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dc.contributor.authorFrancis, Kathryn B.*
dc.contributor.authorBeaman, P.*
dc.contributor.authorHansen, N.*
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-13T08:09:55Z
dc.date.available2019-05-13T08:09:55Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationFrancis KB, Beaman CP and Hansen N (2019) Stakes, scales and skepticism. Ergo. 6(16): 427-485.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10454/17040
dc.descriptionYesen_US
dc.description.abstractThere is conflicting experimental evidence about whether the “stakes” or importance of being wrong affect judgments about whether a subject knows a proposition. To date, judgments about stakes effects on knowledge have been investigated using binary paradigms: responses to “low” stakes cases are compared with responses to “high stakes” cases. However, stakes or importance are not binary properties—they are scalar: whether a situation is “high” or “low” stakes is a matter of degree. So far, no experimental work has investigated the scalar nature of stakes effects on knowledge: do stakes effects increase as the stakes get higher? Do stakes effects only appear once a certain threshold of stakes has been crossed? Does the effect plateau at a certain point? To address these questions, we conducted experiments that probe for the scalarity of stakes effects using several experimental approaches. We found evidence of scalar stakes effects using an “evidenceseeking” experimental design, but no evidence of scalar effects using a traditional “evidence-fixed” experimental design. In addition, using the evidence-seeking design, we uncovered a large, but previously unnoticed framing effect on whether participants are skeptical about whether someone can know something, no matter how much evidence they have. The rate of skeptical responses and the rate at which participants were willing to attribute “lazy knowledge”—that someone can know something without having to check— were themselves subject to a stakes effect: participants were more skeptical when the stakes were higher, and more prone to attribute lazy knowledge when the stakes were lower. We argue that the novel skeptical stakes effect provides resources to respond to criticisms of the evidence-seeking approach that argue that it does not target knowledgeen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipLeverhulme Trust Research Project Grant (RPG-2016-193)en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.isreferencedbyhttps://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0006.016en_US
dc.rights(c) 2019 The Authors. This is an Open Access article distributed under the Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/)en_US
dc.subjectExperimental philosophyen_US
dc.subjectEpistemologyen_US
dc.subjectStakesen_US
dc.subjectKnowledgeen_US
dc.subjectInterdisciplinaryen_US
dc.subjectMTurken_US
dc.titleStakes, Scales, and Skepticismen_US
dc.status.refereedYesen_US
dc.date.Accepted2019-04-02
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.type.versionAccepted manuscripten_US
refterms.dateFOA2019-05-13T08:10:44Z


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