Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorBarron, A.*
dc.contributor.authorTrouille, Jean-Marc*
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-23T10:36:49Z
dc.date.available2015-12-23T10:36:49Z
dc.date.issued2015-11-24
dc.identifier.citationBarron A and Trouille JM (2015) Perceptions of institutional complexity and lobbyists’ decisions to join lobbying coalitions – evidence from the European Union context. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy. OnlineFirst.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10454/7602
dc.descriptionYesen_US
dc.description.abstractWe use data from in-depth interviews with business lobbyists in Brussels to investigate why they choose to join lobbying coalitions. We find that lobbyists face two competing institutional incentives. First, they are confronted with incentives to ally with other European organisations, develop multilateral policy messages, and communicate messages to the Commission and the Parliament. Simultaneously, they face inducements to join narrower coalitions, develop bilateral policy messages, and direct those messages at the Council. Lobbyists’ receptivity to these incentives – and thus their choices of lobbying coalitions – differs with their age, educational background, and with the type and ownership structure of the organisations they represent. Combined, our findings contribute to the limited, mainly American literature on interest coalitions by demonstrating that lobbyists operate in complex institutional environments, and that their interpretations of and reactions to institutional complexity are shaped by individual- and organisational-level factors.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.isreferencedbyhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263774X15614693en_US
dc.rights(c) SAGE Publications. Full-text reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.en_US
dc.subjectEuropean Union; EU; Policy influence; Institutional entrepreneurship; Cross-border co-operationen_US
dc.titlePerceptions of institutional complexity and lobbyists’ decisions to join lobbying coalitions – evidence from the European Union contexten_US
dc.status.refereedYesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.type.versionfinal draft paperen_US
refterms.dateFOA2018-07-25T15:12:08Z


Item file(s)

Thumbnail
Name:
barron_trouille.pdf
Size:
504.7Kb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record