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Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Sierra Leone

Item Type	Report
Authors	Ginifer, Jeremy;Oliver, K.
Citation	Ginifer, J. and Oliver, K. [in association with] Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, PARC & Associated Consultants (2004). Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Sierra Leone. London: DFID. Evaluation report (EV 647) Country/Regional Case Study 3.
Publisher	Department for International Development
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Download date	2025-04-21 12:01:22
Link to Item	http://hdl.handle.net/10454/3934

Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools

Sierra Leone

*Principal author,
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with input from Kaye Oliver*



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HM TREASURY

Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools

Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, PARC

& Associated Consultants

Country/Regional Case Study 3

Sierra Leone

Principal Author: Jeremy Ginifer with input from Kaye Oliver

March 2004

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The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author/s and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department for International Development nor of the other government departments who have assisted in managing this evaluation (Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, HM Treasury)

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PREFACE

P1. The Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) are a joint Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Department for International Development (DFID) mechanism for funding and managing the UK's contribution towards violent conflict prevention and reduction. The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) covers sub-Saharan Africa while the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) covers the rest of the world. The CPPs were established by Her Majesty's Government (HMG) in April 2001, following a government-wide review of UK conflict prevention work in 2000. The rationale behind the CPPs is that by bringing together the interests, resources and expertise of FCO, MOD and DFID, greater effectiveness can be achieved. To this end, the CPPs share a joint Public Service Agreement (PSA) target, expressed as follows:

Improved effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction in potential sources of future conflict, where the UK can make a significant contribution.

P2. HMG commissioned the first evaluation of the CPPs to inform the Spending Review 2004 (SR04). DFID has managed this evaluation through Evaluation Department in collaboration with an Evaluation Management Committee (EMC) that also included the Cabinet Office Defence and Overseas Secretariat (Chair), the FCO's United Nations Department, MOD's Directorate of Policy and Planning, DFID's Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department (CHAD) and DFID's Africa Conflict Team (now the Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit), situated in the Africa and Greater Horn Department (AGHD).

P3. The establishment of a cross-Whitehall Evaluation Management Committee was an innovative approach to managing an evaluation in DFID, and followed the ethos of the joint working of the CPPs. It allowed for extensive consultation between the various departments and conflict prevention teams. Many thanks are due to the various EMC members who contributed to the management of this evaluation. These include: Chris Chalmers, Benjamin Saoul and Anthea Dolman (Cabinet Office), Clare Barras and Stephen Evans (HMT), Joan Link, Euan Wallace and Karen Wolstenholme (FCO), Bernard Harborne and Malcolm Hood (AGHD), Tom Owen-Edmunds, Catherine Masterman and Ben le Roith (CHAD), Alicia Forsyth, Charlotte Brown, Campbell McCafferty (MOD).

P4. The study was managed by Mary Thompson, Iain Murray and Dale Poad (DFID Evaluation Department) in collaboration with the EMC. It was edited by Caryn Maclean

P5. The evaluation was undertaken by Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, the PARC & Associated Consultants. The ACPP Sierra Leone Case study was carried out by Dr Jeremy Giner with Ms Kaye Oliver. Work was conducted in three phases. The first was London-based, and involved situating Sierra Leone ACPP activities in the context of UK approaches to conflict prevention and the overall policy framework of the ACPP. The second phase involved field work in Sierra Leone, whilst the third phase involved consultations in London with key government stakeholders.

P6. The aim of the evaluation of the CPPs is to assess current government approaches to Conflict Prevention through the GCPP and the ACPP, and to provide an overview of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward. The purpose of evaluation generally is to examine the design, implementation and impact of selected programmes in order to learn lessons from them so that these can be applied to current and future work, and also to help strengthen HMG's accountability. It should be borne in mind that any programmes or projects examined are the product of their time, and that the policies they reflected and the procedures they followed have often changed in the light of HMG's developing knowledge.

P7. The Sierra Leone Case Study is one of six studies undertaken within the framework of the evaluation of the CPPs. In accordance with the Terms of Reference (ToRs) and the Inception Report, the Evaluation placed maximum emphasis on the macro level: the policy processes in Whitehall by which decisions on allocations are made and implemented by the CPPs. Considerable attention has also been placed on the meso level: the degree to which CPP policies and activities in a given conflict form part of a coherent package of direct interventions by the international community and local actors to the problems of particular large scale deadly conflicts or potential conflicts. The micro-level of analysis (review of specific projects) confines itself largely to the way in which projects impact on the meso and macro levels. The Evaluation has not analysed systematically whether specific projects funded by the CPPs have been well managed and whether they have achieved their specific project goals. Single projects have been analysed to the extent that they reflect on the macro and meso levels.

P8. The main findings of the evaluation, reflected in this Synthesis Report, are that the CPPs are doing significant work funding worthwhile activities that make positive contributions to effective conflict prevention, although it is far too early in the day to assess impact. The progress achieved through the CPP mechanisms is significant enough to justify their continuation. Overall, the consultants believe that worthwhile improvements could be achieved through:

- a. more consistent approaches to joint assessment and priority setting;
- b. more determined pursuit of coordinated international responses;
- c. and by allocation of more administrative resources and staff trained appropriately in the associated processes.

P9. The Sierra Leone Case Study notes that the UK, having played a major role in bringing the fighting in Sierra Leone under control, has adopted a conflict prevention strategy with the following main objectives: effective, affordable and democratically-accountable security agencies that are able to counter internal or external threats without significant external military presence; reconciliation and justice and the reintegration of ex-combatants into society; reducing the external threats to Sierra Leone from the region. In 2003/4 the majority of ACPP spending in Sierra Leone was on security sector reform (SSR) (£22.25m) with the remainder (£3.7m) going to reintegration of ex-combatants.

P10. Overall the consultant's main findings are as follows:

- a. The ACPP portfolio in Sierra Leone is well directed and represents high priority targets for conflict prevention. Whilst conflict prevention priorities are now shifting since elections were held in 2002, it is recognised that, for institutional and financial reasons, it is highly unlikely that the ACPP will move into the new softer priority areas such as corruption and the justice sector. It is important therefore that ACPP and bilateral programme managers should be fully aware of the linkages between the various programmes.
- b. The ACPP initiatives in Sierra Leone have generally connected well with the UN and there is evidence of worthwhile coordination. However, there are some concerns over issues such as appropriate policing models between some agencies.
- c. There is evidence that UK stakeholders are coordinating their activities more effectively than was the case prior to 2001 before the Pools were set up. Both in the field and in Whitehall there is regular formal and informal coordination and information-sharing. Nevertheless, there is still scope for further improvements in terms of more regular dialogue with international and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) across Departments, and in-country.
- d. In the absence of documents articulating competing priorities and providing reasons for funding current activities at different levels or instead of other activities, it is difficult to judge whether or not the Strategy resources are as well spent as they could be.

P11. The evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools is comprised of the following reports which can be found on the corresponding web-site links:

Synthesis Report	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647synthesis.pdf
Security Sector Reform, Nicole Ball	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647ssr.pdf
United Nations, Pierre Robert & Andrew Mack	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647un.pdf
Sudan, Emery Brusset	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sudan.pdf
Sierra Leone, Jeremy Ginifer & Kaye Oliver	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sleone.pdf
Afghanistan, Jonathan Goodhand & Paul Bergne	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647afghanistan.pdf
Russia and the FSU, Greg Austin & Paul Bergne	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647russia.pdf
Portfolio Review, Greg Austin & Malcolm Chalmers	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647portfolio.pdf

Evaluation reports can be found at the DFID website:

<http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/>

Michael Hammond
Head of Evaluation Department
2 April 2004

EVALUATION TEAM ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The members of the Evaluation Team would like to acknowledge the support of the Evaluation Management Committee (EMC), especially Mr Stephen Evans of Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT), who on behalf of the EMC, accompanied Dr. Ginifer and Miss Oliver on the field visit. The Evaluation Team also acknowledge the support of relevant officials in conducting the interviews and field work, in particular within the High Commission and the DFID office, International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) and the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) in Sierra Leone. The assistance of ACPD officials in London in terms of the visit to Sierra Leone and in providing general assistance was appreciated. We hope this material will be useful to the work at hand.

The Evaluation Team has been supported effectively by Ms Janet Wilson, the Programme Officer at Bradford University's Centre for International Cooperation and Security. Research assistance has been provided by Mr Todd Krannock, Mr David Newton, Mr Rob Lawton, Mr Nick Robson and Mr Thom Oommen. Mr Ken Berry has provided review assistance for the synthesis report and some case study reports, as well as having drafted some background material.

Bradford University
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACC	Anti-Corruption Commission
ACPP	Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
AGHD	Africa and Greater Horn Department
CCSSP	Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project
CDF	Civil Defence Forces
CEIP	Community Education Investment Programme
CGG	Campaign for Good Governance
CHAD	Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department
CIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
CPP	Conflict Prevention Pool
CRP	Community Reintegration Project
DAT	Defence Advisory Team
DEPAC	Development Partners Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EC	European Commission
ECOMOG	Economic Community (of West Africa States) Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EMC	Evaluation Management Committee
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GCPP	Global Conflict Prevention Pool
GoSL	Government of Sierra Leone
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HMT	Her Majesty's Treasury
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
IMATT	International Military Advisory and Training Team
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCDDR	National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

NRS	National Recovery Strategy
ONS	Office of National Security
P5	(United Nations Security Council) Permanent Five Members
PBRS	Peacebuilding Recovery Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSA	Public Service Agreement
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RSLAF	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SALW	Small Arms/Light Weapons
SDA	Service Delivery Agreement
SILSEP	Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLP	Sierra Leone Police
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STTTs	Short-Term Training Teams
ToRs	Terms of Reference
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WAD	West Africa Department of DFID

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

S1. Having played a major role in bringing the fighting in Sierra Leone under control, the UK has adopted a conflict prevention strategy there (see Annex 1) with the following main objectives:

- effective, affordable and democratically-accountable security agencies that are able to counter internal or external threats without significant external military presence;
- reconciliation and justice and the reintegration of ex-combatants into society;
- reducing the external threats to Sierra Leone from the region.

S2. The total programme spending from the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) in Sierra Leone allocated for 2003/4 was 26.3 million. Of this, 22.25 million was allocated to reform of the security sector, including the police, and 3.7 million to reintegration of ex-combatants. In terms of the strategy to build an effective and accountable military, Her Majesty's Government (HMG) has been training and equipping the armed forces and police of Sierra Leone in order to transform them into a professional and appropriately sized national force capable of dealing with both internal and external security threats. At the same time, the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP) has sought to develop appropriate legal and institutional frameworks for national security and defence, including civil leadership, transparency and accountability in the Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Office of National Security (ONS).

S3. The ACPP supports two programmes addressing reintegration of ex-combatants: the Community Reintegration Project (CRP) and the React Programme. The CRP is directed at the reconciliation and reintegration of ex-combatants and other conflict-affected populations into settled communities in northern Sierra Leone. It has supported the development of enterprises, the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, and the supply of water and sanitation. The React programme, run by the German aid agency GTZ, delivers longer-term multi-sectoral support to communities that are considered to be more seriously affected by the conflict. The underlying rationale has been that by addressing the multiple social and physical needs of an entire community, the social and economic conditions required to support permanent reintegration will be created.

Effect on Preventing New Conflicts and Containing Existing Ones

S4. Broadly speaking, the activities under the ACPP in Sierra Leone, the majority of which are aimed at Security Sector Reform (SSR), are well directed and represent high priority targets for conflict prevention support. The three principal objectives under the ACPP Sierra Leone Strategy are well conceived, and UK stakeholders are making progress in maintaining and building upon the peace in Sierra Leone that was finally consolidated in 2002 with the holding of elections. Progress, for example, can be seen in terms of the reform of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) and the reintegration of ex-combatants. Without the ACPP activities, Sierra Leone

in 2001/2 might well have faced the risk of internal discontent, for example, in the army or among ex-combatants, leading to renewed conflict. However, the Evaluators believe there are areas where the Strategy might be strengthened.

S5. By concentrating primarily on SSR, the ACPP in Sierra Leone has covered many of the conflict prevention priorities that seemed urgent in 2001. However, conflict prevention priorities have shifted somewhat since then. Many of the key tasks now facing Sierra Leone are political, social and economic. The fact that the Pools do not generally directly address 'soft' conflict prevention issues, such as corruption, youth unemployment, and the justice sector (some of which are addressed bilaterally), could have a significant impact on the Pool's capacity to address root causes of conflict. However, it is recognised that for institutional and financial reasons, it is highly unlikely that the ACPP will move into these areas. It is important therefore that ACPP and bilateral programme managers should be fully aware of the linkages between the various programmes.

S6. Another core programming issue for the future is how the Sierra Leone Strategy can further contribute to building confidence between the security sector and a sceptical civil society when the latter was frequently abused by elements of the army during the civil conflict.

S7. In terms of sustainability, the ACPP in Sierra Leone seems well placed. Although funds for 2004/2005 will be slightly reduced, the UK commitment under the ACPP seems to have a long-term perspective, with IMATT projecting ahead in its financial planning to at least the end of the decade, for example. New priorities are on the horizon in West Africa and elsewhere but it would be unwise to weaken the commitment to Sierra Leone when it is still at a vital transitional recovery phase. However, sustainability also implies local ownership/engagement and in this area the ACPP does not seem to have fully delivered. This may be partly due to a lack of energy, expertise, will, and resources on the part of the Sierra Leone government, but it also suggests that the Strategy may not be fully engaging with the Sierra Leone government and civil society.

Effect on International Arrangements

S8. The ACPP initiatives in Sierra Leone have generally connected well with the UN and there is evidence of worthwhile coordination (not least in the arresting of Special Court suspects and in policing the Liberian border). However, there are concerns regarding coordination of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) draw-down and, in the past, there have been somewhat strained relations between UN civilian police (CIVPOL) and the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) over issues such as appropriate policing models.

Effect on Inter-Departmental Processes

S9. There is evidence that UK stakeholders are coordinating their activities more effectively than was the case prior to 2001 before the Pools were set up. As one official put it, 'we now have scrutiny of each other's activities and have input into them that would not have happened pre-Pools'. Both in the field and in Whitehall there is regular formal and informal coordination and information sharing. Some of this coordination originated prior to the

Pools, but coordination has been strengthened subsequently. Nevertheless, there is still scope for further improvements in terms of more regular dialogue with international and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) across Departments, and in-country.

S10. In-country issues: having noted that the ACPP has led to more ‘joined-up’ assistance, there has at the same time been an apparent capacity issue in-country. The Department for International Development (DFID) office for legacy reasons is small and the Strategy has been led from Whitehall. It was thought unwise by DFID to set up a country office during an on-going civil conflict. DFID has only limited staff to implement DFID’s considerable bi-lateral and Pool programming and to cooperate with UK stakeholders such as International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT), which are considerably better resourced. Plans are afoot to considerably strengthen the DFID office. Existing interim measures, such as the appointment of a Social Development Advisor, and a Senior Governance Adviser early next year, will help, but the strengthening of the capacity of the DFID office to coordinate in-country should be a key priority. The new Country Office is not to be fully established until the end of 2004 and this timing appears out of step with the priority the ACPP has attached to Sierra Leone.

S11. Whitehall coordination: in Whitehall, much of the day-to-day work is done by a limited number of officials who also have other non-Pool responsibilities. They appear to have good informal links, and also some formal links, within Whitehall, but such coordinated relations could be strengthened. It might also make sense to find some way of providing resources for dedicated Pool officials within Whitehall, although staff costs are not currently provided under the Pools. Although there is a sense in some quarters in Whitehall that this is not a practical proposition, the Evaluators believe that resources should be freed as a matter of urgency to make this possible.

Implications for Financial Management

S12. Beyond the discussion above, it is difficult—in the absence of documents articulating competing priorities and providing reasons for funding current activities at different levels or instead of other activities—to judge whether or not the Strategy resources are as well spent as they could be.

Recommendations

S13. *The ACPP engagement in Sierra Leone Strategy should be continued.* It has served as a focal point for developing a coherent strategy, in cooperation with appropriate international partners, for preventing future conflict in Sierra Leone. It has led to increased coordination and cooperation among HMG departments, though the full potential of this has not yet been realised.

S14. In the current environment in Sierra Leone, where peace seems fairly well consolidated and with the strong UN/UK presence, there is little immediate prospect of large-scale violent conflict. The challenge now is to drive forward government reform, address corruption, and in particular to assist the Sierra Leone authorities to reach benchmarks to which they have agreed. This raises the issue of whether stricter conditionality should be introduced into UK assistance to bring pressure to bear to meet agreed benchmarks.

However, at the same time, the proliferation of benchmarks and sub-benchmarks agreed with the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) by the UK and UN, in particular, in themselves are confusing and potentially contradictory. Further, many of these benchmarks are over-optimistic and are clearly not achievable in the stated time frame. *The Evaluation recommends that HMG consider a more realistic and agreed sense of what can be achieved in Sierra Leone and whether firmer conditionality on progress toward benchmarks might not be agreed with Sierra Leone.*

S15. Local 'ownership' of some of the reform programmes being implemented under the ACPP has not been as prominent as might be expected. HMG is making efforts to address this issue. The withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL) is causing concern in some quarters and may place an increasing burden on the UK in terms of post-conflict recovery. It is important that a programme, articulated to the GoSL and civil society, is in place which will build confidence in the continuation of UK support for Sierra Leone once UNAMSIL leaves, particularly given perceptions that the UK may increasingly fix its attention on Iraq and on other countries in West Africa. *The Evaluation recommends that the ACPP consider a review of its programming in Sierra Leone from the point of view of sustainability and 'local ownership' of the reform agenda.*

S16. Sierra Leone represents one of the more successful examples of 'joined-up' government in the CPPs. However, there is scope for improvement. Whitehall coordination needs to be allocated more resources in terms of dedicated staff if the ACPP is to give of its best, and more formal coordination mechanisms within Whitehall could usefully be instituted. The joint FCO/DFID Sudan Unit may be worth looking at as a model. The strengthening of the DFID office in-country is a priority. This is already in hand but it needs to be pursued in a speedy manner. *The Evaluation recommends that HMG review current coordination arrangements for coordination and monitoring of ACPP programme spending in Sierra Leone in this light.*

1. BACKGROUND

1. In 1991 the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel group moved into Sierra Leone from Liberia, triggering a conflict that only finally ended in January 2002. The conflict had its roots in mismanagement and corruption within the state, neglect of the provinces, poverty, disaffected youth (many of whom were recruited or co-opted as child combatants), and the involvement of external actors, such as former Liberian President Charles Taylor, who supported the RUF. The conflict was further exacerbated by a proliferation of small arms in the region, and by the availability of large income streams to rebel groups from the mining of diamonds.

2. Attempts by regional and international actors to end the fighting during the 1990s, which involved not only the RUF and government forces but civil defence forces (CDF), were inconclusive, with the rebels able to sustain their military campaign, and peace agreements, such as the Abidjan Accord and Lom , breaking down. In 1996, Dr Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected President, raising hopes of a breakthrough, but he was not recognised by the RUF and conflict broke out afresh. By February–March 1998, rebel forces took over most of Freetown, but were later driven out by the Nigerian-dominated ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces, and President Kabbah was reinstated. However, during 1999, rebel forces consolidated control over half the country, and once again ECOMOG forces mounted an offensive to drive the rebels out of Freetown. Despite the efforts of ECOMOG, other peacekeeping interventions, including the unarmed observer mission (UNOMSIL) and later the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), deployed in 1999, conflict continued.

3. In 2000, the RUF again attacked Freetown and took UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage. This helped trigger UK military intervention to secure Freetown, ending with a confrontation with the rebel West Side Boys group who held British hostages. The defeat of the West Side Boys proved to be a turning point which, in effect, ended rebel resistance, and by November 2000 led to the signing of the Abuja ceasefire agreement, which restarted elements of Lom .

4. UN peacekeepers and Sierra Leone Army (SLA) troops deployed during 2001 to rebel-held areas and disarmament of the rebels started. By January 2002, 50,000 combatants had been demobilised. The peace process was finally consolidated, with the conflict officially declared over in January and elections taking place shortly thereafter.

2. BENCHMARKS FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN SIERRA LEONE

5. Groups such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) regularly publish policy recommendations to donor countries to mobilise them into more effective action in conflict prevention and mitigation in developing countries. International organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), also publish policy documents advocating strategies for conflict prevention. Such independently-derived sets of policy proposals are used in this case study as an initial benchmark for consideration of whether the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) has selected an optimum portfolio of activity and whether the components selected are mutually reinforcing for conflict prevention. The purpose of contrasting ACPP policy goals to those recommended outside of the UK Government will not necessarily be to suggest that one is necessarily superior to the other, but to identify possible gaps in policy coverage by ACPP. Many of these ICG/UN recommendations and benchmarks relate to activities outside of the ACPP remit and are therefore not necessarily directly relevant. However, some of them identify areas which the ACPP could consider paying more attention to.

6. In April 2001, ICG noted that ‘the underlying causes of Sierra Leone’s war are frequently forgotten in the face of the immediate conflict. These include corrupt and unaccountable government, manipulated ethnicity and alienated youth. Peace cannot be sustained without addressing these factors.’¹ ICG noted the need for two conditions to be met:

- it is urgent to harmonise the divergent approaches of the UK Government and the UN military mission (UNAMSIL).
- military action must be coordinated with a coherent political strategy accepted by all the key international actors and the Sierra Leone government that may need to last five years or more to help Sierra Leone re-establish good governance and reconstruct its shattered society.

7. In a recent 2003 report, ICG urged donors to:

- use explicit benchmarks as the criteria for distributing and suspending aid, including ensuring that accountability and transparency measures are in place, and to stop funding projects until benchmarks are met;
- create new investment, land ownership, and corporate laws through assistance to the GoSL to encourage international investors to return;
- provide the necessary funds for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to complete its work.²

8. ICG also identified the following additional benchmarks and addressed these to the British Government:

¹ ICG, ‘Sierra Leone: Time for a New Political and Military Strategy’, Africa Report No 28, April 2001.

² ICG, ‘Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance’, Africa Report No 67, September 2003, p ii.

- focus (through the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT)) on training to manage and police border areas and threats of incursion;
- champion high standards to keep unqualified 'political' candidates out of the armed forces;
- help the armed forces reduce their size, and weed out unqualified soldiers and officers as well as remaining trouble makers;
- concentrate on the recruitment and training of new police officers and current officers, especially in the provinces, to ensure the police can handle internal security; and
- encourage UNAMSIL's civilian police unit to use only highly qualified trainers.³

9. ICG also refers to the UN benchmarks on SSR, set out in the Secretary-General's 15th report on UNAMSIL (September 2002), including the need for the UNAMSIL draw-down plan to be kept flexible and to prepare for the contingency that the police and military may not be ready to ensure internal and external security.

10. The UN, together with the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) and other partners, has initiated a number of recovery strategies, some of which set out benchmarks. The most important is a Peacebuilding and Recovery Strategy (PBRs), through which the UN country team devised a Development Assistance Strategy (which provides a common operational framework for transitional activities for 2004–07). The PBRs⁴ sets benchmarks in terms of strengthening the security framework; supporting the transition to national recovery; fostering good governance; and promoting and protecting human rights and encouraging reconciliation. These include:

- Security:
 - strengthen the capacity, accountability and loyalty of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP);
 - support the reintegration of ex-combatants;
 - limit the circulation of small arms in Sierra Leone;
 - address external security challenges and promote regional stability.
- National Recovery:
 - support coordination for recovery;
 - facilitate reintegration;
 - reduce poverty.
- Good Governance:
 - consolidate state authority;
 - strengthen the rule of law;
 - restore local governance.
- Human Rights/Reconciliation:
 - promote and protect human rights, truth and justice.
 - encourage reconciliation.⁵

³ ICG, 'Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance', Africa Report No. 67, September 2003

⁴ United Nations, 'From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: UN Strategy to Support National Recovery and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone', October 2002.

⁵ *Ibid*, pp 8–23.

11. The GoSL also identified additional areas for important conflict prevention work in its National Recovery Strategy (NRS) including restoration of state authority; rebuilding communities; peacebuilding and human rights; and restoration of the economy.

12. In addition, UN agencies are active in advocating the special concerns of children in Sierra Leone's conflicts.⁶ Because of the history of child abductions and conscription, children's issues were incorporated into the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord. Countless numbers of children in the Sierra Leone conflict have witnessed death, killing, and sexual violence, and many have been victims of these abuses. Moreover, some families have been reluctant to accept survivors back during the reintegration process.

13. To meet the needs of former child soldiers, the NCCDR, in partnership with UNICEF, has created two initiatives: the Training and Employment Programme (TEP), which targets ex-child soldiers between the ages of 15–17, and the Community Education Investment Programme (CEIP), which supports individuals below 15 who have opted for formal education.

14. However, the UN maintains that although disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is now 'an integral part of peacekeeping operations, the specific needs of child soldiers have not yet been sufficiently addressed within the overall planning and implementation of these programmes'.⁷ Consequently, commitments to the protection of children's rights and the demobilisation and re-integration of child soldiers have become important benchmarks for advocacy, monitoring and follow-up by UN country teams and non-governmental organisations. The ICG and the UN, then, identify a number of key areas where greater ACPP engagement could be productive, namely in terms of:

- Ensuring that accountability and transparency measures are in place and that funding projects should be halted until benchmarks are met;
- Increased training of the RSLAF to manage border areas and threats of incursions;
- Improve army recruitment by keeping unqualified or unsuitable candidates out of the army;
- Further strengthen the police through new recruitment and highly qualified trainers;
- Support the UN draw-down process;
- Prioritise the reintegration of child soldiers into society.

⁶ See UN General Assembly, *Children and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General*, 30 October 2003, A/58/546-S/2003/1053.

⁷ Ibid.

3. ACPP IN SIERRA LEONE: OVERVIEW

15. The 'Sierra Leone-Medium-Term HMG Strategy' states that the Government's overall policy towards Sierra Leone is aimed to help establish a peace and stability so that by 2005 the country is no longer at risk from internal and external conflict and has begun to make progress in reducing poverty and in bringing about social, economic and political development. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UK Government and the GoSL sets out GoSL commitments in the security sector and related areas of governance reform, along with UK commitments on technical and financial support.⁸ It embraces both ACCP and bilateral activities. Commitments made by both sides are shown in Table 1.

16. Having played a major role in bringing the conflict to an end, the UK has set adopted a conflict prevention strategy in Sierra Leone (see Annex 1)⁹ that sets itself the following main objectives:

- Effective, affordable and democratically-accountable security agencies that are able to counter internal or external threats without significant external military presence.
- Reconciliation and justice and the reintegration of ex-combatants into society. The CDF and RUF to no longer exist as paramilitary forces and a threat to peace.
- Reducing the external threats to Sierra Leone from the region.

The ACPP support to these goals is reflected in Table 2. Table 3 shows the breakdown of expenditure managed by the three departments.

17. In terms of the strategy to build an effective and accountable military, Ministry of Defence (MOD), and SLP, IMATT has been training and equipping the RSLAF in order to transform it into a professional and appropriately sized national force capable of dealing with both internal and external security threats. At the same time, the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP) has sought to develop appropriate legal and institutional frameworks for national security and defence, including civil leadership, transparency and accountability in the Sierra Leone MOD and the Office of National Security (ONS).

⁸ DFID, 'Sierra Leone: A Long-term Partnership for Development', The Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone, February 2003.

⁹ Africa Conflict Prevention Pool: Sierra Leone Strategy (undated).

Table 1: Commitments by UK and Sierra Leone under 2003 MoU

UK	Sierra Leone
Security Sector Reform	
<p>Reach a decision on a comprehensive programme of support to the justice sector by July 2003; Reach a decision on a further phase of the SSR Project by May 2003; Continue to provide support to IMATT for restructuring the RSLAF.</p>	<p>Sierra Leone Police force operating effectively; National security systems operating effectively; RSLAF operating effectively; Accountable and affordable defence system in place.</p>
Improving governance	
<p>Reach a decision on a second phase of support to the ACC by March 2003; Reach a decision on a programme of support to the strengthening of financial management systems, jointly with other donors, by April 2003; Reach a decision on a programme of support to the Office of the Auditor-General by February 2003; Design a programme of support to the work of the Task Force on decentralisation and local government and initiate the work programme by March 2003; Reach a decision on a second phase of support for a programme to assist Chiefdoms by May 2003; Provide support to a management plan for regulation of diamond extraction by the end of 2003; Reach a decision on a programme of further support to the Governance Reform Secretariat by March 2003; Prepare for discussion a programme of support for civil society by June 2003; Establish an independent Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation by the end of 2003.</p>	<p>Anti-corruption strategy in place and implemented; Financial management systems strengthened; Provincial and local government re-established; Diamond industry strengthened; Free and independent media introduced.</p>
Support in International Fora	
<p>Ensure the GoSL's position is represented in international organisations in support of post-conflict reconstruction, conflict reduction, and the reduction of poverty in light of the GoSL's performance against benchmarks.</p>	<p>The GoSL to engage constructively with regional, sub-regional, and international agencies to reduce regional tensions and reduce poverty.</p>

Table 2: Sierra Leone ACPP Spending Initial Estimates 2002/3

	2002/03 (£m)	2003/04
Int Mil Assistance Training Team (IMATT)	16.0	14.5
Op Silkman	1.5	0
FCO	0.1	0.1
SILSEP (Security Sector Reform)	0.5	0.75
Police	5.0	7.0
Reintegration	5.8	3.7
Regional (e.g.) WFD	0	0.2
Sub-total Programmes	28.9	26.3
Peacekeeping assessed costs	36.2	18.0
Special Court	2.3	2.3
Peacekeeping non-assessed	2.1	1.8
Sub-total peacekeeping	40.06	22.1
TOTAL	69.5	48.4

Table 3: ACPP Programme Spending by Department Initial allocations (Feb 02)

12.162	DFID
15.097	MOD
0.100	FCO

18. In terms of policing, the UK has also supported the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP). This programme aims to establish the SLP as an effective and accountable civilian police service that focuses on local needs-based policing based on the full involvement of civil society. The objective is also to have a SLP which is fully staffed, trained and equipped to maintain law and order without RSLAF support when UNAMSIL withdraws at the end of 2004.

19. The ACPP has also been heavily involved in the DDR process in Sierra Leone, supporting UNAMSIL and the NCDDR and, currently, two programmes focusing on reintegration: the Community Reintegration Project (CRP) and the React Programme through GTZ. The CRP has sought to support the reconciliation and reintegration of ex-combatants and other conflict-affected populations into settled communities in northern Sierra Leone. It has worked with a broad sector of the community, not just ex-combatants, and has sought to build viable communities that can generate sustainable livelihoods. The CRP has supported the development of enterprises, the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, and the supply of water and sanitation, to this end. The GTZ React programme has targeted communities that are considered to be particularly badly affected by the conflict for longer-term multi-sectoral support. The underlying rationale has been that by addressing the multiple social and physical needs of an entire community, the social and economic conditions required to support permanent reintegration will be created.

20. Under the ACPP, a contribution has been made to the Special Court for Sierra Leone to help bring to justice those guilty of war crimes and atrocities and to demonstrate that there will be no impunity. The UK is also seeking to strengthen both the Sierra Leone judiciary and the Special Court's relationship with the TRC.

21. Outside the ACPP, the UK has given extensive support and assistance in Sierra Leone to areas such as: media and law development; support to the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC); the Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme (formerly Paramount Chiefs); and the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), which supports the building of an active and informed civil society.

22. **Gaps in UK Programming.** Assistance to conflict prevention in Sierra Leone under the ACCP therefore addresses itself mainly to SSR and DDR, but also including some justice and reconciliation elements. The Strategy does not directly address some of the key issues which, if not dealt with, have the capacity to be sources of violence and conflict or to hamper sustainable peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. These include corruption, manipulated ethnicity, alienated youth, children in conflict, gender-based violence,¹⁰ the reform of government institutions outside the security sector, and the empowerment of local government, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). As noted in the previous paragraph, some of these are addressed in UK programmes outside the ACPP.

4. EFFECT ON PREVENTING NEW CONFLICTS AND CONTAINING EXISTING ONES

23. The Evaluators believe that the ACCP Strategy has had positive impacts by helping to stabilise Sierra Leone in terms of preventing the re-emergence of violent conflict, primarily by supporting reform of the security services, contributing to the dismantling of the RUF and CDF, and continuing the process of reintegrating ex-combatants into the community.

24. The UK presence, along with that of UNAMSIL, has contributed to deterring external threats as well as internal challenges. This process was started before the formation of the ACPP. Nevertheless, the UK presence coordinated under the ACPP has played a vital role in building confidence in Sierra Leone that conflict will not return in the immediate future. Further, the reform of the SLP has made ground in making the police more accountable, professional, reducing corruption, and beginning to restore a measure of civil society belief in law and order.

25. However, some of the ACCP Strategy benchmarks and objectives, when closely scrutinised, are not being met as speedily as might have been originally envisaged, or have stalled. The Strategy objective of effective, affordable and democratically-accountable security agencies capable of countering internal or external threats has not been fully met, for example. In part, delays in implementing objectives can no doubt be explained by the country's semi-paralysis after years of violence and mismanagement. However, there have also been suggestions that UK stakeholders have not been altogether effective, or have found it difficult, to encourage the transition to local ownership and sustainability. Additionally, the multiplicity of UK benchmarks contained in departmental strategy and other UK documents is potentially confusing for UK stakeholders and others in terms of priorities. Further, the GoSL has had the difficult task of implementing both MoU and UN benchmarks. Nevertheless, a fundamental problem the Evaluators found in talking to a range of stakeholders and Sierra Leoneans, was a lack of confidence and trust between the two parties on occasions. On the one hand, it was suggested that the GoSL/NGOs lacked competence and energy, and on the other hand, that the UK did not take into account local considerations or rely on or trust Sierra Leoneans sufficiently to allow them to take the lead. One way forward on this would seem to be to press ahead more vigorously with counterpart and other training in order to develop local confidence and competence. There should also be clear timed targets for the phased withdrawal of expatriate advisers.

¹⁰ In early January 2003, Human Rights Watch released a report that analyzed the widespread and systematic use of rape and other sexual violence during the 10-year civil war in every region of Sierra Leone by the rebel RUF, as well as other rebel, government and international peacekeeping forces. The report maintained that the DDR process in Sierra Leone had 'completely overlooked' the protection of women and children. HRW stated that no clear policy or procedural guidelines exist in regards to meeting the needs of women and young girls. However, it should be noted that Human Rights Watch highlighted the UK's efforts to establish a nation-wide system of Family Support Units to deal with cases of sexual and domestic assault. Under the programme, female police officers are employed to interview female victims, while male colleagues interview possible witnesses and suspects. But, at the time of writing, too few female officers have been recruited.

26. In June 2002, the Defence Advisory Team (DAT) identified some SSR issues that need to be addressed in its 'Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Project II: Output to Purpose Review'.¹¹ This report found considerable deficiencies in UK SSR work and it made the following comments on how SSR activities might be strengthened in Sierra Leone:

- SSR cannot be managed as a separate activity removed from the wider governance environment in Sierra Leone. It recommends the appointment of a Senior Governance Adviser in-country to bring together the SILSEP, Police and law programmes.
- There needs to be effective engagement with civil society in terms of oversight of the military and addressing the people's distrust and fear of armed forces. This should include engaging with civil society institutions involved in the reconciliation process, including the TRC.
- The UK programmes need to address the corruption issue in the security sector, and more broadly across society and government.
- There needs to be more rapid delivery of pressing reforms. Any gains in SSR will be put at serious risk if the government and donors offer only slow and incremental change.
- The RSLAF and the Sierra Leone MOD to take greater ownership of the reform process and it needs to be locally sustained including through improved training and a credible level of future funding.

Some of these recommendations have been subsequently addressed by the UK (see paras 38–45).

27. The following section now addresses the degree to which key benchmarks of the ACPP's conflict strategy for Sierra Leone have been met and whether in fact these benchmarks have been realistic.

4.1 Effective, Affordable and Democratically-Accountable Security Agencies

28. It is clear that the security agencies of Sierra Leone are not yet fully effective, democratically accountable, or, arguably, affordable, despite the considerable effort and funding which have been expended in improving capacities in these areas. Nor are they likely to be soon.

29. In terms of effectiveness, the RSLAF remains dependent upon UK support, guidance, and indeed command. The UNAMSIL presence, for example, on its borders with Liberia, has also provided vital support to the RSLAF, and there are concerns regarding the implications of the UNAMSIL departure at the end of 2004. Indeed, some within the GoSL seem reluctant to acknowledge that this deadline will not be extended, anticipating that the UN may relent and stay on. However, the Evaluators understand that it is highly unlikely that the decision on departure will be reversed. The MoU signed between the GoSL and

¹¹ Roderick Evans, David Jones, and Graham Thompson, Defence Advisory Team, 'Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Project II; Output to Purpose Review', 25 June–5 July 2002.

the UK Government in 2002 sets out some specific benchmarks, together with dates for key elements of SSR to be completed. Virtually none of these have been met: two important examples being the delayed Defence White Paper and the security sector review on which action remains stalled.

30. Effective democratic and civilian oversight of the MOD and the ONS has not yet been fully established, although oversight mechanisms have been set up. There still remains considerable suspicion of the security forces both in the Sierra Leone parliament and in the population at large which needs to be reduced and, hopefully, eventually eradicated. The possibility that an increasingly professional RSLAF may be a future threat to a corrupt and weak government has been voiced by a number of officials. Further, the transition of the RSLAF from a conflict footing to an affordable peacetime force of an appropriate size has yet to be realised. The target figure of around 10,500 personnel by 2007 is still thought by some persons interviewed to be too high for Sierra Leone in terms of likely costs. The SLP is arguably still over-reliant on UK advisers, and local ownership has yet to be fully achieved. Further training and capacity-building in the SLP is required.

4.2 Reconciliation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants

31. The ACCP strategy seeks to promote reconciliation and justice in Sierra Leone and to reintegrate/dismantle rebel and civilian defence forces. The former has been attempted primarily through ACPP funding, along with other donors, for the Special Court which has seen the arrest of some high-profile suspects. This was hoped to demonstrate, in part, that the culture of impunity in Sierra Leone was being reversed. However, the Special Court does not seem to have succeeded in increasing people's confidence in the justice system, despite the fact that it has moved speedily and made a large number of indictments with trials to take place during 2004. Indeed, there is hostility to it in parts of Sierra Leone. It is also confronted with funding problems. Meanwhile, the Sierra Leone courts are ineffective if not almost moribund. This adversely affects morale in the SLP, as there is an awareness that the courts are either not capable of, or are unwilling to, carry out prosecutions.

32. The TRC, tasked with creating an impartial record of the conflict, addressing impunity, and promoting reconciliation, has similarly not yet had a significant impact. To date, the Strategy generally does not seem to have made a significant difference in terms of justice and reconciliation. However, the fact that the TRC is canvassing the views of civil society and creating a record of the conflict, at a time when there is arguably too little civil society empowerment in Sierra Leone, means in the view of the Evaluators that it continues to be worth pursuing.

33. The Strategy has had somewhat more impact in terms of the reintegration and dismantling of rebel and civil defence forces. Following the completion of the disarmament process in January 2002, and working with NCDDR and UNAMSIL, the Strategy has made significant progress in assisting in reintegrating ex-combatants into society. The two principal ACPP-funded mechanisms for this have been the CRP and the React Programme implemented by GTZ. The CRP has focused on swiftly finding work for ex-combatants within communities in a wide range of locations in the north and east, while the React

programme has tended to target select strategic locations in the east for longer-term development. The south presents continuing challenges in terms of reintegration, and there are concerns that some of the RUF leadership has not entered reintegration programmes. More generally, there remains the long-term problem of achieving economic integration in an extremely poor country. The RUF seems to have been dismantled as a fighting force, but there remain concerns that the CDF has retained its command structure. Most worryingly, thousands of Sierra Leone combatants have fought in external West African conflicts and have not been reintegrated.

34. However, the Strategy has generally assisted through the above activities in significantly reducing the possibility of ex-combatants posing an internal threat to Sierra Leone in the immediate future. But longer-term social and economic challenges need to be faced if ex-combatants, particularly younger ones, are not to become dissatisfied and turn to crime and violence. The possibility of a charismatic leader exploiting such dissatisfaction cannot be discounted.

4.3 Reducing External Threats to Sierra Leone

35. The UK presence, along with that of UNAMSIL, provides a deterrent against the spill-over of conflicts and instability in Liberia, Guinea, and Côte d'Ivoire into Sierra Leone. IMATT has made progress in professionalising the RSLAF and improving its capacity to deploy to border regions, and along with the SLP, to deal with potential external threats. However, as mentioned above, the RSLAF and the police are not in a position to do this unaided at present. This remains a matter of concern in the medium/longer-term.

4.4 Other Benchmarks

36. In terms of other benchmarks, the ACPP has achieved mixed progress. The 'Sierra Leone-Medium-term HMG Strategy' objective of improved security is clearly being met. However, the objective of stability in the sub-region is yet to be achieved. Indeed, worries remain about conflict or potential conflict in neighbouring countries, and improvements in governance, tackling corruption, fostering a just and inclusive economy and society, remain elusive and have the capacity to impact upon progress in SSR. Many benchmarks outlined in the MoU on SSR have not been yet achieved by the stipulated dates.

37. In terms of the DAT 2002 Review, it is the Evaluators' perception that some of their recommendations have been taken on board within the security sector in Sierra Leone. A Senior Governance Adviser, as recommended by DAT, but with wider ToRs, will be shortly in place, and this should help bring together a variety of SSR programming.

38. The problem identified by DAT of engaging civil society in oversight of the RSLAF and allaying civilian fears of the military is being addressed by IMATT. However, there would still seem to be some way to go before civil society trusts the army. It is the perception of the Evaluators that the SLP have perhaps made more ground in this area, with many civilians coming into regular contact with them, and an increasing realisation that there is an accessible complaints procedure which can be used. The police, moreover, were less associated with human rights abuses during the conflict, although police corruption and

inappropriate behaviour remain a problem. Engaging civil society is not something just the UK alone should address: the GoSL needs to be encouraged to make progress in this area.

39. Confidence-building between the RSLAF and civil society, as suggested by DAT, would seem to require at least some evidence of public acknowledgement by the military of past atrocities and of responsibility and remorse. The TRC would seem to be one of the mechanisms to achieve this.

40. Despite efforts to reform the MOD, including the intelligence wing, and bolster civilian oversight of the security sector generally, there is still a widespread perception that there is considerable corruption in this sector. Although oversight mechanisms have been established and UK civilian advisers are in place, a culture of transparency and accountability has not been fully established. One problem area frequently referred to is the weak role played by some parliamentarians who seem to have neither the will nor the expertise to monitor the security sector effectively.

41. However, one of the more contentious areas raised by DAT centred on the nature of the relationship between IMATT and RSLAF officers and the alleged lack of local ownership. DAT has highlighted the need to hand over more authority to the RSLAF. IMATT's role has been described as advisory but in reality has involved taking the lead in many reforms and operational matters. Some Sierra Leone officers have complained that they have been sidelined and insufficiently consulted, while for its part IMATT has seen it as necessary to take the lead, given the lack of competence and initiative sometimes displayed by RSLAF officers. In addition, some NGOs have questioned whether the Western-style military reform model is the way to proceed. There was a view among some Sierra Leone interviewees that the RSLAF should be less of a western-style army and more of a community-engaged army that becomes involved, for example, in reconstruction alongside civilians.

42. One key area of engagement, according to DAT, is support for improving the relationship between the RSLAF and civil society so as to lessen future prospects for conflict and dissatisfaction. More specifically, this would include:

- promotion of a RSLAF policy of engaging with and supporting the TRC;
- establishment of a communications strategy to promote RSLAF reconstruction/nation-building activities;
- establishment of RSLAF liaison committees with civil society or similar forms of engagement;
- establishment of accountability, service, and human rights as central to the RSLAF's future training strategy;
- implementation of an effective court-martial process within the RSLAF.

43. IMATT is pressing ahead in cooperation with the RSLAF to address a number of these issues. According to IMATT officials, the RSLAF has identified the need to work more closely with local communities, and is supporting them through new initiatives such

as rebuilding schools, water wells, and sports facilities. There have also been information campaigns through Radio UNAMSIL, for example, to disseminate information about key projects. IMATT believe these initiatives are gradually taking effect, although there are financial, logistical and operational factors constraining this work.

44. IMATT is also taking steps to transfer more responsibility to the RSLAF. IMATT says it is gradually withdrawing from command and executive roles and is occupying advisory and support roles instead. However, this is dependent upon training suitable RSLAF officers to replace IMATT officers in order to ensure capabilities are maintained: premature withdrawal would be unwise. IMATT believe that elements within the RSLAF dissatisfied with IMATT's role are small in number, with the majority of the RSLAF not sharing such a view. Furthermore, IMATT have confidence that well-trained and capable officers are progressing into key command positions. In addition to this, they say that considerable progress has been made during 2003 in terms of introducing an approach to appointments and promotions based on merit. However, the above progress will be dependent on reversing the serious shortages of quality RSLAF officers in certain specialisations and rank groups that has consistently hampered the RSLAF.

45. In order to address the poor human rights record of the army, international law is a compulsory part of the training that the RSLAF undergoes each year. Legal seminars are also held which are presented in a way that is sympathetic to the human rights approach. A court-martial process is also being slowly developed and legislation is now in place to regulate the conduct of court-martials. However, IMATT believe that a number of fundamental safeguards need to be in place before court-martials can be convened.

46. Finally, a key issue for the Evaluation is whether the public service agreement (PSA) objective is being met in Sierra Leone by the ACPP; namely, whether it has achieved, first, a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by conflict; and, second, whether it is achieving a reduction in potential future sources of conflict.

47. Regarding the first target, it is difficult to determine whether the ACPP or UK assistance more generally has helped achieved this. By the time the ACPP was constituted the conflict was largely over in Sierra Leone, in large part through the contribution made by UK legacy activities. It is conceivable that without follow-on Pool activities, such as assistance in reintegration, the continued reform of the SLP, and the reform of the military security sector, that violence might have flared up anew. But on the other hand, it is unlikely that the UK, with or without the ACPP, would have abandoned Sierra Leone.

48. However, it can be said that the coordinated activities undertaken under the ACPP have given a sense of security and confidence to large numbers of the Sierra Leone population and have thus achieved a reduction in lives affected by violent conflict. Without the current UK presence, there is a strong possibility that foreign forces or Sierra Leone combatants returning from neighbouring countries could destabilise areas of the country. The RSLAF remains a concern in terms of a potential mutiny, and the CDF military structure is still said to be in place—all factors of concern if there were no strong external presence.

49. The ACPP has had some impact in achieving a reduction in future sources of conflict.

The UK presence exerts a deterrent effect in relation to threats from neighbouring states, and the UK is increasingly looking to assist in building regional peacebuilding capacities. Internally, IMATT is reducing the likelihood that the army, or former rebels or CDFs, can present a threat to the civilian population, while the CCSSP is assisting in improving the relationship between the SLP and citizens. However, the ACPP is not directly addressing many of the root causes of conflict, such as poverty, corruption (outside of the security sector), and the lack of access to justice. These may well be long-term triggers for renewed conflict.

5. EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

50. The UK's main partner in Sierra Leone in terms of conflict prevention has been the UN. The UK has cooperated extensively with the UN in: peacekeeping/security; policing matters; on the Special Court; and on DDR. However, whether the ACPP has specifically added value to this collaboration is difficult to determine. Cooperation with UNAMSIL predated the ACPP and may well have followed similar lines regardless of the ACPP. Further, there does not seem to have been an attempt in ACCP programming specifically addressed to further developing cooperation with partners such as the UN. Rather, cooperation has been a feature of normal day-to-day business.

51. However, the activities undertaken under the ACPP do seem to have strengthened UN conflict resolution and peacekeeping. The UK presence in 2001 did make a major contribution in permitting the UN mission to consolidate the peace and to push ahead with post-conflict peacebuilding. By taking on support for reform of the Sierra Leone army, the ACPP has assisted in creating a force that can operate alongside UNAMSIL peacekeepers in terms of internal and external security. The ACPP will also have a vital role with the withdrawal of UNAMSIL at the end of 2004 in assisting the GoSL to maintain security and peace. It is also understood that IMATT has played an important role in advising UNAMSIL on security matters.

52. Cooperation between the CCSSP and UN civilian police (CIVPOL) has proved more problematic because of suggestions, for example, that they have favoured differing policing models. However, these relations have since improved.

53. In terms of DDR, cooperation between the UN and the UK in the early critical stages of the process, and in providing support to the NCDDR, was vital. There was considerable UK engagement between the Department of International Development (DFID) Post, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), MOD and the UN in New York. More recently, the ACPP CRP and the React programme concentrating on the reintegration stage are adding value to the UN's DDR work. Furthermore, there was close collaboration between the UK and the UN in arresting suspects to bring before the Special Court.

54. The 2003–05 bid synthesis document, 'Strengthening the United Nations', circulated by FCO's UND in December 2002, states that the UN Strategy seeks to achieve the following main outcome:

to build on the Brahimi peacekeeping/peacebuilding reform process, by enhancing the ability of the UN and UN troop-contributing countries to prevent conflict, launch and sustain peace operations and promote effective peacebuilding.¹²

55. It is stated that an effective UN serves as a 'contribution multiplier' for the UK and also helps meet the PSA target, as well as ensuring that UK assistance has a greater impact upon target beneficiaries: those whose lives are currently or potentially affected by

¹² FCO, UND, 'Strengthening the United Nations' 2003–05 bid synthesis document.

violent conflict. Under these criteria, the Strategy has had a considerable impact in Sierra Leone in adding to the UN's capacities. IMATT and the UK military have liaised with and advised UNAMSIL on military matters as well as professionalising the RSLAF thus lessening the load on UNAMSIL in terms of policing internal and external security.

56. The UK via the UK Mission in New York has exerted considerable influence and has had an impact in assisting and strengthening the capacity of UNAMSIL in the field. The fact that the UK is a Permanent Five (P5) member of the UN Security Council, and the international recognition given to the UK's special role in Sierra Leone, have also given it considerable authority.

57. Examples of UK influence include embedded UK officers being heavily involved in assisting UNAMSIL in terms of thinking, planning, doctrine, logistics, procurement and assessed intelligence. The UK has alerted UNAMSIL to potential threats to its personnel, and on at least one occasion UNAMSIL was able to take action to pre-empt this threat.

58. In addition to the UN, efforts have been made, both in-country and elsewhere, to engage with partners such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Commission (EC). DFID Freetown has maintained a close dialogue with the World Bank country manager and other visiting teams. And there are fairly frequent contacts with the Bank maintained by the DFID West Africa Department (WAD) and Accra, as well as Washington, at a variety of levels from Country Director to Country Team Leaders. Contact with the EC is also said to be regular both in-country and between WAD and Brussels.

59. In terms of policing, UNDP has been engaged in the rehabilitation of police stations while DFID has been working on both police stations and barracks. But the closest links have been in relation to DDR. The World Bank has been working on DDR through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), with USAID on reintegration, and also the EC, with links into NCDDR. The UK is also working closely with USAID on the diamond sector, including a joint office in the east of Sierra Leone, and building civil society capacity is a possible future area of cooperation with USAID.

60. The UK is taking strong steps, particularly with respect to Liberia, to defuse potential external threats to Sierra Leone and to bolster regional peacebuilding capacities. This is being discussed with the EU, the USA, Nigeria, France and ECOWAS. As the 'Sierra Leone Medium-term HMG Strategy' notes:

Our direct influence in the region outside Sierra Leone, while increasing, is still limited. We have to work with others and encourage them to engage in Liberia, especially the US and the EU, Nigeria and ECOWAS.¹³

61. The 'Liberia: Post-Taylor Strategy' suggests that the UK should financially support ECOWAS in Liberia. An initial contribution of £1m has been already made and consideration is being given (with ECOWAS and the US) to contribute a further £1m for which there is agreement in principle that it will come from the ACPP.

¹³ Sierra Leone Medium-term HMG Strategy (undated), para 25, p 6.

62. The UK is taking a series of other steps within and outside the ACPP, which hold out the prospect of lessening security threats to Sierra Leone from Liberia. The UK has made it clear, however, that it cannot afford to take the lead role in Liberia.¹⁴ Initiatives being contemplated, or underway, include:

- Supporting the peace process by encouraging regional peacekeeping efforts.
- Supporting the UN peacekeeping operation.
- Encouraging the US to take a lead role.
- Considering contributing up to 5 military officers (preferably with Sierra Leone experience) to occupy key positions in the Liberian UN HQ and to ensure close coordination with UNAMSIL and the bolstering of Sierra Leone's security.
- Consideration of creating a military adviser post at ECOWAS to help improve ECOWAS's internal procedures and processes.
- Sharing lessons learnt and expertise on SSR and DDR.
- Working with Liberia's neighbours, including making sure that borders are secure, and discouraging Guinea from involvement in Liberia.
- Resisting calls for UNAMSIL to cross the border into Liberia while Sierra Leone remains a priority.
- Developing a wider regional conflict prevention strategy with the US and France.
- Supporting plans for a regional arms embargo.
- Supporting Danish proposals in the EU for a small arms and light weapons (SALW) embargo in the region.
- Working with the EC and other donors to strengthen ECOWAS and its capacities.¹⁵
- Appointment of a regional conflict adviser and the establishment of a UK Embassy in Monrovia.

63. This amounts to a potentially impressive engagement with international and regional actors to safeguard Sierra Leone's stability in the face of external threats, and one which should be supported in an ACPP framework. However, there remain concerns regarding UNAMSIL's draw-down and the burden this may place on the UK. If the UK develops an 'indirect' approach to regional challenges, then care should be taken not to neglect UK support within Sierra Leone, particularly in border areas.

¹⁴ Draft Letter from PS/FCO to PS/No 10, 'Liberia: Post-Taylor Strategy', September 2003 (restricted).

¹⁵ 'Liberia: Post-Taylor Strategy', 8 September 2003 (restricted).

6. EFFECT ON INTER-DEPARTMENTAL PROCESSES

64. A Cabinet Office document notes that although coordination across Whitehall has been good, it needs to be strengthened in Whitehall and in-country.¹⁶ The Evaluation Team has formed a similar impression.

65. Inter-departmental information gathering and coordination in-country between UK stakeholders under the Strategy is generally good and appears to have improved since pre-ACPP days. The High Commissioner, for example, stated that he takes part currently in: twice a week security briefings, a weekly staff meeting, a monthly UK security coordination meeting, and a more general monthly UK coordination meeting. Officials told the Evaluators that, as Freetown is relatively small, there are frequent informal meetings.

66. However, the extent to which activities are coordinated programmatically (for example between IMATT/RSLAF and the CCSSP/SLP) is less clear. The lack of clear evidence of coordination suggesting there may be room for improvement in this area. For example, stakeholder meetings have tended to discuss ACPP activities mainly as an adjunct to other deliberations. To strengthen communication, a dedicated forum for ACPP discussion may be useful. Echoing this recommendation, a government study earlier in the year proposed the establishment of a 'small in-country group' for Sierra Leone involving the FCO, DFID and MOD (including IMATT) to more effectively coordinate the UK's overall approach to 'reform' and to 'jointly agree priorities'.¹⁷ This has since been established.

67. There may also be more scope for UK engagement and coordination with non-UK organisations in-country. There do not appear to be formal and regular ACPP coordination meetings with the GoSL, although the various stakeholders regularly meet with key departments on assistance generally. This raises the question of whether the ACPP is projected holistically to the GoSL, and whether it needs to be.

68. During the course of interviews, some international non-governmental organisations (INGOs)/NGOs suggested that coordination and consultation with them by UK stakeholders has not been as effective as it might have been. There are, for example, INGO monthly coordination meetings to which DFID is invited but which, we understand from INGOs, it has not recently been able to attend. The DFID office used to attend these meetings regularly, particularly during the critical period when DDR was in full-swing. However, the DFID office notes that the agendas of such meetings do not necessarily focus on issues of direct concern to the Department. Further, DFID Freetown reports that meetings are held with all the INGO heads on a regular basis, and that they are free to enlist DFID/British High Commission support in matters relating to the GoSL. The perception that Sierra Leone NGOs are excluded from the coordination process is incorrect, according to DFID Freetown, as NGOs sit in on Development Partners Committee (DEPAC) meetings, the NRS, and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), for example.

¹⁶ 'Sierra Leone: Support to Security Sector Review', Policy Overview Mission, 8 May 2003, p 3.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p 5.

69. Because of the relatively short field visit undertaken to Sierra Leone, it is difficult to form a firm judgement whether NGOs are being fully consulted across the range of ACPP activities, but, if this is not the case, crucial windows of opportunities for peacebuilding and conflict prevention are probably being missed, since civil society plays a critical role in monitoring the GoSL and in establishing a new basis of trust between the Sierra Leone people and their government.

70. As was noted earlier, the UN is a vital partner in Sierra Leone and the Strategy seems to have led to generally good cooperation between the UK and UN. UNAMSIL sits in on the monthly UK security meeting and there is also a monthly UNAMSIL-chaired donors meeting.

71. A structural impediment appears to be the low level of staffing of the DFID office in-country and the legacy of policy being driven and implemented primarily through Whitehall. A number of officials suggested that during the critical conflict/crisis period in Sierra Leone in the late 1990s through to 2000–01, Whitehall frequently took a strong lead. Consequently, the few staff in the office may have found it difficult to give their full attention to the many strands of DFID programming (bilateral and ACPP). Certainly, it seems unusual that a small office should handle such diverse and high profile UK assistance.

72. However, DFID is aware of the staffing shortage, and efforts are underway to remedy the situation. Earlier in 2003, a Social Development Adviser joined the office, and a Senior Governance Adviser will arrive in January 2004. In November 2003, an officer charged with planning for the new office was being identified in Whitehall, who is anticipated to start in the first quarter of 2004.

73. By the end of 2004, DFID plans to have established a country office that might include: a Head of Office, a Deputy, who would be a programme manager/officer, an economist, a Governance Adviser, a Social Development Adviser, and an office manager/accountant, as well as local support. There would also be a person charged with overseeing the relocation of the office. The Evaluators believe this will make a significant difference and will ease the pressure on hard-pressed existing staff. It may also open the way for greater coordination between ACPP and bilateral programming should this be regarded as a priority.

74. There is a strong view within Whitehall that the ACPP has made a difference in terms of improved inter-departmental Whitehall processes. Before the emergence of the Pools, the various departments did not have a clear view or understanding of what other departments were doing in Sierra Leone, according to one official interviewed. In the past, moreover, in-country and Whitehall processes tended to be carried out separately, whereas these two processes are now considerably more 'joined up'. The Pool structure puts departments in a framework where they have to justify their programming and budgeting to other departments. This would not have taken place routinely before, it was observed.

75. However, concerns exist in some quarters regarding capacity and coordination within Whitehall. Desk officers within the MOD, DFID and FCO have been tasked with looking after Pool activities, including Sierra Leone, as well as having other non-Pool responsibilities. Consequently, staff cannot spend as much time as is perhaps desirable on Sierra Leone.

A number of officials have also expressed a wish for basic training on conflict prevention before taking up their posts, whether in Whitehall or in-country. This type of training might focus on, for example, generic programme management skills and conflict policy.

76. Other issues highlighted by Whitehall officials were: the need to meet more regularly; the idea of forming some kind of Whitehall coordination unit; and the need for a strategy to deal with the frequent changing of personnel working on the Pools. The Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Sierra Leone, with a shadow official group, was a useful mechanism but could be probably be strengthened through the use of a more permanent coordination unit. There was also a perception in some quarters that the ACPP after a good start was 'drifting' somewhat and that the high-level drive imparted earlier by a number of senior officials working on the ACPP had been unavoidably diminished by tasking more junior officials. This effect spilled over into the handling of Sierra Leone. Coordination between departments in Whitehall and in the field was generally reckoned to be good, but coordination in-country was less effective, several Whitehall officials noted.

7. IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

77. Beyond the discussion in Section 4, it is difficult to judge whether or not the Strategy resources are well spent in the absence of a framework which outlines competing priorities and provides reasons for funding some and not funding others.. Sierra Leone ACPP allocations for 2003/4¹⁸ to DFID, for example, are apportioned in this year's Pool in the following way:

- SILSEP II: £750,000;
- DDR: ReAct: £1,500,000;
- DDR CRP II: £2,200,000;
- CCSSP: £6,550,000;
- RSLAF restructuring: £1,000,000

78. IMATT was allocated £14.5 million. The balance between policing and army spending under which the army is allocated around twice the spend of policing seems to be a fair division of resources given the threat that the army has presented to past governments and civilians, the need for extensive reform, and its task of supporting internal and external security functions. The expenditure on DDR also seems reasonable given the fairly advanced state of reintegration, although there are continuing challenges in certain parts of the country where reintegration has not been fully achieved.

¹⁸ ACPP Allocations for the Financial Year 2003/4, DFID minute of 19 December 2002.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS: THE FUTURE OF ACPP IN SIERRA LEONE

79. *The Evaluation recommends that the ACPP engagement in Sierra Leone should be continued.* In the view of the Evaluators two principal reasons for its continuation can be identified:

- It has led to increased coordination and cooperation, even if the full potential of this has not yet been realised;
- It serves as a focal point for developing a coherent strategy for preventing future conflict in Sierra Leone.

80. **Benchmarks and Targets:** there is an urgent need to address the lack of success of the GoSL, and indeed the ACPP, in meeting some stated targets and benchmarks. The key Strategy baselines identified of effective, affordable and democratically accountable security agencies; progress on reconciliation and justice; and reducing external threats to Sierra Leone, have only been partially achieved, despite the best efforts of organisations such as IMATT and the CCSSP. This does not necessarily indicate failure, but rather, the Evaluators believe this is partly attributable to unrealistic benchmarks with time-lines which are too short. Additionally, a proliferation of benchmarks across organisations has placed a heavy burden on the GoSL. There are also indications that the Sierra Leone government, and indeed civil society, is ineffective in delivery and in some instances corrupt, which has hampered the achievement of the benchmarks. However, a number of Sierra Leone officials and citizens interviewed thought those involved in ACPP programming did not fully appreciate local conditions, or give enough priority to Sierra Leone approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Whether stricter conditionality should be introduced into UK assistance to bring pressure to bear to meet agreed benchmarks is a moot point when they are quite possibly unachievable in present circumstances. *The Evaluation recommends that HMG consider a more realistic and agreed sense of what can be achieved in Sierra Leone and whether firmer conditionality on progress toward benchmarks might not be agreed with Sierra Leone.*

81. **Coordination:** Sierra Leone represents one of the more successful examples of 'joined-up' government in the CPPs. However, there is scope for improvement. Whitehall coordination needs to be allocated more resources in terms of dedicated staff if the ACPP is to give of its best, and more formal coordination mechanisms within Whitehall could usefully be instituted. The joint FCO/DFID Sudan Unit may be worth looking at as a model. The strengthening of the DFID office in-country is a priority. This is already in hand but it needs to be pursued in a speedy manner. It does not make sense to have extensive Pool and bilateral programming coordinated in Freetown by an office with limited resources, however professional the staff in-country might be. Lastly, a way needs to be found to link ACPP programming, such as the IMATT and CCSSP activities, and to present the Pools activities in a holistic and coordinated way to the GoSL. *The Evaluation recommends that HMG review current coordination arrangements for delivery of ACPP programme spending in Sierra Leone in this light.*

82. **Bilateral/ACPP Links:** the Evaluators found little evidence suggesting the coordination of, or explicit linkages between, these strands of programming. In fact, there would be value in considering some form of coordinating mechanism between them.

83. **Local Ownership and Sustainability:** local ownership of some of the programmes being implemented under the ACPP is inefficiently realised. RSLAF officers, for example, have yet to assume some of the leadership roles originally envisaged for them, and IMATT officers are in effect assuming leadership roles in some areas in their place. Reform of the MOD is proceeding relatively slowly and government ministries in general seem to be under-staffed and lacking key skills and capacities, and are thus not in a strong position to assume ownership. As outlined earlier, IMATT is making efforts to address these issues and engage local ownership. This needs to be continued with urgency as the UK in all probability will wind down its assistance to Sierra Leone over the decade. The withdrawal of UNAMSIL is already causing concern in some quarters and may place an increasing burden on the UK in terms of post-conflict recovery. It is important that a programme, articulated to the GoSL and civil society, is in place which will build confidence in the continuation of UK support for Sierra Leone once UNAMSIL leaves, particularly given perceptions that the UK may increasingly fix its attention on Iraq and on other countries in West Africa. *The Evaluation recommends that the ACPP consider a review of its programming in Sierra Leone from the point of view of sustainability and 'local ownership' of the reform agenda.*

84. **Regional Capacity-Building:** the 'indirect' approach of strengthening regional capacities and coordination with other donors to maximise the UK's input, is a good approach as long as this does not diminish the UK commitment in-country. The UK should continue to work to develop a wider conflict prevention strategy with key partners such as the US and France.

85. **Diamonds and Other Economic Causes of Conflict:** the use of diamonds to finance the conflict was a major conflict multiplier in Sierra Leone. Concerns still remain that ex-combatants and youths currently engaged in diamond mining in the east—potentially one of the future conflict hotspots in Sierra Leone—may become a source of trouble if they disengage from diamond mining. Further, there is the potential for diamonds to be exploited again should another rebel group emerge. Moreover, the lack of government revenue being generated through diamond mining is hindering recovery in Sierra Leone, although the 2003 figure will double that of 2002. The UK should continue to press for rapid progress in terms of GoSL taking control of the diamond sector. This is an area that will need to be closely monitored.

9 BENCHMARKS, TARGETS AND INDICATORS

86. Improved benchmarks, targets and indicators need to be considered which will take account of evolving circumstances in Sierra Leone, especially as UNAMSIL withdraws and as the West African regional dimension is becoming more important. There is a particular need to make these benchmarks, targets and indicators realistic and achievable and not place too heavy a burden on the GoSL, while at the same time bringing pressure to bear on the government to meet reasonable targets. The existing ACPP Strategy benchmarks are useful but need to have more sub-benchmarks, such as those contained within the MoU, which set out more specific and realistic timelines and indicators. The benchmarks contained within the MoU may need to be looked at again as many have not been met within the ACPP context and may be subject to further delay. The GoSL has frequently argued that external factors, such as the delayed provision of advisers, changing circumstances on the ground, and failures to deliver funding have held it back. Leaving aside the validity or otherwise of these factors, a key question is whether benchmarks might be toughened to ensure delivery: linking funds on certain programmes to delivery on targets in others is one approach that has been suggested, along with the need for a realistic assessment of where the UK can afford to be tough without jeopardising programmes.

87. New or improved benchmarks, targets and indicators might be considered in terms of:

- Ensuring that a stable regional security environment beneficial to Sierra Leone is achieved. This implies following through on the Liberia Strategy and specifically incorporating West African security concerns into the Sierra Leone strategy.
- Specific contingency plans need to be in place to cover the UNAMSIL draw-down. These should include specific measures to deploy the RSLAF and SLP to cover this drawdown and to encourage the GoSL to take responsibility in planning for the drawdown.
- Concrete measures to address the youth issue, particularly amongst ex-combatants engaged in diamond mining. The rate of progress on the reintegration of child soldiers remains a matter of concern and measures to speed this up need to be concluded.
- It is essential to defuse tensions arising from ex-combatants returning from conflicts in neighbouring countries. They have the potential to destabilise regions of Sierra Leone if they are mobilised by a charismatic leader or a grievance.
- Involving more local NGOs in conflict prevention and incorporating more Sierra Leone concerns into benchmarks is also important.
- Maintaining, and indeed increasing, the momentum of reform of the RSLAF and the SLP in the areas identified by the ICG, such as improving recruitment and training, so that the security sector can emerge as a professional, accountable and transparent body serving both the state and civil society.

88. The usefulness of the PSA as an evaluative tool in Sierra Leone is open to debate. The Evaluation Team found that some departments in the field were unaware of the PSA/ service delivery agreements (SDAs), did not have a detailed knowledge of their provisions, or were ignoring them. Many officials who were cognisant of them thought the time had come to re-evaluate them.

89. The PSA targets are worthy aspirations but in the context of Sierra Leone, it is difficult to judge the extent to which the ACPP was instrumental in achieving them. The fact, for example, that previous UK assistance prior to the formation of the ACPP had created the security environment in which conflict was reduced, made it difficult to assess the impact of subsequent ACPP activities, although without continued ACPP engagement there was a strong livelihood of a reversion to violence. The consensus that emerged from conversations we had with officials in Whitehall and in the field was that the PSA was too generalised.

ANNEX 1: UK STRATEGY FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN SIERRA LEONE

1. Objectives

The PSA Target on conflict prevention is as follows:

‘Improved effectiveness of UK contribution to conflict prevention and management as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people, whose lives are affected by violent conflict and reduction in the potential sources of future conflict, where the UK can make a significant contribution’.

Since the events of May 2000, we have developed a comprehensive, dynamic and integrated strategy, consistent with the PSA Target, with the following objectives:

- Help GOSL to regain and then retain control of the whole country, with revenue from the diamond fields flowing transparently and accountably to the national exchequer.
- Build an effective Sierra Leone state and help the country make progress towards the 2015 international development targets, with a freely and fairly elected government, which: respects human rights; implements transparent and effective economic policies; is accountable; has the capacity to promote and protect its resources; and exercises full control over its armed forces.
- Build up new, effective, non-political, accountable and disciplined armed forces and police.
- Strengthen the capacity of ECOWAS and its individual members to play a constructive role in conflict prevention and building regional mutual security—and isolate and sanction those like Liberia who continue to sow instability in the region.
- Reduce over time our military commitments to Sierra Leone.

2. Outline of Proposed Strategy

Our strategy has four strands:

(i) Military

- Provide basic training (through short-term training teams (STTTs)) and equipment to 8,500 soldiers in the SLA.
- Provide advice to GoSL on military and security strategy and the administration of the SLA, with the Commander of the British Forces in Sierra Leone acting as Military Adviser to President Kabbah.
- Establish an IMATT to:
 - to provide advice and expertise in operational planning in Defence Headquarters;
 - to follow up STTTs’ training by providing training and operational advice at Brigade HQ level.

- Increase accountability of SLA by reforming the MOD and establishing effective civil control of the SLA.
- Refurbish new premises for reformed MOD.
- Assist with Military Reintegration Package, which includes absorbing limited number of screened ex-combatants into SLA, converting CDF militias into a territorial defence force and downsizing SLA to a sustainable level consistent with threats to state.
- Ensure UNAMSIL deploys throughout country, as per its Concept of Operations.
- Demonstrate UK support for UNAMSIL through over-the-horizon force projections.
- Enhance effectiveness of UNAMSIL by, *inter alia*, providing key senior personnel in UNAMSIL HQ.

(ii) Civil

- Assist/encourage GoSL in extending GOSL presence and services throughout country through projects relating to, *inter alia*, health and education, restoration of authority of Paramount Chiefs, reforming local government, and community reintegration.
- Help ensure GoSL and UNAMSIL establish satisfactory DDR and RRR programmes, with adequate reintegration projects.
- Establish team, including UK secondee as Inspector General of Police, to reform, train and equip more accountable police force, and assert police primacy in GoSL-controlled areas.
- Push for cost-effective establishment of TRC and Special Court as soon as possible.
- Assist/encourage GoSL to hold elections as soon as security situation permits.
- Promote free and fair elections by building capacity of NEC and political parties.
- Help GoSL establish sound, transparent, accountable management of the economy—in particular the diamond mining sector.
- Help GoSL develop strategy to combat corruption and build capacity of Anti-Corruption Commission.
- Help GoSL reform and build capacity of judiciary.
- Assist National Security Adviser to develop an accountable, non-political security service capable of monitoring external and rebel threats.
- Provide humanitarian support for refugees and internally displaced.
- Assist in the building of capacity of civil society to engage in peacebuilding activities—in particular reconciliation and reintegration of former combatants and refugees.

(iii) Regional

- Make it as difficult as possible for Liberia to continue its support for the RUF and destabilise the sub-region. Encouraging ECOWAS countries to implement UN sanctions against Liberia and monitoring attempts to circumvent sanctions, e.g. via Burkina Faso or Togo.
- Encourage ECOWAS to engage constructively in peace-building in Mano River Union states.
- Encourage Guinea to reengage with Mano River Union and ECOWAS.
- Help to build up ECOWAS' capacity in promoting conflict prevention and regional mutual security.
- Liaise with UN and Guinea to avoid premature repatriation of Sierra Leonean refugees.
- Assist Ghana (through the BMATT West Africa) and possibly Nigeria in building its regional Peace Support Operation (PSO) training capacity.

(iv) International

- Convince key partners that Sierra Leone is not a 'British' issue, but an international concern.
- Urge key bilateral and multilateral partners to share the financial burden, by contributing funding for DDR, elections, TRC, Special Court, rebuilding Sierra Leone etc, and to support IMF/ Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) programmes.
- Widen the international element of the IMATT.

(v) Crosscutting issues

The Conflict Prevention Fund has identified building inclusive government, building mutual regional security and tackling the economic causes of conflict as thematic priorities for the Fund's work across Africa. Work is still being done in working up strategies on these themes. All three are of key significance with regard to the conflict in Sierra Leone.

- Building inclusive government—this has already been identified as a key part of the UK's strategy for Sierra Leone. The emphasis is on SSR. But there is also room for more work on improving the structures of democratic and accountable government across the board as well as strengthening the capacity of civil society to play a role in conflict prevention, peace building and reconciliation.
- Building mutual regional security—strengthening ECOWAS, small arms control in the region and building regional peacekeeping capacity are three areas of direct relevance to Sierra Leone and which require further analysis and attention.
- Tackling the economic causes of conflict—promoting responsible investment in conflict areas and controlling the exploitation of minerals to fuel conflict are of direct relevance to Sierra Leone. UK has already done some work on diamonds. More analysis and attention is required in this complex and sensitive area.

ANNEX 2: LIST OF KEY DOCUMENTS AND OTHER WRITTEN MATERIAL CONSULTED

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ANNEX 3: LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED

Armitage, Rachel: International Poverty Reduction Team, HM Treasury
Barras, Clare: International Poverty Reduction Team, HM Treasury
Blell, Ambassador Joe C.: Deputy Defence Minister, MOD, Freetown
Brunner, Christian: Head of Delegation, ICRC, Freetown
Chalmers, Chris: Cabinet Office.
Collier, Val: Commissioner, Anti-Corruption Committee, Freetown
Dolman, Anthea: Assistant Director, Chemicals Unit, DTI (formerly Desk Officer, Conflict Prevention, Africa, Asia, Middle East, Cabinet Office)
Conteh, Brig. Kelly: National Security Adviser, State House, Freetown
Cook, Lt Col S. K.: Chief of Staff, IMATT
Crane, David M.: The Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Freetown
Creighton-Randall, Olayinka: Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown
Cutting, Joel: Consultant, Decentralisation and Local Government Reform Programme, DFID
Donaldson, Stuart: CCSSP, Freetown
Doss, Alan: Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Governance and Stabilisation, UNAMSIL
England, Ray: Police Adviser, CCSSP, DFID
Eliasson, Jessica: Special Assistant to the DSRSG for Globalisation and Stabilisation, UNAMSIL, Freetown
Evans, Steven: International Poverty Reduction Team, HM Treasury
Falloh, Abdulai: Logistics Officer, Actionaid, Freetown
Forber, Ian: Assistant Director, Overseas Secretariat, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia-Pacific Region, MOD.
Freeman, Alithur E.: National Coordinator, Civil Society Movement-Sierra Leone
Freer, Brig A. R.: Commander, IMATT
Hughes, Charlie: FORDI, Freetown
Ithell, Gaynor: Defence, Diplomacy and Intelligence Team, HM Treasury
Gaeta, Aldo S.: Civil Adviser to Sierra Leone MOD, DFID, Freetown
Germano, Fabio: Programme Coordinator—Reintegration, GTZ, Freetown
Hall, Col Nigel: Military Adviser to the UK Mission, New York.
Harborne, Bernard: Senior Conflict Advisor (Africa), AGHD, DFID
Holt, Sean: Counsellor, British High Commission, Freetown
Hood, Malcolm: DFID
Hughes, Peter: CCSSP, Freetown
Jawara, Sorie: District Manager—Bombali, CRP
Jones, Alan: ex-High Commissioner, Freetown
Jow, Aja Satang: Commissioner, TRC, Freetown
Johnson, Dennis: Chief, OCHA, Sierra Leone

Kai-Kai, Francis: Executive Secretary, NCDDR
Kamara, Brima Acha: Inspector General of Police, Freetown
Lambert, Julian: Senior Health Adviser, AGHD/WAD, DFID
Link, Joan: UND, FCO
Lupton, Greg: Sub-Saharan, African Team 2, MOD
Marcus-Jones, Justice: Deputy Chairman, TRC
Mathews, Harriet: Head, Sierra Leone Section, FCO
Maud, Jim: Deputy Director, West Africa Department, DFID
McAfferty, Cameron: MOD
Mitchiner, John: High Commissioner, British High Commission, Freetown
Morgan, Anna: Deputy Programme Manager, Sierra Leone Section, West Africa Department, DFID
Musa, Samuel: Country Director—Sierra Leone/Liberia/Guinea, Actionaid, Freetown
Napier, Johnathan: Country Programme Manager, Oxfam, Freetown
Owen, John: Office of National Security, Freetown
Partridge, Rachel: Project Management Coordinator, Agrisystems Ltd
Poole, Mo: Police HQ, Freetown
Rampe, Chris: Office of National Security, Freetown
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DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Department for International Development (DFID) is the UK Government department responsible for promoting sustainable development and reducing poverty. The central focus of the Government's policy, based on the 1997 and 2000 White Papers on International Development, is a commitment to the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals, to be achieved by 2015. These seek to:

- Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
- Achieve universal primary education
- Promote gender equality and empower women
- Reduce child mortality
- Improve maternal health
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- Ensure environmental sustainability
- Develop a global partnership for development

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DFID works in partnership with governments committed to the Millennium Development Goals, with civil society, the private sector and the research community. It also works with multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, United Nations agencies, and the European Commission.

DFID has headquarters in London and East Kilbride, offices in many developing countries, and staff based in British embassies and high commissions around the world.

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ISBN: 1 86192 617 0