassy of Qatar in the Republic of Austria	6	Europe
P5	Ambassador Embassy of Qatar in Hungary	7	Europe

P6	Second Secretary of the Embassy of Qatar in the Republic of Philippines	9	Asia
P7	Third Secretary of the Embassy of Qatar in the Islamic Republic of Iran	8	Asia
P8	Third Secretary of the Embassy of Qatar in the Republic of Indonesia	7	Asia
P9	Third Secretary of the Embassy of Qatar in the Republic of the Sudan	10	Africa
P10	Third Secretary of the Embassy of Qatar in the state of Eritrea	8	Africa
P11	Diplomatic Attaché of the Embassy of Qatar in the US	7	America

TABLE 8: ACADEMICS, POLITICAL ANALYSTS AND MOFA EXPERTS' PARTICIPANTS

Participant	Expertise	Role	Years of Experience
P1	Political analyst	Director of Editorial Standards & Quality Department in Al-Jazeera Media Networks	6
P2	Political analyst	Editorial Policy of Editorial Standards in Editorial Standards Department in Al-Jazeera Media Networks	8
P3	Academics	CIRMENA Visiting Fellow	9
P4	Academics	Qatari Academics, Journalist and Novelist	5
P5	MOFA expert	Director of Department of International Technical Cooperation	6

P6	MOFA expert	Director of the Media Office	7
P7	MOFA expert	Training Manager in the Diplomatic Institute	7

6.2 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

The interview questions and the rational for interviewing three set of participants are discussed below.

6.2.1 DIPLOMATS AND AMBASSADORS INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Rationale: The purpose of the interview questions and interviewing various ambassadors and diplomats in different regions is to explore the PD strategy, the mechanisms of PD role of PD and the diversity of PD practice in Qatar towards defining a coherent framework that is compatible of enhancing PD practice for Qatar that can be effectively implemented in most Qatari missions across the globe. Interviewees' responses to this question would enable the researcher to learn the elements that make the strategy for Qatar PD clear or unclear and how the state is benefiting from its PD strategy. It will also help understand diplomats' level of knowledge in Qatar PD. Adopting public diplomacy to help the state enhance its image both regionally and in the international arena provides various opportunities as well as challenges. This knowledge would enable the state to take further steps to strengthen some elements and think of how to reduce the identified challenges and can also help the researcher when developing the proposed strategic framework.

6.2.1.1 CATEGORY 1: THE STRATEGY OF QATAR PD

1. To what extent is the strategy for public diplomacy of the State of Qatar clear and what is the payback on the state of Qatar, especially on nation branding?

6.2.1.2 CATEGORY 2: THE MECHANISM OF PD

2. Who are the primary players in Qatari diplomacy? From your point of view, what are the mechanisms for the application of public diplomacy? And how are they applied and communicated with stakeholders?
3. How do you think mediations undertaken by the State of Qatar to resolve disputes part of the public diplomacy of the State of Qatar and what is the payback to the state?

6.2.1.3 CATEGORY 2: THE OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF QATAR PD

4. What measures do you think the state has in place to support the implementation of public diplomacy, e.g., material support, education? Do you support the states? And what is your reaction to these measures?
5. What are the opportunities and challenges of the public diplomacy of the State of Qatar?
6. What are your recommendations or suggestions to improve and promote the application of public diplomacy of the State of Qatar?
7. What themes are discussed at the annual meeting of the ambassadors with the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs? Do these themes enhance Foreign Policy and PD of the State of Qatar?

6.2.2 ACADEMICS AND POLITICAL ANALYST INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Rationale: Since academics and political analyst are not PD practitioners, they mainly have knowledge about Qatar PD as academic personnel and external observers. Therefore, the purpose of the interview questions is to gather the interviewees' knowledge and insight in relation to the various areas of Qatar PD based on their experience and academic perspectives. This will help the researcher develop an in-depth understanding of Qatar PD and how it is use in the diplomatic framework. The interview questions were based on two axes: the strategy of Qatar PD, and the available opportunities, challenges and limitations facing Qatar PD.

1. How would you describe Qatar PD in general? To what extent is Qatar PD strategy clear, and how is it effectively used in enhancing Qatar diplomacy and foreign policy across the world, for example, in mediations?

2. From your point of view, what do you think are the opportunities, challenges and constraints faced by the PD of the State of Qatar?

3. What are your recommendations or suggestions for improving and promoting the practice of Qatar PD?

6.2.3 MOFA EXPERTS INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Rationale: The purpose of formulating these questions and interviewing MOFA experts who constitute cooperative players working with Qatar PD is to help gain a clear vision and understanding of the process of Qatar PD and its practice, as well as communication within MOFA towards achieving an effective PD practice, i.e., how the ministry of foreign affairs provides directives to Qatar's embassies around the globe and the different departments and their responsibilities in implementing Qatar PD.

Set 1 - Department of International Technical Cooperation:

1. To what extent is Qatar PD strategy clear? And what is the payback for Qatar? What is the role of Qatar's assistance in strengthening the role of PD?

2. What are the challenges and limitations of PD of the State of Qatar? What are your recommendations for improving the practice of Qatar PD?

Set 2 - Media office:

1. What is the role of the media office in supporting Qatar PD? How do you cooperate with embassies abroad on analysing political events and crisis? What research papers or reports on Qatar PD or PD crises, e.g., Nepal have you completed analysing?

2. To what extent is Qatar PD strategy clear? And what is the payback for Qatar?

3. What are the challenges and limitations of PD of the State of Qatar? What are the recommendations for improving the practice of Qatar PD?

Set 3 - Diplomatic Institute:

1. What courses or seminars on foreign policy and PD in Qatar are diplomats required to take before starting a diplomatic mission?

2. Do the diplomats attend special courses to develop particular skills in the custom diplomatic skills of negotiation and public speaking and communication? If yes, what are these courses?

3. What plans are put in place to help develop diplomats' skills annually?

6.3 RESULTS

In this section, the findings of the interviews are discussed according to the abovementioned categories of the interview questions.

6.3.1 THE STRATEGY OF QATAR PD

The literature and interviews conducted visibly demonstrated that there is no clear strategy for Qatar PD outlined by MOFA despite Qatar 2030 vision clearly outlining the MOFA strategy and vision on their website and in written materials. Indeed, some interviewees were not very familiar with the term PD and required some clarification on the difference between PD and Public Relations. For example, the Director of a department thought that "*Qatar PD is the same as MOFA strategy*". Moreover, a number of diplomats had the impression that the goal of Qatar PD strategy "*is to achieve the roadmap set by the Emir regarding the Qatari role in mediation and conflict*

resolution in order to put an imprint on the name of the State of Qatar among the countries of the world". Almost all of the interviewees commented on the importance of PD and its payback in promoting Qatar economic and political interests. Diplomats' knowledge of PD varies according to where they are appointed. The Qatar Embassy diplomats in Europe and USA appeared to have more knowledge of the importance of PD than others, especially in the UK where the embassy was the first and only one that established a PD section responsible for performing PD activities.

Although 64% of interviewed diplomats showed an understanding of the importance of the practice of PD in their missions, there were some missions which were still restricted to using the traditional diplomacy, including the Qatar embassies in Hungary, Indonesia, Eritrea and Sudan. These embassies utilised traditional diplomacy based on promoting cooperation and bilateral relations, especially in the political, economic, education and other fields. In these cases, as an ambassador commented, "*the work of the Ambassador and the diplomatic staff is limited to the implementation of Qatar foreign policy and MOFA strategy, following the rules and regulations set by the MOFA*". The ambassador of the Hellenic Republic and most diplomats commented that they should no longer be confined to traditional diplomacy and that PD should begin to play a significant role in Qatar embassies along with traditional diplomacy.

There were some variations on interviewees' opinion about Qatar PD strategy. For example, a diplomat in Indonesia mentioned that "*there is a clear-cut strategy for PD of Qatar, which is complimentary to all efforts of the state's institutions and agencies*". He went on to state that "*they all endeavour to reflect the bright image of the country in all spheres and this, in turn, enhances the nation branding and gives it a prominent and prestigious standing among nations around the world*". Conversely, a diplomat in Austria commented that "Qatar's *diplomatic strategy relies heavily on the recruitment of soft power and mediation*" which can lead Qatar to become known positively and considered on a global level. A diplomat in Indonesia further provided a general statement on the strategy of Qatar PD which is to "*pursue a well-established policy that achieves the aspiration of the Qatari people, including the promotion of international cooperation with all international and regional organisations for the achievement of world peace*". Its purpose is to consolidate Qatar's multi-lateral relations to serve the objectives of Qatar's public policy and contribute to the development of various fields.

In comparison, diplomats in the UK illustrated that "*the diplomatic missions have many roles starting from representing the country, developing political-economic and cultural relations at a bilateral and multilateral level, promoting the economic developments through the investment opportunities and trade exchanges, organising exhibitions and mutual visits and establishing cooperation between universities and high schools*". All these functions combined many methods used by the PD. For this reason, the embassy of Qatar in London has established a PD section that

is responsible for PD practices, ranging from arranging events that serve PD aims to communicating with the public through social media to promote the image of Qatar in the UK and around the world. However, this action was a personal initiative from the Ambassador and not a strategy explicitly developed by Qatar MOFA. The Ambassador added, "*there are also many actions exercised at the diplomatic level that strengthened PD, including participating in regional and international negotiations, negotiating and concluding regional and international treaties and conventions, complying with obligations regarding the region and the international community, representing Qatar in regional and international organisations and taking positive positions concerning regional and international issues*". In addition, the ambassador of Hungary and the ambassador of Hellenic Republic, the Director of the Media Office and the Director of the department of International Technical Cooperation agreed on the necessity of activating PD within diplomatic contexts.

The Director of the Department of International Technical Cooperation specified that the State of Qatar "*has been following a diplomatic strategy founded on clear principles*, i.e. *the Arab and Islamic principles. Its public diplomacy strategy, notably as a peacemaker, has enabled Qatar to enhance its soft power and global image; it has also clearly shown that Qatar despite its small size can have a great impact in the international arena*". Public diplomacy can be practised in various ways, as the Director of Department of International Technical Cooperation commented, "*Qatar PD operates in two directions, one from the state to people, through state institutions, whether cultural, media or otherwise, and the second from people to people, through civil society organisations, universities, research centres, cultural centres, language institutes and others*".

The State of Qatar has made important PD efforts reaching Arab and international community supports, which contributed positively to its nation branding. The director of the media office claims that Qatar has "*considered PD as one of the most useful tools, in which the principal objective is to communicate, engage, and establish relations with foreign public opinion. There are many key and successful pillars in this effort, which won hearts and minds of many countries and people, starting from the role of Qatar as mediator and peacemaker as well as including its humanitarian aid, and its high-profile status in the cultural and educational field*".

On the other hand, academics and political analyst as observers of Qatar foreign policy and diplomatic directions were primarily unsure about Qatar PD strategy. However, all agreed that Qatar PD is illustrated at multiple different levels: education, cultural, sport, media, economic and investment, political mediations and conference hosting. Moreover, they were in unison in their belief that the State of Qatar had brought a media boom leading to a perceptible media revolution in the Arab world. They maintained that the media revolution was the result of the creation of Al-Jazeera network that became a pioneer in freedom of speech and provided a platform where

political, social and cultural issues that were considered taboos in the past were discussed. A diplomat in Belgium has described "*Al-Jazeera as being Qatar's virtual ambassador by providing a PD presence that aimed to raise Qatar's global profile*". He further illustrated the role of Al-Jazeera "*in promoting the image of a mediator that the State of Qatar has exercised during the last decades in regional politics*".

Indeed, the network has broadcasted Qatar's hosting of peace talks for Lebanon, Sudan, and many other countries and actors, and the prominent debates and conferences about important national, regional and international issues. The diplomat in Belgium further specified that "*Al-Jazeera has promoted the Qatari policy that combines Arab-Islamic Identity with modernity, openness and freedom of expression, which had brought international and Arab public opinion closer to Qatar*". This openness has encompassed social and political openness, liberalising and raising the level of education, promoting the status of women as well as strengthening the freedom of worship. The academics agreed that Qatari nation branding has become more accessible to external public opinion also through the use of other tools and channels of communication such as PD, public relations, trade, tourism, media and marketing, humanitarian initiatives.

6.3.2 PD PLAYER AND MECHANISM OF PD

The majority of diplomats appeared to have limited awareness of mechanisms of PD in Qatar embassies; some described a broad role and practice for PD by involving all government institutions and agencies as well as civil society organisations. Regarding the main player of Qatar PD, the researcher noticed discernible differences in the interviewees' comments. For example, a diplomat defined the main PD players as "*the ministry of foreign affairs which has participated in various international forums, supported and revitalised its membership, in cooperation with international and regional organisations*". These roles reflect the real picture in the application and success of PD through international and regional organisations. An ambassador commented that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is "*the one that guides the ambassadors and provides them with information and political guidance of the State of Qatar and supplies them information about the latest developments and how those developments affect the foreign policy of the stat*e". On the other hand, the director of a department stated that the main player of Qatar PD is "*His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs who presents directives of His Highness the Emir of Qatar through the embassies abroad*". Similarly, the diplomat in Belgium towed the official line by stating that the key players in Qatar PD "*from the internal and foreign policy side are H.H the Emir of the State of Qatar and the other members of the ruling family, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and other ministers and the diplomats*". As well as identifying the main players, the interviewees identified other players involved in

enhancing the PD include "*representatives from the economic, social, cultural, educational, sports and media*". See Table 9 for a list of these players and a brief description of their duties.

Most interviewees agreed that MOFA is a central decision organisation defined by the–Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and the action of PD is performed and carried out by MOFA departments through their daily duties. These departments include:

- Department of International Technical which performs some of the PD actions through their cooperation with worldwide entities and various stakeholders.
- Diplomatic Institute which provides training for MOFA employees, mostly diplomats to upgrade their scientific and practical knowledge and capabilities in performing the Qatari diplomatic role.
- Media office which provides the embassies abroad with the daily news related to Qatar published internationally and regionally. The office provides them with research and reports about important events and crisis as required from embassies or the minister office.

An interview with the Training Manager shows that there is a clear vision for the MOFA Diplomatic Institute, which is to be regionally and internationally prominent in empowering MOFA staff to represent Qatar properly and to perform their job professionally while protecting Qatar interests. He commented, "*the diplomatic institute develops human resources at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and give the diplomats and other staff the tools to better represent the State of Qatar in international forums in accordance with the Qatar National Vision 2030*". This vision was supported by H.E. Sheikh Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Bin Jassim Al-Thani who has publicly stated that "human capital is the real wealth; we have to cooperate in building capacities and to exchange experiences" (Diplomatic Institute, 2017).

The diplomatic institute offers rehabilitation programmes and training methods to develop diplomats' skills in the field of foreign policy and international cooperation. It works in cooperation with other ministries, government agencies, universities, institutes and organisations within and outside the State of Qatar. There are two main courses provided by the diplomatic institutes for diplomats: Comprehensive Training Program for New Diplomats and Training Program for Staff to be appointed to new Foreign Missions. The diplomats' programme provides political principles and diplomacy, in cooperation with Qatar and the country agreements, law and regulations, cultural protocol and profile of the country. Although the programme is comprehensive, the topic of PD is not explicitly involved in the course even though there is an emphasis on public relation and communications. Nevertheless, it appears that there is no annual formal plan to develop diplomats' skills after attending such programmes. However, it should be

noted that there are an abundance of seminars, talks and training courses provided for MOFA employees in different interesting political topics. Moreover, the institute provides political publications including Al-diplomacy magazine, research, reports and books on Qatar diplomacy. The institute is scheduled to expand in the near future to provide post-graduate studies including diploma, Masters and PhD in politics.

Nevertheless, both the media office and diplomatic institute prepare special reports, studies and research papers, books on Qatar foreign policy and international collaboration to assist the process of decision making in MOFA. However, there is no specific research on Qatar PD, although there are some reports done on events and crisis related to Qatar, which led to the need further to investigate Qatar PD and its strategy through interviews. In particular, there is a report on the Nepal crisis performed by media office which provides media analysis of the crisis and offers suggestions to resolve the crisis. However, this report is confidential and was only sent to the Nepal Embassy and Minister's Office.

The academics and political analysts illustrated that the practice of PD relies on a package of fundamentals and policies forged by both the state and the tolerant Islamic faith. It is therefore, quickly and smoothly applied by entities and individuals and can, in turn, be quickly and efficiently communicated to stakeholders anywhere. The State of Qatar practices PD through various fields that have witnessed significant developments. It aims to promote and strengthen its international position through its image-building strategy as one of its foreign policy strategies. A political analyst interviewed described Qatari diplomacy as being characterised by several advantages, the most important of which are: ambition, operation, planning, balance, and openness to a partnership with all, carried out with audacity and self-confidence. The Qatari diplomacy strategy is based on the following: Media Leverage (Al-Jazeera Network), Sports Leverage (Organizing World Cup 2022, BN Network), Educational Leverage (Qatar Foundation), Investment Leverage (diversification of investments, especially in Europe) and Charity Work Bridge (Qatar Charity, Eid Foundation).

He added that Qatar's most essential features in this area are:

- The distinguished relations with the USA as reflected by the largest US airbase outside the United States.
- Active engagement and involvement with the most important European countries (represented by the major Qatari investments in these countries).
- The statement of full independence from its large and influential regional neighbours: Saudi Arabia and Iran.

- The hosting of hundreds of international conferences, symposia and regional and international sporting events.
- The active participation in various UN bodies and close relations with many major international non-governmental organisations.
- The involvement as a mediator and has successfully intervened to resolve many of the most complex regional and international disputes.

On the other hand, another political analyst commented that "*through his follow-up, he has seen shortcomings in the PD of the State of Qatar represented in the weakness of the tools and the lack of representatives of this diplomacy and relying too much on the Al-Jazeera channel*". An additional problem is the separation of the local community from the country's diplomacy. The political analyst continued "*I thought that many Qataris viewed the country's foreign policy as a mystery that carries many risks*". He added, Qatar's PD "*appears to be based on several axes, most notably political relations with the USA, important economic relations with the major countries in Europe, attempting independence from traditional Saudi hegemony over the Gulf states, action to support popular movements against tyranny, relations of mutual benefit with Iran despite differences in Syria and Yemen*". In his assessment, Qatar's PD is clearly defined and evident.

Almost all interviewees focused on the role of Qatari mediation as one of the essential PD mechanisms of the country. They specifically declared that the effectiveness of PD can be measured through the country's achievements in mediation between the conflicting parties in the region. For example, Qatar succeeded in achieving reconciliation between the Lebanese and the Sudanese and mediated repeatedly to release Syrian prisoners or hostages and prisoners of war in Syria. This was approved by most diplomats who emphasised that the Qatari leadership tried to avoid conflicts and sought to build strong relations. Qatari mediation has assumed a prominent position and has become a global experience. It has therefore served as a critical component of Qatar PD.

The Director of the Department of International Technical Cooperation illustrated that mediation as an international principle is preserved in the Charter of the UN Chapter VI. The purpose of mediation is to defuse disputes through mediators. He added that mediation between parties to a conflict lies in the core principles of the Islamic faith as well as Qatari fundamentals. Most interviewees agreed that the main payback of mediations to Qatar is *promoting the stature of the country* and *the country's image* while *building trust* worldwide. Many also support Qatar political lead on mediation and peace-making. Moreover, diplomats in Austria added the payback of mediation for Qatar is that many states *support Qatari politics and rely on Qatar in mediation*.

This was supported by the diplomat in Belgium who stated that "*Qatar has been well-known for the mediations it has undertaken to resolve disputes*". That position enables the country not only to be a bridge between the parties to the conflict or dispute but also between the Arab world and the West. Qatar has implemented its foreign policy aiming at bringing peace and stability to the region. He continued "*Qatar was able to move towards this objective through its national, regional and international activities: international aid, development assistance, mediation and hosting conferences and sports events*". The diplomat in Indonesia similarly stated that "*the State of Qatar has attached importance to mediation to resolve conflicts, and Qatari diplomacy has achieved significant gains in countries that have experienced internal or international conflicts*". The State of Qatar has embarked on the assumption that mediation is the best solution to avoid conflict and to complement its soft power, decrease the number of victims and decrease its human, economic and developmental costs.

In this regard, an academic mentioned that Qatar is rightly seen as a moderate Muslim country. The Qatari authorities, political leaders and other key actors are seen as social and political reformers as they contributed to conflict resolution, mediation, peace-making and efforts in building modern institutions. The diplomatic attaché in the US revealed the positive endeavours and achievements the State of Qatar have gained the support and trust of the international community. Qatar is considered to practice soft power and is known for its international presence and good ties with the world. It can further be highlighted that part of this international role was boosted when Qatar became a member of the UN Security Council in 2006–2007. During this period, Qatar increased its regional mediation and assistance activities.

TABLE 9: SUMMARY OF PLAYERS AND THEIR DUTIES

Player in Qatar PD	Duties
H.H the Emir of the State of Qatar and other members of the ruling family	They are the key actors in Qatar public diplomacy and are responsible for making significant decisions in foreign policy strategies. They also give directives to the minister of foreign affairs. Their duties also include attending important forums and conferences such as the Doha forum.
The Prime Minister	The prime minister comes after the Emir of the State of Qatar. The prime minister works with the Emir overseas some of his daily work.

His Excellency Minister of State for Foreign Affairs	The minister is responsible for guiding the ambassadors and providing information relating to new developments and how such developments impact Qatar's foreign policy. The minister also gives political guidance to ambassadors and diplomats.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs	They are responsible for implementing and ensuring the success of Qatar public diplomacy and foreign policy in the international and regional organisations. Their role also includes taking part in and giving other staff the tools required better to represent the State of Qatar in various international forums.
Other Ministers	They are responsible for supporting the effective implementation of Qatar PD practice concerning their ministries.
Ambassadors and Diplomatic Staff	Work of the ambassador and the diplomatic staff is limited to implementing the general policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the strategy of the state's foreign policy, following the rules and regulations specified by the ministry.
MOFA Departments, e.g. Department of International Technical, Diplomatic Institute and Media Office	They are responsible for improving the action of public diplomacy; for example, developing human resources at the ministry of foreign affairs and providing daily international and regional news to embassies around the globe, provide training programs and techniques.
Actors in the Economic, Social, Cultural, Educational Fields, Sports and Media Organisations	They are involved in improving Qatar's public diplomacy such as economic development; its key investments are in education, health care system and culture.

Civil society organisations	Support the state in their PD practice implementation.
Al-Jazeera	Promote the Qatari development to a broad regional and international audience, broadcasting about its economic and political development, investment and culture.

6.3.3 THE OPPORTUNITIES OF QATAR PD

Adopting PD practice presents various opportunities that would help a state enhance its image both at regional and international level. After analysing the gathered interview data, four main factors were identified as opportunities that are linked to Qatar PD practice. In the following sub-sections, discussion on the main factors and some of their associated elements and comments from the interview participants will be presented.



FIGURE 8: QATAR PD: OPPORTUNITIES

6.3.3.1 FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Embassies around the global: Qatar has been working diligently on its international image using various resources. Qatar has provided and continues to provide support in different areas in the PD context both in the regional and international level. The majority of the interviewees agreed that PD opportunities resulted from Qatar being a wealthy country. For instance, one political analyst commented, "*Qatar possesses large gas reserves, and this has indirectly enabled it to build real diplomatic experience and clout*". The availability of financial resources has led Qatar

to provide useful and timely financial support for various activities through their embassies abroad. As a diplomat pointed out, "*the support provided by the state in this respect varies commensurately with the different countries involved and depends on which countries, their priorities and needs*". Another diplomat commented, "*affluent countries may not need to be rendered much support; but underprivileged countries, on the other hand, do require considerable assistance, through financial or other means*". Qatar's goal for targeting and providing support to developing countries is to promote peace and stability and to help deter crimes and extremism.

Targeted development assistance: Regarding its targeted development assistance, Qatar focuses on two main areas, i.e., in the social field and in sports. Taking sports as an example, a diplomat commented, "*the State of Qatar also has invested in all areas of sports diplomacy: organising international competitions, developing sports internally (e.g., in sports academies, sports centres, organising important tournaments and building and improving sports infrastructure), sponsoring several sports competitions or entities, obtaining exclusive broadcasting rights for international competitions and purchasing foreign sports entities*". Qatar has also invested heavily in their upcoming World Cup 2022 organisation (Berger, 2019). There is no specific support for the implementation of PD as it is a pillar of its general policy applied at the internal level and in all its accredited diplomatic missions around the world. A diplomat commented, "*Qatar has invested and developed its country to let its citizens and foreigners enjoy high-level standards of living and offers centres of culture and education as well as finance*".

Qatar is also providing support and investment in the social field. A diplomat commented, "*the state supports through building hospitals and investments for countries, and support is general and does not apply to specific countries, but according to the country's needs and geography*". A director of a department "*outlined that Qatar provided support through targeted development assistance, and there are priorities in support among countries*". There are many support initiatives in the social field at the international level, including the initiative of Her Highness Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser on "protecting education in conflict and insecurity", which deals with protecting and supporting the promotion of the right to education in areas affected by crises and wars. The Reach Out to Asia (ROTA) aims to provision societies to overcome difficulties in education for all. The Silatech initiative offers scholarships for young people in the entire Arab world; the foundation supports projects run by young people and the initiative of "science kid". It is an international enterprise to promote the rights of children whose education has been disrupted due to conflict, war and natural disasters, as well as groups that may face particular challenges to education such as girls, persons with disabilities and minorities.

6.3.3.2 PEACE BUILDING

Qatar PD practice has enabled the state to be a key stakeholder in peacebuilding, especially in regional and international conflicts. Such efforts have led Qatar to contribute significantly to both regional and global stability. As a diplomat commented, "*Qatar plays a greater role in building peace and maintaining regional and global stability, especially in the Middle East Region, which has become at a crossroads, after sectarian divisions and the phenomenon of terrorism that has become apparent some countries such as (Iran - Syria - and Iraq)*". As pointed out earlier in this thesis, Qatar is well-recognised for its mediation efforts to resolve conflicts. A diplomat in Belgium commented, "*Qatar has implemented its foreign policy aiming at bringing peace and stability to the region*". Qatar's peacebuilding efforts have brought various opportunities from countries around the globe, for example, enabling it to amass *public sympathy* and *global recognition*. As Qatar is seen as a moderate Muslim country "*the Qatari authorities, political leaders and other key actors are seen as social and political reformers as they contributed to conflict resolution, mediation, peace-making and efforts in building modernise institution*".

6.3.3.3 POSITIVE IMPACT IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

Qatar's public diplomacy has made a positive impact internationally. For example, it has strengthened the national identity, removed the negative stereotype, enhanced the impact of foreign policy and built relationships with various countries, promoted economic and political interests abroad and attracts foreign investment. As one diplomat commented, "*The Qatari PD, besides gaining the support of other nations by participating in the international community, its PD has rightly promoted the image of Qatar".* A diplomatic attaché added that *"Qatar is considered to practice soft power and is known for its international presence and good ties with the world. We can highlight that part of this international role was boosted when Qatar became a member of the UN Security Council in 2006–2007".* The positive impact of Qatar's PD has helped the state *"earn the support and trust of the international community".*

6.3.4 CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF QATAR PD

With regards to the challenges and limitations facing Qatar PD, the interview findings revealed five main categories of challenges. However, the findings also showed that some diplomats declared that Qatar PD faces no real challenges and limitations since Qatar is a modern country in continuous development. The majority of interviewed diplomats have outlined the following areas in which PD challenges could be faced: Qatar is new in the field of PD and relies mainly on

traditional diplomacy, the effect of policy changes that occurred in Qatar, globalisation effect which might affect Qatar political direction and raise new challenges, cultural divide, lack of knowledgeable diplomats on PD and lack of strategic response to crises and disasters. In the sub-sections below, a discussion on these factors and some of their associated elements are provided.



FIGURE 9: QATAR PD: CHALLENGES

6.3.4.1 LACK OF HUMAN RESOURCES

Human resources refer to the individuals that make up the employees working to enforce Qatar PD practice. When it comes to enforcing public diplomacy activities, human resource variables are essential (Al-Muftah, 2018). An essential human resource factor which is relevant here is knowledge. The lack of knowledge could hinder awareness of various PD practice. When those working to enforce Qatar PD lack adequate knowledge and experience regarding the available strategies, this can profoundly affect its implementation success. A political analyst commented, "*the lack of human resources for the state hinders its ability to pay attention and follow up on many files relating to Qatar PD*". Qatar has put in place some measures to help tackle this challenge through different institutes, as commented by a diplomat in Belgium "*the diplomat institute develops human resources at the Foreign Affairs Ministry and give the diplomats and other staff the tools to better represent the State of Qatar in international forums*". Also, in terms of representations, a political analyst highlighted how this affects PD implementation "*The shortcomings in the public diplomacy of the State of Qatar, is represented by the weakness of the tools and the overall lack of representatives for this diplomacy*".

6.3.4.2 MEDIATION EFFORT

Qatar has played a key mediation role in regional conflicts which help the state gain both region and international support and recognition. However, due to the lack of human and economic

capacity, the state's engagement in different conflicts at the same time can be challenging, as one diplomat observed, "*the only limitations are the need to respond immediately to simultaneous catastrophes befalling more than one country*". Qatar's mediation efforts can negatively impact its relationship with other states as commented by another diplomat who found that "*Qatar faces challenges that are mainly the strained relations with its neighbours, for example, the UAE and Saudi Arabia*". According to (Barakat, 2014), the tense relations between Qatar and Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have undermined its regional negotiation efforts, as was seen throughout the state's endeavours to mediate a truce between Israel and Hamas throughout the latest conflict. Another challenge in their mediation effort is "*the extent of its willingness to give Al-Jazeera network complete freedom in dealing with Arab affairs and the political problems that this will cause*".

6.3.4.3 GLOBALISATION EFFECT

The globalisation effect was another prominent challenge identified by the interviewees. For instance, a diplomat commented that "*the onset of globalisation made the world look like a large village. Any incident or crisis which affects a remote country in the West concerns us in the East*". Qatar shares the sufferings of Muslim brothers and its neighbours and seeks to alleviate their plight by providing them with financial and political support. Moreover, another diplomat found that "*the State of Qatar is aware that its policy changes are unacceptable to regional parties and governments in some countries of the world, which will inevitably affect the bilateral relations between some countries of the world that do not politically, agree with the State of Qatar*".

6.3.4.4 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IMPACT

Another challenge identified from the analysis is global terrorism impact. International terrorism "*has become one of the most prominent issues in the international arena*". Diplomatic work in relation to migration or refugees has become one of the essential international files in the diplomatic field. A diplomat commented, "*the crises of refugees occurred after the emergence of some Arab and Islamic regimes which are working to suppress politicians and citizens in their countries to maintain the throne of power, e.g., Syria, Yemen and Iraq*".

6.4 AMBASSADORS ANNUAL MEETING

In regard to the annual meeting of the ambassadors with the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, the interviewed ambassadors outlined that many important subjects have been discussed in the meeting starting from the latest developments in the international political and economic affairs, Qatar's foreign policy towards international cooperation, humanitarian and development assistance, to regional and international challenges and concerns for countering terrorism and violent extremism and recommending effective solutions and strategies of actions. The meetings

also aimed at developing a mechanism for the development of diplomatic relations and developing a clear road map for the signing of memorandums of understanding and agreed on projects. This is done through sharing communication with diplomats regarding the guiding principles and roles of Qatari diplomats and consular missions towards international interactions, identifying the latest foreign policy concerns regarding current events at the international level. Workshops have followed meetings for each department in the ministry.

The Director of the department of international technical cooperation clarified that the annual meeting provides consistency in institutional work in the ministry for a unified performance as well as discussion of regional and international challenges. The annual meeting also provides a key opportunity to share communication and clarification on the requirements and strategies of action. However, following the meeting, there is no mechanism for following cumulative problems and action taken, diagnosis of challenges and defining requirements. Therefore, the ambassador of Hungary emphasised the need for more meetings so that the picture becomes clear, and the political traditions are established, and tasks, directives and commitments are defined. As a result, the researcher concluded that the annual meeting should discuss several issues, including the PD role, especially in the crisis.

6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the analysis of the interview data, this section provides additional discussions on interviewees' point of view and recommendations to help enhance Qatar PD.

- Some interviewees recommended modernising Qatar's PD further by investing and adopting the e-diplomacy practice. E-diplomacy is defined as 'nations' use of technology to identify and determine diplomatic goals and priorities, as well as to effectively carry out diplomats' functions' (Al-Muftah, 2018 p.502). As a diplomat commented, "*the virtual world including the use of social media is presently a very significant tool at all political, economic and social level*". Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched in February 2016 its official Instagram account to keep up-to-date with the latest developments in the online space. This was following the Ministry's strategy, which focuses on taking advantage of modern technology and innovations. The Ministry signed in March 2016 an agreement with Qatar Telecom Ooredoo to establish an electronic network that connects more than 100 Qatari diplomatic missions around the globe to the headquarters. The network provides voice and video teleconferencing services. Qatar's interest in virtual diplomacy comes as a result of its increasing diplomatic presence in the international arena and its growing awareness of the need to work on building modern infrastructure to ensure that all diplomatic missions of the

State of Qatar continue to receive and exchange information and provide consultation and updates with Headquarters.

- Some interviewees also suggested involving more young people in Qatar's public diplomacy activities. Young people can be considered when developing strategic communication to promote a new or advanced an existing government policy. As a diplomat commented, "*to help improve the practice of PD, more young people need to be engaged in Qatar's PD activities*". He continued "*the youth are active, robust and their engagement will accelerate PD processes and promote its outcomes*". In this respect, Brown et al. (2009) have argued the significance of equipping or educating and training young people to be successful ambassadors for their countries, whether at home or abroad. Young people can be engaged through various means, for example, the internet using social media and educational institutions. Indeed, according to (Brown et al. 2009), in addition to being a powerful tool for young people to be educated about global issues problems, global and cultural interaction can also be a chance for them to learn how to interact and collaborate with people from diverse cultures and backgrounds. This is essential for modern public diplomacy, as it could lead to partnerships being established and national goals achieved.
- Some interviewees recommended learning from experience. As a political analyst commented, "*enhancing Qatar PD through building on and developing past experience, benefiting from the experiences of expatriates, and rigorous planning and balancing between ambition and realism*". This recommendation is in line with the work by (Cull, 2007) who claimed that the PD field currently lacks a basic collection of effective and ineffective cases that might be employed as a foundation by PD practitioners. Cull proposed that a larger-scale project be launched to continue the research started in his study and collect previous experience from across the global in PD practise into a 'Public Diplomacy Playbook' as a tool for building capacity at home and empowering those we want to empower. Similarly, (Henrikson, 2006) recommends that older techniques can be revived and implemented in new circumstances, including some of the circumstances we are experiencing today that are not entirely uncommon.
- The diplomats strongly recommend initiating a PD section in each embassy which would play a more prominent role in introducing Qatar positively to the public and managing the process of PD and its activities in cooperation with other Qatar attachés and diplomat in the diplomatic field. Also, recommended was for the state of Qatar to reflect how the world is changing into their PD practice. As a political analyst commented, "*perhaps the central idea that all the regional powers should work on is to develop their concepts and tools in line with the transformed world that began in the wake of the explosion of popular revolutions in the region and the subsequent changes in the power systems and their relations therein*".

6.6 DISCUSSION

In this chapter, the researcher has investigated Qatar's PD practice by conducting interviews with diplomats, ambassadors, political analysts, academics and MOFA employees. The interviews aimed to collect data on how PD is implemented in Qatar's diplomatic frame and also interviewees' views on Qatar PD strategy, PD opportunities and challenges. The interviews findings indicated that there are opportunities as well as challenges associated with the state's PD practice and that Qatar has put in place a strategy for its PD practice. The interviewees identified four factors as main opportunities associated with Qatar PD, i.e., peacebuilding, positive impact in the international community, financial support and complex relationships with powerful nations. Regarding challenges associated with PD, an additional five factors were identified, i.e., challenges in relation to their mediation efforts, lack of human resources, the effect of globalisation, international terrorism impact and a lack of strategic response. In this discussion, the researcher evaluates whether and how the interviewees mention the PD principles, dimensions and mechanisms discussed in Chapter 4. See Table 10 for further information.

TABLE 10: PD PRINCIPLES, MECHANISMS AND DIMENSIONS COVERED BY INTERVIEWEES

PD principles, mechanisms and dimensions		
	Factors	**How the factors were covered**
PD principles	Credibility	The principle of credibility was covered when interviewees discussed Qatar's mediation efforts in both regional and international communities. Credibility enables others to see or perceived one positively. The interviewees mentioned that Qatar had improved its credibility when all the restrictions in relation to regional gulf news were lifted; this help assured the public that the state has nothing to hide. Also, Qatar's PD includes many development initiatives; this can be seen in their contribution and efforts in developing various sectors in the country and their development efforts abroad, as mentioned by interviewees. This has improved the public's trust in the government. This was covered when interviewees discussed Qatar PD strategy. Additionally, Qatar's PD strategy includes participation in the regional and international arena, e.g.,

		their mediation efforts, which have greatly increased Qatar's image and credibility.
	Discussion	The principle of discussion was covered when interviewees were explaining various PD activities. For example, the state adopted conference diplomacy, which involved organising and hosting conferences between various organisations and nations. Meeting and discussing pressing topics face-to-face help enhance international relations and resolve crises. This principle was central to Qatar's mediation efforts, as different stakeholders come together and discuss the plight of a particular state. Interviewees stated that discussion was a crucial factor in Qatar reconciliation efforts between the Lebanese and the Sudanese, and this led to an arguably positive outcome. The dialogue was also mentioned, for example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar undertook essential political tours to dialogue with the public intending to re-instate the Qataris believe and confident in the foreign policy of the state and include the public in the states diplomacy activities.

	Partnership	The interviewees widely covered the principle of partnership, and most of them commented that openness to partnership is a crucial feature in Qatar public diplomacy. This approach enables the state to achieve key milestones in their PD activities. For example, Qatar's economic and political relations with several important countries such as Germany, France and even American institutions, enabled the state to confront the measures of the blockading countries. This principle was also demonstrated when Qatar's Minister of Foreign Affairs partnered with its US counterpart and signed a new agreement to help combat terrorism and its related activities. At the local level, some departments at the MOFA work in partnership and cooperation with other ministries, government agencies, universities, institutes and organisations within Qatar to develop employees' skills in the field of foreign policy and international cooperation. Additionally, the principle of partnership was displayed in Qatar's mediation activities. Partnership played a significant part in promoting mediation by assisting various parties to coordinate and cooperate with the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as engage in Friends of Mediation Group. Qatar's active involvement in various United Nations bodies and close relations with many major international non-governmental organisations has demonstrated its adopt of partnership principle.
PD mechanisms	Cultural and Sports Diplomacy	The interviewees emphasised how cultural diplomacy was one of the key focus for the state through various activities, initiatives, and events, both internally and abroad. For example, the state has established museums to help promote Qatari culture. Also, through sports diplomacy, the state promotes its cultural image, especially to foreign publics and attracts tourists from around the global.

	Politics and Economy	The interviewees talk about Qatar's actions towards developing political-economic promoting the economic developments by investment and involving in trade exchanges, organising exhibitions, mutual visits, establishing cooperation between universities and high schools. The interviewees also mentioned that the states used economic diplomacy both for economic gains and to promote its public diplomacy. At the educational level, the state has invested in various aspects of education, for example, the presence of foreign universities and having international students in Qatar; students exchange has been soft public diplomacy to connect the Arab countries to the Western countries. In terms of using the media to promote, advocate and get support for its public diplomacy, the interviewees talked about how Qatar brought media revolution and pioneer freedom of speech through the establishment of Al-Jazeera which plays a significant role in shaping the publics minds.
PD dimensions	Daily communications	Al-Jazeera has been and continues to be used to broadcast daily to both regional and international audiences. The interviewees talked about how the platform is used to discuss political, social and cultural issues daily. The interviewees also talked about how the MOFA used the PD dimensions of daily communication through its media office to provide its embassies and diplomats around the world daily published international and regional news relating to Qatar. The embassies are also provided reports about important events for the employees to act on or be informed.
	Strategic communications	The interviewees mentioned how communication is a significant aspect in public diplomacy. Strategic communication can be employed to help reach different audiences through various channels, especially in this digital era. For example, Qatar has positively used social

		media, to defend itself from the siege countries by sending messages clarifying the claims made against them and promote its public diplomacy. Also, Qatar has made its nation branding available to the external public using different communication platforms. The official representation of Qatar embassies, consulates and permanent missions used the internet and various technology platforms to help improve public diplomacy. Moreover, such platforms have helped these diplomats to keep up to date with information relevant to their work.
	Permanent relationships	The interviewees mentioned a permanent relationship as a PD dimension. This was emphasised when they talked about the state's economic diplomacy strategy to promote its public diplomacy and established good relationships with various countries. For example, Qatar has built well-known relations with the US and most European nations, for example, the UK; this is showed through significant Qatari investments in these countries. The state continues to work on strengthening these relations, e.g., in their annual ambassadors' meeting, a key focused is on how to raise investments and trade exchange with friendly countries.

6.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY

Although there is a lack of research on Qatar PD, MOFA has defined Qatar's PD parameters and primary characteristics. However, interviews conducted show limited awareness and vision on Qatar PD strategy in the diplomatic framework, and this was one of the main challenges facing Qatar PD. This has led to a lack of process for Qatar PD, its mechanism and practice, within MOFA vision. The interviews highlighted a number of challenges and limitations facing Qatar PD including, lack of clear strategy for Qatar PD, Globalisation effect, Cultural divide, lack of knowledgeable diplomats on PD, Lack of strategic response to crisis and disasters.

Moreover, the interviews findings outlined that the main PD opportunities resulted from Qatar financial resources which have led Qatar to provide useful financial support for various PD activities. Nevertheless, most interviewees recognised the importance of PD and recommended

involving PD actively in the diplomatic framework. This could happen by the empowerment of Qatar PD in the diplomatic framework and has led the researcher to investigate the PD role in the major political crisis as a case study. The researcher will discuss these crises in detail in the next two chapters.

7. CHAPTER 7: NEPALESE CASE STUDY OF QATAR CRISIS

This chapter explores the case study of Nepalese workers' abuse. It analyses the crisis through a multi-level approach consisting of a media analysis, questionnaires, and interviews with related parties to discover in-depth the dimension of the crisis and how Qatar has dealt with it and whether PD has played a crucial part in the crisis. The investigation undertaken in this chapter seeks to more succinctly define the role of PD during the crisis for the purpose of promoting the Qatari image positively worldwide.

The aim of the study is to look into the role of PD in such crisis, the negotiations, actions, and strategies chosen to resolve the issue and maintain Qatar's reputation and image. In Section 7.1, brief background information on Nepal labour migration to Qatar and the crisis facing the Nepalese workers while in the country is provided. In the research overview section, the research methods adopted in this chapter and how the methods were implemented is discussed. In the result section, the outcome of the media analysis, interviews and questionnaires will be presented. Finally, the discussion section presents the theoretical frameworks and PD models that Qatar used as public diplomacy strategies during the crisis.

7.1 NEPALESE CRISIS IN BRIEF

The history of Nepalese labour migration can be traced back to the previous century (Nepal Ministry of Labour and Employment (MLE) (2013). The initial record of labour permits issued by the Nepalese government demonstrates that in 1993/94, 3,605 Nepalis left for foreign jobs, including in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Gurung, 2004). Qatar has been among the greatest appealing destination for international labour migrants in Nepal since 1993 (Nepal Ministry of Labour and Employment (MLE) (2013), and according to (Sedhai, 2015), after Malaysia, Qatar is the second largest job destination for Nepalis. While Nepal has established various labour migration policies and legislative rules, the deficiencies and loopholes in their implementation adversely affect the rights and protection of migrant workers going to work abroad (Nepal Ministry of Labour and Employment (MLE) (2013). As a result, Nepalese workers in foreign countries continue to face a litany of challenges. Qatar is one such example of a country where Nepalese workers endured various challenges.

Qatar ranks high in the world of immigrants-citizens ratio with 90% of the workforce being comprised of immigrants. The Nepalese comprise 40% of foreign workers in Qatar, where through the year 2012, 100,000 Nepalese migrated to work in Qatar (Meier, 2015; Gibson and Pattisson, 2016). As a whole, there are an estimated 400,000 Nepali migrants, and they represent the largest single contingent of overseas workers in Qatar (Bruslé, 2012). Most migrants work in the construction sector. The protection and security of Nepali migrants in Qatar and other Gulf

nations have emerged in recent years as the most crucial issue, with some rights groups comparing their condition to 'modern-day slavery (Sedhai, 2015). Donini, (2019) stated that sponsorship contracts are frequently ambiguous and represent a contemporary version of forced labour, if not slavery. The Nepalese workers faced many challenges, including lower salaries compared to what they were promised or unpaid wages, and seizure of travel documents by their bosses. The feeling of exploitation becomes evident, in certain instances, when migrants learn that their working conditions are not conducive and salaries are far smaller than what was agreed or detailed on their contracts that they are not allowed to change employers or jobs until the employer signs a waiver of release, and they are not allowed to leave the country without an exit permit, which is withheld to force migrants to act (Donini, 2019).

7.2 RESEARCH METHOD OVERVIEW

Due to limited nature of research conducted on the Nepalese crisis, the researcher performed media analysis and gathered information about the crisis from various sources. The researcher mainly relied on media analysis, interviews and questionnaires to help gather information relating to the crisis. For the media analysis, reports from various media sources were gathered and analysed, including both local and foreign media. The media analysis is based on media records gathered and analysed from political reports, broadcasts and news published in international and local news agencies for the GCC countries, local and international newspapers, and academic centres and institutes including Chatham House and Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). The researcher only included reports published from (2012 to 2019). The aim was to cover reports that were only reported during the crisis and not before or after. Newspapers included in the analysis include the British Guardian and Sky News Arabic. Also, a report by a panel of the Pravasi Nepali Coordination Committee was included in the review.

To further investigate further Nepal workers crisis in Qatar, interviews were held with related personnel and organisations in both Qatar and Nepal. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with interviewees, and questions were designed based on their area of proficiency. As a pilot study and as an initial state of the investigation, from a Qatari perspective, interviews were conducted with previous Qatar's Ambassador to Nepal, and Qatar's Counsellor to Nepal. The interviews aim to provide a better understanding of the Nepalese workers' crisis, its international implications, the PD and diplomatic role in the crisis, negotiations and action performed to solve this crisis in both countries.

The interviews seek to examine each country's views on how effective the actions were in solving the issues. Both sides are consulted for their suggestions on the best way of solving the workers'

issues in Qatar, with a focus on maintaining diplomatic relations, preserving both human rights and the right of employers, and maintaining the reputation of Qatar. Such in-depth elite interviews are expected to yield special insider knowledge, which will be used in concert with other data and compared and contrasted with it in order to achieve triangulation. The interviews were arranged to be conducted in-person. The interviews lasted for around one hour and note-taking was the primary method for recording the interviews.

1. Qatar's Former Ambassador to Nepal.
2. Qatar's Counsellor to Nepal.
3. Nepal's Labour Attache' to Qatar.

Subsequently, the questionnaires were designed to help gather both the workers and their employers' views on Qatar's efforts concerning the crisis of Nepal workers and its consequence on Qatar. There is a broad literature considering the design of the questionnaire; examples include Jeffrey (1986), Fischer and Rohs (1985), Sudman (1982) and Leedy (1997). Most agreed on the need to consider the following guidelines while designing questionnaires: the questionnaire should reflect and attain the research aim; use appropriate sampling, distribution and collection method; and the use of simple and understandable language. The researcher has considered the above guidelines in the development of the questionnaires to ensure effective and reliable questionnaire are developed as much as possible.

The questionnaire completed by Nepali workers in Qatar aimed to draw a profile of workers knowledge on various aspects, (i) their rights and whether they are abused in Qatar, (ii) the problems they encounter and (iii) whether Qatar government provided them with their rights especially after the crisis of Nepal workers. Additionally, Qatari employers and the owners of companies have completed a separate questionnaire, which seeks to assess (i) their knowledge and awareness of worker's rights, (ii) their vision of the best process to ensure worker rights is balance with their rights and their profit outlook and (iii) their opinion on Qatar government actions towards the Nepal crisis.

The questionnaires are applied with a random sample of public workers in Qatar and Qatari employers and were designed in multiple languages, i.e., English and Arabic, to give participants an appropriate choice of language. It was created using easy language and straightforward questions to guarantee reliable outcomes. The questionnaires were sensibly planned and reviewed by the academic and PD expert Dr Jamal Abdullah to provide an effective design and then they were pilot tested on a sample of participants. The outcome of such activity was used to enhance the questionnaire further before the final version was produced to ensure it effectively attain its purpose. The questionnaire has taken advantage of the researcher's connection with the pointed businesses in Qatar. The questionnaires were controlled by the researcher and distributed

manually or through e-mail depending on the participants' preference. Three hundred questionnaires were distributed. Contributed institutes show enough support to the research leading to an acceptable response rate of 100 participants from Nepalese workers in Qatar companies, i.e., Dandy food company and Al-Shamel cleaning service. 100 Qatari employers from different companies, including Dandy food company, Al-Oma printing and Al-Shamel cleaning service completed the questionnaire. Finally, all responses were gathered and analysed quantitatively.

7.3 RESULTS

In this section the outcome of the media analysis, interviews and questionnaires are presented.

7.3.1 MEDIA ANALYSIS

There was a marked conflict and contrast in the way the media covered the Nepalese crisis, between the Qatari and other international press which erupted in 2012. The Qatari press desperately defended the country, adamantly stating that it did not violate workers' rights. The press contended that the disclosed statistics, which revealed enormous numbers of deaths of the Nepalese workers, were fabricated. Indeed, some of the Qatari press described the crisis as a "suspicious media campaign" aimed at spoiling the World Cup in 2022 (NHRC, 2013; Sky News Arabic, 2014).

Foreign newspapers attacked Qatar, issuing reports on the Nepalese workers and their plight while trying to complete the World Cup 2022 projects in Qatar. This media war began with a report in 2012 by the British Guardian, which revealed information and stories depicting the situation of Nepalese workers in Qatar. The report stated that during the summer in Qatar, the mortality rate for Nepalese workers reached the rate of one per day. The Nepalese Embassy in Qatar revealed that 44 people who worked on the construction of facilities for hosting the World Cup in 2022 died in the period between June 24th to August 4th. It was further stated that more than half of them died due to cardiac arrest or during work (Gibson and Pattisson, 2016; Stephenson, 2015).

According to the Guardian investigation, the Nepalese workers lived in conditions comparable to slavery as defined by the International Labour Organization. The report confirmed that many of the workers were not paid their salaries for two months; since the employers feared that the workers would flee once they were paid. It was also reported that their passports were confiscated, and they were deprived of Qatari cards, putting them in an awkward legal position. The working conditions were characterised by cruelty and exploitation. As a result, 30 Nepalese workers had fled to the Nepal embassy in Doha to flee from the rigours of work. The British newspaper said it had spoken to several workers on the conditions they were experiencing, which they described as inhumane (Meier, 2015; Gibson and Pattisson, 2016; LISI, 2016).

The Higher Committee organising the World Cup in Qatar in 2022 expressed concern about the accusations in the press against the contracting companies and stressed that the government should investigate the matter. The report stated that workers suffered from debt, that their wages remained unpaid, and that their travel documents were seized from their employers. Consequently, as they could not leave and were forced to work, they were considered as modern-day slaves (Kittaneh, 2013; Sky News Arabic, 2014; Booth, 2016). A separate report published in 2014 by a panel of the Pravasi Nepali Coordination Committee, in defence of human rights, presented a list of workers who were victims, using official sources in Doha. The report declared that more than 400 Nepalese workers had died on construction sites for the World Cup in Qatar. The Pravasi Committee sought, through this report, to put pressure on the Qatari authorities and the International Federation of Football Association (FIFA) to work to reduce the number of deaths, which some warned could reach 4,000 people by 2022. Also, the Director of International Organisation for Anti-Slavery expressed the opinion that the staggering number of deaths of workers means this is not forced labour, but slavery, with human beings treated as tools (Kittaneh, 2013; Booth, 2016). According to a statistical report published by Nepalese Ministry of Labour and Employment, the most reported deaths at work from the period (2008-2014) were in Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In Qatar, the number of deaths reached 739 compared to 880 in Saudi Arabia and 1121 in Malaysia. Statistics showed that the number of labour deaths had increased dramatically to reach a 70% increase from 2010 to 2014 after Qatar won the World Cup bid (MLE, 2013; Kittaneh, 2013; Sky News Arabic, 2014).

According to The Guardian, an investigation revealed that foreign workers lived in overcrowded dwellings where health standards were non-existent, and there were no air conditioners, despite the very high degree of heat. In addition, there were drainage problems. Some of the workers lived in camps where electricity was not available, and there was no running water. Salil Shetty, Secretary-General of Amnesty International, declared that there was no reason for rich countries like Qatar to abuse foreign labour and offer them low salaries (Sky News Arabic, 2014). As a result of the reports, some demanded the withdrawal of Qatar's right to host the World Cup. Theo Zwanziger, who was a senior FIFA official, has opposed giving Qatar the right to host the World Cup. He stated that such a decision would mean simply not shedding light on these problems. FIFA president Sepp Blatter declared that it was a mistake to select Qatar to be the host of the 2022 World Cup because of its hot weather without mentioning the issue of foreign labours abuse (Gibson, 2016). Nevertheless, the International Trade Union Confederation general secretary, Sharan Burrow believes that FIFA should influence to create a real revolution in Qatar for the migrant workers (Rumsby, 2014; Booth, 2016).

Additionally, Qatar faced other issues with regards to hosting FIFA 2022; one of them was the accusations of corruption around the controversial bidding process. However, FIFA's ethics

committee has investigated the case, and the bidders for 2022 World Cups have denied any offence, as have the FIFA executives who voted at the time (Rumsby, 2015; Withnall, 2015; BBC, 2014). However, despite all claims, Qatar has been acknowledged to host the 2022 World Cup after FIFA's report, which states that some violations were of extremely restricted scope (Gibson, 2016).

Moreover, Theo Zwanziger, who was a senior FIFA official, stated that the union would do unannounced visits to sites to ensure respect for workers' rights. However, some human rights experts still had doubts and declared that this action might not have been enough to ensure human rights concerned with workers, and those who had repeatedly expressed their fears of the conditions in Qatar where the workers remain linked to their sponsor are addressed (Fifield, 2016). Accordingly, the Qatari authorities who are organising the World Cup published detailed responses in the hope that these would answer the concerns raised (Kittaneh, 2013; Sky News Arabic, 2014; LISI, 2016).

In May 2014, the Qatari government agreed to the sponsorship system in order to develop the Qatar image in international public opinion. In October 2015, the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad approved the new sponsor law. The new law recognises the employee and eliminates the reference to the sponsor. The new law cancels the sponsorship system and replaces it with contracts that define the association among the sponsor and the sponsored, i.e., between the employer and the employee. This allows the employee to change his job without requiring the consent of the original employer after five years of work with his or her employer unless the contract provides a specific time (LISI, 2016; Al-Khatib, 2015; Rai, 2015).

Moreover, foreign workers are no longer required to obtain the employer's consent in advance of leaving the country. If the employer does not object within three days, the employee is entitled to leave the Qatar without obtaining prior authorisation from the contractor or employer. Furthermore, employers were asked to deposit employees' wages in banks, and sanctions were increased on employers who held their workers' passports. The head of the National Committee for Human Rights in Qatar, Ali bin Smaikh Marri, has described the new law as positive since it will enhance the human rights situation in Qatar (Al-Khatib, 2015). Be that as it may, the new laws will not come into effect before 2017. One of the European lawyers in Qatar stated that the UAE labour law inspired the new labour law, and it is biased in favour of the employer, despite amendments to the law. Similarly, Mr Ambit Yousson, Trade Union of the Philippines and an official of the International Federation of Trade Unions of Building and Wood Workers stated that the amendments in the Qatari sponsorship law improved the conditions for job hiring. However, the adjustments are slow, and the living conditions of foreign workers in Qatar have not drastically changed since the labour crisis (Al-Khatib, 2015).

In addition, it was reported that the labour law does not cover all foreigners. The employees and directors of major global companies and lawyers enjoy many privileges and luxuries due to their social class. They are not afraid of abuse from their Qatari sponsors. They are entitled to travel, leave and return whenever they want. They get in and out easily and carrying a full speed visa. Only a few thousands of Western cadres enjoy those privileges, while Asian labour is forced to undergo a sponsorship system, which is unfair and shows some discrimination (LISI, 2016; Gibson, 2015).

The Prime Minister Abdullah bin Nasser bin Khalifa Al-Thani, accompanied by Minister of Labour Abdullah Saleh Al Khulaifi, launched the first residential city for workers in November 2015, which hosts seventy thousand workers in decent conditions compared to the camps. But all of that is not enough to accommodate the total number of Asian labourers, which is expected to reach five hundred thousand by 2017, according to the International Trade Union Confederation studies (LISI, 2016).

In November 2015, the International Labour Organization (ILO) decided to send a senior delegation to Doha on a fact-finding mission to place stress on the Qatari government to improve the situation regarding foreign employment. Bernard Thibault, who was at that time the representative of France and the French General Confederation of Labour (CGT) at the International Labour Organization, stated that International Labour Organization (ILO) did not support the manoeuvres of the Qatari government. He contended that the government tried to enter pro forma adjustments to the sponsoring law to show good faith, but in fact, Qatar kept the sponsoring law as it is. He added that there was a big difference between the contracts signed in their home countries and labour contract imposed on them upon their arrival in Qatar. He also stated that monitoring the conditions of workshops remained delicate since monitoring did not exist in all parts of the state due to the availability of only 365 observers and ten interpreters for more than two million workers. In April 2016, FIFA President Giovanni Infantino announced the formation of a committee to monitor the work conditions at the World Cup stadiums 2022 (Booth, 2016). Ultimately, the international organisation has given Qatar an additional year (by 2017) to implement a labour law, which will protect the rights of migrant workers (Al-Khatib, 2015).

Predictably, the state of Qatar denounced the report published by the newspaper the Guardian and denied the existence of what the British newspaper called “forced labour or slavery”. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs indicated that the Government of Qatar takes its international obligations seriously and that the country is obligated to the Global Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers. Furthermore, Ahmed Al Khulaifi, Consultant of International Relations, stated that the Ministry had delegated an international corporate law firm to review the allegations independently and prepare a report for the Ministry (Sharif, 2013; LISI,

2016).

Ali bin Smaikh Marri, Chairman of the National Committee for Human Rights in Qatar, emphasised that there was no forced labour or slavery in Qatar. However, he did not deny the existence of some of the challenges, problems and abuse experienced by workers. He stressed that the Qatari authorities were working to address the abuse. He further stated that the Commission contacted all parties in Qatar and Nepal to check the reality and validity of the number of deaths announced. He stated that the figures reported by the Guardian were grossly exaggerated, and the numbers in official documents of the Nepalese embassy are entirely different (NHRC, 2013). The representative for the Nepalese community said the death-related work accidents in the Nepalese community did not exceed 15 deaths in the workplace during the period from January 1, until September 30, 2013. This number represents only ten per cent of the 151 deaths among the Nepali community in 2013. Other deaths were as a result of traffic accidents or natural causes. The legal adviser approved this statement to the Nepalese community and the General President of the World Organisation for Human Nepalese workers both of whom denied the existence of any violations of labour rights in Qatar (Noonpost, 2013; HRW, 2015; Hanrahan, 2015).

7.3.2 INTERVIEW FINDINGS

The media analysis of the crisis shows that there is insufficient research on PD in Qatar, and specially, the crisis of Nepalese workers especially the negotiations which occurred to solve the crises and to manage the reputation of Qatar. Therefore, to further investigate the crisis of Nepalese workers, its implications for Qatar's reputation worldwide and the role of PD and politics in reacting to this issue, various interviews were conducted. These interviews endeavoured to define the cause and extent of the crisis, its implications, and the negotiations and actions taken to solve the crisis. The key conclusions from the interviews are summarised below (see Appendix, for interview questions and ethical approvals).

- The cause and the extent of the crisis: Qatar's Ambassador to Nepal has declared that there is no real crisis since a limited number of workers have been exposed to some of the problems compared to many Nepalese workers in Qatar. He continued "*the workers main problems lie with the sponsor's salary, housing and lack of cultural adaptation*". Both Qatar's Ambassador and Counsellor mentioned that the media's attacks on Qatar have become more frequent, aiming to damage Qatar's worldwide reputation through the turning of public opinion against Qatar, after it won the bid for hosting the 2022 World Cup. Competing states to host world cup 2022 have exploited some paragraphs in the old labour law against Qatar and tried to utilise the emotions of the world and related international humanitarian organisations through media devices and claim Qatar inability to host the 2022 event. The

Ambassador declared that "*without a doubt, some of the regional countries have helped in fuelling the crisis through the media*".

- The role of diplomacy: Qatar's ambassador has identified that since the beginning of media campaign against Qatar, the government of Qatar has realised their duty and obligation towards those who participate with them in the employment of development plans in the country, and the 2022 World Cup. As a result, it fully cooperated with the World Cup's authorities, and held lengthy negotiations, arranging and facilitating visits to World Cup sites to inspect workers' living conditions. Qatar also has various proposals and ideas to solve workers' problems. Moreover, the Counsellor has mentioned that "*Qatari diplomats have worked to clarify the country's positions, and confirmed its commitment to international conventions, refusing to be dragged toward what Qatar described as unfair media campaigns*".

  Qatar showed its readiness and cooperation with positive proposals, including the revision of the labour laws and executive actions. The role of PD was mainly focused on media to combat the media campaign against Qatar because of the Nepal workers crisis. Mainly, the crisis was solved via traditional diplomacy through visits between both countries to express Qatar's point of view on refusing human abuse and new decisions to protect workers right in Qatar, including the new labour law and discussed ways to make the two countries' relationship stronger.

- Actions performed: Qatar objected to the Nepalese Ambassador, Maya Sharma's remarks in 2013, which described Qatar as an "open jail" (Pattisson, 2013). The Nepalese government withdrew the ambassador immediately in appreciation of the relationship between the two countries and to distance itself from the ambassador's comments. On the other hand, the government of Qatar has worked to address workers' problems and recognises the incompatibility of labour law. Qatar's Ambassador stated that because of Qatar's humanitarian and legal responsibilities, and its dedication to the conventions and global agreements, Qatar has worked on the formation of committees designed to analyse the reality of the problem, causes and how to address them.

  The committee in charge of this matter has made several recommendations to improve workers' lives and living conditions. As a result, Qatar has amended labour law and taken into account the guidance provided by the committee and related international bodies. The new law replaces the sponsorship system with contracts that outline the relationship between the two parties. In addition, the government has constructed many new housing complexes to accommodate thousands of workers and to ensure that workers are living in good conditions. Qatar's Counsellor further stated that Qatar has also set up a special office and a hotline for

workers to submit their complaints, with a simultaneous interpretation of many languages. Also, Qatar has increased the number of inspectors within the Ministry of Labour to cope with a large number of workers.

- Impact of the crisis: the ambassador specified that there were no tangibly adverse effects on relations between the two countries resulting from the unfair and unsubstantiated campaigns against Qatar. The level of relationship between the two nations has improved, particularly after the opening of Qatar's embassy in Kathmandu in 2013.
- Views on the crisis: The ambassador declared that "*there is no doubt that the laws and actions of Qatar are good, civilised and considers the generally accepted standards of human rights*". The counsellor supposed that although the actions performed has already resolved a large part of the problem, but it might not satisfy all parties and expected more actions to be performed without compromising national sovereignty. The smear campaigns are expected to continue as it offers migrant workers an easy way to fight against Qatar, with the support and praise of parties who seek to harm Qatar's reputation so that they might affect the 2030 development strategy and the 2022 World Cup. The interviewees believed that despite the unfair media campaigns against Qatar, the country has continued to make progress with the preparations for the 2022 World Cup and Qatar's 2030 vision.

The above interviewees' highlight the limitations of PD role during the Nepal crisis and in which the media was the key player along with the traditional diplomacy effort to contain the crisis. Moreover, the interviews present Qatar's diplomacy views, and it's clear that they were defensive and favourable towards the Qatar government. This creates critiques against Qatar's diplomacy since the Qatari ambassador and diplomat believe that Qatar has taken the best solutions to resolve the crisis. Therefore, to provide an unbiased and reliable analysis for the crisis, the researcher has interviewed the Nepal's Labour Attaché' to Qatar to listen to all parties involved in the crisis to understand their views on the crisis and the actions performed to overcome it. Nepal's Labour Attaché' has emphasised Qatar effort for crisis containment through fast and effective communication with the Nepal government on the worker abuse case. He added that "*the Qatar government has to condemn this inhumane incident and expressing its willingness to compensate workers and improve their situation through a new law which will protect their rights*".

They must also implore companies to improve the standard of living for workers from accommodation and health assurance, and it imposed sanctions on companies who violate labour law to ensure that they respect the rights of workers and the law of the state of Qatar. In addition, he mentioned "*the political cooperation was impressive, and Qatar shows readiness and gives promises in addressing Nepalese workers' problems*". He added that the action taken by Qatar to contain the crisis was effective and has helped in encountering and solving the worker issue in

Qatar. However, Qatar labour law is still new, and he pointed on the need to recognise the incompatibility of the labour law, especially in enforcement and ensuring that the law is controlled and reviewed.

7.4 DISCUSSION

In this chapter, the Nepalese workers' crisis is presented. The interviews and questionnaires findings showed the various strategies adopted by public diplomacy policymakers to resolve the Nepalese workers' crisis. The questionnaire findings showed the Nepalese workers, and Qatar employers' viewpoints concerning the crisis see Section above. In this section, the discussion will focus on the PD paradigms, PD models and PD theories that were used by policymakers in the Nepal crisis. PD theories and models could be used to improve PD strategies during the crisis and overcome their challenges. A review of the theories and PD models is presented in Chapter 4 of the thesis. Figure 10 presents a summary of the various PD theories, paradigms and models used in the management of the Nepal workers crisis.



FIGURE 10: SUMMARY OF PD THEORIES, PARADIGMS AND MODELS EMPLOYED IN THE NEPAL WORKERS CRISIS

7.4.1 THE IMAGE RESTORATION THEORY

According to (Zhang and Benoit 2004), the Image Restoration Theory claims that there are five choices, i.e. denial, avoiding responsibility, dropping offensiveness, corrective action and mortification that states and organisations can utilise to help repair their image. Concerning the crisis, Qatar government employed different approaches to help resolve the crisis and reinstate the reputation of the state in the regional and international communities. The Qatari government utilised the Image Restoration Theory in regional and international communities to restore their image during the Nepalese workers' crisis. Using the media analysis and interview results, it can be that concluded corrective measures and denial were the main elements applied in the Nepalese workers' crisis.

7.4.1.1 CORRECTIVE MEASURES

Qatar's government corrective measures involved introducing a new law that replaced the sponsorship system in order to enhance international public opinion about the state and also the state's willingness to revise the labour laws and take executive actions where necessary. Additionally, the government has taken other actions aimed at improving the problem and prevent future reoccurrence, including

1. Launching a residential city for the workers.
2. The establishment of committees intended to monitor and assess the problem and used the committee's recommendations and other international organisations as a foundation to amend labour law.
3. Providing workers with a special office and hotline to make their complaints and increased inspectors in the Ministry of Labour to manage a large number of workers.

7.4.1.2 DENIAL

The element of denial was also employed by the Qatar government, particularly when it comes to media reporting of the crises. The state was not impressed with how different media houses reported the crisis. The role of PD was mainly focused on the media to combat the media campaign against Qatar relating to the Nepal worker crisis. On several occasions, the state of Qatar condemned the report published in the Guardian newspaper and denied that there is any "forced labour or slavery" as alleged by the Guardian newspaper. According to the interviewed Qatari Ambassador and Counsellor the media attacks were aimed at damaging Qatar's reputation internationally since the state won the 2022 World Cup bid. Qatar's Ambassador to Nepal has declared that the crisis only affects a small number of workers compared to overall Nepalese workers in Qatar.

7.4.2 PD PARADIGMS

Concerning PD paradigms, PD is an extension of diplomacy used in the Nepal workers crisis. According to (Brown, 2012 p.4), in this paradigm, "the view is that foreign external communication activity is an extension of diplomacy". To help resolve the crisis and improve the conditions of the workers, the Qatari government introduced various strategies. For example, a committee was set up a commission and committee task with revising and crafting new laws that would enhance the situations of the Nepalese workers. An example of such law was the sponsorship system. The establishment of this law involved extensive communication between the designated employees and their counterparts in Nepal. The new law was crafted to help improve the human rights of Nepalese workers. Also, concerning PD paradigms was applied by the commission in their investigation relating to the announced deaths of workers by the media.

The commission employed external communication since all relevant parties both in Qatar and Nepal were consulted to verify the media reports regarding the total number of deaths. The media was also an essential tool used for the state. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs tasked an international corporate law firm to review the claims independently and report their findings to the Ministry. They were involved in extensive communication with international organisations, for example, the International Labour Organization and the FIFA President Giovanni Infantino to improve the workers' situation.

7.4.3 PD MODELS

Regarding the PD models, the rational model was applied by Qatar in this crisis. This model focuses on delivering national interests based on tangible paybacks. In the case of the Nepal case study, the rational model helps bring civil development through labour workers. For example, the FIFA 2022 World Cup would bring with it an abundance of infrastructural development as well as investment and tourism before, during and well after the World Cup. The Qatari government therefore was incentivised to work with the World Cup authorities through negotiations, arranging and enabling visits to inspect workers conditions in various World Cup sites with the aim to improve workers conditions.

7.4.4 QUESTIONNAIRE FINDINGS

To further understand the Nepalese workers crisis and the actions taken to resolve it, two separate questionnaires were created and disseminated to both the labourers in Qatar and their employers. This section provides the questionnaire results from the Nepal workers and Qatari employers' perspectives.

Part 1: For labourers in Qatar

- Does Qatar government provide the labourers with their rights especially after the crises of Nepal workers?
  - Yes
  - Don't know
  - No,
    specify……
- Do you think the new labour law is fair for labourers working in Qatar?
  - Yes
  - Don't know

- No, specify ……

- Do you feel you are abused in Qatar?

  - No
  - Yes, specify…….

- What are the main problems you encounter while working in Qatar?

  - Long working hours
  - Low or non-received ways
  - No holidays
  - Culture difference
  - Language
  - Inappropriate accommodation
  - Health and safety in work place
  - Lack of Health services
  - Lack of entertainment services
  - Disrespect
  - Penalty of the contract
  - Lack of freedom
  - Others, specify…….....

Part 2: For Qatari employers

1. Are you aware of worker's rights in Qatar?

   - Yes
   - No

2. Do you think the new law provides a balance between worker's rights and employer's rights and your outlook for profit?

   - Yes
   - Don't know
   - No, specify…….

3. Do you think the Qatar government actions toward the Nepal crisis were appropriate?

   - Yes

- Don't know
- No, specify……..

4. What are the main problems you encounter with workers?

- Accommodation
- Health and safety in work place
- Health problems
- Penalty of the contract
- Low Skills and ability
- Others, specify…….

7.4.4.1 THE WORKERS PERSPECTIVE

The majority of labourers in Qatar, i.e., 70% asserted that the government provides them with their rights especially after the crises of Nepal worker and about 15% said that still, the Qatari government did not provide the labourers with all of their rights. For example, it was mentioned that domestic workers are working long hours and paid low wages. However, about 80% of the participants believe the new labour law is fair for labourers working in Qatar. In contrast, only 10% thinks it is still unfair since it protects workers in companies rather than domestic workers. Moreover, the majority of the participants (87%) stated that they do not face any abuse whilst working in Qatar, but 13% still feel abuse because of individual actions of employers such as bad treatment, lack of respect for workers and extended working hours with no rest or taking a day off from work a week.

Furthermore, more than half of the workers reported that they encountered problems while working in Qatar due to the following: 94% culture difference, 90% language, 86% low or non-received wages, 74% long working hours, 71% no holidays, 61% lack of entertainment services, 57% lack of freedom to go or do whatever they want since they have to take permission from their employers. It was found that sometimes Leave is not granted, especially for home domestic and in particular for women. On the other hand, the least problems were about less than 40%, which are inappropriate accommodation, health and safety in the workplace, lack of health services, disrespect and penalty of the contract. The workers encountered other problems such as patience of employers to gain working skills, loneliness, missing community life, and lack of open dialogue with employers to discuss their issues and feelings.

7.4.4.2 THE QATARI EMPLOYERS' PERSPECTIVE

Almost all the Qatari employers who completed the questionnaires, 98% to be precise stated that they are aware of worker's rights in Qatar. Meanwhile, 93% believed the new law provides a balance between workers' rights and employers' rights and profit outlook. However, only 5%

found the new law unfair for employers since it entails increasing payment funds to ensure that certain conditions are met, including better workers accommodation, provision of leave and holidays and not violating the law as such violation could lead to the closure of company involved and huge financial losses. Besides almost all employers, 96% praised the Qatar government actions towards the Nepal crisis. Only 4% reported that Qatar government actions towards the crisis was inappropriate since it amended the labour law in a way that could lead to financial losses for some companies that have to provide a standard level of life for labourers and other services such as entertainment.

With regard to labourers' problems, from the employers' point of view, the main problem, they encounter with workers more than 75% of the time are: providing a standard level of accommodation, low skills and ability of labourer compared to what was stated in their CV, a penalty of the contact violation which could range from financial losses to closing the company. Other problems were less than 40%, such as health and safety in the workplace and health problems. Indeed, many thought these were vital and agreed with the contract. However, others have pointed to some problems like language; labourers complain and personal issues, modes and conflict with others, which might affect their productivity.

In conclusion, both questionnaires showed that the majority of labours and employers praise Qatar government action regarding the crises of Nepal workers and the new labour law which ensure the rights for both workers and employers. This has led to the elimination of worker abuse, the promotion and protection of labours' rights in Qatar. The problems encountered by workers and employers varied, depending on the perspective of each group. Employers focused on financial profit and labour productivity and capabilities at work.

At the same time, more than 70% of labourers found the main problems were cultural differences, language, low or non-received wages, long working hours and no holidays. How workers perceived their situation primarily depended on how the employers' treat them and their relations with the labourer, especially if the employer is sensitive to their suffering, e.g., understanding the fact that they are away from their families for an extended period, miss community life and feel lonely in their new environment. Most of these issues could possibly be resolved by open dialogue with labourers to discuss their problems and allow them to express their feelings.

7.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY

Qatar has been able to overcome some of the difficulties it faced and to refine its political capabilities and to have political experience not only in mediation to solve worldwide crises but in solving the crises it faces. Also, it has a long-term strategy and vision for the State internally and externally based on many aspects, including investment abroad and genuine prospects for

new projects in Qatar, so it has its economic position abroad, which supports its foreign policy and orientations. As a result of the investigation of the case studies of crisis, Qatar appears to remain committed to its values, principles and foreign policy as a sovereign state and will not be affiliated with anyone. At the same time at the top of its priorities, it affirms good relations with the GCC countries and supports the Council's march and the continuous affirmation that any issue that affects any of the GCC countries will necessarily affect the rest of the other countries.

Although interviews show that PD was activated during the crisis, most agreed that PD is still new in Qatar's diplomatic context. There is a need for PD empowerment within the diplomatic structure and a need for defining clear PD strategy and a framework for PD practice which is controlled and assessed by government to ensure the PD is employed effectively to manage Qatar image, especially in the current siege crisis. The researcher has defined ten recommendations for MOFA to empower PD. Although these recommendations were valuable and should help to empower PD in Qatar's diplomatic frame, still there is a need for strategic PD framework to guide the PD practice and ensure the practice is controlled. The development of strategic PD framework is defined in the next chapter.

8. CHAPTER 8: THE SIEGE CRISIS

This chapter explores the diplomatic crisis of the Qatar siege/blockade by some Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain. It analyses the crisis through media analysis and expert interviews with related parties to discover in critical detail the dimensions of the crisis and how Qatar has responded to it and to what extent PD has played a vital role in the crisis. The investigation into the siege endeavours to ascertain the role of PD during the crisis and its impact on Qatar's ability to promote its image positively worldwide. The interviews conducted in Chapter 6 were aimed at exploring Qatar's PD strategy and how it is implemented in its diplomatic missions in the international arena. These interviews developed and advanced a foundational understanding of Qatar's PD practice and strategy. Therefore, to gain deeper insight, the researcher has sought to contextualise Qatar's PD and how it is practised through two recent and relevant case studies

The case study intents to investigate the role of PD in the siege crisis, the negotiations, actions and strategies employed to resolve the issue and maintain Qatar's image globally. The case study involves an investigative analysis through media and interview. In Section 8.1, brief background information on the siege crisis is provided. In the research overview section, the research methods adopted in this chapter and how the media analysis and interviews were conducted are developed and discussed. In the result section, the findings from the media analysis and interviews will be presented. Also, due to a lack of clear vision on PD strategy, process and mechanism, the researcher presents ten suggestions on how to empower PD. Finally, the discussion section presents the theoretical frameworks that Qatar used as public diplomacy strategies during the crisis.

8.1 THE SIEGE CRISIS IN BRIEF

The crisis began when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain declared on 5 June 2017 that they were suspending relations with Qatar, and instituting a land, sea and air blockade. This drastic action was followed by an announcement in Cairo which alleged that Doha provided funding to terrorist organisations and groups – an allegation that Doha has vehemently denied due to its strong and sustained efforts in combatting terrorism. The ensuing escalation resulted in a political crisis that has had profound impact on Qatar. The countries that instituted the severing of relations and the establishment of a blockade have stated that they did so as a result of Qatar supporting terrorism and meddling in their domestic affairs which violated 2014 agreement with members of the GCC to maintain the 'interests, safety and stability' of other GCC nations (Barnard and Kirkpatrick, 2017; Gambrell, 2017b; Neubauer, 2017). They further criticised the orientation of the Al-Jazeera channel and Qatar's maintenance of amicable relations with Iran

(Associated Press, 2017*)*. The Saudi-led alliance issued a list of 13 demands to be fulfilled as a pre-requisite to engaging in diplomatic dialogue to restore relations (Feteha et al. 2017). Suffice to say, the crisis has had an impact on Qatar economically, politically and has had important implications on its reputation and image globally. In terms of economic impact, the crisis resulted in a drop in Qatar reserves, a drop in food imports, building materials and building equipment as well as a drop in the state's stock (Feteha et al. 2017). Prior to the blockade, as much as 60% of Qatar's imports, especially food supplies, were estimated to have come through the nations that are now cutting ties Qatar. Thus, the government had to move quickly to obtain alternate supply channels through Turkey and Iran. Moreover, the crisis has led Qatar to improve, deepen and diversify its economic links outside of the Middle East, especially with the United States, while also ensuring food and consumer goods supply (Smith, 2019).

8.2 RESEARCH METHOD OVERVIEW

The recency of the siege has meant that only novel research on the role of PD in the fluid crisis siege is available. Hence, the researcher has sought to employ other data collection methods, i.e., media analysis and interviews. The media analysis aims to uncover the root cause of the crisis based on issues of contention from history and previous diplomatic break-offs, outline the crisis occurrence and investigate its repercussions on Qatar in terms of the political and economic situation and concerning its impact on people, especially on Qatar's reputation worldwide. In particular, the analysis focuses on assessing the Qatari government reaction to the crisis through the role of PD to re-establish Qatar's reputation internationally. Moreover, it analyses the ways in which the crisis has altered Qatar's foreign policy strategies and the role of PD throughout the crisis, leading to a recommendation for Qatar PD empowerment in the diplomatic framework.

The media analysis is based on media records gathered and analysed from political reports, broadcasts and news published in international and local news agencies for the GCC counties, local and international newspapers, and academic centres and institutes including Chatham House and Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). The researcher only included reports published from (2017) to (2020). Local news agencies and newspapers included in the analysis include (Al-Jazeera, 2017d and Gulf News), while international news agencies and newspapers selected for the analysis include (NBC news, New York Times, Qatar News Agency, BBC Arabic, France24, Reuters and The Irish Times). Selection criteria for the reports include (i) published on June 5th, 2017, or later, (ii) report on causes of the problem, (iii) report on the background of the siege countries, (iv) impact of the crisis and (v) actions taken to resolve the crisis.

In addition to the media analysis, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with a number of Qatari diplomats with expertise in PD strategy and its role during the siege crisis. Due to the sensitivity of the crisis, it was difficult to interview the other parties involved in the crisis

which are: Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain, because the researcher was not able to visit the countries or communicate with their citizens due to the enforced siege crisis on Qatar. As a result, the interviews on the siege crisis reflect the diplomatic context of Qatar with the aim of analysing the role Qatari PD. Five diplomats and two ambassadors from different Qatari embassies such as Europe, Asia, Africa and America were interviewed. The interviews explored each diplomat or ambassador's subjective views on how PD strategy was employed to help resolve issues that have emanated as a result of the siege. All participants were asked for their suggestions on the best available means to resolve the crisis with a focus on maintaining diplomatic relations and maintaining the reputation of Qatar. The interviews will be conducted in-person. The interviews lasted for around one hour and note-taking was the primary technique for recording the interviews notes.

TABLE 11: DIPLOMAT PARTICIPANTS

Participants	**Role**	**Years of Experience**	**Region**
P1	The Ambassador of the Embassy of Qatar in Hungary	7	Europe
P2	The Ambassador of the Embassy of Qatar of Qatar in Hellenic Republic	9	Europe
P3	Minister Plenipotentiary in the Embassy of Qatar in the United Kingdom	6	Europe
P4	Third Secretary of the Embassy of Qatar in the Islamic Republic of Iran	10	Asia
P5	Third Secretary of the Embassy of Qatar in the Republic of Indonesia	8	Asia
P6	Third Secretary of the Embassy of Qatar in the Republic of the Sudan	7	Africa
P7	Diplomatic Attaché of the Embassy of Qatar in the USA	9	America

8.3 RESULTS

The following subsections present the results from the media analysis and interviews.

8.3.1 MEDIA ANALYSIS

The following sub-sections present the outcome of the media analysis which is thematically categorised into four aspects to discerned through the discussion and data analysis, i.e., issues of contention, previous break-off, crisis occurrence and crisis impact.

8.3.1.1 ISSUES OF CONTENTION

The onset of the crisis was not marked by a single contentious issue but rather it was the amalgamation of several issues of contention between Qatar and the Saudi-led bloc. Indeed, Qatar has had many critiques of its foreign policy orientation which differs from that of other regional states. The main critiques as revealed by the media analysis were:

- The suspicion that Qatar was preserving good relations with Iran.
- The content of newscasts from Al-Jazeera channels.
- The contention that Qatar assisted the Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab spring (NDTV, 2017).
- The assertion that Qatar intends, since the present Emir's father Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani acquired power in 1995, to transform Qatar from being a vassal state to Saudi Arabia into an independent state capable of rivalling Saudi regional power (Weingarten, 2010).

The maintenance of amicable relations between Qatar and Iran have proven to be an underlying issue of significance leading up to the siege. The Saudi-led bloc has framed these issues within the purview of regional security. For instance, in 2006, Qatar was the only GCC country that voted against UN Security Council Resolution 1696, which demanded Iran stop its nuclear development program (Al-Jazeera, 2014). This is further compounded by the fact that Qatar's gas fields, the North Dome field and the South Pars field are jointly shared with Iran (United Nations, 2010; Haaretz and Reuters, 2017; Champion, 2017). In April 2017, Qatar repealed the ban on the evolution of the gas field with Iran following a 12-year freeze. Robert and Kennedy (2016) point out that this signalled a shift towards promoting cooperation with Iran in an effort to protect its vital resources. Finn (2017) asserts that the autonomy accorded to Qatar by its gas wealth enabled it to carve out an independent position for itself beyond and escape de facto vassal status to Saudi Arabia. Fisher (2017) postulates that Qatar's decision to promote amicable relations with Iran constitute an underlying cause of the conflict.

On the other hand, during the Arab Spring in 2011, Qatar supported civilians and activists, including the Muslim Brotherhood in their call for change. This was in clear opposition to Saudi

Arabia, which supported the current Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and regarded the Brotherhood as a risk to stability in the region (Knipp, 2017). The Muslim Brotherhood opposed Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies due to their policy of hereditary rule (The Wall Street Journal, 2017). In addition, Qatar engaged in multiple international initiatives of reconciliation by accommodating representatives from the Afghan Taliban and Hamas in a concerted effort to mediate and resolve pressing conflicts (Mazzetti and Apuzzo, 2016; Norton, 2016). These developments were further exacerbated by regional criticism of Qatari media channels, and in particular, the Al-Jazeera news network. The network was heavily criticised by regional regimes for its tacit support for Islamists, its coverage of the Arab Spring and its critiques against some foreign governments opposing the Qatar orientation (Siegel, 2013).

More recently, additional issues of contention include Qatar's hostage negotiations in April 2017, with both Sunni and Shiite activists in Iraq and Syria. The purpose of the negotiations was to obtain the release of 26 Qatari hostages who were kidnapped whilst falcon shooting in Iraq. The deal also involved allowing humanitarian relief and safe emigration of 2,000 citizens from the Syrian village of Madaya. This deal drew the ire of Saudi Arabia and the UAE mainly due to the millions of dollars in ransom that Qatar has paid for the deal to Iranian-backed Shia militias in Iraq and Sunni militias in Syria in particular Tahrir al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham (Solomon, 2017). According to BBC Arabic (2017a), the deal involved a return for the release of several Hezbollah fighters and Shiite elements in the Syrian opposition and payment of hundreds of millions of dollars to Iran and Iraqi militias. The prompted the Syrian opposition, Saudi Arabia and UAE to accuse Qatar aiding and supporting to terrorist groups.

During the Riyadh Summit in 2017, then US President Donald Trump provided robust backing for Saudi Arabia's performance in combatting nations and groups linked to Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Jazeera, 2017a). This support led Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, including UAE and Bahrain, to oppose Qatar in order to punish their adversaries and satisfy their partners in the US in order to eliminate consideration of their identifiable defects and challenges (Arango, 2017). Moreover, this action produced an uneasiness amongst other Gulf States, such as Oman and Kuwait, that if they resist the Saudi vision, they will face isolation similar to Qatar (Fox News, 2017).

A fortnight prior to the siege crisis, hackers sent false remarks attributed to the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim Al-Thani, on the official Qatar News Agency (QNA) website stating that Qatar is supporting Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and Israel (Sanger, Landler and Schmitt, 2017). The Emir was cited saying: 'Iran is a regional and Islamic force that cannot be ignored and challenging it would be unwise as it is a major player in the region's stabilisation' (Gordon, Yadlin, and Heistein, 2017; Financial Times, 2017). Although the Qatar government stated that the reports were false and the

result of a hacking operation against QNA (Fox News, 2017), the statements were nevertheless widely disseminated in the many Arab news media, such as Sky News Arabia and the Saudi owned and operated Al Arabiya (Sanger, Landler and Schmitt, 2017). A team from the FBI investigated the hacking incident and found that Russian hackers were behind the attack (Gambell, 2017a).

It has been postulated by the New York Times and Ali al-Marri, Qatar's Attorney General that there are indications which demonstrate that the cyberattack on QNA is related to the states that cut ties with Qatar. This conclusion was reached, mostly since Saudi and UAE media were the first to spread the statement made by the hacked media. They persisted with the false statements despite the official announcement of the state of Qatar about the hacking of the QNA website which advised viewers to disregard any statement issues by the hacked site (Landler, 2017; Wintour, 2017b). Subsequent investigations by US intelligence agencies found that the attack was likely organised by the UAE (MOFA, 2017; Kirkpatrick and Frenkel, 2017). However, the UAE rejected any participation in the hacking (DeYoung and Nakashima, 2017) and on August 2017 five individuals alleged to be behind the hacking were detained in Turkey (Al-Jazeera, 2017b).

Following the hacking event of QNA, Yousef Al-Otaiba, the UAE's ambassador to the United States, had his email address compromised. It detailed the UAE's links to the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (*Qiblawi and Dewan, 2017)* and information related to buying the effect for UAE managed campaigns in the White House (Mills, 2017). Al-Jazeera and Huffington Post Arabic covered this email hack extensively, showing that the UAE diplomat has been closely allied to Israel, working to denigrate Qatar and Kuwait, and has played a role in the movement to smear Qatar’s image and criticised Saudi Arabia, trying to effect policy in Riyadh (AL-Jazeera, 2017 c; Ahmed, 2017a). This media attention to the email hack was considered as incitement by Qatar and extended the divide between the two sides (Ahmed, 2017b; Reuters, 2017a).

8.3.1.2 PREVIOUS DIPLOMATIC BREAK-OFF

Although, the current crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and several Arab countries revolves around two relatively new issues, i.e., Qatar’s approach towards certain Islamic groups and Iran it can be argued that the dispute between Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Qatar is in fact several decades old. In the era of Sheikh Khalifa Al-Thani, Qatar's policy was subjected to Saudi Arabia, as the biggest strategic nation in the region, which insisted that all GCC member states should

abide by its policy directions. At that time, the Qatari and Saudi relationship was healthy, and there was no conflict. However, the Crown Prince at that time was Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani, who was believed to be unsatisfied with his father's approach towards the Saudi regime. Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani had aspirations to obtain full sovereignty for Qatar and to develop the state into an influential global player. As a result, crown prince Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani performed a white coup against his father, Sheikh Khalifa Al-Thani in 1995. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia rejected and refused to recognise the power shift as they believed that Sheikh Khalifa Al-Thani aspired to take power in the region and break with Qatar's obedience and servility to Saudi Arabia by actualising his vision of complete sovereignty for Qatar (BBC Arabic, 2017a).

In 1996 there was a change of government in Qatar and the Qatari government accused several Saudis of supporting the overthrow attempt in the cooperation with the Prince Khalifa Al-Thani. This became a controversial issue in relations between the two countries. However, in 2010 based on a request from the King of Saudi Arabia Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz, the Emir of Qatar Hamad Al-Thani, discharged the Saudi arrested in Qatar for participating in the failed government overthrow attempt in 1996 (BBC Arabic, 2017a). In 2002, Saudi Arabia recalled its ambassador from Qatar as a form of protest against Al-Jazeera's critical attitude towards Saudi Arabia and its ruling family (Weingarten, 2010).

In 2008, diplomatic relations were re-established, following Qatar's declarations that Al-Jazeera would curtail its criticism of Saudi Arabia (Solomon and Malas, 2015). In 2013, when Prince Tamim Al-Thani took power following his father's abdication, the Saudis expected improved relations with Qatar, hoping the new Prince would adopt a foreign policy different from the previous policy of his father. However, the new Emir has followed a similar path to his father, and Qatar foreign policy remains consistent (BBC Arabic, 2017b).

Such a diplomatic incident was repeated in March 2014 when Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE suspended their diplomatic relations with Qatar, claiming that Qatar had been interfering with their internal affairs. They referred explicitly to Doha hosting members of the reform party (Al-Islah) of the UAE who were close to the Muslim Brotherhood and banned in the UAE. After eight months, the incident was resolved when Qatar expelled Brotherhood members from the country (Fox News, 2017; Wall Street Journal, 2017). In 2015 the GCC rejected Egypt's accusations against Qatar for supporting terrorism. However, suddenly in 2017, Qatar was subjected to sanctions and suffered a blockade crisis from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain (Alhayat, 2017).

8.3.1.3 CRISIS OCCURRENCE

The crisis began when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain announced on 5th June 2017 that they were going to cut ties with Qatar, as well as closing their airspace, land and

sea with Qatar. Other countries, including Yemen, Egypt and the Maldives acted similarly (Barnard and Kirkpatrick, 2017; Chang, 2017; Dawn, 2017; NBC News, 2017; Wintour, 2017a). On 23rd August 2017, nine independent governments cut diplomatic relations with Qatar including Senegal, Mauritania, Comoros and Chad (Al Rifai and McGinley, 2017; McKernan, 2017; Reuters, 2017b). Furthermore, another three countries have reduced diplomatic relations with Qatar, including Djibouti, Niger and Jordan (France24, 2017; Reuters, 2017c).

On the other hand, several countries in the EU and the UN sought for the determination of the crisis through negotiation (Al-*Jazeera, 2017d;* Gulf News, 2017a). Saudi Arabia and the UAE have taken multiple actions during the crisis, including instructing ports and shipping agents to stop accepting Qatari shipments. Also, Saudi Arabia closed the land, water and airspace borders with Qatar leaving Qatar to redirect their flights to Africa and Europe over Iranian airspace. Likewise, Qatar Airways responded by postponing its flights to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain. As a result, Oman Air plays an immense role in transferring travellers from and to Doha (Dudley, 2017).

Moreover, Saudi Arabia's central bank requested banks to stop interchange in Qatari riyals (Hassan, 2017; Al-Jazeera, 2017e). The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain announced that Qatari diplomats had to leave their counties within 48 hours, Qatari visitors were asked to leave within two weeks, and they requested their citizens to leave Qatar (Al-Jazeera, 2017 e; Dawn, 2017). Unexpectedly, Qatar was excluded from the Saudi Arabian led intervention in Yemen (Hassan, 2017; Al-Jazeera, 2017e). Kuwait and Oman stayed neutral, and Kuwait has played a role as a mediator to solve the crisis (Hunt, 2017; Nasseri, 2017). Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Mauritania, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt went further by asking FIFA to terminate Qatar as the host of the 2022 FIFA World Cup. However, the 2022 state projects are ongoing in Qatar, and the state is still cable of hosing FIFA 2022 (The Irish Times, 2017). This was supported by FIFA President, who stated that the Qatar World Cup is not under threat as a result of the diplomatic crisis(Al-Jazeera, 2017e).

On the other hand, Qatar has criticised the siege, saying that it impacts Qatar's sovereignty (Nasseri, 2017). The foreign minister of Qatar, Mohammed Al-Thani, stated that Saudi declarations concerning Qatar were inconsistent since they claim that Qatar is supporting Iran, and also supporting the Sunni extremists that are fighting against Iran (Al-Jazeera, 2017e). The diplomatic role of Qatar was harmonious in political visions with several countries such as Turkey, Iran, France, Germany, Russia and some humanitarian organisations and has called for peaceful negotiations to resolve the crisis. This has led Qatar to announce restoring full diplomatic relations with Iran on 24th August 2017 (Overdahl, 2017).

However, the US position has been contradictory in some situations. At the beginning of the Gulf Crisis, the US Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson and Defence Secretary James Mattis made an effort on improving the situation and expressed the opinion that the blockade imposed by the Gulf States on Qatar is unacceptable and that it is important to keep the Gulf Cooperation Council unified. This opinion has been opposed by US President Donald Trump, who has alleged Qatar of supporting terrorism. At the same time, the Pentagon announced that Qatar was a strategic ally and that they would keep the US military base in Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar (Chatham House, 2017g; Jaffe and Gibbons-Neff, 2017; Wadhams, 2017).

In the wake of the crisis, there has been a media war between both sides. On one side, Qatar has described the crisis as a siege on Qatar based on false information; on the other hand, the media of the states imposing the siege and their supporting channels have described the crisis as a blockade on Qatar to isolate and put pressure on the Qatari government to change its foreign policy to be in-line with theirs, claiming that Qatar is supporting terrorism and interfering in the internal affairs of their countries (Al-Jazeera, 2017 e; Khaleej Times, 2017). Qatar has uniformly denied the accusations that it is supporting terrorism and has cited its strong and sustained efforts in fighting terrorism and claims that it has supported the US in the War on Terrorism and the current intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Al-Jazeera, 2017f; Wintour, 2017a).

8.3.1.4 CRISIS IMPACT

The crisis has critically impacted Qatar's economics, politics, as well as its humanitarian situation and its reputation. The following subsection details the key implications that accompanied the blockade.

Economic Impact

Throughout the blockade, Qatari natural gas continued to flood to the UAE, providing roughly 40 per cent of the UAE's energy requirements (Alkhalisi, 2017). However, shipping restraints from the crisis did require many consignments of oil and gas to be redirected thereby impacting several local energy markets. For instance, by mid-2017 gas contracts increased to almost 4 per cent in the UK, which imports almost one-third of their gas needs from Qatar (Domm, 2017). The crisis also affected Qatar's food supplies since approximately 80 per cent of Qatar's food supplies come from Gulf neighbours. Only one per cent is farmed locally, and the rest is imported from countries abroad. These imports typically crossed the Saudi Arabia terrestrial boundary, which became inaccessible with the blockade (Taylor, 2017). Qatari Foreign Minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani said, 'we are not concerned about a food shortage; we are fine. Since we are well prepared, we will be able to live in this manner indefinitely (Reuters, 2017d). As a result,

Qatar pivoted to circumvent food shortages by securing support from Turkey and Iran to provide water and food. Selmi & Bouoiyour (2021) find that external and fiscal buffers alongside a strong financial sector enabled Qatar to sufficiently withstand the blockade.

The International Monetary Fund initially stated that the economic effect of the crisis was uncertain at its onset but as Ulrichsen (2020) notes, Qatar's early efforts to ensure self-sufficiency predated the blockade and positioned it to sufficiently respond to the challenges through logistical processes and infrastructural developments including the development of the Hamad Port which reduced reliance on the port of Jebel Ali in Dubai early on in the blockade. In addition, Qatar Primary Materials Co (QPMC) announced that it maintained a strategic inventory of building materials sufficient for the state's planned infrastructure projects for the Qatar 2030 Vision. Qatar thus did not have to stop any of the state projects and continued ahead with the implementation of all of the planned vital projects (Jazeera, 2017e; Firzli, 2017).

Political Impact

In May 2017, following the cyber-attacks on the QNC website, the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim denied Qatar's link to terrorism and called on Egypt, the UAE and Bahrain to review their stand on Qatar. He said, 'Despite our continuing efforts with our brethren and participation in the international coalition against Daesh, we reject accusations of terrorism assistance'. He added... 'Some governments' attitudes toward terrorism are influenced by their acceptance of a radical interpretation of Islam that fails to represent the religion's inclusive reality'. Furthermore, 'no one has the authority to accuse us of terrorism merely because the Muslim Brotherhood has been designated as a terrorist group' (Al- Jazeera, 2017e, Khaleej Times, 2017). Shires (2020) argues that the hack-and-leak operation of the QNA constitutes a new foreign policy tactic which utilised offensive cyber tools and served to set into motion a divided and distrustful media environment in the Gulf.

In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain (the quartet) formally issued 13 demands for Qatar and gave Qatar 10 days to respond to their demands (Al-Jazeera, 2017 g; Gulf News, 2017 b; Reuters, 2017 e; Sciutto and Herb, 2017; Wintour, 2017c). These demands are summarised as follows:

- With regards to Iran, they ordered that Qatar reduce diplomatic relations with Iran and cut off military collaboration with Iran.
- With regards to terrorist support, they demanded Qatar to cut relations with entitled terrorists and stop supporting them, including sectarian organisations involving the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the ISIL, Al-Qaeda,

Hezbollah, and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. They also demanded the discharge and surrender of all entitled terrorists currently in Qatar.

- Other demands included asking Qatar to ally with the Gulf and Arab countries militarily, politically, and economically. They also expected Qatar to commit to the convention achieved with Saudi Arabia in 2014, and to refrain from meddling in the domestic and foreign affairs in foreign and neighbouring countries, especially the four countries of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. Qatar was asked to stop supporting the political opposition in these countries, to discontinue granting political opponents' citizenship, and to withdraw Qatari citizenship for the existing nationals.
- Finally, they instructed Qatar to close the Al-Jazeera network and to terminate the Turkish military base in Qatar. Also, they requested compensation for years of mistakes and being monitored for ten years.

Qatari officials instantly rejected the demands since they perceived them to be neither reasonable nor actionable. The UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs said Qatar would be isolated until these demands are met. Qatar responded that the demands would affect its sovereignty as a nation (Reuters, 2017f). Turkey also rebuffed requests to close its military base in Qatar, and Iran has encouraged dialogue rather than confrontation (Al-Jazeera, 2017h). Later on 5th July, the 13 demands were reduced to six general principles comprised of promises to cease activities of incitement and to battle terrorism and extremism. However, on 30th July, the 13 demands were returned (Al-Jazeera, 2017 e; Al-Jazeera, 2017h). On 22nd July 2017, Qatar's Emir voiced his willingness for negotiation to solve the crisis, but adamantly stated that any solution had to respect Qatar sovereignty. He insisted that all of the alleged claims were based on fabrications as a means to misguide the international public. He stated: 'Qatar is combating terrorism with persistence and with no compromise, and the international community recognises Qatar's position in this regard'. The Emir added 'It is clear that the campaign against us was pre-planned. We took a test and passed it' (Al-Jazeera, 2017i). Nevertheless, Qatar called for dialogue with the blockade countries and commended the mediation of the Emir of Kuwait in resolving the dispute. Also, he called for removing the dictates and for reaching common decisions binding on all parties (Al-Jazeera, 2017i). In September 2017 Al-Jubeir the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia stated that there is no harm from the continuation of the crisis in Qatar for two more years (BBC Arabic, 2017b; Euronews, 2017).

Human Impact

The travel ban had a vital impact on foreign residents residing and working in Qatar (Al-Jazeera, 2017j). Qatar has reported to the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and UN agency looking for an agreement which led to a solution for the crisis. As a result, in the beginning of August 2017, the agency declared that Qatar Airways would have admittance to three possible

routes over international waters founded on the covenant defined with the General Authority of Civil Aviation (GACA). As a result, the ICAO requested that all member countries obey the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and its supplements (Al-Jazeera, 2017k).

The countries of the region requested the departure of all Qataris from their country, whether pilgrims or residents or visitors (Siddiqui, 2017) and gave them only 14 days to leave. This caused several humanitarian cases because of family ties between the Gulf countries where families and children were affected, and because Qatari students were expelled from their schools and universities. As a result, Qatar has turned some humanitarian cases over to international human rights organisations. Citizens of the countries that have led the blockade have also been oppressed because they were asked to leave Qatar, causing some to lose their jobs. However, Qatar did not initiate the same treatment as the countries of the region. The state upheld its ethics and did not expel any of the citizens of the region.

The countries of the region went drastically further to impose a large fine of up to 500,000 emirate dirhams (about $136,000) on their citizens and imprisonment of 3-15 years or both for sympathisers with Qatar. Likewise, Bahrain issues a penalty of up to five years of imprisonment as well as a fine (DeYoung, 2017). This was a violation of the freedom of expression of their citizens, as they wanted to restrict their freedom of expression only in proportion to their policies and political decisions. They have also blocked access to Qatari news agencies, including Al-Jazeera and Saudi Arabia has closed their local office of Al-Jazeera (Ponniah, 2017). In August 2017, the Alliance for Freedom and Dignity (AFD) probed Qatar blockade, calling for the end of sanctions against Qatar to alleviate the suffering of people. It stated that the states responsible for the siege had violated freedom of opinion, media, speech, study, transportation and even religion since Saudi Arabia stated there would be no pilgrimage for Qataris in 2017 (Younes, 2017).

Reputation and Image

The impact of the crisis on Qatar was perceptible in terms of its reputation and image worldwide. On the one hand, the allegations advanced by the Saudi-led bloc through their extensive and unrelenting media campaign put Qatar firmly in the global spotlight. On the other hand, the allegations, particularly those pertaining to its alleged support of terrorism, impacted its reputation and image, especially on social media platforms. According to the Times (2017), Twitter video advertisements spreading anti-Qatari propaganda have proliferated across UK social media. The advertisements, reportedly sponsored by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, aimed to discredit Qatar's reputation and legitimacy. Qatar engaged in a retaliatory campaign through Al-Jazeera and social media networks to clear its reputation from the aforementioned allegations. The approach is reflective of the digitalization of public diplomacy wherein the state curates information in real-

time and attempts to ‘make sense’ of the deluge of information that accompanies modern digital societies (Manor, 2019).

The analysis of official news agencies of the GCC countries demonstrated that all parties involved put forth an evident bias. In other words, the countries of the blockade (UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain) through their official news agencies (WAM, SPA and BNA), officially attempted to depict Qatar as a supporter of terrorism and a state that has contributed to destabilising regional security over the past decade (WAM, 2017a). For instance, the Saudi Minister of Culture and Media stated that Al-Jazeera "exploits the slogans of "freedom of expression to pass the agenda of Qatar in the spread of violence and extremism (WAM, 2017b). In an interview concerning the siege, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated that the dispute did not affect Saudi Arabia’s investments and that it was a minor issue (SPA, 2017b). A few days later, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Adel Al-Jubeir speaking in London at a meeting at the London-based Chatham House, claimed that Qatar was not a major issue for the Kingdom and that Qatar cannot continue its current policy and must stop funding terrorism. He further called on the Qatar government to change its behaviour to strengthen the GCC (SPA, 2017a; Chatham House, 2017f).

Conversely, the Qatari Foreign Minister at the start of the crisis participated in a talk in Chatham House entitled "The Crisis in the Gulf: Qatar Responds" wherein he outlined Qatar's position and provided a rebuttal to the allegations by the countries of the blockade and the impact of the crisis especially in human terms, as well as the readiness of Qatar to negotiate and resolve the problem, if their sovereignty was not influenced (Chatham House, 2017a).

The 2017 report by Chatham House expressed the absence of a pivotal role of the GCC in solving problems among member states and questioned the continuity of the Council in light of the current dispute (Chatham House, 2017c). During the current Gulf Crisis, social media has played a huge role in spreading political messages through pro and anti-Qatar campaigns. Moreover, a seminar held in Chatham House by Kuwait’s Alsalam Centre, claimed that the extensive use of social media had driven GCC governments to use social networks for persuasion and to raise transparency for citizens and foreign publics. It was expressed that the UAE and Bahrain had criminalised social media activists for supporting Qatar, thereby denying freedom of speech (Chatham House, 2017e).

On the other hand, CSIS has analysed the crisis in depth, finding that the underlying objective of the current siege is to topple the Qatari leadership and that it is unlikely that the siege will result in a war across the region. However, if the crisis continues unabated it is likely to fracture relations and result in irreparable loss of trust in the GCC Council (CSIS, 2017 a). A subsequent 2017 report by CSIS determined that although Qatar seems willing to negotiate a compromise to the

crisis, it has performed actions to separate itself economically and politically from the countries undertaking the siege. Ultimately, Qatar refuses clearly to close Al-Jazeera networks or to declare that it has supported terrorist organisations (CSIS, 2017 b). Ulrichsen, a fellow for the Middle East at Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy, finds that the extent of the crisis would influence the social and economic bonds shared in GCC community, and Qatar should recognise some of the charges from their neighbours (CSIS, 2017 c). As a result, the Qatari image was affected by campaigns from the countries of siege; however, the intensified worldwide media campaigns from both sides have led to confusion in the foreign public on the creditability of each side's statements and allegations.

8.3.2 INTERVIEW FINDINGS

The media analysis of the siege showed the extent and impact of the crisis across various domains. However, the political impact was the primary intension for the researcher to discover, especially in the diplomatic context. The focus was on the role of PD during the siege crisis to react to the crisis effectively for the aim to manage Qatar's image. Since there is a lack of research on PD role in siege crisis, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with Qatari diplomats to assess PD strategy and its role during the siege crisis. In this section, the results from the interviews are reported and analysed.

All of the interviewees stated that there is recently heightened interest in PD by the Qatar Minister of Foreign Affairs, especially after the Qatar siege crisis. This interest was not shown in the previous Nepal crisis. The Ambassador of Hungary claimed that "*the interest comes from the growing awareness of the need to work on building modern diplomacy to enable all the diplomatic offices effectively carryout their duties*". He added that modern diplomacy would enhance communication with the public and the world through what he named Virtual Diplomacy, including social media and the internet. The interviewees were further in agreement that Qatar has recognised the importance of activating the role of PD in Qatar Embassies "*in order to enhance the image of Qatar worldwide, particularly after the recent siege crisis*". However, they declared that there is limited knowledge and understanding of PD practice by most Qatari diplomats. The ambassador of Hellenic Republic has commented "*that activating the practice of PD depends mainly on MOFA strategy for PD empowerment in Qatar embassies and on ambassadors' and diplomats' skills in effectively implementing Qatar PD*".

The Diplomatic Attaché in the US emphasised the need for the establishment of centres of power in embassies for PD, especially after the recent siege crisis by some Gulf States. He added that Qatar appeared to have effective economic and political relations with several important countries such as Germany, France and even American institutions. These connections enabled Qatar to

face measures of the state of siege. The Third Secretary in the Republic of Sudan stated, "*that Qatar used the crisis in a series of declared and undeclared tools, resorting to Al-Jazeera channel and lifted all the restrictions in dealing with the Gulf Region*". The Third Secretary in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Indonesia emphasised on the role of the Foreign Minister of Qatar in countering the crisis politically that led to the refutation of all accusations and worked to sign a new agreement with the US to combat terrorism and perform investment and economic agreements with many countries to supply essential food to Qatar.

All the interviewees agreed that PD role was activated during the crisis but still because it is new to the diplomatic structure of Qatar, its strategy and role in improving Qatar's image worldwide were not clearly defined. The Ambassador of Qatar to the United Kingdom stated "*that the embassy of Qatar in London was the first one to initiate a PD office, which would handle all of the PD activities*". The initiation of the first PD office in the embassy was based on a recommendation from the ambassador of Qatar in London, who believed that PD is vital in the diplomacy context along with the traditional PD. The role of PD has been improved during the siege crisis, and the PD office has performed many activities to restore Qatar's image and to deliver the country's message to the foreign public through political and cultural platforms. Further exploration of the role of PD in the PD office in London is discussed in Chapter 9.

The role of Qatar PD should be a significant concern, including establishing a clearly defined PD strategy, as well as a mechanism to discuss its challenges and how to resolve them, the possible opportunities towards promoting Qatar PD practice in the diplomacy framework through Qatar diplomatic missions across the world. These issues take on particular importance after the Qatar siege crisis, but there is still a need to adopt and empower PD in the diplomatic context of Qatar and to define a clear mechanism for effective PD practice. All interviewees agreed on the importance of PD role during the siege crisis to manage Qatar image, and that significant effort is required to ensure that PD is empowered in Qatar MOFA within the diplomatic structure and through knowledgeable diplomats who can perform PD role effectively based on a defined PD framework which defines the PD strategy and will govern the PD practice across the diplomatic context. Developing such a framework will ensure that PD practice is assessed and governed based on the country's current direction and strategy for PD which is directly related to the political changes and to Qatar's relation with other countries and the intention of current cooperation and relationship between both countries which impact how PD mechanisms and platforms for each mission are designed and implemented.

8.4 QATAR'S FOREIGN POLICY & PD DURING THE CRISIS

Qatar's foreign policy can be defined as it pursues the strategy of enlargement after its independence from Great Britain in order to develop the state in various fields and to be known globally by forming a strategic role in the region in political, economic, sports and media. However, in light of Qatar's recent diplomatic crisis, Qatar's foreign policy has undergone a change in its strategy from the Enlargement Strategy into Containment Strategy, then Transformation Strategy and finally Adaptation and Achievement Strategies. This was based on Henrikson (2006) who has defined the five main foreign policy strategies: consolidation, containment, penetration, enlargement and transformation see Chapter 2.

Qatar's foreign policy during the crisis can be explained in the following three phases:

8.4.1 PHASE I: CONTAINMENT

At the beginning of the crisis, there was an active role for the Qatari Foreign Ministry represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and the heads of Qatari diplomatic missions abroad to clarify the vision of the political system of the State on the crisis, Qatar's position on the crisis and the repercussions of the crisis. In this phase, the Qatari government aimed to clarify and strengthen the image of Qatar in the world and to get the support of other countries and to clarify 1) that Qatar can withstand this crisis and 2) that it is willing to have a dialogue and find a solution to the crisis without the inviolability of national sovereignty and that obligations are reciprocal between all parties. Moreover, the Qatari Foreign Minister and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs played a key role in communicating globally and explaining the repercussions of the crisis and Qatar's position on these allegations through official visits to pivotal countries including the US and some European countries and meeting with international and human rights organisations and leading academic institutes.

As for the heads of Qatari diplomatic missions abroad, they have activated the role of PD through communication with the audio and visual media and academic platforms in the countries of the host to clarify Qatar's position on the crisis and strengthen its image and reputation abroad. In some embassies, social networking platforms have been activated to clarify Qatar's position on the crisis and to form a communication platform with the foreign public to disseminate accurate and reliable news about Qatar and the latest developments in the crisis for the aim of strengthening Qatar's image to the outside public. All Qatar channels and primarily Al Jazeera networks have played a pivotal role in strengthening Qatar's image abroad by delivering the crisis to the world and clarifying the position of Qatar through its broadcasts which are addressed to the world through its programs, reports and its follow-up to the crisis events. The channels' social communications work equally serves to reassure the Qatari people, i.e., residents and citizens, of

the ability of the state to mitigate the effects of the crisis and to strengthen the spirit of stability and solidarity with the state.

8.4.2 PHASE II: TRANSFORMATION

The second phase of the transformation is represented by the directives of His Highness, the Emir and the minister's role in effectively activating this phase. HH the Emir started a transformation in the strategic alliances and partnerships of Qatar with the countries of the world through political marketing that the country is stable and can form a package of strategic partnerships and alliances in various fields, including economics, investments, defence and cultural activities. At this stage, Qatar demonstrated the strength of the inner front and the Emir's ability to move eastward towards Asia, and then north and west towards Europe and America to build new partnerships or strengthen existing partnerships.

Economically, new economic partnerships were represented by the provision of food and medicine at the beginning of the crisis and through the rise in imports from Asian countries such as Iran, Turkey and other countries of the world such as Azerbaijan. Qatar Minister of Economy and Commerce, HE Sheikh Ahmed Al-Thani stated that the current crisis signifies a chance to enhance Qatar's position on the global economic map, to attain its economic independence, and to provide enormous investment opportunities in all fields. He added during the crisis Qatari and Turkish bilateral trade have reached 2 billion QR, during the first half of 2017 (Qatar Tribune, 2017). Defensively, a partnership was formed with Turkey and for the first time found its first Turkish base in the region to protect Qatar from any external threat.

Politically, there has been a major shift through a rapprochement with Iran and the restoration of diplomatic relations with Iran, where the Foreign Minister has recognised Iran as an honourable country that stood with Qatar in the crisis (Alarabiya, 2017). Moreover, there was a shift in the America's position which stood at first with the siege countries with a statement that Qatar supported terrorism but then altered its stance after Qatar signed a peace agreement with America against terrorism (Reuters, 2017g). The siege countries do not approve this agreement since it negates their charges that Qatar is supporting terrorism. As a result, America has approved the continuity and the presence of the US base in Qatar and supported Qatari movements and its willingness to resolve the crisis. This phase shows political rapprochement and new alliances and partnerships, notably with Iran, Turkey and America and some European countries including UK and Italy (MEI, 2017; Pravda Report, 2017; The Peninsula Qatar, 2017c).

Internally, there was a transition from the pure consumer system to self-production in its content to reach self-sufficiency, especially in food materials. This has been achieved through the initiation of various Qatari home-based projects and Qatari food companies of high quality to the

local market. Those Qatari products were supported by the government in the local markets through its internal marketing and supporting popular solidarity to buy Qatari products.

8.4.3 PHASE III: ADAPTATION AND ACHIEVEMENTS

This is the current phase of Qatar, where the state has adapted to the crisis and is focusing on its planned development projects. A package of foreign investment achievements has been developed in new countries and new nations, and there has been increased foreign investment in previous countries, which have reflected positively on the economy of Qatar and its economic power in the conversion of some political decisions and common interests (The Economist, 2017). According to Qatar Chamber Vice-Chairman Mohamed Al-Kuwari, Qatar has found new import destinations through responsive countries comprising Oman, Pakistan, and Turkey, and to a number of foreign business to enhance trade exchange and protect partnerships (Qatar Chamber, 2017).

Qatar has proved that the siege crisis has not affected Qatari development projects associated with the vision of 2030, including the Hamad Port, which is the largest port in the Middle East and costs $7.4 billion dollars. The port includes strategic food storage and could provide the local market's commitments and needs. The port is expected to help in reducing the import costs and capture 27% of the Middle East trade (Al-Watan, 2017; The Peninsula Qatar, 2017 a). Furthermore, the World Cup projects have not been affected by the siege crisis since Qatar has discovered new markets for completing 2022 construction. Accordingly, during the siege, two stadiums have been completed for the 2022 World Cup, Al Thumama and Khalifa International Stadium (Fattah, 2017; The Peninsula Qatar, 2017b).

8.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR PD EMPOWERMENT

The role of Qatar PD in the diplomatic framework has been activated during the crisis through media, academic and social network platforms in the countries of the host. However, there is still a lack of a clear overall PD strategy. This was clear from the interviews with Qatari diplomats wherein several suggestions more collected, collated and thematically deployed to contribute to advancing the suggestions and recommendations presented in this subsection. Since PD strategy was empowered recently and accidentally, there is no framework of PD practice and activities that each embassy performs based on the knowledge of the heads of Qatari diplomatic missions abroad. One of the active embassies in PD was the Qatar embassy in London which is the only embassy that has a dedicated PD section to perform PD activities. This played a role during the crisis through performing events, using social media and media tools to communicate with foreign publics to enhance Qatar reputation of being a state that fights terrorism and not one which supports terrorism. As a result, the next chapter will discover further the role of the PD section

in Qatar Embassy in London through action research in order to explore further PD challenges especially during this crisis and how to enhance PD practice through an established framework.

Interviews conducted showed that Qatar diplomacy is based on traditional diplomacy and economic investments worldwide. During the crisis facing Qatar, PD has played a discernible but limited role in the crisis, especially through new media, but there was a lack of clear vision on PD strategy, process and mechanism. Based on the interviews, the researcher has arrived at the position that there is a need to empower Qatar PD in the diplomatic framework, especially in crises. Empowerment can be activated through the following ten suggestions (which emerged during the interview process) proposed for Qatar MOFA:

1. Develop a clear strategy for Qatar PD that reflects the foreign policy of the State, taking into account the 2030 vision of Qatar and MOFA vision. Furthermore, circulate this strategy to the Qatar embassies and direct them to empower the role of PD in their missions.
2. Empower diplomats in the PD field, in particular PD knowledge, Qatar PD strategy, roles, mechanisms and framework of practice in Qatar missions. This can be achieved through the Diplomatic Institutes in MOFA which could provide a comprehensive and intensive program for those diplomats interested in this specialisation and all diplomats in a simplified form to be added within the Foundational course for new and transformed diplomats in missions.
3. Establish a PD section in all Qatar embassies or at least in vital embassies, while clarifying the roles, responsibilities and importance of enhancing Qatar's image abroad.
4. Define a framework for the mechanism of PD practice in Qatar embassies and specify the role in the crisis within such framework, which could include a group of coordinated axes: economic, political, media, social, cultural, educational and others. This suggestion will be explored further since the main contribution of the research is to create a framework for the mechanism of PD practice in Qatar embassies.
5. Clarify the ways of communicating Qatar PD and the key players that are involved.
6. Develop a system to assess the PD effectiveness, as well as obstacles encountered, and discuss these in the annual diplomatic meeting to develop PD practice and provide a method for following up the decided actions.
7. Draw upon the expertise of the developed countries in the field of PD and transfer their experiences into Qatar by producing academics specialised in PD and capable PD practitioners. The outcome of this knowledge sharing will help in developing Qatar PD to suit the foreign policy and ambitions of the country.

8. Build a PD culture in MOFA employees through seminars on PD and published articles, in particular in the AL-Diplomacy Magazine.
9. Carry out research on Qatar PD and ways of development and empowerment in the diplomacy framework and used it in the Diplomatic Institute Library as a source of scientific research on Qatar PD.
10. Involve various Qatar institutions (private, government and semi-governmental) and create a spirit of cooperation with them and among them to contribute to support the objectives of the Qatar PD and its ambitions. Since PD includes all of the state institutions and is not limited to the diplomatic framework, all parties can contribute positively through an effective PD role in coordination with the Qatar MOFA.

8.6 DISCUSSION

In this Chapter, the focus was on the siege crisis. Research on the crisis was performed through media analysis and interviews; the aim was to investigate the role of PD during the siege crisis. All the interviewees agreed that PD role was employed during the crisis, however, since it is new in the diplomatic structure of Qatar, its strategy and role in enhancing Qatar's image around the globe were not well-defined. The outcome of the interviews showed both ambassadors and diplomats agreed that after the siege crisis, Qatar had acknowledged the significance of initiating the role of PD in their embassies abroad to help improve the reputation of the State. According to (Olsson, 2013), three related fundamental tasks were defined as critical elements of crisis management by public diplomacy, i.e., sense-making, networking and messaging strategies. In this section, the discussion will centre on the PD theories, principles and PD dimensions that were employed by policymakers during the crisis. A detailed review of the PD models and theories that will be discussed here can be found in Chapter 4. Figure 11 presents a summary of the various PD theories, principles and dimensions used in the management of the siege crisis.



FIGURE 11: SUMMARY OF PD THEORIES, PRINCIPLES AND DIMENSIONS EMPLOYED IN THE SIEGE CRISIS

8.6.1 IMAGE RESTORATION THEORY

Concerning enhancing Qatar's image internationally, the interviewees mentioned the image resolution theory on various occasions. Various pillars of the Qatari government put much effort into *countering the allegations* made by the siege countries and improving the state's image.

8.6.1.1 CORRECTIVE MEASURES AND DENIAL

The Qatari government worked to *clarify their position* and fortify its image internationally and also to gather support from influential nations. The element of *denial* (Zhang and Benoit 2004), was employed by the Qatari government to *reject all accusations* made by the siege countries that Qatar is supporting terrorism and interfering with their internal affairs, Qatar emphasised the fact that the allegations were unfounded and completely false "*saying that they spared no effort in the fight against terrorism*".

8.6.1.2 BOLSTERING

Bolstering as an image restoration strategic was employed to reassert and reassure both its citizens and the international community of Qatar's role and policies directed at fighting terrorism and remarked that the allegations were extreme. The Qatari government clearly stated that Qatar is unwavering in its commitment to fighting terrorism, persistently without negotiations, which is recognised internationally. To prove this position, the Foreign Minister worked with the US on combating terrorism and signed an agreement to show their commitment to this course. Additionally, corrective action as a strategy was employed, e.g., the state investigated the message posted on Qatar News Agency accusing Qatar of supporting terrorism, and Qatar's Attorney General acknowledged that there are signs which reveal that the cyberattack on Qatar News Agency is linked to the siege countries. The state's action demonstrated the sense-making process of crisis management through public diplomacy which helps established the scale and nature of the crisis and the various players involved. The sense-making task was also demonstrated by the FBI team who also investigated the cyberattacks incident on Qatar News Agency.

8.6.2 PD PRINCIPLE OF PARTNERSHIPS

The PD principle of partnerships was used to create new partnerships with various nations internationally and fortify ones that were already in place. Such partnership development would involve element of networking, coordinating and cooperating with the different partners or potentially partners (Gallop, 2007). The Qatar government employed the principle of partnerships to help countered some economic issues resulting from the siege crisis. For example, the State formed new economic partnerships at the start of the crisis with other nations such as Iran, Turkey and Azerbaijan to help provide food and medicine to its citizen. The State's Minister of Economy and Commerce stated that the present siege crisis indicates an opportunity to improve Qatar's

economic position internationally, achieve economic independence, and offer huge investment chances. Politically, Qatar has used the principle of partnerships to form alliances with powerful nations, for example, Iran, Turkey as well as America and some European countries, including the UK and Italy to help resolve the crisis.

8.6.3 PD DIMENSIONS

On the onset of the crisis, the Qatari government clearly framed its communication strategy and used various media platforms to disseminate their messages and reach out to both their citizens and the international community. Most studies in crisis communication based on this tradition have concentrated on the efficacy of different techniques in mitigating responsibility and returning organisations to normalcy with minimal damage to their reputations (Coombs and Holladay, 2002). The Qatari government used two elements from the PD dimensions, i.e., daily and strategic communication during the crisis.

8.6.3.1 DAILY COMMUNICATION

As it pertains to daily communication, Qatari network channels have played a key role in strengthening the state's image internationally. These media platforms presented the crisis to the outside world daily through their vast programmes and reports, e.g., what the crisis is all about, and who is involved and stipulate Qatar position about the allegations made by the siege countries. Al Jazeera network is an example of such media platforms. For the siege crisis, the state communicated with various audiences such as internal and foreign publics, foreign governments, international organisations, and mediators, e.g., Kuwait. Additionally, the Qatari Foreign Minister invested enormous effort and time communicating with his counterparts either in-person or virtually to explain the consequences of the crisis, gain the confidence of foreign governments and to galvanise their support. The Qatari government also encouraged dialogue with the countries of the siege to help resolve the crisis. The state clearly stated that they are willing to engage in dialogue with the countries of the blockage without impacting their national sovereignty.

8.6.3.2 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

According to the media analysis and interview findings, the Qatari government used strategic communication in their PD during and after the crisis to help boost the image of Qatar against the allegations by the siege countries. Strategic communication was employed through various channels, including social media and other communications method within the diplomacy channels. The interview findings showed how strategic communication is used in some Qatari embassies abroad using various social networking platforms to change foreign public perception

of Qatar in relation to the crisis and ensure that near real-time information on the crisis developments is provided to strengthen the state's image with the international publics.

8.7 IMPLICATIONS OF THE BLOCKADE: POST-BLOCKADE REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

On 5 January 2021, the six members of the GCC met at a summit in al-Ula, Saudi Arabia to successfully resolve the blockade crisis and to re-establish diplomatic relations with Qatar. However, the reconciliation occurred with Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain failing to secure any compromises from Qatar in regard to their allegations which served to set the blockade in motion (Ramani, 2021). The restoration of relations thus did not entail any agreement to Qatar scaling back its engagement and support for Islamist movements which the aggressors framed as state-sponsor terrorism. Ulrichsen (2021) further asserts that the symbolic agreement to restore stability and solidarity amongst GCC states is likely to be marred by long-term regional consequences which festered over the course of the 43-month siege on Qatar. Moreover, the communique offers neither substance nor any tangible mechanisms to safeguard and ensure compliance with the agreement. If anything, the changing regional landscape suggests that the societal rifts created by the blockade remain at risk of causing future aggravation. It is why Al-Adwani (2021) intimates that GCC stability in a world of shifting dynamics requires new arrangements and strategic partnerships between the GCC and external parties that possess the capabilities to ensure regional stability. The growing disengagement of western powers from the region due to myriad issues and concerns has created a vacuum that the GCC must collectively shore up by substantively aligning their interests – which appear to be divergent.

For instance, Roberts (2019) cogently asserts that Qatar's engagement with various Islamist organisations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, represents a pragmatic approach whereby the state actively seeks to maximise its influence through its 'Islamist' soft power. The approach is however also responsible for contributing to creating the siege crisis in the first instance. By drawing upon its abundant financial resources, Qatar has been able to harness personal links and support intermediaries as part of its wider foreign policy agenda. Roberts (2019) is also correct to assert that Qatar's engagement with Islamist groups denotes a practice of 'politics as usual' in the Middle East, at least prior to the implications that ensued with the events of the Arab uprisings. Simply put, as a small state, Qatar strategically invested in the possibility of shifting power relations in the Middle East at the onset of the Arab uprisings. Moreover, Qatar's foreign policy directives to buttress 'Islamist' soft power are prescriptive of what Diwan (2021) regards as Qatar's lack of significant standing in Islamic learning and historical ability to contribute to Islam's global development. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE are not historically endowed with indigenous clerical establishments that are capable of influencing global Islamic

discourse. These states have therefore actively sought to offset the lack of human resources and generally weak institutional religious authorities (Roberts, 2019) by financially investing in policy measures that aim to strengthen their standing and transnational influence in shaping religious debates in Islam.

In comparison to the UAE, Qatar has remained relatively unimpeded and unthreatened by the Islamist currents of the past (1950s-1990s) It has thus had the ability to view and treat Islamist actors vying for state influence as assets that can be co-opted into its nationalist agenda as well as its desire to procure international support for its ambitious interventions. Accordingly, Qatar has committed to crafting and projecting religious soft power as a means to primarily attract Muslim audiences and stakeholders through faith based diplomacy (Diwan, 2021; Freer, 2018; Fahy, 2018). By comparison, the UAE, which has a contentious past with Al-Islah (the UAE branch of the Muslim Brotherhood) has sought to project a soft power approach that emphasises inter-faith dialogue as a means to offset its weak institutional religious authorities. Qatar's approach has gained notoriety due to the evolution of security and threat perceptions following the Arab Spring and the failure of Islamists the restructure the order of power relations in the Middle East and North Africa. Yet, as Roberts (2019) notes, Qatar's seemingly ambiguous support for Islamist factions have never constituted a unilateral approach. Instead, such policies and engagement has been arrived at in concert with its international partners and allies. In other words, Qatari policies towards engagement with Islamists has incorporated and secured the support of its allies. Its involvement in Syria was accompanied by close cooperation with American, British and Turkish intelligence; its mediation with the Taliban had American support; and its strategic engagement with Hamas has received assistance and support from America and Israel (Roberts, 2017). Qatar is, as Kamrava (2017) calls it, a subtle power that purposefully utilises unconventional means and approaches given to mitigate its status as a small state. Its foreign policy approach which relies on influencing informal contacts (due to a limited foreign policy apparatus) is precisely why it is able to punch above its weight and further reflective of its intent on playing a critical role in contributing to shaping the modern Middle East. As a small state, it therefore relies on unconventional and informal means to spread influence such as by engaging with Islamists in an effort to garner support and cultivate influence in what appeared to be potentially new power centres (Roberts, 2019).

As the United States continues to pivot away from the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been emboldened to engage in a strategic policy of hedging aspects of their foreign policy agendas. The growing uncertainty and lack of commitment from America and western powers to contribute to the security and stability of the region has facilitated moves such as the formation of OPEC+ which includes Russia as well as the UAE's recent decision to abstain from the UNSC

vote to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict). By contrast, it is probable that Qatar will retain its unconventional approach to foreign policy and soft power given its robust security arrangements with America and Turkey, both of which maintain an active military presence in Qatar. According to Cristol (2019), the Turkish military base in Qatar has expanded since the quartet issued their demands and it remains integral as a 'trip wire' to negate an invasion by Saudi Arabia in the event that American-Qatari relations deteriorate in the future. It is thus unlikely from a strategic perspective that Qatar is willing to disengage with Turkey and Iran, both of whom remain sources of considerable contention within the GCC. Ulrichsen (2021) asserts that Qatar's pragmatic relationship with Iran is unlikely to stop given that the two countries share the largest non-associated gas field in the world. Indeed, the blockade created new opportunities for Turkey and Iran to forge ties with Qatar. In addition to increasing troops, the former, which is a highly energy dependent state, has entered into new agreements and investment opportunities with Qatar whereas the latter in a public display has airlifted planes full of food supplies throughout the blockade (Riggs, 2021). The blockade has also created new diplomatic openings between Qatar and Iran through the restoration of full diplomatic relations and increased trade (Riggs, 2021). Hence, despite a resolution, such imbalances and the fear of Saudi-centric ambitions (along with the historically embedded expansionist concerns revolving around Saudi Arabia) are likely to be reflected into bilateral and GCC relations (Ulrichsen, 2021).

The rhetoric and discourse disseminated on media and social media networks during the blockade is also likely to continue to have significant impact on the fabric of societies across the Gulf. According to Ulrichsen (2021), the vilification of Qatar could carry with it generational implications that delay and impede reconciliation at the societal level. For instance, Qatari social media responses reveal heightened fear throughout the blockade and specifically at moments when policies by members of the quartet were enacted. An analysis by El-Masri et al. (2021) which investigates 160,000 Arabic language tweets by Qatari residents finds that they experienced an emotional roller coaster during the blockade. The study reveals fearful and sad sentiments accompanied key policy announcements such as on 1 November and 7 November 2017 when visa entry requirements by Bahrain and a membership freeze from the GCC were respectively announced. They further find while sadness concerning the split from their neighbours remained constant across the period of study, Qatari residents developed a resiliency and positive outlook to cope with the adversities brought about by the blockade. The societal divisions and discontent created by the blockade may thus gradually ease with time if strategic interests and cooperation between Qatar and the GCC can be normalised.

However, it would appear that the political trajectory and present threat perceptions in the region would require substantial coordination and long-term alignment – both of which seem to be absent

from the current GCC agenda. According to Antoniades, Al-Jassim and Gharatkar (2021) the failed intended outcomes of the blockade have actually served to streamline Qatar's ambitious policy track. The authors intimate that the blockade facilitated an urgency for Qatar to expedite its policies and projects aimed at the diversification of its economy. The disruption to supply chains and the threat of economic destabilisation fast tracked Qatari policy efforts to establish new supply chain channels, open the Hamad Port, expand support to local manufacturers, re-route flights through Iranian airspace and provide investors with strong incentives (Antoniades, Al-Jassim and Gharatkar, 2021). These policies and decisions did not however reactively indicate a novel policy path, nor did they come to fruition directly as a response to the blockade. Rather, they were defined in the Qatar National Vision 2030 in 2008 wherein the emphasis was squarely placed on growth and development through economic, human, social and environmental pillars.

Having said that, it would be remiss to say that the blockade did not serve as a catalyst for change. It is evident that the change however has not been in the direction of policies but rather in the processes that underline them. The urgency that accompanied the potential detrimental impact of the blockade catapulted Qatari to focus on enhancing the quality of its policy making, streamlining collaboration between its institutions as well as improving coordination. Antoniades, Al-Jassim and Gharatkar (2021) regard the urgency of this push as being "highly methodical, focused and results-driven" in a manner that separated it from past processes. On the other hand, if we acknowledge that the direction of Qatar remains unchanged and that the quartets attempt to isolate Qatar have largely failed (Ulrichsen, 2021) then we must also consider the future strategic coordination between Qatar and GCC countries. Despite Qatar's expedited efforts during and since the blockade, the diversification of its economy (as well as that of all GCC countries) still remains an important and challenging issue. The inability of the GCC to reconciliate may thus further aggravate relations between the countries as well as progress and prosperity across the Gulf region.

The blockade provides important public diplomacy lessons that Qatar can utilise in maintaining, managing and strengthening relationships with its neighbours in the future. Admittedly, it can be argued that Qatari policies towards Islamists, although never unilateral in nature, were eventually bound to elicit a degree of aggression from neighbouring security actors in the Gulf region. (Roberts, 2019; Ulrichsen, 2021). The subtle power of Qatar, as described by Kamrava (2017) thus faced a significant hurdle through the events of the blockade. Kamrava (2017, p.92) defines Qatar's subtle power as a "composite form of power that combines three classic forms of power". It draws upon soft power, which denotes the ability to influence others (Nye, 2004); to manifest conditions that serve one's strategic interests; and to mobilise bias to shape perceptions of a target. Kamrava (2017, p.94) further prescribes four factors that have enabled the global gains of Qatar

despite constituting a small state, which traditionally would be relegated to secondary importance in international relations. These factors are as follows: “a calibrated and carefully maintained policy of hedging; an equally aggressive global campaign of branding; significant capacity on the part of the state; and prudent use of the country’s comparative advantage in relation to neighbours near and far”. As it pertains to the first, it may be deduced from the events of the blockade that Qatar’s policy of hedging by retaining relations with Turkey, Iran and Islamists have served as a source of agitation to its Gulf neighbours. While the latter threat has somewhat dissipated, Qatar is likely to continue to hedge in its relationships with Turkey and Iran given growing uncertainty of America’s commitment to the region. Alternatively, if Qatar were to acquiesce to GCC demands it may potentially fall under a Saudi-centric or Saudi-UAE centric agenda that could be detrimental to its regional and global ambitions. As Roberts (2022) cogently observes, the UAE has been regarded as critical in leading the blockade against Qatar and its ontological insecurity has driven it to obtain a militaristic edge whereby it actively seeks to reduce the uncertainties facing its national identity within tolerable limits. This notable shift is likely to contribute to a continued and problematic relationship with Qatar which finds itself at the opposite end of the ideological spectrum in projecting its subtle power. Secondly, the blockade appears to have intensified and fast-tracked Qatar’s global campaign of branding, especially as the blockade forced it to re-coup the impact incurred to its tourism industry. In regard to the third and fourth factors, the Qatari state retains significant capacity and has streamlined its comparative advantage since the onset of the blockade. Roberts (2019) asserts that a culture of deference have centralised power to a limited number of senior leaders that remain unchecked and autonomous in undertaking ambitious initiatives that envision Qatar as the Switzerland of the Gulf. In this sense, the blockade emboldened Qatar to strengthen its ties not only to Turkey and Iran but equally to America as a response to hostile neighbours and regional uncertainty.

The three phases of Qatari foreign policy during the blockade were ascertained to be containment, transformation and adaptation and achievements. Following the blockade, it appears that as a small state and subtle power, Qatar remains mired in a relatively precarious regional arrangement. Its emphasis on hedging, specifically with Iran and Turkey, are likely to draw the continued ire of the UAE and Saudi Arabia whereas its projection of religious soft power could continue to have an impact on regional relations if Islamism resurfaces in the region. Moreover, the transformation phase which entails diversification of the economy and is rooted in Qatar National Vision 2030 remains a significant challenge given the human resources shortage of the indigenous Qatari population. The ongoing crisis in Ukraine is likely to influence Qatari-American and Qatari-EU relations due to the pressing energy demands of Europe. One may postulate that these relationships could potentially aid diversification but given the ambiguous stance of Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, uncertainty remains. Moreover, the ongoing

diversification efforts are likely to be impacted for the foreseeable future due to ongoing global disruptions brought about by technology and a pandemic which has severely affected global supply chains. Lastly, as it pertains to adaptation and achievements, the blockade invariably served to improve policy processes insofar as that it streamlined Qatari projects to meet Qatar National Vision 2030. However, moving forward it is imperative that Qatar's adaptation and resiliency further align with the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda.

From a public diplomacy perspective, the blockade provides important lessons that Qatar would potentially benefit from moving forward. As Kamrava (2017) asserts, the subtle power of Qatar as a small state is not guaranteed and thus runs the very real risk of fading if it is improperly and incorrectly managed. Furthermore, as Roberts (2019) states, the inexperience of Qatari ministries and the general culture of deference to leadership would benefit from the introduction of mechanisms that empower public diplomacy. In other words, although Qatar emerged from the siege crisis relatively unimpeded, the ongoing regional dynamics infer that it is likely to face contention from the UAE and Saudi Arabia in the future. Moreover, as a small state that remains committed to hedging, the blockade has facilitated a path towards the entrenchment of potential relations that may continue to draw discord and disenchantment from its neighbours and historical allies. Thus, in an era of public diplomacy wherein the digitalisation of society is evident, Qatar would benefit by empowering a strategy that not only aligns with its 2030 Vision but also with the 2030 United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda. Furthermore, if it is to retain its subtle power and serve as a key influencer in regional outcomes, it must empower its ministries and public diplomacy personnel under a uniform vision that clearly delineates its vision, objectives and global image.

The continued disruption of global society by digital technologies further reflects the imperative need for public diplomacy initiatives to effectively respond to the "melange of technologies, ideas, behaviours, and metaphors" that shape and re-shape the discourse and decisions of the modern digital society (Manor, 2019). In a digital global society, public diplomacy must be conducted openly; control over communication processes must be relinquished; diplomacy must be democratised to a degree; and digital units must live-tweet diplomatic events. Furthermore, public diplomacy must effectively eclipse traditional limitations; engage in digital outreach; make sense of events; build relations and engage in real-time diplomacy (Manor, 2019). Ultimately, the events of the blockade indicate that its resolution remains symbolic rather that substantive in nature. By all indications, Qatar continues to find itself in a position wherein its policies and objectives are likely to be subject to the scrutiny of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In order to mitigate future quarrels, especially in light of the deteriorating state of the GCC, it is imperative that Qatar formulate a clear strategy of public diplomacy that garners global influence and support; develop

its public diplomacy representatives; and emphasise a public diplomacy framework that is coordinated to respond to shocks as well as the volatility that has come to define the political landscape of the Middle East and North Africa. Naturally, as a small state, the preferred strategy of carefully crafted policy of hedging has benefitted Qatar – and it is postulated that the state can successfully continue to hedge granted that it incorporates a more resilient and robust public diplomacy framework in the aftermath of the blockade.

8.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY

Qatar has been able to overcome many of the difficulties it faced and to refine its political capabilities and have political experience not only in mediation to solve worldwide crises but in solving the crises it faces. Also, it has a long-term strategy and vision for the State internally and externally based on many aspects, including investment abroad and open prospects for new projects in Qatar, so it has its economic position abroad, which supported its foreign policy and orientations.

As a result of the investigation of the case studies of crisis, Qatar remains committed to its values, principles and foreign policy as a sovereign state and will not be subjected to the pressure of any neighbouring states. At the same time, at the top of its priorities, it affirms good relations with the GCC countries. It supports the Council's march and the continuous affirmation that any issue that affects any of the GCC countries will necessarily affect the rest of the other countries.

Although the interviews demonstrated that PD was activated during the crisis, most agreed that PD is still new in Qatar's diplomatic context and there is a need for PD empowerment within the diplomatic structure and a need for defining clear PD strategy and a framework for PD practice which is controlled and assessed by government to ensure the PD is employed effectively to manage Qatar image, especially in the current siege crisis. The researcher has defined ten recommendations for MOFA to empower PD. Although these recommendations were valuable and will help to empower PD in Qatar's diplomatic frame, still there is a need for strategic PD framework to guide the PD practice and ensure the practice is controlled. The development of strategic PD framework is defined in the next chapter.

9. CHAPTER 9: DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC PD FRAMEWORK

This chapter commences with an overview of the PD empowerment framework, followed by an explanation of the framework elements, which are then presented in the PD framework diagram. This chapter further advances the researcher's original contribution by proposing a strategic PD framework for Qatar PD. The framework is developed based on the outcomes of Chapters 4, 6, 7 and 8 and comprised of four primary levels, i.e. (i) the strategic level, (ii) tactical level, (iii) operational level and (iv) governance level. The aim of developing a PD framework is to provide PD strategy, architecture, methodology and assurance. The framework is intended to for the diplomatic frame to help resolve the problem of lack of strategic PD, which will help strengthen Qatar PD's practice and reputation in the international community. The framework will focus on the MOFA organisational and governance vision, and drivers for managing the PD structure and ensuring regular contact between the MOFA and governance are met and operate together without any conflicts. It offers a new roadmap for the state to conduct PD through a robust PD empowerment system that can ensure that systematic and regulated PD activity is governed and controlled.

The findings from previous chapters and the involvement of the PD office in London helped the researcher develop the strategic PD framework for Qatar's diplomatic frame. Engaging with the PD office enabled the researcher to further enhance and propose the PD empowerment based on the notion that PD constitutes the focused efforts to influence publics through a public image at home and abroad. For example, employees of the PD office reaction to the framework elements and sub-elements such as the PD goals, PD models and theories showed that it is essential to include them in the framework. Chapter 4, which mainly reviewed the existing PD models and theories, paradigms, frameworks and dimensions serves as the foundation for the proposed PD framework which can assist diplomats and diplomatic personnel in deciding on appropriate PD models and theories to aid the management of crises. Chapter 6 investigated the utilisation of PD in Qatar diplomatic context and defined the PD strategy and mechanism as well as PD opportunities and PD challenges. The goal was to assist the provision of the PD framework that will help manage the challenges of PD resulting from a lack of strategic PD implementation, e.g., the lack of human resources and the lack of a strategic response to crisis management which are address in Level 1 and Level 2 of the PD empowerment framework. Chapters 7 and 8 critically demonstrated that diplomats have limited knowledge in PD practice, e.g., what PD elements to adopt to manage the siege and Nepalese workers crisis and this further stressed the need for a framework that would help with this aspect. The researcher used this knowledge to inform the design of the proposed framework with the aim to help improve diplomats in PD practice.

The PD empowerment framework provides a clear structure and logically shows the sequence between the various levels and can therefore be of great service in helping diplomats to focus on the key aspects required to implement strategic PD. This framework and its associated elements will fill a gap in the current literature in terms of addressing one of the main challenges facing PD practice, i.e., lack of strategic PD, deficiency of strategic PD framework for the diplomatic frame to enhance PD practice. Therefore, this chapter contributes to knowledge by proposing a strategic PD framework for the diplomatic frame, which will help improve the nation's PD practice.

Although some PD elements were used during the Qatar crises, e.g., PD theories, PD models and PD dimensions, the findings from the media analysis and interviews showed that PD played a limited role in the Nepalese workers' crisis. The crisis was primarily resolved through traditional diplomacy, e.g., visits between Qatar and Nepalese diplomats for dialogue between the two nations to fortify the two nations' relationship. During the siege crisis, Qatar worked diligently to enhance the role of PD in the management of the crisis using both cultural and political platforms, mainly through the PD office. The limitations in the implementation of PD during the Nepalese workers' crisis and the siege crisis demonstrate the need to embrace and empower PD in Qatar's diplomatic frame and to develop precise tools for effective implementation of PD. Such importance was echoed by all diplomats interviewed. Indeed, they emphasised that significant effort is needed to ensure that PD is empowered in Qatar MOFA to support diplomats perform PD role successfully by following a defined PD framework. Hence, the forthcoming framework aims to develop and define PD strategy, provide a structure and approach, and guide how PD is practised through the diplomatic context.

Based on the researcher's observation, the main obstacles in implementing PD faced by diplomats include the lack of sufficient knowledge and skills, lack of specific tasks for the diplomats, a lack of strategic PD planning and cultural divide. The proposed framework will enable the diplomats to achieve various activities, including defining PD models, paradigms, and principles that can be adopted and defining the PD architecture system. It will also help support the process of defining a PD methodology for the goal of effective PD implementation.

9.1 STUDY WITH THE LONDON PD OFFICE

The PD empowerment framework was developed based on the findings developed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Moreover, key stakeholders participated in its development process, including the PD office in London. The involvement of the PD office in Qatar embassy in London has provided a clear vision of this section’s activities and their daily duties and communication to improve the methods and approach of the PD practice. This was achieved through the researcher’s cooperation, involvement, and knowledge-sharing with London’s PD office. Working with the

PD office led to valuable outcomes in relation to suitable PD theories, paradigms, and models based on country vision and specific factors. This process concluded with proposing and developing a strategic PD framework for Qatar diplomatic frame to build a strategic PD and improve Qatar's image worldwide.

The main questions the researcher has developed to be answered through the involvement of the PD office are as follows:

1. Is there a clear strategy for Qatar PD?

2. Are there specific objectives for the PD office in London?

3. Does the office follow a framework for PD practice to facilitate the PD process?

4. What are the main PD platforms (e.g., economic, cultural, media)?

5. What are the used PD mechanisms?

6. How is PD communication performed?

7. How does the PD office evaluate the PD activities to ensure it attains desired outcome (e.g., survey, interviews)? Is the PD controlled and evaluated from MOFA (e.g., the PD office function is discussed in the annual embassies meeting in Qatar)?

8. What is the PD office's role, especially under the siege crisis? Furthermore, what are the main challenges and obstacles the PD office face?

9. Does the PD office evaluate its performance (e.g., surveys, interviews)? Does MOFA control and evaluate the PD office (e.g., the PD office performance discussed in Qatar's annual embassies meeting in Qatar)?

10. Do diplomats working in the PD office have the required knowledge and skills to efficiently perform the PD role?

9.2 RESULTS

The main driver for the PD office was Qatar's ambassador in London, who has initiated the first PD office in Qatar embassies. He pointed out the importance of PD's role in attaining Qatar's foreign policy objectives. He stated "*Public Diplomacy is the creation and facilitation of states' opportunities to communicate and engage with every part of society. It is a fundamental part of the future of diplomacy; it ensures there is a far-reaching understanding of the importance of states relationships, interdependencies and shaping perceptions*". The PD office has a clear mission to continue strengthening Qatar's reputation, brand, influence, and relationships within

the United Kingdom through activities that focus on delivering the Embassy's objectives within its engagement and outreach strategy.

The PD Strategy is defined noticeably to promote the long-term engagement objectives in the political, public and society, community and charitable, digital and traditional media, culture, sport, business and science and technology. The focus will be to deliver these initiatives with the ambition of engaging influential individuals and organisations from each of the sectors, as mentioned above, directly or indirectly.

9.2.1 PD OBJECTIVES

1. To continue the promotion of Qatar's national brand and image to all key stakeholders, Qatar's embassy makes representation to, with a focus on changing negative perceptions of Qatar.
2. To promote the close bilateral, economic, cultural, academic, sporting and technological relations between the represented states/countries.
3. To further develop and strengthen the influence Qatar has on the represented states through building long term relationships across sectors to reinforce the mutual benefit of the cooperation's and shared interests domestically and globally.
4. To support the State of Qatar's 2030 vision by bringing together, further, the represented states in all sectors to deliver the ambition of the 2030 vision.

9.2.2 PD GOALS

1. Promote the brand and enhance the image of Qatar to the represented countries.
2. Build a strong base of support for Qatar across various communities and challenge the negative perceptions.
3. Expand further digital media exposure and further promote the ESQ's activities.
4. Enhance the understanding of Qatar's tradition, culture, and history.
5. To build upon and create new relationships between Qatar, its entities, and the represented countries key stakeholders.
6. To promote and affirm Qatar as the most advanced nation in the region in all fields.

Although interviews held with Qatari diplomats show no clear PD strategy, the PD office has defined PD strategy for their office which was a personal effort from Qatar ministry in London represented by the Ambassador (see Chapter 6). Although the PD office has taken great effort in defining PD strategy and infrastructure, it does not currently share its knowledge with other embassies believing that such achievement will provide novelty for the Qatar embassy in London.

This, therefore, led to the recommendation of knowledge-sharing with other embassies in the annual embassies meeting in Qatar.

The approach for the embassy with the PD office is to deliver the objectives and goals through strategic engagement activities and events. These will be innovative and contemporary in approach to ensure for maximum impact whilst adhering to the State of Qatar's global perception of delivery to the highest and most advanced level. These events will be supported by the embassy of Qatar's active social media channels and documented by a video and photographic team for promotion and post-event interactions.

Furthermore, the fundamentals of diplomacy are political interaction, relationships, and bilateral engagement between states. Political participation in its non-traditional format will work in even more innovative, inventive, and contemporary ways within the framework of Public Diplomacy. This is due to its proactive nature of continued engagement, with or without any direct political purpose or reasoning. Therefore, the PD office aims to support the political engagement within the PD strategy, for the aim to support for the traditional means of engagement between states, political figures, and diplomatic missions, influence prominent political figures and deliver unique events programs.

The office also supports social and community engagement to establish a clear line of contact and engagement with the general public and community groups. The importance of this form of diplomacy is continually underestimated and needs far more consideration, especially so as citizens are far more informed and have access to all means of information with immediacy. The PD office performs six main diplomacy roles: Cultural diplomacy, digital diplomacy, sports diplomacy, economic, science and social diplomacy, all are collaborated to attain the ultimate PD strategy.

Regarding the management of PD strategy, it is managed by the Ambassador of the Embassy of Qatar. Specific areas are delegated to diplomats and locally engaged staff members. Each specific area will form databases of key individuals, stakeholders and existing partners, which will be considered when formulating an event and/or engagement program activity. There is a feed-in from the Qatar UK Group and other Qatari entities where relevant. Although the management of PD was defined, the communication performed for PD activities was vague due to the sensitivity of disclosing such information. It was nevertheless disclosed that there is direct communication with MOFA, diplomatic attaches in London and with other organisations in the UK.

1. The PD strategy has been a mission wide priority, where all relevant staff members expect to be involved in a PD activity at any given time as it is within the mission's core objective and strategy. The Diplomat and Staff member could contribute to the embassy's annual plan for potential engagement and activities with consideration for ad hoc engagements

which will arise through the year. Although the Diplomat and Staff member have the required knowledge and skills to perform PD activities gained through experience, they found it takes much time to absorb such experience.

The main challenges facing the PD office were not clearly illustrated by diplomats but were observed from the deficiency of staff to carry out the PD activities, e.g., staff were *stressed* when they were planning, designing, implementing and evaluating the activities. There appeared to be a lack of separation of *duties*; staffs are doing different activities. However, in terms of the *cultural divide*, PD skills and knowledge were embedded through experience, and it was favourable for PD office staff to have a foundation of knowledge and skills in PD through the diplomatic institute of MOFA before being assigned to the PD office as part of their diplomatic training. Nevertheless, there were many opportunities observed including higher management support for the PD office by MOFA and the availability of financial resources to support the PD activities. Each project is assigned human resources and a specific budget approved by the accounting team. Since many challenges surround the adoption of Qatar's PD, including, (i) deficiency of staff resources, (ii) skills capabilities, (iii) a lack of strategic planning to guide PD practice and (iv) cultural divide, the researcher placed an emphasis on the need for defining a useful PD framework which should reflect Qatar's foreign policy and help focus and assess the efficacy of its diplomacy.

Regarding the measurements and evaluation of the PD strategies, the PD office has adopted a time frame for assessment every two years. This evaluation includes an analysis of the previous year's PD programmes within the PD strategy context to allow further comparative analysis of the PD strategy's effectiveness. A measurement framework is created to ensure a fair and practical evaluation. However, during the implementation of PD activities, there are established guidelines to monitoring the progress of the PD strategy with indicators of success that will feed into the comprehensive, end of time frame, evaluation process. The data that will be collated will be both quantities and qualitative using, but not limited to, the following indicators: Analytics of the digital media channels, level of attendees, pre-event expectations of attendance, traditional media coverage and negative and positive and qualitative feedback from attendees. The PD office has a transparent evaluation process; however, the evaluation outcome was kept confidential due to its sensitivity.

As it pertains to the PD role during the siege crisis, digital diplomacy shows an intensive outreach since the crisis. Twitter accounts for the embassy and ambassador were initiated. Moreover, Instagram, Facebook accounts were defined alongside an active YouTube channel. Also, Infographics were used on all platforms to measure its effectiveness. Another main platform was the traditional media, where several events were performed including Media Engagement with

Qatari officials, the Media Round tables for H.E the Foreign Minister, meetings with journalists, TV interviews with BBC, Sky News, CNN, Aljazeera and Al Arabi with H.E the Foreign Minister, Ambassador Yousef Al Khater, Ambassador Nasser Al Khalifa. Also, a Talk at the UK Parliament by H.E Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani and Dr Ali bin Sumaith.

Additionally, think tanks research institute and university engagement were visible during the crisis through Chatham house speech for H.E. the Foreign minister. H.E. Dr. Mutalq Al-Qahtni talked in RUSI on Counter Terrorism and through supporting programs at Chatham house, Forward Thinking, and the Centre for Advancing British Arab Understanding. Moreover, Qatari students supported their initiatives against siege crisis in Qatar. Also, Additional support was gained from the hiring of part-time advisors to provide coherent advice on PD role during the crisis.

Based on the research outcome with Qatar PD office in London, there is no defined governance strategy for PD. However, after discussions with the PD office employees, the researcher was able to discern the following:

MOFA and its associated diplomatic networks mainly carry out PD functions. This was also agreed by Hocking (1999) that MOFA has the responsibility of developing the state's PD. As a result, in Qatar's case study, MOFA is the dominant actor in PD empowerment.

- PD in Qatar uses soft power as it is the most effective PD practice suitable for the state.
- The cooperative relationship between nation branding and PD, referring to Szondi (2008) model is that nation branding was treated as part of PD that aim to improve the national image. However, the researcher has observed a lack of governance over the PD function and lack of strategic PD in the diplomatic frame.
- The key PD principles for Qatar are credibility, discussion, partnerships and transparency. These principles are reflected in Cull (2006) and the Government-specific PD principles.
- The suitable paradigm for Qatar, according to Brown (2012), is PD as a matter of national projection.
- Suitable PD models used by Qatar, which are the rational and non-rational PD models proposed by Rasmussen (2009) based on social tendency (e.g., national identity) and tangible benefits to influence foreign public and government (e.g., national branding) for the aim to restore Qatar image worldwide. This is based on Qatar's to influence foreign public and government, especially after the siege crisis through a feast of tangible

investments, thoughts and norms.

- Image Restoration Theory proposed by Zhang and Benoit (2004) was used to restore Qatar's image, especially after the current siege crisis, which claims Qatar was supporting terrorism worldwide. Qatar's government has chosen to deny all the blockade countries' accusations and performed all possible corrective action to contain the crisis and reduce its impact in the siege crisis.

- The PD office performs six main diplomacy roles: Cultural diplomacy, digital diplomacy, sports diplomacy, economic, science and social diplomacy, all are collaborated to attain the ultimate PD strategy. It also uses, Cull's (2009) PD mechanisms: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, international broadcasting but psychological warfare is not applied. Also, Nye's (2004) dimension of PD was used, i.e., daily, strategic communication and building relationships.

In general, the PD during the crisis provided a concerted attempt to support and safeguard Qatar's position. However, this office is working in isolation from other embassies and thus the impact was neither as extensive nor coordinated as it could have been. Therefore, it is recommended that the experience of the PD office in London is shared with other Qatari embassies to ensure that Qatar PD strategy is optimised and consistent in its efforts to promote Qatar's image in the aftermath of the crisis. This can result in much needed PD empowerment in the diplomatic framework presented by Qatar MOFA for the aim of enhancing Qatar's national image around the world. It additionally requires governance for the PD by defining a comprehensive framework for PD empowerment. Hence, spreading the experience of PD office in London would be beneficial to provide PD infrastructure in all or at least core embassies of Qatar around the world.

9.3 PD EMPOWERMENT FRAMEWORK

The literature revealed a lack of theoretical research proposing a comprehensive PD framework. Therefore, the ultimate objective of the research is to propose a PD empowerment framework, which requires effective communication within the PD processes and strategic-decision making with the involvement of governance as a domain controller for the PD system to ensure that PD is reflective of the government vision and drivers and considering the current situation experienced by the state.

The proposed framework builds upon Gilboa's (2008) framework which promotes PD's mechanisms and government participation in PD practice and The NATO (2013) framework for strategic PD which defines strategies, planning activities, designing and evaluating. The latter framework failed to develop PD's governance and was primarily based on planning PD rather

than empowering PD in the diplomatic frame through building PD structure and controls. As a result, the proposed framework defines PD strategy, structure, implementation methods and advancing an evaluation process.

The proposed framework uses the three phases of the international decision-making pyramid: strategic, tactical and operational (see Figure 12). The topmost-level is comprised of strategic decisions pertaining to policies, changes, and new processes that carry with them long-term influence. This is supported by the intermediate level, the tactical which comprises decisions associated with construction, investments and workforces, and which tend to have short-term influence. In turn, the operational level focuses on the implementation of tactical procedures and strategic policies underatken by the top levels. It involves daily effort and scheduled actions and tools to guarantee the delivery of strategies to stakeholders on time.

FIGURE 12: DECISION-MAKING PYRAMID (REF)

Although this pyramid was used in the framework to ensure that decision-making on PD is structured through these three levels, the pyramid does not provide governance over the decision-making processes to ensure the control over decisions and the continuity of changes and improvements processes on governance expectations and desired outcome. As a result, the Governance level is added to the model to ensure the control and management of PD through all levels and define if there are any changes or improvements required to ensure the PD process provides its strategic outcomes (see Figure 12).

FIGURE 13: PD GOVERNANCE MODEL

In practice, each nation will engage in PD and nation branding based on their choice of PD model, whether rational, idealist or non-rational. Herein, the nation would decide whether branding is considered part of PD effort or dominance over PD. In this research, the selected approach is comprised of the rational and non-rational social trend models in which nation branding and identity is considered as a tool of PD that could be controlled by MOFA in particular through nations embassies to provide a governments strategic control and management over PD efforts and therefore building nation image dimension taken into consideration the distinct characteristics of the target culture and people.

The primary data conducted with Qatar PD office in London, has defined that the PD model is based on rational and non-rational social trend models in which nation branding and identity are considered part of PD that aim to improve the national image. However, the researcher has observed a lack of governance over the PD function and lack of strategic PD in the diplomatic frame. As a result, the researcher has proposed the PD governance model for Qatar based on literature and the London office study outcome (see Figure 13).



FIGURE 14: PD GOVERNANCE MODEL

This framework implements organisation (MOFA) and governance vision and drivers to more efficiently control the PD system and ensure that frequent communication between organisation (MOFA) and governance are met and are working in harmony with no conflicts. The proposed framework consists of four levels (see Figure 14):

1. **Level 1 Strategic:** The first level of the proposed PD empowerment framework defines the PD strategies. Here, three key elements are formulated. The first element is the *PD vision* which would help the users of the framework establish how the nation desires to be seen on the global stage, what interests they are set to promote and their contributions in terms of culture, education and economic. Therefore, it is essential for employees primarily diplomats in various embassies abroad to be well-versed in the nation's PD vision. This is then complemented by *PD goals and the audience(s) sub-level*. In this sub-level, clearly defined plans on achieving the goals should be set at a particular level of abstraction. At this level, the audiences to be engaged or communicated with needs to be clearly identified, e.g., domestic, regional and international audiences. The last sub-level is *PD outcomes and strategies*. This sub-section is responsible for defining the PD principles, paradigm, model, and desired outcomes based on organisation and governance drivers. It is essential to align actions to the nation's vision and strategy. It can also help diplomats effectively enforce the state's PD strategies. Decisions made on the strategic level require fewer real-time data than those made on the lower levels. Diplomats and relevant stakeholders required to familiarise themselves with the nation's PD vision and strategies for crisis management.
2. **Level 2 Tactical:** The tactical level defines the PD architecture system based on the state vision and organisation's readiness and finally define a transition plan. After familiarising with the various elements of the strategic level, the next step is to be familiar with the

different aspects of the tactical level. Typically, the tactical level consists of several divisions, each is in charge of a collection of functions; the decisions made the decisions taken here are connected to the corresponding functions and must adhere to the upper-level strategies specified.

The time to make a decision is an essential key factor on lower levels of the pyramid, e.g., tactical level. Any crisis management necessitates swift decision-making, which can be accomplished at the tactical level of the proposed framework. The lack of making the right and fast-paced decision on the tactical level could intensify the crisis's seriousness by the sum of time that elapses before a suitable action is taken. Here, the first sub-level requires assessing the organisation's readiness to manage the crisis regarding various resources such as human and finance. The nation's readiness to form partnership with other nations could help mitigate the crisis and its impact. In terms of human resources, it is essential to assess knowledge and commitment, especially diplomats. The next sub-level is the PD architecture system. At this level, four activities are defined based on Qatar's vision. The main activities relate to human, social, economic and environmental aspects. The nations and MOFA goals for the crisis management will specify the activities required based on the embassies' abilities and Qatar's connection with the host nation. The last sub-level is the transition plan which involved planning the transition from the tactical level to the operational level, i.e., implementing the activity/activities defined.

3. **Level 3 Operational:** The operational level defines the PD methodology to implement PD and therefore perform monitoring and evaluation based on metrics. The core operations are carried out at the operational level; decision-making power is restricted to optimising individual development activities in accordance with the nation's primary strategy. A method, on the other hand, is a set of logically linked tasks carried out to achieve a specific purpose. In the operational level, extended decision processes can cause failure to achieve strategic PD goal and negatively impact the crisis management process. In this level, three main elements are identified, i.e., PD methodology, PD implementation and monitoring and evaluation. PD methodology defines the structure for the diplomats to help decision making concerning the crisis and control the PD implementation process. The adopted methodology aids the understanding of a problematic situation, such as the siege crisis and helps establish ways of resolving it. For effective PD implementation, it is essential to identify the features needed to support the implementation process, e.g., assessing whether the right infrastructure and knowledgeable workforce are available and other potential factors that could impact PD implementation. After decisions are made, and actions are taken, it is essential to monitor

and evaluate their effectiveness and take actions where necessary. Core decisions are carried out at the operational level; decision-making power is restricted to optimising individual development according to the primary strategy.

4. **Level 4 Governance:** Here, two sub-levels are defined, i.e., audit and change management. The governance level provides control over PD system by auditing the PD implementation process, if it meets the governance desired PD outcomes then PD implementation would continue in the same manner, and if it is non-conformant to the desired outcomes, then governance will lead to performing change management at the above levels based on the analysis on the type of change that has to be done whether in the PD method (operational level), PD architecture (tactical level) or in the top-level which is changing PD strategy (strategic level). The framework mandates that the auditing and change management at the governance level should continue until PD implementation process achieves the intended outcomes.

A significant main factor at the lower levels of the framework is the time to make a decision. The actions/decisions help achieve the state's strategy for the siege crisis management and define their performance and whether the desired outcome is met. Hence, digital diplomacy can be adopted at the tactical and operational levels. As a reminder, digital diplomacy primarily refers to a state's increasing use of social media applications to attain their foreign policy goals and to regulate its reputation and credibility actively. With the involvement of the MOFA and various diplomats working in different embassies, digital diplomacy can enhance their interactions and engagement. Adopting digital diplomacy could enhance collaborative crisis management between diplomats and all relevant stakeholders involved in the process. Given the critical nature of the crisis, using digital platforms will help share new data with the right audiences and at the right time. In the siege crisis management, employing digital diplomacy would enable information to be delivered in an efficient and timely manner, e.g., delivery alerts or notifications or having a meeting using digital platforms.

At the tactical and the operational levels, it is essential for the diplomats and other relevant stakeholders to quickly decide on their preferred communications channels or platforms during the crisis management. Such platforms could then be used to provide the needed information about the crisis to the diplomats and to the public (both foreign and domestic) to help reach their expectation at the right time. Transparency with the relevant audiences could be improved by delivering credible information at the right time using digital platforms such as social media. Also, digital technology can be used to gather information about the crisis, i.e., what the blockade countries are saying about the crisis in various digital media platforms. It can also be used to denying inaccurate information and direct the public to official information sources. Employing

persuasive techniques such as monitoring progress on assigned tasks daily or weekly and providing feedback on tasks performance, sending reminders and persuasive messages could be essential to help motivate the crisis management team.



FIGURE 15: PD EMPOWERMENT FRAMEWORK

By deploying this framework on the state of Qatar, the PD architecture system was cognisant of Qatar 2030 vision. Qatar 2030 vision consist of four pillars (see Figure 16):

1. Human: Concerned with education, health and workforce including worker's right. This pillar aims to build PD in general.

2. Social: Concerned with social care and protection through ensuring humanitarian ideals and morals; and the sound social structure through national heritage, Arab and Islamic values and identity. Moreover, it considers international cooperation over economic, political and cultural platforms which could be through humanitarian assistance, Economic investment, cultural exchange and provision of dialogue among civilisations. This pillar aims to build National Identity.

3. Economic: concerned with sound economic management though investments and economic stability. This pillar aims to develop National Branding.

4. Environmental: concerned with providing equilibrium between growth needs and environmental protection using environmentally sound technologies. This pillar aims to build PD in general.



FIGURE 17: QATAR 2030 VISION

After analysing Qatar's vision, the four pillars were developed as an integral part of the PD architecture system to ensure government vision delivery through PD (see Figure 17). As a result, the human, social, economic, and environmental were main activities that aim to create Qatar's mental image through the sound of human rights, social structure, international cooperation, environmentally support and economic stability and management. However, Organisation and Government objectives will define the required activity by PD system based on the specific Diplomatic Mission condition and Qatar's relationship with the host country and the embassy's capabilities. As a result, there might be all four activities or even three or two based on the Organisation and Government objectives defined for the specific mission. This provides flexibility to the PD system and derives activities that will only benefit Organisation and Government objectives.

Moreover, all activities are inter-linked and integrated to work in harmony. They are measured and managed regularly through the requirement management process to ensure the desired outcome reflects the Organisation and Government objectives defined earlier. The work with the PD office illustrated that they perform six collaborated diplomacy roles, i.e., cultural diplomacy, digital diplomacy, sports diplomacy, economic, science and social diplomacy to achieve the ultimate PD strategy, it is preferable to link these roles to Qatar 2030 vision to provide a standardised PD architecture system for all Qatar embassies.



FIGURE 18: PD ARCHITECTURE SYSTEM

9.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The literature review key conclusion has led to defining the relationship between nation branding and PD. Nation branding was treated as part of PD that requires governance to improve the national image. The chosen paradigm was PD as a national projection considering, MOFA dominance in PD empowerment. As a result, this research's main contribution aimed to propose an outline of PD empowerment framework that provides PD strategy, architecture, methodology, and assurance. The framework advanced in this chapter provides novel guidance for the state to perform PD through a comprehensive framework for PD empowerment to ensure a standardised PD practice that is governed, efficient and controlled. In this research, Qatar was the case study, and therefore, the framework specifically catered to Qatar PD as a practical paradigm of the framework. As a result, the PD architecture system was defined in reference to Qatar 2030 vision to include four core pillars: human, social, economic and environmental which were deployed through different PD platform, and the communication process is still unclear which required further investigation. The framework is in the initiation stage, and a further investigation and evaluation will be required to ensure its effectiveness in improving PD practice. The following chapter will therefore evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed framework for improving PD practice in Qatar's diplomatic context.

10. CHAPTER 10: EVALUATION OF THE PD EMPOWERMENT FRAMEWORK

The PD empowerment framework advanced a strategic PD in the diplomatic frame of Qatar. The framework aims to enhance the effectiveness of improving PD practice and provide PD strategy, architecture, methodology and assurance. The framework is envisioned for the diplomatic frame to help resolve the lack of strategic PD, which will help support Qatar PD's practice. The framework emphasises MOFA organisational and governance vision and drivers for managing the PD structure and ensuring a consistent and synchronised approach between the MOFA and governance is achieved without any complications. The framework provides a new roadmap for the state to conduct PD through a robust PD empowerment system to ensure that a systematic and regulated PD activity is governed and controlled.

In Chapter 9, the PD framework for supporting Qatar PD practice which consists of a various levels and elements was proposed. The PD framework aids the process of implementing PD practice in the diplomatic context as demonstrated by the primary research findings. In this chapter, the PD empowerment framework will be evaluated in relation to the case study chapters. The evaluation will focus on assessing if the framework includes the elements needed to implement strategic PD and the degree to which the supporting materials are helpful in the process. The aim of this chapter is to meet part two of **Objective 5** presented in Chapter 1.

10.1 EVALATION STUDY AIM

This study aims to assess the usefulness of the proposed PD empowerment framework in aiding the diplomatic frame to implement a strategic PD and the extent to which diplomats would like to implement PD using the framework and its components. The objective of the evaluation study is to assess the method and its elements in terms of the following/focusing on the following attributes:

- **Understandability:** The goal here is to test the level to which the process is easy to comprehend and whether the instruments given are helpful and easy to understand.

- **Usefulness:** The emphasis here is to determine the degree to which practitioners will benefit from the process and the materials provided by it. This includes evaluating how the materials will help the decisions of practitioners and strengthen their understanding of the process.

- **Clarity**: The goal here is to help evaluate the degree of clarity of the framework and its accompanying material that would be used to implement a strategic PD in the diplomatic frame of Qatar.
- **Comprehensiveness:** The goal here is to determine the degree to which the framework involved various elements needed to implement strategic PD effectively.
- **Effectiveness:** The emphasis here is to ensure the effectiveness of the framework elements and their supporting materials in aiding diplomats to successfully the PD strategy for crisis management.

10.2 EVALUATION STUDY STAGES

The evaluation study consisted of two stages. These stages are discussed below; an in-depth discussion will be presented in the results section. Framework supporting materials employed in each stage can be found in the Appendix.

- **Stage 1:** This stage involves addressing the blockade crisis without the help of the PD empowerment framework.

- **Stage 2:** This stage involves addressing the blockade crisis with the help of the PD empowerment framework.

Stage 1: this stage of the evaluation is centred on addressing the crisis using PD without the support of the PD empowerment framework and its materials. At this phase, the study participants will be provided with the PD theories and PD models. The participants involved in this stage did not participate in any research that led to the method being created and thus had no previous research knowledge. Participants who decided to take part in this evaluation study were invited to a session in which they were provided with the blockage crisis case study. The results of this session can be found in Table 13 presented in this chapter.

Stage 2: This stage of the evaluation aims to support the participants to implement strategic PD following the empowerment framework and its materials. The first part of this stage involved an evaluation of the framework in terms of aiding diplomats to understand the various elements needed to implement strategic PD in the diplomat frame and the order of these elements. The second part involved applying the framework elements and sub-elements to the blockade crisis following a strategic approach. This process involved diplomats, political analysts and MOFA experts. Study participants that consented to partake in this stage were provided with the framework and its materials. During the evaluation, the participants were provided background

information on the blockade crisis and were asked to apply the framework elements to help resolve the various issues of the crisis. The results of this session are presented in Table 14.



FIGURE 19: EVALUATION STUDY PROCESS

10.3 EVALUATION INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

This study aims to establish whether the PD empowerment framework can help fulfil the following questions:

- What are your thoughts on the significance of the various framework elements?
- To what degree do you think the framework covered all PD strategies?
- What challenges did you think you encounter using the framework?
- What are your suggestions for improving the framework and its materials?

- To what degree do you think the framework and its materials help you implement a strategic PD?
- Do you think the framework impacts crisis management? Why?

10.4 DATA GATHERING METHODS

Focus group and interviews

First, participants, i.e., diplomats, analysts and academics, will be recruited, then they will be invited to an online focus group study. The focus group will be performed with eight participants partaking in the session. At the start of the session, the study participants will be briefed on the PD empowerment framework and its materials and be informed about how the evaluation study will be run. As the session facilitator, the researcher will use the evaluation question to focus the participants' attention on the framework and its elements. After the participants detail their PD strategy for crisis management, supplementary interviews will be conducted to discuss how they assessed the framework, its elements and supporting materials. The researcher will follow a semi-structured interview method. Before the interviews starts, the researcher will define the goals of the interviews. This part of the evaluation study will be recorded. All ethical procedures will be taken care of before the evaluation study commences.

Evaluation study participants' selection

The proposed PD framework recommends the inclusion of various stakeholders in the decisions and implementation of strategic PD. The main stakeholders are diplomats who are believed to have advanced knowledge in public diplomacy. Other stakeholders that would be involved are the MOFA, analysts and academics. Details of the participants who participated in the evaluation of the proposed framework are provided in Table 12. The evaluation study participants selection criteria include (i) participants will have basic knowledge in public diplomacy and working in embassies, or the MOFA and (ii) participants will have strong expertise in researching and disseminating knowledge in public diplomacy. The rest of the participants will be invited, primarily based on their experience in the field. Therefore, the evaluation study adopted the convenience sampling approach.

TABLE 12: EVALUATION STUDY PARTICIPANTS

Participants	Gender	Age	Role	Years of experience
Participant 1	Male	40	Diplomat	5
Participant 2	Male	38	MAFO	6
Participant 3	Female	42	Diplomat	7
Participant 4	Male	55	Ambassador	8
Participant 5	Female	49	Counsellor	7
Participant 6	Female	50	Analysts	9
Participant 7	Male	38	Academic	5
Participant 8	Male	35	MOFA	5

10.5 EVALUATION STUDY PROCESS

The framework evaluation was performed based on the steps below. The following steps were used to perform the evaluation.

- The participant consent form was provided to the participants before the date of the study and a study information sheet detailing the aim of the evaluation and expectation of the participants during the study.
- All other documents relating to evaluating the proposed framework were provided, such as the framework representation and description of the framework pillars with examples.
- The nature of the evaluation study, additional materials, and what is required of them when responding to the questions were explained to the study participants.

- Explanation of the various pillars of the framework and examples was given to the study participants before starting for familiarisation purposes.
- The evaluation study involved two stages, i.e., Stage 1 and 2.
- Stage 1 was performed three days prior to Stage 2 to allow for a reflection period.
- Before answering the evaluation questions, the participants will be asked to read the evaluation case study and discuss it with other participants. The participants were given a chance to ask questions and clarify anything relating to the study case.
- In the end, the study participants were asked to participate in a focus group discussion regarding the completeness, usefulness, and efficiency of the proposed framework.

10.6 FRAMEWORK EVALUATION: CASE STUDY

On 5th June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain declared that their intention to immediately suspend ties with Qatar. The Saudi-led coalition moved to close their airspace, land and sea to Qatar. A coalition of several additional states including Yemen, Egypt, Maldives, Senegal, Mauritania, Comoros and Chad subsequently followed suit by officially reducing or altogether suspending relations with Qatar. The countries declared that the measures were necessary due to Qatar's alleged support of terrorism and its meddling in their domestic affairs which violated a 2014 GCC agreement that sought to uphold the "interests, safety and stability" of its member states. They further criticised the direction of Qatar's Al-Jazeera network and cited Qatar's amicable relations with Iran as potentially dangerous to security in the region. The announcement of the blockade was subsequently supplemented with a list of 13 demands introduced by the Saudi-led alliance. Qatar was instructed to satisfy the extensive list of demands prior to any diplomatic talks could take place to resolve the crisis and lift the blockade.

In the aftermath of the announcement, a media war broke out between the two sides. On one side, Qatar quickly moved to defend itself and its interests by denouncing the allegations made against it. By comparison, the Saudi-led coalition utilised its media and social media channels to intensify its pressure in an effort to isolate and coerce Qatar to converge to their foreign policy agenda. These actions were followed by an announcement in Cairo claiming Doha provided funding for terrorist organisations and groups, which Doha categorically rejected as false and misleading. Nevertheless, the political crisis that erupted following the announcement of the blockade has had a substantial impact on Qatar. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have taken multiple actions during the crisis, including instructing various ports and shipping agents to stop accepting Qatari shipments. The land, sea and airspace closures have further meant that Qatar had to scramble to redirect its resources and flights through Africa, Europe and Iran. Qatar Airways responded by postponing its flights to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain. In addition, UAE, Saudi Arabia and

Bahrain announced that Qatari diplomats had to vacate their countries within 48 hours, Qatari visitors were asked to leave within two weeks, and they requested their citizens to leave Qatar. As a result, Qatar moved to increase its diplomatic relations with several countries including Turkey, Iran, France, Germany, Russia as well as a number of humanitarian organisations to respond to the sudden impact brought about by the blockade.

In addition to impacting its reputation and image globally, the siege invariably impacted the economic, political and humanitarian domains of Qatar. The economic impact of the crisis forced Qatar to tap its reserves, renegotiate and increase its food imports, building materials and equipment from elsewhere. As it pertains to food supplies, Qatar which was used to importing approximately 80 per cent of its food supplies from GCC countries immediately had to seek alternatives. Moreover, by the middle of 2017 the economic impact was evident with gas contracts rising by a notable 4 per cent. Likewise, Qatari stocks plummeted by roughly 10 per cent by June 2017. The unanticipated and unexpected measures enacted against Qatar forced it abandon its traditional economic ties in the region and foster new economic relations elsewhere and particularly with the United States (Smith, 2019).

The political shockwaves produced by the siege caused alarm in the international community and resulted in a number of states imploring the two sides engage in diplomacy and dialogue to resolve their differences. Qatar, renowned for its international mediation and reconciliation efforts, formally called for a greater diplomatic role to be played by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and all relevant UN apparatuses to partake in resolving the crisis. The United Nations expressed its concern in regard to the crisis and leading nations including the United Kingdom called for the cessation of the siege.

The immediate effect of the siege also carried with it important humanitarian implications. The Saudi-led bloc expelled all Qataris from their respective countries irrespective of their status and provided them a fortnight to comply. The suddenness of the demands resulted in a number of humanitarian cases wherein Qatari families, children, students and workers were forced to uproot their livelihoods. These events prompted Qatar to report several cases to international human rights organisations. In turn, the UAE and Bahrain placed gag orders on their populations and restricted their fundamental rights by imposing fines and imprisonment on any of their citizens found to sympathise or be in support of Qatar. For instance, the UAE imposed a fine as large as 500,000AE and an imprisonment term carrying with it a sentence of 3-15 years.

Moreover, the states behind the siege undertook cooperative efforts to launch a worldwide campaign to discredit and defame the reputation of Qatar. They utilised media, new media, academic centres and leading institutional centres to denigrate and disparage Qatar on the world stage. Qatar has responded to these developments by working through the department of MOFA

and its diplomats across various embassies in order to deal with several impacts resulting from the crisis as well as improve its image in the international community. The primary purpose of this section is therefore to serve as a case study to assess the capability of the framework to aid strategic PD implementation to help resolve the crisis.



FIGURE 19: THE BLOCKADE SCREENSHOTS

10.7 EVALUATION STUDY: FINDINGS

The findings of the evaluation study are discussed in this section. The findings will be addressed in light of the suggested evaluation objectives, which include one, the PD empowerment framework effectiveness in supporting the implementation of strategic PD in the diplomat frame of Qatar, and two, the extent to which diplomats would like to implement PD using the framework and its various elements.

10.8 STAGE 1: FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION WITHOUT THE PROPOSED PD FRAMEWORK

This stage was carried out without the use of the PD empowerment framework or its accompanying materials. The study participants were given the task of addressing the siege crisis economic, political, and humanitarian impacts. Table 13 summarises the results of this stage.

TABLE 13: RESPONSE OF THE EVALUATION WITHOUT THE PD FRAMEWORK

Crisis impact	Management strategies	Participant comments
Economic impact	**Planning and preparation:** Adjusting to change, implementing a strategic plan, Self-reliance, communication	Redirect Qatar's foreign investments towards safer and more reliable markets, specifically developed and stable countries. To minimise its reliance on Blockade countries, Qatar needs to open up new markets and strengthen its economic and political relationship with strategic partners, especially Iran considering its importance as the only trade route for Qatar. The crisis can be a good opportunity to develop local industries and serve as a preface to Qatar's future self-sufficiency project. Good preparation and a clear understanding from the participants, which will benefit the management of any crisis effectively and quickly. Develop and implement a strategic plan for ambassadors and those working in the diplomat core to engage their counterparts in foreign countries. Crafting and implementing a clear plan in place would help guide the crisis management process.

	Engagement and transparency: With stakeholders	Learning and gaining experience from small and medium sized countries in the international communities Tapping the knowledge and experience of Qatari students studying in foreign universities. Stakeholders' engagement through monitoring and follow up with various stakeholders, transparency between all stakeholders through communication and ensuring that stakeholders are committed. Honour bilateral agreements in the economic field. Respect economic agreements with the blocking countries.
Humanitarian impact	**Communication and engagement:** Daily communication	Communicating and being transparent with the public, i.e., both local and international, reacting quickly to the public needs by answering their questions, are among the most important foundations contributing to the alleviation of any humanitarian crisis Seek legal advice from international organisations and filing lawsuits. Engage and seek help from international human rights organisations, e.g., NGOs.

		Seeking international support can be achieved through highlighting the humanitarian crisis caused by the blockade: Students forced to drop out, families separated, and jobs lost. It is necessary to focus on the issues of the affected people and find long or short-term solutions, especially for urgent cases, for example, students and separated families. The humanitarian crisis caused by the blockade can play in Qatar's favour on the international level as humanitarian organisations will condemn blockade countries' actions. Provide support and ensure that concerns of affected blockade countries citizens are conveyed to relevant NGOs.
	Protecting national interest and taking decisive actions	The national interest is heavily impacted, considering the hardships many citizens and their families are going through; thus, a social programme must be set to counter these outcomes and defend the national interest. This is not going to be possible to achieve without a clear and decisive approach.

Political impact	**Employing denial strategy:** Denial and corrective actions	Establish a strategic approach in responding to allegations directed at the state of Qatar by the hostile media in every country and defending the reputation of the state of Qatar in the international media. Deny and taking corrective actions since the media can influence people's opinion and the decisions of the democratic states.
	Adopting the dollar diplomacy: Using nation financial power and eliciting new media avenue	The financial power of Qatar can be used to found new media channels that can counter the influence of blockade countries media. This step is necessary considering that Al-Jazeera Channel is starting to lose its position as the most professional and popular media network in the MENA region. Use Qatar's financial power to strengthen its international position might be a good tool for managing the political impact of the crisis. Financial and humanitarian aid is also an excellent investment to improve Qatar's international image. Developing countries supported by Qatar can potentially become its backbone on the international scene. The blockade countries, specifically Saudi Arabia and UAE, tend to have a tremendous financial influence, especially in the United States. To reduce this

		influence, Qatar needs to intensify its lobbying in the United States to affect decision-making in its favour.
	Employing the Swiss foreign affairs model	Considering that Qatar is also a democracy-promoting country, Doha can become the 'Geneva of the Middle East' by attracting, in a first stage, Arab Human Rights organizations and NGOs who are in most cases banned and persecuted in their countries. Employing this model could pave the way to make Doha a new international human Rights promotion centre in the region similar to main international cities such as Geneva, Vienna and New York.

10.9 STAGE 2: FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION WITH THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

This stage of the evaluation was performed to assess the adoption of the PD framework in implementing PD practice in the diplomatic frame. The questionnaires were emailed to the participants who consented to participate in the evaluation study. The evaluation participants were asked to manage the impacts of the siege crisis with the proposed PD framework and its various elements. The researcher showed that the participants effectively state their preference in relation to PD vision, PD goals and audiences, PD outcomes and strategies, PD transition plan and implementation.

TABLE 14: RESPONSE OF EVALUATION WITH THE PD FRAMEWORK

PD Framework Levels	
Level 1 Strategic: Participants Preferences	
PD Vision	Engage in development activities by providing financial support Improve relationships and strengthen partnerships with regional and international communities Develop diplomats and MOFA knowledge in PD in order to enhance the crisis management process
PD goals and audiences	**PD goals:** Open new markets through Economic Diplomacy Improve Qatar's reputation through supporting democracy and freedom of speech Prioritising humanitarian cases caused by the blockade Condemnation of the blockade on the international level, such as international bodies and influential NGOs. **PD audiences:** All Nations through the UN Humanitarian organisations to highlight the humanitarian crises caused by the blockade Non-governmental organisations concerned with human rights

	Law firms The ministry of foreign affairs The Foreign Minister Diplomats The Qatari people The international publics
PD outcome and strategies	**PD outcome:** Improve Qatar's reputation Open-up new markets to face the economic crisis Condemn the blockade countries Change the public perceptions of Qatar regarding the blockage **PD strategies:** PD theories - the image restoration theory to denial media reports made by the media of the blockage countries and the international media. PD theories - the image restoration theory can be used to deny all allegations and enhance Qatar's global image. PD theories - the image restoration theory corrective measures to be used to enhance and restore Qatar's international image, using all its various resources. To promote and strengthen Qatar's international position through its image-building strategy as its foreign policy strategies. Qatar has been working hard on its international image, using all its various resources. PD dimension – daily communication with the Qatari people to update them about the crisis and reassure them that Qatar will take all necessary steps to help alleviate the crisis impact on the

	people. PD dimension - strategic communication will be employed using various platforms to ensure that the international public and governments know our position in relation to the accusation by the blockade countries. PD principles of partnerships - established new economic partnerships. PD principles of partnerships - strengthened existing partnerships with the international community.

PD Framework Levels	
Level 2 Tactical Participants Preferences	
Organisational readiness	Resource availability, such as assessing available human and financial resources, in terms of human resources, it is essential to assess knowledge and commitment, e.g., diplomats, personnel working in embassies and the MOFA employees.
PD architecture system	The architecture system helps approach different aspects of the crisis. It refers to developing four main categories: individuals, society, economy and environment and all the mentioned categories were heavily impacted by the crisis. All the development activities mentioned in the architecture system are required to manage the crisis, even developing the environment as it boosts the country's reputation, especially among international organisations and NGOs.
Transition plan	It will involve setting up the transition plan, which includes defining the bodies and authorities concerned and assigning tasks. Thus, the transition relies on the extent to which different authorities and bodies are concerned with the PD empowerment, ready to start implementing the plan.

PD Framework Levels	
Level 3 Operational Participants Preferences	
PD implementation	The MOFA should lead the implementation: Qatar's PD system can be implemented through the ministry of foreign affairs as the main actor, supported by other authorities. The ministry should assign tasks to the diplomats working in embassies in the blockade countries and other diplomats. The role of diplomats is also significant in terms of Economic Diplomacy, strengthening the country's reputation, especially following up developments, i.e., monitoring.
Monitoring and evaluation	System and actions evaluation, i.e., evaluating the system and taking actions where needed, is required to assess and learn whether the various tasks and activities positively or negatively impact the crisis. Monitoring and evaluating the assigned tasks and activities where needed is related to whether these developments are positive or negative.

PD Framework Levels	
Level 4 Governance: Participants Preferences	
Audit	After auditing the process, the implementation process should continue in the same manner if the required PD outcomes are met.
Change management	Suppose the diplomats are not performing well on their assigned tasks due to unforeseen circumstances. In that case, the ministry of foreign affairs should manage this situation by re-signing tasks and changing roles.

10.10 DISCUSSION ON PARTICIPANTS REACTION ON THE PD FRAMEWORK

Using the results of the evaluation, in this section, the study aim outlined at the start of this chapter will be discussed. As it pertains to overall understandability, the follow up interviews revealed that the study participants found the PD framework, the accompanying documents such as the PD models and theories and the explanation of the pillars of the proposed framework to be understandable and easy to follow. Furthermore, the study participants found the framework to be effective in assisting them in implementing strategic PD to help manage the siege crisis, e.g., selecting appropriate PD models and PD theories. The participants stressed that implementing PD with the help of the framework was easy and straightforward and that they completed all the evaluation questions, demonstrating the usefulness of the framework in assisting the strategic implementation of PD. In terms of clarity, the study participants considered the proposed framework to be presented logically thereby making it easy to follow. The information provided in Table 15 elaborates further on each of the categories. The participants positively reacted to the frameworks and its elements and agreed that it will have a substantial impact on the crisis management *"it defines tasks, duties, outlines and will contribute to the organization of work, good planning, and response to expected and unexpected events"*. Moreover, they enthusiastically agreed with the criteria and elements advanced within the original framework. PD theories and models are important and useful tools that can advance a critical and in-depth understanding of the present international scene. It can be very helpful in understanding foreign policies and to categorise countries and approach more efficiently.

TABLE 15: SUMMARY OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS REACTION ON THE PD FRAMEWORK

Participants opinion on the PD framework	
Understandability	The examples provided for each framework level make them easy to understand and helped me respond to the evaluation questions. All the participants agreed that the PD framework is understandable as it also gives examples for most of the levels, which helps stimulates their thinking while completing the evaluation questions. The framework levels are logically presented, i.e., beginning with the strategic level, the tactical level, the operational level, and the governance level. The framework presented a clear structure for the implementation of

	the strategic PD for the diplomatic context. One participant stated that using the same colour for both level 1 and level 4 can be confusing in the first instance.
Comprehensiveness	The framework covered all the required elements for strategic PD practice *"in my opinion, it covered all the important aspects".* The study participants agreed that the explanation of all the pillars and sub-pillars of the PD framework provided made the PD empowerment framework a lot more complete. None of the participants suggested elements that should be added or remove from the proposed PD framework.
Usefulness	All the participants agreed that the PD framework is helpful because *"it defines tasks, duties and outlines and will contribute to the organization of work, good planning, and response to expected and unexpected events".* The study participants stated that the framework enables them to think about the PD models, theories, goals, and implementation in greater detail. The study participants stated that separating the PD framework elements in different framework levels helps prevent users from getting confused with the various elements and sub-elements.
Clarity	The participants agreed that the framework is straightforward, easy to follow and applicable. The participants agreed that the PD framework is presented clearly, logically, and sequentially in terms of the various levels and sub-levels, which could guide users on the tasks or aspects that need to be considered to ensure effective strategic PD implementation. The participants believed that the framework content was organised and well structured. The form of the PD empowerment framework is clear and simplified.

	Some of the participants highlighted the significance of using colours as this highlight well the level and help them focus on what is needed. The four levels are clear and easily noticed by a first look.

10.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY

In this chapter, the proposed original PD empowerment framework for implementing strategic PD was evaluated. The chapter discussed the process followed to evaluate the proposed framework. Moreover, it was also evaluated as to whether the PD models and PD theories description and the material on the framework levels were capable of effectively supporting the PD implementation process. The evaluation findings indicated that the PD empowerment framework could assist the Qatari diplomats and MFOA employees implement strategic PD in the diplomatic frame of Qatar and help manage the blockade crisis. A case study was adopted to assess the ability of the PD empowerment framework to support the PD implementation process. In the next chapter, the thesis's conclusion and future work will be provided.

States, organisations of states, and certain sub-state and non-state players can utilise PD to establish a better understanding of cultures, attitudes, and behaviour, create and control relationships, and influence ideas and mobilise activities in order to advance their goals and values (Gregory, 2011). Governments are cognisant that increasing their country's international appeal necessitates engaging transnational civil society and gaining the approval of foreign publics. In a field where it is known as a force for good, criticism of PD is a healthy remedy (Melissen, 2011). The criticism of PD serves as a reminder that recognition is not universal. Moreover, it encourages wider consideration on how diplomacy is shifting and how public diplomacy is an expression of the shifting rapport amid the diplomatic community and global society at large (Melissen, 2011).

Since PD practice has moved beyond conventional borders, it faces the challenges of the present environment, which accordingly affects international affairs. Although there are many benefits and opportunities for PD, there remain a number of challenges to PD practice. The advent of environmental and external factors reflects the on-going development of PD and require attention. Although a host of PD challenges have to be considered to improve the PD practice for countries, the primary challenge of PD is to be understood strategically and systematically, wherein the practice is defined clearly and ensures the transfer of suitable messages to the public, generating satisfactory public environment and defining backgrounds for policy conventions (Henrikson, 2006; Cull, 2006). PD, when it is not adequately planned, may lead to a lack of credibility. Therefore, there is a need to build a strategic PD that reflects the state's foreign policy objectives and can cope with contemporary challenges and changes in the international environment. Indeed, PD could be practised successfully in any state provided that there is a strategic plan for its practice by taking into consideration the potential challenges to PD alongside its elements, methods, principles and role in attaining the state's foreign policy goals efficiently (Melissen, 2011; Chitty, 2007).

As a result, this research thesis advances a PD empowerment framework for implementing strategic PD in Qatar's diplomatic frame is required. To understand better Qatar's PD practice, in this research thesis, several literature reviews, media analysis, interviews and questionnaires were performed. Ultimately, the results, findings and analysis of these studies assist in the development of the proposed PD empowerment framework. The framework was developed using the results of Chapters 4, 6, 7 and 8. In conclusion, Section 11.2 presents the contribution to the knowledge of the thesis, Section 11.3 provides the thesis limitations, and Section 11.3 provides prospective future work.

11.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES REVIEW

As defined in Chapter 1 of the thesis, the aims and objectives of the research were established and investigated. This subsection demonstrates how each of them were sufficiently achieved.

Objective 1: To conduct a literature review on PD and related topics.

This thesis reviewed the current literature on PD theories and models, PD frameworks, and PD principles to help attain objective one. The goal of the review was to help establish an in-depth understanding of PD models and theories that diplomats could use to improve PD practice and tackle the PD challenges, especially the lack of strategic PD in the diplomat frame of Qatar. In addition, the thesis reviewed the literature on the historical overview of Qatar's foreign policy and PD. Herein, the aim was to gather background knowledge of the different platforms of Qatar's foreign policy as well as the critiques on Qatar foreign policy. The findings of the review on PD models and theories helped the research present a discussion on the PD theories and frameworks that policymakers can employ to aid the improvement of its PD practice which would eventually reflect on their foreign policy.

Objective 2: To investigate and define suitable research methodologies to help conduct the research studies in order to achieve the research objectives.

To help attain this objective, this thesis reviewed the possible and suitable research philosophies, research methods and research design for the attainment of the research aim and objectives outlined in the introductory chapter one. In addition, a discussion on the data gathering methods, analysis and data interpretation techniques was provided. As a result, different techniques were used to achieve the research objectives, including literature review, archival research, case study, interviews, surveys, and focus group. Performing the review enabled the researcher to understand better and apply appropriate research methods to help achieve the research objective.

Objective 3: To investigate whether Qatar has a strategic PD, the extent of PD role in the diplomatic frame and discovers the opportunities and challenges of PD in Qatar.

In order to achieve this objective, this thesis first investigated Qatar's PD in the diplomatic context by conducting interviews with the aim to explore the use of PD in the diplomatic frame of Qatar diplomatic. Second, it identified PD strategy and mechanism, PD opportunities and challenges. The aim was to improve Qatar's PD practice by providing a PD framework that could sufficiently mitigate the adverse effects of a lack of strategic PD. The researcher performed 11 expert interviews with diplomats and ambassadors, which were then thematically analysed. Based on the interview findings, mind maps were created to develop an in-depth understanding and analysis of Qatar PD's opportunities and challenges. The opportunities were classified into four main

categories and their associated sub-elements. At the same time, the challenges were divided into five categories and their associated sub-elements.

Finally, based on the findings of the interviews, the thesis presented subsequent discussions on interviewees' view and their recommendations to aid the enhancement of Qatar PD. Four main recommendations were presented. Among these recommendations the interviewers suggested involving more young people in Qatar's public diplomacy activities and Qatar's PD further by investing in and pioneering e-diplomacy practice.

Objective 4: To explore through case studies, the role of PD during the main crises faces Qatar's image worldwide, i.e., the issue of the Nepalese workers' security and the current Qatar Siege crises.

In order to help understand the role PD played during the crises, various data collection methods were adopted, i.e., media analysis, interviews and questionnaires. Reports from several local and international media outlets were collected and critically analysed for the media review. The media review focused on records collected from political reports, broadcasts, and news reported by foreign and local news outlets for GCC nations, local and foreign newspapers, and academic centres and institutes such as Chatham House and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Reports published from 2012 – 2019 were included in the analysis. The British Guardian and Sky News Arabic are among the newspapers analysed. The goal was to include only papers that were published during the crisis. Following the media review, semi-structured interviews were performed with relevant individuals and organisations to help explore the Nepal workers crisis in greater depth. Questionnaires were produced to help collect workers' and employers' perspectives on Qatar's efforts in relation to the Nepalese worker crisis and its effect on Qatar.

In relation to the siege crisis, media review and interviews as data gathering methods were adopted to help understand the role of PD in siege crisis management. The analysis aimed to determine what caused the crisis and outlined the effect of the crisis on Qatar, i.e., political, economic and human impact, such as the State's reputation in the international arena. The review focuses on evaluating the Qatari government's response to the crisis, especially the role of PD in the diplomatic framework to restore Qatar's international reputation. It further discussed how the crisis affected Qatar's foreign policy policies and concluded with original recommendations for Qatar PD empowerment in the diplomatic context. Finally, a discussion section on Qatar's theoretical structures and public diplomacy models as public diplomacy techniques during the crises was presented.

Objective 5: To propose and evaluate an effective strategic PD framework for the diplomatic context for the aim to address the challenge of lack of strategic PD and improve the understanding and practice of PD.

The PD empowerment framework was developed based on the findings of Chapters 6, 7, 8 and the contribution of the PD office in London. It consists of four main levels, i.e., the strategic level, tactical level, operational level and governance level. The goal of creating PD empowerment is to make available PD strategy, architecture, methodology, and assurance. The PD framework is structured to assist the diplomatic community in addressing a lack of strategic PD, thus improving Qatar's PD practice and credibility in the international community. Also provided was a description of the four levels of the PD framework and examples in each level. In order to evaluate the PD framework, a two-phase case study was conducted.

In phase one, participants were asked to participate and answer questions aimed at addressing how to manage the crises economic, political, and humanitarian impact using PD models, theories, principles, and dimensions without the help of the PD empowerment framework and its elements. In phase two, participants were provided with the PD empowerment framework and the description for the various levels to aid the process. Participant's perception of how the PD model, theories, principles and discussions would assist them in employing PD to help reduce the economic, political and humanitarian impact related to the crisis. This latter stage of the assessment aimed to ascertain whether the PD empowerment framework could assist the study participants in implementing strategic PD, focusing on the framework's understandability, completeness, clarity, and effectiveness. The evaluation results indicate that the proposed PD framework is easy to understand and useful for the implementation of strategic PD for the diplomatic frame of Qatar. By contrast, the results of phase one show that the participants struggle to specify the required PD models, theories, principles, and dimensions to help manage the impact of the crisis.

11.2 THESIS CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE & POLICY

This research thesis added to understanding of strategic PD implementation, focusing on a novel approach that employs PD models, theories, principles, and dimensions to help reduce the impact of the siege crisis. The key contributions of the thesis to academia and policy are thus presented in the following sub-sections.

The Original Strategic PD Framework

The PD theoretical framework is the first and foremost contribution of the thesis. The theoretical framework advanced consists of various novel elements, including an amalgamation of PD models, PD theories, PD principles and PD dimensions. The combination of these elements, which are uniquely and meticulously devised enable for the emergence of an original and strategic PD framework that contributes to advancing the scarcity of literature available on strategic PD practice thereby contributing to PD knowledge.

The Novel Analysis of Qatar and Contribution to Policy

This research makes a tangible and practical contribution to knowledge and policy that effectively improve the understanding and implementation of strategic PD. The engagement of this framework with Qatar as its case study further produces a two-fold contribution. First, it advances knowledge and understanding on a small yet strategic international player that is scarcely covered in academic literature. In doing so, the research equally enhancing knowledge on the region, its politics and dynamics. Second, the novel engagement of this research with the two selected crises provides a practical contribution that can be utilised and harnessed by Qatari policymakers. The in-depth engagement of this research with the Nepali workers crisis and the siege crisis through a PD lens provide policymakers and diplomats in MOFA with a strategic PD framework that can be effective in advancing its PD practice, better achieving its strategic foreign policy objectives and more efficiently managing its national image and international reputation.

A strategic approach for implementing strategic PD employing PD empowerment framework.

As a whole, the strategic framework and its associated elements fill the gap in existing literature by addressing the fundamental challenge facing modern PD practice – the lack of strategic PD frameworks to accompany PD practice. The framework advanced is comprised of four primary levels: (1) the strategic level; (2) tactical level; (3) operational level; and (4) the governance level. It ultimately provides a robust PD strategy, architecture, methodology and assurance to help resolve the problem of a lack of strategic PD. The framework is rigorously tried and tested in this research through primary data to ensure that it is effective. Thus, the framework developed in this research contributes to and advances existing literature through its original, theoretical and timely approach to analysing PD, Qatar PD practice and the regional political dynamics that currently shape the Gulf region.

11.3 LIMITATION OF THE THESIS

The research thesis has some limitations that can have possible impact on the thesis findings. The points listed below outline the research limitations.

- In Chapters 5, 7 and 8, the researcher was responsible for collecting the data through media analysis. The researcher may be subjected bias and as a result can overlook some reports or data during the media analysis due to the researcher connection with the research subject. However, the researcher ensured that the media analysis was carefully planned and implemented, and the findings was validated by third party such as the researcher's supervisor.

- Another limitation which is the most significant consideration when writing/creating study questions, i.e., the interview questions and questionnaires is making sure that the potential study participants understood the questions as intended and are prepared to answer to them. In order to reduce such limitation, the researcher conducted a pilot study with one ambassador, one counsellor, academics, sample of participants and rationally planned and reviewed by an expert.
- The final limitation was the media analysis performed in Chapter 7 and 8 which primarily focused on Nepal workers and siege crises. Due to the recency of these events however a clearer picture may not yet have emerged. In order to reduce such limitation, in Chapter 7, interviews with relevant personnel and organisations and questionnaires with the Nepalese workers and their employers were conducted. In Chapter 8, interviews were conducted with expert Qatari diplomats to assess PD strategy and PD role during the crisis.

11.4 THESIS FUTURE WORK

The PD empowerment framework provides an approach for implementing strategic PD practice in Qatar's diplomat context.

Future research could advance the theoretical foundations of the PD empowerment framework developed in this thesis. For instance, further analysis could be undertaken for each level and sub-levels of the PD empowerment framework and guidance on what aspects to consider when deciding elements for strategic PD for crises management. It is the researcher's intention to further advance the original framework developed by engaging in additional research that expands the research to include a larger and more diverse dataset comprised of additional experts, diplomats, embassies and personnel that are well-versed in PD practice.

12. REFERENCES

Abdul-Wahid, A., 2010. The role of Qatar's foreign policy in light of the Arab and regional crises. *International Studies*, 43, 119.

Abdullah, J., 2014. *Qatar's Foreign Policy 1995 – 2013: Leverages and Strategies*. Beirut: Arab scientific publishers, Inc.SAL, Beirut.

George, A., 2008. *Qatar is a diplomatic heavy-hitter*. [online] Aljazeera.com. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/7/21/qatar-is-a-diplomatic-heavy-hitter> [Accessed 1 May 2016].

Abu al-Rub, M., 2010. *Al- Jazeera and Qatar: speech of politics and policy speech.* Jerusalem: Abu Ghosh House Publishing, pp.63.

Ahmad, A., 2013. *The gas draws the picture of Qatar politics.* [online] Available at: <http://arabi.assafir.com/Article/3047> [Accessed 27 August 2016].

Ahmed, A., 2017b. Someone Is Using These Leaked Emails To Embarrass Washington's Most Powerful Ambassador. [online] Huffpost.com. Available at: <https://www.huffpost.com/entry/otaiba-ambassador-uae-leaked-emails_n_5932bf04e4b02478cb9bec1c> [Accessed 7 August 2017].

Ahmed, A., 2017a. *New Leaked Emails Show How Qatar Crisis Developed In The U.S.* [online] Huffpost.com. Available at: <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/leakers-share-new-email-dump-targeting-top-arab-diplomat-and-us-foreign-policy elites_us_5934450be4b0c242ca252468> [Accessed 7 August 2017].

Akhmetov, T., 2012. *Explaining Qatari's foreign policy*. [online] openDemocracy.net. Available at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/timur-akhmetov/explaining-qatars-foreign-policy-0> [Accessed 27 August 2016].

Akpınar, P., 2015. Mediation as a Foreign Policy Tool in the Arab Spring: Turkey, Qatar and Iran. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 17(3), pp.252-268.

Al-Adwani, S., 2021. Look Middle, Look East! The Future of GCC Strategic Partnerships. In: M. Zweiri, M. Rahman and A. Kamal, ed., *The 2017 Gulf Crisis*. New York: Springer Link.

Aldardari, S. (2021) *Qatar and Gaza's electricity: Mediation, aid, and expertise* , *Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington*. Available at: https://agsiw.org/qatar-and-gazas-electricity-mediation-aid-and-expertise/ (Accessed: December 1, 2022).

AlDosari, N., 2021. Qatar Crisis: GCC States' Perception of Regional Powers. In: M. Zweiri, M. Rahman and A. Kamal, ed., *The 2017 Gulf Crisis*. New York: Springer Link.

Al Rifai, N. and McGinley, S., 2017. *Kuwait and Oman: As they remain silent on the Qatar-Gulf rift, what does this mean for them?*. [online] Zawya.com. Available at: <https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/story/Kuwait_and_Oman_As_they_remain_silent_on_the_QatarGulf_rift_what_does_this_mean_for_them-ZAWYA20170606110347/> [Accessed 9 August 2017].

Aljazeera.com. 2017c. *Hackers leak emails from UAE ambassador to US*. [online] Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/hackers-leak-emails-uae-ambassador-170603153956229.html> [Accessed 7 August 2017].

Al-Jazeera.com 2017e. *Qatar diplomatic crisis: All the latest updates.* [online] Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/qatar-diplomatic-crisis-latest-updates-170605105550769.html> [Accessed 9 August 2017].

Al-Jazeera.com 2017f. *Qatar-Gulf crisis: Your questions answered.* [online] Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/qatar-gulf-crisis-questions-answered-170606103033599.html> [Accessed 11 August 2017].

Al-Jazeera.com 2017g. *Arab states issue list of demands to end Qatar crisis.* [online] *Available at:*http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-crisis-170623022133024.html [Accessed 22 August 2017].

Al-Jazeera.com 2017h. *Saudi-led group: Qatar not serious about demands.* [online] Available at:<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/saudi-led-group-qatar-demands-170705144209453.html> [Accessed 22 August 2017].

Al-Jazeera.com 2017i. *Sheikh Tamim: Any talks must respect Qatar sovereignty.* [online] Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/sheikh-tamim-talks-respect-qatar-sovereignty-170721184815998.html> [Accessed 2 August 2017].

Al-Jazeera.com 2017j. *Qatar diplomatic crisis: How it affects air travel.* [online] Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/qatar-diplomatic-crisis-affects-air-travel-170605093547258.html> [Accessed 20 August 2017].

Al-Jazeera.com 2017k. *Qatar Airways expected to access new flight*. [online] Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/qatar-airways-expected-access-air-corridors-170801020434530.html> [Accessed 22 August 2017].

Al-Jazeera.com 2017a. *Riyadh summit discusses ways of rooting out terrorism*. [online] Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/riyadh-summit-discusses-ways-rooting-terrorism-170521132843998.html> [Accessed 10 August 2017].

Al-Jazeera.com 2017b. *UAE arranged hacking of Qatari media: Washington Post.* [online] Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/uae-arranged-hacking-qatari-media-washington-post-170717004353563.html [Accessed 5 August 2017].

Al-Jazeera.com *2017d. EU's Mogherini urges direct talks to end Gulf crisis.* [online] Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/eu-mogherini-urges-direct-talks-gulf-crisis-170723162849193.html [Accessed 10 August 2017].

Al-Khatib, A., 2015. *Qatar cancels the warranty and 5 years to move to another job*. [online] Available at: <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/economy/2015/10/27/قطر-تلغي-الكفالة-و5-سنوات-للانتقال-إلى-عمل-آخر> (Accessed 12 August 2016).

Al-Rodhan, N., 2006. *Definitions of globalization - A comprehensive overview and a proposed definition*, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), program on the Geopolitical Implication of globalization and transnational security. [online] Available at: https://www.scribd.com/doc/56147025/Definitions-of-Globalization-A-Comprehensive-Overview-and-a-Proposed-Definition [Accessed 19 August 2016].

Al-Thani, A., 2005. *The Qatari foreign policy 1995-2005,* Doha, Al Sharq, pp.16-19.

Al Thani, M. (2021) "Channelling soft power: The Qatar 2022 World Cup, migrant workers, and International Image," *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 38(17), pp. 1729–1752. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2021.1988932.

Al-Watan 2017. *Minister of Transport: Hamad port holds 27 percent of the Middle East trade.* [online] *Available at:* http://www.al-watan.com/Latest-News/وزير-المواصلات-ميناء-حمد-يستحوذ-على-27-بالمائة-من-تجارة-الشرق-الأوسط [Accessed 9 Nov 2017].

Alarabiya, 2017. *Qatar describes Iran as "honorable" and Saudi Arabia responds: Congratulations to you*. [online] Available at: <http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/mob/arab-and-world/2017/09/12/قطر-تصف-إيران-بالدولة-الشريفة-والسعودية-ترد-هنيئاً-لكم.html> [Accessed 10 Nov 2017].

Alavi, M., 1994. Computer-Mediated Collaborative Learning: An Empirical Evaluation. *MIS Quarterly*, 2 (18) pp. 159-174.

Alavi, M. and Carlson, P., 1992. A review of MIS research and disciplinary development. *Journal of Management Information Systems*, 8 (4), pp.45-62.

Albrow, M. and King, E., 1990. *Globalization, knowledge and society: Readings from international sociology*. London: Sage.

Alhayat 2017. *The Gulf Cooperation Council rejects Egypt's accusations against Qatar for supporting terrorism.* [online] Available at: http://www.alhayat.com/m/story/7527913http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-38339906 [Accessed 25 August 2017].

AlJazeera.com 2014. *Gulf states agree deal to end Qatar tensions.* [online] Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/gulf-states-agree-deal-end-qatar-tensions-201441722105658978 9.html [Accessed 24 July 2017].

AlJazeera.com 2016. *Massacre in Raba.* Available. [online] Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2016/08/massacre-rabaa-160816085846897.html> [Accessed: 6 August 2017].

Alkhalisi, Z., 2017. *Qatar keeps gas flowing to UAE despite blockade*. [online] Available at: <http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/07/news/qatar-uae-gas-pipeline/index.html> [Accessed 11 August 2017].

Althaus, C. Bridgman, P. and Davis, G., 2012. *The Australian policy handbook*. Canberra, ACT, Australia: Independent Pub Group.

Anholt, S., 1998. Nation-brands of the twenty-first century. *Journal of Brand Management*, 5(6), pp. 395–406.

Anholt, S., 2002. Foreword. *Journal of Brand Management,* 9 (4-5), pp. 229-39.

Anholt, S. and Hildreth, J., 2005. *Brand America:* The mother of all brands, London: Cyan Books.

Arabian Business 2017. *Qatar banks can survive Gulf, foreign funds withdrawal, S&P says.* [online] Available at: <http://www.arabianbusiness.com/qatar-banks-can-survive-gulf-foreign-funds-withdrawal-s-p-says--677427.html> [Accessed 21 August 2017].

Antoniades, A., Al-Jassim, R. and Gharatkar, K., 2021. The Blockade Against Qatar: A Blessing in Disguise?. *Journal of Arabian Studies*, 11(1), pp.81-99.

Arango, T., 2017. *Big Ransom and Syria Deals Win Release of Royal Qatari Hunters.* [online] Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/world/middleeast/big-ransom-and-syria-deals-win-release-of-royal-qatari-hunters.html?mcubz=2> [Accessed 23 July 2017].

Arkolakis, C., 2010. Market penetration costs and the new consumers margin in international

trade. *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(6), pp. 1151–1199.

Arnott, D. and Pervan, G., 2005. A critical analysis of decision support systems research. *Journal of Information Technology*, 20 (2), pp. 67-87.

Associated Press 2017. *Saudi Arabia Accuses Qatar of Backing Terrorism, Cuts Ties.* [online] Available at: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/egypt-saudi-arabia-among-gulf-states-cutting-ties-qatar-n768161> [Accessed 10 August 2017].

Sharp, P., 2016. *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*. [online] Available at: <http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/international-relations-and-international-organisations/diplomatic-theory-international-relations> [Accessed: 10 July 2016].

Ayad, N and Marshall, P., 2000. *Diplomacy Beyond 2000*, University of Westminster Press, 1996.

Ayad, N., 2010. *Rethinking Strategic Public Diplomacy: The Role of Social Media*, in the International Conference of the 13th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum "Strategic Public Diplomacy", Dubrovnik- Croatia, Poland, May 20–22, 2010, M. Andrlić and A. Gustović-Ercegovac Eds. Zagreb: Grafomark, 2012. pp. 23-32.

Ayad, N. and Copeland, D., 2009. *Transformational Public Diplomacy: Shaping the Future of International Relations*, University of Westminster.

Babar, Z. and Vora, N. (2022) "The 2022 World Cup and migrants' rights in Qatar: Racialised labour hierarchies and the influence of racial capitalism," *The Political Quarterly*, 93(3), pp. 498–507. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923x.13154.

Barakat, S. (2012) "The Qatari Spring: Qatar's Emerging Role in Peacemaking," LSE

Kuwait Program Working Paper no. 24.

Barnard, A. and Kirkpatrick, D., 2017. *5 Arab States Break Ties With Qatar, Complicating U.S. Coalition-Building*. *[online]* Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/05/world/middleeast/qatar-saudi-arabia-egypt-bahrain-united-arab-emirates.html [Accessed 8 August 2017].

Bátora, J., 2005. *Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium-Sized States: Norway and Canada*, Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy 97, The Hague, The Clingendael Institute.

BBC 2012. *Syria opposition groups hold crucial Qatar meeting*. [online] Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20196107> [Accessed 19 June 2016].

BBC 2013. *Qatari emir Sheikh Hamad hands power to son Tamim*. [online] Available at:

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23026870> [Accessed 19 June 2016].

BBC 2014. *Qatar world cup: '£3m payments to officials' corruption claim*. [online] Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/27652181> [Accessed: 12 August 2016].

BBC Arabic 2017a. *Qatar - Saudi Relations: A History of Tensions.* [online] Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-40172427> [Accessed13 August 2017].

BBC Arabic 2017b. *Al-Jubeir: There is no harm in the continuation of the crisis in Qatar and talk about a Saudi-Iranian rapprochement*. [online] Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-41169061> [Accessed:24 August 2017>.

Belida, A., 2014. *How to Save the Voice of America and U.S. International Broadcasting*, USC centre on public diplomacy. [online] Available at: <http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/how-save-voice-america-and-us-international-broadcasting> [Accessed 20 July 2016]

Benbasat, I.G. Goldstein, D.K. and Mead, M., 1987. The case research strategy in studies of information systems. *MIS Quarterly*, 11(3), pp. 369-386.

Bercovitch, J. Anagnoson, T.J. and Wille, D.L., 1991. Some conceptual issues and empirical trends in the study of successful mediation in international relations. *Journal of Peace Research*, 28(1), pp. 7–17.

Berridge, G.R., 2010. *Diplomacy: Theory and practice*. 4th ed. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI)., 2016. *Qatar Country Report*, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Bishop, D., 2014. *Interview: Ambassador Laurence Pope on the state department, the foreign service, and public diplomacy in the 21st century*. [online] Available at: <http://www.publicdiplomacycouncil.org/commentaries/03-05-14/interview-ambassador-laurence-pope-state-department-foreign-service-and-public> [Accessed 14 August 2016].

Blanchard, C., 2012. *Qatar: background and U.S. Relations,* Washington: congressional research service, report for congress, pp.14.

BNA 2017. *Bahrain News Agency - Sovereignty and Rights - Historical Facts*. [online] Available at: <https://www.bna.bh/portal/news/809526> [Accessed 4 Nov 2017].

Booth, R., 2010. *WikiLeaks cables claim Al-Jazeera changed coverage to suit Qatari foreign policy*. [online] Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/05/wikileaks-cables-al-jazeera-qatari-foreign-policy> [Accessed 1 June 2016].

Booth, R., 2016. *Fifa: We will monitor Qatar's treatment of migrant world cup workers closely*.

[online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jul/30/fifa-monitor-qatar-treatment-migrant-world-cup-workers-closely> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Bouma, G. D., 1996. *The Research Process*, Melbourne, Oxford University Press.

Breu, K. and Peppard, J., 2001. The participatory paradigm for applied information systems research, In Proceedings, 9th European Conference on Information Systems. Bled, Slovenia, pp. 243-252.

Brinkley, D., 1997. 'Democratic enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine'. *Foreign Policy*, (106), pp. 110.

Broinowski, R., 2009. *Driven: A Diplomat's Autobiography*, Sydney: Harper Collins.

Brown, J., 2003. *The Anti-Propaganda Tradition in the United States, bulletin board for peace*. [online] Available at: <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/19.htm> [Accessed 11 June 2016].

Brown, J., 2008. *Public diplomacy and propaganda: Their differences*. [online] Available at: <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2008/0709/comm/brown_pudiplprop.html> [Accessed 20 July 2016].

Brown, R., 2012. *The Four Paradigms of Public Diplomacy: Building a Framework for Comparative Government External Communications Research*. International Studies Association Convention, San Diego. [online] Available at: <https://pdnetworks.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/isa-2012-v4.pdf > [Accessed 10 Nov 2017].

Bruntz, G.G.,1938. Allied propaganda and the collapse of German morale in 1918. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 2(1), pp. 61.

Campion, M.A. Campion, J.E. and Hudson, J.P., 1994. Structured interviewing: A note on incremental validity and alternative question types. *Journal of Applied Psychology,* 79(6), pp. 998–1002.

Canada's international policy statement (IPS)., 2005. *A role of pride and influence in the world. 2nd ed.* Ottawa: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Carey, G. and Fattah, Z., 2017. *Flights Grounded as Gulf Split on Iran Leaves Qatar Isolated.* [online] Available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-05/saudi-led-alliance-cuts-qatar-ties-as-gulf-crisis-escalates> [Accessed 2 August 2017].

Cavaye, A., 1996. Case study research: a multi-faceted approach for IS. *Information Systems Journal*, 6(4), pp.227-242.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2016. *Middle East: Qatar*. [online] Available at:

<https://cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html> [Accessed 12 February 2016].

Champion, M. (2017) *Saudi Arabia's feud with Qatar has 22-year history rooted in gas*. [online] Available at: <http://www.livemint.com/Politics/dHHtps3m3FN83KkPize4LP/Saudi-Arabias-feud-with-Qatar-has-22year-history-rooted-in.html> [Accessed 6 August 2017].

Chang, C., 2017. *Why Saudi Arabia and six other countries have cut ties with Qatar.* Available at: <http://www.news.com.au/finance/work/leaders/why-saudi-arabia-and-six-other-countries-have-cut-ties-with-qatar/news-story/b758105a63a70df40b73211e0395d550> [Accessed 8 August 2017].

Chatham House 2017a. *The Crisis in the Gulf: Qatar Responds*. [online] Available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/crisis-gulf-qatar-responds> [Accessed 5 Nov 2017].

Chatham House 2017b. *The GCC in Crisis*. [online] Available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/gcc-crisis> [Accessed 5 Nov 2017].

Chatham House 2017c. *Is the GCC Worth Belonging To?* [online] Available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/gcc-worth-belonging> [Accessed 5 Nov 2017].

Chatham House 2017d. *The UAE View of the GCC Crisis: What Happened and What Happens Next?*. Available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/file/uae-view-gcc-crisis-what-happened-and-what-happens-next-0> [Accessed 5 Nov 2017].

Chatham House 2017e. *Look to Social Media for the Gulf's Burgeoning Debates*. [online] Available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/look-social-media-gulf-s-burgeoning-debates> (Accessed 5 Nov 2017).

Chatham House 2017f. *In Conversation with HE Adel al-Jubeir, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saudi Arabia*. [online] Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/london-conference/agenda/conversation-he-adel-al-jubeir-minister-foreign-affairs-saudi-arabia [Accessed: 5 Nov 2017].

Chatham House 2017g. *Gulf Crisis Exposes the Weakness of Trump's 'Unpredictability'.* [online] Available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/gulf-crisis-exposes-weakness-trump-s-unpredictability> [Accessed 6 Nov 2017].

Chitty, N., 2007. *Public Diplomacy, Developing the Road Rules*, Submission to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Regarding the Nature and Conduct of Public Diplomacy.

Chronicle Fanack 2013 *Qatar and Israel: A strategic but complicated alliance*. [online] Available at: https://chronicle.fanack.com/qatar/history-past-to-present/qatar-and-israel-a-strategic-but-complicated-alliance/ [Accessed 12 May 2016].

CNN 2009. Ahmadinejad hails election as protests grow. [online] Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/13/iran.election/index.html> [Accessed 10 June 2016].

Coates Ulrichsen, K., 2020. *Qatar and the Gulf crisis*. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online.

Cooper, A. and Momani, B., 2011. Qatar and expanded contours of Small State Diplomacy*, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 46 (3), pp. 113-128.

Cornford, T. and Smithson, S., 1996. *Project Research in Information Systems*, A Student's Guide. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Creswell, J. W., 2003. *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Crossan, F., 2003. Research Philosophy: Towards an Understanding. *Nurse Researcher*, 11(1), pp. 46-55.

Cristol, J., 2019. *The Failed Blockade of Qatar*. [online] Medium. Available at: <https://medium.com/arc-digital/the-failed-blockade-of-qatar-2ed2880546e5> [Accessed 8 January 2022].

CSIS 2017a. *Qatar Crisis: Turmoil in the GCC*. [online] Available at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/qatar-crisis-turmoil-gcc> [Accessed 6 Nov 2017].

CSIS 2017b. *Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar: 100 Days of Pointless Arab Self-Destructiveness and Counting*. [online] Available at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/bahrain-egypt-saudi-arabia-uae-and-qatar-100-days-pointless-arab-self-destructiveness-and> [Accessed 6 Nov 2017].

CSIS 2017c. *Gulf Roundtable: The Fight in the GCC*. [online] Available at: <https://www.csis.org/events/gulf-roundtable-fight-gcc> (Accessed: 6 Nov 2017).

Cull, N., 2006. *Public Diplomacy' Before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase,* USCPublicDiplomacy. University of Southern California. [online] Available at: <http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/060418_public_diplomacy_before_gullion_the_evolution_of_a_phrase> [Accessed 5 February 2016].

Cull, N., 2009. *Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past*, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California. Los Angeles CA: Figueroa Press, pp. 12.

Welch, D., 1999. *Powers of Persuasion*, History Today. Available at: <http://www.historytoday.com/david-welch/powers-persuasion> [Accessed 22 July 2016].

Darke, P., Shanks, G. and Broadbent, M., 1998. Successfully completing case study research: combining rigour, relevance and pragmatism. *Information Systems Journal*, 8(4), pp.273-289.

Dawn 2017. *Saudi, Egypt, UAE, Bahrain and Yemen isolate Qatar over 'terrorism' as rift deepens*. [online] Available at: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1337555/saudi-egypt-uae-bahrain-and-yemen-isolate-qatar-over-terrorism-as-rift-deepens> [Accessed 7 August 2017].

de Gouveia, P.F. and Plumridge, H., 2005. *European Infopolitik: Developing EU public diplomacy strategy*. United Kingdom: Foreign Policy Centre.

Dedrick, J. and West, J., 2003. *Why forms adopt open source platforms: a grounded theory of innovation and standards adaptation.* In J.King, and K.Lyytinen (Ed.): proceedings of MISQ special issue workshop in standard marking: a critical frontier for information systems (pp. 236-257). Seattle: MISQ Quaterly.

Denscombe, M., 2002. *Ground Rules for Good Research*, Maidenhead: Open University Press.

Denza, E., 1961. *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, Audiovisual Library of International Law. United Nations.

Denza, E., 2008. *Diplomatic law: Commentary on the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations*. 3rd ed. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

DeYoung, K., 2017. *Bahrain and UAE criminalize 'sympathy' for Qatar*. [online] Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/bahrain-and-uae-criminalize-sympathy-for-qatar/2017/06/08/ce74a666-4c70-11e7-9669-250d0b15f83b_story.html?utm_term=.67e8855818d5> [Accessed 18 August 2017].

DeYoung, K. and Nakashima, E., 2017. *UAE orchestrated hacking of Qatari government sites, sparking regional upheaval, according to U.S. intelligence officials.* [online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/uae-hacked-qatari-government-sites-sparking-regional-upheaval-according-to-us-intelligence-officials/2017/07/16/00c46e54-698f-11e7-8eb5-cbccc2e7bfbf_story.html?utm_term=.dd2f4f3c780c [Accessed 5 August 2017].

Dickie, J., 1992. *Inside the Foreign Office*, Chapman and Hall, London.

Dinnie, K., 2008. *Nation Branding. Concepts, Issues, Practice.* Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Diwan, K., 2021. Clerical associations in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: soft power competition in Islamic politics. *International Affairs*, 97(4), pp.945-963.

Doha News 2017. *Qatar takes Gulf fight to London*. [online] Available at: <https://medium.com/dohanews/qatar-takes-gulf-fight-to-london-41bd0a8b418f> (Accessed 3 Nov 2017).

Doherty, R., 2010. *Wealthy Qatar tries to build niche as conflict mediator*. [online] Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-diplomacy-qatar-analysis-idUKTRE6531ZO20100604> [Accessed 18 August 2016].

Doherty, R. Bake, A. and Maclean, W., 2013. *Setbacks to bring quieter Qatar foreign policy but no u-turn*. [online] Available at: <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Analysis/2013/Jul-27/225212-setbacks-to-bring-quieter-qatar-foreign-policy-but-no-u-turn.ashx> [Accessed 1 August 2016>.

Domm, P., 2017. *Qatar fight finally spills into global energy market.* Available at: <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/08/qatar-fight-finally-spills-into-global-energy-market.html> [Accessed 11 August 2017].

Doxey, M. and Marshall, P., 1998. Positive diplomacy. *International Journal*, 53(2), pp. 374.

Dudley, D., 2017. *A Winner Emerges from The Qatar Crisis: Oman's National Airline.* [online] Available at: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2017/06/08/oman-air-takes-advantage-of-qatar-crisis/#39c96be225b4> [Accessed 13 August 2017].

Duleymi, M., 2012. *A look at the crude oil sector in Qatar*. Master.

Durkheim, E., 1994. *Social facts*. In Michael Martin And Lee Mcintyre, eds. Readings In The Philosophy Of Social Science.

Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R. and Lowe, A., 2001. *Management research: An introduction*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.

Ebrahimi, H., 2013. *Qatar's UK ambitions could mean billions more in investment,* The Telegraph. [online] Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/globalbusiness/9931220/Qatars-UK-ambitions-could-mean-billions-more-in-investment.html> [Accessed 2 June 2016].

Eldar, S., 2013. *The Two faces of Qatar - al-monitor: The pulse of the middle east*. [online] Available at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/qatar-leading-the-arab-world-to-peace-with-israel.html> [Accessed 12 May 2016].

El-Masri, M., Ramsay, A., Ahmed, H. and Ahmad, T., 2020. Positive sentiments as coping mechanisms and path to resilience: the case of Qatar blockade. *Information, Communication & Society*, 24(13), pp.1835-1853.

Emiri Diwan., 2009. *Economy Development of Qatar*. [online] Available at: www: <http://www.diwan.gov.qa/english/qatar/Qatar_now.htm#Economy> [Accessed 12 January 2016].

Entman, R., 2004. *Projections of power: Framing news, public opinion, and U.S.* foreign policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Euronews 2017. *Al-Jubeir:If the crisis with Qatar continues for two more years.* [online] Available at: <http://arabic.euronews.com/2017/09/06/qatar-sadi-arabia-crisis-port-blockade> [Accessed 24 August 2017].

European Children's Cultural Exchange (ECCE) 2014. [online] Available at: <http://ecce.skynetblogs.be> [Accessed 13 May 2016].

Faget, J., 2011. Mediation in political conflicts: Soft power or counter culture? London, United Kingdom: Intl Specialized Book Service.

Fahy, J., 2018. International Relations and Faith-based Diplomacy: The Case of Qatar. *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, 16(3), pp.76-88.

Fan, Y., 2006. Nation branding: what is being branded? *Journal of Vacation Marketing*, 12(1), pp.5-14.

Fattah, Z., 2017. *Qatar Says Boycott Won't Affect 2022 World Cup Preparation*. [online] Available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-30/soccer-world-cup-host-scrambles-to-bypass-saudi-led-boycott> [Accessed 10 Nov 2017].

Feigenbaum, H.B., 2001. *Globalization and Cultural Diplomacy,* Center for Arts and Culture, The George Washington University. [online] Available at: <http://www.americansforthearts.org/sites/default/files/globalization_0.pdf> [Accessed 21 June 2016].

Fernandes, E., 2012. *How Qatar bought Britain,* Mail Online. [online] Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2113159/Qatar-bought-Britain-They-Shard-They-Olympic-Village-And-dont-care-Lamborghinis-clamped-shop-Harrods.html> [Accessed 2 June 2016].

Feteha, A. MacDonald,F. and El-Tablawy, T., 2017. *Qatar Crisis Is Back to Square One as Economy Shows the Strain.* [online] Available at: <>https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-30/saudi-bloc-ministers-meet-to-discuss-next-step-in-qatar-crisis> [Accessed 27 August 2017].

FIFA 2010. *2022 FIFA world cup awarded to Qatar*. [online] Available at: <http://www.fifa.com/newscentre/news/newsid=1344500/index.html> [Accessed 3 January 2016].

Fifield, D., 2016. *Fifa member breaks ranks to claim 2022 world cup will not be in Qatar*. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/sep/22/fifa-qatar-2022-world-cup-theo-zwanziger [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Financial Times. 2017. *What is behind the extraordinary Gulf dispute with Qatar? [online]* Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/3c6b7224-49d0-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43> [Accessed 3 August 2017].

Finn, T., 2017. *Qatar restarts development of world's biggest gas field after 12-year freeze.* [online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qatar-gas/qatar-restarts-development-of-worlds-biggest-gas-field-after-12-year-freeze-idUSKBN175181> [Accessed 2 August 2017].

Firzli, M., 2017. *The Qatar Crisis and the Eastern Flank of the Arab World.* [online] Available at:<https://www.academia.edu/33925293/The_Qatar_Crisis_and_the_Eastern_Flank_of_the_Arab_World> [Accessed 17 August 2017].

Fisher, M., 2017. *How the Saudi-Qatar Rivalry, Now Combusting, Reshaped the Middle East*. [online] Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/world/middleeast/how-the-saudi-qatar-rivalry-now-combusting-reshaped-the-middle-east.html> [Accessed 3 August 2017].

Fletcher, T. 2017. *The Naked Diplomat: Understanding Power and Politcs in The Digital Age.* London: William Collins.

Foddy, W., 1994. *Constructing questions for interviews and questionnaires: Theory and practice in social research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fox News 2017. *Qatar says UN should play a role in resolving Gulf crisis.* [online] Available at: <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/07/27/qatar-says-un-should-play-role-in-resolving-gulf-crisis.html> [Accessed 16 August 2017].

Fox, J., 2005. Paradigm Lost: Huntington's Unfulfilled Clash of Civilizations Prediction into the 21st Century. *International Politics,* 42, pp. 428–457.

France24. 2017. *With Qatari forces gone, tension rises between Djibouti and Eritrea.* [online] Available at: <http://www.france24.com/en/20170618-with-qatari-forces-gone-tension-rise-between-djibouti-eritrea> [Accessed 9 August 2017].

Freer, C., 2018. *Rentier Islamism: The Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf Monarchies*. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online.

Fukuyama, F., 2006. *After Neoconservatism,* The New York Times Magazine. [online] Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/magazine/after-neoconservatism.html?_r=0> [Accessed 20 August 2016].

Galliers, R. D., 1992. *Information Systems Research: Issues, Methods and Practical Guidelines*. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications.

Gallop, G., 2007. *Towards a New Era of Strategic Government*. In John Wanna Eds. *A Passion for Policy: Essays in Public Sector Reform*. Canberra Australia: ANU E Press, pp. 75-89.

Gambrell, J., 2017a. *Hack, fake story expose real tensions between Qatar, Gulf.* [online] Available at: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/05/23/qatar-says-state-news-website-hacked-fake-article-published.html> [Accessed 3 August 2017].

Gambrell, J., 2017b. *Arab nations cut ties with Qatar in new Mideast crisis.* [online] Available at: <https://apnews.com/8257ce650e224188a1884e34eabb5e90/4-Arab-nations-cut-diplomatic-ties-to-Qatar-as-rift-deepens> Accessed 11 August 2017].

Gawenda, M., 2006. *Rice and Downer in Talks on How to Contain China*. [online] Available at: http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/rice-and-downer-in-talks-on-how-to-contain-china/2006/03/10/1141701692756.html [Accessed 15 May 201].

General Secretariat for Development Planning (GSDP)., 2008. *Qatar national vision 2030.* [online] Available at: http://www.mdps.gov.qa/en/qnv/Documents/QNV2030_English_v2.pdf [Accessed 6 July 2016].

Gengler, J., 2020. Society and State in Post-Blockade Qatar: Lessons for the Arab Gulf Region. *Journal of Arabian Studies*, 10(2), pp.238-255.

Gergawi, M., 2013. *Qatar, 'market maker' in the middle east,* Al-monitor: The pulse of the middle east. [online] Available at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/qatar-foreign-

policy-muslim-brotherhood.html#ixzz48Qm6y2c8> [Accessed 12 May 2016].

Gibson, O., 2015. *Qatar: How have conditions for migrant workers changed in nine key areas?* [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/14/qatar-how-have-conditions-for-migrant-workers-changed-in-nine-key-areas> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Gibson, O., 2016. *Fifa report into alleged corruption clears Qatar to host 2022 world cup*. [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/nov/13/fifa-report-alleged-corruption-qatar-2022-world-cup> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Gibson, O., 2016). *Sepp Blatter: Awarding 2022 world cup to Qatar was a mistake*. [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/may/16/sepp-blatter-qatar-2022-world-cup-mistake> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Gibson, O. and Pattisson, P., 2016. *Death toll among Qatar's 2022 world cup workers revealed*. [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/23/qatar-nepal-workers-world-cup-2022-death-toll-doha> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Gilboa, E., 2008. Searching for a theory of public diplomacy. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616 (1).

Gilboa, E., 2001. Diplomacy in the media age: Three models of uses and effects. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 12(2), pp. 1–28.

Glassman, J., 2008. *Public Diplomacy 2.0: A New Approach to Public Engagement*, U.S department of state. [online] Available at: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/us/2008/112605.htm> [Accessed 20 June 2016].

Goldsmith, B.E. and Horiuchi, Y., 2009. Spinning the globe? U.S. Public diplomacy and foreign public opinion. *The Journal of Politics*, 71(3), pp. 863–875.

Gonesh, A. and Melissen, J., 2005. *Public diplomacy: Improving practice*, *Diplomacy Papers*, No.5, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, pp.19.

Gordon,P., Yadlin, A. and Heistein, A., 2017. *The Qatar Crisis: Causes, Implications, Risks, and the Need for Compromise*. [online] Available at: <http://www.inss.org.il/publication/qatar-crisis-causes-implications-risks-need-compromise/> [Accessed 3 August 2017].

Gregory, B., 2008. Public diplomacy: Sunrise of an academic field. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), pp. 274–290.

Grunig, J., 1997. *A situational theory of publics: Conceptual history, recent challenges, and new research.* In Public relations research: An international perspective, ed. Danny Moss, Toby MacManus, and Dejan Vercˇicˇ, 3-48. London: International Thomson Business.

Grunig, J., 1993. Public relations and international affairs: Effects, ethics and responsibility. *Journal of International Affairs*, 47 (1), pp. 137-61.

Gudjonsson, H., 2005. Nation branding. *Place Branding*, 1(3), pp. 283-298.

Gulf News., 2017a. *EU urges talks to resolve Qatar crisis.* [online] Available at: <http://m.gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/eu-urges-talks-to-resolve-qatar-crisis-1.2063305> [Accessed 9 August 2017].

Gulf News., 2017b. *What are the 13 demands given to Qatar?* [online] Available at: <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/qatar-crisis/what-are-the-13-demands-given-to-qatar-1.2048118> [Accessed 22 August 2017].

Gulf news., 2017c. *Qatar and the 'money diplomacy' strategy*. [online]. Available at: <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/qatar-crisis/qatar-and-the-money-diplomacy-strategy-1.2064205> [Accessed 3 Nov 2017].

Gulf times., 2017. *Britain calls for lifting 'blockade' on Qatar*. [online] Available at: <http://www.gulf-times.com/story/553101/Britain-calls-for-lifting-blockade-on-Qatar> [Accessed 1 Nov 2017].

Haaretz and Reuters., 2017. *The Qatar-Iran Gas Field Behind the Diplomatic War in the Middle East.* [online] Available at: <http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.793798> [Accessed 26 July 2017].

Hankinson, G., 2004. Relational network brands: Towards a conceptual model of place brands. *Journal of Vacation Marketing*, 10(2), pp. 109-121.

Hanrahan, M., 2015. *Nepali minister blasts Qatar, FIFA, over treatment of world cup migrant workers*. [online] Available at: <http://www.ibtimes.com/nepali-minister-blasts-qatar-fifa-over-treatment-world-cup-migrant-workers-1936125> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Harris, L. Weisberg, H.F. and Bowen, B.D., 1977. An introduction to survey research and data analysis. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 14(4), pp. 621.

Harvey, D.D., 2000. *Spaces of hope*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hassan, I.., 2017. *Saudi Diplomatic Offensive on Qatar to Barely Impact Anti-Terror Fight in Region*. Sputnik International. 8 June 2017. [online] Available at:

<https://www.academia.edu/33408486/Saudi_Diplomatic_Offensive_on_Qatar_to_Barely_Impact_Anti-Terror_Fight_in_Region> [Accessed 9 August 2017].

Henderson, A. and McEwen, N., 2005. Do shared values underpin national identity? Examining the role of values in national identity in Canada and the United Kingdom. *National Identities*, 7(2), pp. 173–191.

Henderson, E. A. and Tucker, R., 2001. Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict*, International Studies Quarterly*, 45(2), pp. 317–338.

Henrikson, A., 2005. *Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: The Global 'Corners' of Canada and Norway*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.67-87.

Henrikson, A., 2004. *Niche diplomacy in the world public arena: The global 'corners' of Canada and Norway*. UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Henrikson, A., 2006. *What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'.

Herman, E. and Chomsky, N., 1994. *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. London: Vintage.

Hocking, B., 1999. *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Hocking, B., 2005. *Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy*. The New Public Diplomacy: soft power in international relations. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 28-43.

Hoffman, D., 2002. 'Beyond public diplomacy'. *Foreign Affairs*, 81(2), pp. 83.

Hogwood, B.W. and Gunn, L.A., 1984. *Policy analysis for the real world*. Oxford: ELBS with Oxford University Press.

Holbrooke, R., 2001. *Get the message out,* Washington Post. [online] Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp dyn/content/article/2010/12/13/AR2010121305410.html?utm_term=.c6de53feafc7> [Accessed 11 July 2016].

Hollowitz, J. and Wilson, C.E., 1993. Structured Interviewing in Volunteer Selection. *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, 21(1), pp.41-52.

Hooghe, I. d'., 2007. *The rise of china's public diplomacy*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'.

Howcroft, D. and Trauth, D., 2005. *A Handbook of Critical Information Systems Research:*

Theory and Application. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Hroub, K., 2014. *Qatar and the Arab Spring:* Conflict & International Politics. [online] Available at: <http://www.lb.boell.org/web/113-1159.html> [Accessed 27 August 2016].

Hughey, M.W., 1996. 'Propaganda in the modern world'. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 9(4), pp. 569–577.

Human Right Watch (HRW)., 2015. *Building a better world cup*. [online] Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/06/12/building-better-world-cup/protecting-migrant-workers-qatar-ahead-fifa-2022> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Hunt, K., 2017. *Qatar: We're 'willing to talk' to resolve diplomatic crisis*. [online] Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/06/middleeast/qatar-diplomatic-crisis/> [Accessed 11 August 2017].

Huntington, S.P., 1997. *The clash of civilizations: And the Remaking of world order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Hussey, J. and Hussey, R., 1997. Business research. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Iivari, J., 1991.A Paradigmatic analysis of contemporary school of IS development. *European journal of information systems* 1(4).

International Monetary Fund (IMF)., 2012. *Qatar 2012 article IV consultation*. [online] Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1218.pdf> [Accessed 27 August 2016].

Jaffe, G. and Gibbons-Neff, T., 2017. *For Qataris, a U.S. air base is best defense against Trump attacks.* [online] Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/06/06/for-qataris-a-u-s-air-base-is-best-defense-against-trump-attacks/?utm_term=.cd86a10ae299> [Accessed 11 August 2017].

Janardhan, N., 2010. *Niche diplomacy gets Qatar to its goal*. [online] Available at: <http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=/data/opinion/2010/December/opinion_December142.xml&section=opinion> [Accessed 3 May 2016].

Jensen, J.L. and Rodgers, R., 2001. Cumulating the intellectual gold of case study research. Public Administration Review, 61(2), pp. 236-246.

Jonsson, C., and Hall, M., 2005. *Essence of Diplomacy*, Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Jung, C.G.G. and Fordham, M.S., 1971. *The collected works of C.G. Jung: V. 6: Psychological types*. Edited by Gerhard Adler and William McGuire. United States: Princeton University Press.

Kamin, D., 2013. *Can Israel and Qatar learn to be friends again?* [online] Available at:

<http://www.timesofisrael.com/can-israel-and-qatar-learn-to-be-friends-again/> [Accessed 12 May 2016].

Kamrava, M. (2009). Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar. *The Middle East Journal 63*(3), 401-420. https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/270706.

Kamrava, M. (2011) "Mediation and Qatari foreign policy," *The Middle East Journal*, 65(4), pp. 539–556. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3751/65.4.11.

Kamrava, M. (2015) *Qatar: Small state, big politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kamrava, M., 2017. Qatari Foreign Policy and the Exercise of Subtle Power. *International Studies Journal*, 14(2), pp.91-123.

Kamrava, M. (2019) *Qatari Foreign Policy and the Exercise of Subtle Power*, *Mei.nus.edu.sg*. Middle East Insights. Available at: https://mei.nus.edu.sg/ (Accessed: November 25, 2022).

Kaplan, B. and Duchon, D., 1988. Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Information Systems Research: A Case Study. *Management Information Systems Quarterly*, 12(4), pp. 571-586.

Kaplan, B. and Maxwell, J.A., 1994. *Qualitative research methods for evaluating computer information systems*, In Anderson, J. G., Aydin, C., and Jay, S. J., editors, Valuating Health Care Information Systems: Methods and Applications. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 45-68.

Kennan, G.F. and Lukacs, J., 1997. *The origins of containment, 1944-1946: The Kennan-Lukacs correspondence*. New York, NY, United States: University of Missouri Press.

Khalaf, A. and Luciani, G., 2008. *Constitutional Reform and Political Participation in the Gulf*, Dubai: Gulf Research Center.

Khaleej Times., 2017. *Sheikh Tamim denies Qatar has links to terrorism.* [online] Available at: <http://www.khaleejtimes.com/region/qatar/sheikh-tamim-denies-qatar-has-links-to-terrorism> [Accessed 11 August 2017].

Khatib, L., 2013. *Qatar's foreign policy: the limits of pragmatism*, *International Affairs* 89(2), February 2013. [online] Available at: <http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/INTA89_2_10_Khatib.pdf > [Accessed 1 August 2016.

Khatib, L. (2013) *Qatar's involvement in Libya: A delicate balance*, *Reinventing Peace*. Available at: https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/01/07/qatars-involvement-in-libya-a-delicate-balance/ (Accessed: December 1, 2022).

Khatri, S., 2015. *Nepal officials push for workers' rights during Qatar minister's visit*. [online]

Available at: <http://dohanews.co/nepal-officials-push-for-workers-rights-during-qatar-ministers-visit/> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Kirkpatrick, D. and Frenkel, S., 2017. *Hacking in Qatar Highlights a Shift Toward Espionage-for-Hire*. [online] Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/08/world/middleeast/qatar-cyberattack-espionage-for-hire.html> [Accessed 5 August 2017].

Kittaneh, S., 2013. *Nepalese workers victims of FIFA*. [online] Available at: <http://www.alarab.co.uk/m/?id=15603> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Kitzinger J., 1996. *Introducing focus groups in Qualitative Research in Health Care*. London: B. M. J. Publishing Group, pp. 36–45.

Kleiboer, M., 1996. Understanding success and failure of international mediation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40(2), pp. 360–389.

Knipp, K., 2017. *Discord in the Persian Gulf: Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood.* [online] Available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/discord-in-the-persian-gulf-qatar-and-the-muslim-brotherhood/a-39005743> [Accessed 6 August 2017].

Knoke, D., 2001. *Changing Organizations: Business Networks in the New Political Economy*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press Inc.

Kotler, P. and Gertner, D., 2002. Country as brand, product, and beyond: A place marketing and brand management perspective. *Journal of Brand Management*, 9 (4-5), pp. 249-61.

Kottasová, I., 2017. *Qatari stocks plunge 7% after Arab states cut ties.* [online] Available at: <http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/05/investing/qatar-stocks-plunge-gulf-diplomacy/index.html> [Accessed 20 August 2017].

Kumar, R., 2005. *Research methodology: A step-by-step guide for beginners*. 2nd ed. London: Sage Publications.

Kurbalija, J., 1998. *Diplomacy in the Information Technology Age*, in J. Melissen (ed), *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*. London: MacMillan Press.

Kvale, S., 1996. *Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing*, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Lancaster, A.B.B., 1975. *From containment to coexistence: The foreign policy of the United States, 1945-73*. London, United Kingdom: Edward Arnold.

Landler, M., 2017. *Trump Takes Credit for Saudi Move Against Qatar, a U.S. Military Partner*. [online] Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/world/middleeast/trump-qatar-saudi-arabia.html> [Accessed 5 August 2017].

Langhorne, R., 1992. 'The regulation of diplomatic practice: The beginnings to the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations, 1961'. *Review of International Studies*, 18(01), pp. 3–17.

Lasswell, H., 1937. *Propaganda*, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol.11. New York: Macmillan, pp.524-25.

Lazareva, I., 2015. *Israeli and Hamas officials 'meet in Qatar to discuss a five year ceasefire deal'*. [online] Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/11678800/Israeli-and-Hamas-officials-meet-in-Qatar-to-discuss-a-five-year-ceasefire-deal.html> [Accessed 12 May 2016].

Lebaniese institure for studies and information (LISI)., 2016. *Foreign workers in Qatar : the servants of the 21st century*. [online] Available at: <https://lisireport.wordpress.com/2016/06/28/21العمالة-الأجنبية-في-قطر-عبيد-القرن-ال/> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Lee, D. and Hudson, D., 2004. The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy. *Review of International Studies*, 30(03).

Leedy, P. and Ormrod, J.E., 2001. *Practical research: planning and design*. 7th ed. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Lending, M., 2000. *Change and Renewal: Norwegian foreign Cultural Policy 2001-2005*, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2000, p13-14.

Leonard, M., 2002. Diplomacy by other means. *Foreign Policy*, (132), pp. 48.

Leonard, M., 2003. *Public diplomacy and the Middle East*. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.

Leonard, M. and Alakeson, V., 2000. *Going public: Diplomacy for the information society*. London: Foreign Policy Centre.

Leonard, M. Small, A. and Rose, M., 2005. *British public diplomacy in the age of Schisms*. United Kingdom: Foreign Policy Centre.

Leonard, M. Stead, C. and Smewing, C., 2002. *Public Diplomacy*, *The Foreign Policy Centre*. [online] Available at: <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/35.pdf> [Accessed 21 January 2016].

Lewin, J., 2008. *Is social media behind Barack Obama's success?* [online] Available at: <http://www.podcastingnews.com/content/2008/06/is-social-media-behind-barack-obamas-success/> [Accessed 20 August 2016].

Liiv, D., 2011. *Guidelines for the Preparation of Compacts*. [online] Available at: <http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Transnational/Guidelines%20for%20Preparation%20of%20Compacts.pdf> [Accessed 8 May 2016].

Lindlof, T.R. and Taylor, B.C., 2010. *Qualitative communication research methods*. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Malone, G., 1985. Managing Public Diplomacy. *Washington Quarterly,* 8(3), pp. 199-210.

Manor, I., 2019. *The Digitalization of Public Diplomacy*. Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan.

Maziad, M. (2018) "Qatar in Egypt: The politics of Al Jazeera," *Journalism*, 22(4), pp. 1067–1087. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884918812221.

Mazzetti, M.and Apuzzo, M., 2016. *U.S. Relies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support Syrian Rebels.* [online] Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/world/middleeast/us-relies-heavily-on-saudi-money-to-support-syrian-rebels.html?_r=0> [Accessed 6 August 2017].

McClellan, M., 2004. *Public diplomacy in the context of traditional diplomacy*. [online] Available at: <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/45.htm> <Accessed 10 February 2016>.

McKernan, B., 2017. *Qatar crisis: Saudi Arabia insists Gulf country must meet its demands 'soon'*. [online] Available at: <https://uk.news.yahoo.com/qatar-crisis-saudi-arabia-insists-150444797.html> <Accessed 9 August 2017].

McNamara, C., 1999. *General Guidelines for Conducting Interviews*, Authenticity Consulting, LLC, Minnesota.

Meier, B., 2015. *Labor scrutiny for FIFA as a world cup rises in the Qatar desert*. [online] Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/business/international/senate-fifa-inquiry-to-include-plight-of-construction-workers-in-qatar.html> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Melissen, J., 2011. *Beyond the new public diplomacy*, Northerlands institute of international relations 'clingendael', Clingendael.

Melissen, J., 2005. *The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Middle east institute (MEI)., 2017. *Turkey and Qatar's Burgeoning Strategic Alliance*. [online]. Available at: <http://www.mei.edu/content/article/turkey-and-qatar-s-burgeoning-strategic-alliance> [Accessed 8 Nov 2017].

Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M., 1994. *Qualitative data analysis*. 2nd ed. Newbury Park, CA:

Sage.

Miller, E., 2014. *Israel singles out Qatar as key Hamas terror sponsor*. [online] Available at: <http://www.timesofisrael.com/as-it-battles-hamas-israel-singles-out-its-sponsor-qatar/> [Accessed 12 May 2016].

Mills, J., 2017. *Al Jazeera hit by 'cyber attack on all systems*. [online] Available at: <http://metro.co.uk/2017/06/08/al-jazeera-hit-by-cyber-attack-on-all-systems-6695692/> <Accessed 5 August 2017].

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)., 2012. *Political System*. [online] Available at: <http://www.mofa.gov.qa/ar/Qatar/Pages/PoliticalSystem.aspx> [Accessed1 Jan 2016].

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 2013. *Qatar Foreign policy*. [online] Available at: <http://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/ForeignPolicy/BilateralRelations/Pages/ArabBilateralRelations.aspx> [Accessed 1 August 2016].

MOFA., 2017. *Ministry of the Interior Statement on Piracy Crime on Qatar News Agency Website.* [online] Available at: <https://mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2017/06/07/ministry-of-the-interior-statement-on-piracy-crime-on-qatar-news-agency-website> [Accessed 5 August 2017].

Morgan D., 1996. *Focus groups*, Annual Review Sociology 22. Annual review inc. pp. 129–152

Morgan, M.D.J. and Lennon, A.T.J., 2005. 'The battle for hearts and minds: Using soft power to undermine terrorist networks'. *International Journal*, 60(3), pp. 882.

Mungiu-Pippidi, A. and Mindruta, D., 2002. 'Was Huntington right? Testing cultural legacies and the Civilization border'. *International Politics*, 39(2), pp. 193–213.

Myers, M.D., 1997. Qualitative research in information systems. MIS Quarterly, 21(2), pp. 241-242.

Nader, S., 2013. *Will Sheikh Tamim rebalance Qatar's foreign policy? - al-monitor: The pulse of the middle east*. [online] Available at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/qatar-handover-and-its-economic-power.html#> [Accessed 11 May 2016].

Nagraj, A., 2017. *Emirates, Etihad, Flydubai, Gulf Air and Air Arabia to suspend Qatar flights.* [online] Available at: <http://gulfbusiness.com/abu-dhabis-etihad-suspend-flights-qatar-tuesday/> [Accessed 2 August 2017].

Nasseri, L., 2017. *Saudi-led Rupture with Qatar Pushes Nation into Iran's Embrace.* [online] Available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-06/saudi-led-rupture-with-qatar-pushes-nation-into-iran-s-embrace> [Accessed11 August 2017].

National Human Right Committee (NHRC)., 2013. *Legal adviser to the Nepalese community: There are no violations of labor rights in Qatar*. [online] Available at: <http://www.nhrc-qa.org/ar/المستشار-القانوني-للجالية-النيبالية/> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

NATO., 2013. *A framework for the strategic planning & evaluation of Public diplomacy*. NATO'S joint analysis and lessons learned centre, Monsanto, Lisbon, Portugal. [online] Available at: *<http://www.jallc.nato.int/products/docs/A_Framework_for_the_Strategic_Planning_and_Evolution_of_Public_Diplomacy.pdf>* [Accessed 15 Nov 2017].

NBC News., 2017. *Qatar hosts largest US military base in Mideast*. [online] Available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/egypt-saudi-arabia-among-gulf-states-cutting-ties-qatar-n768161> [Accessed 8 August 2017>.

NDTV., 2017. *Qatar To Reinstate Ambassador To Iran Amid Gulf Crisis.* [online] Available at: <http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/qatar-to-reinstate-ambassador-to-iran-amid-gulf-crisis-1741557> [Accessed 1 August 2017].

Nepal Ministry of Labour and Employment (MLE)., 2013. *Labour Migration for Employment: A Status Report for Nepal: 2013/2014*. [online] Available at: >https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/MigrationReportbyGovernmentofNepal.pdf> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Neubauer, S., 2017. *The curious timing of the Qatar crisis.* [online] Available at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/06/timing-qatar-crisis-saudi-arabia-gcc-uae-egypt-diplomatic.html> [Accessed 11 August 2017].

Noonpost., 2013. *Qatar denies accusations Guardian as 'Enslave' Employment*. [online] Available at: <http://www.noonpost.net/content/641> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Norton, B., 2016. *CIA and Saudi weapons for Syrian rebels fueled black market arms trafficking, report says*. [online] Available at: <http://www.salon.com/2016/06/28/cia_and_saudi_weapons_for_syrian_rebels_fueled_black_market_arms_trafficking_report_says/> [Accessed 6 August 2017].

Nye, J., 2004. *Soft power: The means to success in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

O'Shaughnessy, J. and O'Shaughnessy, N., 2000. Treating the Nation as a Brand: Some Neglected Issues. *Journal of Macromarketing,* 20(1), pp. 56–64.

Olins, W., 2002. Branding the nation—The historical context. *Journal of Brand Management*, 9 (4-5), pp. 241-48.

Olins, W., 2005. *Making a national brand. In The new public diplomacy*, Jan Melissen. Ed New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.169-79.

Onley, J. (2009) *Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820-1971: The Politics of Protection*, *CIRS: Center for international and regional studies*. Georgetown University . Available at: https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/ (Accessed: November 1, 2022).

Orlikowski, W.J. and Baroudi, J.J., 1991. Studying Information Technology in Organizations: Research Approaches and Assumptions, *Information Systems Research*, 2(1), pp. 1-28.

Overdahl, S., 2017. *Saudi and UAE Stumble Over Tiny Qatar.* [online] Available at: <https://magazine.zenith.me/en/politics/pyrrhic-manoeuvres-among-gulf-states> [Accessed 11 August 2017].

Pamment, J., 2012. *New public diplomacy in the 21st century: A comparative study of policy and practice*. New York: Routledge.

Patel, K., 2012. *Is Al-Jazeera a shill for Qatari foreign policy?.* [online] Available at: <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-08-13-is-al-jazeera-a-shrill-for-qatari-foreign-policy/#.V64w2FdiB-U> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Pather, S. and Remenyi, D., 2004. *Some of the philosophical issues underpinning research in information systems: from positivism to critical realism,* Proceedings 2004 Annual Research Conference of the South African Institute of Computer Scientists and Information Technologists on IT Research in Developing Countries, Stellenbosch, South Africa, pp. 141-146.

Pattisson, P., 2013. *Revealed: Qatar's world cup 'slaves'.* [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/revealed-qatars-world-cup-slaves> [Accessed 25 August 2016].

Perry, C., 2001. Case research in marketing. *The Marketing Review*, pp. 23-303.

Peterson, J., 2006. Qatar and the world: branding for micro-state. *Middle East journal*, 60(4), pp. 741.

Peterson, J., 2006. Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State. *Middle East Journal*, 60(4), p.732–48. Available at: <http://www.jepeterson.net/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/peterson_-

_qatar_and_the_world.pdf > [Accessed: 1 August 2016].

Ponniah, K., 2017. *Qatar crisis: Can Al Jazeera survive?* [online] Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40187414> [Accessed 19 August 2017].

Popper, K., 1959. *The Logic of Scientific Enquiry*. London: Harper.

Potter, E., 2002. Canada and the new public diplomacy. *International Journal*, 63 (1), pp. 43-64.

Pourhamzavi, K. and Pherguson, P., 2015. Al-Jazeera and Qatari foreign policy: A critical approach. *Journal of Media Critiques*, 1(2), pp. 11–27.

Powell R.A. Single H.M. and Lloyd K., 1996. Focus groups in mental health research: enhancing the validity of user and provider questionnaires. *International Journal of Social Psychiatry*, 42(3), pp. 193–206.

Powell, P., 1993. Interpreting information systems in organizations. *Journal of the Operational Research Society*, 43(9), pp. 1252–1253.

Pravdareport., 2017. *Is Qatar crisis an opportunity for more productive alliances?* [online] Available at: <http://www.pravdareport.com/world/asia/03-08-2017/138319-qatar_crisis-0/> [Accessed 8 Nov 2017].

Qandil, H., 2011. *Qatari foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict under the rule of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani.* Cairo, Research Institute, pp.28.

Qatar Chamber 2017. *Al-Kuwari: private sector unaffected by siege.* [online] Available at: <http://qatarchamber.com/private-sector-unaffected/> [Accessed 10 Nov 2017].

Qatar Statistic Authority (QSA)., 2016. *Population in Qatar*. [online] Available at: http://www.qsa.gov.qa/eng/population_census/2009/population_census_July.htm [Accessed 11 May 2016].

Qatar Tribune., 2017. *Crisis a chance to achieve economic security: Minister*. [online] Available at: <http://www.qatar-tribune.com/news-details/id/79203> [Accessed 10 Nov 2017].

Qatarneh, Y. (2012) Special case: How qatar manages its regional interactions. *International politics*, 188, pp.3.

Qiblawi, T. and Dewan, A., 2017. *UAE denies Washington Post report it orchestrated Qatar hack.* [online] Available *at:* <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/17/middleeast/uae-qatar-report/index.html> [Accessed 5 August 2017].

Ragab, E., 2012. *Contradiction: How can understand Qatar's policies toward the Arab revolutions?* International politics.

Rai, O.A., 2015. *Qatar is reforming labour laws, but is Nepal? | nation*. [online] Available at: <http://nepalitimes.com/article/nation/Nepal-not-reforming-labour-laws,2687> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Ramani, S., 2021. *The Qatar Blockade Is Over, but the Gulf Crisis Lives On*. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/27/qatar-blockade-gcc-divisions-turkey-libya-palestine/> [Accessed 17 January 2022].

Rapoport, R.N., 1970. Three dilemmas in action research. *Human Relations*, 23(6), pp. 499-513.

Rasmussen, I., 2009. *Towards a Theory of Public diplomacy and soft power*. The Fletcher School (Tufts University). [online] Available at: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e947/5238c3274c82aeca847d74f6ab4454732442.pdf> [Accessed 13 Nov 2017].

Rasmussen, S., 2009. *Discourse analysis of EU public diplomacy: messages and practice*, The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'.

Ravid, B., 2010. *Israel rejects Qatar bid to restore diplomatic ties*. [online] Available at: <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-rejects-qatar-bid-to-restore-diplomatic-ties-1.290866> [Accessed 12 May 2016].

Raya., 2012. *Study the media landscape of Qatar*. [online] Available at: <http://www.raya.com/mob/getpage/f6451603-4dff-4ca1-9c10-122741d17432/bdb08863-d970-49a8-8f60-138034ebd368> [Accessed 27 August 2016].

Remenyi, D. and Williams, B., 1996. The Nature of Research: Qualitative or Quantitative, Narrative or Paradigmatic? *Information Systems Journal*, 6, pp 131- 146.

Reuters., 2017d. *Iran flies food to Qatar amid concerns of shortages.* [online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-iran/iran-flies-food-to-qatar-amid-concerns-of-shortages-idUSKBN1920EG?il=0> [Accessed 15 August 2017].

Reuters., 2017e. *Arab states issue ultimatum to Qatar: close Jazeera, curb ties with Iran.* [online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-demands/arab-states-issue-ultimatum-to-qatar-close-jazeera-curb-ties-with-iran-idUSKBN19E0BB> [Accessed 22 August 2017].

Reuters., 2017f. *Qatar says it will not negotiate unless neighbours lift 'blockade'*. [online] Available at: h<ttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar/qatar-says-it-will-not-negotiate-unless-neighbors-lift-blockade-idUSKBN19A1G6> [Accessed 10 Oct 2017].

Reuters., 2017a. *Qatar says five suspects in news agency hacking detained in Turkey.* [online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-cyber/qatar-says-five-suspects-in-news-agency-hacking-detained-in-turkey-idUSKCN1B608L> [Accessed 7 August 2017].

Reuters 2017b. *Chad to shutter Qatar embassy, expel diplomats.* [online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-chad/chad-to-shutter-qatar-embassy-expel-diplomats-idUSKCN1B31JF> [Accessed 9 August 2017].

Reuters., 2017c. *Niger recalls ambassador to Qatar in solidarity with Arab states"*. [online] *Available a: <https://www.reuters.com/article/gulf-qatar-niger/niger-recalls-ambassador-to-qatar-in-solidarity-with-arab-states-idUSL8N1J70A1>* [Accessed 9 August 2017].

Reuters., 2017g. *U.S. to deploy officials in Qatar in counter-terrorism accord: sources.* [online] Available at: *<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-usa/u-s-to-deploy-officials-in-qatar-in-counter-terrorism-accord-sources-idUSKBN1A51ZD>* [Accessed 7 Nov 2017].

Richmond, Y., 2003. *Cultural exchange and the cold war: Raising the iron curtain*. United States: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Riggs, R., 2022. The Qatar-Iran-Turkey Nexus: Shifts in Political Alliances and Economic Diversification in the Gulf Crisis. In: M. Zweiri, M. Rahman and A. Kamal, ed., *The 2017 Gulf Crisis*. New York: Springer Link.

Riordan, S., (2004. *Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy: A new Foreign Policy Paradigm?* northerlands institute of international relations 'clingendael'. [online] Available at: <https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/dialogue-based-public-diplomacy-new-foreign-policy-paradigm> [Accessed 10 March 2016].

Robert, F and Kennedy, J., 2016. *Why the Arabs Don't Want Us in Syria.* [online] Available at: <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/02/rfk-jr-why-arabs-dont-trust-america-213601?o=1> [Accessed 6 August 2017].

Roberts, D., 2017. *Qatar row: What's caused the fall-out between Gulf neighbours?.* [online] Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40159080> [Accessed 4 August 2017].

Roberts, D. (2011) *Behind Qatar's intervention in Libya*, *Foreign Affairs*. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2011-09-28/behind-qatars-intervention-libya (Accessed: November 16, 2022).

Roberts, D. (2014) "Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or preference?," *Middle East Policy*, 21(3), pp. 84–94. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12084.

Roberts, D., 2015. Qatar and the Arab Spring. *The RUSI Journal*, 160(2), pp.95-96.

Roberts, D. (2016) "The Four Era's of Qatar's Foreign Policy," *Camillas Journal of International Relations*, 5(001).

Roberts, D. (2017) *Securing the Qatari state - The Arab Gulf States Institute*, *Securing the Qatari State*. The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. Available at: https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Roberts_Qatar_ONLINE.pdf (Accessed: November 16, 2022).

Roberts, D. (2017b) *Qatar: Securing the global ambitions of a city-state*. London: Hurst & Company.

Roberts, D. (2017c) *Competing visions for the arab future*, *The Washington Institute*. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/competing-visions-arab-future (Accessed: December 13, 2022).

Roberts, D. (2017d) "Qatar and the UAE: Exploring divergent responses to the arab spring," *The Middle East Journal*, 71(4), pp. 544–562. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3751/71.4.12.

Roberts, D. (2019) *Reflecting on Qatar's 'islamist' soft power - brookings institution*, *Brookings*. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/FP_20190408_qatar_roberts.pdf (Accessed: November 17, 2022).

Roberts, D.B. (2020) "Bucking the trend: The UAE and the development of military capabilities in the arab world," *Security Studies*, 29(2), pp. 301–334. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1722852.

Robertson, J., 2017. *Qatar: Buying Britain by the pound.* [online] Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-40192970> [Accessed 19 June 2016].

Roberts, D., 2022. *Reflecting on the GCC Crisis: Qatar and Its Neighbours*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Rockower, P., (2014) *The State of Gastrodiplomacy*. [online] Available at: <http://publicdiplomacymagazine.com/the-state-of-gastrodiplomacy/> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Rose, C., 2010. *How to Win Campaigns: Communications for change*. 2nd ed. London: Earthscan.

Rose, M. and Wadham-Smith, N., 2004. *Mutuality, Trust, and Cultural Relations*, The British Council, London. [online] Available at: <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/legacy/pdfs/Mutualit-Rose.pdf> [Accessed 11 April 2016].

Ross, C., 2003. *Pillars of public diplomacy: Grappling with international public opinion - Harvard international Review Harvard international review*. [online] Available at: <http://hir.harvard.edu/chinapillars-of-public-diplomacy/> [Accessed 20 August 2016].

Rumsby, B., 2014. *World cup 2022 in Qatar fate to be revealed*. [online] Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/world-cup/11218278/World-Cup-2022-in-Qatar-fate-to-be-revealed.html> [Accessed 12 August 201].

Rumsby, B., 2015. *Fifa crisis: Threat of Russia and Qatar being stripped of next two world cups intensifies*. [online] Available at: h<ttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/fifa/11680400/Swiss-investigation-into-Fifa-corruption-and-awarding-of-World-Cups-to-Russia-and-Qatar-could-take-years.html> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Russett, B.M., Oneal, J.R. and Cox, M., 2000. 'Clash of civilizations, or realism and liberalism deja vu? Some evidence'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(5), pp. 583–608.

Ryan, R., 2014. *A close reading of Qatar*. [online] Available at: <http://www.reillyelizabethryan.com/new-page-2/> [Accessed 1 August 2016].

Sanger, D., Landler, M. and Schmitt, E., 2017. *Trump Has Busy Day in Vortex of Middle East Relations*. [online] Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/world/middleeast/trump-qatar-saudi-arabia-middle-east.html> [Accessed 8 August 2017].

Schneider, C., 2007. *Culture Communicates: US Diplomacy that Works*, in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Melissen, J (ed), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2007, pp.147-168.

Sciutto, J. and Herb, J., 2017. *Exclusive: The secret documents that help explain the Qatar crisis.* [online] Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/10/politics/secret-documents-qatar-crisis-gulf-saudi/index.html> [Accessed 6 Nov 2017].

Sedhai, R., 2015. *Cost-free hiring of Nepalis in Qatar tops agenda*. [online] Available at: http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2015-04-06/cost-free-hiring-of-nepalis-in-qatar-tops-agenda.html> [Accessed 12 August 2016>.

Sekaran, U., 1992. *Research methods for business: a skill building approach,* 2nd ed. New York, Chichester, Wiley.

Selmi, R. and Bouoiyour, J., 2019. Arab geopolitics in turmoil: Implications of Qatar-Gulf crisis for Business. *Elseveier*, pp.1-44.

Sha, B.L., 1999. *Cultural public relations: Identity, activism, globalization, and gender in the democratic progressive party on Taiwan*. [online] Available at: http://capitadiscovery.co.uk/dmu/items/813402> [Accessed 19 August 2016].

Sharif, S., 2013. *Qatar resort to an international law firm to investigate the allegations of foreign labor*. [online] Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/arabic/sports/2013/10/131003_qatar_world_cup_review> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Sharp, P., 2009. *Diplomatic theory of international relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press.

Sharp, P., 2005. *Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy,* Melissen, Jan (ed.) (2005) The New Public Diplomacy: soft power in international relations. Basingstoke, UK: palgrave Macmillan, Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp 106-123.\

Shires, J., 2021. The Cyber Operation Against Qatar News Agency. In: M. Zweiri, M. Rahman and A. Kamal, ed., *The 2017 Gulf Crisis*. New York: Springer Link.

Siddiqui, N., 2017. *550 Pakistani pilgrims stranded in Qatar flown to Muscat.* [online] Available at: <http://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/391625-Qatar-row-Over-200-Pakistani-pilgrims-stuck-at-Do> [Accessed 21 August 2017].

Siegel, R., 2013. *How Tiny Qatar 'Punches Above Its Weight.* **[online]** Available at: <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/12/20/255748469/how-tiny-qatar-punches-above-its-weight> [Accessed 6 August 2017].

SIPRI (2019) *Military Spending and Arms Imports by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE*, *SIPRI*. Available at: https://www.sipri.org/ (Accessed: November 23, 2022).

SIPRI (2021) *World military expenditure passes $2 trillion for first time*, *SIPRI*. Available at: https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time (Accessed: November 26, 2022).

Sky News Arabic., 2014. *Death of 400 Nepalese in Qatar*. [online] Available at: <http://www.skynewsarabia.com/web/article/564912/منظمة-وفاة-400-نيبالي-قطر> (Accessed 12 August 2016].

Smyth, R., 1995. Managing Australia's image in Asia. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 49(2), pp. 223–236.

Snow, N. and Taylor, P.M., 2008. *The Routledge handbook of public diplomacy*. New York, NY: Taylor and Francis Routledge.

Solomon, J. and Malas, N., 2015. *Qatar's Ties to Militants Strain Alliance*. [online] Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/qatars-ties-to-militants-strain-alliance-1424748601 [Accessed 16 August 2017].

Solomon, E., 2017. *The $1bn hostage deal that enraged Qatar's Gulf rivals: Doha reportedly paid al-Qaeda affiliate and Iran to win release of royal hunting party.* [online] Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/dd033082-49e9-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43> [Accessed 20 August 2017].

SPA., 2017a. *Saudi Newspapers / Second Addition.* [online] Available at: <http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=ar&newsid=1684115> [Accessed 4 Nov 2017].

SPA., 2017b. *Saudi newspapers / third and final addition*. [online] Available at: <http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=ar&newsid=1681621> [Accessed 4 Nov 2017].

Stephenson, W., 2015. *Have 1, 200 world cup workers really died in Qatar?* [online] Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-33019838> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Sudan tribune., 2012. *Sudan, Darfur rebel group agree to open peace talks in Doha - Sudan Tribune: Plural news and views on Sudan*. [online] Available at: <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44303> [Accessed 9 May 2016].

Supreme Judiciary Council (SJC)., 2005. *Permanent Constitution of the State of Qatar,* pp.16. [online] Available at: <http://www.sjc.gov.qa/lawlib/criminal_law/constitution/laws/Constitution/1.htm> [Accessed 27 August 2016].

Szondi, G., 2008. *Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences.* Leeds Beckett University. [online] Available at:

<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/253744488_Public_Diplomacy_and_Nation_Branding_Conceptual_Similarities_and_Differences> [Accessed 15 Nov 2017.

Taylor, A., 2017. *Analysis | Qatar could face a food crisis in spat with Arab neighbors.* [online] Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/05/qatar-could-face-a-food-crisis-in-spat-with-arab-neighbors/?utm_term=.2a208d63ff2ez> [Accessed 11 August 2017.

Taylor, P.J., Ni, P. and Derudder, B., 2012. *Global urban analysis: A survey of cities in globalization*. London: Earthscan.

The Economist., 2017. *The siege of Qatar isn't working.* [online] Available at: <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21723419-tiny-emirate-well-placed-hold-out-good-while-yet-siege> [Accessed 10 Nov 2017].

The fletcher school (TFS)., 2011. *What is Public Diplomacy?* The Fletcher School- Tufts University. [online] Available at: <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Murrow/Diplomacy> [Accessed 1 March 2016].

The Guardian., 2010. *US embassy cables: Qatar using Al-Jazeera as bargaining tool, claims US.* [online] Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/235574> [Accessed 1 June 2016].

The Guardian., 2017. *Gulf crisis: Boris Johnson urges Qatar to crack down on extremists.* [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/12/qatar-al-thani-boris-johnson-saudi-arabia-bahrain-uae-egypt-embargo> [Accessed 1 Nov 2017.

The Irish Times., 2017. *Arab boycott nations demand Fifa strips Qatar of 2022 World Cup.* [online] Available at: <https://www.irishtimes.com/sport/soccer/international/arab-boycott-nations-demand-fifa-strips-qatar-of-2022-world-cup-1.3156596> [Accessed 11 August 2017].

The peninsula Qatar., 2017a. *Emir to attend opening of Hamad Port today.* [online] Available at: <https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/05/09/2017/Emir-to-attend-opening-of-Hamad-Port-today> [Accessed 8 Nov 2017].

The peninsula Qatar., 2017b. *2022 World Cup stadium projects unaffected by siege: Official.* [online] Available at: <https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/25/08/2017/2022-World-Cup-stadium-projects-unaffected-by-siege-Official> [Accessed 9 Nov 2017].

The peninsula Qatar., 2017c. *Is there really a turkey-Iran rapprochement?* [online] Available at: <https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/opinion/14/09/2017/Is-there-really-a-Turkey-Iran-rapprochement> [Accessed 8 Nov 2017].

The Telegraph., 2017. *Saudi Arabia suspends dialogue with Qatar, dashing hopes of settlement to long-running dispute*. [online] Available at:

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/09/saudi-arabia-suspends-dialogue-qatar-dashing-hopes-settlement/> [Accessed 8 Nov 2017].

The Times., 2017. Twitter video ads push anti-Qatar propaganda. [online] Available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/twitter-video-ads-push-antiqatar-propaganda-lq59svc39> [Accessed 4 Nov 2017].

The wall street journal., (2017). *Qatar Cannot Have It Both Ways.* [online] Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/qatar-cannot-have-it-both-ways-1497307260> [Accessed 6 August 2017].

U.S. Department of State., 2006. *Transformational Diplomacy*, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC. [online] Available at: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/59339.htm> [Accessed 2 April 2016].

U.S. department of state., 2007. *Testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs*, Washington, DC. [online] Available at: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/us/2007/83269.htm> [Accessed 28 February 2016].

Ulrichsen, K.C, 2012. *Small states with a big role: Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the wake of the Arab spring*. [online] Available at: <http://dro.dur.ac.uk/10011/> [Accessed 1 August 2016].

Ulrichsen, K.C. (2014) *Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and regional implications*, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/24/qatar-and-arab-spring-policy-drivers-and-regional-implications-pub-56723 (Accessed: November 21, 2022).

Ulrichsen, K.C. (2016) "The rationale and implications of Qatar's intervention in Libya," *Political Rationale and International Consequences of the War in Libya*, pp. 118–133. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198767480.003.0007.

Ulrichsen, K.C. (2017) *The Qatar Crisis*, *CHACR*. Available at: https://chacr.org.uk/ (Accessed: November 22, 2022).

Ulrichsen, K.C. (2018) "Lessons and legacies of the blockade of Qatar," *Insight Turkey*, 20(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2018202.01.

Ulrichsen, K., 2021. Evolving Threat Perceptions and Changing Regional Dynamics in the "Post-GCC" Era. In: M. Zweiri, M. Rahman and A. Kamal, ed., *The 2017 Gulf Crisis*. New York: Springer Link.

United Nations., 2010. *Yearbook of the United Nations, Volume 60; Volume 2006*. United Nations Publications. p. 434.

United Nations., 2012. *United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation*, September 2012. [online] Available at: <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english%29_0.pdf> [Accessed 15 March 2016].

US Department of the Treasury (2021) *The United States and Qatar take coordinated action against Hizballah financiers*, *U.S. Department of the Treasury*. Available at: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0381 (Accessed: November 13, 2022).

US State Department (2020) *Agreement for bringing peace to Afghanistan as a state and is known as ...*, *State.gov*. State.gov. Available at: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf (Accessed: November 23, 2022).

Van Ham, P., 2005. power, Public Diplomacy and the Pax Americana, Melissen, Jan (ed.) (2005) The New Public Diplomacy: soft power in international relations. Basingstoke, UK: palgrave Macmillan, Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp 47-66.

Wadhams, N., 2017. *Trump's Qatar Curveball Makes Tillerson Improvise Policy Again.* [online] Available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-07/trump-s-qatar-curveball-makes-tillerson-improvise-policy-again> [Accessed 11 August 2017].

Walid, T., 2009. *Qatar would 'welcome' Israel in 2022*. [online] Available at: <http://www.thenational.ae/sport/football/qatar-would-welcome-israel-in-2022> [Accessed 12 May 2016].

Wall, J.A., Stark, J.B. and Standifer, R.L., 2001. Mediation: A Current Review and Theory Development. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(3), pp. 370–391.

Walsham, G., 1995. The emergence of Interpretivism in IS research. *Information Systems Research*, 6(4), pp. 376–394. doi: 10.1287/isre.6.4.376.

WAM., 2017a. *Ambassadors of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt to Canada: Qatar has not ceased to destabilize the security of our countries for years, despite the demand*. [online] Available at: <http://wam.ae/ar/details/1395302621639> [Accessed 3 Nov 2017].

WAM., 2017b. *Saudi minister: "Al Jazeera" exploits the slogans of "freedom of expression" to pass the agenda of Qatar in the spread of violence and extremism.* [online] Available at: <http://wam.ae/ar/details/1395302621180> [Accessed 3 Nov 2017].

Weingarten, E., 2010. *Qatar's Balancing Act*. [online] Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/09/qatars-balancing-act/63542/> [Accessed 23 July 2017].

Wintour, P., 2017c. *Qatar given 10 days to meet 13 sweeping demands by Saudi Arabia.* [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/23/close-al-jazeera-saudi-arabia-issues-qatar-with-13-demands-to-end-blockade> [Accessed 22 August 2017].

Wintour, P., 2017a. Gulf plunged into diplomatic crisis as countries cut ties with Qatar. [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-break-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism> [Accessed 6 August 2017].

Wintour, P., 2017b. *Russian hackers to blame for sparking Qatar crisis, FBI inquiry finds.* [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/07/russian-hackers-qatar-crisis-fbi-inquiry-saudi-arabia-uae> [Accessed 3 August 2017].

Withnall, A., 2015. *Fifa corruption whistleblower says Qatar will be stripped of 2022 world cup*. [online] Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/fifa-corruption-whistleblower-says-qatar-will-be-stripped-of-2022-world-cup-10302979.html> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Woolcott, R., 2003. *Hot seat: Reflections on diplomacy from Stalin's death to the Bali bombings*. Australia: HarperCollins Publishers Pty.

WorldAtlas., 2017. *The Richest Countries in The World*. [online] Available at: http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-richest-countries-in-the-world.html [Accessed 19 June 2016].

Wu, B. (2022) "Afghanistan: A new arena for geostrategic competition among Middle Eastern countries," *China International Strategy Review*, 4(1), pp. 129–143. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-022-00107-0.

Yan, J., 2003. Branding and the international community. *Journal of Brand Management* ,10 (6), pp. 447-56.

Yin, R.K., 1989. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 1st ed. Beverly Hills-CA: Sage.

Yin, R.K., 1994. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 2nd ed, Newbury Park, Sage.

Younes, A., 2017. *Alliance for freedom and dignity probes Qatar blockade.* [online] Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/alliance-freedom-dignity-probes-qatar-blockade-170723142630124.html> [Accessed 23 August 2017].

Zaharna, R., 2007. The Soft Power Differential: Network Communication and Mass Communication in Public Diplomacy. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy,* 2(3), pp. 213-228.

Zaharna, R.S., 2008. *Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives,* Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy.

Zartman, W.I., 2008. *Negotiation and conflict management: Essays on theory and practice*. London: Routledge.

Zhang, J. and Benoit, W., 2004. Message strategies of Saudi Arabia's image restoration campaign after 9/11. *Public Relations Review*, 30 (2), pp. 161-67.

Zubek, J.M., Pruitt, D.G., Peirce, R.S., McGillicuddy, N.B. and Syna, H., 1992. Disputant and mediator behavior affecting short term success in mediation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36(3), pp. 546–572.

Lewis, D., 2014. *Digital diplomacy*. [online] Available at: <https://www.gatewayhouse.in/digital-diplomacy-2/> [Accessed 21 September 2020].

Sandre, A., 2012. Twiplomacy is bringing diplomacy back to relevancy. [online] Available at: <http://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/ twiplomacy-bringing-diplomacy-back-relevancy> [Accessed 22 September 2020].

Adesina, O.S., 2017. Foreign policy in an era of digital diplomacy, *Cogent Social Sciences*, 3(1) pp. 1-13.

Al-Muftah, H. Weerakkody, V. Rana, N.P. Sivarajah, U. and Irani, Z., 2018. Factors influencing e-diplomacy implementation: Exploring causal relationships using interpretive structural modelling. *Government Information Quarterly*, 35(3), pp. 502-514.

Sotiriu, S., 2015. *Digital diplomacy: Between promises and reality, in digital diplomacy: Theory and practice New York*, NY: Routledge, C. Bjola and M. Holmes Eds. pp. 33–51.

Zhong, X. and Lu, J., 2013. Public Diplomacy Meets Social Media: A Study of the U.S. Embassy's Blogs and Micro Blogs. *Public Relations Review*, 39(5), pp. 542-548.

Fitzpatrick, Kathy R., 2007. Advancing New Public Diplomacy: A Public Relations Perspective. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, ol.2, pp. 187-211.

Kaneva, N., 2011. Nation branding: Toward an agenda for critical research. *International Journal of Communication*, 5, pp. 117–141.

Cull, N.J., 2009. *Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy*. Los Angeles: Figueroa Press.

Sevin, E., 2017. *Public diplomacy and the implementation of foreign policy in the US, Sweden and Turkey*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Barston, R., 2014. *Modern diplomacy*, New York, NY: Routledge.

Vatanartıran, O., 2020. Celebrity social media accounts as public diplomacy TOOLS. *Halkla İlişkiler ve Reklam Çalışmaları E-Dergisi,* 3(1), pp. 142 – 156.

Çevik, B., 2015. *Turkey's public diplomacy*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Kaynak, Selcan.

Hocking, B. Melissen, J. Riordan, S. and Sharp, P., 2012. Futures for diplomacy: Integrative diplomacy in the 21st century. Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Barston, R., 2014. Modern diplomacy (4th ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Lenardo, M., 2002. Public diplomacy. The Mezzanine, Elizabeth House, London: The Foreign Policy Centre.

Szondi, G., 2008. Public diplomacy and nation banding: conceptual similarities and differences, Szondi, Gyorgy. *Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Difference*. Clingendael Institute.

Ordeix-Rigo, E. and Duarte, J., 2009. From Public Diplomacy to Corporate Diplomacy: Increasing Corporation's Legitimacy and Influence. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53(4) 549–564.

Smith, G., 1999. *Reinventing Diplomacy: A Virtual Necessity. Virtual Diplomacy Series*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.

Gruban, D., Kosin, M. and Plavšak Krajnc, K., 2002. *Javna diplomacija kot sodobna diplomatska praksa (Public diplomacy as a contemporary diplomatic practice)*. Ljubljana: D. Gruban.

Ifimies., 2014, Public diplomacy: basic concepts and trends. [online] Available at: https://www.ifimes.org/en/8020-public-diplomacy-basic-concepts-and-trends [Accessed 09 2020].

Krajnc, K.P., 2004. Public Diplomacy: basic Concepts and Trends. *Slovene scholarly journal Teorija in praksa*, 41(3-4), pp. 643-658.

Harris, B., 2013. Diplomacy 2.0: The future of social media in nation branding. *The Journal of Public Diplomacy*, 4(3).

Gultekin, B. and gültekin, T., 2016. Diplomatic public relations techniques for official recognition of palestine state in Europe. In: *23rd International Academic Conference*. International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences.

Williams, 2003. The Ethics of Social Research. In: Making Sense of Social Research.

Williams, M., 2003. The Ethics of Social Research. In: M. Williams, ed., *Making Sense of Social Research*. SAGE Publishing.

Williams, C. (2007). Research Methods. *Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER)*, *5*(3).

Al-Muftah, H., Weerakkody, V., Rana, N., Sivarajah, U. and Irani, Z., 2018. Factors influencing e-diplomacy implementation: Exploring causal relationships using interpretive structural modelling. *Government Information Quarterly*, 35(3), pp. 502-514.

Rathmell, A. and Schulze, K.E., 2002. Political reform in the Gulf: the case of Qatar. Middle Eastern Studies, 36(4), pp. 47-62.

Abu Sulaib, F.M., 2017. Understanding Qatar's Foreign Policy, 1995-2017. Middle East Policy, 24(4), 29-44.

Gilboa., 2016. Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy Arabian Business, 2017. [online] Available at <https://www.arabianbusiness.com/revealed-qatar-investment-authority-s-investments-across-world-674254.html> [Accessed 11 November 2020].

Tsukerman, I., 2020. Qatar's influence spreads to Africa - with a little help from the White House. [online]. Available at: <https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/qatars-influence-spreads-to-africa-with-a-little-help-from-the-white-house/> [Accessed 21 November 2020].

Qatar Stock Exchange., 2020. About Qatar Stock Exchange. [online] Available at <https://www.qe.com.qa/historical-background> [Accessed October 2020].

Khatib, L., 2013. Qatar's foreign policy: the limits of pragmatism. i*nternational Affairs*, Volume 89, Issue 2, March 2013, pp. 417–431.

Ahmed, J., 2020. The theoretical significance of foreign policy in international relations- an analyses. *JCR*, 7(2), pp. 787-792.

Enders Wimbush, S.E., 2009. "Fixing Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications," Hudson Institute Presidential Transition Papers, 8 January 2009; Hady Amr and P. W. Singer

Brown, nE.J. Morgan, W.J. and McGrath, J., 2009. Education, Citizenship and New Public Diplomacy in the UK: What is Their Relationship?

NYE, J.S., 2008. Public diplomacy and soft power. The annals of the American academy.

Barakat, S., 2014. Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper.

Sedhai, R., 2015. Cost-free hiring of Nepalis in Qatar tops agenda. [online] Available at: <http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2015-04-06/cost-free-hiring-of-nepalis-in-qatar-tops-agenda.html> [Accessed 12 August 2016].

Labour Migration for Employment A Status Report for Nepal: 2013/2014.

Gurung, G. 2004. An Overview Paper on Overseas Employment in Nepal (Kathmandu, International Labour Organization).

Brow, 2012, The Four Paradigms of Public Diplomacy: Building a Framework for Comparative Government External Communications Research.

Berger, L., 2019. World Cup 2022: With huge investment, Qatar seeks global unity. [online] Available at https://eu.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/10/04/world-cup-soccer-qatar-unity-hassanalthawadi-muslim-arab-infrastructure-investment/3778062002/ [Accessed October 2021].

Brown, R., 2012. The Four Paradigms of Public Diplomacy: Building a Framework for Comparative Government External Communications Research. International Studies Association Convention, San Diego.

Smith, M., 2019. How is Qatar coping with its economic embargo?. [online] Available at <

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-46795696> [Accessed November 2020].

BBC News., 2017. Qatar row: Saudi and Egypt among countries to cut Doha links. [online] Available at <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-40155829, BBC NEWS 2017> [Accessed November 2020]

Coombs, T and Schmidt, L., 2000. An Empirical Analysis of Image Restoration: Texaco's Racism Crisis. *Journal of Public Relations Research*, 12(2), pp. 163-178.

Antonio Donini, 2019. Social Suffering and Structural Violence: Nepali Workers in Qatar.

Gurung, G., 2004. Overview Paper Overseas Employment Nepal.

Tristan Bruslé, T., 2012. What Kind of Place is this? Daily Life, Privacy and the Inmate Metaphor in a Nepalese Workers' *Labour Camp* (Qatar).

Tristan Bruslé 2012, Daily Life, Privacy and the Inmate Metaphor in a Nepalese Workers' *Labour Camp* (Qatar). [online] Available at https://journals.openedition.org/samaj/3446 02/11/20 [Accessed 10 November].

Olsson, E.K., 2013. Public diplomacy as a crisis communication tool. *The Journal of International Communication*, 19(2), pp. 219-234,

Coombs, T.W. and Holladay, S.J., 2002. 'Helping crisis managers protect reputational assets: Initial tests of the situational crisis communication theory'. *Management Communications Quarterly*, 16(2), pp.165–86.

Gregory, B., 2011 American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation, *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 6 (3/4), pp. 351-372.

This section presents the documents used to evaluate the PD framework and its elements as discussed in Chapter 10.

Sheet

The research Title:

A Strategic PD Framework for Enhancing Implementation of PD Practice in the Diplomatic Field of Qatar

Invitation

You are being invited to take part in this evaluation study conducted by Nasser Al-Hamr, a PhD research student in the School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Management, Law and Social Sciences at the University of Bradford. Before you decide whether or not to participate, it is essential for you to understand why this evaluation is being conducted and is needed. Please do read the following information carefully and discuss it with your friends and family if you like. Ask the research team if anything is not clear to you or if you want us to provide more information. As a participant, you will be asked to sign a consent form, and at the end of the focus group session, you will be provided with a copy of the study information sheet and a copy of the signed consent form.

What is the purpose of the study?

This research thesis aims to address the issue of lack of strategic PD in the diplomatic frame of nations by proposing a strategic PD Framework to improve Qatar's PD practice. This study is being conducted to explore the usefulness and comprehensiveness of the proposed PD empowerment framework to help relevant stakeholders implement strategic PD to help manage the siege crisis.

Why have I been invited to take part?

You have been invited because of your expertise in public diplomacy. You will help the researcher explore whether diplomats and other relevant stakeholders can specify various strategic PD elements following the proposed framework.

Do I have to take part?

You are free to decide whether you wish to take part or not. If you decide to participate in the study, you will be provided with this information sheet to have and be asked to sign a consent form. You are free to pull out from this study at any time and without explanation and without any consequences, and without it affecting any incentive you are entitled to. Whether you decide to take part or not in the study will not negatively affect you.

What would taking part involve?

As a participant, you will be asked to take part in these activities:

- Focus group session: In this session, the researcher will invite you and other participants to specify various strategic PD elements using the proposed PD empowerment framework.

- Stage 1: The participants will be provided with the Siege crisis case study. The purpose of providing the case study is to help the participants apply the different framework elements to manage the crisis.
- Stage 2: Study participants, e.g. diplomats, MOFA employers and other relevant stakeholders will be asked to specify/implement strategic PD to help address the impacts of the siege crisis.
- Stage 3: Study participants will be asked to evaluate the proposed PD empowerment framework's usefulness and weakness and its supporting documents.

- Group discussion and interviews: Group discussions will be held at the end of the focus group. Also, individual interviews at the end of the focus group session collect participants' opinions on the framework and its supporting materials. A semi-structured interview method is expected to be adopted by the facilitator.

What are the benefits or risks of taking part?

Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those participating in the project, the researcher hoped that this research would enhance our understanding of implementing strategic PD, which will help manage the siege crisis. There are no identified risks for taking part in this study.

How will my information be kept?

Any information that can identify the participants will be confidential and not shared with other people apart from Nasser and his supervisors. The data collected as a result of the study will be stored for a period of time than destroy. Data will be stored in a data archive.

Will I be recorded, and how will the recorded media be used?

Yes, you will be recorded if you participate in the interviews and group discussions at the end of the focus group. The recording will help the researcher to gather the information that will be required from you. However, you accept or reject being recorded. The recordings will not be used in any way without your written permission, and only the research team will be able to access the recordings. After the transcription and anonymization, the audio recordings done will be deleted made during this research will be deleted. The transcript of the interviews and group discussions will not have your name or any information that will help identify you in any way.

Contact for further information

If you have any queries about this research please contact Nasser Al-Hamr by email on N.A.J.Al-hammar@bratford.acu.uk

Complaints

If you have any complaints regarding this research please contact Dr Afshin Shahi

Senior Lecturer in Middle East Politics at the University of Bradford at the following address: a.shahi1@bradford.ac.uk

Thank you for reading this information sheet, and please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.

Consent form

A Strategic PD Framework for Enhancing Implementation of PD Practice in the Diplomatic Field of Qatar.

Nasser Al-Hamr

PARTICIPATION IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY IS VOLUNTARY

I have read and understood the study information dated February 2021, or it has been read to me. I have been able to ask questions about the study and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.	YES / NO
I consent voluntarily to be a participant in this study and understand that I can refuse to answer questions and that I can withdraw from the study at any time up until September 2021, without having to give a reason.	YES / NO
I agree to the interview/ focus group discussion being audio recorded.	YES / NO
I agree to maintain the confidentiality of the focus group discussions.	YES/NO
I agree to be video recorded and have my photographs taken.	YES / NO
I understand that the information I provide will be used for Nasser Al-Hamr thesis, research publication, or any future research and that the information will be anonymised.	YES / NO
I agree that my (anonymised) information can be quoted in research outputs.	YES / NO
I agree that my real name can be used for quotes.	YES / NO
I agree to joint copyright of the diary/notes/photographs or videos to Nasser Al-Hamr.	YES / NO
I understand that any personal information that can identify me – such as my name, address, will be kept confidential and not shared with anyone other than Nasser Al-Hamr and his research supervisors.	YES / NO
I give permission for the (anonymised) information I provide to be deposited in a data archive so that it may be used for future research.	YES / NO

Please retain a copy of this consent form.

Participant name:

Signature: _____ Date _____

Interviewer name:

Signature: _____ Date _____

For information please contact Nasser Al-Hamr on N.A.J.Al-hammar@bratford.acu.uk

PD empowerment and the various levels



The framework focuses on organisation (MOFA) and governance vision and drivers to control the PD system and ensure the frequent communication between organisation (MOFA) and governance are met and are working in harmony with no conflicts. The proposed framework consists of four levels (see Figure 14):

1. **Level 1 Strategic:** The first level of the proposed PD empowerment framework defines the PD strategies. Here, three key elements are formulated. The first element is the *PD vision* which would help the users of the framework establish how the nation wants to be seen on the global stage and what interest they are set to promote and their contributions in terms of culture, education and economic. Therefore, it is essential for employees primarily diplomats in various embassies abroad to be familiar with the nation's PD vision. Next is *PD goals and audiences sub-level*. In this sub-level, clear goals and plans on achieving the goals should be set at a particular level of abstraction. At this level, the audiences to be reached or communicated with needs to be clearly identified, e.g. domestic, regional and international audiences. The last sub-level is *PD outcomes and strategies*. This sub-section would start from defining the PD principles, paradigm, model, and desired outcomes based on organisation and governance drivers. It is essential to align actions to the nation's vision and strategy. It can also help diplomats effectively enforce the state's PD strategies. Decisions made on the strategic level require fewer right time data than those made on the lower levels. Diplomats and relevant stakeholders need to first be familiar with the nation's PD vision and strategies for crisis management.
2. **Level 2 Tactical:** The tactical level defines the PD architecture system based on the state vision and organisation's readiness and finally define a transition plan. After familiarising with the various elements of the strategic level, the next step is to be familiar with the different aspects of the tactical level. Typically, the tactical level consists of several divisions, each controlling a collection of functions; the decisions made here are related to the corresponding functions and must comply with the upper-level strategies specified.

   The time to make a decision is an essential key factor on lower levels of the pyramid, e.g. tactical level. Any crisis management needs swift decision-making, which can be performed at the tactical level of the proposed framework. The lack of making the right and fast-paced decision on the tactical level could intensify the crisis's seriousness by the sum of time that elapses before a suitable action is taken. Here, the first sub-level requires assessing the organisation's readiness to manage the crisis regarding various resources such as human and finance. The nation's readiness to form partnership with other nations could help mitigate the crisis and its impact. In terms of human resources, it is essential

to assess knowledge and commitment, especially diplomats. The next sub-level is the PD architecture system. At this level, four activities are defined based on Qatar's vision. The main activities relate to human, social, economic and environmental aspects. The nations and MOFA goals for the crisis management will specify the activity/activities required based on the embassies' abilities and Qatar's connection with the host nation. The last sub-level is the transition plan which involved planning the transition from the tactical level to the operational level, i.e., implementing the activity/activities defined.

3. **Level 3 Operational:** The operational level defines the PD methodology to implement PD and therefore perform monitoring and evaluation based on metrics (see Chapter 3). At the operational level, the core activities are carried out; the decision power is limited to optimising the specific production activities according to the nation's primary strategy. On the other hand, a process identifies a set of logically related tasks performed to accomplish a defined goal. In the operational level, extended decision processes can cause failure to achieve strategic PD goal and impacts the crisis management process. In this level, three main elements are identified, i.e. PD methodology, PD implementation and monitoring and evaluation. PD methodology defines the structure for the diplomats to help decision making concerning the crisis and control the PD implementation process. The adopted methodology aids the understanding of a problematic situation, such as the siege crisis and helps establish ways of resolving it. For effective PD implementation, it is essential to identify the features needed to support the implementation process, e.g. assessing whether the right infrastructure and knowledgeable workforce are available and other potential factors that could impact PD implementation. After decisions are made, and actions are taken, it is essential to monitor and evaluate their effectiveness and take actions where necessary. Core decisions are carried out at the operational level; decision-making power is restricted to optimising individual development according to the primary strategy.
4. **Level 4 Governance:** Here, two sub-levels are defined, i.e. audit and change management. The governance level provides control over PD system by auditing the PD implementation process, if it meets the governance desired PD outcomes then PD implementation would continue in the same manner, and if it is non-conformance to the desired outcomes, then governance will lead to performing change management at the above levels based on the analysis on the type of change that has to be done whether in the PD method (operational level), PD architecture (tactical level) or in the top-level which is changing PD strategy (strategic level). The framework showed that the auditing

and change management at the governance level should continue until PD implementation process meets the wanted result is met.

Qatar 2030 Vision

By deploying the framework on the state of Qatar, the PD architecture system were defined based on Qatar 2030 vision. Qatar 2030 vision consist of four pillars (see Figure 15):

1. Human: Concerned of Education, Health and Workforce including worker's right. This pillar aims to build PD in general.

2. Social: Concerned of Social care and protection through ensuring humanitarian ideals and morals; and the sound social structure through national heritage, Arab and Islamic values and identity. Moreover, it considers International cooperation over economic, political and cultural platforms which could be through humanitarian assistance, Economical investment, cultural exchange and provision of dialogue among civilizations. This pillar aims to build National Identity.

3. Economic: concerned of sound economic management though investments and economic stability. This pillar aims to mainly to build National Branding.

4. Environmental: concerned of providing an equilibrium between growth needs and environmental protection through the use environmentally sound technologies. This pillar aims to build PD in general.





After analysing Qatar vision, the four pillars were found to be participated in the PD architecture system to ensure the delivery of government vision through PD (see Figure 17). As a result, the human, social, economic, and environmental were main activities which each aim to create a mental image of Qatar through sound of either human rights, social structure, international cooperation, environmentally support and economic stability and management. However, Organisation and Government objectives will define the required activity by PD system based on the specific Diplomatic Mission condition and Qatar relationship with the host country and the capabilities of the embassy itself. As a result, there might be all four activities or even three or two based on the Organisation and Government objectives defined for the specific mission. This provides a flexibility to PD system and to derive activities that only will provide benefit for Organisation and Government objectives. Moreover. all activities are inter-linked and cooperated

together to work in harmony and all are measured and managed regularly through the requirement management process to ensure achieving the desired outcome that reflect Organisation and Government objectives defined earlier.

Referring to action research which illustrated that the PD office perform six collaborated diplomacy roles: Cultural diplomacy, digital diplomacy, sport diplomacy, economic, science and social diplomacy to achieve the ultimate PD strategy, it is preferable to link these roles to Qatar 2030 vision to provide a standardised.

PD theories framework

PD Principles

- Credibility –Accuracy and credibility are essential to provide efficient PD strategies, and the eventual delivery of effective foreign policy, especially when dealing with an associated, knowledgeable and interested public audience. Efforts to mislead the facts will generate even bigger suspicion of governments. Also, PD effort has to be consistent and reliable while spreading messages for a particular audience.
- Discussion - the delivery of message in PD is significant, as well as how it is received and whether it is understood. The traditional approach of talking to the audience through media releases without any chance for dialogue is no longer sufficient. The very efficient approach of engagement and encouraging dialogue is face-to-face communication and exchange. Another effective and targeted communication method is the Internet, especially the instant mutual communication obtainable over social networks. . It is preferable to have effective and strategic communication through different communication channels, including social media and other formal communications within the diplomacy channel. It is importance to empower PD practitioners, in particular in the diplomatic frame to handle effective discussion through effective communication and interaction with target groups taking into consideration their culture and country-specific factors along with the national foreign policy objectives.
- Partnership - The concept of partnership is the new route in the improvement and distribution of any state's foreign policy globally. Three main stages lead to partnerships development, starting from networking, coordinating and cooperating; each stage requires some time to build trust between partners. Usually, such partnerships involve bilateral agreements between nations and sometimes lead to commonalities with nations sharing the same interests. However, sometimes such partnerships might be ineffective or opposing the state's interest. it allows cooperation between several governments and NGOs within a state or various states to produce a specific message.

PD Models and Theories:

Since the ultimate aim for PD is to enhance the state's international image, it is quite challengeable to persuade other states to accept a state's national values and interests. Hence, Rasmussen (2009) has proposed a rational model which is focusing on delivering national interests based on tangible benefits such as financial profits, boosted tourism, trade and investments. However, this model presents PD credibility issue, which is one of the main principles of PD. In comparison, the idealistic model considered the PD principle of credibility and aims to improve freedom and influence in foreign publics which relatively will influence its state. However, the main critiques to the idealistic model are that states tend to dislike the attempts of other states to influence their public, hence the non-rational model is developed which is based on social tendency through the feast of thoughts and norms. Although this model seems to be favourable to most states, it is hard to perceive whether this social tendency has rationalist or idealist source. This will assess whether each crisis has applied different PD models based on state interest and foreign policy strategies. Regarding theories, proposed Image Restoration Theory which claims that there are five choices for nations and organisations to repair their image, these are denial, evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification. This theory was used by Saudi Arabia in the US to restore their image after 9/11 terrorist attacks.

PD Dimensions:

"The constant streams of information, education and culture should have relevance across three dimensions that shape PD practice: daily communications; strategic communication; and elaboration of permanent relationships with strategic parties".

- **Daily communication** - In daily communication, the government has to interconnect to both the domestic and foreign publics, and the communication should reflect the choices made on a daily basis. Therefore, the government is seeking to establish a good relationship with the media, specifically international media to ensure that a clarification of national politics reaches foreign publics. Within the daily communication of PD activities, there is an essential need for observing vital international media and consequently reacting promptly to damaging information reported which may harm the nation's image. Daily communications management is a significant element of PD practice, which could affect establishing longer-term relationships with foreign audiences and maintain the state's image worldwide.
- **Strategic communication** - required the development of an approach involving a set of subjects, which might be concentrated through precise policy enterprises. The five layers

of strategic communication are forming awareness; emerging interest and knowledge; rising advocacy; and action.

Evaluation interview questions

Interview questions:

The purpose of this study is to establish whether the PD empowerment framework can help to fulfil the following questions.

- What do you think about the significance of the various framework elements?
- To what degree do you think the framework covered all PD strategies?
- What challenges did you think you encounter using the framework?
- What are your suggestions for improving the framework and its materials?
- To what degree do you think the framework and its materials help you implement a strategic PD?
- Do you think the framework impacts management of the crisis? Why?

Note taking sheet without the framework

Q1A: What PD models, theories, principles, and dimensions do you think are suitable to help manage the economic impact of the crisis and why?
Economic Impact

Q1B: What PD models, theories, principles, and dimensions do you think are suitable to help manage the political impact of the crisis and why?
Political Impact

Q1C: What PD models, theories, principles, and dimensions do you think are suitable to help manage the humanitarian impact of the crisis and why?
Humanitarian Impact

Q2: How did you find the process of implementing strategic PD to help manage the crisis?

Response:……

……..……

……

……

……

……

……

……

……

……

……

……

……

Please provide additional information here:

……

……

……

……

……

……

……

……

……

……

……

……

Note taking sheet with the framework

Q1: What are your initial thoughts of the PD empowerment framework? [i.e. the Figure presented to you in the slides]

Response:

Q2. You have being presented with PD model, Theories, Principles and Discussions. How would that help you in planning PD to reduce Economic, Political and Humanitarian impact of the crisis?

Response:

Q3: What PD goals, audiences and PD outcomes do you think would help in the siege crisis management?

Response:

Q5: What do you think the four activities of the architecture system [See the figures in the slides pelase] in terms of helping you decide which activities are required to manage the crisis? For more information on the architecture system, see Qatar 2030 vision **Document D6**

Response:

Q6: How do you think the transition from the **tactical level** to the **operational level** should be planned?

Response:

Q7: How do you think the **PD system** should be implemented, monitored and evaluated? For more information see **Document 4**.

Response:

Q8: How can the framework supporting documents help diplomats and MOFA employees decide which PD strategies and PD architecture system to employ to manage the crisis?

Response:

Example of evaluation study participants response

Q1: What are your initial thoughts of the PD empowerment framework? [i.e. the Figure presented to you in the slides]

Response: The form of the PD empowerment framework is clear and simplified. The use of colours highlights well the different levels, although using the same colour for both level 1 and level 4 can be confusing. The four levels are clear and easily noticed by a first look.

In general, the content looks organized and well structured, while it might be confusing to put different elements in the same boxes. For example: PD Goals & Audiences (box 2, level) PD Outcomes & Strategies (box 3, level 1) and Monitoring and Evaluation (box 3, level 3).

Q2. You have being presented with PD model, Theories, Principles and Discussions. How would that help you in planning PD to reduce Economic, Political and Humanitarian impact of the crisis?

Response: PD Theories and models are important to understand the international scene present today. It can be very helpful in understanding foreign policies and to categorize countries, and approach each one of them more efficiently. (Know what they want and what they don't).

Q7: How do you think the **PD system** should be implemented, monitored and evaluated? For more information see **Document 4**.

Response:

Qatar's PD system can be implemented through the ministry of foreign affairs as the main actor, supported by other authorities. Diplomats role is also very important in terms of Economic Diplomacy, strengthening the country's reputation, and especially following up developments (monitoring). Evaluating the system and taking actions where needed is related to whether these developments are positive or negative.

Q8: How can the framework supporting documents help diplomats and MOFA employees decide which PD strategies and PD architecture system to employ to manage the crisis?

Response: - Document 2 explaining the crisis is brief and well-structured, it gives a good explanation and can give a good idea about the issue.

- Note taking in Document 3 should probably be done after reading the framework and the theoretical materials as it helps in defining key elements on the political, economic and humanitarian levels.

Supporting documents provide readers with good theoretical background in the field of international relations in general and to solve this crisis specifically. It is up to the diplomats and MOFA employees to choose the theoretical basis that matches best with the crisis.

Q1A: What PD models, theories, principles, and dimensions do you think are suitable to help manage the economic impact of the crisis and why?
Economic Impact
اعتقد أن الآليات المناسبة لوضع السياسات العامة التي تساعد في إدارة الأزمات سواء الاقتصادية أو السياسة أو غيرها هي التخطيط الجيد المبني على دراسة معمقة تشترك فيها جميع الأطراف ذات المصلحة عبر آليات واضحة وشفافة وسهلة للمراقبة والمتابعة . I believe that the appropriate mechanisms for developing public policies that help in managing crises, whether economic, political or otherwise, are good planning based on an in-depth study in which all stakeholders participate through clear, transparent and easy monitoring and follow-up mechanisms. Planning, stakeholder engagement (communication, monitoring and transparency)

Q1A: What PD models, theories, principles, and dimensions do you think are suitable to help manage the economic impact of the crisis and why?
Economic Impact
اعتقد أن الآليات المناسبة لوضع السياسات العامة التي تساعد في إدارة الأزمات سواء الاقتصادية أو السياسة أو غيرها هي التخطيط الجيد المبني على دراسة معمقة تشترك فيها جميع الأطراف ذات المصلحة عبر آليات واضحة وشفافة وسهلة للمراقبة والمتابعة . I believe that the appropriate mechanisms for developing public policies that help in managing crises, whether economic, political or otherwise, are good planning based on an in-depth study in which all stakeholders participate through clear, transparent and easy monitoring and follow-up mechanisms.

Q1: What are your initial thoughts of the PD empowerment framework? [i.e. the Figure presented to you in the slides]

Response: The form of the PD empowerment framework is clear and simplified. The use of colours highlights well the different levels, although using the same colour for both level 1 and level 4 can be confusing. The four levels are clear and easily noticed by a first look.

In general, the content looks organized and well structured, while it might be confusing to put different elements in the same boxes. For example: PD Goals & Audiences (box 2, level) PD Outcomes & Strategies (box 3, level 1) and Monitoring and Evaluation (box 3, level 3).

Q2. You have being presented with PD model, Theories, Principles and Discussions. How would that help you in planning PD to reduce Economic, Political and Humanitarian impact of the crisis?

Response: PD Theories and models are important to understand the international scene present today. It can be very helpful in understanding foreign policies and to categorize countries, and approach each one of them more efficiently. (Know what they want and what they don't).

Q7: How do you think the **PD system** should be implemented, monitored and evaluated? For more information see **Document 4**.

Response:

Qatar's PD system can be implemented through the ministry of foreign affairs as the main actor, supported by other authorities. Diplomats role is also very important in terms of Economic Diplomacy, strengthening the country's reputation, and especially following up developments (monitoring). Evaluating the system and taking actions where needed is related to whether these developments are positive or negative.

Q8: How can the framework supporting documents help diplomats and MOFA employees decide which PD strategies and PD architecture system to employ to manage the crisis?

Response: - Document 2 explaining the crisis is brief and well-structured, it gives a good explanation and can give a good idea about the issue.

- Note taking in Document 3 should probably be done after reading the framework and the theoretical materials as it helps in defining key elements on the political, economic and humanitarian levels.

Supporting documents provide readers with good theoretical background in the field of international relations in general and to solve this crisis specifically. It is up to the diplomats and MOFA employees to choose the theoretical basis that matches best with the crisis.

Q1A: What PD models, theories, principles, and dimensions do you think are suitable to help manage the economic impact of the crisis and why?
Economic Impact
اعتقد أن الآليات المناسبة لوضع السياسات العامة التي تساعد في إدارة الأزمات سواء الاقتصادية أو السياسة أو غيرها هي التخطيط الجيد المبني على دراسة معمقة تشترك فيها جميع الأطراف ذات المصلحة عبر آليات واضحة وشفافة وسهلة للمراقبة والمتابعة . I believe that the appropriate mechanisms for developing public policies that help in managing crises, whether economic, political or otherwise, are good planning based on an in-depth study in which all stakeholders participate through clear, transparent and easy monitoring and follow-up mechanisms. Planning, stakeholder engagement (communication, monitoring and transparency)

Q1A: What PD models, theories, principles, and dimensions do you think are suitable to help manage the economic impact of the crisis and why?
Economic Impact
اعتقد أن الآليات المناسبة لوضع السياسات العامة التي تساعد في إدارة الأزمات سواء الاقتصادية أو السياسة أو غيرها هي التخطيط الجيد المبني على دراسة معمقة تشترك فيها جميع الأطراف ذات المصلحة عبر آليات واضحة وشفافة وسهلة للمراقبة والمتابعة . I believe that the appropriate mechanisms for developing public policies that help in managing crises, whether economic, political or otherwise, are good planning based on an in-depth study in which all stakeholders participate through clear, transparent and easy monitoring and follow-up mechanisms.