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    Corporate Governance, risk disclosure practices, and market liquidity: Comparative evidence from UK and Italy.

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    Publication date
    2015-07-01
    Author
    Elshandidy, Tamer
    Lorenzo, N.
    Keyword
    Corporate governance; Automated textual content analysis; Mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure; Risk disclosure practices; Usefulness of risk disclosure; Market liquidity; United Kingdom (UK); Italy
    Peer-Reviewed
    yes
    
    Metadata
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    Abstract
    Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This paper examines the influence of corporate governance on risk disclosure practices in the UK and Italy and also studies the impact of those practices on market liquidity. Research Findings/Insights: We find that governance factors principally influence the decisions of UK (Italian) firms over whether to exhibit risk information voluntarily (mandatorily) in their annual report narratives. When we distinguish between firms with strong and weak governance (in terms of board efficiency) in each country, we find that the factors that affect mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure appear to be driven more by strongly governed firms in both countries. Furthermore, strongly governed firms in the UK tend to provide more meaningful risk information to their investors than weakly governed firms. In Italy, however, we find that strongly rather than weakly governed firms exhibiting risk information voluntarily rather than mandatorily improves market liquidity significantly. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure when studying the impact of corporate governance. Our findings differ across strongly and weakly governed firms, in terms of both the factors that influence risk disclosure practices and the exact informativeness of those practices. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The results support the current regulatory trend in risk reporting within the UK that emphasizes the importance of directors and encourages rather than mandates risk disclosure. However, the results generally signal a need for further improvements in the Italian context. Our evidence also supports the value of the confidence in the UK governance system, compared to that in Italy, which motivates British firms to provide highly informative risk information more often than Italian firms.
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10454/12865
    Version
    No full-text in the repository
    Citation
    Elshandidy T and Lorenzo N (2015) Corporate Governance, Risk Disclosure Practices, and Market Liquidity: Comparative Evidence from the UK and Italy. Corporate Governance: An International Review. 23(4): 331-356.
    Link to publisher’s version
    https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12095
    Type
    Article
    Collections
    Management and Law Publications

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