Emotional reflexivity: feeling, emotion and imagination in reflexive dialogues

Abstract

Theories of reflexivity have primarily been concerned with the way agents monitor their own actions using knowledge (Giddens) or deliberate on the social context to make choices through the internal conversation (Archer), yet none have placed emotion at the centre of reflexivity. While emotion is considered in theories of reflexivity it is generally held at bay, being seen as a possible barrier to clear reflexive thought. Here, I challenge this position and, drawing on the work of C.H. Cooley, argue that feeling and emotion are central to reflexive processes, colouring the perception of self, others and social world, thus influencing our responses in social interaction as well as the way we reflexively monitor action and deliberate on the choices we face. Emotional reflexivity is therefore not simply about the way emotions are reflexively monitored or ordered, but about how emotion informs reflexivity itself.