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Citation	Greene O, Hiscock D and Flew C (2008) Integration and Co-ordination of DDR and SALW Control Programming: Issues, Experience and Priorities. Thematic Working Paper 3. Contribution to the Project: DDR and Human Security: Post Conflict Security Building and the Interests of the Poor. Bradford: Centre for International Cooperation and Security, University of Bradford.
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Centre for
International Cooperation
and Security

Integration and Co-ordination of DDR and SALW Control Programming: Issues, Experience and Priorities

Thematic Working Paper 3

Owen Greene, Duncan Hiscock, Catherine Flew

July 2008

Contribution to the Project:

**DDR and Human Security: Post-Conflict Security-Building
and the Interests of the Poor**



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Working Paper 3:
Integration and Co-ordination of DDR and SALW Control
Programming: Issues, Experience and Priorities

Owen Greene, Duncan Hiscock, Catherine Flew

1. Introduction

This paper examines the inter-relationships in post-conflict contexts between DDR programmes and processes on the one hand, and wider arms management and SALW control programmes on the other. It is a contribution to the international project on ‘DDR and Human Security: Post-conflict security building and the interests of the poor’, and aims to complement the four other Thematic working papers of this Project. It argues that greater co-ordination, and often integration, between DDR and civilian arms management/reduction programmes is needed to promote human security in most countries emerging from conflict, within the framework of a wider comprehensive strategy for enhancing security from fear and violence that also includes security sector reform.

1.1 Background

In recent years, the international community has aimed to support numerous states faced with the challenges of transition towards sustainable peace after a period of large-scale violent conflict. This has required both short-term priorities – to stabilise the country, address urgent humanitarian needs and begin reconstruction, and promote implementation of the peace-settlement – and a longer-term goal: to shape conditions that will prevent societies from sliding back towards conflict by providing stable foundations for human security and development. In the same period, security has quickly risen up the development agenda as donors have come to understand that a basic level of security (for individuals and communities as well as for states) is a crucial precondition for economic and social development as well as peace-building. The nexus of conflict, security and development has become a key focus for international policy and programming. In the process, understandings of ‘security’ and ‘development’ have broadened considerably, overlapping and blurring at the edges. As they have expanded a variety of new or developed programmes and processes have been developed to fill the spaces into which they are moving. This is particularly true for missions to support peace-building and security in post-conflict countries. In this post-conflict context, amongst the most prominent of these new programme areas is disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes.

DDR processes are in many ways intrinsic to the process of war-termination and post-conflict recovery. In that sense they have a long history. However, specific and co-ordinated programmes and measures to support disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration processes is a more recent development; with relatively intense ‘lesson-learning processes since the early 1990s, leading to revised guidelines culminating in well-developed United Nations ‘Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration Standards’ (IDDRS) published in 2006.

A primary motivation for UN and other international support for DDR programmes in post-conflict countries are to contribute to military and state stabilisation and security, and to promote appropriate demobilisation of armies and militias to reduce the risks that war may resume. However, aims and objectives of DDR programmes have increasingly adopted a broader approach that acknowledges the importance also of ‘human security’, a people-centric approach that stresses ‘freedom from fear’ and from pervasive threats to people’s and communities’ rights, safety, or lives.¹

In recent years, there has been similar international emphasis and support for programmes in a number of other security-related spheres, including transitional justice, control of small arms and light weapons (SALW), security sector reform (SSR), and mine action. To a greater or lesser extent, these programme areas address individual and community security as well as state stabilisation. Furthermore, the policy literature in these fields has often acknowledged the potential impact they may have on poverty reduction and development, even if this relationship is rarely explored in any detail².

Thus, programmes to support DDR, SSR, SALW control, mine action and transitional justice have become relatively ‘standard’ and familiar elements of post-conflict peace-support missions. Despite their obvious linkages and commonalities, however, they remain separate programming areas. Those responsible for the design, initiation and implementation of any one of these programme types are very aware (or should be) that each is highly complex and challenging.

The history of the development of DDR programmes illustrates this point. As policy-makers and practitioners have got to grips with the complex challenges to be addressed by DDR, the good-practice guidelines drawn from experience have grown in size and complexity. The UN’s Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), which are widely accepted to be authoritative, runs to some 25 chapters totalling over 800 pages. It is easy to lampoon

¹ The concept of ‘human security’ is briefly defined detail below; it is analysed more fully in the literature review ‘DDR Framed from a Human Security and Pro-Poor Perspective’ carried out for this project.

² There have nevertheless been some substantial studies on the relationships between security-building programmes and development: AVPI project (CICS; 2005); SAS (2005).

such a massive document intended to be a guide to busy policy-makers and practitioners, and there is clearly a daunting task facing those responsible for ensuring its wide dissemination and promoting its use. However, the scale of the document partly reflects an appropriate desire to present guidelines and advice for necessarily complex programmes that can be customised according to specific local circumstances – not a simple but inflexible blueprint. To take another example, the topic of SALW control is similarly multi-faceted: the UN and other agencies have identified at least eight major component parts to SALW control and numerous other ‘enabling activities’.³

The result is that although the international community has a powerful ‘toolbox’ of security-related measures in post-conflict situations, these tools are complex, and it is often unclear how they can be used in combination. Almost every analysis and policy paper acknowledges the need to ‘integrate’, ‘coordinate’ or ‘mainstream’ each strand of security programme with all others. However, practical proposals as to how such integration or coordination might be achieved are rare.

1.2 Structure of Working Paper

This Working Paper examines the inter-relationships between DDR processes and programmes on the one hand and SALW (and other arms) management and control programmes on the other. SALW management, reduction and control is a relatively new area of programming, but its importance as a security intervention in post-conflict situations is increasingly being recognised, as reflected for example by its prominence within the IDDRS (see Section 3).

Although it is easy to recognise that DDR and SALW control activities are connected, there has been limited detailed examination of where and how the linkages between the two programme areas operate and are important, or indeed where they are not. This has obstructed efforts to identify and explore the priorities for co-ordination and finding synergies between them; probably resulting in missed opportunities and reduced effectiveness of programmes in both issue areas. This Working Paper therefore aims to address this gap, and has three key aims:

- To explore and clarify the relationships and co-ordination between DDR and SALW control processes and programmes, in principle and in practice;
- To examine the implications of inter-relationships of DDR and SALW control programmes and processes for their impact and effectiveness, particularly in relation to human security and to addressing the needs and interests of poor and vulnerable groups;

³ There are numerous well-regarded regional and international guidelines relating to SALW control programmes, including for example Regional Micro-Disarmament Standard/Guideline (RMDS/G) 01.10.

- To examine issues and priorities for the future co-ordination and/or integration of DDR and SALW control programmes and processes.

Our overall argument is that DDR and SALW control policies and programmes at need to be better co-ordinated in countries emerging from conflict, and in many contexts there are important opportunities for integrating aspects of DDR, SALW control and community security. The paper particularly links with Working Paper 2 in this series, on DDR-SSR linkages. Our wider argument is not simply to promote better bilateral coordination between DDR and SALW control and SSR respectively. Rather, it is to argue for a wider change in approach to support post-conflict security building, in which elements of DDR, SALW control, SSR and community security programmes are normally combined in a customised but relatively comprehensive effort to promote human security from violence and coercion.

It is important to highlight some key themes and understandings of this working paper from the outset.

A. We understand post-conflict peace and security building efforts to be highly challenging, uncertain and dynamic processes, in which understandings and priorities of both domestic and international stakeholders are inevitably partial and influenced by a complex of interests, capacities and resources. Even well-designed and implemented security-building programmes may not succeed. Enhanced clarity and co-ordination on key linkages between DDR and SALW control programmes and processes are no panacea; but they could nevertheless make a significant difference to many vulnerable people.

B. The integration/coordination of DDR and SALW control programmes should not be seen as an ‘either/or’ question (either they are fully integrated, fully coordinated, or not at all). This is because DDR and SALW control programmes are not monolithic objects but *dynamic processes each with many components*. It is more productive to clarify key linkages between the various components of DDR and SALW control at various phases of the post-conflict recovery process. For each of the linkages between programme components, integration/coordination agendas can thus range from full integration, through all sorts of partial integration, ‘positive’ and ‘preventive’ coordination (to maximise synergies and minimise contradictions) to no coordination.

C. We are NOT arguing to further expand the scope of DDR programmes so that SALW control is fully integrated within them. We are sympathetic to the concerns of practitioners that DDR programmes should remain focussed, and that effective implementation of key aspects of SALW control policies and activities requires capabilities, scope and timescales that go substantially beyond those of an integrated DDR programme. Rather, we are concerned with identifying the key interrelationships

and links between DDR and SALW control processes, to promote effective co-ordination and synergies and overall coherence of the post-conflict recovery and peace-building strategy.

D. We recognise that recent and contemporary DDR and SALW control programmes typically aim not only to contribute to stabilisation and security of the relevant post-conflict state (and its neighbours) but also to promote ‘human security’ of vulnerable individuals and communities. Indeed, both ‘human security’ and ‘state-security’ concerns motivate most elements of DDR programmes in principle and practice, and SALW programmes in post-conflict countries are normally mostly focussed on reducing risks posed to ordinary people and communities of armed violence and insecurity. In many cases, enhanced clarity and co-ordination on DDR-SALW control linkages could straightforwardly promote both goals. Nevertheless, there are sometimes real or apparent tensions and confusions in DDR and other security programme decisions between human security and state security priorities and implications. We aim to identify and clarify these where they arise, to ensure that interests and needs of vulnerable groups are kept to the fore. This Working Paper prioritises linkages and co-ordination issues that are important for human security, particularly of poor and vulnerable groups of people.

1.3 Processes, Linkages, Integration and Coordination: Clarifying Terms

It is easy in principle to see a range of actual and potential linkages between DDR and SALW control programmes and processes, and we will use this term loosely and inclusively. However, it is important for analytical clarity to distinguish how we aim to use the terms ‘integration’ and ‘coordination’ in this paper, and also ‘programmes’ and ‘processes’. *Programmes* are those DDR or SALW control processes that are explicitly designed, approved and implemented as managed programmes. We distinguish these from wider *processes* of DDR or SALW control that may also include unplanned, spontaneous or ad-hoc activities. For example, some militias may disband on their own, and many ex-combatants may spontaneously return to their communities or migrate to cities outside of the context of a planned programme. Similarly, communities or sectors of the population may change their attitudes or activities relating to gun possession, display or use outside of the context of a declared SALW control programmes. The same distinctions apply to any other post-conflict spheres of policy and programming.

Typically, a DDR or SALW control *process* in a society includes a combination of programmatic and ad-hoc or informal activities. Sometimes the process can occur before or without a recognised strategy or programme approved by relevant policy-makers. Obviously a well designed or implemented programme aims to link and re-enforce beneficial informal or societal normative changes or activities.

Just as policy-makers and programme implementers should try to think clearly about the interrelationships between their policies and programmes and wider societal processes, it is important for this Working Paper to distinguish interactions between DDR and SALW control programmes from links between DDR programmes and wider processes affecting SALW.

It is similarly important to distinguish between programme co-ordination and integration. We understand policy or programme *co-ordination* to relate to efforts to recognise, communicate and use linkages between distinct policies and programmes in order to avoid confusion or inefficiency; exploit possible synergies; and to enhance overall effectiveness and coherence. The key point is that the relevant programmes to be co-ordinated remain distinct entities. In contrast, *integration* of programmes goes beyond co-ordination, and implies that they are merged in some way into a single larger integrated programme. ‘DDR’ is conceived as an integrated (rather than co-ordinated) set of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration measures. Full integration of DDR and SALW control would thus imply either that SALW control had become a subset of the overall DDR process (or vice versa), or that they had been fused together to form a new programmatic discipline.

In practice, the distinctions between co-ordinated and integrated programmes are often blurred. Moreover, declared ‘integrated programmes’ can often actually be rather un-integrated or even un-co-ordinated. For example, in many DDR programmes, longer-term measures to re-integrate ex-combatants into civilian life have often been relatively divorced from the disarmament and demobilisation (including ‘re-insertion’) measures. However, the distinction is important for clarity of analysis. It is also important to avoid raising unnecessary sensitivities amongst policy makers and practitioners, since such distinctions have major implications for them institutionally and politically, and in relation to resources, responsibilities, decision-making and status/careers.

Partial integration is possible where elements of distinct wider programmes are merged. For example, a specific SALW control measure might be integrated into a DDR programme while all other SALW control measures remain distinct. Issues of phasing can arise in this context. Elements of programmes integrated at the design and initiation phase may become relatively independent programmes over time. More rarely in post-conflict contexts, separate programmes may be merged as a result of a mid-term review, to overcome critical co-ordination or management problems.

1.4 Organisation of the Working Paper

The purpose of Sections 2-4 is to place the practical question of how to better coordinate/integrate DDR and SALW control in an appropriate framework and context.

They seek to ensure that the nature of both activities is well understood, that the potential points of intersection or tension are identified, and that the benefits and pitfalls of enhanced coordination/integration are explored. Section 2 briefly defines and characterises DDR and SALW control priorities and programmes in post-conflict contexts. Section 3 starts by outlining the potential benefits and risks of attempting to increase integration or coordination between DDR and SALW control, placing this in the context of human security and pro-poor policies. It then goes on to map the opportunities for integration and/or coordination by exploring the commonalities and differences between DDR and SALW control and highlighting areas where integration/coordination could in principle be achieved. This is followed in Section 4 by an assessment of experience: how DDR and SALW control programmes have been linked or co-ordinated in practice and the impact this has had. The research draws both on general data about recent post-conflict operations across the world and on the initial findings of some in-depth case studies carried out within the overall project. Section 5 the draws together the main findings and discussed emerging policy implications.

2. Understanding DDR and SALW control programmes: some definitions and key characteristics

Section 2 provides some working definitions and understandings of DDR and SALW control as a basis for subsequent analysis.

2.1 DDR: Definitions and key characteristics

Classically, DDR is made up of at least three reasonably distinct activities: disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration of ex-combatants. More recently, the demobilisation phase has been subdivided, to include re-insertion of ex-combatants into civilian life, by providing transitional assistance to bridge the gap before longer-term re-integration.⁴ Taken separately, each of these processes may occur in a variety of contexts, from the end of compulsory military service during peacetime through to the downsizing of forces as part of SSR.⁵ However, during the 1990s international commitment was developed for the concept of an integrated ‘DDR’ package of measures to be implemented after wars come to an end.

Box 2.1 Elements of DDR

<p>Disarmament: the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of (ex-)combatants. Disarmament</p>
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⁴ Full definitions for demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration can be found in IDDRS Module 1.20; the IDDRS definition for disarmament is discussed below.

⁵ Rufer, 2005, pp. 2-3.

may also include the development of responsible and effective arms management programmes.

Demobilisation: the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage encompasses the support package provided to the demobilised, which is called ‘re-insertion’.

Re-insertion: the short-term (up to about one year) material and/or financial assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilisation but prior to the longer term process of re-integration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help to cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and other dependants, and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools.

Reintegration: the longer-term social, political and economic process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is an open time-framed complex process, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country, and is a national responsibility which often requires long-term external assistance.

Note: these definitions broadly follow those of the UN IDDRS, with some editing for clarity and brevity.

The UN IDDRS define the objectives of DDR to be: ‘A process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods.’⁶

The scope and ambition of DDR makes it complex both in terms of its goals and its interaction with other processes. The IDDRS emphasises that ‘the DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions.’⁷ SIDDR underlines that as a key part of the peace process, DDR is a highly political endeavour,⁸ and Rufer notes that DDR is ‘both the means (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration as technical and political instruments) of the peace process and its end (demobilised ex-combatants who have definitely stopped using their weapons, are integrated in civilian life and participate productively in the civilian

⁶ Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) Module 1.20, p. 6.

⁷ IDDRS Module 2.10, p. 4.

⁸ SIDDR Final Report, 2006, p. 9.

economy)'.⁹ Furthermore, it is clearly recognised that DDR is but one element of post-conflict security and peace-building measures, alongside possible peacekeeping operations, SALW control, SSR, transitional justice, and mine action.

Reintegration is a relatively long term and open social, economic and political process. To be successful, it must be part of a wider long-term strategy to rebuild and develop the country in such a way that peace is sustainable. As a result, there has been a tendency to push DDR policy and programme boundaries ever further, at the risk of saddling DDR programmes with unrealistic expectations.

This has been compounded by the characteristics of the funding and donor system. DDR programmes are high-profile interventions, agreed and implemented as the transition from conflict to peace is just beginning. Internationally supported DDR programmes have normally attracted comparatively high levels of funding (compared to wider SALW control). In the context of UN missions, for example, UN Assessed Contributions can be used to support integrated DDR and wider peace-support missions. Later, when it comes to the hard task of long-term, sustainable re-integration and peacebuilding, international and donor attention has typically shifted to other crises, co-ordination measures became (even) less influential, and mechanisms for mobilising international aid become more fragmented and ad-hoc. As a result, advocates of longer-term security and development measures can find it much harder to win the resources they believe necessary. This creates a temptation to 'attach' their initiatives to the DDR framework in an attempt to secure earlier and increased resources.

Such factors have in recent years led to widespread concerns amongst policy makers and practitioners to retain focus in DDR programmes. For example, the SIDDR recommended a return to the chief purpose of DDR: 'to contribute to a secure and stable environment in which the overall peace process and transition can be sustained [by] removing the immediate threat to a fragile peace posed by groups of armed, uncontrolled and unemployed ex-combatants';¹⁰ noting that DDR programmes should be 'based on the goals of security and stability [and cannot] alone [...] achieve either a rapid or comprehensive transformation of societal structures'.¹¹

2.2 Understanding disarmament within DDR

An obvious key linkage between DDR and SALW control is in the area of disarmament. Disarmament is defined in the IDDRS as follows:

⁹ Rufer, 2005, p. 23.

¹⁰ SIDDR Final Report, 2006, p. 14.

¹¹ SIDDR Final Report pp. 14-15.

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.¹²

This definition emphasises that the primary role of disarmament within DDR is to disarm combatants who are being demobilised in the immediate post-conflict period. But it also acknowledges two wider dimensions: that normally it is also desirable and necessary to reduce as well as control the weapons held by the civilian population; and that short-term disarmament measures must be linked to longer-term SALW control, which goes far beyond simple disarmament (see Section 2.3 below).

In order to achieve DDR, different strategies may be required for various elements, including the employment of both short- and long-term disarmament strategies:

The removal of weapons from combatants is only one aspect of disarmament within DDR. A broad range of short- and long-term activities should accompany this process, including: community-based weapons collection and control programmes; weapons destruction; the (re-)establishment of domestic legal systems to control weapons possession, regulate local weapons production industries, and manage the supply and transportation of weapons; and securing State stockpiles to prevent leakage of arms into society. External measures such as international and regional small arms and light weapons conventions and arms embargoes must be used to devise cooperative regional strategies to control the flow of illicit weapons across borders.¹³

There is thus a significant overlap in the IDDRS with the definition and scope of DDR and SALW control measures (see below). This appears to reflect an unresolved (and fudged) debate amongst DDR policy-makers and practitioners about DDR-SALW control linkages. There is clearly an important and practical distinction between the ‘core’ DDR business of disarmament of ex-combatants (and their dependents) and the range of wider ‘arms management and control’ programmes. But, since several recent UN ‘DDR’ programmes (such as in South Sudan and Haiti) have in practice aimed to support wider arms management, they could hardly be excluded in the IDDRS definition. We understand examples of wider practice in some recent DDR programmes to be examples of well-intentioned efforts by programme managers to respond to major gaps in mandated

¹² IDDRS Module 1.20, p. 6; Secretary-General note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005.

¹³ IDDRS Module 2.10, p. 5.

post-conflict security-building missions by extending their own programmes into wider SALW control. Moreover, in many war-torn countries, there is no clear distinction in practice between armies, armed groups and civilians.

For reasons of analytical clarity, for the purposes of this Working Paper our definition of the disarmament element of DDR (see Box 2.1 above) omits or limits reference to wider civilian disarmament and arms management. We believe that our approach is consistent with the overall thrust of the IDDRS, which in other sections makes it clear that the range of short- and long-term disarmament strategies described by the IDDRS are a list of *possibilities* and are not necessarily an integral part of DDR. In this regard, it is worth noting the approach taken by the EU. The EU's 'Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration' adopts the UN definitions for DDR in full, but the definition of disarmament is qualified by a footnote stating that the development of responsible arms management programmes is 'not mandatory', though it should be noted that 'disarmament is often linked to civilian voluntary surrender programmes.'¹⁴

2.3 SALW control: Definitions and key characteristics¹⁵

The issue of SALW proliferation has rapidly risen up the international agenda since the mid-1990s, due to a range of factors including wider recognition of the terrible impacts of inadequately controlled or misused SALW in much of the world, and the challenges these pose for post-conflict peace-building. The size, portability and easy operation of pistols, assault rifles and many other SALW makes them easy to conceal and to smuggle, and they are usually relatively cheap and readily available. They are typically held by many sectors beyond the military, including civilians, police and other civilian agencies, and private security companies - causing serious problems of armed violence and insecurity in many politically stable or relatively peaceful countries. They are also the primary weapons of use in the majority of the world's armed conflicts. During recent wars, large numbers of SALW typically diffused throughout major sections of society, and were used not only in war but also for wider crime, intimidation and personal protection. Their wide and excessive availability after large-scale conflict ends tend to exacerbate violent crime and human insecurity, as well as obstructing state stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are numerous descriptions of the category of 'SALW', but no globally agreed definition. This paper will use perhaps the most widely used understanding of the SALW

¹⁴ EU Concept for Support to DDR, 2006, p.7

¹⁵ This paper uses the term 'SALW control', which is increasingly recognised as the preferred terminology for this field of activity. However, references may also be found to 'arms management' and 'micro-disarmament' in the text where they quote from other sources. These are similar terms but are less conceptually distinct and do not have such a body of policy and practice behind them as 'SALW control'.

category, which has informed the UN Programme of Action and most national policies and regional agreements on SALW. According to this understanding¹⁶, SALW are: *Small Arms* – all conventional weapons that can be carried and operated by a single individual, including: revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines; assault rifles; grenades; sub-machine guns; and light machine guns. *Light Weapons* – conventional weapons that can be carried and operated by a small unit of 2 – 4 personnel and could, for example, be mounted on the back of a jeep. These include: heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; recoilless rifles; portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns; portable anti-tank or anti-aircraft missile systems; and mortars of less than 100 mm calibre. More briefly, as adopted by the UNDP South Eastern and East European Clearinghouse for the Control of Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) in the Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards/Guidelines (RMDS/G),¹⁷ SALW are:

All lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability.¹⁸

In principle, anti-personnel land-mines are also included in this category, but they are normally placed in a category of their own since they are the focus of separate international agreements and programmes. For this reason, this Paper does not focus on land mines. However, it is important to recognise that programmes to clear land of mines and to dispose of land mines often overlap in practice with SALW reduction and control processes. Mines and SALW are often mixed in the holdings of armed groups, and thus collection and disposal programmes need at least to be co-ordinated, and in practice they are often integrated. For example, there are many cases where land-mine disposal programmes have also dealt with SALW and unexploded ordinance as well. Measures to promote arms stockpile management and security must tackle both mines and SALW in practice. More widely, it makes sense for co-operation between land-mine, SALW collection and disposal, and disarmament elements of DDR programmes that are operating in the same geographical areas.

SALW control programmes can be defined for our purposes as ‘activities that, together, aim to enhance controls on SALW and to reduce the social, economic and environmental

¹⁶ Reports of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts (1997) and of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (1999); UNGA, 1997; 1999.

¹⁷ As explained in RMDS/G 01.10, the term ‘micro-disarmament’ was often used previously for activities that are broadly synonymous to those contained within SALW control. ‘SALW control’ is now the most commonly used term (see previous footnote), but the RMDS/G have not been renamed as they are already established standards.

¹⁸ RMDS/G 02.10, p. 20

impact of inadequately controlled SALW spread and possession'.¹⁹ Unlike DDR, SALW control is relevant in all country contexts, including politically stable countries or fragile states as well as war-torn societies. SALW control measures go far beyond the disarmament phase within DDR. Although disarmament within DDR in itself obviously includes SALW control measures, it is a specific intervention primarily focussed on recognised ex-combatants (and their dependents) and is far narrower in scope than SALW control. To facilitate analytical clarity, in this Working Paper 'SALW control' is taken to mean those SALW control *measures other than disarmament within DDR*, unless specifically stated.

SALW control includes a wide range of types of measures. For example, the RMDS/G identify eight types of SALW control:

- Cross-border and arms transfer control measures;
- Legislative and regulatory measures;
- SALW surveys;
- SALW awareness and communications strategies;
- SALW collection programmes;
- SALW destruction programmes;
- Management of information;
- SALW stockpile management and security.²⁰

The past ten years have seen the rapid development of global and regional agreements with norms, standards and programmes to enhance SALW controls and to combat, reduce and prevent proliferation and trafficking of SALW. There is now substantial programming experience, and detailed best practice guidelines for policy development and the programme implementation have also been developed, particularly at the regional level. For example, the RMDS developed under the auspices of SEESAC provide a relatively extensive and systematic set of implementation guidelines for SALW control measures, covering issues from operational practices in weapons collection to legislative issues and the establishment of institutional structures.²¹ Detailed best practice guidelines have also been developed by the OSCE and under the auspices of RECSA, in East Africa, while model legal frameworks for SALW control have been developed within the OAS, League of Arab States and Pacific Islands Forum.²²

¹⁹ Adapted from, IDDRS Module 1.20, p.21; RMDS/G 02.10, p. 20.

²⁰ RMDS/G 01.10, p.4. Other UN definitions appear to list only six component parts by grouping together some of these activities, such as collection and destruction operations.

²¹ See SEESAC RMDS <http://www.seesac.org/index.php?content=&page=crse§ion=5>

²² See: OSCE, *Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, OSCE, Vienna, 2003; RECSA, 'Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol', RECSA, Nairobi, 2005; Arab Model Law on Weapons, Ammunitions, Explosives and Hazardous

The translation of these international and regional commitments and guidelines into more tangible programmes and projects has been uneven, both in terms of where programmes have been developed and in the issues of SALW control on which these programmes focus. Nonetheless, within regions such as East, West and Southern Africa; South Eastern and Eastern Europe; Latin America; South Pacific; and parts of South East Asia, well-established regional SALW programmes are now in place, with active regional co-ordination bodies in operation.²³ A growing number of states have established national commissions, or focal points – inter-agency bodies to co-ordinate policy and action on SALW control. While many have yet to become fully operational, there are a growing number of broad-ranging national SALW control programmes, such as the National Action Plans being implemented in Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Botswana and Namibia, and programmes like the EU-sponsored ASAC project in Cambodia, among others.²⁴ Through the experiences of programmes such as these, there have been rapid improvements in international understanding of the purposes, methodologies and complexities of SALW control.

This outline of SALW control measures underlines the variety as well as the complexity of SALW reduction and control as a field of policy and practice. SALW control has far wider scope than disarmament or weapons collection. Indeed, in some circumstances it may be deemed infeasible or even harmful to political or conflict dynamics to attempt disarmament. In such contexts other types of SALW control should be prioritised, such as measures to raise awareness; reduce the risk of SALW being misused and fuelling crime and insecurity; improve laws and regulations; enhance SALW stockpile security; or improve controls on legal or illicit SALW transfers.

Materials (Full text available at <http://www.international.gc.ca/informalmeetinggeneva2007/arab-model-law-en.asp> (Unofficial English translation), OAS CICAD Draft Model Regulations for the Control of Brokers of Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition. Amendments to the Model Regulation for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, 2003 (http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cicad_brokers.pdf); Pacific Islands Forum, ‘Weapons Control Bill’ (<http://www.globalpolicy.org/smallarms/regional/nadi.rtf>).

²³ Regional Centre of Small Arms (formerly the Nairobi Secretariat) has operated since 2003, facilitating the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol and enabling co-operation among the signatory states to the Protocol. In South Eastern and Eastern Europe, the UNDP SEESAC has been providing support to the establishment of SALW control programmes since 2003.

²⁴ For further information reviewing progress made in the implementation of regional and international commitments and reviews of SALW programmes see, IANSA and Biting the Bullet, *Reviewing action on small arms: assessing the first five years of the UN Programme of Action*, Biting the Bullet, June 2006, (<http://www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php?id=191>) SEESAC SALW Monitor Reports (<http://www.seesac.org/index.php?content=13§ion=3>) and, Small Arms Survey Yearbooks (<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/yearb2007.html>)

Successful SALW control normally depends on the combination of several of its programme elements, rather than implementing any one element in isolation. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that even comprehensive SALW control programmes are unlikely to be effective unless they are placed within a wider security context. SALW control measures typically need to be complemented with measures to address the insecurities that help to generate demand for weapons as well as wider political, socio-economic, cultural and other factors that contribute to criminal or political violence. Thus, for example, SALW control programmes are increasingly linked with programmes to promote community engagement and with SSR initiatives such as police or judicial reform aimed at improving human security and community safety.²⁵

This Working Paper specifically examines links between DDR and SALW reduction/control processes, and thus focuses on SALW control in post-conflict environments. SALW control is typically very relevant after large scale armed conflicts, where SALW remain widely available amongst civilians and armed groups other than recognised ex-combatants, and where risks of misuse are typically high. It is now widely recognised that SALW control measures (in conjunction with related SSR and community safety initiatives) can potentially play a crucial role in promoting human security as well as state stabilisation throughout the post-conflict transition and peace-building period, including the early stages. The IDDRS module entitled ‘SALW Control, Security and Development’ states succinctly that ‘in post-conflict situations, where weapons are often widely held by ex-combatants, civilians and criminals, the presence of SALW can severely hamper security, undermining the prospects of longer-term recovery and development.’²⁶

Without effective action to promote SALW controls, the consequences for human security as well as state stabilisation can be severe:

- **There is a greater chance of a relapse into armed conflict.** Evidence shows that post-conflict countries are particularly vulnerable to the re-emergence of armed conflict.²⁷ While arms do not in themselves cause renewed conflict, high levels of arms availability increase the risk that disaffected groups resort to armed violence; either as a resumption of past conflict or in new formations.

²⁵ UNDP Practice Note “Securing Development”, 2005, p. 10. This is also evidenced at the national level, where the National Action Plans adopted by Kenya and Uganda, for instance, under Section 7.3 of these plans, make explicit reference to the co-ordination of SALW programmes with community-based policing initiatives. See Uganda National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons, “Mapping the Small Arms Problem in Uganda: The development of Uganda’s National Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons”, Saferworld, 2007, p. 68-69.

²⁶ IDDRS Module 4.11, p. 1.

²⁷ See, for example, P. Collier and N. Sambanis (eds), *Understanding Civil War*; The World Bank, 2005.

- **SALW can fuel high levels of post-conflict armed criminal violence and insecurity**, greatly affecting ordinary people and communities through the direct and indirect impacts of armed violence and insecurity. In various ‘post-conflict’ situations, such as El Salvador, Haiti, and Iraq, overall levels of armed criminal violence have been comparable to those during the war. This will typically relate to combinations of score-settling, land and property disputes/theft, warlordism, raiding, street crime, organised crime, domestic violence, sexual violence, and suicide; as well as new forms of political violence as interest groups pursue their interests in the new ‘post-conflict’ environment.
- **Refugee and IDP camps are more vulnerable to armed groups.** There is often a struggle to control such camps after as well as during conflicts – to hide, regroup and gain access to humanitarian resources. Wide availability of SALW can affect the risks and impacts of such struggles.
- **Excessive holdings of SALW can fuel internal or cross-border arms transfers.** Weapons that are rendered surplus in the post-conflict period become available as a commodity for uncontrolled internal or cross-border trade, if they are not collected and safely disposed of. There are many examples of destabilising flows of SALW to rebels or criminals in neighbouring countries and regions as conflicts come to an end.
- **SALW availability increases the risk that armed violence becomes a political or cultural norm.** Widespread (mis-)use of SALW and other weapons during conflicts disrupts previous social regulation and control of violence; and a ‘culture of violence’ and impunity can take hold. Wide availability of SALW increases the risk that these endure in the post conflict period; with high levels of gun possession, armed violence and insecurity becoming a norm, particularly affecting vulnerable people and communities.
- **Missed opportunities to break vicious cycles.** When armed conflicts come to an end, there are often ‘windows of opportunity’ for confidence-building and reducing SALW availability. Ordinary people hope for the best and armed groups know that they may have to change. This provides a context in which well-designed and timely practical initiatives can stimulate a positive dynamic to promote human security and empowerment of communities. Experience indicates that SALW collection or destruction initiatives can constitute an important practical and symbolic entry-point for such confidence-building, while also helping to remove significant numbers of ‘surplus’ arms from circulation.²⁸ Delayed action on SALW control risks missing such windows of opportunity, and allowing a malign cycle to take hold in which civilian demand for SALW is re-enforced by lowered expectations of enduring insecurity from armed criminal or political violence in the post-conflict environment.

²⁸ See CICS, AVPI report, 2005, op cit. Note that such early SALW collection and destruction initiatives do not normally succeed in collecting arms that their owners believe to be essential for their security. Rather they reduce overall arms availability by collecting the arms that are becoming surplus to ‘essential’ requirements – normally substantial quantities, as well as often encouraging people to hide their remaining weapons and thus reducing display and ready access to these as well.

The threats posed by uncontrolled SALW to human security from violence after conflicts are thus clearly established. SALW control programmes can also make an important *contribution* to wider poverty reduction, recovery and development, even though these are not usually set as a declared programme objective.²⁹ The EU SALW Strategy recognises that ‘the destabilizing accumulation and spread of SALW constitutes a growing threat to peace, security and development’ and that ‘human security and human development are interdependent’.³⁰ SALW programmes can help not only by reducing the direct scale and risks of armed violence, but also improving *perceptions* of security, which can be even more important in promoting an environment for development and wider peace-building to take place. A study on SALW programmes within Bradford University’s Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative found that in Sierra Leone, for example, ‘women and men were able to return to farming land that was lost during the war as a result of the reduction of armed violence measured by members of the community in terms of less frequent incidences of gun shot sounds. This had a clear impact on poverty reduction in rural Sierra Leone.’³¹ Similarly, a UNDP SALW ‘arms for development’ programme involving the establishment of gun-free zones had notable impacts on rural participation in primary education and health, as well as in bringing good to markets: the absence of gunfire (even from hunting) built confidence in safe travel for all along rural tracks. As noted above, SALW programmes also facilitate development by promoting ideas such as community ownership and empowerment that can then be translated into other spheres.

2.4 Conclusion

Both DDR and SALW control programmes are highly relevant in most, if not all, post-conflict contexts. Having outlined the key aims, understandings, and elements of each of these two types of security-building programmes, it is clear that there are some potential overlaps and also that linkages between DDR and SALW control programmes and processes can be expected to be important – for each programme and for the overall impact on the poor and vulnerable.

Recognition of the importance of DDR programmes in post-conflict support missions has been internationally- recognised at least since the early 1990s. Similar recognition of the likely importance of early SALW control measures has only recently developed, and is still patchy. In most post-conflict support programmes to date, wider SALW control

²⁹ CICS (Centre for International Co-operation and Security), University of Bradford; ‘Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative Research project, 2005; (a major project, resulting in over 20 research reports relating to this issue): see www.brad.ac.uk/peace/cics/avpi

³⁰ EU SALW Strategy, p. 7 & p. 3.

³¹ CICS University of Bradford, “Assessing and reviewing the impact of SALW projects”, 2005, p. 5.

measures have either been delayed until long after DDR programmes have been launched, or not conducted at all. In such circumstances, there has typically been a security programme ‘gap’ between demobilisation and disarmament of ex-combatants in DDR programmes in the immediate post-conflict period and the wider establishment of human security for vulnerable people and communities. The security of such vulnerable groups is affected by the availability and use of weapons across the whole society and territory, and not only those held by the official combatants addressed in the DDR programme.

Gaps or inadequate linkages between DDR and SALW control measures not only threaten wider prospects for stabilisation and human security but also the viability and effectiveness of each of each programme in itself. For example, ex-combatants are highly sensitive to likely insecurities associated with their re-insertion and re-integration into civilian life. High levels of human insecurity in communities, and lack of action on SALW and community safety, may discourage ex-combatants from disarming properly or from leaving their old command structures – thus undermining the effectiveness of DDR programmes. Similarly, efforts to promote small arms control and reduction amongst civilians are greatly limited if there are not corresponding programmes relating to the military, police and armed militias.

3. Linkages between DDR and SALW Programmes: Issues and Priorities

3.1 Introduction

This section aims to examine the linkages between DDR and SALW control programmes and processes in post-conflict contexts, and to provide an initial mapping of the issues and priorities for possible co-ordination or integration. In line with the overall aims of this Working Paper, it focuses particularly on linkages and issues relating to the interests and concerns of the poor and vulnerable after armed conflicts, although it is important to note that these are often intimately related to progress in sustaining the peace settlement and state stabilisation. Although the discussion draws upon practical experience in many post-conflict countries, the focus is on providing an initial mapping of the issues for possible co-ordination or integration rather than specific examination of country experiences (for which, see section 4).

3.2. Programme co-ordination or integration: risks and benefits

It is important to recognise that efforts to co-ordinate or integrate programmes for complex and challenging post-conflict environments have often proved frustrating, resource and time intensive. It is not always clear that the resulting improvements in overall effectiveness justified the effort, and in some cases they may be a costly

diversion. Thus it is important to go beyond identifying programme linkages and potential overlaps to establish priorities for co-ordination/integration – where the pay-offs are likely to justify the effort. To help to ensure consistent awareness from the outset of the key potential risks as well as benefits of co-ordination efforts, we briefly outline them here.

3.2.1 Possible drawbacks of integration/coordination efforts

There are a number of potential pitfalls for efforts to co-ordinate or integrate DDR and SALW control programmes and measures:

- **Confusion of objectives.** Post-conflict environments are highly complex, challenging and uncertain. The scope of SALW control is not only distinct but also in principle much wider than that of DDR: in terms of issues, capabilities, target groups/beneficiaries, stakeholders, and processes. If DDR programme design and implementation becomes closely entangled with wider SALW control measures, it may not only distract from ‘core’ DDR measures but also lead to wider confusion of objectives between different programme elements. Blurred objectives will further complicate monitoring and evaluation and reduce the accountability of implementing agencies.
- **Overloading design and planning stages.** Despite recent increased international attention and resources allocated to comprehensive and integrated post-conflict mission assessments and programme design and planning, these processes remain severely constrained in terms of time, resources, uncertainty and political complexity. Requirements for on-going close co-ordination or integration between DDR and SALW controls (or other types of programmes) could delay or overload urgent design and planning for core DDR programme elements, exacerbated by the fact that the practitioner communities for DDR and SALW control are often relatively distinct, with different institutional backgrounds and understandings of good practices.
- **Mixed messages sent to beneficiaries and stakeholders.** Since DDR and SALW control have overlapping but different target groups, beneficiaries and objectives, there is a substantial risk of mixed messages being received by various stakeholders. While experienced international staff may understand the distinctions between each strand of programme activity, they may be less clear to national decision-makers or to civilian, and ex-combatant communities. Such confusions can be particularly damaging in post-conflict countries
- **Operational risks from confusion among the civilian population.** The confusions noted above could put programme elements at risk. For example, the IDDRS notes a number of risks if target groups confuse concurrent programmes for D&D of ex-combatants and voluntary civilian weapons collection. For example, there may be misperceptions between civilians and ex-combatants about incentive packages or the extent to which weapons hand-in is voluntary. Similarly, civilians may try to surrender

weapons and ordnance at collection points designed for ex-combatants (and vice versa), resulting in safety problems and mix-ups with record-keeping, cantonment and re-insertion, and individuals' status in the overall DDR programme. Such confusions can result in tension and violence, as illustrated by practical experience (such as in Liberia), and can be exploited by 'spoilers'.

- **Loss of flexibility.** It is important for post-conflict programmes to retain appropriate flexibility to respond to emerging implementation problems or changes in context. Additional requirements to maintain co-ordination (or integration) of programmes raise further obstacles to responsiveness and adaptability of each programme or programme element.

- **Risk of unsustainable close co-ordination:** distinctive but co-ordinated programmes are relatively vulnerable to failures of co-ordination during implementation, even if co-ordination has been good during the initial design and planning stages. The existence of distinct decision-making, funding and resources, institutions, and implementation teams whose primary responsibility is to their own programme makes co-ordination prone to disruption – particularly in the complex and politicised post-conflict context. If one programme has been designed to rely on such co-ordination, the consequences of such disruptions can be serious. In this sense, close co-ordination risks being an unsustainable half-way house between mere information exchange and consultation on the one hand and integration on the other.

Such risks vary according to whether programme co-ordination or full or partial integration is on the agenda. As illustrated in the last point, the integration option can in some cases be seen as a possible solution to mitigate risks arising from attempts at close co-ordination. Similarly, in other respects, co-ordination strategies may appear to pose lower risks than integration (in relation for example to flexibility).

3.2.2 Potential benefits of improved integration/coordination

The potential benefits of enhanced co-ordination or integration of DDR and SALW control programmes should be assessed alongside such risks. The overall direction of recent international policies and lessons from experience of post-conflict peace and security building has been towards enabling and enhancing programme co-ordination and integration – not least through the UN's 'integrated mission' agenda. The IDDRS and many other authoritative sources have emphasised the importance of promoting effective co-ordination of DDR with other post-conflict programmes including SALW control.

The potential benefits of co-ordination or integration of programmes are broadly to recognise and develop synergies and avoid undesirable duplication, gaps or contradictions between the programmes. More specifically, benefits include the following.

- **Recognise that DDR and SALW control programmes should be elements of a more comprehensive process of post-conflict reconstruction and peace and security building.** In this context, co-ordination or integration of DDR and SALW control programmes is important as part of a wider priority to co-ordinate all efforts in line with an overall peace-building strategy. This is important at the design and planning stages, as well as during implementation and review.
- **Promote efficient use of resources.** Where elements of DDR and SALW control require similar information, interact with similar stakeholders, make use of similar skills, capacities and equipment, etc, co-ordination or integration can help to pool resources and avoid duplication.
- **Promote effective use of information.** Formal and informal gathering and assessment of information on progress towards implementation and objectives, and emerging problems and opportunities, are vital for effective DDR and SALW control programmes and processes. Programme co-ordination or integration can facilitate sharing of information, assessments and responses to mutual benefit.
- **Prevent mixed messages and confusion amongst beneficiaries and stakeholders.** The potential for confusion amongst local and national stakeholders between DDR and SALW control elements is intrinsic to post-conflict programmes, and may be more effectively addressed through co-ordinated approaches than by emphasising the distance between programmes.
- **Manage overlapping mandates and objectives.** The mandates and overall objectives established for international DDR or SALW control programmes are often the result of political compromise, and may be vague, over-restrictive, or out of date. Co-ordination between programmes may be required to identify and jointly address gaps, overlaps, and inconsistencies in mandates and objectives in the interests of human security as well as of state stabilisation. Instead of leading to confusion about objectives, as sceptics fear, co-ordination can help to clarify and refine appropriate and balanced objectives within and between programmes. Co-ordination facilitates appropriate sequencing and phasing, as well as concurrent programming.
- **Enable joint problem solving.** Armed violence, insecurity, the continuing existence of armed groups, and difficulties reintegrating ex-combatants often fall within the same vicious circles. Success in DDR and SALW control may depend on tackling obstacles in a co-ordinated way, taking advantage of the differing capacities and constituencies of the two programmes.
- **Promote awareness in DDR programmes of interests of the poor and vulnerable people.** DDR programmes broadly tend to focus on engaging with the main armed groups, and on the concerns of their leaders and ex-combatants, in order to support and maintain the peace settlement and stabilise the state and government. In contrast, SALW control programmes tend primarily to focus more directly on reducing risks of armed

violence to ordinary civilians, and on engaging with wider governmental and community groups. Co-ordination (or integration) between them may help to ensure that opportunities are taken for DDR to contribute to wider security of vulnerable people.

- **Promote links between short and longer term post-conflict security-building.**

Typically, DDR programmes are designed and launched as soon as possible after large-scale conflict ends, and most programme elements are terminated after 2-4 years. In contrast, SALW control programmes are mostly initiated after any DDR programme has started, and may focus on longer-term security-building. Co-ordination between them may improve: consideration of longer-term issues in DDR programming; and continuity and hand-over as DDR programmes come to an end.

- **Enable capacity built during DDR to be carried on to SALW control programmes.** When DDR programmes finish, much of the technical, human, institutional and physical capacity and knowledge that has been built up is withdrawn or dispersed. Co-ordination or integration could help to avoid such waste by enabling valuable hand-over to continuing SALW or other programmes.

These are all important potential benefits from programmes co-ordination or integration. The next step is to identify and examine linkages between DDR and SALW control programmes in order to identify the areas and contexts where there is strong potential for realising such benefits and where they could make a big difference – for human security as well as state stabilisation.

International guidance on such issues remains inadequate. In practice the IDDRS is vague or inconsistent about the circumstances in which integration or close co-ordination with wider SALW control is a priority. In places, the IDDRS comes close to recommending a strongly integrationist approach – to the extent that its definition of disarmament within DDR includes ‘the development of responsible arms management programmes.’ It further states that ‘DDR processes should deal very thoroughly with all aspects of disarmament and weapons control and management’.³² However, as noted, at other points, the IDDRS approach is entirely consistent with a relatively minimalist ‘co-ordination as necessary’ approach. The following sub-sections aim to address these questions more specifically and systematically.

3.3 DDR and SALW Control Programmes: Commonalities and Differences

This sub-section aims to compare and contrast the main ‘macro-level’ characteristics of DDR and SALW control programmes: what they aim to do (objectives, targets and beneficiaries); how they are managed (implementing actors, sources and scale of funding, characteristics of local ownership); when they are completed (phasing and sequencing of

³² IDDRS Module 2.10, p.4.

DDR and SALW control interventions); monitoring and assessments of effectiveness (monitoring, review and evaluation); and their links with other programmes and processes. This helps to structure and illuminate the discussion in section 3.4 of practical links and potential synergies between these two types of programme.

3.3.1 Comparing Programme Aims and Objectives

It is clear from section 2 of this Working Paper that there are many similarities between the overall objectives of DDR and SALW control programmes in post-conflict contexts. Thus:

- The main aim of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict situations so that recovery and development can begin;³³
- The overriding aim of any SALW control intervention programme is to secure a safer environment and control small arms and light weapons within society - to promote the conditions that will encourage progress in enhancing human security across the country and its neighbours.³⁴

Both DDR and SALW control focus on reducing risks posed by arms and armed individuals and groups to society, the state and the region. They are thus both highly political processes, though with numerous technical dimensions that key stakeholders are sometimes prepared (conditionally) to de-politicise for pragmatic reasons.

- DDR programmes primarily focus on a specific target group - ‘ex-combatants’ and associated dependents and camp-followers - with a specific disarmament programme element to ‘reduce or control the number of weapons held by combatants before demobilization in order to build confidence in the peace process, increase security and prevent a return to conflict.’³⁵
- SALW control programmes primarily focus on control and reduction of arms (and associated ammunition), with possible programme elements that may address a wide variety of types of target population groups or institutions.

Some might argue that DDR is more focussed on promoting state stability and security, while SALW control is more focussed on promoting human security by preventing or reducing risk and fears of armed violence or coercion. The historical evolution of these two types of programme gives some credence to this distinction. Classically, international support for demobilisation focussed on supporting the implementation of a peace-settlement by managing rapid and orderly standing-down of large standing armies after a war; and contemporary DDR retains this key focus. In contrast, international support

³³ IDDRS Module 2.10, p. 4.

³⁴ Based on IDDRS Module 4.11, pp. 6-7; RMDS/G 01.10, p. 4.

³⁵ IDDRS Module 4.10, p. 4.

SALW programmes focussed on supporting efforts to reduce or control arms and armed criminal or societal violence in societies where these were severely affecting substantial sections of the civilian population; and were rarely launched in post-conflict societies until well after overall state stability had been achieved.

However, recent developments have tended to undermine such distinctions. Most recent DDR programmes have in practice addressed human as well as state security; and direct beneficiaries have extended far beyond the most dangerous ex-combatant groups that pose direct threats to overall state stability. Similarly, as SALW control measures become more widely used in countries emerging from conflict, they have often been directly relevant to overall state security and stability as well as to security of vulnerable individuals and communities.

Moreover, as the IDDRS notes, many of the operational objectives for aspects of SALW control programmes ‘will be identical, similar or complementary to the operational objectives of the disarmament component of the DDR programme.’³⁶ To demonstrate this, our Table 3.1 aims to group the IDDRS (and RMDS) objectives in a way that facilitates comparison.

Table 3.1: Operational objectives of SALW control and disarmament within DDR ³⁷

Disarmament within DDR	SALW Control
An improvement in the perception of human security within communities	Reduction in the number of weapons available to criminals
Reduction in the number of weapons possessed by, or available to, armed forces and groups	
Reduction in actual, or the threat of, armed violence	
Zero, or at the very least minimal, casualties during the disarmament component	Reduction in the number of weapon and ammunition accidents
The need to make a public connection between the availability of weapons and armed violence in society	Need to make a public connection between the availability of weapons and the amount of violence in the society, (by both national authorities and the civilian population at large)
Requirement to build community awareness of the problem and hence community solidarity	Requirement to build community awareness of the problem and hence community solidarity
Reduction and disruption of the transfer and illicit trade of weapons within the DDR area of operations	Reduction and disruption of the transfer and illicit trade of weapons on the black market
	Control of legal weapons through national legislation and registration
	Recovery of stolen weapons from the community
Reduction of the open visibility of weapons in the community, and addressing the culture of weapons	Reduction of the open visibility of weapons in the community, and addressing the culture of weapons

³⁶ IDDRS Module 4.11, p. 7.

³⁷ These objectives for disarmament are listed in IDDRS Module 4.10, p. 5; objectives for SALW control can be found in IDDRS Module 4.11 p. 7 and RMDS/G 02.10 p. 5 (these two lists are identical except for two very minor changes).

Development of norms against the illegal use of weapons	Development of norms against the illegal use of weapons
	Use of SALW control as a launch framework for future capacity building and sustainable development.

It is thus clear that the operational objectives of SALW control and the disarmament measures in DDR in principle overlap strongly, with close operational concerns, which emphasise not only the likely need for close co-ordination but also possible programme integration.

In practice, there are also several recent examples of internationally-supported DDR programmes that have aimed not only to integrate SALW control and community safety programmes within them, but even to prioritise the latter over supposedly ‘core’ DDR elements. These include phases of UN-supported DDR programmes in Southern Sudan and in Haiti.³⁸ However, the experience of these integration attempts has not been particularly happy (as discussed in section 4), arguably because of a combination of: a very challenging context; confused decision-making about overall programme elements and their co-ordination; contested interpretations of mandates, objectives, and institutional roles; and inadequate local ‘buy-in’.

If we adopt our own narrower understanding of the scope of disarmament measures within DDR – focussed on disarmament and responsible control of arms held by (ex-) combatants and their close associates/dependents – there are still major overlaps as well as linkages. Firstly, in some DDR programmes, possession and hand-in of arms or ammunition is an important element in the official recognition of a person as an ‘ex-combatant’. Secondly, demobilised ex-combatants and their close associates become a key concern and possible target group for civilian SALW control activities. These result in potentially large overlaps of target groups, as discussed below. Thirdly, ‘core’ disarmament measures in DDR programmes need to include record-keeping, secure storage and responsible disposal (including destruction) of weapons collected from ex-combatants. They should also aim to promote safe and secure storage of arms and ammunition of any parts of armed groups that are not to be demobilised. The latter is also a core aim of SALW control programmes; while the former covers virtually the same operational requirements as for a civilian weapons collection programme.

3.3.2 *Targets and beneficiaries*

SALW control programmes may address a broad range of target groups and beneficiaries, in view of their goal of improving controls on arms across all security sector institutions

³⁸ DDR and Human Security project case studies

and the wider civilian sector. There are broadly five generic targets within an affected country for SALW control interventions: individuals (and communities); governments and state agencies (including the police and military); criminals and organized criminal gangs; armed groups with political or ‘war-lord’ affiliations; and terrorists.³⁹ In practice, specific SALW control programmes may directly address one or several such target groups.

DDR programmes are focussed on a narrower set of target groups: ‘ex-combatants’ and their direct associates. The IDDRS lists five categories of people with which DDR programmes should engage:⁴⁰

- 1) Male and female adult combatants;
- 2) Children associated with armed forces and groups;
- 3) ‘Camp-followers’ working in non-combat roles (including women);
- 4) Ex-combatants with disabilities and chronic illnesses; and
- 5) Dependants.

Within this target group, it is the first category of people that potentially pose the most immediate risks to state stability and the resumption of armed violence; while the first and second categories pose the greatest risks to human or community security from armed violence. However, after re-insertion into civilian life, the potentially large number of people covered by all five categories all become target groups for SALW control and community security-building activities. Thus, key linkages between SALW and DDR programmes arise due to their target groups:

- *Overlapping direct target groups, particularly in relation to weapons collection or disarmament measures.* Particularly after complex conflicts involving poorly disciplined or fragmented armed groups, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, DDR programmes have often pragmatically decided to accept virtually any individual presenting arms or ammunition and a plausible story as an ex-combatant or camp-follower. For better or worse, this means that the boundaries are extremely blurred between ex-combatants and the wider group of civilians with access to arms.
- *After re-insertion into civilian life, DDR target groups and beneficiaries become key concerns for SALW control programmes.* At the least, this implies high overlap of targets and beneficiaries during the re-integration phase, with obvious advantages for at least pooled monitoring and assessments relating to the evolving interests and activities of ex-combatants and other armed civilians or ‘veterans groups’ throughout the post-conflict

³⁹ IDDRS Module 4.11, pp. 12-13. The IDDRS does not list communities as a group alongside individuals, but given the shift towards community-based weapons control programmes, it is appropriate to highlight communities as an extra target group.

⁴⁰ IDDRS Module 2.10, p.7.

transition. For example, monitoring to assess the success of DDR programme might be linked with surveys to assess such risk groups for SALW control.

- *Establishing the conditions for each others' success.* For example, the willingness of ex-combatants to give up their weapons in DDR programmes will depend greatly on their expectations relating to arms possession and availability in the wider community. Similarly, the prospects for wider SALW control may be greatly affected by the extent to which DDR programmes are successful in the disarmament, dismantlement of armed units, and reintegration of ex-combatant adults or children.
- *Measures to address armed groups that emerge after the conflict:* it is sometimes important to develop measures to demobilise, disarm and re-integrate armed groups that have formed after the end of the large scale conflict. Examples include the new armed groups occupying rubber plantations in Liberia (check name). These groups typically do not qualify for inclusion in internationally-supported DDR programmes, yet they are important to the objectives of both the DDR and SALW control/armed violence reduction programmes.

3.3.3 Implementing actors

In principle, both DDR and SALW programmes involve similar categories of implementing agencies, including: national governments; security sector institutions (particularly military, police and judiciary); local government; community organisations; NGOs; and private sector companies. Where relevant, international implementing agencies include: UN or other peace-support missions; multilateral and bilateral aid agencies; international NGOs; and private contractors. In general, relatively comprehensive SALW control programmes involve a wider range of civilian implementing agencies than DDR.

In practice, the extent to which the agencies involved in SALW control and DDR overlap varies very greatly, according to the specific countries, context and programme designs. Since SALW control programmes have tended to start significantly later than DDR and have often been relatively small-scale and not comprehensive, the scope for overlap has generally been limited. However, there is emerging good practice that SALW programmes should begin earlier in post-conflict processes, and be relatively comprehensive in scope. So it is likely in the future to be greater potential for overlap of implementing agencies.

At an international level, DDR and SALW control programmes appear mostly to be implemented by entirely distinct management teams and institutions; even if they are nominally embedded within the same UN peace-mission or agencies. More often than not, the (weakly institutionalised) recipient post-conflict government has established distinct DDR or SALW control commissions or units to engage with the separate

international programme structures. Exceptions include those UN DDR missions that have extended themselves to include wider SALW control and community security (e.g. South Sudan; Haiti), and cases such as Angola where a ‘victorious’ government has taken control of the national DDR and SALW control processes according to its own priorities and concerns.

At the level of implementing specific programme elements, military units (national and international) have tended to take the lead on implementing disarmament and demobilisation programmes; while institutions responsible for policing and regulation tend to take the lead on SALW control elements relating to weapons collection. Responsibility for implementation of the re-integration phase of DDR (where it has substantially taken place) has generally tended to be led by a distinct set of actors from other DDR elements; whether as an ad-hoc cluster of community-based programmes or under a major multilateral programme such as the MDRP in Africa.

A host of international and donor agencies and NGOs have contributed to demobilisation, re-insertion and re-integration processes, working with specific groups of beneficiaries according to their functional expertise and interests, ranging from UNDP, IoM, WFP to Save the Children Fund. Local partners in these areas typically include a wide range of relevant ministry departments, local authorities, NGOs and local contractors. In practice, many of these aim to integrate their contributions to DDR into their wider or existing local programmes and activities. At this level, there has in some countries been substantial overlap with agencies contributing to the implementation of SALW control programmes, particularly where they have had substantial ‘Weapons for Development’ programme components. But overlap between implementing actors has mostly been fragmented and ad-hoc.

At the level of the ‘beneficiary communities’, therefore, there have often been a host of different implementing agencies contributing to different but closely related aspects of DDR, SALW control and other PCR programmes. Although redundancy can have some advantages, the risks of confusion, inefficiency and frustration must be real. This in itself implies that greater co-ordination or integration should be considered particularly where SALW control and DDR programmes are engaging with the same communities and regions.

3.3.4 Resources/funding

In principle, resources to support DDR and SALW control should in the first instance be sought from the post-conflict country itself. Post-conflict countries that control substantial oil or other natural resources may not be highly dependent on international funding. For example, after defeating UNITA, the Government of Angola was initially

cautious about agreeing terms to receive international or World Bank aid for DDR or SALW control, and for a period relied substantially on its own resources. In most post-conflict countries, however, DDR and SALW control programmes in practice rely heavily on international resources.

At the UN and wider international level, one of the prizes of establishing the concept of 'DDR' as an integrated programme package was to facilitate the mobilisation of substantial funding and resources. UNSC-mandated support for DDR programmes can be drawn directly from UN Assessed Contributions where they relate to disarmament and demobilisation (including re-insertion). International resources to support re-integration programmes have to be pieced-together from a combination of UN voluntary contributions (including through specifically-established Multi-Donor Trust Funds) and bilateral or multilateral aid budgets from a variety of donors. This disjunction of funding sources is one of the main reasons why reintegration programmes have in practice often been relatively uncoordinated with disarmament and demobilisation programme elements. A major mechanism established to overcome such problems in the Greater Lakes region of Africa is the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) managed by the World Bank, which is funded by a mixture of World Bank funds and a Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

In contrast, SALW control programmes cannot use assessed contributions (unless under the cover of being a 'DDR' programme), and typically rely on support from bilateral donors and the EU (through its Joint Action on SALW). In recent years, the UNDP has developed a relatively substantial programme to support SALW and related human security building programmes, relying mostly on additional voluntary contributions from a few OECD donor countries. UNDP's SEESAC programme to support SALW control in the Balkans is amongst the largest and best established of such programmes.

The overall scale of resources available to DDR programmes, and even to their disarmament component taken alone, dwarfs what is allocated to SALW control programmes across the world. According to March 2007 figures for the MDRP, nearly \$300m has been spent over five years,⁴¹ out of a total budget of \$450-500 million.⁴² These figures do not even include the costs of disarmament, which were expected to be funded either from UN peacekeeping operations (where such operations exist) or by national governments.⁴³ By contrast, the UNDP-managed SALW control programme in

⁴¹ MDRP was initially programmed to run from 2002 to 2006, but this was extended to June 2009 in 2006.

⁴² The overall target budget for the MDRP given in the original programme documents is \$500 million. However, this depends on received contributions, and the working budget for March 2007 (MDRP Monthly Statistical Progress Report) gives a total planned budget of \$454 million.

⁴³ World Bank, Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy, 2002, p. 46.

the same region has a budget of only \$3 million and the budget for the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration on SALW is no more than about \$2 million. Such comparisons are obviously problematic, since they look only at gross figures and do not attempt to balance out their relative importance, scale, resource needs, number of beneficiaries, and other aspects. There is no particular reason to expect parity, or any particular ratio of DDR funding to SALW control funding. Nonetheless, it is clear that DDR programmes tend to attract large amounts of resources in a way that SALW control does not.

Certain observations arise from the characteristics of funding sources. Firstly, they contribute substantially to one of the main challenges for DDR programmes: the typical disjunction between relatively well-resourced and rapidly implemented disarmament and demobilisation programme elements and delayed and often unsatisfactory support for longer term re-integration. Secondly, the often delayed, fragmented, limited and short-term funding for SALW control programmes means that SALW control initiatives are often framed as ‘pilot’ projects or seen as auxiliary activities, and resources are rarely allocated that would allow truly national SALW control programming. This not only limits the extent to which they achieve their potential contribution to human security, but may also impact on the degree of co-ordination achieved with much larger and better funded DDR programmes.

Thus, enhanced co-ordination or integration of DDR and SALW control measures relating to disarmament will depend significantly on initiatives to ensure that sufficient resources for the SALW control elements will be available in time to link with the design and implementation of disarmament within DDR. One way of achieving this is to integrate from the beginning selected elements of SALW control into the mandated and relatively well-funded DDR programme, so that assessed contributions or other readily mobilised resources can be used. Other possible approaches include enabling SALW control programmes to use demobilisation and re-insertion information and activities to facilitate effective tracking of ex-combatants in follow-on programmes during the re-integration phase. We return to these issues in section 5.

3.3.5 Developing Local Ownership

DDR and SALW control programmes both depend heavily for their success on the quality and extent to which national and local ‘ownership’ is achieved and developed. In both cases, this raises complex issues; relating to ‘ownership by whom, and for what purpose’. Both DDR and SALW control good practice guidelines emphasise that national ownership does not equate merely to the government and representatives of the parties to the conflict. The role of civil society is vital, and ‘encourages the active participation of affected communities and groups, particularly those formerly marginalized in DDR and post-conflict reconstruction processes, such as representatives of women’s groups,

children's advocates, people from minority communities, and people living with disabilities and chronic illness.'⁴⁴ Similarly, in terms of SALW control, 'care should be taken to include all stakeholders, even those who are not traditionally seen as weapons owners, such as women, children, and the elderly or disabled.'⁴⁵

Almost by definition in a post-conflict context, both DDR and SALW programmes have to take serious account of the concerns and interests of the powerful parties to the peace settlement as well as to wider national and civil society groups. These are bound to be in tension, requiring complex judgements about how to maintain and develop appropriate local ownership of the DDR or SALW programme over time, and which groups to empower or disempower in the process of programme design and implementation in the wider interests of long-term peace-building.

The differing contexts and priorities of DDR and SALW programme designers and managers tend to lead to different approaches towards 'local ownership'. DDR programmes tend to be directly constrained by (and sensitive to) the terms and accommodations of the main parties to the peace-agreements, and the main recognised armed groups - particularly in the disarmament and demobilisation phases. Powerful mid- and high-level leaders tend also to be sensitive to the terms of any re-integration package – often they have 'sold' the peace settlement to their supporters by referring to generous re-insertion support; and less honourably they often seek illegitimately to capture for themselves some of the resources given to ex-combatants and their dependents. In this context, pressurised DDR programme managers risk neglecting developing 'ownership' of the DDR programme by relatively vulnerable ex-combatants and the civilian communities to which they are expected to return.

In contrast, the wider range of possible elements and timings of SALW control programmes implies broader potential priorities for developing local ownership, including the affected communities, their political representatives, and policing and justice institutions coming relatively high on the list. Awareness raising programmes and sustainability concerns typically has a relatively important place in SALW control programmes. In this context, it seems likely that DDR and SALW control programmes may often have complementary and mutually re-enforcing priorities and opportunities for developing local ownership, implying potentially significant advantages for co-ordination or partial integration.

⁴⁴ IDDRS Module 2.10, p.12.

⁴⁵ IDDRS Module 4.11, p. 13.

3.3.6 Timing and Sequencing

Timing and sequencing issues are widely acknowledged to be critically important for programmes in the insecure and conflict prone contexts of countries emerging from conflict. They are therefore important ‘internal’ considerations in the design and implementation of any DDR or SALW control programme, and are extensively addressed in best-practice guidelines in each programme area. In this context, it is likely that timing and sequencing between these programme spheres could be important issues for co-ordination, particularly since they are likely to overlap (at least during the re-integration phase).

The IDDRS asserts a generic overall sequencing rule between DDR and SALW control: ‘while the disarmament component of a DDR programme should initially focus on former combatants, future measures to deal with the control of legal and illegal civilian possession, national stockpiles and security force possession should also be examined at the appropriate time. These measures should not be put in place before the demobilization phase.’⁴⁶

In practice demobilisation is often substantially delayed, and thus such IDDRS guidance is open to question. There may well be contexts in which it could be better to initiate at least some SALW control activities even before the demobilisation phase of a DDR programme is substantially underway. In fact, the IDDRS can be read as inconsistent on questions of DDR and SALW sequencing. For example, in one part of Module 4.11 on SALW, Security and Development it is stated that ‘*during* DDR operations, an SALW control component should be established to focus on wider arms control and reduction measures at the national and community levels’⁴⁷, yet the same module also states that ‘a ‘*follow-on*’ SALW control programme should be planned, and perhaps initiated, during the DDR programme to enable a seamless transfer from a peacekeeping to a development situation’⁴⁸, while Module 4.10 on Disarmament argues that ‘building the capacity of state and non-state national bodies is essential to their empowerment and the effective, successful continuation of future disarmament programmes *once DDR has come to an end*’⁴⁹ (emphasis added).

In our view, this is symptomatic of the fact that decisions relating to sequencing of DDR and SALW control measures are an important area for co-ordination or integration between programmes, on the basis of analyses of the particular country and peace-building context. The interrelationship between arms management or disarmament of ex-

⁴⁶ IDDRS Module 4.10, p. 3.

⁴⁷ IDDRS Module 4.11, p.3.

⁴⁸ IDDRS Module 4.11, p.1.

⁴⁹ IDDRS Module 4.10, p.4.

combatants and of other sectors of the population is sometimes highly sensitive as conflicts come to and end, due to political symbolism or more basic insecurities. For example, complex interplay may be required, whereby initial disarmament of ex-combatants needs to be followed by wider progress on SALW collection and control before armed groups are ready to fully disarm or demobilise. Similarly wider SALW control measures may be needed to reassure ex-combatants when they return (hopefully unarmed) to civilian communities, or to clarify norms and future regulations on gun possession and use. It is not clear that the IDDRS has adopted the best overall approach here.

3.3.7 Monitoring, Review and Evaluation

Both DDR and SALW control programmes have been criticised for the general weakness of the monitoring, review and evaluation procedures in practice. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) has been one of the weakest areas of [DDR] programme management in the past, partly due to a lack of proper planning, a standardized M&E framework, and human and financial resources specifically dedicated to M&E.⁵⁰ Where systematic evaluations are carried out in UN operations, critical reports are often buried. SALW control is a younger, less resource-intensive field, and it has learnt quickly from the development of M&E in related fields such as mine action to develop and test ‘baseline’ assessments and M&E methods. Nevertheless, monitoring, review and evaluation of recent SALW programmes, in post-conflict or other contexts, has been no more than patchy.

For well-understood reasons, it is difficult to evaluate either DDR and SALW control programmes in terms of progress towards their overall declared objectives: even if overall progress towards security, peace-building or socio-economic re-integration of ex-combatants can be adequately measured over time, the DDR or SALW programmes are only one/two explanatory of factors amongst many others. Thus, process and ‘output’ indicators are often disproportionately used, where any substantial M&E takes place at all.

This could be an area where some pooling of resources could enhance M&E for both DDR and SALW control programmes. They could share baseline, context and outcome analyses, and also co-operate in developing relevant indicators and methods for each of their programmes. In this context, DDR programmes could benefit substantially from the emerging experience in the SALW control community, which appears to be further advanced in clarifying its objectives in terms of human security and community safety, enabling progress in developing appropriate indicators. This has been achieved for example through a number of SALW Survey protocols, a key part of which are public

⁵⁰ IDDRS Module 3.50, p.1.

perceptions surveys that indicate not only general social attitudes towards weapons, but also look in detail at wider perceptions of security. Surveys have been conducted in a number of countries, particularly in Africa and South Eastern and Eastern Europe, and in a number of instances these surveys have directly informed the development of SALW control interventions.⁵¹

3.3.8 Linkages to other processes

Both DDR and SALW control fit within a wider network of post-conflict recovery and peace-building interventions, and they also both intersect with longer-term development processes. One set of linkages, however, is clearly much stronger than the others – the relationship of both DDR and SALW control to SSR. The linkages between DDR and SSR are explored in depth in Working Paper II of this project.

The links between SALW control and SSR have been less researched, though they are briefly analysed in an online ‘Compendium of Good Practices on Security Sector Reform’ run by the Global Facilitation Network on SSR,⁵² which have also been adapted for IDDRS Module 04.10 on SALW, Security and Development.⁵³ Here it may suffice to note two obvious linkages. Firstly, SSR often results in the reduction or restructuring of security forces, which will require related SALW control measures to ensure that strict control and accountability is maintained over the weapons possessed by these forces (often this requires weapons destruction). Secondly, successful SSR – in particular, successful police reform – should result in improved public perceptions of security, which should decrease demand within society for weapons. This provides fertile ground for weapons collections/amnesties – but suitable control mechanisms and resources must be in place to collect and dispose of such weapons.

In the long term, rather than analysing the links between DDR and SALW control, DDR and SSR, and SSR and SALW control in isolation, it may make more sense to consider these three processes as three points of a ‘human security triangle’, and to explore how far they can – and how far they should – be integrated/coordinated. Furthermore, the developing field of ‘community security’ programming suggests that a fourth overlapping element may soon have to be added into the mix. We return to this issue in the conclusion of this Working Paper

⁵¹ Surveys, national assessments or mappings have been carried out in a number of countries including Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Namibia, Botswana, Croatia, Moldova, Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, Georgia, Kosovo, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Republic of Congo among others. For more information see:

<http://www.seesac.org/index.php?content=&page=sur§ion=6>

http://www.saferworld.org.uk/pub_search.php <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org>

http://www.saferfrica.org/progs/safetySecurity/arms_management/assessments.php

⁵² http://www.ssronline.org/good_practice.cfm?id=72&p=21, accessed 15 May 2007.

⁵³ IDDRS Module 4.11, pp. 23-25.

3.4 Mapping Key Areas for Programme Linkages

Building on the discussion of overlapping issues and concerns between DDR and SALW programmes, the following sub-sections aim to map the main areas in which linkages between DDR and SALW programmes could be most important to develop and exploit. At this stage, this remains an initial mapping of *possible* priorities for increased co-ordination or integration. In principle, such a mapping has several dimensions and many elements. For simplicity, we first (in section 3.4.1) organise the discussion according to phases of DDR and SALW programmes; and then discuss linkages between specific sectoral areas of each type of programme.

Table 3.2: DDR and SALW Control: some commonalities and differences

	DDR	Disarmament within DDR	SALW Control
<i>Aims and objectives</i>	To contribute to security and stability in post-conflict situations so that recovery and development can begin	To reduce or control weapons held by combatants before demobilization to build confidence in the peace process, increase security and prevent a return to conflict	To secure a safer environment and control SALW within society in order to promote conditions that will encourage the continued return to normalisation.
<i>Targets and beneficiaries</i>	Ex-combatants and associated groups (children; those in non-combat roles (including women); ex-combatants with disabilities and chronic illnesses; and dependants.	Ex-combatants who possess an eligible weapon	Individuals (including civilians, criminals and terrorists); weapons-affected communities; social groups/sectors; companies, governments; state agencies (military, police etc); neighbouring countries.
<i>Implementing actors</i>	Military and civilian actors from UN agencies, national governments, local NGOs.	Trained military staff, usually primarily international	Military and civilian actors from UN agencies and national governments; police, judiciary, traditional authorities, media, local and international NGOs and civil society groups.
<i>Resources/funding</i>	Major funding, usually combination of assessed and voluntary contributions and bilateral support	Usually well funded, assessed peacekeeping budget	Comparatively low funding, multilateral or bilateral donor support
<i>Extent of local ownership</i>	Gradual transfer of ownership to national actors through capacity building	Theoretically ‘owned’ by local actors but usually depends on international control	Highly variable, but potential for high levels of national/community ownership
<i>Sequencing/context</i>	Usually takes place immediately ‘post conflict’, aims to hand over to longer-term development	First stage of DDR, immediately post-conflict, though may achieve only partial disarmament	Variable. Usually launched after disarmament and demobilisation, likely to continue after DDR ends
<i>Indicators of success and failure</i>	Range of indicators for component activities but poor measurement of how key aims achieved	Easy to measure number of weapons and ex-combatants disarmed, often unclear how relates to total in circulation	Baseline studies of public security perceptions increasingly used to judge progress
<i>Links to other processes</i>	Key part of recovery planning, strong links to SSR	Creates conditions for rest of DDR and wider SALW control	Part of recovery and development planning, strong links to SSR

3.4.1 DDR and SALW linkages through the design and implementation process

In principle, both DDR and SALW programmes go through several phases of a programme cycle (though in practice there are overlaps in complex programmes):

- Pre-planning and needs assessments;
- Assessing and promoting a conducive political environment;
- Programme planning and design;
- Developing ‘local ownership’ and national capacity;
- Implementing each phase of the programme;
- Monitoring, review and evaluation;
- Transition and/or exit strategy implementation.

In this sub-section, potentially important linkages between SALW and DDR programmes are identified and briefly discussed for each phase. Since DDR and SALW programmes typically start at different times, and operate over different time-scales, linkages between different phases of each programme cycle also naturally arise. As discussed in Section 3.3 above, on the basis of empirical experience as well as principle, we do not make any a priori assumptions about such relative timings.

Pre-Planning and Needs Assessments: It is recognized good practice that all post-conflict reconstruction or security-building programmes, including DDR and SALW, should be based on detailed and up-to-date conflict and security assessments. Although international guidelines relate primarily to internationally-supported programmes, the same principle applies equally to national programmes: post-conflict governments are similarly likely to have limited or partial understandings of the complex conflict and security context. Such assessments should be initiated as early in the process as possible, and preferably before the official peace settlement/agreement itself. Linked with such initial conflict and security analyses, systematic needs assessments also need to be carried out at an early stage, to clarify requirements and priorities for humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and peace- and security-building.

In the past, conflict and security assessments and needs assessments have either been neglected or conducted in a fragmented way; with damaging results. In recent years, the UN (and other multilateral or regional organisations concerned with post-conflict missions) has developed mechanisms and procedures to promote timely and comprehensive assessments. Under the UN ‘integrated mission’ approach, for example, there should be an integrated mission task forces (IMTF) at UN HQ level, linked with an integrated mission planning team (IMPT) at country level. Proposals are currently being developed in the UN to promote Team Assessment Missions (TAMs) involving teams of

experts able collectively to provide comprehensive assessments which can then be used by all specific programme teams.

It is now widely accepted that DDR experts should be included in such early assessment missions. These should examine needs and priorities for the whole ‘package’ of DDR, including re-integration challenges (which need to be taken into account at an early stage of DDR programme design).⁵⁴

In principle, the same case can be made for early expert assessment of wider arms management and control issues, including SALW available to civilians. As discussed in section 3.3, the domains of DDR and SALW control often overlap substantially, and there are good logical as well as empirical reasons to argue that initial security and needs assessments should examine both dimensions in an integrated way.⁵⁵ On the basis of such integrated assessments, decisions about phasing and appropriate co-ordination of DDR and SALW control can be taken on a case-by-case basis.

Assessing and promoting a conducive political and security environment: DDR programmes require certain basic conditions before there are reasonable chances of success. For DDR programmes, these include: commitment by all (or almost all) armed factions to a peace settlement/agreement; functioning command and control within the armed factions; cessation of armed violence between armed parties (at least in the regions where DDR is proposed); and adequate engagement by key external stakeholders. It is important to ensure that there are realistic prospects for achieving these conditions before commitments are made to launch a DDR programme.

The basic conditions for SALW control measures appear to overlap significantly with those of DDR, but will also have distinctive elements depending on the type of SALW measure. Substantial civilian disarmament can be expected to have more stringent contextual requirements than DDR; but other possible SALW measures such as surveys, awareness-raising or restricting arms supplies might viably start in conditions that remain hostile to DDR. Therefore, there could be potential advantages for close co-ordination or integration of measures to assess and promote a conducive environment for DDR and SALW.

Programme Planning and Design: The key elements of standard international procedures and contents for DDR programme planning and design, in the context of

⁵⁴ See, for example, proceedings of International Workshop on Re-integrating ex-combatants, Wassenaar, May 2007.

⁵⁵ IDDRS Module 4.30 (pp. 7-8) outlines the contents of a conflict and security analysis for DDR. Most of this is also directly relevant for SALW control programmes, and thus the development of joint analyses would not be particularly challenging.

overall integrated mission planning, include initial technical assessments, development and a strategy and policy framework, and development of a programme and operational framework.

The process of planning and designing a DDR programme almost inevitably implies consideration of SALW and wider arms management issues, since the two areas of concern overlap. At the least, DDR design needs to define the boundaries between its ‘ex-combatant and dependents’ target group and the ‘civilians’ that lie beyond its scope. In many post-conflict contexts, this boundary is very unclear and the outcome depends substantially on the judgement of the programme designers as well as contingent mandate and funding constraints. Such judgements should take into account overall assessments of risks to human and state security from armed groups, and opportunities for disarmament through DDR or SALW control. Moreover, plans for demobilisation, re-insertion and re-integration need to take into account prospects for wider SALW control or the security risks for ex-combatants and recipient communities arising from wide availability or misuse of SALW.

These requirements for co-ordination between DDR and SALW programme planning and design are recognised in the IDDRS, as discussed in section 2 above. [Moreover, SIDDR considered the question of financing DDR programmes in some detail, advocating *inter alia* that ‘donors agreeing to commit resources to DDR...should not ignore the need for planning and financing of broader security transformation’,⁵⁶ which includes SALW control.] The key point here is that the extent to which disarmament aspects of wider SALW control may be integrated into the DDR package is a matter for judgement according to the circumstances. The agenda for DDR and SALW programme planning is thus of partial integration rather than only co-ordination. In principle, it appears that wider arms management measures such as public awareness or stockpile security could also be partially integrated in DDR at the planning stage.

IDDRS envisages that planning for distinctive SALW control measures would normally start sometime after DDR programmes have been designed and launched. In such cases, the new SALW measures clearly should be designed to complement, re-enforce or follow-on from the DDR programmes. They should be based on an up-to-date security and needs assessment, which could also usefully review the impacts of the DDR programme to date. Alternatively (and contrary to UN IDDRS expectations), DDR programmes may be substantially delayed – this has certainly been the case in a variety of countries, ranging from Cambodia to Burundi. In this context, SALW measures may already have been launched, in which case the design of DDR needs to complement, re-

⁵⁶ SIDDR Review of International Financing Arrangements, 2005, p. ix.

enforce or follow-on from SALW control. Either way, a powerful case emerges for SALW experts and surveys to be included in DDR planning, and vice versa.

Developing local ownership and capacity: The overlaps and differences in developing local ownership for DDR and SALW programmes were discussed in section 3.3 above. Where elements of SALW control are integrated into DDR programmes, so too will be ‘local ownership’ issues. Local capacities need to develop to support planning and implementation of each security-building programme.

Contexts vary greatly between countries. Where UN or other external agencies play a leading role in post-conflict security building (such as in Sierra Leone), proper local ownership is often slow to develop, and local institutions to support programme implementation (such as national commissions for DDR or SALW control) reflect international institutional divisions of labour. After victory or peace agreements dominated by local interests (such as in Angola or Nepal), DDR or SALW control programmes can be heavily instrumentalised by local interests, who merely pay lip-service to international guidelines. There are many potential variants between such extremes.

Although distinct DDR or SALW programmes require distinctive local management capacities, almost by definition, it is generally undesirable to stimulate the establishment of fragmented local security-building institutions simply to reflect international preferences. Post-conflict countries already suffer from weak or damaged institutions, and it is a priority to build local capacity for comprehensive strategies to build human and state security.

Thus local capacity building for DDR and SALW programmes should as far as possible be co-ordinated, even where they remain distinct in terms of external support. Opportunities for promoting local awareness and engagement with SALW control can usefully be taken during DDR implementation, and vice versa. Joint training programmes could be useful in areas of functional overlap (such as arms registering, storage, disposal and destruction). Where the programmes are sequenced, attention should be devoted to enable local trained staff and units to transfer from one programme to another wherever useful.

SALW- DDR Links in Programme Implementation: It is clear from the foregoing sections that are important areas where DDR and SALW processes and programmes may link and co-ordinate, due to the overlaps between aims, target groups and functional areas. The challenge is to map and prioritise these in a generic way, given the many different contexts, programme designs and processes. The functional

linkages are mapped and discussed in section 3.4.2 below. Here we focus on some other strategic issues relating to programme structure and dynamics.

The ‘classic case’ envisaged in IDDRS has DDR programmes launched first, with SALW control measures following (if at all) some 12 – 18 months later. In this widely-recognised context, there is an immediate responsibility for international policy-makers to act on these linkages. In this context, critical potential connections include:

- Designing SALW programmes to address all arms management and disarmament issues that remain after disarmament under the DDR draws to a close;
- Ensuring that the SALW programmes can take full advantage of the knowledge and capacities of the relevant D&D programmes as they wind down;
- Possible formal or informal linkages between re-insertion processes and elements of SALW measures, including planning community benefits and providing a supportive environment for re-integration;
- Promoting synergy and uninterrupted development of national capacities to develop post-conflict human security in a relatively co-ordinated way, uninterrupted by transitions between internationally-supported programmes.

However, it is important to recognise that there are several other credible sequencing arrangements between DDR and SALW programmes, including initiating SALW control measures before or at the same as DDR programmes start. In practice, there are several different types of SALW control measures, and DDR is not as integrated as proclaimed – multiplying the potentially important links. Some of these are noted in section 4.4.2 below. But the overall implication is that close co-ordination of programme planning and design of DDR and SALW is critically important at least to clarify in a timely way the priorities for co-ordination for the particular context – and periodically updated as each programme evolves.

Where DDR programmes are delayed, for good or undesirable reasons, it becomes very important to take realistic account of the de-facto demobilisation and weapons processes that have actually taken place. In practice, delayed DDR programmes have often fallen short in this context: although practitioners have been aware that such processes have taken place, for political and institutional reasons DDR programmes have not always been designed in a way that thoroughly takes this into account. This is important, because delayed DDR is more vulnerable to both perverse results (such as holding weapons in order to qualify for Reinsertion packages) and instrumental misuse by local armed group leaders. *In general, the rationale for profoundly re-configuring DDR and SALW control programmes outside the framework envisaged in IDDRS is much stronger where DDR (and SALW) programmes are substantially delayed.*

For example, in the Republic of Congo the MDRP programme to support demobilisation and re-integration started over four years after the conflict ended. The resulting D&R programme took partial account of this, but with strange eligibility requirements and design features (such as children's' programmes for people who had already reached adulthood). UNDP funded a distinct (but linked) SALW collection programme, which focussed primarily on arms collection – in practice from civilians as well as from ex-combatants. Similarly, in the Central African Republic the MDRP supported demobilisation and re-integration programmes starting several years after a coup brought to an end a period of high instability; with a separate UNDP weapons collection programme that linked (in problematic ways) with eligibility for re-insertion benefits.

These two cases illustrate at two main points. First, in several recent cases, the organisation of DDR and SALW elements into integrated packages has been done in ways that are justifiable but far from what is envisaged in IDDRS. Second, when this is done, the capacity to design an appropriately integrated SALW programme, with a longer-term perspective, seems to have been lacking: implying the need to prepare for such eventualities needs substantial further elaboration.

Monitoring, review and evaluation: As noted, there appears to be great scope to pool resources between DDR and SALW programmes for monitoring, review and evaluation, - at least for aspects relating to implementation, impact and future priorities. This is further explored in section 3.4.2. Here, we focus on strategic points for integrated review of needs and programmes not only at initial stages, but at other key milestones.

One of these often strategic review points appears to be 12 – 18 months after the peace-settlement. In the 'classic case', the disarmament and demobilisation phases of the programme will be underway, and perhaps drawing to a close; alongside the development of possible longer-term SALW control, SSR, reintegration and community development and reconciliation programmes. In other contexts, lesson-learning from post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation may provide a basis for possible integrated human security programmes, including SALW control and elements of DDR. In any case, it may be timely for an overall 'mid-term' review of security needs and priorities to provide a basis for comprehensive or integrated longer-term programmes to promote human security and reintegration of ex-combatants and other displaced people (IDPs, refugees).

Transition to longer-term peace-building and development, and exit strategies: As discussed, programmes designed to disarm and demobilise (including re-insertion) ex-combatants are conceived to be relatively short-term, while re-integration processes and wider SALW control should be designed and implemented with a long-term perspective. The links between DDR and longer-term peace and development processes

are considered in Thematic Working Paper No 5 for this Project.⁵⁷ Up to a point, they can be broken down to a combination of the longer term consequences of D&D measures, on the one hand, and the processes of re-integration (of ex-combatants alongside other returnees) into relatively secure and peaceful communities on the other.

In principle, the successful co-ordination of DDR with SALW control will in itself contribute to a successful long-term transition, provided that such controls develop properly over time. In practice, external support for SALW control measures has often been relatively short-term and piecemeal, with only fragile local commitment and capacity to ensure their sustainability. It thus becomes a priority to ensure that SALW controls are not only carefully co-ordinated with the disarmament and demobilisation phases of DDR but also are reviewed and put on a long-term footing at the latest by the time that re-integration.

This highlights the importance of considering ways to link SALW control measures with the re-integration phase. There are potentially several ways in which this could be envisaged. Re-integration processes are more likely to be successful in a secure environment, to which SALW control measures (and also SSR, reconciliation, and peace-building) can contribute. Perhaps surprisingly, the IDDRS do not provide elaborate guidance on how this might be done. However, within the sphere of SALW control measures, there are many potential initiatives that could be targeted for this purpose, including a range of public awareness, community-based ‘weapons for development’ initiatives; stockpile management and disposal. These will often require on-going external assistance, at least through the transition, with appropriate sustainability and exit strategies for when aid may come to an end.

3.4.1 Integration/coordination of functional elements of DDR and SALW control

This sub-section follows the discussion above, and explores ways in which functional overlaps between elements of DDR and SALW control programmes imply important areas for co-ordination or possible integration during implementation. The eight main types of SALW control measures identified in Section 2.2 have been adapted slightly for the purposes of Table 3.3 below,⁵⁸ which presents nine operational areas and matches their key activities

⁵⁷ J. Buxton, *From Post-Conflict Stabilisation to Longer-term Sustainable Development and Peace-building: links and inter-relationships between DDR and Development*; Thematic Working Paper No 5; DDR and Human Security Project; CICS,

⁵⁸ The components on ‘information management’ and ‘SALW surveys and assessments’ have been grouped together as ‘information collection and analysis’, while two other headings have been added: ‘operational planning and management’, which indicates the structures and strategies that oversee the whole process; and ‘addressing instability within communities’, to reflect the growing importance that both DDR SALW control and DDR place on community security.

against related elements of DDR. Brief remarks are also provided on the nature of the relationship between these elements, which are then explored further in the main text.

Operational planning and management: The IDDRS advocates the establishment of a National Commission on DDR (NCDDR), responsible for policy and strategy development, coordination between agencies within the DDR process, coordination of DDR with other processes, and final oversight of the implementation of DDR. The NCDDR should represent all key stakeholders: a full range of government institutions (including those responsible for women, youth and children); the parties to the peace accords; international organisations (e.g. the UN, major donors); and civil society and the private sector.⁵⁹ Best practice in SALW control also advocates the establishment of a national SALW commission, also with the main tasks of policy formation, coordination and oversight, and also with the representation of all key stakeholders (not just security sector institutions but all related ministries, civil society/private sector organisations, and possibly also international organisations).⁶⁰

⁵⁹ IDDRS Module 3.30 p. 9.

⁶⁰ RMDS/G 03.10 pp. 2-3. The RMDS are currently the most comprehensive guides in terms of best practice on SALW control. However, there are various international and regional agreements that also contain important norms and standards. The establishment of a national SALW commission is also recommended by the UN Programme of Action on SALW and by regional agreements such as the Nairobi Protocol, the Bamako Declaration, and the SADC Protocol.

Table 3.3: Functionally related areas of SALW control and DDR

	SALW Control	DDR	Remarks
<i>1</i>	<i>Operational planning and management</i>		
	National SALW commission	National commission on DDR (NCDDR)	Different in scope, many overlapping elements. Must be coordinated to oversee all integration/coordination
	National SALW control programme	Overall DDR programme	
<i>2</i>	<i>Information collection and analysis</i>		
	Possible assessment of priority areas for community safety projects	Assessment of areas of return/ resettlement	Data on public perceptions of security can be shared by both programmes; much info collected for DDR planning can be fed into SALW programme
	Study of public perceptions of security Comprehensive SALW survey	Weapons survey Risk assessment	
<i>3</i>	<i>Public information and communication</i>		
	SALW awareness campaign/education SALW communications strategy	DDR awareness programme (sensitisation)	Information campaigns need coordination to avoid mixed messages
<i>4</i>	<i>SALW collection (and registration)</i>		
	Variety of weapons collection and amnesty programmes to reduce illegally-held SALW control, using various incentives	Weapons registration and accounting Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support	Lessons from previous weapons collections inform both methodologies
<i>5</i>	<i>SALW destruction</i>		
	Establishment of destruction capability Weapons destruction Ammunition destruction	Weapons destruction Ammunition destruction	Simultaneous or consecutive destructions use destruction capabilities more efficiently
<i>6</i>	<i>Stockpile management</i>		
	Weapons storage Ammunition storage	Weapons storage Ammunition storage	Stockpiles may require short-term international protection/verification
<i>7</i>	<i>Cross-border control</i>		
	Cross-border weapons movement prevention programme	Often has regional dimension to deal with refugees, 'recycled' combatants	DDR has rarely dealt with cross-border weapons control
<i>8</i>	<i>Legislative and regulatory measures</i>		
	Updating of legislation and procedures to improve national SALW control regime, incl. framework for weapons collection	DDR process should be approved by national law or decree; might also address SALW legislation	DDR should manage transition to stronger arms control regime
<i>9</i>	<i>Addressing instability within communities</i>		
	Safer Community Plans	Community-based reintegration	Growing area, needs greater research

There is obvious potential for close co-ordination of the national commissions for DDR and SALW control. Although the IDDRS suggest in one place that the national SALW commission ‘should be a component of the national commission on DDR’,⁶¹ there are strong arguments against such deep integration. NCDDRs are established as temporary structures designed to implement a specific, finite process (DDR), whereas SALW commissions should normally be permanent bodies, since SALW control is an issue even for developed peacetime governments. Thus it makes little sense to sub-ordinate SALW commissions to NCDDRs (although any specific SALW control measures that are integrated into the DDR programme should clearly be managed within the NCDDR framework). Operational co-ordination of SALW and DDR programmes in areas where there are important links is clearly the priority. In addition, it is important to avoid fragmentation of local institutional capacities, with joint planning and assessment capabilities and provisions for transfer of appropriate staff and systems to SALW commissions or other national institutions as DDR programmes come to an end.

Information collection and analysis: As discussed, this is a functional area offering major opportunities for pooled or closely-linked resources across DDR and SALW control programmes. This is the case for early pre-planning and needs assessments, through assessments for programme design and planning, to mid-programme and milestone reviews, and monitoring and evaluation. At key points in each programme cycle, both DDR and SALW programming will need detailed surveys and assessments relating, for example, to availability and risks of arms and ammunition (including a DDR weapons survey amongst armed groups, national small arms baselines and follow-on surveys); perceptions of security of specific groups and the public overall; community-security needs and priorities (including for communities receiving ex-combatants or other returnees). For example, UNDP is currently considering the possibilities for using SALW baseline assessments ‘to support...programming on a wider range of security issues, including DDR’.⁶²

Such information collection is demanding work, requiring substantial skills and capacities to use combinations of information collection and assessment methods. People, particularly gun-holders and ex-combatants have reason to be cautious and often will not readily give information about weapons possession and such-like. Quantitative surveys tend to be partial instruments and need to be complemented by qualitative and participatory methods to understand perceptions and concerns. Sustained engagement with relevant groups and communities can be necessary to achieve detailed reliable

⁶¹ IDDRS Module 4.11 p. 14.

⁶² UNDP DDR Practice Note, 2005, p.22

understandings. It is important to co-ordinate and share information between programmes wherever useful and appropriate.

Monitoring changes of selected factors and perceptions over time provides a key tool for measuring the effectiveness of DDR and other peacebuilding interventions. Only recently, however, have DDR programmes begun to realise the importance of gathering such data. The IDDRS note that ‘obtaining data on levels of armed violence, impacts on security (direct/indirect), levels and types of victimization, and local perceptions of security helps to establish a baseline against which to measure changes in the security situation and the contribution of DDR to an overall increase in security’,⁶³ but they are still vague on how this data should be obtained, with the section on methodologies for data collection mostly giving examples related to weapons proliferation or opportunities for economic and social reintegration.⁶⁴ In this respect, SALW control methodologies are more advanced, with public perceptions of security forming a key part of most recent SALW surveys, primarily through sociological surveys.⁶⁵

*Public information and communication: Public information campaigns are a vital component of both DDR and SALW control. They have multiple objectives: ensuring all stakeholders know what is happening; managing expectations and allaying concerns; encouraging the participation and support of target groups and communities; persuading spoilers of the benefits of their programmes; demonstrating progress to improve perceptions of security; etc. Considerable literature is available on public information in both fields: the IDDRS contains a separate module (4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR); while a 150-page SALW Awareness Support Pack has been developed by SEESAC, which though designed primarily for South Eastern Europe has wider applicability.*⁶⁶

Public information is one area in which very strong coordination if not full integration is required; to reduce risks of misperceptions or mixed messages to key target groups. This does not imply that *messages* should be integrated. On the contrary, the whole purpose of coordinating the supply of public information is to ensure that mixed messages are avoided. For example, since the target groups are quite different for classic disarmament within DDR and for wider SALW control initiatives (including weapons collections)

⁶³ IDDRS Module 3.20, p. 7.

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 8-10.

⁶⁵ A methodology for SALW surveys has been developed by SEESAC and Small Arms Survey in their ‘SALW Survey Protocols’, available at: <http://www.seesac.org/index.php?content=41§ion=6> (accessed 1 June 2007). These protocols have been used as the basis for numerous SALW surveys, particularly in Eastern Europe. Links to many of these surveys can be found on the SEESAC website:

<http://www.seesac.org/index.php?content=&page=sur§ion=6>

⁶⁶ SEESAC, SASP2, 2005.

aimed at the whole community, public information campaigns need to attract the key target groups while informing and reassuring others of their role within the process.

SALW collection (and registration): The process of disarming combatants, storing their weapons in the short term, transporting them and placing them in safe stockpiles and/or destroying them (see below) is a sensitive and technical area that should be run by well-trained personnel. This is equally true of weapons collection and registration campaigns aimed at civilian-held weapons; indeed, it can be much harder to find suitable incentives to encourage participation in civilian weapons collections and amnesties.

One of the most obvious ways in which synergies can be built between DDR and SALW control programmes lies in the process of learning lessons from previous experience of weapons collections: within the country concerned and more widely. Good practice guidelines have emerged in both spheres; relating for example to the shift away from ‘buy-back’ mechanisms – where a cash sum is offered for each weapon – towards a concept of ‘weapons in exchange for incentives’ (WEI). Buy-back mechanisms both within DDR and more broadly have been shown to have a number of disadvantages. For example, they may create a secondary weapons market, or encourage corruption. There are various ideas as to how to provide non-cash incentives to weapons collections that would avoid these problems, which include ‘weapons in exchange for development’ (WED), ‘weapons in competition for development’ (WCD), and ‘weapons linked to development’ (WLD). These are usually community-based, linking the provision of some form of development benefit (e.g. infrastructure projects, training, extra funding) to community cooperation in weapons collection. By focusing on communities rather than individuals, some of the above risks are reduced, and reconciliation and development goals are promoted. It can help to enable an arms collection programme to become a focus for community mobilisation and empowerment that can contribute more sustainably to human security.

On an operational level, there are potential synergies between disarmament for DDR and wider SALW collection programmes in the systems and capabilities for weapons collection, registration, safe storage, and either disposal or subsequent tracking of both civilian and state-owned weapons. An existing example is through a management information system (MIS) created by UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). This is software ‘to deal with combatant registration and the management of weapons and ammunition with a DDR programme’ called the *Disarmament, Demobilisation Reintegration and SALW Control MIS (DREAM)*, which is available free

of charge.⁶⁷ It was developed to avoid previous problems faced by DDR programme managers who were forced to design a new MIS for each intervention.

There are opportunities to extend the use of DREAM in future. The information collected in the system during DDR should then be transferred into the host government's national registration and tracking systems; DREAM could even be used as a template where new computer systems are being established under SALW control programmes. In any case, there should be strong coordination between DDR and SALW commissions to ensure that the relevant information is transferable/transferred. More generally, national staff trained on weapons collection, destruction and stockpile management during the DDR programme, and associated systems and equipment, can be retained and used for subsequent SALW control programming.

SALW destruction: In both DDR and SALW control programmes, there is a general guideline to encourage destruction of at least a substantial proportion, if not all, of collected weapons. There are potentially useful opportunities to share arms destruction facilities and capabilities, and to learn lessons between programmes about ways to design arms destruction to build confidence amongst relevant stakeholders. Where larger quantities of weapons need to be destroyed, it is often a challenge to find the necessary resources and capabilities to carry out destruction. The IDDRS recognise openly that this is frequently a problem for DDR missions:

Previous DDR programmes have often decided on the final disposal of the recovered weapons on an ad hoc basis. The lack of available finance and resources during many programmes has hampered this final process of destruction. For example, in Mozambique, the weapons were placed initially under UN control, but only a limited number of weapons were destroyed and the “mission could do no more because it had no budget for destruction and no donor could be found to fund the programme”. This is discouraging, because there was a wide range of available destruction techniques and technologies, and the required human and financial resources were not high as a percentage of the costs of a full UN peacekeeping deployment.⁶⁸

Identifying resources for arms and ammunition destruction can also be a problem for SALW programmes. There is often limited local capacity to destroy weapons and investment may be required to boost local destruction facilities. Pooling resources between disarmament and SALW control programmes to address larger numbers of

⁶⁷ IDDRS Module 4.10, p. 20.

⁶⁸ IDDRS Module 4.10, p. 23.

weapons may make destruction processes more efficient overall. Such links could also promote the possibility that short-term destruction capacities for DDR purposes contribute to longer term national capacities.

Stockpile management and security: Similar opportunities for coordination and resource-pooling exist in relation to stockpile management and security. Immediate efforts to enhance security and safety of stored and collected arms and ammunition associated with DDR or SALW control processes and programmes may usefully be coordinated. Moreover, programme links could help to enable systems established for DDR to contribute to the wider focus for SALW control measures on strengthening national systems and capacities to manage stockpiles in a sustainable way.

In practice, arms and ammunition stockpile management and security is one of the top priority issues for SALW control in post-conflict contexts, and is a major concern for DDR. It needs to start as soon as possible, and to be developed sustainably into enduring national systems. It therefore needs to be a major driver for close co-ordination or partial integration of DDR and SALW control measures throughout the post-conflict transition and beyond.

Cross-border control: In many cases, both DDR and SALW control may have regional elements that must be taken into consideration. Many modern conflicts cut across state boundaries due to political, ethnic or other affiliations or processes, meaning that efforts to build peace in one state only can easily be undermined by further fighting in neighbouring countries or by cross-border flows of combatants. Large quantities of refugees may also cross borders in an attempt to find safety, but these population movements are often ‘contaminated’ by armed combatants, which can further undermine security.

DDR practitioners have acknowledged that previous DDR programmes have not dealt adequately with the complex challenges caused by cross-border population movements, and this is now a growing area of policy development.⁶⁹ DDR guidelines now contain advice on legal and practical measures for the disarming of foreign combatants and refugees. Border management and control is also a major issue for SALW, not least since inadequately controlled movements of arms across borders is typically an

⁶⁹ The IDDRS has a dedicated module on this topic, Module 5.40 on Cross-Border Population Movements. Unfortunately, many of its provisions are weak, doing more to illuminate the problems of cross-border movements than to elucidate concrete responses that will solve them. Similarly, a key rationale for establishing the MDRP was to better address the complicated cross-border dimensions of the various conflicts in the region, but it is debatable how much success it has had in dealing with Combatants on Foreign Soil (COFS) and strengthening border controls.

important concern. Co-ordination with SALW controls (including revised laws and regulations) and SSR (to develop border control systems) can contribute importantly to DDR programme effectiveness in this context.

Legislative and regulatory measures: In order to assert their legitimacy and provide a legal framework for action, DDR programmes need to be legally approved. This usually involves the establishment of an international mandate, agreements between the international actors and the national government, and the national adoption of the programme through legislation, decree or executive order – including the relevant provisions on disarmament and legislation.⁷⁰ However, this is typically a very limited affair.

The wider challenge of developing effective legal and regulatory systems remains. This relates to provisions to enable weapons collection without fear of prosecutions (amnesties etc), as well as adequately comprehensive regulations for arms registration, trade, holdings. The IDDRS suggest that this should be part of the DDR programme.⁷¹ However, this may be unwise. The establishment or transformation of national SALW control procedures and legislation needs to stem from and be an integral part of the wider process of strengthening arms controls, and should be synchronised with the SALW control programme, a national SALW control strategy and the work of the national SALW commission.

Addressing insecurity within communities: As noted above, ‘community security’ is a young but rapidly developing field of programming, informed by the shifting emphasis towards human security. Part of the logic behind this shift is that since many conflicts are not between states but within and across them, (re)establishing national security cannot be an adequate solution since it will fail to address the root causes of instability, which lie at a lower level; in fact, the re-establishment of ‘national security’ can run counter to community security and generate new conflict risks, for instance if this ‘national security’ is equated with certain privileged groups to the exclusion of others, or if it allows the military and other security sector actors to dominate civilian representatives. This has spurred a realisation that conflict must be addressed at the level of the individual and the solutions rooted in local communities.

It is revealing that despite different points of departure and different motives, DDR and SALW control are both increasingly embracing the community security agenda. In DDR, there has traditionally been a major risk that ex-combatants will be perceived as getting ‘preferential’ treatment from the authorities, regardless of their role in the war, and this

⁷⁰ IDDRS Module 3.30, p. 5.

⁷¹ Sample ‘DDR Strategic Objective #3’ in IDDRS Module 3.10, p. 21; IDDRS Module 4.11, p. 14.

can generate tension and lead to the failure of reintegration. However, recently the concept of ‘community-based reintegration’ has emerged, which aims to ensure that equal opportunities are made available to non-combatants and shifts the emphasis from the ex-combatants to the community into which they must reintegrate.⁷² Community security programmes have even become an integral part of the DDR strategy in some places, most notably in Sudan (see Section 4).

SALW control has come towards community safety from a different direction. It has increasingly been understood that SALW control is not an end in itself, so much as a means to achieve the wider goal of reducing armed violence and strengthening community security. SALW control is thus in a symbiotic relationship with community security. Insufficient arms control creates insecurity at the local level, but civilians will not surrender weapons unless they feel secure. Community security plans aim to break out of this deadlock, engaging the public on safety and security issues in a way that will improve public perceptions of security.

Where community security plans are envisaged, there are potential synergies at the planning stage: it may be possible to link assessments of areas of return undertaken prior to reintegration with the mapping of community security dynamics that precede the launch of any community safety plans. Inspiration for community security work or community safety planning comes from various quarters that are worth noting:

1. Within mine action, the concept of ‘safer village plans’;
2. Community development and in particular action-research and PRA techniques;
3. Urban planning and revitalization (geographically based schemes to improve the quality of life at local level for residents);
4. Community based policing, which focuses on crime prevention and the maintenance of public safety by working for sustained collaboration between the police and communities to address these problems.

In general, however, it is hard to determine whether community security measures are ‘elements’ of SALW control and DDR that therefore should be coordinated, or whether community security would be better thought of as a distinct area linked with SSR. IN practice, it may best be seen as an integrated focus for DDR, SALW control and SSR.⁷³

⁷² IDDRS p.440; SIDDR p.27

⁷³ This is a one of several linked overall conclusions merging from this Working Paper and the companion paper (by O Greene and S Rynn) on DDR and SSR. See also Saferworld, ‘Creating Safer Communities: Lessons from South East Europe’, <http://saferworld.client.fatbeehive.com/publications.php?id=236>

4. Experience of Links between DDR and SALW programmes

The previous section has provided a detailed analysis of the multiple links possible between DDR and SALW programme and the opportunities for enhanced co-ordination or partial integration. Section 4 now examines the links that have emerged from experience with DDR programmes. It begins with a brief overview of all the major DDR programmes in recent years where there have been significant issues regarding SALW proliferation (which have usually, but not always, led to a SALW control programme being launched). It then looks in more detail at a number of case studies. These draw substantially on case studies conducted (and separately available) for this project.

4.1 Overview of recent experiences of integration/coordination

This section provides a summary of the major DDR programmes that have been implemented in recent years showing how their relationship to any SALW control activities in the country (whether this was foreseen in the programme or not). It thus provides a very broad overview of recent cases, presented in the form of Table 4.1, which gives simplified descriptions of the DDR and SALW situation in 22 countries, the DDR and SALW control programmes that have taken place, who has implemented them, and the extent of integration/coordination that can be discerned. The aim is simply to provide a sense of what has happened in practice and to discern broad trends where possible.

Table 4.1: Overview of relationship between SALW control and DDR in major DDR programmes 1990-2007

Country ⁷⁴	Date	Implementing actors	DDR situation & programme	SALW situation & programme	Extent of integration/ coordination
Afghanistan ⁷⁵	2002-present	UNDP (funded by Japan, UK, Canada, USA, Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland)	DDR only of Afghan Military Forces (AMF); closely linked to SSR. DDR of AMF completed in 2006. New project on Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) for 2005-2007	Initial DDR ignored wider SALW situation, although project on ammunition stockpiles exists. DIAG targets armed groups but not civilian ownership, no wider SALW programme. DIAG's progress is slow.	DIAG is an extension of the original DDR process, run under the same wider framework (reuse of resources); however, it was a response to severe security challenges rather than planned in advance
Angola ⁷⁶	2002-present	MDRP (funded by MDTF, World Bank,	Several previous failed programmes. Angola Demobilisation and	Wide proliferation and insecurity.	Unclear

⁷⁴ Information for this table has been collated from a wide variety of sources; the most important sources are footnoted for each country as appropriate. Information on broader SALW control activities largely sourced from Biting the Bullet Consortium, "Reviewing Action on Small Arms", 2006.

⁷⁵ International Crisis Group, "Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan", 2003; International Crisis Group, "Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track", 2005; Website of Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme: <http://www.undpanbp.org/>, accessed 12.06.07; UN DDR resource centre Afghanistan country page.

⁷⁶ MDRP Monthly Statistical Progress Report March 2007; Gomes Porto & Parsons, 2003

		EU, and others)	Reintegration Programme (ADRP) has demobilised c.100,000 of target 138,000 ex-combatants.	No major SALW programme; some NGO projects; national SALW commission exists but no SALW control strategy.	
Burundi ⁷⁷	2004-present	MDRP	Demobilisation of approx. 55,000 members of armed movements and Burundi Armed Forces; close links to SSR	Signed Nairobi Protocol, some activity through Regional Centre on SALW (RECSA). SALW coordination body exists but no SALW strategy	Unclear
Cambodia ⁷⁸	1992 and 1999-2001	World Bank	Demobilisation under UN Transitional Authority	Major project: EU Assistance on Curbing	Unclear

⁷⁷ MDRP Monthly Statistical Progress Report March 2007; UN DDR resource centre Burundi country page; RECSA website: <http://www.recsasec.org/>

⁷⁸ EU-ASAC website: <http://www.eu-asac.org/>; UNTAC Background Information http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacbackgr2.html, both accessed 12.06.07.

			suspended in 1992. World Bank D&R programme demobilised 15,000 but little overall impact	SALW in Cambodia (EU-ASAC) collected over 130,000 weapons; reduction in armed violence. Strong civil society engagement.	
Central African Republic ⁷⁹	2002-2003 and 2004-2007	MDRP BCPR	Initial D&R project (PNDR) not targeted specifically at combatants, poorly executed, stopped early. New programme (PRAC) run 2004-2007, DDR of c.7,500 ex-combatants.	UNDP SALW control programme 2006-2009 launched as part of transition from PRAC (with justice and security projects).	SALW programme designed at later stage, but clearly builds on DDR programme. National DDR Commission reshaped as Commission on SALW, Disarmament and Reinsertion (CNPDR)
Colombia ⁸⁰	2003-present	National government	DDR programme is unusual and largely not internationally supported, as it deals with only some paramilitaries while conflict continues.	Quite tough gun control in some cities but one of highest gun crime rates in world. No comprehensi	DDR of paramilitaries seen as way of reducing gun crime but not linked to wider SALW control and community security programmes

⁷⁹ Florquin, 2006; Berman, 2006.

⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch, "Smoke and Mirrors", 2005; Pax Christi, "A New Beginning", 2006.

				ve SALW programmes	
Cote D'Ivoire ⁸¹	2005-present	UNDP	DDR programme agreed in 2005 peace agreement but never implemented due to political tensions	Pilot SALW reduction project planned within DDR programme	SALW reduction project planned by UNDP within DDR programme; details unclear; not implemented
Democratic Republic of Congo ⁸²	2004-present	UNDP/MONUC/MDRP	Very complex post-conflict environment, very complex DDR programme; pilot in Ituri had some success but poorly managed	SALW proliferation is very severe; line between combatants and civilians very blurred, high insecurity – therefore no separate SALW project	Extreme instability makes it difficult to establish longer-term SALW measures until majority of illegal armed groups disarmed.
East Timor ⁸³	2001-2002	IOM and others (funding by USAID, World Bank, Japan, Canada)	DDR of active FALINTIL liberation army members; large number of veterans not included	Unclear	Unclear
Haiti ⁸⁴	2004-present	MIUNSTAH (UN Mission	Programme redesigned because	One of five key	SALW control fully integrated. However, it is debatable how far the

⁸¹ UN DDR resource centre Cote D'Ivoire country page; UNDP Cote D'Ivoire: <http://www.ci.undp.org/>, accessed 12.06.07

⁸² UN DDR resource centre DRC country page; Amnesty International, "DRC: DDR and Reform of the Army", 2007.

⁸³ McCarthy, 2002.

⁸⁴ UN DDR resource centre Haiti country page; Muggah, BCPR Strategic Review, 2006; Muggah, "Securing Haiti's Transition", 2006.

	(redesign 2006)	in Haiti, organised by DPKO)/UNDP	conditions do not suit 'classic' DDR: insecurity caused by armed criminal groups. New programme aims to reduce armed violence	priorities of UN programme is the reinforcement of legislative & institutional framework to control SALW proliferation	'DDR' mission is truly engaged in DDR; also, programme has faced multiple setbacks
Indonesia (Aceh) ⁸⁵	2005-2007	National government, EU, UNDP, others	Demobilisation and reintegration of GAM veterans as part of Aceh peace process.	No particular arms control measures beyond GAM disarmament. National government lacks SALW strategy.	Unclear
Liberia ⁸⁶	2003-present	UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia, organised by DPKO)/UNDP	Disarmament and demobilisation of over 100,000 ex-combatants by 2005. Foreign fighters repatriated. Reintegration programmes continue.	UNDP-backed Community Arms Collection and Development (CACAD) programme launched in	Community-based SALW programme launched after initial disarmament; good coordination apparent between SALW and DDR bodies.

⁸⁵ Centre for Security Sector Management, "DDR Programme in Aceh Indonesia 2005-2006", 2007.

⁸⁶ UN DDR resource centre Liberia country page; Case study of Liberia (carried out for this project);

				2005 following end of formal disarmament . National SALW commission established	
Mozambique ⁸⁷	1994-1996	UNOMOZ (UN Mission in Mozambique)	DDR of 100,000 combatants faced many obstacles, deemed largely unsuccessful.	Only small proportion of arms collected, even less destroyed, major cross-border problems. Various projects since, including Operation Rachel jointly with S Africa.	Little thought appears to have been given to wider SALW control issues when DDR was designed and implemented
Nepal	2006	UNDP, others?	DDR of Maoist rebels and downsizing of government army	Unknown	Unclear
Philippines (Mindanao) ⁸⁸	1997-present	Government (World Bank, other actors)	No demobilisation, little disarmament; focused on	“BARIL” programme collected	Unclear

⁸⁷ Leão, 2004.

⁸⁸ Makinano & Lubang, 2001.

		support development)	integration of MNLF members into national army/police	4,750 weapons, but most MNLF arms not collected. No known SALW control projects, no national commission.	
Republic of Congo ⁸⁹	2000-present	UNDP	Relatively successful Reintegration and Collection of SALW programme ran 2000-2002, closed for lack of funding. Used innovative community micro-projects. Follow-up PCAD launched 2004, on hold.	Small arms collection and destruction (PCAD) largely for ex-combatants but wider elements too. Government launched DDR programme, not coordinated with PCAD. Violence has stalled process	Some attempts at integration/coordination but poor communication with national government
Sierra Leone ⁹⁰	1998-2004	UNAMSIL (UN Mission	Initially DDR unsuccessful but	CACD (Community	DDR did not deal with wider SALW but CACD launched as effective

⁸⁹ Nichols, "Republic of the Congo" 2006.

		in Sierra Leone)	mostly achieved in 2001.	Arms Collection & Destruction) and CACDII projects. Community focused: arms for development .	follow-up.
Solomon Islands ⁹¹	2002-2004	UNDP/Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands(RAMSI)	UNDP funded D&R of Special Constables (no disarmament as supposedly not armed). Australian-led RAMSI addressed disarmament from 2003	UNDP-funded 'Weapons Free Villages' (WFV) in 2002. RAMSI and UNDP ran 21-day amnesty in 2003 that collected significant quantities of weapons	WFV programme innovative but had little effect on disarmament; later amnesty supported both DDR and wider disarmament.
Somalia ⁹²	2002-present	UNDP	Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) programme has 5 components: Judiciary; Law	SALW control one of five elements of ROLS	Complex and entrenched conflict: distinction of military & civilian roles very blurred, high SALW proliferation. ROLS more suited than 'classic' DDR

⁹⁰ Case study of Sierra Leone (carried out for this project); CICS University of Bradford, "Armed Violence and Poverty in Sierra Leone", 2005; Nichols, "Sierra Leone", 2006.

⁹¹ Nelson, 2006.

⁹² UNDP Somalia Rule of Law Programme homepage: www.so.undp.org/page.asp?id=655

			enforcement; DDR; SALW control; mine action.	programme. First phase to 2005 focused on Somaliland, now broader	
Sri Lanka ⁹³	2002-present	UNHCR, IOM and others	Shaky ceasefire. No proper DDR but major reintegration programmes for IDPs and refugees from conflict	Major SALW proliferation. National commission established in 2004.	Ongoing violence makes DDR unlikely. Ongoing SALW projects may be fed into later DDR programmes.
Sudan ⁹⁴	2004-present	UNMIS (UN Mission in Sudan)/UNDP	Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) addresses special needs groups first. Includes community security and SALW elements. No full DDR yet	Many armed groups, military SALW widespread among civilians. Arms Reduction and Control is key section of IDDRP.	Far-reaching integration of SALW control and community security into DDR; some donors are critical, suggest they be separated
Uganda ⁹⁵	2003/05-present	MDRP and UNDP (separate programmes)	MDRP: D&R of fighters under Amnesty Act. UNDP Human Security	Active SALW commission (National Focal Point)	Linkages with DDR called for within National Action Plan, but limited practical co-operation or integration to date.

⁹³ Bartolucci, 2007.

⁹⁴ UN DDR Resource Centre Sudan Country Page; UNDP Sudan website: <http://www.sd.undp.org/>; International Crisis Group, "Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement", 2006. Case study of Sudan carried out for this project

⁹⁵ MDRP Monthly Statistical Progress Report March 2007; UN DDR Resource Centre Uganda Country Page. Case study of Uganda carried out for this project

			Programme includes DDR and SALW Control	with comprehensive SALW strategy (National Action Plan).	
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Although this table is very broad in scope and there is a danger of simplification and over-generalisation, certain observations can still be made.

Firstly, in many DDR programmes, even some that are currently taking place, it does not appear that SALW issues have been considered as a matter of course or that attempts have been made to analyse the relationship between DDR and SALW control. Nonetheless, there is a clear trend towards exploring this relationship and trying to build functional ties between them, as evidenced by many of the more recently launched programmes.

Secondly, there are several examples (e.g. Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone) of SALW programmes being designed during the later stages of DDR or as a follow-up once DDR is officially over. On the one hand, this suggests that some linkages have been formed between DDR and SALW control, and that SALW control measures are intended to build on the foundations for peace and security created by the DDR process. On the other hand, it appears that SALW control was not considered from the start, but was addressed only after the DDR programme was quite advanced and a number of difficulties with wider SALW proliferation had arisen. Furthermore, it is hard to escape the impression in such cases that SALW control activities have been seen as makeshift activities that are put into place when DDR is over or stalling, rather than as an integral part of the peacebuilding and security strategy.

Thirdly, in several cases (particularly the DRC, Somalia and Sudan) the conflict and human security situation is severe and extremely complex, and there is no clear distinction between armies, armed groups, and civilians. Peacebuilding interventions thus face enormous practical challenges. It is very hard to delineate clear plans for DDR, SALW control and other measures, and numerous factors continue to threaten to derail these plans. Finally, there are examples (e.g. Haiti, South Sudan) of attempts to approach DDR in a broad way, integrating SALW control, armed violence reduction and community security building priorities into the DDR programme framework. This indicates a realistic appraisal that comprehensive programmes are necessary, but the experience has not been satisfactory in several ways, with serious problems of internal divisions within UN missions, and problems of co-ordination and implementation within the overall programme framework.

The four case studies that are presented below have been chosen to demonstrate a range of different SALW and DDR interventions and inter-relationships.

4.2 Sierra Leone⁹⁶

Sierra Leone is often held up by the international community as one of the most successful DDR projects undertaken, and is widely believed to have made a very significant contribution to the re-establishment of peace following years of brutal conflict. Yet the case study paper argues that to some extent the virtues of the DDR process in Sierra Leone have been overplayed and that ‘DDR’s potential to improve human security was not fully realised’. Community consultations held as part of the case study revealed various weaknesses of the DDR programme, mainly relating to demobilisation and reintegration, which were criticised for failing to genuinely provide alternative livelihoods, failing to handle vulnerable groups with adequate care, and being considerably less ‘community-based’ than claimed.

From an arms control perspective, however, the situation looks brighter. Disarmament got off to a shaky start, as initial attempts at DDR launched in 1998 soon foundered, and the renewed efforts made after the signing of the Lomé Accord in 1999 quickly became ineffective because of continued fighting despite the official ceasefire. This culminated in a crisis in 2000 when about 500 peacekeepers were taken hostage. After this crisis was resolved, the international community made more strenuous efforts to enforce peace, and by 2001 genuine disarmament was taking place. It is widely acknowledged that this was very successful in removing a large amount of weapons: by January 2002, when DDR was officially declared ‘complete’, 72,500 combatants had been disarmed and demobilized, and 42,330 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were collected and destroyed. This in itself was a significant achievement.

Importantly, however, neither the Government of Sierra Leone nor the international community rested on its laurels, and it was openly acknowledged that there were still many weapons circulating within the country. This was partly because of an awareness that despite the large number of demobilised ex-combatants, there was no way of knowing exactly how many weapons were in circulation, especially as many weapons were thought to have entered into civilian possession, which had not been addressed by the DDR process at all. It was also because there were various armed groups who had been wary of – or felt disenfranchised by – the main DDR process and had not surrendered weapons as part of the official disarmament process. As a first response to this, a Community Arms Collection and Destruction (CACD) project was launched by the Government of Sierra Leone. It was run by the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), with support from the National Commission for DDR (NCDDR) and the UN Mission in Sierra Leone

⁹⁶ As well as the case study of Sierra Leone carried out for this project (REF), this section also draws significantly on the following two sources: CICS University of Bradford, “Armed Violence and Poverty in Sierra Leone”, 2005; Nichols, “Sierra Leone”, 2006.

(UNAMSIL). CACD launched a temporary amnesty, coupled with the threat of prosecution for those found in possession of a weapon after the amnesty expired.

CACD had some success, collecting nearly 10,000 weapons, but it had not even been extended to all parts of the country before the project came to a close. The Government of Sierra Leone therefore launched a new arms control project in conjunction with UNDP, named CACDII, which was implemented in early 2003. This was seen as a preparatory phase for a longer-term engagement in the form of an Arms for Development (AfD) programme. CACDII took on board various lessons both from the challenges faced by the first CACD and from wider international experience, and was considerably different in design. It aimed both to provide a national architecture for SALW control work through the development of new arms control laws and strategies, and to pilot a new approach to weapons collection that stressed community engagement and the provision of development projects in exchange for the establishment of ‘weapons free’ communities. Work on the strategic side stumbled as it became clear how complicated it would be to pass legislation, but the pilots of the arms-for-development approach were largely successful. This led to the implementation of the AfD programme, which has gradually been spread across the country. There have been several reviews of both CACDII and AfD, and it appears that programme managers have allowed the programme to develop further in response to the findings of these reviews.⁹⁷

Although CACDII and AfD are widely considered to be successful projects, they have had some problems. Perhaps the biggest issue is that the AfD approach has been successful in rural areas, but it was not really designed to tackle the very different problems surrounding arms reduction/control in more urban areas. This is particularly true of the capital, Freetown, where high-levels of crime and armed violence continue to cause concern. There have also been grumbles about the amount of money provided for development projects (initially this was set at \$20,000, but due to exchange rate fluctuations it was instead set at 40 million Leones, which often turned out to be much less), and about improper substitutes being given to hunters whose hunting weapons have been indefinitely confiscated.⁹⁸ Some community respondents interviewed for the case study paper also called into question the ‘local ownership’ of the CACD process. Despite these failings, however, CACDII and AfD are generally believed to have had a positive impact, and have demonstrated the benefit of many more progressive measures, such as ensuring that arms control is community based, engaging NGOs in the process (including

⁹⁷ Nichols, “Sierra Leone”, 2006.

⁹⁸ The case study paper recounts how people in Bo and Kono have turned from hunting to running taxi services on motorcycles, because instead of being provided with hunting wires, they were given fishing nets which they felt were of little use.

in the National Commission on SALW), and linking SALW control to policing and wider peacebuilding.

It may be possible to argue that since SALW control was addressed only after DDR was completed, and that both programmes are regarded as successes, it may not in fact necessary to integrate/coordinate them. Certainly, it appears that there was a logical sequencing in terms of dealing adequately with ‘disarmament within DDR’ and not muddying the waters before addressing civilian possession, which in this case worked well. However, the decision to launch SALW control after DDR was over was not so much part of a long-held plan to do things in this way, so much as a realisation that DDR had ignored a problem that urgently needed to be addressed. Although they were not integrated as such, the involvement of the NCDDR in the initial CACD project shows that significant coordination was taking place and that the inter-linkages between the two issues were acknowledged. Furthermore, SALW control programme managers remained open to constructive criticism and new ideas and continued to develop and strengthen the programme as it developed.

Lastly, it may also be argued that the relative success of the arms control process in Sierra Leone is in part thanks to a ‘positive loop’ – international actors have invested so much in post-conflict reconstruction and are so keen to ensure that it continues to be viewed as a success that it is probable that they have been more supportive of SALW control measures than is often the case. Perhaps the main lesson from Sierra Leone is that the programmes were sufficiently responsive to change to achieve their goals, but that it would have still been better to have planned (even if not launched) SALW control measures from an earlier stage.

4.3 Liberia⁹⁹

In many ways, Liberia has faced similar challenges with regards to DDR and SALW control as Sierra Leone. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the measures that have been taken in response are also broadly similar, right down to the names: a preparatory phase titled Community Arms Collection for Development (CACAD) followed by a longer-term Arms for Development (AfD) Programme. Rather than give an overview of the entire process of arms control in Liberia, therefore, this short section focuses on a couple of aspects that are less similar to Sierra Leone.

Liberia first attempted DDR in 1996 following the end of the hostilities known as the First Liberian Civil War. However, the country soon slumped back into conflict, and it

⁹⁹ This section draws primarily on the case study paper written for this project and also the UN DDR resource centre Liberia country page [REFS]

was only at the end of the Second Liberian Civil War in 2003 that DDR became realistic. Yet this DDR was also very nearly derailed at the start following chaotic scenes at one of the demobilisation centres, Camp Schieffelin near the capital, Monrovia. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was dispatched to support DDR, but on it very quickly became clear that it had been launched too soon and the Mission was unprepared to manage the process effectively. On 7 December 2003, significant numbers of heavily-armed government fighters turned up at the camp expecting to instantly receive the \$300 cash payment of which they had heard talk. When they discovered that they would receive only \$150 instantly and would have to wait until the end of a three-week demobilisation programme for the other \$150, they began to riot. In the end, the crowds were calmed and crisis was averted, but this demonstrated how unprepared UNMIL had been, and also acted as a further nail in the coffin of weapons buy-back schemes. More generally, it appears that both the Government of Liberia and the international community had under-estimated the huge demand that the DDR programme would create, in terms of the amount of people disarming and the speed at which they reported for disarmament. This put huge strain on DDR in the early months of the process.

According to the NCDDRR, from December 2003 until the formal end of the DDR process in November 2004, a total of 103,019 (68,162 men, 22,370 women, 8,523 boys and 2,440 girls) had been demobilised, handing in 28,314 weapons, 33,604 heavy munitions, and 6,486,136 small arms ammunition. This suggests a very low ratio of weapons handed in per demobilised person. As a result, it was feared that despite the large number of people engaging in the DDR process, large quantities of weaponry (including heavy weaponry) may still be at large within the country. This led to the development of the AfD Programme, which was launched in 2006 and is expected to run for several years. Like Sierra Leone, it focuses on community engagement, promotes the concept of 'weapons free' districts, is linked into community policing initiatives, and also attempts to establish a national framework for arms control. The AfD Programme is less advanced in Liberia than in Sierra Leone, however, and in the meantime, considerable insecurity continues to be reported, particularly in Monrovia. Nonetheless, consultations carried out for the case study paper suggested that respondents did not view arms proliferation as a priority security concern, with issues such as corruption, bad leadership and lawlessness heading the list of causes of insecurity and further conflict.¹⁰⁰

In general, while the perceived success of interventions in Sierra Leone may imply that it is possible or even preferable to ignore integration/coordination of DDR and SALW control, in Liberia, which is still at an earlier stage in the AfD process, the jury remains out. Arms control interventions have learnt much from similar programmes in Sierra

¹⁰⁰ Liberia case study paper [REF], currently p. 26

Leone, and have also adopted many progressive elements, but it is unclear whether any attempts have been made to link SALW control with the longer-term processes of reintegration and related community-level engagement, or whether this will present many problems in the future.

4.4 Uganda¹⁰¹

Uganda represents a very different case from Sierra Leone and Liberia in terms of both DDR and SALW control. Firstly, recent conflict in Uganda has primarily occurred in the north of the country, while other parts of Uganda have remained relatively peaceful and experienced development and growth. Secondly, unlike most situations in which DDR is implemented, Uganda has quite a wide-ranging SALW control programme and national mechanisms for SALW control are in place. Thirdly, the DDR process has been significantly more ‘locally owned’ than other DDR interventions recounted here since it is primarily run by the Government of Uganda and has received only limited international support. Fourthly, however, it is debatable whether the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration activities that have taken place in northern Uganda in recent years qualify as ‘DDR’ as defined in this paper, since they have been carried out *in advance* of any peace agreement between the Government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the constituent elements of DDR have not been conceived of or implemented as a single programme within which all actors and projects are subsumed. Rather, they have occurred within the context of a broad range of initiatives that have been implemented by various actors within the country, including the Government of Uganda, NGOs and donors agencies, seeking to address past and ongoing conflicts.

Those DDR activities that have taken place in Uganda in recent years have done so primarily under the framework of the 2000 Amnesty Act, which established procedures to grant legal amnesty to ‘reporters’, i.e. members of insurgent groups who ‘report’ themselves to the authorities and agree to disarm and demobilise. The Amnesty Act provides for the establishment of an Amnesty Commission to monitor demobilisation and reintegration and for local Demobilisation and Resettlement Teams (DRTs). ‘Reporters’ can present themselves to various senior figures, such as *‘the nearest Army or Police Unit, a Chief, a member of the Executive Committee of a local government Unit, a magistrate or a religious leader within the locality’*, and are then handed over to a DRT.¹⁰² It is thus fundamentally a locally-owned and driven process, though it has received funding from a variety of bilateral and multi-lateral donors, including the MDRP under a ‘Special Project’.

¹⁰¹ This section draws primarily on the case study paper written for this project and also the UN DDR resource centre Uganda country page.

¹⁰² Section 4, Amnesty Act 2000

Over the past years, Uganda has taken considerable steps to strengthen arms control. At the national level, it has established a functioning National Focal Point (NFP; in many countries these are referred to as national commissions) including a broad range of government and non-governmental representatives, and has developed a National Action Plan (NAP) on SALW. It has also co-operated actively at the regional level on implementing the *Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa*. It is thus a potentially strong candidate for greater integration/coordination of DDR and SALW control, and indeed there has been some limited success in this regard. Nonetheless, much of this potential has remained unrealised, partly due to a lack of government capacity. At the planning level, there is some recognition of the ways in which Uganda's NAP could link to the DDR process, including the future DDR of remaining LRA which has been the subject of recent peace negotiations. The NAP states that linkages should be established with DDR and joint activities undertaken, but to date this has resulted in little practical co-operation. The NFP Secretariat has however indicated that it hopes to strengthen linkages with the DDR process as implementation of the NAP progresses and has identified a number of possible areas where such co-operation could occur. For example, the NFP could contribute to the disarmament process by helping to establish norms for weapons collection, storage and destruction, by providing trainings, and by establishing programmes that supported civilian arms control in areas where reintegration was expected to take place. Additional capacity within the NFP will however be required in order to take this forward. Meanwhile, the mandate of the Amnesty Commission in relation to disarmament is somewhat unclear and in practice the army – the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) – are playing a leading role in the disarmament of reporters. The UPDF report that all weapons collected are registered and then destroyed, but some people have raised concerns regarding the lack of transparency surrounding this process and the difficulty in ascertaining whether all arms are destroyed.

4.5 Sudan¹⁰³

The Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) in Sudan is one of the first DDR programmes to place the ideas at the heart of its focus. It is a highly 'progressive' plan that consciously places human security at the heart of the whole intervention. Furthermore, it ambitiously attempted to integrate SALW control and community safety into the programme from the start. In practice, however, there has been a wide gap between theory and practice, with poor implementation of the IDDRP and many problems in integrating arms control measures into the DDR process. This has fuelled discontent with the mantra of

¹⁰³ This section draws primarily on the case study paper written for this project, and also International Crisis Group, "Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement", 2006 and Muggah "Reflections on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Sudan", 2006.

‘integration’ and there are already plans to decouple the SALW control elements from the programme. It is therefore most important to assess the case of Sudan more closely, because perceptions of this programme are likely to colour attitudes towards integration/coordination of DDR and SALW control in the next few years.

Three main reasons can be given for the current failures of the IDDRP in Sudan. The first is the systematic failure of the various arms of the UN to achieve properly ‘integrated’ management of the DDR process even between its own agencies, let alone with the many other actors on the ground. SALW control was not directly mentioned in the peace agreements or the UNSC resolution that launched the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and hence the SALW-related elements of the DDR process are managed by UNDP. Similar splits of responsibility are evident throughout the programme, and the case study paper discusses in detail many of the practical problems that have been caused by poor management and the different agencies’ inability to ‘integrate’ their work.

Secondly, the SALW control agenda was at once far too ambitious, far too vague, and far too ‘integrated’. UNDP had first explored the possibilities for a ‘Small Arms and Violence Reduction’ Programme in Sudan in 2003, but by 2004 it had been decided that given the complexity of the situation in Sudan, where the distinction between civilians, armed forces, and other armed groups was extremely blurred, DDR and SALW control should be considered together. Months of planning between the UNDP and the main warring parties led to plans both for the disarmament of the two main parties to the conflict, and separately for broader civilian arms control under an Arms Reduction and Control (ARC) component. In practice, however, the ARC component was not realised, apparently because of internecine fighting within the UN as to whether the ARC should be part of DDR programming. Instead, some elements of the ARC about community security were hived off into a separate Community Security Support component while others were ditched. This too, has proved problematic, partly due to a lack of clarity as to what is exactly meant by ‘community security’, but mostly because of a lack of funding and international support for the work. This leads to the third problem, which is that very few of the planned SALW measures have actually taken place. Most of the ambitious measures that were planned have remained on paper, unimplemented for lack of funding and/or lack of clear plans and competent staff. The capacity of the DDR commissions in both North and South Sudan is also very low.

As a result of frustrations with the slow pace of the UN-backed arms control process, the Government of South Sudan instigated its own civilian disarmament initiatives. These were heavy-handed and led to further violence, which spurred UNDP into launching pilot SALW control projects in parts of Jonglei state and drafting a new Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) programme for South Sudan. However, this again became

mired in disagreements about the extent to which it should be under IDDRP management and funded through the IDDRP budget. As a result, the CSAC has so far not been implemented. There is now increasing discussion as to whether CSAC should be decoupled from the IDDRP, since it is a longer term measure, funds within the IDDRP are short anyway, and local actors are reluctant to address civilian SALW control within the DDR framework.

At a broader level, the failure so far of SALW control and community safety interventions is part of the wider failure of the UN to live up to its ideals of 'integrated' DDR. However, it is also an understandable consequence of plans that were always wildly ambitious and probably misguided. This paper has argued that 'full' integration of SALW control into DDR programmes is unwise, and the Sudan example provides a clear illustration of why: confusion of objectives, a lack of clarity about the scope of arms control measures, significant hostility towards SALW control programmes from DDR practitioners and a belief that DDR is being stretched too far. In fact, although SALW control and community safety were brought under DDR, it is questionable how far they were ever actually *integrated*. If integration simply means 'placing everything under the same umbrella', rather than finding real synergies between programmes, it is not surprising that hostility towards 'integrating' SALW control may be growing.

4.6 Observations on the case studies

Both the list of 22 DDR interventions with a SALW control dimension and the four more detailed case studies have highlighted various aspects of the inter-relationship between DDR and SALW control, and the difficulties of integration/coordination. Although it has been possible to identify some examples of good practice, it must be acknowledged that they are few and far between. There are some examples where integration/coordination has at least been considered and even attempted, and these efforts have faced significant obstacles. More often than not, it is not even possible to identify any thought about how DDR and SALW control could be better coordinated. This in itself should be a cause of concern. If it were the case that the majority of DDR programmes had been highly successful without addressing SALW control, it would indeed be possible to argue that integration/coordination is unnecessary.

In most cases, however, the DDR process has hit many difficulties, and in many of them it can be argued that the lack of thought about how to link DDR to SALW control was a contributing factor to these problems. It is indeed worrying that the few attempts at integration/coordination that have taken place cannot be shown to have produced much better results. Yet this is more likely to be from a lack of experience (combined, in the case of Sudan, with over-enthusiasm and overall problems in programme management) rather than the inherent impossibility of the task. The case studies actually emphasise that

practical steps – often quite small – to improve coordination, such as information exchange and joint planning might well have had a positive impact if the capacity, funding and political will to implement them had been there.

5. Assessment and Emerging Policy Implications

This final section aims to bring together some of the key findings and arguments from this Thematic Working Paper and to explore their potential policy implications.

5.1 Enhanced co-ordination between DDR and SALW control programmes

Sections 2 –4 of this paper demonstrate clearly that there are many areas of overlap between DDR and SALW programmes, including in their aims and objectives; target groups and key stakeholders; and functionally and operationally in each relevant country. They both aim to promote both state and human security, and to contribute to the well-being of the poor and vulnerable as part of their wider contribution to peace and security-building in countries emerging from war. As such, they need to be integrated into an overall post-conflict security-building strategy, in which human security and the interests of the poor and vulnerable are given priority alongside concerns with state stabilisation and longer term national and regional security and development. In this sense, the approach endorsed in the UN IDDRS is very relevant in many contexts. The planning, design and implementation of DDR programmes should systematically aim to ensure that they integrate limited but important aspects of SALW control (particularly in relation to assessments and to disarmament of those deemed eligible for DDR); and co-ordinate effectively with other wider (and often more long-term) dimensions of SALW control measures.

The specific priorities for close co-ordination between DDR and SALW programmes depend on the circumstances of each case. However, on the basis of programme analysis and practical experience discussed in sections 2 – 4 above, where DDR and SALW programmes are both present at the same time, they include:

- Close co-ordination or partial integration for re-planning and needs assessments; promoting a conducive political and security environment, and aspects of programme planning and design;
- Close co-ordination and mutual support for developing local ‘ownership’ and national capacity from the initial stages onwards;
- Close co-ordination or partial integration of a number of aspects of arms (and ammunition) collection, arms registration, ‘disarmament’ and arms management and destruction processes;
- Co-ordination in relation to demobilisation programmes and processes (including re-insertion), particularly to promote the role of SALW control in providing a secure

environment in which ex-combatant demobilisation and return to civilian life can take place;

- Co-ordination or partial integration of (recommended) mid-term reviews (perhaps 12 – 24 months) after the peace settlement), to ensure appropriate priorities and integrated approaches to human security and peace-building after the short-term D&D processes have taken place;
- Co-ordination to enhance the role that SALW control measures can play in providing a conducive environment for longer-term re-integration, reconciliation and development;
- Co-ordination to ensure that relevant resources and capabilities developed through the DDR programme are retained for the longer-term – taking advantage of the longer-term perspective of well-designed SALW programmes.

In practice, it has become clear that programmers and practitioners have increasingly recognised at least some of these opportunities and priorities for co-ordination and resource-sharing between DDR and SALW control, and there are examples of efforts to respond to them. However, it is clear that such co-ordination is relatively rare, either through design or implementation. There are a number of obvious factors contributing to such poor co-ordination experience so far, including:

- SALW programmes have only recently emerged as a ‘normal’ element of post-conflict security building, and thus opportunities for co-ordination have only recently developed in practice;
- Many post-conflict SALW programmes that have taken place have not only been delayed, starting as D&D programme elements have been coming to a close or have ended, but also have not been anticipated at an early stage – limiting scope for co-ordination in assessment, planning or design;
- Many post-conflict SALW programmes have left much to be desired in their own terms, and (contrary to accepted good-practice guidelines) have been short-term, ad-hoc and partial (rather than having a longer term developmental focus);
- IDDRS have only recently been developed, and in the prior period DDR planners and practitioners tended to have a relatively narrow concept of their objectives;
- Recently, there has been a damaging tendency to raise unrealistic expectations of what can be achieved through DDR programmes and a relatively disorganised debate about their potential scope. This contributed to unsuccessful attempts to expand DDR programmes to incorporate whole areas of SALW control and community security building without sufficiently careful design and management.

Thus, there is no shortage of contingent explanations of why co-ordination between SALW and DDR programmes has been inadequate so far. The priority is to build on our foregoing analysis to develop priorities and guidelines for promoting effective co-

ordination in the future, in the interests of human as well as national and regional security and to promote the security and well-being of the poor and vulnerable in particular.

5.2 Taking full account of differing post-conflict contexts

The IDDRS repeatedly emphasises the importance of adapting guidelines to specific local contexts or needs, in order to customise DDR programmes for each case. Nevertheless, an important finding emerging from this paper is that the broad approaches recommended in the IDDRS (and thus informing at least international decision-making) appear to underestimate the extent to which different contexts may imply profound re-structuring not only of the ways in which disarmament, demobilisation, and re-integration programme element are integrated but also in the ways in which integration and co-ordination priorities should structure combined approaches to DDR and SALW control. Thus, the IDDRS broadly anticipates the SALW programmes should start after DDR programmes are underway, with a ‘classic case’ expectations that SALW control measures will often be launched when implementation of D&D programmes is well-underway. This is a plausible scenario, and one for which elaborated guidance is useful. But recent experience demonstrates that other scenarios are equally possible.

For a range of reasons, DDR programmes may be seriously delayed. In these cases, substantial re-orientation or demobilisation of armed groups can be expected to have taken place, and many important SALW related issues will have evolved considerably. In these contexts, it is not clear that the IDDRS provides best guidance. It may be better to aim to launch SALW programmes at a relatively early stage, particularly in view of their wider range of programme elements and greater flexibility about target groups and phasing. So many DDR programme elements (including special treatment for various categories of ex-combatant) implicitly assume that they will take place as short-term measures shortly after a peace settlement, and are much harder to justify for programmes that are launched after substantial delays. In those contexts, it may be wise to profoundly re-think the best ways of integrating DDR and SALW control elements, within an overall framework of human security building and conflict prevention.

Similarly, there have been several recent examples of DDR programmes being mandated in contexts that are far from conducive to ‘classic’ DDR as an integrated short-term measure (including South Sudan and Haiti). This was recognised by the programme planners, and could have resulted in good co-ordinated programmes focussed on human security building if it were not for inter-institutional competition and management problems. However, once again, the IDDRS provides inadequate or partial guidance. In such highly complex cases, it may be better to abandon the framework of a integrated DDR programme altogether, and focus instead on a modular approach, involving the

appropriate combination of elements from SALW control, DDR, SSR and transitional justice into a customised integrated programme.

Cases such as DDR in Nepal highlights another way in which post-conflict contexts may prompt a profound re-orientation of approach towards DDR design and the ways in which it aims to co-ordinate or integrate with SALW control (and SSR). In such contexts, the DDR programme is highly vulnerable to become subordinated to the interests of powerful local political authorities or other parties. The ‘form’ of DDR is retained by agreement with local parties, but the processes are driven by considerations other than the orderly demobilisation and re-integration of ex-combatants. In such contexts, it is important to analyse this carefully through assessment and review, and to be prepared to restructure the whole approach towards supporting DDR and SALW control.

Conclusions

The above analysis, if correct, implies that priorities for co-ordination between SALW control and DDR measures to promote human security may require much more than better implementation of the approaches recommended in the IDDRS. Rather than considering how an integrated package of DDR measures can be co-ordinated with subsequent wider SALW controls, as envisaged in the IDDRS, in several contexts it may be better to take a more modular approach to all of the elements of DDR and SALW, and combine those priority elements in a unique package customised for the purpose. This may not include some classic elements of DDR – for example, re-integration programmes may be treated separately, and integrated with IDP or refugee return. At the same time, SALW control measure such as awareness-raising, weapons collection programmes and stockpile management may combine closely with elements of D&D.

It is important to recognise that there are nevertheless important contexts for which IDDRS is highly relevant: contexts in which an integrated short-term package of disarmament, demobilisation and re-insertion measures can be launched shortly after the peace settlement. In such contexts, this paper has elaborated opportunities and priorities for co-ordination and partial integration with SALW programmes from the earliest stage. Plans to support longer-term re-integration processes should be developed early, but implemented with a longer term developmental approach, linked with longer term SALW control as well as other human security building programmes.

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