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The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: Evidence from panel data

Chortareas, G.
; 
Logothetis, V.
; 
Magkonis, Georgios
; 
Zekente, K.
Publication Date
2016-03
End of Embargo
Supervisor
Keywords
Monetary policy, Banking supervision, Inflation conservatism, Panel data
Rights
© 2016 Elsevier. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
Peer-Reviewed
Yes
Open Access status
openAccess
Accepted for publication
27/12/2015
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Department
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Management and Law Publications
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Abstract
We examine the effects of banking supervisory architecture on central bank preferences, quantified through a recently proposed measure of central bank conservatism. Using a dynamic panel data specification we document that central banks serving both monetary policy and banking supervision functions are less inflation conservative than those with only a price stability mandate.
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10454/8307
Version
Accepted manuscript
Citation
Chortareas G, Logothetis V, Magkonis G and Zekente K (2016) The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: evidence from panel data. Economics Letters. 140: 11-13.
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Link to published version
Link to Version of Record
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021
Type
Article
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Notes