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dc.contributor.authorShepherd, Simon J.*
dc.contributor.authorMex-Pereira, Jorge C.*
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-26T10:46:57Z
dc.date.available2009-10-26T10:46:57Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.citationMex-Pereira, J.C. and Shepherd, S.J. (2002). Cryptanalysis of a summation generator with 2 bits of memory. Signal Processing. Vol. 82, No. 12, pp. 2025-2028.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10454/3744
dc.descriptionNoen
dc.description.abstractThe conventional summation generator (SG) has been broken in the past using a number of different methods. Recently, a modified SG was proposed by Lee and Moon to increase the resistance of such generators against these attacks. However, this paper shows that even the modified generator is still vulnerable to correlation attacks.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.isreferencedbyhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1684(02)00356-0en
dc.subjectCryptanalysisen
dc.subjectCorrelation attacken
dc.subjectKeystream generatoren
dc.titleCryptanalysis of a summation generator with 2 bits of memory.en
dc.status.refereedYesen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.type.versionNo full-text available in the repositoryen


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