The Impact of Risk Management on Project Success. A case study of the Land Administration Project, Ghana

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Abstract

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Keywords: Projects, Development Projects, Project Management, Risk, Project Risk Management, Project Success, Project Stakeholders, Land Reform, Sustainable Development.

While previous research suggests that risk management influences project success, less is known about the practical application of the risk management concept on projects and its' influence on development project success. Thus, this thesis investigates the impact of risk management on project success from a development project perspective. Adopting a qualitative case study approach with semi-structured interviews as the main source of data collection and assessing success from a stakeholder perspective as well as the achievements of the project's intended outcomes and analysing the various risk management strategies adopted in the pursuance of those outcomes, the findings indicate that risk management practice positively influence development project success. To achieve this, the empirical data shows that risk identification need to be approached strategically to provide a clear focus for project delivery leading to the design of strategic actions to respond to identified risks as well as an effective monitoring and evaluation of the risk management process as a whole. Additionally, the different stakeholder objectives and expectations need to be strategically incorporated into the risk management strategy without deviating from the project's purpose.

The study recommends the need for development project managers not to over-rely on academic expertise in their identification of risks but make use of the wider pool of knowledge available to them, technical or not and to also pursue the positive impacts of risk. Furthermore, they should widen their risk management strategies to include donor support missions, without deviating from the project's purpose, to ensure transparency and efficiency.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the Lord God Almighty for bringing me this far. When I look back into my life, there is everything to thank you for. I have faced some giants and obstacles in life but through it all, even for the fact that I am still alive to see this day manifested, is by your supernatural grace and mercies. May your name be exalted forever and ever and ever Amen.

To my dear wife

Amamata

Children

Afia Tweneboah Boampong

Akosua Nyarko Boampong

My dear mum

Elizabeth

And my late father

Kwadwo Boampong-Boakye

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Abbreviations

ACLP	Ascertainment of Customary Law Project
ADB	African Development Bank
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AF	Additional Financing
AMA	Accra Metropolitan Assembly
APM	Association of Project Managers
ARAP	Abbreviated Resettlement Action Plan
ATOM	Active Threat and Opportunity Management
AWPB	Annual Work Plans and Budget
BS	British Standards
CAS	Country Assisted Strategy
CBD	Customary Boundary Demarcation
CDD	Community Driven Development
CICOL	Civil Society Coalition on Land
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CLS	Customary Land Secretariat
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy

CSAU	Client Service Access Unit
CSF	Critical Success Factor
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFID	Department For International Development
DP	Development Partners
ERM	Enterprise Risk Management
ERP	Economic Recovery Program
ESIA	Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FASDEP	Food and Agricultural Sector Development Policy
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FMEA	Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GELIS	Ghana Enterprise Land Information System
GIS	Geographic Information System
GoG	Government of Ghana
GPRS	Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy
GRN	Geodetic Reference Network
GSGDA	Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda

GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
HR	Human Resource
HRD	Human Resource Development
ICE	Institute of Civil Engineers
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IDA	International Development Association
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IFA	Institute and Faculty of Actuaries
IMEC	International Program in the Management of Engineering and Construction
IRM	Institute of Risk Management
IS	Information Systems
ISM	Implementation Support Mission
ISO	International Organisation for Standardization
IT	Information Technology
KFW	Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau
KMA	Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly

KPI	Key Performance Indicator
LAP	Land Administration Project
LC	Lands Commission
LIS	Land Information System
LTR	Land Title Registry
LUPMIS	Land Use Planning Management Information System
LUSPA	Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority
LVB	Land Valuation Board
LVD	Land Valuation Division
MCE	Metropolitan Chief Executive
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MLF	Ministry of Lands and Forestry
MLNR	Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources
MLS	Multiple Land Sales
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NDF	Nordic Development Fund
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

NLP	National Lands Policy
NPD	New Product Development
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NSDF	National Spatial Development Framework
OASL	Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PCU	Project Coordinating Unit
PDO	Project Development Objective
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PMBOK	Project Management Body of Knowledge
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PRAM	Project Risk Analysis and Management
PSR	Public Sector Reform
PUMA	Project Uncertainty Management
RAMP	Risk Analysis and Management for Projects
RIP	Risk Identification Performance
RMMI	Risk Management Maturity Index
RMP	Risk Management Processes
ROMP	Project Risk and Opportunity Management

RPRD	Rural Parcel Rights Demarcation
RSDF	Regional Spatial Development Framework
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SD	Survey Department
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SHAMPU	Shape Harness and Manage Project Uncertainty
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TCPD	Town and Country Planning Division
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development

Chapter One Introduction

1.1 Overview

Projects, temporary assignment of resources to bring about beneficial change (Turner 2014), must deliver the expected outcomes to be classified as successful. Although projects are mostly designed to achieve clearly defined objectives, many studies (Camilleri 2016; Pinto and Cleland 2004; Shenhar et al. 2002; Stuckenbruck 1986) have confirmed that the determination of a successful project goes beyond achieving project deliverables to one that achieve various stakeholder perspectives of success which, in many cases, may be skewed towards their views and expectations of the project and as such may not reflect the realities of the project's achievements. Project team members therefore face situations where they need to either meet or exceed the various stakeholder needs and expectations of projects (PMI 2008) in addition to achieving project defined objectives.

Development projects are special kind of investments purposefully undertaken with an expectation that it will set further development moves in motion as part of a development process (Hirschman et al. 2015). This notwithstanding, they tend to face more constraints because they normally involve investing scarce resources and often deliver intangible outputs or outcomes to proposed beneficiaries whose boundaries are in many cases, not properly defined (Golini et al. 2015). They also tend to have wider stakeholder interests which are sometimes difficult to measure (Ofori 2013) due to different interpretations and understanding of complex project environments.

Due to their nature of providing unique products in dynamic and complex environments, projects may encounter risks, potential events with the ability to impact on objectives, which need to be managed effectively to achieve the desired outcomes and to derive opportunities from their positive impacts. The critical question here is; does risk management practice contribute to project success?

Duffy and Thomas (1989) recognised the importance of classifying risk as an important success factor for projects and identified risk analysis techniques to be applied in project auditing. Following on from this, many empirical studies (Cagliano et al. 2015; Chapman and Ward 2003; Cooke-Davis 2002; De Bakker et al. 2010; 2011; Kendrick 2015; Krane et al. 2010; Maytorena et al. 2007; Miller and Lessard 2001; Reeves et al. 2013), have established the criticality of risk and its' influence on project success, whilst others (Ropponen and Lyytinen 1997; 2000; Zwikael and Globerson 2006) also argued that its effects are minimal.

Green (2016) argues that risk changes with context. Consequently, the uniqueness of projects means the environments within which they are undertaken can influence the type and nature of risks a project may face. For example, the type and nature of risks development projects may face can be influenced by cultural attributes in the project environment, types and to wider stakeholder interests and expectations of the project. A review of the current literature however revealed that investigations into development project risks are very rare. This study therefore seeks to find value laden answers in this area of research by adopting a purely qualitative approach to investigate the impact of risk management practice on project success from a development project perspective.

1.2 Gaps and Justification for the Study

A critical review of the current literature on the effects of risk management on project success, presented later in chapter 2, revealed that some empirical studies (APM 2014; Benta et al. 2011; Carvalho and Rabechini Junior 2015; Chapman and Ward 2004; De Bakker et al. 2011; Hussein and Klakegg 2014; Krane et al. 2010; Kutsch and Hall 2010; Maytorena et al. 2007; Miller and Lessard 2001; Reeves et al. 2013; Zwikael and Ahn 2011), concluded that effective risk management provides us with the requisite understanding, assessment, prioritising, monitoring and reviewing of project risks and sometimes lead to project success. However, the practical application of risk management on projects and how this leads to project success is not conceptualised creating a gap between the risk management theory and practice (Bannerman 2008; De Bakker et al. 2010; Mu et al. 2009; Raz et al. 2002). Mu et al. (2009) attempted to address this gap by investigating how risk management affects the success of new product development but the study was limited to technological, organizational and marketing risks.

There is limited literature on the contributions of risk management to the success of development projects as earlier mentioned. Only a few studies (Brière et al. 2015; Ika 2012; Ofori 2013; Yalegama et al. 2016) investigate development project success but not necessarily from a risk perspective. While the achievements of stakeholder objectives have been empirically established as the criterion for determining project success in many studies, how differences in stakeholder objectives influence risk management strategies have not been fully investigated. If stakeholders' matter, then their differing objectives and expectations of projects can affect the way we plan and manage project risks.

Project risk management is a management strategy pursued with the *prima facie* objective of contributing to project success and pursuing opportunity. However, whereas project success goes beyond project management to project outcome, project risk management is mostly limited to the project management phase in many studies (Miller and Lessard 2001; Kollveit et al. 2004) without investigating the impacts of risk management throughout a project's life. Additionally, only a few studies (APM 2014; Kollveit et al. 2004; Mu et al. 2009) recognise the opportunities that accompany risk while the majority of studies also use a quantitative approach.

How risk management practice contributes to project success can be significantly influenced by the adopted risk management strategies used by respective project team members, their perceptions and interpretations of their respective project environments, all of which may be subjective, as well as their interactions with the various stakeholders the project may face. As a result, investigating stakeholders' own account of events qualitatively can provide valuable insights into the impacts of risk management practice on project success. This study therefore seeks to address the gaps identified in the literature and to further contribute to the risk management theory and practice.

1.3 Research Context

As the first exclusively Land Administration Project (LAP) supported by the World Bank (WB) in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Ghana's LAP was chosen as the focus of investigation in this study due to the many opportunities it provided for such a thorough investigation into development project risk management. Access and

security to land play a significant role on the livelihoods of many Ghanaians and the country's developmental efforts. Data from Ghana's 2010 population census revealed that around 41.5% of people aged 15 and over were employed in the agricultural sector whilst 49.1% of the country's population lived in rural areas with their livelihoods highly dependent on land (GSS 2012). Recent data from the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) also revealed that agriculture, manufacturing, construction, mining and quarrying, which are all directly related to land, contributed 51.7% to Ghana's GDP in 2018 (GSS 2019).

Irrespective of the significance of land and matters pertaining to land on Ghana's socio-economic development, the sector has faced a multiplicity of problems over the years with the majority of land users facing tenure insecurity either due to complexities in land registration processes or their inability to afford the high costs involved (Awuah et al. 2013; Gyamera 2018). The ownership structure of land in Ghana is such that around 80% of the country's total land are in customary ownership with state and vested lands constituting the remaining 20% (Kasanga and Kotey 2001; Yeboah and Shaw 2013). While customary land tenure and management systems are recognised by the 1992 constitution of Ghana, individual interpretations, misrepresentations and exploitations have been applied by various Traditional Authorities (TAs) as to the management of customary lands, with some often allocating the same piece of land to numerous people (Kuusanga and Gerber 2015; Ubink and Quan 2008). State institutions charged with ensuring efficiency and transparency in land dealings are also beset with problems such as corruption and favouritism towards the rich and powerful (Bugri 2012).

The need to ensure efficiency and transparency in land dealings and to protect people whose livelihoods depend on land and the benefits accruing on land contributed to the launching of a National Lands Policy (NLP) document in 1999 by the Government of Ghana (GoG). Some of the enactments and ordinances on land, prior to the NLP, dated back as far as 1876 and the 1900's. The LAP was subsequently launched in 2003 as the implementation arm of the NLP. The project is the first phase of a wider commitment by the GoG to enhance economic and social growth through an effective and efficient land management mechanism (GoG 2011; WB 2003; 2011a).

The project affects nearly every Ghanaian in one way or another since land in Ghana is not only a means of livelihood sustainability but also serves as a means of cultural identity linking past, present and future generations. The complexity of the environment within which the project was undertaken and the diverse nature of its' stakeholders means the project faced risks which needed to be identified and managed effectively to achieve the desired outcomes and to derive its' accompanying opportunities, and this forms the focus of investigation in this study.

1.4 Research Aim, Objectives and Questions

Research aim: This research aims at investigating the impacts of risk management practice on project success from a development project perspective.

The research has the following main objectives:

- To critically analyse how risks were identified under the Ghana LAP and the risks identified through these processes.
- To explore the strategies adopted to respond to the identified risks and to establish the links between risk identification and risk management practice.
- To ascertain whether differences in stakeholder objectives influence the effectiveness of project risk management strategies.
- To critically analyse whether the adopted risk management strategies were effective in enhancing the project's success.
- To propose a risk management approach, based on the research findings, to assist project team members charged with the responsibility of managing development project risks.

The central research question designed to achieve the aforementioned objectives is; **does risk management practice contribute to project success?** To answer this, the following research sub-questions are designed:

1 What are the ways by which risk identification can contribute to risk management practice?
2 Do differences in stakeholder objectives influence the effectiveness of risk management strategies?
3 How effective are risk management strategies in enhancing project success?

1.5 Conceptual Framework

A critical review of the current literature on the concepts of risk, risk management and its impact on project success was undertaken and this served as the

theoretical lens for analysis in this study. Following on from this, the context of the study was defined and the various units of analysis established including the identification and definition of the different constructs that needed to be explored and the relationships between them (Baxter and Jack 2008; Miles and Huberman 1994) to achieve the study's objectives. In investigating the application of the risk management concept under the case study project, particular emphasis were placed on the risks identified and how they were identified (Beck 2006; Cooper 2012; Haniff and Salama 2016; Maytorena et al. 2007; Raftery 2003; Stanton and Webster 2014; Sutton 2014), the strategic actions adopted to respond to these risks (Carvalho and Rabechini Junior 2015; Hopkins 2014; Miller and Lessard 2001) and whether these strategies positively impacted the project's success (Cooper et al. 2005; Hillson 2009; Zwikael and Ahn 2011).

How the various units of analysis were designed, and the data collection and analysis techniques used to provide answers to the research questions and to offer valuable conclusions for this study are explained in detail in the methodology chapter. Figure 1.1 below is a diagrammatic representation of the study's conceptual framework;

Figure 1.1 Conceptual Framework



Source: Author's Construct

1.6 Outline of Thesis

This thesis consists of eight chapters. The first, which this sub-section is part of, provides a general introduction and justification for the study and presents the research objectives and research questions.

Chapter two presents a critical review of the current literature on risk and uncertainty, risk management, project stakeholders, effects of risk management on project success and identifies the gaps in the literature. This then enabled the researcher to identify and establish the links between the literature and the research questions for this study.

Chapter three is a presentation of the adopted research methodology used to answer the research questions and to achieve the study's aim and objectives. It also clarifies the philosophical view that guides this study and discusses the data collection and data analysis strategies that were employed, ethical issues, the researcher's fieldwork experiences as well as the strengths and limitations of the adopted approach.

Chapter four presents land issues and land ownership structure in Ghana and its influence on the country's developmental efforts. The chapter also discusses the broader debate on land reform due to the focus of investigation for this study being a land reform project and identifies the risks with the potential to influence the successful reform of Ghana's land sector. The chapter further presents the case study project, LAP, its' stakeholders and their respective objectives and expectations of the project.

Chapter five employs empirical data from the study's fieldwork exercise and available literature on the concepts of risk and risk management to discuss how

risks were identified under the case study project and the risks identified through these processes as the first stage of the projects' risk management process.

Chapter six further explores how risk management has been applied under the Ghana LAP by presenting an analysis and discussion of the multiple strategies adopted to respond to the risks identified in chapter five and the links between risk identification processes and corresponding risk response strategies.

Chapter seven presents an analysis of the various perspectives from which the success of LAP have been determined by the different interest groups attached to the project and provide a discussion, based on the risk management concept, to ascertain whether the project's risk management strategies have positively contributed to the achievements of its' desired outcomes as intended, or otherwise.

The final chapter, eight, summarises the key findings from addressing the research questions based on the study's empirical evidence and provides an answer to the overall research question. The study's contributions to the current knowledge, applicability of the findings, policy implications and recommendations for further research are also presented in this chapter.

Chapter Two Risk, Risk Management and Project Success Debate

2.1 Introduction

The uniqueness of projects and the complexities of project environments, as earlier mentioned in chapter 1, means projects can encounter risks. These risks need to be identified contextually (Green 2016) and responded to effectively to ensure projects achieve expected outcomes as intended. Consequently, project team members tasked with the responsibility of managing project risks need to employ critical decision making skills including the ability to interpret the dynamic environments within which risk arises (Cooper 2012) and to devise comprehensive analytical frameworks to mitigate the threats posed by risks and pursue its accompanying opportunities (Stein 1981).

A number of empirical studies have been undertaken on risks and the management of risks in projects and their effects on project success. The purpose of this chapter is to critically review the literature on risk, risk management, and project success; to identify the gaps in the literature and to clearly identify and establish the links between the literature and the research questions for this study. While acknowledging the contributions such as on social construction of risk by Beck (2006) and on the significance of risk and risk governance in modern society as identified by Hood et al. (2001), this research remains rather focused on risk in the context of projects and project management perspectives.

The chapter begins with a literature review of risk, uncertainty and risk management from different perspectives and establishes the relationship

between risk and uncertainty. The arguments on what constitutes project success, the effects of risk management and the influence of stakeholders on project success and/or failure are also discussed.

2.2 Risk and Uncertainty from Different Perspectives

There have been several approaches to the concept of risk which is a subject of debate. The first approach views risk as a negative consequence that, should it occur, has the probability of the occurrence of loss (Mullins et al. 1999; Williams 1995). Risk can also be seen as a “barrier to success” (Miles and Wilson 1998: 247) and is related to the concepts of chance such as the probability of loss or ruin (Hertz and Thomas 1984). This school of thought argues that risk is a “threat to success” and consequently sees it in a purely negative sense (Chapman and Ward 2003).

Risk, however, does not always have a negative impact on outcome as it can create reward when managed appropriately. Consequently, the second school of thought argues that risk is not just a “threat to success” but also incorporates a positive aspect which creates opportunity (Chapman and Ward 2003; Smith et al. 2014). Jaafari (2001: 89) define risk as an “exposure to loss/gain”. Sitkin and Pablo (1992) however argue further and describe risk using a three dimensional conceptual framework illustrated below;

Figure 2.1 Risk Dimensions



Source: Adapted from Sitkin and Pablo (1992: 10-11)

Raftery (2003) adopted this view and asserts that risk can actually have a two way outcome, either better or worse than originally expected. He called this **upside** or **downside** risks. Green (2016: 2) posits that while risk can have a two way outcome, people normally "associate risk with negative outcomes more than with positive ones". Chapman and Ward (2003) argue further that, although most risk advocates stress the downside effect of risk, to create balance, we need to remember the potential upside effect of risk as well.

In achieving organisational objectives however, there need to be clarity as to the nature of risks identified. Some risks are threats, whilst others create opportunity and others can also result in both threats and opportunities (Taylor 2014). The

ability to manage risk effectively can turn threats into opportunity. Likewise, an opportunity can turn into a threat if not managed appropriately. Beck (2006) argues that how we visualise and broadcast risks gives value to it. How risk is identified and managed can therefore influence whether it will be a “threat to success” or create an “opportunity”. Nevertheless, whether risk results as a “threat” or creates an “opportunity” means the final outcome is uncertain. In all the above perspectives of risk, there is an element of uncertainty and this leads us into a new dimension of risk; uncertainty.

The different perspectives of risk discussed above involve an element of uncertainty in one way or another, meaning there is an uncertainty of outcome which can lead to a deviation from the expected outcomes. Business decision making is mostly undertaken on the basis of expectations and predictions about the future (Raftery 2003). These assumptions, expectations, estimates and forecasts of the unknown, are uncertain and can have inherent risks. Hertz and Thomas (1984) identify the unpredictability of risk and define risk as both uncertainty and the results of uncertainty. The Association of Project Management defines risk as “any uncertain event or set of circumstances that, should it occur, would have an effect on one or more objectives” (APM, 1997: 16). This effect could be positive or negative. Hopkins (2014:14) adopted this framework and defined risk as “an event with the ability to impact (inhibit, enhance or cause doubt about) the effectiveness and efficiency of the core processes of an organisation”. He elucidated further that for risk to materialise, there must be the occurrence of an event which could be unplanned with unexpected consequences.

Taylor (2014: 44) describes risk as the “effect of uncertainty on objectives where an effect is a deviation from the expected – positive and/or negative”. Aven et al. (2014) argues that, whereas risk generally arises where there is the probability of a hazard or threat to a target, there is the uncertainty of this hazard translating from potential to actual damage thereby resulting in an uncertain outcome. These views were affirmed by Green (2016: 2) who describes risk as having two key ideas: uncertainty and outcomes.

Is “risk” therefore different from “uncertainty”? The unpredictability of risk and its linkage to uncertainty means risk and uncertainty are sometimes presumed to have the same meaning. Elucidating Hertz and Thomas (1984)’ definition of risk further, the linkage between risk as both uncertainty and the results of uncertainty implies that risk is unpredictable and its likely effects, uncertain. Yeo (1995) argues further that “risk” and “uncertainty” are sometimes used interchangeably whilst Mullins et al. (1999) assert that risk is the degree of uncertainty and potential loss that may arise from a set or given behaviour.

This link between risk and uncertainty as elucidated above is debatable since a distinction can be made between “risk” and “uncertainty”. Whereas risk has some attributes that are quantifiable, uncertainty does not (Raftery 2003). This quantifiable attribute means there is a probabilistic attribute of risk which makes it measurable (Aven et al. 2014). Aven et al. (2014) only based their argument on the relationship between risk and uncertainty from a negative sense, whereby risk and uncertainty are seen as threats/hazards and their consequences. Risk does not only mean the occurrence of an undesirable event but also the “probability of occurrence of loss/gain multiplied by its respective magnitude” (Jaafari 2001: 89). Raftery (2003: 6) also quantifies risk as follows;

Risk = Probability of event X Magnitude of loss/gain.

From the above equation, risk is measurable and therefore could be insured against. However, it is not possible to quantify an uncertain event as it is practically impossible to attach a probability of likelihood to the occurrence of such an event and therefore, on this argument, uncertainty cannot be measured and consequently insured against.

This quantification and subsequent insurability of risk is debatable as there is an inherent uncertainty in risk itself with the ability to transform a potential hazard into an actual one thereby eluding any planned measures to mitigate its effects (Aven et al. 2014). This in effect nullifies the quantification and any value placed on it. Certainty pertains to a 100% probability of an event occurring whereas uncertainty relates to an unknown percentage of probability. In between these two extremes, the level of uncertainty varies (Jaafari 2001). The level of predictability therefore depends on the level of uncertainty which ultimately determines what risks and/or variances are likely to impact on the achievement of objectives. Smith et al. (2014: 4) elucidate further that whilst risk relates to a "range of possible outcomes with attached probabilities", uncertainty relates to possible outcomes with no assumed probabilities.

A distinction between risk and uncertainty is necessary for its effective management because the level of knowledge as to whether an uncertain event will occur affects the degree to which a premium could be attached to it or not. As argued by Beck (2006), we need to be realistic about what we believe we can calculate and control and what we are unaware of and as such cannot control. This then brings us back to quantifiable and non-quantifiable risk as earlier

elucidated. In this context, uncertainty could be quantifiable and therefore subject to some degree of insurance depending on the predictability of its outcome.

This therefore sets the platform for a definition of risk based on the analysis of the various arguments and counter arguments. Risk is “the implications of uncertainty about the level of performance achievable, portrayed by adverse variability relative to expected outcomes, assessed for each performance attribute using comparative cumulative probability distributions when measurement is appropriate” (Chapman and Ward 2003: 48). This is a more operational definition of risk which is adopted for this study based on the arguments above as it incorporates both opportunities and threats.

People generally tend to have different perceptions towards risk and uncertainty (Adams 1995; Beck 1986; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). The future is unknown, but the ability to be able to turn risks and uncertainties into results is subject to the expertise of the person making such decisions, albeit, based on the nature of the environment where they are likely to occur. Nonetheless, based on the aforementioned arguments, risk and uncertainty are two different entities of a complex phenomenon with similar, but different attributes and a distinction between the two is necessary. Risks and uncertainties are not mutually exclusive and are usually involved in any given situation in some way. Pursuing organisational objectives can even result in new risks arising, resulting in uncertainty of outcome.

The researcher therefore agrees with Chapman and Ward (2003)'s assertion that, risks and uncertainties are two sides of the same coin which can be treated independently but focusing on one should not in any way affect concern for the

other. Although a distinction between risk and uncertainty is necessary to "understand their causes, outcomes and effects", it is possible to "refer to both as risks" since their "impact depends on how they combine and interact" (Miller and Lessard 2001: 438). Krane et al. (2010) however disagree with this and argue that it is impossible to embed uncertainty in risk because the effects of uncertainty may be unknown. For the purpose of this study, the word risk will be used instead of both risk and uncertainty according to the researcher's adopted definition of risk above (Chapman and Ward 2003: 48), which incorporates uncertainty.

In his excellent write up on World Risk Society, Beck argue that despite the ambivalence of risk, modern society places particular emphases on debating, preventing, and managing risks it has produced itself (Beck 2006: 332). He argues further that although risks can be threatening events, the way we visualise and broadcast risks gives value to it. As a result, our construction of risk (which are future events) makes it a reality.

Hood et al. (2001) argues further on the significance of risk and risk governance in modern society. They argued that risk and the regulation of risk could be interpreted through a politico-cultural approach due to the influence of governments and the emergence of new institutional and policy style approaches to certain aspects of the economy by governments. Risk regulation, they argue, may vary across countries and even within countries resulting in differences in risk domains and even more seriously, different policy approaches across the various domains. Power (2004) elucidates further that the failure of risk and risk regulation in some aspects of society are mainly due to a greater investment in formal, generalisable systems of control, rather than on developing informal ones. While the macro aspects may have its uses, its interpretation and applicability in

a real-world situation are also crucial. As argued by Beck (2006), risk is a socially constructed phenomenon with different classes of classification by different people. How organisations interpret their environments can influence the type and nature of risks they identify, and the corresponding strategies designed to respond to them. This study seeks to clarify the notion of the social construction of risk (Adams 1995; Beck 2006; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982) as shaped by our interpretations and understanding of the project environment.

2.3 Risk Management

Uher and Toakley (1999: 161) define risk management as “a procedure for controlling risk levels and mitigating its effects”. The WB (2013b) adopted this procedural nature of risk management and argued further that this involves the ability to identify whatever risks there are in a given situation, making the necessary preparations and adjustments for them and being able to concurrently cope with their effects appropriately.

Risk management could also be described as the culture, processes and structures directed towards managing potential opportunities and adverse effects in an appropriate manner (Cooper et al. 2005: 3); or as a set of activities which an organisation undertakes to deliver the most favourable outcome thereby reducing the volatility or variability of such an outcome (Hopkins 2014: 38). Consequently, the management of risk does not necessarily seek to eliminate all potential risks as there are some aspects of risk that result in opportunity and as such, eliminating all risks will result in missing such opportunities (Cooper et al. 2005; Stanton and Webster 2014).

Several researchers such as Budgen (1999) and De Bakker et al. (2010; 2011) argue further that risk management does not only involve the procedure and processes of identifying potential risks, but also includes evaluating the possible effects of these risks on objectives and developing a workable strategy for the management or improvement of such situations. This evaluation process stems from lessons learnt from previous organisational activities and should be incorporated in risk management, which should be an on-going process about potential situations that may or may not occur in a given situation (Chapman and Ward 2003; De Bakker et al. 2010). This appraisal approach to risk management is therefore to identify risk factors from previous organisational activities, whereas the management approach is to analyse and apply strategies to manage risks an organisation faces in a given situation.

Effective risk management provides insight, knowledge and confidence for making better decisions (Cooper et al. 2005) and can contribute positively to achieving organisational objectives. The earlier potential risks are identified and appropriate measures taken to manage the effects appropriately, the better the chances of achieving set objectives. It also enhances the ability to pursue opportunities.

2.3.1 The Risk Management Process

An examination of the best established risk management processes in the literature reveals that they all share the same basic generic steps (IRM 2002; ISO 31000: 2009; 2018; PMI 2004), including;

1. Risk assessment: which includes;
    - risk identification
    - risk analysis
    - risk evaluation
2. Risk treatment or risk response planning,
3. Risk monitoring and control.

However, there is a slight variation as to how the steps are approached and presented across the models.

There is also the COSO Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Framework 2004, which establishes the relationship between the objectives an organisation tries to achieve and the risk management components required to achieve such objectives. ERM, according to Chapman (2011), is designed to improve business performance due to its robustness in managing threats and opportunity. It comprises of eight interrelated components and is widely used in organisations to manage risks “in a coordinated and integrated way” across the entire business (Chapman 2011: 5). While ERM helps to provide an understanding of the interdependencies between the risks an organisation faces (Green 2016), it is mostly skewed towards the organisation’s internal environment. External risks also impact on the achievement of objectives and an effective risk management strategy needs to take that into consideration.

Figure 2.2 COSO ERM Risk Management Framework

Source: Curkovic et al. (2013:17)

This list is however not exhaustive as there may be other risk management approaches in use due to the subjectivity of risk management. Several countries have also developed their own risk management standards. The ISO 31000: 2009 risk management process (slightly amended in 2018) is widely accepted as the international standard for risk management and is adopted for this study.

The risk management process, adapted from ISO 31000: 2009; 2018 and modified to include risk action instead of risk treatment, is a systematic and continuous framework which begins with critically establishing the context, scope and criteria within which the management of risk would be set, recognising and ranking these risks and then deciding what actions are needed to respond to the risks. All these should be adequately recorded and reported. This is then controlled by a two way feedback process of communicating and consulting with

stakeholders as well as the continuous monitoring and review of the whole process.

The risk management process is illustrated below;

Figure 2.3 The Risk Management Process



Source: Adapted from (ISO 31000:2009; 2018)

2.3.1.1 Scope, Context, and Criteria

Risk changes with context (Green 2016). As a result, the first and critically important aspect of managing risks is to determine the scope and understand the context within which the management of risk will be carried out with due cognisance of the overall organisational objectives. While the internal context of an organisation is crucial and forms the basis for establishing the risk management context, the external environment defines their scope of operation and the trends that affect or could affect the organisation and is also critical to the achievement of objectives (Cooper 2004; 2012; Green 2016; ISO 31000: 2018; Stanton and Webster 2014). The external context includes political, social, cultural and economic factors (Green 2016; Zavadskas et al. 2010) as well as the various stakeholders and their respective objectives (Cooper 2004).

Once the internal and external contexts are defined, risk criteria are set. Risk criteria involve the types and likelihood of risks, risk levels and likely impact on the achievement of objectives (Stanton and Webster 2014). This process is adequately recorded and reported, continuously monitored and reviewed with constant communication and consultation between the various stakeholders. This is because new risks arise that need to be assessed and failure to continually monitor the context within which they may arise can have negative consequences on the progress of the risk management process.

2.3.1.2 Risk Assessment

Establishing the scope, context and criteria then sets the stage for the assessment of risk. Risk assessment involves three main stages in the risk management process; risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation.

Risk Identification

This involves the identification of potential risks, how, when and why they arise and their possible impacts on objectives (Cooper 2012; Cooper et al. 2005; ISO 31000: 2009; 2018; Perry 1986; Stanton and Webster 2014). This is crucial since the identification of risk establishes the extent to which the achievement of objectives is exposed to risk. Researchers such as Chapman (1990) and Haniff and Salama (2016) argue that risk identification should be carried out by well-informed and creative experts with inside knowledge of organisational objectives, the risk management context, including the various stakeholders and their objectives, and the political and social context within which the organisation operates.

However, in a study involving 51 project managers, Maytorena et al. (2007) argued that the role of experience in risk identification is not as significant as widely believed and the style of information search, level of education of the expert, and the risk management training they received are more significant in identifying risk than the level of experience. The study tests two main hypotheses;

H1: Relationship between project managers' years of experience and their level of Risk Identification Performance (RIP);

H2: Project managers style of information search and their level of RIP.

The study uses Expected Utility Theory which argues that decision makers make a rational evaluation of probabilities against final asset positions and then choose a course of action based on this evaluation (Schoemaker 1982). However, Gilovich et al. (2002) criticised the assumption of the possibility of decision-making rationality under such circumstances as biased because they argue that it is based on flawed heuristics.

The information search style which forms the second hypothesis still reflects the individual's attributes which is relative to his cognitive abilities and therefore contradicts the assertion of the insignificance of experience in risk identification by Maytorena et al. (2007).

A quantitative study by Reeves et al. (2013) on risk identification biases and their impact on project performance revealed that biases can limit risk identification activities. This study supported the use of experience in risk identification by determining that risk informed decision making and continuous risk management practices are key drivers used to identify and track risk issues. They tested hypotheses to evaluate the biases in risk identification data collection using data from NASA and concluded that risk identification strategies tend to be more biased towards internal risks than external risks. One major finding from this study is that risks resulting in cost and schedule over-run are mostly caused by external rather than internal factors and are mostly not investigated properly due to the bias towards internal risks.

However, their measurement of performance only against cost and schedule is not enough justification for the generalisation of the study since there are other

important factors such as quality of the final product and stakeholder interests and objectives which also have an influence on performance.

Development projects are mostly undertaken in environments where opinion leaders and people, who may not necessarily have technical knowledge in project decision making, may have inside knowledge and may be well-informed about the politico-socio context of the project. These are also experts in their own right since they have adequate knowledge in their areas of operation (Obeng-Odoom 2011) and can also be a great source of knowledge in as much as the identification of risks is concerned. The key question that therefore arises is, who is an expert? And how should the risk identification process be widened enough to include all key actors in the project environment? This study will seek to clarify the role of experience on risk identification and the relationship between risk identification and risk management practice using empirical evidence from Ghana's LAP.

Cooper (2012), Raftery (2003) and Sutton (2014) argue further that risk identification should be systematic, as failure to employ systematic processes is likely to result in unknown risks to the organisation or new risks that may arise throughout the risk management process. They concluded that, regardless of whether an identified risk falls within the organisational context or not, it should still be included in the risk assessment.

Successful risk identification leads to the development of a comprehensive risk register with various risks attributed to different managerial experts deemed to have the requisite knowledge to monitor the identified risks effectively, and consequently leads to the next crucial phase; risk analysis. However, the

identified risks can influence or determine the risk management practice that is used in the quest to achieve organisational objectives and this relationship will be investigated as the first research sub-question for this study; what are the ways by which risk identification can contribute to risk management practice?

Risk Analysis

This stage is where a systematic strategy is developed to understand each risk, their probability of occurrence and the magnitude of their consequences on the achievement of objectives. Depending on the results, impact assessments are developed and categorized; based on the level of impact and likelihood of occurrence and the overall present risk level determined (Raftery 2003; Stanton and Webster 2014; Sutton 2014). Berg (2010) argues further that an effective risk analysis should also involve identifying risk control measures, a critical estimation of their effectiveness, as well as the resultant risk levels with risk control measures in place.

Risk analysis can be done either qualitatively or quantitatively, or through a combination of both, depending on the nature of risk involved, the level of knowledge and data available, and the purposes for which the analysis is undertaken (Berg 2010; Simon et al. 1997; Stanton and Webster 2014). Qualitative risk analysis is based on our subjective judgements and allows the identification of the main sources and factors of risk, whereas quantitative analysis is based on analysing risk related data.

Due to the nature of risk, qualitative risk analysis is more likely to provide an extensive understanding of the risks likely to result in failure to achieve objectives. Quantitative analysis involves more complex techniques where risk can be measured in terms of cost and time (Simon et al. 1997) and this depends on our ability to predict a future happening, which is subjective. Qualitative risk analysis therefore sets the stage and may lead to quantitative risk analysis making quantitative analysis reliant on qualitative risk analysis. While it is preferable to have both for reliability and efficiency (Chapman and Ward 2003; Hillson 2009), qualitative assessment is an essential pre-requisite.

Risk Evaluation

Risk evaluation involves making a concrete decision on risk levels or priorities by comparing each estimated risk in the identification and analysis stage against the risk criteria identified "when the context of risk was established" (Cooper 2012: 4). This is to determine what actions are needed to address the identified risks. This stage is crucial since the risks accepted would have to be dealt with and monitored continuously whereas those that require further action should be dealt with strategically.

2.3.1.3 Risk Action

After critically assessing the level of risk, a decision is needed on the actions to be taken on the identified risks to ensure they do not impact negatively on the achievement of objectives, as failure to take the necessary control measures to

combat the identified risks could negate all previous efforts of the risk management process. Most of the literature (Berg 2010; Cooper 2004; 2012; Cooper et al. 2005; Green 2016; Hopkins 2014; ISO 31000:2009; 2018; Stanton and Webster 2014; Sutton 2014) classifies this stage as “risk treatment”. They assert risk treatment as the control measures put in place to manage or modify the effects of risk. The word “risk treatment” relates more to seeing risk as a “sickness” or from a “negative” perspective whereas risk, as discussed above, can have positive effects as well. An “action” is therefore required to respond accordingly to both the negative and positive effects of risk instead of “treatment”. For the purposes of this study, “risk action” will be used instead of “risk treatment” to refer to this stage of the risk management process to enable a wider debate on responses to risk that highlights both the negative and positive impacts of risk.

Risk action therefore involves all the necessary actions taken to respond to risk and its effects in a more cost-effective way. As earlier elucidated, it is imperative at this stage to consider that not all risk has a negative outcome. While the definition of risk incorporates uncertainty which can have either a positive or negative effect (Chapman and Ward 2003), the various risk actions in the risk management process tend to place particular emphasis on the negative effects of risk (Hillson 2001). Actions taken to respond to risks need to be designed to accommodate both the traditional approaches based on risks as threats as well as its accompanying opportunities (Hillson 2001).

Based on this argument, Hillson (2001) proposed a different approach to responding to risks which was adopted by Stanton and Webster (2014) and Sutton (2014). This approach is based primarily on the traditional approaches but

modified to accommodate responses to opportunity; as illustrated in Figure 2.4 below;

Figure 2.4 Threat and Opportunity Responses



Source: Hillson (2001: 3)

Both risk avoidance and exploitation strategies aim to eliminate risk by targeting their root causes. Whereas risk avoidance aims to reduce the probability of occurrence or level of negative impact to zero, exploitation on the other hand seeks to increase the probability of positive occurrence to 100% (Hillson 2001;

Stanton and Webster 2014; Sutton, 2014). This is an aggressive strategy undertaken in pursuance of opportunity.

Allocating ownership of risk involves transferring the responsibility of managing risk to a party identified as having the ability to manage both the threats as well as maximise the benefits of the opportunities associated with the risk (Hillson 2001). Sutton (2014) criticised this strategy on the basis that the responsibility and accountability for the allocated risks still rests with the parent organisation in most cases and can also be very costly. When stakeholders already have a stake in the proposed benefits, prioritising stakeholders in the sharing process can maximise positive objectives (Hillson 2001).

Both mitigation and enhancement strategies are aimed at influencing the level of risk exposure for risks that are either impossible to avoid/exploit, or transfer/share (Hillson 2001; Stanton and Webster 2014; Sutton 2014). The resultant effect is a reduction in the negative effects of risk or an increase in risk drivers to maximise opportunity

After exhausting all the aforementioned strategies, the remaining or residual risk is either accepted and a comprehensive plan adopted to monitor it, or ignored. Accepting residual risk is normally the preferred strategy where it is deemed not cost effective to pursue the first three stages above, or when all three measures have been exhausted (Sutton 2014). Under such circumstances, the threat strategy involves accepting the risk and hoping it does not occur, whereas the opportunity strategy is mostly to do nothing but hope for the best outcome (Hillson 2001). None of the above is mutually exclusive or appropriate in any given situation.

Although Hillson's risk management framework is quite an extensive one which proposes the handling together of threats and opportunities, its workability from a development project perspective is debatable. This is due to the fact that development projects mostly tend to have different sets of stakeholders pursuing differing agendas. This study will investigate the effectiveness of risk management strategies in enhancing project success as a research sub-question.

Due to the subjectivity of risk, the risk management process should be used as a guideline rather than a rigid standard since having a standard undermines the subjectivity of risk and may not yield better results. This assertion is supported by findings from Maytorena et al. (2007) and Reeves et al. (2013). Risk is a social construct (Adams 1995; Beck 2006; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982) and consequently its subjectivity must be reflected in its management. Consequently, a project specific approach is proposed.

The risk management process is therefore continuous. It should be adequately recorded and reported through appropriate mechanisms, monitored and reviewed to assess the effectiveness of the process (Green 2016; ISO 31000: 2018) as well as identify new risks that may arise through its implementation. Continuous communication and consultation links must also be established between the various stakeholders, engaging them in the process at every stage.

Risk management should not necessarily be the business of only senior management but should incorporate both the individualistic and functional areas of the organisation. This is due to the fact that risk management can be more effective if all the various stakeholders and their respective objectives are

factored in at every stage of the process. This is one of the justifications for investigating how differences in stakeholder objectives influence the effectiveness of risk management strategies as a research sub-question in this study.

2.4 Projects

Turner (1999: 3) defines a project as “an endeavour in which human, financial and material resources are organised in a novel way to undertake a unique scope of work, of given specification, within constraints of cost and time, so as to achieve beneficial change defined by quantitative and qualitative objectives”. The project management literature adopted this wider description of projects and defines a project as “a temporary endeavour undertaken to create a unique product, service or result” (PMI 2008: 5). Wysocki (2019: 5) asserts projects as “a sequence of unique, complex, and unique activities that have one goal or purpose and that must be completed by a specific time, within budget, and according to specification”, whereas Cusworth and Franks (1993: 3) view projects as “investments of capital in a time-bound intervention to create productive assets”. Consequently, a project according to the aforementioned views, should have a clearly defined objective and as such the end of a project is the stage where this objective is either achieved, or the project is terminated because the objective is too ambiguous and will not and cannot be achieved, or where the results are no longer required (PMI 2008).

Turner (2014) however, modified the definition of projects in his earlier work and simply asserts a project as the temporary assignment of resources to carry out

work that result in beneficial change. In this sense, completing the project's deliverable(s) does not necessarily bring the project into completion until the change it proposes delivers the purpose for which it was intended.

In all the different perspectives of projects above, there is an allocation of resources at a cost within a specific time frame with the *prima facie* objective of bringing about defined change or creating a unique product. Every aspect of human endeavour that results in an improvement upon an existing situation in one way or another has an element of a project embedded in it, and this has resulted in nearly all areas of life adopting project-related principles, rules, techniques and procedures with the aspiration of forming a new era of project rationality (Cicmil and Hodgson 2006).

This study, however, is based on the definition of projects from a development perspective. Consequently a thorough definition of development projects will be adopted. Potts (2002) argues that development projects normally involve investing scarce resources for future benefit within the constraints of time to achieve specific objectives. As a result, although intended to deliver goods or services for public use, development projects also face time, cost and quality constraints as standard projects (Ika 2012).

Development projects are often used as a channel for richer countries to extend financial resources to less richer countries (Rondinelli 1983) to promote economic growth and/or poverty reduction. Consequently, development projects are generally not-for-profit (Ika 2012) but are a special kind of investment undertaken with "purposefulness" and "expectation" that it will set further development moves in motion as part of a development process (Hirschman et al. 2015: 1). However,

such investments do not always result in delivering the intended purposes since the end of such projects may sometimes be difficult to determine (Andersen 2006; Potts 2002). In many cases, their boundaries are also not properly defined (Golini et al. 2015) and consequently they may place a continuous drain on scarce resources.

The WB particularly invested a lot of resources in development projects to poorer countries in an effort to provide the necessary channel for improving development policies and ultimately to serve as a catalyst in achieving development goals. Estimates from Wong (2012) revealed the WB was involved in 400 Community Driven Development (CDD) projects in 94 countries costing nearly $30 billion in 2012 alone.

According to Khang and Moe (2008), development projects require at least three separate stakeholders: the funding agencies who pay for the project but do not receive deliverable(s); implementation units involved in project execution; and proposed beneficiaries who benefit directly or indirectly from the final outcome. The wider stakeholder interest means the completion of development projects is not necessarily the delivery of the project's specifications on time and within budget, but also requires the delivery of the various stakeholder requirements (Ofori 2013; Yalegama et al. 2016). This may be difficult to measure since they tend to deliver intangible outputs or outcomes and their stakeholders normally have different interpretations and understanding of the project environment.

Bokor (2011) argue further that the intangibility of their outcomes and the lack of market pressures make development projects susceptible to political manipulations on the part of donors and political leaders alike who may use

certain projects or some aspects of it for political gains. Consequently, both the project objectives and the methods of achieving such objectives should be very clearly defined. This augments Turner (2014)'s argument for modification of his initial definition of projects since the service provided should deliver its intended purpose for the project to deliver its objectives.

Ika (2012) conducted a study to investigate the reasons behind the failure of development projects in Africa and concluded that irrespective of the huge investments made in development projects over the years to ensure economic growth and/or poverty reduction in Africa, there is "little good" to show for it. This, "little good" according to Ika (2012: 38), have resulted in Africa's underdevelopment which is more to do with "poor implementation" of development projects rather than a lack of "big development goals" irrespective of the fact that development projects are required to follow strict transactional processes and guidelines as laid down by donor agencies. The study recommended the need for decision makers in Africa to break from the "one-size-fit-all trap", the "accountability-for-results trap", the "lack-of-project-management-capacity" trap and the "cultural trap" to ensure the success of development projects in Africa (Ika 2012: 39).

An investigation by Uprety (2014) into challenges faced in development project design and implementation in Asia also revealed that there is a lack of clarity in the enabling legal framework and tools for successful project implementation mainly in the recipient countries and to a limited extent, the donor agencies.

Damoah and Akwei (2017) investigated the reasons behind government project failure in Ghana assessing project failure using a six success/failure criteria

assessment framework; time, cost, requirement, stakeholder satisfaction, national development and contributions to the relevant sector where projects are implemented. Using a mixed method approach, the study concluded that while government projects fail on all six criteria with time overrun and cost being the worst criteria, project failure was mainly within the management phase and not the product phase. They therefore recommended the need for project managers to be proactive in their approach to increase the chances of project success. Analoui and Danquah (2017) elucidates that the poor implementation of development projects are mostly due to the fact that many developing countries lack the adequate capacity and institutions required to implement such huge endeavours.

While the researcher agrees that the aforementioned factors can contribute to project success and/or failure, the above discussions also suggest that development project success goes beyond delivering specific products within the constraints of cost and time since they are designed mostly to produce intangible outputs or outcome to benefit a wider community. This study seeks to explore this further by investigating development project risks, risk management strategies and whether these strategies contribute to development project success.

2.4.1 Project Management

Traditionally, project management has been viewed as a management tool adopted to achieve project objectives. PMI (2008: 6) defines project management as “the application of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques to project activities to meet project requirements”. This traditional view of project management is

generally task orientated as it describes project management as following certain set principles to achieve particular objectives (Andersen 2006; Elena 2011). This task perspective of project management is instrumental in nature (De Bakker et al. 2011) and follows the blueprint approach (Cusworth and Franks 1993) to management which has engineering roots.

Projects are undertaken to create change in the real world and therefore the change the project proposes should be embedded in its management. Camilleri (2016: 23) argues that project management may therefore be seen as “a formalised and structured method of managing change in a meticulous manner”. In developing a theory for renewal projects, Andersen (2006) recommended that projects should not be hampered by a pre-defined set of activities; but should have more room for creativity, improvisation and intuition if it is to deliver real change. He argues further that the temporary nature of projects in a permanent organisation requires the parent organisation to be able to adapt positively to accommodate the changes the project impacts on the organisation. Moreover, the three constraints of quality, time and cost as discussed in the definition of projects (Turner 1999) are undertaken within the day to day operations of the parent organisation and therefore should be carried out in a more adaptable way to effect real change.

Development projects are generally designed to address specific social and economic needs which call for a different approach from the traditional project management approaches. Yalegama et al. (2016) conducted a study to assess the critical success factors (CSF)’s of the Gemidiriya project in Sri-Lanka. CSFs are the limited variables in a project which are strongly correlated to success, such that a slight manipulation of such variables will influence project success

(Ofori 2013; Rockart 1981; Zwikael and Ahn 2011). Administering 167 questionnaires, mostly to villagers or beneficiaries and using factor analysis to analyse this CDD project, the study identified three significant CSFs:

1. Community project management engagement.
2. Enabling community environment.
3. Measuring project management outcomes by village organisations.

Although the study did not place much emphasis on qualitative analysis through the evaluation of participants' own accounts of events, it highlights the need for development projects not to follow the blueprint approach, whereby the project's deliverable(s) are executed without due cognisance of the wider stakeholder objectives and its effects on beneficial change, but rather follow a process (or adaptable) approach to meet stakeholder requirements (Sandhu and Gunasekaran 2004). Development project managers are usually confronted with demanding local constraints and many stakeholders (Diallo and Thuillier 2005) with different perceptions of success and therefore need to be adaptable in their approach to project delivery.

The changing nature of projects, and the continuously increasing interests of project stakeholders in project activities, calls for a more practical management style which takes into consideration a more adaptable approach depending on the nature and type of projects involved. In essence, project management is nothing more than "organised common sense" which needs continuous adapting to "meet the changing needs of the project" (Wysocki 2019: 27).

Critics of the process (or adaptable) approach however argue that it sometimes lead to confused objectives and can also be time consuming as the project design

and specific project actions may vary at each step of the process due to the complexity of projects (Potts 2002: 37).

This research does not reject the blueprint approach; as in some cases and depending on the nature of projects, particularly where a project seeks to deliver a specific objective at an agreed price by a specific date, this approach can deliver. However, my position as a researcher and to answer the research questions in this study is to adopt a more project specific approach which is adaptable and extends to how the various stakeholders understand and interpret their project environment, which ultimately affects their perception of success.

2.4.2 Project Risks and Project Risk Management

Projects, as change instruments, can encounter risks because they are undertaken to provide specific products within specific constraints in an external environment (Hillson 2009). The uniqueness, complexity and dynamic nature of the project environment means there is a lack of repetition in most projects thereby resulting in, at least, some level of uncertainty in outcome (Kendrick 2015).

The recognition of the importance of classifying risk as an important success factor of projects began with a study by Duffy and Thomas (1989) which identified risk analysis techniques to be applied in project auditing. Following on from this, several empirical studies (Cagliano et al. 2015; Chapman and Ward 2003; Cooke-Davis 2002; De Bakker et al. 2010; 2011; Kendrick 2015; Krane et al. 2010; Maytorena et al. 2007; Miller and Lessard 2001; Reeves et al. 2013), have

highlighted risk as a major influential factor critical for project success. Consequently, the PMI classify risk as one of its nine knowledge areas (PMI 2008).

The type of risk associated with a project is dependent on the nature of project and the environment within which the project is undertaken. The ability to identify the various risks associated with a project is crucial to its effective management and consequently to the overall achievement of project objectives. Camilleri (2016) posits that project risk identification simply answer the question, what might go wrong? However, as earlier elucidated, not all risks are threats to outcome. Some also creates opportunity and should be pursued.

Krane et al. (2010) in a study to investigate how project risk management contributes to the achievement of project objectives, critically analysed 1450 elements that constitutes the risk registers of seven large projects using a mixed method approach and categorising risk into three; operational risks, short-term strategic risks, and long-term strategic risks, according to their possible impact on project objectives. Operational risks are risks related to the achievement of the project's operational objectives, whereas short-term and long-term strategic risks are those related to the strategic objectives of the project's results and the strategic objectives of the project's purpose respectively.

The study concluded that operational risks are the most commonly encountered risks in project execution. Although strategic risks are the asset owners' responsibility, they have a significant influence on project success and need to be taking seriously. The study placed specific emphasis on operational risks which is primarily the project team's responsibility. With stakeholders playing a

crucial role in project success, all identified risks, regardless of whose responsibility they are, can influence project success and must therefore be included in the risk management process. A further study by Krane et al. (2012) to investigate the interactions between the project owners and the project management teams' risk focus concluded that, when there was close interaction between project owners and project management teams, operational risk became the main focus of risk management without having a negative effect on the achievement of strategic objectives.

Kolltveit et al. (2004) and Hillson (2003) argued that project risk could best be classified into two categories; internal and external. Internal risks include factors such as the project's technicalities, goals and organisational competence over which the project management team have a degree of control, whereas external risks include factors such as the political and cultural situation, project infrastructure, currency stability and other factors that can have an effect on the project but are outside the direct control of the project management team. Reeves et al. (2013) built on this argument and concluded that, although most identified project risks are internal, external risks also have a significant impact on project success.

Miller and Lessard (2001), in an IMEC study involving 60 large projects across the world asked managers to identify the various risks they face at the early front-end of their respective projects. 41.7% were market related risks, 37.8% were technical risks and the remaining 20.5% were classified as institutional/sovereign risks. The study also identified that some of these risks interacted over time to make them more complex to manage. While the study is based only on the early front-end phase of the project, which, according to Chapman and Ward (2003),

is the stage where risk management is crucial, it nevertheless provides an insight into the types of risk faced by projects at this early stage.

Risk, occurs at every phase of a project and risk management strategies need to be continuous throughout the project. However, risks cannot be managed unless they are identified and this therefore forms the basis of the research sub-question: What are the ways by which risk identification can contribute to risk management practice?

For a project to be successful, the identified risks need to be steered towards the achievement of objectives. Project risk management includes the activities undertaken to ensure that the various risks associated with a project do not have a negative effect on the achievement of project objectives, whilst creating opportunity. According to Stein (1981), an ideal project risk management technique seeks to capitalize on the opportunities that accompany risk, while simultaneously mitigating the effects of threats to outcome. Haniff and Salama (2016) argue that this requires having sufficient knowledge about the scope, objectives, environment and performing organisations of the project and using a proactive approach to identify, analyse and respond to any risks that may occur throughout the project's life.

Maytorena et al. (2007: 315) describes project risk management as a "process that aims to systematically identify, evaluate and manage project related risks to improve project performance" while Cagliano et al. (2015) elucidates further that project risk management begins with developing an understanding of the objectives and scope of the project and planning the response to risk within this environment. Once this is established, they argued that risks can be identified

together with their respective causes, effects and relationships with each other and then their probability of occurrence and level of impact can be ascertained. The focus of analysis for their study was on risks occurring in projects run within an organisation.

They identified three key dimensions that can influence the risk management technique used;

1. The phase of the risk management process,
2. The phase of the projects' life cycle,
3. The corporate maturity towards risk (how the organisation deals with risk).

Risk response strategies, they argued, are then devised for the prioritised risks with effective contingency plans and these are then continuously monitored and reviewed. Cagliano et al. (2015)'s technique follows ISO 31000's framework and, although a good technique, it should be used as a guideline instead of a rigid framework due to the uniqueness of projects and subjectivity of risk management.

An effective project risk management technique requires the effective use of soft skills (project interpersonal relationships) such as effective communication and engagement with stakeholders, not just the hard skills (technical and specific) that lead to project delivery (Carvalho and Rabechini Junior 2015; De Bakker et al. 2011; Söderlund and Maylor 2012). This is the best way to be able to interact and to understand the project's stakeholders and their objectives and also to establish a common agenda towards responding to risk.

Carvalho and Rabechini Junior (2015) conducted a study of 263 projects across eight industries to investigate the importance of soft skills on project performance.

They tested hypotheses on the significance of project hard skills and soft skills and their relationship with project success. The study concluded that the soft side of project risk management is prominent for project success and also has a positive effect on the hard side of project risk management.

Although interviews were conducted as part of the data collection process, data analysis was only done quantitatively. The soft skills of project risk management would be better understood qualitatively than quantitatively as interactions and participants' detailed account of the application of such skills can have significant influence on the findings.

Chapman and Ward (2003) argue further that for project risk management to be effective, it should be embedded in both the base and the contingency plans of the project, be well documented and should be continuously monitored to accommodate the changing nature of the various stakeholders and their objectives, since the perspective of stakeholders in every stage of the project is crucial to success. Hillson (2009: 23) argue that while effective risk management requires a structured approach, structure can also hinder effectiveness in instances where "it imposes a bureaucratic or counter-intuitive straitjacket on project team members". Based on this, effective risk management should be aimed at assessing and understanding the various risks the project faces, avoiding the threats and steering the opportunities to success.

This study will investigate how risk management has been applied under the Ghana LAP, to further contribute to the effectiveness of risk management on project success from a development project perspective.

2.4.3 Project Success and/or Failure

To be able to answer the main research question; **Does risk management practice contribute to project success**? There is a need to first establish the characteristics of a successful project, what determines a successful project and why some projects are classified as successful and others as failures.

The determination of what really is a successful project and what is not is difficult to define since its meaning varies depending on the perspective by which success and failure are assessed. Stuckenbruck (1986) asserts that project success is generally assessed differently by different interest groups related to the project and as such success criteria should reflect the various views of the different stakeholders. In investigating the success factors of 127 Israeli projects through a multidimensional measure of success, Shenhar et al. (2002) argue further that due to the subjective measure of project success to different people, there is a need for success criterion to reflect these different views and interests in project specific situations. According to Pinto and Cleland (2004), the general principle of delivering the three constraints of quality, time and cost alone is not enough to determine project success in an era of competition and customer satisfaction since it does not satisfy the various stakeholder perspectives. They therefore argued that a fourth constraint, customer satisfaction, is needed to determine success since, in their argument, a project is deemed to be successful only if the intended users are satisfied that the project would meet their needs. This however can lead to unrealistic demands, often outside the project's core objective, from the intended users. Consequently, a more operational definition of success is needed to determine what a successful project really is.

The APM conducted a study to ascertain whether their initial framework of project success factors were still relevant in today's projects (APM 2014). The study consisted of an initial qualitative aspect involving APM's own experts in consultation with senior project management professionals and academics to ascertain the relevance of the existing framework and to identify new factors. This was followed by a survey to test the framework against current project delivery in the United Kingdom.

It concluded that most of the existing success factors, including effective governance, capable sponsors, aligned supply chain, proven methods and tools, commitment to success, supportive organisations, stakeholder engagements, competent project teams and secured funding, were still relevant to today's projects. New factors, which include an active and flexible risk management practice to prevent threats and pursue opportunity, such as having clear goals and objectives, continuous planning and review are relevant for project success today.

Project management experts such as Cooke-Davies (2002) and De Wit (1988), in an attempt to define project success, made a distinction between project success measured against project management success (constraints of quality, time and cost) and project success measured against overall project objectives. Cooke-Davies (2002) argues that what constitutes project success requires a critical analysis to answer three questions: factors critical to project management success, factors critical to individual project success and factors that lead to consistently successful projects. He conducted an empirical study of 136 European projects by 23 organisations.

The study identified eight factors critical to project management success of which the first four relate to adequate risk management practices. This corroborates Duffy and Thomas' (1989) assertion of risk management as a CSF of projects. It also revealed that in addition to these eight critical factors, the interests of stakeholders and their objectives are critical to the overall success of a project. He argued further that consistently successful projects require completely new sets of processes and practices and learning from successful projects already undertaken by the organisation. The study concluded that project management success is easier to achieve than project success because the latter involves controlling both goals and methods which are both liable to change.

The study was however approached quantitatively with particular emphasis on the actions and not the interactions between the project management team and the various stakeholders. Although very informative, listening to participants' own account can provide a more interesting insight into this.

Camilleri (2012) argued further that, whereas project management success refers to a project delivering the desired outputs, project success on the other hand refers to whether the project has delivered the desired outcomes. A quantitative study by Nanthagopan et al. (2019) involving 1426 NGO's in Sri Lanka however highlighted a strong interconnection between project management success and project success, and that the successful delivering of project outputs lead to the successful achievements of development project outcomes.

Sutton (2005b) links the success and/or failure of a project to overall corporate strategy. He identified four levels of operation, each representing different stakeholder interests. These include project management success (with thorough

and continuous risk assessment as one of its components); repeatable project management success; and project success and project corporate success. He argued that project failure could occur at every level and that managers need to look at this holistic approach and target where and how they are failing or succeeding.

Sutton (2005a) in his argument on what constitutes project failure, grouped projects into two categories namely; *type one projects*, involving the delivery of a manufactured structure and *type two projects* involving the delivery of non-physical objects. He argued that whilst success is more difficult with type two projects than with type one projects, stakeholder perception of success is crucial to the success of both categories of projects irrespective of the fact that type two projects tend to have more powerful stakeholders, often beyond the scope of the organisation. Moreover, successful projects generally have realistic and clearly defined goals from the outset.

Development projects face more challenges and are likened to Sutton's *type two projects* because they normally produce intangible outputs or outcomes. Brière et al. (2015: 713) assert that such challenges include ambiguous planning, weak control mechanisms, inadequate risk assessment, bureaucratic management by donor agencies, and lack of interaction between donors and organisations. Based on a case study involving the Canadian NGO, Enablis, which aims to promote sustainable development by supporting entrepreneurship in developing countries, they identified four main factors for development project success;

- Not transposing a developed country model to a developing country.

- Adapting to local context and developing local roots during implementation.
- Maintaining a balance in resource allocation between stakeholders.
- Aligning local culture with that of the IDA.

Although this qualitative study only focuses on entrepreneurship, it highlights some of the risks faced in the quest to steer development projects to success and corroborates some of the findings of the quantitative study by Yalegama et al. (2016) earlier discussed.

Based on this argument, a project could be perceived as successful even if it fails to be completed on time and not within budget, but delivers the desired outcome. Likewise, a project could also be perceived as a failure even if it satisfies all the three basic constraints of project management, but does not deliver the desired outcome. Project failure is not only caused by lack of effective project management practices but also as a result of lack of social interactions between the project's stakeholders (Achterkamp and Vos 2008). The success and/or failure of a project "ultimately depends on the perceptions of the different stakeholders that have an interest in the project" (Camilleri 2016: 23). These perceptions should be realistic as to whether the project has actually been beneficial to the intended stakeholders (Atkinson 1999) or at least, to the majority of them and not assessed from a stakeholder personal interest perspective. CSFs should therefore be viewed from stakeholder impact perspective rather than the task perspective.

Consequently, project success goes beyond the traditional restrictions of time, cost and quality to one where the stakeholders determine what a successful

project is and is not, depending on their own satisfaction with the final product. Development project success includes all these parameters, as well as the success of the projects' long-term goals and its impact on society (Golini et al. 2015). Successful projects are therefore those with a positive stakeholder view of success. The project manager's role in all this is to attend to the critical factors that lead to success (Nagadevara 2012). It is therefore the project management team's responsibility to ensure that the final product meets the specifications of the sponsor, within the constraints of time, cost and quality before handing over (APM 2014; Ofori 2013). This however raises stakeholder expectations of the final product which could be unrealistic (Szajna and Scamell 1993). Due to this, it is possible for stakeholders to change the course of the project and to influence the risk management strategy that is being applied in the project, depending on their own expectations and interests. McManus and Wood-Harper (2008) argues that while it may be extremely difficult to satisfy the many stakeholders a project may have, particularly public sector projects, project team members should aim to satisfy them to a certain degree or at least satisfy the majority of them.

Different stakeholders have different objectives and how differences in stakeholder objectives influence the effectiveness of risk management strategies will be investigated as a research sub-question for this study.

2.5 Project Stakeholders and their Contribution to Project Success

For a project to deliver the expected outcome, the interests and expectations of the people who are affected, or may be affected in one way or another by the changes the project proposes need to be continuously monitored since success

is not necessarily delivering the project deliverable(s) but achieving stakeholder perceptions of success (Stuckenbruck 1986).

Project stakeholders are groups, individuals, or entities who can affect or be affected by a project or by a project's decision or outcome (PMI 2013) either directly or indirectly and their influence is important throughout the project. Their ability to influence project decision making in one way or another (Roeder 2013) means project managers must aim to either meet or exceed the needs and expectations of stakeholders for projects to be successful (PMI 2008).

The various stakeholders need to be identified together with their characteristics, classification and an analysis carried out according to their attributes, involvement (PMI 2008) and individual interests in the project (Aaltonen 2011; Jepsen and Eskerod 2009). This is the first step towards developing a response strategy to ensure that particular stakeholder groups do not impact negatively on the success of the project.

A meta-analysis of 42 publications by Achterkamp and Vos (2008), investigating the use of the stakeholder notion in the project management literature, concluded that whilst identification and classification of project stakeholders are necessary, they should also include the role the various stakeholders will play to ensure the overall success of the project. On the basis of this argument, they confirmed the assertion made by Stuckenbruck (1986) that project failure is not necessarily due to failure to deliver the project deliverable(s) but can also be caused by lack of social interactions between stakeholders. They recommended the classification of stakeholder involvement as a CSF for projects.

Whilst it is important to analyse stakeholder roles in the overall success of a project, the study does not consider the role and influence of stakeholders on project risk management strategies. With stakeholders critical to project success, it is also important to consider their influence and effects on project risk management strategies.

Stakeholders can either be internal or external to the project. Internal stakeholders are those with a primary interest in the project and are usually the project's core group (Cleland 2004). Once identified, they must be motivated to support the project's vision. An assertion by Beringer et al. (2013) and Cleland (2004) that internal stakeholders generally support the project's vision is debatable because empirical findings (Artto and Kujala 2008; Yang et al. 2014) have confirmed that not all or even the majority of project stakeholders always support the project's vision. Sometimes their interests and/or objectives are different from that of the project management team.

External stakeholders on the other hand refers to stakeholders such as sub-contractors, government agencies, regulatory bodies, local community groups, and traditional authorities who are not directly associated with the project but may have an influence or be influenced by the project or its outcome. Development projects are undertaken mostly to serve the external community and consequently, external stakeholder interests need to be critically assessed for the project to deliver its expected outcome.

Some stakeholders may have power and influence (Johnson and Scholes 1999; Olander and Landin 2005) and may resist change. Due to this, their degree of influence and level of interest need to be assessed and taken into consideration

in the project's design and implementation. Stakeholder management should therefore encompass their economic, ecologic and social interests (Eskerod and Huemann 2013). Whereas internal stakeholders are mostly primary to the project's physical environment and are therefore subject to some degree of control by the project team, external stakeholders are difficult to manage (Olander and Landin 2005) and sometimes even difficult to identify.

Critics of the traditional stakeholder identification approach argue that it is mostly focused on identifying stakeholders that can affect and influence (van Offenbeek and Vos 2016) thereby neglecting stakeholders who can be affected (Jones et al. 2007) and in effect, it does not take into consideration the uncertainties (Cooke-Davies et al. 2007) of the project environment.

To address this limitation, effective stakeholder management is therefore needed throughout the project to determine which response strategy is ideal for each stakeholder (Jepsen and Eskerod 2009) and this should be focused on addressing stakeholder issues as and when they arise (van Offenbeek and Vos 2016) albeit without prejudice to the project's overall objectives.

Stakeholder positions do not stay constant throughout the project (Aaltonen et al. 2015; Missionier and Loufrani-Fedida 2014). Contingency planning is therefore required to ensure that their dynamic nature does not impact negatively on project objectives. Aaltonen et al. (2015) conducted an empirical study examining stakeholder dynamics at the front-end stage of two complex nuclear waste repository projects. They concluded that dramatic changes in stakeholder salient positions has an effect on stakeholder influence and management strategies which in effect influences stakeholder attributes and positions towards the

project. Whilst this study only focused on the project front end stage, stakeholder dynamics affect the entire project life cycle and should therefore be considered throughout the project. The researchers only based their conclusions on the effects on large and complex projects and did not address how the changes in stakeholder salient positions influence the project's risk management strategies.

Missionier and Loufrani-Fedida (2014) argue further that stakeholder relationships are "dynamic" and "emerge" throughout the project and should therefore be studied longitudinally. They recommended the need to move from weak independent relationships to a "relational ontology" (Missionier and Loufrani-Fedida 2014: 1110), which embodies and recognises the dynamic and emergent nature of stakeholder relationships as the project progresses. Whilst this "relational ontology" is a positive move from independent stakeholder relationships, its effects and influence on the project's risk management strategy also needs to be investigated.

Jepsen and Eskerod (2009), in an empirical study on the response strategies of four different projects, revealed that different stakeholders are important at different stages of the project and that they may also influence and interact with each other during the course of the project. Completing stakeholder analysis early therefore increases the possibility to anticipate opportunities and problems for effective stakeholder management. This study confirms that effective communication among stakeholders is instrumental to effective stakeholder management (Cleland 2004). The correct approach to stakeholder management is however different for every project even if they share the same characteristics (Bourne and Walker 2006). Moreover, response strategies emerge through interactions of multiple project network actors (Aaltonen and Sivonen 2009).

Based on the argument of what constitutes project success or failure, project stakeholders (both internal and external) are crucial to the success and/or failure of a project and could therefore be classified as CSFs for projects since their dynamics, interactions and engagements have an influence on the way we plan, execute and implement projects (Achterkamp and Vos 2008; APM 2014; Boonstra et al. 2008; Cooke-Davies 2002; Olander and Landin 2005; PMI 2013; Thomas and Fernandez 2008; Worsely 2017; Yalegama et al. 2016).

To ensure that stakeholders do not impact negatively on project success, and to identify and exploit the opportunities therein, it is imperative to engage and manage the wide array of stakeholders effectively. To achieve this, there is a need to identify firstly who the project's stakeholders are, including those that can affect or can be affected by the project; to identify their respective objectives and expectations, motivations, specific interests in the project and why; to investigate their level of power and influence on the project, how they interact with each other and who are the key stakeholders; and to consider their emergence and dynamic relationships throughout the project and their roles on the overall success of the project. Worsely (2017) argues that although it is important to identify project stakeholders as per the aforementioned, we also need to establish their significance on the project to ascertain which stakeholders require the most or least attention.

Some projects fail to deliver the desired outcome because stakeholders in one way or another refuse to continuously support the project's vision or objective (Bourne and Walker 2006), or due to lack of social interaction between stakeholders (Achterkamp and Vos 2008). Some also develop their own interests and refuse to adapt to change. Some projects are also "installed" rather than

“implemented” because stakeholders are not properly engaged throughout the project (Miller and Oliver 2015: 3) and some stakeholder groups are also outside the influence of the project management team (Olander and Landin 2005). Stakeholder risk is therefore a major obstacle to project success and consequently needs to be managed effectively.

Since stakeholder objectives influence their perceptions of success, differences in stakeholder objectives have the potential to influence the projects’ risk management strategies which can ultimately affect project success. Whilst many studies reviewed in the literature ascertain the need for stakeholder identification, dynamics and influence on projects, none focuses on investigating how differences in stakeholder objectives influence risk management strategies. This study will therefore attempt to address this gap.

2.6 Effects of Risk Management on Project Success

As earlier discussed, projects as change instruments can encounter risks which require the requisite risk management techniques to reduce or prevent their negative effects on the achievement of project objectives and to maximise opportunity with their positive effects. The extent to which risk management impacts on project success is relative to the nature of the project, the various risks identified at the various stages of the project, stakeholders’ understanding, interpretation and influences of the project environment, the risk management strategies employed by management and how relevant they are in steering the project to success.

Following on from Duffy and Thomas' (1989) identification of the criticality of managing risks in projects, many studies (APM 2014; Benta et al. 2011; Carvalho and Rabechini Junior 2015; Chapman and Ward 2004; De Bakker et al. 2011; Hussein and Klakegg 2014; Krane et al. 2010; Kutsch and Hall 2010; Maytorena et al. 2007; Miller and Lessard 2001; Reeves et al. 2013) have established that project risk management has an effect on project success. One of the most extensive of such studies is Zwikael and Ahn (2011), which involved a survey of 701 project managers and their supervisors across seven industries in New Zealand, Israel and Japan.

The study investigated the effectiveness of current risk management practices on project success with particular emphasis on the effects of industry and country on project risk levels and project risk management planning. Using project success as a dependent variable and measuring against time, cost, quality and customer satisfaction, the study revealed that risk management practice significantly moderates the relationship between project risk levels and project success and even the most minimal project risk management planning reduces the negative effects of risk levels on project success. Another important finding is that risk management planning does not always impact on success as it depends on the level of project risk. Moreover, the environment within which the project is undertaken determines perceived risk levels and different risks were identified across industries.

Although the study expands the definition of success to include customer satisfaction, it is limited only to the project planning phase. It also uses only quantitative data without taking into consideration participants' own account of events. Risks can occur at every stage of a project and looking at this from a

qualitative perspective throughout the entire project life cycle, can provide an interesting insight. Nonetheless, this is a very extensive study across industries and countries which underline the relationship between risk management practice and project success.

Hussein and Klakegg (2014) conducted a survey involving 79 respondents, investigating the correlation between project risk factors and the definition and management of project success criteria. The study identified four main risk factors in the project initiation phase which lead to the occurrence of risk factors in the project implementation and evaluation stages. These include;

- Inadequate knowledge of stakeholders resulting in failure to identify all success criteria,
- Accommodating multiple and diverse stakeholders which ultimately results in conflicting success criteria,
- Pessimistic and optimistic success criteria,
- Soft/ambiguous success criteria with multiple interpretations.

They iterated that these risk factors lead to other risks occurring later in the project including; inadequate alignment to success criteria, lack of team commitment and support from top management and different assessments of project outcome and evaluation. This study corroborates Potts (2002: 37) assertion that the issue and level of participation in the adaptable approach to projects sometimes leads to confused objectives. This empirical evidence proves that accommodating multiple and diverse stakeholders, leads to conflicting success criteria. Although Hussein and Klakegg did not offer any risk management strategies to mitigate these, it highlights the need for adequate risk

response as early as possible as failure can lead to more complex risks occurring later in the project's life. It also confirms the need for risk management to be continuous and to constantly review success criteria using different approaches and interactions.

De Bakker et al. (2011) investigated the relationship between project risk management and IS/IT project success as perceived by project stakeholders using two enterprise resource planning system projects as case studies. Three levels of stakeholders (project management team, supplier and customer) were interviewed, each considered as having an influence on the project. Stakeholder satisfaction was also considered as the most important criterion for success followed by the delivery of the project's requirements.

Using Habermas' (1984; 1987) concept of instrumental and social action, this qualitative study revealed that risk management activities do lead to project success through communicative action as perceived by stakeholders and that the effect through instrumental action is minimal. However, the case study projects were not time sensitive as time was not considered as an important factor in the projects' delivery. With time playing an important role in projects, this study only offers resonance in a similar setting.

Mu et al. (2009) conducted an extensive study on 217 Chinese firms in an attempt to establish the relationship between risk management and the performance of New Product Development (NPD). They tested three main hypotheses on the most common risks associated with NPD's; Technological, Organisational and Marketing risks and how their effective management impacts on NPD performance. The study revealed that effective management of all three identified

risks positively impacted on the success of NPD and that a fourth hypothesis of all three identified risk management strategies complementing each other also provided a positive effect on NPD performance. As NPD leads to opportunities and organisational growth, this study also confirms that effective risk management does not only target threats but also creates opportunity.

Findings from a PhD study by Voetsch (2004) investigating the correlation between project risk management practices and project performance reveals a positive relationship between risk management and the three constraints of time, cost and quality. Although the study acknowledges the importance of stakeholder satisfaction as a success criterion, it did not really look at the effects of project stakeholders on success.

Kollveit et al. (2004), in investigating the importance of exploiting the opportunities in the project environment and not just looking at risk as threats, conducted four mini case studies assessing the risk management strategies of four different industry settings; construction, IT, shipbuilding and production. The study focused on the early project phase since, in their opinion, risk is highest and opportunities are identified at this stage. A key finding of this study is that, whilst external risks are more difficult to control than internal, effective risk management strategies positively affect the profit potential of a project whilst reducing the negative impacts on objectives. This study only focuses on the early phase of the project but, as earlier elucidated, risk occurs throughout the projects' life and opportunities can also occur by chance and consequently, focusing on only the early front phase might lead to missed opportunities and the invitation of different threats.

Notwithstanding the above arguments on the positive effects of project risk management on project success, a few studies have concluded that its effects are minimal.

A quantitative study by Ropponen and Lyytinen (2000) using self-reported data from 83 project managers and nearly 1100 projects concluded that, although project risk management does improve system development performance and that the environments within which projects are executed significantly impacts on the management of risks, specific risk management had little effect on specific risks. Zwikael and Globerson (2006) also concluded that risk management planning had a low impact on project success and that risk management planning only has a significant effect on project cost overrun according to their study involving 282 project managers. They therefore argued on the basis of their findings that risk management planning should be restricted to controlling cost instead of an overall project management technique. A qualitative study by Willumsen et al. (2019: 17) argues that instead of trying to establish “causation” and “statistically confirming the effects of risk management on project success”, which is often complex due to the different perceptions, interpretations and subjectivity of project success, experts should rather “embrace the complexity, ubiquity, impreciseness and contextual nature of the value creation of project risk management”

Other researchers such as Bannerman (2008) and Raz et al. (2002) argue that there is a huge gap between risk management literature and practice in projects and recommended the need for more empirical research on the practical application of project risk management. A meta-analysis by De Bakker et al. (2010) revealed that, although project risk management impacts positively on

project success, less is known about how project risk management is applied in projects and how this actually leads to project success. De Bakker et al. (2011) however attempted to address this gap through their major finding that communicative action leads to project success as perceived by project stakeholders. Whilst Reeves et al. (2013) and Kollveit et al. (2004) established the impact of external and internal risks on project performance, the former elucidates further on how risk identification affects project performance.

Results from empirical studies lead to the conclusion that effective risk management provides us with the requisite understanding, assessment, prioritising, monitoring and reviewing of the risks in the project environment and sometimes leads to project success. The review of the literature therefore confirms the correlation between risk management and project success. However, the practical application of risk management on projects and how this leads to project success is not conceptualised creating a gap between the risk management theory and practice. Whereas the APM (2014) and Krane et al. (2010) use a mixed method approach, nearly all the studies on the effects of risk management on project success reviewed, with the exception of De Bakker et al. (2011), Kutsch and Hall (2010) and Willumsen et al. (2019), use a quantitative approach. Only a few studies (Brière et al. 2015; Ofori 2013; Ika 2012; Yalegama et al. 2016) investigate development project success but not necessarily from a risk perspective.

However Ofori (2013), in assessing the project management practices commonly used by Ghanaian companies to ensure quality and success, mentioned risk management as part of the adequate contingency plans. The study, based on a survey of 156 project managers from different organisations in Ghana, did not

look at the effects of risk management on success. A follow up study (Ofori 2014) identified risk management as part of the respondent project managers' competencies but did not investigate the application of this competency for project success. Success factors identified by both Brière et al. (2015) and Yalegama et al. (2016) are not classified as risks, but are risk related.

Moreover, with the exception of APM (2014), Kollveit et al. (2004) and Mu et al. (2009), which clearly recognises the opportunities that accompany risk management, nearly all the studies reviewed deemed risk as a negative consequence or do not clearly identify the positive aspect of risk management. Consequently, there is a need for more qualitative research into the effects of project risk management on project success from a development project perspective and this forms the basis for this study.

The focus of investigation however, is on a land reform project which seeks to deliver unique services in a complex and dynamic environment where the majority of land is owned by an indigenous population who are used to customary tenure and ownership practices. As a result, the ownership structure and the manner in which the benefits to land are distributed can influence the type and nature of risks the project may face. These are discussed further in chapter 4.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the concepts of risk, risk management and investigated the correlation between risk management and project success. Relevant literature on project risk management has been reviewed in an attempt

to clarify and establish the research questions and to identify the links and gaps for this study. The literature reveals that risk management sometimes leads to project success and that more research is needed to ascertain this relationship particularly in the context of development projects. Moreover, an analysis of what really is a successful project revealed that stakeholders have a strong influence on success and that a successful project is one with a positive stakeholder view. Development project success also includes the success of the long-term goal of the project and its impact on society.

Some stakeholders also interact with each other to make their management quite complex. A critique of stakeholder influence therefore points to the need to clearly identify and define all stakeholders, including those that can affect or could be affected by the project and its outcome, their roles, objectives and expectations, to acknowledge their dynamics and to engage them in every stage of the project. The influence of stakeholders on success means they can affect and influence the risk management strategy used in the project. The literature does not address how differences in stakeholder objectives influence the effectiveness of risk management strategies. This study will attempt to address this gap.

A critique of the effectiveness of risk management on project outcomes pointed out that the most effective risk management practice focuses on addressing risk from a project specific perspective in order to deal properly with threats whilst simultaneously pursuing opportunity, particularly in the context of development projects due to their complex environments and wide array of stakeholders.

The gaps in the literature identified and analysed all pointed to the need to address the gap between the risk management theory and practice and to

establish the link between risk management and development project success. This therefore forms the basis of the central research question:

Does risk management practice contribute to project success?

Three sub-questions are formulated based on the literature review to help answer the main research question;

- What are the ways by which risk identification can contribute to risk management practice?
- Do differences in stakeholder objectives influence the effectiveness of risk management strategies?
- How effective are risk management strategies in enhancing project success?

This research seeks to build on these links and to investigate further the relationship between risk management and project success, from a development project perspective in an attempt to address the gaps identified in the literature.

The next chapter presents the research methodology used to answer the aforementioned research questions and to offer valuable conclusions for this study. It elucidates the philosophical underpinning that guides this research and justifies the adopted methodology. Fieldwork design and approach as well as ethical issues relating to the study are also discussed.

Chapter Three Methodology

3.1 Introduction

In an attempt to establish the parameters leading to answering the research question; **Does risk management practice contribute to project success?**, The relevant literature on risk, risk management, project stakeholders, risk management and their effects on project success were reviewed in the previous chapter. This enabled the researcher to identify the gaps in the literature and to clarify the research questions needed to investigate and to ascertain whether risk management practice can contribute to project success from a development project perspective.

This chapter presents the adopted research methodology used in the study. Guba and Lincoln (1994) assert research methodology as the approach with which the researcher arrives at what he believes can be known from the world. This approach, according to Creswell (2014), needs to clearly explain the steps taken in the study ranging from broad assumptions to specific details of data collection, data analysis as well as the interpretation strategy used. This study adopted a qualitative case study approach by investigating Ghana's LAP in its real life context in an attempt to address the gaps identified in the literature and to achieve the study's aim and objectives.

The chapter begins with a discussion on the philosophical assumptions for this study and justifies the suitability of the constructivist paradigm for the study. The adopted research strategy and its justification, the data collection and data

analysis techniques, ethical issues, the researcher's fieldwork experiences as well as the strengths and limitations of the adopted approach are also discussed.

3.2 Philosophical Position

Research philosophy, according to (Creswell 2012: 16), is the "abstract ideas and beliefs that inform our research". Risk identification, its effective management and its impact on project success are highly influenced by the perceptions of project team members and an analysis of the various stakeholder interactions and interpretations in relation to the project environment in which they try to make meaning. Consequently, the constructivist paradigm was deemed the most appropriate in answering the research questions for this study as well as the usage of semi-structured interviews as the main source of data collection.

To justify the constructivist approach to the study however, three basic defining questions need discussing: the ontological question, the epistemological question, and their linkage to the methodological question (Guba and Lincoln 1994). Ontology relates to the form and nature of knowledge and what can be known about it (Creswell 2012; Guba and Lincoln 1994). Ontology is the study of being and it is defined by the nature of the social world and what we are within it. Epistemology on the other hand "is a way of understanding and explaining how we know what we know" (Crotty 1998: 3). It is linked to the researcher's ontological position and determines the knowledge that is to be known and how adequate and legitimate such knowledge is, in relation to the researcher's ontological stance (Crotty 1998).

There are three main epistemological paradigms in which meaning is generated and understood; objectivism, subjectivism and constructionism. Objectivists are of the view that truth is real and independent of our human consciousness (Crotty 1998). The researcher in this sense is independent of the research and he or she "neither affects nor is affected by the subject being researched" (Saunders et al. 2003: 84). A purely objectivist view was deemed not to be appropriate for this study because investigations into the impacts of risk management practice on project success are not beyond the reach of project team members and stakeholders. An objectivist approach to the study would not have fully investigated the perceptions and interactions between the project's team members and its' stakeholders in relation to project activities. These perceptions and interactions, as discussed in chapter 2, are critical to project success.

At the other extreme is subjectivism, where meaning is imposed on the object by the researcher (Crotty 1998). Subjectivism is purely an interpretivist view of the world, where the object under study plays no role in how meaning is generated. Subjectivists therefore explore individual understandings and how they interpret and give meaning to social reality. They are of the notion that meaning is created out of nothing by the researcher. This is however debatable since meaning is deemed to be "created" out of the researcher's ideas, dreams and aspirations (Crotty 1998: 9).

A purely subjectivist view was also deemed not to be ideal for the study since it would not have fully investigated the role of the project's (object's) risks to its success. Although the project team member's perception (subjective) of risk has an influence on project success, the role of the project (object) in such success is also crucial.

Constructionism on the other hand posits that meaning is not created but "constructed by human beings as they engage with the world they are interpreting" (Crotty 1998: 43). Constructionists are of the view that meaning can neither be deemed simply as objective nor subjective but is constructed by individuals as they interact with the realities of the world (Crotty 1998). Constructionism therefore brings objectivism and subjectivism together as it recognises the importance of the value placed on the object by the subject.

Constructivism, which is built on constructionism, was adopted as the philosophical view suitable for this study. Constructivists are of the view that truth is dependent on people's cognitive perspectives, relative to the interactions with the realities of the world that they are interpreting (Crotty 1998). Risk management is dependent on the cognitive abilities of the people with whom the onus of risk identification and its subsequent management lies. Constructivism has similar attributes to social constructionism. However, constructivism is an individualistic understanding of the constructionist paradigm whereas social constructionism is a collective view of the constructionist paradigm (Crotty 1998).

An investigation as to whether risk management practice contributes to project success cannot be studied purely from an objectivist or a subjective perspective since it is dependent on the risk management strategy adopted by the project players, and how risk management is approached. These project players (subjects) therefore form the "constructs" and their activities and expertise (cognitive abilities) determine how risk is identified and managed in relation to the social world in which the project (object) exists, and this ultimately impacts on the success of the project. Consequently, the research questions for this study were best answered from a constructivist perspective.

3.3 Research Strategy and Approach

Research strategy is the path through which the research proceeds in order to answer the research questions effectively (Punch 2001). As a result, Saunders et al. (2009) opines that the choice of research strategy needs to be informed by the particular research questions posed in the study and how best they can be answered; the researchers' philosophical position; and how the objectives of the study would be achieved

This research adopted an exploratory approach to investigate and to better understand the relationship between risk management practice and project success from a development project perspective. Exploratory research is used to investigate a new phenomenon, or when little is known about a phenomenon. It is used to investigate "what is happening; to seek new insights; to ask questions and to assess phenomena in a new light" (Robson 2002: 59). Neuman (2014) argues further that exploratory research is used to formulate more precise questions for future research; to generate new ideas; to develop techniques for measuring and locating future data; and to determine the feasibility of a more extensive study. Consequently neither a descriptive approach which seeks to "draw a picture of a situation, person or event or show how things are related to each other" (Gray 2014: 36), nor an explanatory approach which seeks to ask "why" and "how" questions to determine the relationships between variables (Gray 2014; Saunders et al. 2009) were deemed to be appropriate for this study. This notwithstanding, the focus of the study was to seek new insights into the relationship between risk management practice and project success and although an exploratory approach was deemed the most appropriate in answering the research questions, some aspects of the analysis were both

descriptive and explanatory in an attempt to provide a more accurate description of the study and to investigate further the relationship between risk management and project success.

Additionally, due to the perspective seeking nature of the study to investigate and to better understand the relationship between risk management and project success from a development project perspective, hypothesis were not derived from theoretical models and tested against empirical evidence to identify causality (Bryman 2016). However, this study was approached inductively using empirical evidence from Ghana's LAP. The study then progressed towards more abstract concepts and theoretical relationships (Nueman 2014) between the application of risk management on the Ghana LAP, stakeholder contributions and interactions, and their effects on project success. Inductive approaches to research are more particular with the context with which the research is conducted and the researcher using such an approach develops theoretical understanding only during and after collecting empirical evidence.

A common critique of this approach is that results from inductive studies are not expected to be generalised as they are context specific (Saunders et al. 2009) but can offer resonance in similar settings as is the case in this study. On the contrary, results from deductive studies are expected to be generalised (Saunders et al. 2009).

Gray (2014: 17) however asserts that it is possible to construct generalisations, relationships and even theories from inductive studies through the analysis of data to investigate patterns that depict relationships between variables. Inductive studies are more flexible than deductive approaches and the researcher is mostly

part of the research process (Saunders et al. 2009). The researcher in a deductive study however, is independent of those observed but this was not the focus of this study due to the study's perspective seeking nature which necessitated the usage of semi-structured interviews as the main source of data collection.

3.3.1 Methodological Approach

Researchers such as Bryman (2016) and Creswell (2014) argue that the consideration of the type of research strategy ideal for a study as either quantitative, qualitative or a combination of both (mixed methods) is dependent on a variety of factors such as the philosophical stance of the researcher, the type of research questions posed, the relationship between theory and research in the study; whether theory guides research (deductive approach), or whether theory is an outcome of research (inductive approach), and how these factors relate to each other. In line with the inductive and exploratory approaches to the study as earlier discussed and the study's focus on a detailed investigation into the impacts of risk management practice on development project success, a qualitative approach was deemed the most appropriate in answering the research questions.

Qualitative research is a "naturalistic approach that seeks to understand phenomena within their own context-specific settings" (Gray 2014: 160) and seeks to build social relations by placing particular emphasis on how individuals understand and interpret the social world in which they live (Flick 2014). Qualitative research generally follows the constructionist or subjectivist

epistemological paradigm and seeks to answer broader questions through interactions between the inquirer and the phenomenon and mostly provides value laden answers (Guba and Lincoln 1994), as is the case in this study.

Qualitative studies seek to give meaning and value to social phenomena which are constantly changing, making the relationship between the researcher and the researched very crucial (Denzin and Lincoln 1998). As a result, the adopted interpretation strategy can considerably impact on the presentation of findings. Results from qualitative research are not generalised but are dependable and trustworthy within the study's context.

On the contrary, quantitative research emphasizes quantification and the testing of objective theories by examining causal relationships between variables (Creswell 2014), but this was not the focus of this study. As risk management is about the perceptions and cognitive abilities of project team members and their interactions with stakeholders and interpretations of complex project environments, a quantitative approach would not have answered the research questions effectively. The researcher in a quantitative study generates and test hypotheses from distinct variables that lead to answering the research question(s) using mostly surveys or experiments and statistical analysis (Bryman 2016). Data collection approaches under the quantitative strategy are highly structured and the findings can be generalised and replicated (Creswell 2014).

A mixed method approach was also deemed not to be suitable for the study because it would not have fully investigated the perceptions and interactions between the project team members and stakeholders in relation to the project's risk management practice and stakeholder contributions. Mixed methods involve

collecting, analysing and integrating both quantitative and qualitative data within a single project (Creswell 2014). They are useful in instances where they provide better opportunities in answering research questions (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003) but this was not ideal due to the interactions involved in project risk management. Bryman (2016) argues that, although they can be useful, there can be contradictions between the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of the study.

This research sought to gain a deep, intense and holistic overview of the impacts of risk management practice on development project success and involved investigating the interactions between the LAP's stakeholders and project team members. This continuous interactions and interpretations of stakeholder perceptions of risks, risk management and project success, coupled with the type of research questions posed, the study's inductive approach and the non-generalisation of the findings, means the qualitative strategy was deemed the most appropriate for the study.

Moreover, due to the fact that the majority of the risk management studies in the literature were approached quantitatively, the qualitative strategy was deemed appropriate to supplement these studies and to address the gaps in the literature and to further explore new insights into development project risk management.

3.3.1.1 Qualitative Case Study

Within the adopted qualitative approach, this study followed a case study design with Ghana's LAP chosen as the focus of investigation. Baxter and Jack (2008)

argue that qualitative case studies are best suited where intensive data collection from a variety of sources are applied by the researcher to answer the research questions as was the case in this study.

Case studies can either be designed as single or multiple, depending on how the phenomenon under study can be understood (Baxter and Jack 2008; Yin 2014). A single case study (embedded design) approach was adopted due to the fact that it led to an in-depth understanding of the project's risks, risk management strategies and its effects on the project's success. Semi-structured interviews from the various implementation agencies and MLNR were the main units of analysis. These were then supplemented by interviews with various TAs, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and proposed beneficiaries such as leaseholders and farmers and an analysis of project documents as well as the researcher's observations of the project environment to present an in-depth understanding of the case study project. These sub-units (embedded units) were explored and converged comprehensively in a triangulation fashion during data analysis to provide a greater understanding of the project's risk management strategies and its effects on the project's success to ensure that the findings are more accurate and compelling (Yin 2003).

Yin (2014) elucidates further that case studies are suitable in studies where the researcher has little or no control over behavioural events, the focus of study is an in-depth enquiry into a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, or when the research seeks to answer "how" or "why" questions. All three conditions stated above relate to this study. The central research question establishes the relationship between risk management and project success in a real life project with multiple stakeholders over whom the researcher had no

control in relation to their decisions, project objectives and perceptions of success.

Notwithstanding the benefits of case studies in providing in-depth understanding of the complexities of cases under study and illuminating the possibility of its application in similar settings, a common critique of the case study approach is that it cannot be generalised beyond the case to represent a population (Yin 2014). This critique however, is generally affiliated to qualitative research as a whole. The case study project was strategically selected Flyvbjerg (2006) to reveal more information about the impacts of risk management practice on development project success. Maoz (2002) criticize the qualitative case study approach on the basis that it lacks methodological rigour and that some case study researchers do not follow systematic procedures. Irrespective of the flexibility offered by the qualitative case study approach, this critique is however arguably unfair since research in general needs to follow methodological guidelines in order to fully investigate a phenomenon successfully. This study however, offers resonance and could be applied to expand the risk management theory and practice and offer policy directions in similar settings because the case was strategically selected to reveal more information through the activation of more actors (Flyvbjerg 2006) in Ghana's land management and administrative system.

3.4 Fieldwork Design

Having previously worked with the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL) between 1999 and 2001, the researcher is quite conversant with Ghana's

land management and administrative system. With knowledge of the complexities of land administration and management in Ghana, the researcher developed an interest in LAP and followed the project's implementation from its inception in 2003 as it sought to address the problems of land administration and management in Ghana as highlighted by the NLP in 1999. This interest developed into assessing the possibilities of the LAP's success within its complex environment. This then led to looking into the risks to project outcome and how an effective management of those risks might influence its success, hence this PhD research project.

On deciding to use LAP as a case study, the researcher wrote to the Project Coordinating Unit (PCU) on 22nd September 2014, to formally request to use the project as a PhD case study. This request was granted on the 24th of October 2014. Two resource persons from the PCU were assigned to help with access to non-classified data to enable the researcher access the necessary project information as and when they became available which according to Yin (2014), is very critical to the success of case study research.

The researcher undertook a personal field trip to Ghana throughout June to mid July 2017. The purpose was to obtain first-hand information from the project's stakeholders and implementation team, to investigate the types of risk they identified, how they were identified and the events they encountered during project implementation. The researcher also enquired from the project team members their adopted risk management strategies and the opportunities that came with those strategies if any, and whether risk management actually had an influence on the project's success. The field trip also gave the researcher an opportunity to interact with the various stakeholders of the project, including some

of the proposed beneficiaries and to visit some of the project's outputs and establishments to analyse the situation as compared to the before project situation.

3.4.1 Entry Point

Before embarking on the field trip, the researcher sent a letter to the PCU to inform them of the intended fieldwork. Previous colleagues of the researcher who were still working at the Lands Commission (LC), OASL and the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources (MLNR) were also informed. This was to ensure that the necessary bureaucratic arrangements and procedures were followed in line with access to the necessary information required for the successful completion of the study. The LAP's PCU under the MLNR was the first point of contact as they had the overall responsibility of the project's implementation, in collaboration with the implementation agencies.

On arriving at the PCU on Monday the 5th of June 2017, the researcher was informed that the WB had sent a delegation from Washington to conduct a joint Implementation Support Mission (ISM) with the GoG to review and discuss overall progress of the project from 5th to 9th of June, 2017. An invitation was handed to the researcher to join the team in all their sessions. The ISM was attended by representatives of the various implementation agencies many of whom were prospective interviewees for this study. This gave the researcher the opportunity to interact with them and to pilot the interview questions and restructure them in line with the aim and objectives of the study.

3.4.2 Purposive Sampling

To achieve the study's objectives, a purposive sampling approach was used to select participants to collect data for this study. According to Bryman (2016: 408), purposive sampling is a strategic sampling procedure where participants or sample cases are chosen dependent on their relevance to answering the research question(s). Key participants were strategically selected from the PCU; officials of the MLNR; project specialists from the WB implementation support team; officials of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA); officials of the LC, OASL, Town and Country Planning Division (TCPD); TAs and/or coordinators of the Customary Land Secretariats (CLSs); Judiciary; CSOs; individual landowners and leaseholders; farmers and staff of the various implementation agencies who have had various encounters with the case study project (see table 3.1).

All the participants had varying degrees of experience with the project or with Ghana's land management and administration system. The technical director of the MLNR actually designed the project concept document in 2000. A director of one of the CSOs was a Deputy Minister of Lands in 1999 and was part of the team that designed the NLP in 1999, whereas a land specialist with the WB team is affiliated with the design of land management projects for the WB in Africa and had worked as part of LAP's WB task team since the project's inception.

The farmers interviewed were proposed beneficiaries of the Rural Parcel Rights Demarcation (RPRD) exercise, whereas the leaseholders and the other landowners were a mixture of people with varying degrees of experience with Ghana's land titling and registration system.

3.4.3 Interviews

In all, a total of 43 interviews were conducted (semi-structured and informal), although 50 semi-structured interviews were initially planned. While the participants represented people from diverse backgrounds, age and gender (33 males and 10 females), as already mentioned, the purposive sampling approach used was based on their various experiences with the project and/or with Ghana's land management and administration system and not selected based on their age or gender.

The researcher initially planned to undertake 3 focus group discussions with some of the proposed beneficiaries to discuss their objectives and expectations of the project and to analyse their different perceptions of the project's success. The researcher identified 2 groups of 5 participants each at Afoako Patase with the assistance of the Secretary to the Adankragya CLS on the 29th of June 2017 and personally handed them information sheets and consent forms and explained the aim of the research project and interview process as elucidated on the information sheet to them in line with ethical procedures (Flick 2014). However, only half of them turned up on the day of the focus group discussions (30th June 2017). Out of the 5, 3 informed the researcher immediately that they will not participate in a group discussion but would not disclose their reasons for this. Further investigations from the Secretary to the CLS revealed historic land encroachment and litigations from amongst themselves as the reason for their withdrawal. After further deliberations, the researcher realised that they do not share the same sentiments and experience (Morgan 1998). Consequently, the focus group discussions were converted into one-to-one informal conversational

interviews (Gray 2014) since, under the circumstances, a one-to-one interview was considered the best approach to answer the research questions.

Additionally, the researcher noticed that the farmers and some leaseholders found the informal conversational interviews more relaxed and freer to interact which allowed them to engage with the topic under discussion and to express their feelings more openly and freely (Ruane 2016). An approach which was very beneficial to the quality of data collected with regards to their views and expectations of the case study project. A summary of the key participants is shown in Table 3.1 below;

Table 3.1 Interview Participants

Respondents	**Type of Interview** Semi-structured Informal		**Position**
MLNR (Accra)	2		Technical Director Lands Officer
LAP PCU (Accra)	2		Project Coordinator Head of HR
Judiciary (Accra)	1		Project Officer
LC (Accra)	2		Head of Policy and Research Team Leader at CSAU
LC (Kumasi)	1		Team Leader at CSAU
OASL (Accra)	2		Technical Director Assistant Stool Lands Officer
OASL (Kumasi)	2		Regional Head Assistant Stool Lands Officer
OASL (CapeCoast)		1	Regional Head
LVD (Kumasi)	1		Regional Head
TCPD (Accra)	1		Head of Operations
TCPD (Kumasi)	1		Team Leader
AMA		2	Mayor Coordinating Director
ACLP	1		Technical Coordinator
WB Task Team	1	2	Team Leader and Two Land Specialists
TAs Adankragya	2		Supreme Traditional Leader

Bekwai Manhyia (Kumasi) Kwabenya Ejisu	1 1 1	1	Secretary to CLS Sub-chief Spokesperson Sub-chief Secretary to CLS
Civil Society	2		Project Manager for CICOL Director, Land for Life
Building Contractor		1	
Landowners, Leaseholders and Farmers Accra Kumasi Afoako Patasi	 2 1	 4 5	
Total = 43			

Source: Fieldwork Data

The choice of semi-structured interviews adopted in the study was to ensure that participants were able to express their feelings about the project activities freely and also to help probe new areas that arose in the course of the interview (Flick 2014). This flexibility led to more depth and detailed illustrations of participants' experiences and perceptions of LAP. Interview guides for the various interviews were designed (See Appendix E), based on answering the study's research questions and achieving study objectives. However, during the course of the

interviews, some participants started sharing their own personal problems with access and expectations of project resources. In areas where such eventualities occurred, the researcher took note of their concerns to build good rapport with the participants but tried as much as possible not to deviate from the main aim of the data collection exercise by reverting to the initial questions asked to ensure the necessary data was collected in line with the study's aim and objectives.

To ensure that participants were asked questions that related to their contributions to, and expectations of the project to ensure robustness and representativeness, there were different interview guides for different groups of participants. However, the same guide was used for the implementation agencies such as the Land Sector Agencies (LSAs) and the Judiciary as they performed similar roles in the project. This enabled the researcher to identify areas where their roles overlapped or where there were conflicts of interest.

The interviews were grouped into general project questions such as the project activities they were involved in, project risk and risk management strategies, project stakeholders and project success. The interviews took between forty-five minutes to one hour, with the longest lasting ninety minutes. Prior to the start of the interviews, the researcher explained the project's main aim and objectives to the participants. The researcher also explained what he meant by project risks (including opportunities) and any technical terms to the participants before asking for their views to reduce biases. This was to ensure that the collected data were in line with the study's objectives to reduce biases, although there were instances where the conversation led to highlighting other issues in Ghana's land management and administration system which were not initially part of the study's focus.

The researcher assured the participants that the study was for academic purposes and the main aim was investigating the impacts of risk management practice on development project success. Some policy makers were highly interested in the study and were willing to participate and to offer their support. This was mainly due to the fact that, at the time of the fieldwork exercise, not only had the project delayed, it was also considering into entering a third phase. With lack of research in development project risk management, the policy implications of the study's findings may contribute to the success of similar projects in the future.

All the informal interviews were conversational in nature and were not initially recorded since the researcher noticed that some participants were less open and less freer to interact (Ruane 2016) on seeing a digital recorder and the formality of following set questions in a normal semi-structured interview. The researcher however, having drafted his interview questions to align with his research questions and objectives, and having conducted some initial semi-structured interviews, was able to conduct these informal conversational interviews without formally using an interview guide to make the conversations more interesting and meaningful. Although steps were taken to ensure all relevant questions were asked, the questions did not follow chronologically as designed in the interview guides but the approach was robust with regards to the quality of data collected as it represented their views and expectations of the project in a more relaxed manner. Although the researcher initially took notes in the informal interviews, nearly all the participants (with the exception of the property developer and two leaseholders), having felt comfortable and relaxed and confident that this was

purely an academic exercise, allowed the researcher to record the interviews halfway through to quicken up the process.

All but one of the semi-structured interviews was audiotaped. The researcher therefore took notes instead, in line with ethical procedures but a follow up interview was arranged with the LC official who refused to be audiotaped to fill the gaps identified. Apart from the chiefs of Adankragya and Bekwai, as well as the farmers and two leaseholders, all the interviews were conducted in English. Customarily, chiefs in Ghana prefer speaking in the native language although some are very conversant with the English language. Conducting some of the interviews in the Ghanaian local language gave participants the flexibility of expressing themselves freely in a language they are comfortable with (Laws et al. 2003). The researcher also speaks and understands the Ghanaian local language in detail so this even made the conversations more interesting and friendly.

3.4.4 Observations

As part of the study's data collection exercise, the researcher overtly observed a full weeks ISM which involved a wider variety of the project's stakeholders including; heads and representatives of the various implementation agencies, TAs, WB and land policy officials in Ghana. In addition, the researcher also spent time observing the activities of the Client Service Access Units (CSAUs) in Accra and Kumasi as well as the Kwabenya, Bekwai, Ejisu, Manyhia and Adankragya CLSs. The observations were mainly non-participant observations, as the researcher was mainly "an outsider watching and taking field notes" of the various

meetings and activities (Creswell 2012: 167). This enabled the researcher to have a clearer understanding of the interactions between the project implementation team and policy officials and to ask them questions that were in line with the research questions, taking valuable field notes in the process. According to Gray (2014), field notes are essential and contribute quite significantly to the success of fieldwork.

Additionally, the observations at the CSAUs and CLSs were mainly to assess and to analyse some of the project's main outputs and to interact with leaseholders, farmers, visitors and staff. This enabled the researcher to analyse the success of those outputs and to interact with some of the leaseholders who had come to register various interests in land. As some of these leaseholders also had experiences with the before project situation, it gave the researcher an opportunity to inquire from them about the success and/or the acceptability of the new system from the leaseholder perspective.

The researcher also had the opportunity to observe a very important stakeholder meeting between the contractors of the then delayed Kumasi integrated LSA building at the time, officials of the PCU and the various implementation agencies on the 28th of June, 2017. This was one of the main outstanding activities that had caused the delay of the project at the time and offered the researcher the opportunity of interviewing the contractor afterwards to discuss the cause of delay from the contractor's perspective.

During the various observations undertaken by the researcher, particular attention was given to participants' actions and reaction to some of the discussions particularly that of implementation agency staff and how they were

responding to client needs. Comparing these reactions to the pre-project situation enabled the researcher to assess and to analyse whether there have been improvements in such areas. As the case study approach is an in-depth study, data from the observations were used to complement the interview data during data analysis (Yin 2003) and were very valuable in answering the research questions.

Moreover, during the observations, the researcher also had informal discussions with some proposed beneficiaries. These discussions paved the way for the conduction of some informal interviews on realising that people were a lot more open informally than formally (Ruane 2016) in order not to break ethical rules. The informal interviews provided valuable information which would have otherwise been difficult to obtain in a normal semi-structured interview.

3.4.5 Project Documents

Archival records and project documents from the various implementation agencies and government departments were used to corroborate and augment data collected from the fieldwork exercise. The documents used in this study range from Ghana's NLP of 1999, which highlighted the problems in Ghana's land administration and management and hence the need for LAP, the project implementation plans, through to the Project Appraisal Documents (PADs) of LAP-1 and LAP-2. In addition, the various Project Implementation Manuals (PIMs), ISM reports, project progress reports, WB project documents, MLNR policy documents and reports, implementation agency manuals and reports *inter alia* were consulted as well as expert papers and publications on LAP and

Ghana's land management and administrative system to reduce biases and to ensure rigour (Gray 2014).

These documents highlighted some of the risks and risk management strategies adopted in the project's implementation. It also detailed the project's implementation strategy and served as useful guides in identifying the various areas and questions that needed to be asked in relation to answering the study's research questions. This confirms Yin (2014)'s assertion that thoroughly reviewing documentary evidence is crucial in case study research as they play an explicit role in obtaining the necessary data for the successful completion of case studies. In assessing all these documents however, the researcher was fully aware that they were written for a specific audience to achieve specific objectives other than this research (Yin 2014: 108), and therefore did not rely on them, to reduce biases, but only used them to augment and to corroborate the data collected during the fieldwork exercise.

3.5 Data Analysis

According to Gray (2014: 607), data analysis enables the researcher to "break down the data into constituent parts" and make "connections between the developed concepts". The collected data therefore need to be prepared and organised before analysing them (Flick 2014: 371). The data analysis technique used in the study involved, preparing and organising the collected data around the research questions and study objectives, reducing the data into themes, and then linking the developed themes with the literature to provide answers to the research questions and to offer valuable conclusions for the study. Although there

are different forms of qualitative data analysis techniques due to the flexibility of qualitative research in general, Creswell (2012) argues that qualitative researchers normally follow this generic process.

All the interviews were transcribed by the researcher through listening and typing to obtain a full record of the interview and line coded, highlighting key areas and links to the research questions in the process. The researcher had initially planned to use voice to text software to transcribe the interviews but later realised that due to the detailed one-to-one interviews collected interactively (Nowell et al. 2017), observations and document analysis involved, personally listening and transcribing the interviews without using computer software will provide more insights into the study while also contributing to data triangulation (Yin 2014) and to ensure rigour (Gray 2014) by providing an accurate representation of the study's findings. This process was however cumbersome, but research in itself is a cumbersome process and with determination, this task was successfully achieved.

Data analysis was done thematically, using a qualitative narrative approach based on the substance of the collected data and the various documents and notes from my fieldwork observations. Braun and Clarke (2006) argue that thematic analysis involves identifying and analysing patterns within the data in relation to the research questions. The various themes emerged through searching across the data set to find repeated patterns of meaning that were linked to the study's research questions (Braun and Clarke 2006) and categorised based on the particular research questions they were linked to, using the line coding technique adopted at transcription as reference points to the raw data involved. As a result, the data was analysed inductively (Braun and Clarke 2006)

as the themes are strongly linked to the data itself. This is also to ensure rigour in the findings (Gray 2014). In addition to the themes developed from the interviews, field observations and project documents were consulted in areas where they provided further depth (Yin 2014) and explanations into the themes.

Thematic analysis focuses on the substance of what is said rather than on the discourse and as such was deemed the most appropriate analysis technique due to the study's inductive nature and the subjectivity of risk management, and to reduce biases. Consequently, content analysis, which deals with patterns of words used, their frequency and discourses (Vaismoradi et al. 2013), was not appropriate for this study as it is more deductive in nature (Gray 2014).

3.6 Ethical Issues

Qualitative research occurs in natural settings and involves interactions with people. Due to these interactions, the interests of people prepared to participate in the research and the interests of vulnerable groups who may also be affected by the study in one way or another need to be protected. Bryman (2016: 121) elucidates that research ethics need to revolve around two main issues;

- How we treat the people on whom we conduct research.
- Identify the type of activities which we as researchers should or should not engage; in our relations with the people on whom we conduct research.

Consequently, there are specific codes of ethics that regulate social research. Prominent among these are the need for informed consent, voluntary

participation, anonymity and responsible dissemination of collected material (Bryman 2016; Flick 2014: 50).

In line with the University of Bradford's ethics policy, the researcher applied for ethical clearance which was granted by the Chair of the Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel at the University of Bradford on 28th of March, 2017. An information sheet elucidating the research project and interview process was personally given and explained to participants by the researcher and their right of withdrawal, freedom of participation and anonymity explained to them prior to the beginning of the interviews in line with ethical procedures in social research (Flick 2014). In addition, the researcher made it categorically clear to all participants that the purpose of the study is purely academic and every piece of information provided will be used only for the purposes of this study. Once participants agreed to partake, they were given a consent form to sign and were informed that they can still withdraw even after agreeing to partake. Moreover, as this research is about participants' involvements, experiences and/or interactions with the LAP or Ghana's land management and administration system, allowing participants to consent to partake on their own accord was not only ethically right but also improved data quality.

During the interviews, the researcher explained and assured participants of their anonymity, in line with the moral principles of research (Gray 2014: 68), and ensured previous interviews were not discussed with subsequent participants. Some participants (particularly those at the MLNR, PCU and some LSA staff), were not concerned about anonymity. Out of curiosity however, some were asked about why they were less concerned about anonymity as it is a requirement for social research and their answers were unanimously based on the fact that LAP

was designed to “right the wrongs” in Ghana’s land management and administration so a study focusing on the projects’ risk and risk management strategies and its contribution to its success should rather be promoted.

The study did not involve interviewing any young people and did not appear to have caused any physical and/or psychological harm/distress to any of the participants although the researcher had made provisions for that due to the fact that there was a possibility of interviewing participants with negative experiences of the before project situation to have been reminded of their predicaments. Under such circumstances, the researcher planned to suspend the interviews and to offer and respect their right of withdrawal. However, all the participants were happy to share their experiences and perceptions of the project freely. All observations and informal discussions were overtly done to ensure that the people who were being observed were completely aware about the researcher’s presence and purpose in order not to invade their privacy. Permission was also sought from the project coordinator before attending any of their meetings whereas the various heads of department granted permission for the researcher to observe some departmental meetings and activities at CSAUs.

All the collected data and recorded materials were stored with password protection in line with data protection and anonymity guidelines as explained to the participants in the information sheet.

3.7 The Researcher's Fieldwork Experience

The field trip started on a very positive note. Having been invited to partake in the ISM meetings during the first week of the fieldwork exercise, gave the researcher access to the prospective respondents' right from the beginning. According to Saunders et al. (2009), successfully conducting a study is dependent on the researcher's ability to gain access to an appropriate source. All the departments and agencies involved in land administration and management in Ghana ranging from the Ministry level to the grassroots, and representatives from all the various implementation agencies as well as the donors attended the ISM.

Participating in the ISM gave the researcher an opportunity to obtain first-hand information about the project implementation strategies and progress as at the time, the types of risk and risk management strategies adopted by the various implementation agencies and the types of project activities the respective agencies were involved in. The *aide memoire* that was given to all the participants at the end of the ISM had all the names, email addresses and phone numbers of all the participants printed at the back and with their permission, the researcher was allowed to follow up with any questions that needed answering and to arrange further meetings and interviews with them.

On joining the team on Monday the 5th of June at the MLNR, the project coordinator himself was presenting a paper on "LAP's accomplishments, impacts of its interventions and the way forward". The researcher spoke to him personally after his presentation and gave him a copy of his fieldwork introductory letter (Appendix A). The coordinator was enthused since more research is needed to assess the impacts of the project on Ghana's land management and

administration system and gave a copy of his presentation to the researcher. He then arranged for the researcher to speak to a member of the WB task team who himself is a land management specialist with extensive knowledge in African land management projects. This gentleman was more than happy to provide the researcher with the necessary information, from the donor's perspective to ensure the successful completion of the study. The ISM also offered the opportunity for the researcher to personally meet the new MCE of Accra and Metropolitan Coordinating Director to discuss the aspects of the project that the AMA were involved in, an access which would have otherwise been difficult to arrange.

As part of activities in the first week, the researcher also accompanied the team to the Kwabenya CLS where he had the opportunity of meeting the chiefs and people of Kwabenya and enquiring from the indigenous owners themselves about the activities of the CLS and other issues pertaining to land management and administration in the area. The TA in Kwabenya has made impressive advances in their customary land governance with the support of LAP. The researcher had a discussion with two WB experts and took valuable notes about their views of LAP from a donor perspective as he had the opportunity of sharing a car with them either way to Kwabenya. Every single opportunity gained during the first week was used to speak to majority of the participants both formally and informally as it was impossible to arrange interviews with some of them after the first week, particularly the WB team who were leaving for Washington after the ISM. One of them granted the researcher an hour-long interview at his hotel, providing valuable data which would otherwise have been difficult to obtain.

The second week was used to follow up with arranged interviews which were very successful. Moreover, due to the researcher's previous working relations with colleagues at the OASL, gaining access to the heads of department was not difficult. These personal links were however used to contribute positively to the research rather than being detrimental (Creswell 2014), by only using it to gain access and not to bias the data.

Just when everything was moving on smoothly, a terrible experience occurred on Friday the 16th of June 2017 which nearly brought all these efforts and progress on this research to an abrupt end. On the way home after a very successful day on the field, the researcher was attacked by four masked armed men and personal belongings including his laptop, phones and valuable field notes were stolen. Traumatised by this experience, the researcher initially decided to abandon the study. However, with encouragements from colleagues, friends and family, he persevered and even contacted people that had already been interviewed for follow up interviews.

The researcher also had to visit some of the remotest parts of the country to find some of the project's proposed beneficiaries, CLSs and diverse stakeholders to interview them about their experiences with the project. Chieftaincy in Ghana is a very powerful institution and gaining access to an *Omanhene* (supreme traditional leader) and to the *Asantehene's* (King of the Ashanti kingdom) palace on matters pertaining to land is difficult. Colleagues working at the LC and OASL were very helpful as they contacted the chiefs directly on the researcher's behalf which means he did not have to go through the traditional norms to gain access. Despite all these challenges and experiences, with perseverance and a clear focus, the fieldwork was successfully completed.

3.8 Strengths and Limitations

A key strength of this study is the variety of qualitative data gathered mainly through semi-structured interviews and interactions with project team members, policy makers, implementation agencies, donors, farmers, TAs, CSOs, and leaseholders. The employment of multi-data sources allowed for data triangulation to improve the reliability of the data (Yin 2003) to reduce biases and to ensure greater confidence in the findings (Bryman 2016) and helped to provide an in-depth understanding into the risks the project faced and how they were identified, the corresponding strategies designed to respond to these risks and its' impact on the project's success. While the investigation into the case study project through a variety of lenses allowed for multiple facets of the study to be revealed and understood (Baxter and Jack 2008) and contributed positively to the research findings and contributions, there are also some limitations to the study which need to be acknowledged accordingly to clarify the applicability of the research findings.

The scope of the study was limited to one development project environment. Besides, projects are dynamic and the management of project related risks are subjective to the approach used by the project's team members. This, in itself, can affect the extent to which risk management can contribute to project success in specific project situations. Additionally, the success of the case study project was mainly derived from analysing the perspectives from which success was assessed by the various stakeholders. While this provided an opportunity to discuss success from different perspectives, their assessments of success may reflect their subjective views and expectations of the project, some of which may be biased towards their individual needs and may not reflect the realities of the

projects' achievements. While attempts were made to address this limitation by interviewing different stakeholder groups as well as corroborating the data with key project documents to engage more actors (Flyvbjerg 2006) to reduce biases, these are also to an extent, subject to the views of the experts who documented and interpreted them.

The qualitative approach to the study and the usage of a single case study to present the findings, although appropriate, means generalisability is not sought from the study's findings (Yin 2014) but can offer resonance in a similar setting. This notwithstanding, the case study project had embedded units (Baxter and Jack 2008) with several project activities covering a greater part of Ghana and could be argued as extensive since it activated more actors with different views and experiences in the project environment. However, the inductive approach to the study means the findings and conclusions are context specific (Saunders et al. 2009) and as such generalisability is not recommended.

Time was also a limiting factor. The research data was collected in June and July 2017. However, this limitation was partly mitigated since the researcher timed the data collection exercise to coincide with one of the donor support missions which brought together all the various implementation agencies, policy officials and donors who were all prospective interviewees to which the researcher had the opportunity to interact. The researcher personally listened to the recorded interviews and transcribed the data without using computer software to ensure the data is as accurate as possible to improve reliability (Silverman 2004) and even rang some interviewees, who were happy to be contacted for clarification, to cross check with them but acknowledge that some information might have been lost in translation particularly where the interviews were not conducted in

English or the interviewee refused to be audiotaped. Additionally, the researcher's previous employment at the OASL and understanding of the complexities of Ghana's land management and administration system means some aspects of the interpretation may be biased to reflect the researchers' views.

3.9 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the approach used to answer the research questions and to achieve the study's aim and objectives. This study followed a perspective seeking approach to investigate the impacts of risk management on development project success. As an in-depth exploratory study into the Ghana LAP in its real-life context, the qualitative case study approach was deemed the most appropriate as it led to understanding the complexities of the project's risks, risk management strategies and its effects on success. It also led to addressing the gaps identified in the literature and the study's quest to provide new insights into development project risk management since the majority of project risk management studies use a quantitative approach. The adoption of the constructivist paradigm as the philosophical underpinning guiding this study, led to an in-depth understanding of the cognitive perspectives of the project's team members and its' stakeholders in relation to the project's risk management approach. In effect, it contributed to understanding why they did what they did.

This notwithstanding, critics of the case study approach argue that it cannot be generalised beyond the case. However, this study was strategically selected to engage more actors in Ghana's land management and administration system.

Although generalisation is not recommended from the findings, the strategic selection of the study and the complexities of Ghana's land management and administrative system means the recommendations and policy directions can offer resonance in similar settings and contribute strategically to the risk management theory and practice.

The next chapter discusses land issues and land ownership structure in Ghana and its influence on Ghana's developmental efforts. It also gives a general overview of the case study project, LAP and discusses the various stakeholders, their objectives and expectations of the project.

Chapter Four Development Policy in Ghana: Land Issues and Land Ownership

4.1 Introduction

Land serves as the main source of income and the most productive asset for the majority of the world's poor (Lipton 2009), and Ghana is not an exception to this. Ghana's economy, over the years, has been over-reliant on Agriculture and Mining both of which are dependent on land. Consequently, access and security to land and land use are seen as a development issue in Ghana (Bugri 2012).

Reforming land, interventions that alter existing land ownership patterns and control as well as enhance the legal and contractual forms of land tenure to create a more equitable access to land, provides the opportunity for sustaining and improving the livelihoods of the many Ghanaians whose livelihoods depend on land and the benefits accruing on land. This view is supported by researchers such as Lipton and Saghai (2016) and De Soto (2000) who argue that releasing the latent value of land through such reforms promote investments in land which can ultimately lead to poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods.

This chapter discusses land issues and land ownership structure in Ghana and its influence on Ghana's developmental efforts. The wider debate on land reform and its impacts on development as well as risks with the potential to influence attempts to successfully reform Ghana's land sector are also discussed. The chapter further introduces the case study project, LAP as Ghana's approach to

land reform and discusses the project's stakeholders and their respective objectives and expectations of the project.

4.2 Land Reform and Development

Issues of ownership and rights of use over land have been central for the development of several countries throughout history and continue to be dominant in the development issues of many countries today (Bowyer-Bower and Stoneman 2000: 1; Manji 2006). It has been claimed that, of the three basic factors of production (land, labour and capital), land is the least well understood (Dixon-Gough 1999: 1).

According to Ellis (1992), land ownership in most countries is unequally distributed. This inequality, coupled with restrictions on land availability, pressure from population growth and the need for livelihood sustainability have resulted in many countries embarking on land reform policies to correct historical distortions in land ownership (Azadi et al. 2020) and to make access and security to land more readily available for development.

There have been several approaches to land reform which remains a subject of debate. The first approach describes land reform as the redistribution of land to create equity, thereby making access to land readily available to the landless and poor (Bowyer-Bower and Stoneman 2000; Boyce et al. 2005; Deininger et al. 2004; Ntsebeza and Hall 2007; WB 1975).

WB (1975: 5) define land reform as "interventions in the prevailing pattern of land ownership, control and usage of land in order to change the structure of land

holdings, improve land productivity, and broaden the distribution of benefits accruing on land". Boyce et al. (2005) asserts land reform as the redistribution of land from wealthy land owners who use hired labour to poor farmers who uses their own family labour, whereas Deininger et al. (2004) asserts land reform as the more equal distribution of land to reduce poverty sustainably. This approach argues that inequality in land ownership creates disparity in people's standard of living since many people, particularly in less developed countries, depend on land directly or indirectly for their livelihoods.

The second approach describes land reform as the consolidation of legal and contractual forms of land tenure, property rights, land titling and registration, and the formalization of customary tenure to ensure security of ownership of land rights and security of tenure to land (FAO 2003; Manji 2006; Rosset 2001). This approach views land reform as the establishment of legal mechanisms, governed and regulated by legal and administrative frameworks to improve access to land (Payne and Durand-Lasserve 2012; Rosset 2001).

A third approach however asserts land reform as a combination of the first two approaches. They argue that land reform is a redistributive entity that creates equity and flexibility in access to land as well as the security of title and rights to land (El-Ghonemy 1990; Ellis 1992; Ghimire 2001; Griffin 2002).

All the aforementioned approaches in one way or the other view land reform as direct interventions of government, through using enforceable enactments to alter existing land ownership patterns and control as well as enhancing the legal and contractual forms of land tenure to create a more equitable access to land for development that is fair, effective and efficient.

While researchers such as Lipton and Saghai (2016) and De Soto (2000) argue that land reform policies that prioritises on the registration of interests in land releases the latent value of land and serves as a vehicle for investments in land and can positively contribute to the reduction of poverty and ultimately to sustainable livelihoods, others such as Amanor (2009) and Benjaminsen et al. (2008) are of the view that viewing land from this perspective is an over-exaggeration of ways to bridge the poverty gap. A 2014 study by Abdulai and Owusu-Ansah however suggest that land registration alone do not guarantee security of tenure since it can be successfully contested in courts and therefore recommend the need for land owners to go one step further to obtain title insurance, where available (Abdulai and Owusu-Ansah 2014). Title insurance however, can be very expensive and beyond the means of many people in developing economies. Land reform policies are mostly carried out to regulate activities that are carried out on land (Rajabifard 2019) and for these activities to be sustainable, there is the need for them to aim at improving and sustaining the livelihoods of people who rely on land and the benefits accruing on land.

According to Jürgenson (2016), successful land reform particularly in developing economies can lead to the creation of social justice in society due to the contributions made to reduce the exploitation of poor farmers, who are mostly affected by societal injustices in land ownership. Consequently, for land reform projects to achieve the objectives for which they were undertaken and to contribute to sustainable development as a whole, the differing interests and objectives of the various stakeholders with interests in land need to be acknowledged in its design and implementation. As discussed in chapter 2, this

study will explore this further by investigating whether differences in stakeholder objectives influence the effectiveness of project risk management strategies.

Tenure in Land Reform

Land tenure, “the way land is held or owned by individuals and groups, or the set of relationships legally or customarily defined amongst people with respect to land” (UN-Habitat 2008: 5), is very critical to the success of land reform policies. While many land reform policies in history were based on creating equity in land ownership by the destruction of feudal land ownership and tenancy structures (Ellis 1992: 200), modern land reforms are mostly focused on current policy issues such as the adjustment and alteration of customary tenure for equitable land management, land titling and registration, land redistribution and market-assisted land reforms where land is offered on a “willing-seller, willing-buyer” basis (Cortula et al. 2004; Ntsebeza and Hall 2007; Payne and Durand-Lasserve 2012).

The WB supported market-assisted land reforms which were basically to ensure that land reform is regulated by market forces and not by the state or discriminatory policies (Gauster and Isakson 2007). However, empirical studies have confirmed that this policy may have a lesser effect on the reduction of poverty and in some instances, may even entrench poverty due to factors such as, limited financial support, lack of appropriate regulatory frameworks, high land prices that have indebted the “intended beneficiaries”, and the complexities of uprooting the cultural and political roots of land and trading it simply as a transferable commodity (Gauster and Isakson 2007; Payne and Durand-

Lasserve 2012). Obeng-Odoom (2016: 675) argues further that prescriptions that the extension of capitalist markets and modernity in the land sector will be beneficial to everyone is simplistic because while some pre-reform issues still persist, others are worsened whereas new ones are created.

This notwithstanding, in many countries including Ghana, land transactions will still occur with or without regulation so incorporating some level of transparency through land reforms can provide the necessary checks and balances to ensure these transactions are regulated, in some way, and in effect ensure that people whose livelihoods depend on land and the benefits accruing on land are protected to reduce exploitation.

There are other forms of land reform such as the conversion of large foreign owner operated commercial farms into freehold parcels for local farmers, mostly with paltry or no compensation to the original owners (Adams and Howell 2001; Bowyer-Bower and Stoneman 2000; Ntsebeza and Hall 2007). This form of “land nationalisation” was particularly exercised in Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and some countries that experienced colonialism but have been criticised as promoting political extremism (Moyo 2001) rather than alleviating poverty and hunger and in some instances, may also serve as a deterrent for foreign investments in land (Attfield 2004).

In all forms of tenure however, the main basic components needed are having the appropriate rights as to what use the land is put and having an “effective legal protection against eviction or arbitrary curtailment” of rights to the land (UN-Habitat 2008: 7). Land tenure therefore defines title and the extent to which the owner can dispose and benefit from the wealth and income accruing on the land.

The different forms of land tenure and their characteristics are shown in Table 4.1 below;

Table 4.1 Land Tenure Systems and their Characteristics

Tenure	Characteristics	Advantages	Limitations
Freehold	*Ownership in perpetuity*	*High security. Provides freedom of disposal and can be used as collateral for loans. High commercial value. Value can increase.*	*High access costs. Collateral value may be affected by low incomes or weak financial institutions. Property values can fluctuate.*
Delayed freehold	*Provides conditional ownership. Title dependent on payments or completion of developments.*	*Same high security and advantages as freehold upon meeting conditions.*	*Payment default or development delay may result in eviction and loss of funds. Low incomes can affect collateral value. Fluctuations in property values may affect initial investments.*
Registered leasehold	*Specific ownership duration; few months – 999years.*	*Provides same security as freehold throughout lease duration.*	*Legal framework required. High access costs.*
Public rental	*Occupying public land or house on rental basis.*	*Has high degree of security when occupation terms and conditions are met.*	*Access restricted to availability. Terms generally restrictive. Location mostly unsuitable for livelihoods.*
Private rental	*Renting privately owned land or property.*	*Provides good security if contract is legally binding. Flexible tenancy.*	*Some tenants abused by unscrupulous owners.*
Shared equity	*Occupants purchase a stake in property and pays rent on the rest.*	*Stake can be increased. Lower repayments. Combines security of delayed freehold*	*Its management and legal framework needs to be efficient.*

		and flexibility of tenancy.	
Co-operative tenure	*Ownership vested in groups who are co-owners.*	*Provides adequate security and promotes social inclusion.*	*Requires an efficient legal framework. Its restrictions may affect investments.*
Customary ownership	*Ownership vested in tribes, groups, communities or family. Traditional/customary authorities have power to allocate land.*	*Accepted by communities and some governments. Promotes social cohesion. Can be registered under title.*	*Poor leadership can affect its legitimacy. Multiple allocation of same land by some leaders lead to conflict. Non registration leads to multiple allocations.*
Religious tenure	*Different religious groups have different tenure arrangements*	*Provides accessible and affordable land for members.*	*Conflicts due to inheritance disputes.*
Temporary or intermediate tenure.	*Arrangements such as certification, temporary licences, etc.*	*Provides short-term investment opportunities. Protects long-term interests.*	*Inhibits redevelopments if excessively accessed.*
Non-formal tenure.	*Different land holdings both legal and illegal.*	*Generally provides ready needs for the poor.*	*Poor sometimes unable to afford due to commercialisation.*

Source: Adapted from UN-Habitat (2008: 9-10)

A critical look at table 4.1 above shows that tenurial arrangements both before and after implementing land reform projects need to be carefully considered to ensure such projects achieve intended outcomes due to their influence on how land is held or owned or the manner in which the benefits accruing on land can be distributed whether customary, private or state owned. This may also include

focusing on addressing issues such as land litigations, inappropriate evictions and landlessness among the poor and vulnerable, and inappropriate land management practices among land owning communities to ensure more people benefit due to the criticality of land to poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods and ultimately to the development of many countries.

4.2.1 Land Reform and Land Management in an African Context

For the majority of the poor in Africa, particularly SSA, land serves as an important tool for livelihood sustainability and for investments. Although this study focuses on Ghana's approach to land reform, Ghana's land ownership structure, its' accompanying issues and the importance of land to Ghana's socio-economic development are not unique to Ghana since many African countries share similar characteristics with regards to land. A greater percentage (over 70%) of land in SSA is estimated to be under customary ownership (Chimhowu 2019; Willy 2011; 2017). This notwithstanding, many of these customary tenure systems are built on colonial constructions and discriminatory policies which have inadvertently affected the ability to invest on such lands and to use land to access credit facilities (Deininger 2003; Willy 2011) to enhance economic and social growth in SSA.

Particularly, land ownership in South Africa was based on discriminatory policies during the days of Apartheid with white South Africans owning majority of the land (Obeng-Odoom 2012). Attempts to reform the South African land sector, post-independence, to ensure a fairer distribution of land however had links to some of the discriminatory policies experienced during the colonial regime. For

example, the passing of The 2003 Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill and the 2003 Communal Land Right Act, effectively allowed TAs to administer and allocate land in rural areas (Ntsebeza 2005) creating a direct link between TAs and the land question with women still marginalised with regards to land ownership.

Countries such as Nigeria and Uganda, to mention but a few, have had their own individual experiences with regards to land ownership and land management. Prior to the introduction of the 1978 Land Use Act, land tenure in Nigeria followed a traditional communal system with land vested in families, clans, villages or the community (Ghebru et al. 2014). However, customary land tenure was viewed as having a negative influence on the country's agricultural and economic development, particularly with conflicting rules of operation in different parts of the country. As a result, The Land Use Act 1978 nationalised the control of all lands and empowered state governors and local government agencies with land administration and management. Unfortunately, the excessive power given to state authorities to administer and manage lands in Nigeria have been abused drastically with excessive corrupt practices resulting in only a few elite groups benefitting from land at the expense of the poor and vulnerable (Famoriyo 1984).

Uganda, on the other hand, reversed a dictatorial decree dating back to 1975 and allowed both customary and state land ownership through its' 1995 constitution (Willy 2017). This was followed by The Land Act 1998 encouraging customary landowners to apply for certificate of ownership to enable them access credit facilities since this provision was inaccessible through customary tenure (Obeng-Odoom 2012; Willy 2017).

The discussions above suggest that confrontations between political arrangements, colonial agreements and customary law arrangements complicate land issues in SSA. While attempts have been made by many countries in SSA to “decolonialise” some of these discriminatory practices pertaining to customary land ownership and management, little progress have been made with regards to the management of customary lands in SSA (Willy 2011). This, coupled with the increase in demand for land for sustained socio-economic growth and the need for livelihood sustainability collectively in post-independence Africa, calls for the need for state interventions through land reform policies that seek to alter existing land patterns and control as well as enhance the legal and contractual forms of land tenure to create a more equitable access to land in Africa. This notwithstanding, the usage of land title formalisation as a vehicle for enhanced socio-economic development in SSA have experienced very low patronage mainly due to the cost involved in the registration exercise (Awuah et al. 2013; Toulmin 2009) and the complexities involved in land registration processes.

Irrespective of the unique land holdings in Africa, particularly the dominance of customary land tenure systems SSA, and its accompanying complexities and links to colonial interventions and agreements as discussed, researchers such as Grant (2009) and Obeng-Odoom (2014) argue that approaches to land reform in Africa should not be excluded from the world system but should rather follow a holistic approach linking the past, present and the future.

4.3 Land and Development in Ghana

Ghana, located at the west coast of Africa with an estimated population of 30,792,608 million as at 2021 (GSS 2021), covers a total land mass of approximately 238,540 sq km. As the first SSA to gain independence, Ghana, over the years, has experienced political stability relatively compared to many of its' neighbours irrespective of some brief military regimes it experienced after the overthrown of its first president, Dr Kwame Nkrumah (Meng 2004).

The quest to develop Ghana began immediately after independence in 1957 when the newly independent state exchanged goods it produced but did not consume such as cocoa and gold for manufacturing goods it consumed but did not produce (Konadu-Agyemang 2000) which, to a large extent, has continued till today. The continuous exportation of raw materials means Ghana lacked the necessary structural and institutional capacity to generate a higher amount of output (Morvaridi 2008) thereby, to a large extent, maintaining its' colonial mentality.

Ghana's economy struggled significantly between 1970 and 1983 with the nation on the edge of bankruptcy mainly through mismanagement, over regulation and inflation (Konadu Agyemang 2000), necessitating the need for development strategies such the Structural Adjustment and Economic Recovery Programs (SAPs and ERPs) implemented between 1983-2000 and the Ghana Vision 2020 agenda (Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy and Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy) implemented between 2003-2009 (Breisinger et al. 2011; Crawford and Abdulai 2009).

While these strategies and subsequent efforts by successive governments to develop the country have mainly been targeted at ensuring economic stability, reducing poverty and improving the sustainable capabilities of the poor, many of these efforts did not lead to sustained economic growth as expected (Meng 2004). Although there were some brief successes achieved by the SAPs and ERPs and the Ghana Vision 2020 agenda, empirical evidence suggest these were only felt at the macro level with the poor and vulnerable suffering from the resultant budgetary cuts and unequal distribution of resources that accompanied these programs (Breisinger et al. 2011; Kasanga 2003; Konadu-Agyemang 2000). Morvaridi (2008) argues that development should bring about a more equal and fairer society that provides opportunities for the poor. While over-reliance on external funding and the lack of continuous political commitments may have negatively influenced the success of these policies (Kasanga 2003; Konadu-Agyemang 2000), Breisinger et al. (2011) argues that many of the development plans were over ambitious and not adaptable to the local content.

Ghana's economy, over the years, have been reliant on agriculture. Kasanga (2003) estimates that of the 10 regions (now 16) in Ghana as at 1999, 5 had over 40% of their inhabitants living in poverty with their livelihoods basically dependent on land. Data from Ghana's 2010 population census revealed that 41.5% of the economically active population aged 15 and over were employed in the agricultural sector, whereas 49.1% of the country's population lived in rural areas with their livelihoods highly dependent on land (GSS 2012). Additionally, out of a total of 5,467,136 households in Ghana as at 2010, 45.8% were agricultural households, with their livelihoods also dependent on land (GSS 2012). Although the discovery of oil in 2007 have slightly changed the over-reliance on agriculture,

the sector maintains a high level of significance in Ghana's economy with cocoa, gold and oil alone accounting for over 80% of Ghana's exports in 2015 (ADB 2019).

Recent data from the GSS also show that agriculture, manufacturing, construction, mining and quarrying, which are directly related to land, contributed 51.7% to Ghana's GDP in 2018 (GSS 2019). The above evidence suggests that land is central to Ghana's developmental efforts due to its significant role on the livelihoods of a significant proportion of the country's population and economic growth. As a result, the ownership structure of land and the conditions under which land is managed in Ghana have implications for the country's economic development as a whole. Consequently, to be able to reduce poverty sustainably, development policies in Ghana should also include ensuring access and security to land.

4.3.1 Land Ownership Structure in Ghana

Land tenure in Ghana, as with other countries in SSA, is highly influenced by historical perspectives, culture, political and individual influences, state institutions, constitutional and legal frameworks. All of these directly or indirectly affect the way in which land is held or owned in Ghana and the manner in which the benefits accruing to land are distributed. Researchers such as Berry (2013), Kugbega (2020) and Obeng-Odoom (2014) argue that the current land ownership structure in Ghana and its' accompanying complexities are inextricably linked to interventions and compromises made during the colonial era. To set the tone for the discussion on the current land ownership structure in Ghana therefore, a brief

historical background relating to colonial land administration is provided to highlight this linkage.

Brief Historical Background

The British colonial administration ruled Ghana through a policy of indirect rule where they sought paramount chiefs prepared to be part of the “colonial venture” as allies (Amanor 2001: 36) mainly because of their non-understanding of the customs and cultural practices of the people and to reduce resistance to opposers of colonialism (Obeng-Odoom 2014). With regards to land however, the colonial administration introduced the Crown Lands Bill of 1894 and its’ subsequent amendment by the Lands Bill 1897 (Amanor 2001; Obeng-Odoom 2014) with a proposition to claim all “vacant and unoccupied lands” and vest them in the British Crown (Berry 2013: 37). This was however seen as a form of land nationalisation and a way to control the countries forest and mineral resources (Kugbega 2020) and was hugely opposed by a special elite class of people who were mainly traders, businessmen, lawyers and chiefs who argued that all lands, vacant or not, were owned by the people with their rulers as representatives and as such there was nothing for the Crown to claim (Amanor 2001; Berry 2013). As a result, the colonial administration accepted, albeit reluctantly, that rural administration including land management responsibilities should be carried out by paramount chiefs without interference (Amanor 2001; Kugbega 2020) without making adequate provisions to regulate this and this set the motion for non-interference in customary land tenure which, to a large extent, have continued till today.

Today, there are three main land ownership systems in Ghana; customary, state and vested lands (Yeboah and Kakraba-Ampeh 2016; Yeboah and Shaw 2016). Whereas customary lands are owned collectively by families, kingdoms and tribes, state lands, popularly called Government lands as stipulated in 1992 constitution, are deemed to be owned by the entire Ghanaian citizenry (Gyamera 2018; Kasanga and Kotey 2001; Yeboah and Kakraba-Ampeh 2016; Yeboah and Shaw 2013). The state therefore maintains absolute ownership of state lands. Vested lands on the other hand are lands which were previously owned by indigenous communities but are vested in the state for the benefit of the indigenous owners, with the state holding the legal interests (as a trustee) and the indigenous communities having the equitable (the right of usage and enjoyment) interests (Gyamera 2018).

All three land ownership structures are managed by two established land management systems (customary and state) operating concurrently in Ghana (Bugri 2012; Kasanga and Kotey 2001).

Customary Land Tenure and Management

The customary land tenure system is the dominant form of land ownership structure in Ghana. As the name depicts, customary tenure is based on traditions, customs and established norms or practices that have existed within a particular cultural setting and passed on generationally. Estimates from Kasanga and Kotey (2001) show that about 80% of Ghana's undeveloped lands are held in customary ownership. These include all lands held by families and some individuals, kingdoms, communities, *tendamba* (first settlers) or clans.

The 1992 constitution recognises customary land tenure and management as a competent form of Ghana law and vests all customary lands in the appropriate TA to be held in trust for the wider community, including the dead, living and yet to be born (GoG 1992; Gyamera 2018; Kasanga and Kotey 2001; Ubink and Quan 2008). This definition of land technically places the appropriate traditional leaders as custodians of land under their authority with no right of alienation since the land does not belong to the current generation alone.

There are various forms of title under Ghana's customary land tenure including Allodial title, customary law freehold, usufructuary interest, leasehold and customary tenancies (GoG 2016; Hughes et al. 2011; Kasanga and Kotey 2001; Ubink and Quan 2008). The Allodial title is the highest possible interest in land, vested in communities and represented by their corresponding TAs who exercises judicial, land management and governance functions in trust for the people. All the other forms of interest derive from the Allodial title.

Customary law freehold is the second most powerful interest which refers to permanent, private secured rights acquired from the Allodial owners through an outright purchase. It can be held by individuals, groups or families and is alienable and inheritable.

Usufructuary interests are acquired either by subjects or members of the Allodial title holders through the development of an unappropriated portion of the land, or expressly granted by the Allodial owners or granted for settlement to a non-indigene by the Allodial owners for a period of not less than fifty years. Usufructs are inheritable and alienable.

Leases are legal rights of usage acquired from land owners for a specified period of time, whereas customary tenancies are lesser interests created by arrangements made between permanent land owners and tenants that may involve rent payments, sharing farm produce or physically partitioning the farm or land between the parties. The idea behind customary land tenure was to offer the entire land owning community a sense of belongingness and to be able to access land without state interference and interventions, linking to the colonial arrangements as earlier mentioned.

The non-egalitarian nature of colonial Ghanaian society means land policies built on such principles will inevitably be non-egalitarian (Obeng-Odoom 2014). Although the 1992 constitution of Ghana recognises customary land tenure and management, it did not clearly specify how these should be managed. This, coupled with the continuous demand for land due to population growth, urbanisation and the ever increasing economic value of land, have led to individual interpretations, misinterpretation and exploitation by various TAs leading to land conflicts and misunderstanding amongst families about land ownership (Hughes et al. 2011; Ubink and Quan 2008).

State Land Tenure and Management

All vested and state lands in Ghana are administered under a state land management system which vests all such lands in the President as the trustee. State lands constitute around 18% of the total land whereas vested lands are estimated at 2% of total land in Ghana (Kasanga and Kotey 2001; Yeboah and Shaw 2013). This figure is however highly contested since the state has divested

some of its land holdings in recent times while some state lands have also been encroached upon (Adiaba 2014).

Section 18(2) of the 1992 constitution empowers the state to acquire private lands in the public interest (GoG 1992). Such lands are expropriated from the land owning community by the state for the economic well-being of the country. Lands compulsorily acquired by the colonial administration were also passed on to the state at independence in 1957 (Gyamera 2018). All land transactions under statutory land tenure are administered by the LC on behalf of the state. The LC is also responsible for providing consent to the disposition of customary lands to ensure they are in conformity with approved planning schemes.

4.3.2 Land Issues in Ghana

From the discussions so far, it is evident that land plays an important role in sustainable growth, good governance and people's livelihoods in Ghana. With the majority of the land under customary owners, who can dispose of such lands at their discretion, the livelihoods of many people are affected since the economic benefits accruing on such lands are in the hands of TAs (Ubink and Quan 2008).

The customary sector throughout history has defined boundaries by physical landmarks such as hills, streams, trees, instead of survey maps and in some instances even used oral grants to transfer land ownership (Kasanga 2003). The culminating effect of this form of boundary demarcation and land ownership agreements is constant litigations over boundaries and land ownership due to these landmarks shifting over time and the fading memory and/or death of

witnesses involved. Although there have been significant progress on the demarcation of boundaries quite recently, with the introduction of The Land Act 2020 (Act 1036) and many CLSs, land litigations due to boundary and ownership disputes persist among many land owning communities.

Despite considerable efforts by successive governments to streamline the land acquisition process, Ghana's land acquisition framework remains very complex (Gyamera 2018). As a result, many land users in Ghana are faced with tenure insecurity either due to the complexities of the registration process, with land acquisition being a major contributory factor to the high cost of establishing business in Ghana (Gyamera 2018), or their inability to afford the costs involved (Awuah et al. 2013). According to De Soto (2000), where legal procedures take too long or fail to address people's needs, they resort to extralegal means to protect their assets by circumventing the laws. Although Ghana practices two types of registration in land, title and deeds registration (Gyamera 2018; Sittie 2006), only 2 (Ashanti and Greater Accra) out of the 16 regions issue land titles with the others only able to register deeds. While deeds registration registers instruments on land based on which instruments were registered first, it does not confer title to the land and as such can be susceptible to fraud but can be helpful in cases of conflict of priority. On the other hand, title registration confers title and provides certainty of proof of ownership to land (Gyamera 2018; Sittie 2006).

Lack of accountability and transparency in land dealings have led to widespread exploitation by some unscrupulous TAs often allocating the same piece of land to numerous people (Kuusanga and Gerber 2015; Ubink and Quan 2008). Farm lands have been sold at very high prices and converted to residential properties often with little or no consultation with those whose livelihoods depend on these

lands leading to landlessness or land fragmentation with many people migrating in search of a livelihood as a result (Obeng-Odoom 2014). This has resulted in the erosion of the trusteeship system of customary land ownership as originally designed (Hughes et al. 2011; Ubink and Quan 2008). The affected people are also rarely compensated by the TAs or government and in instances where compensation is paid, this is paltry as compared to the loss of livelihoods involved.

Due to the extensive power of TAs, the state does not necessarily interfere in customary land dealings to maintain the status of traditional land institutions (Kuusanga and Gerber 2015), but has, over the years, chosen to play an advisory role to ensure proper land dealings (GoG 2016). According to USAID (2013), land disputes are the most common cause of violent conflicts in Ghana since individuals who have lost confidence in the system, or are unable to access the formal system, choose to protect their own lands extralegally (De Soto 2000) by employing land guards. There have even been instances where these conflicts have resulted in death as a result of violent clashes relating to claims and counter claims to land ownership (Acquah 2013).

Estimates from Kasanga (2003) revealed that in 2002, there were 60,000 land litigation cases before Ghanaian courts. A critical analysis of all land disputes between 1961 and 2004 reveals that 60% of them were as a result of Multiple Land Sales (MLS) whereas the remainder were from boundary and ownership disputes (Kotey 2004).

Empirical evidence have proven that state land management is also beset with problems including corruption among LC staff and other state land management

institutions, and favouritism towards the rich and powerful in society thereby failing to address the “land question” for which they were designed (Bugri 2012; Kasanga and Kotey 2001). Although state lands can be acquired by any Ghanaian citizen, the exorbitant financial value placed on them disqualifies the disadvantaged and poor. Morvaridi (2012) argues further that this issue is exacerbated by “land grabbing” on the part of foreign investors supported by governments if it encourages Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) thereby reducing the local population’s access to land, with the poor, women and vulnerable groups the most affected.

The relatively political stability in Ghana, as compared to many of its’ neighbours and cheap agricultural labour have over the years either directly or indirectly promoted land grabbing in Ghana (Kuusaana 2017). While this may in a way result in job creation and some investments within the local communities, empirical evidence suggest that land grabbing deals are often done with very low levels of transparency, consultation and respect for individuals whose livelihoods depends on the land (Margulis et al. 2013). The culminating effects of this, coupled with the lack of adequate regulatory mechanisms and lack of accountability on the part of TAs with regards to land revenue means the unfortunate victims of land grabbing are mostly the poor and vulnerable whose livelihoods mainly depend on land.

Additionally, weak institutional capacities and the duality of land management systems (customary and state) operating concurrently in Ghana means there are continuous interactions and confrontations between constitutional provisions, policy arrangements, common law principles, statutory enactments and customary law agreements (Akaateba 2019) which inevitably complicate land

issues in Ghana. Ghana's land market is demand driven by the fixed nature of land and the ever-increasing pressure placed on land due to population growth and urbanisation, which according to Amanor (2001), leads to land scarcity with its' accompanying problems of land disputes and land litigations. Unfortunately, despite considerable positive progress in land matters, both the state and customary land management systems have been unable to provide expected returns with regards to the huge investments made over the years to respond to these demands and to resolve the general indiscipline in Ghana's land market. The discussions suggest that land sector issues have had a negative impact on Ghana's economic growth and development.

4.4 Risks to a successful Land Reform in Ghana

The aforementioned issues relating to land in Ghana and the need to regulate the way land is held or owned and the manner to which the benefits accruing on land are fairly distributed in an efficient and effective way means any centralised approach adopted to reform the Ghanaian land sector have the potential of being exposed to loss/gain. While many of the aforementioned issues pertaining to land may pose threats to a successful reform of the Ghanaian land sector, risks, as argued in chapter 2, are uncertain events with the ability to impact on objectives positively or negatively should they occur. So, while there are issues relating to land in Ghana as discussed, these issues may not necessarily pose risks although there is a greater possibility for some of them posing as threats to a successful reform. Below are the main risks identified as having the potential to influence the successful reform of the Ghanaian land sector.

Institutional Risks

The land tenure system in Ghana is unique to Ghana. The duality of land ownership and its accompanying acceptability of the two established land management systems (customary and state) operating concurrently in Ghana (Ehwi and Asante 2016; Ubink and Quan 2008) means any centralised approach to reform the Ghanaian land sector need to be done within this established land management and administration framework and recognise the range of customary rights and arrangements through which people access and manage lands (Ubink and Amanor 2008). Any attempts that fail to acknowledge the uniqueness of the Ghanaian land management and administration framework but rather adopt a one-size-fit all approach based on experiences from approaches used in other countries (Owusu 2012), may face institutional risks that can influence its outcome significantly.

In addition, there is a lack of trust between the customary landowners and the state due to historical perspectives where lands were taken from their customary owners without the payment of adequate compensation (Ubink and Amanor 2008). This lack of trust between the state and customary land owners may also pose risks to a successful land reform in Ghana due to the possibility of such reforms failing to receive the full support of the customary land owners who owns the majority of land. Moreover, bottlenecks such as the usage of temporary structures to define boundaries and the honouring of oral grants of transfer of land ownership in the past (Kasanga 2003) also pose risks to successful land reform in Ghana since there need to be an established link between the informal land transactions that were made, some of which proof of ownership may be difficult due to fading memory and/or the death of witnesses, and government

agencies who may be tasked to register such interests to achieve expected results. Many of these agencies also lack the necessary capacity, logistics and expertise required to carry out such complex endeavours (Ehwi and Asante 2016; Gambrah 2002).

Political Risks

Bratton and van de Walle (1994) argue that the political environments in many countries in Africa are neopatrimonial in nature where people are more likely to vote for leaders based on personal gains rather than on ideology or broader policies. They argue further that these leaders therefore amass wealth for themselves and associates when in power instead of pursuing the national interest. While there have been improvements to neopatrimonialism in many African countries, including Ghana, over the years with the introduction of multi-party democracy, opinion leaders and political leaders are still revered due to the hierarchical nature of the Ghanaian society (Damoah and Akwei 2017). As a result, they can use the power they possess to positively or negatively influence efforts to reform the land sector to their advantage.

Additionally, implementing and managing land reform policies may involve huge sums of money which faces the risk of misappropriation on the part of the revered politicians and/or opinion leaders to satisfy their personal gains and/or political interests. Moreover, the state's reluctance to interfere in the affairs of TAs (Kuusanga and Gerber 2015) linking to compromises and interventions made during the colonial era and the need for politicians to foster a way to maintain the support of the traditional leaders who could be voter brokers in subsequent

elections (Ubink and Amanor 2008) means political leaders may skew efforts to reform the Ghanaian land sector to suit their personal interests by protecting their associates. In so doing, the objectives may not be fully met as intended which in effect may not benefit the ordinary Ghanaian.

Stakeholder and Social Risks

The broad definition of land ownership and rights of usage of land in Ghana means the Ghanaian land sector is characterised by many stakeholders who may be affected in one way or another by any centralised attempt to reform the sector. These include but not limited to state institutions, customary landowners, law enforcement agencies, individual landowners, tenant farmers, leaseholders and many more who may have the right of usage of land but may not be easily identifiable. As a result, attempts to reform the Ghanaian land sector may face the risk of effective stakeholder identification and involvements (Worsely 2017). This is due to the fact that where stakeholders are not easily identifiable, their role and contributions to outcome cannot be clearly defined (Achterkamp and Vos 2008) and as such they may negatively impact the successful implementation of any endeavour carried out to reform the Ghanaian land sector.

Moreover, these stakeholders in land may have differing views of what constitutes fair and efficient usage and distribution of land due to their individual interests and expectations from the proposed reforms and/or may be benefitting corruptly from the status quo. Some of these stakeholders may have power and influence (Olander and Landin 2005) and may frustrate these efforts if their interests and expectations are not addressed as expected, including but not limited to the

possibility of creating social contracts of their own making (De Soto 2000) to protect their assets and interests thereby undermining the success of such reforms.

Nonetheless, while many of the aforementioned risks are skewed towards threats to a successful land reform, successfully designing a strategy to reform the Ghanaian land sector can also come with an added opportunity of poverty reduction by redistributing income through job creation and enhancing the economic value of land, create social justice, build trust and create harmony between the two established land management systems, reduce litigation, promote transparency and reduce corruption in Ghana's land delivery system, and contribute positively to Ghana's economic growth and development as a whole.

4.5 Measures Instituted to address Land Issues in Ghana

The significance of land to Ghana's development and the issues relating to land in Ghana as discussed means appropriate measures that provide the opportunity to encourage transparency in land dealings and facilitate easy access and security to land need to be instituted and incorporated in a workable institutional and evaluation policy framework to ensure that the many Ghanaians whose livelihoods depend on land are protected in line with Ghana's development priorities. Consequently the GoG has, over the years, instituted policies aimed at regulating land usage and addressing the problems of land ownership, land tenure and its contribution to sustainable livelihoods and sustainable development. These include the NLP and the LAP.

National Land Policy

In 1999 the GoG, in consultation with various stakeholders and the then MLF (now MLNR), launched a comprehensive NLP document which aimed at providing a policy framework to address the problems of the land sector sustainably (MLF 1999). Prior to the NLP, land management and administration in Ghana were carried out under ineffective and inefficient fragmented enactments and ordinances, some dating back as far as 1876 and the 1900's.

The main objectives of the NLP, *inter alia*, include;

- Instilling order and discipline into the Ghanaian land market in order to address incidents of land encroachments, multiple or illegal land sales, unapproved land development schemes, land speculation and racketeering.
- Promoting community participation and public awareness by involving all identifiable stakeholders in the decision-making process to ensure the optimum use of land.
- Protecting the rights of landowners and their descendants.
- Facilitating equitable access and security of tenure to land.
- Minimising or eliminating (where possible), boundary disputes, land conflicts and litigations.

To ensure the efficient and effective implementation of the NLP, the LAP was formulated as the implementation arm of the NLP (WB 2003).

4.6 Ghana's Land Administration Project

Launched with support from the WB and other donor agencies and approved by the WB in July 2003, the LAP is the first phase of a wider Land Administration Program which is a long-term (15-25 years) commitment by the GoG to enhance economic and social growth through an effective and efficient land management mechanism (GoG 2011; Kasanga 2003; WB 2003; 2011a). It is the first exclusively land administration project supported by the WB in SSA and seeks to address land administration and policy issues highlighted by the NLP.

The significance of the contribution of land to the reduction of poverty and enhancement of economic growth in Ghana as earlier discussed means the LAP was designed in line with GoG's development priorities as per the guidelines of the 2000 CAS and GPRS (WB 2003; 2011b). The project's main target is to reduce poverty and strengthen the sustainable capabilities of the poor by ensuring easy access to land and security of land rights through ensuring efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery. Initially designed in two phases, LAP-1 and LAP-2, the project is a complete representation of Ghana's approach to land reform and falls within the context of the third-generation post Washington consensus Public Sector Reform (PSR) agenda (Ayee 2015) with particular focus on improving service delivery in land management and administration in Ghana.

Although the public sector is the largest spender and employer in Africa (WB 2008b), many public sector organisations operate in a non-transparent and inefficient manner and Ghana is not an exception to this. Ayee (2005) argues that the need for PSRs in Africa began immediately after the post-colonial era as

newly independent states pursued strategies to strengthen their institutional capacities. Owusu (2012) argues further that Human Resource Development (HRD) and technical assistance from the previous colonial administration became necessary as the newly independent states were not prepared for self-governance. Strategies, otherwise known as the “Washington Consensus” were developed by international development agencies to reform the structure of Africa’s public sector (Owusu 2012: 5; Williamson 2000) with an aim of injecting real effectiveness, efficiency, hard core competence and financial prudence into the running of the public sector (Omoyefa 2008: 17).

Although one-sixths of WB’s projects between 1999 and 2006 supported PSRs (WB 2008b), whereas over half of DFID project’s between 2004 and 2010 are PSR related (Ayee 2015), many problems in Africa’s public sector still persist. Excessive state interventions, failure to develop and to strengthen the human resource capacity and deterioration of service delivery in Africa’s public sector, including Ghana, led to a third phase post Washington Consensus agenda (Ayee 2015; Owusu 2012) to which the LAP falls within.

Three crucial benefits were identified at project inception; improved land tenure security as a vehicle for investment opportunities; improved efficiency in land registration systems and service delivery; and the provision of more accessible, better quality and cheaper land information systems to foster efficiency in land administration and management (WB 2003; 2011a).

First Phase (LAP-1)

LAP-1 began in 2003 and was initially scheduled to be completed on 31st December 2008 but had to be extended twice (to 31st December 2010 and then to 30th June 2011) due to over ambitious initial objectives such as the "surveying and titling of hundreds of thousands of land parcels" (WB 2011a: 4), procurement delays, and an under estimation of the complexities of the project environment (WB 2008a). The PDO for LAP-1, was therefore revised in 2008 to "undertake land policy and institutional reforms and key land administration pilots for laying the foundation for a sustainable, decentralised land administration system that is fair, efficient, and cost effective and ensures land tenure security" (WB 2008a: 12). This new PDO was deemed to reflect the realities of the project environment and to establish and pilot the foundations of institutional and statutory reforms and initiatives to be up-scaled at the second phase.

LAP-1 finally ended in June 2011. Although 3 years overdue, the project cost $6.85 million less than originally estimated mainly due to the re-design of the PDO which led to a significant reduction of $16.84 million in the institutional reform and development aspect, which was rolled over to LAP-2, with LAP-1 only establishing the foundations (WB 2011b).

Major achievements of LAP-1, according to GoG (2011); WB (2011a); and WB (2011b), include;

- Strengthening institutional capacity and efficiency to improve land service delivery by the establishment of the new LC Act 2008 (Act 767), consolidating four previous land sector agencies (LC, Land Title Registry, Survey Department, Land Valuation Board), which hitherto performed

overlapping and duplicating duties, into one single entity – the LC. This consolidation also initiated reforms in the land delivery sector which ultimately resulted in some level of transparency in land service delivery and reduction in the cost of land transactions.

- Facilitating and regulating land management and administration under customary authorities by the establishment of 36 new CLSs (exceeding a target of 30), tasked with adequate record keeping in customary land transactions in an attempt to improve transparency and accountability in the customary land sector.

- A significant reduction in the time required for deeds registration from more than 36 months in 2003 to 2.5 months in 2011, against a target on 1 month, through the decentralisation of deeds registry to all regional capitals. Registration of titles also significantly reduced from more than 36 months to no more than 6 months at project closure, meeting the set target of 6 months.

- Tackling the backlog of land litigation cases, reducing land related cases in the high courts and circuit courts by 88% as at June 2011, against a 100% set target.

- Significantly increasing local and central government revenue from land transactions from $12 million dollars in October 2003 to $135 million dollars in December 2010, significantly exceeding the 130% target. The LSAs now contribute more to government fiscal policy than they received through the central budget.

- Bridging the gender gap in land ownership by significantly increasing land titles and deeds registration by women (from 288 in 2003 to 47, 294 at project closure).
- Effectively regulating laws governing land by establishing the Draft Land Bill (which has since been passed as The Land Act 2020) to oversee land related matters instead of the 166 laws and regulations that existed prior to the introduction of LAP.
- Successfully completing the inventory of state lands in 43 districts against a target of 50.
- Targeting the reduction of tension and land conflicts among Allodial landowners and ensuring clarity in Customary Boundary Demarcations (CBD) by successfully completing and validating one and awarding nine CBD contracts.
- Establishing a new Geodetic Reference Network (GRN) for southern Ghana, comprising Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi.

Irrespective of the highlighted achievements, a 2013 review by the Independent and Evaluation Group (IEG) downgraded the original Implementation and Completion Report's (ICR) grading from moderately satisfactory to moderately unsatisfactory (WB 2013c), highlighting issues such as conflicting reports on certain outputs such as the backlog of court cases and failure to delineate female title and deed applications from joint ones, among others (WB 2013c). The yardstick, with which this, and subsequent reviews were measured and their links to the project implementation strategy and empirical evidence from this study are discussed further in chapter 7.

Second Phase (LAP-2)

The Ghanaian economy's over reliance on Agriculture and Mining, both of which are dependent on land and accounted for 90% of Ghana's exports in 2011 (WB 2018c), means a lot still needed to be done, irrespective of the progress achieved in LAP-1, in terms of consolidating and strengthening these gains, building on the established foundations and up-scaling the pilots to ensure efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery. LAP-2 immediately followed LAP-1 and aimed at; strengthening the policy, legal and regulatory framework of Ghana's land administration; decentralising and improving business and service delivery processes; improving maps and spatial data to support land administration; and human resource development and project management (GoG 2011; WB 2011a).

LAP-2 also had a higher level objective, in line with Ghana's development priorities, of contributing to the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) 2010-2013 and its related Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II) which recognises access and security to land, and land use as a development issue (Bugri 2012; WB 2011a).

4.6.1 Project Stakeholders and their Objectives

As earlier discussed, land matters affect the livelihoods of many Ghanaians and play a crucial role in the political, social and economic development of the country. This means the project is characterised by many stakeholders whose views and expectations of the project may differ, but their commitment and

acceptability of the project is crucial to its success. Although the entire Ghanaian population is expected to benefit from the project in one way or another, the discussion below focuses on stakeholders that have been identified and their respective objectives.

National and Local Government

These include the Executive, Parliament, Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies. Their main interests in LAP are an increase in government revenue accruing from land transactions and an increase in title and deeds registration through the removal of barriers in the land registration process, the passage of laws to consolidate all the fragmented laws governing land in Ghana to ensure sustainable land administration and management as well as provide a regulatory framework for land related matters and ensuring an orderly urban development in line with Ghana's National Development Plan (NDP).

Other interests of national and local government agencies in LAP include ensuring equitable access and security to land for individuals, ensuring sustainable land administration and management systems as per the country's developmental efforts, and regulating the land market to create an enabling environment for investment opportunities in Ghana (GoG 2011; WB 2003).

Land Sector Agencies

LSAs include agencies such as LC, TCPD (now LUSPA), OASL, LTR, SD and LVB (now LVD) through which many Ghanaians access land services but were

fragmented institutions with very weak institutional and technical capacities prior to the introduction of LAP. Ehwi and Asante (2016) elucidates that the many agencies involved and division of tasks among these agencies resulted in a lack of coordination and fragmentation of responsibility which was very detrimental to effective land management and administration in Ghana.

Their main interests in the project are stronger institutional capacities and infrastructural development, an increase in land transactions, improved efficiency and transparency in land information systems, improved documentation of land transactions, easy sharing of information from amongst themselves, human resource management and development as well as an effective decentralised system to ensure their services are available throughout the country to reduce public frustration in accessing land services.

Traditional Authorities

Due to their autonomy and power over land, TAs were seen as the greatest threat to the success of the project initially (WB 2003). However, irrespective of their autonomy, only a few TAs (the Asantehene's Land Secretariat and the Gbawe Family Land Council) were properly organised prior to the project (WB 2003). Many of them lacked transparency and experienced a multiplicity of problems such as multiple sales of the same land to different people, poor boundary demarcations and inappropriate recording of land transactions leading to conflict and land litigations prior to the introduction of LAP (Hughes et al. 2011; Kasanga and Kotey 2001).

Their interests include clear boundary demarcations to reduce land litigations and to provide accurate recording of land transactions, reduction in land conflicts within their traditional areas, adequate representation and consultation throughout the implementation process, increased revenue through improved documentation on customary lands, transparency in government dealings in customary lands, strengthening their capacities for them to be able to manage their lands, the continuous recognition of their authority in Ghana's land management and administration system and the right to be able to continue with the allocation of customary lands without government interference.

Judiciary

These include District Courts, Circuit Courts, High Courts, and other institutions and people charged with the delivery of justice and law enforcement in Ghana. Land cases constitute around 70% of all civil cases filed in Ghanaian courts (MLNR 2016). Their interests include a reduction in land litigation cases to reduce pressure in the courts and access to accurate information on land to ensure fair and transparent judgments with regards to land matters.

They are also interested in improving their institutional and technical capacities and having coherent and consistent land laws that are modernised and easily understood, and in the creation of a conducive environment and adequate infrastructure to make the Judiciary more effective and coordinated in delivering land cases.

Landowners, Leaseholders and Farmers

This group of stakeholders include private sector enterprises and individuals who acquire land for investment purposes such as estate developers, leaseholders, as well as those whose livelihoods depend on land and the benefits accruing on land, such as tenants and small scale farmers. These are the most vulnerable group affected by the uncertainties in Ghana's land management and administration system and are mostly victims of MLS leading to land litigations and sometimes violent clashes over land ownership.

Transparency in land management and administration, proper access to land services, secured and transferrable title to land as well as the reduction and, where possible, the removal of barriers in the land registration system are their most important interests in LAP. In addition, they also seek to benefit from clearer boundary demarcations, proper survey maps, honouring of oral land leases, street naming and addressing, reduction in land litigation cases and easy access to land information.

Donors

While donors are not direct beneficiaries of the LAP or its' outcome, their provision and supervision of project funds means they can affect the project's implementation or its' outcome (PMI 2013) and as such can be classified as stakeholders. The project's main financiers are the WB and other Development Partners (DPs) such as CIDA, KFW, DFID, GTZ and NDF who agreed at inception to provide joint monitoring missions to ensure the projects' funds are

used for the purposes for which they were intended (GoG 2011). Consequently, all the donors agreed to use common annual work programme and reporting systems, monitoring and evaluation strategies to ensure that project funds were not misappropriated, or directed towards other sectors of the Ghanaian economy. In addition, they also had the flexibility of individually applying separate procurement, financial management strategies and disbursement procedures to serve as checks and balances in monitoring project funds.

Their main interests in the LAP is to jointly provide the necessary support to GoG led programmes aimed at improving the lives of ordinary citizens. The WB's involvement in the project is also in line with the bank's CAS designed to support the GPRS which recognises access and security to land as a development issue needed to ensure that Ghana attain middle income status in line with the then MDGs (WB 2011b).

In addition to the above stakeholders, there are CSOs such as NGOs and the media, and service providers (Electricity Company of Ghana, fire service, telecommunications) who are either directly or indirectly involved in the project, or seek to benefit from the project's outcome. Many of these CSOs are particularly involved in promoting participation, community awareness, educating the population on gender equality, land rights, monitoring and evaluation of key project activities. The media also promote transparency in the project's implementation by educating the population on their rights and benefits of the project and direction as to where to seek the necessary information if needed.

Despite considerable progress towards the achievement of the PDO, significant project activities required to improve efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land

service delivery such as the development of Land Use Planning Management Information System (LUPMIS) and the development of the Ghana Enterprise Land Information System (GELIS) delayed due to the amount of data needed to be loaded unto the system for it to run efficiently (WB 2018c).

In addition, delays in procurement and complexities of the project environment delayed or stalled some aspects of the project. Consequently, the initial completion date of 31st March 2016 was initially extended to 31st March 2017 and then to 31st January 2019 to ensure the total commitment of all stakeholders for the successful completion of the project. Although the project was initially estimated to cost $72 million, not all agencies fulfilled their obligations resulting in a $22 million shortfall (WB 2019b; 2018c). On reviewing the project performance and progress towards the PDO in March 2018, the WB in collaboration with the GoG agreed to invest a further $35 million under an Additional Financing (AF) component to allow the completion of on-going activities and extend the completion date to 31st December 2021 (WB 2018a; 2018c) but the AF was withdrawn by the WB at the request of the GoG due to the inability of both parties to agree on the modalities of a PPP arrangement with the project formally closing on 20th January 2020 (WB 2020).

The extent to which the various stakeholder objectives have been met or otherwise are discussed in chapter 7.

4.7 Conclusion

Ghana's development policies, over the years, have been targeted at ensuring economic stability, reducing poverty and improving the sustainable capabilities of the poor. The criticality of land to Ghana's development and the significance of agriculture and mining (which are all directly related to land) to Ghana's economy means measures to reform land in Ghana must be developed with an aim of ensuring equitable land distribution that is fair, efficient, effective and transparent and to ensure that people whose livelihoods depend on land are duly protected to reduce poverty sustainably.

This chapter has discussed land issues and land ownership structure in Ghana and the importance of land to Ghana's developmental efforts. An analysis of Ghana's land ownership structure and its relating issues demonstrate that the customary sector controls around 80% of Ghana's undeveloped lands. Although Ghana's constitution recognises the customary land management system, individual interpretations, misrepresentations and exploitations have been applied by various TAs leading to multiple problems in the customary land management system which have inevitably had rippling effects on Ghana's developmental efforts. Because of the autonomy of TAs linked in a way to interventions and compromises made during the colonial era, the government is reluctant to intervene in the customary land management system and have resulted to play an advisory role instead. State institutions charged with land management functions are also bereft with problems such as corruption and favouritism towards the rich and powerful.

The political environment in Ghana, as in many countries in SSA, and the way land is held or owned in Ghana means attempts to reform the Ghanaian land sector faces risks ranging from political, institutional and to stakeholder and social risks. While these may be skewed towards threats to outcome, successfully reforming the Ghanaian land sector can also create opportunities by redistributing income, build trust between the state and the customary land owners, reduce corruption and promote transparency in Ghana's land delivery system.

In 1999, the GoG launched the NLP which aimed at providing a policy framework to address the problems of the land sector sustainably and to derive the opportunities therein due to the significance of land to poverty reduction and economic growth in Ghana. The LAP, the first of its kind in SSA, was subsequently designed in 2003 as the implementation arm of the NLP to ensure efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land delivery system. The criticality of land matters to the political, social and economic development in Ghana means the project is characterised by many stakeholders each with a different view and expectation of the project. Their acceptance and commitments, irrespective of their differing views and expectations, are crucial to the project's success.

Having discussed the context within which this research is being carried out in this chapter, the next chapter employs data from the fieldwork exercise to discuss the ways by which the project's risks were identified and the risks identified through these processes.

Chapter Five Risk Identification Issues and Land Administration Project-Risk Management Process

5.1 Introduction

Risk identification, according to Cooper (2012); Stanton and Webster (2014), determine the extent to which the achievement of objectives are exposed to risk and can also determine the extent to which necessary preparations and adjustments could be made to cope with the effects of risks appropriately (WB 2013b) while pursuing opportunity. As earlier elucidated in chapter 4, land plays an important role in economic growth, poverty alleviation and food security in Ghana and as result, matters pertaining to land are critical to the socio-economic development of the country as whole. Consequently, as a development project designed to ensure efficiency and transparency in land management and administration systems in the whole of Ghana, the LAP was exposed to a variety of risks which had the potential of influencing its expected outcomes.

To answer the research sub-question, **what are the ways by which risk identification can contribute to risk management practice?** The project's risk identification processes, and the risks identified through these processes needed to be thoroughly investigated and analysed. This is the first stage needed to establish the parameters required to investigate whether risk management practice can contribute to the project's success. Effective risk identification, according to Haniff and Salama (2016), requires having sufficient knowledge about the project's scope, environment, specific objectives and the various implementation agencies. This is needed to ensure that the purpose of the project

is aligned within the context in which the management of risk would be carried. This chapter discusses the project's risk identification processes and the risks identified through these processes.

5.2 The Project's Risks and Risk Identification Process

The processes used in identifying the project's risks and the risks identified through these processes are discussed in 5.2.1 - 5.2.4 below.

5.2.1 Experience

When asked how risks were identified under LAP, an LSA official who was very conversant with the project's risk identification strategy explained that experienced professionals with the requisite knowledge of Ghana's land management and administration system were the first point of call:

The potential problems with the ability of impacting on the success of LAP were identified through expert judgement and experienced consultants thoroughly scrutinising the issues relating to land administration and management in the country. These technical men deal with these problems day in and out so they literally know what issues we were likely going to encounter (Interview with team leader at CSAU one, 14/06/2017).

By referring to risks as problems, this official clearly did not acknowledge the opportunities that accompany risks. A land management expert who played an active role in the project's design, corroborated the above assertions and

elucidated further that the complexities of Ghana's land tenure system means the experienced professionals who designed the project, even at inception, were sceptical about tackling issues pertaining to land since they were conversant with these complexities and issues involved in reforming the land sector:

Ghana at the time had gone through so much reform processes in different sectors. In Agriculture, in forestry, in the road sector etc. so there were so many projects that were going on and to which we had experience in managing, but land was looked upon by almost all the major donors and even government as too complicated and intractable ……so if the thing was so convoluted and the interests so convoluted and the rest, nobody was interested in tackling land (Interview with technical director at the MLNR, 22/06/2017).

The institutional arrangements in Ghana's land tenure system, particularly the customary tenure system and the autonomy of chiefs in controlling the way land is held or owned in Ghana, to which these officials were conversant with having dealt with their complexities in their day to day activities, as per the official's assertion above, informed the project team members about the need to "implement" rather than "install" (Miller and Oliver 2015) the project within a workable institutional and policy framework. According to Miller and Oliver (2015), where stakeholders are not properly engaged, particularly those who can affect and influence project outcome significantly, projects stand the risks of being "installed" rather than "implemented" to achieve desired outcomes. These institutional risks the project faced, which were identified by expert judgements of the institutional arrangements in the project's environment as per the above assertions, were exacerbated by the existence and acceptability of both customary and state land management systems operating concurrently within the

country (Bugri 2012). Many of the interventions the project had to come up with to ensure its' success, were influenced by the institutional arrangements as explained by a TCPD official who had worked on the project for 9 consecutive years at the time of data collection in 2017:

..nearly all the interventions the project had to come out with had been influenced by the land tenure system, particularly the customary land tenure system (Interview with head of operations at TCPD, 29/06/2017).

The institutional arrangements and the autonomy of chiefs in controlling land, also have a potential of creating social issues that can influence the successful implementation of the project. Cagliano et al. (2015), argues that in identifying project risks, project team members need to be conversant with the different categories of risks and their relationships with each other to ensure they do not impact negatively on the achievement of project outcome. An OASL official, when asked how risks were identified under LAP, explained:

We knew through our experience with working with the land owning community that there were going to be social problems with regards to implementing some aspects of the project (Interview with technical director at the OASL, 20/06/2017).

The culture of the project environment is such that there is a lack of trust among some community members, and about the intentions of government in matters relating to land, which according to Hughes et al. (2011) have led to individual interpretations and misinterpretations in matters relating to land. The lack of trust and clarity in land matters had social implications on the project since some farmers were reluctant to make their lands available for demarcation, under the project's RPRD exercise. The RPRD exercise was undertaken with the *prima*

facie objective of replacing physical landmarks used to define boundaries in the designated areas, with survey maps in the project's quest to reduce land litigations as a result of the physical landmarks shifting over time. A supreme traditional leader, who also oversee the running of one of the CLSs explained:

The farmers were not happy with the demarcation exercise, particularly the settlers as they thought it was an indirect way to tax them or to take the land from them (Interview with supreme traditional leader, 30/06/2017).

These views were affirmed by an official of the MLNR who explained:

At the initial stages of the project, so many of the farmers thought the state was going to use the RPRD exercise for taxation purposes or use that to monitor them so some of them were a bit sceptical and didn't want to be part of it…. So if you see the composite plan we did, you will see that there are still pockets of voids within it. Ordinarily, if everybody had come, you wouldn't have seen voids but farms scattered on it (Interview with lands officer at the MLNR, 19/06/2017).

Settler farming is common practice in Ghana. It involves the migration of farmers from resource deprived areas to areas with the requisite conditions for Agriculture such as Southern Ghana. Tenure insecurity and lack of transparency in land dealings sometimes leads to settler farmers being exploited by TAs (Serwonu 2012), with many at risk of losing their main livelihoods.

An official of the OASL corroborated the above assertions and explained further that:

We knew some of the problems that we were most likely going to encounter because our office has been working on these issues even before the land policy

which identified the problems were launched. Some of the problems were also identified by technical people who formed the basis of the National Land Policy. So all these problems of indeterminate boundaries……were problems we knew and were captured in the land policy. We envisaged that selling the project's idea to the people especially the traditional authorities, would be a challenge because they are in their comfort zone selling their own land then we were talking about bringing a secretariat to bring issues of transparency and good governance to customary land administration? (Interview with regional head of OASL, 12/07/2017).

The issue faced by the project team members at inception was that, in addition to issues of indeterminate boundaries, many of these land-owning groups were not registered themselves. Land was sold to prospective investors and in some instances, were not even recorded properly which resulted in technical challenges for the land management and administration institutions. A combination of these institutional and technical risks to project outcome also led to the identification of other stakeholder related risks such as the issue of multiple sales of same land to different individuals which is a serious issue in Ghana. A sub chief I interviewed confirmed that:

Due to the fact that we didn't have proper records of our land transactions, we encountered issues of multiple land sales (Interview with sub-chief and leader of CLS, 30/06/2017).

His views were replicated by nearly all the TAs I interviewed. A CLS official who is also a secretary to one of the TAs re-iterated that:

The issue is that there should be layouts before we sell lands. The chiefs however still sell their lands without layouts and also don't keep proper records of the sold lands so they keep selling the same parcel of land to different people (Interview with secretary at CLS, 07/07/2017).

So how can their activities be regulated or tracked if they are not registered? This unfortunately, lead to a lack of accountability and transparency in their land dealings (Kuusanga and Gerber 2015) which in effect lead to land disputes as a result of claims and counter claims of the same parcel of land by different individuals.

Another official I interviewed was however of the view that:

If you have land and don't have proper records, you are more than likely to encounter such problems…….in some instances however, due to fraud and the love for money, people engage in multiple land sales deliberately, especially in Accra (Interview with regional head of OASL, 12/07/2017).

Although the official acknowledges the fact that there may be some institutional and technical attributes such as not having proper records on land transactions and layouts linked to MLS, there are also instances where MLS are deliberately done on the part of the land owning groups out of greed. Accra is the capital of Ghana. Over the years, there have been many incidents of MLS in the city due to the increasing value of land and the quest for development from amongst wealthy Ghanaians. Land ownership in some prime parts of the city is a measure for riches which inadvertently lead to competition and in some instances, lead to the multiple sale of land to same individuals since some prospective buyers are prepared to go any length to acquire such lands, sometimes fraudulently. This is

not unique to Accra but are replicable throughout Ghana due to the increasing value of land which has even led to “land grabbing” on the part of foreign investors who can afford the exorbitant prices at the expense of the poor and vulnerable (Morvaridi 2012).

This notwithstanding, the state land management system and the various LSAs which were mainly the implementation arm of LAP also faced risks which had the potential to influence the project’s outcome. The project documents itself, which were designed by experts in Ghana’s land service delivery system who deal with issues relating to land as part of their day to day activities, identified at inception that the willingness of some of the project’s main stakeholders, particularly public land sector officials, TAs, judiciary, and some landowners to partake and cooperate with the reforms proposed by the project, as the main risks to its’ successful preparation, implementation and sustainability (WB 2003; 2008a; 2011a).

Project stakeholders play a crucial role on development projects since their commitments and acceptability determine the success (Stuckenbruck 1986), or otherwise of the project. LAP, as a development project, have wider stakeholder interests each with a different interpretation, understanding and expectations of the project and its’ outcome. Consequently, willingness and contributions of the project’s main stakeholders to partake and cooperate with the reforms proposed by the project is key to its’ successful implementation and sustainability.

When asked about the project’s key risks to development outcome, a key member of the PCU explained that along the way the project team members noticed that the majority of the project’s stakeholders and proposed beneficiaries

did not understand the project's purpose due to the fact that they were used to doing things their own way:

We noticed that people are used to doing things a certain way and have their own measure of rearranging the process to suit them…… How to make the people accept change is a real issue (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

Resistance to change and lack of understanding of the project's purpose is partly due to lack of transparency in land dealings and exploitations of the before project situation. Another PCU official who was responsible for driving change in the LSAs confirmed the first official's assertion and explained further that:

People were just resisting the change as they were comfortable ……...so long as land transactions were done in a manual way there was no way that proper change could be implemented…….Don't forget majority of these people were benefitting from the status quo……. It is not a matter of people not seeing the benefits of the change……., they reluctantly refuse to change (Interview with head of HR at the PCU, 22/06/2017).

Refusal to accept and adapt to change and to support the vision of a project (Bourne and Walker 2006), as exhibited by some of LAP's key stakeholders, is detrimental to the delivery of the project's desired outcome, and exploration of opportunities therein. The LSA staff are key stakeholders who are critical to the successful implementation of the project, and to whom many of the proposed changes were designed to ensure good practice in their endeavours to enable them carry out their tasks more effectively and efficiently. It is therefore an issue for concern to be faced with such resistance as these stakeholders can affect and influence (van Offenbeek and Vos 2016) the project and its' outcome,

significantly. An MLNR official, who could not comprehend the justification for their resistance explained:

Along the way what was seen was that people were comfortable with a certain scheme of operation and therefore they were in their comfort zones and there was very massive resistance in changing that (Interview with technical director at the MLNR, 22/06/2017).

A TCPD official I interviewed confirmed the extent to which resisting change on the part of their internal colleagues might have on project outcome:

Getting staff to accept that this is how planning is going to be done going forward is an issue (Interview with head of operations at TCPD, 29/06/2017).

Aside the unwillingness to support the project's vision on the part of some of the project's stakeholders as discussed, another TCPD official I interviewed at a different regional office explained further that switching from the manual way of doing things to apply the project's installed technical cadastre infrastructure was also challenging because:

For most of the country, technical officers were used to using radiograph so getting technical officers to switch from the manual way of doing things to a new one is very challenging (Interview with team leader at TCPD, 11/07/2017).

There are some technical attributes to projects that require the requisite expertise to ensure its' successful implementation. Consequently, the lack of institutional capacity and expertise can directly impact the competence of organisations (Kollveit et al. 2004) tasked with the successful implementation of projects. According to Turner (2014), projects are carried out to bring "beneficial change".

However in some instances, as elucidated above, this change might not be beneficial if the people the change is designed to benefit are used to doing things a certain way and therefore refused to accept or adapt to change, or are unable to carry out the change due to technical incompetence(s). Does this therefore mean that the change should be designed to suit the way people do things normally? Certainly not, as this will defeat the purpose of carrying out the project. Nonetheless, these poses risks that can influence the achievements of project outcome significantly.

A key member of the implementation team confirmed the assertions made by the TCPD official above and explained *inter alia* that:

Inadequate capacity amongst the project implementation arm is one of the key risks to the project's outcome (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

Nearly all the officials in the implementation agencies I interviewed were of the view that the project lacked the human resource capacity needed for its' successful implementation. One particularly explained:

The work load is more than the work force. For example, every district in Ghana needs a land officer to oversee key project activities but this is not the case. In addition, the infrastructure to implement the changes is simply not available (Interview with team leader at CSAU two, 11/07/2017).

It is evident from the above discussions that some key institutional, technical, stakeholder, social and political risks to project outcome were identified through experienced professionals with the requisite expertise of Ghana's land management and administration system, a view of risk identification supported

by researchers such as Chapman (1990) and Haniff and Salama (2016). Chapman (1990), in investigating the criticality of risk identification on the achievement of objectives, recommends the need for risk identification to be carried out by well-informed and creative experts with sufficient knowledge of the politico-socio context within which an organisation operates, whereas Haniff and Salama (2016) argues further that experts are a great source of knowledge for risk identification due to their exposure to risk informed decision making.

Maytorena et al. (2007) however elucidates that the role of experience in risk identification is not as significant as widely believed but argues in favour of the information search style, level of education and the risk management training received by the expert as more significant than experience in the identification of risks. However, their arguments against the role of experience lack clarity in the sense that the information search style, level of education and risk management training of experts, to which they argue are more significant, are all linked directly or indirectly to the built up of experience and cognitive abilities of the expert and do not clearly delineate the role of experience from risk identification.

While people tasked with dealing with risk related outcomes as part of their job delivery can provide valuable insights to the identification of project risks, there may be instances where experience alone may not be enough in identifying project risks. An expert in Ghana's land management and administration system who was also part of the team that designed the project explained:

So there were so many projects that were going on and to which we had experience in managing, but land was looked upon by almost all the major donors and even government as too complicated and intractable …… so if the thing

was so convoluted and the interests so convoluted and the rest, nobody was interested in tackling land because when you are running projects, you want to see a successful start and a successful end. So even with our experience in projects and knowledge of Ghana's land management and administration system at the time, it was difficult for us to conceptualise exactly what the risks and success factors were at the time. So we had to use a combination of experience as well as a learning-by-doing-approach to identify the project's risks. So what we were doing was that, yes we know there were going to be a lot of pitfalls along the way, but we make the mistakes and learn. (Interview with technical director at the MLNR, 22/06/2017).

Although the interviewee acknowledge the importance of experience in identifying project risks to an extent, in some instances, the project environment, nature and type of project and the type of stakeholders involved can also influence the extent to which experience could be beneficial in identifying project risks. In his arguments in favour of the socially constructed phenomenon of risk, Beck (2006) argues that there are different classes and capacities of classification of risk which need to be acknowledged accordingly to reduce its probability of occurrence. This means experts may not be the only source of knowledge in identifying risks to project outcome as they may not have all the knowledge as perceived. The MLNR officials' view of risk identification supports the arguments of Beck (2006), Cooper (2012), Raftery (2003) and Sutton (2014) who recommends the employment of systematic processes in the risk identification process. These systematic processes also require a combination of different risk identification strategies and not just rely on experience, or people perceived as having the requisite expertise, in the identification of project risks**.**

Consequently, there may also be people who may not necessarily possess the requisite academic expertise but may be well-informed and creative with inside knowledge of the project environment and Ghana's land management and administration system, who can also provide valuable insights into the identification of the project's risks. Their role on project risk identification is discussed in 5.2.1.1 below.

5.2.1.1 Risk Identification and Perceived Non-Experts

From the discussions so far, it is evident that there was an over-reliance on experts in the identification of the LAP's risks without exploring the wider pool of knowledge available to the project team members. "Perceived non-experts", in this context, include a category of the project's stakeholders and/or proposed beneficiaries, such as some TAs, individual landowners, farmers, and the wider land owning community, who may have a different class of classification of risk (Beck 2006) and as such, may possess the ability to provide valuable insights into the nature and type of risks the project faced, but were marginalised in the project's risk identification strategy due to being perceived as not having the requisite technical and/or academic expertise by project team members.

The main focus of the LAP's objective of ensuring efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery is to use access to land and security of land rights as a vehicle to reduce poverty and strengthen the sustainable capabilities of the poor. Consequently, many of the "perceived non-experts", including the poor and vulnerable and many others who rely on land and the benefits accruing on land for their livelihoods can either affect, or be affected by the project and/or its'

decision or outcome (PMI 2013). As key stakeholders therefore, their involvements in the identification of the project's risks are crucial to its' successful implementation and sustainability of its reforms. A regional head of the OASL however explained that the project team members, at inception, thought they were conversant with events that had the potential of influencing the project's successful implementation and outcome without actively involving many of the project's main stakeholders and intended beneficiaries, in the risk identification process:

A lot of the drafting, the project design and implementation plan were office based as they thought they knew the problem so they didn't go deeper in involving the beneficiaries. They even brought this slogan that it was a learning-by-doing-approach so obviously once you adopt that approach you realise that you didn't do much consultation….we should have consulted more (Interview with regional head of OASL, 12/07/2017).

A spokesperson for a powerful TA confirmed the lack of consultation on the part of the project team members and explained:

Project experts need to understand that when they are dealing with projects of this nature, they need to consider the social characters of the people they are dealing with. In Ashanti here, you cannot have a successful project unless you have had a successful audience of his majesty the Otumfour. That audience is not necessarily the permission to carry on with the project but actually knowing what he wants and what can be permitted. There are things that are legal, but it can easily be frustrated by our customs because our customs define us. Before

the law, we had our chiefs and respect our chiefs (Interview with traditional land secretariat spokesperson, 29/06/2017).

The Ashanti kingdom has one of the well-established land management secretariats in Ghana. It was established in 1943 under the then colonial administration. The current king of the Ashanti Kingdom, Otumfour Osei Tutu II, restructured the office in 2011 and has since engaged both land management professionals and traditional leaders who are not necessarily land experts but have an understanding of land acquisition and dispute resolution, and issues relating to land to manage the office. Together, they are involved in land acquisition involving stool lands, land documentation, revenue collection and dispute resolution. The Asantehene's land secretariat preceded LAP and all the CLS under LAP were set up to perform similar duties as the Asantehene's land secretariat. Consequently, it would have been prudent if the project team members had consulted the secretariat during the risk identification stage of the project to assess the possible risks that had the potential of affecting the project's success, particularly the CLSs that were established under LAP. Although the LC is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that customary lands are disposed in conformity with approved planning schemes, they have been reluctant in administering this role due to the autonomy of TAs (GoG 2016). The above interview however suggest that irrespective of their autonomy and power, the chiefs have listening ears and are ready to sit down with project team members to determine how best things could be done to improve land management and administration in Ghana.

Projects are change instruments (Turner 2014) and the people who may be affected either directly or indirectly by the change the project proposes are crucial

in every stage of a project's life. As argued by van Offenbeek and Vos (2016), stakeholder identification and involvements should not only involve those that can affect and influence project decisions. The consultations or involvement of "perceived non-experts" should therefore not only involve those who can affect and influence the project or its' decision, but also those who may be affected by the project's decision in one way or another. A regional stool lands officer was however of the view that there is a greater possibility of marginalising the latter due to the nature of Ghana's land tenure system. He explained:

Because of the complexities in the land tenure system in Ghana, you may end up targeting certain chiefs. In consulting, we should not only focus on people in higher authority and paramount chiefs etc but the message need to go to the grassroots to involve all critical stakeholders (Interview with regional head of OASL, 12/07/2017).

The critical stakeholders, as per the official's assertion, include many in the perceived non-expert category. The fieldwork data however suggest that many of the "perceived non-experts" I interviewed were very much conversant with the risks to project outcome and could have provided valuable insights to the identification of some of the project's risks and positively influenced its' successful implementation, should they have been consulted. Below, three leaseholders interviewed at two regional LSAs explained some risks, based on their individual experiences, which have the potential to influence the project's outcome:

Leaseholder 2: *The attitude and supervision of the people is what the problem is. I have worked here before and senior officers don't supervise staff unless someone has reported something to them or there is a complaint, but as to*

whether they will come and check what's going on or check files etc they don't. They don't even know the files on people's desk or how they move (Interview with leaseholder 2, 06/07/2017).

Leaseholder 5: *It's the officers I think. They need to be more vigilant and serious with what they are doing* (Interview with leaseholder 5, 11/07/2017).

Leaseholder 7: *A lot needs to be done at the lands commission as there are so many people there who are there for personal gains…..our political system also has the potential of derailing any gains made in the land sector particularly when we take people out of office because they belong to a different political party* (Interview with leaseholder 7, 05/07/2017).

Although perceived as "non-experts", the aforementioned assertions are institutional, technical, stakeholder and political risks with the potential to influence project outcome. While some of these risks may have been identified by the project team members from a different perspective, actively involving multiple project actors (Aaltonen and Sivonen 2009), including those perceived as "non-experts", can complement their gains and provide a better understanding of the project's risks, from a beneficiary perspective since some are well known in their areas of operation as argued by Obeng-Odoom (2011) in his study involving stakeholders in the Ghanaian housing market. Besides, as argued by Beck (2006), there are different classes of classifications and capacities of risk which can complement each other to provide a holistic understanding of the risks the project faced.

Even in areas where stakeholder consultations were involved to an extent, “the final litigants”, more or less the marginalised, were not involved as explained by a project officer for the judiciary:

We didn’t include the final litigants……..it is technical and you need the technical people to design them (Interview with project officer at the Judiciary, 21/06/2017).

The projects own Implementation and Completion Report (WB 2018c: 23) stated that “the project was well designed as an academic exercise, with all the key land administration and land management factors included, but there was little practical recognition of what could be achieved”. This statement in itself acknowledges in some way that irrespective of the fact that experts are and can be a great source of knowledge (Haniff and Salama 2016), they are arguably not the only source of knowledge. Besides, projects need to be implemented practically and as such using a wider variety of expertise, technical or not, as well as soliciting the views of intended beneficiaries in the identification of project risks is necessary to reduce risk identification biases, which according to Reeves et al. (2013), could be detrimental to project performance and ultimately its’ success.

A greater majority of the project team members in various government departments and implementation agencies confirmed the importance of considering all the key actors and the wider pool of expertise, technical or not, in the identification of project risks. When asked what they would do differently in terms of risk identification for future projects of this nature, 18 out of the 19 project team members I interviewed in different implementation agencies confirmed that some of the issues they faced at the implementation stage could have been avoided if the projects’ wider stakeholders and a greater number of proposed

beneficiaries were consulted appropriately in identifying the project's risks at inception.

Below, are excerpts from the interview I had with an official of the MLNR:

Interviewer: Given the opportunity, what would you do differently?

Interviewee: *Personally, I think we overlooked the importance of involving the project's beneficiaries actively at project inception. We sat in our offices and came up with some programmes which we wanted to roll out in those areas without recourse to whatever those people wanted although as an office, we came across some of these problems in our everyday activities but to be honest with you, we never asked their opinion. But I think it makes sense for us to go to the people who would be affected at the inception stage in subsequent projects and ask for their opinion. Who knows? They may have some inputs that may go a long way to help the design of the project and may even solve some of the problems we face in the course of implementing the project* (Interview with lands officer at the MLNR, 19/06/2017).

The interests and expectations of proposed beneficiaries regardless of their influence and authority are crucial and need to be considered during project risk identification, particularly in development projects of this nature where the overall outcome is the provision of a service instead of a tangible output, making the different classes and capacities of risk (Beck 2006) even more beneficial.

Using a variety of experts and non-experts with adequate knowledge of the project and its' environment in risk identification also help to identify the most likely risks the project may face across all sectors, as well as provide an

opportunity to understand how they combine and interact with each other (Miller and Lessard 2001). This in effect, reduces the likelihood of previously unknown risks coming up to impact on the achievement of objectives at some point within the project's life.

5.2.2 Project Environment

Zwikael and Ahn (2011) posit that the level of project risks varies across industry and country and recommends that the environment within which a project exists need to be taken into consideration when identifying project risk levels. A project's environment can arguably be categorised into; the physical (natural) environment within which the project exist as well as its cultural, social and organisational environment. Together, these categories define the context (both internal and external) within which the project is undertaken and on which the management of risks would be carried out (ISO 31000: 2018).

When asked how risks were identified, an interviewee from one of the project's implementation agencies elucidated that the project's risk identification strategy involved identifying workable interventions that could be implemented within Ghana's land tenure framework:

..nearly all the interventions the project had to come out with had been influenced by the land tenure system, particularly the customary land tenure system. We are talking about 80% of our total lands. How can you ignore that? The sustainability of LAP depends on the acceptance of the reforms the project proposes. This is impossible to achieve unless the environment within which the reforms would be

implemented is understood and incorporated. (Interview with head of operations at TCPD, 29/06/2017).

As earlier discussed, the complexities in Ghana's land tenure system are mostly due to the existence of two land management systems (customary and state) operating concurrently in Ghana. With about 80% of Ghana's land in customary ownership and the remaining 20% constituting state and vested lands (Yeboah and Shaw 2013), conflicts of interest between the two established land management systems in the project's environment posed institutional and stakeholder risks to the project's quest to ensure efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery. Interestingly, some of the TAs perceived their regularisation and subsequent registration and transparency as more or less, interferences in their day to day activities as explained by a secretary at one of the CLS':

Some of the chiefs think you are delving too much into their personal affairs since they think it's their land so they can do what they want with it (Interview with secretary at CLS, 07/07/2017).

All the LSA, WB and MLNR officials I interviewed were of the view that the tenurial arrangements in the project's environment had an influence on the project's risk levels in one way or another. The leader of the WB strategic task team, having under-studied the project's environment critically, asserts:

To be able to achieve progress in Ghana's land management and administrative system, we need to actively involve the customary sector. Unless we involve them actively, efforts would be made but this wouldn't lead to progress sufficiently. Until then, we will be wasting resources trying to achieve what could have otherwise

been easier with tackling the problem from the root (Interview with WB task team leader, 07/06/2017).

Bowyer-Bower (2000) argues that issues of land ownership and rights of use are central to development and continue to dominate the development of many countries in SSA, and Ghana is not an exception. This is mostly due to the fact that many are shaped by cultural and individual practices which are allowed to operate in these countries and are difficult to amend in many instances. These, then serve as development impediments (Willy 2011) in instances where land is needed for development. The aforementioned assertions by the WB official corroborates the arguments made by Haniff and Salama (2016), that identifying the source of risks as well as its consequences, define the root cause of the problem and provides the platform for effective risk management. This also means that the project team members need to effectively acknowledge the various institutional arrangements across all sectors of the project environment to enable them identify all possible risks to project outcome.

In addition to the institutional arrangements in the project environment which posed institutional and stakeholder risks, the political arrangements in the project environment were also considered as having the potential to influence the project's risk levels. LAP's project appraisal document (WB 2003: 30) stated among others that "the willingness of government officials in the public sector agencies to adapt to the initiated institutional and governance reforms were threats to the project's successful completion and sustainability of its reforms". An MLNR official who was part of the team that designed the project's concept document and have been affiliated with the project in different capacities elucidated further that:

The institutional arrangements made it very difficult to put implementation measures in place and it has continued to today…Appointments to heads of institutions were not based on competence or seniority but on political grounds…… So when the person comes, his frame of mind is a bit different. Unfortunately the succession hierarchies were also very opaque (Interview with technical director at the MLNR, 22/06/2017).

Krane et al. (2012) argues that the interests of politicians in projects are mostly different from that of the project management teams' since politicians fall within the "project owner" category whose interests are strategic to achieving a political goal, while that of the project management teams' are specific to the achievement of project objectives. The aforementioned assertions by the MLNR official were confirmed in one of the meetings I personally attended between officials of the WB task team and a newly appointed mayor. When asked about the progress of one of the project's key activities, the street addressing system, he replied:

I have followed the project but don't have any technical knowledge about it. All I can say is that I'm happy with the street naming system so far, the vice president and chief of staff are all interested (Comment by newly elected mayor, 06/06/2017).

Blatantly, this political appointee was trying to achieve a political goal (Krane et al. 2012) by praising his political masters without key knowledge of activities specific to the achievement of the particular project objective. Since returning to constitutional rule in 1992, Ghana has experienced a change in government every 8 years. The long-term nature of the project means its implementation spans through different political administrations. Although governance is

supposed to be continuous, this is not often the case in Ghana. An investigation by Damoah and Akwei (2017) into the reasons why government projects fail in Ghana revealed that while nearly all these projects are undertaken with a national development agenda, many are abandoned when governments change to start new ones in order to impress the electorate. This is partly due to successive governments been assessed politically by their individual achievements whilst in power and not the continuity of government business, which should rather have been pursued.

While successive governments have supported the project's implementation, this has been done within a different political spectrum. Although there is a PCU charged with the coordination of the day to day activities of the project, they are meant to liaise with the MLNR in project implementation. Ministers and their deputies as well as other political appointees are replaced when governments change. As argued by Atesmen (2015), changes in upper management such as political appointees during a project's life often comes with new ideas which can significantly impact on project outcome. These changes can also pose financial and procurement risks to project outcome such as delays in accounting for transferred funds and continuity in the vigilance and purchase of goods and services for project execution.

Although political risks are mostly outside the direct control of project team members, their impacts can be critical to project outcome since they can directly or indirectly affect the achievement of project objectives. An MLNR official I interviewed explained the extent to which political interferences can influence project execution:

The politicians try to run the departments for us and it's a big issue in Ghana. If you say no, they will find ways and means of demoting you....so sometimes, the best way is to keep quiet (Interview with lands officer at the MLNR, 19/06/2017).

This in effect make the project, or some aspects of it, susceptible to manipulations (Bokor 2011) by some politicians for political gains which can also influence project performance negatively (Damoah and Akwei 2017). As argued by Stuckenbruck (1986) and affirmed by Achterkamp and Vos (2008), effective social interactions between key stakeholders in a project's environment, particularly those who can affect and influence project decisions need to be maintained continuously during project implementation. However, from the above discussions, the "relational ontology" (Mission and Loufrani-Fedida 2044:1110) which is needed throughout the projects' implementation to ensure transparent, continuous social interactions between the project team members and politicians, were not as transparent since some of them will rather play along, even in circumstances where they were clearly unhappy with some decisions, due to political influence.

In addition, the organisational culture and capacity in the LAP's implementation environment also had the potential to influence the project's risk levels. At inception, it came to light that the ability of the various institutions in the project's environment to be able to support the implementation and sustainability of a project of this nature were questionable. A town planning official in one of the implementation agencies, when asked about how risks were identified at inception, explained that the organisational structure was scrutinised and it came out that:

We didn't have the right staff in terms of capacity to apply the changes and to prepare the plans proposed under the project (Interview with head of operations at TCPD, 29/06/2017).

Ubels et al. (2010) argues that capacity is not necessarily the number of employees in an organisation, but the ability to be able to carry out a task successfully. The project involves the application and establishment of cadastre related technology, Land Information System (LIS) technology, geodetic infrastructure, and ICT applications in its' quest to promote efficiency and cost saving in Ghana's land service delivery and as such require adequate technical expertise for their sustainability and applicability. Without the ability to provide such expertise, projects as change instruments, face risks which have the potential to influence its' outcome and sustainability of its establishments. With LAP however, the lack of technical infrastructure was evident in all the LSAs and government agencies tasked with the successful implementation of the project. This problem was also exacerbated by the duplicity of duties in some of these agencies playing overlapping roles as explained by a key official at the MLNR:

Here you had land surveyors thinking that their brand of land administration was the best, where you had land valuation board who thought that they were the super valuers of the world, where you look at the lands commission at the time……..thinking because they had been engaged with virtually all the stakeholders in land administration, they were the super heroes…….the bottom line is that all the implementation agencies were very weak as far as technical infrastructure was concerned. For example the land valuation board as at 2003 had just one dos base computer for the entire country (Interview with technical director at the MLNR, 22/06/2017).

As part of my fieldwork observations, I visited the knowledge transfer section of the GELIS control room on 14th June 2017. I noticed that a lack of adequate logistics in carrying out their tasks successfully resulted in scanning errors in the transfer of old land documents. This however, places continuous drain on the already scarce resource since the data will have to be reconciled with other documents to reduce errors.

In addition to the technical and institutional risks the main implementation agencies faced, the customary sector who controls the majority of land in Ghana, also lacked the requisite capacity in the various land owning communities to support the project's implementation and sustainability of its' reforms. As critical stakeholders, due to their dominance in land ownership, they have the ability to affect and influence (PMI 2013) the project and its' outcome significantly. Unfortunately, particular emphasis were not placed on improving the capacity of the wider land owning groups in the identification of the project's risks as was done in the various LSAs partly due to their marginalisation in the risk identification process as earlier discussed.

A member of the Civil Society Coalition on Land (CICOL), who was very critical with the project's approach of only emphasising on building the capacity of the LSAs without doing same to the wider land owning community, explained:

We need to develop the capacities of the land owning groups to enable them manage these lands properly to make it easier to monitor their activities or else they will not even come and report to the LSA institutions (Interview with project manager at CICOL, 22/06/2017).

He was of the view that majority of the business activities in the LSAs is as a result of the land owning groups going to register their lands. Identifying the need to build the capacity of the LSAs as potential risks to project outcome without doing same to the land owning groups will in effect, not lead to the smooth implementation of the project as a whole. This is due to the fact that the LSAs exist mainly to manage land, the majority of which is owned by the land-owning groups. A deputy minister of lands at the time of project inception, who now runs an NGO, elucidated further that:

Building the capacity of the land owning groups particularly in terms of registration is very important because if their system of recording transactions is weak, they will definitely pass on the virus into the national grid (Interview with director Land for Life, 23/06/2017).

Aaltonen (2011) asserts the criticality of identifying the different characteristics and involvements of such key individual interests in projects as failure to do so may impact on outcome. Moreover, the established institutions, particularly in development projects that provide intangible outputs, need to be sustained and as such the continuous monitoring of the various institutions and the organisational competence(s) to support this sustainability is critical to identifying any risks that may arise throughout a project's life. With the LAP however, adequate sustainability measures were not built into some key project activities particularly the established CLS'.

Representatives of all the CLS' I interviewed shared similar experiences with regards to their sustainability. Below are extracts from three different CLS':

Secretary at CLS: *All they did was just establishing the CLS. No one is checking on us so there is no accountability* (Interview with secretary at CLS, 07/07/2017).

Sub-chief and leader of CLS: *They placed the equipment here but didn't recommend anywhere for us to maintain them so when they stop working, maintenance then becomes an issue* (Interview with sub-chief and leader of CLS, 30/06/2017).

Supreme traditional leader: *They haven't monitored the CLS to identify the problems we are facing with regards to our sustainability. All they said is that we are responsible for our own running and maintenance but no recommendations as to how* (Interview with supreme traditional leader, 30/06/2017).

For development projects to be able to support sustained change, the capacity of beneficiaries at the local level should be built for them to own and sustain this change (Analoui and Danquah 2017). From the above discussions however, it is evident that this was not prioritised.

Data analysis from this chapter show that the sustainability of institutions established under development projects is crucial since scarce resources (Potts 2002) are invested to establish these institutions in the first place. Consequently, in identifying institutional and technical risks a project may face, sustainability of these institutions need to be incorporated irrespective of significance as failure to do so can place continuous drain on already scarce resources and in effect, impact on project outcome and/or its' long term benefits to society. One may argue that this aspect of sustainability falls within the operations (Chapman and Ward 2012) of the MLNR and therefore falls outside the project's scope and jurisdiction. Nonetheless, development projects are undertaken for the benefit of

society as a whole (Golini et al. 2015) and as such, risks that can impact on the sustainability of institutions established by projects need to be identified and suitable recommendations made on handing over to ensure more people benefit from the project and its' establishments.

LAP itself falls within the context of the third-generation post Washington consensus PSR agenda which aimed at improving service delivery in Africa's public sector (Ayee 2015). Irrespective of the gains made under the Washington consensus, Owusu (2012) argues that many of the problems in Africa's public sector persist after years of continuous reform, and Ghana is no exception to this. The culminating effect of this has created a culture in many public sector organisations in Ghana, including the project implementation arm, who are key stakeholders in the LAP. An MLNR official explained:

The biggest problem is the attitude of the people in some of our LSAs. In all these things, the person dealing with the issue is the problem. Even without the digital means, we could have done far better than what we were doing but some people were deliberately hiding files etc. (Interview with lands officer at the MLNR, 19/06/2017).

As earlier discussed, the organisational culture in the project implementation agencies is such that some employees seem to be comfortable with what they are doing and see change as a threat to their livelihood. Unfortunately, these are people who were either benefitting corruptly from the before project situation, or are deliberately resisting change or delaying the process in an attempt to frustrate the efforts made in ensuring efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery. A PCU official explained further:

Attitudinal change is a serious problem with development projects that establishes institutions particularly where people are used to an old way of doing things. One thing I noticed at our LSAs was that people were intentionally delaying the land administration process by looking for files in wrong cabinets so as to get something from clients. With the system automated, people have a problem with its usage although considerable training and assurance have been given….corruption is a factor (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

Another official confirmed this assertion and elucidated further that:

When we first started, someone who has now retired told me point blank that this was not going to work because they were comfortable with what they were getting with the LC at the time. Although I've been involved with LC for a long time, I thought the cost of searches was 200 GHS but when the CSAU came, I realised it was actually 20 GHS. Imagine trying to change somebody charging this much for a product? (Interview with head of HR at the PCU, 22/06/2017).

What this means is that even though the people in the various implementation agencies were fully aware of the project's intended benefits, their own corrupt practices posed stakeholder and institutional risks as they were serving as huge obstacles to enable them support its' successful implementation. As highlighted by (WB 2008a), the lack of transparency and efficiency in Africa's public sector is an impediment on Africa's developmental efforts and until there is a change of heart or people adjust their myopic mind-sets to include that of the national interest, many developmental efforts in Africa will be thwarted by greed. Fieldwork data from this study confirms Ghana is not an exception to this.

A WB official I interviewed, who has been on similar land administration missions in other SSA countries including Uganda, Malawi and Sierra Leone, and was part of LAP's design team explained his experience with some implementation agency staff:

I had people coming to me blatantly saying that this will not work. My investigations further revealed that they were benefitting corruptly from the old system so didn't want change (Interview with academic and member of the WB task team, 09/06/2017).

The lack of transparency in these organisations has resulted in a lack of trust from the general public particularly on the part of leaseholders who patronise the services of the LSAs. Below are extracts from two leaseholders I interviewed who have had varying degrees of experience with the various LSAs and share similar experiences with the organisational culture in these agencies:

Leaseholder 1. *There is too much corruption in the system and this is an issue that is not helping us at all* (Interview with leaseholder 1, 06/07/2017).

Leaseholder 2. *Corruption on the part of the officers here is a serious issue. Although there is a statutory provision, they just don't follow it to charge the right amount. For example a charge of 50 GHS was displayed as 500 GHS but because I knew, I approached the officer who changed the terminology but changing the figure became a problem* (Interview with leaseholder 2, 06/07/2017).

For LAP, however, where the PDO includes the promotion of efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land delivery system, this issue of corruption amongst

the project delivery arm, who are key stakeholders required for the successful implementation of the project, is a major obstacle to the achievement of the project's overall outcome. Fieldwork data from this study confirm the assertions made by Artto and Kujala (2008) and Yang et al. (2014) that not all internal stakeholders support a project's vision. The PMI (2013) in identifying the criticality of key stakeholders on project success recommended the need for project managers to engage stakeholders effectively to ensure they do not impact negatively on outcome. This, according to Beringer et al. (2013), require the need to motivate key stakeholders to support the project's vision, to ensure the project achieves its' intended outcome, and to explore the opportunities therein. However, in instances where their non-cooperation is driven by greed and exploitation as discussed, getting stakeholders to support a project's vision becomes extremely difficult.

The lack of transparency and failure to support a project's vision, particularly in development projects of this nature which mostly rely on donor funding to undertake key project activities, have contributed to the laying down of stringent bureaucratic procedures and guidelines as well as continuous vigilance and monitoring strategies by the donors (Ika 2012) to ensure project funds are used for the purposes for which they were intended. The culminating effects of these stringent measures and donor perceptions of the project environment have the potential of creating financial, procurement and institutional risks that can influence project outcome significantly. An MLNR official explained:

We had 6 donors supporting the project, the WB, DFID, GTZ, KFW, the Nordic Development fund and then the FAO came in to provide technical assistance…...each of them came with their own perceptions of what they

wanted…..so all the multiplier of the wrong things that they think were corrupt so they wanted to see a change in that whether it actually fitted into the project purpose or not….One donor particularly changed their focus and therefore disrupted quite a lot of things we needed to do (Interview with technical director at the MLNR, 22/06/2017).

Aside deviating from the project's purpose through what they thought should be done instead of aligning with the needs identified under the project implementation plan, some donors changed focus when they realised they could not achieve what they intended, causing disruptions to the project's implementation plan. The project document (WB 2011b), stipulates that irrespective of the agreements made by the key financiers to ensure continuous flow of funds at inception, this was not the reality during implementation as some donors did either not release the funds on time or commit to the initially agreed funds. These inconsistences in fund release had rippling effects on the ability to successfully purchase goods and equipment and to obtain goods, work and services required for successful project implementation. A project officer at the Judiciary explained the implications these had on the activities they were involved in:

The contractors were not paid on time. It took a long time for money to be released to the contractors (Interview with project officer at the Judiciary, 21/06/2017).

This notwithstanding, due to the technicality of some aspects of the project and the need to train more experts in project delivery, the project management team identified the need for capacity building as part of the activities that needed to be

undertaken by the project. This, however, did not materialise as expected mainly due to donor frustrations as to the type of training needed. The MLNR official explained further:

Similarly, with the sort of arrangements we made for this capacity building of getting people to be embedded in institutions, never materialised because they themselves did a head count and said we had so many people with BSc and Masters degrees…… so we should rather use that money on practical training. Practical training for what? So what then turn out was people were collected for workshops in M&E training……so the entire core of what the project intended to do was frustrated (Interview with technical director at the MLNR, 22/06/2017).

The aforementioned supports Bokor (2011)'s assertions that development projects are susceptible to donor manipulations which can have rippling effects on project implementation. While it is prudent for development projects to follow transactional processes that ensure rigor and transparency in their delivery due to the environments in which they are undertaken (Ika 2012), interfering in the day to day activities of the project frustrates the project plan and has repercussions on the overall achievements of project outcome. Financial availability and its' continuous flow are critical to the achievement of project objectives since they are required for the project to be operational, which according to Krane et al. (2010), are the most commonly encountered risks in project execution. They emphasised that operational risks are the project teams' responsibility due to their criticality in the achievements of project objectives.

However, with development projects of this nature as discussed, the project management team have little or no control as to the flow of funds from donors to

ensure the smooth operation of the project due to the strong procedures and guidelines, often laid down by donor agencies. With projects designed to operate within the constraints of time and cost, how donor influences impact on these constraints are crucial, especially when they are outside the project management teams' control to an extent, but their success are measured against these. I therefore agree with Brière et al. (2015)'s assertion that to reduce bureaucratic management and a lack of interaction between donors and organisations in development projects, it is important to adapt a local context and maintain a balance in resource allocation between key stakeholders. This notwithstanding, there need to be adequate checks and balances to ensure that project funds are used for the purposes for which they were intended. Once the funds have been received however, how they are disbursed for the procurement of goods and services can be controlled, to an extent, by the project management team in accordance with laid down guidelines.

A total of 38 out of the 43 interviewees confirmed directly or indirectly that the project's physical, social, cultural and organisational environment had an influence on project risk levels and the type and nature of risks identified; including political, financial, procurement, stakeholder, institutional, technical and to social and environmental risks. Fieldwork data from this study suggest that having sufficient knowledge of a project's environment and performing organisations are critical in identifying the potential risks to project outcome and the extent to which the achievement of project objectives are exposed to risks. It is also evident from the discussions that all aspects of the project environment, internal and/or external, are crucial in considering the nature and type of risks a project may face and should therefore be taken into consideration and

continuously monitored when identifying project risks, particularly with development projects where the outcomes are normally intangible outputs with a wider stakeholder base, each with different interpretations, understanding and expectations of the project environment.

5.2.3 Best Practice

Although projects are unique endeavours (Turner 1999) due to the uniqueness of the environments in which they are undertaken, lessons of best practice from similar projects in the past can contribute positively to identifying highly probable threats and opportunities in subsequent projects irrespective of the fact that the implementation strategy may be different from the previous project. A key MLNR official, who was actively involved in the LAP's risk identification process, explained how this strategy was applied:

So what we were doing was that, yes we know there were going to be a lot of pitfalls along the way, but we make the mistakes and learn and then also take best practice examples……...The best practice example we had at the time in terms of similar land administration projects was Thailand's Land Titling Project, which at the time had experienced a lot of successes for us to learn from. The only difficulty in applying their strategy was that land in Thailand is wholly owned by the king and as such they didn't have the legal and tenurial complexities we have here but it was still a great example to follow……by looking at the project's trends, milestones and key successes, we were able to identify key areas of concern such as complexities in land titling and technical capacity of staff (Interview with technical director at the MLNR, 22/06/2017).

Thailand's land titling project according to Bowman (2004) was one of the success stories in land administration projects and even received a WB Award for Excellence in 1997. The project itself began in 1984 so many of Ghana's land management and administration issues at the time, such as the technical and institutional threats to outcome as per the official's assertion, were similar to some of the issues Thailand faced in their approach to land reform. In addition to other risk identification strategies such as experience and analysing the project environment already discussed, the best practice strategy enabled the project team members to comprehend the extent to which these risks were likely to influence the successful implementation of the project and sustainability of its' reforms as explained by a TCPD official I interviewed:

By looking at lessons from Thailand's approach to Cadastral mapping under their land titling project and comparing it to Ghana's existing infrastructure at the time and the project's approach to land use planning, we were able to assess the possible risks that were likely to influence the sustainability of LAP such as the technical ability of our staff to implement those reforms as well as their acceptance of those reforms in land use planning by the larger community (Interview with head of operations at TCPD, 29/06/2017).

Haniff and Salama (2016) argue that the best practice strategy is best suited when risk categories from previous similar projects are drawn from and tailored to the current project during the risk identification process. This means it can be more effective when aligned with particular situations within the current project. While this might be the case for many projects, the assertions by both officials above suggest that the best practice approach can provide valuable information in the identification of probable risks even if the two projects do not share the

same characteristics and/or undertaken in similar environments. Chapman and Ward (2003) argues further that this involves evaluating possible occurrences from previous activities and then designing adaptability measures based on potential situations that may or may not occur in the current project.

One area where the best practice approach can be very effective in project risk identification is by analysing trends in other projects undertaken in similar environments, particularly in development projects where government departments mostly undertake several projects simultaneously or continuously. The usage of this strategy provided valuable information in the identification of financial, procurement, social and environmental risks as explained by two MLNR officials I interviewed:

Official one: *Through managing other projects under the ministry, we also became aware that people saw projects as providing resources so we had to prepare for that to ensure funds were not re-directed* (Interview with technical director at the MLNR, 22/06/2017).

Official two: *One thing is, you have to satisfy the financiers that you have done due diligence in terms of the people the project may affect before the project can even begin……..We looked at some of the social issues encountered in other projects we undertook in the ministry and then conducted stakeholder consultations in five regions to determine who and how they may be affected by the project* (Interview with lands officer at the MLNR, 19/06/2017).

As part of the stringent transactional processes and guidelines development projects have to follow (Ika 2012), the project team members needed to submit a comprehensive document to the funding agencies to explain the necessary

actions planned to ensure that people are not adversely affected by the project. Following due precedence by looking at best practice examples from similar projects as per the official's assertion, the project team members identified at inception that some key project activities such as the demarcation of boundaries, construction of new offices, rehabilitation of courts and traditional land secretariats involve taking land away from present occupiers which can lead to loss of accommodation or assets, loss of income or means of livelihood, displacements and land disputes, pollution, loss of vegetation, loss of bio-diversity, soil and water contamination (WB 2011a). These therefore pose social and environmental risks to project outcome. This notwithstanding, the location of certain project activities revealed that the social and environmental threats to project outcome is not as widespread as identified at inception since many were demarcated to be built on either government or beneficiary customary lands. An LSA official, when asked about the risks posed by the construction of the Kumasi Integrated LSA complex, explained:

The new complex is situated on government land. The area was schemed for offices and rightfully allocated to state institutions (Interview with team leader at CSAU two, 11/07/2017).

This means the land was not taken away from people whose livelihoods directly depend on it. My observations however revealed that there were a few squatters who were asked to vacate the land for the construction of the building to commence. Since they were illegally occupying government land, their rights were not considered as being trampled upon. This means that while the best practice approach can provide valuable insights into highly probable risks subsequent projects may face, the uniqueness of projects (PMI 2008), means

they do not always yield expected results even in projects undertaken in similar environments.

Although requirements such ESIAs are necessary to identify the extent to which projects are likely to impact on people and the environment, not all projects share the same characteristics and as such making this a stringent requirement that follow a strict guideline assume all projects follow a similar approach. This therefore reduces its efficacy since project team members tend to satisfy donor agencies by seeing this as a “check list” without looking at the dynamics of the project environment and wider implications it may have on people, particularly the poor and vulnerable. It will be more beneficial, as argued by Brière et al. (2015), for donor agencies to adapt to local contexts in development project implementation to ensure they benefit the people for which they were intended. This notwithstanding, with regards to financial and procurement risks, stringent measures that are adaptable to local environments are needed to ensure project funds are used for their intended purpose.

Where projects are implemented in different phases, the best practice approach can also provide valuable information for the identification of highly probable risks in subsequent phases by looking at “lessons learned” reports (Atesmen 2015: 26). Where available, evaluating the project’s milestones, success stories and areas for concern in previous phases from these reports can provide valuable insights into events that have the potential to influence project outcome, positively or negatively. This approach was used under LAP-2, particularly in the establishment of subsequent CLSs. All CLSs established between 2004 and June 2007 under LAP-1 were based on a “supply-led approach”, where LAP officials in collaboration with the relevant LSA agencies and government officials

decided on the customary areas that were selected for these CLSs without actively involving the customary landowners in the process.

The “supply-led” approach, according to WB (2011b), led to challenges which eventually negatively affected the smooth implementation and sustainability of the CLSs including; lack of full ownership and commitment by the TAs, and over reliance on government for their sustainability. An OASL official I interviewed was of the view that the lack of transparency in their establishment contributed to these challenges in one way or another. He explained:

There were a lot of political considerations under the supply-led approach to CLS establishments under LAP-1. I remember the then minister of lands just decided to score political points by establishing a CLS at his hometown. He got a posh office, furnished it, sent office equipment including air conditions etc, but there was no electricity in the area. Moreover, in that area, everybody occupies their ancestral land. Nobody sells land there for records to be taken. So what was the point establishing a CLS there? (Interview with technical director at the OASL, 20/06/2017).

By establishing an office and furnishing it with electrical equipment in an area without electricity, this political appointee clearly misplaced his priorities in an attempt to achieve a political goal. Damoah and Akwei (2017), argues that incidents like these negatively influence the success of development projects and partly contribute to the failure of government projects in Ghana. An interviewee from one of the “supply-led” CLSs explained further that the “supply-led” approach was not beneficial to some TAs since the lack of proper consultations led to some of them not understanding the actual concept of the CLS as a whole:

I think the chiefs should understand the concept of the CLS. They should understand the importance of the CLS and the benefits they will accrue from it….. If they do not understand it, how can it be successful? This office was brought here without the chief asking for it so it was imposed (Interview with secretary at CLS, 07/07/2017).

This affirms Miller and Oliver (2015)'s assertion that in instances where stakeholders are not properly engaged, projects tend to be "installed" rather than "implemented". Although installed and could be signed off as completed, intended beneficiaries of such projects may feel detached from the final outcome due to their non-engagement, resulting in the project having a lesser impact on the proposed beneficiaries. This strengthens my earlier arguments about the need for project team members to actively involve people they perceive as "non-technical" in the identification of project risks.

Lessons were therefore learnt from the experiences of the first phase and these were used extensively in the identification of risks at the second phase. The OASL official elucidated further:

Lessons from the first phase informed the planning for the second phase where the demand-led approach was used. We set out a criterion for qualification for the establishment of CLS in a traditional area. These included but not limited to; having a good place as an office; having very little land litigation issues to ensure resources were not wasted and finally, having the ability to process enough land transactions in the area (Interview with technical director at the OASL, 20/06/2017).

In addition to providing valuable information for the identification of some of the political, stakeholder, institutional and technical risks the CLS' faced, the "demand-led" approach can also help to reduce waste by ensuring that resources were advanced to areas where they were practically needed in line with the project objective of ensuring efficiency and transparency in land service delivery. Landowners had to formally apply for a CLS to be established in the area. Once they went through the process of selection and approval, there was a sense of belongingness where landowners felt attached to the CLS in an attempt to ensure they were steered to success.

It is evident from the discussions so far that while analysing historical documentations in previous projects through the best practice approach can lead to the identification of highly probable risks a project may face and help determine the extent to which the achievements of project objectives are exposed to risks, due to the dynamic nature of the project environment, it is also necessary to use the best practice approach to complement other risk identification strategies such as experience and an analysis of the project environment, since they can provide an extensive understanding of risks identified through these processes and their probability of occurrence in the current project.

5.2.4 Sensitization

The LAP's design was spread across the country with demand driven aspects which required the project team members to interact continuously with the wider Ghanaian community, including those who had the potential of influencing the project's risk levels in one way or another. These engagements provided the

opportunity for the usage of sensitization, the process of becoming highly sensitive to specific events or situations, as one of the LAP's risk identification strategies. Carvalho and Rabechini Junior (2015) supports this view of using effective engagement for project delivery and recommends the need for project team members to use effective interpersonal relationships to adapt to new risk environments. A gender advocate and regional head of one of the implementation agencies, when asked how her office identified the risks with the possibility of influencing the achievements of the project activities they were involved in, explained:

We knew by analysing the cultural barriers in the project environment that women will be reluctant to play a key role under LAP because they are marginalised when it comes to land ownership. However, to understand the root cause of this problem and how we could plan successfully towards it, we had dialogue meetings with the chiefs during some of our stakeholder meetings and outcomes of these meetings were used to devise strategies of how to successfully get our women on board (Interview with regional head of LVD, 11/07/2017).

Marginalisation of women in terms of land ownership is an age-old problem in Ghana, where men are mostly seen as heads of household charged with the responsibility of providing for the family. This inequality in land ownership directly or indirectly affect the standard of living of many women in Ghana due to the over dependence on Agriculture in many communities and their inability to access the economic benefits accruing on land. Although marginalised in their respective communities, women are key stakeholders in as much as the effective representation of women in land ownership, a key objective under LAP, is concerned. In employing systematic processes (Sutton 2014) to identify the

cause of gender inequality in land ownership and to help design a strategy that is fit for purpose to address these stakeholder risks, as per the official's assertion above, the LAP embarked on a campaign to actively protect women's interests in land.

The issue with the approach used by the project team members, as per the official's assertions, is the organisation of dialogue with chiefs about how to address women's interests in land. Both are key stakeholders with different interests in the project. It would have been prudent to meet the women themselves, who are the marginalised in the land ownership structure and should understand and express the issues they face more clearly, instead of meeting the chiefs, who are mostly men, to discuss the marginalisation of women. Although done with good intent, actively involving the men in such meetings in itself promotes the patriarchal nature of the project environment and affirm Kuusanga and Gerber (2015)'s assertions on the reluctance of the Ghanaian government to intervene in matters regarding traditional land institutions. For sensitization to be able to identify risks that are not easily identifiable within the project environment, it needs to be targeted and approached from a stakeholder interest perspective and not follow the normal way of doing things. This is due to the fact that by becoming sensitive to specific issues particular stakeholders face, project team members are presented with a better opportunity to understand the realities of the project environment thoroughly, from the stakeholder interest perspective, to enable them design strategies that are fit for purpose to address these issues in their quest to steer the project to success and pursue opportunity.

Due to the power they possess in their respective communities in Ghana, one may argue that the dialogue with the chiefs may be strategic to seek their

approval and assess the extent to which the achievement of such an objective is exposed to risks (Stanton and Webster 2014). Nonetheless, for sensitization to examine all areas of a project systematically (Gardiner 2005), it need to be targeted and sensitive to specific issues, be able to identify potential opportunities and be continuous since new risks can arise in every stage of a project. This in effect will reduce risk identification biases (Reeves et al. 2013), particularly in development project environments where cultural practices have the potential to influence the effective usage of the sensitization approach. This notwithstanding, having the ability to approach the chiefs who possess extreme power in Ghanaian communities about the need to actively involve women in land matters in itself is a positive statement to the chiefs about the need to overhaul some of the existing cultural practices to strengthen the sustainable capabilities of women.

When used in collaboration with other risk identification strategies, sensitization can help provide a better understanding of the sources of some of the risks projects face and why they interact with each other. One area where this strategy was very effective was the identification and understanding of why some key stakeholders in the various LSAs were resisting change. Although some resisted change due to the fact that they were used to a certain way of doing things and/or benefitted corruptly from the before project situation as earlier discussed, some deliberately saw the changes proposed by the project as threats to their livelihood. A team leader in one of the LSAs explained:

This project wasn't too popular with the internal LC staff, they felt their jobs are being taken away and their very survival is threatened. Some back office staff even deliberately delay certain critical tasks. This defeats the set turn-around time

as captured in the project document (Interview with team leader at CSAU one, 14/06/2017).

When asked how he came about such information, the official explained further that:

I was a junior officer for a while so I have a very good working relationship with the team here…… so they confide in me (Interview with team leader at CSAU one, 14/06/2017).

Through working closely with the internal LSA staff, this official was able to adjust his information search style to enable him to identify the reasons behind their reluctance to support the project's vision. Being part of the project implementation arm, these stakeholders have power to affect and influence (Olander and Landin 2005) the project's outcome irrespective of the degree of power they possess. Additionally, with regards to the RPRD exercise, the reluctance of some intended beneficiaries to make their lands available for demarcation and the reasons behind their reluctance were identified through sensitization as explained by an OASL official:

With regards to the RPRD exercise, people were sceptical about why this needed to be done……...but they kept their fears to themselves. This was however identified through sensitizing with the land owning community (Interview with assistant stool lands officer, 26/06/2017).

The aforementioned evidence suggest that where possible, project team members need to adjust their information search style to suit specific risk environments (Carvalho and Rabechini Junior 2015) to enable them understand

the reasons why people do what they do in their identification of risks. This means that where sensitization is approached systematically, it can provide valuable insights and address specific issues of risk identification biases, including the marginalisation of people perceived as “non-experts” in the identification of project risks.

The evidence also suggests that while sensitization was used to identify some risks to project outcome, and in some instances, to complement other risk identification strategies to identify and understand some of the project’s risks, and provided an opportunity to address risk identification biases, the approach did not go far enough to actively involve the marginalised groups in the risk identification process.

A critical analysis of the risk identification processes also revealed that while many of them, particularly the role of experience and the criticality of the project environment and some aspects of the best practice approaches began before the project’s inception, all of them working collaboratively with each other continued throughout the project’s implementation.

Employing systematic procedures by project team members in risk identification, as was mainly the case in the identification of the LAP’s risks, also highlights the information search style of the experts involved in the risk identification process since it is linked to the usage of their cognitive abilities and therefore contradicts Maytorena et al. (2007)’s argument of the insignificance of experience in risk identification. Fieldwork data from this study suggest that experience play a key role in risk identification.

The analysis of data also show that employing systematic processes in risk identification and continuous monitoring of the project environment should not just rest on people perceived as having technical and academic expertise, but need to be widened to include all resources available to the project team members and people with the ability of contributing to the identification of risks that have the potential to influence project outcome, irrespective of their different classes of classification of risk (Beck 2006).

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed and discussed the LAP's risk identification processes and its accompanying issues as well as the risks identified through these processes as the first stage of the project's risk management process. The analysis and discussions revealed that the project's key risks were identified through the experience and expertise of officials in Ghana's land management and administration institutions, sensitizing with the various stakeholders, looking at best practices from previous projects, as well as the continuous monitoring and analysis of the project's environment. Despite the critical role experts play in project risk identification, risk identification is a collective responsibility and should include all areas of the project and its' environment systematically. An over-reliance on technical and academic expertise means many stakeholders and intended beneficiaries, perceived as not having the requisite expertise, were marginalised in the LAP's risk identification process.

Irrespective of the aforementioned issues, the risk identification process provided a strategic approach for the successful implementation of the project by

highlighting the risks to project outcome including; political, financial, procurement, institutional, technical, stakeholder, and to social and environmental risks, none of which is mutually exclusive but were skewed toward threats to outcome without actively pursuing the opportunities that accompany risks. The empirical evidence from this study suggest that despite considerable efforts to reform Ghana's land management and administration system, many of the people for whom these efforts are being made to ensure efficiency and transparency in their delivery of service, continue to frustrate the efforts made. These findings align with Yang et al. (2014)'s assertion that, not all internal stakeholders support a project's vision.

This chapter also highlights that due to the near impossibility of identifying all risks a project may face, the identified risks need to be continuously monitored and evaluated to identify new risks that may arise at any point in a project's life. This systematic approach to risk identification supports the constructivist approach to the study as it elaborates the cognitive abilities of the projects' team members and continuous interaction with the project and its' environment.

Having discussed the correlation between the risk identification processes and risks identified through these processes, the next chapter provides an analysis and discussion of the actions taken to respond to the identified risks and clarify the ways in which risk identification can contribute to risk response strategies.

Chapter Six Risk Response Strategies and Land Administration Project-Risk Management Process

6.1 Introduction

Project risk management is a continuous process. Consequently, after identifying the most likely risks a project may face, a decision is needed to respond to these risks in an attempt to steer the project to success and explore the opportunities therein. While the identification of risks establish the parameters required to answer the central research question; **does risk management practice contribute to project success?** An analysis of the corresponding strategies adopted to respond to these risks seek to consolidate these gains by helping to ascertain whether risk management practice can contribute to project success. The contributions of risk management practice to project success can however be fully determined after analysing and discussing the success, or otherwise of the project and the contributions of the adopted risk management strategy to this, in the next chapter.

The ability to effectively design strategies to respond to risks also require the ability to interpret the environments within which these risks exist and to plan response strategies within this environment (Cagliano et al. 2015) that are fit for purpose. This is to ensure that projects are able to deliver the most favourable outcome, albeit without deviating from the projects' purpose in the process.

This chapter explores how risk management has been applied under the case study project by providing an analysis and discussion of the multiple strategies

adopted to respond to the risks identified in chapter 5. It also attempts to answer the first research question; **what are the ways by which risk identification can contribute to risk management?** By analysing the links between the risk identification process and the corresponding risk response strategies. With project stakeholders playing a significant role in determining the success or otherwise of projects (Stuckenbruck 1986), I argue that differing stakeholder objectives and expectations of projects can also have an influence on how project risks are planned and managed. The involvements of the projects' stakeholders and/or recognition of the various stakeholder objectives in designing the project's risk response strategies are also discussed.

6.2 Risk Action

Many researchers (Berg 2010; Cooper 2004; 2012; Cooper et al. 2005; Hopkins 2014; ISO 31000:2018; 2009; Stanton and Webster 2014; Sutton 2014) classify this stage of the risk management process as "risk treatment". I discussed in chapter 2 that the word "treatment" focuses on the negatives of risk and sees risk as a "sickness". Risk, as discussed in chapter 2, can also create opportunity and therefore require an "action" and not "treatment" to highlight the opportunities therein as well as mitigate the threats they can pose to project outcome. The discussions below (6.2.1- 6.2.5), focuses on the actions taken to respond to the LAPs identified risks to ensure it delivers the "beneficial change" of efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery as intended.

6.2.1 Political Risk Action

Due to the long-term nature of the project and the need to ensure that the people tasked with the responsibility of deciding and influencing policy decisions in Ghana supports the project's implementation, a clear strategic action was needed to mitigate the impacts of political risks on project outcome, whilst pursuing opportunity. According to Krane et al. (2012), politicians fall within the project owner category who generally tends to have a different risk attitude to that of the project management team since their interests also include the pursuance of a political agenda. Politicians, particularly in developing economies such as Ghana, possess excessive power and can sometimes interfere in the successful implementation of development projects through the usage of such power (Ika 2012) to their advantage. Consequently, an adaptable approach was needed to mitigate the negative impacts of their political agenda and to ensure that successive political administrations support the project's implementation.

The project document (WB 2003: 32), stated at inception that among others "public and civil society awareness and debate on socioeconomic impact of lack of political commitment and government inaction will be promoted through the communication strategy of the project". What this means is that right from inception, the project adopted a communication strategy with an aim of using public opinion to promote awareness and in a way, compel successive governments' acceptance and continuity of the project. When asked about their actions taken to respond to the identified risks, a PCU official explained:

Public adverts were placed in newspapers to educate the general public about the project and its' benefits (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

When asked why this approach was chosen as a risk response strategy, he explained further that:

Politics play a crucial role in the way things are done here. Since it is a tricky area for some of us in this position, public awareness becomes the best way of getting the politicians to follow due process (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

According to Anand (2007), collective action or voice through media is a crucial way of expressing viewpoints more openly whilst De Bakker et al. (2011) supports this view of using communicative action as perceived by stakeholders in project risk management. Communicative action, through the usage of public awareness strategies as per the official's assertion, can even be more effective in development projects of this nature with powerful political stakeholders whose view of success, as earlier discussed, include the pursuance of a political agenda and are sometimes outside the control of project management team. Hood et al. (2001) argue that under such circumstances, public opinion have the ability to shape risk regulation regimes. This is due to the fact that by ensuring the general public are made aware of their rights, politicians, especially in democratic project environments, tend to follow due process and agree to laid down procedures due to fear of losing the support of the electorate.

Ika (2012) posits that the political environments within which development projects are undertaken can be influential to its' successful implementation due to the fact that they can be subject to the manipulations of political leaders and policy makers which, according to Bokor (2011), can lead to "dirty" politics. "Dirty" politics, in some instances, occur when politicians blatantly refuse to

acknowledge an achievement by a political opponent or deliberately decide to undertake an activity with an aim of sabotaging the success of an activity, or use empty promises of development projects as bait for political gains. In Ghana for instance, political leaders, the rich and those in authority are revered in society. Damoah and Akwei (2017) argue that their reverence enables them to influence government project decision making to their advantage to the detriment of the ordinary Ghanaian. In response to the political risks to project outcome, the project adopted a decentralisation strategy to spread its' implementation across the country. This decentralisation strategy, according to the project coordinator, served two purposes in an attempt to steer the project to success. He explained:

By spreading the projects' implementation across the country, the influence of politics were also spread across the country to reduce its' stings as well as ensuring that the project's complex design does not affect its' implementation (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

Ghana is split into 16 different regions (10 at the time of project inception) with each having its' own decentralised administration. All the different regions played significant roles in the project's implementation strategy in one way or another with the various regional heads of implementation agencies leading project implementation in their respective regions. Although most project decisions are made at the Ministry level and the PCU, the various regional heads can exercise a level of discretion in implementing the strategy to some extent. In doing so, the risks to project outcome are also spread out to reduce the negative impacts of particular groups of people on project outcome, to ensure the project achieve the most favourable outcome (Hopkins 2014). As argued by Miller and Lessard

(2001), projects are not pre-selected to be successful but by using effective risk resolution, projects can be steered to success.

With regards to LAP, the effective use of the aforementioned as a political risk response strategy was to use circumstances as presented by the project's environment to respond to these risks which were mostly outside the direct control of the project management team (Zavadskas et al. 2010), but are critical to the achievements of project outcome. This confirms Hillson (2009) assertion that the environment projects operate are sometimes characterised by different aspects of change which can pose challenges for the achievement of its outcome. While effective risk management requires a structured process, in development projects of this nature where politicians pursue political agendas which can influence and manipulate project activities to an extent, structure can sometimes be less effective due to the bureaucratic and counter-intuitive pressure it places on project team members (Hillson 2009). Consequently, to steer the project to success, project managers faced with these challenges need to be adaptable in their risk response by developing a workable strategy that reflects the way people behave or think in the project environment.

As part of my fieldwork observations, I attended ISM meetings between the WB task team and the various implementation agencies. I noticed that while these ISMs are requirements for donor funded projects to ensure accountability (Ika 2012), they inadvertently also serve as a risk response strategy by reducing the interference of politicians on project implementation and making them more accountable for their actions and inactions. This is due to the fact that the ISM brought together the project team members and affiliated politicians from all the various regions in Ghana for them to present reports on their approach to key

project activities. These presentations were also questioned and critiqued by the other participants including querying their timings and amounts spent on various project activities.

The aforementioned evidence suggest that, in addition to ensuring an adaptable approach in their response to political risks due to the power and influence of politicians on project outcome, development project managers should also widen their risk management strategies, without deviating from the project's purpose, to include the contributions of donor support missions to risk mitigation and its' accompanying opportunities. This will enable them to have more creativity, improvisation and intuition in their approach to reflect their respective project environments (Anderson 2006), since the donor support missions inadvertently serve the purpose anyway and consequently, need recognition and embedding into the project's risk management strategy. This will also help maintain an open mind (Atesmen 2015) in dealing with political risks since they are mostly outside the direct control of project team members but are critical to project success.

6.2.2 Financial and Procurement Risk Action

Projects are expensive endeavours which require the continuous flow of funds for them to be operational in their quest to achieve the purposes for which they were undertaken. As discussed in chapter 5, LAP as a development project relied heavily on donor funding whose flow and reliability were outside the control of the project team members. Nonetheless, the project team members have a responsibility to ensure that project funds are used for the purposes for which

they were intended. When asked about the actions taken to ensure project funds were used for their intended purposes, the project coordinator explained:

Stringent measures were put in place with regards to project financial management right from the beginning. Funds management are centralised here at the PCU. People need to follow the right procedures and processes before funds will be released (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

These assertions were affirmed by another official in one of the LSAs I interviewed. He explained:

We were guided by the annual budget that we had to submit for the release of funds for the project (Interview with head of operations at TCPD, 29/06/2017).

These Annual Work Plans and Budget (AWPB) documents are in line with the transactional processes and strict guidelines development projects are required to follow to ensure rigour and transparency (Ika 2012) in their implementation and also extend to the award of contracts for the procurement of goods and services for project implementation. The project coordinator explained further:

A highly qualified procurement specialist familiar with WB procurement requirements has been appointed to deal with the procurement aspects. He oversees the activities of the procurement unit in line with WB guidelines (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

When asked how effective this has been with regards to key project procurement activities, he emphasised that:

Key procurement activities need to be approved by the procurement unit before money will be released. Bids are strictly evaluated and quality control measures

are undertaken before major contracts are awarded (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

Damoah and Akwei (2017), in investigating the reasons why government projects fail in Ghana, argued that many Ghanaian government project contracts are awarded on grounds of family and clan patronage instead of ability which can compromise project performance. Consequently, the stringent procurement measures put in place by the project team members serves two purposes; firstly, to ensure that project funds are used for the purposes for which they were intended and secondly, to reduce corruption in project implementation through the bidding processes in line with WB procedures.

Due to the inconsistencies in the flow of funds from donors, proactive measures were needed to ensure the continuous flow of funds for key project activities. Prominent among these were the introduction of cost recovery measures with regards to revenue internally generated in the various LSAs, where possible. A lands officer at the MLNR explained:

As part of our activities to ensure the continuous flow of funds, we contracted someone to do a generic business plan for the various agencies with regards to their internally generated funds (Interview with lands officer at the MLNR, 19/06/2017).

These cost recovery measures such as revenue from service fees, land rent and land taxation were replicated throughout the various implementation agencies to ensure that the funds they accrue are used to support the implementation of key project activities where possible. Nonetheless, bureaucratic dispensations made it impossible to re-invest the money directly into the project since these are

classified as “government funds” and as such cannot be directly used for continuous project implementation without following due process, and may not be effective in the short term.

The only department where the strategy could work effectively for the intended purpose were the established CLS’s due to the fact that they were directly managed by their respective TAs and as such, the accrued funds could be used directly by the TAs without going through central government scrutiny. One of the TAs I interviewed explained:

On the establishment of the office, we were advised to set up a fund where we deposit money in every time so when a time comes when there is no income into the office, we will still be able to pay our staff (Interview with sub-chief and leader of CLS, 30/06/2017).

The set-up of funds as instituted by the business strategy, with regards to the CLSs, could also be relied on for their sustainability where successful.

Ika (2012) argues that the stringent financial accountability and procurement measures and procedures laid down by donor agencies, development projects have to follow, such as complying with the strict procurement procedures and how subsequent project funds are released for key project activities, fall within the “accountability-for-results trap” because it is used for an external stakeholder audience instead of an internal management decision and renders the project manager’s role unclear. While it is prudent for development projects to adapt to a local context and maintain a balance in resource allocation during implementation (Brière et al. 2015), these stringent measures and rigour should rather be encouraged, albeit adaptable to project specific situations, because

they provide an opportunity for efficiency and transparency with regards to the usage of project funds which could be diverted without these key measures, and can ultimately lead to a stall or delay in project implementation. A close collaboration between the project team members and the financial and procurement specialists assigned to the project are required to ensure efficiency in project delivery. This collaboration, according to Krane et al. (2012), can lead to operational risks (risks that can influence the project's direct results including financial and procurement risks) becoming the main risk focus without affecting the achievements of project objectives.

6.2.3 Institutional and Technical Risk Action

In chapter 5, I identified the risks likely to influence the successful implementation of LAP and emphasised on the need for development projects of this nature that seek to reduce poverty and strengthen the sustainable capabilities of the poor to be implemented within supportive institutional and policy frameworks by people with the requisite knowledge of the project and its' environment, technical or not, for them to be able to achieve the purposes for which they were undertaken. Although institutions and institutional coherence are key for the success of risk governance (Hood et al. 2001) and the successful design and implementation of development initiatives, Ayee (2015) argues that irrespective of the huge investments made over the years to strengthen the institutional and technical capacities in Africa's public sector, many of these problems still persist after years of reform and Ghana is not an exception to this. Comprehensive capacity development and institution building measures were therefore needed to support

the project's successful implementation and sustainability of its reforms to ensure efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery. A MLNR official I interviewed explained:

When we identified these key issues of capacity, we thought that we should use the first phase to build very huge capacities for the institutions and earmarked $8.5 million for capacity building……..including PhD's, Masters level training ……and technical training (Interview with technical director at the MLNR, 22/06/2017).

The official's assertion elucidates what the project team members intended to do at inception but in reality, their initial response to tackle the capacity issues did not materialise as planned because the donors opted and influenced a different action. He explained:

..they themselves did a head count and said we had so many people with BSc and Masters degrees…..so we should rather use that money on practical training. Practical training for what? So what happened was people were collected for workshops in M&E training ……..most of the entire $8.5 million were spent on this type of things……. so the entire core of what the project intended to do was frustrated (Interview with technical director at the MLNR, 22/06/2017).

These assertions relate to the first phase of the project. When asked about the actions taken to respond to the identified institutional and technical risks, a PCU official in charge of HRM affirmed the above assertions and explained further that:

I joined the project in the middle part of LAP-1. When I joined the project, a lot of the capacity building projects had been done but they were not effective so at the

end of the project, one of the recommendations at the evaluation was that there should have been a needs assessment before the training. It was done anyhow. People took people for training by just looking at their faces (Interview with head of HR at the PCU, 22/06/2017).

This "little good" (Ika 2012) to show for the huge investments made under LAP-1, with regards to the capacity development initiative, had recurrent effects on the successful implementation of the project as a whole since projects have some technical attributes which require some level of technical and specific skills to execute. Consequently, due to their inability to tackle the identified capacity issues as outlined by the project team members during the first phase, the same issues persisted at the beginning of the second phase.

Capacity development in terms of developing institutions to sustain organisations and projects of this nature should not be done as a "quick-fix" venture as was dictated by the donors of LAP during the first phase of the project. This supports Owusu (2012)'s assertion that investments in PSRs, particularly in Africa, fail to deliver the intended results because of dictatorial external interests and the usage of a "one-size-fits-all" approach without necessarily looking at within country experiences and project specific situations. Every nation has its' own challenges and needs and these individual challenges and needs, need to be acknowledged to ensure that projects serve the purposes for which they were intended. As argued by Analoui and Danquah (2017), capacity development needs to "rise and evolve" in line with current trends and should therefore be a continuous venture that goes beyond projects and include all the key actors in the project, including those perceived as non-experts and not just a selected few.

In analysing his personal experiences of managing different projects over a 35 year period, Atesmen (2015) recommended the need for project managers to release their “lessons learned” reports at project closure. This, he argued, is to ensure that avoidable mistakes are not repeated in future projects, particularly with projects involving different phases as in the case of LAP. Recommendations made at the evaluation stage of LAP-1 led to an adoption of a different response strategy towards institutional and technical risks at the beginning of LAP-2, in an attempt to address some of the issues faced under LAP-1 and to steer the project to success. The head of HR at the PCU explained further that:

After completing a comprehensive capacity needs assessment for the second phase, we realised we needed $20 million to develop the capacity of the various implementation agencies but the provision under the project was only $3 million so we had to bring all the agencies together to prioritise. Some officers were supported for masters programmes, some for first degree programmes and others for short courses in specifically needed areas (Interview with head of HR at the PCU, 22/06/2017).

Millar and Doherty (2016) argues that comprehensive capacity needs assessment enables organisations to highlight their particular capacity needs and assets that may be critical in supporting capacity building initiatives. For the LAP, the adoption of this strategy at the beginning of the second phase identified the various areas where capacities were critically needed to be developed to ensure the project’s successful completion, as well as the efficient usage of resources to prevent the “waste” of resources as per the “quick-fix” and “one-size-fits-all” approaches undertaken during the first phase. Interestingly, the needs of the various implementation agencies identified had similar attributes to those

identified at the inception stage of LAP-1. Had the donors not interfered in the original strategy, this issue would have, at worst, been mitigated at the beginning of LAP-2.

When asked about the strategies used to respond to institutional and technical risks, another PCU official explained:

A variety of strategies were used including capacity development in ICT, extensive training on the use of the established infrastructure and even finding something for those that didn't want to change to do whilst they are faced out (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

Upon investigating further as part of my fieldwork observations, I realised that although some of the staff were reluctant to adapt to change by agreeing to re-train as per the project plan, the GoG had placed a ban on public sector employment at the time so they could not be easily replaced. As argued by Khang and Moe (2008), competencies are useless unless there is a will and dedication to perform. Consequently, the easier option for the project team members was to train those who were willing to train, and keep the others occupied with other organisational activities since many were due for retirement within 5 years. This, in effect, was a strategy adapted to adjust to the given situation to make it possible to cope concurrently with the effects of risks while making adjustments for the future, a strategy supported by the WB (WB 2013b) and its' development partners. When asked about their response to the technical and institutional risks faced by their respective departments, two TCPD officials explained:

Official one: *We needed to provide technical training for our staff so we hired a consulting firm with the capacity to prepare these plans coming to Ghana and*

then working with our staff…we had counterpart attachments to the consultants to work with them. So in doing so, we get them to learn new skills from the consultants (Interview with head of operations at TCPD, 29/06/2017).

Official two: *We took all our staff through training to ensure they develop the capacity to hold on to the process and carry it forward* (Interview with team leader at TCPD, 11/07/2017).

Both approaches elucidated above were strategized at helping their organisation to improve their performance even beyond the projects' life. The success of this strategy, as argued by Analoui and Danquah (2017), is dependent on the ability of the internal employees of the various establishments to 'own' the ability to improve their own performance for it to be sustainable.

As discussed in chapter 5, the project only concentrated on identifying the need to build the capacities of the LSAs without emphasizing on the need to also improve the capacities of the land owning communities who own the majority of land in Ghana. This notwithstanding, with regards to the established CLSs, some level of training and guidance were provided for staff and the TAs to help them operate the established equipment as well as a guide as to how to implement their respective CLSs. One of the TAs I interviewed explained:

When they brought the equipment, we didn't know what to do with it as this wasn't explained that much until a time came when they took us for workshops to train us on how to implement the equipment and how they wanted us to run the CLS (Interview with sub-chief and leader of CLS, 30/06/2017).

For capacity development to be effective, it has to be sustained over a long period of time (Analoui and Danquah 2017). With the case of the CLSs however, although efforts were made to provide technical support and offer direction for their operations to an extent, strengthening the capacity of the various TAs who were the implementing arm of the CLS were not given the necessary attention as compared to that of the LSAs.

In criticising the project's risk identification strategy in chapter 5, I emphasised on the need for development project team members to include people they perceive as "non-experts" in their risk identification process since many in this category are key stakeholders who can affect and influence the project and/or its' outcome, significantly. The lack of adequate consultation of the wider land owning community, perceived as not having the requisite technical expertise, in the identification of the LAP's risks had rippling effects in one way or another, on the design of the corresponding risk response strategies that were skewed towards government institutions at the expense of the wider land owning communities.

This bias towards strengthening the sustainable capabilities of government institutions without doing same to the wider land owning communities had rippling effects on the sustainability of some of the established CLSs. On a visit to the Ejisu, Adankragya and Bekwai CLSs myself as part of my fieldwork observations, I noticed that they all lacked the necessary capacity required for them to operate optimally. These offices are more or less established under the OASL irrespective of the fact that they are being run by their respective TAs. This therefore strengthens my earlier argument in chapter 5 about the need to ensure the sustainability of institutions established under development projects, and affirms Hood et al. (2001)'s assertion on the significance of institutional coherence on the

success of risk governance, since some of these CLSs were rather “installed” (Miller and Oliver 2015). As institutions developed as part of development projects however, they should rather be “implemented” than “installed” (Miller and Oliver 2015) to ensure more people benefit, for it to contribute to the project’s quest of ensuring efficiency and transparency in Ghana’s land service delivery.

As earlier elucidated in chapter 4, prior to the introduction of LAP, four main LSAs; LC, LVB, LTR and SD operated as independent agencies performing overlapping and duplicating duties. A key response strategy adopted to strengthen their institutional capacity as stated in the project document (WB 2003; WB 2011a) was the consolidation of these four agencies to one entity-the, LC. This merger was made possible due to the passing of Act 767 in 2008 under LAP-1. An interviewee at the PCU who played a key role in the merger explained:

Because they were different agencies, if you go to valuation they will ask to go and see the land. Then they will ask you to go to survey who will also ask to go and see the land and then you will come to registry and they will also ask to go and see the land. So we decided, why don’t you have one team? So the client go to the land once. So a lot of the processes were taken away…..that was a major step in the transformation process because at least the end user will not have to go to the land twice, I mean the merger of the agencies. Ideally, we were targeting specific risk management strategies at specific risks (Interview with head of HR at the PCU, 22/06/2017).

Performing overlapping and duplicating duties in the midst of lacking adequate capacity and expertise was very detrimental to project outcome as it placed continuous drain on the already scarce resources (Golini et al. 2015).

Consequently, strategically targeting specific risk response strategies at specific risks by re-defining their boundaries and consolidating them into one entity, as per the official's assertion means the projects' risk identification strategy, which identified these risks to project outcome, contributed to the provision of a clear, strategic focus to respond to these risks specifically. The consolidation of the LSAs also provided transparency by streamlining the processes and removing barriers for the end user of land as per the project's objective of providing efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery. A 2016 study by Ehwi and Asante to assess the impacts of the merger revealed the merger itself raised public confidence and expectation and there is now a clear organisational hierarchy and work itinerary among the different divisions within the new LC.

Once the need for the reforms to the various LSAs were identified as part of the institutional and technical risks the project faced, the need also arose for the revision of the laws needed to support the implementation of these reforms. A TCPD official I interviewed explained:

Once we identified the need for these reforms we also had to take the bold step of revising the laws to accommodate the new reforms so that the new reforms will have legal backing. Also because the reforms were new to our planning system, we had to use pilot areas. We selected some districts as pilot areas to test and then we can use the success stories to move the whole thing forward (Interview with head of operations at TCPD, 29/06/2017).

Devising a strategy to revise the existing laws to accommodate the project's reforms to ensure they had legal backing as well as testing the new planning systems before rolling it out nationally, means the project team members

strategized their risk response for the project's successful implementation and supports the earlier assertions of the head of HR at the PCU. It was also to strengthen the various institutions to perform efficiently and for them to be sustainable after the project.

Disputes over land are a common phenomenon in Ghana and constitute around 70% of all civil cases filed in Ghanaian courts (MLNR 2016). These claims and counter claims of rights and ownership to land have resulted in pressure on the courts. The judiciary, as an institution, also need to function effectively to ensure the successful implementation of the project and its proposed reforms. When asked about the strategies used to respond to the identified risks, an official at the MLNR explained among others that:

We engaged an ADR expert on the project to be in charge of alternative dispute resolution. This was to ensure that many land disputes are resolved outside our courts to reduce congestion (Interview with lands officer at the MLNR, 19/06/2017).

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), as the name depicts, is a strategy designed to ensure that certain land disputes that are resolvable outside the courts are resolved through alternative means to ease pressure on the courts. A sub-chief in one of the TAs I interviewed confirmed the usage of ADR in resolving land litigations in his community and explained:

The chief had an arbitration committee which he made me the chairman and then when the CLS started, we were taken for training under LAP to continue with the good works we were already doing under the arbitration committee (Interview with sub-chief and leader of CLS, 30/06/2017).

From the TA's assertion, it is evident that the arbitration committee was an institution which existed before the introduction of LAP but was developed further and strengthened under the project for efficiency. Although the arbitration committee mainly fall under the "perceived non-expert" category as discussed in chapter 5 and were marginalised in the identification of the project's risks, the above evidence suggest they possess the requisite soft skills needed to resolve disputes outside of courts despite not necessarily possessing academic knowledge in that area of expertise. Carvalho and Rabechini Junior (2015) argues that soft skills (project interpersonal relationships), which do not necessarily require academic expertise to deliver, are effective in managing project risks and can also positively influence the hard side (technical and specific skills) of project risk management. Consequently, strengthening the capabilities of the arbitration committee and encouraging them to use their soft skills to resolve disputes and reduce congestion in courts means the courts will be able to focus on more serious cases that cannot be resolved through ADR, to promote efficiency.

Data analysis from this study show that to ensure projects are implemented within supportive institutional and policy frameworks, project team members need to embody all the institutions within the project environment that can influence the achievement of project outcome, in one way or another, in their identification and response to risks since workable institutions are key to project outcome as they are central to the successful implementation of projects, particularly development projects that establish institutions rather than tangible outcomes and affirms Hood et al. (2001)'s assertion on the significance of institutional coherence on the success of risk governance. Additionally, having the necessary institutions with

developed capacity to support project implementation will not only ensure their successful implementation but can also contribute significantly to the employment of systematic practices to identify key risks that may arise throughout the project's life for the necessary actions to be taken to respond to them.

6.2.4 Social and Environmental Risk Action

A study by Carvalho and Rabechini Junior (2017) involving 222 different projects revealed that reducing the negative impacts of social and environmental effects on projects positively influence project success. Irrespective of the fact that the majority of the LAP's activities were earmarked to be built on government and/or beneficiary customary lands as discussed in chapter 5, the project had the potential to affect people's social lives as well as some environmental considerations that needed to be responded to accordingly. Development partners, over the years, have required stringent investigations into social and environmental risks as well as a clear action plan on how to respond to these risks as, "ex-ante" analysis (Salcito et al. 2014) before releasing funds for development. This is to ensure that people adversely affected by development projects are adequately compensated and their livelihoods restored to at least, pre-project levels.

As discussed in chapter 5, some project activities such as the construction of new offices, refurbishment and rehabilitation of courts and boundary demarcations posed some social and environmental risks which in effect, triggered the WB's safeguard policy on environmental assessment and involuntary resettlement. The project document (WB 2011a: 20) stipulates that in response to this and as per

requirements for development projects of this nature “a comprehensive Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) plan and an Abbreviated Resettlement Action Plan (ARAP) were prepared to meet donor expectations before project approval”.

A MLNR official, in explaining the actions taken to respond to the potential impacts the project might have on people, among others explained:

We undertook a social study to assess the situation to know the dynamics of the people, population and other things to inform our activities……..we then engaged civil society to help educate the people about the need to embrace the project to promote transparency (Interview with lands officer at the MLNR, 19/06/17).

It is evident from the official’s assertion that the dynamics of the project environment were taken into consideration in planning the response strategy to the social risks the project faced. These dynamics are shaped by the culture of the proposed beneficiaries due to the critical role culture play in the way people think and act in Ghana. Ubels et al. (2010) posits that over time, people develop norms, routines and mind-sets that become part of their way of life and changing the way people think and act becomes difficult. In Ghana particularly, there is a lack of trust about the intentions of government to take land from people for development. This lack of trust has rippling effects on development such as successfully convincing people about the need to make their lands available for demarcation or registration, which were key activities under LAP.

Aaltonen et al. (2015) argues that project team members need to understand that stakeholder positions do not stay constant and as such contingency planning is needed to respond to these dynamics. Educating the public for them to

understand the importance of the project was a key strategy designed to respond to these risks to ensure proposed beneficiaries support its' implementation. Two officials I interviewed, who work at different departments, corroborated the MLNR official's assertions above and explained:

Official one*: Public adverts were placed in newspapers to educate the general public about the project and its' benefits* (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

Official two: *We also developed public education campaigns and brochures to the various communities to explain the importance of the project because customary land administration is not only about the chiefs, it is also about the people, the usufructs, the land users and everybody so we needed to educate them more* (Interview with regional head of OASL, 12/07/2017).

The aforementioned officials are both at the policy level and as such, can affect and influence the project's decision making directly. While researchers such as Chapman (1990) and Cooper et al. (2005), argue the need for risk management to be carried out by well-informed and creative experts due to the technicalities involved, in development projects of this nature where norms and traditions have an influence on the way people think and act, it is also prudent to establish the role of other relevant stakeholders (Achterkamp and Vos 2008) such as TAs, opinion leaders and key beneficiaries who may not necessarily possess the requisite technical expertise, but may be well-informed and creative in disseminating this information. One of the TAs I interviewed confirmed their involvements in the dissemination of information as part of the risk response strategy and explained:

We ourselves attended seminars which were very helpful since they explained the nature and tenure of land to us…..we also had to educate our people for them to understand the need for the project and its' accompanying benefits (Interview with supreme traditional leader, 30/06/2017).

After benefitting from the education strategy used to respond to these risks, the TAs then passed on the knowledge acquired by educating the proposed beneficiaries in their respective jurisdictions. What this means is that although the TAs were marginalised in the identification of risks as discussed in chapter 5, they were incorporated to an extent in responding to the identified risks particularly with regards to disseminating information to their subjects. Chiefs in Ghana are very influential in society and are regarded as "voter-brokers" particularly in rural areas (Ubink and Amanor 2008). Although there have been instances of conflicts among some TAs and their subjects, these are often resolved by a more powerful chief, who serves as an 'overlord'. The powerful nature and popularity of chiefs means people are more likely to obey their instructions than project team members to an extent. Consequently, including relevant stakeholders such as the TAs to help educate the public, according to Hopkins (2014), can help deliver the most favourable outcome as well as reduce the volatility and variability of such outcome.

This approach however should not just have involved the powerful TAs but should have incorporated a greater majority of people in the "perceived non-expert" category who may also have the ability to provide valuable insights into the project, as argued in chapter 5, due to the social nature of the project and the target audience of the education campaign since many proposed beneficiaries may not be easily accessible by the project team members. In so doing, key risks

that may arise during the project's implementation can also be identified accordingly and the necessary actions taken to respond to them.

With regards to the environmental risks, a key member of the project team explains:

We conducted an ESIA as required but found out that there were no critical habitats or natural resources which may be affected. If some come up, we will ensure they are preserved where possible (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

Social and environmental risks can either directly or indirectly affect people and can sometimes be difficult to determine due to the dynamic nature of project environments. As argued by Salcito et al. (2014), project related impacts change over time and as such corresponding measures to respond to these impacts also need to be adaptive to respond to these changes and to reflect the uncertainties in the project environment. Although the project does not seem to pose an immediate environmental concern as per the above official's assertion, this needs to be continuously monitored due to the dynamic nature of the project environment and the uncertainties that may accompany this dynamism.

I therefore agree with Salcito et al. (2014)'s assertion that responses to social and environmental risks should not just be an "ex-ante" analysis to guide the design and early operations of projects and argue further that project team members need to approach these responses strategically from a human rights perspective to minimise their impacts on people, should they occur, and also ensure their systematic monitoring and evaluation throughout project implementation and even after a project's life.

6.2.5 Stakeholder Risk Action

As earlier elucidated in chapter 4, LAP has a wider variety of stakeholders with varying degrees of interest, some of whom were either totally outside the control of the project team members or could only be controlled to an extent. The fieldwork data suggest, in identifying the various stakeholder risks in chapter 5, that not all the project's stakeholders support the projects' vision. Many are driven by their own individual interests and need to be made to support the projects' vision for the project to achieve its' expected outcome. Chapman and Ward (2003) argue that response strategies need to be embedded in both the base and contingency plans of the project for projects to achieve the best possible outcome. Nonetheless, projects are time bound and due to this limited amount of time available to complete such complex endeavours and the criticality of stakeholders in determining the success or otherwise of development projects, responding to risks posed by stakeholders need to be strategic to provide the best possible outcome. Consequently, a workable strategy to respond to stakeholder risks had to be acceptable, in some way, by the varying degree of stakeholders to encourage them to support the project's vision.

For LAP, designing such a response strategy began with using one of the projects' risk identification strategies, sensitization, to assess and understand the stakeholder risks further as explained by a regional LSA official I interviewed:

We organised stakeholder sensitization programmes to educate the stakeholders in the various regions on the need to improve land issues in a nice way. This helped us to understand their concerns and the need to direct resources at the main issues (Interview with regional head of LVD, 11/07/2017).

Not only does this strategy help to direct resources strategically in project execution, it also provides an opportunity to reduce waste in resource allocation. From a development project perspective where resources are scarce, this also contributes positively to increasing efficiency in project delivery. Designing a response strategy to ensure people support the projects' vision in an environment where people are used to doing things a certain way and refuses to adapt to change as a consequence was arguably, one of the most herculean, yet possible, aspects of the projects' risk response strategies. In response to this, different strategies were used collaboratively as explained by the project coordinator:

There was an extensive orientation of staff in the various LSAs soliciting their views and training them on how to use the established infrastructure. We identified through our sensitization programme that for some, resistance to change was due to fear of the unknown (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

From the officials' assertion, the project team members were very open in their approach to dealing with the stakeholder risks identified by soliciting their views as to what was beneficial for them. Identifying the various concerns, needs and expectations of the project's key stakeholders and designing response strategies strategically to either meet or exceed these concerns, needs and expectations (PMI 2008) were a strategic approach adapted by LAP's team members in their quest to ensure particular groups of stakeholders who were resisting change, do not impact negatively on the achievement on project objectives, and to maximise opportunity. He elucidated further that:

In doing so, once the system is deployed, they will have to use the new system because they will be trained to use them and their fears will be curtailed (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

While training does not guarantee usage, there is a possibility that some of the stakeholders that were resisting change will use the new system once their fears have been curtailed as per the official's assertion. To strengthen the viability of this response strategy and to reassure those resisting change about the need to support the project's vision, another PCU official, who had the responsibility of driving change, explained:

The main concern for most of the staff was the fear of losing their jobs once the new system was up and running. The assurance was given to them that there will be no job losses (Interview with head of HR at the PCU, 22/06/2017).

Irrespective of the fact that the LAP was designed to bring "beneficial change" (Turner 2014) in Ghana's land service delivery, for many of these key stakeholders, their refusal to support the "beneficial change" proposed by the project is partly due to their prime individual interest, job security. The head of HR's assertion corroborates that of the project coordinator's and strengthens Stuckenbruck (1986) argument on the need for projects to achieve stakeholder perceptions of success and not necessarily deliver project deliverable(s) as this, according to Miller and Oliver (2015), could lead to the project being installed rather than implemented. For this group of stakeholders, "beneficial change" simply means job security.

A positive attitude towards embracing "beneficial change" can also lead to minimising the amount of corruption that seeks to influence the achievement of

project outcome. As discussed in chapter 5, some incidents of refusing to support the projects' vision on the part of some stakeholders were due to corrupt practices linked to exploitations under the before project situation. The projects' objective of promoting efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery in itself is designed towards reducing corruption in Ghana's land management and administration system. The project team members had to focus on promoting transparency particularly in the project implementation arm, while also supplementing these with other risk responses designed to encourage support for the projects' vision. The head of HR at the PCU explained further:

We had to find a way of switching from the manual way into a digital environment to reduce corruption (Interview with head of HR at the PCU, 22/06/2017).

A senior colleague of this interviewee, who had worked on the project for a considerable number of years explained further:

Nearly all project activities such as public awareness programmes, construction of CSAUs, consolidating of LSAs, CLSs, land courts, automation of land courts and land services etc were aimed at reducing corruption. We cannot achieve transparency until we reduce corruption (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

As part of my own investigations during my fieldwork exercise in 2017 and my subsequent visit to Ghana in August 2019, I visited some of the completed CSAUs and noticed evidence of transparency with regards to displayed notices of some of the cost of services rendered to the general public as well as clear precautionary messages about how to pay for these services (see figures 6.1 and 6.2 below). These public awareness displays are also amended regularly, in line

with contemporary issues as highlighted by figure 6.2, to prevent exploitation by some unscrupulous employees of the CSAU in their communication of such increments, to reduce corruption.

Figure 6.1 Displayed Public Notice at CSAU Accra



Source: Lands Commission Accra (2019)

Figure 6.2 Displayed Fees of Land Services at CSAU Accra



PUBLIC NOTICE

REVISION OF LAND TITLE PUBLICATION FEES

The general public is hereby informed that publication fees payable for registration of title have been revised due to increased advertising cost.

The new fees payable effective **Monday, 1st April, 2019** are as follows:

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Special	GHS 590.00

SIGNED

YAA AGYEMAN BOADI
DIRECTOR (LRD)

Source: Lands Commission Accra (2019)

The strategy of automation of land services, digitising and public awareness also help reduce corruption amongst more powerful stakeholders such as the land owning groups and TAs to whom the project team members had less control over, as it provides clarity and transparency to an extent, by ensuring that the correct amount is paid for the services they render to the public.

While the project team members are unable to prevent landowners from selling same land to different individuals physically, the digitising and automation strategies adopted will frustrate the process of multiple registration of same land. In instances where the prospective buyer conducts the necessary checks, with automation and digitisation in place, they can avoid being a victim of MLS thereby reducing the number of such corrupt practices. Due to the power of the chieftaincy institution in Ghana as earlier explained, successive governments over the years have been reluctant to make chiefs accountable for land revenues and for their usage of these revenues (GoG 2016) as this can negatively affect the politician's ability to win political power in subsequent elections. This notwithstanding, the chiefs listen to themselves with the more powerful chiefs serving as 'overlords' to ensure the integrity of the chieftaincy institution is maintained.

For the project team members however, these are powerful stakeholders who can influence project outcome significantly but are directly outside their control (Zavadskas et al. 2010). Under such circumstances, adaptability measures to incorporate the respective 'overlords' to help regulate such powerful stakeholders can reduce their negative impacts on project outcome. My interview with a spokesperson for a powerful TA who has re-structured his area to bring some level of sanctity into the chieftaincy institution in areas under his authority

revealed that measures have already been put in place to ensure transparency in land transactions carried out under their jurisdiction. He explained:

When we started in 2011, people could pay 500,000 GHS and were not given receipts and the explanation was this is the palace, you don't pay money here and expect receipts. They created a myth around revenue on stool lands to intimidate people but when we came, we had to change that and said for every cedi you pay, you will be given a receipt. The people were happy but the chiefs were not. Because the traditional chieftaincy system here is very strong and the hierarchy here is there and it works, sanctions are applied. Since we came, over 10 chiefs have been de-stooled for lack of transparency (Interview with traditional land secretariat spokesperson, 29/06/2017).

Chieftaincy in Ghana is inherited within families and normally follows a successional hierarchy although there have been instances where the hierarchy have been challenged by different family lineages. Being de-stooled as a chief is a very disgraceful act which comes with serious cultural and generational consequences and can sometimes even discontinue the person's lineage of succession. Consequently, chiefs will always try and avoid such sanctions as much as possible by following the transparency measures applied by their respective paramountcy.

While this was not a formal risk management strategy under LAP, it inadvertently contributed to mitigating the threats of transparency and corruption in land service delivery and provided an opportunity for reform under an institution where the project team members had little or no control. In development projects of this nature where culture and beliefs play a significant role on the achievement of

project objectives, it is prudent for risk response strategies to be adaptable to include all possible avenues and multiple project network actors (Aaltonen and Sivonen 2009) such as the aforementioned. This therefore strengthens my earlier argument for development project managers to widen their risk management strategies to reflect the way people behave or think in the project environment, and not to over-rely on project experts since they are not the only source of knowledge, arguably.

Stakeholder engagement strategies such as assuring people of job security and communication as well as the orientation and education programmes used by the project team members, are key in promoting efficiency and transparency between the project team members, implementation arm and proposed beneficiaries. This strategy supports Miller and Oliver (2015)'s assertion of using stakeholder engagement as well as Beringer et al. (2013) argument of adapting strategies that motivate key stakeholders in an attempt to encourage them to support a projects' vision and help drive the project to success. This is due to the fact that once stakeholders are efficiently engaged in project decision making, they are more likely to take ownership of the project which may lead to their support of the projects' vision.

Data analysis and discussions on the LAP's stakeholder risk response strategies suggest that many of the efforts were directed at promoting attitudinal change and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery. This was to ensure that the varying degree of stakeholders take "ownership" and "responsibility" (Analoui and Danquah 2017) to help steer the project to success and to explore the opportunities therein. The analysis and discussions also show that with the exception of some TAs and opinion leaders who were incorporated in the delivery

of the project's risk response strategy to an extent, formally or informally, many stakeholders who rely on land and the benefits accruing on land for their livelihood were, once again, marginalised. A project officer at the Judiciary who was very critical with the over-reliance on experts in project risk management explained:

Everybody must be involved. Everybody must buy into the project and understand its objectives. If we don't see projects from this perspective, I'm sorry short term objectives will be met but long term outcomes and impacts will not be met (Interview with project officer at Judiciary, 21/06/2017).

What this means is that while project risk management is a formal process that require some level of expertise in project decision making (Maytorena et al. 2007), for development projects of this nature where intangible outputs are pursued to improve the sustainable capabilities of a wider community, taking "ownership" and "responsibility" should not be limited to particular stakeholder groups but should be widened to include the different classes and capacities (Beck 2006) in all areas of the project including those who rely on land and the benefits accruing on land for their livelihood. This particular group of stakeholders can also affect and influence the achievement of the project's overall outcome and/or its' long term benefits to society.

6.3 Contributions of Risk Identification to Risk Response

While researchers such as Cooper (2012), Raftery (2003) and Sutton (2014) agree with the importance of systematic risk identification in the risk management

process, the contributions of risk identification in the risk management process in a project setting is not clear. Having discussed the LAPs risk identification strategy, risks identified through this strategy and the corresponding actions taken to respond to these risks, I now need to highlight the links between risk identification and risk response strategies as applied under LAP in an attempt to answer the research sub-question; what are the ways by which risk identification can contribute to risk management practice?

It is evident from the discussions so far that some risk identification strategies worked in collaboration with each other to identify certain risks the project faced. For example, a combination of all four risk identification strategies; experience, project environment, best practice and sensitization, led to the identification of risks to project outcome such as the lack of capacity and the inability of the implementation agencies to support project delivery which then led to designing a comprehensive capacity development programme specifically to respond to these risks. Likewise, a combination of the sensitization, experience and project environment strategies led to the identification of risks such as the resistance to change and corruption on the part of some of the project's stakeholders and consequently led to specific risk response strategies such as training, assurances of job security and the usage of public awareness programmes such as education and displaying of prices at the various CSAUs for transparency. Risk identification, despite been over reliant on experts, was also continuous throughout project implementation which then led to continuous monitoring of the dynamics of the project through the sensitization and education programmes adopted under the project.

This strategic approach to risk management by specifically targeting specific risk response strategies at specific risks, according to the project team members, were a deliberate approach to ensure the project achieve the best possible outcome in the midst of the uncertainties faced (Hillson 2009) at project design and implementation. A MLNR official explained the linkage between the identified risks and risk response strategies:

These were the risks we had already identified so we had actually built it into the project…..these were the sort of things we thought could be done to address these risks specifically (Interview with technical director at the MLNR, 22/06/2017).

What this means is that specific actions to respond to the identified risks were strategically built into the project design. The above interviewee was part of the team that designed the project concept document in 2000. His views were affirmed by a PCU official who explained further that:

Ideally, we were targeting specific risk management strategies at specific risks (Interview with head of HR at the PCU, 22/06/2017).

Based on the two officials' assertions, I decided to ask the team leaders in the various implementation agencies about how this technique was applied in their respective departments and whether they targeted specific risk management strategies at specific risks. Below are extracts from the interview I had with two of them:

OASL official*: We looked at the problems and needs at our department and then we designed our strategy at working to achieve the best possible outcome so*

yes, we did target specific risk management strategies at specific risks. An example is the RPRD exercise used to define boundaries instead of the usage of physical landmarks over the years. The idea is to reduce land litigations over boundary issues (Interview with assistant stool lands officer, 26/06/2017).

TCPD official: *Yeah that's what we did. We targeted specific risk management strategies at specific risks. For instance if you talk about the risk of inadequate capacity, in terms of skills and the numbers, the strategy we used was let's attach our staff to the consultants to learn from them and at the same time, we made a case to central government to give special consideration to recruit a certain number of professional planners who will be able to carry on with the project* (Interview with head of operations at TCPD, 29/06/2017).

The above assertions confirm that while specific strategies were designed to respond to specific risks, the project team members also ensured that the process was designed to be continuous for effective project delivery. In addition to the assertions above, the other heads of implementation agencies I interviewed also confirmed, in one way or another, that they were targeting specific risk management strategies at specific risks in their quest to ensure the project achieve the best possible outcome.

Empirical evidence from this study shows that all the risk identification processes, namely experience, project environment, sensitization and best practice, played a direct role on the risks identified as well as the risk actions taken in the project's quest to deliver "beneficial change" in Ghana's land service delivery. It is therefore evident from this analysis that risk identification can be classified as strategic to risks to project outcome and their corresponding risk response

strategies. Based on these discussions, systematic risk identification therefore leads to;

- A clear strategic focus for project delivery by identifying the risks that can influence project outcome.
- A strategic risk action to respond to these risks.
- Effective monitoring and evaluation in the risk management process.

Consequently, empirical evidence from this study suggests that risk identification contributes to risk management practice through strategic action.

6.4 Stakeholder Objectives and Risk Management Strategies

The review of literature in chapter 2 revealed that many researchers such as Aaltonen et al. (2015), Jones et al. (2007), van Offenbeek and Vos (2016) and many others highlight the importance of stakeholder identification, dynamics and influence on projects. According to the PMI (2008), project managers need to aim to either meet or exceed stakeholder needs and expectations for projects to be classified as successful. This, in some instances, may be difficult to achieve because stakeholder needs and expectations may be different for the different variety of stakeholders a project may face since they assess success differently depending on their own objectives, views and expectations of the project. In chapter 4, I explained the objectives of the various stakeholders of LAP and highlighted the need for their commitments and acceptability to ensure the project achieve its' intended purpose. Analysis and discussions from this study so far on the various risks and risk actions supports Eskerod et al. (2015) assertion that stakeholders' resistance and reluctance may also pose risks that have the

potential to influence project outcome. To achieve or exceed stakeholder needs and expectations (PMI 2008), project stakeholder objectives need to be considered, in one way or another, in designing project risk management strategies.

Irrespective of the criticality of project stakeholders on project outcome, none of the studies reviewed in the literature investigates the influence of stakeholder objectives on project risk management strategies. Having discussed the LAP's risks and risk response strategies, I now need to investigate the level of influence and involvements of the projects' stakeholders and/or the recognition of their views, objectives and expectations in designing the project's risk response strategies as the first stage in an attempt to answer the research sub-question; do differences in stakeholder objectives influence the effectiveness of risk management strategies?

It is evident from the discussions on stakeholder risk response strategies such as; the sensitization programme to educate many of the project's stakeholders on the need to improve issues relating to land, assurances of job security, the extensive orientation of the LSA staff to solicit their views on training, as well as the involvements of some TAs in the dissemination of information were done with some consideration of the respective stakeholder objectives and expectations of the project in mind, in this case the various LSAs tasked with the successful implementation of the project and some of the land owning groups. When asked whether proposed beneficiary expectations were considered in designing project risk response strategies, a PCU official explained:

It was done with them. In fact, we had a consulting firm. The first thing I put in place was a counterpart team made up of all the people in the divisions so the divisions supervised the work of the consulting firm. Most of the needs assessment for instance, the consultants visited every division. They also visited some of the regions to talk to the staff. So it was an extensive consultation (Interview with head of HR at the PCU, 22/06/2017).

The consultations and stakeholder interactions explained by the official is in relation to the capacity development programmes undertaken in the various LSAs. A TCPD official also confirmed taken stakeholder expectations into consideration in their response to risks. He explained:

We decided that land use planning was going to be participatory. In fact all the designs we have done in terms of land use planning were based on feedback from stakeholders….so the plan is the outcome of the stakeholder consultation (Interview with head of operations at TCPD, 29/06/2017).

In quoting De Shepper et al. (2014), Nguyen et al. (2018) argues that these inform, involve and collaborate strategies as adopted by the LAP team members in dealing with stakeholder expectations, are stakeholder management strategies that have the potential to change stakeholder salient positions to enable them support the project's vision since many stakeholders in the various LSAs, who were the implementation arm of LAP, were resisting the changes proposed under the project. When asked whether stakeholder expectations were taken into consideration in designing response strategies to the risks they identified, a project officer in charge of the judiciary aspects of the project explained:

We did a lot of stakeholder consultations and brought together the bar and the bench with regards to the ADR aspect…….regardless of how tight your stakeholder matrix is, you will still have issues with stakeholders in land. Somebody might just pop his head to claim an interest (Interview with project officer at the Judiciary, 21/06/2017).

The official's assertion means that while there is a possibility to identify many project stakeholders to an extent, it is impossible to identify all stakeholders a project may face. Worsley et al. (2017) argues that, in some instances, the ones we miss or ones who emerge later can have significant impacts on project delivery and outcome. This supports my earlier arguments about the need to widen the scope of risk identification and not to over rely on academic and technical expertise. For a project of this nature where rights to land may be involved, this issue becomes even more complex due to the different interests that may be involved with regards to ownership and tenure security rights.

I therefore decided to enquire which stakeholder interests were incorporated in their response strategy, due to the different stakeholder views and expectations involved. The official explained further that:

We didn't include the final litigants. Let's put this in perspective, when we were doing the review of laws we put together everybody such as chiefs and everybody within the informal justice system came together to deliberate on how the law be made, especially with the ADR they were heavily represented in all our deliberations. But when it comes to infrastructure, the chiefs have no say. When it comes to automation, the chiefs have no say. What he can benefit is that he comes to court and his processes are quick and he gets his judgement…….it

is technical and you need the technical people to design them (Interview with project officer at the Judiciary, 21/06/2017).

The infrastructure as per the official's assertion relates to the rehabilitation, refurbishment and automation of land courts as executed under LAP. What this means is that while it is necessary to incorporate particular stakeholders and their expectations in risk response strategies, it is also necessary to clarify their roles and necessity at certain stages in order not to deviate from the project purpose in so doing. Consequently, certain stakeholders can be ignored (De Shepper et al. 2014) at certain stages of a project when their involvements are seen as not beneficial to the execution of certain project activities. Stakeholder involvements in risk response strategies should therefore be designed with particular reference to who they are, what they want from the project and how they expect to achieve their aim (Worsley 2017), without deviating from the project's purpose.

While the final litigants, as per the official's assertion, may include some TAs, on many occasions it is mostly the vulnerable landowners and individual leaseholders who are marginalised or ignored in project decision making. As argued in chapter 5, the views of these marginalised groups were not solicited at the risk identification stage at project inception although the data suggest many were conversant with the risks to project outcome and could have provided valuable insights should they have been consulted. When asked whether stakeholder objectives were taken into consideration in their risk response strategy, to ensure the data represents the approach adopted by the various implementation agencies, an OASL official explained:

To some extent. Although we only consulted the opinion leaders, I think more could be done in future projects (Interview with assistant stool lands officer, 26/06/2017).

A more senior colleague of this interviewee explained further:

As an office, we felt that these are things we have to do and then we came up with the design and sold it out to them. That's why we had to sensitize them to buy into the project (Interview with technical director at the OASL, 20/06/2017).

Consulting opinion leaders alone is not enough representation of the different variety of stakeholders since their views and expectations of the project may be different from that of the ordinary leaseholder and affirm Beck (2006)'s arguments on the need to consider the differenct classes and capacities of classification of risk. Nonetheless, the OASL officials' assertions suggest that in their department, some aspects of incorporating stakeholders in their risk response strategy offered some level of flexibility and to an extent, were done at the discretion of project team members. This strengthens my earlier assertion in chapter 2 of using the risk management process as a guideline and not a rigid standard due to the subjectivity of risk and the need for risk management to be incorporated in both the individualistic and functional areas of an organisation.

While the main strategy adopted at the OASL was designed in accordance with recommendations from the land policy, implementation was discretionary to an extent to enable the incorporation of some level of stakeholder inputs and participation. A regional head of the OASL, when asked about the involvements of stakeholder objectives in their response to risk, explained:

Initially no. The whole project was a result of the land policy that came out. So some consultations were done to get the land policy in place and the project was done to address the problems of the land policy. So a lot of the drafting, the project design and implementation plan were office based as they thought they knew the problem so they didn't go deeper in involving the beneficiaries (Interview with regional head of OASL, 12/07/2017).

His views were affirmed by a TA I interviewed. He explained:

We didn't know what they were about. All they did was come to sell the idea to us (Interview with sub-chief and leader of CLS, 30/06/2017).

Apart from incorporating stakeholder objectives and involving some of the project's stakeholders in the project's response to stakeholder risks as discussed above, there were instances where particular stakeholder objectives were indirectly addressed in other risk response strategies irrespective of the fact that the respective stakeholders were not actively involved in designing those strategies. For example, a critical view of social and environmental risk response strategies such as the completion of a comprehensive ESIA, although undertaken to satisfy donor expectations of development projects, also inadvertently served the interests of individual landowners and tenant farmers who either acquire land for investment purposes, or derive their livelihoods from land in one way or another by recognising their rights and making it possible for them to be compensated accordingly, should their lands be taken away. Likewise, the public awareness and education strategy used in response to political risks were also beneficial to individual landowners, leaseholders and tenant farmers by helping them to understand their rights and the procedures involved in the registration

process. In addition, cost recovery measures taken to increase internally generated funds in the implementation agencies, a financial and procurement risk response strategy, also served the interests of national and local government stakeholders by contributing to increased revenue for them.

Project team members tasked with managing development project risks therefore need to approach the management of such risks with wider stakeholder interests in mind due to the different views and expectations and the difficulties involved in clearly defining and identifying such complex stakeholders (Worsley 2017). These differences also have the potential of influencing the risk management strategies if wider stakeholder objectives are not taken into consideration in their design. While it may be impossible to identify all these stakeholders, project team members need to find a way to “factor in” the expectations of those they are able to identify, including proposed beneficiaries, in their risk response strategies to ensure they do not impact negatively on project outcome and to derive accompanying opportunities since their interests and expectations need to be achieved, in some way, for the project to be classified as successful (Stuckenbruck 1986).

While it is prudent to involve stakeholder objectives and expectations in project risk management, there are also instances where it may not be prudent to fully involve the “direct” stakeholders in managing these risks in order to ensure its’ smooth implementation. For example, strategies designed to fight corruption such as changing from the manual environment to the digital environment to promote attitudinal change in the various LSAs as well as the automation and displaying of prices in the CSAUs, although beneficial to certain stakeholders such as the state and beneficiary leaseholders, may be unpopular with the people

involved in these corrupt practices. Nonetheless, their involvements are also needed, in some way, to ensure the practicality and implementation of the response strategy.

Consequently, the effectiveness of incorporating stakeholder objectives in risk response strategies is dependent on the type of stakeholders involved, their views and expectations of the project and how they intend to achieve their respective objectives. What may benefit particular groups of stakeholders may not be beneficial to another group of stakeholders. The “unhappy” stakeholders should not be allowed to derail the purpose of the project under such circumstances. Project team members should therefore not deviate from overall project objectives in their quest to address stakeholder objectives (Aaltonen et al. 2015) in project risk management strategies.

The analysis of data and discussions on involving project stakeholders in the risk management process reveals that while some project team members incorporated the objectives and expectations of some stakeholders, others only incorporated stakeholder objectives to an extent, whereas others did not take this into consideration at the project inception stage but incorporated some aspects of it through sensitization during the implementation stage. Empirical evidence from this study therefore suggest that different stakeholder objectives had an influence, in one way or another, on the project’s risk management strategies. Although particular stakeholders such as individual landowners, leaseholders, tenant farmers and some TAs were not actively involved in the design and implementation of the response strategies, in some instances, their interests were indirectly addressed in some way. How effective these were on the risk management strategies can however be fully ascertained after analysing the

contributions of the projects' risk management strategy on its' success, or otherwise, in the next chapter.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an analysis and discussion on the strategies adopted to respond to the LAPs identified risks and highlighted the ways by which risk identification can contribute to risk management practice. A critical look at the various risk response strategies discussed shows that the project team members adopted a strategic approach to risk response by strategically targeting specific risk response strategies at specific risks in an attempt to ensure the project achieve the best possible outcome. The culture of the project environment is such that politicians and opinion leaders can influence project decision making to an extent. Project team members managing projects, under such circumstances, need to ensure their risk management strategies strategically reflect the way people behave or think in their respective environments to yield expected results.

Empirical evidence from this study also suggest that risk identification can contribute to risk management practice through providing a clear strategic focus for project delivery by identifying the likely risks to project outcome; contributing to the provision of strategic risk actions to respond to these risks and contributing to effective monitoring and evaluation of the risk management process as a whole.

The chapter has also provided the necessary background with regards to the influence of stakeholder objectives on risk management strategies. Irrespective

of the over-reliance on experts and the marginalisation of people perceived as "non-experts" by the project team members in the identification of the project's risks as discussed in chapter 5, some opinion leaders, who were also marginalised in the projects' risk identification process, were incorporated and involved to some extent, in the risk response strategies. The discussions revealed that stakeholder objectives had an influence on the projects' risk management strategies in one way or another, with the interests of the marginalised stakeholders incorporated in some way in the risk response strategies despite their non-involvements and incorporation in their design and implementation. While it is a near impossibility to identify all the stakeholders a project may face, project team members need to find a way to "factor in" the views and expectations of those they are able to identify in some way due to the criticality of project stakeholders in ensuring the success or otherwise of development projects. This, flexibility, should however be done within the context of the project's purpose.

The next chapter provides a discussion as to whether the LAP has been successful in achieving its' desired outcome as intended or otherwise, and the influence of the adopted risk management strategies on this.

Chapter Seven Land Administration Project and the Impacts of the Adopted Risk Management Strategies

7.1 Introduction

Projects are deliberate endeavours undertaken to result in beneficial change (Turner 2014) and as such, the *prima facie* objective of devising strategies to respond to identified risks in a project, is to steer the project to success by mitigating its' threats and capitalising on the opportunities that accompany risks to result in "beneficial change". This chapter presents an analysis of the various perspectives from which the success of LAP have been determined by the different interest groups attached to the project and provide an argument, based on the available literature, to ascertain whether the project's risk management strategies have positively contributed to the project's quest to ensure efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery as well as contributing to the strengthening of the sustainable capabilities of people whose livelihoods depend on land by ensuring easy access and security of tenure to land, as intended.

As argued by Shenhar et al. (2002), projects are undertaken in different environments and as such success criterion needs to reflect critical factors specific to particular project environments. Based on this, critical questions this chapter seeks to answer to help determine whether the adopted risk management strategies were effective in enhancing the project's success and to ascertain whether risk management practice do contribute to project success, from a development project perspective, include; have the LAP achieved its' intended outcomes? Have the adopted risk management strategies positively influenced

the project's success? Is land administration and management in Ghana more efficient and transparent as compared to the pre-project situation as a result of the implementation of LAP? Have the proposed beneficiaries, including those whose livelihoods depend on land, benefitted positively from the implementation of LAP? In this context, WB (2019b: 6) defines land administration as "ways in which rules of land tenure are applied and made operational" and land management as "the process of managing the use and development of land resources", both of which mutually enforce each other to ensure efficiency and transparency in land service delivery.

To set the tone for these discussions, the perspective from which the LAP's success has been determined is discussed in the next section.

7.2 How has Project Success been determined?

In reviewing the literature in chapter 2, I made a distinction between project management success and project success and argued that while project management success relates to projects delivering the desired outputs (measured against the constraints of quality, time and cost), project success on the other hand relates to whether a project has actually achieved its' desired outcome (Camilleri 2016; 2012; Cooke-Davies 2002), and how beneficial it has been to its' intended beneficiaries Atkinson (1999). While the completion of project deliverables can contribute, in one way or another, to the achievements of desired outcomes, assessing success from a project management perspective of completing deliverables at an approved cost within particular time frames will not be an acceptable measure for determining the success of LAP. This is due to

the fact that several factors including; the continuous flow of project funds outside the direct control of the project management team, the numerous amount of deliverables undertaken under the project, and the difficulty involved in measuring development project outcomes and impacts on proposed beneficiaries in quantitative metrics, need to be taken into consideration to reflect the environment within which the project was implemented.

Another justification for not assessing the success of LAP against the three constraints of quality, time and cost is due to the extension of completion times for both phases of the project; LAP-1 from 31st December 2008 to 31st December 2010 and then to 30th June 2011 and LAP-2 from 31st March 2016 to 31st March 2017 and then to 31st January 2019 and finally to 20th January 2020 (WB 2020; 2018a; 2018c; 2011b), but did not reflect on final cost of the project. LAP-1, although three years overdue, cost $6.85 million less and LAP-2 had a funding gap of $22 million due to some agencies failing to fulfil their initial financial obligations as agreed at project inception (WB 2018c; 2011b).

Project success for LAP, will therefore be measured against the achievements of the project's desired outcomes; including the solution of issues and achieved results and impact on proposed beneficiaries as anticipated at inception to reflect the critical factors specific to the project environment (Shenhar et al. 2002). This notwithstanding, the contributions of completing project deliverables to the achievement of the project's desired outcome will be highlighted in the discussions to highlight the links between project management success and the achievements of project outcome since outputs are not achieved for its' own sake but are in effect progress pursued towards the "beneficial change" a project seek to achieve.

7.3 Different Perspectives of Success and the Role of Risk Management

According to Stuckenbruck (1986), a successful project is one that achieves stakeholder perceptions of success. However, stakeholder perceptions of success can reflect their views and expectations of a project and as such, may not reflect the realities of the project's achievements. While it may be impossible to satisfy the needs of all interest groups under LAP due to many of them pursuing different agendas, McManus and Wood-Harper (2008) argue that, under such circumstances, project managers need to focus on achieving these needs to an extent or at least the majority. To ensure that this analysis is comprehensive enough to reflect the different views and interests as well as realistic enough to reflect the realities of the project environment and the project's intended outcomes, the extent to which the majority of the various stakeholder needs have been met or otherwise will be assessed as well as the project's intended outcomes to provide a comprehensive criterion in assessing the project's success. To enhance data credibility (Yin 2003), the empirical evidence from the study's fieldwork data will also be corroborated with key documented information on the achievements or otherwise of project objectives from key project documents; Project Implementation and Completion Reports (WB 2018c; 2011b) and its' review by the Independent and Evaluation Group (WB 2020; 2019b; 2013c). This does not necessarily mean that the documented evidence in the aforementioned project documents is absolute. Gaps and incorrect information in these documents will be criticized accordingly.

The different perceptions of success as perceived by the different interest groups of the project, and the contributions of the project's risk management strategies to this, are discussed below (7.3.1- 7.3.8).

7.3.1 Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources

The MLNR is the Ministry, under whose authority the LAP was implemented. When asked about their perception of success, an influential member of the Ministry explained some key successes of the project:

Under LAP-2, when we specifically targeted certain things like the development of the national spatial infrastructure development and the AMA street addressing system, remarkable successes were achieved. Take for example the interventions in the judicial process, like coming out with amendments in the court rules……..has not only transformed land administration but the judicial service operations in general. The fact that we were able to create 6 land courts and 3 in the districts…..and the changes in the court rules has shown remarkable progress (Interview with technical director at the MLNR, 22/06/2017).

While this official outlined some successes which were positively influenced by the actions strategically used to respond to the institutional and technical risks identified, when asked about his personal opinion as to whether the expectations of the project's beneficiaries have been met, he was of the view that more still needs to be done with regards to some aspects of what the project intended to do at inception to ensure that many beneficiaries benefit fully from the project and its' establishments: He explained:

Interviewer: *Sir, do you think the expectations of the project beneficiaries were met? Your own personal opinion please?*

Interviewee: *I wouldn't say so. What was our aim? Let's go back to the basics. Have we achieved easy access to land as at now? 13 years down the project? I will say no, not there yet…… Do we have a legislative framework that has*

clarified the positions? Not there yet……..but what I will say is that a lot has also been done along the way which actually also bear testimony to the concept we had from the beginning that this is going to be a long haul. We will have to go on this between 15-25 years to be able to get significant results (Interview with technical director at the MLNR, 22/06/2017).

The official's assertion bear witness to the initial project plan designed at the inception of LAP as the first phase of a wider long-term (15-25 years) commitment by the GoG to enhance economic and social growth through an effective and efficient land management mechanism (GoG 2011). To him, while he agree that progress towards intended purpose have been made to an extent, the project need to run its' full course for more people to benefit as intended. The key legislative instrument that was pending at the time of data collection has since been passed as The Land Act 2020 (Act 1036).

When asked whether the management of risks had an influence on the progress so far, he explained further:

It's difficult to assess……don't forget many of our anticipated plans to a successful outcome were either stopped or re-directed in a way by our donors. This notwithstanding, the interventions we were able to and allowed to make led to remarkable successes in those areas. Land disputes which used to take between 3 and 7 years are now resolved within 10 months…..land registries were only located in Accra and Kumasi but by extending it to 10 regions, it has made accessibility easier (Interview with technical director at the MLNR, 22/06/2017).

While donor interferences, particularly the cancellation of the original capacity development strategy set out by the project team members and other stringent

measures, had an influence on the implementation strategy to an extent, significant achievements such as the reduction in the time required to settle land disputes and extending land registries to other regional capitals have resulted in reducing barriers in the land registration system to make it more accessible to the ordinary Ghanaian as anticipated at inception.

These interventions, as per the official's assertion, are strategic risk actions adopted to facilitate the achievements (Miller and Lessard 2001) of the LAPs outcome of ensuring efficiency and transparency in land administration and management in Ghana. For example, the success of the Spatial Development infrastructure and completion of the GRN, key establishments under the project through the institutional and technical risk response strategies adopted by the TCPD (now LUSPA), did not only result in successfully developing the anticipated infrastructure, but the established infrastructure are also guiding major investments both nationally and regionally with regards to easy access to LIS (WB 2018c). While the aforementioned achievement is an opportunity derived from successfully managing the identified risks (Hillson 2001), it also highlights the positive impacts of the decentralisation approach used to manage political risks. By spreading project activities to all the implementation agencies strategically, the TCPD were able to effectively contribute to the success of the project through effective risk resolution (Miller and Lessard 2001) on the aspects they were involved in, as well as contributing to the creation of opportunities for investments in land which can go a long way to positively impact the economic development of the country as a whole, a long term goal of the project. Consequently, as per the official's assertion, where risk management was

strategic, effectively managed, and successfully implemented, significant successes were achieved.

Another MLNR official, when asked about the success of the project, explained:

The project as a whole has been successful…….. At the end of the whole thing we have achieved most of the outputs and sometimes most of the outputs are just inputs for major outcomes which we have not achieved yet. When it comes to our customary interventions….we have done the plans and established the CLSs and others but those are not established for its own sake. It's been done because we want to reduce land litigation, we want to have a very clear cut land administration principles where people can access information easily……with regards to some lands commission aspects such as reducing the turn-around time for getting land titles etc, that target has not been achieved yet but we are working on it (Interview with lands officer at the MLNR, 19/06/2017).

From this official's assertion, the project has either achieved what it set out to do to some extent, or established the necessary structures needed for the achievement of these outcomes (PMI 2008). When asked whether their risk response strategies had an influence on the outlined, he explained:

It's had a positive influence. Looking at the litigation and the understanding of the project etc, there is a clear linkage between the strategies we adopted and successes achieved. If people had not gone there to do the initial sensitization and knowing the cultural settings within which people operate etc I don't think we would have achieved what we achieved. Even in some of the areas, the activities may even not have taken place (Interview with lands officer at the MLNR, 19/06/2017).

The aforementioned were adopted social risk response strategies, which according to the official, were paramount in paving the way for a successful project implementation in some parts of the country. His views confirm that of his technical director in terms of the positive influence of risk response strategies towards project outcome but attribute these as leading to outputs (project management success). While project management success may in some instances, be easier to achieve than outcome as argued by Duffy and Thomas (1989), the achievement of outputs are significant milestones in overall project success since they can lead to a successful outcome (Nanthagopan et al. 2019). For example, institution building measures such as the comprehensive capacity building programme and establishments of 88 CLSs, a key output under LAP, have contributed significantly to the removal of some barriers and providing transparency in the land registration process by serving as access points to land services by the local communities as well as ensuring security of tenure by supporting the completion of leasing documentation and supporting the registration of 36,178 customary land rights under the project (WB 2020; 2018c). These documents can also be used to access credit facilities to reduce poverty for the people whose livelihoods depend on land, in line with the GoG strategy of using the projects' establishments to enhance economic and social growth, a positive impact of the risk management process.

In addition, the reductions in the time used to resolve land litigations and the resolution of some land litigation cases through ADR are significant achievements with regards to the provision of efficiency and transparency in land service delivery, particularly, with the customary sector controlling 80% of Ghana's total land.

Nanthagopan et al. (2019) argues that the success of development projects depend on the extent to which project outputs produce desired outcomes. This does not necessarily mean outputs always lead to outcome, but as per the official's assertion, outputs are not achieved for outputs sake, but progress towards outcome. From the discussions above, the achieved outputs have a positive influence on the project's desired outcome. Consequently, from the MLNR perspective, while some targets as set out at inception were yet to be achieved at the time of data collection, considerable progress had been made towards the achievement of project outcome with risk management positively influencing this.

7.3.2 Land Sector Agencies

A greater percentage of the Ghanaian populace access land services through the LSAs. These agencies played an indispensable role in the implementation of LAP and benefitted immensely from many of the project's risk management strategies including the comprehensive capacity building programme used to respond to many of the institutional, technical and stakeholder risks the project faced. When asked about project success, an OASL official explained:

We've been successful even though there have been some few junctions that circumvented some aspects of the project but we came out of it…under LAP-2, we wanted to roll out 50 CLSs but we ended up with 51. With the RPRD, in the project design, we were looking to demarcate 5118 parcels but in the course of doing those estimations, we estimated that an average farm will be about 2.5 acres but when we went there, the average was about 10.5 acres, some had

about 80 acres….also one of the surveying firms could not deliver but we still demarcated almost 4000 parcels, about 80% success. We now have good data to be able to plan for subsequent projects. Our aim is that we will use those plans for registration so people can use it to go into formal agreements with their landlords to ensure security of tenure (Interview with technical director at the OASL, 20/06/2017).

One key issue that exacerbated incidents of land litigation prior to the implementation of LAP is the usage of physical landmarks to define boundaries in rural communities, instead of survey maps due to these landmarks shifting over time. The RPRD exercise was therefore strategically designed to replace these physical landmarks with survey maps in the designated areas since many landowners in rural communities may not be able to afford the costs involved in surveying their lands. The project team members may have possibly had an idea about the average farm sizes, prior to the RPRD exercise, had they actively interacted and involved the indigenous communities in their risk identification strategy. While this may not have provided a guaranteed outcome, people in the grassroots know the issues they face day in and out and can provide valuable insights that can reduce the volatility and variability (Hopkins 2014) in investigations regarding their communities. This therefore strengthens my earlier argument in chapter 5 about the need for project team members not to over-rely on academic and technical expertise in their risk identification process. Nonetheless, to achieve an 80% success in an aspect where there were significant under estimation of activities as well as exceeding some targets such as completing more CLSs than estimated under LAP-2, shows the extent to which this particular LSA went to ensure that the project did not only achieve the most

favourable outcome (Hopkins 2014) of ensuring that the identified beneficiaries have access to proper documentation to ensure security of tenure, but also to help secure the projects' long term goals and its' impact on society (Golini et al. 2015), poverty reduction and livelihood sustainability through the usage of the data established under LAP for subsequent projects. In addition, the documents can also be used as collateral to access credit facilities and to facilitate an increase in investment opportunities on those lands (Deininger 2003; Willy 2011), an opportunity created through pursuing the initial objective of reduction in land litigations through RPRD. When asked how they managed to achieve these successes amid the challenges they faced, he explained:

The strategies we put in place really helped. Especially the ones we anticipated and took steps to intervene like the social assessment and all those things. The gender issues, land holding systems etc came out clearly so it informed us to strategize. I remember when we were doing the CBD at Bongo…..the ADR expert was always on the ground talking to the people….sometimes tempers started rising and she had to go and intervene to resolve it…..the success of the CLSs under LAP-2 as compared to LAP-1 is due to the switch from the supply-led to demand-led (Interview with technical director at the OASL, 20/06/2017).

The strategy used to calm down tempers and steer the project to success during the CBD exercise as well as the support of the CLS through the demand-led approach, confirms Carvalho and Rabechini Junior (2015)' assertion about the need for project team members to make good use of their soft skills (project interpersonal relationships) in their management of project risks. By having a personal relationship with proposed beneficiaries and explaining the benefits of projects for their social and economic wellbeing, people tend to take ownership

of such endeavours and support their implementation which can positively impact on project success. Another OASL official affirmed the aforementioned assertions and explained:

I would say there has been considerable progress in the activities that my office has been involved in, for example the RPRD, CBD and CLS establishments… (Interview with assistant stool lands officer, 26/06/2017).

The assertions of the OASL officials are the positive effects of the project approach of strategically targeting specific risk response strategies at specific risks and show a link between risk identification, risk response and project success. This also affirms that of the MLNR officials discussed earlier, with regards to the positive effects of the social, institutional and technical risk response strategies towards project outcome. One key area where the established CLSs have been beneficial, apart from the recording of land rights, contribution to leases locally and dispute resolutions, is their creation of awareness and promotion of transparency by serving as a point of call for the local community to access information and guidance with land matters, which hitherto, were not easily accessible.

When asked about success, a TCPD official explained:

I can say the project has been largely successful…..all the land use plans we have established are all due to the implementation of LAP. If you talk about the registration, I know that the lands commission has undergone a lot of reforms which has been largely successful. The judiciary aspects has also been very successful as we now have land courts etc and the CLS are all due to the project (Interview with head of operations at TCPD, 29/06/2017).

The aforementioned are the positive influences of the project's institutional, technical and stakeholder risk response strategies on the project. However, to ascertain the extent to which their management of risks had an influence on the project and whether opportunity was pursued in their approach, I asked this official whether in his opinion, there have been any positive outcomes of their approach to risk management. He explained:

All these successes would not have been possible if we hadn't been strategic in our approach. Now I can say that we've been able to train many of our professionals under the new reforms and they are in a position to implement their skills, also we've been able to prepare a National Spatial Development Framework for Ghana, we've prepared two regional development frameworks for greater Accra and Ashanti Regions, we've prepared a comprehensive urban development plan for greater Kumasi, we've also prepared a spatial development framework for the Northern Savannah Ecological Zone in Ghana….all these were due to the interventions we made and it has even benefitted interventions outside the project (Interview with head of operations at TCPD, 29/06/2017).

This official's department, utilised orthophoto maps developed under the project to complete some key establishments of LAP, the NSDF and two RSDFs. Working under the project's established Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority (WB 2019b), the NSDF and RSDFs are guiding land and infrastructural developments in Ghana such as the Eastern section of the national rail network as well as private investments in waste treatment. This is an exploitation strategy (Hillson 2001), used to increase the probability of positive occurrence of the project for more people to benefit. The frameworks are also transparent and offer automation facilities for easy access by the ordinary Ghanaian in line with

ensuring efficiency and transparency in land service delivery. At project closure, a fully functional LUPMIS had been developed to support urban planning as a result of LAP (WB 2020). According to the projects' ICR, the NSDF and RSDFs are one of the key accomplishments of LAP that meets all aspects of the PDO (WB 2018c: 14).

When asked whether, in his opinion, proposed beneficiary expectations of the project have been met, he explained further:

I will say to an extent because some of them are now aware of issues regarding land administration. They know what to do when they want to buy a piece of land even though there have been some lapses. I think what they probably want to see is how the process is quickened so that when someone buys a piece of land, they can get it registered quickly. That aspect, we are still working on but in terms of general awareness about land issues, the project has been widely successful (Interview with head of operations at TCPD, 29/06/2017).

The aforementioned assertion of the LAP's success suggest that even though there were some aspects of the project which were still in progress with regards to quickening the land registration process at the time of data collection, considerable progress had been made with regards to the project achieving its' intended outcome. One key issue that existed at the pre-project situation, as explained in chapter 4, was the lack of transparency and accountability in land dealings which necessitated the need for LAP. By promoting public awareness and ensuring that people know where and how to access information on land, political, social and stakeholder risk response strategies, the project has contributed significantly to the removal of some barriers in the land registration

process to make access and security to land more easily accessible as compared to the pre-project situation.

With regards to the achievement of the targets for title and deed registration of three month and one month respectively, an official of the LC who is a team leader in one of the project's established CSAUs explained the processes involved and the role the institutions involved have to play for this to be possible:

If LAP want to achieve a 3 month lease, then we can say that it is achievable because of the progress we've seen at other aspects of the project but a lot of this rest on the institutions. It takes a while for the process of registration to go through….each case is different and in Kumasi here, the process also includes Manhyia. People initially submit to the Asantehene's land secretariat and then it will come over here for us to confirm whether the land is available or not. We check whether the land is registered by a different party…then we have a look at the layout…. to check whether it is in conformity with the development plan of the area. If it's ok, then we write to them (Interview with team leader at CSAU two, 11/07/2017).

As per the official's assertion, although institution building measures such as the consolidation and strengthening of the various LSAs were aimed at removing barriers and ensuring efficiency in their endeavours, this can only work to an extent as far as the achievements of the set turn-around times for registration of land titles and deeds are concerned due to the presence of some powerful institutions in some registration areas, some of which are outside the direct control of the project team members, in the process. *Manhyia* is the official residence of the powerful King of the Ashanti kingdom. This means that while it

is possible for the institutional and technical risk response strategies to contribute positively to project outcome, how powerful certain institutions are, can also influence the achievements of such outcomes to an extent. Setting the turn-around time targets for titles and deeds registration should therefore not have followed a one-size-fit-all approach, but be flexible and realistic enough to reflect different paramount areas, procedures and the realities in the project environment.

As part of the project's quest to remove barriers in the land registration process for efficient and transparent land service delivery, the project embarked on a campaign to reduce the marginalisation of women in Ghana's land ownership structure by putting measures in place to ensure that more women register their interests in land for tenure security. When asked about its' success, the official in charge of the gender aspects explained:

The registration of titles in the name of spouses have been very successful in the sense that if someone brings a document for registration and it bears Mr and Mrs instead of their actual names, they will be asked to take it back and correct the names on the document to things like Mr Isaac AAA and Adwoa BBB before it will be registered……..in terms of the overall success of the project, I will say it has been successful to an extent because at the moment, we have so many CLSs as a result of lap which has been very successful because now when the lands are sold, the chiefs are aware that they need to record the transactions and give the buyer allocation notes to depict the type of land sold and the exact one as well….they have also been provided with computers so they are able to keep records to avoid multiple land sales (Interview with regional head of LVD, 11/07/2017).

The aforementioned are strategic stakeholder and institutional risk response strategies adopted to address the issue of marginalisation of women in terms of land ownership and the understanding of their land rights as well as the promotion of transparency and building of trust in the land registration process. By being recorded as rightful owners of land, more women will be able to benefit from the proceeds accruing on land, particularly from amongst married couples where the men had wanted to only register their names on land documents. Today, as a result of LAP, five gender equality desks have been established in the CSAUs (WB 2018c) to promote gender equity in the quest to promote transparency and remove some barriers in the registration process which hitherto, prevented many women from registering their interests in land. These are significant achievements toward the projects' long term goals and impact on society of reducing poverty and strengthening the capabilities of the poor and vulnerable to enhance economic and social growth.

When asked whether her departments' adopted risk response strategies had an effect on these achievements, she explained:

Oh yes. Now, you can see that the women are happy as they are involved in land acquisition and their names are appearing on land documents….investors can now get information with regards to land administration because they can walk to any office and will be able to access information regarding particular lands. Hitherto, people didn't know much about land but now they know and can even access some on the internet (Interview with regional head of LVD, 11/07/2017).

According to the ICR (WB 2018c), women interests constitutes 30% of all recorded registered land transactions under the project as at December 2017.

With chiefs now fully aware of the need to record land transactions and more importantly, the measures put in place to ensure the reduction of multiple sale of same lands to different individuals as well as the ability to easily access information on land online as per the official's assertion, confirms that the project has made considerable progress towards the promotion of transparency and efficiency in Ghana's land service delivery as set out at inception. The adopted risk management strategies have not only positively influenced this progress, but have also created an opportunity (Cooper et al. 2005) for investors to easily access information on land for development which is positive for the economic growth of the country. The onus however, lies on how the various institutions utilise the project's established institutions to ensure the project fully achieve its' intended outcomes for more people to benefit.

Despite all these positive assertions from the LVD official, when asked whether, in her opinion, the project has met the expectations of its' proposed beneficiaries, she explained further:

Not wholly. I will say its' about 80% achieved. For example bringing the land sector agencies together is a positive thing although there is still a problem because we still see ourselves as individual agencies (Interview with regional head of LVD, 11/07/2017).

What this means is that while the idea behind the consolidation of the agencies, which were a combination of the institutional, technical and stakeholder risks response strategies, was good to promote transparency and efficiency in the new LC, the individual departments still compete for roles which in itself undermine the core reason for which they were consolidated. The above assertions suggest

that where institutions are not coherent, interventions designed to provide new public management directions (Hood et al. 2001) may not work as intended. As argued by Achterkamp and Vos (2008), lack of social interactions between key stakeholders can negatively influence project success and as such, the various departments under the new LC need to come to a common consensus for working together harmoniously and see themselves as one entity, as anticipated, to ensure the full benefits of the merger is realised.

Measuring the achievement of beneficiary expectations in development projects therefore depends on the type of beneficiary, what was expected, and the perspective from which such measurement is assessed. Another LSA official who was responsible for the Ascertainment of Customary Law Project (ACLP), which in itself was linked to LAP and experienced an 80% success at project closure (WB 2020) affirmed the above assertions and elucidated further that while they are still working on how to get some things to work perfectly, considerable progress have been achieved under the LAP. She explained:

I think the project has been quite successful….I have seen the changes that have been done at the LC, the CSAUs, the CLS etc. There are still some teething problems and we are still grappling with how to get some things to work perfectly but we have made considerable progress (Interview with lands officer and technical coordinator of ACLP, 10/07/2017).

7.3.3 Traditional Authorities

With about 80% of Ghana's total land under customary ownership, successfully streamlining the activities of TAs is critical to ensuring efficiency and transparency

in Ghana's land service delivery. Below, three different TAs with established CLSs, who benefitted in one way or another from the project's risk response strategies such as the education and public awareness campaigns, dissemination of activities, generic business plan, institution building and capacity development programmes, expressed their perceptions of success. The first began by explaining how beneficial the LAP has been to his TA:

We have benefitted from the project for example we now ensure people are provided with allocation notes when they come to buy land. This wasn't prioritised before the introduction of LAP….. Secondly, we have receipts here which are authentic ones from our customary land secretariat…….the project has also provided us with machines like photocopiers etc which we had to go and do elsewhere prior to the implementation of LAP (Interview with supreme traditional leader, 30/06/2017).

As per the TAs assertion, the project has provided them with the necessary equipment and infrastructure needed to help promote efficiency and transparency in their land service delivery including the recording of land transactions and providing authentic receipts as proof of land purchases which hitherto, were not prioritised and contributed, in some way, to the many claims and counter claims of same land by different parties. These are direct results of the institution building measures designed to improve land issues at the community level. In terms of contributions toward project outcome, the aforementioned achievement is significant progress in the quest to successfully reform land management and administration in Ghana. When probed further about the success of key activities such as the ADR and RPRD, he explained:

Although the RPRD exercise was successful, many people who wanted to take part were taken out of the scheme by LAP….people have however realised it was beneficial because, at least, they will get some documentation to proof the boundary and type of parcel they own….this will also help with the collection of land tributes. With the ADR, we had our own land management committee before LAP which is made up of sub-chiefs so we didn't want the ADR committee to take over their responsibilities…..the project coordinators advised that the ADR committee under the CLS should sit with the land management committee when land issues are being resolved (Interview with supreme traditional leader, 30/06/2017).

For the poor and vulnerable, some of whom could not afford the costs involved in surveying their lands but for LAP, the RPRD exercise provided them with the opportunity to receive documentation on their land as security to prove ownership as well as the opportunity to improve their sustainable capabilities by benefitting from the economic value of their lands as these documents could also be used as collateral. For this group of stakeholders, the LAP has had a positive impact on the improvement of their livelihoods and could therefore be classified as successful as per Atkinson (1999)'s argument that a successful project is one which has been beneficial to its' stakeholders. However, when asked whether in his opinion, the project has been successful overall, he explained:

To be honest, on some parts, the project achieved its' purpose, in other parts, it did not….they gave us a motor bike which is not working now. I even asked for a pick-up truck which has not been provided. We need this because our villages and towns are in the hinterlands and not easily accessible….we also need help

with layouts as it is very expensive and I have to pay for these myself (Interview with supreme traditional leader, 30/06/2017).

The TAs assertion on the aspects of the project which, to him, was not satisfactory is the project's inability to provide a personal need which in itself was outside the project's intended purpose and are also contradictory to his earlier assertions of success which are in line with what the project sought to achieve. As argued by (Worsely 2017), projects will always encounter limited resources and as such in steering a project to success, project team members need to focus on the right stakeholder activities that are crucial to the project's intended outcome. Many people in Ghana have raised expectations from projects as having the ability to provide every resource they ask for which may sometimes be unrealistic (Szajna and Scamell 1993) and outside the project's intended purpose. According to Golini et al. (2015), when adhered to, these can lead to confused objectives and indeterminate project boundaries, which can place continuous drain on already scarce resources. The LAP's team members were focused on what the project sought to achieve at inception and were not amenable to some stakeholder demands, some of which were unrealistic and outside the project's core, in their quest to provide the best possible outcome as desired.

A second TA, who shared similar experiences with the first with regards to how beneficial the LAP has been to his TA, explained:

The project has made it possible for us to keep records of our land transactions which have been beneficial... For example due to the fact that we didn't have proper records of our land transactions, we encountered issues of multiple land

sales but after maintaining proper records through LAP, we do not encounter such problems. Secondly, the issues of land litigations and land disputes have minimised. Thirdly, people have recognised the need for having documentation on land and have come forward to regularise their lands to proof ownership for future records. Moreover, documentations have also helped ……..because people now go to OASL to pay their ground rents……this helps with increasing revenue both for the traditional council and the district assembly (Interview with sub-chief and leader of CLS, 30/06/2017).

When asked about his perception of the overall success of the project, he explained further:

Apart from the benefits to my TA already explained, land litigations in our paramount area have reduced drastically due to ADR. We prepare our own leases now as a result of the CLS and then get the solicitors to certify…so now if a prospective client comes and want to buy land, they know we will do everything to cover their interests in the land which in effect means the money paid is not wasted…this documentation was purely done by solicitors at first (Interview with sub-chief and leader of CLS, 30/06/2017).

Contrary to the experiences of the TA interviewed earlier with regards to ADR and the overall patronage of the ADR strategy under LAP, the fieldwork data suggests this TA's paramount area have had a different experience with regards to the success of ADR. When asked how ADR has helped his paramountcy, he explained:

The chief had an arbitration committee which he made me the chairman and then when the CLS started, we were taken for training under LAP to continue with the

good works we were already doing under the arbitration committee. So this extra training and the expertise we already had has really helped to solve the issues of land litigation in this area. That is one aspect of LAP I'm really thankful for because land litigations can be very laborious and we are grateful not to have such things in this area (Interview with sub-chief and leader of CLS, 30/06/2017).

For this particular paramountcy, the removal of some barriers in the land registration process by improving the recording of land transactions to promote transparency, increases in revenue accruing from land, their empowerment to produce their own leases instead of over-relying on solicitors prior to the inception of LAP, the reduction in land litigation cases and the benefits accrued from the project's comprehensive capacity building programme, among others, means the strategies used to respond to risks to project outcome, have been successful in promoting efficiency and transparency in their delivery of land service as anticipated. In addition, it has also created opportunities (Kollveit et al. 2004) for growth and investments in land by helping to build some level of trust between prospective investors and the TAs.

The contrasting experiences of the two TAs with regards to the success of ADR means where the project team members sought to build on the existing land management committee, the ADR provided remarkable results than areas where they did not. According to the PMI (2008), in identifying project stakeholders, project team members need to be clear about their individual attributes and involvement in project implementation but from the aforementioned, it is evident that the project team members underestimated the role of the TAs to an extent, with regards to the success of the ADR hence the low patronage in some areas and affirms Power (2004)'s assertion that sometimes, developing informal

systems rather than formal generalisable ones can increase the success of risk regulation. In areas where there were existing land management committees that preceded LAP, they should have rather empowered and resourced the already existing committees for them to be more efficient instead of creating new ones to provide overlapping duties.

This affirm my earlier arguments in chapter 5 about the need for project team members to involve people they perceive as “non-technical” in project decision making. The soft side of project risk management (project interpersonal relationships) positively influence project success as argued by Carvalho and Rabechini Junior (2015) in their study involving 263 industries across eight industries. Successfully implementing project interpersonal relationships in project delivery does not necessarily require the possession of “technical” knowledge to deliver due to different classes and capacities of classification of risk by different people (Beck 2006). Although these members of the already existing land management committee may not have academic qualifications in that area of expertise, they are community leaders who are revered by their people and as such, have the ability to apply their interpersonal relationships with the community to settle disputes that may arise from amongst their own people.

A spokesperson for a powerful TA, who had some reservations about some aspects of the LAP’s approach, explained his perception of success:

LAP made a lot of progress in land administration….they’ve also made significant strides such as setting up CLSs and creating awareness etc as a lot of traditional areas come here to ask how things are done which means people are eager to progress…but against all the objectives, well there are some positives but they

are not there yet (Interview with traditional land secretariat spokesperson, 29/06/2017).

When asked to explain his assertions further, he explained:

Historically, the government has always tried to intervene to oust the jurisdiction of the customary sector in managing its own land and there's always been fierce resistance….I think the way to go is strengthen the customary sector instead of limiting their role. Unfortunately, our chiefs have been undermined for a long time so they don't have the same level of expertise of managing lands as the lands commission is supposed to do. Besides, they are chiefs and chieftaincy even though is inexplicably linked to land ownership, being a good chief is completely different from being a good land manager. So I will propose we establish an institution that will train our chiefs on land management…..who owns what, who should be entitled to what etc…..chiefs allocate the same plot to multiple people because they think they have the power (Interview with traditional land secretariat spokesperson, 29/06/2017).

The spokesperson's criticism of the project approach is based on the fact that, in his opinion, the project placed too much emphasis on the promotion of efficiency and transparency in the LSAs without particular reference to the land owning groups who own the majority of land in Ghana. Consequently, in his opinion, while the LAP made considerable progress in establishing laws and consolidating the land administration aspects of land service delivery, and made some progress in land management, 80% of purported land managers (TAs and land owning groups) cannot be side-lined for the project to achieve an acceptable outcome. While the established CLSs sought to address issues of transparency in the

delivery of land service in the traditional areas, land management training needs to go beyond the established CLS to include the wider land owning community for more people to benefit from the project.

This notwithstanding, projects are undertaken within defined boundaries (Golini et al. 2015) due to the limited amount of time and budget involved and as such, from the discussions so far, while the LAP has not satisfied the needs of all the TAs and land owning communities in Ghana, among the TAs the project focused, considerable progress have been made in resolving some of the many issues they faced prior to the implementation of LAP including; the lack of transparency in land dealings, inappropriate recording of land transactions that led to multiple sale of same lands to different individuals and land litigations, poor boundary demarcations and trust from among the general public. The evidence suggest the LAP has contributed significantly to the promotion of transparency and efficiency in their delivery of land service to the ordinary Ghanaian with more TAs now aware of the positive impacts of transparency and tenurial arrangements in land, and the adopted strategies used to respond to identified risks to these outcomes have had a positive influence on their achievements. This however needs to be built upon, post project to include more TAs, for more Ghanaians to benefit from the project.

7.3.4 Judiciary

In Ghana, the Judiciary play a very critical role in the promotion of efficiency and transparency in land service delivery due to the prevalence of land litigation cases in Ghanaian courts. The project's partnership with the Judiciary was therefore

primarily aimed at strengthening their institutional capabilities and empowering them to improve their efficiency to enable them to significantly reduce the time used in resolving land cases. When asked about success, a project officer for the Judiciary explained:

ADR has been implemented alright but the outcome has been low. The review of laws and refurbishment and automation of courts have been very successful. Overall on a scale of 1-10, I will say LAP achieved 6.5 in the sense that I think it did well when it comes to gender and social inclusion, the judicial component was quite successful, AMA was quite successful, LUSPA's bit with national plans were quite successful, OASL did well with the CLS's and then in terms of training and capacity building, yes it did very well. I scored it low because of the non-achievement of the lands commission's target of reducing the turn-around time for the registration of deeds and titles (Interview with project officer at judiciary, 21/06/2017).

Estimates from Kasanga (2003) revealed there were 60,000 land litigation cases in Ghanaian courts in 2002 prior to the implementation of LAP. ADR in itself was an institutional and technical risk response strategy adopted to help resolve some land cases at the community level and reserve the more serious cases for the courts in the project's quest to reduce pressure in Ghanaian courts. Many litigants however prefer the court system to the project's established ADR system. As at project closure, only 307 land cases had been resolved through the project's established ADR against its target of 2000 (WB 2020).

In terms of contribution towards outcome, the established ADR structures have created awareness for the local communities as they now have a more accessible

means of resolving land matters. However, the low patronage of ADR and continuous prevalence of land cases in Ghanaian courts means this aspect of the project has not fully achieved its' intended outcome. This low patronage, as earlier discussed, is partly due to the implementation strategy used in different CLS'. This notwithstanding, in terms of progress towards outcome, the completion and automation of land courts, the training of 645 judges and key Judiciary staff, the amendments of court rules (WB 2018c), the passage of The Land Act 2020 (Act 1036) and The Land Use and Spatial Planning Bill 2016 (Act 925), are all positive influences of the project's institutional, technical and stakeholder risk management strategies which aimed at steering the project to success (Miller and Lessard 2001), and in effect also contributes significantly to the consolidation and strengthening of land management and administration and the promotion of efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery. As per the official's assertion, the Judiciary components under the project have been quite successful and as at December 2017, has help reduced the time used to resolve land disputes in the courts from more than 24 months before the inception of LAP to about 10 months (WB 2018c). Additionally, dedicated land courts increased from six to twelve at project closure (WB 2020). The aforementioned are all significant achievements of LAP through the removal of some of the barriers in the land registration process to ensure easy access to land and security of land rights for the ordinary Ghanaian.

7.3.5 Civil Society

Under LAP, different CSOs played independent roles by promoting participation and community awareness to ensure that the wider Ghanaian public benefit from the project and its' outcome. To ensure that the data represents the view of all interested parties, I interviewed two CSOs who played differing roles in the project's implementation. When asked about his perception of the project's success, one of them explained:

The project to a large extent has been able to develop the capacity and service delivery apparatus of government implementing agencies. Hitherto, a lot of those sector agencies were handicapped. I mean with obsolete maps, limited equipment etc….but the interface between the client and service delivery is where CICOL comes in and that is where I think a lot still need to be done……if you improve the service delivery aspect and you don't facilitate the landowners to be able to bring their documents to the service delivery people, then the same problem will be there…..so more still need to be done in terms of the land owning community (Interview with project manager at CICOL, 22/06/2017).

This means that while the project to a large extent positively improved land service delivery as intended, the focus was mainly on the LSAs. According to this interviewee, the benefits will not be fully realised until the wider land owning community is equipped to fully benefit from the project and its' establishments. The second CSO member was very critical with the LAP's focus on improving the capacity of government institutions without doing same to the wider land owning community. He explained:

Personally, I think we need to involve the grassroots more to achieve wider success. The whole project was designed based on the land policy which also identifies the rights of landowners and their descendants as well as facilitating equitable access and security of tenure. How much of the funding was spent on the land owning groups? (Interview with director Land for Life, 23/06/2017).

While the researcher agree with the interviewees with regards to widening the benefits of the project, from a project management perspective and the need for projects to have clearly defined boundaries, the project progressed positively towards what was intended at inception. Although many activities were arguably skewed towards strengthening the LSAs than the wider land owning groups, project success can only be measured against what was intended at inception and not what should have been done. The institutions have been established and these can be built upon, post project, for more people to benefit from the project.

7.3.6 Landowners, Leaseholders and Farmers

As part of the study's fieldwork exercise, I spent time in different CSAUs (one stop shops) established under the project to observe the processes involved in the land registration process. I also used this opportunity to interview some landowners and leaseholders who patronise some of the project's established institutions about their individual experiences as to the usage of these institutions. These are people who were not directly involved in the project implementation process but were earmarked as proposed beneficiaries of the project and its' established institutions. Below, two different leaseholders who had gone to

register their interests in land at different regional CSAUs expressed their perceptions of the LAP's success:

Leaseholder 6: *Its' been successful to some extent at least with the displayed prices and text messaging system. Yet, a lot still need to be done to make transactions on land more transparent…they should at least do it on a first come first serve basis. It looks like that but it is still to whom you know. Although the CSAU was meant to make the registration process easier, the same problem persists because it is the same people here. More need to be done in terms of the staff. Probably change them. You cannot change an institution with the same staff and attitude……It looks nice and to me, it's just the beginning. Until land registration becomes more easier and straight forward, the one stop shop is only one step forward* (Interview with leaseholder 6, 16/06/2017).

Leaseholder 4: *I've just seen the CSAU over there and have been told it is a one-stop-shop…people should be made to understand the system otherwise nothing can be achieved* (Interview with leaseholder 4, 06/07/2017).

While leaseholder 6 was fully aware of the existence of LAP, leaseholder 4 did not know about the existence of a project designed to facilitate easy access and security to land but had only seen a designated office delivering land services. From the leaseholder perspective, the education and public awareness campaigns adopted to ensure more people benefit from the project did not go far enough although leaseholder 6 believe some progress have been made towards efficiency and transparency as per displayed prices and the test messaging system to update them on the progress of their submitted documentation. In addition, the job assurances strategy adopted to ensure employees of the various

LSAs support the project's purpose seems not to have gone well with some people who patronise the CSAUs.

As per leaseholder 6's assertion, the registration process is still not transparent enough due to maintaining the same staff in the new LC. These employees received training before transitioning to the CSAUs under the project's comprehensive capacity development strategy but some of them need to have the willingness to perform (Khang and Moe 2008) for their competencies to be beneficial as intended. While the various employees in the old LC were assured their job security in an attempt to ensure they support the project's vision, leaseholder 6's assertion confirms some aspects of Omoyefa (2008) argument that sometimes the best way to inject real effectiveness, efficiency and competence into public sector organisations is to completely overhaul the employees. From a project management perspective however, this approach can be very costly in terms of continuous project delivery.

In addition to the above leaseholders, I also interviewed some farmers who had their farms surveyed under the RPRD exercise to ascertain, whether to them, the LAP has indeed serve the purposes for which they were intended. They explained:

RPRD beneficiary 5: *For me, the exercise has been very beneficial as I haven't had any problem with boundaries since. We now have clear boundaries* (Interview with RPRD beneficiary 5, 30/06/2017).

RPRD beneficiary 4: *There was litigation on the land before the exercise so we first had to resolve this with the elders. Since the erection of pillars along the boundaries to clearly demarcate my cocoa farm, there's been no issues since we*

all know our boundaries now although we haven't received the documents yet (Interview with RPRD beneficiary 4, 30/06/2017).

RPRD beneficiary 4 actually resolved her land litigation through ADR before also benefitting from the RPRD exercise. Although some of them had not received the documents to their demarcated lands at the time of data collection due to a delay on the part of the surveyor, 4 out of the 5 I interviewed said the RPRD exercise has been very successful in helping to protect their rights to land by clarifying their boundaries to secure their farms, on which their livelihoods depend, in line with the GoG's quest to reduce poverty and strengthen the sustainable capabilities of the poor through ensuring easy access to land and security of land rights. While security of tenure also includes protection from encroachments (FAO 2002), the erection of pillars along the boundaries for clarity is a deterrent to encroachers. The only exception was someone who had a misunderstanding with her neighbour because she failed to attend the exercise on the day, thinking it was for taxation purposes.

For this group of stakeholders, the LAP has either satisfied the majority or has satisfied them to an extent and has created an awareness of the positive effects of regularising land rights and security of tenure. Although more needs to be done in terms of the transparency aspects in the established CSAUs, considerable progress have been made as compared to the before project situation and confirms McManus and Wood-Harper (2008) arguments about the impossibility of public sector projects to be able to satisfy all interest groups but to aim to satisfy at least the majority of them or satisfy their needs to an extent to be classified as successful.

7.3.7 Donors

While the donors did not benefit directly from the LAP or its' outcome, they played an active and indispensable role in the project from inception to implementation. Their definition of success is therefore crucial in determining whether the project achieved its' intended outcome, or otherwise. As earlier elucidated, I had an opportunity to attend a week's ISM during the fieldwork exercise which was also attended by the WB's strategic task team attached to the project. I had the opportunity to interview and to interact with some of them. When asked about the project's success, one of them explained:

Reforming land administration and management is a process. The foundations have been laid, let's focus on strengthening the gains. For the ordinary leaseholder, it is when he can register his title on time and without frustrations can he say that the project has been successful (Interview with academic and member of WB task team, 09/06/2017).

This official acknowledged that the LAP has made considerable progress in ensuring efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery, which he stressed as a process that needs to be built upon for many people to benefit from the project. A more senior member of the WB team however stressed that:

The turn-around times for deeds and title registrations are the main KPI's that the bank is looking at (Interview with WB task team leader, 07/06/2017).

This senior WB official had decided that the only acceptable measure of success for the LAP is to achieve the targets for the turn-around times of 3 months in CSAU areas and 1 month for the registration of land titles and deeds respectively. The turn-around times at project closure for registering deeds had reduced from

a pre-project level of more than 36 months to 2.11 months with the actual data for registering titles unavailable at project closure since the initial figure of 4.2 months was hugely contested by the WB (WB 2020; 2018c). While the aforementioned targets are outputs which were not achieved as expected, people are still registering titles and deeds day in and out at considerable shorter periods than the before project situation. This, coupled with other significant achievements of the LAP already discussed, constitutes the removal of some of the barriers in the land registration process and consequently, can be regarded as positive progress as compared to the before project situation. The assertions of the team leader at CSAU 2, one of the managers involved in the land registration process discussed earlier, revealed the need to factor in the powerful traditional settings involved in the registration process in the different paramount areas and not follow a one-size-fit-all approach since they can also influence the achievements of the turn-around times for title and deeds registration significantly.

The evidence suggest that assessing the overall success of a complex project of this nature from a project management perspective (Cooke-Davies 2002) on the non-achievement of one key target of not-reducing the turn-around time for the registration of land titles and deeds as per the WB official's assertion, without considering the key actors involved in the registration process and the numerous activities undertaken under the project, which have benefitted many of its' proposed beneficiaries (Atkinson 1999) in one way or another, is not a true presentation of the overall achievements of the project in terms of outcome, from which development project success should rather be assessed (Camilleri 2016). Additionally, empirical evidence suggest (Abdulai and Owusu-Ansah 2014) that

land registration alone does not guarantee security of tenure since it can be successfully contested in courts and that title insurance, which can address insecurity of tenure, can also be very expensive and beyond the reach of many of the LAP's proposed beneficiaries.

Many people who depend on land and the benefits that accrue on land for their livelihoods such as the TAs, rural farmers and some landowners, and many in the informal sector in urban communities, may not directly benefit from the registration of title and deeds, but have benefitted immensely from the LAP in one way or another as discussed and these should also be taken into consideration in assessing the project's success.

7.3.8 Project Coordinating Unit

The PCU was a unit specifically set up under the guidance of the chief director of the MLNR to oversee the coordination and monitoring of the day to day activities of the project. These responsibilities also include coordinating with the various implementation agencies to ensure a successful implementation of the various actions designed to respond to risks to outcome in the attempt to steer the project to success and benefit from its' accompanying opportunities. When asked whether the LAP has been successful, a senior PCU official explained:

From the generic point of view this has been largely successful as we've established A to B. However, in terms of whether the project has achieved its purpose then this is debatable. Success is something that is debatable as it depends on which perspective you are looking at it from……..but we also need

to ensure that the established structures are used by the people for whom they were intended (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

From the official's assertion, in terms of assessing success from an output perspective, the project has been largely successful, but he would rather the established institutions are used by the proposed beneficiaries as intended. Their patronage of the final product, according to Pinto and Cleland (2004), would signify their level of satisfaction and acceptance of the project and highlights the impact it can make on their livelihoods. While the official's perception of success is synonymous with the criteria from which the project's success is being assessed in this study to an extent, outputs are not established for its' own sake but are progress towards the overall achievement of project outcome. Nanthagopan et al. (2019) argues that the success of development projects is largely dependent on the extent to which project outputs lead to outcome. The official's assertion corroborates the MLNR perspectives with regards to the contributions of project management success to overall project success. While the delivering of project outputs may in some instances, be easier to achieve than outcome as argued by Duffy and Thomas (1989), the project's ability to establish the institutions it set out to establish can arguably be considered as positive progress as compared to the before project situation, since many of these establishments as already discussed, continue to remove some of the barriers in the land registration process to make access and security to land more easily accessible for the ordinary Ghanaian.

When asked how his risk management strategy helped to establish "A to B", he explained:

The project was too complex. It was trying to address too many things at the same time….. However the measures we put in place have helped us to establish the main things we set out to do…For example our public awareness and education campaigns and the spreading of project implementation across the country really helped with reducing political influence on the project…apart from a few procurement delays due to the procedures involved, our strict financial measures helped to police project funds, our involvements of the main LSA staff in many activities and design also helped to ensure their support etc……. In all, the good thing is that the ideas and structures have been developed so let's build on this and ensure the whole country benefits (Interview with project coordinator, 14/06/2017).

At the time of data collection, the new LSA building in Kumasi, built under LAP to help consolidate and improve their efficiency and institutional capabilities, had delayed partly due to delay of funds release linked to the project's strict financial and procurement procedures. The building was however completed in July 2018 with the beneficiary LSAs moving in on 25th February 2019.

From this official's assertion, their risk response strategies, designed to ensure the project achieve the most favourable outcome (Hopkins 2014), have had an influence on the successful establishment of project outputs, which in turn are ingredients for a successful outcome. For example, establishing and equipping CSAUs and CLSs for improved efficiency and transparency in land service delivery and the education and public awareness strategies involved in their establishments in effect have provided the opportunity for more people to be aware of the social impact of land reform and importance of tenurial arrangements and as such, continue to lead more people to register their land

rights and interests for security of tenure. Capitalising on this opportunity for tenure security, from a risk management perspective, is a positive impact of the adopted risk management process which did not only contribute positively to project outcome but also provided an opportunity for growth (Hillson 2001) in the process, since people are able to access credit facilities with their land documents to improve their livelihoods. In addition, registered lands tend to attract a higher economic value than non-registered one.

Another PCU official confirmed some of the above assertions but was critical about some aspects of efficiency and transparency within the LC. He explained:

We've made a lot of strands and we are getting there. Others might not see this but I'm saying that the last bits to do is that once the GELIS is in full operation, people may not be able to do things their way because now people do get messages about the progress of their documents till it is completed…….as to how the LC has handled it, it is still not clear about the transparency….but once the GELIS is in place, it will have to be by merit (Interview with head of HR at the PCU, 22/06/2017).

One of the key expectations of LAP is to remove barriers in the land registration process to make access and security to land easily accessible. This is one area where the leaseholders I interviewed at different CSAUs had reservations. Although considerable progress have been made in terms of the transparency aspects, with people more aware of statutory fees and contact persons in the CSAUs as well as the ability to track land rights through a public registry instead of paying for searches as a result of LAP (WB 2019b), a lot still need to be done with regards to the promotion of transparency in the registration process. To

begin with, measures have been put in place to ensure that people are updated regularly as to the progress of their land registration documentation when sent for registration in as much as they provide a valid phone number on submission of their documents. To streamline and reduce corruption in the process, the submitted documents need to be processed by merit. However, the technology needed to ensure its' smooth running is incomplete due to the delay in GELIS, an automated system designed specifically for the digitisation of land data to provide quicker access to land records once they have been scanned or digitised into the system which can also contribute to significant reductions in the turn-around times for the registration of deeds and titles.

As part of my fieldwork observations, I visited the knowledge transfer section and the GELIS control room on 14th June 2017 to observe progress on the scanning and transfer of old land documents unto the system in preparation for the full roll out of GELIS which, at the time, was running smoothly apart from some minor scanning errors which needed to be reconciled for authenticity. Irrespective of the efforts made, it came to light that the software developed to support the roll out of GELIS under LAP-1 was not comprehensive enough to support its' full roll out under LAP-2 (WB 2018c), hence the delay. Although this was up-scaled, significant amount of time is needed for it to be fully operational due to the amount of data required to be loaded unto the system and was still incomplete at project closure on 20th January 2020 (WB 2020).

The head of HR explained further that transparency and efficiency in the registration process is still possible, even without the full roll out of GELIS, with determination:

Even with this system, they can still do it but the management are not committed so it's not working. Although this system can work on merit, the management devised a strategy of getting into the system to change this……so it comes down to leadership. Change is difficult and people need to change for this to work but we have made some gains definitely and we will get there (Interview with head of HR at the PCU, 22/06/2017).

Based on this response, I decided to ask him if there is anything he would have done differently, given the opportunity. He explained:

One main thing I would have done differently would have been if there was any change management initiative, target the top. Start from the top because until the top can speak it, demonstrate it and make it an everyday thing, the possibility of success is slim (Interview with head of HR at the PCU, 22/06/2017).

This means that irrespective of the efforts made to reduce corruption and promote transparency in the land registration process, the systems put in place to ensure its' smooth running are still susceptible to manipulations from the people in authority, some of whom refuse to consider change and/or take steps to avoid corruption (Analoui and Danquah 2017). In investigating the correlation between project risk factors and success criteria, Hussein and Klakegg (2014) posits that the lack of team commitment and support from top management is one of the main reasons why risk management strategies fail to positively influence project success. Anand (2000) argues that management style has a significant influence on co-operation and as such for investments to reduce corruption in public sector organisations to achieve desired outcomes, the people charged with leading this change need to agree to embrace the proposed change themselves.

As to whether risk management has positively impacted success, he explained:

To some extent anyway. We've had some successes with our approach especially in areas we strategized. Some of the LC staff have supported us fully but others are still reluctant maybe for their own personal gains…. At least now we can say that a lot of people we trained in specific areas are leading teams in the development of certain organisations. For example LUSPA, we trained two guys to go and do their masters abroad. They are now back and leading teams and are making the difference within their organisations (Interview with head of HR at the PCU, 22/06/2017).

By training people to lead teams in their various departments and organisations to sustain the institutions established by the project and sustaining livelihoods, the adopted risk response strategies are also contributing significantly to the achievements of the project's long term goal and its' impact on society of enhancing economic and social growth through an effective and efficient land management and administration mechanism. As argued by Golini et al. (2015), this is an acceptable measure to determine the success of development projects.

Irrespective of the delay in the roll out of GELIS, as at December 2017, 82,438 (16,490 of which were from female) land transactions had been registered under LAP exceeding the projects' target of 30,000 and 36,178 land rights locally recorded in the CLS, also exceeding the project's target of 25,000 (WB 2019b). In addition, as earlier elucidated, considerable progress have been made with regards to achieving the targets for the turn-around times in registering deeds as compared to the pre-project situation whereas 80% out of the backlog of 79,472 title applications from 1988-2010 identified were cleared as at December 2017

(WB 2018c). Without the complete roll out of GELIS to facilitate the automation process and the recognition of the different institutions involved, achieving the project's target of 1 month for deeds and 3 months for title registration will be difficult due to the processes involved. To this effect, although the targets for deeds and title registrations were not met as expected, it is evident that some of the barriers in the land registration process have been removed and have resulted in an increase in the number of land registrations and reductions in the time expected for such registrations, a key outcome, as anticipated under the project.

From the PCU perspective therefore, the aforementioned discussions suggest the actions taken to respond to the identified risks were influential in the reduction of the project's risk levels and positively influenced its' success. Moreover, where specific risk management strategies were targeted at specific risks, significant gains were achieved in terms of success.

7.4 Assessing Overall Project Success and the Contributions of Risk Management to Success

In deciding whether the LAP, a development project, has been successful overall, the following questions need answering using the discussions on the different perspectives of success from the various interest groups and project documents;

- Is land administration and management in Ghana more efficient and transparent as compared to the before project situation? If so,

- Have this resulted in efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery as compared to the before project situation?

It is evident from the discussions so far that through the implementation of LAP, Ghana has strengthened its' land administration framework through the completion of several laws and policies that guide the usage and management of lands throughout the country, replacing enactments and ordinances some dating back as far as 1876 and the 1900's. As a result of LAP, there is now an established Land Act (Act 1036) and Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority in Ghana. Land administration institutions such as the judiciary and the LSAs have also been provided with the necessary infrastructure to streamline their operations to ensure efficiency and transparency in their delivery of land services. In addition to helping resolve court cases more quickly, these laws and policies are also easily accessible to the ordinary Ghanaian to promote transparency.

In terms of land management, the analysis and discussions from this study suggests that the progress achieved under the LAP in ensuring efficiency and transparency were skewed towards the various LSAs, established CLSs and government institutions than the land owning groups who control the majority of land in Ghana. This notwithstanding, this is what the project sought to do so in terms of achieving its intended outcome, this has been achieved to an extent, but more still need to be done for the land owning community for more people to benefit from the project. In areas where the project focused, positive progress have been made in ensuring efficiency and transparency in land management as compared to the pre-project situation. While there were some concerns about transparency by some landowners/leaseholders who patronise the CSAUs, more Ghanaians are now aware of the processes involved in the land management

processes and the need to ensure security of title to improve their livelihoods as a result of LAP.

In addition, successful project activities such as the RPRD, the removal of some barriers that resulted in an increase in the recording of land rights and land transactions, efficiency and transparency in recording land transactions in established CLS, minimised land litigations, decreased turn-around times for deeds, and the usage of registered lands to access credit opportunities by some beneficiaries, have improved land service delivery and provided an opportunity for the ordinary Ghanaian, including those whose livelihoods depend on land and the benefits accruing on land, to access the social benefits of land reform and tenure security through the implementation of LAP.

With regards to contributions of the project's risk management strategy to the aforementioned achievements; politically, the prudent actions taken to respond to the identified political risks had a positive influence on the project to the extent that issues of political interference and manipulations did not negatively influence project outcome. As a result, the project was continuously supported and accepted by successive political administrations. The project's ICR states "the project has been well managed on the government side and the interventions addressing the broader land administration and management activities have been well documented, with multiple comprehensive reports explaining what has been achieved and the benefits to society" (WB 2018c: 13).

Financially, although LAP-2 experienced a funding gap of $22 million without a change to the PDO, the prudent financial and procurement risk actions adopted means the project team members were able to achieve the most favourable

outcome (Hopkins 2014) even in the midst of a funding gap, which were outside their direct control.

Additionally, by taking the steps to understand the social dynamics of the proposed beneficiaries and designing social inclusion measures to respond to this, the project team members were able to address many issues that limit the ability of many Ghanaians, including those whose livelihoods depend on land and the benefits accruing from land, to ensure they benefit from the project. While more education is needed for more people to understand the ADR mechanism as intended, the structures have been established and accessible to many Ghanaians, who ordinarily cannot afford to access the court system to resolve land related cases.

The adopted institution building measures, including the review and creation of laws that govern land administration and management have had a positive influence on the successful implementation of the project and its' established institutions. Today, as a result of LAP, there are many laws that govern land administration and management in Ghana which are also easily accessible to the ordinary Ghanaian. While the project has strengthened the capacities of many institutions through its' comprehensive capacity development programme to support its' implementation, some institutions still require the necessary expertise needed to continuously support the institutions established under the project due to the dynamic nature of the project environment and the ever increasing needs of organisations within these environments.

With regards to the impacts of stakeholder risk actions on project success, while there were recorded incidents of the positive influence of stakeholder risk actions;

including areas where they were actively involved in designing the response strategies, the promotion of transparency and measures taken to reduce corruption in the various LSAs, there were also recorded incidents of deliberate delays by some staff and people in authority to circumvent some of the transparency measures instituted. This notwithstanding, some proposed beneficiaries such as TAs, RPRD beneficiaries, some landowners and farmers have embraced the transparency measures put in place by the project and to which they have benefitted immensely. Impacts of stakeholder risk actions on project outcome therefore depends on the type and nature of stakeholders (Worsely 2017) and how prepared they are to embrace the change proposed by the project.

Fieldwork data from this study therefore suggest the LAP positively influenced Ghana's land management and administration system to ensure efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery. Not only did the adopted risk management strategies positively influenced the achievements of such an outcome by providing the necessary insights, knowledge and the confidence (Cooper et al. 2005) required for successful project implementation, it also contributed to the creation of opportunities that will positively influence the project's long term impacts on society.

This notwithstanding, previous evaluations and reviews of both phases of the project by the IEG (WB 2013c; 2019b) and ICRs (WB 2011b; 2018c) had conflicting assessments of the project's success. These reviews and evaluations will therefore be assessed systematically in relation to the empirical findings from this study.

LAP-1's ICR rated the overall success of the first phase as moderately satisfactory by assessing success against 3 key outcomes they argue the project sought to achieve following its' restructuring in 2008 namely, institutional reforms, policy reforms, and pilot activities (WB 2011b). The restructuring of the project in 2008, as earlier discussed in chapter 4, were based on the premise that the original PDO's idea of developing a sustainable and well-functioning land administration system (WB 2008a; 2011b), was based on the GoG's long-term policy objectives which could not be achieved within 5 years and as such required a phased approach through laying the foundations and piloting certain aspects of the interventions identified to reflect the complexities of the project environment (WB 2008a; 2011b). The restructuring also led to a re-formulation of certain output indicators and the dropping of those they argued were not measurable nor achievable within the project's life (WB 2008a: 13).

Specifically, the success of the institutional reforms was rated as highly satisfactory by LAP-1's ICR due to key achievements highlighted in chapter 4 such the consolidation of agencies, decentralisation of deeds registries and significant reduction in the turn-around times for deeds registration. The success of the policy reforms was rated as satisfactory with key successes including the gender strategy, backlog of land cases reduced but not eliminated, and the Draft Land Bill (now passed as The Land Act 2020). Finally, of the 6 pilot activities initiated through the restructuring, 4 achieved their intermediate outcome targets with the remaining partially achieving those targets and hence was rated moderately satisfactory overall, by the ICR (WB 2011b).

A 2013 report by the IEG (WB 2013c), however downgraded the ICR's rating on review to moderately unsatisfactory. The IEG however, based their assessments

of the success of the first phase on the original PDO, without taken into consideration the revised elements of the restructuring (approved by the board on the 11th of July 2008) including the re-formulation and dropping of certain outcome indicators (WB 2008a) by arguing that the key difference between "developing" as per the original PDO and "laying the foundations" as per the revised, is "subtle" and not as significant as perceived (WB 2013c: 3) despite the restructuring stressing that the former was consistent with the GoG's long-term plan and required a phased approach through the latter. From the IEG perspective, the 3 key outcome indicators on which the ICR assessed the success of LAP-1 is "arbitrary" and cannot be used to measure the project's outcome (WB 2013c). They therefore "construed" their own outcome indicators out of the original PDO and benefits identified at project inception namely, tenure security, efficiency and cost effectiveness, fairness and transparency, and sustainability and assessed the success of LAP-1 against these (WB 2013c: 1).

One may argue that the restructuring was as a result of the project team members evaluating the complexities of the project environment and planning and/or adjusting response strategies (Cagliano et al. 2015) half-way through its' implementation and that the IEG were not under an obligation to consider the re-designed objectives in their assessment of success. However, the ability to "systematically identify, evaluate and manage project related risks to improve project performance" (Maytorena et al. 2007: 315) is an adequate risk management strategy and to which the project implementation team must be commended for. This notwithstanding, once the restructuring was approved by the board themselves, they should have followed through with their approval of the change to the PDO in their review of the project's success. Approving a

change of objective and then reneging on this to assess success against the original PDO, without taken the revised PDO into consideration, amounts to setting a “trap” (Ika 2012) for the LAP to fall into.

Specifically, tenure security was rated as modest by the IEG stressing on key concerns such as the low achievements of the number of land titling certificates issued, their reservations of and subsequent objections to the Draft Land Bill and the low achievements of the CBD exercise (WB 2013c). The IEG’s evaluation about the low achievement of the CBD exercise is synonymous with the findings from this study since it was mainly due to the failure to adequately involve the TAs involved in the identification of the project’s risk as earlier discussed. However, there are other significant factors and institutional bottlenecks involved in the land registration process, as per my interview with the team leader at CSAU 2 as well as the cost of land title registration (Awuah et al. 2013), beyond the scope of the LAP which also needed to be taken into consideration. The Draft Land Bill, to which the WB had reservations and objected to its’ passing, has since been passed as The Land Act 2020 and remains one of the significant achievements of the LAP.

The success of the IEG’s second theme, efficiency and cost effectiveness, was also rated as modest (WB 2013c). The reason behind this rating primarily being that while efficiency among the consolidated LSAs increased, the individual agencies still work as independent bodies. Others include the need for continuous capacity development to ensure the effective functioning of the project’s establishments, and the non-achievements of the turn-around times for title and deeds registration among others. Findings from this study however shows that the project management team identified the need for continuous capacity

development initiatives and designed risk management strategies to respond to these, but their initial approach was frustrated by the donors who “dictated” a different approach that ended up not being beneficial overall, for the project’s successful implementation and sustainability of its’ reforms. The outcome of the third theme, fairness and transparency, was rated modest mainly due to the ICR’s failure to delineate stand-alone female title and deed applications from joint ones and the lack of adequate baseline data to support the reported figures (WB 2013c).

Finally, the success of theme 4, sustainability, was also rated as modest. Key issues highlighted were the sustainability of the established CLS’ particularly those established under the supply-led approach as already discussed. Findings from this study suggest that the demand-led approach used to establish subsequent CLS improved their acceptance and ownership responsibilities by their respective TAs to an extent. While the evidence suggests that the CLS have improved transparency and efficiency in the delivery of land services in the traditional areas as already discussed, their sustainability remains an issue due to conflicting accounts as to who should be responsible for their sustainability. The respective TAs retain a substantial amount of the income from their CLS’ but expect government to be responsible for their sustainability. It will be prudent if project team members recommend sustainability measures, on handing over, to ensure more people benefit from institutions established by development projects. Moreover, while the IEG agree to an extent that LSA revenue increased substantially throughout the implementation period, they had reservations with the financial integrity of these agencies (WB 2013c). While corruption remain an

issue in many of these agencies, government revenue from those agencies increased substantially as anticipated.

The findings suggest that the failure to address the skills gap and to improve the project management capacity and project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, as highlighted by the IEG, were the rippling effects of the donor interruptions and frustrations of the initial capacity development initiatives as identified by the project team members. Moreover, the key procurement delays and challenges highlighted by the IEG (WB 2013c) were mainly due to the stringent procurement measures in alignment with WB guidelines to ensure that project funds were used for their intended purpose, and to reduce corruption in the bidding processes.

The IEG's assessment of the second phase, LAP-2, was very similar to that of LAP-1. While the projects' ICR rated LAP-2 as moderately satisfactory (WB 2018c), the IEG downgraded this rating on review to moderately unsatisfactory (WB 2019b), mainly due to the inability to reduce the turn-around times for the registration of titles and deeds to 3 months and 1 month respectively, irrespective of the significant achievements in other project activities as discussed. Empirical evidence from this study however suggests the project has been beneficial, overall, to many of its' proposed beneficiaries and have achieved many of its' intended outcomes even in the midst of LAP-2 suffering a funding gap of $22 million.

To assess the success of a complex development project of this nature which sought to address so many issues at the same time, based on the non-achievement of a target to reduce the turn-around times of titles and deeds

registration to 3 months and 1 month respectively, irrespective of how key that target may be and without taking other equally important factors such as cost of registration which is also a major determinant factor for low registration (Awuah et al. 2013; Toulmin 2009), and the presence of different institutional arrangements in some traditional areas as per my interview with CSAU official 2, is not and cannot be a true reflection of the projects' success. Besides, as earlier elucidated, empirical evidence suggest that land registration alone does not guarantee security of tenure since it can be successfully contested in courts (Abdulai and Owusu-Ansah 2014) and title insurance, which can address the issue of insecurity of tenure, can also be very expensive and beyond the reach of many proposed beneficiaries in development project environments.

The evidence suggests that this assessment of success by the IEG group seems to have been "dictated" (Owusu 2012) since one of the WB officials stressed during our discussion that, from the donor perspective, the turn-around times for titles and deeds will be the key KPI used to determine the project's success.

The discussions suggest that the two reviews of the LAP by the IEG (WB 2013c; 2019b) do not reflect the project's key achievements and how beneficial it has been to its intended beneficiaries. As discussed in chapter 2, perceptions of success need to be realistic as to whether the project has actually been beneficial to the intended beneficiaries (Atkinson 1999) or at least, to the majority of them. The LAP therefore seems to have fallen into Ika (2012)'s "accountability-for-results" and "one-size-fits-all" traps because too much emphasis was placed on what KPIs success would be assessed against without looking at other important outcomes the project achieved, and the complexities of the project environment. Previous research (Hammond 2008) although, conducted before the

strengthening of the institutions under the LAP, suggests that the economic benefits of land titling in Ghana is not as significant as perceived. This evidence therefore strengthens my argument on the need to widen the assessment of development project success and not to assess success on a few pre-conceived ones, whose benefits may not even be as significant and beneficial to many intended beneficiaries.

It is also clear that in some aspects of the project, the progress made were not as wide as anticipated. Nonetheless, land administration projects are complex (Attfield et al. 2004) and Ghana is no exception to this since they involve numerous institutions and actors many of whom pursue different interests often different from the project's intended purpose.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter presented an analyses and discussion of the LAPs success from the perspectives of the various interest groups attached to the project and the contributions of the project's risk management strategies in enhancing its' success. Despite the differing views of success from the various interest groups including; The MLNR, LSAs, TAs, donors, PCU, Judiciary, CSOs, individual landowners, and to leaseholders and farmers, the discussions suggest that the LAP has been successful overall in strengthening Ghana's land administration and management framework through the completion of several laws and policies that guide the usage and management of lands throughout the country.

The discussions also revealed that some land management aspects were skewed towards ensuring efficiency and transparency in the LSAs and the

established CLSs at the expense of the wider land owning communities, but from a project success perspective and the need for projects to have defined boundaries, this is what was intended and on which success can be assessed. For the project to result in beneficial change for many Ghanaians however, the established institutions need to be built upon and rolled out nationally. This notwithstanding, significant successes were achieved in ensuring efficiency and transparency in the TAs that were covered under the project including ensuring the recording of land transactions and completing of own leases which have contributed to a reduction in incidents of multiple sale of same lands to different individuals in some traditional areas and have also contributed positively to building some level of trust between prospective investors and the TAs.

The strategies adopted to respond to the identified risks had a positive influence on reducing the negative impacts of risk on the project and provided an opportunity for the positive impacts to be realised. Although the ADR strategy had a low patronage nationally mainly due to the approach used in some traditional areas and the preference of the court system by some litigants, there were also significant successes in areas where the project built on the already existing land management committee and highlights the need for project team members not to underestimate the attributes and contributions of people they perceive as “non-technical” in their approach to development project risk management, but incorporate both the individualistic and functional areas in their respective project environments for a successful outcome.

While it may be impossible to satisfy the needs of all interest groups a project may face, the empirical evidence suggests the LAP made considerable progress in satisfying many of its’ intended beneficiaries, including those whose livelihoods

depend on land, and provided them with an opportunity to access the social benefits of security of tenure to improve their livelihoods for their sustainability irrespective of the IEG's "construed" assessments of the project's success, and the strategies adopted to respond to the identified risks to project outcome were very influential in enhancing these successes.

The next chapter presents the findings and conclusions to this study and offer valuable policy recommendations for the management of risks in development projects, as well as the theoretical and practical contributions to the present knowledge and recommendations for further research into project risk management.

Chapter Eight Conclusion, Recommendations and Policy Implications

8.1 Introduction

This thesis followed a qualitative case study approach to investigate the impacts of risk management on project success from a development project perspective. This final chapter presents the research findings, contributions to theory and practice, applicability of the findings, implications for policy as well as recommendations for further research.

8.2 Research Findings

The first research question investigated the ways by which risk identification can contribute to risk management practice by investigating the links between the processes used in identifying project risks, the risks identified through these processes and the risk response strategies designed to respond to these risks. The empirical evidence shows that there was a strategic approach to risk management in an attempt to ensure the case study project achieves the best possible outcome with the various risk identification processes working in collaboration with each other in the identification of risks which also led to the design of strategic actions to respond to the risks identified.

The evidence also shows that there was an over-reliance on experienced professionals in the identification of risks under the case study project. It however also revealed that many of the project's stakeholders and/or proposed beneficiaries, perceived as not having the requisite expertise and were

marginalised in the identification of risks, were conversant with some of the projects' risks and could have provided valuable insights into the type and nature of risks the project faced should they have been consulted or involved in the risk identification process.

I argued that while experts play a key role in the identification of project risks, there may be instances where experience alone may not be enough in identifying project risks and as such over-relying on experienced professionals in the identification of project risks limit the ability to identify and to understand certain risks from a beneficiary perspective and how they combine and interact with each other. Development project environments, as was the case in this study, are mostly characterised by people who may not necessarily possess the requisite academic and technical expertise as perceived by project team members but may possess adequate knowledge of the project environment due to having extensive knowledge in their areas of operation (Obeng-Odoom 2011) and as such, can also contribute positively to the identification of the most likely risks the project may face irrespective of their different classes of classification of risk (Beck 2006). Findings from this study therefore supports the social construction phenomenon of risk as argued by Beck (2006) in the sense that different classes and capacities of classification of people need to be considered and incorporated in the identification of project risks.

Empirical evidence from this study shows that risk identification provides a clear strategic focus for project delivery by identifying the risks likely to influence the achievement of project outcome, leading to the design of strategic risk actions to respond to these risks as well as the effective monitoring and evaluation of the risk management process and therefore contribute to risk management practice

through strategic action. The different processes used to identify project risks need to complement each other to contribute to this strategy.

One of the gaps identified during the study's literature review was that although several studies acknowledge the criticality of project stakeholders in the determination of project success, none investigated the influences of different stakeholder objectives on the effectiveness of risk management strategies. If stakeholders matter, then their differing objectives and expectations of projects can affect the way we plan and manage project risks. Empirical evidence from this study shows that risk management is more effective when strategic and incorporates the different stakeholders and their respective objectives and expectations of the project. Where their views and objectives were incorporated into the risk management strategy, many stakeholders supported the project's implementation and significant successes were achieved. The evidence also revealed that in some instances, it may not be prudent to fully involve some stakeholders in the management of some risks in order to ensure its' smooth implementation. For example, strategies designed to reduce corruption may be unpopular with the stakeholders involved in these corrupt practices but may be beneficial to another group of stakeholders.

I have also demonstrated that while incorporating stakeholder objectives and expectations in project risk management can positively influence project strategy, help to deliver the best possible outcome when stakeholders support the project's vision and participate in the implementation strategy as a result, and in some instances help maximise opportunity, it can also lead to unrealistic demands from some stakeholders which may be outside the project's core and as such should be done within the projects' purpose in order not to deviate from the overall

objectives of the project. The empirical evidence from this thesis shows that differences in stakeholder objectives influence the effectiveness of risk management strategies but the level of effectiveness depend on the type of stakeholders involved, their views and expectations of the project and how they pursue their respective objectives and expectations of the project.

A comprehensive approach was used to assess the success of the case study project, a development project, to ensure it reflects the different views of the various stakeholders and interest groups as well as the realities of the project environment, its achievements and intended outcomes. The project's success was measured by discussing how its' success was assessed by the various stakeholders and interest groups and measured against the achievements of the project's desired outcomes; including the solution of issues and achieved results and impact on proposed beneficiaries as anticipated at inception.

The evidence shows that the adopted political risk response strategies, which were also strengthened by the donor support missions, significantly reduced the interference of Ghanaian politicians on project implementation. Although there were some incidents of procurement delays due to strict financial accountability procedures laid down by the donor agencies, the adopted financial and procurement risk response strategies even in the midst of the second phase of the project experiencing a $22 million financial shortfall, ensured the project achieved the most favourable outcome. I argued that these strict financial and procurement guidelines laid down by donor agencies for development project implementation provide an opportunity for efficiency and transparency with regards to the usage of project funds and should be encouraged, but adaptable to specific project situations.

The strategies taken to understand the social dynamics of the project's proposed beneficiaries as well as its' accompanying social inclusion measures, ensured that some of the many issues that limit the ability of many Ghanaians, including the poor and vulnerable whose livelihoods mainly depend on land and the benefits accruing from land were addressed. While more education is needed for more people to understand some of the project's establishments such as the ADR mechanism as intended, the structures have been established and readily accessible to many Ghanaians, who ordinarily cannot afford to access the court system to resolve land related cases.

The evidence also shows that while the adopted institutional and technical risk response strategies have significantly consolidated and strengthened the capacities of the various organisations and institutions including the review and creation of several laws and policies that guide land administration and management throughout the country, the dynamic nature of project environments and the ever increasing needs of organisations mean some institutions still require the necessary expertise needed to continuously support the institutions established under the project.

Furthermore, while there were significant positive influences of stakeholder risk response strategies on project success; including areas where particular stakeholder objectives and expectations of the project were taken into consideration as well as areas where respective stakeholders were actively involved in designing these strategies, there were also recorded incidents of deliberate delays by some staff and people in authority to circumvent some of the transparency measures instituted by the project in some implementation agencies. The evidence suggest that in addition to the type of stakeholders

involved, their views and expectations and how they pursue their respective objectives and expectations of a project, how effective stakeholder risk management strategies enhance project success also depends on how prepared they are to embrace the change proposed by the project. Empirical evidence from this study therefore shows that despite the differing views of success from the various interest groups attached to the case study project, the strategies adopted to respond to the projects' risks positively influenced its success and created opportunities that can positively influence the project's long term impacts on society.

From a development project perspective as was the basis for analysis for this study, risk management practice has a positive influence on project success and as such does contribute to project success. The approach however needs to be strategic with all aspects of the risk management process playing significant roles in the achievement of success. To achieve this, risks with the potential to influence project outcome need to be identified to provide a clear strategic focus for project delivery leading to the design of strategic actions to respond to the identified risks as well as the effective monitoring and evaluation of the risk management process. Additionally, the different stakeholder objectives and expectations need to be strategically incorporated into the risk management strategy without deviating from the projects' purpose. Development project team members therefore need to have an informed and strategic approach to the management of risks and be aware that despite the differing views of success from the various interest groups development projects may face, effective risk management practice can contribute to development project success and can

also create opportunities that can positively influence the project's long term impacts on society.

However, the qualitative and inductive approaches to the study and the usage of a single case study to present the findings, although appropriate, means generalisability is not recommended from the study's findings but can offer resonance in a similar setting.

8.3 Research Contributions to Theory and Practice

With a dearth of research into the impacts of risk management on development project success and how risk management contribute to project success as a whole, the researcher believes this research brings some valuable contributions to the risk management theory and practice.

Previous research recommends the need for risk identification to be carried out by people with the requisite expertise and exposure to risk informed decision making (Chapman 1990; Haniff and Salama 2016). While this study acknowledges the critical role of experts in risk identification, the evidence show that development project environments may also be characterised by people who may not necessarily possess the requisite expertise as perceived by project team members, but may be well-informed with adequate knowledge of the project environment and can also provide valuable insights into the identification of project risks. The findings from this study extends this knowledge and clarify that while experts are a great source of knowledge in project decision making, they are not the only source and as such using a variety of experts and non-experts with adequate knowledge of the project and its' environment in risk identification

provide an opportunity to identify the most likely risks the project may face across all sectors and reduces the likelihood of previously unknown risks coming up to impact on the achievement of objectives at some point within the project's life.

The review of literature revealed that most of the literature (Berg 2010; Cooper 2004; 2012; Cooper et al. 2005; Green 2016; Hopkins 2014; ISO 31000:2009; 2018; Stanton and Webster 2014; Sutton 2014) classify the actions taken to respond to identified risks as "risk treatment" thereby emphasising on threats to outcome and seeing risk from a negative perspective. Although Hillson (2001) proposed a threat and opportunity response strategy to recognise the opportunities that accompany risks, the evidence from this study shows that risk is not a disease to be treated and as such "risk actions" are required instead of "risk treatments" to respond accordingly to both the negative and positive impacts of risk to ensure projects result in beneficial change.

Additionally, development projects are mostly carried out in environments where politicians can influence project decision making to some extent thereby posing challenges to the achievements of project outcome. Where projects are donor funded, the accompanying donor support missions designed by donor agencies to ensure accountability also reduces the interference of local politicians on project implementation due to being made accountable for their actions and inactions. As a result, in addition to ensuring an adaptable approach in their response to political risks due to the power and influence of politicians on project outcome, development project managers should also widen their risk management strategies, without deviating from the project's purpose, to include the contributions of donor support missions to risk mitigation and derive its' accompanying opportunities.

To contribute to bridging the gap between the risk management theory and practice as to how risk management actually contribute to project success, the following approach is proposed, based on the study's findings, towards an effective management of development project risks. Due to the subjectivity of risk and the qualitative case study approach to the study, the researcher recommends that this proposal should be used as a guideline and not a standard.

- **How to identify risks?** Make sure this is continuous due to the dynamic nature of the project environment. Do not over-rely on academic expertise. Yes experts are a great source of knowledge but they are not the only source. Make good use of project specific situations and respect the cultural practices in the project environment. Make sure you identify as many stakeholders as possible since those we miss could be very influential on outcome. In doing so, also ensure you identify the roles they can play in implementing the risk response strategy.

- **How to ensure responses are strategic?** Risks are not "problems". Neither are risks "diseases" that require "treatment". Risks also have positive impacts which need pursuing. Have a plan and stick to it but also remember to have room for creativity and where things are not working as planned, amend accordingly. Incorporate stakeholder objectives into your risk management process strategically including those who refuse to support the project's vision. Where there are more powerful stakeholders to whom the project team members have little or no control, incorporate opinion leaders into the risk response strategy. You are the expert but you need adequate support to realise your

expertise. Although some stakeholders and/or proposed beneficiaries may make unrealistic demands, remember you are working on a project and as such are limited by budget and boundaries. Evaluate their suggestions and recommendations and where feasible, plan into the wider plan of the organisation post project but do not be amenable to unrealistic demands. Stay focused on achieving the project's intended outcome for more people to benefit.

- **How to effectively ensure it leads to success?** Be proactive and be aware that irrespective of the differing views of success from the various interest groups your project may face, effective risk management can contribute to success. Do not try to achieve so many things at the same time, instead, break these down to smaller manageable aspects and remember some success factors may be outside your direct control so be flexible and try to use other means to achieve your objectives. For example, in environments where politicians can influence project decisions, make sure the proposed beneficiaries understand the benefits of the project as they can, to some extent, use the voice of public opinion to convince or even pressurise the politicians to support the project's vision. Have a positive perspective for donor support missions since, in addition to ensuring that project funds are used for their intended purposes, donor support missions also reduces the interference of local politicians on project implementation. This should however be done in accordance with the project's purpose. In areas where culture and beliefs play a role in the way people behave or think, embed more powerful stakeholders such

as traditional leaders and cultural institutions in your risk management approach, where possible.

8.4 Implications for Policy and Further Research

Project risk management, as earlier elucidated, is an understudied area and as such this study recommends that more empirical research is conducted in this area to contribute to the risk management body of knowledge. The focus of this study was to investigate the impacts of risk management practice on development project success using Ghana's LAP as a case study. Projects are unique endeavours and the environments within which they are undertaken can be very influential to its success. As a result, the researcher recommends that future research can adjust and develop some aspects of the research questions further in other project environments. For example, to investigate the contributions of people perceived as not having the requisite technical and academic expertise on development project implementation as a whole and not necessarily from a risk management perspective.

Similarly, the contributions of people perceived as not having the requisite expertise in risk identification could be investigated further either through a mixed method approach or purely quantitatively in different project environments to further contribute to the risk management theory and practice and to address some of the limitations of generalisability of this study.

Additionally, to further contribute to both project management theory and practice in general and risk management in particular, future research could investigate project success comparatively by investigating two projects in the same project

environment where one applied risk management techniques and the other used no risk management at all. For the LAP itself, further research can be conducted to investigate the long-term impacts of the project's establishments on some beneficiaries. The investigation could focus on the project's long term impact on the landowners who benefitted from having access to land and security of land rights. Such a study can help policy makers to assess the social benefits of land reform and tenure security on the poor and vulnerable and how long their livelihoods could be sustained through such projects. Further research could also investigate the long-term impacts of key project establishments such as the CSAUs and designated land courts in improving efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery.

Additionally, the discussions in chapter 4 revealed that many African countries share similar characteristics with Ghana with regards to land ownership and issues pertaining to land. As a result, further research that could be beneficial to dealing with land issues in Africa as a whole, and SSA in particular, should focus on a multi-stakeholder approach on how to solve the issue of multiple sale of same lands to different individuals, by soliciting views from key stakeholders such as land sector agencies, customary landowners, leaseholders, CSOs, government agencies and the Judiciary.

For policy makers, empirical evidence from this study shows that donor interferences on how certain aspects of development projects should be implemented have the potential to frustrate the project's intended core with recurring effects on subsequent phases where projects are in different phases. Donor support and guidance, although needed to ensure transparency and efficiency in some development project environments, should be fit for purpose

and reflect specific project situations and not follow a one-size-fits-all approach due to the dynamic nature of projects. Furthermore, donor assessments of success should be broad enough to reflect the project's key outcomes and benefits to society as a whole as compared to the before project situation and not just be measured against a few preconceived KPIs.

Beneficiary governments of development projects should also not have preconceived ideas that these projects have the ability to provide every resource they require or solve every problem they need solving but should rather direct project resources strategically and honestly within the projects intended scope. Empirical evidence from this study shows that the case study project tried to address so many things at the same time. Complex projects need to be broken down to smaller manageable projects which are achievable within defined limits in order not to ask for extension of completion times from donors. This will also help maintain some level of trust between donor agencies and beneficiary governments.

The researcher believes that the study's findings, conclusions and recommendations, if adhered to, will in addition to contributing to how future development project risks are identified and managed effectively, also contribute to the design, implementation and success of development projects as a whole both in Ghana and in other development project environments which share similar characteristics.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Fieldwork Introductory Letter

School of Social and International Studies

UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD
MAKING KNOWLEDGE WORK

Date: 28th April, 2017

To Whom It May Concern

I am writing to introduce Mr. Boakye Boampong, a doctoral student at the Bradford Centre for International Development, University of Bradford in the UK. The focus of Boakye's doctoral thesis is on ***The Impact of Risk Management on Project Success: A case study of the Land Administration Project, Ghana.***

Boakye has completed the first phase of his PhD research successfully, but in order to complete his thesis, he needs to carry out fieldwork in Ghana. Ethics approval has been granted by the Chair of Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel at the University of Bradford.

Please could you assist him in this task. Your help and guidance will be invaluable in helping him to complete his data collection.

If you need further information, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

David Potts

Dr. David Potts

Principal Supervisor

Email: d.j.potts@bradford.ac.uk
Tel direct line: +44 (0) 1274 233974

School of Social and International Studies.University of Bradford, Richmond Road Bradford BD7 1DP
Tel: +44 (0) 1274 235251 Web: www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/ssis

Appendix B: Case Study Request Letter

57 Longfield Drive,

Bradford.

West Yorkshire.

BD4 8UG.

22nd September 2014.

The coordinator,

LAP.

Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources,

Accra.

Dear Sir,

APPLICATION TO USE THE LAND ADMINISTRATION PROJECT AS A CASE STUDY

I hereby request to use the Land Administration Project currently going on in your ministry as a case study for my PhD thesis. The title of my research is; **Impact of Risk Management on Project Success**.

I completed a Bachelor's degree in Land Economy and an MSc in Project Planning and Management. My MSc dissertation was on "The Role of Land Reform in Sustainable Development. The challenges of Sub-Saharan Africa". Part of the analysis I used for this dissertation was on LAP but that was during the initial stages of LAP-1. I have followed the project since and see it as the best case study for this research.

I would be very grateful if my request is granted while looking forward to receiving the necessary information towards the success of the project.

Looking forward to a mutual beneficial relationship and response.

Yours faithfully,

Boakye Boampong

Appendix C: Participant Information Sheet

UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD
MAKING KNOWLEDGE WORK

Faculty of Social Science

IMPACT OF RISK MANAGEMENT ON PROJECT SUCCESS, A CASE STUDY OF THE LAND ADMINISTRATION PROJECT, GHANA.

Information Sheet

We would like to invite you to take part in this PhD research project which aims to explore the Impact of Risk Management on Project Success, using Ghana's Land Administration Project as a case study. It is up to you to decide whether you wish to participate. Participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time. Before you decide, we would like you to understand what the project will involve for you and ask that you read through the information below. If you have any questions about the study, please feel free to ask the researcher, **Mr Boakye Boampong**, who will personally deliver and explain this information sheet to you. You can also email the researcher at **b.boampong@bradford.ac.uk**. If you agree to take part, we would then ask that you complete, and sign two copies of the attached consent form. One is for you to keep.

The research is about your involvement, experience and/or interactions with the project, or the Ghana Land Management and Administration system and as such and in line with the law, we believe you have every right to consent to participate on your own behalf.

Outlined below are details of what the research involves and what we are asking for from you. We appreciate that there is a lot of information and please let us know if you have any questions, if there is anything you would like explaining further or do not fully understand. This is purely a PhD research project and the interviews will last approximately one hour. Every information you provide is confidential and would be used only for the purposes of this study.

The interview will begin with the researcher asking you about your personal experience with the project. As the interview progresses, this will develop into whether you think the project has been successful and what factors led to the success in your opinion. Particular emphasis will be placed on the project's risk management strategies and whether they had any effect on the success or otherwise of the project. All the interviews will be audiotaped to enable the researcher assess it at a later date for the purposes of this study.

Participants can of course contact the researcher at any point to raise any concerns about the project even after agreeing to partake. You can withdraw your consent at any time. Any of your data that is to be shared as part of the research will be anonymised with anything from which you might be identified taken out and you will be able to see this before it is shared. All data will be stored in a secured location and locked. Data will not be stored on laptops or flash drives unless it is only for a temporary purpose and that the data will not be sent through emails. However, there are limits to these rights where the researcher is required by law to disclose potential risk of significant harm in order to protect both you and others. The researcher will not break confidentiality with you for any other reason and, should such a disclosure be necessary, the researcher will discuss it with you first.

We hope that this information explains what you would have to do, as a participant in the project, and that you are still interested in being part of the project. The consent form for completion is attached.

Contact: b.boampong@bradford.ac.uk

THANK YOU

Appendix D: Consent Form

Faculty of Social Sciences

IMPACT OF RISK MANAGEMENT ON PROJECT SUCCESS, A CASE STUDY OF THE LAND ADMINISTRATION PROJECT, GHANA.

Consent Form

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information provided for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. ☐

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason and that this will not affect my legal rights. ☐

3. I understand that any personal information collected during the study will be anonymised and remain confidential. I understand that any data that is to be shared as part of the research will be anonymised. ☐

4. I agree to take part in the above study. ☐

Participant:

_____	_____	_____
Name of Participant	Signature	Date

Researcher:

_____	_____	_____
Name of Researcher	Signature	Date

Appendix E: Interview Guides

Interview Guide

This research employs semi-structured interviews as the primary source of data collection. These interviews will last approximately one hour. Prior to the start of the interviews, the researcher will explain the project's main aim and objectives to the participants. Researcher will also explain what he means by project risks (including opportunity) and any technical terms to the participants before asking for their views.

Participants will be handed an information sheet and consent form which will be explained to them. They will then be given at least 24 hours to decide whether they want to partake or not. The researcher will not ask for participants name to guarantee their complete confidentiality and anonymity. The data is only for the purposes of this study.

Project Coordinating Unit, MLNR.

1. **General Project Questions.**
    - How long have you being working on the project?
    - What are the main objectives of the project?
    - Would you say they were achievable? **Yes/no**. Why?
2. **Project's Risk and Risk Management.**
    - What risks were identified at project inception?
    - What events did you encounter during implementation that could affect the achievement of the project's objectives?
    - Were these anticipated? **Yes/no**.
    - How were risks identified?
    - Did risk identification lead to the design of the project's risk management strategy? **Yes/no.**
    - How was risk management approached in the project?
    - What risk management strategies were applied?
    - What are the strengths and weaknesses of the risk management strategies?
    - Were specific risk management strategies targeted at specific risks? **Yes/no**. why?
    - Would you say risk management had an influence on the project's results? **Yes/no**. If yes, how?
    - Were there any positive outcomes (opportunities) as a result of the project's risk management strategy? **Yes/ no.** If yes, what are they?
    - Would you replicate the project's risk management strategy in further projects? **Yes/no**. why?
3. **Project Stakeholders.**
    - Who are the main stakeholders/beneficiaries of the project?
    - What do you think their expectations were?
    - Do you think their expectations were met? **Yes/no**. why?

- Were their objectives incorporated into the project's risk management strategies? **Yes/no**. If yes, how was this done?
- In your opinion, what role do you think stakeholders should play in the risk management process?
- Was there enough consultation between the stakeholders/beneficiaries and the project management team? **Yes/no**. why?
- How has this consultation influenced the project's results?

4. **Project Success.**
   - How would you define project success?
   - Would you say the project has been successful? **Yes/no.** why?
   - If yes, what factors led to the project's success?
   - Would you say the project's risk management strategies contributed positively to the project's outcome? **Yes/no.** why?
   - Would you say the project environment had an influence on the project's results? **Yes/no.** If yes, in what way?
5. **Concluding Remarks.**
   - Given the opportunity, would you do anything differently? **Yes/no.** Why?
   - In your opinion, do you think the project has contributed to the prevention of multiple sale of land?
   - Do you have any additional remarks that are relevant to the project or this research? **Yes/no.** If yes, what is it please?

Thank you!!!

Lands Commission, Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands, Town and Country Planning Division, Judiciary, District Assemblies.

1. **General Project Questions.**
   - How long have you being working on the project?
   - Which specific project activities were you involved?
   - What do you think the main objectives of the project are?
   - Would you say they were achievable? **Yes/no**. Why?
   - What were your expectations of the project?
2. **Project's Risk and Risk Management**
   - What risks were identified at project inception?
   - What events did you encounter during implementation that could affect the achievement of the project's objectives?
   - Were these anticipated? **Yes/no**.
   - How were risks identified?
   - Do you think risk identification had an effect on the design of the project's risk management strategies? **Yes/no.** why?
   - How was risk management approached in the project?
   - What risk management strategies were applied?
   - What are the strengths and weaknesses of the risk management strategies?

- Were specific risk management strategies targeted at specific risks? **Yes/no**. why?
- Would you say risk management had an influence on the project's results? **Yes/no**. How?
- Were there any positive outcomes (opportunities) as a result of the project's risk management strategy? **Yes/ no.** If yes, what are they?
- Would you replicate the project's risk management strategy in further projects? **Yes/no**. why?

3. **Project Stakeholders.**
   - Who are the main stakeholders/beneficiaries of the project?
   - Do you think their expectations were met? **Yes/no**. why?
   - Were their objectives incorporated into the project's risk management strategies? **Yes/no**. If yes, how was this done?
   - In your opinion, what role do you think stakeholders should play in the risk management process?
   - What level of consultation existed between the stakeholders/beneficiaries and the project management team?
   - How has this consultation influenced the project's results?
4. **Project Success.**
   - How would you define project success?
   - Would you say the project has been successful? **Yes/no.** why?
   - If yes, what factors led to the project's success?
   - Would you say the project's risk management strategies contributed positively to the project's outcome? **Yes/no.** why?
   - Would you say the project environment had an influence on the project's results? **Yes/no.** If yes, in what way?
5. **Concluding Remarks.**
   - Given the opportunity, would you do anything differently? **Yes/no.** Why?
   - Did the project live up to your expectations? **Yes/no.** why?
   - Were there any aspects of the project that were seen as a threat to your department? **Yes/no**. Why?
   - What are your recommendations for future projects?
   - In your opinion, do you think the project has contributed to the prevention of multiple sale of land?
   - Do you have any additional remarks that are relevant to the project or this research? **Yes/no.** If yes, what is it please?

Thank you!!!

<u>Civil Society Coalition on Land (CICOL)/NGOs/Donors/Independent Estate Agents</u>

1. **General Project Questions.**
   - How long have you been associated with the project?
   - What were your specific interests in the project?
   - Were you involved in any specific project activities? **Yes/no**. If yes, what are they?

- What do you think the main objectives of the project are?
- Would you say they were achievable? **Yes/no**. Why?

2. **Project's Risk and Risk Management**
    - What risks did you identify which in your opinion, could affect the achievement of the project's objectives?
    - How were they identified?
    - Did you communicate this to the project implementation team? **Yes/no**. Why?
    - Did you suggest any risk management strategies with regards to the identified risks? **Yes/no**. If yes, what are they?
    - Do you think identified risks have an influence on its corresponding risk management strategies? **Yes/no**. Why.
    - Was there any link between the identified risks and the risk management strategy suggested? **Yes/no**.
    - In your opinion, how has the project's risk management strategies influenced the project's results?
    - In your opinion, were there any positive outcomes (opportunities) as a result of the project's risk management strategy? **Yes/ no.** If yes, what are they?
3. **Project Stakeholders.**
    - Who do you think the project's main stakeholders/beneficiaries are?
    - What do you think their expectations were?
    - Do you think their expectations were met? **Yes/no**. why?
    - In your opinion, do you think their objectives were incorporated into the project's risk management strategies? **Yes/no**. why?
    - What role do you think stakeholders should play in the risk management process?
    - Do you think there were enough consultation between the stakeholders/beneficiaries and the project management team? **Yes/no**. If yes, how do you think this consultation had an influence on the project's results?
    - Have you received any complaints from any stakeholders/beneficiaries as to the project's implementation plan? **Yes/no**. If yes, what are they?
4. **Project Success.**
    - How would you define project success?
    - Would you say the project has been successful? **Yes/no.** why?
    - In your opinion, what factors led to the project's success?
    - Would you say the project's risk management strategies contributed positively to the project's outcome? **Yes/no.** why?
    - Would you say the project environment had an influence on the project's results? **Yes/no.** If yes, in what way?
5. **Concluding Remarks.**
    - Given the opportunity, would you do anything differently? **Yes/no.** Why?
    - Did the project live up to your expectations? **Yes/no.** why?
    - In your opinion, do you think the project has contributed to the prevention of multiple sale of land?

- What are your recommendations for the implementation of similar projects in the future?
- Do you have any additional remarks that are relevant to the project or this research? **Yes/no.** If yes, what is it please?

Thank you!!!

Traditional Authorities.

1. **General Project Questions.**
    - What were your specific interests in the project?
    - Were you involved in any specific project activities? **Yes/no**. If yes, what are they?
    - What do you think the main objectives of the project are?
    - Would you say they were achievable? **Yes/no**. Why?
2. **Project's Risk and Risk Management**
    - What risks did you identify which in your opinion, could affect the achievements of the project objectives?
    - How were they identified?
    - Did you communicate this to the project implementation team? **Yes/no**. Why?
    - Did you suggest any risk management strategies with regards to the identified risks? **Yes/no**. If yes, what are they?
    - Do you think identified risks have an influence on its corresponding risk management strategies? **Yes/no**. Why.
    - Were there any link between the identified risks and the risk management strategy suggested? **Yes/no.**
    - In your opinion, how has the project's risk management strategies influenced the project's results?
    - In your opinion, were there any positive outcomes (opportunities) as a result of the project's risk management strategy? **Yes/ no.** If yes, what are they?
3. **Project Stakeholders.**
    - Who do you think the project's main stakeholders/beneficiaries are?
    - What do you think their expectations were?
    - Do you think their expectations were met? **Yes/no**. why?
    - Do you think the achievements of your objectives were incorporated in the project management strategy? **Yes/no**. Why?
    - In your opinion, what role do you think stakeholders should play in the risk management process?
    - Was there enough consultation between yourself and the project management team? **Yes/no**. If **yes**, would you say this consultation had an influence on the project's results? If **no**, why?
    - What does secured title mean to you?
4. **Project Success.**
    - Would you say the project has been successful? **Yes/no.** why?
    - In your opinion, what factors can lead to the success of projects of this nature?

- Would you say the project's risk management strategies contributed positively to the project's outcome? **Yes/no.** Why?
- Would you say the project environment had an influence on the project's results? **Yes/no.** If yes, in what way?

5. **Concluding Remarks.**
    - Did the project live up to your expectations? **Yes/no.** why?
    - What are your recommendations for the implementation of similar projects in the future?
    - Are you in a boundary dispute with any other traditional authority? **Yes/no**. If **yes**, how has the project help to resolve this?
    - In your opinion, do you think the project has contributed to the prevention of multiple sale of land?
    - Do you have any additional remarks that are relevant to the project or this research? **Yes/no.** If yes, what is it please?

Thank you!!!

Individual Land Owners/Leaseholders/Farmers.

1. **General Land Registration and Ownership Questions.**
    - What type of tenancy arrangement are you into?
    - Did you experience any difficulties during the land registration process? **Yes/no.** If yes, what are they?
    - In your opinion, what should have been done to prevent these?
    - What does secured title mean to you?
2. **General Project Questions.**
    - What were your specific interests in the project?
    - What do you think the main objectives of the project are?
    - Would you say they were achievable? **Yes/no**. Why?
    - Do you think the project has contributed to the prevention of multiple sale of land?
3. **Project's Risk and Risk Management**
    - In your opinion, what risks do you think could affect the achievements of your interests in the project?
    - What do you think could be done to prevent these?
    - Have you noticed any positive outcomes as a result of the project? **Yes/no**.
      If yes, what are they?
    - Do you see any linkage between this and the project's risk management strategies?
    - In your opinion, how has the project's risk management strategies influenced the project's results?
4. **Project Stakeholders.**
    - Who do you think the project's main stakeholders/beneficiaries are?
    - What do you think their expectations were?
    - Do you think their expectations were met? **Yes/no**. why?
    - Do you think the achievements of your objectives were incorporated in the project management strategy? **Yes/no**. Why?

- In your opinion, what role do you think stakeholders should play in the risk management process?

5. **Project Success.**
    - Would you say the project has been successful? **Yes/no.** Why?
    - In your opinion, what factors can lead to the success of projects of this nature?
    - Would you say the project's risk management strategies contributed positively to the project's outcome? **Yes/no.** Why?
    - Would you say the project environment had an influence on the project's results? **Yes/no.** If yes, in what way?
6. **Concluding Remarks.**
    - Did the project live up to your expectations? **Yes/no.** why?
    - What achievements of the project are you most happy with? Why?
    - What other activities should the project have addressed?
    - Do you have any additional remarks that are relevant to the project or this research? **Yes/no.** If yes, what is it please?

Thank you!!!

Appendix F: Examples of Participants' Views on the Contributions of Risk Management to the LAP's Success

"We've had some successes with our approach especially in areas we strategized. Some of the LC staff have supported us fully but others are still reluctant maybe for their own personal gains but we are still working on this. At least now we can say that a lot of people we trained in specific areas are leading teams in the development of certain organisations. For example LUSPA, we trained two guys to go and do their masters abroad. They are now back and leading teams and are making the difference within their organisation" **(Head of HR at the PCU).**

"..the measures we put in place have helped us to establish the main things we set out to do to which I believe is positive. For example our public awareness and education campaigns and the spreading of project implementation across the country really helped with reducing political influence on the project. Additionally, apart from a few procurement delays due to the procedures involved, our strict financial measures helped to police project funds, our involvements of the main LSA staff in many activities and design also helped to ensure their support etc to an extent. In all, the good thing is that the ideas and structures have been developed so let's build on this and ensure the whole country benefits from the project" **(Project Coordinator).**

"It's had a positive influence. Looking at the litigation and the understanding of the project etc, there is a clear linkage between the strategies we adopted and successes achieved. If people had not gone there to do the initial sensitization and knowing the cultural settings within which people operate etc I don't think we would have achieved what we achieved. Even in some of the areas, the activities may even not have taken place" (**Lands Officer at the MLNR).**

"Under LAP-2, when we specifically targeted certain things like the development of the National Spatial infrastructure development and the AMA street addressing system, remarkable successes were achieved. Take for example the interventions in the judicial process, like coming out with amendments in the court rules, you see it's been very successful and has not only transformed land administration but the judicial service operations in general. The fact that we were able to create 6 land courts and 3 in the districts making it 9 and the changes in the court rules has shown remarkable progress" **(Technical Director at the MLNR).**

"All these successes would not have been possible if we hadn't been strategic in our approach. Now I can say that we've been able to train many of our professionals under the new reforms and they are in a position to implement their skills, also we've been able to prepare a National Spatial Development Framework for Ghana, we've prepared two regional development frameworks for greater Accra and Ashanti Regions, we've prepared a comprehensive urban development plan for greater Kumasi, we've also prepared a spatial development framework for the Northern Savannah Ecological Zone in Ghana through LAP.

All these were due to the interventions we made and it has even benefitted interventions outside the project" **(Head of Operations at TCPD).**

"The strategies we put in place really helped. Especially the ones we anticipated and took steps to intervene like the social assessment and all those things. The gender issues, land holding systems etc came out clearly so it informed us to strategize. I remember when we were doing the CBD at Bongo in the Upper East Region, the ADR expert was always on the ground talking to the people. There were a lot of things on their mind and sometimes tempers started rising and she had to go and intervene to resolve it so those risk management strategies we put in place really worked and the success of the CLSs under LAP 2 as compared to LAP 1 is due to the switch from the supply-led to demand-led" **(Technical Director at the OASL).**

Appendix G: Sample Interview Transcripts

Transcript One: Head of Operations at the TCPD (now LUSPA)
Date of Interview: 29/06/2017

Question: Good morning sir. How long have you being working on the project please?
Answer: I've been working at LUSPA for the past 12 years but have been on the project for the past 9 years.

Question: That's a long time. Which specific project activities were your department involved in please?
Answer: The land use and spatial planning authority formerly TCPD has been involved in the land use and spatial planning components of the project. Specifically components 3 and 5. That has been our main activities on the project. But we have also been involved in issues of the legal reform. So component 1 of the project which is about reforming land administration in Ghana. We have also featured under that component and the activities there which include the preparation of land use and spatial planning bill and then the passage of the bill. Also, when it comes to the business processes with regards to land administration which is component 2 of the project, we have been involved in terms of streamlining land so specifically we have been involved in land use planning and management systems in terms of plan preparation and the issuance of the plans.

Question: These activities that you've been involved in, what specific risks did you identify at the inception of the project then please?
Answer: At the inception of the project, we identified a number of risks. The first one is the sustainability of the project. Then also the financial aspects of it, including the continuous support of our donors to see this through. By sustainability we are talking about sustainability in terms of the acceptance of the reforms in land use planning by the larger community and then also the capacity of our staff to hold on to the process and carry it forward. With the financial also, because land use planning involves large chunks of funds to be able to prepare plans, we were concerned about how the preparation of these plans could be financed by the authorities when the project has ended. So that is also a major thing we identified at the inception stage.

Question: Sir so during the implementation, what events did you face that could affect the project's success?
Answer: During the implementation, there were a lot of issues we faced. Getting the staff to accept that this is how planning is going to be done going forward is an issue and then again because the old Town and Country Planning ordinance, CAP 84 has been in existence since 1945, and then ACT 462 in 1993, these were the regulations that were governing planning in the country. So one of the challenges was how to revise this legislation and come out with a new legislation for land use planning in Ghana. It was one of the major problems we encountered. And then again we didn't have the right staff in terms of their capacity to apply the new changes and to prepare the plans proposed under the project.

Question: Sir, so how were these risks identified?
Answer: We used a variety of strategies actually. For example by looking at lessons from Thailand's approach to Cadastral mapping under their land titling project and comparing it to Ghana's existing infrastructure at the time and the project's approach to land use planning, we were able to assess the possible risks that were likely to influence the sustainability of LAP such as the technical ability of our staff to implement those reforms as well as their acceptance of those reforms in land use planning by the larger community. This is just one of them. We also analysed our own personal encounters with planning staff up and down the country.

Question: What strategies did you adopt then to mitigate these risks you identified?
Answer: One strategy was technical assistance. We needed to provide technical training for our staff so we hired a consulting firm with the capacity to prepare these plans coming to Ghana and then working with our staff so we had counterpart attached to the consultants to work with them. So in doing so, we get them to learn new skills from the consultants. And in terms of the financial aspect it was a project funded activity so we were guided by the annual budget that we had to submit for the release of funds for the project. Once we identified the need for these reforms we also had to take the bold step of revising the laws to accommodate the new reforms so that the new reforms will have legal backing. Also because the reforms were new to our planning system, we had to use pilot areas. We selected some districts as pilot areas to test and then we can use the success stories to move the whole thing forward. We used that as a strategy in our implementation of the reforms.

Question: Did you actually target specific risk management strategies at specific risks then?
Answer: Yeah that's what we did. We targeted specific risk management strategies at specific risks. For instance if you talk about the risk of inadequate capacity, in terms of skills and the numbers, the strategy we used was let's attach our staff to the consultants to learn from them and at the same time, we made a case to central government to give special consideration to recruit a certain number of professional planners who will be able to carry on with the project.

Question: These strategies you adopted, have you actually seen any positive outcomes out of that please?
Answer: Yeah there's been a lot of successes. All these successes would not have been possible if we hadn't been strategic in our approach. Now I can say that we've been able to train many of our professionals under the new reforms and they are in a position to implement their skills, also we've been able to prepare a National Spatial Development Framework for Ghana, we've prepared two regional development frameworks for greater Accra and Ashanti Regions, we've prepared a comprehensive urban development plan for greater Kumasi, we've also prepared a spatial development framework for the Northern Savannah Ecological Zone in Ghana through LAP. All these were due to the interventions we made and it has even benefitted interventions outside the project.

Question: Good sir. Please let's go back to the project's objectives of trying to promote efficiency and transparency in Ghana's land service delivery etc. Do you think it was over ambitious or achievable?
Answer: Well, I think that the objective is achievable because it's for the overall project, LAP. So it's better to break down for the entire 25 years. So within the time frame of let's say LAP 1 or LAP 2, I will say that a lot of achievements has been largely met, even though there are some lapses but generally speaking, it has brought a lot of changes.

Question: So can we infer from that to say that so far the project is on course to be successful from what you are saying?
Answer: Yes I can say that the project has been largely successful. If I want to single it out the land use planning sector, all the land use plans we have established are all due to the implementation of LAP. If you talk about the registration, I know that the lands commission has undergone a lot of reforms which has been largely successful. The judiciary aspects has also been very successful as we now have land courts etc and the CLS are all due to the project.

Question: In terms of the project's beneficiaries, do you think their expectations have been met?
Answer: I will say to an extent because some of them are now aware of issues regarding land administration. They know what to do when they want to buy a piece of land even though there have been some lapses. I think what they probably want to see is how the process is quickened so that when someone buys a piece of land, they can get it registered quickly. That aspect, we are still working on but in terms of general awareness about land issues, the project has been widely successful.

Question: With regards to your risk mitigation strategies, did you actually consult the stakeholders in terms of what their expectations were when you were designing them or which strategy did you use then?
Answer: Exactly. We decided that land use planning was going to be participatory. In fact all the designs we have done in terms of land use planning were based on feedback from stakeholders. So we consulted stakeholders extensively so the plan is the outcome of the stakeholder consultation. In our planning system, when you are preparing a particular plan, whether it is a spatial dev framework, or structure plan or local plan, you need to do at least 4 sections of stakeholder consultations. So that tells you that the stakeholders have been part and parcel of how we run out the system and they have come to accept it. There has been ownership of the system.

Question*: One thing I've noticed is the project environment. For eg customary sector owning the majority of land etc. Do you think that has had an influence on the project? Your personal opinion please.*
Answer: The land tenure system has affected the project in such a way that nearly all the interventions the project had to come out with had been influenced by the land tenure system, particularly the customary land tenure system. We are talking about 80% of our total lands. How can you ignore that? The sustainability of LAP depends on the acceptance of the reforms the project proposes. This is impossible to achieve unless the environment within which the reforms would be

implemented is understood and incorporated and also vice versa because now the project has also brought a lot of interventions to the customary sector so I think it worked both ways.

Question: One thing that I want to ask is that has this project lived up to your personal expectations?
Answer: Personally I will say yes, speaking from where I am working. It has met my expectations even though there are some lapses in some of the interventions but the successes over shadow the lapses. So the expectations have been met, widely.

Question: At the moment they are thinking about going into a third phase. What are your recommendations for future similar projects, please?
Answer: I think there were a lot of activities under the project, both LAP 1 and 2. So going forward if they could reduce the number of activities and focus on certain pertinent issues so they are able to be tackled. I mean come to think of it, if I can go to register my land and can do that from the comfort of my office and access the system at Lands Commissions, that will be good. So going forward I think they need to look into solving the issue of land title. Solving the issue of the issuance of development permits. So that people get their permits quickly so they can build their houses quickly. If we are able to focus on these interventions particularly under lap 3 that will help. Because whilst we are leveraging on the gains, we should also know that it would be better to leverage on those gains and build on it than to bring in new ones that we will struggle to achieve.

Question: One more thing please, in your opinion what do you think could be done to prevent this issue of multiple lands sales please?
Answer: Multiple land sales is about attitude of people because the laws are there and then the fact that people sell land to Mr A and B is not an infringement on land administration. Because you expect that when somebody want to buy land, there is what we call 'caveat emptor', buyer be aware so you the buyer needs to check and satisfy yourself before buying land. But we are in a situation where people can go ahead and buy land without recourse to the agencies concern. So in that situation, if you happen to buy land which has also been sold to somebody then it is your problem. So I think it is an issue of attitude and greediness on the part of the land owners and this one I don't think is a land administration issue because it is not an institutional problem. It is an attitude, honesty and all the other moral issues you can think about because the laws are there. The land use planning laws talks about the fact that before you buy a land make sure that the land is planned and you have to check. so if you go and buy a land and later find out that the land has been earmarked for a certain use and that they wouldn't give you permit, that one then becomes your problem and the land law also says that you need to check it before you buy. so under such circumstances, you cannot blame it on land administration. Unless there is a system, and maybe we will get there one day, where if anybody sells land, there is a system to track it and that system is linked to the land sector agencies then you can track that this land is sold or not. But as at now we don't have that data or that system to do it. So the issue of multiple sales is not a good thing, it is causing a lot of issues and stalling development in our country but people need to be aware.

Question: Is this not linked to the transparency aspect of the project?
Answer: The transparency aspect is at the point of institutional processes. For example if I go to an institution and want to buy land, I need to know as a client whether the land is planned or not. If I go to lands commission, I need to be able to ask how long it will take to register land etc and they should be able to do a search on the land and tell me about transactions etc and that is even when the land has been registered. Until then, there is nothing the land sector agencies can do. The transparency is to do with the institutional level but at the grassroot level, we will still have to deal with attitude, honesty etc.

Thank you very much for your time.
End of interview.

Transcript Two: Adontenhene of Bekwai Traditional Area
Date of Interview: 30/06/2017

Question: Nana, as a traditional authority, what interests did you have in LAP? Or how did the project help in your traditional authority?
Answer: Before establishing the CLS, they informed us that it was demand driven. So officials of LAP came over here and spoke to the then Omanhene who's now deceased and explained the situation to him. He then agreed for them to establish a CLS here. So at the beginning, the requirement was for the traditional authority to find an office for the CLS and then we were also told to find our own staff which we will have to pay them ourselves. However the project will provide equipment for the office but the maintenance of such equipment is the responsibility of the CLS. So the government through LAP decided to provide capacity building for the staff of the CLS. This started in 2008. So about 6 months later, they took us for training and then told us how they wanted us to run the CLS afterwards.

Question: Nana, what do you think the main objectives of the project are?
Answer: I've been informed it is to make transactions in land more efficient and transparent which is a good thing.

Question: Do you think this is achievable?
Answer: Why not? It depends on how they go about all this. Everything is achievable but you have to be determined.

Question: What other project activities have you been involved in?
Answer: Apart from those I've just explained, the other activity the LAP decided to help us with is the RPRD exercise. When we were told to register the farmers, I registered 1500 farmers in my area. When we then submitted this to LAP, they told us that they will only allocate 80, which were even later cut down to 40. This development discouraged us a lot as it made it look like we have disappointed the farmers but this wasn't our fault. So this didn't help us at all. For us, the boundary demarcation is very important because when you look at the Amansie district, Bekwai is the biggest. We have a lot of land but the boundaries are not

clearly demarcated so if LAP can help us solve our boundary issues, it would be very much appreciated.

Question: Nana, so when they wanted to establish the CLS, did they ask your opinion on how you wanted it established?
Answer: They brought the idea and everything themselves. We didn't know what they were about. All they did was come to sell the idea to us and then if the chief is interested, find an office space for it and then they provided the equipment. There were a series of meetings prior to the establishment of this office. They came and check the progress on many occasions before bringing the equipment one day. When they brought the equipment, we didn't know what to do with it as this wasn't explained that much until a time came when they took us for workshops to train us on how to implement the equipment and how they wanted us to run the CLS.

Question: Nana so what issues do you think is impeding the progress of the CLS?
Answer: The main one is financial issues based on the fact that the office is not financially backed so we cannot even pay salaries. This has resulted in so many CLSs not functioning at the moment. On the establishment of the office we were advised to set up a fund where we deposit money in every time so when a time comes when there is no income into the office, we will still be able to pay our staff. The salary is not enough and also not regular so people do leave eventually. Change of staff does not also help with progress of any organisation because you spend money to train people and then they leave with the expertise. Then you will have to retrain somebody else.
Me for instance, I would not have still been here if I wasn't a chief. Being a chief means I cannot leave that's why I'm still here. When the Omanhene was alive, I was very close to him so now that he's no more; I have a responsibility of ensuring the continuity of this office.
They placed the equipment here but didn't recommend anywhere for us to maintain them so when they stop working, maintenance has been an issue. They brought us a motor bike which wasn't a bad idea but most of the areas we operate are rural areas where it is impossible to go with.

Question: Nana, did you communicate this to the project implementation team?
Answer: Yes, I have on so many occasions but they couldn't do anything about it when we asked. As at now, our AC is not working, the printer they gave us is not working so we had to buy another one ourselves. We always rely on the OASL for sensitisation exercises to educate the people in the villages. Or if we need loud speakers etc. Unfortunately, there are no district OASL offices. They are all located in regional capitals. So if the district plans something, we will then have to channel through the regional level and if the region cannot provide those equipment or pickup at the time due to extensive demand from all the districts, then the idea will have to be shelved.
So I think it would be better if they are even able to equip the district assemblies with logistics, then we can contact them for the things we need to help us carry on with our day to day running of the office.

The district assemblies also take 55% of the money that comes in but sometimes when you even go for assistance to educate people, they even want you to pay the fuel cost and these are things I think need to be resolved at the government level.

Question: Nana, with the RPRD exercise, which people actually benefited from it?
Answer: Those that registered had their farms demarcated so at least, there have been some progress in that area since the pillars have been erected in those areas. The documents have been delayed but at least the pillars have been erected and the head of OASL has visited and assured us that the contractor is working on submitting the documents to us soon.

Question: Nana so is this a positive outcome of the project?
Answer: Yes, to some extent anyway. We are still working on it but there have been progress with regards to the RPRD beneficiaries.

Question: Nana do you think the project has been beneficial to your traditional authority?
Answer: Yes. The use of ADR has helped in such a way that in our paramount area, land litigations have reduced drastically. The project has made it possible for us to keep records of our land transactions which have been very beneficial to the traditional council. For example due to the fact that we didn't have proper records of our land transactions, we encountered issues of multiple land sales but after maintaining proper records through LAP, we do not encounter such problems again.
Secondly, the issue of land litigations and land disputes have minimised. Thirdly, people have recognised the need of having documentation on land and have come forward to regularise their lands to proof ownership for future records. Moreover, documentations have also helped the traditional council because people now go to OASL to pay their ground rents as there is documentation that proves the type of parcel they own. Because when there were no records, people were not going to pay but with records available now, they don't have a choice but to go and pay. Even after preparing the lease, the person will have to go and pay for the first year's ground rent before being allowed to collect his documents. So this helps with increasing revenue both for the traditional council and the district assembly.
Moreso we went into a sensitisation exercise prior to the establishment of the CLS to announce and to educate the people about the establishment of this office and their mandate to ensure that even the chiefs in the villages who transfer land to people will know and inform us so we know and prepare the lease accordingly. It has also help investors wanting to invest in our traditional area as when they come over here, we can direct them to the chiefs and available lands for them to acquire and invest on transparently. This boosts investor confidence and also helps the chiefs to get to know what is going on in their traditional authority. These are some of the benefits that the CLS, established through LAP, has given to this community.

Question: Nana, in your own opinion, will you say the project has been successful overall?

Answer: The project has been successful in some way. Apart from the benefits to my TA already explained, land litigations in our paramount area have reduced drastically due to ADR. We prepare our own leases now as a result of the CLS and then get the solicitors to certify. This documentation was purely done by solicitors at first. So now if a prospective client comes and want to buy land, they know we will do everything to cover their interests in the land which in effect means the money paid is not wasted.This is as a result of the CLS.

Question: Nana, how has ADR helped over here?
Answer: The chief had an arbitration committee which he made me the chairman and then when the CLS started, we were taken for training under LAP to continue with the good works we were already doing under the arbitration committee. So this extra training and the expertise we already had has really helped to solve the issues of land litigation in this area. That is one aspect of LAP I'm really thankful for because land litigations can be very laborious and we are grateful not to have such things in this area.

Question: Nana, so what are your recommendations for future projects?
Answer: What I will recommend is that before they initiate any project, they should go and discuss with the authorities in that area and investigate whether the project they are planning is what the people actually need.
Secondly, the elders or authorities in such areas will also guide them about the proper steps they should take to ensure that the proposed project is beneficial. For instance Bekwai has about 6 paramount areas. So if we do not show someone the nature of the area and they just come and decide to start a project, how would they know which paramountcy need what or what etc? So if they go and speak to the elders, they will get to know more about the people they intend to help.
Thirdly, people outside the traditional council are also critical to project success. So they should have a forum and ask the people in the towns etc about the area as there are some people in our towns and villages who have a lot of information that is crucial to project success. Organising a forum and inviting the entire community for people to share ideas will go a long way to contributing to the smooth implementation of the project.

Question: Multiple land sales nana, what do you think we can do to solve such problems?
Answer: We need collaboration with the land sector agencies particularly the TCPD. In Ghana, we don't have lands with proper layouts. Sometimes, the TCPD will just decide to do re-zoning of an area without even involving the traditional authorities who in effect owns the land. The land sector agencies, the traditional authorities and the state should collaborate together. If we have proper layouts and then do the leases properly, it will be difficult for people to attempt to sell the same land to multiple people. But if there are no layouts and people only come with cadastral plans, how can you tell that the land has already been allocated to someone?

Question: Nana, who is responsible for ensuring layouts are done? Is it the TCPD, chiefs or who should initiate it?

Answer: With already existing towns, TCPD already have the layouts. The problem is that every town increases in size and there are some lands which were not covered which now needs to be sold because the town has developed in a way. Surveying is a very expensive thing. Surveying a one mile land is extremely expensive, something the chief cannot pay. The truth is that every traditional authority is under a district or metropolitan assembly. My argument has always been that the chief and the district assembly should sit down and plan to get a surveyor who can do the base map and decide where each part of the land will be used for. After that, the charge should be like say the chief given land as a form of payment to the assembly to cover this whilst the assembly then make arrangements and pay for the cost of surveying. At the end of the day, the assembly also takes a percentage on every ground rent that is accrued on the land. So why can't there be such an agreement?

Question: Nana, so will you say LAP lived to your expectations?
Answer: It's made some strands but more could have been done. Land management and administration is huge. They need to involve more people in the planning process. Most people think chiefs sell lands and put the money into their pockets but this is a government department which was established for a reason and that should be taken into consideration. This office was started in 2008, now we are in 2017 so definitely the equipment is not of the same strength as they were at the beginning. They depreciate with time and I think they should take all these into consideration.

Thank you very much for your time.
End of interview.