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dc.contributor.authorDietrich, M.*
dc.contributor.authorMcHardy, J.*
dc.contributor.authorSharma, Abhijit*
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-21T09:30:13Z
dc.date.available2017-02-21T09:30:13Z
dc.date.issued2016-12
dc.identifier.citationDietrich M, McHardy J and Sharma A (2016) Firm Corruption in the Presence of an Auditor. Review of Economic Analysis. 8: 97-124.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10454/11422
dc.descriptionYesen_US
dc.description.abstractWe develop a theoretical framework exploring firm corruption accounting for interactions with an auditor who provides auditing and other services. A multiplicity of equilibria can exist including stable corruption and auditor controlled corruption. Whilst fining the auditor cannot eliminate all corruption, fining the firm can, but marginal increases in this fine can also have perverse effects. Investing in corruption detection may be effective in deterring auditor corruption but ineffective in deterring firm corruption. Policy effectiveness is highly dependent upon several factors which may be hard to observe in practice making general rules about policy interventions to address corruption very difficult.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.isreferencedbyhttp://rofea.org/index.php?journal=journal&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=282en_US
dc.rights© 2016 The Authors. Licensed under the Creative Commons CC-BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/bync/ 3.0/)en_US
dc.subjectFirm corruption; Auditor corruptionen_US
dc.titleFirm Corruption in the Presence of an Auditoren_US
dc.status.refereedYes.en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.type.versionPublished versionen_US
refterms.dateFOA2018-07-26T09:25:35Z


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