Chapter 8 Cycles of Police Reform in Latin America

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Introduction

Over the last quarter century post-conflict and post-authoritarian transitions in Latin America have been accompanied by a surge in social violence, acquisitive crime, and insecurity.¹ These phenomena have been driven by an expanding international narcotics trade, by the long-term effects of civil war and counter-insurgency (resulting in, inter alia, an increased availability of small arms and a pervasive grammar of violence), and by structural stresses on society (unemployment, hyper-inflation, widening income inequality).² Local police forces proved to be generally ineffective in preventing, resolving, or detecting such crime and forms of “new violence”³ due to corruption, frequent complicity in criminal networks, poor training and low pay, and the routine use of excessive force without due sanction. Why, then, have governments been slow to prioritize police reform and why have reform efforts borne largely “limited or nonexistent” long-term results?⁴

This chapter highlights a number of lessons suggested by various efforts to reform the police in Latin America over the period 1995-2010. It focuses on two clusters of countries in Latin America. One is Brazil and the Southern Cone countries (Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay), which made the transition to democracy from prolonged military authoritarian rule in the mid- to late 1980s. The other is Central America and the Andean region (principally El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Peru, and Colombia), which emerged/have been emerging from armed conflict since the mid-1990s.

The chapter examines first the long history of international involvement in police and security sector reform in order to identify long-run tropes and path dependencies. It then focuses on a number of recurring themes: cycles of de- and re-militarization of the policing function; the “security gap” and “democratization dilemmas” involved in structural reforms; the opportunities offered by decentralization for more community-oriented police; and police capacity to resist reform and undermine accountability mechanisms.

**Cycles of Externally Influenced Police Reform**

Latin America differs from Sub-Saharan Africa firstly in having a common Luso-Hispanic heritage in its formal legal systems.\(^5\) Secondly, its independent nation states had already been established by the early nineteenth century. Although the consolidation of rule of law across national territories took time, and is arguably still incomplete in many countries, the first cycle of military and police reform was underway, with the assistance or interference of foreign powers, by the mid-nineteenth century. The “strong-men” presidents of South America invited first the French, then the victorious Prussians, to help them establish national, stable, and professionalized armies\(^6\) that would centralize the use of force and protect the consolidating nation-state against challenges from regional based political and economic rivals and their personal militias.\(^7\) Policing of local communities continued to be conducted by rural and municipal constabularies and was of little interest either to national leaders or to external powers.

However, geography determined that Central America and the Caribbean would be subject to the repeated military interventions of the Colossus of the North, which established itself as the regional hegemon throughout the nineteenth century. The 1823 Monroe doctrine and its corollaries interpreted US security as a hemispheric imperative to protect the region against foreign threats, understood in the first instance as European political and economic interests, later as continental ideologies (fascism, socialism, and syndicalism) and, finally, in the Cold War period, as Cuban- and Soviet-backed insurgency. Huggins argues that a key US objective was to internationalize its own security by penetrating and reforming the police systems of the fractured and weak states of its “backyard” in order to concentrate repressive force under the command
of dependable, authoritarian political elites. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the United States sent in the marines to occupy several countries and establish friendly proxy regimes, which it backed with new police forces, generally militarized gendarmeries, in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Nicaragua. Existing armed forces were disbanded and the new constabularies brought under direct US control, thereby fusing (and blurring) military and police functions, a feature of Latin American security sectors that still bedevils contemporary police reform. Where the United States operated indirectly, through existing political elites and institutions, such as in Nicaragua in the 1920s, it contracted private US citizens, often former police chiefs, to train local police forces. These police forces were, however, largely concerned with disciplining the local population in order to preserve the interests of domestic and US business interests, suppressing organized labor and enforcing anti-vagrancy and labor ordinances in order to provide workers for the large landowners.

After the Second World War the United States became more active in South America, offering first the police then the armed forces advice in Cold War counter-insurgency techniques. Police training, whether in-country, in the United States, or in third countries, was delivered in the 1950s through the International Cooperation Administration, the forerunner of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), then in the 1960s by the Office of Public Safety (OPS), which assisted police forces in Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina in tackling incipient left-wing guerrilla and social movements. In 1974 the OPS was closed down following public concern in the United States about its links to repressive regimes and propagation of illegal practices such as torture and unlawful detention. However, despite the passage of Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, US military aid continued to flow to joint military and police forces in Central America during the Civil Wars of the 1980s, with police assistance channelled via the US Drug Enforcement Administration, the newly established Office of Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning, and the FBI.

Strategic interests still drive the United States’ support for police reform, now delivered through its International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), founded in 1986 to help the Salvadoran police investigate human rights abuses committed by the US-supported armed forces in that country. After US forces invaded Panama in December 1989 to overthrow General Noriega, the immediate dissolution of the corrupt and militarized Panamanian Defence Force
(PDF), a combined military, police force and presidential guard, resulted in ICITAP taking on the more ambitious role of building a new civilian police force from scratch, a role it has since replicated in weak or collapsed post-conflict states such as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.\(^{16}\) It has subsequently been joined by a bewildering plethora of other US police assistance providers including, in an echo of the 1920s, private citizens acting as consultants.\(^{17}\) William J. Bratton, the former police chief of New York City, Boston and Los Angeles police, was contracted first by the city of Fortaleza, in northeastern Brazil, then by the mayor of Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, from 2000–2002\(^{18}\) to implement the CompStat approach to crime reduction.\(^{19}\) Bratton’s former employer, ex-mayor of New York Rudy Giuliani, also found himself offering similar advice to Mexico City in 2003.

However, the 1980s and 1990s also drew new actors into funding police reform, including the European Union, a number of individual European countries (which were now offering support in justice and policing in their former colonies), Canada and Japan, as well as agencies of the United Nations, such as the United Nations Development Program. Non-governmental organizations such as the Ford Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Open Society Institute, and the Washington Office on Latin America funded academic studies and fostered the creation of an epistemic community through interchanges between police practitioners in the region, and police training bodies and academics in the North.\(^{20}\) In some ways these were offering alternatives to what they saw as disastrous and misguided US interventions in the region. Spain, for example, took the lead in police reform in El Salvador and Guatemala. A Spanish Police Academy official headed the group of international police experts that drafted the former’s reform plan, which was completed by technical teams from Spain and the United States (ICITAP) and by representatives of the warring factions (the Salvadoran military and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, FMLN).\(^{21}\) Spain and other bilateral donors (Norway, Sweden, Chile)\(^{22}\) helped fund El Salvador’s root-and branch reform and provided observers, trainers and equipment, all under the aegis of the UN peacekeeping operation.\(^{23}\)

**Cycles Of De- And Re-Militarization**

By the 1990s, Latin America had the most structurally militarized police forces in the world. Yet since the initial wave of reform in the first three decades of the early twentieth century, the region has actually
seen cycles of police demilitarization and depoliticization. These were intended to stop the police acting either as a praetorian guard for local or national political elites, or as autonomous political agents, capable of determining the outcomes of elections, installing or blocking civilian politicians, and backing military governments. Reforms to those ends have often been followed by re-militarization prompted by changes in the political regime and concomitant (re)definitions of internal and external “security threats.” Police forces either became militarized (in terms of training, hierarchical organization, ethos, and mission) in the absence of military institutions per se, as occurred with the national guards created or encouraged by the United States in the Caribbean and Central America, or found themselves functionally subordinated to the armed forces and Ministry of Defence during periods of direct military rule or civilian-directed counter-insurgency and political repression. The legacy of this promiscuity between military and police functions has been hard to break. Military hierarchies, police corporations and their political allies persist in seeing an advantage in maintaining both police and military, using each as a “reserve” force for the other’s effort in relation to the “new” security threats of environmental degradation, common crime, organized crime, drug trafficking, youth gangs, and political “terrorism.” In addition, where national militaries are not greatly reduced in status, autonomy and resources, they continue to compete with the police for the mission of protecting the nation from these internal threats. As national borders were largely fixed in the immediate post-independence era, the region’s armed forces have long lacked external enemies. Even when operational and hierarchical command links with the armed forces have been severed post-transition, police leaders often cling to the residual privileges and protections afforded by their institutional links with the military, such as the enduring jurisdiction of military courts over the main police forces in Chile and Brazil. This undermines police accountability to the public and to civilian authorities and guarantees impunity for the worst abuses.

Decoupling The Police And Armed Forces

Cases of successful institutional separation of police and military fall into two categories. The first is where the armed forces were discredited or weakened in the transition, and it was relatively easy for civilian authorities to impose their control, reduce their power and encourage the development of new missions. Argentina’s federal police
was militarized from its inception in 1943, after which it had almost exclusively military heads and fell under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence. After the collapse of the military government in 1983 following its defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands conflict, it was easy for incoming civilian President Alfonsín to remove the police operationally from military control and to legally prohibit the armed forces from any routine involvement in internal law-and-order. The police service was finally moved to civilian control under the Interior Ministry in 1994 and under the new Ministry of Justice, Security and Human Rights in 2002. Despite initial attempts to reassert themselves against the civilian regime, the armed forces have now successfully reinvented their mission through active involvement in UN peacekeeping.

By contrast, Peru’s 2001 attempts at full-scale structural reform of the police, following the collapse of the Fujimori’s semi-authoritarian regime and the discrediting of the military-police-intelligence community due to widespread corruption and egregious human rights abuses, were sabotaged in part by the military. The National Police of Peru (PNP) had been centralized and militarized under the “developmental” military regime of 1968–80, and then been brought directly under the control of the armed forces in the name of combating the Marxist guerrilla group, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, in the 1980s and the Maoist guerrilla group, Shining Path, in the 1990s. In the 1988 fusion of three preexisting police forces, militarized traditions had prevailed. With the defeat of the insurgents, the armed forces were left competing with the police for resources, withheld their cooperation, and acted as spoilers in the police reform process.

The second category is that of pacted transitions controlled by the incumbent military government. However, the determining factor for police and military separation appears to be not the character of the transition, but in fact the longer-run institutional history of the police and of the quality of rule of law and democratic governance in general. Before the 1973 coups Chile and Uruguay both boasted democratic institutions, strong rule of law, political liberalism, high human, cultural and social capital and, especially in the latter, low poverty and inequality. The transition saw the rapid organizational separation of police and armed forces, which had been fused under the dictatorships, as the police were keen to return to the status quo ex ante, when they had enjoyed high public legitimacy, institutional pride and autonomy untainted by human right abuses. As in Argentina, the armed forces of these countries have found a new mission in peacekeeping and hemispheric security initiatives.
This path dependency allowed not only rapid institutional separation but also functional
demilitarization. In Uruguay, although crime, including armed robbery and homicide, and anxiety
about crime rose sharply in the post-transition period, police extra-judicial killings dropped to a mere
two or three a year, and most cases have been properly prosecuted. Yet no post-transition purge
of police officers, nor major institutional reform, was carried out. An amnesty law introduced in 1986
to protect 360 members of the armed forces and police against prosecution has been challenged
periodically and vigorously by human rights groups, yet a majority of the population twice upheld it in
referenda in 1989 and 2009. In Brazil and elsewhere, such amnesty laws guaranteeing impunity for
outgoing military regimes have been blamed for the persistence of authoritarian practices by the
police, as many officers remained in post and institutional culture went unchallenged. By contrast, it
seems that Uruguay’s legal amnesty allowed the years of military rule, police repression and
institutional violations of the social contract to be “bracketed” in the national imaginary as a period of
exceptionalism. Also, it was the Metropolitan Guard, an armed infantry division of the National
Police, rather than the mainstream force that had been responsible for the greatest repression.
Brinks suggests that Uruguay’s sense of social solidarity enabled a confident populace and judiciary
to uphold civil liberties within a less remote state than was the case elsewhere in the region. By
contrast to Central America and Argentina, Uruguayan politicians and media eschewed “tough” talk
on crime, and polls repeatedly showed that the general populace rejected heavy-handed policing.

Chile’s Carabineros, thought to have committed a third of the regime’s gross human
rights violations, were also rehabilitated very quickly. Corruption levels are low and they score the
highest public approval rating of police in the continent. Although they continue to commit human
rights abuses, even if at a much lower level than during the military regime and in comparison to
neighboring countries, the Carabineros have managed to avert scandal and public criticism as their
allies in the right-wing parties help them maintain control over the political agenda on police
matters. In the extensive reform of the criminal justice system of 1999, the Carabineros managed
to block any attempts to remove them from the purview of the military courts. Like the Brazilian
state-level military police, they remain hierarchically linked to the armed forces, continuing to report,
formally, to the Ministry of National Defence, even though finally, in 2011, they were
brought under the day-to-day operational control of the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, which fully controls the Carabineros’ sister body, the investigative police.

In Brazil’s protracted and pacted transition, however, there was no centralized police force with a distinguished history of public service to advocate for demilitarization. The drafters of the 1988 Constitution, which set the tone politically for the New Republic, paid scant attention to the issue of democratic policing. As a result the document determined that each of Brazil’s 27 states would have two police forces, the uniformed Military Police, which has a preventive remit and forms some 80% of the country’s police contingent, and the Civil Police, a much smaller investigative force. The former had been subordinated to the armed forces during the dictatorship of 1964–84, and learned counter-insurgency techniques, such as extra-judicial executions, death squad activity, torture, and “disappearance”, which they then employed against criminal suspects or social undesirables. The Civil Police also adopted these practices as they filled the policing vacuum left by the Military Police, and began to compete with them institutionally. The new Constitution also left the latter protected by the Military Courts. There was no purging of the ranks, restructuring or retraining, ensuring continuity of operational practices and personnel into the democratic period, a common experience in the region, even where root-and-branch reforms have occurred.

**New Remilitarizing Missions**

The chief cause of re-militarization of the police is the securitization of new forms of violence and disorder that pull the military back into crime-related matters, and militarize police practice. The Honduran police were civilianized in a 1996 constitutional reform but the public backlash generated by the rise of violent youth gangs (“maras”) meant that they, like their counterparts in El Salvador, were soon under pressure to re-adopt military-style repressive tactics. In the meantime the armed forces halved in size, lost control over the police, and were subjected to civilian control in 1999. However, they also acquired the new mission of tackling organized crime and “narco-terrorism,” in which they inevitably competed with the police for jurisdiction. This re-emboldened them as an institution, and in June 2009 democratically elected leftist President Zelaya was overthrown in a military coup. Since then the police have been deployed alongside the armed forces to quell street protests.
The wars on drugs and on "narco-terrorism" have proven major obstacles to police reform in key producer or trans-shipment countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil. Founded in 1891, Colombia’s National Police Corps (CNP) survived the bloody episodes\(^\text{38}\) of the first half of the twentieth century as a decentralized, politically partisan body. Under subsequent military rule and the National Front governments of the 1950s and ’60s the CNP was progressively centralized, brought under military control, and deployed as a paramilitary police force assisting the armed forces in counter-insurgency operations in rural areas. Only much later did it develop an urban-focused crime-fighting and investigation remit. Reform, when it came, was internally driven and stimulated by the formation of new urban metropolitan police departments in the early 1980s in the three largest cities: Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali.\(^\text{39}\) Despite increased use of technology and a re-decentralization of policing services, public confidence continued to drop and in the early 1990s successive governments made a concerted effort to bring them under the oversight of local authorities and external review offices, increase community engagement and use the CompStat approach. However, this process of civilianization and modernization had been conducted in the face of a rapidly rising illegal narcotics trade. As the United States defined this as a hemispheric security threat, by 2000 it had poured some $850 million into counter-narcotics assistance, giving the CNP better military and surveillance equipment than the armed forces. As the coca growing and processing areas were pushed back into ever remoter areas, and the rents were being captured by the leftist guerrillas and rightwing paramilitaries rather than by urban drug barons such as Pablo Escobar, the armed forces stepped back in to tackle narco-terrorism, creating competition between police and military over this domain.\(^\text{40}\) Colombia’s national police force remains under the Ministry of Defence, retains a military character and in the 2000s found itself part of the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategy of the Uribe government.\(^\text{41}\)

Meanwhile, Mexico’s drug cartels have been able to thrive in part due to police incompetence and corruption, and over 15,000 individuals were killed in drug-related violence in 2010, especially in the border and Pacific regions. The United States’ desire to repress both the drugs trade and the spillover of violence led to the Mérida Initiative, a US$1.3 billion project covering Mexico, Central America and the Dominican Republic, with President Calderón obliged to bring in troops to take over from the police.
Demilitarizing Police Culture

Demilitarization consists of more than delinking the police and military in terms of organizational command and mission. Historically, Latin America’s police forces have been modelled on Continental European gendarmeries (hierarchical, armed), not on the Anglo-Saxon style of policing, now represented by the United States’ CompStat data-led and British “policing by consent” approaches. The region’s police operational culture and practices are shaped by military-style structures, generally a two-tier structure of officers and non-commissioned police agents, who receive a differentiated training and career structure, with few opportunities for the latter to rise up through the ranks.42 A typically military fixation on internal norms, combined with the protection of the military courts, means that in the Brazilian and other militarized police forces an officer is more likely to be punished for a defect in their uniform than for beating or killing a member of the public. A common reform initiative has been to set an internal ombudsman’s office to protect the lower police ranks from arbitrary abuse by their superiors. Police are often trained in military academies, with a focus on firearms and public order, rather than on the techniques of modern crime prevention and detection. This militarized culture inhibits the police’s ability to engage with the community as public servants rather than as agents of an anxious state.

Security Gaps and Demobilization Dilemmas

One of the key dilemmas facing police reformers is how rapid and deep the reform needs to be, and how to manage crime and public order in the case of a total restructuring following the collapse of the previous regime and its security forces. For example, Peru had to deal with street demonstrations when the return to democracy opened up a new space of contention for previously suppressed popular demands, all the while that the institutional reform of the police was underway. The other dilemma is what to do with demobilized and purged police officers whilst the new police force is trained and operational. This problem affected Panama, El Salvador, and Guatemala in quick succession and policy-makers in governments, the UN and ICITAP drew a number of different conclusions.43

In the immediate aftermath of the 1989 regime change in Panama, which unleashed unanticipated looting and damage to property, US
forces assumed responsibility for domestic policing in order to plug what Gray and Manwaring term a “deployment gap.” However, they needed to hand over this function as quickly as possible to the newly constituted Panamanian National Police, so as not to look like an army of occupation. As ICITAP, then still in its infancy, took time to design, recruit and train this new police force, in the meantime members of the disbanded Panamanian Defence Force had to be drafted back to fill the “enforcement gap.” Despite the screening out of the most rotten apples, “Panamanians knew that the police were the same personnel as before, only with different uniforms,” undermining public confidence in the new force.

The Panamanian experience provided important learning for El Salvador. There, the army and FMLN guerrillas had fought each other to a stalemate and the guerrillas were able to demand police reform as a keystone of the 1992 peace accords. The UN was keen to play an important mediating role in the new post-Cold War climate in which US funding was switching from military counter-insurgency to rule-of-law reform. The military-controlled police forces (National Guard, Treasury Police and National Police) were abolished, rural paramilitary patrols disbanded and a new civilianized National Police Force created, with 20% recruited from the ranks of the FMLN, 20% from the former National Police and the rest by open application. A National Public Security Academy was established to train thousands of new recruits and the UN peacekeeping mission, ONUSAL, undertook to supervise the rump of the old police in keeping order during the transition period. Nonetheless, members of highly criticized counter-insurgency divisions were transferred wholesale into the new police structure. Coordination problems with multiple donors, lack of personnel, and the vagueness of the peacekeeping mandate meant that ONUSAL could prevent the National Police from disrupting the peace process but not induce it to police effectively. Thus, the security gap opened up very rapidly as army, guerrilla and police demobilization reduced the number of vigilance forces from 75,000 to 6,000. The new PNC struggled to stem the subsequent explosion in organized crime, kidnappings, rural gangs, armed robberies, homicides, and social violence. Although the PNC is less abusive of human rights, more accountable and less militarized and politicized than its predecessor, continuing corruption, poor understanding of community-police relations and limited crime control capabilities have meant that while international observers consider the police reform a success story, ordinary Salvadorans do not.
By contrast, Guatemala’s security forces had effectively beaten the guerrilla forces during their civil war and were very wary of the role of externals in the peace process. The final provision of the 1996 peace accord offered a detailed blueprint for security sector reform that would have separated police and military functions. However, this was defeated in a May 1999 referendum on constitutional reform. The powerful Guatemalan military had long opposed structural changes in the security apparatus, so the government avoided UN or ICITAP involvement. Instead the Spanish Civil Guard, a rural, militarized police force, was appointed to design a police reform that resulted in weak recruitment, poor screening, and inadequate internal controls. It replicated its own military-style disciplinary code, very much focussed on officers disciplining subordinates who were unable to report superiors for misconduct. Equally, no avenue was created for members of the public to lodge complaints against officers.49 The Guatemalan authorities also feared that full-scale, civilianizing reform would lead to the security gap observed in El Salvador, and thus chose a very rapid deployment of the new Civil Police (PNC). Personnel from the old corrupt and abusive police force were incorporated into the leadership of the PNC, and joint operations continued with the military.50

Nicaragua offers a lesser-known case, where the police underwent two relatively successful post-conflict reforms. After the July 1979 overthrow of the Somoza regime, former National Guardsmen fled, joined the Contras, retired discreetly, or were prosecuted and imprisoned. The revolutionary government quickly established a new, civilian Sandinista police force, composed of fresh recruits and trained by Cuban and Panamanian officers. However, during the civil war of 1982–88, the police took on an increasingly militarized gendarmerie role, subordinated to agencies within the Ministry of the Interior. Although Sandinista institutions such as the army remained powerful after their 1990 electoral defeat, incoming President Chamorro had to conduct a political purge of both the police and armed forces in order to release a promised US annual commitment of US$100 million in loans and assistance. The police force then initiated its own process of institutionalization, which has been neglected by the Sandinistas. The new regulatory framework,51 which subjected the police to civilian control, was completed by 1995 changes to the constitution and a 1996 policing law. In the early transition period, Nicaragua saw a much lower rise in crime than its war-torn neighbors, arguably because the policing reform was driven
from within an existing force, and because of the residual social capital resultant from revolutionary-era structures such as the community-based Sandinista Defence Councils.

**Police Resistance to Reform**

Successful police reform, such as that in Nicaragua and Colombia, is very often led from within the institution. However, where it is initiated by external actors or civilian politicians or policy-makers, the vested interests of police corporations make them frequent veto-players. These corporate interests can range from the very personalized to the macro-institutional. In Peru’s technocrat-led reform, police turned out to have relatively petty rent-seeking concerns. Officers feared losing perks such as a petrol allowance that they used to supplement their incomes. However, these fringe benefits trickled so far down the institution that it was impossible to set the lower ranks against the upper ranks in favor of the reform. Similarly, long-serving officers wanted automatic promotion and rejected a meritocratic system.⁵²

One of the higher-level sources of police resistance is existing institutional arrangements that foster fragmentation and internal competition. Brazil’s state-level police are functionally separated into uniformed patrol police and investigative/judicial police. The two operate with their own recruitment, training, internal regulation and discipline, and organizational cultures. They do not share crime data, intelligence, or operational information, and use different territorial divisions, making coordination and transaction costs very high. As this division is enshrined in the 1988 Constitution, the police lobby in Congress blocked any amendment that would permit structural solutions such as unification or demilitarization.⁵³ Even legislation hurriedly passed following episodes of police misconduct, such as a law transferring to civil courts jurisdiction over homicides committed by the Military Police, was watered down and rendered meaningless. In the face of such paralysis, individual state authorities have taken unilateral steps to fuse the police forces operationally, even if not legally. However, at local level police have managed to sabotage reform. A policy of setting up model civil police stations in Rio de Janeiro, inspired in the data-centered CompStat model, was undone by a group of old-style cops. The latter’s instant “results,” that is, arrests and killings of alleged criminals achieved through illegal violence, graft and selectivity (picking off the small fry and doing deals with the big drug traffickers), appealed to
the immediate anxieties of politicians and the public more than did the longer term modernizing approach.\textsuperscript{54}

In the light of these kinds of problems, the tendency in the region has been to create unitary police forces, but with specialist internal departments for criminal investigation, anti-narcotics and so forth.\textsuperscript{55} The Panamanian Defence Force had been broken into five different units in order to depoliticize and civilianize public order institutions. However, in March 2010, for efficiency and effectiveness reasons, military and police forces were brought under the wing of a new Ministry of Public Security and previously separate investigative police was subsumed as a unit in the National Police.

The result of police resistance is that in post-authoritarian situations police reform is conducted more incrementally than in post-conflict scenarios, and often as the result of public scandals related to corruption or police brutality, which open up momentary opportunities. “Big bang” reforms like those in El Salvador and Panama tend to follow regime change or collapse. However, Peru’s attempt at this was led by civilian reformers, with little external support, in a somewhat different context. It also frequently stalled for lack of investment of political capital, which is frequently scarce in a precariously balanced coalition government. This also, partly, explains why major police reform has not been attempted in Brazil, under presidential coalition governments since the mid-1980s.

Resistance, incrementalism, and fragmentation have all combined to undermine the accountability mechanisms (internal affairs departments, ombudsman’s offices, and civilian oversight bodies) introduced in all the police reforms conducted in the region. The reasons for failure are multiple. Sometimes existing but ineffective bodies are not shut down but overlaid with new initiatives: Brazil has four separate distinct police oversight mechanisms located within three branches of government.\textsuperscript{56} Police are often able to control data and the initial stages of investigation into their own misconduct. Oversight bodies do not receive sufficient political support, autonomy or resources to do their job effectively. Accountability is also the endpoint of a longer process that includes not just criminal laws, but also norms and professional practices against which “proper” conduct can be measured. In Brazil militarized police training tends to emphasize hierarchical obedience: formalized policing pro-cedures, for example, on the use of force, are conspicuous by their absence.\textsuperscript{57} The police human rights training programs instituted by international actors and governments in the region tend to have little impact, and may even be counter-productive when
disconnected from operational issues. Thus, accountability institutions struggle to bridge the gap between persistent informal practices and attitudes, and formal rules and expectations.

**Cycles Of (De)-Centralization in Policing**

Militarization of the police has always been accompanied by centralization in a single security apparatus. Periods of relative democracy have, therefore witnessed the opposite swing of the pendulum toward deconcentrated and decentralized governance, which in the 1980s constituted a key element of the second wave of neoliberal institutional reform in Latin America. As repressive policing failed to stem the rising tide of crime and social violence, external “missionaries, technocrats and ‘converts’” found increasing receptivity to the view that delivering and controlling policing at a more local level would increase community involvement in preventing and detecting crime, and improve community-police trust, cooperation and accountability.

**Municipalization By Design**

One possible option is full-blown devolution to allow each municipality to have control all aspects of policing, from training to oversight to salaries. This has begun to happen in the larger cities in countries that have limited federal arrangements. In Colombia, constitutional reform (legal, fiscal, and administrative realignment between the three principal layers of government—national, provincial, and municipal) encouraged decentralization of police services in the period 1993–94. Similarly in Venezuela, the Decentralization law of 1989 prompted the creation of dozens of municipal police forces, including in the capital, Caracas.

The other side of the coin is that hundreds of autonomous local police forces can completely fragment policing, which is particularly dangerous in contexts of low accountability, poor crime data management, and frequent politicization. Mexico has the most decentralized policing structure in the continent, due to the 1917 revolutionary Constitution. Municipalities are permitted to organize their own preventive (not investigative) policing, and around 85% have their own police forces, ranging from under 100 officers, to several thousands in the bigger cities. The country’s 87 largest cities account for some 70% of all preventive police, and municipality-based officers represent just under 40% of
all police. However, the 2008 constitutional reform of the criminal justice system led to a lively debate about the *de*-municipalization of policing in order to bring municipal police forces under the control and command of the relevant state-level authorities. Indeed, in order to start winning the war on drugs, organized crime and police corruption, the Calderón administration wanted to dissolve both state and municipal level police and nationalize police in a single unitary police force. Venezuela’s 2008 National Police Law has already brought state and municipal police back under the central control of the Ministry of Popular Power for Internal Affairs and Justice for similar reasons.

*Municipalization By Default*

In the “vacuum” model, municipalities often become involved in crime prevention due to the inadequacy of the state- or national-level police. Local authorities invest in this area in order to improve citizen quality of life and reduce the negative externalities of crime, such as the burden on municipal-run health services of treating victims of crime, and the cost of damage to municipal facilities. By devising successful initiatives for improving citizen security, even when on paper they have limited political and administrative control over the police, mayors, who are now generally elected not appointed, can reap political-electoral dividends. This contrasts with national and provincial governments, which control the police but fear being punished by the electorate for promising, and failing, to reduce crime.

The policies that mayors typically pursue fall into two broad categories. The first are social/environmental policies that remove some of the proximate, contextual, or environmental factors linked to crime. These include new alcohol licensing laws, reducing the opening hours of bars (for example, in São Paulo and Diadema in Brazil, and in Bogotá, Colombia), or shutting them down in homicide hotspots. Another is the elimination, or fencing off of deserted urban ground, improvements in street lighting and so forth, ideas derived from the “signs-of-crime” philosophy or “broken windows” thesis, now part of the US police reform package. Such policies are relatively easy for mayors to enact, as they fall within the generally accepted purview of municipal authorities.

One of the most fêted city-wide violence-reduction programs was initiated in 1995 by Antanas Mockus, mayor of Bogotá. Not only did he have the advantage of authority over the policing, following the 1993
constitutional reform, but he also conceived of violence reduction as a much wider social enterprise, that hinged on rebuilding social capital, solidarity, and trust among the citizenry. On the policing side, he followed the example already set by Cali, where the mayor, a public health specialist, approached violence, particularly gun-related homicides, as an epidemic. Both had data collated and analyzed and then targetted at policing resources at the root causes, to notable effect. This evidence-led, problem-solving reflects the CompStat philosophy. However, Mockus’ mobilization of the general public around social norms and violence reduction was distinctly more creative. He employed hundreds of mime artists to reflect anti-social behavior on the streets. The distribution of thousands of foam hands enabled the public to give a thumbs down to dangerous driving: the rate of traffic accidents dipped noticeably.

The second strategy is the development of municipal guards as parallel and “alternative” police. Generally, municipalities are allowed to employ agents to protect public buildings, and the definition of their duties has been stretched to include community safety. In Brazil, where the state-level policing structure has been very resistant to reform, in the mid-1990s cities began to exploit an overlooked constitutional provision. By 2009, 865 municipalities had set up a municipal guard. Fewer than 20% of cities allow guards to carry firearms, so they function, and are perceived as, a community policing force focussing on conflict prevention and reduction. Municipal governments are able to design appropriate police training, career progression and disciplinary structures, and encourage community engagement through the development of comprehensive municipal security plans. However, they are still faced with the challenge of harmonization of state-level police administrative districts with municipal territorial boundaries, and political and territorial rivalries between municipal and state/national police, most notoriously in Rio de Janeiro and elsewhere. Like all forms of decentralized social policy, local policing does not exist in an island. Its success depends on a strong normative and operational framework provided by the higher levels of government, especially the national state. Federalism provides opportunities for local, horizontal police reform, but also obstacles to thorough-going and vertical institutional transformation.

**Cycles of Hard and Soft Policing by Communities and States**

Another set of interlinked cycles in law-and-order provision in the region has been evident in recent years, with an oscillation between
new “community” oriented policing and more old-style crackdowns. This intersects with policy debates about the desirable role of state and community in the provision of security. Arrangements range from democratic partnerships between the two, to situations either of state dominance of security, with the community the target rather than the beneficiary of policing, or of state absence, where the community is obliged to provide its own policing and conflict resolution, sometimes in distinctly uncivil and undemocratic ways.

Community policing, one of the watchwords of recent years, has been championed more vigorously by international reformers and sub-national actors -- mayors, state governors, provincial or municipal police chiefs, individual zonal commanders -- than by national authorities, who remain subject to countervailing pressures, such as the lobbying power of police corporations and international pressures around new security threats. Such “soft” policing, which relies on community cooperation with the police through the sharing of local intelligence, consultation about local anxieties and appropriate allocation of police resources, and implies police accountability to the populace, has been adopted as official policy only in a minority of the region's police forces. In Chile, since the late 1990s the carabineros have developed an over-arching “Block Watch Plan” that targets policing resources very specifically within urban neighborhoods. In most countries, community policing exists more as an aspiration, and is either restricted to experiments in specific geographic locations, or is short-lived, ended by a return to more militarized policing styles, where the populace are treated as the enemy, not the objects of state protection. The “community” aspect can also be very superficial: police may be more visible, for example, patrolling on bicycles or stationed on raised platforms on the streets, but this does not mean that their training or operational practices have changed. Similarly, citizen “consultation” can mean little more than allowing local businesses to contribute to the purchase of police equipment and thus capture police services for their own benefit.

The relative popularity of “hard” and “soft” policing styles ebbs and flows with each government, objective criminogenic factors, and waves of media-generated moral panic. Between 1994-2002 Honduras introduced a number of reforms intended to consolidate democracy, such as citizen security councils, a new civilian police force, police law and penal procedure law, and the institution of a community policing program in the 30 most crime-ridden areas. However, the election of a rightwing president, Maduro, saw the reintroduction of more aggressive policing,
specifically of youth gangs, whilst his successor, Zelaya, recognized that this strategy had failed, and re-emphasized a community-oriented approach.

Similarly in Rio de Janeiro, which has become an international totem of lawless slums (favelas) and murderous police, successive state governments have cycled between both types of policing. The first experiment with community policing there, instituted in two upper-middle-class neighborhoods, vanished in 1995 with the new state government offering the military police pay rises and prizes for the number of criminal suspects that they took down in shoot-outs. The second attempt at community policing, in 2000, focussed on a number of city centre slums, and managed to reduce homicide rates and drug trafficking activity, but not levels of police corruption or brutality against residents. Local drug traffickers bought off the new police battalion, whilst officers whose corruption networks had been disrupted carried out violent raids whilst their colleagues were off duty.

By 1998, 15 of Brazil’s 27 federal states had initiated community policing in some form: four years later all had foundered. This underscores the problem of “islands of excellence”. These pilot projects go against the grain, leaving them vulnerable to being isolated, actively undermined, or simply having no impact more broadly on the dominant police culture and practices. The current big solution in the violent slums of Ciudad Juárez and elsewhere is to send in specially trained and selected squads of military police and soldiers to seize territory back from the drug traffickers, opening the way to social services and laying the ground for eventual improved community-state relations and community-oriented policing. Rio de Janeiro is reliant on tourist revenue and acutely aware of its reputation as Brazil prepares to host the football World Cup in 2014 and the summer Olympic Games in 2016. Thus at the end of 2008, the authorities tried this new strategy, sending in so-called Police Pacifying Units (UPPs) to 17 of the most violent and drug-plagued favelas in Rio de Janeiro. The UPPs are distinguished by vertical integration of military, federal, state and municipal police in the provision of security, and horizontal multi-agency integration in the provision of other state services. This represented a breakthrough, as it was the first time that such an approach had been initiated from the top of government and accepted by lower level authorities.

This new strategy of “re-occupation” of urban space highlights the precarious and partial character of state control of national territory, both rural and urban, in many Latin American countries. In the absence
of state law-and-order agencies, other entities – indigenous governance structures, (un) civil society, organized crime – have stepped in to fill the void. Some of these non-state strategies can be positive and empowering to local communities that the central state has never served well. In Peru peasant patrols (rondas), originally set up to fend off cattle-rustling, began to be used in the 1970s by local communities to solve land, neighborhood and family disputes, promote development and deal with certain types of crime. Although during the civil conflict in the highlands Fujimori’s government created a new, parallel, type of peasant patrol as a state-sponsored anti-subversion committee, the rondas were able to make the transition from somewhat repressive policing bodies to become conflict resolution mechanisms in the local community. Since the 1990s multi-cultural legislation has made it easier for indigenous communities to self-govern and self-police in conjunction with the national state. However, communities whose social norms and social capital have been destroyed by conflict, violence and inequality are far more likely to respond to insecurity with death squads, vigilantism, lynchings and private militias and security guards. In a region of partially consolidated rule of law, such community-based actions are not new, but are responding to more recent cycles of security sector reform, and failure, and to the latest wave of perceived security threats.

**Conclusion**

What lessons, then, can be learnt from the cyclical characteristics of a century of police reform in Latin America? The first is that local policy-makers and politicians are often less interested in police reform than are external actors. However, this means that the reforms are designed to meet the more global security needs of the donors and policy exporters. This can be seen very clearly in the current US-funded war on narco-terrorism which had crept from the Andean region, especially Colombia, up through the Central American isthmus and into Mexico, in echoes of the anti-Communist counter-insurgency focus of previous decades. The reform agenda set out by international donors is also contradictory, on the hand advocating community orientation, retraining, and institutional restructuring of the police in order to reduce common crime, social violence and protect human rights, and, on the other, preparing the police and other security actors to tackle threats to hemispheric security. Few governments have been able to integrate both agendas by clearly differentiating the functions of the separate
security agencies. More common has been repeated “mission creep” for both the police and armed forces, except in those countries where the latter have taken on a distinctive and exclusive externally-oriented mission through peacekeeping.

Secondly, police reform has been slow to move up the governance agenda of many Latin American countries because it is squeezed out in transitional contexts by apparently more pressing liberal peace reforms, such as polyarchic democratization and macro-economic management. Few transitions occur through regime collapse, such as in El Salvador or Panama, where fundamental security sector reform is a precondition for these other reforms. Such an opportunity brings with it, however, the dangers of a security vacuum that is best avoided by proper sequencing and partnership between external and local security actors.

Thirdly, vested interests – police, armed forces and politicians – have also been able to render police reform very costly in terms of likely political capital required. As a result some national politicians, for fear of being punished rather than rewarded at the ballot box, have left the status quo untouched, or engaged in populist “tough on crime” rhetoric, rather than deal with the thorny institutional arrangements, and have often delegated responsibility to subnational government, or resorted to the armed forces.

However, when domestic actors do want police reform, long term results are more likely when it is driven by the police corporations themselves and not by politicians or technocrats. Police pride in their own professionalism, encouraged both from within the institution and by policy-makers through training and performance management, is one of the best ways of reducing politicization and meeting complex security agendas. Enduring and effective police reform is also contingent on wider political and institutional factors, including democratic institutions, a culture of accountability and citizen participation. The welfare and security of ordinary Latin Americans thus depends on breaking the negative cycles that have dogged policing and security issues: of de- and re-militarization of police forces; the import of contradictory policing agendas; a mis-handling of security gaps and demobilization so that community orientation is sacrificed for a retreat to military-style policing; an uncertainty about the roles of different levels of government in delivering differentiated and effective policing and crime reduction, and a continuing lack of conviction that members of the public should be the drivers, beneficiaries and ultimate arbiters of a new, democratic police. Latin America’s policing challenges are by no means unique. However, this chapter has argued that the region’s history over the last
150 years has repeatedly thrown these challenges into relief, offering important and transferable lessons over the longue durée for regions such as Africa beset with fresh transitional security dilemmas.

Notes

1 The opinion poll organization Latin Barometer has found that since the 1990s, Latin Americans have ranked fear of crime as their top or second priority, displacing unemployment or economic concerns. On the “normality” of the social violence see Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel M. Goldstein (eds.) (2010) Violent Democracies in Latin America (Durham and London, Duke University Press).


5 Latin America has a Continental European civil law system, based on systematic, written legal codes. In indigenous communities, customary law and ways of maintaining social order exist in parallel to this formal system.

6 The British also assisted with the establishment of navies and air forces.


10 Ibid., pp. 31–34.

11 Ibid., p. 87.


Anthony Gray and Maxwell Manwaring (1998) “Panama: Operation Just Cause” in Oakley et al. op. cit. Under Noriega, US forces stationed in Panama attempted to destabilize the PDF through covert operations, to which the PDF responded in kind.

ICITAP is focused on criminal investigation knowledge transfer, which means that work with the sections of Latin American police forces focused on public order tends to be left to other actors.

As Section 660 prohibits the United States from funding police assistance out of overseas development funds, this agency has been, as Call notes, institutionally - orphaned, hindering coordination with other government agencies, including the US military.

In the online periodical of the right-wing think-tank, the Manhattan Institute, Bratton and his associate lament that their task there was interrupted by political upheaval. William Andrews and William J. Bratton (2008) “Crime and politics in Caracas” City Journal Autumn 2008, 18 (14) accessible at www.city-journal.org/2008/18_4_snd-caracas.html. They also explored the possibilities of consultations in Argentina, Ecuador and Peru.

The CompStat approach requires the police to collect, computerize and analyze local crime data, discuss spatial, temporal and crime patterns, and devise strategies and tactics to targeting resources at crime “hotspots” and prolific offenders. For a discussion of this and related innovations in US policing that are increasingly being exported to Latin America, see David H. Bayley (2008) “Police reform: Who done it?” Policing and Society 18 (1): 7-17.


Latin America’s police and militaries have been involved in policy transfer within the region since the mid-nineteenth century, with those with greater capacity assisting others.


The last substantial inter-state, territorial armed dispute was the Chaco war between Paraguay and Bolivia in 1932-35.


28 They were the Republican Guard, the most militarized, the Civil Guard with a military rank structure and the Investigative Police, the most clearly civilian. Gino Costa and Rachel Neild (2005) “Police reform in Peru”, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 38 (2): 216-229.


37 Legislation criminalized gang membership (the penalty was 9-12 years in prison), and allowed police to detain “vagrants” (those with no visible means of support).

38 The Thousand Days War, 1899-1902, and La Violencia, 1948-58.

39 For an account of the police reform process in the 1990s see Pablo Casas Dupuy et al. (2005) Seguridad urbana y policia en Colombia (Bogotá, Fundación Seguridad y Democracia).
In Brazil, Ministers of Justice have twice fallen when Federal Police chiefs lost tussles with the military over control of the suppression of the illegal narcotics trade.


Call op. cit. p. 330.

Stanley and Loosle “El Salvador: the civilian police component of peace operations”.

Ibid. p.117.


This was drafted in 1992 by the newly sacked head of the police, Rene Vivas, and the Minister of the Presidency, Antonio Lacayo, who had removed him.

Former state governors in the Senate generally defend the Military Police, and there is an increasing trend for police officers to run for legislative office to protect their own personal and corporatist interests.

See the account by Luis Eduardo Soares (2000) of his attempt to reform the Rio police and how they resisted him in *Meu casaco de general: quinhentos dias no front de segurança pública no Rio de Janeiro* (São Paulo, Companhia das Letras).

This occurred in the police reforms in Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala and Colombia. Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay already had unitary police forces. Countries that retain separate forces for patrolling and crime investigation include Chile, Honduras and Venezuela. Costa Rica has ten specialized police forces, with police investigation conducted by a unit within the judiciary. Mexico’s investigative police at federal level and in the 31 states and federal district are similarly an auxiliary branch of the Prosecution Service rather than linked to the police forces involved in crime prevention.


Leeds op. cit. fn 17 and p. 33.

Goldsmith, Llorente and Rivas pp. 78-78.


Gerard Martín and Miguel Ceballos (2004) *Bogotá: anatomia de una transformación: políticas de seguridad ciudadana 1995-2003* (Bogotá, Editora Pontificia Universidad Javeriana); There is, as always in criminology, a debate about how to weight the factors that may have caused the drop in homicides, whether it was municipal policies, improved policing, or changes in the context of drug-trafficking and political violence. Pablo Casa Dupuy and Paola González Cepero “Políticas de seguridad y reducción del homicidio en Bogotá: mito y realidad” in Dupuy et al op. cit.

Chile has set up Citizen Security patrols, whilst Peru has serenazgos, or night watches.