The Corporate Governance–Risk Taking Nexus: Evidence from Insurance Companies
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2018Rights
© 2018 Emerald. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.Peer-Reviewed
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This study examines the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms on insurance companies’ risk-taking in the UK context. The study uses a panel data of all listed insurance companies on FTSE 350 over the 2005-2014 period. The results show that the board size and board meetings are significantly and negatively related to risk-taking. In contrast, the results show that board independence and audit committee size are statistically insignificant, but negatively related to risk-taking. The findings are robust to alternative measures and endogeneities. Our findings have important implications for investors, managers, regulators of financial institutions and effectiveness of corporate governance reforms that have been pursued.Version
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Elamer AA, AlHares A, Ntim CG and Benyazid I (2018) The Corporate Governance–Risk Taking Nexus: Evidence from Insurance Companies. International Journal of Ethics and Systems. 34(4): 493-509Link to Version of Record
https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOES-07-2018-0103Type
Articleae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOES-07-2018-0103