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The impact of the global financial crisis and institutional settings on corporate financial decisions.
Tekin, Hasan
Tekin, Hasan
Publication Date
2019
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The University of Bradford theses are licenced under a Creative Commons Licence.
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University of Bradford
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Faculty of Management, Law and Social Sciences
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2019
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Abstract
Since theories of corporate finance are recognised to be conditional, this study explores the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 and institutional settings in determining corporate financial decisions. The recession on the supply of credit and demand for credit affects the corporate financial channels. The credit recession causes more agency costs, bankruptcy costs and information asymmetry, which adversely influence both borrowing and investments. Firms reduce debt financing, retain more cash and cut corporate payouts due to a sharp rise in uncertainty. Moreover, the role of institutional settings on corporate decisions differs following the GFC. Three empirical chapters contribute to the literature: First, Chapter 3 investigates the role of GFC on determinants and the adjustment speed of leverage and debt maturity and reveals that the effect of bankruptcy costs, agency costs and information asymmetry only increases on debt maturity, as opposed to leverage in the post-GFC. The adjustment speed of leverage and debt maturity drops after the GFC due to the low supply and demand for credit. Chapter 4 examines how cash holdings have been affected by the GFC across countries which have different agency problems and analyses how the rise of agency costs and information asymmetry can explain cash decisions before and after the GFC. Financially constrained firms have quicker cash holdings’ adjustment compared to unconstrained firms. However, while firms in low-governance countries have slower adjustment speed of cash than those in high-governance countries in pre-crisis, it has been found that it is vice versa in the post-crisis period. Finally, Chapter 5 analyses the effect of agency problems and the GFC on dividend payouts. Contrary to firms in high-governance countries, those in common-law countries are less likely to pay out dividends, as confirmed by the substitute and outcome models, sequentially after the GFC. Also, dividends are used as a signalling device by the GFC. Overall, the GFC and institutional settings impact corporate financial policies of firms to specify where and when their shareholders invest.
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Qualification name
PhD