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Centre for
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and Security

Linking and Co-ordinating DDR and SSR for Human Security after Conflict: Issues, Experience and Priorities

Thematic Working Paper 2

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July 2008

Contribution to the Project:

DDR and Human Security: Post Conflict Security Building and
the Interests of the Poor



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Working Paper 2:
**Linking and Co-ordinating DDR and SSR for Human Security after
Conflict: Issues, Experience and Priorities**

Owen Greene, with Simon Ryan

1. Introduction

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for ex-combatants have become an important component of many, if not most, post-conflict stabilisation, peace-building and recovery programmes over the 15 – 20 years. They are specifically focussed on ‘ex-combatants’, a category which for DDR purposes includes direct ex-combatants and those closely associated with them including spouses, ‘camp followers’ and dependents.

The experience with DDR has provided many lessons. International standards and good-practice guidelines for DDR have become relatively highly elaborated in recent years. The UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-Integration Standards (IDDRS) represent the fullest expression of this, composed of some 800 pages of detailed guidance to practitioners, as distilled by a special UN Inter-Agency Working Group and the work of dozens of international experts.¹ Such standards are recently developed, and their adoption and usefulness has yet to be fully tested. One overall aim of this project is to critically examine the understandings informing such standards, and clarify how they may be revised or developed.

It is clear that there are continuing problems in practice. For example, several recent UN-mandated DDR programmes have seriously struggled to establish an effective focus, and have in some cases had to be re-launched several times. Haiti and Southern Sudan provide two examples of this. Part of the problem is that DDR programmes are continuing to be mandated as if they can in themselves address much of a war-torn country’s post-conflict security building needs. In fact, DDR needs to be co-ordinated with a range of other post-conflict security building programmes, including Security Sector Reform (SSR), wider arms collection and management programmes, transitional justice, peace-building and reconciliation processes. DDR needs to be one of several peace and security-building programmes, all co-ordinated within the overall framework of a broad peace-building and recovery strategy and process.²

¹ UN, “Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-Integration Standards”, December 2006, available at www.unddr.org/iddrs.

² As emphasised, for example, in the Report of the UN Secretary General on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, UN General Assembly Document A/60/705, 2 March 2006; and also in the IDDRS, *ibid*.

The importance of this process of co-ordination, and in particular the linkages between DDR and SSR processes in countries emerging from conflict, have increasingly been recognised in a number of reports and guidelines. Some key recent examples include the Final Report of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration (SIDDR--2006); UN IDDRS (2006); UNDP Practice Note on DDR (2005); and UN Security Council Debate on SSR (February 2007).

In principle, the argument for recognising strong linkages between DDR and SSR programmes in post-conflict contexts is strong and easy to make. DDR focuses primarily on ex-combatants and their direct dependents, as a way of contributing to the security of wider communities as well as state stabilisation. It thus needs to be complemented and reinforced by SSR programmes, designed to reconstitute, reform and improve the security sector institutions and agencies to address the justice and security needs of all of the citizens and communities in the relevant conflict-affected countries. Moreover, the implementation and management of DDR programmes typically involves national security agencies and institutions: raising issues (for example) of capacity-building and reform of such institutions as they seek to play their role in DDR.

There are numerous potentially important programmatic links between SSR and DDR strategies and programmes, in addition to the institutional linkages noted above. For example, whether and how ex-combatants may be integrated into military or police structures intrinsically raises institutional reform issues for these security organisations. SSR and DDR processes need to be co-ordinated to reduce the risks of violence and insecurity from informal armed militias or demobilised soldiers. The demobilisation package and guarantees offered to ex-combatants should take into account possible transitional justice issues, such as the extent to which perpetrators of war crimes are eligible or vetted, and the comparability with possible reparations packages.

However, much remains to be done to research experience of the interactions (positive and negative) between SSR and DDR processes, and to clarify how best to co-ordinate or integrate SSR and DDR programmes in practice. It is important to be realistic about what is practicable in post-conflict contexts, and (for example) to establish priorities and understandings about timing and sequencing. There is little guidance on such issues: for example they receive little attention in the new UN IDDRS: a fact which the UN aims to rectify by the end of 2008, through an additional IDDRS chapter on SSR-DDR linkages.

This paper is relevant to this new IDDRS chapter, since it includes a mapping and review of experience with the interplay between SSR and DDR programmes, and the ways in which DDR practitioners should take into account and make use of SSR-DDR links. However, the focus of the chapter is not to provide an informal draft of such a document, but rather to explore the possibilities of going beyond such an IDDRS

framework - towards deeper co-ordination, if not integration, of DDR and SSR programmes in post conflict contexts.

The paper aims to examine the actual and potential linkages between DDR and SSR programmes and processes, in order to clarify these important issues. In doing so, it aims to contribute to an important and urgent emerging debate for policy-makers and practitioners on how best to operationalise links between SSR and DDR.

The Working Paper contributes to our larger project on ‘DDR and human security: post-conflict security-building and the interests of the poor’. Its relevance to this wider project is high. SSR processes must be central to efforts to promote and ensure a secure environment for communities and individuals in war-torn societies, and poor and vulnerable people are typically particularly in need for this. If DDR programmes are to contribute effectively to human security, they not only need to be designed and implemented directly to do this but also need to reinforce appropriate SSR and access to justice (or at a minimum to not undermine its prospects).

All of this needs to be achieved through improved overall integration and co-ordination of post-conflict security-building processes in which SSR and DDR are two key elements of a wider strategy including SALW control, community security building and wider peace-building. This paper thus links substantially with Working Paper 3 in this project working paper series, which focuses on enhanced linkages and integration between DDR and SALW reduction/control programmes. The overall objective is not simply to promote improved bilateral co-ordination or integration between DDR and SALW control and SSR respectively. Instead, the aim is to argue for a wider integration of all three post-conflict security-building programmes into comprehensive customised programmes to promote human security from violence and coercion in countries emerging from conflict.

The Working Paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides some initial definitions and briefly outlines the roles of DDR and SSR processes in post-conflict contexts. Section 3 then aims to map the range of actual and potential links between DDR and SSR programmes. The purpose of this is to unpack the many types of links and interrelationships that could exist, in order briefly to examine each in turn and to assess their relative importance (to the extent that this is possible generically).

The following two sections aim to illustrate and examine experience so far. Section 4 examines experience relating to selected sectors of the security system, and includes some short country case studies, each aimed to highlight the extent to which SSR-DDR linkages were important and effectively managed. Section 5 of the Working Paper focuses on examining the policy, programmatic and operational implications of national or international commitments to ensure effective co-ordination and/or integration of DDR and SSR processes. We argue that DDR and SSR programmes should be planned and carefully co-ordinated within an overall integrated and coherent post-conflict peace and security building process. The first part of Section 5

explores the mechanisms, priorities, and challenges for doing this in the best case: where the relevant local and international political authorities and mission heads are committed to such an approach from an early stage – before the peace agreement is signed. It subsequently examines possible recovery strategies where such commitment is initially lacking, so that efforts to develop co-ordination between DDR and SSR have to start after DDR and wider post-conflict recovery programmes have already started.

Section 6 provides conclusions and emerging policy implications. Some of these essentially imply further development of co-ordination between DDR and SSR programmes within the present international framework. Others, however, raise more profound questions about the overall approach to planning and implementing SSR and DDR in post-conflict contexts. We outline a possible alternative strategic approach to the design and implementation of post-conflict programmes designed to promote human security. In this approach, the focus is on designing and implementing an overall integrated security-building programme customised to the specific circumstances of the country and time concerned. It is the integrity of this programme that needs to be optimised, rather than the integration of DDR and SSR processes in themselves. This raises the possibility of a new ‘modular’ approach to the various potential elements of any ‘DDR’ and ‘SSR’ process of programme; in which relevant elements are combined in a more customised way.

2. DDR and SSR Processes as Conflicts Come to an End

This section aims briefly to outline key characteristics and roles of DDR and SSR programmes in countries emerging from conflicts. Its main purpose is to provide a basis for the mapping of the relationships between DDR and SSR processes in Section 3, and for the discussions in the remainder of this working paper. It does not aim to provide a detailed review of either DDR or SSR - each should be understood as highly political as well as technical processes, and as complex and contested.

2.1 Security sector reform

Security Sector Reform (SSR) broadly refers to reforms or transformations to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, legitimacy or democratic accountability of the ‘security sector’ so that it provides the security services needed by the citizens and communities of the country concerned. It may involve reforms of security services or institutions, or measures to strengthen civilian management or democratic governance and accountability of the sector and its institutions.³

³ OECD DAC, *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series; OECD, 2005.

The scope of what should be included in the ‘security sector’ is still debated, and depends to some extent on the policy context. It includes:

- **‘Core’ security agencies and institutions:** military, police, presidential guards, intelligence services, national guards, border guards, coastguards, prisons, etc.
- **Security governance and oversight institutions:** government executive, National Security Council, Ministries of defence, interior and justice, Legislature/Parliament, local authorities, ombudsmen, traditional/customary authorities;
- **Justice and rule of law institutions:** judiciary, prosecution service, penal service, traditional/customary justice systems.

In addition, some commentators also include non-statutory security forces, including private security companies, body-guard units, political party militias, or liberation or guerrilla armies. These are indicative of a number of important ‘grey areas’, which need to be examined on a case-by-case basis. In general, we take the approach that all legal bodies or groups that provide security services should be included in our understanding of the ‘security sector’. Further, if there are government tolerated or supported bodies, such as paramilitary or militias, or ‘traditional’ authorities that play a role that is widely recognised if not fully legalised, they too should be included, although with a clear understanding that reform processes need to aim to ensure that these are either made fully legal and accountable or are abolished.

Box 1: Illustration of types of SSR programmes or processes

- Conduct of national security strategy reviews
- Development of national security strategy implementation plans
- Development of national, provincial and sectoral SSR strategies
- Enhancement of democratic or legal accountability of security sector policies and institutions; including improved civilian governance and control; improved parliamentary oversight and accountability structures; enhanced openness or engagement with citizenry
- Integrated reform of a sector of security provision (e.g. reform of the criminal justice system or border management system)
- Institutional reform of single security sector services or institutions, to enhance effectiveness (including capacity, efficiency, relevance), accountability and legitimacy (e.g. police reform, defence reform; budgetary reform)

The OECD DAC definition of SSR is one that is now widely used, and reflects a particular approach to SSR, formulating it as ‘*security system reform*’, and placing it

within a development framework. According to this definition, SSR concerns the transformation of the ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, thus contributing to a well-functioning security framework. This formulation has been developed to express a *developmental* approach to SSR, endorsed in the first instance by donor development aid agencies. This approach has been developed and promoted within a wider framework of developmental principles, which emphasise a focus on providing a secure environment for wider economic, social and political development for the whole country, including the poorest and most vulnerable. It emphasises factors such as ‘local ownership’, good governance and accountability, and sustainability, with human security at the forefront, and ‘regime security’ and ‘state security’ relevant only to the extent that these contribute to human security and development.

This is therefore an approach that is consistent with the priorities of our ‘DDR and Human Security’ project. Elaborated good practice guidelines have recently been published by the OECD DAC to support implementation, which although they are so far untested, are of value for those concerned with implementing SSR nationally as well as for international agencies offering external support.⁴

2.2 SSR in post-conflict contexts

SSR is best seen as a continuous process that is relevant to all countries and regions, including politically stable developed and developing states as well as fragile states and post-conflict countries. However, it is widely understood that there are particularly urgent SSR priorities in countries emerging from large-scale violent conflict.

Almost by definition, much of the security sector needs to be restructured after large-scale armed conflict, to reflect the requirements for political settlement, post-conflict stabilisation and peace-building, and to address the high insecurity, violence and crime that ordinary communities and people typically continue to face. In this post-conflict context, concerns for the security and viability of the new government (regime security) and of the emerging legitimate state institutions and borders (state security) are inevitably a high priority – for the national leaderships of the affected country and its neighbours, and for the UN and wider international community. Arguments that these are necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for promoting security of the wider population are generally persuasive.

However, it is also important to note the risks that SSR can be used less benignly to challenge or consolidate the power of specific groups for selfish interests. In practice,

⁴ OECD DAC Handbook, *Supporting Security and Justice*, OECD DAC, 2007.

therefore, SSR issues and processes have been prominent in most post-conflict peace-building, whether labelled as such or not. This has been true for decades (and centuries), but as the UN and other multilateral organisations have become more intensively engaged in peace-support missions over the last 15 years, they have similarly been drawn into engaging with SSR.⁵

There are a number of recent studies of SSR processes after wars come to end, either through peace-agreements or through victory by one of the parties.⁶ Perhaps not surprisingly, the findings show a wide variety of complex, highly politicised and contentious processes, with many examples of bad or confused practices as well as good ones. Where peace agreements or processes have stalled or broken down, this is generally linked to failures or problems around security institutions and SSR. Often SSR processes have been geared to the priorities of the primary power-brokers and national elites, rather than the wider population, leading to alienation and enduring state fragility. They are also often ‘supply-driven’ to some extent, in line with the perceived priorities of donors and their local allies. Nevertheless, there are examples of (relative) success – although also mixed with some failures, such as in South Africa and Mozambique. Section 4 of this working paper provides brief outlines and case studies to illustrate such issues and experiences.

The experience and effectiveness of UN Missions in supporting and promoting appropriate SSR has been similarly very mixed.⁷ One important contributing factor is that the UN lacks a clear and developed approach towards SSR in peace-support missions, or more widely in its conflict prevention and reduction activities. This is in strong contrast to DDR programmes, which are routinely and explicitly mandated by the UN Security Council and for which elaborated guidelines have been developed and periodically revised. There are several multilateral agencies within the UN family that have developed substantial institutional capacity and expertise for supporting all or part of DDR programmes, including the UNDPKO, UNDP, World Bank, IoM, and UNICEF. It is important to emphasise that UN agencies have tended to be less prominent and important in SSR processes than other actors such as bilateral donors, the OSCE or the EU.

There are several political reasons why shared international understandings and pooled capacities to support SSR have been relatively slow to develop. Many SSR

⁵ See, for example, H. Hanggi and V. Scherrer, “Towards a Common UN Approach to Security Sector Reform: lessons learned from integrated missions” (DCAF Policy Paper No 25; November 2007, DCAD), for a good summary of emerging UN engagement with SSR in post-conflict support missions.

⁶ See for example, Edward Rees, “Security Sector reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: ‘improvisation and confusion’ from the field”, UNDPKO External Study, UN March 2006; A. Schnabel and H-G Ehrhart (eds), *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peace-Building*, UN University Press, New York, 2005; A. Bryden and H. Hanggi (eds), *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, DCAF, Lit Verlag, Munster, 2005; and also the case studies in H. Hanggi and V. Scherrer (eds): *Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions: experience from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti and Kosovo*, DCAF/LIT VERLAG, Geneva, 2008.

⁷ See for example Rees (2006), op cit; Hanggi and Scherrer (2008), op cit.

processes, as well as DDR processes, have developed as well as implemented at a national level, with little international awareness. Alternatively, where SSR processes have had an international dimension, reforms have often been conceived and implemented through bilateral arrangements in which a donor country has formulated its own support programme together with national governments or specific security agencies. This has understandably led to divergent forms of programming in many cases.

More problematically, within the UN, influential members of the UN Security Council as well as much of the General Assembly have been reluctant to endorse explicitly support for SSR in post-conflict or other contexts. Efforts to influence or re-shape countries' security institutions have raised concerns about implications for 'sovereignty'. There has been a high degree of suspicion that SSR may be a cover for self-interested pursuit of contestable foreign and security policy objectives. This suspicion continues to be shared by some in development aid agencies. In contrast, the objectives of DDR have been regarded as less political and more limited in scope and duration.

Further, development of UN programmes and capacities to support SSR processes has been obstructed by institutional inertia and has raised concerns about inappropriate diversion of development or other aid resources.

Nevertheless, over the last seven years, substantial progress towards international co-operation and support for SSR has been achieved. This is manifest in the OECD DAC guidelines, relevant UNDP and World Bank programmes, and greatly enhanced co-operation amongst bilateral donors building on previous policy and programme work.⁸ In relation to post-conflict peacebuilding, the UN has recognised the critical importance of post-conflict policing and rule of law missions. Following the 'Brahimi report' in 2000,⁹ and particularly since 2003, UNDPKO and associated agencies have substantially developed guidelines, doctrine and capacity to support the timely and effective deployment of a variety of types of missions to provide or support post-conflict policing and rule of law.

In 2006, through a UN Working Group on SSR, the UN actively engaged in a political and policy process to clarify its position on support for SSR, culminating in important political decisions in February 2007 to establish an SSR Unit within the UN HQ (co-led by UNDPKO and UNDP). The UN Security Council held a productive debate on 20 -21 February 2007, where the Secretary-General noted that 'UNSC peacekeeping

⁸ Although many donor countries have been active in supporting SSR both at the policy and programme levels over the years, the work of the governments of the UK, Netherlands and Switzerland is particularly noteworthy. For past contributions in the policy field, see for example, "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform", DFID, 2000; "Justice and Poverty Reduction: Safety, Security and Access to Justice For All", DFID, 2000.

⁹"Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations", at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations.

mandates increasingly reflect the perspectives of security sector reform', and highlighted examples of immediate UN priorities including: SSR in the DRC; institutional reforms and the constitution of integrated security forces in Burundi; strengthening Sierra Leone's security sector; and supporting the restructuring of the defence and security forces in Cote D'Ivoire.¹⁰

This UN process could lead to some distinctive understandings of the scope and focus of SSR support in post-conflict or conflict-prone countries. Several key members of the UN Security Council have emphasised that:

- UN engagement in SSR should be limited to post-conflict countries;
- While the UN has strong comparative advantage for overall co-ordination of post-conflict peace support and peace-building, it may not be the key co-ordinator for SSR;
- National 'ownership' of SSR processes is particularly important (but with very different emphases on what is meant by national ownership);
- That a comprehensive approach to SSR is required.¹¹

The UN Policy Committee has recommended that an SSR Support Unit be established in the DPKO Office for Rule of Law and Security Institutions (and at the time of writing this Unit is being established). In practice, a combination of UN politics and bureaucratic or institutional concerns resulted in strong bargaining about whether 'policing and rule of law' should be considered to be within the scope of SSR. Specialist UN units and doctrine on policing and rule of law have already been established, and there has been resistance to integrating these into a new SSR policy or Unit. The risk remains then that for the UN, post-conflict SSR missions may come to include reform of military, border guards, coastguards etc, but to exclude policing and rule of law (criminal justice system etc). Wider institutional tensions and differences in perspective on SSR (such as between DPKO and UNDP) remain unresolved, and are likely to influence emerging UN systems and structures.

In principle possible complex UN institutional division of labour may be manageable, provided that it does not lead to confusion and unproductive doctrinal debates. In this paper, we consider that SSR has the full scope outlined at the beginning of this section, and so may be addressed by several hopefully coherent and co-ordinated UN Units, policies and agencies.

¹⁰ UN Secretary-General, 'Remarks to the UN Security Council Debate on the Role of the Security Council in Supporting Security Sector Reform' UN New York, 20 February 2007.

¹¹ UN, Summary of the Debate in the UN Security Council on Security Sector Reform, 21 February 2007.

2.3 DDR processes

DDR is primarily concerned with promoting security and post-conflict stabilisation in the immediate post-conflict period by ensuring that ex-combatants and their close associates and dependents are taken out of the conflict context; disarmed and demobilised as appropriate/agreed; and provided with a package of support to enable them to be re-inserted into the wider community and as far as possible re-integrated – to reduce the risk that they re-engage in armed violence or otherwise destabilise the peace process.¹²

Although the primary focus of DDR is on ex-combatants, it is now well-established that DDR programmes should address the needs of a wider target group, which includes:

- Male and female (ex-)combatants;
- Children associated with armed forces and groups;
- ‘camp-followers’ working in non-combat roles (including women as well as men in a range of coerced or voluntary roles);
- ex-combatants with disabilities or chronic illnesses;
- dependents of (ex-) combatants.

‘Classic’ DDR programmes are designed for a context in which there is a peace agreement in place, and political commitment and capacity amongst relevant political and military leaders to demobilise and disarm at least a proportion of their forces. In UNSC-mandated DDR programmes, the disarmament, demobilisation and re-insertion elements¹³ are resourced through assessed contributions, while the reintegration elements require additional voluntary contributions from member states.

At this point, it is important to emphasise that in practice, DDR programmes have been mandated for post-conflict contexts which do not meet all the assumptions of the ‘classic’ model. For example, only some of the armed groups may be committed to the agreements; many fragmented armed groups may be involved, under uncertain or ineffective central command; and there may be on-going violence in some areas. Examples include DDR programmes in Haiti, Southern Sudan and the Solomon

¹² We assume that readers are relatively familiar with DDR programmes and practices (see Working Paper 1 of this project, and standard references on DDR, including the UN IDDRS and associated (shorter) Operational Guide to the IDDRS), at <http://www.unddr.org/iddrs>.

¹³ **Disarmament:** the collection, documentation, control and safe disposal of arms and ammunition from ex-combatants; linked with the development of appropriate arms management programmes; **Demobilisation:** the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and other armed groups. This often includes processing of ex-combatants in temporary cantonments or assembly areas. Demobilisation also includes **Reinsertion:** transitional assistance offered to ex-combatants during the demobilisation process, to meet their immediate needs. Such re-insertion support packages typically last for a few months, and up to about 18 months; **Reintegration:** the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and reintegrate into with wider community – hopefully gaining sustainable and useful employment, income and social position.

Islands. In practice, therefore, DDR programmes have sometimes sought to include a wider range of elements to those listed above, and have covered a relatively large number of possible direct beneficiaries going beyond ‘core’ ex-combatants and their direct dependents and camp followers.

It is further important to note that not all DDR processes take place in the context of an internationally-recognised peace agreement or a UN peace mission. Programmes of very similar nature may be conducted on a purely national basis, or under the control of a victorious party (such as in Angola).

2.4 Comparing principles and approaches of DDR and SSR

It is useful at this point briefly to compare and discuss the principles and norms underlying DDR and SSR programmes in post-conflict contexts. This will enable us to highlight some key similarities and differences that need to be taken into account when considering enhanced co-ordination and integration of DDR and SSR programmes and processes in countries emerging from conflict.

In terms of overall good practice principles, there should be high compatibility between internationally supported DDR and SSR programmes. For example, according to the IDDRS guidelines and OECD-DAC guidance for SSR, they aim to be: people-centred and rights based, flexible, transparent and accountable, nationally owned, integrated, and well-planned.¹⁴ Practical experience in both programme spheres has often fallen short of these aims, but overlapping principles and goals should facilitate better linkages between them.

Overlapping aims. Both DDR and SSR aim to promote a secure and stable environment enable recovery, peace-building and development to begin. DDR focuses on specific target groups centred on (ex-) combatants and their dependents, and aims to take opportunities for their orderly integration into agreed future defence forces or for their disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration into peaceful civilian roles. SSR focuses on reforming the security system and its component parts to promote the prospects for effective, legitimate and accountable provision of justice and security services in the country as it emerges from conflict. Thus, although they have distinctive foci and approaches, the aims of SSR and DDR overlap in several key areas, including:

- Sustainable dismantlement of illegitimate or undesirable armed groups and command structures;
- Appropriate resizing and restructuring of defence forces;

¹⁴ As noted and explored, for example, by A. Bryden “Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: building sustainable peace in Africa”, Paper presented at Second International Conference on DDR and Stability, Kinshasa, 12 – 14 July 2007 (available at www.dcaf.ch).

- Addressing the security and other needs of ex-combatants and associated vulnerable groups, as well as recipient communities as part of wider peace and security-building.

In this context, *both* SSR and DDR aim to address both state and human security priorities. The balance between various dimensions of state and human security priorities must legitimately be decided according to specific circumstances. But in countries emerging from conflict there is always a potential perceived or actual tension between addressing security concerns of powerful groups in order to avoid resurgence of armed conflict and those of vulnerable wider sectors of society, whose needs may be greater even if they are less able to press for attention.

Elements of a more comprehensive security and peace-building process. Neither DDR nor SSR are panaceas, capable (even in principle) of ensuring the development of a more secure environment in which humanitarian aid, re-construction, and peace-building can take place. They both have to be approached as elements of a more comprehensive security and peace-building process, requiring co-ordination and synergies between a range of elements, also including: SALW control, transitional justice, mine action, IDP/refugee return, confidence-building measures, and so on.

Engaging with processes that are intrinsic to post-conflict contexts. Even in the absence of planned *programmes*, some sorts of DDR and SSR *processes* are inevitable as countries emerge from conflict. Combatants and their dependents and commanders inevitably try to accommodate to the new emerging ‘post-conflict’ situation, with many demobilising and attempting to return to civilian roles. In a changing security context, powerful and other local stakeholders are bound to have high concerns about the activities of security agencies or armed groups, and to try to impose controls and reforms on them (hopefully in line with a peace agreement). However, there is a high risk that such processes will remain dangerously incomplete or will contribute to insecurity, human suffering and risks of resurgent conflict.

The purpose of planned DDR and SSR programmes is to ensure that such processes take place in a way that not only promotes the prospects of security and longer-term peace-building but also addresses the needs of the weak and vulnerable as well as the relatively powerful. Thus, it is a mistake to approach either DDR or SSR programmes as if processes of demobilisation, re-structuring of armed groups, or changes of security sector institutions will not take place in their absence. Rather, they need to be designed and implemented in a way that takes careful account of existing local concerns, interests and dynamics – to shape, constrain and facilitate these in beneficial ways.

Complex combinations of political and technical processes. Both DDR and SSR programmes are politically sensitive in the most benign of circumstances, and key local stakeholders are highly aware of this. They also involve substantial technical

complexities and procedures. In highly politicised post-conflict contexts, it often becomes important to find ways to discuss the support, planning and implementation of both DDR and SSR programmes as if they are in large measure rule-based technical procedures. However, this should not distract programme teams from high awareness of the ways in which DDR and SSR programmes relate to wider political, security and peace-building processes.

Challenges of co-ordinating short and long-term processes and objectives. All programmes in countries emerging from conflict have to cope with the challenges of addressing urgent short-term priorities in ways that are effectively co-ordinated with longer-term programme objectives. The IDDRS aims to guide the design and implementation of relatively short-term disarmament and demobilisation programmes so that they provide an enduring basis for longer-term peace-building. However, this requires effective use of in-depth assessments and reviews that are often inadequately achieved. Moreover, co-ordination of shorter-term D&D with longer-term re-integration programmes has proved to be a major structural challenge for DDR programmes.

Similarly, those engaged with SSR have to respond to immediate challenges or windows of opportunity (for example, relating to defence or police reform), as the conflict comes to an end, long before an appropriately inclusive process of determining future national security strategy and SSR strategy has been completed. All SSR processes face difficult choices on phasing and prioritisation, and there is an enduring tendency towards unsatisfactory piece-meal or ad-hoc reforms.

One approach towards addressing this in relation to SSR-DDR linkages is to suggest (as implied in the IDDRS) that SSR should be regarded as a longer-term ‘developmental’ process, which may only start as the DDR programme (or at least D&D) is coming to a close. In some circumstances this may be the case, but it is far from clear that this can or should be the norm. There is a real risk of confusing ‘internationally-supported SSR programme’ with ‘SSR informal or local process’; the latter can be expected to begin early (for better or worse) even if the former starts late. Moreover, DDR programmes have often been delayed for particular reasons, opening the possibility that SSR programmes may start earlier.

Challenges and priorities of ‘local ownership’. All international guidelines for DDR and SSR (including IDDRS and OECD-DAC IF-SSR guidelines) emphasise that ‘local ownership’ of programmes is critically important for their effectiveness as well as legitimacy. However, ‘local ownership’ is a complex and contested concept in any context. It is especially so in countries emerging from conflict that, almost by definition, have deep political or societal divisions, weak or damaged representative institutions, and often limited expertise. Thus, local ownership can be expected to be highly partial or weak in the early stages of post-conflict programming, and the priority shifts towards enabling better, more influential and representative ‘local

ownership' as the process evolves. In practice, the dilemmas, ways and means of achieving this for DDR and SSR can be expected to overlap substantially.

3. DDR and SSR links in post-conflict contexts: initial mapping

The main aim of this section is to provide an initial mapping of the actual and potential linkages between DDR and SSR processes in post-conflict contexts. At this stage, we confine ourselves to an initial 'mapping' and assessment of significance. Subsequent sections of this Working Paper will develop the analysis and systematically address key issues of prioritisation, programme design to facilitate synergies, and sequencing.

This mapping has several dimensions and many elements, some of which overlap. At this stage we have adopted a simple organisational approach.¹⁵ The first subsection (3.1) focuses on linkages according to phases of the processes of assessing, designing and implementing DDR and SSR processes. Section 3.2 then identifies linkages related to cross-cutting issues (such as gender, youth, cross-border issues or transition to longer term development). Section 3.3 then addresses specific sectoral issues. It concludes with a brief summary of key initial findings and questions.

For convenience, we have adopted the overall frameworks and structures for DDR and SSR programmes respectively of the IDDRS and the OECD DAC Handbook. Despite various shortcomings, these have become relatively authoritative and widely endorsed, and are also quite systematic and comprehensive as required for a mapping exercise. (We recognise that the OECD DAC Handbook mostly focuses on SSR in the context of stable or fragile states, but the framework remains relevant and it does also address post-conflict contexts).

Finally, it is convenient (for the purpose of discussion) to divide the transition from conflict to peace-building and development into a number of phases.

- Preparation and negotiation of a peace settlement (either negotiated or imposed by a victor or external intervention)
- Peace agreement
- Immediate post-conflict stabilisation
- Post conflict recovery and peace and security-building
- Longer term peace-building and development

¹⁵ We acknowledge many useful discussions with policy and practitioner experts on these issues, and earlier works, particularly those of the SIDDR; A. Schnabel and H-G Ehrhart (eds), *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, UN University Press, New York, 2005; A. Bryden and H. Hanggi (eds), *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, LIT Verlag, Munster, 2005; M Brzoska, 'Embedding DDR Programmes in Security Sector reconstruction', in A. Bryden and H. Hanggi, op cit.

In practice, the processes of ending wars and establishing an effective peacebuilding process under a legitimate and relatively stable government are generally very messy. Distinctions between these phases are often unclear, and peace agreements break down or conflict re-emerges for a time. These phases are thus simply constructs to facilitate the mapping of DDR – SSR programme links.

3.1 DDR – SSR links through the design and implementation process

Both DDR and SSR programmes nominally go through several phases of a programme cycle:

- Pre-planning and Needs assessments
- Assessing and promoting a political and security context offering prospects for success
- Programme planning and design
- Developing ‘local ownership’ and national capacity
- Implementing each phase of the programme
- Monitoring, review and evaluation
- Transition and exit strategy implementation

In this subsection, the possible and actual linkages between SSR and DDR processes are identified and briefly discussed for each of these phases in a post-conflict context.

Sequencing issues immediately arise. DDR and SSR programmes are usually distinct, starting at different times and operating over different time scales. Typically, international engagement with, and support for, SSR processes after conflicts has begun later than for DDR. But this has not always been the case; and (as noted in section 2) national SSR processes often informally begin as soon as there is a ceasefire or good prospect of a peace-agreement). DDR programmes typically are of relatively short duration (approximately three years, with sometimes only ad hoc re-integration programmes continuing later), while support for SSR programmes may well extend well beyond the post-conflict stabilisation phase and into longer term peace-building and development.

Thus, possible linkages include interrelationships between the DDR and SSR programmes when they are at different stages of their ‘programme cycle’.

3.1.1 Pre-planning and needs assessments

At the first stage of programme development, there is a need to examine the situation in the relevant country or region, assess needs, and identify possible programme options and support roles. In relation to transitions from conflict, it is preferable if this is done while any peace agreement is being discussed and negotiated, since this

enables relevant provisions to be agreed within the peace agreement itself, and also timely initiation of required programmes after the peace settlement is agreed.

The UN has a well-developed set of procedures for assessing and preparing for possible UN peace-support missions. Under the new UN ‘integrated mission’ approach, there is an integrated mission task force (IMTF) at UN HQ level, linked with an integrated mission planning team (IMPT) at country level. At the first stages, the priority is to make early assessments of the situation and the relevant needs, and identify possible options.

In the past, there was a problem that initial assessments were conducted in a fragmented way, so that initial assessment teams may not have included an appropriate mix of experts and institutional representatives, resulting in un-integrated assessments and planning. This is now recognised to be bad practice, and the UN and other regional agencies (e.g. EU, NATO) concerned with post-conflict peace support strive to implement guidelines to ensure integrated and appropriately comprehensive assessment teams.

Thus, it is now clear (as outlined in IDDRS¹⁶) that representatives from relevant DDR teams should be included in integrated initial assessments at the earliest stage. For UN operations, this would be co-ordinated by the relevant UN Resident Co-ordinator (RC) or Humanitarian Co-ordinator (HC), for example.

Guidelines and practices are typically much less advanced for SSR processes. Specific examination of SSR needs and programme options have often been delayed until after other elements of a peace-support mission or DDR programme are relatively well-advanced. In the context of the UN, this is partly due to its lack of explicit mandates or common approaches towards supporting SSR, as discussed above.

However, it is increasingly widely recognised that it is important to address SSR issues at an early stage, so that assessments can be integrated into wider peace support strategies and programmes from the beginning, and so that parties to the conflict and peace process are encouraged to address them appropriately in the peace negotiations and agreements.

In recent years, the UN (and other relevant multilateral or regional institutions such as the EU) has adopted guidelines to integrate experts on post-conflict police support into initial assessment teams. However, these have typically focussed on issues relevant to early deployment of relatively combat-capable police units (such as gendarmerie), with assessments of other police services, rule of law institutions, penal service etc, often being delayed until a later phase. This means that some elements of

¹⁶UN IDDRS, Chapter 3.10, ‘Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures’, at <http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/03/#7>.

SSR are increasingly integrated into early assessment teams, with others still excluded. There has been some progress to rectify this (note for example that the UK government's guidelines for deployment of police officers to peace-support operations have provisions to avoid this risk¹⁷), but it remains patchy.

In summary, it seems clear that there are important potential linkages between DDR and SSR initial assessment and pre-planning processes. In some cases, there have actually been such linkages, but these have often been rather partial or ad-hoc. The general significance of such links is:

- To help to ensure the development of an overall assessment and strategy for external support for post-conflict security building, with DDR and SSR designed and implemented as parts of a coherent and integrated programme.
- To encourage the conflict parties to address the linkages between DDR and SSR appropriately at an early stage, hopefully during the negotiations for a peace settlement.

Where SSR assessments start after DDR programmes have been designed, there are also significant potential linkages:

- SSR initial assessment teams should be able to make use of the earlier DDR assessments, and also of subsequent assessments and experience of DDR Teams. This is often done informally in practice, but could be strengthened by promoting better access to confidential assessments, and by ensuring that DDR assessments properly address relevant SSR issues and are aware of SSR priorities.
- Initiation of locally-desired DDR programmes may be made conditional on the recipient governments announcing appropriate SSR plans and programmes. This was done in the DRC and Great Lakes, in the context of the MDRP, to some useful effect.¹⁸

3.1.2 Promoting a conducive political and security context

Both DDR and SSR processes and programmes require certain basic conditions before there are reasonable prospects of success.

For DDR programmes, these include:

- Commitment by all (or almost all) armed factions to the peace agreement;

¹⁷ For example, Peace Support Operations: information and guidance for UK police personnel, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom, April 2007.

¹⁸ MDRP Secretariat, "Position Paper: Linkages between DDR of ex-combatants and Security Sector Reform", MDRP, October 2003, at <http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/ssr-paper.pdf>.

- Functioning command and control within the armed factions;
- Cessation of armed violence between armed parties, at least in the regions where DDR is planned;
- Substantial and relatively co-ordinated engagement by key external stakeholders, particularly if the peace settlement is negotiated (this is also important for DDR after victories, but some argue not necessarily essential).

SSR programmes cover a wider range of types of objectives and activities, so the conditions for success are less easily summarised, including in post-conflict contexts. But they include:

- Commitment by relevant and legitimate national or factional leaders, and prospects of wider public buy-in;
- Virtual cessation or adequate geographical confinement of large-scale armed violence,
- Legitimate and potentially sustainable SSR programme objectives;
- Appropriate balance between seeming SSR priorities in the immediate post-conflict stabilisation and longer term security and justice needs of wider population;
- Engagement and reasonably coherent support of key external stakeholders;
- Commitment by partner (beneficiary) governments to the normative priorities of SSR (as for example specified by OECD-DAC).

In practice, there are potentially large overlaps and synergies between efforts to establish and promote the conditions for potentially effective DDR and SSR programmes. In many cases, the high-level influence that needs to be mobilised to promote conditions for successful post-conflict security-building programmes should integrate the concerns and priorities of both DDR and SSR, and also other related programmes (such as SALW control and arms management).

Further, there are potentially important opportunities to use progress in elements of one programme to promote confidence and commitment to progress in the other. For example, progress on demobilisation of a rebel group might be linked with commitment to reform key government security forces, such as the army. For example, in Nepal it was clear that ‘classic’ DDR of the ‘Maoist’ rebel forces would not be possible without corresponding SSR processes involving the Nepal Army (withdrawal to barracks pending changes in command and accountability, and possible re-structuring).¹⁹ The design and implementation of the so-called ‘comprehensive peace agreement’ in practice requires a complex combination and sequencing of elements of DDR, SSR and arms management programmes.

¹⁹ See S. Rynn and O. Greene: “DDR in Nepal”; DDR and Human Security Project mini case-study, July 2008, at [www. http://www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk](http://www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk).

Moreover, where DDR or SSR programmes have already started, they may help to create the conditions for success for the other. This is not automatically the case. There are cases where the design and implementation of a DDR process has constrained SSR options in a way that for example empowered ‘spoilers’, limited wider public support and relevance, or created obstacles for effective or efficient provision of some security services.

3.1.3 Programme planning and design

After initial assessments have been carried out, and there are decisions to proceed with DDR or SSR programmes, the next phase of the programme cycle is to engage in the detailed design and planning of the programmes. The UN IDDRS elaborate on these processes in relation to DDR programmes, within the context of overall integrated mission planning. It elaborates various elements, including initial technical assessments; development of a strategy and policy framework; and development of a programme and operational framework.

On SSR, the UN has developed some guidelines for designing and planning police and rule of law missions in the context of integrated post-conflict peace-support missions, which are presently developing relatively rapidly. However, as discussed above, for the immediate post-conflict stabilisation phase, these are often focussed on relatively narrow objectives to enable basic police and judicial support. The institutional reform objectives that are so central to SSR programmes are often marginalised, on the assumption that these do not become relevant until rather later in the peace-building process. However, elsewhere there are now relatively well elaborated guidelines on the processes of designing and planning SSR programmes, including in the OECD DAC Handbook, which can be adapted to the post-conflict context.

Although many changes to security sector agencies and institutions take place in the immediate post-conflict context, SSR is in many ways intrinsically a longer term process than disarmament, demobilisation and re-insertion of ex-combatants (though re-integration process are also relatively long term). This is because they focus on institutional reforms, and on the processes required to develop the complex set of security services and governance and oversight bodies required to meet the long-term security needs of the country and all its citizens.

For this reason, the OECD DAC Handbook emphasises that the quality of the process of designing and planning SSR is as important as the resulting programme design itself. It takes time to develop an appropriately comprehensive framework and plan for SSR with wide political and institutional support and buy-in. In principle this can be addressed through transitional SSR processes, but this in itself poses challenges.

Some peace agreements specify an institutional framework for at least aspects of SSR, such as an army that integrates combatants from several factions, or a reformed or

decentralised policy service. In this context, it is legitimately possible and appropriate to start to embark on the implied SSR processes relatively quickly. Even in such contexts, however, complex judgements are required on how to sequence the programme, to provide appropriate scope for early review and adjustment as wider post-conflict SSR priorities are recognised and the voices and interests of armed faction leaders become less dominant. Parties dominating the negotiation of a peace agreement are often not the best ones to make these complex judgements.

DDR teams have sometimes reportedly become impatient with the consultation and ‘process’ orientation of good SSR planning. Often they come from a pre-dominantly military culture, where objectives, once specified, should be planned and implemented as quickly and efficiently as possible. SSR teams from the police and other sectors as well as development aid agencies have sometimes been equally guilty of this. Timeliness is a particularly important aspect of DDR programmes, so that ex-combatants gain confidence in the process.

A further institutional obstacle to co-ordinated SSR and DDR programme design and planning, at least at present, is that SSR programmes tend to be supported through bilateral programmes, whereas DDR programmes are normally an intrinsic element of UN peace-support missions and able to draw upon UN assessed budget contributions. This adds to institutional obstacles to co-ordination. We return to this below.

There are important shared programme objectives where DDR and SSR linkages could be critical. These include:

- Clarifying the consequences of disarmament and demobilisation of armed factions for security of the communities and people in the areas in which they operate – normally an effective combination of DDR and SSR will help local people, but there is the risk that DDR may be removing important security protection without replacing it with alternatives.
- Ensuring that packages and options for demobilised ex-combatants and their dependents take appropriate account of employment opportunities in reformed security sector institutions (not only the defence forces, but also other institutions, including the police and border guards).
- Developing an integrated approach linking DDR, SSR and civilian arms collection/management to engage with, and limit security risks from, criminal armed groups or gangs in the post-conflict situation.
- Ensuring a closely co-ordinated approach towards enduring command structures amongst de-mobilised groups. IDDRS advises that command structures should be dismantled wherever possible, but in practice they have

often proved enduring even amongst ex-combatants, and vulnerable people look to their old unit commanders for guidance or protection. This is an issue of common concern for SSR and DDR.

- Ensuring a closely co-ordinated approach towards decisions on extent, timing and character of demobilisation or integration into on-going defence forces and wider SSR. Experience in East Timor and several other countries demonstrates the importance of ensuring that such processes do not create undue risks of resurgence of division or conflict with different security sector units taking different sides.
- Promoting a consistent and effective approach towards transitional justice issues. As will be discussed in section 4, DDR programmes have rarely taken deep account of issues of transitional justice, except where constraints are explicitly built into the terms of the peace agreement or by indictment by the ICC (as for the demobilisation of the LRA in Northern Uganda). DDR vetting and interview procedures associated with determining programme eligibility and needs do not generally also include vetting for possible war crimes.²⁰ The connections between SSR and transitional justice have often been more profound: for example, vetting for possible war crimes became an important factor in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, sometime acting as a major constraint on SSR processes to establish or reform police services. Similarly, it is important to achieve useful synergies between the development of special institutions to try those accused of war crimes and wider criminal justice institutions. For both SSR and DDR, it can be difficult to establish the appropriate balance between programme and transitional justice priorities, but their overlapping aims and target groups imply that a common approach is likely to be important.
- Personnel and Institutions— when DDR and SSR are managed at the national level with financial and technical support from international donors (such as in MDRP countries) – in many instances personnel and institutions responsible for design, implementation, monitoring of DDR are located within a wider security sector institutional framework. National capacity-building to enhance implementation of DDR programmes, such as the development of National DDR Commissions, should take wider SSR concerns into account, and vice versa. For example, capacities developed to implement short-term DDR should be linked with enduring security sector management institutions, to help to ensure enduring contributions to their capacity as DDR programmes wind down.

²⁰ ITCJ, Project on DDR and Transitional Justice; provisional findings (author interviews with ITCJ project researchers, New York, 2007)

In conclusion, we can summarise the significant linkages between planning and designing DDR and SSR programmes in post-conflict contexts. The most important elements include:

- The need to ensure that DDR programmes are coherent with overall SSR priorities and strategies, so that they do not unduly constrain or undermine longer term SSR goals (and sometimes vice versa);
- The need to examine systematically opportunities and programming implications for designing an integrated programme for post-conflict security building, in which elements of DDR and SSR programmes are integrated or sequenced in the interests of wider peace-building;
- The opportunities for SSR and DDR planning teams to pool or exchange resources in the consultations that are involved in programme design and development. This could include joint consultations. Even if implementation of SSR programmes is likely to be delayed, there could be real mutual benefits in having SSR experts participate in consultations relating to DDR programme planning.
- Co-ordination to ensure an appropriately consistent or common approach to linked programmes or issues, such as SALW control or transitional justice.

3.1.4 Developing local ownership and national capacity

Both DDR and SSR guidelines emphasise the importance of ‘local ownership’ of programmes, and of developing national capacity to contribute to their design, implementation and review. In practice, performance of both SSR and DDR programmes against these criteria are often poor.

Understandings and priorities for ‘local ownership’ can often be confused or contested, particularly in a post-conflict context in which social and political divisions remain potent and institutions to ensure effective democratic or community representation are highly imperfect. Similarly, in war-torn developing societies, national capacities to contribute to the design and implementation of complex security-building programmes are often weak, vulnerable to capture by special interests, or tainted by conflict.²¹

In this context, the perceived urgent need to achieve substantial DDR or embark on urgent changes to key security institutions (such as the military or police) can easily take priority over the complex challenges of securing meaningful local ownership or national capacity building. This is in many ways understandable. However, such an

²¹ See, for example, L. Nathan, “No Ownership, No Commitment: a Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform”, University of Birmingham, (2nd Edition), October 2007.

approach carries real risks, and the balance needs to be struck carefully according to the specific circumstances at the time.

In this context, there are important possible synergies and pooling of scarce resources between DDR and SSR programmes to promote local ownership and build relevant national capacity.

- Co-ordinate, or pool resources, to enable adequate local engagement in the pre-planning, needs assessment, planning and design of both DDR and SSR programmes. In the immediate post-conflict period, it may not be practical initially to develop meaningful local ownership – but it is important that a strategy is in place enabling this to develop over time, and DDR-SSR links could facilitate this.
- Consultation to develop beneficiary or wider community input and buy-in to elements of demobilisation, re-insertion or re-integration programmes could be combined with consultations relating to SSR programmes, and vice versa. Between them the SSR and DDR could combine to develop local mechanisms to facilitate community inputs.
- There are examples of National DDR Commissions being established purely for the purposes of DDR, when they could be designed also to contribute to national capacity for SSR and for wider and longer-term security-building programmes. In many countries, the effectiveness and sustainability of the National DDR Commissions has been seriously undermined by lack of resources. So any combination of responsibilities for SSR would need to be assigned and supported in a way that took account of this.
- Programmes could pool resources to support the development of relevant national legal frameworks, material and logistic support; training programmes for national staff; and implementation and financial management (as listed for example in IDDRS).

In practice, it appears that concerned programme managers have sometimes co-operated informally to achieve such synergies – for example in Sierra Leone - but that formal institutional arrangements have often obstructed rather than facilitated this.

3.1.5 SSR-DDR links during programme implementation

In principle, the links between DDR and SSR during design and planning phases are all relevant during programme implementation. More specifically, the linkages exist in at least three different categories:

- Pooling resources or making use of the other programme's expertise, resources and implementation capacities;
- improving implementation by gaining benefits from the outputs or outcomes of the other programme; and
- co-ordinating joint efforts to influence overall peace-building and PCR strategies and resource allocation – nationally and internationally.

In relation to **disarmament**, DDR programmes require specific procedures and arrangements customised to the disarmament of identified ex-combatants. In practice, however, implementation of the disarmament component of DDR has often been conducted in a way that has strong links with aspects of SSR and arms management programmes. For example, the ways in which a DDR programme manages and disposes of collected arms will have implications for SSR and arms management programmes to promote secure stockpile management and disposal of surplus stocks of remaining military, police and other armed security institutions. Record-keeping and accounting systems established for DDR could contribute to enduring national capacities in this area. Surveys of weapons possession relevant to the setting criteria for weapons hand-in could usefully link or combine with similar surveys done to assess community security needs or develop civilian arms management programmes.

In relation to **demobilisation**, there is a range of important links with SSR. Most prominent of these are links between decisions on demobilisation and processes of down-sizing and restructuring the military, police or border-guard services. Detailed implementation strategies are important as well as connections at the strategic level. Reportedly, demobilisation of Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan was implemented in a way that particularly focussed on more experienced and capable fighting units, to contribute to the process of preventing them dominating the re-constituted national army.²² It remains debateable whether this was a wise approach, but it certainly provides an important illustration of SSR-DDR links at the level of detailed implementation. It is also important to note links with transitional justice here, where amnesty has been granted to ex-combatants without due account of the needs or opportunities for truth and reconciliation processes and mechanisms.

SSR issues may be linked with choices between demobilisation using semi-permanent demobilisation sites (cantonment) and a so-called 'mobile' approach of demobilising where groups of ex-combatants are gathered. Such decisions may substantially affect the implications for local community security after demobilisation, for example, and the priorities for SSR and justice. The regional dimensions of these peace and conflict processes add additional challenges here, as experienced for example in the Great

²² Interview with Prof Isezaki, Co-ordinator DDR Afghanistan, 2002-4, Tokyo, March 2007

Lakes region where combatant and 'ex-combatant' groups from one country have been a concern in neighbouring states.

In a further example, the processes of registering and processing ex-combatants and associated dependents including women and girls, for DDR could contribute to vetting for possible employment in police or other security services, and could provide a context in which information provision and awareness raising on future SSR consultation and plans could be promoted. In this way, DDR could contribute to cross-cutting issues for SSR (such as gender mainstreaming). In this area, links with transitional justice concerns become strategic: both DDR and SSR would need to take a consistent approach, to reduce risks of community rejection of elements of newly formed security services.

On **reinsertion**, the process of discharge and the character of the discharge package has to be designed with due awareness for wider security and arms management issues, with indirect implications for SSR. Re-insertion of ex-combatants could usefully be co-ordinated with community safety and security initiatives, for example, not least to build mutual confidence between returning ex-combatants and recipient communities that their insecurities are being addressed. Similarly, DDR and SSR joint concerns relating to command structures being informally or formally maintained during reinsertion imply a co-ordinated approach. In northern Uganda, for example, returning LRA groups have typically almost been encouraged to retain their links with old commanding officers. In other areas (such as the Kivus in DRC), such enduring links are a matter of concern.

As discussed in Thematic Paper No 4, there are also important links here between re-insertion of ex-combatant and their dependents and IDP return packages. Even if there are good reasons for distinctive re-insertion packages and procedures for ex-combatants and their dependents (compared with other displaced people), it is important that this is explained and co-ordinated.

The characteristics and effectiveness of **Re-integration** programmes has wide-ranging and complex implications for security, and thus indirectly for SSR. More specifically, community safety, security and access to justice initiatives within an SSR programme could benefit from careful information exchange if not co-ordination with DDR programme officers, both to address the specific needs of returned ex-combatants and their dependents and those of the community as a whole. There is, for example, evidence that returned ex-combatants at low-levels in their previous command structures can be particularly vulnerable to exploitation and recruitment by local elites or criminals.

Pooling resources between DDR and SSR to track ex-combatants after their return to civilian life may make sense for both programmes, and is currently relatively neglected. It appears that many ex-combatants and their dependents gravitate back

towards towns and cities after re-insertion, with important implications for re-integration support programmes as well as SSR (for example in relation to regulation of private security companies or promoting safer spaces in their new environments.

From an SSR perspective, there are numerous ways in which SSR processes could potentially link with or contribute to DDR. Obviously progress towards reforming and developing security and access to justice for communities will both contribute to the confidence of demobilised ex-combatants and their dependents and facilitate re-integration processes. An illustration of a more direct linkage is that progress in developing mechanisms and institutions for security sector governance and oversight could directly improve national capacity to contribute to national engagement with elements of DDR programmes.

3.1.6 Monitoring, review and evaluation

Good practice guidelines for the DDR and for SSR both emphasise the importance of regular monitoring and review of progress, and of evaluation of programmes at milestone points or as they come to an end. Regular monitoring and review during programme implementation is critical, in order to identify and address emerging problems or opportunities in a timely way. Evaluation is important not only to ensure appropriate accountability, but also to contribute to wider lesson learning and refinement of guidelines.

In practice, monitoring, review and evaluation processes have been ad-hoc or inadequate, in numerous post-conflict DDR and SSR programmes. Where they have been conducted their findings are often deemed ‘sensitive’, and thus not properly shared. Mechanisms for wider institutional learning and contributing to revision of guidelines and training for practitioners are often inadequate.

These are shared problems for both DDR and SSR programmes, and indeed for many other post-conflict programmes. There may be advantages in some pooling of resources for monitoring, review and evaluation between DDR and SSR programmes: although specific programme evaluations will require distinct elements, the overlaps between programmes, their target groups and stakeholders, and their objectives should imply areas where joint monitoring and review could be useful. Further, monitoring and review processes for each programme could, with appropriate co-ordination and consultation, usefully contribute to the other’s effectiveness. Responses to emerging problems with demobilisation or disarmament, for example, might require SSR measures as well as adjustments to the DDR programme itself.

3.1.7 Transition to longer-term peace-building and development, and ‘exit strategies’

SSR processes are best planned and implemented as long term processes, continuing from the immediate post-conflict recovery period into the longer term. DDR programmes are normally of relatively short duration and end as the post-conflict stabilisation and recovery phase is completed. Issues and priorities relating to linkages

between DDR programmes and longer-term peace building and development are examined in Working Paper 5 in this series. The question here is whether there are significant SSR-DDR linkages.

Experience indicates that there are some links, though further research is required to assess their likely significance. For example:

- Some of the capabilities, staff, procedures and institutions developed in the course of the DDR project may have continuing value for SSR and arms management processes, yet mechanisms to enabling effective transfer are mostly lacking.
- There may be value in adapting some of the mechanisms and expertise developed in a successful DDR programme to contribute to the dismantlement of criminal or other armed groups that emerge after the conflict has ended – linking with policing and rule of law.
- Longer-term re-integration programmes could be usefully linked with community safety and security programmes or access to justice reforms that are broadly located within the remit of SSR.
- Continuation of external support for SSR might be useful in facilitating exit strategies for UN or other international DDR teams, by providing a framework for continuing support for any elements of continuing value to the country concerned.

3.2 SSR-DDR links and cross cutting issues

DDR and SSR programmes both have to engage effectively with similar cross-cutting issues in the post-conflict context. These cross-cutting issues include specific issues and requirements relating to women (whether ex-combatants, dependents or other), gender, youth, children, cross-border controls and movements, and transitional justice. Other cross-cutting issues relating to linkages with non-security post-conflict programmes to address the return of displaced people, food aid, health, education of infrastructure are addressed in Working Paper 4 of this series, and are thus not considered here.

Each of these cross-cutting issues poses some specific challenges and issues for DDR programmes. The IDDRS includes specific chapters to assist DDR practitioners and policy-makers to identify and appropriately respond to almost all of the cross-cutting issues noted above. Similarly, SSR processes should engage effectively with the same issues, though on a different basis.

In this context, it is important to ensure reasonable coherence and co-ordination of responses. Surveys and assessments of the particular concerns and needs of women, youth and children passing through the DDR programmes could usefully be informed by SSR assessments of the wider concerns and security and justice needs of these people across the country and in particular in the communities to which ex-combatants are to be re-inserted.

Measures to address the particular concerns and needs of these groups of ex-combatants could include SSR programmes. For example, women and girls who have actually been directly involved in the conflict as combatants typically find re-integration particularly difficult, and some could benefit from SSR programmes specifically designed to provide opportunities for female recruitment. Programmes within SSR to promote community policing and local justice mechanisms (including through traditional/customary authorities) could usefully focus on raising awareness and capabilities for engaging with youth, facilitating the re-integration of young ex-combatants.

Post-conflict peace-support missions continue to pay inadequate attention to cross-border and transnational issues, as evidenced for example by the damaging inconsistency between DDR programmes in the Mano River sub-region and the lack of co-ordination between SSR and peace-support missions in the Western Balkans. SSR programmes to enhance regulation and control of border regions could contribute to monitoring and management of cross-border movements relevant to DDR programmes. By combining forces, SSR and DDR teams might be better able to ensure that senior national and international authorities engage with cross-border issues more regularly and determinedly.

The DDR and SSR linkages with transitional justice processes are particularly complex and worthy of investigation. In principle, programmes to promote transitional justice and challenge impunity from war crimes could be included within the scope of SSR. In practice, the international organisations, experts and programmes which address transitional justice and ‘truth and reconciliation’ processes have developed separately from the wider SSR community, and typically have different priorities.²³

While transitional justice programmes focus on addressing crimes and grievances arising from past conflict or oppression, SSR tends to focus more on reforms to enhance provision of security and justice to communities and people during and after the transition. Special War Crimes tribunals or Truth and Justice Commissions are usually customised for their specific purpose. Though they aim to promote reconciliation and confidence-building, as well as rule of law, they are rarely designed

²³ See for example, O. Greene and D. Henriksen: Panel presentations made at ITCJ Conference on SSR and Transitional Justice, February 2007, New York.

to contribute to wider SSR institution building, as evidenced for example by experience in Sierra Leone, the Former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.

Similarly, emerging findings from case study research by ICTJ indicate that DDR programmes have rarely taken systematic account of transitional justice issues.²⁴ In some cases, such as Colombia, the demobilisation package has involved amnesties and protection from prosecution for past crimes that many find hard to accept. More generally, international DDR guidelines emphasise that demobilisation packages should not extend amnesties for serious war crimes. In practice, however, DDR practitioners continue to tend to focus on short-term peace and security priorities rather than those of transitional justice.

An example of a key operational linkage between DDR and SSR programmes on the one hand and transitional justice on the other is provided by vetting procedures. Where vetting has been neglected in recruitment for reformed security institutions in post-conflict context, the results have sometimes been disastrous (e.g. police recruitment in post-intervention Iraq and Afghanistan) and always difficult. On the other hand, effective vetting of existing post-holders and new recruits can lead to long delays in SSR programmes. Meanwhile DDR programmes generally include registration and interview processes that could be relevant for these processes. Linkages in these areas between DDR, SSR and transitional justice are extremely sensitive, and have to be handled carefully. But they exist, and could be better managed.

3.3 Initial summary

There are many actual and potential links between DDR and SSR programmes in post-conflict contexts. Many fall within the framework of ensuring that DDR and SSR programmes are well-co-ordinated within an integrated overall programme of post-conflict security building. Many of the specific links between DDR and SSR appear indirect or secondary in programming terms. However, a number of direct and significant links to appear to have been identified. These include:

- linked assessment, planning, monitoring and review processes;
- opportunities to pool resources and combine or sequence different elements of SSR and DDR to mutual benefit during the design or implementation phases as part of a customised security-building programme (for example, in relation to defence reform, various aspects of policing, and
- reducing risks from emerging armed groups after conflicts.

²⁴ ICTJ, New York, 2007.

4. DDR and SSR Links: Sectoral Linkages and Country Experiences

After the initial mapping of potentially important linkages between DDR and SSR programmes in section 3, this section examines some lessons and experiences from selected countries, and then discusses linkages in relation to specific sectors for SSR – focussing particularly on the types of links that emerged from section 3 as potentially important.

4.1 SSR-DDR sectoral linkages

The security sector includes a wide range of different institutions covering a range of sectors. As outlined in section 2, these include: democratic security governance and oversight; armed forces and military, policing, intelligence and security services, judicial services, penal sector, border management and control. Private Security Companies (PSCs) and civil society are also important sectors of society relevant to SSR. These are each separately addressed in the OECD DAC Handbook. It is useful briefly to review some sector specific linkages with DDR processes.

4.1.1 Governance and oversight

Promoting good, democratic, governance and oversight for the security sector is a high priority for SSR. For example, OECD DAC policy and guidance on SSR lists four ‘overarching objectives’ for programmes, the first of which is ‘establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system’.²⁵ Despite this, the record of SSR programmes in enhancing civilian oversight of security forces and introducing greater accountability for their actions in law, policy and practice has been extremely patchy, and has often been neglected in comparison the programmes to train, equip and professionalize run-down security forces.

There are often important windows of opportunity after peace agreements to establish principles and procedures to contribute to this objective, although it must generally be a long-term process. There may be possibilities for DDR programmes to contribute to this process, and also to benefit from some SSR-related initiatives in this sphere.

Some linkage issues are essentially to avoid actions in DDR programmes that might undermine SSR initiatives in this area, and take opportunities to bolster them. Thus, DDR programme managers and decision-makers should aim to take due account of new or emergent government or democratic institutions where relevant. This may be in relation to needs assessments, programme planning or design, implementation and review. In practice, this may be frustrating, since transitional governments and emergent political parties and parliaments are prone to symbolic debates, which may

²⁵ Others are: improved delivery of security and justice services; development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process; sustainability of justice and security service delivery. DAC policy also espouses the following ‘principles’ during SSR: ‘locally owned and based on democratic norms’, ‘...greater civilian involvement and oversight...’, ‘Developed adhering to basic governance principles such as transparency and accountability’, and ‘Implemented through clear processes and policies’.

not be useful. However, it is important to try, as a contribution to wider peace-building and also to developing wider 'local ownership' of DDR and related programmes. Further, efforts should be made to ensure that local institutions to manage and oversee DDR programmes, such as national DDR commissions are appropriately accountable and open to local stakeholders and parliaments, as well as to the executive branch of the new post-conflict government.

There may be other possible linkages with DDR in this respect. An important but relatively neglected area relates to the transition of conflict parties and combatants towards active civilian engagement in democratic politics. Case studies have demonstrated that many ex-combatants often remain relatively politicised and interested in fulfilling leadership or representational functions as they return to civilian life. For example, many UNITA ex-combatants in Angola appear to have re-integrated into their communities and adopted community or political leadership roles.²⁶ More widely, a key strategic goal for peace-building is to enable successful transition of rebel groups or conflict parties into legitimate and peaceful political movements and parties.²⁷

This is this an important aspect of DDR processes, which could usefully be taken into account in re-insertion and re-integration measures in DDR programmes. The DDR programme in Nepal perhaps illustrates ways in which conflict parties can instrumentally use DDR in undesirable ways: in this case, most senior or experienced Maoist ex-combatants were demobilised before the DDR programme officially began (and replaced with new raw recruits to ensure that overall re-insertion benefits were not diminished), so that they could act unimpeded as political cadre for continuing struggle.²⁸ However, there may be many more positive opportunities. Re-integrated ex-combatants contribute to a pool of civilians with detailed knowledge of security sector issues that can help to develop more effective civilian management and oversight through participation in relevant government ministries, parliamentary committees, NGOs or media outlets.

A related question of managing and overseeing reform *programmes* such as DDR and SSR is also important. Arrangements for managing and overseeing SSR programmes are often inadequate.²⁹ Similarly, although greater attention has been paid to developing adequate management arrangements in DDR due to the high-pressured environments they take place in, most programmes have exhibited significant failings in this area (e.g. Sudan, Uganda, Sierra Leone). There is a *prima facie* case for developing common and possibly linked approaches towards management and

²⁶ J. Gomes Porto, I. Parson and C. Alden, *From Soldiers to Citizens: the social, economic, and political re-integration of UNITA ex-combatants in Angola*, Ashgate, 2007.

²⁷ As examined, for example, in J. de Zeeuw (ed), *From Soldiers to Politicians: transforming rebel movements after civil war*, Lynne Rienner, London 2008.

²⁸ See S. Rynn and O. Greene, *op. cit.*

²⁹ See, for example, G. Peake and A. Hills (ed), *Civil Wars*, special issue, 2007.

oversight arrangements for DDR and SSR. Using evidence from case studies and a wider literature review, a brief overview of some key issues arising in relation to the management and oversight of DDR and SSR programmes is outlined below.

It is well-established that national commissions have a central role to play in DDR, but there is a need to ensure that they do not neglect community participation. It is sometimes asserted that externals do not fully comprehend local DDR contexts, but similar observations apply to national commissions who sometimes disregard local perspectives and focus more on the national picture. They are also often overstretched. This suggests there could usefully be formal mechanisms to strengthen links and co-ordination between the two so that human security risks and vulnerabilities can be identified.

Some significant issues emerge from this brief review of governance and oversight arrangements for DDR and SSR programmes, which are highlighted below.

Local ownership

- The objective of ‘establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability’ implies or requires local ownership, for it is hard for an SSR programme to contribute to enhanced oversight of a country’s security system without itself being well managed or overseen. There is therefore a clear relationship and interdependence between ownership and oversight.
- For their part, recipient or partner governments have committed to “exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies, and co-ordinate development actions” under the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.³⁰

Capacity issues

- National government institutions need to develop the capacity to assess, plan and direct the reform SSR processes. The OECD DAC IF-SSR Handbook notes there is commonly a need to support capacity development in at least four areas: strategic planning and policy making, budgetary processes, management and monitoring, review and evaluation. Guidance on ‘strengthening national capacity’ is offered, as is advice on ‘managing international assistance programmes’.
- The requisite infrastructure necessary for the range of DDR activities are often weak and poorly institutionalised. Government ministries and institutions may be under-funded and poorly equipped and their capacity to deliver essential public services is will likely have been severely reduced during conflict. Examples of this are to be found in several case studies, including Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan and Uganda.

³⁰ See: www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclaration. Donors are similarly committed to “...respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it.” (OECD, 2005).

- There is a clear tension here, since the capacity of national governments and civil societies is likely to be limited in countries emerging from conflict, SSR and to some extent DDR programmes have both to ensure adequate participation of national governments and civil societies in the management and oversight of programmes, and create the preconditions for adequate participation through capacity building.

Donor – Recipient government partnership

- Attention needs to be paid to issues of co-ordination at the ‘supply end’, between those who support DDR and SSR such as donors and multilaterals. This requires a lead agency, which often takes time to establish. The record is patchy and almost all post-conflict security building efforts have had failures of coordination and leadership. The models and institutional arrangements donors and multilateral agencies have for delivering support to DDR or SSR programmes have varied widely.

4.1.2 Military or defence reform

The sectoral links between DDR and SSR are most direct and obvious in relation to reform of armed forces. All substantial reforms of the armed forces typically involve restructuring and redundancy or transfer of significant numbers of armed forces personnel. During the last 15 – 20 years, most developing countries have had to engage in downsizing the military, which has often proved to be a major and difficult issue. Demobilisation and re-integration of armed forces personnel is therefore a central element of most defence reform. After conflicts, as rival forces are reconciled and partially combined, such reform can lead to at least temporary increases in security force sizes, as the new state aims to integrate ex-rebels while retaining most of its existing forces.

DDR programmes are designed to manage such processes in the special and particularly sensitive context of war termination and implementing peace-agreements. But they are always implemented in the context of wider processes or reform and restructuring of armed forces in the country. Depending of the particular context and the nature of the peace settlement, some armed groups are almost entirely disarmament and demobilised, normally with national or international security guarantees. Others are to be integrated into a unified national army and security system. These are SSR processes that not only provide a strategic framework for DDR programmes but also affected the details of its design and implementation.

4.1.3 Policing

Defence reform is generally closely linked to police reform in many stable or fragile developing or transitional states. After reviews of their security needs, many countries have recognised over the last 20 years that they combine an oversized army with inadequate policing services. This is true in peace-time and even truer as wars come to

an end, and the need for effective police services becomes a priority. SSR often involves a rebalancing, in which the army withdraws from internal policing functions while the police institutions are established as independent institutions requiring substantial institutional reform and capacity-building.

Policing is increasingly recognised to be a priority in post-conflict security and peace-building processes. The UN IDDRS devotes a chapter to clarifying how UN Police roles, and wider policing reform can contribute to re-integration processes by enhancing community safety and security. However, this linkage tends to be downplayed in relation to the demobilisation element of DDR, which focuses on the immediate challenges of demobilisation of ex-combatants who are not to be integrated into future defence forces.

There are good reasons for keeping demobilisation in DDR separate from police recruitment in post-conflict setting. The UN IDDRS advises DDR practitioners to exercise extreme caution. Taking to arms in a conflict is not an obvious indication of an aptitude for professional policing, and integrating ex-combatants into the police force risks increasing tensions (particularly when one recalls that vetting procedures and transitional justice measures are incomplete or worse).

The incorporation of ex-combatants into internal security institutions such as the police or private security firms as opposed to the military obviously poses unique challenges. Provision of public security is in some respects more complex than external security: it requires coordination between criminal justice institutions such as the police, judiciary, corrections and perhaps related agencies tasked with intelligence gathering, civil emergencies and border control. Each of these may embrace different philosophies and have its own ways of working, with the judiciary in particular performing an important free-standing role in safeguarding the rule of law independently of politics.

Having noted this, however, there is a case for this approach to be reviewed on a case by case basis. Standards of recruitment practices of police in post-conflict societies are often very low in any case. While establishing links between DDR and police recruitment may increase political risks for the DDR programme, it might in practice in some contexts help to improve *de facto* police recruitment procedures. There is a case for developing closer and more systematic links between police reform and DDR programmes in some contexts. Vetting and screening processes for ex-combatants to address transitional justice concerns could at least inform (with careful safeguards) similar processes in police recruitment, as discussed above, and at best reduce likelihood of creating tensions between communities and future civilian security providers. In countries where women are poorly represented in police services, and where women ex-combatants find it hard to re-integrate, such links may become an element in gender mainstreaming in SSR.

These arguments are explored below using examples drawn mainly from Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Kosovo and Timor Leste, but in addition Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq and Liberia. Each location has seen deliberate attempts to merge former combatants into police structures. In Bosnia and Kosovo, there is also some evidence of the unintended effects between DDR (or demobilization) and a burgeoning private security industry. No definitive conclusions are drawn on the basis of these cases, but they do suggest a number of considerations to be applied when attempting to link DDR and SSR in this way. A particular focus is placed on issues around vetting new recruits (a tool more commonly used for transitional justice but which is among the most important for DDR-SSR linkages) and the implications for the effective rule of law of such measures.

Vetting, i.e. the investigation of the background of individual post-holders or applicants for public sector employment, is an important tool in preventing the improper employment of undesirables in security bodies.³¹ It is sometimes claimed that many problems associated with the political foundations of security sector institutions could be avoided with improved vetting procedures. Vetting (like lustration) is certainly one way of introducing accountability for past acts in post-conflict settings, and preventing human rights violators from becoming too entrenched in the security system. Sanctions designed to ensure this does not occur might include forced retirement, dismissal, or a bar on entry to particular jobs or organizations. Kosovo, Haiti, Liberia, Timor Leste and Bosnia have all seen internationally-led public sector vetting processes in recent years.

The different approaches to vetting that have been used in each of these cases are not examined in detail here, and there is much to be said about the different drivers, criteria, sanctions and standards that may be applied.³² While other priorities will also be relevant, including short-term law and order considerations and the need to find employment for ex-combatants, the focus below is on the implications that the integration of ex-combatants has for the rule of law. It is arguable that in judging the success or failure of the reintegration of ex-combatants into police services or the private security industry, the likely impact on the rule of law and the implications for the development of cohesive, accountable and effective security institutions are paramount considerations.

Finally, it is also important to note the risks related to auxiliary security forces. For example in many countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, figures relating to absorption of ex-combatants into national security services look radically different when auxiliary forces (e.g.. Anti-Stock Theft Units in Uganda) are included.

³¹ A key reference document is 'Vetting Public Employees in Post-Conflict Settings: Operational Guidelines', ICTJ/UNDP/OHCHR.

³² For a more detailed treatment see, Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff, (eds), *Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies*, SSRC, 2007, at <http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/books/2007/05/08/justice-as-prevention/>.

4.1.4 Border and coastal management and control

In principle, SSR processes relating to establishment and capacity-building of border-guards and coast-guards could be linked usefully to DDR in similar ways to policing. More widely, improved management of border regions is often a critical issue in preventing further conflict and facilitating appropriate re-integration of ex-combatants into communities in border areas. Inappropriate or corrupt border controls, and bad performance of security sector and development processes in wider border areas is often a key contributor to alienation and impoverishment.

DDR programmes involving demobilisation of ex-combatants in border regions may be useful sources of information to contribute to SSR assessment and priorities in these regions. Too often, SSR focuses on central or capital city institutions in the immediate post-conflict context, to the relative neglect of poorer and more insecure border areas. Links with DDR programmes may help to increase capacity to rectify this.

4.1.5 Justice and penal systems

The development of systems to enhance access to justice is a high priority in post-conflict countries. Efforts to reform and build capacity of the judiciary and wider criminal justice system have become a prominent part of UN integrated missions, for example, though a complex and difficult one.³³ The importance of developing an approach that also integrates ‘traditional’ justice and dispute resolution mechanisms has become widely recognised. So too has the importance of redressing past neglect of penal services in this context.

Links between DDR and SSR appear to be relatively indirect in this sector, however. The main links appear to relate to re-insertion and re-integration processes. All returnees after conflict, including ex-combatants and their dependents, face relative high risks that others have taken possession of their property or other resources. In this context, ensuring adequate dispute resolution mechanisms is a priority to enable successful and just re-integration and reduce risks of local conflicts.

4.1.6 Transitional justice

Here we briefly return to a discussion of transitional justice and DDR links, building on the discussion in section 3.

Transitional justice focuses on the question of how societies in transition from conflict or authoritarian rule address a history of gross human rights abuses or war crimes. These may include torture, summary executions, forced disappearances, slavery, enforced arbitrary detention, as well as ‘international crimes’ such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of humanitarian law. Transitional justice focuses on such past crimes, and is an umbrella term covering the range of approaches

³³ See, for example, discussion in Hanggi and Scherrer (2007), *op cit*.

that societies may use to contribute to a sense of justice, civic trust, and reconciliation relating to such crimes and to reduce impunity. Important approaches towards transitional justice include: prosecutions before national or international courts; truth-seeking commissions and initiatives; reparations, and institutional reforms.³⁴

Both DDR and SSR have substantial potential links with transitional justice (TJ), some of which were identified in previous sections. As already noted, in principle TJ could be considered to be part of SSR, but in practice it has evolved as a distinct community and issue area.

At the heart of DDR programmes lies an issue relating to transitional justice: is it appropriate or right to focus much attention and resources on the needs of (ex-) combatants and their dependents after conflict, to the relative neglect of the rest of the community – many of which were victims of the violence and insecurity to which combatants contributed. This is a question that local communities and the international community has generally answered positively, in the context of short-term post-conflict security-building. Prioritising the needs of ex-combatants can be wise and acceptable as a transitional measure in the interests of consolidating the peace – but only up to a point. It is now widely agreed that while ex-combatants should individually benefit from re-insertion packages, longer-term re-integration programmes should also provide benefits for the wider recipient communities. A fundamental point, however, is that community acceptance of this approach is more likely to be undermined if there are no substantial TJ measures to address gross abuses or war-crimes. The acceptability and effectiveness of DDR may depend on a combination to parallel TJ measures and appropriate sensitivity to TJ issues within the DDR programme itself. Thus, DDR programmes need to take TJ issues into account in their eligibility criteria for DDR benefits, and in their re-insertion programmes.³⁵

4.1.7 Private security companies

Many ex-combatants drift into employment in loosely regulated private security sector – a source of substantial concern. While the activities of mercenaries and combat-oriented private military/security firms has come to the attention of the world's media, private security and military companies more commonly offer services ranging from military training and logistical support through to static guarding or close protection. Internationally, calls for better regulation of the sector are increasing in connection with their prominent role in theatres like Afghanistan and Iraq.

However, like other non-state security actors, PMCs/PSCs have been relatively neglected until recently within SSR. Their existence is by-and-large neglected in

³⁴ For example, M. Freeman, *What is transitional justice?*, International Centre for Transitional Justice, New York, 2003.

³⁵ For a more substantial discussion of DDR and Transitional Justice, see for example outputs from the ITCJ project on transitional justice and DDR, including 'DDR and Transitional Justice: Issue Paper for Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa; Kinshasa, DRC, 12 –14 June; 2007; UN OSAA.

programming, and as one study puts it, "...while SSR programmes now recognise the 'rightsizing' and reform of public security agencies such as the military and police as key to transition and democratisation, the need to introduce similar levels of professionalism and accountability in the private sector has typically been neglected by donors and practitioners alike."³⁶

In the absence of adequate legislation and regulation, or in circumstances where regulations are poorly enforced, there may be no real control over the type or quality of services provided by PSCs. There is a risk that PSCs function in practice as local militias for powerful interest groups. Inadequately-trained staff with questionable backgrounds may be able to access weaponry and use force in an illegitimate way. Where the rule of law and democratic governance is weak or where the context is one of widespread-armed violence, such problems will be of special concern. Even if the country remains politically stable, this process can contribute to a large constituency of armed groups in the country. Although PSCs form an important element of most countries' security sector (for example, by providing security services for shopping centres etc), they do tend to work for local elites, diverting commitment to adequately resourced police services and often to not substantially enhance the security of the poor and vulnerable.

DDR programming has been similarly remiss, with employment opportunities and risks in the industry receiving too little attention during reintegration planning. But little research has been done on ex-combatant employment in the private security industry worldwide and there are no substantial case studies to draw on. However, the initial work that has been done, coupled with media coverage and anecdotal evidence shows that former police and military personnel are among the favourite employees for private security firms. One of the few detailed research studies carried out anywhere in the world on this topic has shown that in South Eastern Europe, a mature post-conflict area, the industry is an increasingly large and important provider of security, the number of whose personnel often rivals or outstrips state providers.³⁷ In this region at least, inappropriate links between PSCs and actors such as political parties, criminal gangs or paramilitaries seem to be a recurrent problem affecting a small number of firms. Worldwide, the growth of privatized security, depending on the quality of state regulation and public security provision, may either provide a welcome additional layer of security for citizens and property, or yet another challenge to law and order.

Ensuring appropriate regulation and oversight of PSCs is therefore an important aspect of SSR in all societies, and particularly in countries emerging from conflict.

³⁶ Anna Richards and Henry Smith, "Addressing the role of private security companies within security sector reform programmes", Saferworld, 2007.

³⁷ Saferworld and International Alert, "SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: A Cause or Effect of Insecurity?", UNDP-SEESAC, 2005, at <http://www.seesac.org/reports/psc.pdf>.

This would include covering this important non-state sector in initial assessments of both security threats and institutions through which security is delivered and reflecting any findings in SSR programme priorities and design.³⁸ Appropriate regulation, oversight and enforcement or rules, is a priority in most countries emerging from conflict. If this is done well, then some of the risks from ex-combatants joining PSCs will be mitigated. The same applies to SALW control: ensuring that PSCs have access to limited or no arms also mitigates risks.

DDR may also contribute more in this respect. Some DDR programmes appear to have taken few precautions to discourage or prevent ex-combatants joining inadequately regulated PSCs, or even undesirable political militias. At a minimum it is important that reintegration planning and implementation is carried out with a recognition of the sector's importance and in the knowledge that whether by design or default, a proportion of ex-combatants are likely to find employment with non-state security providers including PMC/PMCs. Re-insertion packages could be designed to at least postpone or mitigate such eventualities. Further, DDR systems for tracking of ex-combatants after re-insertion might (with safeguards) be used to facilitate regulation and control of PSCs.

4.2 Experiences from selected countries emerging from conflict

This sub-section briefly discusses some relevant experience from selected countries. These are necessarily brief and highly selective: space does not allow a more comprehensive analysis here. Readers are referred, for example, to the case studies prepared as part of this project, for further relevant experience relating to DDR-SSR links in countries emerging from conflict.³⁹

4.2.1 Kosovo

The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), established in 1999 onwards with wide-ranging executive powers was a landmark in internationally led police development in post-conflict arenas. Together with the OSCE and UNDP, UNMIK established a new police service, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) from scratch from 1999 onwards. Unlike the Kosovo Protection Corps (a civil emergency service composed of the rump KLA in order to bring its membership wholesale under international control), the KPS was primarily established to fill a policing void left by retreating Yugoslav institutions. Nevertheless, inclusion of former KLA combatants was an important consideration and the KPS's mandate required that 50% of candidates (not necessarily

³⁸ Introducing background checks, licensing for companies and staff, strict limitations on the use of force and firearms, and establishing a clear delineation of public/private sector roles and functions and functioning public oversight of the industry might all be appropriate elements of SSR programming that takes account of the private security industry. Richards and Smith, *op. cit.*

³⁹ See the materials of the "DDR and Human Security" project, at <http://www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk>. Note also that the case studies of Kosovo, Haiti, Burundi and DRC conducted by DCAF in its SSR and UN integrated missions project contain relevant material, particularly in relation to SSR (see Hanggi and Scherrer, 2008, *op. cit.*).

recruits) be former KLA members. Over a remarkably short timeframe and within a confused political context, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) has grown to around 7,000 personnel and with the important exception of the Kosovo Serb community, continues to enjoy the highest popularity rating of any public institution in the territory. Notable achievements in relation the KPS range across human resource management, strategic planning, logistics, finance/budgeting and procurement.

Kosovo Police School trainers regard the vetting procedures employed, and more broadly the deliberate inclusion of suitable ex-KLA members within the KPS's ranks, as having been highly beneficial to the organisation's growth and development. Given the varied skill-levels and backgrounds among rank-and-file KLA members, all applicants for KPS positions, regardless of background, were subject to the same vetting and recruitment procedures. These included written tests, interviews, psychological and physical tests as well as background checks.⁴⁰ Although background checks were often incomplete due to missing documentation or witnesses (a problem not confined to ex-combatants), ex-combatants do not appear to have been overly represented among those subsequently dismissed for misconduct or falsification of paperwork. Moreover, training staff assert that the organization was moulded and strengthened in its early days through by including respected and proven leaders who were openly supportive of the post-war reconstruction and state-building project. Perhaps because of the short duration of the Kosovo conflict, the vast majority of ex-KLA recruits adopted a KPS identity quickly. Although UN managers were aware that previous KLA hierarchies and loyalties might present challenges, any informal reporting to former chiefs or political parties is believed to have died out within the first year. That career prospects within the organization offered better incentives than those outside surely played a part.

There are however notable constraints and failings in relation to the KPS. Eight years after it was established by UNMIK, it remains substantially under the control of the international administration and CIVPOL, and subject to minimal oversight by a newly established Ministry of Interior and an inexperienced parliamentary security committee. For the first six years of its existence, KPS had no legal foundation whatsoever and is currently only subject to skeleton legislation passed hurriedly by UNMIK in 2006. The organisation's performance also appears to have been mixed during the riots the swept the territory in March 2004, with others, principally KFOR, having to restore order as KPS floundered without a functional communication system and a minority of recalcitrant officers. While it appears that basic training (OSCE-led) has been strong in the KPS's case, field training and overall organizational development (UNMIK responsibilities) have been haphazard.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Based on Saferworld interviews with senior KPS, UNMIK and KAPSCED staff, June 2007. Today, 37% of KPS personnel are former KLA.

⁴¹E. Rees 'Public Security Management and Peace Operations. Kosovo and UNMIK: Never Land.', in Anja H. Ebnöther and Philipp Fluri (eds), *After Intervention, Public Security Management in Post-*

4.2.2 Timor Leste

In Timor Leste following the cessation of conflict, UNTAET/UNMISSET oversaw the training and equipping of a new police service, bringing some 3,000 uniformed officers up to basic standards in a short time frame. As in Kosovo, the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL) has great symbolic significance and has performs many routine law enforcement duties. Yet the organization has exhibited numerous internal failings and has not been embedded well within a broader institutional and governmental context. The organisation has been criticized as having no development plan or institutional identity but rather a patchwork of allegiances among the officer corps and ranks and to various political figures. Lacking both a development plan and overarching security policy to guide it, PNTL has also seen a worrying growth of paramilitary units within itself whose function is unclear. PNTL's oversight body, the Ministry of the Interior, also established over the same period, routinely interfered in operations and internal affairs, while below-par administration and procurement processes hindered service delivery.

Externally, the organization has also been variously at odds with former armed factions (due to the inclusion of a minority of former officers from the period of Indonesian occupation), and with the national defence force, FALANTIL-FDTL. One report quotes Timor Leste's senior commander of the country's defence force as admitting that in 2004, the greatest threat to the country's security was the police.⁴² Like the PNTL, Timor Leste's defence force, FALINTIL-FDTL, was the progeny of UNTAET and the subsequent UNMISSET, both missions being mandated to build effective and democratic public institutions in Timor Leste. In January 2004, a dispute between FALINTIL-FDTL's First Battalion (made up primarily of ex-combatants) and the police led to an attempted mini-coup d'état in the east of the country. In July 2004, the Australian and British governments initiated major police reforms. In fact, problems such as indiscipline and politicization cut across both organizations, and in February 2006, one third of FALINTIL-FDTL ultimately mutinied and was dismissed.

4.2.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina⁴³

Under extensive executive powers assigned by the Dayton Accord, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) undertook the post-war vetting of nearly 24,000 law enforcement staff, mainly police, between 1999 and 2000. The environment in post-war Bosnia presented many challenges for this work, including a bloated police sector whose ranks had swelled as a result of the conflict, a patchwork state of confused competencies designed to protect national-ethnic interests and

Conflict Societies, From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership, Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence, DCAF, PfP-Consortium, Jun 2005.

⁴² Edward Rees, 'Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: "Improvisation and Confusion" from the Field', United Nations Peacekeeping Office, March 2006.

⁴³ Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, 'Vetting to Prevent Future Abuses: Reforming the Police, Courts, and Prosecutor's Offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina', in Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff, op cit.

territorial gains of the conflict period, and a political class often at odds with both itself and international actors. Bosnia had two (initially three) ethnically-based police services operating independently in different territories under the direction of nationalist political parties. Given the crucial role of many police units in the Bosnian wars, each police service contained numerous ex-combatants (though they were not termed as such), some of whom were inappropriate for longer-term employment, whether due to inappropriate skills and training or dubious war records.

Based on competencies assigned to it in late 1998, from November 1999 to December 2000, UNMIBH registered all ministry of interior personnel in Bosnia, a total of 23,751 persons, for later vetting. Over the following three years background checks and performance monitoring were used to ‘de-certify’ individuals. Grounds for exclusion included evidence of serious breaches of law or duty and acts or omissions from April 1992 to December 1995 which were deemed to ‘demonstrate the inability or unwillingness to uphold international recognized human rights standards.’⁴⁴ UNMIBH assumed all key responsibilities in this task, from reviewing information to conducting follow-up investigations and in the person of the UNMIBH police commissioner, taking the ultimate decision to approve or reject individuals for certification from employment with any law enforcement agency in BiH.⁴⁵ Individual officers’ rights of appeal were limited and handled via a somewhat opaque internal review process, a fact which together with a low threshold of proof (de-certification was possible if there were ‘grounds for suspicion’), has led to criticisms of the process used.⁴⁶

By December 2002, although certification had only been actively denied to 481 officers, only 15,786 of all applicants were granted full certification. The reduction in the overall size of Bosnia’s police services was a useful by-product of the vetting process. This in turn was accompanied by some improvement in the representation of ethnic minorities and women within policing agencies. Yet a recent study questions whether the post-war vetting process has led to any improvement in police performance except in minority areas where cases of harassment and other attacks dropped markedly.⁴⁷ To date, no overall assessment of police performance in Bosnia in terms of ‘hard’ measures such as crime rates has been compiled. Public opinion surveys show either a slight improvement in popularity levels, but no real change in other areas such as perceptions of corruption.⁴⁸ From the point of view of many

⁴⁴ IPTF Policy P10/2002, para. 2(h).

⁴⁵ Madrid Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council Declaration—Annex, Article II, para. 16.

⁴⁶ No review was permitted by an independent tribunal or similar body, and officers were not permitted to make oral representations in support of their case. See for example, IPTF Policy P10/2002, paras. 10–11; and IPTF Policy P11/2002, para. 13–14; and International Commission of Jurists, *The Rule of Law and Human Rights. Principles and Definitions* (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1966).

⁴⁷ ‘Vetting to Prevent Future Abuses’, Ibid.

⁴⁸ According to UNDP’s Early Warning surveys, public confidence in the police rose from between 46.2% and 73.3% in 2000 to between 63.2% and 79% in 2003. UNDP Early Warning System in Bosnia

individual officers, both those denied certification and those who witnessed the inevitable confusion wrought by such widespread vetting of colleagues, this is hardly surprising. On the one hand, those excluded from employment continue to express frustration and in some cases to challenge via the European courts and appeals to the UN regarding a lack of due process. Many serving and retired officers also point to the negative effects that the certification process had on routine policing work as a combination of administrative confusion within UNMIBH, the removal of experienced personnel and an overarching discourse centring on police abuse created favourable conditions for criminality and eroded police morale.⁴⁹

Today, Bosnia's two police services continue to operate in parallel jurisdictions and too little has changed.⁵⁰ Progress on overall police restructuring, a contentious but crucial element of the international community's state-building project there, is conspicuously stalled despite the lure of an EU SAA agreement.

4.2.4 El Salvador⁵¹

The cessation of armed conflict in El Salvador in 1992 saw the role of the armed forces being redefined constitutionally to that of external defence only in light of their long involvement in the country's civil war. Policing functions that they had taken on in the intervening twelve years were hived-off to a new *Policia Nacional Civil* (PNC), and other policing structures dismantled. Accompanying measures included development of a new national security doctrine, abolition of numerous paramilitary structures and the introduction of a Truth Commission and enhanced judicial oversight of the security sector. The establishment of the PNC was viewed as one of several measures to demilitarize society following the peace agreement but also as one guarantee for the rebel Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) that its members would enjoy security as the group transformed itself into a political party. Entry to the PNC was open to FMLN members and those formerly employed by security structures such as the old *Police Nacional* (PN). According to the terms of the 1992 peace accord, up to 20% of new candidates for the PNC could be nominated by the Government (from PN) and 20% by FMLN from its ranks, with the remainder having to be drawn from wider society.

and Herzegovina, Annual Report 2000, and Annual Report 2003, <http://www.ews.undp.ba/eng/izvjestaji.asp>.

⁴⁹ One former interview with a background in the Republika Srpska police maintains it became routine for criminal suspects to accuse arresting officers of human rights abuses in the knowledge that this would likely lead to an investigation against the officer or them being released without charge. Routine law enforcement obviously suffered in this climate. Saferworld interview with former RS police officer, Sarajevo, June 2007.

⁵⁰ See for example, International Crisis Group, 'Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU', Europe Report N°164, September 2005, available at www.crisisgroup.org, 6 September 2005.

⁵¹ This section draws heavily on, 'The Struggle for Lasting Reform: Vetting Processes in El Salvador', Rubén Zamora with David Holiday, in Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff, op. cit.

The PNC's creation has since been widely acclaimed for its contribution to the peace process and for the move towards a more progressive public security model than previous structures. However, systemic problems with criminality have dogged the new organization over the years. They are said to have directly flowed from a flawed initial vetting process and to have been compounded by other problems of recruitment and internal accountability. Cheating by both government and FMLN during the initial recruitment and vetting phase, coupled with the difficulties of carrying out background checks using unreliable police and guerrilla records certainly played a part in this, though the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), was able to reverse most such actions. FMLN's success in inserting members into civilian posts in the PNC and youth gangs into the police academy in later years, are worth noting. However, weak internal accountability systems within the PNC compounded these problems, leading to a greater reliance on ONUSAL than would otherwise have been the case. Those arrangements that did exist, a disciplinary tribunal, disciplinary investigative unit and a control unit, were also overlapping and inefficient. The fact that in 1998, two years after nearly half of all police sub commissioners had been charged with some kind of disciplinary infraction, none had been dismissed, is evidence of this. Subsequent dismissals, more akin to purges, needed Presidential backing in the wake of high-profile kidnappings and robberies by PNC members in 2000. The national human rights ombudsman, along with outside observers, criticized the lack of due process which led to hundreds of officers being dismissed that year and the subsequent modification of the existing police act institutionalising this arrangement.

Although the PNC's public approval ratings have improved since 2000, nearly one third of officers were subject to public complaints in 2003, indicating that serious problems remain. Moreover, most dismissed officers have reportedly entered employment in the country's growing private security sector which is now larger than the PNC itself. Checks on their conduct are now obviously far fewer. The arbitrary and externally-driven nature of these disciplinary procedures has been noted by observers, as have the contributing factors such as the intense pressures placed on a new institution with inadequate staffing and poor leadership which operated in a policy vacuum.⁵²

4.2.5 Some reflections and lessons from case studies

The examples of El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo and Timor Leste suggest a number of different considerations that those undertaking DDR in a context of police reform or wider SSR need to bear in mind. Firstly, questions surrounding vetting warrant obvious attention and the above cases offer lessons related to the vetting process itself (e.g. criteria, right of appeal, transparency). While a balance must obviously be struck between practical considerations and the need to weed out undesirables rapidly, vetting processes used in places such as Bosnia or Iraq have come under fire for their

⁵²Ibid.

heavy-handed treatment of individuals in a manner not fully consistent with international standards. (In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has also come under fire for its blanket exclusion of Ba'ath party members, irrespective of their personal history.)⁵³ Although independent scrutiny or judicial review of vetting decisions may not always be possible, some semblance of due process should be attached to vetting arrangements in order that they do not further undermine rule of law while attempting to find a role for ex-combatants.

In some cases, there may also be an option of including former employees of state security bodies into new structures. Whereas in Iraq, Ba'ath party members were totally excluded from re-employment in the security sector, partial inclusion of former employees was attempted in Haiti and Timor Leste under UN auspices in an attempt to bolster new police services. In Haiti from 1994 onwards, 1,500 former military officers were brought into the new Haitian National Police service alongside new recruits, despite their association with the previous dictatorship. Vetting in this case was minimal and with a focus on competency rather than integrity. While this allowed the police service to grow rapidly, insufficient attention to the likely dynamics between old and new recruits led to politicization, a re-emergence of human rights abuses and corruption within the service.⁵⁴ The longer-term perspective adopted in Timor Leste, and greater attention to transitional justice issues, meant that few officers from the era of Indonesian occupation were incorporated into the PNTL for fear of creating division both within the service and with the public. Although this presented some difficulties, the tensions between these former officers that emerged were not with the public at large, but with particular elements formerly associated with armed factions, which highlights the importance of context in dictating such decisions.⁵⁵ Similarly in Liberia, it has not only been the country's two partially demobilised armed groups, LURD and MODEL, that pose difficulties for the peace process and related SSR, but internal disputes within them as well as the agendas of their ex-combatant supporters.⁵⁶

A number of difficulties have outlined above in relation to the development and reform of the police or private security firms, but it is important to recognize that police and private security reform are developing fields of work with a mixed track record. They are difficult undertakings at the best of times and little guidance exists on how to design and implement programmes in a post-conflict settings. The above examples are drawn not just from post-conflict environments but contexts with Peace Support Operations (PSOs) which adds an additional layer of complexity. PSOs are

⁵³Magarditsch Hatschikjan, Dusan Reljic, Nenad Sebek (eds.), *Disclosing Hidden History: Lustration in the Western Balkans, A Project Documentation*, CDRSEE, 2005.

⁵⁴Eirin Mobekk, 'International Involvement in Restructuring and Creating Security Forces: The Case of Haiti', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 12(3), 2001, pp. 97-114.

⁵⁵Eirin Mobekk, 'Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform: Enabling Sustainable Peace', Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Occasional Paper – № 13; see also, Rees (2006), op. cit.

⁵⁶Rees (2006), op. cit.

characterized by short yet vague mandates, competition between international donors and institutions, and the tendency is for short-term contingencies to take precedence over long-term solutions to deep-rooted problems. Security institutions created or rebuilt under such conditions bear these hallmarks. For example, KPS and PNTL, both established under UN mandated administrations have both struggled to overcome decisions taken within the first twelve months of their creation for expedient reasons.

Only a minority of the problems identified above arise from DDR programming or its attempted linkage with SSR. Reforming or newly established public security institutions face a number of different challenges post-conflict, of which the potential incorporation of ex-combatants is but one. These challenges remain regardless of whether ex-combatants are brought into the fold or not, and the dilemma may of whether to recruit ex-combatants into security forces needs to be seen from a number of different perspectives, including the capacity and intended role of those institutions, the symbolic importance of any such moves within the wider political settlement, and the societal capacity to deal with the aspirations of ex-combatants. Like society at large, police services will face any pressures arising from DDR processes, with or without ex-combatants in their ranks. The inclusion of some ex-Indonesian era police officers in Timor Leste's PNTL has caused ongoing tension with the country's different former armed factions, while the substantial numbers of ex-KLA fighters in the KPS has long overshadowed mundane questions of operational effectiveness among Kosovo's Serbs.⁵⁷ In Kosovo's case, at least in the eyes of the majority K-Albanian population, the problems of the KPS have not been to do with the inclusion of ex-combatants in the organization. Factors such as the politicization of public life, confusion over the territory's final status and tensions between the neo-autocracy of UNMIK, a UN Mission with strong executive powers but no meaningful accountability in Kosovo itself, and an indigenous government with restricted powers, arguably affected the KPS far more than having ex-combatants in its ranks.

But included consciously or not in SSR, ex-combatants (registered or otherwise) will always exert influence within SSR processes and within other forms of post-conflict reconstruction and state-building. Whether as individuals within the workplace or community, as civil society associations dedicated to their representation and advancement, or as the 'rehabilitated' politicians and government officials of the new state, they are bound to have influence. It is as natural for them as it is for others to seek positions of influence in state institutions and the better connected and savvier among them will see this as their 'due'. Others may simply be drawn to occupations in keeping with their skills and experience – policing, military service, private security work all have this attraction. Cases such as Kosovo highlight the fact that demobilized armed factions continue to influence the political direction of post-conflict societies in more than one way. Their acknowledged role as freedom fighters,

⁵⁷ Rees (2006) op. cit.

or the successful conversion from armed groups to militias, veterans' associations or political parties, warrants at least as much attention.

This suggests that some priorities of DDR, SSR and also transitional justice may be in tension, and thus co-ordination becomes a priority. Vetting processes are a case in point: whether stripping capable personnel out of already degraded law enforcement institutions and adding to the pressured environment in which their colleagues work (as in Bosnia) is seen as wise or necessary will depend on the primacy different societies and actors see the trade-offs between DDR, SSR or transitional justice processes. Too often, the trade-offs and judgements involved have been poorly explored or not dealt with explicitly enough. In relation to the possible incorporation of ex-combatants into the police or private security agencies, clear objectives need to be agreed and in doing so competing priorities weighted. As the case studies above show particularly in relation to police services, true institution-building (rather than the mere creation of police organizations with the accompanying trappings) often remains an elusive objective for police reform projects. Although there are clearly important questions around the vetting of personnel, in the future, researchers and practitioners would do well to consider in more detail whether the integration of ex-combatants into new or reformed security institutions can support, or at a minimum not undermine, the deeper process of institutional development as a means by which the delivery of security and consolidation of rule of law can be achieved. This would entail embedding vetting and recruitment processes within long-run and comprehensive plans for organizational development (or in the case of private security market, sector development), with due attention to often neglected issues of developing rules and procedures, shared norms and a working ethos to bind old and new recruits together in a way that reflects the broader social contract or underlying peace building strategies.

5. Assessment and Emerging Policy Implications

This final section aims to bring together some of the key findings and arguments from this Thematic Working Paper and to explore their potential policy implications. It includes a discussion of the possible overall implications of linkages between DDR, SSR and SALW control

5.1 DDR-SSR programme links and priorities for enhanced co-ordination

This paper has, we believe, demonstrated clearly that there are many areas of overlap and linkage between DDR and SSR programmes and processes in countries emerging from war. Although DDR and SSR programmes have distinctive characteristics, they interlink due to overlapping aims and objectives, target groups, key stakeholders, functions, and operational implementation. Both DDR and SSR can contribute substantially to human security as well as state stabilisation, and to be effective they need to be integrated into a wider peace and security-building process. In each

sectoral area of concern to SSR, there are potentially important links with aspects of DDR programmes and processes. Similarly, in many contexts, the long-term effectiveness of DDR can be expected to depend substantially on adequate progress on SSR

In this respect, the lack of a specific and substantial chapter providing guidance on co-ordinating DDR and SSR was clearly a major omission in the IDDRS published in 2007. It is therefore good news that the UN plans to prepare such a chapter by the end of 2008, through a task force jointly coordinated by UNDPKO and UNDP. This Thematic Working Paper highlights several key issue areas and priorities that need to be addressed by policy-makers and practitioners, which need to be addressed in such a new chapter of IDDRS.

Similarly, SSR guidelines such as those provided in the OECD-DAC IF-SSR handbook need to be substantially further developed in relation to countries emerging from conflict. In practice, the overall approach of these OECD-DAC guidelines were primarily prepared with other contexts in mind, with special post-conflict sub-sections added where relevant.

As the UN prepares a common approach to supporting SSR in the context of integrated peace support missions, it is not clear how far the ‘developmental’ approach promoted by OECD-DAC will be maintained and successfully combined with the time-limited priorities characteristic of such post-conflict missions. In their review of SSR activities in recent UN integrated missions, Hanggi and Scherrer identify extensive but relatively fragmented and ad-hoc efforts to support SSR.⁵⁸ The relatively holistic approaches associated with the Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) and the SSR approaches developed by the UN Office in Burundi were the exception rather than the rule. Even these two cases appear to be far from the practices envisaged in the OECD approach, because of the limits of local ownership: UNMIK’s authority to impose externally-determined strategies conditioned the approach in Kosovo, while the UN Office in Burundi’s holistic approach was rejected by national authorities in favour of a more limited piecemeal approach to SSR. More generally, the extensive range of SSR related activities supported in the context of UN peace support missions have tended to focus on immediate post-conflict priorities rather than the longer-term process-oriented developmental approach of OECD-DAC, and this may reflect enduring post-conflict political and security realities as well as inadequacies in UN capacity and co-ordination for SSR support.

On the basis of the findings of this Thematic Working Paper, there should be no a priori assumption about the sequencing of DDR and SSR programmes and processes. There are certainly relatively ‘classical’ contexts in which DDR can be launched and implemented quite promptly after a peace agreement between conflict parties with

⁵⁸ Hanggi and Scherrer (2007), op. cit.

relatively disciplined and defined armed forces, in which circumstances demobilisation and re-insertion processes may be well-advanced before SSR programmes start in earnest. However, it is not even clear that this is the case for most post-conflict countries, let alone all. DDR programmes can be seriously delayed for a range of contingent reasons. Moreover, in several recent cases (including Haiti and South Sudan), the post-conflict context was not conducive to early large scale DDR, and SSR and wider community security-building activities were a relative priority. Thus guidelines for DDR-SSR co-ordination need to allow for a variety of sequencing possibilities.

Similarly, it is important to recognise the limits of any guidelines for co-ordination between DDR and SSR that rely on close and effective planning from the outset. It is an important priority to aim to achieve co-ordinated or joint DDR and SSR needs and pre-planning assessments, and similarly for programme design and planning. However, there are structural limits to what can be achieved. Even in a ideal context of co-ordination in a country conducive to early launch of post-conflict security-building programmes, there will be many limitations on capacity to design appropriate re-insertion and re-integration programmes or longer-term SSR programmes. In the case of SSR, for example, it would probably even be wrong in principle to define longer-term SSR strategies before reasonably inclusive and extended national debates can be held involving all relevant government ministries, parliamentary representatives and civil society groups. In practice, these cannot be expected to be substantially advanced until 1-2 years after any peace settlement.

Thus, an emerging critical policy implication is to plan from the outset for a major 'mid-term' review of SSR and remaining DDR priority and programmes, which may take place some 12 – 24 months into the post-conflict peace-building process. International donors and agencies should be prepared to substantially re-consider their support programmes at that stage, to adjust to emerging local and national preferences and priorities. This is required even in an 'ideal' case, where good SSR –DDR co-ordination is established at the outset. It is even more important in reality, where poor co-ordination is likely and structural opportunities to recover the situation are needed.

The specific priorities for close co-ordination between DDR and SSR programmes depend on the circumstances of each case. However, on the basis of programme analysis and practical experience discussed in sections 2 – 4 above, where DDR and SSR programmes are both present at the same time, they include:

- Close co-ordination or partial integration for pre-planning and needs assessments; promoting a conducive political and security environment, and aspects of programme planning and design;
- Close co-ordination and mutual support for measures to enable and develop local 'ownership' and national capacity (for assessment, policy development,

planning and implementation) and policy debates from the initial stages onwards;

- Close co-ordination or partial integration in relation to a number of assessments and decisions relating to partial integration of ex-combatants into continuing national security sector institutions: particularly the defence forces, but also potentially border and coastal management institutions; police or auxiliary forces; and private security companies. Such decisions will profoundly affect both reform of these security sector institutions and the character and extent of DDR.
- Co-ordination in relation to demobilisation programmes and processes (including re-insertion), particularly to promote ways in which SSR and DDR programmes can combine to ensure an environment in which both returning ex-combatants and their dependents and recipient communities feel adequately secure and have access to functioning and acceptable dispute resolution and justice mechanisms. These might find focus around community safety and security initiatives, which may also combine elements of SALW control.
- Co-ordination of approach of DDR and SSR programmes to transitional justice issues and mechanisms, with the aim of maintaining appropriate support for TJ processes while achieving effective programming;
- Co-ordination or partial integration of mid-term reviews (perhaps 12 – 24 months) after the peace settlement), to ensure appropriate priorities and integrated approaches to human security and peace-building after the short-term D&D and SSR priorities have been acted upon.
- Co-ordination to enhance the role that SSR measures can play in providing a conducive environment for longer-term re-integration, reconciliation and development.
- Co-ordination to enhance the role that DDR might play in supporting gender mainstreaming in SSR, and in facilitating the development of ex-combatant roles in civilian and democratic governance and oversight of the security sector.
- Co-ordination to ensure that relevant resources and capabilities developed through the DDR programme is retained for the longer-term – taking advantage of the longer-term perspective of well-designed SSR programmes.

Each of these points are discussed and substantiated in detail in sections 2-4 above.

It appears to us that that time is now ripe for achieving relatively wide range support from relevant and experienced DDR and SSR policy-makers and practitioners now for the above findings. The fact that such co-ordination and synergy has so far been relatively rare and patchy can at least partially be explained by a range of contingent factors that may now be possible to overcome. These include:

- SSR activities and programmes have only recently emerged as a recognised ‘normal’ and major element of post-conflict security building, and thus substantial opportunities for co-ordination have only recently developed in practice;
- Many recent post-conflict SSR-related activities associated with peace support missions, relating for example to post-conflict policing or ‘rule of law’, have not been conceived to be part of a wider SSR strategy or process, but rather as emergency post-conflict security-building measures – limiting practitioners perceived needs for co-ordination with DDR;
- Where DDR decisions have obviously and closely linked with decisions about the re-sizing and re-structuring of defence forces, there has in practice been high awareness of this amongst key national and international stake-holders, and co-ordination between DDR and this aspect of SSR has often been substantial without having to establish wider DDR-SSR co-ordination mechanisms.
- Those post-conflict SSR programmes that have been launched with a longer term ‘developmental’ perspective have often not only been delayed, starting as D&D programme elements have been coming to a close or have ended, but also have not been anticipated at an early stage – limiting scope for co-ordination in assessment, planning or design;
- Most post-conflict SSR activities and programmes have left much to be desired in their own terms, and (contrary to accepted good-practice guidelines) have been short-term, ad-hoc and fragmented. It is important to develop SSR strategies and also mechanisms and capacities for co-ordination of SSR programmes if adequate co-ordination with DDR is to be achieved.
- Recently, there has been a damaging tendency to raise unrealistic expectations of what can be achieved through DDR programmes and a relatively disorganised debate about their potential scope. This has sometimes contributed to unsuccessful attempts to expand DDR programmes to incorporate whole aspects of SSR, particularly in relation to community safety and security initiatives, without sufficiently careful design and management.

In this context, it is relatively easy to explain why effective co-ordination between SSR and DDR has often been lacking in the past. The time is now ripe to build on our foregoing analysis to develop priorities and guidelines for promoting effective co-ordination in the future, to promote the security and well-being of the poor and vulnerable as well as contribute to national and regional security.

5.2 Taking full account of different post-conflict contexts

All good guidelines for programmes to promote security and peace-building after conflict emphasise the important of adapting the guidelines to specific local contexts and needs. Thus programmes for DDR, SSR and SSR-DDR co-ordination need to be customised carefully in each country, on the basis of detailed assessments.

Nevertheless, there is a tendency for international guidelines to make generic assumptions about post-conflict contexts, not least to maintain a relatively coherent overall approach.

We believe that the IDDRS have been prone to this, underestimating the extent to which different contexts may imply profoundly different approaches; particularly where they depart in a major way from a ‘classic’ case in which an integrated DDR programme can be launched quite rapidly after a definitive peace agreement between relatively committed and well-organised conflict parties.

5.2.1 Outline guidance for co-ordination in ‘classic’ case contexts

In contexts resembling such classic cases, one could envisage the following broad structural approach to promoting DDR-SSR co-ordination. Firstly, ensure that mechanisms and capacities are mobilised to enable a co-ordinated and relatively integrated approach to DDR and SSR as distinctive integrated programmes. At present, these have become relatively well developed for DDR, but much, much more needs to be done to enable co-ordinated SSR programmes.

Secondly, prioritise joint initial pre-planning and needs assessments for all post-conflict peace and security-building programmes, including DDR, SSR and also SALW control, mine action, IDP return and so on. Thirdly, on the basis of these, aim to plan and design appropriate DDR and SSR programmes with appropriate close co-ordination in areas that assessments indicate to be a priority (taking into account the discussion in sections 2 – 4 above). These programmes should be designed with a shorter-term focus on disarmament and demobilisation (including re-integration) on the one hand, and on immediate SSR priorities for defence restructuring, policing, rule of law and access to justice on the other. At the same time, preparations should be started for re-integration (in the case of DDR planners); capacity building for development of longer term SSR strategies (for SSR planners); and enabling and promoting local ownership (a concern for both DDR and SSR). These programmes should then be implemented, with effective DDR-SSR co-ordination in priority areas within the framework of an overall strategy for peace and security building.

Then, after 12 – 24 months, a major mid-term review of all post-conflict security-building programmes could usefully be envisaged. This would assess overall progress, and emerging challenges and opportunities, and for the basis for longer-term programmes for completing re-insertion, re-integration of ex-combatants, and the development of comprehensive SSR strategies. From this stage onwards, it is less clear that DDR should be maintained as a distinctive integrated programme separate from SSR or re-integration other displaced people. In principle it is possible that ex-combatant re-integration programmes should be integrated into community safety and security initiatives and wider re-integration and development processes, alongside holistic SSR programmes developed as envisaged by OECD – DAC.

This outline sketch of a possible overall approach to DDR –SSR coordination is broadly consistent with the wider IDDRS approach to co-ordinating DDR with related programmes in the first 12 – 24 months. However, it deliberately envisages a more open approach thereafter, in which a more ‘modular’ approach to remaining DDR elements may be envisaged. Although DDR may continue as an integrated and distinctive programme, it can also be envisaged as elements integrated into wider security-building and re-integration processes.

5.2.2 Co-ordination in contexts where DDR is substantially delayed

For a range of reasons, DDR programmes may be seriously delayed. In these cases, substantial re-orientation or demobilisation of armed groups can be expected to have taken place, and many important SSR related issues will have evolved considerably. Many DDR programme elements (including special treatment for various categories of ex-combatant) implicitly assume that they will take place as short –term measures shortly after a peace settlement, and are much harder to justify for programmes that are launched after substantial delays. In those contexts, it may be wise to profoundly re-think the best ways of integrating DDR and SSR elements, within an overall framework of human security building and conflict prevention.

In these contexts, it is not clear that the overall approach to co-ordination envisaged by IDDRS provides best guidance. It may be better to aim to launch SSR programmes at a relatively early stage, particularly in view of their wider range of programme elements, greater flexibility about target groups and phasing, and the importance from the beginning of developing local processes and capacity to take ownership of SSR strategy.

For example, and combination of defence restructuring, establishing security governance institutions, and community safety and security building initiatives (combining SSR (such as community-policing partnerships), SALW control and confidence-building initiatives) might sometimes form a primary focus for early post-conflict security building. Disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants on a large scale might be postponed. In this context, many elements of DDR described in IDDRS will remain relevant, such as those to address the special needs of camp followers, dependents, disabled combatants, women and children associated with armed groups, and also measures to facilitate ‘spontaneous’ re-insertion and re-integration. These may be combined into a customised and partial ‘DDR’ programme, but might also be integrated on a more flexible modular basis into wider programmes to support re-integration and support for displaced people. Haiti and South Sudan provide two examples of such contexts, where it may have been better at the outset to focus on developing a customised post-conflict security building programme without such prominence being given to integrated DDR planning.

As in the classic case, a major mid-term review would be desirable after 12 – 24 months, to reconfigure security building programmes according to emerging and longer-term priorities.

5.2.3 Responding to risks of undesirable instrumental use of programmes by powerful local stakeholders

Post-conflict security-building processes are intrinsically highly contested, with conflict parties and other powerful actors seeking to pursue their interests. In this context, ‘local ownership’ of DDR or SSR programmes can manifest itself in distinctly undesirable ways, as elites or sectional interests capture key national positions and policies. This is recognised by all international policy-makers and practitioners with experience of post conflict reconstruction and peace-and security building programmes.

Experience shows that DDR programmes have sometimes been particularly vulnerable to instrumental use by conflict parties. They offer potentially very large resources to members of armed groups through their re-insertion packages, that powerful interest groups have an interest in securing for the own purposes – for example to encourage continuation of a ceasefire, maintain loyalty of combatant and supporter groups, or to corruptly capture a proportion of the resources for themselves. Although it is legitimate for DDR programme managers and their donors to compromise in some areas, it is also important to take action to respond to excessive local instrumental use of their programmes.

In this context, it is important to reflect on criteria for evaluation and response. It may often be acceptable for local stakeholders to insist on practices that are not recommended in the IDDRS. Otherwise, ‘local ownership’ risks becoming an empty term. Further, there may be circumstances in which policy-makers legitimately decide to go along with instrumental use of DDR programme elements in line with a wider strategy for post-conflict security and peace-building. However, such decisions should be taken deliberately, and in line with a wide strategy, rather than in the context of drift and unproductive attempts to get programmes ‘back on track’.

Similar comments can be made in relation to SSR, and perhaps even more powerfully. In a context of many competing priorities, compromises legitimately need to be made, particularly in the early stages of post-conflict recovery. However, some SSR activities may definitely not be worthy of support. It is important that SSR benefits the poor and vulnerable, and contributes to an overall long-term goal of enhanced democratic governance and accountability.

The specific relevance of these comments here is that they can have profound implications for overall approaches to integrated programming for DDR and SSR and for co-ordination between them. Adherence to guidelines for integrated programming can help to bolster resistance to opportunistic or selfish instrumental use of DDR or

SSR programmes. But they do not render them invulnerable to them. It is important to take regular stock of the situation, and to prioritise overall post-conflict peace and security building over the integrated delivery of specific programmes. In contexts where powerful national stakeholders drive DDR and SSR according to their own sectional priorities, it may be better for external donors and supporters to adopt a more flexible, modular approach to what DDR and SSR activities they support, in line with a strategic political approach. International guidelines could usefully be developed to provide advice for these situations as well as for more benign contexts.

Conclusion

It is clear from our analysis, that there are many important actual and potential strategic linkages between DDR and SSR programmes. Some are much more direct and significant than others. This paper thus clarifies and details such significant linkages, and hopefully contributes to current international processes including the preparation of a new IDDRS chapter on the implications of such linkages for DDR practitioners. There are, for example, important benefits in integrating assessment and design of SSR and DDR, and ensuring close consultation in monitoring and review processes. Provisions for pooling resources and joint national capacity building are valuable. However, it explores and develops a case for potentially going beyond such a framework towards a deep co-ordination or integration of DDR and SSR programmes in post-conflict contexts.

Some of the substantial linkages imply important potential advantages to substantially enhancing co-ordination of SSR and DDR programmes, and customised integration of particular elements of DDR, SSR and arms management in an overall post-conflict security building process. Some elements of disarmament and demobilisation, for example, might usefully directly be linked to SSR processes. Re-integration strategies and requirements should directly inform SSR priorities. Integrated SSR, DDR and arms management programmes are required to address the specific issues of small residual and emergent-armed groups in the post-conflict context.

As discussed, substantial progress towards effective co-ordination, and partial integration, of DDR, SSR and SALW control programmes can be achieved in a way that is consistent with the overall approach underlying the IDDRS, which seek to retain integrated and distinctive DDR programming. However, many of our findings identify limits to this approach, particularly after the first 12-24 months of post-conflict programming or in 'non-classic' contexts for DDR.

In practice, within present frameworks there are major obstacles to effective co-ordination of DDR, SSR and SALW programmes. The challenges of effective co-ordination, even communication, between different programmes, internal actors, and external donors and institutions are well known. They are typically designed and implemented by different coalitions of actors and institutions, drawing on differently

structured and authorised resources and funds. It appears very possible that the emergent overarching approach of conceiving DDR, SSR and SALW as separate policy and programming spheres that should be co-ordinated where strategically necessary might make matters worse.

In practice, 'DDR', 'SSR' and 'SALW' are labels for a wide and potentially disparate range of issues and programme elements. The precise ways in which these different programme elements should be combined to promote post-conflict security effectively will however be highly contingent on the particular circumstances of the country and region concerned. They should also depend critically on a realistic assessment of the likely commitment and resource allocation of relevant internal and external actors and organisations. In principle, it is not clear that it is better to aim for integrated programming within these spheres, and mere 'co-ordination between them.

It is not effective to develop a supposedly ideal integrated plan, which predictably will not and cannot be implemented because of the patterns of resources, capabilities and interests of the relevant actors that would need to be involved.

For these reasons, we believe that there is strong potential in exploring the possibility of a more 'modular' approach to all of the types of policy and programme across the range of DDR, SSR and SALW programmes in post-conflict contexts. The approach is to explore ways in which elements from each of these spheres might be integrated in an overall post-conflict security building programme customised on a case by case basis for each situation. If institutional processes, assessments and resources were organised on the assumption that this is the best approach, it is possible that the prospects for effective integration and co-ordination to meet the security needs of post-conflict societies, and particularly those of the poor and vulnerable, might be more likely in practice to be achieved.