bradscholars

Peace and conflict resolution activities in support of strengthening civil society's democratic capacity in South Korea. Case studies on three civil society organisations working on peace and conflict resolution in South Korea.

Item Type	Thesis
Authors	Chung, Da Woon
Rights	 The University of Bradford theses are licenced under a Creative Commons Licence.
Download date	2026-05-20 07:57:58
Link to Item	http://hdl.handle.net/10454/5488

Library

University of Bradford eThesis

This thesis is hosted in Bradford Scholars – The University of Bradford Open Access repository. Visit the repository for full metadata or to contact the repository team



© University of Bradford. This work is licenced for reuse under a Creative Commons Licence.

D.CHUNG

PhD

2011

PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY'S DEMOCRATIC CAPACITY IN SOUTH KOREA

D. CHUNG

PhD

2011

PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY'S DEMOCRATIC CAPACITY IN SOUTH KOREA

CASE STUDIES ON THREE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS WORKING ON PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA

DA WOON CHUNG

submitted for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Peace Studies

University of Bradford

2011

PCR Activities in Support of Strengthening Civil Society's Democratic Capacity in South Korea

Sub-Title: Case studies of three civil society organisations working on peace and conflict resolution in South Korea

Keywords: civil society, democratic consolidation, democratisation, peace activism, conflict resolution, South Korea

ABSTRACT: In the last fifteen years, conflict resolution, a collaborative, problem-solving approach to social conflicts, was introduced to new democracies in an attempt to develop civil society's capacity for conflict management (Mayer, 2000). Conflict resolution provides people with an opportunity to advocate effectively for their own interests in a non-violent, constructive manner through systematic educational efforts, skills trainings, dialogue initiatives, and mediation practices (Mayer, 2000). It empowers people to address, manage, and transform difficulties and antagonism into a source of positive social change and, thus, change people's negative psychological responses to conflicts (Bush & Folger, 1994). In this view, conflict resolution in new democracies' civil society provides citizens as well NGO practitioners with the skills and opportunities to practice how to express and resolve differences in a safe and constructive environment (Shonholtz, 1997). In an effort to provide additional information about civil society's conflict resolution practices and their affect in new democracies, this dissertation examines the existing efforts of South Korean civil society organisations to promote conflict resolution methodologies. Specifically, three organisations are examined to understand better South Korean civil society's response to PCR issues. Furthermore, by closely examining these three civil society organisations, this dissertation aims to explore what affect increased awareness and engagement in conflict resolution methodologies have on the democratic quality of civil society.

Acknowledgement

I am grateful that I can finally write this acknowledgement to thank everyone who provided support and guidance throughout my PhD process. First, I would like to express my deepest appreciation and gratitude to Dr. Tom Gallagher for being a truly insightful and supportive academic mentor and thesis supervisor. In addition to his academic insights and scholarly inputs, Dr. Gallagher has provided continuous guidance and moral support and I would not have been able to overcome my fear and self-doubt of not completing the paper during the PhD process without his help. It is truly privilege to study under a respectful scholar and great teacher, and my gratitude cannot be fully described in writing.

Second, I am also grateful for a number of professors and researchers I have encountered during my studies in Bradford. It is truly privilege to be part of the Department of Peace Studies, the first academic centre devoted to advancing the understanding of peace and conflict resolution. The Department's presence signals to the world that peace is a subject of study and worthy of academic endeavour. I have grown intellectually by being exposed to fine research and various perspectives on peace, conflict resolution, and social change – I have particularly enjoyed being part of the research groups on conflict resolution and politics and social change.

Third, the Department of Peace Studies has not only helped me grow intellectually, but also given me an opportunity to meet a number of amazing friends and colleagues from all around the world. Especially, I am thankful to have classmates who endured this long PhD process in solidarity: Katija, Kazuyo, Cuz, Josh, Cathy, Adam, Egoitz, Daniel, Masa, Rick, and many other fellow PhD researchers. I am grateful that I was able to nourish friendships with them during my time in Bradford. In addition, I would like to express gratitude to my best friends Heather and Ellie for their love, friendship, moral support, and editorial guidance. They are my power-house women. I also cannot thank enough my partner and best friend Arthur for his love, moral support, and comradeship – his presence has not only enriched the quality of my life, but has also helped me maintain my sanity during this long process of writing up.

Fourth, during my third year, I converted my status from a full-time to a part-time extra-mural to work in New York. While working for this exciting

organisation, I felt often tempted to give up my academic pursuit. Yet, my boss has been extremely supportive of my pursuit of writing up this dissertation, and has been actively encouraging me to finish up. I thank him for his moral support.

Fifth, this dissertation records South Korean civil society activists' stories –without all those who I met during my research trip this dissertation would not have been possible. Throughout the writing-up process, I could not stop thanking all the interviewees who have willingly shared their time and stories. Listening to their courageous stories and sharing their perspectives through this dissertation has been one of the most rewarding parts of the research process. In particular, I am truly thankful to Dr. Joo-jin Chung, Ms. Soo-seon Park, Mr. Jae-young Lee, and Dr. Sung-young Park for their guidance and advice. They are true pioneers of peace and conflict resolution in Korea. I am also grateful to all the interviewees for their willingness to help out a young researcher who was curious about their stories. It was really inspiring to have a conversation with these amazing individuals dedicated their life for social change.

Sixth, I would like to thank my family. Without their love and endless prayers, I would not have been able to complete my dissertation. I thank my paternal grandmother for her prayers and love. I also deeply miss my maternal grandmother who passed away in 2009 and am thankful for her strengths, independence, and perseverance. She would have been very proud to see that the grand daughter of a refugee from the North during the Korean War became the first female doctor of philosophy in our family. I thank my brother Joonmin for his tireless love and friendship. I am very lucky to have a best friend like him in my life. I am also thankful to my mother, my very best friend, mentor, and role model. Without many hours of chatting with my mother on a daily basis, my sanity would have been seriously compromised. Above all, my father truly deserves all my thanks and gratefulness – he has not only generously supported my study, but also instilled the value of education, intellectual curiosity, and fearless pursuit of truth from the very beginning of my life. He has been my role model and hero with his continued dedication to writing, reading, and passionate intellectual discussion. I would like to dedicate my PhD dissertation to my father Prof. Myungkyu Chung. Finally, I am fully aware that nothing is possible without my heavenly Father and His divine intervention – and I am grateful for His love and support.

List of Tables

Table 1: Profiles of Interviewees ………………………………………………..96

Table 2: School Peace Youth Education Curricula 186

Table 3: School Peace Adult Education Workshops...................................... 191

Table 4: Training on Conflict Resolution and Mediation Skills 221

Table 5: Comparison: Organisational Overview 273

Table 6: Comparison: Interview Reflection 284

Table 7: Comparison: Conflict Resolution and Issue Framing........................ 291

Table 8: Comparison: Democratic Quality 302

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT I
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT II
LIST OF TABLES IV

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1
THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION PERIOD 4
POLARISATION AND DISCORD WITHIN CIVIL SOCIETIES DURING THE CONSOLIDATION PERIOD 6
CIVIL SOCIETY DISCOURSES IN SOUTH KOREA AFTER THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 8
RESEARCH QUESTION AND CORE ARGUMENTS 11
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 16
POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION 22

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 23
DEMOCRATISATION 25
THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY 29
LIBERAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY 30
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 36
CIVIL SOCIETY IN DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATISATION 45
THEORIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY – LIBERAL AND ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSE. 45
CIVIL SOCIETY IN PRACTICE. 55
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE 60
CONCLUSION 70

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 72
CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 75
CASE STUDY ORGANISATIONS AND SELECTION CRITERIA 81
FIELD RESEARCH: REFLECTIVE MOMENTS 85
DATA COLLECTION IN THE FIELD 92
CONCLUSION 104

CHAPTER FOUR: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATISATION IN SOUTH KOREA 106
PRIOR TO DEMOCRATISATION IN 1987 109
MODERNIZATION AND JAPANESE OCCUPATION (1875-1945). 109
POST-COLONIAL TRANSITION AND KOREAN WAR (1945-1953) 111
AFTER THE KOREAN WAR AND THE RISE OF PARK CHUNG-HEE (1953-1979) 116
THE END OF PARK AND THE RISE OF NEW MILITARY DICTATORSHIP (1979-1986) 123
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION (1987-2008) 130
NEGOTIATED DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION (1987) 132
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION (1988-1992) 138
TRANSITION TO CONSOLIDATION – THE RISE OF OPPOSITION (1998-2003) 144
CONSOLIDATION AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS (2003-PRESENT) 149

CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDIES IN SEARCH OF PCR PRACTICES IN SOUTH KOREA 162
PCR MOVEMENT IN SOUTH KOREA 163
CASE STUDY 1: SCHOOL PEACE MAKING 171
CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW OF SCHOOL PEACE. 173
DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW OF SCHOOL PEACE. 179
ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW OF SCHOOL PEACE. 193
CASE STUDY 2: WOMEN MAKING PEACE – CONFLICT RESOLUTION CENTRE 209
CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW OF WMP-CR CENTRE 209
DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW OF WMP-CR CENTRE 218
ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW OF WMP-CR CENTRE 227
CASE STUDY 3: PEACE ACTIVIST NETWORK 243

Contextual Overview of PAN. 244
Descriptive Overview of the PAN 248
Analytical overview of the PAN. 256
Conclusion 268

CHAPTER SIX: CASE STUDY COMPARISON AND REFLECTION 270
Organisational Overview 272
Comparing Interview Reflections: Motivation, Benefits, and Challenges 282
Conflict Resolution and Issue Framing 288
Democratic Quality 299
Conclusion 308

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 309
Summary of Conclusions 313
Detailed Reflections on Conclusions 315
Further Reflections 333

ANNEX 1: SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS 337

ANNEX 2: SAMPLE COMMUNICATION APPROACHING INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 338

ANNEX 3: PROFILES OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 339

ANNEX4: DOCUMENTATION FOR CHAPTER 5 & CHAPTER 6 342

BIBLIOGRAPHY 343

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

> For the last fifteen years, various social conflicts have rapidly emerged at all levels of society. A major problem with these conflicts is linked to the citizens' inability to constructively deal with them. Instead of responding to various conflictual social issues through the process of negotiation and bargaining, citizens often manage the conflict with hostility[1]. (The Special Advisory Committee on Sustainable Development, 2004, p. 8)

The above quote from the *2004 Report on the Institutionalization of the Conflict Resolution System in the Republic of Korea*, the first government-sponsored publication on such a topic, highlights that social conflicts are increasingly affecting the country. At the centre of the social conflict debates in the Republic of Korea (South Korea hereafter) lies the country's civil society, an institution once most trusted by South Koreans (Kim, 2009). The country officially embarked on democratic transition in 1987, after Chun Do-Hwan, a military dictator agreed to accept the oppositional civil society's demands for democracy, including the restoration of regular, free, and democratic presidential elections. Since then, civil society in South Korea has been largely revered for its influential role in monitoring the state's democratic reforms and offering a space to mobilise citizen action.

In the early 2000s, civil society in South Korean was criticised for its inability to resolve growing social conflicts (Park, 2004). Conservative political parties and media have particularly exploited South Korean civil society's apparent failure in its role in the country's growing social and public policy conflicts, also claiming that South Korean civil society has a limited impact on fostering democratic citizenship and values (Lee, 2009). Such criticism portrayed civil society as a party to social conflict by instigating conflictual social

[1]Translated by the author.

dynamics, as well as escalating a public policy debate into a fierce protracted social conflict (Han & Seol, 2006). In response, a number of South Korean civil society organisations published essays that showcased the peace and conflict resolution efforts they had undertaken (Park, 2002; Park, 2007). They also argued against the conservatives' claim that South Korean civil society was ill-equipped to operate in a democratic environment in which disagreements and difference were tolerated and appreciated.

Coming from a generation that benefits from the fruits of bloody democratisation battles endured by the oppositional civil society, the author grew up romanticising people power and civil society's role in mobilising citizen action. Inspired by progressive intellectuals and civil society activists in South Korea, the author had the view that the expansion of civil society and its heightened capacity to generate progressive political discourses were beneficial to the country's democratic development. However, the rise of social conflicts and civil society's interplay with them in the last ten years offered an opportunity to reflect upon the author's assumptions about the positive relationship between civil society, citizen participation in the public sphere, and democracy. This dissertation is a summary of the journey that the author has undertaken in the last six years to assess her assumptions about civil society and democracy critically, and to investigate civil society's constructive engagement in South Korea's social conflicts.

This thesis grew out of a collision between the ideas and values shared by South Korean civil society activists who pioneered the Peace and Conflict Resolution (PCR hereafter) movement, whom the author met during her early

20s[2], her intellectual training in peace studies, and an escalating interest in participatory democracy theory fuelled by reading Benjamin Barber's *Strong Democracy* (1984). A growing body of scholarly work analysing the PCR movement's effort to strengthen civil society further guided the development of the thesis (Gidron, Katz & Hasenfeld, 2003; Shonholtz, 1997; Van Tongerene, 2005).

This dissertation will make a contribution by exploring South Korean civil society's responses to growing social and public policy conflicts and the impact such activities have in strengthening civil society's role in deepening democracy in the country. The author will argue that civil society organisations in South Korea, which integrate peace and conflict resolution methodologies, play a vital role in enhancing civil society's ability to nurture democratic values, norms, processes, and skills. Their use of peace and conflict resolution practices, emphasizing problem solving and tolerance, enables democratic participation and the constructive management of contentious social issues. To understand this core argument better, this thesis uses a case study methodology, investigating three civil society groups in South Korea that have integrated PCR methodologies.

This introductory chapter reflects on the rationale for the research project, and describes the relevance of the core premise of the dissertation to South Korea's continuing process of democratic development. To begin, this introduction chapter contextualises how the emerging social conflicts became a challenge for democratic consolidation and deepening processes by briefly

[2]The author met two PCR activists while she studied abroad from 2000 to 2005 in the United States. She was exposed to the emergent PCR movement in South Korea through her interaction with these individuals. They played an influential informant role for this dissertation, and are introduced as interviewees in Chapter Three.

reviewing existing literature. Then, it reflects on how effectively the research questions examine South Korea's civil society and its changing role in post-democratic contexts. To conclude, the chapter introduces the structure of this dissertation, and how each chapter supports examination of the core premise.

The Emergence of Social Conflict in the Democratic Transition Period

Since the 1980s, efforts to move from authoritarianism to democracy have been initiated throughout the world (Huntingdon, 1991). This process generally begins with the restoration of an institutional infrastructure that allows open competition for the right to control the government (Grugel, 2002). At the top level, the political elites in new democracies have introduced a wide range of measures aimed at institutional reform in order to create a political environment favouring pluralistic democracy. With the opening of democratic space, civil societies in new democracies—which had previously functioned to mobilise democratic forces to challenge authoritarian states—have begun to undergo qualitative transformations (Howard, 2005). They have moved away from their previous role in strengthening oppositional movements, to taking on new roles that complement institutional democratisation. This process can be a difficult one: in new democracies, the excitement, joy, and celebration at the prospect of a democratic future, and the sense of civic pride that enabled the transformative change, have often been quickly replaced by day-to-day struggles to address political, economic, and social issues that the transition process has created[3].

[3] The challenges facing new democracies vary from one country to another; they are hard to generalize, as each country engages in a democratic transitional process in a different way. A few commonly observed challenges that the new democracies were pressured to address in the late 1980s and early 1990s include: the rise of ethnic nationalism, economic reforms (privatization and introduction of neo-liberal economic measures), transitional justice mechanism to handle previous regimes' corruption and human rights abuses, activation of civil society, and the rise of social conflicts. The aforementioned challenges should not be understood as general trends, but rather as the issues focused on by scholars

In the transitory environment of new democracies, many social issues intensify and often become sources of conflict. In studying social conflicts emerging in Eastern and Central Europe, Shonholtz (1997, p. 437) contends that within the process of democratic transition, three different types of social conflict exist in new democracies. The first type emerges because citizens have been “long suppressed or fostered by the previous regimes” to help the authoritarian and totalitarian elites maintain their control over society. The second type is closely linked to the transitional process that a country experiences “from one political and economic order” to a new system based upon liberal democracy and market economy. The third type of social conflict is “inherent to (liberal) democracy” as its underlying assumption is that democracy is an institutional mechanism developed to manage pluralistic interests, conflicts, and disputes (Shonholtz, 1997, p 437). The rise of contentious social issues or social conflicts was not unique to former communist countries; this has been witnessed in new democracies globally (Kaufman, 2005; Peters 2005; Rubinstein & Zeilzer, 2009; The South Korean President’s Special Advisory Committee on Sustainable Development, 2004).

The emergence of various social conflicts not only influences the daily lives of citizens, but also creates sizable challenges to nurturing constructive citizen participation in the public sphere (Shonholtz, 1997). Conflict resolution scholars, including Augsburger (1992), define *conflict* as an inevitable, natural, and normal part of human life, and contend that it affects society both negatively and positively, depending on how it is managed. These scholars advocate the development of social, governmental, and individual capacities for

---

investigating the issues emerging after democratic transitions (Diamond, 1994; Huntingdon, 1991; Linz & Stepan, 1996, Linz & O’Donnell, 1996; O’Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1996; Potter, 2005).

constructive management of conflict. Given that *democracy*, by definition, constructively regulates the social interests of diverse groups within institutional boundaries, scholars such as Ury (1999) and Augsburger (1992) contend that conflict erupting within the political and judicial boundaries of democracy can serve as a positive social force for the pursuit of democratic consolidation. However, generally, the development of effective institutional mechanisms for mediating conflict has not been rapid enough to cope with the growing social needs in new democracies, and citizens' struggles to deal with social conflicts constructively have become a consistently problematic aspect of democratic consolidation (Shapiro, 1999). Most citizens whose lives have been long-dictated by heavy-handed states are inadequately equipped to manage social conflict constructively when working with those who hold opposing points of view. In the absence of effective conflict-mediating institutions, people have resorted to coercive means of handling divisive social issues, by demonising those with different perspectives (Shonholtz, 1997).

Polarisation and Discord within Civil Societies during the Consolidation Period

As a result of the challenges in constructively managing social conflict within the early phases of democratisation, the role of civil society has changed. It has moved from working to overthrow authoritarian governments, to enabling civic participation within the democratic sphere. Defined as a "sociological counterpart of the market in the economic sphere and to (liberal) democracy in the political sphere", *civil society* has emerged as one of the most important theoretical units for examining the potential for social and political change (White, 2004, p.6). It comprises voluntary associations, organisations, movements, and networks engaged in bringing about collective action

(Diamond, 1994; Edwards, 2004). Within the liberal democratic tradition, a vibrant, robust civil society is critical for democratic learning because it models the values and attitudes essential to deepening democracy (Diamond, 1994; Finkel, 2003). Similarly, proponents of participatory democracy stress civil society's potential as a space for active citizen involvement in the process of generating critical debates on common issues (Barber, 1985). Such enthusiasm has produced copious resources devoted to promoting civil society in new democracies (Carothers & Ottawa, 2000).

The initial euphoria over the role of civil society in constructive management of conflictual social issues has eventually faded as disappointing aspects of civil society have surfaced during the consolidation stage (Mendelson, 2001). First, certain sections of civil societies have practiced anti-democratic norms and values, thus playing a counterproductive role in advancing democratic ideals and creating a negative conflictual dynamic. For example, the democratic transition in Russia and Eastern Europe brought about a rise in the number of grassroots organisations that mobilised around chauvinistic nationalism and xenophobic agendas (Francis & Ropers, 1999). As Chambers and Kopstein (2001) rightly point out, illiberal civil society entities in new democracies in post-communist countries moved political discourse away from democratic ideals and practise. Second, civil society activists' unfamiliarity with collaborative problem-solving processes has often turned public policy debates into fierce social conflicts, which have some cases collapsed fragile emerging deliberative spaces (Im, 2000; Kim, 2004; Shin, 1999).

In addition to impeding ordinary citizens' abilities to handle contentious social issues in a constructive manner, authoritarian legacies have affected the

pattern of civil society activists' engagement in public discourse. Specifically, authoritarian environments have not equipped civil society elites with the appropriate skills to foster constructive dialogue concerning highly divisive social issues (Shonholtz, 1997). Throughout the transitional period, dedicated civil society activists have mobilised the public around democratic struggles and led assertive non-violent direct action to restore public spaces that respect open discussion and dialogue (Grugel, 2002). The illegitimacy of the regimes allowed these activists and others to minimize and rationalise the antagonistic way in which civil societies engaged with states in struggles over public interests. After the transitions, civil society actors finally began to enjoy the freedom to advocate for public issues in what they perceived to be the best manner for the advancement of their societies. Yet, instead of facilitating multiple perspectives on public interest issues through dialogue and negotiation, movement-oriented actors have often fallen into ”political radicalism, militancy, intransigence, and moral purism” in their engagement with other civil society groups holding opposing perspectives (Im, 2000, p. 37). This, in turn, has created highly polarised civil societies that marginalise problem-solving approaches within civil society space (Shin, 1999).

Civil Society Discourses in South Korea after the Democratic Transition

These dynamics have not gone unnoticed by scholars in the field, as highlighted by the abundance of literature examining the emergence of social conflicts and civil society's engagement in the context of democratization (Diamond, 1994; Glick & Levy, 2009; Howards, 2003; Kaufman, 2005; Peters 2005; Rubinstein & Zeilzer, 2009; Shapiro, 1999; Shonholtz, 1997). These emerging challenges are particularly pertinent for the current dissertation, which

seeks to understand the post-transitional dynamics of South Korea's civil society. In this context, this thesis reviews the emergence of social conflicts in South Korea during the democratic transition and consolidation processes. Thus far, no research examines the negotiated meaning of social conflicts in contemporary South Korea in relation to civil society. Most scholarly investigations into conflicts in the context of South Korea apply to international relations and security studies, which focus on South Korea's conflictual dynamics with North Korea. Further, the majority of research on South Korean civil society focuses on civil society's contributions to and limits in advancing democratic reform processes through advocacy and citizen mobilisation (Diamond & Kim, 2000; Kim, 2006; Kim, 2005; Kim, 2000; Kim, 2003). These efforts were rarely directed toward understanding the role of civil society in responding to conflictual social issues in the context of democratisation.

In the early 2000s, social conflicts emerged as a public policy issue in South Korea due to frequent, protracted policy and social debates and the negative conflictual dynamics that these debates often exhibited. Under the Rho Moo-Hyun administration (2003-2007), the *Presidential Committee on Sustainable Development* commissioned a study on social conflicts in South Korea and public policy options for constructive conflict management and resolution in the country (Chung & Kang, 2006; Kim, 2008). The study contends that social conflict in South Korea and its ineffective management stem from the legacy of the authoritarian past, as well as from a lack of adequate procedures and cultural infrastructures to handle challenges emerging from democratisation. It found that decentralisation was one main problem, that the rising consciousness regarding the importance of sustainability over rapid economic

growth was a second, and that the lack of nationwide efforts to address past divisions was a third (Chung & Kang, 2006). While the study looks at various ways to develop institutional capacity to manage social conflicts effectively, it neglects to examine the potential role that South Korean civil society can play in this democratic consolidation challenge.

The lack of reference to civil society in the context of social conflicts and their management in South Korea is attributed to the fact that civil society has been increasingly criticised for being a party to social conflicts because their positions are aligned with a political stance (Kim, 2008). Park's (2004) paper on civil society activism in support of constructive conflict resolution and reconciliation eloquently summarized such perspectives. He argued that progressive ideals embedded in civil society activism create contentious dynamics with conservative segments of South Korea (Park, 2004). When a political party in the centre-left spectrum used a number of advocacy campaigns that mainstream civil society organisations had led in the late 1990s and 2000s, the neutrality of civil society was questioned. Further, progressive civil society organisations' partisan stance on centre-left political ideals provoked the emergence of conservative civil society organisations, and created highly dichotomised and politically contentious dynamics within the civil society. Park (2004, p.26) pointed out civil society's lack of emphasis on "constructive dialogue and tolerance of diversity" in approaching contentious social issues. He analysed that the experience of oppositional civil society created values of conformity and solidarity for greater public goods, and relatively neglected to nurture the processes, values, and skills to appreciate diverse views and to facilitate them in a constructive way (Park, 2004).

Research Question and Core Arguments

The aforementioned context begs questions. What types of civil society organisations can help strengthen civil society's function as a space for democratic learning without restricting its ability to generate critical discourses? How are these groups adapting and changing over time? What types of activities can help enhance democratic values, norms, and skills? To search for answers to these questions, the author pays attention to civil society organisations, networks, and groups that pioneered South Korea's PCR movement. At the time of writing this dissertation, there has been very little research conducted on the role of civil society in the advancement of citizens' capacity for constructive conflict resolution in South Korea. Their efforts are presented in a few recently published papers written by civil society activists, many of whom the author interviewed during the field research (Park, 2006). Through capacity building activities and organising a space for engaging in PCR discourses, these organisations have addressed ways in which citizens and civil society leaders can be empowered to engage constructively in divisive social issues. These organisations call themselves peace organisations or conflict resolution groups, and contend that their activities integrate PCR practices (such as conflict resolution training, dialogue workshops, and mediation) observed in other parts of the world (Park, 2006).

The emergence of peace and conflict resolution activism in South Korea triggers another sets of questions in the context of democratisation and civil society development. How and under what contexts have PCR methodologies been applied to the South Korean context? What are the primary motivations of these organisations in incorporating these methodologies? What changes do

these organisations aim to bring about in strengthening the country's civil society through the emergent practices of peace and conflict resolution?

Triggered by these questions, and inspired by conflict resolution literature (Augsburger, 1992; Bush & Folger, 1994; Lederach, 1995; Mayer, 2000; Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 2005; Shonholtz, 1997; Tongeren, 2005; Ury, 1999), this dissertation argues that the PCR movement, (which initially emerged in a post-transitional period in South Korea), strengthens civil society by embedding democratic skills, norms, and values. The dissertation further argues that this grassroots PCR movement in South Korea consists of a range of pragmatic responses that, at times, support citizens in addressing growing social conflicts and constructively engaging in contentious debates in civil society spaces. However, while these efforts have assisted in moving some civil society activist beyond purely antagonist positionality, the scope and reach of such efforts have thus far been limited to specific political constituencies.

The core arguments in this dissertation have their foundation in the work of participatory democratic theorists who examined the types of skills, norms, and values beneficial to the deepening of citizens' democratic engagement and participation in the public sphere (Barber, 1984; Dryzek, 2002; Galston, 1991, Gidron et al., 2002; Kymlicka, 2002). These scholars emphasised the importance of meaningful citizen participation for a sustainable and healthy democracy, which constructively manages competing social conflicts and pluralistic complexities. They outlined core participatory values, norms, and skills, including tolerance, non-violence, empathetic listening, collaborative problem solving, and willingness to engage in dialogue. These values and skills

are at the core of PCR practices highlighted in the literature (Shapiro, 1997; Shonholtz, 1999; Ury, 1999).

The dissertation examines particular types of civil society organisations (PCR organisations) that attempt to achieve greater success at embedding democratic values. It explores the status of the PCR activism in South Korea and offers an examination of the existing efforts of the country's civil society organisations to promote the PCR methodology. Firstly, then, the dissertation examines three PCR civil society organisations that emerged in the early 2000s in South Korea. The individual case study examples illustrate how conflict resolution activities were manifested in different forms of organisations and practitioners.

The first case study explores a grassroots association run by local citizens. This organisation adopted PCR techniques in order to enrich its outreach programs to youth and parents. The second case study examines a pioneering organisation that sees PCR resolution as its core mission. The third case study analyses a network of peace practitioners established to prepare a global meeting on conflict prevention and peace building and to promote regular interaction among peace activists. By presenting these case studies, this dissertation reviews how these organisations have utilized PCR activism, and what has shaped the direction of these organisations' PCR activities. To provide additional information on the operating contexts of these organisations, this dissertation maps PCR activism in South Korean civil society space, how it emerged, and how PCR principles are adapted to advance the organisations' core functions.

Secondly, the dissertation explores what effect increased awareness and engagement in PCR methodologies can have on the democratic quality of civil society. Building on the participatory democracy and conflict resolution literature (Barber, 1984; Dryzek, 2002; Galston, 1991; Gidron et al., 2002; Kymlicka, 2002), this dissertation analyses qualitative interviews of 54 civil society activists to examine the extent to which PCR activism has contributed to embedding the following democratic values, norms, and skills: a) tolerance; b) commitment to non-violent, constructive problem-solving; c) commitment to participation in the public sphere; and d) willingness to engage in dialogue. Furthermore, it examines whether, and to what extent, civil society activists in South Korea understand and practise the democracy nurturing aspect of PCR methodologies.

While more than 20 countries transitioned to democracy during the late 1980s and early 1990s, this dissertation investigates South Korea and its civil society actors working in the field of peace and conflict resolution for the following reasons. South Korea is a newly democratising country in which the majority of the citizens claim membership in voluntary associations, and civil society's influence on the populace remains relatively high (Shin, Park, Hwang, Lee & Jang, 2003). After the initial transition, post-Communist countries' civil societies moved quickly toward becoming political societies, and the elites in civil societies became political leaders (Bernhard, 1996). For this reason, the influence of civil societies in these countries has declined. In contrast, after its transition in 1987, South Korean civil society waited for more than 10 years to establish a relatively congenial relationship with the state before electing an oppositional candidate as president. Until 1998, relatively few civil society elites

were recruited to political positions, and thus, Korean civil society had time to develop its own capacity, such that it was strong enough not to be as easily co-opted in challenging institutional power (Moon, 2002).

South Korean civil society rarely receives foreign funding for its program implementation, and local actors initiate the PCR activities in the country. In post-Communist countries, a significant amount of foreign funding for democratisation has been transferred to civil societies. Due to strong ties with the international donor community, most conflict resolution programmes have been introduced by foreign-affiliated NGOs (Shapiro, 1999). This has often raised concern as to whether the conflict resolution activities that originated in North America and Western Europe have been imposed in an ethnocentric manner. With the introduction of 'social capital', policymakers have applied social capital theory to a number of third-wave democracies, and this, in turn, has triggered the institutionalisation of civil society (Howell & Pearce, 2001). Rather than widening participation and advancing democratic principles, such attempts have sometimes had a detrimental effect on social inclusion and participation. For instance, the civil society organisations funded by foreign organisations have become quasi-elite institutions, which are more likely to benefit people who have education, money, and status because they are best equipped to organise and make their voices heard under pluralism (Carothers, 1999). Therefore, the existence of elite-civil organisations in transitional democracies has resulted in political polarisation and cynicism among those with fewer resources. It is important to acknowledge that the aforementioned phenomenon has been widely observed in many low-income transitional countries. The PCR field in South Korea benefits from being more locally

grounded than those in the countries described above are; it is far less affected by foreign agencies, although Western literature has, in many ways, inspired its activities. South Korea's civil society interacted with external actors differently from the aforementioned countries which underwent democratisation during its transitional period.

Finally, South Korea is a post-transitional country facing external security threats from its neighbour to the North. Often, the country's full potential for democratisation is limited, as this external actor constantly threatens its stability. South Korea serves as a unique example of how domestic democratic forces work toward democratisation, despite constant tension due to security dilemmas.

Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation pertains to a very specific period, limited by the obligatory constraints placed upon any research aimed for the awarding of a doctoral degree. The author's fieldwork and data collection took place in January 2007 and between April 2007 and June 2007. Consequently, this dissertation does not fully capture changes in policy environments and civil society's engagement in social conflicts in South Korea that have proved to be of significant importance for the case study organisations since that time. The constraints of producing this thesis have also required the imposition of a 'cut-off point' to the literature, and the author has limited her literature reviews to materials published before June 2010. The only cited materials published after June 2010 are news items of significance to the case study organisations.

This dissertation consists of seven chapters, including an introduction and a conclusion. The second, third, and fourth chapters (Literature Review,

Methodology, and Historical Analysis) allow the author to present relevant conceptual frameworks utilised to investigate the core premises, and to elaborate on the relevant contexts that have guided the development of the core thesis. The fifth and sixth chapters (Presentation of Case Studies and Comparison of Case Studies) exhibit how South Korean civil society activists and active, politically conscious citizens interviewed during the fieldwork in 2007 manifest the aforementioned contexts and conceptual relevance in their narratives. Their views and thoughts are represented through the author's interpretations and interview excerpts. Individual interviewees' voices highlighted in these chapters are those the author found relevant to the core premises of this dissertation, and selected narratives are presented due to the limitation of the space. The concluding chapter summarises key issues that the author identified as most relevant in bringing together various components of the dissertation, and acknowledges the limits of this dissertation.

The following describes specific details of each chapter. Chapter two examines the conceptual assumptions that supported the development of the dissertation's research questions by reviewing the existing literature on civil society, democracy, and peace and conflict resolution. It reviews two influential democratic theories that have a deep impact on South Korea's collective discourses on the vision of its consolidated democracy: liberal democracy and participatory democracy. Specifically, the chapter discusses how each elaborates an ideal form of consolidated democracy and engages in democratic citizenship discourses. In addition, Chapter two reviews three main conceptual frameworks of civil society—liberal democracy, emancipation, and public sphere—to understand how each tradition helped South Korean civil society to

evolve throughout its modern history. Specifically, this chapter focuses on how these different theories conceptualise civil society's role in nurturing democratic citizenship.

Chapter two briefly reviews the existing conceptual framework for peace and conflict resolution, and explains the relevancy of this conceptual framework to understanding the South Korean PCR movement. In particular, this dissertation sides with the holistic view on conflict resolution, which includes "all process oriented activities aiming to address the underlying cause of direct, cultural, and structural violence" (Reimann, p.10-11). This broader approach was adopted because South Korean PCR activism emerged not only to transform the conflictual dynamics of immediate public policy disputes, but also to alter the long-term patterns of problem solving among civil society activists because of the country's historical legacy. Furthermore, this section presents a range of PCR activities in which civil society organisations engage.

Chapter three begins with the brief overview of case study methodology, credited for its strength in investigating how and why questions. Concurring with Bennett and George (2002), Verschuren (2003), and Yin (1989; 2003), this dissertation argues that a case study is a holistic research methodology suitable for looking at a few strategically selected cases occurring in specific contexts. The first section of Chapter 3 explains why the case study research strategy is considered most appropriate in conducting this dissertation, and how this methodological choice has shaped, guided, and influenced the overall research design. After reflecting upon the research methodology, Chapter 3 introduces the three case study subjects that will be the focus of this dissertation: School Making Peace (School Peace hereafter), a grassroots civil society association,

which emerged to address school violence through PCR education; Women Making Peace–Conflict Resolution Centre (WMP—CR Centre hereafter), a multi-purpose hybrid organisation which utilises conflict resolution services to advance the country's peace discourses and embed constructive problem-solving culture into society; and Peace Activist Network (PAN hereafter), a set of two ad-hoc coalitions that emerged in response to the global call to action on peace-building and conflict prevention, as well as with a view to developing peace discourses unique to South Korean contexts. By reflecting on Fast's (2003) article, the author presents the selection criteria used in choosing these case study organisations, and the criteria that are excluded.

Chapter three introduces the fieldwork that the author undertook in 2007 in order to collect the primary data, and shares the insights that the author gained during this period. Specifically, the author reflects upon power dynamics between interviewees and interviewers because of the cultural hierarchy and formality present in South Korean society, and contemplates the insider-outsider dynamics that the author experienced during her engagement with research subjects. This reflective section presents how the author has coped with practical and ethical dilemmas that she encountered, and illustrates her efforts in pursuit of insights into South Korean civil society. Finally, Chapter three presents how the author utilised interviews, observation, and documentation in collecting data, and the challenges that she faced in obtaining the information through these methods.

Chapter four is a review of South Korea's political history since the late nineteenth century, focusing on democratisation in detail. Specifically, this chapter is an examination of the extent to which civil society plays a role in

various stages of democratisation in South Korea. To begin, the first part of Chapter four explains the emergent context of civil society in South Korea, illustrating to what extent civil society in the country served as a space for resistance and struggles. Specifically, it highlights the last 100 years of challenges to democratisation efforts and contingent demands for developing a democratic practice in South Korea. This chapter further substantiates that the Gramcian emancipation vision endorsed by South Korean civil society activities is an inevitable product of the country's historical context, and that the emancipatory vision legitimized the civil society's antagonistic and conflictual dynamics with state apparatus, economic and political elites in the country.

The second part of Chapter four looks at South Korea's democratic transition in 1987, and the subsequent consolidation processes from 1987 to 2002, and examines the extent to which civil society plays a role in various stages of democratisation. This section highlights the rapidly changing political context in which South Korean civil society operates, and illustrates the evolving role of civil society.

The final section of Chapter four focuses on key challenges that South Korea faced in furthering democratic consolidation. It highlights the context in which PCR organisations have developed, and their evolving role in Korean civil society. Specifically, this section examines how social conflicts and civil society's role in this context have become problematical to policy makers, commentators, and civil society practitioners, and the responses that have resulted to resolve these conflicts. A comprehensive literature review of Korean political history and civil society movements, as well as interview transcripts from the 2007 field research, provide the foundation for Chapter four. Given the

impact of South Korean political history on the development of the country's civil society, a number of interviewees referred to historical incidents or their experiences with some of the critical historical moments.

Chapter five begins with the overview of PCR activism in South Korea, based upon the information collected throughout the field research and archival studies. This helps to provide the context in which the case study organisations operate, laying the groundwork for an in-depth presentation and analysis of individual case studies. Each case study presents the following information: two themes relevant to explaining the uniqueness of a particular case study organisation; background information and historical context; main activities undertaken; positive contributions of the activities or the organisation based upon interviewees' input and media analysis; and specific challenges the participants experienced in advancing an agenda of PCR after being engaged with an organisation.

Based on the findings of the case studies, Chapter six is a summary of the similarities and differences among the organisations. These comparisons are based upon four levels of analysis: organisational overview; reflection on conflict resolution and issue framing; interviewees' reflections on PCR activisms; and reflection on the democratic nurturing qualities of these organisations, as revealed during the interviews. Chapter six concludes with a critical reflection on the research findings and identifies the opportunities and challenges facing South Korea's PCR activism in pursuit of fortifying democratic consolidation.

The dissertation concludes with a short summary of the overall research, and acknowledges its limitations. The concluding chapter (seven) draws together and affirms constituent parts of the arguments presented in previous

chapters. Specifically, this chapter highlights three key findings that this dissertation identified through multiple case studies on three civil society organisations.

Potential Contribution

This thesis aims to provide a previously neglected critical eye to the contributions of the PCR movement to the development of South Korean civil society, where only a few case studies on this issue have been documented to date. This thesis helps enhance understanding of the PCR movement in South Korea including its emergent contexts, the framing of PCR issues, and their similarities and differences compared to existing PCR practices in North America. Further, this dissertation explores to what extent the PCR movement contributes to embedding democratic values, processes, and skills by looking at three case study entities in South Korea. In so doing, this thesis has the potential to form the bedrock for further study into the relatively under-investigated field of the role that civil society organisations engaged in PCR activism play in enhancing the democratic quality of a civil society in new democracies.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

This dissertation investigates three South Korean civil society groups engaging in PCR activities. The investigation explores to what extent the PCR movement contributes to embedding democratic norms, processes, and skills in Korean civil society. The PCR movement is a nascent phenomenon in South Korea that emerged in the country's post-transitional civil society. The civil society space in South Korea surfaced initially as a space for emancipation and for resistance against colonialism and authoritarianism, both of which repressed people's democratic desires. After the transition, the country's civil society embraced a range of functions that had been previously neglected. Yet, the author agrees with scholars such as Kim (2009) and Joo, Lee, and Jo (2006) who argue that one of the functions to which South Korean civil society has paid less attention is its role in embedding democratic norms and processes into civil society space and nurturing people's democratic habits and skills. Recently, nurturing civil society's democratic capacity and fostering democratic citizenship have become more important as the government has put more emphasis on creating a participatory democratic system in the country – an emphasis reflected in speeches and policy directives highlighted by South Korean political leadership (Lee, 2008).

A multiple layer of theoretical and conceptual assumptions about civil society, democracy, and PCR have guided the development of the central thesis of this dissertation and have shaped the author's interpretation of South Korean civil society and its interaction with peace and conflict resolution. This chapter reveals the conceptual assumptions that supported the development of

the dissertation’s research questions by reviewing the existing literature on civil society, democracy, and PCR. After briefly reviewing the notion of democratisation, the first section reviews two influential democratic theories that have a deep impact on South Korea’s collective discourses on the vision of its consolidated democracy: liberal democracy and participatory democracy. While theories of democratisation are less central to the core premise of this dissertation, they are helpful to understand the conditions affecting the process of democratisation. In reviewing two democratic theories, this section focuses on how each elaborates an ideal form of consolidated democracy and engages in democratic citizenship discourses. Given its prevalence in the field of democracy studies, liberal democratic theory has shaped the political thinking behind Korean political elites and influenced the country’s policies in reforming its institutions and rules (Kim, 2000; Lee, 2008). The participatory democracy theory, which this dissertation sees as a complement to a liberal democratic vision, is especially important in defining a core set of democratic norms, processes, and skills; this dissertation argues that the PCR movement in South Korea strengthens this core set.

The second section of this chapter begins by reviewing three main conceptual frameworks of civil society—liberal democracy, emancipation, and public sphere—to understand how each tradition helped South Korean civil society to evolve throughout its modern history. Furthermore, this section examines how these different theories conceptualise civil society’s role in nurturing democratic citizenship. The second section introduces how existing literature written by scholars and practitioners define actors in current civil society discourses. By paying attention to different forms of civil society entities

relevant to contemporary democracies, this section shows the relevancy of the more general categorisations to civil society actors in South Korea.

Finally, the third section reviews the existing conceptual framework for PCR and explains the relevancy of this conceptual framework to understanding the South Korean PCR movement. Further, this section presents a range of PCR activities in which civil society organisations engage. These comparisons with ideal types highlight the differences and similarities in the PCR movement that emerged in South Korean civil society space.

Democratisation

While each country embarks on different journeys toward democracy, democratic scholars have theorised preconditions of democratic transition. Potter (2005) summarises three main theoretical approaches explaining the triggers of democratisation: modernisation, political actors, and structural analysis.

First, contemporary academics influenced by modernisation, such as Diamond (1994) and Saxer (2002), emphasise the importance of socio-economic development and contend vibrant social and economic conditions have greatly contributed to democratic transitions in many countries, including those in East Asia. They also argue strong economic development has a positive effect on a country's political development as it fosters socio-political conditions conducive to democratisation including the growth of a middle class (Ahn & Jaung, 1999). According to this view, civil society is an outcome of this social, political, and economic modernisation. People power is a manifestation of a politicised middle class and an expression of the desire of newly emerging social actors for liberty and freedom (Diamond, 1994). While modernisation

theory explains certain aspects of some transitional countries with a certain level of economic development, such as South Korea, Taiwan, or Chile, it fails to explain other countries that do not necessarily experience rapid economic development during the time in which they begin a political transitional process, such as former Communist countries (Potter, 1997).

Second, the actor-oriented theory identifies domestic and international political conditions affecting the behaviours of political elites, and contends democratisation is closely linked to their decisions and actions. This theory challenges the assumption of modernisation theorists, that successful economic development creates an environment preferable for democracy. These theorists contend that understanding the behaviours of political elites helps to explain why some countries with similar economic development successfully transition to democracy and others do not. Huntington (1991), for example, focuses on the strategies, beliefs, and interests of elites and describes how such factors have affected processes of democratic transition and their respective effects on the future type of regime. He distinguishes three different transitional processes based upon the elite's actions: transformation, replacement, and trans-placement. Transformation occurs when the existing political elite takes the lead in restoring democracy, such as in Spain and Brazil. Replacement takes place when an opposition overthrows the existing regime, as seen in Romania or in the past democratisation attempts in South Korea between 1945 and 1948 and between 1960 and 1961. Trans-placement refers to a negotiated compromise between the regime and the opposition to establish democracy, as in the cases of South Korea in 1987, Uruguay, and Poland (Huntington, 1991).

As the theory puts a strong emphasis on political elites, scholars in this school of thought minimise the importance of the contribution of people power to the transition of third-wave democracies. Rather, theorists such as O’Donnell (1996) and Linz (2000) focus on political elites’ reactions to, or strategic alliance with, such mass mobilisations. When these theorists highlight civil society, they often spotlight radical oppositional political leaders who gained their power and legitimacy from these democratic movements and the grassroots political action of mass populations (Linz, 2000; O’Donnell, 1996). Despite its influence in the field of democratisation, the actor-oriented view is often criticised for its lack of attention to other actors in society, such as underground activists, trade unionists, and local religious leaders who are less visible than radical oppositional political figures (Potter, 2005). Although they acknowledge the importance of the institutional basis of effective democratic development, critics argue democratic transition requires more than agreements on democratic rules and norms among the political elite and must involve all levels of society, including civil society (Barber, 1984). However, despite their focus on political elites, Linz and Stepan (1996) acknowledge a macro-perspective that values the importance of citizens with attitudes congruent with democratic values and practices.

Third, scholars in the school of structural analysis explain that the changing structure of class, government, and external power influences democratisation, such as the emergence of a strong and conscious middle class, the change of state power as a result of violent conflict, and the end of the Cold War (Potter, 1997). Structural scholars also criticize the actor-oriented approach as it underestimates the effect of structural and international changes

on elite behaviour (Yeo, 2006). Regarding third-wave democracy, structural analysis offers a compelling explanation for the democratic transitional process, given its insights on transnational actors such as the United States and the former Soviet Union, and its insights on non-traditional domestic actors, such as middle class intelligentsia and underground activists.

While people power, oppositional movements, and economic development may play important roles, structural analysis scholars argue that such explanations lack a systematic approach to external influence (Yeo, 2006). Yeo (2006) argues that international actors played a significant role in changing power balance internally by shifting their political alliance or support, or affecting economic conditions in a country. For example, democratisation in Poland is closely related to the relative weakening and eventual disappearance of Soviet influence (Yeo, 2006). Similarly, the transition of South Korea was greatly affected when the US withdrew its blunt support for the military regime at the end of the Cold War (Yeo, 2006).

Mainstream democratisation theory sees institutional arrangements as the first step toward democratic transition. Yet, as Berhard and Karkoc (2007) rightly point out, a procedure-focused democratic transition neglects to address various issues arising in new democracies (e.g., the rise of nationalism, xenophobia, social exclusion, ethnic conflicts, and political apathy). While many new democracies have managed to prevent these negative legacies from being a source of violent conflict, some countries have failed to overcome these difficulties (Bogdanor, 1995). In response to socio-political problems that emerge after an initial transition[4], scholars suggest various strategies for

[4] It should be noted each country undergoing democratisation experiences a different timeframe within its unique political context. Countries experiencing totalitarianism or authoritarianism linked to violent conflict

democratic consolidation with a view to overcoming fragility and enhancing the sustainability and quality of democracy in newly democratic countries (Shonholtz, 1997). Influenced by their own theoretical interpretation of ideal democracy, scholars offer different normative frameworks for democratic consolidation in new democracies.

Theories of Democracy

Unlike a democratic transition that can define a point of completion, democratic consolidation is a continuous process by which a society collectively searches for ideal norms and institutions suitable to its citizens. The author agrees with Baker (2004) who argues that arbitrarily characterising a consolidated democracy also implicitly imposes the idea of a particular form of democracy and limits the political imagination of new democracies. This section will present two democratic theories, namely, liberal democracy and participatory democracy, as they are most relevant to understanding South Koreans' vision of consolidated democracy. Liberal democratic vision has played a prevalent role in shaping the country's democratic reform measures, which required institutional and legal changes, and it was deeply influential in the early stage of the country's democratic consolidation (Kim, 2000; Lee, 2008). Participatory democratic vision, on the other hand, resonates with civil society activists' visions of a consolidated democracy; this vision has gained momentum since the early 2000s, especially with the inauguration of President Roh Moo-Hyun who named his administration the '*Participatory Government – Chamyeo Jeongboo* (in Korean)' (Lee, 2008). This section specifically focuses on the vision of democratic citizenship proposed by these two theories.

---

require a more careful and long-term perspective in transitioning to democracy. A number of countries in this category are most vulnerable to returning to their authoritarian pasts during the transitional process (Lyons, 2002).

Participatory democracy literature on citizenship is particularly useful in defining a set of skills, norms, and processes that South Korean civil society space can foster.

Liberal Perspective on Democracy

The liberal tradition advocates pluralist democracy as the desirable end-goal of consolidation. It defines democracy as "a system that institutionalises competition among intermediary groups representing different and conflicting social interests through free and fair elections" (Linz & Stephan, 1996, p.3). As expressions of diverse interests are common in a democratic polity, the liberal vision emphasises the importance of adhering to democratic norms to prevent the expression of different views from turning into violent tensions between interest groups (Dixon & Senese, 2002). As Dixon and Senese (2002) point out, when there is no mutual agreement to follow procedures and practices that constructively channel differences, factions and interests inevitably collide in the public realm. Thus, it is of critical importance to develop democratic institutions and procedures that will facilitate and manage the competing interests of diverse social groups constructively (Dixon & Senese, 2002; Inglehart & Welzel, 2008; Ury, 2001). This perspective of consolidated democracy, therefore, aims at fully embedding liberal values into all social, political, and economic institutions, rules, and procedures (Dahl, 2000).

Despite its emphasis on free and fair elections, the liberal tradition contends democracy extends beyond integral free elections, competing parties, and responsible politicians (Rose & Shin, 1999). Expanding citizen participation in a political process is democracy's raison d'être as pluralist democracy is devised to protect people from the tyranny of the powerful who often interfere

with people's full exercise of citizenship (Dahl, 2000). Rose and Shin (2001, p. 334) further articulate this view by emphasising development of institutional attributes and procedures to ensure different groups in society have access to the political system. In addition, the liberal tradition recognises the fragility of a democratic system in the absence of citizens and political actors who are willing to accept democratic procedures and rules (Dixon & Senese, 2002). Thus, the liberal tradition contemplates how to enhance citizens' political competency and inculcate values that contribute to the functioning and sustaining of a liberal democratic system.

This dissertation pays particular attention to one of the most influential conceptual frameworks developed in this area: civic culture. Defined as "attitudes toward the political system and its various parts and attitudes toward the self in the system" (Almond & Verba, 1963, 13), civic culture is maintained by democratic citizens. Docherty, Goodlad, and Paddison (2001) rightly summarises that the core characteristics of civic culture constitute the liberal vision of democratic citizenship and that a set of virtues essential in democratic citizenship facilitate the integration of citizens into liberal democratic procedures and institutions. In this context, the liberal vision outlines the following set of democratic citizenship characteristics that would benefit the democratic consolidation process: citizens who would participate in civic affairs and civil society (*civic participation*); citizens who would possess *civic competence* in order to undertake roles in society to influence public policy processes; citizens who would have a sense of *political efficacy* by understanding the impacts of political events and activities; and citizens who would embrace a sense of *civic duty* for community affairs (Almond & Verba, 1963; Sapsford, 1999). To this end,

civil society is an important institution to facilitate citizens' learning for democratic citizenship and to nurture civic culture as it helps to spread democratic norms and attitudes among citizens (Diamond, 1994; Edwards, 2004, Markoff, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996).

In the last fifteen years, the liberal democratic view has prevailed and influenced the democratic consolidation process of various third-wave countries including South Korea. As mentioned above, South Korea's close relationship with the U.S. influenced its initial democratic transition, which followed a path to liberal democracy in terms of institutional reforms, strong emphasis on independent judiciaries, and focus on the electoral process (Carothers, 1999; Kim, 2000; Lee, 2008). The incorporation of the liberal democratic vision has strengthened South Korea's capacity to address a range of issues that emerged during the democratic transitional process (Shin, 2005). However, despite its strengths to support institutional reforms, the liberal vision invites a number of criticisms (Barber, 1985; Beetham, 1997). Korean scholars, civil society activists, and commentators echo the main criticisms against the liberal democratic vision (Kim, 2000).

First, liberal democracy assumes all social groups with conflicting interests have equal access to the political stage and ignores the structured privileges of certain groups built into the society. A number of theorists attribute the lack of citizen participation to its optimism toward the market economy and its underestimation of the existing power relationships in society (Beetham, 1997). Particularly, the uncritical association between market economy and liberal democracy has raised questions over whether liberal democracy is in fact a

system ruled by all of the people (Barber, 1985; Beetham, 1997). Barber (1985) summarises this point eloquently:

> (Liberal representative) democracy is deficient because it relies on the fictions of free market and of the putative freedom and equality of bargaining agents; because it cannot generate public thinking or public ends of any kind; because it is innocent about the real world of power and because it uses the representative principles. (Barber, 1985, p.132)

In other words, liberal democracy raises economic liberty over political equality, and it is apathetic to the structural inequality affecting citizens' meaningful participation in political activities. Neo-Marxist socialist thinkers such as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) strongly advocate this view. They assert liberal democracy and its alliance with the market economy creates oppressive power relations prohibiting a majority of individuals in certain classes from participating in the political process in a meaningful way (Laclau & Mouffe,1985; Sekhon,1999).

Second, as participatory democracy proponents including McPherson (1972) and Pateman (1970) further point out, liberal democracy fails to motivate citizens toward participating in a political process. Liberal democrats such as Diamond (1994) argue that institutional foundations and fair political procedures are beneficial to citizens since they aim to enhance citizen participation in the democratic political process. In contrast to such assumptions, citizens in liberal democracies are, in reality, restricted in exercising their rights to participation in political spaces (McPherson,1972; Pateman,1970). Theorists including Scaff (1975) and Gordon (2001) have identified a number of factors contributing to such problems, such as the bureaucratic and complex nature of contemporary political issues, a sense of alienation, a lack of trust in political parties and leaders, a lack of political knowledge and competence, and powerlessness.

Feeling disempowered and sceptical of their ability to influence political decision-making and political discourse, citizens may withdraw from the political process in order to demonstrate their frustration and dissatisfaction (Gordon, 2001).

Even in many new democracies including South Korea, participation in elections and trust in political institutions quickly diminish (Howard, 2003; Kim, 2009). While the introduction of liberal democracy opens up the space for free expression and liberalises various aspects of political society to a great degree, it does not provide a solution to the problem of limited mass participation in the democratic process. As a result, many new democracies often report the problem of the masses continuing to feel disempowered in the democratic process (Howard, 2003). In the case of South Korea, the decline of citizen participation in the political process became an issue in the mid 2000s, and this trend is reflected in the low turnout of voters in various elections (Kim, 2006; Kim, 2009; Song, 2007; Suh, 2006).

Third, critics such as Barber (1984) challenge the validity of a liberal democratic claim on its strong ability to manage competing values and interests constructively. Liberal democracy's procedural emphasis is effective in managing the competing interests of the political and economic elite, but this does not extend to addressing those of citizens. Particularly, theorists from the tradition of participatory democracy contend a system of conflict mitigation under liberal democracy is limited to competing values expressed in a politically organised manner, thus ignoring conflicts at the community level (Dryzek, 2002). For example, liberal democratic procedures and rules are helpful in addressing the issue of rising nationalism or xenophobia in both developed and transitional

democracies by establishing institutional mechanisms to prevent any racially motivated discrimination or crimes (Shonholtz, 1997). Yet, such institutional arrangements are not necessarily equipped to handle contentious behaviours often witnessed at the community level. People at the grassroots level rarely have opportunities to examine issues and identify ways to resolve them within their own communities (Mayer, 2004). Rather, people are often informed of decisions that have already been made by political leaders and asked to respect them.

A source of conflict is merely suppressed within legal boundaries, but not effectively managed, thus leaving a strong possibility that political leaders can exploit such issues at a later stage (Shonholtz, 1997). This explains to some degree why many new democracies struggle to maintain political and social stability after the introduction of liberal democracy. The emergence of social conflicts and public policy disputes in South Korea since the late 1990s in part exemplifies that institutional mechanisms alone cannot effectively address people's concerns (Chang, Kim, Kim, & Moon, 2005). Specifically, community members entrapped in social conflicts in South Korea often argue that the system in place privileges those with knowledge of how to utilise such measures to resolve conflicts (Park et al, 2006).

Despite its shortcomings, liberal democratic theory provides one of the most comprehensive explanations of how democratic ideals can be realised through a centralised political structure. In South Korea, the incorporation of institutional reforms based upon the liberal vision has certainly contributed to developing the basic social and political infrastructure needed to maintain a functioning democratic society that respects individual rights and promotes

economic development. Without emphasising institutional reforms and strengthening democratic rules and regulations, citizens would not be able to express their views in a more organised manner and would not be able to develop a certain level of confidence in the country's governing system.

Participatory Perspective on Democracy

The theory of participatory democracy emerged as an alternative vision to liberal democracy and contends that participation is at the core of democratic values and practices (McCowan, 2006; Pateman, 1970). Maintaining a critical perspective towards the liberal vision, proponents of participatory democracy, such as Bowman (2000), Fisher (2004), Pateman (1970), and Rosenberg (2003), contend that the liberal democratic political model and its strong emphasis on representation through political parties and elections has neglected to foster a system conducive to citizen participation. Pateman (1970) argues that there is a great need to devise a process that motivates private individuals to have ownership over decisions affecting their lives through active participation. In her view, the liberal notion of democracy simply reinforces the existing social order and impedes genuine democratisation of society, which promotes the good of the community (Pateman, 1970). From the participatory democratic perspective, democratic consolidation should put a greater focus on strengthening citizen participation.

In order to deepen democracy and overcome the participatory deficiency of liberal democracy, participatory theorists, including Dryzek (1994), Roberts (2004), and Rosenberg (2003) call for a system that better facilitates the authentic participation of citizens in the political system. They emphasise the need for building a deliberative decision-making procedure at various levels of

society including at a grassroots level. Wood (2003) supports this argument, contending that mass participation through deliberative decision-making mechanisms is at the core of creating meaningful democracy. A public deliberative process is designed to focus on particular needs and issue-specific networks, rather than on general values and is often localised in order to overcome the practical difficulty of bringing relevant stakeholders (both individuals and groups) together (Dryzek, 1994; Rosenberg, 2003). Deliberative processes provide a space where citizens can discuss issues affecting their lives and can make decisions on possible solutions (Dryzek, 2000). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, civil society activists and policy makers in South Korea increasingly called for a mechanism based upon strong citizen participation to integrate citizen perspectives in decision-making processes (Park, 2004). In this context, local municipalities welcome the introduction of deliberative frameworks as ways to sustain grassroots democracy and to address public policy debates in the country (Ha, 2003; Park, 2004).

In the process of creating a participatory mode of democracy, participatory democrats such as Rosenberg (2003) explain that positive development takes place in relation to the society's conflict resolution and problem-solving capacity and citizen empowerment. First, as argued by Barber (1984), citizen participation is a critical element of the problem-solving aspect of democratic polity because it "creates a political community capable of transforming dependent private individuals into free citizens and partial and private interest into public goods" (Barber, 1984, p.151). Barber continued to emphasise the conflict-transformative ability of participatory democracy because such a democracy "develops a politics that can transform conflict into cooperation

through citizen participation, public deliberation, and civic education" (Barber, 1984, p.135). Especially, public deliberation processes serve to address conflicting social issues at the grassroots or local level because they are inclusive processes of dialogue designed "to facilitate mutual understanding and informed agreement, in which participants are free from coercion and manipulation and are free to express their genuine views" (Dryzek, 2002, p.43). To integrate fully the problem solving mechanism at the grassroots level, participatory democratic theorists such as Dryzek (1990), Rosenberg (2003), and Bowman (1998; 2000) advocate citizen virtues suitable for vibrant political culture. They argue citizens are required to learn to articulate their positions and views while taking into consideration the rights of others and respecting common visions (Bowman, 1998; Drysek, 1990). Participatory democracy requires "a political culture and corresponding structures that would enable citizens to retrieve information, to develop and advance positions on issues affecting their lives and to take part in debate" (Sekhon, 1999, p.8).

Second, a participatory mode of democracy cannot function without empowered citizens who are autonomous and democratic. For example, in order to take part in a localised decision making process, citizens are required to increase their knowledge of the political process and learn the necessary information to judge and deliberate upon the public affairs affecting their lives (Drysek, 1990). A deliberative framework requires a much higher level of civic competence and political efficacy than does the liberal vision. Barber (1984) explains the empowerment of citizens through participatory democracy as follows:

> Civic activity educates individuals how to think publicly as citizens, even as citizenship informs civic activity with the required sense of publicness and

> justice. Politics becomes its own university, citizenship its own training ground and participation its own tutor. (Barber, 1984, p.152)

Given the interconnectedness of empowered citizens and their effective participation in democratic processes, theorists such as Bowman (2000), Dryzek (2000), and Rosenberg (2003) deeply value the quality of democratic citizenship. This dissertation pays particular attention to the specific qualities of democratic citizenship that participatory democracy delineates because these qualities are particularly relevant in facilitating citizens' effective and constructive participation in the civil society space. Additionally, the characteristics underpinning democratic citizenship are also complementary to a set of citizen virtues outlined by liberal democrats such as Almond and Verba (1963). As mentioned above, the liberal democratic discourse emphasizes citizens' procedural and institutional knowledge as core elements of democratic citizenship. For example, citizens are encouraged to possess civic competence, which includes knowledge about the political system and its leaders, civic skills, and democratic attitudes such as tolerance, compromise, and respect for rules (Sapsford, 1999). While embracing all of the aforementioned virtues valued in the liberal tradition, the core virtue of the participatory vision further specifies what it means for citizens to engage in a deliberative process.

As Kymlicka explained (2002, p.289), citizens in participatory democracy are asked to be willing to "engage in a conversation and to continue the conversation." In order to stay engaged in a public discourse, participatory democrats such as Dryzek (1994) and Galston (1991) emphasise virtues such as respect for difference, tolerance, and empathy as key elements for ensuring meaningful citizen involvement in the decision-making process. Tolerance is a

basic element of democratic citizenship in participatory democracy, as individuals with that virtue recognise others are entitled to contribute to decision-making processes (Scanlon, 2000). To engage in a participatory process (as opposed to strategic bargaining or other kinds of purely self-interested exchanges), citizens must attempt genuinely “to understand the perspectives of those with whom one is deliberating and to want to reach agreement with them” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1997, p.32).

Further, Dryzek (1994) contends citizens who are engaged in a democratic political process should listen as well as speak, seek to understand what others say, and respond respectfully to the views of others. Such attitudes, it has been proposed, will be developed when individuals are willing to accept the mutual reasonableness of others (Gutmann & Thompson, 1997). Similarly, Galston (1991, p.227) notes the virtue of citizenship in public discourse includes the willingness to listen seriously “to a range of views which will include ideas the listener is bound to find strange and even obnoxious”.

Bowman (1997) describes how active participation contributes to fostering democratic citizenship, thus strengthening democracy’s deepening consolidation process in society. Kymlica (2002) argues private individuals gain such democratic virtues or skills through an active, authentic political participatory process. At the same time, this presupposes that effective political participation is virtually impossible without virtuous, engaged citizens who work toward enlightened understanding of public affairs or common political issues. Thus, Rosenberg (2003) highlighted the urgency to engage citizens to be prepared for the participatory process through a wide variety of formal and non-formal educational activities. He summarises his argument thus:

> It is not enough to think of citizen deliberation as a venue for inclusive, equal participation in what will naturally be collective decision-making. Deliberative arrangements must also be designed as pedagogical devices for fostering the capacity for personal autonomy and constructive interpersonal relations that the governance of the lives of real people requires. (Rosenberg, 2003, p.15)

In the context of democratisation, such arguments often legitimise various capacity-building programmes targeting civil society groups, youths, and the marginalised population. In South Korea, such efforts are surfacing and this dissertation argues that the PCR movement in the country is one such example.

Despite its growing importance, critics such as Posner (2003) challenge its applicability to new democracies, as well as existing democracies where democratic culture has been more firmly integrated. First, critics such as Posner (2003) question the practical applicability of core participatory ideals in the context of modern, complex societies and their challenges. While it provides a valuable alternative perspective on democratic theories, its practical relevance as a political framework at the level of the nation-state appears to be relatively low (Posner, 2003). Specifically, the theory of participatory democracy emphasises individuals must have equal access to ‘epistemological’ and ‘substantial’ information, in order to engage fully in a participatory process. Yet given the complex nature and variety of knowledge modern democracies need to deal with, it raises the question of whether individuals will have enough time and resources to absorb such knowledge while pursuing their own individual day-to-day activities. Thus, how such an ideal could be integrated into a larger political system needs further elaboration. Previously, participatory democracy has figured in grassroots settings such as participatory budgeting in Brazil, yet there has not yet been a participatory democratic regime at the national level. In the context of South Korea, a public deliberation process was introduced to

respond to a particular public policy dispute, rather than being utilised as a proactive form of governance (Park et al., 2006).

Second, critics such as Mouffe (1999) question whether it is practical to integrate the system of deliberation to newly democratised countries deeply divided along ethnic, religious, and cultural lines (Mouffe, 1999). Participatory democrats assume citizens will be willing to engage in difficult issues and will be committed to solving them for the benefit of common values. However, in a society where a strong identity affects one's interests and political position, direct communicative action among citizens can escalate existing social tensions. Mobilisation of the civil society for particular issues can serve to reinforce identity politics (Berman, 1997). For this reason, critics caution that it is premature for new democratic states to integrate a strong element of deliberation until citizens are ready to embrace basic democratic values. In part, conservative commentators in South Korea such as Kim (2006) argue that the rise of conflictual dynamics, social conflicts, and public policy disputes is related to the rapid expansion of a deliberative space without preparing citizens. Instead of focusing on the public good and common interest, parties in a deliberative process often resort to identity politics, making it extremely difficult to arrive at a mutually convenient solution (Park et al, 2006). A case in point was illustrated in Park (2006)'s essay that outlines her experience as a co-facilitator for a public policy dispute related to local development and dam construction.

Third, while participatory democratic theorists emphasise the importance of citizen participation and the quality of democratic citizenship, there is a dearth of information regarding how citizens obtain such virtues. The theory

often highlights democratic citizenship as the outcome of active civic engagement. Often, it is assumed citizens will embrace democratic citizenship and its core virtues as long as there is an equitable system allowing individuals access to necessary information. In order for the theory to be more practical, it needs to provide a much more concrete theoretical vision of how these virtues can be developed and a more specific indication of institutions or circumstances that best nurture such conditions. This dissertation is an attempt to explore whether the PCR movement in South Korea can serve as a practical solution to address such challenges.

Despite the limits, in the context of democratisation, the participatory theory offers a holistic approach to democratic transition and consolidation, as it calls for greater involvement of citizens in the political process and explores ways to engage citizens at all levels of society, including grassroots communities, regional municipalities, and national political systems. In particular, in the context of South Korea, participatory democracy serves as a valuable framework in engaging citizens, strengthening communities, and encouraging grassroots democracy (Ha, 2003; Kim, 2006).

This section reviews the theories of liberal and participatory democracy, and examines their complementary aspects. This dissertation maintains that an emphasis on citizen participation in the deliberative process does not contradict or undermine the core elements of liberal democracy: the representative system, respect for the rule of law, and various institutional and procedural aspects of democratic practices. Understanding these two theories has been particularly useful in identifying a set of norms, values, and skills to be diffused into civil society space. The theoretical elaboration of both perspectives begins with the

quest to find how their systems can better facilitate citizens' meaningful encounter with the political and democratic processes. Thus, citizen participation in a public sphere is at the centrepiece of democratic consolidation. These two theories argue that civil society brings citizens together in a public space and serves as a pedagogical utility to educate citizens to be better participants of a participatory process (Rosenberg, 2003).

To facilitate citizen participation effectively and to create a safe space for civic engagement, both theories articulate certain virtues that citizens in a democratic polity should embrace. Tolerance for difference and respect for diverse opinions are commonly required virtues. Without the willingness of citizens to adhere to tolerance and diversity, both liberal rules and participatory mechanisms cannot effectively function. The participatory views presented above suggest how one's tolerance can manifest in practice such as empathetic listening. Closely connected to tolerance for difference, both theories encourage citizens to engage in dialogue and solve differences through conversations. While the liberal theorists advocate this in abstract terms, the participatory theorists contribute to devising institutional mechanisms that further motivate citizens to address public issues in dialogue. For example, many procedures introduced in advanced democracies such as alternative dispute mechanisms and third-party mediation are inspired by the participatory vision that aims to overcome the liberal vision's weakness in handling community problems. Both theories further imply that citizens' participation must be facilitated in a non-violent and constructive manner. Based upon the understanding of liberal and participatory democracy theories, this dissertation will define a set of democratic norms, values, and skills that a post-democratic civil society in South Korea

should facilitate: a) commitment to non-violent; b) constructive problem solving; c) commitment to engaging in a difficult conversation; and d) commitment to tolerance and respect for diverse opinions.

Civil Society in Democracy and Democratisation

Since the late 1980s, when democratisation took place in different parts of the world, interest in the study of civil society has increased among academics including those in South Korea. Broadly understood as *a "*sociological counterpart of the market in the economic sphere and to (liberal) democracy in the political sphere*",* the term *civil society* has emerged as one of the most important prisms through which to examine social and political changes in transitional democracies (White, 2004, p.6). Despite the increased interest in the subject over the last two decades, civil society remains a highly contested concept without an established definition (Heinrich, 2005). The following section first discusses the different usages of the term 'civil society' to understand better various ideals that are attached to the term. It considers how this term is influenced by the different theories of democracy examined above, and explores how civil society is understood to contribute to fostering democratic citizenship. Then, the section presents four different forms of civil society actors frequently referenced in democratisation literature, and discusses how they are situated to the South Korean civil society space.

Theories of Civil Society: Liberal and Alternative Discourse

Two different intellectual Western traditions elucidate the concept of civil society as applied to socio-political changes. The first is a liberal democratic – mainstream approach inspired by Alexis de Tocqueville's writings on democracy. Tocqueville (1956, p. 229) defined civil society as an entity distinct

from the state and political parties "in which the art of association takes place among people of all ages, all conditions and all dispositions". Praising it as a solution to prevent the tyranny of the state, he contended a robust and diverse civil society permits "the delimitation of government prerogatives" and creates "a context for constraining arbitrary or intrusive state power" (Tocqueville, 1956, p. 230). Furthermore, Tocqueville (1956) asserted civil society served as an important arena in which democratic values could be modelled, pressuring the state to follow suit.

Recent liberal democratic literature on democratisation reflects Tocqueville's ideas on civil society. Civil society is an autonomous realm bounded by a set of shared rules comprising voluntary associations, organisations, movements, and networks engaged in collective action (Diamond, 1994; Edwards, 2004). In relation to democratisation, liberal democratic scholars such as Diamond (1994) and Grugel (2002) have highlighted the following two functions of civil society. First, civil society, more precisely, an aggregation of (voluntary) civil associations, serves as an important supporting structure for existing (liberal) democracy at the institutional level. As an aid to the state, civil society helps to improve democratic governance by reducing the load the state carries, addressing concrete social problems, and checking the abuse of state power (Diamond, 1994; Grugel, 2002).

Second, civil society exists as a vital space for ordinary citizens to develop skills and habits that are beneficial to democratic development (Finkel, 2003). In the 1960s, based upon empirical research on four countries, Almond and Verba (1963) argued that civil society is a space for democratic learning, as participation in secondary, non-political associations positively affects the

development of civic competence. More recently, Putnam (1993) presented the positive effect of civil society on democracy through his research paradigm on social capital, a concept based upon the premise that social networks have values that benefit society's overall development. The theory of social capital endorsed the idea that all institutions within civil society operate "in ways that reinforce positive social norms such as tolerance, non-discrimination, trust and cooperation", all of which are important elements of democratic consolidation (Edwards, 2004, p.76).

As previously stated, South Korea neglected the democratic educational function of civil society that the liberal democratic vision advocates partially due to South Korean civil society activists' ambivalence towards the liberal vision, which trivialised the discourse generational function of civil society and institutionalised civil society as apolitical space to support the status quo (Kim, 2000). Nonetheless, with the proceeding of democratic consolidation, South Korean civil society activists are increasingly reflective of their dilemmas as they outline in later chapters in this dissertation. The civil society space, which they operate, is constantly interacting with the political society (governments, parliaments, and other governing institutions), which is highly influenced by the liberal democratic vision (Kim, 2009). Further, as a result of the influence of the liberal democratic vision in the country, these activists witnessed a range of civil society associations including apolitical organisations, voluntary associations, and conservative (defined as counter-movement by the country's civil society actors) groups gaining further strengths in the civil society space (Kim, 2009). Reflecting upon the plurality within the country's civil society, South Korean civil society practitioners began to engage more in civil society's democratic

educative function and contemplated how to make their activism more relevant to fostering democratic citizenship (Park, 2007). This is the nucleus of this dissertation.

The tension between South Korean activists' reluctance to embrace the liberal vision of civil society fully and their desire to nurture citizenship begs a question. Why do civil society activists experience such dilemmas, and what conceptual framework could facilitate civil society's attempt to mediate both of their desires? The author argues that reviewing the emancipation framework of civil society provides answers to the first question and that a better understanding of the public sphere discourse on civil society at least partially answers the second question.

The emancipation framework of civil society is influenced by the work of Antonio Gramsci, and it values the liberating potential of civil society. In modern capitalist society, dominant groups maintain their positions through the state's coercive power and hegemony, the capacity of dominant classes to persuade subordinate ones to accept, adopt and internalise their values and norms (Cox, 1999). Like the political society, civil society, an entity existing between the economy and the state, reflects the existing social order. Yet, by virtue of being independent of the state and separated from the market, civil society has the potential for the development of counter-hegemony narratives, expressed through the competition of ideas (Cox, 1999). The emancipation vision contends that civil society provides different groups with an opportunity to participate in forming and disseminating their messages to pursue the collective good. Thus, it serves as an emancipatory sphere in which the poor, the exploited, the voiceless, and the marginalised can engage in battles against the

dominant hegemonic power and attain social and political transformation (Ehrenberg, 1999).

The role of democratic citizens in the Gramscian vision is to contribute to building up a counter hegemony that challenges the status quo creating oppressive social and economic dynamics. The emancipation vision maintains a rather ambivalent approach to the democratic citizenship that the liberal vision endorses, given its role in reinforcing dominant hegemony in society (Smyth, 1989). To become an active agent of social change, the Gramscian vision challenges people to develop their own, what he terms “organic intellectuals,” to counteract conservative ideologies, and urges them to maintain the active, critical engagement in practical life “as constructor, organiser, permanent persuader, and not just simple orator” (Gramsci, 1970, p.10).

In democratisation literature, the Gramscian notion of civil society is credited with providing an intellectual rationale for oppositional movements fighting against authoritarianism and militarism (Arato & Cohen, 1994; Kean, 1988). The emancipation vision inspired numerous intellectuals throughout the late twentieth century and challenged individuals to engage in real life issues in a critical manner with one’s heightened awareness and consciousness of the oppressive social structure that perpetuate inequality and injustice. The Gramscian vision has been particularly influential in shaping the civil society discourses in South Korea. Intellectually, mainstream civil society scholars and prominent activists in South Korea are highly sympathetic to Gramsci’s vision (Chang, 2000; Kim & Kim, 2001; Kim, 1991; Lee, 1998; Moon, 1994; Moon, 2002). This is closely linked to the historical context in which the country’s civil society developed.

Civil society in South Korea emerged in the early 20th century. It subsequently served as a primary space for oppositional struggles against the authoritarian regimes, economic elites closely tied to state apparatus, and colonial/neo-imperial power (Hahm, 1997). In such historical context, South Korean civil society's relationship with the state or other status-quo institutions in society had been mostly characterised as antagonistic and confrontational, and civil society activists focused to increase individuals' political and class consciousness around the oppression perpetuated by a series of authoritarian rules in the country (Kim, 2000). The oppositional civil society in South Korea and its persistent struggles are credited for triggering the democratic transition in 1987 and for making the early transitional process more vibrant.

Due to civil society's historic contributions to the country's democratic transition, South Korean activists took great pride in engaging in a space that could transform the power dynamics of the society (Joo et al., 2006). Thus, even after the 1987 democratic transition, civil society activists in the country continued to emphasise the resistance and emancipatory capacity of civil society, and such vision guided their activism. As Kim and Kim (2001) pointed out in their critical reviews on civil society studies in South Korea, civil society is often interchangeable with terms such as "civil movement" and "(social) movement organisations", implying its strong connection to emancipation. Further, in a recent study on the status of South Korean civil society, Joo et al. (2006) noted that the civil society and civil society activists expressed their strong preference to preserve civil society as an emancipatory space that pursued progressive social change and sought to advance public interests.

Despite the important contribution that the emancipation vision has made in shaping the civil society agenda and in generating critical democratic debates, this dissertation concurs with the concerns voiced by academics such as Kim and Kim (2001) and Joo et al. (2006). They argued that looking at South Korean civil society through the Gramscian framework limits the scope and reach of civil society research in the country. Firstly, relying on one particular conceptual vision inevitably excludes organisations and activities perceived to be contradictory to progressive social, economic, and political ideals. While the majority of civil society space is taken up by casual social groups (i.e. leisure, sports, and alumni clubs), these apolitical social groups that sprang up after the transition were less focused by both scholars and activists in South Korea due to these organisations' lack of willingness to politicise their constituents (Joo et al., 2006). Additionally, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, many civic organisations sympathetic to conservative political parties and nationalist ideology emerged; yet, the dominant civil society conceptual framework in South Korea treats these entities as reactionary movements and inhibits constructive engagement with these groups (Kim, 2009). Secondly, this dissertation contends that, in addressing critical issues, the emancipation vision has implicitly encouraged civil society to create and escalate conflictual dynamics that contribute to producing and reinforcing oppressive and unjust social structures. The emancipation view inadvertently contributes to the neglect of the processes, values, and skills that civil society can utilise to diffuse tensions and conflictual dynamics among civil society actors in order to contribute to establishing a collaborative, democratic civil society space,

especially when one engages with those within the ‘oppressors’ group (Lee, 2007).

Another influential alternative perspective on civil society is the public sphere school of thought influenced by the work of Jurgen Habermas. Civil society, as the public sphere, is a space containing institutions and practices that exist between the private interests of everyday life and the realm of state power, where the processes of unconstrained communication take place (Habermas, 1984). In this discursive arena, arguments are raised in order to articulate the themes and topics worthy of public discussion. When it is weak, civil society becomes a social space in which individuals gather to discuss their common public affairs. On the other hand, the strong public sphere does not merely encourage the formation of public opinion on common concerns; it also serves as a participatory space for the democratic process. This is because the public sphere contains the transformative potential to promote societal democratisation and to reshape political society to be more responsive (Habermas, 1984).

Within the literature on democratisation, the public sphere approach provides a normative basis for people to be engaged and to rejuvenate a more inclusive and egalitarian grassroots democracy – an alternative to liberal, procedural democracy. The public sphere vision embraces the participatory democrats’ democratic citizenship vision. Nonetheless, surprisingly, there have been relatively few efforts to apply the public sphere vision of Habermas to understand South Korean civil society[5]. This dissertation contends that the public sphere framework can serve as an important additional theoretical lens to

[5] CSO14 (Personal interview, 14 May 2007) indicated that the public sphere framework was considered by progressive scholars and activists to be a political conservative analytical tool to examine the South Korean civil society.

explore South Korean civil society and its contribution to the country's democratic consolidation and deepening processes. The dissertation proposes that the public sphere framework appreciates civil society's discourse-generating capacity to bring about transformative social change without rejecting inclusiveness and liberal democratic values. Within the public sphere framework, civil society is a discursive and democratic participatory space, which facilitates individual expression of ideas and views worthy of public discussion (Habermas, 1984).

Although each theory differs in its interpretation of citizen participation in a democratic polity, both liberal and public sphere discourses on civil society agree on civil society's educational effect on citizens' democratic skills and overall democratisation. Theorists in the mainstream and alternative schools of thought contend civil society provides citizens an opportunity to interact and freely express their views. By continuously engaging in such space, people obtain democratic skills and knowledge. However, such theoretical assumptions require much more elaboration when they are applied to new democracies, as they underestimate the difficulty many citizens in new democracies experience when they begin to participate in a political space (Shonholtz, 1997). In new democracies, many people remember that their democratic habits and skills, for example, freedom of expression or right to organize, have been long suppressed. Often some of these democratic qualities have caused personal danger and threatened one's well-being. Such a legacy deeply affects people's attitudes and competency. Even after political changes, attitudes and behaviours are not easily altered. Furthermore, without instilling the values and skills required to practice their rights and responsibilities, people can turn a civil

society into a space where uncivil forces can mobilize to silence minority views, as was the case in post-World War I Germany and in many divisive societies in the 1990s where grassroots youth movements turn into chauvinistic, xenophobic phenomena (Berman, 1997). This is precisely where conflict resolution methods can play a positive role in new democracies.

Throughout South Korean political history, as presented above, the emancipation vision had guided the development of civil society discourses in the country. In this dissertation, the emancipation vision will serve only to understand the historical context of civil society; it will be less utilised in analysing organisations featured in the field research because of the ambivalence of the vision towards PCR activism. Instead, this dissertation interprets case study organisations based upon the liberal vision of civil society, and their discourse formation capacity and critical distance from the liberal democratic value will be examined through the public sphere framework. By serving as a space to allow diverse views to be expressed, civil society ultimately contributes to enhancing the existing liberal democratic system and facilitates the meaningful participation of citizens in newly democratised states. By utilising the combination of the public sphere and liberal frameworks, this dissertation reviews the processes in which South Korean civil society engage to embed democratic norms and skills that are central to enhancing civil society's ability to generate discourse in a constructive and democratic way and to deepen meaningful citizen participation.

The combination of these two theoretical lenses provides this dissertation with an opportunity to apply less examined civil society theory to understand South Korean civil society's activities in support of strengthening civil society's

capacity to nurture democratic norms, values, skills, and processes. Embracing the public sphere and the liberal democratic vision of civil society does not reject nor undermine the important contribution made by civil society activism inspired by the emancipatory vision. Rather, these alternative conceptual frameworks help to bear witness to micro-level changes that civil society organisations have brought about to strengthen citizen participation and to embed a collaborative, democratic civil society.

Civil society in Practice: Organisations and Activities

Based upon the theoretical frameworks outlined above, the following section discusses how civil societies manifest in modern democracy by examining their organisational structures and the types of activities in which they engage. Although civil society covers a wide range of actors and activities, civil society studies often focus on a particular segment of civil society. Such a narrow focus is necessary, especially when examining civil society organisations' contribution to political development in new democracies. Among various entities in civil society, this dissertation introduces four different types of actors in civil society, chosen because they are relevant to explaining the current composition of the South Korean civil society as well as its past actors: voluntary associations, social movement networks, non-governmental organisations, and multi-purpose hybrid organisations.

First, inspired by Tocqueville and further popularized by Putnam, voluntary associations refer to associations run voluntarily by interested citizens. Embedded strongly within North American political contexts, voluntary associations are at the core of democratic citizenship. As rightly pointed out by Paffenholz and Spurk (2006), voluntary associations provide space for civic

engagement, thus contributing to producing social capital, a vital element for fostering collective trust and vibrant democratic civil society. Voluntary associations are horizontal and network-based in principle as they differ from professional interest groups or non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which have much more rigid organisational structures and hierarchies. Voluntary associations exist at the grassroots level and include church groups, neighbour associations, community groups, and social clubs.

Within the North American political context, voluntary associations do not engage in activities that challenge the state. However, in developing countries, voluntary associations are a mix of apolitical groups and politically motivated entities. For example, in countries that have transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy, voluntary associations are divided into two types: state-administered voluntary associations that often serve to advance the state's authoritarian propaganda; and other voluntary associations that tend to be community organisations of a local and membership-based nature that do not pursue activities pursuing profits. Yet, they are organised to mobilize their grassroots constituents in support of collective goals particular to their localities. These community groups include community associations and cooperatives. For example, in Latin America, community associations play a critical role in mobilising the grassroots population to advance the rights of the poor and marginalised (Carothers, 1999). In this regard, many community organisations in developing countries share similar characteristics of social movement networks as they attempt to transform the existing status quo. This trend is not an exception in South Korea, and one of the organisations featured in this

dissertation is a voluntary association that emerged in response to the lack of political responses to address school violence in public schools.

Second, theorists from the Gramcian tradition who see civil society as a space for emancipation and radical discourse formation examine social movement networks. Goodwin and Jasper defines social movement as “a collective, organised, sustained, and non-institutional challenge to authorities, power-holders or cultural beliefs and practices” (2004, p. 4). Tilly (2004) elaborates further by contending social movement is a series of contentious performances, displays, and campaigns expressed by ordinary citizens who pursue the collective common good. From this perspective, social movement networks/organisations engage in a wide variety of activities designed to challenge the status quo (e.g., campaigns, protests, demonstrations, and petition gathering). In contemporary social movement discourses, non-violent action plays a strong role and theorists tend to agree that, by their commitment to non-violence, they are distinguished from other non-state actors such as rebel groups or terrorist organisations that violently engage with the state to pursue their own political agendas.

In the democratisation literature, social movement networks and organisations are considered to play a significant role in opening a space for transition, as was witnessed in various Latin American countries, Eastern European nations, and South Korea (Johnson & Lovemen, 1995; Nogeira, 1995; Diamond, 1994). Under authoritarian and near-totalitarian situations, citizen-led, politically motivated activities are designed to alter state behaviours and often appear contentious. In this regard, social movements are credited with mobilising citizens and leading to a positive social change in various new

democracies in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the consolidation period, social movement networks are portrayed to advocate the rights of the marginalized population (Cohen 1995). Liberal democratic scholars, however, often exclude social movement networks from their research when looking at democratic consolidation processes due to their contentious relationship with the state. Such contentious relationships are often viewed as antagonistic to a civil society that supports the democratic state. Yet, this dissertation does not exclude social movement networks from the civil society in South Korea as many civil society organisations' historical roots in the country's democratic movement and the democratisation contributed to transitioning them to more legally established organisations.

Third, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are commonly defined as private, non-profit, professional organizations with a distinctive legal character, concerned with pursuit of the common good. In studies of democratisation, NGOs are most commonly included, given their increasingly influential role in political affairs. NGOs engage in a wide variety of activities including service delivery, policy advocacy, and information dissemination. They include organisations devoted to environment, development, human rights, peace, and their international networks. In many parts of the world, the distinction between NGOs and voluntary associations tends to be legal in nature, as NGOs are often required to register with an authorising body to be recognised legally while voluntary associations can exist outside legal obligations.

While NGOs undertake a wide range of tasks and activities, most NGOs examined in the democratisation literature as well as in this dissertation are advocacy NGOs. They aim to influence public policy from outside the formal

structure of elected government, and engage in lobbying, public advocacy, awareness-raising, and policy agenda-setting activities (Ahmed & Potter, 2006). Advocacy NGOs stimulate public participation with a view to advancing various policy issues (e.g., human rights, environment, gender, anti-corruption, and economic justice) (Carothers, 1999). These NGOs are most extensively examined for their contribution to democratic consolidation, due to their ability to hold the state accountable by mobilising citizens, providing policy analysis, or closely working with media to publicise issues. South Korea is not an exception to such trend, and organisations that received most scholarly attention are NGOs with strong advocacy profiles (Kim, 2009).

Finally, Gidron et al. (2002) introduced the notion of multiple purpose hybrid organisations in order to explain some of the organisations that have overlapping objectives of voluntary associations, non-governmental organisations, and social movements. Gidron et al. (2002) describe how these multi-purpose hybrid organisations differ from social movement organisations, NGOs, or voluntary associations; first, they seek to bring about social change, but not necessarily through protest or other direct action. Second, their services, such as social or educational services, are strategies for social change. Third, these organisations embrace collectivist, horizontal, network-based models while they incorporate some levels of bureaucratic elements (Gidron et al., 2002). Multiple purpose hybrid organisations provide a valuable theoretical category to explain numerous NGOs or non-profit organisations that do not fit into the definitions described above. Further, this concept is highly valuable in understanding South Korean civil society organisations engaging in PCR activism.

Conflict Resolution and Peace

In the second half of the twentieth century, the conflict resolution movement became popular. As the abundance of literature on the subject suggests, conflict resolution is no longer unfamiliar jargon understood by a select few. Inspired by a wide range of activities undertaken in the real world, academics and practitioners ask complex questions about conflict and the ways in which to manage it. However, the term 'conflict resolution' is still rather ambiguous and it is highly contested by scholars and practitioners (Fast, 2003).

The ambiguity is related to the historical background, which influenced the emergence of the conflict resolution movement. Mayer (2004) explained that the field of conflict resolution emerged prominently in the late 1960s in North America, and gained momentum in the 1990s. During its initial phase, the field's connection to the social movement and peace activism was strong and explicit as it intensely interacted with the environment affected by progressive discourses underpinning the civil rights movement and anti-war demonstrations (Mayer, 2004). However, the boundaries between peace activism[6] and the conflict resolution movement have become clearer in recent days as conflict resolution has gained more currency among funding agencies, thus claiming its unique and distinct identity (Mayer, 2004). As a theoretical exercise, developing the boundary of conflict resolution may be helpful as argued by Fast (2003).

However, the author encountered difficulty in applying the clear-cut definition of the concept to the field research for this dissertation examining civil

[6] According to Nigel Young, "the peace movement refers to social or political movements which consciously, explicitly or implicitly, concern themselves primarily with peace as a term, concept or title, which define themselves (or are defined) as part of the 'peace movement' or are overtly opposed to war, militarism or the organized use of force" (Young, 1986,p. 185).

society organisations engaged in the PCR activism in South Korea[7]. Initially, this dissertation intended to look at organisations embracing conflict resolution activities. Yet, as the research continues, it became apparent that conflict resolution was pioneered by progressive civil society organisations in South Korea who identified themselves closely with the social movement tradition; they shaped the conflict resolution agenda in the country. Thus, describing the organisations examined in this dissertation as 'conflict resolution organisations' in English is highly misleading and ignoring its contextual nuances. Therefore, instead of using the clear-cut definition on conflict resolution, this dissertation adopts the term 'Peace and Conflict Resolution activism (PCR activism)' to explain how conflict resolution manifests in South Korea.

Having the aforementioned background in mind, this section reviews briefly the core concepts related to peace and conflict resolution; it also considers how these core concepts apply to and are relevant to understanding South Korean civil society organisations.

Theories on Conflict Resolution and Peace

As stated above, the field of conflict resolution began in the late 1960s in North America in the midst of civil rights and anti-war movements when governmental institutions in advanced democracies revealed their lack of capacity to manage a wide range of conflicts emerging in all levels of society (Wehr, 1998; Mayer, 2004). The historical origin of conflict resolution implies the field emerged in response to inadequacies in procedural democracy in terms of resolving contentious issues expressed outside of formal institutional spaces,

[7] This is not unique to this dissertation. In countries experiencing violent conflicts or new democracies, boundaries between peace activism and conflict resolution movement are blurred, and highly overlapping. For example, a number of organisations featured in van Tongeren (2005)'s work are professionalised conflict resolution non-government organisations while they continuously engage and operate in the social movement space. Gidron et al. (2003) indicated in their study on PCR organisations operating four conflict-affected areas that PCR organisations are part of social movement organisations.

namely, party politics and interest groups (Mayer, 2004). By offering an alternative framework for social conflict in democracy, the field of conflict resolution has contributed to institutionalising a mechanism for the constructive management of contentious social issues at various levels of society.

Increasingly, the field became recognised in the 1990s as an important tool for effective intervention in global conflicts. The growth of the field in the 1990s coincides with a massive wave of democratisation, which affected numerous countries in the world and changed international contexts as internal violent conflicts were increasingly on the rise. In this context, conflict resolution – a highly North American academic and practical discourse – began to be introduced to various newly democratising countries (Mayer, 2004). Among these new democracies, conflict resolution was promoted prominently in transitional countries with high levels of violent conflict.

The conflict resolution approach highlights the positive aspects of conflict that can serve as an agent for social progress and provides a blueprint for violence prevention. The notion of conflict resolution rests on the premise that conflict is an inevitable part of human life and advocates “the source, cause, and process of (social) conflict can be turned from life-destroying to life-building ends,” depending on how the process of social conflict is managed (Augsburger, 1992, p.5). By placing individuals and communities’ participation at the core of its approach, the field of conflict resolution advocates a process empowering individuals and communities to address issues affecting their lives without resorting to destructive and ineffective methods (Mayer, 2004).

The field of conflict resolution promotes a collaborative approach, which “empower(s) participants to advocate effectively for their own interests in a safe

and constructive environment" (Mayer, 2000, p.170). As a short-term goal, conflict resolution is an effort to change adversarial relationships among parties in disagreement into constructive partnership (Mitchell, 2005). In the longer-term, to deal with a multi-faceted conflict triggered by a wide range of personal and structural elements, any meaningful resolution requires a holistic approach addressing all the underlying issues of social conflict and handling the different dimensions of it (Mayer, 2000).

In this perspective, conflict resolution is "all process oriented activities aiming to address the underlying cause of direct, cultural, and structural violence" (Reimann, 2004, p. 10). Riemann defines "structural violence as the social, political and economic structure of a conflict situation when unequal power, domination and dependency are perpetuated, while cultural violence refers to the social and cultural legitimisation of direct and structural violence" (Reimann, p. 10-11). Thus, conflict resolution is a preliminary step adopted for "a deep transformation in the parties and their relationships and in the situation that created the conflict" (Miall et al., 1999, p. 29).

This holistic view on conflict resolution advocates that different levels of leadership in society, ranging from governmental institutions to grassroots organisations, make a concerted effort to address the various problems underpinning a social conflict (Lederach, 1997). In this context, a peace movement is a form of the broader and holistic notion of conflict resolution as it attempts to transform the structure and negative dynamics perpetuating social conflicts. In studying South Korean civil society organisations, this dissertation adopts the broader, holistic notion given that the civil society organisations

examined have explicit goals to transform the negative dynamics and concerns about structural and cultural violence (Park, 2007).

Civil Society In Support of Conflict Resolution and Peace

Based upon some of the concepts discussed above, the following sections represent a review of specific activities undertaken by civil societies under the broader theme of 'peace and conflict resolution' in countries with different levels of political development – conflict-affected transitional, relatively stable transitional, and advanced democratic societies. The core processes underpinning the aforementioned conflict resolution methods are "face-to-face activities in communication, training, education, or consultation that promote collaborative conflict analysis and problem-solving among parties engaged in social conflict" (Fisher, 1997, p.8).

Civil society actors advocating PCR activities aspire to accomplish three objectives through various educational, training, and mediation techniques (Barnes, 2007). First, these actors attempt to develop new, innovative conflict resolution mechanisms to complement the state's capacity to handle conflictual social issues that can become sources of violence (Fisher, 2007). Second, through education and mediation activities, civil society actors provide the individuals and communities vulnerable to social conflicts with an opportunity to learn how to take control of their own common problems through direct involvement. This, in turn, empowers citizens and communities to address, manage, and transform difficulties and antagonism into sources of positive social change (Buah & Folger, 1994). Third, skills training and personal experience with solving common problems through facilitated dialogue is intended to provide ordinary citizens with the means to handle future conflicts in

a constructive manner (Shonholtz, 1997). Thus, civil society actors contribute to the prevention of violent social conflict.

Inspired by existing literature (Barnes, 2007; Bartoli, 2008; Fisher, 2008; Mayer, 2004; Shonoltz, 1997), this dissertation categorises conflict resolution activities undertaken by civil society actors based upon socio-political contexts in which civil society organisations operate: transitional and conflict-affected, transitional without much visible violence, and advanced democratic deepening contexts.

First, in transitional and conflict-affected countries, conflict resolution refers to an effort attempting to address various aspects of conflict, thus reducing the intensity of violence (Barnes, 2007; Bartoli, 2008; Fisher, 2008). In conflict-affected countries such as the Balkan states, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa, these conflict resolution activities focus on relationship building and changing conflict dynamics between conflictual parties (Barnes, 2007). Such programmes include training civil society leaders for negotiation and conflict resolution skills, restorative justice, peace education for inter-ethnic tolerance and understanding, reconciliation projects, developing indigenous-based conflict/dispute resolution systems, training journalists to be more conflict sensitive, capacity building for women leaders to be part of peace process, and so forth (Barnes, 2007; Bartoli, 2008; Fisher, 2008). The aforementioned activities have clear objectives to alter people's behaviours as well as to transform conditions sustaining conflict dynamics in society (Van Tongeren, 2005).

Second, in transitional countries with a low level of violent conflict, peace and conflict resolution focuses on training aspects and introduces the basic

element of conflict resolution to strengthen citizen participation as well as to reduce conflicts among different social actors (Shonholtz, 1997). South Korea fits into this category. In transitional countries, conflict resolution programmes are not much different from dispute resolution mechanisms existing in North America. Such activities include adult education for democracy, civic education (e.g., election, citizens' rights, and independent media), peace education (tolerance, inter-ethnic/religious/cultural understanding), community mediation programmes, civil society capacity building for increased advocacy, dialogue, and problem-solving skills (Shonholtz, 1997). To understand better the underlying assumptions of conflict resolution activities undertaken by civil society in transitional societies with low levels of violence, the following section reviews advanced democracies' conflict resolution activities.

Third, in advanced democracies, conflict-resolution NGOs have been leading the effort in community mediation and public dialogue, as facilitators and capacity-builders. Unlike the aforementioned contexts, in advanced democracies, conflict resolution NGOs are more specialised and are less connected to the peace movement (Mayer, 2004). These specialised organisations provide training, advocate the practices, lobby governments on inclusion, and directly facilitate these activities. The common values – improving communications, education, and supporting their ability to analyse and understand conflicts – empower citizens to enhance the quality of interaction between different social groups (Liebmann, 1998, p. 43). Three particular activities have gained popularity within civil society and policy circles in advanced democracies, especially in North America, and they have been

reviewed extensively: community mediation, conflict resolution skills training (conflict resolution education), and public dialogue.

Community mediation centres on the notion of individual and community responsibility in constructively engaging with local-level conflicts, providing local residents with a chance to choose a settlement process requiring their active participation (Pavlich, 1996). In other words, community mediation is a venue for civic conversation providing opportunities for communities to bridge the divisions that separate them. Community mediation refers to an informal process helping parties to reach a mutually acceptable settlement with the help of a neutral third party that has no power to impose a resolution (Bush & Folger, 1994).

Community mediation has an educational effect on “how to resolve future disputes” before they develop into crises requiring state intervention (Pavlich, 1996, p.711). Proponents such as Bush and Folger (1994) argue that community mediation, at the individual level, has a transformative power to change people’s attitudes toward conflict. At the same time, community mediation strengthens the quality of democratic participation as it develops the capacity of popular justice (people-based justice). Community mediation embodies community power and provides a means to express community values. Community mediation is often portrayed by its advocates as “an empowerment tool” that enables “individuals and communities to take back control over their lives from a state institution” (Hedeen, 2004, p. 103). Community mediation also provides parties in dispute with an opportunity to see underlying issues causing tension with their neighbours and to understand the need for social change to solve their problems. In mediation, in particular,

during the problem-solving phase, disputants often come up with effective strategies to address specific issues related to a larger structural problem and learn to work with their adversaries to tackle common problems. This process allows disputants who felt relatively powerless to take part in a democratic process and provides them with “a new sense of participation in civic life” (Bush & Folger, 1994, p. 19).

Conflict Resolution Skills Training: As in conflict-affected societies, advanced democracies need citizens capable of dealing with social conflicts affecting their lives. These organisations operate on the assumption if citizens have opportunities to explore different options available for conflict resolution, they will respond to violent situations in a constructive way. These organisations offer a series of training programmes that help individuals become familiar with different types of conflict and supply them with specific skills to manage circumstances that can lead to violence constructively. In certain contexts, conflict resolution training is contextualised as part of broader peace education, which aims to enhance citizens’ awareness on a range of issues affecting the society’s peace.

Public Dialogue: A healthy democracy embraces the notion of competing interests through organised groups designed to cope with such contentions in a constructive manner (Ury, 1999). Yet, in recent years, policy-related conflicts in advanced democracies including the US have been expressed in a highly contentious manner, further increasing division among citizens who hold opposing perspectives. In an effort to reduce tensions around particular public policies and improve the state’s decision-making procedures, new collaborative techniques that can effectively incorporate public participation in policy

formation processes have been developed (Kovic, 2005, p.46). Public dialogue has been evident for over 15 years, and organisations such as the Civic Forum and Dialogue Circles are gaining support from political leaders in mainstream parties (McCoy & Scully, 2002). Collaborative decision-making processes are now receiving increasing attention from a governmental body struggling with contentious social issues (Lavigne, 2003). Public dialogue ensures the representation of all major interests, clarifies their disagreements, and discusses equitable solutions that could stimulate collaborative action and effective policy making (White, 2004). They promote the deliberative nature of democracy. This, in turn, improves the quality of democracy as it overcomes the limitation of representative democracy, that is, a lack of citizen participation and under-representation of a diversity of voices and concerns in the policy making process (Jackstreit, 1999).

In summary, civil society organisations' engagement with the aforementioned activities in advanced democracies as well as in new democracies with low levels of violence is presupposed to contribute to strengthening democracy based upon the following assumptions. First, these activities help citizens develop effective communication skills. They build citizen capacity for conflict resolution, a form of constructive communication. Such rational, constructive communications of citizens form a basis of citizen participation in public discourse, a critical element in strengthening the participatory dimension of democracy. Second, with an increased capacity for conflict resolution, citizens are empowered to engage constructively in the processes normally considered the realm of government. For example, as a number works in the literature on conflict resolution organisations in North

America testify, these organisations provide previously powerless individuals with an opportunity to find constructive ways to engage with others in the public sphere by working on common problems facing their respective communities (Mark, 2005). Third, these activities also help to enhance the quality of civic participation. Specifically, public dialogue is designed to capture citizen deliberation on critically contentious social and public issues effectively. But, all other activities including mediation and conflict resolution trainings empower citizens to engage in public and community affairs effectively.

In South Korea, in 2007, when the author engaged in fieldwork, almost all the activities under the PCR movement were educational activities. Conflict resolution skills training was framed and presented to their constituents with a range of terms such as conflict resolution education, facilitation workshop, nonviolence training, and peace education. A majority of these educational programmes were a mixture of different conflict resolution traditions, peace activism, and nonviolence political discourses. These activities were implemented on the ground with a view to preparing citizens to engage in mediation, public dialogue, and other activities that could alter the conflictual dynamics existing in South Korea.

Conclusion

This section has reviewed various works of literature related to democracy, democratisation, civil society, and conflict resolution. By reviewing core concepts of various social and political phenomena that affected the late 1990s and early 21st century, this section investigated how these different concepts are related to one another. In particular, this chapter attempts to explain how other theorists understand the contribution of civil-society-led

conflict resolution activities and their contributions to the overall process of democracy development, the overarching theme of this dissertation. In the next chapter, these concepts provide the foundation from which to identify a suitable methodological framework for this dissertation from among differing methodological perspectives.

CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

In the last twenty years, civil society organizations around the world have undertaken a wide array of activities: human rights advocacy, electoral education, women's empowerment, anti-corruption awareness campaigns, mediation services, judiciary reforms, community development, and conflict resolution skills training. These measures have been taken in order to strengthen democratization processes in new democracies. In the last ten years, a number of policy research organizations, as well as bi- and multi-national agencies, have examined these activities, and evaluated the effect of civil society activities on democracy.

In response to growing interest in civil society's engagement with PCR activities, practitioners as well as scholars have examined civil society's conflict resolution efforts (van Tongeren, 2005 and Gidron et al., 2003). These studies have analysed civil society organisations engaged in PCR in a variety of countries, many of which have undergone democratisation during the last twenty years. Compared to other regions, Eastern Asian experiences on this subject are less documented. The majority of existing literature investigates how PCR activities contribute to managing and transforming overt conflicts, whereas their use in support of democratic transition and consolidation is under-explored. To fill this research gap and to understand better how PCR activism can contribute to fostering democratic values, norms, and skills, this dissertation reviews South Korean civil society organisations engaged in peace and conflict work.

Given the novelty of the field, the majority of studies examining civil society's PCR efforts have been conducted using qualitative methodology to provide context-rich information, and rely on data collection methods such as interviewing, observation, and field research. However, triangulation methodology has been increasingly utilised by practitioners and researchers; such studies rely primarily on qualitative data collection methods with the limited use of surveys inspired by quantitative methodology (Howard, 2003; Frankel, Linan, & Seligman, 2007). While an array of scholarship has contributed to developing the core ideas underlying this dissertation, the following three publications have played the most influential roles in choosing a suitable methodological framework for the dissertation and in designing the research project: *Improving the Practice* by Shonholtz and Goncz (2000), *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society* by Van Togeren (2005), and *Mobilising for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa* by Gidron et al (2003).

Shonholtz and Goncz (2000) discuss how the incorporation of conflict management systems has helped build democratic institutions in former communist countries, based upon case studies on Partners for Democratic Change in Central and Eastern Europe. These case studies utilize multiple methods ranging from observations and interviews with programme participants to field visits that investigate how Partners for Democratic Change programmes have contributed towards advancing a culture of conflict resolution in new democracies. Similarly, van Tongeren (2005) illustrates how civil society organizations have contributed to the restoration of peaceful relations among conflicting parties and to interventions in difficult social conflicts in conflict-

affected areas. The sixty case studies van Tongeren (2005) explores draw upon interviews and global ethnography, and provide a detailed description of the peace-building activities undertaken by civil society organisations.

Whereas the aforementioned research projects have been undertaken by civil society practitioners, Gidron et al.(2003) provide a scholarly endeavour to compare the work of peace organizations systematically in three different conflict settings. This book is the outcome of a multi-year research project involving a number of academics working in different countries. It highlights the difficulties and rewards of comparative research across conflicts, societies, and cultures. Gidron et al.(2003) elaborates on the process involved in designing this research project and outlines the challenges of combining different data methods in order to capture peace organisation activities and their histories. These studies examine civil society organisations' engagement in PCR using case study methodology. They capture in detail how civil society organisations have utilised PCR and what impacts these activities have had in the specific contexts in which these organisations have operated.

Inspired by the methodological choice reflected in the work of Gidron et al.(2003), van Tongeren (2005), and Shonholtz and Gonz (2000), this dissertation uses case study as an overarching methodological framework. Credited for its strength in investigating 'how' and 'why' research questions, case study is a holistic research methodology suitable to examining strategically-selected cases occurring in specific contexts and it is a popular research approach among PCR scholars (Verschuren, 2003). Furthermore, with the limited archival information available on the PCR movement in South Korea, and the newness of this subject in general, case study serves as the most

suitable research methodology for exploring the core thesis of this dissertation, and for providing detailed accounts of South Korean civil society groups engaged in PCR practices.

The first section of this chapter explains why the case study research strategy is most appropriate in conducting this dissertation, and how this methodological choice has shaped, guided, and influenced the overall research design. This section also presents the three case study subjects that are the focus for this dissertation, and presents the criteria used to select these particular subjects. The second section of this chapter introduces the fieldwork undertaken by the author in 2007 to collect the primary data, and shares the insights that the author gained during this period. The final section introduces the three data collection methods: interviews, observation, and documentation.

Case Study Methodology

Based upon the literature review conducted on different methodologies and their applications in the study of civil society, conflict resolution, and democracy, case study methodology emerges as the most suitable guiding framework for this research project because of its emphasis on reflexivity, context-specificity, and integrative approaches to combining methods. Further, the case study enables the research outcomes to be relatively generalizable to theoretical propositions (Yin, 1989). Specifically, the following three attributes of the case study strategy provide particular relevance to this dissertation:

First, as Yin elaborates, a case study approach is appropriate when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are asked about “a contemporary set of events over which the researcher has little or no control” (2003, p. 9). The approach also helps a researcher to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions by identifying “operational links

needing to be traced over time” (Yin, 2003, p.11). This dissertation investigates two specific ‘how’ questions. As previously stated, it investigates a nascent social phenomenon – PCR in civil society – in depth, and aims to understand how this phenomenon emerged in the context of South Korea’s post-democratic transition, and why this phenomenon is considered a novel response to the growing challenges that Korean civil society has faced. By using case study methodology, the author has been able to capture the context of South Korean civil society and the processes leading to the emergence of PCR activism through examining civil society participants’ reflections. In addition, this dissertation looks for answers as to how civil society’s PCR activities help to embed democratic norms, processes, and skills into the South Korean civil society space by focusing on three organisations. The operational links between PCR practices and civil society participants’ exposure to democratic norms, process, and skills are identified by the people who participated in them through the contextualised interpretation of the three case study organisations.

Second, a case study approach is useful when an investigator attempts to examine “a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident” (Yin, 2003, p. 13). This aspect of the case study approach allows a researcher to cover contextual conditions highly pertinent to a particular phenomenon, and overcomes a disadvantage of traditional quantitative methodology – separation of phenomena from context. As presented in the previous chapters, civil society in South Korea is a highly fluid contemporary phenomenon, and it corresponds to particular political, historical, and social contexts of the country. Throughout modern history, the boundaries and core functions of civil society in South

Korea have changed and co-evolved over time, and the fluidity of civil society characteristics in the country results from its adaptation to the country's changing political, social, and historical contexts.

For example, from the late 19th century until the democratic transition in 1987, civil society in South Korea served as a space to mobilise and strengthen progressive political ideals in response to repressive measures introduced by the state apparatus (Kim, 2000; Moon, 2002). This dissertation maintains that Korean civil society prior to 1987 reflects societal needs to resist and seek emancipation from oppressive social orders that restrict freedom of thinking, expression, and other basic rights of democracy. Thus, prior to 1987, there was limited space to engage in PCR discourses. After the transition in 1987, the country's civil society expanded its boundaries to adapt and operate within the transitory political and social context, specifically by incorporating the watchdog functions of civil society in democracy (Kim, 2000). In the absence of strong institutions advocating citizens' need for democratic reforms, civil society's advocacy function at the expense of instigating public policy disputes was welcome and appreciated. Since the late 1990s, when deepening democracy has become an issue, South Korean civil society has paid attention to new functions such as democratic learning, citizenship enhancement, and constructive facilitation of public discourses. During this period, civil society has integrated key issues and processes underpinning PCR practices (Moon, 2002).

Against this dynamic and changing background, it is inappropriate and premature to divorce the PCR phenomenon occurring in South Korean civil society from its constantly evolving socio-political context. The country's civil society, and the ways in which civil society participants define PCR practices,

cannot be explained by a precise and singular definition, nor fully understood by answering a cause-effect research question. Thus, the author argues that a case study methodology allows the integration of contexts and phenomena in an integrative framework, and can better explore key themes of this dissertation. As eloquently proposed by Bennett and George (2002, p.19), a case study methodology allows this dissertation to achieve "high levels of conceptual validity" on the negotiated meaning of the PCR movement within South Korean civil society. Based upon the conceptual validity obtained through contextual understanding, the case study methodology further captures the process of integrating democratic norms, skills, and values within civil society, as reflected in participants' own narratives of how they have interacted with PCR practices. One of strengths that a case study strategy brings to the research process is that it can be used to identify the adaptability of PCR in non-Western, new democracies, in that it allows the author to present findings and reflections obtained in a specific cultural setting.

Third, Yin (2003) argues that the case study approach is appropriate when a researcher constructs a preliminary theory related to the topic of study. While a case study is not suitable for investigating causal effects and making scientific generalizations, it is effective for the development of preliminary theoretical propositions (Yin, 2003). As presented in the previous two chapters, the core argument of this dissertation is that the PCR movement emerged as a practical response to civil society's growing need to address conflictual social dynamics in a constructive manner, and that this movement helps to enhance democratic norms, processes, and skills, thus strengthening civil society's democratic nurturing function. This core argument is built upon the liberal

democratic and public sphere visions of civil society and liberal and participatory democratic perspectives, and it presupposes that a civil society that deepens democratic processes and citizen participation also empowers citizens to obtain democratic norms, values, and skills (cf. Chapter 2). By engaging with civil society, individuals develop their understanding of democratic citizenship and can participate in public discourses in a constructive and democratic manner (Dryzek, 2002). While the case study approach may not allow for scientific generalization, it does permit the author to examine preliminary arguments and conceptual assumptions in detail through context-specific analysis, and to explain how these arguments and assumptions are linked to the specific context in which South Korean civil society groups operate.

Fourth, Yin (2003, p.18) explains that a case study methodology is useful when a researcher “relies on multiple sources of evidences, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion”, and that it can accommodate four different types of triangulation (data, investigators, theories, and methods). This dissertation use three data collection methods – observation, internal documentation, and interviews to strengthen construct validity (Yin, 2003). The findings obtained through these methods are presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6; the conclusions of this dissertation are based upon inductive reasoning to set the stage for additional research.

The author maintains that through the many strengths of this methodology presented above, the case study is a rational choice to explore the worth of this research project’s core premises. Nonetheless, the author acknowledges that a case study strategy has limits, and that specifically, its context-based selectivity poses methodological challenges. As Church and

Shouldice (2003) argue, the field of civil society, conflict resolution, and democratisation faces the challenge of more fully explaining the relevance of grassroots activities to broader social change. Although sophisticated analyses of particular activities undertaken by civil society organizations have increased, researchers still confront the difficulty of examining theoretical assumptions and connecting the changes occurring at different levels of society (Church & Shouldice, 2003). By utilising the case study methodology, this dissertation focuses on the analysis of micro-level change occurring in South Korea, rather than on generalizing about macro-level social change. Like many other existing studies on civil society's PCR practices, including those conducted by Shonholtz and Gonz (2000), this dissertation's methodological choice does not purport to link micro-level events and their impact to broader, macro-level social and political changes scientifically. Rather, the dissertation relies on inductive logic stemming from the findings of multiple case studies to investigate the links between micro and macro changes.

The first-hand data was collected and then analysed to understand better the relationship between conflict resolution activities and the democratic quality of civil society in South Korea. In order to link this micro-level intervention to broader social change, the dissertation turns to the existing literature and analyses how other scholars draw the theoretical linkage between the democratic quality of civil society and its effect on the deepening of democratic processes.

Nonetheless, the author emphasises that this dissertation is a first step to exploring the implicit assumption that a link exists between conflict resolution and civil society's capacity building in South Korea, and argues that a case

study approach provides an in-depth investigation of this assumption. The next section introduces the case study selection processes, presents the specific methods utilized to conduct this research project, and further explains the case study units.

Case Study Organisations and Selection Criteria

Since the 1980s, numerous countries have experienced democratic transition. This dissertation chose to look at South Korea, and within the South Korean context, it selected three civil society groups as case studies. Concurring with Yin's (2003) and Scholtz and Tietje's (2003) terminology, this dissertation is a form of embedded case study because the three case studies are embedded within the larger case study of South Korean civil society engaging in PCR activities after the democratic transition in 1987. In addition to the practical reason that the author is a Korean native, this dissertation chose to examine South Korean civil society from specific interest in the following: the integration of civil society leaders into mainstream politics; the time associated with the development of civil society's capacity after the transition; and the ways in which South Korean civil society has engaged with external actors in terms of funding and sustainability (cf. Chapter 1).

Through a broader study of South Korean civil society in the context of democratic consolidation and deepening, this dissertation aims to explore the links between PCR practices and civil society's function for democratic learning, and how or whether these practices can contribute to developing four sets of democratic values, norms, and skills. Bennett and George (2003, p.24) warn case study researchers to be aware of case selection bias - bias can "overestimate or underestimate" the relationship they aim to explore. Further,

Bennett and George (2003) emphasise the importance of stating the selection criteria in conducting case studies. This dissertation investigates three civil society entities in post-transitional South Korea, based upon multiple case studies reflecting the literal replication logic. While the sampling logic widely used in surveys assumes a number of subjects represent a larger pool of respondents, the literal replication logic selects multiple cases, expecting similar patterns to be found in different case units (Yin, 2003). Multiple case studies require a rich, theoretical framework to construct the validity of research (Yin, 2003). In addition, Bennett and George (2003) explain that cases should not be seen as representative of the population as they are seen in the cases of quantitative or statistical methods.

After reviewing the literature on civil society's engagement with PCR, two criteria were formed to select case study entities (Fast, 2002). The first was to select existing networks providing PCR services to their constituents or raising awareness on PCR – where conflict resolution practices included a wide variety of activities including skills trainings, mediation, and non-violence and peace education. The selected case study subjects were those that operated programs or projects to address conflictual social issues that were problematic in the stage of democratic consolidation. The second criterion was to embrace the principle of inclusiveness, viewed for example as a willingness to encourage the participation of people with differing political viewpoints (Fast, 2002). To be specific, this criterion determined whether an organisation was willing and able to bring people who held different viewpoints together in one place.

There is one important feature of conflict resolution that this dissertation did not use in selecting case study subjects: impartiality. One of the core

attributes of impartiality in conflict resolution is that a third party who would intervene in a conflictual situation should be free of bias and should set aside his or her opinions, feelings, and agendas (Gibbs et al., 1996). In the context of third-party intervention, the notion of impartiality is critical for an intervening organisation to maintain its credibility for parties in conflict. Yet, this dissertation does not use impartiality as a selection criterion because it does not capture the nuances of South Korean civil society organisations engaged in PCR activism in the country. One of the recurring themes during field research was the challenge of ensuring the empowerment of citizens, as PCR activism emerged in a civil society space primarily dominated by those who advocated social change (cf. Chapter 5 & Chapter 6). Thus, the author excluded impartiality as a selection criterion as it would have inhibited the dissertation from capturing fully the emergent phenomena of the PCR movement in South Korea. The issue of impartiality will be further addressed in later chapters.

Given the novelty of PCR activities in the country, the pool of samples that this dissertation could choose from was limited, and the selected case study entities were the organisations that introduced PCR practices into the country: School Making Peace (School Peace), Woman Making Peace-Conflict Resolution Centre (WMP-CR Centre), and Peace Activists Network (PAN).

School Peace is a grassroots, community-based organization providing peace education and conflict resolution skills training to elementary and junior high schools located in the city of Gwacheon, a suburb south of Seoul. The organisation was founded in 2003 after an incident resulting in the suicide of an elementary school student who suffered from chronic isolation and violence from his classmates. Organised by concerned parents, Schools Peace attempts

to provide young students and parents in the local community with skills to manage violence and anger more effectively. Volunteers in this organisation also offer a weekly extra-curricular class about conflict resolution in a number of schools in the city of Gwacheon.

The WMP-CR Centre addresses the small-scale conflicts occurring daily in schools and civil organisations (particularly those working for the rights of women). Founded in 1998, WMP is a pioneering organisation providing conflict-resolution training services. The organisation's programme began in 2000, in collaboration with other Korean NGOs and the American Friends Service Committee. WMP provides a regular series of workshops, based on the principles and techniques of conflict resolution, for NGO practitioners and secondary public school teachers. The organisation has also developed manuals that their participants can take with them to use in their work environments. WMP works to raise awareness of conflict resolution by organising a conflict resolution network.

The Peace Activists Network (consisting of two ad-hoc coalitions, the Global Partnerships for the Prevention of Armed Conflict – Korean Committee and the Preparatory Committee for Annual Peace Activists Retreat) brings civil society practitioners together and provides them with the opportunity to discuss various issues impeding the promotion of conflict resolution in the country, including in the civil society sector. Established in 2004 as an ad-hoc committee, the Global Partnerships for the Prevention of Armed Conflict – Korean Committee (GPPAC-Korea) was comprised of civil society practitioners from diverse sections. The Committee's main activities included discussions of various conflict-related issues facing South Korea, which were held during

workshops, seminars, and series of meetings. After the Committee's dissolution in 2006, the Preparatory Committee for Annual Peace Activists' Retreat has continued to provide a space for interaction and capacity building for PCR practitioners.

Field Research: Reflective Moments

Field research is "the study of people acting in the natural course of their daily lives ... (and) a method of study whose practitioners try to understand the meanings that activities observed have for those engaged in them" (Emerson, 1983, p.1). Field research aims to fulfil the same goal as other types of research done in the library or on the internet—it aims to gather information contributing to researchers' understanding of an issue or question and to organise those findings in a cohesive and persuasive document offering new insight, answers or solutions (Mason, 2001). The appropriateness of this dissertation's choice of field research is quite apparent. Because of the field's short history in South Korea, there are a limited number of written essays on civil society organisations' PCR activities in the country. Further, no other practical options existed to obtain the primary data and to add original pieces of information other than meeting individuals who engaged in the PCR activities of the three case study entities. Field research in South Korea was the essential and virtually the only way to obtain information to understand civil society's PCR activities.

The field research had three specific purposes: observing civil society and conflict resolution practices, collecting documents and other unpublished resources, and conducting interviews with relevant individuals. Taking advantage of the author's linguistic and cultural familiarity with the research

setting[8], the duration of the field research was set to be no more than four months (January 2007 and April to June 2007). In retrospect, four months was not a sufficient length of time to grasp fully the entire field of PCR in South Korea. Nonetheless, the four-month research trip enabled the author to meet all the aforementioned goals: she observed various forums, sites, events, and general scenes of South Korean civil society; she acquired numerous documents; and she conducted a series of interviews with over 50 individuals.

In addition to these specific tasks, the fieldwork enriched the author's understanding of the contexts and situated realities in which PCR activities operated, and strengthened her insights into the research process. The qualitative interviews with 54 civil society practitioners and participants formed the most critical part of the field research, and they contributed immensely to developing the findings of the case studies presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. The field research, however, went beyond the interviews. In essence, the field research was a process of gaining access to the community of civil society practitioners and scholars engaged in PCR activities in South Korea. Gaining access to this community was a guarantee for successful data collection as it offered opportunities to observe and interact with key individuals.

As the research took place in a country where formality is important[9], identifying appropriate ways to request interviews and access to particular events required more creativity than was anticipated initially. Spradely (1979)

---

[8] Studies on the field research and qualitative driven academic work highlight the importance of acknowledging the inevitable bias of the author in interpreting the reality she or he observes (Denzin & Lincoln, 2007). Thus, such studies encourage the author to acknowledge his or her situated reality to make the author's interpretation and possible bias explicit (Denzin & Lincoln, 2007). This is to acknowledge that the author of this dissertation is a female South Korean native speaker who was born and raised in Seoul with upper-middle class upbringing, and received university and graduate education in the U.S.

[9] As Owen (2007), an English businessman who worked in South Korea, elaborates, the South Korean vertical social structure is based on age and social status. The society also operates upon hierarchy, social harmony, and collectivism, and meets the core characteristics of high-context culture (Kim et al., 1998).

highlights that eliciting information and establishing rapport with research subjects are two key elements for quality in fieldwork. Particularly, establishing rapport was critical to gathering the information needed. In a highly formal culture such as South Korea, building trust and harmonious relationships with research subjects required more time than four months, even for a native Korean who was familiar with the cultural and social setting. Fortunately, the author's entry into the community of PCR activists was facilitated and secured through two individuals with whom the author had already developed personal relationships (cf. Chapter 1). These two individuals were insiders of the community, and were highly respected in the field. On the author's behalf, they wrote emails, made phone calls of introduction, and allowed the author to use their names when approaching important interviewees. Their introduction of the author to the community played a critical role in allowing the author to gain access and to develop relationships with the majority of the interviewees from the case study organisations. In addition to these two individuals, the author's former high school classmates also helped to establish contacts with young civil society activists. Although building individual relationships with the interviewees required additional effort on the part of the author, a smooth entry into the community of PCR activists was a great advantage.

The entry into the core community was just the beginning of the author's encounters with expected and unexpected intellectual, ethical, and practical dilemmas. In retrospect, these challenges – whether anticipated or not - emerged not only in the context of the right to research and knowledge versus the rights of the studied, but also in relation to the situated realities of both the researcher and the researched (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992; Cassell,

1980). The author noted and reflected upon specific recurring patterns and dynamics that emerged during the field research process. These patterns involved detecting and responding to varying degrees of power dynamics between interviewees and the author, and balancing the author's dual identities as an insider (Korean national and native Korean speaker) and an outsider (a researcher educated and living her formative years in the U.S. and the UK).

First, as Neff and Suizzo (2006) rightly summarise, perceived power inequality in human relations is likely to have a strong influence on authentic self-expression, and this has an impact on the research process. In particular, as researchers such as Lee (2002) have frequently articulated, Korean culture has specific effects on one's relationship with others and on the ways in which one engages with other people. Lee (2002) explains that an individual's existence is determined by her or his relationships with others, and that social and power dynamics constantly redefine the concepts of self and roles. The collectivism, hierarchy defined by social status and age, and emphasis on harmonious relationships found in Korean culture all affect engagement with other people. In Korea, there are clear social and gendered hierarchies – while youth define the norms of popular culture, the old, educated, and socially established are dominant over youth and emergent in workspace. Strong male dominance in politics and intellectual circles exists despite the change in gender dynamics witnessed in the last twenty years because of women's empowerment in workplaces. However, during the research, age and social status played more significant roles in defining the researcher-researched relationship than did gender. This can be partially explained by the fact that the male interviewees with whom the author met operate in a socially progressive

space, and they are more advanced in internalising gender-empowerment perspectives than their mainstream counterparts whose gender bias often goes unchallenged.

During the author's encounters with research participants, the relationships and modes of engagement changed depending on the social, cultural, and gendered norms of South Korea. For example, the majority of research participants were older than the author who was 27 years old at the time of the fieldwork, and age is a key element that defines relationships with others in South Korea (Lee, 2002). In approaching older research participants, the author's general attitudes were rather submissive, courteous, and highly formal. The degree of informality between the author and an older interviewee was highly dependent upon the latter's personality – if he or she was formal, the author adopted an extra-formal attitude. If he or she was more informal, the author became more relaxed. The degree of formality reduced dramatically when the author interacted with participants whose ages were similar to hers (in 2007, between 25 and 32). In addition to age, research participants were well established within South Korean civil society, and were closely linked to an extensive network of civil society practitioners and progressive political circles—in short, they were in a position to open the door for career advancement for the author. Many of the interviewees were engaged in activities that the author wished to pursue after completing the PhD degree. Certainly, this additional layer of power differentiation added formality during the author's interaction with interviewees.

Furthermore, despite the respectful rapport established with research participants, there were a number of occasions that reminded the author and

the researched of the author's outsider identity. Certainly, the author was a Korean national, and familiar with linguistic and cultural codes of Korean society. Further, her interest in civil society and peace studies located her within the progressive political stance of many of the civil society activists. Nonetheless, the author was an aspiring academic studying in a foreign country, and had little exposure to the country's civil society activism. The insider-outsider dynamic due to the author's lack of lived experience as a social movement activist was especially pronounced during her interaction with younger practitioners. Several individuals in their late 20s and early 30s challenged the author's credentials with regard to activism and social movements, and questioned whether the author's lack of experience provided a proper framework in which to understand the nuances of the South Korean civil society movement. For example, during an interview conducted on 17 April 2007 in Seoul, PAN9 (Personal interview, 17 April 2007) said,

> You will not be taken seriously by civil society practitioners, given your lack of exposure to student activism and progressive social movements. You have not demonstrated your commitment and dedication to the causes of civil society in your life. This raises a question for me as to whether you are fully equipped to interpret the country's civil society movement and its contributions to democracy.

In addition to the author's lack of experience in the civil society movement, the insider-outsider dynamics were inevitable because the research trip was a mission to fulfil the requirements of her academic task. Certainly, the author was genuinely curious about civil society activists' perspectives on peace and conflict resolution, and the trip was part of the author's overall commitment to, and solidarity with, civil society activists and their goals. However, entering into the community of activists was a temporary intellectual excursion. Moreover, the knowledge extracted was to

be displayed through findings and outcomes within a PhD dissertation that would be shared with academics and researchers in English-speaking academia.

One of the moments in which the author experienced this dynamic most vividly occurred when a research participant made a casual comment. On 5 April 2007, CR 2 (Observation & Personal communication, 5 April 2007) asked her peers to help the author successfully complete her field research by donating their time for interviews, and noted, “Ms. Da Woon needs information from us to complete her dissertation to become a Doctor in Peace Studies. We should help her so she can pass her exam”. Her casual comment illustrated that the community perceived the author as an outsider, and revealed their acknowledgement of the author’s core mission.

Another moment in which the author felt her status as an outsider (not only to the community of civil society activists, but also to other Koreans) involved language and translation. Many times, the author was asked to provide some information about PCR based upon her knowledge. Because the author had not been living in South Korea for over 8 years at the time of the field study, she had difficulty identifying suitable translation for certain key terms and articulating civil society, and peace and conflict resolution, activities in a way that resonated with those who operated in the activism space. After one month, the author identified effective ways of communicating the core notions of the research project to others. During this time, the author also became aware that the term ‘PCR activism’ was an effective way of describing the activities undertaken by civil society activists.

The author's engagement with South Korean civil society actors working in PCR activism and democratisation movements enriched the overall quality of the research. In particular, through these encounters and reflections, the author gained a more nuanced understanding of the field, and was able to conceptualise better the ways in which the narratives and observations could be presented to the British research community.

In addition, by reflecting on the insider-outsider dynamics, the author was able to re-define her role as a bridge-builder between the English-speaking academic world and Korean civil society. This enhanced her awareness of the potential impact of her research, as it was one of the first attempts to present narratives of South Korean PCR to English-speaking academia.

Data Collection in the Field

During the fieldwork, three commonly adopted data collection methods were utilised: observation, quantitative interviewing, and documentation. The qualitative interviewing process provided the most critical and original data for this dissertation and was most useful in forming the core propositions and main findings reflected in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. This section will present each data collection method, and describe how the author utilised these techniques to engage with research subjects and obtain information.

Qualitative Interviews

The majority of the field research was dedicated to meeting individuals for interviews, as their first-hand insights were rarely available through other archival means. As Mason (2002, p. 225) articulates, interview methodologies are employed with "the assumption that it is possible to investigate elements of the social by asking people to talk, and

to gather or construct knowledge by listening to and interpreting what they say and to how they say it." As previously stated, few publications on conflict resolution and social conflict in South Korea exist. It was also difficult to use archival studies to understand how civil society practitioners conceptualised peace and conflict practices, partly because of the difficulty in identifying how common jargon of the field in the West was understood and interpreted by Korean civil society activists. For this reason, interviewing was an effective way to understand PCR activism in South Korea more accurately, as it allowed for a better understanding of individuals' experiences and insights into the activities offered by civil society organisations.

The author adopted a semi-structured quality interview method. As Fife explains, semi-structured interviews are:

> An attempt to capture something of the control of structured interviews without the need to use close-ended questions or force people into the role of a respondent rather than that of an initiator of information. Furthermore, semi-structured interviews are a chance to develop a conversation along one or more lines without most of the usual chatter that accompanies such talk. At the same time, through the use of open-ended questions, the interviewee is given the opportunity to shape his or her own responses or even to change the direction of the interview altogether. (2005, p. 94-95)

The insights elaborated on by Fife (2005) were particularly relevant to interacting with interviewees. In South Korea, qualitative interviews were rather new, and except for a few individuals with more well-known public profiles, most people had never been asked to talk about their experiences in the form of an interview. Furthermore, informal and casual interactions with South Koreans required extensive relationship building that could not be easily accomplished within a four-month period. In this context, pre-developed, open-ended questions were helpful in getting the interviewees to agree to interact with the

author. Semi-structured interviewing also allowed interviewees to provide additional information that went beyond the authors' questions, and allowed the author the flexibility to modify terminology that may have seemed confusing or misleading to interviewees.

Initially, the main questions were pre-developed in order to identify the following eight issues: 1) the way in which interviewees defined conflict resolution and civil society; 2) their experience with the democratisation process; 3) their motives for engaging in conflict resolution activities; 4) particular activities / programmes in which they were participating or which they were implementing; 5) the benefits of conflict resolution work; 6) the weaknesses of their conflict resolution programmes; 7) the challenges they had found in further expanding conflict resolution programmes in the country; and 8) the value of conflict resolution programmes in relation to democracy. All interviews included interviewees' responses to the eight pre-developed questions. (Please see Annex 1 and Annex 2 in order to review how the author provided the aforementioned questions to research participants.)

It should be acknowledged that as the field research continued, new terms were added and certain terminologies were rephrased to help interviewees better understand the questions being asked. For example, peace activism, peace education, conflict resolution, dispute resolution, or conflict transformation were rather interchangeable to interviewees. Specifically, when using the term "conflict resolution," interviewees frequently related it to a range of peace activism, peace movements, or peace educational settings. Thus, in this dissertation, the author introduces their encounter with conflict resolution by using the term 'PCR methodology', 'PCR activism', and 'PCR movement' to

highlight the interconnectivity between peace activism and conflict resolution movements in South Korea.

The interviewees were identified primarily through archival studies and expert interviews with the two key individuals who played a critical role in introducing the author to the community. Two sampling criteria were used to identify interviewees. First, the author utilised an elite interviewing strategy — a "specialised case of interviewing that focuses on interviewees considered to be influential, prominent, and/or well-informed people in an organisation" (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p.113). Leaders and senior staff members were selected for interviews because of their expertise and extensive knowledge of their organisations' history and programme development, which might not have been available in documents provided by the organisations. Second, the author adopted the theoretical or purposive sampling strategy, which selects "groups or categories to study on the basis of their relevance to one's research questions, analytical framework, and arguments or explanation that one is developing" (Mason, 2002, p.124). The purposive sampling strategy helped the author identify individual participants who had engaged in the country's PCR activism. The interviews aimed to understand how the interviewees' experiences with conflict resolution practices had shaped their participation patterns in a public sphere.

The profiles of interviewees are organised in the Table1. The Table 1 includes the date and venue of the interviews, as well as the interviewees' aliases, genders, ages, and experiences with democratisation. To honour the confidentiality and anonymity agreement made between the author and interviewees, the names of specific individuals are not identified at any time in

this dissertation[10]. When their statements are incorporated into the dissertation, their aliases indicate whose statements have been used: interviewees from WMP-CR Centre, School Peace, and Peace Activist Network are given code names CR, SP, and PAN respectively, plus numbers. All other interviewees are given the initial 'CSO' plus a number.

Table 1: Profiles of 54 Interviews

Date and Location	Alias	Gender	Age	Democratisation
May 24, 2007 at a youth center, Seoul	CR1	F	40s	Yes
Jan 26, 2007 & June 19, 2007 at CR2's office in Seoul	CR2	F	40s	Yes
May 21, 2007 at CR3's office in Seoul	CR3	F	30s	N/A
April 10, 2007 at CR4's office in Seoul	CR4	F	20s	Yes
May 23, 2007 at CR5's office in Seoul	CR5	F	20s	N/A
May 24, 2007 at a pub in Seoul	CR6	F	40s	Yes
May 30, 2007 at CR7's office in Seoul	CR7	M	30s	N/A
May 28, 2007 at CR8's office in Seoul	CR8	M	30s	Yes
May 30, 2007 at a café in Seoul	CR9	F	40S	Yes
Jan 26, 2007 & June 20, 2007 in CR10's office in Seoul	CR10	M	30s	N/A
May 21, 2007 at CR11's office in Seoul	CR11	M	30s	N/A
May 21, 2007 at CR12's office in Seoul	CR12	F	20s	N/A
June 14, 2007 at a Buddhist Temple in Yeojoo	CR13	M	30s	Yes
April 23, 2007 at a SP1's office in Seoul	SP1	F	40s	Yes
April 25, 2007 at a SP2's office in Gwacheon	SP2	F	30s	N/A
April 30, 2007 at a Nation Zoo in Gwacheon	SP3	F	40s	Yes
April 23, 2007 at a SP4's office in Seoul	SP4	M	30s	N/A
April 25, 2007 at a SP5's office in Gwacheon	SP5	F	40s	Yes
April 30, 2007 at a National Zoo in Gwacheon	SP6	F	40s	Yes
April 30, 2007 at a National Zoo in Gwacheon	SP7	F	40s	Yes
Jan 29, 2007 at a PAN1's office in Seoul	PAN1	M	50s	Yes
Jan 29, 2007 at a pub in Seoul	PAN2	F	20s	N/A
April 16, 2007 at a PAN3's office in Incheon	PAN3	M	40s	Yes
May 2, 2007 at a PAN4's office in Seoul	PAN4	M	30s	N/A
May 2, 2007 at a PAN5's office in Seoul	PAN5	M	30s	N/A
May 2, 2007 at a PAN6's office in Seoul	PAN6	M	50s	Yes
Jan 29, 2007 at a PAN7's office in Seoul	PAN7	M	50s	Yes
May 11, 2007 at a café in Seoul	PAN8	F	40s	Yes
April 17, 2007 at a PAN9's office in Seoul	PAN9	M	30s	N/A
June 14, 2007 at a Buddhist Tempe in Yeojoo	PAN10	F	40s	Yes
May 10, 2007 at a PAN11's office in Seoul	PAN11	M	20s	N/A
April 30, 2007 on the subway from Ansan to Seoul	PAN12	F	40s	Yes
Jan 29, 2007 at a PAN13's office in Seoul	PAN13	F	20s	N/A
May 10, 2007 at a PAN14's office in Seoul	PAN14	M	40s	Yes
May 10, 2007 at a PAN15's office in Seoul	PAN15	M	50s	Yes
May 26, 2007 at a pub in Seoul	CSO1	F	30s	N/A
Jan 30, 2007 At CSO2's office, moved to her car, and continued interviews at a restaurant in Seoul	CSO2	F	60s	Yes
June 15, 2007 at a Buddhist temple in Yeojoo	CSO3	F	50s	Yes
May 28, 2007 at a pub in Seoul	CSO4	F	30s	N/A
June 1, 2007 at a CSO5's office in Seoul	CSO5	F	50s	Yes
June 1, 2007 at a CSO6's office in Seoul	CSO6	M	40s	Yes

[10] In addition to their names and initials, the author did not include the organizational affiliation of the individual interviewed to prevent their identity from being exposed.

May 25, 2007 at a CSO7's office in Seoul	CSO7	M	40s	Yes
May 26, 2007 at a CSO8's office in Seoul	CSO8	M	30s	Yes
June 4, 2007 at a CSO9's office in Seoul	CSO9	M	40s	Yes
June 1, 2007 at a café in Seoul	CSO10	F	20s	N/A
April 18, 2007 at CSO11's office	CSO11	F	20s	N/A
April 26, 2007 at CSO12's office	CSO12	M	40s	Yes
April 18, 2007 at CSO13's office	CSO13	F	50s	Yes
May 14, 2007 at a school cafeteria in Seoul	CSO14	F	40s	Yes
April 26, 2007 at a CSO15's office	CSO15	F	40s	Yes
April 3, 2007 at a pub in Seoul	CSO16	F	30s	N/A
April 6, 2007 at a café in Seoul	CSO17	F	20s	N/A
April 4, 2007 at CSO18's office in Seoul	CSO18	M	20s	N/A
April 5, 2007 at CSO19's office in Seoul	CSO19	M	30s	N/A

In January 2007, seven interviews were conducted with key informants who were actively engaged in the field of PCR in South Korea. This initial set of interviews played a critical role in developing a general overview of PCR activities in Korean civil society. The participants also introduced the author to other interviewees who were interviewed during the field trip between April and June 2007. Dan (2008) cautions researchers not to assume that key informants are representative of the group to be studied. As stated above, during the field research, two individuals were especially helpful, as they helped the author build rapport and trust with group members. They were considered the key informants for this research. Without their willingness to participate in the study, critical information on their work would not have been obtained. Additional interviews with those introduced by the key informants, as well as interviews with individuals who the author contacted independently, were extremely valuable in assessing the information obtained during the author's interaction with the two key informants.

Most interviews were conducted in Seoul, the capital city of South Korea where peace and conflict activism was concentrated and where the majority of civil society organisations were registered. This does not dismiss efforts undertaken outside of Seoul where approximately ten interviews were

conducted, requiring extra travel. The venue for interviews varied, but the majority of interviews took place in interviewees' offices and nearby cafes and pubs. Some interviews were undertaken in subways, parks, or other informal settings. The style of interviews changed depending on the venue. For example, the interviews conducted in offices were more structured and questionnaire-based, due to time constraints, whereas the interviews outside of the office environment were more conversational and less structured. Except for two interviews, all of the interviews with male participants were conducted in their offices, whereas the venue of interviews for female participants varied. The formality of the office venue highlighted the gender dynamics between the author (a female in her late 20s) and the interview participants (males between 30s and 50s).

In total, 85% of the interviews were recorded with the interviewees' permission, and 15% were not recorded due to technical problems encountered during the field research. Throughout the field research, a total of 54 political activists, NGO practitioners, academic-practitioners, and citizens were interviewed - 13 in relation to WMP-CR Centre, 7 in relation to School Peace, and 15 in relation to the PAN. The remaining 19 interviewees were met to identify more comprehensively the existing conflict resolution practices being implemented in South Korean civil society. In terms of gender breakdown, 31 interviewees were female and 23 were male. The higher proportion of females represented in the interview data is related to the fact that conflict resolution practices were first implemented by women's movement organisations, which attempted to bring about social change through cultural and attitudinal shifts, as well as institutional reform. PAN3

(Personal interview, 16 April 2007) raised an interesting point during the field research with regard to the higher representation of females in the field of PCR in South Korea.

> Hard politics (policymaking in diplomacy and security issues) is considered a masculine realm reserved for male activists. Reunification, advocacy, or major political activities involved are often considered as a more masculine space. In soft politics such as the cultural realm, for example, conflict resolution education or peace education in school – all of the topics related to grassroots politics and ordinary people's day-to-day life – are considered to be more feminine subject.

The majority of interviewees were engaged in the oppositional democratic movement in the 1980s and early 1990s. Some interviewees had joined the movement as university student activists, while others had participated in the movement through progressive faith-based organisations. The research found that their activism experience in the 1980s played a significant role in defining their views on the role of civil society in the democratic process. About 20% of interviewees were in their late 20s and early 30s, and had attended university in the mid and late 1990s, when student activism began to decline on campuses. Many of these participants had been politically active throughout their university lives and they were considered the first generation of NGO professionals, working exclusively in the third sector as full-time staff members.

In terms of organisational association, most interviewees (both practitioners and participants) contacted for this research project had worked for a wide variety of advocacy groups related to women's rights, consumer rights, social justice, global peace, regional peace, political reform, anti-corruption, North Korea, environmental issues, human rights, and the urban poor. In terms of their political spectrum, most of these organisations were considered reform-oriented and liberal.

Anonymity and confidentiality were reoccurring themes for many research participants – particularly those who were younger and new to the field - due to the fear of misperception by established civil society veterans. Furthermore, some interviewees expressed concern that conservative newspapers and groups wishing to undermine civil society's contribution to South Korea might misuse their statements or insights. Despite the statement of assurance that the recording would be transcribed by the author only and that their identities would remain anonymous, interviewees wanted to reconfirm that statement of assurance in moments in which they were compelled to assess critically or challenge the status quo of South Korean civil society activism. Such concern was legitimate given that one of the civil society research projects that Joo et al. (2006) undertook as part of the Global Civil Society Index Project was quoted out of context by conservative newspapers, and it undermined the contributions made by civil society organisations (CSO 14, Personal interview, 14 May 2007).

The interviewees' caution made the author more mindful of the research project's potential impact on these interviewees and the progressive civil society circle, given that a range of audiences could access the final outcome of the dissertation through library searches, and that the constituency critical of civil society activism could interpret the findings of this dissertation differently. There is a wide consensus among social scientists that researchers "have the obligation to weigh carefully the potential benefits or contributions of a proposed project against the costs to individual participants" (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992, p.78). Further, as Denzin and Lincoln (2007) reflects, action research often struggles to balance what the author can view as a critical

priority and what the research participants think is relevant to advance their causes. At the same time, such encounters allow reflection on objectivity—the critical distance of the author from research subjects—and neutrality – how one can maintain objectivity without jeopardising the researched.

Documentation

The review of documents, as Marshall and Rossman (1999, p. 116) note, is “an unobtrusive method, rich in portraying the values and beliefs of participants in the setting”. It has two distinct advantages in case study methodology. First, reviewing documents helps researchers develop an in-depth understanding of the setting or group studied. Second, as Yin (2003, p.87) emphasises, documents gathered on-site help “corroborate and augment evidence from other sources”, and support research findings from other means (e.g., qualitative interviews and observation). During field research, a researcher receives a number of valuable documents from case study organisations including program overviews, press clips, publicity materials, and annual reports that are not available to outsiders.

The documents obtained from the three case study organisations were extremely important data because little published information on the organisations was available. While documents from the same organisation have been reviewed and analysed together, cross-organisation analysis has not been conducted with these pieces of data. The detailed overview of the types of unpublished documents that the author used for Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 is outlined in Annex 4.

Observation

Observation is a qualitative data collection method entailing the systematic noting and recording of events and behaviours in the social setting chosen for study (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). As explained by DeWalt and DeWalt (2002, p.92), observation helps the author develop “a holistic understanding of the phenomena under study” This highly important and fundamental method enables the investigator to discover complex interactions in natural social settings, to learn things that cannot be revealed in interviews or questionnaires, and to understand the context of activities in depth. The observation undertaken during the field research period for this study was not merely limited to events, meetings, or workshops convened by the three case study organisations. While the data obtained from such visits was primary information for this dissertation, the author also obtained insight by observing the civil society arena and the overall societal contexts of South Korea.

Spending approximately four months in South Korea was helpful to understand better the overall societal context in which PCR activism was practiced. Furthermore, such observation provided the author with the opportunity to interact regularly with ordinary individuals. Extensive conversations with these individuals were helpful to understand more fully how the mainstream population understood PCR practices. Such observation processes required the author to introduce the research project to ordinary South Koreans. Inevitably, these observations were interpreted through the author’s class and educationally privileged lens, but they also resulted in a greater frequency of interaction with people from similarly privileged backgrounds – educated and politically conscious individuals who were familiar with Korean politics, international affairs, and civil society discourses. However,

it became apparent that PCR practices were highly cutting-edge subjects. This observation was made based upon the fact that the author had to explain the core notions of PCR multiple times. The Korean translation of the basic terminology of PCR had not yet been fully mainstreamed, and it required a great deal of additional explanation.

In addition, because civil society is a politically charged concept to the right wing or conservative population, the author's research project provoked a negative reaction from individuals who identified themselves as conservative leaning. When the author interacted with a politically conservative male in his late 50s, he lectured her about the role of South Korean civil society in interrupting social harmony. He said, "How can you assume that civil society, which contributes to disharmonising the Korean society through protests, can be connected to peace making and problem-solving? Civil society's presence creates conflicts in our society."[11] Within the more progressive civil society, advocacy, rights, and reform agendas were the main activities undertaken by influential organisations, and PCR activism was considered something of an experiment undertaken by a few pioneers.

In addition to observing the civil society dynamics and general perception on PCR in close proximity, the observation method allowed the author to attend a wide range of meetings, seminars, and training programmes open to civil society practitioners and/or the public. There were specific benefits to attending these meetings, seminars, and training programmes and interacting with other participants. It helped to assess whether interview

[11] The conversation took place on 8 April 2007 when the author attended a meeting organized by a Catholic Church parish in Seoul, and the gentleman is an educated professional in his late 50s and works in a respectful corporation with senior ranks. The conversation was noted because it represented one of many reactions that the author experienced during the field research process.

samples were sufficient to obtain the necessary information to develop the dissertation. For example, by attending these gatherings over a period of four months, the author was able to identify the general profile of participants engaged in PCR activism. At the same time, attending helped to identify those who were not present in these settings. Visiting these meetings helped the author better understand how PCR terminologies were shared with others by civil society practitioners. Furthermore, observation was specifically helpful as it allowed the author to note to what extent conflict resolution activities and their benefits were manifested in people's behaviour in their natural work settings.

Conclusion

This chapter began by explaining why this dissertation chose case study methodology as an overarching methodological framework. It demonstrated that the case study is suited to investigating a key research question of this dissertation – contributions of PCR activities to civil society's democracy nurturing function – in a context-specific and in-depth manner. As this dissertation is an exploratory study on the emergent field of PCR in South Korean civil society, a quantitative study, which would require a large number of samples, was unsuitable. The case study approach helps this dissertation to convey more fully the negotiated meaning of PCR activism by South Korean civil society activists, and allows the author to take a more nuanced approach to assessing peace and conflict activism in South Korea. Specifically, the author argues that the case study methodology allows this dissertation to capture the ways in which civil society participants interpret the experiences with PCR activities provided by the three civil society groups featured in this dissertation. In addition, by allowing the author to utilise multiple data collection methods, the

case study strategy helps the author understand the assumptions and motivations civil society participants have with regard to PCR activism, and how they articulate the values obtained through their exposure to these civil society groups' activities.

Guided by the case study strategy, the author identified the necessary information needed to develop this dissertation and designed four months of field research, which involved qualitative interviews, observation, and documentation. The chapter explained why this dissertation utilised multiple data collection methods, and how the findings from these different methods contributed to corroborating the same phenomenon – that is, three case study units during the field research in South Korea. This chapter also presented the reflections that the author made during the field research, such as the power-cultural dynamics affecting the researcher-researched relationship and insider-outsider dynamics observed throughout the fieldwork. Further, the author shared practical challenges encountered in utilising these three different data collection techniques – documentation, qualitative semi-structured interviewing, and observation – and described the profiles of the interviewees and the author's engagement with them.

CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATISATION IN SOUTH KOREA

Civil society is not a fixed concept separated from one's historical contexts, as Kumar (1993) rightly indicated. Its emergence is a response to the particular political context in which a civil society is situated. Similarly, the occurrence of PCR activism is reflective of one's political history as illustrated in Gidron et al. (2003, cf. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3)'s study on PCR organisations in four conflict-affected areas. Therefore, the author argues that a detailed account of South Korea's political history over the last 100 years provides insights into the context in which the country's civil society emerged and evolved over time.

This dissertation explores PCR organisations that emerged in post-transitional South Korea, and aims to understand their contributions to deepening democratic processes. One of the key arguments is that PCR activism is civil society's pragmatic response to growing social conflicts. The historical analysis of the South Korean civil society and its evolution helps to contextualise this claim as it demonstrates that antagonism, fierce struggles, conformity, and outcome-focused reasoning were defining features of civil society for over 100 years. Thus, this dissertation contends that PCR activism is a nascent phenomenon within South Korea's civil society because it advocates constructive problem solving and engagement with others, and it emphasises processes of forming discourses over outcomes of activism.

The first part of this chapter is dedicated to demonstrating that until the democratic transition, the country's civil society, which emerged in the late 19th century and early 20th century to challenge the despotic social order and

imperialism, served as a space for resistance and struggles. The first section, therefore, highlights the last 100 years of challenges to democratisation efforts and contingent demands of developing a democratic practice in South Korea. In light of over 100 years of turbulence – forced modernisation (1875 – 1910), imperialism (1910-1945), North-South Korean conflictual dynamics (1948-present), and military dictatorships, and authoritarianism (1948-1987), antagonism had long been the defining feature of civil society in its attempt to create a democratic space. The consistent suppression of civil society voices throughout the country's modern history radicalised civil society, and confrontation was utilised to preserve a democratic space where citizens' voices could be channelled (Chang, 2008; Sohn, 1996). The first section of this historical chapter further substantiates that the Gramcian emancipation vision endorsed by South Korean civil society activities is an inevitable product of the country's historical context, and that the emancipatory vision legitimized the civil society's antagonistic and conflictual dynamics with state apparatus and vested interests in the country.

The second part of this chapter looks at South Korea's democratic transition in 1987, and the subsequent consolidation processes from 1987 to 2002, and examines to what extent civil society plays a role in various stages of democratisation. This section highlights the rapidly changing political context in which South Korean civil society operates, and illustrates the evolving role of civil society. By emphasising civil society organisations' contributions to democratic reform through its advocacy function and their contributions to the democratic transition and consolidation processes, this section continues to illustrate that due to growing democratic reform needs, the country's civil

society has not fully re-defined its core characteristics from a space for emancipation to a space for facilitation of public discourses and the advancement of democratic learning.

The final section of this chapter focuses on key challenges that South Korea faced in furthering democratic consolidation, and highlights the context in which PCR organisations have developed and their evolving role in Korean civil society. Specifically, this section will examine how social conflicts and civil society's role in this context have become problematical to policy makers, commentators, and civil society practitioners, and what responses have been made to resolve these conflicts. This dissertation concurs with Kim et al. (2005) and Lee (2005) that democratisation in the country opened a space where various social conflicts – pre-existing and emergent – could surface freely. This section will highlight that civil society's partiality to social issues was less problematic, and to a certain extent welcomed by citizens until the mid-1990s, when very few institutions in the country were equipped to raise critical democratic reform issues. With the further integration of the democratic consolidation process in the late 1990s and early 2000s, citizens' overall capacity to raise their concerns and government's responsiveness have expanded, and progressive civil society had become less representative of the country's civil society. As a result, the author contends that civil society's partiality to certain social issues, and its fixation on civil society's role in challenging the status quo and altering unequal social structures began to be viewed as a contributing factor to growing social conflicts in the country.

This chapter is founded on a comprehensive literature review of Korean political history and civil society movements as well as on interview transcripts

from the 2007 field research. Given the impact of South Korean political history on the development of the country's civil society, a number of interviewees referred to historical incidents or their experiences with some of the critical historical moments. Because the focus of the interviews was on the country's PCR activism, this chapter used segments of transcripts in which interviewees referenced the country's history[12].

Contemporary Political History: Prior to Democratisation in 1987

Modernization and Japanese Occupation (1875-1945)

Modern Korean history began in 1875 when the last monarchy— the *Chosun* Dynasty — was forced to open its border by Japan. In an attempt to modernise a centuries-old monarchy that had maintained a closed-door policy for over a half century, ruling political elites and aristocrats put into place various measures and introduced modern political, economic, educational, and military systems. Despite their efforts, *realpolitik* of the late 19th century in East Asia negatively affected Korea, which was surrounded by major powers including China, Russia, and Japan. In 1910, the country was officially annexed to the Japanese Empire, experiencing a thirty-six year colonial rule (Hytreck & Shin, 2002, p. 150).

While the legacy of colonialism is highly contested, scholars in the field of Korean Studies agree the colonial experience had a lasting effect on the political development of the Korean Peninsula (Shin, 2002). As Kim (2000, p. 24) rightly summarises, Japanese colonial rule in Korea greatly contributed to "the emergence and development of a pattern of 'conflictual engagements' between the repressive state and the resistant civil society". The Japanese

[12] For interviewees' profile, please see Chapter 3 or Annex 3.

colonial period effectively limited the development of autonomous groups and democratic civil society space (Steinberg, 1997). Private groups of a non-political nature were allowed to exist, but they were kept under strict surveillance. Although severely disempowered and manipulated by a colonial state apparatus, (civil) society emerged in an attempt to preserve an emancipatory space for radical political discourses, such as those regarding national resistance struggle, anarchism, socialism, and communism (Steinberg, 1997). Every time civil society was mobilised in protest against the colonial rule, they were severely prosecuted by colonial authorities. The powerful state apparatus of the Japanese Empire engaged with the mass population in an extremely exploitative way throughout its occupation (Hytreck & Shin, 2002). A case in point was the 1919 National Resistance Movement, which mobilized the population to demand independence from the Japanese authority. A series of more than 1,500 demonstrations lasting roughly 45 days attracted more than 2 million Koreans. Over 7,000 people were killed, 15,000 were wounded, and approximately 45,000 were arrested (Park, 1920).[13]

In addition, throughout the colonial period, workers and peasants were at the forefront of violent struggles against Japanese capitalists and imperialism (Kim, 2000). They resisted unfair treatment and exploitation from the Japanese authorities. Consequently, unions were outlawed, and using their extensive network of police and security forces, the Japanese colonial government effectively suppressed peasants and labour union movements, further

[13] It should be noted the number provided by Park Eunsik, a Korean historian who played an important role in the national resistance movement, is different from the official statistics the Japanese Empire's district governor announced in 1919. The Japanese Official report indicated 553 people were killed, with over 12,000 arrested, while eight policemen and military policemen were killed and 158 were wounded.

radicalising activities and embedding antagonistic patterns of engagement between civil society and the state.

The author agrees with Kim (2000) who argues that the colonial experience between 1910 and 1945 significantly influenced the course of Korea's political history over the next fifty years. It activated the radicalised civic space where left-wing intellectuals, peasants, and labour unions mobilised the population with a view to challenging and replacing the status quo colonial authority (Kim, 2000). Further, the authority's continued exploitation of its colonial subjects radicalised a majority of the population, particularly educated citizens. A lot of intellectuals and activists engaged in national resistance movement drew their inspiration from socialism, a popular ideology in the early 20th century among the colonised population throughout the world. Civil society was synonymous with the underground nationalist resistance and activism, and thus the core characteristics attributed to South Korean civil society became emancipation.

Post-Colonial Transition and Korean War (1945-1953)

In 1945, when the Japanese Empire collapsed, the Korean Peninsula gained independence, and underwent a three-year military occupation by two rising super-powers of the post-World War II world order — the Soviet Union and the U.S. Although extremely limited, independence from the Japanese Empire replaced the country's governance structure, providing Koreans with an opportunity to experiment with democracy. For example, the U.S. Army Military Government (USAMG), which occupied the Southern part of the country between 1945 and 1948, claimed that the U.S. advocated pluralistic democracy in the South (Kim, 2000). The USAMG's antagonistic engagement with radical,

progressive civil society forces, however, testified that the U.S. tolerance of pluralism was limited to right-wing organisations (Park, 1992).

Immediately after independence, progressive social forces that had been suppressed during the colonial era, including peasant organisations and labour movements, began to proliferate (Kim, 2000). The USAMG was deeply suspicious of various society organisations representing the interest of labourers and peasants in particular due to their close association with the Korean Communist Party. In order to suppress the explosion of left-wing civil society, political parties, and media, the USAMG introduced several laws to prohibit labour and peasant movements, closed progressive newspapers, and arrested leftist leaders (Kim, 2000). Furthermore, the U.S. Military Governor restored key colonial administrators and various police collaborators to establish control in the South (Walter, 1966). He has also supported right-wing social organisations advocating anti-communism and anti-Soviet sentiment (Kim, 2000). In so doing, the transitional period in South Korea witnessed again the suppression of diversity within civil society, and reinforced the conflict dynamics between the state and civil society.

Reports indicated that in North Korea the Soviet authority supported communists loyal to Moscow and suppressed the more nationalist/independent communist and socialist leaders — a number of non-Soviet loyal communists were prosecuted during this time (Kim, 2000). However, the Soviet intervention in the Korean Peninsula was much less confrontational than the United States' intrusiveness, because the educated population, peasants, and labourers generally supported socialist ideals versus capitalism. On the other hand, the United States put forth a major effort to strengthen US loyalists, to convince the

population of the danger of communism, and to establish active civil society as a root cause of social chaos (Park, 1996). In other words, the military occupation by these superpowers created a complex social dynamic and ignited a power struggle between different factions of social, economic, and political elites (Hahm, 1994).

As a result, the transitional period not only created a region intensely influenced by the Cold War's ideological battle, but also generated situations conducive to violent clashes and civil wars between various social groups (Shin, 1999). Between 1945 and 1950, there were a number of violent engagements between militant socialists and right-wing militias, and thousands of innocent civilians in the South were killed, as they were labelled communists or communist sympathisers (Shin, 1999). Although there are not many accurate historical documents testifying to situations in the North, eyewitnesses and remaining historical records confirm similar situations took place in the Soviet-controlled North.[14]

In 1948, the plan to hold free elections throughout the Peninsula failed. As a result, two separate nations were established in the North and South, with ideologically different political, economic, and social systems. Yet between 1948 and early 1950, Koreans were able to move freely between the arbitrary borders of the two Koreas. During this period, most radical, left-leaning civil society organisations in South Korea either went to the North or went underground. The Republic of Korea's history began officially in 1948 with the election of the First Republic headed by President Syngman Rhee (1948–1960),

[14] It is greatly contested as to what happened in North Korea during this post-colonial transitional period. Furthermore, a number of documents on North Korea are highly classified. Available documents elaborating the cruelty of extra-judiciary killings of innocents were often developed by conservative and right-wing figures.

a strong anti-communist politician backed by the United States (Schmitz, 1999). There were a number of problems with the Rhee administration in terms of managing the country's democratisation process (Kim, 2000). In particular, his administration further reinforced the antagonistic dynamics between the state and civil society by suppressing the development of autonomous civil society in the country (Kim, 2000).

In order to minimise the influence of communists and ideology-based social conflicts, Rhee engaged with the colonial state apparatus, including those officials who held key positions during colonial rule (Kim, 2000). By absorbing colonial elites into his powerbase, Rhee was confronted by civil society organisations and opponents who demanded the prosecution of collaborators who accumulated wealth during the colonial period. During the interview, CSO13 (Personal interview, 18 April 2007) explained that the issue of handling colonial collaborators became "an issue for progressive civil society" because of Rhee's policy. In an effort to deal with his political dilemmas and suppress oppositional voices within civil society, Rhee's regime institutionalised anti-communism measures. In 1949, the Special Act on Anti-Subversion (commonly known as the National Security Law) was passed in order to prohibit all activities that aimed at "subverting the state" and preventing "unsound thought" (Lim, 2006). The law allowed people to be punished for any activities suspicious of disturbing the state's status quo, and enabled the government to arrest people for their thoughts and intent. A number of intellectuals and activists were prosecuted under this law; in 1949 alone, more than 118,621 persons were arrested and imprisoned under the National Security Law (Lim, 2006).

The author concurs with the analysis of Kim (2000), who posited that the post-colonial transition era set a precedent for oppressive measures against civil society and played a detrimental role in the democratisation process in South Korea. Despite a window of opportunity to nurture civil society for dialogue, any open discussion on controversial subjects or ideologically contracting views were suppressed and anti-democratic political manoeuvres were encouraged in order to install a U.S.-friendly government in the Korean Peninsula. In addition, the transitional period allowed future Korean governments to exploit anti-communism as a way to suppress opposition and civil society groups. Thereafter, rooting communism out of the country was always viewed as justifiable at any cost — human rights abuses against individuals were allowed as long as the state named the recipients as communists. Individuals associated with communism or anti-state ideals were denied rights to due process and fair trials.

In the midst of political chaos, the country entered into a full-scale conflict with Soviet-backed North Korea on 25 June 1950 (Gorchakov et al., 1993). North Korea claimed to want to liberate the South from the US and other Japanese collaborators who continued to oppress Koreans. The intense conflict continued for over three years, killing or wounding over 2.5 million people throughout the Korean Peninsula; 80% of casualties were estimated to be civilians (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Countless human rights abuses were reported as both North Korean and South Korean militaries committed serious war crimes — innocent civilians were executed through extrajudicial processes as they were suspected of supporting the other side (Gleditsch et al., 2002). In

1953, the civil war ended with the Korean Armistice Agreement - a cease-fire agreement, not a peace agreement.

The Korean War not only ended the existence of progressive, left-leaning ideals in civil society, but also created complex perceptions toward democracy and diversity within civil society (Kim, 2000). While people desired the right to influence the political process through elections, many were also fearful of the chaos or social disharmony that transitional democracy had brought to the country. The memory of the Korean War created the perception that proliferation of progressive social groups was destructive to the society's well being. To a certain extent, this explains why a majority of Koreans tolerated military rule in the 1960s and 1970s despite their disapproval of the military government's anti-democratic measures (Lee, 2002).

After the Korean War and the Rise of Park Chung-Hee (1953-1979)

As the war destroyed a majority of the country's industrial infrastructures, South Korea became increasingly dependent on the US for its national security and economic survival. In post-war South Korea, popular support for Rhee was extremely weak and he was constantly confronted with opposition. In response, Rhee's regime became increasingly authoritarian, and government corruption and injustice were widespread. The ruling party manipulated the two presidential elections that took place in 1952 and 1956, irregularities and fraud were reported, and the ruling party prosecuted oppositional and critical voices that emerged in civil society (Kim, 1995). In 1960, after Rhee won a fourth term in office, a wave of pro-democracy uprisings initiated by pro-democracy student groups and labour unions swept across the country, condemning the election fraud and calling for Rhee's

resignation (Kim, 1995). Eventually, Rhee was forced into exile and replaced by a democratically elected administration headed by Prime Minister Jang Myon (1960-61) and President Yoon Bo Seon. During the Second Republic (1960-1961), the country switched to a parliamentary cabinet system of governance from a presidential system in order to avoid a concentration of power in a single individual (Lee, 2002).

The Second Republic fits into a replacement model of democratisation as the people's uprising supported by student activists overthrew the illegitimate, authoritarian regime (Huntingdon, 1992); it also offered the second opportunity for South Koreans to experiment with democracy. Due to the critical role that civil society played in overthrowing Rhee's regime, the Second Republic recognized the proliferation of civil society organisations, particularly from the leftist grassroots entities, labour unions, and student groups (Kim, 2000). These groups' voices were expressed in the form of public protests. Around 2,000 demonstrations were held during the eight months of the Second Republic (Yang, 1999). The most important political agenda items this progressive political force advocated were re-visiting US-Korean relations and a strategy for rapid reunification. During an interview, PAN1 (Personal interview, 29 January 2007) explained that the idea of peaceful reunification was misunderstood in the 1960s, and misunderstood perceptions had an impact on the development of the early peace movement in South Korea. He said,

> The roots of peace activism in South Korea can be traced to the 1960s when theorists such as Hahm Seok-Hyeon advocated peaceful reunification and non-violence. Yet, the early peace movement was based upon abstract ideas, and did not secure the support from broader population due to the fact that the Second Republic was established only 8 years after the end of the Korean War.

The proliferation of progressive autonomous groups provoked the conservative population, triggering the mobilising of right-wing organisations. They advocated the anti-communism slogan and fiercely opposed the rise of progressive organisations. A series of demonstrations took place, initiated by both rightists and leftists, and some turned into violent clashes (Kim, 2000). The Second Republic was unable to resolve the ideological polarisation and Koreans' intensifying fear of another civil war because of increased tension between right-wing groups and leftists (Kim, 2000). In addition, the country's economic conditions had become worse — currency lost half its value against the US Dollar within six months, and inflation and unemployment soared (Nahm, 2000).

Social and economic instability and the inability of the Second Republic to manage these effectively further burdened the fragile democracy in the country and left it ripe for military overthrow. In 1961, military officers staged a coup, claiming the country needed strong leadership to restore political order and pursue rapid economic development. The country's second democratisation experiment ended unsuccessfully as it regressed to another authoritarian rule. Military juntas blamed progressive civil society organisations for failing the country's potential political and economic well-being, and propagated that diversity and political pluralism were dangerous to South Korea (Kim, 2000). The military order put strong restrictions on autonomous civil society movements, and banned numerous political activities of civil society groups.

After two years of emergency military rule, the leader of the 1961 coup, Park Chung-Hee (1961-1979) was elected to head the new government in 1963.

The legacy of Park's military rule is highly contested by Koreans, and is currently one of the issues, which defines one's political spectrum in South Korea. Park represented an era when Korea rose to economic power at the expense of democracy, and his rule has created heated debates among conflicting ideologies of economic progress, political freedom, and social justice.

Conservative academics such as Hahn (1993) tend to be apologetic for the authoritarian behaviours of Park and argue that political oppression was necessary to pursue a coordinated economic policy in a focused way. During his 18-year rule, the country grew by 8.5% on an annual basis (Hahn, 1993), and the per capita GNP rose rapidly from USD 87 in 1961 to USD 1,242 in 1978. On the other hand, as echoed by revisionists or progress academicians such as Kim (1993) and Park (1992), the effect of such military rule was detrimental to the development of democracy and civil society in South Korea. By prioritising centralised rapid economic development over political democratisation, Park justified his authoritarian rule, which severely suppressed oppositional civil society leaders, politicians, intellectuals, and religious figures. Several interviewees that the author met during the field research, including PAN1 (2007), PAN6 (2007), PAN7 (2007), and CSO2 (2007), engaged in pro-democracy movements during Park's regime, and CSO2 (Personal interview, 30 January 2007) expressed the restriction that she felt during this era and recounted the damage that Park's rule had inflicted on the country's equitable development and political freedom. The following summarises the negative impact that Park's rule had on the country's democratic development and civil society.

By staying in power for 18 years, Park undermined various democratic procedures introduced during the short-lived Second Republic and banned the rights of citizens to participate in presidential elections. In 1972, Park introduced the Yushin Constitution, which gave unlimited power to Park and eliminated the direct electoral system. The Park regime justified this by announcing this change was necessary to avoid any internal security risks that might make South Korea vulnerable to its counterpart in the North (Kim, 1978). In response, pro-democracy student groups were fiercely opposed and organised a series of protests. On a monthly basis, there was an average of 100 protests recorded in 1972 (Chang, 2008). In response, Park issued a series of Emergency Decrees to silence protests. To silence oppositional civil society and justify his anti-democratic measures, Park also exploited the population's hostility toward their communist neighbour by fabricating criminal cases, targeting oppositional political figures and civil society activists. One notable case was the 'People's Revolution Party Incident[15]', which was officially announced in late 2007 as fabrications of Park's regime. These fabrications evoked emotional reactions by a civil society activist that the author met in 2007, and CSO5 (Personal interview, 1 June 2007) explained that the People's Revolution Party Incident was one of many examples of why she had a "difficult time to hold more tolerant perspective towards conservatives in South Korea". She asked how to apply a

[15] The People's Revolution Party Incident involved twenty-three individuals who were alleged to re-establish the People's Revolution Party, an underground communist party supported by North Korea. Park's regime accused this party of attempting to overthrow the South Korean administration. These individuals were arrested due to their alleged connection to the Democratic Students Movement, a leading student group that staged anti-government/anti-dictatorship demonstrations in the 1970s. Eight of them were sentenced to death, and the rest were sentenced to life imprisonment. Those who were sentenced to death were executed eighteen hours after the verdict was announced in the High Court. In 2007, the Korean Supreme Court corrected its original verdict of 1975 and announced all those who were prosecuted in 1975 were innocent. In April 2007, the author visited a public event which commemorated the death of those who were executed during People's Revolution Party Incident, and tear-filled testimonies of the wives of those executed provoked strong emotional reaction to Park's rule.

conflict resolution technique to engage in such a case “where there is a clear wrongdoing by the state” (CSO5, personal interview, 1 June 2007).

Park further used anti-communist rhetoric to suppress any criticisms toward him and introduced various dictatorial measures under the banner of anti-communism. To silence dissidents, Park’s regime restored the National Security Law in 1961 and 1962 (the law was discarded by the Second Republic to protect political and civil rights) and introduced the Special Act on Anti-Communism. Under these rules, numerous dissidents, including politicians from the opposition, were arrested and prosecuted (National Human Rights Committee, 2008). The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was strengthened to arrest and detain anyone suspicious of wrongdoing or harbouring anti-state sentiments. Citizens complaining about the regime were often alleged to violate the National Security Law and were detained without due process. Anti-government organisations led by university students and urban intellectuals were suppressed through special decrees, campus shutdowns, and curfews (Kim, 2000). Under the National Security Law, dissident intellectuals, movement groups, student activists, and religious leaders critical of the regime were frequently declared illegal or anti-national (Steinberg, 1997). The National Security Law was another point of contention among progressive civil society activists that the author met. CSO9 (Personal interview, 4 June 2007) questioned: “how one can apply a problem-solving approach to engaging with conservative parliamentarians who refused to abolish this out-dated and anti-democratic legislation which had been instrumentalised by authoritarian leaders to silence civil society”.

In addition to intellectual activists, dissidents, student activists, and religious organisations, labour unions voiced their criticisms towards Park's regime. The emergence of labour union movements in the 1970s was notable because all labour-related activism was suppressed and prosecuted during the late 1940s and early 1950s due to its close connection to the Korean Communist Party (Kim, 2000). The 1970s labour union movement focused on working conditions and workers' welfare, given numerous conditions that Korean industrial workers had to endure in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. long working hours, no minimum wage, no right to organise, etc.) (Kim, 2000). To suppress labour union movements and workers' politicisation, in 1973, when the fourth constitution was announced, Park made it clear no workers could strike in state or local autonomous governments, state-run enterprises, public utility businesses, or enterprises that had serious influence on the national economy (Kim, 1978). Under the fourth constitution, virtually all Korean companies were protected, as most of them were promoted under the export-oriented policy. Park's policy on the suppression of workers' rights indirectly contributed to the formation of a militant labour movement, further politicised industrial workers, and fostered the antagonism between the state and labour unions. The issue of labour union activism would later become one of the most contentious social issues in the country after democratisation. During an interview, CR8 (Personal interview, 28 May 2007) mentioned, "developmental economic policy at the expense of workers' rights allowed the state under Park to brutally exploit and suppress any union movements, and the historical legacy further reinforced the antagonistic labour movement in civil society".

Under Park's rule, democratic development was undermined; diverse views and discontents were suppressed, dialogues were non-existent, citizens' participation in the political process was extremely limited, and numerous human rights of individuals were denied. In addition, his rule further institutionalised the confrontational relationship between the state and society — his constant monitoring and controlling of dissidents and his security apparatus discouraged the ideal among activists of nonviolence. Despite its limited capacity, civil society continued to mobilize oppositional voices, and pro-democracy student activism, dissident intellectuals, and progressive church groups sustained the oppositional space for resistance against authoritarian regimes. Chang (2008) argued that Park's repression had unintended consequences of consolidating oppositional civil society movements. Yet, compared to civil society activism in the mid 1980s, oppositional voices under Park's era were less consolidated and activities lacked mass participation (Kim, 2000). This dissertation noted that Park's rule intensified people's ambivalence toward democracy when economic conditions of the country became difficult (Chang, 2008). As described later in the chapter, as every economic crisis affected the population, nostalgia for the authoritarian rule gained strength among the conservative population of the country (Chang, Chu, & Park, 2008).

The End of Park and the Rise of New Military Dictatorship (1979-1986)

The 18-year regime ended with the assassination of Park by his associates in October 1979. Despite citizens' aspirations for democracy, in December 1979, two months after the assassination of Park, young military officers led by General Chun Doo-Hwan (1980-1987) staged a coup and reinstated military rule. Under the martial law of May 1980, all political activities

were banned; leading politicians, government officials, journalists, and dissident intellectuals were arrested; and university campuses were closed down (Kim et al., 2006). By arguing that the new leadership needed to purify the society from communists and anti-government mobs, Chun deployed the military to do police work, arrest activists, and go into campuses to stop students from mobilising for pro-democracy protests.

Despite the repressive measures, Chun continued to be confronted with fierce pro-democracy forces in early 1980. Specifically, in May 1980, citizens in the city of Gwangju were mobilised to challenge the Chun regime's legitimacy, calling for the restoration of democracy in the country. The Gwangju Democratic Uprising, which lasted approximately 10 days, was brutally crushed by extremely repressive measures of special military forces, resulting in the death of approximately 200 civilians and the severe injury of over 2,000 citizens (Korean National Human Rights Committee, 2008). All those prosecuted during the uprising were labelled anti-government and pro-communist rebels, and commemoration was considered an anti-government activity until the late 1980s. In discussing a historical moment that requires peace movement's attention, PAN12 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) accounted, "Gwangju in May 1980 served as a constant reminder to the democratic oppositional movement of why we engaged with the dictatorial forces. The Democratic Uprising had deep impacts on the democratic oppositional movement and civil society (after the transition)"

Three months after the Gwangju Democratic Uprising, Chun became the president of the country based upon the support of the national conference for unification, without direct presidential election. Thus, his legitimacy was

continually challenged and this gave more strength and moral authority to the opposition. To consolidate his power further, Chun continued to introduce intrusive and dictatorial measures throughout 1980, and these measures were targeted specifically to suppress the oppositional civil society.

First, the authorities randomly arrested citizens without warrants, and all of those arrested were denied their basic right to due process. One of the anti-democracy policies launched by Chun's regime was the social purification/cleansing campaign that specifically targeted university students participating in pro-democracy activism. Throughout history, the university campus has been a space to mobilise politically conscious citizens, and student activism played a significant role in shaping the oppositional movement in the country. Between 1981 and 1983, over 1,000 student activists were forcefully enlisted in the military (Im, 2000). These students were sent to special training, were tortured, and were forced to spy on their fellow university students after being released from their service in the military (Im, 2000). Furthermore, university administrators and faculty members were forced to report to various government agencies about their students and their political engagement. As Cummings (1989) explained, for example, a Dean of Students had to report almost daily to several government agencies: police, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, military intelligence units, civil government, and neighbourhood governments. These routine reports identified radical students staging anti-government demonstrations on campuses. These policies were launched to terrorise society and to silence young dissidents, labour activists, and college students participating in anti-government demonstrations (Kim, 2000). Several interviewees that the author met during the field research,

including CR1 (2007), CR2 (2007), CR6 (2007), CR9 (2007), SP1 (2007), SP5 (2007), PAN12 (2007), and CSO 15 (2007), mentioned that they began their activism in the early 1980s as university students, and described the impact on their lives of their experiences with student activism in the 1980s. A few of them, including CR6 (2007), CR9 (2007), SP5 (2007), and PAN12 (2007), described the heavy-handedness of police they witnessed on campus. CR6 said,

> Repression in the 1980s made us question about the government's legitimacy and moral authority. Its continued repression to maintain their power gave little option but to antagonistically engage with the state. In the 1980s, it was clear for us who engaged in the movement which forces you were fighting against. (Personal interview, 24 May 2007)

Second, in order to consolidate the media into a pro-government institution, Chun closed down two privately owned stations and introduced the Basic Press Law. This authoritarian media law asked radio, television stations, newspapers, and magazines to register with the Ministry of Culture and Information, which retained the right to revoke the registration, thus removing the legal right to publish (Chira, 1987). The law also allowed governments to censor the content of print and electronic media — newspapers and television stations frequently received instructions as to what events could be covered and how they should be described. The Bureau of Information Policy issued daily press guidelines to control the media; for example, one item under the press guidelines specifically instructed the press to label anti-government protesters as pro-communist (Youm & Salwen, 1990; Chira, 1987). During the field research, almost all the interviewees that the author met maintained their critical stance against three major daily newspapers in the country because of their support of the regime by distorting democratic movement's legitimacy in their reporting; interviewees portrayed them as the vested interest, which was hostile to the progressive values that civil society advocates.

Third, the regime passed labour laws that were more restrictive than Park's regime in order to decrease union bargaining power. Chun issued the "Purification of Labour Unions", which prohibited labour unions from engaging in any disputes, denying the right of labour organisations to provide support to industrial workers (Shin et al., 2007). Unlawful disruption in the workplace (including any protests against employers) had to be reported to the Labour Office. One hundred-eighteen unions were dissolved, numerous union leaders were arrested for engaging in labour activism, and workers were fired and blacklisted due to their support for unions. Such repression destroyed the space for trade union movements, thus further intensifying the antagonistic engagement of labour unions with the state and the country's economic elites.

As Shin et al. (2007) illustrated in their analysis of Korea's democratic movements, very few demonstrations were reported between 1981 and 1983 due to Chun's extremely repressive measures, which terrorised citizens and monitored anyone suspected as anti-government. As Cummings (1989) rightly pointed out, Chun, like his predecessor Park, exercised exclusive coercive power to control Korean society using its military (more than 600,000 active members on duty), various intelligence agencies (intelligence agencies had influences over virtually all government and public institutions), and paramilitary riot police (more than 150,000 members). Ironically, his brutality and the severity of these anti-democratic measures provided an opportunity for the oppositional movement to form alliances and gain nationwide momentum from other supporters (Cummings, 1989). In spite of the repressive measures, society witnessed the expansion of oppositional civil society, made up of militant industrial workers, reform-minded white-collar workers nicknamed the

‘neck-tie squad’, progressive intellectuals, university students, religious leaders, and traditional conservative opposition politicians (Lee, 1993). The pro-democracy alliance in the mid 1980s was more consolidated than ever before by focusing on a single issue – democratisation of South Korea (Kim, 2000).

Consistent with its antagonistic engagement with the repressive, dictatorial, and morally corruption state, oppositional social forces in South Korea defined civil society as an emancipatory space battling against the dominant hegemonic power, (i.e., the authoritarian state). Many dissidents in this period staged militant street demonstrations, enduring tear gas barrages and beatings at the hands of the police, and risking torture. As resistance to Chun’s regime increased, the government applied the National Security Law to dissidents more frequently. From 1980 to 1987, more than 2,000 people were charged with violations of the law, and 1,565 were prosecuted (Lim, 2005). The regime continued to label these pro-democracy activists communists and North Korean loyalists.

By reviewing the political history of South Korea, the author presented that Korea’s two experiments with democracy since 1945 ended in failure; these failed democratisation experiences had serious repercussions on the country’s political development. This section further demonstrated that South Koreans experienced a series of authoritarian leaders who suppressed basic human rights and ignored the political liberties of citizens in favour of national economic development and capitalist ideology. Specifically, this dissertation contends that two previous failed attempts at democratization contributed to legitimising authoritarian leaders’ arguments that open contests in the civil society sphere, diverse interests advocated by civil society groups, and civil society activism

were counterproductive to the country's well-being. Further, by framing the existence of diverse civil society organisations as a root cause of social conflict, authoritarian leaders exploited South Koreans' fear of another civil war and justified their repression against oppositional civil society.

The author agrees with Kim (2000) who argues that two failed democratization attempts and subsequent state repression institutionalised civil society's antagonistic engagement with the state. This dissertation noted that due to this historical legacy, South Korean civil society has internalized antagonistic measures into its core survival strategies; raising legitimate concerns in aggressive and confrontational manners was accepted in civil society activities as they were considered necessary means to attain justice and freedom. With the denial of an autonomous space where non-violent ways of expressing criticism and grievances against the state were entertained and encouraged, oppositional civil society activities resorted to antagonistic tactics, which demonstrated their discontents; yet these tactics included protests, campaigns, and other types of nonviolent direct action. Nonetheless, as presented in this chapter, throughout history, progressive politicians, pro-democracy movements, and progressive civil society figures in South Korea were portrayed by mainstream media, government agencies, and dictators as a wing of violent opposition to the state supported by North Korea in order to disrupt the capitalist economic system and anti-communist social order (Kim, 2000).

As the state-society conflict intensified in the 1980s, street protests often ended with violent clashes – most offensive measures were taken by the military police, and some of the protestors threw gasoline bombs (Kim, 2000).

The use of gasoline bombs and street protest culture was reflected by CR8 (Personal interview, 28 May 2007) who recounted that the historical circumstance in the 1980s gave very little opportunity for pro-democracy activists to reflect upon the issue of nonviolence and peaceful engagement with the state authority in street protests. Activists were constantly confronted with violent responses from riot police, and many of their fellow activists were killed and injured because of these violent measures from riot police. While these protestors and pro-democracy movement activists were portrayed as militant left-wing radicals attempting to overthrow the government by media and authoritarian leaders, their visibility grew in the 1980s as the opposition became consolidated, and South Koreans' political consciousness increased.

Contemporary Political History: Democratic Transition and Consolidation (1987-2008)

After nearly 40 years of experience with dictatorship, South Korea began its transition to a democracy in 1987. By reviewing historical contexts, the following section introduces key issues raised during the democratic transition and consolidation periods and the significance of civil society in such processes. Specifically, this section will demonstrate that the successful democratic transition in 1987 legitimatised progressive civil society space and validated tactics to engage with the state and political and economic elites in the country. Further, this section will stipulate that, because of the civil society's successful engagement with the democratic transition, progressive forces in civil society shaped the South Korean civil society after the transition that advocated for a democratic reform agenda.

Negotiated Democratic Transition (1987)

While no direct presidential elections had been held since 1971, both Park and Chun did not eliminate regular elections for National Assemblymen. The ruling parties headed by the presidents and enforced by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency manipulated three such elections, held respectively in 1973, 1978, and 1981. The opposition party, which united various political factions in opposition, secured 29% of the seats, while the ruling party won only 35% of votes at the 12th National Assembly election (Park, 1997). The 12th National Assembly election gave further strength and momentum to oppositional civil society, which had long been engaged in democratisation struggles (Park, 1997). Based upon the electoral outcome, the opposition party, with strong support from civil society movement groups, increased the pressure to Chun, demanding the restoration of direct presidential election and constitutional amendments (Park, 1997).

Defying the opposition's continued demand for presidential elections and constitutional reforms, Chun announced in April 1987 that he would suspend discussions with the opposition on constitutional reform. Chun claimed the opposition party was unsuitable for such negotiations and the continued debate on constitutional reform would delay the transfer of power to his successor (Han, 1991). Chun long promised he would step down voluntarily in February 1988, prior to the 1988 Summer Seoul Olympics Games (Haberman, 1987). Chun's refusal to amend the constitution for direct presidential elections further triggered oppositional civil society. Further, in May 1987 during the 7th Commemoration of the Gwangju Democratic Uprising, an activist priest announced that a 20-year old student activist found dead in January 1987 was

tortured to death, and police had fabricated the cause of his death. In early June 1987, the image of a 20-year old student activist who was killed by tear gas shot by riot police was covered in the mainstream daily newspapers, further triggering citizens' sympathy towards democratic movement activists (Kim, 2000).

On 10 June 1987, nationwide demonstrations were held to commemorate the death of the student activist and to demand the end of authoritarian rule. Unlike previous street demonstrations, which generally attracted student activists, trade unionists, and oppositional political leaders, street protests during this time attracted ordinary citizens — white-collar workers, mothers, street vendors, taxi drivers, and so forth - people who had not previously joined demonstrations. Nationwide protests were held on a daily basis; firebombs were thrown at riot police and tear gas was sprayed endlessly on the crowds. Foreign correspondents reported Koreans were gambling for democracy with their blood, and some even worried about the violent eruption of conflicts in South Korea (Chira, 1987; Hiatt, 1987; Solarz, 1987; Wilbur, 1987). Due to Seoul's close proximity (30 miles) to the 38th parallel, there was concern over North Korea's provocation as South Korea's political turmoil and a potential confrontation among 800,000 North Korean Troops, 600,000 South Korean Troops, and 40,000 US Solders. The instability continued (Hiatt, 1987 and Solarz, 1987). It was estimated that approximately 4 million citizens participated in nationwide demonstrations. The *New York Times* reported Chun considered military intervention to restore order, and the country came close to experiencing violent military interventions (Haberman, 1987).

On 29 June 1987, Roh Tae-Woo, a presidential candidate of the ruling Democratic Justice Party and Chun's close ally, issued a statement announcing the reinstitution of presidential elections, which the 1972 Yushin Constitution had eliminated. The declaration included eight major political promises including peaceful transfer of presidential power through direct, free elections under a new democratic constitution. Roh, a former general and a key member of the 1979 coup, was credited with this action as the declaration contributed to halting a likely bloody clash between the army and protestors (Sneider, 1989). His political gesture on 29 June played a significant role in electing him as the next president. South Koreans overwhelmingly welcomed the declaration. On 1 July, Chun announced he would accept Roh Tae-Woo's recommendation based upon the declaration. The declaration paved the way for the transition from military dictatorship to political pluralism, and preventing violent conflict from taking place (Sneider, 1989 and Haberman, 1987).

The opposition, with strong support of civil society activists, entered into negotiations on constitutional reform with the ruling party[16]. Throughout negotiations, civil society activists continued to organise and to pressure politicians from the ruling party. After concluding negotiations over the constitutional revision, the *Act of Constitutional Reform* was approved by the National Assembly in early October. On 27 October 2010, the 6th National Referendum took place, with the participation of over 70% of South Koreans, and 90% of voters approved the content of the revised constitution. The revised constitution promised direct, regular presidential elections and limited the

[16] Because the transition began as a result of the regime and the opposition's negotiation to reach to a settlement, the country's democratisation in 1987 is categorised as transplacement-style democratic transition (Huntingdon, 1992). The 1987 transition also differed from the two previous democratisation attempts based upon a 'replacement' model (Huntingdon, 1992). The first democratisation began right after gaining independence from Japan because of the Allie's victory over Japan, and the second attempt took place in 1960, when Rhee was overthrown by a popular uprising.

presidential term to five years without the ability to seek re-election. The revised constitution reduced the possibility of concentrating power to a single individual, strengthened the rights of the National Assembly, and raised the status of the Supreme Court.

The first direct presidential election in 17 years was scheduled to take place in December 1987, and the country witnessed fierce presidential campaigns launched by the ruling party and opposition leaders. During this period, a number of civil society movement groups within a pro-democracy alliance engaged in protests, demanding the rapid implementation of democratic reforms (Kim, 2000). In response, Chun's regime employed anti-communism fear tactics to increase the population's support for the ruling party; numerous political dissidents were arrested during this time and all of them were labelled radical leftists and communist loyalists (Kim, 2000). In the midst of the fragility of the transition, the opposition failed to nominate a single candidate representing the democratic movement; instead, the most well known opposition leaders of the country, Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, each ran a separate presidential candidacy. As Ahn and Jaung (1999) rightly indicated, the 1987 democratic transition failed to develop political parties based upon principles and issues, and civil society groups emerged to fill this void as a core advocate of various democratic transitional issues. Because of this split in the opposition, Roh Tae-Woo and his ruling party won the presidential election with approximately 34% of votes. While the opposition obtained over 60% of the votes, its division caused them to wait for another five years to run for the presidency (Haberman, 1987). Protesting the result of the presidential election, civil society activists supporting the opposition held protests.

As presented above, South Korea's two previous attempts at democratisation ended in failure and authoritarian dictatorship was reinstated. Both attempts ended in failure, partially due to democratic forces' inability to manage various social contentions. The 1987 democratic transition continued without disruption until present day. This begs a question: what has made this transition process different from the previous democratic transitions, and what role has civil society played in this process. A number of political, social, and economic factors, and their interaction can explain the process of democratisation in South Korea, but this dissertation notes the following three: a growing middle class because of economic development, changed international relations, and effective civil society mobilisation. First, as presented in Chapter 2, a majority of foreign scholars contend the economic development of South Korea led to political liberalization, particularly the growing middle classes, who called for increased freedom (Diamond, 1994; Underwood, 1987). Throughout Chun's rule from 1980 to 1987, the country witnessed growth at an average rate of 9.4%. Lee (1993) supported this view by emphasising the contribution of urban white-collar workers to the process of democratisation. The growth of these highly educated, modern, professional young workers and their participation in the democratic opposition turned anti-regime rallies and riots into a nationwide popular movement (Lee, 1993). Second, scholars like Yeo (1992) and Cummings (1989) explain that changed international politics, as well as the US policy toward South Korea, pressured political elites to accept the democratic demands of citizens. The US administration was under pressure to advocate the democratic transition in South Korea, as numerous articles were

published on the subject in major US newspapers and the Democratic Act of the Republic of Korea was introduced in the US Senate (Haberman, 1987).

Third, the persistence of the 'oppositional' civil society and their effective mobilising strategy that focused on a single issue (democratic reform through the restoration of presidential election) contributed to making the historic democratic transition possible (Howard, 2003; Kim 2000). The oppositional civil society existed throughout contemporary political history; however, repression was severe, and the oppositional civil society movement had been consistently crushed by the regime. In the 1980s, student activists and labour unionists became more politicised, radicalised, and embraced more disruptive tactics to stage the democratic movement. While this radicalised democratic movement created fierce confrontation, it successfully raised peoples' awareness of the regime's brutality (Kim, 2000). Furthermore, as democracy — specifically direct presidential elections — became a central issue of the oppositional civil society, it was able to attract diverse social actors. Traditionally, students, religious activists (progressive Catholic priests and protestants), and blue collar workers were the main social forces behind the democratic movement, yet by focusing on a single issue, an end to an authoritarian rule through free elections, it attracted more diverse participants, such as concerned parents, and white-collar workers (Kim, 2000). In other words, civil society activists formed an effective, broad, and nationwide coalition, which encompassed a range of social groups advocating a range of reform agendas.

Democratic Transition (1988-1992): Roh Tae-Woo and Kim Young-Sam Administrations

Amid such doubts and uncertainty over the success of South Korea's democratisation, Roh Tae-Woo (1988-1992) was inaugurated as the President of the Republic of Korea in 1988 (Hiatt, 1987; Haberman, 1987; Kempe, 1987; and Chira, 1987). His administration took a series of liberalisation measures, including tolerance toward political opposition, media freedom, autonomy of social organisations, lifting the ban on overseas travel, and legalisation of unions (Lee, 1993). As a result, civil society emerged openly as a space for political discourses. Previously, oppositional civil society focused on regime change and reinstituting democratic rule in the country. With the advent of a democratically elected administration, citizens put an emphasis on democratic reforms in various parts of society (Lee, 1993). For the first time, the focus of the civil society movement changed from regime change to specific reform issues, which ranged from elections, media literacy, environmental regulations, and education reform to economic justice. Kim (2000) presented that out of 69 nation-wide advocacy organisations existing in South Korea in 1993, 47 were established after 1987. One notable example illustrating the change within civil society is the establishment of the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), one of the most influential non-governmental organisations in the country. CCEJ was founded in 1989 by 500 professionals — professors, lawyers, church leaders, and other former intellectual dissidents — who wished to address the socio-economic concerns of middle and working class populations (Lee, 1993). This organization argued that authoritarian, regime-led development had created socio-economic conditions not benefiting ordinary

citizens. Their main function was to watch corporate activities, particularly large conglomerates that accumulated wealth during the authoritarian regime (Lee, 1993). In the next twenty years, they grew into one of the largest organisations in the country, with 35,000 memberships nationwide (Lee, 1993). In the early stage, CCEJ engaged with the state in a rather antagonistic manner as the state was reluctant to accept CCEJ's request to reform legislative measures that protected Korean conglomerates (Lee, 1993).

Although Roh introduced various institutional measures to democratise the country's political system, progressive civil society organisations including CCEJ considered his administration as quasi-democratic due to Roh's strong connection with the previous military dictatorship. Further, he was criticised for demonstrating a number of anti-democratic characteristics in engaging with the transitional civil society movement in the country. During an interview, PAN5 (2007) mentioned that student activists did not treat Roh's era differently from that of Chun and they engaged struggle against his regime. By challenging the legitimacy of Roh's administration, civil society engaged antagonistically with the state, and continued to organise a series of protests, calling for the acceleration of democratic reforms. One of the specific issues for which Roh was criticised by opposition and civil society was his failure to investigate past human rights abuses fully or to prosecute those who were responsible for abuses and corruption. Due to civil society's continued emphasis on and promotion of this issue, public hearings on Chun's regime were negotiated at the National Assembly in 1988, and as a result, a few key allies of Chun were sentenced for rampant corruption; specifically, Chun and his allies were accused of extorting USD 107 million, at the exchange rate of 1988, from

Korean businesses (Mydans, 1988). Chun was also forced to offer a national apology for his administration's human rights abuses and corruption scandals and went into self-exile in a rural Buddhist temple in an eastern province of South Korea. However, civil society argued that such gestures exposed nothing, failed to address affected citizens' grievances, and denied genuine investigation efforts to prosecute properly those who were responsible for wrongdoings (Billet, 1992).

In 1993, Kim Young-Sam (KYS 1993–1998) was inaugurated. Although he became the first civilian president since 1961 – Park, Chun, and Roh all retired from their military ranks in order to become president – he was severely criticised for making an alliance with Roh's ruling party during the 1992 presidential campaign,[17] and his legitimacy as a long-time oppositional dissident leader was undermined and questioned throughout his presidency. Nonetheless, his administration implemented a number of key democratic reform measures including the development of civil society. During the KYS administration, South Korea saw the expansion of civil society "accompanied by its qualitative transformation" (Moon, 2002, p. 484). A large number of NGOs were formed; they replaced traditional voluntary associations, which used to administer mass organisations created by military regimes to implement their public policies. For example, about 1,034 civil society groups (a majority of which were Government-administered, mass organisations and political,

[17] The 1992 presidential campaign is often criticised as it further intensified the country's regionalism through party politics. Since 1961, all presidents came from one particular region and put more emphasis on regional development of their native hometowns. As a result, other parts of the country rarely enjoyed the benefits of regional developments (transportation, education, rural development, industry development, and major infrastructure). This created grievances toward the regimes against a particular region. The regimes mobilised people from their hometowns to support their power by intensifying regionalism. Despite democratisation, the 1992 presidential campaign was based upon one's regional association, and political parties were based upon regional loyalties rather than political or social agendas. President Kim Young Sam formed an alliance with the ruling party, as his regional powerbase was closely aligned with ruling party leaders (Ahn & Jaung, 1999).

social/leisure-based groups) were registered in 1974, whereas this number rose to 2,181 in 1994 (Kim, 2004). This rapid growth in civil society groups was a result of the introduction of government funding for such groups by 1994. For the first time in the country's political history, even advocacy organisations, which tended to be critical of the government's policies, were eligible to apply for funding.

Furthermore, in the early 1990s, NGOs began to address a broad spectrum of issues ranging from human rights, peace, unification, environmentalism, and feminism to rights for people with disabilities. All of these issues had been suppressed within the former oppositional civil society, whose primary focus was to topple the authoritarian regime. In addition, autonomous interest groups, organised by businesspeople, workers, farmers, the urban poor, progressive artists, teachers, and journalists, proliferated. Around this time, two very influential NGOs were also founded (1994) — the Korean Federation of Environmental Movement (KFEM) and the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD). KFEM brought the public's attention to various environmental issues that had been neglected during the oppositional civil society era. As an environmental watchdog, over the next twenty years, KFEM grew to become the largest civil society organisation, with 60,000 members across the country. PSPD was established to mobilise citizen action at various levels of society and contributed to election reforms and the monitoring of corruption.

Throughout his administration, a number of democratic reform measures, all of which were advocated by civil society, were implemented to enhance further democratic elements in South Korea's economic, social, and

political areas. First, KYS issued a wide-ranging political amnesty; over 40,000 political dissidents, including the well-known activist Reverend Moon Ik Hwan, who visited North Korea in 1989, were released. Furthermore, a long-time professed communist and political prisoner since the Korean War was released and repatriated to North Korea on humanitarian grounds. As Cha (1993) rightly indicated, these acts were highly symbolic to the dissident community in South Korea, who were often accused of being communist and anti-government activists due to their activism during the authoritarian period. During this time, over 1,000 university students and faculty members who were dismissed from their universities due to their activism were re-enrolled to their respective universities. The release of political prisoners and restoration of students' status were long advocated by civil society throughout the 1980s, and his action was one of the first attempts of the state to develop a less confrontational and conflictual engagement with civil society (Kim, 2000).

Second, KYS made political efforts to overcome the authoritarian legacy of South Korea's political system. For example, KYS attempted to demonstrate that the government was independent from the old establishments of the military regimes by appointing academics rather than career bureaucrats or senior ruling party politicians to key government positions such as those in the Foreign Ministry, the Unification Ministry, and the National Planning Ministry. In addition, in response to civil society's appeals, KYS initiated a fact-finding mission on the Gwangju Democratic Uprising of 1980, and established a special commission that investigated those who were responsible for killing civilians in 1980. As a result, former presidents Chun and Roh and their close associates were arrested and sentenced; Chun was sentenced to death and Roh was

sentenced to 22 years. PAN3 (Personal interview, 16 April 2007) explained during an interview that civil society groups advocated the full, accurate investigation of the Gwangju Democratic Uprising, and "connecting with international human rights movements were helpful to frame this issue as a transitional justice matter".

Third, KYS introduced measures to strengthen local governments' autonomy by restoring local municipal elections in 1995. From 1948 to 1960, South Koreans elected leaders of local municipal governments through elections; however, when Park took power in 1961, he eliminated local autonomy, and the government in Seoul centrally controlled various development agendas. Civil society had long argued that a lack of power among local municipalities caused South Korea's imbalanced regional development (preference of Southeast over Southwest) (Kim, 2000). Thus, the restoration of local autonomy was an important political reform agenda in 1987, yet Roh did not fully implement it. KYS restored the election of local municipality leaders in 1995, and established a presidential commission to assist in the acceleration of local municipal development. The restoration of local autonomy not only contributed to remedying inequitable regional development, but also activated grassroots local organisations in the country (Kim, 2000).

However, his reform efforts, as well as other political and economic policies, were seriously undermined at the end of his tenure due to corruption scandals and the financial crisis that hit the country. Roh's administration was insufficient to change state-civil society dynamics due to Roh's close connection with the past military regime, and his antagonistic manner of engaging with civil society. Yet, the opening of a democratic space because of 1987 allowed the

emergence of advocacy civil society organisations focusing on a range of issues related to democratic reforms. KYS as a civilian President and long-time oppositional leader undertook a range of democratic reform measures, and contributed to expanding civil society space. Cha (1993) argued that the KYS administration witnessed the rise of advocacy civil society groups and non-governmental organisations, and the decline of student activism and movement-oriented groups. The transitional period provided the first-time opportunity to legitimize a civil society movement as a way to form critical political discourses. Throughout history, until 1987, civil society's focus was to mobilise anti-government forces to challenge illegitimate, authoritarian regimes.

With the opening of a democratic space, civil society was able to redefine its role in society. In this process, progressive civil society groups incorporated into their role a number of democratic functions such as monitoring of the state, supporting of the state's efforts, and facilitation of citizen participation in critical political discourses. At the same time, due to its long tradition of oppositional movement and political partiality towards progressive values, South Korea's civil society neglected to address issues of reconciling politically conservative populations into the civil society space. Its strategy to reach out to the politically conservative centred on outreach and educational activities, assuming that knowledge and awareness of certain issues would shift their political stances.

Transition to Consolidation: the Rise of Opposition (1998-2003)

In 1998, South Korea, which had experienced decades of one-party hegemony, witnessed an electoral victory by the opposition-party presidential candidate, Kim Dae-Jung (the most influential and respected dissident in the

country). This was the first transfer of power from the ruling party to the opposition through elections in contemporary Korean political history. The election of President Kim Dae Jung (KDJ, 1998-2003) marked a new phase of democratic consolidation.

Whilst KDJ'S administration was in a position to prioritise economic policies over any other social and political reforms due to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis that affected South Korea, he chose to undertake various measures that have had a positive effect on Korea's democratic consolidation.

First, he shifted the policy toward North Korea from confrontational to a partnership; KDJ's greatest accomplishment during his tenure was his policy toward the North, and he was the first Korean president who was able to meet with the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-Il. As KDJ further strengthened this constructive engagement with the North, the practice of labelling anti-government voices as communists almost disappeared. Peace activists the author met, such as PAN1 (2007) and PAN7 (2007), credited KDJ's sunshine policy from giving birth to diverse peace movements in South Korea.

> This policy shift is fundamental to the development of peace activism in South Korea. This policy change allowed peace organisations that formally focused on the development of constructive relationship with the North to diversify their areas of interest. Further, the administration's policy change weakened our position as the only progressive voice advocating the reconciliatory approach to North Korea. This allowed us (peace organisations) to develop alternative peace narratives and focus on global solidarity. (PAN1, personal interview, 29 January 2007)

Interviewees such as CR2 (2007) and CSO2 (2007) explained the notion of conflict resolution was brought to South Korea's civil society during the KDJ era because progressive civil society groups viewed conflict resolution as a technique to prepare a peaceful reunification and engagement with North Koreans.

Second, KDJ pushed for controversial democratic reforms in social, political, and legal areas. For example, he contributed to establishing the independent national commission on human rights. Due to South Korea's authoritarian past and its frequent human rights abuses, there had been strong demand for an independent commission investigating human rights abuses since the early 1990s. However, the Ministry of Justice, responsible for various legal matters, strongly opposed the establishment of an independent human rights commission; it argued such matters should be managed within the Ministry of Justice. After three years of negotiations, in 2001, the National Assembly passed the Human Rights Commission Act, which founded the Korean Human Rights Commission. Other notable reform efforts included the legalisation of the controversial Teachers Union,[18] the establishment of the Ministry of Gender Affairs, the withdrawal of the government's plan to build a dam in one of the most preserved river[19] areas, and pursuit of balanced regional development.

Third, KDJ brought about a dramatic qualitative transformation of civil society. In 1998, the KDJ administration passed the Assistance for Non-for-Profit and Non-Governmental Organisations Act, an effort to strengthen a mechanism to provide financial assistance effectively to NGOs for their sustainable operations (Lee, 2005). In 1999 and 2000, two ministries (the Ministry of Government and Home Affairs and the Ministry of Labour) and local

[18]Over ten years, various attempts to establish a nationwide teachers union were suppressed for two reasons: public teachers were civil servants, meaning they were not allowed to organise unions, and teachers were equivalent to priests and should not be viewed as workers (the cultural reason is based upon Confucianism's social values). However, under KDJ, in order to guarantee the educational independence of teachers, the National Teachers Union became a legally permitted organisation.
[19]This was noted because it was one of the first incidents of the ruling administration choosing the environment or other social factors over economic growth and prosperity. Until this incident, the Korean Government was notorious for ignoring other stakeholders' voices on any national planning issues or regional development.

governments, including the city of Seoul, launched various projects supporting civil society organisations, and almost USD 12 million was disbursed for the support of NGOs (Lee, 2005). In addition, in 2000, the Special Law on Non-Profit Organisations passed in parliament. Under the new law, so-called 'red' organisations were able to register with the government as legitimate social entities. Civil society actors, who had maintained antagonistic relations with the State, gradually adopted cooperative strategies.

Scholars such as Lee (2005) argued that there are two main reasons explaining the KDJ administration's intensive support for the growth of civil society. Firstly, KDJ needed progressive social forces that would help his economic reform agenda, especially those policies targeting *chaebol* (conglomerates) and establishments in South Korea. As Lee (2005) explains, KDJ needed political allies to push for his agenda without jeopardising the state's relationship with the business community, one of the most powerful groups in South Korea. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, influential NGOs in South Korea took the lead in a series of campaigns to pressure big conglomerates to enhance their corporate governance and transparency. A case in point was PSPD's effort to protect minority shareholders' rights from large shareholders (mostly owners and founders of big conglomerates). As a result, the KDJ administration was able to implement various reform policies on big conglomerates without damaging its relationships with them; instead, big conglomerates directed their resentment toward NGOs and civil society in general, and civil society's relationship with the business community became much more contentious. Secondly, the KDJ administration needed an active voluntary sector, which had played an instrumental role in providing social

services to the urban poor, the homeless, and the unemployed who were severely affected by the economic downturn (Moon, 2002). Under the International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s Structural Adjustment Programs, the government was required to cut off public expenditure allocated to welfare programs and was unable to extend its support to the marginalised; the voluntary associations filled the void of State support to the poor. It was during KDJ's era that a-political, voluntary organisations became a significant part of the country's civil society movement (Moon, 2002). During an interview, CR 11 (Personal interview, 21 May 2007) highlighted that "young activists began to pay attention to a-political voluntary organisations due to increasing participation of citizens in these organisations."

Based upon the significant strength gained during this administration, civil society organisations successfully led the Fair Election Campaign during the nationwide General Election in 2000. The Campaign blacklisted some of the politicians for their links to corruption, unethical practices, and/or their dictatorial pasts. By blacklisting these politicians, the Campaign hoped to persuade party leadership not to nominate these individuals for election. However, the results were mixed, as only 40 out of 110 blacklisted candidates did not win their respective parties' nominations (Park, 2004). The Campaign then launched another round of blacklisting, which identified 86 candidates who they argued should not be elected for their failure to meet the democratic requirements of the country. Of the 86 candidates, 59 lost the General Election in 2000 (Park, 2004). This Campaign proved the ability of civil society organisations to mobilise citizens in order to influence the political process effectively. As Seong (2000) explained, the tradition of social movements during democratisation was

replaced with politicised NGOs in South Korea. Particularly, in the absence of issue-based political parties, these NGOs have quickly gained social and political hegemony over other social entities (Kim, 2009). This was evident at the end of KDJ's tenure, as various surveys (i.e. Gallup and the World Economic Forum) on institutional trust indicated over 75% of South Koreans chose NGOs as the most trustworthy institutions, over other entities such as labour (57%), the military (56%), the media (48%), the private sector (35%), the government (25%), and the National Assembly (11%) (Kim, 2009, cf. Chapter 1 & Chapter 7).

KDJ completed the democratic transition process, and he paved the way for further consolidation or deepening of the process of democracy in the country. Through his progressive "Sunshine" policy toward North Korea, he modelled the government's role in building a constructive relationship with its counterpart in the North, and he pursued more of an independent reunification policy despite the Bush Administration's uneasy relations with North Korea. KDJ also led various democratic reforms in controversial areas and provided more space for progressive political and social discourse than any other administration. However, his legacy suffered from corruption scandals involving his sons and close allies receiving bribes. In addition, with the expansion of socially progressive spaces, social conflicts surfaced more frequently, as citizens became familiar with exercising their rights in a vocal manner.

Consolidation and the Rise of Social Conflicts (2003-Present)

After defeating a conservative candidate from the opposition by a very small margin (2% difference: 49% vs. 47%), Roh Moo-Hyun (RMH: 2003-2008), a centre-left politician from the ruling party, became the President of South

Korea in 2003. As a result, conservative voters constantly questioned RMH's legitimacy, and his tenure is remembered as a continued confrontation between the conservative and the progressive. Under the slogan of Participatory Government, RMH began his presidency by promising to democratise all aspects of South Korea and to deepen democracy through citizens' authentic participation in the decision making process. As RMH continued to implement KDJ's progressive reform measures, collaborations between NGOs and governmental institutions were further enhanced; one of his top 15 policy priorities was enhanced cooperation with NGOs to address social, political, and economic issues (Lee, 2005).

By partnering with NGOs, RMH implemented a number of controversial policies: the launch of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, an independent investigative body that looked into human rights abuses that took place between 1945 and 1992, independent foreign policies toward the US, continuation of the Sunshine policy toward North Korea, discussion of the abolition of the National Security Law, and conglomerate reform. In addition, RMH introduced innovative policies through collaboration with NGOs; two of the notable policy priorities RMH undertook were related to the establishment of comprehensive conflict management mechanisms, and several interviewees that the author met, including CR2 (2007), CR8 (2007), and PAN8 (2007), participated in the development of RMH's policy measures on conflict resolution. In addition, with his centre-left political position, he expanded KDJ's democratic reforms into the economic sphere in order to reduce income disparities among populations and enhance the fair share of large corporations and affluent populations.

Fifteen years after the democratic transition began, throughout the RMH administration, various progressive reform agendas were able to integrate into mainstream political agendas; in this regard, progressive intellectuals and liberal politicians assess RMH's tenure as the accomplishment of the 1987 democratisation (Kim, 2009). During his tenure, not only his allies, but also more progressive social forces, were able to enter into mainstream political space. A case in point is the electoral victory of the first issue-based political party, the Korean Democratic Labour Party; during the 2004 general elections, they secured 10 seats at the National Assembly. As a result, his tenure further politicised moderate conservative populations and led to the growth of rightwing civil society organisations. The RMH administration contributed to South Korea's democratic consolidation, particularly their efforts to integrate progressive voices formerly suppressed into mainstream politics. However, his controversial policies, the ruling party's inability to reconcile with conservative social forces, and the global financial crisis, which negatively affected the country's economic performance, turned moderate populations away from RMH and resulted in the decline of progressive politics' influence in the country. In 2007, South Koreans elected Lee Myung-Bank, a centre-right politician, former Mayor of Seoul, and former CEO of Hyundai, as South Korea's next President. With the 2007 presidential election, South Korea demonstrated its democratic maturity in terms of selecting leaders and expressing discontent through the electoral processes (Doucette, 2010).

In the past twenty years, the South Korean government introduced various political, social, and economic policies to foster the institutionalisation of democracy. Regular elections have been held, the transfer of power from ruling

parties to opposition has been accepted without violence, basic human and civil rights of individuals are now being protected, past wrongdoings are being investigated to redress grievances of those who were severely affected by the country's authoritarian past, diverse social issues have been freely raised through independent civic organisations, and civil society has been significantly empowered. Institutionally and procedurally, South Korea's democratisation process has been relatively successful, yet twenty years of experimenting with democracy has also raised new challenges. South Korea needs to address these challenges to enhance the quality of its democracy and to consolidate its democratic process further. This section will focus on two of these issues: 1) the NGOs' role in the democratic deepening process, and 2) better management and transformation of rising social conflicts.

First, as seen above, the RMH administration further strengthened cooperative relationships with progressive civil society organisations. For example, a new position was established in the Blue House to institutionalise a close consultative relationship between NGOs and the President's office. In addition, throughout his tenure, civil society leaders were occasionally recruited as ministers and heads of governmental institutions for anti-corruption, fair trade, consumer protection, human rights, sustainable development, and decentralisation, and some were elected as national legislators and regional or local leaders. Nonetheless, civil society organisations' politicisation and close association with KDJ and RMH administrations invited criticism from the opposition and the conservative population regarding NGOs' claims of non-governmental, autonomous relationships with the state. For example, a controversial report entitled "PSPD Report" was released when over 300

positions in various government agencies and committees were filled by NGO practitioners working for PSPD (out of 417 former and current staff members or associated activists) (Yoo & Wang, 2010). During an interview, PAN12 reflected the growing influence of NGOs in the policy-making arena, sharing an episode on her address book.

> To be effectively organising, we do engage in politicians, and my address book a few years ago contained a number of key contacts in the administration. When I lost my address book, the person found it thought I was working for a government agency. This gave me an opportunity to reflect civil society's growing influence and how others may perceive our interaction with government officials and politicians whether I would agree with conservatives' accusation of our bias or not. (Personal interview, 30 April 2007)

Another controversy arose with a report that a number of NGOs receiving government funding played a significant role in furthering the governments' controversial reform agendas (Kim, 2009). Political appointments, frequent recruitment of NGO leaders, and government funding allocation to the administration-friendly NGOs were highly criticised by the opposition, who stated NGOs acted as political advocacy groups supporting the RHM administration. As a result, institutional trust in NGOs/civil society declined significantly from 2003 to 2006. For example, as quoted above, in 2003, civil society ranked as the most trustworthy institution in South Korea, and surveys conducted in 2006 ranked civil society as the fifth most trustworthy institution (Kim, 2009). As Kim (2009) rightly indicated, despite its critical role in monitoring the democratic reform process, civil society's credibility was damaged due to its highly politicised activities and close associations with particular administrations.

Another problem with civil society, raised during the RMH era, was the lack of genuine citizen participation in NGOs and interest-based civil society organisations. For example, according to the latest statistical overview of South

Korean civil society, released in 2006, an estimated 5,556 NGOs (out of approximately 30,000 civil associations) were registered in the country (Joo et al., 2006). A majority of NGOs in South Korea were founded in the 1990s, yet 30% emerged in the early 2000s with the spread of the internet spurring civic activism through online activities (Joo et al., 2006). While a majority of civil society entities (32.8%) serve as social and welfare service providers, 25.5% are advocacy-oriented NGOs working in the areas of human rights, peace, consumer rights, women's rights, social justice, political reform, anti-corruption, and media literacy (Joo et al., 2006). Culturally motivated organizations and environmental NGOs represent 11.1% and 10.4%, respectively, of South Korean civil society space (Joo et al., 2006). Despite exponential growth in numbers, citizen participation in these organisations rather declined in the 2000s.

According to research on social capital and citizen participation in South Korea conducted by Lee (2008), participation in civil society organisations significantly declined from 1996 to 2006; it was reported over 90% of South Koreans indicated their affiliation with civil society organisations in 1996, whereas only 77% indicated their affiliation with these groups in 2006. More notable findings were citizens' participation in interest-based civil society organisations (most NGOs fit into this category); of those who maintained affiliation with civil society groups, only 32% participated in interest-based civil society organisations in 2006, a decline from 43% in 1996 (Lee, 2008). This indicates that, most recently, most citizens affiliated with civil society groups participate in cultural, social, and friendship-based, non-politicised civil society groups (Lee, 2008). During an interview, CR2 (2007) and PAN12 (2007) shared

their personal reflections on the decline of citizen participation in advocacy activities and civil society movement by explaining that civil society activism placed too much emphasis on great political discourses at a macro level and suffered from a lack of attention to micro issues close to citizens' lives. CR2 elaborated on this,

> In the late 1990s, we began to be keenly aware that we have internalized too much violence and confrontation, and forgot to engage with others in a humanistic way. We were lost in great discourse, and neglected to pay attention to processes, which guide change and progress. (Personal interview, 26 January 2007)

Another issue directed toward South Korean NGOs was their failure to nurture civic skills and virtues due to their antagonistic ways of managing conflicts and differences (Shin, 1999). Because of their close affiliations with political reform issues in the country, civil society organisations developed policy influencing and campaign skills and became some of the most influential opinion makers in society, but they have focused less on developing the various democratic virtues of citizens. While most civil society organisations aim to create a participatory democratic society, they neglect nurturing the very instrument to sustain a well-functioning civil society, which is promoting discussions and interactions among citizens. For example, in *Assessment of Civil Society in South Korea,* Joo et al. (2006) found civil society in the country to be relatively weak in promoting democracy and nurturing tolerance and non-violence.

As Kim (2004) indicates, South Korean civil society has been increasingly perceived as a party to social conflict (often protracted, extreme, and militant); while conflicts between NGOs and the State have decreased since the late 1990s, conflicts among NGOs or interest groups (conservative vs.

liberal) have continued to rise. In addition to the increase of social conflicts in which civil society organisations were engaged, the perception change is closely linked to citizens' expectations of civil society. From the 1980s to the late 1990s, civil society's antagonistic manner of raising its concerns was less challenged due to the urgency of democratisation and the need to accelerate democratic reform agendas and other policy priorities that civil society aggressively advocated. Yet, by the late 1990s, urgent democratic reform measures had been integrated, and civil society's advocacy role began to decrease quickly from the early 2000s to the mid 2000s. In other words, the author agrees with Kim (2009) who argued that citizens' expectations of civil society's role shifted from a mobiliser of democratic movement to a facilitator of democratic discussion. Further, after the 1997 Economic Crisis, conservative populations in the country were reminded of the early 1960s when social conflicts triggered by the rise of progressive civil society groups contributed to the decline of the country's economic performance (Chang et al., 2008). As Chang et al. (2008) argued, economic hardship experienced by citizens provoked certain population's nostalgia for the authoritarian past, and conservative politicians exploited this perception that civil society's left-wing policy created conflicts in society and weakened South Korea's economic performance. As a result, the author argued that during Roh's administration, civil society began paying attention to the issue of social conflict and its constructive management, and conflict resolution and peace activism emerged as an instrument to strengthen civil society's capacity in this regard. The details of conflict resolution and peace activism in civil society will be introduced in

greater detail in the next two chapters, the core findings of the field research the author conducted in South Korea in 2007 (Hahm, 2005).

Second, in addition to redefining civil society's role in nurturing democratic citizenship, the matter of social conflict has emerged as a challenging political and social issue. In administrations prior to RMH, the term 'social conflict' was mostly linked to regionalism and labour disputes that intensified immediately after the democratic transition. Yet, in the early 2003s, a wide range of social conflicts emerged in South Korea and affected a broader population. Both RMH and the current president, President Lee[20], could not avoid addressing this rise of social conflict and its management system. Nicknaming South Korea "the Republic of Social Conflict", the media has increasingly ridiculed the state's inability to reduce the intensity and frequency of social conflict (Han, 2009). During RMH's tenure, the issue of social conflicts and their management became political agendas of democratic reforms. In 2003, RMH launched a special Presidential Commission on Social Conflict and Conflict Management and introduced a number of policies to strengthen South Korea's ability to manage the difficult social issues that often turned into conflicts among the parties involved.

Nonetheless, the root causes of the various social conflicts more prominently covered by the media in the late 1990s and 2000s were closely related to South Korea's political history, and thus required more than a government effort to establish laws and committees (Kang & Chung, 2006). As scholars such as Diamond (1994) agree, these institutional measures must

[20]The Samsung Economic Research Institute determined South Korea's social conflict was one of the worst among the OECD countries – 23rd out of 27th. Soon after the release of the report, President Lee established the Social Reconciliation Commission, which looked into the development of a conflict resolution mechanism in society.

accompany citizens' democratic virtues, skills, and willingness to accept democratic norms and culture. In 1987, when the democratic transition began to take place, foreign correspondents of the *New York Times, Wall Street Journal*, and *Washington Post* questioned whether democracy would prosper in South Korea, a place where people rarely embraced democratic norms and skills such as negotiation, compromise, and open and horizontal dialogues. South Koreans surprised the world by sustaining its democratic transition for over two decades, proving the scepticism of the late 1980s wrong. Unfortunately, to a certain extent, the reasons for foreign observers' concerns became more evident as democracy became consolidated and diverse and pluralist interests surfaced (Haberman, 1987).

While social conflict became a political issue during RMH's era, Hahm (2005) explains social conflict surfaced because of democratisation, which allowed free expression of diverse views. As reviewed in this chapter, throughout the modern history of South Korean, expressing different viewpoints (ideologies) was highly discouraged and suppressed by authoritarian regimes, which focused on social control to sustain their power. Under authoritarianism, diverse social views were suppressed, not only by the state, but also by the oppositional civil society, which focused on a single goal: democratisation. With the opening of civil and political spaces for free expression, numerous issues suppressed during the authoritarian regime have rapidly surfaced. Most frequently expressed social conflicts are caused by the following factors: ideological differences (most prominently expressed in the area of foreign relations and North Korea), class differences (commonly in the area of labour disputes, as well as in conflicts between progressive civil society and large

conglomerates), disagreements over public policies (infrastructure development projects involving the environment and neighbourhood autonomy), and regionalism (rivalry and prejudice toward particular regions) (Chun et al., 2005).

As presented throughout this chapter, South Korea's political history, including a failure to investigate properly their colonial legacy, the exploitation of anti-communism, repressive authoritarian measures, and civil war experiences, explains why social conflict has emerged in a more contentious manner with the expansion of space for public discourse. The authoritarian experience provided citizens with limited opportunities to practice how to resolve differences or address contentious social issues in a constructive manner through dialogue or institutional, political frameworks (often party politics and elections). Historically, due to authoritarian leaders' repression, South Korean civil society actors had limited means to engage citizens in voicing any concerns against the state, and such means (public protests, anti-government statement issuance, etc.) continuously reinforced antagonistic relationships with the state. Further, civil society's demands for democracy during the authoritarian era were almost irreconcilable with political elites who maintained their powerbase by suppressing diverse voices in civil society and controlling the population. These further embedded the conflictual relationship between the state and civil society in the country. In addition, until the early 1990s, the various grievances that emerged in the South Korean civil society, including workers' rights, democratic reform, and human rights abuses of the state, were met with violent repression by the state, and were framed as anti-government, pro-North Korean forces' disruptive action.

As a result, South Koreans were never exposed to democratic problem solving in political situations until 1987, in response to authoritarian repression; politicised citizens wishing to express their concerns had to be willing to engage with the state in a confrontational manner. Non-violent ways of addressing differences were virtually non-existent in authoritarian South Korea, and even after the transition, expressing differences outside of street protests or demonstrations was not considered a viable option by most citizens. It has taken almost two decades for citizens to regain their confidence in legal institutions. Political debates in the National Assembly were not constructively managed — fistfights in the Korean National Assembly were broadcasted a few times through the international media (Chun et al., 2005). Furthermore, South Korea's culture created additional barriers to constructive management of contentious social issues in South Korea. For example, in Korean culture, compromise has always been regarded as an act of dishonest and unethical individuals, with individuals willing to stand by their own principles being more valued than those making deals or compromising their own stances (Sohn & Wall, 1993). In such circumstances, social conflict and its management became rather urgent issues, requiring the collective efforts of society.

When surveyed to solicit their perspectives on social conflict and its management, citizens agreed a holistic approach is necessary to transform the current pattern of negative engagement with contentious social issues (Chung & Kang, 2006). The survey suggested the following measures to improve South Korea's capacity to deal with conflict: 1) enhanced legal and institutional measures, led by Government agencies (36%); and 2) educating citizens and raising awareness on conflict resolution mechanisms (30%). Interestingly, the

survey also revealed a lack of understanding of the meaning of social conflict in citizens of South Korea, specifically its root causes, and democratic ways of addressing conflict areas. Citizens blamed political and economic elites for creating social conflict (over 80% of respondents) and rising individualism (nearly 50%), and suggested conflict could be reduced or better managed if the government punished those who made inadequate arguments, all of which are indicative of South Koreans' inability to address difficult social issues (Chung & Kang, 2006).

In 2007, when political pundits through major newspapers heatedly debated the negative role of civil society in social conflicts, the author engaged in the field research, and met civil society actors reflecting on civil society's PCR activism. Viewing this type of activism as an emergent response to the changing environment in which progressive civil society in South Korea operates, CR2 (2007), CR10 (2007), PAN7 (2007), and PAN8 (2007) emphasised in their interviews the value that PCR activism brings to the country's civil society. Further, CR2 (Personal interview 19 June 2007) explained, "PCR activism is gaining momentum, yet they remain marginal in mainstream progressive civil society in South Korea." In the next two chapters, this dissertation will examine the status of PCR activism in the country, and review three civil society organisations' various efforts to integrate PCR within the country's civil society space.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the political history of South Korea and discussed how the democratisation process has affected the development of civil society in the country. The country's civil society has gained strength, both in quality

and quantity, over the last 20 years. As Shin (2003) rightly put it, state-society relations in South Korea have transformed from strong state-weak society relations, but they have yet to evolve into strong state-strong society relations. The challenge remaining for the country's civil society is to promote further democratic values, habits, and skills among its citizens through much more active engagement with their constituents.

CHAPTER FIVE
CASE STUDIES IN SEARCH OF PCR PRACTICES IN SOUTH KOREA

As discussed in Chapter 4, highly politicised and advocacy-centred NGO activism in South Korea has contributed to critical reform agendas in the context of democratisation. Yet, faced with growing social conflicts and public policy disputes, it is criticised for its inability to serve as an educational space to nurture citizens' democratic values, virtues and norms including tolerance, nonviolence, and diversity (Joo et al., 2006). This dissertation prefaces its investigation with the assumption that the PCR movement in South Korea contributes positively to the development of the country's civil society. It presupposes that engagement in the PCR movement has a positive effect on the democratic quality of civil society.

To explore the central thesis, this dissertation examines South Korean civil society organisations engaged in the PCR movement. Specifically, it looks at three civil society organisations in-depth and aims to understand how these groups emerged and how these three organisations affected public awareness and engagement in the PCR movement and lastly what effect they have on the democratic quality of civil society. As presented in Chapter 2, there are four sets of democratic values, skills, and norms that this dissertation focuses on. The selection criteria were that they are beneficial to advancing participation-oriented liberal democracy through active civic participation, respect for tolerance and diversity, respect for non-violent, constructive, problem-solving, and willingness to engage in dialogue. This chapter's case study on three organisations intends to capture to what extent civil society activists and participants in South Korea conceptualise the democratic value of the PCR

movement, and in what ways their enhanced understanding are manifested in practice.

To begin, the chapter briefly gives an overview of PCR activism in South Korea, based on the information collected through field research and archival studies. This will help provide the context in which the case study organisations operate. Then, this chapter introduces the individual case studies in-depth. Each case study includes two themes relevant to explaining the contexts in which a particular case study organisation operates; historical background which explains its emergent context; core activities undertaken; positive contributions of an organisation based on interviewees' input and media analysis; specific challenges participants experienced in advancing a PCR agenda after engaging with an organisation; and reflections on democratic nurturing capacity expressed by an organisation. The information highlighted in each case study will be analysed in the next chapter that compares similarities and differences of these organisations.

PCR Activism in South Korea

To contextualise the environment in which the three organisations operate in, this section presents the historical background that has influenced the emergence of the PCR movement in South Korea. The historical overview of the PCR movement was constructed based on archival studies and interviews conducted during field research. Conflict resolution is, with less than 10 years of history, a very recent phenomenon in South Korea and is categorised as a sub-activity within the country's peace activism[21]. It emerged

[21]Inspired by Nigel Young's definition, peace activism here refers to "social or political movements that consciously, explicitly or implicitly, concern themselves primarily with peace as a term, concept or title, which define themselves (or are defined) as part of the 'peace movement' or are overtly opposed to war, militarism or the organized use of force" (Young, 1986, p. 185).

in the early 20th century as an intellectual exercise by prominent educators in the country (Park, 2002).

Peace activism as a concerted effort advocating the value of (positive) peace did not appear in Korea's traditional political discourses, which were heavily affected by Confucianism.[22] The very first development of peace activism can be traced back to the early 20th century when the Japanese Empire annexed the country and incorporated it in its imperial order (Lee, 2006). Intellectuals in this period, including Ahn Joong-Geun (1897-1910), Yoon Dong-Joo (1917-1945), and Ahn Chang-Ho (1878-1937), articulated that independence was a central element for obtaining peace in Korea, and called for Koreans to engage in national resistance. This initial form of peace activism in the country existed as a meta-frame rationalising the national resistance movement, and was sceptical about nonviolence struggles. For example, Ahn Joong-Geun assassinated a Japanese governor in South Korea and rationalised his decision to shoot a Japanese politician by arguing that his presence was destructive to maintaining peace in Asia (Lee, 2006).

From 1945 to 1953, South Korea experienced a series of violent conflicts including a full-blown three-year long civil war over ideological differences. Yet, despite its rather traumatic historical past, peace or pacifism did not emerge as a viable political alternative in South Korea. In the early 1950s, the opposition leader ran for presidency and one of his political slogans was to promote peaceful reunification, as opposed to the overthrowing of the communist regime in North Korea. His ideology was considered dangerous and he was executed for treason (Park, 1994). Further, in the 1960s, when a military

[22] Confucianism contemplates ways in which elites and scholarly aristocrats could promote peace in the world through politics. Peace has always been understood in the context of social harmony; as the absence of visible confrontation obtained through social manners and norms (Lee, 2006).

dictatorship began in South Korea, the term peace was hijacked by the authorities and became closely linked to the military strength that would deter a North Korean invasion. The authoritarian leaders, such as Park, justified his anti-democratic rule by arguing that military might and economic development as the only way to maintain peace in the country.

In this context, alternative voices in opposition to the dictator were prosecuted sharply and were labelled as forces disrupting social harmony and peace. Amidst severe suppression of peace discourse in civil society, there were a few intellectuals such as Hahm Seok-Heon (1901-1989) advocating the value of peace and opposing the authoritarian regime's militaristic approach to social problems. However, their message was philosophical rather than easily accessible to a wide range of citizens. PAN1 elaborated Hahm's influence on the country's peace activism during an interview.

> Mr. Hahm has been highly influential during my college era. His elaboration on the notion of peace was powerful, and he maintained his position on peace and peaceful reunification even when he was threatened by Park's regime. He inspired us (college students). His idea was, however, complex, and highly conceptual. When people suffered from poverty and exploitative labour conditions, his message on peace sounded too metaphysical and irrelevant to the grassroots' reality. Nonetheless, his message shaped the contemporary peace movement, and inspired many of us to sustain our activism. (Personal interview, 29 January 2007)

The peace discourse of the 1960s and 1970s failed to reach a wide range of people (Lee, 2006). Case in point was the country's first deployment of its own troops in foreign wars. In 1965 Park announced the deployment of Korean soldiers to Vietnam at the request of the United States. In response, a series of demonstrations were held to protest against this decision. Instead of anti-war messages the dominant meta-frame uniting demonstrators was anti-Americanism and anti-Park's sentiments (Lee, 2006). The term 'peace' in the South Korean movement tradition usually refers to positive peace and absence

of structural violence that perpetuates conflictual dynamics in society (Galtung, 1969).

Contemporary peace activism slowly emerged in the early 1990s. Lee (2006) elaborates the three historical contexts that influenced its emergence. First, the transition to democracy allowed civil society to reflect on the issue of peace. Second, with the democratic transition, as well as a shift in international politics, South Korea's stance toward North Korea has shifted towards a more reconciliatory direction recently and with a major international crisis focused on the North Korean nuclear armament, more Koreans have become conscious of peace as an important political issue. Third, more diverse social activism emerged in the 1990s, which has sparked the inclusion of a wider variety of concerned citizens. Specifically, starting from the mid-1990s, a number of pioneering organisations began to advocate for peace by promoting a wide range of activities including peaceful reunification advocacy, an anti-nuclear movement, and a movement to reduce the defence budget.

Nonetheless, until the late 1990s peace activism had existed in South Korea's civil society in the context of reunification and the relationship with North Korea, as those two elements were directly related to the conditions threatening peace in the country. As inter-Korean dynamics were highly affected by international political arrangements similar to Cold War politics, citizens' organisations felt disempowered about their influence on reunification strategies (Lee, 2006). Thus, the country's peace activism was defined by the anti-American discourses. PAN3 (Personal interview, 16 April, 2007) noted that strong anti-American sentiments underpinning the country's peace activism have had negative impacts on the country's peace discourses because the

movement strategy tends to focus on critiquing American imperialism and neglected to nurture diverse peace discourses in South Korean civil society.

More diverse forms of peace activism began to gain strength in the early 2000s[23]. For example, civil society began to advocate peace issues that go beyond the Korean territory including human rights abuses in Vietnam (1965-1973) by Korean soldiers, the global peace movement, relief activities in conflict-affected countries, international solidarity with people in Palestine, the anti-nuclear movement, and conscientious objectors[24]. The organisations working on these peace discourses adopted a range of activities including education, outreach, international solidarity, and campaign. A more detailed description of peace activism in the 2000s will be introduced when examining peace activists' networks in South Korea in the latter part of this chapter.

The conflict resolution movement in South Korea emerged in the early 2000s as one of strategies designed to strengthen the peace movement and its outreach capacity for ordinary citizens. While the restoration of democratic institutions and legislations were still being implemented, some sections of civil

---

[23]At the time of the field research, 60 large national NGOs have self-identified themselves as engaged in peace activism through their regular appearance in the network of peace activists (Peace Retreat Committee, 2007). Out of these NGOs, 16 engaged in reunification and North-South related issues, seven are working on human rights including minority issues, nine focusing on general progressive politics and peace discourses, 10 working on Eastern Asian peace discourses including the Korean Comfort Women[23], five involved in educational activities, four supporting media literacy, five engaged in peace activism including peace museum, nonviolence, and anti-nuclear movement, and four working on environment and ecological issues. Yet, in reviewing the list of NGOs in South Korea, this dissertation noted that such self-assessment does not include at least 50 other influential non-governmental organisations engaged in similar topics and activities.

[24] While the conscientious objectors and anti-nuclear movement are one of the early topics discussed in the peace movement emerged in advanced countries, these two topics only became political issues in the early 2000s. The lack of politicisation on the anti-nuclear movement and conscientious objectors is closely related to the country's historical background. With regard to the nuclear disarmament, lack of political consciousness among Koreans is closely related to the Japanese Occupation era. Throughout the contemporary history, South Korean dictators framed that nuclear attack in 1945 liberated the country from the Japanese Empire. Thus, despite the fact that there were numerous Koreans victimised by the 1945 autonomic bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Korean Government suppressed any political alternative discourses around this issue. The Government also dismissed alternative discourses around nuclear disarmament as anti-American political discourses (Lee, 2006). In the mid-2000s, the Korean Supreme Court announced the verdict that conscientious objection to the country's military conscription is illegal under the Korean constitution. CR10 (Personal interview, 26 January 2007) highlighted that his organisation works closely with conscientious objectors and identify ways in which this issue can "better appeal to a broad population in South Korea".

society organisations, in particular organisations focusing on gender and peace-related issues, became aware of the legacy of authoritarianism–a strong emphasis on hierarchy, militancy, division between in-group and out-group, enemy psychology and secrecy—which remains strong at all levels of society. Even civil society, which aimed to overcome this legacy, has subconsciously internalised attributes such as a firm hierarchy, highly charismatic leaders, and misunderstanding of non-violent peaceful activism in their operations (CR 2, personal interview, 26 January 2007).

The conflict resolution practices were introduced to the country's civil society when civil society activists contemplate their dilemmas of being unable to practice nonviolence and other democratic values they advocate. In an effort to overcome the legacy of authoritarianism, as well as an effort to bring new ideas into peace activism, a group of NGO activists decided to receive conflict resolution training. The training programmes were offered by a US-based NGO, which perceived the introduction of conflict resolution as a good opportunity to transform various social conflicts in South Korea (Feffer & Lee, 2000). For one-and-a-half years, these NGO members attended a series of trainings and participated in capacity-building programmes. In the early 2000s, a pilot training programme was set up to train public school teachers and then expanded as a regular training programme for NGO members. In the last five years, conflict resolution practices have become one of the fastest growing trends in the country's civil society and more NGOs have slowly integrated conflict resolution practices.

Currently, conflict resolution practices in South Korea's civil society are exercised in three different ways. Three case studies representing these three

categories will be introduced and discussed in detail. The first case is an organization incorporated into national peace advocacy organisations as part of its peace education and outreach programmes. Peace advocacy organisations represented by this case study have engaged in a wide variety of issues ranging from reunification, humanitarian assistance to North Korea, international peace solidarity action, Northeast Asian relations, war crimes in Vietnam, overcoming an authoritarian and colonial legacy, to peace museums, and the integration of North Korean defectors into South Korean society. The second case study discusses NGOs that integrated PCR practices into their operations and that are deeply inspired by the core principles such as problem-solving underpinning community mediation and alternative dispute resolution systems. The third case study focuses on small community-based organisations working on violence prevention or inclusive community development. Similar to the first category, they utilise PCR methods in their operations to advocate particular community-related issues. Due to their limited resources and voluntary nature, these groups have selected PCR practices as their main programme focus. They use them as a key strategy to increase active participation of ordinary citizens in civil society space and to draw them into engaging in public discourses.

In North America, there are numerous specialised NGOs promoting conflict resolution activities such as the Consensus Institute, the Search for Common Ground, and the Community Board. This represents a key difference to Korean organisations: PCR practices in South Korea are often adopted by multi-purpose hybrid organisations (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005). South Korean civil society organisations currently engaged in PCR activities evolved from a

wide range of grassroots democratic oppositional movement groups. Almost all the NGOs registered in South Korea consider progressive social change and the pursuit of public goods as the most important mission of civil society (Lee et al., 2006). In the 1980s, these groups existed to mobilise the public through protests and information dissemination and the goal was to create greater democratic opposition movements. Yet, with the transition to democracy, instead of radical social movement strategies, the current multi-purpose hybrid NGOs utilise social and educational services and "adopt a mix of collectivist and bureaucratic elements for their internal organisational structure" (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005, p. 98).

These multi-purpose hybrid organisations are advocacy-oriented groups, promoting particular policy changes. Conflict resolution practices are often part of their social change strategies and are routinely integrated into their activities. This was well reflected during the interview with CR 12 (2007) who articulated her motivation to integrate conflict resolution techniques into her advocacy work. CR 12 (Personal interview, 21 May 2007) stated, "My work is primarily centred around advocacy on consumer rights. I have been engaged in conflict resolution because its techniques highly relevant in building our constituents' capacity in effectively articulating their views in a constructive way."

These views are not unique to CR 12 (2007). In fact, civil society practitioners engaged in conflict resolution that the author met during the field work are working in organisations whose core mission is to bring about social change, whether their specific objectives are related to women, consumers, youth, or environment. In other words, rather than a desire for an immediate resolution to particular social problems, conflict resolution practices draw the

attention of South Korean civil society due to their strategic values to advance the civil society's social change objective.

Examining Three Case Study Organisations

This section introduces individual case study examples selected based upon two criteria: the first involved selecting existing networks providing conflict resolution practices for its constituents or raising awareness on subjects – where conflict resolution practices include a wide variety of activities ranging from skills trainings, mediation, and non-violence and peace education. Case study subjects were those who operate programmes or projects working on conflictual social issues that are problematic during democratic consolidation. The second was to embrace the principle of inclusiveness, as viewed for example as a willingness to encourage the participation of people with differing political viewpoints. The field research process informed the second criterion was partially fulfilled, as this research process was unable to verify whether conservative constituents were actively engaged in the third case study entity, a network of peace activists.

Individual case study examples illustrate how conflict resolution activities are manifested by different forms of organisations and practitioners. The first case study organisation is a grassroots association run by local citizens. This organisation chose conflict resolution techniques in order to enrich its outreach programmes to youth and parents. The second case study organisation is a pioneering organisation that was the first to introduce conflict resolution training programmes in the country; thus, conflict resolution is integrated into this organisation's core mission. The third case study entity is a network of peace practitioners that can be divided into two ad-hoc committees.

Established to prepare a global meeting on conflict prevention and peace-building and to promote regular interaction among peace activists, this case study illustrates how global civil society affects the norms, affects discussions and helps further advancement in the context of South Korean civil society's awareness of peace-building and conflict prevention.

Each case study presents the following information. First, in order to contextualise their uniqueness as a case study sample, two themes will be introduced describing how each case study represents a certain type of peace and conflict resolution activism that emerged during the democratic consolidation process. For example, grassroots activism and education are highly novel phenomena in South Korean civil society, and the first case study entity represents how these two themes inform this organisation to adopt conflict resolution methodologies into their activities. Similarly, specialisation on conflict resolution and women's inclusion in the peace processes are underlying themes of the second organisation, and help to understand better how these activities could emerge in the post-transition context. The third case study entity elaborates how peace activism is gaining momentum with the changing political context, and to what extent democratic consolidation has influenced peace activism in the country. Second, each case study introduces historical background information – when the organisation began and how their activities have gained momentum for recognition. Third, main activities undertaken by each case study organisation will be presented to help better understand how these organisations apply conflict resolution methodologies in their operations. Fourth, based upon interviewees' input and media analysis, each case study presents positive contributions of their activities and their presence. Fifth, each

case study ends with specific challenges participants perceive regarding advancing a peace and conflict resolution agenda in the country, and highlights their critical reflection on the issues.

Case Study 1: School Peace Making

School Peace Making (School Peace), a community-based organisation, was founded in 2002 to raise awareness of school violence and to identify ways to prevent violence in both primary and secondary schools through local residents' involvement. In addition to awareness-raising campaigns and advocacy activities about violence prevention in schools, this organisation provides peace-education programmes and conflict-resolution skills training to local residents and youth. This is done to strengthen their capacity to address the issue of violence. This organisation is one example of how local residents can apply peace and conflict-resolution practices to address community issues. Furthermore, School Peace illustrates how grassroots activism undertaken by a small-scale volunteer association can address one of the most important issues to South Koreans—education.

Contextual overview of School Peace.

Grassroots volunteer associations and activism in South Korea. As reviewed in Chapter 2, volunteer associations are regarded as being at the core of democratic citizenship because they serve as primary spaces for civic engagement and produce social capital, a vital element for fostering collective trust and a vibrant democratic civil society (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006; Putnam, 1993). Scholars such as Lee (2005), inspired by Putnam's social capital theory, have explained how South Korea's strong emphasis on associations has contributed to the creation of an environment conducive to a strong civil society.

In fact, numerous social networks and neighbourhood volunteer associations have existed in the country throughout its history. According to the 1996 World Value Survey, 80 per cent of respondents indicated their membership in volunteer associations.

Authoritarian leaders in the past, however, have taken advantage of South Korea’s strong associational life. Co-opted by political elites and tightly controlled by authoritarian governments, strong associations consisting of traditional social networks and other informal neighbourhood groups were being turned into government propaganda machines up until the mid 1980s (Moon, 2002). As Moon (2002) explains, associational life in South Korea prior to the democratic transition was dominated by administered mass organisations[25] created by the government to implement the regime’s policies. For example, community-based organisations and traditional social networks in rural areas served as major intermediaries for institutionalising the message of the New Village Movement (cf. Chapter 4). These organisations and networks also called on community members to work hard, value self-sacrifice, and remain intensely loyal to the government (Han & Ling, 1998, p. 66).

In this context, the country’s progressive forces were somewhat ambivalent about community-based civil-society organisations and their effects on the democratisation process (Ha, 2003). Specifically, due to these organisations’ general tendency to stay away from political and social issues, community-based groups were evaluated in terms of whether they would be

[25] In addition to implementing public policy, administered mass organisations drew their membership from entire categories of people, recruited their members in the absence of competing organisations, had their leaders appointed by regimes, and were focused on activities and goals determined by those regimes (Moon, 2002; Kaza, 1995).

able to mobilise grassroots populations and initiate public discourse around critical social and political issues.

Like other social spaces, grassroots associations too were tightly controlled and managed by the regimes (Han & Ling, 1998). Therefore, as there was no grassroots autonomy in South Korea, scepticism about grassroots movements continued until the democratic transition. In the 1990s, with the restoration of municipality elections and increased local autonomy, a new era of grassroots politics began in South Korea. Institutional democratic procedures were introduced through regular local elections and the presence of a local assembly consisting of elected officials. As well, citizens were given a space in which they could voice concerns specifically related to their own reality (cf. Chapter 4). With this new change, grassroots organisations and community-based associations were organised around a wide range of issues affecting community needs. According to Lee (2005), approximately 50 percent of civil-society organisations established in the 1990s now operate outside of Seoul and focus specifically on regional issues. Furthermore, government funding, increased interest in voluntarism, and legislation support for non-governmental organisations have all contributed to the quantitative growth of community-based organisations.

In addition to grassroots organisations growing exponentially, activism and progressive agendas began to be integrated into these community-based organisations. With the increased opportunity to participate in municipal politics, large and influential national NGOs, such as the Korean Environment Federation Association, opened their regional branches in various small and medium-sized cities and rural towns around the country and mobilised the

grassroots population. These national advocacy organisations focused on issues of grassroots politics not only to broaden their political base but also to empower the grassroots population to participate effectively in regional political processes (Lee, 2005). This is in contrast to the focus of grassroots organisations during the authoritarian era. As indicated above, grassroots organisations in the past were strictly controlled by regimes, and thus most remained apolitical. In some cases, in order to prove their loyalty to the regimes, these community groups took very conservative views on various social and political issues. However, during democratisation in the 1990s, as Bystydzienski and Sekhon note, many grassroots organisations emerged 'as a significant part of efforts to create and expand spaces for democratic decision making' (1996, p. 10).

The rise of grassroots activism and enhanced civic participation at the local level has become a part of the democratic consolidation process. School Peace is part of this new phenomenon and is highly regarded as a model of a healthy grassroots movement and an ideal association (Beautiful Foundation, 2007). It is a volunteer association with NGO status under South Korean law, and it embraces the ideal of grassroots activism—stimulating collective action at the community level for social change. As reviewed in the previous chapters, cutting-edge social and political issues have often been brought into South Korean society by civil-society organisations that are larger and more influential (cf. Chapter 4). Yet, as a small grassroots organisation, School Peace illustrates how peace and conflict-resolution activities can be utilised to address community issues.

Education and democratisation in South Korea. Education is one of the most important social rituals for South Koreans. For the first twenty years of life, the average South Korean spends most of his or her time in school and doing school-related activities. According to Doh's (1992) nationwide survey on youth and their daily lives, more than 70 percent of adolescents indicated they spent an average of eleven hours in school and an estimated three hours doing activities related to schooling. Furthermore, according to the Korean Educational Development Institute (2010), over 95 percent of teenagers graduated from high school in 2009, and 83.8 percent of these students went on to university in 2010. This statistical data is particularly impressive when compared to past data on education. In the late 1940s, over 50 percent of the population was illiterate, and less than fourteen percent of people graduated from elementary schools. In the 1970s, only 42 percent of teenagers went to middle school, and seven percent of high school graduates went on to university. Development economists and political scientists such as Diamond (1994) and Fukuyama (1997) explain that the rapid expansion of educational opportunities combined with South Koreans' obsession with education has become one of the most important factors influencing the country's economic growth and democratic development.

No other local issue is more important to South Koreans than education. However, despite its significance, educational space used to be strictly controlled by authoritarian regimes and no educational autonomy ever existed at the level of individual schools until 1987—the entire curriculum was centralised and all the textbooks used in public schools were controlled by the Ministry of Education (Seth, 2006). Authoritarian leaders justified the centralised

educational system as producing efficiency and effective anti-communism education. As Seth (2006) points out, education and public schools were primary instruments used by authoritarian regimes to control the population. As well, no democratic ideas were presented in schools. Thus, very limited opportunities existed for students to raise their concerns, and no space existed for parents to provide any input into their children's school system. Any teachers or administrators who disagreed with the state's control over education were met with harsh disciplinary measures, and students' lives were closely monitored by teachers. As well, teachers suppressed violence and conflict in schools—corporal punishment was justified to control students' violent behaviours. Thus, no constructive mechanism for conflict resolution between students was ever introduced to schools.

With the democratic transition, greater autonomy was given to schools, but the authoritarian legacy continued to negatively affect the country's education system. The School Governing Committee Act was introduced in 1995 but did not take effect in most schools. In 1999, the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union was recognised as a legitimate organisation and has been advocating for better working conditions and more autonomy for teachers as well as improvement to students' learning environments and to the education system overall. In 2000, legislation was passed to strengthen the participation of the school governing committees, composed of teachers, administrators, and parents. Further, with this legalisation for the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union, combined with the increased status of the school governing committee, grassroots activism that focused on education gained strength at the local and regional levels. For example, in 2005, public groups focusing on

education had fewer than 1,000 members, and many of these small NGOs were run by volunteers, not structured as professionalised organisations (Seth, 2006)

In this regard, an organisation such as School Peace demonstrates how local politics can take up the cause of democratisation through peace education, conflict resolution, and violence prevention. This organisation can be understood as local citizens' efforts to transform school culture as well as introduce practical democratic skills and qualities to students, teachers, and other stakeholders, such as parents.

Descriptive overview of School Peace.

Background.[26] School Peace was established as an ad hoc citizen initiative in 2002 after a sixth grader in a neighbourhood public school committed suicide because of ongoing violent bullying from his classmates (Gwacheon News, 2001). Certainly, bullying is not a new phenomenon in South Korea. Like any society, incidents of school violence, including bullying, are common. Yet, it was widely perceived that school violence and bullying affected secondary school students and that teachers could have intervened with proper disciplinary measures. After this incident, community members in the neighbourhood began to realise that all students were being exposed to school violence, and questions were raised regarding how to address this issue (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007).

This particular incident grew into a controversial social issue and was widely covered by mass media because of the teachers' and school administrators' lack of assistance for the student when he was alive. Despite

[26] While everyone's interviews contributed to developing the historical context of School Peace, SP5's narratives play a central role in constructing the historical background on School Peace. She has been engaged with the group since the beginning of School Peace and is frequently given invitations to speak about the organization from media and other civil society organisations engaging in violent prevention.

the victim's appeals and the teachers' knowledge of the situation, no specific action—such as disciplinary measures, counselling programmes, or meetings with the parents of the students who had committed the violence—had been taken (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007). The victim had written a long report outlining his experience with school violence a few months before his death and was later diagnosed with serious depression. As well, even after the student's death, no action was taken to address the issue. School administrators did not report the incident to the Ministry of Education, which instructs public schools to report such incidents for further investigation.

One of the interviewees explained that it became apparent the leadership in the school was not equipped to prevent and intervene in school violence, and no procedures or systems were in place to handle the situation (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007). In response, the school's governing body organised a meeting to facilitate conversations between teachers, administrators, the parents of the bullies, and the parents of the victim, but it ended without any resolution. In particular, the victim's parents felt deeply hurt and extremely disappointed with the meeting (SP5, personal interview 25 April 2007). For example, SP5 (personal interview, 25 April 2007) described some of the discussions exchanged at the meeting.

> School administrators indicated they wished to move on, and appealed to the victim's parents to forgive everyone involved in the situation as part of a Christmas gift to the school. It was winter and the school was preparing for a winter vacation. No apology or follow-up measures were ever offered by school officials or the parents of the perpetuators. This was very disappointing to all of us. (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007)

When the outcome of the meeting was report to the community, the lack of genuine effort to systematically look at school violence angered numerous parents (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007). In an effort to introduce a

systematic response to school violence, in early 2002 a group of neighbourhood citizens organised an ad hoc initiative called the Gwacheon Citizens' Meeting to End School Violence. At its inaugural meeting, the group issued a statement directed to the President's Office, the Ministry of Education, and all the major newspapers around the country, calling for the introduction of systematic measures to prevent school violence. Specifically, the statement demanded that the government do the following: introduce legislation regarding school violence prevention, establish a committee on school violence prevention (consisting of parents, teachers, and child/adolescent psychologists), introduce a series of mandatory violence-prevention courses for violent students and their parents, and provide government-supported medical treatment for students suffering from bullying (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007)

In addition to a nationwide message, the group made demands that were more specific and locally based, such as asking the principal of the victim's school 'to resign from his post because of his failure to address this issue' (SP3, personal interview, 30 April 2007). In order to achieve this goal, the group organised a series of awareness campaigns throughout the city of Gwacheon and sought support from local residents. With the campaign continuing in the local community and with nationwide media engagement, the group succeeded in raising awareness of the seriousness of school violence by drawing attention to this particular incident. The Korean media, including periodicals that tended to avoid covering political and social topics, reported on the case extensively.[27]

[27] SP5 (personal interview, 25 April 2007) said to the author, 'the incident was quite depressing. It even got an attention by *Lady Trends* (a women's life style magazine equivalent to *Marie Claire* or *the Vogue)*. With the momentum created by the campaign, we received many supportive messages from fellow mothers in the country".

As a result, the principal of the elementary school was forced to resign.[28] Although School Peace's initial activity had been in response to a specific issue affecting the community, the group grew into a grassroots advocacy movement.

As School Peace's campaign continued to attract community members' attention, the group organised regular meetings to discuss ways to reduce school violence and identify specific tools or educational resources that could be offered to students, parents, teachers, youth workers, and other community members. SP5 (personal interview, 25 April 2007) explained that 'this was not only helpful to maintain the organisation's sustainability, but was also necessary to engage with diverse community members who may not have been comfortable with political and social action'. Educational activities and counselling services for parents and children affected by bullying and school violence were identified as being more practical and useful to community members than discussion forums that civil society in South Korea usually utilised (SP Members News Letter, Spring 2003). On a regular basis (bi-weekly or monthly, depending on the members' other commitments and the availability of volunteer instructors), seminars and interactive workshops were held targeting both students and parents.

In 2003, the initiative turned into an independent, non-for-profit entity registered with the Provincial Government of Kyungki in an effort to apply for government funding and maintain the organisation's financial sustainability and qualitative growth (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007). SP5 explained that registering the association with the provincial government was meant to provide a range of educational programmes to local residents.

[28] SP7 (personal interview, 30 April 2007) acknowledged that because of the campaign they had begun, conservative population and educators in the district perceived School Peace as a radical, antagonistic civil society group.

> Other community organisations advised us that we should register as a non-profit organisation. Initially, we were hesitant, as we wanted to maintain our voluntary-run organisational structure. Further, we did not want to deal with all the paperwork required. However, with the help of community members who are familiar with these procedures, we were able to register and began to apply for the government funding to maintain our core activities. Yet, we still receive our membership fee, but the government funding subsidises various educational programmes that we organise (Personal interview, 25 April 2007).

Since then, it has been offering various forms of conflict resolution and peace education workshops to community members—both youth and adults. SP4 (Personal interview, 23 April 2007), who provided the initial training, said that School Peace's peace education and conflict-resolution skills training 'is one of the first local-based regular conflict resolution training programmes'. In 2005, the group was invited to provide conflict resolution and peace education classes to public schools in the city of Gwacheon. Such educational efforts continued in public schools during the 2007 school year, when the interviews for this research took place.

Main Activities.[29] School Peace has been offering three main services to its members and community constituents: youth education, parent/adult education, and advocacy.

Youth education. School Peace regularly offers a wide variety of extra-curricular educational programmes for students aged from seven to fifteen years old. Through collaboration with other grassroots organisations, local municipalities, and national NGOs, its education programmes help young students become familiar with conflicts in their lives and find constructive ways to resolve them.

[29] Main activities are identified based upon its internal reports and newsletters. For more information, please see Annex 4.

These educational programmes are divided into two categories: peace education[30] (human rights, conflict resolution, and peaceful coexistence) and self-esteem improvement (creative writing, art therapy, music therapy, and so forth). Conflict resolution and peace-education programmes were first offered in 2003, in the very early stage of conflict-resolution education in South Korea. Its youth-educational programmes are usually offered during the weekend and school holidays—both summer and winter—and recruit young students from the community. Since 2005, School Peace and its volunteer teachers have been invited to local primary and secondary schools to provide a weekly peace-education workshop throughout the semester.

School Peace offers peace-education programmes to youth with a view of providing students with knowledge, attitudes, and skills for addressing the conflict that they experience daily in their school lives. The main content of these programmes is borrowed from conflict-resolution education programmes used widely in North American public schools, the aim of which is to enhance students' capacity for conflict resolution and democratic citizenship. Conflict-resolution education is being widely offered at public schools in North America in an effort to strengthen students' perception of democratic citizenship as well as reduce school violence (Bickmore, 2001). As Bickmore (2001) summarises, in North America conflict-resolution education is introduced into public school systems with an expectation of providing a set of skills beneficial to students'

[30] Harris (2004, p. 6) defines peace education as educational activities 'teaching about peace: what it is, why it does not exist and how to active it'. By Harris' definition, peace education includes teaching about the challenges of achieving peace, developing non-violent skills, and promoting peaceful attitudes. Conflict-resolution education is a sub-category of peace education and is defined as educational activities that 'model and teach, in culturally meaningful ways, a variety of processes, practices and skills that help address individual, interpersonal, and institutional conflicts, and create safe and welcoming communities' (Jones, 2004, p. 233-234). When examining the case study organisation, the definitional boundaries between peace education and conflict-resolution education were rather unclear and used interchangeably. While they used the term 'peace education', their educational purposes and activities were more closely aligned with conflict-resolution education. Thus, in this dissertation, when introducing this case study entity, both peace education and conflict-resolution education are used interchangeably.

democratic citizenship, such as the ability to listen respectfully to alternative viewpoints, analyse problems, identify solutions, and participate in collective decision making. In so doing, as Hedeen contends, conflict-resolution education 'empowers students to exercise their own self-determination and respect' and contributes to creating safe and welcoming communities (2005, p. 186).

School Peace offers peace and conflict-resolution educational programmes based upon the assumption that nonviolent conflict-resolution skills and an enhanced understanding of differences will help students engage constructively with peers whom they may perceive to be different. SP5 highlighted that School Peace's education programmes emphasise on the importance of accepting and acknowledging difference because of the value of conformity that the Korean school culture values. She continued,

> Our education programmes provides students with an opportunity to reflect how young people's fear and intolerance of difference could turn into discrimination and end up hurting other people. We try to help our youth better embrace diversity (Personal interview, 25 April 2007).

Table 2 shows the two sample curricula of peace-education programmes that School Peace offers to students. They illustrate what aspects of PCR are emphasised in School Peace's education approach.

Table 2: School Peace Youth Education Curricula

	Curriculum (I)	**Curriculum (II)**
Title	Hello Kids, Let's Play with Peace	Human Rights, Violence Prevention and Conflict Resolution
Target	Elementary school students aged from 10 to 12	Secondary school students aged from 13 to 15
Recruitment	Advertisement; School Invitation; and Local Community Groups	Local Municipalities' Volunteer Programmes; School Invitation; and Community Groups
Group Size	15-20 students	15-20 students
Time Commitment	8 hours (one-and-a-half hour per session)	20 hours (two hour per session, plus street campaign and survey)
Course Overview	This workshop aims to raise children's awareness around various issues related to peace and conflict. In particular, it aims to help children	This workshop aims to enhance students' understanding of human rights and school violence, and helps them better understand ways to resolve

	better manage various types of conflict they may experience with their peers. It also teaches young students to manage conflict in their daily lives in a peaceful way by strengthening their decision-making skills and democratic group communications techniques.	violent conflicts students are exposed to during their school lives. By teaching political organising and interpersonal conflict resolution skills, this course helps students be active participants to prevent school violence.
Detailed Content	▪ Understanding Peace &Conflict; ▪ Understanding Difference& Discrimination ▪ Understanding School Violence; ▪ Decision Making Process in a Group Setting; ▪ Nonviolent Conflict Resolution Communication Skills;	▪ Understanding Human Rights – Street Survey with Youth on Human Rights ▪ Human Rights and Youth – Responsibilities and Rights and Human Rights Instruments ▪ Human Rights Violation in Schools through Case Studies ▪ School Violence – Types of School Violence / Scenario-Based Role Play ▪ Understanding Difference and Embracing Diversity ▪ Alternative for School Violence ▪ Peer Mediation and Nonviolent Communications ▪ Effective Decision Making ▪ Organising Campaign for Violence Prevention and Human Rights – Poster Making ▪ Street Campaign
Teaching Method	Role Play; Scenario; Games; and Group Activities	Lecture; Role Play; Scenario; Group Activities; Street Surveys; Street Campaigns

As seen in Table 2, ‘Hello Kids, Let’s Play with Peace’ is an introductory educational programme for students between ten and twelve years old and integrates basic elements of peace and conflict-resolution education. In promoting the programme, the Hello Kids curriculum makes specific reference to the fact that nonviolent conflict-resolution skills are closely related to the democratic decision-making capacity of students. This eight-hour course has been offered to a wide range of students, but volunteer teachers such as SP2 emphasised during the interview that this amount of time is insufficient for creating the desired outcome.

> Our primary dilemma is having such a limited amount of time to share a range of information to our students. We are teaching values, processes, and skills that require more than cognitive understanding and memorisation. Yet, schools to which we are invited expect us to deliver a comprehensive

> programme with immediate results. We think of these educational programmes as an opportunity for students to become familiar with conflict resolution concepts. (Personal interview, 25 April 2007)

To make all these concepts more accessible to students, Hello Kids utilises a great number of interactive teaching methods involving role play, games, and various group activities. Students are recruited through general advertisement, outreach to local community groups, and invitation by neighbourhood elementary schools.

Compared to the education programme for elementary students, the conflict-resolution programme targeting secondary-school students approaches this subject by emphasising human rights. School violence and violent interpersonal conflicts in public schools are contextualised as a form of human rights violation and a denial of individual rights and dignity. Students also learn different conflict-resolution techniques as alternatives to violence in times of disagreement with peers. They are also asked to become active advocates of conflict resolution and violence prevention through awareness campaigns.

In the absence of a systematic approach to peer mediation and conflict-resolution mechanisms in secondary schools, SP5 (Personal interview, 25 April 2007) argued that their educational programme offers “a hands-on opportunity for students through street surveys and campaigns”. Students are invited to participate in the street survey in order to collect information about their peers’ perceptions of human rights and youth and to organise a campaign advocating violence prevention, human rights, and conflict resolution. Campaign processes teach students the necessary skills for organising awareness campaign, including developing a campaign theme, creating campaign posters, and reaching out to local community members in their neighbourhood.

Given the amount of the extra time that secondary-school students spend on studying for exams, the author was curious about ways in which School Peace recruits students. In response, SP3 answered,

> We recruit youth through community groups working with young people. We also make general advertisements through local newspapers and posters on the street. We contact local municipalities' youth volunteer programmes to recruit the students. Local municipalities were great places because students' participation with our programme can be counted as a volunteer activity for them. By promoting human rights and violence prevention in local communities, these students can earn necessary credits for volunteerism, which many universities include in their evaluation during the entrance exam. (Personal interview, 30 April 2007)

School Peace's youth-education programme is a community-driven movement run by volunteers, interested NGOs and civil society practitioners, and educators (mostly counsellors and art therapists). As it is a community movement, its educational programme lacks a systematic mechanism to analyse the effect of its educational activities on young students or on a local community. In the absence of analytical capacity, School Peace reaches out to other organisations with more experience and invites practitioners and educators to develop their own educational programmes. It also meets regularly to reflect on volunteer teachers' engagement with youth and on how School Peace can improve its teaching. Interviewees such as SP5 (Personal interview, 25 April 2007) emphasised such specialised activities, noting however that a systematic analysis of its effects are rather unrealistic and are beyond its mandate and capacity.

Parent and adult education. During the field research, parent and adult education was discussed by interviewees who were participants of School Peace's parent and adult educational programmes. The importance of parental education about children's educational and behavioural outcomes has been confirmed by numerous studies (Dubow et al., 2009). In the context of conflict

resolution, Ross (2007) notes that parents' experience with conflict-resolution training has a positive effect on their children's ability to constructively handle conflict because parents are able to model good behaviours and offer feedback that is more constructive to children experiencing interpersonal conflict.

Similarly, School Peace emphasises the importance of parents and adults in the local community for promoting conflict-resolution values to young students. It also emphasises their effective intervention in violence-related conflicts that their children may experience in schools. SP5 highlighted the value of adult education:

> Adults' heightened awareness of conflict resolution is particularly important because we are often unable to intervene in conflict situations our children are exposed to. When we grew up, we were taught by our parents to suppress such disharmony, and the conflictual situations we created were met with strict disciplinary measures embedded in traditional Korean parenting discourses. Unfortunately, that does not work with our current reality. A prime example is the 2002 incident of school violence that led to the death of a student. Our old parenting styles were limited to address the issue. In the absence of knowledge, and skills, our efforts to address school violence ended in failure—all those involved felt very hurt and dissatisfied with the outcomes. (Personal interview, 25 April 2007)

School Peace holds the view that adults' enhanced knowledge of constructive ways to resolve conflict is helpful for advocating the systematic integration of approaches to school violence that are more constructive. School Peace's adult education programmes are offered to local community members through regular seminars and workshops. These educational programmes transfer useful knowledge to adults interested in proactively engaging in the issue of school violence and provide them with volunteering opportunities to engage with students and local community members. Specifically, all of School Peace's adult educational programmes focus on practical skills and knowledge that can be easily applied to one's daily life. Its educational programmes are

divided into two broad categories: the training of conflict-resolution skills and parenting education. Table 3 shows sample descriptions of the two workshops.

Table 3: School Peace Adult Education Workshops

	Curriculum (I)	Curriculum (II)
Title	Workshop for Trainers of Conflict Resolution Skills and Peace Education	Parents' Education
Target	School Peace adult members; local community members	School Peace adult members; local community members
Size	No more than 30 people	No more than 30 people
Commitment	54 hours (three hours per session)	42 hours (three hours per session)
Overview	This workshop helps attendees better understand different types of conflict in our lives and ways to constructively manage various conflicts. Specifically, the workshop will introduce conflict resolution theories and teach different techniques that can be applicable to conflict situations. Upon successful completion of this workshop, participants are invited to participate in volunteering for school violence prevention education programmes School Peace offers to local public schools.	This workshop helps to enhance parents' understanding of their children by reviewing various developmental stages. Furthermore, it provides a wide range of techniques that can be used to improve parents' relationship with their children as well as enhance the effectiveness of parenting.
Content	▪ Peaceful Resolution of Conflict ▪ Understanding Conflict Resolution ▪ Patterns of Conflict and Conflict Analysis ▪ Basic Techniques for Peaceful Conflict Resolution ▪ Nonviolent Communications ▪ Problem Solving ▪ Anger Management ▪ Prejudice Management and Respecting Difference ▪ Conflict Resolution & Mediation: Theories and Practice ▪ School Violence and Peace Education ▪ Curriculum Development and Practice	• Self-Reflection • Parenting Skills for Children's Development • Understanding Children with Children's Life Cycle • Understanding Parent-Children Boundaries • Respecting Children as Independent Individuals • Understanding Children's Emotions • Expressing Emotions and Supporting Children's Emotional Development • Understanding Adolescent Culture • Communication Techniques for Dialogue • Methods for Stress Reduction Coming from Parenting
Teaching Methods	Lecture, Role Play, Group Activities; Scenarios; and Practicum	Lecture and Group Activities

School Peace's workshop on parenting skills was one of the first programmes offered to its members and local residents. This workshop brought in a range of experts in the field of counselling and child development

psychology and focused on improving the individual parent-child relationship. Based upon traditional pedagogy, this workshop was delivered to participants through lecture and a few group activities.

A qualitative change in School Peace's adult education occurred in 2004 when peace and conflict-resolution education programmes were introduced. As the field of conflict resolution was extremely new in 2004, NGO practitioners from two national NGOs focusing on conflict resolution (The Korea Anabaptist Centre and the WMP-CR Centre) led the workshops. During the interviews, SP4 (Personal interview, 23 April 2007) shared how he came to lead the workshop.

> I was looking for an opportunity to share the value of conflict resolution skills with ordinary Koreans that may not be frequently exposed to civil society activism. We reached out to School Peace, hoping that engaging with its constituents would help us further integrate conflict resolution practices into grassroots communities. (SP4, personal interview, 23 April 2007)
>
> I met SP4 at a conference on school violence. I learned about the conflict resolution training, and asked whether they would be able to come to our neighbourhood. I thought that this would be of great interest to our members, and we were interested in new, practical ways to address our challenges. (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007)

School Peace, which was searching for more pragmatic methods to address school violence, initially framed this workshop as a capacity-building exercise regarding communications skills. Later, with increased interest in School Peace's youth education programme, the conflict-resolution training programme, which prepares participants to be school volunteers, became a regular workshop. The four interviewees (SP2, SP3, SP6, and SP7), whom the author met during field research, began to engage with School Peace after they participated in the conflict-resolution training programme.

Because of this, the integration of PCR into its core activities has greatly contributed to strengthening the organisation's sustainability and effect.

However, similar to the youth education programme, there is lack of systematic information regarding the effects of these educational activities on participants. Furthermore, while a majority of its teaching content includes macro and systematic perspectives, its outreach materials put great emphasis on the inter-personal dynamics of conflict resolution as well as on parenting skills. Regarding this, SP5 (Personal interview, 25 April 2007) said,

> We feel a great need to enrich our curriculum and better reconcile interpersonal communication skills and conflict resolution skills that are more systematic and community oriented. But, we do not necessarily make our training too politicised or heavy in social conflicts. We want our community members to find this training relevant to their life. This is something we continue to reflect upon.

Advocacy and community outreach. Initially, School Peace began as an ad hoc grassroots advocacy group for addressing specific issues related to school violence. While a majority of its current activities are closely related to education, School Peace continuously engages in public advocacy work in an effort to raise local community members' awareness of school violence and the need for holistic ways to address the issue in the public school system. A case in point has been a series of campaigns calling for the revision of the 2004 Special Law on School Violence. School Peace, in solidarity with other national education NGOs, cautioned against the 2004 Special Law on School Violence because the law failed to address the importance of both prevention and proactive measures for addressing school violence (Hahn, 2006)

In addition to rather politicised public advocacy, in an effort to expand a pool of its supporters, School Peace also organises easily accessible outreach activities to raise awareness about peace, conflict resolution, and violence prevention. Together with its youth participants, it holds regular human rights and peace education campaigns in the neighbourhood. For instance, every

September, School Peace organises an annual event in honour of the International Day of Peace, and in October, on Apple Day, it holds a day-long street performance event, a special day designated to providing students with an opportunity to apologise for acts of violence directed at their peers (in Korean, ‘apple’ and ‘apology’ have the same sound and spelling).

As previously mentioned, School Peace’s public advocacy campaign in the early 2000s was considered highly effective. Nonetheless, due to this work, School Peace is often perceived as a progressive grassroots organisation by local constituents, an image that has somewhat deterred conservative constituents from joining its activities (SP7, Personal interview, 30 April 2007).

Analytical overview of School Peace.

Interviews and observation**.** As a small grassroots volunteer association, School Peace is operated by one full-time staff and numerous volunteer members who actively participate in the running of School Peace’s three main activities. Because this organisation is a community-based group focusing on education and school violence, an overwhelming majority of its members (including a staff member and active volunteers) are female. These adult females, between twenty and 40 years old, are highly educated and tend to be middle class. Many of them have children attending neighbourhood schools, and a majority have chosen to become full-time homemakers or have decided on a flexible part-time work arrangement for childrearing purposes. The high representation of females in grassroots organisations is not surprising, given the gender segregation commonly observed in all aspects of public and private life in South Korea.

While prominent periodicals such as the *Economist* and *Atlantic Weekly* celebrate the increasing gender equality in South Korea since democratisation, traditional gender roles continue to define South Koreans' daily lives and heavily affect social discourses about women's participation in the public space. Certainly, there is no exception when it comes to women in activism and progressive civil society. As Khor (1999, p. 648) articulates, the cultural acceptance of gender roles validates social discourse on the unique perspective of women that is more useful and effective in addressing activities undertaken "within culturally prescribed women's spheres such as marriage, family, children, school, the elderly, health, peace/anti-war and ecology". In addition, Moon (2002, p. 490) notes that South Korean civil society organisations engaging at the grassroots level often address less controversial matters, such as education, consumer rights, childcare, and the environment, in order to reach out to a diverse group of community members, a majority of whom tend to be conservative politically and socially. In this context, School Peace's higher female membership reflects the accepted socio-political discourse, which emphasises that women's areas of expertise are education, child development, and peaceful inter-personal and community relationships. Therefore, female adults feel more comfortable voicing their concerns within these 'women's spheres' (Khor, 1999).

Except for one interviewee, all of those whom the researcher met for the School Peace case study were females in their 30s and 40s. Although their age group represents the most politically conscious group in South Korea, only one interviewee—a professional non-governmental practitioner—was actively engaged in the democratisation process. The rest of them were sympathetic to

the cause of the democratic transition but did not consider themselves democratic activists. Altogether, seven interviews were conducted in order to understand School Peace: two of the interviewees provided skills-training workshops to School Peace members, and five others directly engaged in School Peace's daily activities.

The workshop trainers' perspectives were used in order to understand how these programmes were introduced to School Peace and what changes the trainers had observed during their interactions with School Peace members in the last five years (2003-7). Interviews with five active School Peace members were conducted to understand how they define opportunities and challenges to integrating their peace and conflict-resolution practices into their volunteering and interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, interview transcripts from these meetings helped to identify how participants frame the elements of PCR that are incorporated into School Peace's programme and how they apply them to the broader context of democracy. Unlike the interviewees from the other two case studies, the individuals who participated in this study had less experience with professional political organising and non-governmental affairs. This lack of a political background is reflected in School Peace's semi-formal and voluntary structure.

No observation was made regarding specific educational initiatives, but there were opportunities to visit School Peace's office and attend social gatherings. These visits allowed the researcher to understand how firmly the organisation is rooted in the local community. Its office is located next to residential areas where a majority of members reside, and its social gatherings

are rather informal and less hierarchical within South Korean cultural and social boundaries.

Motivation. The interviewees engaged in School Peace expressed two primary motivations regarding their engagement with the organisation's peace and conflict-resolution activities: the integration of conflict resolution into grassroots activism for cultural transformation and an expectation of enhanced capacity for nonviolent conflict resolution.

The trainers tend to have a great amount of strategic motivation for engaging with School Peace, specifically promoting nonviolent conflict resolution and peace in local communities.

> Shifting our violent patterns of engaging difference by spreading the culture of PCR was one of the primary purposes that interest me in peace and conflict resolution. When we learned about School Peace, we were looking for an opportunity to spread our conflict resolution programmes to ordinary citizens. School Peace's constituents seem perfect for our programmes. (SP4, personal interview, 23 April 2007)

> Activism targets politically conscious populations. Often, we do not engage with housewives (homemakers). Thus, going to a suburban neighbourhood and reaching out to housewives actively engaged in School Peace was thought to be an excellent opportunity to connect with ordinary citizens who are less exposed to civil society activism (SP1, personal interview, 23 April 2007).

These interviewees' motivations are in line with the mission of the organisations to which they belong. Both of them work for organisations that aim to use conflict-resolution practices to transform the violent culture ingrained in the Korean society as a result of its historical legacy.

On the other hand, interviewees who are active members of School Peace have a greater amount of practical motivation closely related to their personal lives. Five interviewees (SP2; SP3; SP5; SP6; SP7) explained that their personal experiences with their children or their own interpersonal conflicts

have motivated them to take part in conflict-resolution skills training. With an enhanced understanding of the main concepts of peace and conflict resolution, they see a need to be involved in the organisation and to make a voluntary commitment to advocate the core messages of School Peace. The narrative of SP5 (Personal interview, 25 April 2007) summarised these sentiments well.

> I had very difficult time resolving my differences with my son in a constructive manner. I always yelled at him and felt disempowered. One day, I saw this poster in the bulletin, and thought that the training can help me interact better with my family members including my children. I wanted to try although I was not sure whether this would work. I am very glad that I bothered to make a call to SP4 to inquire about the training.

The community members' motivations are particularly illustrative of the value of peace and conflict-resolution practices when engaging with ordinary South Koreans who are often excluded from the civil society movement. Echoing Moon's (2002) analysis, homemakers in South Korea had been portrayed in two different ways. A positive image is given to the mothers of activists who provided moral support to the civil society movement. On the other hand, homemakers are thought of as being apolitical or as having political opinions identical to those of their husbands. Thus, their roles have often been discounted within civil society activist discourses, including by women's' organisations who work closely with women employed outside of the domestic sphere.

Reflections on positive aspects of engaging with School Peace. There are two positive contributions that the interviewees highlighted regarding their engagement in the activities offered by School Peace: first, a strengthening of community participation and, second, an enhancement of individuals' awareness of conflict and its nonviolent resolution and of their enhanced capacity for conflict resolution.

Attracting local populations to politics: In the last five years, a number of national periodicals have published articles introducing the work of School Peace, highlighting the important role that voluntary grassroots associations can play in raising awareness of community-related issues (Kim, 2006; Jeong, 2007; Naeil, 2009). Among progressive civil society advocates, School Peace serves as an ideal model of a healthy grassroots movement because it is run by local residents and addresses issues important to all community members.

Established in 2002, School Peace has been active for the last eight years and has successfully mobilised community members, specifically female residents. Informality, volunteerism, and a community-centred approach have contributed to motivating ordinary citizens to engage with School Peace. This is nicely expressed by an interviewee explaining the composition of its membership and noting that the high representation of female residents with children played a significant role in motivating her to participate in School Peace. The following quote illustrates the interviewee's perspective on this aspect of School Peace:

> Although the issue of conflict resolution and peace education is new and sounds difficult, it was rather easy for me to get involved in the organisation as all those who participate in the training share common challenges and found this issue useful to address our own problems. Although I was not comfortable speaking to people about the issue we advocate, the fact that this group has so many mothers like me gave me confidence and motivation to continue to be involved. (SP3, personal interview, 30 April 2007)

Conflict-resolution training practices are considered particularly useful when reaching out to local residents because School Peace frames such training as an opportunity to empower residents and effectively address various interpersonal conflicts to which they are exposed. By illustrating the positive aspect of conflict resolution—as a method for

learning good parenting skills—School Peace provides ordinary citizens, many of whom would not usually participate in advocacy organisations, with an opportunity to engage in grassroots civil society. An interviewee summarised this point:

> I was never politically active. But I experienced interpersonal conflict with my family members and my child and I had difficulty in communicating as he got older. When the conflict resolution training programme was announced, I thought that this could help my own personal problem. After completing the programme, I found this extremely useful, and wanted to bring this to my child and his friends. Since then, I have been participating in some of the activities as a member. (SP2, personal interview, 25 April 2007)

Specifically, interviewees appreciated the opportunity to volunteer at public schools because it allowed them to use, in their own communities, the knowledge and skills gained through conflict-resolution education. Furthermore, through conflict resolution, School Peace identified ways to address specific community problems in a less confrontational manner and reached out to more people (Hah, 2006). For example, to be invited by local public schools, members of School Peace first need to establish contacts and engage with different parent groups, school governing committees, and school administrators. Through this process, SP2 (Personal interview, 25 April 2007) explained that she became familiar with skilful ways to articulate the importance of bringing PCR education to the public school system in order to communicate with those who would not otherwise be interested in this subject.

Enhanced awareness of conflict and capacity for its peaceful resolution: Interviewees found their experiences with peace and conflict-resolution education positive and useful because they were able to better understand basic concepts of conflict and conflict resolution. The increased awareness

helped them reflect more clearly on their inability to address their daily interpersonal conflicts. One interviewee recalled her experience of confronting her desire to resolve conflicts without listening to others:

> I instructed my children, husband, and friends to do certain things in times of conflict. I desired to solve conflict on my terms and ignore what others needed to say. I did not fully realise how much I internalised negative ways of addressing conflict. (SP6, personal interview, 30 April 2007)

In addition to conflict-resolution education, interviewees emphasised the importance of an opportunity to participate as instructors in peace and conflict-resolution education programmes for youth; it helped them understand young people's perspectives on conflict and violence. An interviewee recounted the positive effect of her new knowledge on her own child's perspective regarding violent ways of resolving conflict:

> After I attended the conflict resolution education, I changed my ways of communication with my child. I used to say, 'do this', 'listen to what I said' to my daughter. After the training, I have improved my ability to ask a question about what she wants, in times of our disagreement. This has certainly helped improve our relationship. In addition, I found that my changed communication styles altered my child's behaviour. Before, she was hesitant to articulate her viewpoints and expressed frustration with anger. But, now, a year after my initial attempt, my daughter has learned to elaborate her views and ask what others think about. I feel my engagement with School Peace had a small effect in my life. (SP2, personal interview, 25 April 2007)

As interviewees had positive experiences in School Peace's conflict-resolution programme, they began to appreciate the opportunity to teach peace and conflict-resolution concepts to young students. The interviewees explained that their peace and conflict-resolution programme provides young students with an insight into conflict, violence, and its resolution. However, they acknowledged that the current youth education programme, given its ad hoc approach, is not effective enough to expect any visible behavioural changes.

Challenges. As much as the interviewees highly appreciated their activities and the accomplishments of their organisation, they indicated a wide

range of aspects that needed improvement. There are three specific aspects that they found kept them from making greater contributions to their local community: a misunderstanding of peace education in the community, conflict resolution and grassroots activism; a lack of interest in the issue among teachers and school administrators; and a lack of opportunity to provide programmes that are more systematic to students.

Misunderstanding PCR and grassroots activism: Two types of misunderstanding regarding PCR programmes made the interviewees initially hesitant to join the organisation: 1) a lack of visible change after taking the courses and 2) a difficulty understanding the notion of peace education and conflict resolution.

Firstly, when asked how the interviewees shared their experience of engaging with the organisation, all of them indicated they had difficulty talking with their friends and family members about their participation in the workshop. Particularly, they were afraid of letting people know they were trying to improve their awareness of conflict and to enhance their constructive conflict-resolution skills. This is because they were concerned about a lack of visible change. An interviewee recollected her memory of the early days:

> One of the books that I had to read was *Nonviolent Communications*, but I was so afraid that other family members would notice. So I wrapped the book with newspapers. I was particularly concerned as I felt no change in my attitudes toward my family and friends, and I was afraid that they would judge me and the subject I study. (SP3, personal interview, 30 April 2007)

Such concern stems from a lack of understanding of conflict resolution—many thought it would be easily integrated into their daily lives without continued practice. Furthermore, they did not fully understand how much they had been affected by South Korea's authoritarian legacy, which discourages

constructive ways of resolving differences and contentions. SP5 (Personal interview, 25 April 2007) reflected on her lack of awareness of the impact of the country's history and culture on her ways of dealing with violence, saying that 'until I was given an opportunity to reflect, I did not fully understand the extent in which I was affected by the general pattern of conflict resolution in our society'.

Secondly, when peace education or conflict-resolution programmes were introduced to others outside of the organisation, people had difficulty understanding the concept. An interviewee recollected the early days when she saw the term 'peace education' and 'conflict resolution' on a flyer recruiting participants for the training programme:

> I thought that peace meant world PCR was for those who engaged in serious violent conflict in Africa. Thus, I was not sure why the organiser said that this was relevant to solving problems in our daily lives. (SP2, personal interview, 25 April 2007)

Interviewees found this aspect particularly challenging when explaining the notion of PCR to younger students. Due to such a difficulty, out of the 30 community members who complete the conflict-resolution training, an average of three participants become active supporters and volunteer instructors for children and students (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007). Trainers who introduced the peace and conflict-resolution practices to School Peace noted that such a difficulty is closely related to the issue of translation:

> When we first customised our training modules to School Peace, we worked hard to translate all the key concepts into Korean. All these concepts were very new, and it is extremely challenging to find corresponding words. It was difficult to differentiate macro-conflict from interpersonal and community conflicts. We would have had a hard time describing the Conflict Layer Model if they had not named it as the 'Onion Model.' This is just one example. To explain each concept, we developed a series of scenarios and examples based upon Korean contexts. Yet, our examples are primarily targeted to those who are working; thus, we had to spend a long time thinking about the situations that housewives would be exposed to. (SP1, personal interview, 23 April 2007)

When first introducing peace education to school principals and administrators, the trainers were confronted with ambivalence to the term because principals thought peace education was an anti-capitalist education programme put forward by radicals criticising South Korea. SP6 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) recalled her conversation with a school official who told School Peace that their 'school does not need peace education as I often emphasise the importance of anti-communism in my weekly meetings with students'. In South Korea, as Kim (2005) recalls, peace education has long been regarded as synonymous with anti-communist education. Thus, any alternatives to this anti-communist education can be understood as anti-government and pro-communist ideas advocated by the progressive and radical segments of society.

Lack of cultural foundation for conflict resolution: In addition to the difficulty of explaining the notion of conflict resolution and peace education, interviewees lamented the lack of cultural foundation for fostering conflict resolution and peaceful ways of managing differences. All of the interviewees grew up during the reign of authoritarian regimes, and five out of seven interviewees were exposed to student activism during their time in university. Except for one interviewee, SP4, all of them commented on this historical legacy and how it affected their ways of looking at differences between people and at the behaviours used to solve such conflict situations. An interviewee stated,

> The environment I grew up in was highly militant and suppressed differences; I was not exposed to peaceful resolution of conflict in my daily lives. It took a while for me to fully understand how I could explain easily to my children the notion of peaceful coexistence and constructive ways of solving problems. (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007)

In addition to the authoritarian tendency, SP2 (Personal interview, 25 April 2007) noted the cultural tradition regarding how to look at conflict and its management. Particularly, interviewees indicated the practical difficulty of applying conflict resolution skills to family or close friends, where there is a clear hierarchy. One interviewee said,

> I don't think other family members who are older than me feel any difference about my change. As you know, in (South) Korea, we cannot argue with others and explore our common interest because such communication styles could be perceived to be extremely rude by the elderly. (SP2, personal interview, 25 April 2007)

Similarly, SP3 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) expressed her dilemma in helping her children apply conflict-resolution practices and peer mediation to a Korean school culture, where there is a hierarchy even between students in different age groups. When her child was exposed to conflict between his classmates and older students, she felt hesitant to tell her child to utilise the peer mediation techniques she had learned because 'younger kids cannot intervene in conflicts with older students (SP3, personal interview, 30 April 2007). Their efforts would be perceived as disrespectful to older kids.

Lack of opportunity for providing programmes that are more systematic to students: Interviewees were particularly concerned about the lack of awareness regarding the importance of conflict resolution, and they were critical of the public schools' lack of interest in providing more systematic support to students concerning this issue. Specifically, when asked about the effect of their educational outreach on students, SP5, SP6, and SP7 commented that such effects cannot be measured unless a systematic approach is incorporated into the formal educational programme.

Peace and conflict-resolution training requires more than the sporadic introduction that School Peace offers students. As many peer-mediation specialists indicate, consistent exposure to this programme is required in order to measure visible change (Heeden, 2005). However, in neighbourhood public schools in Gwacheon, teachers and administrators ‘are ambivalent toward peace education and conflict resolution programmes and avoid taking innovative steps to address school violence’ (SP7, personal interview, 30 April 2007). SP7 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) and SP6 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) believe that such ambivalence is caused by two factors: teachers and administrators’ insecurities and concerns for their reputation as well as a lack of understanding of these programmes. Regarding insecurity and reputational damage, an interviewee said,

> Teachers seemed to feel that parents offering conflict resolution trainings and peace education to their students was implicitly criticising their inability to handle school violence and students’ ability to constructively handle these problems. Further, principals refused to take up this issue as they thought that their schools offer such course to students because they have serious problems with conflict—they negatively responded to the term conflict. (SP3, personal interview, 30 April 2007)

As well, because the teachers and administrators did not fully understand the basic concepts and principles underpinning peace education and conflict-resolution skills training, they believed the programme wasted people’s time without producing outcomes. SP7 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) said a teacher surveyed his or her students about the effectiveness of this educational effort by asking them to raise their hands. By minimising the efforts required to constructively resolve difficult issues in schools, teachers and administrators seemed “to disregard the need to look at this issue in a systematic, holistic, and comprehensive manner” (SP5, personal interview, 25

April 2007). Without systematic implementation, interviewees agreed that such educational efforts would not produce any visible outcomes or make a difference in students' lives in schools.

Reflection on democratic nurturing. As of 2010, School Peace continues to provide conflict-resolution skills training to local community members and offers workshops on PCR in local public schools. School violence continues to exist in schools, and there continues to be lack of a systematic approach to violence prevention.

Yet, some positive news has been reported regarding peace and conflict-resolution education in the city of Gwacheon. A report stated that more organisations host workshops about conflict-resolution and nonviolent communication methods for enhancing local residents' knowledge in this area. In 2009, it was announced that re-training courses for teachers would include programmes about nonviolent communication skills and conflict-resolution techniques (Gwacheon News, 2010). In 2010, the Anyang-Gwacheon Educational Ministry, a local municipality covering the neighbourhood where School Peace is operating, reported that they had adopted non-violent communication and conflict-resolution skills in order to effectively empower schoolteachers and administrators when handling conflicts that arise in schools (Gwacheon News, 2010). Such change has paved the way for the creation of a school environment that is more open to what School Peace advocates: a proactive, holistic approach to school violence.

In addition to specific policy changes at the macro level, there are a number of notable contributions that School Peace has made towards improving the democratic quality of civil society. First, as outlined in

interviewees' narratives, an organisation like School Peace mobilises a grassroots population and creates space for civil discourse about community issues. As seen in the historical overview, School Peace emerged as a specific response to a student's death resulting from school violence (bullying). They did so because there was no constructive space in the school in which to engage in debates about this issue. In the absence of a space for open discussion, local residents were mobilised to initiate public discourse about school violence outside of the public school system. This alternative space for discussion about schools in the neighbourhood attracted the participation of local residents. The group linked school violence, and other politicised issues, to educational opportunities and opened itself up to learning about conflict-resolution skills. Today, instead of mobilising local residents around specific causes, School Peace broadens its support base through education and volunteering opportunities. In this context, conflict-resolution education serves as a preparatory tool for civic engagement in specific community issues.

Second, School Peace's educational programmes help its participants improve those communications skills that are beneficial to resolving conflict in a constructive manner. As indicated by SP3 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) and SP6 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007), their experiences with conflict-resolution training provided them with an opportunity to reflect on the importance of listening respectfully to others, acknowledging differences, and promoting cooperative problem solving. As Dryzek (1994, cf. Chapter 2) explains, these skills are critical to mainstreaming participatory democracy and active civic discussion.

Third, School Peace's active members are exposed to opportunities to engage with a wide range of constituents, including those who hold different positions. While interviewees are critical of school administrators, teachers, and local residents who are sceptical of the interviewees' efforts, their interviews illustrate the members' willingness to work with different constituents to find a common solution. This effort and willingness is reflected in SP5's recollection of her experience with school officials:

> 'We reach out to various school officials and teachers. They sometimes misunderstand our educational activities, and express concerns about an ideological bias of peace and conflict resolution. In such contexts, we highlight that this programme is related to our common desire—reducing school violence. (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007)

In examining School Peace, the author was reminded of the article written by Church and Shouldice (2003). Their assessment of peace and conflict-resolution evaluation practices revealed that understanding the effect of micro-level change on macro issues that are often structural is extremely challenging (2003). In the context of School Peace, it is unclear whether a micro-level contribution to democracy (democratic skills) has an effect on the overall democratic quality of South Korean civil society. The lack of clarity on the impact of micro-level change on a broader society is particularly prominent in the absence of systematic assessment of School Peace and the effect of its educational programmes on students. It is rather unrealistic to expect a small community-based organisation to conduct systematic research on its educational programmes and their effects on their main constituents.

Furthermore, despite its willingness to engage with various local community members as presented above, School Peace is considered to be a progressive-leaning civil society organisation due to its advocacy activities. Specifically, its views on the 2004 Special Law on School Violence, its demand

for the resignation of the principal in 2002, and its occasional policy seminars implicitly indicate the organisation's political perspectives. The organisation, therefore, tends to be more accepted by progressive and liberal-leaning constituents and is less effective in reaching out to conservative residents, who are often sceptical of the notion of conflict resolution. The author notes that School Peace is a reflection of gendered civil society, which has a clear division of labour, and it clearly operates within the women's sphere. In this context, its main constituents are female; therefore they are less effective at promoting conflict-resolution values to male constituents, especially those values that are closely linked to democratic skills.

Case Study 2: Women Making Peace – Conflict Resolution Centre

The Women Making Peace Conflict Resolution Centre (WMP-CR Centre) is a pioneering organisation in South Korea. It is an example of how a national NGO has adapted Western conflict resolution practices to a country-specific context and has utilised them to advance the country's democratic development. In addition, the WMP-CR Centre demonstrates how a conflict resolution programme enhances the quality and diversity of the women's movement in the post-transitional era by allowing the WMP-CR Centre to reach out to a broad range of constituents.

Contextual overview of WMP-CR Centre

Conflict resolution, civil society, and democratisation. As Reimann (2004, p. 10) summarises, "conflict resolution refers to all process-oriented activities aiming to address the underlying causes of direct, cultural, and structural violence." Riemann defines structural violence as "the social, political, and economic structure of a conflict situation when unequal power, domination

and dependency are perpetuated, while cultural violence refers to the social and cultural legitimisation of direct and structural violence" (p. 10-11). By emphasising the transforming potential of conflict, conflict resolution scholars, such as Burton (1993) and Mitchelle (2006), have contended that conflict expressed in a nonviolent manner serves as an essential catalyst for social change.

The field of conflict resolution, as an academic discipline and practice, began in the late 1960s and gained momentum in the 1980s and 1990s in both North America and Western Europe. By offering an alternative framework for social conflict in democracy, the field of conflict resolution has contributed to institutionalising a mechanism for the constructive management of contentious social issues at various levels of society. Examples of such mechanisms include: dispute resolution, community mediation, problem-solving workshops, and facilitated dialogue. Conflict resolution became increasingly recognised in the 1990s as an important tool for effective intervention in global conflicts. The growth of the field in the 1990s coincided with a massive wave of democratisation, which affected numerous countries worldwide, changing international contexts as internal violent conflicts were increasingly on the rise. In this context, conflict resolution began to be introduced to various newly democratising countries. Among these new democracies, conflict resolution was promoted prominently in transitional countries with high levels of violent conflict.

As presented in Chapter 2, the author contends that core concepts and underlying assumptions of the conflict resolution movement are derived from liberal democratic theories, including neutrality, impartiality, confidentiality, open

communication, compromise, inclusiveness, tolerance, and respect for differences; moreover, they are interest-based and aim to separate people from issues. Furthermore, its goal—altering the underlying causes of violence so conflict can be expressed in a constructive manner—is more likely to be attainable in a democratic society (Ury, 1999). For example, as Reychler elaborated, non-democratic regimes "refuse to acknowledge the value, utility, and healing power of conflict" (p. 141), and thus, have suppressed the development of institutional foundations for constructive transformation of conflict. In contrast, democracy "legitimates conflicts that are peacefully expressed and resolved. By its very ideology, democracy welcomes diverse opinions and expression of ideas, and its various procedures are created primarily to address contentious issues peacefully" (Reychler, 1997, p. 439). In other words, without basic democratic procedures, the effectiveness of various conflict resolution methods—third party intervention, problem-solving workshops, mediation, negotiation, educational efforts, public dialogue, and so forth—is significantly limited.

Conflict resolution advocates for successful democratisation, such as Bianchi (1997), Shapiro (1997), and Shonholtz (1997, 2003) consider capacity building for conflict resolution a highly complementary element to formal democratisation, which focuses on the strengthening of procedural and institutional measures. In this context, the emergence of conflict resolution NGOs and professional conflict resolvers in South Korea signals the society's need for effective management of conflict. It has surfaced as the result of democratic transition and consolidation. In Chapter 4, this dissertation discusses the increasing need for Korean civil society to embrace PCR

practices to transform the adversarial and antagonistic position in which civil society actors are increasingly entrapped in their pursuit of social change. This dissertation also contends that the emergent PCR movement in South Korea is a testament to civil society's response to such needs.

In the process of building a society's capacity for constructive conflict resolution, civil society organisations reach out to the grassroots population in order to raise their awareness of conflict resolution norms and skills. For example, according to Reychler (1999, p. 142), civil society organisations in new democracies play a significant role in the process of challenging old values and introducing new ones by facilitating open communication. These efforts are particularly notable in contrast to certain segments of civil society, which play a supportive role in escalating violent conflict by providing political hardliners with moral, intellectual, and political justification for violence, such as in the case of Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia (Fischer, 2008).

While some notable NGOs are specialised, such as the Community Board, a community-mediation specialised non-for-profit organisation, Search for Common Ground, a US based non-governmental organisation promoting conflict resolution, and International Crisis Group, a conflict resolution think tank, most NGOs working in the field of peace and conflict also have many other mandates, and thus conflict resolution practices are part of their overall strategies to accomplish their organisational missions (Barnes, 2005; Debiel & Stict, 2005; Peck, 2002). Hasenfeld and Gidron (2005, p.98, cf. Chapter 2) termed these NGOs "multi-purpose hybrid" organisations because of their unique features that are distinctive from not-for-profit organisations, volunteer-

run associations or social movement networks.[31] The emergence of multi-purpose hybrid organisations is strongly related to the expansion of the public sphere and not-for-profit sector (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005).

Specific political contexts that contribute to opening a civil society space, such as democratisation, serve as a prerequisite for the activation of conflict resolution organisations. This is also reflective of the emergence of WMP and its CR Centre. Emerging ten years after the democratic transition, WMP was at the forefront of promoting the country's peace movement and alternative reunification discourses. Hence, it brought conflict resolution practices to its outreach strategy with a view to developing and strengthening peace constituents in South Korea and embedding constructive problem solving in Korean society. The establishment of the WMP-CR Centre was possible because there was a space for diverse forms of peace activism, which was enabled by the post-transitional context.

Diversification of the women's movement in South Korea. As Moon summarises, because of gender norms in Korean society that associate physical violence with masculinity, "the violent relationship between civil society and the state under the political conditions of military authoritarian rule and national division accentuated the masculinisation of the public sphere and discouraged women's access to civil society before the 1987 democratic transition" (2002, p. 482). During the militant struggle for democratisation of the 1980s, progressive male activists criticised the women's movement for its lack of militancy; women's organisations emphasise legal and procedural reform-

[31]Hasenfeld and Gidron (2005, p. 98) outlined three key features of these groups: "(a) multi-purpose hybrid organisations seek to bring about social change, though not necessarily through protest and non-institutional means; (b) the services they provide, such as social and educational (including conflict resolution training), are a strategy for social change; (c) their internal structure is a mix of collectivist and bureaucratic elements." (cf. Chapter 2)

oriented approaches to social change and democratisation (Moon, 2002). Furthermore, prior to the 1987 democratic transition, gender equality and women's rights were not pursued as a separate political agenda because embracing diversity of social and political issues were considered to weaken the effectiveness and coherence of the opposition movement.

As Lee (1993) observed, from 1987 on, South Korea witnessed the activation and expansion of civil society with the emergence of nongovernmental organisations advocating diverse social issues, such as environmental protection, economic justice, women's rights, consumer protection, education, and so forth. In particular, the democratic transition provided female activists with a space for reinterpreting various social and political issues through the lenses of gender in addition to advocating the unique needs of women. With this increased opportunity, women's NGOs emerged rapidly and advocated for the integration of gender perspectives into various social, political, and economic issues that perpetuated gender relations in society.

However, as Moon (2002) explained, despite the diversification of women's activism, these issues did not receive equal attention from women's groups. In order to reach out to ordinary female citizens in largely conservative local communities, women's groups had to frame certain social, political, and economic issues as extensions of women's concerns (Moon, 2002; Khor, 1999). Furthermore, in their emphasis on the importance of women's perspectives, these groups tended to focus on issues taking place within culturally prescribed women's spheres of activities. These "women's spheres" often involved marriage, family, children, school, the elderly, health, and consumerism. Those

advocating these less controversial issues considered the women's perspective without challenging traditional roles, thus contributing to the reproduction of feminine gender roles within the institution of marriage and family (Moon, 2002; Khor, 1999). In this context, women's issues within culturally masculine spheres of activities such as employment, law, business, politics, diplomacy, and security received less attention by moderate women's organisations because these issues tended to directly challenge unequal gender power relations in South Korea.

The absence of women's voices in traditionally masculine spheres reflected a broader gender inequality in such areas. Until the late 1990s, women cadres were denied the opportunity to apply for military, naval, and air-force academic study; less than 2.5% of women currently hold high-ranking military positions; only as recently as 2000 were women police officers allowed to apply to a special academy for superintendent candidates, and currently only 2% of superintendents or higher are women; less than 3% of women hold high ranking civil servant positions above the director level; less than 15% of elected parliamentarians are females; 20% of district attorneys are women; 18% of journalists are women; 10% of diplomats are women, but less than 1% of diplomats hold high-ranking positions. 17% of professors at universities are females; less than 5% of top management are women; and men's overall income is 1.9 times higher than women on average (National Statistics Office, 2009). The lack of women's representation as high ranking officials in the areas of security, politics, diplomacy, business, and journalism does not necessarily indicate the overall inequality of South Koreans. Indeed, 47% of the labour force is female, and women's educational level, on average, is about the same as

their male counterparts in terms of high school graduation and university admission; 25% of PhD graduates are females; and approximately 40% of civil servants are females (National Statistics Office, 2009).

The statistics suggest that the general opportunity for women's participation in the public realm has been expanded, whereas gender ideology, which discriminates against women's access to traditionally masculinised public spheres, continues to prevail. The lack of representation is particularly prominent in the areas of security and diplomacy because both issues are closely related to the division of the Korean peninsula. Reunification and South Korea's relationship with the North have been long framed as a security issue requiring military intervention and toughness (Moon, 2002). Military engagement and security-related issues have been the exclusive domain of South Korean males. A case in point is universal military conscription in the country, which calls for the military service of all healthy males in their late teens and 20s; however, it excludes women from participating. This explains the low level of high-ranking female officials in the military and police force in South Korea. In this context, women are highly discouraged from debating public issues related to military and security matters; such attempts often provoke emotional reactions from males, who argue they are the only ones entitled to such debates because of their dedicated military service to the country.[32] Thus, reunification debates, as well as international political debates, are the exclusive realm of South Korean males.

[32] In the mid 1990s, the Ministry of Women's Affairs began to lead the movement, calling for the abolition of the test bonus for those who served in the military service for over 24 months when they applied to exams for civil servants. After a few years of the campaign and appeal to the Korean Constitutional Court, the bonus test scores were announced as discriminatory against females. During this campaign, the women's movement was met with a series of criticisms from the conservative population, and provoked emotional reactions from Korean males who served military service. Even 10 years after the abolishment

The exclusion of females from debates on peacemaking is not limited to South Korea. In general, males dominate international peacemaking processes, as these activities exist primarily in male spheres such as diplomacy, security, and politics. In response, over decades, international women's NGOs and prominent female politicians have advocated for a higher representation of females in such processes. Women's groups particularly criticized the fact that political outcomes after conflict lack considerations of gender and often exclude women's perspectives. In 2000, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325, which calls on UN member-states to ensure the equal participation of women at all decision-making levels for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict. Security Council Resolution 1325 marks a milestone in feminist peace and security policy. It is the first Security Council decision in UN history calling for women's equal participation in decisions concerning peace and security that is legally binding under international law.

Established in 1997, WMP was founded to advocate for women's perspectives in public debates about peaceful reunification and international affairs affecting the Korean Peninsula. By reaching out to the public, WMP raised women's consciousness of the role of women in reunification and international political debates and has stimulated women's participation in such debates. WMP frames reunification and peace as issues closely linked to women's lives and highlights to what extent the exclusion of women from peace and reunification debates perpetuates the unequal gender balance in South Korean society (Lee & Meeks, 2003).

---

of such test bonuses, conservative politicians continue to use this as their election campaign slogans (Kang, 2010).

Initially, their member bases were intellectual, highly educated feminists with significant activist experience. The WMP also integrated practical and less politically intense activities in order to reach out to a broad range of constituents (including both males and females). WMP uses conflict resolution methodologies are strategies to broaden its constituency and make peace and reunification an issue that is accessible to the public. Like conflict resolution, debates about the role of women in peacemaking within South Korean civil society are indicative of the country's progress in the areas of democratization.

Descriptive overview of WMP-CR Centre

Background.[33] WMP was founded with the assumption that a peaceful and reunified Korea will not only liberate the country from the continuing threat of war but also contribute to reducing the conditions that perpetuate gender inequality (Lee & Meeks, 2003). The idea for the WMP-CR Centre emerged in response to WMP's search for a new peace paradigm accessible to Korean women. As presented in Chapter 4, with the inauguration of Kim Dae-Jung in 1998, the South Korean government began to embrace more inclusive and reconciliatory approaches to North Korea. Known as the "Sunshine Policy," this was the most important legacy of his presidency.

In the context of changing the North-South relationship as well as alternative ways to prepare for reunification, WMP and a few other non-governmental organisations were exposed to conflict resolution by the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), with whom they worked closely in a number of reunification related activities (Lee & Meeks, 2003). Particularly, in the preparation for a reunified Korea, these civic groups thought that conflict

[33]The historical background was constructed based upon interviews, archival studies, and media analysis. A majority of the information was obtained during the interviews with CR 2, CR 10, and CR 5.

resolution-related content and methodologies could help foster peaceful co-existence among people who grew up in different political systems and ideologies (Feffer & Lee, 2000). In the context of democratic consolidation, confrontation and social conflict have become more frequently observed throughout South Korean society (cf. Chapter 4). Thus, there was a need for a new approach to conflict and alternative ways to address this rather new social phenomenon (Park, 2006).

In September 1999, WMP, together with two other Korean NGOs and the AFSC, hosted a Workshop on Conflict Resolution and Tolerance Fostering, which was attended by 26 young civil society practitioners/activists (WMP, 2000; Feffer & Lee, 2000). This two-day workshop was the first conflict resolution programme conducted in Korean.[34] It introduced the following content: active listening, interest-based problem solving, win-win approaches, negotiation skills, and mediation principles. The workshop also provided participants with an opportunity to think about ways to apply conflict resolution to Korean society "at the interpersonal, group, and international levels" (Feffer & Lee, 2000, p. 6).

An article published in WMP's 2000 Newsletter described the novelty of this workshop as follows:

> This two-day workshop provided a lot of new information on conflict resolution to me, who barely understood the meaning of the workshop's title. First, I thought I would learn how to successfully resolve various conflicts in my daily lives and workplace. Through this workshop, I was humbled that I was too ambitious – resolving conflict and fostering tolerance is extremely difficult to obtain. I felt happy that I became aware of the fact that there are different approaches to problems or conflict. (Kim, 2000, p. 10-11)

[34]The author learned about this workshop in 2003 during her email exchange with CJJ. She took part in the training, and received a master's degree in conflict resolution from a foreign university at the time of the email exchange. In the email exchange, the author first developed a sense of an overview of the country's conflict resolution.

In an effort to deepen civil society's capacity for conflict resolution skills, WMP, together with two other Korean civic groups and AFSC, embarked on a 13-month-long conflict resolution and mediation skills training course for which 15 civil society activists were recruited. The course consisted of 10 modules focusing on various items related to conflict resolution and peaceful coexistence. At the end of this course, participants were expected to develop potential conflict resolution programmes that their organisations could utilize, as well as to produce Korean language conflict resolution manuals for future training.

Table 4: Training on Conflict Resolution and Mediation Skills

June 2000 – July 2001 *Summarized and Translated based upon two articles published in WMP Newsletter in 2001 (Park, 2001)*	
Contents	Duration
1. Orientation & Introduction	Two Days
2. German Reunification and Conflict Resolution: How to understand social conflict that emerged after German reunification and what efforts Germany makes to resolve such conflict? (guest instructors from Germany)	Two Days
3. Conflict Resolution Skills Training (guest instructor from George Mason University)	Five Days
4. Women and Conflict Resolution (guest instructor from International Alert)	Two Days
5. Useful Tools and Methodologies for Conflict Resolution (guest instructor from USIP)	Two Days
6. Application and Conflict Resolution Programme Development	Five Days
7. Workshop on Content Development	Two Days
8. Workshop on Labour Disputes and their Resolution and Field Visit	Three Days
9. Studying Conflict Resolution Theory at George Mason University & Field Visit ▪ Fairfax County Public School-Lake Braddock High School (Peer Mediation) ▪ United States Institute for Peace (Peace research) ▪ Search for Common Ground (conflict resolution NGO) ▪ Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (conflict resolution NGO) ▪ Resolve (environment dispute resolution NGO) ▪ National Association for Community Mediation (community mediation) ▪ Help Increase the Peace (youth and peace education) ▪ Superior Court of the District of Columbia – Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Division (arbitration at the judiciary)	Two Weeks
10. Development of Conflict Resolution Manuals and Resources	Five months

Upon completion of the activists' participation in this long training course in July 2001, WMP took the lead in integrating a conflict resolution programme into its core activities for two purposes: promoting citizens' awareness of peace and bringing peace activism into citizens' daily activities. In its 2001 overall strategy, WMP stated that it would explore a way to strengthen a "conflict resolution and tolerance fostering programme" in order to reach out to ordinary

citizens (WMP, 2001). In May 2001, a "conflict resolution team" was organized within WMP in order to study conflict resolution theories and methodologies, and to develop tools and resources applicable to South Korean society, particularly in the area of peace education. Initially, only four members participated in this group (Park, 2001).

This group first introduced conflict resolution to public school educators with the vision of strengthening teachers' capacity for peace education (Park, 2001). In August 2001, the group planned a summer workshop on conflict resolution in which female public school teachers could participate. However, due to lack of understanding of the notion of conflict resolution, the group failed to recruit a single participant. As Park (2001) recalled,

> When we planned our second workshop in winter, we paid a great deal of attention to the recruitment process. Based upon our experience in summer, we realized that it was critical to explain conflict resolution in greater detail, and reach out to public school teachers to provide a detailed briefing of their intention. After many attempts since September 2001, thankfully, we were able to connect with one public school teacher who was interested in this issue. She reached out to her colleagues and brought them to the workshop (Park, 2001).

The year 2001 marked the beginning of civil society-led conflict resolution programmes in South Korea with the delivery of a workshop for female teachers on peaceful resolution of conflict in schools (CR5, personal interview, 23 May 2007). In 2002, these programmes brought conflict resolution education into public schools and, beginning in 2003, organized regular training programmes for conflict resolution practitioners. "As conflict resolution receives more attention, there is a need for a more systematic approach to conflict resolution programmes than WMP provided at the time" (CR2, personal interview, 26 January 2007). In response, WMP established the Conflict Resolution Centre, which was the first conflict resolution programme operated

by a non-governmental organization in South Korea.[35] Staff members engage in consulting activities on conflict resolution.

As a membership organisation, the WMP-CR Centre is funded by membership fees. The WMP-CR Centre also receives funding from government agencies, such as the Seoul City Government, Ministry of Public Administration and Security, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Gender and Family Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice and private foundations (CR2, personal interview, 19 June 2007; WMP, 2010). There was no discussion on contributions from private corporations, which is common in progressive civil society circles due to the ambivalent relationship with Korean conglomerates. Compared to School Peace, the WMP-CR Centre has a broad funding base. However, it should be noted that funding is always a central problem for civil society organisations in South Korea (Lee, 2009).

Main Activities:[36] The WMP-CR Centre engages in three main activities: education and training, conflict resolution service delivery, and conflict resolution research and policy advocacy. In earlier stages, WMP-CR focused mainly on education and training programmes, as well as leading efforts to strengthen conflict resolution research and policy advocacy work. With an enhanced conflict resolution capacity, WMP-CR increasingly intervenes in real conflict cases in the area of public conflict and adolescent victim-offender

[35]In 2005, the CECJ, one of the largest and most influential NGOs in South Korea, established a Conflict Resolution Centre (the name is slightly different in Korean as resolution can be translated into a few other words). The author met the practitioners running this programme. Their conflict resolution programmes are similar to the one run by the WMP-CR Centre. Yet, this dissertation chose to focus on WMP-CR Centre because the CCEJ is highly influential, and their influence in the political process can interfere the public's perception on their impartiality and neutrality. Further, due to its political influence, it is much less likely that the CCEJ could bring the conservative constituents.
[36]Main activities were identified by interviews (mainly with CR2, CR5), internal documents, and archival studies. For documents, please see Annex 4.

relations.[37] This section focuses on conflict resolution education and training, and conflict resolution activities.

Conflict Resolution Education and Training. In the early 2000s, when a conflict resolution programme was first brought into South Korea, there was little awareness of the notion of conflict resolution. For example, very basic concepts underpinning the field of conflict resolution were new to South Korean civil society practitioners and academics, let alone to most ordinary citizens. In an effort to generate awareness of conflict resolution, it was essential for the WMP-CR Centre to focus on education and training programmes. As highlighted by CR 5 (Personal interview, 23 May 2007), "without general awareness of the basic principles underpinning the field of conflict resolution, other plans—promoting the culture of conflict resolution and integrating conflict resolution principles into the lives of South Koreans—would not be attained."

WMP-CR's education and training programmes reach out to a wide range of constituents—youth, teachers, educators, school administrators, public servants, civil society practitioners, ordinary citizens, and grassroots organisers.

- Conflict Resolution Training for Teachers, Educators, and School Administrators: When awareness of conflict resolution was low, the WMP-CR Centre approached elementary and secondary educational institutes and reached out to schoolteachers, who are constantly exposed to a wide range of interpersonal and intergroup conflicts their students are experiencing. WMP-CR offers regular workshops for teachers to enhance their capacity to handle conflicts emerging during their encounters with students. Furthermore, by introducing conflict

[37]This was not a full reality during the time of the fieldwork in 2007. The pilot programmes began to be implemented in 2008.

resolution skills and principles to teachers and school administrators, the WMP-CR Centre, together with WMP's Peace Education Team, aimed to promote a peaceful school culture and reduce school violence. In addition to educators and administrators, the WMP-CR Centre organises a regular workshop for elementary and secondary school students aged 10 to 17 years old. A majority of the workshops offered at schools are linked to the issue of violence prevention in schools or are supplements to reunification education.

- Conflict Resolution Training for Public Administrators: During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, conflict management has become a policy priority due to rising social and public conflict involving major development and infrastructure projects in which the government is involved. Reflecting the government's interest, the WMP-CR Centre was invited by various government agencies to provide public servants with a basic knowledge of conflict analysis and resolution techniques. These government agencies included the Central Officials Training Institute (2003-6), Ministry of Public Administration and Security's Human Resources Development Bureau (2004-6), Korean Housing Corporation, Training Institute for Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs (2005-6), Legal Research and Training Institute (2005-6), Korea Labour Institute (2005), Korea Human Resource Institute for Health and Welfare (2005), Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (2005), Seoul City Officials Training Institute (2006), National Institute for Environmental Human Resources Development (2006), and the National Unification Advisory Council (2006). WMP-CR's outreach to public sector organisations was

designed to prepare civil servants to improve the integration of conflict resolution techniques into their work. In addition, "by raising awareness of policy implementers, it aims to prepare the ground for institutionalising conflict resolution systems in South Korea" (CR2, personal interview, 26 January 2007).

- Conflict Resolution Training to Grassroots Civil Society Groups: After a few years of experience in organising regular workshops and training programmes, WMP-CR began to reach out to grassroots civil society groups located outside of Seoul. Educational programmes offered to grassroots organisations were introduced in the context of addressing rising public conflict and environmental disputes that had become critical social issues. Many grassroots organisations were involved in public conflicts "as an advocate for local citizens and were pulled into conflict dynamics" (CR2, personal interview, 26 January 2007). These groups lacked the capacity to approach public or social conflict (in addition to the lack of the government's ability to resolve constructively), which had become a serious obstacle to community building as well as effective implementation of public policy.

  Thus, The WMP-CR Centre invited grassroots activists and civic group members to understand better the conflict dynamics they were involved with and to help them identify ways to transform destructive conflict patterns. The training programme for grassroots activists focused on conflict analysis: how to objectively assess conflict dynamics and parties involved; problem-solving approaches; how to identify common challenges and interests; effective communication skills; how

to engage with those who have differing perspectives and build trust with them; and how to engage in effective and democratic decision making processes. In 2004 and 2005, the WMP-CR Centre convened for the "Conflict Resolution Workshop for Community Cohesion and Reconciliation" in three provinces in the southern part of South Korea, and in 2004, "Training for NGO Activists to Improve Conflict Resolution Capacity" was organised in four major cities outside of Seoul.

- Specialised Training for Conflict Resolution Practitioners: One of the most important educational activities the WMP-CR Centre has been engaged in is the annual "Conflict Resolution Training for Trainers", which began in 2003. CR2 (personal interview, 26 January 2007) recalled the challenge in recruiting participants due to the extensive commitment required to complete this course (90 hours plus a weekend retreat):

> The first training course had to recruit participants through activists' networks, and we were able to attract 15 civil society practitioners. This year (2007), we completed five training courses, and 70 people participated in the courses. Twenty of those who completed the training continue to work with the WMP-CR Centre by supporting the WMP-CR Centre's activities. Our programme's advantage is to allow our students to re-take the course without additional charge. The purpose is to ensure that those who take the course fully internalise the skills (CR2, personal interview, 26 January 2007)

Conflict Resolution Service Delivery. Although the opportunity is rather limited due to the absence of a comprehensive conflict resolution system in South Korea, the WMP-CR Centre staff intervenes in social and public conflicts and serves as mediators and facilitators.

One of the first cases that WMP-CR participated in was as a member of a four-person mediating committee during the Hantan River public dispute. The

public dispute was related to the government's plan to build a dam to control frequent flooding at the expense of the local community and natural environment. CR2 (Personal interview, 26 January 2007) recounted her experience as one of the facilitators:

> This was one of the first public disputes intervened in by a government-appointed mediation committee, and the mediation committee spent over five months working to form an official agreement from both parties (pro-Dam and against-Dam). The statement asserted that the parties involved would not protest any decision made by the mediation committee within a month. The mediation committee's decision was to build a smaller dam exclusively designed to prevent flooding. As this was one of the first mediation cases in public dispute, there were mixed evaluations because the process did not result in the agreed outcome concerning the actual decision on the building of the dam. This serves as one of the experiments where a civil society organisation participated in mediating complex public disputes in South Korea.

Analytical overview of WMP-CR Centre

Interviews and Observation. The WMP-CR Centre is run by two full-time staff members and supported by a number of volunteers who are members of WMP. Because WMP is an NGO advocating for the integration of gender perspectives into peace and reunification, more females than males were met during the field research for both observation and interviews. Eight females responded positively to interview requests, and five males were interviewed for the research. All of the interviewees are familiar with civil society activism in South Korea, and eight of them were NGO professionals working on a range of issues including consumer rights, environmental activism, community building, peace, and social justice. Only five interviewees directly experienced the democratic transition as activists. All were involved in student activism in the 1980s, and the rest of the interviewees are young practitioners in their late 20s and early and mid 30s. Three interviewees have been involved with WMP for

over five years, and the rest of the interviewees became affiliated with WMP within two years prior to the interview.

In terms of political orientation, all interviewees are considered to be liberal, and have a strong understanding of various political, social, and economic issues. This orientation reflects the WMP-CR Centre: as a membership-based organisation, it attracts highly politicised and highly educated South Koreans aged between the late 20s and late 40s. As a result, their understanding of political and social issues in South Korea is extremely informed, and their interviews provided an in-depth understanding of South Korean civil society and emerging issues in the 21st century. In terms of specific content, two interviews were conducted with WMP insiders to understand better the context in which conflict resolution practices were introduced to the organisation and how their conflict resolution activities have evolved in the last five years. The rest of the interviewees were met in order to understand their motivation in becoming involved in WMP-CR Centre's training programmes, and to elicit their reflections on conflict resolution activities and their application to South Korean civil society.

During the field research, four different training sessions were observed in order to understand how these activities were communicated to WMP-CR Centre's participants and how conflict resolution concepts were explained to others during the training. These training sessions provided the researcher with the opportunity to interact informally with many other participants who attended the training sessions, retreats, and seminars. A majority of the training attendees are females who have been engaged in civil society activism and women's rights issues. This observation confirms that conflict resolution training

is a preferred method for female practitioners engaged in civil society organisations, which is related to the fact that conflict resolution is perceived in South Korea as among practices applicable to youth and educational programmes or activities appropriate to women's spheres (Kohr, 1999).

Motivatio*n*. Interviewees' motivations to become involved in WMP-CR Centre's conflict resolution activities are related to their desire to fulfil both personal and professional needs. In terms of personal motivation, one-third of the interviewees indicated they had a difficult time dealing with the range of conflict they had experienced in their lives. When they were introduced to the conflict resolution training programme, they hoped it could help them better manage the negative conflict patterns that they had internalised. CR 9 (Personal interview, 30 May 2007)'s narratives reflect this motivation:

> I was angry when I was engaged in activism in my youth. I tried to unleash my anger through writings. One day, my mentor, who read my writing, told me that my supposed peace story was full of violence. This made me think about ways I engage with others. I have internalised violence without realising it. This motivated me to learn more about conflict resolution.

The rest of the interviewees explained that the negative conflict patterns they observed through their professional work had motivated them to explore alternative methods. Some of these interviewees work for advocacy organisations and were drawn into conflictual situations when they intervened in controversial policy issues on behalf of their constituents. With repeated experiences of confrontational engagement in conflict situations, they felt the strong need to find alternative methods to deal with these situations in a constructive manner. For example, CR 13 (Personal interview, 14 June 2007) said that he used to spend "a majority of working hours fighting and engaging in confrontational debates with" his opponents. CR 13 (Personal interview, 14

June 2007) wanted to find a better way to manage his working relationship, and was exposed to conflict resolution trainings.

Other interviewees work for organisations that often facilitate dialogue among their constituents regarding controversial and difficult issues, and they often realise that their constituents lack various conversational skills and basic attitudes required for negotiation and constructive dialogue. As practitioners, they felt unable to help their constituents improve these skills, and they wanted to enhance their ability to coach others to solve conflictual issues in a constructive manner. CR12 (Personal interview, 21 May 2007) said, "I felt frustrated with my inability to facilitate contentious discussions. Definitely, cultural elements and Korean stubbornness work against me, but I felt I needed something else to intervene such situations in an innovative way."

Reflections on Positive Contributions. The interviewees assessed three positive contributions as the strength of WMP-CR Centre's activities: raising awareness of conflict resolution principles (difference, tolerance, problem-solving, separating people from issues, active listening, and so forth); increased capacity to handle conflictual situations at home and in their workplace; and an opportunity to bring people into civil society activism and public discourses.

Raising awareness of conflict resolution principles: Overwhelmingly, all interviewees greatly appreciated the opportunity to participate in skills training as either student or instructor because it allowed them to be more aware of various conflict resolution principles. Two main aspects of the experience provided interviewees with an "aha" moment of appreciation. First, their perspective on the function of conflict has changed. Frequently,

the interviewees expressed how negatively they had perceived “conflict” and its value in society, depending on the ways it is resolved, and they indicated that this paradigm shift helped them better confront a wide range of conflicts they experience in their daily lives. Such comments were made by participants with soft-spoken voices and less confrontational personalities.[38] CR 5 (Personal interview, 23 May 2007) recounted the negative response that she had when she heard the term “conflict.” She said:

> I was afraid of conflicts, and avoid conflictual circumstances at any cost. My colleagues were often curious about how I managed to stay engaged in civil society activism given my tendency to run away from any tense moments. I think that such fear stems from my inability to constructively handle strong emotions associated with conflicts (CR 5, personal interview, 23 May 2007).

Second, interviewees overwhelmingly highlighted that they were able to embrace and practice “tolerance” and made an effort to understand and accept different positions held by others. This particular point was reflected well in the following interviews:

> I did not realise that others did have a genuinely different perspective from me. I rather thought that such difference in a conflict situation was others’ intention to refuse conversation with me. I was critical of the difference, and interpreted the difference as other’s willingness to fight with me. (CR 4, personal interview, 10 April 2007)
>
> Before the training, I was not able to sit through the arguments made by those who had seriously different perspectives from me. But, now, I have a bit more tolerance of difference. I am doing my best to remind myself that others could have such different perspectives. (CR 5, personal interview, 23 May 2007)
>
> I am still confused. But, one interesting change that happened after the training is my perspective shifted on righteous anger toward oppressors. Given the reality and social structure, it is important to advocate for the disfranchised. However, I feel much more hesitant in being angry and aggressively judgemental toward those who I consider as holding an oppressor’s position. I used to think that there should be a clear target to resist for social change whether they are conservative politicians or the ruling bourgeoisie. But, really now, I am constantly struggling with the idea that I should accept others’ humanity and their differing position because we strive to co-exist. (CR 6, personal interview, 24 May 2007)

[38]Throughout the interviews, CR 5 and CR 3 quietly recounted their experiences. During the interviews, they repeatedly mentioned that they do not like confrontations in conflictual situations.

Interviewees' initial suspicion about conflict resolution is deeply related to the South Korean cultural perspective toward conflict in the political history of the country, which created polarisation, suppression, resistance, and denial of pluralistic ideas. Culturally, avoiding direct confrontation is highly encouraged in order to avoid any embarrassment (Miyahara et al., 1998). However, regarding political oppression of authoritarianism, for those who hold oppositional perspectives, conflict suppression is considered defeated only through direct confrontation against the oppressive state (Miyahara et al., 1998). Interviewees value the conflict resolution programme because it provides an alternative framework for various strategies to deal with difference.

Increased capacity to handle conflictual circumstances. Shockley-Zalabak explained that systematic training in coping skills contributes to individuals' development of positive "alternatives for functioning in conflict from personal actions and reactions at the cognitive, emotional and behavioural level" (1984, p. 493). Similarly, interviewees highly value the importance of teaching various skills, such as active listening and problem-solving, as these help them perform their work better, but also enable them to handle contentious social issues. All the interviewees worked as civil society practitioners or active supporters, and had engaged in civil society organisations as staff members or committed activists during the democratisation movement. They noted that enhanced conflict resolution skills helped not only their interpersonal relationships, but also their work-related conflictual situations. For examples, two interviewees noted as follows:

> I annually organise a peace camp and interact with young people interested in this topic. Yet, our camp as a human community is full of conflict. We dreamed of peace and peaceful coexistence as a broader politics, but I was unable to

> intervene in different types of conflict that erupted in our programme. In such a context, I participated in the conflict resolution training workshop, and I was happy with various skills that I learned to engage with our camp participants when they were in a conflictual situation with other camp members—a problem solving and process-oriented mind-set has been particularly helpful. With also better listening skills and communication techniques, others also seemed to feel more genuine and comfortable around me. (CR 3, personal interview, 21 May 2007)

> In my work, I engaged in a wide range of grassroots politics—local politics or in any community conflict. In our area, with continued pursuit of development, there are confrontations between those who would like to bring leisure facilities and community members who are critical of such facilities' environmental affect. I used to engage in debates fiercely. I argued why my perspective was right and why others were wrong. It was very stressful, and the same debates continued on and on, etc. Now, I actually enjoy conflict situations because I feel confident in how to engage constructively with difficult situations that have clear positional differences. Before, I pointed out their wrongdoings. Now, I ask whether they have considered others' perspectives. If so, I ask how they plan to address or understand such differences. I cannot speak for one incident, but such attitudinal change or skill improvement help me to get involved in various issues in our community without being exhausted. (CR 8, personal interview, 28 May 2007)

While interviewees appreciated their enhanced capacity for conflict resolution, they also emphasised how difficult it is to practice various skills in their daily lives and apply them to their organisations.

Opportunity to bring people into civil society activism. Interviewees positively assessed the importance of conflict resolution programmes in bringing more people back or welcoming them to civil society activism in a democratic era. Interviewees were quite confident about both their progressive political orientation and how such views are important for positive social change in South Korea. However, they noted that the movement or single-handed focus of activism often neglected processes, details, and methods to obtain their larger goal. After many years of involvement in activism, veteran practitioners often feel exhausted and desire to go back to ordinary life without too much involvement in big political issues. After being exposed to conflict resolution training or related activities, they believed they found ways to reclaim their political consciousness and remain relevant to social discourses. In particular, their positive assessment is linked to their involvement in educational

programmes with youth, and outreach to citizens, informed citizens, and educators. One interviewee summarised his experience in the following conversation:

> I was drawn to conflict resolution for its healing potential for my mind. I wanted to be more at ease with various conflicts that happen in my life. I was not quite interested in taking up social issues again as I was a bit exhausted with the whole intensity… but as I continued my participation in the training programme, I realised that I could remain highly active and relevant to social issues without putting myself into exhaustion and extreme dedication. I was happy that I could reclaim this space without sacrificing other important aspects in my life. (CR 1, personal interview, 30 May 2007)

In their own experiences, some interviewees saw the huge potential for this programme to genuinely reach out to the general public, who find politics, activism, and civil society engagement highly difficult and far from their own reality.

Challenges. A wide range of personal reflections were made regarding the WMP-CR Centre's programme, but as the interviewees were mostly supportive of the WMP-CR Centre's programme, their criticisms were directed at external circumstances and the overall quality of conflict resolution activities and the training programme. Interviewees identified four challenges that could be considered further: difficulty in reaching out to ordinary citizens; difficulty in describing the concept; difficulty in understanding how individual change and cultural shifts would contribute to problem solving that requires structural and systematic change; challenge of bringing and applying conflict resolution principles and programmes into mainstream South Korean society; lack of systematic support from the government to utilise conflict resolution expertise and knowledge; and lack of opportunity to connect to conservative civic organisations and/or individuals with conservative ideologies.

Bringing the concept of conflict resolution to mainstream South Koreans. WMP-CR Centre's conflict resolution training programmes have become increasingly popular among NGO professionals, educators, civil servants, and informed citizens, who have extensive backgrounds in civil society activism or who have been previously involved in political activism. Specifically, the demand for high-quality conflict resolution training has increased as issues surrounding social conflict have become an important policy debate in the country. However, except for regular youth education and periodic local community programmes, WMP-CR Centre's conflict resolution programme has not been attended by ordinary citizens. Some interviewees explained that the lack of ordinary citizens' participation is largely due to the complexity and unfamiliarity of various ideas underpinning conflict resolution. An interviewee whose organisation does outreach with community members in a rather conservative neighbourhood illustrated the difficulty of trying to explain some of the basic conflict resolution concepts learned during the training to ordinary citizens:

> WMP-CR Centre's programme is the most advanced conflict resolution training programme in the country. Yet, the training we received does not necessarily help us to articulate these concepts in a pragmatic manner that can be understood by ordinary citizens in the community or conservative populations. In part, such difficulty comes from the fact that main concepts come from the Anglo-Saxon cultural context, which is very different from our culture. So far, we have not yet translated these concepts [to be] applicable to our daily lives. In order for us to reach out to broader constituents, we need more efforts. (CR 11, personal interview 21 May 2007)

Highlighting the difficulty in explaining the various terminologies translated from conflict resolution manuals written in English to ordinary citizens, an interviewee recalled her personal experience of giving up trying to explain what she learned from her training to those who are not engaged in civil society activism:

> When I met my friends, they asked me what conflict resolution is about. I tried to explain what the concept is. But, so many terms that I learn from the training are not shared by ordinary citizens. They are very foreign concepts which require extensive background explanation. Furthermore, some terms sound very unnatural in Korean. The fact that I have to explain so much for them to understand the basic concept is quite challenging to me, and it was boring to my friends. So, in the end, I ended up not explaining to my friends. I just told them I joined the training. (CR5, personal interview, 23 May 2007)

Interviewees emphasised the strong need for developing scenarios and examples applicable to local community members who are not necessarily politically active, as well as identifying culturally appropriate frameworks for conflict analysis to enhance these programmes' accessibility to ordinary citizens.

Difficulty in understanding the affect of micro-level changes on a macro-level social structure. All interviewees are politically active and advocate a progressive social change agenda. As discussed in previous chapters, a majority of civil society activists in South Korea are deeply inspired by a neo-Marxist theoretical framework such as that of Gramsci, and thus view civil society as an emancipatory space existing to transform unequal and oppressive social relations (Lee, 1993). These activists are more accustomed to address structural challenges, and they seek to transform the negative structural patterns creating injustice or inhibit social justice. From such perspectives, conflict resolution's emphasis on micro-level issues seems unable to address various structural issues, which perpetuate negative conflict patterns in society. Thus, for many, conflict resolution is rather difficult to share with their activist colleagues, as they feel it is difficult to connect micro-changes or cultural shifts taking place at the individual or community level to a broader social change. Many felt it was difficult to articulate specific links between conflict resolution practices that they have been integrating into their lives, both at the personal

and workspace level and in the context of overall social change goals. An interviewee illustrates the aforementioned challenge below:

> I often ask myself how much my own perspective change or [how much] resolution of small conflicts in my community can bring about broad social change which requires structural transformation. In order to make meaningful social change, we cannot ignore structural elements that reproduce oppressive social relations. However, the conflict resolution training programmes either lack such reflections or do not raise these questions of structural elements. I have advocated that activism and movement must address structural injustice and work to alter the negative structural elements through policies and systematic approach. Without addressing this fundamental question of structure, conflict resolution is limited in attracting a broad range of constituents from activists circle. Without articulating how the change taking place at the individual level affects a broader social change agenda, conflict resolution becomes a spiritual tool to teach us how to accept and tolerate the existing social structure and status quo. (CR 6, personal interview, 24 May 2007)

In order to bring more mainstream activists into conflict resolution, interviewees assessed the need for a clear linkage between conflict resolution and a broader social change agenda.

Lack of participation of conservative constituents. As Fisher contends, training in conflict analysis and resolution can serve as a form of interactive conflict resolution “when it brings together members of conflicting groups to share a common learning experience that is based in part on the conflict between the two sides”(1997, p. 335). Some social conflicts in the country were escalated to the destructive level due to differences between progressive and conservative constituents. A civil society that often advocates progressive agendas contributes to mobilising conservative constituents around an opposing position. This pattern appears more visibly with regard to issues related to development (environmental public policy) and policy toward North Korea. In discussing one of the contentious social issues in South Korea, CR2 (Personal interview, 19 June 2007) expressed the difficulty in engaging those who hold differing positions from the stance advocated by her organisation:

> It is genuinely difficult for us to intervene in certain social conflicts such as the Maehyangli case.[39] My organisation, along with others with whom we interact closely, has a strong stance. We are sympathetic to villagers, and are in solidarity with them. We also believe that the SOFA Agreement should be renegotiated. Under such circumstances, we are aware that we are not fit to mediate tensions between progressive and conservatives. Our society including civil society is polarised, and it is challenging to identify ways to bring these opposite sides together in a constructive manner. (CR2, personal interview, 19 June 2007)

While the WMP-CR Centre occasionally reaches out to conservative constituents through ad-hoc workshops, their regular training programme tends to attract participants who are more liberal. In explaining an ad-hoc encounter with conservative constituents, CR2 (Personal interview, 19 June 2007) recalled a lady who the author met briefly on 15 June 2007 during the meeting observation. “SJY whom you met at the training works for one of the most conservative women’s organisations in the country. In the past, it was very unlikely that you would have had someone from that organisation in an event that we organised” (CR2, personal interview, 19 June 2007).

A majority of the people who remained connected to the WMP-CR Centre, or who have participated in conflict resolution training programmes, are similar in many ways: politically progressive, feminist friendly, highly educated, and politically active. CR2 (Personal interview, 19 June 2007) highlighted the importance of promoting conflict resolution skills and principles to a wide range of South Koreans, but indicated that time may be needed to connect with more people with different political positions. CR 9 shared an episode when she and

---

[39] Since 1952, the U.S. Air Force has used the land and facilities of the range in Maehyang-Ri for free, without any rent, on the basis of the SOFA agreement, which obliged the Korean Government to grant areas to the U.S. Armed Forces for free. Residents organised in early 2000 to demand the immediate closure of the range and reparation of and compensation for the damages to livelihood, violation of human rights, and destruction of environment and ecology. As a result of the continued campaign by residents of this village and civil society coalition, the Korean Government and the U.S. Armed Forces agreed in 2006 to the closure of the range. This issue created two conflictual positions between Koreans—those who supported the villagers, and those who argued that Koreans should honour the SOFA Agreement for its security purposes.

her colleagues were asked to provide conflict resolution training to a conservative population.

> A few months after I began to provide conflict resolution training, CR 2 said that we were invited to provide training to members of the conservative advisory group on reunification. At the beginning, my colleagues and I were unsure whether we could manage the situation well, given that we almost all the time disagree on reunification related issues. However, in the end, we accepted the offer and provided the training. It was very educational for me, and was a good opportunity to engage with those who advocate differing positions. However, this will take a longer time for me to better internalise conflict resolution skills. (Personal interview, 30 May 2007)

Lack of systematic support to utilise conflict resolution expertise and knowledge: One of the most frequently cited challenges in advancing conflict resolution programmes in the country is the lack of systematic support from governments to utilise conflict resolution expertise and knowledge. In a country where conflict is often considered negative or culturally taboo, it is critical to have systematic support from the public sector, such as the government.

The RMH administration attempted to introduce legal infrastructure for conflict resolution and an infrastructure for public administration on conflict management, but CR2 (Personal interview, 26 January 2007) highlighted that further efforts are required to institutionalise the conflict resolution mechanism in South Korea. The interviewees, including CR2 (2007) and CR 10 (2007), emphasised the need for the introduction of a conflict resolution system to all levels of society by establishing mediation centres, embarking on nationwide campaigns on conflict resolution, or institutionalising victim-offender restorative justice programmes. Without such systems in place, individuals with skills will not have any practical opportunity to sharpen their skills as well as advance the field in general. However, CR2 (Personal interview, 26 January and 19 June 2007), CR7 (Personal interview, 30 May2007), and CR10 (Personal interview, 26 January and 20 June 2007) cautioned that the conflict resolution system will

only be widely successful if it is brought into mainstream society with proper conflict resolution training facilities and quality assurance mechanisms. CR2 said:

> Conflict resolution has become too fashionable. Numerous organisations have begun to claim their expertise. But, our basic infrastructure on conflict resolution remains unchanged compared to a few years ago. We need better education, and have clear expectations of what conflict resolution can do and what it cannot deliver. (Personal interview, 26 January and 19 June 2007)

Reflection on nurturing a democratic system. Since the conclusion of the field research, there have been two notable developments in which the WMP-CR Centre has undertaken to advance conflict resolution practices in South Korea.[40] First, the WMP-CR Centre has expanded its conflict resolution programmes into school violence intervention programmes through victim-offender restorative justice.[41] This programme began as an experiment in 2007 in collaboration with the Seoul Metropolitan Police when six cases were reviewed. In 2008, the Family and Juvenile Court forwarded 14 cases for mediation based upon restorative justice principles. In 2009, six cases were sent to the WMP-CR Centre for mediation. The restorative justice mediation service is one of the first conflict resolution cases referred to a civil society organisation. However, all of these cases were intervened during the pilot test period, and restorative justice has not yet been integrated into the juvenile criminal legal system.

Second, in late 2007, RMH announced a presidential decree on the *Prevention and Resolution of Conflict within Public Institutions*. This decree was

[40]In relation to case study organisations presented in this dissertation, the author wishes to acknowledge that the events occurring after September 2010 were not captured.
[41]Restorative justice is an approach to justice focusing on the needs of victims and offenders, instead of the need to satisfy the abstract principles of law or the need of the community to exact punishment. Restorative justice can involve a fostering of dialogue between the offender and the victim. The practices have shown the highest rates of victim satisfaction, true accountability by the offender, and reduced repeated offences (Mason, 2004).

symbolically significant because it introduced the resolution of public conflict into public political debates. However, its implementation lagged because of the weak enforcement authority of the presidential decree. Even with the inauguration of Lee Myung-Bak, who represented a conservative centre-right party, the issue of social conflict remains an important agenda, and in late 2010, *the Act on the Prevention and Resolution of Public Conflicts* was scheduled to be introduced to the National Assembly for their approval. The act makes the participation of civil society in the public policy decision-making process as an obligation. Given that the WMP-CR Centre played a pioneering role in advocating for a conflict resolution mechanism at a broader societal level, such policy development reflects that their efforts have been recognised by policymakers.

The WMP-CR Centre brought about a number of positive changes in terms of nurturing the democratic capacity of civil society. These positive contributions can be divided into three categories: making peace discourse more accessible to grassroots populations; increased capacity for conflict resolution—particularly, tolerance and willingness to listen to others; and increased awareness of the need to connect with diverse populations. First, as indicated by a number of interviewees including CR 1 (2007), conflict resolution provides a useful tool to reach out to broader constituents and allows peace discourses to be easily accessible to ordinary citizens who perceive civic engagement as either an act of sacrifice or aggressive public engagement. As stated by CR 1 (Personal interview, 24 May 2007), "conflict resolution brings a macro-level peace discourse into a micro-level practical activity that anyone can engage within his or her daily lives" (CR 1, personal interview, 24 May 2007).

Thus, the conflict resolution activities of the WMP-CR Centre serve as a useful tool to enhance ordinary citizens' participation in civil society's space.

Second, a number of interviewees, including CR 4 (2007), CR 5 (2007), and CR 6 (2007), indicated their satisfaction with the conflict resolution training because of their increased ability to tolerate differences. As emphasized by CR5 (Personal interview, 23 May 2007), the training helped them to be more patient with different opinions and provided them with skills to endure such differences without resorting to anger and emotional reactions.

Third, in relation to increased tolerance of different opinions, interviewees such as CR4 (Personal interview, 10 April 207) acknowledged the need for engaging with others—that meant engaging with conservative constituents without attacking others' differences. While this awareness has not been fully integrated into daily actions, except for a few interviewees who testified about their experience of engaging with former "others" in their workplace, increased awareness can contribute to changing their engagement pattern with those who hold different viewpoints.

However, from the perspective of theoretical conflict resolution, WMP-CR Centre has not been completely successful in mobilising more conservative and non-usual constituents around their activities. In part, this is related to the fact that the CR Centre is situated within WMP, an advocacy organisation founded in feminism and progressive political activism. As a result, to a certain extent, its affiliation with a progressive advocacy group negatively affects its neutrality and impartiality. As indicated by CR9 (Personal interview, 30 May 2007) above, as individual members, WMP-CR Centre staff members or volunteers may be invited to intervene or facilitate difficult public dialogue

without losing their impartiality or neutrality as a facilitator or mediator. However, in situations where WMP has clear advocacy objectives, their affiliation becomes an obstacle to intervene without arousing the suspicion of those who hold ideological positions that differ from WMP members (CR2, personal interview, 26 January and 19 June 2007).

In addition, The WMP-CR Centre has not effectively articulated the link between micro-level change with conflict resolution techniques and its affect on macro social change. For example, one of the initial objectives was to prepare the foundation for peaceful reunification by building peace constituents. However, it is not clear whether those who are trained in conflict resolution actually become peace constituents, as many of the training participants were already sympathetic to WMP's overall goal. Without expanding its constituent base to reach a more grassroots population and to include more politically moderate South Koreans, their foundation for a peaceful society may have difficulty gaining a solid foothold in the broader activism of civil society.

Case Study 3: Peace Activist Network

The third case study emerged in the early 2000s. As an umbrella organisation with a semi-formal structure, it consists of a number of formally organised peace and conflict NGOs, and serves as a pioneering role in mobilising peace constituents within South Korean civil society. The network's function goes beyond mobilising organisations in preparation for the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, which took place in 2005 in New York. Since 2004, it has laid the foundation for a network of peace activism, such as an annual retreat among activists who are involved with peace and conflict organisations. A majority of organising committee members for this

annual peace activists' retreat were active in the GPPAC-Korean Committee's activities. Due to highly overlapping membership, this dissertation treats these umbrella groups (GPPAC-Korean Committee and Preparatory Committee for the Annual Peace Activist Retreat) as one entity. This entity will be called the Peace Activist Network.

Contextual Overview of Peace Activist Network.[42]

Peace beyond reunification. Studies on the peace movement[43] in North America and Western Europe have described the post-World War II peace movement as closely linked to anti-war, anti-nuclear issues. As Salomon notes, "the peace movement may be considered as a human reaction to the level of armaments and to militarism, as an advocacy of alternative approaches to policies of national security" (1986, p. 115). As presented earlier in this chapter, in South Korean civil society discourse, issues concerning peace have been discussed in the context of broader democratisation strategies and reunification efforts (Koo, 2006).[44]

With the democratic transition in 1987, diverse interests began to be expressed within civil society and numerous non-governmental organisations were formed to advocate a wide range of previously supressed social issues. Peace was one of the many themes to emerge after the 1987 democratisation.

---

[42]This section is re-elaboration of the PCR field overview presented in the first section of this chapter. This section is constructed mostly based upon literature reviews and interviews with peace activists.

[43]According to Nigel Young, "the peace movement refers to social or political movements which consciously, explicitly or implicitly, concern themselves primarily with peace as a term, concept or title, which define themselves (or are defined) as part of the 'peace movement' or are overtly opposed to war, militarism or the organized use of force" (Young, 1986, p. 185).

[44] The only exception in this trend was found in the Christian church-affiliated social movement groups. Throughout modern history, progressive and radical Christian groups had not only played a critical role in mobilising the broader populations through their outreach activities, but also contributed to sustaining democratic activism due to their strong link to progressive political circles in the West – particularly the progressive Christian organisations in North America and Western Europe. In the 1970s, when democratisation was the single most important issue, progressive church organisations engaged in advocacy activities for South Koreans who were affected by Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombing. Specifically, on behalf of nuclear bombing victims, this group demanded compensation equal to that given to Japanese nationals (Lee, 1992).

However, unlike women's rights, environmental conservation, consumer rights, or youth rights, peace activism in the early democratic transition period was invisible and remained at the very margin of civil society (Park, 2007). The relative absence of peace activism after the democratic transition is related to the fact that peace was framed within the reunification discourse, and both progressives and conservatives claimed their legitimacy on peace. As a progressive force, the peace movement confronted a particular challenge of authoritarian and cold war legacies in Korea – being labelled as red organisations. Even after the democratic transition, alternatives to the reunification strategy proposed by the South Korean government have a risk of being perceived as anti-government and pro-communist.

In the early 2000s, South Korea's peace activism became diversified and soon moved beyond a strictly reunification discourse. A wide range of issues was advocated under the banner of peace activism: anti-nuclear movement, anti-war movement, nonviolence movement, peace camps for young people, peace volunteering in conflict-affected countries, and peace education. For the first time, as PAN2 (Personal interview, 29 January 2007) noted, peace is beginning to be understood outside of reunification logic and is becoming more relevant to ordinary people; advocating for peace outside of the Korean Peninsula is slowly becoming accepted by the broader population. This trend emerged because of two significant political changes – further consolidation of democratisation and changes in inter-Korean relations (Lee, 2005)

By 2000, three presidential elections had been held in South Korea, one of the most notable being the election of an opposition political figure as

president in 1997. A majority of democratic reforms had been introduced by that time. These reforms allowed civil society to look at a wide range of issues taking place outside of Korea – internal political and social issues were put into perspective within a global framework. In other words, peace activism in South Korea should be viewed as an outcome of the progress that occurred through democratic consolidation. In addition, with the 6-15 Korean Summit, an event wherein two Korean leaders meet in Pyongyang for the first time since the division, inter-Korean dynamics and the South Korean government's ways of engaging with its counterpart in North Korea have shifted dramatically. As a result, for the first time, civil society has shifted its focus on the state and state behaviour toward North Korea when raising issues around peaceful reunification. Peace is more recently being framed as something that can exist outside the realm of inter-Korean diplomacy, or amidst advocacy work directed at top political leaders and diplomats. In this context, the Peace Activist Network is the first nationwide effort to claim civil society activists' engagement in peace discourse, and is reflective of the activists' desire to articulate a form of peace activism that is suitable for the country's civil society.

Toward the culture of peace and peace by peaceful means. One of the notable changes peace activism has experienced since the early 2000s is that civil society organisations have begun to focus on peaceful means or peace methodologies to foster the culture of peace. In this context, peace activism in South Korea integrates conflict resolution practices and principles in the context of cultural transformation.

Highly critical of structures and cultural norms that perpetuate violent conflict, peace activism advocates the culture of peace, "a set of values,

attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue" (UN Resolutions A/RES/52/13). In particular, peace activism in South Korea seeks to alter cultural elements deeply rooted in authoritarian legacies – militarism, extreme dichotomisation, and emphasis on outcomes (CSO2, personal interview 30 January 2007). As explained by CSO15 (Personal interview, 26 April 2007), it stresses that authoritarian legacies affect all levels of South Korean society from ordinary citizens, institutional political systems and civil society to social movements. These legacies are detrimental to fostering a set of values, attitudes and behaviour conducive to peaceful resolution of contentious issues and peaceful coexistence with those who are 'different'. By integrating conflict resolution methodologies into their peace education programmes or public outreach activities, peace activism aims to contribute to a cultural paradigm shift on peace.

Conflict resolution methodologies are also increasingly appreciated by peace activists as a new way of promoting activism in South Korean civil society. One criticism recently directed to South Korean civil society is related to its methodology in its outreach activity, or its method of generating public discourse. One of the interviewees, PAN6, shared the following insight:

> Internally, within civil society, we would like to practice what we advocate – for example, there is a joke that there is absence of democracy for the organisations advocating democratic reforms; there is absence of peace for the organisation advocating peace. (Personal interview, 2 May 2007)

This quote reflects peace activists' self-reflection on how much civil society activists have themselves been affected by authoritarian legacies. Through the Peace Activists' Network, practitioners do not only gain an opportunity to strengthen their knowledge on reducing violence and negative

conflict patterns that are often internalised through socialisation, but they also learn specific skills to help implement their activity through peaceful methods designed to foster attitudes and behaviours conducive to peaceful conflict resolution.

Descriptive Overview of the Peace Activist Network.[45]

Background. GPPAC-Korean Committee and the Preparatory Committee for the Annual Peace Activists Retreat emerged in 2003. Both networks emerged in response to an international call to civil society's active engagement in peace work.

This section will first discuss the context in which the GPPAC-Korean Committee was established. The Global Partnerships for the Prevention of Armed Conflict was established in 2003 "in response to Kofi Annan's call to civil society organisations to elucidate their role in peace-building in his 2001 report on *Preventing Armed Conflict*" (Glasbergen, 2009, p. 17). The first global conference on the role of civil society in the prevention of violent conflict and peace building was scheduled to take place in New York in 2005, and 15 regional centres were organised to mobilize civil society action and solidarity in their own respective regions.

PAN8 (Personal interview, 11 May 2007) recalled that there was no regional centre initially covering Northeast Asia. In November 2003, after recognizing the need for a separate regional support center in Northeast Asia as its conflict dynamics differ from the ones in Southeast Asian countries, a centre was established with a headquarter in Tokyo (PAN8, personal interview,

[45]This section is constructed based upon internal documents, meeting reports and interviews. The key document that the author referenced is the *GPPAC Korean Activity Report* (2006) as this is one of the most comprehensive reports that summarized the GPPAC Committee, Peace Retreat and overall peace activism in South Korea. For more information, please see Annex4.

11 May 2007). PAN8 described her experience in engaging with the early phase of the GPPAC-Korean Committee:

> A number of us (Korean civil society activists) working on peace related issues saw this as an important opportunity to strengthen the country's peace discourse. We volunteered to lay the ground for the official launch of the GPPAC-Korea Committee, and our work began in early 2004. (Personal interview, 11 May 2007)

The committee was officially launched on 8 April in 2004. Over 20 civil society organisations and individuals participated in the national committee with a view to elaborate on the role of civil society and the specific experience of South Korean civil society in conflict prevention and peace-building efforts. In addition, the national committee was aimed at strengthening and developing a network of peace practitioners in South Korea. PAN8 (Personal interview, 11 May 2007) described the GPPAC-Korean Committee as "the first effort made by South Korean civil society organisations to engage with global civil society networks on the issue of conflict prevention and peace building." Over the course of 14 months, the GPPAC-Korea Committee engaged civil society organizations through national consultative meetings, regional forums, and international gatherings. With the conclusion of the GPPAC Global Conference in 2005, GPPAC-Korea was phased out, except for a few sporadic and ad-hoc basis gatherings (PAN8, personal interview, 11 May 2007).

The Preparatory Committee for the Annual Peace Activists Retreat emerged in a much more ad-hoc manner – the first two workshops convened to discuss specific issues of concern to South Korean peace and conflict organizations, namely, the deployment of Korean troops in Iraq. In 2003, the US government requested the South Korean government deploy approximately 3,000 troops to Northern Iraq to support U.S. reconstruction efforts (Korea

Defense Ministry, 2010). As reviewed in the earlier section, anti-war protests in the mid- 1960s and early 1970s existed at the very margin of South Korean civil society activism, and did not lead into the popular movement because such protests were considered anti-government, pro-democracy and anti-American radical movements (Lee, 2005).[46]

By 2003, the context had changed due to the progress made in democratic consolidation. Furthermore, the RMH administration was highly critical of the traditional Korean diplomacy toward the U.S., and expressed the government's discontent more freely than previous administrations. As a result, the previously labelled "anti-government," "anti-dictatorial" and anti-American" radical protests were, for the first time, portrayed as international solidarity work that opposed the U.S. invasion in Iraq (Kim, 2009). To gain broader support, South Korean peace organisations began to use this campaign as a pro-peace and pro-international solidarity movement, and put more emphasis on peaceful ways of resolving conflict (Lee, 2005). To that end, civil society organisations focused on the integration of peaceful and non-violent methods in their engagement with citizens. For example, candlelight vigils and humming peace songs became a symbol of the anti-war movement in 2003. It is estimated about 10,000 citizens were mobilised in support of civil society organisations' campaign against the deployment of Korean troops. Nonetheless, in mid-October 2003, the National Assembly approved the Iraq Deployment Act, and

[46] As reviewed in Chapter 4, the United States has been the most important ally to the South Korean Government since 1945. It has not only provided a large number of U.S. troops in South Korea, but also played a critical role in inter-Korean relations and Northeast Asian security as a superpower. There is a precedent for South Korea's deployment of its troops into war zones the U.S. was involved with: the Vietnam War. For example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, over 320,000 South Korean troops were sent to Vietnam (Kim, 2001). The decision was made by Park in an effort to revise the military agreement between the U.S. and South Korea. At the end of the war, in total, 5,000 soldiers were killed, and 10,000 were wounded. It is estimated approximately 20,000 soldiers who served in Vietnam suffered from being exposed to Agent Orange (Kim, 2001).

the anti-war movement lost strong momentum. In 2004, activists working with civil society organisations actively engaged in this process were “in need of space for reflection and re-energising peace activists” (PAN9, personal interview, 17 April 2007).

In this context, the *2004 Workshop for Peace Activists and Professional NGO Practitioners for Peace Solidarity Work* were convened in March 2004, and reviewed four themes: inter-Korean relations and the North Korean nuclear crisis; South Korea- U.S. relations and independent diplomacy; deployment of troops to Iraq and international anti-war movement; and North Korean human rights. Due to the strong interest organisers received after the first workshop, they decided to organise a second workshop in November 2004. In late 2004, the anti-war campaign lost its momentum to a greater degree, and reflections that are more critical were made by peace activists. CSO2 recounted the intensity he felt during the November 2004 Workshop:

> Throughout my youth, I felt deeply sad that our society uncritically accepts the inevitability of wars and violence. I felt that I had to wait to raise peace in civil society activism, as democratisation is our foremost priority. In 2003, we organised a nationwide anti-war campaign for the first time. I felt sad about the situation, but was very encouraged to see fellow Koreans join us on the streets to oppose violence. Yet, by November 2004, we were faced with reality that we don’t have sustained peace movement, and felt like I disappointed our constituents. I even questioned my ability as an organiser to bring citizens into this important topic in a sustainable manner. I remember that I was not the only one with such sentiments. (Personal interview, 30 January 2007)

Echoing CSO2, the minutes from this meeting illustrated that serious reflections were raised about the lack of civil society’s capacity to make peace activism more accessible to ordinary citizens. A participant in this meeting reflected on his disappointment of the experience of organising broad peace activism:

> Citizens expressed their dissatisfaction with the movement because all our activities centred on street protests. They were asked to come to a central place, and had to wait until professional activists initiated. Instead of making citizens more active participants, the movement objected. Secondly, the movement failed to create more innovative ways of framing this issue – always candlelight vigils or protests. It seemed that we had very little space for citizen participation in this issue. Thus, sustainability became a serious concern. (Peace Activists Retreat Minutes, 2004)

To overcome the challenge, it was suggested that peace activists in South Korea were in need of building capacity to engage with a wide range of constituents and identified ways to sustain the peace movement "from a one-time anti-war protest against Iraq to a continuous movement advocating the culture of peace" (PAN7, personal interview, 29 January 2007).

The workshop identified three major follow-up activities to integrate into South Korean peace activism. First, participants suggested traditionally neglected peace issues, such as human rights in North Korea, an anti-nuclear movement and nonviolent action. Second, innovative methodologies needed to be introduced to build broad peace constituents through a wide range of activities that could be easily communicated to ordinary citizens. Peace education, conflict resolution skills training and nonviolent communication techniques were suggested as a way to bring peace activism closer to the public. Third, participants recognised the need for regular gathering among peace activists and the need for a network among peace practitioners. PAN2 (Personal interview, 29 January 2007) argued "the 2004 Workshops mandated the organisation of regular retreats for peace activists. We thought that these retreats would enhance the quality and depth of the peace movement in South Korea."

In 2005, as a majority of peace organisations focused their participation on the GPPAC Korean Committee and its related international solidarity work, the annual retreat did not occur. In 2006, the third workshop for peace activists

and professional practitioners convened, and the preparatory committee for this annual retreat was organised. A majority of the preparatory committee members for the annual retreats (up to date) have played a key role in the GPPAC Korean Committee. PAN2 who worked on the organisation of the 2006 Peace Activist Retreat highlighted the importance of organising the 2006 retreat:

> Right after our exposure to a major international peace conference, all of us were highly motivated, and felt a strong need to search for our own voices in peace discourses. It was a lot of work involved in preparing for the meeting, but I felt that this retreat was an important step to advancing peace activism in the country. (Personal interview, 29 January 2007)

Main activities[47]. These two networks have undertaken three main activities: action research concerning South Korean civil society engagement in peace and conflict activities; international solidarity work; and regular interaction among peace activists.

Peace activism action research.[48] The GPPAC-Korea Committee was organised primarily to document civil society's efforts in conflict prevention and peace-building in the context of the Korean Peninsula. Specifically, the GPPAC-Korea focused on collecting good practices and notable examples of civil society engagement in peace-building and conflict prevention activities in South Korea. PAN8 highlighted the value of generating knowledge around South Korean peace activism in civil society, arguing:

> The report writing process involved a series of consultations for us to gather necessary data. We convened a meeting among like-minded practitioners, and asked them to reflect upon our overall approach to conflict prevention and peace building. This process has not only allowed us to assess our work from the peace building and conflict prevention perspective, but also offered an

[47]This section was heavily relied upon interviewees' narratives. Some of the minutes from the meetings were also consulted (see Annex4).

[48] A primary purpose of action research is to produce practical knowledge that is useful to people in the everyday occurrences of their lives. A wider purpose of action research is to contribute to the increased well-being — economic, political, psychological, or spiritual — of communities and individuals. Action research is initiated and sustained by participants who are affected by, or who have lived through, aspects touched upon by specific research.

> opportunity for us to think of ourselves as peace activists. (Personal interview, 11 May 2007)

The GPPAC-Korea frequently referenced global and regional themes in the development of the report on South Korean peace activism. This, in turn, led civil society organisations to further reflect on their activism through new conceptual frameworks. PAN2 (Personal interview, 29 January 2007) shared her experiences in reflecting her work based upon the four themes that the GPPAC Northeast Asia Report addresses: peaceful coexistence, peaceful engagement, culture of peace and economy of peace.

> Initially, I was not quite enthusiastic about these themes as I felt they were irrelevant to our contexts. I felt slightly irritated that we had to comply with the foreign-imported theoretical lenses. However, this was a useful exercise, and empowering experience. By allowing myself to look at the issues that I work on through alternative conceptual frameworks, I identified what is missing in my work. There is a serious gap in micro-level peace discourses, and all my energy was devoted to highlighting great discourses on peace. (PAN2, personal interview, 29 January 2007)

By 2005, GPPAC-Korea contributed to developing two papers – one is an activity report on South Korean civil society organisations' work in conflict prevention and peace-building, and the other one is a regional agenda and action plan. These two reports were considered one of the first efforts capturing peace activism undertaken by South Korean civil society organisations.

Similarly, the Preparatory Committee for Annual Peace Activist Retreat provided a space for continual reflection on existing practices and took steps to archive such efforts. Based upon existing knowledge produced through the GPPAC-Korea's research work, the committee identified areas for further reflection and empowerment, and surveyed how such challenges can be addressed and used as opportunities for peace activism in South Korean civil society (PAN2, personal interview, 29 January 2007). As a result, the committee produced one of the most comprehensive reports on South Korean

peace activists' perspective on current peace activism and published an annual white paper on peace activism in South Korea. PAN7 explained the importance of having knowledge generated by Korean activists:

> As you can imagine, having our own voices and our critical lenses helped us continuously explore peace discourses corresponding to our own reality. I think that these reports would make an important contribution to young activists in their pursuit for peace in our country. (Personal interview, 29 January 2007)

Regular interaction and network building. Prior to 2003, very few meetings were organised specifically to empower peace activists compared to other movements such as environmentalism, gender empowerment and human rights. PAN12 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) explained, "In my early encounter with civil society activism, I was not familiar with the term 'peace activists'. I consider them existing in other countries, but not in our context." Both GPPAC-Korea and Preparatory Committee brought previously disconnected activists together under the banner of peace activism. They reached out to a wide range of constituents interested in peace-related issues, and brought together NGO practitioners across the field. By regularly convening meetings, these two entities contributed to building a network of activists who identified themselves as peace practitioners in South Korea.

GPPAC-Korea had a series of national meetings and workshops allowing sustained and focused interaction among over 20 organisations interested in conflict prevention and peace-building. As for the Preparatory Committee, their annual retreats currently bring together over 150 activists, practitioners and researchers to exchange ideas on peace activism relevant to South Korea. Their preparatory meetings further strengthen pioneering organisations' leadership capacity for network building. Each retreat requires more than 15-20 meetings as well as a financial commitment to build the network.

In order for GPPAC-Korea to better articulate their knowledge of certain themes in conflict-affected countries, a number of their meetings were organised as workshops examining global peace themes, trends and issues raised by other GPPAC regional centres and global agendas. Such workshops provided peace practitioners with new knowledge and methodologies to practice and share their agendas. For the Preparatory Committee of the Annual Peace Activist Retreats, a number of different programmes are offered to help activists gain new skills, such as peace education, conflict resolution skills, non-violent communication and other relevant techniques with which South Korean civil society organisations are not familiar.

International solidarity and cooperation. As stated earlier, GPPAC-Korea was launched in support of a global network of civil society organisations working on conflict prevention and peace-building. In this regard, a majority of their activities were related to engaging with civil society counterparts in the northeast region and participated in the 2005 Global Meeting. From 2004 to 2005, a series of meetings and workshops were organised to bring together activists and practitioners in the region, and Korean peace practitioners were exposed to international solidarity work in this regard (GPPAC-Korea Activity Report, 2005). The Peace Activist Retreat continued this legacy by including international solidarity in their core themes and by discussing ways to include non-Korean speaking activists into their meeting (PAN2, 29 January 2007).

Analytical overview of the Peace Activist Network.

Interviews and observation. Fifteen interviews were used to better understand the work of the two semi-formal associations – a majority of them are veteran NGO practitioners working for PCR organisations. Thus, with a few

exceptions, most of them were fully involved in the democratic transition and opposition movements. NGO activists work to cover a wide range of issues and many of them share the characteristics of hybrid multi-purpose organisations.

The issues covered by interviewees' organisations include: political reforms, economic policy, democratic reforms, human rights, reunification and humanitarian assistance to North Korea, international solidarity action work, Northeast Asian relationships, youth work, peace camps, peace education, war crimes, peace culture, Christian ecumenical activism, women's rights, the integration of North Korean defectors into the South Korean society, policy monitoring, anti-corruption and so forth.

All of the interviewees indicated that they were involved in peace and conflict activities, and, to some extent, embrace conflict resolution methodologies in their work – whether they are policy-oriented, training-oriented, or service delivery. Nearly two-thirds of interviewees are males – this reflects gender divisions existing in civil society. For example, as an interviewee noted:

> Hard politics (policy making in diplomacy and security issues) is considered to be a masculine realm reserved for male activists. Reunification, advocacy, or major political activities involved are often considered as a more masculine space. In soft politics such as the cultural realm, for example, conflict resolution education or peace education in school – all of the topics related to grassroots politics and ordinary people's day-to-day life – are considered to be more feminine subjects. (PAN3, personal interview, 16 April 2007)

This research included not only activists working for innovative and emerging NGOs, but also practitioners engaged in prominent and politically well-connected civil society organisations. Furthermore, higher-ranking civil society officials were engaged for the interviews – most of them had been working for civil society organisations for over two decades and were either running the organisation or were responsible for a particular team. Senior ranks

combined with prominent NGOs partially explain a higher representation of males.

All of the interviewees are highly educated – their educational background and strong knowledge on this issue were fully reflected in the interview transcripts – as compared to other interviews, which reflected much more informal narrative styles; the interview transcripts used for this case study consist of facts and specific knowledge related to PCR work in South Korea. Rather than personal reflection on the work, their interviews present historical overviews of their work and of the peace movement in general. This posed a challenge to the author in terms of interpreting and analysing their interviews. Instead of personal reflections, there were too many facts that the author had to constantly check back with existing literature to verify the accuracy of their narratives on certain subjects.

Except for two seminars organised by one of the interviewees, no specific observations were made to better understand the peace activists' network. However, the two seminars provided an opportunity to interact with a range of individuals interested in PCR issues within South Korean civil society – one noticeable observation was that the seminars were largely attended by young practitioners in their late 20s and early 30s, and attracted ordinary citizens without special civil society organisational affiliations.

Motivation. Unlike interviewees who participated in the two other case studies, interviewees from the Peace Activist Network shared their motivation as stemming from a professional affiliation-standpoint with peace-oriented organisations rather than for personal reasons.

First, interviewees engaged in the GPPAC-Korea Committee with a vision of consolidating South Korean civil society's efforts in the areas of conflict prevention and peace-building. This was related to the fact that they wanted to introduce the South Korean perspective into the global stage. PAN1 summarised the views reflected by other interviewees:

> In peace discourse within global civil society, I realised that we were under-represented compared to civil society organisations in other countries that western NGOs were more familiar with. I felt that our efforts are worth sharing with the global community, and decided to engage in the GPPAC-Korea Committee. (personal interview, 29 January 2007)

Second, interviewees indicated they became involved in Peace Activists' Retreat to strengthen their capacity to undertake peace activism. PAN13 (Personal interview, 29 January 2007) described that there was a lack of opportunity to share personal reflections on peace activism, and he engaged in the retreat in order to enhance his personal and organisational capacity in this area.

Reflection on positive contributions of having a peace activist network. Interviewees indicated a number of positive contributions these networks have made for them and more broadly, for South Korean civil society.

Space for reflection. Positive responses were given concerning the fact that the space provided by these entities allows interviewees to reflect on how they engage with their constituents when advocating an issue linked to peace and conflict. Specifically, these spaces provided interviewees with an opportunity to reflect on their outreach and educational methods when communicating a peace agenda. A number of interviewees indicated they became more aware as activists and focused more on knowledge sharing rather than providing practical tools to build a peaceful culture. Concentration

on knowledge and critical interpretation of such information has been an impediment to reaching broader constituents. An interviewee summarised this point, as follows:

> We have a number of knowledge forums and seminars. These forums and seminars intellectually analyse all sorts of problems inhibiting peaceful inter-Korean relations. However, compared to the knowledge realm, peace activism in Korea neglects process, values, and technical aspects of peace. Interacting with other peace activists highlight such aspects and make us more reflective on how we can promote a culture of peace through peace activism. (PAN1, personal interview, 29 January 2007)

As highlighted above, interviewees recognise that knowledge-focused activism has failed to equip practitioners with non-knowledge related PCR techniques. Interviewees highlighted how interacting with other practitioners and collectively reflecting upon civil society's peace activism practices helped them to identify techniques and practical tools that could be usefully incorporated into their daily activism. An interviewee shared his experience of integrating peace and conflict into his organisation's reunification education programme:

> We provide an educational programme on reunification – background and historical development around reunification discourses. Then, we integrate more pragmatic items into a reunification agenda in order to stimulate their participation in peace activism on a daily basis. My colleagues and I have gained increased understanding on conflict resolution through regular interaction with other peace activists. (PAN4, personal interview, 2 May 2007)

Through the network, some interviewees participated in international and regional seminars and were given an opportunity to interact with peace activists from different countries. An interviewee appreciated the opportunity to reflect further on peace activism:

> I enlarged my perspectives on peace through this opportunity. I was reminded peace cannot be attained only by altering structural violence and internal militarism. Rather, peace is a holistic process based upon shared appreciation for peaceful coexistence and requires all actors of society. (PAN9, personal interview, 17 April 2007)

Enhanced capacity for nonviolence and conflict resolution. With increased participation in capacity building programmes in the areas of conflict resolution, nonviolence communications, conflict transformation seminars, and so forth, interviewees felt more empowered to explain these concepts to their constituents. An interviewee recalled her experience:

> I was easily nervous when confronted with opposition who I considered wrong. But, with frequent exposure to peace methods and conflict resolution techniques, I feel more at ease in dealing with difficult situations. My colleagues used to joke about peace practitioners who are least peaceful in their ways to resolve differences. By interacting with others and sharing these concerns together, I feel more conscious about the ways I am engaged with others. I am grateful for various capacity building opportunities. (PAN14, personal interview, 10 May 2007)

Bringing diversity into activism. Young interviewees welcomed the space provided by these networks and a new wave of peace activism, as they were more innovative alternatives to existing social movement organisations prominent in South Korean civil society. From young practitioners' perspectives, the space provides an opportunity to reflect upon alternatives to traditional activism and fierce advocacy movements, which employ street protests, marches and policy statements. Specifically, these interviewees found that skills provided by conflict resolution, such as facilitation, dialogue, active listening and interactive 'ice-breaker' games are useful to diversify their outreach tactics toward youth.

One interviewee noted, "I find the notion of conflict resolution and non-violence highly valuable. These concepts taught me how to convey the message of big issues such as peace, regional security, North Korea and human rights through creative, reflective ways" (PAN9, personal interview, 17 April 2007). Many voiced their concern that, initially, they felt sceptical about the way conflict resolution was framed because it often underplays the importance

of structural injustice and marginalisation of the poor and underprivileged in society.

The younger interviewees such as PAN2 (2007), PAN9 (2007), PAN11 (2007) and PAN13 (2007) highly value the importance of traditional advocacy work for its ability to mobilise collective action in order to change various structural issues facing the country. However, many of them believed something else needed to be brought into current NGO activism to broaden citizen participation, particularly among the younger generation. In their organisations, these interviewees worked closely with young adults and organised youth-based activities such as workshops, training programs and awareness-raising events. Their experience made them aware that traditional 'policy discussion' and 'radical activism' ideas need to be translated into more interactive, experiential programs the younger population can easily approach. Unlike the previous generation, who lived through the authoritarian regime, the young population does not respond to traditional advocacy work and ideologically-driven social reforms that appeal to moral arguments. Increasingly, a strong demand has been made by the younger South Korean population, aged 17 to 30, to engage in political activism with a more practical approach and career-oriented values. The journey for younger practitioners in participating in conflict resolution is to engage more proactively with the population with which they intend to connect.

Interviewees, such as PAN8 (2007), PAN9 (2007), and PAN12 (2007), who were not affiliated with any organisations, expressed difficulty in terms of involving individuals from a non-activist background to engage in activism within South Korean civil society. Even in the civil society space, PAN9 (2007)

highlighted that the existing authoritarian legacy deeply and unintentionally left out those who did not fit into the usual confines of civil society practitioners. PAN12 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) highly appreciated that more individuals with less affiliations and less traditional social movement were allowed to join and interact with civil society colleagues through the Peace Activists Network.

Reflection on challenges of advancing peace activism agenda. While interviewees appreciated many aspects of these peace networks, they also raised certain concerns regarding South Korean civil society's peace activism.

Difficulty in mainstreaming peace activism. Despite its continued growth, interviewees noted that peace activism remains marginal within South Korean civil society for three reasons. First, perception toward the term "peace" has been relatively negative or absent. An interviewee shared others' reactions when he used the term "peace education" in order to demonstrate how little understanding exists concerning the term peace:

> Every time I introduced myself as a peace educator, people did not understand what I meant by saying that. They were thinking of ethics or morality education or looking at me as if I am a cult religious leader. Even within activist circle, the concept of peace and peace education are not well understood. People think peace is related to religion or spirituality such as peace of mind or they automatically link peace to reunification. In South Korea, peace is an extremely foreign and difficult concept to effectively advocate. (PAN7, personal interview 29 January 2007)

Another interviewee, PAN13 (personal interview, 29 January 2007), indicated that practicing peace in daily life is perceived to be extremely difficult for practitioners, and often peace activists mistakenly perceive that someone like Ghandi could only advocate peace on a daily basis. The lack of practical models on peace activism and lack of unique South Korean

peace discourses have further alienated peace activism from mainstream civil society practitioners, let alone ordinary citizens.

Second, similar to the first point, peace as a political term is too often linked to inter-Korean relations and is understood as a radical discourse. This radical, inter-Korean related perception often provokes an emotional reaction from conservative constituents. An interviewee recalled a phone call she received from a conservative individual attacking her organisation's position on peaceful reunification: "For older generations, peace should be equal to anti-communism. Peace as a method of co-existence is perceived to be very dangerous and radical. I remember a phone call from old gentleman who called us communists when he learned about our work" (PAN13, personal interview, 29 January 2007). In this context, some interviewees, including PAN2 (2007) and PAN13 (2007), indicated practical difficulty in engaging with conservative constituents who are entrapped in the Cold War mentality regarding the issue of peace, despite their enhanced capacity to manage difficult conversations.

Third, veteran NGO practitioners indicated that a lack of structure within peace activism inhibits further growth of peace organisations in South Korean civil society. An interviewee explains this phenomenon:

> Many civil society organisations have an issue with sustainable organisational structure. However, peace organisations are significantly decentralised and work against various social and cultural norms in terms of organisational structure, hierarchy, and formality. Various peace issues emerge sporadically and disappear quickly without central focal points. Unless these organisational issues are more seriously reflected upon, peace activism would continue to remain at the margin of civil society. (PAN10, personal interview, 14 June 2007)

In summary, interviewees emphasised the uniqueness of the peace movement in South Korea and illustrated how its innovative quality can turn into

its weakness when there is no sustainable organisational structure to continue the momentum.

Relevance of Western peace theoretical framework. Numerous theories on conflict analysis, peace and different terminologies have been introduced to South Korean civil society practitioners. Regarding this knowledge base, PAN1 (personal interview, 29 January 2007) questioned whether such reference points could be useful to strengthen South Korea's own peace discourses and expressed a concern that such unreflective acceptance of a certain theoretical framework may distort civil society practitioners' creativity to generate a discourse unique to the context of South Korean society. PAN1 (Personal interview, 29 January 2007) was particularly vocal, and argued, "some of the theories that are currently popular in the West are more useful to explain conflicts and violence erupting in their peripheries. As much as I am critical of the traditional realist international relation, the Korean peace context seems better explained by those than the peace discourse we were exposed to here in Seoul." Veteran peace activists, such as PAN7 (Personal interview, 29 January 2007), highlighted the strong need to foster the country's own peace discourses.

Reflection on democratic nurturing component. The Peace Activist Network continued to organise their annual retreats, and published a book on Korea's peace activism. By engaging with global civil society's action agenda on conflict prevention, Korean peace activists were provided an opportunity to document their efforts and frame their experiences from the perspective of conflict prevention. Furthermore, consistent with action research objectives,

activists identified the areas of further engagement to strengthen peace capacity in the country.

The network has contributed to enhancing participants' ability to nurture democracy in the following three areas. First, in order to prepare for an international report as well as through regular interactions, peace activities were afforded frequent opportunities to build new tools and methods, including conflict resolution training and other peace methods such as nonviolence techniques, conflict transformation analysis, nonviolent communication and so forth. The activists' exposure to these methods helped them reflect upon their overall strategy to engage with the general population as well as their methods to advance peace agendas (PAN14, personal interview, 10 May 2007). Interviewees, such as PAN4 (2007), PAN5 (2007), and PAN14 (2007) highly appreciated the opportunity to reflect upon the process and methods corresponding to their overall objective; that is, creating structure that sustains peaceful relations. In so doing, they identify that the field needs to value a process rather than an outcome, to place an emphasis on tolerance rather than judgement and embrace increased empathy toward others rather than criticising others' differences.

Second, the Peace Activist Network provided practitioners with an opportunity to explore how peace, often understood in the context of national reunification, which is separated from people's daily activities, can become an issue that matters in the daily lives of ordinary citizens (PAN7, personal interview, 29 January 2007). Through research and exchange of viewpoints, peace activists identify that their peace agenda has not been successfully shared with a grassroots population, in part, because their agenda focuses on

macro-level political changes. With increased reflection around their ability to connect to ordinary citizens, the network identified the need to enhance its outreach and educational capacity through peace education programmes, conflict resolution training and other innovative methods focusing on peaceful processes.

Third, younger practitioners, as well as veteran activists, indicated that the Peace Activist Network was beneficial to civil society in general, as it provides an opportunity to reflect upon a lack of democracy existing within South Korean civil society organisations. While a majority of NGOs uphold and advocate for progressive social values, the space reflects the culture of the larger society. The country's cultural values to respect authority, elders, community and collective values have enormous potential to foster a harmonious society. Yet, when these values are imposed, they become culturally oppressive and undemocratic. An older practitioner reflected on this matter:

> Even for peace-like issues, you need to contact the executive body of the organization if you want to get things done. But, I hope civil society becomes a model of inclusive participatory decision-making bodies. I see the potential of CR practices that allow our young practitioners to articulate their views and opinions even before their bosses. (PAN1, personal interview, 29 January 2007)

Various techniques learned through retreats are a useful reference to begin discussion on how to democratize internal civil society structures, which are often hierarchical, collective and less participatory.

Despite its contributions, the Peace Activist Network has some limits to strengthening civil society's capacity for nurturing democratic skills and attitudes. First, in response to increased interest in the field of peace and conflict resolution, practitioners from diverse NGOs began to engage in the network –

however, it still excludes the conservative population from peace discourses, and these organisations are increasingly questioned on their ability to interact with a wide range of constituents. These problems are in part related to the fact that there is a lack of procedural mechanism within progressive civil society organisations to address constructively different viewpoints around what peace constitutes.

Second, in spite of activists' increased awareness on process and communication techniques, their advocacy patterns have not changed significantly in the last five years. Within progressive organisations, peace advocates continue to resort to traditional advocacy techniques in relation to expressing their disagreement with the government. A prime example is a 2010 incident on a South Korean naval ship that wrecked due to an alleged attack by North Korea; in an attempt to express their disagreement with the government's official position, the organisation held protests, issued statements and engaged in advocacy campaigns. However, during this time, there was a lack of effort to engage citizens from a wide range of political backgrounds and to understand, and include, their perspectives.

Conclusion

After briefly discussing the status of conflict resolution activities in South Korean NGOs, this chapter has reviewed, in detail, three case studies. School Peace is an example of a grassroots organisation utilising conflict resolution activities in their educational activities for youth and adults. As a pioneering organisation, WMP-CR Centre illustrates how a small NGO introduces and develops the field of conflict resolution in South Korea. As reviewed extensively, it has contributed to raising awareness on conflict resolution and has advocated

the need to develop conflict resolution and leadership within civil society organisations. Finally, this chapter has reviewed the Peace Activists' Network and has examined how global civil society's agenda has helped to strengthen national-level PCR organisations. Further, the case study highlighted how building a support network of peace activists contributes to diversifying peace agendas within civil society. Based upon the aforementioned case studies examined in this chapter, the next chapter will compare the findings of these three organisations and will discuss to what extent these organisations have contributed to enhancing civil society's capacity for nurturing democracy.

CHAPTER SIX
CASE STUDY COMPARISON AND REFLECTION

The previous chapter reviewed three case study organisations individually by focusing on the organisations' overall structure, emerging context, and interviewees' reflections on the opportunities and challenges of advancing the peace and conflict-resolution agenda that each organisation advocates. Each case study concluded with a short reflection on its contribution to enhancing civil society's democratic quality, and discussion of its limitations. Built upon the in-depth analysis of each case study, constructed through interviewees' narratives, observations, and archival study, this chapter discusses the similarities and differences between these organisations' approach to peace and conflict-resolution activism. The comparison across case studies aims to outline how different types of civil society organisations in South Korea emerge and shape the country's peace and conflict-resolution movement. The comparison of these case study organisations will be based on four levels of analysis: organisational overview; interviewees' narratives on motivation, challenges, and opportunities; issue-framing on peace, conflict, and conflict-resolution; and reflections on democratic qualities.

An overview analysis of the organisations helps to provide a better understanding of the similarities and differences in terms of organisational types, emerging context in relation to democratisation, main constituents, and how they utilise peace and conflict-resolution practices within their broader organisational contexts. This basic analysis also helps to identify specific patterns that can contribute to the emergence of peace and conflict-resolution organisations. An analysis of interviewee narratives discusses what motivates civil society activists and participants to engage in peace and conflict-resolution

activism that each organisation promotes. It also compares the aspects of each organisation's peace and conflict-resolution activism perceived as strengths and opportunities to further enhance the country's civil society, and what areas are considered as challenges to advance the peace and conflict-resolution agenda that each organisation represents.

An analysis of conflict-resolution and issue-framing focuses on the issues these organisations advocate to their constituents. Specifically, this helps to explore how the concepts of peace, conflict, and conflict-resolution are presented to each organisation's constituents and allows for an assessment of each organisation's inclusiveness and impartiality, while also exploring their potential to facilitate social conflicts emerging in South Korea. The paper will analyze how these interviewees assess and elaborate the democratic qualities to which they are exposed as a result of their engagement with the peace and conflict-resolution activities. Specifically, it focuses on how these interviewees' narratives reflect a set of four democratic qualities that this dissertation defined as key elements to strengthen civil society's ability to nurture democratic citizenship. As elaborated upon in previous chapters, the author will argue that the following set of democratic norms, processes, and skills are beneficial to advancing the embracing of liberal democracy: respect for diversity and tolerance; commitment to non-violent and constructive problem-solving; willingness to engage in difficult conversations; and participation in the public sphere. The chapter concludes by reflecting briefly on the opportunities and challenges facing South Korea's peace and conflict-resolution activists in pursuit of deepening democratic consolidation.

Organisational Overview

Table 5 summarises each organisation's overall activities and emerging contexts to compare the similarities and differences between the three organisations.

Table 5: Comparison: Organisational Overview

	School Peace	WMP-CR Centre	Peace Activist Network
Type of Organisation	▪ Grassroots Voluntary Association	▪ Multi-Purpose Hybrid Organisation	▪ Network of NGO Practitioners/ Civil Society Network
Year of Establishment	▪ 2002 (15 years after the democratic transition)	▪ 2003 (WMP-CR Centre: 16 years after the transition) ▪ 1997 (WMP: 10 years after the transition)	▪ 2003 (GPPAC-Korea: 16 years after the transition) ▪ 2003 (Peace Retreat: 16 years after the transition)
Context / Background	▪ Suicide of a 12-year-old boy in the neighbourhood as a result of school violence ▪ Response to address the lack of systematic and preventive measures for school violence	▪ Partnership with AFSC on conflict resolution training to build peace constituents in South Korea ▪ Preparing for a reunified Korea and building capacity for conflict resolution ▪ Searching for alternative ways to manage conflicts emerging after democratisation	▪ Launch of the GPPAC Global Secretariat ▪ Anti-War / Anti-deployment of troops in Iraq movement in 2002-2003, the first large scale peace movement in Korea
Political Orientation	▪ Progressive / Liberal	▪ Progressive / Liberal	▪ Progressive / Liberal
Constituents	▪ Local residents in the neighbourhood	▪ Citizens, but mainly informed citizens, feminists, progressive intellectuals, educators, and civil society practitioners	▪ Peace activists, peace scholars, and civil society practitioners interested in peace and conflict issues
Strategies & Activities	▪ Policy advocacy ▪ Youth peace education ▪ Adult conflict resolution training	▪ Conflict resolution training – youth and adults ▪ Facilitation/mediation training ▪ Conflict resolution research ▪ Policy advocacy ▪ Conflict resolution service delivery	▪ Action research on peace agenda ▪ Network building/knowledge sharing ▪ Capacity building activities ▪ International solidarity

Types of organisation. Each organisation represents a different aspect of civil society, demonstrating the applicability of peace and conflict-resolution

activities to various civil society settings. School Peace illustrates how local community members can utilise conflict-resolution in educational programmes to address a community problem in an inclusive manner. While it lacks specialised knowledge on peace education and conflict-resolution, School Peace's informal, less hierarchical structure motivates its members to take active ownership of the materials they use to promote peace among young students and to stimulate further learning among members. However, its lack of formal structure creates difficulties when it comes to fundraising. As a result, the organisation's ongoing sustainability is deeply dependent upon volunteers' motivation, availability, and willingness to work, as outlined in School Peace's 2010 evaluative meeting on its future direction.

Barnes (2005) highlights civil society's ability to improve ordinary citizens' conflict-resolution capacity as one of the advantages that civil society organisations have in the areas of conflict-prevention, resolution, and peace-building. As the first specialised conflict-resolution non-governmental organization (NGO), WMP-CR Centre promotes the spreading of conflict-resolution values and skills to the broader society. WMP-CR Centre began as an ad hoc team consisting of its members' active contributions. Later, however, its operational capacity was strengthened by the employment of full-time staff members charged with managing funding applications, co-ordinating communications, and managing other daily activities. At the same time, it maintains its roots as a membership-based NGO seeking strong input and participation from its dues-paying members. Reflecting this, it is no surprise to find a majority of WMP-CR Centre's activities are undertaken with the strong participation of its members. By combining a membership-based structure with

a professionalised organisational mechanism, WMP-CR Centre demonstrates how an NGO can motivate its members' active engagement in conflict-resolution educational programmes, while ensuring funding sustainability and the operational capacity to manage daily activities.

As Rios (2000) explains, "A network structure emerges when linkages are formed to address a certain issue. Recognizing a type of coalition or network is necessary to accomplish a broad, common mission" (p. 176). The sustainability of networking structures is secured through various forms of partnerships: "networking partnerships for information exchange; co-operative partnerships with minimal linkages by middle and lower-level staff; co-ordinating partnerships involving shared, common goals, formal processes and structural patterns of co-ordination; and collaborative partnerships encompassing strong linkages, specific long-term purposes, a stable membership base, significant resource-commitment, formal process and structural pattern of collaboration" (pp.176-177). The Peace Activist Network (PAN) began as a networking partnership for exchanging information among peace practitioners about the challenges and opportunities facing them as they worked to promote peace and conflict-resolution agendas in the country. Later, with the advent of a more formal structure and significant commitments of resources, time, and staff members, the PAN began to co-ordinate partnerships—specifically, partnership network structures, which reached their peak when peace practitioners prepared for a report to share with global civil society. Furthermore, peace activists retreats organised in 2006, 2007 and 2008 were the results of a co-ordinating partnership networking structure, as the committee regularly

organises meetings, develops formal processes and identifies follow-up visions, actions that all require collective effort.

Formation context. Understanding the emerging context of these case study organisations helps to provide a better understanding of the circumstances under which these peace and conflict-resolution organisations were established and what motivated them to incorporate conflict-resolution methodologies into their activities. The useful conceptual frameworks are well articulated by Gidron, Katz, and Hasenfield's 2002 study on peace and conflict-resolution organisations in three protracted conflict areas: Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Israel-Palestine. The study explains how expanded political opportunity and the severity of violence motivated civil society's actions to advocate a peaceful resolution of local conflicts. In addition, in an academic article on multi-purpose hybrid organisations, Hasenfield and Gidron (2005) summarise two specific societal conditions helpful to the proliferation of civil society organisations: the existence of the public sphere—a participatory space "in which actors with overlapping identities as legal subjects, citizens, economic actors, and family and community members, form a political body and engage in negotiations and contestations over political and social life" (Somers, 1993, p. 589) and the richness of associational life.

The emerging contexts of the three case study organisations reviewed in this dissertation illustrate the similarities of the aforementioned preconditions. The three organisations emerged in the early 2000s, around 15 years after the initial democratic transition in South Korea and ten years after the inauguration of a civilian president. It is also notable that most of the civil society organisations that work closely with WMP-CR Centre or were formally affiliated

with the PAN were established in the late 1990s and early 2000s. A couple of the South Korean NGOs affiliated with the PAN were founded in the early 1990s, but their programmes did not explicitly include peace and conflict-resolution principles until the early 2000s. The late 1990s and early 2000s saw a significant expansion of civil society space and an enhanced capacity of the public sphere, which led to the establishment of peace and conflict-resolution organisations.

Four specific socio-political contexts explain the expansion and maturity of civil society and its enhanced capacity for generating public discourse. These socio-political contexts are closely related to the recent emergence of peace and conflict-resolution organisations in South Korea. Firstly, there was once only a limited capacity to advocate and reflect upon issues related to the peaceful resolution of various social conflicts, the democratic qualities of civil society, or alternative peace paradigms, owing to the urgent need to strengthen democratic reform processes. During the early transitional period, there were questions about the sustainability of democracy in South Korea owing to its two previous failures with democratisation. Consequently, civil society organisations in the early democratic consolidation period of the 1990s focused on urgent democratic reform and institutional development issues. A majority of the advocacy organisations that emerged in the 1990s played a critical role in generating public discourse around a wide range of social issues suppressed during the authoritarian period. In the early 1990s, civil society organisations advocated institutional reform, fact-finding committees on past regimes' human rights abuses, civil rights-related issues and sustainable and equitable development of the country. In so doing, these organisations strengthened civil

society's capacity for raising critical social and political issues and developed its ability to monitor the state and other elite institutions in the country, such as conglomerates representing the interests of economic elites.

Secondly, there was a great need to expand civil society and strengthen its capacity to accommodate alternative socio-political paradigms. During the democratic struggle, civil society spaces emerged to consolidate opposition voices calling for the restoration of democratic elections. Over the two decades prior to the democratic transition, limited civil society space existed as a sphere for generating democratic discourses and mobilising progressive constituents to challenge the status quo of authoritarian regimes. Immediately after the democratic transition, civil society served to legitimise the suppressed needs of citizens during the authoritarian era, and citizens were exposed to the freedom of expressing their views without fear of coercive state power. In this context, it took roughly ten years for South Korean civil society to legitimise and institutionalise the liberal socio-political issues freely discussed in most advanced democratic countries, such as women's rights, consumer rights, civil rights, environmental justice, public policy reform, and democratic governance. In so doing, civil society's capacity to integrate new and emerging discourses has matured and expanded.

Thirdly, civil society's capacity to accommodate alternative paradigms has been influenced by changing inter-Korean contexts; specifically, South Korea's collaborative and inclusive approach to North Korean issues. South Korea's civil society has been negatively affected by the intense Cold War dichotomy reflecting North-South relations. Hostile North-South relations not only affected Korea's overall security context, but also put great constraints on

society's capacity to generate alternative frameworks. For example, any perspectives on North Korea inconsistent with the state's official position were often considered forms of treachery or attempts to overthrow the South Korean government. This political climate not only discouraged the emergence of diverse views on peace within civil society, but also limited peace discourses within the inter-Korean context. Finally, until the late 1990s, the institutional mechanism for supporting civil society organisations was rather limited. With the inauguration of the KDJ administration, a legal and financial regulation on civil society has been further liberalised and expanded. More regular funding channels have been secured, and governmental restrictions on civil society's freedom of expression have diminished.

In terms of more specific emerging contexts, School Peace was formed in response to an incident affecting the local population, but the two other organisations were established in the context of national NGOs' enhanced awareness of international issues and increased collaboration with global civil society. Compared to peace and conflict-resolution organisations operating in conflict-affected countries, South Korea's peace and conflict-resolution organisations are relatively lightly influenced by global civil society and foreign NGOs that specialise in peace and conflict work (Mayer, 2002). Furthermore, their funding bases are less dependent on foreign sources. However, the two case study organisations' emerging contexts are closely related to their affiliations with international civil society organisations. For example, an American NGO brought in the first institutionalised conflict-resolution programme for civil society practitioners. Consequently, the main contents and methodologies of the WMP-CR Centre are similar to North American conflict-

resolution practices. Likewise, peace and conflict resolution organisations were mobilised into the network of peace practitioners in order to participate in global civil society discourses on conflict-prevention and peace-building. The global intellectual framework of peace and conflict-resolution has been used as a reference point for articulating their peace activism in support of South Korea's peace and conflict-resolution efforts.

Political orientation and constituents. As Joo et al. (2006) highlighted in the CIVICUS-affiliated study on South Korea's civil society, South Korean civil society leaders, most of whom represent advocacy groups with extensive historical roots in the democratic movement, prefer to define civil society as a space where social-reform-oriented organisations operate in the pursuit of centre-left progressive social and political agendas for the public interest. As Joo et al. (2006) articulated, such a definition often excludes civil society entities—mostly voluntary associations and interest groups—that are pursuing more conservative and right-wing social and political values from civil society space. Such a perspective disagrees with the liberal notion of civil society, which exists as the arena, outside the family, the state and the market where people associate to advance common interests and fulfils a key role in civil society as a space to channel diverse societal values and interest in a peaceful manner. One of the main problems with such a view in terms of civil society's democratic qualities is that such narrow perspective, that only privileges certain political viewpoints, inhibits the strengthening of civil society's capacity to manage conflict-ridden social issues constructively. Defining civil society as a space for generating radical discourses and limiting the public interest on radical political ideals silences other perspectives and denies the participation

of citizens who are sympathetic to conservative social and political values. With such preferential and value-judgement perspectives, civil society can be perceived as a political party representing particular interests, and its ability to facilitate difference can be greatly constrained. To a certain extent, civil society's judgemental attitude towards non-progressive/non-radical social views make civil society organisations a part of the conflict, as they negatively affect the neutrality needed to intervene in conflict-laden social settings.

In terms of political orientation, all three case study organisations embrace centre-left political and social perspectives; however, their political orientation does not indicate that these organisations publicly denounce or discriminate against alternative viewpoints. Rather, they aim to bring diverse viewpoints together to generate alternative peace paradigms in their sphere of influence, South Korea's civil society. For example, School Peace has demonstrated repeated attempts to engage in dialogue with school officials who tend to embrace more conservative positions on school violence prevention strategies. The WMP-CR Centre has offered workshops and courses on conflict-resolution to those who are unlikely to engage in civil society activities, such as civil servants. Although peace activists tend to embrace more radical and anti-establishment paradigms, the PAN continues to explore how these alternative values can be communicated to ordinary citizens. Despite such efforts to bring together diverse constituents, because of the general perception of civil society organisations as spaces for individuals advocating particular political perspectives, their recruitment efforts have been limited to citizens who embrace liberal centre-left values. Any experiences in reaching out to

conservative constituents are documented only as anecdotal examples of certain individuals affiliated with the organisations.

Main activities and the use of peace and conflict methodologies. To a certain extent, the three case study organisations began as advocacy groups raising awareness of specific political and social issues—violence-prevention in the case of SP; conflict-resolution and cultural transformation for the WMP-CR Centre; and the inclusion of peace paradigms within civil society discourses by the PAN. Specifically, School Peace advocates the development of a systematic mechanism for preventing school violence and calls for the integration of educative methods, such as peace and conflict-resolution educational programmes into schools' violence-prevention efforts. WMP-CR Centre advocates the holistic and proactive integration of conflict-resolution mechanisms into all levels of society and calls for a systemic and long-term approach to empowering individuals' conflict-resolution capacities. As part of a larger peace NGO, the WMP-CR Centre emphasises the importance of conflict-resolution as a critical, cultural foundation for promoting a culture of peace and preparing peace constituents in the country. The PAN emphasises the importance of civil society participation in conflict-prevention and peace-building and calls for the mobilisation of civil society organisations to promote alternative peace paradigms in South Korea.

Conflict-resolution strategies and peace activism have been integrated into each organisation as key strategies for advancing their overall advocacy objectives. For example, School Peace aims to demonstrate the usefulness of peace education and conflict-resolution communication techniques through their youth and adult education programmes. Specifically, its outreach activities are

directed at parents and adult community groups, with the aim of enhancing these groups' understanding of conflict-resolution activities and peace education, and therefore generating their support for the inclusion of these activities in schools. The WMP-CR Centre offers a training course for conflict-resolution trainers in order to spread conflict-resolution values and programmes that can be applicable in various social settings. The PAN conducts different capacity-building workshops to enhance peace activists' and practitioners' overall capacity to promote a culture of peace and to develop their emotional intelligence as rooted in peace values. Furthermore, the PAN provides activists with an opportunity to discuss peace education and conflict-resolution methods to enhance the applicability of peace activism to ordinary citizens' lives and to broaden their support bases.

Comparing Interview Reflections: Motivation, Benefits, and Challenges

Table 6 summarises the reflections made by interviewees regarding their experiences of engaging in three case study organisations.

Table 6 Comparison: Interview Reflections

	School Peace	WMP-CR Centre	Peace Activist Network
Motivation	▪ Integrating conflict resolution into grassroots activism for cultural transformation ▪ Expectation of enhanced capacity for nonviolent conflict resolution	▪ Help improve the management of negative interpersonal conflict patterns ▪ Identify alternative methods for changing negative conflict patterns inhibiting the effectiveness of their work	▪ Consolidating South Korean civil society's efforts in the areas of conflict prevention and peace-building ▪ Documenting the existing efforts to share with global civil society ▪ Strengthening practitioners' capacity to undertake peace activism
Positive Reflection	▪ Attracting local populations to politics ▪ Enhanced awareness of and capacity for addressing conflict and its peaceful resolution	▪ Awareness raising regarding conflict resolution principles ▪ Increased capacity to handle conflict-laden circumstances ▪ Opportunity to bring people into civil society activism	▪ Space for reflection and networking ▪ Enhanced capacity for nonviolence and conflict resolution ▪ Bringing diversity into activism
Challenges	▪ Misunderstandings about peace and conflict resolution and grassroots activism ▪ Lack of cultural foundation of conflict resolution ▪ Lack of opportunity to provide more systematic programmes to students	▪ Difficulty in bringing the conflict resolution concept to mainstream South Koreans ▪ Difficulty in understanding the affect of micro-level change on macro-level social structures ▪ Lack of participation from conservative constituents ▪ Lack of systematic support for utilising conflict resolution expertise and knowledge	▪ Difficulty in mainstreaming peace activism ▪ Questions about the relevance of Western theoretical frameworks regarding peace

Motivations to engage with peace and conflict-resolution activism. The interview process provided rich information, particularly about the motivation of NGO practitioners to participate in the case study organisations. The motivations differed from one individual to another, yet two themes emerged repeatedly during the research.

Firstly, an overwhelming majority of NGO practitioners expressed their desire to strengthen their skills to better address conflict-laden social situations or interpersonal conflicts. The interviewees found conflict-resolution

methodology such as dialogue, engagement, non-violence and a collaborative working approach, extremely appealing for their empowering aspects, which in turn enabled the interviewees to manage difficult conversations or stressful human relationships constructively. In the case of SP, interviewees are engaged in conflict-resolution designed better to manage conflict erupting in interpersonal settings (for example, between family members or neighbours). Interviewees from the two other case study organisations indicated that they felt the need to improve their conflict-resolution skills and nurture peaceful attitudes to improve their management of conflicts encountered in the workplace and to ensure the sustainability of their civic engagement. A few interviewees specifically indicated that they attended the conflict-resolution training programme to develop their collaborative problem-solving skills, as these are often considered lacking among South Koreans, owing to some of the misconceptions regarding conflict within the Korean cultural context. For example, culturally, conflict is greatly discouraged in communities, as Koreans tend to perceive conflicts as negative situations that represent a shameful inability to maintain harmonious relationships (LeResche, 1992). However, once a conflict surges, individuals and communities generally feel that they should never withdraw from the conflict until their demands have been fully met (Kim, 2004). This “all or nothing” cultural attitude leaves people very little room to withdraw gracefully from conflicts. These interviews reflected that the NGO practitioners wanted to learn conflict-resolution practices to alter such habits that have been influenced by the Korean cultural context.

Secondly, a number of the interviewees working with School Peace and the PAN identified conflict-resolution as attractive because they think it will

enable them to practise social consciousness and political awareness on a daily basis in their community life. In the country's mainstream activism scene, working for social justice, equality and the public good through civil society are like a religious vocation that often demands the sacrifice of an ordinary lifestyle. For civil society practitioners working on outreach and community engagement, conflict-resolution tools help them to find a balance between active participation in the civil space and an appreciation of their community-based life.

Benefits. When asked to assess the main value that their experiences with case study organisations have presented, two dominant themes emerged: capacity-building and linkage to day-to-day activism. Almost all the interviewees across all groups indicated that their experiences have helped to enhance their capacity to deal with difficult social issues. For example, interviewees expressed that they feel more confident in their ability to articulate their values and opinions in a less confrontational manner than they could in the past (cf. SP5 (2007) and CR5 (2007) in Chapter 5). Civil society in South Korea has long been perceived as a space in which to struggle and fight for public causes, and it emphasises the value of stubborn debates. In such a space, person-to-person holistic interaction with those who hold different viewpoints has been minimised. The peace and conflict-resolution principles and techniques that interviewees have been exposed to have helped them to regain confidence in their ability to connect personally with other people. The increased confidence in basic conflict-resolution communication skills has also helped many interviewees to appreciate the process of problem-solving and compassionate dialogue in the midst of difficult debates and uncomfortable social circumstances.

Young practitioners and community groups expressed their satisfaction with the case study organisations' conflict-resolution practices, owing to their ability to bring activism into day-to-day practice (CR11 (2007) & PAN11 (2007) in Chapter 5). For many years, becoming an activist was seen as a lifelong vocation, requiring a great deal of sacrifice. Furthermore, the focus of civil society activism was directed towards big policy issues that required government-level changes. The younger interviewees, including CR 11 (2007), highlight that these new methodologies have provided them with various ideas to approach the sharing of these complex political issues with their constituents more creatively. Certainly, many community organisers felt enthusiastic about the relevance of these tools for small-scale activism that addresses more local and decentralised topics.

Reflections on challenges. Despite the enthusiasm and excitement built around peace and conflict-resolution methodologies the interviewees voiced concerns about some peace and conflict-resolution practices that are currently gaining popularity in the country's civil society scene. For example, an overwhelming majority of interviewees indicated they are concerned about two conceptual pieces that are missing from conflict-resolution principles. One is the lack of emphasis on the issue of structural injustice, which often creates unequal power between parties in conflict (cf. CR 6 (2007) in Chapter 5). The other is difficulty in differentiating constructive engagement for alternative solutions from compromising their values and integrity. Activists working with advocacy groups including PAN2 (2007) repeatedly voiced these concerns. The first question has been one of the most commonly raised points wherever conflict-resolution has been practised, and therefore it has been long debated in

the conflict-resolution field, regardless of geographical location. Nonetheless, for South Korea's NGO practitioners, a majority of whom have long advocated social and economic justice for the oppressed, the lack of attention paid to this structural component has posed enormous challenges. Many, including CR13 (2007), indicated that their colleagues were extremely sceptical of applying conflict-resolution principles at first, because their advocacy work and the notion of conflict-resolution appear to be contradictory. The second conceptual challenge is directly linked to the first point. Because of the lack of attention to the structural issues and inequalities that often trigger conflict, conflict-resolution principles often appear "to be deceptive concepts that glorify the compromise for the benefit of the powerful" (CR7, personal interview, 30 May 2007). All voiced that these conceptual issues pose great challenges for them as they work to share the value of conflict-resolution practices with their colleagues.

In addition, many interviewees identified a few practical challenges to mainstreaming conflict-resolution practices throughout society. With an increased interest in the field of conflict-resolution, PAN6 (Personal interview, 2 May 2007) explained, "More expectations are raised to intervene successfully in a well-known social conflict case or to facilitate a multi-stakeholder process." However, it has been extremely difficult to find a neutral third party among NGOs owing to the general perception from conservative constituents that NGOs have a specific political position favouring liberal political values. CSO5 (Personal interview, 1 June 2007) emphasised the difficulty in creating a safe space for constructive dialogue between conservatives and liberals, and was rather pessimistic of such a possibility in the near future. She said, "Any conflict-

resolution processes progressive civil society organise will be perceived as favouring liberal-leaning parties in the conflict. Conservatives will disarm their suspicion towards [progressive civil society activists].”

Finally, some of the interviewees, such as CR 11 (2007), raised concerns that conflict-resolution training materials are still too theoretical for use with ordinary citizens. The materials are heavily influenced by North American literature, and some language that the conflict-resolution materials adopt is very awkwardly translated. Similarly, those interviewees working closely with the PAN1 also questioned whether Western-imposed theoretical frameworks could accurately elaborate South Korean civil society’s unique political and social context (PAN1 (2007) in Chapter 5).

Conflict Resolution and Issue Framing

Framing is generally defined as “The conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimize and motivate collective action” (McAdam et al., 1996, p. 6). Benford and Snow (2000) articulate two core functions of framing: framing functions to organise experience and guide action by linking culturally resonant meaning to specific events, issues or occurrences; and framing that “performs an interpretive function by simplifying and condensing aspects” of particular social issues, with a view to “mobilising potential adherents and constituents, garnering bystander support, and demobilising antagonists” (p. 614). Collective action frames are constructed “as a result of negotiations among movement adherents on shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attribution regarding how or what is to

blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements and urge others to act in concert to effect change" (p. 615).

Framing is one of the most frequently investigated concepts in the social movement literature of the last two decades, as it helps scholars gain a better understanding of how ideas and meanings are produced and used to generate broad social support (Benford & Snow, 2000). In addition to studying social movement phenomena, framing references are helpful for understanding how civil society organisations articulate their missions and core strategies in order to justify and sustain their existence. There are three objectives that this section employs to frame an analytical approach to understanding how each organisation frames peace, conflict, and conflict-resolution. It is helpful to compare how each organisation defines peace and conflict and elaborates upon conflict-resolution as an important methodology for understanding peace and conflict issues. Framing helps to improve our understanding of how South Korea's specific cultural values and norms have affected the ways in which conflict-resolution is articulated by each case study organisation. Framing explores whether and how some of the core features of conflict-resolution practices, such as inclusiveness, neutrality, and impartiality, have been elaborated by each case study organisation. The summary of each organisation's issue-framing on peace, conflict, and conflict-resolution, and some perspective on the core features of conflict-resolution, are visualised in Table 7.

Table 7: Comparison: Conflict Resolution and Issue Framing

	School Peace	WMP-CR Centre	Peace Activist Network
Types of Conflict	▪ Interpersonal / School violence	▪ Social conflicts / Interpersonal conflicts / School violence / Organisational conflicts	▪ Social conflict / Inter-Korean conflict / Structural violence / International relations in northeast Asia
Framing – Conflict	▪ School violence as a violent manifestation of interpersonal conflict ▪ Stems from intolerance and insensitivity to difference ▪ Ignorance of others' human rights	▪ Exists everywhere ▪ Can be a source of positive social change ▪ Erupts as a result of lack of skills in dealing with differences in a constructive manner	▪ Created as a result of militarisation and security paradigms ▪ State-centred orientation to resolve differences ▪ Coercive approach to Inter-Korean dynamics and northeast Asian security ▪ Emphasis on conformity and denial of differences and diversity
Framing – Peace	▪ Values that can be taught ▪ One's mind-set ▪ Basis for school violence prevention strategies	▪ Foundational value to promote the culture of peace	▪ Paradigm based upon tolerance, inclusiveness, diversity, consensus and right to disobedience (freedom of expression) ▪ Cultural and structural conditions which eliminates systematic and cultural obstacles to perpetuating violence
Framing – Conflict Resolution	▪ Techniques to address inter-personal communications ▪ Good parenting methods ▪ Tools to enhance young students' democratic decision making and peaceful communication ▪ Preparatory tool for civic engagement in specific community issues	▪ Various techniques to resolve conflict-laden social situations in a peaceful manner ▪ Process of resolving conflict through individuals' active involvement ▪ Basic techniques for promoting a culture of peace	▪ Strategy to transform the structural violence ▪ New security paradigm to change the existing security policy – emphasis on prevention and cooperation ▪ Peace education to promote a culture of peace ▪ Peace movement to promote the peace paradigm
Inclusiveness	▪ Open to all local residents, but high representation of women with children	▪ Open to all citizens, but high representation of women (likely educated, politically engaged and progressive feminists)	▪ Open to all civil society activists (mostly progressive civil society practitioners and researchers)
Neutrality / Impartiality	▪ Progressive political views, thus limited neutrality as a conflict resolution third-party	▪ Mostly yes; but the organisation's position on certain public conflicts can be influenced by its progressive political affiliation, thus their neutrality can be limited on certain	▪ Progressive political views, thus limited neutrality as a conflict resolution third-party

		public conflicts. However, staff members and volunteers of the WMP-CR Centre are aware of the issue and make an effort to stay impartial and neutral.	

Types of conflict and conflict issue-framing. Each organisation emphasises different aspects of conflict as requiring a certain type of intervention and focuses on types of conflict more relevant to their respective constituents.

By arguing that school violence is a violent manifestation of interpersonal conflict among students, School Peace focuses on interpersonal dimensions that affect conflict dynamics and outcomes. Specifically, School Peace 291roblematizes intolerance and insensitivity towards difference as the core issue perpetuating school violence, as such attitudes are indirectly nurtured by South Korean society's demand for conformity, uniformity, and harmony. Furthermore, by emphasising the connection between conflict and the lack of democratic values, School Peace contends that school violence is widely manifested because of a lack of respect for others' individuality and their rights to difference. In so doing, School Peace attempts to combine both interpersonal and systemic analysis of conflict.

The WMP-CR Centre emphasises the inevitability of conflict in one's life and makes an effort to alter the general perception of conflict, which is that conflict is a highly undesirable phenomena manifested because of personality deficiencies. Contending that addressing conflict requires certain sets of communication skills and values, the WMP-CR Centre focuses on strengthening individuals' capacity for conflict-resolution. Despite its emphasis

on the inter-personal aspects of conflict, the WMP-CR Centre is rooted in the South Korean civil society tradition of advocating systemic change. Conflict, therefore—even at the individual level—and its negative dynamics carried out by individuals are outcomes of social, political, and economic structures that privilege certain values and attitudes fostering negative patterns for dealing with conflict.

Finally, the PAN addresses a wide range of conflicts, including social conflict, inter-Korean conflict, and international relations—mostly those dealing with North-East Asian relations. Rooted in the social movement tradition, these activists place a great deal of emphasis on the structural and cultural dimensions that sustain negative conflict patterns in society. Peace activists are distinguished from other types of civil society activists in South Korea because of the assumption that conflict and violence are perpetuated in the country owing to militaristic cultural norms nurtured throughout South Korea's contemporary political history. With such a perspective in mind, transforming militaristic paradigms and cultural norms into more peaceful ones are seen as equally important as improving socio-economic conditions in order to alter the negative conflict patterns embedded in all levels of society.

It is rather difficult to generalise regarding issue-framing of conflict across these three case study organisations. However, there is one notable observation that deserves attention. While the WMP-CR Centre and PAN implicitly and explicitly acknowledge the positive functions of conflict in society as a potential source of social change, School Peace does not about the inevitability of conflict as it assumes that interpersonal conflict at schools is often manifested in violent forms. These organisations' constituents can explain

such differences. Both the WMP-CR Centre and PAN reached out to their respective constituents, who have become increasingly party to certain social conflicts. As reviewed in the previous chapter, civil society practitioners have become involved in a wide range of social and public conflicts as part of their advocacy activities. In many cases, they have generated awareness by vocalising problems or employing confrontational strategies. In reaching out to such constituents, both organisations needed to articulate the dual function of conflict in order not to de-legitimize their core constituents' conflict patterns. On the other hand, School Peace sought support from parents who are concerned about their children being a victim of school violence; therefore, they presented conflict as being synonymous with violence. As a result, the positive function of conflict was not directly presented to School Peace's main constituents. Rather, its positive function was framed within the "embracing difference" and "tolerance of diversity" discourses.

Peace-framing. In the peace and conflict-resolution literature, peace is understood as comprising two categories: negative peace and positive peace (Galtung, 1969). Negative peace indicates the absence of violence and indicates a society in which the state does not engage in violent, coercive confrontation with either other domestic armed groups with certain political aspirations or foreign militaries. Positive peace goes beyond the absence of violence and is a presence of social justice. It is attained when structural and cultural elements that perpetuate violence are transformed through various means, such as equal opportunity, fair distribution of power and resources, equal protection and impartial enforcement of the law. Within such frameworks, all three organisations work towards creating socio-political conditions and

installing certain cultural values that foster positive peace. At the school and community level, School Peace believes that a peaceful school culture can be attained through educational efforts and school curriculum/management reforms. Peaceful attitudes need to be nurtured through peace and conflict-resolution education. At the same time, the organisation advocates the creation of a system that fosters and rewards students' constructive conflict-management patterns. Similarly, the WMP-CR Centre uses conflict-resolution methodologies to lay the foundational ground for spreading the culture of peace, a key element to preparing for a reunified Korea. Deeply influenced by positive peace perspectives, the PAN aims to enhance the capacity and influence of peace activism within South Korea to emphasise the importance of positive peace and work towards the elimination of cultural and structural conditions that perpetuate violence.

Conflict-resolution framing. The term "conflict-resolution" is rather ambiguous and highly contested. There are two approaches to conflict-resolution terminology: a narrow, short-term, social psychological, internal approach focusing on conflict parties; and a comprehensive, long-term, sociological, systemic approach including the cause of violence. From the former perspective, conflict-resolution is defined as an effort to change adversarial relationships among parties in disagreement into constructive partnerships (Mitchell, 2005). This narrow definition of conflict=resolution explains how the lack of interaction between parties in conflict and inadequate communication skills greatly contributes to the exacerbation of destructive conflict patterns and focuses on various techniques to assist parties in conflict as they seek better to manage their conflicts.

However, the broad definition considers conflict-resolution to be “all process-oriented activities aiming to address the underlying cause of direct, cultural, and structural violence” (Reimann, 2004, p.10). Riemann defines “structural violence as the social, political and economic structure of a conflict situation when unequal power, domination and dependency are perpetuated, while cultural violence refers to the social and cultural legitimisation of direct and structural violence” (pp.10-11). Critical of the narrow approach to conflict-resolution because of its indifference to structural and cultural elements that perpetuate violence, scholars such as Fast (2002, pp.531-532) argue that such conflict-resolution mechanisms “may strengthen the structures that oppress individuals, thereby retarding, decreasing, or even negating the possibilities for systematic change”. In order for conflict-resolution to become a tool for social change, system-oriented conflict resolution scholars such as Galtung (1969) and Lederach (2000) emphasise the need to address a wide range of structural and cultural aspects that sustain violence in society by working with diverse actors at all levels of society.

There are two notable observations regarding conflict-resolution framing. Similar to peace-framing, the case study organisations present conflict-resolution methodologies and principles as strategies and activities that contribute to addressing the underlying cause of direct, cultural and structural violence, partially owing to the lack of opportunity for them to intervene in specific conflict settings. In the last two years, the WMP-CR Centre has intervened in a number of cases involving school violence, as an alternative to the existing juvenile punitive mechanism. A few practitioners interviewed in 2007, including CR2 (2007), CR9 (2007), CR12 (2007), and CR13 (2007),

shared personal anecdotes about their positive experiences resolving group conflict using the techniques they had learned. Except for such examples, these organisations' conflict-resolution activities are justified, as their outcomes are expected to strengthen the cultural foundation for positive conflict-management and democratic decision-making.

All of the case study organisations use conflict-resolution as a means of attaining their broad organisational goals. For example, with respect to School Peace, conflict-resolution is presented as a democratic decision-making and constructive communication strategy, helpful for preventing violence in the community and schools. The WMP-CR Centre offers conflict-resolution training to individuals. They argue that an enhanced capacity for conflict-resolution at the societal level can contribute to preventing social conflicts that can emerge during the reunification process. The PAN frames conflict-resolution as a useful tool for engaging with a wide range of constituents, as it makes peace discourse more accessible.

Conflict-resolution features: inclusiveness, impartiality and neutrality. Fast (2002) argues that inclusiveness, impartiality and neutrality are central features that distinguish conflict-resolution organisations from other civil society organisations addressing the structural elements of conflict. Such perspectives are highly relevant for understanding organisations that employ third-party intervention conflict-resolution methods and include the following activities as conflict resolution work: negotiation; mediation and alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms; interactive conflict-resolution approaches, including public dialogues, problem-solving workshops and human relations workshops; and transformation and reconciliation work, including victim-

offender reconciliation. Conflict-resolution training is categorised as a conflict-resolution activity when it brings together parties that are in conflict. There is criticism of Fast's attempt to create a boundary between conflict-resolution practice and other types of activities influencing the conflict-perpetuating structure, as opponents claim it imposes academic perspectives on actual practice, yet this effort is useful, as it provides a framework for comparing different activities undertaken under the conflict-resolution banner.

When applying Fast's core characteristics of conflict-resolution, two organisations—School Peace and the WMP-CR Centre—are qualified to engage in conflict-resolution work, with some limitations. School Peace does not provide conflict-resolution services to students or school officials. Rather, it provides students with an opportunity to interact with everyone and reflect upon conflict and school violence in a relatively safe space. Unlike some specialised extracurricular activities that recruit a few selected students for participation, their conflict-resolution and peace education programmes are offered to public school classrooms without selective processes. As a result, School Peace's education programmes are offered in a setting where both victims and perpetrators of school violence are present. In this context, School Peace's conflict-resolution training is an opportunity to bring students in opposing situations (violence-enduring/violence-perpetuating) together to reflect upon conflict-resolution issues. Regarding the WMP-CR Centre, its conflict-resolution practice is most visible in relation to its victim-offender reconciliation and mediation programme. For this programme, the WMP-CR Centre brings parties who are in conflict together to engage in dialogue aimed at mending their relationships and enhancing each other's position. As pioneers in this area,

practitioners from the WMP-CR Centre are perceived as specialists with a pool of experts capable of facilitating and mediating difficult conversations. Furthermore, since the victim-offender mediation programme targets youth, the WMP-CR Centre's political affiliation with pro-peace and centre-left political perspectives does not necessarily undermine its neutrality. However, its regular training programmes on conflict-resolution can be considered a general capacity-building tool for democratic decision-making or civil-society-building, rather than a conflict-resolution practice, as a majority of its training participants share similar political views and are not engaged in conflict-settings. However, in a broader sense, School Peace and the WMP-CR Centre are advocacy groups inspired by South Korea's civil society activism, sympathetic to centre-left ideals, and their main constituents are those who appreciate civil society's liberal and centre-left-leaning position. Certainly, however, working closely with one end of the political spectrum limits these organisations' outreach capacity and negatively affects their impartial and neutral images.

This dissertation contends that the PAN cannot be considered as engaging in conflict-resolution practice because of its strong position on peace-related issues and its limited constituency basis. Like the two other organisations, the PAN's main constituents are drawn from one end of the political spectrum. The PAN has also employed rather radical peace discourses to challenge the status quo and militaristic paradigm that sustains structural and cultural violence in South Korea. The master frames of the PAN—elimination of militarism and replacing a security-centred peace paradigm with peace discourse—resonate well with a particular audience; that is, young, politically active individuals and civil society activists. However, one-sided constituents

and radical positions are considered as having a negative effect on peace activism's neutral and impartial image. Specifically, a one-sided perspective may discourage activists' empathetic attitudes towards the other side, in this case, conservative constituents. Furthermore, peace activism can be so locked into radical peace discourse that it is unable to reach out to those who do not embrace radical political views and may provoke counter-movements, thereby denying the value of peace activism. Such a situation can create political conflict between groups that no longer actively engage one another in dialogue (Miceli, 2005). While all of the activists interviewed during the field research indicated their willingness to engage with non-usual constituents, it seems that such aspirations are inhibited by the fact that civil society activists represent certain interests contradictory to the moderate or centre-right conservative populations.

Democratic norms, values, and skills

The democratic quality of a civil society is closely related to its ability to monitor and support existing democracy, its ability to generate public discourses and its ability to foster democratic skills and habits beneficial to democratic consolidation. The democratic skills and habits obtained through civil society engagement in turn contribute to strengthening the other two functions that civil society performs in the democratic consolidation process. This dissertation contemplates what values, skills, and attitudes are considered to play a positive role in strengthening civil society's public-discourse-generating capacity, and turns to participatory democratic theorists (cf. Chapter 2).

A number of scholars, such as Barber (1984), Walzer (1974) and Kymlicka (2001), call such values, skills, and attitudes “civility”: tolerance, non-discrimination and public reasonableness. They refer to “a set of practices that involves the exercise of self-constraint and a concern for others”. Civility promotes “reciprocal empathy and mutual respect” and “tempers tensions that arise out of different impressions of the good” (White, 2006, p. 446). Participatory democracy proponents, such as Kymlicka (2002), Dryzek (1994), and Galston (1991), put a great deal of emphasis on the following values, skills and attitudes, as these are particularly helpful in creating a public space based upon democratic norms and civility: the ability to tolerate different views and respect others’ opinions; promoting and accepting non-violent ways of problem-solving; and a willingness to engage in dialogue with those who hold different positions.

Kymlicka (2002) argued that effective and meaningful civic engagement generates a wide range of public discourse in civil society that cannot be facilitated without virtuous, engaged citizens who work towards an enlightened understanding of public affairs or common political issues. Civility underpinning the aforementioned democratic values, skills and attitudes “serves as a basic test of civic competence, as it encourages citizens to exercise self-constraint; to express a concern for others; and to maintain a commitment to civil discourse that is grounded in rational dialogue” (White, 2006, p. 456).

This section explores whether participants found their engagement with the case study organisations beneficial to fostering the values, attitudes and skills helpful for enhancing civil society’s public-discourse-generating capacity,

and, if so, how their reflections are linked to the aforementioned democratic values and skills. Such findings are summarised in Table 8.

Table 8: Comparison: Democratic Quality

	School Peace	WMP-CR Centre	Peace Activist Network
Democracy: Participation Enhancing	▪ Mobilises grassroots population and creates space for public discourse on community issues ▪ Broadens their support base through education and volunteering opportunities	▪ Makes peace discourse more accessible to grassroots population ▪ Initiates and scales up conflict resolution discourse in the country	▪ Increased reflection on how to strengthen their outreach capacity to connect to ordinary citizens ▪ Initiating and promoting discussion about how to further democratize internal civil society structures
Democracy: Tolerance and Respect for Difference	▪ Acknowledging the importance of differences	▪ Increased capacity for conflict resolution, particularly tolerance and the willingness to listen to others	▪ Opportunity to strengthen skills and attitudes such as tolerance
Democracy: Nonviolence, Peaceful Resolution of Conflict, Collective Problem-Solving	▪ Help to improve communication skills beneficial for resolving conflict in a constructive manner ▪ Promoting cooperative problem-solving	▪ Promoting skills for enduring differences without resorting to anger and emotional reactions ▪ Enhancing civil society practitioners' capacity for conflict resolution	▪ Capacity building to enhance he peace agenda – promoting peace education, nonviolence principles and conflict resolution skills
Democracy: Ability to Work with Individuals/Groups with Differing Position	▪ Exposed to an opportunity to engage with a wide range of constituents including those who hold different positions ▪ Reaching out to various school officials and teachers ▪ Emphasis on common desires – reducing school violence ▪ Less effective in reaching out to conservative residents ▪ Less effective in promoting conflict resolution values to male constituents	▪ Increased awareness of the need to connect to diverse populations ▪ Limited outreach capacity to conservative constituents ▪ Accumulated expertise in intervening school violence / Interpersonal conflict among young people ▪ Successful individual-basis examples of reaching out to different constituents	▪ Tend to exclude conservative constituents from peace discourse ▪ Lack of visible shift in confrontational advocacy patterns

Tolerance and respect for difference. As one of the central values for fostering a stable and effective democratic system, political tolerance is understood as “The willingness to extend procedural liberties, such as free speech and association to unpopular or disliked individuals or groups” in liberal democratic discourse (Finkel, 2000, p. 2). Participatory proponents, such as Dryzek (1994), define attitudes manifested in citizens willing to listen and seek to understand what others say and respond respectfully to the views of others. Galston (1991, p. 227) refers to tolerance as one’s willingness to give serious attention “to a range of views, which will include ideas the listener is bound to find strange and even obnoxious” (cf. Chapter 2). In new democracies where the notion of political tolerance was non-existent or suppressed by authoritarian regimes, as Finkel (2000) summarises, one can observe generally low levels of tolerance and support for minority rights. Compared to established democracies’ limited willingness to extend civil liberties to unpopular groups, a lack of tolerance for difference and minority views poses a threat to new democracies’ long-term viability (Finkel, 2000).

As recent statistics on rising social conflict indicate, South Koreans are increasingly criticised for their inability to discuss public affairs openly in a constructive and civilised manner (*The Korea Herald*, 2007). The lack of ability to practise tolerance during citizens’ participation in civic discourse exacerbates contentious social issues and often escalates into negative confrontation (Kim et al., 2005). In a joint study on the socio-political contexts in which South Korean civil society organisations operate, Joo et al. (2006) identified that mistrust and intolerance are widespread and the levels of intolerance and

impatience towards minority and differences are the highest in the world. Scholars such as Ha (2003) attribute the high levels of intolerance to the historical and political experiences that have suppressed the diversity of ideologies and culture. The lack of tolerance and emphasis on conformity are also reflected in South Korea; until the early 2000s, South Korean civil society organisations put a great emphasis on common attitudes and actions, thereby unintentionally discouraging the emergence of diverse opinions and ideas. Furthermore, compared to other political and socio-economic reform issues—transparency, corporate accountability, environmental justice, civil rights, gender equality—promoting tolerance in society was not considered a priority concern for civil society organisations (Joo et al., 2006).

When asked what benefits they have experienced by participating in the case study organisations and their conflict-resolution activities, an overwhelming majority of interviewees indicated that they had learned the *importance of listening to others* who hold different opinions and acknowledging others' positions, even when they do not agree with them. Some of the specific examples to which School Peace's participants referred testify that such changes were drawn from their own daily lives and interaction with family members. Some of the interviewees went on to say that training experiences have helped them to listen empathetically to their children's perspectives, in contrast with their previous attitude that assumed that they, as parents, knew what their children were thinking and needed (cf. SP1 (2007), SP2 (2007), and SP3 (2007) in Chapter 5). The participants with the WMP-CR Centre and PAN shared their positive reflection on enhanced capacity for tolerance by using the examples in professional settings, rather than using anecdotes about changes

that took place in their private lives (cf. CR 2 (2007), CR3 (2007), and CR 13 (2007) in Chapter 5).

As explained in the previous chapter, a number of the interviewees the author met during the field research have engaged in the democratisation struggle or other forms of civil society activism, which clearly distinguishes good and progressive versus wrong and conservative. Specifically, owing to its long tradition of struggle against the state, South Korean civil society activism was entrapped in the dualistic master-frames that categorise the values promoted by civil society organisations as progressive, idealistic, morally superior and liberal. However, values opposed by civil society groups were presented as ultra-conservative, anti-revolutionary, anti-democratic, and morally corrupt. In such contexts, interviewees shared that their exposure to conflict-resolution practices and methodologies forced them to reflect on whether their own behaviours have contributed to the escalation of conflict (cf. CR 6 (2007), CR8 (2007), SP5 (2007), and PAN3 (2007) in Chapter 5). Furthermore, a number of the interviewees emphasised that they appreciated conflict-resolution because of their increased capacity to listen to others and reflect empathetically on others' positions, despite the fact that they vehemently opposed their viewpoints in a political sense. In the context of interview findings, it is observed that conflict-resolution methodologies have helped increase levels of tolerance towards minorities and difference.

Ability to work with individuals with positions different from their own. Tolerance is a value individuals can internalise through educational efforts. The ability to work with individuals who hold positions different from one's own is a specific form of action that practises the value of tolerance. Conflict-

resolution methodologies can be, to a certain extent, considered as contributing to enhancing one's level of tolerance of differences. However, it appears this value has not yet been systematically translated into action. Out of over 50 interviewees, fewer than ten individuals responded that they were able to engage with others during a rather contentious situation and positively reflect their ability to handle such situations[49]. Fewer than five individuals illustrated a specific example in which they used conflict-resolution skills and values in an attempt to solve social and public conflicts, either as a third-party facilitator or as a direct party to the conflict (cf. CR 2 (2007), CR 13 (2007) in Chapter 5). The limit in translating the values and skills into specific action can be explained by the fact that civil society organisations have increasingly become party to conflicts and are considered by conservatives, who would likely oppose civil activism, to favour certain positions. It can be argued that such a lack of trust in civil society's ability to be neutral and impartial to certain values limits civil society organisations' opportunities to engage with opposing sides.

Non-violent and peaceful problem-solving. Shonholtz (2003, p. 402) elaborates on why democracy is considered a system for facilitating different opinions and conflicting values in a non-violent and constructive manner, by emphasising democracy's inherent goal "to create democratic processes, policies, structures, mechanisms, skilled personnel, and enforcement procedures" when managing contentious social issues, while maintaining peace and order. Democracy as a system of conflict-management explains, to a certain extent, how the field of conflict-resolution has emerged in advanced

[49] These individuals include CR2, CR9, CR10, CR11, CR12, CR13, PAN6, PAN7, and PAN8. Their ability to engage in difficult conversations with those who hold differing positions cannot be solely explained by their exposure to conflict-resolution and peace activism. Their professional positions require them to engage with more diverse constituents than other activists interviewed in 2007.

democratic societies. Conflict-resolution avoids the use of violence as a means of social change; when applied to national settings, "it privileges more pacific methods of negotiation, dialogue, prevention or peace-building" that promote incremental social change (Fast, p. 207, 2002). The term "civil" in the context of civil society in democracy implicitly assumes that non-violence and collaborative problem-solving are critical elements for distinguishing civil society's benefits, such as democracy, from other forms of civil associations that potentially threaten the democratic political order, such as civic gatherings mobilised around ethnic chauvinism, extreme nationalism or religious fundamentalism. As elaborated by Barber (1984, p. 223), civility based upon non-violence and collaborative problem-solving based upon public reasonableness helps "citizens deal with conflicts of public life, and works as a social lubricant to ease the demands".

As explained by Joo et al. (2006), non-violence in civil society became more prominent in the late 1990s and 2000s. However, in the context of social and public conflict between civil society and the state, or civil society and large corporations, violent demonstrations have occasionally been employed in order to voice civil society's vehement opposition, even in the early 2000s. Reflecting civil society's increasing acceptance of non-violence as an organising principle to articulate one's views, more recently civil society organisations have begun to engage in activities to promote the value of non-violence and the constructive management of contentious social issues. The three case study organisations reviewed in this dissertation serve as notable examples of such efforts, as their activities emphasise the importance of non-violence and collaborative problem-solving. Yet, as acknowledged by a number of interviewees from the WMP-CR

Centre and the PAN, the influence of these case study organisations is rather limited and remains a minority voice within civil society (cf. CR2 (2007) in Chapter 5). Specifically, civil society practitioners experience difficulty in promoting peace and conflict-resolution methodologies to other civil society actors, owing to the complexity of core concepts and a rather limited effect on social structure.

Increasing participation. One theme that emerged repeatedly from interviews is that conflict-resolution methodology provides an alternative outreach method for civil society practitioners to engage with ordinary citizens; this claim frequently appeared during the interviews with those who participated in the WMP-CR Centre and the PAN. At the same time, School Peace interviewees, who tend to be volunteers and non-professional civil society practitioners, also indicated that conflict-resolution training and its relevance to their daily lives gave them courage and a willingness to participate in activities organised by civil society groups. Such enthusiasm over conflict-resolution as a method for helping civil society activism to focus on macro and systemic social issues and grassroots politics can be related to the fact that civil society organisations have long been faced with limited participation of ordinary and grassroots population. For example, Joo et al. (2006) reported that the growth of citizen participation does not contribute to the structural development of civil society, as their participation is limited to one-off activities, and has not led to sustainable participation in civil society spaces. Although interviewees indicate that they see great potential for expanding citizen participation through conflict-resolution, there is very limited evidence as to whether such participation can

have a significant effect, owing to the lack of specific data profiling the type of citizens participating in conflict-resolution activities.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the findings of three case study organisations through four different analytical frameworks: organisational overviews; interview reflections; conflict-resolution issue-framing; and enhancing democratic quality. Such analysis helps us gain insight into these case study organisations and allows reflection on their role in enhancing conflict-resolution capacity, while nurturing the democratic functions of civil society. The next chapter will summarise the ideas of this dissertation and reflect critically upon some of its limitations.

CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION

Evolution of democracy is not possible if we are not prepared to hear the other side. (Mahatma Ghandi)

No one is born a good citizen; no nation is born a democracy. Rather, both are processes that continue to evolve over a lifetime. (Kofi Annan)

These quotes are illustrative of the two main arguments of this dissertation. The author embarked on this research project based on contemporary views that democracy requires citizens who are willing to participate in civic discourses non-violently, who respect diverse views, and who engage in dialogue with others for problem solving (cf. Chapter 2). The above quotes allude to the process of obtaining citizen virtues and deepening democracy as a journey of both an individual citizen and a society that embraces democratic ideals. South Korea, the focus of this dissertation, is still new to democracy. It celebrated the 20th anniversary of the democratic transition only in 2007. The 1987 transition was its third attempt at democratisation since a modern governance system was incorporated in the late 19th century. The previous democratisation attempts were unsuccessful, and authoritarian rule prevailed. In this context, this dissertation showed that the country continues to experiment with democracy, and so does its civil society, in which citizen action is primarily organised. The author highlighted the critical role civil society and citizens in South Korea play in the country's democratic experiments because the civil society advocates for citizens' interests, supports the state's democratic reforms, and monitors the government for its accountability. In 2003, the civil society in South Korea became the most trusted institution in the country (cf. Chapter 1, Lee, 2008).

The country no longer restricts basic rights, nor do have citizens to fear for their lives because they are willing to share their ideas in public. Yet, South Korea is a new democracy and its government, civil society, and citizens were not fully equipped to manage conflictual social dynamics or emerging public policy-related disputes in a constructive manner. This dissertation argues that peace and conflict resolution is South Korea's civil society's innovative response to this emerging challenge, and that peace and conflict resolution activities in the civil society space contribute to enhancing its capacity to nurture democratic citizenship, which is a key ingredient for a vibrant civil society, and participatory democracy.

This dissertation first reviewed the emerging challenge related to constructive management of social conflicts, pubic disputes, and other conflictual dynamics, and then investigated ways in which the South Korean civil society responded to conflictual social issues throughout history. Through the historical analysis, the evolution of civil society's roles and characteristics at different junctions of the democratisation process are explored, and ways in which it engaged with the state in pursuit of democratic advancement are investigated. The historical overview helped to specifically identify how the authoritarian legacy and South Korea's relation to North Korea reinforced conflictual dynamics between civil society and the state. Furthermore, civil society's self-identification in relation to social conflicts in the country is examined. Based on the empirical data assembled through fieldwork, ways in which civil society activists and participants engaged in PCR activism were examined, and their perspectives on the added benefits and limits of these activities outlined. Finally, this dissertation investigated whether—and to what

extent—peace and conflict resolution activities were beneficial to embedding democratic norms, skills, and values into civil society.

While a liberal democratic vision overarches South Korea's democratic transition and consolidation process (cf. Chapter 4), the KDJ and RMH administrations emphasised the importance of citizen participation in their policy directives. Specifically, the RMH administration, which held the power at the time of the field research, placed the promotion of citizen participation at the core of its democracy-deepening policies and introduced various supportive policies. This dissertation suggested that participatory democracy was a complementary vision to the liberal one, as it offered mechanisms for citizen empowerment. As highlighted in Chapter 2, this dissertation agreed with Baber's vision on participatory democracy; specifically his view that through the genuine empowerment of citizens, participatory democracy strengthens a society's capacity to address conflicts (Barber, 1984; cf. Chapter 2). Barber's vision strengthened liberal democrats' vision that democracy was a system that constructively managed differences and diverse viewpoints. While a majority of liberal democratic scholarly efforts focused on macro-level institutional measures to fulfil the vision, participatory democracy gauged democratic citizenship and micro-level measures affecting their abilities.

In engaging with theoretical discourse on democracy, this dissertation turned its attention to civil society, which emerged as one of the most examined concepts since the late 1980s. Especially its dramatic role in triggering democratic transitions in various parts of the world, including South Korea, continued to play a relevant role in shaping processes of democratic deepening and consolidation in these countries (Diamond, 1994). For South Korea it was

virtually impossible to imagine the country's democratic vision without including the civil society.

This dissertation interpreted the post-transition civil society in South Korea through the lenses of the liberal and the public sphere (cf. Chapter 2), as these frameworks better reflected the roles and activities civil society played since the 1987 transition. Through the historical analysis in Chapter 4, the author demonstrated how mainstream civil society activities transitioned from oppositional struggles for emancipation to discourse generation on critical reform issues for public debates. Built upon the civil society and democratisation literature by Diamond (1994), Edwards (2004), and Finkel (2003), three main areas where civil society played an important role in the post-democratic, transitional process were identified: a) monitoring, advocating, and supporting the state's reform process, b) raising citizens' awareness of key reform agendas and democratic processes and c) mobilising relevant actions and nurturing people's democratic capacity.

This dissertation paid particular attention to the third function of civil society–mobilizing relevant action and nurturing people's democratic capacity/citizenship because Korean scholars including Kim (2000) examined extensively the relevance of the first two functions to the democratisation process in South Korea. As outlined in Chapter 2, this dissertation concurred with participatory democratic theorists such as Barber (1984), Drysek (1990), and Kymlicka (2002) that democratic citizenship was critical to ensure the quality of the democratic participation of citizens. These theorists made explicit references to certain virtues of democratic citizenship to operationalize the participatory vision of democracy in practice. These virtues included tolerance,

open-mindedness towards differences, embracing diversity, empathetically listening to opposite sides, a willingness to solve problems in dialogue, and participation to advance public interests with a commitment to nonviolence.

With the aforementioned theoretical backgrounds in mind, this dissertation faced the following questions:

- How were such virtues obtained in new democracies such as South Korea?
- Who was engaged in such discourses in South Korea?
- What mechanisms and activities were utilised by South Korean actors to promote these democratic citizenship qualities?

The PCR lens led to the examination of three South Korean civil society organisations that brought PCR practices into the country. The three investigated case study organisations were a representation of the different forms of civil society groups that exist in South Korea. At the same time, they represented the same vision—alternative forms of civil society activisms that go beyond street protests and petition signing and collaborative management of conflictual social issues. Their stories were told in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, and it was examined how they were intertwined with the country's political history. This dissertation was a journey in search of understanding the linkage between PCR, civil society activism, and democratic citizenship in South Korea and it attempts to honour its PCR pioneers. This chapter aims to summarise what this dissertation explored and found.

Summary of Conclusions

This chapter summarises and affirms the related arguments that have been presented in previous chapters. Arguing that PCR activities are beneficial

to strengthening civil society's the nurturing capacity for democracy, the dissertation reviewed the country's political history and civil society's changing response to social conflicts, and analysed empirical data assembled through observation, interviews, and documentation during the field research.

The dissertation mapped existing efforts in the areas of peace and conflict resolution by civil society, and concluded that the field is still in a developmental phase in South Korea. The mapping exercise and subsequent case studies highlighted that the field differs from those observed in advanced democracies. Specifically, it has not yet fully integrated core features of conflict resolution—advocating neutrality, inclusiveness, and impartiality not only through their rhetoric, but also through their actions (Fast, 2002; cf. Chapter 3). With a majority of their policies oriented centre-left, civil society organisations studied here had limited success with reaching a wide range of constituents including conservatives and mainstreaming a PCR agenda within South Korea's civil society. In addition, with the societal pressure that success had to be demonstrated, civil society organisations often hesitated to take on specific cases that could practically utilise conflict resolution techniques and peace education in the community (PAN6, Personal interview, 2 May 2007 in Chapter 5). This limited the possibility of expanding PCR activities into the broader society and prohibited a greater effect on the macro political processes.

Nonetheless, rather than putting great emphasis on comparing South Korean PCR to the ones in North American, the dissertation examined the emergence of peace and conflict resolution in South Korea's civil society within the framework of democratic deepening and consolidation process. Throughout the dissertation, the author contemplated this field's potential, relevance, and

promises to the country's on-going democratic deepening processes. The following three findings were highlighted in the last three chapters of this dissertation; the historical overview, the description of three case studies, and the analysis and comparison of these case studies, and are summarised below.

1. PCR activism in South Korea emerged as a result of civil society activists' efforts to transform the negative pattern of problem solving that intensified social conflicts in post-transitional South Korea. Conflictual ways of handling differences are embedded in the South Korea's civil society because of its antagonistic encounters with authoritarian regimes throughout its modern history.
2. Civil society practitioners initiated the PCR movement in order to increase citizen participation and make civil society activism more accessible to South Koreans. The PCR movement offers a range of practical solutions that appeal to the ideals of participatory democracy. However, there is limited evidence on whether PCR has made specific contributions to expanding citizen participation in civil society.
3. Exposure to the PCR movement sensitizes civil society activists in South Korea towards the values of tolerance and constructive problem solving. However, there is limited evidence on whether these values have been systematically integrated into activists' action.

Detailed Reflections on Conclusions

In Search of an Alternative Framework for Problem-Solving Pattern of Civil Society: *PCR activism in South Korea emerged as a result of civil society activists' efforts to transform the negative pattern of problem solving that intensified social conflicts in post-transitional South Korea. Conflictual ways of*

handling differences are embedded in the South Korea's civil society because of its antagonistic encounters with authoritarian regimes throughout its modern history.

As presented in Chapter 4, how the civil society in South Korea handles social conflicts is closely linked to country's political history. Until 1987, civil society had existed as a space for mobilising oppositional forces to challenge the status quo, and antagonism had long defined the state-society relationship. Throughout the country's modern history, authoritarian leaders repeatedly denied setting up democratic measures for citizens to raise their concerns and grievances legitimately. Civil society was suppressed, and authorities denied their oversight function and failed to openly mobilise South Koreans, especially for matters and causes that were controversial and might be perceived as anti-governmental. Civil society opposition had been portrayed by the authoritarian regimes as a dangerous attempt to overthrow the government and the capitalist system in South Korea. To challenge authoritarianism and to demand democratic rights, civil society had very little choice but to resort to confrontational engagement with the state, even at the expense of being accused of interrupting social harmony—one of the most important Confucius virtues, which are highly relevant for South Koreans.

During historical periods such as the colonial era from 1910 to 1945, or Chun's military regime from 1980 to 1987, civil society opposition and anti-state confrontation were viewed necessary by a broad range of South Koreans (cf. Chapter 4). On the other hand, the oppositional civil society and its antagonistic engagement with the government from 1945 to 1979 were highly contested and polarised the opinions of South Koreans' (cf. Chapter 4). The complex

interaction of anti-communism ideology, the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, the South-North tensions throughout the Cold War, and Park's successful economic development strategies that resulted in an annual 8.5% GDP growth, spilt the population in two in regard to the role of civil society and their strategies towards engaging the state. Specifically, authoritarian leaders claimed that the civil society and its progressive ideals were responsible for the two failed attempts at democratisation, arguing that civil society brought chaos (Kim, 2000). Kim (2002) further elaborates (cf. Chapter 4) that authoritarian leaders also successfully linked civil society and the diverse interests expressed by civil society actors to attempts by North Korea to invade South Korea.

This dissertation reviewed the evolution of South Korean civil society and the manner in which it has interacted with the country's socio-political history (cf. Chapter 4). In doing so, it investigated the pattern of civil society's responses to social conflicts, and the ways in which society has changed since the democratic transition. The dissertation noted that the two previous failed attempts reinforced the arguments of authoritarian leaders that open contests from the society sphere, diverse interests advocated by civil society groups, and civil society activism were dangerous to the country's well-being, and were sources of social conflicts. In addition, the two failed democratisation attempts and the subsequent repression through the state restricted the autonomy and independence of the civil society and its members, and in turn legitimised the antagonistic engagement of civil society with the state or other actors who were loyal to the regime and the status quo, such as conservative social groups, state-controlled media, and conglomerates.

The military dictatorships and their repressive measures gave civil society actors few options for confrontation or anti-government resistance. In South Korea, oppositional movements sparked through civil society were not groups engaging in guerrilla warfare or covert violent conflicts with the state. Their tactics were mostly protests, campaigns, and other types of nonviolent strategies. However, throughout history, oppositional politicians, pro-democracy movements, and progressive civil society figures were portrayed to be part of a wing of violent opposition against the state because the presence of North Korea legitimised labelling these groups as violent (Kim, 2000). As the state-society conflict intensified in the 1980s, street protests often ended with violent clashes; however, most of the offensive measures were taken by the military police, while a limited number of protestors resorted to throwing gasoline bombs (Kim, 2000). This dissertation found that due to South Korea’s historical legacy, its civil society had internalised antagonistic measures into its core survival strategies, and raised legitimate concerns in more aggressive and confrontational manners than what was traditionally accepted under the term civil society activities. In activist’s minds, these measures were a necessary means to attain justice and freedom.

As elaborated by Kim (2000), the 1987 transition provided progressive South Korean civil society actors with an opportunity to expand and redefine roles and characteristics of civil society, based on the changing political contexts. However, their engagement patterns with the state and other economic and political elites remained conflictual and antagonistic for the first ten years post-transition (cf. Chapter 4). To promote public interests and equality and to restore the wrongdoings of the past regimes, activists have

utilised civil society as a space to mobilise against previously suppressive voices and to promote progressive causes such as transitional justice measures, workers' rights, a conciliatory approach to North Korea, women's rights, and highly gender-biased family laws, corruption of politicians, development over rights for the poor, conglomerates' close association with the state power. To publicise these progressive ideals, civil society actors continued to utilise strong advocacy campaigns, street protests, and strikes. Civil society activists rarely viewed civil society organisations' lack of attention to other democratic needs of the society as a problem because they argued that more urgent tasks had to be addressed before thinking about other issues (Moon, 2002; cf. Chapter 4).

Civil society's long battles with economic and political elites contributed to the rapid development of democratic institutions and measures that accelerated the democratic consolidation process. With the election of KDJ in 1998, more progressive measures to institutionally legitimize civil society were introduced and its influence on publicizing critical issues were strengthened (cf. Chapter 4). In the early 2000s, the civil society was at the centre of media attention with numerous successful campaigns; major dam development projects were blocked for conserving the environment and peoples' livelihoods; corrupt politicians were blacklisted from being elected; the conservative parties' attempt to impeach RMH was stopped; and many anti-American protests against the as perceived influence U.S. military power has on South Korean politics were organised. Civil society became South Korea's most influential institution in 2003 (Kim, 2009).

Simultaneously, the rising influence of the progressive civil triggered increased activity of conservative social groups whose goals were to confront

progressive activists and to restore the country's conservative values. In dealing with these conservative groups, progressive civil society activists took more confrontational and antagonistic measures, denying them their association with the term 'civil society', or discounting their presence and views (Joo et al., 2006). In addition, in the early 2000s, numerous public policy disputes involving local development projects were reported in the media. Both KDJ and RMH were sympathetic to progressive civil society actors, and influential state officials in these administrations were considered progressive and civil-society-friendly. Despite the attempts to arrive at mutually agreeable resolutions, the disputes between the state, civil society, and community members ended with dissatisfactory outcomes for the involved parties, and civil society began to be perceived as a conflictual organisation (Park, 2004; Park 2006).

In this context, this dissertation noted that PCR activism emerged as an alternative framework for self-reflection and action for the country's civil society actors. As stated by CR2 (Personal interview, 26 January 2007), "civil society began to realize that the previous conflictual patterns were deeply influential to how civil society activists resolved differences… we felt that alternatives need to be explored to transform this." As summarized in Chapter 5 and 6, many other interviewees echoed her views. For example, PAN6 (Personal interview, 2 May 2007) shared that "we internalized violence, antagonism, and confrontation, and neglected many other values that we claim to promote." These actors integrated peace and conflict resolution as a framework, which challenged the negative pattern of how civil society handled differences. They further embraced peace and conflict resolution ideals because they offered more than just a tool for self-critiquing (cf. PAN and WMP-CR Centre). These activists including CR2

(Personal interview, 26 January 2007) appreciated peace and conflict resolution because of its practical value for empowering activists and active civil society practitioners to constructively engage in social conflicts.

Activists the author met highlighted that the increased spread of PCR and its rising popularity among civil society activists were reflective of PCR's practicality, and its process-oriented values. A statement by CR2 (Personal interview, 26 January 2007) elaborated how peace and conflict resolution emerged in civil society:

> In the late 1990s, we began to be keenly aware that we have internalized too much violence and confrontation, and forgot to engage with others in a humanistic way. We were lost in great discourse, and neglected to pay attention to processes, which guide change and progress. I was drawn to peace and conflict resolution because of its offer to emphasise the process, and raise my consciousness around these negative patterns that I absorbed.

This dissertation showed that PCR in South Korea was a self-reflective effort to transform violent patterns of problem solving and reflected during the encounters with volunteers with the School Peace. These activists tended to be less politicised than practitioners associated with the WMP-CR Centre and the PAN, yet they asserted that negative patterns of problem solving affected them and their community despite their political awareness and active community engagement. SP5 (Personal interview, 25 April 2007) elaborated on her interaction with youth on peace and conflict resolution, "peace education and conflict resolution training tries to showcase constructive problem solving examples to our children who are already deeply exposed to the negative conflict management patterns of Korean society."

Peace and Conflict Resolution for Citizen Participation: *Civil society*

practitioners initiated the PCR movement in order to increase citizen participation and make civil society activism more accessible to South Koreans. The PCR movement offers a range of practical solutions that appeal to the ideals of participatory democracy. However, there is limited evidence on whether PCR has made specific contributions to expanding citizen participation in civil society.

This dissertation noted that in the mid-2000s, citizen participation in civil society began to decrease (Joo et al., 2006). Especially, the low level of participation in progressive advocacy activities became more visible with civil society research advancing more in South Korea (Joo et al., 2006). For example, civil society membership declined by nearly 15% from 1996 to 2006, and while the percentage of civil society membership was with 77% still rather high, the membership of most South Koreans was linked to cultural, social, and friendship-based groups (Lee, 2008). It is especially notable that only 30% of those who indicated their membership with one or more civil society groups were affiliated with interest-based advocacy and progressive civil society groups (Lee, 2008). In addition to the low level of participation, institutional trust in civil society has declined in recent years. In 2006, the same survey that previously ranked civil society as the most trusted institution in the country revealed a dramatic change. Kim (2009) explained that the civil society in 2006 ranked as the fifth trustworthy institution because of its highly politicized activities, too much emphasis on progressive, macro-political ideals, and citizens increasingly perceiving civil society as a source of social conflict.

The decline of public citizen participation and institutional trust in civil society are not unique to South Korea. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the notion of

participatory democracy emerged in response to advanced democracies' continued decline of civic engagement in democratic processes (Barber, 1984). Putnam's social capital theory was inspired by his research comparing Italian and American civic engagement patterns and the overall well-being of their respective societies (Putnam, 1993). Howard (2003) examined the low participation of citizens in civil societies in former communist countries in his triangulation study, and argued that these countries' totalitarian legacy is strongly linked to the decline of civic participation. Further, scholars such as Carothers (1999) argued that the lack of genuine citizen participation in civil society organisations in developing countries was closely linked to the rapid professionalization of civil society, which tended to attract particular types of elites to such space.

In South Korea, researchers sympathetic to progressive causes tended to dominate civil society discourses (cf. Chapter 1; Chapter 4). Further, the decline of civic participation was a relatively new phenomenon in the country. As a result, comparably few studies were conducted, and discussion of the subjects was limited to editorials and commentaries in newspapers (Joo et al., 2006). Within progressive civil society circles, activists began to identify these patterns and ways to revive citizen action in civil society. In this dissertation, civil society practitioners' self-reflections on the decline of civic participation are evident in their motivations to engage in PRC activities and their assessment of PRC's positive contributions (cf. Chapter 5).

One of the most frequently cited reasons for the decline of civic participation by the interviewees was the emphasis on great political discourses that were far removed from the day-to-day concerns of citizens that were not

professional civil society practitioners or life-long activists. All the volunteers interviewed for School Peace (cf. Chapter 5) indicated that prior to their joining School Peace, although they were politically conscious, they had not been engaged in civil society activism since their college days because of their daily obligations, including child rearing. Specifically, SP2 (Personal interview, 25 April 2007) elaborated her perception towards civil society activism when explaining how surprised she was when she felt urged to volunteer with School Peace. She said, “I never imagined myself volunteering for a neighbourhood civil society organization before … because I thought activism is for somebody else.” Similarly, a number of interviewees featured in WMP-CR shared their reflections on civil society activism and its focus on big political issues. CR1 (Personal interview, 24 May 2007) stated, “after a number of engagements in the movement, I burnt out, and could not continue. I wanted to stay away from activism, and engage in my daily life.” The rationale of Peace Activists’ Network is also closely linked to the lack of sustained civic participation. After a movement opposing the government’s decision to deploy troops in Iraq emerged, activists recounted that they began to reflect on how ordinary citizens’ interest in peace activism had quickly diminished. One of those self-reflections was shared in their meeting minutes from 2004; civil society saw anti-war protests in the context of Korea-U.S. relations and complex international politics, rather than something more personal to South Koreans (Peace Activists Retreat Minutes, 2004 in Chapter 5).

In addition to civil society’s intense focus on great political discourses, the interviewed civil society activists including PAN1 (Personal interview, 29 January 2007), PAN6 (Personal interview, 2 May 2007), and CR9 (Personal

interview, 30 May 2007) pointed a lack of diversity within civil society out, and remarked that the absence of a holistic approach to activism contributed to the decline of civic participation. A majority of veteran civil society practitioners that met for the Peace Activists' Networks acknowledged that South Korean activism intellectualized various issues, and relied upon political knowledge for people's empowerment. PAN1 said:

> We have a number of knowledge forums and seminars. These forums and seminars intellectually analyse all sorts of problems inhibiting peaceful inter-Korean relations. However, compared to the knowledge realm, peace activism in South Korea neglects process, values, and technical aspects of peace. (Personal interview, 29 January 2007)

Young practitioners including PAN9 (Personal interview, 17 April 2007) and CR11 (Personal interview, 21 May 2007) were particularly critical of the lack of diversity within civil society activism and the implicit and explicit pressure to conform to the movement tradition. They assessed that lack of attention to fostering diversity and embracing a holistic approach turned young people away from activism. Interviewees shared self-reflective comments and explained that the issues causing the decline of civic participation in civil society were problematic because citizen participation was viewed as critical in sustaining a vibrant civil society and creating a participatory democratic space. Certainly, the stance of progressive civil society on macro-political issues or its own lack of creativity in approaching and reaching out to citizens could not solely explain the lack of sustained citizen participation. As Joo et al. (2006) and Kim (2009) elaborated, more complex circumstances affected citizen participation; de-politicisation of young people, the association of progressive civil society with RMH, whose administration had a low approval rate during his final years in office, and conservative media's attacks on influential progressive groups in the

mid-2000s are some of the discussed reasons.

Yet, this dissertation only briefly touches upon the discussed decline of civic participation. Rather, this dissertation paid attention to various interviewees who repeatedly emphasised their enthusiastic assessment of the PCR movement as an instrument to enhancing citizen participation in South Korea (cf. Chapter 5). All three case studies stressed that activists and participants viewed peace and conflict resolution alike as tools to advance the quality of civic engagement, diversify existing civil society movements, and renewing civic participation in civil society (cf. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). Through informality, volunteerism, and a community-centred approach, School Peace successfully mobilised community members, specifically female suburban residents who tended to be less politically active than their male counterparts (Moon, 2002). As SP3 stated:

> Although the issue of conflict resolution and peace education is new and sounds difficult, it was rather easy for me to get involved in the organisation as all those who participate in the training share common challenges and found this issue useful to address our own problems. (Personal interview, 30 April 2007 in Chapter 5)

Furthermore, School Peace's example illustrated that framing peace education and conflict resolution as an empowering opportunity to address various interpersonal conflicts was effective in reaching out to ordinary citizens.

The interviewees met for the WMP-CR Centre to assess the importance of conflict resolution programmes in bringing more people back or welcoming them into civil society activism in a democratic era. Interviewees thought that PCR activities offered by the WMP-CR Centre allowed ordinary citizens, who may have been away from activism, to reclaim their political consciousness and remain relevant for social discourses. CR1 explains her motivation to return to

her engagement with civil society:

> As I continue my participation in the training programme, I realised that I could remain highly active and relevant to social issues without putting myself into exhaustion and extreme dedication. I was happy that I could reclaim this space without sacrificing other important aspects in my life (Personal interview, 24 May 2007 in Chapter 5).

The author identified that the WMP-CR Centre responded to their participants' need for engaging in activism without being trapped into macro-dynamics by framing peace and conflict resolution activities as small daily practical tools that could address the underlying causes of structural, systematic, and cultural violence that reinforced conflictual dynamics in society (cf. Chapter 6). Such framing appealed to centre-left or centre constituents who were sympathetic to causes, but less willing to engage in activism with the full intensity demonstrated by professional or life-long activists.

The interviews the author conducted for the PAN also revealed that activists welcomed the new wave of peace activism that emerged out of continued network and capacity building. This approach was attractive because of its potential to reach out to the young adult population. Especially peace activists frequently interacting with young adults highlighted that peace activism and its process-centred and holistic approach enabled young people to encounter activism in a more easily accessible way (cf. Chapter 5). Furthermore, activists stated that the traditional activism model, which centred on street protests and policy discussions, was less effective in engaging young people than experiential programmes such as travelling to particular cites for historical reflection on social justice, or engaging in dialogue with people from different countries to address common challenges such as environmental degradation or

gender.

The interviewees of the three case studies expressed their appreciation for the PCR activities their respective organisations had implemented for their participatory potential. The present dissertation argued that the aforementioned sentiments, especially the ones highlighted by School Peace interviewees, were reflective of Folger and Bush's (1994) and McCoy and Scully's (2002) claims that empowerment increased through PCR activities including deliberative dialogue and transformative mediation allowed citizens to engage more in issues affecting their lives. The reflections from the interviewees also echoed Shonholtz's (1997) argument that PCR could serve as a vehicle to prepare effective civic participation in new democracies.

Interviewees' appreciation for PCR activism as a way to enhance civic participation, reminded this author of Gidron et al.'s (2002) notion of multiple purpose hybrid organisations. Through a case study of PCR organisations in four protracted conflict areas, Gidron et al. (2002) argued that these organisations utilised PCR techniques to advance the causes their respective organisations advocated. Similar to these four localities' PCR organisations, the author noted that South Korean civil society organisations studied in this dissertation incorporated PCR methodologies and ideals in order to promote their advocacy goals.

Nonetheless, the participatory potential of peace and conflict resolution has limits in terms of skewed success along gender and political ideological lines. Echoing Khor's (1999) view on the impact of what on gender in reinforcing women's participation in a culturally prescribed sphere for women, this dissertation agreed with PAN3's assessment that PCR was considered a

female-dominated civil society space by South Korean civil society activists (PAN3, Personal interview, 16 April 2007). The WMP-CR Centre and School Peace showed a high representation of female citizens while the PAN, which drew activists from peace organisations advocating peaceful North-South relations, had a stronger male presence. In this context, while the PCR movement was effective in bringing ordinary citizens into the public sphere, it tended to be more successful with women and young people. As highlighted in Chapter 6, during the analysis of these organisations' core constituents and perceived political affiliation, the organisations of the case study and their PCR activities were less successful in enhancing participation of citizens less sympathetic to centre-left ideals. All interviewees acknowledged the lack of perceived political neutrality, but this dissertation acknowledged that few offered any concrete solutions to address the challenge; this could be an area for future research.

Sensitising Citizens towards Democratic Values and Norms: *Exposure to the PCR movement sensitizes civil society activists in South Korea towards the values of tolerance and constructive problem solving. However, there is limited evidence on whether these values have been systematically integrated into activists' action.*

The present dissertation put an emphasis on civility and civic virtues as critical elements of civil society because they serve "as a basic test of civic competence as they encourage citizens to exercise self-constrain, to express a concern for others, and to maintain a commitment to civic discourse that is grounded on rational dialogue" (White, 2006, p.456). To understand how civility and civic virtues are fostered, the author examined civil society's role in

providing a space for citizens to develop skills and habits beneficial to democratic development. Reiterating the view of White (2006) on civility, this dissertation argued that democratic skills and habits citizens obtained through engagement in civil society contributed to strengthening the two other functions civil society performs in democratic consolidation processes: monitoring and supporting the government's action and generating public discourses (Habermas, 1980; Calhaun, 1993; Finkel, 2003, Edwards, 2003). In identifying a set of democratic values, skills, and attitudes that can be beneficial to strengthening a civil society, this dissertation drew inspiration from the work of participatory democratic theorists such as Barber (1984), Walzer (1974), Kymlicka (2001), Dryzek (1994), and Galston (1991). Based upon their work, the dissertation examined three democratic values, skills, and norms; tolerance and respect for diversity, commitment to non-violent problem solving, and willingness to engage in difficult conversations in the public sphere, as they are deemed beneficial to strengthening civil society.

As Joo et al. (2006) argued, civil society's capacity to promote tolerance, diversity, and non-violence had been limited in South Korea. Many activists and practitioners assumed that these were qualities produced through exposure of citizens to civil society activism, and secondary outputs of civic participation. Furthermore, major newspapers such as the *Korea Herald* (2007) published essays, arguing that South Korea generated social conflicts because Koreans were unable to tolerate different opinions when engaging in public discourses. Ha (2003, cf. Chapter 6) indicated that the root causes of high levels of intolerance in South Korea were linked to the country's historical and political experiences that have suppressed the diversity of ideologies. The country's

historical development reinforced the conflictual dynamics of resolving differences within civil society (cf. Chapter 4). Additionally, its cultural heritage valued conformity and social harmony over diverse opinions and individual autonomy (cf. Chapter 3).

In this context, this dissertation demonstrated that PCR activism in South Korea represented the efforts of civil society to generate civic virtues and democratic citizens. Specifically, interviewees across the three case study organisations valued the increased level of tolerance towards differences because of their encounters with PCR activism. This dissertation furthermore noted that School Peace participants focused more on their increased tolerance based upon their personal experiences of interacting with family members and friends. SP2 (Personal interview, 25 April 2007 in Chapter 5) explained that training experiences had helped her to listen more empathetically to her children's perspectives, as opposed to her previous attitude that assumed that she, as parent, knew what her children needed. The WMP-CR Centre and PAN interviewees illustrated their enhanced capacity for tolerance by using the examples from professional settings. Many of the interviewees from these two organisations have engaged in the democratisation struggle or other forms of civil society activism. Civil society's long tradition to struggle against the strong state entrapped activists in dualistic master frames, one that categorised the values promoted by civil society organisations as progressive, ideal, morally superior, and liberal, and another in which civil society groups were presented as ultra-conservative, anti-revolutionary, anti-democratic, and morally corrupt (cf. Chapter 5). In such contexts, interviewees such as SP2 (Personal interview, 25 April 2007 in Chapter 5) shared that their exposure to conflict resolution

practices and methodologies forced them to reflect on whether their own behaviours had contributed to the escalation of conflict. CR5 (Personal interview, 23 May 2007 in Chapter 5) highlighted that her exposure to conflict resolution training programmes increased her capacity to listen to others and empathise with positions of others, despite the fact they vehemently opposed their political viewpoints. Corresponding to interviewees' self-assessment of their level of tolerance for different opinions, this dissertation observed that PCR activism triggered some changes in the perspectives of civil society practitioners on constructive problem solving. One example is CR6 (Personal interview, 24 May 2007 in Chapter 5), who highlighted that her exposure to PCR activism shifted her previously ambivalent view on constructive problem solving. Formerly, she treated problem solving as a search for a mutually agreeable solution—a linguistic euphemism for compromise or co-optation. CR6 noted her perspective changed as constructive problem solving enhanced her ability to engage with people from differing positions.

While this dissertation demonstrated that PCR activism contributes to sensitising civil society participants towards tolerance and problem-solving approaches, the author noted that democratic values, norms, and skills had not yet been systematically translated into activists' action. An example was highlighted in Chapter 6; out of over 50 interviewees, fewer than ten responded that they were able to engage with others during a rather contentious situation and positively reflect their ability to handle such situations. Fewer than five individuals illustrated a specific example in which they used conflict resolution skills and values in an attempt to solve social and public conflicts, either as a third-party facilitator or as a party directly involved in the conflict. The limited

translation of the values and skills into specific actions can be explained by the fact that civil society organisations are considered to favour certain positions by conservative constituents of the centre –right and right, who would likely disapprove progressive civil society activism. It seems likely that such a lack of trust in the ability of civil society to be neutral and impartial to certain values, limits the opportunities of civil society organisations to engage with opposing sides.

Further Reflections

Despite the rather encouraging findings from the case studies, this dissertation does not condone fully conclusive statements such as, *PCR activities advanced civil society's democracy-nurturing capacity in South Korea*. Rather, this thesis presented nuanced and exploratory arguments that illustrate the complexities surrounding the application of PCR in the context of the South Korean civil society. This is due to the scope, methodological choice, and purpose of this dissertation. It was intentionally designed to avoid coming up with a generalizable statement based upon a cause-effect analysis of quantitative information on PCR activities. The author deliberatively adopted case studies as methodology to capture the relationship between civil society and PCR activism in South Korea. As a result, this dissertation collected experiences of interviewees with the PCR activities each case study organisation offered, and aimed to understand how the field of PCR emerged in South Korea's post-transitional space. Additionally, the detail-rich narratives of the interviewees allowed the analysis of how they assess the benefits and added value of PCR in fostering democratic citizenship.

While this author opted for the method of qualitative case studies to explore emergent practices in South Korea's PCR activism, it is worth examining the quantifiable data and its value for advancing this topic. During the field research, the author noted an absence of quantifiable data on PCR activities in South Korea and through interviews identified that this was partially related to a lack of emphasis on monitoring and evaluation in the civil society sector. Given the increased demand in the donor community for evidence-based practices, international NGOs with sustainable funding tend to have a rigorous framework for monitoring and evaluating their practices. For example, Search for Common Ground and International Alert, two of the most reputable international NGOs in the area of PCR, have staff members dedicated to measuring the effects of their activities on the ground. However, South Korean NGOs examined in this dissertation hardly receive a large sum of foreign funding, and are therefore rarely confronted with such rigorous requirements. The funding received from foreign organisations is limited to supporting activists' travels, or to the development of tool kits and workshops (WMP-CR Centre in Chapter 5). The author learned that a majority of donors tend to be Korean philanthropic organisations, or governmental institutions whose policies on monitoring and evaluation of PCR activities are non-existent at the time of the field research.

The absence of quantifiable data means researchers in the field cannot compare how the individual understanding and attitude toward democratic problem solving, tolerance, and willingness to engage in difficult conversations, have changed as a result of their exposure to PCR activities over time. In the future, if funding is available, the time is opportune, and the field further

expands, this dissertation's exploratory findings could further benefit from additional research, designed as a longitudinal study, focusing on those who participate in PCR activities. A longitudinal study with more measurable indicators could strengthen some of the arguments presented in this dissertation.

In order for the overall themes of this research to be relevant to a larger academic community, the author believes that it is necessary to conduct multiple case studies and cross-national analyses in this area. This research looks only at South Korean civil society practitioners and citizens. Despite its unique contribution of bringing a new area to the field, this significantly limits the potential to add relevant information to other contexts. As cited previously, two notable case studies conducted by Finkel (2005) and Gidron et al. (2003) could serve as examples of how such cross-national analysis could be conducted.

In conclusion, the field of peace and conflict resolution is still in a developmental stage in South Korea; thus, it is extremely difficult to indicate what this field can contribute to South Korean democracy. However, those who participated in conflict resolution activities have confirmed their positive experiences and recounted the transformative effects of these activities had on their lives. In this context, it is hoped that PCR will come to its full potential in South Korea; altering the violent pattern of conflict that has caused enormous damage to human relationships, and that citizens can integrate democratic values and norms in their lives and utilise them to demand and exercise the fundamental rights that they obtained through their drawn-out struggle. Certainly, this dissertation is encouraged by the enthusiasm expressed by civil society participants, highlighting that PCR can offer citizens an instrument that

helps them to be active participants in building a peaceful society. This author hopes that more research by Korean and foreign scholars will emerge and determine whether this hope can turn into reality.

ANNEX 1: FIELD RESEARCH: SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS (DRAFTED AS OF SEPTEMBER 2006)

Unofficial Translation from Korean to English by the Researcher

Constructing Baseline for Research Subjects

1) Gender, Age, Occupation
2) How have you get involved in (xx) activities that (xx) organisation is providing?
3) How have you learned about (xx) activities that (xx) organisation is providing?
4) Before joining (xx) programs, how did you understand conflict resolution, dialogue, peace action, or peace education?
5) Could you describe your experience with Korea's democratisation process?
6) How do you understand Korea's democratisation process? What does democracy, participation, or democratisation of South Korean mean to you?
7) What other civil society activities have you participated in (e.g. voluntary activities, campaigns, or anything related to community organisations, charity groups, or non-governmental organisations)?
8) How did you handle conflicts taking place outside of home or friendship circle?
9) How do you describe conflicts in social setting?

Questions in relation to their experience with activities

1) What programs have you participated? How often (or regularly) have you participated in their programs?
2) What programs have you found more relevant (or useful) to fulfil your expectation or motivation to participate in (xx) organisation?
3) How have your perception toward others (e.g. Japanese youth, North Korean defectors, migrant workers, or people sitting in different political spectrum) changed after participating in the program?
4) Can you describe your experience with (xx) activities?
5) What experiences do you find most useful or rewarding in terms of applying to other social situations?
6) Do you find your involvement in (xx) programs helpful for you to participate in social or political process?
7) After joining the program, have you noticed any changes in terms of your reaction when you confront 'opposing' sides?
8) What challenges do you face when applying skills and knowledge gained through your participation in (….) organisations? Do you think such challenges are related to the specific context of Korean culture or society?
9) What skills and knowledge do you find most useful in applying to Korean civil society?
10) Could you share your views on the value of PCR activism in advancing participatory democracy and sustainable development of Korea's civil society?

ANNEX 2: SAMPLE COMMUNICATION APPROACHING INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS (DRAFTED AS OF SEPTEMBER 2006)

Unofficial Translation from Korean to English by the Researcher

Dear (   ),

How do you do? This is Da Woon Chung who has visited your office / spoken to you via phone about my PhD dissertation on PCR activism in (South) Korea's civil society.

[or when I obtained the contact detail from someone, the following sentence was used]

How do you do? This is Da Woon Chung who is currently registered in the University of Bradford to do a PhD on PCR activism in South Korea's civil society. I have obtained your contact information through [….], and he/she highly spoke of your work and strongly recommended that I should meet you to seek your views on this issue.

My PhD dissertation aims to highlight South Korean civil society organisations focusing on PCR activism, and the critical resources that will be used for my research will be interview data obtained from having a structured conversation with experts/ practitioners / participants such as yours. I am sorry to interrupt you during your busy schedule, but I very much hope that I could visit your office or meet with you at your convenient place to seek your views for 40-50 minutes. Specifically, I am interested in learning about your experience on PCR activism and how such experience are being integrated into your daily life as well as work.

For your reference, I have briefly summarised sample questions that can be used during our conversation. My sole purpose is to learn your perspectives in a comfortable and relaxed environment. It is really essential to see you and have our interviews recorded to create a solid research paper. I am in Seoul to do a series of interviews with numerous experts, practitioners, activists, and participants, and am very flexible and stand ready to accommodate your convenient time. Of course, the conversation we have will strictly remain confidential. I would greatly appreciate that I could learn about South Korea's PCR activism by listening to your experience and views.

I very much look forward to hearing from you soon, and thank you in advance for positively considering my request.

Respectfully,

Dawoon Chung

Enclosure: Sample Interview Questions

ANNEX 3: PROFILES OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

Date and Location	Alias	Gender	Age	Democratisation
May 24, 2007 at a youth center, Seoul	CR1	F	40s	Yes
Jan 26, 2007 & June 19, 2007 at CR2's office in Seoul	CR2	F	40s	Yes
May 21, 2007 at CR3's office in Seoul	CR3	F	30s	N/A
April 10, 2007 at CR4's office in Seoul	CR4	F	20s	Yes
May 23, 2007 at CR5's office in Seoul	CR5	F	20s	N/A
May 24, 2007 at a pub in Seoul	CR6	F	40s	Yes
May 30, 2007 at CR7's office in Seoul	CR7	M	30s	N/A
May 28, 2007 at CR8's office in Seoul	CR8	M	30s	Yes
May 30, 2007 at a café in Seoul	CR9	F	40S	Yes
Jan 26, 2007 & June 20, 2007 in CR10's office in Seoul	CR10	M	30s	N/A
May 21, 2007 at CR11's office in Seoul	CR11	M	30s	N/A
May 21, 2007 at CR12's office in Seoul	CR12	F	20s	N/A
June 14, 2007 at a Buddhist Temple in Yeojoo	CR13	M	30s	Yes
April 23, 2007 at a SP1's office in Seoul	SP1	F	40s	Yes
April 25, 2007 at a SP2's office in Gwacheon	SP2	F	30s	N/A
April 30, 2007 at a Nation Zoo in Gwacheon	SP3	F	40s	Yes
April 23, 2007 at a SP4's office in Seoul	SP4	M	30s	N/A
April 25, 2007 at a SP5's office in Gwacheon	SP5	F	40s	Yes
April 30, 2007 at a National Zoo in Gwacheon	SP6	F	40s	Yes
April 30, 2007 at a National Zoo in Gwacheon	SP7	F	40s	Yes
Jan 29, 2007 at a PAN1's office in Seoul	PAN1	M	50s	Yes
Jan 29, 2007 at a pub in Seoul	PAN2	F	20s	N/A
April 16, 2007 at a PAN3's office in Incheon	PAN3	M	40s	Yes
May 2, 2007 at a PAN4's office in Seoul	PAN4	M	30s	N/A
May 2, 2007 at a PAN5's office in Seoul	PAN5	M	30s	N/A
May 2, 2007 at a PAN6's office in Seoul	PAN6	M	50s	Yes
Jan 29, 2007 at a PAN7's office in Seoul	PAN7	M	50s	Yes
May 11, 2007 at a café in Seoul	PAN8	F	40s	Yes
April 17, 2007 at a PAN9's office in Seoul	PAN9	M	30s	N/A
June 14, 2007 at a Buddhist Tempe in Yeojoo	PAN10	F	40s	Yes
May 10, 2007 at a PAN11's office in Seoul	PAN11	M	20s	N/A
April 30, 2007 on the subway from Ansan to Seoul	PAN12	F	40s	Yes
Jan 29, 2007 at a PAN13's office in Seoul	PAN13	F	20s	N/A
May 10, 2007 at a PAN14's office in Seoul	PAN14	M	40s	Yes
May 10, 2007 at a PAN15's office in Seoul	PAN15	M	50s	Yes
May 26, 2007 at a pub in Seoul	CSO1	F	30s	N/A
Jan 30, 2007 At CSO2's office, moved to her car, and continued interviews at a restaurant in Seoul	CSO2	F	60s	Yes
June 15, 2007 at a Buddhist temple in Yeojoo	CSO3	F	50s	Yes
May 28, 2007 at a pub in Seoul	CSO4	F	30s	N/A
June 1, 2007 at a CSO5's office in Seoul	CSO5	F	50s	Yes
June 1, 2007 at a CSO6's office in Seoul	CSO6	M	40s	Yes
May 25, 2007 at a CSO7's office in Seoul	CSO7	M	40s	Yes
May 26, 2007 at a CSO8's office in Seoul	CSO8	M	30s	Yes
June 4, 2007 at a CSO9's office in Seoul	CSO9	M	40s	Yes
June 1, 2007 at a café in Seoul	CSO10	F	20s	N/A
April 18, 2007 at CSO11's office	CSO11	F	20s	N/A
April 26, 2007 at CSO12's office	CSO12	M	40s	Yes
April 18, 2007 at CSO13's office	CSO13	F	50s	Yes
May 14, 2007 at a school cafeteria in Seoul	CSO14	F	40s	Yes
April 26, 2007 at a CSO15's office	CSO15	F	40s	Yes
April 3, 2007 at a pub in Seoul	CSO16	F	30s	N/A
April 6, 2007 at a café in Seoul	CSO17	F	20s	N/A
April 4, 2007 at CSO18's office in Seoul	CSO18	M	20s	N/A
April 5, 2007 at CSO19's office in Seoul	CSO19	M	30s	N/A

ANNEX 4: DOCUMENTATION USED FOR CHAPTER 5 & CHAPTER 6

(All documents were produced in Koreans except for the GPPAC-Korea Committee Report whose English version is available. The author wishes to acknowledge that their titles were translated into English by the author)

School Peace
(http://cafe.daum.net/schoolpeace)

Department, K. A. E. (2008). Plan to Reduce School Violence in Anyang and Gwacheon Area. Anyang: Kyungki Anayng Education Department.

Gwacheon News. (3 May 2007). School Peace's Youth Rights.

Kim, M.-y. (30 August, 2006). School Violence? Please ask homemakers - Cup of Tea with Activists: Lee Hwa-Yung, School Peace. *Ohmynews*. Retrieved from http://www.ohmynews.com/nws-web/view/at-pg.aspx?cntn_cd=a000356400

Lee, S., & Kim, Y. (29 January 2002). Request to Establish School Violence Prevention Legislation. Kyungin News. Retrieved from http://www.kyeongin.com/news/articleview.htlm/idxno=125769

School Peace: Members Newsletter Inaugural Edition: February 2003.

School Peace Members Newsletter 2: March 2003.

School Peace Members Newsletter 3: April 2003.

School Peace Members Newsletter 4: May 2003.

School Peace Members Newsletter 5: June 2003.

School Peace Members Newsletter 6: July 2003.

School Peace Members Newsletter 7: August 2003.

School Peace Members Newsletter 8: September 2003.

School Peace Members Newsletter 9: October 2003.

School Peace Members Newsletter 10: November 2003.

School Peace Members Newsletter 11: December 2003

School Peace Members Newsletter 12: January 2004

School Peace Members Newsletter 13: February 2004

School Peace Members Newsletter 14: March 2004.

School Peace Members Newsletter 15: April 2004.

School Peace Members Newsletter 16: May-June 2004.

School Peace Members Newsletter 17: July 2004

School Peace Members Newsletter 18: August 2004

School Peace Members Newsletter 19: September 2004

School Peace Members Newsletter 20: October 2004

School Peace Members Newsletter 21: November 2004

School Peace Members Newsletter 24: March-April 2005.

School Peace Members Newsletter 25: May 2005

School Peace: Members' Newsletter 26: February 2006.

School Peace Annual Plan - 2006

Women Making Peace – CR Centre
(http://www.peacecr.org/)

Chung, K. (1999). Reflection Essay: Geneva to Iwaguni. Unpublished Raw Data.

Feffer, J. (1999). Meeting Women Making Peace. Unpublished Raw Data.

Kim, D.-S. (2000). Peace Narrative: Reflection on Experiences of Participating in Conflict Resolution and Tolerance Building Workshop WMP. Unpublished Raw Data.

Kim, J.-s., & Park, S.-S. (2000 Autumn). Women Peace Academic: Autumn - Peaceful Resolution of Conflict. WMP. Unpublished Raw Data.

Lee, S.-y. (2001). Workshop Experience: Peaceful and Tolerance Life Styles. WMP. Unpublished Raw Data.

Park, S.-S. (2001). Learning Conflicts in the Midst of Conflict. WMP. Unpublished Raw Data.

Park, S.-S. (2001). New Civic Virtue: Facilitation and Conflict Resolution for Coexistence and Peace. WMP. Unpublished Raw Data.

Park, S.-S. (2001). Seed for Peace Culture: Female Teachers' Workshop on Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts in Public School Systems in South Korea. WMP. Unpublished Raw Data.

Park, S.-S. (2002). Cultural Approach: Application of Conflict Resolution to the South Korean Context. Unpublished Raw Data.

Park, S.-S. (2002). Understanding peaceful resolution of conflict. UNESCO Korean Commission. Unpublished Raw Data.

WMP-CR. (2000). Discussion Papers on Conflict Resolution and Tolerance Building Workshops.

WMP-CR. (April 2006). Discussion on School Violence: Conflict Resolution and Peace Education as Preventative Measures.

Peace Activist Network
(http://www.cp.or.kr/)

2006 Peace Activist Retreat Planning Commission Brochure.

2006 Peace Activist Retreat Report: Opportunities and Challenges for Peace Activism in South Korea (30 November 2006 – 2 December 2006)

Brochure from the Peace Activist Retreat Planning Committee. 2006.

GPPAC Korea Preparation Committee Meeting Minutes: 16 February 2004.

GPPAC Korea Preparation Committee Meeting Minutes: 26 February 2004.

GPPAC Korea Preparation Committee Meeting Minutes: 10 March 2004.

GPPAC Korea Preparation Committee Meeting Minutes: 25 March 2004

GPPAC Korea Preparation Committee Meeting Minutes: 19 August 2004

GPPAC Korea Preparation Committee Meeting Minutes: 27 August 2004

GPPAC-KOREA. (2005). Activity Report on GPPAC-KOREA.

Minutes: Peace Activist Retreat: 19 April 2003.

Peace Activist Retreat Activity Plan for 2007.

Park, S.-y. (2009). Korean Society: Peace Movement. Unpublished Raw Data.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abiew, F. K., & Keating, T. (2004). Defining a role for civil society. In T. K. Keating, W. Andy (Ed.), *Building sustainable peace*, 93-118. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Abott, P. (2007). Cultural trauma and social quality in post-Soviet Moldova and Belarus. *East European politics and society (21)*, 219-258.

Abott, P., & Sapsford, R. (2006). Happiness and general satisfaction in post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine. *Journal of Happiness Studies (7)*, 251-287.

Addor, M. L., Cobb, T. D., Dukes, E. F., Ellerbrock, M., & Smutko, L. S. (2005). Linking theory to practice: A theory of change - model of the natural resources leadership institute. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 23*(2).

Adesnik, A. D., & McFaul, M. (2006). Engaging autocratic allies to promote democracy. *The Washington Quarterly, 29*(2), 7-26.

Ahmed, S., & Potter, D. (2006). *NGOs in international politics*. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.

Ahn, C. S., & Jaung, H. (1999). Country studies: South Korea. In I. Marsh, Blondel, Jean, and Inoguchi, Takashi (Eds.), *Democracy, governance, and economic performance - East and Southeast Asia*, 137-166. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Almond, G., & Verba, S. (2003). From the civic culture (1963). In V. A. H. a. M. W. Foley (Ed.), *The civil society reader*, 173-189. Hanover: University Press of New England.

Amsden, J., & VanWynsberghe, R. (2005). Community mapping as a research tool with youth. [Article]. *Action Research, 3*(4), 357-381.

Amsler, T. (1996). Case study: Strengthening our civic muscles. *Lifelines*, 35-40.

Anderson, R. T. (1971). Voluntary associations in history. *American Anthropologist, 73*(1), 209-222.

Anheier, H. (2005). *Nonprofit organizations: Theory, management, policy.* New York: Routledge.

Anheier, H., & Salamon, L. (1998). *The nonprofit sector in the developing world: a comparative analysis*: Manchester University Press.

APSA Committee on Professional Ethics, R. a. F. (1998). *A guide to professional ethics in political science* (2nd edition). Washington DC: The American Political Science Association (APSA).

Armstrong, C. (2002). *Korean society: civil society, democracy, and the state*: New York:

Routledge.

Arnold, K. (2005). Challenge of Building Training Capacity: The Centre for Conflict Resolution Approach in Burundi. In L. a. T. P. Reychler (Ed.), *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*, 277-289. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Aruch, K. (2003). Type I and type II error in cultural sensitive conflict resolution practice. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 20*(3), 351-371.

Ashton, C. V. (2007). Using theory of change to enhance peace education evaluation. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 25*(1), 39-53.

Augsburger, D. (1992). *Conflict mediation across cultures: Pathways and patterns*: Westminster: John Knox Press.

Baiocchi, G. (2003). Emergent public spheres: Talking politics in participatory governance. *American Sociological Review, 68*(1), 52-74.

Baker, G. (2004). The taming of the idea of civil society. In P. a. C. Burnell, Peter (Ed.), *Civil society in democratization*, 43-71. London: Frank Cass.

Barber, B. (1985). *Strong democracy: Participatory politics for a new age*. London: University of California Press.

Barge, J. K. (2006). Dialogue, conflict and community. In J. G. Oetzel, and Ting-Toomey, Stella (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of conflict communication: Integrating theory, research, and practice*, 517-528. London: SAGE Publications.

Barnes, B. (2007). Conflict resolution education in the Asian Pacific. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 25*(1), 55-60.

Barnes, C. (2006). *Civil society role in preventing war and building peace*. Den Haag: European Centre for Conflict Prevention.

Baron, L. (2004). Commentary: The case for the field of community. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 22*(1), 135-144.

Bartoli, A. (2008). NGOs and conflict resolution. In J. Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, Victor, and Zartman, I William (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of conflict resolution*, 392-412. London: SAGE Publications.

Baxter, V. (2005). Civil society promotion of truth, justice, and reconciliation in Chile: Villa Grimaldi. *Peace & Change, 30*(1), 120-136.

Becker, S., & Bryman, A. (2004). *Understanding research for social policy and practice: themes, methods and approaches*: (Understanding welfare: Social issues, policy and practice). Bristol: The Policy Press.

Beetham, D. (1997). Market economy and democratic polity. *Democratization, 4*(1), 76-93.

Bedeski, R. E. (1994). *Transformation of South Korea*. London: Routledge.

Bell, C., & Keenan, J. (2004). Human rights nongovernmental organizations and the problems of transition. *Human Rights Quarterly, 26*(2), 330-374.

Bell, J. (2005). *Doing your research project: A guide for first-time researchers in education, health and social science* (4th edition). Berkshire: Open University Press.

Bellin, E. R. (2000). Contingent democrats: Industrialists, labor, and democratization in late-developing countries. *World Politics, 52*(2), 175-205.

Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology, 26*, 611-639.

Bercovitch, J. (1996). *Resolving international conflicts: The theory and practice of mediation.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Bercovitch, J., Kremenyuk, V., & Zartman, Z. (2008). *The SAGE handbook of conflict resolution*. London: SAGE Publications.

Berman, S. (1997). Civil society and the collapse of the Weimar Republic. *World Politics, 49*(3), 401.

Bernhard, M. (1993). Civil society and democratic transition in East Central Europe. *Political Science Quarterly, 108*(2), 307-337.

Bernhard, M. (1996). Civil society after the first transition: Dilemmas of post-communist democratization in Poland. *Communist & Post-Communist Studies, 29*(3), 309-331.

Bernhard, M., & Karakoç, E. (2007). Civil society and the legacies of dictatorship. *World Politics, 59*(4), 539-567.

Bernhard, M., Reenock, C., & Nordstrom, T. (2004). The legacy of western overseas colonialism on democratic survival. *International Studies Quarterly, 48*(1), 225-250.

Bernhard, M. A., Ekrem, K. (2007). Civil society and the legacies of dictatorship. *World Politics, 59*, 539-567.

Bevir, M., & Rhodes, R. A. W. (2002). Interpretive theory. In D. Marsh & G. Stoker (Eds.),

Theory and methods in political science (2nd edition), 131-152. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bhattacharyya, J. (2004). Theorizing community development. *Community Development, 34*(2), 5-34.

Bickmore, K. (2001). Student conflict resolution, power "sharing" in schools, and citizenship education. *Curriculum Inquiry, 31*(2), 137-162.

Blair, H. (2003). Jump-starting democracy: Adult civic education and democratic participation in three countries. *Democratization, 10*(1), 53-76.

Blau, J. L. (1956). Royce's theory of community. *The Journal of Philosophy, 53*(3), 92-98.

Bloch, A. (2004). Statistical reasoning: From one to two variables. In C. Seale (Ed.), *Researching society and culture*, 163-178. London: SAGE Publications.

Blumer, H. (1956). Sociological analysis and the "variable". *American Sociological Review, 22*(4), 683-690.

Bobbio, N. (2006). *Liberalism and democracy*: Verso.

Bobbio, N., & Bellamy, R. (1987). *The future of democracy: a defence of the rules of the game. St. Paul*: University of Minnesota Press.

Bogdanor, V. (1995). Overcoming the twentieth century: democracy and nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. *The Political Quarterly, 66*, 84-97.

Bohman, J. (2000). *Public deliberation: Pluralism, complexity, and democracy*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Bohman, J. (2003). Deliberative toleration. *Political Theory, 31*(6), 757-779.

Boix, C., & Stokes, S. C. (2003). Endogenous democratization. *World Politics, 55*, 517-549.

Bond, D., Jenkins, J. C., Taylor, C. L., & Schock, K. (1997). Mapping mass political conflict and civil society. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41*(4), 553-579.

Booth, J. A., & Richard, P. B. (2006). Revolution's legacy: Residual effects on Nicaraguan participation and attitudes in comparative context. *Latin American Politics & Society, 48*(2), 117-140.

Boyd, R. (2004). Michael Oakeshott on civility, civil society, and civil association. *Political Studies, 52*, 603-622.

Bradford, U. o. (2003). Code of practice for ethics in research. Retrieved 09/12/2005, from,

http://www.bradford.ac.uk/admin/rsil/Ethics/Code-of-Practice.pdf

Branch, D., & Nic, C. (2009). Democratisation, sequencing, and state failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya. *African Affairs, 108*(430), 1-26.

Brigg, M. (2008). *The New politics of conflict resolution: Responding to difference*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Bryman, A. (2004). *Social research method* (Second Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brysk, A. (2000). Democratizing civil society in Latin America. *Journal of Democracy, 11*(3), 151-165.

Burian, R. M. (2001). The dilemma of case studies resolved: The virtues of using case studies in the history and philosophy of science. *Perspectives on Science, 9*(4), 383-404.

Burnell, P. (2000). *Democracy assistance: International co-operation for democratization*. London: Frank Cass.

Burnell, P. (Ed.). (2003). *Democratization through the looking-glass*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Burnell, P. (Ed.). (2007). *Evaluating democracy support: Methods and experiences*. Stockholm: International IDEA.

Burnell, P. (2008). From evaluating democracy assistance to appraising democracy promotion. *Political Studies, 56*(2), 414-434.

Burnell, P., & Calvert, P. (1999). *The resilience of democracy: Persistent practice, durable idea*: F. Cass.

Burnell, P., & Calvert, P. (2005). Promoting democracy abroad. *Democratization, 12*(4), 433-438.

Burr, V. (1995). *An introduction to social constructionism*. London: Routledge.

Burton, J. (1993). *Conflict: Human needs theory.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bush, R., & Folger, J. (1994). *The promise of mediation: Responding to conflict through empowerment and recognition*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Buxton, C. NGO networks in Central Asia and global civil society: Potentials and limitations. *Central Asian Survey, 28*(1), 43-58.

Byrne, J., Glover, L., Hoesung, L., Young-Doo, W., & Jung-Min, Y. (2004). Electricity reform at a crossroads: Problems in South Korea's power liberalization strategy. *Pacific Affairs,*

77(3), 493-516.

Bystydzienski, J., & Sekhon, J. (1999). *Democratization and women's grassroots movements. Bloomington*: Indiana University Press.

Cahill, S., Riley, S., & Schouten, W. (2003). Exploring the dynamics of subjectivity and power base between researcher and researched. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 4(2), Art. 40. Retrieved from http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0302400.

Calhoun, C. (1993). Civil Society and the Public Sphere. *Public Culture*, 5(2), 267-280.

Callister, R. R., & Wall, J. A., Jr. (1997). Japanese community and organizational mediation. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41*(2), 311-328.

Carothers, T. (1999). *Aiding democracy abroad: The learning curve*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Carothers, T. (2004). *Critical mission: Essays on democracy promotion*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Carothers, T. (2006). The backlash against democracy promotion. *Foreign Affairs, 85*(2), 55-68.

Carothers, T. (2009). Democracy assistance: Political vs. developmental? *Journal of Democracy, 20*(1), 5-19.

Chambers, S., & Kopstein, J. (2001). Bad civil society. *Political Theory, 29*(6), 837.

Chang, P. Y. (2008). Unintended consequences of repression: Alliance formation in South Korea's democracy movement (1970-1979). *Social Forces, 87*(2), 651-677.

Chang, Y.-s. (1998). The progressive Christian church and democracy in South Korea. *Journal of Church & State, 40*(2), 437.

Chang, Y.-t., Chu, Y.-h., and Park, C.-m. (2008). Authoritarian nostalgia in Asia. In L. Diamond, and Plattner, Marc F. (Eds.), *How people view democracy,* 74-88. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Chang, W.-y., & Lee, W.-t. (2006). Cyberactivism and political empowerment in civil society: a comparative analysis of Korean cases. *Korea Journal*, Winter, 136-167.

Chapin, E. (1969). Successful story in South Korea. *Foreign Affairs, 47*(3), 560-574.

Charkoudian, L. (2005). A quantitative analysis of the effectiveness of community mediation in decreasing repeat police calls for service. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 23*(1), 87-98.

Charkoudian, L., & Wilson, C. (2006). Factors affecting individuals' decisions to use community

mediation. *Review of Policy Research, 23*(4), 865-885.

Chatterjee, P. (2001). On civil and political society in post-colonial democracies. In S. Kaviraj & S. Khilnani (Eds.), *Civil society: History and possibilities,* 165-179. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chira, S. (1987, 1 July). Korea's press awaits the promised freedom*. New York Times*.

Chira, S. (1987, 15 December). South Koreans obsessed by dream of democracy*. New York Times*.

Cho, H. (1997). The historical origin of civil society in Korea. *Korea Journal*, 24-41.

Cho, M.-y. (2005). From "power to people" to civil empowerment: the making of neoliberal governmentality in grassroots movements for the urban poor in South Korea. Paper presented at the *International Graduate Student Conference Series* (2005, Easter-Western Center).

Choi, C.-W., & Kim, J.-h. (2006). Analysis on the affect of youth conflict resolution programme. *Studies on Korean Youth, 17*(1), 61-78.

Choi, J. J. (2000). Democratization, civil society, and the civil social movement in Korea. *Korea Journal, 40*(3), 26.

Choi, J.-W. (2006). Deliberative democracy, rational participation and e-voting in South Korea. *Asian Journal of Political Science, 14*(1), 64-81.

Choi, Y. H. (1978). Failure of democracy in legislative process: The case of South Korea, 1960. *World Affairs, 140*(4), 331.

Chong, T. (2005). Civil society in Singapore: Reviewing concepts in the literature. *ISEAS Working Paper: Social and Cultural Issues No.1* Retrieved February 27, 2006 from, http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg

Chun, Y.-P., Kim, S.-Y., So, Y.-J., Lee, B.-R., and Lee, S.-J. (2005). *Research on people's perception on social conflict and gap analysis on public policy for conflict management.* Seoul: Korea Research Society on Economics, Humanity and Social Science.

Chung, C. (2005). The new class and democratic social relations in South Korea: Nascent moves toward non-hierarchical and participatory relations. *La nueva clase y las relaciones sociales democráticas en Corea del Sur: movimientos emergentes hacia las relaciones no-jerárquicas y participativas. 20*(2), 225-246.

Chung, C.-P. (2003). Democratization in South Korea and inter-Korean relations. *Pacific Affairs, (76)*1, 9-35.

Chung, J. (2007). Diffusing power or concentrating control: The affect of information technology on civil society in China and South Korea. *Conference Papers – International Studies Association*, 1-27.

Chung, T.-s. (2004). Korean Civil Society and NGO: Discourses and Review Paper presented at the *2004 South Korean NGO Studies Spring Academic Conferenc*e.

Church, C., & Fitzduff, M. (Eds.). (2004). *NGOs at the table:Strategies for influencing policy in areas of conflict*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Church, C., & Rogers, M. (2006). Designing for results: Integrating monitoring and evaluation in conflict transformation programs. Retrieved 8 August 2010 from, http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/ilr/ilt_manualpage.html

Church, C., & Shouldice, J. (2002, 31 May). Part II: Emerging practice and theory. *The evaluation of conflict resolution.* Retrieved 30 September, 2005, from http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/policy/evaluation/eval_meeting.html

Cochrane, F. (2000). Beyond the political elites: A comparative analysis of the roles and affects of community-based NGOs in conflict resolution activity. *Civil Wars, (3)*2, 1-22.

Cochrane, F. (2000). Beyond the political elites: A comparative analysis of the roles and affects of community-based NGOs in conflict resolution activity. *Civil Wars, (3)*2, 1.

Cohen, J. L. (1985). Strategy or identiy: New theoretical paradigms and contemporary social movements. *Social Research, 52*, 663-716.

Collier, D. (1993). The comparative method. In A. W. Finifter (Ed.), *Political Science: the State of the Discipline II* (pp. 105-119). Washington D.C.: American Political Science Association.

Corrales, J. (2006). Does parental participation in schools empower on strain civil society? The case of community-managed schools in Central America. *Social Policy and Administration, 40*(4), 450-470.

Cotton, J. (1989). From authoritarianism to democracy in South Korea. *Political Studies, 37*(2), 244-259.

Cotton, J. (1992). Understanding the state in South Korea. [Article]. *Comparative Political*

Studies, 24(4), 512.

Cox, R. W. (1999). Civil society at the turn of the millenium: Prospects for an alternative world order. *Review of International Studies (1999), 25*, 3-28.

Coy, P., & Hedeen, T. (2005). A stage model of social movement co-optation: Community mediation in the United States. *The Sociological Quarterly, 46*, 405-435.

Crawford, G. (2002). Evaluating European union's promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance toward a participatory approach. *Journal of International Development, 14*, 911-926.

Croissant, A. (2004). Riding the tiger: Civilian control and the military in democratizing Korea. *Armed Forces & Society (0095327X), 30*(3), 357-381.

Croissant, A., & Kuehn, D. (2009). Patterns of civilian control of the military in East Asia's new democracies. *Journal of East Asian Studies, 9*(2), 187-217.

Crow, I. (2000). The power of research. In D. Burton (Ed.), *Research training for social scientists: A handbook for postgraduate researchers.* 68-80. London: SAGE Publications.

Culbert, V. (2005). Civil society development versus the peace dividend: International aid in the Wanni. *Disasters, 29*(1), 38-57.

Cumings, B. (2005). *Korea's place in the sun: A modern history.* New York: W. W. Norton.

Cumings, B. (2010). *The Korean war: A history.* New York: Random House Publishing Group.

Cummings, B. (1989). The abortive abertura: South Korea in the light of Latin American experience. *New Left Review, (173*) 5-32.

Curl, A. (1971). *Making Peace*. London: Tavistock Press.

Dahl, R. (1989). *Democracy and its critics.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dahl, R. (2000). *On democracy.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dai, X. (2006). The conditional nature of democratic compliance. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50*(5), 690-713.

Dai, X. (2006). The conditional nature of democratic compliance. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50*(5), 690-713.

Dalton, R. J., Shin, D. C., & Jou, W. (2008). How people understand democracy. In L. Diamond, and Plattner, Marc F. (Eds.), *How people view democracy,* 1-15. Baltimore: The Johns

Hopkins University Press.

Damron, D. , 2004-03-11 "Democratic Reform and Social Movements: Lessons from Korea" *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Marriott Hotel, Portland, Oregon Online* <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p87755_index.html

Davies, L. (2004). Building a civic culture post-conflict. *London Review of Education, 2*(3), 229-244.

Day, G. (2006). Chasing the dragon? Devolution and the ambiguities of civil society in Wales. *Critical Social Policy, 26*(3), 642-655.

De Finger, S. A., Di Cecco, S., & Kasman, R. G. (2007). Conflict resolution education: A key tool for the construction of citizenship in Argentina. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 25*(1), 87-91.

Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2003). Introduction: the discipline and practice of qualitative research. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (pp. 1-45). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

De Rivera, J. (2004). Assessing the basis for a culture of peace in contemporary societies. *Journal of Peace Research, 41*(5), 531-548.

De Rivera, J. (2004). Assessing the basis for a culture of peace in contemporary societies. *Journal of Peace Research, 41*(5), 531-548.

De Solrzano, B. T. (2004). Democracy and dialogues: Challenges for democracy in the 21st century. *UNDP Democratic Dialogue Regional Project*.

Dean, D. G. (1960). Alienation and political apathy. *Social Forces, 38*(3), 185-189.

D'Estrée, T. P., Fast, L. A., Weiss, J. N., & Jakobsen, M. S. (2001). Changing the debate about “success” in conflict resolution efforts. *Negotiation Journal, 17*(2), 101-113.

Deutsch, M., Coleman, P., & Marcus, E. (2006). *The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Development, K. P. C. o. S. (2004). Research summary on the development of conflict management system infrastructure. *Korea Presidential Committee on Sustainable Development, 4*(2), 1-341.

Development, K. P. C. o. S. (2005). Developing educational programme for conflict

management. *Korean Presidential Committee on Sustainable Development Working Paper, 4*(20), 1-225.

Devotta, N. (2005). Civil society and non-governmental organizations in Sri Lanka: Peacemakers or parasites? *Civil Wars, 7*(2), 171-182.

DeWalt, K.M. & DeWalt, B. R. (2002). *Participant observation: a guide for fieldworker*s. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.

Dewey, J. (1916). *Democracy and education*. New York: Macmillan.

Diamond, L. (Ed.). (1994). *Political culture and democracy in developing countries.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Diamond, L., & Kim, B. (2000). *Consolidating democracy in South Korea. Boulder*: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Diamond, L., & Kim, B.-K. (2000). Introduction: Consolidating democracy in South Korea. In L. Diamond & B.-K. Kim (Eds.), *Consolidating democracy in South Korea,* 1-20. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. F. (Eds.). (2002). *Democracy After communism*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. F. (Eds.). (2008). *How people view democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dixon, W. J., & Senese, P. D. (2002). Democracy, disputes, and negotiated settlements. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46*(4), 547-571.

Doane, M. (2001). A distant jaguar: The civil society project in Chimalapas. *Critique of Anthropology, 21*(4), 361-382.

Docherty, J. S. (2004). Culture and negotiations: Symmetrical anthropology for negotiators. *Marquette Law Review, 87*(4), 711-722.

Docherty, I., Goodlad, R. & Paddison, R. (2001) Civic Culture, Community and citizen Participation in Contrasting Neighbourhoods. *Urban Studies,* 38(12), 2225-2250.

Doh, C.-S., Chung, M.-S., Moon, S.-H., Kim, S., & Chung, S. (1992). *Korean adolescent life style and their reflections. 92-1-1*. Seoul: Korean Youth Development Research Institute.

Dominguez, J. I. (2002, 2002/08/28/2002 Annual Meeting, Boston, MA). *The perfect dictatorship? Comparing authoritarian rule in South Korea and in Argentina, Brazil,*

Chile, and Mexico.

Dootson, S. (1995). An in-depth study of triangulation. *Journal of Advanced Nursing, 22*, 183-187.

Doucette, J. (2010). The terminal crisis of the "participatory government" and the election of Lee Myung Bak. *Journal of Contemporary Asia, 40*(1), 22-43.

Dryzek, J. (1994). *Discursive democracy: Politics, policy, and political science. West Nyack*: Cambridge University Press.

Dryzek, J. (2002). *Deliberative democracy and beyond: Liberals, critics, contestations.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dryzek, J. S. (2002). Chapter 1. Liberal democracy and the critical alternative. *deliberative democracy and beyond, 1*, 8-31.

Dryzek, J. S. (2005). Deliberative democracy in divided societies: Alternatives to agonism and analgesia. *Political Theory, 33*(2), 218-242.

Earle, L. (2005). Community development, 'tradition' and the civil society strengthening agenda in Central Asia. *Central Asian Survey, 24*(3), 245-260.

Eckstein, H. (1996). Lessons for the "third wave" from the first: An essay on democratization. Retrieved from http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/ 6c9087q7

Edwards, M. (2004). *Civil society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Edwards, B., & Marullo, S. (1995). Organizational mortality in a declining social movement; the demise of peace movement organizations in the end of the Cold War era*. American Sociological Review*, 60(6), 908-927.

Ehrenberg, J. (1999). *Civil society: The critical history of an idea*. New York: New York University Press.

Ekiert, G. (1991). Democratization processes in East Central Europe: A theoretical reconsideration. *British Journal of Political Science, 21*(3), 285-313.

Emersen, R. (1983). *Contemporary field research: a collection of readings.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Emily, F. R., Carol, I., Lori, C., Andres, P., Allyson, B., & Donald, T. (2010). The violence intervention and prevention team (VIP): Results of an action research evaluation. *Progress in Community Health Partnerships: Research, Education, and Action, 4*(3), 181-188.

Encarnación, O. (2002). On bowling leagues and NGOs: A critique of civil society's revival. *Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID), 36*(4), 116-131.

Eric, F. D., Paul, B., & Huesmann, L. R. (2009). Long-term effects of parents' education on children's educational and occupational success: Mediation by family interactions, child aggression, and teenage aspirations. *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 55*(3), 224-249.

Ester, P., & Vinken, H. (2003). Debating civil society: On the fear for civic decline and hope for the Internet al.ternative. *International Sociology, 18*(4), 659-680.

Evans, J. (2004). *National voluntary youth organisations inspecting youth work: LEAP confronting conflict*. Retrieved from http://www.leaplinx.com/.

EWHA. (1991). Minjokminju undongkwa yosong haebangundong (the nationalist and democratic movement and the women's liberation movement). *EWHA, 46*, 247-270.

Fagan, A. (2006). Transnational aid for civil society development in post-socialist Europe: Democratic consolidation or a new imperialism? *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 22*(1), 115 -134.

Fersh, R. (2003). In brief: Legislative updates – progress on the US consensus council. *ACResolution*, 8.

Fielding, N. (2004). Getting the most from archived qualitative data: Epistemological, practical and professional obstacles. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 7*(1), 97-104.

Finkel, S. (2003). Can democracy be taught? *Democracy, 14*(4), 137-151.

Finkel, S. E., Pérez Liñan, A. S., & Seligson, M. A. (2007). The effects of US foreign assistance on democracy building, 1990 – 2003. *World Politics, 59*(3), 404-440.

Fioramonti, L., & Fiori, A. (2010). The changing roles of civil society in democratization: Evidence from South Africa (1990-2009) and South Korea (1987-2009). *African & Asian Studies, 9*(1/2), 83-104.

Fish, M. S., & Brooks, R. (2004). Does diversity hurt democracy. *Journal of Democracy, 15*(1), 154-1666.

Fisher, J. (1998). *Nongovernments: NGOs and the political development of the third world*. West Hartford: Kumarian Press, Inc.

Fisher, M. (2008). Civil society and peacebuilding: Potential and limit. In V. Ritteberger, and

Fischer, Martina (Eds.), *Strategies for peace: Contributions of international organizations, states, and non-state actors*. Opladen & Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers.

Fisher, R. (1997). Training as interactive conflict resolution: Characteristics and challenges. *International Negotiation, 2*, 331-351.

Fisher, R., Kopelman, E., & Schneider, A. K. (1996). *Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for coping with conflict*. New York: Penguin Books.

Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (1991). *Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in*. New York: Houghton Mifflin.

Fisher, R. J. (1993). Developing the field of interactive conflict resolution: Issues in training, funding, and institutionalization. *Political Psychology, 14*(1), 123-138.

Fishkin, J. (1993). *Democracy and deliberation: New directions for democratic reform*: Yale University Press.

Fontana, A., & Frey, J. (1994). Interviewing; the Art of Science. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *The Handbook of Qualitative Research* (pp. 361-376). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Forum, P. (2006). *Korean peace movement's challenges and opportunities*. Seoul: 2006 Korea Peace Activists Workshop Preparatory Committee

Francis, D., & Ropers, N. (1999). Peace work by civil actors in post-communist societies. *International Negotiation, 4*, 529-547.

Frankfort-Nachmias, C., & Nachmias, D. (1992). *Research methods in the social science* (4th edition). London: St. Martin’s Press.

Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy. *Social Text*(25/26), 56-80.

Fredericksen, P. J. (1996). Community collaboration and public policy making. *American Behavioral Scientist, 39*(5), 552-569.

Freedman, A. L. (2005). Economic crises and political change: Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia. *Asian Affairs: An American Review, 31*(4), 232-249.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The end of history and the last man*: Free Press.

Fukuyama, F. (1997) The Illusion of Exceptionalism,” *Journal of Democracy* 8(3), 146-149.

Galston, W. (1991). *Liberal purposes: Goods, virtues, and diversity in the liberal state*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Galtung, J. (1969). *Theory and method of social research. Columbia*: Columbia University Press.

Garreton M., M. A., and Newman, Edward (Eds.). (2001). *Democracy in Latin America: (Re)constructing political society*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Garreton, M. A. (1999). Chile 1997-1998: The revenge of incomplete democratization. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 75*(2), 259-267.

George, A., & Bennett, A. (2004). *Case studies and theory development in the social science*. Cambridge: MIT Publication.

Gergen, K. J. (1999). *An invitation to social constructionism*. London: SAGE Publications.

Gianpaolo, B., Patrick, H., & Marcelo Kunrath, S. (2008). Making space for civil society: Institutional reforms and local democracy in Brazil. *Social Forces, 86*(3), 911-936.

Gibson, J. L. (2005). On the nature of tolerance: Dichotomous or continuous? *Political Behavior, 27*(4), 313-323.

Gidron, B., Katz, S. N., & Hasenfeld, Y. (2002). Mobilizing for peace: Conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Israel/Palestine. *Mobilizing for Peace*. New York Oxford University Press.

Ginsburg, T. (2002). Confucian constitutionalism? The emergence of constitutional review in Korea and Taiwan. *Law & Social Inquiry, 27*(4), 763-799.

Glasbergen, P. (2008). Global action network: Agents for collective action. *Global Environmental Change, 20*(1), 130-141.

Gleditsch, N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksoon, M., Sollenberg, M., & Strand, H. (2002). Armed conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research, 39*(5), 615-637.

Golafshani, N. (2003). Understanding reliability and validity in qualitative research. *The Qualitative Report, 8*(4), 597-607.

Goncharov, S., Lewis, J., & Xue, L. (1993). *Uncertain partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War*: Stanford University Press.

Goncz, K., & Shonholtz, R. (2000). Improving the practice. *IAP2, First Quarter*.

Goodwin, J., & Jasper, J. (2003). *The social movements reader: Cases and concepts*: Blackwell Publications.

Goodwin, J., & Jasper, J. (2004). *Rethinking social movements: Structure, meaning, and emotion.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Gordon, N. (2002). Dahl's procedural democracy: A Foucauldian critique. *Democratization, 8*(4), 23.

Gould, C. (1989). *Rethinking democracy: Freedom and social cooperation in politics, economy, and society.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Grugel, J. (2002). *Democratization: A critical introduction*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Gunnell, J. G. (1981). Political theory and the theory of action. *The Western Political Quarterly, 34*(3), 341-358.

Ha, S.-S. (2003). Korean Citizen Movement - Korean Social Movement without People *Citizen and World 3,* 99-11..

Haberman, C. (1987, 13 December). Is South Korea ripe for democracy or more repression. *New York Times*.

Haberman, C. (1987, 15 December). Key man in Seou, perspective of many South Koreans: Either for or against Kim Dae Jung. *New York Times*.

Haberman, C. (1987, 20 December). Whose Mandate: In a Cautious Taste of Freedom, Korea Elects Government Candidate. *New York Times*.

Habermas, J. r. (1984). *The theory of communicative action* (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.

Hahm, C., & Kim, S. (2005). Constitutionalism on Trial in South Korea. *16, 2*(28-42).

Hahn, S., & McCabe, A. (2006). Welfare-to-work and the emerging third sector in South Korea: Korea's third way? *International Journal of Social Welfare, 15*(4), 314-320.

Hall, B. W. (1986). The Church and the Independent Peace Movement in Eastern Europe. *Journal of Peace Research, 23*(2), 193-208.

Hall, R. B. (2003). The Discursive Demolition of the Asian Development Model. *International Studies Quarterly, 47*(1), 71-99.

Hamh, C.-b. (2005). The two South Koreas: A house divided. *The Washington Quarterly, 28*(3), 57-72.

Hamh, C. (2008). South Korea's miraculous democracy. *Journal of Democracy, 19*(3), 128-142.

Han, I. S. (2005). Kwangju and beyond: Coping with past state atrocities in South Korea. *Human Rights Quarterly, 27*(3), 998-1045.

Han, J., & Ling, L. H. M. (1998). Authoritarianism in the hypermasculinized state: Hybridity, patriarchy, and capitalism in Korea. *International Studies Quarterly, 42*(1), 53-78.

Han, J., & Seol, D.-H. (2006). *Social conflicts in South Korea and ways to constructively manage them*. Seoul: Korea Research Society on Economics, Humanity and Social Science.

Han, S.-J. (1983). The politics of pacific cooperation. *Asian Survey, 23*(12), 1281-1292.

Han, S.-J. (1988). South Korea in 1987: The politics of democratization. *Asian Survey, 28*(1), 52-61.

Han, S.-J. (1989). South Korea in 1988: A revolution in the making. *Asian Survey, 29*(1), 29-38.

Han, S.-j. (1991). The Korean experiment. *Journal of Democracy, 2*(2), 92-104.

Hanberger, A. (2001). Policy and program evaluation, civil society, and democracy. *American Journal of Evaluation, 22*(2), 211-228.

Hancock, B., & Kim, J. J. (2009). Is South Korea backsliding on its democracy movement? *Christian Science Monitor*, 10.

Hansen, T. (2008). Critical conflict resolution theory and practice. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 25* 403-427.

Harrison, S. S. (1987). Dateline South Korea: A divided Seoul. *Foreign Policy,* (67), 154-175.

Hasenfeld, Y., & Gidron, B. (2005). Understanding multi-purpose hybrid voluntary organizations: The contributions of theories on civil society, social movements and non-profit organizations. *Journal of Civil Society, 1*(2), 97-112.

Hawkins, K. A., & Hansen, D. R. (2006). Dependent civil society: The circulos bolivarianos in Venezuela. *Latin American Research Review, 41*(1), 102-132.

Hayes, W. (2005). Do springs of democracy lead to falls of justice? State – civil contests for political accountability in South Korea. *Journal of Human Rights, 4*(2), 251-265.

He, B. (1999). The role of civil society in defining the boundary of a political community: The cases of South. *Asian Studies Review, 23*(1), 27.

He, L. (2010). Social movement tradition and the role of civil society in Japan and South Korea. *East Asia: An International Quarterly, 27*(3), 267-287.

Hedeen, T. (2004). The evolution and evaluation of community mediation: Limited research suggests unlimited progress. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 22*(1-2), 101-133.

Hedeen, T. (2005). Dialogue and democracy, community and capacity: Lessons for conflict resolution from Montessori, Dewey, and Freire. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 23*(2), 185-202.

Heinrich, V. F. (2005). Studying civil society across the world: Exploring the thorny issues of conceptualization and measurement. *Journal of Civil Society, 1*(3), 211 - 228.

Helgesen, G. (1995). *Democracy in South Korea*: Nordic institute of Asian Studies.

Helgesen, G. (1998). *Democracy and authority in Korea: The cultural dimension in Korean politics. New York*: St. Martin's Press.

Hemmati, M. (2007). *Participatory dialogue: Toward a stable, safe and just society for all*. New York: United Nations

Herrick, J. (1975). South Korea ticks on. *Nation, 220*(13), 390-392.

Hiatt, F. (1987, 5 September 1987). Nation's yearnings for freedom conflict with fear of chaos. *The Washington Post*.

Hiatt, F. (1987, 23 December). South Korean president-elect to seek better ties with China, Roh pledges to investigate corruption and promote democracy. *The Washington Post*.

Hill, B. J. (1982). An analysis of conflict resolution techniques. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 26*(1), 109-138.

Ho, S. & Park, S. (1979). Rural-urban imbalance in South Korea in the 1970s. *Asian Survey, 19*(7), 645-659.

Hodgson, L. (2004). Manufactured civil society: Counting the cost. *Critical Social Policy, 24*(2), 139-164.

Høivik, T. (1983). Peace research and science. A discussion paper. *Journal of Peace Research, 20*(3), 261-270.

Homan, R. (1980). The ethics of covert methods. *The British Journal of Sociology, 31*(1), 46-59.

Homan, R. (1980). The ethics of covert methods. *The British Journal of Sociology, 31*(1), 46-59.

Homan, R. (1992). The ethics of open methods. *The British Journal of Sociology, 43*(3), 321-332.

Hong, K. (2005). The affect of NGOs on South Korea's decision to dispatch troops to Iraq.

Journal of International and Area Studies, 12(2), 31-46.

Hong, S.-R. (2002). Reunification issues and civil society in South Korea: The debates and social movement for reunification during the April revolution period, 1960-1961. *Journal of Asian Studies, 61*(4), 1237.

Hopwood, N. (2004). Research design and methods of data collection and analysis: Researching students' conceptions in a multiple-method case study. *Journal of Geography in Higher Education, 28*(2), 347-353.

Howard, M. M. (2002). The weakness of postcommunist civil society. *Journal of Democracy, 13*(1), 157-169.

Howard, M. M. (2003). *The weakness of civil society in post-communist urope*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Howard, M. M. (2005). Conceptual and methodological suggestions for improving cross-national measures of civil society: Commentary on Heinrich. *Journal of Civil Society, 1*(3), 229-233.

Hudock, A. C. (1999). *NGOs and civil society: Democracy by proxy?* London: Polity Press.

Hudson, W. (2003). Problematizing European theories of civil society. In D. C. S. W. Hudson (Ed.), *Civil society in Asia.* 9-19. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Huntington, S. P. (1984). Will more countries become democratic? *Political Science Quarterly, 99*(2), 193.

Huntington, S. P. (1991). Democracy's third wave. *Journal of Democracy, 2*(2), 12-34.

Hyde, C. (2000). The hybrid nonprofit: An examination of feminist social movement organizations. *Journal of Community Practice, 8*(4), 45-67.

Im, H.-B. (2000). South Korean democratic consolidation in comparative perspective. In L. Diamond & B.-K. Kim (Eds.), *Consolidating Democracy in South Korea.* 21-52. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Im, H. B. (2004). Faltering democratic consolidation in South Korea: Democracy at the end of the 'three Kims' era. *Democratization, 11*(5), 179-198.

Inglehart, R. & Welzel, C.(2008). The role of ordinary people in democratization. In L. Diamond, and Plattner, Marc F. (Ed.), *How people view democracy,* 16-30. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Isenhart, M., & Spangle, M. (2000). *Collaborative approaches to resolving conflict*: Sage Publications.

Jacksteit, M., & Kaufmann, A. (1999, December). Common ground network for life and choice manual. Retrieved 15 July, 2006, from http://www.sfcg.org

Jai Kwan, J. (2005). Popular mobilization and paths toward democracy after democratic transitions: A comparative study of South Korea and Taiwan since the 1980s. *Conference Papers – American Political Science Association*, 1-40.

Jaime, J. A. (2000). NGOs: Fragmented dreams. *Development in Practice, 10*(3), 390 - 401.

Jameson, S. (1987, 18 October). Seoul Targets radical left amid reforms*. Los Angeles Times*.

Jaquette, J., & Wolchik, S. (1998). *Women and democracy: Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe*: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Javeline, D., & Lindemann-Komarova, S. (2010). A balanced assessment of Russian civil society. *63*, 171-191.

Jean, J. S., Marlene, J. B., & Ken, M. W. (2008). Challenging hegemonies: Advancing collaboration in community-based participatory action research. *Collaborative Anthropologies, 1*, 102-137.

Jeong, H. (2000). *Peace and conflict studies: An introduction.* Farnham: Ashgate.

Jeong, H. (2009). *Conflict management and resolution: An introduction.* Florence: Routledge.

Jick, T. D. (1979). Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: Triangulation in action. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 24*(4), 602-611.

Johnson, S., & Loveman, G. (1995). *Starting over in Eastern Europe: Entrepreneurship and economic renewal.* Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Jones, T. (2004). Conflict resolution education: The field, the findings, and the future. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 22*(1-2), 233-267.

Joo, S., Lee, S., & Jo, Y. (2006). The explosion of CSOs and citizen participation: An assessment of civil society in South Korea 2004. *CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for South Korea*.

Kamat, S. (2003). NGOs and the new democracy: The false saviors of international development. *Harvard International Review,* 65-69.

Kamat, S. (2004). The privatization of public interest: Theorizing NGO discourse in a neoliberal

era. *Review of International Political Economy, 11*(1), 155-176.

Kamiya, F. (1980). The Korean peninsula after Park Chung Hee. *Asian Survey, 20*(7), 744-753.

Kandath, K. (2006). Critical approaches to community conflict in developing countries: A case study of India. In J. G. Oetzel, and Ting-Toomey, Stella (Ed.), *The SAGE handbook of conflict communication: Integrating theory, research, and practice.* 501-514. London: SAGE Publications.

Kang, D. C. (2002). Bad loans to good friends: Money politics and the developmental state in South Korea. *International Organization, 56*(1), 177-207.

Kang, S.-W. (2002). Democracy and human rights education in South Korea. *Comparative Education, 38*(3), 315-325.

Kang, W.-T., & Chung, B.-K. (2006). *Social conflict and reconciliation - UK and Germany*. Seoul: Korea Research Society on Economics, Humanity and Social Science.

Kapstein, E. B., & Converse, N. (2008). *The fate of young democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Katsiaficas, G., & Na, K. (2006). *South Korean democracy: Legacy of the Gwangju uprising. Florence*: Routledge.

Keane, J. (2003). *Global civil society? (Contemporary political theory).* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Keim, W. D. (1974). The South Korean peasantry in the 1970s. *Asian Survey, 14*(9), 854-868.

Kempe, F. (1987, 24 November). Campaign transforms a town in Korea - It discovers new openness and old angers*. Wall Street Journal*

Kempe, F. (1987, 18 December). Great expectations: Korea's new president faces heady demands of workers, students - Roh must surmount charges of election fraud first and deal with dissident - A life for democracy in Asia*. Wall Street Journal*.

Kempe, F. (1987, 3 December). Korean business fears democracy's disorderly period - presidential election's outcome could test country's economic miracle*. Wall Street Journal*

Kent, G. (2000). Ethical principles. In D. Burton (Ed.), *Research training for social scientists: A handbook for postgraduate researchers.* 61-68. London: SAGE Publications.

Khor, D. (1999). Organizing for change: Women's grassroots activism in Japan. *Feminist*

Studies, 25(3), 633-661.

Kim, A. E. (2006). Civic activism and Korean democracy: The affect of blacklisting campaigns in the 2000 and 2004 general elections. *Pacific Review, 19*(4), 519-542.

Kim, B.-K. (2005). Defeat in victory: Conservatives in South Korea's democratic consolidation. *Conference Papers – American Political Science Association*, 1-51.

Kim, C. I. E. (1978). Emergency, development, and human rights: South Korea. *Asian survey, 18*(4), 363-378.

Kim, C. I. E. (1979). Significance of Korea's 10th national assembly election. *Asian Survey, 19*(5), 523-532.

Kim, D.-C. (2006). Growth and crisis of the Korean citizens' movement. *Korea Journal*, Summer, 98-128.

Kim, D.-h., Pan, Y., & Park, H.-s. (1998). High-versus low-context culture: a comparison of Chinese, Korean, and American Cultures. *Psychology & Marketing*, 15(6), 507-521.

Kim, E. (2009). The limits of NGO-government relations in South Korea. *Asian Survey, 49*(5), 873-894.

Kim, H.-K. (2005). Changes in ideological terrain and political consciousness in South Korea. *Korea Journal, 45*(3), 117-136.

Kim, H. (2003). Political Participation of Civil Society in South Korea. University of Leeds, Leeds.

Kim, H.-R. (2000). The state and civil society in transition: The role of non-governmental organizations in South Korea. *Pacific Review, 13*(4), 595.

Kim, J. H. , 2002-08-28 "The military under Park Chung Hee's reign" *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts Online* <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from <http://www. allacademic.com/meta/p66592_index.html>.

Kim, J.-k., & Kim, J.-b. (2001). Critical reflection on NGO research in South Korea. Public Administration, Hangjeong Nonchong, 39(3), 199-233.

Kim, K. (2004). Research summary: Policy to develop the northeastern community for peace and prosperity. *Humanity and society studies committee collaborative research paper, 4*(26), 1-107.

Kim, H.-S. (2006). Reflection on Criticism towards Civil Society Movement: Focusing on Criticism of 'Citizen Movement without Citizens'. *NGO Research, 4*(1), 191-220.

Kim, N. H., Wall, J. A., Jr., Sohn, D.-W., & Kim, J. S. (1993). Community and industrial mediation in South Korea. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37*(2), 361-381.

Kim, P. (2002). The development of Korean NGOs and governmental assistance to NGOs. *Korea Journal, 42*(2), 279.

Kim, S. (1996). Civil society in South Korea: From grand democracy movements to petty interest groups? *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 15*(2), 81.

Kim, S. (1997). State and civil society in South Korea's democratic consolidation: Is the battle over? *Asian Survey, 37*(12), 1135.

Kim, S. (1998). Civil society and democratization in South Korea. *Korea Journal, 38*(2), 214.

Kim, S. (2000). Democratization and environmentalism: South Korea and Taiwan in comparative perspective. *Journal of Asian & African Studies (Brill), 35*(3), 287-302.

Kim, S. (2000). *The politics of democratization in Korea: The role of civil society.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Kim, S. (2003). *Korea's democratization.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kim, S. (2006). Civil society and local democracy. *Korea Journal, 46*(4), 62-86.

Kim, S. (2006). Civil society and political action in democratized Korea: Revamping democratic consolidation from a participatory perspective. *New Political Science, 28*(4), 527-546.

Kim, S. (2006). The politics of Jeong and ethical civil society in South Korea (46), 212-241.

Kim, S. (2007). Liberal collectivism: The Korean challenge to liberal individualism. *The Good Society, 16*(1), 54-59.

Kim, S. (2009). Confucianism in contestation: The may struggle of 1991 in South Korea and its lesson. *New Political Science, 31*(1), 49-68.

Kim, S. (2006). Civil society and local democracy. *Korea Journal*, Winter, 62-86.

Kim, S. (2006). The politics of *jeong* and ethical civil society in South Korea. *Korea Journal*, Autumn, 212-241.

Kim, S., & Lim, W. (2007). How to deal with South Korea. *The Washington Quarterly, 30*(2), 71-82.

Kim, S.-H., & Han, M. (2005). Media use and participatory democracy in South Korea. *Mass*

Communication & Society, 8(2), 133-153.

Kim, T.-H., Moon, M.-K., Kim, E.-K., & Chang, Y.-S. (2005). *Research on the establishment of conflict management system to reduce social conflict* (2). Seoul: Korean Research Society on Humanity, Economics and Social Science.

Kim, Y. C., Liddle, R. W., & Said, S. (2006). Political leadership and civilian supremacy in third wave democracies: Comparing South Korea and Indonesia. *Pacific Affairs, 79*(2), 247-268.

King, C. R., & Springwood, C. F. (2001). Unsettling engagements; on the ends of rapport in critical ethnography. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 7(4), 403-417.

Kirkbride, P. S., Tang, S. F. Y., & Westwood, R. I. (1991). Chinese conflict preferences and negotiating behaviour: Cultural and psychological influences. *Organization Studies, 12*(3), 365-386.

Kleidman, R. (1994). Volunteer activism and professionalism in social movement organizations. *Social Problems, 41*(2), 257-276.

Klesner, J. L. (2007). Social capital and political participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru. *Latin American Research Review, 42*(2), 1-32.

Klicperova, M., Feierabend, I., & Hofstetter, R. (1997). In the search for a post-communist syndrome: A theoretical framework and empirical assessment. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 7*, 39-52.

Klopecky, P., and Mudde, Cas. (2003). Rethinking civil society. *Democratization, 10*(3), 1-14.

Kondoh, H. (2002). Policy networks in South Korea and Taiwan during the democratic era. *Pacific Review, 15*(2), 225-244.

Koo, H. (1991). Middle classes, democratization, and class formation: The case of South Korea. *Theory and Society, 20*(4), 485-509.

Koo, H. (2002). Symposium: Civil society and democracy in South Korea. *The Good Society, 11*(2), 40-45.

Kopecky, P., & Barnfield, E. (1999). Charting the decline of civil society: Explaining the changing roles and conceptions of civil society in East and Central Europe. In J. Grugel (Ed.), *Democracy without border: Transnationalization and conditionality in new democracies.* 76-91. London: Routledge.

Kovick, D. (2005). The Hewlett foundation's conflict resolution program: Twenty years of field building. Retrieved 20 September 2006, from http://www.hewlett. org/Default.htm

Kriesberg, L. (2003). *Constructive conflicts: From escalation to resolution* (2nd ed.). New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Kuenzi, M. T. (2006). Nonformal education, political participation, and democracy: Findings from Senegal. *Political Behavior, 28*(1), 1-31.

Kuklinski, J. H., & Quirk, P. J. (2001). Conceptual foundations of citizen Competence. *Political Behavior, 23*(3), 285-311.

Kumar, K. (1993). Civil society: An inquiry into the usefulness of an historical term. *The British Journal of Sociology, 44*(3), 375-395.

Kumar, R. (2005). *Research methodology* (2nd edition). London: SAGE Publications.

Kwon, H.-K. (2004). Associations, civic norms, and democracy: Revisiting the Italian case. *Theory and Society, 33*(2), 135-166.

Kwon, H. Y. (2005). Targeting public spending in a new democracy evidence from South Korea. *British Journal of Political Science, 35*(2), 321-341.

Kwon, Y. (2008). Understanding international education. *Journal of Sustainability Research, 2*(1), 49-67.

Kymlicka, W. (2002). *Contemporary political philosophy: An introduction* (2nd Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (1985). *Hegemony and socialist strategy: Toward a radical democratic politics*. London and New York: Verso.

Lacombe, D. (1996). Reforming Foucault: A critique of the social control thesis. *The British Journal of Sociology, 47*(2), 332-352.

Landrey, W. G. (1987, 23 June). The dilemma of the friendly despot. *St Petersburg Times*.

Larzar, D. (2004). Selected issues in the philosophy of social science. In C. Seale (Ed.), *Researching society and culture* (2nd ed.) 7-20, London: SAGE Publication.

Lederach, J. (1995). *Preparing for peace: Conflict transformation across cultures. Syracuse*: Syracuse University Press.

Lederach, J. (1997). *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies.* Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Lederach, J. (2005). *The moral imagination: The art and soul of building peace. Oxford*: Oxford University Press.

Lee, A.-R. (1999). What we know about party nonidentifiers in South Korea. *Asian Affairs: An American Review, 25*(4), 209.

Lee, A.-R., & Glasure, Y. U. (2007). Social capital and political participation in South Korea. *Asian Affairs: An American Review, 34*(2), 101-118.

Lee, A. S. (1991). Integrating positivist and interpretive approaches to organizational research. *Organization Science, 2*(4), 342-365.

Lee, C.-J. (1984). South Korea in 1983: Crisis management and political legitimacy. *Asian Survey, 24*(1), 112-121.

Lee, H. (1992). *The 25 years of history of Korean Christian women's council (한국 교회 여성 연합회 25 년사)*. Seoul: Korean Christian Women's Council.

Lee, H. Y. (1993). South Korea in 1992: A turning point in democratization. *Asian Survey, 33*(1), 32-42.

Lee, H. Y. (2003). South Korea in 2002: Multiple political dramas. *Asian Survey, 43*(1), 64-77.

Lee, J. (2002). Primary causes of Asian democratization: Dispelling conventional myths. *Asian Survey, 42*(6), 821-837.

Lee, M.-w. (1990). *The odyssey of Korean democracy: Korean politics, 1987-1990*. New York: Praeger.

Lee, S.-i. (2002). Transforming gender relations through intimacy. *Korea Journal*, Winter, 46-69.

Lee, S.-H. (1993). Transitional politics of Korea, 1987-1992: Activation of civil society. *Pacific Affairs, 66*(3), 351-367.

Lee, W. (2006). Understanding peace in the Korean society: Concept, movement, and recognition. *The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, Working Paper*.

Lee, Y. (2005). Participatory democracy and chaebol regulation in Korea: State-market relations under the MDP governments, 1997-2003. *Asian Survey, 45*(2), 279-301.

Lee, J. (2008). Path toward democracy in South Korea: Social capital and democracy embedded in the citizens. *Asian Survey, 48*(4), 580-602.

Lee, J. (2008). Unravelling the dynamics and trends of social capital: Case of South Korea. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 11*(2), 105-115.

Lehman, H. P. (2008). The emergence of civil society organizations in South Africa. *Journal of Public Affairs (14723891), 8*(1/2), 115-127.

Leighley, J. (1991). Participation as a stimulus of political conceptualization. *The Journal of Politics, 53*(1), 198-211.

LeResche, D. (1992). Comparison of the American mediation process with A Korean-American harmony restoration process. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 9*(4), 323-339.

Letki, N. (2004). Socialization for participation? Trust, membership, and democratization in East-Central Europe. *Political Research Quarterly, 57*(4), 665-679.

Letki, N., & Evans, G. (2005). Endogenizing social trust: Democratization in East-Central Europe. *British Journal of Political Science, 35*(3), 515-529.

Levitt, B. S. (2005). Political culture and the science of politics. *Latin American Research Review, 40*(3), 365-376.

Levy, J. S. (2007). Qualitative methods and cross-method dialogue in political science. *Comparative Political Studies, 40*(2), 196-214.

Lewis, P. (2003). Central and eastern Europe. In P. Burnell (Ed.), *Democratization through the looking-glass,* 153-168. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Lichao, H. (2007). In search for an East Asian model: Comparative civil society study in China, Japan and South Korea. *Conference Papers – Southern Political Science Association*, 1.

Lie, J., & Kim, A. E. (2008). South Korea in 2007: Scandals and summits. *Asian Survey, 48*(1), 116-123.

Lie, J., & Park, M. (2006). South Korea in 2005: Economic dynamism, generational conflicts, and social transformations. *Asian Survey, 46*(1), 56-62.

Liebmann, M., & Beckett, G. (1998). *Community and neighbour mediation*: Cavendish.

Lim, H.-C., & Jang, J.-H. (2006). Neo-liberalism in post-crisis South Korea: Social conditions and outcomes. *Journal of Contemporary Asia, 36*(4), 442-463.

Lim, H.-S. (2000). Historical development of civil social movements in Korea: Trajectories and issues. *Korea Journal, 40*(3), 5.

Lim, T. C. (2003). Racing from the bottom in South Korea? The nexus between civil society and transnational migrants. *Asian Survey, 43*(3), 423-442.

Lincoln, Y. S. (2001). Reconsidering rapport: interviewing as post-modern inquiry practice. Paper presented at the *Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association* (Seattle, WA, April 10-14, 2001).

Linz, J., & Stepan, A. (1996). *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Linz, J. J. (2000). *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Littlejohn, S. (2004). The transcendent communication projects: Searching for a praxis of dialogue. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 21*(3), 337-359.

Long, T., & Johnson, M. (2000). Rigour, reliability and validity in qualitative research. *Clinical Effectiveness in Nursing, 4*(1), 30-37.

Lopez, L. (2005). Advancing human rights policy: Does grassroots mobilization and community dispute resolution matter? Insights from Chiapas, Mexico. *Review of Policy Research, 22*(1), 77-92.

Lummis, C. D. (1996). *Radical democracy*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Lund, M. (1996). *Preventing violent conflicts: A strategy for preventive diplomacy*: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Lyons, T. (2002). The role of postsettlement elections. In S. J. Stedman, Rotchild, Donald, and Cousens, Elizabeth M. (Ed.), *Ending civil wars: The implementation of peace agreement*, 215-236. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Maas, P. (1987, 16 November). Philippine people power revolt becoming burden for Seoul opposition*. The Washington Post*.

Markoff, J. (1999). Where and when was democracy invented?. *Comparative Studies in Society and History, 41*, 660-690

McCoy, M. L. & Scully, P.L. (2002). Deliberative Dialogue to Expand Civic Engagement: What Kind of Talk Does Democracy Need? *National Civic Review*, 91 (2), 117-135.

Macfarlane, J., & Mayer, B. (2005). What theory? How collaborative problem-solving trainers use theory and research in training and teaching. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 23*(2), 259-276.

Maddison, S., & Denniss, R. (2005). Democratic constraint and embrace: Implications for progressive non-government advocacy organisations in Australia. *Australian Journal of Political Science, 40*(3), 373 - 389.

Manheim, J. B. (1987, 30 December). Korea: The second generation gap. *The Washington Post*.

María Isabel, C.-C., Michal, O., & Dana, E. P. (2008). Blurring boundaries: Recognizing knowledge-practices in the study of social movements. *Anthropological Quarterly, 81*(1), 17-58.

Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. (1999). *Designing qualitative research.* London: SAGE Publications.

Mason, J. (2002). *Qualitative researching* (2nd ed.). London: SAGE Publications.

May, T. (2001). *Social research: Issues, methods and process* (3rd edition). Buckingham: Open University Press.

Mayer, B. (2000). *The dynamics of conflict resolution: A practitioner's guide*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Mayer, B. (2004). *Beyond Neutrality: Confronting the Crisis*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Mayhew, D. R. (2000). Political science and political philosophy: Ontological not normative. *PS: Political Science and Politics, 33*(2), 192-193.

McDonough, P., Shin, D., & Moises, J. A. (1998). Democratization and participation: Comparing Spain, Brazil, and Korea. *The Journal of Politics, 60*(4), 919-953.

Mendelson, S., & Glenn, J. (Eds.). (2002). *The power and limits of NGOs: A critical look at building democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.* New York Chichister: Columbia University Press.

Mendelson, S. E. (2001). Democracy assistance and political transition in Russia: Between success and failure. *International Security, 25*(4), 68-106.

Mendelson, S. E., & Glenn, J. K. (2002). Introduction: Transnational networks and NGOs in postcommunist societies. In S. E. Mendelson, Glenn, John K. (Eds.), *The power and limits of NGOs,* 1-28. New York: Columbia University Press.

Mercer, C. (2002). NGOs, civil society and democratisation: A critical review of the literature.

Progress in Development Studies, 2(1), 5-22.

Mi, P. (2005). Organizing dissent against authoritarianism: The South Korean student movement in the 1980s. *Korea Journal, 45*(3), 261-288.

Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O., & Woodhouse, T. (1999). *Contemporary conflict resolution*. London: Polity Press.

Miceli, M. S. (2005). Morality politics vs. identity politics: Framing processes and competition among Christian right and gay social movement organizations. *Sociological Forum, 20*(4), 589-612.

Michelson, E., & Read, B. (2008). Mediating the mediation debate: Conflict resolution and the local state in China. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52*(5), 737-764.

Mitchell, C. (1993). Necessitous man and conflict resolution: More basic questions about basic human needs theory. In J. Burton (Ed.), *Conflict: Human needs theory,* 149-178. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Mitchell, C. (2005). Conflict, social change and conflict resolution: An enquiry. *Constructive Conflict Management.* Retrieved 15 July, 2006, from http://www.berghof-center.org/

Miyahara, A., Kim, M.-S., Shin, H.-C., & Yoon, K. (1998). Conflict resolution styles among "collectivist" cultures: A comparison between Japanese and Koreans. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 22*(4), 505-525.

Monahan, J. (2004, 6 July). Teen spirit*. The Guardian,* 17.

Moon, S. (2002). Carving out space: Civil society and the women's movement in South Korea. *Journal of Asian Studies, 61*(2), 473.

Moon, S. (2010). The interplay between the state, the market, and culture in shaping civil society: A case study of the people's solidarity for participatory democracy in South Korea. *Journal of Asian Studies, 69*(2), 479-505.

Morera, E. (1990). Gramsci and democracy. *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, 23*(1), 23-37.

Nadler, J., Thompson, L., & Van Boven, L. (2003). Learning negotiation skills: Four models of knowledge creation and transfer. *Management Science, 49*(4), 529-540.

Nagda, B. A., & Gurin, P. (2007). Intergroup dialogue: A critical-dialogic approach to learning about difference, inequality, and social justice. *New Directions for Teaching &*

Learning(111), 35-45.

Najam, A. (2000). The Four-C's of third sector - government relations: Cooperation, confrontation, complementarity, and co-optation. *Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 10*(4), 375-396.

Nam, S. (2010). The women's movement and the transformation of the family law in South Korea. Interactions between local, national and global structures. *European Journal of East Asian Studies, 9*(1), 67-86.

Neff, K., & Suizzo, M.-A. (2006). Culture, power, authenticity and psychological well-being within romantic relationships: a comparison of European American and Mexican Americans. *Cognitive Development*, 21, 441-457.

Nevitte, N. (2000). Value change and reorientations in citizen-state relations. *Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, 26* S73-S94.

Newman, E., & Schnabel, A. (2002). *Recovering from civil conflict: Reconciliation, peace, and development.* London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Newton, K. (2001). Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy. *International Political Science Review, 22*(2), 201-214.

NKCCA. (1987). *1970-yondae minjuhwa undong : Kidokkyo inkwon undong ul chungsim uro (Democracy movement: Focusing Christian human rights movements)*. Seoul: The Human Rights Commission of the Korean Christian Church Association.

Obadare, E. (2005). Second thoughts on civil society: The state, civic associations and the antinomies of the public sphere in Africa. *Journal of Civil Society, 1*(3), 267 - 281.

Oberdorfer, D. (2001). *The two Koreas: A contemporary history.* New York: Basic Books.

O'Donnell, G. (1996). *Illusions about consolidation,* 40-57.

Oh, C. H., & Arrington, C. (2007). Democratisation and changing anti-American sentiments in South Korea. *Asian Survey, 47*(2), 327-350.

Oh, J. (1999). *Korean politics: The quest for democratization and economic development.* New York: Cornell University Press.

O'Donnell, G. (1996). Illusions about consolidation. *Journal of Democracy, 7*(2), 34-51.

Orjuela, C. (2005). Civil society in civil war: The case of Sri Lanka. *Civil Wars, 7*(2), 120-137.

Ottaway, M., & Carothers, T. (2000). The bourgeoning world of civil society aid. In M. Ottaway,

and Carthers, Thomas (Eds.), *Funding virture: Civil society aid and democracy promotion*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Ottaway, M., & Carothers, T. (Eds.). (2000). *Funding virtue: civil society aid and democracy promotion*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Owen, D. (2007). South Korea Business Culture Report. *UK Trade and Investment*. Retrieved from: http://www.mva.org/media(3089,1033)/South_Korea_Culture_Field_Report.pdf

Paley, J. (2004). Accountable democracy: Citizens' affect on public decision making in post-dictatorship Chile. *American Ethnologist, 31*(4), 497-513.

Pammer, W., & Killian, J. (2003). *Handbook of conflict management.* New York: Marcel Dekker.

Park, C.-M. (1999). Beliefs of government bureaucrats in democratizing South Korea. *Korea Journal, 39*(2), 162.

Park, C.-M., & Doh, C. S. (2006). Popular support for democracy and its institutions in Korea: The dynamics and sources of regime support and institutional trust. *International Review of Sociology, 16*(3), 665-681.

Park, C.-M., & Shin, D. C. (2006). Do Asian values deter popular support for democracy in South Korea? *Asian Survey, 46*(3), 341-361.

Park, E., & Kim, D. (1920). *Korean independence movement history* Seoul: Somyung Publications.

Park, M. (2005). Organizing dissent against authoritarianism: the South Korean student movement in the 1980s. *Korea Journal*, Autumn, 260-289.

Park, S.-s. (2009). Women Making Peace-Conflict Resolution Centre: Accomplishments and Potentials of Conflict Resolution, Peace Education, and Facilitation Training Paper presented at the *South-North Peace Foundation's Open Forum on South Korean Conflict Resolution Status and Potentials* (2 November, 2009).

Park., S., Park., H., Shin., J., Shin., C, Kim., D., & Kim., Y.(2006). *Art of Conflict Meditation*. Seoul: Good Information.

Park, S. (2006). *Case Study: Construction of Hantan River*. Seoul: WMP.

Park, H. J. (2004). Between development and the state: Recasting South Korean dirigisme. *Asian Journal of Political Science, 12*(1), 95-115.

Park, K. (2010). Party mergers and splits in new democracies: The case of South Korea (1987

– 2007). *Government & Opposition, 45*(4), 531-552.

Pateman, C. (1976). *Participation and democratic theory*: Cambridge University Press.

Pattie, C. J., and Johnston, R.J. (2008). It's good to talk: Talk, disagreement, and tolerance. *British Journal of Political Science, 38*, 677-698.

Pavlich, G. (1996). The power of community mediation: Government and formation of self-identity. *Law & Society Review, 30*(4), 707-733.

Petras, J. (1997). Imperialism and NGOs in Latin America. *Monthly Review, 49*(7). Retrieved from http://www.monthlyreview.org/1297petr.htm

Pierce, N. (2004). Resolving youth conflict. *Catalyst,* 17-18.

Pietrzyk, D. (2003). Democracy or civil society. *Politics, 23*(1), 38-45.

Posner, R. (2003). *Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Potter, D. (1997). *Democratization.* Cambridge: Polity Press in association with the Open University.

Pouligny, B. (2005). Civil society and post-conflict peace-building: Ambiguities of international programmes aimed at building 'new' societies. *Security Dialogue, 36*(4), 495-510.

Polkinghorne, D. E. (2005). Language and Meaning: data collection in qualitative research. *Journal of Counselling Psychology*, 52(2), 137-145.

Prasad, R. (2003, 16 July). A leap of faith*. The Guardian*.

Prevention, E. C. f. C. (Ed.). (1999). *People building peace: 35 inspiring stories from around the world*. Utrecht European Centre for Conflict Prevention.

Pridham, G. (2000). Confining conditions and breaking with the past: Historical legacies and political learning in transitions to democracy. *Democratization, 7*(2), 36.

Pruitt, B., & Kaufer, K. (2004). *Dialogue as a tool for peaceful conflict resolution* (2). New York: United Nations Development Programme.

Prutzman, P., & Johnson, J. (1997). Bias awareness and multiple perspectives: Essential aspects of conflict resolution. *Theory into Practice, 36*(1), 26-31.

Putnam, R. (1993). *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ray, L. (2004). Civil society and the public sphere. In K. Nash & A. Scott (Eds.), *The blackwell companion to political sociology,* 219-229. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Rayburn, J. (1996). Alternative dispute resolution symposium: Note. Neighbourhood justice

centers: Community use of ADR – does it really work? *University of Memphis Law Review, 26*, 1197-1228.

Regulska, J. (1999). NGOs and their vulnerabilities during the time of transition: The case of Poland. *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 10*(1), 61-71.

Regulska, J. (1999). NGOs and their vulnerabilities during the time of transition: The case of Poland. *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary & Nonprofit Organizations, 10*(1), 61-71.

Reilly, C. A. (Ed.). (1995). *New paths to democratic development in Latin America: The rise of NGO-municipal collaboration*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Reimann, C. (2004). Assessing the state-of-art in conflict transformation. *Berhof handbook for conflict transformation*. Berghof: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Reychler, L. (1999). *Democratic peace-building and conflict prevention: Theory is in the transition*. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

Reychler, L., & Paffenholz, T. (2001). *Peacebuilding: A field guide.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Rhee, B. J. (2009). The affect of bureaucratic openness on public trust in South Korea. *Democratization, 16*, 969-997.

Rios, J. M. (2000). Environmental justice groups: Grass-roots movement or NGO networks? Some policy implications. *Review of Policy Research, 17*(2-3), 179-211.

Robinson, M. (2009). The making of Minjung: Democracy and the politics of representation in South Korea. *American Historical Review, 114*(4), 1053-1054.

Robson, C. (2002). *Real world research* (2nd edition). Oxford: Blackwell.

Roche, C. (1996). NGOs, civil society and the state: Building democracy in transitional countries. *Development in Practice, 6*(3), 270 - 271.

Rooy, A. V. (2003). Civil society as idea: An analytical hatstand? In A. V. Rooy (Ed.), *Civil society and the aid industry,* 6-30. London: Earthscan.

Rose, R. & Shin, D.C. (1999). Popular Response to Korean Democratization in Comparative Perspective". In C.I. Moon and J, Mo, (eds). Democratization and Globalization in

Korea. Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 329-348,

Rose, R. & Shin, D. (2001). Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science 31 (2)*, 331-35.

Rosenberg, S.W. (2003). Theorizing political psychology: Doing integrative social science under the condition of postmodernity. *Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 427- 460

Ryoo, W. (2009). The public sphere and the rise of South Korean civil society. *Journal of Contemporary Asia, 39*(1), 23-35.

Salamon, L., & Anheier, H. (1996). *The emerging nonprofit sector: An overview.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Salomon, K. (1986). The peace movement - An anti-establishment movement. *Journal of Peace Research, 23*(2), 115-127.

Sampson, C., & Lederach, J. (2000). *From the ground up: Mennonite contributions to international peacebuilding*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sampson, S. (2003). From forms to norms: Global projects and local practices in the Balkan NGO scene. *Journal of Human Rights, 2*(3), 329-337.

Sapsford, R. (1999). *Survey research*. London: SAGE Publications.

Sarbin, T. R., & Kitsuse, J. I. (1994). A prologue to constructing the social. In T. R. Sarbin & J. I. Kitsuse (Eds.), *Constructing the social,* 1-18. London: SAGE Publications.

Saxer, C. (2002). *From transition to power alternation: Democracy in South Korea, 1987-1997*. London: Routledge.

Sayer, A. (2000). *Realism and social science*. London: SAGE Publications.

Scaff, L. (1975). *Participation in the western political tradition: A study of theory and practice.* Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

Scaff, L. A. (1975). Two concepts of political participation. *The Western Political Quarterly, 28*(3), 447-462.

Scanlon, T.M. 2000. *What We Owe to Each Other*. Mass.: Harvard.

Schatzman, C. (2005). Political challenge in Latin America: Rebellion and collective protest in an era of democratization. *Journal of Peace Research, 42*(3), 291-310.

Schimitter, P. C. (1997). Civil society East and West In L. Diamond, M. F. Plattner, Y.-H. Chu & H.-M. Tien (Eds.), *Consolidating the third wave democracies: Themes and perspectives,*

239-262. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Schmelzle, B. (2006). Training for conflict transformation - An overview of approaches and resources. Retrieved 1 June 2010 from http://www.berghof-handbook.net

Schmitz, H. P. (2004). Domestic and transnational perspectives on democratization. *International Studies Review, 6*(3), 403-426.

Scholz, R. W. & Tietje, O. (2002). *Embedded Case Study Methods: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Knowledge*. London: Sage Publications Inc.

Schönleitner, G. (2006). Between liberal and participatory democracy: Tensions and dilemmas of leftist politics in Brazil. *Journal of Latin American Studies, 38*(1), 35-63.

Schreurs, M. (2002). Democratic transition and environmental civil society: Japan and South Korea compared. *The Good Society, 11*(2), 57-64.

Schütz, A., Walsh, G., & Lehnert, F. (1967). *The phenomenology of the social world,* Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Schwartz-Shea, P., & Yanow, D. (2002). "Reading" "methods" "texts": How research methods texts construct political science. *Political Research Quarterly, 55*(2), 457-486.

Sen, A. (1999). Democracy as a universal value. *Journal of Democracy, 10*(3), 3-17.

Seoul, C. (2005). *Activity report from Seoul - Global partnership for prevention of armed conflict, northeast Asia* Seoul: Korean Committee of the Global Partnership for Prevention of Armed Conflict, Northeast Asia.

Search for Common Ground. (2006). HIV/AIDS consensus-building progress report. Retrieved 10 September, 2006, from http://www.sfcg.org

Shadish., E. C. a. W. R. (Ed.). (1997). *Evaluation for the 21st century : A handbook* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Shapiro, I. (1999). New approaches to old problems: Project in four central and Eastern European Countries. *Negotiation Journal, 15*(2), 149-168.

Shelley, B. (2005). *Democratic development in East Asia*. London; Routledge.

Shils, E. (1992). Civility and civil society. In E. C. Banfield (Ed.), *Civility and citizenship in liberal democratic societies,* 1-15. New York: Paragon.

Shin, C.-H., & Park, H.-S. (2005). *Social conflict affect assessment and policy consideration.* Seoul: Korea Research Society on Economics, Humanity and Social Science.

Shin, K.-Y. (2006). The citizens movement in Korea. *Korea Journal*, Summer, 5-34.

Shin, D. C., & Jhee, B.-K. (2005). How does democratic regime change affect mass political ideology? A case study of South Korea in comparative perspective. *International Political Science Review, 26*(4), 381-396.

Shin, D. C., Park, C.-M., Hwang, A.-R., Lee, H.-W., & Jang, J. (2003). The democratization of mass political orientations in South Korea: Ascertaining the cultural dimension of democratic consolidation. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 15*(3), 265-284.

Shin, D. C., Park, C.-M., & Jang, J. (2005). Assessing the shifting qualities of democratic citizenship: The case of South Korea. *Democratization, 12*(2), 202-222.

Shin, E. H. (2003). The role of NGOs in political elections in South Korea: The case of the citizens' alliance for the 2000 general election. *Asian Survey, 43*(4), 697-715.

Shin, E. H. (2004). Correlates of the 2002 presidential election in South Korea: Regionalism, the generation gap, anti-Americanism, and the North Korea factor. *East Asia: An International Quarterly, 21*(2), 18-38.

Shin, E. H. (2005). Election democracy, populism, and generational politics: The case of the April 15, 2004 general election in South Korea. *East Asia: An International Quarterly, 22*(1), 51-81.

Shin, G.-W., & Hytrek, G. (2002). Social conflict and regime formation. *International Sociology, 17*(4), 459-480.

Shin, K.-Y. (2010). Globalisation and the working class in South Korea: Contestation, fragmentation and renewal. *Journal of Contemporary Asia, 40*(2), 211-229.

Shipper, A. W. (2007). Associative activism: Organizing support for foreign workers in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. *Conference Papers – International Studies Association*, 1-31.

Shoemake, A. T., Noel, B. R., & Hale, C. (2007). Striving to sow the seeds of peace: Conflict resolution training in Indonesia. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 25*(1), 137-144.

Shonholtz, R. (1997). Conflict management training: A transformative vehicle for transitional democracies. *International Negotiation, 2*(3), 437-450.

Shonholtz, R. (1997). The mediating future. *ANNALS, AAPSS, 552*, 139-150.

Skapska, G. (1997). Learning to be a citizen: Cognitive and ethical aspects of post-communist

society transformation. *Democratization, 4*(1), 145 - 160.

Smolar, A. (2002). Civil society after communism. In L. Diamond, and Plattner, Marc F. (Ed.), *Democracy after communism,* 48-62. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Smyth, J. (1989). Critical perspectives on educational leadership. London: Routledge

Sneider, D. (1989, 29 June). South Korea sinks democratic roots*. Christian Science Monitor,* 4.

Snow, D., Soule, S., & Kriesi, H. (2004). *The Blackwell companion to social movements.* Oxford: Blackwell Publications.

Sobal, J. (1984). The content of survey introductions and the provision of informed consent. *The Public Opinion Quarterly, 48*(4), 788-793.

Sohn, D.-W., & Wall, J. A., Jr. (1993). Community mediation in South Korea: A city-village comparison. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37*(3), 536-543.

Sokolowski, S. W., & Salamon, L. M. (2005). Mirror, mirror on the wall? Commentary on Heinrich. *Journal of Civil Society, 1*(3), 235 - 240.

Solarz, S. J. (1987, 6 July). Give Koreans the credit for their miracle*. Los Angeles Times*.

Somers, M. R. (1993). Citizenship and the place of the public sphere: Law, community, and political culture in the transition to democracy. *American Sociological Review, 58*(5), 587-620.

Song, K.-j. (2007). South Korean social capital and citizen participation. *National Strategy, Gook-ga junrak*, 13(4), 101-127.

Song, J. (2008). The making of 'undeserving' homeless women: A gendered analysis of homeless policy in South Korea from 1997 to 2001. *Feminist Review,* (89), 87-101.

Special Advisory Committee on Sustainable Development (2004). South Korea: Emergence of Social Conflicts and Their Resolution. Seoul: Presidential Special Advisory Committee on Sustainable Development.

Spicer, N. (2004). Combining qualitative and quantitative methods. In C. Seale (Ed.), *Researching society and culture,* 293-304. London: SAGE Publications.

Sprenger, D. The training process: Achieving social affect by training individuals? How to make sure that training for conflict transformation has an effect on conflict transformation. *Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management*, 1-15.

Spradley, J. (1979). *The Ethnographic interview*. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co.

Squires, J. (2008). Deliberation, domination and decision-making. *Theoria: A Journal of Social & Political Theory, 55*(117), 104-133.

Steinberg, D. I. (1997). Civil society and human rights in Korea: On contemporary and classical orthodoxy and ideology. *Korea Journal, 37*(3), 145-165.

Stentzel, J. (1976). The South Korean trap. *Nation, 222*(14), 423-426.

Stoker, G., & Marsh, D. (2002). Introduction. In D. Marsh & G. Stoker (Eds.), *Theory and methods in political science* (2nd edition), 1-16. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stroh, M. (2000). Qualitative interviewing. In D. Burton (Ed.), *Research training for social scientist,* 196-214. London: SAGE Publications.

Stroh, M. (2000). Using NUD*IST: a hand-on lesson. In D. Burton (Ed.), *Research training for social scientists,* 257-288. London: SAGE Publications.

Stueck, W. (1998). Democratization in Korea: The United States role, 1980 and 1987. *International Journal of Korean Studies, 2*(1), 1-25.

Suh, D. (2006). Civil society in political democratization. *Development and Society* 35(2), 173-195.

Sztompka, P. (1998). Mistrusting civility: Predicament of a post-communist society. In J. C. Alexander (Ed.), *Real civil societies: Dilemmas of institutionalization* 191-210. London: SAGE Publications.

Tempest, C. (1997). Myths from Eastern Europe and the legend of the west. *democratization, 4*(1), 132-144.

Thapar-Björkert, S., & Henry, M. (2004). Reassessing the research relationship: Location, position and power in fieldwork accounts. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 7*(5), 363-381.

Thompson, P. (2004). Researching family and social mobility with two eyes: Some experiences of the interaction between qualitative and quantitative data. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 7*(3), 237-257.

Tilly, C. (2000). Processes and mechanisms of democratization. *Sociological Theory, 18*(1), 1-16.

Tilly, C. (2003). Inequality, democratization, and de-democratization. *Sociological Theory, 21*(1), 37-43.

Tilly, C. (2004). Contentious choices. *Theory and Society, 33*(3/4), 473-481.

Timothy, C. L. (2008). Will South Korea follow the German experience?: Democracy, the migratory process, and the prospects for permanent immigration in Korea. *Korean Studies, 32*, 28-55.

Tjosvold, D., & Fang, S. S. (2004). Cooperative conflict management as a basis for training students in China. *Theory into Practice, 43*(1), 80-86.

Tobin, G. A., & Begley, C. M. (2004). Methodological rigour within a qualitative framework. *Journal of Advanced Nursing, 48*(4), 388-396.

Tonkiss, F. (2004). Analysing text and speech: Content and discourse analysis. In C. Seale (Ed.), *Researching Society and Culture,* 193-206. London: SAGE Publications.

Townsend, D. M. R. (2000). How does substantive law currently regulates social science research? In D. Burton (Ed.), *Research training for social scientists : A handbook for postgraduate researchers,* 109-134. London: SAGE Publications.

Tsujinaka, Y., Choe, J.-Y., & Ohtomo, T. (2008). Exploring the realities of Japanese civil society and politics through comparison. *Conference Papers – International Studies Association*, 1-22.

Turner, J. H. (1985). In defense of positivism. *Sociological Theory, 3*(2), 24-30.

Underwood, H. H. (1987, 2 July). South Koreans hit the books and the payoff is impressive*. Los Angeles Times*.

Underwood, H. (2008, 9 July 2010). Korean Culture: Very Informal Essays.

Ury, W. (1999). *The third side: Why we fight and how we can stop*. New York: Penguin Books.

Ury, W. (2007). *The power of a positive no: How to say no and still get to yes.* New York: Random House Publishing Group.

van Tongeren, P. (Ed.). (2005). *People building peace II: Successful stories of civil society*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Verschuren, P. (2003). Case study as a research strategy: Some ambiguities and opportunities. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 6*(2), 121-139.

Walzer, M. (1974). Civility and Civic Virtue in Contemporary America. *Social Research*, 41, 593-611.

Wampler, B., & Avritzer, L. (2004). Participatory publics: Civil society and new institutions in

democratic Brazil. *Comparative Politics, 36*(3), 291-312.

Warren, M. E. (2002). What can democratic participation mean today? *Political Theory, 30*(5), 677-701.

Wax, M. L. (1997). On negating positivism: An anthropological dialectic. *American Anthropologist, 99*(1), 17-23.

Wayne, E. K. (2008). Is it just talk? Understanding and evaluating intergroup dialogue. *25, 4*(451-478).

Wehr, P. (1979). *Conflict regulation*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Weiss, J. N. (2003). Trajectories toward peace: Mediator sequencing strategies in intractable communal conflicts. *Negotiation Journal, 19*(2), 109-115.

Weissberg, R. (2001). Democratic political competence: Clearing the underbrush and a controversial proposal. *Political Behavior, 23*(3), 257-284.

White, G. (2004). Civil society, democratisation and development: Clearing the analytical ground. In P. Burnell & P. Calvert (Eds.), *Civil society in democratisations,* 6-21. London: Frank Cass Publications.

White, M. (2006). An Ambivalent Civility. *The Canadian Journal of Sociology, 31*(4), 445-460.

Wicks, A. C., & Freeman, R. E. (1998). Organization studies and the new pragmatism: Positivism, anti-positivism, and the search for ethics. *Organization Science, 9*(2), 123-140.

Wong, J. (2005). Adapting to democracy: Societal mobilization and social policy in Taiwan and South Korea. *Studies in Comparative International Development, 40*(3), 88-111.

Wood, G. (2003). Sociology. In P. Burnell (Ed.), *Democratization through the looking-glass,* 115-134. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Wright, R. G. (1976). A note on participation. *Political Theory, 4*(2), 227-234.

Xie, J., Song, X. M., & Stringfellow, A. (1998). Interfunctional conflict, conflict resolution styles, and new product success: A four-culture comparison. *Management Science, 44*(12-Part-2), S192-206.

Yap, F. (2010). Strategic government spending in South Korea and Taiwan: Lessons for emergent democracies. *Social Science Quarterly, 91*(3), 613-634.

Yeo, A. (2006). Signaling democracy: Patron-client relations and democratization in South

Korea and Poland. *Journal of East Asian Studies, 6*(2), 259-287.

Yin, R. (2003). *Applications of case study research*. London: SAGE Publications.

Yin, R. (2003). *Case study research: Design and methods*. London: SAGE Publications.

Yin, R. K. (1981). The case study crisis: Some answers. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 26*(1), 58-65.

Yin, R. K., & Heald, K. A. (1975). Using the case survey method to analyze policy studies. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 20*(3), 371-381.

Yoon, E., & Jeong, H.-S. (2006). Environmental governance in South Korea: Sharing authority between the state and civil society. *Conference Papers – International Studies Association*, 1.

You, J.-s. (2009). Is South Korea succeeding in controlling corruption? *Conference Papers – Midwestern Political Science Association*, 1.

Young, N. J. (1987). The peace movement, peace research, peace education and peace building: The globalization of the species problem. *Security Dialogue, 18*(3), 331-349.

Zald, M. N. (1995). Progress and accumulation in the human sciences after the fall. *Sociological Forum, 10*(3), 455-479.

Zartman, I. (2007). *Peacemaking in international conflict: Methods & techniques.* Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Zhong, Y. (2004). Political culture and participation in the Chinese countryside: some empirical evidence. *PS: Political Science & Politics, 37*(03), 445-453.

Zhu, Y., Diamond, L. J., & Sin, T.-c. (2005). Halting progress in Korea and Taiwan. *Journal of Democracy, 12*(1), 122-136.