• 2001 Review Conference: Concensus Broken

      Sims, N.A.; Whitby, Simon M. (2001)
      In this video Nicholas A. Sims describes what it was that broke the consensus at the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
    • 2001 Review Conference: The Future - What can be done?

      Sims, N.A.; Whitby, Simon M. (2001)
      In this final Review Conference Video Nicholas A. Sims describes strategies that both governmenal and non-governmental groups might adopt prior to the reconveneing of the Review Conference process in November 2002.
    • 2001 Review Conference: The Future of the Ad Hoc Group

      Sims, N.A.; Whitby, Simon M. (2001)
      For the past 7 seven years the so-called Ad Hoc Group had been mandated to negotiate a legally binding verification and compliance Protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In this video we asked Nicholas A. Sims whether it was the intention of the United States to put forward a proposal during the course of the Review that was intended to terminate the work of the Ad Hoc Group and its mandate.
    • Anti-crop Biological Weapons Program

      Whitby, Simon M. (2006)
      The threat of biological weapons has never attracted as much public attention as in the past five years. Current concerns largely relate to the threat of weapons acquisition and use by rogue states or by terrorists. But the threat has deeper roots--it has been evident for fifty years that biological agents could be used to cause mass casualties and large-scale economic damage. Yet there has been little historical analysis of such weapons over the past half-century. Deadly Cultures sets out to fill this gap by analyzing the historical developments since 1945 and addressing three central issues: Why have states continued or begun programs for acquiring biological weapons? Why have states terminated biological weapons programs? How have states demonstrated that they have truly terminated their biological weapons programs? We now live in a world in which the basic knowledge needed to develop biological weapons is more widely available than ever before. Deadly Cultures provides the lessons from history that we urgently need in order to strengthen the long-standing prohibition of biological weapons
    • The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Protocol Negotiations

      Pearson, Graham S.; Whitby, Simon M. (2000)
      Professor Graham S. Pearson discusses the scope of the international legal prohibition against biological warfare and provides an overview of the status of negotiations, currently in the end-game phase, to agree a legally-binding verification Protocol to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
    • Biological Warfare Against Crops

      Whitby, Simon M. (2001)
      Until now little attention has been paid to the development of military capabilities designed to target food crops with biological warfare agents. This book represents the first substantive study of state-run activities in this field. It shows that all biological warfare programmes have included a component concerned with the development of anti-crop biological warfare agents and munitions. Current concern over the proliferation of biological weapons is placed in the context of the initiative to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The book concludes by arguing that the risks posed by this form of warfare can be minimised, but that this would depend largely on the effective and efficient implementation of regimes concerning the peaceful use and control of plant pathogens that pose a risk to human health and the environment.
    • Biological Warfare Against Crops

      Whitby, Simon M. (2009-10-28)
      Until now little attention has been paid to the development of military capabilities designed to target food crops with biological warfare agents. This book represents the first substantive study of state-run activities in this field. It shows that all biological warfare programs have included a component concerned with the development of anti-crop agents and munitions. Current concern over the proliferation of biological weapons is placed in the context of the initiative to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The author concludes that the risks posed by this form of warfare can be minimized by the implementation of regimes concerning the peaceful use and control of plant pathogens that pose a risk to human health and the environment.
    • Biomedical Community and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

      Dando, Malcolm R.; Whitby, Simon M. (2001)
      Negotiations to find a legally binding way to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972 [1]are in danger of failing. The crisis was precipitated during the current round of talks, now in its final week in Geneva, when the US, alone amongst the negotiating States, rejected the text of a protocol that has taken six and a half years to negotiate.
    • Biotechnology and the Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future?

      Meselson, M.; Whitby, Simon M. (2002)
      Matt Meselson, Professor of Molecular and Cellular Biology, Harvard University, 'Biotechnology and Weapons of Mass Destruction - the Future? ' November 2002.
    • The BTWC 2001 Review Conference

      Sims, N.A.; Whitby, Simon M. (2001)
      In this video Nicholas A. Sims begins by describing the main objectives of the Review Conference Process. He then goes on to explain what happened at the Fifth Review Conference and why the Review process was suspended until November 2002
    • The BTWC: An Evolving Regime

      Sims, N.A.; Whitby, Simon M. (2001)
      In this video Nicholas A. Sims describes the way in which the BTWC treaty regimes has evolved since its entry into force in 1975.
    • BWC Fifth Review Conference Resumed Session: Evaluation of Proposals

      Sims, N.A.; Whitby, Simon M. (2002)
      Nicholas Sims, Reader in International Relations, London School of Economics, 'Evaluation of Proposals: Resumed Session of Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Fifth Review Conference', November 2002.
    • BWPP Launch Speech

      Dhanapala, J.; Whitby, Simon M. (2002)
      Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, Civil Society Organisations and the BWC speech given at launch of the Bio-Weapons Prevention Project, during the Resumed Session of the 5th Review Conference of the BWC, United Nations, Geneva, 12 November 2002.
    • The Chemical Weapons Convention and the General Purpose Criterion

      Robinson, Julian P.P.; Whitby, Simon M. (2000)
      Julian P. Perry Robinson describes the so called 'General Purpose Criterion' and the way in this mechanism operates in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
    • Composite Text - Address by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group Ambassador Tibor Toth

      Toth, Tibor; Whitby, Simon M. (2000)
      Ambassador Tibor Toth, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, gives an address relating to the submission to the Ad Hoc Group of the Chairman's Composite Text of the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
    • Declarations and inspections in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the relevance of this form of verification to the BTWC

      Guthrie, Richard; Whitby, Simon M. (2000)
      Richard Guthrie describes the central pillars of the verification regime for the Chemical Weapons Convention and assesses the relevance of a similar verification architecture for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
    • Developments relating to the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, implications for the BTWC

      Feakes, D.; Whitby, Simon M. (2000)
      Daniel Feakes assesses the success of the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and comments on the potential for such a regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
    • Ethics, neuroscience and public policy: can team-based learning be a means to raise awareness of the problem of dual-use among practicing neuroscientists?

      Whitby, Simon M.; Dando, Malcolm R. (Routledge, 2018-11-02)
      The revolution in neuroscience, based on the recent development of novel techniques such as brain imaging that allow greater insight into the working of the central nervous system, will be accelerated by the injection of major funding in state-level brain research projects around the world and will undoubtedly lead to great benefits. However, the results of the research may be subject to hostile misuse, which in the context of chemical and biological weapons has been called the problem of dual use. An example could be the development of novel so-called non-lethal incapacitating chemical and biological agents that attack the central nervous system based on the knowledge derived from benignly-intended civil brain research. Unfortunately, most practicing neuroscientists are not aware of this problem and therefore cannot add their expertise to efforts to prevent such misuse. This paper reviews an attempt to test whether a Team-Based Learning (TBL) active learning exercise could be used to raise awareness of the problem of dual use amongst a group of practicing neuroscientists. It is concluded that TBL is a useful approach, but to effectively engage neuroscientists in helping to deal with dual use it would need to be incorporated within a co-ordinated national, regional and international educational initiative.
    • Failure to agree a Procedural Report at the 24th session of the Ad Hoc Group

      Rissanen, Jenni; Whitby, Simon M. (2001)
      Video interview with Jenni Rissanen, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, Geneva Analyst, on the failure to agree a Procedural Report at the 24th session of the Ad Hoc Group. (Filmed on the final day (17 August 2001) of the final day of the 24th session of the Ad Hoc Group.)