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Perceptions of institutional complexity and lobbyists’ decisions to join lobbying coalitions – evidence from the European Union context
Barron, A. Trouille, Jean-Marc
Barron, A.
Trouille, Jean-Marc
Publication Date
24/11/2015
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(c) SAGE Publications. Full-text reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
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Abstract
We use data from in-depth interviews with business lobbyists in Brussels to
investigate why they choose to join lobbying coalitions. We find that
lobbyists face two competing institutional incentives. First, they are
confronted with incentives to ally with other European organisations,
develop multilateral policy messages, and communicate messages to the
Commission and the Parliament. Simultaneously, they face inducements to
join narrower coalitions, develop bilateral policy messages, and direct
those messages at the Council. Lobbyists’ receptivity to these incentives –
and thus their choices of lobbying coalitions – differs with their age,
educational background, and with the type and ownership structure of the
organisations they represent. Combined, our findings contribute to the
limited, mainly American literature on interest coalitions by demonstrating
that lobbyists operate in complex institutional environments, and that their
interpretations of and reactions to institutional complexity are shaped by
individual- and organisational-level factors.
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Accepted manuscript
Citation
Barron A and Trouille JM (2015) Perceptions of institutional complexity and lobbyists’
decisions to join lobbying coalitions – evidence from the European Union context. Environment
and Planning C: Government and Policy. OnlineFirst.
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Article