Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorSerbera, J-P.
dc.contributor.authorFry, John
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-05T11:24:39Z
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-09T12:41:17Z
dc.date.available2020-01-05T11:24:39Z
dc.date.available2020-01-09T12:41:17Z
dc.date.issued2019-04
dc.identifier.citationSerbera J-P and Fry J (2019) Takeover deterrents and cross partial ownership: the case of golden shares. Managerial and Decision Economics. 40(3): 243-250.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10454/17561
dc.descriptionYesen_US
dc.description.abstractWe analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital‐linked firms in cross partial ownership (CPO). Before merger, CPO reduces the profitability of involved firms, confirming the “outsider effect.” However, the impact of CPO upon merger profitability is two‐sided in a Cournot setting. CPO, by cointegrating profits, increases output collusion leading to anticompetitive effects with facilitated mergers in most cases. Nonetheless, a protective threshold exists for which CPO arrangements can reduce the incentives for hostile takeovers. This has potentially significant regulatory implications. An illustrative example showcases the potential relevance of CPO as a defence against hostile takeovers across different industries.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.isreferencedbyhttps://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2998en_US
dc.rights© 2019 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Serbera J-P and Fry J (2019) Takeover deterrents and cross partial ownership: the case of golden shares. Managerial and Decision Economics. 40(3): 243-250, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2998. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.en_US
dc.subjectTakeoversen_US
dc.subjectCross partial ownership (CPO)en_US
dc.subjectMergersen_US
dc.titleTakeover deterrents and cross partial ownership: the case of golden sharesen_US
dc.status.refereedYesen_US
dc.date.Accepted2018-11-30
dc.date.application2019-01-28
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.date.EndofEmbargo2021-01-29
dc.type.versionAccepted manuscripten_US
dc.description.publicnotesThe full-text of this article will be released for public view at the end of the publisher embargo on 29 Jan 2021.en_US
dc.date.updated2020-01-05T11:24:49Z
refterms.dateFOA2020-01-09T12:41:44Z


Item file(s)

Thumbnail
Name:
CPOMDErevised.docx
Size:
77.20Kb
Format:
Microsoft Word 2007
Description:
To keep suppressed
Thumbnail
Name:
Fry_MDE.pdf
Embargo:
2021-01-29
Size:
336.0Kb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record