How Does the Market View Bank Regulatory Capital Forbearance Policies?
Publication date
17/01/2017Keyword
Bank regulatory closure rulesPolicy parameter
Bank insolvency
Regulatory forbearance
Market-based closure rules
Financial crises
Peer-Reviewed
NoOpen Access status
closedAccess
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During the subprime crisis, the FDIC has shown, once again, laxity in resolving and closing insolvent institutions. Ronn and Verma (1986) call the tolerance level below which a bank closure is triggered the regulatory policy parameter. We derive a model in which we make this parameter stochastic and bank-specific to infer the stock market view of the regulatory capital forbearance value. For 565 U.S. listed banks during 1990 to 2012, the countercyclical forbearance fraction in capital, most substantial in recessions, could represent 17%, on average, of the market valuation of bank equity and could go as high as 100%.Version
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Lai VS and Y X (2017) How Does the Market View Bank Regulatory Capital Forbearance Policies?Link to Version of Record
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2536017Type
Reportae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2536017