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Police for Peace

An Assessment of Sudan's Police Force in Peacebuilding

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PhD

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Police for Peace An Assessment of Sudan's Police Force in Peacebuilding

Abstract

Police, Sudan, Community policing, Peacebuilding

This study aims to examine the relation between Sudanese police and peacebuilding in the country following an exceptionally long period of varied and complex violent conflict. Literature on peacebuilding acknowledges the increasing role of police in peacebuilding, but is more often focussed on international police forces than domestic police.

In order to investigate the roles of domestic forces in peacebuilding an analysis of the Sudan police is undertaken, which includes its history, organisation, management, training and the adoption of a policy of 'community policing'. The study evaluates community policing as a relatively modern policing style that is espoused by international peace builders in post conflict settings. It also examines the placement of police in peace agreements.

The study concludes that whilst international police efforts in peacebuilding are not without pitfalls, domestic police, such as the Sudanese, may also be unfit for peacebuilding roles without changes in certain aspects of their organisational, management, recruitment, training and policing approaches. The study proposes a

more combined approach that brings together domestic and international police for more effective role in peacebuilding.



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Chapter One

Introduction

“No history of the Sudanese police exists in the English language and there are only occasional mentions of the police in the standard general histories of Sudan. The three published histories of the police in Arabic are all authored by Sudanese police officers and thus together represent something of an ‘official history’ (Berridge, 2011:p2)



Source: <http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/sd.htm>

This research is to examine the relationship between the police and peacebuilding, taking Sudanese Police as a case study. It is evident that literature linking police to peacebuilding focuses on the role of international police with little focus and recognition of domestic police forces, whereas this research explicitly focuses on the role of domestic police in peacebuilding. This

chapter maps out the research through a brief overview of the research methodology and introduces the aim and objectives, research questions and genesis, as well as the overall structure of the thesis. I begin with defining the concept of police and policing in the next section.

Definition of terms; police and policing

The UK Association of Chief Police Officers in 1990 issued the Statement of Common Purpose for police in the UK. "The purpose of the police service is to uphold the law fairly and firmly: to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; and to keep the Queens peace; to protect, help and reassure the community; and to be seen to do all this with integrity, 'common sense' and sound judgment" (Rogers, 2011,p.633).

There is however a debate about the definition of the police and in considering this it is necessary to differentiate between police as a concept and what the police actually do (policing). Both criminologists and sociologists have sought to clarify. They conclude that the historical background of police, in particular their relation with the state and their policing jurisdiction, are central (Wright, 2002,pp.5-6). Terpstra (2011) discusses Weber and Durkheim's ideas on the police force as a state agency to use legitimate force and moral agency with moral symbolic meaning. He highlights the implications of the state's role of maintaining the solidarity of citizens and protection from violence and its moral obligation, which gives the police their moral and social duties (Terpstra, 2011). Police in much academic literature is regarded as the department employed by the state especially to maintain order and control crime. Nevertheless in recent years, with the emergence of the private security companies, this definition is contested. Policing as it appears in the Dictionary of Policing by Newburn and

Neyroud (2008) is defined as follows: "Policing involves organised order maintenance, peace keeping, rule of law enforcement, crime investigation and prevention, and other forms of investigation and associated information brokering, which may involve conscious exercise of coercive power" (Newburn and Neyroud, 2008,p.217). In this sense policing is what the police force in any service does on behalf of the state which may include the use of coercive force and legal action. The Oxford Dictionary defines police as; "The civil force of a state, responsible for the prevention and detection of crime and the maintenance of public order" (Oxford, 2014). Some researchers view policing as being both state and non-state business. In light of previous definitions I understand policing can only be state apparatus legally empowered to use coercive force and concerned of maintaining public order and protection against crime for all. Other forces like the army and security forces might be empowered to use force but for different purposes in different contexts. Social control or private security agents or vigilantes groups may do work that resembles police work but not policing and they are not actually police as they are not empowered to use force for the purpose of maintaining public order and crime fight for all as Wright (2002) states that police force is distinguished from other state departments by their capacity, capacity to use force is a core function for police he asserts (Wright, 2002,p.27, Bittner, 1979). Baker (2010) argues that any organised activity that seeks to achieve communal order is form of policing (Baker, 2010). This seems to be too broad a definition which makes the concept of policing blurred. One feature that distinguishes police from what Baker is proposing is that they are for the public while other groups are concerned with their specific area of responsibility. Police remit can be very diverse embraces different service delivery as set out by some researchers

(Mulcahy, 2008, Francis, 2012b), they will in all cases include fighting crime for all, maintenance of public order as well as the legal use of force within defined legal and geographical boundaries (Francis, 2012c, Newburn, 2008, Hills, 1996).

Police in recent years have been leaving some of the jobs that were traditionally done by the police to now be the responsibility of other agencies, for example vehicle parking, report typing and control rooms, to focus more on core police functions (Waddington and Wright, 2010). In conflict ridden contexts where the police may have collapsed, individuals, communities, business or others may form their own protection means but they do not meet the former criteria of police and policing whereby a state run apparatus is empowered to use force and provide policing service for the public. Moreover forms of non-state policing are seen to be weakening the state power; legitimacy and sovereignty as well as facing resistance from state police officials (Francis, 2012b,p.18). Baker (2010) asserts that policing is wider and deeper than just security matters, and includes complex tasks ranging from crime prevention to crime detection besides other services like immigration management and traffic control. It is interesting to see many police definitions linking the police to peace which further consolidates the argument in this research about police and peacebuilding especially with the increasing recognition of the police role in peacebuilding by the UN and other actors. In this research the focus is on the public police or state police as opposed to what has been termed non-state policing.

Police organisations around the world differ in terms of their organisation as federal or decentralised police. The United States, for example, adopt an

extremely decentralised policing system that is scattered at small local levels. The United Kingdom has a less centralised country-county based system with three separate police at England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland then independent police force at county level in each of the four countries (Newburn, 2008). In contrast the police in continental Europe are more centralised with military components in many countries. For example the French system is a federal one where the police are managed at the central level. Like Spain and Italy the French police include a national police section that is part of the Ministry of Defence, the Gendarmerie, the Guardia Civil and the Carabinieri are all military police extensively armed in France Spain, Italy and respectively. This is thought to have been adopted to avoid a situation where too much power is concentrated in one department (Mulcahy, 2008, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Berridge, 2011, Wisler et al., 2009, Salim, 2005). The Sudanese Police are closer to the French system with one police organisation managed at the national level, nevertheless they are like the UK police under the Ministry of Interior and have no affiliation with the Ministry of Defence. Police around the world have taken on responsibilities beyond law enforcement and crime fighting to include social work, policing morality, mediation and political surveillance (Leys, 1995,p.133). Police in continental Europe have roles in diverse issues such as passport, alimony supervision, tax collection, building regulation and milk inspection but at the same time there little evidence of consistency in policing functions in Europe (Mawby, 2008,p.23).

Hills (2000) identifies six types of African policing systems in terms of how they are established and developed and their relationship with the state in the continent evolution where the system is developing in high institutional capacity that continued since independence as in Uganda; conversion as is the case in

Ethiopia where insurgency regime takes power then adopt and reform the existing police system; the integration of insurgency rebels and existing police that took place in Namibia; establishing of new police from scratch is described in Alice's model as construction, example of which can be found in Eritrea: when the police are seeking to embrace new developments affecting the policing is what she termed as adaptation; and finally in fragile states when the state is not in full control of security issues that is the police in transition (Hills, 2000,p.82). The model does provide a sense of understanding of how police forces in Africa have established and developed up to the 1990s which is relevant to what these forces look like today, nevertheless it does not explain how these forces are structured and managed. The Sudanese Police is akin to that model of Uganda described above which is also a common police model in other African countries. Such countries have their police systems built during the colonial times and continue to exist throughout different regimes (Hills, 2000, Marenin, 1982, Berridge, 2011, Salim, 2008). Two distinctive features of all these police models are that they are highly militarised and have restrained relation with their communities mostly because of rampant corruption and brutality especially against political opponents, and close ties with governing regimes (Hills, 2000, Berridge, 2011).

Modern British police, with the exception of Northern Ireland, is known to be unarmed and adopting policing by consent. However there is a debate around how can this consent be practically obtained from the public. Adlam and Villiers (2003) pointed to the fact that police is often state department which in one way or another would carry out government policies and that they will, at some point, have to act without the consent of all citizens. Police in this capacity are not independent bodies even in operational terms. They cited the British police

interference with the miners' strike in the during Margret Thatcher time as Prime Minister as an example of police being influenced by government policies (Adlam and Villiers, 2003,pp.223-227).

Research overview

This research is based on the Sudan, which has seen some of Africa's most protracted and complicated conflicts. These conflicts started in the South Sudan in 1955, with other regions following later, and only approached an end in the first decade of the 21st century. The country has been undergoing a major peace process that started in 2005 and will continue for some time into the future. The focus of the research will be on Sudanese Police and their relation with and / or their role in the peacebuilding process. The peace process started when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South Sudan was signed in 2005, which has put an end to the two decades of civil war between the two parties. The implementation of this agreement throughout the six years interim period culminated in South Sudan becoming an independent state in July 2011. Following the CPA an agreement between the government of Sudan and one of the fighting rebel groups (the Sudan Liberation Movement) in Darfur was signed in Abuja 2006, and then another peace deal was reached in the Eritrean capital city, Asmara, between the government and rebels (the Eastern Front) in Eastern Sudan in the same year. The Darfur conflict continued after the Abuja agreement (see Chapter Four) due to the fact that two of the main rebel factions refused to participate in the Abuja peace process. Nonetheless In July 2011 the Darfur Doha agreement which was mediated by Qatar, the United Nations and the African Union, was signed by the main fighting groups and the Sudan Government. Still some factions remained

outside the peace process and continued their insurgency war against the central government (Woodward, 1990, Barltrop, 2011).

The police have also been deeply affected by the conflict either by being a target for the rebel groups fighting the government, or because they have to deal with fragile situations where firearms are widespread or providing security to areas engulfed by conflict and, in particular, providing security to the internally displaced people's (IDPs) camps for people who fled their homes because of the escalating violence. In some of these agreements, as explained more in Chapter Four, former combatants joined the police service in Sudan as part of the power sharing arrangements, or the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process (DDR) (Barltrop, 2008, Movement, 2011).

The international community was part of that major peace process in Sudan, first the United Nations Mission (UNMIS) in Sudan was deployed in 2005 to monitor and help implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South. The mandate of this mission ended in July 2011 after the last phase of that agreement was achieved by conducting the referendum that led to the secession of South Sudan (Movement, 2005, Council, 2008a, Council, 2011a, Robson, 2002, Curran, 2010). In the aftermath of the South Sudan secession new conflicts emerged in two areas of the new Sudan. The Blue Nile state and South Kordofan, both bordering South Sudan, witnessed violent conflict between rebels and government forces. Moreover the border disputed area of Abyei remained an unsolved issue between the two countries of Sudan and South Sudan. The African Union deployed a Mission upon the agreement of the two parties composed of troops from Ethiopia to keep the peace in the area (See Chapter Four). In Darfur the African Union mission was deployed in

2006 followed by the United Nations African Union hybrid Mission which was deployed in 2008, this mission is still operating to help the parties achieve the goals of the peace accord (Council, 2008a).

Despite the emerging literature on policing and police science from both academics and practitioners in recent years, and the long history of the Sudanese Police force that extends over a century, very little has been written to explore and / or to investigate their role in the modern Sudan (Berridge, 2011), and in particular during these periods of conflict and peacebuilding. The Sudanese Police force is therefore under researched as part of the overall under researched area of Africa police (Francis, 2012b, Hills, 2000, Marenin, 1982, Berridge, 2011). Abdullah Hassan Salem, a former Director General of Sudanese Police, wrote a PhD thesis at Khartoum University in 2005 titled, 'The Development of Sudanese Police Systems between 1899 and 1999', this was followed in 2011 by a PhD thesis at Durham University by James William Berridge titled 'Under The Shadow of the Regime, the Contradictions of Policing in Sudan 1924-1989'. Apart from these two theses, and a small number of other non-academic contributions, the Sudanese police as an organisation or practice have neither attracted Sudanese police officers to reflect on their experiences, nor scholars from other disciplines to write about them (Salim, 2005, Berridge, 2011). Nonetheless the growing debate on the role of police in liberal peacebuilding operations suggests that a police force like that of Sudan should come into focus because it inevitably has an impact on the peacebuilding process in the country. Assumptions are made in the peacebuilding literature about the potential of police forces in contexts of fragile peace (Francis, 2012b, Stedman et al., 2002, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Curran, 2010). This

research will investigate them further with particular emphasis on the role of domestic police in Sudan.

To provide understanding of police in post conflict settings and the different features of policing in such settings I therefore begin with brief overview of the African context and in particular the post-Anglo colonial African due to the common police characteristics between former British colonies in Africa where the police was mainly shaped by the interest of colonisers to provide security to the white settlers and their allies; to guard their commercial interests and to protect the colonial regime against any national resistance (Hills, 2000, Marenin, 1982). It will also make comparative observations from the British police due to the historic links between the British who colonised Sudan 1898-1956 and the renowned reputation that British police have today across the globe as a fine police with deep democratic policing traditions (Berridge, 2011, Thomas and Jenkins, 1990, Mulcahy, 2008, Sinclair, 2012).

In this regard it is important to note that, contrary to what some writers mistakenly believe, the Sudanese Police was built along the same lines as the Northern Ireland paramilitary rather than the metropolitan civil service police of London famously known as unarmed and adopting the policing by consent method. Therefore it is no surprise that personnel of the colonial police in Sudan were either retired military personnel of Sudanese or Egyptian origins. Policing strangers by strangers was a common practice during the colonial times and in this way Egyptians were employed to serve in the newly established Sudanese Police. This is comparable with using Hausa Nigerians in Ghana and Indians in East Africa or using the Hausa police from North Nigeria to police the Lagos area in the

South, moreover freed slaves were recruited into the police to police their former masters in Nigeria (Salim, 2005, Hills, 2011, Ellison and Smyth, 2000, Deflem, 1994, Killingray, 1986).

The colonial administration of the Sudanese Police and the ruling regimes after independence were divided on whether to have a strong, professional and united police force that could serve the agenda of the ruling regime or to have divided police at regional and provincial level which did not represent any threat to the regimes. The latter was preferred by the political colonial service and the military regimes after independence (Berridge, 2011). They sought not to leave the local police with too much power at their disposal and therefore distributed some policing powers to between different departments as did President Nimeri when he dissolved the Ministry of Interior and police headquarters then divided the police between the Ministry of Justice and the Presidency to weaken it. At the same time different political regimes preferred to have strong, well equipped, police at the centre of power which can protect the regime's interest, especially if challenged by civil protest (Berridge, 2011, Salim, 2008). This divided police system has also reflected the centre versus periphery divide and the effect of equal development on the resources available to the police (Berridge, 2011). The concentration of resources in the centre of the State contributed to the centre periphery divide as we will see in Chapter Four. This divide was confirmed during the field work where it appears through respondents' feedback that the national capital, where the political power is based, the police are better resourced and better equipped. So, political regimes sought to maintain police force that is not too strong to threaten the regime but strong enough to protect it when in threat of political opponents.

The combined ethos of the British policing by consent in mainland Britain and the paramilitary oppressive police of Ireland and later Northern Ireland were both applied in the British colonies. Colonial authorities who used to export British police officers to serve in the colonial police also tended to move police officers between the different colonies, this practice made possible the dissemination of blended colonial- British policing method across the British Empire. The shared colonial policing experience prevailed with similar pattern of policing that focused in two main aspects; the maintenance of order and taxation. To reduce cost and to appeal to local communities the colonial police adopted two strands of policing; a formal one and native police based on the traditional society structures as part of the indirect rule strategy, the two were operating in parallel or complementary manner (Deflem, 1994, Killingray, 1986). The Northern Ireland police maintained its paramilitary and oppressive character until the signing of the Good Friday Agreement when it was transformed to become a model for police reform in post conflict contexts (Marijan, 2014, Ellison and Smyth, 2000). At the end of the cold war and the surge of peacebuilding missions, the UK policing traditions of democratic policing developed since 1829 and the quasi-military policing in Ireland developed between 1921- 2001, especially in public order management, was found useful to provide robust policing in divided communities (Sinclair, 2012). During the 1990 and into the 21st century the British police used to train UN police commissioners at their police college in Bramshill as explained by retired British police officer and former staff of Bramshill.

Throughout the colonial period in Sudan and other countries the police force was tasked with monitoring nationalist movements and political activist resisting the colonial rule. The international influence of the British police described by

Newburn (2008) as “fine” police service across the globe and specially in Africa cannot be ignored (Newburn, 2008). They proved that their policing system is valid for both democratic societies and societies emerging from conflict with adaptable models of harsh and soft policing. Later the national governments after independence continued to use the police for political aims against opposition groups (Marenin, 1982, Berridge, 2011, Musiime, 2012, Salim, 2008). Sudanese Police today, like other police forces in Africa, still reflects the structure and identity of that colonial legacy of being a paramilitary police force in the way they are structured, trained, uniformed and administered, with military ranks, and military command and remained close and influenced by the ruling regimes (see Chapter Three) (Marenin, 2009, Berridge, 2011).

The Sudanese Police have little to do in the area of exercising their statutory power within the range of their relevant ranks and area of responsibility due to the rigid military command structure (see Chapter Three and six). Unlike the military police, they have to exercise discretionary powers in their day to day work as put by Villiers and Adlam, “Every street corner police is a leader” (Peter, 2003, Mulcahy, 2008). The tight military structure nurtures the culture of blame among the police where no one is prepared to accept mistakes and must find someone to blame (often a junior rank) this culture is impeding their ability to work independently as is evident from my respondents’ feedback and may ultimately culminate in limiting their potential role in peacebuilding, as I shall show.

The Police force is a key institution to peacebuilding, development, liberalisation and democracy, and these principles of peacebuilding are usually accompanied by the adoption of community policing, upholding the rule of law and vindication

of human rights. The importance of police role is evident by the increasing number and roles of international policing in United Nations peace missions in recent years (see Chapter Two) (Francis, 2012b, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Hills, 2006). This links the police to liberal peacebuilding processes in post conflict and war-torn contexts.

In recognition of that police role, police reform is becoming part of peace deals that end conflicts around the world. This role however, as stated earlier, mostly focuses on the international police role with little recognition of the domestic police role. International actors often push for police reform as part of the overall post conflict reform programme, though sometimes motivated by their own security agenda especially in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in western countries like the US, UK and Spain and the attacks in East Africa and Yemen (Francis, 2012b, Charles, 2002, Hills, 2006). This could be institutional reform, structural reform or capacity building programmes; however in all cases the international actors tend to take the leading role with less involvement of domestic police who would ultimately take the lead at the end of these programmes. These programmes often take the form of short-lived interventions without vision of how to sustain what has been achieved. (Macualay, 2012,p.185). Ironically when the police system collapses such as in East Timor, Panama, El Salvador, Haiti, Kosovo, Namibia, Guatemala, and a new police force had to be created from scratch, this provides a better chance for reform with special focus on training, selection criteria and human rights standards (Charles, 2002, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Paris and ebrary, 2004). In other cases like Rwanda, Croatia, the occupied territory of Palestine, Northern Ireland, South Africa and Angola, where issues of identity are more acute and societies are divided mainly between religion and ethnicity, the approach for

reform is often to influence the doctrine and the conduct of the relevant police force (Call, 2002). The relationship between the police and development is asserted by many scholars for example Francis (2012) and Hills (2000) where good policing is seen as a prerequisite for development where security is provided (Hills, 2000, Francis, 2012b). In some cases as put forward by Calls (2002) international investors would insist on the police reform to provide a secure and safe environment for investment (Call, 2002). Interventions to ostensibly enforce liberal peace are sometimes seen as being inseparable from vested western interest as in Libya, when western powers intervened to defend their oil interests. Likewise in Sierra Leone when the United Kingdom intervened to secure favourable diamond contracts for British companies (Francis, 2012b, Hills, 2006, Mac Ginty, 2011). As described by Hills (2006) the targeted aid to Africa has always come with broader objectives as in the quote from USAID document;

What happens in Africa is of growing concern to the United States and our active engagement advances significant US interests. The overarching goals of US policy in Africa seek to enhance African capacity to fight terrorism and create favourable conditions for US and African trade and business opportunities, while developing the foundation for sustained growth, regional stability, good governance, a healthier population and responsible use of natural resources (USAID, 2005).(Hills, 2006,p.633)

The police role in liberal peacebuilding is reflected in the literature on peacebuilding in different contexts (Call, 2007, Paris, 2006, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Greener, 2011b). This role, as stated earlier, is attributed mainly to the international actors, in specific, the

United Nations police, the European Union and individual donor countries (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Durch, 2003). The international community is often hesitant to trust the local police with an executive role due to the risk associated with that since the police in such contexts are almost always corrupt and do not represent the society therefore might favour one group over the other (Greener, 2011a). For this they tend to take advisory, monitoring or training roles to help with the development of the host police organisations (Charles, 2002).

Even though it is common for the international police to play an important role in peace missions in post conflict contexts they often face many challenges, not least their limited understanding of the local contexts, which minimises their effectiveness and efficiency in peacebuilding role in the host country (Greener, 2009b). There are also issues around their coherence and their professional backgrounds since they tend to be drawn from different policing systems within the contributing countries. There are as well issues surrounding their training and the hasty way they are often chosen by their contributing countries and the UN which does not allow for rigorous vetting system to be applied. Moreover the legitimacy of international police to operate in different contexts is also constantly questioned by some observers (Greener, 2009b, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a).

This study examines first the main components of the Sudanese Police mandate, testing their relevance to peacebuilding. It will then explore three different pertinent aspects: the leadership and management style of the Sudanese Police, in other words, how the Sudanese Police force is structured, managed, operated, and the relationship between its different administrative

levels. Second the training system, its institutions, regulations, challenges and the current practises and how suited they are to the current context. Third, I focus on the community policing approach adopted by Sudanese Police and its history, development and practice. Community policing is an internationally recognised approach which has arisen as police forces around the world have come to the realisation that they are not close enough to their communities and thus they are unable to gain their trust or the tremendous value of intelligence and support. Therefore they adopt this approach to bridge that community-police gap. Furthermore police forces also come to understand that the resources available at their disposal are not sufficient to support their endeavour in the fight against internationally growing and newly emerging multi-faceted crime (Verma et al., 2013, Newburn, 2008, Wisler et al., 2009).

To further examine the Sudanese police role in the peace process we need to identify what are the key elements that are mostly related to or can affect police performance in such contexts. Two areas can be identified in this regard. First, the issues of police representation recruitment and training are constantly discussed in the literature examining police in the post conflict and war-torn contexts. In divided societies where one group dominates public affairs the police are most likely to be dominated by one ethnicity, religious or political group examples from Rwanda, Bosnia, Northern Ireland and Latin America and indeed other countries, especially in Africa, support this assumption (Call, 2007, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Ellison and Smyth, 2000, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006b, Baker, 2006). To maintain equal representation of the society that the police serve, a fair and transparent selection and recruitment system is imperative. Once recruited police in these environments need adequate training tailored to address specific issues such as the rule of law and

vindication of human rights. This is particularly relevant as such police are almost always having a record of human rights violation and abuse of power. Second the police-community relation in conflict ridden countries like Sudan is always problematic. This raises the question of how relations between police and societies can be repaired and what would be the policing style that is likely to be suitable for that purpose. Community policing, as literature shows, is modern policing approach that is sought to engage communities in the policing process. The relevance of community policing does not only come from the fact that it is the policing style proposed by peace builders in conflict zones but it is also the approach that most likely to engage the public in the policing process in a way that might win their support and trust, both key elements of successful policing particularly in peacebuilding environment (Greener, 2009b, Holm and Eide, 2000a, Palmer et al., 2012, Grabosky, 2009a, Verma et al., 2013, Wisler et al., 2009). To examine these matters within the Sudanese police we need to understand how they are structured, operate and administered, how they manage the selection, recruitment and training processes and whether they do community policing and how they do it compared to the international practice. These interrelated policing issues will be examined separately in chapter five, six and seven. This detailed local-insider knowledge of Sudanese police that I will present in these chapters might be helpful to avoid the mistakes highlighted by critics of peacebuilding as shown in chapter two. This understanding which will reflect on the limitations of Sudanese police and how they emerged can provide opportunity for positive change. Such change may take the form of locally driven and internationally supported reform within the current legislative framework

Research genesis

Studying policing and police science has not drawn the attention of either academics or practitioners until the last two decades during which there has been a surge of new literature . As argued by Peter Grabosky, when police officers write about their policing experiences they do that in a language not comprehensible ¹ to people who are not familiar with police culture and at the same time when academics write about police they tend to do so in difficult language that is not easy for police and ordinary people to understand (Grabosky, 2009a)

In identifying this research focus I acknowledge that I have been influenced by my career and experience of working in the Sudanese Police for over two decades; living in a country that was engulfed with protracted civil conflicts which affected all aspects of life; and also being from Darfur, one of the most conflict-torn regions in Sudan (See Chapter Four) (Musa, 2011, Bashar, 2013, Johnson, 2011, Mamdani, 2009). Police are often affected by conflict by either being victims of or part of the conflict (see Chapter Two and Three) (Francis, 2012b, Ellison and Smyth, 2000, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). My experiences inspired me to look at the relationship between the police as an organisation, and their potential role in peace processes. In this endeavour I try to identify potential links between the two. This ambition is also based on what literature has shown of the involvement of the police in civil conflicts and their increasing role in peacebuilding (Durch, 2003, Greener, 2011a). A further motivation was that the Sudanese Police force is an under researched area of police in Africa (Baker, 2008, Marenin, 1982, Berridge, 2011, Hills, 2000). The

¹ By conducting this research I am accepting the challenge and trying to break that mould where police officers tend to refrain from reflecting on their policing experience and present it to wider readers in simple readable manner.

Sudanese Police are not part of the UN police in that they do not have police personnel within the UN missions. Being part of the UN police as asserted by Francis (2012) provides chances for training, experience and funding. Sudanese police do not seek to take part in the UN police and so they do not prepare their officers up to the UN required standards. I also have experience of participating in the training of South Sudanese Police, as a member of a team that was tasked to deliver training to the police in the South region of Sudan in 2006/2007. The team was part of a UK Department for International Development (DFID) project to support the justice sector in Sudan. During that experience I witnessed how war can affect police and also how challenging it can be to build a new police force to replace that which had totally collapsed during conflict.

Aim and Objectives of the Research

The aim of the research is to evaluate the peace process in Sudan through the lens of examining the Sudanese police roles and capabilities with a view to evaluating their effectiveness in the peacebuilding process.

It will also use Sudan as a case study to consider the role of the domestic police (and community policing in particular) in peacebuilding processes in fragile and post-war states, which is a much under-studied topic.

Research questions

Main research question:

Has the adoption of community policing by the Sudanese Police force been successful? In particular, are the management and leadership style; training

and human resources management systems; and in particular community policing approaches suitable for this endeavour?

Subsidiary Research Questions:

1. What are the main components of the Sudanese Police mandates?
2. To what extent are contemporary community policing approaches facilitating the peacebuilding roles of the Sudanese Police?
3. What does community policing mean within the context of the mandate of the Sudanese Police?
4. What are the main features of the community policing approaches adopted by Sudanese Police?
5. Did the community policing approaches adopted by Sudanese Police help police in undertaking peacebuilding role?
6. What are the challenges faced these approaches which hinder the police in Sudan to undertake an effective role in peacebuilding?

Contribution to knowledge

It is evident through the literature review that the Sudanese Police and policing are an under-researched topic within the overall under-researched area of African police and policing in fragile states. The peace process in Sudan has inevitably affecting the Sudanese Police force in peacebuilding activities since 2004, with little research undertaken and so in this sense it will also make a contribution to original knowledge. Most peacebuilding literature examines the

police role in relation to the role of international police. I am taking an unusual approach which explores the domestic police force in particular. This will enable me also to make a judgement as to whether it has a potentially greater role than recognised at present. Moreover I seek to understand possible useful means to determine and manage international support to mitigate any negative impacts on the host police force and country. So my contribution is expected to enrich the literature on Sudanese Police and the role of local police in peacebuilding using the Sudanese Police as case study, but also to locate these findings within the wider topic of police and peacebuilding in Africa. A final note on this relates to Berridge's (2011) conclusion quoted at the onset of this chapter describing the studies on Sudanese Police by former Sudanese police officers of being "something of an official history". I believe that being a member of an organisation does not undermine the prospect of conducting a valuable scientific research so long as research principles and ethics have been adhered to. Thus I hope this study would be an authentic contribution.

Limitations

One of the limitations of this research in the methodology area is that the samples for research respondents had to be taken from members who belong to para-military type of organisation which is governed by military structure and that the members of it are not used to talking about their work to an outsider under any circumstances. Moreover there is a lack of access to police documents since these are regarded by the police as confidential documents. The second one is that I am a member of the organisation that is being researched. It was a point of concern as to how I will be perceived, especially with the power issues embedded in the rank structure, and therefore collecting

data for research in such environment was not without some implications, and I examine these issues further below. Finally I had originally considered that the most appropriate assessment of the community policing approach would be to seek the views of community members, but on reflection this idea was dispensed as impractical due to my identity and the potential ethical considerations arising of that. It is to be hoped that at some point a scholar with a more appropriate identity may take up this investigation.

Literature review

Bryman (2012) states that existing literature is essential part of any research and that further reading is indispensable to clarify some issues related to our chosen topic. These issues he writes related to how much is known about the topic; concepts and theories applied; methods used; evidence presented as well as those who significantly participated in researching the area (Bryman, 2012,p.8). Literature review as Mathews and Ross (2010) put it is about getting to know how others have researched the same topic that you intend to research, this they point out should take place at early stage of the research to help develop and formulate your ideas (Matthews and Ross, 2010,p.93). To establish understanding of the police and peacebuilding I examined existing literature on these topics. Modern trends on police and policing around the world are reviewed. The development of peace keeping into peacebuilding and liberal peacebuilding is as well examined (see Chapter Two). The literature review on Sudan focused on the published studies, even though they are scant, beside laws and regulations that currently govern the role of the police, particularly in the areas of recruitment, selection, training and community policing. Analysis of Sudanese Police management and leadership systems

additionally, it examined academic literature on the peace process in the Sudan, beside reports, newspapers and any data that are available on the impact of policing on peacebuilding.

Methodology

In order to investigate the research problem in detail it was necessary to undertake some empirical research within the police force, keeping in mind the challenges mentioned above.

“The debate between qualitative and quantitative researchers is based upon the differences in assumptions about what reality is and whether or not it is measurable. The debate further rests on differences of opinions about how we can best understand what we know, whether through objective or subjective methods” (Jha and ebrary Inc., 2008,p.6).

This study took place in specific contexts with specific agents and so it fulfils Robson’s definition of case study (Robson, 2002,p.185). Data for this research has been collected at different stages through several data collection periods whilst in Sudan. Analysis followed each visit and more data were collected in the next visit. In this sense Grounded Theory is deemed to be applicable to the way I formulated my understanding and interpretation of data through the research journey (Matthews and Ross, 2010,p.79-80). In Gounded Theory according to Robson (2002) different research methods are combined until research reaches saturation. It can be used for data analysis for both qualitative and quantitative research (Robson, 2002,pp.192-194). Developed by Strauss and Corbin grounded theory brings data collection and analysis in seemingly inseparable phases, and in this way the researcher is developing new theory stems from the data. In other words data collection goes in tandem with data

analysis and the latter does not have to be done at the end of data collection phase (Sarantakos, 2013,p.371).

Matthews and Ross (2010) indicate that qualitative research takes place when a researcher interacts with people, interviewing and observing events as they happen within their natural contexts, and in this sense the researcher is using methods and data generated by research. Qualitative research differs from quantitative research in that quantitative is based on the fact that physical reality of the world is possibly measurable and the result would not change on repeating experiment. Despite the narrowing gap between the two in the late twentieth century one of them will still be known to dominate particular areas of research or discipline (Matthews and Ross, 2010,p.141). As such, research on police behaviour and peacebuilding is dominated by qualitative research. Whilst this current research is mainly qualitative some limited quantitative data have been used where appropriate. Jha and Inc (2008) state that qualitative and quantitative can be combined in one research (Jha and ebrary Inc., 2008).

Secondary data from academic books, journal articles, media resources, reports and others were used, along with primary data.

Primary data were generated through interviews and focus groups with full consideration of ethical issues regarding the confidentiality and encoding of participants throughout the research process. Samples for research respondents were drawn from different ranks and roles within Sudanese Police personnel with a diverse range of experience.

All primary data was collected in Khartoum, the capital city of Sudan. Issues of experience and rank within the police, as well as gender issues were all

considered to ensure appropriate representation, using a purposive sampling approach. With regard to safety of research subjects there had been no foreseen concerns of this type due to the nature of the research (see below).

A hybrid method provided triangulation of the data corroborated by participant observation, to reduce errors or limitations to the research. Specific methods were tailored to suit particular groups or individuals to ensure that the methods used are the most appropriate ones to generate more relevant data in relation to the research question. For example interviews were used mostly with senior police officers who were expected to be confident and not intimidated by my rank, whereas focus groups were more suitable for middle and junior ranks, they were thought to be less intimidating and would not identify individuals. In both cases these judgements seemed to be borne out in that both groups were forthcoming.

Interviews

Interviews are the most common method used in research, it is distinguished with the researcher being directly engaged in the data collection process by asking questions and receiving answers. Among the different types of interviews semi-structured interviews with open ended questions are common in social research. They may take the form of one to one face to face interviews or group format (Robson, 2002). Interviews as Robson (2002) indicated can be used as the only method or in combination with other methods in multi-method approach as is the case in this research (Robson, 2002,pp.269-270). An important element of structured interviews is that interviewees have to be asked

exactly the same questions, preferably in the same order so that responses can be easily recorded and aggregated (Bryman, 2008,p.193).

Sampling

Conducting research using interviews is expensive and time consuming therefore the need arose for choosing a sample that can adequately represent the large community of the study. Larger sample is recommended for better results; however practical matters should be taken into consideration when deciding size of sample. Many researchers take a minimum of 30 participants to secure a more normally distributed data (Beins, 2014,p.49-50). If the research findings are to be generalised then the sample has to represent the whole research population in a meaningful way (Bryman, 2012,pp.186-187). All participants were chosen because they are expected to provide critical feedback, and thoughtful insights building on their policing experience and exposure to police culture. A purposive approach to sampling was taken whereby characteristics were chosen to establish stratified variables or stratified sampling (David and Sutton, 2004,p.151). The selection process was designed to ensure that there was no accidental exclusion on the basis of rank, gender, age, tribe, class or ethnicity. A preliminary study in which I ran interviews and focus group for ten senior Sudanese officers during their visit to the UK in 2011, confirmed my impression that they would be open to such engagement, as was confirmed during field research in Sudan.

Participant observation

Often any research that involves people would include element of observation especially participant observation which stemmed from anthropologists' work. It helps corroborate data obtained by other research methods. Moreover

observation can be used as an alternative method to collect data and interpret what people say; they may act differently from that which they report (Robson, 2002, pp.209-312). Sarantakos (2013) adds that participant observation takes place in natural setting in unstructured format. He also put some ethical caveats regarding research participants being unaware of being observed and researcher hiding his identity while observing research participants (Sarantakos, 2013,pp.240-243). During the span of the research I used observation to collect data through interacting with and meeting members of the Sudanese Police on numerous occasions in informal contexts. Ethical issues, in particular researcher identity and research objective were considered throughout.

Ethical issues

Research ethics have developed rapidly during the last few decades. Institutions, professional bodies and tertiary institutions established their own ethical standards that researchers have to adhere to, as well as ethical boards to review and approve any research that involves people or animal (Sarantakos, 2013, Beins, 2014). I will outline below some of the perceived ethical matters related to this research. Issues of personal safety were perceived very unlikely as I am a Sudanese citizen with policing background and, consequently, have an excellent understanding of the ongoing safety and security issues in areas of my country. I also recognize that such safety issues are limited to a few specific areas of Sudan and that most areas are completely secure and safe to visit. The field work was conducted in the capital Khartoum which is not a conflict region and it is not one of the areas that are identified by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) as a risky area.

It was ethically appropriate to obtain consent from research participants, this in part gives them confidence that it is their own decision to take part on the research and in part, gives them the assurance that the researcher is seriously considering their participation. As for the researcher, the informed consent supports the validity and credibility of the obtained data. Reasonably informed consent was offered early on when I was approaching the participants for the first time. It was properly elaborated for the participants in written or verbal form as appropriate. Some of them signed happily but most of them indicated that there was no need to do so.

Participants were told that they are free to withdraw from the research process at any time and there had been no need to revisit this in order not to affect the research participants' desire in continuing as research respondents.

Ample time was given to the participants until it was certain that they understood the extent and the nature of the consent. I was aware that the time needed might vary from one participant to another.

All Sudanese speak Arabic; fortunately Arabic is my first language, and this made it easy to overcome any potential problems, misunderstanding or misinterpretation.

Reliability

A reliable research method is equivalent to consistent research method; it is the method that will produce the same results, if repeated, regardless of who is conducting the research. It also means that the instrument used is not biased and is not influenced by the researcher, the research participants or the environment in which the research was conducted. Reliability of research

according to Sarantakos (2013) can be featured in three common types; the first one relates to time known as stability reliability meaning that results will stay the same through different times; the second is representative reliability, this one is about the group from which research participants were selected; and third is the what has been termed equivalence reliability across indicators used in the research (Sarantakos, 2013,p.104). By attending to research principles and considering ethical issues I sought to give the utmost reliability. I do acknowledge, however, that my status as a member of the researched group may have given me a much higher level of trust than other researchers would obtain if they were to seek to replicate the research.

Reflexivity

I explained my role, as a researcher as well as an officer, to the research participants, the research scope and objectives were made clear moreover research participants were assured that there would be no harm as a result of their contribution, and confidentiality and anonymity would be secured. As the participants are all from the police force I was aware of the problems concerning researching one's own organisation and how the participants would perceive the researcher. From my own experience I expected that majority of participants from all ranks would contribute without reservation and that they would not withhold any significant information. However it makes sense to expect that some might be suspicious of researcher motivation or feel uncomfortable talking about specific issues, nevertheless it was noticeable how all respondents welcomed being part of the research. Again the researcher stressed the point that no harm would be inflicted on any participant as a result of his or her participation and that issues of anonymity and confidentiality are strictly

considered which would make their identity and the content of what they say accessible only to the researcher and his supervisor. In all cases objectives of the research were made very clear and protection of the participants' identities would be emphasised. I anticipated that research participants would be enthusiastic to take part in the process once they were assured that they would be protected and that the research aimed to improve the police service in the future. This was realised during the field work.

Another matter of concern was the power differential between my own rank and that of more junior colleagues, which may have inhibited the latter in what they may say. Therefore it was important that I convince them that I will abide by research ethics pertaining confidentiality and anonymity and reassured them that no harm will result to them arising from anything that they will say. As such I would have to earn their trust and demonstrate that for these purposes I will be putting aside my hat as a superior officer. I endeavoured to illustrate this by insisting also that if they say anything which constitutes a breach to any existing law and/or regulation, I gave an undertaking not to reveal or use any of what they say as evidence against any of them at any point in the future. I think I managed to achieve this because of the openness with which they responded.

Furthermore I stressed that participation was absolutely voluntary and no one would be forced to participate and that withdrawal was permitted at any stage of the research.

I used my policing experience and knowledge of police related subjects to direct the research inquiry and to probe the questions to generate the most useful and relevant data.

Risks and challenges

It was challenging to research one's own organisation especially as police work is still considered to be secretive in Sudanese society, where any data that are related to police are regarded as confidential even the number of police personnel and figures of police budget are not known to most police officers let alone the public. Beside the fact there is little published work on the subject this is compound by the difficulty in accessing police documents. At the onset of this research I was hoping that the Sudanese Police would help fund it either fully or partially however this was not achieved. I therefore encountered numerous difficulties in funding my studies in particular how to get funds through to the United Kingdom with Sudan being subject to economic sanctions that prevent money transactions outside the country. Furthermore the sanctions have led to my UK bank account being closed and was not allowed to have any one at any UK based bank because of my nationality. With support of sincere friends and dedicated family members I was able to overcome these difficulties. Also a big challenge for me was not to allow my own views and judgements to supersede the research finding and how finding a way to suppress them. A further concern of mine was what would be the consequences if the Sudanese Police force was not happy with the research findings; luckily first indications seem to suggest that they are.

Reflection on Data from Field Work

Introduction

This section presents the summary of analysis of the fieldwork data collected from Khartoum through asking questions of a research sample population of forty-five police officers of different ranks through semi-structured personal and

focus group interviews, supplemented by the author's observations. All interviews and focus groups took place at departments where participants work. In the cases where I ran focus groups the head of department was notified of the date and place of the activity. For interviews I informed the head of departments about the research and potential participants. In all cases the names of research respondents were not disclosed to their superiors. Participants were willing to speak despite my reservation that they may not be comfortable speaking to researcher belonging to the same organisation. At all ranks participants were ready to speak; sometimes with noticeable zeal. It was however the middle and junior ranks, and women alone, focus groups which were the more open compared to senior ranks. Because all field work was carried out in Khartoum there was ease in reaching research participants. During this time I only provided snacks and drinks for one focus group. All other participants were happy to host me in their work space and provided me with drinks. Of note is that the women alone focus group proved especially productive as they had the chance to focus on their own issues within the overall police issues which was unusual because of their unique status in the Sudan police and also because of the nature of their responses which is considered to be unique to this group alone.

Background to respondents and common responses

In addition to the three levels of rank represented, the respondents came from a variety of personal backgrounds in relation to geographical regions, tribes, gender, work experience, years of services, family economic background, role and age groups. Additionally, although they were based in Khartoum at the time of the interviews and focus groups, they had diverse work experience and

had served in many other states of Sudan. Examples of departments and roles include: Headquarters; State Command Team; Criminal Investigation; Wildlife Protection; Traffic and Road Policing; General Patrol; Administration; Police Station Command; International Relations; Reformatory for Child Offenders; Popular and Community Policing (PCPD); Training Authority; Police Hospital; and Control Room (CCTV observations). Moreover, the respondents' length of police service was varied and ranged from 5 to 34 years.

Most of the senior officer and middle ranking officers had worked in conflict zones, but none of the junior ranking officers or the female respondents had conflict area experience. This is due to conditions of service i.e. it the norm in Sudan police that female officers do not work in operational posts or away from family residence unless they chose otherwise and NCOs from the rank of warrant officer down to private are recruited and deployed in the same state (in this case, Khartoum), but they can be transferred to different area or department within that state whereas officers from the rank of lieutenant up to major general can be posted anywhere according to the state or department they working in.

The vast majority of respondents welcomed the opportunity to discuss the research issues and, consequently was very open and candid in most areas. A few were reluctant to discuss issues of corruption or the misconduct of managers. Additionally, one of the potential female respondents agreed to be interviewed but when the time arrived she seemed reluctant and postponed twice. Researcher understanding of this is part of the conservative culture of the Sudanese society therefore the potential female police respondent felt shy to be interviewed in private. Despite reassurances regarding confidentiality and

informed consent, she still seemed hesitant resulting in the researcher cancelling the interview in line with ethical considerations.

Research outline

Chapter one has outlined the thesis by providing research overview, research questions and the justification of research and outlined the methodology followed along with its challenges. Chapter two seeks to lay out the wider concepts of peace studies and liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict contexts, its features, agendas and critics, including the specific components that aim to achieve peace through building liberal institutions adopting democracy and upholding the rule of law and vindication of human rights. It will then examine the centrality of the police to liberal peacebuilding and development which is advocated by peace builders, donor countries and the United Nations and how police reform is becoming a more integral part of peace accords across the globe and explore this further within peace missions analysing the roles of both international and the domestic police and to what extent are these roles complement and/or contradict each other. It will also provide analysis on how community policing is introduced within the framework of the liberal peace and how it has been conceived by the different actors.

Chapter three provides an overview of Sudan's history, politics and the relationship between the Sudanese Police and the ruling regimes, exploring the doctrinal and operational philosophy of the Sudanese Police through its composition, mandate, management and practice. To achieve this it will seek to explain its colonial legacy as a paramilitary oppressive state apparatus that was tasked with maintaining order and repressing political opponents of the state. Then finally it assesses the consequent challenges facing the Sudanese Police.

Chapter four introduces the conflicts in Sudan which started in 1955 and its ramifications since then. Using secondary sources it presents the consensus view on its root causes as well as its development from local conflicts into one that attracted the attention of the international community. It will also assess the peace process in the country after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 between the Sudan government and the rebels of South Sudan and other peace accords in the different parts of the country that ensued. It will offer an overview of the roles of the Sudanese police in the peace process and how that role was shaped by, and reflected in, the different peace agreements.

Chapter five evaluates the extremely diverse legal mandate of the Sudanese Police which extends far beyond the traditional police duty of maintaining order and fighting of crime. Then it presents an analysis of the leadership and management style of the Sudanese Police and their effect on the management, shaping and influencing of the performance of the police and finally testing the mechanisms in place for Sudanese Police to observe human rights, uphold the rule of law and maintain accountability and transparency. These are then calibrated against the international trends in leadership and management and police practice in some parts of the world and finally examining the impact of these systems in the Sudanese police role in peacebuilding.

Chapter six maps out the role of the Sudanese Police training system and its complexity. It seeks to provide understanding of the method of the training which tends to be militarised, suitable for a paramilitary police force. It then focuses on the training resources and how they are managed to deliver training for the different levels of the police personnel at the basic training stage as well

as the on the job training. Finally it will evaluate the recruitment approach in this diverse society. This will be contrasted with multi-national training partnerships with other countries and peacebuilding roles.

In chapter seven, community policing as a comparatively new emerging policing approach will be examined. It provides an analysis of the origins and development of this policing concept as well as the different perspectives of community policing in different contexts. The Sudan community policing is evaluated against internationally recognised practise. Then the relationship between the Sudanese policing approaches and community policing finally are examined to identify possible links between community policing in Sudan and peacebuilding efforts in the country.

And finally chapter eight will build on the analysis and research results to draw conclusions and identify knowledge gaps to establish reasonable grounds for further research in the area. It will also offer some relevant lessons for policy that could be used for future reform.

The next chapter provides account of literature review which represents the conceptual frame work that underpins this study.

Chapter Two

Police Forces in International Context

Introduction

This chapter explores existing literature on police and policing at international level and their relation to peacebuilding process. A critical assessment of police operating in post-war contexts, in particular the United Nations Police, and domestic forces in conflict settings is also offered. In particular I investigate the extent to which existing research presents an effective evaluation of the roles of international and domestic police forces in peacebuilding. Literature on liberal peacebuilding, the development, the challenges and the critique of liberal peacebuilding forms part of the broad context of the discussion in this chapter. I first explore the expectations and critical evaluations of peacebuilding itself. Lastly community policing *per se* is emerging as the key policing method endorsed by the United Nations and adopted by most of donor countries in post conflict settings, and there is also an emerging literature on this specifically as will be seen in this chapter.

Liberal Peace and its Critics

The 'liberal peace debate' relates, broadly speaking, to a discussion of the theory and practice of intervention in poor post-war countries by international institutions, supported by or alongside wealthy Western governments and NGOs, in order to stabilise, develop and generally free them from the scourge of war."(Sabaratnam, 2011,p.9)

During the Cold War there were two conflicting ideologies were dominating the world politics and influencing the United Nations interventions in conflict areas under the umbrella of 'peace keeping missions' : capitalism and communism.

At the end of the Cold War, and the corresponding collapse of the Soviet Union, international peace actors – led by the western powers – started to launch ‘peacebuilding’ missions. This implied that peace would be built on the basis of liberal principles of democracy, role of law and free market (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Heathershaw, 2008). In this context, technical assistance was provided to war-torn countries to achieve stable peace and a democratic system. In comparison, the traditional peacekeeping missions (before the end of the Cold War) more or less abided by their mandate of not interfering with internal issues of the host countries. The major shift in UN peace operations took place when the peace missions were mandated to interfere with internal issues of the host states. In his 1992 policy statement known as An Agenda for Peace, the Secretary General of the UN Boutros Ghali outlined the three categories of peace operations: peacekeeping; peace enforcement, in which missions are authorised to use force in circumstances other than self-defence; and post-conflict peacebuilding. He defined peacebuilding as “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace” (Paris, 2006, Boutros-Ghali, 1992b). In post conflict peacebuilding missions peace builders interfere with diverse sets of activities: from drafting laws, reforming the security and justice sector, monitoring elections and enforcing peace-terms between the former combatants (Paris, 2006, Boutros-Ghali, 1992b). The diversity of tasks in peacebuilding missions led to the involvement of a variety of organizations. Some were within the UN, such as the United Nations’ Development Programme (UNDP), whilst others included: regional organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSEC), individual states such as the United States of America and NGOs from the western world all coming to help in the peacebuilding efforts. Between 1989 to 1999 thirty three

missions of this type were launched (Paris, 2006,p17). In some cases the UN missions themselves conducted police functions, as in Namibia, and in other countries the UN took responsibility for running the affairs of the country, as in Cambodia, and in others they were authorised to use fire not only for self-defence but to enforce peace, such as in Somalia and Bosnia (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006 , Barash, 2000).

In his theoretical argument to conceptualise peace, Richmond (2006) identifies four strands of peace; victor peace where peace can sustain after the domination of one party over the other; institutional peace that brings states together to agree on possible ways of maintaining peace, an example of which is the Westphalia Treaty and the formation of the United Nations; and constitutional peace, which stems from the liberal values of democracy and the free market. He also includes the peace that emanates from civil society campaigns, especially to protect human rights, as happened when the international slave trade was abolished in the nineteenth century (Richmond,2006).

Building peace is, however, an enormously challenging task that goes far beyond the mere absence of war, to include the improvement of life and values. As war issues are so complex and difficult to understand, so the international community has found them difficult to respond to. It may well require social transformation, economic reform and beyond to achieve social justice in deeply divided societies (Barash and Webel, 2009, Rogers, 2010) although the views about what precisely is needed, and where, is often contested.

The history of the United Nations peace keeping missions can be traced back to June 1948 when the United Nations' Truce Supervision Organisation was sent

to Palestine to supervise the truce between Israel and its Arab neighbours (Barash, 2000). Peace keeping efforts by the United Nations then evolved rapidly. The first major peace keeping operation in Africa was the Congo peace mission operation (1960-1964). It was the first peace mission to be deployed in a country where the institutions of the host country were collapsing. It was also the first one to include substantial civilian elements (Barash, 2000). Furthermore it was the first operation to move from peacekeeping to peace enforcement when the Security Council authorised it to use force to end the secession of the Katanga region (Barash, 2010). According to Barash the peace keeping operation often has five pillars which are; it should be authorised by the United Nations legislative body, it has to be impartial, it should be deployed with the consent of the host country, troops have to be provided by member states contributing their military or police personnel to serve as members of a UN mission and finally the UN troops are often authorised to use force to defend themselves or in rare occasions to fulfil their mandates. Through the development of the peacebuilding operations six types of peacekeeping operations were identified and each applies to certain conflict situation and designed to address specific phase in the development of the conflict. Type one aims to prevent the eruption of a conflict by deploying UN troops upon request by one of parties to the conflict as was the case in Macedonia. The second type of peace keeping operations is that of deploying troops to help in fostering peace negotiations example of this type is Cyprus, Syria and Kashmir. A third type of peace keeping operations is often deployed after a peace accord is reached so the mission main objective would be to assist the parties in implementing the peace agreement, this is the most known type of peace keeping operations. It involves various activities all of which aim at consolidating

the peace conditions. Examples of this in Africa include Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. Operations conducted to secure delivery of humanitarian aid for the needy in conflict zones are the fourth type of the operations which was exemplified by the operations in Somalia and Bosnia. The fifth type of peace operations involve enforcement of peace, as happened in Congo when its institutions collapsed or were collapsing, and the UN intervened to attempt a solution. The sixth type of peace operations is enforcement where UN troops are deployed with a mandate to use force to compel all parties to comply with the peace accord requirements (Barash, 2000).

Peacebuilding operations developed rapidly from short-term, quick-fix operations to long-term complex ones. Where the mission mandate extends for many years it will include a variety of tasks all aiming at building peace in states devastated by wars (Sabaratnam, 2011, Opongo, 2011, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a).

Ghali's statement recognised the failure of the previous methods of peacebuilding and sets new perspectives of collective human security in which the international community is more committed to the peace. Peace that is less connected with individual powerful states' interests and goes beyond state sovereignty. In his report Ghali emphasised the UN commitment to protect human rights, especially in areas of ethnicity, religion and cultural values of ethnic minorities (Boutros-Ghali, 1992b). Furthermore an Agenda for Peace advocates for liberal peace based on democracy but with less intrusive and more dependent on preventive diplomacy and calls for using force to enforce humanitarian interventions (Peou, 2010, Boutros-Ghali, 1992a).

Intrastate conflicts present particular concerns to the international community because they affect regional and international stability and may become safe havens for criminals to operate freely, homes for terrorist groups and markets for the drug trade (Paris, 2006, Francis, 2012b). Moreover conflicts can spill over the border of neighbouring countries, as happened when the Rwandan conflict moved into Zaire (Paris, 2006). Great numbers of Sudanese refugees were reported in Chad after the escalation of violence in the western region of Darfur (Johnson, 2011). The international community may, driven by the UN charter, intervene in such situations to maintain the stability and try to eliminate any threat to the international peace (Johnson, 2011, Paris, 2006).

Paris (2006) strongly argues that the peacebuilding approach that depends on introducing the democratic principles, market economy and liberalisation, without establishing strong state institutions in post conflict countries, will have negative side effects and will not lead to stability and long lasting peace (Paris, 2006). From Angola to Mozambique to Sierra Leone to Liberia international community interventions have shown that pushing the democratic process too much and too quickly, without preparing the relevant community and drafting of necessary laws, may not improve the stability and does not necessarily lead to self-sustained peace in the country (Paris, 2006). An example of this is Angola when the election process was introduced before achieving the necessary requirements of the peace settlement the parties who are not happy with the election results resisted the process. A similar example was seen in the Balkans (Paris, 2006, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006). Paris (2006) defines peacebuilding as international military and/or civilian interventions in states aimed at creating the conditions for stable and lasting peace in the wake of civil strife while Merlingen describes peacebuilding as the “international action within

states either to prevent civil war or to rebuild peace in the aftermath of violence” (Merlingen et al 2006.p1). While both definitions recognise international interventions in states at the end of the conflict, Paris’ definition emphasises the creation of conditions for long lasting peace and this implies that the international interveners are directing their engagement with the internal context to guarantee sustainable peace.

Driven by liberal values, ethical beliefs, concern for international security, humanitarian crises, plus political and economic interests of the west, the liberal peace agenda is usually imposed in post war contexts with few or no consultations with local actors (Francis, 2012c, Tadjbakhsh, 2011). Economic interests represent key drivers for international peace builders to intervene in post-conflict contexts. For example Britain acted to secure access for British companies to invest in diamonds and other minerals in Sierra Leone and likewise led participated in a military campaign to remove Colonel Gadhafi from power which, some have argued, was motivated by their interests in Libyan oil (Francis, 2012c). The idea of transferring liberal peace principles exemplified in the form of human rights, rule of law, free market and open democracy, without building the necessary institutions or creating suitable conditions for the new ideas to grow with ample time, has gradually led the international interveners to realise that it is necessary to include internal actors in policies and actions and to be realistic about what can be achieved in the given time and circumstances (Tadjbakhsh, 2011, Richmond, Sabaratnam, 2011, Paris, 2006). Tadjbakhs (2011) highlights the lack of evidence to support the proposition that launching a peacebuilding mission necessarily produces positive results. Richmond criticises liberal peace that includes coercion to

introduce democratic values, suggesting that this itself means it is not compatible with liberal values (Richmond).

A further critique to liberal peace is that set forth by Paris, who recognises the failure of liberal peace to achieve its stated objectives, but rather than abandoning the practice he suggests that it be reformed. He criticises those who claim that liberal peace is illegitimate and suggests that they are going too far (Tadjbakhsh, 2011, Paris and ebrary, 2004). Another critique of the implementation of liberal peace is that it tends to adopt top-down approaches and in so doing the intervener undermines or even destroys the local capacity and institutions (Richmond, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006b). Being wary about bypassing the local actors and the resultant issue of local ownership, the international intervener came to recognise the need to communicate with the local civil society, NGOs and the state in a more bottom-up approach. This approach also needs to involve the state in what has become known as the 'hybrid approach' between international and local approaches (Richmond, Sabaratnam and Meera, 2013, Mac Ginty, 2011).

In a further critique to liberal peace Tadjbakhsh (2011) highlights Paris' assessment of some cases where it has been imposed successfully in a coercive manner, pointing out that there is not sufficient evidence to support the view that this approach could be successfully transferred to other situations. To correct the mistakes of past liberal peace approaches which bypassed local actors including the state, contemporary peace builders tend to see that state building should be part of the liberal peace projects in the belief that this will lead to building effective institutions that can support the process (Tadjbakhsh, 2011, Francis, 2012c, Paris, 2006). Doyle (2012) argues, as an advocate of

liberal peace, that despite criticism of the liberal peacebuilding it proved that states with liberal values are more capable of maintaining peace among them and with other countries. Even so the liberal states themselves have histories of invading other countries and the former expansionist colonial policy adopted by especially Britain and France during the nineteenth century, Doyle still believes that the liberal world composed now of around seventy states has an outstanding record of peace compared to the illiberal world (Doyle, 2012). Richmond contests this assumption and wonders if the end of 56 civil wars in the last decade of the twentieth century actually led to durable peace. Richmond is particularly cautious of using military intervention to make peace (Richmond, 2005). Peacebuilding, as MacGinty (2011) puts it, is after all failing to address the root causes of conflict, in particular development and equity and it rather offers problem-solving approach for complex issues (Mac Ginty, 2011,p.24).

The debate continues between those who believe in the liberal peace agenda as a solution to problems of war torn societies and others who think that models of liberal peace do not often lead to sustainable peace, and are rather a western agenda which is not appropriate in all settings and is often implemented inappropriately. The need for reform at least is increasingly recognised, particularly in the way that they are designed and implemented. In particular there is a growing consensus on the need to involve the local recipients in determining what they need, and in building effective institutions and recognising the need for a phased approach to achieve lasting peace. The literature also refers to some of the negative impacts of imposing a peacebuilding model that undermines state sovereignty, introduces alien cultures, and raises issues of power and dominance, although some authors

suggest that all of these issues can in theory be mitigated by effective means of communication and co-ordination with local actors (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006b).

The western powers which have dominated liberal peace interventions are said by critics to have often acted out of political and economic motivations (Mac Ginty, 2011). They now face a major challenge from emerging donor countries (Tellidis, 2013). The BRICS group composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are heavily investing in peacebuilding and development by establishing their own intervention agenda that does not necessarily comply with the western ones and by-passes the UN and other international organisations. Some of these countries are keener on development as a means of peacebuilding and tend to engage more with states and societies. Oil rich countries like Iran and the Gulf Arab countries are also investing in this arena, transferring their understanding of aid, development and peacebuilding. In this regard the role of Qatar in fostering the Darfur peace process in Sudan and pumping huge amounts of money to rebuild the region is but one example (Richmond, Tellidis, 2013, Barakat and Sultan, 2012, Movement, 2011).

The following section will explore the development and the role of police in peacebuilding operations.

Police and Peacebuilding

Deploying police personnel to operate in post war contexts outside their homeland is an old practice. Police from the United States were deployed in both Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War to serve in a Peacebuilding role. Following that the UN police took part in peace keeping missions since the 1960s (Greener, 2011a, Brodgen, 2005). Later the UN

police, first named CIVPOL, and changed to UNPOL in 2005, witnessed a rapid growth in numbers from 35 in 1988 to 14000 in 2010 (Greener, 2011a). This reflects the growing need for police to serve in post-conflict zones in recent times. However, the police role in Peacebuilding was not recognised by the United Nations until relatively late. According to Merlingen et al, (2006) that delay was due to the connection of police with violent oppression in some parts of the world (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). By the mid-1990s the UN recognised the importance of the police in peacebuilding and started to consider police as key component of Peacebuilding missions. Following this development a mission of UN police was deployed in Haiti and Eastern Slavonia. Then a major shift in police role was cited when UN police personnel were deployed in East Timor and Kosovo in 1999 to undertake executive policing functions (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a)

Moreover many observers agree that properly delivered policing functions and services are crucial to achieving social justice and thus contributing to the issue of peace and security among communities (Call, 2007, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). A representative police organisation that is bound by a robust code of conduct; which communicates and collaborates with the communities it serves; and has reasonable measures of accountability (including acceptable standards of transparency) will put that agency in a leading position to enhance the social cohesion of the communities it serves, which is a key element of Peacebuilding. The role of the police in maintaining internal security in post-conflict countries is vital to moving forward from 'negative peace' to 'positive peace'. This role has progressively grown in recent decades as police forces become more and more involved in peace keeping operations to the extent that the term police peacekeeping is becoming familiar

among the officials of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) (Francis, 2012b, Durch, 2003, Greener, 2011b).

It is often mentioned by the UN that the United Nations Police play multiple roles in Peacebuilding within UN missions in post conflict contexts to help keep the order and build the peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). It is now increasingly recognised that domestic police forces must also be recognised in Peacebuilding or there will be a diminished prospect of long lasting peace and ownership (Greener, 2009b, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a).

Kemp and Fry (2004) pointed out the importance of police involvement at the very beginning of each conflict as government's responses tend to use the police to either oppress or contain the conflict through legal measures that could be specially designed to control the leaders of the conflict (Smith, 2011). According to Smith (2011), when internal conflict erupts in any part of the country governments usually have two options, to make political concessions by entering into negotiations or adopt coercive policy to crush the conflict and in this regard police is often used by governments to conduct surveillance, face demonstrations or pursue members of the rebel groups (William, 2011, Byman, 2002, Smith, 2011).

Citizens generally tend to accept police involvement in conflict management even when the composition of the police as diverse and representative organisation of the whole society is under question (Smith, 2011). Perhaps where this is the case it can be attributed to the law enforcement role with which the police are entrusted. The imbalanced composition of police organisations in deeply divided societies is sometimes seen as a form of injustice within particular societies, that could itself lead to conflict, and

therefore any political deal that usually involves power sharing will have an impact on the police, as experienced in contexts like Northern Ireland, Kosovo, and Rwanda (Gorani, 2005, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Paris, 2006). Peace agreements which end conflicts are also likely to include provisions to reform the police as is the case in Sudan, El Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa, Croatia, Haiti, Mozambique and Northern Ireland (Movement, 2005, Johnson, 2011, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Stedman et al., 2002, Hall and McClintock, 1999). Enshrining police reform in peace accords may indicate the parties' genuine commitment to fully implement the peace agreement provisions as well as recognition of the important role of the police in the era that follows the peace deal. In cases where police reform is not covered in the peace settlement parties more often renege on their commitments to achieve lasting peace, as exemplified by Sri Lanka, Western Sahara, Liberia and Sierra Leone's Conakry Agreement (Stedman et al., 2002). It is thus understandable as stated by Francis (2012) that the police force is crucial to stabilization and investment in transitional societies (Francis, 2012a). Also the police role is said to be equally crucial in securing the safe transition from war to peace (Oakley et al., 1998).

Police as defined in chapter one are more likely state department where government would enact the laws, set the budget and appoint the police leadership. Therefore history suggests that police are almost always political due to their connections with governments and can on t occasions exert leverage to influence the internal politics or get influenced by the ruling regime (Hills, 2000, Stedman et al., 2002). It is in light of police affiliation with governments that Hills (2000) asserts that when the independence of a police institution is questioned the police will inevitably be affected during civil conflicts.

This autonomy of the police is derived from the separation of powers within the democratic state system where the legislative, the judiciary and the executive are constitutionally separated (Hills, 2000). That can help protect them from political influence and enhance the role they play in Peacebuilding (Hills, 2000). This situation sometimes leads to the police becoming a target for rebel groups in conflict zones because of their affiliation with the political system. This may become even more acute when the police force is mainly composed of one ethnic group. The greatest losses occur in the police force when their stations are targeted the police officers attacked and official records of crime and criminals are damaged (Willoughby, 2002, Jackson, 2010). This is true in the context of Sudan, especially the Darfur region where police and police stations were constantly targeted by insurgence group.

“Demand for civilian police operations dealing with intra-State conflict is likely to remain high on any list of requirements for helping a war-torn society restore conditions for social, economic and political stability”. (Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000 P. 20)

Recognising the crucial role of the police in Peacebuilding, the panel on United Nations peace operations headed by Lakhdar Brahimi reported in August 2000 that United Nations police which come only second to military component in each UN mission, should be given more resources, training and support to undertake the policing functions usually required by UN police, which include, but is not limited to, monitoring, training and advising the local police in war-torn countries. The panel presented a set of recommendations to enhance the efficiency of the UN police in post-conflict and conflict-prone zones. It pointed out that rapid deployment requires readily prepared units within the contributing

states to be deployed within a short time of the UN Security Council's mandate. For this the panel urged the contributing countries to establish pools of well-trained police officers ready to be deployed at short notice. The panel also recommended that for the purpose of achieving common policing perceptions, contributing countries should enter into joint training programmes at the regional level. Furthermore the panel recommended a single point of contact to be designated within the contributing government's structure as a body responsible for managing the process of training, selecting and assigning the local police to serve as UN police. Moreover the panel acknowledged the difficulties experienced by contributing countries to send the right police numbers without compromising their local policing needs (Peou, 2010, Durch, 2003).

Some of the issues undermining UN police efficiency highlighted by the panel are related to the conflicting policing background of the UN police members; the short term of six months rotating period; and misplacing police officers by asking them to carry out tasks beyond their policing experience for example assigning police officer from training background to do operational tasks or *vice versa* (Durch, 2003, Peou, 2010). Finally it has been pointed out by the panel that member states often face less political pressure from their own constituencies authorising their police to work with the UN compared to the pressure when the military is involved. Perhaps because the military is usually tasked with operational duties where the risk of human casualty is high while the police are mainly tasked with less risky law enforcement duties. To overcome the issue of police officers serving with the UN for only two years, and the restricting condition of UN recruiting system that only allows the organisation to take active serving police officers, the panel extended its

recommendation to permit the recruitment of retired police officers with previous UN experience (Durch, 2003). Despite the UN understanding of the importance of the police role in peacebuilding it seems to take a top down approach that does not place enough focus on the role of the domestic police in the country concerned as the seen in the panel recommendation the role of the domestic police seems to be overlooked as the recommendations were solely for the UN personnel.

Following the UN as the leading organisation in the field of Peacebuilding is the European Union (EU) the effort of which is mapped out in Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2006), who noted that, since the 1990s greater attention has been given to the police in peacebuilding (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). This fact, according to them, has been underpinned by two factors. First, is the important role of the police in the Peacebuilding process and second, the role of police in the conflict as the police have often been part of the civil conflicts by either being composed mainly of one ethnicity or being used by the government to repress opponents (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). Recognising the role of the police in Peacebuilding the EU launched police missions to help restore order, reform or build police services in Bosnia, Macedonia, DRC, Iraq and Palestine. These missions also aimed at disseminating best European policing practice (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). The authors examined the power relation embedded in the police aid programmes and the fact that these programmes introduce norms and systems of the donor countries without allowing the local communities in war-torn countries to develop their own. Ignoring the role of the domestic police in the peacebuilding process they assert, may lead to making things worse (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006b). Peacebuilding through EU policing missions, the authors articulate, is not only

about improving the life of target communities. It contains some elements of dominance and authority over others. In summary they denote the potential negative impact of these missions on local structures. The authors identified two main pitfalls connected to police missions on the ground. These are the way they engage with local police and how they address the host communities. They then suggested that local police to be subjected to reform to come up to international standards and that community policing be introduced to engage local communities in drawing up policing plans and determining policing priorities in their areas (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006b).

Police reform in peacebuilding setting according to Holm et al (2000) is often approached through international support provided through 1) international and regional organizations 2) UN organizations and 3) bilateral support (Holm and Eide, 2000c). The role of police in Peacebuilding has grown since the first UN police mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1964 until the UN Sudan mission in 2005. Greener (2009) provides a full overview of international policing from the first major international police-led peace mission in the Solomon Islands and up to the executive policing missions in both East Timor and Kosovo where the police mission has actually carried out police tasks in these countries (Greener, 2009a). Holm and Eide (2000) emphasise the need for a clearly defined police role within all relevant peace operation mandates, besides strong and competent political backing and adequate personnel, supplemented by sufficient logistical and administrative support. The authors stress the significance of political will in bilateral support which is essential but not sufficient for the success. In addition, there should not be any opposition to police reform in both the donor and the recipient country (Holm and Eide, 2000b). In relation to what the police do in peacebuilding missions Oakley et al.,

(Oakley et al 1998) identified three types of international policing: First; monitoring and supervision of local law enforcement organizations: second; training and mentoring local police force: and third; on rare occasions actually performing law enforcement functions. They then turn to evaluate the international police missions which they describe as being established for relatively short periods of time, whereas effective police work needs long periods of stability, in contrast to the military missions which need less time to achieve their targets. They conclude that the only option left is to ensure that the local police are either reformed or recreated. Finally the authors decisively state that providing security and stability is never a short term task and good coordination between the different actors is important for the success in achieving long term peace(Oakley et al., 1998). Some authors further argue that the renowned community policing approach, which is now internationally recognised as the most effective policing approach, cannot be performed by international police. Local police are required, who understand the context and speak the language, and refer to the example of translators who are locally hired but are not trusted by the local community, especially if they come from different backgrounds or political parties. They go on to state that on some occasions the international police train local police for a very short time, which is not sufficient to produce competent and effective police officers. The authors highlight the crucial role of the police in securing the transfer from war to peace, as the trust that the police gain during that sensitive period will assist in building durable peace (Greener, 2009b, Greener, 2011a, Holm and Eide, 2000b, Call, 2007).

Greener (2009) stresses a similar point and highlights it with a description of the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have further served to demonstrate

the significance of police in international missions, particularly because the military forces do not give much attention to maintaining public order and crime control.

Whilst advocating the need for international police support to peace keeping and Peacebuilding, literature highlights some of the problems that may be encountered when international policing missions operate in a peacekeeping or Peacebuilding role. Holm and Eide (2000) further stress that police organizations are difficult to change as such change is connected with individual and organizational interests, as witnessed in Salvador and Guatemala police reform programmes, where police have made great efforts to impede the reform process. They also state that plans, which are designed to serve political purposes, are often difficult for police organizations to implement if any reform agendas are to be achieved. Greener (2009) also argues that the use of police professionals from one country to police another has become a very sensitive issue raising the questions of sovereignty, authority and transferring of an alien culture to another country.

Holm and Eide (2000) add that because international policing personnel are recruited from many countries they may not have the same training background or views about operational procedure. In many countries there are a huge number of police organizations; each of them adopting different policing methods. Therefore it can even be challenging for police individuals to fit into another local force within the same country, let alone fit into a national or federal policing system, . For example, the US has no general federal police; rather it has 17,400 different police forces. Greener (2009) further asserts that many international policing institutions simply introduce political agendas or

values that are alien to the country or region in question. Some international policing is even done by contractors and/or consultants recruited by international organizations or governments adding further difficulties for them to work in harmony with each other (Holm and Eide, 2000a, Greener, 2011a).

Within the broader context of liberal Peacebuilding international donor bodies introduce police reform to improve security in post-conflict and war-torn countries. In this context Francis (2012) links the Peacebuilding process to development with the police playing a central role in that endeavour. He raises the concern of deploying the police in fragile security situations in the aftermath of conflict, when the security context is still more military in nature, and far from being within the ability of local police forces to manage. He also warned against the consequences of using the military to police such situations, or deploying the police to deal with them, which may lead to the police becoming more militarised (Francis, 2012b).

Greener (2011) provides a detailed analysis of the growing demand for police to take part in peacekeeping roles, and he examines the challenge to maintain standardization alongside the numbers required to fulfil the increasing demand for policing, and how police who are traditionally trained to undertake domestic roles have to cope with expeditionary role abroad. Greener (2011) underlined the contribution of international policing to liberal Peacebuilding as being of great significance because of the set skills and ethos that police possess compared with other agencies. She also noticed that the status of police has risen compared to the military as national institutions that can have external missions within the peacebuilding efforts around the world. Greener also pointed out that the full potential of police in peacebuilding zones cannot be

achieved without realizing the right balance between international and local police needs (Greener, 2011b, Greener, 2011a).

Despite the critique to police interventions in external Peacebuilding interventions, which is part of the broader critique to liberal Peacebuilding it represents strong support to fill a security gap that national governments in violence-prone context are usually unable to bridge due to either lack of funding or incapacity. Police in fragile and post-conflict contexts could be totally collapsed, corrupt, brutal or incompetent so the need will raise for external assistance usually through peace missions (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Grabosky, 2009).

Oakley et al., (1998) examined the two different cultures and roles of both the police and the military. Stating that the military think that police work is less prestigious, even within the military the military police are considered to be of lower status than, for example, the airborne and the combat soldier. Soldiers are trained to be tough and police are trained to be flexible, is the stereotype. Soldiers also fear to lose their fighting capabilities and spirit by engaging in peace operations. They conclude that there seems to be an existing contradiction between peace keeping operations and military professionalism (Oakley et al., 1998). It is also noticeable throughout the literature that the difference in role and mentality between the police and the military is defining their roles in peacebuilding and that the police are well placed to better participate in building long lasting and durable peace (Bayley, 2011, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). Equally (Francis 2012) warns against using the two organisations interchangeably because the two were trained for different tasks and any of them is not adequate to do the other's job (Francis, 2012a).

Lutterbeck (2004) observed that the dividing line between the police and military in post- cold war era has become blurred as police are becoming more militarised (Lutterbeck, 2004b,p.46). This, he explains, is due to the increasing Paramilitary and Gendarmerie units in many countries with heavy weaponry. In reality police would not be able to operate in fragile peace environment unless they are able to protect themselves, as stated earlier in this section and later in chapter three. As previously mentioned in this section international actors are also faced with some contentious issues when doing policing in post conflict contexts. One of the most challenging issues is that dealing with the police and doing policing is a sensitive matter closely related to the sovereignty of the state. Therefore international police missions need the legal framework that gives them legitimacy. This often stems from three consecutive processes; mission mandate, which is passed by the security council, the agreement of force status which is concluded between the host country and the mission, and the memorandum of understanding that international police representatives had to reach with the local police to ensure access and cooperation (Hansen, 2002,p.80).

The Relevance of Police Recruitment and Training to Peacebuilding

As Call (2008) points out, state building is often crucial to Peacebuilding. State building entails building of state institutions especially throughout the public finance, security and justice sector (Call and Wyeth, 2008,p.61). It is within the security and justice sectors that police will fit into the state building project. The suitability of police for Peacebuilding contexts was reflected in a study by Galtung conducted on Norwegian members of the Lebanon and Congo UN missions. When he asked the members of the missions who were soldiers on

what is needed to better prepare them for doing their job, they asked for better police training (Galtung, 1976, Curran, 2010, Anderson and Killingray, 1992). In their report the international panel on the United Nations peace operations headed by Lakhdar Brahimi, the panel after highlighting the increase need for UN police then emphasised the importance of training as the key element to prepare them for future roles. For that purpose the panel urged countries to establish regional centres to conduct the training. Peacebuilding according to the panel, includes *inter alia* integrating of former combatants and training of the police (Durch, 2003). Police training to some extent is not viewed by international actors as a matter of importance for the development of police in post war conflict (Gorani, 2005). Police training is often connected with Peacebuilding efforts driven by the international community, especially when the entire police organisation is disbanded at the end of civil conflict as is the case in Liberia in 2003 or dissolved as in Rwanda in 1994 (Francis, 2012b,p.20). In such cases a complete process of recruitment, selection and training for the new police will be required with new laws and regulations to be introduced. In other cases such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Northern Ireland the rules governing the selection and training had to be reviewed to suit the proposed Peacebuilding process (Paris, 2006, Call, 2007, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006). Police reform is also becoming increasingly an integral part of the Peacebuilding process, which means that behaviour and practice of policing has to be changed (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Francis, 2012b). That change can only be achieved through delivery of effective, tailored and relevant training. An imperative aspect of Peacebuilding and training is that in most cases the international community have the upper-hand and the leading role in the process with limited or no involvement of the local actors thus the

programmes produced are most likely to suffer two shortcomings; first they may lack the relevance and the suitability for the local context and second, these programmes will be difficult to sustain since they by-passed the local actors throughout the different stages as they are neither involved nor empowered through a vision of local ownership right at the start of the Peacebuilding process (Donais and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces., 2008, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Paris, 2004).

To prepare police for peacebuilding roles, adequate training that covers the most relevant Peacebuilding issues that often emerge at the end of civil conflict is indispensable. In post conflict settings issues of human rights, accountability and community policing are of especially necessary for the police to aware of through quality training. The United Nations through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is developing standardized training for all member states to use, moreover the UN is also developing a training curriculum for pre-deployment training for UN Police (Haberfeld et al., 2012).

Defining community policing: the international concept

The Kenya police service act define community policing in article 2(1) as; “the approach to policing that recognises the voluntary participation of the local community in the maintenance of peace and which recognises that the police need to be responsive to the communities and their needs, its key element being joint problem identification and problem solving while respecting the different responsibilities the police and the public have in the field of crime prevention and maintaining order” (Government, 2011).

Community policing, as stated earlier in chapter one, is a relatively new policing concept that has not yet taken the shape of a defined model, but it is accepted

as a paradigm shift from one professional form of reactive policing to a proactive community oriented one (Wisler et al., 2009, 2009, Francis, 2012b). It is worth reiterating that when Sir Robert Peel established the London Metropolitan Police in 1829, he set forth a number of principles, one of which could be considered the seed of community policing: “the police are the public and the public are the police”. But, for a number of reasons, the police in the UK and other countries did not regard relationship with community as the central concept for police service (Newburn, 2008, Wisler et al., 2009, Verma et al., 2013). Literature on community policing shows that there still no common definition of the concept and seems like it is being understood differently in different contexts (Chávez, 2012a, Grabosky, 2009b). Nevertheless two definitions seem to come close to what community policing is perceived today. Skolnick and Bayley cited by Palmer (2012) define community policing as “community policing should be said to exist only when new programs are undertaken that raise the level of public participation in maintenance of public order”. (Palmer et al., 2012,p.30) Stipak (1994) also cited by Palmer defines community policing as follows ”management strategy that promotes the joint responsibility of citizens and police for community safety through working partnership and interpersonal contacts (Palmer et al., 2012,p.32)” Community policing is also defined in terms of the thematic aspects that it covers philosophical, strategic, tactical and organizational dimension. The philosophical dimension which other researchers call ideological refers to the core ideas behind the community policing approach. The strategic dimension means translating community policing method into practical programmes that can be implemented; this dimension is also called programmatic; Detailed plans to address the practice and behaviors of police that are based on the community

policing methods is what has been termed as tactical dimension or pragmatic approach. And finally the organizational dimension or what others term as organizational structure is about transforming the structural, management and information to suit the community policing philosophy (Palmer et al., 2012,p.33). Dictionary of Policing define community policing as “centralized system of strong two-way communication between the police and the local community who identify priority and have leading role in determining the relevant and acceptable solutions for their problems” (Newburn and Neyroud, 2008,p.40)

The move toward communities through partnerships has resulted in contemporary community policing being introduced by many countries, especially in the developed world, and it has been advocated by nearly all international Peacebuilding and United Nations missions in the recent years as the right approach to policing for post-conflict countries (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). Consequently, it has been implemented in a variety of different forms in many different countries, resulting in many academics and practitioners defining the concept of community policing from different angles, such as the institutional approach and the philosophical approach. For example, according to the USA Office of Community Oriented Policing Service (COPS) (2007), reducing crime and social disorder is the focus of community policing. This is achieved through service delivery, which includes aspects of regular law enforcement, prevention, crime problem solving, as well as community engagement and partnership. In the view of the COPS community policing strikes a balance between traditional reactive responses and preventative, proactive-problem solving, specifically targeted on the causes of crime and disorder. COPS also stress that community policing is essentially about partnerships between the police and the citizens and that partnership

should include organizational change at the police side. They view the organizational change as “The alignment of organizational management, structure, personnel and information systems to support community partnership and proactive problem solving” according to COP organizational transformation represents one of three key components of community policing beside community partnership and problem solving (Justice, 2007,p.1).

Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1998) take a philosophical approach and stress that community policing represents an aspiration to establish partnerships between the people and the police to overcome contemporary challenges to security, such as social and physical disorder, crime and the fear of crime and promoting racial harmony in order to enhance the overall quality of life (Trojanowicz, 1991). Tilley (2008) add that Community Policing in a way is about the importance of policing being related more to the people and their communities, rather than purely the policing of the community. It aspires to improve the quality of life, aiming to solve community problems alongside the community and by the community (Mulcahy, 2008, Tilley, 2008).

Manning (2003) bases his definition on the application of community policing, stating that visibility and locally-based interventions become the operational role of the police personnel, to ensure that disorder and crime are managed properly (Manning, 2003). The community supports this operational policing role with information, feedback and, when appropriate, with actions such as joint patrolling. Additionally, the police should respond to all community concerns (Manning, 2003).

In 1994, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice (1994) observed that community policing embodies two major components, which include community partnerships and problem solving. Problem solving, in this

context, involves diagnosing effective and applicable antidotes to glaring community ills. The Bureau stressed that the involvement of local authorities, schools, churches/mosques, social agencies and business groups in crime prevention partnerships with the police was necessary for the success of community policing. This does not mean taking away the power of the police but rather a relief to some of the most difficult challenges of security the police have been battling with. Community partnerships, in essence, must begin with proper communication, which facilitates the building of trust between the people and the police, making the use of force unnecessary and useless in most cases (Justice, 2007).

Kratcoski et al., (1995) explain that in addition to the techniques that are employed to identify community problems and deal with them, community policing is also a philosophy. It also involves listening to, and responding to, the concerns of community members. The term may vary from one context to another depending on the technique and method employed but it all focuses on getting members of police personnel to interact with community members in order to address the safety issues of that community (Kratcoski and Dukes, 1995). In a later analysis on the concept of community policing, Allendar (2004) agreed with Kratcoski and Dukes by stating that community policing represents a philosophy of full time service, and personalized policing in which a particular police officer patrols and works in an area on a permanent basis from a decentralized place, working in a proactive partnership with citizens to identify and solve problems. Driven by the growing policing needs of their communities and the rising cost of the police work in a world that is suffering financial difficulties, police organisations around the world realised that they cannot do

the police job alone, found a practical and effective solution in the community policing method (Greener, 2009b, Verma et al., 2013, Wisler et al., 2009).

Community Policing is the method of moving away from the traditional reactive policing to the proactive method. Community policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing are all elements of the same policing approach, which the British police tried to adopt in the mid-eighties to improve the police-community relations which was thought to be unsatisfactory, as the next paragraphs describe in more detail (Newburn, 2008, Wisler et al., 2009).

Researchers have suggested that the reform era in government in the UK, which began in the early 1990's, coupled with a nationwide move toward professionalization, resulted in the separation of the police from the community (Wisler et al., 2009). For example, police managers assigned officers to rotating shifts and moved them frequently from one geographical location to another to eliminate corruption. Police management in the UK until the 1990s also instituted a policy of centralized control, designed to ensure compliance with standard operating procedures and to encourage a professional aura of impartiality (Wisler et al., 2009). This and the failure of traditional policing method to police the increasing ethnically diverse communities especially in London has led to the introduction of community policing (Wisler et al., 2009). The great numbers of black and Asian people who started to arrive and settle in the UK led to confrontations between them and the local indigenous communities in the middle of the twentieth century. In some areas of the UK, particularly the larger cities, the police failed to adopt a fair handling of the these events and adopted a discriminating policing style against the black communities and, at times, they resorted to fabricating and planting evidence,

as well as being brutal to citizens (Wisler et al., 2009,p.151). In other areas, the police had little or no training about black and Asian cultures, resulting in the use of 'institutional racism'. This disharmony reached the peak in the riots of 1981 when violent confrontations between the police and black youth took place in several cities in the UK. Lord Scarman conducted a review into the police behaviour during the Brixton events in London and highlighted the need for the police to develop relationship with the communities they were serving. A key part of his recommendations were the need for police personnel to undergo training on community relations. Lord Scarman's recommendations were adopted and thus laid the foundation of British community policing (Wisler et al., 2009). Community policing was first piloted in the UK by the Kent police whose officers and staff shifted their focus from the crime to focusing on the criminals and their activities. This method was then officially introduced and adopted by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Her Majesty's Inspectorate Constabulary (HMIC) and the Home Office in the UK (Wisler et al., 2009, Newburn and Neyroud, 2008). Community policing was then formally introduced as policing approach to be adopted by the police in Britain when enshrined into the crime and disorder act of 1998 (Chávez, 2012a,p.6).

Whilst community policing is not precisely defined all researchers and practitioners agree that it embraces the basic idea of involving the community in policing issues to build better relations between the police and the communities and establish partnership for better police service delivery.

Community policing; ambitious policing approach

As stated previously, community policing is a product of political reform connected to democratic values, it is as well a result of police reform in particular fixing police community relations and making the police more

transparent, accountable and less corrupt. But what are the objectives that community policing is meant to achieve? . Tilley (2008) quoted John Alderson when he laid out the objectives of community policing as follows: to contribute to liberty, equality and fraternity; to help reconcile freedom with security and to uphold the law; to uphold and protect human rights and thus help to achieve human dignity; to dispel criminogenic social conditions through co-operative social action; to help create trust in communities; to strengthen security and feelings of security; to investigate, detect and active the prosecution of crimes; to facilitate free movement along public thoroughfares; to curb public disorder and deal with crises and help those in distress involving other agencies where needed (Tilley, 2008,p.376). This seems to be a comprehensive list of objective which almost resembles common police objectives. Its ambitious and far reaching goals reflect the hope put on community policing to achieve and solve the ever challenging tasks that police across the globe are struggling with. In their attempt to explain why community policing is necessary to introduce in the form of community problem solving and what it is hoped to achieve, Peak and Glensor (1999) came up with a set of different list of reasons on which reads as follows: the narrowing of police mission to crime fighting; increased cultural diversity in our society; the detachment of patrol officers in patrol vehicles; increased violence in our society; a scientific view of management, stressing efficiency more that effectiveness, quantitative policing more than qualitative; a downturn in the economy and, subsequently, a “ do more with less” philosophy toward the police; increased dependence on high technology equipment, rather than contact with the public; the emphasis on organisational change including decentralisation and greater officer discretion; isolation of police administration from community and officer input; concern with police violation of minority rights;

a yearning of personalisation of government services and burgeoning attempts by the police to adequately reach the community through crime prevention team (Peak and Glensor, 2012,pp.21-22). Grabosky (2009) links the police through community policing to peacebuilding. He identified two reasons as to why the two themes are relevant to the contemporary policing, the ever increasing demand of policing service that exceeds the resources available to public policing, evidence of that is the growing industry of private security. This means that private security services benefited and flourished as a result of the police failure to provide security in areas that would have been otherwise covered by the police. The key difference here is that police is funded by limited budget to provide free policing and security service while the private security services sell their services to businesses and private companies. Second is the failure of many countries around the globe to provide basic security to their citizens which paved the way to international intervention by all means and in diverse capacities and forms to bridge the policing gap mainly in the form of community policing. This often take place within the context of state failure or state collapse (Grabosky, 2009b).

Wisler et al. (2009) make an important contribution to the debate on community policing when they assert that it is more likely to succeed in countries that are adopting non-central methods of governance, than in other countries. They highlighted France as an example stating that the country's top-down and centralized system proved not to be appropriate for community policing, since the central system does not encourage contacts with local public and maintained direct contacts between the central government and the regional departments. It is for this reason that the community policing is not widely known in France as in other countries of the Western democracies (Wisler et

al., 2009). So in contexts such as France where the police is more centrally governed and are far from their communities that community policing is needed.

Community policing came at time when police organisation shifted away from the beat patrol and replaced that by car patrol with officers placed in air-conditioned police vehicles fitted with radios to communicate with their controllers. Officers would not leave their cars to interact with the community thus they have little knowledge of what is actually going on at street level. By being stationed in police cars they also miss the opportunity of obtaining valuable intelligence through talking to community members and be able to closely observe their activities (Verma et al., 2013).

The role of domestic community policing in Peacebuilding

In recent years domestic police services are becoming more centred in playing a crucial role in the development of transitional societies, especially in Africa. Within that role there is an increasing focus being placed on the model of community policing, with the belief that the police can help societies in war-torn contexts to develop, adopt democracy and maintain durable peace (Francis, 2012b). Francis explains how donor countries pushed for policing reform in war-torn countries with the underlying objective of achieving liberal Peacebuilding. In doing this they are aiming at creating police organisations that are accountable to the public within the overall democratic structure of the state. Contemporary discourse suggests that police personnel were involved in human rights violations and becoming part of the conflict, isolated from the societies they were supposed to serve, as was shown in the cases of Rwanda, Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Willoughby, 2002).

Community policing is becoming more and more the common theme within the international peace-building missions around the world. That is because this approach of policing is believed to be capable of, among other things, bringing members of divided societies to work together in the aftermath of civil war. The link between police and Peacebuilding is clear when we recognise the fact that domestic police are necessary to maintain order, stability and guard the democratic process in post war countries. Moreover, when the police are completely destroyed by the conflict, the international police will move in to fill the vacuum – clear examples of which are, as stated earlier, Timor East and Cambodia interventions with both having a strong focus on community policing. As we will see later in this chapter international police come with a number of problems which hinder them from having effective role in host countries making it necessary for domestic police to be more involved in peace process mainly through Community Policing. The international actors champion community policing in conflict contexts to lessen the tension between warring parties and make them have trust in the police. Nevertheless community policing that is proposed by international actors do come accompanied by some flaws, which some researcher alluded to as we will see later in this chapter (Greener, 2009b, Grabosky, 2009a, Holm and Eide, 2000b). Despite the greater hope that have been placed on community policing as a suitable policing approach in post conflict contexts, there are however some caveats around introducing the approach. Francis (2012) claims that “Community policing, the concept is still ”alien” to the traditional policing culture and institutional philosophy. The practice itself is challenged by several limitations and it is far from being the panacea or magic wane for peaceful civil-police relations that its proponents claim” (Francis, 2012b,p.31).

Verma (2013) asserts that adopting community policing at organisational level need to be supported by good training for all police personnel in key areas that are related to working with communities these might include, communication skills, problem solving, intervention techniques collaborative skills and public relations. Moreover adequate knowledge of the local context and continuous on-site monitoring, assessment and briefing of staff is as well necessary to maximise odds of success. Verma further articulates that the centralised model of police is unsupportive of community policing approach as it hinders individual police at street level from making decisions and they would rather wait for directions to come from the top command. Another essential matter that Verma alluded to is the recruitment which he thought must be tailored to target the recruits with suitable qualities to undertake community policing responsibilities (Verma et al., 2013,pp.8-11). Recruitment is particularly essential to Peacebuilding, in that it should be directed to make the police more inclusive at the same time attract the best individuals who can better understand policing in the aftermath of conflict. This make the domestic police organisation crystallises peace by being inclusive and being prepared for the challenging policing role within Peacebuilding context.

The Increased Interest in Community Policing and its critics

Much writing on policing in recent years has been devoted to community policing as an emerging policing approach that aims at working closely with communities to gain their trust and secure their support (Verma et al., 2013, Peak and Glensor, 2012, Palmer et al., 2012, García Chávez and University of, 2012, Chávez, 2012a). Ranging from international to regional, national and local policing, literature on police science covers every aspect of policing, however specific types of policing have captured more attention than others,

and community policing is the clearest example in this regard (Grabosky, 2009). As stated earlier in this chapter this relatively new policing concept of Community Policing has not yet taken the shape of a defined model, but it is accepted as a paradigm shift from one professional form of reactive policing to a community oriented one (Chávez, 2012b, Wisler et al., 2009). Verma (2013) asserts that this emerging method of policing does not solve all policing problems but can come very close to it if it is properly delivered (Verma et al., 2013). Police officers are not always in favour of this approach as, from their point of view, there are concerns about working closely with the community as this demands a higher level of probity as corruption is more easily identified, plus there is an anxiety about pressure or what Verma called the “everyone’s is out there to get us” syndrome, as police officers fear that their corruption and misconduct will be exposed to the public (Verma et al., 2013). Grabosky (2009) further points out that it is hard for many police officers to treat civilians as equal citizens to themselves, as police personnel tend to exercise their powers in an aggressive manner; something that they inherited as part of traditional police culture. He also makes the point that like peacekeeping and peacebuilding, community policing need to carefully observe the requirements of the local context and the local culture (Grabosky, 2009a).

There can be negative side of actively engaging with the community in the process of community policing as this may deprive the vulnerable segments in the society and give advantage to those who are able to engage and speak loudly. It is imaginable how difficult it is for some disadvantaged segments of society to engage with the police as a result of the lack of confidence and skills. It would be essential that this point is addressed carefully, as this engagement is an essential element of community policing, without which the whole process

does not operate (Grabosky, 2009b). The mixed response that Community Policing has received in critical literature is perhaps due to the fact that it is a very widely interpreted term, including many different tactics, and it is applied with varying levels of commitment and enthusiasm to vastly different contexts. Therefore community policing has different meanings for different people and argues that different states adopt various types of community policing (Grabosky, 2009b).

International fund bodies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) now ask for police reform in the direction of community policing as a precondition of their support (Brodgen, 2005). Thus policing in some countries is shaped by the donor perception of policing rather than being national choice. One of the critiques against community policing is that it has been imported from democratic countries where police is more accountable and transparent to countries where the police are not so (Brodgen, 2005). Francis supports the same argument, asserting that community policing is imposed by western countries as part of the liberal Peacebuilding agenda in post-conflict war-torn Africa in particular Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda (Francis, 2012b). He argues that the concept of community policing is nonetheless relevant to Africa because of the history and the social ties among the African societies. According to Francis community policing in Africa is highly dependent on external funding and can hardly be sustained without that fund (Francis, 2012b). There are however some positive aspects of embracing community policing in some transitional societies which led to better crime detection and maintenance of law and order. The level of involvement of the community to police

themselves also helped change the perception of police as a quasi-military authoritative organisation to a community friendly service (Francis, 2012b).

Cities have more diverse societies who know little or nothing about each other, such societies were described by some researchers as societies of strangers without traditional mechanisms of social control. In such urban societies neighbours would barely know their next door neighbours, they lack common customs and traditions (Ellison and Smyth, 20001, Francis, 2012b). In a way one can claim that community policing exists in the non-urban of Sudan societies as a natural life style, it does not have to take the form of police working with community to achieve common policing goals. This links to the point raised by Francis (2012) earlier in this chapter about African communities being more prepared to embrace community policing methods because African cultures are more open and rely more on oral communication (Francis, 2012b). My own experience shows that these African societies especially in Sudan are changing, especially the urban communities, and that Francis' argument may still be valid in rural areas but not the urban ones, as these are changing now in the direction of "cities of strangers" alluded to earlier in this chapter. By implementing community policing the international actors champion this policing approach in conflict contexts to lessen the tension between warring parties and fixing the broken community-police relation and bestow trust in the police. Nevertheless their version of community policing does come accompanied by some flaws. These include critical issues such as the fact that the international police personnel are often not experienced or trained, there is a culture and language barrier between them and the local community and the short term

deployment of international police (Grabosky, 2009a, Greener, 2009b, Holm and Eide, 2000b, Greener, 2011b, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). It could be true that community policing has been successful in some areas where it was introduced. However mechanism to test that can be problematic since the management of the overall police performance is not clear cut (Adlam and Villiers, 2003, Newburn, 2008). Even if community policing is proved successful in one area does that really guarantee success in another.

Police in Africa; State Agents

“One thing can be stated categorically. Very little is known about the police in Africa” (Marenin, 1982,p.385).

Policing in Africa is very much understudied area of research as put forward by the pioneering researcher the African police in 1982. Marenin (1982) attributed the dearth of information about the African police partially to African Governments’ tendency to consider anything in relation to the police as confidential government information that should not be allowed out (Marenin, 1982). He recognised the need of conducting an empirical study to explore the African police as any theorizing on the topic would not provide the analysis for deep understanding in its absence. He noted the historical link between African police forces and the colonial powers and how the police was established in the former colonies to serve specific colonial agendas. He also questioned the sociological background of the police and how that affects their relation with public and how the public perceive them (Marenin, 1982). He also raised questions about the nature of the police work asking specifically about the extent to which this is undertaken with integrity, especially in exercising discretionary power before shedding light on the state’s role in organizing,

controlling and setting the standards to measure performance and enact laws for the police force and using it to achieve political ends against political opponents (Marenin, 1982). Police in Africa were often recruited as retired soldiers by the colonial state, and drawn from ethnicities with the right characteristics to serve the colonial powers. Even after the departure of the coloniser they tended to maintain a close non-autonomous role with the national governments. This relation between political regimes and police also featured by Call (2002) in his study of the police in post-Apartheid South Africa argues that political change in a country can seriously affect police performance. He asserts that the South African Police Service (SAPS) was once classified as one of the best police organizations in Africa during the Apartheid era, particularly in terms of crime fighting and crime detection despite the biased manner in policing and behaviour during the Apartheid period (Baker, 2010, Shaw, 2002). However Shaw (2002) argues that this reputation dropped dramatically when the Apartheid regime was abolished in 1994, which reflects how the relation between the political system and the police can affect the efficiency of the police. The example of South Africa is relevant as a country that has witnessed a relatively peaceful transition from authoritarian to democratic regime. However, at the same time it could be irrelevant because it is now argued to be an example of policing in one of the most oppressive regimes in modern times, which tended to use brutal methods to fight crime mainly for political ends (Shaw, 2002).

Police forces continued to serve different authoritarian regimes led by national governments and continued to adapt to different political situations and keep close contacts with the different regimes. According to Hills, the police institution in most African countries remained dysfunctional which also

crystallised the poor capacity of the state in relation to governance and economic development. Hill's study covers the last decade of the twentieth century but a lot of developments have ensued since that time especially with regard to change of regimes and the move by many African countries towards more democratic governance. Furthermore police reform has been instigated by many individual donor countries, UN organisations and peace agreements that ended conflicts in many African countries, and it has become more common for police reform to be highlighted in peace accords. It is noticeable that major studies of African police in English literature have focused on Anglophone Sub-Sahara Africa rather than Francophone Africa or North Africa even though literature on Africa police as a whole, researchers acknowledge is still scant (Hills, 2000, Marenin, 1982, Marenin, 2009, Berridge, 2011)

As stated earlier Francis (2012) also Marenin (2009) and Hills (2000), all agree that police in Africa being an under-researched topic. Francis took a new approach in which he recognised the important role of the police in achieving stability, development and economic growth in the African context especially the war-torn countries. Francis pointed to the constrained relation between police and societies in Africa saying that "Societies across Africa have an historic and justified mistrust of the police for, in the majority of these societies the police have been separate from the people"(Francis, 2012a,p.8). Chukwuma ((1999) , observed that the relationship between the Nigeria Police Force and the Nigerian public is characterised by mutual suspicion, hostility and violence that have brought a disconnection between the two, which has affected the ability of the police to effectively prevent crime and serve the community(Chukwuma, 1999). In 2000 Alemika et. Al,. stated that the police could not change the hostile character of its relationship with the public at independence because it

was only 'a change in the colour of the rulers...' they also stressed that the unequal socio-political and economic structures of the Nigerian society have not undergone any radical change since independence (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2000). Alemika, (1993) stressed that these structures foster antagonism between the government and the citizens, which requires the police to suppress the oppositions of the citizens against the government as the police continued to be accountable to the political leaders hence the lingering hostile police-community relationship (Alemika, 1993, Alemika, 2009) Perhaps that is partly because of historic links between the police and the political regimes as stated earlier.

In recent years African police in general, according to Francis 2012, are becoming more and more interested in engaging in Peacebuilding process in Africa and around the world. Motivation for African police, he conclude, is hope of getting more resources, experiences and training (Francis, 2012b).

Most African police forces in British colonies were modelled on the semi-military structure of the Royal Irish Constabulary Police established in 1834 rather than the unarmed, civil London Metropolitan police established in 1829. This includes for instance, Ghana police, Malawi police and the Kenyan Police (Deflem, 1994) examples of militarised police exists within many police organisations around the world. The Gendarmerie nationale police in France, the Italian Carabinieri police, and Guardia di Finanza police in Italy, The German Federal Border Police and The US Border Patrol police, all have got military characteristics and some affiliation with both the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence (Lutterbeck, 2004b, Lutterbeck, 2004a). Like most African policing institutions, the Sudanese Police was built in line with these para-military types of police, a

system that is maintained to the current day, as we will see in chapter three, five, and six. This system, which as Lutterbeck (2004) puts it, is considered to be a paramilitary-Gendarme type of police (Lutterbeck, 2004a). This type of policing is characterised by their training methods, uniforms, military ranks moreover, all police are trained to carry fire arms. The military identity and the long chain of ranks may lead to poor communication between the different levels in the hierarchy and make them less likely to interact with, and build relations with, their community which are both relevant to peacebuilding. Baker (2010) noticed that there are huge variations in African communities in relation to culture, religion and education, and consequently their perceptions and policing needs are sometimes very different (Baker 2008, 2010). Efforts of the international community in Africa often aim to “provide security to citizens in a manner consistent with human rights and the rule of law and an effective system of democratic regulation and oversight of policing providers (Baker, 2010)

Baker (2008) asserts that police reform programmes in most post-conflict countries in Africa, with the exception of Mali, South Africa, Eritrea and Ethiopia are forced into these countries. Baker pointed out to the role of the UN police in supporting the African police through the peace keeping missions and the United Nations Development Programme by providing capacity building programmes and in some cases equipment. Baker argues that international efforts to build African police forces have bypassed the local policing agencies and focused on building state police, which has proved to be inadequate. Baker (2008) questions the ability of African states in post conflict zones to provide basic policing for its citizens and that in practice they are not the most important provider of policing services (Baker, 2008). In my view the problem with Baker’s assumptions is that he does not draw clear lines between the formal police

force that is linked to the justice system and operates within legal frameworks, and the traditional or commercial forces who may serve tribal, commercial or personal interest, that might even be classified as unlawful because they do not operate as part of the overall state law enforcement system and therefore cannot handle legal cases by reporting crimes, detecting them or presenting them before the courts. Francis (2012) observed the increasing participation of African police in peace keeping operations and police reform (Francis, 2012b). This, he explains, is driven by different motivations. Some of these relate to acquiring further training and interaction with international and UN police and the possible funding opportunities that might come with that.

Conclusion

The main components of liberal peace identified throughout the literature are democracy, liberal market and the rule of law. The majority of literature reflects a major critique of liberal Peacebuilding. Most of that critique is pointed towards the interventionist method of liberal Peacebuilding, but it also focuses on certain aspects of liberal peace. One is that liberal peace builders do not engage with recipient communities to identify their needs and what type of peace they prefer and how it should be achieved. Second is that the peace builders deploy policies and structures that may not be suitable for post-war environments. Thirdly peace builders adopt a hasty pace in quick-fix exit strategies. Fourth is those Peacebuilding actors pursue their political or economic interests through Peacebuilding interventions. And finally they do not seek local ownership by empowering local actors and establishing means of sustainability at the end of their peacebuilding mission. Believers in liberal peace defend the approach and

argue that it is the only model that is capable of being introduced and there is no convincing alternative to it. The literature on Peacebuilding shows new emerging powers like the BRICS group and the Gulf countries that are constantly intervening in conflict situation providing aid and building peace in their own terms which are different to the traditional Peacebuilding practices.

It is notable that most of this literature mentions the growing role and importance of the police in Peacebuilding, There is much less recognition of the importance of the domestic police with regard to Peacebuilding, however most researchers link Peacebuilding to international policing led mainly by the UN, EU and supported by multi-national donors. Nonetheless observers increasingly comment that domestic police forces have the potential to play positive roles in the Peacebuilding process. In spite of this it is also noted that domestic police forces are often involved in the conflicts themselves, and are often partial, corrupt, incompetent, under-resourced and have antagonistic relationships with their communities.

With regards to the international role for police in Peacebuilding, community policing is recommended as suitable policing approach that can address community concerns and may represent them in a process that brings members of the community and the police to think collectively about policing plans. The literature however also reveals some of the problems encountered when this policing approach has been attempted, not least that by definition international forces are not part of the communities that they serve and bring a range of different policing cultures with them even in the one mission. The literature also shows the lack of clarity or consensus about what community

policing should be and the difficulty with identifying specific styles that are most appropriate for war-torn societies.

Literature on Africa police shows the colonial legacy of policing in Africa persists long after the departure of the colonial powers, this is featured mainly on the restrained relation between police and the communities in Africa and the close relations between the police and political regimes. It is as well evident that literature on Africa police is focused on Sub-Sahara English speaking countries with hardly any mention of the police the Arabic or French speaking parts of Africa. Literature on both liberal peace and community policing highlights the need to work closely with the local community to solidify peace. Furthermore the literature reflects the growing consensus on the need to involve local organisations in a hybrid model to jointly identify local needs and formulate peacebuilding strategies to achieve long lasting peace. In this context it is the domestic police organisations that are needed to be involved in peacebuilding process and policing their war divided communities. When we put this into the Sudan context as a conflict-zone area, coupled with the fact that Sudan police force is not immune from the illness of other African police in relation to close ties with political regimes, restrained relationship with their communities, the militaristic identity and scant literature on Sudanese Police the importance of this study is clear.

The next chapter is devoted to introduce Sudan as a country and Sudan police as an organisation with its historical background and contextual analysis.

Chapter Three

The Policing Context in Contemporary Sudan

Introduction

As stated in the previous chapter literature on the police in Africa is restricted to Sub-Saharan Africa and, as Sudan falls on the dividing line between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, it is not usually covered. In addition to that not much is written on the Sudanese police as shown in chapter one.

Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the 9 January 2005 Sudan has experienced many troubles, among the most serious of which are the sporadic conflicts in the five Darfur states, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile States, (see Chapter Four) which impact on the country's police and the service they provide. The aftermath of the war and the current conflicts inflict

various consequences that impede the development of the Sudanese Police primarily because officers and NCOs are redeployed to manage conflict areas which takes them away from core policing tasks. However, the Sudanese police have also taken up opportunities provided by the on-going peace process, including new legislation and relationships with international partners, to develop both their systems and personnel. These developments include: improved community-police relationships through community committees; improved support to children who live and work in the streets and improved transparency, oversight and accountability. In the light of this dichotomous environment, this chapter presents a view of the Sudanese police organisation particularly the structure, mandate, approaches and methods of policing adopted and their relation with the country's ongoing peace processes.

The first part of this chapter provides a brief overview of the Sudan, followed by a description of the history and the structure of the Sudanese Police, with particular emphasis on how the police force works in the face of many challenges within an ever-changing political and security environment. Moreover different actors have different roles in supporting and/or undermining police efforts in Peacebuilding. The state plays a critical role as both employer and legislator: the employer sets out conditions of service and determines the police budget, which includes payments and salaries, whilst the legislator enacts laws and regulations that direct police work. In this context, the second part will also outline state policies towards the police during the period that followed the independence of Sudan in 1956. In summary, the huge task required of the Sudanese Police force is considerably complex as responding to the sensitive issues of Peacebuilding necessitates a tolerant, acumen and even cosmopolitan policing style, requiring police personnel to be carefully selected,

trained and developed. Consequently, the third part explores aspects of policing in the Sudan and examines their contributions, or otherwise, to the Peacebuilding process. This chapter will also explore how the Sudanese police have developed as part of Sudan's political history.

Overview of the Sudan and the Sudanese Police

Figure 3.1: map of Sudan



The Sudan is a large and geographically diverse state, located at the North East of the African Continent, bordered by Libya and Egypt in the north; the Red Sea, Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east; South Sudan and the Central African Republic in the south; and Chad to the west.

Formerly the largest country in Africa, Sudan was officially divided into two countries in July 2011, after the overwhelming majority of South Sudanese voted in a referendum for separation, rather than a united Sudan (Copnall, 2014). The South Sudan people chose to name their new country 'The Republic of South Sudan' and became the 192nd member of the United Nations, with its capital being the city of Juba (Copnall, 2014). The remaining part of the country retained the name 'The Republic of Sudan' and the same capital city, Khartoum. This research focuses on the Republic of Sudan. The majority of the ethnically diverse 30 million population of the Republic of Sudan are Muslims, with Arabic as their main and official language. Khartoum is one of

the most populated capital cities in Africa, with more than five million, most of them driven to live there by drought, conflict and unequal development policies. Surrounded by poor communities from all over Sudan, Khartoum contains representatives from almost all Sudanese communities. After the separation of the country, when most of the oil revenues went to South Sudan, the country faced economic difficulties exacerbated by the conflicts in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan (Alraouf, 2011, Natsios, 2012). Despite all that, Sudan is still one of the fastest growing economies in the world (Bennett et al., 2010). However Sudan also ranked seventh amongst the most corrupted states (International, 2011).

History of Sudan

“An incident which easily might have convulsed Europe, and from which far reaching consequences have arisen. It is unlikely that the world will ever learn the details of the subtle scheme of which the Marchand mission was famous part, we may say with some certainty that the French government did not intend a small expedition at great peril to itself, to seize and hold an obscure swamp on the upper Nile (Churchill, 1902,p.187)”

The history of Sudan extends from antiquity, and is intertwined with the history of Egypt, with which it was united politically over several periods. Anthropological and archaeological research indicates that during the fifth millennium BC migrations from the drying Sahara brought Neolithic people into the Nile Valley. The population that resulted from this cultural and genetic mixing developed a social hierarchy over the next centuries to become the Kingdom of Kush. Northern Sudan's earliest historical record (2007 years BC) comes from Egyptian sources, which described the land upstream from the First

Cataract, called Kush (Metz, 1992). Egypt established political control over Kush and officials, priests, merchants and artisans settled in the region (Hasan, 2010). By the 11th century BC, the authority of the New Kingdom dynasties had diminished ending Egyptian control of Kush. Although there is no information about the region's activities over the next three hundred years, in the 8th century BC, Kush emerged as an independent kingdom ruled by an aggressive line of monarchs who slowly extended their influence into Egypt (Hasan, 2010).

The modern State of Sudan started to formulate as a united entity after the Turkish-Egyptian invasion in 1821 that ended the rule of kingdoms and tribes and then established an administration in almost the current borders of Sudan and South Sudan. Supported by European officers, the new administration continued to rule Sudan until 1885 when the Mohamed Ahmed Al Mahadi led a revolution to end the regime and established the first Sudanese rule in the modern Sudan (Woodward, 1990, Thomas and Jenkins, 1990, Moorehead, 1972). After a brief period of national governance that continued until September 1998 Sudan became one of the British colonies during the scramble for Africa that sprung up among the European powers in late nineteenth century and early twentieth century (Woodward, 1990, Pakenham, 2013). The involvement of the British in Sudan began with their advice to the Egyptians, who were themselves occupied by the British, to evacuate Sudan after the Mahadist revolution that threatened the Egyptian rule in the country. This advice developed into proposing General Charles Gordon to carry out the evacuation mission. The evacuation mission failed and General Gordon was killed in January 1885 (Woodward, 1990, Natsios, 2012, Churchill, 1902). Pakenham (2013) described the political atmosphere in London when the news of Gordon's

death was received quoting Queen Victoria's famous open telegram to her government blaming it for the fiasco; "These news from Khartoum are frightful, and to think that all this might have been prevented and many precious lives saved by earlier action is too frightful" (Pakenham, 2013,p.260). Gordon's death was considered in Britain as a matter of national humiliation, which therefore provoked a British led invasion, occupation and colonisation of Sudan with the Egyptians symbolically being part of what become to be known as the Condominium Rule from 1898-1956 (Pakenham, 2013, Churchill, 1902, Woodward, 1990 (Thomas and Jenkins, 1990)). The Egyptians were later expelled from Sudan in 1924 after the Sudanese revolt against colonial rule (Woodward, 1990,p.230).

Despite the stated goals of restoring order to Sudan and securing the Nile sources, the colonial story was also an outcome of the competition between colonial powers in Africa. As pointed out by Moorehead (1972), on arriving in Khartoum, Kitchener opened sealed order to proceed south to obstruct the French mission advancing up the White Nile led by Marchand (Moorehead, 1972). The incident represented the climax of the colonial expansionist race; as in the quote at the beginning of this section. Military confrontation between Britain and France was narrowly avoided when the crisis was diplomatically solved (Churchill, 1902, Moorehead, 1972). The Mahadi era ended when the Anglo-Egyptians defeated the Mahadi's army in a decisive victory in the battle of Omdurman on 2 September 1898 (Collins, 2008, Churchill, 1902). Nevertheless, Sudan never became a truly united country, due to the deep cultural differences between the south and north, aggravated by the British-imposed policy that the south was a restricted area. This policy was based on forbidding Sudanese citizens from free movement between the two parts of the country (Collins, 2008,

Woodward, 1990). Moreover, this colonial policy ran the south as an independent administrative entity with few links with the northern part of the country (Thomas, 1990). When this policy was abolished just before independence in 1956, the various efforts of the different successive governments to bring the two parts of the country together did not succeed as the recent separation starkly demonstrates. It is worth mentioning that western region of Darfur did not become part of the British colonial Sudan until 1916. This resulted in the region's development, including education and health services, becoming less developed compared to other parts of northern Sudan (Mamdani, 2009).

Since Sudan's independence there has always been political instability, as illustrated when the first democratically elected government was overthrown by a military coup led by Lt. General Ibrahim Aboud on 17 November 1958. His regime continued in power until October 1964 when a public uprising forced the regime to give up power. Following this, a transitional government of one year was established to prepare for a general election. Democracy was then restored by a newly elected government, which continued until 1969. Another military coup led by Colonel Jaafer Nimeiri took power on the 25th May 1969 to be in office until April 1985, when again another public uprising overthrew the regime and democracy was restored, only to be aborted once again in June 1989, when a group of officers led by Brigadier Omer Albasheir instated themselves as the new government, which continues up to the present day (Thomas, 1990, Woodward, 1990). As a result of this political instability, Sudan has been operating with an interim constitution since its independence in 1956 (Government, 2005).

Political analysis of the country

The democratic national regime which followed after independence was disrupted by a military coup in November 1958. Cycles of civil rule and military coups ensued with all failing to end the civil war started in the south of the country in August 1955 followed by other conflicts in other parts of the country as shown later in chapter four. The dual identity of the country of Arab and African links puts Sudan as a member of the African Union and Arab League with close ties to both (Barltrop, 2011). Political instability in the country that has fluctuated between democratic, transition and military rule since independence has affected Sudan's relations with external world. Among the Arab world Sudan was historically close to Egypt, especially the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) who formed the first national government after the elections of 1953. Unity of Nile Valley was the slogan of DUP in which they called for unity with Egypt; the slogan was however dropped at a later stage (Thomas and Jenkins, 1990, Woodward, 1990). The smooth governance of the Sudan by the British after expulsion of the Egyptians in 1924 without officially abrogating the 1899 condominium agreement ended in fierce competition between the two parties to shape the allegiance of independent Sudan. Both parties sought to prevent the independent Sudan falling under the influence of the other. As cabinet documents show in a letter dated 18th April 1953, Britain sent a special agent disguised as a trade commissioner but his mission included political propaganda work to minimise Egyptian influence. Following his visit to Sudan the minister of state stated that the purpose of his visit was to "encourage the British officials not lose heart and to stiffen the pro-independent Sudanese to stand up to Egyptians" (Minsiter, 1953). At independence, the British were concerned about Sudan's membership of the Commonwealth, which they

considered incompatible with South Africa being a member since the Sudanese openly criticises the apartheid regime and support the South African national resistance movement. The official position of the British government was explained in a letter by both the Secretary of the Foreign Office and Colonial Secretary to the cabinet dated 23th December 1952 in which they stated that British government would not encourage nor would explicitly address an application by Sudan government to join the Commonwealth concluding that Britain would adopt a non-committal attitude toward Sudan's membership to the Commonwealth (Office, 1952). Sudan remained a controversial country with strained relation with the west throughout the different regimes (Natsios, 2012). During the military regime of Nimeri in the 1970s and 1980s Sudan signed agreements of collaboration and defence with Egypt and Libya (Thomas and Jenkins, 1990, Woodward, 1990). With economic deterioration under the pressure of war Sudan continued to receive economic support from the Gulf countries (Barltrop, 2011). The United States became a close ally of Sudan in the 1980s supporting it to stand against the communist regime in Ethiopia and Gadhafi in Libya. In this period the US provided military aid to assist fighting the pressing rebellion in the south of the country hosted and support by Ethiopia. Other countries in the Middle-East also provided military aid to Sudan, especially when the war in the south started to move north, such as Iraq, Iran and Jordon. (,p.212, Barltrop, 2011). However relations with the US weakened in the mid-eighties when the interim government suspended the joint military drills between the two countries run for many countries followed by the democratic government of Sadiq Almahadi terminating the US privileges in Port Sudan (the sea port at the Red Sea (Barltrop, 2011)). Relations with the West have remained tense since 1990 when Sudan hosted Osama Bin Laden and

other Islamist groups. This was compounded with ICC allegations of war crime and crime against humanity (Barltrop, 2011, Hoile, 2010). For the last three decades, Sudan attracted significant international attention which Natsios (2012) attributes to violent conflicts, the discovery of oil, potential valuable minerals and the Islamist orientation of the government (Natsios, 2012). In 1964 and 1985 military governments were overthrown, due to civil protest akin to what was recently termed the Arab spring/awakening and transitional governments took over to arrange for elections that were run as timed within one year. But the democratically elected governments were too weak to solve the complex issues of economic development and conflict (Copnall, 2014). Therefore the violent conflict that started in 1955 continued in the country up to this date as I will chart in chapter four.

Sudan's Police History

The Sudanese Police force, as were most African police forces (see chapter two), was established by the British Colonial Authorities in 1899. The way it is structured and managed indicates that it was built in line with the Irish Police and not the British police system initiated by Sir Robert Peel in 1829. The method of policing adopted by the Metropolitan Police Service in London was based on policing by consent and not considered suitable to be exported to the former British colonies because it was not considered useful for the colonial political agendas (William, 2011). For this reason the Sudanese Police, as many other police forces in former British colonies, was built as paramilitary police closer to the Ulster Constabulary of Northern Ireland (William, 2011, Newburn, 2008).

Despite the emerging literature on policing and police science from both academics and practitioners in recent years, and the long history of Sudanese Police that extends over one century, very little has been written on its contribution in the development of the country and their actual and potential role in the modern Sudan. As previously said in chapter one, Abdullah Hassan Salim, a former Director General of Sudanese Police explored the historical development of the police during and after the independence of the country in 1956 and the police law which has evolved during the colonial era and the national governments up to 1999. He stressed that there had been many changes in the police laws and roles pointing out that these changes have prevented the Sudanese Police from becoming a more professional and efficient police force (Salim, 2005). Salim's pioneering study was to be followed in 2011 by Berridge (2011). Berridge's study is more analytical, and includes empirical research, which included a wide range of interviews with diverse individuals, resulting in useful data which provided a broader understanding of Sudanese Police and their relation with the state. Moreover it analysed the relation between the centre of the country and its peripheries, and how that affected the police. Most importantly it sheds light on the dominance of some particular ethnicities over the police since independence (Berridge, 2011). It is worth noting in this regard that the two studies of Salim and Berridge on Sudanese Police both outlined the historical links between the British police and the Sudanese police drawing the link between the two police forces. I believe that this is relevant because it first provides an understanding the historic links between the Sudanese Police and the UK police and also because of the formidable reputation of the British police, which is setting the international policing model that is being disseminated in so many countries and is being

viewed as best practise of policing all over the world as stated by Newburn (2008) (Salim, 2005, Berridge, 2011, Newburn, 2008). In Sudan, the police have to operate in conflict-prone areas, inhabited by diverse people with diverse religious, social and political values and against the background of a long history of armed conflict and civil war. This conflict puts additional pressure on the Sudanese Police, on the one hand they are involved in counter-insurgency operations, on the other hand they are also affected by the Peacebuilding process in terms of reform, policing the peace accord requirements and hosting some of the former rebels who were integrated into the police. Even though the civil war ended in the southern part of the country when the peace settlement was reached in 2005, there are still violent conflicts in the South East of Blue Nile State, the South Kordofan State and the West Region of Darfur (Johnson, 2011 , Berridge, 2011 , Movement, 2011) .

The nature of policing cannot be detached from the political system and cultural context in which it operates, therefore the Sudanese Police which was historically coercive and non-democratic police during the colonial times and beyond. It used to oppress political opponents when the Sudanese nationals who were educated by the British started to push for political reform (Salim, 2008). As was the case in all British colonies the Sudanese Police force was close to the political colonial authority (Hills, 2000) This situation continued through the post independent era where the police was used for political aims and there used to be special units within the police to monitor political activities (Salim, 2008).

After the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of Sudan at the end of 1898, the two parties began to lay down the systems of governance with an agreement being

reached on 19 January 1899, known as the 'Condominium Treaty between the British Government and the Khedive Government of Egypt' to establish administrative and legal systems in the Sudan including prisons, police and judiciary (Collins, 2008). A small number of soldiers were assembled in 1899 headed by a British army officer to work as a police force. Later in the same year an Egyptian Captain, Abdaljaleel Afendi Esmat, was appointed to be responsible for the police and another thirty officers were also appointed, thus establishing the Sudanese Police force under the new administration as a federal force with Head Quarters in Khartoum (Idrees, 2011). Police personnel were drawn mainly from Sudanese who completed their term of service in the army and the warders previously working in Halfa Guard Company, who were mainly Egyptians. The then Governor General of Sudan, Sir Reginald Wingate Pasha, decided in 1905 that controlling the police from the centre in Khartoum was not efficient in a vast country with poor roads. Therefore, he made governors of the provinces responsible for police within their provinces. Wingate, as Governor of Sudan (1899-1916), issued the first police law in 1908 to regulate police work (Sudan, 1906).

The Sudanese Police continued to develop with British army officers and Egyptians serving on secondments, and by 1906 commissioners of the provinces started to recruit local Sudanese to serve as police non-commissioned officers, commonly referred to as 'NCOs'. At that time policing was not an attractive job to local people as many viewed working in the police as an inappropriate association with the colonial administration (Salim, 2008).

The practice of recruiting soldiers into the police was not successful, according to the Governor General's report of 1906; likewise the central system of

administering the police, primarily because the soldiers had been trained for a different role and many found it difficult to adapt to policing. Additionally communications and transport were limited at the time, making central administration a difficult task in such a vast country. Therefore that policy was relinquished and police matters were all made provincial including recruiting, training and administrative issues as seen in the following quote (Wingate, 1945). The following paragraph from the Governor General of Sudan report in 1906 shows how they perceived the Sudanese Police administration at that time.

26. POLICE.

One of the main administrative faults against which it is essential to guard in the Sudan is over-centralization. The risk of over-centralizing is obviously liable to increase as telegraphic communication is extended. Sir Reginald Wingate, therefore, has very wisely decided that the system of endeavouring to administer the Sudan police from a central department at Khartoum is to be abolished. Since the 1st January, 1905, the Governors of provinces have been made wholly responsible for the enlistment, training, discipline, clothing, pay, &c., of the police. That the new system will lead to increased efficiency, I do not doubt. It should also prove economical.

Whatever be the general system of administration, the difficulties in the way of forming an efficient police force are very considerable. Heretofore the force has for the most part consisted of soldiers who had completed their term of military service. The results obtained by the adoption of this system have not been altogether satisfactory, but it is not possible to abolish it altogether. It will still continue to exist to a certain extent in the large towns, such as Khartoum, Halfa, and Dongola, where a certain number of Europeans reside. But elsewhere an attempt is being made to raise a police force locally.

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Some Sudanese police NCOs joined the National Sudanese Resistance against colonial rule; this was reflected in the mutiny in Khartoum in 1951, when a group of Sudanese NCOs went on strike demanding some changes to their working conditions. It then spread to other cities of the country including Port Sudan and Atbara. As a consequence, the situation deteriorated and the Sudan Defence Force was ordered to intervene to manage the resulting threat to security. A wide investigation followed and a special court was established,

which punished the leaders of the strike with different sentences ranging from dismissal to imprisonment (Salim, 2005). In October 1954, General Amin Ahmed Hussein became the first Sudanese Director General of the Sudanese Police, in line with the “Sudanization” of Sudan governance that was implemented towards the end of British rule.

The political instability of Sudan seems to have affected the development of Sudanese Police laws which is clear when we examine the rapid change of laws since the first police legislation was enacted in 1908. There have been fourteen new police acts. For example, since independence new acts were created in 1970, 1971, 1977, 1979, 1984, 1986, 1992, 1999 and 2008. This shows that police laws had been changed five times during the colonial era from 1899 to 1956 whilst successive National Sudanese governments made nine changes after independence. This rapid change indicates instability moreover it would have probably have made it difficult to establish best practice and also minimised the potential for ‘lesson learning’. Moreover, this rapid change reflects the extent of government interference with police matters, perhaps in their attempts to dominate the police, and thus secure their political interest in using police as political organ for political ends.

When President Nimeri dissolved the Ministry of Interior in 1979, police departments were scattered between the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with police HQs attached to the Presidency. This situation did not continue for long and the Ministry of Interior was reinstated again in 1981; it continues to be the political body that supervises the police until the present day. This is common practice in several countries where the police are under the Ministry of Interior. It is easier to administer and can help improve oversight and

efficiency in policing. (Salim, 2005). As with any other department or institution in the country, the Sudanese Police force is affected by the long-term civil war in the country and, as a consequence, has to cope with poor budgets whilst carrying out an essential, challenging and demanding job.

Table 3.1: The Development of Police Acts since 1899

Date	Type of government	Act / Amendment	Remarks
1899	Colonial administration	Establishment of police in Sudan	
1908	Colonial administration	Sudan police Act 1908	The First Police Act
1912	Colonial administration	Amendment 1912	
1925	Colonial administration	Amendment 1925	
1928	Colonial administration	Sudan Police Act 1928	
1970	Military Regime	Sudan Police Act	First act after independence
1971	Military Regime	Amendment 1971	
1975	Military Regime	Amendment 1975	
1977	Military Regime	Sudan Police Act 1977	
1979	Military Regime	Sudan Police Act 1979	The ministry of interior was dissolved and police was scattered between the

			Presidency, the Ministry of Justice and Police Headquarters
1984	Military Government	Sudan Police Act 1984	
1986	Democratic Government	Sudan Police Act 1986	The only change during democratic governance
1992	Military Regime	Sudan Police Act 1992	Integrated the civil defence, the protection of wild life, the prisons and the customs into the police
1999	Military Regime	Sudan Police Act 1999	
2008	Transitional Government	Sudan Police Act 2008	Created three levels of police (National, South Sudan and state)

Table 1

It worth noting that all changes but one took place during military governments. This may indicate military regimes worried about dominating the police. Even with the much shorter period of democratic governance of fourteen years since independence compared with forty five years of military regimes the data still clearly shows that military regimes were comparatively more concerned about police than democratic governments (Department, 2011) .

The current situation of the Sudanese Police

When interviewed by Al Rayaam Newspaper on the 9th of July 2011, the State Minister of Sudan Kong Danair Golwak, stressed the ability of police to safeguard the referendum process and added that “The Sudanese Police is one the best and most competent police forces in the region” (Alkhair, 2011). These comments have even more significance since the State minister was representing South Sudan with all the political rivalries between the two parties.

The Sudanese Police are currently operating as a federal force with a mandate to cover all of the Republic of Sudan. The Headquarters is based in Khartoum and has responsibility for setting country-wide standards, managing the transfer and welfare of the entire human resources strength and dealing with national issues, such as the on-going conflict. Nevertheless the Major Generals of police in charge of the States have a degree of autonomy, for example they manage budgets, human resources and day to day policing activities within their States. However they are required to report to Headquarters and are regularly inspected by teams from Headquarters. The total force strength stands at approximately 190,000 of which 11,113 are officers and the remaining are NCOs. Approximately 11,000 of the total number are females, and in this respect it is worth mentioning that the Interim Constitution of 2005 gave equal chances for women in public posts. Moreover the election act of 2009 allocated 25 per cent of all parliamentary seats in the country to women (Government, 2005, Government, 2009). Whilst this percentage has been achieved in the current parliament, it is still far from that in the police, which is predominantly due to cultural beliefs of many Sudanese that the police force is not a suitable employer for women. Consequently, young females are generally not encouraged by their families and the larger community to join the police.

The Sudanese Police now operate under the 2008 Sudanese Police Forces Act, which gives the police their statutory functions, sets goals and objectives and explains the organisation of the force. The overall command in the Sudanese Police force is the Director General of the rank of First Lieutenant General, appointed by the President according to Article 20 of Sudanese Police Force Act of 2008 which reads: 'The President will appoint the Director General of the police and his deputy from among the commissioned officers who are in the rank of Major General or above'. Article 21/1/A specifies that the Director General is responsible to the Minister of Interior for the performance of the police in particular: issuing orders and directions regarding the organisation and the development of the force; managing police performance in administrative, finance, technical and professional aspects; identifying police needs and making recommendations to the Minister with regard to that; the nomination of policing delegations participating in activities abroad; appointing the Directors of the General Directorates; appointing of Directors of national departments, in consultation with heads of these departments. Moreover, Article 20/2 stipulates that the Deputy Director General is accountable to the Director General for the performance of the departments under his responsibility, as well as acting as Inspector General to conduct regular inspection on police performance (Government, 2008).

According to the government, the current formation of the police as a federal force, with a remit all over Sudan, is appropriate in a country still suffering conflict in many areas, but also with some autonomy granted to the state police in managing day-to-day policing work. The Sudanese Police consist of departments that appear to be heterogeneous and include a range of activities outside that normally considered police work, such as: prisons, wild life, civil

defence, customs, emigration and passports. As previously explained in chapter one police work can be diverse but the Sudanese model seems to be unique in this sense. These departments were historically independent from the police until 1992 when police law was changed to bring them all under the umbrella of the police, which was proposed by the former vice-president and minister of interior Alzubair Mohamed Salih who called for a unified police force (Salim, 2005). Other departments like hospitals, forensic, finance, and engineering are also part of the police. They are uniformed and trained to the same level of training and are subject to the police act just like other police personnel. The current (2012) structure of the Sudanese Police is provided in the following flowchart (Sudanese Police Planning Department, 2011)




Figure 3.2: The Organisation Structure of Sudanese Police

Sudanese police adopt two categories of officers and Non-Commissioned Officer each is completely different to the other, for instance while officers are subject to a three years training course in the central police college located in Khartoum, NCOs only undergo three to six months of training in any of the training centres scattered throughout the states (See Chapter Five and Six).

The Mandates of the Sudanese Police

The Republican Decree No. 34 of 2005: This Decree was issued by President of Sudan, Omer Albasheir, following the adoption of the Sudan National Interim Constitution of 2005 and reinforces the mandate of the Sudanese National Police within the Ministry of Interior (Sudan, 2005). It specifies the mandates of all Ministries and constitutional bodies so that they are clear about their remits and to prevent areas of overlap. This Decree gives the Ministry of the Interior the following responsibilities:

Set out regulations, controls and systems and take procedures and measures to protect lives, property, public utilities and public institutions from danger and disaster.

Increase public awareness through adequate information and the means to help fight crimes and support the Police in exercising their duties.

Organise and manage the Civil Roll, Passports, Nationalisation and Identity Cards and Immigration Affairs.

In close coordination with other concerned authorities, demarcate and re-demarcate boundaries with neighbouring countries in accordance with the agreements entered into with those countries.

Set out controls and systems necessary to maintain good behaviour, conduct and public order.

Conduct criminal investigations or procedures in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedures Act of 1991 and execute judicial judgements and decisions of the competent authorities.

Set up standards and controls for organising the traffic, determining the terms and conditions for granting driving licenses and licensing of vehicles and organising traffic on national roads.

Undertake technical supervision of customs work in accordance with the provisions of law.

Set up standards and controls for granting licenses for weapons and ammunition and regulation of their trade

Manage and maintain the security of federal prisons and the welfare and rehabilitation of prisoners.

Look after the welfare of refugees, in accordance with international treaties and encourage their voluntary return to their country of origin.

Set up standards and arrangements for the training, upgrading and rehabilitation of the Police at the National and State levels

This list contains the main responsibilities of Sudanese Police force set out in the Police Act of 2008. The only exception is the responsibility of looking after the welfare of the refugees this is because the refugees Commission is part of the Ministry of interior which but its separate from the police (Sudan, 2005).

The Sudanese Police Forces Act 2008: This Act was passed in the light of the National Interim Constitution and consists of 11 sections (Government, 2008). The CPA stipulated that there should be new constitution which was passed in 2005. This resulted in the change of several laws including the police to cope with the new constitution. It details the objectives, duties and responsibilities of the Police Forces. In this Act article 11 introduced three important concepts for the first time, the first of these is the respect of the rule of law; second is vindication and respect of human rights in accordance with the constitution and finally the adhering to the acceptable national and international standards of policing to include professional, technical and conduct issues. These concepts are relevant to peacebuilding process and for the police to be able to contribute to it they need to change their conduct and behaviour and to abide by the law.

Sudanese Police objectives as in Article 12 of the police act 2008:

Keeping the security and safety of the country and citizens.

Enforcement of law and maintaining peace and security.

Protection of the country's internal security and contributing in realising its national security in close coordination with competent authorities.

The achievement of international, regional and bilateral cooperation in the combating of crimes

Police duties, powers and obligations as detailed in Article 13 of the police act 2008:

Keeping the security and safety of the country and citizens.

Safeguarding the safety of persons, their property and chastity.

Prevention and detection of crime.

The consolidation of the rule of law.

Safeguarding neglected, lost, seized or acquired possessions; and disposing of the same; according to the provisions of the law.

Making the public aware of the information and means, which assist in the protection against crime and exercising the police duties, in a way that enhances the participation of the public in supporting the police.

Preserving morals, discipline and public order.

Take appropriate measures and arrangements to protect property, public utilities and private establishments.

The execution of judicial judgements or any legal rules or decisions which may be issued by competent authority.

Any other tasks or duties assigned to the Police, in accordance with the law.

Article 14 sets out the obligations of a police officer, which include the requirement to bear responsibility for the execution of orders issued by him/her and to obey lawful orders issued to him/her. Assigned duties must be performed precisely and honestly whilst preserving the dignity of citizens. Paragraph 15 then defines the powers of the individual police officers as shown below:

Detention, pursuit and arrest.

Blocking roads, places and public utilities.

Seizure of weapons and dangerous materials.

Interrogation and surveillance.

Conducting criminal investigations.

Inspection, seizure and safeguarding of evidence.

Issue of warrants for attendance.

Asking any person to provide help, to detect any crime.

Taking undertakings and guarantees.

Using of reasonable force in accordance with the controls to be determined by the Law Criminal Procedures.

Any other powers provided for by any valid law.

The functions of Police at the national level are set out in article 16 of the Act as shown below.

Setting the standards and national norms of policing at National and State levels, including the standards of training at the National Capital;

Planning, organising, monitoring and inspecting the administrations and technical work at the national level;

Dealing with issues of nationality and citizenship;

Issuing passports and visas;

Dealing with issues of immigration and aliens affairs;

Dealing with issues of the National Identity Card;

Dealing with issues of Legal Affairs;

Management, organisation and coordination of police regional, international and bilateral relations;

Setting the norms and standards of civil defence duties and standards of safety and fire and rescue procedures;

Control of the Central Reserve Force;

National training;

Setting the national standards of light arms sales and combating the illegal trade in them;

Management, organization and coordination of criminal investigation and the technical criminal work of the crime laboratories and forensic science institutes;

Combating terrorism, organised and trans-national crime;

Raising awareness of crime prevention;

Combating of drugs;

Protection of national utilities and establishments including national natural resources;

Monitoring borders to combat human trafficking and illegal immigration

and cross-border crimes;

Setting the norms and principles of the civil roll;

Setting out systems, regulations and policies for the national traffic;

Establishment and administration of the federal prisons, setting the standards for prisons work and approving the penal policy, on all levels;

Combating smuggling;

Protecting the national museums, heritage and tourism sites;

Setting the standards and regulations of wildlife and environmental preservation;

Any other functions or work of a Federal nature;

Any other duties authorized by the law.

The Act of Criminal Procedures of 1991:

This Act details the functions pertaining to the role of the Police in enforcing the law in the following areas: pursuit, capture and detention; closure of roads, public places and locations; examination, investigation and surveillance; inspection, arrest and holding in custody; control of weapons and dangerous materials; processing of undertakings; bails and issue of warrants for attendance; requesting assistance from any person to avoid or detect any crime; and implementing of judicial decisions (Government, 1991). Article 4 of this law sets some principles to be observed. The following four important principles shown below are quite relevant to police work:

Prevention of crime is a duty of everybody

No one is to be accused of any crime unless under an existing law that was in effect at the time of the criminal act.

Any suspect is considered innocent until convicted.

Prevention of violation against any suspect or his property.

This law is important for the police as it organises the relations between the police, the attorneys and the judges, with each having specific remits. It is mainly concerned with applying the Criminal Act of 1991. Investigations are widely carried out by the police, however, in a few cases the attorneys will conduct investigations, but in all cases the police investigations are fully supervised by the attorneys, as mandated for in Article 19 of Criminal Procedures Code which reads: 'Attorney has the authority of supervising the course of the criminal case, investigations, charge and prosecution before courts as well as all authorities pertaining to investigation and arrest except those in relation to taking of confessions, remands in custody for more than three days and general search'². The last three authorities are usually exercised by judges as its stated in Article 7 of the same code (Government, 1991).

In summary, these mandates are considered to be contemporary and wide-ranging as shown in the DFID funded programme report particularly in relation to community relations and the observance of human rights. However, the report also recognised that the Sudanese Police are still in the process of institutionalising these laws and making them part of day-to-day policing (Programme, 2011).

² This is when the search is not confined to specific place or area for example search of a house, office or a shop. Its when the search is to include a larger area or neighbourhood that a judge must authorise it.

As a result of the peace process that started in 2005, the government is becoming more dependent on the police for the purpose of safeguarding the democratic transformation process in the country, as one of the requirements of the 2005 peace agreement. It has been clearly stated in the interim constitution of 2005 that police will be responsible for internal security. This resulted in an increase in police personnel numbers just before the elections of January 2001 by nearly a third. Despite the hasty manner of recruiting and training these new recruits, and the poor training environment they were trained in, there was an expectation that the recruits would undergo further specialised training. The expansion was considered a great boost for the police force which is now seeking to strengthen its partnership with many countries and organizations for training and capacity building programmes.

Sudanese Police, as many other African police forces, are poorly paid (Hills, 2000). This fact was highlighted during a parliamentary debate on the performance of police on the 22th of November 2011. In that debate it was stated that the police is the worst paid department within the civil services in Sudan, (Alzaki, 2011). Poor wages are damaging to the force by either motivating corruption or lowering the morale of the force. In both of these cases, reputation integrity and performance of the police would all be at risk. The military training and uniform of police within a semi military structure gave them little space to use discretionary powers and take independent operational decisions. It rather makes them almost always wait for further instructions to come from the top of the hierarchy, and therefore as Adlam and Villiers put it, makes it difficult for police independence to develop (Adlam and Villiers, 2003, Hills, 2000). The widespread availability of illegal firearms throughout the country, coupled with the prevalence of armed robbery, has also made the

Sudanese Police closer to a paramilitary organisation, to enable its personnel to protect themselves and provide protection and reassurance for their communities

In many African countries there has always been a concern of the police being too militarised especially when police began to take part in some coups that took place in some African Countries such as Ghana, Ethiopia, etc. (Hills, 2000). In Sudan the Police have always been seen to have a lower profile and to be inferior to the military perhaps because of the military involvement in the South Sudan conflict, which has reinforced this tendency to under resource them.. Even though in the 1971 coup led by Major Hashim Alata it has been thought that Brigadier Abd Alkhalig Gism Allah was aligned with the coup organiser who appointed him as Police Director General for three days before the regime managed to take power back and dismiss him. This did not however prevent him from claiming a pension as a Director General of Police (Salim, 2005). This may indicate that police and politics cannot be easily disconnected.

The weak post independent democratic governments and military regimes both seem to be reluctant to have effective, independent police service that are popular among their communities. It might be perceived as undesired power which might challenge the government or hold some of its members accountable especially in corruption related matters (Hills, 2000).Therefore the issue of supporting police capability and independence is not simply a matter of scarcity of resources within the state.

Challenges facing the Sudanese Police

Characterized by vast porous borders, involving seven neighbouring countries and the Red Sea, one of Sudan's greatest policing challenges is the management and

control of both lawful and unlawful mass-movement and migration over a vast territory. Moreover, in this age of globalization and mobility all police services are expected to contribute to global security. Most of these borders witness insecurity issues such as regional and international cross border crime, including the trafficking of drugs terrorism and firearms – even of human beings and spill over of insurgencies. It is difficult, if not impossible, for Sudan to police all of these phenomena, especially given budget restrictions and the current weakened capabilities of the Sudanese Police, primarily caused by the need to divert both funds and workforce strength to conflict and/or potential conflict areas, as described below.

The long conflicts in Sudan, which have at some point in recent history affected all parts of the country - the west, east, south and north, have had a negative impact on the police. For example, I am aware that during the war between the south and north of the country police budgets were reduced considerably, even though there are no accessible data on this, requiring the police to operate with poor funds and, consequently, insufficient material resources and human development. In many cases the police would ask complainants to provide vehicles or other material to launch investigations. In other cases, especially armed robbery of livestock, the police would not be able to chase the armed robbers due to poor armoury compared to the robbers' arms; moreover they lack the sufficient personnel, vehicles and fuel. This usually results in the complainants organising their own force to chase the criminal culminating in violent confrontations in which many could be killed or injured. Moreover, as in other countries, the conflict represented a direct threat for the police where rebel forces were targeting its members, as they believed the police were representing government authority (Baker, 2006).

To take Darfur as an example: many police stations were attacked there, and many police officers were killed as a result and their firearms were taken. In an attack launched at Shearea village of South Darfur state in January 2004, a senior police officer of the rank of colonel was killed along with other police NCOs (Police, 2004). More tragic incidents were reported in the following years requiring Police Head Quarters to try to cope with the new reality by taking appropriate measures to provide adequate protection for the police, such as upgrading weaponry and tailoring training programmes to suit the new situation. In Darfur the police were heavily involved in guarding IDP camps and convoys of humanitarian aid, as well as the protection of roads that link the major cities with the capital city of Khartoum. To date there are still regular attacks by rebel groups on the roads, to seize fuel and food for themselves and many police officers have lost their lives in these attacks.

Armed robbery has been widespread in Darfur since the early 1980s and has always been an enormous threat to security in this remote western region of the country. During the period between 1990-1997 there were 2,824 reported armed robbery related crimes (Mohamed, 2009) which is close to an armed robbery incident happening every day. Between 1992-1993, 206 people were killed and 268 were wounded as a direct result of armed robbery in Darfur (Mohamed, 2009). Armed gangs which, in most cases, are better armed than the police, conduct persistent attacks on roads, markets, and villages as well as cattle herds. The crimes vary from individuals being murdered for a mobile 'phone, to some cases where banks were robbed in the two capital cities of North Darfur and South Darfur, threatening the bank's staff and taking all the money available. These armed gangs usually flee to the mountains and deserts through bumpy roads and frequently ambush the police when they try to pursue them. The more poorly equipped police in relation to

transportation, communication and weaponry find themselves in an increasingly difficult situation.

The robbery challenge has been aggravated by the widespread availability and use of firearms as a result of both the internal conflict and conflicts in some neighbouring countries during the last three decades. For example, Sudan sheltered the Eritrean opposition fighting the Ethiopian government for three decades; and it was a key battlefield for the armed conflict in Chad that continued throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, as well as the Ugandan rebel group of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) operating in South of Sudan. All these and other incidences – one of the most notable being the 1976 invasion of Khartoum supported by the Libyan regime to overthrow the Nimeri Government (Thomas and Jenkins, 1990) made firearms available for whoever wanted to purchase them. The weak capacity of the authorities in Khartoum and the poorly equipped police failed in containing the problem of firearms and, consequently, armed robberies continue to disturb the stability and the growth of the Darfur region.

Competition over resources is one of the key global security threats (Brock, 2011) and Sudan is no exception as armed tribal conflicts usually occur over pasture or water resources, which represents a further challenge to the police. Resources are a major cause of conflict in Darfur and have been highlighted in a study of the causes of tribal conflict between 1924 and 2003, which included 39 conflicts – 29 of them were over resources (Mohamed, 2009, Bashar, 2013, Musa, 2011). On other occasions tribal conflicts occur over tribal boundaries or deeply rooted disputes between farmers and nomads where farmers claim that nomads take their cattle into the farms and the nomads complain about the tendency of farmers to cultivate areas traditionally known as grazing areas (Mohamed, 2009). The police would in most

cases try to intervene and carry out mediation processes by talking to tribal leaders and chieftains, but these disputes are usually complex and far beyond police ability to contain. In this regard the Darfur Doha Agreement signed in the capital city of Qatar in July 2011 to put an end to the on-going conflict in Darfur, devoted a full section to tenure and land use in Articles 33-38 which might, if implemented, help in tackling the problems arising from land use, which in recent history usually lead to violent conflicts between tribes (Movement, 2011).

The improvement of communications and oil exploration during the nineteen nineties led to the influx of international business investing in the country especially after the signing of the CPA in 2005 which allowed the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to come into Sudan drawing in individuals from all over the world. This culminated in new cultures and traditions which influenced the pattern of crime; therefore new types of crimes emerged in particular: cybercrime; money laundering; transnational crimes; and drug trafficking to mention only a few. The Sudanese Police was not prepared for detecting and investigating some of these crimes and is currently seeking training in many of these areas (Police, 2012).

In the aftermath of the separation from South Sudan, the economic situation in Sudan reached a crisis point, causing the cost of living to rise dramatically (Alraouf, 2011). Spurred on by the Arab Spring many people were inspired around the region to protest against their governments. These financial hardships drove some of the Sudanese population to demonstrate on a few occasions in Khartoum, which is highly unusual. The majority of the demonstrators were acting lawfully under the right of assembly. Articles 124-128 of the criminal procedure code regulate this process (Government, 1991). The events represented a great challenge for the police as they also attracted criminals and gangs who carried out unlawful activities, such as

looting, criminal damage to buildings and cars. Consequently, the police needed to act in a way which secured the right of the people to lawfully protest, whilst at the same time provide protection for properties against vandalism and looting in these tense and fragile situations (Terpstra, 2011). This new phenomenon rendered the police confused on how much legal force was needed to protect people and properties, especially the use of fire arms which is difficult to manage without the endangering innocent people. In this regard the Sudanese Police implemented training for the relevant units in non-lethal techniques to improve their skills in dealing with peaceful protests.

Internal challenges as I see them from my own experience include the issue of indiscriminate postings of officers which continuously causes instability and undermines officer's commitment to long term strategic planning and/or programmes (see chapter five). Officers often get posted to the states on the assumption that they will spend only a limited period there (normally two years) but they actually remain for far longer than that. In the states most officers are mainly concerned about spending as little time there as possible and getting back to the capital, where their families are usually based for the purpose of better education, health services and security. Officers do this even if they are originally from the states where they are posted. This is the result of recruiting and posting systems combined with poor development which made the capital the only attracting urban centre for services such as education and health. This applies to almost all senior officers from the ranks of colonel and above who prefer to live in the capital. In some Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan states it is not considered safe enough for officers to bring their families. The posting issue is one of the most frequently raised issues to the different Director Generals of police visits to the states. Additionally, whenever

delegations from Head Quarters in Khartoum visit the states the issue is always raised with them. This is one of the sensitive issues that is not easily approached or openly discussed among personnel, because it is considered to be connected to criticising the top command policy, and therefore police personnel avoid talking about it openly so that they do not get themselves into disciplinary complications. Nonetheless to maximise the benefits of a posting policy and to mitigate any side effects, it needs to be addressed with some degree of transparency.

Until recently police NCOs were recruited at the regional level and were then assigned to work all over the region regardless of the location of their home towns or villages. That has been changed and NCOs are allowed to work within their own states or localities. It seems to me that this method was adopted due to the growing cost of transportation for NCOs, their luggage and their families each time they get posted. Another factor that contributed to the adoption of this policy is the lack of police houses to accommodate the NCOs, whereas in the past there were enough houses to accommodate them wherever they were posted but the increasing number of NCOs and the shrinking budgets all contributed to NCOs being locally recruited and locally assigned. This new system is internally viewed as effective in relation to NCOs working among their local communities where they have good understanding of the context. However, I also believe locally recruited and locally operating NCOs are considered to be affecting the performance in relation to tribal influence and / or involving in local politics. For this reason NCOs may find it difficult to keep their impartiality away from the influences of kinship and political affiliation.

The training programmes at the regional centres are important in bringing together police recruits from different tribes to live in the same training environment and share their experiences. Additionally this mixing of cultures/tribes provides a good

opportunity in a mainly illiterate society with poor communication and transportation means who would not have had the opportunity to engage in cross-cultural learning without the training event. For instance, in the vast region of Darfur, there used to be one training centre at the regional capital city of Alflashir until the end of the 1970s. Two more centres were built during the 1980s in both Nyala (the capital city of South Darfur State) and Elginena (the capital city of West Darfur State). Unfortunately, they were not built to acceptable standards and were not equipped with appropriate training facilities for NCOs.

Malpractice and corruption also represents one of the great challenges facing police in Sudan. This is closely linked to the issue of community trust of the police. Even though the police leadership did not explicitly address the problem of power misuse, nonetheless it is self-evident that the establishment of a committee, followed by a court, to look into police misconduct suggests that there is a problem that needs to be addressed. Despite this tacit recognition of corruption Sudanese police is seen by many international police consultants who worked in Africa that I interviewed as less corrupt compared to other police force in Africa (see Chapter Six).

Either for considering police matters as sensitive issues related to the national security or police officers being discouraged to reflect on their experiences, few opportunities are provided for police to learn lessons even from major incidents in the past. Such major policing incidents like the one in March 1953 when the then Egyptian president Mohamed Najeep was visiting Sudan to attend the first session of the Sudanese parliament, many people died including police officers in clashes between supporter of the Oma party opposing the visit and the police. Another incident in 1964 when the minister of interior who was visiting South Sudan did not arrive into Khartoum at the expected time (Berridge, 2011, Salim, 2008). Violence

erupted in Khartoum and hundreds people were killed. Both incidents are not known about or taught to police officers. Thus lessons have not been learned to police future similar events. The clear example of this is the riots followed the death of First Vice President of Sudan John Garang, who died in a plane crash in July 2005. If lessons had been learned from previously mentioned incidents, the police would have been better able to predict and tackle the situation.

One of the weaknesses of Sudanese Police training system at the police college is the lack of practical training. The current programme includes only four weeks field training out of the three years training programme designed for police officers. It might be useful for officers to acquire good legal knowledge but they need the practical aspect of training that allows them to put that knowledge into practice.

Partnerships

In an increasingly interdependent world, police forces around the globe cannot operate in isolation of the outside world prompted by modern travel means and easy communication, the Sudanese Police force is working in collaboration with many other police forces and organisations to promote partnerships. Beside their internal partners which include the wider community, civil society organisations, and government departments and being a member of the international police criminal organisation Interpol, Sudanese Police also have long established relations with many police forces around the world.

Soon after independence, the Sudanese Police built a strong relationship with the Western German police force which provided excellent training opportunities for many officers and provided printing press, communication system and help in building the Sudanese Police laboratories. The Sudanese Police gradually

continued to expand their partnership with other police forces, with which they exchange formal visits between high ranking officials, conduct study tours or run training programmes both in the Sudan and in the partner country. This exposure to the outside world gave chance to Sudanese Police to interact with diverse methods of policing approaches and identify common themes as well as learn lessons from other's experience. The international partners now include Nayif Academy for Security Studies, Egypt; Turkey; UK; India and Russia as major partners, with which Sudanese Police has signed a training protocol or a memorandum of understanding. Another important partner for the Sudanese Police since 2005 was the UN police operating within the United Nation Mission in Sudan. The mission started at the beginning of the implementation of the CPA and formally ended in 2011. The UNAMIS police mandate was to monitor and train Sudanese Police. Many short term training programmes were conducted across the country the focus of most of them was community policing, human rights and forensic evidence courses.

Sudan is also a member of the Arab Council Ministers of Interior's Councils, headquartered in Tunisia. As a regional organisation this council is concerned about policing matters and policies of common interest among the members states mainly crime fighting, security and cooperation. This includes coordination of the extradition of criminals and terrorists, monitoring of borders, transnational crime and drug trafficking (Sulyman, 2007).

These partnerships are however not all without difficulties, as the policing styles in these countries differ, which can lead to confusion (See Chapter Five). It is also essential to note that almost all these partnerships were in the areas of consultation and training and did not include provision of equipment, which is significant for any police service operating with poor budget. The UK government, for instance,

supported the police in Sierra Leone with a great deal of equipment including fire arms and vehicles at the end of the civil war in the country. In Somalia, the US government provided the police with substantial amount of vehicles, clothing and other items. Despite the significance of partnership and aid, it must however be underpinned by strong commitment and genuine willingness to achieve the desired outcome for both partners. In part, it is organisational change that usually meets some resistance from groups and individuals who feel that their interests are being threatened if new systems are introduced.

Efforts Towards Reform

The Sudanese Police faced allegations of corruption and misconduct of some of its members and the lack of trust from local communities. The Sudanese police is engaged in a process of reform to improve its image and gain trust among the community .

These efforts include the following:

1/ The Sudanese Police is part of the justice system in which police personnel are held accountable according to Sudan laws (Abdalhag, 2005). On 2nd November 2006, the then Director General of police, Mahgoub Hassan Saad, issued Order No 81/2006 to all state police commissioners to set up a committee to gather, investigate and deal with the information regarding police personnel misconduct and behaviour in their states. He also ordered a central committee at the national level to be established; the Order stated that the purpose of the establishment of these committees was to maintain discipline and good conduct among the force to prepare them for better performance. Following that, there was the establishment of a discipline court at Khartoum State Police Head Quarters in 2007, when the

Commissioner of Khartoum police issued order No 2/2007 setting up a committee to look at all misconduct and crimes committed by police personnel in Khartoum State. The purpose was to have a swift and efficient mechanism to immediately deal with cases that involve police corruption and misconduct. Although there was no public statement about the extent of the problem, one can deduce that it must have been quite serious for such measures to be taken. Officers from legal backgrounds were assigned to serve as judges applying law from police acts and criminal acts and following the provisions of act of criminal procedure acts. This court has played a significant role in two areas; first is that it encouraged citizens to come forward and report police corruption as well as reassuring them that their complaints would be seriously considered. Second, it contributed to better police conduct and behaviour as a result of the many cases in which police personnel were dismissed, fined or sent to prison – all that has helped in enhancing building a culture of accountability among the force. It is actually being feared, especially by NCOs who think that these courts has been established only to find them guilty, according to one NCO who the author interviewed at West Greif police station in Khartoum in March 2010. Since this Court was established 113 officers have been convicted and 495 NCOs were convicted, the big difference between the numbers reflects the combination of the force in which officers are far less than NCOs (Jackson, 2010).

2/ The second initiative has been the establishment of the community committees, to work closely with police at the police station level. These committees, which are usually selected by the local community in a non-formal selection process, are designed to represent the local community by interacting with the police in regular meetings to raise community policing concerns and in some cases, provide support to the police in different forms. The members of the committees volunteer and are

from a variety of professions and backgrounds. Community policing has been introduced as the key policing approach that is being pushed forward by UN organisations and International donors, as described above. One of the main purposes of introducing this type of policing is to involve the community in policing aspects, thus providing some transparency in police work, which might in the end lead to building community trust in the police. Once the police have achieved this goal to a reasonable degree, they would expect to have access to valuable intelligence in return which can then be used for proactive policing rather than reactive policing which will serve the main strategy of preventing crime as stated in Article 13 of the Sudanese Police Act of 2008. The first point of contact with these community committees is the community safety centres established in neighbourhoods, the committees usually contribute or build these centres as well as providing free meals to the police NCOs working there. These centres conduct joint night patrols with volunteers from the area to deter criminals. These have so far only been partially successful. It may be the case that the quasi-military police uniforms contribute to slow progress in getting closer to their communities.

3/ the Code of Conduct for the Sudanese Police were introduced in 2009, drawn widely from the ethos of the UN Police Code of Conduct and Sudanese Police Act. This code was aimed at strengthening accountability for police officers and drawing their attention to their core duties as law enforcement agents as well as the rights citizens are entitled to in accordance with Police Act, act of criminal procedure, and other laws and regulations pertinent to police and human rights. These include: respect for human rights, care of victims of accidents, refraining from torture plus the protection of the health of detainees, and refraining from corruption. It also urges police personnel to build good relations with communities. Moreover the code

prompts members of the police to maintain discipline and respect subordinates in accordance with the law. Police Head Quarters carried out a wide campaign to distribute the Code of Conduct and explain its contents to police personnel in the different departments and states. Printed in pocket-size, Head Quarters required every police officer and NCO to have a copy of the code at all times to show it to citizens they meet and explain it to them.

Conclusion

Enforcing the law is always a sensitive matter that needs good use of discretionary powers, whilst observing human rights and having a deep understanding of the context (Adlam and Villiers, 2003). With this in mind, police forces are often assessed on how they respond to demands and whether they act proportionately, swiftly and appropriately. This assessment becomes even more complicated when the police have to operate in post-war contexts. The Sudanese police themselves suffered severely by attacked by the rebels and have lost their relatives who were also killed by the rebels, the situation gets further complicated when the police find it difficult to be impartial. As in other countries emerging from conflict, the Sudanese Police have also been highly affected by the conflict ranging from the fact that it has to cope with ever shrinking budgets to embracing new policing philosophies to meet emerging policing realities prompted by conflicts. However, as pointed out by Call (2007) post-conflict situations have some advantages for police as they often constitute a good chance for reform to be introduced within the overall state building process. In this regard the police Act of 2008 is a product of the peace process started in 2005 even though the Sudanese police did not change much as a result of

that Act. Moreover in the aftermath of conflict police can also get improved resources through international donors (Call, 2007).

This chapter presented the history, the status quo, the challenges and how they are affected by the conflict in Sudan. It is important to note that police cannot be judged in isolation from the state system to which it is tied very closely and the society within which it is operating. Police practice and performance may be drawn from state attitude and behaviour. Society is a teaching source and police can hardly behave in a way that is far from the morals and beliefs of that society (Terpstra, 2011). Even though this assessment appears to be inaccurate in a shrinking global world it is also fair to say that every context needs to be judged independently from other contexts however similar (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006). I therefore conclude that the Sudanese police have the colonial legacy which can still be seen in the constrained relations with society as a result of the society seeing the police as state agent that can at times act to serve political agenda. This represents a great challenge for the police as they cannot develop or undertake any reform without government support. Despite the great challenges, especially those arising from the conflict and political instability, Sudanese police are seen as much competent and less corrupt than other forces in the region (see chapter five). Moreover the success in providing security to the elections of 2010 in an extremely politically tense situation was a great success with international praise for the Sudanese police. Corruption allegations have prompted the anti-corruption measures to improve police image, however these measures as we will see in more details in chapter five, produced discontent among police personnel as being too harsh and unfair. In an attempt to overcome some of these challenges the Sudanese police sought support through partnerships with many countries.

Complex and perpetual conflicts in Sudan as stated earlier have impinged on the police in various ways. I will therefore provide an understanding of the nature of conflict and peace process as well as their relation with the Sudanese police in the next chapter.

Chapter Four

The impact of Conflict on Sudanese Police and Their Roles in Peacebuilding Processes in Sudan

Introduction

This chapter does not seek to present an exhaustive account of the complexity of conflict in Sudan. It rather provides a brief background for the conflict in one of the African countries that was debilitated by bitter internal conflicts since independence in 1955. Conflict continued for nearly half a century despite efforts to bring peace to the country that, on occasion, brought short-lived peace. In this background, I will be presenting the main features of that conflict which spread from the south of the country to both the east and west with catastrophic cost in human lives and suffering. Moreover, these will shed light on the peace efforts by outlining the peace deals reached, the challenges encountered, and the contentious issues faced when implementing those peace deals. I will then seek to draw the link between the conflict, Peacebuilding process, and the Sudanese Police locating the police in the peace agreements and explain to what extent these agreements impinge on the Sudanese Police role in the peacebuilding process.

Conflicts in Africa

During the Cold War, there were many active conflicts in Africa (Baker, 2010, Barash, 2000). In part, these conflicts came as a result of the colonial legacy of the artificial borders and the divide and rule policy but also because of the mismanagement of resources and abuse of power from national regimes that took

power in Africa at the end of the colonial period (Thomson, 2010, Mamdani, 2009). The arbitrary borders drawn to mark the interests of the colonial powers, without consideration of the economic, ethnic, social, or cultural consideration of inhabitants of the regions, later became major sources of conflict in the continent; moreover, many ethnic groups found themselves divided between more than one country. The Somali people, for instance, were divided between more than three countries. Such ethnic divides culminated in conflicts between states to unite ethnic groups and triggered conflicts among the heterogeneous groups who found themselves squashed into one state (Thomson, 2010.pp.4-15). Post-colonial Africa witnessed numerous military coups, especially during the 1960s. Between 1963 and 1985, 61 such coups took place (Furley and May, 2006,p.19). As previously stated in Chapter Three, Sudan has had a fair share of such coups with three successful coups in 1958, 1969, and 1989. Also, the military ruled the country for various periods whilst several other unsuccessful coups were thwarted (Thomas and Jenkins, 1990, Woodward, 1990).

Conflicts in Modern Sudan since 1955

Sudan has constantly been destabilised by interconnected octopus-like conflicts with many peace talks and peace agreements. Peace agreements led to UN and AU peacekeeping missions being deployed -- all failed to achieve durable peace in the country. Conflict in one part of the country affects another, as pointed out in the preamble of UNSC resolution 2003/2011, “. . . the negative effect of the ongoing violence in Darfur on the stability of Sudan as a whole as well as the region”. The next section will set out the root causes and triggers of these conflicts, and then briefly outline the anatomy of conflicts in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, Darfur, East Sudan, and Abyie.

Triggers of Conflict

Political and development marginalisation in the Sudan of the peripheries by successive governments' policies are commonly assumed by observers to be the main factors for igniting and sustaining the conflict in the country (Barltrop, 2011). This geographical pattern of marginalisation was rooted in and compounded by the colonial policy of divide and rule when it created artificial divides between some parts of the country (Mamdani, 2009, Berridge, 2011, Barltrop, 2011). For example, the policy of blocked areas in the south separated the south of Sudan and some parts of Kordofan state from the northern part of the country and, likewise, from the focus on the tribal system through indirect rule in Darfur which deepened tribal sentiments and separated the region from being effectively united into the country (Bashar, 2013, Mamdani, 2009). Sources of conflict in Sudan can be attributed to many factors including political participation, equal and just development, fair resource distribution, and identity issues (Bashar, 2013, Barltrop, 2011, Natsios, 2012, Copnall, 2014, Malwal, 2005). Many believe that the colonial policy sowed the seeds in Sudan for unavoidable conflict which is particularly evident in Darfur and south Sudan which were actively isolated from the riverine Sudan during colonial times (Berridge, 2011,p.25). It is important to note that the conflict in Sudan is neither ethnically rooted in a simple way, nor it is religiously motivated (Barltrop, 2011). Mamdani 2009 indicated that in Darfur, British rule allocated certain tribes a homeland and left others without land; this, he says, was then exacerbated by the drought that hit the region later and became a source of conflict between those with land and those without land (Mamdani, 2009). The competition amongst tribes in Darfur over diminishing resources of water, grazing land, and farming land developed into violent

tribal conflict in the 1980s and continued into the first decade of the 21st century (see Chapter Three) (Mamdani, 2009, Bashar, 2013, Musa, 2011).

In addition to these internal factors, there are external factors. The former Sudan (before secession of South Sudan), was surrounded by nine countries, two Arab and six Sub-Saharan African countries, three of which witnessed civil wars. Ethiopia, DRC, and Chad were suffering internal conflicts. The spill over of the conflict of Ethiopia and Chad was particularly significant. Refugees from these countries flooded into Sudan. As a consequence of the conflict in neighbouring countries, rebel groups operated on Sudan's territory, and firearms became widespread. The eastern region of Sudan, bordering Ethiopia and northwest of Darfur, were war zones for the Eritrean revolution and Chadian rebels respectively (Barltrop, 2011, Furley and May, 2006, Woodward, 1990). The combination of internal and external factors left Sudan susceptible to insecurity and volatile for insurgency as described in the following section.

South Sudan

The Colonial policy of divide and rule blocked South Sudan from other parts of the country and, thereby, limited the access of people from other parts of Sudan to travel into the south and parts of Kordofan regions. Similarly, South Sudanese were not allowed to travel to the north. Furthermore, the British restricted the use of Arabic language and Islam as well as prescribing that education had to be conducted in English and end at lower level than that of the north (Woodward, 1990,p.48). In the Juba Conference of 1947, the British brought together representatives from South Sudan and northern Sudan in which the two parties agreed to a united Sudan which meant an end to the policy of South Sudan (Woodward, 1990). On the eve of

independence, the civil war started in Toret, in South Sudan, when part of the Sudan civil defence force that were all from South Sudan mutinied killing their colleagues and officers from the northern part of the country . That cycle of civil conflict ended in 1972 when an agreement was signed in Addis Ababa. Peace prevailed in the south of Sudan until 1983. The violation of the Addis Ababa agreement by president Nemeiri motivated officers in Bor led by Colonel of Sudan army Johan Garang to start a new war in 1983. Garang formed the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLA) and launched a war that was wider and more violent than the previous one. It included new areas outside the borders of Southern Sudan, in particular, South Kordofan and Blue Nile areas which became part of the conflict theatre. Moreover, in late 1991, the SPLA sent fighters led by one Darfur Islamist politician to start an insurgency war in Darfur. This attempt was crushed by the central government. In the east of the Country, SPLA formed an alliance with some north Sudanese political parties to launch an insurgency war in that part of the country 1996 (Barltrop, 2011, Mamdani, 2009).

The CPA was based on the Machakos Protocol signed in Kenya, 20 July 2002, which, for the first time, granted the South Sudan people the right to self-determination. Article 1.3 of the Machakos Protocol stated, “. . . that the people of south Sudan have the right to self-determination *inter alia*, through a referendum to determine their future status”. The internationally monitored referendum was thus enshrined in the Protocol to be conducted at the end of the six-year transitional period agreed between the parties therein. The Protocol planted the seed for the end of Africa's longest running conflict and the breakup of Africa's largest country. Article 1.1 affirmed the unity of Sudan to be the priority of the parties. CPA also granted South Sudan an autonomous status during the transitional period with the right for

SPLA to keep their army intact in addition to a police force to be created independent of that of north Sudan. Considerable attention from the international community was given to the negotiation of the CPA which was led by the Intergovernmental Authority for Development Group (IGAD) of East Africa. The African Union, European Union, and United States provided support throughout the prolonged negotiations, and finally, their representatives witnessed the signing of CPA in Nairobi on 9 January 2005 (Movement, 2005, Johnson, 2011). When the last major phase of the CPA was accomplished by conducting the South Sudan referendum, it was apparent that the CPA had not only succeeded in achieving independence for South Sudan but had transformed the Sudanese conflict. In spite of its name, the CPA did not prevent conflict from continuing in several parts of Sudan and, indeed, arguably caused some of these.

South Kordofan and Blue Nile

These two areas are geographically separated from each other but share a special status within the CPA. This was due to the fact that people from these areas were fighting with SPLA during the South-North conflict. Two separate Protocols within the CPA were dedicated to these individuals to determine their status during the interim period and decide on their future status through what was termed 'popular consultation'. The protocols stated that during the six-year transitional period, the two areas would be governed through power-sharing arrangements that gave fifty per cent to both the Government of Sudan (GoS) and SPLA. At the end of the transitional period and before the consultation was arranged, conflicts broke out just as South Sudan was becoming an independent country (Movement, 2005). During the transitional period, the two areas were home to the Ninth and Tenth Divisions of the SPLA army. Based in South Sudan and rebranding themselves SPLA North, the

new leadership of the two areas continued to fight the Sudanese government with their back to the new South Sudan state. When violence escalated, the two parties went to negotiations in Addis Ababa hosted by the African Union in accordance with UNSC resolution 2046 (2012) (Council, 2012b).

Chapter Five of the CPA was devoted to the two states; Articles 5.8-5.11 dealt with policing matters within the two states. Article 5.9 states that police officers are to be chosen by the state and sent to get training at the national level in accordance with the national standards while NCOs have to be chosen and trained locally. When training for groups, officers, and NCOs, the national standards should be adhered to. Article 5.10 and 5.11 are concerned with the transferring of police personnel to and from the states which must take place upon consultation between national and state authority (Movement, 2005). Failure of the two parties to adhere to the agreement to clearly define and then implement what they called 'popular consultation' protracted the conflict in the two states. Article 3.1 of Chapter Five of the agreement defined 'popular consultation' as, "democratic right and mechanism to ascertain the views of the people of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states on the comprehensive agreement reached by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement". The agreement went on to state in article 3.2 "that this comprehensive agreement shall be subject to the will of the people of the two states through their respective democratically elected legislatures". In later articles, it was stipulated that each legislature should establish a commission to evaluate and assess the implementation of the agreement and submit a report to the legislature by the fourth year of the agreement. Another independent commission was to be set up by the presidency to assess and evaluate the implementation of the agreement and to report to both the state legislature and the presidency. If satisfied, the legislature in

each state would endorse the agreement as meeting the aspiration of the people of the state (Movement, 2005). The problem is the final provision in this section which leaves the door ajar for rectifying the shortcomings of the agreement in the constitutional, political, and administrative aspects through consultation with the national government. This simply means that the situation is open to potentially never ending negotiations. The section reads, “Should any of the legislatures of the two states, after reviewing the Agreement, decide to rectify, within the framework of the Agreement, any shortcomings in the constitutional, political and administrative arrangements of the Agreement, then such legislative shall engage in negotiations with the National Government with the view of rectifying these shortcomings” (Movement, 2005).

Abyie Disputed Area

Like the two areas of Blue Nile and South Kordofan, Abyie area, too, has its own Protocol in the CPA. It is an area at the border between South Sudan and Sudan with both parties claiming ownership. What distinguishes Abyie is that it was not part of the war area during the conflict. In Chapter Five of the CPA, “the resolution of the Abyie conflict”, the area was defined in article 1.1.1. as “a bridge between the North and South linking the people of Sudan” (Movement, 2005). The dispute originates from the special administrative arrangements during the British time in 1905. This administrative arrangement encompasses a change of borders of land and movement of people between the two parts of the country (Movement, 2005, Johnson, 2011). A special administrative status was granted to the area during the interim period. A joint council equally representing citizens of the area from Western Kordofan state and Bahr el Ghazal was to run the area. Being an oil-rich area, the revenues of the oil were equally divided between the north and south. The future of

the area, according to the Protocol, was to be decided through referendum at the end the transitional period. Disagreement arose between the two parties on who constitutes a citizen of the area and is thus be entitled to vote on the referendum. The issue of the border of the area was contentious, and the Agreement stated that a commission should be appointed to demarcate the borders of the area; the commission commenced its work to solve the problem, but with little success. The two parties took the matter to the International Arbitration Tribunal in The Hague (Tribunal, 2009, Deng, 2010). Not convinced by the outcome of the arbitration, the two parties reverted to violence which led to the intervention of the UN with the deployment of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyie (UNISFA). The mission was mandated by resolution 1990 which states that it is mandated under Chapter Seven of the Un charter and composed of Ethiopian troops agreed upon by the two parties (Council, 2011b).

Darfur

Darfur, as stated earlier in Chapter Three, was not part of the British Sudan until 1916 when its then Sultan, Ali Dinar, showed his alliance to the Ottoman Empire during the WW1. The British then invaded the region and annexed it to Sudan in November 1916. Recognising its poor economic worth, the British ruled Darfur with as little as possible administration. Using tribal chiefs as governing instruments, they used an adaptation of indirect rule until the end of the colonial period. Hardly any development was recorded in the region during this period (Mamdani, 2009, O'Fahey, 2008). Following independence, one government after another failed to adopt an inclusive political policy in the region. What is more, Darfur remained one of the least developed areas of the country (Movement, 2011, Musa, 2011, Bashar, 2013)).

The Darfur conflict that started in 2003 extended beyond the region of Darfur to include three states of Kurdofan. At one point, the Justice and Equality Movement, the leading rebel movement in the region, attempted to attack the capital in May 2008 (Hoile, 2010, Barltrop, 2011). The spill over of the Chadian and Libyan conflict during the 1980s and 1990s exposed the region to large numbers of Chadian refugees and filled the region with widespread firearms. Government in Khartoum approved the use of Darfur soil by Chadian rebels fighting their government in Ndjamea (Barltrop, 2011). These factors, combined with severe drought, led to bloody conflict among the tribes residing in the region who were fighting over depleting resources of water and arable and grazing land. Conflict among tribes heightened during and toward the end of 1980s with weaker governments in Khartoum unable to intervene to restore order. It was further deepened by being politicised through politicians in Khartoum seeking support of certain tribes and favouring one group over another (Musa, 2011, Bashar, 2013, Barltrop, 2011). Tribal conflict began to feature in UNSC resolutions expressing concern about increased inter-tribal violence as in resolution 2003 (Council, 2011c) and 2006 (Council, 2012a). With this background, the region was ripe for conflict which effectively started in 2003. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in tandem with the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) launched a fierce insurgency war against the government. In response, the government embarked on a violent counterinsurgency war in which it allied with certain tribes drawing recruits forming militia forces who fought beside the government forces. These militias, who become known as Janjaweed, were later embroiled in human rights allegations leading the International Criminal Court ICC to indict and later issue an arrest warrant against the incumbent President Omer Albasheir charging him and other Sudanese officials with war crimes

and crimes against humanity (Hoile, 2010, Mamdani, 2009, De Waal, 2007, Daly, 2007). The violence culminated in large numbers of refugees in Chad and internally displaced people (IDPs) in camps around the main cities of Darfur-- mainly Alfasir, Niyala, and Zalengi (Mamdani, 2009). This situation led to humanitarian crises resulting in a plethora of international organizations stepping in to provide aid in the form of food and other basic needs. In May 2006, the Government of Sudan signed The Abuja Peace Agreement with SLM in Abuja, Nigeria. JEM, however, refused to sign with the splitting faction from SLM so, the violence continued in the region. The African Union, the UN, and Qatar led mediation efforts culminating in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) which was signed in Doha in 2011 when the government and Liberation and Justice Movement agreed a peace deal. The DDPD left an opening for rebel factions intending to join it. Later, a faction that split from JEM joined the deal while the main body of the movement remained resistant to DDPD. In 2012, the UNSC adopted resolution 2063 welcoming the agreement and urging, in vain, the non-signatory faction to join the process (Council, 2011b, Council, 2012a)At the peak of the violence, the African Union authorised a peace mission, and later, the UNSC approved a further peace mission. The United Nations African Union Hybrid Mission UNAMID was then established in accordance with resolution 1769/2008 to act under Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter to protect civilians in Darfur from violence (Council, 2008a).

Eastern Sudan

The eastern Sudan conflict was the least violent internal conflict in the country. The Eastern Front (Beja Congress) operating from Eritrea backed by the Sudanese Opposition Parties under National Democratic Alliance (NDA) together with SPLA launched, in 1995, an insurgency war against the government. They attacked

Kasala, the capital of eastern Sudan, and occupied Hamesh Koraib, thus, threatening the strategic road that links the capital Khartoum with main seaport of Port Sudan. The signing of the CPA ended SPLA and NDA involvement here (Barltrop, 2011,p.26). The Eastern Front remained active in the region until 2006 when successful mediation in Eritrea, in 2006, led to a peace agreement in the same year. The government agreed to establish an Eastern Fund to undertake development projects in the region. On the political side, a post of presidential assistant was allocated to the region as well as numerous political posts both at the national and regional level. There was also a quota of police officers to be given to the region, and combatants from the Front were integrated into the police at different ranks (see Chapter Five).

Police in Peace Agreements in Sudan

According to Barltrop (200) Security sector reform was never a primary aim of the negotiations at the CPA talks, nor were its elements negotiated in detail. Because the agreement granted a measure of autonomy to the south, it, in effect, created a second set of security actors, at least for the interim period. However, the CPA did not stipulate that the security sector, at either the overarching or local levels, should be brought under civilian command; nor did it require conformity with international norms about the use of force or other policies that are typically associated with SSR. Nor, for that matter, did the agreement contain detailed arrangements for police reform (Barltrop, 2008)

Power sharing in peace agreements usually aims to provide a sense of inclusiveness, recognition of self-governance for minorities, and fair representation of marginalised groups (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005,p.8). Perhaps, because the Sudan

peace agreements are regional ones that did not affect the whole country, DDR programmes for the regional former rebel fighters included the possibility to be recruited into the police (excluding South Sudan where the Comprehensive Peace Agreement gave the south the right to have their own police, military, and security systems). Furthermore, the CPA provided two separate DDR programs for the two parts of the country (Movement, 2005, Barltrop, 2008).

Despite the fact that police reform was not clearly stipulated in the CPA, it nonetheless was hoped by observers that some reform would take place along the ethos of the CPA of good governance and equality in both parts of the country. However, the fact that there were two separate police forces in both the north and south of Sudan, in reality, minimised the chances for real reform that could be monitored by the two former enemies. Both were keen to keep their policing system intact and away from the influence of the other party. The implementation of agreements of Darfur, Eastern Sudan, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile states led to the integration of former rebel fighters into the police, but the agreements included no provisions to reform the national police. During the South Sudan peace negotiations, representatives of the Sudanese Police were present at the negotiations table as they were during the Darfur peace negotiations. One representative, who I interviewed, indicated that the two parties avoided committing themselves to real reform. He said that the rebel groups were more concerned about their quota in the police and having more inclusive police organisations. They insisted on securing specific numbers of their fighters to join the police often at different high ranks. When they started the recruiting process, they failed to present individuals who were qualified for the appropriate rank (see Chapter Six).

The CPA provisions did, however, succeed in prompting the Police Act of 2008 to be enacted. The imperative of that act was the establishment of a clear division of the police into three levels: national, South Sudan, and state level (Government, 2008). In the Security Arrangements section within the CPA, the police were only mentioned under article 8, National Security Organs and Police Reform, which reads, “Structures and arrangements affecting all law enforcement organs, especially the police and National security organs, shall be dealt with as part of the power sharing arrangements and tied, where is necessary, to the appropriate level of the executive”. In the power sharing section, however, the police force was referred to indirectly when detailing the national and state powers. For instance, the passport, visa, and nationalisations being specified within national powers, and state police and prison guards allocated within state powers (Movement, 2005). The CPA included no provisions explicitly regarding the reform of the police; as stated earlier, the fact the two parties were intending to have their own policing system seems to have left them with no appetite for national police reform. The CPA came close to the policing issue in article 2.10.1 of the power sharing arrangements that stipulated that there shall be established a National Commissions for Civil Service, Judiciary Service, and Human Rights, but it fell short of saying anything explicit about the national police. The opportunity that Macaulay alluded to of police reform when peace agreements were concluded, has been lost in the CPA detailed provisions of power and wealth sharing arrangements (Movement, 2005).

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) dedicated a section for the reform of the selected security institutions, which included the police. For example, article 446 stated that state police and their subsidiary departments of popular police and the nomadic police should be subject to reform. Article 447 detailed the required reform

which should include the size, mandate, membership based on merit regardless of ethnicity or political affiliation, fair representation of all groups; legal oversight and accountability, and representation of women in all ranks with special section to address their specific needs. This put the DPA forward as the best agreement to address the police issues (Movement, 2006). Despite the promising provisions set forth in the DPA, nothing was implemented. It seems that reform of the domestic police and their potential role in the peacebuilding process is more present in the peace missions mandated to monitor the peace process than in the peace deals reached between the parties. Police are an integral part of missions mandated to operate in Sudan, but this features the role expected international police forces, rather than local police in Peacebuilding. In other peace accords, police have been given more attention than this. In Paragraph 6 of the UNSC resolution 2063, for example, the Council requested UNAMID to support the implementation of the DDPD by working closely with the United Nations country team on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and building the capacity of the police, justice, and corrections sectors (Council, 2012a).

Sudan's Police Force since the CPA

To understand the relationship between the Sudanese Police and peacebuilding in the country, it is useful to have closer look at the mandate of the Sudanese Police in the Sudan Interim Constitution of 2005. Article 137 states that the statutory function of the Sudanese Police is to maintain internal security (Government, 2005). This is how the Sudanese Police force was perceived in the light of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Movement, 2005) signed in 2005 and the Sudan Interim Constitution passed in the same year. In the aftermath of years of war and conflict, the Sudanese Police have, since 2005, become part of the peace process in the

country. The CPA stipulated that the police had to be subjected to reform; to achieve this, a new Police Act, the Sudanese Police Forces Act (SPFA) of 2008, was enacted (Government, 2008).

As stated earlier, the reform was driven by the provisions of the CPA (2005). This required a restructuring of the police system into the three levels-- the Sudan National Police, the South Sudanese Police, and the State police. The Sudanese Police Forces Act of 2008 abolished the 1999 police legislation. Although much of the content was based on the provisions of the previous law, it included new aspects of policing to be embraced and clearly stated the police force is a national force that is open to all Sudanese people without discriminations as stated in article 11 (1) of the Police Act 2008. Guided by the ethos of the CPA, the new act also emphasised the observation of the rule of law and human rights article in article 11(2). The Sudanese Police force is also required by the Act of 2008 to seek efficiency and professionalism through interacting with the international community and to adopt international best practice (Government, 2008).

Despite the significance of these provisions to the development of the police in Sudan, it seems that the new Police Act did not set out adequate measures for accountability and transparency which are essential elements for any police force to be trusted by the community they are providing service to and thus able to play an active role in keeping the peace among communities.

I also stress that, even though these documents introduce most of the new policing matters to Sudan, they fall short of specifically linking policing approaches to the Peacebuilding process. Policing in post-conflict countries, such as Sudan, is an integral part of the peacebuilding process as it is evidenced throughout this chapter,

and yet, the legislative framework does not make this clear. Consequently, the concept of peacebuilding is not institutionalised in the selection, training system, or management of the Sudanese Police. The difficulty of police working in the conflict prone areas is described in the following quote from the research respondent:

It is difficult to get involved in peace-keeping or peace-building when you work in a conflict area as the police become actively involved in the conflict, including heavily armed conflicts and shootings. This is not the role of the police because it is a civil service and the army should cover it. The police, through international humanitarian law, are protected because its personnel are part of this civil service and should not be attacked by any party. However, because the police are used in this inappropriate role, officers and staff become the enemies of the parties involved in the conflict. So, they cannot support the peace process – in fact the police often become the target of those involved in the conflict. This also creates other serious problems as the Police Rules and Regulations state that police personnel can only be involved in conflict if there is a Presidential Decree, but normal practice on-the-ground does not involve getting that decree. Consequently, if a police officer is injured or killed, there is no compensation for him or his family because the Presidential Decree has not been issued. A memo was put in about this serious anomaly, but it did not make its way 'to the top', so nothing has changed (A1/3/7)

It was noticeable during the fieldwork that the Sudanese police have little understanding of the peace process and their role in that process. Their

understanding of the peacebuilding is built on what they hear or read in the news as opposed to institutional briefing or training.

The Contributions of the Sudanese Police to the Peace Process

This section explores aspects of policing in Sudan and examines their contributions, or otherwise, to the Peacebuilding process. One of the great challenges for the Sudanese Police emanating from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was the securing of the general election in January 2010 and the referendum process for the South Sudan people in April 2011. Tension was huge, consequently, both activities were monitored by the international community -- The United Nations, The Arab league, and The African Union. The whole situation was of great political sensitivity. To prepare for this, the Sudanese Police first launched training programmes for officers in Khartoum to cover the legal aspects and the potential threats. Experts representing all relevant departments, which included the police, the Election Commission, and the Ministry of Justice designed a curriculum to be used for this purpose. At the end of their training in Khartoum, these officers were asked to deliver training courses for both officers and NCOs in the different states including the South Sudanese Police (which, at that time, had an autonomous status by the virtue of the CPA) to secure the election process throughout the whole country. Elections went smoothly and without violence. Monitors from the international community witnessed that the policing of the elections was excellent. The Sudanese Police learned many lessons from the election which enabled them to manage the referendum process for South Sudanese people in April 2011. This time, trainers did not go to South Sudan (where a separate training programme took place) but replicated the process for police personnel in all the northern states focusing on the areas where many southerners reside because people from north Sudan were

not entitled to vote for the referendum. Once again, the tension was high, but the international community was monitoring the process which was accomplished with a great degree of success. The two parties in the south and the north immediately recognised the results as well as the international community which paved the way to South Sudan becoming an independent state in July 2011. The serious violent disturbance in the capital following the death of SPLA leader and First Vice President John Garang 2005, alluded to in Chapter Three, placed a lot of pressure on the police and jeopardized the whole peace process. It was ethnically based violence in which hundreds of people were killed; it was all sparked from a rumour that the death of SPLA leader was a result of criminal act plotted by Sudanese government. Police were able to contain the situation even though many innocent people were killed and many private businesses were burned. The success of the police in containing the violent troubles and restoring order was necessary for the peace process to continue.

Conclusion

The internal conflict of Sudan, as shown in this chapter, is a complex one in terms of the length, the area affected, and the human cost. It is also noticeable how much international attention it attracted. Yet, comprehensive and durable peace remained an elusive goal for a long time. The peace arrangements reached to end these conflicts are marked by the political interests of the conflicting parties and their obsession with security arrangements and power sharing thus failing to address the root causes of the conflict and to effectively link the police to the peace process. Police structure and philosophy have officially not been affected by the peace arrangements themselves, which on paper, at least, were expected to operate at the margins of the policing establishment. Therefore, the important role of the police in peacebuilding, discussed in Chapter Two, is not reflected in the peace process

across the country. As the major peace agreement in the country, the CPA did not seem to allocate attention to the police and policing matters. The Abuja Peace Agreement addressed police matters more than did the CPA; however, the implementation was not significant. Despite the neglect of the police role in the peace process, it proved indispensable in solidifying the peace process which was embodied by the securing of the 2010 elections and the referendum on South Sudan independence in 2011.

I have now presented the Sudanese police case and where it fits within the wider international literature on police peacebuilding as well as how the Sudanese police were affected by the peace process, where they are located in the peace agreements, and what role they have played within the peace process in the country. In the following chapter, I will examine the leadership and management of the Sudanese police and consider the Sudanese policing style in the context of peacebuilding in the country.

Chapter Five

Leadership and Management in the Sudanese Police Force

Introduction

“The current promotion system can only produce weak police leaders“(A1/3/8)

Quality leadership and effective management system as explained in chapter one are key elements that are indispensable for any police force striving to have an effective role in peacebuilding. Even with the current structure of Sudanese police if leadership and management were different there would be a greater chance for success in the several policing-peacebuilding related matters. Issues of community policing, accountability, lack of meritocracy in promotions and posting of officers, training as well as the overall performance of police personnel are closely related to management and leadership. In this chapter I will examine how the leadership and management styles adopted by Sudanese police can reduce their effectiveness in peacebuilding.

Research into the police usually includes one or more of three key aspects: the study of the police as an organisation; an examination of policing culture or an investigation of activity and practice of policing (Newburn, 2008). This chapter explores leadership and management with specific focus on the Sudanese Police, which encompasses two of Newburn’s aspects of police research as it examines

both police culture and the police as an organisation. Like other police organisations in sub-Saharan Africa, the development of the police in Sudan has been greatly affected by perpetual cycles of political instability, insecurity, violence and corruption (see chapter four). As a reflection of this, Otwin (2009) wrote that an individual police leader's development efforts would not succeed unless the social context changes through the influence of international aid programmes and continuing domestic reforms (Marenin, 2009). In this chapter I outline the ways in which this has happened in Sudan.

Leadership and management are not the same thing, but are intrinsically linked and complementary. All references throughout the chapter to police management cover planning, organising and coordinating policing activities, whilst references to police leadership include those actions that inspire and motivate police staff to do a better job, improve performance and provide a quality service to their communities. However, as Murray (2010) states, whilst the roles of leaders and managers were traditionally distinct, they are increasingly found in the same person as personnel look to their managers, not just to assign them a task, but to define purpose for them. Equally, managers must organise their staff, not just to maximise efficiency, but also to nurture skills, develop talent and inspire results. Even though Murray is talking about leadership as general, leadership in the police is not different. This chapter therefore, takes cognisance of this increasingly important overlap and complementary nature of management and leadership (Murray, 2010).

The chapter commences with a brief overview of leadership and management in policing including references to international trends followed by a description of

management and leadership styles within the Sudanese Police. It analyses policing systems with an emphasis on the Sudanese Police structure. The chapter explores some of the main management features in the Sudanese Police, particularly those relating to promotions and postings, as well as women in the Sudan police. It also provides insights into the oversight and accountability mechanisms that impact on leaders and managers.

International trends in police leadership and management

Management

Whilst re-emphasizing that police leadership and management are not the same thing but linked, complementary and overlapping (Kotter, 1999), I also recognise the distinct elements of police management as the administrative activities of controlling, directing, and coordinating police personnel, resources, and activities in the service of preventing crime, apprehending criminals, recovering stolen property, and performing regulatory and helping services. To this end, police managers set goals and design plans to achieve organisational aims and objectives. These are usually connected with employees' and employers' expectations, for example the police organisation expects the employees to do their best and provide a quality service to communities with far reaching commitment and dignity. In turn, the employees expect the organisation to meet their needs as groups and individuals whilst treating them fairly. Roberg and Kuykenall (1997a) argue that it is this mutual benefit that binds both organisations and their staff to fulfil their obligations, they stress that this includes sharing successes and achievements and acknowledging failures (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997b). However some police managers fail to adopt a policy of recognition and fair treatment of all personnel, especially for those at the lower end of the organisational hierarchy. Such inaction makes lower ranks feel exploited,

misused, or unfairly sanctioned and often regard others as inappropriately rewarded by their superiors (Marenin, 20099). All the NCO research respondents complained about the tendency of their superiors to protect themselves by putting the blame on NCOs for unintentional mistakes or problems and asserted that they refuse to take any responsibility, and so fitted with this general position. NCO's respondents expressed frustration and disappointment about the ways in which senior officers frequently employed tough investigation processes that always seemed to find NCOs guilty. Moreover they asserted that the police court frequently used data from dubious investigations to apply harsh punishment. In addition all respondents asserted that they do not get fair treatment especially in promotions and posting and job assignment.

Above the Sudanese police leadership and management there is the Sudan Board of Police Leadership and the twin Board of Police Management, as laid out in Article 18 and 19 of the Police of 2008 Act respectively, they are meant to assist the Director General in the leadership and management of police at the national level. The Board of Police Leadership is comprised of the Director General as chairman and the Deputy Director General; all heads of general directorates are members of the board, moreover paragraph D of the same article gives permanent or temporary membership to other designated police officers according to regulations. The Board has two main roles: one is to assist the Director General to carry out his duties, and second is to set out proposals for the police budget. Furthermore the Board would undertake any other duties put forward by the minister of interior or the Director General.

Just like the Board of Leadership, the Board of Management is headed by the Director General with the Deputy Director General as a member. The membership of the board is organised through regulations, nevertheless the Director General can invite any of the directors of police departments and or any specialist to attend the meetings. The Board of Management is to be responsible primarily of overseeing the general policy, implementation of plans and programmes. Furthermore the Board would follow up the plans, programmes and research that aim to the development of the police force as well as any other duties assigned by the Minister. The two Boards convene for weekly meeting to discuss matters on the agenda and emerging policing matters. It is to be noted that statutory functions of the two Boards are not clearly defined and are very similar. The composition of the two Boards is very large and to have them all available for weekly meetings presents a significant disruption to police work, as senior managers have to be away for long periods two days out of five, and in most cases the same manager will go for both meetings. Mechanisms to empower members of these boards to have candid discussions on any policing plans or emerging matters that are put before them do not seem to be in place.

Leadership

“Successful police reform requires widespread acceptance of change across ranks and units, but some officers will not modify their behaviour unless they believe it is in their personal interest. Tangible rewards (pay increases, transparent promotion procedures, etc.) can help win such support. Extensive and genuine consultation is also key to winning acceptance for new programmes; it must be demonstrated that the views and work of individual officers are respected (Develeopment, 2007,p.170).

Leadership in the police is defined by Newburn et, al., as “ the ability to influence and combine individuals and resources effectively to achieve objectives that would otherwise be impossible ” (Newburn and Neyroud, 2008,p.156). In common with the generic trends in leadership theory, police leadership research tends to support a less authoritarian style of police leadership than was prevalent three decades ago (Denesten, 2003,p.241, Robert and Peter, 2003). Leaders need to acquire certain virtues to ascertain their professional leadership and they need to assemble resources and proportionately distribute them fairly at all levels, as well as maintain a sense of humour (Robert and Peter, 2003,p.242). Police leaders need to develop multi-rank, cross-departmental leaders to assist them doing their job by distributing responsibilities and roles among subordinates (Gardner, 1990). Researchers believe that every member of a police organization must have leadership qualities to perform their ever-increasing and challenging roles from even the most junior ranks, such as constable, who must take the lead when dealing with an incident in the community. This emerging concept implies that there are leaders at all levels of any police organisation that need to be trained and developed and, in so doing, the potential for a department to become vibrant and self-motivated is unleashed, which is known a “dispersed leadership” (Gardner, 1990).

Adlam and Villiers (2003) agreed with this concept when they highlighted that the police officer by the nature of their work to operate alone and consequently must exercise discretion is a leader (Adlam and Villiers, 2003). They, along with other researchers for example Roberg (1997), highlighted this as one of the main differences between the police and the military; for the individual soldier is always operating under command and is among other soldiers. It is very rare that military personnel operate independently, whereas police officers can act alone whether on

general patrol or dealing with incidents such as crimes, traffic accidents or other emergencies. Consequently leadership in policing is not necessarily linked to rank, but is more about the role of police officers when the community looks to them to act in a way that will lead and coordinate efforts, for instance at a crime scene or accident scene (Rogers, 2008,p.4).

Importantly, contemporary police research also stresses the need for police leaders to be able to adapt their leadership style to suit diverse contexts from helping a lost child to managing violent civil conflict, which includes being able to provide directive, active leadership (command and control) when required (Mulcahy, 2008, Adlam and Villiers, 2003). The next section explores how the external and internal operating environments of the Sudanese Police have an impact on its leadership and management styles.

Police occupational culture

Mulcahy (2008) asserts that researchers have employed ethnography to closely observe police behaviour and practices which make up the police culture in other contexts. They believe that studying of police culture is imperative due to its relevance to police discretion, legitimacy, accountability and police conduct. Understanding police culture requires knowing more about policing as an activity and a police force as an organisation and how they deal with issues of gender, ethnicity, corruption, class and violence and other police related matters (Mulcahy, 2008,p.254)

Police culture refers to the common values, work norms, practices and attitudes among police personnel across the world. Whilst there are positive aspects to police culture such as camaraderie and a commitment to hard work it can impact negatively on police use of discretion and sometimes embrace corruption and misconduct

(Newburn and Neyroud, 2008,p.203). The Sudanese Police is historically dominated by male police officers who share similar values and attitudes as in many other police organisations. One of the most negative cultural aspects is unification against external scrutiny and public accountability. For example police personnel sometimes collude to cover up police misconduct Adlam et al., (2003) and police officers often believe that police work is understood only by the police themselves and so staff use this to exclude others, like women groups and minorities. Moreover many police officers undervalue office work and social care type of duties, preferring enforcement work (Blair, 2003,p.177). These views were corroborated by some of my research findings, such as an interview with three senior police officers, who raised the case of a police officer who was jailed because he accused Sudanese police of some corrupt practices. He was sent to the police court not because of false accusations but because he followed the wrong channel to speak out by handing written cases of police corruption to a government official. Unanimously the respondents said that he was wrong to have done this and should not have talked about police issues to the external world³.

Sudanese Police Organisation

As stated earlier in chapter three the Sudanese Police force has a federal police headquarters in the capital, Khartoum, with one Director General with overall authority to manage the organisation (Government, 2008). Article 5 of the Sudanese Police Act defines the Sudanese Police as a federal force with two levels; the national and the state level, but it is highly centralised in practice because the local state police have virtually nothing to do with allocating the budget, the appointment,

³ Later in November 2015 the Constitutional Court ruled out the police court verdict and ordered the officer to be released. This provoked discontent among police leadership on the basis that if they cannot discipline police officer this will lead to revolt among the police thus police leadership will lose control over their officers.

the promotion, and the transfer of police officers, all of which is managed from the headquarters in Khartoum. The leadership of the force as in article 17 of the Police Act is placed under the President as supreme leader. Article 17 of the Sudanese Police Act 2008 (Government, 2008) puts the President of Sudan as the top Commander of Police, with the Minister of Interior being the direct supervisor of the police, with their stated responsibilities in the same Article as shown in chapter three. The Director General of Police, with the rank of 1st Lieutenant General, is the overall executive manager of the police responsible only to the Minister of Interior. He and the Deputy Director General of the police have to be appointed by the President according to Article 20 of the Sudanese Police Act of 2008 (Government, 2008) with the Minister of Interior as the second political person supervising the police is authorised to draft directors to organise and manage the development of the force moreover he is also empowered to oversee the professional, finance, administrative and the technical performance of the force as well as the identification of the police needs, appointment of the directors for the general directorates, nominations of members of delegation who take part in missions abroad and finally the appointment of the directors of other police department that work in partnership with other civil departments with the consultation of the head of these departments⁴. Such departments include *inter alia* the railways, the river transportation, the sea ports, and judiciary. In essence the Director General, who is not chosen in a competitive manner that is based on merit, is thus empowered with tremendous authority. In many countries in the region that adopt a similar federal policing system, such as Kenya and Ethiopia, the Commissioner of Police does not have to be a serving police officer (Government, 2011), therefore he or she can be drawn from qualified

⁴ These also include oil and Minerals, Tourism, Dams and others.

individuals of any relevant background, which is also the case in selecting police chiefs in the United States, although it is recognised that the US does not have a federal police system (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997). In addition the Kenyan system has set forth a rigorous selection process for the police commissioner who should be chosen by the Kenyan commission of police service (Government, 2011).

The Sudanese Police force consists of diverse police departments that make them unique in this organisational structure where so diverse responsibility that some of them often do not belong to police in other countries come under the Sudanese police (see Chapter three). Beside the main body of police which include the traditional policing aspects of crime preventing and crime fighting there are other departments that have different non-crime functions.

The military identity of the Sudanese Police is more clearly featured in the department of central reserve; more like the Gendarme police of France (the central reserve police which was established in the late 1970s which is recruited and trained to serve as an emergency/intervening force in the areas of trouble and severe civil disturbances) (Salim, 2005, Wisler et al., 2009). With military capabilities and strict military command they are stationed in the rural areas across the country, mainly where the region have destabilised areas and flash points. The mobile nature of the units makes it easy to move quickly from one region to the other. Utilising military tactics and weaponry the central reserve were used to protect strategic projects and secure the roads in Darfur. Such paramilitary police units as the central reserve force of the Sudanese Police are found in other countries within the police according to the OECD- DAC document on security sector reform 2007. These units are often better resourced than the rest of the force and have a sense of elitism and independent identity (Develeopment, 2007,p.171). Some researchers raise

concerns about the violations of civil rights by these units (Campbell and Campbell, 2010,p.45), which may be an outcome of their selection and training as they are recruited with less rigor and their training is often focused on combat, the use of fire arms and self-defence techniques rather than law enforcement.

The composition of the Sudanese Police according to Article 5, Section 1, of the Sudanese Police Act 2008, is that of a regular, national force tasked with delivering policing services to its communities. The Act emphasises that every Sudanese citizen is entitled to join the police, to ensure the national identity and reflect the diversity of Sudanese society with equal representation. However, the Act does not place any responsibility on the police to observe this diversification of police personnel. In comparison, the Kenyan Police Service Act of 2011 stipulates, in Article 5 section B, that the composition of the Kenyan police, so far as reasonably practicable, shall “reflect the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya”, which is more legally binding and obliges the leaders and managers of the Kenyan police to monitor the ethnic and regional balance when conducting recruitment (Government, 2011). It evident that police at state level is very much under resourced compared to the police at the capital as the majority of my respondents stated that the state level is weaker and more poorly resourced compared to the police based at the capital.

In the following section I will present the reflection of the research respondents on how they feel towards their police management and leadership. Their feedback is featured in the diverse themes as follows;

Poor police salaries and services

All respondents highlighted the issue of welfare as poor salaries and services such

as health care, transport and housing. Many believed that this was due to the negligence of top police leadership and four respondents cited other organisations, such as the army, that provided a good health service, social welfare and transportation for its staff. One respondent stated that the Police Co-operative sells fridges to police members but it requires 1,000 SDG as a down-payment, whilst the police salary is 600 SDG for some junior ranks. He stressed that this meant he could never afford it and that the police could help by selling it with better 'conditions of sale'. He also suggested that the police could support their junior ranks by helping them with income-generating schemes such as providing a rickshaw-taxi for the staff to get income from. He was aware that the army had run similar schemes.

Qualifications, skills, thoughts and ideas are not respected and Junior-ranking colleagues leaving the service

80% of respondents stated that their qualifications and skills were not recognised by senior personnel. Moreover if they had a 'brilliant idea' or a helpful thought it was rarely respected. Taken together this lack of recognition and respect leads to dissatisfaction and, as a consequence, the junior-ranking staff stops using their initiative as highlighted in the following quote.

'New ideas are not accepted, although sometimes they would be fruitful. Previous disappointment means that you don't say them, because you fear the consequences.'

One junior-ranking interviewee, with over 30 years of experience, stated that he and

his colleagues regarded the Warrant Officer rank as ‘the end’ because it is so rare for an NCO to progress any further than that. For that they call this rank (The Stop Rank) another made the following comment:

“I am going to leave when my contract comes to an end next year because I feel that it is hopeless; there will never be any reform.”

80% of the respondents stated that many of the junior personnel do not renew their contracts mainly due to the poor pay compounded by other issues highlighted above. It was stressed that many junior-ranking personnel know beforehand that their contract is coming to an end before the police administrators realise and go to their administration offices to state that they will not renew it. One respondent stated that in 2013 three thousand NCOs are leaving the service in Khartoum state alone. Another senior respondent mentioned that the pensions department is receiving an average of five hundreds file of retired NCOs each month.

It is highlighted by the majority of respondents that the training system and lack of job security can only produce poor quality of leadership. Senior officers do not value the skills, knowledge and understanding of their junior staff in many ways therefore they do not gain their trust which will ultimately lead to poor communication between the top command and the staff.

Most respondents stressed that top manager’s interference in individual police officers’ decisions, when they exercise their discretion powers, will affect the police individual trust on their leaders. Top managers when they bend to pressure by most senior ones, politicians, relatives or friends and interfere with their subordinate’s

work, they lose respect and find it difficult to enforce the law through those same individuals that they once forced to deny the law. When senior leadership distribute training opportunities in an unequal manner they have sent the wrong people to the wrong course and they end up having on the one hand staff with poor morale because they were deprived from well-deserved training opportunity and on the other hand have people whom they spent resources to train but they are not competent to do a good job. Departments are not given equal resources and finance department treat departments not according to what they do but according to personal relations this will affect key departments' performance and again leave the staff with low morale This also reflects the dominance of centre over periphery as put forward by Berridge, 2011.

Legal and Structural Contexts

As stated in Chapter three the Sudanese Police have witnessed rapid changes to their operating environment and social contexts since the first police law was passed in 1908 (Salim, 2008). These changes have impinged upon police structures, mandates and relations with the different regimes that have governed the country, which is also indicative of how different governments have interfered with the leadership and management of the police and sought to manipulate it through varied measures (Berridge, 2011). This and the extremely overstretched remit of the Sudanese Police which includes many different services, as explained earlier, has an impact on the leadership and management functions. According to Leys et. al., (1995) the British 'policing by consent' to achieve core policing functions stands on the following seven principles: bureaucratization; rule of law; the use of minimal force; political non-partisanship; providing service to the public; emphasizing prevention of crime rather than detection; and providing effective law enforcement to

all classes (Leys and Saul, 1995). However, because Article 16 of the Sudanese Police Act 2008 specifies the many diverse functions of the police, some are related to the common principles of police work in nature, but many are not such as customs, wildlife, civil defense (fire and rescue emergency response); passport and immigration; and prison services. In other countries these are separate services and not commonly part of the police. It is therefore difficult to cite principles that cover all of these functions, and if one does, they look less like police ones since there seem to have little in common between these distinct departments. Nonetheless the Sudanese Police force is not alone in this regard. As Leys et. al (1995) argue that many police officers around the world are performing functions that are not related to law enforcement and crime prevention activities (Leys and Saul, 1995,p.133, Leys, 1995). There is no available information in Sudan regarding the number or percentage of police officers and NCOs who are actually working in core policing activities and those who are dedicated to non-policing activities, so it is difficult to explore the comparison systematically. Whatever the case, it would be challenging for such police force to develop effective management and leadership styles to effectively manage this wide range of responsibilities.

Impact of the Rank Structure on Leadership and Management

As explained in chapter three and earlier in this chapter the Sudanese Police force has a multi-layered military rank structure with clear distinction between officers and NCOs.

Table 5.1: The Ranks in the Sudanese police

Officers	Non-Commissioned Officers
First Lieutenant General	Warrant Officer

Lieutenant General	First Sergeant
Major General	
Brigadier	Sergeant
Colonel	
Lieutenant Colonel	Corporal
Major	Lance Corporal
Captain	Private
First Lieutenant	
Lieutenant	

Article 20 stipulates that the Director General and his deputy are appointed upon recommendation by the Minister of Interior and only two conditions apply: first that they must be commissioned police officers and second they must be of the rank of Major General or above. The act provides no other more requirements or qualifications, unlike Article 11 of the Kenyan Police Service Act where the police commissioner has to meet a set of requirements such as distinguished career, serving in senior management post for at least fifteen years in key areas relevant to his job, good knowledge in related areas, commitment to maintain integrity, honesty, impartiality as well as commitment to fight corruption and nepotism (2011). Once nominated from among the Major Generals within the Sudanese Police leadership, the Director General is appointed with formidable administrative and financial powers as outlined in Article 21 of the Act. However, these powers are poorly described and

insufficiently detailed with no laid down limits or constraints, in comparison Article 10 of the Kenyan Police Service Act put forward a set of constraints and clear guidelines for the police commissioner to abide by.

The Director General is not accountable to anybody other than the President and the Minister of Interior who appointed him. Even though the Director General serves under the Minister of Interior there is no published oversight mechanism to hold him accountable. Literature in this regard does not show how the Director General would be held accountable nor does it show any precedent where the Director General has been held accountable for any mismanagement. For example, the last Kenyan police officer was a former army police officer. I believe that employing a neutral character from outside the police who is not influenced by the organisational culture and free from colleagues' connections might prove good practice. An example of that occurred at the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone when a retired British police officer was appointed to lead the Sierra Leonean police (Albrecht and Jackson, 2010). Keith Piddle who was appointed Inspector General of police in Sierra Leone in 1999 demonstrated effective leadership that was not influenced by ethnicity or region. He managed to carry out serious reforms within the police, most importantly he was able to reduce the rank structure from twenty two to just ten ranks (Kabia, 2012). The Sudanese police structure with 16 ranks makes it less motivating for those who join as privates to rise through the ranks in addition this long chain of structure make it hard for top command to communicate with lower levels.

The total number of civilian staff in the Sudanese Police is less than two hundred. As recounted to me by a senior civil servant at the police headquarters, the police no longer recruit staff in civil roles. The Sudanese police before the current government

came to power used to employ bigger numbers of civilians. Most of those were encouraged to join the police during the early nineties. The idea was that they would be easy to control when they are police than if they are working for the police as civilian staff. The Sudanese police can recruit more civilians to undertake non-crime related tasks which can include administrative, finance, IT and communications and office work. This could release more police officers and NCOs who are currently undertaking these tasks to work in crime fighting and law enforcement work. The cost of recruiting and retaining civilian staff is less than that of the police personnel, which allows the police to have more staff with the same budget that they have now. Moreover having more civilian component in the police may ease the military spirit throughout the force and make them less militarised and more prepared to work with their communities.

Promotion and Transfer

Officers' Promotion

The Sudanese Police promotion system for officers allows people to be promoted mainly because of the period of time the officer has spent in his or her rank, rather than on a merit or on a competence basis. When a Batch (a group of police personnel who joined on the same date) reaches the required number of years in the rank, individual promotions are decided upon by a committee set up by the Director General in accordance with article 30 of the police act of 2008. The committee assesses the possibility of individuals from that Batch being promoted; dependent on their line manager's performance reports, his training or academic qualifications, and their seniority within the Batch. Upon recommendation from the promotion committee the Director General will put forward a recommendation before the Minister to

approve promotions for officers below the rank of Colonel (Government, 2008). For those from the rank of Colonel upwards the President would sanction their promotion upon the recommendation of the Minister. The majority of officers interviewed as research respondents expressed their distrust of the promotion process believing that it is based more on the top leadership and manager's personal views and preferences rather than being fair, objective or structured.

At no time during consideration for promotion is the individual called for interview or assessment. Furthermore, they are not asked if they wish to be promoted or remain in the rank, it is as though the system gives no options; you either get promoted or removed to allow others to move forward. Each individual has three chances (generally once a year) of being promoted; on the third occasion they will be forcibly retired if there are no vacancies in the next rank. Promotions on this basis has led to many 'bottle-necks' as there are a plethora of personnel in the senior ranks resulting in there being higher numbers in some senior ranks than numbers in lower ranks, which is considered to be an administrative error which could have been avoided with a better promotions system and planning . A similar situation existed in Sierra Leone in the aftermath of the civil war when there were 19 percent of the force were senior police officers with more non-commissioned officers than constables, as stated earlier this led to drastic reform in the police structure (Kabia, 2012,p.63, 62).

Data on the numbers of officers in each rank in Sudan is not obtainable but some respondents said that the numbers of police officers in some senior ranks are markedly disproportionate to the strength of the force and the other ranks therein.

Naturally, this system does not encourage police officers to make any effort to get promoted. Moreover, the actual personnel strength and associated current needs do not guide annual recruitment and it is notable that annual recruitment to the College of Police Sciences and Law is fluctuating in numbers and there has been no limit on how many candidates should be recruited each year. One respondent indicated that in 2010 the police recruited over 700 police students for training; the number was far higher than the capacity of the police college could accommodate. In one case they have to be trained in a borrowed training centre that belongs to the army, in another case they have to be trained in a temporary training centre that was originally designed to train NCOs. In both cases a lot of money had to be spent to refurbish the new site. These large numbers would often result in officers being massed in certain ranks without enough vacancies at the next rank. Officers who complain about the promotion process when they were overtaken by other junior colleagues often do not get satisfactory answers and are more likely to get into future troubles, because a complaint made by any officer will be understood as challenging a decision made by the headquarters. Promotion in the UK police, for example, as described by a retired UK police officer with experience working at the UK prestigious police training college, Bramshill, are based on the individual indicating that he or would to be considered for promotion. Such individuals would apply then subjected to specific training assessed by specialist panels before decision can be made regarding his/her promotion. This was asserted by the majority of respondents who are all police officers representing different ranks. Retirement from the police can easily take place at the promotion season where large numbers would be forced to retire at the same time. This represents a great loss of experience and knowledge for the police. To have them all retiring at the same time means that the police force loses a

lot of resources which have been invested in training those officers and risk the loss of institutional memory.

NCO promotion

NCO promotions are a far more transparent, structured and straightforward process than that of the officers. According to my experience, the task is often conducted by a panel set up by the head of the relevant department who is delegated by the Director General of Police to conduct promotion among NCOs within their department as stipulated in article 35 of the Sudanese Police act of 2008. The panel would consist of senior officers with relevant experience. They will record the points that each candidate achieves depending on seniority, qualification, training certificate, performance report etc. According to the higher marks won by each candidate measured against the available vacancies they panel will make a decision and recommend it to the head of department for approval. An appeal is available for those who believe that they unfairly missed their promotion and will often be considered by the panel. Like officers' promotion process individuals eligible for promotions are not required to indicate their intent to be promoted neither they are personally assessed by the promotion panel.

Transfers and tenure

NCOs are not subjected to transfers, except within their own States, therefore this section relates primarily to officers. The officer's transfer system is conducted regularly and often without clear objectives, ostensibly to transfer knowledge between different departments (many of which are not related to core policing functions) and expose police officers to different policing environments, with a view to expanding their knowledge and policing skills in different contexts. Consequently,

when they get to the top of police hierarchy they have a wider understanding of policing matters in different areas and police departments. In reality it is not clear how many of these police officers make use of the experiences they gain from working in markedly different departments. Moreover, this process could only produce a fruitful outcome if it was based on a systematic, fair method of transfer through the maintenance of accurate, computerised, personnel data on police officers, which would be used to both achieve organisational goals and individual officer's development goals. Such a system is not in place, although members of the Sudanese Police Headquarters are currently seeking to implement one entitled 'Right Person, Right Place at the Right Time', even so it is currently in an embryonic form. As a senior police officer from the Headquarters that I have interviewed confirmed, they are aiming to rectify the transfer system so that the skills, and relevant training, among other issues, would be considered to achieve both organisational goals and individual police officers' development.

The downside of current method of posting is that much is lost in terms of resources, experience and knowledge as a result of posting people with rare expertise who have undergone expensive training programmes. Some of these programmes have taken place abroad at high financial costs. Additionally, if such an officer is engaged in vital partnership activities, for example in high conflict areas, their relocation could result in a breakdown of the partnership.

In the UK, the Home Office has driven police services to address this issue of tenure through the development of effective policies. For example, paragraphs 11.1 to 11.3 of the Sussex Police Tenure Policy states that the length of an officer's posting should be determined by the needs of the Force combined with the development and well-being of the officer. The minimum tenure period will normally be 24

months. However if the officer's post required a formal training element equal to or greater than 4 weeks, a minimum tenure of 48 months will normally apply. The policy also states that there 'is not ordinarily any maximum tenure but police officers must not expect to occupy any post on a permanent basis'. Paragraph 11.6 goes on to state that the following facts should be considered when establishing periods of tenure (either minimum or maximum); the Force's needs, especially regarding continuity of partnership activities; individual career development aspirations; cost and extent of training; and the individual's wellbeing (Police, 2010).

Regular posting is common police practice, and the French police for instance adopts a similar system built on the tradition of building a united nation with public servants attached to the center of the state. This became the rule for the police in France where officers are constantly posted and were often reminded that no one should expect to stay in the same place for more than three years (Wisler et al., 2009,pp.105-106).

It worth noting here that the states according to article 31 section 3 are entitled to be consulted if any officers working in that particular state are to be posted out of the state. A senior officer at state Headquarters stated in an interview that he has yet to be consulted, as the police Headquarters continue to conduct postings as before the enactment of the law in 2008. He also confirmed that in article 23, the Director General should appoint the police state commissioners on consultation with the state governor, but that this too has not been adhered to yet (Government, 2008). All respondents unanimously said that the posting system is fraught with injustice and corruption and is conducted without consideration to the individual's welfare. The posting was ostensibly conducted to give officers diverse experience, fight corruption and inject new expertise into some departments but it is also been used punish

rogue officers who do not comply with what their departments or managers needed of them. As a result some officers stay for long periods in one department while other are constantly being posted to different regions and departments. The implications of this for an effective police force are officers feel insecure.

Guarding the Guards; Accountability and Human Rights

It has always been a matter of debate as to who will supervise the police to ensure that public power is used in public interest. To put it differently who will handle public complaints against police misconduct and corruption. To achieve these police organisations as literature shows, various mechanisms and methods have been thought to be necessary. A mixture of agencies, rules, management tools and practices need be employed for that purpose. Designing of such bodies and systems will help holding both police personnel and police organization accountable for malpractice which may ultimately assist in building the public confidence in the police (Palmer et al., 2012,PP.282-285, Mulcahy, 2008,pp.6666). These will include rules, institutions staffed with high integrity personnel to adequately investigate police misconduct and corruption. The Patten Report on Northern Ireland policing (1999) in paragraph 4.1 stated that: “The fundamental purpose of policing should be the protection and vindication of human rights of all.” This was reinforced in 2001 by Neyroud and Beckley when they argued that police have been challenged by new policing ethos at the beginning of the 21st century full with many challenges and protection of human rights (Neyroud and Beckley, 2001). Researchers are divided on the issue of police corruption and whether or not it is a widespread phenomenon, but evidence of police corruption around the globe has been seen time and time again. Well established police organisations, like the UK police, are not immune from such

behaviour where cases of perjury and beating of suspects were uncovered (Gottschalk, 2010)

Oversight and accountability within the Sudanese Police is one of the sensitive issues that still not adequately addressed. There is no independent body entrusted with the duty of oversight and accountability. The parliament is empowered with overall responsibility to oversee all public body's performance (Government, 2005). Below that there is nobody that is entitled to hold the police accountable or ensure their compliance with rule of law and observation of human rights standards. Oversight and accountability over the police within Sudanese Police is exercised primarily through the parliamentarian Commission on Security and Defence of the Parliament. Internal accountability within the police system is conducted through the general directorate of the police headed by the Deputy Director General of the police. As in article 12/2 of the Sudanese Police Act, this is the department that is tasked with conducting regular and surprise inspections of all police departments by sending teams to the different states and departments to check their compliance with the laws and regulations and see how they are performing in general (Police, 2008, Government, 2008). Moreover the police departments have responsibility to check on how their subordinates at the lower level are performing. Leaders of departments are required to check on their subordinates to ensure that they are doing their job in accordance with the law. The police also have a security department that is assigned to report on the police conduct and the irregularity of police departments directly to the Director General (Police, 2008). Civil society organisations also have a role in monitoring the police conduct but this is not done in a structured manner, as they are not empowered with specific code to do so.

On the finance aspect of the matter the police have an internal audit unit that is tasked with ensuring that the finance process is being managed in accordance with the regulations. The Auditor General who has overall responsibility to check on the spending of government financial resources is also entitled to inspect the police finance process. Two respondents pointed out that there have been allegations that the police did not allow the Auditor General to inspect the police.

The police also are seeking to engage with the public through the police media branch which publishes its own magazine and newspaper to make the public aware of their role as partnership. Moreover the police have their own radio FM station that broadcasts programmes on policing issues and some of these are live programmes that receive calls from the public and seek to respond to their concerns (Jubara and Moaweya., 2010).

The financial department is part of the police structure staffed by police personnel from all ranks. This, with the military structure that governs Sudanese Police, does not seem to be creating a healthy environment for oversight and accountability. Newburn 2008, argues the more militaristic and more centralised the police the less accountable they are (Newburn, 2008:23). Haunted by corruption and misconduct the police organisations around the world tend to adopt a culture of blame and punishment which can be seen more prevalent as police always thought to seek to please the public through disciplining of their staff. This usually leads to the police staff become more secretive and less open so that they avoid getting punished for mistakes. Care for both staff and customer is a core element of organisational success. As Roberg et al, (1997) rightly put it, managers should treat their staff the

way they want them to treat the organisational clients (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997b).

The Sudanese Police introduced a code of conduct in 2009 to raise awareness of the police personnel that they have obligations towards suspects, citizens, and the public at large and that they should behave and conduct their duty in a good manner that does not abuse the law but also preserves the dignity and rights of all citizens to be treated with respect without segregation based on any background (Police, 2009).

Accountability, as I see it and in light of what has been said in this section, would do well for the police by removing and / or punishing those with “corrupt attitude” who tend to violate the law and abuse the rights of others, thus preventing them from besmirching the reputation of the police. Moreover it will reassure the public and help building their trust in the police by showing that justice can be done and no-one is above the law including the police themselves. Through seriously investigating public allegations and the due process of law be applied to any-one proven to have done wrong, misbehaved or committed act of misconduct.

***Alalie-h* or ‘Mechanism’**

All the junior officers and NCOs believed that if they were taken to the mechanism they would be convicted without a proper investigation or any clear evidence; because the presiding officers believe it is important to ensure public/complainant satisfaction and protect the reputation of the police rather than be just in their decision. The research respondents were adamant that if a member of the community wants revenge on a police person he or she would go to the *Alalie-h*. The following quotes are indicative of this:

'If you are reported or a complaint is put against you to your superiors the complainant is always right and you are always wrong.'

"The *Alalie-h* is never merciful; there is no protection for us as police."

Despite this, and in comparison with regional forces, corruption in the Sudanese police is not as endemic or rampant as put by British police consultant with diverse working experience in different African countries. I also recall that when DFID introduced training programmes and used police officers from the neighbouring countries as trainers a young south Sudanese police officer said "we lived as refugees in the countries where these trainers come from and we know what the police is like there, they are too corrupt and brutal to train us to be good police officers"

Planning in the Sudanese Police

Planning is the activity that can take the individual or organisation from where they are to a future point, as John Adair writes; poor planning would usually lead to endless chaos (Adair, 2011,pp.66-67). An integral part of effective police leadership is the ability of leaders to guide their subordinates with clear vision and direction which can only be achieved by the knowing where they are heading to (Adlam and Villiers, 2003,p.240). Police planning in Sudan, as described by respondents, does not exist. Each police leader at any level posted to a new department will set his own plan, but that plan may not be followed by his successor. This is also the case at the national level with successive Director Generals.

Respondents gave the example of the police 2010 recruitment that increased the police strength by one third in matter of few months to prepare for the elections and the referendum of South Sudan. To achieve that goal recruitment was done in haste, there were no adequate training facilities for large numbers, especially at state level, so trainees had to be recruited in a poor training environment in a hasty manner to meet specific dates. This happened when the need for the police to play this important role had been known since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 (Movement, 2005).

Ethnicity and Gender in the Sudanese Police culture

The Sudanese Police force is historically dominated by ethnicities from the riverine region of the northern Sudan (Berridge, 2011). In legal terms the laws of Sudan have set out clear provisions to form a representative police force that is open to all Sudanese regardless of ethnicity or region. Article 148 of the Sudan Interim Constitution affirms the right of every Sudanese to join the police as a national force which should reflect the diversity of the Sudanese society in its composition, article 7 and 12 of Sudan interim constitution emphasizes the same point through equal rights of citizens (Government, 2005). So far this law has not changed the ethnic makeup of the force. The women only focus group explained that they have little chance to get to the top ranks not because of incompetence but due to male domination and the negative view of the male managers towards female police officers, which is similar to the situation reported by women in many other forces like the British police in the 1970s (Adlam and Villiers, 2003).

Policing in a Competitive World

In many countries the police are no longer the primary agency in preventing and detecting crimes, as is evident in the UK by the introduction of the Crime and Disorder Act in 1998. The local authorities also have responsibilities (Adlam and Villiers, 2003,p.184). The wide functions of police duties make it necessary to evaluate the work done by the police or if it is done by other agency, or as Adlam et. al., pointed out the police is a public sector agency and they should be guided by competition in the way they conduct their business. In that they pay attention to their clients, focus more on their staff as human resources and motivate them and consider value for money issues (Adlam and Villiers, 2003,p.181).

Baker (2010) argues that in Africa it is not the police that people will go to for protection from crime nor it is where they go when crime is committed, adding that private security companies are claiming dominance and people are seeking their own means of providing alternative policing (Baker, 2010). Police are required to adopt efficiency in policing and management and effective leadership is becoming even more indispensable.

Senior officers

This sub-section covers issues that were unique to senior officers or were only discussed by a senior officer. One issue in this category is the budget. This may indicate the lack of transparency around budget issues in that lower ranks have little understanding of issues related to budget. They all emphasised that budgets are shrinking year by year and they even if they are increasing in the annual budget they are losing their value due to the rising inflation and prices. One senior police officer

stated that:

“We have very little budget to do our work it’s simply not sufficient this coupled with lack of transparency at the financial department at police Headquarters”

On the budget issue another senior police officer stated that:

“We do not have enough budgets to provide food to the detainees in custody and we had to find money from private service to other organisations to pay for that in some cases we have sought resources from other organisations which might influence our work”. They all pointed out that if you are well connected then you are more likely to get a bigger budget for your department. And you have to push hard to get you a larger budget.

90% of this group stressed the point of insecurity of job and the uncertainty, so they have to spend most of their time worrying about whether they will be leaving soon or not by that they do not commit themselves to any long term planning. They as well expressed their strong feeling of insecurity in terms of posting and promotion and that it is unfair and is conducted without rationale and all respondents were clear about role of cronies, tribe, and political affiliation in the posting and promotion process.

In relation to peacebuilding this group seems to have better understanding too of the issue than the other two groups of junior and middle ranking officers. One senior police officer stated that:

“Police can contribute to peace by adopting plans that prevent fight between the different groups being religious, political ethnic or other”

another senior police officer stated that some international organisations provided a

lot of support to the police in relation to the peacebuilding particularly in the Blue Nile state these organisations include the DFID, UNDP, JCOM, World Vision and Blue Nile Emergency Fund but then he added that some of these organisations take advantage of the situation and seek to trigger the conflict by supporting one group and ignoring the other. Another one added that some organisations like the United Nation Mission in Sudan UNMID and Qatar supported the peace process in Darfur but he went on to accuse UNMID of supporting the rebel groups also by spreading exaggerated news about the security situation in the country which will make people panic. It is however recognised by the collaboration between the UNMID and the Sudan police while their presence there and that they are able to provide some training in the areas of child and family protection, control of small arms conference and human rights., they were also able to provide refurbishment for police custodies, solar energy units for remote police stations and communication equipment. Two of this group pointed out the police contribution to the peace process by securing the safe return of internally displaced people to their home towns and play crucial role in preventing escalating disputes between tribes. That role would often include identifying safe routes for nomads so that they do not pass through farmers' farms and damage their crops.

Two respondents stressed the importance of the police not to be tasked with military duties like the case of Central Reserve Force now fighting the rebels in Darfur that will detract them from their primary duty and the police resources in this case would be misplaced.

On the equipment this group also stated there is generally shortage of equipment and those provided were not of good quality because they provided by unqualified

and inexperienced agencies due to corruption. In most cases equipment were provided without providing training to the staff that will be operating them.

The Police Leadership and Management - Peacebuilding Nexus

Police officers and NCOs are empowered to enforce the law and act in any situation that requires them to intervene as law enforcement agents. This role becomes even more imperative when they operate among communities especially in post conflict and war-torn societies like that of Sudan with protracted multi-region conflict. In order to operate effectively they need to be in an environment which promotes individual initiative, which allows them to freely exercise their discretionary powers without fear, but all this is constrained in the Sudanese Police as shown earlier. The paramilitary Sudanese structure and the strong chain of command within the police does not support the police personnel work in contexts where they could contribute to the Peacebuilding process through their day to day policing activities.

Peacebuilding often requires time as one critique of the international peace builders is that they work within tight time frame works to implement Peacebuilding programmes; the Sudanese police with their posting system that does not allow them to stay long enough in one area have little chance to take part in successful Peacebuilding programmes. The national recruitment system which brings individuals to work where they are not familiar with the local context is also more unlikely to produce officers or who are not in good understanding of the local setting and carry out sustainable Peacebuilding process. The Sudanese Police headquarters' policy of not consulting with the states in regard to recruiting of new officers is contradicting one of the root causes of conflicts, that is the share of power

and the feeling of being represented, the same thing apply to transferring officers in or out of the states and finally the appointment of state police commissioners seems to be contrary to the one of the important principles of Peacebuilding that stands on trust self-governance and adequate understanding of the local context.

The unfair non-transparent promotion system deprives the police of competent potential future leaders and also leaves police officers working with low morale and feeling uncertain about their future. Effective and fair accountability mechanisms can improve the police image and thus put them in a better place for community trust and support which is vital for police working in Peacebuilding contexts, but this is not present in Sudan as accountability is either absent or done in a punitive manner through unjust processes. Systematic development of police leadership at all levels is crucial in improving the chances of the police to work more effectively in Peacebuilding settings. It is however the selection of the Director General that might have the most significant implications for the role police can play within the Peacebuilding. A more rigorous selection process for the Director General based on merit would ensure selecting the most competent experienced and committed people to run the police. An independent commission for the police service like the case in Kenya could help in nominating police leadership. Selection of good leadership could provide a good example for others to follow, ensure effective management and better performance. Most conflicts arise from unequal development as seen earlier in chapter four police at state level is less well-funded than that of the capital, and this could have serious multi-dimensional implications. Finally the more representative the police the more confident they are to introduce themselves to the public and seek their support. So in sum leadership and management can impinge on police

effectiveness in general and in particular if they are expected to take part in peace process.

Conclusion

Leadership that can be promoted on the basis of merit is more capable of setting a good example of leadership and administer the force by employing the most efficient and fair methods. Effective leadership needs to be neutral, free and immune from being influenced by colleagues; region, ethnicity or other which are common in Africa particularly in Sudan. In some countries the Director General can come from outside the police and such option tends to widen the pool of experienced impartial candidates who are more likely to succeed. In Sudan these criteria are not met. The promotion system is flawed and does not gain trust among police officers which may result in them losing morale and confidence. The transfer in the way that it is done within the Sudanese Police does not seem either to be achieving the organisational goals, or be in the interest of the individual's welfare. Moreover it does not value or recognise experience, or speciality training that police personnel have received during their service. An independent body empowered to look into police misconduct and corruption may help reassure public and clear the police from malpractice. All these limitations have significant impacts on the police relationship and management with local communities which are crucial to any Peacebuilding effort that may involve the police.

To further explore aspects that can affect police suitability for peacebuilding role the selection, recruitment and training in the Sudanese police will be examined in the next chapter.

Chapter Six

The Selection and Training of Human Resources in the Sudanese Police

Introduction

“Issues surrounding the numbers, recruitment and training of police personnel are one of the key issues to be addressed by post-conflict policing” (Baker, 2006,p.23).

Training, recruitment and selection of police in war divided communities is an essential element of peacebuilding. Issues of police representation of the community and the dominance of one ethnic group over others are often raised. Moreover police must select the right individuals and subject them to the right training to prepare them to work effectively in war-torn societies. The right selection of the right individuals who undergo relevant training would ensure the observation of human rights, the rule of law and the understanding of sensitive issues present in such environments. There is a dearth of literature on the Sudanese Police; axiomatically very little has been written on the organisation’s recruitment and training methods or the capacity of its training institutions and facilities (Berridge, 2011). This scarcity of literature on Sudanese Police and the lack of accessible documents and data on

training is the main limitation of this chapter. Despite that, I critically examine the organisation, human resource, recruitment, and selection and training mechanisms of the Sudanese Police and its relevance to peacebuilding. Data collected from the field in the form of written documents as well as data generated from interviews and focus groups will be employed to inform the argument throughout the chapter.

First, I provide an overview of the recruitment and selection process, including the multi-entry level and initial training, then examines on-the-job/in-service training together with the training environment in which training activities are being conducted. I then go on to explore the role of the Training Authority, which is the department responsible for training within the Sudanese Police, including its statutory functions, and its horizontal and vertical relations with related departments within the Sudanese Police structure. It draws some comparative examples from police selection and training systems in other countries, then it points out the relevance of police training to Peacebuilding and finally leads to a conclusion on why selection, recruitment and training of Sudanese police are important for peacebuilding in the country.

Overview of the Sudanese Police Recruitment, Selection and Initial Training Processes

The selection and recruitment process is so essential to achieving an efficient and effective police service or, to paraphrase Newburn et al., (2008), it is the stage at which the quality of any police force can be judged (Newburn and Neyroud, 2008,p.257). The three seemingly different processes of recruitment, selection and training of police personnel are intrinsically interlinked and inseparable. Recruitment refers to the stage where police organisations will seek to attract candidates to join

the police, while selection is the process that follows, and through which the best candidates are selected according to a set of criteria. Recruitment and selection are significant for the success of any police organisation and prerequisite for good policing. Training often encompasses relevant knowledge and skills conferred on those new recruits and other in-service police personnel to further build their skills and expand their knowledge (Osse, 2006, Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997b).

The Sudanese Police methodology for the recruitment and selection of personnel varies markedly between the officer class ranging from 1st Lieutenant up to 1st Lieutenant General and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) , ranging from Private up to Warrant Officer as stipulated in article 24/1 and 2 of the Sudanese Police Act (Government, 2008). This includes the length and quality of initial training which the two groups receive, always in two separate training environments and, ultimately, the roles and tasks they will be assigned to following that training (Government, 2008). In these disparities between officer corps and lower ranks, Sudanese Police is not different from other African police forces (Marenin, 2009, Marenin, 1982). This section first examines the various entry levels to the Sudanese Police, followed by a description of the methodologies for recruiting officers and NCOs moreover it will provide insights into the system of recruiting and training of women in the Sudanese Police.

Entry Levels to the Sudanese Police

The Sudanese Police adopts a multi-level entry system for potential police recruits (Government, 2008). This system, as with other recruiting and training matters, is not clearly stipulated in the police law or regulations. Yet, from respondents' feedback and my own experience of levels of entry to the Sudanese police force, we learn that

potential recruits can join at one of the following levels. The first and main entry route provides the personnel for the vast majority of the police for non-commissioned police officers and is conducted at a state level, rather than national level, which involves recruits being trained within their recruiting state for a period of three to six months, resulting in them graduating at the police rank of Private and then deployed within that same state as in article 35/1 and 4 of the Sudanese Police Act (Government, 2008). The second level is the one that is conducted at the national level in accordance with article 25 of the Sudanese Police Act for Officers who, once selected, are trained for three years at the National College of Police Sciences and Law and graduate at the police rank of 1st Lieutenant with Bachelor in Law and Police Science. The newly graduated recruits will be deployed across the country throughout states and police departments (Government, 2008). The third level relates purely to what is known as Technical Police NCOs (literal translation of *Shurta Faneyah*) who are recruited at the national level and must hold a minimum qualification of the Sudanese Secondary Certificate which is the same qualification required for officers to join the police college. Technical NCOs are trained for one year at the National Unified Training Centre, based in the capital city of Khartoum, and graduate at the police rank of Sergeant to be deployed at the national level.

The fourth level is an internal recruitment process that focuses on upgrading outstanding NCOs with good performance and conduct who have served for minimum of seven years to be police officers. This group receives additional training at the National College of Police Sciences and Law for one year and, once graduated, they join the Officer class at the police rank of 1st Lieutenant. The fifth level involves the targeted recruitment of specialist individuals such as doctors, engineers and IT technicians who join the police at different ranks according to their

specialist qualification and work experience. These specialist recruits are trained at the National College of Police Sciences and Law for six months before moving to their specialist posts for induction training, for example within the Police Hospital, prior to beginning their new posts. The sixth level involves the recruitment of officers to join specialist areas such as Customs, Scientific Support to Criminal Investigation (forensics) and Civil Defence departments known as Specialist General Directorates. Officers for these departments also receive training at the National College of Police Sciences and Law for one year and graduate at the police rank of 1st Lieutenant. The last entry level is that for skilled individuals such as mechanics, carpenters and those with building and painting skills and the like, recruited to provide specialist service for the police. This group, after being trained at NCOs training centres, will be given ranks within the NCOs as appropriate to their experience and specialist area. Their recruitment will take place under article 35 of the police act (Government, 2008).

The following section will provide in-depth analysis of the recruitment and training of officers and NCOs followed by the recruitment and training of women police officers.

The officers' recruitment process

The Sudanese Police recruit candidates to be officers each year from among those who are qualified for university study at about the same time as when universities start the admission process for new undergraduates. The recruitment process for officers begins with an advertisement by the Sudanese Police stating that it will be recruiting officers during specified dates, in accordance with article 25 of the Sudanese Police act (Government, 2008). The process will be managed jointly between the administrative department at the headquarters and the police college, with the administrative department having overall authority over the process. These

advertisements are distributed via national and regional media outlets, including newspapers, radio and television, also by posting a copy of the advertisement at police stations. However, remote areas of Sudan may not have access to these diverse media outlets, making residents less likely to hear of the recruitment campaign. In recent years Sudanese police began to upload the advertisement on the police website, but with a tiny percentage of the population having access to internet, not many people will benefit from this. The application form has to be completed manually and handed in to the police college in person.

Having heard that the Sudanese Police are recruiting, potentials applicants have to buy the application form for 60 Sudanese Pounds before they can begin the recruitment process. This process commences with a preliminary interview during which time the panel will check the applicants' certificates, height (which must not be below 5.8" for males and 5.5" for females), as well as his or her ability to hold a conversation using a few basic questions that often include the candidate's motivation to join the police. The Police Headquarters would form a set of panels to run interviews at this stage both at the national and state level. Each panel also checks the physical wellbeing of the interviewee, to make sure that he or she is not disabled in any way, as disabled people of any kind are not accepted in the Sudanese Police. At this preliminary stage almost half of the recruits will be disqualified and the successful candidates will be referred for a full medical examination and, if successful, they will then be subjected to a written test to examine their general knowledge, intelligence and level of English language.

This is followed by a test held at the National College of Police Science and Law to examine the candidate's physical strength, which includes running for a certain

distance and doing some body exercises. For those fortunate enough to pass the physical test there will be another interview panel, which is headed by senior police officer from the police Headquarters who represents the Director General of the Sudanese Police. The outcome of this interview will be send to the Director General for the final approval and his office releases the final list of selected candidates, who will be required to report to the National College of Police Science and Law to start their three-year training programme. This recruitment and selection process takes six months or more to be completed. The training of the new recruits will take place in a confined camp that they do not leave for 45 days. After this period they are released to stay with their families during weekends until the end of the three-year training programme. The training programme is often a mixture of parade, physical exercise and law, with a total five weeks of work placement at different police departments. During these weeks recruits experience police work and they also get the chance to be tasked with small duties like patrol under the supervision of an experienced police officer from the relevant department (college, 2012).

For those who are disqualified there is no explanation as to why they were disqualified apart from in the case of medical examination. The majority of the research respondents reported that, in spite of this clear set of required stages, at every point new applicants are added to the pool of potential recruits who have not been through the former stages (and they will not be required to do so) as the panel members are approached and influenced to include them by influential people from inside or outside the police. Thus some are considered without undertaking any of the preliminary tests due to patronage. A clear example of corruption in the recruitment and selection for officers which happened during the interim period following the signing of the CPA when South Sudan was allocated a certain quota

for officers to be selected by the South Sudanese authorities and trained at the police college in Khartoum. Some senior police officers and dignitaries managed to put their sons and relatives within that quota. At independence when South Sudan demanded to have officers trained in those quotas to be transferred to South Sudan. The families of those officers came forward saying that they do not want their sons to be transferred to the South as they are not South Sudanese.

The final interviews are designed to test areas of self-confidence, communication skills, decision-making and other key performance areas that have not been tested during the earlier stages. These interviews are not run in a structured manner and the panel will make the test as they think is appropriate. The police officers who sit on the panels and run the interviews are selected regardless of their knowledge and / or training in assessment and interviewing and they are not subjected to any training to prepare them for the important role that they are going to undertake⁵. I experienced sitting in one of these panels in 2006 during my work at the police college. What I noticed is that we were making judgements without adequate knowledge or training to exclude some applicants who could have become good police officers. We were not trained, briefed or provided with systematic assessment criteria to do that job. A process with this level of importance needs to be conducted by well-trained, independent individuals who enjoy high standards of commitment and integrity.

Additionally, scenario based testing and role play are not part of the recruitment system in the Sudanese Police. Assessment of the candidates' KUSAB in (Knowledge, Understanding, Skills, Attitude and behaviour) is undertaken through

⁵ From my own experiences of being a member of such panels there are no pre-conditions to be part of them.

hypothetical situations in many other police forces but not in Sudan (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997a).

In some countries where the community is involved in policing issues, the selection and recruitment process would be scrutinised by community members. As is the case in the US (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997b). From my experience I did not notice any form of involvement of community members in the selection process in Sudanese police. To this end the selection for Sudanese Police officers is a solely police managed process that is managed directly through the police Head Quarters and takes place at the police college.

Non-commissioned officers' recruitment and training

As stated earlier in this chapter, there are two main levels of recruitment for NCOs, one level is the Technical NCOs, who are required to be holders of the Sudanese Certificate (the same certificate required of officers to join the National College of Police Sciences and Law - it is only the grade that differs slightly). This group is recruited with far less scrutiny and assessment than officers and they are graduated as Sergeants after undergoing training in a confined training camp for nine months. They are deployed to work only at the national level in the capital city or in other central departments based in the capital. Like the officer-class, states are not allowed to recruit or train this group at state level.

The second level of NCOs recruitment is those men and women who are recruited and trained at the state level to graduate at the police rank of Private in state training schools. They are recruited with even less scrutiny, with lower or no academic qualifications and receive a shorter period of training that does not usually exceed

three months also in closed training centre, during which they are taught basic legal knowledge, physical training, parade and the use of fire arms.

It is of note, that the recruitment and training requirements of this vast majority of police personnel is not clearly explained in the Police Act of 2008 (Government, 2008). This group is recruited and trained in accordance with article 35/1 and 4 but there are no further explanations as to provisions of their recruitment and training. There seems to be more focus on the officer's selection and training, whereas the aforementioned percentages of officers in contrast to NCOs indicate that the largest percentage of police work, particularly at the front line and community interface, is done by the NCOs. A later section in this chapter examines how much of the financial resources allocated to training is spent on officer's training and how much is spent on NCO's training.

60% of respondents asserted that the vetting system for all recruits is flawed and fraught with corruption and nepotism, and, as a result, many people with poor skills and questionable criminal records found their way into the police. They added that the police headquarters is obsessed with recruiting large numbers of recruits but they pay little attention to the quality of those recruits.

The recruitment of women in the Sudanese Police

“We are not seeking to be the same as men, but we do not want to be discriminated against” (Respondent)

The role of men and women in each society is shaped by how the society perceives them and the expectations of each, which differ in most societies, depending on the socio-cultural understanding of that particular society (Donais and Geneva Centre for

the Democratic Control of Armed Forces., 2008,p.107). Police forces are historically dominated by masculine cultures everywhere, as women even in the United Kingdom were not accepted into the police until during the Second World War. The first women to be police commissioners did not appear in the UK until the mid1990s (Peter, 2003, Neyroud and Beckley, 2001, Mulcahy, 2008). Since 1975 the number of police women in the UK police grew rapidly until by 2008 they reached 23 percent of the total force in England and Wales with three women as chief constables and 12 assistant chief constables (Mulcahy, 2008,p.655). The United Nations Security Council 1820/2008 acknowledges the role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding stressing the significance of their involvement in such situations especially at decision making in these contexts. Resolution 1325/ 2000 supports women's representation and involvement in the international, regional and national institutions. Moreover the resolution calls for mainstreaming a gendered perspective into the United Nations peacekeeping operations and the need to pay attention to the special needs of women as stated in paragraph 8 of the resolution specially the encouragement of local women to participate in the peace process and to ensure that women's rights are enshrined in the relevant documents when negotiating the peace deals. Having police women operating in peacebuilding settings is thought to help protect women's rights and enhance their role in peacebuilding (Council, 2000, Council, 2008b).

The Sudan Constitution of 2005, Article 32/1 states that women should be granted equal rights to men, including the right of work, equal pay for equal job and all other job privileges. These rights apply to the Sudanese Police. However, women are still under-represented in the police service, totalling only 5% of the workforce (Government, 2005, Police, 2008). Article 7/1 of the constitution also supports

women rights when it links the rights to citizenship where the rights and duties are based on citizenship status. More over article 25/1 of the Sudanese Police act also asserts women's right when it explicitly states police is open to all citizens regardless of religion, gender or other differences (Government, 2008).

Despite this, women were totally excluded from the 2012 and 2013 intakes to the National College of Police Sciences and Law, as the authorities believed that the administrative posts for women, where they usually work, were adequately staffed, according to the women- only focus group who were all senior police officers. As put by one respondent "The law never discriminates against women, it is people who discriminate." However, they noted that, the exclusion was not announced in any recruitment drive or recruiting advertisement as that would be against the law and unconstitutional. Consequently, women applied by filling in the application forms, paying the associated fees and even went to the first interview – before being told at later stage that female applicants were excluded from the process in that year, 2012. So the College of Police Sciences and Law included no female recruits in the 2012 and 2013 batches. Nevertheless women's under-representation in any community is not entirely due to discrimination against them, according to Pankhurst (2008) it can take place due to culture as stated previously. Similarly women's political participation may be hampered by cultural issues family and community pressures (Pankhurst, 2008).

Police women in Sudan are subject to the same training programme as their male colleagues and receive equal pay. However, conditions of service and deployment vary between male and female officers. For example women are not required to work in patrols or operational departments, particularly night shifts. Additionally, women

police officers predominantly work in administrative departments and do not get posted away from their family residence. In legal terms Sudanese laws do not discriminate against women as they are entitled to equal pay and equal job and they are allowed to all police jobs, its their preference of not doing certain type of police work or working away from family home which became part of police culture this regard. This is not the case for male officers who are frequently posted to different states. There are a few exceptions such as: women work night shifts in departments for example at customs in air and sea ports as well as passport departments and police hospital. The level of grievances expressed by the group shows that the Sudanese police women are not satisfied with the way the Sudanese Police handles their representation within the force. The women focus group cited another example of discrimination when they explained how they were excluded from the newly built police flats which were all distributed to male police officers in 2013. When they asked why they were excluded they were told that they could be married to a non-police person, they said even though this applies to their male colleagues: they were not judged by whom they were married to.

In the UK a gender balance policy within the police was introduced in the light of the new Equal Opportunity's Act in the 1970s, and the new public management policy and the police reform. According to their study the ability to confront violence and danger is what determine police identity, the use of force, coercion and some degree of brutality is a necessary feature of police work that women are not prepared to cope with for both physical and emotional reasons. Therefore police women were traditionally assigned to social service type of work rather than law enforcement one (Peter, 2003). As stated by the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in 1974 "until relatively recently policing has been regarded as pre-eminently masculine profession

necessarily depending in part for its success upon the size and physical strength of its membership. The time has come for these attitudes to alter. Discrimination against qualified girls and women is not only insulting and unfair it's also wasteful of skills and abilities of half our population" (Adlam and Villiers, 2003,p.177). When the Equal Opportunity Act was introduced in 1975 the three police associations in the UK opposed the inclusion of police women on an equal basis with their male colleagues.They built their arguments on the following points; the unsuitability of police work for women; their physical and emotional deficits; and the risk they posed to male colleagues (Peter, 2003).⁶

Despite strong resistance the act was passed and police women in the UK were integrated into the police structure but their promotion chances were adversely affected due to special women departments being abolished and women being assigned to the type of work that traditionally is not valued by police. They also prefer not to work nights or hard shifts and go home early thus limiting their chances to get promoted. It was thought that women were better at working with other women and sexual offences and tended to be excluded from crime fighting activities. Police work is putting gender demarcation and exclusion against women who cannot put in long working hours and pursue aggressive, competitive behaviour. Police work has often been difficult to balance with the domestic responsibilities held by women police officers (Neyroud and Beckley, 2001). Police work is widely not considered to be an attractive job for women since police organisations in countries like the United States, Germany and India are all facing difficulties in increasing the numbers of female police officers in their police organisations (Call, 2007). It is the right balance

⁶ (these were twofold: the distraction caused by possible sexual entanglements and their inability to provide back-up to male colleagues); their economic worth, this is explained by the likelihood that they would leave after marriage and /or child bearing

of equal opportunities for women coupled with job duties and consideration of culture that can bring up the police women contribution up and allow them to do their best and achieve their full potential. As Adlam et al., put it police women found themselves in a work environment predominantly dominated by men. In this masculine culture they argue, women can only adapt to the organisational culture rather than change it as studies in the women police officers concluded in the UK, USA and Canada (Adlam and Villiers, 2003,p.175). In India where women police officers have reached high positions the total percentage of them with the police is only 4% of which 89% are in lower ranks, and they are assigned to specific departments that do not include operational type of police work. Police women who ask for part-time assignment due to family responsibilities face resistance within the police organisations and consequently being deprived of potential training and advancement. Research in this area also suggest that organisational police culture needs to change to accommodate female police officers and pave the way for them to advance (Kratcoski and Kratcoski, 2011,p.20).

The situation in the Sudanese Police is not different in terms of police organisations being discriminative against female police officers. In their focus group interview seven women Sudanese police officers unanimously stated that they are facing discrimination from their police departments. They confessed that they do not do the same job their male colleagues do like working night shifts, working in hardship areas, operational departments or get posted away from their family residence. However they say this should not make them victims of discriminative organisational policy. Despite the fact that they are treated equally in pay and promotion nevertheless they do not often get promoted to ranks higher than colonel. One


respondent stated that “We are not seeking to be the same as men, but we do not want to be discriminated against”(A1/3/9).

Integration of Former Combatants into the Police

This practice has a long history in Sudan dating back to 1972 when rebels from South Sudan were integrated into the army and the police after the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972 (Licklider and Roy, 2014). In recent years as Sudan has undergone its major peace process, an additional entry level was added into the Sudanese police. This entails recruiting former combatants into the Sudanese Police as part of the arrangements for power sharing and the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration programme. This process involves many challenges relating to the maintenance of the established recruitment standards. Most ex-combatants had been bush fighters, with little opportunity for education and predominantly possess skills relating to warfare, making it very difficult for many of them to achieve the established recruitment criteria. Reintegrating former combatants into the police of civilian society is part of the Peacebuilding process as stated by the UN panel looking into the United Nations peacekeeping operations (Durch, 2003,p.3). However integration of former combatants into the police is becoming more common in recent years (Hills, 2011). The implications of former combatants joining the police such as their poor qualifications and the antagonistic relations with existing police were identified by Leys et.al.,(1995) in the context of Namibia at the end of the independence war when the new SWAPO government had to deal with restructuring the police by incorporating former combatants into the police (Leys and Saul, 1995,p.138).

Similarly, in the years following 2004, the Sudanese Police witnessed for the first time groups of former combatants joining the police as a result of the peace agreements between the Sudan Government and the groups fighting in Eastern Sudan, the Darfur region of Western Sudan, Blue Nile State and South Kordofan State. A key challenge relating to this process occurred because many of the former combatants had been given ranks in the bush, but these ranks did not match the qualifications and requirements of the corresponding police rank. To cope with this challenge the groups were subjected to a training programme that was specifically tailored to their needs. Unlike other groups, these recruits had been indoctrinated into a 'war mentality', which required specific training focusing on the principles to counter this attitude such as the rule of law, human rights, and some legal knowledge. The groups were then assigned to different police departments around the country. The following table provides some information on the numbers of ex-combatants from each area in recruitment batches 39 and 40 who were trained at the police college 2007-2009 and graduated as police officers at different ranks. These figures were obtained from the registration office at the police college during my visit to the police college in 2013. The process also led to 2687 former combatants being integrated into the police as NCOs. Darfur region has the largest number 1545, followed by Eastern Sudan 192 and the two regions of South Kordofan and Blue Nile 95 as provided by the Department of Administrative Affairs when I visited the Department in 2014. In both visits I had to go through someone that I know and they provided the figures on personal trust as they are not publically available anywhere.

Figure 6.1: Number of combatants in Batch 39 and 40 (2006)



The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur DDPD stipulated in article 456 that for former combatants to join the police or the army they have to undergo a vetting process agreed upon between the two parties and to meet the following conditions; Sudanese National; age not less than 18 and not exceeding the age or retirement (60 years); medical and mental fitness; have combat experience; no previous conviction and the voluntary consent of the individual to join the police or the army. Furthermore in article 457 the document included specific conditions for former combatants to integrate as officers as they have to have a minimum qualification of secondary school attendance and / or completion. Nevertheless some field commanders can be exempted from this and their long experience would be considered *in lieu* of school certificate. Secondly potential officers cannot be considered if they have previously been dismissed due to incompetence. Article 458 states that all former combatants joining the police or the military should be subject to military training; this reflects the fact that military training is an integral part of the training for police in Sudan. According to article 460 combatants joining the police or

the military for the first time are to be trained according to the training requirements of the respective force whether military or police. In article 459 the document explains how the numbers of the former combatants who are to become officers should be based proportionately on the size of the NCOs and soldiers according to the organisational structure of the police and the army. Ranks for the former combatants are determined according to age, training, combat experience and academic qualifications as stated in article 461 (Movement, 2011).

I interviewed one of the Sudanese Police's representatives at the Doha peace process who was present during the negotiation and was also tasked with overseeing the implementation of the peace deal in particular the integration of the former combatants into the police. He expressed frustration at how the armed movements are failing to fulfil their obligations with regard to numbers and conditions to complete the integration process. At negotiations rebels would claim certain numbers and ranks but then they often fail to present these with the matching qualifications for integration into the police. The integration of those former combatants into the police, as I see it, will further the dominance of certain ethnicities within the police especially in Darfur where the rebellion in Darfur, for instance, is made of three tribes of (Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit) (Natsios, 2012). Including recruits from specific tribes can deepen the existing imbalance within the police and may lead to those who did not take part in the fight against the government thinking that violence is rewarded better than seeking peaceful means. A Nigerian army officer informed me that recruiting former rebels into the police or the army was not contemplated in Nigeria. The DDR programme there sought to find jobs and support the former rebels in civil sectors but not the police or the army. He pointed out the unpleasant outcome of recruiting such groups who mainly come from certain

ethnicities in the army and the police without rigorous vetting. Such recruitment may bring into the force people with serious human rights violations and deepen the unbalanced representation of certain ethnicities in the police.

At the end of each training programme for each group trainees, they will be graduated in special ceremony which the police college used to do for each graduating group of officers; this will be outlined in the next section.

Graduation ceremonies

As detailed above, four of the entry levels receive training at the National College of Police Sciences and Law. On successful completion of this training, the Sudanese Police normally holds a luxurious graduation ceremony for each batch. According to three respondents with experience in the training field, interviewed in this study, the aim is, as they see it, to raise the morale of the graduates and boost the police profile through a wide media campaign that is orchestrated for many days before the ceremony. These prestigious ceremonies are usually attended by the President of Sudan, other government officials and diplomats. It often takes place at a large non-police venue, which is rented by the police because the ceremony attracts large crowds and is open to the public, and is attended by the families, relatives and friends of the graduates. Ironically therefore, the event requires a major policing operation to maintain order and security.

The parade represents one of the military features of Sudanese Police. Instructors at the police college will aim to present a more impressive parade than military college graduation parade. Ample time is allowed for preparation and practice, with as much as eight to ten weeks usually dedicated for that purpose. Additionally, rehearsal


parades are often inspected by high ranking officials from Sudanese Police Headquarters before they declare it ready for the actual ceremony. This type of ceremonial activity is very costly in terms of money but the police leadership believes that they are important to improve the image of the police as well building effective community police relations. Both points can be seen relevant as the ceremony usually attracts huge crowds. The following section details the Sudanese Police Training Estate.

The Sudanese Police training estate and police training process

The expanding duties of the Sudanese Police and the wide range of policing roles and services make training in the Sudanese Police a daunting task. This is particularly significant when we link it to peacebuilding and examine whether training institutions are qualified to produce police personnel to serve the peacebuilding process and to what extent are these processes are equipped to train officers and NCOs to be more effective in peacebuilding. According to article 16 paragraph L of the Sudanese Police Act 2008, training is one of the national matters that must be designed and monitored at the national level (Government, 2008). Then article 37 stipulates that training is subject to the national standards set out by the police Headquarters and would include the following issues. First, identifying training needs and designing of training plans to be implemented internally and externally; second, designing training curriculum and crafting training programmes at the national and state levels; third, preparing qualified trainers and modernising training facilities; fourth, developing relationships with training institutes at bilateral, regional and international levels; and fifth, supervising and inspecting police training institutions at state and national level (Government, 2008).

Coping with the diverse tasks and duties required from Sudanese Police has necessitated the establishment of multi-function training institutions. Considering the hugely diverse policing functions it is almost impossible to establish training institutions to match these functions. The figure below explains the police training institutions and the relations between them. It is worth noting that these institutions provide training in a wide range of subjects and that officers and NCOs are trained in separate institutions.

Figure 6.2 **Sudan National Police Training Authority**



As the flowchart demonstrates, Sudanese Police training is the primary responsibility of the Training Authority, which is one of five Directorates working under and supporting the Director General of Police to achieve strategic policing objectives (Police, 2008). Police training is divided between many institutions. Some of them are purely under the management and supervision of the Sudanese Police but others are not. For example the Forensic Institute is a faculty of Ribat University, which is a Ministry of Interior (police) and Ministry of Education establishment. Some provide initial training and others provide on-the-job and promotion training, which is detailed later in this section.

The main training body in terms of facilities, budget and level of management is the National College of Police Sciences and Law, which was established in 1952 (Salim, 2005) and is entrusted with initial training for all police officers (officer-class). In

1997, the National College of Police Sciences and Law gained university status and was transformed into the Ribat University, retaining its original name as a faculty of the University. The intention of this transformation was to enhance police training, development and research by giving it academic status; consequently it now falls under the Ministry of Higher Education.

To this end, the Sudanese Police Personnel Department posts police personnel to Ribat University's Faculty/College of Police Sciences and Law, making them responsible for training police officers in accordance with police law and regulations and the stringent academic requirements of the University. The officers graduate with a Bachelor in Law and Police Science after spending three years of combined training that includes physical training, police sciences and law subjects. Examining the semesters of the College of Police Sciences and Law (Law, 2005) it is noticeable that human rights is not covered till the fourth semester after the trainee officers had attended their operational one-month beat course, where they are expected to engage with citizens.

Two other police training institutions are faculties within Ribat University – one is the Police Academy, which is tasked with providing on-the-job training to police officers in a variety of subjects. The main programme delivered by the Police Academy is the Fellowship Programme for police Colonels to develop their leadership skills, as the programme is a prerequisite for promotion to the next rank of Brigadier. However, officers holding a Master's degree in any subject are exempt from attending the programme, even if their Masters are in a field that is not related to police work. The Fellowship Programme originally ran for one year, but the 2012 batch spent only six months after it was reduced in terms of both time and content,

said the head of Fellowship programme at the Academy in an interview. He added that, the Fellowship Programme includes a didactic trainer-centred element covering police-specific subjects such as crime prevention and detection plus other academic and generic subjects such as management, leadership and planning. Furthermore he added; Officers in the programme also have the opportunity to share their policing experience and discuss diverse policing matters from different Sudanese perspectives in a semi-academic environment, which enhances their understanding and deepens their policing knowledge. The programme concludes with an academic research project, that each participant must complete in any police or police-related subject, the head of Fellowship programme concluded. These research projects despite being of less academic rigor nonetheless enrich the Police Academy's Library and help researchers in police science and other subjects.

A major criticism of the Fellowship Programme, as pointed out by one respondent with working experience in the training institutions, is that it does not sufficiently prepare the participants for their next role as senior and strategic managers, as the leadership element is generic and tends to be academic in nature. Moreover, it is not focused on the actual implementation of improved policing through enhanced competence for leaders and managers. Furthermore, the programme does not closely examine individual participant's competence through scenario or work-based assessments, to ascertain if they have the correct knowledge, understanding, skills, attitudes or behaviour to be senior managers (Adlam and Villiers, 2003). The Academy also runs other shorter courses for officers most of which are promotion related course for different ranks. This limitation of such programme features even more when the challenges of peacebuilding are considered.

The third police Faculty of Ribat University is the Institute of Forensic Science, which has the main objective of providing training to enhance scientific support to the legal justice system, by ensuring the presentation of scientific and legally acceptable evidence that corroborates other evidence before the court. To this end, the Forensic Institute specialises in training and developing police personnel, particularly those working in the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and the scientific support to Criminal Investigation General Directorate, which covers areas such as crime scene investigation, ballistics, DNA, forged documents, chemistry and trace evidence. To a lesser extent, the Forensic Institute's remit also covers the development of other agencies working in law enforcement, including but not limited to judges and prosecutors, by building their knowledge and understanding, of some relevant forensic science, in particular crime scene management, which includes the gathering and securing of evidence, investigating cyber-crimes and relevant advances in contemporary science. The role of the institute continues to expand as a result of those advances in science in order to fight emerging crime trends through advanced investigative techniques such as the emerging and fast developing fields of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and high technology crimes (Forensic Institute, 2010).

Selection for Training Courses

The Sudanese police force is conducting a lot of training in other countries, as explained in Chapter Three and later in this chapter, even though data on numbers of officers being trained each year is not available. The importance of this type of training is exhibited by the fact the Police Act explicitly addressed the issue in several provisions. For example the selection for training police officers abroad is

organised by article 37/2 of Sudanese Police Act 2008 which states that a panel is to be established to select police personnel for training programmes and scholarship for studies in other countries. This panel should include representatives from both the central and the state levels and should be set up by the Director General of the police. The same Article fell short of elaborating how the panel will make the selection or on what basis and what are the criterion to be employed for that purpose (Government, 2008). However, this panel has never been established, leaving the selection process fraught with nepotism and cronyism preventing the police from nominating the most suitable individuals to ensure maximum benefit for the police and the communities they serve. This difficulty was pointed out by the majority of respondents. For example, as one middle rank police officer puts it “well-connected officers are being given more chances than others”. Two focus groups asserted that to date the Training Authority has no reliable records on the number of courses each police officer has undergone. The groups continued, to correct this situation, the Authority circulated a letter requiring officers to declare what type and how many courses they had attended abroad. However, as widely expected, officers abstained from telling the truth, believing that this might deprive them from future training opportunities abroad.

The overlap between posting and training courses is also obvious as many officers seek to join training programmes if they are posted to a hardship area whereas the same officers would avoid being on that same course if they are stationed in the capital, Khartoum. This is of particular concern when the course is abroad as many would want to have the opportunity to travel and gain *per diems*, which is covered in the next section.

On-the-job training

'I had never been to any training course during my seventeen year service, until last year when I was sent to a course about firing big guns, it is completely irrelevant to the administrative job that I am doing'.(A1/3/10).

Police organisations need to regularly update their staff on new laws, growing community expectations, contemporary policing methods and new technology and to have them ready for new roles, new policing challenges, deployments or promotion, a process which is known as on-the-job training in Sudan, or in-service training in the United States, whilst other countries, such as the UK, call it Refresher Training and/or Promotion Training (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997b, Peak and Glensor, 2002). For police to maintain good performance they are required to incorporate new policing approaches in their training programmes and subject their staff to regular training to build their knowledge and sharpen their skills to face new challenges. It is recognised that senior or older police officers may be less enthusiastic to attend training than newly recruited ones and they may need to be motivated to go on training courses (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997b). Police officers also need to be prepared for new roles to be executive or managerial ones.

The programme and courses for on-the-job training are of particular significance in that they need to be designed in sufficient detail to cover all policing aspects and all police personnel who need to be trained. The date and time of the course, the cost, and the necessary arrangements of replacing candidates to go for the training are all matters of significant importance that they need to be considered through the lens of scientific assessment. The latter is especially important so that the operational or administrative job of the trainee is not being affected by selecting key individuals with

rare skills to attend training programmes, without ensuring there is a replacement. How much money is dedicated to training, which aspect of training should come first, at what time, for how long, which ranks the training should focus on are also issues to be considered when planning for such training (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997a). Training is particularly challenging when it is connected with introducing new ideas and concepts, it could lead to organisational resistance if the concepts are going to lead to change. Such training that includes new concepts is a necessity for both new recruits and those already in police service (Peak and Glensor, 2002, Develeopment, 2007).

Just like the basic training described earlier most of the resources are spent on officers' training internally and abroad rather than NCOs. All research respondents made similar comments to the quote at the beginning of this section and expressed their dissatisfaction with the management and the contents of training programmes. They explained that the contents of most training programmes are outdated or irrelevant and the selection for these courses is flawed. They presented examples when people are sent to courses that are irrelevant to their job or attending the same course several times.

Quasi-military training in the Sudanese Police

The authoritarian military command style of policing is contrary to democratic principles of participation. The authoritarian style is known to produce low morale and the rigid rank structure fails to provide sufficient job satisfaction for police officers (Peter, 2003: p 160).

As stated in Chapters two and three, many police organisations around the world have a military component and therefore they are classified as paramilitary police (Newburn, 2008, Campbell and Campbell, 2010, Lutterbeck, 2004b). The Sudanese Police, as in many African countries, (Hills, 2000, Berridge, 2011, Francis, 2012b, Marenin, 2009) have the same military characteristics as exemplified by the military training that includes military command, parades, firearms, and tactics. This primarily goes back to the historical origins of police forces in British colonial Africa which were established to enforce forced labour, taxation policies and so forth (Marenin, 1982,p.387). Marenin pointed out the blurred boundaries between the police and the military and the interchangeable roles that they undertake in Africa, therefore it is not surprising to see the police include a substantial element of military training in their curriculum (Marenin, 1982).

However, in countries that experience serious violent crimes and/or civil conflict such as Sudan, it may be relevant to train only selected police personnel in the use of firearms and military tactics, since they work in high crime areas or conflict zones, where they are exposed to attacks by heavily armed robbers, drug-smugglers or rebels (see chapter three) (Berridge, 2011). Conversely, it is however not clear to most of the research respondents why all Sudanese Police have to undergo that type of military training, including even those who will be assigned to work in departments that are not exposed to such dangers.

According to Adlam and Villiers 2009 military-like police organisations tend to use training as a way to sustain the military style so that the military spirit is passed onto recruits during the training programmes, through what they called the militaristic high-stress approach (Peter, 2003). Proponents of this militaristic high-stress

approach argue that it has three main advantages. First, it helps the recruits to weather high stress in work; second it builds their spirit of working as a team and third; it prepares them to obey commands from their superiors. In addition to the points made at the beginning of this section another criticism of these “advantages” is that this type of training will produce officers who are less flexible and more aggressive, moreover they may not be able to make decisions in difficult situations especially where force might be used (Peter, 2003). In his criticism of this type of policing Newburn (2008) explains that it does not only undermine the public trust it as well shake the legitimacy of the state (Newburn, 2008). Nonetheless in recent years many police organisations across the world, driven by the growing rate of crime and violence, are moving towards adopting paramilitary policing style. This includes the UK police with long established tradition of civil police who does not carry firearms (Mulcahy, 2008,p.666).

Training abroad: disorientation, confusion and poor impact

The Sudanese Police have training protocols with a host of countries around the world including but not limited to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, India, Russia and United Arab Emirates. They also constantly send their officers for training programmes in other countries such as South Africa, Malaysia, the UK, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Pakistan. In most cases Sudanese police officers will be sent to these countries to attend training programmes, short courses or a study visit where they will be able to see how policing is being done in other countries. The length of these programmes extend from one or two weeks to lengthy programmes lasting several weeks and cover a wide variety of subjects from the host country’s perspective. Additionally, officers also attend short workshops, meetings or conferences in other

countries. In a few cases trainers from these countries were flown into Sudan to train Sudanese Police personnel in the country.

These interactions with diverse police organisations around the world provide chances for the Sudanese Police to experience and learn from different police practices. It is widely accepted that policing globally has common features such as the protection of life and property, crime prevention and detection, and maintaining the peace (Newburn, 2008). Conversely, it is also true that each country constitutes a special policing case that needs to be well understood in order to design and deliver specific policing requirements for that particular context. The selection of these country partners comes on political bases; the Sudanese police do not select which country to work with. Countries with political ties or interest in Sudan would offer support in various aspects that might include the police. Most of these countries are inexperienced in peacebuilding, none of them have successful track record in peacebuilding which make their contribution irrelevant to the acute need of the Sudanese police in acquiring peacebuilding related policing knowledge. The exception of that is the DFID/UK programme which was implemented in two phases with the first starting soon after the signing of the CPA providing training for police in north and south of the country. The second phase provided training to police in Sudan with special focus on Blue Nile and South Darfur state. In the absence of proper evaluation of training programmes it is difficult to assess how much Sudanese Police are learning from these programmes. For this it would be interesting to evaluate whether it is useful for Sudanese Police to be exposed to that diverse range of policing or does that lead to different views about which policing method should be adopted, because of the range of different policing styles covered. At present,

deepening the understanding of trainees of the policing issues through such programmes is not evident.

It is also not clear whether these courses are included in the Sudanese Police Training Plan and represent a genuine training need for the police. It is known that it is a very expensive type of training as the police often pay travel expenses, accommodation and living expenses for officers travelling for training abroad. Even in the cases where the host country provides accommodation and food, officers will take advantage and get paid *per diem* 'expenses' that are not pertinent to the actual course cost. I can say from my experience and observations, that it is the norm in the Sudanese Police that once an officer is nominated for these courses he or she views it as a chance to earn some money, believing it to be their right to improve their conditions caused by poor salaries.

These external programmes according to all NCO respondents rarely include NCOs, and when they do they usually involve courses on protecting VIPs, rescuing hostages or similar subjects in Turkey or Egypt. This reflects how the small officer-class is dominating the training opportunities at the expense of the vast majority of the NCOs-class who do most of the police work in the real world.

Furthermore similar police organisations working in similar environments, in similar cultural contexts, with similar resources may learn from each other. In the example of Sudan, the training conducted abroad is taking place in such diverse environments that most cases are markedly different from the Sudanese one, making it difficult to understand the relevance and measure the impact of such training in the Sudanese context.

70% of respondents asserted that in many cases, the selection for these external courses is conducted arbitrarily, as there are no set criteria on who should go on each course. As a result some people go for the same course twice or more and some go on a course that is irrelevant to their role. Most of them said that since it is considered a chance for travelling and earning extra income it would be attractive to every single police officer and should be equally distributed between officers. The Training Authority is currently trying to manage the process by establishing a computerised record that contains the details of the courses each officer has undergone and measures that against the specialisation of the officer, in order to avoid sending officers to course that do not correspond with their experience or having people going twice or more for the same course. However this process might be hampered by those who are interested in maintaining the current system. There is growing discussion within the Sudanese Police about the selection criteria for candidates for courses abroad as there is a widespread belief among police officers and NCOs that the awarding of training opportunities abroad system is flawed, as was reiterated by all research respondents.⁷

Sudanese Police Trainers

Prior to designing any training programme there needs to be a training need assessment to determine the training need for the personnel and the police organisation (Peak and Glensor, 2002). Following this process a qualified staff of trainers will need to be deployed to deliver the training.

⁷ Sudanese Police also have a long tradition of hosting recruits from other countries including Ethiopia, United Arab Emirate, Comoros, Djibouti, Somalia and Palestine to be trained in the police college.

The standards of those who work at the police training estate in Sudan, both as officers and NCOs, are not measured as there are no qualification or assessment processes to determine the standards of those working at the College of Police Sciences and Law or other police training institutions. Any police officer or NCO can be posted, often randomly, to work at a training institution or assigned a training role. Until comparatively recently officers transferred to a training roles were regarded as being punished, as training is considered to be less attractive and undervalued by police officers as emphasised by the majority of respondents. In recent years Police Headquarters is placing more attention on the training environment. For example 2012 was denoted as 'the year of training' and great efforts were made to enhance the welfare of those working in the training estate, making training more attractive for some officers (Authority, 2013). Additionally, in a move to adopt international training standards, the Training Authority became an Accredited Centre of the UK-based international Institute of Leadership and Management (ILM) resulting in 32 officers undergoing an ILM 'Training of Trainers programme' during 2012 and 2013, requiring them to meet internationally recognised standards, although the majority are still not in a training posts (Programme(SAJP), 2012). Respondents from NCO focus group pointed out that trainers from junior ranks cannot train senior ranks however competent they are, this rank barrier in their opinion is depriving the police from some of the best trainers from mostly junior ranks.

Comparative examples from police recruitment in other countries

The quality and effectiveness of the police service could be said to start with recruitment (Newburn and Neyroud, 2008,p.237)

Internationally, police work has always been important for maintaining order and keeping peace within communities (Newburn, 2008). However in recent years emerging issues such as globalisation, the easy travel of people and advancing technology has made the policing role even more essential, requiring the police to be more sophisticated, dependent even more on the use of technology and embracing the relatively new tendency of working closely with communities to gain support and trust. This necessitates police institutions recruiting the best possible qualified individuals to undertake law enforcement tasks with higher standards (Wilson, 2012, Escobar, 2008, Gray, 2011, Newburn and Neyroud, 2008). However, recent research findings show that police organisations are facing increasing challenges because of the expanding role of police and the decreasing pool of police recruits; additionally growing numbers of police officers are leaving the police through early retirement to find new careers (Wilson, 2012). This last point has been the case in Sudan where all respondents asserted that more police personnel were leaving the service because of the poor pay. One NCO respondent said that “my contract is going to end soon and I am not going to renew it for whatever reason” A1/3/11).

As to the qualities required of recruits, police organisations do not always keep up with the most relevant qualities in terms of education, cognitive intelligence, gender and age, which they can build further with effective training. For example, for many years physical strength coupled with a tall physique was viewed as essential, whereas it is less valued today as the contemporary policing focus is on proactive, rather than reactive, measures (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997a). It is also essential to note the difficulties associated with measuring the laid down criterion and assessing whether they are related to the contemporary police role (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997b). For example, in 1971 the United States Supreme Court decided

on the case of *Griggs v. Duke Power Company*, that the requirement of certain certificates and tests disqualified a high percentage of black applicants and were irrelevant to job performance and ruled that this represented discrimination against the complainant (Griggs) personally, and blacks generally. The impact of this court decision in the US is that police have to prove all the tests conducted on candidates are job related. This was reinforced in the case of *Davis v. City of Dallas* (1985) because the police of Dallas were able to prove that the forty-five college hour's requirement was necessary because of the complexity of police work. It was recognised that some minority groups may not be able to fulfil the requirement, but the supreme court upheld the Dallas police view (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997a). It is therefore necessary that selection criteria and methodologies should be built upon job analysis. An interview with former United Kingdom deputy chief constable police officer reinforces the US court findings. The interviewee spoke of two inappropriate tests that were abolished in view of the need for them to be job-related and non-discriminatory. The first prevented internal female applicants from becoming police motorcyclists on the grounds that they would not be able to lift a fully-laden police motorbike if it were to fall over. When this criterion was contested through an internal grievance procedure two findings caused it to be abolished: the first finding was that the incidences of having to pick up a fully-laden motorcycle were very rare (only one reported incident in three years) making it unrelated to the job; the second finding was that the majority of in-post male motorcyclists were unable to pick up a fully-laden motorcycle without assistance, making the criterion a discriminatory one as it only applied to women.

The second example related to the criterion that men should be 5' 7" tall and women 5' 4" to join provincial police services (and taller in Metropolitan forces) despite their

policing roles being identical, which clearly discriminates against men if women can be an effective and efficient police officer at 5' 4" then a man of the same height should be able to. Moreover, it also discriminated against many ethnic minority groups, such as British-Chinese, as the majority of males and females did not reach the required heights. Consequently, the height criterion was completely abolished in the UK on the grounds that it was discriminatory, for that the UK police is adopting recruitment standards that require no minimum or maximum height for applicants (Newburn and Neyroud, 2008,p.237).

Therefore, it is agreed by many international police institutions that using job-related and non-discriminatory criteria is the most efficient and effective way of recruiting the best possible candidates or, in the words of Beckley (cited by Neyroud and Beckley, 2001), recruiting "supermen and women' to be members of their forces". According to them, the characteristics required to join the police are:

Able to monitor personal performance; Investigative skills; Job and general knowledge; Decision making, problem solving and planning skills; Practical effectiveness; Clear and succinct written reports (Neyroud and Beckley, 2001).

This debate reflects international move towards policing that does not rely heavily on physique.

The issues of age is usually the first consideration for selecting new police recruits, including the Sudanese Police, which requires that applicants must fall in the age category of 18-21 years old, believing that this is the ideal age for recruitment into the police. Many think that at this age people are too young to be assigned to a policing mission but Roberg and Kuykendall, (1997b) query if age really matters,

regardless of being discriminating against certain segments and deprive the police from potential highly qualified personnel. The UK police have a minimum age of 18 but there is no maximum age (Newburn and Neyroud, 2008, Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997a). Different countries adopt different minimum ages: the Kosovo police, for instance, have their minimum age at 21 years old for new recruits (Gorani, 2005,p.21). These examples from the US and the UK reflects an international move towards change in policing which is more proactive and does not rely heavily on old norms relating to physique. This move could be seen as useful for police engaged in peacebuilding as it paves the way to attract recruits from diverse backgrounds and experiences.

Many policing institutions strive for representative recruitment to ensure that the diverse needs of their communities are met. This is mainly because the relation between the police and some ethnic minority groups is widely affected by the level of representation in the police (Verma et al., 2013, Sabaratnam and Meera, 2013). For example the UK police drive to recruit more ethnic minorities into the police started before the Scarman report following the riots of the 1980s. Even so the percentage is still below the ambition however the number of ethnic minority police officers have risen considerably in recent years (Mulcahy, 2008). As a result of the conflict settlement in Northern Ireland in 1999, the Northern Ireland Police Service adopted a clear policy to achieve balance between the underrepresented Catholics (Republicans) and the Protestants (Unionist) who were dominating the police. For that a fifty percent recruitment plan for both conflicting groups was set and the necessary legal documents to maintain this policy were enacted (Hall and McClintock, 1999, Ireland, 2013).

Several other countries with multi ethnic and or religious population are adopting a policy that ensures equal representation of all groups. In Nigeria for example all security agencies are required to reflect the federal composition of the country. Despite the fact that the policy was started many years ago a special multi stakeholder commission was established and entrusted to oversee the process. Necessary guidelines were provided by the commission to ensure that recruitment is being conducted equally among all states and the different cultures (Group, 2013).

Article 5 of the Kenyan Police Service Act states that there should not be more than two third of the appointments of the same gender and that the police should reflect the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya (Government, 2011). In summary, recruitment must encourage diversity of police recruits to match the community being policed, which is important for political and performance reasons (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997b).

In large multi ethnic countries, such as Sudan, it is relevant to have similar provisions to ensure equal representation of all ethnicities. Articles 7 and 12 of the constitution and article 25/1 of the police act stipulate the right of all Sudanese in taking jobs within the police, nonetheless the provisions seems to be generic. A binding measure like that of the Nigerian or the Kenyan cases does not exist within the legal documents available. Article 25/3 of the police act clearly states that states are to nominate their candidates for national training at the police college . During the interviews most participants said this provision has not been adhered to and the police headquarters continued to recruit for the police college without any consideration to this article.

Training Budget

The Training Authority which is the Sudanese Police's department responsible for training is divided into the following two Directorates: the Officer's Training Directorate and the NCOs' Training Directorate. According to the Training Authority's 2013 Training Plan, the national training budget for the Officer's Training Directorate was estimated at 9,291,300 Sudanese pounds (SDG) of which, 2,730,950 is dedicated to train 8,204 officers within Sudan and 6,560,350 SDG to train 1,074 officers in other countries. The total national budget of the NCOs Training Directorate was 17,051,192 SDG, of which 2,140,000 SDG has been allocated to the external training of 340 NCOs. Internally, the NCOs Training Directorate is aiming to train 94,230 NCOs through some 598 training programmes (Programme(SAJP), 2012).⁸

From the figures shown, it is clear that money spent on officer training, whether internally or externally, is proportionately far more than that spent on training programmes of the NCOs. It is also noticeable that training abroad is more expensive than training conducted within the country, in that the figures show the numbers of officers trained abroad are less than that trained in the country but the cost for the latter is less than that of the former. It seems as well that Sudanese Police tend to regard training their personnel abroad as more valuable than training them in the country. The acute variation in officers as opposed to NCOs training raises the question: 'to what extent does the job of officers differ from that of the NCOs?' In reality, as stated earlier, NCOs undertake the great majority of the work

⁸ With the value of the Sudanese Pound constantly deteriorating it's hard to make sense of these figures when compared to Dollar nevertheless this does not minimise their significance when put in Sudanese context (the official rate is \$1:6SDG).

due to their numbers and availability. This is more understandable when we know that officers are usually assigned to managerial roles while NCOs have front line duties where they interact more with community members. There are no data available from previous years as I was not able to find access to data that can allow analysis to understand whether the training budget was growing or decreasing during the last decade.

Discussion of Comparative Recruitment and training with Sudan

Selection and appraisal is in the heart of the human resources management globally, which nowadays are influenced by many factors such as technology, personality and psychometric tests, bio data, and performance appraisal reviews. These factors are crucial in securing objectivity, efficiency and scientific standards (Storey, 1989,p.92). Article 25 of the Sudanese Police Act of 2008, paragraph (1) on recruitment for the College of Police Sciences and Law, stipulates that all Sudanese have the right to join the college regardless of their gender, region, religion or any other description and that selection should be conducted on the basis of fair competition (Government, 2008). This stems from article 7a and 12 of the Sudan interim constitution on the equal rights of all citizens as well as article 148 of the constitution which states that the police is a national force and that all citizens are entitled to join the police to reflect the diversity of the country (Government, 2005).

In the same Article, paragraph (2) sections C, D and E do not clearly specify the required academic qualifications and the physical test or agility needed. Paragraph (3) also specifies that states select their nominees in accordance with the national standards set by the police Headquarters at the national level. This right for the states to nominate their candidates was fully exercised by the ten South Sudan

states during the six year transitional period that followed the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. When South Sudan seceded to become an independent country in 2011, the remaining eighteen states of northern Sudan did not exercise that right as the recruitment process is still being conducted by the Police Headquarters in the capital city of Khartoum. Interestingly the Khartoum state enacted its own police law in 2009 which is almost replica of Sudanese Police law of 2008, the Khartoum state police law did not mention the appointment or selection of officers even so it did mention the appointment of the NCOs in article 22 of the act to be the conducted by the Director of the state police (2009).

The training of the police is one of the national powers bestowed on the training directorate to oversee and set the standards for training at the national level according to article 16 paragraphs 1/A and B. These national standards are not included in the Police Act, however, and it is not clear who is entitled to decide on them, which make this area highly ambiguous. Moreover, it is not clearly stated if these standards are to be updated and revised regularly to suit the changing needs of the Sudanese communities and there is no guidance on ensuring they are job-related and non-discriminatory. A key problem associated with this is that some deprived groups from the most disadvantaged states with poor education systems might not be able to obtain the same qualification that it is easy to obtain in the capital. Moreover, to ensure the knowledge, understanding, skills, attitudes and behaviour that candidates are required to demonstrate are job related, a critical analysis of their future role and job is required.

It was in comparatively recent times that police organisations worldwide sought to attain professional policing. In the UK, for example, it was not until 1960 that the first

police academy was opened and around the same time in the USA, also in Latin America the Colombian police college was first opened in 1950 (Leys and Saul, 1995, Escobar, 2008)

The training system in the UK has witnessed great change since 1998 when it set out to link the content to aims and objectives with measurable outcomes and more focus on the knowledge, understanding, skills, attitudes and behaviour (Neyroud and Beckley, 2001). Nonetheless these objectives did not include ethics or professional behaviour and the tutor constables do not get any training on how to manage vocational assessment for new recruits undergoing on the job training (Neyroud and Beckley, 2001).

The 2011 report of Peter Neyroud on the leadership and the training of the UK police recommended that a professional body be created to oversee a set of international standards including the establishment of qualifications and new approaches to training for police officers, requiring police forces to engage with higher education institutions to help deliver the proposed qualification (Yesufu, 2013,p.75-76). With these developments in mind, it is not surprising to see police in the UK moving towards linking police work to higher education. This was further stimulated by the HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) thematic report of 2002 on police training. The report suggested that if the police are to catch up with other professions, especially within the field of criminal justice, they have to raise their qualification standards. The move resulted in modules being taught at university level to prepare graduates to join the police. The police will thus be provided with qualified recruits and also boost the chances for those with policing degrees to join the police (Waddington and Wright, 2010).

Training modules should thus develop regularly to include the emerging issues and concepts related to police and policing. An example of this is the Northern Ireland situation in the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement, when human rights were incorporated into all training modules in accordance with the European Human Rights Convention of 1998 (Hall and McClintock, 1999, Independent Commission on Policing for Northern and Patten, 1999). Unlike those in the UK system described above, the Sudanese Police training modules are not linked to any aims or objectives, therefore it is not clear as to the purpose of the training or what impact they intend to have on the trainees or, importantly, what impact they may have on the communities the recruits will ultimately be serving when deployed at the end of their training period..

As stated earlier in Chapter Three the Sudanese Police Forces' Act of 2008, Article 11 introduced three contemporary concepts for the first time, which obviously has important training implications these are: Respect for the rule of the law; Vindication and respect of human rights in accordance with the constitution; Adhering to the acceptable national and international standards of policing to include professional, technical and conduct issues. Despite this the Sudanese Police did not develop a training strategy to capture these new concepts or produce competent trainers who can fully understand these modern concepts and are able to pass the message on to their trainees. Despite this a third of the respondents stated that in recent years the training quality have been improved in terms of content and training environment.

Matters of age limit and time spent in training in the Sudanese recruitment and training system are not justified. For example Sudanese police recruit officers from university graduates who are over 22 years old and train them at the police college

for one year proves that age does not matter since these recruits are from different age groups and there is no available evidence to suggest that they are less competent than the younger groups who are recruited from the age group between 18-21 years (college, 2012). The existing multi-level system of recruitment allow recruits from different age groups to join the police. For example, those recruits from university are six to seven years older than those who are recruited into the police before they join universities. Due to the high cost of training its imperative that it should be based on clear examinations of the time spent on training and the programmes covered and whether they are job related. In particular the training period for officers who spend three years in the college, those who spend one year coming from NCOs background and those who are not actually going to do real police work, like doctors, engineers and so forth. For these groups it seems like waste of time and resources to keep them in training for that long time

To achieve that goal their training modules need to be analysed to ensure that they are both police related and also relevant to the specific job training. Spending six months in a confined training centre must be justified otherwise it might be true that officers are trained in some policing aspects that they do not use throughout their career which would constitute a waste of resources, and time. Many weeks are dedicated to train police recruits in parade-related exercises, for instance, but their main / sole purpose is in preparation for the graduation ceremony.

Post-war Reform and Police Recruitment

At the end of civil wars police recruitment and training is often discussed within the context of 'restructuring or reforming the police' and or 'power sharing arrangements' because the police were invariably affected by, or were part of, the conflict. This is

evident in the cases of Rwanda and Bosnia, among other post-conflict contexts including Northern Ireland (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Willoughby, 2002, Smith and Charles, 2013, Hall and McClintock, 1999). One of the main aims is to achieve a fair balance of posts within the police institution through awarding equal opportunities to the conflicting groups. In Rwanda, the police visited every *prefecture* (county) in the country over several months and held mass community meetings and/or small focus groups to ascertain from each region how they wanted their new police service to be recruited, formed and act, particularly in relation to human rights, involving over 7,000 community members taking part in meetings or focus groups. This resulting in new police recruits taking part in peace-camps to encourage them to take an active role in Peacebuilding and encourage a spirit of Rwandese nationality, rather than being divided into Hutu and Tutsi groups (Willoughby, 2002). It is through the broader post-conflict police reform programmes that the rules governing the selection and recruitment of police candidates will be altered to allow formerly under-representative minorities to find their way into the police. That reform will in most cases be met by resistance from institutions and individuals (Charles, 2002, Francis, 2012b). The reform of the police in post-war conflict countries is often led by international actors, with Northern Ireland being an exception .

In Sudan the international actors also have a lighter footprint, to use a term coined by Lakhdar Brahimi (Durch, 2003, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). Here a distinction should be made between reforming the police at the end of the conflict to make it more representative of the whole population and allowing former combatants to join the police as part of the peace deal, whether in the form of providing jobs, achieving balance between the different groups as part of the power sharing or removing of notoriously abusive police officers from their powerful positions. The

aftermath of the conflict will also provide opportunities to restructure the police to be more transparent and accountable (Call, 2007, Network, 2009, Adlam and Villiers, 2003).

Conclusion

The Sudanese Police training system which seeks to prepare police officers in every policing aspect is expensive, confusing, unfocused and arguably leads to police personnel being unable to master any of their policing duties well. The multi-entry system of the Sudanese Police leads to training being of a generic nature, designed to suit the markedly diverse groups of trainees. Furthermore, the wide remit of the Sudanese Police that expands well beyond the traditionally known police functions (maintaining the peace, crime fighting and crime detecting) to include a host of services, that are normally provided by other agencies in many countries, is making recruiting selecting and training of suitable personnel a much more difficult task. This diversity in the remit of the Sudanese Police is also contributing to the daunting task of delivering adequate training to embrace all these extremely diverse tasks of the police. This acute diversity of tasks turns the police into multi-service delivery organisation, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the police to capture the required knowledge and skills to effectively fulfil their mandate.

The training systems appear to have included nothing about peace education in the curriculum of either the police officers or the NCOs during the initial training period. Nor it is incorporated into on the job training for both groups. The time spent in the theoretical teaching of law, criminology and police sciences compared with that of the practical training suggests that far more time is spent on the former which means that police officers have not been prepared to put their theoretical knowledge into

practice. Yet, research findings suggest that police students are more interested in the on the job training than theoretical approaches (Lauritz et al., 2013).

The multi-national partnership and training conducted by many countries seems inconsistent as the policing requirements vary from one country to another and there is no evidence to show that that type of training delivered actually leads to the expected outcome. It could potentially have been beneficial for the Sudanese Police to be exposed to different policing experience if offered free of cost training or to get international experience at reasonable cost. This could have been achieved by conducting some of the training in the Sudan and by employing the same international experts to run in-country training. By having them in Sudan the trainers may be in a position where they will be able to understand the local context and therefore tailor programmes that suit the Sudanese Police instead of subjecting them to programmes that were originally designed for different police officers, with different experience, and are operating in totally different policing environment.

Most importantly the Sudanese police recruitment and selection system, despite clear provisions in the Police Act, does not guarantee fair representation of the Sudanese community in the police, a matter that is vital for police in peacebuilding settings as shown in literature. The matter of equal representation in the police as stated in Chapter Two is part of the inequality which feeds into the root causes of conflicts.

Sudanese Police recruitment, selection and training appear to be completely unconnected to the peace process and do not seem to address the core peace issues to be dealt with by police officers. Matters of equal representation, community policing, accountability and human rights are all essential for police operating in post-

conflict settings. Among these, community policing is constantly proposed by peace builders as the policing approach that is suitable for policing post-war and conflict contexts as will be explained in the next chapter.

Chapter Seven:

Community Policing in Sudan

Introduction

The Relationship between Community Policing and Peacebuilding

Discourse stresses the common-sense mantra that proactive and credible policing ensures peaceful development and that without durable security provided and maintained by the police there will be no development and this may potentially lead to or create the conditions for violence and armed conflict or relapse into further war (Francis, 2012a,p.8).

This chapter examines community policing as an approach, which has been relatively recently introduced across many countries, and considers its relation to peacebuilding. It will first define the community policing approach as a philosophy and a set of activities that aim to engage communities in the policing process. It then explores the international concept of community policing, how it was developed, and examine, particularly, international practices and how international peace builders

have championed it as suitable policing style for war-divided societies. It then seeks to analyse community policing in Sudan, both history and practice, then examine to what extent is the deployment of community policing in the Sudanese context is suitable for or incompatible with peacebuilding. For that, it will explain how the Sudanese Police sought to apply community policing as an ethos and implement it through 'Community Committees' and 'Community Policing Academies' among other smaller initiatives. Further, it will discuss the diverse perspectives and practices of community policing as well as the advantages and disadvantage of this approach to policing. Finally, it explores the relevance of community policing to peacebuilding in the Sudan and the wider contexts of post-war and divided societies in transition.

Policing and Community Policing in Perspective

Common characteristics can be identified among colonial police in Africa. As stated earlier in Chapter Two, they are often militaristic, centralised, armed, and barracked focusing more on public order as well as acting on behalf of the colonial authority as opposed to focusing on the indigenous community. Moreover, to ensure that police did not establish close relations with communities, it was common practise that police personnel were not recruited from the local communities, rather, they were drawn from the army and had their senior officers rotated between the different colonies⁹. Towards independence as the nationalist movements grew, colonial regimes built more oppressive police; this was preserved by the national regimes at the departure of the colonial administration (Newburn, 2008,pp.23-25). Hills (2001) argued that policing in Africa was predominantly established by the former colonial powers to serve the interests of their 'masters'. This role of police organisations changed little after independence; they simply shifted from serving the colonisers to

⁹ Colonial Police Service was based in London with its Inspector General of Colonial Police appointed in 1948 to ensure direct central control (Newburn, *Handbook of Policing*, 2008)

serving the national governments that came to office after the departure of the European powers. Therefore, the dominant style of authoritarian policing of this period of history will need time and support to make the necessary mental shift to working with the community (Hills, 2000, Berridge, 2011, Francis, 2012b). Francis (2012) asserts that, "Societies across Africa have an historic and justified mistrust of the police for, In the majority of these societies, the police have been separate from the society" (Francis, 2012b,p.8). Therefore, he argues for weakening the relationship between the two parties (Francis, 2012b). In Sudan, the situation is not much different as reflected by the following common saying embedded into the contemporary street level discourse, "If your finger is a police officer, chop it off". This reflects the perception of police as extremely untrustworthy and not in any way there to serve their communities, rather, they serve other bodies that created them which could be the ruling regime. Writing in 1980, Carter and Marenin asserted that the Nigerian Police often found themselves in conflict with the Nigerian society because of what they did to implement the colonial policy which entailed routing nationalists, exacting taxes and labour, and suppressing dissent (Marenin, 1980,p.244).

Hills (2007) examined these issues across Africa and asserted that she did not expect much change in the antagonistic relationship between the police and the communities in Africa because the police are actually governed by the heads of the state to serve the leaders' interests without the public having any say to hold the police accountable. The Ugandan Police in the 1960s and 1970s, during the eras of president Obote and Amin respectively, have had more focus on political disloyalty than on crime fighting; they committed wide spread atrocities against the Ugandan

citizens during that period (Musiime, 2012,pp.98-99). The Ugandan Police, as other police forces in Africa, found themselves at odds with their communities after being used by the Obote regime 1985-1989 to fight the rebels in Luwero during the guerrilla war that resulted in NRM taking power (Francis, 2012b,p.105, Marenin, 1980). As a result, when the Ugandan Police introduced community policing later, it was met with suspicions; the public was sceptical about the real objectives of the programme. The Ugandan constitution of 1995 in article 212(d) encouraged the police to cooperate with the community, nevertheless, like the case of Sudan, the Ugandan Police Act does not include provisions on community policing (Francis, 2012b, Government, 2008). In comparison, the community policing as policing approach is enshrined into the Kenyan Police act as institutional policy (Government, 2011). It is true that police cannot develop democratic policing practices, such as community policing and accountability, unless the overall political system is operating within a democratic environment. Democracy is, with its principles of rule of law and good governance, a prerequisite for democratically accountable police; likewise, a corrupt police organisation has the potential to hinder the progress of a given country towards democratic rule (Hinton and Newburn, 2009). Hinton et al. (2009), in identifying characteristics of developing democracies, set out five elements that all affect the police to varying degrees: weak democratic institutions; corruption and weak rule of law; significant level of poverty and inequality; high crime and societal instability; and finally, poorly institutionalised channels of police accountability and responsiveness (Hinton and Newburn, 2009,p.6). These overlapping, highly interconnected issues can actually be related to police and policing in different ways.

Consequently, changing this situation through police reform, meliorates community and police relations and improves listening to community concerns about police and policing issues that have come to the fore as a key part of central national development, economic growth, socio-political progress, and the maintenance of long lasting peace and security (Francis, 2012b).

Community policing was introduced in Latin America, primarily, when the police reform began as a result of the process in El Salvador and Guatemala when peace agreements were signed in these countries in 1991 and 1995 respectively. The reform followed the community policing model that was prevalent in the United States and Europe during the 1980s(Palmer et al., 2012). The democratisation process that swept through Latin America in the 1990s further influenced the police reform which was as well driven by the rise of crime and the dissatisfaction with police across the region (Palmer et al., 2012). In the US, community policing was introduced following the rise of violence and disorder and the associated fear, the changing method of crime, and the demographic changes in the American society as well as the poor relations between the police and the community. The demographic change in the American society in 1980s, as a result of the wide migration from Asia, Africa, and Latin America which indicated that whites might not remain the predominant ethnicity in the near future, had significant impact on the move toward interacting with the community being policed in what came to be known as community policing (Peak and Glensor, 2002,p.18, Trojanowicz, 1991).

Reform of the police, democracy, and accountability of police are very much interconnected issues. The democratisation climate that followed the end of the cold war was interrupted by the global war on terror which led to first world democracies

adopting non-democratic policing practices. Such practices undermined the credibility of these well-established democracies as proponents of democratic change in other countries. The move away from democratic norms in these countries was featured through adopting more central policing systems, harsh policing techniques, increased detention periods without charge, and poor detention conditions (Hinton and Newburn, 2009,p.24). This becomes particularly relevant when we remember that most police reform programmes are driven and funded by countries with democratic forms of governance even though the outcome of such programmes does not always appear to be consistent with democratic practices (Hinton and Newburn, 2009,p.2).

At the end of the Cold War and the corresponding collapse of the Soviet Union, international peace actors – led by the western powers – started to launch ‘peacebuilding’ missions. This implies that the peace would be built on the most basic of liberal principles of democracy and the free market (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Paris, 2006). In this context, technical assistance was provided to war-torn countries to achieve stable peace and democratic systems. In comparison, the traditional peacekeeping mission (before the end of the Cold War) more or less abided by the mandate of not interfering with internal issues of the host countries. This period is also marked by the increased focus on UN Police rather than the military. It was recognised that the police role was more viable than the military after a relative level of stabilisation, and, therefore, the police should be entrusted with domestic security (Grabosky, 2009b, Greener, 2011b). In this paradigm shift in peacebuilding missions, as stated earlier in Chapter Two, peace builders commenced to undertake a diverse set of activities including drafting laws, reforming

the security and justice sector, monitoring elections, and enforcing peace-terms between the former combatants. Between 1989 and 1998, eleven missions of this type were launched (Paris, 2006). In some cases, the UN missions conducted police functions such as in Namibia. While in other countries, the UN took responsibility for running the affairs of the host country such as in Cambodia. Still, in other countries, they were authorised to use fire not only for self-defence but to enforce peace such as in Somalia and Bosnia (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Barash, 2000, Paris, 2006). The 1990s have witnessed tremendous efforts at reform exerted by international community to rebuild or reform police forces in countries such as Nicaragua, Haiti, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Namibia, El-Salvador, Guatemala, East Timor, Panama, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Kosovo, and South Africa. Most of these came as part of UN peacekeeping missions. The participation of police in these missions has increased dramatically from 35 in 1988 to 9000 in 2000, and by September 2008, the number of UN Civil Police (CIPOL) deployed around the world peaked at nearly 13,000 police personnel. The growth in number of UN Police was coupled with rapid increase in their role which, until 1990s, was to monitor local police behaviours but has expanded to include reporting, advising, and training for local police. Finally, UN Police were empowered with firearms to undertake a law enforcement role in Haiti in 1994 and Kosovo and East Timor in 2001. This means that UNCIVPOL in these countries are empowered to arrest, search, and detain suspects of criminal behaviour (Bayley, 2006,p.233). So, the police role in peacebuilding missions expanded from merely a SMART model (Support, Monitoring, Administrating, Reporting, and Training) to include structural issues and whole set of activities such as elections, human rights, selection and recruitment, law

enforcement, and providing security to internally displaced people (Grabosky, 2009b).

In building effective institutions, the police would come to be recognised as one of the most important bodies responsible of maintaining the order, vindicating human rights, and securing the democratic process. These goals are often achieved, among other things, through implementing community policing strategies. This means that the police are becoming a tool for and subject of peacebuilding; in other words. They have to adopt the necessary organizational changes to embrace reform and implement new policies that link policing to peacebuilding principles which, in this case, means adopting community policing. International actors in peacebuilding contexts would often propose community policing within the wider security sector reform programmes as one of the peacebuilding tools. As stated by Call (2007), police reform is so important because it is linked to many other areas of reform in the journey to achieve stability in the aftermath of civil conflicts (Call, 2007, Greener, 2011b).

Community Policing a Catalyst for Changing Old Policing Styles: Why Community Policing is Necessary

From what has been said, here, we see that a whole lot of reasons are making community policing a necessary policing approach to achieve many objectives at the heart of that peace among divided communities. The chart below summarises the drivers for community policing.

Figure 7.1: Drivers of Community Policing



Community policing came at a time when police organisations shifted away from the beat patrol and replaced it with car patrol with officers in air-conditioned police vehicles fitted with radios to communicate with their controllers. Officers would not leave their cars to interact with the community thus, they would have little knowledge of what is actually going on at street level. By being stationed in police cars, they also miss the opportunity of obtaining valuable intelligence through talking to community members and being able to closely observe their activities (Verma et al., 2013).

The Role of Domestic Community Policing in Peacebuilding

In recent years, domestic police services are becoming more centred in playing a crucial role in the development of transitional societies, especially in Africa. Within that role, there is an increasing focus being placed on the model of community policing with the belief that the police can help societies in war-torn contexts to develop, adopt democracy, and maintain durable peace (Francis, 2012b). Francis

(2012) explains how donor countries pushed for policing reform in war-torn countries with the underlying objective of achieving liberal peacebuilding. In doing this, they aimed at creating police organisations that are accountable to the public within the overall democratic structure of the state. Contemporary discourse suggests that police personnel were involved in human rights violations and became part of the conflict isolated from the societies they were supposed to serve. This was highlighted in Chapter Two and shown in the cases of Rwanda, Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Willoughby, 2002).

Community policing is becoming more and more the common theme within the international peacebuilding missions around the world. That is because this approach to policing is believed to be capable of, among other things, bringing members of divided societies to work together in the aftermath of civil war. The link between police and peacebuilding is clear when we recognise the fact that domestic police are necessary to maintain order, stability, and guard the democratic process in post war countries. Moreover, when the police are completely destroyed by the conflict, the international police will move in to fill the vacuum – clear examples of which were stated earlier such as the interventions in East Timor and Cambodia which both had a strong focus on community policing. As was shown in Chapter Two, international police come with a number of problems which hinder them from having an effective role in host countries. By implementing community policing, the international actors champion this policing approach in conflict contexts to lessen the tension between warring parties and make them have trust in the police. Nevertheless, community policing that is proposed by international actors does come accompanied by some flaws which some research alluded to in Chapter Two

(Greener, 2009b, Grabosky, 2009a, Holm and Eide, 2000b). Despite the greater hope that has been placed on community policing as a suitable policing approach in post conflict contexts, there are, however, some caveats around introducing the approach. Francis (2012) claims that, “Community policing, the concept is still “alien” to the traditional policing culture and institutional philosophy. The practice itself is challenged by several limitations, and it is far from being the panacea or magic wand for peaceful civil-police relations that its proponents claim” (Francis, 2012b,p.31). It could be true that community policing has been successful in some areas where it was introduced. However, mechanisms to test that can be problematic since the management of the overall police performance is not clear cut (Adlam and Villiers, 2003, Newburn, 2008). Even if community policing is proven successful in one area, does that really guarantee its success in another?

Literature shows that community policing, as a concept, can be defined in a variety of ways(Tilley, 2008, Grabosky, 2009a, García Chávez and University of, 2012, Peak and Glensor, 2012, Wisler et al., 2009, Verma et al., 2013); nevertheless, it might be useful, in this context, to look at to what extent community policing is different from what the police have always been doing. Below is a count of differences between traditional policing and community policing:

Table 7.1: Differences between Traditional Policing and Community Policing

Community policing	Traditional policing method
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involve average citizens in the community • Seek advice/ consult with the community 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No involvement of the community • Reactive policing • Police can hide in the big crowd (some cover their badges)

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Answers and solutions may come from community • Community is the primary source of intelligence • Listen to all community concerns • Minorities are especially engaged • Police are accountable to the public and transparent • Work for the community • Better relations with the community • More trust in police • Local police working at grassroots-level • Beat patrols of small numbers (one or two police officers) • Proactive policing • Individual police officers are encouraged to be innovative and find alternative solutions • Community policing officer is known by the community and is accountable to them • Policing by consent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Depends on recruited informants paid by the police to provide intelligence • Police alone have the answers for community problems • Police are the experts and seek no advice from the community • Focus on specific type of crime that may be of interest for the police • Minorities are most probably targeted • Unaccountable police force/ accountable to the state • Work for the state • Tense relation with the community • Organisational crackdown policy • Suspicious relationship/ less or no trust • Centralized police • Motor patrols or patrols of larger numbers • Policing by coercion
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The Role of the Popular Police in Community Policing and Peacebuilding

The Sudanese Police, as with other police forces in Africa, remains close to the political regimes and has conducted coercive policing towards citizens of western regions during the 1970s in the aftermath of the armed protest against the Nimeri regime in July 1976 (Berridge, 2011). Furthermore, during the first decade of the 21st century, there were several other occasions where the police acted against citizens to serve political agendas of the ruling system in the country (Berridge, 2011,p.252).

Since 2007, community policing in Sudan has been represented by the Popular and Community Policing Directorate (PCPD). Its predecessor Directorate, the 'Popular Police Directorate' was established early in September 1992 with a similar mandate; however, as the name suggests, the new PCPD has an expanded remit with more focus on police community relationships (Hassan, 2009, 2007, Sudan, 2010). This is a separate police department that is directly linked to the police headquarters with no coordination with other police departments (see Sudanese Police organisational structure in Chapter Three). This makes the community policing very isolated with little opportunity to impact on the vast majority of the police personnel that constitute the different police departments. Community policing is thus not being institutionalised within the policing structure in the country. Furthermore, community policing, as a philosophy and policing approach is not mentioned in the Sudanese Police Act of 2008; article 13, which articulates the police functions, includes nothing about community policing. However, in paragraph F, the police are required to raise the awareness of the public through making available all relevant information about crime fighting to ensure the public's engaged support for the police to carry out their

duties (Government, 2008) (see Chapter Three). Article 13, therefore, does not explicitly talk about community policing, but it can be inferred that community policing can be legally located within the wider meaning of this article. Community policing in Sudan means that people work at a specific department on a volunteer-basis; nevertheless, they are paid some money as a salary. This is contrary to the international concept of community policing where the whole police organisation moves to work closely with the community and, with their consultation, to set up policing objectives and be part of the policing process.

Just as its predecessor, the Popular and Community Policing Directorate is staffed by volunteers (*Morabiteen*) recruited by the Sudanese Police Headquarters and regular police personnel, both officers and Non-commissioned officers, according to article 4 of the community and popular police regulation (2007). The *Morabiteens'* conditions of service differ from those of regular police personnel, for example, they do not get pensions and/or promotions in the same manner as the regular police, and they do not get the same depth or length of training prior to starting their service. However, they do get paid a comparable salary to the regular police. So they are considered volunteers, but not in the sense that they are not paid; their volunteering comes from the fact that their future professional development and pension are, in contrast to the regular police, not considered as part of their conditions of service. Headed by a senior police officer, often a Major General, the PCPD also has a senior civil coordinator (*Monasiq*) at the national level, appointed by the President¹⁰. The *Monasiq's* role is to represent and engage the wider community and civil society organisations with the PCPD. Furthermore, as part of his responsibilities, the

¹⁰ The *Monasiq* is usually a political figure from the ruling party with direct access to senior politicians in the country.

Monasiq is to secure support and funding for the PCPD from government. He is adopting a structure akin to the police in terms of national, regional, and local levels. This means that the PCPD has two heads-- one for the operational administrative and day to day matters and another for coordination with external bodies and entities as was pointed out by one respondent working at the department of popular and community policing.

According to one respondent, this department was politicised during the South-North conflict. Before the secession of South Sudan, this department was criticised for sending some of its members (*Morabiteen*) to voluntarily fight side-by-side with the Sudanese army. The criticism was based on the fact that this is outside of the police remit. Other respondents argued that it was not the only police department to take part in the fight against the rebels of former South Sudan. For example, the Central Reserve Police were ordered, at different times, to send units to the South even though they may only be operating in guarding roles and not actively engaged in the front line combat.

The new directorate's aims and objectives are to work with the communities. To achieve this, comprehensive Peace and Security Centres were established in most of the urban centres with the purpose of reassuring the communities and to help and support individuals in need. These centres used to be part of the original Popular Police Directorate but, in recent years, they have become attached to the local police stations under the command of the relevant Station Commander, although they are still staffed by the 'Popular and Community Police'. Each centre is hosted by the local community; they voluntarily provide the building, furniture, and food for the small group of centre staff who often work in shifts. At night, community members

from the area, together with the serving police staff at the centre, will organise joint patrol teams to patrol the area. These patrols have the effect of reassuring the communities, deterring burglars, and reducing other types of criminality.

Community Committees were introduced in 2007 to be a regular standing body to work closely with the police stations so that their members can actively take part in identifying the policing needs and provide the necessary support to the police (Hassan, 2009). They are meant to represent the community by drawing interested members from different agencies, backgrounds, and experiences. In forming these committees, police are also seeking to maintain gender balance through representing females who are, in most areas, still reluctant to participate due to culture barriers. However, in those areas where the police commanders have made an effort to break the barriers, women have become very active members of the committees; for example, in Gezera State, there are 52 Community Committees associated with the 52 police stations. In the majority of those committees, women form 50% or more of the group. Community policing in Sudan is more flourishing in the rural areas than in urban areas because the police in the rural areas will interact with the tribal chieftains to nominate trustworthy individuals to serve as members of the 'popular police'. That may explain why the popular police is formed along the lines of tribal and ethnic lines. The PCPD members intervene in simple community matters to prevent problems, but without detention or investigative powers, although they do have the authority to stop and search. Therefore, the PCPD personnel have to refer any significant matters to the relevant police stations as they are not empowered to take reports of crimes and do not have the necessary police folders. A similar practice occurs in Mozambique where the police contact tribal leaders to

nominate the individuals whom they think are suitable to work with the police (Baker, 2010).

Respondents of this research comprised of both officers and NCOs all confirmed that working with the community within the community policing approach is better for the police and the community. They highlighted the positive impact on police work where valuable intelligence is provided for police. Three respondents expressed caution, saying that community policing in Sudan is being politicised and is being directed to serve a political agenda, but they could not give further explanation. Most respondents also said that training and the selection of the right people is essential to make community policing successful.

Reflecting on relations with the community, the majority of NCO respondents considered the Sudanese community relations with Sudanese Police to have been better before but are now deteriorating and especially damaged after the riots of September 2013 during which many citizens were shot dead and many private properties were looted and burned. They said citizens think that we failed to protect them and their properties. Interestingly, none of the respondents from officers' group mentioned that the relationship between the police and community is worsening. This perhaps can be attributed to the fact that NCOs work closely with community members at the front line of service delivery unlike officers who rarely leave their offices to interact with community. One focus group of NCOs stressed the role of the media in shaping the relationship between the police and community whereby misunderstandings occur as the media tends to focus on the negative side of police

work and does not reflect police achievement. Here, they say, the role of police is essential in getting the right message to the community.

As shown in Chapter Two, the scant resources available to the police and growing policing needs are forcing the police around the world in the direction of community policing as it is thought to be less expensive and to better address the concerns of communities regarding their policing matters. It is also the policing approach recommended to police in divided societies who suffered civil and intra-communal violence. Both are relevant to Sudanese Police who suffer financial difficulties in a country that witnessed protracted internal conflict and lack the trust of the Sudanese community (see Chapter Four).

Forms of Community Policing: Police Academies, Community Policing Developers and Neighbourhood Watch

The UK's Department for International Development's Safety and Access to Justice Programme (SAJP) in partnership with Sudanese Police introduced a range of initiatives to support the community policing approach in Sudan. These are international initiatives implemented in other countries but were introduced for the first time in Sudan between 2011 and 2014. Citizens' Police Academies have been implemented in five of the Sudan States. These are Red Sea, Blue Nile, South Darfur states, Khartoum state, and Jazeera state. They emanate from the same idea of engaging the community in police and policing matters in the hope of building trust and getting support. It is based on bringing members of the community in certain areas into one forum to educate them in policing issues by presenting short inputs given by police officers from different specialities. This is usually done over one or

two days and for two or three hours each day. Responding to community members' questions, listening to their concerns, and getting them to tell stories of their experiences with the police is the general approach taken. The police commissioner in the relevant state or his representative might step in during the process and may engage in an interactive session answering questions or just making himself available to the public for further clarifications.

It is an innovative idea that captures the core principle of community policing by engaging the community in a way that reassures them about what the police are doing, meanwhile, providing the right opportunity for the police to get some feedback that can be used to develop police plans and/or modify them to avoid mistakes and make them more suited to the community needs. To this end, this kind of policing which engages the community, suits the Sudanese culture that is known to be more open and social. Sudanese can also easily respond to join a public consultation forum where they can talk and show off their knowledge in different subjects. In practice, the programme seeks to attract people from all backgrounds regardless of their profession, gender, age, or ethnicity. In this way, they often get a group that almost reflects the various segments of that community.

Sudanese Police leadership recognised the usefulness of the police academy and adopted it as an official policing method that has to be disseminated throughout the country. It is important to note that when interacting with the community, the police do not want the community to take part in the operational policing but to participate in a consultative process where members have their questions answered and their concerns listened to and have the potential chance to be addressed.

Community Policing Developers (CPD) are members of the community and members of the SNP who will work together as part of a role model initiative of police-community partnership. As the Sudanese Police philosophy of community policing is focussing on the development of external partnerships with community members in order to implement problem-oriented policing (POP) through neighbourhood policing (NP) and intelligence-led policing (ILP), the SAJP is training the CPDs in all these concepts of community policing plus the methodologies they must employ to implement the concepts.

A neighborhood watch has recently been implemented in two areas of Sudan, in Khartoum and Red Sea State, by groups of citizens who are devoted to crime and vandalism prevention within their neighborhood. The term originated in the United States and builds on the concept of a *town watch* from Colonial America. In Sudan, the pilot areas have preferred to coin the term 'safer neighbourhood policing' as local police officers are heavily engaged in supporting the members of the community. This practice was implanted successfully in West Aljereef Police station.

Community Policing for Peace: Policing IDP Camps in Khartoum and Darfur

Since first piloted in Sudan in 1976, and introduced in a more formal way throughout the country in 1992, community policing is set to be practiced in many areas to support the mainstream Sudanese Police. One area that was considered for community policing was the camps of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) who fled their homes as a result of the conflict in other areas of the country especially in South Sudan (Sudan, 2010, Hassan, 2009). The initiative that brought together the Sudanese Police, represented by the department of community policing and the

United Nations Mission in Sudan UNMID, sought to introduce community policing in IDP camps. The initiative, which received financial support from the UNDP office in Khartoum, was developed into a two-year programme which was based on the Sudanese community policing model and aimed to address issues of human rights, gender, and local traditions including tribal and sensitive religious matters. The targets were IDP camps around the capital city of Khartoum: Al Baraka north of Khartoum, Wad El Bashir in Omdurman area, Dar El Salaam, Jebel Aulia, and Mayo camps all south of Khartoum (Sudan, 2010, Hassan, 2009).

The programme that was implemented between 2007 and 2009 started with developing a training model for both police and community members to educate them about the importance and the objective of the programme. The programme aimed to achieve a set of goals such as to improve community safety and develop partnership, communication, and interaction between the IDPs, community, and the police; empower the community to work closely with the police to promote safety and security in the camp; and encourage reporting of criminal activities and prevent crime. The programme gave special consideration to training women police officers which culminated in the training of 240 female police officers in community policing, gender, and child protection. Community safety committees were established throughout the camps to liaise with the police to achieve the stated objectives. By the end of the programme, 175 such committees were established to represent the different sectors of the camps with representatives from youth, women, teachers, traditional leaders, and other groups. It was recognised between the partners in this programme that the police of Sudan would be taking the leading role with the UNMID Police supporting the effort (Sudan, 2010).

In Darfur, where the most populated IDP camps exist as a result of the conflict that started in 2003, police have also worked throughout the camps to provide security and to engage members of these camps to take part in policing themselves. Otash, Kas, and Alsereif camps in South Darfur; Alsalam camp in North Darfur; and Mornay camp in West Darfur all witnessed engagement of community in policing the camps and facilitating voluntary return for those who wanted to go back to their home villages. In total, 93 members of these camps joined the process to work as members of committees to work beside Sudanese Police and UNPOL to police the IDP camps (Hassan, 2009,p.84).

The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) included an element of community policing; it defines what it termed as 'Community Police' as follows, "Community Police means volunteer personnel who are recruited by GoS in consultation with Darfur Regional Authority DRA from local communities to undertake patrolling activities to assist in maintain public peace and tranquillity" (Movement, 2011,p.5). Furthermore, article 413 of the document urged the government of Sudan (GoS) to recruit with the consultation of the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) volunteers, both men and women from the internally displaced camps, local community, and the returning refugees and tasked the recruits to work in community policing and to keep the peace and security in the camps and the villages where the displaced people are returning to homes that they fled at the peak of the conflict (Movement, 2011).

Despite these provisions, hardly anything has been done with regard to implementing them. Mistrust between the parties to the peace agreement hindered efforts of implementation.

A Soft on Crime Approach; Challenges of Community Policing

The direct benefit of community policing, as its proponents claim, (see Chapter Two) is building trust between the police and communities which would lead to the community providing essential intelligence to help the police do a better job. Also, it is a much more affordable way of policing than expecting police to gather all the intelligence themselves. One main concern that I see is that if the community is to come too close to the police, that might create the environment for corruption, nepotism, or give those with close ties with police the chance to influence police work and bend it to serve their narrow interest. On the other hand, the close relationship between police and the community can also serve to make the police more transparent by helping the community keep an eye on the police organisation and its activities. Another disadvantage could be that the police officers might not be keen to engage in building a working relationship with the community since they know that they could get posted to another area any time if operating within central policing system like that of Sudan. Literature also suggests that this method of policing will work better in truly democratic countries than in non-democratic ones when there is separation of power and the rule of law in semi-independent police institutions. In such independent police institutions, the government does not interfere with the operational work of the police even though this is contested as explained in Chapter One. As Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) put it, “community policing is inherently more democratic than the professional model of policing” (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006,p.2). Employing community policing seems to be a necessity for

today's complex world where communities are more sophisticated, exposed to different cultures, and more aware of their rights. Moreover, literature on community policing suggests that it is not entirely welcomed as a policing approach by both senior and junior police personnel (Verma et al., 2013, Grabosky, 2009a). The difference between those who embraced community policing as promising approach that may yield good results and those who questioned its viability may stem from the way community policing is implemented in different areas (Palmer et al., 2012,p.38). Palmer et al. (2012), too, alluded to the importance of training for personnel in community policing as best way to introduce them to the model, thus, they will be more prepared to accept it as a better policing model.

The police are the first line defence of the community, and they are expected to intervene when conflict starts among people. But the police image is marred by the way it was used against minorities throughout the history; adopting community policing may prevent that practice from being repeated (Trojanowicz, 1991,p.9). As Verma et al., puts it, police officers need to be stationed for extended periods to better know the geographical area and the population. Even if this might bring in fears of officers becoming corrupt, there can be measures in place to counter corruption practices through close supervision and discipline as well good pay for the police which can all help reduce corruption (Verma et al., 2013).

It is also true that some communities are more prepared to engage with the police than others due to their education, culture, or economic status. The risk associated with this is excluding part of the society, which may lead to their policing needs not being heard. The police may, as well, lose some of the potential intelligence from that side-lined part of the community. Police officers also fear that they will be closely

watched by community members if they come to work closely with community (Verma et al., 2013).

Community policing can also be used sometimes to cover some malpractice of traditional policing. It is a fact that community policing is being applied in so many different ways and to such an extent that it may impede the practice producing measurable desired outcomes. Nevertheless, the element of community involvement and the building of relationships, which is always at the heart of community policing, can secure the minimum of acceptable outcomes. According to Pino and Wiatrowski, this philosophy of policing is closer to achieving democratic means of policing and engaging the public by allowing the community to design their policing plans and take part in monitoring them while being implemented (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006). Mobilizing the community to engage in the process and persuading police personnel to embrace community policing are among the issues that make implementing community policing a challenging task (Grabosky, 2009b)

Community Policing: A Panacea for Policing Increased Complexities of Modern Society

“Due to their place in society, distinct training, ethos and underlying philosophies, police are uniquely placed to help disseminate certain values within the communities they are policing”

(Greener, 2011b,p.184)

Research on the effect of community policing in improving police work by reducing crime and the fear of it, building better police-community relations, and ameliorating the quality of life for targeted communities is mixed (Palmer et al., 2012,p.39). The

fact that community policing is becoming more and more common does not necessarily mean that it has succeeded but rather suggests that there is no better alternative to it (Palmer et al., 2012). Much has been said in the literature on community policing about the imperative of public trust in the police; this one-way trust does seem to fall short of building the two-way trust as the police have also some caveats toward their communities. As pointed out by Verma et al. (2013), working with community can make police officers uncomfortable as they, according to him, “can be very paranoid ” (Verma et al., 2013,p.6). They fear that working with community will uncover their corruption, and, therefore, officers may be reluctant to engage with community members in partnership or work closely to achieve common policing goals (Chávez, 2012a,p.270).

Community in Sudan context

Three respondents from the senior police officers’ group linked the community policing to the traditional system of chieftaincy pointing out that it is the right way to do community policing through the traditional tribal system since tribal leaders have a good knowledge of their community members. Furthermore, they can communicate easily with their community and, thus, can pass on policing issues and receive community concerns around police and policing.

Disturbances and Demonstrations of September 2013 Adversely Affecting Relationships with Community Members

One focus group stated the relationship between the police and the community was adversely affected by the September riots, and they said that some other forces who were not police but were in police uniform were wandering around Khartoum streets shooting firearms and killing many people. Part of the public understood that it was the police who were shooting, but some do not know who they are. This, they say,

deeply affected the relationship between the police and the community especially for those who thought that it was the police who fired at the gatherings. Because of the burning of private properties such as houses, fuel stations, pharmacies, and shops by demonstrators, some citizens, they say, felt that the police were unable to provide appropriate protection for them. This also left a negative effect on the police-community relations.

As I was in Khartoum during the September 2013 riots, I noticed that the police did not publicly admit shooting at the riots, and they defended their position of being unable to protect the properties of individual citizens by stating we were trying not to shoot. This was the case because the operational police on the ground have no orders to shoot at rioters. I also observed that this was not mentioned by the senior or middle ranking officers including those who work at the relevant departments. Perhaps they were unaware, and this group of junior police personnel were more close to the community and, in interacting with different segments of the society, were able find out what was said by the community.

Conclusion: Identifying Best Practices and Gaps in the Sudanese Version of community policing

Sudanese Police, as other police forces in Africa, suffer a historical mistrust by their communities. Community policing is intended to bridge this trust gap. However, and despite the efforts made to introduce community policing, the central Sudanese Police system that manages the recruitment for officers at the national level combined with the posting system which requires the officers to be moved every two or three years, does not encourage or support officers to build relationships with the community. It is also a great loss for the police to lose out on the relationship with the

community built by posted police officers. Their successors have to navigate through the community to establish new relationships. It may as well be a reason for the community not to go too far and put much trust in the police when they know that the officers will be moved from their current area sooner or later. Community policing in Sudan is not institutionalised or embedded within the Sudanese Police establishments; therefore, community policing is not a policy that is adopted by all police departments. It is located in a separate department without clear coordination with other police departments.

Community policing in Sudan is based on a voluntary basis in that the members of community policing are recruited and trained in a separate process to that of the mainstream public police. Community policing is seen to be closely linked to the peacebuilding process in the international literature. The United Nations Police, through their role within the UN missions, have often proposed the approach as relevant to post-war divided communities (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Greener, 2009b). The problem with community policing is, despite wide disparities in its concept and application, it has not been integrated in the police strategy in many countries including Sudan. The early attempt of introducing community policy in the 1970s, and more practical steps taken to introduce it in the early 1990s, does not seem to have made the approach an integral component of the police. The introduction of community committees to work closely with police stations was a significant move toward achieving real partnership with local citizens and working with them to achieve commonly identified goals. The international understanding of the community policing as a suitable policing method in the peacebuilding setting has evidence in the Sudan context where Sudanese Police have worked with

partners in IDP camps to provide security and build trust between the police and the inhabitants of the camps who are affected by the conflict. The peace agreements have not affected the Sudanese Police's existing structure culminating in the police maintaining their traditional police structure and practises. This might be a reason why the existing department for community policing has witnessed little change to accommodate the peacebuilding efforts into its activities with specific programs to address peace concerns. As we have seen earlier in Chapter Two in Latin America and elsewhere, this approach is linked to peacebuilding in the way that it has been introduced as part of the peace process. For Sudanese Police to introduce community policing as a policing approach for the whole force, they will need to integrate and institutionalise the concept into their policing curricula and training programs.

The next chapter will bring together arguments and themes discussed in the different chapters.

Chapter Eight

Conclusions

Introduction

This thesis has focussed on the question of whether or not the adoption of community policing by the Sudanese Police force can be seen as successful. In particular, it has considered the management and leadership style; training and

human resources management systems; and community policing approaches with regard to whether or not they are suitable for peacebuilding endeavours?

Furthermore I have considered these questions within the overall context of a concern about an overall Liberal Peace approach. Critics of this approach suggest that the imposition of a 'one size fits all' approach by western donor countries is focussed on achieving a specific form of democracy, free market and the rule of law, and is connected to a more hidden agenda which serves the specific interests of donor countries. They also argue that the interventionist manner of liberal peace as a strategy tends to deny the recipient communities opportunities to be engaged in matters of concern to them (Paris, 2006, Doyle, 2012, Mac Ginty, 2011).

In order to consider this question I have considered first what is thought to be appropriate on an international level, subsequently undertaking an insider's view of the recent and current context of the Sudanese Police Force. The strength of the thesis is in its contribution of original data generated from an insider's perspective.

Policing in peacebuilding contexts is usually considered with respect to international police that are part of peace missions, along with donor programmes to aid, reform or build domestic police forces. In so far as policing is considered as part of a 'liberal peace blueprint' it contains both of these elements, but the emphasis is far greater on the former; the roles of international police (Durch, 2003, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006).

The expectation was, and to some extent still is, that international police officers can transport their skills to new locations and manage other communities in a less authoritarian manner than soldiers. Nonetheless there is now widespread awareness

of their limitations precisely because they are international and not sufficiently aware of local cultural, social and political issues to be effective, as described in chapter 2.

As donors strive to improve the performance of these forces then nonetheless are criticised by anti-Liberal Peace writers In particular for the illegitimacy of police operating in other countries, especially when working in executive roles, not least as policing is so strongly associated with sovereignty (Greener, 2009b, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Grabosky, 2009b).

Donor focus has shifted somewhat towards the reform of local forces, with an emphasis on human rights and accountability. Beyond this the promotion of a 'community policing' approach has become part of the reform package, which is derived from mixed experiences in western countries. On the face of it this is another manifestation of donors setting an agenda (particular that of general police reform), but with the intent being to achieve the same result through better use of local knowledge – through community policing.

Domestic Police Forces in Post-Conflict Settings

Domestic police in conflict zones and post-conflict contexts such as Sudan are inevitably and to various degrees affected by that context. Conflicts as literature has shown in this research can inflict damaging consequences on police. They may totally collapse, become demoralised and/or find themselves surrounded by insurmountable problems. In extreme scenarios police are attacked by rebels as in Sudan (shown in chapter two and three) and in others they can thus be distracted from their core policing tasks of crime fighting and crime detecting (Willoughby, 2002, Francis, 2012b).

In the cases where the police force collapses it is said that this provides a chance for building a new police force in which the failings of former police regimes could be avoided. In the cases where police survive the conflict some sort of reform can be introduced when peace is initiated as policing is becoming more and more present in peace deals (Durch, 2003, Greener, 2011b).

In Sudan's case the experience was complex. The Sudanese police force was left under resourced as the war impoverished the country and the limited resources were directed to support the military in their counterinsurgency war to quell insurgents. Nonetheless the force did not collapse but policing issues marginalised in the peace deals as explained in chapter four, and as is common in other peace agreements (Macualay, 2012, Hills, 2006, Paris and ebrary, 2004). Therefore police and policing have not changed as much as might have been expected from a reform process built into the peace process. Only insignificant reform took place in the aftermath of the signing of the CPA when a new police act was introduced in 2008. The act included provisions on fair representation for all Sudanese and conferred some rights to the states in the appointment and transfer of police officers, but as revealed during field work little of these reforms found their way to implementation. As stated in chapter four the two parties of the major peace deal in Sudan, the CPA have shown little interest in conducting police reform with Sudan's government unwilling to reform the national police while SPLA sought to build their own largely autonomous police along with other institutions in anticipation of independent South Sudan state (Barltrop, 2008, Movement, 2005).

In chapter five it is evident how the remaining military structure of the Sudanese police impinges on the force's ability and chances to be better placed for peacebuilding role. The centrally managed force in vast country with poor means of transport and communication is detached from local policing concerns relating to Peacebuilding. Discretionary powers of police leaders are limited by the fear of blame prevailing among the force. Sudanese police have employed severe disciplinary punishment for misconduct especially for NCOs. Whatever advantages that might bring in relation to observing human rights and eliminating misconduct, this research has shown it has also impacted negatively on the willingness to be innovative in tackling problems, and undermined their confidence in tackling complicated policing matters. Police leaders, to avoid being blamed by communities and governments and perhaps to win some approval, tend to place harsh punishment on those who misbehave, especially in Khartoum where they send them to the notorious Al alia (see Chapter Six). It is a double-edged sword that on the one hand maintains discipline and reassures citizens and on the other hand it prevents force members from being proactive in dealing with issues on the ground which is key if police are to have role in Peacebuilding.

It is claimed that Peacebuilding through community policing is well suited to serve post-war communities but neither of the local police such as Sudan one nor the international police are without problems to undertake the Peacebuilding roles, especially where a militaristic style and culture prevails, as in Sudan.

A better approach is to establish strong partnership with the local police supported and empowered to take the leading role in policing issue. One main aspect of

building the capacity of the local police through such partnership is effective police training.

Locally Anchored Police for Peacebuilding

An emphasis on the virtues of local knowledge can also lead to problems as of course local forces also have their shortcomings, as in societies that are ethnically deeply divided. Using members of police organisation from the opposite group to police particular community can have damaging consequences, and this does happen in Sudan. Moreover local police in such environments are often corrupt, unequipped, or incompetent for Peacebuilding roles. Nevertheless the right balance can be achieved by seeking to empower local police with clear ownership strategy at the end of peacebuilding programme (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). Francis (2012) and others noted the quick fixed short termed programmes of the Peacebuilding missions in which they have to meet tight mandate and time line and specific budget in extremely unstable environment. This coupled with staff related issues in particular policing background and lack of pre-deployment training put pressure on mission's implementation strategy (Greener, 2009b, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Francis, 2012a).

One of the root causes of the conflicts in the country is the domination of the centre, with some ethnic groups taking much power than others; unequal development and representation as explained in Chapter Three and Four (Copnall, 2014, Berridge, 2011, Musa, 2011, Bashar, 2013). The actual composition of the police reflects one aspect of the country's policy of equal opportunities as police in post conflict is dominated by one ethnic group. Chapter six shows that recruitment policy is not targeted to provide equal chances for all Sudanese despite the guarantees provided

in the interim constitution of 2005 and the Police Act of 2008. Moreover data from field work show how police at state level are neglected and under resourced compared to the police in the capital city as yet another evidence of marginalisation and neglect of the centre towards the periphery.

Examining the peace agreements in Sudan reveals that the role of local police in Peacebuilding is hardly acknowledged. Peace agreements on the South Sudan conflict and the subsequent conflicts emanating from it and Darfur focus more on the power sharing security arrangements. Security arrangements tend to be centred on military DDR programmes while power sharing is widely understood as political participation by allocating ministerial posts to former combatants at central and state level (Johnson, 2011, Movement, 2005, Barltrop, 2008). These security arrangements as stated in their provisions deal mainly with the military aspect of the conflict. It includes demobilisation, disarmaments and redeployment of the former combatants.

Integration of former combatants into the police is part of the power sharing arrangements where former combatants join the police mainly as police officers. This was clearly stated in the DDPD compared to other agreements. DDPD provided a framework for integrating former combatants in the police following a set of requirements as articulated in Chapter Four. The missed opportunity for reforming the Sudanese police within CPA seemed to have been addressed in the DPA but in practice implementation delivered on this regard as Chapter Four shows can hardly be seen (Movement, 2006). The major Sudanese police achievement in regard to peace process is their role in the 2010 presidential and parliamentary elections

which involved South Sudan after CPA this was followed by the referendum that led to the secession of South Sudan in 2011 as explained in chapter four. Both processes were run amidst considerable political tensions but passed peacefully with Sudanese police leading the role of providing secure environment.

Training the police for peace role

Quality training is not only essential requirement for effective policing in traditional police duties as explained further in Chapter Six. It is also a necessity for police operating in conflict setting (Baker, 2006, Durch, 2003). Training in the Sudanese police is affected by the extraordinary wide remit of the force. With such a wide remit it is challenging to develop training that address the wide and varying needs of policing and equip police personnel with the required knowledge and skills. Training in Sudan is not targeted to serve peacebuilding in the way that key components of police training in post-war settings. For instance human rights and the rule of law are not properly incorporated into the training curricula. Trainers in Sudanese police are not selected or especially trained to undertake training duties; any police officer can be drawn into training regardless of their experience. It is not credible that trainers chosen in this way would be qualified to deliver effective training.

UNPOL is mandated in some missions to train local police; as shown in Chapter Two, but they also do not have specialist trainers to provide training for police in the host country. Any police officer within the mission can be assigned to training role. This often because of the hasty way police personnel for international missions are selected. The Sudanese police experiences (chapter six) show that the UN mission does not have qualified trainers to help training the host police. Without training

experience and good understanding of the local contexts, including host policing challenges, international police are incapable of supporting police in conflict zones with the required training, and there is no effective implementation of training for Sudanese trainers.

Lacking training and experience Sudanese police are doing peacebuilding as de facto operation without sufficient preparation. Sudanese police officers are not gaining relevant experience from working in the UNPOL as police forces from some other countries are doing. Chapter Two shows that working as peace keepers in UN missions brings expertise into the police organisation. This can then be used to build local police capacity to better police post-conflict situations. Competent police officers trained by international police leave the country for better opportunities working with the UNPOL. A senior British consultant in Sierra Leone reported that the well trained police officers left the country to join UN missions in other countries.

The difficult 'post-conflict' situation in Sudan is not conducive for police to undertake peacebuilding roles in the country. They have to police conflict zones at the same time as working to build peace among communities in areas where peace deals were reached and a relative calm prevailed. Areas such as Darfur where part of the region is in peace and others are still in war require the police to adopt two different policing styles to fit the situations. With that wide remit and generalised training method of the Sudanese police it is unlikely that they will be able to deliver training that can serve the peacebuilding issues and prepare personnel for peacebuilding role.

The multi-country training of the Sudanese police abroad is akin to the multi-national training that the international police trainers of peacebuilding missions would deliver

in the host countries which can be inconsistent and confusing due to the different policing backgrounds of those who deliver it. There is no overall 'international policing training curriculum' and so what is imposed internationally is itself not at all consistent. In Sudan this varied experience is added in a piecemeal way to an already ineffective and highly varied approach to police training.

Community policing

Community policing originates in democratic countries and often introduced as part of a democratisation process. That means the viability of introducing community policing in non-democratic countries depends how much progress is made on the democratisation process in that specific country. In such countries mechanism of transparency and accountability of police organisations are not effective and ordinary citizens are not encouraged to get involved in their policing matters. In these countries police forces would often focus on what the state demands rather than what the community needs. Even when community policing is introduced within emerging democracies there still exists the issue of police organisations' resistance to change the old ways of doing policing. Police officers and police organisations generally as seen in Chapter Two and Seven are reluctant to adopt policing styles that make them more transparent and accountable. Police officers are also not always comfortable to work closely with community members. The crucial point comes when police work close to community is, what if the collaboration between the two resulted in policing style that does not comply with governments' interest.

Governments of all types in many countries on occasion tend to use the police to protect their interests (see Chapter one and Two). Community policing is proposed by international peace builders as the right policing approach for post war contexts (see Chapter Two and Seven). It is almost always introduced within the wider concept of liberal Peacebuilding principles of free market, parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. Community policing is meant to produce policing that is based on democratic ethos of good governance and accountability. As presented in Chapter Seven, a version of community policing is being formally adopted in the Sudan since early 1990s. Because it is widely interpreted concept it has been presented differently in many countries but has yet to be precisely defined. As explained in Chapter Seven the basic idea behind this approach is engaging communities in the policing process to secure support for the police, accountability as well as transparency.

Sudan has not fully integrated community policing as policing philosophy within the whole Sudanese police and its goals remain poorly defined. There is however some experience of attempts to introduce this approach, such as in IDP camps in Khartoum (see Chapter Four) which features one aspect of Peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict. It is perceived to be relevant in that the context where people who fled their homes are more insecure and desperate for policing services. The central police system of Sudanese police now seems to be preventing this approach from developing, as explained in Chapter Four. In this regard it is interesting to see that Wingate's vision in the first decade of the last century referred to in Chapter Three of locally raised and managed police in Sudan is as relevant, and perhaps as distant, today as it was then.

The efforts of the Sudanese police to develop their community policing model are often hampered by histories of strained relation with their communities, a rigid management system, flawed recruiting regime unfocused training which all contribute to minimising police ability to undertake more effective Peacebuilding role. The problem of police in such situations as that of Sudan is that they are seen as the state arm in the counterinsurgency strategy which makes it even more difficult for them to present themselves as trustworthy, impartial organisation.

This itself is not particularly an African or Sudanese problem. Before the Good Friday Agreement, the Northern Ireland police force was perceived by one side of the conflict as being partial police and thus was inconceivable that they could have established a close relationship with the wider community. But the fundamental reform programme initiated by the Lord Patten Report dramatically transformed the force and community policing approach became central era to suit the peace (Ellison and Smyth, 2000). By achieving that level of reform in relatively short span of time, the UK police demonstrated that they had the ability to adapt to embrace new policing realities.

Such ability has not been evident in Sudan in the aftermath of the various peace agreements, so the Sudanese police did not bring about much change in their perceived role. There is however some hope and, even expectation from the international police in the UNAMIS, that the work in the IDP camps in Khartoum might constitute a model that could be implemented in future (see Chapter Four).

The role of women in peacebuilding

As stated in Chapter Six women's role in the peacebuilding process is now seen as a vital ingredient. As stressed by the UN resolutions 1325/2000 and 1820/ 2008. They called for greater roles for women in peacebuilding missions and the need for considering women's specific needs in conflict zones. As seen in chapters 3 and 6, women in the Sudanese police are only small percentage due to organisational discrimination in recruitment and cultural issues in Sudanese society. The institutional discriminatory policy against Sudanese women also results in them being confined to lower ranks and not being promoted to higher ranks where they could be effective in decision making. This is exacerbated by the fact even for the small number they tend to choose not work out of the family residence or in conflict zones limiting their potential role in peacebuilding.

Lessons for Policy

It is evidently clear in the literature on police and policing that the police around the world are changing and policing is by no means static. This is due to the rapid changing environment of policing not least the changing of societies as a result of the easy means of travel and the media revolution which made the world small place where hardly anything is remote or unknown. This is coupled with advances in technology which is also changing the way the police are doing their job. These changes are bringing police around the world closer to each other and making more policing issues to be of universal concern. Matters of terrorism and cross border crimes, trafficking of humans and drugs are just examples. This means that collaboration between different police forces is becoming an inescapable truth (Kratcoski and Kratcoski, 2011, Newburn, 2008). It is not possible for any police force to opt out of this international trend of semi-universal policing where different

forces are interdependent on each other for policing issues that of concern to their home citizens. Growing demands for policing entails more resources to provide efficient policing service. One way of responding to these issues is to work more closely with communities and strengthening of partnership with relevant organisations and police forces. The more democratic the governing system the more accountable the police would be. This is particularly relevant when it comes to police budget and spending and requires the police to justify their spending and become more transparent. As people and governments would want to know where the money is being spent and whether there is another way of doing the job with less cost. That will help the police to gain more legitimacy and support from the public. Police also need to be innovative to think of doing good job within reasonable cost. It needs courage and honesty to have an inclusive police force as people may no longer believe that recruiting of the police is secret security matter. In democratic society they would scrutinise the process and may want to see it being fair for everyone. Sudanese police need to address this point to reflect the composition of the Sudanese community and present themselves as national police force open for all Sudanese citizens.

Literature also shows that police and policing is attracting more researchers and the subject is developing rapidly as established discipline with the social science and criminology. The police should encourage research within the police and in partnership with other institutions this may help the police develop evidence based plans to support their policies. To achieve this sufficient budget needs to be allocated for research purposes. It could as well be useful for the police to encourage officers to reflect on their experiences and impart lessons learned to younger generations. Incidents like the violence in the aftermath of the death of Garang in 2005 could have

been avoided if lessons were learned from previous incidents with similar characteristics like the one in Clement Amboro in 1964 (see Chapter Three). Teaching of recent modern history of the force and not treating it as secret past for the serving officers could prove useful. Only by studying this past, younger generations will have the opportunity for them to understand the mistake of the past and learn lessons for future operations.

This can be built on the fact that most of the research respondents said that they are proud to be part of the Sudanese police. This spirit of belonging and the invaluable experience they accumulated together with the resources spent on training them throughout their careers make sound to think of innovative ways of adopting retention policy. In Chapter Six we have seen the rising numbers of police personnel leaving the service. Retaining the existing staff could be easier and less expensive than recruiting and training new ones. Perhaps employing more civil staff is less expensive to train, pay to release more police for core police business. This civil staff can enhance the capacity of the police and do valuable jobs. Many of the jobs assigned to police officers can be done by civil staff; this practice is common in many police forces. For Sudanese police it would be correcting the mistake of the early 1990s when almost all civilian staff were trained and incorporated into the police. Research respondents reflected on the budget where hardly anyone knows about the budget how it is allocated and how it is spent. Senior Sudanese police managers find difficulties to receive a fair share of the budget to run their departments. They even do not know how much budget is allocated to them.

The peace process in the country and the internationally growing role of police in peacebuilding entails the Sudanese police reconsider their position and prepare the force for a potential peace role. This can take place in the form of institutional reform

that take into account the various factors affect and enhance the police role in peacebuilding. The composition of the force alluded to in this section and training system are essential elements of this. The training will need to embrace and focus more on the peace related issues of rule of law, vindication of human rights and accountability. Finally community policing as the most relevant policing approach to peacebuilding may need to be developed and institutionalised across the force rather than being in a separate department isolated from mainstream policing and other police departments.

Planning

It is a fact that the Sudanese police do not have a long term strategy or annual plan that is used as a guide to implementing the stated objectives. Linking objectives to specific time frames and budgets may prove helpful in achieving the long and short term programmes. The DFID funded programme in Sudan in collaboration with the Sudanese police drafted a five year strategic plan after wide departmental consultations and with the support of British consultants with expertise in policing and planning. At the final stage of signing and adopting the strategy a change in police leadership took place and the new Director General did not approve the plan and it was abandoned. Planning would include nurturing potential future leadership and motivating police officers towards specific targets and measuring their success. Furthermore, planning sets the goals and engages every member of the police organisation to clearly defined objectives.

Future Research

The current composition of the Sudanese police, which encompasses many departments that are not part of the police in most countries, is making the organisation overstretched into too many responsibilities. The integration of the

prisons, civil defence, customs and protection of wild life (see Chapter Three) into the police that took place in 1992 does not seem to be helping the organisation to focus more core policing issues. These departments have obviously different roles to that of the core traditional police work related to crime fighting, crime detecting and the protection of life and property. The Sudanese police leadership in 2010 conducted survey among all police officers asking them whether they think Sudanese police is better with these departments or whether it would be better that they are separated as was the case before 1992. The result of this survey is however not announced and the situation remains. The conducting of this survey reflects the Sudanese police leadership unconvinced of the current situation but it was political decision that needs political approval.

Further research focused on the recruitment, selection and training system may be needed to critically evaluate the system and suggest future solutions for these important issues for successful police force. As previously stated that any police force can be judged by how good is their recruitment and selection process. Recruitment is particularly important to peacebuilding to enable the police to operate in peacebuilding settings. Police should reflect the community in such environment so that they are accepted and supported by that community. Future research in this regard should focus on how are the various Sudanese communities are represented in the police and how can they be represented in the future in more inclusive police force. Training is expensive activity and should be targeted towards the needed knowledge and skills therefore to meet departmental needs. It must also be relevant to the nature of work and the appropriate rank. Its

Literature available in English on African police seems to have included little on the police in Northern Africa especially former French colonies of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria as well as the Arabic speaking countries of Libya, Egypt and Sudan. The significance of this region comes in the backdrop of the political turmoil and the security threats swept through many countries during and after the Arab awakening. The potential security gap that arise from the collapse of the political structure and inevitable police weakness may entail further study on what relationship police forces had with these regimes and what role the police have played during the riots that led to the change of regimes in these countries and how police is affected by and adapted to the political change.

Sudanese police can harness their relationship with international regional police forces to build local training centre to the international standards which can attract regional police forces to be trained in the Sudan. While they will gain the same interaction knowledge they seek by sending officers to be trained abroad they can also save a lot of resources they used to spend in training Sudanese police personnel abroad. In such training centre Sudanese police can specially share their experience in peacebuilding and learn more from other police forces operating in similar situations

Summary of Sudanese police and peacebuilding discussion

The international trend of increasing police involvement in peacebuilding makes it feasible for the Sudanese police to have role in the peacebuilding process taking place in the country. Even though literature in this regard often focuses on international police within peacebuilding missions the aim of this research has been to further explore possible role for domestic police in peacebuilding within that growing international police role in peacebuilding. International police role in

peacebuilding is undermined by several issues highlighted earlier in this research and are connected to the critique of liberal peace explained in chapter two. Issues such as the lack of relevant training; poor understanding of the local setting; the short term rotation of the UN system and most importantly the lack of clear strategy to empower local police for durable peace. Domestic police too are hindered by problems of corruption; poor relationship with communities due to brutality, association with political regimes or being composed mainly of one ethnicity; incompetent and under-resourced. Sudanese police are also experiencing problems similar to those of domestic police that minimise their role in the peacebuilding dilemma. Some of these issues are internal institutional problems around recruitment, training, management and corruption. Others are external challenges like budgets legal mandates and relation with political regimes which in most times adversely affect their relation with Sudanese community. Despite these issues coupled with insufficient police role in the peace agreements Sudanese police as this research shows are trying to take part in the peacebuilding process in the country. Some of the possible Sudanese Police contribution to peacebuilding can be related to root causes of conflicts alluded to in chapter two and six by seeking to have more inclusive police composition through reforming the recruitment and selection process. Other contributions however are related to their role in policing the peace in the country through effective policing approaches such as community policing. This role can be enhanced through international support and reform to tackle the above mentioned issues through effective partnership between international actors and Sudanese police. The hope is that this research and the themes it highlighted will contribute to the support of Sudanese police role in the peacebuilding process in the country.

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Appendix

Aim and Objectives of the Research and Research Questions

Aims and Objectives

The aim of the research is to evaluate the peace process in Sudan through the lens of examining the Sudanese police roles and capabilities with a view to evaluating their effectiveness in the peacebuilding process.

It will also use Sudan as a case study to consider the role of the domestic police (and community policing in particular) in peacebuilding processes in fragile and post-war states, which is a much under-studied topic.

Research questions

Main research question:

Has the adoption of community policing by the Sudanese Police force been successful? In particular, are the management and leadership style; training and human resources management systems; and in particular community policing approaches suitable for this endeavour?

Subsidiary Research Questions:

1. What are the main components of the Sudanese Police mandates?
2. To what extent are contemporary community policing approaches facilitating the peacebuilding roles of the Sudanese Police?

3. What does community policing mean within the context of the mandate of the Sudanese Police?

4. What are the main features of the community policing approaches adopted by Sudanese Police?

5. Did the community policing approaches adopted by Sudanese Police help police in undertaking peacebuilding role?

6. What are the challenges faced these approaches which hinder the police in Sudan to undertake an effective role in peacebuilding?

Questions for interview and Focus Groups

Senior police officers

When did they join/ what rank/ department

How do you feel about belonging to the police organisation?

Is it difficult job?

What do you think is the greatest police achievement in (just one example) the last decade?

Do you think police is contributing to the peacebuilding in the country?

Do you think that include conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace keeping

Do you know about the official position in this matter?

Is there any support from international community for the police in relation to peacebuilding?

How do you assess police training?

Do you think the police have appropriate equipment?

Do you have enough budgets for your department?

Was there any cuts to your budget and how much

People are now more aware of their rights, does that represent any challenge for the police

How do you respond to allegations that police is corrupt

Do you see any reasons for that?

How do you feel about the new challenge of working with community?

How do you perceive the community policing approach?

What are the advantages of this approach?

What are the disadvantages of this approach?

What can be done to improve it?

Have you ever worked in Darfur or other conflict area in the country?

Is it difficult for police to work in such environment?

Why?

Do they feel free to make judgements and exercise discretion?

Do they feel secure in your job? (Losing career, career development... etc.)

Middle rank police officers

When did they join/ what rank/ department

How they feel about belonging to the police organisation

Is it difficult job?

Do they feel secure in your job? (Losing career, career development, etc.)

How do you feel about belonging to the police organisation?

Do they feel free to make judgements and exercise discretion?

How quick do you think police is when they respond to crime?

Do you think the police have appropriate equipment?

Are you able to speak about colleagues and managers misconduct?

People are now more aware of their rights, does that represent any challenge for the police

How do you feel when working with community?

How do you perceive the community policing approach?

What are the advantages of this approach?

What are the disadvantages of this approach?

How do you respond to allegations that police is corrupt

Do you see any reasons for that?

What can be done to improve it?

Have you ever worked in Darfur or other conflict area in the country?

Is it difficult for police to work in such environment?

Why?

Junior police officers

When did they join/ what rank/ department

How do you feel about belonging to the police organisation?

Is it difficult job?

Do you feel secure in your job? (Career development, losing career..etc.)

Do they feel free to make judgements and exercise discretion?

How do you assess the relation between the police and the community

How quick do you think police is when they respond to crime?

Are you able to speak about colleagues and managers misconduct?

Do you think the police have appropriate equipment?

People are now more aware of their rights, does that represent any challenge for the police

How do you feel when working with community?

How do you perceive the community policing approach?

What are the advantages of this approach?

What are the disadvantages of this approach?

How do you respond to allegations that police is corrupt

Do you see any reasons for that?

What can be done to improve it?

Have you ever worked in Darfur or other conflict area in the country?

Is it difficult for police to work in such environment?

Why?

Informed consent form

Dear(Research Participants)

Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed by me, Mohamed Aldago, as part of my doctoral research.

I would appreciate it, if you would carefully read the information below, plus the proposed set of interview questions provided.

Then, if you are happy with the conditions of the interview, sign and return the form to me on the date of our meeting.

Confidentiality

Please note that any information you provide during the interview will form part of my doctoral submission and, therefore, be in the public domain. However, should you wish to remain anonymous this is perfectly acceptable. If this is the case, please state this prior to our interview and this will be abided by throughout the interview process and within my thesis.

Interview Terms

If you would like any of the questions I am proposing to ask you during the interview to be removed, please do not hesitate to inform me and the questions will be removed and replaced by a different question – or set of questions.

Moreover, if you are happy to be quoted in my thesis, with the exception of certain pieces of information – which you prefer to be from an anonymous source, please do state this prior to or within the interview.

If upon reflection after the interview you decide that there is a certain piece of information you wish to be omitted from the transcript, please let me know as soon as possible.

Please sign to confirm that you are happy with the terms outlined above:

Signature: Mohamed Aldago

Date: August 2013

Researcher identity and contacts

Dear research participant

My name is Mohamed Ahmed Abaker ALdago I am a Sudanese police officer studying for my PhD at Bradford University/ Department of Peace Studies. My Supervisor is Professor Fiona Macaulay. My research is focusing on Sudan police and peacebuilding and aims to achieve the following objectives:

1. Raising the Sudan police awareness of the intrinsic value that they can add to the peace process through introducing peace education within police training institutions
2. Promoting the Sudan police leadership's commitment to the peace process
3. Encouraging Sudan citizens to fully engage in policing themselves, through community policing
4. Help in building the trust between the police and the community, which will result in effective policing that support the peace and stability among communities
5. Strengthening the Sudan police efficiency in handling issues that are likely to disturb the peace

I appreciate if you could participate in my research by providing some information according to structured questions. I emphasise that all the information provided and the identity of each participant will remain anonymous and that participants are free to withdraw from the research process at any time before the completion of the research.

Here are my contact details

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