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dc.contributor.authorChortareas, G.*
dc.contributor.authorLogothetis, V.*
dc.contributor.authorMagkonis, Georgios*
dc.contributor.authorZekente, K.*
dc.date.accessioned2016-05-06T10:09:49Z
dc.date.available2016-05-06T10:09:49Z
dc.date.issued2016-03
dc.identifier.citationChortareas G, Logothetis V, Magkonis G and Zekente K (2016) The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: evidence from panel data. Economics Letters. 140: 11-13.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10454/8307
dc.descriptionYesen_US
dc.description.abstractWe examine the effects of banking supervisory architecture on central bank preferences, quantified through a recently proposed measure of central bank conservatism. Using a dynamic panel data specification we document that central banks serving both monetary policy and banking supervision functions are less inflation conservative than those with only a price stability mandate.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.isreferencedbyhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021en_US
dc.rights© 2016 Elsevier. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)en_US
dc.subjectMonetary policy; Banking supervision; Inflation conservatism; Panel dataen_US
dc.titleThe effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: Evidence from panel dataen_US
dc.status.refereedYesen_US
dc.date.Accepted2015-12-27
dc.date.application2016-01-11
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.type.versionAccepted manuscripten_US
refterms.dateFOA2018-07-25T13:26:20Z


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