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dc.contributor.authorMykhayliv, Dariya
dc.contributor.authorZauner, K.G.
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-02T12:16:22Z
dc.date.available2017-02-02T12:16:22Z
dc.date.issued2015-12
dc.identifier.citationMykhayliv D and Zauner KG (2015) The Q Theory of Investment with Private Benefits of Control, Soft Budget Constraints and Financial Constraints. Working Paper. The Authors.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10454/11240
dc.descriptionyesen_US
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we extend Tobin’s Q model under financial frictions (Hennesy, Levy, and Whited, Journal of Financial Economics (2007)), using a discrete-time version of their model, to include private benefits of control of managers and other stakeholders and soft budget constraints in the form of money injections into the firm. Managers are not viewed to maximise shareholder value, but to maximise the value of their shareholding plus their private benefits of control. Private benefits of control introduce elements of asset stripping into the model. We characterize the optimal investment policy, analyse comparative statics and discuss applications to firms in transitional economies.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.rights© 2015 The Authors. Reproduced by permission from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.subjectCorporate governance; Q therory of investment; Financial constraints; Investment; Private benefits of control; Soft budget constraintsen_US
dc.titleThe Q Theory of Investment with Private Benefits of Control, Soft Budget Constraints and Financial Constraintsen_US
dc.status.refereedn/aen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.type.versionAccepted Manuscripten_US
refterms.dateFOA2018-07-26T09:23:09Z


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