The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: Evidence from panel data
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2016-03Rights
© 2016 Elsevier. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)Peer-Reviewed
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We examine the effects of banking supervisory architecture on central bank preferences, quantified through a recently proposed measure of central bank conservatism. Using a dynamic panel data specification we document that central banks serving both monetary policy and banking supervision functions are less inflation conservative than those with only a price stability mandate.Version
Accepted manuscriptCitation
Chortareas G, Logothetis V, Magkonis G and Zekente K (2016) The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: evidence from panel data. Economics Letters. 140: 11-13.Link to Version of Record
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021Type
Articleae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021