An independent audit oversight system in a non-developed market: the case of Egypt
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2017Rights
(c) 2017 Inderscience Publishers. Full-text reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.Peer-Reviewed
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openAccess
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This study aims to provide a better understanding of oversight the audit profession in Egypt, including its motivations, objectives and its working approach. Further, it reaches a better understanding of the Egyptian Big 4 partners’ perceptions of the new Audit Oversight Board (AOB). Previous studies have frequently examined the audit oversight system in developed countries (US and UK in particular), but little is known on how the system works on developing countries. We believe that facing different problems and challenges demands that audit regulators in developing countries follow different approaches in order to improve the quality of their audit markets. Lack of skilled auditors, lack of transparency and public accountability, and a high level of corruption are the main problems facing the audit profession in Egypt (Awadallah, 2006, Wahdan et. al., 2005: a). Our findings suggest that establishing an audit oversight board in Egypt has been motivated by the need to attract foreign investments and follow the global trend of auditing in developed countries. A number of legal changes are needed in order to improve the AOB’s efficiency.Version
Accepted manuscriptCitation
Eldaly MKA and Abdel-Kader M (2017) An independent audit oversight system in a non-developed market: the case of Egypt. International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation. 13(3): 254-279.Link to Version of Record
https://doi.org/10.1504/IJAAPE.2017.10005538Type
Articleae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
https://doi.org/10.1504/IJAAPE.2017.10005538