• The Financial and Economic Performance of Social Banks

      Mykhayliv, Dariya; Zauner, K.G. (2016)
      The financial crisis of 2008 provides evidence for the instability of the conventional banking system. Social banks may present a viable alternative for conventional banks. This paper analyzes the performance of social banks related to the bank business model, economic efficiency, asset quality and stability by comparing social banks with banks where the difference is likely to be large, namely with the 30 global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) of the Financial Stability Board over the period 2000-2014. We also analyze the relative impact of the global financial crises on the bank performance. The performance of social banks and G-SIBs is surprisingly similar.
    • The financial and economic performance of social banks

      Mykhayliv, Dariya; Zauner, K.G. (2018-02)
      The financial crisis of 2008 provides evidence for the instability of the conventional banking system. Social banks may present a viable alternative for conventional banks. This article analyses the performance of social banks related to the bank business model, economic efficiency, asset quality, and stability by comparing social banks with banks where the difference is likely to be large, namely with the 30 global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) of the Financial Stability Board over the period 2000–2014. We also analyse the relative impact of the global financial crisis on the bank performance. The performance of social banks and G-SIBs is surprisingly similar.
    • The Impact of Equity Ownership Groups on Investment: Evidence from Ukraine

      Mykhayliv, Dariya; Zauner, K.G. (2017)
      We empirically investigate the impact of different ownership groups on companies’ investment in Ukraine with a novel dynamic investment model where investment is based on present and historical levels of profitability (market-to-book value of equity) and lagged investment. Groups include state, insider, non-domestic, financial and financial and industrial group (FIG) ownership. Contrary to the literature, we find that the past level of profitability significantly affects investment; the presence of and increases in state ownership have a negative impact on firms’ investment, as is the case for non-domestic and financial companies’ ownership. Insider and FIG ownership have no impact on investment. We explain the results by the extent of liquidity concerns (hard and soft budget constraints) and the extent of asset stripping for the corresponding ownership group and relate them to over- and underinvestment, and to the free cash flow or cash constraint hypothesis.
    • The Impact of Ownership on Companies' Investment Rates Using Present and Past Values of Profitability

      Mykhayliv, Dariya; Zauner, K.G. (2016)
      We empirically analyze the impact of different ownership groups on companies’ investment rates in Ukraine allowing investment rates to depend on present and past market-to-book values of equity. We relate the impact to the presence of soft and hard budget constraints, to the free cash flow and the cash constraint hypothesis and discuss over- and under-investment. Several robustness checks, in particular, the potential endogeneity of ownership variables are considered.
    • The Impact of Ownership on Companies’ Investment Rates in Ukraine

      Mykhayliv, Dariya; Zauner, K.G. (2016)
      In this paper, we empirically analyze the impact of ownership groups on companies’ investment rates in Ukraine using a new dynamic Tobin’s Q model allowing investment rates to depend on present and lagged Q. We find that the presence of a majority in and increases in state, non-domestic and financial companies’ ownership has a significantly negative impact on investment rates. State and insider ownership are associated with soft budget constraints whereas non-domestic, financial companies’ and financial and industrial groups’ ownership with hard budget constraints. The dynamic model shows persistence in the market-to-book value of equity, the proxy for Q.
    • Investment behaviour, corporate control, and private benefits of control: Evidence from a survey of Ukrainian firms

      Mykhayliv, Dariya; Zauner, K.G. (2015)
      We analyse the impact of ownership and corporate control on firms’ investment using the 2001survey of Yacoub et al. on Ukrainian firms. The model explains investment by output, financial and soft budget constraints, and corporate control (and ownership) categories potentially enjoying private benefits of control. We find that the corporate control model fits better than the ownership model,a negative relationship between state and employee control and firms’ investment, and evidence forthe presence of soft budget constraints. A negative relationship between firms’ investment and the relative size of non-monetary transactions strengthens the conclusion of private benefits of control impacting investment.
    • The Q Theory of Investment with Private Benefits of Control, Soft Budget Constraints and Financial Constraints

      Mykhayliv, Dariya; Zauner, K.G. (2015-12)
      In this paper, we extend Tobin’s Q model under financial frictions (Hennesy, Levy, and Whited, Journal of Financial Economics (2007)), using a discrete-time version of their model, to include private benefits of control of managers and other stakeholders and soft budget constraints in the form of money injections into the firm. Managers are not viewed to maximise shareholder value, but to maximise the value of their shareholding plus their private benefits of control. Private benefits of control introduce elements of asset stripping into the model. We characterize the optimal investment policy, analyse comparative statics and discuss applications to firms in transitional economies.