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The Corporate Governance–Risk Taking Nexus: Evidence from Insurance Companies
Elamer, Ahmed A. AlHares, A. Ntim, C.G. Benyazid, I.
Elamer, Ahmed A.
AlHares, A.
Ntim, C.G.
Benyazid, I.
Publication Date
2018
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© 2018 Emerald. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
Peer-Reviewed
Yes
Open Access status
openAccess
Accepted for publication
06/09/2018
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Abstract
This study examines the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms on
insurance companies’ risk-taking in the UK context. The study uses a panel data of all listed
insurance companies on FTSE 350 over the 2005-2014 period. The results show that the
board size and board meetings are significantly and negatively related to risk-taking. In
contrast, the results show that board independence and audit committee size are statistically
insignificant, but negatively related to risk-taking. The findings are robust to alternative
measures and endogeneities. Our findings have important implications for investors,
managers, regulators of financial institutions and effectiveness of corporate governance reforms that have been pursued.
Version
Accepted manuscript
Citation
Elamer AA, AlHares A, Ntim CG and Benyazid I (2018) The Corporate Governance–Risk Taking Nexus: Evidence from Insurance Companies. International Journal of Ethics and Systems. 34(4): 493-509
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Article