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Reinsertion Assistance and the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in War to Peace Transitions

Thematic Working Paper 4

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Working Paper 4: 
Reinsertion Assistance and the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in War to Peace Transitions

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1. Introduction: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants constitutes one of the most crucial activities in a post-conflict peacebuilding context with important effects upon the wider transitional process from war to peace. The efficient implementation of DDR programmes can reassure belligerent parties of the possibility of a permanent cessation of hostilities, as they are often the most visible element of the peace agreement. Moreover, a well-planned and flexible reintegration process can also promote the viability of long-term peace locally, nationally and internationally.¹ Since the end of the Cold War, DDR initiatives have been undertaken in more than 25 war-to-peace transition contexts: Afghanistan, Aceh, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), El Salvador, Eritrea, East Timor, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Kosovo, Liberia, Mindanao, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tajikistan and Uganda. In 2007, over 1,129,000 combatants were taking part in DDR programmes in 20 countries at an estimated cost of US$ 2 billion; one estimate suggests that it worked out to be around US$1,686 per ex-combatant. Some 2/3 of former combatants were from African countries; 42% were members of the armed forces and 58% belonged to armed militias, guerrilla groups and paramilitary groups. Of this statistic, nearly 10% were child soldiers.²

According to the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), launched by the UN Secretary-General in December 2006, with the aim of promoting an integrated approach between UN agencies and other actors in DDR processes,³

³ Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) is available at www.unddr.org. The IDDRS, which run to more than 700 pages in their full version, arose from a detailed two-year process of consultation. They were produced by the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, which brought together 15 agencies, programmes and funds, mainly from the UN.
DDR ‘is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions.’ The IDDRS defines **disarmament** as the collection, control and disposal of small arms and light weapons and the development of responsible arms management programmes in a post-conflict context. Meanwhile, **demobilization** is defined as a planned process by which the armed force of the government and/or opposition or factional forces either downsize or completely disband. Having been demobilized and transported to their community of choice, the former combatants and their families must establish themselves in a civilian environment. **Reinsertion assistance**, which is intended to ameliorate the process, often includes post-discharge orientation, food assistance, health and educational support and a cash allowance. Finally, **reintegration** is the process whereby former combatants and their families are integrated into the social, economic and political life of (civilian) communities. Thus while reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion provides short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year. At the same time it is important to note that these three phases are interrelated, rather than sequential, but they can be thought of as part of a sequence of activities that have to happen for a society to recover from armed conflict.

Two distinct types of DDR programmes can be identified: demilitarisation activities; and those taking place in a war-to-peace transition. The former involves a reduction in the number of military personnel following a decisive victory, with a view to reducing military expenditure in order to take advantage of a peace dividend. Large scale downsizing as part of peacetime demobilization initiatives can also be considered under this heading. However, in the war-to-peace transition scenario, no clear victor emerges and DDR is undertaken as part of a peace settlement. Within this war to peace transition scenario, the outcome of any DDR programme depends predominantly upon the political context, and political will among the belligerent parties remains the chief criterion for determining success of peacebuilding. Berdal refers to this relationship as ‘an interplay’ and ‘a subtle interaction’. Although a sustainable recovery after war cannot be achieved without a successful DDR process, conversely, without a successful peacebuilding process the viability of a DDR process would, in general, be questionable.

This paper looks specifically at the conceptual underpinnings and practical implications of **reinsertion assistance** as a transitional and interim support mechanism which links the demobilization and reintegration phases. In practice, ex-combatants once demobilised are in theory no longer part of any military structure, yet they may have no livelihood or place to live while they wait for the vocational training or employment opportunities which are supposed to enable their economic reintegration. Even those returning immediately to agriculture will have to wait until their first crops have grown. Interim support plays an important role by meeting basic

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4 Ibid., p. 2.
6 Berdal. 1996, p. 73.
needs at a time when neither the state nor a reintegration process can do so. While demobilization benefits often offer inducement to join a DDR process, reinsertion assistance can provide early insurance against an immediate return to violence (individually or collectively). Thus as a concept reinsertion has grown to cover the gap between the ‘DD’ and the ‘R’ in DDR.

The IDDRS explicitly states the need to support the life of ex-combatants and their dependants in the short term. This aim is pursued in the knowledge that for those who do not already have work or land to go to it may be extremely difficult to cover basic needs in the first few months after leaving the military unit or demobilisation camp. Not only does reinsertion attempt to alleviate a significant humanitarian concern, but it also acts as a measure of insurance against an ex-combatant’s return to violence in an effort to secure their basic needs. Another likely objective for reinsertion is the provision of early, tangible peace dividends and rewards for combatants, heralding further, long-term entitlements in the reintegration phase. Indeed, even when reinsertion benefits are not explicitly conceived as a reward or entitlement, they may be seen as such by combatants and by the population at large. At its most negative, this belief in an entitlement can lead to expectations that cannot be met, perhaps sparking unrest among combatants. In Liberia, for example, riots broke out in camps when ex-combatants’ expectations with regard to the amount of money they would receive were not met.

The duration of reinsertion as transitional support is largely contingent on whether its objective is to fulfil a political function, assist in long-term cantonment, reinforce efforts towards the early and complete demobilisation of some or all forces, or provide an entitlement. Other processes do influence the duration of the reinsertion phase, such as the time span for registration, the mode of demobilization, and funding flows, together with the viability and sustainability of a peace agreement, which coalesce to enable a smooth and non-violent transition. The type and duration of reinsertion support, moreover, is heavily reliant on how the reintegration process is conceived in a given context. For instance in Sierra Leone, reinsertion was planned as a short transitional period for ex-combatants to meet basic needs, but was delayed until problems related to disarmament, demobilisation, funding and insecurity were overcome and the reintegration phase was initiated. On the whole despite attempts to provide concrete definitions of what reinsertion is in a structured and widely-accepted form, as a process it remains hostage to its multiple needs.

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1.1 Structure of the paper

The paper begins with a conceptual exploration into reinsertion assistance, delineating its significance in the sequence of activities which together coalesce as DDR. The second section explores the two sides of the reinsertion assistance contents debate, regarding what it should involve, namely cash or in-kind assistance. Both forms of reinsertion assistance are discussed in detail, to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of cash. Financial Reinsertion Assistance subsumes several intricate issues such as selecting beneficiaries and defining target groups. This in turn entails clear enunciation of logistics, planning schedules for disbursement, mobilization of funds, establishing criteria for different standards, deciding on the quantum of allowance, financial education for ex-combatants and ensuring delivery through a non-corruptible distribution system. Experience drawn from cross-country cases help illustrate this further.

The next section turns attention to the ‘in-kind’ side of the debate and looks at other elements of reinsertion assistance. A significant part of this discussion is the ability to decide on the merits of different types of in-kind assistance, in particular voucher programmes, in-kind kit and equipment, including tangibles like domestic and agricultural tools, shelter materials, and access to food rations.

The final section revisits the sequence of DDR to establish the linkages between short-term and interim reinsertion support which acts as a palliative to the immediate needs of demobilized ex-combatants and the longer-term, resource intensive and multidimensional reintegration programmes. At the same time DDR programming has evolved over the years to encompass broader agendas, and ambitious mandates, expanding focus from the ex-combatant group – men, women and children – to include the wider civilian community, including the disabled, refugees and internally displaced people, through indirect linkages with other kinds of transitional assistance programming in the post-war recovery phase. However this paper concludes that the merit of reinsertion lies in the specificity and focus of its purpose. Diluting its focus by burdening reinsertion assistance with unrealistic goals can result in diminishing its utility as interim and transitional support for a very limited target group – namely ex-combatants (men, women and children). Community involvement and the emphasis on community based strategies is a legitimate and important goal, but one which needs to be reserved for longer term reintegration programming.

2. Reinsertion Assistance: A Conceptual Exploration

A conceptual exploration into the reinsertion phase entails locating the role of reinsertion assistance within the DDR spectrum. Broadly speaking, current theorisations of DDR can be located within a continuum ranging between the minimalist perspective espoused by the UN, in terms of “improving security” on the one hand, and the maximalist understanding of DDR as “an
opportunity for development and reconstruction” embraced by the World Bank on the other.\textsuperscript{10} The importance of recognizing the complementarities of the minimalist and maximalist standpoints is revealed when DDR is conceptualized as a social contract. In the ‘social order’ of war, a weapon has both economic and security value for its owner in the sense that it can be used to make economic gains as well as preserve physical security. Hence DDR in such a context can be seen as a social contract forged between the combatant and the government and/or international community. DDR therefore, represents commitment to, and faith in, the short- and long-term creation of an environment where the economic and security value of a weapon is gradually eliminated.\textsuperscript{11}

Within this coinage, \textit{disarmament} and \textit{demobilisation} are primarily concerned with consolidating security on the ground, which in turn can facilitate the initiation and commencement of reconstruction and developmental activities.\textsuperscript{12} Reinsertion and reintegreation however constitute part of wider development affairs, with the long-term goal of reintegrating ex-combatants into communities, in terms of financial independence and acceptance by community members and leaders. Thus in a sense DDR bridges the ‘controversial “relief–development” gap’ that spans short-term emergency and long-term development concerns.\textsuperscript{13} In practice the sequential phases of D/ D / R and R do not follow any linear progressive logic, but in this matrix an interesting interim support role comes to be played by reinsertion assistance which ties together the two significant processes of demobilization, i.e, the formal renunciation of a military identity and its markers and reintegration and the gradual process of transcending into civilian roles.

Most practitioners concede that reinsertion of former combatants following demobilization and prior to participation within a reintegration programme constitutes a crucial stage within the overall DDR process. Kostner states the importance of reinsertion assistance as follows:

\begin{quote}
Upon discharge, an ex-combatant loses his/her source of (formal or informal) income. Immediately thereafter, s/he is normally in a critical financial situation until s/he can generate income through self-employment. During this period (the reinsertion phase), an ex-combatant is in need of special assistance (transitional safety net) to cover the basic material needs of him/herself and his/her family.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

Yet there are a number of conceptual ambiguities surrounding ‘reinsertion’, especially about who or what it is for. The UN definition stresses the transitional nature of the reinsertion phase, since it is conceptualised as a bridging mechanism between formal demobilisation and long-term development.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Muggah, 2006, p.27.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Knight and Özerdem, 2004, p. 506
\item \textsuperscript{13} Muggah, 2006, p.241.
\end{itemize}
reintegration. This definition allows for reinsertion to begin during the demobilisation phase, and therefore before a combatant has legitimately become an ex-combatant. The UN concept focuses on basic needs for (ex-) combatants, ranging from food and simple items to assisting with the physical journey from the point of demobilisation to the entry into a “community”, all the way through to skills training and education. This blurs the boundary between reinsertion and reintegration programming.

The different prescriptions used during the reinsertion phase are a broader sign that the concept itself needs contextualizing: the prefix ‘re’ assumes that the ‘re-insertee’ will be returning to a basic societal state that the combatant remembers or at least understands. This pre-war state does not necessarily exist, however. Therefore, while reinsertion has a clear role to play, the instruments to implement it may come from a broad ‘basket’ of tools, some quite sophisticated, others still undeveloped, and it may begin and end in a blurred fashion, creating uncertainty for both recipients and planners.

Given the inevitable overlap and interconnectedness, reinsertion assistance has traditionally been understood as a stage in reintegration rather than as a stand-alone process. Traditionally, therefore, reinsertion packages have routinely been included as part of the demobilization process itself, or labelled as resettlement and rehabilitation packages as in Ethiopia. Recent studies, however, impart leverage to its significance, by suggesting that a better use of international community resources may be to de-link disarmament and demobilization from reintegration, relegating reintegration programming to the developmental realm and expanding the role of reinsertion assistance with DDR to provide necessary and time bound targeted support within a practical and time-bound mandate following disarmament and demobilization. This has resulted in more recent DDR programmes, for instance in the Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, and Sudan, developing the reinsertion segment as a separate stage in the sequence of processes involved in DDR. The next section attempts to create clarity about the

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15 Faltas, 2005.
19 Porto et al. 2007.
concept of reinsertion and its content by drawing on its peculiarities and differences from reintegration planning and programming.

2.1 Differences between reinsertion and reintegration

The field of DDR is littered with several overlapping terminologies which result in a conflation of stages and cross-cutting mandates. Taxonomy hence demands that the various and overlapping R’s (namely Reinsertion, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Resettlement) be clarified, to impart preciseness to the concept of reinsertion in terms of timing, scope and the nature of activities involved. For the purposes of this paper, we focus on the distinction between reinsertion and reintegration only. **Reinsertion** involves ‘stepping stone’ activities and acts (as the World Bank handbook puts it) as “a safety net to provide support for ex-combatants between demobilisation and full reintegration”. The initial action of bringing an ex-combatant and his/her family back into society is often viewed as a stage in reintegration rather than a standalone process.²³ Classical UN approaches to DDR would look at this in terms of ‘entitlement packages’, which is premised on the belief that an ex-combatant and his/her family should be provided with the means to “bridge the difficult period between demobilisation and reintegration”.

**Reintegration** on the other hand is as an open-ended process during which the DDR programme merges with the ongoing post-conflict process. Kingma for example, views reintegration as not one general process but as rather ‘consisting of thousands of micro-stories, with individual and group efforts and with setbacks and successes’.²⁴ According to Berdal, reintegration programmes are ‘meant to increase the potential for economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants and their families.’²⁵ Supporting this view, Kingma states that the objective of social reintegration is to create an environment in which former combatants and their families feel part of, and are accepted by, the community. Political reintegration is the process through which they become a full part of decision making processes, while economic reintegration enable them to build up their livelihoods by having access to production mechanisms and other types of gainful employment.²⁶

Nübler asserts that the long-term objective of reintegration is “to enhance economic and human development and to foster and sustain political stability, security and peace”.²⁷ It is also crucial that the reintegration process recognises and reinforces local reconciliation processes, since reintegrating former combatants in society can contribute in the long term to the overall

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²³Ngoma, 2002.
strengthening of peace and to reconciliation through growing interaction between different groups and former warring factions. In other words, successful reintegration helps in building of mutual confidence among former belligerent groups, thereby reducing the risk of renewed hostilities. An important issue that needs to be recognised is their sheer complexity, they are conducted on a far bigger scale, in terms of their scope, reach, coverage, funding needs and capacity to bring about transformation at multiple levels.

This does not mean that the disarmament and demobilization and reinsertion phases are somehow less complex undertakings, but it is still necessary to bear in mind that reintegration is by nature a social, economic and psychological process that is both slow and costly, and if implemented effectively, it can indeed increase social justice and contribute to the eradication of the root causes of conflict. As is the case with the disarmament and demobilization phases, reintegration is also an intensely political process; indeed, there is perhaps a higher degree of political intensity since reintegration would mean a comprehensive involvement in political, economic and social reconstruction, ameliorating the root causes of the conflict as much as possible.

The content of reintegration programmes can vary from the provision of access to land and education to vocational training and micro enterprise development projects. In fact former combatants tend to have limited information about their society and the opportunities available to them when they arrive back in their home. If this task has not been covered as part of the demobilization phase, then information, counselling and referral services should be established in order to provide the vital link between former combatants and the services planned for them. The reintegration of former combatants, whether this takes place in a rural or urban area, would need first of all to consider a number of basic needs such as housing, infrastructure and services. However, for the reintegration of former combatants in rural areas, access to land is probably the most important consideration. Reintegration activities in urban areas, according to one source, by contrast need to be more diverse and of longer duration. In the Ethiopian reintegration experience it was explained that “the urban target group was more complex and difficult than that of the rural ex-combatants because of the diverse social and economic backgrounds of the ex-combatants, the tightness of the urban labour market”. Bearing in mind these socio-economic characteristics and the likelihood of high unemployment rates in a post-conflict environment, the

31Berdal. 1996.
33Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer. 1996a, p. 58.
utilisation of large public works programmes in the short term is recommended. In Ethiopia the majority of former combatants were referred to short-term public works programmes such as agricultural and construction activities for the Ministry of Agriculture, in addition to Employment Intensive Works Programmes (EIWP) as an economic stimulator and mass employment creation tool.\textsuperscript{34}

One of the correlates of DDR planning which is often overlooked is the overall economic situation in which programmes are attempted. Much of the literature on reintegration stresses the inevitability of conflict recurrence if ex-combatants return to abject poverty. This raises critical issues of sustainable livelihoods and socio-economic wellbeing for both the caseload of combatants and their receiving communities. The challenges posed by poverty in this context is a critical factor to consider, as it is decisive in the way reinsertion and reintegration benefits are needed and translated into programmes. For example, the benefits of newly gained vocational skills or micro-enterprise schemes created as part of reintegration could only be realized if there is a sufficient demand and absorptive capacity in the economy. The issues of corruption, economic insecurity and infrastructural challenges in the financial system can also undermine the utility of certain types of reinsertion and reintegration assistance. Therefore, it is essential to consider macro economic indicators and issues of poverty in planning DDR responses.

Another crucial issue with the reintegration process is that of beneficiaries. There is a mistaken tendency to regard the caseload of former combatants as homogenous overlooking the significant variations based on gender, age, disability, ethnicity, military ranking, education and vocational skills which even small caseloads encompass. In fact the range of needs, capacities and expectations, of former combatants tends to be wide depending on these specificities/characteristics. On the whole transition from reinsertion to reintegration is often fraught with delay and considerable difficulty in catering to all beneficiaries and developing comprehensive programmes. In fact mistakes, and oversights made during the reinsertion phase has the potential to compromise long-term reintegration. The following section tries to wean out the basic difference between the reinsertion and reintegration phases with respect to the timing, scope and type of activities involved at each stage.

2.1.1 Timing

The definition of ‘reinsertion’ adopted by the UN General Assembly and incorporated into the IDDRS suggests that the timing for a reinsertion phase is dictated by the timing of the preceding demobilisation phase.\textsuperscript{35} The IDDRS recommends that in light of its primary purpose of meeting the basic needs of ex-combatants as they transition into civilian society, reinsertion should last for one year only, i.e., before reintegration support commences. Beyond this recommendation, there is little discussion of reinsertion timing and procedures in the IDDRS or other policy


\textsuperscript{35} IDDRS 2006, p. 4.
reviews. In view of this, it is advised that reinsertion interventions should provide time-bound, basic benefits which have an immediate focus and are delivered over months rather than years. Reintegration by contrast can only be achieved over several years, and involves a long-term process built on a much broader array of measures and benefits (including counselling, access to technology, credit, land and other productive assets), which need to be planned carefully to make sure that ex-combatants are sustainably re-integrated within communities. Typically most DDR programmes allocate 12 -18 months for the ‘reinsertion’ phase in which the socio-economic needs of ex-combatants and receiving communities are addressed to ease the process of reintegration. However, experience suggests, as in Sierra Leone, that the reinsertion process can last much longer, and reintegration programs are often delayed. This interim period can be crucial, as delays in assistance can fuel unrest or a return to crime or fighting on the part of demobilized combatants unable to sustain themselves. It demands careful attention from policy and programme personnel to impart continuity to the DDR process, and also to keep the ex-combatant target group in the DDR loop.

2.1.2 Type of Activities
Re-insertion of ex-combatants is a highly sensitive process and the communities into which ex-combatants and their families are expected to return need not only to be prepared, but also, in some cases, encouraged to receive demobilized personnel. In some instances participation of the communities designated to receive ex-combatants in planning and decision-making about who, how many and when ex-combatants will be reinserted can be helpful. Reinsertion benefit involves a mix of material and monetary assistance to the families of the ex-combatants easing the transition to civilian life; it includes food supplements, indemnity payments and cash allowances. Packages may be distributed upon departure from assembly, upon arrival at the destination, or at both points. Several points have come to be institutionalised in the design and disbursement of reinsertion assistance: notably, package contents should be designed around the ex-combatant’s family and not simply the individual, as a token of support for their decision to demobilize.

2.1.3 Scope
While in the reinsertion phase the predominant focus is on the restoration of security and therefore on ensuring that ex-combatants are neutralised and their needs attended to, during the reintegration phase the focus should shift from ex-combatants to receiving communities. A major debate concerns mode of disbursement for benefit packages. On one side of the debate analysts consider that unassimilated soldiers pose a serious threat to law and order, and this in

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turn provides the rationale for targeting them directly. Others support targeting of ex-combatants because they constitute a vulnerable group, which has to cope with important transformation challenges, issues of sustainable livelihoods, return and community reintegration. Targeted support however has its critics. It is often perceived as unfair, given that the demobilized combatants being targeted are usually the perpetrators of violence and instability. Besides, it can create cleavages, exacerbate stigma and problematize community acceptance of returning ex-combatants who may be envied on account of the support they receive, given that there are many other vulnerable groups - refugees, internally displaced persons, women, orphans, and unaccompanied children, who as direct victims of war also deserve support. The alternative to targeted support is providing support directly to the community: advocates of this approach claim that such a move acts as a safety net for all children associated with armed groups, particularly girls. The following section elaborates on the reinsertion assistance package contents further by addressing various aspects of the cash vs. ‘in kind’ debate in DDR practice.

2.2 The cash vs. ‘in kind’ debate

The basic material needs of former combatants and their dependants as discussed in the previous section can be divided into two areas: household consumption, such as food, clothes, health care and children’s education; and household investment, such as shelter, agricultural tools and kitchen utensils. The transitional safety net is often planned for a period of six months to a year after demobilization and delivered through the provision of cash and/or goods. Traditionally cash has been viewed as difficult in context of war, because of weak banking systems, weak markets, insecurity, and corruption among other concerns. However, it is widely used: cash assistance can be provided as a monthly amount or in a lump sum, as is most appropriate for the individual needs of the former combatant. Not all former combatants will require the same amount of reinsertion assistance, therefore criteria for assistance need to be established and implemented in a transparent manner. Hence disbursement and distribution of reinsertion assistance has come to be mired in a strongly felt debate over its nature and content. Should benefit packages provide material or monetary assistance to ex-combatants and their families? Disparate views also arise over the proportion of each constituent, along with nuances such as ease, liquidity, problems of corruption and cheating among others.

39For example, Colleta, Kostner and Wiederhofer (1996a).
Cash payments are a common feature in several phases of DDR. Apart from reinsertion assistance, cash payments are also part of demobilization payments in exchange for guns as was tried by the UN in El Salvador, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Somalia; cash as an incentive was also used in Eastern Slovenia, Croatia.\(^{44}\) Cash has been an integral feature in reintegration programmes like that of Sierra Leone,\(^{45}\) mainly as periodic allowances to support investments in education, training, purchase of goods for trade, or capital investments. In some cases cash may not come from an externally funded DDR process, but may be part of a payment made by a national government. In southern Sudan, SPLA soldiers received an early cash payment from the regional government of South Sudan in lieu of a more regularised salary a year after the signing of the CPA. This was perceived by the army and the National DDR Commission as a holding payment, providing support and assistance and making up for the broader supply difficulties that were affecting morale.\(^{46}\)

In the reinsertion stage, cash payments are often preferred over tangibles like food supplements and indemnity payments on account of their relative ease of distribution and greater flexibility. Its primary appeal to donors lies in simpler logistics and rapid implementation, and the ability to give ex-combatants the opportunity to make their own decisions. Cash may be disbursed in a lump sum or periodically. Cash allowances may be allotted towards the purchase of clothing, food, medical care, agriculture, household effects and housing construction in lieu of or to supplement in-kind assistance.

Cash and vouchers have now come to be primary alternatives, in particular to food aid, non-food items, shelter, seeds, tools and other agricultural commodities such as fertilizer.\(^{47}\) Proponents of cash and voucher-based approaches argue that they can be more cost-effective and timely, allow recipients greater choice and dignity, and have beneficial knock-on effects for local economic activity. Skeptics fear that cash and voucher approaches are often impractical due to additional risks of insecurity and corruption, and the fact that targeting cash may be more difficult than commodities. Even where they are feasible, there are concerns that women may be excluded that cash may be misused by the recipients and that it may have negative effects on local economies, and could fuel conflict. Others feel that cash-voucher responses sound interesting, but that in


\(^{45}\) Solomon and Ginifer, 2008.


\(^{47}\) Harvery, 2005, p. 8.
practice commodities are perhaps more substantive in terms of meeting immediate needs of returning combatants.  

A study carried out by Peppiatt, Mitchell & Holzmann, 49 asserts that although cash allowances, as a transitional safety net, provide a cost-effective and beneficiary-friendly method of delivering reinsertion assistance, the problem is that ex-combatants, especially those who have spent many years in the army, are not always prudent with their cash payments. While most ex-combatants are likely to utilize in-kind assistance for the intended purposes, at the same time in-kind assistance does not provide the flexibility the beneficiaries need. 50 Innovative thinking demands halfway strategies which mediate between full-fledged community involvement in reinsertion support with providing more direct support to the immediate family of the ex-combatant, which can help stabilize the immediate household’s economic and health condition. For example, making provision, for school fee waivers for ex-combatant’s children and healthcare support for an ex-combatant and family. 51 Vouchers can be highly useful in this context. The following sections discuss different elements of reinsertion assistance in greater detail.

3. Financial Reinsertion Assistance

Cash payments in DDR can be of various types and disbursed at various stages. Examples of cash payments include conditional cash transfers (i.e., cash for weapons surrendered as part of demobilization exercises), or transitional safety net payments which are usually made in installments, as part of reinsertion assistance. Cash payments can be used for household consumption and household investment. The following sections will explore the different elements and modalities of financial reinsertion assistance by examining the advantages and disadvantages of cash payments together with comparative experiences of how cash assistance has disparate outcomes in different country contexts. Issues related to the targeting of beneficiaries and intricacies such as planning, logistics, mode of mobilization, criteria for differentiation, and ways of establishing a non-corruptible distribution system will be subsequently elaborated upon.

3.1 Advantages and disadvantages of cash payments

The advantages of cash as reinsertion assistance, compared to other kinds of material assistance, include the relative ease of distribution, since no transportation or warehousing expenses are incurred. If a banking system is operational, the cash can be paid directly into recipients’ bank accounts, thereby reducing the security risks involved in cash distribution and also strengthening

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48 Ibid.
50 Knight and Özerdem, 2004.
51 Harvey, 2005, pp. 8-9, 13.
the local banking system. However, it is at this point that the difference between cash payments during the demobilization and reintegration phases needs to be recognized. As the reinsertion initiative serves the purpose of a linkage between demobilization and reintegration, the financial reinsertion might be seen as a reintegration initiative. However, as far as this working paper is concerned, reinsertion assistance is considered as a transitional safety net. It is accepted that there is in fact no clear correlation between the size of the sum issued and the subsequent employment rate during the reintegration phase. It is asserted that “cash payments per se do not address the problems of socially integrating ex-combatants into society”.\(^5\) However, a study carried out by Peppiatt, Mitchell & Holzmann asserts that cash allowances, as a transitional safety net, provide a cost-effective and beneficiary-friendly method of delivering reinsertion assistance.\(^5\)

The southern Africa safety-net studies indicate that beneficiaries tend to use cash for social and productive investment only after consumption needs have been met and show how cash can act as a stimulant to the local economy. Evidence of squandering – on alcohol and gambling, for example – was not found in any of the case studies that looked at how grants were spent. Two independent surveys carried out among ex-combatants in Sierra Leone produced similar results: the money received was spent on meeting living expenses and family needs,\(^5\) respectively on food and clothing, followed by investments in trading businesses, medical care, housing construction, education, marriage and family.\(^5\) In addition, according to Willibald “cash transfers are perceived as having beneficial knock-on effects on local markets and trade. By encouraging local production, it is asserted that disincentive effects often triggered by commodity aid are avoided. Moreover, cash is deemed to sidestep the problem of commodity aid being sold at a great loss in value, since it can be used directly to meet diverse livelihood needs”.\(^5\)

Furthermore, the intent of the cash payment in the Ethiopian case was to assist in the establishment of a civilian household. The National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Sierra Leone specified the objective of the reinsertion support, which also included a cash payment, as being “to facilitate the return and initial reintegration of ex-combatants into their home areas, and to help ensure their basic short-term necessities are accommodated without being an undue burden on the receiving household”.\(^5\) In fact, the Sierra Leone example introduces an important element when considering the reinsertion assistance.

\(^{52}\)Berdal. 1996, p. 47).
\(^{54}\)Humphreys and Weinstein. 2004, p. 31.
\(^{56}\)Willibald. 2006, p. 21.
of former combatants, namely the effect upon the host community and household into which they will be reinserted. Former combatants may have to rely on the informal support structures available from family and community. Consequently, any cash allowance would help to ameliorate the additional drain on resources experienced by the receiving communities and households.

Focus group discussions often point to the issue of misuse, but this can reflect a preconceived position. Even when misuse is apparent it needs to be contextualised. In Mozambique, for example, ex-combatants spent money on alcohol, but as part of village celebrations that helped facilitate their social reintegration.\textsuperscript{58} Studies in Sierra Leone show that cash payments were spent on meeting living expenses and family needs – food and clothing, followed by a range of investments including house-building, marriage, business and education.\textsuperscript{59} Targeting cash allowances through in-depth context analysis can help minimise misspending, as can the provision of information on the local cash economy and guidance on planning spending. Available studies show that cash has appeared to significantly disadvantage women, even when they have had access to the DDR process.\textsuperscript{60} Cash transfers have been more successful when women have been identified specifically as an early reinsertion group, as commanders have little to gain in excluding them from the process. On the contrary, commanders can gain status by ensuring women’s access to reinsertion benefits. Identifying women as a specific target group early in a DDR process also provides for a more transparent measure of control, and reduces the likelihood of ‘favoured women’, often not ex-combatants, being registered for DDR support by local commanders, or even by peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{61}

In line with the conceptual and practical ambiguities which conflate the reinsertion-reintegration axis, there exists a weapons buy back – inducement vs. reinsertion-entitlement logic premised on the belief that during the disarmament stage of DDR processes, inducements are needed to trade in weapons, since “the warring parties expect something in return for their preparedness to disarm”,\textsuperscript{62} and that ex-combatants as a vulnerable group in the post war period are entitled to special assistance that smoothes their reinsertion into host communities.\textsuperscript{63} (However, it is necessary to make a distinction between the payment in ‘buy-back’ programmes for disarmament and financial assistance in reinsertion. This is probably one of the most challenging aspects of financial reinsertion assistance as it can easily be construed as enticement to buy the complicity of ex-combatants and their disarmament. It should be noted that there are no easy answers for avoiding such a perception from the war-affected community at large but this issues can be tackled in more innovative ways.

\textsuperscript{58}Harvey, 2007, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{59}Humphreys and Weinstein. 2004, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{60}Willibald, 2006, p. 329.
\textsuperscript{61}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62}Tanner, 1996, p. 185.
\textsuperscript{63}Knight and Özerdem, 2004, p. 506.
Most would agree that a mix of cash and in-kind assistance is best suited to meeting the needs of ex-combatants in the reinsertion phase. For instance in Mozambique, both cash and in-kind assistance was offered under the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) and Information Referral Service (IRS) program managed by the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination (UNOHAC); this was one of the best examples of programs that provided incremental financial assistance and job market information while promoting integration into the local community.\(^{64}\)

The thrust was on providing demobilized soldiers with 18 months of subsidies in the form of cash disbursements. Thus a needs assessment and a proper review of the local economy’s capacity to absorb cash inflation, together with an ex-combatant’s needs profile and an assessment of the sustainability of the peace process can help inform the decision on opting for conditional cash transfer strategies.\(^{65}\)

Former combatants also received vocational kits that consisted of agricultural tools, seeds, and food rations for up to three months, with ex-combatants being given financial assistance before leaving the cantonment sites.\(^{66}\) In Liberia, cash was a component of both demobilization and reinsertion phases. However, payment of US$75 as a demobilization benefit became a source of violence and unruliness among ex-combatants. The initial programme was redesigned later, and the demobilization payment was scrapped by UNMIL when the DDR programme recommenced in 2004. A reinsertion allowance of US$ 300 was paid in two instalments, with the first US$ 150 tranche given at the completion of a two to three-week demobilisation process, and the second US$ 150 tranche of the reinsertion allowance paid following the return to their home community three months later. This experience suggests that cash as assistance is better suited to reinsertion than the demobilization and disarmament phases on account of the problematic “weapons for cash image”.\(^{67}\)

3.2 Beneficiaries and issues of targeting

Former combatants are a heterogonous group, including men, women, boys and girls, with varied characteristics and needs, which may face different difficulties and obstacles in the DDR process. When assessing the diversity of caseloads, there is a need to establish the beneficiaries and target of reinsertion assistance. Recent practice acknowledges that special attention needs to be given to the fate of former combatants, who have been disabled as a result of the conflict, as well as female combatants and child soldiers.

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\(^{65}\) Ibid.


In fact that the IDDRS recommend a gender-responsive approach in all phases and activities of DDR from the negotiation and needs assessment of the process to its implementation and evaluation. Mainstreaming gender in reinsertion is an imperative given that, in many cases, women in the company of male combatants are seen only as dependents, regardless of whether they bore arms or engaged in violence. If they were, in fact, fighters, they often appear to be unable to claim DDR assistance. Moreover, often the structure of assistance packages runs counter to the well-being of female ex-combatants\(^{68}\); although efforts have been made in recent DDR programmes to rectify this shortcoming as was the case in Burundi.\(^{69}\)

With respect to child soldiers, the case of Liberia, where this group was provided money in equal proportion to adult combatants, the experience was negative. Child ex-combatants reportedly used the cash to purchase “marijuana and other drugs that are plentiful in Liberia” or had it taken away by their former commanders.\(^{70}\) Contrary to this, in Sierra Leone there is some evidence that children gave money to their families. However, on the whole it has come to be accepted that cash payments as part of demobilization of child soldiers is not a good option.\(^{71}\)

Most demobilization and reintegration processes have treated families as secondary beneficiaries. This means that it is up to the soldier to share benefits with the household, even though the soldier might misuse these benefits. Cursory observations suggest that former fighters in Sierra Leone did give a share of their money to spouses and other female household members, as they also did in Somalia, where ex-combatants’ wives had to sign the contract that would subsequently lead to cash payments. Such best practices are currently being applied in Sudan, where male ex-combatants are encouraged to bring along their wives when collecting the cash allowance—they receive an additional US$ 100 if they show up as a pair.\(^{72}\) Besides it might be more expensive and difficult to target all dependents given that family members must be identified and registered. One possibility is that of conducting an intra-household analysis to evaluate how benefits might be shared and also carry out an assessment of the male ex-combatant’s acceptance in the case of benefits given directly to families. A strong sensitization campaign targeting ex-combatants and communities could trigger community pressure on the recipient of benefits to use them fairly and wisely.


\(^{71}\)IDDRS, 2006.

\(^{72}\)Willibald, 2006.
Cumulative evidence from the field has proven that women and families tend to benefit very little from payment schemes, such as with the DRP in Angola, since demobilized men do not feel obliged to use their pay in the best interest of their dependants. While giving some benefits directly to families might solve this problem, this strand has also given rise to an appeal that community involvement in reinsertion can be a possible option. The ongoing DDR in Sudan is a test case for this approach. However, early evaluations of the process suggest that despite its emphasis on balancing support to individual combatants with support to communities, problems have been encountered in the practical aspects of operationalising community support. Reinsertion and transitional assistance consisted of a one-off cash payment for transportation and resettlement immediately after demobilization, non-food items to support the resettlement, three months of food ration distributed on a monthly basis and a monetized reinsertion support.

Flowing from a broader debate within DDR theory and practice of whether the target should be the individual combatant or the broader community, there have been recent calls of involving the community in reinsertion support as well. The underlying rationale is to mitigate animosity felt by the community towards returning ex-combatants, who are viewed as perpetrators of violence and also beneficiaries of DDR programmes, by involving the community in the design and disbursement of reinsertion support. This community rooted approach seeks to create a more just distribution of benefits in the recovery phase. Although preliminary reports from Eastern DRC suggest that financial focus on the individual ex-combatant has combined with a lack of broader demobilization for the individual to produce a powerful and political group identity, the need to deliver cash assistance at a community level seems to be too vague a goal, hence in this paper, our position is that while the emphasis on community based strategies is a legitimate and important goal, this logic must be reserved for the more long term and comprehensive reintegration programmes for practical purposes. The merit of the reinsertion phase lies in its interim support character and in its strictly defined mandate of helping a particular section of the war-affected, namely ex-combatants.

3.3 Planning and logistics

Overall, five primary issues must be addressed when planning cash reinsertion assistance: the mobilization of funds, differentiation criteria, the amount of the allowance, financial education and the development of a non-corruptible identification system. Alongside the overall challenges of the DDR process in general, mobilization of the necessary funds for financial reinsertion assistance is obviously the first obstacle to be overcome in this process. For example, although the donor community provided 89 per cent of funds for the DDR process in Uganda, there was a substantial overlap of activities owing to delays in the mobilization of funds, and consequently,

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there were occasions when funds had to be loaned from the Ministry of Defence.\textsuperscript{76} The World Bank plans for demobilization in Cambodia in 2000 also faced similar funding problems, as both donors and government failed in their mobilization of funds. Consequently, the original plan for a severance payment of US$1,200 per demobilized Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) soldier was reduced to US$240 per veteran. The further demobilization of RCAF soldiers is likely to face problems with the provision of necessary funding.\textsuperscript{77}

In line with the inherent challenges of providing cash payments in post conflict environments, the DDR process in Sierra Leone faced problems like the “…absence of banks in various parts of the country, movement of [a] huge quantity of cash across the country, security for the process and co-ordination of various agencies involved within a tight timeframe”.\textsuperscript{78} Willibald notes that despite initial hiccups, these challenges were overcome by contracting payment officers to deliver the cash by means of helicopter and under UN security to district headquarters for subsequent collection by ex-combatants.\textsuperscript{79} The results were positive and reflected in ex-combatant survey responses which “considered the process of paying their benefits to have been transparent and efficient”,\textsuperscript{80} with delays in delivery being the major cause of the process being considered as inefficient. The Sierra Leone case also suggests that, from a logistical point of view and despite the difficulties of a post-conflict environment, cash was the superior form of assistance, in light of the conducive weather conditions during the time of ex-combatant demobilization: rains would have made delivering in-kind assistance far more difficult.\textsuperscript{81} Hence various related factors need to be taken into account when planning and developing logistical support for the reinsertion phase.

\textbf{3.3.1 Differentiation criteria}

Experience indicates that criteria for differentiating the amounts paid to particular groups must be clearly and transparently established. This is particularly important in order to avoid discrimination, for example against female former combatants. However, the Ugandan reinsertion process adopted an approach based on egalitarian differentiation. It was the same for all former combatants, irrespective of their rank, age or years of service. In contrast, during the process in Ethiopia, the criteria for differentiating amounts and types of reinsertion assistance included length of service, location of settlement (urban or rural) and level of disability.\textsuperscript{82} In the Namibian experience, the need for reinsertion assistance was not foreseen at the beginning. However, protests from former combatants and the resulting threat to security meant that retrospective reinsertion assistance was eventually provided, but the two criteria for

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{76}Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b.
\item \textsuperscript{77}Kingma, 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{78}Kai-Kai, 2002:2–3 cited in Willibald, 2006, p. 329.
\item \textsuperscript{79}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{80}SSL, 2002, p. 36.
\item \textsuperscript{81}Tesfamichael, Ball and Nenon, 2004, p. 54.
\item \textsuperscript{82}Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
differentiating payment – being unemployed and in service at the time the decision was made – proved difficult to establish. Furthermore, the payments were considered as severance pay and were therefore not calculated on the basis of projected needs.  

The amount of the allowance, as a general rule, should broadly correspond to the level of household income of the general population in order that it does not cause resentment within the community in which the former combatant will settle.  

In other words, establishing the amount of reinsertion assistance must be based upon information gathered from combatants and the prevailing socio-economic environment into which they are to be inserted. Also, the amount should be calculated so as to avoid creating a disincentive to find employment. Criticism of the reinsertion assistance in Mozambique suggests that it was too generous, creating a sense among former combatants that they were special and they could therefore expect and demand more from the government and the international community.  

DDR experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone also suggest that the provision of cash to ex-combatants can indeed elicit community resentment. The final evaluation report of the Sierra Leone DDR programme asserted that “[t]he lure of the Le 600,000 reinsertion benefit encouraged corruption at the commander level”.  

3.3.2 Amount of the allowance and financial education  

In addition to the level of financial assistance, another important issue is whether this should be paid as a lump sum or by instalments. The World Bank (1993) study shows that former combatants tend to have little success in investing lump sum payments for productive purposes, suggesting that cash payments without financial planning sessions are of limited utility. Depending on their context, former combatants may have little or no experience in managing money or operating within a cash economy. In such circumstances, cash payments should be combined with the provision of finance education sessions as an integral component of the reinsertion assistance. Consequently, the preferred approach should entail payment by instalments that decrease over time, thereby reducing dependency and clearly establishing that the assistance is strictly time-limited. For example, the process in Angola which was initiated in 2002 plans to provide former combatants with one cash payment of US$100 in addition to a severance payment in the form of three-months salary.  

Burundi is a case in point here. The National Programme on Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NPDDR) had a significant reinsertion component. This included a fixed

85UNIDIR, 1996.  
reinsertion allowance (to the equivalent value of 18 months’ wages, calculated according to army salary scales) given to each demobilized person after leaving the Demobilisation Centre (DC), to assist with socio-economic reinsertion. The 18 months’ pay was issued in installments, with nine months’ wages being paid on leaving the DC, and three tranches of three months’ pay, deposited into the ex-combatant’s bank account at regular intervals. A unique transportation fee of US$ 20 is also given to every demobilized person, regardless of his or her destination. The total reinsertion benefit (Indemnité Transitoire de Subsistance — ITS) for ex-combatants and ex-soldiers was differentiated by rank, and amounted to a minimum of FBU 566,000 per candidate (indexed on the ex-FAB salary scale), which was paid in cash. Upon discharge from the DCs, each demobilised person receives the first of the four installments as shown in Table 1 below.88

Table 1: Reinsertion payments by rank and schedule in Burundi National Defence Force (in Burundi Francs)89

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank category</th>
<th>In Demobilisation Centre</th>
<th>4 months after demobilisation</th>
<th>7 months after demobilisation</th>
<th>10 months after demobilisation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>88,676</td>
<td>88,676</td>
<td>88,676</td>
<td>566,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Commissioned Officers</td>
<td>570,000</td>
<td>168,272</td>
<td>168,272</td>
<td>168,272</td>
<td>1,074,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Officers</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>175,162</td>
<td>175,162</td>
<td>175,162</td>
<td>1,125,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officers</td>
<td>970,000</td>
<td>284,179</td>
<td>284,179</td>
<td>284,179</td>
<td>1,822,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,770,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>518,524</strong></td>
<td><strong>518,524</strong></td>
<td><strong>518,524</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,325,572</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The next phase consisted of subsequent payments which were made through the banking system in the place where each former fighter resettles. This approach enabled ex-combatants and ex-soldiers to familiarise themselves with the banking system, and indirectly made access to credit easier. The remaining three installments were paid to ex-combatants once they have resettled in their community of choice over a 10-month period. The money allowed the ex-combatants to

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88Lamb, 2008.
89In July 2008, 1 US$ was worth approximately 1,174 Burundi Francs.
meet the expenses that come with her or his social re-entry into the community and finance a basic livelihood for about 18 months. Initial findings by ONUB are that the process has been a success and most ex-combatants are not experiencing difficulty in accessing these payments, and that the money is generally used well. This process of phasing the reinsertion package also allows the NCDRR to ensure ex-combatants not only receive assistance for the first 10 months after their return to civilian life, but also enabled them to “buy” extra time for preparing reintegration assistance activities in communities where ex-combatants and ex-soldiers settled.  

3.3.3 Non-corruptible distribution system

Finally, a non-corruptible identification system must be established during demobilization that will allow former combatants to receive their reinsertion assistance. The establishment of a non-corruptible identification system is imperative in forming and maintaining confidence in the distribution of reinsertion assistance, among both the beneficiaries and the donors contributing towards the DDR programme. The payment list needs to be complete and accurate, former combatants should be registered and provided with a non-transferable photographic ID and benefits should be tracked via the DDR programme management information system. Other factors to be taken into account before planning community cash transfers around reinsertion include funding requirements, the allocation system and the support needed during the ‘mobile’ phase, when a returnee is physically undertaking the journey to their (new) home. New technologies are beginning to play a role in cash transfer as well. The ability to move money through mobile phone systems has risen dramatically in the last few years. Systems such as ‘Celpay DRC’ provide mobile phone based banking and money transfer, allowing transitional payments to be made country-wide while dramatically reducing the logistic and security burden, although not without raising problems of its own. On the flip side, it left ex-combatants vulnerable when returning from the highly visible collection points. Conditional cash transfers which operate under stricter supervision may create the necessary check on cheating in terms of distribution systems. In the Republic of the Congo (RoC), there was reportedly little malpractice in terms of distribution due to good supervision, which ensured that the money was spent in accordance with prior agreements.

4. Other Elements of Reinsertion Assistance

Cash allowances should not be considered to be exclusive. For example in Angola, in addition to cash, former combatants were provided with in-kind kit, including clothes, domestic tools, food and agricultural tools. The section below explores different facets of reinsertion assistance such as the role of voucher programmes, in-kind kit, food aid, domestic and agricultural tools and shelter materials in easing the reinsertion of former combatants into their communities.

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92 Willibald, 2006.
4.1 Voucher programmes

Vouchers are often used in place of cash in humanitarian assistance packages and emergency relief support. Several factors coalesce to prompt this choice, including donor constraints, a desire to ensure that a particular type of good or commodity is purchased by the recipients, on account of security fears about negative effects of cash flows, or because of market weaknesses. Vouchers may be denominated in money terms or in physical quantities of specific commodities. They are normally restricted to particular commodities, such as food or seeds, and may be more effective than cash if the objective is not just to transfer income to a household, but to meet a particular goal, such as improving nutrition or boosting agricultural production. Although voucher programmes generally require more planning and preparation than the distribution of cash (including agreements with traders so that vouchers can be exchanged easily), they often provide a useful alternative to commodity-based distributions, particularly seeds.\(^{94}\)

Other possible challenges with a voucher system would likely to be with the quality of products and services disbursed and the way these issues could be monitored as part of the reinsertion assistance phase in a given context. Any shortcomings with such provisions would be reflected negatively for the overall success of DDR process and it is critical that such voucher elements would pay adequate attention not only to the demand side of the equation but also the supply side. One of the sectors where vouchers can be useful is for operationalising free health services included as part of the reinsertion assistance package. The IDDRS recommends that in order to mitigate possible resistance of communities to receiving returning ex-combatants, the latter can be issued employment vouchers to access employment opportunities.\(^{95}\) In fact vouchers can also be used as part of reinsertion assistance to target children of former combatants to cover some of their critical financial needs for the transitional period up to one year. Assistance could include school fees, books and uniforms, operationalised through a system of vouchers redeemable at schools and shops: this approach could significantly assist ex-combatants in terms of their familial support responsibilities.

4.2 In-kind kit

The in-kind component is a strong feature of reinsertion assistance programmes across much of Africa and in other continents, although entitlements vary by country, as well as by recipient (male, female, child). In-kind kits used in typical DDR programmes, for example, may include clothing (T-shirt, trousers, underwear, socks, shoes), eating utensils (cups, plates, cooking pots), hygiene materials (toothbrush, toothpaste, soap, plastic buckets) and basic household goods (blankets, sleeping mats, jerry cans, bags, plastic tarpaulin for shelter). Women may also receive wraps, packages of sanitary napkins, and kits with baby supplies.

Case evidence from the recently concluded DDR experience in the Central African Republic (CAR), however, suggests that in-kind kits can also be susceptible to corrupt practices and result in dissatisfaction, disappointment among ex-combatants. For instance, in the CAR the reinsertion kit consisted of US$ 700, of which 10 % was paid as a training levy paid to a training institution to which the ex-combatant was attached. The remainder was given to the ex-combatant in


\(^{95}\)IDDRS: UN, 2006b, p. 25.
material form for the ex-combatant to start a business enterprise. Initially, about three months passed before the reinsertion kits arrived, causing panic amongst ex-combatants, who regularly demonstrated in the streets of Bangui. When the kit did arrive, it included cement, roofing sheets, fishing kits, livestock keeping and US$ 150 as a transitional safety allowance. However, a large number of ex-combatants rejected the reinsertion kits alleging that the kits were overpriced, and could be sourced more cheaply from elsewhere if they were given cash. They alleged that there had been misappropriation of funds, and instead agitated for cash payments, abandoning the kits on site.96

4.2.1 Food aid
Food aid programmes in support of DDR can be offered at various stages, but they play a particularly important role during the reinsertion period and often constitute take-home rations as part of reinsertion packages. Other possible food-for-work and/or food-for-training programmes can be offered over during the reinsertion period of normally one year in order to strengthen the food security of ex-combatant households. Vulnerable groups amongst the war-affected population such as children associated with armed forces and groups, war-disabled ex-combatants, pregnant and lactating women, and those beneficiaries affected by HIV/AIDS or other chronic illness can also be special targets of food assistance during the reinsertion phase.97 In much of Africa, on-site feeding programmes as well as take-home rations have been an important inducement to children to participate in demobilization and reintegration programmes.

The following is an example of a food basket for the reinsertion phase, providing the recommended overall nutritional value for food aid during this phase of approximately 2,100 kcal per day.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TAKE-HOME RATION (DAILY)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize 450 g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulses 50 g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil 30 g</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A general guideline is that food should be provided for three months; factors like timing and expected yields/production of the next harvest and prospects for the re-establishment of employment and other income-generating activities are criteria for deciding on the length of food support.98

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96 Alusala, 2008.
97 IDDRS: UN, 2006c, pp. 2-3
98 Ibid.
4.2.2 Domestic and agricultural tools

In countries where the large majority of ex-combatants are rurally based, reinsertion support may also include an agricultural kit with seeds and basic tools. In the past, DDR programmes such as in Sierra Leone overlooked the importance of agricultural package for providing sustainable livelihoods to returning combatants. In this context, Arthy notes that although apparently the DDR agricultural package was a less attractive option for former combatants than the skills training packages, with time many of the ex-combatants trained in vocational skill were later forced to fall back on agriculture (or mining) due to the limited absorption capacity of the labour market.\(^99\)

The Sierra Leone case suggests that agricultural sector and allied tools and benefits (vouchers for seeds, fertilizers etc) should be a key area of emphasis in reinsertion and reintegration programmes for agrarian economies. Ex-combatants who were forced to join agricultural activities in light of poor employability in other sectors in Sierra Leone did so without the implements and tools that would have been at their disposal had they been able to receive help under the DDR programme. Even in the case of Liberia, one study found that spatial distribution of reintegration outcomes in terms of urban-rural divide was a key factor in the successful transition to civilian life.\(^100\) Former combatants who returned to a rural life, and opted for agriculture, were over time more self-sustainable and integrated within their communities compared to ex-combatants who remained in Monrovia, and opted for vocational training schemes, since skills like carpentry had limited demand in the labour market. Even in the case of El Salvador, access to cultivable land was an important feature of reintegration benefits (given that reinsertion was not a separate feature in the El Salvador case) disbursed amongst former FMLN fighters.\(^101\) Another case of relevance here is that of CAR. Although in choosing their reinsertion packages, ex-combatants were advised to select skills that they were already engaged in and/or were familiar with, most (nearly 48%) opted for retail trade because of the cash or business start up capital offered. However, the high incidence of enterprise failure in subsequent evaluation of the programme\(^102\) should inform the need for strengthening the agricultural option in reinsertion packages for future DDR programmes.

4.2.3 Shelter materials

Immediately following their return to their community, the most pressing need for former combatants and their dependants is often finding shelter. Assistance can be given either as a cash subsidy or via material inputs such as roofing materials.\(^103\) Nevertheless, material assistance, in


\(^{101}\)Gomez, 2002.

\(^{102}\)Alusala, 2008.

\(^{103}\)Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b.
terms of roofing materials and tools, incurs higher transitional costs. In addition, these materials are unlikely to meet the specific needs of individual former combatants and might be sold by former combatants for cash to meet more pressing needs. The special needs of female former combatants should also be borne in mind in this process. For example, in urban areas their housing needs could be covered through the safety net by assisting them with rent fees for a limited period. For those who are in rural areas, cash can be provided for materials for constructing or rehabilitating a house. However, women, particularly those who are single heads of households, can face problems in this process, since they often lack the necessary technical skills. Therefore, the transitional safety net for female former combatants could also include the payment of essential labour for construction of their houses.104

5. Linking Reinsertion to Reintegration

Having developed a conceptual framework for locating the role and significance of reinsertion assistance in DDR, this section tries to wean forth the various ways in which reinsertion assistance can aid reintegration efforts for former combatants and their receiving communities. The key role of reinsertion as explicated earlier lies in the stop gap nature of its support, since it helps to ease the transition from military life in the post demobilization phase. This interim period when ex-combatants wait for the commencement of reintegration programmes such as vocational and skills training; educational catch up programmes; and economic reintegration support, provides an important opportunity for undertaking the kind of assessment necessary to inform broad reintegration plans. In the contextualisation of reintegration needs and provisions, one of the most critical factors to bear in mind would be the resettlement environment. The ex-combatants might be returning to either their home communities or alternate communities far away from family roots, perhaps on account of a complete decimation of their family network over the war period, or motivated by feelings of fear, rejection, and revenge in communities where they caused death, destruction. In Sierra Leone survey results indicate that nearly 75% of Civil Defence Forces (CDF) fighters returned to the communities in which they had lived before the war began, but only 34% of Revolutionary United Front (RUF) combatants returned home.105 These decisions can be explained in part by the willingness of communities to accept returned fighters. Ex-combatants may also choose to resettle in the home communities of their spouse or partner; this choice may relate to a rural-urban spatial distribution. In this context, the ability of rural communities to absorb returning combatants has been a primary focus of recent community based reintegration initiatives in Sierra Leone.

If the reinsertion activities are not linked with reintegration needs effectively, there are likely to be a number of challenges in the economic reintegration of ex-combatants. Meaningful employment or livelihood opportunities, particularly in urban areas where ex-combatants are likely to be at the fringes in terms of economic and political access, are essential for preventing ex-combatants from returning to fighting or relying on familiar combatant social networks for survival. A survey conducted in Lofa county, in Liberia, which shares borders with Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire, perhaps the loci of most intensive fighting during the second civil war (1997-2003); suggests that ex-combatants often perceive themselves as being at an economic disadvantage, with respect to a basket of issues such as lack of marketable skills (40%), lack of education (23%), and discrimination against ex-combatants (25%).

In Monrovia, Utas (2005) noted that most young ex-combatants who could not go back to rural areas and stayed in the capital; were engaged in wage labour such as construction work, collection of scrap metal and garbage for resale, drug peddling and petty thievery. In this activity, they relied on the close connections with the army (AFL) and hence many in the ex-combatant group became part of a corrupt security nexus and could not reintegrate effectively.

Understanding the demographic and socio-economic characteristics, and the social cohesion and occupational trends in the pre-war period, would make it easier to assess workforce skills, that can help address the challenges of posed by the limited absorptive capacity of the local economy and of the labour market into which ex-combatants are returning. In other words, utilising this period effectively can provide a stronger basis for reinsertion packages as well as for future reintegration plans. The reinsertion stage would also provide the time to cross-reference this information with combatants’ profiles to identify suitable strategies for training and job creation in social and economic reintegration. With an eye to this window of opportunity, there may be a need to design specific programmes that cater for the 12-18 month reinsertion period, which can provide the necessary infrastructural framework for ex-combatants to feel part of DDR by being formally registered, periodically reporting to a particular programming site. Such exercises can provide ex-combatants sufficient time to adjust to the process of becoming civilian. However, there are several key issues which often plague the reinsertion phase, particularly in the context of delayed commencement of reintegration benefits. The section below discusses two main issues in this context: coordination as part of how the different mandates of various agencies impact on reinsertion; and funding dynamics, which is relevant for every stage of DDR, but more so in reinsertion given the need to leverage its significance within DDR programming.

5.1 Coordination issues
One of the primary conditions for ensuring an effective relationship between peacebuilding and a DDR process is the coordination of activities. Experience shows that a wide range of programmes are carried out by a variety of agents, actors preferably, but not necessarily,
coordinated by a single vision for the future. Inter-agency cooperation in the planning and implementation of DDR programmes, operations, in particular policy and strategic level coordination between national and international actors is a desirable goal, but one which is lamentably lacking in practice. This creates confusion, overlap and a lack of clear demarcation of responsibilities, which afflict every stage of DDR programming, but in particular has a negative impact on the linkages between reinsertion and reintegration. This lack of clear demarcation is because no single international agency has a dedicated mandate for every stage of DDR programming, and while various models of leadership have been tried, with various levels of national ownership and involvement, most DDR is still managed and administered by various international agencies.\(^\text{107}\)

While historically many DDR programmes were very much security centred in their mandate and addressed solely the ex-combatant group as targets and beneficiaries, of late there has been a perceptible shift of emphasis towards community based approaches at each stage. This has resulted in the inclusion of a diverse set of international agencies apart from UN mandated peace keeping missions to pilot different stages in DDR in a single country. So far as role performance is concerned UN peacekeeping operations are often mandated to undertake, or oversee, the disarmament of belligerent factions. Hence, the UN perspective is primarily focused upon the initial phase of DDR programmes, namely disarmament, particularly the approach of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO). The World Bank’s perspective, on the other hand, is coloured by the organisation’s involvement in the latter phases of DDR programmes: demobilization and reintegration. However, a number of other international organizations such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Labour Office (ILO) have increasingly become critical players in the demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration stages.

The IOM has considerable cross-country experience with a specialized focus on Information, Counselling and Referral Services (ICRS), along with community revitalization programmes (CRPs), notably in Angola, Mozambique, Haiti, and Afghanistan. In addition, the UNDP and USAID are at the forefront in evolving community based reintegration strategies in West Africa and the ILO has traditionally been a key player in attaching significance to the criticality of economic reintegration and vocational training, to achieve a successful civilian transition. These international donors and agencies have to liaise with a complex array of national and local government authorities, international financial institutions, bilateral donors, international and local NGOs and community-based organisations who are involved in the DDR process at different times and in different ways. As a result of these varied mandates and focus areas the

thrust of each phase, with respect to performance and delivery of services tends to be tempered and shaped by the priorities and preferences of the agency or actor involved.

While the DDR architecture fundamentally affects the relationship between the different DDR phases, only limited efforts have been made to ensure that institutional arrangements are configured in a way that facilitates coordination, either within the UN family or beyond. Disagreements are rife over which institutions are best suited to manage DDR processes, and which approaches should be adopted. When a peacekeeping mission is set up, specific planning for DDR is incorporated into overall planning for the mission. A lead DDR department or agency within the UN is usually identified and tasked with conducting assessments that will inform the eventual UN mandate as regards DDR. The strategic development phase which follows the assessment stage establishes which actors are involved, in addition to operational frameworks, implementation plans and budgetary requirements. Therefore, while much of the detailed planning is undertaken in-country, the structure and principles underpinning the DDR process are pre-configured, frequently with limited attention paid to parallel processes or programming. This lack of flexibility is compounded by capacity constraints, particularly in the latter stages of DDR. A comparison of institutional capacities to plan and implement DDR activities in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) highlighted deficiencies within DPKO, UNDP and the World Bank, in particular in areas relating to the reintegration component and the more civilian elements of DDR.108

This multiplicity of actors also characterises the implementation process, with more than a dozen additional UN agencies and international organisations involved, in addition to international and local NGOs. The plethora of agencies and institutions has resulted in both overlaps and gaps in planning and implementation. For instance, where there is a UN peacekeeping mission, DPKO traditionally has responsibility for the disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants. It is less likely that the mandate will include reintegration. In the absence of a UN mandate, national military strategies often address disarmament and demobilisation, but again reintegration is not usually part of this process. In such cases, reintegration is left to other actors, such as UNDP, the World Bank, the IOM and NGOs, making it difficult to achieve a coordinated and integrated approach. Reinsertion as a post demobilization exercise is also subject to similar ambiguity: apart from Burundi and the RoC, which are examples of recent DDR exercises which had a distinct reinsertion component,109 most programmes have treated reinsertion either as part of the demobilization benefits package or as the first stage of reintegration.

A number of proposals have been developed and piloted to foster more integrated and joined-up approaches to DDR. The SIDDR has recommended ‘parallel programming’ so that DDR

108 Ibid., p. 220.
109 Alusala, 2008,
processes can be undertaken in conjunction with other early recovery initiatives, and proposes joint funding to support this. In Haiti, the original proposal set out elements of a classic DDR programme, such as the formal cantonment of ex-combatants, and linked this to a community-centred strategy to reduce violence. However, disagreement over content and funding meant that the integrated DDR Section rapidly fractured, with DPKO continuing to argue for encampment approaches and UNDP promoting ‘community violence prevention and development committees’ around the country. The DDR Section was thus effectively administering two separate programmes, each competing for priority. This is because military planners at DPKO continue to adhere largely to a narrow reading of DDR, focusing on the security and military aspects of disarmament and demobilisation. UNDP, however, has a broader human security approach, focusing on the more ‘civilian’ aspects of reintegration and enhancing the absorptive capacities of areas of return. This resulted in a confused approach to reinsertion which was treated within the two security vs. community perspectives by the two different agencies.

The IDDRS represent the first major effort to establish structures and methods to underpin cooperation and linkages between DDR-related programming. However, even at the policy level there are faults. The structure proposed by the IDDRS relies heavily on pre-existing architecture and staff. It adopts a ‘top-down’ approach, and thus is not truly integrated at the country level. The guide to conducting DDR assessments set out by the IDDRS requires the identification of reinsertion processes and other transitional planning efforts, but beyond that no mechanism, guidance or institutional capacities are outlined to ensure that this is achieved. Furthermore, the IDDRS identify the DDR process as the key driver and decision-maker on how reinsertion should occur and how it should be linked with reintegration phase. Given this top-down approach, inherent tensions between the different approaches of DPKO and UNDP remain unresolved and are deeply embedded in the design and delivery of reinsertion and reintegration support.

Recent efforts to pilot the integrated approach enunciated in the IDDRS in Haiti and Sudan, provide early lessons which highlight the challenges inherent in operationalising integrated approaches in practice. The pilots showed the importance of identifying common or complementary objectives and combined planning and responses in order to lay the foundation for a complementarity between the different phases and to help create a smooth transition from reinsertion to reintegration programming. They also highlighted how the different approaches of DPKO and UNDP and different operational priorities created irreconcilable divisions over the direction and content of the programme, despite integrated institutional arrangements. Experience in Sudan has been similarly fraught. Again, a narrow, security-focused and top-down approach was advocated by DPKO, whilst UNDP and other developmental actors promoted an alternative model that included a ‘community security fund’ and the promotion of needs-based

\[110\] Muggah, 2006.
disarmament. This emphasised local and participatory approaches to defining ‘community security needs’, and supported different income-generation and other recovery-related support in exchange for voluntary disarmament.\textsuperscript{111} This and other challenges to the process have meant that little has been achieved in the two years of implementation beyond the approval of a national DDR policy.\textsuperscript{112}

The experiences of Haiti and Sudan suggest it is difficult to build on linkages between the various elements of DDR through integrated, coordinated efforts. Not only have they not achieved their declared goals, but arguably the attempt to develop this integration has made it even more difficult to meet the fundamental security objectives of the DDR programme. While there may be benefits to complementary approaches without agreement between the key actors on objectives and without integrated community-driven approaches in the initial planning phase, top-down efforts will continue to fail and delays will continue to plague long-term reintegration support. In order to respond to this important challenge effectively, institutional changes such as possible complementarities between agency approaches should be developed to inform logistical planning and practical implementation at every stage of the reinsertion-reintegration dynamic. For example, with the Mobile Information Counselling and Referral Service (MIRCAS) programme Mindanao, in the Philippines, the UNDP funded this highly visible component of reinsertion assistance which was, executed by the IOM. This is a good example of how agencies can actually coordinate their mandates and resources in designing programmes for ex-combatants.

5.2 Funding issues

Viewed from a humanitarian and development assistance perspective, DDR programmes often attract significant financial support at a time of limited aid assistance, and in a context of high vulnerability. Traditionally much emphasis in funding and in agency programming was confined to the more technical and tangible phases of disarmament and demobilization, but over the years a perceptible shift in agency focus and programming is evident with growing acknowledgement that the reintegration and now the reinsertion phase is critical to the sustainability of DD success and indeed to the overall success of DDR. Consequently nearly 85 percent of recent DDR funding is budgeted for the reinsertion and reintegration phases.\textsuperscript{113} Funding channels include assessed contributions in UN peacekeeping missions, Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) managed by, for example, the World Bank or UNDP, and bilateral funding; the UN Peace-building Commission may be added to this list in the future. UN peacekeeping missions often include DDR funding as an assessed contribution, with provisions for support to reinsertion programming.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[111] Smith, 2008, p. 21.
\item[112] Ibid.
\item[113] Carames et. al., 2006.
\end{footnotes}
Despite, the range of funding options and the seemingly large amount of financial support available, in reality DDR programmes face problems obtaining money in a timely way and on the scale required.\textsuperscript{114} A review of the 18 DDR programmes in operation in 2005, for example, showed that seven faced financial problems.\textsuperscript{115} Multiple funding processes mean that some elements are well financed, while others are not. Most funds are channelled through the World Bank, either by means of regional funds or through direct disbursement to specific countries. Such arrangements generally introduce complex power relations and networks into the DDR process, especially when policy is driven by one international institution, but funding is distributed by another. Some donors elect to fund a programme bilaterally, in addition to funding through a trust fund. This can often usefully be channelled to address specific, even niche, parts of the DDR process – arms reduction and control programmes or public awareness campaigns, for example – ensuring that they are always sufficiently funded. On the other hand, this form of funding can be overburdened with conditions and reporting requirements. This results in overlapping and cross-cutting mandates and often a lack of basic coordination.

Financial limitations reduce opportunities for coordination and complementarity between parallel processes at the reinsertion phase. For instance in Liberia, both the reinsertion and reintegration phases of the DDR programme lacked adequate resources at a time when other transitional programming had yet to create sufficient employment opportunities. As a result, many ex-combatants sought out their former faction commanders, who helped them find work on rubber plantations. This dependency on former leaders created the conditions for possible remobilisation.\textsuperscript{116} Lack of funding has also affected the DDR process in Sierra Leone, which has suffered from delays in the delivery of training, allowances and toolkits. A lack of sustainable employment after training has led many to turn to crime.\textsuperscript{117} Thus funding issues plague each stage of DDR and reinsertion and reintegration phases in particular face the brunt of resource shortfalls as evidenced in Liberia, which has made the relatively successful D & D phases vulnerable to the difficulties in delivering reintegration benefits over the long term, which has fuelled disappointment amongst the ex-combatant community and threatens sustainable recovery and transition in that country.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{114}SIDDR, 2006, p.27.
\textsuperscript{115}Carames et al, 2006, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{116}Alusala, 2008.
\textsuperscript{117}Solomon and Ginifer, 2007, p. 15.
Conclusion
The focus of this working paper has been the reinsertion phase of DDR and how it could be effectively linked to other DDR phases. Without assuming a linear progression from one phase to another in the DDR process, the analysis has conceptualized the reinsertion assistance as a linking element between demobilization and reintegration. As it is often implemented as part of demobilization activities and given that the literature makes little attempt to make a distinction between reinsertion and reintegration projects, one of the main objectives here was to locate the reinsertion assistance in the overall landscape of DDR undertakings. Therefore, the discussions in the first section were initiated with an overview of DDR phases and what significant role the reinsertion assistance could play in relation to such transitional activities. It is with this objective in mind that the paper elaborated the differences between reinsertion and reintegration through the factors of timing, scope and type of activities. These issues are particularly important to understand the critical elements of the cash versus ‘in kind’ debate, which is fundamental to position the reinsertion assistance within the DDR framework effectively.

The investigation of financial reinsertion assistance has shown that it provides a number of advantages in its delivery to former combatants while waiting for their reintegration packages. The paper has also incorporated a critique of financial reinsertion assistance. A number of critical issues, such as targeting criteria for the selection of beneficiaries, the planning and logistic challenges of funding mobilisation, and decisions on its amount and methods of delivery were considered in order to elaborate the way reinsertion assistance can be used for transitional programming. Furthermore, to explore other methods of reinsertion assistance provision in an effective way the paper also elaborated how voucher and in-kind kit assistance programmes such as food, domestic and agricultural tools and shelter materials can be planned and implemented. One of the main conceptual underpinnings of these discussions was that the relationship between reinsertion and reintegration is determined by the overarching objective of each DDR phase and the degree to which the D & D are understood within purely a security prism and essentially as a confidence-building exercise in a peace process, and possibly, a step towards long-term recovery.

The new institutional arrangements of the IDDRS, while providing structures that allow greater complementarity, continues to be plagued by an in-built tension between the security-focused approach of DPKO and the more community-oriented perspective of UNDP. Until these tensions are addressed, or at the very least tackled at the planning and strategy phase of the DDR process, easing the transition from reinsertion to reintegration will continue to be mired in lags and gaps. While opportunities exist at a programmatic or operational level to ensure greater complementarity between reinsertion initiatives and long-term reintegration, experience shows that, without overall coherence, these efforts will be piecemeal at best and counter-productive at worst.
Reinsertion represents the transition between the security-oriented disarmament and demobilisation phases and the often more community-oriented reintegration phase of DDR, and is therefore more vulnerable than any other component to inconsistencies between the two. Delays in the commencement of the reintegration phase can mean that reinsertion packages are relied on, not only to meet immediate needs while ex-combatants move from military to civilian status, but also to support the initial phase of reintegration. The failure of reinsertion packages to effectively support early reintegration has been clearly demonstrated in contexts such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. This failure in turn has a significant impact on human security and long-term development, and in particular any kind of disconnect affects the poorest members of society most severely, whether ex-combatants or those communities associated with them. Therefore, this paper recommends that this phase is tightly time-bound and focuses on the demilitarisation rather re-civilianisation aspects of the process.

The main recommendations presented are summarised below and they clearly have a number of implications for how DDR programmes are structured, coordinated, funded and implemented, and how they can underpin broader reintegration processes.

- Reintegration is a complex and drawn out process, yet the way in which ex-combatants are introduced to reintegration programmes needs a more human sensitive and human security approach – ex-combatants cannot be de-programmed in a mechanistic mode to be civilians, rather the social bonding elements of community based reintegration can help heal wounds of conflict. Reinsertion packages can facilitate the initiation of this process, by reintroducing the basic semblance of civilian existence through its efforts on the well-being and economic sustainability of ex-combatants in the post discharge period.

- Reinsertion support should be broken down into support for ‘movement’ and ‘support for resettlement’. The movement element should include the period of transit from an assembly area to a community, with support for transport and subsistence, and other basic needs during this time. This type of reinsertion should be focused on the individual and their travelling dependants.

- Reinsertion support for resettlement would also need to adopt a combatant-focused approach to a large extent, as moving away from individual support could easily dilute the main objective of reinsertion assistance, and in reality this may simply be impossible to achieve due to funding constraints. However, it is important to retain flexibility in determining the level of resettlement support, and if possible, would even ensure a greater benefit for the community and for civilian returnees. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the main objective of reinsertion assistance should be to have a ‘stop-gap’ impact while demobilized combatants are waiting for their reintegration benefits.
• It needs to be acknowledged that a combatant-focused approach can easily create resentment and dissatisfaction among the civilian population and consequently, targeting issues and the question of beneficiaries in DDR will also be a point of debate. However, this paper assumes the position that community-based approaches are best for long-term reintegration support, and calls for a reinsertion assistance approach that prioritizes the return and immediate resettlement needs of ex-combatants.

• The entitlement or inducement debate in DDR is probably one of the most controversial issues that planners and practitioners need to bear in mind, but reinsertion benefits should be viewed outside of this framework as a demobilized combatant returning ‘home’ empty-handed could easily become a potential security risk as the period immediately after demobilization is particularly critical in their transformation of identity from a combatant to civilian. Their potential involvement in crime for example, could easily worsen the social reintegration prospects further in later stages of DDR. Therefore, although the paper advocates a human resource development perspective in the reintegration phase which would be expected to address the challenges with the receiving communities’ absorption capacities as much as possible; for reinsertion assistance to be effective it needs to be targeting ex-combatants first in their transition from demobilization to reintegration.

• Contextual analysis should be strengthened, and should be more clearly integrated into the delivery process, which is particularly imperative for ensuring a well-balanced understanding of how reinsertion benefits for ex-combatants can be perceived as rewards by war-affected communities.

• Financial assistance provided in benefit packages is often controversial as an option, but experience suggests that cash as part of reinsertion assistance has an empirically substantiated role to play in support for ex-combatant return to their home communities.

• For the success of financial reinsertion assistance it is necessary to identify specific needs of each target group within the broader ex-combatant caseload. This requires careful planning, adequate monitoring and sufficient funding to tailor the reinsertion assistance accordingly in terms of its selection criteria, amount and delivery.

• The existence of an operational banking system and incorporation of a financial education component would be likely to impart the necessary financial prudence for the efficient delivery and utilization of financial assistance. However, this needs to be complemented with innovative and flexible modalities of distribution in more complex environments.
• Specific needs in the post-demobilisation transition period need to be approached with a balanced mix of in-kind, voucher and financial components as part of reinsertion packages. The reinsertion period consists of significant undertakings such as return and resettlement, which can be catered for by using cash, vouchers, and in-kind elements appropriate to each stage of reinsertion.

• In the planning of reinsertion assistance it is imperative that the overall socio-economic dynamics and poverty challenges are factored in as key variables to minimise any resentment and marginalisation of broader war-affected communities. This can ensure a better linkage from reinsertion to reintegration, contributing to the sustainability of identity transformation of ex-combatants.

• Coordination must allow for a more holistic understanding of the purpose and priority of the reinsertion support in any given context. This will require a clear awareness of the risk that the DDR process is open to compartmentalisation due to the involvement of military and civilian actors with different and even sometimes conflicting mandates.
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