Impact of HIV and AIDS on intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer and its implication for both sectoral and summative governances in Namibia

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Key words: Namibia, governance, summative, sectoral, knowledge, tacit, HIV/AIDS, intergenerational, formation, transfer

Abstract

In this thesis, I argue for a move from the preoccupation with the obvious (crude and quantifiable impacts), towards critically examining the subtle (less than obvious impacts), which will allow us to deal with adversities (the likes of HIV and AIDS) in the most effective ways. The thesis adopts the summative governance framework to demonstrate how our preoccupation with the quantifiable impacts shrouds our intellectual and practical ability to deal with the subtle impacts of AIDS. Governance is hypothesised to emerge amidst turbulent, unpredictable, messy, complex and dynamic path conditions predicated upon certain orders of criticality, including but not limited to the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. The thesis suggests that the evolution of governance from nascent to fully institutionalised mechanisms of control is in itself a product of the evolution of knowledge. Notwithstanding, HIV and AIDS constrain the emergence of governance through impacting the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer.
Resultantly, these impacts are not merely additive and isolated to the sectoral governances, but are summative, intergenerational and structured, and potentially endanger the fundamental systems of governance. The pre and post independence induced vulnerabilities of Namibia are presented to demonstrate that the country is an engrossing, but yet a perilous mix of the past and the present. Whilst Namibia aspires for a democratic, non-racial, progressive society, the thesis demonstrates that due to constraints engendered by HIV and AIDS this proceeds on terms and conditions that by no means guarantee a happy outcome.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>ALAN</td>
<td>Local Authorities in Namibia</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>Antenatal Care</td>
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<td>ARC</td>
<td>Association of Regional Councils of Namibia</td>
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<td>ARV</td>
<td>Antiretroviral</td>
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<td>BMI</td>
<td>Body Mass Index</td>
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<td>CCR5</td>
<td>Chemokine receptor type 5</td>
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<td>CHGA</td>
<td>Commission on HIV/AIDS and Governance in Africa</td>
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<td>CHH</td>
<td>Child- and youth-headed households</td>
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<td>CR</td>
<td>Critical Realism</td>
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<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>ECN</td>
<td>Electoral Commission of Namibia</td>
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<td>ECOSCOC</td>
<td>UN Economic and Social Commission</td>
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<td>ECSP</td>
<td>Environment Change and Security Program</td>
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<td>ETSIP</td>
<td>Education and Training Sector Improvement Programme</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GF</td>
<td>Global Fund</td>
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<td>GT</td>
<td>Grounded Theory</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit or German Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAMU</td>
<td>HIV and AIDS Management Unit</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<td>Idasa</td>
<td>Institute for democracy in Africa</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>IPPR</td>
<td>Institute for Public Policy Research</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>LED</td>
<td>Local Economic Development</td>
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<td>LKI</td>
<td>Local Key Informant</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>MoHSS</td>
<td>Ministry of Health and Social Services</td>
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<td>MTP</td>
<td>Medium Term Plan</td>
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<td>NDHS</td>
<td>National Demographic and Health Survey</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NIED</td>
<td>National Institute for Educational Development</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Planning Commission</td>
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<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Strategic Framework</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OPO</td>
<td>Owamboland Peoples Organisation</td>
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<td>OVC</td>
<td>Orphans and Vulnerable Children</td>
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<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan African Congress</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>S&amp;T</td>
<td>Science and Technology</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>SIV</td>
<td>Simian immunodeficiency virus</td>
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<td>STD</td>
<td>Sexually Transmitted Disease</td>
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<td>STI</td>
<td>Sexually Transmitted Infection</td>
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<td>SWANU</td>
<td>South West African National Union</td>
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<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African Peoples Organisation</td>
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<td>TB</td>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>United Nations Joint Commission on AIDS</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCT</td>
<td>Voluntary Counselling and Testing</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
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SECTION I: CONCEPTUALISATION

Chapter 1: Introduction

Background and justification

In an effort to demonstrate the subtle but yet perilous impacts of HIV and AIDS on societal systems of rules that foster order and stability, I set out to advance the argument that, in the most severely affected countries of the world, the impact of HIV and AIDS on the various levels of systems of governances cannot be viewed as merely additive but must be understood as summative. The summative governance framework is considered- and thus adopted for this thesis- to best approximate the impacts of HIV and AIDS, as they move through societies’ governance structures in varying horizontal and vertical densities. The thesis is rooted in the notion that whilst disruptions to societal order are sometimes visible to the eye, many are rendered visible only by a more inquisitive gaze. This is not hard to see, because human civilisations, despite their level of development, self-consistently generates complex problems, requiring insights into the extent to which the social, cultural, political and economic systems can tolerate such complex problems and rapid changes without them succumbing. The conceptualisation of the impacts of HIV and AIDS on governance as ‘summative’ helps us understand how rapid, pervasive and subtle changes- such as those engendered by HIV and AIDS- are capable of disrupting the stable continuance of societies. By utilising the
governance framework that views governance as a summative phenomenon, we begin to comprehend the extent to which HIV and AIDS subtly disrupts societal coherence of nations most afflicted by HIV and AIDS.

Governance is viewed (in this thesis) as a summative phenomenon, in that the various systems of governances from a higher to a lower order interact “between actors on micro, meso, and macro levels of socio-political aggregation”.\(^1\) Rosenau proposed the term summative governance in order to reflect the complex interplay and interdependence of the various systems, which not only involves flows, consequences and causation within the systems but also involves sustaining flows across the systems.\(^2\) Governance in this context encompasses what Knight calls the complex web of multi-level governance structures”.\(^3\) And whilst scholars admit that it is important, from a conceptual point of view, to recognise the various governances related to a specific arena of activity- that is sectoral governances- in the grand scheme of things, governance must be seen as the totality of all these sectoral governances and thus a summative phenomenon.\(^4\) In a sense, Simon’s concept of architecture of complexity captures the summative governance framework more clearly. Simon argued that “complex systems (such as governance) have some form of


hierarchical structure, that is, a structure within a structure, within a structure\textsuperscript{5}. His hypothesis is that complex systems are characterised by a multi-level structure, each of which depends, in an aggregate way, on each other.\textsuperscript{6} Governance is therefore much more than the sum of all the sectoral governances, but more specifically about how these structures interact in varying horizontal and vertical densities.

In a broader context, the thesis defines governance as the overall mechanisms of social order that emerges amidst turbulent, unpredictable, messy, complex and dynamic path conditions predicated upon certain orders of criticality, including, but not limited to, the process of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer. I view knowledge as the necessary condition for the various actors of governance from a lower to a higher order to interact between actors on the micro, meso and macro level of socio-political aggregation. However, the systems of governance and the knowledge that sustains their evolution and stability are highly vulnerable to disruptions and fragmentations. And there is no evidence that suggest that we have started understanding these vulnerabilities, particularly in the context of HIV and AIDS. My contention is that neither the governance literature, nor the HIV and AIDS literature takes sufficient account of the impact of HIV and AIDS on intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer and its implication for both sectoral and summative governances, and the serious implication for governance at the state level. Thus, there


\textsuperscript{6}Ibid.
exists a need to improve our understanding of the underlying impact of HIV and AIDS on the interplay between the formal and informal, private and public and institutional and non-institutional governances, but more specifically how this is likely affected through the loss of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer. In this context, whilst summative governance is the way in which the various levels of governance interact in varying horizontal and vertical densities, the process of knowledge formation greases the wheel that allows these systems to interact and evolve smoothly. I refer to this as one of the orders of criticality for governance- in other words, it is a socio-political condition that must be maintained for there to be a continuous evolution of governance from a nascent to fully institutionalised systems of governance. I view governance as a product of knowledge and that its emergence must be seen in the context of the historical progression of knowledge. In virtually all of the informal and nascent systems of governance, knowledge is transmitted from individual to individual because it is largely tacit. Tacit in that it is not codified and therefore cannot be specified or easily transferred between people and is usually carried in strings of symbolically encoded meanings. Whilst language is an important tool that enables the sharing of knowledge, Michael Polanyi proposed that we often know how to do things without being able to articulate what we know in precise language. Such knowledge, in its broader sense, exists in the form of rules, norms, beliefs, customs created to protect populations by influencing accountability and legitimacy. Similarly, knowledge relates to how formal or institutionalised
systems of governance are run and how key tasks are most efficiently performed within them. It involves a collective set of facts, concepts, experiences, and know-how held by individuals. These are memories that transcend specific technical skills and require ongoing transmission among people in an organisation. Utilising Polanyi’s theory, I have postulated such knowledge as tacit in that it extends beyond and cannot be reduced to writing and thus cannot be inscribed in documents, books, manuals or journals.

**Conceptual Frameworks**

The thesis presents governance in its broader context as the overall mechanism of social order. It advances the idea that governance not only encompasses the work of government, but also includes other command mechanisms that perform functions, irrespective of whether these have evolved institutions. The functions are ever present and self-evident, and include such things as coping with external threats, avoiding conflicts, maintaining law and order and providing food to ensure survival of the human species. In positing that all these actors of governance be recognised and their interdependence acknowledged, both in the domestic and international arenas, I argue that governance is a continuous process of evolution that runs in a continuum from a nascent to fully institutionalised mechanism of control. Thus, governance emerges out of path-dependence conditions and passes through a lengthy

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7 Ernst-Otto Czempiel, and James N. Rosenau, *Governance without government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
evolution and as Rosenau puts it; “is more likely to evolve out of bottom-up than top-down processes”.\(^8\) From a broader perspective, governance is the totality of all the governances and thus a summative phenomenon. Whilst this framework may not sufficiently capture the complexities of the relationships of the various governances, Rosenau coined the summative governance framework as a first step to help us reconceptualise the interactions of the various actors from a higher to a lower order towards a self-regulating and self-organising state. Whilst the term summative governance is largely cited within the global governance literature due to the complexities of the global system and the inability of international governance institutions to adequately respond to world problems, I have nonetheless argued that the term also best describes the governance of the domestic. I posit that the domestic, as with the global, consists of some kind of collage networks of governances because what appears in the international arena reflects the complexities of the sphere of the “local”, the only difference is that it is all these on a global scale. Therefore summative governance is the sum of all the formal, non-formal, state and non-state governances at both the global and local levels.

Additional to the summative governance framework, I have adopted Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge as the best framework to explicate the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer within the governance systems. Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge asserts that because not all knowledge can be articulated by verbal means as it is

rooted in tacit knowledge, transfer of such knowledge requires constant contact and interaction between people. My interest in the theory of tacit knowledge lies in Polanyi’s expression that ‘we believe more than what we can prove and know more than what we can tell’. This expression captures the complexity of the process by which knowledge is transferred because it cannot be understood by looking at how people communicate verbally. This is not hard to understand because, as Jackson reminds us, “[t]he knowledge whereby one lives is not necessarily identical with the knowledge whereby one explains life”. This is the case because humanity emerges primarily through our everyday, practical engagement with the world rather than through a contemplative reflection upon the world. Accordingly, the knowledge whereby one lives is thus largely tacit and consequently embodied and as Polanyi would say, it is ineffable. Ineffability in the theory of tacit knowledge is taken literally in that nothing can be said precisely. This is the hard to articulate knowledge with formal language, and therefore cannot be articulated in grammatical statements, mathematical expressions, specifications, manuals and so forth. It is the type “embedded in individual experience and involves intangible factors such as personal belief, perspective and value system…” It is therefore manifested in collective set of facts, concepts, experiences and know-how. Such knowledge is regularly transmitted between members of a family and organisation through regular contacts and interactions. As


Polanyi posits, “an art that cannot be specified in detail cannot be passed on by prescription since no such prescription exist for it”.\footnote{Michael Polanyi, \textit{Personal knowledge}, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p.53} It follows that it can be passed only through regular contacts and interactions, for example from a master to an apprentice. The problem is that HIV and AIDS restrain such contacts and interactions, because as I shall discuss in later chapters, HIV and AIDS has located itself among the drivers of the governance systems, that is, the economically active generations—those in their prime economically productive and sexually active years.

Concomitantly, I have developed a summative impact framework to capture the impacts of HIV and AIDS as they move through the various waves, with such impacts being circular within and across the various structures of governance. The framework demonstrates that the waves of impact are omnipresent and starts with people getting infected, thereby increasing morbidity and mortality in these key institutions. Morbidity and mortality reduces worker productivity in these key institutions at the same time that it reduces household wealth and affects school enrolments. From the government point of view the cumulative impact is that human capital accumulation is impaired. When this happens, the institutional ability to deal with the very agent that is weakening it is undermined. Demonstrably, HIV and AIDS have become a complex vicious circle that reinforces itself through the iteration of impacts throughout the social and institutional structures of governance. These are no longer only projections, because evidences are piling up that governments’ ability to
deal with the epidemic has been weakened; children no longer attend school as a result of being orphaned or being sick; teachers are dying as a result of AIDS and organisations are losing employees due to HIV related illnesses and death. The fact that people are not falling dead in streets cannot be seen as a sign of the ability of nations to deal with HIV and AIDS. The ameliorative powers of antiretroviral (ARV) therapy have evidently changed people’s perception of the devastating impact of HIV and AIDS. But, I argue that ARVs may have offered us with a temporary reprieve because the impacts of HIV and AIDS are yet to be felt in the coming years. There are no certainties about the longer-term survival of people on ARV treatment, albeit the only certainty is that they will eventually die, though they may have lived a little longer. When, as the current estimates suggests, 15% of the teaching profession of circa 26,000 being infected with HIV, we are reminded that in these severely affected countries, unless a cure is found, the only viable option is to reverse the spread of HIV through intensive behavioural change interventions. Paradoxically, when teachers are infected with HIV and die of AIDS, it not only raises problems in terms of creating institutional gaps, but the very system that is key to imparting the knowledge- which knowledge is also necessary to reverse the spread of HIV- is weakened.
Research Methodology

Research question and objectives

My contention is that neither the governance literature nor the HIV and AIDS literature takes sufficient account of the impact of the pandemic on intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer and its implication for both sectoral and summative governances and the serious implications for governance at the state level. The key issue is to show that one of the major ways in which HIV and AIDS has an impact on governance in severely affected countries is through its effects on intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer. I argue that such impacts are not merely additive and isolated to the sectoral governances, but are structured, endangering fundamental systems of governance. Therefore, the research aims to address the following question: how HIV and AIDS impact governance, by impacting on the intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer within the various systems of governance and more importantly on how these affect the interplay between these systems from a lower to a higher order, that is, the interplay between the formal, non-formal, state and non-state governances.

Major objectives of this thesis are to demonstrate that; i) the necessity of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer for the purposes of sectoral and summative governance is generally assumed, ii)
that the complex governances, both formal and informal, high and low, that provide and sustain intergenerational knowledge are highly vulnerable to disruptions and fragmentations and iii) in the event where this has become evident, as in the case of HIV and AIDS, our understanding of the foundation of governance, both sectoral and summative is impoverished.

Moreover, the governance literature is silent on the imperative of intergenerational knowledge to the functioning of the various systems of governance. The concept is even less understood in the literature on HIV and AIDS. Therefore utilising the concept of intergenerational knowledge as one of the important lenses through which the impact of HIV and AIDS on governance can be understood serves multiple purposes. It not only helps us understand the imperative of intergenerational knowledge to governance, but also helps us conceptualise the flow of impacts across the various levels of governance- for the reason that intergenerational knowledge is the key factor for the continuous evolution of governance and its emergence from long run equilibria of processes. It also serves to underlie its necessity for the various systems of governance, from a higher to a lower order, to interact between actors on micro-, meso-, and macro-levels of socio-political aggregation.

Unfortunately there are major gaps in knowledge on the interactions of the various systems of governance in Namibia and why, because of their inherent interdependency, the effects of HIV and AIDS are likely to be far-
reaching. In fact, there is little research about the impact of HIV and AIDS on intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer and whether we have started comprehensively addressing these core issues. I believe that if we are to bring true knowledge regarding the complexities of the operations of social systems, whether individually or collectively, there must be a fundamental change in our outlook of things, and thus acknowledge that human problems are not simple, they are complex. Besides, I hope that focusing on the theme of knowledge, in terms of its necessity to sustain governance systems, I will keep alive an issue, which I believe has received less attention than what it deserves and that I am not only adding to knowledge as it relates to the subject of this thesis, but that I am contributing to a higher goal- the constant search for truth of all things (political, economic, social, religious, personal and environmental), which bear greater significance in our lives. Perhaps adopting the intergenerational knowledge framework also serves another higher purpose- in as much as we know the multifaceted nature of the impacts of HIV and AIDS, such knowledge is ineffable in that we are unable to articulate these impacts clearly.

Justifying the case study and the education sector as the quintessence of the flow of impacts in Namibia

Namibia is in an unenviable position of belonging to one of hyper endemic countries with 18.8% of the population testing positive during the
2010 Sentinel Survey.\textsuperscript{12} Sadly, HIV has also located itself among the young people. Whilst it is increasingly recognised that young people are the greatest hope for turning the tide against AIDS, the overall HIV prevalence for the age group 15–24 years is alarmingly 10.3%. The epidemic is concentrated in three geographical areas of the northwest, north and central districts. These areas have high mobile populations, or are border entry or exit points. The geographical variations also mean that the epidemic is not evenly spread across the country, with some areas showing emerging epidemic, others show declining epidemic, whilst some others show increasing epidemic. With the fist case of HIV reported in 1986, the epidemic spread like wildfire, with the first official Sentinel Survey carried out in 1992 reporting 4.2% prevalence among pregnant women, before reaching a peak of 22% in 2002. Since 2002, it appears the epidemic across Namibia is stabilizing around 18-20%, but such stabilization could either likely be due to statistical abnormalities or reflect an appalling equilibrium with the number of people dying equaling those being infected. Moreover, the extent of the epidemic is not known because Namibia is yet to carry out a comprehensive population based testing. As I shall explain, the current Sentinel Survey, which tests pregnant women, is fraught with deficiencies of measurement. Despite all the efforts, reducing new infections- the only viable solution in the absence of cure- has proven illusive. It has often been commented that as elsewhere in Africa, patterns of sexual behaviour in Namibia are embedded in complex and often opaque social relations, which, in

\textsuperscript{12} Ministry of Health and Social Services, 2010 National Sentinel Survey, (Windhoek, 2010)
different respects and to differing degrees, may favour or hinder viral transmission in various parts of the country. Therefore sustained inroads against the epidemics in all likelihood have remained inadequate because these social templates are less understood and continue to be reproduced. Be that is it may, HIV and AIDS are likely to remain de facto threats to the Namibian people for the foreseeable future.

Namibia also provides a good case study because, besides being one of the countries severely affected by HIV and AIDS, there is a way in which the various levels of governance are closely intertwined, such that impacts are easily replicated across these governance systems. It follows that once a crack appears in one structure of governance, all others are readily affected. The inherent fragility of the governance systems has been occasioned by years of colonial and apartheid rule. Namibia’s societal dimensions of its mnescope (a term used widely by Reinhart Kossler, a leading scholar on Namibian history, which term I use here in reference to our visual memories on the past) represent social and cultural juxtaposition resulting from an evolution spanning a period of over 100 years. For instance, the consequences of the land dispossession and labour migrant system shaped the institution of the family to an extent that scholars agree that this provided the prelude to the culture of polygamy, violence against women and child neglect in Namibia.

15 The term mnescope refers to our visual memories of the past and is adopted from Reinhart Kossler, Facing a Fragmented Past, Journal of Southern African Studies, 33(2), (2007), pp.361-382
Therefore, the vulnerability of the family unit to HIV and AIDS must thus be understood in the context of the historical progression of the interplay between social processes and economic and political factors. In the context of HIV transmission, this has far-reaching consequences. Pernicious and overtly racially ranked hierarchies endorsed and enforced during apartheid are often cited as reasons for higher incidences of rape of women and girls in Namibia. The general admittance is that the apartheid system denied the women and girl child from taking part in economic affairs, effectively subordinating women to lower economic status than men. Today sexual relation reflects men’s generally superior economic position and access to resources. For most women, lower economic status sometimes results in them engaging in risky sexual relations, *inter alia*, transactional sex. Women are particularly vulnerable to unsafe sexual activities within such sexual relationships due to their weaker bargaining position relative to their male partners. Women tend to use their limited bargaining power to negotiate for higher economic gains instead of safe sexual practices increasing their risk for contracting HIV. Therefore, the issue of vulnerability to HIV and AIDS for these systems of governance cannot be divorced from the enduring struggle for the independence of Namibia, and as I shall demonstrate in later chapters, this is applicable to all other structures and levels of governance.

Similarly, after independence, Namibia adopted an education system that served to re-enforce the interdependency of the vulnerabilities of the

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various structures of governance. In its totality, the education system encompasses a whole spectrum of governance systems. At the lowest level of the education structure is the circuits and clusters, then the schools at the meso level. At the macro level is The Ministry of Education (including the seven directorates). Besides being one of the institutions of governance at the nation state, the Ministry of Education is solely responsible for the implementation of education in Namibia- in the sense that private education is limited only to a few, and constitutes only a marginal fraction (5-6%) of all schools in the country. Coupled with the fact that the Ministry of Education employs 10,000 of the 96,000 public service employees (or 3% of the total workforce of 334,000), making the government the largest employer and education the biggest sector in Namibia, there is no better place to demonstrate the impact of HIV and AIDS as it moves through the various governances. There is an intrinsic mutual dependency between government and the people at every level of socio-political aggregation. In the context of HIV and AIDS, these are important factors and must enter the frame of mind when analysing how the various social systems interact in varying horizontal and vertical densities, because this bears upon the nature of their vulnerability to HIV and AIDS. It follows that the impact of HIV and AIDS is not only limited to this sector, but filters through to the other governance structures almost unhindered. Therefore using the Ministry of Education to demonstrate the impact of HIV and AIDS on governance serves multiple purposes: First, due to the interdependency of the school system and the Ministry of Education, there is no better way to demonstrate the interactions of the
various systems from a lower to higher order, that is, to describe the fact that the interdependence not only involves flows, consequences and causations across the systems, but that they also sustain such flows. Second, using the school system and in combination with the Ministry of Education provides for the best setting to capture the complex flow of impacts of HIV and AIDS across the various systems of governance and the overall implication for the fundamental systems of governance, which system includes the Ministry of Education as one of the most important institutions of governance at the level of nation state. Third, it offers the most appropriate platform to discuss the framework of knowledge formation, retention and transfer because, in totality, the school system and the Ministry of Education are the key social mechanisms for the process of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer in their continuum from the family, school, local governance, to the level of political institutions of governance.

It follows that the education system is the quintessence of the flow of impact from the lower levels to the higher levels of socio-political aggregation in Namibia.

**Philosophical consideration and methodological construction**

The ensuing debate in the social sciences has been focusing on which paradigm best describes the social world, with each of them having their own assumptions about the nature of reality. Whilst these are too diverse,
the two extremes are the interpretivism and the positivism. The ontological perspective of positivism is that reality is independent of the researcher and thus objects of study are external to the researcher. The view is that objects have intrinsic meaning, and knowledge is a reflection of a correspondence to reality, and thus knowledge should be stable, “because the essential properties of objects are knowable and relatively unchanging”. The ontological perspective of interpretivism on the other hand is that the knowledge people build reflects their particular goals, culture, experience, history, and so on, that is, they intentionally constitute knowledge. It follows that the researcher cannot be separated from reality, and therefore the researcher and the objects of study are inseparable. Whilst these presents the two extremes in the ontological continuum about the nature of reality, my research leans towards the interpretivist paradigm and specifically draws from the work of critical realism (CR), first proposed by Roy Bashkar. Critical Realism holds that the social world, though socially constructed, is a social product that people reproduce and transform. Whilst CR diverts from the strictly interpretivist approach in that it views social objects (such as governance) as “typically structured and intransitive, that is irreducible to patterns of events and active independently of their identification by men”, it regards the social world as open and context dependent and therefore can only be studied by qualitative methods. CR is clear on the

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inappropriate use of quantitative methods of research in the social sciences, because as Sayer puts it, quantification of objects implies that objects must be qualitatively invariant, that is, they can be added and subtracted without changing their nature. This creates a particular problem because in the social world, we cannot have certainty of the stability of objects, as they are context-dependent. In studying the object of governance and what makes it vulnerable to HIV and AIDS, the first and foremost question is whether governance is reducible to qualitatively unchanging entities, in other words, whether it can be added and subtracted without changing its nature. Obviously, it cannot be argued that governance is qualitatively invariant, because in studying the powers and liabilities of governance, a critical analysis is required and as critical realists would say, the ability of quantitative methods to critically examine objects is minimal as quantitative research leans towards the use of causal language, which misses the point as mathematics, at least as a language, is causal and astructural. In other words, “it lacks the category of producing, generating or forcing”, which critical realist take to denote causality. Therefore the major question was whether the objects of my study will pass the test of being qualitatively invariant to be studied using quantitative methods. In view of governance as a summative phenomenon and its irreducibility, it is clear that these cannot be added and subtracted without changing their nature, because as I have referred to earlier, these phenomena are context-dependent. It is clear that my research must critically evaluate the powers, and more specifically the

20 Ibid.
21 Ibid. P. 179
22 Andrew Sayer, Method in social science, (London: Roudledge, 1992)
knowledge liabilities of governance structure as a result of HIV and AIDS. The question was; what powers do the governance structures possess that makes them withstand the impact of HIV and AIDS? This is what CR denotes as the mechanisms of objects, their causal powers to generate change when activated.

Therefore the research took on the qualitative approach, and contains both the elements of being descriptive and explanatory. Descriptive in the sense that the aim was simply to describe and “not to develop explanations…. (therefore) problems of causation, of causal order of the influence of uncontrolled variable do not matter”. At the same time the research aims to collect data to establish the relationship between HIV and AIDS and the loss of intergenerational knowledge within the institutions of governance using the education system as an example of how HIV and AIDS affect the interactions of the various systems from a lower to a higher order. I have adopted some aspects of Grounded Theory (GT) as the analytical framework for this study. The key motivation for the adoption of GT is because I have decided to enter into an unknown territory of the impact of HIV and AIDS on the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer and its implication for summative governance. Whilst literature on HIV and AIDS is unprecedented, in that scores of books, articles, journals, manuals, encyclopaedias, have been written about HIV and AIDS since the summer of 1981 when the epidemic was discovered, none so far have

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looked at the impact of HIV and AIDS on summative governance, particularly in terms of how this is likely impacted by the loss of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer. This is the case because I have alleviated knowledge to the level of criticality for the systems of governance to interact between actors on micro, meso, and macro levels of socio-political aggregation. Therefore, utilising the GT method to develop a theory on the relationship between summative governance, knowledge formation and HIV and AIDS seemed the most appropriate approach. Because GT’s central tenet is the “discovery of theory from data systematically obtained from social research”\textsuperscript{24}, one can argue that even if the various frameworks were adopted for this research, the ultimate goal is to discover a theory of how HIV and AIDS impact the summative governance through impacting knowledge formation, retention and transfer within the structures of governance. In this regard, my role was to understand what is going on on the ground by observing, conversing and interviewing. These techniques are viewed as key tools by GT. Perhaps the theory that I will develop, as GT would say, may not be completely contested or replaced by another theory since it is too intimately linked to the data.

Data Collection and sampling

Data collection started with a review of literature of existing documents, reports and data on HIV and AIDS within the structures of governance as

\textsuperscript{24} Ib id. p. 2
defined by the thesis. Whilst the fierce debate rages on in GT on whether literature should be used before the research or not, or whether literature is necessary and inescapable, I have rather adopted the latter argument and utilised literature as emergent, in that it was used to provide more insight into the phenomenon of my study in order to establish the current state of understanding about the various frameworks. The literature was also viewed to get an in-depth understanding of how HIV and AIDS affect the governance systems in varying horizontal and vertical densities and linked to the summative governance framework, though I must admit such literature was few and far between.

Following literature review, 17 one-on-one interviews were conducted across the various structures of the Ministry of Education (MoE) with administrators, workplace programme managers, teachers, managers, training managers and other senior personnel of the education system in Namibia. A senior government member in the Office of the Prime Minister responsible for the Public Sector HIV and AIDS Workplace and Wellness Programme was also interviewed. A purposive sample technique was used and therefore respondents were chosen on the basis of their relevance to the research and were sampled by referral method. The aim was to try as much as possible to cover respondents from the lowest to the highest level of governance systems. Key informant interviews lasted minimum 45 minutes and maximum 95 minutes. In addition to the 17 key informants, two focus groups discussions, consisting of five participants (teachers) and six participants (administrators and teachers) respectively
were also conducted at the selected school in the Kavango Region of Namibia. In total, 28 people (17 key informants and 11 as part of the FGDs) were interviewed. The major motivation for conducting both key informant interviews and focus group discussions in this particular study was to compare and contrast responses in a more private and relaxed environment- as is the case with individual interviews- and a group setting where respondents could verify and challenge individual responses. In this way I could use group discussions to verify certain responses provided during individual interviews. Information obtained from key informants could be expanded, clarified, confirmed and reflected upon during focus group discussions. In combination the individual interviews and focus group discussions proved useful as they allow me to explore and probe participants responses in order to gather more in-depth data. All interviews were carried out between June and November 2011. The cooperation rate and understanding of the research purpose was very high among all respondents.

Whilst the research is mainly a desk review and analysis of the various documents, interviews also proved useful for chapters six and seven as the responses provided valuable insights into the current understanding of the factors fuelling the epidemic and the impact of HIV and AIDS on the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. The interviews also served to demonstrate that the necessity of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer for the
purposes of both sectoral and summative governance is generally assumed and not well understood.

**Limitations of the research**

Although this thesis has several methodological limitations, it aims to offer various insights into an important issue, which I felt was neglected for far too long. Because I have opted to enter an unknown area for which little or no research has been done, problems of appropriate methodology and sampling became prevalent from the onset. Therefore, in judging the merits of this thesis, several limitations should be noted. The first is methodological and related to the appropriateness of the sampling procedure and sampling size in terms of whether this will help to adequately reflect what is actually happening on the ground. Second, whilst I first set out to demonstrate how empirically HIV and AIDS affect summative governance by impacting on the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer, the thesis is biased towards secondary data analysis. The little empirical work conducted in this field also required that, first and foremost, I spend a great deal of time conceptualising the research question and related hypotheses. Third, the complexity of the research question provided the need for creative analysis and interpretation of the existing materials, thereby limiting the available time to collect sufficient primary data. Fourth, this study was primarily limited by its sample size. The participants provided a narrow range of the various systems of governance, and therefore was limited to
the schooling system. Ideally, in demonstrating the impact of HIV and AIDS as they impact summative governance, it would require that this be empirically demonstrated by analyzing the circular impacts of each of these structures in isolation, and then collectively. Fifth, the questions asked during key informant and focus group discussions were in many respects too general, because the issue being addressed was unknown to many of the respondents, resulting in the use of proxy indicators about respondents’ perception of how HIV and AIDS affects intergenerational knowledge. Therefore responses may not effectively capture the real intergenerational knowledge gaps created by HIV and AIDS. Despite these limitations, the thesis provides some evidence of the subtle impact of HIV and AIDS on the societal structures that sustain order and continuity.

Ethical Issues

The subject of my research gives rise to ethical concerns as it not only involves human subjects, but also deals with a sensitive public health problem. The known ethical concerns include harm to participants because talking about HIV and AIDS often invites emotional reactions and in a generalised epidemic, everyone is either infected or affected in one way or the other, as is the case with Namibia. Some of the participants may already know their status and the interview may “confront (them) with the severity of their illness and lack of prospects in
Another generally known concern is that of invasion of privacy. This is particularly relevant in the context of this research as people may feel that talking about HIV is too private. My research experience in Namibia shows that if people are given full information about the purpose of the research and feel adequately protected and respected, they are normally willing to participate. All participants on this research gave full consent; and a request for anonymity was respected.

In addition, whilst the research also refers to intergenerational knowledge within family as a key institution of governance, no interviews were carried out with people in family settings or children.

Another ethical issue not only relates to concerns about the subjects, but with the conceptualisation of my research topic. The European Union (EU) Code of Ethics acknowledges that “conducting ethical research is not necessarily easy…. and researchers have to make difficult decisions and address complex ethical dilemmas (that) may emerge before, during or after the research project is completed”. Notably, my research gives rise to the “before” ethical dilemma of what constitutes the most appropriate “research topic”, that is, what is worth researching in the context of Namibia and its vulnerabilities as a developing nation. The challenge pertains to the acceptability of this research because, to some degree, it entails linking HIV and AIDS to state vulnerability. According to Walliman (2006: 151) the aim of any research should “be analysed from

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an ethical viewpoint” as well.\(^{27}\) It follows that the aims and objectives of the research be clearly defined and ultimately be beneficial to the society being studied. In addition, research in any setting should lend itself to being studied using conventional social research methodologies and right from the start the researcher must address the question of whether the use of social research methodology is suitable for the topic.\(^{28}\) Evidently, the topic of my research fits well within the sphere of social science research and can be studied through empirical investigation. Nonetheless, the major challenge relates to the social acceptability or rather political acceptability of the research topic. The central question is the extent to which the outcome of the research will benefit the country or at the very least, not to harm it. Although this may seem as a politically and/or ideologically motivated argument, it may be exacerbated if the research is construed, wittingly or unwittingly, to contain elements of deception. “Deception occurs when researchers represent their research as something other than what it is”.\(^{29}\) Due to the sensitivity of the topic, there exists an inherent potential to suspect the research as being more than what it is. The ethical concerns should also be viewed in the context of Namibia as a developing country that relies on external funding for its HIV and AIDS programmes. Therefore, revelations of failure of the responses may compromise the country’s ability to attract funding.


\(^{28}\) Martyn Descombe, Ground Rules for Social Research, (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2010).

\(^{29}\) Bryman, (2004), p. 514
However, this research project is a consequence of previous research findings that identified the need to research how HIV and AIDS affect institutions of governance in a complex way and the broader implication for state functioning. For example, the Multi-sectoral Response Review of 2008 highlighted the need for research to move beyond the obvious economic and epidemiological impact of HIV and AIDS. Essentially, there is an appreciation of the need for more in-depth research in Namibia.

Another ethical issue I had to deal with arose during the data analysis and reporting phase of my research, specifically relating to how best to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of my respondents. Confidentiality and anonymity are not only important from an ethical point, but methodologically important as well. This is so because “if participants are confident and that their responses are truly confidential (or even better if they are anonymous), we can expect that people are more likely to participate in the study”.\textsuperscript{30} The issue of anonymity and confidentiality is inextricably linked to the issue of privacy as discussed above. The key question here is the protection of the privacy of respondents by ensuring anonymity and confidentiality. Since this research is largely qualitative and cross-sectional in nature it was easy to convince participants that research anonymity will be ensured, since I required no tracing of participants. The issue however was that I had collected detailed information on one school which I used as a case study… “and with detailed information…. it would be easier for someone with access to the

\textsuperscript{30} de Vaus, (2001), p. 86
data to identify some individuals”.31 It was therefore important that as the researcher I ensured that “no individual is identifiable by means of cross-classifying detailed information in individual cases”.32 The way I did this was to anonymise the data before I pass on to people whom I will share my analysis with, by omitting certain information such as biographical details, locations and the name of the school were most interviews took place. This is what Campbel and Russo refers to as removal of individual “identifiers”.33 In this respect, the name of the case study school was removed in addition to making sure that individual data are not stored on time-sharing or networked computer systems and that all the electronic files had a password and are encrypted. This was to ensure that the data is secure and protected. Similarly, when presenting the thesis, I will make sure that findings are not linked to the school or individual. Responsible dissemination of results dictates that in no way, the respondents are identified in my thesis and by extension will not cause harm or distress to the participants.

In the above case I have deliberately used anonymity and confidentiality interchangeably because in anonymising the data during analysis and reporting, I did not only ensure that I, as the researcher cannot link the responses to the respondents, but also ensured that the information is kept confidential between the respondent and the researcher by not passing this on to third parties.

31 Ibid, p. 192
32 Ibid., p. 192
Thesis outline and key themes

The thesis is organised around specific themes, which also forms the basis for each chapter. Broadly speaking three themes are being explored: governance, intergenerational knowledge, and HIV and AIDS. The thesis is divided into two sections. The chapters can be read separately but are more rewarding if read as a whole, because they all link to the research question and related objectives. Section one is devoted to conceptualisation of the research in four distinct chapters. Chapter one is the overall orientation of the research and provides the reader with a snapshot of the key issues to be addressed, justification for the case study, the conceptualisation of the various theoretical frameworks to be employed and the overall philosophical orientation and methodological construction of the research. Chapter two introduces the summative governance framework and gives an analysis of the various sectoral governances (formal and non-state actors), the dynamics of governances and their application. Whilst acknowledging the fact that summative governance has often been discussed in relation to global governance, in this chapter, I extend the argument of summative governance to argue that this framework is indeed more applicable to national governance because no one actor of governance can adequately deal with the complex issues at any level. The chapter concludes by introducing the socio-political imperatives of governance, including the necessity of knowledge for the evolution of the governance systems from a lower to a higher order. In Chapter three, I present an analysis of the
central nature of knowledge in social systems. Whilst it was not my intentions to enter the epistemic enterprise, it was necessary that in this chapter, I provide an overview of the classical theories of knowledge and how these theories were foundational to our understanding of the nature of knowledge and the complexities of the study of knowledge. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the theory of tacit knowledge, which I view as having the best epistemic significance to my area of inquiry. The theory of tacit knowledge is put forward in this chapter as not only glorifying epistemology for its own sake, but transcend the early epistemologies by proposing the necessity of knowledge to sustain social systems. Chapter four discusses the governance liabilities of HIV and AIDS. The various impacts are discussed as they move through the formal and informal institutions of governances. The chapter introduces the summative impacts of HIV and AIDS framework. The framework provides a good basis for the subsequent chapters as it demonstrates, rather in a simplified fashion, how the impacts of HIV and AIDS are not only additive or isolated to the sectoral governances, but also summative. The final section of this chapter re-introduces the concept of knowledge and postulates that because the emergence of governance is a function of the evolution of knowledge, when HIV and AIDS affects the process of knowledge formation, the systems of governance are endangered.

Section two presents the context and empirical evidences in four chapters, from chapter five through chapter eight. Chapter five introduces the case study and discusses how at independence, the future of
Namibia was severely constrained as a result of protracted periods of colonisation and apartheid, with many commentators agreeing that only a few countries have started on such a severely constraint state. The micro, meso and macro governance vulnerabilities of the governance systems are discussed and their interdependency contextualized. These vulnerabilities are discussed within both the current economic and social and historical contexts. In this chapter, I argue that the prevailing economic and political order led to structural and political limitations to foster improvement in the lives of the majority of the people and that resultantly, this may endanger governance at the level of nation state. Similarly, the historical analysis demonstrates that the burden of the past weighs heavily on the present and the future, because the varied forms in which every activity of life is staged and acted reflects the colonial history of the country. The chapter demonstrates how specific events were directly linked to disintegration of some systems of rules, and how the vulnerabilities of the systems of governance to HIV and AIDS must primarily be understood through a historical lens. Chapter six builds upon the arguments presented in chapter four, but extends the argument to demonstrate how Namibia is in an unenviable position of belonging to the group of countries with hyper endemic prevalence. The chapter outlines the reasons for Namibia’s high prevalence, and demonstrates how—because of the inability of research to uncover the social, cultural and economic orders through which the spread of HIV is facilitated—sustained inroads have been inadequate. The chapter discusses the HIV and AIDS liabilities of the governance systems in Namibia and conclude by
highlighting how AIDS has become a vicious complex circle that reinforces itself through the iteration of impacts throughout the various systems of governances. Chapter seven, re-introduces the concept of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer and argues that the various vulnerabilities of the systems of governance are best understood through analysing the impact of HIV and AIDS on the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. Utilising primary data collected through key informant interviews and focus group discussions, the chapter discusses how HIV and AIDS affects the process through which knowledge is passed between people. At the heart of this chapter is the attempt to address the question of how HIV and AIDS impact the process of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer and how, because of the interdependency of the various systems of governances in Namibia, the impacts are not only additive but summative, that is, they are circular within and across the systems of governance. Chapter eight summarises the various chapters and reiterates the major findings that the best lens through which the impact of HIV and AIDS on the various levels of governance could be understood is through its impact on the process of intergenerational knowledge, formation and retention. The chapter concludes by providing the theoretical and policy implication of the findings of this thesis.
Chapter 2: Governance: theoretical framework for analysis

Introduction

Forms of governance are as old as human civilisation, but they only came to prominence in academic debates during the second part of the twentieth century, albeit their analytical use has largely been linked to the state and its ability to address societal problems. Understandably, the etymological root of governance derives from the Greek word kybernan, which means “steersmanship”. In Latin, the term kybernan transforms into gubernator, which literally translates into governor in English. The traditional conceptions of governance were therefore the processes by which the activities of the state are steered. Given that the term government and governance have the same root, these have hitherto largely been regarded to mean the same thing, the consequence of which is the dominance of state-centric theories of governance in the early literature on governance. State-centric theories, sometimes characterised simply as the control-centrism perspective, focus on the question of the extent to which the state has the political and institutional capacity to steer. Within this understanding, the state is seen as the only significant player, largely impervious to other actors and processes. This is not surprising because earlier academic discourse focused on understanding the mechanism of decision making and the study of the formal

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procedures and institutions that societies have created to express their interest. While Knight attests that one can find examples of governance throughout human history, as people were always attempting to “manage the interactions of people, clans, tribes, city-states and states to ensure harmonious relationships or deal with common problems”, John however observes that it was largely during the 1960s that the political sciences developed an interest in how social movements “became expressed in structural form of political behaviour, which became institutionalised over time”.

With the pace of social changes at the end of the twentieth century and the emergence of highly differentiated and diverse societies, academic interest shifted the theoretical perspectives of the concept away from the ‘institutionalised’ view of governance. Rosenau notes how almost everyone during the end of the twentieth century sensed that the course of history was at a turning point. There were powerful forces within and outside the nation state that challenged both the theoretical and empirical traditional conception of governance to include other forms of governance. Today, there is recognition of forms of governance in addition to and/or without the presence of a formal state or inter-state institutions.

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the emergence of today’s highly differentiated societies, the complexity of functional interdependence of the various systems of governance has grown immensely. Indeed, Kooiman asks the central question “of how such dynamic, complex and diverse socio-political systems can be governed in dynamic, complex and diverse ways.” Since the 1990s, literature began to address what Dunsire emphatically calls the apocalyptic question of whether social change at an ever-increasing rate, towards ever-increasing complexity, diversity and criticality, can be accommodated by the current arrangements to steer change in desired directions.

Such questions led to the re-examination of governance and government and the concept of self-steering in political science, public policy and international relations. Since these questions emerged, the concept of governance has gained immense popularity in contemporary political and academic debates, but this did not necessary translate into a unified conceptualisation of governance. Many are now united in the view that non-state actors are important in governing processes, but nonetheless the extant approaches differ markedly in that some address the question of how government can exert even more control over the actors, whilst others address the question of interaction between governments and rest

of society to reach mutually acceptable outcomes or in combination, provide comprehensive forms of stability and order. For instance, Pierre and Peters adopt the state-centric approach to governance as they posit that although governance relates to changing relationships between state and society, the state is still the centre of considerable political power, and society provides complementary and occasionally competitive functions in the process of governing.\(^{43}\) On the other hand, other writers such as Rosenau postulate the probability of self-governing systems, grounded on the hypothesis that any viable human system has functions to perform, “irrespective of whether the system has evolved organisations and institutions explicitly charged with performing them”.\(^{44}\) This view is echoed by other commentators such as Dunsire, who considers the possibility of social system stability maintenance without constant government; and by Kooiman, who recognises the interdependency of society and government because, in his words, there is a need to shift from unilateral (government or society separately) to interactionist focus (government with society).\(^{45}\)

It is along these lines that the intent of this thesis moves; that governance be viewed broadly as the Council of Rome suggests; that it “not be restricted to the national and international systems, but should be used in relation to regional, provincial and local governance as well as to other

\(^{45}\) Kooiman, (1993)
social systems such as education, and the military, to private enterprise, and even the microcosm of the family”. 46 Suffice to say, the complexities, dynamics and diversity of social systems renders the state-centric model of politics problematic in that many of the social systems meet the requirement of what Dunsire calls “dynamic constancy without governors”. 47 It follows that social systems persist amidst constant changes through feedbacks and voluntary self-corrections, and mostly remain identifiably the same and recognisably in similar relationships with each other, with or without a government. Conversely, as Holsti eloquently argues, “institutions and organisations may exist... but if they are imposed solely by coercion and violence, then there is a government but no governance”. 48 Thus, governance not only encompass the work of government, but must include all other command mechanisms that, as Rosenau succinctly describes, “make demands, frame goals, issue directives, and pursue policies”. 49 Governance can therefore exist irrespective of whether these mechanisms evolved into institutions or central political authority. This thesis characterises governance as a continuous process of evolution that runs in a continuum from a nascent to fully institutionalized mechanisms of control. It argues that governance be seen as the totality of governances, that is, state and non-state, or private and public and is thus a summative phenomenon.

47 Dunsire, (1993)
Dynamics of governance and their application

Conventionally governance has been regarded to manifest in four different contexts: *global governance, national governance, local governance and corporate governance.*

Global governance

Governance in the international arena has usually been examined from an international relations (IR) perspective and within the context of the enduring tension between and among states. The emphasis has been on the explicit relationship between countries and the roles of the different players. However, during the latter part of the twentieth century, there was an increasing disjuncture between these theoretical and empirical conceptions about authority as it relates to the operation of the international system. At the same time, the multi-dimensional process of globalisation started to manifest itself in the “spatial reorganization of production, the interpretation of industries across borders, the spread of financial markets, the diffusion of identical consumer goods to distant countries […] and massive transfers of population within the South as well as from the South and the East to the West”.\(^{50}\) Political, cultural and economic institutions became more globalized as the world moved from the sharply divided international economy of the Cold War to the

increasingly integrated global economy. These events challenged and highlighted the limits of traditional IR theory to explain a world where the shape and importance of individual states is changing. In other words, it soon became evident that many aspects of perceptions about the power of government had to shift; and what followed was an attempt to address the apparent theoretical and analytical challenges posed by the globalised world. It could safely be argued that the opportunity was lost for intellectual engagement amidst changing realities, because IR scholars are, according to Zacher, the “most conservative groups of social scientists in the world” as they are very sceptical if not cynical about the possibility of change in their subject area.\textsuperscript{51} This is well reflected in Porter’s conclusion that “traditional international relations theory dismissed the importance of non-state actors and treated states as not only the most important actors but also as relatively bounded and autonomous institutions”.\textsuperscript{52} To a large extent, this may have blinded IR to the emergence of global politics and its impact on state and the international system.

Now, there is a growing recognition in the IR literature that the concept of governance needs to be extended beyond the state to describe the current global order. According to Axford this growing appeal is embedded in the idea that the complexities of social life can no longer be


extracted from analytic focus of world society in its totality.\textsuperscript{53} The concept is further popularised in various sub themes such as international institutions and regimes where “it is widely recognized that certain important problems cannot be controlled or contained by action at the level of nation state alone.”\textsuperscript{54} It is perhaps for this reason that Weiss and Kamran point out that readers mistakenly consider international organisation and global governance as synonyms.\textsuperscript{55}

While theories of global governance are still nascent and the various frameworks conceptualise global governance differently, according to Dingwerth and Pattberg, “the best-known version is that of James Rosenau who conceives of global governance as a multiplication of spheres of authority.”\textsuperscript{56} It follows that global governance has been equated (by Rosenau and others) to the sum of all governances of every character and at every level, that is, global in an inclusive sense. Rosenau links global governance with global order in that the latter “consists of those routinized arrangements through which world politics gets from one moment in time to the next”, without an overarching political authority or a global government.\textsuperscript{57} This definition sufficiently describes the status quo, in the sense that it, in the words of Dingwerth and Pattberg, gives us a “new perspective that helps us describe,

\textsuperscript{54} Pierre (2000), p. 15
\textsuperscript{56} Klaus Dingwerth and Phillip Pattberg, \textit{Actors, arenas and issues in global governance}, in Jim Whitman (ed) \textit{Global governance} (Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan, 2009), p. 43
\textsuperscript{57} Rosenau, (1992), P. 5
understand and explain the political world that is undergoing profound change”.\textsuperscript{58} But others have raised concerns that the absence of an overarching authority may pose a challenge for the future of global governance. Stone, for instance, has suggested the formation of a global public policy.\textsuperscript{59} While such discussion is beyond this thesis, it remains to be seen whether such global scale policies are feasible.

**National governance**

Governance is also applied in the context of national governance. It was discussed earlier how conventionally, the term government and governance were conceived to mean the same because they had a similar root. But more specifically, the interchangeable use of the terms became increasingly popular after the great depression and subsequently the Second World War in what Mayntz calls the increasing claims of political guidance, and the “growing orientation of political decision-makers towards planning and the use of planning techniques”.\textsuperscript{60} Criticisms were exerted over the glaring failure of states to maintain and avoid mass unemployment, prevent poverty and assure a fair sharing of benefits after the dark periods of the 1930s till the late 1940s in Europe. In Scharpf’s words, “the failure to maintain even (these) minimal assurances during the great depression destroyed the legitimacy of

\textsuperscript{58} Dingwerth and Pattberg, (2009)


\textsuperscript{60} Mayntz, (1993), p. 12
Consequently, governance became the mantra in political discourse as the guiding principle for public management. The synonymous use of the term government and governance gained further currency with the increased advocacy of international development agencies, such as the World Bank, which underlined ‘good governance’ as a necessary condition to its loans to governments throughout the world.⁶²

Governance at the level of the nation state started gaining prominence amidst the political and social crisis of the Welfare State during the last decades of the 1970s and 1980s. Increasingly, both endogenous and exogenous factors rendered the state-centric view incompatible with current events. The conventional view of governance as the central theme in government started to dissipate, because understanding the role of government in the governing process required that, according to Breuillard, “we move away from the static description of political and governmental functions… to the dynamic analysis of mechanisms and processes at work which determine actions but also re-actions within the socio-political systems”.⁶³ Even though many contemporary writers hold this view, government as the key centre of political power is still held pre-eminent. Other social mechanisms of governance are seen to provide complimentary functions in the process of governing. This is clearly

captured in Stoker’s definition that governance be “broadly defined as a concern with governing, achieving collective action in the realm of public affairs, in conditions where it is not possible to recourse to the authority of the state”.  

Local governance

The third level of application of governance is local governance. Academic scholarship acknowledges the importance of local governance in facilitating local economic and social development and as a necessary condition for growth and stability. As discussed earlier, much of the earlier literature on governance reflected the consolidation of national democracies after the turbulent period of the 1930s and 1940s. The common agenda at that stage encompassed the role of central authority to deal with the radical changes and the process for managing the public action in a structured and systematic way. Indeed John asserts that this has happened even when local politics were first democratised, with national institutions following rather than leading. He says:

“Local organisations, party systems and institutions became embedded in national political, administrative, and legal frameworks whilst central or state government bodies managed

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territorial politics. In the end nation states emerged as the legitimate political organisations.\textsuperscript{65}

The consequence is the neglect of academic thinking and discourse on the imperative of local governance in the continuum of governance. It was not until recently that Stoker stimulated discussions on the link between governance and local government.\textsuperscript{66} He described governance as interaction of various agencies and postulated local government as but one of the multiple agencies that interact at the local level to form local governance. Today, it is recognized that government efforts must be pursued in conjunction with local authorities. Many scholars, as Goss explains, view “the switch from government to governance as a change in government processes, of how local communities are governed”.\textsuperscript{67} At the same time she argues that this was not simply a structural change that makes up government, but more a change in the governance project, that is, a change of purpose and a change in ideas of what governance is for. This is evident in recent debates that focus on how democracy can remain sustainable if the issues of social and economic justice at the local levels are not addressed. The key to the argument is that democratically elected local government should by definition reflect the will of the people, since how else could economic and social justice be achieved other than through local structures. At the heart of the argument, which is often referred to as the democratic project, lies the ideal of political, social and

\textsuperscript{65} Peter John, Local governance in Western Europe, (London: Sage, 2001), p. 1
\textsuperscript{66} Stoker, (1991)
\textsuperscript{67} Sue Goss, Making local governance work: networks, relationships and the management of change, (Hampshire: Plagrave, 2001), p. 12
economic inclusion. Decentralisation thus becomes an imperative for democratisation of governance. Many states have now enacted legislation to facilitate the process of decentralising the government functions to the local level. To a certain extent, one can understand why the debate has only started focusing on the decentralisation of political and administrative functions. Emerging democracies first required some time to develop the policy and institutional frameworks that can sustain the very process of democratisation. Now local authorities around the world are taking the lead as policy makers to facilitate local economic and social development, as a co-ordinating body between the different levels of government (i.e. local, regional/provincial and national) and as facilitators of development through policy making, land-use planning and provision of information. The emerging functions of local government require that these are carried out in responsible and accountable ways, and as Goss asserts, “the requirement of equity, equality, and probity do not allow individual solutions to be found without regard to the impact they have on others”. We may be reminded at this stage that this is what is often referred to as ‘good governance’.

**Corporate governance**

Another area in which governance gained sustained and intense interest is in the corporate domain. Though the term is now commonplace in

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literature on corporate management, it was rarely found in literature before the 1990s.\textsuperscript{70} It is difficult to appreciate that as recently as thirty years ago a course in corporate governance, and textbooks on this subject were few and far between, because today there are scores of books, articles and research publications on this subject. The World Bank attests that “corporate governance has only recently emerged as a discipline in its own right, although the strands of political economy it embraces stretches back through centuries”.\textsuperscript{71} With the increasing crisis in the corporate world and concerns about the defective nature of corporate management, corporate governance has now become a focus of much attention. Though there is still some disagreement on what the actual definition of the term should be, and that it is in any case symptomatic of the whole debate on governance reform, there is a general consensus about its purpose. Accordingly, corporate governance serves to ensure that the corporation protects resources and allocates them to make planned progress towards the organisation’s defined purpose, that those governing and managing an organisation account appropriately to its stakeholders (shareholders, the public and government) and enable shareholders and other stakeholders to take boards to task.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{70} Kevin Keasy, et al. (eds) \textit{Corporate governance: economic, management, and financial crisis}, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)


\textsuperscript{72} Andrew Chambers, Ten principles of corporate governance, (2009), Available from http://realbusiness.co.uk [accessed on 11 October, 2010]
Fundamentally, the growing academic interest in corporate governance reflected concerns about business functions, specifically because both corporations and governments were confronted with the challenge of managing the expectations of societies which were becoming increasingly alerted to the negative externalities associated with economic development. Stated differently, society became more conscious that in their operations, industries produce spillovers, which affect the welfare of other people and that these at times are totally disregarded by the industries generating them. Moreover, these are not included in the cost of production of the companies, neither do ‘they enter the set of prices that would be thrown up by perfectly competitive markets’. In other words, the price system fails to take into account these “spillover effects”. Because prices are the signals through which the nation’s resources are allocated, “a failure of the signal leads to a failure in the allocation of resources”. In many respects, there was what Clarke referred to as “a general sense that corporations cast a long shadow and they must be governed responsibly if they are to benefit society”. What is more, “in recent years, the institutions and structures required for corporate, public, and global governance have experienced a series of scandals resulting from a lack of responsibility on the part of political and corporate leaders”. More specifically, major concerns emerged with the

73 Sue Benn, and Dexter C. Dunphy (eds), Corporate governance and sustainability: challenges for theory and practices, (London: Routlidge, 2007)
75 Ibid., p. 22
77 Heidi Ullrich, Towards accountability: the G8, the World Trade Organisation, and global governance, in Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona and John Kirton (eds),
governance structures of public corporations following what Fratianni and Pattison call, “outbursts of corporate malfeasance, market volatility, inadequate disclosure, and conflict of interest that are injurious to the public and undermine confidence in the marketplace”. Other major concerns were related to how the current trend of economic growth may seriously degrade the environment and jeopardise the welfare of future generations. Undoubtedly, growth is almost entirely dependant on the capacity of the environment to sustain such growth. Scholars today discuss sustainable economic growth or sustainable development within the broader discussion on governance. They define sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs”- in other words, without affecting intergenerational equity, a concept that refers to equity over generations. These concepts (sustainable economic growth, sustainable development and intergenerational equity) have gained popularity during the past three decades in discussions on corporate governance.

As with global governance, the term corporate governance gained eminence and has been transformed as globalisation became entrenched in every sphere of human activity. Corporate governance has expanded

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*Corporate, public and global governance: the G8 contribution*, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), p. 103

78 Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona and John Kirton (eds), *Corporate, public and global governance: the G8 contribution*, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), p. 127


80 Ibid., p. 226. This widely accepted term has been coined by the United Nations World Conference on Environment and Development in its final document generally referred to as the Brundtland Report (1983-1987)
in scope and is inextricably linked to the activities of multinational corporations, not least because privately owned multinational corporations are at the forefront of the process of globalisation. Paradoxically, there is a greater focus on how international regulation may contain them, because as d’Estaing argues, “the main problem facing the world today is lack of confidence” in business- in other words, the loss of trust in the very structures that facilitated the widening and deepening of international trade, finance, information, and culture into a single, integrated world market. As a result and most notably, “the G8 leaders are now dealing directly with the central question of how to build better global governance in both the public and private spheres”. Evidently, we have entered the era in which it is impossible to talk about global and world governance without relating it to interactions of the transnational actors of business.

Non-state governances

Because this thesis defines governance as a continuous process of decision-making and command mechanisms at every level of human activity, it follows that “government could never govern if people- in their organisations, their families, their groupings of all kinds- were not self-governing”. Yet, these systems have been overlooked and most literature has concentrated only on the four levels of application and most

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82 Ibid., p. 24
83 Kooiman, (1993), p. 27
importantly on state power and authority to the exclusion of the importance of the other mechanisms. Indeed, Hall and Biersteker point out that it was not only until the last few years of the twentieth century that the traditional theoretical and empirical conceptions of governance were challenged to include private authority, and now there is a recognition of forms of governance without the presence of a formal state or inter-state institutions.\textsuperscript{84} Whilst there has been discussion on the probability of governance in the absence of a government, a major weakness has been on the tendency to relate this to global governance (as discussed above) to the exclusion of the other levels of governance. It is important that these levels, such as the family, clanship, social and community networks, education and even illicit groupings be situated within the larger debate on governance. This is not difficult to fathom as part of the explanation for the survival of states resides in the model of the family and social networks and the education systems, not only as instrumental, but constitutive forms of governance that sustain social order. Evidently, the rules and regulations associated with government cannot cover everything, and adherence to them cannot only depend on state coercion, but they are reliant on the social and moral dispositions that have come to be linked to these governance mechanisms. Moreover, the analyses of governance thus far have failed to acknowledge that over eons and before the dawn of formalised institutions, societies, however disparate, have created enabling and protective environments for their men and women because they have within themselves the resources and

\textsuperscript{84} Hall and Biersteker, (2002)
capital to self govern. It follows that when we derive our understanding of governance largely by looking at the function of state, intra-state and international agencies alone, we fail to comprehend that many of the determinants of the ability of states to function lies beyond the observable means of governance. Borrowing from Rhodes, governance is carried out through both “self-organising and interorganisational networks”.85

Community and social networks

The starting point is to acknowledge that some self-organising networks are clearly visible at community levels. Goss notes that many “examples of governances are taking place at neighbourhood level outside state agencies- through community development trusts, tenant management organisations and community groups”.86 Several writers such as Benn, et al., refer to these decentralised centres as “sub-politics”, consisting of networks comprising individual actors, not-for-profits and community groups.87 Others, like Rosenau and Scharpf call it “multi-level” or “multi-layered” governances respectively, even if those terms are often used in relation to national and international governances.88 The problem with the current literature is that, while acknowledging the importance of these

86 Goss, (2001), p. 31
87 Susan Benn, Dexter C. Dunphy and Andrew Martin, Towards a model of governance for sustainability: networks, shared values, and new knowledge, in Susan Benn, and Dexter C. Dunphy (eds), Corporate governance and sustainability: challenges for theory and practices, (London: Routlidge, 2007), p. 103
sub-political groups, much of it has remained superficial, despite a substantial amount of empirical work on the formal or institutional forms of governance. In truth, community governance is not a new phenomenon. Local authorities have always been promoting some form of locality governance for many years and according to Goss some have recently started creating neighbourhood communities or area forums and many others have supported community self-governance through such things as trusts and community-led projects. Recent commentators have embraced the importance of these self-organising networks and are united in the view that they constitute forms of governance - in the sense that these are not adequately understood and they operate across and between geographical boundaries. That is, they are spatially diverse, pervasive and are important for social cohesion and as such create a challenge for the future discourse of governance. This is clearly captured in the following extract from Goss:

“The most interesting dilemma for the future of governance is whether and when it is useful to formalise the concept of neighbourhood by creating structures of governance with spatial boundaries - or whether it actually helps the process of governance to have overlapping and fuzzy boundaries, with different groups of people coming together for different reasons and with governance

89 Goss, (2001), p. 28
structures that can rise and fall depending on the energy level participants and the life-cycle of the neighbourhood”.

As we move towards a more globalised world, some of these self-governing mechanisms are being transformed into formidable social movement networks across nations. Giddens refers to this as the New Social Movements (NSM) which started in the 1960s with the student and civil rights movements, followed by the 1970s with the feminist movement, then by the anti-nuclear and ecological movements of the 1980s and the gay rights campaigns of the 1990s. With the current level of telecommunication technology, immediate and systematic connections across national boundaries have become common. The rise of the NSM in the information age makes it harder for traditional political institutions to cope and thus creates problems with governability. Giddens attests how “social movements around the world are able to join together in huge regional and international networks, comprising non-governmental organisations, religious and humanitarian groups, human rights associations, consumer protection advocates, environmental activists and others who campaign in the interest of people”. These networks have the unprecedented ability to respond promptly, access information and share resources. “In short, our time can well be characterised as the age of networked individual”.

90 Ibid., p. 28
92 Ibid., p. 1021
93 Rosenau, (1992), p. 2
These movements in most cases start out as “loose self-organising networks, usually based on oppositional stances, and with informal grass-roots networks”. As they seek to increase their political influence, they usually evolve into more hierarchical movements. Eventually, they start participating in political institutions and legislation in their areas of concern. In fact, it is known that such movements have led to the formation of Labour, Green and Feminist political parties around Europe, albeit once they develop hierarchies, they are referred to as Old Social Movements. Notwithstanding, the key point is that movements must be acknowledged as an integral part of the discourse on governance, not least because they provide a good model for the study of non-state governance, but because they promote a bottom-up approach to governance and challenge centralised authority. In other words, they usually present a constant and strong challenge to ‘top-down’ governance.

**Education as the foundation for governance**

Needless to say, there is near universal agreement on the importance of education to democratic systems of governance, in that it increases the capacity of individuals to contribute and benefit from society and the economy. In this context, education is seen broadly as the system by which societies transmit their accumulated knowledge, skills and values from one generation to the next. Gaffield points out that it must be

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94 Montserrat Guibernau (Ed.), Governing European Diversity, (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 2001)
95 See Giddens (2009), Sociology: 6th edition
treated “as part of a larger social context involving basic transition of activity from family to school”.96

Understanding the role of education as the key to human society presupposes its importance to governance. Education transforms people to live a better life and serves as the means to develop people physically, mentally and socially. It brings about the desired change in society and helps develop a generation of virtuous individuals. It follows that education re-enforces the needed attributes to lead life in a proper way. Education in general “provides for better citizenship, the ability to appreciate and recognize wider range of cultural and other services, ... and the chance to give the next generation better education and... a better future.”97 The principle purpose of education is to gain knowledge and inculcate the forms of proper conduct. In other words, education is not only the learning of techniques, but the process of helping man ‘to experience the integrated process of life’.98 Evidently, education is a central feature of the governing process as it not only re-enforces and produces the “governable”, but also generates what Rosenau refers to as the “governors”.99

96 Chad Gaffield, coherence and chaos in educational historiography, Interchange, vol. 17, no. 2 (Summer, 1986), pp. 112-121
99 Rosenau, (1997)
While this link between education and governance, in terms of the capacity to govern and be governed seems obvious, discussions on the imperative of education to governance seem to have eluded scholars worldwide. This lack of attention can be attributed to the present-day education system that overemphasises technique, rather than education as a means to make people free and according to Krishnamurti, as a function of bringing about “an integrated individual who is capable of dealing with life as a whole”. Notwithstanding, the importance of education as the pillar for human advancement has long been recognised, albeit as it relates to its direct influence on poverty. Central to the argument is that education is having a key role in tackling the problem of what it is to be a citizen. It contributes to sustainable democracy by encouraging full participation of citizens in political, social and economic life. According to McCowan, citizenship education has long been taught in schools around the world and in some countries this is being reintroduced. Whilst McCowan argues that transmitting preconceived notions of citizenship through schools may both be unviable and undesirable, he nevertheless demonstrates that these are largely the matter of design. He further stresses that the future of citizenship education lies in acknowledging the significance of pedagogical relations and school democratisation, one that allows students to develop as political agents in their own right. The notion of putting education in the centre of good citizenship presupposes its necessity to make men

100 Krishnamurti (1953)  
102 Ibid.
progress towards a more balanced, coherent and sustainable system that society so desperately needs.

Concomitantly, there is a growing awareness that limited education in the modern digital world is the key reason for exclusion in the political process. The emergence of the telecommunications technology and infrastructure over the last few decades has been so immense, that according to Scrimgeour, they “have the potential to transform the way in which society is organised and governed”. Technology now enables individuals to engage with others, learn from others and contribute significantly to the rest of society in a meaningful way. Technology has opened up a new democratic space in which anyone can now participate. The rapid integration of technology into modern life has for the first time, made certain forms of participatory forms of governance feasible. People are now well informed and aware of what is happening in their societies and the rest of the world. Looking ahead, education will play a key role within the continued progression of telecommunication technology. Whilst the archetype of a fully integrated society seems possible, those with limited education will be socially and economically excluded, at which point, a darker outcome is feasible since exclusion may sow the seeds of civil and political instability.

Family as a key institution for governance

My contention is that in the continuing debate on social and political stability in modern states, the family should be in prominent focus. Though there are various concepts of the family, the use of the term takes its pre-eminent definition to include all forms of domestic living arrangements. As Karl Max succinctly puts it, “the individual depends on and belongs to a larger whole; at first it is, naturally the family and the clan, which is but an enlarged family”.\textsuperscript{104} The institution of the family has long been recognised in sociology literature as one of the key ingredients of human life, the basic unit of a society and as Peplar expressess it “is the necessary foundation of all order and morality”.\textsuperscript{105} The formal view of the family as a crucial institution within modern societies stems from functionalist schools that dominated sociology in the 1940s and 1950s. This view continues to be influential in Europe and the United States of America. According to Muncie the view is that “society is upheld by social institutions, each of which has well defined functions to perform”.\textsuperscript{106} To this end, the role of the family is seen as the rearing and socialisation of children. Parents in families are the leaders that carry out the parental responsibilities, which not only entails enforcing discipline in their children, but includes provision of material needs and social guidance. In Africa, beyond the family is a network of people connected either by kin

\textsuperscript{104} Tibor R. Machan, Classical Individualism: The supreme importance of each human being, (London and New York: Routlidge, 1998), p. 161

\textsuperscript{105} Michael Peplar, Family Matters: A history of ideas about family since 1945, (London: Longman, 2002), p. 6

or blood called the clan. The clan performs important functions of uniting their members, coping with external threats and avoiding conflicts. There are village heads whose primary responsibility is to attend to the immediate needs of their villagers and are also the custodians of the sacred traditions of their people. In fact, it is argued that with the crumbling of the Soviet’s attempt to collective action did it dawn on most people that only in small units, such as the family and the clan, are collectivist arrangements feasible.\textsuperscript{107}

Scholars now acknowledge that although the family institution has undergone radical transformation in recent years in response to external socio-economic environments, good family governance is increasingly a crucial element for peace and development. Inherent in this is the primacy of the family for the well being of society and by extension the security of states. This is partly the reason why, after the Second World War, states in Europe were concerned about the stability of the family and well being of the state, and these concerns, according to Peplar, were “inextricably linked”.\textsuperscript{108} Inevitably, the search for family stability in the face of rapid changes led to various state policies that aim to assist families to produce healthier social outcomes. While these were well intentioned, and founded in the recognition of the family as an important element for peace, these were often based on “functionalism and particular political as well as historical perspectives, one which gives

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{107} Machan, (1998)
\item \textsuperscript{108} Peplar, (2002), p. 18
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families... little scope for creating and sustaining social change”.\textsuperscript{109} Moreover, the widely held view is that, while the family is an important element for peace and development, family life should remain a private affair as, in the words of Muncie, “the family provides sanctuary from the external world and thus the state should not be seen to be intervening directly in its affairs”.\textsuperscript{110}

**The dynamism of actors and the changing forms of governance**

The discussion so far has highlighted the importance that the analysis of governance must include both the formal and informal, state and non-state governances. Evidently, as Mayntz emphatically emphasises, “formal organisation is of course not a pre-condition for governability”.\textsuperscript{111} More precisely, governance is the way these different levels interact according to certain rules and norms. Section two discussed varieties of formal governance, that is those based on written constitutions, laws and formal contracts; and section three referred to the informal governance, that is, those based on moral rules and unwritten societal codes of conduct. Actors involved in governance vary depending on the level of governance that is under discussion. Whilst formal state-actors are well known and to a large extent identified in the preceding sections, in recent years, there has been an “explosion” of literature that poses fascinating questions on non-state actors, their levels, modes and order and how


\textsuperscript{110} Muncie, (1995), p. 41

\textsuperscript{111} Mayntz, (1993), p. 19
these influence governing processes. The birth of the ‘new governors’, their purpose and dynamism pose a challenge to the traditional conception, that is, the state-centric perspective of governance.

**Transnational actors and the changing nature of domestic and international governance**

Perhaps it is natural to start the discussion with the various actors in the international system because in essence this can be classified as either formal or non-formal, depending on the level of applications. They could be regarded as formal because “while these actors are non-state, and do not rely exclusively on the actions or explicit support of the state in the international arena, they often convey and/or appear to have been accorded some form of legitimate authority”\(^\text{112}\). On the other hand they are informal in that while they have formed what Dingwerth and Pattberg call “transboundary social institutions to address transnational problems”, they do not operate under a single global legal or policy framework.\(^\text{113}\) Undoubtedly the dramatic increase in the different players in the international system cannot be overstated. According to Rosenau, “the pervasiveness of turbulent conditions has extended to the number and types of actors who play key roles on the global stage”\(^\text{114}\) and now the “proliferation of actors is at the centre of much of the global governance literature”.\(^\text{115}\) Because of the diversity of the actors, scholars have started

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\(^{112}\) Hall and Biersteker, (2002), p. 4
\(^{113}\) Dingwerth and Pattberg, (2009)
\(^{114}\) Rosenau, (1997), p. 275
\(^{115}\) Dingwerth and Pattberg, (2009), p. 44
to conceptualise global governance as a multilevel structure of transnational and supranational actors, all of whom deal with each other in what Payne refers to as “complex networks of varying horizontal and vertical density.” Hall and Biersteker identify these actors to include authority of the global market, private market institutions, human rights groups, and environmental non-governmental organisations, religious movements and even illicit groups such as the mafia and mercenary armies. Dingwerth and Pattberg include in the list of actors hybrid organisations, private foundations, international bureaucracies, local state agencies and epistemic, migrant and local communities. It is telling that the plethora of actors is largely non-state, state-based or state-created and that as we begin to comprehend their magnitude and scope, many more are emerging. Perhaps, many scholars can be forgiven for believing that chaos theory best explains the international system; that our analytical focus is limited by the ‘disorderly nature’ of global politics. As Rosenau would also attest, many students and scholars “are inclined to use the term anarchy to designate the absence of centralised authority in world politics.” Anarchy in the sense of lack of overarching authority, but then Rosenau disputes that anarchy is perhaps less determining of international stability- and by extension global order- than many realist theories sometimes suggest. In a sense, Rosenau echoed North’s view

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117 Hall and Biersteker, (2002)
118 Dingwerth and Pattberg, (2009), pp. 45-47
that the “the international system (in spite of this lack of an overarching regime or world governance) is several steps beyond anarchy”.\textsuperscript{120}

What cannot be denied is the influence of these actors in both the international and domestic arenas. Put differently, the proliferation of these actors has significantly reduced the monopoly of the states in global politics and even domestic policy making. For instance, Cutler refers to how contemporary developments in domestic and international arenas are enhancing the authority of private international regimes through, for example, privatisation and deregulation of markets, the delegation of regulatory authority to private business associations and agencies and the increased reliance on market mechanisms across and between nations.\textsuperscript{121} Through such arrangements, private actors are increasingly gaining authoritative decision making powers, some of which were formerly the prerogative of government. Similarly, the past twenty years, or so have begun to see an unprecedented participation of socially based, non-state actors in global level regulation. Not only have they been involved in international meetings involving multilateral organisations such as the World Bank, World Trade Organisation, UN Economic and Social Commission (ECOSOC), and Framework Convention on Climate Change, they have become instrumental in filling the gaps in environmental and social regulations. They have also become important actors in such things as UN election observers, advisors,

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\item Claire Cutler, Private international regimes and interfirm cooperation, in Thomas J. Biersteker and Rodney B. Hall, \textit{The emergence of private authority in global governance} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 23
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
writers and “for seeing that regulations- both national and international- are adhered to by both public and private actors”.\textsuperscript{122} Whilst the discussion of the influence of all the actors are beyond this thesis, it is not hard to fathom that the sphere of what Hall and Biersteker call the “private” in global governance is changing and the change is accelerating.\textsuperscript{123} Essentially, we are just beginning to understand the reciprocal, mutually defining relationship between the public and the private. What we know for sure is that the world is changing and other actors are taking the authoritative role in domestic and global politics. As Hall and Biersteker so eloquently and tellingly observe, “The state is therefore no longer the sole, or in some instances, even the principal, source of authority, in either the domestic arena or in the international system”.\textsuperscript{124}

**Governance actors in the domestic arena**

In the domestic arena, the capacity of the society and the market to self govern are eluding the state’s ability to control them. The past two decades can be characterised by the demand for greater participation by various non-state actors. They include non-governmental organisations, community based organisations, community forums, women’s organisations, faith based organisations, trade unions, social movements, professional organisations, business coalitions and associations, self-help

\textsuperscript{123} Hall and Biersteker, (2002)
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p. 5
groups, advocacy groups, and even the military, to name just a few. Whilst the list is obviously diverse, the common characteristic is that these are neither politicians nor public sector managers and are simply outside the institutionalised forms of governance. As the political world is changing these groups are, as Giddens asserts, thriving and bringing new issues in the mainstream.\textsuperscript{125} They make the boundaries of public sector governance blurred as they forge new relationships with the different levels of government, the private sector and among themselves. This is well captured in Pierre’s assertions that as a result of the growing societal interdependency, “the dividing line between public and private sectors are blurring, and interests generally are not just public or private, they frequently are shared”.\textsuperscript{126}

More than ever before, these actors are popular and prominent in dealing with complex economic, political and moral issues and have gained legitimacy in the public eye and are increasingly regarded as an important centre of social life. They bring new complexities to the socio-political governing process and they are at the heart of the “civic culture- the sphere between the state and the marketplace occupied by family, community associations and other non-economic institutions”.\textsuperscript{127} Pierre, while trying to juxtapose traditional conceptions of governance with the normal changing nature of social relationships, unwittingly admits the complexities of governing by asserting that the “lengthening chains of

\textsuperscript{125} Giddens, (2009)
\textsuperscript{126} Pierre, (2000), p. 139
interactions cause and require a multiplication of numbers of parties participating in them, while the number of interactions among these parties also multiplies”.  

Kooiman, in response to the diversity and dynamism of the contemporary socio-political environment, describes that “these interactions not only reflect the basic complexity, dynamics and diversity of societies, they are themselves complex, dynamic and diverse”. Goss echoes this sentiment that if we recognise that communities and societies are now characterised by diversity of actors, then we also recognise that this creates problems for governance in the sense that public sector role in economic and social development will change from that of a governor in the real sense of the word, to more of an enabler, that is, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), providing a flexible framework within which economic and social activity can take place. Put differently, government’s role will be defined in terms of its ability to enable the capacity of the governing systems, as a whole, to coordinate policy and solve public problems in a complex context. Admittedly, as many commentators would confirm, the economic realities and political imperative will force government to withdraw from some areas in favour of these actors. With the rapid changes brought about by globalisation, the non-state actors are gaining further currency, as people feel powerless and more alienated from their governments. In Giddens’ words, “the cumulative effects of these new challenges... may be a

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129 Kooiman, (1993), p. 41  
130 Goss, (2001)  
growing sense that people are losing control of their lives in the midst of rapid change”.\textsuperscript{132} Perhaps, as Goss and others would like us to believe, we are possibly approaching an alternative form of governance, some sort of “hybrid organisation”, characterised by a clear cell structure and decentred authority.\textsuperscript{133}

**Governance as a summative phenomenon**

The challenge to the traditional conception of governance resulting from the emergence of new forms of governances and the dynamism of the various actors postulate a postmodern world characterised by extraordinary complexities, both in the domestic arena and international system. Yet, from the point of view of the layman, nothing appears that complex; somehow, the system seems to be one of a self-reproductive process, as if an invisible hand (a term which I owe to the greatest expositor of economic thought, Adam Smith, 1723-1790), were working to guide the system towards a self-organising and self-preserving state. Surely, from a scholarly perspective, it is not so much whether the system works or not (or for whom), but more about the critical analysis of what makes it function. With society becoming more diverse and volatile, scholarly diagnostics of the discernible features of the governing process become an imperative. It is therefore important to elucidate the consolidation of the various systems, especially in terms of how the actors from a higher to a lower order interact towards a self-regulating

\textsuperscript{132} Giddens, (2009), p. 1021
\textsuperscript{133} Goss, (2001)
and self-organising state, what Kooiman refers to as the “interactions between actors on micro, meso, and macro levels of socio-political aggregation".\textsuperscript{134} Therefore academic description must reflect this complex interplay and clearly capture the fact that, using Rosenau’s claim, the interdependence of the various systems not only involves flows, consequences and causation within the systems but that they sustain flows across the systems.\textsuperscript{135} While such a synopsis may be a bit far fetched, Rosenau helps us to reconceptualise governance by referring to it as a ‘summative phenomenon’. Whitman attests the importance to- from a conceptual point of view- recognise the various governances related to a specific arena of activity, which he refers to as sectoral governance.\textsuperscript{136} He further acknowledges that, in the grand scheme of things, governance must be seen as the totality of all these sectoral governances and thus a summative phenomenon. Whilst this is applied more often in relation to global governance, I would argue that summative governance is both an international as well as domestic phenomenon, not least because no one sector of governance is adequate to deal with the complex issues at any level.

The conceptualisation of global governance as a summative phenomenon is clearly embedded in the complexities of the global system and the inability of international governance institutions to adequately respond to world problems. Quoting Knight:

\textsuperscript{134} Kooiman, (1993), p. 41  
\textsuperscript{135} James N. Rosenau, Governance in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, in Jim Whitman (ed) Global governance (Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan, 2009)  
“[The] holistic conceptualisation of global governance is in part linked to the recognition that international governance institutions are no longer adequate to address contemporary transnational issues and problems and that ‘summative’ global governance (the sum of all governance processes and institutions that seeks to address transnational issues affecting our planet) represents, in effect, a shift of paradigm— from international to global politics—and an evolution in multilateralism, as top-down and bottom-up multilateral activities and institutions intersect”. 137

In effect, global governance can be thought of as the way in which sectoral governances symbiotically interact in both vertical and horizontal directions. It also highlights that, as Whitman describes, “global governance of any form of human activity, or arena in which it takes place, depends upon a vast array of other actors, some distant from the sector under consideration”. 138 Whilst perhaps the concept of summative governance, in its normative sense, may not sufficiently capture the complexities of the global ‘disorder’, it nevertheless offers some level of assurance as a first step to conceptualise governance in the global arena as encompassing what Knight aptly calls the “complex web of multi-level governance structures”. 139 It is surprising that the boom in literature on global governance has not translated into similar rigorous analysis of

137 Knight, (2009), p. 160
138 Whitman, (2009), p. 140
139 Knight, (2009), p. 173
governance at the domestic level. The domestic, as with the global, consists of some kind of collage networks of governances. In truth, what appears in the international arena reflects the complexities of the sphere of the "local", the only difference is that it is all these on a global scale. The boundaries of what constitute global and what is local are blurred; and 'opt-outs' become an impossibility, because:

“Globalisation has configured the world so that local or individual concerns cannot entirely be sheltered from global dynamics; and at the same time, larger-scale and/or inclusive global issues can be created or exacerbated by the cumulative and sometimes the synergic outcomes of small-scale activities. What this means for the practical purpose of exercising governance is not only that failing in sectoral global governance can have extensive, multiple impacts (as we have seen in the case of global finance), but also that a great many actors and dynamics that have a bearing on sector-specific governances originate outside of its purview”.140

Therefore, and while summative governance is generally cited within the global governance literature, the term summative governance also best describes governance of the domestic particularly as it relates to its influence and/or its contribution to the globalisation of governance. How else do we describe governance emerging out of path-dependence conditions, out of a long run equilibrium of processes if the actors such as

140 Whitman, (2009), p. 145
local community leaders, families, teachers, community-based organisations, national social movements and the like are excluded from the discussion? To exclude these actors is to propose that the global is ‘external’ to them, a proposition that lacks the trace of common sense. Conversely, how else do we make intelligible that a family in Lumwana district in the Copperbelt region of Zambia is faced with a severe food insecurity because the husband lost a job in the copper mine as a result of the 2008 financial crisis? Whilst I agree with the critical realist position that governance is a social object that may exist independent of the actors that created it, as Bhaskar alludes, it is however important to acknowledge that summative global governance is nothing other than the sum of all the formal, non-formal, state and non-state governances at the local and global levels. In fact, summative governance is well captured in Simon’s concept of architecture of complexity. In 1962, Simon put forward a very compelling argument that “complex systems (such as governance) have some form of hierarchical structure, that is, a structure within a structure, within a structure”. His hypothesis is that complex systems are characterised by a multi-level structure, each of which depends, in an aggregate way, on each other. It is therefore much more than the sum of the people that make up such structures, but more specifically about how these structures interact in varying horizontal and vertical densities.

143 Ibid.
Whilst summative governance is a relatively new concept, the interest in multi-level governances, mainly in the global arena, precedes this term. In his analysis of the contemporary interest in global governance, Night recalls how the global systemic challenges led to paradigmatic challenges in the 1970s and early 1980s, which in turn paved the way for intellectual discourse around multi-level governance.¹⁴⁴ Thus, it is not so much a question of whether the participation of the new actors and interdependency of the various forms of governance at the domestic or on the global level is new. But, as highlighted throughout the preceding sections, the summative concept serves to remind us to keep asking the right question and think afresh in the face of such unprecedented periods, because, as Rosenau so eloquently purports, “the pace of change is too great to justify avoidance of (these) phenomena that cannot be easily classified”.¹⁴⁵ Because the current pace of change far supersedes any found in historical records, it begs the question: “how can one not pause and wonder what it all means… and consider the possibility that (maybe) one’s approach to the subject is in need of repair, if not replacement”.¹⁴⁶

**Socio-political imperatives of governance**

What makes governance work amidst the turbulence, unpredictability, messiness, complexity and dynamism? This question has been implicitly repeated in several of the preceding sections. Addressing such questions requires greater insight into what I would refer to as the “orders of

¹⁴⁴ For a detailed analysis of the various systemic challenges see Night (1999) p. 177
¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 13
criticality” that must be achieved for any system of governance to function, in the sense that their absence renders the concept of governance questionable. Because governance does not emerge for its own sake, but out of what I referred to earlier as path-dependent conditions, it is predicated upon certain socio-political conditions. The first order of criticality is the admittance that nothing in the social world can exist without people. Whilst it is true that, from a functionalist perspective, society takes primacy over the individual, at the same time, society is not external to the people in the same way that physical objects are external to people. If we cease to exist, society will also come to an end, only the physical processes, such as gravity, sound, and orbits of planets will continue in the same fashion, although we will not be there to experience it. But just as important, governance is mediated through language and concepts, it is therefore embedded in ways of life; in what naturally emerges as individuals transform themselves into social groups as tribes, communities, and ultimately as nations. Put differently, governance cannot be alienated from people and their culture. The idea that culture is an important aspect of governance is not new and according to Meranze it can be traced back to the eighteenth century with the “linkage of culture to direction, and thereby governance”. A common sense view is that people and their culture constitute the first order of criticality.

The second order of criticality is the consideration that human security is a vital component of the process of governing. Since the early 1990s

147 Michael Meranze, Culture and Governance: Reflections on the cultural history of eighteenth century British America, The William and Mary Quarterly, (2008), vol. 65 no. 4, pp 713-745
there has been a marked recognition that the need to ensure human security is a critical condition for governance. Human security is the ability of people to enjoy complete and full lives. Duffield refers to human security as the technology for governance in that the “failure to achieve human security risks disillusionment, internal war and the mobilisation of transborder networks and flows that threaten the cohesion of borderland states and hence the global order itself”.148 The concept of human security is not new and can be traced back to the 1970s, starting with the Club of Rome which produced a series of volumes on the ‘world problematique’, which were premised on the idea that there are ‘complex problems troubling men of all nations’.”149 Whilst the Club of Rome facilitated discussions on security as a people-centred issue, the turning point was in 2003 when the UN Commission on Human Security proposed a paradigmatic shift from taking the state out of the equation of human security, because as they posited, the very state that was the fundamental purveyor of security often fails to ensure security of its people and at times it is a “source of threat to its own people”.150 What followed was a lesser emphasis on state security in favour of human security. Human dignity in terms of meeting their basic needs and ensuring full participation in political process became the mantra. Despite the criticism on whether this is too broad a term to be useful either analytically or practically, human security became much of the focus in

political and academic discourse on governance and security. Thus, in
drawing attention to the critical imperative of human security, it is useful
to recall that governance is carried out through both self-organising and
self-regulating networks; therefore it is concerned with human
organisations and with how people live harmoniously and persistently in
their societies, and how freely they can exercise their choices, just as
human security, according to the UN is concerned…

“[With] human life and dignity... It is concerned with how people
live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many
choices, how much access they have to market and social
opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or in peace.”\textsuperscript{151}

In other words, in the absence of human security, governance or more
appropriately, the exercise of governance becomes difficult, because all
these conditions are critical for humans to co-exist. Thus, it is not a
question of whether governance exists in spite of these conditions, as
clearly, it is as a result of such conditions.

The third order of criticality is that we cannot be fully human without some
degree of knowledge, for our continued existence is largely dependent on
the process of knowledge generation, retention and transfer. Suffice to
say, knowledge is an important part of society and as I shall discuss in
greater detail in later chapters, it exists both in the informal and formal

\textsuperscript{151} See Bajpai, (2000), p. 15
governance structures. In the formal governance systems, knowledge is partly of technical skills, and the kind of informal, hard-to-pin-down skills captured in the term ‘know-how’. Similarly knowledge in the informal governances exists in the form of rules, norms, beliefs, customs created to protect populations by influencing accountability and legitimacy. As one commentator puts it:

“Knowledge, in all its forms, is a means to the attainment of (socio-economic) self-determination and self-reliance. Every aspect of human activity in terms of the use of knowledge is becoming a vital component of socio-economic and political interaction. This has prompted many a commentator to proclaim that we have entered the 'Information Age'. Information is power, so the cliché goes.”152

The current literature on governance fails to acknowledge the relationship between knowledge- in its broader sense, including but extending beyond technical expertise- and governance. It neglects the fact that governance is itself a product of knowledge and is also often directed at changing knowledge in order to influence behaviour. Governance is also a historical construct, and its emergence must be seen in the context of the historical progression of knowledge. By implication, we cannot imagine our world without such knowledge, for our understanding of such a world is dependent upon knowledge antecedents. Conversely, our knowledge

of the world, according to Bhaskar is the raw material of science. With the understanding that governance in the 21st century is best characterised by dynamism implies that the capacity of individuals, communities and societies must change and adapt to what Rosenau refers to as the modern “crazy-quilt”. People will have to become more analytically skilful just to comprehend the changes. The world has transformed into what is often referred to as knowledge society. With the current trend of change, knowledge is increasingly becoming the fundamental basis for human advancement, both as individuals and as societies. Our education system in its totality, from the informal to the formal, will eventually be measured not only in terms of building technical competencies, but also in terms of its contribution to a more tolerant society, a society that appreciates diversity and a society that possesses appropriate social skills. In short, a society that is more governable. As I emphatically stated earlier, education- as the key social mechanism for knowledge formation and transfer in its continuum from the family, school, institutions of higher learning, political governance institutions- will become the foundation for governance as we move into the new era.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided a conceptual understanding of what we mean by governance and to identify the potential actors in the process of governing. I have highlighted how political, social and economic life has

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153 Bhaskar, (1975)  
154 Rosenau, (1997)
clearly undergone serious changes in the last few decades. While it is true that continuous change is a natural condition of physical, biological and social systems, I have reiterated the words of Chambers that what makes the change different is “its combination of scale, speed, global scope and unpredictability (and) more seems to be changing and changing faster; changes are more interconnected and more instantly communicated; and the future is harder to foresee”.\(^{155}\) We are forced to operate along a continuum of local-to-global on an almost daily basis, constantly seeking to understand complex exchanges of activity. Whilst some writers proclaim that globalisation is possibly the best thing that we have ever witnessed, it is nonetheless what Knight calls a “double-edged sword”.\(^{156}\) Along with it came many ills, including, but not limited to the widening of the gap between the poor and the rich and the proliferation of illicit networks across the globe. Inevitably, from a governance perspective, new forms of non-state governance are emerging as community and social movements are gaining momentum. The implication of this is that that political scientists and scholars must come to grips with these new forms of governance. As Giddens puts it; scholars “may have to work across interdisciplinary boundaries and specialised subjects as they are to understand where the ‘new’ politic is taking us”.\(^{157}\) Similar sentiments are echoed by Payne who argues that, “in seeking to make an analytical link between globalisation and governance at the


\(^{156}\) Knight, (2009), p. 174

\(^{157}\) Giddens, (2009), p. 1025
intellectual level, a coalescence of literatures or sub-fields within political analysis is required".\textsuperscript{158}

I have presented governance in its broader context as the overall mechanisms of social order and as more than the sum of its constituent parts. It follows that governance not only encompasses the work of government, but includes these other command mechanisms that perform functions, irrespective of whether these have evolved institutions. The functions are ever present and self-evident, and include such things as coping with external threats, avoiding conflicts, maintaining law and order and providing food to ensure survival of the human species.\textsuperscript{159} In positing that all these actors of governance be recognised and their interdependence acknowledged both in the domestic and international arenas, I am arguing that governance is a continuous process of evolution that runs in a continuum from a nascent to fully institutionalised mechanisms of control. Thus, governance emerges out of path-dependence conditions and passes through lengthy evolution and as Rosenau puts it; “is more likely to evolve out of bottom-up than top-down processes”.\textsuperscript{160} It should almost be axiomatic that the various forms of governance are inextricably discussed in relation to each other. In fact, the argument extends beyond identifying the various forms of governance, but advances the idea that governance is pronounced as a fundamental element of human existence. When we attach such issues as health, economic development, environmental quality, education and

\textsuperscript{158} Payne, (2000), p. 201
\textsuperscript{159} Czempiel and Rosenau, (1995)
\textsuperscript{160} Rosenau, (1997), p. 152
human security to governance, we move the concept from being an
ideological or academic abstract, to being a pre-condition for human
existence (or more appropriately as a pre-condition for human co-
existence). In the grand scheme of things, governance is the totality of
the governances of all of these things that make life what it is. Thus,
governance is defined as a summative phenomenon, premised on
various “orders of criticality”, including, but not limited to, 1) societal and
cultural stability, 2) human security and 3) the process of knowledge
formation, retention and transfer.
Chapter 3: Knowledge formation, retention and transfer

Introduction

I have proposed the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer as one of the orders of criticality for governance to emerge from long run equilibrium of processes, as an important process that greases the wheel that allows the various levels of systems of governances to interact and evolve smoothly. It is a socio-political condition that must be maintained for there to be a continuous evolution of governance from nascent to fully institutionalised systems of governance. I view governance as a product of knowledge and that its emergence must be seen in the context of the historical progression of knowledge. I have also argued that knowledge be seen as one of the lenses through which the impacts of HIV and AIDS on governance could be understood. Thus, it is vital to examine the concept of knowledge more closely. However, to ‘know’, this epistemic concept par excellence, is much more complex than meets the eye. In a sense, the classical expression, cogito ergo sum or I think therefore I am, by the 17th century French philosopher, Rene Descartes, to prove that the mere fact of knowing that you think about being is enough prove that one actually exists, captures the complexity. Whilst the expression has a much deeper philosophical meaning, intrinsic to its constituents is the complexity of the nature of knowledge, for we acquire knowledge as we perceive our existence and the world around us, as we think
about things we already know, and as we look into our consciousness. Socrates, renowned as the founder of western philosophy once remarked, “man is the measure of all things”, not only in reference to the fact that it is through the life of man that one can see what things mean, but also in that it is within the limits of human nature to produce knowledge in our endeavor to make sense of our lives. The study of knowledge and how it is formed, transformed, retained, and transferred has been puzzling scholars for eons. Leading classical and contemporary philosophers have postulated major themes on the nature of knowledge, how it is acquired and the evidences used to justify what we know. From Plato’s Theaetetus dialogue (Plato, 360 BCE), to contemporary writers, the question of the nature and scope of knowledge has been a major area of philosophical inquiry. This is because, as Aristotle once said, “all men by nature desire to know”. To date, there is no agreement on the precise definition of knowledge and numerous theories exist to explain it. Nonetheless, and while philosophers are unable to provide a generally acceptable analysis of knowledge, the general agreement is that when we talk of knowledge, we know roughly what we are talking about not least because it is hard to imagine a stable person, let alone a stable society without some degree of knowledge. Therefore, the various theoretical formulations, whilst different in their foci of knowledge, are uniform in their understanding that we cannot be fully human without some degree of knowledge, for our continued existence is largely dependent on the process of knowledge generation, retention and transfer. Knowledge serves as the

human compass to navigate the interstice of the increasingly complex problems facing our world. Whilst this is incontestable, unfortunately studying knowledge has often been avoided in modern day academic discourse, because defining knowledge, especially as it pertains to the philosophical question of what constitutes true knowledge is complex. It is an easy to avoid question, which avoidance clearly creates gaps in our knowledge of the nature and causes of the stability of complex social systems. Mainstream academic inquiry paradoxically avoids the question of the central role knowledge plays in maintaining social systems, more so how continuity through change is maintained by the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. I hope that focusing on the theme of knowledge in sustaining social systems, I will keep alive an issue, which I believe has received less attention than what it deserves. Not only that, but knowledge is generally valuable in human social and organisational systems. My interest is inspired by the contention that in humans, knowledge has an instrumental value as it gets us through the day as well as the night. Essentially, I view the importance of knowledge not as its philosophical definition but its virtue. Borrowing from Aristotle, another renowned philosopher; “virtue has to do with the proper function (ergon) of a thing… (because) an eye is only a good eye in so much as it can see, because the proper function of an eye is sight”. 164 Thus knowledge is relevant because it serves specific functions to humans, and also because it has an element of immediacy. Admittedly, the epistemic importance of knowledge is also in its value, for knowledge is not only good for its own sake, but as Kvanvig, asserts, the value of knowledge is in its

connection to practical affairs of life. The early theories of Descartes, Locke and Kant and the preceding perspectives trace the value of knowledge to the value of its constituents or some intrinsic value that it has, but did not perceive knowledge as valuable because it is useful. These are questions very rarely asked in the early epistemologies, whilst clearly, it is only if the primary focus of epistemological theorising is valuable that the epistemological enterprise is itself worth undertaking.

In what follows, I will argue for the following: having scrutinised the available arguments that bear on some important questions in the theory of knowledge, the theory of tacit knowledge postulated by Michael Polanyi’s (1891-1976) has the best epistemic significance to my area of inquiry. Whilst the classical theories recognised that knowledge is never complete, it remained deeply ingrained in their conception that knowledge could be studied mechanically in a static way. Michael Polanyi, along with other philosophers in the twentieth century, saw weaknesses in this scientific view of knowledge and moved towards a post-modernist view. He questioned the commonly held view that knowledge can be studied objectively, and advanced the idea that “Into all act of knowing there enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known and that this coefficient is no mere imperfection, but a vital component of the knowledge”.

166 Ibid
Typologies of knowledge

Before delineating the major themes of the theory of tacit knowledge, I shall first address the question of what is knowledge, not least because in everyday language we talk of knowledge fairly loosely without due regard to what it actually means to ‘know’, nor do we distinguish among the various kinds of knowledge and whether our narratives recognise that such differences indeed exist. More importantly, there is a general tendency to use the term information and data interchangeably with knowledge as though these are the same. It is therefore important to understand from the onset that when we talk of knowledge, we refer to a “more broader, richer and deeper” understanding of and ability to do things and as Davenport and Prusak assert, it “exists within people, part and parcel of human complexity and unpredictability.”

Knowledge is generally accepted to either belong to one of the three ‘senses’ or ‘kinds of knowledge’, namely a) procedural knowledge b) propositional knowledge and c) personal knowledge or acquaintance knowledge.

Procedural knowledge or simply ability knowledge, cannot be contested as it refers to knowing how to perform tasks such as driving a car, playing a music instrument, or swimming, but at the same time does not claim an understanding of the theory involved in those activities. It is rather that we actually possess the skills involved and are able to perform such things as driving, cooking or swimming. For analytical purposes, I will contrast propositional against acquaintance knowledge, though as I shall posit later,

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169 Noah Lemos, Introduction to the theory of knowledge, Chapter 5, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)
because personal knowledge is information possessed in the minds of people and is personalised and may be related to facts, concepts, procedures, ideas, observations and judgements, it follows that it embraces both ability and to some extent propositional knowledge, though in contrast to the latter, personal knowledge cannot be mechanised. What this means is that whilst propositional knowledge does not give personal or procedural knowledge, personal knowledge on the other hand involves acquiring some form of propositional knowledge in as much as it involves knowing how to do things though such knowledge is ineffable. I will draw on Polanyi’s work to demonstrate how the tendency to make knowledge impersonal “has split fact from value, science from humanity”, because, the detachment from personal involvement of the knower in all acts of understanding has undermined science’s ability to make a relevant contribution to our understanding of the nature and causes of stability of social systems. I will return to this issue in later sections.

**Propositional Knowledge**

Without entering the epistemic enterprise for which numerous books have been written, to get a firmer hold on the typology of knowledge which I will set out to promote, it is important to discuss the propositional knowledge, also referred to as descriptive or declarative knowledge at some length. Unlike procedural knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance, propositional knowledge is described rather than depicted, mainly by use of symbols, for

example language. The difference with knowledge by acquaintance or procedural knowledge is that “we know a description and we know that there is just one object to which this description applies, though the object itself is not directly known to us.” 171 Epistemology is primarily concerned with this kind of knowledge, as it always involves truths as its source and ground. The reason is well captured in the following extract from Lemos:

“[P]hilosophers are typically concerned with what is true. They want to know what is true and they want to evaluate and assess their own claims, and those of others, to know the truth. When philosophers ask, for example, about the extent of our knowledge, they are typically concerned with the extent of our propositional knowledge, with the extent of the truths that we know. When one philosopher says he knows that there are external objects and another philosopher denies this, they are disagreeing about whether there is propositional knowledge of a certain sort. They are disagreeing about whether truths of a certain kind are known. Acquaintance knowledge and “how to” knowledge are not in the same way “truth focused.” 172

It is clear that the knowledge to which Lemos refers involves certain elements of complexity, in contrast to the characteristically direct sort of knowledge by acquaintance. According to Clark, the complexities are also in terms of the degree of syntactical complexities in our forms of reference. 173 Whilst only

171 Russel, 2010-11)
172 Ibid, p. 5
logical proper names and predicates are the syntactically simple linguistic vehicles used to express reference to the particulars, statements contain terms, concepts, theories which themselves may be syntactically confusing. Another complexity is that propositional knowledge can be further distinguished in terms of the range of subjects and questions to which it extends. Audi identifies three important domains in which “we are widely thought to have knowledge of truths that are central in guiding our lives: the scientific, the moral, and the religious.”¹⁷⁴ Here, Audi attempts to show that different questions depend on the domain under discussion, but most importantly that while propositional knowledge is truth focused, some proposition are only true as far as our moral, or at times our religious beliefs, dictates. Accordingly, when we judge something to be wrong we go beyond the evidence of the senses, and indeed beyond scientific evidence. When, for example, we believe that beating a child for crying is wrong, we accept it but do not necessarily know it, nor can we establish it scientifically. We find it natural because it is grounded in our culture and to be accepted simply as part of the social fabric that holds our lives together.¹⁷⁵ The complexity here is that Audi introduces an old epistemic debate on the nature of true knowledge. On the one hand empiricists, and many other theories aligned to it, reject the notion of personal beliefs, as they view this as personal acceptance, which falls short of empirical demonstrability. The complexity is in a sense intrinsic in the statement of what constitutes right or wrong, as empiricists would like us to believe that statements of belief and faith are value-laden. On the other hand, rationalists and similar theories recognise belief as a true source of

¹⁷⁵ Ibid
knowledge, because such things as intellectual passions, sharing of idiom, sharing of cultural heritage, affiliation are the impulses that shape our vision of nature of things that cannot operate outside what Polanyi calls the ‘fiduciary framework’ of belief.¹⁷⁶

Clearly, these earlier theories revolutionalised our understanding of the nature of propositional knowledge and how such knowledge can be acquired, transferred and retained. Since these early theories, many more theories have been framed in pursuit of understanding the nature of propositional knowledge. The complexities presented by these early theories seem to have instead inspired revolutionary intellectual discourse leading to a period known as Enlightenment, during the eighteenth century, where several schools of thought sprung to the fore. The period of Enlightenment saw the early theories of empiricism and rationalism radicalized. More theories of knowledge have emerged, attempting to rejuvenate the epistemic question of what is the extent of knowledge and whether the enterprise of epistemology is worth undertaking. The empiricist epistemology was extended, albeit under the positivist philosophy, and essentially reiterated and amplified the belief that progress in knowledge is made from observation to verification by means of observational methods. While rationalism on the other hand, inspired hermeneutics, the belief that true knowledge can only be uncovered in hidden texts embedded in human meaning. Both rationalism and empiricism continue to shape major epistemological perspectives to date. The theories are too numerous to be discussed in any length. Scanning these perspectives seems

to suggest that they continue to emphasise the high purpose of knowledge, what Aristotle calls Eudaimonia, the broadest and deepest human well-being, because as Roberts purports; “in the epistemically virtuous person the disposition of caring about the intellectual goods will derive in part from a disposition of caring about other goods such as justice, human well-being, and friendship.” This, of course, underscores and explicates the epistemological preoccupation with propositional knowledge. Whilst obviously my views are biased by my sincere interest in the necessity of knowledge to sustaining social systems, one may say, that the insistence on wholly explicit truth may have limited our ability to acknowledge that not all knowledge can be made explicit by prescription (I shall return to this in the next section). At the same time, one cannot help but to accept the contribution of classical epistemology as the foundation to our knowledge today and an indicator of our limitation to knowing. In truth, many greatest discoveries of our age have been rightly attributed to some of the greatest epistemologists. But it is also true that the avowed purpose of epistemology should be to establish intellectual understanding on the value of knowledge in terms of its necessity to sustain social systems. The major gap, as I shall explain later, is epistemological preoccupation with the principles governing social and natural systems, therefore turning a blind eye to the fact that not all knowledge can be specified in detail, insofar as the knowledge is useful whether it is codified or not. Admittedly, the epistemic importance of knowledge is also in its value, for knowledge is not only good for its own sake, but as Kvanvig, asserts, the

value of knowledge is in its connection to practical affairs of life.\textsuperscript{178} As I have stated earlier, the early theories of Descartes, Locke and Kant and the preceding perspectives trace the value of knowledge to the value of its constituents or some intrinsic value that it has, but did not perceive knowledge as valuable because it is useful, hence the neglect of personal knowledge. The value of knowledge is in its instrumentality as is evident that regardless of whether knowledge is ascribed in terms of its propositional form, social systems persisted before such propositions were laid out by science. These are questions very rarely asked in these early epistemologies, whilst as I have said earlier, it is only if the primary focus of epistemological theorising is valuable that the epistemological enterprise is itself worth undertaking.\textsuperscript{179}

**Personal Knowledge**

I will now turn to the more relevant knowledge for which I shall start with the assertion that all humans possess such knowledge. Personal knowledge, sometimes also referred to as knowledge by acquaintance, is generally easily understood and usually taken to be a *sui generis*, a simple relation between the mind and objects, that is, between a conscious being and various kinds of entities. It is a cognisance of circumstances and facts gained through experience and observation (or in other words by acquaintance). In most cases such knowledge is unspecifiable, which in effect means that it should not and cannot necessarily be reducible to the laws of physics. The contention that knowledge is personal and largely extends beyond and cannot be


\textsuperscript{179} Ibid
Reducible to writing or enumerated and inscribed in documents, books, manuals and journals as is the case with propositional knowledge, lies at the heart of my thesis. Bertrand Russel popularised personal knowledge in a paper that appeared in the Aristotelian Society Proceedings for 1910-11. Russel’s view was that “we shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths”. \(^{180}\) Russel further argues that knowledge of things by acquaintance is essentially simpler than any knowledge of truths and logically independent of knowledge of truths, “though it may be rash to assume that human beings ever, in fact, have acquaintance with things without at the same time knowing some truth about them.” The issues raised in Russel’s paper are too numerous to be dealt with adequately in this thesis. However at the core of his philosophy is the importance of knowledge by acquaintance and for him it is arguably the most fundamental concept on which all epistemology is built. His paper presents some compelling arguments that knowledge by acquaintance is indeed the basis for all knowledge, because “knowledge concerning what is known by description (i.e propositional knowledge) is ultimately reducible to knowledge concerning what is known by acquaintance.” \(^{181}\) This is true because for every proposition to be understood, it must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted with. For example, we attach meaning to the words used to speak significantly rather than rhetorically and such words must be something with which we are acquainted. This view has created major interests in knowledge by acquaintance, and with it, many criticisms. The major criticism


\(^{181}\) Ibid
of this view was proposed by Sellars, when he argued that even if we were acquainted with individuals, properties, or facts, that relation does not necessarily give us knowledge of truth because while correct, it is irrelevant to the more sophisticated view according to which the acquaintance is only a constituent of the ground of propositional knowledge.\footnote{Wilfrid Sellars, \textit{Empiricism and the philosophy of mind, science, perception and reality}, (London: Routledge and Kegan Pau, 1963)} Notwithstanding these criticisms, Michael Polanyi succinctly extended Russel’s argument further by proposing that no matter how empirical or formalised knowing is presented, ultimately all knowledge will rely upon personal knowledge or knowledge of what is known by acquaintance. Whilst many epistemologists draw a line between procedural and acquaintance knowledge, for Polanyi, because personal knowledge involves active comprehension of things known, connected to the ability and skills to do those things, he in effect treats both procedural and acquaintance knowledge as personal. Polanyi therefore only sees knowledge to belong to either the knowledge of things by description or the tacit knowledge of things- which knowledge include both the knowing by doing and acquaintance, though as I have alluded earlier, it also involves acquiring some form of propositional knowledge in as much as it involves knowing how to do things though such knowledge in ineffable.

Michael Polanyi initially set out to critique the positivist’s account of science by advocating a post-critical approach in which he urged us to recognise science’s neglect of the role of personal commitment in the very practice of science. Whilst the art of science set out to promote the explicit dimension of knowledge, in that knowledge can be codified in statements, manuals,
documents, books and journals, we ought to recognise that there exists a
dimension of personal knowledge that cannot be made fully explicit, which in
his later works, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy (1958)*, Polanyi popularised such as the tacit dimension of knowledge. His
theory starts with the premise that all knowledge has personal and tacit
elements. Polanyi was inspired by the Gestalt psychology, and therefore
developed strong views that the process of knowing is inspired by fragmented
clues, sensory motors and derives from memory. In Polanyi’s words, “Gestalt
psychology has demonstrated that we may know a physiognomy by
integrating our awareness of its particulars without being able to identify these
particulars.”\(^{183}\) Gestalt Psychology is a school of thought originated by Max
Wertheimer in opposition to structuralism, and specifically molecularism of
Wundt’s program for psychology. The fundamental tenet of Gestalt, according
to Wertheimer, is that “there are wholes, the behaviour of which is not
determined by that of their individual elements, but where the part-processes
are themselves determined by the intrinsic nature of the whole.”\(^{184}\) It is a
theory that regards the whole as greater than its parts, and thus not reducible
to the analysis of each part in isolation. Wertheimer was particularly interested
in the capability of our senses, as they relate to the visual recognition of
figures and wholes and how it goes beyond just a collection of lines and
curves. He postulated that the mind and brain have self-organising tendencies
that operate holistically, analogically and in parallel. Polanyi slightly modified
the Gestalt psychology by extending it from the spontaneous equilibrium of its
particulars impressed on the brain to seeing it as what he calls, “the outcome

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of an active shaping experience performed in the pursuit of knowledge”.

He sees the shaping of experience, or his version of Gestalt, to be the “greatest and indispensable tacit power by which all knowledge is discovered and once discovered, is held to be true”.

Polanyi is famous for the expression, “we can know more than what we can tell”, an assertion that is reflective to his opposition to positivist epistemology of knowledge, which assumes knowledge to be explicit in nature. The positivist approach to knowledge, he argues, is the conception of natural science as a set of statements, which are ‘objective’ in the sense that its substance is entirely determined by observation, even if paradoxically its presentation may be shaped by convention. This obviously lacks substance, because knowing more than we can say helps explain how knowledge can be passed on by non-explicit means. Polanyi’s opposition to positivism was so entrenched that he once referred to it loosely as a “philosophy-to-end-all-philosophy”.

He was particularly concerned that positivism, while it set out to liberate reason from enslavement, disposed of the traditionally guiding principles, like morality, law, custom, and justice, insofar as these were not demonstrable by science. Paradoxically, the belief that science is positive, and thus involves no affirmation of personal belief was the cause of positivism demise during the latter part of the twentieth century. It is important not to construe Polanyi’s opposition to positivism as doubting the efficacy of

185 Ibid, p. 6
187 Michael Polanyi in The logic of liberty: reflections and rejoinders extends this argument further that the positivist movement, having first exalted science to the seat of universal arbitrament is on the brink of collapse and it is, according to him, the logical consequence of the conflict between aspiration of positivism and true nature of science.
scientific knowledge, but instead his contention is that knowledge extends beyond propositional knowledge, and the area into which it extends is tacit.

On the tacit dimension of knowledge, Polanyi set out to demonstrate that personal judgement may have made significant contributions to scientific thought, though such tacit operations may not be easily discernable. It is therefore not hard to imagine how personal belief not only led to discoveries, but also in the very holding of scientific knowledge. As Polanyi says; “even writers like Kant, so powerfully bent on strictly determining the rules of pure reason, occasionally admitted that into all acts of judgement there enters, and must enter, personal decision which cannot be accounted for by rules.” In essence, admitting that the exercise of judgement is at times inscrutable. It is this unaccountable truth that the theory of tacit knowledge attempts to elucidate because as Polanyi puts it; “an art that cannot be specified in detail cannot be passed on by prescription since no such prescription exist for it”. The central tenet of the theory of tacit knowledge is that knowledge is ineffable in that it cannot be understood by looking at how people communicate verbally. This sort of knowledge, according to Fabian, “can be represented, made present only through action, enactment, or performance.” Ineffability in theory of tacit knowledge is taken literally in that nothing can be said precisely. Like Polanyi says, “what I call ineffable may simply mean something I know and can describe even less precisely

189 Polanyi, 1962), p. 53
than usual, or even only in vague language". In other words, it is the unspecifiability of personal knowledge, that part of knowledge that is the residue of what is left unsaid by our “defective articulation”, a term I borrow from Polanyi who describes such defectiveness as common and often glaring. Polanyi distinguishes the unspecifiable knowledge from subsidiary or instrumental knowledge, such as those of riding a bicycle, which he essentially uses to prove that though we may possess it, such knowledge cannot be articulated clearly, yet this will not prevent one to say, ‘I know how to ride a bicycle’. Accordingly, even if an analysis of such knowledge may be brought into focus by analysis, or formulated as a maxim, or feature in a physiognomy, such will never be at best and not exhaustive. Polanyi expresses this point quite explicitly in the following extract from his book, Personal Knowledge:

“Although the expert diagnostician, taxonomist and cotton-classer can indicate their clues and formulate their maxims, they know more things than they can tell, knowing them only in practice, as instrumental particulars, and not explicitly, as objects. The knowledge of such particulars is therefore ineffable, and pondering of judgement in terms of such particulars is ineffable process of thought. This applies equally to connoisseurship as the art of knowing and to skills as the art of doing, wherefore both can be taught only by aid of practical example and never solely by

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Ineffability results from the highly personal knowledge of humans which is different from the facts of inanimate world. The personal faculty becomes even more manifested as we ascend the ladder of life, resulting in “more far-reaching participation of the knower- in order to understand life.” Such is the participation that the tacit coefficient of knowing broadens and the complexities to declare it become dominant. In later writings, the tacit dimension of knowing became Polanyi’s focal point of his theory, thereby effectively shifting his focus towards the process of knowledge formation and transfer. The framework of tacit knowing has its basis in Polanyi’s description of physiognomy, a term referring to recognition of human faces without being able to tell how we know it, which he extends further to include what he calls “peculiar appearances of species which can be recognised only aesthetically” and “the characteristics of wines and blends of teas which only the experts can recognise”. The three main themes of tacit knowledge are that, first, discovery cannot be accounted by a set of rules of algorithm; second, knowledge is both public and to a large extent personal; and third all knowledge is tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge. In a sense knowledge is not private but social and when conveyed socially, it blends with experience of the individual. Sveiby argues that this is as a result of the fact that “new experiences are always assimilated through the concepts of which the

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192 Polanyi, 1962), p. 88
193 Ibid, p. 347
individual disposes and that the individual has inherited from other users of the language”.196 Nonaka, echoes that it “consists of mental models, beliefs, and perspectives so ingrained that we take them for granted and therefore cannot easily articulate them”.197 Zappavigna-Lee and Patrick pronounce that whilst the part of experience is below-view and unattended, it nevertheless “allows us the experiential agility to be at once efficient and creative, to assimilate the novel and the familiar: in essence, to develop expertise.”198 Zappavigna-Lee and Patrick further articulate how we possess skilful practice, such as those of the artisan, the witchdoctor or the physician, all of which have occupied a position of both importance and mystery in most cultures since ancient times. It is “such hidden knowledge [that] made us mythologise expertise, placing it beyond the common by constructing it as unspeakable.”199 Gerard adds to this quite appropriately, that it should not be confused with unconscious knowing, that is, the type of knowledge that, even while in use, is unknown to the knower, or with pre-conscious knowing or non-conscious knowing.200 To extend this further, knowing that we know how to perform a task is not the same as knowing that we cannot explain the principals involved in performing such a task. Though we know our ability through successfully performing such tasks as riding a bicycle or swimming, we become puzzled when we realise that no matter how hard we try to elucidate the precise forces, laws and principles involved in such exercises, it

196 Ibid
198 Michele Zappavigna-Lee and Jon Patrick, Tacit Knowledge and Discourse Analysis, (Encyclopaedia of information Science and Technology, 2005)
199 Ibid
is inscrutable.

It should become clear that whilst it was important, from an analytical point of view to present the various knowledge typologies, I am setting out to promote the importance of the personal dimension of knowledge or what Polanyi, in his later writing termed tacit knowledge, for such knowledge has largely been overshadowed by the vigorous scientific search for the laws governing the social and material worlds. According to Polanyi, universities around the world have failed to tap into this knowledge. In his words, “…while the articulate contents of science are successfully taught all over the world in hundreds of new universities, the unspecifiable art of scientific research has not yet penetrated to many of these…”201 I argue that by focusing on this type of knowledge I will promote an understanding of the imperatives of knowledge formation, retention and transfer to our everyday life, because as Bloch further remarks; “…it is not just the case that tacit knowledge is not formulated linguistically and not available for reflection, rather its effectiveness in enabling everyday life is founded on it not being explicit and linguistic…”202 Despite this fact, there has been little mainstream academic inquiry into how tacit knowledge is an important element of the process of continuity of social and cultural systems.

Knowledge formation, retention and transfer

The nature of tacit knowledge is such that it is intergenerational and knowing

by experience, observation and education presupposes knowledge to be transferred between humans. Polanyi’s point that ‘we know more that we can tell’, is a significance starting point to remind ourselves that the knowledge by which we live our everyday lives cannot easily be verbalised, but yet our everyday activities in our social settings are meaningful even if such activities cannot be postulated in words. Polanyi’s argument also reminds us of the fact that, as Jackson puts forward; “The knowledge whereby one lives is not necessarily identical with the knowledge whereby one explains life”.203 This is the case because humanity emerges primarily through our everyday, practical engagement with the world rather than through a contemplative reflection upon the world. Because the knowledge by which one lives is tacit and embodied, we project ourselves into the world in our every day interactions. Polanyi’s theory in so far as it treats knowledge as largely personal and therefore tacit, provides the most appropriate foundation to address the question of how knowledge formation, retention and transfer is possible in social and cultural settings.

**Household knowledge formation, retention and transfer**

Reiterated throughout the previous sections is the primacy of the institution of the family (or family household) as one of the key ingredients of human life, the basic unit of a society and as Peplar expresses, it “is the necessary foundation of all order and morality”.204 All individuals relate to the community through the unit of family. It is the smallest social unit but yet the key facilitator

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203 Jackson, 1996
of the knowledge creation process, particularly that which I defined as personal and tacit, for such knowledge is largely not codified and thus cannot easily be expressed and transferred, specifically between members of a household. Unlike in organisations where attempts are made to preserve knowledge through succession planning mechanisms, encapsulated into computers using databases and systems, families pass on knowledge from generation to generation by means of tradition and value systems. Polanyi reminds us that whilst language is a means of getting information from one mind to the other, most knowledge during interaction amongst family members is carried in strings of symbolically encoded meanings. Such knowledge must be passed from generation to generation through learning by example. According to Polanyi, to learn by example is to submit to authority. In attempting to clarify how knowledge is transferred within social settings, Polanyi further alludes:

“You follow your master because you trust his manner of doing things even when you cannot analyze and account in detail for its effectiveness. By watching the master and emulating his efforts in the presence of his example, the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, including those which are not explicitly known to the master himself. These hidden rules can be assimilated only by a person who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically to the imitation of another.”

Based on Polanyi’s description of authority which he further ascribes as tradition, we can proceed to conclude that family units have a natural authority, making them the key social unit for intergenerational knowledge transfer. As children grow up in family settings, there appears to be a clear hierarchy of authority to which they submit themselves to, because this authority exerts some form of legitimacy, credibility, trust and confidence. According to Polanyi such learning is first a-critical and therefore children would surrender to the knowledge of their parents and older siblings without questioning because they attribute to them the legitimacy of their actions. Therefore, the formation of knowledge within family settings takes place locally due to the submission of authority and the legitimacy ascribed to it. Most importantly is that most knowledge assimilated locally is largely tacit in that it triggers an individual’s personal knowledge, which knowledge is acquired through the immersion in the practice. Whilst it is true that knowledge transfer could be reciprocal across the ages, by adopting Polanyi’s view of authority, I am in effect promoting an understanding that intergenerational knowledge transfer involves an older member of the household passing on knowledge to younger members. Put differently, I am positing that in family settings, the role that older family members play in the transmission of personal knowledge takes primacy in the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. Borrowing from the social capital theory, the father, mother, siblings and other older relatives, form the social capital through which younger members of the household assimilate knowledge. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, I view the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer locally
knowledge creation as intergenerational. The concept of generation is not hard to grasp. Whilst generally, a generation is often used to refer to the gap between birth of a parent and their offspring, which period is considered to be about 30 years, I use it here simply to denote different stages in family members’ lives. It follows that a mother or father are the older generation and the son or daughter the younger generation, without necessary referring to the chronological age to which they belong. Be that as it may, with the current societal changes, including increased geographical mobility, increase in the nuclear family unit and ageing population, it has become imperative to invest in the promotion of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer, specifically as it relates to the personal dimension of knowledge. This becomes ever so pertinent because, as Polanyi proclaims; “an art (that cannot be specified) which has fallen into disuse for the period of a generation is altogether lost.”

The loss is more so profound when family units are disrupted, which is (as I shall explain in later sections) usually linked to greater chance of children exhibiting problem behaviour such as delinquency. This is not difficult to demarcate, because as I have set out to demonstrate, whilst living in the age of explicit knowledge, systemised in rules and guidelines, interactions with members of the family (at an early age) creates the subtle knowledge that has come to be associated with socially acceptable behaviour of children. Many social science fields, such as clinical and developmental science, criminology, family studies, public health and networks as valuable assets, as they enable people to build communities and knit the social fabrics. Many researchers have now positioned social capital as a key factor in understanding knowledge creation. This is the case because if relationships are viewed as valuable and depending on the strength of the relationship, as is in the case of a mother and a daughter, the knowledge creation process tend to be seamless.

anthropology have all pointed to a relationship between lack of parenting and a range of problem behaviours, including delinquency, substance and alcohol abuse, early sexual activity and poor school achievement and truancy. In the era of HIV and AIDS, we have come to witness how far too often the ability of families to impart the key knowledge necessary to protect their young and promote changes in community norms have been compromised because of the lack of inter-generational knowledge formation, retention and transfer around sex and sexuality. This is particularly true for tacit knowledge in traditional communities where major differences exist in the ways boys and girls are treated by their parents and the knowledge they receive. Generally, boys are expected to engage with their fathers and girls with their mothers, with such exchanges involving mostly tacit knowledge, particularly as it relates to sexual conduct. Therefore, when the process of knowledge formation is disrupted, it affects boys and girls differently because this is embedded in the context of gender relations, and this has central implication for girls and boys vulnerability to delinquency, alcohol abuse, truancy, risky sexual encounters and other anti-social behaviours.

Today, there is a greater recognition that families do possess some formidable knowledge not easily accessed through formalised systems, leading to greater interest in traditional and indigenous knowledge systems. This area of inquiry has captured the attention of scholars around the world and scores of research is being undertaken. With the current interest on biodiversity, health and environmental protection, recognition of traditional knowledge is gaining momentum and there is a general consensus that
traditional/indigenous knowledge is germane to all other knowledge. It has become ever clearer that traditional knowledge is the cornerstone of cultural identity and survival of communities and families as it produces a frame of understanding and validation that give meaning to the world. As one commentator during a conference on traditional knowledge systems pronounced; “the loss of traditional knowledge is not just a loss for the traditional communities themselves but also a loss to the intellectual property of the country as a whole”. Communities largely feel this loss not only because they use it for practical purposes, but such knowledge forms part of their cultural identities as well. It is handed down from previous generations through tradition, but as Polanyi reminds us, this knowledge is particularly not ‘tellable’, positing serious challenges to those interested in such knowledge. Whilst some progress is made to codify indigenous knowledge, it becomes increasingly evident that the indigenous knowledge projects do not sufficiently account for the major part of knowledge because it is tacit. Whilst recognising that such knowledge indeed exists, not enough effort is made to ascribe this to the interaction of both the tacit and explicit knowledge. In other words, there is no sufficient attention given to the fact that traditional knowledge interacts with the formal education system to create knowledgeable people necessary to maintain societal systems. However, what seems the case is the treatment of indigenous knowledge as if it is the same across various cultural settings, resulting in ineffective articulation of the bounds of indigenous knowledge. The problem, as Bicker, Sillitoe and Pottier put forward, is the “link between

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the tacit and the explicit, between the spoken and the unspoken that make it dangerous to treat indigenous knowledge as ‘fungible’ goods, freely convertible between different cultural contexts.”

Organisational knowledge formation, retention and transfer

The area in which Polanyi’s theory has been used extensively is organisational behaviour. Nonaka and Takeuchi in particular, employed Polanyi’s theory to attempt to explicate how organisations act as knowledge creating machines where people acquire knowledge through the process of socialisation, externalisation, combination and internalisation. As such the theory has revolutionised current understanding of organisational knowledge creating processes. It is the most cited piece of work in organisational knowledge creation. This point is echoed by Grant when he stated that “it is surprising that one of the most cited references in Knowledge Management and Intellectual Property papers is not to any of the work published in recent periods but to the work of an author from some 50 years ago.” Grant was speaking in reference to the explosion of publication on knowledge management and intellectual capital in the period 1995 until 2002. He quoted Serenko and Bontis who found that prior to this period fewer than 100 papers were written, but between 1995 and 2002, over 5,000 papers were published, most of which cited the work of Polanyi, specifically his two books, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy (1958) and The Tacit


210 Kenneth A. Grant, Tacit knowledge revisited: we can still learn from Polanyi, The electronic journal of knowledge management, 5 (2), (2007), pp. 173-180, available online at www.ejkm.com
One of the key authors known to have taken Polanyi’s theory to new heights in organisational knowledge is Nonaka and to a lesser extent Takeuchi.

The theory of tacit knowledge is now the dominant theory in organisational studies. The interest in organisational knowledge management and the value creation of organisation has increased in both the popular and scholarly literature over the past fifteen years or so. But as McLean says, “as is often the case in applied fields, it appears that the practices related to the phenomenon of knowledge management and knowledge creation have accelerated faster than the scholarly work to explain them.” However, the theory of tacit knowledge appears to date to be the most appealing framework as it challenges the ‘input-process-output’ paradigm that dominated organisational knowledge studies for years. It has led to paradigmatic shift towards viewing organisations as knowledge creating machines through the process of socialisation, externalisation, combination and internalisation. Because, while new knowledge is developed by individuals, organisations also play an important role in articulating and amplifying such knowledge.

The appropriateness of the tacit knowledge theory is fathomable as the creation of institutional knowledge is complex and even hard to recognise in

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211 Ibid
212 Polanyi’s theory is the most cited piece of work in organisational knowledge management. Alexander Serenko and Nick Bontis (2004; 2009), found that prior to 1995 fewer than 100 papers were written, but between 1995 and 2002, over 5,000 papers were published, most of which cited the work of Polanyi, specifically his two books, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy (1958) and The Tacit Dimension (1966)
the first place. Such knowledge exists unidentified until when it is necessary and impossible to do without it. Nonaka, epitomised as the most influential Polanyi scholar\textsuperscript{215}, describes tacit knowledge in organisations as partly of technical skills, the kind of informal, hard-to-pin-down skills captured in the term “know-how”, for example a master craftsman who after years of experience develops a wealth of expertise at his fingertips, but more often than not “unable to articulate the scientific or technical principles behind what he knows”.\textsuperscript{216} In later works, Nonaka and Takeuchi have developed Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge in business organisation and included in their explanation the dimension of explicit knowledge to demonstrate the contrast. They have described tacit knowledge in organisations as the hard to articulate knowledge with formal language, the type “embedded in individual experience and involves intangible factors such as personal belief, perspective and value system” as opposed to explicit knowledge, “which can be articulated in formal language including grammatical statements, mathematical expressions, specifications, manuals and so forth.”\textsuperscript{217} The tacit knowledge of organisations is manifested in collective set of facts, concepts, experience and know-how. It transcends the individual, and is regularly transmitted between members of the organisation. It is the tacit knowledge that Nonaka and Takeuchi believe business organisations have virtually neglected in management studies. Organisational knowledge creation in this context is described as the

\textsuperscript{215} Nonaka has been so influential in extending Polanyi’s theory in organisational studies, such that Kenneth Grant suggests that “a cynic might be excused for thinking that some of the authors did not in fact actually read Polanyi but, more simply, re-presented what Nonaka reported, while still citing Polanyi as the reference.”\textsuperscript{215}
capability of a “company as a whole to create new knowledge, disseminate it throughout the organisation and embody it in products, services, and systems.” More specifically, organisations fail to see that they are not merely processors of knowledge but are also creators of it. In Nonaka’s words:

“The theory of organization has long been dominated by a paradigm that conceptualizes the organization as a system that ‘processes’ information or solves problems. Central to this paradigm is the assumption that a fundamental task for the organization is how efficiently it can deal with information and decisions in an uncertain environment. This paradigm suggests that the solution lies in the ‘input-process-output’ sequence of hierarchical information processing. Yet a critical problem with this paradigm follows from its passive and static view of the organization. Information processing is viewed as a problem-solving activity which centers on what is given to the organization—without due consideration of what is created by it.”

Using the theory of tacit knowledge as the basis for their work, Nonaka and Takeuchi have demonstrated how Japanese companies have increased their global competitiveness through the process of knowledge creation. They

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218 Ibid, P. viii
have been able to strategically acquire, create, exploit, and accumulate new knowledge and use these to increase their competitiveness, competency, and sustainability. Herein lies my interest in tacit knowledge: my aim is to build a conceptual bridge that is able to span the space between the complex philosophical conception of knowledge and its practical application. The theory of tacit knowledge, specifically that of Nonaka and Takeuchi has demonstrated that knowledge creation is also a process of value creation not only for the organisation but for the person acquiring that knowledge as well. It extends knowledge beyond the theories of Descartes, Locke and Kant that trace the value of knowledge to the value of its constituents or some intrinsic value that it has, to perceiving knowledge as valuable because it is useful. It follows that Nonaka and Takeuchi utilises the theory of tacit knowledge to demonstrate that knowledge can get people and organisations money, prestige, power, and the like. Moreover, it can increase organisational competitiveness, thereby increasing its ability and probability to survive harsh times.

Polanyi’s assertion that tacit knowledge is accumulated, for example, by a master craftsman who after years of experience develops a wealth of expertise at his fingertips, should remind us that the process of knowledge formation is, to a large extent, intergenerational. In attempting to justify this proposition, it is important that I turn to the question of what is meant by a generation in the context of business organisation, before shifting to the more relevant question of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer within organisational settings. In collective terms, a generation is seen
as “of the people born and living at the same time”, generally sharing distinct attitudes, behaviours, expectations, habits and sometimes, also engage in similar activities, because as the cohort theory denotes, “they are similarly located in time and as such have experienced similar historical events.” Whilst there are contrasting theories of generation, the general cohort theory best promotes an understanding of the intergenerational nature of knowledge in an organisational setting. In fact, organisational science literature usually builds on this theory to delineate the various generations. Many writers have since utilised the theory to classify generations in four groups;  

i) the still generations (born 1925-1945),  

ii) the baby boomers (born 1946-1964),  

iii) generation X (born 1965-1980) and generation Y (born 1981-2001). Many writers now use these groups to postulate and delineate the differences in knowledge characteristics of these groups. For example, McNichols, in her examinations of intergenerational knowledge transfer within an Aerospace Engineering community postulate how the baby boomers possess different knowledge than those of the Generation X. She further outlines how potential knowledge gaps may be created if the baby boomers generation aerospace engineers’ knowledge is left unharnessed. This is in consistence with Polanyi’s argument that an art that has fallen into disuse may be lost forever. Polanyi explains the transmission of knowledge within a social context by introducing the concept of communities of practice, where he

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221 Oxford English Dictionary  
222 Donal C. Rogers, Making waves: ageing knowledge workers and intergenerational learning, (Center for research and intellectual capital: Inholland University of Applied Sciences, pp.3)  
223 Donal C. Rogers, Making waves: ageing knowledge workers and intergenerational learning, (Center for research and intellectual capital: Inholland University of Applied Sciences, pp.3)  
224 Debby McNichols, Tacit knowledge: an examination of intergenerational knowledge transfer within an aerospace engineering community, (Phoenix: University of Phoenix, 2008)
outlines the process through which knowledge is transferred between the master and student in the case of scientific practice. His contention was that because an art that cannot be specified in detail cannot be transmitted by prescription, it is only through example that a younger apprentice learns from the master to apprentice. In his words, “by watching the master and emulating his efforts in the presence of his example, the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, including those which are not explicitly known to the master himself.” Here Polanyi resolves two problems; first, by asserting that the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art from the master, Polanyi responds to the question of the possibility of how knowledge creation is made possible through both physical gesture (which to some extent can be described) and those subliminal unconscious rules not known to the master. Second and most importantly, whilst he does not specifically refer to knowledge as intergenerational, by postulating that a master, whose experience is gained over years, possesses certain level of authority and inadvertently is also a carrier of tradition, we could proceed to conclude that Polanyi indeed regarded the process of knowledge creation as being hierarchical. This is further evidenced in Polanyi’s introduction of the concept of authority and tradition in which he argues that “a society which wants to preserve a fund of personal knowledge must submit to tradition…we accept the verdict of our appraisal, be it at first hand by relying on our own judgment, or at second hand by submitting to the authority of a personal example as carrier of a tradition.” For knowledge to be passed on through tradition is to postulate that such knowledge is a consequence of intergenerational

relations. Therefore, it is clear, according to Frade, that “Polanyi seems to regard tradition as a process in which the master is always older than the apprentice.” Whilst many writers argue that this is no longer the case, and that it was consistent only with professions up to the 1970s, I shall argue that for analytical and the purpose for which I use it, organisational tacit knowledge is largely intergenerational.

**Conclusion**

The theory of tacit knowledge is best suited to explicate the impact of HIV and AIDS on summative governance, because as I have said, the impacts of HIV and AIDS are subtle, daunting, subdued and long-waved and the concept of knowledge formation, retention and transfer, particularly that proposed by Polanyi, can help us conceptualise the flow of impacts across the various levels of governance- for the reason that intergenerational knowledge is the key factor for the continuous evolution of governance and its emergence from long run equilibria of processes. Polanyi’s epistemology demonstrates social science’s neglect of the necessity of knowledge to maintain social systems. Whilst presenting the various epistemologies, I have advanced Polanyi’s, whose was classified under the scientific period in which the greatest interest was the empirical pursuit of knowledge. This period is best categorised as a move away from the descriptive and normative meta-scientific claims about the nature of knowledge. In so doing, epistemology inadvertently started addressing the question of knowledge formation and transfer in the context of

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227 Cristina Frade, Polanyi’s social construction of personal knowledge and the theories of situated learning, (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, p. 4)
social systems. In effect, the attenuation of the concept of knowledge from its purely abstract and philosophical conception took place during the scientific period, as a result of which knowledge regained its virtue. As I have highlighted in earlier sections, the virtue of knowledge is its relevance to the practical affairs of life. To an important degree, the theory of tacit knowledge demonstrates that knowledge is the central feature that sustains the various governances, whilst maintaining the philosophical underpinning of the concept. Its philosophical foundation is that most knowledge that people possess is not fully explicit and it is of the kind, which, by its nature cannot be conveyed in grammatical statements, mathematical and statistical expressions, specifications or manuals. Polanyi utilises the Gestalt psychology to demonstrate that most knowledge that people possess is ineffable in that it cannot be understood by looking at how people communicate verbally, because as he puts forward, ‘we can know much more than what we can tell’.

It should now be clear that having scrutinised the available arguments that bear on some important questions in the theory of knowledge, the theory of tacit knowledge postulated by Polanyi have the best epistemic significance to my area of inquiry. This epistemology seems not only to glorify epistemology, in terms of only its propositional sense, but for its practical significance in social systems, specifically as it relates to the family unit and business organisation. The theory of tacit knowledge, moves from the traditional epistemology that typically expresses knowledge in propositional forms in formal logic to treating knowledge as a dynamic human process necessary for
maintenance of social system stability. In a sense, this seems to be more interested in the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. In other words, it moves from the more epistemological question of the extent of propositional knowledge to more fundamental questions of how knowledge is acquired in every day life and how people use knowledge to navigate the interstate of life. Whilst the classical theories recognised that knowledge is never complete, it remained deeply ingrained in their conception that knowledge could be studied in a static way. Borrowing from Vuyk, classical epistemologies saw knowledge only as a fact and not a process. For the purpose of this thesis, I would argue that the theory of tacit knowledge is appropriately regarded as the epistemology of intergenerational knowledge creation, retention and transfer for it emphasises the process of knowledge creation as a dynamic process. Perhaps it is not surprising as this was developed during the period called scientific epistemology, whilst the preceding theories were developed either during the periods known as metascientific or parascientific epistemologies. Moreover, the theory of tacit knowledge has been utilised in real life settings and its proponent was not only a philosopher, but also practitioner of the art.

By using the family unit and organisational setting as examples, I advance the idea that knowledge is indeed also socially situated, and its process where the context in terms of structure, activities and relationship influence the process.

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228 The terms scientific, metascientific and parascientific epistemology have been increasingly used by Jean Piaget to distinguish the periods in which the focus of science was in part determined by whether the interest was to establish the limits of science in that not everything could be known, or the philosophy of science, that includes the history of science, psychology of science, sociology of science politics of science, and the economics of science, or as with early philosophies, the challenge to conventional wisdom respectively.
of acquisition. To understand how people learn to become knowledgeable, it is to acknowledge that knowledge is not fixed but an outcome of the changing relationship between social relations and individuals. The social relations are situated in institutional and social systems. Social in the sense of being long-standing for “some of the most complex knowledge that people acquire, such as languages or cultural norms, can only be learned from other people, who themselves learned from previous generations”. It follows that knowledge is a product of transmission of prior knowledge. It is along these lines that the intent of this thesis moves; that whilst philosophy ponders the nature of true knowledge and the demarcation of the forms of knowledge, we recognize the interplay of the various kinds of knowledge and that the process of knowledge formation and transfer moves in a continuum from nascent to fully institutionalised social systems.

Chapter 4: Governance liabilities of HIV and AIDS

Introduction

Ever since clinicians in the USA discovered HIV in the summer of 1981, there has been fierce debate about the origin of HIV. Earlier on, many theories on the origin of HIV were put forward. Some advanced the idea that AIDS was due to a smallpox vaccine. The smallpox theory is to date the most paradoxical as it suggests that, on the one hand the vaccine triggered the HIV, whilst on the other hand there are suggestions that the cessation of the vaccine may have triggered AIDS. The former view suggests that in obliterating one disease (polio), another disease (AIDS) was transformed from a harmless and minor endemic into a worldwide pandemic. The view here is that the vaccine triggered a rather dormant virus. In recent years, the prevailing view suggests that though the vaccine may have been responsible for AIDS, it is not because it triggered the virus, but contrastingly, the vaccine may protect against HIV infection as it improves the ability of the immune cells to fight HIV virus by, for example, altering the receptor called CCR5 on the surface of white blood cells, which HIV and polio viruses usually exploit to enter the host cell.230 The view that HIV was a result of a biological warfare experience that has gone wrong, has also received considerable attention in

the years following the discovery of HIV.\textsuperscript{231} Others, including the molecular biologist Peter Duesberg argued that the virus is not distinct from other viruses at all and that AIDS is not due to HIV. The Duesberg hypothesis argues HIV is rather a harmless passenger virus without any link to AIDS.\textsuperscript{232} The dominant theories about the origin of HIV are those that advance the idea that HIV is a new human virus of animal origin. At the centre of these theories is that chimpanzees and other primates from sub-Saharan Africa including green monkeys, sooty mangabeys and mandrills carry a form of simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV) that is nearly identical to the aggressive form of HIV. Therefore it seems plausible that at some point the virus may have crossed species from primates to humans.\textsuperscript{233} It is generally accepted that many other viruses can pass from animals to humans in what is known as zoonosis. The first view is that HIV may have occurred through natural transfer of immunodeficiency virus from monkeys to humans, for example through a bite, sexual intercourse with primates or eating uncooked meat from any of these primates. The other view, made popular by Tom Curtis, is that HIV may have occurred through iatrogenic (man-made) transfer through contaminated polio vaccines used in Africa in the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{234} Over a million people in Burundi, Rwanda, and what is now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo were given the Koprowski's polio vaccine between 1957

\textsuperscript{231} The biological warfare speculations are not surprising as many commentators believe that this is fuelled by secrecy surrounding military chemical and biological weapons programmes. Generally, medical sciences do not support this view, see for example Myra McClure and Thomas Schultz, the Origin of HIV: Either from Primates or from a Non-pathogenic Human Virus, \textit{British Medical Journal}, (1989), 298(6683), pp. 1267-1268
and 1960. The polio vaccine is cultured on monkey kidneys, which may have been contaminated with SIV.\textsuperscript{235} All these theories are intensely debated and alternative theories are regularly proposed. Detailed analysis of these theories is beyond the scope of this thesis. Notwithstanding and whilst the debate rages on, there is scientific consensus that HIV infection is a necessary condition for progression to AIDS. Science has proven that HIV weakens the immune system over time and that people with HIV will eventually develop AIDS. Sadly, since the first case was recorded, no cure has been found, though medication are available to slow down the rate of HIV infection progression. Now the AIDS pandemic, as it is commonly referred to, has not only become known as the killer of people but has become one of the most destructive crises of modern times, ravaging families and communities throughout the world. The epidemic knows no boundaries, and in the thirty years since the first case was discovered, HIV and AIDS has permeated borders, crossed continents and affected societies and has become what scholars appropriately refer to as “a public policy crisis of virtually unprecedented proportions”.\textsuperscript{236} This is not hard to fathom, because the AIDS pandemic has only few parallels in recorded history, “the 1918 flu pandemic and the Black Death in the fourteenth century”.\textsuperscript{237} It is therefore not surprising that no other topic has received so much attention as HIV and AIDS in recent history, despite the fact that as early as 20 years ago, the terms HIV and AIDS were not found in any medical dictionary. UNAIDS estimates that as of

\textsuperscript{235} This hypothesis was vehemently rejected by Hilary Koprowski, the pioneer of the Koprowski polio vaccine. See for example Hilary Koprowski, AIDS and the polio vaccine (letter), \textit{Science}, 257, (1992), pp. 1026-1027
\textsuperscript{236} Robert Ostergard (ed) and Jim Whitman (Gen Ed), \textit{HIV/AIDS and the Threat to National and International Security}, (Palgrave McMillan, 2007) p.3
2010, over 33.3 million people were living with HIV and over 30 million have
died to date.\textsuperscript{238} But the truth is, the virus has not spread proportionately
across the globe. It is in Africa where the epidemic has taken its greatest toll.
UNAIDS data shows that Africa carries 69\% of the world’s infections whilst it
is home to only about 12.6\% of the world’s population, and worse, nine
countries (Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia,
Namibia, Mozambique and Malawi), are home to 34\% of people living with
HIV globally. As Craddock puts it, “the phrase [AIDS in Africa] has come to
signal an almost apocalyptic level of devastation… [and] images of the
pandemic as it has progressed through sub-Saharan Africa are by now mind-
numbingly familiar: painfully wasted bodies; haunted eyes; isolation; fear;
imminent death.”\textsuperscript{239} The basis for all of these lies in the figures; “with less than
8\% of the world’s population, sub-Saharan Africa accounts for two thirds of
the world’s HIV cases”. In some of the southern African countries, the HIV
epidemic has grown at an extremely fast pace, for example of the ten hyper-
endemic countries, five have an infection rate higher than 15\%, the highest
being Swaziland where in 2008, 42\% of pregnant women attending antenatal
care have tested positive\textsuperscript{240} and 26\% among the population aged 15-49 have
also tested positive.\textsuperscript{241} Many of the sub-Saharan countries are only at the
beginning of a rising impact curve of the AIDS epidemic, with impact on the
vulnerable groups intensifying over the coming years.

\textsuperscript{238} UNAIDS Report on the AIDS Epidemic, Global Report, (UNAIDS, 2010)
\textsuperscript{239} Susa Craddock, Beyond Epidemiology: Locating AIDS in Africa, in Ezekiel Kallipeni, et al.,
(eds), HIV and AIDS in Africa and beyond, (Blackwell: Oxford, 2004), pp 1-11
\textsuperscript{240} Swaziland Ministry of Health, 11th National HIV Sero-surveillance, (Mbabane: Ministry of
Health, 2008)
\textsuperscript{241} Swaziland Ministry of Health, Demographic and Health Survey, (Mbabane: Ministry of
Health, 2007)
During the early stages of HIV and AIDS, its impact was widely discussed and disputed, but thirty years now, there is consensus about the devastating impact this is having on people, families, communities and societies. The question appears to have shifted from whether these consequences exist to whether they are well understood and adequately dealt with. What we know for sure is that the HIV epidemic continues to have devastating effects. Despite modest successes in some areas, serious challenges remain for Africa. The immense scale of AIDS related illness and deaths is weakening governance capacities for service delivery with serious impact on food security, economic growth, and human development. Despite the temporary reprieve from ARVs, many problems persist. For instance in some countries (for example Swaziland and Lesotho), more than 25% of the health budget is spent on ARVs, resulting in over reliance on external funding; the number of AIDS Orphans are on the rise and economic conditions of many people are making adherence difficult, creating a breeding ground for drug resistance. AIDS has undermined the capacities of individuals, families, communities and the state to fulfil their roles and responsibilities in society. Thinking ahead, if current trends are not reversed, the longer–term survival of many African states will be seriously threatened as the pandemic not only threatens to reverse years of economic gains, but disrupts key governance structures, which structures are necessary for continuity. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), “AIDS already has significant consequences for all forms of social economic and political activity and thus for governance in the years to come”\textsuperscript{242} More potently, HIV and AIDS disrupt

the interactions of governance actors from a higher to a lower order, which interaction is a necessary condition to achieve a self-regulating and self-organising state. It is along these lines that the intent of this thesis moves, to demonstrate that HIV and AIDS has not only disrupted the sectoral governances as the UNECA suggests, but has had the greatest impact on what Kooiman would refer to as the “interactions between (governance) actors on micro-, meso-, and macro-levels of socio-political aggregation.”

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Impact of HIV and AIDS on sectoral governances

Although this thesis characterises governance as a summative phenomenon, it is imperative to start the discussion with how HIV and AIDS is posing a challenge to sectoral governances. Here, I will restrict the discussion to two forms of what I referred to earlier as formal levels of governance, namely national and local and three forms of what I earlier referred to as non-formal governances. I will not focus on global and corporate governance, not because I do not view this to be an important component in my analysis of the impact of AIDS on summative governance, but because this will not add value to my endeavour to demonstrate how HIV and AIDS have the potential to affect the continuous process of decision-making and command mechanisms at every level of human activity in the highly affected countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Suffice to say, the loss for corporate governance is no different from the loss to national and local governance structures.


243 Kooiman (1993), p. 41
National Governance

Over the past 60 years since the first country in Africa gained independence, the majority of the African countries have been working towards creating democratic framework of governance for their citizens. Institutions have been set up to deliver on the public good, which goods include not only the basic services such as roads, water, electricity and other infrastructure, but that which the market fails to produce in sufficient quantities, such as protection of internal and external peace, equality before the law and due legal process and enforcements of contracts. Now AIDS is threatening this very basis of democratic governance as it compromises the capacity of governance institutions to deliver these services. As the epicentre of the epidemic, the impacts of HIV and AIDS on the critical infrastructures that sustain the security, stability and viability of modern nation-states in Africa are manifold.\textsuperscript{244} HIV and AIDS are now reversing gains made in these rather fragile sectors by eroding all development efforts by sharply reducing human capital.

The impacts of the AIDS pandemic on governance institutions at the national and local levels are not hard to see. In these most heavily affected countries, there is evident deterioration of social welfare indicators. General levels of life expectancy, literacy, and schools enrolment are falling as a result of high morbidity and mortality. In countries such as Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia and South Africa, life expectancies have

\textsuperscript{244}Mark Schneider and Michael Moodie, \textit{The destabilizing impact of HIV/AIDS, A report for the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),} (Washington: CSIS, 2002)
declined to levels seen during pre-industrial ages. When life expectancy is low and prevalence is high, high profile personnel are lost in their active years in sectors as diverse as the military, the civil service, the private sector, the educational system, industry and other indigenous sectors such as agriculture. When this happens, according to Hsu, “the potential exists for institutional collapse, which would undermine governance.”245 In Zambia, for instance, the Commission on HIV/AIDS and Governance in Africa (CHGA) estimates that the country may lose 32% of its government workforce over a twenty-year period and will need to replace 1.7% of its workforce annually to maintain current staffing levels. Evidently,

“[t]he loss of key skilled personnel greatly reduces the quality and quantity of basic services that the government can deliver and contributes to the rising costs of accessing infrastructure, deepening the cycle of poverty in areas affected by the AIDS epidemic. It is also harder and more expensive to replace such skilled workers.”246

In other words, if the government fails to replenish its civil service, service delivery will be weakened, institutional robustness and vitality is reduced as the important function of policy-making and implementation are inhibited. With the nature of HIV, such institutional fragility could persist over time because of what Barnet refers to as “the evident disharmonious resonance between the life cycle of the virus and the length of infection in the individual human host

246 UNDP Urban Management Programme for Regional Office for Africa, HIV/AIDS and local governance is sub-Saharan Africa, Occasional Paper, July 2002
and the length of human generation”. In a sense, the trajectory of the impact is intergenerational as children born to HIV positive parents may grow to be orphans, who may grow up to be infected, but perhaps before they themselves have had children, who will also become orphans. These create problem for governability as these children grow up without guidance and education, an outcome that may create a threat to national order.

At the same time, not only does AIDS undermine governance institutions in the highly infected countries by way of creating institutional fragility, but it also weakens the governance capacity for an effective response to AIDS. Coupled with the fact that many governments are only starting to treat AIDS, not only as a health crisis, but a broader public development challenge, it underscores the importance of governance in the context of AIDS response because AIDS “affects the way a government manages the response in its relationship with the population…”.

Responding to the crisis created by AIDS will require that national policy makers devise innovative ways to sustain and improve the human resources capacity of the population in the face of the pandemic. HIV and AIDS make investing in the process of policy formulation an essential element of governance. At the same time though, Africa’s problem is that whilst many of the sub-Saharan countries display outward signs of democratic states, as though power and decision making reside within government

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247 See Tony Barnet, A long-wave event. HIV/AIDS, politics, governance and security: sundering the intergenerational bond, Journal of International Affairs, 82, pp.297-313. Tony Barnet put forward a compelling argument in which he demonstrates how AIDS has rendered the traditional three-generation bond linking grandparents, parents and children sunder due to the mean life expectancies and reproductive cycles that spans only 70 years in the absence of effective treatment

institutions, many of these countries’ institutions are deeply rooted in anti-
democratic and non-developmental mode. Whilst these states exhibit
democratic characteristics similar to those found in the West, such as holding
regular elections and forming democratic style institutions, real power resides
in individuals outside formal institutions of government. In such states,
corruption is rampant as the state and the individuals running the affairs of the
state are inadvertently seen as one. State resources and personal resources
become inseparable. As Cammack puts it, “decisions about resources are
made by ‘big men’ and their cronies, who are linked by ‘informal’ (private and
personal, patronage and clientelist) networks that exist outside (before,
beyond and despite) the state structure, and who follow a logic of personal
and particularist interest rather than national betterment.” This
neopatrimonialism tendencies means the institutions of governance are not
well developed to deal with the threat posed by HIV and AIDS, at the same
time that HIV and AIDS weakens these institutions of governance. We can
begin to see that HIV and AIDS becomes a vicious circle of lower capacity (as
a result of AIDS itself and neopatrimonialism), loss of human resources, poor
growth (i.e lower income base), lower propensity to save, increased service
level requirement due to high levels of poverty and orphanhood, which in turn
impacts the viability of the state to provide service, foster law and order and
weakens government institutions to deal with HIV and AIDS. In due time, this
may lead to even higher levels of HIV infections as the government’s capacity
to respond to the virus is weakened, impacting on the number, quality and
implementation of strategic policies for prevention and care due to lack of

249 Diana Cammack, The logic of African Neopatrimonialism: What role for doners,
capacity. Thus, for the purpose of building peace and political stability guaranteed by strong governance institutions, tackling HIV and AIDS cannot be regarded a trivial issue, but as fundamental to effective governance.

**Local Governance**

Whilst decentralisation is not new, it was not only until the early 1990s, that a number of African countries renewed efforts to implement policy instruments to facilitate the process of local or decentralised governance as a means to entrench pluralist democracy. Many are constituted as three or more distinctive but yet interconnected spheres of government on national, regional/provincial and local government. It is perhaps appropriate to point out at this stage that I am dichotomising the impact of AIDS on central and local governance here for analytical purposes only. Evidently, most of the African governments started as part of a framework of government imported from the West, wherefore many followed the integration model on which the emphasis is put on the role of the central and local government as part of the single state, instead of the autonomous model that regards the central and local governance as separate. Thus, the impacts of AIDS as described earlier are fully applicable to this level of governance.

But in contrast to the central governance where the impacts are largely institutional and centralised, local governance provides a safety net for may people in Africa, and an impact on this level of governance has a direct effect on the people on the ground. Local government is a resource of social capital,
which many local people use to solve their daily problems. This point is clearly put forward by Olowu and Wunsch who assert that “research in Nigeria, Cameroon, Congo and a host of other countries, particularly with weak central government, also demonstrate these patterns (of local governance as a resource to solve daily problems)”. On the other hand, a number of African countries follow the welfare state principles of equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth and public responsibility for the citizens unable to maintain the minimal provision of a decent life. For examples, South Africa, Namibia and Botswana are among the few countries providing social welfare benefits including old age pensions, foster parents care grants and free basic services at the local government levels. Evidently, as Tomlinson eloquently purports, the “ability of local government to carry out this mandate is premised on institutional capacity and the ability to deliver and to obtain payment for services whilst being able to levy and obtain payment for property rates.” In South Africa, for example, the service policy dictates that local government should provide free basic services, which meets the “World Health Organisation’s (WHO) criteria for the lowest services required to ensure the health of the user”. The loss of productive members of the society means not only a loss of key staff in the local governance institutions, but also a loss of income for local government to deliver these services. As Swartz and Roux so tellingly summarise:

250 Dele Olowu and James Wunsch, Local Governance in Africa: Challenges of democratic decentralisation, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 45
252 Ibid, p. 6
“[T]he disease will most likely escalate socio-economic and health needs while at the same time undermining municipalities’ capacity to provide for such needs. The rates base will be severely cut down as an increasing number of poorer households struggle to pay for services. At the same time a combination of rising needs, less money and the loss of skilled staff will place added pressure on already stretched resources. This will further undermine the capacity of local governments to carry out their core functions of local service delivery.”

Using the city of Johannesburg to demonstrate the impact of AIDS on local governance, Tomlinson estimates that in this city of about 2,2 million people, there will be 377,820 AIDS related deaths and 322,022 non-AIDS related deaths between the years 2000 and 2020 increasing the maternal AIDS orphans from 28% to 90%. This will increase service level requirements of households. It is hypothesised that because it is both undesirable and complex to expand service to only destitute households, the local government will find itself having to offer free basic services to all households in keeping with the social service policies. When this happens, service level requirements will exceed government’s free basic service levels, rendering the social policy unattainable. This scenario paints a difficult picture to local government as evidence is already piling up that majority of local governments are institutionally and financially unable to sustain their role to provide basic services.

Concomitantly, when people are infected, they lose hope and according to Poku, “many activities that used to be attractive when life expectancies were normal, lose their appeal and even relevance”. Consequently, things such as election and voting lose their appeal. When large numbers of people are infected, a significant number of people and families shift their attention from taking part in electoral processes to caring for the sick. Casting a vote, the cornerstone for democracy and the most fundamental and absolute of rights and civil liberties is diminished, as it is regarded a burden to vote, thereby putting the legitimacy of locally elected persons into question. This creates a particular problem for the democratisation process. During the past two decades or so, there has been a dramatic increase in the language of rights and entitlements, which rights were seen to be fully exercised through casting a secret ballot. A related challenge is that large numbers of HIV infected people cannot cast their votes because a sizeable number become disabled and many more are hospitalised. Most electoral laws in Africa do not make provision for this segment of voters, whilst many are signatory to the various international instruments guaranteeing and protecting the rights of people with disabilities, which instruments include the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, the 1971 Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, and the 1969 Declaration on Social Progress and Development and more specifically, the Bill of Electoral Rights for Citizens with Disabilities. The latter Bill calls on states to meet their

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obligation to take effective measures that all citizens with disabilities are able to exercise their universal right to participate fully and on equal terms in electoral processes.

Again, at this level of governance, we witness the mutually re-enforcing consequences of HIV and AIDS, with substantive changes in demographic profiles of local communities (for example orphaning children), disruption of family units as we know them, burdening families and local governance, which in turn has the potential to disrupt social stability, and undermine democracy and governance structures.

**Social Groupings and Civil Society Organisations**

Since the 1980s, there has been a growing number of civil society organisations and groupings, which political commentators hailed as the key to democratic society transitions in Africa. These were the grassroots activists and promoters of political reform, who in some instances, were vital in moving policy forward. According to Hegel, these civil society groupings "occupy a space between the family and the state".\(^{256}\) As Goss noted earlier, these are examples of governances that are taking place at neighbourhood levels outside state agencies, through community development trusts, tenant management organisations and community groups.\(^{257}\) With other writers like Benn, et al. and Rosenau and Scharpf calling them decentralised centres of “sub-politics”, consisting of networks comprising individual actors, not-for-

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\(^{257}\) Goss, (2001), p. 31
profits and community groups or “multi-level” or “multi-layered” governances respectively. These are important governance structures that provide much needed services in many African countries and are a vital part of democracy and a driving force behind development. These organisations are key to dealing with diverse issues as solving local problems, solving conflicts and disputes, dealing with risks and disasters, and promoting sustainable practices such as those dealing with environmental protection.

Unfortunately, literature on the impact of HIV and AIDS on these key governance structures is few and far between. But, the impact of HIV and AIDS on this level of governance is not difficult to elucidate. When HIV enters the picture, these locally based structures will have to adapt to serve changing needs in the communities they serve, and will experience the epidemic’s impact on their own operation and evolution. In short, the impacts are both exogenous, in the sense that organisations are unable to cope with the demand exerted by the communities they serve, and endogenous as they are impacted by the loss of key members due to death, long absence from key activities and in some cases members taking frequent compassionate leave. According to a report by Manning, conducted as part of the University of Natal Health Economics and HIV and AIDS research, HIV and AIDS have serious implications for the effectiveness, and long-term sustainability of locally based organisations. The report concludes: “To survive the HIV/AIDS epidemic and continue to provide essential services and an important avenue for

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258 Susan Benn, Dexter C. Dunphy and Andrew Martin, Towards a model of governance for sustainability: networks, shared values, and new knowledge, in Susan Benn, and Dexter C. Dunphy (eds), Corporate governance and sustainability: challenges for theory and practices, (London: Routlidge, 2007), p. 103
participation in public life, organisations must recognise, plan for, and take steps to minimise the impact of HIV/AIDS on themselves and their work.”

On the other hand, these groups are vital partners for government in the fight against AIDS due to the inability of the government to confront the epidemic. As Seekinelgin puts forward, HIV and AIDS have inspired changes in the thinking of politicians and scientists and today, the disease is one of the most recognised issues in the global arena. Their work has increased the profile of the disease and helped reduce the stigma associated with it. The importance of civil society groupings is not particularly surprising as the response to HIV has coincided with unprecedented movement of civil societies around a wider range of social and economic issues in many of the African countries. What this analysis also points out is the paradox of HIV and AIDS. Whilst these organisation have been on the forefront of the response, they have not been spared the brunt of its impacts, with a large number of these losing staff due to AIDS related illnesses and death. In his study of six mid sized companies, Manning finds that 76% of the 59 respondents reported that HIV and AIDS has impacted on their organisation, which impacts ranged “from absenteeism and turnover to declining community participation and stigma of those infected or affected by HIV/AIDS”. HIV and AIDS are clearly generating problems for community governance that was never part of the debate on this level of governance. The question therefore remains; if

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262 Ryan Manning, (2002), p. 8
Manning could demonstrate that the more formalised and professional organisations found it difficult to develop policies and programmes to manage HIV and AIDS, how will the less formal and more grassroots groupings survive the impact of HIV, considering that the worst of the AIDS pandemic is yet to come? Already, these groups operate in conditions of very high unemployment and poverty.

**Family Institution**

The impact of HIV and AIDS in Africa goes far beyond only the human tragedy of loss of key skill, but it altered social systems, disrupts family units, and produce AIDS orphans *en masse*. Many of the traditional structures are already overwhelmed and liable to break down if they are not given support, nurtured, protected and strengthened. The impacts of AIDS on families are manifold. First, the emerging specter of AIDS threatens to wreak havoc on the already precarious position of the poorest people of this world. A paper by Bloom, River Path Associates and Sevilla attempts to elucidate the mutually reinforcing relationship between AIDS and poverty. As they purport;

“95% of those infected with HIV live in developing countries… [and] cross country evidence indicates a strong statistical significant association between high prevalence and poor socio-economic performance whether measured by per capita income, income
inequality, absolute poverty or the UNDP’s Human Poverty Index”.263

As Arrehag, et al., further comment; “HIV/AIDS acts as a forceful vehicle for impoverishment at the individual and household level and result in increased income and asset inequality”.264 The loss of a wage earner means that a vast number of households become poor and are also fragmented as a result of children being sent away to extended family members. As the Urban Management Programme for Regional Office for Africa also points out;

“Providing these children with food, housing and education in the face of disintegrating traditional safety nets and depleting government services with demand resources for many years to come… [and] caring for AIDS sufferers is a considerable drain on already tight household budgets”265

Richter adds to this that in several countries, for instance Cote d’Ivoire, the average income of households where a family member has died as a result of AIDS, income levels fall as low as 60%, expenditure on health care quadruples, savings are depleted and families often go into debt.266

263 David Bloom, River Path Associates and Jaypee Sevilla, Health, wealth, AIDS and poverty, 2004, p. 6
Second, the increasing death rates as a result of AIDS have left in their wake a growing number of orphaned children. The declining HIV prevalence rates are not indicative of a declining orphan population. In fact the orphan population is estimated at 50 million up from 43.4 million in 2003. Children on the Brink Report points out that of these children, 15 million are as a result of HIV and AIDS, and the majority of them are in Africa. It is therefore appropriate to conclude that if the 1980s was the decade of HIV infection and the 1990s was the decade of AIDS, the 2000s are an era of orphan-hood in the East and Southern African regions. Without any intervention, most of these children, especially the young girls, will not attend school, as most of them will end up as primary caregivers of their households. This is in addition to other overlapping and interdependent impacts, which impacts include loss of home and income, poor nutrition, new responsibilities as children have to work, increased internal migration and general psychological impact of trauma due to the loss of a parent. These children, as Richter asserts, “will endure enormous anguish as they find themselves alone and unsupported, the butt of cruel commentary and behaviour, excluded, exploited, beaten, raped and forced into labour”. Whilst others may argue that children living in extreme adversity develop a certain resilience, it cannot seriously be argued that displaced children living in conflict, abusive, dehumanising and disaster situations will grow up to become what Rosenau referred to earlier as the

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268 Gloria Thupayagale-Tshweneagae, Susan Wright and William Hoffmann, Mental health challenges of the lived experience of adolescents orphaned by HIV and AIDS in South Africa, Journal of AIDS and HIV Research, 2(1), (2010), pp. 8-16
governable. Because it is suspected that these adverse conditions are endured over time, the likelihood of socially undesirable outcomes are increased.

Third and compounding the challenge is the gendered dimension of HIV. Evidence clearly demonstrates that in Africa the burden is largely borne by women. Almost everywhere one looks, data clearly indicate that women bear the disproportionate burden at the community and household levels in terms of prevalence rates and also care (particularly the young and the very old). Recent estimates by UNAIDS suggest that 52% of people living with HIV and AIDS in low- and middle-income countries are women and that women account for over 60% of all new HIV infections.\textsuperscript{270} In sub-Saharan Africa, women comprise six out of ten people infected, according the Commission on HIV and AIDS and Governance in Africa.\textsuperscript{271} For instance, in Namibia, it is estimated that 39% of women under 30 years are positive compared to 29% of men of the same age.\textsuperscript{272} In terms of care, it is estimated that women account for 95% of carers in HIV and AIDS programmes in the Southern African region. Therefore, women overwhelmingly bear the burden for the physical and emotional caring of the sick, because the role of caring always has been regarded as the full responsibility of women including the girl child. In some cases, these young girls are expected to abandon their education, thereby denying them the benefits associated with education, including increased political participation, improved economic participation, lower crime

\textsuperscript{270} UNAIDS Report on the AIDS Epidemic, Global Report, (UNAIDS, 2013)
\textsuperscript{272} Ministry of Health and Social Services, 2010 National Sentinel Survey, (Windhoek, 2010)
rates, general protection against diseases such as HIV, and so forth. The complex interplay between gender, orphans and HIV is daunting. As a woman or a girl, vulnerability doubles due to exposure to sexual violence and other exploitation, which increase their vulnerability to HIV, whilst at the same time these women face more AIDS-related stigma, discrimination and marginalisation than their male counterparts. And worse, when these men fall ill, women are expected to take care of them because caring for orphans and the sick falls within a woman’s domain.

Fourth, the HIV and AIDS pandemic has profound implications for societal private enterprises, as families are forced to cope with the loss of skills. For instance, in the subsistence agricultural sector, young family members are denied the opportunity to gain the required knowledge as their parents fall sick and die. Subsistence agriculture plays a major part of social life of many African societies and it is the sector that sustains the stability of societies and ensures their survival.

Fifth, the family in Africa maintains its place as the key social unit, whether in the nuclear or extended form. Beyond these families is a network of people connected either by kin or blood called the clanship. The clanship performs an important governance functions of uniting their members, coping with external threats, avoiding conflicts, maintaining law and order and providing food. HIV and AIDS is affecting the function of these important structures.
Education System

The importance of the education system as the pillar for human advancement has long been recognised. It has often been touted as the most important determinant of the future wealth of nations. In his education paper in 1848, Mann wrote:

“... our means of education are the grand machinery by which “raw material” of human nature can be worked into inventors and discoverers, into skilled artisans and scientific farmers, into scholars and jurists, into the founders of benevolent institutions, and great expounders of ethical and theological science”\(^{273}\)

Despite the benefits of education, and its role in lowering the spread of HIV\(^{274}\), which role has been widely documented, I have presented education more broadly as a key governance system. I have defined education in terms of its role to provide for better citizenship, the ability to appreciate and recognise wider range of cultural and other services. In this context, education provides benefits external to the person accruing such benefits, as other members of the society also absorb the benefits obtained from education. Akocha and Maiyo puts this rather succinctly when they posit that education must be “seen as a human right, a key to civilization and enlightenment and as a source for wealth and power... and it is a cornerstone of any country’s social and


political institutions”.275 Because a person being educated is a member of a society, the total benefit of education is the sum of the private benefit and the social benefit. The essence of education as a source for social capital is increasingly being recognised. Following on the theoretical work of Bourdieu who proposed such topics as human, social and cultural capital, Coleman extensively developed the concept of social capital and linked this to social stability. The World Bank Social Capital Initiative defines social capital as “internal, social and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that govern interactions among people and the institutions in which they are imbedded”.276 Looking at education from the social capital theory should serve to remind us of the imperative of education as a key governance institution when such a definition is indeed linked to it. There is an understanding among scholars of the reciprocal relation between education and social capital. For example, in his paper on the effects of social capital on academic success, Acar analyses the work of various writers on social capital and concludes that the reciprocal link between education and social capital is in part due to its contribution to academic success, and due reciprocally to education as the source for social capital.

Notwithstanding, this main source of social capital (that is, education) is at the crossroads. As Lavell noted, “the HIV and AIDS pandemic is seriously affecting education systems today and will continue to have a negative impact

275 Judith Achoka and Julius Maiyo, Horrifying disaster in Western Kenya; impact on education and national development, Education research and review, 2008, 3(3), pp. 154-161
in future”. Kagotho appropriately alludes to the fact that whilst the institutions of education is regarded in countries like Kenya, as a key socialisation agent, which inadvertently also provides coping mechanisms for the effects of HIV and AIDS, it is bearing the greatest brunt of HIV and AIDS. Available evidence suggests that thousands of students, learners, teachers and other school personnel have died as a result of AIDS, others are frequently absent as a result of AIDS-related illnesses. The most appropriate way to explicate the impact of HIV and AIDS in the education system is to put the child in the centre of the discussion and demarcate the various groups of children whose lives are mostly affected. Bennell has identified three groups of children being affected; i) children who are HIV positive, ii) children in households with a sick family member and iii) children whose parents (or parent figure) have died as a result of AIDS. Because of his focus on the direct effect of HIV and AIDS, the other group which Bennel fails to mention is children whose teachers are infected.

**Infected children**

Whilst information on the exact numbers of children directly affected by HIV and AIDS is scanty, because HIV is notoriously known to have no mercy, the double might of HIV is clearly evident in this segment of society. First, children get infected before they are born because their mothers are infected with HIV.

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Second, those who manage to live through puberty, they get infected, because in places like Africa, patterns of sexual activity are embedded in the social relations and material realities of families which often puts young people at risk of contracting HIV at an early age.

Whilst prevalence among children is decreasing as a result of improvement in services preventing the transmission of the virus from the mother to the child during pregnancy, labour and delivery or breastfeeding, UNICEF estimates that globally 1,000 children were infected every day through mother to child transmission in 2010. UNAIDS estimates put the number of children under the age of 15 years living with HIV in the world today at 2 million, most of whom are infected by their mothers. There are suggestions that this number can be much higher because the silence, secrecy, and denial that surrounds the disease makes it very difficult to obtain accurate information. Notwithstanding, this figure is staggering, especially since these numbers refer to children. It is perhaps important to note that even in the absence of HIV, all children are most vulnerable during the first five years of life, with any child being at greatest risk of dying in the first year. HIV just makes things worse for the children unfortunate to be infected by their mothers. Whilst not all children born to HIV positive mothers do get infected, those infected have a slimmer chance of survival. In fact, research has observed some patterns of disease progression in children with about 20% developing serious disease in the first year of life and most of them dying by age four. The remaining 80%

have a slower rate of disease progression, with many not developing the most serious symptoms of AIDS until school entry. But 90% never actually make it pass elementary school.\textsuperscript{282} A related problem, according to the World Bank report on disease and mortality is that “children with HIV infection are at special risk for developmental disabilities… (and) low birth weight, prematurity, poverty, malnutrition, and micronutrient deficiencies, more frequently seen in HIV-infected children, are likely to compromise early child development”.\textsuperscript{283}

On the other hand, many young people become infected through unprotected sex during their adolescent years. This is a time when several key development experiences occur, including physical and sexual maturation, progress toward social and economic independence and identity. However, the scourge of HIV traps many of the world’s adolescents before navigating the interstate of life. UNICEF estimates that nearly 2,600 people aged 15–24 were infected every day in 2010 and “some 2.2 million adolescents aged 10–19 were living with HIV worldwide, the majority of them unaware of their HIV status.” The reason for such a high number is perceptibly the neglect of appropriate information, including age-appropriate sexual reproductive health and prevention service at such a critical period of transition out of childhood. The consequence of HIV is that it reduces the probability of some boys and girls of going to school.


The cumulative effect of these two scenarios is the reduction in the number of children seeking to attend school, as most of those infected from the mother do not make it past elementary school and studies have shown that HIV prevalence among adolescents is linked to school drop-outs and truancy.

**Orphaned children**

The HIV and AIDS pandemic have not only killed people and brought suffering to communities, as I alluded earlier, but has spurred a generation of children without parents, whose absolute number has increased from 28 million in 1990 to 145 million to date, with AIDS attribution increasing from 3% to 37% over the same period.\(^\text{284}\) According to the Children on the Brink Report, there were 15 million AIDS orphans in 2003, of which 11.6 million were in Sub Saharan Africa.\(^\text{285}\) Indeed, this number should not come as a surprise considering that HIV and AIDS affects people in their young and child-bearing age. It has therefore the greatest impact on the people dependent on them. The distinctive characteristic of HIV and AIDS in regards orphans is that it has the largest potential to create double orphans. “With HIV, if one parent is infected there is a high probability that the other parent is or will become infected and that both will eventually die.”\(^\text{286}\) Fundamentally, the greatest effect of the HIV and AIDS epidemic on learners is the experience of being orphaned through the loss of one or both parents. When this happens, the education performance of these children is expected to


\(^{286}\) Ibid
deteriorate markedly with higher repetition and dropout rates and generally poor learning outcomes. For instance, in Zimbabwe, research has shown that the “consequence of orphanhood is delayed school enrollment, an increase in the drop-out rate, erratic attendance, lack of concentration and poor performance.” The evidence of the impact of HIV and AIDS on orphans and education are now piling up. Gertler, Levine and Amos found that orphanhood reduced school enrolment in Indonesia and that the impact is greatest among children transitioning from primary to high school. At the same time Evan and Miguel found that in Western Kenya, orphans are 5% less likely to attend school. Other studies, for instance, Ainsworth, Beegle and Koda and Case, Paxton and Ableidinger found delayed enrolment and lower school attendance by orphans respectively. This is demonstrable of the havoc AIDS has wrought to existing family coping mechanisms. When a parent falls ill, the needs of children are likely to suffer as resources are diverted to taking care of that ill parent, instead of paying for children’s education and providing for other needs. Resources, including the available time that children may have, are shifted towards care giving. The challenge is that children who would normally be classified as living in stable family conditions are turned into children living in adverse conditions, leading to

287 Bennell, 2005
290 David K Evans and Edward Miguel, Orphans and schooling in Africa: longitudinal analysis, Demography, 44(1), (2007), pp. 35-57
greater frequency of truancy and dropouts. A research by Thupayagale-Tshweneagae, Wright and Hoffmann, on mental health challenges of the lived experience of adolescents orphaned by HIV and AIDS in South Africa has shown a clear link between children orphaned by AIDS and school attendance. For instance, they have reported that “adolescents orphaned by AIDS are exposed to unpredictable and unfamiliar experience which is compounded by the grieving process where there is no adult”. They found that a child found it difficult to get integrated with their peers at school after the death of the parent as a result of AIDS. Jere adds to this that in Malawi, while some studies have shown that households are narrowing the gap between net enrolment rates of orphans vis-a-vis non-orphans, other household studies have disputed and demonstrated higher absenteeism and withdrawal amongst orphaned children. Various other studies have found evidence of the association between parents and increased risk of dropouts and delayed school entry.

**Vulnerable children**

Parental death seems only one of the many difficulties children in these high prevalence countries are subjected to. There is an increasing group of

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295 Ibrahim Kasirye and Eria Hisali, (2002) quote various studies demonstrating the link between HIV and AIDS and children vulnerabilities. For example they quote Gertler (2004), et al., Evans and Miguel (2007), Ainsworth (2005), Case, et al. (2004) and Bicego, et al., (2003) whom have all demonstrated, utilising various methodologies, the negative relations between school attendance and orphaned children
children whose educational prospects are made dire as they have to contend with what Kagotho refers to as “the complexity of navigating changing family roles”²⁹⁶ because a mother, father or guardian is chronically ill. Parents living with HIV has been narrated as one of the most stressful of human experience.²⁹⁷ Instead of developing within safe and supportive environments, children are faced with striving to integrate previous roles of being young and carefree to having to deal with the emotional demand of caring for a sick parent, exacerbated by the fear that the parent will die. The meaning of life for such children changes and sometime such change is permanent. Research has shown that the care giving responsibility has had a variety of economic, social and psychological impact on children. Children are often required to financially support themselves and their siblings in addition to having to take care of the ailing parent. The learning environment in a family is severely weakened, creating a worrying scenario as these children are at a stage of seeking for and developing norms around appropriate social behaviour. The absence of a parental figure means that children are left to navigate social interactions without the support of a parent figure. Because children in their early years of life need to feel emotionally close to at least one of their parents for their health development and survival, these children have the greatest possibility to enter a vulnerable puberty and adolescent period during which they can engage in risky behaviours without adequate precautions. Clearly, HIV positive parents in childhood pose a serious threat to the survival and development of young children. Already the Children on the Brink report,

states that children “under age 5 [five]- especially those whose families live in poverty in developing countries- are vulnerable to potentially fatal measles, diarrhea, and pneumonia”, which will increase the chance of dying by the first few years of life. In addition, it has been shown that “maternal-child interaction of HIV-infected mothers are at higher risk for cognitive and language delays”. It is therefore becoming increasingly clearer that HIV and AIDS are compounding an already dire situation in the poorest parts of the world.

On the other hand, with responsibility shifting from being a child to being an adult, educational performance is compromised. As Fontaine and Fletcher assert: “these care-giving responsibilities compromise a child’s ability to attend school; in instances where they do attend, their ability to perform well is diminished.”

Infected teachers

The uniqueness of the HIV epidemic is that it does not discriminate; everyone in the poorest countries seems to have almost an equal chance of being infected. Significantly, teachers, who themselves are responsible to impart the skills necessary to prevent HIV, have not been spared the brunt of the epidemic, creating a formidable challenge to the system that is the key to turning the tide against HIV. With cash stripped countries already struggling

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300 Fontaine and Fletcher, 2003
with the provision of basic education to their people, the increasing number of teachers being infected with HIV is appalling. A study examining the social determinants for HIV prevalence in South Africa makes some horrendous observation of the epidemic in this country. The authors demonstrate how, despite the plethora of prevention programmes and comprehensive plans to control HIV and AIDS, HIV prevalence remains at a staggering 13% of educators working in the public service. The observation is that because South African women, as is the case elsewhere in Africa, make up the majority of educators (68%), the teaching profession is likely to face challenges of lack of female teachers. “With the majority of female educators teaching in primary schools, this is likely to have a devastating effect on the quality of education and on the learners themselves because these educators serve as their role models, nurturers and at times provide psychological support”.

Ultimately, when the teachers fall victim to HIV, AIDS-related absenteeism, in-service mortality and early retirement will increase, the consequence of which is reduced productivity in the teaching sector.

Using the ecological framework to demonstrate the impact of HIV and AIDS on teachers in South Africa, Theron expanded the discussion to include other contextual factors that further create and exacerbate the tensions that teachers face. She contends that because teachers are members of multifaceted social systems, in the context of HIV and AIDS their functions are compromised by a variety of exogenous epidemic related stressors such as

grief, fear, escalating workloads, pastoral care demands and others. According to her:

“[E]ducators are ecologically situated beings. In other words, the educator functions within a dynamic, interconnected constellation of micro-, meso-, and macro-systemic relationships, and these relational contexts impact on educators’ roles, identities and experience. Given the scale of HIV epidemic in South Africa, it is possible that any (or all) of these relational levels have been revised by the challenges inherent to the epidemic- with concomitant ramifications for educators’ identities and lived experience. South African educators are situated within an HIV-impacted ecology, which often translates into demotivation.”302

It is not difficult to discern the factors that Theron refers to in her assessment. When children are infected or affected by HIV or AIDS, teachers are likely the first in line to know. They first-handedly experience the suffering of children who are HIV positive, orphaned and whose parents are ill. In these contexts, many teachers do more than merely teaching the children, they become counselors, supporters and at times even the primary provider of material needs for these children. Moreover, because the experience of loss and bereavement is difficult for children and sometimes only manifest long after the event and have a tendency to fluctuate, teachers find it difficult to recognise these symptoms and provide the appropriate support. The key issue is that they become wearied by these multitudes of uncertainties, new

tasks and the distress of learners. With all of these micro- and meso-ecosystemic impacts occurring against the macro-ecosystemic backdrop of high prevalence rates and deep-rooted poverty and gender imbalances, one cannot help but to foresee a difficult future for such a key governing institution.

**Summative effects of HIV and AIDS**

Because this thesis characterises governance to emerge out of pathdependence conditions, with some form of hierarchical structure, characterised by a multi-level structure, each of which depends, in an aggregate way, on each other, it follows that the key issue is to demonstrate how the impact of HIV and AIDS on one of the key structures of governance will inevitably lead to an impact across all the other structures. To do this, I have developed a framework to illustrate the summative impacts of HIV and AIDS.

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303 Linda Theron (2009)
304 Kooiman (1993), p. 41
Whilst it is not possible to capture the full effect of HIV and AIDS, the framework demonstrates that once a crack appears in any of the structures of governance, all others are affected. It is therefore possible to see that every level or form of governance impacts on all other levels and forms. The impacts are circular within and across the structures. From a national governance perspective, when a large number of people are infected, the first wave of impacts are increased attrition of the work force due to morbidity as increasing numbers of people fall ill, care for infected relatives and attend...
funerals of colleagues, friends or relatives. The eventual outcome is reduced productivity of the workforce within the formal levels of governance, at the national and local levels. These losses are further compounded and consolidated by the second wave when workers in these institutions of governance develop full blown AIDS and eventually die. When this happens, there are cumulative absolute losses in the quantity and quality of labour to the economy and the nation and service delivery gets disrupted. This is not difficult to see, because HIV has located itself amongst the economically active population, those in the prime economically productive and sexually active years. Therefore, the drivers of service delivery are taken out of service. When these active members of society die, the whole spectrum of services gets disrupted, as services are now diverted to care. And as Poku asserts, the fact that sevice delivery gets weakened is no longer a projection as evidence are now piling up that institutions, businesses and families shift spending from productive things that used to be attractive to medical care and related services. The losses in these sectors have a direct bearing on the welfare of families, communities and the nation as a whole. Simtowe puts this summative impact more succintly:

“At micro level, when adults are dying or getting infected, the cost of treatment or funeral might outweigh the share of children and older member’s part of expenditure. At the macro level, while governments

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are in tight budget constraints, the increasing expenditure on public health related to HIV may cause a decrease in other sectors.\(^{307}\)

When investment is reduced to key sectors such as education, school enrolment is impacted, which in turn reduces the amount of people available to work and contribute to the national budget and therefore reduces the national income available to carry out government’s mandate to provide the public good. Concomitantly, reduced levels of education reduces the social capital available to a society, which capital “greases the wheels that allow communities to advance smoothly”, because in the words of Acar, “when social capital exist in the form of norms, sanctions, or trust and trustworthiness, everyday business and social interactions become less costly”.\(^{308}\) This is the case because education, as I have shown earlier, does not only involve the development of science and technical skills, but it is a key ingredient needed to foster harmonious living with others, and an important element for good governance and participatory democracy.

Similarly, when someone dies as a result of AIDS, household labour endowment is reduced, thereby reducing not only the supply of labour to government but household welfare as well. From a household point of view, the loss of labour, especially if the infected person was a breadwinner, means the whole family is affected, as not only households’ income reduces, the meager resources and time available to them are now diverted towards caring, making the impact multifaceted and multilevelled. From a national

\(^{307}\) Simtowe, and Kinkingninhoun-Medagbe, (2011)

governance point of view, it means that the quality and quantity of labour supply to the institutions is reduced, thereby impairing service delivery. For instance, the capacity of the management of the school systems is weakened, which in turn leads to a lower human capital accumulation. At the same time, when families are affected, the number of people that seek to attend school is reduced as resources are diverted to taking care of that ill parent, instead of paying for children’s education. And as I have said earlier, the family is a key ingredient of human life, the basic unit of a society and as Peplar expresses it “is the necessary foundation of all order and morality”. It follows that when HIV and AIDS affects this very foundation of human existence, the future of nation states becomes hard to foretell.

The uniqueness of HIV and AIDS is that its effect is not only one dimensional but multidimensional and circular, as it weakens family capacity to turn the tide against the epidemic, weakens the schools system, the very system that is key to imparting the knowledge necessary to reverse the spread of HIV, and inhibits government institutions for policy-making and implementation necessary to provide a conducive environment in which every player can contribute to reversing the epidemic. As Poku posits:

“The epidemic weakens institutions, rendering the government increasingly ineffective at stopping the very agent that is weakening it. The result is a downward spiral wherein the epidemic relentlessly

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reduces state capacity, even as the state requires ever-increasing capacity to stop the growing epidemic.”

Therefore, we are starting to see that HIV and AIDS have become a complex vicious circle that reinforces itself through the iteration of impacts throughout the social and institutional structures of governance. The impact cannot only be understood in isolation, but in the context of its intertwining impacts with other systems of governance. It follows that the impacts are not merely additive and isolated to the sectoral governances, but must be understood as summative and structured, thereby endangering fundamental systems of governance.

**Putting it all together: Governance, HIV and AIDS and knowledge formation**

Whilst the framework and the accompanying analysis demonstrate the impacts as it affects these structures in varying horizontal and vertical proportions, it does not reflect the fact that HIV and AIDS impacts are long-waved events. As Barnett puts it, it is “one where the troubling and large-scale effects emerge gradually over decades” and is not the kind we call imminent disaster. Whilst many other imminent disasters have long-term effects, in as much as people die and leave others bereft, the impacts of AIDS are subtle, daunting and long-waved. It causes a gradual and subdued disruption to how communities and households are maintained and how governance institutions

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310 Poku, (2007)
and schools are run. However, the debate on HIV and AIDS has largely neglected these fundamental questions of how continuity through change is maintained, but more importantly the critical role knowledge plays in maintaining stability of these systems. Such knowledge, as I have postulated, is largely tacit, and thus culturally and historically conditioned. In my earlier discussion, I also referred to Audi who posits that, “there exists good reason to say that at least many of our scientific beliefs are also culturally and historically conditioned.”

In a sense, the process of knowledge formation and transfer facilitates both the vertical and horizontal interactions of the governance actors. In other words, tacit knowledge interacts with the formal education system to create knowledgeable people necessary to run governance institutions. Unfortunately, personal knowledge and its necessity to the functioning of social and cultural systems has been overlooked. Not only that, but HIV and AIDS literature is silent on this issue. However, with the current interest on biodiversity, health and environmental protection, recognition of traditional knowledge is gaining momentum. Traditional knowledge is the cornerstone of cultural identity and survival of communities and families as it produces a frame of understanding and validation that give meaning to the world. This is handed down from previous generations through tradition. I have earlier shown how such knowledge is generally tacit. The problem with AIDS is that the high and rising levels of morbidity and mortality have a direct impact on tacit knowledge because such knowledge cannot easily be articulated or postulated in manuals, books and journals. When HIV and AIDS struck, communities and families are robbed of the very basis that

defines and determine their existence. As one commentator during a conference on traditional knowledge systems pronounced; “the loss of traditional knowledge is not just a loss for the traditional communities themselves but also a loss to the intellectual property of the country as a whole.”

Communities largely feel this loss not only because they use it for practical purposes, but such knowledge forms part of their cultural identities. The greatest challenge confronting governance today is how to promote, protect and nurture tacit knowledge amidst the rising tide of HIV and AIDS-related deaths. The key challenges, as I will repeat throughout this thesis, is that HIV and AIDS has taken a foothold on the population whose sole responsibility is to impart knowledge, which knowledge is not only necessary for social systems stability, but also to turn the tide against the very agent that is affecting it.

At the same time, the persistent loss of human resources in the severely affected countries compromises organisational knowledge systems. Whilst knowledge and its successful usage in business organisations have received much attention in recent years, little is known on how HIV and AIDS impact on the systems of knowledge formation within organisations, but more how this impact the indiscernible dimensions of such knowledge. The merits of this argument are quite clear as Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge views knowledge as ineffable in the sense that it cannot be understood by looking at how people communicate verbally. It is the knowledge that is often complex

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and hard to recognise. Such knowledge, as I have demonstrated, exists unidentified until when it is necessary and impossible to do without it. This is the knowledge that has been virtually neglected in management studies, whilst such tacit knowledge allows companies to strategically acquire, create, exploit, and accumulate new knowledge and use these to increase their competitiveness, competency, and sustainability. It is this type of knowledge that poses the greatest loss to organisations when AIDS struck—however aware and able these organisations are in managing knowledge. The reason is that such tacit knowledge is held by people, whom themselves are unable to articulate such knowledge precisely, and as Polanyi asserts, is only at times manifested in collective set of facts, concepts, experience and know-how. Even if “organisations strive to find optimal ways to facilitate the flow and transfer of the company’s knowledge from individuals in order to integrate and individual unique knowledge into the company’s knowledge bank”\textsuperscript{313}, it is not possible to discern because tacit knowledge is embedded in individual experience and involves intangible factors such as personal beliefs, perspectives and value systems. Such knowledge cannot be articulated in formal language including grammatical statements, mathematical expressions, specifications, manuals and so forth. The key issue is that when people who hold such knowledge are increasingly absent from work or die as a result of AIDS, such tacit knowledge may be lost forever. It is almost like— as the old Ethiopian saying goes— ‘when an elder dies, a library burns’.

Conclusion

This chapter constitutes the centrality of my argument that the various governance systems are highly vulnerable to disruptions and fragmentations and that such vulnerabilities could only be understood in summative terms. The chapter also highlights that one of the major ways in which HIV and AIDS has an impact on summative governance in severely affected countries is through its effects on intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer. In this context, I defined knowledge broadly to include rules, norms, beliefs, and customs created to protect populations by influencing accountability and legitimacy. In earlier sections, I referred to this as one of the orders of criticality for governance - in other words, it is a socio-political condition that must be met and maintained for there to be a continuous evolution of governance from a nascent to fully institutionalised systems of governance.

Whilst my interest is on the summative effects of HIV and AIDS, I have spent a great deal of time demarcating the sectoral impacts of HIV and AIDS. This was an important exercise to demonstrate the magnitude of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in these sectors and also to highlight the vulnerabilities of these governance systems, for how else can we appreciate the summative impacts without understanding the depth of the impact of HIV and AIDS on these systems. I have developed the framework, which serves to demonstrate rather in a simplified fashion, the aggregate impact of HIV and AIDS on governance. The framework shows that the impacts are not merely additive
and isolated to the sectoral governances, but are summative and structured, endangering fundamental systems of governance. I have attempted to demonstrate that HIV and AIDS not only impact the sectoral governances in isolation through impacting on the intergenerational knowledge within these systems but more importantly that it affects the interplay between these systems from a lower to a higher order, that is, the interplay between the formal, non-formal, state and non-state governances. Literature is silent on the imperative of the intergenerational knowledge to the functioning of the various systems of governance, whilst at the same time there is recognition that the impacts of AIDS are subtle, daunting and long-waved. The concept of intergenerational knowledge is even less understood in the literature on HIV and AIDS. Therefore utilising the concept of intergenerational knowledge as one of the important lenses through which the impact of HIV and AIDS on governance can be understood served multiple purposes. It not only helps us understand the imperative of intergenerational knowledge to governance, but also helps us conceptualise the flow of impacts across the various levels of governance- for the reason that intergenerational knowledge is the key factor for the continuous evolution of governance and it is foundational to its emergence from long run equilibria of processes. It is a necessary condition for the various systems of governance, from a higher to a lower order, to interact between actors on micro-, meso-, and macro-levels of socio-political aggregation.
SECTION 2: CONTEXT AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES

Chapter 5: Vulnerabilities of Namibia’s Micro-, Meso- and Macro governances to disruptions

Introduction

Whilst it could be argued that Namibia presents a typical microcosm of an African country, its history is unlike any other. With a population of only 2.1 million and a land area of 835,100 km² (the second least densely populated country in the world after Mongolia), Namibia had to content with over 100 years of brutal colonial rule involving first Germany, then England and finally South Africa. Namibia endured the longest armed liberation struggle apart from South Africa, was the last country in Africa to receive its independence and its last coloniser was not any distant country, but what Simon refers to as “Namibia’s dominant and pariah neighbour.” It is perhaps ironical that this least populated country on the African continent attracted the likes of Germany, a country least known for being a coloniser, albeit notorious for its brutality. The history of Namibia is primarily documented from the time of the German seizure of Angra Pequena in 1884 and the subsequent annexure of the country, renamed for Germany’s convenience sake, as German South West Africa. From then onwards, the people endured one of the harshest forms of modern colonial history. Prior to colonisation, historical records point to a relatively harmonious existence of the San hunters and gatherers who

lived in the country some 2,000 years ago, followed by the Nama herders who are estimated to have arrived some 500 A.D, then the Bantu-speaking Ovambo and Hereros who migrated from the north into the southern African region sometime in the 14th century. The arrival of Germany signalled the end of any harmonious existence of these tribes and heralded the beginning of one of the longest and most brutal oppressions ever recorded in modern history. From then on, all facets of the Namibian society (the religious, the social, the economic and the political) became fragmented.

In 1990, 106 years after the Germans arrived, Namibia became independent from South Africa, marking the end of Africa’s longest war and officially bringing to closure colonial rule over Africa. The significance of the year 1990 is not only in ending the long protracted rule of the South African apartheid regime over Namibia, but can be seen as a moment in time when the geopolitical and temporal canvasses of the country’s socio-economic landscape was forever changed. What this means, for the examination of Namibia’s social systems, including those I define as forms of governance, is that our understanding will remain incomplete without relating these to the role played by years of colonisation. Be that as it may, the matter that has been puzzling the people of this country, is why, despite all government’s efforts, the country has been unable to deliver the expected results. This question is often explored within the context of the legacy of the colonial history, because at present, the varied forms in which every activity is acted out and staged, whether individually or collectively, reflects the colonial history of this country known to its people as ‘the land of the brave’. In fact, the numbers, rather
tellingly, reflect these legacies: At independence, the settler community was 5% but controlled an estimated 71% of the GDP, whilst the bottom 55% of the population controlled just 3% of GDP.\textsuperscript{315} The last Income and Expenditure Survey, carried out in 2003-4 estimates that 10% of the population still owns about 60% of the wealth whilst the remaining 40% of wealth is shared by 90% of the population.\textsuperscript{316} What is more, “the 2% households with the highest income account for 15% of the total income, whilst the one-quarter of the Namibian households with the lowest income account for only 6% of total income.”\textsuperscript{317} The per capita income for the 25% households with the lowest income is about £ 130 compared to almost £ 12,500 for the two per cent households with the highest income.\textsuperscript{318}

**Table 1: Namibia HDI indicators for 2012, actual and adjusted for inequality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Adjusted for inequality</th>
<th>Overall Loss (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HDI Value</td>
<td>0.608</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean year of schooling</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (US$ GNI per capita)</td>
<td>5,973</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A quick glance of the above table (column two) seems to suggest that Namibia is doing well in its Human Development Index. Namibia’s HDI is 0.608, which according to UNDP, puts Namibia below the average of 0.64 for countries in the medium human development group but above the average of...
0.475 for countries in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, when the index is discounted for inequality (column three), the HDI falls to a whopping 0.344, putting the country way below the average of sub-Saharan Africa. This is clear testimony that Namibia is a country of poverty amidst plenty. The disparities have proved the most difficult issues to address. The UN has on several occasions proclaimed that Namibia is one of the most unequal societies in the world. The gini coefficient of 0.743 for the period 2000-2010, means “Namibia’s income gini coefficient is the worst in the world” and “higher than any recorded in the latest World Development Report.” National Income Statistics like GDP per capita do not reflect the extent of poverty and inequality. Despite all the efforts and investments, economic development has been sluggish, particularly with regard to their impact on job creation and poverty reduction. Whilst these statistics always emerge with every research in Namibia, this is never followed with extensive intellectual analysis that will put the country on a road map to understand the fundamental causes of unemployment, poverty and inequalities. Accordingly, many efforts seem to have run up against formidable hindrances, not least because of the historical legacies, but also due to malfunctioning of the current system and misjudgement and poor management of the economy.

Writings about Namibia’s history has often sought to dissect the post-independent developments by focusing only on the effects of colonisation and

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apartheid on the macro-economic and social landscape of the country, without an inclusive view of the pre and post independent developments and how the current political and economic order perpetuates the inequalities and thereby the vulnerabilities of the systems of rules. In what follows, I will broaden the inquiry, and include in my analyses both the current political and economic, and historical contexts. Admittedly, only through such an analysis are we able to understand that Namibia is indeed an engrossing and at the same time a perilous mix of the past and the present.

Situating the vulnerabilities of the governance systems within the current political and economic order

Contemporary macro governance vulnerabilities: national governance

In 1990, after an agreement was reached by the United States, South Africa, Angola and Cuba to implement the peace plan as set out by UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, Namibia became a constitutional democracy and joined the world as its newest member of the family of nations. For the first time, all Namibians were allowed to cast their votes. According to commentators, “the fact that 97% of registered voters cast their ballots, often in intimidating or difficult conditions, was moving testimony to the determination of the Namibian people to exercise their democratic rights”. 322 With independence, the political elite and civil society began the process of re-establishing and redefining the democratic state structures, systems, and

322 Freeman, (1992), pp. 687-718
processes. A system of multiparty democratic elections was established, and the armed forces, from both the South West African forces and SWAPO’s guerrilla forces, became accountable to civilian rule. A new constitution was drafted by the Constituent Assembly, adopted on the ninth day of February 1990. The constitution, according to the Namibian government, “established the country as a sovereign, secular, democratic and unitary State founded upon the principles of democracy, the rule of law and justice for all.” The constitution is based on the principles of separation of powers with the executive, consisting of the president and ministers responsible for the implementation of laws, the legislature consisting of the National Assembly and National Council responsible for law making and the Judiciary, consisting of the Supreme Court, High Court and Lower Courts, responsible for law enforcement and interpretation. This constitutional necessity of these structures lies in the need to establish checks and balances among these branches. Today, Namibia’s Constitution is construed the most liberal in the whole of Africa.

The constitution laid the groundwork for genuine democracy and progressive social change. At the same time though, current evidence suggests that the process will be a long and painful one that will last several decades, because at independence the future of Namibia was severely constrained from the legacy of apartheid, making a move towards real independence and development minimal, such that many commentators agreed that only a “few

countries have started in such a heavily determined context”. Just after independence Freeman commented that the major problem is that Namibia started off with a severe fiscal crisis, dependent economy, uneven development and inadequate services for the black population. Namibia had to operate within these internal and external contexts, whilst attempting to promote social equity with an economy that faced decades of stagnation. On the balance of probability though, it could be argued that the SWAPO government inherited a country with very good structures to ascend, with the necessary adjustments, into the ranks of developed nations. However, challenges persist and the question has always been why SWAPO’s ascend to political power did not immediately result in the improvement of the well being of all the people. The major issue is that Namibia seems unable to convert its high income into human development for the majority of its population. Namibia is regarded a relatively wealthy country by continental standards, but as I have alluded earlier, it has the worst income inequality in the world, with concentrated and widespread poverty unmatched by any country in the world. According to the UN poverty index for Namibia, on average 25% of all Namibians are deprived of the basic needs for survival, i.e. they are absolutely poor. In some regions the index goes as high as 35%. The UN also notes that since independence the Namibian Human Development Index has not increased at the desired rate, mainly when adjusted for inequality. This is a worrying trend, because as Adam Smith wrote in 1776, “no society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the


greater part of the numbers are poor and miserable”\textsuperscript{326} When Theodore Schultz accepted his Noble Price in Economics in 1979 he noted that “most of the people (of the world) are poor, so if we knew the economics of being poor we would know much of the economics that matters”\textsuperscript{327} These words of wisdom cannot be trivialised or taken lightly, because in its broader sense, stability is premised upon not simply sustained levels of growth, but on the need to reduce and ultimately eradicate absolute poverty and economic inequalities, which Namibia seems unable to do. Inequalities that decide the fate of the majority of the people continue to be reproduced. The economy seems structurally incapable to provide jobs on the scale and terms required to reduce poverty. Overall, the biggest challenge for Namibia is to maintain legitimacy and reproduce consent in order achieve social and political stability.

It cannot be disputed that the long years of colonisation and apartheid entrenched these inequalities with grotesque and fastidiousness and to a large extent, anti-human severity. At the same time though Namibia is a hard country to classify, because on the one hand it represents a microcosm of the world system, with some areas mirroring the capitalist first world lifestyle, whilst some areas correspond to the third and even fourth worlds. There is an overwhelming white majority whose lifestyle exhibits the advanced capitalist world. There is also a growing black middle class who belong to the modern industrialised third world, whilst the rural population, making up 70% of the

\textsuperscript{326} Adam Smith, The wealth of Nations, vol. 1: an inquiry into the nature and the courses of the wealth of nations, (London, W Strahan and T Cadell, 1776), Book 1, chapter, para. 36
\textsuperscript{327} Theodore Schultz, The economics of being poor, the journal of political economy, 88(4), (1979), pp. 639-651
Namibian population, do not differ much from the rest of Africa’s fourth world. But then there are the white farmers, who essentially have been put, by the racialist policies, into a group similar to the previous known socialist countries of the second world. But today, it cannot only be argued that the perpetual nature of this inequities strictly are conditioned (though traceable) to colonisation and apartheid, and understanding the present mnescope means the current political, and economic order cannot be left uninterrogated. Whilst certainly apartheid played its role, the continuity of the Namibian politics and history is premised in ways that seem to reinforce the inequities of the majority of the population and the signs of a happier future seems irresolute. Too often overlooked and unexplored are the power, strengths and frailties of the SWAPO party, which won all the elections since independence in 1990. Understanding how Namibia became a democracy but predominantly a one party state, we are able to appreciate the limitation or the aide to progress and thus situate the governance systems within broader post-independence context as well. In the aftermath of independence, the SWAPO party took over government and has since consistently won every election, some of which with absolute majority, leading to a type of neopatrimonialism on the part of the ruling party. When SWAPO won the second election in 1994 with an absolute majority of 74%, this according to some scholars “encouraged the misperception that the state is the property of the government… (and) SWAPO’s leadership started to perceive itself as untouchable.”

The political elite started adopting aggressive reformist attitudes, but often for personal gain, further stimulating resentment among the populace. Compounding the

problem is that there are no serious vetoing agents in Namibia against the powerful SWAPO party. The institutions that yield some power (churches, civil society, unions) are incapable to influence the political process when such is set in motion by SWAPO. The economically powerful white business people and commercial farmers, for better or for worse, prefer to stay out of politics and therefore don’t offer any counterweight. Therefore it is conceivable that such power, when concentrated in a few hands, engenders neopatrimonialism. Whilst colonisation and apartheid clearly entrenched the divide between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the less powerful, there is a sense of perpetual indulgence on the part of the most powerful within the ruling party. Commenting on South Africa, Marais observed that;

“Far from having dissolved into a fraternity of common purpose, tranquilised by the levelling language of nation-building, South Africa remains in the midst of an intense, renewed struggle that currently and demonstrably favours the most powerful and privileged sections of society. The defining trends of transition are shaping a revised division of society…” 329

The division to which Marais refers to are not hard to see in Namibia. The African development Bank (AfDB), notes that Namibia’s middle class has been rising and now stands at 9% of the population.330 At independence, this urban middle class was almost non-existent. It is argued that many of these

330 African Development Bank, Markert Brief, April 20, 2013, The middle of the pyramid: dynamics of the middle class in Africa
have been rapidly enriched through their connections with the ruling party, by leveraging them into profit-sharing corporate partnerships with foreign investors, most of them in the mining sector. The SWAPO party senior leadership also seems entangled in an assortment of interest ideologies and ideals that now appear to contradict the liberation ideals of social justice. Sections of the party now have acquired what Marais calls, “reflexive sympathy for policies that put the market ahead of society, and the pursuit for justice deeper into the shadows.” As a result the country is now incapable to muster ideological and strategic coherence to steer it into a progressive project of change. Namibia’s inequalities are perpetuated by the persistent failure of the state to steer the country into the desired direction. As Marais reminds us; the problem is not only that of poverty (the lack of means), but the glaring disparities that assault people on a daily basis. It is the oxymoronic nature of the public service, the widening inequalities, and the rampant sense of unfairness that generates rancour and resentments, which ultimately pose a threat to governance.

Witnessed recently is the tension created by the newly powerful political elite between the government and former fighters, many of whom were unemployed and yet to be fully reintegrated into society. Whilst Namibia enjoys relative peace and very low levels of armed violence for a country coming out of a long period of armed resistance, nation-building is often frustrated by dissatisfied former fighters demanding compensation for their sacrifices. What this clearly shows is what Kingma calls the naivety of the

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331 Hein Marais, South Africa: Limits to change: the political economy of transition, (Kenvyn: UCT Press, 2001), p.5
332 Ibid
government to assume “that demobilized soldiers would simply reintegrate into civilian life on their own, and no assistance was made available.” 333 This entrenched heritage of armed struggle started when many became dissatisfied with the slow progress in socio-economic reforms. In the years coming, “ex-combatants expressed grievances through demonstrations and, realising the potential security hazard that a significant group of unemployed and dissatisfied individuals with military training represented, government devised a cash payment scheme, created vocational training programmes in the form of development brigades, and included ex-combatants in the general refugee resettlement programme.” The problem of dissatisfied ex-combatants still persists to date and there have been more protests in recent years. Again, whether this poses a threat for governance is not in dispute, but it remains to be seen how long their call will persist, because many of these fighters are well in their age. But, as events in neighbouring Zimbabwe seem to suggest, such issues have an enduring tendency to linger on for ages. The first signs have started to emerge with the so called ‘struggle kids’ 334 demanding greater recognition and preference for job recruitments. This discussion is however beyond the scope of this thesis.

Another thorny issue that often remains tight-lipped is the Caprivi secessionist issue. Despite the successes in the transition from colonialism to


334 No literature in Namibia exists on this issues, there has been recent demonstration, including camping outside parliament and the SWAPO headquarters, by children born in exile to former fighters of the struggle, also known as ‘struggle kids’, demanding services such employment, resettlement and cash payments. The argument is that these children were denied the opportunity for schooling and they therefore remain poorly qualified and cannot enter the job market.
independence, attempts to write about Namibia national governance framework often leads to the issue of the Caprivi annexure and how up to date, it remains an issue that is often swept under the carpet. However, vulnerability of this governance structure must not only be seen in the context of post-independent structures of governance, but what makes it vulnerable.

In 1999, armed men, known as the Caprivi Liberation Army stormed the radio station, police headquarters, border posts and the military base in Katima Mulilo, the capital town of the Caprivi strip, in what is now commonly known as the Caprivi Secessionist Movement. The group was led by Mishake Muyongo, a once post-independent parliamentarian and demanded the secession of the Caprivi strip from the rest of Namibia. The source of the conflict emanates from the belief that the Caprivi is not part of Namibia, but was annexed in July 1890 by the Germans “as part of a territorial swap with Britain known as the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty”. The treaty was inspired by the need to access corridors to the Zambezi, which would have led to easier access to other German protectorates in eastern Africa and the interior of Southern Africa in what was known as the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty. The major motive was Cape-to-Cairo, specifically the Zambezi River, an important outlet to the Indian Ocean.

Germany never fully settled in Caprivi, as this territory’s value was often questioned, “resulting in the sardonic name Caprivi Zipfelt”, a mockery name for the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty. As a result, the Caprivi was never actually fully occupied until sometime in 1909. Suffice to say, this was almost 25 years after the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, “which

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laid down the rules for the Europeans partition of the continent”. As the Germans were about to settle in the Caprivi, the first World War broke out, South Africa marched into Namibia to replace the Germans, and the Caprivi strip was taken over by the British and administered as part of Bechuanaland. Similarly, under the British, the strip was largely neglected until South Africa started utilising it as a strategic supply route for the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) movement in Angola only after the second World War. But they too “perceived the Caprivi Strip to be unsuitable for white settlement and low commercial potential”, requiring a “cost-effective administrative model of dual chieftainship under the supervision of the white government officer”. It was not until after the Odendaal Commission recommended the South Africa style Bantustan government for the Caprivi in 1963 that white settlement occurred. In a sense, virtually all the colonial masters neglected this strip. For the people of Caprivi, this meant that at least until recent memory, the strip was never fully a protectorate of the Germans, nor the British or the South Africans. Whilst the secessionist movement seems to have dissipated since the uprising in 1999, the Namibian government views this as a potential threat to the territorial integrity of the country. Protecting the country’s territorial integrity is the mandate of the government provided for by the constitution. The current government seems aware of the implication of losing some or any part of its territory. Whether the

336 See for example, Ieuan Griffiths, the scramble for Africa: Inherited political boundaries, The Geographical Journal, 152(2), (1996), pp. 204-216. In this article Griffiths talks about the evolution of the African boundaries emanating from the 1884-5 conference in which the political boundaries were drawn up for Europeans, for Europeans who paid scant regard to Africa. Most of the boundaries, including Namibia, were completed by the turn of the century precisely as it is today, with the few remaining being completed by 1914. The greatest challenge according to the author is that 44% were based on astronomical lines and therefore totally disregarded Africa’s identity or any other territorial boundaries that existed by then. Few attempts were made to draw these along traditional lines.

337 Zeller, (2009)
secessionist momentum will be maintained remains to be seen, but for analysis of governance in Namibia, it remains an issue worth discussing.

**Contemporary macro governance vulnerabilities: local governance**

At the local levels, the current system of governance in Namibia is characterised by decentralisation of activities to regional and local councils. This system of governance is not new. When pre-empting the imminence of Namibia’s independence, Pretoria instituted a series of reforms in the management of local authority during the late 1970s and early 1980s. These changes included overall re-organisation to create a “three-tier administrative structure headed by a supposedly autonomous central regime”.

As evidence now suggests, although the administrative reorganisations were meant to devolve powers to the local people, there remained no change to the underlying model as conservative white local authorities were created only to promote what Simon refers to as “racially fragmented apartheid-style local authority structures legitimised by the vocabulary of change”.

After independence, Namibia opted for the three-tier government of national, regional and local governance. In contrast, the new Namibian government’s argument was genuinely developmentally focused. The contention was clear: for any country to achieve development at grassroots level, there should be effective decentralisation of responsibilities, policy management, decision-making authority, and sufficient resources to local authorities. The Ministry of Regional, and Local Government and Housing became the line ministry.

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339 Ibid
tasked with facilitating the establishment of an effective, decentralised regional and local government system, capable of delivering services, housing and physical planning. To this end the Decentralisation Policy of Namibia was approved in 1996, and implemented in April 1998. The policy was widely discussed with all the stakeholders, such as the Association of Regional Councils of Namibia (ARC), the Association of Local Authorities in Namibia (ALAN) and line ministries to get their input and reach consensus in the development of the policy. The philosophy underpinning this approach is that local government is better suited to take the lead in Local Economic Development (LED). The primary responsibility for planning and implementation of LED should therefore rest with local government officials. It is further argued that democratically elected local government should by definition reflect the will of the people and therefore be best suited to lead LED.

Since the institutionalisation of local authorities, strategies have been developed to ensure a smooth transfer to regional councils and local authorities. From the discussions within government and among local leadership, the preferred decentralisation model in Namibia is that of devolution of power to lower tiers within the context of and overall authority of a unitary state. Decentralisation in Namibia aims to ensure economic, cultural and socio-economic development, provide people at the grassroots level the opportunity to participate in their own decision-making, and extend democracy

to them as a right based on national ideals and values.\textsuperscript{341} Since the enactment of the Local Authorities Act (1992), the Regional Councils Act (1992) and the Decentralisation Enabling Act (1996), a lot has happened to build administrative capacity in the various regions. The challenge rests upon the individual local structures to take advantage of the enabling framework that has been set out by central Government. Critics believe that though this is a vital step towards local economic development, the pace of the decentralisation process is slower than what was expected and is yet to deliver the desired results. A key challenge facing local authorities has been the rapid increase in urban migration and the expanding urban population. This places tremendous strain on basic service delivery, urban infrastructure and employment creation.

Some scholars now argue that, as a result of the slow pace of development at local levels, there are signs of resurgence of chieftaincy. Writing about Gender and Traditional Authorities in Namibia, Becker concludes that contrary to earlier predictions of the impending demise of these traditional institutions, there is now a growing revitalisation and popular support for them.\textsuperscript{342}

According to Becker;

"Various explanations have been suggested for this resurgence. Several authors have argued that the weakness or inaccessibility of the..."
postcolonial state’s local and regional structures has driven rural populations to resort to the more accessible traditional authorities”.

Whilst it is encouraging that the emergence of traditional systems could provide an alternative form of governing, it is too early to forecast their future role given that neo-liberal ideologies have now taken precedence over any other form of governance in Namibia and other parts of the modern world. Notwithstanding, in the broader context, this bears testimony that this structure of governance in Namibia is highly susceptible to disruptions and fragmentations.

Contemporary meso governance vulnerabilities: the education system

The education system that Namibia inherited at independence was in a state of chaos, designed to perpetuate apartheid rather than providing the necessary human resource base to promote equitable social and economic development. It required that a specific approach be implemented, specifically to rectify the racial and geographical inequalities. At the time of independence, the World conference on Education, which was held at Jomtien, Thailand in March 1990 adopted what became well known as the “The World Declaration on Education for All”. Article One of the Declaration states that: “every person- child, youth and adult- shall be able to benefit from educational opportunities designed to meet their basic learning needs.”

343 Ibid.
344 World Conference on education for all: meeting the basic learning needs, 5-9 March 1990, World declaration on education for all and framework of action to meet basic learning needs, (Jomtien: UNESCO, 1990)
declaration could not have come at the right time for Namibia. Namibia was part of the 1,500 delegates representing 155 countries that participated in the drafting of the declaration. Since then Namibia has put a lot of effort in trying to meet the objectives of the declaration. At independence, a new Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sport was formulated with the overall responsibility “to fashion a national and unitary ministry out of eleven departments bequeathed by the previous regime”. In 1991, a Commission on Higher Education was appointed by the President with the mandate to “advise government on the needs, demands and scope of higher education, its organisation, structure, location, funding, admission criteria, programmes, relationship with government and much else, including national research policy”. The Namibian government has since consistently expressed its intention to prioritise education as a means of promoting development. Article 20 of the Namibian constitution is devoted to education. It states: “Everyone has the right to education and, furthermore, primary education is compulsory and should be provided free of charge to every resident by the Namibian state”. The role of government in the provision of education is emphasised in this article. And in April 1991, for the first time in history, all public education systems in Namibia came under one cohesive authority”. A philosophical perspective was adopted and contained in the policy document, Towards Education for All. This document became the guiding principle for education in Namibia, specifically in terms of providing the overarching framework to redress the ills of the past and to use education as the vehicle and the driving force for development. The National Institute for Educational Development

346 Ibid
(NIED) was set up to coordinate foreign development aid and to design new curricula, teaching materials and pedagogical approaches.

To demonstrate its commitment to education, the Namibian government devoted the largest part of the public sector spending to education. By 2003, the amount devoted to Education Affairs and Services has risen more than fourfold from N$ 510\textsuperscript{347} million in 1990/91 to N$ 2.3 billion in 2002/3. Estimated spending in 2002/3 represented 21.3% of total public spending and actual spending rose from N$ 660 million to N$ 2.1 billion during the same period.\textsuperscript{348} As a percentage of GDP, actual spending is currently estimated at 9% of GDP. This trend highlights the importance attached to education by the Namibian government. But the question is: does higher spending in education lead to perceived improvement in the standard of living of a society as a whole? Like many other countries, Namibia has succeeded in achieving high and sustained public spending on education since independence. Namibia has also consistently expressed its intention to prioritise education as a means of promoting development. To this effect, Article 20 of the Namibian constitution makes this intention clear by asserting that “everyone has the right to education and, furthermore, primary education is compulsory and should be provided free of charge to every resident by the Namibian state”. The role of government in the provision of education is emphasised in this article. But what this constitutional provision does not highlight is that the involvement of government is not only necessary to correct the market’s

\textsuperscript{347} The exchange rate between the Namibia Dollar and British Pounds has consistently been fluctuating between £1/N$10 and £1/N$15
\textsuperscript{348} Institute for Public Policy Research, Briefing Paper no. 11., A secondary Consideration: Public Spending on Education Since 1990, (Windhoek, 2002)
inability to achieve social efficiency, but that the education sector is also the largest employer base in Namibia, employing approximately 38,000 (or 11.5%) of the total workforce of approximately 331,444. In the context of HIV and AIDS, it is not only important to maintain stability in this sector for the sake of preserving the knowledge transfer to the younger generation, but to mitigate the macro-economic impact as well.

The importance attached to education has led to the quick “quantitative” expansion in the numbers of education opportunities in Namibia. However there is now a growing discontent among economists on the role of education in bringing prosperity to the Namibian nation. The problem has been one endemic to most developing nations who believed that rapid quantitative expansion of the educational opportunities is a key to accelerated development. Many countries opted to adopt a fast-pace approach to education and have adopted the goal of education in the shortest possible time. The mission is more educated people and the vision was a faster economic growth. But this has not happened. The challenge that formal education does not lead to faster economic growth is now gathering momentum. After approximately three decades of rapid increase in registration and the expenditure of billions of dollars, we have not seen major changes in the position of the average African, Asian and Latin American.

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350 See the The Labour Force Survey of 2008, Windhoek, 2008). The survey estimated that there were about 959,187 working age population in Namibia due to its youthful population. However only about 55.4% of the working age belong to the labour force and the rest classified as economically inactive.
The same could be said about Namibia, because after decades of expanding enrolments and billions of dollars of education expenditure, the material well being of many people in Namibia has not improved. Following independence in Namibia, there was a steady increase in education expenditure, but little reduction in poverty and the number of people seeking for a decent job. Absolute poverty is what is evident and the gap between the poor and the rich is still widening. Additionally, and whilst millions of dollars are spent on education, the illiteracy level remains high, because as Smit alludes, “opportunity cost for going to school is high for poorer families who cannot do without the labour of the school going children”. Some critics raise concern that the situation for poor black people is yet to change with some positing that only a few elites- children of politicians and black business people, have access to schools previously reserved for whites. Accordingly, these schools have become inaccessible. And most public schools face severe shortage of textbooks, classrooms, qualified teachers and other teaching aids like laboratories. Therefore the disparities still exist with many of the newly middle class people opting for education of their children in private schools. Whilst private schools in Namibia account for a relatively small percentage of 6%, their pass rates are way above public schools, which in essence, demonstrates the disparities of education in Namibia.

The questions rarely asked is whether the current education system actually addresses fundamental questions of what education is all about. As I have earlier posited, education serves a higher purpose than only learning of

353 Ibid
techniques, it is the key foundation to governance as it not only encourages the learning of techniques, but helps man to experience the integrated process of life and thus creates the governors and the governable. As Krishnamurti asserts, “it is the experience that will put capacity and technique in the right place”.  

The current education system emphasises specific technique, without necessarily looking at the whole spectrum of life, therefore does not produce creative people, able to turn opportunities into prosperity. It would appear that unless Namibia brings about radical transformation in the education system, unemployment, poverty, inequality and disease the likes of HIV and AIDS will linger on.

Situating the vulnerabilities of the micro, meso ad macro governance systems within historical context

I argue that the nature of the governance systems cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of their historical evolution. My contention is that the burden of the past weighs heavily on the present and the future, nowhere more so in the structures of governance. For example, using the German colonisation as a reference point for the analysis of the family as a key governance structure, specifically the genocide of 1904-08, serves to remind us of its direct impact on this structure of governance. Most significantly, the genocide provided a prelude to the systematic repression that followed and the wholesale appropriation of the land belonging to the communities.

354 Jiddu Krishnamurti, 1953, p. 12
355 See Reinhart Kossler account of the German brutal suppression of Namibia, which he refers to as a carnage of the extent of being genocide.
Whilst attempting to make reference to the historical progression of these systems, sadly though, I was obliged to be creative as indeed little is researched about Namibia and the social systems of rules, due in part to the protracted period of colonisation and apartheid, which effectively limited scholarly research to a handful of people outside Namibia. This is not in any way an endorsement of the notion that historical records and memory centres only on codified written texts as opposed to the oral traditions and rituals, but poignantly, such rituals and oral traditions are inaccessible and thus textual representations have taken precedence in modern day discussion about the history of Namibia.

**Historically induced macro governance vulnerabilities: national governance**

I have highlighted in earlier sections that the term governance, as it relates to the work of government, gained prominence after the great depression and subsequently the Second World War in what Mayntz calls the increasing claims of political guidance, and the "growing orientation of political decision-makers towards planning and the use of planning techniques".356 The idea was that governments had to take seriously the accountability to steer their nations towards sustainable human development, which development was a necessity to eliminate poverty, create jobs, increase sustainable livelihoods and protect the environment and the most vulnerable in society. Whilst governance became the mantra in political discourse as the guiding principle

in the years coming, this thinking has completely eluded the government in South Africa. Paradoxically, and when the world’s attention focusing on good governance and what this means for governments, things were taking a completely different turn in Namibia and South Africa. Precipitated by the election of the National Party into power in 1948; the term governance was diminished to the point that it became estranged from government. Conceivably, the systematic repressions of the indigenous structures of governance were followed by years of colonial administration set up to legitimise the policies of apartheid. In the early years, power was centralised to the national government comprising of a number of powerful individuals selected by the administrators of apartheid. From 1915-1977, the Head of the country was an Administrator directly responsible to the Prime Minister in South Africa. In 1977, the Administrator was replaced by an Administrator-General who was empowered to act by proclamation but at the same time responsible to the Head of State in South Africa. Scholars often use these early institutional characteristics to explain how Namibia managed to elude the difficulties so endemic to many African states. These, according to Bratton and Van de Walle, is because Namibia was the last settler oligarchy, and thereby do not share the same characteristics as many other neopatrimonial regimes in Africa. Oligarchies, approximated “exclusionary democracies-where political competition is high but participation low- with settlers reproducing functioning democracies of themselves, while fully excluding the

indigenous majority.” In such instances, competition, though limited to a few, was tolerated and “the dominant group used instruments of law to deny political rights to ethnic majorities, usually through a restrictive franchise and emergency regulations backed by hierarchical organised coercion.” Whilst in the process indigenous people lost their political and economic powers, the settlers produced functioning democracies in their microcosmic enclaves, with regular elections, leadership turnover, opposition, independent courts and some degree of press freedom all of which were reserved for whites. In the process, strong institutions were established at the level of the state, making the transition from colonialism to independence somewhat seamless. Similarly, it could be said that because independence was not only won by the barrel of the gun, but by protracted periods of negotiations, the settler community became an integral part of the transition to independence, as they negotiated some form of power sharing and protection of the rights of minorities. This is clearly demonstrable in the constitution of Namibia, which contains explicit provisions for protection of citizens regardless of colour, skin, or socio-economic status. Additionally, a constitutional commitment was made to keep all the civil servants who held a position “in the civil service on the date of independence... until they resigned, or were removed in accordance with the law.” This clearly created problems from the onset as SWAPO had hoped that many of these people would opt to return to South Africa, freeing up space for returning comrades. But as evidence was piling up that South Africa was also on the verge of majority rule, almost all opted to stay. At the

359 Ibid.
360 Ibid.
361 Ibid
same time though, it ensured that the key structures remained intact and that critical skills could be transferred to the new government employees, many of whom were not adequately trained for the civil service. Of the 40,000-50,000 who returned from exile, only an estimated 15% had some form of comprehensive post-secondary education; many were trained only as soldiers, or had other rudimentary artisan skills obtained in camps in Angola. Therefore, the remaining government employees played a key role, not only in transferring skills, but also in avoiding an overreliance on expatriate skills, a phenomenon found in many of the previously African independent states. These are the factors scholars often cite as undoubtedly the key reasons Namibia is hailed as a model for democratic transition- a model that indeed defies the African status quo. For the purpose of analysing this form of governance, undoubtedly, continuity through change was made possible.

**Historically induced macro governance vulnerabilities: local governance**

What existed in Namibia pre-colonialism was a system of local governance based on traditional systems of kings, chiefs, and headmen. But these traditional systems of rules were not uniform across Namibia. Most communities in southern and central Namibia were predominantly pastoral, and the uncertainty around pastures required that these communities disperse “widely over the territory in small groups in order to utilise existing resources”, with maximisation of pastures and water resources requiring “a high degree of

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363 Ibid
mobility, characterised by epicyclical migration”. Therefore, kingdoms and chiefdoms were defined in terms of small groups of people, usually consisting of a few families. “Corresponding to the high degree of mobility was a social and political structure characterised by a relatively low degree of political centralisation… (and) coherent tribal units with a paramount chief on top did not yet exist”. The northern parts on the other hand, were predominantly agro-pastoral, with communities settled around agricultural fields combined with animal husbandry. For the Owambo speaking people, the largest tribal group at the time, water was the crucial factor detecting human settlement as they relied on ground water and flood water (efundja). Communities were largely settled around cleared areas of flood plains after fairly heavy rains, which rains occurred occasionally during the summer period lasting a few months. Therefore unlike the people from the central and southern areas, they were fairly settled, the result of which was more organised communities under kingships. Historiography on Owamboland demonstrates that the kingship was an important aspect of their lives. Records demonstrate how king Mandume Ndemufayo became the forceful leader, known as one of the pioneers of resistance to colonial rule. These structures are known to be the first forms of local traditional governance in Namibia and their functions extended beyond land management and included such things as religious, judiciary, military and administrative management. In Owamboland for instance, these structures are known to have been well organised and were part of a complex political and religious organisation overseeing the


365 Ibid
management of natural resources amidst the fragile ecological setting. Their organisation is well captured by Hayes who wrote that:

“Each polity was divided into administrative districts called oshikandjo, presided over by a headmen or counsellors (omalenga), and further subdivided into wards (omikunda) under sub-headman (onlengwena). The main responsibility of omalenga was administration of the oshikandjo, where they arbitrated in minor legal disputes. They also organised labour for the king’s fields or bigger public projects, levied war bands and exacted the okasava, an internal cattle prestation from subjects.”

Political commentators today ascribe the vulnerability of these traditional systems to the different traditional authorities that existed at the time. Because communities were loosely defined in the central and southern parts of Namibia, characterised by smaller groups and very small chiefdoms, who were constantly at odds with each other, they were easily penetrated and manipulated. In fact, records show that the first land was obtained in 1883, “when a German trader, Adolf Lüderitz, obtained the first tracts of land from chief Joseph Frederick in the south of Namibia”. Since then, the Germans signed protection orders with the chiefs for protection against their adversaries in exchange for land. On the contrary, records demonstrate that the powerful Kwanyama kingdom under the leadership of Mandume Ndemufayo was a key factor in limiting or at least delaying colonial settlement

366 Ibid
in the northern parts of Namibia. As Hayes in reference to Germany’s slow move towards the north alludes; “not only was it economically an unpromising region, but the populous and well-armed Owambo polities were considered too formidable to be easily subdued, especially before 1904 when Germany was still struggling to establish a presence in the centre of German South West Africa.”367 This was largely due to organised traditional authorities under the leadership of kings, chiefs and headmen.

Broadly, these were what Werner calls the “political and economic matrix into which German colonialism inserted itself”.368 Clearly, such a formidable local organisation posed a threat to both colonial settlement and governance. In the years following German colonisation, there was a persistent and consistent barrage to dismantle these traditional structures. Instead, what followed was a system of chiefs created by the colonial administration for the purpose of expanding their mandate. Indeed, matters became worse after the National Party government in South Africa engaged into the restructuring of rural societies, which fundamentally changed the role of traditional authorities. The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 clearly rested the power with a hierarchy of compliant chiefs who were made utterly dependent on the patronage of the Department of Native Affairs, and were no longer accountable to their subjects but to the apartheid regime. As Kessel and Oomen pronounced, “their powers were increased while their legitimacy was being eroded.”369

What this meant is that chiefs and everything related to the traditional

368 Werner, (1993), pp.135-146
369 Ineke van Kessel and Barbara Oomen. ‘One chief, one vote’: The revival of traditional authorities in post-apartheid South Africa, African Affairs, 96, (1997), pp. 561-585
authority became unpopular and chiefs were no longer perceived as potential allies in the struggle for freedom. The roles of chiefs got so diminished to the extent that one leading ANC intellectual on the dawn of independence in South Africa straightforwardly wrote: “Backward tribal and other relationships such as the role of the chiefs in such situations, will be replaced by democratic institutions founded on the organs of people’s power’.\textsuperscript{370} This seems to be the philosophical underpinning of the local governance system in Namibia after independence. For better or for worse, the function of traditional authorities have been diminished to the extent that their role is marginal in the new political dispensation.

**Historically induced meso governance vulnerabilities: education system**

I have repeatedly presented education as the fundamental element in the governing process as it “provides for better citizenship, the ability to appreciate and recognise wider range of cultural and other services, reduced reliance on the market for such services as the filling of income tax returns, and the chance to give the next generation better education and … a better future.” It becomes imperative at this stage to reiterate that whilst the importance of education to the governing process has long been recognised, it was not only until the 1960s that W. Schultz, the Nobel prize winner for Economic Science, guided the revolution of recognising human capital in the production process, leading to the development and interest in the measurement of human capital, which capital was further extended to include

the creation of norms for harmonious living with others. Prior to this period, the value of people was largely construed as a function of their physical rather than their mental strength.

Whilst the paradigmic shift was taking place throughout the world, the South African apartheid regime, on the contrary, started implementing one of the most dehumanising systems of education ever known. In seeking to pursue the policy of apartheid, the regime had to introduce a new ideology into the black schooling system, which became known by the generic term ‘Bantu Education’.371 According to Gonzales, “several scholars have written about Namibia’s pre-independent education system, detailing its ideological propagandising, institutional discrimination, dependence on rote memorisation of the canon, and alienation of both pupils and educators”.372 In a sense, the Bantu Education became the cornerstone for apartheid and the vehicle through which the apartheid ideologies could be maintained. As Hopfer later wrote; “one of the strongest forces that sustained Apartheid in Namibia until 1990, and in South Africa until 1994, was an education system with different schools and resources for the different population groups.”373 The historical progression of this ideology could not have been better phrased than Christie and Collins who wrote that:

373 Christiane Hopfer, Empowering adult education in Namibia and South Africa during and after apartheid, International Review, 43(1), (1997), pp. 43-59
“In January 1949, the Nationalist Government, believing that the schooling was an essential means to achieve success in bringing about apartheid, set up a Commission on Native education under the Chairmanship of Dr W.W.M. Eiselen… In the main it considered that black education should be an integral part of a carefully planned policy of segregated socio-economic development for the black people. Above all, it emphasised the functional value of the school as an institution for the transmission and development of cultural heritage. Consequent to this report, the Bantu Education Act was introduced giving wide powers to the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr H. F. Verwoerd, to bring into effect the major recommendations of the Eiselen Commission. Black education was to be directed to black- not white- needs; it was to be centrally controlled and financed under the Native Affairs Minister; syllabuses were to be adapted to the black way of life and black schools were to be slowly taken over from the missionary bodies who were running the vast majority of black schools at that time and to be placed under the Native Affairs Department.”

In the years that followed, all aspects of education was racially prescribed, which in effect, meant that formal schooling, introduced by missionaries as far back as the late 19th century was abandoned. Whilst it is true that the previous education used by missionaries to teach people to read the bible and later used by the Germans to teach people artisan skills was in many respects to propagandise colonialism, the racially prescribed school system became

known to have created acute disparities and inequalities to unimaginable proportions. In this context, the racial hierarchy was defined with Europeans on top, Indians, Arabs and other mixed groups in the middle and Africans on the bottom. Separate schools were built based on this hierarchy, with education not being seen as a right to blacks, but a privilege reserved for the whites. The segregation was made easier because at the same time, the geographical divisions were also implemented with the setting up of the reserves, modelled on the South African Bantustans or homelands, as they became known in later years. Thus, “education was further fragmented along tribal lines for schools all over the country”, in addition to having “different educational systems and administrators” based on race, “administered by racially based Education Department/Authorities.”

Because as far as the whites were concerned education was not a priority for blacks, education directed to blacks was much more inferior than that of the whites. In fact, it is known that the apartheid authorities spent 10 times more on a white child than on a non-white child. Shilongo puts this quite succinctly when he commented that, “to further strengthen the apartheid state’s machinery, only a few, ill-equipped, poorly staffed and financed schools were made available for the indigenous people”.

What this meant is that most black people stayed out of school and competed for the few places available in schools. Many peripheral tribes, such as the Himbas, Zembas, San and other tribes were literally excluded from the education system, because after all, it did not matter to the South African government whether these children attended school or not. What this meant is that a large number of the tribal groups were

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375 Erica Shilongo, Historical overview of educational assessment in Namibia, Reform Forum, (Windhoek, 2004), p. 2
376 Ibid, p.2
excluded from the education system, a legacy still being felt to date. What is more, even in instances where some blacks were privileged to attend school, records show that only a small number proceeded to high school, with commentators believing that this was a deliberately engineered mechanism that enabled the colonisers to rationalise separate and unequal education systems to which the oppressed were submitted. The ideological consequences of this machinery seemed to have filtered through to the white middle class public in later years, as they became resolute to preserve the status quo, which status quo they believed must be passed on to later generations in order to maintain the privileges of the white communities. In effect, this is as a result of what Bourdieu and Passerson refer to as the use of cultural capital that the white people gained through education, which they then used to make the rules to further build and appropriate it.

Historically induced micro governance vulnerabilities: family institution

Looking at the present Namibia, it is not hard to recognise that the societal dimensions of its mnescope represents social and cultural juxtaposition resulting from an evolution spanning a period of over 100 years. It is what Kossler refers to as a fragmented mnescope discernable by key events, personage, dates and periods that form the most vital points of reference for


each region or community. In a sense, the consequences and internal contradictions of each period are readily evident in each region of the country. So, when looking at the family structure as a key governance institution, it becomes clear that whilst historically, the family institution has undergone tremendous transformation in various parts of the world as a result of external socio-economic environment, the Namibian family structure did not follow the same pattern and what is more, it did not evolve monotonically across all the parts of the country. What forms the central point of reference for the people of central and southern Namibia was the rebellion, which escalated into the catastrophic war of 1904-1908. After this war, major parts of the southern area were allocated for colonial settlement. Together with the genocide, this led to wholesale dispossession of most African groups of their land. For the people of central and southern Namibia, land dispossession meant “the end of independent communal life and posed a vital threat to the continuance of collective identity”. With collective identity retarded, coupled with reported 75-80% of all Hereros and 50% of all Nama people killed in what is commonly referred to as the Herero and Namaqua genocide, the institutions of the family were severely weakened. After the genocide, with many men having perished, large numbers of women were rounded up to work in concentration camps and prevented from owning land. Many more were used as sex slaves, resulting in numerous children being born to these abused women, some of

379 Kossler, 2007
380 Kossler, 2007
these children being used as research objects into the genetics of race.\textsuperscript{382} Whilst scholars have been mute on this subject, the significance of colonial racism lies in its connection to the anti-Semitism attitude, which in many respects and to a certain degree, was the preamble to the Holocaust. Using examples from psychoanalytical school of thought, Melber, a leading scholar on German colonisation, reminds us that the impact of racial colonisation on the mindset of German \textit{petit bourgeoisie} and other members of the middle class did not start after World War I, but can be traced to such events as those that happened in Namibia during the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. But for Namibia, these events meant families were fragmented, with increased single parenting and women headed households, a phenomenon still prevalent in most parts of central and southern Namibia. The interconnectedness of family members was broken, therefore the process of joint decision making within the culturally accepted notions was undermined. Conceivably, what this meant, for most communities, is that the family lost its role as an important structure in the governing process. Even when families were re-constituted after the genocide, the introduction of the contract labour system served to further undermine family life. When, after the genocide, the Germans were encouraged that they crushed the resistance, specific regulations were issued between 1905 and 1907 to expropriate land from the Hereros and the Namas. This allowed the colonial administration to exert control over the political affairs of these communities with the power to decide where and how the indigenous people must be settled. “Henceforth, black Namibians could obtain land only with special permission of the

\textsuperscript{382} In fact, Adolf Hitler cited a study conducted by Eugene Fischer, who studied the genetics of this group of mixed raced children to conclude that they were physically and mentally inferior to white, in his pursuit for racial purity, which pursuit led to the Holocaust.
Governor”, but up until 1912, “this was never granted”. Instead, the appropriation became the precursor of the migrant labour system, with native reserves being set up to provide a wage subsidy to the colonial economy. Such a system denied communal farmers to accumulate capital, so that every household is dependent on wage labour. It was used as a coercive means of extending the periods of employment of indigenous labourers and served as policing of movements of migrants from reserves where they were forced to live.383 Very broadly speaking, this meant that for the first time, a large number of men were separated from their wives and children, and in some instances, such separation endured for long periods of time. Equally, one can argue that, generally, this signalled the beginning of the end of family units, as it was previously known.

For the people belonging to the northern areas of Kaokoveld, Owamboland, Kavango and Caprivi, actual colonial intrusion did not occur until after the Germans and did not specifically entail land dispossession. Actual intrusion only started during World War I, when South Africa, being part of the British Commonwealth started occupying Namibia. Indeed, many scholars agree that, contrary to the order of the Majesty to serve the interest of the people of Namibia, this marked an extension of yet another brutal repression of the people of this country. In fact, this was clearly documented, when, at the dawn of South African colonisation of Namibia in 1916, the Officer in charge of Native Affairs proclaimed that:

383 See David Sill, the International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, (New York: Macmillian, 1968)
“the setting aside of small areas of land for use by black Namibians was never intended to create reserves to which tribes could remove themselves and thus restore their old tribal methods under the Chiefs. Instead, married women and children should live on their reserves and have benefits of the milk from their cattle… men should go out like the natives of the Transvaal and leave their women at home on the reserves until they return.”

Indeed, South Africa is known to have put this to good effect. Tribal confinement increased with the settlers deciding where each tribe is settled. Whilst South Africa did not have an explicit policy of forced migration per se, literature search of the history of Namibian contract labour system all seem to point to the fact that labour migration kept on increasing each year after the South African ‘take-over’. Although numerous reasons are often cited for the increase in labour migration in later years, job related reasons often outweigh the other reasons. To compel people to migrate, South Africa introduced a system of taxation through tribal chiefs in addition to introducing commercial goods (consisting of various types of food, ploughs, fencing wires, clothes, food and other modern commodities), which in effect necessitated one to have cash in order to buy these items. This was followed by the climate situation in the north, which led to 160,000 Owambo people dying from famine in 1915, and the imposition of ‘hut tax’. All these were meant to ‘force’ people to leave their tribal homes in search of employment. According to Mitchell, “the attitude of the early settlers to the reluctance of the local African

population to enter into wage-earning employment was that if ‘the African’ did not respond to economic motives, then the best way to make him work was not to pamper him, but to tax him so that he would learn the dignity of labour.  

Quite clearly, the consequences of the migrant labour system are still felt to the present time. Scholars today agree that as a result and despite its small population, Namibia has one of the greatest linguistic variety per capita in the world, with thirteen distinctive languages being spoken by these slightly over two million people. The long years of migrant labour system also meant that men, who would normally have one monogamous relationship, were put into situations that encouraged polygamous relationships, which over time, became an acceptable way of life for many of them. Writing on labour migration between South Africa and Namibia, Hishongwa posits that migration “prevented African men fulfilling their roles as fathers, husbands and members of the community”. Many men entered into what Hishongwa refers to as transnational polygamy, and many more established second families in South Africa leading to some abandoning their families back home in Namibia. This issue has received little attention from historians, and many scholars appear reluctant to engage in a dialogue on how the migrant labour system inspired the culture of polygamy and extra marital affairs in Namibia, which culture is still evident in major parts of the country. In fact,

385 John Mitchell, the causes of labour migration, 1961, p. 200; cited in Ginilla Bjeren, Some theoretical and methodological aspects of the study of African urbanisation, research report no. 9, (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1991), pp. 9
387 Ibid
others trace the high prevalence of child and wife neglect to the system of
labour migration. Mager, whilst writing about the relationship between
sexuality and violence, unwittingly admits that in the context of absent male
migrants, wife neglect and sexual violence became endemic in South Africa.
She further concludes that ‘the war on women’, as she phrases it, must be
seen as “the outcome of a complex interplay between wider social processes
and those power relations, themselves mediated by economic and political
factors”.\textsuperscript{388} In a sense, this could be extended to argue that most men
subjected to the migrant system developed dominant patriarchal attitudes in
what Ramphele called “migrant labour hostels of Cape Town”.\textsuperscript{389} Moffet,
writing about the complex relations between what she terms ‘gender war’ and
social and racial legacies in South Africa, also concludes that the reason
South Africa has the highest rape of women and girls for a country not at war
or embroiled in a conflict, is a result of the “pernicious and overtly racially
ranked hierarchies endorsed and enforced during South Africa’s apartheid
regime”. She further writes:

“Under apartheid, the dominant group used methods of regulating
blacks and reminding them of their subordinate status that permeated
not just public and political spaces, but also private and domestic
spaces. Today it is gender rankings that are maintained and women
that are regulated. This is largely done through sexual violence, in a
national project in which it is quite possible that many men are buying

\textsuperscript{388} Anne Mager, \textit{Gender and the making of a South African Bantustan: a Social history of
\textsuperscript{389} Mamphela Ramphele, \textit{A bed called home: life in the migrant labour hostels of Cape Town,
into the notion that in enacting intimate violence on women, they are performing a necessary work of social stabilization.”

This scenario leaves us with too many questions, one of which is the extent of the devastating impact of violence on women in these high HIV background prevalence countries. This is an important question because for young women, sexual coercion is a key factor limiting their ability to prevent HIV and sexually transmitted infections (STI) transmission as safe sex is rarely practiced where women are coerced.

Other momentous effects of the labour migration system was to deny the woman and girl child from taking part in wage labour. Women were left at the tribal home to deal with the problems of caring for their children, themselves and the entire household. This implies that because of different experiences, these women were also united by oppression but differently from the men who were on contract in white areas. This too led to not only the development of an alternative lifestyle or subculture of resistance as I shall discuss later, but to further weaken women’s economic power relative to men and indeed to engage in sexual networking of their own as a means of survival. A study carried out in Halbisi, a community in South Africa’s Kwazulu Natal, corroborates this hypothesis. The study concluded that among the discordant couples, about 20% women were HIV positive whilst their migrant

390 Moffett, (2006), pp. 129-144
husbands were negative.\textsuperscript{392} It therefore emerges that the contract labour system played an important role in altering the way of life of indigenous families. The effects are numerous to be discussed in any length. In fact, there is a vast amount of literature on the social effects and by implication the psychological effects of the contract labour system on families. The strong relationship of these events is not only evident in the spatial variations of the regions, but in that various communities in Namibia ascribe key aspects of their collective identity construction to these events. Today, whilst everyone talks about one Namibia, it is much harder to talk of a unified Namibian culture, unless this is only in reference to the symbolic exercise of national identity formation. In a sense, making the task of discerning one family culture a complex exercise. Whilst it is true that most family units meet Murdock’s sociological and anthropological definition as a social group characterised by common residence, economic co-operation and reproduction… including adults of both sexes at least two of whom maintain a socially approved sexual relationship and one or more children\textsuperscript{393}, a large number of families fall short of this definition. Single parenting, not only in the Western sense of an unmarried mother having to raise a child, but more so married mothers having to content with raising children in the absence of the father, and at times having to contend with the consequence of being in a polygamous relationship. At present, many men from the northern periphery work in the major towns of Windhoek, Walvis Bay, Lüderitz, Rosh Pinah and Oranjemund.


Conclusion

Key to my argument is that the complex governances, both formal and informal, high and low, that provide and sustain intergenerational knowledge are highly vulnerable to disruptions and fragmentations. Because the thesis characterises governance as a summative phenomenon that emerges from long run equilibria of processes, there will be little justification in omitting the historical influences of the violence, suffering, intimidation, death, distorted economy, population dislocation, and military rule on these systems. Emerging from this chapter is the profound impact of years of colonisation and apartheid on Namibia’s social systems of rules. The impact of the genocide and the migrant labour system on families are so profound, such that scholars often view this as a preamble to the lasting violence against women, the burgeoning culture of polygamy and extra marital affairs, wife neglect and the weakening of women’s socio-economic power relative to men. As Britton reminds us; “during the colonial period and throughout the apartheid era, rape was used as a weapon to ensure control, obedience and interracial conformity.”³⁹⁴ As such, violence against women has become what Britton terms “the most visible and destabilising vestiges of this complex history”. Similarly, the consequence of years of distorted access to education are still evident today, with an estimated 35% of the labour force being unable to find a job because they are not qualified. Only about 43% of the labour force is in formal employment.³⁹⁵ After two decades of rapid increase in registration and

the expenditure of billions of dollars, the position of the average Namibian has not changed. Clearly and whilst Namibia is heralded as a model for reconciliation and inter-party constitutional reformation for the rest of Africa, many scholars believe that “…the task of promoting greater social equity has yet to be adequately addressed.” Therefore we bear testimony to the subtle, daunting and long waved impacts of colonisation in these structures of governance. Conversely though, the implication of protracted period of colonisation meant that Namibia inherited very strong institutions at the level of nation state, and in the process was spared from the ominous danger so often associated with newly independent states in Africa. At the same time, independence occurred at a time that Bauer calls, the “apparent universal triumph of ideas of neo-liberalism and liberal democracy”. These ideas have formed the basis for Namibia’s constitution and other national development documents, strategies, programmes and plans. Today Namibia’s constitution is hailed the most liberal in the world and is regarded as a good case study for democratic transition, tempting many to court controversy by trumpeting that the protracted period of colonisation was, after all, not too bad.

Nonetheless, Namibia’s case presents a good example of the interdependence of the various forms of governance from a higher to a lower order. In earlier sections, I made reference to the challenges faced by the traditional conceptions of governance due to the emergence and dynamism of

396 See for example Chris Tapscott, National Reconciliation, Social Equity and Class Formation in Independent Namibia, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 19(1), (1993), pp. 29-39. Tapscott shows that while national reconciliation has played an important role in overcoming political and racial tensions of the past, he nevertheless hypothesise that such a policy entrenches the status quo by protecting the pre-independence gains of the minority and by legitimising patterns of social differentiation that had existed in the colonial era.
actors in the governing process and how academic description is necessary to reflect the interplay of the various actors on micro, meso, and macro levels of political aggregation. Using Rosenau’s conceptualisation of the interdependence of these various systems, I referred to governance as a summative phenomenon. Implied in the analysis of the various systems of governance is the interdependency of each of these on each other. It follows that the family is an important institution providing input to the education, which in turn is a necessary foundation for local and national governance. Similarly, the civil society is an important element in the governing process as it not only fills the gap between families and government, but fulfils important functions at grassroot levels, such as solving land disputes, and dealing with disasters such as HIV and AIDS and floods. In recognition of the interdependence of these systems, the Namibian government describes civil society as “a wide range of organisations found at all levels of civil society between the individual or family and the state, and which becomes involved in activities that pursue the interest of its members, sponsors and/or beneficiaries.”

Whilst it was important to discuss governance for the specific arena in which it takes place, in the grand scheme of things, governance must be seen as a totality of these sectoral governances. Reiterating Kooiman’s words: “government (in Namibia) could never govern if people- in their organisations, their families, their groupings of all kinds- were not self-governing.”

397 Republic of Namibia National Planning Commission, Civic Organisations Partnership Policy, (Windhoek, 2005)
398 Kooiman, (1993), p. 27
Chapter 6: Namibia HIV and AIDS related governance liabilities

Introduction: AIDS in Namibia

Since the first case of HIV was diagnosed in 1986, the epidemic continued to rise, reaching a peak of 22% in 2002, before declining to 17.8% in 2008 and picking up again to 18.8% in 2010 among pregnant women.

Graph 1: Namibia HIV prevalence rate in pregnant women, 1992-2010

Namibia monitors the prevalence of the HIV epidemic every second year through the sentinel survey, the first of which was carried out in 2002. The sentinel survey is conducted anonymously with pregnant women attending antenatal care (ANC). Blood samples are taken from women attending a selected number of sites and tested in accordance with methods...
recommended by the World Health Organisation (WHO). The latest survey, conducted in 2010 and released in 2011, shows that the HIV prevalence among pregnant women was 18.8% compared to 17.8% in 2008.\textsuperscript{399} Similarly, the report highlights that there is “no significant difference between urban (18.5%) and rural (19.1%).”\textsuperscript{400} However the report also demonstrates that HIV prevalence peaked in the age group 30-39 years and the age group 30-34 years to 29.6% and 29.7% respectively. Seemingly, as the report suggests, the epidemic is understandably concentrated in three geographical areas of the northwest, north and central districts. These areas have high mobile populations, or are border entry or exit points. The regional variations also testify to the various epidemics in Namibia, with some regions showing leveling epidemics, whilst others show emerging, and others declining. Encouragingly though, there appears to be a decline in the age group 15-24 years from 15.2% in 2004 to 10.3% in 2010, though such optimism must only be viewed in the context of its nominal reduction, because as I shall discuss later, this number is still extremely high. Of the new HIV infections, an estimated 44% were among young people aged between 15-24 years, and 77% of these are females. These women are most likely infected early in their sexual life by their first or second partner.\textsuperscript{401} Namibia recognises that the long incubation period of HIV means that the full-scale impact will manifest itself only within a decade or two. Despite regional and geographical variations, Namibia experiences what is referred to as a generalised epidemic with HIV being transmitted primarily through heterosexual sexual intercourse. As

\textsuperscript{399} Ministry of Health and Social Services, 2010 National Sentinel Survey, (Windhoek, 2010)
\textsuperscript{400} Ibid
\textsuperscript{401} Ministry of Health and Social Services, \textit{Namibia Demographic and Health Survey}, (Windhoek, Namibia, 2006)
opposed to a concentrated epidemic where the spread is confined to a defined subpopulation, a generalised epidemic is well established in the general population. In concentrated epidemics, HIV is confined to specific groups, *inter alia*, prisoners, injecting drug users, men having sex with men, prisoners, truck drivers and commercial sex workers. While it is true that these groups continue to be most vulnerable to HIV transmission, there is no evidence to suggest that the rate of infection is different from that in the general population. Therefore in Namibia, heterosexual transmission continues to drive the epidemic among the population.

So far, the sentinel survey report has given us the most reliable information, “due to its early detection of changes or trends and its ability to discern meaningful differences in disease rates and trends between sentinel sites.”

“To calculate national prevalence the ANC prevalence must be adjusted to account for males and other women that are not represented in the ANC surveillance.” The real prevalence in the general population is currently estimated at 13.4%. When adjusted and compared to other countries, the adult prevalence is the second least highest among countries in southern Africa as the table below shows.

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403 Ministry of Health and Social Services, *Namibia estimates and projections report*, (Windhoek, 2008)
Graph 2: Namibia’s adult HIV prevalence relative to selected countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>23.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Therefore and besides the adjusted figure to account for men and other women not attending ANC, we cannot have certainty of the actual numbers of people infected without a comprehensive population based surveillance survey. Namibia lags behind many countries in Africa, who have started combining sentinel surveys with national based surveys in which testing is also included. This creates a particular problem because studies have shown that sentinel surveys generally overestimate the population prevalence by as much as 20%.

Bongaarts, et al, lists various reasons why this may be the case; first, prevalence is a lagging indicator of HIV, because the numerator prevalence is all currently infected individuals, regardless of when they were infected. What we get is information on transmission patterns and levels of infections that occurred over a decade ago. Second, the treatment of HIV has made it possible for many people to survive beyond the normal disease

See for instance, Eleanor Gouws, Vinod Mishra and Timothy B Fowler, Comparison of adult HIV prevalence from national population-based surveys and antenatal clinic surveillance in countries with generalised epidemics: Implications for calibrating surveillance, Sexually Transmitted Infections, 84 (1), (2008), pp. 17-23. In this study the authors demonstrate that in countries with a generalised epidemic, there is a tendency for sentinel survey to overestimate the population prevalence by 20%. They suggest that HIV prevalence derived from ANC clinic surveillance data must be multiplied by 0.8 to adjust for the overestimation.
progression, putting an upward pressure on prevalence. Third, when individuals start to die as a result of AIDS related illness, the pool of infected people reduces and as a result, may provide a picture of declining prevalence. Moreover the interpretation of data obtained from sentinel surveys are complicated by various factors, including what Gouws, Mishra and Flower refer to as “....biases in the sample due to subfertility associated with bacterial sexually transmitted infections and HIV and by the disproportionate selection of surveillance sites in urban area”. These complications have often been linked to the failure to deal with HIV in many countries. Instead, epidemiologists have urged Namibia to opt for the use of incidence rate, a technique to measure annual rate of new infections. Despite these caveats, sentinel surveys continue to provide a good approximation of the burden of HIV related morbidity and a good advocacy tool for action.

Understandably, the immense scale of AIDS related illness and deaths is weakening governance capacities for service delivery with serious impacts on food security, economic growth, and human development in Namibia. The AIDS epidemic has started to undermine the capacities of individuals, families, communities and the state to fulfil their roles and responsibilities in society. It has been hypothesised that if current trends are not reversed, the longer–term survival of Namibia as a country will be seriously threatened. Though prevention efforts are beginning to reverse the trend, the epidemic still affects large numbers of individuals, families and communities in Namibia, creating a severe burden for the country as a whole. The government has on

several occasions made a public call for a concerted effort to continue to prevent new infections especially in the young age group, more so among young females. HIV and AIDS have reached the crisis stage in Namibia and require multi-sectoral approach, where all Namibians, including bi- and multi-lateral organisations have been asked to intensify the fight against its spread. The staggering spread of HIV and AIDS in Namibia has prompted the government to adopt a multi-sectoral approach in order to intensify the fight against the spread of the disease. The government’s national response had been organised through the implementation of four consecutive plans; the Short-term Plan, covering 1990-1992, the Medium Term Plan (MTPI) covering the period 1992-1998, the National Strategic Plan on HIV and AIDS (MTPII) covering the period 1999-2004, the Multi-sectoral National Strategic Plan for HIV and AIDS (MTPIII) covering the period 2004-2009 and now implements the National Strategic Framework (NSF) covering the period 2010-2016. Each plan highlights changes in the management and coordination of the national response. Structures are set up to coordinate and oversee the implementation of the various plans. The current plan intends to prevent further infections, enhance care, treatment and support, and mitigate the impact of HIV and AIDS. It underlines the importance of harmonisation and synchronisation of the various interventions with national response priorities and the imperative of result and evidence-based planning. In 2007, an HIV and AIDS Policy was formulated to legitimise the plans, and more specifically to provide a supportive policy environment for implementation of HIV and AIDS programmes to reduce new infections, improve treatment, care and support and mitigate the impact of HIV and AIDS. The policy also offers a
basic framework for responding to HIV and AIDS in the workplace, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), surveillance and research, and institutional framework for policy implementation.

**Changing demographic structure**

As in many countries severely affected by the AIDS epidemic, Namibia has gone through a demographic transition. The first population census carried out in 1921, estimated the population at 229,000. Since then, the population has been growing steadily at 2% per year during the first half of the 1900s, rising to 3% during the five decades leading to the 2000s. In the last decade up to 2010, the population growth declined to 1.5%. It was earlier estimated that the population will rise to 2,2250,00 in 2010, but only 2,104,900 were enumerated during the last census, 4% lower than the expected increase. The annual rate of increase is expected to decline lower than the 1.5% between 2010 and 2020, both as a result of HIV and AIDS and falling fertility rates.

The shape of Namibia’s population pyramid shows an obvious increase in the number of people but at a decreasing rate, with the most obvious increase observed in the younger population. Overall the population under 15 years make up 43% of the population and those between 15-44 make up 42%. This presents a very youthful population, making Namibia’s population very distinctive. In the more developed countries of the world, the age group below

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15 years makes up only 22% and the average for less developed countries is 35.5%.

There seems to have been a reduction in the rate of growth of 0-4 year olds in recent years. The most obvious trend in Namibia’s demographic structure is the effect of AIDS mortality and decline in fertility rates on the population structure. These appear to be the two demographic variables affecting the structure and as a result of HIV and AIDS, these are intertwined. Because the age pattern of AIDS mortality is different from the normal mortality patterns in the absence of HIV, the J-shaped model have started to assume a different shape. Whilst the number of women exceeds men in the age group 20 upwards, and with a disproportionately greater discrepancy in older age due to women’s longer life expectancy, there are signs that the younger aged population is not growing as it would have in the absence of HIV. Because HIV is more prevalent in the sexually active population, fertility is reduced. The shape of the pyramid is expected to change further as HIV starts to take its toll in the coming years with increased mortality in the middle-aged population. At the top end of the pyramid, dramatic changes are expected as life expectancy at birth starts to fall to the projected levels of 52 years. In the absence of HIV Namibia’s population was expected to reach 3.5 million by 2021, but projections now point to a growth to 2.6 million. In short, the effects of HIV on the demographic structure are not hard to see. HIV and AIDS decreases life expectancy in the general population, increases mortality in the middle aged group, reduces fertility and makes children orphans. A

report examining the effect of HIV in Namibia’s municipalities put this picture more succinctly:

“The crude death rate for Namibia is expected to more than triple due to AIDS, rising to 19/1000 by 2006, well above the expected level of 5/1000. Infant mortality is expected to be 59% higher with AIDS than without AIDS, while child mortality is expected to be double due to AIDS, despite enormous advances made in child health.”

At the same time, these effects render population projections in Namibia problematic. As Heuveline points out, HIV has quickly rendered obsolete contributions to demographic estimation and forecasting in populations hardest hit by the epidemic, especially those with HIV exceeding a few percentage points. This is the case because “no existing model accurately represents the age structure of mortality when AIDS accounts for a significant proportion of all deaths.” Therefore, to accurately project the population, Namibia may require models that allow for the different age-specific rates of mortality and child-bear-ing of HIV-positive individuals.

Why HIV has spread rapidly across the population in Namibia

Like much of southern Africa, the HIV epidemic in Namibia has grown at an extremely fast pace and has reached exceptional intensities in several

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410 Ibid
regions. As the graph below demonstrates, the northern towns of Katima Mulilo, Oshakati, Tsumeb, Rundu and Engela all have prevalence over 20% of the adult population.

**Graph 3: National prevalence rate relative to selected sentinel sites in Namibia**

Again, like countries in the sub-region, there is no evidence that the Namibian epidemic is declining in intensity. Not even the apparent stabilisation of HIV prevalence can, on current evidence, be linked to prevention efforts. Rather, it is likely that these are either statistical anomalies or reflect an appalling equilibrium, with the numbers of people newly infected with HIV roughly equalling the numbers dying of AIDS. It has often been cited that as elsewhere in Africa, patterns of sexual behaviour in Namibia are embedded in
complex and often opaque social relations which, in different respects and to differing degrees, may favour or hinder viral transmission.\textsuperscript{411} Unfortunately there are major gaps in knowledge about what is actually happening. Across Namibia, there is very little knowledge in all regions about the factors fuelling the epidemic in terms of relative importance. However, through this research, logical inference and limited other researches, among the core vectors include: multiple concurrent partnerships, intergenerational sexual relations, negligible usage of condoms, transactional sexual relations, pervasive use of alcohol, migration and gender relations.

\textbf{Multiple concurrent partnerships}

Evidence collected as part of this research demonstrates that multiple concurrent partnerships, particularly with men having more than one partner is a significant factor in spreading HIV in Namibia. As one respondent put; “the biggest problem in Namibia is our culture that encourages men to have as many sexual partners as possible. Therefore, we can only talk about the reversal of the spread of HIV if we are able to convince our men and women that having more than one partner is dangerous.”\textsuperscript{412} The general admittance is that this is the key factor facilitating the spread of HIV. Other studies corroborate this and show that multiple partners for men are condoned and even encouraged. For example, a study which I have conducted in 2010, examining the knowledge, attitudes, practices and beliefs about HIV and AIDS in the Kunene and Erongo Regions of Namibia found that over 56\% of the

\textsuperscript{411} Poku, (2006)  
\textsuperscript{412} Interview 9, July 2011
respondents surveyed agreed with the statement that “It is acceptable for men to have many sexual partners”. Similarly, Caprivi and Kavango, for instance have reported a striking increase in the number of men reporting two or more sexual partners between 2000 and 2006. In attempting to understand this concept more clearly, recent anthropological and gender research have demonstrated the traditional and historical practices that makes concurrent relationships acceptable. These issues include the practice of polygamy in some places in Namibia, the history of the migrant labour system, rapid modernisation and the need for transactional sexual relations necessitated by the sudden shift to a cash based economy. The issue of multiple partnerships in Namibia has also been seen in the context of the relatively low rates of marriages compared to the rest of the world. What is more, the marital rates has been decreasing, with consecutive National Demographical and Health Surveys (NDHS) showing a decrease in marriages from 27% in 1992, to 23% in 2000 and 19% in 2006. Major reasons for the low rates of marriages include the migrant labour system, high prices of wedding and lobola and the apartheid controls that forbade cross-ethnic relations. Because studies have shown that in countries with low marriage, the incidence of multiple and concurrent partnerships is high, it could safely

413 Jerry Mameja, A study to identify knowledge, attitudes, practices and beliefs (KAPB) on HIV/AIDS of women and men in Kunene and Erongo, (Windhoek: Meicos del Mundo, 2010)
415 For more analytical discussion, see Timothy Mah and Daniel Halperin, Concurrent Partnership and the HIV Epidemic in Africa: Evidence to move forward, *AIDS and Behavior*, 14(1), (2010), pp. 11-16
417 Denotes a practice where a man pays the family of his wife-to-be for their hand in marriage, widely practiced in parts of Southern Africa.
be argued that this is a key factor in multiple concurrent sexual relations in Namibia.

In the context of HIV, the secondary evidence collected as part of this research conclusively shows the significant role multiple concurrent (as opposed to serial) sexual relationships play in exacerbating the transmission of HIV. This is not hard to see, because serial monogamy traps the virus within a single relationship for years or months, whereas as soon as one person in a network of concurrent relationships contracts HIV, everyone in the network is placed at risk especially women as it is biologically easier to transmit HIV from men to women, then from women to men. Therefore concurrent partnerships have a possible bearing on an HIV epidemic’s trajectory. Mathematical modelling have shown that when multiple partnerships are concurrent, as opposed to consecutive (so-called “serial monogamy”), the chances of HIV spread appear to increase considerably.\(^{418}\)

This is partly due to the fact that a newly infected person has an extremely high viral load (infectivity) in the first weeks after infection, which also increases the likelihood that anyone else in that person’s sexual network at the time will be infected.\(^{419}\) Indeed, one recent study has calculated that more than half the heterosexually transmitted HIV infections from men to women in sub-Saharan Africa occur in the first six weeks of the man’s infection.\(^{420}\) This has prompted some observers to court controversy by trumpeting the


\(^{420}\) See Christopher Pilcher, et al., Brief but efficient: acute HIV infection and the sexual transmission of HIV, *Journal of Infectious Diseases*, 189 (10), (2004), pp. 1785-1792
importance of promoting “fidelity” and even serial monogamy, as part of a comprehensive prevention strategy.\textsuperscript{421}

It follows that without multiple sexual partnerships, an HIV epidemic in Namibia would not occur. By extension, partner reduction is the most obvious, yet paradoxically neglected approach to the prevention of HIV in Namibia. In the ABC model for preventing HIV in Namibia (abstinence, or deferred sexual inception—A, be faithful, or partner reduction—B, and condom use—C), promotion of sexual deferral and condom use have persuasive advocates but partner reduction does not.

**Intergenerational sexual relations**

The 2010 sentinel surveillance in Namibia projects that the overall HIV prevalence for the age group 15–24 years is 10.3%. Of the new HIV infections in 2007, an estimated 44% were among young people aged between 15-24 years, and 77% of these are females. This is often regarded as a sign of early sexual debut, which in turn is associated with the concept of sugar daddy, with major motivation being material gains by young girls. The issue of sugar daddies is said to be more prevalent in the more urban and affluent settings.\textsuperscript{422} As one participant noted in a focus group discussion; “these girls

\textsuperscript{421} See for instance Simon Gregson, et al. Fluctuations in sexual activity, the validity of sexual behaviour estimates for short time-intervals, and HIV intervention evaluation in rural Zimbabwe, *Journal of Sex Research*, 2, (2001), pp. 180-181. The authors argue that the duration of partnerships in serial monogamy is of epidemiological interest because the chain reaction in very short relationships related to viraemia with new infections could fuel the epidemic. However, if patterns of turnover in serial relationships were more than 3 months, the risk for infections decreases dramatically.

\textsuperscript{422} See Peter Delius and Liz Walker, AIDS in Context. *African Studies*, 61(1), (2002), pp. 5-13 who elaborated that particularly in urban areas, these relationships are formed amid
want to live a high life and they want to have cell phones so they end up
dating sugar daddies and having unprotected sex. The men buy them beer
and when drunk they will have multiple partners which leads to pregnancy as
well.\textsuperscript{423} Another member of the group added that the “young girls are getting
cornered by sugar daddies and manipulated with money. Sugar daddies are
ruining the lives of young girls; they get them pregnant and later deny the
responsibility.”\textsuperscript{424} This age-mixing phenomenon is one of the crucial factors
increasing STIs and HIV among adolescents. A study examining the
behavioural and contextual factors driving the epidemic in Namibia found that
“among women aged 15 to 24, seven percent of single women and 26 percent
of married women have a partner 10 or more years older.”\textsuperscript{425} The same study
also concludes that intergenerational sex is associated with higher levels of
sexually transmitted infections.\textsuperscript{426} It follows that if adolescent girls were merely
having sex with boys their age, the spread of infection among adolescents
would not be as high. When girls are having sex with older men, who are
more likely to be infected, compared to boys their age, and who might also be
involved in other high risk relationships, the chances are that the epidemic
among this group will increase. In Namibia, this issue has proved the most
difficult to deal with as evidences suggest that physiological factors, such as
the need for food and shelter may also be exchanged for sex as a matter of
survival, desire for material goods such as fashion items, cell phones, money

\textsuperscript{423} FGD 1 participant 4, September, 2011
\textsuperscript{424} FGD 1 participant 2, September, 2011
\textsuperscript{425} Christina de la Torre, Shane Khan, Erin Eckert and Jennifer Luna, \textit{HIV/AIDS in Namibia: behavourial and contextual factors driving the epidemic}, (MEASURE Evaluation, Macro-
international, 2010), p. ix
\textsuperscript{426} Ibid
and transport, which may foster risky transactional sexual relationships. The evidence also suggests that in some instances much of the very early sexual activity for girls takes place with parental knowledge, with a number of parents confessing that while this may be shameful and disgraceful, parents reluctantly look away when this happens.\footnote{See for example Luke & Kurz, Cross-generational and transactional sexual relations in Sub-Saharan Africa: prevalence of behaviour of behaviour and implications for negotiating safer sexual practices, (Washington DC: Office of HIV/AIDS, Global Bureau, September, 2002) and Longfield K et al., Relationships between older men and younger women: Implications for STIs/HIV in Kenya. Studies in Family Planning, 35(2), (2004), 125-134. In this multi country study the authors demonstrate that there are often other factors at play. It found that many girls looked to older men as potential marriage partners, or as sources of assistance in education, jobs and other aspirations or desires. Many reported that gifts of clothes, jewellery and perfume also boosted their self-esteem and their status among their peers.} Not only do parents look away, but according to one key informant; “some parents put pressure on their kids to emulate their friends to dressing nicely and having nice things even though these other kids might be from well of families.”\footnote{Interview 5, June 2011} The reason for this lies in the fact that around 28% of households in Namibia are classified as being poor, with 50% of these households severely poor, representing about 14% of all households.\footnote{Central Bureau of Statistics, National Planning Commission, A Review of Poverty and Inequality in Namibia, (Windhoek: Central Bureau of Statistics, National Planning Commission, 2008)} In some instances, the ability of families- mainly women- to provide for their own personal, social and financial needs is seriously compromised by their care giving roles in households where, for instance, someone is infected with HIV. This shows that in many of these cases, such “age mixing” is tied to economies of need and aspiration of the parents. But the older men are also more likely to have been exposed to HIV, all the more so in these areas with high background prevalence.
This issue was noted by several key informants, with one key informant eloquently purporting that “the kids today just want to have nice things and when a man comes to her to ask for sex, she will do it as long as the man can pay her more and buy her nice things”. This was corroborated by another key informant who added that “youth today are infected by HIV/AIDS because they copy what their friends do, for example if a girl sees her friends with expensive cell phone and nice clothes which her parents cannot afford to buy for her she will get involved with a sugar daddy in order to be given money so that she can also buy an expensive cell phone.” This leads to adolescents engaging in sexual activities with older man in order to buy these nice things, added a couple of participants in a FGD. But, such early sex carries a threat of HIV infection in areas where HIV prevalence is high and their male partners are substantially older. The problem is that women are particularly vulnerable to unsafe sexual activities within such sexual relationships due to their weaker bargaining position relative to their male partners. Young women tend to use their limited bargaining power to negotiate for higher economic gains instead of safe sexual practices increasing their risk for contracting HIV.

**Negligible usage of condoms**

The evidence suggests that inconsistent use of condoms with regular and non-regular partners is often linked with the rapid spread of HIV, with other reports also showing that condom use is seen as the antithesis of good

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430 Interview 4, June, 2011
431 Interview 5, June, 2011
432 FGD 2, September, 2011
pleasurable sex for men. The experience of condoms by men as physically desensitising was a common emphasis in men's accounts during this research and is widely recognised as a complaint among men in Namibia in general. As one male participant in a FGD puts it; “there are men who would risk contracting HIV instead of using condoms”.

In other words, the practice of safe sexual practices by using condoms involves de-prioritising their own sexual pleasure in the interests of sexual safety something that a significant majority of men in Namibia are not willing to entertain even in high HIV prevalence environment as is common in the country. When women insist on the use of a condom for their own safety, they are going against the construction of sexual intercourse as men's natural pleasure, and women's natural duty. This shows that women's HIV risk from HIV transmission in Namibia clearly is embedded in the context of gender relations and that this context has central implications for interpersonal relationship factors relevant to women's HIV. Cultural norms of womanhood in Namibia place a high value on sexual innocence, passivity, virginity, and motherhood. Women and girls are not supposed to be knowledgeable about sex and generally have more limited access to relevant information and services in the country as some studies have shown.

They often, therefore, remain poorly informed about sex, sexuality and reproduction. For instance, according to a number of key informants, for a Himba woman to raise the issue of using condoms before they are actively involved in sex, or for a woman to have condoms available, means that she must make explicit her sexual interests and this is in contradiction to traditional gender roles regarding sexual interactions.

434 Interview 2, June 2011
Condoms are thus rarely used, increasing opportunities for the transmission of sexually transmitted infections and HIV. Condom use must thus be understood in the context of the contradictions and tensions of gendered relationships.

Moreover, the inconsistent use of condoms with regular and non regular partners is due in significant part to the type of interventions that the actors (primarily the government) have been implementing and the availability of condoms i.e. interventions that focus on general HIV and AIDS education rather than on behaviour change that addresses underlying factors that lead men and women to take risks. As one national key informant noted; “for many years, condom availability was not matched with condom promotion.”

It follows that it is not enough to just provide condoms without educating communities on correct and consistent use of condoms and the benefits of condoms as a prevention method for HIV and sexually transmitted infections. In order to promote behaviour change among the communities, it has often been suggested that Namibia embarks on the use of theory based, participatory approaches (e.g. stepping stones), which challenge communities to confront, reflect on, develop their own responses to, and build their own normative consensus concerning sexual values and practices.

436 See Jerry Mameja, A study to identify knowledge, attitudes, practices and beliefs (KAPB) on HIV/AIDS of women and men in Kunene and Erongo, (Windhoek: Medicos del Mundo, 2010)
437 Interview 8, July, 2011
Transactional sexual relations

Whilst data on the number of transactional sexual relations in Namibia is not available, this study and various other researches have identified this as a widespread phenomenon. For example, a report by LeBeau on alcohol consumption, sexual partners and HIV concluded that the most pertinent problem for poor women in Namibia is that they tend to have multiple men; one steady partner and another one whose paying the bills and buy them gifts. As such, “even if the woman knows that her partner has other women or makes use of sex workers, because she is economically dependent on him, she is in no position to curtail her partner’s sexual exploits”.438 One key informant added, “some young girls who go to school are given free transport to school by taxi drivers in exchange for sex and parents know this is happening”.439 According to another key informant these issues are paramount, and parents cannot necessary be blamed for this because, according to him, “parents need jobs and income to look after our children to avoid girls having sexual relationships with sugar daddies who provide material things and money which parents cannot provide”.440 Similarly, even if women may prefer to be in a steady relationship, because men float between partners, many women and adolescent girls participate in exchange sex and sometime sex work with the hope that one day, they may find a man with

438 Debie LeBeau and Stanley Yoder, DHS Qualitative Research Studies 16, Alcohol consumption, sexual partners and HIV transmission in Namibia, (Windhoek: USAID, 2009)
439 Interview 2, June 2011
440 Interview 4, June 2011
whom they can settle. LeBeau also concludes that many sex workers in Namibia admitted to have started sex in exchange for goods such as food.

Hence, it becomes impossible to divorce the issue of transactional sexual relations, especially involving older men and younger girls, with low economic status (poverty and unemployment). As girls are trying to find other means for financial income, they are left with little option but to start sexual relations with older partners. In most cases the financial assistance extend beyond the women and helps to meet girls’ family essential needs such as school fees, transport costs and groceries. Therefore the most common explanations of transactional (in this sense intergenerational) sex with older men hinges on assumptions of economic desperation of these households. As a result, sexuality, survival and consumption have become closely intertwined.

Transactional sex therefore simultaneously reflects men’s generally superior economic position and access to resources. Studies in other countries have found relatively high proportions of women reporting that they have accepted money, goods or services in exchange for sex. In the context of Namibia,

441 LeBeau, (2009)
442 Ibid
443 A 2002 survey in South Africa, for example, found that sexual experience among youth was significantly higher in urban informal areas (where unemployment levels are extremely high and affordable recreational opportunities very rare), than in any other types of localities; Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), (2002) Nelson Mandela/HSRC Study of HIV/AIDS: South African National HIV Prevalence, Behavioural Risks and Mass Media Household Survey, Pretoria). The research indicates that in the context of deep impoverishment and high unemployment (and the absence of affordable recreation), sexual relationships often feature in bids to boost self-esteem and peer status, or simply relieve boredom and torpor. What makes these quests dangerous for so many young girls is that they are played out not only in areas where HIV has firm footholds but in circumstances marked by glaring gender and other inequalities.
445 See Delius & Walker, (2002). The authors elaborate that particularly in urban areas, these relationships are formed amid aggressively propagated cultures of consumerism, and in the midst of extreme juxtapositions of abundance and deprivation. As a result, sexuality, survival and consumption have become closely intertwined.
this seems to tell only half the story, because in the grand scheme of things, sexual behaviour must be seen in the context of its intertwining relationship with a host of other factors, for instance, many young girls look to older men as a source of assistance in education (due to parents’ inability to pay), whilst others look at older men to boost their self-esteem (to buy them mobile phones, perfumes and clothes) and others look at it to escape poverty (especially those orphaned).

Pervasive alcohol abuse

Alcohol abuse in Namibia is pervasive, with 41% of all respondents admitting that they have drunk alcohol in the past month during the 2006 NDHS. As this research found, alcohol has been seen as the most abused substance in Namibia. In the ensuing years since independence, various other studies proceeded to make similar conclusions. Citing various studies, LeBeau and Yoder put the issue of alcohol more succinctly:

“A small 1996 survey found that at least 51% of respondents said they had more than one drink daily; furthermore, 9.5% of the adult population said they consumed alcohol daily. Almost 75% of out-of-school youths who had access to money consume alcohol regularly, while those without money only drank occasionally. Many school children, some as young as nine years old, said they had also experimented with drinking alcohol. Early 1990 estimates indicated that
7.5% of the Namibian population had alcohol-related diseases and were thus classified as alcoholics…”

Empirical evidence from this research shows that alcohol consumption in Namibia is episodic and heavy, occurring mainly on weekends. It has become a currency for sexual exchange, which heightens the risk for HIV, as the many evidence point to the link between alcohol abuse and sexual risk behaviour, including frequency of sex, more casual partners and unprotected sex. Alcohol and heavy drinking is also associated with the desire to meet new sex partners and when this is nested in an environment of poverty and gender inequality, it provides a conducive setting for risky sexual encounters. The one big factor facilitating the use of alcohol in Namibia, as this research shows, is that venues for alcohol consumption are numerous, with “shebeens” (drinking establishments) almost making up every second or third house in major towns. Therefore many young people are exposed to these establishments at an early age, the implication of which is the belief that this is part of the social fabric. This is particularly worrying because these children are at a stage of seeking for and developing norms around appropriate social behaviour. According to a member of one FGD; “peer pressure leads to this risks and as a result a 10 year old child ends up drinking beer and sometimes the child have copied from the parents when they used to go with them to the club/shebeen and some parents do not talk to their children about these things because of cultural barriers.”*446* Another key informant added that, “young children from the age of 10 are being sent by their parents to purchase

*446 FGD 2, September, 2011*
alcohol and in the process they end up drinking alcohol with other teenagers and end up having sex without protection because their hormones have kicked in and are not educated about such issues." Another FGD participant was adamant that the issue of alcohol is directly linked to parents who are “setting a bad example to their children because they drink alcohol with their children”.

Also, because alcohol in Namibia seems to be central to men’s lives, young boys grow up with the belief that alcohol consumption is normal and for better or worse, can be used as a currency to secure sexual favours. Often associated with high alcohol use, unlike many other countries in Africa, is the apartheid system that institutionalised massive alcohol consumption. During the heightened years of apartheid, workers, such as farmer workers were paid in alcohol in what is referred to as a DOP system. This presents a challenge for post-apartheid health sector transformation in Namibia. Whilst no research has been conducted on the DOP system in Namibia, studies elsewhere, for example in South Africa, have confirmed the implication of this system for alcohol abuse among the mainly poor people.

447 Interview 6, July, 2011
448 DOP is an Afrikaans concept meaning a glass of wine, a pint of beer or a tot of whisky/brandy
Migration

Evidences collected shows that in recent years, Namibia has experienced one of the most rapid internal migration of people from the rural to the urban areas, with the growth being fastest in the migrant receiving areas like Windhoek, Walvis Bay, Oshakati, Rundu, Swakopmund and Luderitz. I have earlier alluded to how years of migrant labour system provided fertile grounds for polygamous relations and how over time, this became an acceptable way of life for many Namibian men. The effects of this system and many aspects of the system still remain, with men commuting from the northern areas to work in mines and fishing industries in central, western and southern Namibia. In fact, the system of labour migration is the most fundamental determinant of present day migration patterns in Namibia. It started in the northern areas of Namibia with young men being recruited to work in the so-called white areas, denied the opportunity to visit their families until their contract ends and women being prevented to work in these areas. In fact, estimations point to the fact that up to 50% of men were absent from the northern areas at any given point in time.450 Winterfeldt writes that the long history of migration has created what he calls “collective experience for a culture of migration”, which system also created a culture for cheap labour in primary industries.451 Coupled with seasonal agricultural production, and a rapid urban migration, a major part of the population is constantly ‘displaced’. As de la Torre, et al., posit; such a scenario makes it easier for infections to pass on “rapidly

450 See, for example, Debie LeBeau, Corridors of mobility: mobility and HIV vulnerability factors in four sites along transport corridors in Namibia, (Windhoek: IOM and IPPR, 2006)
through a chain of interconnected sexual networks that are often distributed over various regions of the country". This is the case because such large-scale migration happens in the context of impoverishment, deep socio-economic inequalities and social dislocation, which provides an ideal situation for the transmission of STIs. It follows that conditions favour HIV transmission, when men are separated from families and their customary frameworks of social regulation are disrupted, and have some disposable income, lack recreational options, and live or socialise in low-income communities, marked by strong gender and other inequalities, specifically among migrant labourers (such as low poor living conditions, high levels of unemployment and lower access to health). Indeed, very high infection rates have been reported with migrants in informal settlements, farm labourers, military personnel, truckers and mine workers in Namibia, all of which fit the description of being ‘internally displaced’.

According to de la Torre, et al., compounding the problem of migrants is that they usually tend to arrive into areas with higher STI and HIV prevalence, “so there is a greater likelihood of coming into contact with infected individuals”. This is the reason, according to one national key informant, “we focus most of our attention on these vulnerable areas in terms of providing specific guidance to prevent the spread of HIV and mitigate the impact of AIDS.”

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452 Christina de la Torre, Shane Khan, Erin Eckert and Jennifer Luna, HIV/AIDS in Namibia: behavioural and contextual factors driving the epidemic, (MEASURE Evaluation, Macrointernational, 2010), p. ix
454 Interview 8, July 2011
other countries in Southern Africa, migrant-receiving areas have been documented to have higher levels of HIV infection. De la Torre and his colleagues conclude that it is not surprising that “some of the highest HIV prevalence areas in Namibia also correspond to locales that receive large numbers of migrants or transient individuals, such as Katutura in Windhoek, Oshakati, Walvis Bay, Swakopmund, Rundu and Katima Mulilo.”

Gender relations

Women make up little over 51 percent of the total population; but in spite of their numerical strength compared with men, they bear a disproportionate burden of HIV in Namibia. The gendered contours of HIV risk among women are profound. Therefore, it would not be possible to address any issue in Namibia without coming up against a gender issue, as this research shows. As one key informant alludes, “the issue of gender in Namibia is complicated and we are a long way understanding what the concept actually means. Since independence, we have been trying to understand the issue of gender (and gender based violence), but it seems every time we think we have made some progress, new issues emerge.”

This is testimony to the fact that the enduring contribution of gender role socialisation and norms to both men and women’s vulnerability to HIV in Namibia is incontrovertible. As this and other similar researches have

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456 Interview 8, July 2011
demonstrated, women's HIV risk transmission in Namibia is clearly embedded in the context of gender relations and that this context has central implications for interpersonal relationship factors relevant to women's HIV. The evidence shows that women and girls, in particular, encounter numerous sexuality-related risk factors that stem not from individual choice but are embedded in the social relations and material realities of their families. Gender roles are historically emergent, culturally dynamic constructs through which individuals and groups actively interpret, engage and construct their daily behaviours and relationships and as such, they have broad implications for sexual behaviour in relationships. Evidence from recent studies, which I conducted suggest that sexual decision is largely gender based, with girls and boys displaying differential power and agency relating to sexual activity. The study also shows that masculinity is equated with sexual knowledge, while femininity is equated with innocence, and in sexual activity, girls are also supposed to be submissive and less sexually aggressive than men. Dominant femininities among these women are characterised by an ‘over respect’ of men and to relate to men in a submissive and obedient manner and such naïveté, ‘over respect’ and obedience to men may not sit well with the assertiveness, the planning and the sexual knowledge they need to ensure that their sexual encounters are safe. These are the factors that appear to influence people’s cognitions and emotions as sexual beings and if, how, and when to have sex and use protection. It has often been hypothesised that males are socialised to be more directive and assertive about their sexual needs and the initiators

457 Jerry Mameja and Backson Sibanda, Community Needs Assessment, Global AIDS Program, (Windhoek: Namibia National Center for HIV, Hepatitis, STD and TB prevention Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012)
of sexual intimacy, whereas females are expected to be sexually naive.\textsuperscript{458}

This may lead males to be more open in discussing sexual topics.

Empirical evidence from this research also shows that a related issue is that while cultural norms of womanhood in Namibia place a high value on sexual innocence, passivity, virginity, and motherhood, where the virtue of chastity in areas like the Caprivi is supposed to be observed by women, which means remaining a virgin before marriage and faithful to their husbands, alive or dead, the increasing number of young people falling pregnant tells a different story. “Girls are falling pregnant as young and 12 years, whether we like it or not”, proclaimed one participant in a FGD.\textsuperscript{459} Compounding the problem, as one key information puts it; “is that parents do not speak to their young ones about these contemporary issues that affects their sexual health, but instead focus on the cultural norms that, on the contrary, increases their vulnerability.”\textsuperscript{460} However, most such cultural norms shape community attitudes where, as a result, girls are not supposed to be knowledgeable about sex and generally have more limited access to relevant information. They often, therefore, remain poorly informed about sex, sexuality and reproduction.

Because gender has become convoluted and synonymous with women, addressing gender issues is challenging for Namibia. The concept of gender


\textsuperscript{459} FGD 2, September, 2011

\textsuperscript{460} Interview 6, July, 2011
has become confused also at grass roots level, where this concept needs to be widely understood in the context of HIV and AIDS. The mistake is that interventions on HIV and AIDS being implemented have been addressing gender issues generically without understanding the underlying factors. It follows that there is need for any efforts to develop and implement evidenced based strategies that empower women, but also deal with male responsibility.

HIV and AIDS liabilities of the family structure

It then becomes much clearer why, in the context of HIV and AIDS, the historical progression of the family structure makes it vulnerable to disruptions and fragmentations. The long protracted migrant labour system (a system that forced men to stay away from their families) and the historical and legal status of women as minorities have weakened the institution of the family to withstand the threat posed by HIV and AIDS. Today, HIV and AIDS related morbidity and mortality put severe strain on this already fragile institution. It is hypothesised that in Namibia, HIV and AIDS affect every family in one way or another. This conclusion is not surprising as a family unit in Namibia could broadly be defined to consist of a group of people who live together in the same households, share common ancestry, are related by blood or have long-term commitment to each other. And given that at least one in every six persons is living with HIV in Namibia, it is not hard to see the validity of such a hypothesis. Even if the definition of a household is adopted, which is but a smaller component of a family unit, due to the high prevalence of HIV, and the
estimated 204,000\textsuperscript{461} people infected with HIV, it is fathomable to conclude that of the 465,400\textsuperscript{462} households in Namibia, at least every third household has one person who is infected with HIV. The fact that AIDS related morbidity and mortality places sever strain on the coping mechanisms of families in Namibia cannot be in dispute. As Poku and Freeman put it; the fact that people are not dropping dead in the streets cannot be construed as evidence that families are coping.\textsuperscript{463} Anecdotal accounts in Namibia suggest that the severe stress families experience as a result of HIV and AIDS often results in families disintegrating as social and economic units. When we see grandmothers assuming new roles of motherhood due to orphans, adolescents becoming head of households, women becoming widows, we are reminded of the devastating impact of AIDS on this key institution. Because of the multifaceted and interconnectedness nature of HIV and AIDS impacts on families, various perspectives can be adopted to demarcate the AIDS effect. In what follows, I will discuss the vulnerabilities from a few perspectives: the orphan perspective, the child headed household perspective and the loss of breadwinner perspective.

Examining the situation of orphans in Namibia reveals the devastating impacts of AIDS on families and how as a result, the traditional conception of families is ever rapidly changing. In 2006, the NDHS revealed that 17\% of children under the age of 18 years are orphaned and only one in three of

\textsuperscript{461} Ministry of Health and Social Services, Estimates and Projections of the impact of HIV/AIDS in Namibia, (Windhoek: Ministry of Health and Social Services, 2008)
Namibian children aged under 18 years live with both parents. The orphan figure in Namibia is staggering, with the NDHS suggesting that the orphan population in Namibia more than doubled, from 11% during the previous survey carried out in 2000, to 17% during the 2006 survey. Double orphans, that is, children with both parents dead, tripled from 1% in 2000 to 3% in 2006. The NDHS further states that 14% of children under the age of 18 years live in a household with at least one adult who is chronically ill during the past year or at least one parent suffering from a chronic disease. Whilst all these cannot be attributed to HIV and AIDS alone, it is well known that death as a result of AIDS has left in its wake a growing number of orphaned children. Indeed the declining rate of HIV in Namibia is not indicative of a declining orphan population. The orphan population has been increasing exponentially from 131,130 in 2004 to 248,000 by 2008.\textsuperscript{464} It is estimated that AIDS accounts for 28% of these children. For a population of slightly more than two million this figure is appalling, no more so because children under 20 years make up 50.7% of the population.\textsuperscript{465} These figures do not only tell a story of the suffering endured by these orphans and vulnerable children, but that the traditional conception of a family as comprising a man, a woman and children is changing. Even in this African country with clearly defined extended family support networks, one cannot help but to deduce the strain put on these families, mainly those living in rural areas as research has shown that orphans and fostered children are more likely to be found in rural than urban


\textsuperscript{465} National Planning Commission, (2012)
areas (51% compared to 24%).\textsuperscript{466} This is not difficult to explain because as people fall ill, children are often sent to rural areas, placing a burden on already struggling households. The gendered dimension of HIV and AIDS means that these children are sent to female parents and relatives. The NDHS confirmed that in Namibia 63% of women as compared to 45% of men are more likely to be primary care givers of children under 18 years.\textsuperscript{467} This is not surprising because care giving has traditionally and socially been regarded as the domain for women, and hence the role for caring for orphans has been abdicated to grandmothers. Whilst no data exist on the number of children living with their grandmothers, there is no doubt that the number of granny-headed households is appallingly high. In some cases children are sent to distant relatives, compromising a significant number of children’s wellbeing, because as UNICEF posits; the well being of children depends on the relatedness of the household head. It follows that the more distant the relationship, the worse the outcome for the child.

Another momentous effect of HIV and AIDS in Namibia has been the increasing numbers of child- and youth-headed households (CHHs). As part of the coping mechanisms of families, children are often distributed among family members to spread the burden. Whilst the poor collection of statistics and registration makes it difficult to estimate the exact numbers of CHHs, the 2006 NDHS provide some hints. When orphans were asked about their living arrangements, 55% said they do not live with their siblings. Whilst this is not a direct measure of children headed households, it is reasonable to deduce

\textsuperscript{466} Ibid
\textsuperscript{467} Ministry of Health and Social Services, \textit{Namibia Demographic and Health Survey}, (Windhoek, 2006)
from the figures that of the 45% who live with their siblings, a significant number could be classified as child or youth headed households. For example, 55.5% of the 0-4 years and 45.2% of the 5-9 years respectively indicated living with their siblings. Because of their relatively young age, one can assume that siblings, who are not much older, are parenting a significant number of these children. Also, anecdotal accounts show that fewer orphans are absorbed into extended family networks and the absolute numbers of relatives available to take care of orphans is shrinking. This is clear evidence of the mutually reinforcing effects of HIV and AIDS. This leaves siblings as the only choice available to orphans. Whilst sibling connectedness is seen as particularly important after the death of the parent as a means to maintain family coherence, in the context of HIV and AIDS, it creates problems in that it is more likely that these families are poor and could not afford proper medical care, the children and siblings are still young and they live in rural or the poorest areas of Namibia. As a result of children being orphaned, there is now a growing problem of child labour in Namibia, with reports of children being used to commit crimes and some being used for sexual exploitation. The Ministry of Labour recently commissioned a number of studies to look into the situation of child labour, in order to inform the drafting of the National Action Programme on the elimination of child labour. What these reports found is that 16.3% of Namibia’s workforce of 331,000 were children and that “many of the worst forms of child labour were practiced in the country”. This situation has been attributed to the high incidence of poverty and the rise of orphaned children.

Viewing the impact of HIV and AIDS on the family structure from the orphan and child headed perspectives are only a few among many other ways of demarcating the AIDS impact on this important, but rather fragile institution in Namibia. The most striking and indeed distinctive nature of HIV and AIDS is that it kills people in the prime age, thereby increasing the likelihoods of loss of wage earner for many families in Namibia. The recent sentinel survey confirms that HIV prevalence peaks in the age 30-39 years with 29.6% in the age group 30-34 and 29.7% in the age group 35-39 testing positive respectively. With mortality expected within the first decade following infection, it is clear that a large number of men and women will succumb to AIDS in their economically active years, robbing not only the economy of key skill, but families of their most important sources of income. In Namibia, the spread of HIV is linked to economic mobility of people, with income earners at the highest risk than any other members in the population. Whilst we do not have accurate statistics on the age of people, it could be argued that a substantial number of the 5,400 people who died as a result of AIDS in 2008 were economically active people. Even with the roll-out of ARVs, the number of deaths per year was expected to increase to 7,500 by 2013. This shows that even if ARVs have offered a temporary reprieve, the situation of people dying will become worse. As the Namibian Estimates and Projections report suggests; “as the size of the treatment population increases, the absolute number of deaths will grow and eventually approach the number of deaths

469 Ministry of Health and Social Services, 2010 National Sentinel Survey, (Windhoek, 2010)
470 Ministry of Health and Social Services, Estimates and Projections of the impact of HIV/AIDS in Namibia, (Windhoek: Ministry of Health and Social Services, 2008)
prior to treatment, though patients would have lived longer.\textsuperscript{471} The implication is that many more families are on the verge of losing one and in many instances two economically active members of their households. When this happens, families lose their most important resource for survival, creating far-reaching consequences for every dependant in the line of support. Because in Namibia, working people often take care of multiple households, a loss of one person extends far beyond only the immediate family members. In more extended terms, and considering that AIDS kills the brightest in society, the loss of one person diminishes the community’s level of social capital.

**HIV and AIDS liabilities of the education system**

Whilst the constitutional provision makes preserving this sector a necessary obligation on the part of the government, and by implication on every Namibian, this sector has been the hardest hit by HIV and AIDS, not least because it is the key institution necessary to reverse the spread of the epidemic and as I have explained earlier, this sector is by far the most significant employer. Before the introduction of ARVs, projections were made that Namibia will lose about a quarter to a third of its workforce by 2020. It was further estimated that 20\% of teachers would be lost as a result of HIV and AIDS.\textsuperscript{472} Many of these figures are now being revised to take into account the impact of ARVs. However, whilst it is reasonable to celebrate the relative success of ARVs in slowing AIDS related deaths, it is also reasonable to assume that ARVs offer only a temporary reprieve. The only difference ARVs

\textsuperscript{471} Ibid, p. 20
bring to the equation is to make some people live a little longer. This argument cannot only be seen in the context of our inability to foretell the lifespan of people on ARVs, but must be seen in the context of the complexity engendered by improper use of ARVs. Namibia, like many countries in Africa, use a combination therapy involving generic forms of zidovudine, didanosine, zalcitabine, stavudine and lamivudine (jointly known as reverse transcriptase inhibitors), all of which are known to have a higher probability of developing a multi-drug resistance mutation. In recent years, many cases of serious multi-drug resistance strains have been reported, many of which resulted in premature deaths. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that whilst Namibia is a leader in the rollout of ARVs, with over 80% of all people in need of treatment being enrolled, the success will only be measured in terms of the number of people on treatment able to evade the development of multi-drug resistant mutation of the virus in the coming years.

Whilst it is complex to determine exactly how many people in the education sector are infected with HIV and how many are on ARV treatment, against the backdrop of the high prevalence rates among the general population, it is not hard to see how HIV and AIDS affects teachers and learners. The only comprehensive study on the impact of HIV and AIDS in the education sector was carried out in 2002. The report, using projections from the 2000 sentinel survey projected the number of teachers living with HIV in 2002 to be one in seven, with levels reaching one in four in Katima Mulilo.\textsuperscript{473} The report further estimated that 3,360 teachers might be lost between 2002 and 2010 in the

\textsuperscript{473} Ibid
absence of effective ARVs and 860 if comprehensive ARV treatment is introduced. Whilst we cannot have certainty of the exact numbers of teachers lost through the system as a result of AIDS since these projections were made, assuming that most teachers accessed treatment since then and that the treatment was successful, we can conclude that perhaps somewhere between 1,000 to 2,000 teachers died as a result of AIDS. This translates into about 5-10% of the teaching force lost due to AIDS in the past decade. In 2009, the Ministry of Education commissioned a study to ascertain the attitudes, practices, behaviours and beliefs of teachers with regard to HIV and AIDS. The surveys interviewed 4,257 teachers. Among the questions asked were whether any of the respondents tested positive for HIV and a staggering 14.4% said yes. Using this as a proxy of prevalence among teachers, slightly over 3,000 of the 21,607 teachers are infected with HIV. The report further suggests that due to the sensitivity around this question, under reporting were observed, mainly among younger and male respondents. Considering the endemic problem of lack of properly trained teachers (especially in science subjects and mathematics) and the reported slow growth in the number of people entering the teaching profession per year, these figures are frightening. Suffice to say, the Ministry of Education put the number of teachers with less than 2 years tertiary education at 3,255, in other words, about 15% of all teachers are not properly qualified. It follows that AIDS is compounding an already dire situation, with the burden of HIV and AIDS currently being manifested in higher teacher absenteeism, attrition and turnover. Evidences point to an increase in the demand for relief teachers.

474 Susan Rogers, Amy Uccello and Elisabeth Sommerfelt, Knowledge, attitudes, practices and behaviours survey with Namibian Teachers, (Windhoek: Ministry of Education, 2009), p. 50
across the country. For science subjects, the situation is more frightening, because of the short supply of this cadre of skills. Looking into the impact of HIV and AIDS on secondary school science teachers, Chinsembu, Kasanda and Shimwooshili-Shaimemanya conclude that the main putative impact of HIV and AIDS on science teachers in Namibia is absenteeism, poor performance and stress.\textsuperscript{475} The authors further allude that whilst the perception on the putative impact of HIV and AIDS was low at 10\% of all learners interviewed, they posit that this may be as a result of the ameliorative power of ARVs. In their words; “We conclude that with the advent of free ART [antiretroviral therapy], the impacts of HIV/AIDS on science teachers and learners have now been transformed from quantitative losses of mortality and attrition to more qualitative attributes of stress and poor performance at school.”\textsuperscript{476} Whilst these qualitative attributes are clearly visible, due in part to ARVs and the secrecy surrounding HIV, as I have earlier demonstrated, it is reasonable to conclude that we are yet to see the full effect of HIV in the coming years. With the ameliorative and temporary relief of ARVs, it is nearly impossible to predict, with any degree of certainty, if ARVs will offer permanent and longer-term mitigation. Encouragingly though, the Ministry of Education seems not deceived and have taken steps to deal with HIV and AIDS in the education sector, introducing a comprehensive workplace policy aimed at curbing the spread and mitigating the impact of HIV and AIDS respectively.


\textsuperscript{476} Ibid
Concomitant to the effects on teachers, many young people are infected with HIV annually. Young people are particularly among Namibia's most threatened citizens, but also its greatest hope for turning the tide against AIDS. Various research have demonstrated that despite high levels of HIV knowledge among young people, large numbers continue to have risky sexual practices, including unprotected sex, multiple and concurrent partners, transactional and intergenerational sex, and this is often coupled with low risk perception. As I have stated earlier, the most recent results of the 2010 sentinel surveillance projects that the overall HIV prevalence for the age group 15–24 years is 10.3% and of the newly infected people in 2007, 44% were aged between 15-24 years of which 77% were females. There is no doubt that these young people were infected early in their sexual life by their first or second partner. The table below provides statistics of the education system in Namibia. As the table demonstrates, the current student population is 614,101 of which approximately 172,000 are in secondary schools (Grade 8-12). The Namibian teacher-learner ratio is 28:1, which is not that bad compared to many countries in the sub-Saharan Africa.

478 Ministry of Health and Social Services, *Namibia Demographic and Health Survey*, (Windhoek, 2006)
Table 2: Namibia education system at a glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of schools</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>1,573</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Number of learners | Total     |         |       |
|                   | 614,101   | 579,792 | 34,309|
| Pre-Primary       | 6,141     | 4,627   | 1,514 |
| Primary           | 406,920   | 387,194 | 19,726|
| Secondary         | 169,390   | 160,723 | 8,667 |
| Tertiary          | 28,630    | 24,350  | 4,280 |
| Other             | 3,020     | 2,898   | 122   |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teachers Qualifications</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Without teacher training</th>
<th>With teacher training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21,607</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>20,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than Grade 12</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 12 or 1-2 years' tertiary</td>
<td>3,255</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>2,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 2 years' tertiary</td>
<td>17,258</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>17,162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Learners per teacher</th>
<th>Average learner: teacher ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28.42</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of teaching rooms</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>17,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefabricated</td>
<td>1,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>1,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hired</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Namibia 2010 Education Management Information System (EMIS) report

Taking the prevalence among the age group 15-24 to approximate the prevalence among learners, it should become clear that a significant number of the secondary school children are indeed infected with HIV. With the availability of ARVs, it means that the population of children living with HIV is not declining in the medium to long term. It is reported that in Namibia, 52% of
all children in need of ARVs are receiving treatment.\textsuperscript{479} Be that as it may, the question remains the extent to which the needs of these children are met by the education sector. Following the immediate emergence of HIV, the major and most immediate focus in Namibia was limited to education about HIV prevention, treatment, and care and support, neglecting the most fundamental needs of these children as enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, including the right to equitable and equal access to education. Indeed, the Convention has specific sections particularly applicable to HIV-infected children. A report by UNESCO examining Namibia’s and Tanzania’s response to the educational needs of children infected with HIV demonstrates that the learning needs of HIV-positive children in both countries are currently not being met by their education sectors. The report states:

“…while structures are in place to manage the issues, there are widespread sense that the MoE is not tackling HIV and AIDS seriously enough, and repeatedly attributed this lack of leadership and capacity in HAMU… Recurring criticisms of the attitudes of teachers, principals and schools across Namibia seem to confirm systematic failure to address the problem of HIV and AIDS. The study revealed a pervading sense of denial at the school level, feeling that the best way to handle HIV and AIDS is to ignore it on a personal level, to reduce information

\textsuperscript{479} Ministry of Health and Social Services, \textit{Namibia estimates and projections report}, (Windhoek, 2008)
about it to the minimum curricular requirements and to restrict discussion to AIDS Week of AIDS Clubs.\footnote{480}

Clearly demonstrable in this is the lack of capacity or more appropriately the little understanding of how to respond to the HIV-related needs of learners. Certainly, HIV is posing new challenges to the education sector. Fulfilling the needs of children infected with HIV and AIDS means that the education sector recognises these special needs. Whilst the HIV and AIDS Policy of the Ministry of Education has at its core the principle of full participation in educational activities by all learners, the UNESCO report notes the apparent failure of policy implementation, monitoring and reporting. This is testimony to the overwhelming nature of HIV in these hyper endemic countries. For the children infected with HIV in Namibia, the failure to address their needs have led to truancy and school drop-outs. Whilst no data exists to relate school drop-outs and HIV positivity, it is not particularly difficult to see the increased probability of drop-outs when a 9-year old Namibian boy who is HIV-positive says the following; “My friends will just laugh at me and leave me out of the group if I tell them I am HIV-positive. Then who will be my friend”.\footnote{481} When this happens, the likelihood for the child to drop out of school is significantly increased. Again, this is clearly linked to the education sector’s failure to provide comprehensive HIV and AIDS education to correct people’s misconception about HIV-positivity.

\footnote{480}{Peter Badcock-Walters, \textit{Supporting the educational needs of HIV-positive learners: lessons from Namibia and Tanzania}, (Windhoek, Dar es Salam: UNESCO, 2008, p.25)}

\footnote{481}{See Peter Badcock-Walters, \textit{Supporting the educational needs of HIV-positive learners: lessons from Namibia and Tanzania}, (Windhoek, Dar es Salam: UNESCO, 2008), p.25}
The two scenarios presented above are but only two ways of looking at the impact of HIV and AIDS on this sector. Obviously, whilst HIV-positive children and teachers pose a significant threat to educational attainment of children, the most ominous effect is the growing number of children left orphaned by AIDS. Namibia is among the few countries providing welfare support in sub-saharan Africa to citizens in destitute situations including orphans and vulnerable children. To this effect, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare reported that 110,000 OVCs and families caring for OVCs received nutritional support through the education system in 2006.\textsuperscript{482} Whilst this is clear testimony of the government’s efforts to mitigate the impact of HIV and AIDS on orphaned children, clearly a significant number of these children are lost through the system. The Namibian government admits that despite all these efforts, many orphaned children are denied their inalienable right to education. The evident inability of the system to absorb orphans is captured in the Government’s National Plan of Action for OVC, which states:

“Despite the evident intentions to ensure that OVCs are not deprived of schooling because of their financial position, in practice there are still some OVCs who do not attend school either because they cannot afford the school development fund contribution, the boarding fees or the school uniform or because they are required to stay at home to care for sick parents or siblings. In practice, the exemption procedure

for orphans and poor children is rarely used due to lack of awareness.\textsuperscript{483}

What this does not say is the role of stigma in school drop-outs and truancy. In earlier sections, I have referenced a number of studies to demonstrate the effects of orphanage on school attendance. Namibia is no different from countries like Kenya, where Evan and Miguel found that 5\% of orphans are less likely to attend school\textsuperscript{484} or Zimbabwe where Rember found that the “consequence of orphanhood is delayed school enrolment, an increase in the drop-out rate, erratic attendance, lack of concentration and poor performance.”\textsuperscript{485} In Namibia, it could also be argued that the impact of reduced school enrolment is greatest for children transiting from primary to high school.\textsuperscript{486} Therefore, it becomes apparent that HIV and AIDS present a particularly worrying scenario given the government’s relentless efforts to fill the Science and Technology deficit which the country so desperately needs to address the socio-economic challenges, which challenges paradoxically include HIV and AIDS.

**HIV and AIDS liabilities of the macro governance structures**

The summative impact framework, which I developed in earlier sections, clearly captures the various waves of impacts and demonstrates how the impacts are circular within and across the various facets of society. Therefore,

\textsuperscript{483} Ibid, p.33  
\textsuperscript{484} See Evans and Miguel, (2007)  
\textsuperscript{485} Symphorosa Rembe, *An assessment of the policies and programmes of Zimbabwe in addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the education sector*, *Education Research and Review*, 1(7), (2006), pp. 234-255  
\textsuperscript{486} See Gertler, Levine and Ames, (2004)
the demographic impacts, the effects of the institution of the family and deficiencies created in the education system mean that the ability of the government to function properly is seriously undermined. In April 2007, Namibia adopted the National AIDS Policy and in the foreword, the Namibian President, Hifikepunye Pohamba, made the following observation:

“HIV/AIDS is the single largest threat to the development of Namibia. Its impacts are felt at every level of our society, and affect all individuals, families and communities, who are the fundamental building blocks of our social and economic development. HIV/AIDS threatens the education and psycho-social development of our children as it robs them of their parents, caregivers, teachers and, ultimately, their future. As the infected become too ill to work, workplaces lose valuable human resources and expertise. At the same time, increasing portions of our land remain unattended as those who must work it succumb to the ravages of the epidemic.”

It is obvious why the president arrived at this conclusion: In Namibia, HIV and AIDS has wrought havoc to every aspect of the society. Namibia is particularly susceptible in this respect for two reasons. First as a young democracy, every aspect of the Namibian society is so closely intertwined such that impacts are easily replicated across the social systems. It follows that once a crack appears in one structure of governance, all others are easily affected. Second, close to a quarter of all employed people work for the public service

487 Ministry of Health and Social Services, National HIV and AIDS Policy, (Windhoek: MoHSS, 2007)
(96,000 of the 334,000 employees), making the government the single most important sector of the Namibian society.\textsuperscript{488} Therefore, there is an intrinsic mutual dependency between government and the people, in the same way that children are inseparable from their families or families inseparable from their communities. In the context of HIV and AIDS, these are important factors and must enter the frame of mind when analysing how the various social systems interact in varying horizontal and vertical densities, because this bears upon the nature of their vulnerability to HIV and AIDS. For instance, the Ministry of Education is the government’s biggest division, employing 38,000\textsuperscript{489} of the total government’s workforce, therefore an impact is not only limited to this sector, but is directly linked to the government’s capacity to deliver services. Because approximately 10,000\textsuperscript{490} of the employees in the Ministry of Education (or 10\% of the total government workforce or 3\% of the total country workforce) are administrative staff, it follows that the burden is not only evident in the classrooms, but filters through to the government’s capacity to deliver services. As I shall demonstrate in the subsequent sections, when an administrator, whose responsibility is to formulate staff retention or relief policies is ill or dies as a result of AIDS, the government’s policy making capacity is reduced. When this happens, the quality of education is impacted by the inability to fill positions left vacant by teachers who died as a result of AIDS. At the same time, as I have posited earlier, the capacity to implement HIV and AIDS Workplace programmes is weakened, exacerbating the already structural incapacity to adequately deal with the

\textsuperscript{488} See the International Labour Office, Employment Working Paper No.81, Growth, employment and decent work in Namibia, (Geneva, ILO, 2012)

\textsuperscript{489} See The Ministry of Education Annual Report, (Windhoek, MoE, 2012)

\textsuperscript{490} Ibid
problem of infected teachers and children in schools. The UNESCO study attests to this that whilst the Ministry of Education’s HIV and AIDS Policy is among the most robust in sub-Saharan Africa, its implementation is hampered by the “lack of leadership and capacity in the HIV and AIDS Management Unit (HAMU)”\(^\text{491}\). In a nutshell, a loss of staff is not only a loss of government capacity to formulate and implement policies, but for the entire learning system in its totality and the welfare of many households whose livelihoods are heavily dependent on this sector. Thus, the importance of the education sector lies in its centrality to the systemic interaction of the people, and their organisations and government. Hence, in a summative sense, the impact on this sector has the greatest multiplier effect.

Delineating the various mechanisms through which government as an individual sector is impacted would require that I discuss the effects as they move through the various waves; with the first being people falling sick, leading to increased attrition of the work force due to morbidity, reduced productivity, compounded and consolidated by the second wave when workers in the government institutions develop full blown AIDS and eventually die, with the overall impact being the cumulative absolute losses in the quantity and quality of labour and the tax base of the government. This will also require the presentation of data on the actual impacts on these mechanisms, which data is scanty at best owing to the secrecy surrounding HIV and AIDS. Such secrecy is indeed provided for in the National Code on

\(^{491}\) Peter Badcock-Walters, *Supporting the educational needs of HIV-positive learners: lessons from Namibia and Tanzania*, (Windhoek, Dar es Salam: UNESCO, 2008), p.25
HIV and AIDS in Employment\textsuperscript{492}, which guarantees the right to confidentiality of HIV status in the workplace and with disclosure only being possible with the written consent of the person concerned. But in truth, chapter 4 of this thesis sufficiently captures the effects of HIV and AIDS on government function. Being a hyper endemic country, it means the analysis presented in chapter 4 is well suited for the Namibian scenario. However, how HIV and AIDS subtly erode the democratisation process in Namibia is less understood. One way to understand this is by looking at how HIV and AIDS affect the electoral processes. This is the approach I would like to adopt to demonstrate the sectoral impact of HIV and AIDS on this key governance institution, not least because I view Namibia’s transition to democracy as relatively incomplete.

Before Namibia gained independence, a constitutional principle by the so-called Western Contact Group was brokered, which set out the post-independence dispensation, including the conduct of regular elections. It was later also agreed that the Proportional Representation (PR) System is to be used for the Constituent Assembly elections (that is the members of parliament), with the presidential elections following the single majority principle of 50\% and the regional elections following the single plurality system or first-past-the-post system. These criteria are fully enshrined in the constitution. The local authority elections are not enshrined in the constitution but since independence it has been following the ward system until in 2002 when it was replaced with the party list system. However, elections in Namibia are governed by the Electoral Act, No 24 of 1992. The Act, \textit{inter alia}, provides

for the election of persons to the office of the President, as well as members of the National Assembly, regional councils and local authority councils; the establishment of an electoral commission and its powers, duties, and functions; the registration of voters and of political parties; the conduct of such elections; and to provide for matters incidental thereto. This Act has since been amended over nine times. To understand the impact of HIV on electoral processes would firstly require an analysis of the internal impact of HIV and AIDS on this organisation responsible for elections and secondly, an outline of the cost of conducting an election in the event that a member of the regional council or local council dies. The Electoral Commission of Namibia (ECN) is the highest electoral body and the sole and exclusive authority, that has been tasked by the Electoral Act No 24 of 1992, as amended, to oversee and supervise all electoral processes. It comprises five Commissioners whose role is to enhance the mission and vision of the ECN by providing strategic support and guidance to the management. The Commission appoints a secretariat consisting of The Director of Elections, Director of Operations, Deputy Director of Operations, Deputy Director for Finance and Administration and Deputy Director for Voter Education and Democracy Building. The Commission also appoints supervisors of registrations, registration officers and returning, counting and presiding officers. The task of the ECN could be summarised to include, among other things, the supervision and control of registration of voters; preparing, publication and maintenance of a national voter register and local authority voter’s register; the registration of political parties and conducting of the electoral processes. Despite a few isolated

494 Ibid
cases, the ECN has been successful in conducting the various elections since independence. But there are anecdotal evidences that HIV and AIDS complicates the electoral process.

In 2007, the Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa (Idasa) carried out a research in which the aim was to “unravel the governance consequences of the AIDS epidemic (in order) to help institutions to understand the implications and respond appropriately.” What this research demonstrates is the impact of HIV and AIDS as it moves from the internal impact of loss of qualified skills to the cost of conducting by-elections when an elected member of one of the government’s sector dies. Whilst the report acknowledges the complexities surrounding access to appropriate HIV and AIDS related data, the authors postulate that moving forward, “the cost of additional sick leave by HIV-positive employees is likely to affect productivity and increase costs.”

Moreover, the report makes the following observation:

“With the loss of skilled, experienced employees, staff will need to be trained at extra cost. Increased absenteeism due to AIDS-related illnesses, the attendance of funerals and having to take care of sick family members might also hinder the internal functioning of the commission. The effective administration of elections is also likely to be seriously affected by lower staff morale, making for a negative impact on the employment equity profile.”

496 Ibid, p.29
497 Ibid, p.29
The Commission is particularly vulnerable because of its youthful profile, with 21 of the 25 permanent employees aged between the 25 and 49 years.\textsuperscript{498} Whilst this cannot be attributed to AIDS, the report notes that at least two members of the Commission died due to illness in the past five years preceding the research.\textsuperscript{499} With Namibia’s low capacity base and the protracted employment procedure of the Public Service Commission, the death of senior members of the Commission could be detrimental to its function.

The most direct impact of the HIV and AIDS epidemic is on the cost of conducting elections. Because of Namibia’s use of the Proportional Representation system, it follows that when a member of either of the houses dies, a by-election must be carried out. As at 2004, Idasa estimates that 32 by-elections were made and observed that “eight (or 25%) might thus be blamed on AIDS.”\textsuperscript{500} The report further outlines that whilst it is difficult to quantify the cost of hosting by-elections, the £ 5 million budgeted each five years for elections should provide an indication of the cost associated with the exercise of conducting elections in Namibia, with other effects being increased demand for service delivery during the pre-election and polling phases. During the pre-election period higher demand is placed on the ECN to accurately and timeously compile and maintain the voter’s register due to high mortalities in order to protect the integrity of the voter’s register. If the ECN fails to do this, “inaccuracies on the register could facilitate electoral

\textsuperscript{498} Ibid
\textsuperscript{499} Ibid
\textsuperscript{500} Ibid, p.24
frauds." During voting, complexities arise in part due to the tendered voting system that requires people to travel to polling stations. As I have emphasised in earlier sections, the combination of people being sick and unable to vote and members of the family shifting their attention from taking part in the electoral process to taking care of the sick, means that casting a vote, the cornerstone for democracy and the most fundamental and absolute of rights and civil liberties, is diminished. Voting becomes a burden; the legitimacy of locally elected persons is put into question; and the democratisation process is jeopardised.

**Conclusion**

There is generally an acknowledgement of the devastating impact of HIV and AIDS, but the evidences suggest that Namibia is yet to comprehensively address the factors fuelling the epidemic. Tackling the AIDS epidemic in Namibia is fundamentally about behaviour change, aimed at effecting a ‘transformation’ in gender relations and roles. This inherently means interventions need to move away from generic messages, but begin to tackle underlying cultural factors and societal dispositions within the gender dynamics that are putting men and women at risk. Namibia seems to have missed the point in addressing the epidemic because targeted strategies that address the needs of men and women within the cultural dimensions, which is key to addressing the hidden underlying challenges, has been few and far between. Also, evidence is piling up that partner reduction is the key to

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501 Ibid, p.35
preventing the spread of HIV especially in epidemics driven by heterosexual transmission, but many approaches around prevention have been focusing on abstinence and the use of condoms, whilst neglecting partner reduction. Moreover, the various epidemics in Namibia, also express particular configurations of social, cultural and economic orders, and occur on various templates of social relations. And AIDS research has been unsuccessful in uncovering these “complicated interactions of social norms and networks, sexual ideology, and behaviours that could provide us with the leverage to view African sexual systems in broader socioeconomic, political and historical context”.502 As such sustained inroads against the epidemics in all likelihood have remained inadequate because these social templates are less understood and continue to be reproduced.503 Incidentally, these patterns are often fraught with controversy and ellipsis, not least because attempts to explore these dimensions of Africa’s AIDS epidemics have often sailed close to the winds of racialist discourse. Discomforting stereotypes about “African” sexual mores and behaviour have long coloured HIV prevention discourse in Africa, and according to Poku, this tendency has already been pointed out more than a decade and a half ago by Green (1994).504

What this chapter also demonstrated is that the scope of prevention and impact-mitigation needs in Namibia is too great and that ARVs only offered a temporary reprieve. Moving forward, successful roll-out of ARVs should not only be about the numbers reached, as it is the case currently, but attention is

502 Ibid
504 Ibid

-263-
required to the focus, quality, sustainability and the impact of ARVs. Each element is vital in its own right, but even more so in its symbiotic relationship to the others. Notwithstanding, it is clear that HIV and AIDS will remain a *de facto* threat to the Namibian society for the foreseeable future.

Similarly, I have presented the various socio-demographic impacts of HIV and AIDS as they impact the various levels of governances from the family institution, the education and the electoral process, with the purpose to demonstrate the multifaceted nature of the impact of the Human Immunodeficiency Syndrome- HIV. Clearly, it would be impossible to discuss the full effect of HIV and AIDS in any length. Discussing the full effect of HIV will require an inclusion of the micro and macro economic gaps created by HIV and AIDS in the economic sectors as well. For the purpose of demonstration and because this thesis aims to demonstrate the impact of HIV and AIDS on governance, I have rather adopted a more ‘social’ approach to the analysis of the impacts. In truth though, the impacts on the social systems cannot be separated from the loss in the economic sectors as HIV creates a vicious circle in which a loss of key staff in the Ministry of Education impacts the quantity and quality of policies, which in turn impacts the quality of education, thereby the pool of qualified resources available to business. At the same time, HIV and AIDS contributes to the rising cost of infrastructure, including roads and telecommunications, which businesses rely on for their operations, at the same time that it reduces labour productivity. Therefore HIV and AIDS become a vicious complex circle that reinforces itself through the iteration of impacts throughout the various sectors of the Namibian society;
making it imperative that these be understood in the context of their intertwining impacts.
Chapter 7: Intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer impacts of HIV and AIDS on sectoral and summative governances

Introduction

My contention is that the necessity of knowledge formation, retention and transfer for the purposes of sectoral and summative governance is generally assumed and that our understanding of how HIV and AIDS affect the interactions of the various levels of governances through impacting the knowledge formation, retention and transfer is impoverished. I have presented the framework of knowledge formation as the best lens though which the long waved impacts of HIV and AIDS on the levels of governances could be understood, because as I have demonstrated, the evolution of governance from long run equilibria of processes is in itself the function of the evolution of knowledge- for knowledge is the necessary condition for the various levels of governances to interact between actors on the micro-, meso- and macro- levels of socio-political aggregation. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it is to demonstrate, through the empirical data that indeed the necessity of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer for the purpose of both sectoral and summative governance is not well understood and is generally assumed. Second, it is to show how, by delineating the perception of key people in the Ministry of Education on the impact of HIV and AIDS on the various levels of governance, our understanding of the foundation of governance, both sectoral and summative is impoverished.
In what follows, I will utilise the theory of tacit knowledge to demonstrate how HIV and AIDS affect the process of knowledge formation within these various levels of governance, but more importantly, how they affect the interaction of the various actors on the micro, meso and macro levels of socio political aggregation. The analysis is limited to the school system and national governance. As highlighted in previous chapters, the education system in its totality encompasses a whole spectrum of governance systems in Namibia. Demonstrating the impact of HIV and AIDS as it moves through the various levels of governance do not require that all the levels of governance be discussed. I have outlined how, in the Namibian context, all systems of governance are closely intertwined as a consequence of the fact that Namibia is a young democracy and the importance of government, not only as a facilitator of development through policy making, but itself as an important employer. In a real sense, government plays the key role in the economic and social lives of many people, making it more than only an enabler, but a key player of the very system for which it aims to enable. I will complete this chapter by providing an analysis of the summative impact of HIV and AIDS on governance and how this is likely impacted through the disruption in the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer.
Impact of HIV and AIDS on the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer for micro and meso governances

Based on Polanyi’s description of tacit knowledge, we could proceed to conclude that knowledge resides in people and that learning is not merely a process by which information is transferred from the head of the teacher to the head of the learner. It is through their senses (seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, and feeling) that learners interact with teachers in the classrooms to make sense of the world. Therefore, both the teacher and the learner are active agents in the process of knowledge formation, with the learning resting ultimately with the student. In a sense, education could be seen as a process of experimental inquiry and critical reflection in which learners make sense of what is being taught. To a large extent, the Namibian government made no secret after independence that the previous system, based on rote memorisation was not in the best interest of the country and adopted the “system based on critical thinking and problem solving”505, in other words, a system based on the tacit theory approach that views education as a cooperative learning strategy that allows learners to engage in the process of knowledge formation, which knowledge is largely tacit. It follows that the philosophy underpinning Namibia’s education system, acknowledges that the process of knowledge formation is evolutionary, in the sense that it is a sequential integration of knowledge. Consequently, as the theory of tacit knowledge would say, the process of knowledge formation is a function of previous knowledge, in that learning is filtered through pre-existing

knowledge. Therefore, the various actors throughout a child’s development play an important role in the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer, with families often seen as the first transmitter of such knowledge. When one talks of the impact of HIV and AIDS for the process of knowledge formation, the family structure should come into prominent focus, because, according to the theory of tacit knowledge, there exists good reason to say that all our knowledge are socially and culturally conditioned. Such knowledge is germane to all other forms of knowledge. The problem, as I have demonstrated earlier, is that HIV and AIDS have had the biggest impact on how families function, with many children left orphaned and others taking care of ill parents. In this respect, whilst it was not possible to interview children, as discussed in the methodology section, many respondents in both Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Local Key Informants (LKIs) agreed that when a parent dies, children’s learning process is affected. As one teacher puts it; “The most difficult thing for these orphans is that there is no one at home to impart the necessary social skills to them and therefore it becomes difficult for these children to cope with daily demands of life.”

Demonstrable in this quote is the impact of HIV on the process of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer. It goes without saying that such loss of knowledge extends beyond only causing learning inability but threatens the survival of these children as well. When asked about their perception of the consequences of the loss of intergenerational knowledge, many respondents were of the opinion that the greatest loss is the

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506 Interviewer 6, July 2011
thread that links knowledge obtained in family settings to knowledge generated within the institutions of learning. This is a general admittance that when children are denied the opportunity to learn in family settings, their educational prospects are also put in jeopardy. Such loss is hard to recognise but usually its presence is manifested in various behavioural aspects, for instance, difficulty in learning, inability to distinguish wrong from right and general risky sexual behaviours that put these children at risk of contracting HIV.

Besides the obvious gap created in the process of intergenerational knowledge when a parent dies, there are various ways in which the theory of tacit knowledge could be used to demonstrate how HIV and AIDS affect the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. The key issue is that because learning is a reflection of one's personal life, embedded in distinct thought process that we utilise in our daily experience, it is easy to see how experience of parents infected with HIV will affect the learning of children. Because every person comes to the learning process with a set of life events, which life events may have been altered by HIV and AIDS, it follows that children who have been robbed of the opportunity to learn some critical skills from their parents come to the process with heavily constrained life experiences. As a result, the learning process is also inhibited, because as I have alluded earlier, children construct knowledge from a base of prior knowledge.
Similarly, in earlier sections, I have outlined the impact of HIV on the learning outcomes of children. When children are infected with HIV, education is one among other things that loses their appeal and sometimes even relevance. Because the theory of tacit knowledge is rooted in the belief that our sense of knowing is not a passive expression of the world, but a result of our construction, beliefs and emotions about our experiences of our lives, it is not difficult to fathom how the experience of living with HIV or AIDS will severely alter the learning process, in other words, the process of knowledge formation in classroom settings. As I have said, being infected with HIV invites stigmatisation and discrimination by others or self-infliction. As a result, and because stigma and discrimination are the hardest things a child could ever experience, children use such life experience in their endeavour to make sense of the world. Again, this means that a child enters the process of learning in a heavily constrained state. The implication is that the interaction between the learner and teacher is also constricted, thereby affecting the learning environment. With the current learner-centred system requiring greater interaction between the learner and the teacher, when such interaction is disrupted as a result of HIV and AIDS, the consequence for the learner is more severe. Therefore in the Namibian case, the impact of HIV and AIDS is more severe when the experience of HIV and AIDS is on the part of the child, because these children are expected to be active agents in the process of knowledge formation. Teachers’ account of HIV-positive children’s inability to interact with others ostensibly shows the complexities these children face. One teacher noted that, “for children to be infected with HIV means their self-esteem is affected, which ultimately affects the way in which
the particular student interacts with others. The situation is more severe when others know that the student is HIV positive. 507

In the context of the Namibian schooling system, this creates a particular problem because the process of learning involves other learners, and is therefore not only intergenerational but also omni generational. In other words, the process of learning involves the student, other students and the teacher, with such interactions taking place against a backdrop of prior knowledge obtained as the learner navigates the interstice of life since childbirth. Therefore, effectively dealing with HIV and AIDS in schools would require that the impacts are understood in the context of their intertwining effects on other learners and teachers. It follows that not only is the impact of knowledge formation one dimensional, but also at times multi-directional, because if a student is infected with HIV, the interaction with other students is also affected, therefore robbing the group of possibly their active and bright member. The current response, which focuses on providing material support, does not address the fundamental question of what learning is about. As demonstrated in earlier sections, regardless of the terms used to describe the difficulties faced by children experiencing the scourge of HIV and AIDS, it all boils down to its impact on their ability to learn and thus the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. When teachers were asked whether they attempt to address these needs of children, the general response was always non-affirmative. Understandably, addressing the needs of these children would first and foremost require full disclosure and

507 Interview 4, June 2011
identification of the children infected and affected, which, as I have shown earlier, would be problematic because, in Namibia, full disclosure is not possible. Therefore the response has remained largely inadequate in addressing the learning needs of these children. Indeed, many respondents raised the concern with the current focus on material support at the expense of the ‘real’ learning needs of children infected by HIV and AIDS. According to one informant; “There is a need to move away from the material driven programme to programmes that would address the cognitive and learning needs of these children”.508 In a sense, there is a general recognition that for the learning environment to be conducive for children affected by HIV and AIDS, psychotherapeutic interventions in schools are required. Scholars today talk of remedial education, not in the strictest sense of postsecondary education aimed at increasing the skills competency for the purpose of higher education entry, but to address the learning deficit created as a result of HIV and AIDS.

In earlier sections, I have referred to how HIV and AIDS also affect teachers en masse. Therefore students infected with HIV and orphaned by AIDS are but one part of the equation. The omnipresent nature of HIV and AIDS makes it hard to even start conceptualising the impact on the education system. Those children lucky enough not to be infected or orphaned face the prospect of losing teachers to HIV and AIDS. Besides their situation made complex by being infected, the ability of teachers to teach is compromised. Whilst it would have been ethically inappropriate to ask HIV positive teachers if their situation

508 Interview 16, October 2011
is made complex, from the discussions with both key informants and members of FGDs, there is a general admittance that the biggest effect is when teachers develop AIDS and absenteeism increases. As a couple of respondents attested; “The process of knowledge formation for the students is impacted, because in most of these cases, students are left without a teacher.”

But besides this obvious loss, when someone is HIV positive their confidence is severely affected, and normal things such as teaching lose their appeal and relevance. The situation is also compounded when learners know that the teacher is positive, because as some respondents alluded, in some instances, students are mocking teachers. As one respondent noted; “The greatest problem for teachers infected with HIV is not only that they lose their passion for teaching, but that they fear that if their students know that they are infected, they will be discriminated against”. Therefore, even if teachers are willing to teach, stigma and discrimination inhibits their interactions with learners. Because learning is an active engagement of the learner and teacher, instead of the type of learning where the student passively receives knowledge, it presupposes the importance of the teacher as the key driver of the process of learning. Teachers are the leaders that help learners through guided discovery of knowledge. It follows that the teacher plays an important role of prompting and facilitating discussion in a guided manner. Living with HIV is said to affect this critical role of teachers. When asked if they have noticed differences in the teaching outcomes, a number of key informants

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509 FGD 1, September 2011
510 Interview 5, June 2011
admitted that teachers’ HIV status affects the teacher as well and that in some instances learners complain of lack of attention by the teacher, especially if the teacher is frequently falling ill. In a sense, the effect of HIV and AIDS on the process of knowledge formation cannot only be seen as a function of teachers being absent, but must also be understood in the context of the environment in which learning takes place.

Therefore, when I say that HIV and AIDS affect the process of knowledge formation in the education system as a key governing system, I am not only saying this in reference to the obvious loss of teachers, but I am highlighting an endemic problem that affects the very core of the system and our existence- our desire to know. Because the learner and teacher are the active agents in the process of learning, and HIV and AIDS affects both of these agents in varying degrees, the impact on knowledge formation is daunting. Taken together, we are starting to see that because learning or the process of learning is a function of pre-existing knowledge, the impact of HIV and AIDS become long-waved, which in essence affects the process of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer not only for current generations, but more poignantly, future generations as well. This fact cannot be trivialised by stating that ‘the HIV and AIDS Policy sufficiently addresses issues of AIDS in the Ministry’\(^{511}\), as some respondents may want us to believe. Also, the fact that these issues are not well understood cannot provide sufficient justification for not dealing with the intergenerational knowledge gaps created by HIV and AIDS, because evidently, the education

\(^{511}\) Interview 11, September 2011
system is the key mechanism through which such knowledge transfer is facilitated. In a sense, understanding and attempting to tackle the problem that is weakening the very reason for which it exists should be the greatest focus of any intervention facilitated by principals of this institution. But, as I have discussed throughout the preceding sections, the issue of how HIV and AIDS impact the process of knowledge formation has received little attention. When the question of how the Ministry of Education addresses the issue of intergenerational knowledge liabilities of HIV and AIDS, the various responses reveal a lack of understanding of what this issue pertains to. In some instances, the responses were astonishing, for example one key informant puts things this way:

“The Ministry of Education is the principle caretaker of education in the country, but it is difficult for the Ministry to deal with such issues as we do not understand them very well. Issues of how HIV and AIDS affect intergenerational knowledge within schools or our institution requires that we first and foremost understand what this is all about before moving to questions of how to best deal with it. So, in short, we have not even started talking about HIV and how it affects the learning process of students, because our immediate concern is to try as best as we can to reverse the spread of HIV and also to mitigate its impact”.  

One could argue that on account of this statement, there is a sense in which the government is being overwhelmed by HIV and AIDS, and admittedly, the

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512 Interview 11, September 2011
many facets of the epidemic makes it difficult for the system to rank the relative importance of each of these impacts.

Impact of HIV and AIDS on the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer for macro governances

It is perhaps appropriate that I start this section with the theory of tacit knowledge’s assertion that organisational knowledge is ineffable in that it cannot be known until it becomes a problem in its absence. It is the type of knowledge, whilst important, that cannot be written in manuals, grammatical expressions or symbolically encoded. As I have discussed throughout the preceding sections, the theory of tacit knowledge, originally proposed by Polanyi, depicts knowledge as vested in our ability to know how to do things, but ironically our inability to say, at least symbolically, how we know such things. Polanyi believes that the best start is to acknowledge that ‘we can know more than what we can tell’. It follows that such knowledge is hard to study with current research tools. Fundamentally, the purpose of this research was not to demonstrate whether tacit knowledge exists, but rather whether there exists an understanding of such knowledge and more appropriately whether the loss of such knowledge poses a threat to the organisation of the Ministry of Education. It became obvious during my interviews that these are indeed very complex questions to ask. For instance, a senior manager in such an important institution says the following: “The issue of how knowledge is transferred between individuals in the organisation is not a focus of
management, as our concern is whether our staff perform in accordance with their job description.⁵¹³

When the above happens, we are reminded that knowledge has been delegated to its propositional form, in the sense that there is a belief that our understanding of things is only possible when broken down into grammatical propositions or formal terms. Whilst this should not be seen as an attempt to relegate scientific knowledge, the theory of tacit knowledge views scientific knowledge only as part of a larger knowledge base, but more importantly that the area in which such knowledge extends is the tacit. It would therefore appear that the theory puts forward tacit knowledge as an important dimension of the knowledge that people possess, more than what proponents of scientific knowledge would like us believe. Therefore, when managers reduce workers' responsibility in the process of knowledge sharing to written work codes, the tacit dimension of knowing has been demoted to a state of irrelevancy. In the strictest sense however, this is not surprising, because even within highly capacitated institutions of business, acknowledging the existence of tacit knowledge has been very difficult. With Namibian governance institutions being relatively in their infancy, coupled with the capacity constraints engendered by years of colonisation and the system of apartheid, it is not surprising that there is an acute inability to recognise that such tacit knowledge does exist. Strictly speaking, it should not be entirely unacceptable when another senior manager says the following: "When you ask about the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer within

⁵¹³ Interview 11, September 2011
our Ministry, you are but reminding us that there are issues which we do not yet understand. For sure, these issues relating to how knowledge is formed and how HIV and AIDS impact this are not yet on our radar. How do you expect us to deal with these issues if we are yet to make all the services available to our staff?"^514

Clearly, in the context of HIV and AIDS, understanding the issue of intergenerational knowledge, that is, how these institutions are most efficiently run, is an imperative. It would appear that even if the general feeling is that the Ministry is yet to deal with these issues, when asked if a highly skilled personnel should die as a result of HIV and AIDS, most respondents agreed that this will create serious problems, with one key informant eloquently saying: "There are some people that are just irreplaceable. If one of these people has to leave, we would not know what to do. Even if a replacement is found, things will not be the same".\textsuperscript{515} This is the type of knowledge that the theory of tacit knowledge refers to. The type of knowledge that these ‘irreplaceable’ people possess, which knowledge they are unable to articulate clearly, even if they are aware that the organisation is unable to operate without such knowledge. The Ministry of Education, as I have stated earlier, operates a highly structured system, with a line of authority that extends from the clusters, through the circuits, to the regional directorates, up to the head office. At every level, there are key people who possess key proficiencies (or tacit knowledge), which will make it difficult for the organisation to operate in their absence. Because as I have outlined time and again, HIV and AIDS, are

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\item \textsuperscript{514} Interview 15, September 2011
\item \textsuperscript{515} Interview 11, September 2011
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non-discriminatory, in that they affect the poor, rich, educated, uneducated, employed and unemployed in an equal measure, it is not difficult to see that the organisation of the Ministry of Education is in jeopardy, not more so because it is the largest employer of highly skilled people such as teachers, lecturers, and other professionals. Already, there is an admittance that some positions within the structure are hard to fill when someone resigns or dies. As one key informant puts it: “There are some positions that we have been unable to fill because we are just not getting the right people. Some of these positions have been vacant for a long time, and in some cases even years.”

Whilst this statement should not be taken on face value to mean there is an explicit search for tacit knowledge in candidates, it goes a long way to highlight that whilst the exercise of breaking down tacit knowledge is complex, it does not prevent an implicit pursuit for such knowledge. As Polanyi would say, it is only when such knowledge is absent that we begin to understand that it is necessary. Therefore, being unable to find a suitable candidate could easily be construed a subtle understanding that such knowledge is indeed necessary for the running of the institution. Because it would have been ethically inappropriate to ask if these positions have been left vacant by people who died of AIDS, assuming that AIDS was a factor, the hypothesis that AIDS creates knowledge gaps could well be proven by the above statements that ‘positions are hard to fill and even if these are filled, things may never be the same’. Because AIDS is not an imminent disaster, in as much as people die instantly and leave others bereft, the impacts of AIDS are

516 Interview 15, September 2011
subtle, daunting and long-waved, one would naturally expect that institutions are able to predict and thus deal with such impacts. At the same time though one should acknowledge that the non-discernible nature of tacit knowledge is the key reason that even private business organisation have been struggling to document such knowledge. Here, I am putting forward this sympathetic critique, because to expect government organisations to know that such knowledge does indeed exist is somewhat far-fetched. But again, when respondents acknowledge that the unprecedented levels of absenteeism, high staff turnover and lower productivity makes operations difficult, it may not be far fetched to conclude that even if such knowledge is not known by the name ‘tacit knowledge’, it is still regarded an important part of business. When respondents agree that illness and death have replaced old age as the leading cause for leaving work, it is not far-off from an admission that the intergenerational knowledge formation is being affected by the losses of economically active people. For instance, one key informant put things this way: “It is not difficult to see that we (Ministry of Education) are losing many people due to illnesses and death. In such cases, we are losing people who would have otherwise still be in their work if it was not due to their illnesses. Therefore, yes losing people in their active years is painful not only for the family and colleagues, but for the institution as well, because then it means we must recruit, train and reorient the new person.”

The Ministry of Education can safely be regarded a knowledge based institution, in that its work is predominantly that of the purveyor of knowledge.

517 Interview 16, October 2011
In other words, the Ministry of Education is, or at least has been mandated by an act of parliament to lead the country’s research agenda through its partner institutions, including the University of Namibia and the Polytechnic of Namibia, both of whom are directly accountable to the Ministry of Education. Suffice to say though, there is little understanding that indeed when one talks of the process of knowledge formation, the Ministry of Education should take prominence. Be that as it may, the effect of HIV and AIDS on the process of knowledge formation in the Ministry has far reaching consequences. These consequences are not hard to see: At the macro-systemic levels, such knowledge gaps create problems for governability as these institutions are robbed of highly knowledgeable people, some of whom have been with the system for years. As I have highlighted in earlier sections, when Namibia gained independence, an agreement was reached that government would maintain all civil servants who held positions at independence, until such people resign, or are removed by law. I have also discussed how these people played a key role, not only in transferring skills to the new employees returning from exile, but also in maintaining continuity of the governance systems. By and large, the reason that Namibia is considered a successful case study for democratic transition is partly a result of the agreement to keep the civil service intact at independence. Whilst it could be argued that it is long after independence, these civil servants still hold positions of extreme prestige. Demonstrably though, for the framework of knowledge formation that I have adopted for this thesis, in as much as the agreement to maintain the civil servants of the apartheid regime was to ensure continuity, the fact that such continuity is a product of knowledge transfer cannot be disputed. Suffice
to say, Namibia has not been able to successfully fill the knowledge gaps which may suggest that whilst political independence has been achieved, ideological independence is far from being achieved in many of the institutions of governance. Clearly, a number of employees have what key informants referred to as ‘irreplaceable skills’, whose absence as a result of HIV and AIDS can seriously undermine the ability of this institution to meet its mandate. This is not difficult to see because the theory of tacit knowledge asserts that knowledge is vested in people, who regularly transmit such knowledge between themselves within organisations. Strictly speaking, such knowledge is not necessarily transmitted in whole, in the sense that some people hold such knowledge until they die, the fact that HIV and AIDS affect people in their prime years, one can argue, quite generally, that the process by which knowledge is transferred within organisations is being clogged midway. In the case of Namibia, this creates serious problems for governability mainly if the person referenced possesses a highly sought after skill, because, as I have alluded earlier, only 15% of the approximately 40,000 civil servants who returned from exile had post-secondary education. Because the apartheid system ensured rigorous education for employees of the state, it would appear that some are highly trained, and their death as a result of AIDS means that such skills may be lost forever, particularly since the government seems unable to attract newly trained professionals. This is worrying, because it is clear that moving forward, the governance institutions at the level of nation state would find it difficult to operate without an injection of newly trained people. Again, this is not difficult to see because we are officially part of a ‘knowledge-based society’, which society requires concerted efforts to
safeguard organisational knowledge. Therefore my assertion that the impact of HIV and AIDS on the process of knowledge formation will endanger governance in Namibia cannot be trivialised, but must be seen in the context of Namibia’s constrained knowledge base, the inability to fill such gaps and the relatively low understanding that such gaps may create macro-systemic impacts which may eventually pose a threat to future governability of the country.

At the micro-systemic level, as I have stated in earlier sections, when people in key positions of the Ministry die, not only is the institution affected in terms of how it does business at the national level, but these are likely to trickle down to the regional offices as well. Applying the knowledge-sharing continuum\textsuperscript{518} analysis to the organisation of the Ministry of Education, one could argue, quite generally, that even in the absence of an in-depth knowledge readiness assessment, there is a constant pulling of knowledge between the various structures, in that employees of the various structures require knowledge from someone other than themselves to complete tasks. There is an evident intrinsic knowledge-dependency among the various structures, wherefore staff in lower units of the organisation exhibits relatively high dependency on staff in higher structures. Fathomably, because the nature of the structure, following a lean line of authority to the national level,

\textsuperscript{518} See Robert Seiner, The knowledge-sharing continuum: understanding levels of knowledge worker reliance, \textit{The Data Administrator Newsletter}, 2001, available on: http://www.ewsolutions.com/resource-center/rwds_folder/rwds-archives/rwds-2002-01/knowledge-worker-reliance, Accessed: 20 June 2012. The knowledge sharing continuum framework is used as a tool to determine an organisation’s knowledge sharing capabilities and its characteristics of moving from being knowledge dependent to knowledge independent to knowledge inter-dependent organization. The basic assumption underlying this framework is the extent to which employees need knowledge from somewhere else to perform their tasks.
means that people on the upper levels of the structure are mandated certain control over the business of the lower structures. When respondents were asked whether there is evidence of disruption at the lower level when someone at the national level dies or resigns as a result of illness, one senior member puts things this way: “Obviously, the various structures of the Ministry are interlinked in the sense that the reporting structure is clear to everyone. There are things that the lower level structures can carry out on their own, but in most cases, the head office must approve this to ensure they are in line with the Ministry’s mandate. Also, the lack of properly trained staff at the lower levels means they require continuous input from the head office.”

This statement is an admission that things cannot be carried out without the continual involvement of the head office. Similarly, the inability of the regional offices to attract qualified staff means the lower level structures are always under-capacitated, requiring constant feedback from the upper structures for work to be completed. Therefore when evaluating the business organisation of the Ministry of Education as an institution on the basis of the knowledge-sharing continuum framework, it is clear that its movement towards knowledge independence is inherently constrained. This means that HIV and AIDS impacts are readily replicated through the various levels when a skilled personnel is lost due to illness or death. In other words, not only is the process of knowledge formation constricted within the organisation of the Ministry at the head office level, but also the impacts become more so evident at the local levels, thereby impacting on how schools are being run. This is in

519 Interview 15, September 2011
addition to the process of knowledge formation being constricted at the regional, circuit and cluster levels by the loss of skilled people in these structures, which skills, as I have said earlier, are already in short supply. Therefore we are beginning to see that in addition to impacting the process of knowledge formation and transfer between learners and teachers in the classroom, the disruption of the process of knowledge formation within the institution and the related structures also affect the learning environment by impacting the way in which schools are run more efficiently. It could therefore be argued that whichever way one looks at it, the magnitude of the impacts on the interactions of the various systems of governance is beyond our understanding. Perhaps utilising the framework of tacit knowledge to demonstrate the impact of HIV and AIDS on organisational knowledge formation serves a higher purpose— in as much as we know the multifaceted nature of the impacts of HIV and AIDS, such knowledge is ineffable in that we are unable to articulate these impacts clearly. What can be said however is that AIDS has located itself among the brightest of society, thereby taking away the drivers of business operation. In today’s knowledge based society, the impacts are more so evident, because knowledge is the key commodity of business operation. Thus our defectiveness as humans to articulate and describe what we know means that AIDS— as it compounds the problem by obstructing our attempt to overcome such defectiveness— has become the most potent problem facing the human race. It would appear that the only viable solution for these institutions of governance is in stopping the spread of the virus, but paradoxically their ability to deal with the spread of HIV has
been rendered ineffective in stopping the very agent that is weakening these institutions.

**Summative intergenerational knowledge impacts of HIV and AIDS**

The impact of AIDS has reverberated every system of governance in Namibia. Whilst the above analysis was restricted to the two levels of governances to demonstrate the impact of HIV and AIDS on the sectoral governances, I need to refer back to the summative impact framework presented in earlier sections. In this framework, I have demonstrated how HIV and AIDS impact the various governances as they interact in varying horizontal and vertical densities. The analysis presented above served to substantiate this framework and must put to rest any doubt that the impact of HIV and AIDS on one system of governance filters through to all other structures, thereby endangering fundamental systems of governance. In a sense, and as I have alluded in the methodology section of this research, the education system is the quintessence of the flow of impact from the lower to the higher levels of socio-political aggregation in Namibia. What this means is that when gaps are created in the school system, the ability of the institutions of governance at the level of nation state to carry out its mandate is limited. Limitations are created because when school enrolment is reduced due to parents and children being infected with HIV, orphanhood and absenteeism and death of teachers, the amount of people available to work in the institutions of governance is reduced. Because this thesis characterises education as the means through which society creates norms for harmonious living with others;
as an important element for good governance and participatory democracy, and the means to create what Rosenau refers to as the governors and the governables, a defect in this system creates trouble for governability. At the same time, when gaps are created at the institutional level as a result of employee absence and death, service delivery is disrupted and in the case of Namibia, the schools are at the receiving end of such losses, because the Ministry of Education is the purveyor of education in Namibia and thereby directly responsible for schools. A I have put forward earlier, because the impacts of HIV and AIDS are circular within and across the systems of governance, HIV and AIDS have become a complex vicious circle that reinforces itself through the iteration of impacts between the schooling system and the institutions of governance at the level of nation state. Therefore, the best way in which the nascent governance systems’ (for example the schooling system) impacts can be understood is in the context of its intertwining impacts with the institutional systems of governance. In summative terms, the impacts are not merely additive and isolated to the sectoral governances, but structured, and in the long run, may endanger the fundamental systems of governance. I have earlier referred to the interdependency of the various systems of governance in Namibia; therefore the impacts easily pass through the various systems somewhat unimpeded. On this account, one can argue that there is no better place to demonstrate the impacts of HIV and AIDS as they impact the interplay of the various actors on micro-, meso-, and macro-levels of political aggregation than Namibia.
CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

I have presented the various mechanisms through which governance emerges, with the family, at the micro level, being the most basic, but yet the most crucial and necessary foundation for all order and morality. It follows, that the fundamental systems of governance are endangered if the institution of the family is not governable. The education system was presented as another form of governance at the meso level, which not only re-enforces and produces the governable but generates the governors. I have presented education, not only as the learning of techniques, but as the pillar for governance, for it helps people understand what it is to be a citizen and sustain democracy by encouraging full participation of citizens in political, social and economic life. Increasingly, education will play a key role as we move towards an integrated society with new democratic space facilitated by the rapid development of technology. At the same time I described how this system is highly vulnerable to disruptions and fragmentations. I have discussed the more formal macro level governance, and pronounced that the term government and governance had the same etymological roots and hence were regarded to mean the same thing. However, with criticisms exerted over the glaring failure of governments to maintain social and economic order, did it dawn on people that governance not only encompass the work of government, but also include all other mechanisms of control. Therefore, I have adopted Rosenau's conceptualisation of governance as a summative phenomenon, that is the sum of all governances, premised on various orders or criticality, including the necessity of the process of
knowledge formation, retention and transfer. In a sense, summative governance is the way in which the various levels of governance interact in varying horizontal and vertical densities, with the process of knowledge formation being the grease that allows these systems to interact smoothly and act as the string that holds them together. The major question I set out to explore was how HIV and AIDS impact the various levels of systems of governance and how this is likely affected through impacting the process of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer. In addition, the research aimed to demonstrate that the necessity of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer that sustain these systems is generally assumed and to show how the systems of governances that sustain intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer are highly vulnerable to disruptions.

I have referred to HIV and AIDS impacts on the systems of governance as long-waved, gradual, subdued and daunting. The summative governance framework and the intergenerational knowledge framework, in combination, provided the most formidable way in which these long waved, daunting, subtle and subdued impacts of HIV and AIDS could be understood. The summative governance framework proved the most appropriate to demarcate the impacts as they move through each of the structures in varying horizontal and vertical densities, at the same time that the framework of intergenerational knowledge helps us understand how HIV and AIDS disrupts the continuity through change of the governance systems. In other words, the framework of intergenerational knowledge challenges the traditional conception of how
continuity through change is maintained. I referred to knowledge as the order of criticality for governance in the sense that we cannot imagine functionality of these systems, let alone our existence as humans, without some degree of knowledge. I have presented the framework of knowledge formation as the best lens through which the long waved impacts of HIV and AIDS on these levels of governance could be understood, because as I have put forward, the evolution of governance from long run equilibria of processes is in itself the function of the evolution of knowledge- for knowledge is the necessary condition for the various levels of governances to interact between actors on the micro-, meso- and macro-levels of socio-political aggregation.

To quell any doubt that because knowledge can be inscribed in books, manuals, documents, and databases, and therefore easily transmittable; I have adopted the tacit knowledge framework proposed by Michael Polanyi that views knowledge as ineffable. Such knowledge can only be passed through non-explicit means, because as Polanyi articulates “an art that cannot be specified in detail cannot be passed on by prescription since no such prescription exist for it”.

It follows that because such knowledge can only be transferred among people, as it is carried in strings of symbolically encoded meanings, it requires constant contact between people in their everyday interactions. I have gone a step further to propose that the process by which tacit knowledge is shared is largely intergenerational, because according to Polanyi, such knowledge is passed through learning from example, like from a master (a carrier of tradition) to an apprentice. In communities and household

520 Polanyi, 1962)
settings, intergenerational transmission of knowledge is fundamental and the process by which knowledge is transferred is through tradition kept in the memories of the elders throughout generations. In general terms, knowledge is passed on through observation, performances, storytelling and ceremonial practices because the area into which such knowledge extends is tacit. I argue that knowledge formation, retention and transfer in organisational settings, especially as it pertains to the tacit dimension is also intergenerational. Intergenerational in that it is the type that is embedded in experiences, beliefs, perspectives and values that individuals accumulate over successive years of their lives, which they pass on to the younger generation through non-explicit means, because as I have put forward, such knowledge is hard to articulate with formal language. Polanyi’s contention that tacit knowledge is accumulated, for example, by a master craftsman who after years of experience develops a wealth of expertise at his fingertips, is testimony to his belief that the process of knowledge formation is, to a large extent, intergenerational.

Namibia provided the best case study because of the interdependency of the various systems of governance, which makes it easier for the impacts to pass through the various systems somewhat unimpeded. At independence, the future of Namibia was severely constrained from the legacy of apartheid, making a move towards real independence and development minimal, such that many commentators agreed that only a “few countries have started in such a heavily determined context”. 521 This question is often explored within

521 Freeman (1992)
the context of the legacy of the colonial history, because at present, the varied forms in which every activity is acted out and staged, whether individually or collectively, reflects the colonial history of this country. The present mnescope portrays the colonial history, and therefore justifies situating the governance structures within the context of the enduring struggle for independence. The case can be argued that these pre-independent periods went beyond reifying racial and ethnic division throughout the country, but as Tapscott eloquently alludes, went to the extent that different communities were segregated geographically, economically and socially, with the bitterness engendered by war and by the racist practices of apartheid rule presenting a real threat to a peaceful post-independent Namibia. As I have said in earlier sections, the threat lies in protracted disruptions and in some instances retardation of some important indigenous systems of rules, which systems I perceive not only to include those of the state, but every other command mechanisms that perform functions, irrespective of whether these systems have evolved institutions. I earlier defined these to include command mechanisms at every level of human activity.

Clearly and whilst Namibia is heralded as a model for reconciliation and inter-party constitutional reformation for the rest of Africa, many scholars believe that “...the task of promoting greater social equity has yet to be adequately addressed.” Therefore we bear testimony to the subtle, daunting and long waved impacts of colonisation in these structures of governance. On this account, it is reasonable to argue that there is no better place to demonstrate

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522 Tapscott (1993)
523 Tapscott, (1993)
the impacts of HIV and AIDS as they impact the interplay of the various actors on micro-, meso-, and macro-levels of political aggregation than Namibia. At the same time though, the implication of the protracted period of colonisation meant that Namibia inherited very strong institutions at the level of nation state, and in the process was spared from the ominous danger so often associated with newly independent states in Africa. Nonetheless and notwithstanding HIV infection and AIDS remain at pandemic levels and the impacts on governance institutions at the national and local levels are frightening. There is evident deterioration of social welfare indicators. General levels of life expectancy, literacy, and schools enrolment have been falling as a result of high morbidity and mortality. Life expectancy has declined to levels seen during pre-industrial ages. Because life expectancy is low and prevalence is high, high profile personnel are lost in their active years in sectors as diverse as the military, the civil service, the private sector, the educational system, industry and other indigenous sectors such as agriculture. This has the potential for institutional collapse, which may in the long run undermine governance. This proves the vulnerability of the systems of rules to disruptions and fragmentations, which in turn also affects the process by which knowledge is formed, retained and transferred. This should not be hard to see because this thesis characterises governance as a summative phenomenon, in that governance cannot only be seen as encompassing the work of government, but that of every command mechanism at every level of human activity.
Synopsis of major findings

The main findings were presented in the preceding chapters six and seven: Namibia HIV and AIDS related governance liabilities and Intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer impacts of HIV and AIDS on sectoral and summative governances. The result confirms that the various levels of systems of governance, on the micro, meso and macro levels, are highly vulnerable to disruptions and fragmentations, but more so in Namibia, a country that endured one of the harshest forms of colonisation. Situating Namibia’s governance systems within the context of the enduring struggle for independence reminded us of the effects of the pre-independence periods on the susceptibility of these systems to disruptions and fragmentations. The point was made that the governance systems in Namibia were severely constrained from the legacy of apartheid, making them highly susceptible to fragmentations. This has become ever more so evident with the onset of HIV and AIDS. Situating the vulnerabilities of these system within the historical context also served to remind us that the Namibian epidemics express particular configurations of social, cultural and economic orders, and occur on various templates of social relations, necessitated by years of oppression. These are complex interactions of social norms and networks, sexual ideology, and behaviours that research has been unable to uncover, because such is not viewed in the broader socioeconomic, political and most importantly, historical context. As I have put forward earlier, inroads against

-295-
the epidemics in all likelihood have remained inadequate because these social templates are less understood and continue to be reproduced.\textsuperscript{524}

Using the example of the migrant labour system, I have demonstrated how this was fundamental to the disruption of family lives. The system of migration was the precursor to wife neglect, sexual violence and the culture of polygamy and extra marital affairs, all of which are still evident in Namibia. The long years of migrant labour system also meant that men, who would normally have one monogamous relationship, were put into situations that encouraged polygamous relationships, which over time, also led to breakdown of families. The vulnerabilities of this structure of governance must therefore be viewed in the context of its historical progression. Today, HIV and AIDS is able to put severe stress on this important institution, which often results in families disintegrating as social and economic units. Most importantly, when this happens, not only do families lose important members of their households, but in more extended terms, family life is disrupted and ruptured, their traditional roles and responsibilities are altered and the process of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer is retarded.

Similarly, I have shown, how, on the meso levels, the racially prescribed schooling system created acute disparities and inequalities to unimaginable proportions. Because education was not seen as a right for blacks but a privilege reserved for the whites, only a few ill equipped and poorly staffed and financed schools were made available to black people, effectively limiting

\textsuperscript{524} Freedman and Poku (2005)
schooling to a few. A large number of the population, especially those from the peripheral tribes of the Himbas, Zembas and San were excluded from the education system because after all, it did not matter to the settler administration whether these children attended school or not. At independence, Namibia inherited an education system in a state of chaos, designed to perpetuate apartheid rather than provide the necessary human resource base to promote equitable social and economic development. The implication is that the ability of this important governance system to provide the firewall against such things as HIV and AIDS was undermined. The system’s accountability to ensure that the process of knowledge formation is safeguarded was compromised. I have demonstrated how, in the context of HIV and AIDS, it is not only important to maintain stability in this sector for the sake of preserving knowledge transfer to younger generations, but to mitigate the macro-economic impact as well.

The vulnerability on the macro level should not be too hard to discern. On the local governance levels, the local governance systems, which performed important functions that extended beyond land management and included such things as religious, judiciary, military and administrative managements were disintegrated through systematic and carefully planned strategy of divide and rule. I have demonstrated how, in areas of the north, these structures were known to have been well organised and part of a complex political and religious organisation overseeing the management of natural resources amidst the fragile ecological setting. With colonisation and the policy of apartheid, there was a persistent and consistent barrage to dismantle these
traditional structures and instead new structures for the purpose of expanding the mandate of the settler communities were instituted, which fundamentally changed their traditional roles. Whilst the absolute powers of these structures were increased, their legitimacy was undermined because they (the structures and the chiefs) were no longer regarded as potential allies in the struggle for independence. In the context of the summative governance framework, one could argue, quite generally, that there was local government but no governance. Over the years, the functions of these traditional structures were diminished to the extent that their role became marginal in the new political dispensation. They no longer occupied the space between the family and the state, but instead they were replaced by a system of local governance characterised by decentralisation of activities to regional and local councils. Today these structures no longer play their vital traditional role of dealing with diverse issues such as solving local problems, solving conflicts and disputes, dealing with risks and disasters, and promoting sustainable practices such as those dealing with environmental protection. In a sense, they have been rendered ineffective to play a role in the prevention and mitigation of the impact of HIV and AIDS. These locally based structures bear a heavy burden and experience the epidemic’s impact on their own operation and evolution as well.

At the national governance level however, I argued that because Namibia was the last settler oligarchy, which does not share the same characteristics as many other neopatrimonial regimes in Africa, it inherited very strong institutions at the level of nation state, and in the process was spared from the
ominous danger so often associated with newly independent states in Africa. Because the indigenous structures of governance were repressed and replaced with colonial administration set up to legitimise the colonial and apartheid systems, power was centralised to the national government comprising highly educated and powerful individuals carefully selected for this purpose. This was further legitimised by instruments of law that denied political rights for ethnic minorities, but encouraged functioning democracy in their microcosmic enclaves- characterised by regular elections, leadership turnover, opposition, independent courts and some degree of press freedom all of which were reserved for whites. In the process, strong institutions were established making the transition towards independence somewhat seamless. From the summative governance framework adopted for this thesis, which characterises governance to emerge from a long run equilibria of processes, it should not be difficult to see that the vulnerability of this system results as well from the vulnerability of the other levels of governance due to their inherent interdependency. I have presented the HIV and AIDS summative impact framework to show the full effect of the pandemic as it moves in waves from the nascent to the fully institutionalised mechanisms of control. Therefore, understanding the vulnerability of this fundamental level of governance requires that this be understood in the context of the intertwining impacts engendered by the various levels of governance. I have postulated that HIV and AIDS not only impacts the sectoral governances in isolation, but adopted the view that it affects the interplay between these systems from a lower to a higher order, that is, the interplay between the formal, non-formal,

525 Ibid
state and non-state governances. Notwithstanding, because the settler community was part and parcel of the transition to independence, and all the civil servants of the state were kept in position by law, most of which were highly trained, this creates serious problems of shortage of skills when one of these people should resign or die. Coupled with the fact that only 15% of the approximately 40,000 civil servants who returned from exile had post-secondary education, the multitude of vulnerabilities for this structure of governance should be comprehensible.

Because my contention is that the necessity of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer for the purpose of sustaining the flow of the governance systems from a lower to a higher order is generally assumed, I have utilised the knowledge framework to help us conceptualise the flow of impacts across the various levels of governance. Consequently, I have elevated knowledge to the level of criticality for governance to emerge from long run equilibria of processes and also as the necessary condition for the various systems of governance, from a higher to a lower order, to interact between actors on micro, meso and macro levels of socio-political aggregation. In chapter seven of this thesis, I have demonstrated how HIV and AIDS affects the knowledge formation of the institution of governance through mainly affecting how knowledge is formed, retained and transferred between people. The process of knowledge formation is evolutionary and sequential, with the institution of the family being the first transmitter of such knowledge. I have posited that good family governance is increasingly a crucial element for peace and development and fundamental to the well being
of society and by extension the security of states, primarily because they transmit the knowledge necessary for maintenance of peace and order. But we now bear witness to how, in the most severely affected countries of the world, the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer within family settings is disrupted as a result of HIV and AIDS. Experience of parents being sick and dying as a result of AIDS is the harshest thing a child has to deal with and because, as I have put forward, it disrupts the hierarchy of authority to which they submit themselves for the purpose of intergenerational knowledge formation and transfer. As the theory of tacit knowledge would assert, learning is first a-critical and children would surrender themselves to the knowledge of their parents and older siblings, it is not hard to see how a sick or dying parent easily relegates the authority as the main transmitter of knowledge. Suffice to say, knowledge to which these children ought to submit to is tacit, in that it cannot be said precisely, because it is carried in symbolically encoded meaning, and at the same time, it cannot easily be accessed through formalised systems, therefore the loss is greater in the context of HIV and AIDS. I have earlier alluded to the intergenerational nature of the trajectories of the impact of HIV and AIDS, because children born to HIV positive parents may grow to be orphans, who may grow up to be infected, but perhaps before they themselves have had children, who will also become orphans. In a sense, when families are disrupted as a result of HIV and AIDS, it not only raises questions of loss of income but raises problems for the process of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer for successive generations. Because our identities, values and epistemologies are all learned and shaped in family contexts, and when the process of intergenerational
knowledge formation for one generation is disrupted, the entire spectrum of life bears the repercussions and creates disjuncture in the process of knowledge transmission for the rest of the other structures, not only for the current generations but for future generations as well. In the context of the summative framework adopted for this thesis, this creates problems for current and future governability at the macro level of socio-political aggregation.

Similarly, through formal and informal education, we learn our values, identities and epistemologies. But in these high prevalence countries, when people are infected with HIV and AIDS, education is one among other things that loses its appeal and sometimes, even relevance. This is not hard to see because many activities that used to be attractive when life expectancies were normal are replaced with important things such as taking care of the sick. I have shown how the education system in Namibia, as the key mechanism for knowledge formation, is under the barrage as a result of HIV and AIDS and how it fails to address the fundamental question of what learning is all about. I have also shown that the impacts on the process of knowledge formation for the schooling system are multifaceted and omni present, involving the family, the child, other children and teachers. First, not only does a loss of parent create knowledge liability within the household setting, but also, learning becomes a problem when children are denied the opportunity to learn at home, putting their educational prospects in jeopardy. Because the theory of tacit knowledge adopted for this thesis views knowledge as a reflection of one’s personal life events, children who have
been robbed of the opportunity to learn some critical skills from their parents come to the learning process with heavily constrained life experiences. As a result, the learning process is also inhibited, because these children construct knowledge from a base of prior knowledge. Second, experience of living with HIV or AIDS severely alters the learning process of children because of stigmatisation and discrimination by others or self-infliction often associated with it. I have highlighted how stigma and discrimination are the hardest things a child could ever experience. When children are subjected to stigma and discrimination, they enter the process of learning in heavily constrained states, the implication of which is constricted interaction between the learner and teacher, thereby affecting the learning environment. Third, with the learner-centered approach of the Namibian schooling system requiring greater interaction amongst learners, it raises problems with the learning process when other learners are also infected with HIV. In a sense, because the process by which knowledge is transmitted in classroom settings is not only intergenerational, but multi generational, it requires that the impact on knowledge formation, retention and transfer be understood in the context of their intertwining effects on other learners and teachers. When, as I have demonstrated, a student is infected with HIV, the interaction with other students is also affected, therefore robbing the group of possibly their active and bright member. Fourth, I have shown how the omnipresent nature of HIV and AIDS makes it impossible for the schooling system to escape its onslaught. Those children lucky enough not to be infected or orphaned face the prospect of losing teachers to HIV and AIDS. I have demonstrated how being infected with HIV affects teachers in various ways; including frequent
absence from school, the loss of confidence in teaching and thus lack of attention and the stigma associated with students’ knowledge of the status of the teacher. Evidently, the greatest impact on the schooling system is the loss of a teacher due to illness or death as a result of HIV and AIDS respectively, because the teacher is the key driver of the process of learning in a classroom.

Correspondingly, the theory of tacit knowledge is dominantly used in organisational studies as it challenges the traditional input-process-output conception of organisational knowledge studies. The theory, as adopted and further developed by Nonaka and Takeushi views organisations as knowledge creating machines, because, “while new knowledge is developed by individuals, organizations play a critical role in articulating and amplifying that knowledge.” The knowledge to which this refers to is tacit, which knowledge remains unidentified until when it is necessary and impossible to do without it. I have expressed how such knowledge is hard to articulate with formal language as it is embedded in such things as individual experiences, personal beliefs, perspectives and value systems held by individuals within an organisation. The Ministry of Education was presented as the quintessential of the flow of impacts of HIV and AIDS on intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer. It is the purveyor of knowledge and the key institution mandated by an act of parliament to lead the country’s knowledge creation agenda. At the macro-systemic level, this institution is robbed of highly knowledgeable people when HIV and AIDS struck. As highlighted in

526 Nonaka, (1994)
previous sections, to ensure continuity and transfer of knowledge, at independence an agreement was reached to keep the civil servants, some of whom have been with the system for many years. I earlier referred to how apartheid ensured rigorous education for employees of the state and how the current government struggles with attracting newly trained professionals. In the event that one of these highly trained personnel should die as a result of AIDS, serious knowledge gaps are created within this key institution of governance. On the macro-systemic level, the impact of HIV and AIDS on the process of knowledge formation in this key institution will endanger governance in Namibia, because there is an inherent inability to fill the knowledge gaps. What is more, the relatively low perception that such gaps may create macro-systemic impacts, which may eventually pose a threat to future governability of the country, is worrisome. Using the Ministry of Education, I have demonstrated how, at the micro-systemic level, the loss of knowledge filters through the other structures of governance almost unhindered, due to the structure of the education system in Namibia. Because of the nature of the structure of the education system, following a lean line of authority to the national level, people on the upper levels of the structure are mandated certain control over the business of the lower structures, effectively creating an intrinsic knowledge-dependency among the various structures. It follows that the staff in lower units of the organisation exhibit relatively high dependency on staff in higher structures. It is clear that HIV and AIDS impacts are readily replicated through the various levels of the structure. In other words, not only is the process of knowledge formation constricted within the organisation of the Ministry at the head office level, but also the impacts
become more so evident at the local levels, thereby impacting on how schools are being run. Because, as I have said, knowledge is the key commodity of business operation, HIV and AIDS essentially take away the drivers of business operation within the Ministry of Education, thereby creating problems of governability across all the structures of governance.

Conclusion

Overall, the analysis confirms the hypothesis that the impacts of HIV and AIDS are circular within and across the systems of governance, and that HIV and AIDS have become a complex vicious circle that reinforces itself through the iteration of impacts throughout all the levels of governance. In more extended terms, the impacts are not merely additive and isolated to the sectoral governances, but are summative, intergenerational and structured, thereby beginning to endanger the fundamental systems of governance. Therefore, the demographic impacts, the effects of the institution of the family and deficiencies created in the education system mean that the ability of the government to function properly is seriously undermined. Government’s ability to deal with the very agent that is weakening it has been rendered ineffective. As I have put forward in earlier sections, these are no longer projections, because evidences are piling up that government’s ability to deal with the epidemic has been weakened; children no longer attend school as a result of being orphaned or being sick; teachers are dying as a result of AIDS and organisations are losing employees due to HIV related illnesses and death, all of which create liabilities for the process of knowledge formation, retention
and transfer. The fact that people are not falling dead in streets cannot be seen as a sign of the ability of nations to deal with HIV and AIDS. The ameliorative powers of antiretrovirals (ARVs) have evidently changed people’s perception of the devastating impact of HIV and AIDS. But, I argue that ARVs may have offered us with a temporary reprieve because the impacts of HIV and AIDS are yet to be felt in the coming years.

I have referred to HIV and AIDS impacts on the systems of governance as long-waved, gradual, subdued and daunting and how the concept of knowledge helps us understand these impacts. How knowledge is germane to the evolution of the systems of governance from a lower to higher order and how the process of knowledge formation and transfer facilitates both the vertical and horizontal interactions of the governance actors has largely been ignored in contemporary literature on governance. The concept is less understood in literature on AIDS, specifically in terms of how HIV and AIDS affect the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer within and across the various systems. Therefore, strictly speaking, I have opted to enter into an unknown territory, or more appropriately into one of the least researched fields, not because of a sense of bravery, but because I feel the need to add to human endeavor to find solutions to a rather pressing issue. Be that as it may, I have adopted the theory of tacit knowledge to show how HIV and AIDS affect the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. This theory proved useful in that it refers to the hard to articulate knowledge with formal language, the type that is embedded in experiences, beliefs, perspectives and values that individuals hold. Such knowledge is
ineffable in that it cannot be understood by looking at how people communicate to each other. As such, tacit knowledge cannot be stored but only transmitted from individuals to individuals. Utilising this theory also proved useful because the mechanisms through which knowledge is transferred in these systems are complex. The theory of tacit knowledge transcends the earlier theories of knowledge in that it is not only concerned with propositional knowledge and the intrinsic value that it possesses, but with how people learn from each other. In a sense, it provides an intellectual discourse around how the process of knowledge formation is possible. However, I have limited my analysis to the process of knowledge formation in households, schools and organisations respectively. It should be noted that because knowledge formation is a product of interweaving factors in successive stages of a person’s life, therefore the boundaries between the socially and institutionally situated knowledge is always open. As I have demonstrated, when the process of knowledge formation in the schools is constrained as a result of parents, teachers and learners falling ill and dying, the knowledge gaps are replicated in the other systems of governance. In other words, HIV and AIDS reduce the pool of the knowing people that the institutions of governance, like the Ministry of Education needs in order to operate more effectively, at the same time that it creates the institutional knowledge gaps in the Ministry of Education, thereby reducing its ability to create the necessary instruments to facilitate the process of knowledge formation in schools. Ultimately, whichever way one looks at the sectoral knowledge gaps created by HIV and AIDS, the bottom line remains; because, as Simon would postulate, summative governance refers to a complex
hierarchical structure, characterised by multilevel structures, each of which depend in an aggregate way on each other, it follows that knowledge gaps created in any of these structures exponentially replicate across all the structures. What is more, because HIV and AIDS simultaneously create knowledge gaps within each of these structures, the impacts are indeed more than summative, but are highly structured, thereby endangering the fundamental systems of governance at the level of nation state.

**Theoretical and policy implications**

Whilst the framework of summative governance provided the first step towards viewing governance as the complex web of multi-level governance structures, it nevertheless does not sufficiently address the most important question of how continuity through change is maintained. There has been a lot of scholarly work conducted over the years on organisational knowledge management, some of which also made reference to the necessity of intergenerational knowledge. Nevertheless, they all fail to address knowledge in its totality and how the evolution of knowledge is maintained and predicated upon certain micro, meso and macro societal conditions, including the necessity of the governance systems themselves to sustain the process of knowledge formation. The theoretical case for intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer therefore needs to be revisited in order to further understand the various orders of criticality that sustain the flow and interactions of the various levels of systems of governance between actors on

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the micro, meso and macro levels of socio-political aggregation. In a sense, the summative governance framework, whilst acknowledging what Rosenau refers to as the unpredictability, messiness, complexity and dynamism of this system, and the complex web in which these various governances must interact, cannot on its own, account for what makes the system function in summative terms. It would appear, therefore that a new theoretical and or conceptual model, capturing the various socio-political imperatives of summative governance is required. Such model would help us understand the flow of impacts of HIV and AIDS (or any other adversity for that matter), as they move in both vertical and horizontal directions.

Understanding the necessity of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer for the purposes of both sectoral and summative governances is an important step in helping us conceptualise and therefore address the impact, not only of HIV and AIDS, but any other problem that affects the continuity of these governance systems. The research further supports the argument that the reciprocity of the governance systems that sustain the process of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer are highly vulnerable to disruptions and fragmentations. If (as argued here), HIV and AIDS affect the interactions of the various systems, from a lower to a higher order, through affecting the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer and the inherent vulnerabilities of the various systems of governance are indicative of their inability to withstand the multifaceted threat posed by HIV and AIDS, then the findings that the impacts are circular both within and across the various systems have the following theoretical
implications: First, the necessity of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer cannot continue to be assumed if we are to start addressing these core issues, more so in the wake of HIV and AIDS. Therefore, once these core issues are understood, we can start comprehensively addressing the fundamental questions of how best to deal with these less than obvious issues. Second, the point can be made that addressing the more subtle impacts of HIV and AIDS needs further understanding. The major problem, as it were, is with the emergency type response adopted in response to HIV and AIDS, focusing on the most obvious issues, which in many respects has shrouded intellectual discourse on the subtle impacts. Symptomatically, our analysis has often been preoccupied with the quantifiable (gross or crude) impacts, thereby limiting the ability to deal with the subtle impacts in the most effective ways.

On policy level, it is clear that we are a long way off addressing these less-than-obvious issues. But the fact that these are difficult to understand and analyse is not enough reason to pretend that they do not exist. The impacts on the process of intergenerational knowledge formation continue to be reproduced, with the schooling system being at the receiving end of this. Paradoxically, the system is the key to filling the gap in our knowledge about these issues, at the same time that it is the very system that facilitates the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. It transpires that HIV and AIDS may abrogate the status of the system as the purveyor of the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. But this hyperbolic pessimism can only be viewed in relation to the system’s inability to provide
the firewall against a force that threatens to alter the very reason for which it is 
required- in other words, its accountability to ensure that the process of 
knowledge formation is safeguarded. In a sense, understanding and 
attempting to tackle the problem that is weakening the very reason for which it 
exists should be the greatest motivation and focus of any intervention 
facilitated by principals of the institutions of governance at the macro level. 
Policy review, which will enable the various systems of governance to address 
the issue of how HIV and AIDS impact the governance systems that sustain 
the process of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer, 
especially in this high prevalence country, is an imperative, though 
challenging. Disconcertingly, the reciprocity and the systematic relationship of 
the governance systems that sustain intergenerational knowledge and the 
knowledge that sustains these governance systems are not well understood, 
which to a large extent creates problems for policy formulation and 
implementation. In the context of HIV and AIDS, these issues cannot be 
treated as though they were epiphenomenal, and/or divergent, because it is 
not only common sense that tackling one issue may solve only a fraction of 
the problem, but that addressing the summative impacts of HIV and AIDS also 
means that a summative approach is required. Admittedly, these issues are 
not easy to address, but then it is also important to recognise that, as I have 
stated in the introduction of this thesis, human social systems self-consistently 
generate complex problems, requiring that our responses (through our 
policies, strategies, programmes, plans and activities) reflect our adaptive 
capacity to deal with these complex issues. However difficult and challenging 
these issues are, as long as they pose challenges for our established systems
of rules that ensure our continual existence, and as long as we have an awareness of the extent to which they pose threats, we have the capacity to confront these issues head-on, and our policies are the instruments through which our desire to confront such societal problems are expounded. Worth noting however, is that one problem, often and consistently overlooked (either in policy formulation and implementation) is the demographic realities of Namibia as the most sparsely populated country in the world after Mongolia, making a move towards coordinated efforts to eradicate HIV and AIDS extremely complex. Concomitantly, this cannot be used as an excuse because whilst statistics always emerge with every research in Namibia on the impact of HIV and AIDS on all facets of society, this is never followed with extensive intellectual analysis that will put the country on a road map to deal with these issues in the most effective way. I hope this thesis will act as stimulus to undertake further research on these difficult issues. In all important respects, the enviable Namibian constitution provides the necessary foundation to thrive amidst the constraints and adversities, and therefore Namibia’s future is her own to make.


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