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THE POLITICAL POWER OF DIASPORA AS EXTERNAL ACTORS IN ARMED CIVIL
CONFLICT

Ethnonationalist Conflict-Generated Diaspora Use of Social Media in Transnational
Political Engagement in Homeland Conflict: The Case of Rwanda

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Abstract

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The Political Power of Diaspora as External Actors in Armed Civil Conflict: Ethnonationalist Conflict-Generated Diaspora Use of Social Media in Transnational Political Engagement in Homeland Conflict: The Case of Rwanda

Keywords: Diaspora, Ethnonationalism, Armed civil conflict, Social media, Cyberactivism, Rwanda, Genocide Denial, Peace-building, Virtual ethnography

This study explores the power of ethnonationalist conflict-generated diasporas (CGD) as external actors in homeland conflict by exploring the nature of their political engagement on a transnational level using Internet Communication technologies (ICTs), with Rwanda as a case study. Virtual ethnography was chosen as the research methodology to explore the online activities of Rwandan CGD using social media (social networking sites) to form virtual transnational networks for political purposes. Diasporic online formations and activities were mapped in order to gain increased insights into ways that CGD use social media to engage in homeland conflict, and the effect their engagement has on the conflict cycle in the home country. Results of the study revealed that Rwandan CGDs demonstrate attitudes and motivations to act in ways that are consistent with other case studies of CGD, including exhibiting an enduring commitment and loyalty to co-ethnics, a romanticized conceptualization of homeland and a myth of return home. The results also revealed Rwandan CGDs’ strong propensity to use social media to engage in homeland conflict on a political level through the development of a large and dense transnational network used for a range of political purposes, including the dissemination of genocide denial and propaganda consistent with the pre-genocide propaganda campaign. Implications for peace-building and conflict analysis are discussed.
Copyright Page

© 2013 Michelle Elaine Martin
To Xander Martin, my son
For helping me see the world through your child’s eyes, which reminded me
that we should never let the constraints of adult life limit our dreams, ideals or
goals.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank several people who provided me with unending support throughout the long and challenging process of completing this dissertation. First and foremost I would like to thank my son who enduring years of my split attention, and listening endlessly to reading various drafts. I’d also like to thank family and friends who were understanding and supportive throughout this process. In addition, I would like to thank my colleagues Leticia Villarreal Sosa, Kathy Clyburn and Sr. Wamuyu Wachira. I would also like to thank my dissertation supervisor, Dr. Jim Whitman for his very generous and valuable guidance and honest feedback throughout my dissertation studies. I am confident that this dissertation would not have been possible without his constant unrelenting and patient support. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to all those people who made my multiple trips to Rwanda possible. Without these trips, I am certain that my perspectives about the dynamics in the region would not have evolved as they did. This dissertation represents several years of hard work, dedication and enduring sacrifices, and its completion would not have been possible without the support and assistance of all those who came along my side and walked this journey (or at least a part of it) with me.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire/ Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre. Rebel group supported by Rwanda and Uganda that was in part responsible for toppling Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko. Comprised primarily of Banyamulenge (Tutsis from South Kivu), but led by Laurent Kabila, who went on to become president of the DRC (formerly Zaire) in 1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADRN-Igihango</td>
<td>Alliance for Democracy and National Reconciliation /Alliance Pour La Democratie et la Reconciliation Nationale. Hutu rebel group coalition including Intrawri-Partnership, the FDLR, ARENA, and Nation-Imbaga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALiR</td>
<td>Army for the Liberation of Rwanda/Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda. One of the first extremist Hutu groups comprised of ex-FAR and Interahamwe formed in the refugee camps in the DRC shortly after the genocide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>Hutu rebel group that is part of the ADRN-Igihango coalition with Intrawri-Partnership, the FDLR, and Nation-Imbaga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBTG</td>
<td>Broad Based Transitional Government. The transitional government established by the Arusha Accords, which included the Tutsi RPF and five Hutu political parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique/Coalition for the Defence of the Republic. An extremist Hutu Power political party formed after the Habyarimana regime was forced by constitutional amendment to transition to a multi-party state. Promoted Parmehutu ideology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGD</td>
<td>Conflict-Generated Diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Computer-mediated communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>Congrès national pour la défense du peuple/National Congress for the Defense of the People. Established in 2006 by Laurent Nkunda in the Kivu region in the DRC. Split in 2009 when Nkunda was arrested, and Bernard Ntganda took control. Incorporated into the DRC army, the FARDC in response to a peace deal with the DRC government on March 23, 2009. Comprised primarily of Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulenge) concentrated in the Kivus who had lost their land when Hutu refugees (including ex-FAR and Interahamwe) fled across the border in 1994. A constant target of the FDLR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CNA-Ubumwe</strong></td>
<td>A Hutu rebel group formed in the diaspora, which is a part of a Hutu umbrella group, Partenariat-Intwari (Intrawri-Partnership) that includes FDLR-CMC, and PDN-Igihango.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DRC</strong></td>
<td>The Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ex-FAR</strong></td>
<td>Former members of the Armed Rwandan Forces/Forces Armées Rwandaises under President Habyarimana. Presumed to have participated in the genocide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FAR</strong></td>
<td>Members of the Armed Rwandan Forces/Forces Armées Rwandaises under President Habyarimana. Presumed to have participated in the genocide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FARDC</strong></td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. DRC’s official armed forces under President Kabila.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FDLR</strong></td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. Formed when ALiR merged with another Hutu rebel group in the DRC. Considered the primary “remnant” of the original Hutu power group (ex-FAR and Interahamwe). Military wing of FDU-Inkingi/RDR in East DRC, fighting along Rwandan border (the Kivus).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FDLR-CMC</strong></td>
<td>A Hutu splinter rebel group from FDLR formed in the diaspora. Part of a Hutu umbrella group, Partenariat-Intwari (Intrawri-Partnership) that includes PDN-Igihango and CNA-Ubumwe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FDR</strong></td>
<td>Democratic Forces for Resistance/Forces de Défence Rwandaises. Hutu rebel group formed in the diaspora. Part of UFDR coalition with RDR, and GID/IGR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FDU-Inkingi</strong></td>
<td>United Democratic Forces of Rwanda/Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda. Hutu rebel group formed in Paris in April 2006. Was RDR, joined with ADR-ISANGANO and the FRD. Based in Netherlands. Strong connection with FDLR. President is Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GID/IGR</strong></td>
<td>Groupe d’Initiative pour la Réconciliation /Initiative Group for Reconciliation. Hutu rebel group formed in the diaspora. Part of UFDR coalition with RDR and FDR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIIRD</strong></td>
<td>Highly Inclusive Inter-Rwandan Dialogue. The meetings organized by Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza of FDU-Inkingi and Spanish human rights advocates with Veritas Rwanda Forum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ICT</strong></td>
<td>Internet Communication Technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IRE</strong></td>
<td>Internet Research Ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M-23</strong></td>
<td>Mouvement du 23-Mars/March 23 Movement. Tutsi rebel group formed by some ex-CNDP. Named after the month and day of a peace deal established in 2009, which the rebels state was violated by the DRC government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formed on March 23, 2013.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MDR</strong></td>
<td>Mouvement Démocratique Républicain/Democratic Republican Movement. An extremist Hutu political party formed in 1991 after the Habyarimana regime was forced by constitutional amendment to transition to a multi-party state. Youth wing: Inkuba (“Thunder”). Based on Parmehutu ideology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nation-Imbaga</strong></td>
<td>A Hutu rebel group this is a part of the ADNR coalition, which included Nation-Imbaga, Intrawri-Partnership, the FDLR, and ARENA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PALIR</strong></td>
<td>The military wing of ALiR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parmehutu</strong></td>
<td>Parti du mouvement de l’émancipation des Bahutu. Founded during the era of independence. Parmehutu ideology is a racist philosophy that aggressively promoted the belief that Rwanda was the ancestral land of Hutus, not the Tutsis, and that permitting Tutsis to reside in Rwanda, or have any involvement in social or political life would threaten “Bahutu” solidarity. It was the Parmehutu political ideology that was promoted by Hutu extremists who took power from the Tutsis just after colonial independence. Parmehutu ideology promoted the majority rules edict that advocated Hutu domination, and Tutsi eradication. MDR party emanates from the Parmehutu party/movement during the era of independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partenariat-Intwari/ Intwari-Partnership</strong></td>
<td>Hutu rebel group formed in 2004 in Brussels by Emmanuel Habyarimana, a Hutu who was a part of the RPF government before going into exile in 2003. The co-founder was Déogratias Mushayidi, a Tutsi who served as Secretary General and Spokesperson. Serves as a Hutu umbrella group that includes CNA-Ubumwe, FDLR-CMC, and PDN-Igihango and PDN-Igihango. Became inactive when Déogratias Mushayidi formed PDP-IMANZI. In 2010 Intrawri-Partnership, the FDLR, ARENA, and Nation-Imbaga came together to form an alliance called the ADRN-Igihango.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PDC</strong></td>
<td>Parti Démocrate Chrétien/Democratic Christian Party. An extremist Hutu political party formed in 1991 after the Habyarimana regime was forced by constitutional amendment to transition to a multi-party state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PDN-Igihango/PDN</strong></td>
<td>A Hutu rebel group formed in the diaspora, which is a part of a Hutu umbrella group, Partenariat-Intwari (Intrawri-Partnership) that includes PDN-Igihango, CAN-Ubumwe, and FDLR-CMC.</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PDR-Ihumure</strong></td>
<td>Hutu political party formed by Paul Rusesabagina, as well as ex-FAR and Interahamwe in the United States (although has cells through Europe). Coordinates with FDU-Inkingi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PL</strong></td>
<td>Liberal Party/Parti Libéral. An extremist Hutu political party formed in 1991 after the Habyarimana regime was forced by constitutional amendment to transition to a multi-party state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PS-Imburikuri</strong></td>
<td>Extremist Hutu group formed prior to the 2010 elections in Rwanda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PSD</strong></td>
<td>Parti Social Démocrate/Social Democratic Party. An extremist Hutu political party formed in 1991 after the Habyarimana regime was forced by constitutional amendment to transition to a multi-party state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RCD</strong></td>
<td>The Congolese Rally for Democracy, sometimes referred to as the Rally for Congolese Democracy. Its French name, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RDR</strong></td>
<td>“Rally for the Return of Refugee and Democracy in Rwanda” (“National Army in Exile”). Former Hutu regime and genocidaires political party formed in post-genocide border refugee camp in DRC (Zaire). Name changed to “Republican Rally for Democracy in Rwanda” after a meeting in Paris of former Hutu regime leaders and genocidaires in exile in diaspora. Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza selected to be representative in the Netherlands and Ignace Murwanashyaka was selected to be the representative in Germany (1998-2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RUD-URANA</strong></td>
<td>Splinter group of the Hutu FDLR led by Dr. Jean Marie Vianney Higiro.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RPA</strong></td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Army. Tutsi military branch of RPF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RPF</strong></td>
<td>Fronte Patriotique Rwandese/Rwandan Patriotic Front (“Inkotanyi”). Tutsi rebel group created in Uganda. Founding members are Fred Rwigema, Paul Kagame and Faistin Kayumba, Comprised primarily of second-generation Tutsi exiles from post-1959 Hutu persecution. After unsuccessfully demanding entry into Rwanda and a voice in the country, the RPF Invaded Rwanda in 1990. Took control of the country in July 1994, and stopped the genocide. Currently the controlling political party in Rwanda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTLM</td>
<td>Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (&quot;Radio RTLM&quot;). Official government radio under President Habyarimana. Disseminated non-stop hate speech inciting genocide against the Tutsi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Social Networking Site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFDR</td>
<td>Coalition of three Hutu military opposition groups formed in 1998 including FRD (Resistance Forces for Democracy), RDR and Initiative Group for Reconciliation (IGR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAR</td>
<td>Union Nationale Rwandaise. Royalist Tutsi party. Active before and during era of independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1: DIASPORA IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: 
GLOBALIZATION OF DOMESTIC POLITICS

A relatively new area of study in peace studies and conflict analysis focuses on the effect of forced migration on civil armed conflict, particularly the effect of refugee and exile communities on the peace and conflict processes in the home country (Salehyan, & Gleditsch, 2006). This area of study has gained recent attention because of changing patterns of civil conflict, particularly in the Global South where in the last two decades there have been between 16 and 33 armed conflicts at any one time, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa (SIPRI, 1993, 2008). The dynamics surrounding these new patterns of conflict reflect a significant departure from historically familiar, interstate conflict over territory, toward new forms of ethnonationalist intrastate conflict that sometimes extend well beyond static borders (Demmers, 2002; Kahler, 2006). “New war” studies are concerned with exploring these new patterns of conflict – and particularly violent ethnonational intrastate conflict, in a post-Cold War era.

The effects of globalization on these kinds of conflicts are many and often include the “deterritorialization”\(^1\) of conflict through the globalization of communication technologies; mass forced migration in response to conflict which scatters homeland residents throughout the world; the enduring psychological attachment to homeland among diaspora groups; and the tendency of diaspora generated from conflict to remain engaged in homeland politics, particularly homeland conflict due to their enduring psychological attachment. These dynamics are all areas of interest for “new war” scholars (Behr, 2008; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998. 2000, 2002; Demmers, 2002; Duffield, 2001; Kahler, 2006; Lyons, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b). In fact, intersects between a dramatic increase in migration (forced and voluntary) and globalization have allowed migrants to claim a stake in homeland affairs in

\(^1\) The concept of ‘deterritorialization’ can refer to the lessening of a nation-state’s control over its territory due to globalization, as well as conflict becoming ‘deterritorialized’ as a consequence of it spilling across
ways not previously possible. But other dynamics are involved as well, influencing diaspora attitudes and actions toward their respective home countries. Commenting on reasons why migrant groups are increasingly becoming key players in the new patterns of civil conflict, Kaldor-Robinson (2002) notes that:

…as globalization increases interconnectedness and at the same time strengthens feelings of alienation, which in turn increase the popularity of fundamentalist ideologies, whether religion or ethno-nationalist, it is likely that diasporic networks will be of increasing importance both as actors in the “new wars” and in changing national narratives.

Hence, from an analytical point of view, the study of contemporary conflict (e.g. the onset, duration and termination of war) is impossible in the absence of close attention of diasporic dynamics (p. 185).

**Ethnonational Civil Conflict and Territory**

Territory often remains the focal point of civil conflict due to individuals’ attachment and/or practical interests (Demmers, 2002; Goemans, 2006; Kahler, 2006; Lyons, 2006). Sack defines territoriality as the exertion of influence or control (often by a nation state) over a geographical area (Sack, 1985, as cited in Kahler, 2006). Consequently, individuals assert and/or are often identified by their territorial attachment to a region, such as their citizenship in a particular nation-state, often in a very symbolic manner (Kahler, 2006). Territoriality is so powerfully symbolic that Lyons (2006a) and Toft (2003) go so far as to describe “homeland” as a perception only, which in time often bears little resemblance to the actual region. Territorial attachments range in intensity, with high levels of territorial attachment involving considerable emotion, which increases the stakes in intrastate conflict, particularly when religion, cultural symbolism, and a way of life is attached to a certain geographical territory (Kahler, 2006; King & Melvin, 2000; Lyons, 2004, 2006a, 2006b). In fact, conflict over territory often involves such high levels of intense emotions that violence emanating from conflict often escalates quickly outside borders, sometimes throughout the world as migrant groups engage in conflict from host countries, due to their enduring attachment to their homelands.
and conflicts tend to be far more protracted than other types of conflict (Kahler, 2006).

The links between ethnonationalism and territory are key to understanding why the homeland sometimes takes on mythical proportions for diaspora, particularly when co-ethnics perceive the territory as their ancestral homeland. Their perceptions of and claims to exclusivity also help to explain why ethnonationalist civil conflict is often more violent and remains far more protracted than traditional interstate conflict (Kahler, 2006), as well as why diaspora self-identified as co-ethnics remain engaged politically in homeland affairs, particularly if the ruling government is perceived as being from a different ethnic group.

The Globalization of Ethnonationalist Civil Conflict

Ethnonationalist civil conflict has become increasingly globalized, due to the most recent wave of globalization, which has allowed civil conflict to extend well beyond traditional territorial boundaries (Guarnizo, Portes & Haller, 2003). The development of new technologies has globalized not only market economies, but the areas of communication, travel, and the media as well (Behr, 2008). Such changes have challenged the notion of the territorially bound nation-state, limiting the autonomy and control of ruling governments, and making borders more porous; requiring changes in how sovereign nation-states respond to conflict within their “bounded territorial units” (Kahler, 2006, p. 2). For instance, the globalization of communication technologies permits a level of rapid communication, mobilization, dissemination of information (including propaganda), and the exchange or transfer of technologies among transnational political actors on a scale unparalleled during the Cold War era (Behr, 2008; Kahler, 2006; Kent, 2005; Lyons, 2005, 2006a). It is interesting to note that despite the impact of globalization on nation-states, and the significant increase in migration (both voluntary and involuntary), territorial attachment has not declined, and in fact has remained the focal point of many civil conflicts (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Demmers, 2002, 2007; Kaiser, 2002; Wayland, 2004).
Ethnonationalism and territoriality take on increasing importance in the context of forced migration, particularly when the ethnic dimension of the conflict (real or perceived) is the root cause of forced displacement. Territorial attachment among co-ethnics and the actions associated with this type of attachment are best considered a form of ethnonationalism. Several studies have found that ethnonationalism appears to be a distinguishing feature of the newest wave of civil conflict, as well as the newest wave of forced migration, most of whom left their countries due to violence (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011; DeVotta, 2000; King & Melvin, 2000). The landscape of refugee flows has changed considerably in the post-Cold War era, mirroring changing patterns of civil conflict. In the past three decades the number of refugees and political asylum-seekers migrating to, or resettling in host countries in the West has increased sharply, and are increasingly a result of mass forced migration as a consequence of protracted ethnonationalist civil conflict over territory.

In 2012 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNCHR) estimated that there were approximately 42.5 million individuals forcibly displaced from their homes worldwide. Among the world’s displaced population, the UNHCR is responsible for approximately 35.8 million, which according to the agency, is the second highest on record (UNHCR, 2012). Among the many worrying trends cited by the UNHCR, are the number of individuals being displaced on a daily basis (23,000 per day in 2012 compared to 10,000 per day in 2003), and a dramatic increase in the number of years refugees are forced to remain in a state of displacement, are of the greatest concern. The UNHCR cites the number of new refugees generated in 2012 (7.6 million) as the highest since 1999. With regard to the protracted nature of refugee resettlement, refugees are now likely to wait in excess of five years for a durable solution, significantly increasing the psychological trauma, as well as the possibility of refugee camps becoming militarized (UNHCR, 2012).

Refugees who are forced to migrate en mass in response to civil conflict tend to exhibit a far different typology than other migrant groups. For
instance, Lyons (2006a) discusses the difference between voluntary economic migrants whose attachment to their homeland tends to wane after migrating to a new country, compared to those who are forced to migrate due to violent conflict. These latter migrant groups, often by definition, retain a strong attachment to their homeland regardless of the amount of time they have lived in another land, and relate in a different manner to their home country. This dynamic will be explored briefly in the present chapter, and in greater depth in Chapter 2.

**Diaspora Involvement In Ethnonationalist Intrastate Conflict**

**Diaspora Defined**

There are several terms used to describe migrant populations living outside their homelands, including immigrant, guest worker, refugee, political asylum-seeker (or “exile”), and “expatriate” (Tölölyan, 1991). One term that has seen a resurgence in use is “diaspora.” The word diaspora is Greek in origin and has ancient roots; it was originally used in reference to the historic Jewish exile chronicled in the Hebrew Bible. The Greek word “diaspora” literally means “scattering” or “dispersion” (“dia” – over, and “speiro” – to sow). Diaspora has since not only been used to describe ancient ethnonationalist groups, such as Jewish and Greek populations, but other historic groups as well, such as the Armenians, who persisted in a desire to return home after centuries of forced exile from their historic homelands (Sheffer, 2003).

There is considerable debate among scholars regarding the definition of the term diaspora, including what groups of migrants should be considered as “diaspora,” and which groups should not. Contemporary attempts to operationalize the concept of diaspora are often based on the historic models of Jewish and Greek diaspora (Shepperson, 1966 as cited in Brubaker, 2005). Definitions put forth in the last several decades range from broad and inclusive (see Tölölyan, 1991) to more narrow definitions with a set of specific criteria relating to forced dispersion, a collective identity, an ongoing relationship with the home country, a desire to return home, and some level of alienation from...
the host country. Several scholars have cautioned against depicting diaspora as a homogeneous group (Cochrane, Baser & Swain, 2009; Vertovec, 2005). Vertovec (2005) cites the importance of diasporic membership being self-ascribed, and although belonging to a diaspora involves a strong emotional attachment to “commonly claimed origins and cultural attributes associated with them,” he also cautions against including criteria of diaspora membership based solely upon how “ethnic” one is, such as the “number of festivals celebrated, ethnic meals cooked, or style of dress worn” (p. 2).

In his seminal work exploring the nature of diaspora Safran (1991) provided a detailed list he refers to as generic criteria that can be applied to a variety of contemporary diaspora groups, including Armenian, Chinese, Greek, Indian, Kurdish and Palestinian migrant groups. His criteria are based on a Jewish diaspora paradigm, and include:

1. Dispersal from a specific original “center” to a foreign region
2. Retaining a “collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland—its physical location, history, achievements, and, often enough, sufferings”
3. A sense of alienation from their host country
4. A regard for their “ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return—if and when conditions are appropriate”
5. A pattern of relating “personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity, which reach across political boundaries…a collective commitment to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its independence, safety, and prosperity”
6. A “wish to survive as a distinct community—in most instances as a minority—by maintaining and transmitting a cultural and/or religious heritage derived from their ancestral home and the symbols based on it.
7. The development of communal institutions that reflect their “cultural,
religious, economic, and/or political relationships with the homeland” (Safran, 1999 as cited in Safran, 2005, p. 37).

Shain and Barth (2003) also provide a more narrow definition of diaspora as:

People with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland – whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control. Diaspora members identify themselves, or are identified by others – inside and outside their homeland – as part of the homeland’s national community, and as such are often called upon to participate, or are entangled, in homeland-related affairs (p. 452).

Politically mobilized diasporas are often categorized by their level of activity. Core members are the “organizing elite” who have a high level of activity and participate in the mobilization of the broader diasporic members. “Passive members” engage in activities when called upon, and “silent members” of the diaspora are typically not involved in political activities, except in times of crisis (Shain & Barth, 2003). Diaspora groups fall into three distinct timeline categories: “historical diaspora,” which existed in premodern times (e.g., the Jewish diaspora after the Babylonian exile), “new diaspora,” which existed in the post-industrial era (e.g., the Turkish Armenians in the early 1920s), and “incipient ethnonationalist” diaspora, which are the most recent group of diaspora existing in current times (Smith & Stares, 2007).

Ethnonationalism Defined

There is considerable ambiguity in the literature regarding a precise definition of “ethnonationalism,” thus it is important to define this term in order to clarify its meaning, particularly within the diasporic context, which is the focus of this study. Sheffer (2003) has defined ethnonational diasporas as:

A socio-political formation, created as a result of either voluntary or forced migration, whose members regard themselves as of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one or several host countries. Members of such entities maintain regular or occasional contacts with what they regard as their homelands and with
individuals and groups of the same background residing in other host countries (pp. 9-10).

Ethnonationalism has also been defined as the loyalty an ethnic group has for its nation-state, whether living within or outside of the bounded territory (Conversi, 2007). Likewise, Brandon, Popon and Melton (2010) define ethnonationalism as “the source of national identity, the adoration of nation, making people from the same community believe they are related to each other and enforcing their feelings of being connected and having a common destiny” (p. 170).

There is some confusion about whether nationalism and ethnonationalism are synonymous terms, and whether these terms are referencing the loyalty to a nation, or loyalty to a group of people who represent a nation. The term “nationalism” has been used by scholars to refer to both—loyalty to a nation, as well as loyalty to a group of people who represent a nation, such as a group of co-ethnics who may or may not live within a specific nation-state. Conversi (2007) asserts that the terms nationalism and ethnonationalism should be used when referring to loyalty to a group of people who represent a nation, and the term "patriotism" should be used when referring to loyalty to a nation. In fact, Conversi argues that all nationalism among co-ethnics is actually ethnonationalism, which is practiced in some African and Asian countries, whereas patriotism is what is most commonly practiced in the West.

Although nationalism and ethnonationalism may both refer to loyalty to a group representing a nation, Smith (1993) and Bradatan, Popon and Melton (2010) assert that there are significant differences in terms of how such loyalty is understood and expressed in various cultures. For instance, Smith notes that in most Western 2 countries national identity is based on common

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2 In this study I use the terms “Western” and “non-Western” countries when making a distinction between more economically developed countries (often OECD member countries) from countries with an underdeveloped industrial and economic base. Other terms commonly used are ‘Developed’ and “Least Developed Country” (LDC), ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ These designations can be controversial in that they do not necessarily accurately describe the stage of development reached by a particular nation-state, and often denote notions of power differentials. I use these terms as a matter of distinction, and to
historical memory, symbols, folklore and traditions, whereas in non-Western countries national identity is more commonly based on an “ethnic model,” where a nation is perceived as a “community of common descent with people being related by birth/blood” (Smith, 1991, p. 11), who inhabit an “historic land.” Smith notes that in a “non-Western” context an historic homeland is often invested with powerful emotional attachments as it comes to represent the place where the people’s ancestors, “saints and heroes lived, worked, prayed and fought” (p. 9). This strong emotional attachment to homeland territory often leads to claims among co-ethnics of homeland territory being “exclusively theirs, consigning all non-members to the status of foreigners or outsiders who do not properly belong” (Kaiser, 2004, p. 230).

Max Weber (1968) captured the essence of ethnonationalism (nationalism based on an ethnic model) asserting that co-ethnics operating as a cohesive group are by nature political. Of particular interest is his emphasis on the subjective belief in a common line of ancestry versus an actual kinship group:

We shall call "ethnic groups" those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of custom or both, or because of the memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership (Gemeinsamkeit) differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed identity, not a group with concrete social action, like the latter. In our sense ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere. On the other hand, it is primarily the political community, no matter how artificially organized, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity (p. 389).

In other words, the actual existence of a common ancestry is not required for a group to be considered an “ethnic group,” but rather it is the perception of—or belief in—a shared ancestry among the group members that is required, and in fact, often it is this subjective belief that drives group formation and

reflect terms used in the diaspora literature, but note the importance of acknowledging the contested
subsequent political action. Also, because ethnicity is based on self-identification and perceived commonality, it cannot be defined externally. Conversi (2007) concludes that ethnicity is one of the most significant aspects in the development of nationalism.

For the purposes of this study, ethnonationalism will be defined as a form of nationalism, often found in non-Western regions, involving loyalty to a group of co-ethnics who are perceived as having a shared ancestry through birth/blood, and who are the “rightful owners” of a perceived historic land, to which they are strongly attached (whether they currently reside within the bounded territory or outside of it). This loyalty serves as the foundation for collective action (which is often political in nature) focused on their imagined homeland.

**Diaspora Typology: Motivations for Involvement in Homeland Affairs**

The role of diaspora in ethnonationalist intrastate conflict has become a focus of inquiry in the past few decades, where ways in which diaspora members remain strongly attached to their homeland territory and consequently relate to their homeland government on a political level are explored, including potentially positive and negative affects on peace efforts in post-conflict regions (Brinkerhoff, 2006; Baser & Swain, 2008; Cheran, 2003; Cochran, Baser & Swain, 2009; Demmers, 2002; Horst, 2008; King & Melvin, 2000; Kahler, 2006; Lyons, 2004, 2006a, 2006b; Safran, 1991; Shain & Barth, 2003; Sheffer, 2003; Vertovec, 2005; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006).

Diasporas that result from violent forced migration often possess distinct characteristics that influence their political activities. Cheran (2003) who has studied Sri Lankan diaspora cites several characteristics of incipient ethnonationalist diasporas that distinguish them from other transnational communities. According to Cheran, diaspora tend to retain a collective memory of pain and loss, and experience a sense of alienation from both their host country and home countries that leaves them feeling isolated. They are...
deterritorialized from their home country, which Cheran theorizes may lead to an exaggerated attachment to the “imagined homeland.” In addition, they tend to remain invested in preserving and maintaining their homelands, and maintain a “unique ethnonationalist consciousness” and a desire to return home (Cheran, 2003, p. 5). However, there have been some challenges though to a strict “homeland orientation and return” being applied to all diaspora, often presumed to be posited by some diaspora scholars such as by Safran, Cheran and Lyons. Khayati (2008) examined the concept of homeland orientation often attributed to diaspora groups and notes how a strong emphasis on homeland orientation (i.e., a desire to return to a physical homeland) may negate the experiences of diaspora who do not desire to return home and instead re-create their culture in their respective host countries. Khayati cites Safran’s newer writings where the notion of homeland is broadened to include homelands beyond the physical, including “spiritual, emotional, and/or cultural home that is outside the hostland” (Safran, 2004, p. 13).

Lyons (2004) developed a model of conflict-generated diaspora (CGD) that includes homeland orientation as a component of ways in which diaspora generated from conflict differ from other transnational migrant groups, and how these differing dynamics manifest in both collective identity and action. Lyons notes how the trauma CGDs experience prior to and as a result of conflict and subsequent forced migration leads to a desire to keep alive the memory of the original cause of their displacement, which ultimately becomes incorporated into their identity (Lyons, 2004, 2006a, 2006b). They do this by maintaining an imagined homeland, or as Faist (2000) describes, “a vision and memory of a lost or an imagined homeland still to be established” (Faist, 2000, 197). Lyons notes how many CGD groups keep the memories of the trauma alive by telling and retelling stories of their trauma, including passing these stories of trauma and violent dispersal on to the next generation as a sort of trauma “inheritance” (Lyons, 2004, 2007). The cause of and circumstances surrounding their mass forced migration leads to the development of what
Lyons (and others) refer to as a collective identity, which serves as a focal point for their long-distance nationalism and other political activities which are most often focused on their homeland (Anderson, 1992; Bernal, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2012; Shain & Barth, 2003).

According to Lyons, the second distinguishing factor of CGDs involves ways in which they relate to their homeland. Lyons describes how many CGD groups maintain an ongoing relationship with their homeland that is different from other migrant groups. Although other migrants may remain connected on a social or humanitarian level, CGDs remain active in their homeland affairs primarily on a political level. Although they remain outside their country of origin, Lyons (2004) echoes Shain and Barth’s (2003) contentions that CGDs view themselves as key stakeholders in regard to homeland affairs, a contention borne out of their desire to return home once conditions allow. Lyons refers to this dynamic as the myth of return (Faist, 2000; Lyons, 2004).

The third distinguishing factor according to Lyons involves CGDs’ tendency to create transnational networks, which are based on ethnic affiliation, a sense of collective identity, and collective goals (Lyons, 2004). Such transnational organizations and networks serve numerous purposes such as keeping nationalists’ hopes of return alive and solidifying their collective identity by reminding CGDs of the circumstances surrounding their forced migration, and often serve as the conduit for their political activities (Demmers, 2007). Political activism through diaspora transnational networks is nothing new, but with the globalization of communication technologies, CGDs now have far greater ability to mobilize their compatriots throughout the world through social networking websites. Transnational networks also engage in fund-raising activities, which often include raising financial support for insurgency and rebel groups actively fighting in the homeland region (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000, 2002; Demmers, 2005; Lyons, 2004; Horst, 2008).
How Diasporas are Defined in the Present Study

For the purposes of this study, diaspora is defined as a sub-set of the broader immigrant population, comprised of individuals who have been generated by conflict in their homelands, and who were expelled from their home countries by force. Drawing on Lyons’ (2004, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) work on collective experiences, beliefs, attitudes, motivations and activities, the term “conflict-generated diaspora” will be used to distinguish contemporary diaspora from previous waves and types of migrants. Further, drawing on the work of Cheran (2003), Conners (2007), and Wayland (2004), and other diaspora scholars cited in Chapters 1 through 3, for the purposes of this study, conflict-generated diasporas are considered ethnonationalist, by definition, since as Cheran (2003) noted, the conflicts leading to displacement are principally ethnonationalist in nature.

It is important to note though that defining diaspora as ethnonationalist CGD is in no way intended to imply, either directly or indirectly, that diasporas are homogeneous populations. Rather, diaspora communities are quite heterogeneous with regard to attitudes, beliefs, experiences and activities, thus references to conflict-generated diaspora typologies pertaining to collective dynamics do not negate individual differences and sub-group deviations and uniqueness. In addition, the term ‘CGD’ is used throughout this manuscript in order to maintain clarity, yet not all of the sources being referenced and/or relied upon in the literature review use this term in their work, as many diaspora scholars use the term ‘diaspora’ in a generic sense when referring to a range of diaspora groupings. Where the meaning of the term ‘diaspora’ in cited passages differs from the one adopted in this work, it was maintained in two types of circumstances: 1) when used in a direct quotation; and 2) when the original author was referring to broader migrant groups beyond those generated from ethnonationalist conflict.
Conflict Generated Diaspora: Facilitators of Peace or Fomenters of Conflict?

Although most scholars studying CGD dynamics agree on the major tenets of an identity typology they do not necessarily agree on whether CGD activities have a positive or negative impact on peace-building processes. At the heart of this debate is whether the political activities engaged in by some CGDs exacerbate or mitigate conflict in the homeland (Al-Ali, 2007; Baser & Swain, 2008, 2009; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004; Demmers, 2002; Lyons, 2004; Mohamoud, 2005; Public International Law & Policy Group [PILPG], 2009; Smith & Stares, 2007). Those advocating the position that CGDs’ political activities are generally positive argue that CGDs can make contributions to their homelands by assisting in peace negotiation processes, helping in the development of civil society and nation-building efforts, and providing poverty alleviation through financial remittances to family and friends (Baser & Swain, 2008; Cochrane, 2007; Mohamoud, 2005, 2006, 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006; Zunzer, 2004).

Baser and Swain (2008) assert that numerous CGDs living in the West are well positioned to have a positive impact on conditions in their homeland because they often have a greater understanding of the dynamics internal to the country than members of the international community, including having greater insights into local issues, and having a better understanding of the historical context and political complexities of the conflict. Cochrane (2007) echoes Baser and Swain’s assessment: “…being from outside the conflict zone but having a connection to it, might provide diaspora groups with specific abilities as third party actors in pre-negotiations or even in formal talks over a political settlement” (p. 27).

Conversely, other scholars argue that CGDs that are engaged in political activities stall peace efforts by interfering with politics in the homeland, thus prolonging ethnic and/or nationalist conflict and making compromise more difficult (Lyons, 2003; Vertovec, 2005), financing rebels, (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002), taking advantage of liberal Western political systems by engaging in
political activities against their home countries (Shain, 1994), and utilizing technology available in the West that is not always available in the home country to engage in virtual conflict often providing them a strategic advantage over their home country governments (Demmers, 2007; Lyons, 2004, Østergaard-Nielsen 2006).

Studies focusing on the causes of civil war reveal that a large diaspora increases the chances of renewed violence in a post-conflict region six-fold when all other factors were held constant (Collier & Hoeffler 2000, 2002). King and Melvin (2000) found that diaspora organizations with a strong ethnic identity when well organized and well funded can become powerful independent actors often successfully challenging the ruling governments in their homelands. Even with various constraints placed upon their political activities, King and Melvin caution that diaspora organizations are not benign players on the political scene and their political activities on “local, national and international political processes” should be taken seriously (p. 779).

**Ways in which CGDs Foster Peace**

There are many scholars who assert that the threat of CGDs is exaggerated, and that CGDs contribute positively to peace-building efforts in the home country (or possess the potential to). Positive contributions to homeland dynamics by CGDs tend to fall into six categories: humanitarian aid, community support groups, women’s organizations, political campaigning, human rights, and church organizations. Many CGDs engage in a variety of these activities through collective action (Warnecke, 2010).

Brinkerhoff cites three factors that influence CGDs’ ability to positively contribute to the home country. The first relates to their ability to effectively mobilize, which enables the “bonding and bridging” of social capital. This dynamic can contribute to developing a sense of psychological empowerment and the ability to develop resources in the host country for the benefit of the home country. The second is the availability of opportunity structures, such as access to economic resources and various infrastructures (e.g., technological and informational) that are required to facilitate their contributions. The third
necessary factor involves CGDs’ willingness and motivation to act for the benefit of those they left behind (Brinkerhoff, 2006a).

Numerous case studies illustrate that CGDs can and often do contribute positively to the development of civil society in their home countries (Brinkerhoff, 2006a; Mohamoud, 2005; Warnecke, 2010). Mohamoud notes that a large percentage of CGD members engage in “civic-oriented” activities including community development and business investment through livelihood development, on the local level, which Mohamoud asserts helps strengthen civil society from the bottom up. This type of contribution can help with peace-building through poverty alleviation, thus lessening the chances of conflict erupting over scarce resources (Mohamoud, 2005, 2006).

CGDs also assist in poverty alleviation by providing individual and collective remittances. Although collective remittances are often seen as a security risk because they are may be used to support rebels (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001), Mohamoud argues that individual remittances are far larger than collective remittances and are sent primarily to relatives to help them meet daily living needs, such as shelter, food, health care and education. Such remittances help the local economy as well as individual families.

Although the consensus in the literature suggests that CGDs’ long-distance nationalism will likely increase the chances of renewed conflict, Baser and Swain (2008) argue that not all CGDs engage politically with the intention of maintaining the conflict, thus some political engagement can be positive. While acknowledging the ways in which CGDs can negatively interfere with homeland affairs, Baser and Swain note the great potential CGDs have for engaging in activities that foster peace. One way CGD members may do this is by returning home after a regime change. They cite the example of many members of the Iraqi and Afghanistan CGD who returned home to take leadership roles in the post-regime governments, transferring new attitudes and technologies gained while living in exile in the West (Baser & Swain, 2008). Baser and Swain also cite numerous examples of CGDs that successfully served as third-party mediators in homeland conflict, including the
Northern Ireland diaspora, and the Somali diaspora. Purdy similarly asserts that CGDs can be effective third-party mediators in homeland conflict because they are outside of the country and have a broader perspective of the issues, and are not as easily influenced by intense emotions, such as anger (Purdy, 2003 as cited in Baser & Swain, 2008).

In his 2005 study of African CGDs Mohamoud (2005) found that many CGDs were involved in positive political activities, such as transmitting “new political ideas and practices that help the promotion of a democratic political life in the homeland” (p. 32). Thus, CGDs can foster peace building through the exchange of new ideas and technologies, contributions to civil society infrastructure development and poverty alleviation.

**Ways in Which CGDs Foment Conflict**

Several scholars have noted CGDs’ potential to increase the risk of renewed conflict, as well as make conflicts more protracted (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; Demmers2007; Kahler, 2006; Lyons, 2007). In fact, several scholars cited Lord Action’s reference to this phenomenon as early as 1862 when he noted that exile was the nursery of nationality, meaning that living in exile actually increases feelings of ethnonationalism (Demmers, 2007; Faist, 2008). Demmers (2007) notes how most separatist movements develop within CGDs, such as the Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, from Sri Lanka), Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), National Liberation Army (NLA, Albanians from Macedonia), and Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), all of which were founded in the United States or Europe by political exiles, engaging politically against their home countries. She argues that one of the most significant elements that allows for this dynamic, in addition to co-ethnic group formation in exile, is the availability of political opportunity structures in Western liberal democracies, such as in the United States.

Mohamoud (2005) lists seven ways in which CGDs can have a negative effect on homeland affairs: 1) supporting rival political groups; 2) having unrealistic expectations and making unrealistic demands; 3) using undemocratic means to achieve their goals; 4) organizing around special
interests, e.g., ethnic, clan or religious affiliation (which can increase existing fragmentation in the homeland); 5) using modern technology to influence (and manipulate) perceptions and political processes in the homeland and host countries (technology often not available in the home country); 6) transferring technology to rebel groups, such as providing access to the Internet, mobile phones, etc.; and 7) acting as a distant political wing for armed rebel groups waging war within the homeland, or its surrounding regions.

A considerable body of research highlights the reasons for and ways that CGDs increase the risk of conflict in their home countries and why this occurs. Lyons (2004, 2007) points out that CGDs often have an investment in prolonging the conflict, rooted in a combination of personal agendas and outdated perspectives of homeland conditions. Noting how CGDs often take hardline positions on issues at stake, Lyons and Mandeville point how CGDs have a tendency to view homeland dynamics in fixed and categorical terms making compromise difficult. Such attitudes often result in accusations against those on their side who do seek authentic compromise and reconciliation as “traitors to the cause” (Lyons, 2003, 2004; Lyons & Mandeville, 2008).

Some research studies also appear to indicate that compromise and reconciliation may threaten the collective identity of CGDs, a dynamic that may act as a deterrent to compromise. Demmers describes how CGDs often base their collective identity on a sense of historic victimhood that reconciliation would threaten (Demmers, 2002). Verotec (2005) asserts that because the circumstances surrounding the CGDs’ dispersal becomes engrained in their identity, the ancestral homeland takes on an almost mythical nature, becoming a symbol of all that is lost and all that must be restored. Lyons argues that this dynamic can lead to CGDs becoming stuck in time, unable to move beyond the circumstances of their forced migration, leading to an idealized conception of their home country based on conditions prior to the conflict (Lyons, 2003, 2004).

Demmers found that CGDs often portray themselves as strong nationalists who are authorities on the traditional ways of their homeland. They
often see themselves as responsible for keeping their traditions alive until the time when they can reclaim their homeland (Demmers, 2002). Lyons (2004) states that this dynamic, where CGDs members adhere strongly to old traditions and social structures, can render “diaspora an obsolete organization that clings to old ways while the homeland evolves” (p. 13). Lyons (2004) also asserts that the myth of return and a collective identity born out of unresolved conflict and violence often leads to exaggerated claims of poor conditions and human rights abuses in their homeland.

Lyons explains how exaggerated claims that the homeland government is brutal and oppressive are often rooted in the original conflict, particularly if the ruling government is from the “winning side” of a civil war. Both Demmers (2007) and Lyons (2007) speculate that such exaggerations may serve numerous purposes, including providing a justification for remaining outside the country and engaging in the conflict from a position of relative safety and comfort, as well as giving CGDs a sense of purpose and legitimacy as they continue to fight for their cause. Lyons (2007) describes how such exaggerated claims of abuse and oppression can also be a result of outdated information and a lack of connection with what is actually going on in the homeland, as well as a reluctance to accept new information, stating:

“[t]here may be multiple reasons for those in the diaspora to engage in exaggerated criticism of the homeland government. It is not surprising that some diaspora have perceptions of the homeland that are frozen in time or distorted by nostalgia rather than recent experience. As the years pass, diaspora groups are likely to be increasingly distant from homeland events. Stories are told and retold, sometimes freezing images in the past and making it difficult to incorporate new information that may be from “untrusted” sources (Lyons, 2007, p. 533).

Demmers (2007) captures the consensus among scholars who acknowledge CGDs’ propensity to foment conflict in their homeland, quoting Fuglerund (1999) who argued that “[w]hat revolutionary nationalism does in exile is to provide a name for individual nostalgia and shared exclusion from the host country” (as cited in Demmers, 2007, p. 20). Building on Fuglerund’s
assertion, Demmers notes how CGDs draw on “traditional and revolutionary narratives” in their support for “ethnonationalist separatism” as a coping mechanism, something she refers to as the “exile condition” (p. 21).

Transnational Diaspora Communities

Diaspora members in general are often referred to—and even defined by—their transnationalism, in that they engage in activities that cross international boundaries (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Cheran, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Vertovec, 1999; Wayland, 2004). Faist (1998) describes diaspora transnationalism as occurring in “transnational social spaces,” which he defines as “the combinations of social and symbolic ties, positions in networks and organizations that can be found in at least two geographically and internationally distinct places” (p. 40). Research in the area of diaspora transnationalism tends to focus on both diaspora networks and diaspora identities with an emphasis on diaspora networks. Yet, given the ethnonationalist impetus for establishing and maintaining both, the distinction between networks and identities is more a useful abstraction than a clearly discernible difference. In this section the nature of transnationalism within a diasporic context will be briefly explored, and examples of some ways in which diaspora, particularly CGD, engage in transnational networks on a political level will be provided. Transnational identity will be explored in Chapter 2, with a more detailed examination of the types of activities facilitated through transnational networks provided in Chapter 3, including how they are used within a diasporic context, which is the primary focus of the study.

Broadly speaking, transnationalism within a migrant context involves the internationalization of social, economic and political relationships and activities (Al-Ali, Black & Koser, 2001), where individuals live their lives across international borders (Guarnizo, Portes & Haller, 2003). Vertovec and Cohen (1996) define transnationalism as a “site for political engagement,” which according to Khayati (2008) is a reference to the tendency of CGDs to engage in transnational political activities focused on homeland affairs “….realized largely through different transnational political, social, economic and cultural
performances that refugee and immigrant population sustain across the boundaries of nation states” (p. 28), what Anderson (1992) has termed “long-distance nationalism.” Wayland (2004) defines diasporic transnationalism as involving “identities and intra-ethnic relations that transcend state borders” where migrants “subsume two or more languages and cultures, and who have frequent contact with ethnic kindred [“co-ethnics”] in other locations” (p. 408). Mohamoud and Osman (2008) refer to diasporic transnationalism as “intersecting social, economic and political bridges that link their new places of residence with their original homelands” (p. 39). The notion that diasporic identities, relationships and activities span the globe and are not contained within a territory is in contrast to the traditional notion of the mutually exclusive categories of “domestic versus international” and “state actor versus non-state actor.” As Turner (2008) describes it, CGDs are “at one and the same time, both and neither” (p. 2) domestic or international, and are often referred to as transnational actors. The multiple attachments within the multiple spheres where CGDs operate are often called transnational social fields (Schiller, Basch, & Blanc-Szanton, 1995).

Bradatan et al, (2010) refer to CGDs who remain connected to their homelands as transmigrants and note how they present a special case in that they remain strongly committed to a homeland in which they no longer live, while exhibiting varying levels of commitment to their new country of residence. In this sense, they “live with their soul at home, and their body abroad” (p. 175). According to Bradatan, et al, the emotional life of many CGD members is often connected to their country of origin, which they still consider their home, and many “have no interest in interacting with the social life of the new land, as they look forward to the moment of return” (p. 175) whereas others can become quite connected to and invested in their new host country while remaining strongly attached to their homelands.

Transnational relationships and activities can be constructed and maintained on an individual basis, such as is the case with migrants who maintain personal relationships with family and friends in their home country,
and includes collective activities through organized community efforts, membership in transnational organizations, and activities that span two or more nation-states (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Guarnizo, Portes, Haller, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Vertovec, 1999). Transnationalism can involve activities within a variety of domains as well, including social, civic and political realms, on an individual or collective basis.

Much of the recent research focusing on contemporary CGDs’ political activities on a transnational level (political transnationalism) explores the ways in which CGDs relate to the home country and host country, including identifying collective motivations, goals and activities. For example, Wayland (2004) cites several ways in which CGDs get involved in their home country affairs on a political level:

- When diasporas engage directly or indirectly in homeland politics; when actors in the homeland – government officials, opposition groups, co-ethnics — actively seek their support;
- When actors in the homeland provide diasporas with economic or political support;
- When actors in the homeland deny or discredit the legitimacy of the diaspora;
- When the diaspora forge ties with sympathetic third parties such as other ethnic groups, nongovernmental organisations, political parties, or international organisations (Wayland, 2004, p. 410).

When transnational networks are based on ethnonationalist status, there tends to be an increase in solidarity and common goals, which appear to increase CGDs’ collective action on a political level. Wayland (2004) describes how co-ethnics operating in transnational networks frequently engage in a variety of concurrent political activities, often with the aid of what Wayland calls “international allies” – members of the international community, who may or may not be members of the CGD communities. Wayland echoes other researchers when she describes how members of transnational ethnic networks often take advantage of political opportunity structures in the host
country, advocating for their causes in the homeland, influencing foreign policy, and providing support to co-ethnics in the home country.

**Case Studies on CGDs Engaged in Transnational Networks**

Several case studies provide examples of CGDs and their political activities using transnational networks. Through advances in information technology, such as the Internet and mobile phones, CGDs can now develop immediate connections with others around the world via email, mobile phones, Skype, social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, and online newsgroups and blogs (Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Castles, 2002; Demmers, 2002; Koinova, 2009; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006). Such mediums can be positively used by migrant groups making connections to family and friends throughout the world, but research indicates that CGDs often use such networks to spread propaganda, provide support and information to rebel groups, and develop strategies for political activism that can influence and interfere with homeland affairs (Brinkerhoff, 2006b; Demmers, 2002; Lyons, 2004).

Transnational networks also engage in fund-raising activities, which often include raising funds for insurgency and rebel groups fighting in their country of origin (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000, 2002; Demmers, 2005; Horst, 2008; Lyons, 2004).

Østergaard-Nielsen (2006) and Brinkerhoff (2009) use the term “digital diaspora” due to the prolific use of the Internet among many CGDs to further a political agenda, describing how websites are used as platforms for political activities and campaigns, and the recruitment and the mobilizing of members. Demmers (2002) uses the term “virtual communities” to describe CGD transnational networks describing how politically active CGDs use technology-based networks to continue the war on a virtual level, where “they live their conflicts through the Internet, email, television, and telephone without direct (physical) suffering, risk or accountability” (p. 94). The technological advances available in the West provide politically active exiles in Western countries a distinct advantage over governments in their homeland where such
technological advances are often not available on the same level (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000).

Case studies of CGDs engaging in political activities reveal that their use of transnational networks is highly organized and quite creative. For instance, in Lyons’ studies on Ethiopian CGDs he found that those who resettled in the Global North and were aligned with the former government (and against the current government) maintained blogs, newsgroups, and websites with the goal of mobilizing exiles and those they left behind to advocate against the new ruling government. Operating in transnational networks also allow CGDs to engage in well-coordinated simultaneous lobbying efforts of NGOs and international organizations such as the European Union and the United Nations. For instance, CGDs often lobby the host country and international organizations in support of their cause (and against the interests of the ruling government), appeal to human rights organizations, media outlets, and the general public for support while engaging in activities intended to create awareness of their plight.

In their study on Kurdish separatism in Germany Lyons and Uçarer’s (1998) found that the ability of opposition groups to mobilize effectively using transnational networks depended on the existence of three dynamics: collective and politicized identity, operational resources, and political opportunity. Smith (2007) found that it is the political opportunity structures in the host country that in large part determine the ability of CGDs to mobilize and act on a political level. Living in the Global North appears to provide CGDs with a distinct political advantage. According to Baser and Swain (2009) the more liberal and open a host country’s political system, the easier it is for CGD groups to influence foreign policy affecting their homelands. Shain (1994, 2002) describes how the openness of the U.S. political system, which values

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3 Political opportunity structures generally refer to structures within a society that influence how receptive a nation-state is to change, particularly when initiated by a social movement or protest. The structures of a nation’s political institutes will determine whether social movements are allowed to develop, and mobilize (Rootes, 1999). The United States is typically considered a country that is open to social movements, thus has political structures that provide opportunities for social mobilization (Kitschelt, 1986).
ethnic diversity and individual rights, benefits CGD groups, stating that many CGD groups have been granted a “meaningful voice in the U.S. foreign policy, especially on issues concerning countries of origin or symbolic homelands” (p. 812).

In mapping the Ethiopian CGD opposition Lyons (2007b) found that they existed transnationally across several countries, but it was those CGD groups in North America, particularly those based in Washington, D.C., that had the greatest power and influence in setting a political agenda in their home country, because living in Washington, D.C. provided them with easy access to people in power. Likewise, Baser and Swain (2008) noted that many political opposition groups operating within the CGD chose to relocate to the Washington, D.C. area primarily because the locale provides them easy access to politicians and other political resources (Baser & Swain, 2008). Brinkerhoff noted a similar trend for some members of the CGD, whose migration to a particular Western locale was “a tactic intended to enable political influence” (Brinkerhoff, 2009, p. 6).

Lyons (2007b) notes how successful many CGDs are in their lobbying efforts once resettled in the Washington, D.C. area, citing the example of the Ethiopian CGD networks who were “extremely hostile” toward the ruling government in Ethiopia and successfully lobbied for a significant reduction in U.S. foreign aid to Ethiopia. They were also exceptionally effective at fund raising and political lobbying using the Internet to organize political demonstrations. They also aggressively lobbied U.S. State Department employees, relevant members of Congress and even policy makers at the World Bank. In fact, politically active CGDs tend to be some of the strongest lobbies in Washington, D.C. (Vertovec, 2005). Finally, Byman, et al. (2001) point out that “one of the largest contributions diasporas make to insurgencies is through diplomatic pressures” (as cited in Brinkerhoff, 2009, p. 21).

The Current Study

Diasporas were traditionally conceptualized as “powerless dispersed ethnic communities” but with the globalization of technology, particularly the
Internet and communication technologies, technologically based transnational diasporic networks have developed which have increased the means, reach and collective power CGDs can wield in their homeland’s politics (Cheran, 2003). Contemporary CGDs, defined as those diaspora generated from ethnonationalist conflict, increasingly claim a stake in homeland affairs even though they reside outside the country’s boundaries (Horst, 2007). As such, CGDs are now considered a dynamic force that must be considered when evaluating significant factors in ethnonationalist intrastate conflict situations, peace building efforts, post-conflict reconstruction and host country/home country relations (Shain & Barth, 2003). In fact, Demmers (2002) states “it is no longer possible to understand ethno-nationalist conflict dynamics without incorporating the ‘diasporic component’” (p. 88).

Recognizing the nature and power of CGDs as key stakeholders in conflict, and thoroughly exploring the context and the motives of their political activities are vital for furthering our knowledge and understanding of peace and conflict processes. Demmers (2007) states that it is the task of conflict analysis is to “unravel the complex dynamics of interactive processes in order to understand how and why people resort to violence.” Regardless of whether CGDs are framed as “peace makers” or “peace wreckers,” future research must explore the complex dynamics related to CGDs’ long-distance political engagement in homeland conflict, as well as the interactive processes involved in CGDs’ role in perpetuating conflict in their homelands. Demmers suggests future research should map CGD activities by exploring the following areas: relevant CGD communities, their internal subgroups (and their constituencies); their respective diasporic positions, interests and needs and fears; their relationships with other conflict parties and their qualitative or quantitative asymmetries; and the various perceptions of the causes and nature of the conflict (pp. 24-25).

Diaspora researcher Kenneth Bush asserts the need for additional case studies on CGDs, in order to better understand what circumstances influence
CGDs to contribute to peace or conflict. In a recent conference on the future of diaspora research, Bush states:

It is a well known fact that diaspora sometimes engages in peacebuilding processes and other times in conflict promotion activities. However, we do not know when, why and how they engage in peacebuilding vs. conflict promotion.

Bush (2007) notes that each case study conducted on CGD contributes to greater understanding of the “when, why, and how diaspora contributes to peacebuilding in particular cases, in specific circumstances” and conflict in others (p. 6). He notes that one of the most significant challenges diaspora researchers face is evolving from specific case understanding to “higher levels of systematic generalization and application” (p. 6). Bush recommends the use of a basic model to analyze complex CGD communities, including mapping collective CGD dynamics which permits the researcher to “delineate and begin analyzing a diverse set of nested interconnected relationships that constitute the narrative foundation for the peacebuilding and conflict sustaining stories that are captured in the case studies” (as cited in Baser & Pejcic, 2007, p. 7).

After conducting a thorough literature review on the diaspora-conflict nexus, Pirkkalainen and Abdile (2009) found several areas where further research needed to be conducted, including the exploration of the relationship between members of the CGD and the home country community, a detailed analysis of the dynamics and context of the conflict, the political opportunity structures in the host country, and the dynamics that may influence some CGDs to avoid dichotomous “black-and white” descriptions of the conflict and home country dynamics. Previous case studies on the nature and effect of CGDs’ political activities have focused on the activities of Ethiopian CGDs (Lyons, 2004, 2007b), Sri Lankan CGDs (Cheran, 2003; Fair, 2005), Kurdish CGDs (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006, 2007), Somali CGDs (Abdile, 2010; Brinkerhoff, 2006b), Afghanistan CGDs (Berg & Harviken, 2008; Brinkerhoff, 2004), and Eritrean CGDs (Bernal, 2006). As of this writing, there has been no case study on Rwandan diasporic transnational political engagement in
homeland affairs.

The present study focuses on Rwandan CGD consisting of those generated from the 1990 to 1994 civil war in Rwanda and the genocide against the Tutsi, who are living in real and virtual communities of identity in Western host countries, and who are engaging in homeland conflict on a political level using ICTs. Rwanda is an interesting case study that can make a significant contribution to existing research. First, Rwanda’s conflict was ethnonationalist in nature, and there are only two major ethnic groups in Rwanda,\(^4\) which increases ethnic polarization and the risk of renewed violence, particularly when one ethnic group is the majority (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Thus, this research will then also shed light on the dynamics of ethnic dominance in the CGDs, and its effect on protracted conflict in the region.

The present study will explore the context of the original conflict in Rwanda as recommended by Smith and Stares (2007), who caution that prior to coming to any conclusions about the nature and effect of diasporic political involvement in homeland affairs and intrastate conflict it is imperative to thoroughly explore the historical and sociopolitical contexts of the conflict in the country of origin which will shed light on the potential motives of CGDs in regard to their engagement in homeland affairs. This exploration will serve as context for further descriptions and analysis of the Rwandan CGD living in the Global North (primarily the North America and Western Europe), and the nature of their transnational political activities using Internet communication technologies (ICTs), primarily social media.

This study seeks to fill current gaps in the research, including the nature of diaspora groupings, their positions in relation to other conflict parties and external actors, their interests and needs, fears and agendas, the nature of their online transnational networks, including ways in which they use ICTs to accomplish their goals, and their various perceptions of the causes and nature of the conflict. This will be accomplished by following the recommendations of
key scholars in the area of CGDs by further exploring diasporic transnational political engagement on a collective level by exploring the case study of Rwanda. A key question to be answered in this study is whether Rwandan CGD conform to the literature on the collective CGD typologies with regard to the existence and nature of their attachment to their homeland, and the activities that emanate from this attachment. Additionally, the nature of Rwandan CGD transnational networks will be examined through the exploration of their use of ICTs to engage in transnational political activities focused on homeland conflict. This study seeks to answer the following questions about Rwandan CGD communities:

1. Do Rwandan CGD communities living in the West (principally North America and Western Europe) engage in homeland conflict on a political level, in a way that conforms to the typologies demonstrated in the literature, and if so how?

2. How do Rwandan CGD communities use ICTs, particularly social media, to engage in homeland conflict on a political level? How are virtual communities structured, and utilized for the purposes of political engagement, mobilization and action?

3. Are there significant differences in the types and nature of political activities between intra-diasporic virtual communities (i.e., internal to the Rwandan diaspora), and inter-diasporic virtual communities (i.e., outreach to non-Rwandans, such as Americans, or other Westerners)?

4. What do the purported and actual aims of Rwandan CGD appear to be attempting to achieve, and what is the potential impact of diaspora political engagement on the conflict cycle in the home country?

The outline of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 1, “Diaspora in International Politics,” provides an overview of the globalization of domestic politics, including exploring the areas civil conflict and territoriality. The term

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4 There are three self-identified ethnic groups in Rwanda: Hutus, which are the majority at approximately 85 percent of the population, Tutsis, which comprise about 14 percent of the population, and Twa, which
“diaspora” is defined and explored within the context of diasporic involvement in ethnonationalist intrastate conflict. CGD typologies are also briefly explored, including common CGD motivations for engaging on homeland conflict on a political level. The role CGD play in peace processes in their homelands is also briefly explored with an introduction of diasporic transnational communities. Chapter 1 concludes with an exploration of the purpose and aims of the present study. Chapter 2 “Exploration of Conflict Generated Diaspora,” provides a more in-depth exploration of ethnonationalist CGD, including how the collective identity of many CGD is shaped and expressed. A more thorough exploration of common typologies of ethnonationalist CGD is also included, linking how these common typologies are expressed in communities of identity, particularly virtual communities, which tend to serve as conduits for political action. Chapter 3, “Ethnonationalist Conflict-Generated Diaspora use of the Internet for Political Purposes” begins with a general exploration of how the Internet is used for a variety of purposes, ranging from social activities to political engagement, concluding with an exploration of ways in which CGD use the Internet for political engagement. Chapter 4, “The Case of Rwanda,” provides background information on the country Rwanda, the focus of the case study, placing Rwanda within historical and socio-political contexts. Chapter 5, “Methodology” includes the methodology of the study, including a description of the methods used in the study, a description of virtual ethnography, the data collection plan and ethical considerations. Chapter 6, “Results,” includes the results of the study, and Chapter 7, “Discussion and Implications” includes a detailed discussion of the study results and their implications in several areas related to diaspora transnational activities, including their impact on conflict, and peace building processes.
CHAPTER 2: EXPLORATION OF CONFLICT GENERATED DIASPORA

In Chapter 1 the concept of diaspora was introduced as a sub-set of the broader migrant community. In this chapter a more in-depth exploration of diaspora generated through conflict will be explored, including how CGD collective identity is shaped and expressed. A more thorough exploration of common typologies of CGD (briefly explored in Chapter 1) will also be undertaken, demonstrating how these common typologies are expressed in communities of identity, particularly virtual communities, which tend to serve as conduits for their long-distance nationalism.

As explored in Chapter 1, CGDs’ ties to homeland are both tangible and symbolic (Lyons, 2006b; Orozco, 2003); they exhibit a strong tendency to create a mythical homeland, which often serves as a basis for collective action (Cohen, 2008; Lyons, 2006b; Safran, 1991; Vertovec, 1997). This collective action most often involves the mobilization of support within and outside the host country, with a goal of what several scholars refer to as the “myth of return,” an idealized desire to return to the homeland of their past (i.e., the symbolic homeland; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Cohen, 2008; Lyons, 2006b; Safran, 1991). This collective action often manifests on a political level, and can involve action against their home country’s government, particularly if the diaspora were forced into exile as a result of a civil war (Lyons, 2006a, 2006b; Østergaard-Neilson, 2006; Safran, 1991).

Although some scholars consider only those migrants who are forced from their homelands due to violence to be members of a diaspora (see Cheran, 2003), many offer more inclusive definitions that include voluntary migrants. Because the typology and collective actions of involuntary migrants appear to be significantly different from migrants who leave their home country voluntarily in search of better opportunities, Lyons (2004, 2006b) refers to diaspora generated from conflict (often protracted civil armed ethnonationalist conflict) as “conflict-generated diaspora.” Mohamoud (2005) notes that the term CGD is used to distinguish the wave of forced, involuntary migrants that
began in the 1990s from earlier waves of labor and economic migrants. Mohamoud estimates that there are approximately 3.8 million members of the African CGD living in North America and Europe, most of whom are from the Great Lakes Region (Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo), and the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan), two regions that have experienced considerable protracted armed conflict.

Lyons theorizes that it is these diaspora members, those generated from conflict, who are most likely to collectively engage in homeland conflict on a political level, often against the homeland government, with a collective dream of returning to their homeland and restoring it to the imagined condition prior to their forced dispersion (Lyons, 2006b). As referenced in Chapter 1, globalization, particularly the globalization of communication technologies, such as the Internet, has significantly increased diaspora members, particularly CGDs’ ability to mobilize and engage in long-distance collective political action (through the development of virtual transnational networks), allowing them reach and influence on a global level (Adamson and Demetriou, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Lyons, 2006b; Østergaard-Neilson, 2006; Vertovec, 1997).

**Communities of Identity: CGDs’ Collective Identity**

Communities of identity can refer to any community of individuals who share mutually agreed upon and self-identified characteristics and shared histories, to the extent that they bind people together in a way that the group determines are unique in nature. Such characteristics are based primarily upon one’s social identity (Bradatan, Popon & Melton, 2010). A community of identity based on social identity is formed not only by bonding with fellow group members who share the community’s key identifiers (e.g., ethnic identity, religious identity, gender, geographic locale), but also by delineating those who are not members of the group (e.g., members of other ethnic and/or religious groups, alternate gender, members of other communities). Scholars often refer to the identified members of a group as having “in-group” status, and those not accepted into a community of identity as having “out-group”
status. Bradatan, Popon and Melton (2010) note how social identity in relation to group membership is strengthened when group membership is difficult to attain, because membership is more likely to be deemed special. Thus the more distinct members consider the characteristics required to become a member of a community of identity, the stronger the collective identity among members. Fixed or immutable qualities, such as gender or ethnicity create even stronger bonds, because there will always be an “out-group,” and mobility opportunities between in-groups and out-groups are limited.

When communities of national identity are based on ethnic group membership (as they are with ethnonationalism) they combine elements of both national identity and ethnic identity (Conner, 1997; Smith, 1991). Smith (1991) offers a comprehensive description of communities of national identity based ethnic group membership, which extends to diaspora communities. First, Smith distinguishes between “ethnic categories”—a designation of a group as a separate cultural grouping that is determined by outsiders (of which the group may or may not be aware)—and “ethnic communities,” which involves a self-ascribed designation as culturally separate, based on specific attributes, often called “key identifiers” or “cultural markers.” According to Smith, ethnic communities contain the following attributes:

1. A collective proper name;
2. A myth of common ancestry;
3. Shared historical memories;
4. One or more differentiating elements of common culture;
5. An association with a specific “homeland”; and
6. A sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population (p. 21).

Smith (1991) points out that although objective cultural identifiers of ethnic community membership do exist (e.g., skin color and language), the majority of attributes or cultural markers are subjective. For instance, notions of common ancestry are subjective because they are often based on the myth of shared genealogy, which translates into a belief that members of the ethnic
community/group emanate from interrelated families comprising one large extended family. Smith states that self-ascribed membership in such "ethnic families" persists even when members are in exile, which is accomplished through "an intense nostalgia and spiritual attachment" to homeland (p. 23).

Smith (1991) describes how in communities of national identity, dimensions of territoriality are commonly blended with genealogy while encompassing ‘bonds of solidarity’ among community members who are unified through "shared memories, myths and traditions" (p. 15). When ethnicity is involved in the formation of national identity, the concept of national identity becomes even more complex, involving what Smith describes as a type of cultural collectivity "bound by historical forces, both with regard to national identity as well as a perceived historical culture, involving culturally-based myths believed to be rooted in pre-modern ethnic identities" (p. 21).

The collective cultural identity associated with ethnic group membership can be malleable, flexible, and fluid, in terms of boundaries and cultural content. This flexibility enables ethnic groupings to remain durable over time, despite changing conditions, such as distance from the homeland (Conner, 1997; Smith, 1991). Yet the boundaries are also fixed, particularly with regard to group membership, because blood ties are required as an attribute/cultural marker. Thus, it is virtually impossible for outsiders to be fully accepted as members of an ethnonationalist community of identity because no amount of embracing relevant nationalist values could ever reach the level of “binding through blood” (Bradatan, Popon & Melton, 2010).

**Communities of Ethnic Identity and In-Group/Out-Group Dynamics**

Keeping the idea of rather nonpermeable membership boundaries in mind, communities of national identity that are based on ethnic membership often exhibit strong in-group/out-group dynamics, which involves the favoring and privileging of co-ethnics, at the expense of those in the out-group. Conner recognized this phenomenon as early as 1973 when he stated:

The peculiar emotional depth of the ‘us’-‘them’ syndrome which is an
intrinsic part of national consciousness, by bifurcating as it does all mankind into ‘members of the nation’ versus ‘all others’ appears thereby to pose a particularly severe impediment to coordinated action with any of the ‘others’.

For instance, the favoring of co-ethnics (referenced in Chapter 1 in connection with a CGDs’ enduring connection to homeland), is based on a sense of social identity, and often results in collective action, sometimes against another group. As noted above, this sense of social identity is based on the subjective belief among co-ethnics that they, and others within their group, have a common ancestry, and therefore an “extended family” (Conversi, 2007). Whether a group does in fact share a common ancestry is immaterial. Rather, the perception of commonality is what matters (Conner, 1997).

Closely related to the process of privileging ingroup members are dynamics called “suprahumanization” and “infrahumanization.” These theoretical propositions hold that ingroup members will tend to attribute more refined human emotions (e.g., hope, grief, openness, warmth, humility, moral reasoning.) to ingroup members (suprahumanization), while attributing principally base animal-like emotions (e.g., fear, anger, pleasure) to outgroup members (infrahumanization) (Bain, Kashima, & Haslam, 2006; Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, & Gaunt, 2000). This dynamic is considered one form of outgroup dehumanization, and occurs with varying frequency depending upon the type of group and the nature of the characteristics used to identify group membership. For instance, studies on groups based on nationality found that ingroups tended to engage in levels of suprahumanization of ingroup members and infrahumanization and dehumanization of outgroup members (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Viki & Calitri, 2008). It is noteworthy that these results did not hold true for groups formed based on patriotism,⁵ leading the authors to predict that ethnonationalist groups⁶ possessed more intangible cultural identifiers, which may have led to

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⁵ Previously defined as loyalty to a nation-state.
⁶ Previously defined as those exhibiting loyalty to co-ethnics representing a nation-state.
great interethnic group competition, which in turn may have led to higher levels of “animalistic dehumanization” of outgroup members (Viki & Calitri, 2008, p. 1060).

Studies on the suprahumanization and infrahumanization processes related to ingroup/outgroup dynamics, particularly those exploring communities of identity based on intangible identifiers (i.e., ethnic identity), provide additional insights into why conflicts over intangible issues are almost always zero-sum games, particularly when they involve “identity, beliefs, values, cultural norms or a way of life” and occur in unstructured environments, such as civil wars. According to Bercovitch (2007), intangible issues such as these, which are almost always found in ethnonationalist communities of identity, virtually always make conflict more violent and less likely to be resolved through conflict resolution strategies (Bercovitch, 2007, p. 24), which in order to be successful requires increased empathy toward—and understanding of—opposing sides. Because ethnonationalism involves the “privileging of coethnics,” (based on a belief that members of a particular ethnic group are a part of an “extended family” (Berghe as cited in Conversi, 2007, p. 2), ingroup/outgroup dynamics in CDGs become a powerful force in determining group cohesion, which often serves as a foundation for collective action. This issue will be discussed in greater detail in the sections on CGDs’ unique typology, and their effect on the conflict cycle.

**Transnational Communities Based on Hybrid Identities**

The number of intangible variables that contribute to forming ethnonationalist communities of identity often include not only one’s ethnic clan or tribe and country of origin, but also the diasporas’ particular immigration wave, the circumstances surrounding the dispersal (forced and violent or voluntary and peaceful; Brinkerhoff, 2007; Demmers, 2007; Lyons, 2004), religious affiliation (Brinkerhoff, 2007), and gender (Al-Ali, 2007). Safran (1991) cites four aspects of CGD identity that bind them in a
community of identity, including common language, historical memory, shared religious beliefs, and chronic minority status within a dominant society. The unique nature of CGDs is an outcome of their shared history of involuntary migration marked by violence and trauma and their “deterritorialized” commitment to their homelands, both of which influence the quality and substance of their collective identity (this dynamic will be explored further in the subsequent section on CGD typology).

CGD communities of identity are also based on their status as transmigrants, which serve as a foundation for activity, commonly referred to as their “transnationalism.” Transnationalism in a migrant context has been defined as “the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multistranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” where immigrants “build social fields that cross geographic, cultural and political borders” (Basch, Schiller, & Blac-Szanton, 1994, p. 7). Migrant transnationalism has gained increasing attention in the literature due in large part to the increased ways in which it can be exercised because of the globalization of transportation, economic markets, and communication technologies, such as the Internet and easily cellular telephones (Castles, 2002; Demmers, 2002; Koinova, 2009; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006).

Although there has always been a transnational dimension to diasporas by virtue of the fact that they live outside of their country of origin, globalization has rendered CGDs transnational far more dynamic, because it is now easier than ever before to act “transnationally” by initiating cross-continent contact with a few keystrokes on a computer connected to the Internet, or by making a relatively inexpensive telephone call to another country using a hand-held mobile device. According to a UN Human Development report on the effect of globalization on human development and relationships, “[t]he cost of a three-minute telephone call from New York to London fell from $245 (USD) in 1930 (in 1990 prices) to under $50 (USD) in 1960 to $3 (USD) in 1990 to about 35

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7 Brinkerhoff (2009) notes that CGDs often define themselves according to a particular refugee wave, such as pre-or post some significant event.
cents in 1999 (UNDP, 1999, p. 28). In 2014 it would likely be free, or almost free if one has access to a communication devise using a Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP), or one of Internet-based communication applications, such as Skype.

Hybrid identity is at the core of CGDs transnationalism, which is defined as “a sense of self that is neither wholly of the homeland nor exclusively reflective of the hostland” (Brinkerhoff, 2009, p. 339). The body of research on immigration, ethnic identity, and transnationalism has evolved considerably over the last several decades, with an increasing focus on the importance of hybrid identity, particularly within transnational CGDs. Traditional migration theories tended to focus on the experiences of Europeans who migrated to the United States during a significant immigration wave occurring between 1880 and 1920. These theories were then applied quite broadly, which assumed that all immigrants shared similar experiences. These classic immigration theories have as their centerpiece the prescriptive concept of the complete assimilation of migrants into the host country as ideal (Guarnizo, Portes & Haller, 2003). Although classic immigration theorists noted challenges first-generation migrants would face in the assimilation process, the overarching belief was that with each successive generation would see increased opportunities to assimilate into the dominant culture. The assimilation process was perceived to be dependent in large part on an immigrant’s willingness to cut virtually all ties with his or her home country in order to integrate into the new host country (Gordon, 1961; Hansen, 1952).

Classic immigration assimilation theories were based on the belief that cultural identity was an “either/or” proposition, and hybrid identity was not possible. Although newer theories of immigration allow for hybrid identities, even more recent studies of CGDs transnationalism cite host country receptivity and opportunities for migrant integration into the host country’s society as key factors discouraging long-distance nationalism, particularly political activities that involve violent opposition to the home country (activities that are posited to be juxtaposed to cultural assimilation; Brynen, 2002). In
other words, the more a migrant community assimilates into a host country culture and is accepted by that culture, the less they will feel compelled to remain connected to home country dynamics.

A growing body of research reveals that at least with regard to CGD members who were forced from their countries of origin and did not migrate voluntarily, host country receptivity does not appear to have an impact on long-distance nationalism. In fact, CGD can show high levels of integration into the host country’s society, engaging in society on a range of levels (e.g., educational, occupational, social) and maintain a hybrid identity, particularly within multicultural societies (Bradatan, Popan, & Melton, 2010; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Conversi, 2004; Inglehart, 2000; Schiller, Basch & Blanc-Szanton, 1995). For instance, Adamson and Demetriou (2007) describe CGD transnationalism as follows:

They are not sojourners because they settle and become incorporated in the economy and political institutions, localities, and patterns of daily life of the country in which they reside. However, at the very same time, they are engaged elsewhere in the sense that they maintain connections, build institutions, conduct transactions, and influence local and national events in the countries from which they emigrated (p. 48).

The reasons for this hybridity are threefold—first, many Western countries have an increased tolerance for multiculturalism and hybrid identity, due in part to a dramatic increase in global migration, therefore there is less pressure for CGD (and all migrants in general) to assimilate into their host countries by completely cutting off ties with their homeland and/or homeland cultures (Safran, 1991; Sheffer, 1994; Weiner, 1986). Second, facilities and opportunities, such as the globalization of communication technologies have made remaining connected to the homeland far easier despite the fact that they are “deterritorialized” (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Castles, 2002; Demmers, 2002; Koinova, 2009; Lyons, 2006b; Sheffer, 1994; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006); and third, there appears to be qualitative differences between voluntary and involuntary migrants in terms of how they relate their host country and home county (Demmers, 2007; Lyons, 2004,
Hybrid identity, therefore, is at the core of the CGD identity and serves as the foundation for the development of communities of identity as well as collective and transnational activities and activism. Research on hybrid identity among migrant populations extends back to the early 1990s, coinciding with the most recent wave of globalization (Brinkerhoff, 2009). Hybrid identity involves a synthesized identity the migrant manifests through the differences they embody and encounter (not despite them) (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Hall, 1990). Hybrid identities among CGDs are not static, but “are constantly produced and reproduced” (Brinkerhoff, 2009, p. 727).

Many variables influence CGD hybrid identity development. Most significant among these influences are the circumstances surrounding CGD migration. Other variables include ethnic group membership, religious affiliation, age, gender, the receptivity of host country, and conditions in the home country (Brinkerhoff, 2009). Navarro (2003) discusses how storytelling contributes to the formation of identity, where telling and retelling stories helps to make sense out of collective experiences, which then helps to craft identity. This is an important insight (explored in more detail later in this chapter), as it highlights the fluidity of CGDs identity and how it is constantly being negotiated and renegotiated as CGDs adapt to their new host society while maintaining ties to their homeland. Finally, the Internet, particularly social connections maintained through cyberspace, offers the ability to negotiate CGDs identity, which in turn reinforces hybridity (Brainard & Brinkerhoff, 2004).

Transnational Virtual Communities

Diaspora members as a whole have always had a yearning for “home,” but globalization has made the world smaller, and as such, the worlds of CGDs have shrunk as well, making it easier for them to act on their desires to remain connected to their homelands (Fullilove, 2008). Brinkerhoff (2006) notes how CGDs tend to engage in formal and informal CGD organizations, which assist with several aspects of their relocation and displacement.
experience. These organizations can exist in real world domains, or in an online (i.e., virtual) domain. Online community participation in what is often called “virtual communities” (or “cyber-communities”) has increased significantly in recent years, with some CGD engaging with other members of the CGDs solely online (Castles, 2002; Demmers, 2002; Koinova, 2009; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006). In fact, virtual communities are one of the fastest growing phenomena on the Internet, allowing users to access knowledge, exchange information and interact socially without geographical limitations (Caverlee & Webb, 2008).

CGDs’ virtual communities serve multiple purposes. They provide a place where CGD members can engage with fellow CGD members across the globe, thus providing them with a social outlet, and reducing potential loneliness often inherent in moving to a new country. Virtual communities can also provide CGDs with much sought-after information about home (Brinkerhoff, 2009). CGDs’ online engagement in virtual communities can also provide much-needed assistance with identity development (or redevelopment). For instance, online engagement helps to reinforce existing identities through the telling and retelling of stories of past experiences in the homeland, or sharing home country cultural artifacts from the home country online. Online engagement in virtual communities also helps to recreate identities of CGD members through the sharing of information about their new host country, which can help with the acculturation process (Brinkerhoff, 2006b; Cohen, 1996). In her study on the Eritrean CGD, Bernal (2006) found that CGD members used the Internet as a “transnational public sphere where they produce and debate narratives of history, culture, democracy and identity,” and where CGDs could rise above their circumstances and create new forms of “citizenship, community and political practice” (p. 161).

The Internet has increased the ease of developing transnational communities by permitting CGD members to remain up-to-date on events occurring in their homelands by following international news, and local news about the home country via Internet “newspapers,” online radio and Internet
television. As Fullilove (2008) observed, the increased connectivity that the Internet offers “…is herding like-minded individuals towards each other” (Fullilove, 2008, p. 9). For instance, relationships are expanded through social media using online applications that allow free “telephone” calling and texting (SMS) between electronic devices, such as Skype, iChat, Tango, Viber, WhatsApp, and FaceTime.\(^8\) Most of these applications can be used on various devices, such as computers, laptops, tablets, and “smart phones.” CGD members are increasingly using online blogs to facilitate social, civic and political engagement (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Fullilove, 2008; Lyons, 2006b; Østergaard-Nielson, 2006). CGD are also increasingly engaging in online (virtual) environments using the Internet, specifically social media (web-based media used for the purposes of social interaction), where opinions are expressed and exchanged, ideas are debated, and relationships are built (Brinkerhoff, 2006b, 2009).

A virtual community can include chat rooms, newsgroups, interactive websites (i.e., the ability to post comments at the end of an online news article), blogs, and online forums. A subset of these virtual communities is called online “social networking sites” (SNS), and though the terms ‘virtual community’ and SNS are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature, the term SNS is most often reserved for online forums that exist with the chief purpose of encouraging social networking among groups and individuals (Caverlee & Webb, 2008). These include Facebook, MySpace, Oruk (Google), Tumblr, and Twitter, for example. The communication that occurs within these SNSs is most commonly referred to in the literature as computer-mediated communication (CMC; Walther, 1996), and data that involves posts within virtual communities is referred to most commonly as text artifacts, or cultural artifacts (e.g., photos of old national flags, former leaders of the homeland; Caverlee & Webb, 2008).

Some of the newer SNSs are built upon a more visual platform. For instance, Pinterest is a content-sharing website that allows users to “pin”

\(^8\) Specifically for Apple products
artifacts they find on the web to a “virtual pinboard” according to selected themes (e.g. food, travel, home design, hobbies, social interests), which can be auto-posted on other SNSs, such as Facebook. Pinterest also allows users to “follow” others' Pinterest “pinboards,” and then like, share or comment on posts, thus providing an interactive component. Instagram, another visually based interactive SNS, is a photo-sharing social networking site that allows users to digitally edit and artistically enhance their photographs and then post them on both the Instagram site as well as a user's additional, integrated SNSs. Instagram users can also “follow” each other and “like,” share and comment on the posted photos on Instagram’s application or on the user’s other associated SNSs (if they are linked). Although both of these sites are relatively new (both started in late 2010), CGDs using these sites have the ability to post photos of cultural artifacts related to their homelands, such as home country architecture, and traditional foods, or even more politically motivated photos, such as political demonstrations. Because these new SNSs can be linked to users’ other SNSs, they become a part of a virtual web of social interconnectivity, but also a part of broader transnational networks where various linkages that can assist in large-scale mobilization and the dissemination of a broad range of materials (Brinkerhoff, 2009). Although it is important to note that immigrants in general use virtual communities based on web-based social media for a broad range of purposes, Lyons (2004) notes that CGD often use these communities to engage politically in homeland conflict. The nature of these types of political transnational networks will be explored more thoroughly at the end of this chapter.

Motivations to Act: The Unique Nature of CGD

As noted above, CGDs, at their most elementary level, are built on the basis of their self-identified membership in a deterritorialized ethnic group, their enduring connection to their imagined homeland (Anderson, 1992; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Crisp 1999; Kleist & Hansen, 2006; Lyons, 2004), and their shared migration experience (Cohen 2008). These collective experiences are shared in a variety of ways within their transnational communities of identity
(Brah, 1996, Lyons, 2006a, 2006b; Safran 1991). But increasingly research is illustrating how CGDs are unique in both their identity and activities, with their collective identity serving as motivation for collective action, often on a political level. In fact, Adamson and Demetriou (2007) found that the binding nature of CGD internal organizational structures, which are built on common identity and shared goals, have enabled them to effectively mobilize group members and engage in long-term political activities, in both their host and home countries. Although the existence of these types of networks has been solidly established through a growing body of empirical research, the question as to why CGDs are motivated to engage in long-distance nationalism through virtual transnational networks is still being explored.

Lyons (2006a, 2007b) developed a typology for CGD collective motivation and action based on his study of Ethiopian CGD. He found that CGDs differ from other migrant groups in terms of their motivation to act, in three primary ways. The first relates to the cause of their migration (which is associated with a strong attachment to homeland); second, the nature of their relationship with their home country; and third, their tendency to develop transnational networks that serve as primary conduits for political activism related to the original conflict in their home country.

**Cause of Migration**

Lyons (2007a, 2007b) asserts that by definition CGDs have experienced violent forced migration. It is the experience of violence, trauma, and forced expulsion from their home country that sets this group apart from all other migrant groups, and that influences their collective identity, attitudes (particularly about their home country), and the types of activities in which they tend to engage, involving home country dynamics.

Lyons (2007a, 2007b) notes that ethnonationalist CGDs have been violently displaced from their home country as a result of armed civil conflict, often in large numbers. CGD are often forced to flee their homes and villages quickly, leaving most or all of their possessions behind. As such, the majority of CGDs experience significant trauma prior to arriving in the host country.
Although they may have been perpetrators of violence (e.g., the regime oppressors who flee the home country following international intervention), many others experience wartime civilian victimization involving an array of human rights violations, such as political persecution, massacres of entire villages; ethnic cleanings, and genocide (Bellamy, 2011). Many women and girls are raped as tactic of war (Kivlahan & Ewigman, 2010), children are conscripted into armed conflict (Betancourt et al, 2010; Vindevogal, Coppens, Derluyn, De Schryver, Loots, & Broekaert, 2011), men are often targeted as threats and killed, and elders and the physically weak often perish (Fox & Tang, 2000; Hoefller & Reynal-Querol, 2003). These traumatic events may occur during the original conflict (particularly during armed civil conflict), during the escape across borders, or while temporarily residing in refugee camps (UNHCR, 2011).

Lyons (2007a, 2007b) notes that the consequences of these traumatic experiences include an enduring desire to keep the memory of their traumatic displacement alive and an unrelenting desire to go home. Lyons describes that a primary way in which displacement memories are kept alive is by telling and retelling the story of their violent forced migration. It is important to recall Navarro’s (2003) reference to the importance of storytelling in the crafting of identity in migrant communities. The relevance of this dynamic in terms of CGDs is not necessarily in the mere act of story telling, but in the stories’ content.

According to several diaspora scholars, CGDs often cast themselves as victims in their stories of exile, even if they were perpetrators in the original conflict, because they were the ones who were violently expelled. As such, their storytelling often reflects their victimhood status. In fact, in her description of various types of diaspora groupings, Brinkerhoff (2008) refers to CGDs who perceive that they are the victims in the original conflict as “victim diaspora,” noting how the collective perception of themselves as victims has implications not only for their identity development as a distinct diaspora grouping, but also for assimilation into the host country and subsequent mobilization and action.
Shain (2002) and Demmers (2007) note that when ethnonationalist CGDs perceive themselves as the victims (e.g., in the original conflict, of forced expulsion, of violent civil war, of persecution by the home country regime) the telling and retelling of stories of their victimhood often becomes so endemic to their collective identity that attempts at reconciliation can be threatening to their victimhood status, contributing to a reluctance to compromise. This reluctance can then become a polarizing force in ongoing reconciliation efforts in homeland conflict.

**Imagined Homeland**

Another way in which CGDs keep the memory of the trauma surrounding their displacement alive is by retaining ties to the homeland, and though CGDs are deterritorialized, much of their identity remains centered on their homeland, and is expressed in symbolic terms (Lyons, 2007). For instance, Adamson and Demetriou (2007) note how CGDs often unite in common purpose on the basis of ethnonationalist pride, manifested in the adoption of territorial symbols and nationalist ideologies. Likewise, Lyons (2004) cites how CGD social networks, particularly online social networks, tend to focus less on general issues related to acculturation and daily living, and more on the original conflict, and a collective desire to return home—what Lyons (2004) describes as the “aspiration of return to a particular piece of territory that is the symbolically important homeland” (p. 9).

Lyons (2004) also describes ways in which this symbolism is deployed, noting that often CGD social networks “link past conflict, the contemporary challenges of living in a host state, and an aspiration of return” (p. 7) symbolically through “imagination of homeland.” Lyons describes the “language of exiles” as being filled with literary images that depict the homeland as an “earthy place by speaking of the ‘original soil’ and the need to maintain ‘roots’” (p. 7). He also notes how many CGD websites and publications feature a variety of symbols representing the homeland such as maps, flags, images of past leaders, icons representing homeland geography, use of nationalist colors, and other symbolic icons. Other examples of
symbolism representing an imagined homeland include annual commemorations celebrating events of the pre-exile homeland. Although most migrant groups may become nostalgic about their respective homelands, Lyons describes the relationship between CGDs and their symbolic homelands as taking on mythical overtones so that in time, CGDs' vision of their original homeland has little resemblance with the current homeland. For instance, in Lyons' (2004, 2006a) studies on Ethiopian CGD, he found that they tended to have a “territorially defined concept of an Ethiopian homeland which was key to their identity” (p. 19), that included Eritrea, despite the fact that Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1991. Likewise, Lyons (2004) cites how the Oromo CGD (also from Ethiopia), which generally opposes the current Ethiopian government and advocates for an independent Oromo, has websites and publications that are replete with “maps, nationalist colors, and images of the Oromo national symbol the odaa tree” reflecting their desire to return to an imagined homeland independent from Ethiopia.

Cohen (2008) notes how CGD imagined homeland is filled with sentimental notions expressed through terms such as “motherland, fatherland, native land… the ancestral land….” — terms that are consistently emotional and referential. He also notes the interchange between feminine and masculine depictions of homeland where ‘motherland’ represents nurturing, represented by the “biblical Promised Land [which] was said to be ‘flowing with milk and honey’ ” (p. 103), and ‘fatherland’ represents fighting and protection, where “the nurturing white milk of motherland is replaced by the blood of soldiers gallantly defending fatherland” (p. 103).

The Nature of CGDs Relationship with the Home Country

The nature of the relationship between many CGD communities and their home countries is varied and complex. As noted above, a commonly cited characteristic of CGDs is their orientation toward their homeland. Cohen (2008) asserts that a common feature among all CGDs is the “idealization of the… ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity” (p. 184). Although diasporic
conceptualizations of homeland may have similar characteristics across CGD groupings, the nature of the relationship can vary considerably, depending in large part on the circumstances surrounding the dispersal. Mohamoud (2005) describes four primary ways in which African CGD members relate to their respective homelands (many of which he notes are positive in nature): providing financial remittance, making contributions to civil society, lobbying in the hostland, and engaging in homeland affairs on a political level.

Relating through Financial Remittance

Financial remittance is defined as “transfers of money by foreign workers to their home countries” (Brinkerhoff, 2006a, p. 1). Foreign remittances to developing countries equaled $372 billion (USD) in 2011, which represents a 12 percent increase over 2010, and over a 400 percent increase over 2004 (Mohapatra, Ratha, & Silwal, 2011), outpacing funding for international development (Brinkerhoff, 2006a). Although Mohamoud (2005) acknowledges that some financial remittances are collective and may be used to finance conflict, he asserts that the overwhelming majority of remittances sent by migrants, including CGD, are generated on individual bases to family and friends, with the money being used for poverty alleviation, and building up local business infrastructure. Mohamoud notes, however that there is limited hard data on the “amount, nature of transfer and use” of CGDs’ financial remittances to rebel groups, acknowledging that in his study he was unable to ascertain the answer to these questions because the CGD members he interviewed were not forthcoming in their responses, and for the most part claimed that financing rebel groups was impossible. Mohamoud asserts that what is of critical importance and which has not yet been answered is “how much of the collective remittances fund community welfare activities and how much is used to fund conflict?” He recommends further investigation “through extensive interviews with diverse political groups, actors, civil society organisations, human rights groups, journalists, peace activists and locally operating international NGOs and agencies” (p. 24).
Other scholars strongly contend that CGDs cause more harm than good, particularly when it comes to contributing financially to rebel movements. Abdile (2010) states that whether financial remittances have a positive or negative effect depends in large part on the circumstances surrounding CGDs’ engagement, such as ethnic affiliation and generational status. For instance, in the case of the Somali diaspora, Abdile found that first-generation Somalis were motivated to contribute financially based on strong ethnic ties and ethnic clan obligations, and felt an obligation to support ethnic fighting when called upon to do so by a clan elder, whereas second-generation Somali diaspora were far less motivated by ethnic interest and ideology, stating that they did not believe it was their obligation to “blindly” support clan militias, but rather they were primarily moved to support specific causes related to poverty alleviation. Van Hear (2003) found that Sri Lankan diaspora provided considerable financial support to the LTTE, which increased the conflict in Sri Lanka. He points out, however, that not all financial remittances are voluntary, explaining that sometimes these financial remittances may be a result of “extractions” from migrants because “the LTTE regulates movement out of the areas they control. Exit taxes are levied on people leaving, and appropriations are made from households with members abroad” (p. 11).

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) predict that a large diaspora (relative to the home country population) increases the risk of renewed conflict significantly (up to six-fold), due in large part to the financial remittances that support rebel groups. The “Collier and Hoeffler Model of Civil War” is based on a quantitative analysis of 73 civil wars in 161 countries during eight five-year subsets between 1960 and 1999. The model predicts that certain factors (characteristic variants) significantly increase the risk of civil war (defined as an internal conflict in with at least 1000 battle-related civilian and military deaths) in post-conflict regions in sub-Saharan Africa (the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa). The study (and succeeding studies based on the model) found that variations in characteristic variants could either exacerbate
or mediate this risk (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004). Collier and Hoeffler evaluated whether the initiation of wars were prompted more by economic factors or grievances. Among both sets of circumstances they found that diaspora have a significant exacerbating effect on certain variants contributing to an increase in risk of civil war, particularly in cases where there is ethnic dominance. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler’s model predicts that if all characteristics are held constant, a country in sub-Saharan Africa in a stage of post-conflict, with a risk of renewed conflict of 6 percent would experience an increase in risk of conflict to 36 percent if the country had a large diaspora living in the West (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). The reasons cited for this increased risk of renewed conflict relate to the impact of CGDs’ political activities, which increase both economic opportunities and perceived grievances. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002, 2004, 2008) found that CGDs provide the economic opportunity for civil war by financing rebel groups through collective remittances, and serving as long-distance representatives for rebel and insurgency groups fighting the governments in their homeland—activities can facilitate and exacerbate conflict, making conflicts more protracted.

Although there does appear to be significant evidence that in some circumstances CGDs contribute to war efforts through collective financial remittances, Brinkerhoff (2006) argues that CGD individual and collective financial remittances can have a significantly positive effect on home countries particularly concerning cultural and civil development, and disaster relief. In fact, Brinkerhoff (2006) notes that the benefit of remittances to home countries often balances out the loss most experience in terms of social capital (i.e., ‘brain drain’).

**Relating through Contributions to Civil Society**

The second way that CGDs relate to their homeland, according to Mohamoud (2005), is by making contributions to the civil societies in their respective home countries. This type of contribution is often referred to as a ‘humanitarian contribution’, and involves multiple dynamics, depending upon
the state of the home country and the nature of the relationship with its diaspora. Definitions of what constitutes civil society vary. Cochrane (2007) states that although the concept of civil society is quite broad, in general “it refers to the dynamics of political power [that] go beyond the narrow level of the state and are woven into the other sinews of society and community” (p. 19). The World Bank defines civil society as “…the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations” (The World Bank, 2010, para 5).

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) include community groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), women’s cooperatives, charitable organizations, not-for-profit foundations, human rights organizations, professional associations, faith-based organizations, and indigenous groups that exist to provide support to society by strengthening the polity and democracy (Cochrane, 2007; World Bank, 2010). Contributions to civil society are particularly important in post-conflict regions where there are fledgling democracies, as is the case in many countries making the transition from oppressive undemocratic regimes to democracies. The process of strengthening these new democracies through the development of social institutions that partner with and influence the polity and economic systems can in many contexts also contribute toward peace, ensuring that countries, particularly those in post-conflict development and transformation, avoid risks of renewed conflict (Cochrane, 2007).

Mohamoud (2005) refers to the strategic support of civil society as social remittances. He notes how CGDs provide social remittances to their home countries by contributing to the capacity building of civil society by transferring “organisational know-how, financial management and administration skills” (p. 36). Mohamoud asserts that within an African context the sustainability and success of civil society organizations within the home country are dependent on the contributions of its diasporas in the building of
the social infrastructures, stating that diaspora CSOs “are filling a vacuum created by the weakening or the collapse of governance structures at all levels of society” (p. 37).

**Relating through Lobbying the Hostland**

The third way in which CGDs relate to their homeland is through lobbying the hostland and international agencies either for or against the interests of the home country governments. Lobbying activities vary but often include lobbying for issues of interest to CGDs in the hostland, as well as attempting to change foreign policy toward the home country. Mohamoud (2007) notes that when CGDs lobby against the home country (as is often the case when the losing side of a civil war goes into exile), the chances of such lobbying activities exacerbating conflict are significant.

**Relating through Political Engagement in Homeland Affairs**

The fourth way that Mohamoud notes that CGD relate to their homelands is through political engagement in homeland affairs, with transnational networks serving as primary conduits for political engagement and activism (Mohamoud, 2005; Lyons, 2004). The nature of CGD political engagement may vary, but often includes mobilizing others to their cause, disseminating information, including propaganda, supporting rival political groups, and acting as a political wing of a rebel group (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; Demmers, 2007; Lyons, 2004; Mohamoud, 2005).

The nature of political involvement of CGD in home country dynamics has evolved over the years. For instance, during the Cold War era, many host countries in the West, such as the U.S., took a stance against communism, and often granted political asylum to exiles based on their political ideology as a part of the host country’s foreign policy. In fact it was post-World War II anticommunism policy that ushered in a new era in U.S. immigration policy, away from its traditional isolationist stance, and toward a more expansionist immigration policy particularly toward refugees from Communistic-dominated Eastern Europe. When diaspora from communist countries demonstrated and
protested against the oppressive regimes in their home countries, U.S. leaders believed these political activities bolstered U.S. anticommunist policies (Tichenor, 2002). Although diaspora motivations may be similar, political engagement of contemporary CGDs in homeland affairs has changed significantly since the Cold War era, in large part due to the development of the Internet, and other communication devices, such as mobile phones.

**Political Transnational Networks Explored: Motivations for Engagement and the Impact on the Conflict Cycle**

**Political Networks and Activities**

CGDs engage politically in homeland affairs on a domestic level within the host country, on a regional level within the host country, on a transnational level involving two or more nation states, and on a global level (Bercovitch, 2007; Mohamoud, 2007). Their political activities tend to focus on maintaining a sense of ethnic identity and cohesion, and promoting CGDs’ interests, which may include “activities where diaspora works actively through the political and economic channels in its host country to promote the concerns and interests of its homeland” (Bercovitch, 2007). Shain points out that CGD also attempt to influence foreign policy in their host countries through organizing around special interests and using their “transnational economic or political clout (or both)” to affect homeland policies (Shain, 2001). Because of their ability to successfully leverage their collective political power, particularly through their virtual transnational networks, CGDs are increasingly recognized as formidable external actors in homeland conflict situations.

CGDs can wield their influence for either positive or destructive ends, thus it is important to evaluate not only the overall pattern and processes of CGD political engagement, but also their motivations to engage in political activity. When CGDs engage in political activity by lobbying for or about the home country, they can significantly influence host country foreign policy toward the CGDs’ homeland, but the motivation for this may be to support the homeland government (Mohamoud, 2007). For instance, the Israeli diaspora
living in the U.S. is a very powerful lobby for the Israeli government and are believed to have significant influence over U.S. policy in relation to the Jewish state (Demmers, 2007; Sheffer, 2007; Vertovec, 2005). In fact, although many home countries, such as Israel and Ireland initially perceived their diaspora negatively for reasons relating to patriotism, Vertovec points out that currently many countries, including Israel, now perceive their diaspora as “strategically vital political assets” (p. 1).

CDGs also engage in lobbying efforts against their home countries, particularly if the home country government represents the interests of the opposing side of an ethnonationalist conflict. At times it is difficult to determine whether the nature of the activities of CDGs fall into the category of humanitarian (as would be the case with making contributions to civil society explored in the preceding section), or political since much of the political engagement that involves lobbying host countries against home country regimes is framed in humanitarian terms. Thus, what is actually a continuation of war on a virtual level, is often masked as a fight for human rights, or as attempts to contribute to the development of democracy in the home country (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Lyons, 2004, 2007). Lyons (2004, 2007) notes that the relationship that CDG most often have with their home countries is overridingely political in nature (rather than social or humanitarian), although many diaspora-based political movements are presented as humanitarian in nature by framing their grievances about their homelands in human rights terms.

There are many variables that motivate ethnonationalist CGD to engage politically against the home country. One powerful motivating factor referred to in Chapter 1 is what Faist (2000) and Lyons (2004) characterize as the myth of return home or what Kaiser (2004) calls the call of the homeland. The ethnonationalist CGDs’ seemingly unwavering desire to return to their homeland, despite an extended absence, is often considered the most effective tool available to mobilize co-ethnics across the globe for political action. This longing, coupled with an intense desire to return the homeland
back to its pre-departure state appears to motivate CGDs into action against the home country (particularly when the home country is governed by the opposing side in an ethnonationalist conflict), by “activating an exclusionary national territoriality among ethnonational members of the homeland group” (Kaiser, 2004, p. 229).

An example of the nature and power of virtual transnational CGD communities is highlighted in Østergaard-Nielsen’s (2006) study on Kurdish CGD living in four different countries. The study revealed that because transnational networks were facilitated primarily through the Internet, Kurdish CGDs were able to coordinate resources and exchange information on a grand scale in their efforts to lobby host countries in their fight against the Turkish government. She cites the examples of a series of well-coordinated political demonstrations that occurred simultaneously around the world, as well as well-coordinated simultaneous lobbying efforts of NGOs and other international organizations such as the European Union and the UN. Østergaard-Nielsen states that such virtual transnational networking enable CGD to coordinate political engagement in such a way that it gives the appearance of a broad-based global constituency rather than as more isolated regionally based movements.

Impact on the Conflict Cycle

Most violent conflicts follow a somewhat predictable progression, evolving through various phases. The first phase is often referred to as the latent phase of conflict (Bercovitch, 2007). During the latent phase parties become aware of the existence of a discord on some level, but neither party escalates the conflict, thus the relationships involved remain stable. The second stage of a conflict begins when the disagreement escalates to a level where differences become concrete. This stage is often called the emergence stage, because the nature of the conflict rises to the point where both parties become increasingly polarized and mobilization of resources takes place (Brahm, 2003). The third phase of conflict is called the escalation phase, where violence occurs, and in a particularly protracted conflict, severe loss of
life is likely (Bercovitch, 2007). During the escalation phase, leaders often remain determined to win, believing that compromise would represent losing face in the eyes of supporters. The fourth phase of conflict is often called the hurtsing stalemate. Zartman (2001) and Brahm (2003) describe the hurting stalemate as the stage when both sides of a conflict experience violence fatigue due among other things, to heavy loss of life. During this stage both parties recognize that any perceived benefit of keeping the conflict going (in hopes of a zero-sum win) is outweighed by the cost of the conflict, leading to both sides becoming increasingly weary of the consequences of war. This is the phase when intervention in the form of conflict resolution strategies is most likely to be successful (Zartman, 2001). Subsequent phases in the conflict cycle reflect patterns of de-escalation, dispute settlement and post-conflict peacebuilding (Brahm, 2003).

Although most scholars agree that conflict cycles have not necessarily changed in terms of the linear nature of their evolution, most would agree that globalization has changed the ways conflicts are fought, and as such, contemporary conflicts are rarely bi-lateral affairs involving just two parties. Rather, the majority of conflicts now involve multiple parties, including those central to the conflict (often called primary actors), as well as external actors (often called secondary actors) (Bercovitch, 2007). External actors that influence the course and outcome of conflicts may include international organizations such as NGOs, the United Nations, other organized communities, other nation states, and diaspora. The greater the number of external actors with a vested interest in the outcome of a conflict, the more difficult it is to resolve the conflict (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). How external actors, such as diaspora, affect the conflict cycle depends in large part upon when and how they intervene in the conflict cycle. According to Bercovitch if CGDs desire to constructively assist in peacebuilding processes by encouraging compromise and supporting moderate positions then they can contribute to conflict avoidance efforts in the early stages of a conflict, or conflict reconciliation and peace-making in the later stages of conflict. But if
they adopt hardline or extremist positions, and discourage compromise among their co-ethnics in the home country, their role in the conflict cycle will be a destructive one.

CGDs’ role in violent conflict also depends upon their size, strength, and ability to organize politically (Bercovitch, 2007), as well as the political opportunity structures available in the host country (Smith & Stares, 2007). It is important to note Bercovitch’s observations, noted earlier in this chapter, that conflicts involving “identity, beliefs, values, cultural norms or a way of life” are not only more violent and less likely to be resolved through conflict resolution strategies (p. 24), but are also of the type in which CGDs are most likely to become involved as external actors. Further, since CGDs are external actors and do not have to directly suffer the consequences of violent conflict in their home country, they are unlikely to experience either violence fatigue, or the hurting stalemate stage, which ushers in the phase of conflict de-escalation; and conflict resolution among the primary parties, may be perceived by an engaged CGD as a sign that co-ethnics at home are betraying the cause (Lyons, 2004). It is in this vein that Anderson frames ethnonationalist CGD engagement in conflict in the home country as self-serving and irresponsible, stating that individuals so engaged see themselves as key stakeholders in country where:

...he does not intend to live, where he pays no taxes, where he cannot be arrested, where he will not be brought before the courts, and where he does not vote; in effect, a politics without responsibility or accountability (Anderson, 1992, p. 11, as cited in Demmers, 2002).

It is important to note once again though that despite the seeming solidarity demonstrated in the identities and actions of many CGDs, often, under the veneer of solidarity lay many fractures. In Kleist and Hansen’s study of the Somaliland diaspora, they note that what initially appeared as a homogeneous group, standing “shoulder to shoulder united through shared symbols of flags, songs, slogans, colonial histories, memories of civil war and oppression,” was actually, upon more in-depth analysis a community that
experienced a fair amount of conflict, described by Kleist and Hansen as “dangerous liminal identities not yet certain of what to be, where to go, whom or what to support and how and when to do so” (p. 21). This seeming divergence between public image and internal dynamics may have significant relevance to peace-building processes since efforts toward compromise and ethnic reconciliation may be met with increased fragmentation, as once cohesive CGDs may splinter off in response to external pressure (or perceived opportunity).

Regardless of potential behind-the-scenes fragmentation, the political power of CGDs as external political actors has increased markedly in the last three decades, directed in large part by the technology era “that has made communication instantaneous over large distances, breaks down the barriers of territorial identity, facilitating the development of new kinds of ‘imagined community’,” (Bercovitch, 2007, p. 20) thus allowing CGDs to transcend territorial borders, and to link up with co-ethnics from around the globe. Through the Internet, CGDs can engage in transnational political activities as independent external actors, without authorization of the host state in which they reside. Further, as referenced in Chapter 1, as well as in the present chapter, CGDs can actively migrate to liberal democracies that embrace multiculturalism, and are now able to maintain almost constant contact with other diaspora members from their home country, displaced all over the world, through online chat rooms, websites, and online newspapers, which enable them to remain abreast of conditions in their respective home countries, increasing their interest and investment. Bercovitch puts it this way: “Developments resulting from globalization have brought conflicts closer to the diaspora and simultaneously brought the diaspora closer to the conflict” (p. 20). Consequently, CGDs often use the increased access they have to information about their homeland through the Internet as a basis for mobilizing co-ethnics for political action.

According to several scholars, CGDs that engage in political activities using virtual transnational networks based on an ethnonationalist agenda, with
the goal of destabilizing the home country government, may have the potential of significantly increasing the risk of renewed conflict (Anderson, 1992; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Demmers, 2002; Ignatieff, 2001, Kaldor, et al., 2003; Lyons, 2004). Studies exploring the relationship between CGD transnational political engagement and conflict are important because they highlight both how CGDs use information communication technology (ICTs) in virtual communities and online social networks to engage politically, but they also shed light on the impact such activities have on the conflict cycle. Determining whether the political activities of CGDs have a positive or negative effect on the conflict cycle is a difficult and controversial task.⁹

Despite the controversy surrounding whether there is a direct or tangential relationship between CGDs political activities and conflict in the homeland, gaining greater understanding into the ways in which CGD use virtual transnational networks to engage in homeland conflict on a political level is worthy of further exploration, particularly since technology continues to develop at such a rapid pace, rendering studies a mere decade ago likely outdated. In Chapter 3 CGD technologically-based political transnational networks are further explored, including ways in which CGDs mobilize for political action on various levels, and for various purposes. It is through this deeper examination of the ways in which CGDs form virtual transnational networks and use new technologies to engage within and outside of CGD communities that the questions posed in this study will be addressed within the Rwandan diasporic context.

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⁹ Whether the activities of some CGDs are justified, must be considered separately from the issue of whether their involvement in homeland conflict on a political level increases the risk of conflict generation or perpetuation, and are beyond the scope of this study.
CHAPTER 3: ETHNONATIONALIST CONFLICT-GENERATED DIASPORAS’ USE OF THE INTERNET FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES

Using the Internet, and online social media in particular, for the purposes of political engagement is not unique to diaspora, thus it is worthwhile to explore its uses by the other collectivities for the purposes of political activism. For instance, scholars exploring the area of Internet use for political engagement have revealed the strengths and limitations of ICTs, particularly for the purposes of political engagement and activism (often referred to as “cyberactivism”), and the various methods activists employ when using the Internet to achieve their collective ends. The first part of this chapter will explore these methods and uses in general terms by various collectives with the latter part of the chapter focusing on ways in which CGDs use the Internet, and social media in particular, for the purposes of political engagement in homeland affairs, with a focus on a growing body of literature that explores the rapid development of online social media, including its uses and possible outcomes.


Prior to any discussion of how the Internet is used for the purposes of political engagement and activism it is important to first provide some basic information about common terms and relevant concepts related to the online relational sphere. First, information and communications technologies (ICTs) have been defined as “a diverse set of technological tools and resources used to communicate, and to create, disseminate, store, and manage information” (Blurton, 1999, p. 46). ICT is an umbrella term used to describe any means of communication using technology. ICTs can include everything from communication via the telephone, radio, television, and computers.

As referenced in Chapter 2, a subsection of ICTs includes forms of technology using the Internet. The Internet is used for the purposes of communication in a variety of ways, and is increasingly used as a platform for
social media, defined in Chapter 2 as any web-based media used for the purposes of social interaction. The engagement of social interaction on a broad scale is referred to as online social networking. The difference between social media and online social networking lay in the act of engagement. Whereas social media is the term used to describe the way in which information is shared with a broad audience (i.e., the format), social networking involves the actual act of engagement in an online or virtual community (Stelzner, 2009). Thus, all online social networking occurs through social media, but not all social media involves online social networking. In general, online social networking sites (SNS) offer a wide range of opportunities for communities of individuals to come together and use social media for sharing common interests and/or pursuing common goals and purposes (Akin, 2011; Brinkerhoff, 2006b; Carty & Oynett, 2006; Hogan, 2007). The nature of SNS has been described as:

[W]eb-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system. The nature and nomenclature of these connections may vary from site to site (boyd & Ellison, 2008, p. 211).

Online SNS came into existence in the late 1990s, shortly after the Internet became more widely available (boyd & Ellison, 2008). Early SNS were primarily “profile-centric” allowing for only the most basic of networking – creating a personal profile, and the ability to search for other users, called “friends,” “contacts,” “connections” or “buddies” (boyd & Ellison, 2008). Subsequent waves of SNS added increased functionality with both site-initiated tools, and third-party tools, often called “add-ons.” SNS that offered a singular functionality, such as “online chatting,” were increasingly merged or duplicated on SNS allowing for tethered or integrated sites that offered a multitude of functions. For instance, Facebook was one of the first online SNS
that combined online chatting, email, online posting of statuses with interactivity (posting replies, liking posts, interacting with friends of friends, etc.), online games, networking through the posting of other website links, posting of photographs and video, the development of profile niches, such as a common area of interest (e.g., a bird watcher’s club), joining Facebook groups based on profession, political affiliations, etc., and the addition of Community pages and Causes, which users can like and/or join. Facebook was also one of the first SNS that allowed for the linking to other online social networking sites such as Pinterest and Twitter, thus when a user sends a “tweet,” they have the option of having this show up on their Facebook page as a status. Adding third-party applications enables the user to use Facebook for a multitude of more specific purposes, such as online dating, business networking, posting articles to an online newspaper, microblogging, and political activism (boyd & Ellison, 2008). With each additional function comes an increased opportunity for networked communication, for various purposes. For instance, the Internet is increasingly being considered a great power equalizer in the sense that it is providing a voice to the voiceless thus countering hegemonic forces within society (Akin, 2011; Bernal, 2006; Kellner, 2001), or as a report from the World Bank asserts, the Internet is putting “unequal beings on an equal footing and that makes it the most potent democratizing tool ever devised” (in Wheeler 2001, p. 187).

As a consequence, the Internet is increasingly the medium of choice among disenfranchised members of society, such as ethnic groups, particularly for political purposes, including mobilization and recruitment, communication among activists, generating media coverage for political causes and social movements, and the organization of political protests (Akin, 2011; Lyons, 2004, 2007). One of the most common mediums for political engagement on the Internet is through SNS. When an SNS is used for political purposes every aspect of social movement engagement appears to be larger

10 The surname is not capitalized in order to comply with the author’s stated preference for how her name is expressed in written form.
and faster, including mobilization, coalition-building, lobbying, communication, and information dissemination. This is in large part due to the immediacy and interactivity that the Internet offers users (McCaughey & Ayers, 2003) as well as the general ease of access, together with the fact that the Internet sphere has no geographic boundaries (Carty & Onyett, 2006).

**Network vs. Networking**

boyd and Ellison make a distinction between network sites and networking sites, stating that the term networking “emphasizes relationship initiation, often between strangers,” whereas many network sites do not. However, this distinction may soon be irrelevant since many social network sites are increasingly providing networking opportunities (such as those described above with Facebook), increasing their interactive capabilities (p. 20). Thus, sites that previously offered solely network opportunities are now providing networking opportunities. For instance, when LinkedIn.com was first launched in May of 2003, the site was strictly designed for the purposes of publishing professional profiles and making professional connections through the addition of network contacts to one’s LinkedIn community, allowing mutual profile viewing and the sharing of contact information. There was no functionality that allowed for posting status updates, and no ability to post responses to another’s posts. In response to increased interactivity of other online social networking sites, LinkedIn recently added a networking function allowing users to post comments, link to other websites such as online news articles, and post replies to others’ posts (i.e., networking). In addition, LinkedIn now includes a running newsfeed on its landing page, and also invites users to post recommendations and endorsements on behalf of their connections. These additional features increased the networking functionality, rendering this site somewhat more comparable to other SNS such as Facebook. Likewise, Twitter has also significantly increased its functionality, with the ability to post photos, engage in online discussions, and the sharing of “tweets” from users from those one is “following”. In addition to cross-status posting and the linking of outside media (such as online news articles), many
social networking sites also provide the opportunity to increase networks by making user contact lists visible, thus allowing for inter-and intranetworking possibilities (e.g. “Friends you should Know,” “People you may Know,” “Suggested Friends,” “Who Viewed Your Profile?”).

**Social Networking Site Usage: Breakdown by Demographics**

The use of social media, and SNS in particular has dramatically increased on a worldwide basis in recent years. According to a 2011 study conducted by the Pew Research Center, almost 47 percent of adults in the United States use an SNS, compared to 26 percent of adults who used the Internet in 2008. This represents a doubling of SNS use among the U.S. adult population in only three years (Hampton, Goulet, Rainie, & Purcell, 2011). Worldwide Internet usage is at about 34 percent (often referred to as the penetration rate), with a growth rate between the years 2000 and 2012 of over 566 percent. Growth of Internet access worldwide is expected to continue to grow rapidly, particularly with the increase in access via mobile telephone devices that have Internet access capabilities. Growth of Internet usage in developing countries is particularly dramatic, with Internet access in Africa alone growing over 3600 percent between 2000 and 2012. The percentage of individuals in Africa who now have access to the Internet ranges from 0 percent in South Sudan to 50 percent in Morocco. The Middle East has also experienced a sharp increase in Internet usage, with just over 40 percent of the population now having Internet access, representing a 2640 percent increase between 2000 and 2012 (Internet World Stats, 2012).

In the United States, Internet usage has increased significantly and rapidly as well. For instance, in 2008 only 5 percent of Americans had Internet access in their homes, compared to 78 percent in 2012 (Internet World Stats, 2012; NAS Insights, 2010). With regard to social media usage, a recent study on global usage of SNS conducted by eMarketer (2012) indicates that as of 2012 there were approximately 1.43 billion individuals worldwide using SNS, representing a 20 percent increase in just one year. With regard to global usage, an estimated 20 percent of people worldwide used SNS in 2012, but
this number is expected to increase significantly along with increased Internet access globally (eMarketer, 2012). In fact, in 2012 just over 20 percent of people worldwide used an SNS at least once per month from any device, compared to 17 percent in 2011. This number is expected to increase to about 26 percent in 2014. Further, in 2012, of all adults with Internet access globally, approximately 63 percent used an SNS, and in 2014 this is expected to increase to over 70 percent. Facebook remains the leading SNS, with approximately 840 million worldwide users in 2012,\(^{11}\) a 27 percent increase from 2011 (eMarketer, 2012).

According to a recent Pew Research Center poll on social media usage in the United States, usage levels can be correlated with demographics such as gender, race/ethnicity, income and education levels (Brenner, 2012). For instance, among all adults who use the Internet, more women access SNS than men (75 percent versus 63 percent). Younger adults use SNS far more frequently than older adults, with approximately 92 percent of Internet users between the ages of 18 to 29 using SNS, compared to 73 percent of Internet users between the ages of 30 to 49 years, 57 percent of Internet users between the ages of 50 to 64 years, and 38 percent of Internet users being 65 years and older. Further, with increased education and income appears to come increased use of SNS (see Figure 3.1).

\(^{11}\) In a Facebook status posted on October 4, 2012, Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook CEO announced that Facebook had 1.01 billion users worldwide (compared to just 20 million in April 2007), with 584 million daily users (see “Facebook Now has 1 Billion Users…” at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/04/facebook-1-billion-users_n_1938675.html
Based upon Pew Internet Civic Engagement Tracking Survey, July 16 – August 7, 2012 (Brenner, 2012).

Further, usage of SNS among younger adult Internet users has increased significantly in recent years, with the use of SNS by individuals between the ages of 18 and 29 increasing from 9 percent in 2005, to 55 percent in 2006, to 73 percent in 2009, and to 92 percent in 2012 (Lenhart, Purcell, Smith, & Zickuhr, 2010) (see Figure 3.2).
An interesting trend found in the research involves SNS usage among various ethnic minority groups with Internet access. For instance, despite research that shows that racial minority groups in the United States use the Internet at significantly lesser rates compared to Caucasians (Kamalu, 2012; Smith, 2010), a recent Pew study on social media usage in the United States indicates that the use of SNS among ethnic minority groups with Internet access is either equal to or higher than that of Caucasians (see Figure 3.3). A 2012 Pew Research Center’s study on SNS usage among mobile phone users might explain this trend. The study found that among mobile phone users, approximately 40 percent use their mobile phone to access an SNS, and among these, a significantly higher number of Black and Hispanic mobile
phone users access SNS compared to Caucasian mobile phone users. This trend may be explained by the very recent phenomenon of decreased cost and increased access to the Internet via mobile phones, rendering access through costly computers and Internet subscriptions unnecessary. For instance mobile phone usage in the United States has increased sharply in recent years, with only five percent of the American population owning a mobile phone device in 2005, compared to 88 percent in 2012. This dramatic increase in access to mobile telephones, coupled with the increased number of Internet-ready mobile phones, has made the Internet available to segments of the population that previously did not have access. The increased access of the Internet, particularly via mobile phone devices, as well as the decentralized nature of the Internet may be a powerful amelioration of cultural hegemony (Krueger, 2002), a dynamic that has implications for the current study, particularly since use of social media by CGDs is considered prolific, despite CGDs’ often marginalized ethnic minority status (Brinkerhoff, 2009).

Based upon Pew Internet Civic Engagement Tracking Survey, July 16 – August 7, 2012 (Brenner, 2012).
Use of SNS has not only increased significantly in the last five years (among all demographic categories), but preferences for SNS have changed as well. For instance, in 2008 MySpace was more popular with younger adults (18 to 29 years), and Facebook was more popular with mid-range adults (30 to 49 years). But by 2012, the majority of adults with Internet access used Facebook (89 percent of all adult SNS users) (Brenner, 2012). Facebook also appears to be more frequently used among all demographics compared to other SNS in 2012, with 66 percent of all Internet users using Facebook, followed by LinkedIn (20 percent), Twitter (16 percent), Instagram (12 percent), Pinterest (12 percent), and Tumblr (5 percent) (Brenner, 2012). Yet in light of various changes demonstrated in studies between 2005 and 2012, it would be expected that SNS preference might continue to change, particularly as the trend toward SNS linking and functionality embeddedness continue to increase.
Recent research has also revealed the social impact of SNS usage. A 2010 study found that SNS are increasingly used to remain close with social connections. Additionally, the study found that compared to those without Internet access, SNS users have more close ties, are less likely to be socially isolated, and receive more social support from their social connections. Additionally, Facebook users tend to be more trusting, have more close relationships, many of which have been revived through Facebook. Also, Facebook users tend to be more politically engaged than the average American (for instance), and other SNS users (Brenner, 2012).

**Relationship between Online and Offline Spheres**

Several researchers have explored the ways in which online and offline spheres interact on a continuum in order to better understand how cyberspace affects “real world” interactions (and visa versa), particularly with regard to how cyberspace is used as a form of social interaction, and civic and political engagement. These conceptualizations help us to better understand the ways in which activities in cyberspace fit holistically into broader living spaciality, since online and offline worlds are rarely dichotomous spaces, but overlap and intersect along a continuum of relating, in ways that have the potential to have both limiting and enriching effects on each binary sphere. For instance, Bailey (2011) describes how “online territory becomes a network in which ideas and discourses travel through a complex system of connections which link and disconnect the alternative and mainstream” (p. 4). This continuum of relating represents “smooth space” in the sense that it is non-linear, and non-hierarchical, “anarchic and nomadic” (p. 2). In describing the relationship between online and offline spheres, Bailey relies on Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of rhizome, an alternative model for understanding knowledge and how one’s self is situated within contemporary society. The rhizome concept has been increasingly applied to understanding cyberspace, including how communication and relationships are interwoven, and networked, not as a linear and hierarchical processes (such as “real life”), but as one where connections can occur at any point of the network, where the rules are
“constantly in motion because new elements are constantly included” (Bailey, 2011, p. 2), and where connections “may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but… will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 9). Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) principle of cartography applied to cyberspace aptly describes the nature of interconnectivity of the Internet (juxtaposed to “real life” communication and relating) if it were to be mapped:

The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation. It can be drawn on a wall, conceived as of as a work of art, constructed as a political action or as a meditation. Perhaps one of the most important characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entryways (p. 12).

Bailey’s use of rhizome as a metaphor for the connections and synergy between online and offline spheres, illustrates how the “map” of cyberspace interconnectivity is vastly different to that of offline spheres, illustrating how the two spheres are highly interrelated in a non-linear fashion, “with each space in a constant process of engagement and disengagement with striated (mainstream) spaces” (p. 2). These differences are particularly pronounced within diasporic contexts. In fact, Bailey’s conceptualization of rhizome not only provides insights into the ways that CGDs’ hybrid identity is influenced by cyberspace (where CGDs' identity is a both formed and transformed), but also helps to better understand the fluidity of these online and offline spheres in terms of relatedness and connectivity, with some relationships and activities occurring solely in cyberspace, and some online activities acting as extensions of real-life social interactions and activities. This conceptualization is particularly useful in understanding ways in which cyberspace is used for civic and political engagement in virtual transnational networks, and how its use interacts and influences offline (“real life”) engagement (and visa versa).12

12 This dynamic is explored more fully in the section entitled “Types of Cyberactivism,” where Morris and Langman’s work on social activism in cyberspace is introduced and explored.
Using the Internet for Civic and Political Engagement

The Internet, and particularly social media, is increasingly being used for civic engagement in public life, particularly for political purposes. A recent study by the Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project found that about 66 percent of social media users have used an SNS for civil engagement and political purposes. The study organized civic engagement into eight categories, including (1) “liking” political material on an SNS, (2) using an SNS to encourage voting, (3) posting opinions about political and social issues on an SNS, (4) reposting political content, (5) encouraging others to take action on a political or social issue, (6) posting links to political stories on an SNS, (7) joining a group on an SNS of a political nature, and (8) following an elected official or political candidate on a SNS (Rainie, Smith, Schlozman, Brady & Verba, 2012). The study found that among all individuals who use social media, approximately 30 to 35 percent use social media for civil and political engagement, particularly young adults ages 18 to 29 (Rainie, et al, 2012).

Civic engagement in public life can involve a variety of activities, but most often refers to political activity such as voting or active support of a political candidate, (e.g., political canvassing). Political engagement has been defined as “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action – either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies” (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, p. 38). Since the advent of the Internet, political engagement has been increasingly conducted online, using social media as a facilitation aid. Research indicates that not only is political engagement facilitated online just as successful as the traditional forms of engagement, but it may be even more successful when the engagement involves mobilization for the purposes of political activism, since the Internet is faster, and has no geographic bounds (Castell, 1997, 2001, 2007; Margolis & Resnick, 2000; Vissers, Hooghe, Mahé, & Stolle, 2008). The next section will explore the use of the Internet for the purposes of political engagement, in
particular political activism by the general public, followed by a more focused exploration of CGDs’ use of online political engagement and activism, with a particular focus on trends, possible motivations, methods and effects.

**Cyberactivism: Social Mobilization and Social Mobilization on the Net**

The term *cyberactivism* has been defined as “the extensive use of the Internet to provide counter-hegemonic information and inspire social mobilization” (Morris & Langman, 2002, p. 3). In Carty and Onyett’s 2006 analysis of the role of cyberactivism in peace movements they explore the many ways in which the Internet affects the processes involved in collective activism. For instance, Carty and Onyett describe how political organizers present grievances in such a way as to tap into the beliefs and values of their target audience, and thus have a greater likelihood of influencing public opinion. In order to motivate others to spring into action, organizers sometimes appeal to their sense of justice by rooting their grievances in matters of injustice and identity. Taylor and Van Dyke (2003) refer to the need for the development of a collective identity necessary for political activism to be successful, emphasizing the importance of developing not only a sense of solidarity among like-minded members, but also an oppositional consciousness that allows a challenging group to identify common injustices, to oppose those injustices, and to define a shared interest in opposing the dominant group or resisting the system of authority responsible for those injustices.

Carty and Onyett (2006) refer to an activism strategy called *radical empathy*, which increases the general public’s empathy for the plight of others by immersing them into their “authentic life-experiences,” thus shrinking the distance between observer and victim – a distance that typically allows the general public to remain emotionally distant and aloof. By closing the gap between “us” and “them” solidarity is enhanced “through a shared sense of morality and consciousness of human rights” (p. 242). This is easily accomplished in an online social networking environment where photo streams, videos, and personal testimonies bring distant dynamics into the very
living rooms of potential recruits. Another strategy often used by political activists and organizers is called *swarming*. Carty and Onyett (2006) describe swarming as the virtual organizing of multiple wired groups that appear at live demonstrations, seemingly spontaneously, but in actuality, they are organized through the Internet.

The Internet has enabled social movements and protests to grow in size far faster than in previous generations. Often these movements have no identifiable leader, thus rather than the traditional top-down movement, the Internet has enabled formerly disconnected groups from all over the world to connect and coordinate through online social networks in a free-flowing and non-hierarchical fashion. Thus in the past where a demonstration had to be organized over several months by a few key organizers who mailed paper flyers and made hard wired telephone calls, the Internet permits information about protests to be disseminated instantly, and broadly, allowing news of an event to go “viral” through email, text, Twitter, listservs, and Facebook (for example).

Essentially, the Internet’s ability for mass mobilization allows organizers and participants the potential of reaching thousands of people in a matter of minutes, something not possible in the pre-Internet era. Rheingold (2002) refers to this type of Internet-driven mass mobilization as “smart mobs,” where people who are most often strangers work in concert with one another via the Internet. In describing how the Internet has and will continue to change the way protest movements are facilitating, Rheingold states:

The people who make up smart mobs cooperate in ways never before possible because they carry devices that possess both communication and computing capabilities. Their mobile devices connect them with other people’s telephones … These devices will help people coordinate actions with others around the world – and, perhaps more importantly with people nearby. Groups of people using these tools will gain new forms of social power, new ways to organize their interactions and exchanges just in time and just in place… Location-sensing wireless organizers, wireless networks, and community supercomputing collectives all have one thing in common: *They enable people to act together in new ways and in situations where collective action was not possible before*, (emphasis in original) (p. xviii).
It is the very fact that swarming by smart mobs does not require central leadership that makes it so effective, and so difficult for political elites to manage, since it is “multi-headed [thus] impossible to decapitate” (Carty & Onyett, 2006, p. 242). As an example of the power of smart mobs Rheingold cites how President Joseph Estrada of the Philippines was ousted from power in response to mass demonstrations organized almost solely through instant text (SMS) messaging.

Types of Cyberactivism

Morris and Langman (2002) have developed an analytical model for better understanding the different types of cyberactivism. They posit that there are six types of cyberactivism, combining two factors:

1. The type of social action engaged in (either through the Net, where the Internet is used as a tool for offline ["real life"] activity, or in the Net, where the Internet is used as a "social space or site of contestation") (p. 3); and,

2. The social sphere in which the activity occurs (e.g., economic, political-relational, and cultural spheres).

The six types of cyberactivism Morris and Langman describe include activism within economic, political-relational and cultural spheres that are facilitated either through the Net as an extension of “real world” activities, including 1) “Internetworking,” 2) “Capital and information flows,” and 3) “Alternative media and alternative theory networks”; or in the Net, including 1) “Direct cyberactivism,” (also called “hacktivism”), 2) “Contesting and constructing the Internet,” and 3) “Online alternative community formation.”

The first type of through the Net cyberactivism is “Internetworking,” which involves the linking of various forms of online media, such as email, listservs, and websites in a social movement campaign, referred to as

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13 Morris and Langman clarify that categorizing types of cyberactivism in this way are for political purposes only, since in actuality “many of these phenomena develop in tandem, in synergy and/or dialectically” (p. 4).
organization and network coordination. Morris and Langman (2002) cite the example of Internetworking efforts of the NGO, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), which engaged in a proactive campaign of online social movement networking, extending its offline campaigning—ultimately leading to the passage of the Landmine Treaty Act of 1997. Internetworking also involves political networking with other online social movements, where the linkages of smaller movements come together to create a sort of “super movement sphere” that has the ability to network information and resources. This type of internetworking is often referred to as grassroots and global internetworking. Morris and Langman describe how global grassroots networking has allowed social movements that formerly operated in somewhat of a silo, to join forces with movements across a variety of domains. They use the example of feminist groups linking up with union groups, citing how “the various memberships and universal charters overlap in networks that forward social justice initiatives in many social domains” (p. 5). Internetworking may also include direct action coordination such as the coordination of on-the-ground social action with online sources being used for logistical purposes.

The second type of through the Net cyberactivism is “Capital and Information flows” and involves using the Internet within economic spheres to solicit donations and transmit funds. This type of cyberactivism can also include the development of contact via the Internet for the purposes of coalition-building for political support in addition to soliciting donations. The third type of “through the Net” cyberactivism is called “alternative media,” which refers to new web-based media formats, such as online news sites and blogs. Morris and Langman (2002) describe how the Internet has dramatically changed traditional forms of media by increasing fluidity, interactivity, and responsiveness.

The first type of in the Net cyberactivism is called “Direct cyberactivism” and includes civil disobedience via the Internet, such as disrupting Internet traffic, or hacking websites (hactivism). In its extreme form, direct cyberactivism can include cyberterrorism, such as the purposeful spread of
computer viruses. As the world becomes increasingly dependent upon the Internet for global functioning (economic markets, the health sector, defense, transportation, etc.), cyberterrorism has the potential to exact profoundly catastrophic consequences. For instance, Morris and Langman (2002) argue that cyberterrorism could result in the collapse of “vital global transportation, health care, energy, and food distribution networks,” since all of these systems are now highly reliant on the Internet (pp. 8-9).

The second type of cyberactivism is called “Contesting and constructing the Internet” and involves a type of social movement that is aimed at the further development of the Internet, but in a particular direction. An example are cyberactivists who advocate for equity in Internet access, such as ensuring the availability of open access and open source websites and software, particularly for historically marginalized and excluded populations. The third type of in the Net cyberactivism is called “Online alternative community formation” and refers to the development of virtual communities for political purposes. Although there may be a range of goals in developing virtual communities, most virtual communities are based on pre-existing social identities, such as nationality or religion (Morris and Langman refer to this type of virtual community as “Solidaristic associations”). Another type of virtual community is based on novel motives, where identities who have not previously connected come together online for a collective mutual purpose. Often these types of virtual communities are comprised of diverse groups with shared values (Morris and Langman refer to this type of virtual community as “New forms of mutuality”). Morris and Langman’s analysis contributes to the growing body of literature in the area of social movement theory, exploring the role of the Internet, and social networking sites, in political engagement and cyberactivism, particularly among everyday people who engage in grassroots movements (see Carty & Onyett, 2012; Khamis & Vaughn, 2011; Langman, 2005; McCaughey & Ayers, 2013; Milan & Hintz, 2013; Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2013).
Examples of Cyberactivism

Carty and Onyett (2006) cite the activities of MoveOn.org as an example of the effectiveness of cyberactivism. MoveOn.org is a public policy advocacy organization, founded in the United States in 1998. This virtual grassroots political peace movement boasts over seven million online members and consists of a Political Action Committee (PAC), and a civic action website. MoveOn.org organizers engage in online activities *in the Net*, such as the facilitation of online petitions where they have effectively collected millions of digital signatures of everyday citizens typically not involved in politics. MoveOn.org has also engaged in online activities *through the Net*, such as sending emails and texts to members encouraging them to call and FAX their Congressional representatives in support or against various causes. For instance, in opposition to the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq, MoveOn.org engaged in a virtual civil disobedience campaign resulting in U.S. Congressional offices receiving hundreds of thousands of telephone calls and faxes with the simple message: “DON’T ATTACK IRAQ!,” which not only sent a clear message of dissent among a very large constituency, but it also illustrated the sheer power of the Internet since this action resulted in Senate office FAX machine and telephone lines being clogged for hours.

It is important to note though that while many cyberactivists frame their efforts in terms of working for peace, not all cyberactivism results in increased peace, and in fact, many types of cyberactivism actually results in contributing to the conflict cycle and ultimately can make conflict more protracted (Brinkerhoff, 2008; Lyons, 2004) (as explored briefly in Chapter 2).

Conflict-Generated Diasporas’ Engagement In Homeland Affairs through Cyberactivism

CGDs have a long history of political engagement in both their host countries and their home countries (Anderson, 1992; Shain, 1994-1995), with CGDs’ political engagement increasing since the end of the Cold War era (Fullilove, 2008). Increased lobbying opportunities along with the globalization of communication technologies that allow for cheap travel, instantaneous
communication, and virtual networking, coupled with the deterritorialization of conflict (primarily ethnonationalist in nature) has resulted in a contemporary picture that often finds CGDs as key players in conflict situations, working to exert power and influence, and determining outcomes to unprecedented degrees.

Research in the area of diaspora studies indicates that CGDs become engages in politics in their homeland in two primary ways – they are recruited by their homelands for lobbying or on-the-ground support, particularly during periods of post-conflict reconstruction (Abdile, 2010; Fullilove, 2008; Lyons & Mandeville, 2008; Turner, 2008), such as the case of the American Jewish diaspora, or the Afghani diaspora (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Fullilove, 2008; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006; Mohamoud, 2005; Smith & Stares, 2007), or they are working against their homeland governments, such as the case of the Ethiopian diaspora (Lyons, 2004), the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora (International Crisis Group, 2010), and the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora (Østergaard-Neilson, 2006). And while not all CGD political engagement is conducted through the Internet, research shows that CGDs are increasingly engaged in social action both in the Net and through the Net within a variety of social spheres (Bernal, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Conversi, 2004; Demmers, 2002; Lyons, 2007).

Just as CGDs engage politically in the real world as well as through the Internet, CGDs also use the Internet for a variety of purposes beyond the political realm. For instance, CGDs often use the Internet to maintain social connections with members of the home country (both those who remained at home and those who live abroad), or as Hirji (2006) puts it, many CGDs use the Internet to substitute a “virtual community for geographic closeness” (p. 129), where the effect of geographical distances are minimized, giving the sense of greater immediacy and community (Alinejad, 2011; Helland, 2007). Eriksen (2006) notes that networking via the Internet can even create a sense of “virtual return,” which serves as a surrogate for an actual return to the homeland. CGDs also use the Internet for the purposes of social and cultural expression, and to produce and debate historical narratives (Bernal, 2006).
But the research is clear that in addition to the various types of activities CGDs use the Internet for, those activities that are political in nature are increasingly common. For instance, Vissers, Hooghe, Mahé, and Stolle (2008) have noted evidence that CGDs’ online political engagement in homeland affairs, particularly conflict, has sharply increased in recent years. In fact, the increase in CGD cyberactivism has been so rapid, that in 2006 Østergaard-Nielsen noted that while general CGD usage of the Internet was quite high, she had not noted that the Internet was being used much for political purposes, such as lobbying. And yet, just a few years later several scholars have noted how CGDs are becoming prolific users of the Internet for various types of political engagement, indicating just how quickly this phenomenon is developing within CGD communities (Brinkerhoff, 2012; Conversi, 2012; Leurs & Ponzanesi, 2011; Vissers, et al, 2008). Kent (2005) describes how the dramatic expansion of the Internet and other forms of communication, such as mobile telephones, in the last three decades has enabled CGDs to develop organized transnational networks in a way not previously possible. Kent notes how the Internet has made it possible for organized diaspora to develop vast worldwide networks where virtual linkages permit real-time communication for the purposes of political debate, discussing and formulating goals and implementing plans pertaining to peacebuilding and reconstruction in their respective homelands.

Although Kent’s study focused on diaspora contributions to peacebuilding in the homeland, the same can be alleged for how CGDs’ political engagement through virtual transnational networks can contribute to conflict as well. Gauging the actual level of CGD engagement in political activities in regard to homeland affairs, particularly conflict, is challenging since many CGD political activities are actually masked as humanitarian or informational efforts (Skjerdal, 2009), thus in order to gain greater understanding of the nature and effect of CGD online political engagement (cyberactivism), it is important to explore the both the overt and covert motives, agendas and activities of CGD through more in-depth analyses of CGD online behavior.
Motivation to Act: Identity Formation and Political Outcomes

Identity Formation through Cyberactivism

CGDs’ online political engagement in homeland affairs serves many purposes, but most often research has shown that such activities tend to 1) reinforce aspects of CGD identity; and 2) influence political outcomes in the homeland, with each dynamic interacting and influencing the other. A considerable amount of time was spent in Chapters 1 and 2 describing CGDs’ motivations to engage politically in homeland conflict, particularly as they relate to identity and a desire to return to the traditional homeland, thus these analyses will not be repeated here, but it is important to note that the Internet provides a powerful means to engage politically in homeland conflict while at the same time reinforcing CGD identity.

In summary, CGDs’ online political engagement in homeland conflict contributes to the development of CGD identity, both with regard to their hybrid and transnational qualities, but also with regard to reinforcing dynamics related to the reasons for their forced displacement. Chapter 2 cited the fluidity of CGD identity and how it is constantly being negotiated and re-negotiated as CGD adapt to their new host society, while at the same time maintaining ties to their homeland. Østergaard-Nielsen (2006) touches on this very issue when she notes how the Internet provides CGD “diagonal space” where historic tradition and contemporary society converge to produce new types of self-understandings. Similarly, Lyons (2006) notes how CGDs have a “territorially defined sense of identity” that link past conflicts with current challenges of living in the host state. He also argues that for diaspora, identity, territory and conflict are conflated concepts, which when combined often serve as the motivation to act.

Themes Involved in Online Political Engagement in Homeland Affairs

Due to the relative novelty of the phenomenon of CGDs using the Internet to engage politically in homeland conflict, there is not a well-developed body of research that explores the actor dynamics involved to any
level of real specificity. Rather, the majority of research in this area is in the form of case studies, which tend to concentrate on the means employed with examples of cyberactivism used to illustrate a wide range of political activities. These case studies are very useful in developing a more comprehensive representation of ways in which the Internet is used, but the literature is still being informed in this regard, which points to the contribution the current study will be making.

Mobilization

Virtual ethnographies of CGDs’ online political engagement have found that CGD are prolific users of the Internet for political purposes, particularly social media, online newspapers, and blogs (Bernal, 2009; Brinkerhoff, 2009, 2012; Lyons, 2004, 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006). Most of the studies on CGD online engagement in homeland politics found that CGDs’ use the Internet for mobilization (both internally and externally), debate, dissemination of information and propaganda, and lobbying. For instance, in Østergaard-Nielsen’s study of Kurdish refugees she found that websites served as platforms mobilizing CGDs as well as the wider public through the dissemination of information, often propaganda.

Bernal’s (2006) study on Eritrean diaspora found that they have used the Internet to mobilize demonstrators, fundraise for war efforts, and used social media to debate the political issues, such as the new Eritrean Constitution. Bernal notes how the Internet has had a particularly strong impact on Eritrean politics since the development of the Internet coincided with Eritrean independence in 1993; and that nation-building projects in Eritrea developed within the “context of late millennial/twenty-first century conditions and communications” (p. 162). In Bernal’s study of an Eritrean interactive website (www.dehai.org), he noted that its primary purpose (stated in its online charter) was to “promote freedom of expression, and to facilitate an open environment in which members may express a diversity of opinion that is to be both welcomed and respected” (p. 169). The website contains a space for users to post news articles about Eritrea, as well as an interactive community
discussion forum where users exchanged ideas and debated issues. The website also had a space for world news, where videos pertaining to Eritrea could be posted (primarily links to YouTube videos). Bernal explains that due to limited access to the Internet in Eritrea, most political activism occurred within the diaspora, but that is changing now that Internet penetration is increasing in many African countries, including Eritrea. Bernal also notes that the Eritrea website he studied was a source of cultural production as well as a forum for political expression, and that while on the surface the Dehai website appeared to exist solely as an open access information portal, on a deeper level it served, among other things, as a place where national and virtual history was constructed, and a place where civic engagement and political dissent was facilitated.

Lyons’ study of the Ethiopian diaspora and their political activism against the government of Ethiopia found many of the same dynamics as Østergaard-Nielsen and Bernal, but Lyons noted that the Ethiopian diaspora engaged in cyberactivism both in the Net (similar in fashion to the Dehai website), as well as through the Net. For example, Lyons found that the Ethiopian diaspora living in the West, particularly those strategically located in Washington, D.C. used online newspapers, blogs, email lists, and online radio stations to lobby the U.S. government as well as the international community demanding that aid be reduced to the Ethiopian government due to human rights conditions within the country. Thus, not only did some activism occur primarily within cyberspace, a considerable amount of political engagement used the Internet to complement more familiar forms of political engagement, such as real life demonstrations, and lobbying the U.S. government against the Ethiopian government. Lyons found that the techniques used by the CGDs, both in cyberspace and in real life, had a strong influence on the international community, as well as on political actors in Ethiopia.

Photographic Displays of Victim Status

CGD also use the Internet as a medium for using photographs as a way of expressing their victimhood. For instance, in Axel’s (2004) virtual
ethnography of Sikh diaspora online narratives (the Sikh population has endured significant trauma as a result of long-standing persecution on the part of the Indian government), he describes how the Sikh used the Internet to develop a collectively romanticized new homeland called “Khalistan” given to them by God. In describing this online narrative, Axel frames the rationale for the Sikh separatist movement in this way:

Khalistani discourse constitutes the homeland, Khalistan, as a unique place created by God, later given by the Sikhs to the British, and, as Punjab, is presently occupied by alien polity, the Indian nation-state.

Axel describes the Sikh diaspora website [www.khalistan.net](http://www.khalistan.net) as featuring on its landing page a map of the world with the imagined homeland of “Khalistan” prominently featured, with the tagline “Khalistan: The New Global Reality.” Axel also describes how the website, among other purposes, is used to raise awareness of Sikh persecution by the Indian government through the posting of numerous photographs labeled “Glimpses of Genocide,” depicting incidences of torture of Sikhs in India, alleged to have been committed by Indian government officials. Axel cites one particularly gruesome photograph of a tortured and ultimately murdered Sikh man labeled with the following statement: “A candidate for Punjab Assembly brutally tortured (with hot iron and electric shock) and murdered by the Indian Police” (see Axel, 2004, pp. 35 – 37). Axel refers to the posting of such photographs online by CGD as a cyber-archive intended to document diaspora struggles and used to create a “transnational spectacle of subjectification” (also referred to by Axel as a “transnational domain of visual images”) as an expression of diaspora displacement and temporalization (a form of nostalgia unique to CGD populations14), where CGDs perceive themselves as a self-identified subjugated ethnic population (p. 35).

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14 Daniel Martin Carter refers to the concept of temporalization within a diasporic context as “diasporic nostalgia,” encompassing not only traditional notions of temporalization (looking back in time), but also a concurrent looking forward in time to a return to home country under the right circumstances. Thus, diaspora nostalgia involves a yearning “for only a part of the past and some part of a future” (p. 148).
Hybrid Journalism: CGDs’ Online Newspapers and Political Activism.

Several researchers analyzing online content on diaspora-run websites found that many involved various types of journalism, some mainstream, but a considerable amount that was quite political in nature, or what Skjerdal refers to as political activism masked as journalism. In Hiriji’s study of Muslim CGD online activity, he noted that despite CGD members’ criticism of mainstream media, alternate media outlets outside of the diaspora joined forces with diaspora activists in criticizing mainstream media. He also found that social justice activists outside the diaspora formed partnerships with CGD in their attempts to fight for social justice. In Skjerdal’s analysis of Ethiopian diaspora online newspapers’ professional journalist standards, he found that each of the nine Ethiopian online newspapers were far more political in nature than they were journalistic, with the majority of the news stories being centered on politics. Even in cases where articles appeared to be focused on a non-political topic, they were depicted in what Skjerdal referred to as “politicized wrapping,” with impartial and objective stories being rare, and opinion often presented as fact. Skjerdal also noted that in articles about the Ethiopian government, the word “government” was consistently replaced with the word “regime.” Further, the Ethiopian prime minister was not referred to by his official title, but rather by the term “dictator” or “tyrant.” Skjerdal provides the following example from an online story about the reelection of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia:

The 14th African Union Summit on Tuesday unanimously re-elected Ethiopian Prime Minister [sic] genocidal dictator Meles Zenawi to represent Africa in future global climate conferences (p. 736).

Additionally, adjacent to various online articles were photographs and illustrations featuring the prime minister with “(manipulated) horns and vampire teeth, or with a long, forked snake tongue (also manipulated).”

Skjerdal also found that the majority of the online newspapers had connections to political opposition groups, all working against the Ethiopian government, but for different reasons (some, but not all, were allied with
Eritrea). This was evidenced by the fact that the writers (identified as journalists) and other contributors were for the most part former Ethiopian politicians (or those affiliated with their political parties) now residing in the diaspora. Most of the online newspapers analyzed in the study would be considered SNS in that they allowed for interactivity by encouraging readers to post responses and comments to the various stories, although on most sites editors retained control over what comments remained on the sites, and efforts were made to ensure that the dominant opinions of the editors prevailed where the editors served “as both gatekeepers and participants in the debate” (p. 737-738).

Additionally, each online newspaper included in the study claimed to exist in order to provide a public service through professional journalism, rather than as an “outlet for advocating political ideas,” yet Skjerdal notes that when asked about the overt political activism they engaged in via their online newspapers, several of the editors justified the simultaneous engagement of journalism and political activism by “blaming the (in their view) detrimental political situation in Ethiopia, or maintaining that the activism aspect is only associated with campaigning for free speech, human rights and democracy, not with party politics” (p. 739). In fact, one editor referred to this brand of reporting as journalism and activism combined. Skjerdal cites the common nature of this type of “hybrid journalism” throughout Africa, invoking Kperogi’s (2008) reference to guerrilla journalism.

Skjerdal’s findings regarding the extent to which the Ethiopian diaspora online newspapers adhered to professional journalism standards, included the following: 1) with regard to objectivity, the online newspapers demonstrated political bias in both the reporting of news as well as in the analysis of events and situations; 2) with regard to journalistic independence, the online newspapers were autonomous from the Ethiopian incumbent, but identified with political opposition groups; and 3) with regard to public participation, the online newspapers appeared to support participation on the surface, but maintained distance from the public in practice. Skjerdal concludes, “given the political character of the Ethiopian diaspora websites … the immediate
impression would be that the editors are primarily motivated by political activism rather than journalistic professionalism” (p. 738).

Hirji (2006) conducted content analysis of an interactive online newspaper facilitated by Muslim diaspora living in Canada, called MMN (www.montrealmuslimnews.net). MMN included “electronic versions of mainstream media, Internet-only news Web sites, and media aimed specifically at Muslim audiences,” as well as commentary, editorials, and action alerts. Hirji notes that although the website provided information on a variety of topics, its primary focus was on political issues affecting the Muslim world, such as the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and the US-Iraqi war. Hirji’s analysis yielded numerous themes emerging from the various online newspapers’ postings, including accusations of colonialism and imperialism on the part of the world’s superpowers (primarily the United States and Great Britain), and accusations that the mainstream media outlets were biased and working on behalf of governments churning out propaganda.

Hirji also found that MMN had a considerable amount of content focusing the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, with expert analysis, that demonstrated significant anger and despair about the Western invasion of Iraq and its resulting consequences. Particularly noteworthy in light of the related research in this area is Hirji’s observation that a common discourse expressed throughout the site involved calling for the exercising of their democratic political rights to dissent and protest. Hirji cites a particular action alert posted on the site where the editors called on the moral and faith obligations of every Muslim and other people of conscience to lobby the UN in advance of a General Assembly emergency session focusing on the legality of the Iraqi war. The action alert went so far as to assert that “…anyone failing to take such action…” would be a partner in killing the innocents and helping in the human and material losses of both sides'” (p. 135). Hirji found that while much of the content on MMN was quite partisan in nature and had the potential to increase division between Muslim and non-Muslim populations in Canada, the nature of the articles, posts and CMC may also represent ways in which online portals
can serve as a safe place where Muslims can collectively express a range of contrary views while still maintaining their individual identities. Hirji also posits the possibility that rather than creating division, MMN may present opportunities for collective expression and action among Muslims and non-Muslims committed to social justice causes.

**Uncompromising Attitudes and Online Bullying**

Not all cyberactivism offers such productive possibilities. For instance, Conversi (2012) found that some CGDs engaging in cyberactivism became aggressive when faced with dissenting opinion. Conversi theorized that ethnic diaspora, who she refers to as “state-related nationalist diaspora,” often became more radicalized in exile compared to those who remained in their respective homelands, particularly when they were defending their ethnic boundaries which they perceived were under threat (p.1358). For instance, Conversi found that diaspora participating in online political activism (cyberactivism) engaged in a type of “rule of the online mob” behavior where they “bully more liberal and tolerant participants by accusing them of complacency, cowardice and even treason” (p. 1359). This dynamic is consistent with Lyons and Mandeville’s (2008) and Demmers’ (2007) assertions of CGDs’ tendency to view homeland dynamics in categorical terms often results in accusations that diaspora who do seek authentic compromise and reconciliation are traitors to the cause.

**CGD Political Engagement using Social Media**

Although the area of research focusing on CGDs’ use of social media for political purposes is relatively new, there have been a few key studies – including case-specific empirical studies, that have shown that in general, CGDs are using SNS, such as Facebook and Twitter, as both a social media outlet, as well as a political tool (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011; Oiarzabal, 2012; Wilson & Dunn 2011). For instance, in Khamis and Vaughn’s study of an Egyptian diaspora Facebook page created during the recent Egypt revolution, they found that Facebook served a number of important needs for Egyptian
diaspora, such as providing a place to speak freely in a public domain, as well as providing a safe place to openly share political views. Facebook also offered Egyptian diaspora users the opportunity to engage in “citizen journalism,” through the posting of politically-related photographs and videos. One interviewee quoted by Khamis and Vaughn stated how the Facebook page and its networked activities helped him feel far more connected to what was going on in Egypt, than he had felt before, stating: “As soon as I joined this page and “liked” it on Facebook, I started to receive many messages, updates, links and videos that kept me informed of all the developments on the ground. I felt that I was there in Egypt living the revolution and participating in it moment by moment through my close attention to this page on a daily basis” (p. 153). These comments reflect the power of social media embeddedness (with other social media sites) and networking capabilities, as well as the multiple purposes served by an SNS during a time of political unrest.

In their analysis of the role the diaspora Facebook page played in Egypt’s political revolution, Khamis and Vaughn found that it was used for:

1. Disseminating news, increasing international awareness, and creating motivation in the pre-revolutionary phase;
2. Mobilizing and coordinating protests, inspiring political activism, and exposing brutality and violations of human rights during the revolutionary phase; and
3. Engaging in nation-building, democracy-building and consensus-building in the post-revolutionary phase. This shows the flexibility and dynamism of social media tools and their ability to serve multiple roles.

Khamis and Vaughn also noted that when users had a common goal, such as ousting Mubarak, the Facebook page had high traffic, but traffic dropped off when multiple visions for a future Egypt led to too many online debates. Ultimately they found that online activism was often coordinated with off-line activism (*through the Net*), but they concurred with Wilson and Dunn’s (2011)
findings that mobilization conducted through Facebook was significantly more successful than traditional off-line mobilization efforts.

The Tahrir Project was initiated in recognition of the need for a structured empirical analysis of the use of the Internet for political purposes, particularly the use of social media (Wilson & Dunn, 2011). The Tahrir Project is a longitudinal study evaluating how “digital media” is being used by those engaged in Egypt’s revolution that resulted in President Mubarak’s overthrow. The study involves online analysis as well as interviews with “digital actors” who used the following types of social media: “text messaging, telephone (mobile and landlines), satellite television, radio, print media (including newspapers and revolutionary leaflets), Twitter, Facebook, blogs, E-mail and live communication (face-to-face conversations, graffiti, banners, and speeches at the protests)” (Wilson & Dunn, 2011, p. 1250). This ongoing study is examining such variables as:

- Frequency of use;
- Type of Information obtained from the source;
- The perceived reliability of the content;
- The reasons for use of information obtained;
- How information was linked to other media;
- What media was used to view or distribute citizen-produced documentation, such as videos or pictures;
- How various media was ranked by users with regard to “importance, informativeness, frequency of use, and motivating effect” (p. 1250).

Preliminary results have yielded some very interesting information about usage, patterns, and related phenomena, and since it is a longitudinal study, more data will be forthcoming that will no doubt have implications for all research related to cyberactivism. Although the study did not focus exclusively on diaspora, the results of the study yielded valuable information that has definite implications for better understanding diaspora behavior in social protest situations, particularly with regard to the use of SNS for communication
and mobilization purposes.

Although the study did not fully support the anecdotal theory that the 2011 Egyptian protest to oust President Mubarak was solely a “Facebook Revolution,” the authors did contend that the data demonstrated that the Internet was a powerful driving force behind the protest, and while most protesters still preferred traditional forms of media for the purposes of obtaining news, information dissemination and communication (such as face-to-face communication, satellite television and print media), social media significantly changed the way in which the protest evolved, illustrating the power of SNS in political engagement (Wilson & Dunn, 2011).

Among an array of results, the study found that the majority of those engaging in the Egyptian protest through social media were educated young males. In general, social media—Facebook, Twitter, online newspapers and blogs—were valued the most highly and used the most prolifically among respondents who were already using social media; and Facebook was used more than other media for relaying information. Facebook was also rated as one of the top three media choices for its importance and informative qualities (after telephone and face-to-face); and Twitter and Facebook were ranked the highest among all media in terms of increasing motivation to participate (i.e., the power to mobilize) (Wilson & Dunn, 2011). Existing SNS users also reported that they believed social media to be more reliable and more proficient at relaying information than more traditional forms of media, indicating that as the availability and use of social media increases, reliance on them will likely increase as well (currently, Internet penetration in Egypt is only about 17 percent) (Wilson & Dunn, 2011).

Although the Tahrir Project does not focus specifically on CGDs, the study did reveal findings that have implications for diaspora studies, including the finding that the majority of those who used Twitter were outside of Egypt, while the majority of those who retweeted were inside Egypt, reflecting the dynamic of information dissemination between those outside the country to those inside the country. For instance, the study found that among all tweets
captured during the study (675,713 tweets sent by 106,563 Twitter users), the majority of the tweets were sent by about 200 “power users,” 75 percent of whom resided outside of Egypt, primarily in Western countries (North America and Europe), with 96 percent of tweets being written in English, and only 1 percent being written in Arabic (Wilson & Dunn, 2011).

The authors concluded that while digital media was not the dominant media used by protestors during the Egyptian revolution, it was nonetheless a powerful driving force. This was especially true for social media, in particular Twitter, which propelled “a significant transnational discourse and support network” (Wilson & Dunn, 2011, p. 1269). Further, despite the fact that Twitter was used by a very small number of “power users,” their contribution to the protest movement was substantial, particularly in the area of mobilization through motivating others to participate and by keeping morale among protestors high, since the transnational nature of the tweets reinforced to the protestors that their plight was receiving worldwide attention. Ultimately, Wilson and Dunn (2011) assert that social media, particularly Twitter and Facebook, may be “distinctively well suited to dynamic protest contexts” (p. 1270). Additionally, they recommend future research focus on how social media is being used for political activism in protest situations, including how digital media interacts with traditional media, and the nature and influence of online information flow, with a particular focus on the geographic mapping of social media users engaging in cyberactivism.

**Conclusion**

Studies on CGDs’ online social networks have found that those who are the most active politically are not always those with the most power in society (Akin, 2011; Kellner, 2001). In fact, the opposite appears to be true in many instances. For instance, in Bernal’s (2006) study of politically active Eritrean diaspora engaging in an interactive website focusing on historic, cultural and political dynamics, he found that the most active online posters often held low-level positions, such as parking lot attendants and taxi drivers. Online political engagement may serve multiple purposes then relating to both stated and
unstated goals. In fact, Bernal has posited that online social networks have the ability to mend “ruptures in the social body…through the ability of the Internet to bridge distance or at least render it invisible, making physical location irrelevant” (p. 168), countering the sense of isolation, disenfranchisement and alienation often experienced by those living in the diaspora due to forced displacement. Brinkerhoff (2009); Lyons (2006; 2007), and Østergaard-Nielsen (2006) found similar dynamics, where online political engagement served a number of purposes for CGDs, many of which seem less focused on achieving stated desired political ends, and more pertaining to unresolved psychological dynamics, as a result of their violent dispersal from their homelands. This may indicate that as long as the psychological dynamics related to trauma are not resolved, there is some indication that even if political ends were met, the target may shift, and the fight would likely continue.

Not all cyberactivists are diaspora members, and not all diaspora members are cyberactivists; further, not all diaspora who use social media use it for political purposes, just as not all diaspora who engage politically use social media as a tool of activism. But what these studies do indicate is how social media, particularly SNSs are significantly altering the way people connect to each other, particularly when they are dispersed widely geographically, as well as how social media is changing the way protest movements are facilitated. With regard to CGDs’ political engagement in homeland affairs, the body of research is new, but has provided clues into to ways in which CGDs use the Internet, particularly social media such as Facebook, Twitter, online blogs, and online newspapers (often one and the same), to engage politically using transnational networks of social media users, both within and outside of the CGD. Most notable is the matter of whether the “power users” in the CGD are working on behalf of the homeland regime or against it, as this will often determine the ways in which social media are used, and for what purposes.

Equally relevant are the types of social media used, and the nature of the relay between the various mediums (i.e., interlinking and exchange of
information between mediums). Greater understanding is also needed in regard to how online political engagement influences and reinforces identity, and how identity dynamics motivate CGDs to engage politically in the first place. In relation to motivation and desired political outcomes, greater insights into overt and covert goals will be useful in understanding the range of agendas of politically engaged CGDs. The extent and nature of partnerships between CGDs and Western allies is also worthy of further exploration, particularly for gaining increased insight into the range of motivations for, and ways in which politically active CGDs and non-state actors (such as members of Western media and social justice activists) partner in political and social justice-related activities. Types of online political engagement (lobbying, etc.) and ways in which the Internet is used for these purposes are important to explore as well. Other areas of further exploration can include ways in which CGDs come together for collective purposes with seeming homogeneity, yet on closer inspection reveal fissures and conflicts indicating far greater heterogeneity within CGDs than may appear on the surface (Kleist & Hansen, 2005). Finally, online behavior is an area in need of further exploration, particularly with regard to achieving overt and covert agendas, online strategies for achieving goals, and behavior toward other online users.

It is the goal of the present study to explore these very dynamics using the Rwandan CGD as a case study. Rwanda serves as a compelling case because of a history of enduring ethnonationalist conflict, a large diaspora living in the West (relative to population totals inside the country), which appears similar in many respects to other ethnonationalist CGD who engage politically using the Internet and social media (particularly the Ethiopian diaspora who engage politically against the current Ethiopian government). In the subsequent chapter I will provide necessary context of the country of Rwanda, exploring the history of ethnonationalist conflict within the broader socio-political context, beginning with Colonial occupation through contemporary times. The case will focus primarily upon the 1990 to 1994 civil war between the majority ethnic Hutu and minority ethnic Tutsi population, the
genocide against the Tutsi in 1994, and the ensuing exodus of over one million ethnic Hutus into exile. Providing this contextual information about Rwanda is in accordance with the recommendations of Smith and Stares (2007), who caution that prior to coming to any conclusions about the effect of CGDs on a conflict situation it is vitally important to thoroughly explore the historical context and background of the conflict in the country of origin, as well as the potential motives of the CGDs.
CHAPTER 4: THE CASE OF RWANDA

There are currently an estimated 40,000 to 60,000 Rwandan refugees and political exiles living in the United States and Europe, many of whom are engaging in various levels of political and social advocacy in relation to their home country (U.S. Rwanda Embassy, 2012). It is necessary to understand the history of Rwanda, the complex nature of the Hutu-Tutsi relational dynamics and the 1990 to 1994 civil war, as well as the events leading up to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, if we are to understand Rwandan CGD political activism in matters related to Rwanda.

Relevant History of Pre-Genocide Rwanda

Pre-Colonial Rwanda

The history of Rwanda is controversial, in large part due to the “divide and conquer” politics rooted in Belgian colonization (Des Forges, 1999; Lemarchand, 2009; Prunier, 2009). The brief history of Rwanda presented in this chapter is relevant to the contemporary Hutu-Tutsi conflict, as well as to current political activities within the diaspora, and will be based on the consensus of objective scholars (see Appendix A for a summarized timeline of key events). However, it is important to note that much of Rwandan history remains contested. Further, it is equally important to note that Rwandan history, particularly within sociopolitical contexts, is inextricably linked to its regional neighbors, Burundi, Uganda, and in particular the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Prunier, 2009).

Rwanda was settled approximately 2000 years ago by people who are believed to have lived as a relatively cohesive group, speaking a common language, and practicing collective cultural traditions (Chretien, Dupaquier, Kabanda & Ngarambe, 1995). What evolved through the 18th century was the development of two loosely defined groups, based primarily upon differing economic and labor traditions, but who for the most part shared a single culture. The two groups consisted of cultivators who worked the land, and a
smaller group of pastoralists who raised cattle. In time, ownership of cattle became a sign of wealth and privilege, with the wealthiest members of society and its rulers measuring wealth by head of cattle. Cattle owners were called “Tutsi” (Kinyarwanda 15 for a person rich in cattle), and cultivators were known as “Bahina”, who were eventually referred to as “Hutu” (Kinyarwanda for “cultivators of land”, signifying “the masses”). It is important to note that the original Hutus and Tutsis were not considered ethnic groups, but rather were groups distinguished primarily by economic livelihood and eventually social status. Traditionally, it was possible to switch between the two groups by changing one’s economic activity. For instance, Des Forges (1999) describes how one could become Tutsi by acquiring more cattle.

A working balance existed between Hutu and Tutsi groups throughout the 18th century, but the groups remained relatively distinct. Des Forges (1999) asserts that physical distinctions between Hutus and Tutsis were a result of the tendency of individuals to marry within their occupational groups, with Tutsis being taller and thinner, and Hutus being shorter and stockier, with broader features. Because Tutsis were pastoralists, they became recognized as the elite, and Hutus, who were farmers and far greater in numbers, became known as workers and as “the masses.” A smaller group of inhabitants called the Twa, comprising about 1 percent of the population. Twa primarily lived in the forest and were considered hunters and gatherers. Twa were distinguished from both Hutu and Tutsi by their small “pygmie-like” stature (Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 2009).

During Rwanda’s pre-colonial period the government was centrally organized as a kingdom and ruled by a Tutsi king. Most of the rulers within the kingdom were also Tutsi with a few rare exceptions. Although there was some marginalization of Twa and Hutu, scholars believe that these groups lived relatively peaceably together in an organized and interdependent social structure. Mamdani (2002) offers an alternative theory of early Hutu/Tutsi identities, asserting that they were neither market-based identities, nor cultural

15 Kinyarwanda is the native language in Rwanda
identities, but political identities. Mamdani argues that the Hutu identity was one of subjugation, whereas the Tutsi identity was one of power. He posits that Hutus could become Tutsi over generations, primarily through intermarriage, and Tutsis could become Hutus over generations through a process he refers to as being “discarded.” Mamdani proposes that race did not become incorporated as a factor in Hutu/Tutsi identity until colonial occupation introduced race as an ideological concept. As evidence of his theory, Mamdani cites how the Hutu of northern Rwanda were called “Bakiga,” “just like their cousins in Western Uganda,” but were called Hutu once incorporated into the state of Rwanda. Mamdani states that “rather than a transhistorical ethnic identity, Hutu was really a transethnic identity of subjects, of all those who came to be subjugated to Tutsi power in Rwanda” (p. 498). Despite the controversy regarding the origins and divergent meaning of Hutu and Tutsi identities, there is general agreement about the impact of colonialism, including the ideology of race on Rwandan culture.

**Colonial Rwanda**

Rwanda (along with the country of Burundi) was originally colonized by Germany in the late 1800s, and under the Treaty of Versailles it became a League of Nations trust territory under Belgian colonial rule in 1918. At that time Rwanda had a population of approximately 10 million, comprised of the three groups – the Hutu (85% of the population), the Tutsi (14%), and the Twa, (1%). Despite the League of Nations mandate that required colonial power be used to protect countries considered incapable of self-rule, Belgium’s management of Rwanda was quite abusive, particularly toward the Hutu (Melvern, 2006).

The Belgian colonialists applied scientific racism to Rwandan social structures, an ideology that was based primarily upon physical anthropology, and a belief that the intellect necessary to develop a civilization was reserved solely for the Caucasian race. Because the stereotypical Tutsi was tall and thin with slender features, the Belgians presumed they were racially superior, and therefore more able to rule the masses. As a consequence, Tutsis were
elevated to a superior racial status over Hutus and Twa due to their more “European” look.

The formal categorization of all Rwandans into racial groups of Hutu, Tutsi or Twa occurred during a comprehensive census conducted by the Belgians between 1926 and 1933. Melvern (2006) notes how Belgian administrators descended upon Rwanda and subjected all Rwandans to a racial evaluation, a completely arbitrary and rudimentary process involving the measurement of perceived “racial markers,” including height, nose shape and size, and eye shape. The result of this process was the issuance of an ethnic identity card, which included a designation of Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. Individuals from mixed marriages were registered with the race of their fathers, consistent with a cultural tradition that recognized a paternal lineage system (Lemarchand, 1970; Prunier, 2009). Thus what had been very loose and porous groupings based on labor activities, evolved into rigid ethnic groups involving false narratives of social and intellectual elitism (Melvern, 2006).

The initiation of a racial identity program did not end the potential of switching ethnic groups, but it did make it significantly more difficult (Des Forges, 1999). In fact, Des Forges describes how the initiation of ethnic registration and use of identity cards created a powerful and enduring “in group/out group” dynamic in which Tutsi elite began to embrace their elevated separateness and the socially excluded Hutu began to unite around their collective experiences of oppression and exclusion. Niane (1984) cites these dynamics as the precursor to subsequent ethnic conflict, which “left a veritable powder keg in Rwanda and Burundi on the eve of independence” (p. 13).

Des Forges (1999) asserts that it was not necessarily the intention of the Belgians to “divide and conquer,” but rather this was the result of their attempt to establish social structure based on racist ideology prevalent in early 20th-century Europe. During the colonial era, Tutsi rulers appeared to have taken advantage of this belief system by crediting the majority of achievements in Rwanda’s early history to the Tutsi group. Although this version of history was false it was consistent with the “Hamitic hypothesis,”
(sometimes referred to as the “Hamitic myth”), a theory popular during the
colonial era that credited the development of civilization to Caucasians.
According to the “Hamitic hypothesis,” Caucasians from the north migrated
into Central Africa bringing with them pastoralism, a caste system and other
advancements (Lemarchand, 1999; Niane, 1984). This theory, which has no
basis in fact, supported the European colonial belief in the superiority of
Caucasian over black, and herdsman over farmers. Because the average Hutu
resembled the traditional image of the African “negro” and the average Tutsi
appeared more “Caucasian-like,” the “Hamitic hypothesis” was easily applied
to Rwanda by the Belgians eventually leading to the false belief that Tutsis
were foreigners who invaded Central Africa from the north (primarily Ethiopia),
civilized it, and in the process exploited and oppressed its original (and
rightful) inhabitants (Lemarchand, 1999; Niane, 1984).

Of the widespread belief in the “Hamitic theory” and its damaging
effects, Des Forges states:

This distorted version of the past told more about the intellectual
atmosphere of Europe in the 1920s than about the early history of
Rwanda. Packaged in Europe, it was returned to Rwanda where it was
disseminated through the schools and seminaries. So great was
Rwandan respect for European education that this faulty history was
accepted by the Hutu, who stood to suffer from it, as well as by the
Tutsi who helped to create it and were bound to profit from it. People of
both groups learned to think of the Tutsi as the winners and the Hutu as
the losers in every great contest in Rwandan history (p. 48).

Referring to the introduction of the “Hamitic hypothesis” by Belgian
colonizers, Prunier (2009) notes that the Belgians (in similar vein to other
colonial powers) engaged in “manic cultural reengineering” and historical
revisionism that although playing on historic Rwandan culture, created a
dynamic that made the genocide possible. Unfortunately, the “Hamitic
hypothesis” has remained an underlying theme in Rwanda, fanning the flames
of ethnic hatred that served as the genesis of genocidal thinking decades later
(Prunier, 2009). Another justification for the international community’s policy of
noninterference during the genocide (and the months leading up to the mass
killings), was the tendency by many in the West to frame civil conflict as the result of nothing more than tribal fighting, believed to be a common occurrence in Africa (Melvern, 2006).

The “Hutu Revolution” of 1959

In the early 1950s, the colonial administrators started to allow some Hutus access to educational and leadership opportunities (Des Forges, 1999). It wasn’t until Tutsis began to push for independence in the late 1950s (during the same time that the UN was pushing for the end of colonial rule), that the Belgians switched sides and began supporting the Hutus. Although moderate parties advocated a Hutu-Tutsi power-sharing scheme, extremist groups on both sides began to advocate for power on behalf of their respective groups. Extremist Hutus formed the Parmehutu organization (eventually coming to represent “Hutu Power”), and conservative Tutsis developed the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), with each side advocating for exclusive control – Tutsis because they had been elevated to the social elite, and Hutus out of a fear of returning to prior years of oppression and marginalization (some considered this a manufactured fear; Melvern, 2006). Several events occurred between 1957 and 1961 that led to the eventual “Hutu Revolution,” in which elections and a social uprising ended the Tutsi monarchy and put the Parmehutu in control (Lemarchand, 1970). Des Forges (1999) points out that although Hutu extremists later used the “revolution” as a sign of their people’s triumphant victory over oppression, the Belgians actually orchestrated much of the shift in power.

One event that added to the momentum resulting in the “Hutu Revolution” was the publication of what has become knows as the “Hutu Manifesto” in March of 1957. The Hutu Manifesto, a 10-page document prepared by nine “Hutu intellectuals” and addressed to the vice-governor general of Rwanda, attributed the racial problems in Rwanda to the social, economic, and political monopolies held by the Tutsi. The Manifesto

16 “Le Manifeste des Bahutu: Note sur l’aspect social du problème racial indigène au Ruanda”
demanded the end of Hutu oppression by Tutsi elites (referred to as the “Hamitic oppressors” of the Hutu), the end of colonial rule, and the initiation of system of majority rule, where the Hutus would have exclusive control of the country.

Grégoire Kayibanda was elected as the president of Rwanda in 1962, and his MDR party (Mouvement Démocratique Républicain), the Parmehutu party of Hutu power and reigned until 1973. According to Melvern (2006), Kayibanda was an authoritarian ruler who considered the Tutsi an enemy of the state. Over the course of the next few years there were several Tutsi attempts to regain power, with each of these incidents being put down by a powerful response by the Hutu government, including increased exclusion and mass killings, leading to thousands more Tutsis fleeing into exile (Lemarchand, 1970). What was evolving during this time was a spiraling dynamic involving Tutsis attempting to combat their oppression and social exclusion with Hutus in power responding by using perceptions of their past oppression to justify increasingly harsh treatment of the Tutsi population. In fact, the conditions the Tutsis were facing in the country prompted the UN General Assembly to establish a Commission of Inquiry in 1962 charged with the responsibility to investigate the racial problems in Rwanda. The Commission’s final conclusion was that racism against the Tutsi minority was so dire it bordered on Nazism. The Commission attributed the racial situation to the Hutu government and the Belgians, which the Commission accused of artificially manufacturing the racial divide. The Commission concluded that if racial reconciliation wasn’t implemented, Rwanda’s future was “bleak” (UN General Assembly, 1962 as cited in Melvern, 2006). Consistent with the UN Commission of Inquiry, Des Forges’ investigation into the events leading up to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi revealed that the Hutu government used the false narrative created by the Belgians, including, “…ideas about Tutsi distinctiveness, foreign origins, and complete control over the Hutu—to justify the violence of the revolution and the discriminatory measures of the years after” (p. 37).
Despite the UN’s acknowledgement of the serious threat to Tutsi safety in Rwanda, Kayibanda initiated a campaign to kill Tutsis after an attempted coup d’état by exiled Tutsis wishing to return home. Melvern describes how Kayibanda orchestrated this killing campaign by spreading rumors that Tutsis were planning to kill Hutus. Government officials and propagandists were sent throughout Rwanda to engage the local Hutu community to hunt down, capture and kill their Tutsi neighbors, believing that if they didn’t, they were soon be victims of Tutsi aggression. Roadblocks were erected throughout the country, and an estimated 10,000 to 14,000 Tutsis were killed with everyday tools, such as hoes and machetes used for farming (Melvern, 2006). Melvern describes how then army officer Theoneste Bagosora, broadly considered the architect of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, was involved in these Tutsi pogroms and included the following reference on his resume as an accomplishment: “1963 Campaigns in the Bugesera against Inyenzi.” Melvern (2006) also notes how Bagosora frequently repeated Kayibanda’s warning to the Tutsi in March of 1963: “Some of you are causing trouble for your brothers who live in peace in a democratic Rwanda…and suppose you take Kigali by force how will you measure the chaos of which you will be the first victims…it will be the total end of the Tutsi race… Kayibanda warned the Tutsi population that if they ever tried to gain political power in Rwanda again, “they would find that ‘the whole Tutsi race will be wiped out’” (p. 9).

Contributing to the belief among Rwandan Hutus that Tutsis were a significant threat to their survival were ethnic conflicts in neighboring countries, such as the 1972 conflict in Burundi in which the Tutsi-dominated army massacred thousands of Hutus, causing hundreds of thousands of Hutus to flee into refugee camps (Des Forges, 1999). Des Forges (1999) proposed that the Tutsi pogroms also may have served to test the resolve of the international community, and when the response was one of seeming indifference to the plight of the Tutsi, a culture of impunity evolved among the extremist Hutu population.
The Habyarimana Administration

Juvenal Habyarimana took control of Rwanda in a bloodless coup in 1973. In fact, long-standing tensions between Hutus from the south who supported Kayibanda, and Hutus in the north who supported Habyarimana resulted in the transition of power from Kayibanda to Habyarimana. Both camps professed to be the true representatives and protectors of the Hutu people, the “true” Rwandans, and both camps consistently scapegoated the Tutsi for the country’s problems, yet Habyarimana ultimately prevailed espousing a platform of unity and reform. Despite promises of a more transparent and egalitarian government, Rwanda quickly became a single-party state with mandatory membership in Habyarimana’s MRND party\(^\text{17}\) (Lemarchand, 1970).

Habyarimana and the MRND controlled Rwandans through a complex system of micromanagement and manipulation, which resulted in an obedient Rwandan following, particularly in the Northern provinces, which was Habyarimana’s home (McDoom, 2005). The Tutsis continued to be scapegoated leading to widespread resentment and a strong “in-group/out-group” mentality, with the belief that Tutsis were not legitimate residents of Rwanda and therefore had no rights. Although there has been much discussion about the pre-genocide propaganda campaign waged by Habyarimana’s regime, and the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), it is important to reiterate that the spreading of anti-Tutsi propaganda actually began during the “Hutu Social Revolution of 1959.” For instance, Des Forges (1999) describes how schools taught children the distinct differences between Hutus and Tutsis, with Hutus being described as descending from the Bantu tribe, the original inhabitants of Rwanda, and the Tutsis being described as “Hamitic” or “Ethiopid,” having migrated from the north (see discussion of the “Hamitic hypothesis, above).

\(^{17}\) National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development; French: Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement
By the late 1980s, with many Tutsis fleeing to bordering countries, the international community recognized the need to address “the Rwandan refugee problem.” As many as 600,000 Tutsis had sought refuge in neighboring countries, and many were now claiming the right to return home (Des Forges, 1999). Many of these refugees were living in Uganda and were part of the Ugandan Army—Paul Kagame among them. Kagame ultimately helped create and lead a rebel group of Rwandan Tutsi refugees, called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF attacked Rwanda in October 1990, entering the country from the north, demanding the right of all Tutsi exiles to return home. Prunier (1995) cites that the regime’s response to the invasion was to clamp down even harder on dissent, including increasing its oppression of Tutsis. Numerous pogroms against Tutsis were executed in the next few years, justified by accusations that all Tutsis were RPF collaborators (Ibyitso). In fact, even some Hutus who opposed the Habyarimana regime, or anyone who attempted to rescue Tutsis (including priests and nuns) were deemed Ibyitso, or “no better than a Tutsi” and killed as well (p. 231).

The Pre-Genocide Propaganda Campaign

Despite Habyarimana’s claim to the outside world that he considered all Tutsis to be brothers, from 1990 to 1994 the Habyarimana regime engaged in a well-documented and widespread propaganda campaign against the Tutsis. As a part of his anti-Tutsi campaign Habyarimana encouraged Hutu civilians to view their Tutsi neighbors as threats, not only to the country, but also to the lives of all Hutus, as well as of their families. Des Forges’ (1999) research study Leave None to Tell the Story is considered one of the most reliable and detailed accounts of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, and the events leading up to it. Within her report, Des Forges provides a detailed account of the propaganda the Habyarimana government, and its military, the FAR, engaged in leading up to the genocide. She cites widespread governmental efforts to eradicate the RPF threat and its alleged supporters such as widely disseminating documents that clearly defined the “enemy” as all Tutsi, not solely the RPF.
Des Forges (1999) points out that at no time were there any government attempts to distinguish average Tutsi civilians from the RPF. In fact, Des Forges cites government documents that clearly attempted to categorize all Tutsis as Inyenzi supporters of RPF, bent on destroying Hutu solidarity. She notes how Habyarimana even considered any Hutu-led political opposition groups to be the result of Tutsi infiltration. Hutus who attempted to sound a voice of reason were accused of being “bought off” by the RPF and Tutsi infiltrators, and were considered enemies as well.

Prunier (1995) cites a speech delivered on November 22, 1992 by an influential MRND leader that clearly demonstrated the government’s propaganda war. In his speech, Leon Mugasera, a high-ranking MRND leader addressed party militants and accused the opposition (Tutsi and moderate Hutus) of plotting with the Inyenzi enemy\(^\text{18}\) in order to undermine Habyarimana’s armed forces. Mugasera stated that anyone caught conspiring with the enemy would be condemned to death:

…and what about those **Ibyiyo** here who are sending their children to the RPF? Why are we waiting to get rid of these families? […] We have to take responsibility into our own hands and wipe out these hoodlums. […] The fatal mistake we made in 1959 was to let them [the Tutsi] get out. […] They belong in Ethiopia and we are going to find them a shortcut to get there by throwing them into the Nyabarongo river [which flows northwards]. I must insist on this point. We have to act. Wipe them all out! (as cited in Prunier, 1995, pp. 171-172).

It is important to note Mugasera’s threat to send Tutsis back north to Ethiopia was a clear reference to the “Hamitic hypothesis.” This speech was repeated numerous times throughout Rwanda reinforcing the notion that all Tutsis were foreign invaders, were collaborating with the RPF enemies, and that the only solution was complete eradication.\(^\text{19}\)

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\(^{18}\) *Inyenzi* is a term that means cockroach in Kinyarwanda, and was used by Hutu power extremists to refer to the Tutsi army during the 1960s and was later used during the genocide to refer to all Tutsi.

\(^{19}\) There is some controversy, among legal scholars about the accuracy of the translation of the speech. In particular, attorneys representing Mugasera in his bid to remain in Canada (where he had fled in 1992), and avoid extradition to Rwanda to face charges of inciting genocide, argued that Mugasera’s speech did not include any references to killing Tutsis or throwing their bodies in the river. His speech,
In describing the intentional nature of the anti-Tutsi propaganda, Des Forges (1999) references a document “Note Relative à la Propagande d’Expansion et de Recrutement” (Note on the Propagation of Expansion and Recruitment) written by a government official. The Note provides detailed instructions to government officials and Interahamwe militia (the extremist youth wing of the MRND) on tactics for using propaganda to manipulate the Hutus in Rwanda (the tactics were based on a French book on the psychology of propaganda published in 1970). The propagandist provides instructions on the use of propaganda, as well as descriptions of two techniques most frequently used in Rwanda in advance of the genocide – “creating events” and “accusations in the mirror.” In describing the propagandist’s instructions, Des Forges (1999) writes:

The author of the note claims to convey lessons learned from the book . . . He advocates using lies, exaggeration, ridicule, and innuendo to attack the opponent, in both his public and his private life. He suggests that moral considerations are irrelevant, except when they happen to offer another weapon against the other side. He adds that it is important to not underestimate the strength of the adversary nor to overestimate the intelligence of the general public targeted by the campaign. Propagandists must aim both to win over the uncommitted and to cause divisions among supporters of the other point of view. They must persuade the public that the adversary stands for war, death, slavery, repression, injustice, and sadistic cruelty…In addition to these suggestions, the propagandist proposes two techniques that were to become often used in Rwanda. The first is to “create” events to lend credence to propaganda. He remarks that this tactic is not honest, but that it works well, provided the deception is not discovered. The “attack” on Kigali on October 4-5, 1990 was such a “created” event, as were others—the reported discovery of hidden arms, the passage of a stranger with a mysterious bag, the discovery of radio communications equipment—that were exploited later, especially during the genocide. The propagandist calls his second proposal “Accusation in a mirror,” meaning his colleagues should impugn to enemies exactly what they

which was neither televised nor videotaped, was translated from a cassette tape. The ICTR verified the existence of the portion of the speech referred to in Prunier’s book, but a translation accepted by the Canadian Court of Appeals does not include this inflammatory language (see http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Mackin/mugesera.pdf for a copy of the judgment). The alternate version accepted by the Canadian court still reflects numerous calls to kill Tutsi “cockroaches” in self-defense, (“Do not be afraid, know that anyone whose neck you do not cut is the one who will cut your neck”), but it is important to note that there remains controversy about whether the section of the speech most often cited as being the most inflammatory, is accurate.
and their own party are planning to do. He explains, “In this way, the party which is using terror will accuse the enemy of using terror.” With such a tactic, propagandists can persuade listeners and “honest people” that they are being attacked and are justified in taking whatever measures are necessary “for legitimate [self-] defense (pp. 79–80).

Melvern also describes the regime’s use of “accusations in the mirror” including a staged attack on Kigali on October 4, 1990 that the regime claimed was perpetrated by the RPF. Melvern notes how the regime staged the all-night attack (which included gunfire and explosions) to make it look as if the RPF was responsible in order to incite fear among the majority Hutus. The regime even encouraged Hutu citizens to “make arrests of ‘Tutsi suspects’” (p. 15).

The Habyarimana regime also used the media to disseminate propaganda that included false reports of Tutsi and/or RPF-generated violence, using both print media (articles as well as cartoons), and radio to spread messages of hatred toward the Tutsi. For instance, the government-linked radio station, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (Radio RTLM) pumped nonstop messages of hate into the airwaves, as well as constant reports warning of impending Tutsi attacks on Hutus. Although these reports were false, they were successful in prompting defensive attacks against Tutsis. The radio announcers also engaged in a campaign of dehumanizing Tutsis using an interactive format style in which Tutsis were consistently referred to as invaders, oppressors, traitors, cockroaches, and snakes. Radio announcers also played on the collective memory of perceived historic oppression in order to incite fear among Hutu civilians by claiming that their Tutsi neighbors were planning to reinstate the regime of the past in which the Hutus would be forced to lay down for their Tutsi masters (Dallaire, 2003; Des Forges, 1999; Melvern, 2006).

Des Forges (1999) argues that extremist Hutus warned against any type of Rwandan unity, alleging that such sentiments were used by the enemy to destroy Hutu solidarity. Des Forges describes the regime’s characterization of the Tutsi, as “ruthless conquerors...[who] had ground the Hutu under their
heel in a repressive and bloody regime.” Des Forges cites the regime’s description of the Hutu response to attempts to challenge their solidarity: “...the great mass had become conscious of its own strength and had come together...[and] had been able to overthrow the ‘feudal’ oppressors in the great revolution of 1959” (p. 86).

In a similar vein, Melvern (2006) cites a report generated from a meeting on December 4, 1991, organized by Habyarimana with more than 100 top gendarmerie (presidential guards) and military officers in attendance, with a focus on resolving dissent and charting a way forward in order to defeat the enemy Tutsi. Melvern quotes the testimony of some attendees who spoke of a developing consensus that Habyarimana was losing power and control over the country, creating a “power vacuum.” The report issued by senior army officers who attended high-level military commission meetings (chaired by Colonel Bagosora) was later identified by the ICTR as a key piece of evidence that the meetings probably served as the genesis of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. Melvern references a key passage in the report that describes how the enemy of Rwanda was defined:

The principle enemy is the Tutsi inside and outside the country, extremist and nostalgic for power and who have never recognized and will never recognize the realities of the social revolution of 1959 and who want to take back their power by any means, including weapons. The accomplice of the enemy is anyone who supports the enemy (Des Forges, 1999, p. 50).

Propagandists also characterized Tutsis as having a single, collective identity that could not be changed. A famous article that demonstrated this anti-Tutsi sentiment was published in Kangura Magazine in December of 1990 just two months after the RPF invaded Rwanda. The article, “Hutu Ten Commandments” and was written by the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (Coalition pour la Défense de la République, CDR), an extremist party, advocating for ‘Hutu Power’ and ‘majority rules.” Critical of Habyarimana and MRND on the surface but frequently collaborated with them “leading some observers to conclude that this bitterly anti-Tutsi party existed only to state positions favored by the MRND but too radical for them to support openly” (Des Forges, p. 44).
Hutu political party formed in 1991 after Habyarimana was forced to allow a multiparty state in response to a constitutional amendment. The commandments provided a list of rules all Hutus were commanded to live by, lest they be considered a traitor (see Appendix B for entire transcript). Among the 10 commandments were prohibitions against Hutus taking Tutsi wives or concubines, prohibitions against doing business with Tutsis because “every Tutsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group.” Additional commandments include admonitions that all leadership positions in Rwanda be held by Hutus, including “political, administrative, economic, military and security,” as well as all positions within the educational system, and the FAR (Rwandan Armed Forces). The final commandment provides this grave warning:

The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961, and the Hutu Ideology, must be taught to every Hutu at every level. Every Hutu must spread this ideology widely. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother Hutu for having read, spread, and taught this ideology is a traitor (Kangura Magazine, 1990).

The “Hutu Ten Commandments” is an important document because it illustrates how the concept of national loyalty came to be defined – as complete and unconditional support for Hutu nationalism, as well as how being a traitor came to be defined – as all Tutsi, everywhere, whether inside or outside of the country.

Likely one of the most virulent and well known articles published in the Kangura, the state-run newspaper, in February 1993 is entitled “A Cockroach (Inyenzi) cannot bring forth a Butterfly,” which portrayed Tutsis as insects deserving of annihilation because they are the same as the Tutsis of the past that purportedly enslaved the Hutus. This article reads in part:

From the outset, we said that a cockroach cannot bring forth a butterfly, and that is true. A cockroach brings forth a cockroach. I do not agree with those who state the contrary. The history of Rwanda tells us that the Tutsi has remained the same and has never changed. His treachery and wickedness are intact in our country’s history. Administratively, the Tutsi regime has been marked by two factors: their women and cows. These two truths have kept the Hutus in
bondage for 400 years. Following their overthrow during the 1959 social revolution, the Tutsis have never given up. They are doing everything possible to restore their regime by using their vamps and money, which has replaced the cow. In the past, the latter was a symbol of riches...We are not wrong to say that an Inyenzi brings forth another Inyenzi. And in fact, can a distinction be made between the Inyenzi that attacked Rwanda in October 1990 and those of the 1960s? They are all related since some are the grand children of others. Their wickedness is identical. All the attacks were meant to restore the feudal-monarchy regime. The atrocities that the Inyenzi of today are perpetrating against the population are identical to those they perpetrated in the past, namely killings, plundering, rape of young girls and women... etc. (Kangura Magazine, 1993, p. 78; see Appendix C for entire article).

Finally, another article, “I am Not Concerned, I am a CDR Member,” published in the Kangura Magazine in July 1993 also reflects anti-Tutsi sentiment and a strong warning to Hutus who agreed with the Arusha Accords21 (see Appendix D for the entire article). The article was written as a chant, and provided a stern warning to Hutus not to acquiesce to demands of compromise, followed with the refrain, “I am not concerned, I am a CDR member.” The article espouses a clear admonition against the signing the Arusha Accords (Kangura Magazine, 1993).

The civil war and propaganda campaign raged on through 1994 despite international attempts at conflict resolution such as the aforementioned Arusha Accords. The Arusha Accords were signed by Habyarimana and the president of the RPF in August of 1993, and consisted of three agreements designed to end the civil war with the RPF. Among the agreements was a power-sharing scheme that established a transitional government that included RPF representation, as well as a plan for the repatriation of refugees and the integration of rebel RPF soldiers into the government’s army (Dallaire 2003, Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1995).

The Arusha Accords were not realized, however, due to considerable

attempts to sabotage their implementation, culminating in the assassination of Habyarimana. Despite significant controversy regarding which side sabotaged the agreement (with each side blaming the other), there is considerable evidence to suggest that Habyarimana and eventually the more extremist wing of his regime engaged in overt attempts to circumvent the implementation of the Arusha agreements, including sabotaging any attempt to form a coalition government.\textsuperscript{22} The general consensus that any attempt at ethnic reconciliation or power sharing would destroy Hutu national unity and security was demonstrated in editorials published in the Kangura Magazine while the Arusha Accords were being negotiated in the months leading up to the genocide. An example of this dynamic is demonstrated in a February 1993 editorial, “Be Vigilant, or else, the Arusha Talks would bring us back to the Feudal Regime we Rejected in 1959.” This article initially supports the Arusha talks, but then quickly reveals its true motive, stating that the Accords should focus on the 16 Hutu political parties, but should exclude the RPF (Kangura Magazine, 1993).

The Genocide

On April 6, 1994, the airplane carrying Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana, and Burundi’s president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was shot down on its descent into the airport in Kigali, which eventually ushered in 100 days of genocide of Tutsi men, women and children (Des Forges, 1999). President Habyarimana was returning from having signed the Arusha Accords, which would have compelled power sharing, thus ensuring RPF representation in the government (Dallaire, 2003). Dallaire notes how the extremist Hutu faction of Habyarimana’s regime immediately barricaded the airport and refused to allow UN investigators to inspect the crash site. He also notes how these same factions, led by the head of the Interahamwe militia, Colonel Theoneste Bagosora; MRND president Mathieu Ngorumpatse; the Minister of Defense,\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{22} For a more detailed discussion of the nature of the MRND’s repeated attempts to sabotage peace negotiations and the implementation of the transitional government mandated by the Arusha Accords
Augustin Bizimana; Gendarmerie Nationale, Major-General Augustin Ndindiliyimana; and Army Chief, General Deogratias Nsabimana, immediately accused the RPF of shooting down the plane, while setting up roadblocks, and distributing machetes and lists of individuals registered as Tutsis to local authorities with instructions to kill them all (Dallaire, 2003; Melvern, 2006).

Dallaire (2003), who was head of the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), asserts that there were ample indications that Hutu extremists had long prepared for the genocide against the Tutsi, reflected in Bagosora’s own words to a UNAMIR sector commander, that he did not support the Arusha Accords and that once they were signed, he would return to Kigali and prepare for an apocalypse. Dallaire asserts that Bagosora and his cohorts used the downing of the president’s plane as the launching point for the genocide. Melvern (2006) notes that during the months leading up to the plane crash, the Interahamwe were “flexing their muscles” by harassing Tutsis throughout the country. Dallaire cites the immediate and systematic killing of moderate Hutus who didn’t agree with plans to exterminate the Tutsi, the setting up of roadblocks by the Interahamwe for capturing and killing Tutsis attempting to escape (Dallaire, 2003; Des Forges, 1999). Dallaire and Des Forges both cite the ongoing anti-Tutsi propaganda campaign, which in print as well as via radio waves on Radio RTLM demanded that Hutus exterminate all Tutsi in the country as a national obligation in order to protect their motherland from the Inyenzi enemy.

Accounts of Atrocities

Genocide scholars as well as ICTR records cite how several top military leaders took control of the country immediately following the crash of the president’s plane, and began orchestrating the genocide. George Rutaganda, vice president of the Interahamwe, was a key player, organizing the on-the-ground operations of the genocide. In fact, ICTR records state that the genocide was so systemic because of Rutaganda’s ability to organize the

see Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda by Romeo Dallaire, and Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide by Linda Melvern
Interahamwe youth. In addition to facilitating the distribution of weapons to local *Interahamwe* forces, he coordinated roadblocks operations, the checking of national identity cards of all Rwandans, and the detaining of Tutsis who were subsequently systematically slaughtered. Rutaganda also oversaw house-to-house searches for Tutsis, ordering the *Interahamwe* forces to kill any Tutsi they found, sometimes ordering them to throw the bodies in the river. He also oversaw many of the killings of Tutsis at churches and schools where Tutsis and some moderate Hutus took refuge, often coordinating efforts with the Presidential Guard, the National Gendarmerie, and the FAR. According to the ICTR, Rutaganda was on the scene of many of these killing sites and directed the *Interahamwe*’s actions, including separating Hutus from Tutsis, while sparing the Hutus and ordering that all Tutsis be killed. He also ordered the *Interahamwe* to bury the bodies of Tutsis in order to cover their crimes (ICTR, 1996).

There are also numerous personal accounts of atrocities that occurred during the genocide, including rape as a weapon of war, torture, infanticide, and the killings of thousands of Tutsis hiding in churches and other venues that held large numbers of people. Des Forges (1999) cites the genocidal government’s strategy of offering Tutsis protection by encouraging them to congregate in locations such as churches and schools, only to later slaughter them. Des Forges quotes a Rwandan’s characterization of this strategy, explaining, “it was like sweeping dry banana leaves into a pile to burn them more easily” (p. 161).

What was unique about the Rwandan genocide was not solely the level of violence involved in the massacres, but also the fact that the every day citizens responded to the calls to kill their Tutsi friends and neighbors, by the extremist Hutu government, national police, military and the Interahamwe militia (Dallaire, 2003; Des Forges, 1999; Ilibagiza & Erwin, 2006; Prunier, 2009). The reasons for the civilian nature of the genocide are complex, but McDoom (2005) attempts to explain why so many ordinary civilian Hutus engaged in the killings by describing a top-down/bottom-up dynamic where
state control interacted with local grassroots genocidal movements. This illustrates the success of the ambitious anti-Tutsi propaganda war leading up to the genocide. Hatzfeld (2005) provides an example of the local grassroots genocidal movement by quoting an explanation of the violence from a convicted genocidaire he interviewed: “in the rural land of Rwanda, genocide was meant to purify the earth, to cleanse if of its cockroach farmers” (p. 70).

Des Forges (1999) documented several atrocities in her study, including the following:

An elderly Tutsi woman in Kibirira commune had her legs cut off and was left to bleed to death...A Tutsi baby was thrown alive into a latrine in Nyamirambo, Kigali, to die of suffocation or hunger...Assailants tortured Tutsi by demanding that they kill their own children and tormented Hutu married to Tutsi partners by insisting that they kill their spouses...Victims generally regarded being shot as the least painful way to die and, if given the choice and possessing the means, they willingly paid to die that way ...Assailants often stripped victims naked before killing them, both to acquire their clothes without stains or tears and to humiliate them...In many places, killers refused to permit the burial of victims and insisted that their bodies be left to rot where they had fallen (p. 164).

The rape of women and girls during the Rwandan genocide was unparalleled, and the sexual crimes were so gruesome that scholars continue to struggle to provide explanations for the brutality. Infants and elderly women were savagely raped, with some women were raped with sharp objects, which caused injuries that eventually resulted in their deaths. Further, there were numerous accounts of women being sexually mutilated while being raped (Melvern, 2006; Mukamana, & Brysiewicz, 2008). In fact, Bijleveld, Morssinkhof and Smeulers (2009) noted that rape was the norm during the genocide, not the exception. They estimate that approximately 80 percent of non-surviving females and 60 percent of surviving females were raped. Cohen, et al, (2009) estimate that approximately 250,000 women, who constituted the majority of female survivors, were victims of rape as a weapon of war, with tens of thousands of them contracting the HIV virus (Cohen, et al., 2009; HRW, 1996). In addition, Prunier (2009) estimates that approximately
300,000 children were orphaned during the genocide, some of whom were taken in by already fractured survivor families, and some of whom lived in “minor headed-households” (Melvern, 2006).

**Genocidaire Justifications**

Research is replete with examples of genocidaire justifications, including genocide denial, trivialization, and historical revisionism, as well as reversing dynamics claiming that Hutus, not Tutsis, were the victims. In addition, there was a continuation of the pre-genocide propaganda campaign subsequent to the genocide, and although some professions of denial are clearly rooted in dishonesty, others may very well be rooted in the enduring belief in a misinformation campaign rooted in colonial false narratives. Melvern (2006) describes former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda’s guilty plea in the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania, noting that he not only acknowledged the genocide against the Tutsi, but also explained that the purpose of the genocide was to exterminate all Tutsi. Within the transcripts of Kambanda’s interrogation, reflecting 60 hours of interviews with investigators, he articulates the extensive efforts the government went to in planning the genocide, as well detailing the ways in which the genocide was carried out. Melvern notes Kambanda’s complete lack of remorse for his and his colleagues’ actions. She also notes the extensive collaboration among other government and military officials charged with genocide and held by the ICTR in the UN prison in Arusha, Tanzania, including their collective coordination in relation to their defense:

The Arusha prisoners remain convinced of the rectitude of their actions. They have formed an association to plan and coordinate their defence and to maintain contact where possible with their co-conspirators who are still at large, those still planning and agitating for Hutu Power. They blame their fate on the skill of the Tutsi in attracting the sympathy of the ‘international community’.” They claim the Tutsi are the masters of deceit and accuse them of undertaking a campaign to compare themselves with the Jews in order to get sympathy (Melvern, 2006, p. 3).

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23 Rwanda’s former prime minister
Melvern also references Colonel Theonest Bagosora’s writings while awaiting trial, where he justified the genocide based in part on the “Hamitic Hypothesis”:

The Tutsi never had a country of their own to make themselves into a people…They are people who came to Rwanda and were naturalised…[rather than remaining in neighboring countries]…with arrogance and pride [they imposed] “their supremacy” [on the Hutu of Rwanda]. The Tutsi had eliminated all the Hutu kings and their descendants and rule the Hutu with cruelty until the colonisers had arrived] (as cited in Melvern, 2006, p. 3).

Melvern describes Bagosora’s depiction of Tutsi as “proud, arrogant, tricky and untrustworthy…[who believed that] the only good Tutsi was a Tutsi in power” whereas Hutus were “modest, honest, loyal, independent and impulsive” (p. 3). Melvern asserts this ideology was the foundation of the genocide against the Tutsi.

Hatzfeld (2005) cites first-hand reports from genocide perpetrators who described initially being ordered by Interahamwe militia to engage in the killings or suffer consequences such as financial sanctions or public humiliation, noting that the majority of civilians who participated in the genocide only needed such threats to serve as initial encouragement at the start of the genocide, and were self-motivated after a few weeks into the killings. Hatzfeld’s interviewees described how they engaged in the slaughter of Tutsis by hunting them like animals in the marshes as well as other hiding places. They consistently referred to the killings as if these activities were like a “9 to 5” job, as well as referring to the killings as “getting the job done.” For example, one interviewee stated that “[w]e had to put off our good manners at the edge of the muck until we heard the whistle to quit working. Kindness, too, was forbidden in the marshes. The marshes left no room for exceptions. To forget doubt, we had meanness and ruthlessness in killing, and a job to do and do well, that’s all” (p. 47). Hatzfeld’s subjects also stated that any initial hesitancy quickly vanished when they realized that the international community was not going to intervene. This realization, according to the
genocidaires interviewed, resulted in a sense of impunity, where Hutu men and boys hunted by day, and their female family members looted the belongings of those massacred, without much guilt or fear of reprisal:

Since I was killing often, I began to feel it did not mean anything to me. It gave me no pleasure, I knew I would not be punished, I was killing without consequences, I adapted without a problem. I left every morning free and easy, in a hurry to get going. I saw that the work and the results were good for me, that’s all. During the killings I no longer considered anything in particular in the Tutsi except that the person had to be done away with. I want to make clear that from the first gentleman I killed to the last, I was not sorry about a single one (p. 51).

In describing the sheer ruthlessness among most of the killers, another interviewee described his feelings about the killings in this way:

We no longer saw a human being when we turned up a Tutsi in the swamps. I mean a person like us, sharing similar thoughts and feelings. The hunt was savage, the hunters were savage, the prey was savage—savagery took over the mind. Not only had we become criminals, we had become a ferocious species in a barbarous world. This truth is not believable to someone who has not lived it in his muscles. Our daily life was unnatural and bloody, and that suited us (pp. 47-48).

Hatzfeld’s book is organized thematically, identifying various influences and dimensions of the genocide as they pertain to the genocidaires’ perspectives and motivations, including the role of religion in the lives of the killers. For instance, the interviewees noted the various ways in which they rationalized their activities within the context of their relationship with God, which appears to include a combination of compartmentalization and scapegoating:

FULGENCE: I was a deacon, the one who made arrangements for Christian gatherings on the hill of Kibungo. In the priest’s absence, it was I who conducted ordinary services. During the killings, I chose not to pray to God. I sensed that it was not appropriate to involve Him in that. This choice came up naturally. Still, when dread would grip me suddenly in the night, if I had done too much during the day, I would ask God as a personal favor to let me stop for just a few days. God preserved us from genocide until the crash of the president’s plane; afterward He allowed Satan to win the match. That is my point of view.
Since it was Satan who pushed us into this predicament, it is God alone who can judge us and punish us, not men, who are surpassed by the power of those other two, especially in this unnatural situation (p. 142).

**IGNACE**: The white priests took off at the first skirmishes. The black priests joined the killers or the killed. God kept silent, and the churches stand from abandoned bodies. Religion could not find its place in our activities. For a little while, we were no longer ordinary Christians, we had to forget our duties learned in catechism class. We had first of all to obey our leaders – and God only afterward, very long afterward, to make confession and penance. When the job was done” (p. 142).

**ÉLIE**: Once we found a little group of Tutsis in the papyrus. They were awaiting the machete blows with prayers. They did not plead with us, they did not ask us for mercy or even for a painless death. They said nothing to us. They did not even seem to be addressing heaven. They were praying and psalming among themselves. We made fun of them, we laughed at their Amens, we taunted them about the kindness of the Lord, we joked about the paradise awaiting them. That fired us up even more. Now the memory of those prayers just gnaws at my heart (p. 143).

**LÉOPORD**: We no longer considered the Tutsis as humans or even as creatures of God. We had stopped seeing the world as it is, I mean as an expression of God’s will. That is why it was easy for us to wipe them out. And why those of us who prayed in secret did so for themselves, never for their victims. They prayed to ask for their crimes to be a bit forgotten, or to get just a little forgiveness— and they returned to the marshes in the morning… Through killing well, eating well, looting well, we felt so puffed up and important, we didn’t even care about the presence of God. Those who say otherwise are half-witted liars. Some claim today that they sent up prayers during the killings. They’re lying: no one ever heard an Ave Maria or the like, they’re only trying to jump in front of their colleagues on line for repentance. In truth, we thought that from then on we could manage for ourselves without God. The proof— we killed even on Sunday without ever noticing it. That’s all (p. 143).

**The Death Toll**

Most genocide scholars estimate that between 500,000 and 1 million people, primarily Tutsi, were killed during the genocide (Des Forges, 1999;
Determining how many people were killed in the genocide, particularly how many Tutsis were killed compared to Hutus, remains not only contested, but is often subject to statistical manipulation in post-genocide political wrangling (Prunier, 2009). It is important to understand how scholars arrived at their estimates in order to evaluate the validity of arguments surrounding the nature of the genocide. The controversy involved in determining with any level of confidence the death toll during the genocide includes not only how many Rwandans were killed, but also the demographic make-up of these deaths, including whether more Tutsis were killed than Hutus (which would support the notion that a Tutsi genocide did occur), or whether more Hutus were killed than Tutsis (which would support theories that a genocide did not occur), or whether generally the same number of Tutsis and Hutus were killed (which may support the double genocide theory).

There have been four major studies that have attempted to determine the number of deaths as a result of the genocide (Davenport & Stam, 2009; Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1995; Verpoortan, 2005). In addition, one study has attempted to determine the percentage of Tutsi and Hutu families that experienced the loss of one or more direct family members as a result of the genocide (a test for the double genocide theory) (Verwimp, 2003). Based on these studies, estimates of total Rwandans killed in the genocide range from 550,000 (Des Forges, 1999) to 1.2 million (Davenport & Stam, 2009). Estimates of total Tutsis killed during the genocide range from 300,000 (Davenport & Stam, 2009) to 800,000 (Des Forges, 1999), and estimates of total number of Hutus killed during the genocide range from 10,000 (Prunier, 1995) to 700,000 (Davenport & Stam, 2009). These estimates illustrate a broad range, therefore some analysis of how these scholars arrived at these calculations is important.

Verpoortan (2005) utilized a quantitative research design using regression analysis and sensitivity analysis and determined that approximately 660,000 to 860,000 Rwandans were killed during the genocide, of which approximately 60,000 were Hutu, and about 600,000 to 800,000 were Tutsi
(representing about 84% of the Tutsi population). Des Forges (1999) utilized a mixed method research design, which included field work, quantitative analysis and secondary data analysis and estimated that approximately 547,000 to 567,000 Rwandans were killed during the genocide, of which between 45,000 to 60,000 were Hutu, and about 507,000 were Tutsi, (representing 77% of the Tutsi population). Prunier (1995) utilized a qualitative research design using primarily fieldwork, and estimated that approximately 850,000 Rwandans were killed during the genocide, of which approximately 10,000 to 50,000 were Hutus, with the remaining 800,000 being Tutsi.

Davenport and Stam’s (2009) study involved qualitative field work and estimated that between 800,000 and 1.2 million Rwandans were killed in the genocide, although they assert that the majority of those killed were Hutu, not Tutsi, estimating that approximately 300,000 to 500,000 Tutsi and 500,000 to 700,000 Hutu were killed during the genocide. Describing how they arrived at these estimates, they state:

In the end, our best estimate of who died during the 1994 massacre was, really, an educated guess based on an estimate of the number of Tutsi in the country at the outset of the war and the number who survived the war. Using a simple method — subtracting the survivors from the number of Tutsi residents at the outset of the violence — we arrived at an estimated total of somewhere between 300,000 and 500,000 Tutsi victims. If we believe the estimate of close to 1 million total civilian deaths in the war and genocide, we are then left with between 500,000 and 700,000 Hutu deaths, and a best guess that the majority of victims were in fact Hutu, not Tutsi.

They arrive at these estimates by utilizing 1991 census data, yet several scholars, including Des Forges (1999), Prunier (1995) and Verpoortan (2005), assert that the 1991 census grossly underestimated the number of Tutsis in Rwanda, in an attempt to further socially exclude Tutsis which were granted government benefits (such as education and jobs) based on population demographics. The consensus in the literature appears to support the contention that the actual pre-genocide Tutsi population likely exceeded the 1991 census by several hundred thousand (rendering Tutsis 17.5% of the
total Rwandan population, rather than the reported 8.6% (Des Forges, 1999; Verpoortan, 2005). Davenport and Stam also appear to have grossly overestimated the number of Tutsis who survived the genocide, by using the figure of 300,000, which is unsubstantiated and unsupported in the research. The number of Tutsi survivors already established in the literature as being reliable, is approximately 150,000. This number is based on Prunier’s work, refugee head counts, and Human Rights Watch estimates (Prunier, 1995). Davenport and Stam calculate the number of survivors by subtracting their overestimation of Tutsi survivors of 300,000 from their underestimation of Tutsi’s pre-genocide of 596,400 to determine that approximately 300,000 Tutsis were killed in the genocide. Thus if 800,000 to 1 million Rwandans were killed in the genocide, according to Davenport and Stam’s calculations, they deduce that between 500,000 to 700,000 Hutus were killed during the genocide compared to only 300,000 Tutsis. The table below provides an overview of these four studies, including the estimates of pre-and post-populations of both ethnic groups relied upon in calculating the various death toll estimates.

Table 4.1 Comparison of studies estimating deaths due to genocide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Marjike Verpoortan</th>
<th>Allison Des Forges</th>
<th>Gerard Prunier</th>
<th>Davenport &amp; Stam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Study</strong></td>
<td>Quantitative study with regression analysis and sensitivity analyses</td>
<td>Mixed methods (field work, quantitative and secondary data analysis)</td>
<td>Quantitative (Secondary data analysis)</td>
<td>Qualitative (field work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Estimated Killed in Genocide</strong></td>
<td>660,000 to 860,000</td>
<td>547,000 to 567,000</td>
<td>850,000</td>
<td>800,000 to 1.2 million</td>
</tr>
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</table>
As stated previously, demographic breakdowns of the death toll are often used as evidence of varying political positions regarding the nature of the genocide. One theory often advanced involves a sort of “leveling of the playing field,” where both ethnic groups are purported to have killed the other. Verwimp (2003) set out to test the “double genocide theory” empirically, and found that there was a distinct difference in killing patterns between Tutsis and Hutus. Using pre-genocide census data, the author located almost 2000 of the original households (both Tutsi and Hutu) and solicited information regarding the extent and types of losses experienced by both groups. Verwimp found that among the 2000 households interviewed:

- 89 percent of all deceased Tutsi in census households were killed during the genocide, compared to 27 percent of Hutus.
- Of all Tutsi deaths 85% were executed by Interahamwe (comprised of MRND youth forces and civilian Hutus) and 7.5 percent by government soldiers, the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Genocide Tutsi Population</th>
<th>837,100</th>
<th>657,000</th>
<th>Does not state, but cites the 1991 census number as low</th>
<th>596,400 (1991 census data)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-genocide Tutsi survivors</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Tutsi killed in Genocide</td>
<td>600,000 to 800,000 (84% of Tutsi population)</td>
<td>507,000 (77% of Tutsi population)</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>300,000 to 500,000 (total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Hutus killed in genocide (includes months after)</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>45,000 to 60,000</td>
<td>10,000 to 50,000</td>
<td>500,000 to 700,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Half of all Hutu deaths during the genocide were a result of RPF executions of alleged Hutu genocidaires.
• 0.6 percent of Hutus were killed by Interahamwe (presumably because they were moderates and considered “Tutsi sympathizers”).
• 8.3 percent of Tutsi households reported no members lost during the genocide, whereas 91 percent of Hutu families reported no members lost during the genocide.
• One out of three Tutsi households lost all of their family members in the genocide, whereas none of the Hutu households lost all of its members.

In disputing the “double genocide” theory, Verwimp states:

One out of 3 Tutsi households in the pre-genocide sample had all its members exterminated in 1994, very often on the same day and in the same place by the same people. Only 2 of the 27 Tutsi households (8.3%) reported no members lost during the genocide. This genocidal pattern is not found in the killings of Hutu household members. From the Hutu households with full information on all members, 91% reported not to have lost members who died violently. Even when a number of false testimonies and missing information on members of Hutu households who stayed or died in Congo are accepted, the pattern of killing of Hutu and Tutsi was clearly different. In effect, we have traced and found, in a material and physical sense, a large majority of Hutu households from the pre-genocide sample, including wives and children. This is not the case for most members of Tutsi households. We therefore argue that for those prefectures in which we performed our fieldwork, the term genocide should be reserved for the killings committed by the Interahamwe and the FAR, and another word should be used for the killings committed by the RPF (p. 441).

There is equal controversy surrounding the estimates of the number of Hutus who participated in the genocide, with some asserting that the majority of Hutus were actively engaged (see Hatzfeld, 2005), whereas others estimate that approximately 200,000 Hutus participated in the genocide (Straus, 2004). In fact, Straus stresses the importance of recognizing that not all Hutus participated in the genocide, and not all genocidaires participated at the same level. Further, the conflict was far more complex than a Hutu/Tutsi dyad, and also included regional dynamics with northern provinces, such as
Ruhrengeri and Gisenyi being favored by Habyarimana and his regime, and southern provinces often feeling socially excluded. Government favoritism of the north created some level of conflict within the Hutu population, and spurred the development of political parties that opposed the Habyarimana regime and its MRND party (McDoom, 2005). McDoom also describes how killing patterns were regionally influenced with Hutus in the North engaging in killings of Tutsis far in advance of the downing of the president’s plane, whereas Hutus in the South did not begin killing Tutsis until mid-April. Also, in some regions, participation in the killings was low solely because there were no Tutsis to kill, as they had already fled to other regions (McDoom, 2005).

The motives for participation in the genocide are equally complex. McDoom’s (2005) field work reinforces the results of Hatzfeld’s work—that those who participated in the genocide frequently offered contradictory reasons for their involvement. For instance, McDoom’s study includes a statement from a nonparticipant, who initially stated that Hutus in his community engaged in the slaughter of their Tutsi neighbors solely because they were told to by their leaders, but then later admitted that many killed for financial profit:

If they were going to attack a rich person, more people would join. If they were going to attack a poor person, there would be less people [...] When they attacked a home, somebody would say that “so and so had cows” and they would plan to meet there. In the first days people went by force to go and fight in the war (gutabara) and after that they went voluntarily because they could get property (p. 12).

McDoom concludes that although it may be impossible to ever determine the exact number of Hutus who participated in the genocide, their motives for having done so include a “complex interaction of racism, ideological indoctrination, opportunism, habituation, conformity, and coercion” (p. 14).

Post-Genocide Rwanda

In July of 1994 the RPF took Kigali, and by August a new government was sworn into power. At the same time the former regime fled into the jungles of Zaire, (now the DRC), “taking all the money from the Central Bank and
herding into exile approximately 2.1 million people (out of a post-genocide population of about 6.9 million)” (Prunier, 2009, p. 5). Prunier describes what ensued in Zaire as a state of complete chaos. The *Interahamwe* occupied refugee camps alongside innocent civilians, and together with the former regime continued to fight to regain power in Rwanda. Prunier (2009) describes similar levels of chaos in Rwanda following the genocide.

Any remaining social balance was significantly affected by the mass influx of Tutsi returnees, who settled primarily in the capital city of Kigali, often displacing the remaining Hutus from jobs, and thus creating further social division (Prunier, 2009). Factions on both sides of the ethnic divide are alleged to have used the genocide for political and financial gain, where revenge was sought, and where both Hutus and Tutsis were sometimes wrongly imprisoned through false accusations based upon historic grudges. Also, Prunier describes rampant Hutu indifference to the plight of Tutsi survivors, which further exacerbated Tutsi trauma, stating:

Many Hutu showed little or no sensitivity toward what had just happened and equated their own real but limited plight with the massive horrors suffered by the Tutsi. Some even denied that any genocide had taken place at all and attributed the many deaths to “the war” (Prunier, 2009, p. 4).

**Post-Genocide Political Dynamics in Rwanda**

After the genocide a transitional government was created called the *Broad Based Government of National Unity* (BBGN). The new government, led by then-President Pasteur Bizimungu, a moderate Hutu, and then-Vice-president, and RPF leader Paul Kagame, was based partly upon the country’s constitution, and partly on the Arusha Accords. Paul Kagame, the current president of Rwanda, succeeded Bizimungu in 2003. The Kagame administration has been extolled for its many accomplishments in the aftermath of the genocide, including creating an atmosphere where development has flourished (Terrill, 2012). Yet the RPF-dominated government has also been harshly criticized, with some alleging that the RPF lost its idealistic values, and came to resemble an authoritarian regime (Des
Forges, 1999). Regardless of the nature and validity of such critiques, it is important to keep context in mind, and recognize that the genocide resulted in a decimated country that lacked any real social, civil, or political infrastructures. A judicial system needed to be established to try hundreds of thousands of alleged perpetrators of genocide, and ethnic reconciliation and trauma programs needed to be established in order to manage the aftermath of the propaganda war, the widespread slaughter, and the psychological recovery of genocide survivors.

Prunier (2009) states that many Westerners theorize about the causes and outcomes of the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi without fully understanding the complexities involved, which has resulted in inappropriate and/or ineffectual international responses. He describes how this genocide cannot be compared to any other genocide because in Rwanda the government engaged the community to rise up against neighbors, friends and family members who were Tutsi. Prunier explains that unlike other genocides, in Rwanda it was a “hill by hill and home-by-home thing. And it is this neighborly quality, this grisly homespun flavor, that contaminated the world of the survivors after the killing had stopped” (p. 1). To complicate matters further, although Hutu-Tutsi marriages were discouraged, they did exist, especially in the capital city of Kigali, and in the southern provinces (McDoom, 2005), and although some Hutu husbands did kill their Tutsi wives, many did not. Further, children with a Hutu father and a Tutsi mother complicate the concept of “genocide survivor,” particularly if the mother was killed in the genocide, because ethnic identity is passed down through the father in Rwandan culture, thus the offspring in such situations would be considered Hutu, not Tutsi. Finally, the genocide occurred essentially with international knowledge, but with little to no intervention, other than a generally ineffectual peacekeeping mission that was poorly equipped and banned from using force (Dallaire, 2003; Des Forges, 1999).

The post-genocide climate in Rwanda remains tainted by the long-standing pre-genocide anti-Tutsi propaganda campaign. In fact, in McDoom's
(2005) qualitative study of the extent and nature of Hutu participation in the genocide, he found that the collective Hutu memory of perceived past oppression persists. Approximately 85 percent of the Hutus interviewed stated that they still believed that their Hutu ancestors were historically oppressed by the Tutsi. Further, 92 percent of Hutus interviewed said they believed the “Hamitic hypothesis.” In addition, 72 percent of Hutu respondents reported that at the time of the genocide they believed all Tutsi to be enemies of the state, not solely those in the RPF. And finally, the majority of Hutu respondents (86% in the north, and 65% in the south) reported that they believed that the actions of the *genocidaires* were justified for a variety of reasons, including that the Tutsis were the enemy, that the authorities had ordered Hutus to kill, and because the authorities did not punish them.

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the Rwandan civil war and Tutsi genocide bled across borders, particularly into the DRC, which has experienced several cycles of violence since largely rooted in Hutu-Tutsi conflict. For instance, the mass exodus of primarily Rwandan Hutus into then-Zaire displaced hundreds of thousands of Congolese, primarily Tutsi, living in the Kivus regions along the DRC/Rwandan border. The former regime, according to Prunier, also used the Rwandan Hutu civilian exile population as a buffer to continue their fight from the refugee camps along the DRC/Rwanda border. The initial post-genocide Rwanda was devoid of all infrastructures since most police, “judges, school-teachers, doctors, and nurses” fled along with the former regime into the jungles of Zaire (p. 6).

**Genocide Denial and Revisionism**

Prunier (2009) notes how the Catholic Church was deeply involved with the former regime, and assisted in the carrying out of the genocide, and did not appear willing to accept responsibility for this complicity due in large part to the deep involvement of many Hutu priests and nuns in the genocide (p. 6). In fact, Prunier points out that many Hutu priests were so indignant that the former Hutu regime lost power in Rwanda that they wrote an appeal to Pope John Paul II after they fled with the former regime into Zaire (now DRC),
expressing fear that the Hutu refugees would how be forced back into slavery conditions experienced prior to the “1959 social revolution.” Pleading for help, the Hutu priests wrote of the events in Rwanda, stating

This is a vast plot prepared a long time ago... It is an anti-Catholic movement supported by some priest who work with the RPF. Some have become Muslims and others dug mass graves financed by the RPF.... This explains the anger of the people... Let us forget about this International Tribunal where the criminals will be both prosecutors and judges” (Letter d’un groupe d’Abbés a Sa Saintete le Pape, Coma, August 2, 1994 as cited in Prunier, 2009, p. 6).

Prunier also notes how many in the Catholic Church believed that the Hutus were the actual victims of the genocide, not the perpetrators, stating that:

The Catholic Church was using the fact that about half of its clergy had been killed to wrap itself in martyrs' shrouds, omitting to say that most of the victims were Tutsi and that the Hutu priests who were killed trying to protect their flocks were often considered traitors by their fellow Hutu clerics (Prunier, 2009, p. 8).

This perspective helped to bolster the widespread revisionist and denial propaganda disseminated by the former government and those allied with them, which culminated in calls for an investigation into the possibility of a “double genocide.” Prunier (2009) notes that the former regime living in exile consistently leveled accusations of a double genocide at the same time that they patently denied that a genocide against the Tutsi even occurred. He notes how as early as November 1994 the Hutu extremists and members of the MDR party[^24] demanded an investigation into an RPF genocide of Hutus, and used rumors of post-genocide RPF killings as well as a seeming “global disdain for the RPF” as justification for such an investigation, in order to “confuse issues and develop a revisionist argument” (p. 8). Tutsi factions agreed to an open debate instead of a formal investigation, but Prunier notes that public debates did not help the issue of polarization and mutual blame as neither side appeared willing to alter its position.

[^24]: The MDR was the Hutu component of the new coalition government, which consisted of remnants from the former government not believed to be involved in the genocide.
Amidst the ongoing dissemination of pre-genocide anti-Tutsi propaganda and genocide denial was a climate of fear and general suspiciousness that rendered attempts to balance the need for justice with the need for reconciliation challenging. Because the international community or the UN had failed to intervene and stop the genocide, attempts to intervene after the genocide were often treated with great levels of suspicion and resentment, particularly on the part of Tutsi survivors, and the RPF. For instance, Prunier (2009) notes that the MDR’s quick and urgent demands for democratic elections, which was supported by the international community, were actually self-serving due to the ethnic divide and significant Hutu majority, stating “…democracy was itself a loaded word in the Tutsi-Hutu context, and the MDR’s ‘innocent’ appeal to the ballot box was far from free of ethnic calculations” (p. 8; emphasis in original).

The climate of fear aided the former regime’s attempts to revise and/or outright deny the genocide by fueling reciprocal allegations between extremist Hutus and the new Tutsi-dominated government. For instance, allegations of genocide denial and revisionism have been made by Tutsi genocide survivors and the Rwandan government, particularly against extremist Hutus living in the diaspora, including against political opposition figures allied with the former regime (Johnson, 2010). Counter-allegations included claims that accusations of genocide denial and revisionism were a “smoke screen” for the Rwandan government’s ongoing attempts to maintain power in Rwanda by keeping the political space closed (HRW, 2010a). A commonly cited example of this dynamic includes complaints that Rwanda’s new genocide ideology laws are designed to limit free speech and enforce a government-sanctioned genocide narrative on all Rwandans (and non-Rwandans), which effectively makes it illegal to challenge the government’s “script” (Amnesty International, 2010).

It is important to evaluate these dynamics within the context of current scholarship in the area of genocide denial and revisionism. Charny (2003) explored this area extensively and developed a typology of genocide denial and revisionism that categorizes such behavior according to a range of
different motivations. Charny notes that it is not just perpetrators who engage in genocide denial and historical revisionism, and his classification system includes a “broader range of individuals, coalition of deniers,” which includes not only perpetrators but bigots and racists, as well as many other categories of individuals drawn to denials because they serve their interests (p. 11).

Charny’s (2003) first category of genocide denial is entitled *Malevolent Bigotry*, which includes genocide denial and revisionism engaged in by perpetrators. Charny describes a range of ways in which *genocidaires* and genocidal governments deny a genocide, and/or engage in historical revisionism, often beginning with blatant denials while they are actively engaged in the killings. Perpetrators’ denials and revisionism include a diverse set of tactics driven by a variety of motivations. For instance, one common form of revisionism includes the manipulation of statistics whereby perpetrators begrudgingly acknowledge the killings but claim that the number of victims killed has been grossly exaggerated. Other examples of denials and revisionism by *genocidaires* include admissions that perpetrators did engage in killings but only because they were following orders (and would have been killed if they refused); that the deaths were a result of wartime conditions; and that although killings did occur, both sides in the conflict were affected; that the killings were caused by low-level military squads, not higher level government officials; that the killings were the result of “civilians running wild”; and that the government was just cracking down on a resistance movement (p. 14). Charny also notes how *genocidaires* “may complain about a subsequent strike against them, as if it cancels the record of their genocidal actions” (p. 16).

A particularly egregious form of genocide denial, according to Charny (2003), is when the *genocidaires* and their sympathizers “turn the tables” on truth, and accuse the victims of being the actual perpetrators of the genocide, contradicting historical documentation. In describing the nature of this type of denial Charny states that often the deniers will rely on “pseudo-documentation” in support of their claims that “the victims were really the victimizers.” Using the examples of the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust,
Charny states:

The Turks claim that the Armenians massacred more than a million Turks and several communities in Turkey have actually erected memorials to the martyrs of the genocide of the Turks by the Armenians! Even the Jews have been accused of having been the aggressors against the Nazis (pp. 14-15).

Charny also notes how *genocidaires* and genocidal regimes often go so far as to politicize denials and historical revisions by attempting to gain the cooperation and assistance of the international community, such as democratic nations and the UN, which lends a level of legitimacy for their denials.

Charny’s (2003) second category in his genocide denial/revisionism classification system is entitled *Self-Serving Opportunism*, which is characterized by “denials in the service of personal or collective self-interest or power such as careerism, pragmatism, exhibitionism and realpolitik” (p. 16). Charny notes these types of deniers are the most dangerous and perplexing because they do not involve genocide perpetrators or bigots (e.g., white supremacist groups), but seemingly well-intentioned individuals who have the ability to give legitimacy (often unintentionally) for the *genocidaires*’ cause. Charny describes how many deniers that fall into this category are “peace-seeking people, including a considerable number of bona fide academics—who unfortunately are to be found in all Western countries” (p. 16). Other examples of deniers falling within this category include governments that acknowledge a genocide, but go along with denials for the purposes of *realpolitik*; self-promoting individuals who draw attention to themselves for being “problematic people to be reckoned with” for their counterculture perspectives; individuals “jockeying for intellectual or academic exclusivity and power by creating for themselves high visibility”; and generally conscientious individuals who are searching for “truth and justice” who partner with deniers and revisionists because they gain power and advantage, either economically or politically. Charny asserts that these types of denials and revisionism do not necessarily involve an overt desire to deny a genocide, but are motivated by
self-serving opportunism, including a desire to acquiesce and conform to a particular organizational culture or political climate.

The third category of genocide denials and historical revisionism is *Innocent Denials/Innocent Disavowals of Violence*, which involves a need on the part of some individuals to maintain a worldview that people are incapable of engaging acts as evil as genocide. These types of deniers are most often motivated by a belief in a “just world” view that posits that the world (i.e., society, people, even the “universe”) is a just and good place where evils, such as genocides, cannot exist. Charny cautions that the desire of decent people to see the world as generally good, and people as generally just has been exploited by many deniers in the first and second categories in order to gain a consensus and legitimacy. Charny (2003) explains how often the more insidious deniers will recruit well-intentioned individuals by reframing genocide denial as attempts to contribute to reconciliation efforts; most innocent deniers in this category do not realize the harm they are causing. According to Charny, many innocent deniers are uninformed about the facts of a genocide and for whatever reason do not take the necessary steps to become informed, despite the availability of fact-based resources.

Also included in Charny’s (2003) third category are those who advocate that deniers and revisionists should have a voice based on “the grand democratic principle of free speech,” where it is perceived a violation of democratic principles to deny alternate perspectives from being expressed. Charny warns that this perspective can be easily manipulated by self-serving deniers and revisionists because they frame their denials in such a way as to give the appearance of being based on democratic ideals and a desire to promote diversity of opinion, when in actuality the motivations are based on anti-democratic ideas and “demagogic movements” (p. 21). Charny notes though that not all seemingly innocent denials are so, as some may be a smoke screen for attempts to introduce denials and revisionism into mainstream academia. For instance, deniers often use academics’ commitment to open debate as a pretense for spreading false propaganda.
about a genocide, amounting to a "calculated strategy to befuddle and confound the thinking of well-intentioned people" (p. 21). By mixing fact and fiction and even expressing some regret that the genocide occurred, purposeful denials made to look innocent can “seriously weaken or cripple the factual basis of a genocide” (p. 21). For example,

…the declaration that one regrets the deaths of so many Armenians may be coupled with statements that wartime conditions were prevailing and no fewer Turks and Kurds died than Armenians, and that they died at the hands of the warring Armenians. Making people believe that all sides were equally at fault is often the goal of deniers (although as noted they also can progress to reversing the roles, hence claims that the Armenians were the authors of the real genocide and not the Turks).

Charny’s (2003) fourth category of genocide denial is entitled *Definitionalism*, and involves the debating of competing definitions of genocide by academics, or the debate over loopholes in legal definitions of genocide by legal scholars. Scholars who engage in this type denial will often argue that a killing event is more appropriately considered “mass killings” or “war crimes” because it does not meet some arbitrary criterion, or legal standard for genocide. Charny argues that these types of denials and revisionism are particularly dangerous because “hairsplitting” of this type often leads to the marginalization of moral outrage and reverence for victims, whereas debating competing definitions becomes an end in its own right.

Charny’s fifth and sixth categories include *Nationalistic Hubris* and *Human Shallowness*, involving indifference toward the targeted group, and the human tendency to trivialize or become desensitized to significant events in history, respectively.

**Political Opposition Groups Developed in the Diaspora**

Also important to note is the evolution of political opposition parties that emerged in the diaspora, many of which had deep roots in the former regime, most of which were created along ethnic lines, and many of which were heavily involved in post-genocide regional conflicts, particularly in the DRC, as
well as the continued promulgation of pre-genocide propaganda and post-genocide denial and revisionism. Geographic borders in the Great Lakes Region are quite porous (Prunier, 2009), thus conflicts, particularly those falling along ethnic lines, are not contained within country borders and often spill over boundaries, affecting broader geo-political dynamics. For instance, ethnic conflicts in Burundi, the DRC, as well as in Rwanda “have tended to merge giving rise to an expanding zone of insecurity and the export of wars to neighboring countries” (Elijah, 2011, p. 2). It is for this reason that having some sense of regional dynamics and their relationship to pre and post-genocide conflicts in Rwanda is important, in order to gain contextual understanding of Rwandan diaspora political engagement in homeland conflict.

**Hutu Rebel/Political Opposition Groups Formed in Exile**

Any exploration of post-genocide political dynamics will be as controversial as pre-genocide dynamics, given the polarized nature of the conflicts occurring in the Great Lakes Region, the deeply rooted nature of the propaganda campaigns and the continuing efforts of the former regime to regain power. Yet despite the various controversies over which parties are responsible for the ongoing conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, having some contextual knowledge about post-genocide regional conflicts, as well as the evolution and development of various rebel groups is important in order to better understand the contextual meaning of current political activities. For instance, much of the fighting in the DRC, including the First Congo War from 1996 to 1997, as well as the Second Congo War from 1998 to 2003, is directly related to the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda, and the Tutsi genocide that destabilized the entire region (Prunier, 2008).

A very complex dynamic related to the ongoing regional conflicts rooted in Rwandan ethnic conflict is the number of rebel groups that sprouted up after the Tutsi genocide, particularly in the DRC. For instance, remnants of the former regime formed a number of rebel groups (many of which continue to operate today), and engaged in fighting that has contributed to the conflict
cycle in the DRC, as well as the displacement and targeted rape and killings of Congolese Tutsi in the Kivus when they flooded into the region after fleeing the RPF take-over. These dynamics eventually led to the creation of Tutsi-dominated rebel groups formed in the DRC (Prunier, 2009).

Tracing the evolution of the various rebel groups, formed in the diaspora is a daunting task, given the consistent splitting and merging of various rebel groups, but a summary of these dynamics will be explored, with a particular focus on political and military groups that developed in the Rwandan diaspora. Although this is not an exhaustive list of diaspora-based rebel opposition groups, the following summary includes most of the viable opposition groups formed in exile, that have remained steadily active since their inception.

One of the first rebel groups formed shortly after the ending of the Tutsi genocide, and the RPF gaining control of Rwanda was the Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (Army for the Liberation of Rwanda; ALiR). The ALiR was formed in the refugee camps in the DRC, and was comprised of the former regime (ex-FAR), including the military, and Interahamwe. The primary goal of the ALiR was to retake control of Rwanda, and ousting the transitional government, including Kagame’s RPF. In the fall of 1997 the ALiR formed a political wing called the Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda; PALIR). In 1999 the group of ALiR/PALIR rebels kidnapped a tour group of 14 Westerners, brutally killing eight (including two U.S. citizens) as well as one game warden, claiming as their motive the US/UK support for Kagame and the RPF/RPA (BBC, 2006).

On April 3, 1995, another rebel group was formed in the refugee camps, also comprised of ex-FAR and Interahamwe, called the Rassemblement Républicain pour la Démocratie au Rwanda (Rally for the Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda; RDR). Despite denying that they were connected to genocidaires in the camps, the RDR disseminated extremist Hutu propaganda similar in nature to propaganda used prior to the genocide (Kenyon-Lischer, 2006). In response to the continued attacks on
Rwanda by Hutu extremists waged inside and outside of Rwanda, and concerns that the refugee camps were being used as a base for these attacks, as well as the belief that the *Interahamwe* was holding innocent Hutus as captives (information confirmed by the UN), the RPF decided on April 13, 1997 to close all refugee camps, and repatriate those civilians who did not participate in the genocide, and apprehend and prosecute (and at times execute) the *genocidaires* (Prunier, 2009).

On April 27, 1995 the Rwandan Patriotic Army (the military wing of the RPF; RPA) arrived at the Kibeho camp located in the southwest region of Rwanda (formerly the “Turquoise Zone” established by the French), with the intention of forcibly closing the camp. Prunier notes that the Interahamwe and former members of the regime purposely incited fear in the civilian refugees by spreading rumors that if they returned to Rwanda, as instructed, they would be indiscriminately killed. Hutu civilians who attempted to leave the camp and return home were threatened and harassed by the *Interahamwe*, and many were even killed to prevent them from leaving the camps. The Kibeho camp housed between 80,000 and 100,000 Hutu refugee. The RPA’s military incursion into the Kibeho camp was described by many as a massacre since the RPA engaged in a “show down” with the *Interahamwe* and refugees who refused to leave the camp (Prunier, 2009). The military incursion resulted in a number of civilian deaths (the exact number is unknown and is a point of controversy), and even more deaths as the remaining refugees faced a treacherous evacuation to Butare, Rwanda. The estimates of deaths range from 330 to 5000, and according to Australian forces while many deaths were clearly the result of RPA gunfire, the *Interahamwe* killed a significant number of Hutu civilian refugees, using what appeared to be machetes.

Members of Australian medical forces present that day reported that the RPA was processing refugees out of the camps, and a part of this processing involved determining whether the refugees were *genocidaires* (e.g., civilian
genocidaires, Interahamwe members, or ex-FAR), or innocent civilians. Australian forces reported that the RPA was accompanied by genocide survivors who were identifying potential genocide perpetrators. When Interahamwe leaders saw this occurring they reacted by attempting to use Hutu civilian refugees as human shields. The Australian forces theorized that the Interahamwe leaders were attempting to create a distraction so that they could escape, as well as likely killing potential informants. The witnesses also reported that their actions caused the crowd to panic, leading some IDPs to rush the RPA line, and “the RPA soldiers, fearing a riot began to shoot into the crowd and soon most joined in, firing indiscriminately” (Office of Air Force History, 2002). The Kibeho tragedy has remained a focal point of Hutu grievances with many Hutus, particularly those in the diaspora, referring to the massacre as a genocide against Hutus.

In 1997 after Rwanda and Uganda shut down the militarized refugee camps along its border in eastern DRC (the Kivus), the RDR leaders met in Paris, and decided to change the name to their organization to Rassemblement Républicain pour la Démocratie au Rwanda (Republican Rally for Democracy in Rwanda; RDR), and moved the rebel group’s headquarters from the camps in eastern DRC, to the Netherlands. Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza was named president of the Dutch branch in 2000, and Ignace Murwanashyaka was appointed as president of the German branch. In September of 1998 the RDR developed a coalition called the Union of Rwandese Democratic Forces (Union des Forces Démocratiques Rwandaises, UFDR), which included the RDR, the Forces de Defence Rwandaises (Democratic Forces for Resistance; FDR), and the Groupe d'Initiative pour la Réconciliation (Initiative Group for Reconciliation; GID/IGR). Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza was president of the UFDR from 2003 to 2008. In April 2006 three rebel opposition groups created in exile, (Umuhoza’s RDR,

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25 For the sake of consistency and clarity he term “refugee” is being used to describe the camps residents, but legally, they would be considered Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) since they were displaced within their country of origin.
the Democratic Alliance for Rwanda [ADR-ISANGANO] and the FRD), joined together to create the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (United Democratic Forces of Rwanda; FDU-Inkingi). It was the goal of Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza that the FDU-Inkingi serve as an umbrella organization for all political opposition parties formed in exile (FDU-Inkingi, 2013).

Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza also created and participated in numerous other groups, many of which were structured as human rights groups, focusing on “truth and reconciliation,” peace, and democracy. One of these organizations was the International Forum for Truth and Justice in Great Lakes Africa (Foro Internacional para la Verdad y la Justicia en el Africa de los Grandes Lagos), most commonly referred to as Veritas Rwanda Forum (see www.veritasrwandaforum.org), which was created in 2000 in Barcelona, Spain in partnership with Spanish human rights advocates Juan Carrero Saralegui, Adolfo Pérez Esquivel and Federico Mayor Zaragoza. In 2005, Saralegui, Esquivel and Zaragoza, with their attorney, Jordi Palou, filed a lawsuit against 40 members of the RPF government for their alleged murder of nine priests and nuns during the genocide. According to a U.S. diplomatic cable, the lawsuit was based on the testimony of 40 Hutu witnesses currently in exile, brought forth by Veritas Rwanda Forum. Victoire worked with the Spanish human rights advocates Saralegui, Esquivel and Zaragoza in the coordination and facilitation of three meetings with Veritas Rwanda Forum in Barcelona, Spain, with a focus on creating a path toward peace and “truth and reconciliation” in Rwanda. These meetings were called the Highly Inclusive Inter-Rwandan Dialogue (HIIRD) and occurred in 2006, 2007 and 2009, and were attended by approximately 20 Rwandan exiles at each meeting.

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26 ADR-Isangano was formed in exile in Brussels, Belgium in January 2002 when it merged with the African Democratic Congress (Congres Democratique Africain, CDA) and the Movement for Peace, Democracy and Development (Mouvement pour la Paix, la Democratie et le Development (MPDD)).

On September 30, 2000 the ALiR changed its name to the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda; FDLR), after it was placed on the U.S. terrorist watch-list (Straus & Waldorf, 2011). The FDLR is based in the Kivus, and is comprised primarily of remnants of the original Hutu power group, including ex-FAR, and the Interahamwe who were opposed to Tutsi rule. Many scholars consider the FDLR as the military wing of FDU-Inkingi/RDR in East DRC, fighting along Rwanda border. Paul Rwarakabije was appointed commander in chief of the entire FDLR force and RDR leader Ignace Murwanashyaka28 was named as named First President of FDLR. The First Vice President of FDLR was Jean Marie-Vianney Higiro (former Habyarimana government official evacuated prior to the genocide; currently a university professor in New Hampshire), and the Executive Secretary was Callixte Mbarushimana,29 (Rafti, 2004-2005).

Major General Sylvestre Mudacumura, former deputy commander of the FAR Presidential Guard in Rwanda in 1995, is currently the overall military commander of the FDLR (Straus & Waldorf, 2011). FDLR rebels are considered the primary contributor of conflict in Eastern DRC, including slaughtering civilians, including ethnic Congolese Tutsi called the Banyamulenge 30 (HRW, 2009), as well as committing thousands of rapes of women and girls. For instance, in 2010 the UN estimated that in the first six months of 2009 at least 5400 civilian women and girls in South Kivu were raped (Aljazeera, 2010). These rapes were attributed to FDLR rebels as well as soldiers from DRC’s military, the FARDC (Worship, 2010). Additionally, there is considerable evidence that the DRC government has provided support for the FDLR, despite proclamations to the opposite (Prunier, 2009). In

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28 Ignace Murwanashyaka was recently arrested on genocide charges in Germany in April 2009 (BBC, 2009).
29 Callixte Mbarushimana was arrested in France on October 10, 2009 on a warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on several counts of crimes against humanity including murder, torture, rape, inhumane acts and persecution, as well as several counts of war crimes including attacks against the civilian population, murder, mutilation, torture, rape, inhuman treatment, destruction of property and pillaging in Eastern DRC (ICC, 2012).
September 12, 2004 Jean Marie-Vianney Higiro left the FDLR with treasurer, Félicien Kanyamibwa and formed the Rally for Unity and Democracy (RUD-URUNANA) in the diaspora. Higiro is currently a professor in Massachusetts and Kanyamibwa is now Executive Secretary of RUD-URANA and lives in New Jersey.

In advance of the presidential elections in Rwanda on August 9, 2010, Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza returned to Rwanda in January 2010 after 16 years in exile, in order to register her party, FDU-Inkingi and enter the race as a presidential candidate. She went directly to the Gisozi Genocide Memorial Centre, with flowers in hand, and made a speech on behalf of her party, the FDU-Inkingi. Although she acknowledged the genocide, she also asserted that in order for true and lasting reconciliation to occur both sides needed to be held accountable for their crimes, including RPF crimes against the Hutu. These comments were seen as an authentic form of reconciliation by some, but were perceived as inflammatory by others, particularly Tutsi genocide survivors, because her comments were delivered at a Tutsi genocide memorial. She followed up her comments with a letter to the editor of Rwanda’s primary newspaper:

We are here honouring at this Memorial the Tutsi victims of the Genocide; there are also Hutu who were victims of crimes against humanity and war crimes, not remembered or honoured here. Hutus are also suffering. They are wondering when their time will come to remember their people. In order for us to get to that desirable reconciliation, we must be fair and compassionate towards every Rwandan’s suffering (Victoire2010, 2010).

Umuhoza was placed under house arrest in April 2010, and arrested in October 2010 and charged with “endangering state security, destabilizing public order, divisionism, defamation, and forming a criminal enterprise” (HRW, 2012a, p. 1). Four co-defendants, FDLR members, implicated Umuhoza in the coordination of the collaboration FDU-Inkingi and the FDLR

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The Banyamulenge are a historic group of Tutsis that migrated from Rwanda into South Kivu in the Congo in the 17th and 18th centuries.
Victoire was sentenced on October 30, 2012 to eight years in prison (the prosecution was asking for life) (BBC, 2012).

Another Hutu opposition group formed in exile is PDR-Ihumure, created in 2005 in the United States by Paul Rusesabagina (of the film “Hotel Rwanda”) and several ex-FAR members. PDR-Ihumure has actively lobbied the U.S. government and international community against the current Rwandan government, challenged the government’s genocide narrative, and many members have served as defense witnesses at the ICTR on behalf of accused and convicted genocidares. Additionally, in 2004 the Partenariat-Intwari (Intrawri-Partnership) was formed in Brussels by Emmanuel Habyarimana, a Hutu who was a part of the RPF government before going into exile in 2003. The co-founder was Déogratias Mushayidi, a Tutsi who served as Secretary General and spokesperson. Partenariat-Intwari is a Hutu umbrella group that includes CNA-Ubumwe, FDLR-CMC, and PDN-Igihango. In 2008 Déogratias Mushayidi founded Pact Defence of the People (People’s Defense Pact; PDP-IMANZI) in Brussels and served as president until his arrest and capture, and transfer to Kigali in 2010. In 2010, the Intrawri-Partnership, the FDLR, ARENA, and Nation-Imbaga came together to form an alliance called the Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Reconciliation Nationale (ADRN-Igihango; Rafti, 2003-2004).

**Tutsi Political Opposition Groups Formed in Exile**

The Congolese Rally for Democracy, sometimes referred to as the Rally for Congolese Democracy or by its French name, Le Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) is a Tutsi-dominated rebel group that operated out of Goma (in the Kivu regions) in eastern DRC from 1998 to 2003. The RCD was created in large part as a response to anti-Tutsi sentiment growing in the ADFL, and the ongoing persecution of the Banyamulenge by the Congolese government. President Laurent Kabila of the DRC, and

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31 See Rusesabagina’s not-for-profit charity website to review recent letters he has written regarding the current state of Rwanda. The website can be found here: http://hrffoundation.org/

32 Déogratias Mushayidi was charged with crimes related to supporting terrorist groups and is currently serving a life sentence in Rwanda.
government allied rebel groups, including extremist Rwandan Hutu militias, and the Mai-Mai, an ethnic group from the Kivus area of the DRC also are accused of persecuting the Banyamulenge, particularly after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi (HRW, 2012b; IRBC, 2000; Lemarchand, 2009; Mandami, 2000; Prunier, 2009). There are currently an estimated 50,000 to 150,000\(^{33}\) Banyamulenge concentrated primarily in South and North Kivu, in Eastern DRC, along the Rwanda and Ugandan borders.

Persecutions of the Banyamulenge often center on land and citizenship disputes. In fact, the Congolese government, under both Kabilas (Laurent, and his successor, his son Joseph) have attempted on numerous occasions to strip indigenous Banyamulenge of their citizenship status, despite the Banyamulenges’ presence in the region for over 200 years (Mamdani, 2001). Lemarchand (2009) notes that despite many distinct differences between indigenous Banyamulenge and more recently arrived Tutsi refugees from Rwanda, there is a growing tendency for people within the region to perceive all Tutsis in the Congo as “Rwandan Tutsi in disguise,” feeding concerns among many in the Kivus that the Banyamulenge property rights represent Rwandan attempts to expand into the Kivus regions (p. 66). A further blurring of the lines between Congolese and Rwandan Tutsis occurred when many young male Banyamulenge crossed the border into Rwanda and fought alongside the RPF in the 1990 to 1994 civil war against the Hutu extremist government (Lemarchand, 2009; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 2009).

Central African scholars describe how conflict in Rwanda spilled across borders after the Rwandan genocide when over a million Hutus flooded into the Kivus onto historic Tutsi Congolese lands, much of which belonged to the Banyamulenge. Thus, thousands of Congolese Tutsi, including Banyamulenge who had avoided earlier governmental efforts to remove them from their historic land were now forced to flee to Rwanda when extremist Rwandan

\(^{33}\) This population of the Banyamulenge is often contested, based on disputes regarding who is legitimately considered a member of this ethnic minority group (based on the date of migration). Some estimates put the number of Banyamulenge as low as 50,000 (Lemarchand, 2009; Prunier, 2009), whereas others place their numbers is high as 150,000 (IRBC, 2000).
Hutus fled into the region, and began terrorizing them (Mandami, 2001). When asked about the decision to leave their historic lands, the Banyamulenge stated that armed Hutu refugees associated them with Rwandan Tutsis and had threatened them, killing some of them before they had a chance to flee (Lange, 2010).

The Rwandan-backed RCD, led by Laurent Nkunda (a member of the Banyamulenge ethnic group) took control of the Kivus in order to protect the Banyamulenge people, while also fighting a proxy war on behalf of Rwanda, against Rwandan extremist Hutus fighting in the region (Lemarchand, 2009; Prunier, 2009). This spill-over of ethnic fighting into the DRC ultimately evolved into the First Congo War (1996 to 1997), fueled in large part by ongoing fighting between the RPF and ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces, who, as previously mentioned, used Hutu refugee camps in the Kivus as military bases (Lemarchand, 2009; Prunier, 2009). In 1998, once the fighting diminished, DRC President Laurent Kabila expelled all Rwandans from the country (both Hutus and Tutsi) in an attempt to reduce Rwandan interference, as well as to limit the possibility of renewed violence (Prunier, 2009). This decision was not well received by the remaining Banyamulenge population, who relied on Rwandan forces in the DRC for protection from ex-FAR and Interahamwe militia (Minorities at Risk, 2006).

Fighting broke out again in 1998, resulting in the Second Congo War (1998-2003). The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999, which provided for the disarmament of ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces operating in the DRC, failed to stop the fighting (Turner, 2008). In January of 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated and was immediately replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila. Despite numerous allegations that both Kabilas were working alongside extremist Hutu factions (now called the FDLR), Joseph Kabila entered into a peace agreement with Rwanda in 2002 in an attempt to stop the fighting. The

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34 Mandami (2001) notes that some Hutus civilian refugees were targeted as well, many of who fled to Uganda.

35 By way of reminder, Laurent Kabila was initially allied with Tutsis when fighting with the ADFL since he was fighting against Hutus serving under then president Mobutu Seso Seko, but then later allied with the Hutu population, and against the Tutsis.
peace agreement called for the immediate withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the DRC in exchange for the DRC addressing Rwandan security concerns, particularly those caused by continued cross-border raids by the FDLR. In response, the DRC agreed to take all necessary steps to track down and capture ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* factions, dismantle the FDLR, and return any militia members who had participated in the 1994 genocide (Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2002).

This peace agreement would ultimately fail, and in response, Laurent Nkunda formed the Le Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (the National Congress for the Defense of the People; CNDP) in 2006 comprised primarily of Congolese Tutsis, with the primary goal of protecting Congolese Tutsi in the DRC (primarily in the Kivus areas). The CNDP focused on the eradication of the FDLR and was the primary source of persecution of the ethnic Tutsis living in the Congo (Minorities at Risk Project, 2006), yet Prunier (2009) theorizes that an additional goal of Nkunda was to move beyond the Kivus to Kinshasa, expanding “his ‘crusade’ beyond the local level” (p. 323). The CNDP played a key role in the Second Congo War, and has been cited for numerous human rights violations by human rights groups and UN peacekeeping forces (HRW, 2010b; Lemarchand, 2009; MONUC, 2009). Central African scholars also noted that some of the violence committed by the CNDP was likely in retaliation for FDLR persecution of Congolese Tutsis (Lemarchand, 2009; Minorities at Risk, 2006; Prunier, 2009).

Bosco Ntaganda\textsuperscript{36} took control of the CNDP in January 2009 when Laurent Nkunda was arrested for war crimes as a part of an agreement between the DRC and Rwandan governments (U.S. Congress, 2012). On March 23, 2009 the DRC government entered into yet another peace agreement with the CNDP, which included the conscription of the CNDP members into DRC’s national army, the FARDC; the transformation of the CNDP into a political party; the release of CNDP political prisoners; amnesty
for CNDP rebel forces; and the implementation of national reconciliation efforts. The development of a community police force was also a part of the agreement, focusing on the resolution of conflicts on a local level. The agreement stipulated that former members of the CNDP would be included in the community police force in order to ensure equal ethnic representation (Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2009).

An additional—and crucial—component of the 2009 peace agreement included the “quick implementation” of a strategic plan in order to facilitate the return of Congolese refugees (primarily Tutsi) from neighboring countries, such as Rwanda (Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2009, p. 11). The plan called for 1) the identification of refugees, 2) an analysis of their locations, 3) an analysis of the viability of the return areas (e.g., security and infrastructure), and 4) a plan for social integration. Finally, several articles in the agreement concerned the complete integration and national representation of the CNDP, with CNDP interests demonstrated at all levels of the DRC government (Democratic Republic of Congo, 2009).

In order to facilitate the return of refugees, in February 2010, the DRC, Rwanda and the UNHCR signed the Tripartite Agreement, which stipulated the facilitation and return of approximately 53,362 refugees registered with the UNHCR. Ultimately the return of refugees experienced significant challenges at local, national and even international levels, as national efforts of Tutsi refugee repatriation gave way to historic fears of Rwandan expansionist efforts, contributing to the continuation of historic ethnic tensions in the region. In addition, land disputes were common with Hutu chiefs often refusing to relinquish land to Tutsi returnees, claiming that the returnees were Rwandan, not Congolese (Refugees International, 2010). According to Lange (2010) local ethnic groups along with local politicians:

... express[ed] fears about plots by the “Rwandans” (often code for “Tutsis”) to “re-occupy” parts of North Kivu, aided by the international

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36 Bosco Ntaganda was indicted by the ICC in August 2006 for war crimes. In March of 2013 Ntaganda surrendered to the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda and was subsequently transferred to the ICC in The Hague (ICC, 2013).
community. There are also legitimate fears voiced by Congolese who live in areas where the refugees will return, largely focused on land conflicts that may arise when refugees who sold or lost their land come back to reclaim it (p. 48).

Lange further described how many Congolese living on disputed lands “firmly believe that Rwandan citizens are mixing themselves in with returning refugees so as to escape land scarcity in Rwanda and “occupy” North Kivu” (p. 49).

Growing dissent grew among many ex-CNDP, culminating when the DRC government announced plans to deploy ex-CNDP soldiers away from their families in North Kivu, meaning that they would no longer be able to protect their family members (Webb, 2012). In April 2012 about 300 ex-CNDP soldiers deserted the FARDC and formed a new military group called the Mouvement du 23-Mars (the Movement of March 23; M23). The new rebel group cited the DRC government’s failure to implement the March 23, 2009 peace agreement as the primary reason for their desertion, as well as poor conditions in the FARDC, and the government’s decision to move them out of the Kivus and away from their families (Webb, 2012). The group was named after the date of the failed peace agreement, March 23, but is most frequently referred to as the M23. Bertrand Bisimwa is the current leader of this rebel movement. Bisimwa took over as leader, when its former leader, Bosco Ntganda, was arrested for war crimes in March 2013 and transferred to the ICC (ICC, 2013). In a recent interview, Bisimwa claimed that the M23 would continue fighting until the DRC government fully implemented the 2009 Peace Agreement. The M23 is also asking for a legitimate government that supports
the development of infrastructure in the country, as well as the complete dismantling of the FDLR. Bisimwa has also accused the DRC government of collaborating with the FDLR, responsible for mass human rights violations against civilians, particularly the Banyamulenge (Patel, 2013).

The M23 has grown from about 300 soldiers to over 5,500 soldiers, and they recently surprised the international community by briefly taking control of Goma in November 2012, despite a strong FARDC and UN presence. Several members of the international community have accused Rwanda of providing material support to the M23, although Rwanda has denied doing so (Pflanz, 2012). The UN has accused the M23 of contributing to renewed ethnic fighting in the region, as well as committing human rights violations against the civilian population, although the M23 has vehemently denied these allegations (UN News Centre, 2013). The UN is also investigating reports by its peacekeeping mission MONUSCO of alleged FARDC abuses committed against M23 detainees and desecrating their corpses (Reuters, 2013). In September 2013 the M23 announced that it would disarm and return to civilian life if Tutsi refugees currently living in camps in Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi were returned home, and the FDLR militia was completely disbanded (AFP, 2013).

This detailed exploration of Rwanda’s sociopolitical history, and the ongoing ethnic fighting in the DRC is important as it provides insights into the contested, complex and controversial nature of the ongoing Hutu/Tutsi conflicts ensuing throughout the region. It is also within this context that the political activities of the Rwandan CGD operating within virtual transnational
networks and engaging in homeland conflict will be explored, evaluated and analyzed.
CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY

This study contributes to the body of knowledge on the global dynamics involved in ethnonationalist armed civil conflict, by exploring the role of diasporic transnational political engagement in homeland conflict. In particular, this study explores the ways in which ethnonationalist CGD, traversing both real and virtual communities of identity in Western host countries use social media to engage in homeland conflict on a political level. The Republic of Rwanda was used as a case study due to its recent history of ethnonationalist conflict, its large diaspora (relative to its in-country population), and the tendency for many members of the Rwandan diaspora to use social media for the purposes of political engagement in homeland conflict. Additionally, among the 22 case studies located in the literature on ethnonationalist CGD typology and political engagement, there have to date been no studies conducted on Rwandan CGD and the nature of their political engagement.

Due to the nature of this study, and its focus on activities occurring on the Internet, it was decided that a qualitative research approach was the most appropriate methodology, using virtual ethnology for the research design. Since virtual ethnography is a newer research method, it is important to fully explore its methodology in order to better understand how it is used in the present study. Thus in this chapter I provide a detailed description of virtual ethnography, exploring its underlying principles and characteristics, including a summary of the current status of ethical issues and established ethical standards pertinent to Internet research as demonstrated in the literature.

Providing a comprehensive description of virtual ethnography also contributes to the body of knowledge related to this emerging research methodology. Research methodologies that are well suited for exploring activities in cyberspace are likely going to be increasingly used in the future due to the dramatic evolution of new technologies, and the significant growth of the use of the Internet for a variety of purposes. Accompanying the increased use of the Internet, particularly social media, is an increase in the
number of social scientists researching this phenomenon. The importance of Internet research in order to better understand this socio-political and socio-cultural phenomenon is articulated by Carverlee and Webb (2008), authors of large-scale study of MySpace users, who state:

There is a growing demand for understanding this new social phenomenon, understanding the processes by which communities come together, how virtual communities attract new members and develop over time, and understanding what it takes to empower the online communities with the ability to attract and retain a core of members who participate actively (Carverlee & Webb, 2008, p. 1).

The recognition of the Internet as a rich source of data for researchers is also attracting increasing attention among social and political scientists, with a particular focus on how data collection strategies can be adapted to the virtual world (Dholakia & Zhang, 2004).

Research studies focusing on Internet dynamics have been referred to in a variety of ways, including Cyberethnography (Rybas & Gajjala, 2007); Internet-mediated Research (Mathy, Kerr & Haydin, 2003); Internet-based Research (Battles, 2010); Netnography (Kozinets, 2002); and Cyber-research (Tulbure, 2011). Some of these terms are used to denote research using the Internet, or research of activities on the Internet in a generic sense, while other terms refer to specific methodologies used when studying phenomena occurring in cyberspace. When the social phenomenon being studied focuses on higher levels of electronically mediated human interaction in virtual communities, the techniques employed are most frequently referred to in the literature as virtual ethnography (Hine, 2000). A nascent research methodology has begun to develop to guide virtual ethnographers, which is in large part drawn from methodology used in traditional ethnography and adapted to an online world.

**Virtual Ethnography as an Emerging Research Methodology**

Virtual ethnography is a research method that is used when the ethnographer’s sustained presence in the field is located in the Internet. Virtual
ethnography allows researchers to systematically explore relational and behavioral activities occurring within virtual communities (Boellstorff, Nardi, Pearce, & Taylor, 2012) where the ethnographer engages in the “making and remaking of space through mediated interaction” (Hine, 2000, p. 1061). Traditional ethnography is defined as “the sustained presence of an ethnographer in the field setting, combined with intensive engagement with the everyday life of the inhabitants of the field site… by the ethnographer” (Hine, 2000, p. 1061). An aspect of ethnography that distinguishes it from other qualitative research methodologies is the researcher’s sustained immersion in a culture that provides insights into other people’s way of life (Geertz, 1993 as cited in Fereday, & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Virtual ethnography is defined similarly, but rather than the ethnographer being immersed in one specific place and/or culture, the virtual ethnographer is immersed in a virtual community, or a virtual network of communities (Beneito-Montagut, 2011).

Virtual ethnography offers insights into the lives of online participants engaging in virtual communities due to the interactive nature of many social media sites, which allows for the formation of social connections that are often reciprocal in nature. According to Hine (2000), the virtual ethnographer makes sense out of the Internet by exploring how it is “used, interpreted and reinterpreted” primarily in three ways: as a form of communication, “as an object within people’s lives, and as a site for community-like formations” (Hine, 2000, p. 1067). The Internet is a dynamic data source rich in information, “a place of ongoing activity and static, pre-existing information, both of which can inform the ethnography being undertaken” (Evans, 2010, p. 6), meaning that a virtual ethnographer can analyze real-time, asynchronous, and archival data simultaneously.

Virtual communities are not wholly abstracted from “real world” dynamics. In fact, it is often “real world” dynamics that give rise to online interaction (a point that even applies to online gamers). This is particularly true when the purpose of a virtual community is to bring about some form and/or degree of social and/or political change. In situations where online interaction
is in some manner connected to, or arises out of off-line phenomena, the boundaries between the online and offline worlds can become quite indistinct, requiring the virtual ethnographer to make methodological decisions about the boundaries of the virtual field site.

The Virtual Field Site: Altered Space and Time

The “field site” in virtual ethnography differs from the field site in traditional ethnography in that the field is located not in a bounded geographic location, but in cyberspace where space and time are conceptualized differently. For instance, in virtual ethnography, space relates to “flow and connectivity” of culture and community, and not to physical boundaries. Knowing where the boundaries of the field site begin and end can be challenging. The virtual ethnographer must first abandon the concept of natural geographic boundaries of the culture and focus instead on when to stop expanding the online exploration. Although the virtual field site is framed primarily by the research questions, which in a qualitative study answers the “how” question, according to Hine (2000), the field in virtual ethnography is limited by the ethnographer’s “constraints in time, space and ingenuity” (p. 1070). Hine notes that the determination of the field boundaries in virtual ethnography is an integral part of the methodology, stating: “finding the field becomes as much a part of the research project as any data collection which is done once the field is found” (p. 15), where “the ethnographic object itself …[is]… reformulated with each decision to either follow yet another connection or retrace steps to a previous point” (Hine, 2008, p. 1070).

Time in a virtual world is also conceptualized differently since some observations may be synchronous (i.e., real time), and some may be asynchronous. Further, online observation often includes what could be considered “archival research,” since postings may have been posted years ago, depending upon user preferences and medium functionality (i.e., some social media sites only show recent history, while others date back several years). Since sustained immersion is not possible in a traditional sense, and because subjects may be posting on a variety of social media at any given
time, it is important to remember that virtual ethnography can never capture the entire picture of an online culture. In traditional ethnography the researcher is fully immersed in a specific culture for a considerable, albeit fixed amount of time, leading to a faithful representation of that culture. Yet in virtual ethnography the concept of “sustained presence” in the field is qualitatively different in a variety of ways, thus it captures only glimpses of informants, communities and cultures, rendering the representation of the culture only partial. How the “field” is defined then, and what data is collected, is based on what is deemed to be of strategic relevance to the ethnographer(s), as guided by the research questions (Hine, 2005, 2008).

Although virtual ethnography provides an in-depth exploration of an exciting new medium and the range of human activities that take place within it, it is not without its critics. Some ethnographers note that it is impossible to truly be immersed in a culture that is primarily textual in nature. Dholakia and Zhang (2004) cite the limitations of virtual ethnography, noting that with online ethnography the researcher cannot compare (or triangulate) narratives with observed behaviors, which is a key component of traditional ethnography.

Comparing the one-dimensional nature of online textual interactions with real-life behavioral and relational activities, Dholakia and Zhang note the rich amount of information that can be gleaned in a traditional field from visual and aural cues, such as “pausing and reflection… loudness and pitch of speech” as well as other visually-noted characteristics such as age, gender, race, attire, “eye contact, body language and gestures, and emotive responses” (para 12).

Dholakia and Zhang (2004) note that the absence of aural and visual cues in an online environment is a limitation because “important information is lost, making it hard for the researcher to be sure about the real meanings and intentions of the ‘online informants’” (para 12). Many of Dholakia and Zhang’s concerns may no longer be as valid since in the decade since the publication of their article, social media sites have evolved considerably, and now include far more than textual CMC. For instance, technological advances now permit
the posting of, and linking to visual data in the form of videos and photographs as well as aural data in the form sound clips and online radio stations. Additionally, many social media sites permit interactions in non-textual ways through the online expression of emotion and attitudes, including “likes,” “emoticons,” and “shares.”

In response to criticism that virtual ethnography does not permit the ethnographer to become fully immersed into the culture for a sustained period of time, Evans (2010) notes that traditional and virtual ethnography offer different types of “sustained immersion.” Although sustained immersion in traditional ethnography provides a “faithful portrayal” of one particular culture, the virtual ethnographer can explore multiple online cultures simultaneously (since they are fluid, with indistinct boundaries), producing an “ethnographic survey.” Thus while there are certainly differences in the types of data produced by traditional and virtual ethnography, each approach is unique with advantages and disadvantages.

**Data Collection in Virtual Ethnography**

Many of the data collection strategies available to traditional ethnographers are also available to virtual ethnographers, including interviews, surveys, and archival research. In fact, there is a growing body of knowledge regarding ways in which traditional data collection strategies can be adapted to Internet-based research (Alessi & Martin, 2010; Payne & Barnfather, 2012). Although several data collection strategies can be used in ethnographic research, the primary method used in studying social phenomena in virtual communities is observation; participant observation, if subjects are aware of the presence of the researcher, and naturalistic observation if they are not. The primary form of communication used on the Internet is called CMC, which is defined as a text-based communication that lay somewhere between oral and written speech since it includes visual components as well (Paccagnella, 1997). CMC is quite transient in nature, compared to off-line communication, in that textual and cultural communication can be posted, and then subsequently edited or deleted, often with no trace of its original format. Thus,
in order to obtain a holistic picture of the social phenomena occurring within a virtual community the ethnographer must make a commitment to spend a considerable amount of time exploring online environments of interest.

Studying the culture of an online community is accomplished through the observation and analysis of its artifacts, as well as through the journals of the ethnographer, who documents impressions, insights, and experiences while engaging in the ethnographic immersion (Hine, 2005). As mentioned previously, participant observation occurs when the ethnographer observes a culture the members of who are aware of the observation. In traditional ethnography, a sustained presence in a community almost always warrants disclosure of the existence of the researcher to the community members, but this is often not the case in the virtual world. Naturalistic observation of virtual communities is becoming increasingly popular, and is often referred to as “lurking.” Although concerns have been raised about the ethical nature of naturalistic observation (many of which will be explored later in this chapter), significant benefits have been noted as well, particularly when used in an online environment. For instance, Paccagnella (1997) notes:

It is well known how, in social sciences as well as in other fields, the phenomena being studied are modified by the very act of observing them. Even in the case of soft, qualitative techniques, as in participant observation, problems arise because of the presence of the researcher in the field.

Paccagnella discusses Internet research in particular, and strongly advocates for the use of naturalistic (unobtrusive) observation in order to avoid altering subject behavior, something he notes would be unavoidable in many situations, if online participants knew they were being observed.

Triangulation of the data is as important in virtual ethnography as it is in traditional ethnography. Triangulation of data obtained in a traditional ethnographic study is accomplished through the collection of multiple forms of data, such as observations, interviews, the taking of photographs, etc., while in virtual ethnography data is triangulated through the collection of data from a variety of CMC, from a variety of online sources (Hine, 2000, 2008), such as
textual CMC posted on various social media sites, including Facebook, Twitter, online newspapers, and public blogs, as well as other types of CMCs, such as photographs, videos, and online radio stations. Evans (2010) asserts that what ultimately matters with regard to reliability and validity of study results is that the ethnographic study is credible. To this end Evans stresses the importance of the researcher providing detailed information about the ethnographic process (a roadmap of sorts), which validates the study’s credibility.

**Ethical Considerations for Conducting Internet Research: The Consensus of the Literature**

Accompanying the development of new methodologies used in online environments is the concomitant development of ethical considerations and standards appropriate to research occurring within cyberspace. Buchannan and Ess (2008) define Internet research ethics (IRE) as a “multi- and interdisciplinary field that systematically studies the ethical implications which arise from the use of the Internet as a space or locale of, and/or tool for, research” (p. xxvi). The area of IRE is evolving rapidly, and while to date there is no universally accepted set of ethical standards guiding Internet research, there is a relatively well developed body of knowledge that can provide significant guidance to Internet researchers.

A well developed set of guidelines and recommendations that is frequently adopted by Internet researchers was developed by the Association of Internet Research (AoIR), a global working committee representing numerous disciplines engaging in various types of Internet research (Markham & Buchanan, 2012). AoIR developed the original guidelines in 2002 (Ess & AoIR Ethics Working Committee, 2002), and recently published an updated version in 2012 (see the original guidelines updated guidelines here: http://ethics.aoir.org/index.php?title=Main_Page). The AoIR working committee also provides a comprehensive definition of Internet research, noting the broad nature of Internet research, as well as the wide range of disciplines engaging in Internet research of some type. The AoIR working
committee stipulates that their recommendations are considered ethical guidelines and not an ethical code, in order to reflect the need to be flexible enough to deal with the range of complexities involved in Internet research. By not being too rigid or prescriptive, the AoIR ethical guidelines can be adopted by a wide range of disciplines (e.g., political science, business, sociology, social work and psychology, the humanities, and the natural sciences), each of which utilize a range of research designs, exploring an equally wide range of phenomena (Basset & O'Riordan, 2002).

In general, ethical considerations in Internet research are concerned with the protection of online participants where the benefits of the research are weighed against any possible risk to subjects. Questions related to the protection of online participants being studied include how, when and even whether such protection can and should be afforded, how “participants” are defined (as “human subjects,” or as authors of text and/or cultural artifacts), whether informed consent is required, concerns about privacy, and proprietary rights (Ess & AoIR Ethics Working Committee, 2002; Heilferty, 2010; Markham & Buchanan, 2012). For instance, determining whether information posted online is considered confidential, even if posted publically, and whether expectations of privacy on the part of the online participants are reasonable and/or should even be considered in ethical decision-making, have all been evaluated by numerous researchers on a study-by-study basis, as well as within collective efforts seeking the development of some general ethical guidelines for Internet researchers (Battles, 2010; Bober, 2004; Buchanan, 2004; Clegg Smith, 2004; Ess & AoIR Ethics Working Committee, 2002; Eysenbach & Till, 2001; Jacobson, 1999; Pittenger, 2003; Paccagnella, 1997; Rafaeli, Sudweeks, Konstain, & Mabry, 1998; Sveningsson, 2004; and Whiteman, 2007).

The various debates about Internet research ethics reflect the complex nature of Internet research, such as the ability of online participants to mask their real identity through the use of pseudonyms, the different types of online forums (from online social networking sites that provide users the ability to set
their preferred privacy levels, to message boards that explicitly and repeatedly remind users that there is no guarantee of privacy). Although ethical decision-making can be based on the adoption of some ethical model, some researchers emphasise the importance of making decisions contextually, based on the nature of the research, the specific methods being utilized in the study, the level of sensitivity of the topics being discussed (i.e., parents grieving the loss of a child, sexual orientation, illness, etc.), and the perceived expectations of privacy of online participants (Ess & AoIR Ethics Working Committee, 2002; Eysenbach & Till, 2001). Despite this complexity and the numerous variables at play, it is both important and useful to explore the array of ethical issues inherent in Internet research and adopt some framework for ethical decision-making in the methodology of an Internet research study. The following is a summary of the consensus of the literature focusing on IRE.

Essentially, ethical considerations are concerned with whether the object of research is a person, and the human subject model should apply, and whether online space (the “virtual field”) should be considered public, private, or a combination of both, including whether online participants’ reasonable expectations of privacy should be considered. These are not issues that are easily resolved due to the complexities involved, and the difficulty in resolving these ethical issues are demonstrated in the wide range of opinions among Internet research scholars.

Application of the Human Subject Model: Text as Object/Text as Author

Markham and Buchanan (2012) authors of the AoIR Ethical Guidelines for Internet Research, pose the question whether virtual ethnographers are working with human subjects at all, or with artifacts:

If information is collected directly from individuals, such as an email exchange, instant message, or an interview in a virtual world, we are likely to naturally define the research scenario as one that involves a person. If the connection between the object of research and the person who produced it is indistinct, there may be a tendency to define the research scenario as one that does not involve any persons.
If the researcher determines (using the guidance of ethical guidelines) that the object of research are human beings, then the CMC data collected are considered “text by author” and the human subject model will likely need to be applied, and issues related to privacy and the appropriateness of providing informed consent must be considered. If it is determined that privacy is a reasonable expectation of the online participants, and informed consent is deemed necessary, the researcher must then determine the best way to provide notice to online participants, including determining the appropriate parties to notify. If the researcher determines that the object of research is detached from personal identity, then the CMC data collected are considered text and/or cultural artifacts, and the human subject model does not apply.

Basset and O’Riordan (2002) argue against applying the “human subject model” in most cases of Internet research, stating that the Internet is a form of “cultural production” where users can produce cultural artifacts, including online books, articles, radio shows, news blogs, and visual media. Advocating for a “text as object” perspective (versus “text as author”), where the object of research is considered detached from its author, Basset and O’Riordan cite the example of independent media sites, which are often used by freelance human rights advocates and journalists to express counter-political perspectives. Basset and O’Riordan caution that treating such CMC as “text as author” (i.e., as real people), would be counter-productive and quite likely impossible, asserting that “nobody would suggest that the text of a news item published in a newspaper be conflated with its author and considered as a human subject, yet this is exactly what is happening regarding Internet text” (p. 236). In fact, they express concern about the risk of being over-protective of virtual material, which may actually undermine the expectations of online participants who are posting online because of a desire for public representation. Basset and O’Riordan caution that “overly protective research ethics risk diminishing the cultural capital of those engaging in cultural production through Internet technologies, and inadvertently contributing to their further marginalization” (p. 244).
Public or Private: The Need for Informed Consent

If the researcher determines that the object of research involves persons, and applies the human subject model, a determination must then be made as to whether the online participants should be provided with informed consent. Internet research scholars have expressed a variety of perspectives on the ethical considerations regarding how to determine when informed consent is necessary, when it is not, and when providing informed consent is not only unnecessary, but may actually be damaging to the online participants (Ess & AoIR Ethics Working Committee, 2002; Eysenbach & Till, 2001; Markham & Buchanan, 2012; Pittenger, 2003; Paccagnella, 1997).

Ethical considerations focus on how decisions about privacy on the Internet should be made. For instance, should the Internet be considered public in all circumstances? If not, how does a researcher determine when an online forum is private? And, should online participants’ expectations of privacy be a factor to be considered when making this decision, even if their expectations are unrealistic? What are the benefits and risks of providing informed consent, and what are the benefits and risks of not providing informed consent? The position taken on these issues has a significant impact on research designs, thus decisions about the public or private nature of the Internet, and under what conditions informed consent is warranted are of fundamental importance. Although it might be tempting to take an “either/or” approach – the Internet is always a public sphere/ the Internet is always a private sphere–dichotomous positions negate the heterogeneous nature of the Internet, and fail to recognize the range of forums with differing levels of perceived privacy. For instance, if the researcher takes the position that online participants’ CMC are always private and confidentiality must always be presumed in an online environment, (and informed consent always obtained), then conducting any naturalistic observation would be impossible. But if the Internet is presumed public under all circumstances (as suggested by ProjectH Research Group), and no informed consent provided, then online participants
may be harmed if a sensitive CMC is traced back to the author, which is a possibility even if CMC are anonymized (Markham & Buchanan, 2012).

Thus the issue of whether online participants have a right to privacy, and whether informed consent must be secured depends in large part on the nature and purpose of the online forum, whether the online forum is public, private or somewhere in between, whether informed consent would be possible (in light of the frequent use of pseudonyms in online environments sometimes obtaining informed consent is impossible), whether providing informed consent is in the best interests of the online participants (some online participants may not want to be contacted), and whether an expectation of privacy is even reasonable.

**Determining the Difference between Public and Private Domains**

The first step in resolving the problem of whether informed consent is required (presuming that the nature of the research deems the human subject model be applied), is to determine whether the object of research is posted in a public or private environment, a determination that must include the expectations of the online participants (as well as whether their expectation is reasonable) (Battles, 2010; Bober, 2004; Buchanan, 2004; Clegg Smith, 2004; Ess & AoIR Ethics Working Committee, 2002; Eysenbach & Till, 2001; Jacobson, 1999; Pittenger, 2003; Paccagnella, 1997; Rafaeli, Sudweeks, Konstain, & Mabry, 1998; Sveningsson, 2004; Whiteman, 2007).

The level of privacy in some online forums is relatively clear and as such Ess asserts that “the greater the acknowledged publicity of the venue, the less obligation there may be to protect individual privacy, confidentiality, right to informed consent, etc.” (Ess & AoIR, 2002, p. 5). Pittenger (2003) cites the importance of developing a set of criteria to assist in making this determination stating, “it is necessary to develop a schema that proves a general test for determining the boundary of expected privacy within the Internet and the domain in which behavioral researchers can stand as non-participatory observers of the behavior of others” (p. 49).
Another consideration relates to the level of Internet savviness of online participants who might have a range of privacy settings available to them (increasingly common in social networking sites), but not understand how to set the privacy settings at the desired level. In this situation, some online participants new to the Internet may believe they have complete privacy when in fact they do not. Yet even if an online forum can be deemed public, there are numerous issues to consider relating to the expectations of the online participant. Considerations include whether online participants expect that their posts are public, or private, whether online participants are posting for public consumption and whether they want to remain relatively anonymous, and finally, whether online participants have the technological sophistication to determine the difference between a public forum and a private one.

Whiteman (2007) cites the common problem of online participants navigating out of a private forum and into a public one without realizing it. Whiteman notes how this would not be possible in the real world, and uses the example of how in the real world one would certainly notice leaving a public shopping mall and entering into the privacy of one’s car, yet in cyberspace one can transition into different types of spaces with varying illusions of privacy by clicking on a few links.

The public/private nature of the CMC must be considered within the context of the poster’s expectations, including whether any expectation of privacy of the poster is reasonable (Sveningsson, 2004). For example, Battles (2010) points out that even in cases where messages are posted in forums that are clearly public, if the nature of the posts are of a private nature, such as dealing with a sexually transmitted disease, or being a victim of a crime, and the online environment appears private, then the expectations of privacy among posters is likely reasonable, and lurking will likely be considered intrusive.

In addition to determining the online participant’s expectations of privacy the researcher must evaluate whether these expectations are reasonable. Eysenbach and Till (2001) have developed a set of ethical
guidelines for Internet researchers and Institutional Review Boards that specifically deals with issues of privacy expectations of online participants. The guidelines suggest that Internet researchers discuss the following seven issues when making decisions about privacy and the reasonable nature of online participants’ expectations:

1. **Intrusiveness**—discuss to what degree the research conducted is intrusive (“passive” analysis of Internet postings versus active involvement in the community by participating in communications)

2. **Perceived privacy**—Discuss (preferably in consultation with members of the community) the level of perceived privacy of the community (Is it a closed group requiring registration? What is the membership size? What are the group norms?)

3. **Vulnerability**—Discuss how vulnerable the community is: for example, a mailing list for victims of sexual abuse or AIDS patients will be a highly vulnerable community

4. **Potential harm**—As a result of the above considerations, discuss whether the intrusion of the researcher or publication of results has the potential to harm individuals or the community as a whole

5. **Informed consent**—Discuss whether informed consent is required or can be waived (If it is required how will it be obtained?)

6. **Confidentiality**—How can the anonymity of participants be protected (if verbatim quotes are given originators can be identified easily using search engines, thus informed consent is always required)

7. **Intellectual property rights**—In some cases, participants may not seek anonymity, but publicity, so that use of postings without attribution may not be appropriate

Pittenger (2003) asserts that online participants should have no reasonable expectation of privacy in a public forum, suggesting that reasonable perceptions of online privacy should increase with the number of barriers provided by the forum, such as application processes, the need for
usernames and confidential passwords, all of which “creates prima facie evidence for the presumption of expected privacy” (p. 51). One way of determining the reasonable expectation of privacy is to make a direct comparison with how a similar situation would be handled in a real-life environment. Thus, an online participant who posts material in a public online forum but has the expectation of privacy could be compared to an individual who engages in private behavior in a public park (for instance). Despite this individual’s wish that his or her behavior was private, no reasonable expectation of privacy would exist due to the public nature of the environment. Pittenger (2003) describes the basis for this position, asserting that the Internet is public by design, thus people should for the most part be free to observe others’ online activities stating, “whether I kiss my wife or scold my children in public, I cannot expect others to avert their eyes to avoid seeing me do something that I might consider intimate or embarrassing for the simple reason that I have acted where it is easy for others to see what I do and hear what I say,” adding, “what I send through the Internet, no matter how intimate or embarrassing I believe the information may be, passes through a public medium. Therefore, I cannot expect that others will avert their gaze” (pp. 49 – 50).

If a virtual forum or community is deemed public Pittenger is adamant that informed consent is not required, even if the research involves naturalistic observation (i.e., lurking) since “the collective exchanges among persons in various virtual communities are public events that support no expectation of privacy. Consequently, a researcher may have access to these records and publish them, exercising moderate discretion, as he or she sees fit.” (p. 51). Yet even in cases where the domain or forum is determined to be public, and informed consent unnecessary, it is still important to protect the confidentiality of online participants, including using pseudonyms and limiting quotations from online participants since quotations are searchable and can be traced back to the original poster. Additionally, AoIR ethical guidelines require that the age of
the participants also be considered with child and youth participants warranting greater protection.

**Challenges in Obtaining Informed Consent**

Assuming that informed consent may be deemed necessary, the Internet researcher must determine whether obtaining it is even possible, and if it is, the researcher must determine who to obtain informed consent from (e.g., by the webmaster, moderator, facilitator, or online participant), and further, how the information is to be used (direct quotation, paraphrased, attributed to a specific person or pseudonym, etc.). Further, the researcher must determine whether attempting to provide informed consent may actually harm online participants.

Assuming the Internet researcher determines that the object of research exists in an environment where online participants may have a reasonable expectation of privacy, providing informed consent may not be possible, or even desirable. For instance, some online participants post in forums under a pseudonym because they believe that anonymity will enable them to be freer in expressing dissenting opinions, and they have no desire to disclose their real identity (Battles, 2010; Jacobson, 1999). These online participants may fully intend to have their posts read publically (despite logging into the virtual community with a screen name and password), but they may not wish to be contacted and asked for permission to be observed, believing this will compromise their anonymity. Further, it may not be possible to provide informed consent if a pseudonym is used since often online participants who use pseudonyms do not provide contact information (Bruckman et al., 2010; Whitman, 2007). Posting a generic notice in a virtual community notifying participants that their activity is being observed is one possible solution but Battles (2010) discourages this since such an action may violate the very privacy researchers are attempting to protect as such a posting would likely render the forums searchable through online search engines, such as Google. In other words, providing informed consent may negate all other attempts to protect online participants’ privacy and confidentiality (see Battles, 2010, p.
In regard to the present study, ethical considerations relating to whether the objects of research were text as object or text as author, whether the application of the human subject model was warranted, whether the online forums observed were public or private and whether online participants’ perceived expectations of privacy were explored using both the 2012 AoIR Ethical Decision-Making Guidelines and Eysenbach and Till’s ethical considerations (referenced above), and the determinations are explored in detail in the subsequent section on methodology.

**Methodology of the Current Study**

As outlined in Chapter 1, this study seeks to answer the following questions:

1. Do Rwandan CGD communities living in the West (principally North America and Europe) engage in homeland conflict on a political level, in a way that conforms to the typologies demonstrated in the literature, and if so how?

2. How do Rwandan CGD communities use ICTs, particularly social media, to engage in homeland conflict on a political level? How are virtual communities structured, and utilized for the purposes of political engagement, mobilization and action?

3. Are there significant differences in the types and nature of political activities between intra-diasporic virtual communities (i.e. internal to the Rwandan diaspora), and inter-diasporic virtual communities (i.e. outreach to non-Rwandans, such as Americans, or other Westerners)?

4. What do the purported and actual aims of the Rwandan CGD appear to be attempting to achieve, and what is the potential impact of diaspora political engagement on the conflict cycle in the home country?

I utilized virtual ethnography as my research method, and naturalistic observation as my data collection method. I drew data primarily from two sources: 1) CMCs of online community participants with public profiles on
social media sites that self-identified as Rwandan diaspora living in Western host countries, who were using social media to engage in political activities focusing on homeland affairs; and 2) a journal containing my reflective field notes, where I logged my impressions, observations and experiences as an ethnographic researcher. I used a purposive sampling approach to identify the initial online data sources (social media sites). I then used a snowball sampling approach adapted for an online environment in order to identify and then map additional social media sites used by Rwandan CGD by utilizing site-specific networking search functions. In this way I was able to map Rwandan CGD political virtual communities that were a part of broader transnational networks.

**Identification of Data Sources**

I developed a data collection plan that was limited to public online social media sites with CMCs intended for public consumption, so that all data mined was deemed textual and cultural artifacts, thus no informed consent was provided to participants. I adopted a conservative approach to determining whether online profiles' CMCs, forums, and virtual communities in general were public or private, utilizing the guidelines provided by Eysenbach & Till (2001), referenced earlier in this chapter. If it was determined that an online profile, forum and/or virtual community was private, or that online participants had a reasonable expectation of privacy based on moderator/webmaster posts, group policies, the nature of online participants’ CMCs, the sensitive nature of forum topics, purpose of the virtual community, size of the virtual community, and the age of the online participants, then the online social media was excluded as a data source. To this end, I took the following steps before selecting a data source:

1. Identified the existence of an online moderator’s reference to the public/private nature of the forum and/or virtual community, including

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37 “Political activities” was operationalized using Lyons’ and Mohamoud’s conceptual models.
whether messages were archived (thus available for a longer time period than online participants may have understood).

2. Evaluated whether the posters’ intentions were to make their CMCs public, through an examination of privacy settings (if possible), the nature of the SNS, and whether the user made reference to their intentions.

3. Determined the purpose of the virtual community, including whether the sharing of highly sensitive and confidential information was encouraged.

4. Determined the age of the online participants.

5. Determined the nature of the CMCs, including whether they would indicate that the textual or cultural artifacts posted were intended for public consumption (e.g., public blog, online newspaper).

All data collected were from online sources generated by members of the Rwandan CGD, and all textual and cultural artifacts were of a political nature focusing on matters relating to the online participants’ home country of Rwanda; in particular, ethnonationalist conflict in Rwanda and the surrounding regions. Online data sources included the following:

1. Facebook community pages and profiles\(^{39}\) that were clearly public with no personal identifying information (e.g., memorial pages, community groups, pseudonyms, online newspapers, etc.) used for internal and external mobilization, dissemination of information, recruitment, lobbying, debate and discussion.

2. Twitter tweets that were posted on public Facebook pages.

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\(^{38}\) A researcher’s reflective field notes are a key component of ethnography (see Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 2011), and can be adapted to virtual or online ethnography per the guidance provided by Kozinets (2010).

\(^{39}\) Facebook’s most recent Statements of Rights and Responsibilities for individual profile users, prohibits naturalistic observations of individual profiles, and requires that researchers (or observers) provide disclosure to the individual profile user if his or her profile and posts are being observed, recorded and analyzed. Although many social networking sites, such as Facebook and MySpace allow users to create profiles with varying levels of privacy, based on Facebook’s TOS, data from online participants with individual identities, evidenced by the individual posting of personal identifying information, including personal photographs, were excluded as a data source.
3. Typewritten articles posted on public online newspapers.

4. Public online blogs used for internal and external mobilization, dissemination of information, debate and discussion.

5. YouTube videos used for internal and external mobilization, dissemination of information, debate and discussion.

6. Public websites operated by self-identified political organizations within the Rwandan CGD, utilized for internal and external mobilization, dissemination of information, debate and discussion, including posted position statements, open letters to dignitaries and political identities, and press releases available for download.

7. Public websites operated by self-identified human rights and advocacy organizations located within the Rwandan CGD, used for internal and external mobilization, dissemination of information, debate and discussion.

Initial data source identification began with an Internet search utilizing Google.com using a range of keywords in order to locate self-identified members of the Rwandan CGD living in a Western host country, operating in virtual communities and virtual transnational networks. Keywords included “Rwanda,” “Rwanda conflict,” “Refugee,” “Kagame,” “Rwanda Genocide,” “Tutsi,” “Hutu,” “Rwanda diaspora,” “Rwanda Exile,” “Rwanda Youth,” “Rwanda Women,” “Rwanda opposition,” “Rwanda, Congo,” “Interahamwe,” “Rwanda human rights,” “Rwanda ethnic reconciliation,” “Rwanda genocide survivor,” “Juvenal Habyarimana” (the president of the former regime), Theoneste Bagosora (often considered the “architect” of the genocide), the “FDLR,” “RPF,” “RPA,” and “Hutu refugee.” More specific keywords included political opposition groups currently operating out of the diaspora and in the Great Lakes Region, such as the RCD (Tutsi), CNDP (Tutsi), FDU-Inkingi (Hutu), P.S. Imberakuri (Hutu), PDR-Ihumure (Hutu), as well as prominent members of these groups, such as Bosco Ntga (former leader of the CNDP), and Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza (president of FDU-Inkingi). Using
these keywords served as a starting point for the search process, and were designed to potentially “tap into” any CMCs with related tagged words. Once some potential data sources were identified, the process of searching for additional data sources became a creative and intuitive process, where one identified source opened the door to potentially new sources.

Additional SNSs were discovered through politically-oriented public profiles on Facebook that linked to other social media forums. For instance, many identified public profiles on Facebook included website links in the “About” section to other social networking sites the online identities facilitated. Further, most CMCs posted on politically-oriented public domains included links to online blogs, online newspaper articles, YouTube videos, online radio stations, and other public websites, for the purposes of the dissemination of information and propaganda. The way in which linked social media sites were discovered depended upon the functionality of the original SNS being viewed. For instance, public Facebook pages and Twitter accounts allow users to view others’ connections, and members of the same online group. Identifying online identities engaging in political dynamics and conflict in Rwanda became easier as the process evolved (e.g., profile photos depicting a former regime leader, or a photo of Rwanda’s pre-genocide flag). Group memberships, “likes,” and “shares” were also cross-referenced.

Since the largest data source was Facebook, it is important to further clarify how public profiles were distinguished from individual identities in order to remain in compliance with Facebook’s TOC, and the AoIR Ethics Working Committee’s ethical guidelines. All profiles deemed public that were selected as data sources included no personal information, but rather utilized a pseudonym, had a profile photograph that was politically related (i.e., a political figure, a flag, a cultural artifact, a famous advocate such as Nelson Mandela or Martin Luther King, Jr., etc.), and included information that clearly indicated that the profile owner(s) had an expectation (and even a desire) that the profile was intended to be public. For instance, one Facebook profile that was deemed public included the following statement in the “About” section:
“We are a Rwandan opposition party in exile, formed by young, disillusioned by anti-democratic practices [sic], ... IF YOU WANT TO HELP, JOIN U.S., [sic] YES WE CAN Educate young people around you.” The profile then included a link to the organization’s online blog located outside of Facebook. Other examples of statements on Facebook profiles indicating the expectation that the content was intended for public consumption include the following: “We must remember that one determined person can make a significant difference, and that a small group of determined people can change the course of history. Stay tuned [sic]!!” The profile then included a link to the owner(s)’ YouTube channel, and Twitter account. Another example of a Facebook profile deemed public included a statement in the “About” section pleading with all observers to disseminate the profile link widely so that they could have “open debate” about politically-related topics affecting Rwanda, and to “get the word out.” Again, each profile selected as a data source for the present study included no personal information and no information that could be connected with an individual.

An additional way of determining the public or private nature of a SNS, and its associated CMCs included the manner in which the online identity posted CMCs, including the level of boldness (if any) in their online engagement. For instance, it would be a reasonable expectation that members of the Rwandan diaspora who are ardent opponents of the current government of Rwanda would be fearful of the Rwandan government discovering their hostile and critical CMCs. Yet, a significant number of online identities not only openly posted critical comments about the current Rwandan government, but often they posted these CMCs on the Facebook walls and Twitter accounts of key members of the Rwandan government, as well as on SNSs of government agencies in their host countries.

Data Collection

Data was collected over a 10-month period from April of 2012 through May of 2013, with most CMCs collected being posted between 2009 and 2013. Data was collected through sustained immersion in a range of SNSs,
defined as monitoring the sites for between four to seven hours per day, five out of seven days per week. Data that was mined from identified data sources included CMCs posted as statuses (Facebook, Twitter, etc.), and interactive discussions in response to statuses; online newspaper articles, including related interactive comments; blogs, including related interactive comments; photographs posted on various SNSs; Facebook “Notes”; YouTube videos, and online radio stations. Data also included the nature of linkages, and networked patterns, such as posting a YouTube video or link to an online radio on a Facebook wall or website, linking Twitter with Facebook, posting an online newspaper story on Facebook, or Twitter; patterns noted with regard to posted CMCs, such as frequency of postings, duplicative postings, and number of “likes,” “shares,” and “seen” on Facebook. Due to the Rwandan diaspora’s prolific use of Facebook, the Facebook community pages included in the ethnographic survey served as the initial site of immersion in the study, with linked SNS sites such as Twitter, YouTube, Pinterest, online newspapers, blogs, and other related websites, such as organizations and charities.

The physical collection of data was accomplished in a number of ways. First, all data sources were bookmarked using Google Chrome, a freeware web browser. If a social media site was compatible with printing (i.e., all information was formatted to correctly appear on the printed page, including photographs) then the data was saved as PDF through the “print to PDF function” and saved to a laptop. Documents available for download from public websites, blogs, online newspapers and Facebook, such as press releases, lobbying letters to dignitaries and government figures, and photographs, were downloaded to a laptop. Downloaded documents were kept in their original format with original file names, and were also saved to PDF format and given a document name reflecting the data source, data type, truncated date, and any other identifying information deemed pertinent. Data contained in the “Properties” section under “File” in Microsoft Word documents were collected in order to determine the date of creation.
Since new social media provides for communication that extends far beyond the text-based CMC it was important to utilize a data collection method that permitted the capturing of the entire screen. For instance, text-based CMC on many social media sites often includes appended photographs, emoticons, various types of icons, as well as other visually-based data providing links to related data (e.g., linked groups, user “likes,” etc.). Boellstorff, et al. (2012) recommend the taking of screenshots in order to capture visual elements of an online environment constituting cultural artifacts, stating that screenshots:

...can help illustrate an observation or show the appearance of the virtual world we are studying. They can jog our memories, reminding us about a significant event or issue. A screenshot, for instance, can provide an instant summary of who was present at an event or help us recall patterns of movement and visual details. We can also use screenshot analysis to provide a visual explanation of cultural phenomena (p. 115-116).

Screenshots were particularly useful in the present study since “print to PDF” often captured only a single live segment of the screen, and omitted other segments that were relevant to the data. Further, since CMC can be deleted, a screenshot provides holistic information about each data source that may only be available for a short time (such as the website address). Each screenshot was saved in two formats, in the original .jpg format with the auto file name signifying the date and time of the shot, and as a PDF document with a given file name reflecting the data source, data type, truncated date, and any other identifying information deemed pertinent. Saving all .jpg documents in PDF format also allowed for the redacting of CMC posted by online participants with individual profiles.

All data was retained on an Apple MacBook Pro that was password protected, as well as an Apple iPad for the purposes of data management. The data on the Apple iPad was managed using an App called Photo Manager Pro by Linkus, which allowed for the initial organization of data into thematic

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40 A ‘screenshot’ is a system photograph taken of the laptop desktop, by pressing CMD, Shift and 3 keys
folders titled during the data analysis stage. Data was backed up to an Apple Time Machine hard drive over a wireless connection that was password protected and encrypted. Data was additionally backed up to Digital Dropbox, a private, password protected web-based document storage site, which allowed for mobile access.

**Translation of Data**

The majority of the CMC were written in a combination of English, French and Kinyarwanda (the native language of Rwanda). English is my native language, and I have a working knowledge of French, but used Google online translator as a back up, in order to confirm an accurate translation. Translating the CMC written in Kinyarwanda was more complicated due to the challenge inherent in finding a certified translator who could translate the text accurately, without risk of bias. Because of Rwanda’s history of ethnonationalist conflict between Tutsis and Hutu, it was assumed that there was some potential that a Rwandan translator would translate content through a biased lens, influenced by historical narratives. In order to minimize this risk, I contracted two certified translators for the purposes of cross-verification. Although both translators disclosed that they were Tutsi, increasing the potential for some bias, they also disclosed that they were raised in the diaspora thus were not in the country during the genocide. The issue of language translation will be explored in a subsequent chapter, in the section on possible limitations of the study, but it is important to note that from a methodological perspective significant attempts were made to limit the possibility of bias (conscious and unconscious) in the translation process.

**Data Analysis**

There is no one officially sanctioned way of analyzing data collected in an ethnographic study, including virtual ethnography, and in fact, data analysis methods used in ethnography have often been shrouded in mystery (Boellstorff, et al., 2012). Boellstorff, et al. (2012), assert that data analysis in
virtual ethnography is “profoundly exploratory and deeply identified with
discovery... a rigorous intellectual process of working deeply and intimately
with ideas” (p. 159). Although there are computer software programs
designed to aid in the analysis of qualitative data, Boellstroff, et al, strongly
discourage their use asserting that “it is erroneous to assume that a piece of
technology (which, incidentally, is made by people) can do the interpretive
work of a thoughtful human mind” (p. 166). Thus, in the present study I did not
rely upon a computer software program for qualitative analysis, but rather,
followed the guidance of Boellstroff, et al. (2012) in analyzing ethnographic
data using a thematic analysis approach adapted for an online environment to
analyze both the field notes, as well as the data collected from time immersed
in the “field.”

Thematic analysis has historically been considered a tool to encode
qualitative data in a systematic and disciplined way, particularly when the data
is rich and complex (Boyatzis, 1998). Yet thematic analysis can also be used
in a manner that is flexible and adaptable. According to Braun & Clarke (2006)
thematic analysis is a very effective method for qualitative research because it
has the potential to provide “a rich and detailed, yet complex account of data”
(p. 78). Thematic analysis is a particularly effective method for analyzing data
mined from a virtual field since it allows the researcher the flexibility to deeply
reflect upon the data in a systematic manner without being too rigid. This is
important, particularly in light of Boellstroff, et al.’s assertion that data analysis
in ethnographic research, particularly virtual ethnography, is “deeply personal,
almost idiosyncratic,” involving “stretching cognitive and perceptual horizons to
encounter, absorb, and react to relevant literatures and conversations” (p. 160).
Thematic analysis of online data mined from a virtual field must be
approached creatively and with flexibility in a way that supports the researcher
in “finding, creating, and bringing thoughtful, provocative, productive ideas to
acts of writing” (p. 159). Additionally, the data analysis scheme is developed
after data collection, not before as with other qualitative research approaches.
Boellstroff et al, note that waiting until after the data is mined to develop the
data analysis plan allows the researcher to be more responsive to the unexpected, stating “it is up to us to develop sound, persuasive arguments about what we find interesting, and to convince others that these arguments illuminate our data and speak to crucial concerns and debates” (p. 160). Approaching data analysis in this more flexible and reflective manner is particularly important since ethnographic data is “culturally situated” thus the researcher must be able to “modify methods and research questions to respond to what we find in the field” (p. 160).

Thematic analysis defined broadly is a data analysis technique that is used in many qualitative approaches to identify themes or schemas through the methodical, thoughtful and repeated reading of the qualitative data (Attride–Stirling, 2001). Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006) describe thematic analysis as “a form of pattern recognition within the data, where emerging themes become the categories for analysis” (p. 4). Boyatzis (1998) describes thematic analysis as:

A way of seeing, a way of making sense out of seemingly unrelated material, a way of analyzing qualitative information, a way of systematically observing a person, an interaction, a group, a situation, an organization, or a culture, a way of converting qualitative information into qualitative data (p. 5).

Themes are described as patterns observed in complex information that assist the researcher in organizing, then interpreting various phenomena within the data. In thematic analysis, thematic categories are not predetermined by the researcher, but are allowed to “emerge” as the researcher explores the data. Thus, in thematic analysis the researcher can include newly recognized themes throughout the analysis process, rather than adhering to the predetermined coded list of themes/patterns. In fact, a key aspect of thematic analysis involves the development of a set of skills within the researcher, that allows him or her to recognize patterns and themes within a data set through the “careful reading and re-reading of the data” throughout the analysis process (Rice & Ezzy, 1999, p. 258).
Thematic analysis generally occurs in two levels – the initial coding of the data, and then “thematicizing” the coded data. The process of encoding involves the classification and analysis of themes seen in the data, with the ultimate goal of developing a “code book” that is then used as a guide in the on-going process of interpretation and analysis of the thematic patterns seen in the data (Boyatzis, 1998). Upon reviewing and re-reviewing the data collected in the present study, as well as considerable reflection of both the data and the relevant literature, numerous patterns emerged that allowed for the coding of data. Once the data was coded, it was organized thematically. I created numerous documents that assisted me in thematically organizing the data in a way that demonstrated a variety of patterns and themes. For instance, I used Microsoft Excel to assist with the mapping of online identities, noting screen names, additional social media accounts that are cross-referenced with the identity, associated charities, etc. Additional tools related to coding and thematic analysis will be explored in the subsequent chapter focusing on the results of the data analysis.
CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The Nature of Rwandan Diaspora Political Engagement and their Motivations, Patterns and Outcomes

The data being analyzed in this study, as referenced in Chapter 5, was drawn from several sources and consistent with methods used in ethnography including “hard data” as well as the general impressions and experiences of the researcher as noted in an ethnographic journal. Hard data consisted of 946 screen shots of CMCs on SNSs (drawn from the original collection of 2031 screen shots), as well as 37 photographs, and 22 PDF documents (e.g., political party statements, media releases, open letters to political figures.) mined while engaging in the ethnographic immersion of the Rwandan CGD virtual transnational networks. Yet, consistent with Hine’s principles of virtual ethnography, rather than being immersed in specific field sites, data was drawn by following the field connections of approximately 121 deeply nested and densely intertwined online identities. Also consistent with virtual ethnography methodologies, the results also include the author’s impressions, insights and experiences gleaned while engaging in the extended intermittent ethnographic immersion, recorded in an ethnographic journal. In addition, numerous documents were collected for the purposes of triangulation, including ICTR transcripts and exhibits, and other historical documents (e.g., Karunga newspaper articles, mainstream media articles about the Rwandan genocide, UN documents about the ethnonationalist conflict in Rwanda).

In order to comply with the ethical framework and guidelines adopted in this study, a conservative approach was taken in what was determined to be within the public domain. As such, the data in its entirety is not included in the appendices, as revealing this information could potentially lead to the

41 Several screen shots were not included in the analysis, either because they were not political in nature, or included CMCs posted by real identities.
42 The term 'online identity' is used throughout this chapter to identify SNS users, facilitators and/or "admins," thus the use of this term does not reflect a personal identity or individual. For instance, one online identity may represent an individual using a pseudonym, a political opposition or a virtual community operating within the broader network.
inadvertent disclosure of data not included in the study. For instance, many screen shots included the entire URL of the SNSs, CMCs posted by online identities that may not be using pseudonyms, and non-political CMCs. Thus revealing the data in its entirety opens up the possibility of violating a SNSs' TOS, and the ethical guidelines adopted in this study. A balance was struck by including examples of what the data revealed in text format, as well as “snippets” of CMCs in the appendices that accurately reflect the nature of the data collected and analyzed. The entire data set remains intact, in electronic format on a password protected hard drive and online cloud service as specified in Chapter 5.

An analysis of the hard data, in combination with the information gleaned through the ethnographic immersion (consistent with the tradition of ethnography) demonstrated that the online identities included in this study used SNSs in a variety of ways for purposes related to their political engagement in homeland affairs and homeland conflict, including fund-raising; lobbying the host country (and international community); dissemination of anti-Tutsi propaganda (against the Rwandan government and President Kagame, primarily); and mobilizing other diaspora to engage in politically-related activities, such as participating in anti-Kagame demonstrations, letter-writing, and signing petitions. The first part of this chapter explores the nature of the virtual transnational networks within which the online identities operated (the “who,” the “what,” the “why,” and the “how”), whereas the second part of this chapter presents an analysis of the themes and sub-themes that emerged in the process of subjecting the data to an ethnographic thematic analysis.

**Identification of Diaspora Status and Ethnic Membership: The “Who”**

Virtually all Rwandan diaspora included in the study who actively used social media to engage politically in homeland affairs and homeland conflict, and who were represented by one or more online identities, self-identified as Hutu. Further, the online identities included in the study engaged in online activities of a political nature using public pages and profiles on Facebook, public online blogs, public websites, online newspapers, and public Twitter
accounts. And although no personal identifying information was included on any SNS or computer-mediated communication (CMC) used in this study, the nature of the posts, as well as the descriptions of the identities in the “bio” and “About” sections indicated that those posting CMCs of a political nature, were likely male. For instance, despite using pseudonyms, online dialogues consistently referred to each other using male personal pronouns and terms such as “brother.” With regard to age, among those online identities that appeared to represent a single identity (i.e., authors of online newspapers) and who made reference to their age in some respect, it appeared as though most online identities included in the study represented both those who were adults during the genocide (determined by the sharing of personal experiences that signified an age range, such as “I was in college during the genocide…”), as well as those who were children during the genocide (i.e., “I was seven years old when we fled to the Congo, and my father was arrested for genocide crimes…”).

A search for Tutsi diaspora groups using social media for political purposes was largely unsuccessful. Four public Facebook pages were located that appeared to have primarily Tutsi members, although these SNSs were not used for political purposes, but rather for social purposes. For instance, two SNSs appeared to focus on the facilitation of social gatherings within the diaspora, and two SNSs were dedicated to genocide survivor causes. The former two groups were generally active, but the CMCs were clearly social in nature, and while the latter two groups contained some CMCs that could be considered somewhat political, the SNSs were generally inactive, with the most recent CMC being posted in 2009.

The majority of online identities self-identified as Hutu in a very direct manner, demonstrated by CMCs 1) declaring membership in the Hutu ethnic group, 2) advocating for a Hutu cause such as Parmehutu ideology, and/or 3) describing ethnic affiliation in the “About” section of an SNS that self-identified as Hutu (e.g., “I am Hutu…” “We are proud to be Hutu…” “We are a Hutu youth fighting for our country…”). Essentially, online identities included in the
study primarily fell within the following six categories: 1) Memorial pages and Facebook profiles dedicated to members of the former Hutu regime, 2) open groups and memorial pages dedicated to Hutus killed in post-genocide violence (particularly in the DRC), 3) Hutu rebel groups self-identified as political opposition parties based in the diaspora, 4) Diaspora-based human rights groups fighting for social justice and democracy in Rwanda, 5) Diaspora online identities dedicated to Hutu Power, and 6) Diaspora-based online media, most commonly in the form of online newspapers and online radio stations. It is important to note though that there was some overlap in these categories, particularly with the final category, the diaspora-facilitated online newspapers.

The first category of online identities included those dedicated to members of the former Rwandan regime, including Hutus who were known for their adherence to Hutu Power (Parmehutu) ideology, as well as for those who engaged actively in the genocide against the Tutsi. Some of these SNSs were established and facilitated as if the former regime members were the actual profile owners, and others were established as memorial pages. Examples of the former include eleven Facebook profiles that were named after the former president, Juvenal Habyarimana, ten of which were created as if Habyarimana himself was facilitating the page and writing the CMCs, with the remaining page having been established as a true memorial page. Most of these SNSs were simply called “Juvenal Habyarimana” or “Habyarimana Juvenal,” and included the former president’s actual hometown, and educational and work experiences (i.e., “Presidence-Rwanda”). Many of the CMCs were written as if authored by Habyarimana himself, and included what appeared to be primarily propaganda, focusing almost exclusively on the current Rwandan government, with a particular focus on the Tutsi president, Paul Kagame (i.e., “Kagame is a real killer for sure I do not know why God created him and yet he is a murderer...”). CMCs posted on these SNSs also included dedications to Habyarimana, as well as posts reflecting a nostalgic longing for the past. Several of the SNSs also included online photo albums containing cultural
artifacts pertaining to the former president. For example, a photo album contained on one of the memorial pages contained six photographs of Habyarimana when he was president of Rwanda, and had the following title and description: “PRESIDENT OF RWANDA FROM 1973-1994…This is the album to help the children of Rwanda know and understand the history of Rwanda.”

Another Facebook page was named after Theoneste Bagosora, the architect of the genocide against the Tutsi, who was convicted by the ICTR for genocide crimes, and is currently serving a life sentence in Arusha, Tanzania. This page was also operated as if Bagosora was the owner and facilitator. The Theoneste Bagosora open Facebook community page had 230 “friends,” many of which were online identities included in the study. Although the facilitator(s) of the Theoneste Bagosora page rarely posted CMCs, the page appeared to be used for three primary purposes: 1) the dissemination of propaganda, 2) the memorializing of Bagosora, and 3) expressing sentimental nostalgia (e.g., wishing Bagosora a happy birthday, expressions of missing Bagosora, referring to him as a hero, etc.).

The second category of online identities included memorial pages dedicated to survivors of post-genocide violence, including those killed in Hutu refugee camps in Rwanda and the DRC (formerly Zaire). Two such online identities were “TingiTingi Survivors” and “Tingi Tingi Congo” both named after the Tingi Tingi refugee camp in Kinsasha, DRC. Additionally, some SNSs were dedicated to those killed at the Kibeho refugee camps in southwest Rwanda (explored in Chapter 4). These SNSs included both textual artifacts as well as cultural artifacts in the form of CMC containing analysis, dedications and commentary, and photographs of victims (respectively).

The third category of online identities appeared to be created and facilitated by Hutu political opposition/rebel groups operating out of the diaspora (many of which were referenced in Chapter 4). Online identities within this category facilitated a range of SNSs, such as public Facebook pages, public websites, online blogs, and online media (newspapers and radio
stations), most of which were facilitated in a simultaneous fashion. For instance, many of the major Hutu political opposition group formed in the diaspora that utilized SNSs for political purposes also facilitated a YouTube channel and an Internet Radio station, both of which were disseminated on almost a daily basis via Facebook and Twitter. Additionally, most of the online identities operating within in this category were overt in identifying their organizational affiliation, but were at times were covert in identifying the ways in which their various SNSs were linked. The majority of major political opposition groups created in the diaspora (as explored in Chapter 4) appeared to facilitate numerous SNSs. For instance, two online identities were named after Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza, president of the political opposition group, FDU-Inkingi, who is currently imprisoned in Rwanda. Online identities named on behalf of Victoire and her political party included five public Facebook pages and Twitter accounts entitled “Free-Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza,” FDU-Inkingi, including “FDU Musanze Rwanda,” “FDU-Inkingi-Musanze-Rwanda,” and “FDU-Inkingi FDU-Inkingi.” These SNSs were coordinated with the party’s public website and blog. Several other Hutu-dominated opposition groups also facilitated a rage of SNSs, including public Facebook pages, public websites, online newspapers, and/or public Twitter accounts, each of which was represented by pseudonyms. These political opposition groups, and corresponding SNSs include PDR-Ihumure (“Pdr Ihumure”), PDP-Imanzi (“Pdp-imanzi Parti de Mushayidi”), and PS Imberakuri (“Imberakuri PS PS”).

Additional Hutu political opposition groups formed in the diaspora facilitated SNSs as well. For instance, a newer political group called Movement for the Liberation of Rwanda (“MLR Rwanda”) self-identified as a movement formed by disillusioned Rwandan youth in the diaspora, announcing on its primary SNS: “We are a Rwandan opposition political party formed by young, disappointed [sic] by anti-democratic practices,….” The “About” statement on a related blog was similar, but written in French, stating: “We are a political opposition party formed by young Rwandans in exile, disillusioned by anti-democratic practices, which, since independence,
continued to be applied by power-hungry leaders (posted in French as, “Nous sommes un partipolitique d’opposition Rwandaise en exil, formé par des jeunes, déçus par des pratiques anti-démocratiques, qui, depuis l’indépendance, ont continué à être appliqués par des chefs assoiffés du pouvoir”). Often the only personal identifying information included on these SNSs pertained to party leaders, while those engaging in the postings (on behalf of the leaders) were identified with pseudonyms and profile photos reflecting a range of cultural symbols pertaining to human rights and/or Rwanda.

The fourth category of online identities included organizations that appeared or purported to exist for the purposes of advocating for human rights and democracy in Rwanda, often in opposition to the current Tutsi-dominated government. The nature and goals of these online identities was demonstrated in a variety of ways, including in the SNSs’ “About” or “Bio” sections (which often included goals of the organization), the nature of the CMCs, as well as the names of the online identity profiles and pages. For example, most of the online identities identifying their goals as advocating for human rights and democracy in Rwanda had names with words such as freedom, justice, reconciliation, patriotic, democracy and human rights (e.g., “Freedom for Rwanda Now,” “Justice Rwanda Reconciliation,” “Fight Democracy Rwanda”43). This category also included several online identities with Kagame’s name included, reflecting disdain for him in some respect. For instance, Kagame’s name was often combined with English, French and/or Kinyarwanda words such as “anti,” “hate,” “dictator,” “genocidaire,” and “evil.” Although these online identities had names that appeared to be intentionally offensive to the Rwandan government, they included descriptive information in their “About” and “Bio” sections that in some respect related to fighting for human rights, democracy, peace and reconciliation in Rwanda. For instance, one online identity included the following statement in its “About” section: “We

43 These are is not actual online identities name, but serves as an example of how the names of the online identities were structured.
hate Kagame and his dictatorship. We are looking for people (men and women) who’re ready to bring a non violent fight against him.” Yet in a subsequent section pertaining to the organization’s goals, the following statement was included: “[...] association aims to promote socio-cultural exchanges on the Great Lakes region and conduct projects for peace, justice, coexistence and development in this region.” Many of the online identities in this section also included profile photos and logos reflecting a commitment to peace and social justice. For instance, many online identities included the same logo with a picture of a balance weight scale representing justice, and the acronym ERFR, which standards for “Equal Rights for Rwandans.” Despite the focus on human rights, virtually all CMCs posted on these SNSs were highly political in nature, and included content that was often quite aggressive and conflictual in nature.

The fifth category of online identities included in the study focused on themes related to Hutu Power consistent with Parmehutu ideology. Many online identities within this category facilitated SNSs with the word “Hutu” in their pseudonyms along with terms reflecting pride and/or power, or names that demonstrated their cause in some respect. For instance, one online identity facilitated an SNS entitled “I am Proud to be a Hutu [...]” using a combination of English, French and Kinyarwanda. In the “About” section the facilitators included the following statement (in part) also in a combination of English, French and Kinyarwanda:

This group is to restore the dignity of all Hutus’ dignity damaged by the regime of the dictator and war criminal Bwana Paul Kagome. Whose regime has shed Hutu blood as a glass of water without any attention to the suffering of the children of Rwanda. [...] Say I am proud to be a Hutu by joining this group and inviting other Hutus we all know who are proud to be a Hutu.... go and read the story of RUKARA RWA BISHINGWE... 44

44 A famous Hutu chief during pre-Colonial Rwanda known for his rebellion against the Tutsi king and his murder of a missionary sent to manage rebellious Hutu chiefs in the northern part of the country, and rumored murders of German soldiers sent to arrest him. Rukara rwa Bishingwe became a national hero among Hutus representing collective rebellion against Tutsi domination.
Additionally, several online identities within this category used the term “the Fifth Column,” a term that refers to those within a country that sympathizes with invading rebels, or enemy invaders.

SNSs that focused on Hutu Power often included what appeared to be relatively recent photographs and videos of FDLR soldiers with machine guns and traditional weapons used during the genocide, as well as photographs and videos allegedly of Rwandan soldiers in the Congo (Tutsis) who were captured, and some of whom appeared dead. CMCs on these SNSs included prayers for their “brothers and sisters” in the FLDR, and one “Hutu Power” SNS was used to post recent YouTube “documentaries” of FDLR soldiers, featuring their daily rituals (including their evening prayers). Additionally, several of these online identities listed Parmehutu under political views. Many of these SNSs were used to disseminate positive propaganda about Hutu Power, and the FDLR in particular, as well as anti-Tutsi propaganda.

The sixth category of online identities included online media, including online newspapers, online videos, and Internet radio stations. Although many online identities falling within each category listed above also facilitated online media, many of the online media SNSs emerged as a distinct category, in that some appeared to be facilitated by self-identified journalists in exile from Rwanda. The online newspapers included Jambo News, ReDacteur en Chef, Inyenyerinews, Jambo Asbl, and Rwanda Infozone. The majority of the online newspapers had affiliated and integrated Facebook, Twitter and YouTube accounts. These SNSs appeared to serve as a mirror to the online newspapers and radio stations. For instance, Jambo News, an online newspaper facilitated by diaspora members in Brussels, was facilitated as both a dedicated public webpage as well as a public Facebook page (“Redacteur en Chef – Jambo News”), with the Facebook page being used to disseminate linked new stories generated from its primary website. The self-identified purpose of this online newspaper states that it exists to “…inform our readers on current issues affecting the Great Lakes of Africa in general and in
Rwanda,” a statement included on both its public website, as well as on its public Facebook page. Additional online newspapers included “Inyenyerinews Inyenyeri,” and “The Rwandan,” each of which used Facebook in the same manner, as a mirror of their corresponding public websites, for the purposes of further dissemination. Three online radio stations were also facilitated by diaspora online identities included in the study, using Blogtalkradio.com. Each online radio was also linked to a corresponding Facebook page and Twitter account. Numerous YouTube channels were identified that were facilitated by online identities identifying themselves as documentary filmmakers and journalists. These channels were also linked to public Facebook pages and Twitter accounts, operated by the same online identities. Additionally, the online media included in this category purported to cover a wide range of topics, although the majority of the published stories focused solely on politics and conflict in Rwanda and the DRC, with virtually all stories reflecting negative criticism of the current Rwandan government.

**Virtual Transnational Networks and Networking: The “How”**

The online identities included in the study were operating in large virtual transnational networks that appeared to be based on a sense of collective identity, shared ethnic affiliation, a shared history of trauma, as well as what is often referred to as the “exile condition”—the experience of being forced from one’s homeland and living as an outsider in a new land. Online identities operating within the virtual network also were drawn together through a relatively clear set of collective goals, which were demonstrated in the nature of the SNSs within which they operated, and by the CMCs they posted. Further, the online identities were located within the Rwandan diaspora, primarily in North America and Western Europe.

The locations of the online identities were determined in a variety of ways, including the biographical information contained on the online identity’s SNS, as well as by the “GeoStamp”\(^\text{45}\) contained adjacent to CMCs, a feature

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\(^{45}\) Also called a “Geotag”
included with several SNSs, including Facebook and Twitter. The majority of SNSs contained information that explicitly identified the location of the posters, including making clear that the facilitators were members of the Rwandan diaspora. In some instances though, there appeared to be an attempt to indicate that the SNS facilitators were residing in Kigali, Rwanda, while the CMCs demonstrated a location stamp within the diaspora. For instance, one SNS consisted of an open Facebook page facilitated by Rwandans, with a pseudonym with the word “freedom,” and a profile photo of Malcolm X (a famous U.S. black activist). The “current city” was listed as Kigali, Rwanda, yet the GeoStamp on all CMCs showed that the “geolocation” was Brussels, Belgium. In instances where the biographical information conflicted with the CMC location stamp, the location was determined based on the location stamp.

As previously stated, CMCs were posted primarily from Western regions, such as North America (United States and Canada), and Western Europe (primarily the UK, France and the Netherlands). The CMCs from the United States originated from throughout the country, but tended to be concentrated in immigrant gateway communities, such as Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, and Texas (known to have high concentrations of Rwandan diaspora), as well as large urban centers, such as Washington, D.C. and Chicago, Illinois. The majority of CMCs from Europe originated in Brussels and the UK. Additionally, a smaller proportion of posts originated from Uganda, South Africa and Zambia. Further, while a content analysis was not conducted in this study, it appears as though many of the original CMCs posted by the Rwandan diaspora online identities were from a smaller group of “power posters” and “power tweeters,” with the majority of networked online identities (also from the Rwandan diaspora) reposting and re-tweeting the original CMCs.

**How Networks Developed and Grew**

Online identities included in the study networked (i.e., connected) in several ways, with the primary motivation for becoming networked appearing
to be based on the perception of mutual interest and mutual causes (i.e., like-mindedness). Since the primary purpose of SNSs is to encourage the development of increasingly broad networks of online identities, there are numerous ways that like-minded people can find each other online, including CMCs appearing on feeds and walls of unrelated online identities, unrelated online identities posting CMCs in an open group, or community page focused on a particular cause or collective goal, and online identities requesting to be added to unrelated online users’ networks on the basis of mutual connections and mutual causes. For instance, it was common to note the simultaneous adding of the same online identities among many of the identities included in the study (e.g., online Identities A, B and C would be added to numerous networks on the same day). Additionally, many of the open groups on Facebook had thousands of members, thus the potential for networks to grow quickly and significantly (among like-minded people) was substantial.

**How Online Identities SNSs were Linked**

The majority of online identities had several SNSs, including Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube channels, public blogs, online radios, online newspapers and public websites. Online identities that facilitated more than one SNS often linked them together in a variety of ways. For instance, linked SNSs may be included on each SNS bio section (e.g., the inclusion of an associated website and/or Twitter account in the “About” section), as well as by utilizing the SNSs’ integrative functionality that permits the linking of multiple SNSs facilitated by the same online identity. Thus, many online identities linked their Facebook accounts to their Twitter accounts so that all CMCs on Twitter simultaneously appeared as status posts on Facebook (see Appendix F for an example).

**How Networking Occurred between Online Identities**

Networking occurred within the virtual transnational networks in ways that appeared designed to disseminate information within the network and beyond, to the maximum capacity (a dynamic often called “going viral”). With
regard to what online identities most frequently posted or tweeted (the nature of CMC contents will be explored in more detail in subsequent sections), the majority of CMCs included photographs and links to online content on another SNSs, such as photographs posted on other sites, news stories from mainstream media outlets, and content from diaspora online newspapers, public blogs, and online media, such as radio stations.

A common way of disseminating online content throughout the network involved the utilization of the “share” option integrated into most online mediums, which permits the instantaneous posting of the online material onto one’s own SNSs (see Appendix G for examples). Online identities included in the study also engaged in networking through the reposting of a connection’s CMCs onto one’s own SNS. For instance, Facebook has a function that allows online identities to click a “share” icon adjacent to a networked friend’s wall, which then allows the user to share the friend’s CMC on their own wall (now called a timeline), the walls/timelines of selected online identities within the network, or the wall/timelines of a group and/or community page in which they are a member. Similarly, Twitter permits users to re-tweet the tweets of those they are following or tweets posted on public Twitter accounts to their own twitter feeds. Another method observed for disseminating CMCs, including cultural artifacts, was the practice of “tagging” a post or photo with several networked “friends” names so that the CMC appeared on all of their Facebook walls, and/or Twitter feeds. This practice was most frequently utilized as a form of dissemination when an online identity wanted to share a photograph, cartoon, or online news article with a wide range of people. For instance, a photograph of the pre-genocide Rwandan flag, or a doctored photograph of President Paul Kagame was posted with approximately 30 networked friends’ names tagged. Tagging a photo with an online identity’s name results in the photograph being permanently placed in the tagged identity’s photo album (unless the online identity refused the tag).
Another interesting trend revealed in the analysis of the data is what appeared to be a newer, and increasingly utilized practice (for networking purposes) of posting the same CMC numerous times on the same SNS. For instance, many online identities in the study posted or tweeted the same CMC three times in a row, often within a few minute timeframe. A newer function on many SNSs permits observers to see how many times a post is seen and how many times it has been shared, and it appeared as though the repeated posting of the same CMC may significantly increase the likelihood of greater dissemination, with more identities viewing the material, as well as reposting the CMC on their own SNSs. It was not uncommon to view the same news story (favorable to an online identity’s particular cause) posted repeatedly on linked SNSs over a prolonged period of time, which due to the extended immersion in the Rwandan diaspora online networks revealed the way in which content often “went viral” on a global basis.

For instance, if an online identity included in the study had thousands of online connections in overlapping networks of linkages (i.e., mutual friends on Facebook, or members of the same open group, following each other on Twitter, and/or connected on LinkedIn), then one CMC posted on a Facebook wall and tweeted on Twitter could potentially appear on thousands of networked SNS sites. Yet since not all CMCs appear on all networked sites consistently (i.e., only a small percentage of networked friends’ CMCs will appear at any given time on one’s SNS, depending on the frequency of a user checking the SNS, and other variables such as individual settings), repeatedly posting a CMC would increase the likelihood of everyone in the network seeing the CMC at some point, and having the opportunity to acknowledge it in some manner through the utilization of the like and share function, as well as through commenting on the CMC. The ethnographic immersion revealed that on many occasions a CMC would be viewed by hundreds of people each

46 Tagging involves linking an online identity to a photo for the purposes of identifying the individual as being in the photo, but it is often used as a way of posting a photo or other post onto the walls of one or more online identities.
time it was posted, with a majority of online identities sharing, reposting/retweeting the CMC, and commenting on the content on a global basis.

This same type of reposting/retweeting occurred in what appeared to be an attempt to keep discussions going. For instance, on numerous occasions the online identities included in the study would post a news story (for example) with a question or statement asking for comment and discussion. When the conversation went dormant (no responsive CMCs for a few weeks), frequently the original poster would repost the same news story in a new CMC (status post or tweet) in what appeared to be an attempt to re-engage networked connections in the previous discussion, or perhaps to initiate a new discussion/debate with other networked connections. Similarly, if an event occurred in the offline world that rendered the old story once again relevant, online identities often reposted old news stories with different questions or comments, encouraging comment and discussion. Rarely would the online identity make reference to the story having been previously posted, but would often repost the story as an original CMC with a comment making it appear as though the news story was recent. A retrospective review of SNSs walls, twitter feeds and public websites revealed that the “regurgitation” of an older news story would often be posted and re-posted for years.47

Frequently, the linked content shared within the network appeared to be from online sources that were not authored by or connected to the online identity facilitating the posting, yet at times the relationship between the poster and the material being posted was difficult to determine, or appeared to be purposely masked. For instance, frequently the online material being linked to a CMC originated from an online media outlet, such as BBC or Reuters, thus it was obvious that the source of the linked content was unrelated to the online identity doing the posting, and the information was being posted because it was of interest to the online identity and the broader network (i.e., news of what was occurring in the homeland and/or region). On other occasions an
online identity would make the relationship with the source of the linked content explicit, as was the case with one Facebook online identity that posted an article from its related online blog (which was included in the contact information section on its “About” page). The article was posted on its Facebook timeline with an introduction that began: “In this article we take a look at...,” thus making it clear to others within their network, and outside observers that the online identity facilitated both SNSs.

In some instances though the connection between the online identity doing the posting, and the source of the content being posted was not only unclear, but appeared to be purposely masked. This dynamic became apparent when during the immersion it was noted that an online identity would post a CMC with linked content along with a statement making it appear as though the two SNS were unrelated (e.g., “This blog has several great posts that will help our cause, please share!”), when in fact it was determined that the online identity was the author of both the CMC disseminating the article, and the article itself. Finally, there was such a high level of linkages and integration between SNSs that it was at times difficult to draw distinctions between one SNS and another. For instance, many online news articles included content and links to Facebook content, and many Twitter feeds and Facebook pages were integrated in such a manner that the origin of the CMCs were at times difficult to determine. This level of integration was noteworthy for two reasons, first, it demonstrated the online identities’ intention to render their CMCs public; and second, it illustrated the sophisticated nature of the online identities’ utilization of SNSs (and online technology in general) demonstrated in their ability to utilize the networking capabilities of various SNSs to their maximum capacity.

47 It is important to note that with many SNSs it is possible to scroll back in time, which allows observers to note historic patterns. This ability was noted in Chapter 5, within the section entitled “Virtual Field Site: Altered Space and Time.”
An Ethnographic Analysis of CMC Content: The “What” and “Why”

An ethnographic analysis of the data collected from the Rwandan diaspora online CMCs and activities revealed several themes with regard to the nature of the content of CMCs, as well as with regard to the nature of the diaspora’s online activities using SNSs within their virtual transnational networks. Overall, virtually all of the CMC content and SNS activities were overwhelmingly political in nature, although most political activities were often not framed as such (this dynamic will be explored in more detail in Chapter 7). The primary themes that emerged in the data were related to imagined homeland; relationship to homeland; ethnic identity; religion; genocide denial and historical revisionism; and anti-Kagame propaganda. Another very strong over-arching theme that emerged in the data was anti-Tutsi rhetoric, but since virtually all CMCs analyzed in the present study involved some level of anti-Tutsi sentiments, ranging from the subtle (scapegoating Tutsis for the plight of Hutus), to the profound (anti-Tutsi extremist rhetoric seemingly rooted to the pre-genocide propaganda campaign), it was deemed impossible to consider “anti-Tutsi propaganda” as a distinct theme.

Despite clear themes emerging from the data, It is important to note that virtually all CMCs evaluated in this study depicted numerous overlapping themes, such as anti-Kagame sentiments expressed while denying or trivializing the Tutsi genocide, or a CMC that demonstrated a strong religious overtone while expressing themes related to a perceived identity as a Hutu. An example of this dynamic is a blog that was frequently linked to a number of Rwandan diaspora SNSs. The blog’s name and “about” statement demonstrated strong themes of promoting democracy and human rights in Central and Eastern Africa, but the flash banners on the cover page of the website indicated themes consistent with imagined homeland and identity, particularly with regard to ethnic membership in the Hutu ethnic group. The blog is a public website with a name that includes the words “Democracy Watch” and its “about” description clearly emphasized its purported commitment to democracy, human rights and justice, stating:
Welcome to “[...] Democracy Watch Blog.” Our objective is to promote the institutions of democracy, social justice, Human Rights, Peace, Freedom of Expression, and Respect to humanity in Rwanda, Uganda, DR Congo, Burundi, Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. We strongly believe that Africa will develop if only our presidents stop being rulers of men and become leaders of citizens. We support Breaking the Silence Campaign for DR Congo since we believe the democracy in Rwanda means peace in DRC.

Despite the pretense of focusing broadly on a wide range of countries in Central and East Africa, as well as a wide range of topics, virtually every post focused on Rwanda and the DRC, where the ethnic conflict spread after the genocide. The primary focus of articles and responsive CMCs were quite political in nature and focused almost exclusively on attacking the current Rwandan government, particular its president, Paul Kagame. Appendix H includes a screen shot of the flash content that consistently scrolled across the screen, prominently portraying a doctored photograph of President Kagame as Hitler, as well as a scrolling banner with the words, “Rwanda is our Father’s Land.” Thus while the blog creators portray the goal of advocating for human rights throughout Africa, a more in-depth evaluation of the content on the site reveals several themes found in this study, including an extremely negative depiction of the current Tutsi president of Rwanda, a seeming attempt to frame political activity and grievances in human rights terms, and a sentimental depiction of homeland as the land of their fathers.

Imagined Homeland

Several diaspora scholars have described a dynamic where diaspora reflect homeland symbolically through a range of historic cultural artifacts, as well as with words describing homeland in terms that reflect an earthiness (i.e. roots), or heritage (i.e., motherland, fatherland) (Cohen, 2008; Lyons, 2004). These types of symbolic representations of homeland were prevalent throughout the data, both in the form of textual and cultural artifacts. For instance, Rwanda was consistently referred to as “our beloved country,” “our motherland,” “our fatherland,” and “the land of our fathers.” Homeland was
also demonstrated through photographs. For examples, photographs of Rwanda’s landscape of “1000 hills,” of traditional Rwandan women carrying baskets on their heads, and of gorillas in the Virunga volcano mountains were often used as profile photos and banners on various SNSs.

Many reflections of the imagined homeland of Rwanda were often presented within the context of homeland sub-themes, including references to their “fatherland’s invaders,” as well as taking retaking their beautiful country and returning it to its “prior glory.” For example, numerous online identities referenced how Ugandans stole their homeland from them, and how they were going to fight to get their country back, as demonstrated in the following CMC addressing ways in which the Tutsi population manipulated the international community: “I mean look at them…all were part of the creation of RPF back in Uganda and at that time already their plans were evil.” Additionally, several online discussions posed theories that RPF members were not true Rwandans, but were Tutsis of Ugandan origin. Historic themes of the Hamitic theory were often used as a justification for wanting all Tutsis out of the country, such as the CMC stating, “Let them go home where they belong – to Uganda!!”

A significant focus of many online discussions centered on returning to Rwanda, as well as ways in which the online identities were going to take their country back. For instance, in one online interactive discussion between two online identities representing political opposition groups, references were made to the political structure they developed in the diaspora, and in the process of one wishing the other a happy birthday (the “birthday” of the formation one of the political opposition group), the online identity wrote “Happy birthday! Next year we will be celebrating in Rwanda!” As previously stated, most often these sub-themes were expressed collectively – rescuing motherland from its invaders and returning to the country and reinstating it to its prior condition. Within these types of CMCs, there were also strong themes of collective identity within the context of being members of the Hutu ethnic group.
A particularly noteworthy sub-theme that emerged in the data relates to how several online identities representing political opposition/rebel groups joined forces to achieve these collective goals. For instance, a public press release posted on numerous SNSs was entitled “Rwandan Opposition FDU-Inkingi and Rwanda National Congress (RNC) agree to Operate together to Liberate the Motherland.” Another example of online identities working toward collective goals pertaining to their homeland of Rwanda is a CMC posted by an online identity which stated: “FDU, GREEN PARTY, PS, PDP, PARTENARIA, RNC, FDLR, duhurije hamwe, imbaraga zacu ni iki cyatunanira” (translated: if we put our strengths together, what will defeat us?).

Themes of imagined homeland and the collective goal of returning home were also demonstrated on important anniversaries, such as the month of genocide commemoration (explored further in the section on genocide denial and historical revisionism), and Independence Day (independence from colonization). For example, an invitation to a celebration of Rwanda’s 50th anniversary of independence, organized by several political opposition groups in exile, was widely disseminated online for mobilization purposes. The invitation invited all Rwandans in exile to a conference in Brussels, Belgium hosted by the Hutu-majority opposition parties formed in the diaspora, including FDU-Inkingi, PS-Imberakuli (Imberakuri), PDP-IMANZI, PRD-Ihumure (PDR), and the newest opposition group, Rwanda National Congress (RNC). The most prominent feature of the invitation, consistent with imagined homeland themes, was a map of Rwanda reflecting the names of cities and provinces prior to the RPF taking control in 1994. The sponsoring groups, all of which have significant representation online as well as deep ties to the former regime, self-identified as political organizations focused on intervention, or “associations of action” (“Intervention des Associations

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48 The RNC is a political opposition party that was created by three Tutsi politicians who escaped into exile after being charged criminally for corruption in Rwanda. Although these three individuals are Tutsi and have strong leadership roles in the RNC, the ‘rank and file’ of this new group appear to be drawn from existing Hutu rebel groups in the diaspora, the core of which appear to be from PDR-Ihumure and PS-Imberakuri. The RNC and FDU-Inkingi issued a press statement indicating that while they were not
This invitation was widely disseminated via online newspapers, blogs and chat rooms, as well as being posted as an event on Facebook by the online identity “Vicotte Ingabire Umuhoza” (see Appendix I).

**Imagined Homeland Expressed Through Photographs**

With regard to cultural artifacts relating to imagined homeland, online identities posted numerous photographs reflecting Rwanda prior to the 1990 civil war, and the take-over by the current government. Several online identities posted picturesque photographs of Rwanda, with sentimental titles such as “our beloved homeland,” “the land of our parents,” and “Rwanda, the land of a thousand hills, the land of our ancestors.” Additionally, many photographs were couched within sub-themes of fighting for the human rights of those they left behind, including demanding the release of all Hutu political prisoners (a frequent term used to describe Hutus currently imprisoned for acts of genocide).

Examples of cultural artifacts representing imagined homeland that were posted, shared and linked to various SNSs include photographs of Rwanda’s pre-genocide flag; photographs and cartoons reflecting Rwanda’s traditional colors of green, red and black; audio recordings of the pre-genocide Rwandan national anthem; an audio recording of former President Habyarimana’s swearing in ceremony posted on YouTube (linked to Facebook, Twitter, and public blogs); and pre-genocide maps reflecting the names of cities and provinces prior to the new government taking power (the geographic names of cities and provinces were changed after July 1994). One map that was posted numerous times by several online identities had the following notation at the bottom of the photograph:

Keep your history alive. Thea [sic] shall work hard to Make you slaves by deleting your History but thea [sic] will will [sic] never win over History.

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Oftentimes these symbolic representations of imagined homeland were combined with other symbols that mirrored the text conversations, reflecting sub-themes of the “myth of return” and returning Rwanda back to its pre-genocide state. For instance, one commonly posted photograph depicted the traditional Rwandan flag with a fighting fist in the center of the flag. Another photograph depicted a map of pre-genocide Rwanda with handcuffs and the phrase “Free Rwanda” in the center of the map (see Appendix J for examples of symbolic representations of homeland). These symbolic photographs were frequently used as profile photos on Facebook and Twitter, included in online photo albums, as well as being disseminated individually throughout the virtual transnational network.

**The Myth of Return Expressed through Memorializing Former Regime Members**

The “myth of return” was also expressed through the elevation and memorializing of prominent Hutu politicians, including former Hutu presidents, Grégoire Kayibanda (in office from 1962 to 1973), and Juvenal Habyarimana (in office from 1973 to 1994), as well as genocide architect Theoneste Bagosora. As explored in Chapter 4, Kayibanda, Habyarimana and Bagosora were all known for their extremist and racist ethnonationalist views, as well as for their embracing of Hutu Power anti-Tutsi rhetoric, and yet each of these individuals had several memorial pages and impersonated profiles on Facebook memorializing their role in a seemingly romanticized past. Although many of these memorial pages were used to disseminate propaganda against the current government of Rwanda, they were also used to preserve perceived history, memorialize heroes, and educate the next Hutu generation. These goals were also accomplished through statements in the “About” or “Info” pages on the SNSs, CMCs posted by various online identities (many of which were included in the present study), and the posting of historic photographs of Kayibanda, Habyarimana and Bagosora on various SNSs, many of which included captions reflecting nostalgic reflections of Rwanda between 1959 (the “Hutu social revolution”) and 1994 (the year the genocide occurred and Hutus
lost power). For instance, one of Habyarimana’s memorial pages that was created by one of the online identities included in the study\(^{49}\) had the following statement reflecting an idealized vision of Rwanda’s past:

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THIS IS TO REMIND ALL RWANDANS THOSE STILL LIVING TODAY AND THOSE BEING BORN AND THOSE WHO ARE TO COME THAT RWANDA USED TO BE A PEACEFUL COUNTRY UNTIL THE DAY OF HABYALIMANA’S DEATH THIS MARKED THE BEGINNING OF MISERIES TO OUR NATION…ALWAYS PRAY FOR PEACE.
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Nostalgic and sentimental CMCs were often posted on these memorial pages, such as the following CMCs posted in 2010 on one of Habyarimana’s memorial pages:

- “I miss you l’presidente”
- “GONE TOO SOON our beloved president…”
- “I love u and I will love u all my life”
- “May your soul rest in eternal peace…it is unfortunately [sic] that your life was cut short by the enemies while you were working hard to bring unity, peace and stability in our nation.”

Historic photographs of memorized members of the former regime were also used symbolically to represent pre-genocide Rwanda, as well as to preserve history. Each memorial page referenced above had online photo albums that included several photographs of Kayibanda, Habyarimana and Bagosora. Individual historic photographs were also disseminated widely, through posting and tagging on Facebook pages and timelines, as well as through online blogs and websites. Most photographs had captions that were sentimental and nostalgic, expressing a longing for the past, and a desire that Rwanda’s history not be forgotten. For instance, a widely disseminated photograph of Kayibanda had the caption, “Let us all Rwandans restore our

\(^{49}\) This memorial page included ‘contact info’ on the ‘Info’ page that included the email address: Habyarimana@xxx.com, a website to a blog facilitated by a Hutu-majority opposition group that was very politically active in Rwandan politics (included in the study), an ‘office location’ of “Bruxelles Maison du Rwanda” (Rwanda’s house in Brussels), and a location of Louvain, Brussels, Belgium.
history the way it should be.” Another photograph depicted Kayibanda and other high-ranking Parmehutu officials during Rwanda’s official independence ceremony in 1962 (see Appendix K for examples of memorializing former regime members).

**Ways in which Diaspora Related to Homeland**

Several scholars have noted how CGD have a relationship with their homeland that is primarily political in nature (Anderson, 1992; Lyons, 2004, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2010), because they view themselves as being key stakeholders in homeland affairs (Faist, 2000; Lyons, 2004). In addition to the psychological orientation toward homeland, Chapter 2 references ways in which diaspora, particularly originating from Africa, relate to their homelands, including providing financial remittances on a collective level, lobbying the hostland on issues that pertain to diaspora, and engaging in homeland affairs on a political level. The data revealed that the online identities related to their homeland of Rwanda, particularly with regard to its past and current conflicts in all of these ways.

**Relating to Homeland through Financial Remittance**

Although the data did not verify indications that the online identities included in the study directly transferred funds to rebel groups on a collective level, considered to significantly contribute to the risk of renewed violence (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000), there were indications that funds were being raised by the online identities for their collective causes. For instance, several opposition groups were linked to charities engaged in fund-raising for a variety of causes, most of which related to the promotion of human rights and democracy in Rwanda, as well as providing assistance to genocide orphans and widows. Most often there appeared to be a consistent attempt to mask the connection between online identities and the charities for which they were associated. For instance, frequently online identities would post a CMC with a link to a charity while claiming no connection (e.g., “we just found this charity and believe it to be a valuable resource for our people…please consider
Upon further immersion, it became clear that on many occasions the online identities were actually connected to the charities that they were promoting. For instance, one online identity self-identified as representing a major Hutu political opposition group with strong ties to the former regime, actively posted on a public Facebook page that was overtly political in nature, and that disseminated a significant amount of anti-Rwanda propaganda. On numerous CMCs posted on the Facebook page this online identity promoted a charity purported to be unrelated. This same online identity (an organization) also served as an online moderator for a public blog. The online identity’s posts were accompanied with an auto-inserted signature line with its Facebook pseudonym and a link to the charity’s website and a plea to contribute to their charity. This same online identity organized an anti-Kagame demonstration in Washington, D.C. with two other online identities representing at least three Hutu political opposition/rebel groups with strong ties to the former regime. Thus although CMCs posted by this online identity on Facebook made it appear as though the charity was unrelated, the auto-signature on CMCs in the public blog revealed that they were in fact related, and the charity was clearly being utilized as a source of funding for the organizations’ collective efforts.

Several online identities included in the study linked their SNSs to websites of not-for-profit charities that included photographs of African children, many of whom were purported to be genocide orphans. Sometimes these websites demonstrated that the charity’s purpose was to raise funds for orphans, but the majority of the time the charity focused on human rights, democracy and “truth and reconciliation” programs related to Rwanda’s history of ethnic conflict. Due to the complex nature of the networks though, it was often difficult to determine whether an online identity was the founder of a charity or whether the charity was actually the political organization presented supporting their work”).

50 If references to genocide orphans were intended to refer to the 1994 Tutsi genocide the orphans would be 19 years old or older.
as a humanitarian organization (see Appendix L). For instance, many online identities that were clearly presented as a political opposition group possessed not-for-profit status in the United States (501c3 status), and were registered as non-political charities. Regardless of the nature of the connections, the data revealed that when online identities representing political opposition groups advocated for a particular charity, in the majority of cases, these charities were either directly or indirectly linked to the political organizations that the online identity represented.

**Relating to Homeland through the Dissemination of Information and Propaganda**

Theoretically, all CMCs could be categorized as “dissemination” of some type. In light of the high level of conflation with other thematic categories, the CMCs posted or linked on SNSs that illustrated how the Internet was used to relate to homeland through dissemination of information and propaganda will be limited to media-related information about current affairs affecting Rwanda from online newspaper articles, blogs, online radios, and YouTube videos, and then linked to other SNSs, such as blogs, Facebook and Twitter.

The majority of CMCs included in the study involved the dissemination of some type of propaganda, almost all of which was against the current government of Rwanda. The primary way in which propaganda related to Rwanda was disseminated was by linking online articles, either from mainstream media outlets, or online articles, blogs and YouTube videos generated from online identities within the network. Some CMCs disseminated information seemingly for the purposes of sharing relevant information, such the dissemination of U.S. State Department articles and updates. At other times information from mainstream media outlets was disseminated with false or misleading commentary rendered by the online identity. In fact, the majority of CMCs disseminated propaganda that was either embellished commentary, or completely false. Most CMCs disseminating propaganda about Rwanda focused on current events, such as the current renewal of violence in the
DRC; the downfall of President Kagame; the arrest of Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza; Rwanda’s “No-Scalpel Vasectomy” family planning program; dynamics involving the Rwandan Ambassador to the UK; and the current state of poverty in Rwanda.\(^\text{51}\)

For instance, numerous CMCs focused on the arrest and trial of Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza, the 2010 presidential candidate and party president of FDU-Inkingi (explored in Chapter 4). Several CMCs cited political persecution and closed political space, as well as poor treatment of Victoire, while also citing her as a hero. Typically, the FDU-Inkingi public website would publish an article, and then link it to its open Twitter and Facebook accounts, which were then shared and retweeted throughout the network. An example of this dynamic is a widely disseminated online article that detailed the abuse of Victoire’s supporters in Rwanda, entitled, “Rwanda: Police attacks Ingabire supporters heading to the Supreme Court to hear the case of the political prisoner.” This article was self-generated and was inconsistent with reports published by mainstream media outlets.

Another current event that sparked a considerable amount of activity within the virtual network is the current conflict in the DRC involving Hutus (primarily the FDLR), Tutsis (primarily the M23), the DRC military (the FARDC), and a UN peacekeeping force (MONUSCO). Graphic photographs of slain M23 soldiers were widely disseminated with captions congratulating the forces that killed them. Numerous online articles from mainstream media outlets were also posted with captions predicting the outcome of the conflict. Additionally, numerous articles were posted challenging Rwanda’s denial of providing assistance to the M23 rebel group. One CMC that was widely disseminated throughout the virtual network included unsubstantiated claims that Rwanda was recruiting children to fight in the M23. The online article was entitled: “Rwandan Children and young people forcibly fighting with M23 are victims not enemy combatants.” Of particular interest with regard to this CMC

\(^{51}\) The majority of propaganda disseminated throughout the virtual network was focused on President Kagame, thus is organized thematically as ‘anti-Kagame’ propaganda.
was that the photograph included in the online article depicted a child soldier carrying a large gun, but the photograph is not of a Rwandan child conscripted by the M23, rather, it is of a child soldier conscripted by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, the military wing of the South Sudanese political party, disseminated widely throughout international human rights organization websites.

The online network’s response to Rwanda’s “No-Scalpel Vasectomy” program initiated as a part of a broader family planning initiative targeting all Rwandans\footnote{The Rwandan government Ministry of Health, in cooperation with several international partners, including USAID, WHO, and UNFPA initiated a ‘No-Scalpel Vasectomy’ program as a part of their existing family planning and HIV/AIDS prevention program, with the goal of addressing unplanned} was also the focus of numerous CMCs and involved a considerable amount of propaganda dissemination. CMCs posted by numerous online identities and disseminated broadly accused the Rwandan government of attempting to eradicate the Hutu population so that Tutsis could become the majority population in the county. For example, one CMC posted a link to a BBC article that was generally positive about Rwanda’s “No Scalpel Vasectomy” program, yet the commentary posted by the online identity introducing the linked article wrote the following generally misleading caption introducing the article: “KAGAME SAID THAT ALL HUTU MALE MUST BE CASTRATED IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE HIS PLAN OF MAKING TUTSIS THE MAJORITY TRIBE BY VISION 2020.”

False propaganda was also disseminated throughout the virtual network in order to elicit fear within the diaspora regarding Rwanda. Often this type of propaganda was generated in response to the government of Rwanda’s organization of diaspora events, such as “Rwanda Day,” an annual government-sponsored outreach event. For instance, in advance of “Rwanda Day UK,” a blog facilitated by an online identity widely disseminated an article entitled “A mind defiled by Dictatorship! Rwandan ambassador to UK instructed to recruit women for deadly mission!” The blog then provided the following dire warning to all Hutus living in the diaspora in the UK:
Paul Kagame believes that after capturing the hearts of these women it will be easy to infiltrate the opposition through their own mothers who will threaten their men with taking their children from them, divorce or even poisoning them. This group of women have access to large amount of money and they have been meeting and discussing how to capture the hearts of the mothers in Diaspora. Some of their ideas are creating jobs, opportunities and organisations to coerce the mothers with. However, the Police in the UK may have to investigate these women due to some activities which involve fraud and criminal allegations according to an unnamed legal expert we spoke to regarding these activities.

Interactive CMCs posted in response to the blog included numerous statements from online identities purporting to know someone in the Rwandan government who had confidentially confirmed this plan as well as similar ones, including plans to poison the food any Hutu who attended the government-sponsored event.

Another CMC that disseminated false propaganda involved an online article on a public domain facilitated by an online identity included in the study and then linked to the same online identity’s linked SNS, entitled: “Hunger and poverty increasingly alarming in Rural Rwanda.” The online identity (a pseudonym) wrote the following commentary, which did not accurately reflect the content of the article:

SOS for Rwanda. To those who care about Rwanda: There are indicators which don’t lie. The silence and frustration of people should not be a license to ignore their plight. Ongoing people’s suffering can lead to more social unrest and loss of life. Please listen to the anguished murmurs of the silenced rural farmers. Please open the eyes, read the signs and advise wisely.

A final example that illustrates the nature of how the Internet was used to disseminate propaganda throughout the diaspora virtual network relates to Canada’s decision to extradite Leon Mugesera, a member of the former regime who had delivered an anti-Tutsi speech at an MRND rally, that many cite as being at the root of the genocide (see Chapter 4). An article posted on

pregnancy, maternal health, and population management. See the following USAID report on this program: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADS635.pdf.
an online newspaper that was disseminated widely throughout the virtual network was entitled “Leon Mugesera’s extradition: The Rwandan community is outraged.” The article begins with the following bolded statement: “Leon Mugesera will die tortured.” It is with these words that the President of the Rwandan [...] of Canada [...] expressed outrage about the deportation of Leon Mugesera to Rwanda to be tried for ‘incitement to genocide.’” The article included a photograph of a man holding two signs: “Reconciliation in Rwanda without Fair Justice” and “Extradition to Rwanda = Torture” (see Appendix M for this example as well as others reflecting how CMCs were used to disseminate information and propaganda).

**Relating to Homeland through Political Mobilization**

The online identities included in the study used the Internet prolifically for the purposes of mobilization of political activities pertaining to Rwanda. The majority of CMCs focused on mobilizing diaspora to act in some manner, such as attending an anti-Kagame demonstration, or signing a petition relating to a political matter – for example, the UN’s decision to no longer provide refugee status to Rwandans (many of whom are Hutus). A very frequent focus on mobilization was for the facilitation of anti-Kagame demonstrations in response to the trips President Kagame made to a country where diaspora resided (this dynamic is explored in greater detail in the subsequent section on “Anti-Kagame Propaganda”). A considerable proportion of the CMCs involving mobilizing activities included the facilitation of telephone-calling campaigns, online petitions and letter-writing campaigns within the diaspora. Targeted members of the Rwandan diaspora as well as Western allies were often provided with contact information for the hosting organizations and were provided scripts and sample letters and asked to bombard the hosting organizations with phone calls, emails and letters protesting the focus of the cause (e.g., President Kagame’s visit, the cessation of refugee status, etc.). Diaspora members and Western allies were also often asked to attend offline events, such as demonstrations and protests (see Appendix N for examples of how SNSs are used for mobilization purposes).
Lobbying the Host Countries

The Internet was used frequently by the online identities included in the study for lobbying purposes. For instance, most online mobilizing efforts were often for the purposes of lobbying the host country or international community in some manner, in relation to a collective cause concerning Rwanda. For instance, online identities often posted open letters written to foreign leaders and dignitaries asking for their support, including a reduction in aid to Rwanda, and the general condemnation of the government of Rwanda. During the ethnographic immersion, open letters were disseminated that were written to former U.S. President George W. Bush, former U.S. President Bill Clinton, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, the U.S. Pentagon, and the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Additionally, off-line lobbying was often coordinated with on-line efforts, through the posting of videos, or written updates of the off-line events. According to these updates (oftentimes in the form of YouTube videos), online identities and related diaspora organizations frequently met with UN representatives, members of U.S. Congress and the U.S. State Department, as well as human rights organizations based in Western host countries and major media outlets, such as the National Press Club. CMC updates reporting on offline lobbying efforts often included commentary seemingly designed to encourage online identities within the network (e.g., “UK Rwandans spoke and the UK government listened! Kagame lost again!”)

Online identities engaging in lobbying efforts often presented themselves as experts on the “on-the-ground” conditions in Rwanda and the DRC, as evidenced by YouTube videos of media events, congressional testimony, statements on public websites and press releases posted on SNSs (which were then linked to a range of SNSs and disseminated widely, both outside the network as well as inside). Most lobbying efforts facilitated by diaspora presenting themselves as experts focused on demanding that financial support be withdrawn from Rwanda, at times alleging that the withdrawal of support was the only way to prevent future ethnic violence. The
information shared during online and offline lobbying efforts was often interspersed with historical narratives that were consistent with the pre-genocide propaganda campaign.

An interesting pattern that emerged in the data analysis indicated that a significant proportion of online identities that used the Internet for lobbying efforts consisted of groups representing Hutus who were children during the genocide, including children of those accused of genocide, or Hutu children whose parents died in the post-genocide refugee camps. This pattern was demonstrated in the online identities’ historical narratives that included testimony of fleeing to the DRC as children with family members, including descriptions of traumatic experiences surviving in the camps in the DRC (formerly Zaire). Such testimony demonstrated what might be considered a somewhat narrow perspective of post-genocide dynamics in Rwanda, but many testimonies used in lobbying efforts appeared to be quite sincere, and despite their narrow focus many testimonies were consistent with historic fact, particularly with regard to the conditions in the camps.

There were also several testimonies used in lobbying efforts that were not consistent with historical fact, and appeared contrived for the purposes of manipulation. For instance, several YouTube videos widely disseminated throughout the virtual network and used for lobbying purposes depicted members of the Hutu diaspora testifying before a U.S. Congressional panel, mainstream media outlets, and the UN identifying themselves as “genocide survivors.” Yet the organizations with which they were associated had online connections with extremist Hutu groups, such as the “Bagosora, Theoneste” Facebook community page, and other Hutu Power SNSs. In some instances it appeared that those providing this type of testimony purposely attempted to confuse the audience by mixing fact with fiction, such as sharing a commonly known experience (involving Interahamwe-controlled roadblocks, for instance), but switching the ethnic groups, claiming that Tutsis were the aggressors. Another way in which those providing personal testimony appeared to purposely confuse audience members was to make reference to “the
genocide” implying the Rwandan genocide, yet the genocide to which most were referring was actually a genocide against the Hutu – a reference to the military incursions into militarized refugee camps in Rwanda and the Kivus. When asked what ethnic group the diaspora were members of, many stated that they were “mixed,” despite a strong online association with groups clearly aligned with extremist Hutu causes.

Additionally, some of the testimony captured in a YouTube video and published by an online identity included in the study included patently false information, which appeared designed to mislead. The YouTube video depicted an individual testifying before a national political organization in Washington, D.C., clearly implying he was Tutsi, despite being a founding member of a Hutu Power organization with an online presence. The individual testified about his experiences as a child escaping ethnic conflict in Rwanda, which included a story about how the Interahamwe was going door-to-door killing his neighbors. He also shared how he and his mother escaped in their car only to be stopped at a roadblock manned by Interahamwe. He stated that he and his mother were dragged out of the car and threatened with machetes while being ordered to dig their own graves. He then stated that neighbors confronted the Interahamwe and demanded that he and his mother be released. He then shared the story of their escape into the DRC (formerly Zaire), as well as their ongoing persecution by the RPF. His narrative included elements of accuracy, in that such events occurred consistently throughout the genocide, but they were exacted against the Tutsi population by the extremist Hutu government and militia. The testimony appeared to be intended to confuse the audience as he clearly implicated the current government of Rwanda as being responsible for the genocide. This diaspora member also presented himself as a “genocide prevention activist,” and disclosed that he was the recipient of a major U.S. genocide prevention research fellowship, and yet at no point during the testimony did he disclose that he was Hutu, or had family who worked within the former regime. Although there were only a few such incidences found in the data reflecting this level of overt manipulation
(the majority of lobbying attempts included the dissemination of widely held pre-genocide historic narratives applied to contemporary Rwanda), when such incidences of blatantly false propaganda did occur, the testimonies were widely disseminated throughout the virtual network, and frequently relied upon in subsequent lobbying and mobilizing efforts.

**Ethnic Identity**

Another theme that emerged in the data relates to identity, particularly in relation to overlapping sub-themes of ethnic identity, collective identity, historical identity, and identity as a victim. Frequently CMCs reflecting identity-related themes were immersed or intertwined with other themes, such as imagined homeland, genocide denial and historical revisionism, and anti-Kagame propaganda themes. There was considerable discussion within the online identities’ virtual network focusing on how their Hutu ethnicity, or being a member of the Hutu ethnic group was the core of their identity. Many online discussions clearly articulated perspectives that being a Hutu was synonymous with being Rwandan, yet there was a tremendous amount of identification with Hutus in the DRC, often referred to as “our brothers and sisters in the jungle,” implying that one remained a Rwandan Hutu regardless of location. In other words, the online identities included in the study appeared to stand by their Hutu “brothers and sisters” regardless of their location and/or other identity indicators, such as gender, exile status, age and religion.

One incident that demonstrated how ethnicity is at the core of the identity of those included in the study was the Rwandan government’s decision to abolish any reference to ethnic classification on national identity cards, in order to promote a singular national identity as “Rwandans.” The following online discussion (portions of which were translated to English from Kinyarwanda), illustrates the passion with which many online identities reacted.

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53 This term is known among Rwandans as a reference to those Hutus who fled to the refugee camps after the 1994 genocide, particularly those who remain in the jungles of the DRC near the Rwanda
to the government’s policy. Despite the fact that this policy was implemented in 1997, it remained a relatively frequent topic of online conversation.

Online Identity 1:
You may also ask why they removed ethnicity on ID cards? To be able to fake DEMOCRACY and a MINORITY ruling instead of the MAJORITY ruling and apply the rules of minorities. ~From a friend of Mine~

Online Identity 2:
Removing ethnicity in the ID cards is another manifestation of idiocy! Ethnic belonging is intrinsic value to Human being so you don’t need to write it down! I know they know their paranoic [sic] decisions in so many things will end up as a trap to their rule! It’s genocidal ideology to deny somebody’s ethnicity! So the whole regime of Kagame is committing an act of genocide [sic] by denying Rwandans to belong to their ethnic background! He shall answer this when time comes

Online Identity 3:
I hear that they use 213llood213 [sic] criteria to describe who is a Hutu who is a Tutsi. The ugly is Hutu the beautiful is a Tutsi! Oh poor things!... So my handsomeness can make me their president ·

Online Identity 1:
To remove ethnicity or a tribe from our ID, I support it, it is a step forward to try and make Rwandans feel one, although sometimes it’s hard. BUT BUT, I DON’T SUPPORT THOSE WHO DID IT, BECAUSE THEIR INTENTION WASN’T IN MAKING RWANDANS ONE, BUT AS A TACTIFUL AND SMART WAY TO OPPRESS AND ISOLATE ONE TRIBE IN THE GOVERNMENT, IN THE CONTEXT THAT THERE IS NO MORE TRIBE IN RWANDA. But if it was done for unity, nothing good like that, but although they did it with an evil intention, I can’t wish ethnicity to be in our ID again. And I tell you, it is not easy at all, to identify Hutu from Tutsi and Tutsi from the Hutu where there is no ID, without killing your own brother and your own sister!!!! But despite all those efforts, if I say there is no tribe in Rwanda, I am a liar [sic], because already every Rwandan feels he belongs to a certain tribe, but we will try to make it almost impossible to identify the ethnicity of an individual, unless he tells as much as we can, but as I said, since Rwandans already feels ethnicity in their inside, we can’t destroy that feeling in any way, but we can minimize it
Online Identity 4:
I don’t think that ethnicity on ID makes any difference who doesn’t know that he is a Hutu, Twca or Tutsi? Who doesn’t know that RWANDA gives scholarships to Tutsis only? How does it know whom to give bourse and whom not to give? That’s a pure rubbish,, [sic] it was done in order when Tutsis are given privileges only it not look like they are favoring Tutsis only but Rwandans, then Hutus will not have facts to show that they are being sidelined, […] wake up man…everything has been crafted to suit TUTSIS not RWANDANS all in the bid to establish TUTSILAND

Collective identity was expressed in many of the CMCs as well, in both opinion as well as action. For instance, when confronted with differences of opinions on issues of importance, such as the history of Rwanda, the nature of the genocide, whether a Hutu in the Rwandan government was still “true” to being a Hutu, or whether some Tutsis could be trusted, there was often a harsh reaction, and references to the those with significantly differing opinions as being traitors. In virtually all instances when the online identity challenging an accepted narrative was Tutsi, the online identities engaging in the discussion would accuse him or her of being a paid agent of the “pro-RPF Rwandan government.” Another example of collective identity was a variant of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” attitude expressed in numerous CMCs such as to the following:

Dear friends, I’m happy to have interacted with you in 2012. Being my friend is first to adhering to an ideology. You are at least 400 to agree with me that Kagame is a kind of nightmare for our beloved country. Let’s go forward in a non-voolance [sic] denunciation of kagamism. Don’t forget all victims of his regim [sic]. i.e. all Rwandans he caused death since 1990, and Congolese since 1996. Let’s hope 2013 will bring change in our region, particularly in Rwanda. Best wishes for all of you towards 2013.

Although this CMC encompasses multiple themes, including victimization and imagined homeland, it also demonstrates a strong sense of collective identity and unity in a mutual hatred for Kagame, and a strong desire for change within Rwanda.
**Hutu Power as an Expression of Collective Identity**

A significant aspect of collective identity revealed in the data was related to ways in which the online identities included in the study expressed perspectives consistent with Hutu Power ideology. This dynamic was expressed prolificaly and consistently in CMCs monitored during the ethnographic immersion, as well as in CMCs captured retrospectively on SNSs. Ways in which Hutu Power ideology was expressed included overtly espousing (and defending) Hutu Power ideology, representing a united front on issues related to Hutu extremist causes, and defending those high profile Hutus and Hutu political opposition/rebel groups that were perceived as being persecuted by the Rwandan government and/or the international community (donor countries, the UN, and the ICTR).

Overall, there were elements of Hutu Power ideology in a majority of the online identities’ CMCs, many of which will be explored in a subsequent section on genocide denial and historical revisionism. The following are examples of online identities defending Hutu causes and/or Hutu political opposition/rebel groups that were related to ethnic and collective identity:

On a public blog:

Reports from diverse media outlets this week indicate that a 2nd military operation is about to be launched against the FDLR by the UN’s MONUC peace keeping forces and the DRC army. Traditionally, UN peace keeping forces do not take sides overtly in any conflict, but that’s exactly what they are doing in the DRC conflict. We need to find a way to expose the criminal nature of this bias in order to save our FDLR brothers and sisters under threat of extermination. We will also have updates about the on-going persecution of […] Please notify your friends about this meeting and its critical importance so they can attend in big numbers.

A press release expressing support of Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza that was widely disseminated throughout the virtual network on numerous SNSs was

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54 By way of reminder, CMCs were monitored and collected that were posted in the past and still available on SNSs.
55 The redacted name is of a Hutu in exile in the United States who was charged with crimes of genocide in Rwanda and in 2012 was arrested by U.S. Immigration officials. He is currently awaiting deportation proceedings, which may result in his returned to Rwanda to face charges.
reflective of collective identity in action. The press release was disseminated by a high profile Hutu political opposition group formed in the U.S. diaspora, and stated (in part):

We will stand in unity with our brothers and sisters in the opposition, whether armed or non-armed, against the current brutal RPF military dictatorship in Rwanda.

Another example of a CMC reflecting collective identity defends the FDLR while indicating a clear commitment to its cause. The CMC was disseminated by an online identity clearly allied with Parmehutu ideology (Hutu Power) and reposted and retweeted through the network. This CMC is particularly noteworthy because its use of the term “finish the job,” a term that was prolifically used throughout the genocide as a reference to the killings of Tutsis being a “job.” Using this term in a current day context is a reference to finishing the genocide and killing all remaining Tutsis.

FDLR and Hutu power are not terrorist and they are not listed anywhere, not even on the UN or USA lists. Don’t be fooled by the Rwandan government anymore let’s all stand up with the FDLR and Hutu power and get rid of that government of genocidaires for years. Everyone who doesn’t want to be their slaves, come and stand with us to finish the job and be able to stop it.

Another CMC posted by an online identity that was well connected to the virtual network demonstrated collective identity based in Hutu ethnic membership included the following:

- Hutu power, yes, yes
- FDLR, yes, yes
- True Mai Mai, yes, yes
- True FARDC, yes, yes
- MDR-Parmehutu, yes, yes
- CDR, yes, yes
- MRND, yes, yes
- Hutu resistance fighters, yes, yes

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56 See Susan E. Cook’s “Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: A New Perspective.”
Long live the Hutu people in Rwanda, Burundi, Congo and Uganda.

An online identity posting a response to a story about an FDLR soldier who testified on behalf of Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza during her trial in Rwanda serves as yet another example of the online expression of Hutu collective identity. The online identity refers to the FDLR soldier who testified on behalf of Victoire as a “courageous soldier,” and the FDLR soldier who testified against her, a “mole” from the “RPF Academy of Lies.”

Additionally, the data included numerous CMCs that appeared designed to promote a “majority rules” philosophy, a Hutu Power ideology used by the former regime to justify anti-Tutsi policies. References to “majority rules” philosophies are based on the principle that since Hutus constitute the majority population in Rwanda, they should have that relative level of power. For instance, an open letter from one of the Hutu political opposition parties to a branch of the U.S. government, posted on the party’s public website, states (in part):

President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, who is a member of the Tutsi minority, would not have won the war and be in power today without the full backing of the American government. In the entire Great Lakes region of Africa, which comprises the countries of Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and Tanzania, Tutsis represent at most 5% of the total populations of these countries combined. Is America really serving its interests by backing 5% of the population and alienating the rest? The only way 5% can rule over 95% of the population is through repression and tyranny, and that’s exactly what President Kagame has been doing. It seems not only logical but also humane, democratic and beneficial to everybody that the right way for America in the Great Lakes region of Africa is to side with the majority, while making sure the rights of minorities are protected. If the American government adopts this policy, there is no question that its interests will be safeguarded, recurring violence will end, and the economy and the people of the region will flourish.

**Victim Status as an Expression of Identity**

A significant portion of CMCs that highlighted elements of ethnic identity presented within the context of victimhood, primarily at the hands of Tutsis, but
also the international community. The international community was often accused of either directly collaborating with Tutsis, or of being non-interventionists in matters involving grave human rights violations against Hutus. As with previously explored sub-themes related to identity, multiple themes were interlaced with themes of ethnic victim identity, including themes expressing a very strong anti-Tutsi sentiment that appeared to be solidly grounded in pre-genocide propaganda and rhetoric, as well as themes espousing “anti-Kagame” propaganda, and genocide denial and historical revisionism.

Again, many of CMCs that evinced an identity based on a sense of victimhood expressed broader themes that paralleled the pre-genocide propaganda campaign, including perceptions that all Hutus had been slaves of the historic Tutsi monarchy, that Hutus were liberated by the Parmehutu party, perceptions that Rwanda under Kayibanda and Habyarimana was a democracy concerned with the human rights of its citizenry (particularly on behalf of Tutsis), perceptions that all Hutus were victims of the RPF (perceived as foreign invaders), that Hutus were unjustly and forcibly expelled from their country, and finally, that Hutus were the true victims of the genocide, as well as ongoing persecution at the hands of Tutsis, particularly the RPF.\(^{57}\)

Numerous CMCs included references to a Hutu history of being the slave of the Tutsi, reflecting the “staying power” of what many scholars assert was a false narrative implemented by Belgian colonizers (explored in Chapter 4). Such CMCs were used for a variety of purposes, including denying the genocide narrative that holds Tutsis as the victims of Hutu aggression and the genocide; warnings against trusting any Tutsi; and teaching the next generation about the “real” history of the Hutus. The overriding purpose of CMCs that cast Hutus as victims of Tutsis, appeared to be a sort of “sounding of the alarm” that the time for action (often referred to as a “revolution”) was now. The following is an excerpt from a long article describing the history of

\(^{57}\) There was considerable conflation between CMCs with victim-identity themes and genocide denial and historical revisionism.

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the Tutsi/Hutu conflict that was widely circulated among the online identities included in the study, through numerous SNSs:

The decade before the African independences saw in 1959 what historians have called the Rwandan revolution, where the excluded Hutu majority was enslaved from birth by the Tutsi minority, managed to become owners of their destiny in the years that followed. Fifty years on the spirit and values of the Rwandan revolution have been crashed. Rwanda has fallen in the hands of a local and international mafia type of political leadership which is using oppressive policies of the past to control and use the population for its own greed.

The article ends with the following “call to action”:

What Rwanda has experienced in recent months and which culminated in a masquerade of presidential election on August 9th, 10 calls every Rwandan from all ethnic groups young and old, literate and illiterate, inside and outside the country, rich and poor, and friends everywhere of the real Rwanda and not the one of oppressors, to come out more than at any other time of the country’s history to stop a criminal political system led by Paul Kagame. By coming out together and taking back their destiny into their hands Rwandans can bring and give to their country a transformative revolution which can and will undoubtedly address effectively current and future political economic and social challenges.

Responses to this online article also revealed a belief in the Hutu victim status, as these excerpts illustrate:

Response 1:
Why do you start Rwandan history in the 50s when you know very well that we were already puppets in the 50s !?

Response from Author:
… Puppets or not, what really matters is the significance of their action at that time and today […] The problem with democracy in Rwanda is not the fact there is a Hutu majority population but the only fact that some people particularly among Tutsi think that they are God’s agents on earth. And for that simple reasons [sic] they have to dominate and exploit other ethnic groups. They think they were born to rule.

Several CMCs warned diaspora not to become “lazy” or too comfortable living in the West, forgetting about their Hutu brothers and sisters they left
behind, while others noted that they would probably not return to Rwanda, but felt a responsibility for their “brothers and sisters” in the DRC and Rwanda to fight their victimization. Additionally, many online identities cited the Belgian historical narrative of Hutus as victims of Tutsis as a reminder of why working with Tutsis was impossible, particularly in matters relating to the political leadership of the country. The following excerpt from an online dialogue (translated from Kinyarwanda) illustrates this sentiment:

These Inkotanyi have never and will never acknowledge or accept the 1959 revolution and will always try to make us their slaves.

Similarly, the following excerpt from a popular online blog facilitated by Hutus in the diaspora in Belgium appears to rely on the historic feudal narrative, casting Hutus in the victim role in the 1994 genocide:

The assassination on April 6, 1994 of [...] Habyarimana [...] was interpreted in many Rwandans’ understanding as the fall of Kigali into the hands of the attacker of the country – the Rwandan Patriotic Front of Paul Kagame…Hutus on the hills fearing a restoration of the feudal system and being subjected again to slavery, began eliminating their Tutsi neighbours.

Anniversaries of important events, such as Independence Day and genocide(s) or massacres of the Hutu, as well as holidays such as Easter and Christmas were often commemorated with online reminders of their victim status. The following poem/song posted on several SNSs and widely distributed on July 1, 2011 (Rwanda’s date of independence from Belgium), is an example of this dynamic:

HAPPY INDEPENDENCE DAY

58 Genocide commemorations were often held in the same week as Tutsi commemorations, yet upon analysis it became clear that Hutus in the diaspora were not commemorating the same genocide, although it appeared as though they were often attempting to make it appear as though they were. This dynamic will be explored in more detail in the section on genocide denial/trivialization.

59 Although the lyrics did not include an author, they appeared to have originated from a website facilitated by anonymous identities self-identified as being members of Rwandan Hutu youth, many of
Eeeee! Remember the whip and the chore!
Remember the days you spent serving the master without remuneration
And therefore rejoice of Independence!

Chorus: We said goodbye to the monarchy
The feudal and colonial yokes disappeared at the same time
And we got the democracy that suits us.
Come and let us celebrate the independence.

Remember the days of walking,
The many nights that you spent in difficult conditions,
Carrying tribute to the home of the head or the royal court,
At the expense of your family who had needed you
And when, exhausted, you arrive at your destination,
We were not even appreciated.
Come, let us celebrate the independence.

[Chorus]

I am very young and I did not know it
I was told and I’ve learned through reading
And when I preserved the death penalty;
It is for this reason that I look forward to independence.

[Chorus]

Numerous CMCs also referenced Tutsis’ desire to kill all Hutus, both inside and outside of Rwanda, until they are all dead or slaves of the Tutsi, reflecting a significant fear of ongoing victimization despite living in the diaspora. Although most of these CMCs were written within a context of denying or historically revising the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, an additional dominant theme was related to identity, as the content of these CMCs were animated by a perception of Tutsis as a threat to their Hutu identity, as well as a threat to their majority status. The following CMCs capture these sentiments:

A “status” posted in 2011 on a public Facebook page using a photograph of Kayibanda and his Parmehutu party as profile photo ran as follows:

whom have parents who are currently imprisoned for crimes of genocide, or who were killed during the
One of the big achievement [sic] that the Tutsi led regime of Kagame and his cronies achieved so far is to kill as many Hutus as possible as they had planned in 1985. He killed Mumutara, BYUMBA, RUHENGERI, Ibivugwa Gisenyi\(^6^0\) then he continued his bid to make the Hutu the minority to the south where now you can hardly find any middle aged Hutu in Butare. Banyarwanda aho muli mswe mwavombye guhaguruka mukamagana iyingoma mbyisha kdi mukayikiza itarabamara….Rukundo reka iza mperi sibwo bwambere zatubuza amahoro [Translation: Rwandans wherever you are, you should all stand and fight against this bad government before they kill all of you]…they did it for over 400 years and now they are still happily killing us.

Similarly, an article posted on the same public Facebook community page, also in 2011, demonstrated an attempt to instill fear into the Hutu diaspora based on their collective membership in the Hutu ethnic group:

There was a meeting in Boston which brought together all Rwandans of Tutsi ethnic background to discuss and plan for the following with the Rwandan Ambassador to the USA:

1. All pro Kagame must know by names and residential areas of all Hutus living in North America and try to understand and know what they do for living and what they say and who they like interacting with.
2. All Tutsi students in the USA and Canada must make sure they identify all Hutu students in their schools and try to know what they talk about Rwanda and its leadership. They even planned to use any kind of threats and elimination if necessary to defend Kagame against Hutu intellectuals and some American scholars…because of the above reasons all Hutus and Kagame critics in USA are asked to be cautious....”

Another CMC on a public SNS provided a list of the various ways that current government programs in Rwanda place Hutus living in Rwanda at risk of being killed or returned to the era of feudal domination:

You remember when he said that he could empty a barrel of water with a small coffee spoon! Of course he meant [sic] that he could eliminate all the opposition and the so called Hutu genocidaires, one per

\(^{60}\) These are all cities in the Northern Provinces of Rwanda, which had high numbers of Hutus in the population. These cities are often referenced in Hutu narratives since they suffered high losses when the RPF invaded Rwanda in October of 1990.
one...one per one without Nyakatsi huts till 700,000 huts are destroyed...one per one Hutu and Twa man sterilized till 700,000 hereditary enemies of his mafia are sterilized...one per one Hutu male condemned to slavery and poverty on the gacaca trials till 1,000,000 males work as slaves or TIGists for RPF-State...meaning 6,000,000 Bahutu without decent revenues...But Kagame Kagoome forgets that the barrel of water is an impossible Sisyphean task! In fact, what is his size? For the shoes it is N-53, but for the costume? I'd like to offer him a pink costume\(^{61}\) for his trial.

This CMC is particularly noteworthy because it cites several current Rwandan government initiatives perceived by the online identity as targeting solely Hutus, including the campaign to remove all grass-thatched huts (called “Nyakatsi”) occupied by the Twa, which the Rwandan government alleges are no longer safe or appropriate in light of Rwanda’s infrastructure development goals, called “Vision 2020;”\(^{62}\) Rwanda’s “No Scalpel Vasectomy” program (referenced earlier in this chapter); and the government program, Travaux d’Interet General (TIG), where individuals convicted of genocide-related crimes in Gacaca trials, work as manpower for development programs (TIG is particularly used for those who engaged in property destruction during the genocide).

Finally, the following excerpts from an online article posted on numerous SNSs during Genocide Commemoration week in April 2013 incorporates multiple aspects of Hutu identity within the context of Hutus being the historic victims of Tutsis, as well as the international community. This online article is particularly noteworthy for several reasons, including its close

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\(^{61}\) This is a reference to the color of prison uniforms in Rwanda, which are pink.

\(^{62}\) According to Rwanda’s Ministry of Local Government, the “Nyakatsi eradication campaign” (commonly referred to as “Bye Bye Nyakasti” program) is a part of the government’s community and social welfare program. The government of Rwanda asserts that modern replacement homes are being provided for Twa families displaced by this campaign. Information on the nature and progress of this program can be found on the government’s website here: [http://www.minaloc.gov.rw/index.php?id=514](http://www.minaloc.gov.rw/index.php?id=514). The program has been criticized by international aid organizations citing numerous problems with implementation, including the possible violation of human rights of the Twa. According to Globalissues.com, an international advocacy organization the “Bye Bye Nyakasti” campaign is a genuine attempt to lift the Twa out of poverty, as well as addressing safety concerns posed by the grass-thatched huts, but they challenge the rapid implementation of the program on a local level, which resulted in the destruction of several hundred huts prior to the completion of the replacement homes, leaving already poverty-stricken Twa homeless or residing to unsuitable temporary housing. Global Issue’s statement about this program can be found here: [http://www.globalissues.org/news/2011/04/27/9429](http://www.globalissues.org/news/2011/04/27/9429).
adherence to pre-genocide propaganda, its seeming defense of convicted genocidaires in Rwanda’s prisons, and its negative reference to Ibuka, a Tutsi genocide survivor advocacy organization. This CMC, as with several others, served as a “call to action” to all Hutus, in order to protect innocent Hutus inside and outside the country:

“The Blood of Rwandan Hutu: Is it not Red?”

The persecution of Hutu Rwandans did not begin yesterday or today. It is rooted in the Tutsi monarchy XVI th century and the period of African independence in the 1950s through the European colonization. Indeed, the Hutu Rwandans have been subjected, abused, persecuted and massacred without thank you, the so-called civilized countries of the planet Earth and the so-called international community playing the role of interested observers. If one starts from the earliest period when the RPF and Inyenzi-INKOTANYI attacked RWANDA Monday, October 1, 1990 from Uganda, the report is damning. They called themselves 224lood224224 INKOTANYI RWANDA invaded from the customs in Kagitumba Prefecture BYUMBA giving border with Uganda. In three and a half years, the RPF-INKOTANYI had killed 650,000 innocent ethnic Hutu BYUMBA Prefecture alone without including others that were killed elsewhere in the prefectures of Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, Kibungo and Kigali. This carnage was perpetrated under the complacent eye of the so-called international community and the perpetrators of this grisly task were not worried to date!”

[...] What to say Hutu languishing in jails Rwandan death houses since 1994 to date and without criminal records established?? Many people have lost their lives. Do not forget the Arusha tribunal (ICTR), which condemns the innocent on the basis of false testimony prefabricated and / or assembled from scratch by the RPF-Inkotanyi and its network of informers as Ibuka! Furthermore, those trying to flee the continued RWANDA, abused if not killed by death squads of DMI Paul Kagame in the country of refuge in BURUNDI, in UGANDA, KENYA, Belgium, etc ...

[...] Oh! Great people of this world, international community and humanitarian organizations who take pleasure in such crimes of Kagame and his regime continue to let you destroy the Hutu Rwandan across the globe and is an open secret for now!

63 Among the various elements of pre-genocide propaganda, the numbers of Hutu killed during the 1990 to 1994 civil war are not supported by research cited in Chapter 4.
We urge you to reconsider your strategies if the history and God Almighty, the Great Judge, you will condemn leaders bloodshed of innocent Hutus.

Conclude with these words of Albert Einstein: ‘The world will not be destroyed by those who do evil, but by those who look and refuse to act.’!

To all the people for the human misery and injustice to the poor and the weak, know that war does not build that simply exacerbate the hatred!

Story of a Rwandan, an eyewitness to the tragedy of his people.

**Religion**

A more subtle but consistent theme found in the data involves religion, primarily in respect to how religion was used as a source of support and motivation in the political activities of the networked online identities included in the study. This dynamic occurred in three primary ways: 1) identifying members of the Hutu diaspora who were members of the clergy and elevating them in some manner as leaders of their cause, 2) defending members of the clergy who were charged with genocide, and 3) the most frequent pattern noted was the posting of religious materials, including scriptures that were in some way related to their plight (as a source of motivation), including asking God for protection in their fight to take their country back from the Tutsi.

The data revealed that the primary role the Internet served within a religious context was the posting of religious content on SNSs, including scriptures, prayers, songs (or poems), and sermons (e.g., textual artifacts, cultural artifacts in the form of photographs of churches and Hutu leaders in the clergy, online radio sermons and YouTube videos). Religious content disseminated by the online identities was most often focused on providing encouragement to the network, including reminding online identities that God was on their side, and would liberate them soon. Such CMCs were often responded to by comments such as “Amen!” and “Yes, God is on our side!”

The dissemination of scripture from the Old Testament was particularly prevalent, especially scripture related to the Israelites time in the desert and
God’s promise to deliver them to the “Promised Land.” The following are examples of CMCs invoking the Christian God that demonstrates these patterns and dynamics:

A tweet posted on a Twitter feed of an online identity integrated into a public Facebook profile:

GOD SPEAKS TO ALL OF US TO GET UP AND TO REBUILD OUR COUNTRY WHICH IS IN RUINS....

Now this is what the Lord Almighty says: “Give careful thought to your ways. You have planted much, but harvested little. You eat, but never have enough. You drink, but never have your fill. You put on clothes, but are not warm. You earn wages, only to put them in a purse with holes in it.”

Haggai 1:5-6

A public Facebook status with 22 online identities tagged:

For I know the plans I have for you, declares the Lord, plans to prosper you and not to harm you, plans to give you hope and a future. Then you will call on me and come and pray to me, and I will listen to you. You will seek me and find me when you seek me with all your heart. I will be found by you, declares the Lord, and will bring you back from captivity. I will gather you from all the nations and places where I have banished you, declares the Lord, and will bring you back to the place from which I carried you into exile.

Jeremiah 29:11-14

A Facebook post on a public community page linked to a public blog:

God created 226lood226 for reason. To show his power like the way he created usama bin laden, iddi amini, 226lood226, and everyone. and hey!! Remember the time of 226lood226 people when they was slave in 226lood. what God has said about Farao?? I created you to show my power. what do u think about 226lood226? Can be the samething. it’s only God who knows why 226lood226 killing everyone, hutu, tusi twa, even he was not 226lood226226226n what he have done in his coutry, till he went beyond to kill in congo, without 226lood226226226ng darfour. guess what?? He was born killer. what the 226lood226226 say? Akamasa kazaca inka kazivukamo. but, we will never give him any chance anymore. Its over
One particularly noteworthy CMC involving religion was posted by an online identity that was highly connected within the network, and which claimed to represent the FDLR. The identity used a pseudonym that consisted of a combination of French and Swahili words, which translated means “Armored Tank.” The online identity appeared to be used primarily for disseminating information about the FDLR’s activities on the front lines of the most recent Congo/Rwanda conflict, including the posting of a February 2013 documentary on the plight of the FDLR, as well as numerous very graphic “victory” photographs of soldiers alleged to be Tutsis from Rwanda who were captured, tortured and killed. Additionally, this online identity also posted numerous CMCs containing sexually explicit and offensive content toward women. Amidst these CMCs was the following prayer posted during genocide commemoration week asking for God’s protection over the FDLR as they fight for their God-given cause:

In the name of Jesus Christ our Lord, Jesus Christ is the true salvation; Jesus Christ governs, Reigns, defeats and conquers every enemy, visible or invisible;

Jesus, be with FDRL Soldiers at all times, forever and ever, Upon all roads and ways, upon the water and the land, On the mountain and in the valley, in the house and in the yard,

In the whole world wherever We are, stand, run, ride, or drive; Whether We sleep or wake, eat or drink, There be thou also, Lord Jesus Christ, at all times, late and early, Every hour, every moment; and in all Our goings in or out.

Your five holy red wounds, oh Lord Jesus Christ, may they Guard us against all firearms, be they secret or public, That they cannot injure us or do us any harm whatever, In the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

The blessing which came from Heaven at the birth of Christ be with You, The blessing of God at the creation of the first man be with us; the blessing of Christ on being imprisoned, bound, lashed, crowned so dreadfully and beaten, and dying on the cross, be with us;
Evangelists, Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, be with us; the Archangels St. Michael, St. Gabriel, St. Raphael and St. Uriel, be with us; the twelve holy messengers of the Patriarchs and all the Hosts of Heaven, be with us; and the inexpressible number of all the Saints be with us.

In the name of God the Father, the Son and Holy Spirit: As Christ stopped at the Mount of Olives, all guns shall stop! If Jesus is on our Side none of our Soldiers will be damaged through the enemy’s guns or weapons, none of us shall be taken prisoner, nor wounded by the enemy. As true as it is that Jesus Christ died and ascended to Heaven and suffered on earth he shall not be shot, but shall stand unhurt, and adjure all guns and weapons on earth by the living God, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, I pray in the name of Christ’s blood that no ball shall hit us, be it gold or silver, but that God in Heaven may deliver us of all sins in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.

God give us strength; We shall not fear robbers and murders, nor guns, pistols, swords and muskets shall not hurt us through the command of the Angel Michael, in the name of the Father, Son and the Holy Spirit, God with us.

Amen.

This CMC was accompanied by what appeared to be a relatively recent photograph of an FDLR soldier carrying a high-powered automatic weapon. The post had numerous positive responsive posts, as well as 10 “likes,” four of which were online identities included in the study. In fact, two of the online identities that “liked” this CMC were major political opposition groups based in the diaspora that claimed to be fighting for “truth and reconciliation,” human rights and peace in the region.

Although CMCs of a religious nature were not as prevalent as other themes, they are noteworthy in light of the role some religious leaders played in the genocide, including how religion was used to justify the killings of Tutsis, and how many priests and pastors of various Christian denominations were leaders in the genocide, engaging in the coordination of killings by alerting the Interahamwe when Tutsis sought refuge in churches (explored in Chapter 4).
Genocide Denial and Historical Revisionism

Another theme that emerged from the data relates to how the 1994 genocide was perceived, including attempts to deny the genocide, and/or engage in historical revisionism by those within and outside of the diaspora virtual network. Genocide was the topic of, or referenced in most of the CMCs reviewed in the study, but content regarding genocide emerged within a variety of contexts. Generally, the CMCs concerning genocide expressed deep grievances in response to what many online identities perceived as the neglect and ignorance of the international community, as well as anyone else who appeared to believe the generally accepted narrative that the Tutsis were victims, and Hutus were perpetrators.

There appeared to be a variety of ways in which the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi was referenced and perceived by the online identities included in the study. In fact, there are so many narratives emanating from the data that it was difficult to organize them in any systematic manner. This was particularly the case because many CMCs incorporated numerous narratives concerning the genocide at one time, merging “bits and pieces” of older genocide narratives in order to create new ones. Additionally, there was often only a slight distinction between genocide denial and historical revisionism with many claims of denial occurring on a continuum (i.e., several online identities posted CMCs that were consistent with double genocide, and subsequently posted CMCs that outright denied a genocide in Rwanda). Additionally, some CMCs included both, denials and historical revisionism, in an “either/or” sort of manner.

Overall, CMCs focusing on genocide denial and historical revisionism represent a collective attempt to deny and/or historically revise the genocide against the Tutsi population in several ways. Examples include claiming that the killings were the result of the civil war, and thus did not constitute genocide; claiming that genocide was actually against the Hutus, not the Tutsis, supported through the manipulation of statistics indicating that more Hutus died than Tutsis; and a failure to acknowledge the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda, while claiming that the military incursions into the post-genocide militarized refugee camps (explored in Chapter 4) were the “real” genocides.

As mentioned earlier, many CMCs included both genocide denial and historical revisionism, particularly when advancing the argument that Tutsis were the perpetrators and Hutus were the victims. This was accomplished in three primary ways: 1) claiming that Tutsi killings were a justified response to the 1990 RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990; 2) that the RPF could have stopped the genocide earlier but kept the war going in order to secure complete control over the country; and 3) that the Interahamwe was infiltrated by Kagame without the knowledge of the Interahamwe, thus the Tutsis committed genocide against themselves. Although the RPF was often blamed, in many CMCs the Tutsi were blamed collectively for genocide(s) against the Hutu. Other noteworthy subthemes that emerged from the data included responses to and engagement in genocide commemorations, as well as how photographs were used to deny and/or historically revise the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi.

**Deaths from Civil War: ‘More Hutus died During the Genocide than Tutsis’**

Several CMCs advocated the position that the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi was not genocide, but rather civilian deaths caused from the 1990 to 1994 civil war. Often this argument was based on a manipulation of statistics, asserting that more Hutus died than Tutsis, or an equal number died from each ethnic group. For instance, one post on a public Facebook community page, linked to Twitter and tagged with approximately 14 other online identities within the virtual network asserted that there was no genocide at all, but rather a civil war:

Fighting between government troops and armed insurrectionists is not genocide. It is civil war…it is wrong to characterise every violence as genocide or imminent genocide so as to use it as a pretext for undermining of the sovereignty of states.
CMCs that argued that more Hutus were killed during the genocide than Tutsis, or that an equal number died often cited the Davenport and Stam study (referenced in Chapter 4) in order to add legitimacy to their stance. Some CMCs even exaggerated statistics far beyond the Davenport and Stam study, thus having no basis in fact, as the following excerpt from an online news article illustrates. The article, which was disseminated throughout the virtual network, featured a Hutu in the diaspora speaking to schoolchildren in the U.S. about the “1994 Rwandan genocide”:

There was a civil war in Rwanda from 1990 to 1994, against the Hutus. “There were 50,000 civilians killed in the conflict,” he said…. He said more than 100,000 people were killed in 100 days.64

The reference to first 50,000 killed and then 100,000 people killed “in 100 days” (a clear reference to the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi) demonstrates a gross underestimate that even the most prolific propagandists within the diaspora did not cite.

The “double genocide theory,” was frequently postulated early in the ethnographic immersion, which asserted that there was not one, but two genocides starting on April 6, 1994, since “every time a Tutsi was killed, a Hutu was killed as well.” For instance, a CMC posted by an online identity included in the study, in response to a Tutsi diaspora member's CMC posting information about “Rwandan Day” in Boston in 2010 asserted the belief that both sides experienced equal losses:

IF YOU ARE SENT BY KAGAME TO CONTINUE SPREAD LIES NO ONE IS GONNA COME. YOU ARE USED TO TELLING LIESTHEN WILL YOU TALK ABOUT RECONCILIATION, PEACE, AND DEMOCRACY WITHOUT LYING ABOUT GENOCIDE. DON'T YOU KNOW I DESERVE TO MOURN FOR MY FATHER AND 300 PEOPLE KILLED WITH HIM IN KIYOMBE?

Another perspective that was frequently circulated online asserted that starting the genocide narrative on April 6, 1994 did not tell the whole story,

64 Chapter 4 explores the legitimate range of Tutsi killed during the 1994 genocide at between 500,000 and 800,000, and Hutus killed at between 30,000 and 50,000.
thus the killings of each ethnic group must be counted from October 1990, the date that the RPF invaded Rwanda. According to numerous online identities, if the October 1990 date was used, then the number of Hutus killed far exceeded the number of Tutsis. Additionally, many online identities overtly denied that extremist Hutus engaged in any killings of Tutsis, while decrying Hutus killed when the former regime and the Interahamwe were fleeing into the DRC (formerly Zaire). These postulations appeared to still hold that all deaths were caused by the civil war, or what was often called the “RPF guerrilla invasion,” and did not constitute a genocide (unless genocide was considered against the Hutu).

How the word “genocide” was used when in reference to Tutsi killings also constituted a type of genocide denial and/or revisionism. For instance, when CMCs did reference the genocide, it was often referenced in a manner that made it appear as though the term “genocide” was used rather begrudgingly and in a highly qualified manner. For example, when used in a sentence the word genocide was often placed in quotations (i.e., “the Genocide”), or the genocide was referred to as “the so called Genocide,” or “what has become known as the Rwandan genocide.” These types of references were used particularly when the CMCs were written in English or French. When CMCs were written in Kinyarwanda, and appeared directed primarily toward the online identities included in the virtual network, the 1994 genocide was referred to as “mutual killings,” the “1994 massacres,” or as the “civil war.”

**The ‘Real Genocide’: Military Incursions into Hutu Camps**

The significant number of CMCs that espoused some variation of genocide denial and/or historical revisionism focused on the conflicts in the DRC, both past and current. The most frequent narrative expressed in the CMCs framed the real genocide as having occurred in the DRC, not Rwanda. Many CMCs referenced Hutus who were killed by the RPF after they took control of the country, and consistently referenced all Hutu deaths, even of those who committed genocide, as persecution. Online identities also cited
deaths caused by border conflict, and the military incursions that resulted in 
civilian deaths in the Kibeho camp in southern Rwanda in 1995, and in the 
refugee camps in the Kivus in 1996 and 1997 (referenced in Chapter 4) as 
genocides. The majority of CMCs focusing on allegations that Hutu genocides 
have occurred and continue to occur in the DRC will be explored in the next 
section on “Anti-Kagame” CMCs since the majority of CMCs that accused 
Rwanda of genocide in the Congo did so by leveling blame at President 
Kagame on a personal level, as if he personally engaged in the killing of 
Hutus.

An important practice noted in the data was how the online identities in 
the virtual network used photographs to express grief, disseminate 
propaganda, and mobilize support both from within the network as well as with 
outsiders. Numerous online identities facilitated online photo albums and 
disseminated photographs widely throughout the network depicting massacre 
sites. Often these photographs were extremely gruesome, showing 
dismembered bodies, bodies piled on top of one another, some with children 
looking on, or children holding onto what was presumed to be a deceased 
parent’s hand. Most of the massacre photos had captions identifying the 
massacre site(s), as well as other information about the photograph(s). For 
instance, one photograph depicting the charred remains of a woman and 
infant had the caption: “A woman and her child burned to death in DRC.” 
Another photograph of a young child holding a deceased woman’s hand had 
the caption “Hutu orphan holding the hand of his dead mother killed by RPF 
murderers.” Most of the photographs appeared to originate from SNSs that 
existed for the sole purpose of memorializing a massacre, such as the Tingi 
Tingi public Facebook page. Others were placed into online albums on public 
SNSs that contained a range of other photographs. Many of these 
photographs were also enlarged and placed on posters, and then used during 
real world anti-Kagame demonstrations.

What was particularly noteworthy about these photographs is that a 
Google image search revealed that the majority were not photographs of
Hutus slaughtered at refugee camps, or in Rwanda. Although a few photographs appeared authentic, and were accompanied by photo credit information, the majority of the photographs did not appear to be authentic photographs in that they were not from massacre sites involving Rwandan or Congolese Hutus. Roughly two-thirds of the photographs of massacre sites posted on SNSs of the online identities included in the study were not of the sites/conditions claimed by the online identities. In fact, some of the worst massacre photos depicting bloody piles of slaughtered corpses that were frequently disseminated throughout the virtual networks (as well as during offline demonstrations) were actually photographs of the Pagak Massacre in Uganda involving the slaughter of Acholi by the LRA. The photograph referenced earlier of a burned and deceased Hutu mother and child, was actually a mother and child slaughtered in Jos, Nigeria by Muslim extremists.

The majority of the photographs though were actually of Tutsis slaughtered by Hutu extremists in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, and incorrectly identified as being of Hutus slaughtered in refugee camps by Tutsis. An example is a photograph of a group of children laying strewn about some stairs with the caption “bodies of Hutu children at Kihendo refugee camp 1996.” The photograph was actually taken by a Human Rights Watch photographer of Tutsi children slaughtered during the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. Another example involves the use of a photograph showing numerous dead bodies wrapped and laying on the side of a road. The online identity wrote the following caption: “Paul Kagame is a war criminal and he deserved to be executed 20 times a day for his crimes against humanity.” The original photograph (actually a video) was taken from a Public Broadcasting System (PBS) documentary entitled “Confronting Evil,” and the bodies were identified in the film as Tutsis killed by Hutu extremists during the genocide. Also, the majority of the original photographs appeared to be captured from legitimate sources such as the UN, PBS and educational sites, providing strong indications of the photographs’ original source (see Appendix O for
examples of genocide denial and historical revisionism using false photographs).

**Victims Really Victimizers: ‘It was the Tutsis Fault, not the Hutus’**

Numerous online identities posted CMCs arguing that the Hutus were the true victims of the genocide, not the Tutsis, either because the RPF allowed the genocide to unfold as a strategy to gain control over Rwanda by infiltrating the Interahamwe, thus the Tutsis committed genocide against themselves. CMCs that relied upon manipulated statistics often did not provide a detailed rationale, except to say that the 1994 genocide was committed against the Hutu. For instance, a photograph widely disseminated throughout the virtual network showed a genocide memorial in Rwanda that displayed skulls of Tutsi genocide survivors, with a caption alleging that the bones were actually from Hutus, not Tutsis (see Appendix P). The caption stated:

FPR INKOTANYI has been using our Parents Remains as the main income for the War criminals Party, mostly Kagame. If I may ask can anyone point out among the skulls which one belong to a HUTU, TUTSI or TWA?

Many CMCs also included allegations that Tutsis had been the historic aggressors, both during and after the genocide, as this segment of a widely disseminated post directed to President Kagame suggests:

THE RPF INKOTANYI ITINERARY OF BLOODSHED Staring from KAGITUMBA all the way to MBANADAKA.

The post then proceeds to list numerous massacres against the Hutus ranging from October 1, 1990 through 1997. An online chat ensued that included several identities included in the study referencing plans to take their country back. One identity appearing to be located in Rwanda held a dissenting opinion, challenged the narrative as well as the online identities’ perceptions of the conditions inside the country. Numerous online identities then responded quite aggressively, using rather threatening language, taunting what appeared
to be a Tutsi responder, referencing the possibility of Hutus invading the country. The Tutsi online identity wrote: “I’ve told you one thing, let me repeat it. We are not, and we have never been scared by homosapiens. If you want to know the determination and heroism of Rwandans, try to wage a war against us; we’ll put you where genocidaires deserve.” When one Hutu online identity praised the others for attempting to engage the Tutsi on an intellectual level, another online identity posted the following:

What do you mean by intellectual engagement if there are people who think intellectually the pro-RPF people are nothing but empty trolleys because u think intellectually, you know Kagame caused the death of many innocent Tutsis when he killed Habyarimana Juvenal [name linked to Facebook memorial page] and Ntaryamira then after that he continued killing Hutus from 1990s to this day as millions of Hutus are either in jail or at Iwawa Island..another think u guys you are blind that is why u say that people who are well educated like us I engage intellectually its coz u cant match up to our thinking because we are beyond your anarchy and think in more civilized way. Here is a list of the people u drunk their blood three of them being my uncles... [website included] and you still think that KAGAME IS NOT A MURDERER?

A similar CMC that was widely disseminated referenced the 1994 genocide as having been started by the antichrist from the North (a reference to Kagame’s birthplace):

INDEED, 1994 WAS THE REIGN OF ANTICHRIST IN RWANDA...AND THIS ONE CAME FROM THE NORTHERN PART OF IKIRIINGA MUHABUURAI

The data did not reveal a single incident where the online identities included in the virtual network referred to the genocide as “the genocide against the Tutsi.” Tutsis were never referred as the victims in the genocide in a collective sense, and although the counter-accusations of genocide were primarily leveled at President Kagame and his “RPF cronies” (which will be explored in the subsequent section), some CMCs accused all Tutsis in general of engaging in several genocides against the Hutu, as well as other types of

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65 A key feature of Tutsi genocide memorials in Rwanda is the displaying of bones of murdered Tutsis.
killing campaigns. Tutsis were also accused of manipulating the international
community for sympathy. The following post, translated from Kinyarwanda,
provides an example of these types of accusations that portrayed Tutsis as the
perpetrators of the genocide, rather than the victims:

The Tutsi have launched a global campaign of disinformation to believe
that the killers are victims and victims murderers.

I announce the extermination of Hutu people of the Great Lakes: I
announce that "Agaciro Development Fund" is a clear ideological and
racist anti-Hutu I announce that “Rwandan Vision 2020” is a clear
ideological and racist anti-Hutu.

I announce the extermination of Hutu people of the Great Lakes I
announce the extermination of Hutu people of the Great Lakes I
announce the extermination of Hutu people of the Great Lakes Here the Tutsi killers in the heart of the tragedy in Rwanda, Congo,
Burundi and ugandaise:

Yoweri Museveni is a real monster and sangineur genocidal Rwandan Tutsi extremist.

Paul Kagame is a real monster and sangineur genocidal Rwandan Tutsi extremist.

Hippolyte Kanambe alias Joseph Kabila is a real monster genocidal sangineur and Tutsi extremist.

!!!!!!!!!!!! 7777777777!!!! 999999! !!!! 3333333333!!!!!!!

1. Many Hutus were victims: More than 5 million of death in Rwanda!! Catch these Tutsi killers in the heart of the Rwandan tragedy .................

2. Many Hutus were victims of more than 10 million dead in Congo!! Catch these Tutsi killers in the heart of the Congolesan tragedy ............... 3. Many victims were Hutus in Burundi Catch these Tutsi killers in the heart of Burundi tragedy ................. 4. Many Hutus were victims in Uganda. Catch these Tutsi killers in the heart of the tragedy ugandaise!

Although Tutsi were consistently referred to as aggressors, perpetrators
and genocidaires, online identities within the network never referred to any

The bones serve as a gruesome reminder to ‘never forget.”
Hutu genocidaire or suspected genocidaire as such, even those considered to be the “masterminds” of the 1994 genocide prosecuted by the ICRT. In fact, there was a significant amount of online activity focused on defending any and all Hutus who were suspected, charged and/or convicted of genocide, either in Rwanda or in a host country. This dynamic included the posting of mainstream newspaper articles reporting on the arrest and/or sentencing outcome of a suspected genocidaire, and complaining about the outcome. In dialogues within the virtual network that did not appear to be directed to Westerners (often written in Kinyarwanda or French), genocidaires were often referred to by a number of terms, such as “our brothers and sisters,” “our persecuted brother,” “our hero,” “comrade,” and “soldiers.” CMCs referencing the arrest and/or sentencing of Hutu genocidaires often included responsive CMCs that very emotionally pronounced their innocence. For instance, a 2010 CMC that included what appeared to be the “copy and pasting” of an article about a notorious genocidaire Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi, a Pentecostal pastor (and the first genocide suspect to be returned to Rwanda by the ICTR), was responded to by an online identity challenging the veracity of the article. The CMC, written in Kinyarwanda admonished the original poster for publishing something that was “factually incorrect,” ending the CMC an all-caps profession: “HE IS INNOCENT!!”

In articles written in English, genocidaires were sometimes referred to as “genocidaires,” but most often they were referred to as “so called genocidaires.” Numerous CMCs expressed the belief that any Hutu who was charged with genocide was being persecuted by Tutsis (assisted by the international community), with several referencing a large cover-up of the truth, commonly referenced as “Tutsi propaganda,” or the “RPF propaganda machine.” Widely disseminated articles providing the “true” history of Rwanda appeared to have as their goal a continuation of the propaganda campaign spread prior to the genocide that cast Habyarimana as the hero of not only

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66 A relatively new self-initiated anti-poverty campaigning in Rwanda established to enable Rwandans, both in the country and outside of it (diaspora) to fund development projects in order to reduce the need
Hutus but of Tutsis as well. An example is an article posted on a public online blog frequently linked to Facebook and Twitter accounts included in the study, entitled “President Habyarimana protected Tutsis between October 1990 and 1994 as much as he could.” The article, written by a pseudonym, provided a historical version of events leading up to the genocide and included the following statement that appeared to provide a justification for the genocide:

Despite the troubled and war time that the country experienced between October 1, 1990, date of RPF invasion of Rwanda from Uganda, and the day he died on April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana demonstrated a humanity towards Tutsis inside Rwanda that RPF would not dare to credit him for, because this would deprive Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, of claiming that he has been their savior [...] The assassination on April 6, 1994 of the two Presidents, Habyarimana of Rwanda and Ntaryamira of Burundi, when the aeroplane they were travelling in was shot down while attempting to land at Kanombe airport, was interpreted in many Rwandans’ understanding as the fall of Kigali in the hands of the attacker of the country – the Rwandan Patriotic Front of Paul Kagame.

In this same article, references to the genocide were placed in quotation marks, perhaps as an indication that the genocide was not real, and references to genocide perpetrators were consistently referred to as “alleged Hutu perpetrators” or “alleged Hutu genocidaires,” even in regard to those who were convicted by the ICTR (see Appendix P for examples of how SNSs were used for genocide denial and historical revisionism).

One of the most dramatic and blatant examples of outright denials by genocidaires is an instance of one depicting himself as a victim, in the form of a letter and personal testimony statement written by Georges Rutaganda, a top leader of the Interahamwe, and shareholder of Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). The letter was written to the president of the ICRT, on the 10th anniversary of his incarceration for genocide and crimes against humanity, and contained 37 pages of what Rutaganda called his “personal testimony.” The letter was sent to numerous international figures as well,

for foreign aid.
including the head of the UN Security Council, the Prime Minister of Sweden, the President of Appeals Chamber at The Hague, and the head of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR). In his letter and testimony, Rutaganda decries his conviction by the ICTR, expressing outrage and contempt for the international institution he claimed to have trusted to seek truth and exonerate him. His testimony presented what appeared to be a very sincere and heartfelt attempt to profess the injustice of his conviction by the ICTR, and the betrayal of the international community as a whole. The letter was widely disseminated throughout the virtual network, where it was celebrated by numerous diaspora identities included in the study, many of which identified Rutaganda as a hero of Rwanda.

Rutaganda begins his letter by stating that he was compelled to tell the truth because of the vast number of lies circulating about the “tragedy” in Rwanda, which was causing innocent people to be convicted of genocide. He then dedicates his letter to all Rwandans, stating:

I dedicate this testimony to all the victims, dead or alive, the tragic events that hit my country, Rwanda. I join all Rwandan families who have been bereaved and continue to be bereaved by these tragic events whose extensions are always difficulty experienced by our people.

Claiming to speak for victims of the “tragedy” from both ethnic groups, Rutaganda writes:

“Enough is enough”: ten years of various manipulations, ten years of deliberate concealment of the truth on the Rwandan tragedy, ten years of blatant injustice against Mr. Georges Rutaganda. I am forced out of my silence out of respect for all Rwandans and in memory of victims of the Rwandan tragedy, whatever ethnicity they come. How can I continue to remain quite quiet in response to false speech on reconciliation of Rwandans, before rigged judgments based on manipulation, lying and official denunciation? I decided to talk to restore dignity to the victims of tragic events that have befallen my country Rwanda, giving my testimony to the truth violated by a two-tier justice, a discriminatory justice, justice for the winner.

He also proclaimed to be fighting for truth and reconciliation in Rwanda when
he writes: “...without truth there is no Justice and without justice there is no real reconciliation.”

In his letter and testimony Rutaganda outright denied that there was any attempt on the part of the Interahamwe to commit genocide. With what appeared to be sincerity and authenticity, he presented himself and others in the Interahamwe as the victims of a conspiracy to keep the truth of the killings of Tutsi hidden, stating:

Even before the tragic events that have devastated our country, Rwanda, up to date, all power hungry critics of Habyarimana and his party MRND have conspired to allocate all the ills suffered by the people of Rwanda to “Interahamwe,” creating a malicious suspicion around the MRND youth wing, called ‘Interahamwe za MRND”...Acts of terrorism and vandalism that have engulfed the country from 1990 to 1994, were also placed on the back of the Interahamwe za MRND, without providing any tangible evidence. The legend of the Interahamwe za MRND militia’s formidable militarily-trained incredible killing machine that would travel throughout the country and facilitate the “Tutsi genocide” with the main weapon of systematic rape of Tutsi women, is a fallacious manipulation orchestrated and maintained to the extent that it has become almost a reality, indelible in the minds of certain categories of people, rigged as based on manipulation, lying and official denunciation. I decided to talk to restore dignity to the victims of tragic events that have befallen my country Rwanda, giving my testimony to the truth violated by a two-tier justice, a discriminatory justice, justice for the winner.

Rutaganda also professed his own innocence as well as his bitterness at having been betrayed by long-time friends for whom he claimed he did favors for (e.g., saving the lives of their Tutsi friends and family). Rutaganda provided painstaking details of incident after incident where he saved Tutsis, often risking his own life to do so. For example, in one section of his letter Rutaganda states:

Responsibilities in the Rwandan tragedy are well documented, but no one wants to look at reality and act accordingly. My bitterness has another justification much more personal. I was betrayed by the selfishness of some of my colleagues of the National Transitional “Interahamwe za MRND” which sold to the Prosecutor by telling lies to
secure personal benefits and/or family. I was dragged through the mud by the very people whose lives I saved, often at the cost of mine... I was betrayed by longtime friends and partners ...

He concludes by professing a hope that in time, he would be exonerated and seen as the true hero that he is:

The truth is that I saved a lot of Tutsis. But, I ask nothing in return, except the recognition of the humanitarian acts that I performed, often risking my life to save many lives. To accuse me of trying to eliminate the Tutsi ethnic group is quite wrong. I claim that an injustice was done to me. I will continue to proclaim my innocence with the hope that one day, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about the Rwandan tragedy will one day become public.

‘The RPF could have Stopped the Genocide Earlier’

A more recently postulated version of the genocide disseminated online in articles addressing the “true history” of Rwanda alleges that President Kagame committed genocide against both Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 in order to gain control over the country. For instance, in a widely disseminated online article entitled “Kagame Political Ambitions Triggered the Genocide” published by one of the online identities included in the study, the author writes:

Kagame’s guerrilla war was aimed at accessing to [sic] power at any cost. He rejected all attempts and advice that could stop his military adventures including the cease-fire, political negotiations and cohabitation, and UN peacekeeping interventions. He ignored all warnings that could have helped him to manage the war without tragic consequences.

Not only is this statement factually incorrect, it demonstrates how stories of denial evolved, becoming almost folklore as they were passed from one SNS to another.

The Interahamwe was Infiltrated by Kagame

Several online identities accused Kagame of being responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, through an elaborate take-over of the Interahamwe, without the knowledge of the extremist Hutus running the
county. The following excerpt is from an interview of a high level member of the Hutu diaspora associated with a Hutu extremist group with ties to the Interahamwe. The interview was published on numerous online sites, including the opposition group's public website. The online identity states in part:

Because Kagame had infiltrated the Habyarimana’s army [FAR], and the militias, everywhere; he [Kagame] had his own militia within a militia… Kagame had infiltrated the militias…most of those guys who were just on the roadblocks, where so much killing was done, were Kagame people…and the Interahamwe were not aware that they were working for him [Kagame].

Genocide Commemorations

A majority of the online identities included in the virtual networks held genocide commemorations both online and offline. Online commemorations consisted of an online event attended virtually in an asynchronous manner, whereas offline commemorations were coordinated via the Internet through an event posting, and a video of the event was then subsequently disseminated through the posting of YouTube videos on various SNSs.

Hutu diaspora groups often held genocide commemorations in April (the same month as Tutsi commemorations) that were attended solely by Hutu diaspora members. Many of these events were commemorating the victims of the Kibeho killings, but it was often difficult to determine what genocide the CMC was referencing. For instance, in the following CMC the poster appears to be commemorating victims of Kibeho, but then references April 6, 1994, which is the date of the genocide against the Tutsi. The date of the Kibeho tragedy was April 27, 1996:

FROM APRIL 6, 1996 MORE THAN 99% OF ALL RWANDANS FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT RWANDA ARE REMEMBERING THEIR LOVED ONES WHO LOST OF THEIR LIVES BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT MURDERER KAGAME PAUL..PLEASE JOIN US ALL RWANDANS TO GIVE OURSELVES DIGNITY
Indications that members of the virtual network were not commemorating the Tutsi genocide, but were either referencing a double genocide, or a Hutu genocide were expressed in a variety of ways. Although no CMC acknowledged that the majority of those killed during the 100 days of genocide in Rwanda were Tutsi, many did express outrage that official commemorations focused solely on Tutsis killed, and not Hutu. Other CMCs complained about Rwanda’s genocide ideology laws that prohibited genocide denial and historical revisionism, as these laws were perceived as barring Hutus from mourning their losses, and speaking about their perceptions of the genocide. Additionally, many CMCs posted during commemoration did not make reference to a particular ethnic group, but were clearly focused on Hutus. For instance, the following CMC was posted on April 6th, the anniversary of the initiation of the Tutsi genocide, by an online identity that consistently espoused Hutu Power/Parmehutu ideology, as well as genocide denial. Those outside of the network might easily assume that the poster was referencing the Tutsi genocide:

The misfortune of losing them should not make you forget the joy of having known them. Never forget your friends, your family disappeared during the 1994 genocide.

A noteworthy dynamic that emerged in the data was what appeared to be a growing pattern of some members of Hutu diaspora identities attempting to “hijack” or disrupt Tutsi commemorations in some manner. This dynamic was discussed on several public SNSs, reporting some Hutu diaspora members showing up at a Tutsi commemoration and pretending to be Tutsi genocide survivors or supporters, and then heckling speakers and survivors, particularly those who broke down crying at the event. Similarly, CMCs demonstrated a pattern of some Hutu diaspora members engaging in what was perceived as an attempt to confuse commemoration attendees by facilitating commemorations and inviting Tutsis, but then commemorating Hutus killed in RPF military incursions into refugee camps in southwest
Rwanda and the Kivus. A similar tactic appeared to involve offering assistance to commemoration organizers, particularly if they were Westerners, but not disclosing their ethnic affiliation, or that the genocide they were commemorating was either a double genocide, or the killings of Hutus in the DRC refugee camps after the 1994 genocide.

This same pattern of apparent deception was evident in online genocide commemorations as well. For instance, many online identities included in the study posted captions and photographs on their SNSs of symbols representing the Tutsi genocide commemoration, such as the term “Never Again” and/or photographs of a single lit candle with a purple background (a global symbol for Tutsi survivors). Quite commonly Westerners would post responsive CMCs on these public SNSs offering sympathy. It was clear that many of the outsiders were confused about what genocide was being commemorated (particularly because of the use of universal Tutsi symbols), as they posted responsive CMCs referencing regret about how many Tutsi were killed, or asking a question about what it was like to be Tutsi now. Often the Hutu online identities did not correct them, but rather accepted their condolences, often using the exchange as an opportunity to introduce an alternate genocide narrative.

A holistic review of many of the online identities’ CMCs and SNSs during the month of genocide commemoration revealed a strong tendency to denigrate Tutsi commemorations and Tutsi genocide survivors. Many CMCs internal to the network included comments criticizing or even ridiculing Tutsis who attended the commemorations, particularly those who expressed emotions, such as crying. For instance, many of the online identities that facilitated online genocide commemorations were members of the “Bagosora, Theoneste” Facebook page. Another example of denigrating Tutsi genocide survivors involves an article featuring the official Tutsi commemoration held in

67 The Tutsi genocide began on April 6, 1994, and the military incursion into the Kibeho refugee camp in southwest Rwanda occurred on April 27, 1995.
Washington, DC in 2011 with a photograph of a Tutsi survivor crying. The article was reposted throughout the virtual network, and included a range of derogatory comments, including an online identity asking: “Are these fake tears?”

The few Tutsi online identities that did attempt to challenge the narrative of the Hutu diaspora through posting challenging statements online, by appearing at demonstrations as a counter force or by appearing at a public debate later published on a YouTube channel, experienced an overwhelmingly aggressive response by the online identities in the virtual network. For instance, YouTube videos of public debates demonstrated that the debates were often widely attended by Hutus in the diaspora, many of whom appeared to overwhelm participating Tutsis with vehement and aggressive responses, (sometimes screaming). Online identities self-identifying as Tutsi, and Tutsi counter-demonstrators were often confronted with accusations that they were “paid agents” for President Kagame, RPF spies and informants. This dynamic was particularly prevalent if Tutsis identified themselves as genocide survivors.

For instance, an online identity posted a CMC with a linked newspaper article about a group of Tutsi genocide survivors in the diaspora who demonstrated against the presence of high profile Hutus in the diaspora giving a public speech at an event at a Martin Luther King exhibit in Europe, focusing on peace and reconciliation. The Hutu speaker was a self-described member of the Hutu diaspora, and the leader of a political opposition group with strong ties to the former regime. Although the speaker consistently testified on behalf of genocidaires prosecuted by the ICTR, and had a strong online presence where he consistently espoused anti-Tutsi ideology and genocide denial, he presented himself to Western audiences as a human rights activist who actively advocated for truth and reconciliation between the Tutsis and Hutus.

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68 As explored in Chapter 4, Theoneste Bagosora was a former high-ranking leader in Rwanda’s military under Habyarimana who took control of the country after Habyarimana’s death was widely believed to be the architect of the genocide.
Tutsis in the diaspora wrote letters of protest and demonstrated at the event. One CMC posted by an online identity included in the study referred to the Tutsi demonstrators not as genocide survivors, but as “self-described survivors of the Rwandan genocide,” with responders within the network claiming that Tutsis who demonstrated were all paid by the RPF, and even included an amount of money. Another online identity, self-identified as a Tutsi genocide survivor group, challenged this allegation, citing the nature of the grievances of the Tutsi demonstrators. One online identity included in the study responded with sarcasm, claiming to be applauding at the Tutsi’s ability to “read the script” of Kagame so well. What is noteworthy about this exchange was that it served as an example of a consistent and collective response leveled at any Tutsi in the diaspora who challenged the narrative of the online identities in the virtual network. There was not a single incidence found within the data, or during the ethnographic immersion that demonstrated an attempt to engage self-identified Tutsis who responded online in an authentic and constructive manner. Rather, the accusations of alliance with and allegiance to President Kagame and the RPF were swift and definitive.

**Allegations of Ongoing Perpetration of Genocide Against the Hutu**

Numerous CMCs included content expressing the belief that the RPF was continuing to target Hutus for extermination. Often these allegations were focused on the current conflicts in the DRC, but some referenced any high profile development initiative undertaken within Rwanda. For instance, Rwanda’s “No-Scalpel Vasectomy” program was the target of numerous CMCs that arose in various thematic categories within the data (ethnic identity, anti-Kagame propaganda, etc.). Many of these CMCs accused the Rwandan government of targeting only Hutus with this program, thus the accusations most frequently leveled included passionate pleas for the international community to intervene and stop the most recent genocide on the Hutu population.

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69 This high level online identity’s testimony for the defense on behalf of a leader in the genocide charged and subsequently convicted by the ICTR was included as data in the study.
In fact, hundreds of CMCs leveled accusations of genocide against the Hutu population, including an article on the FDU-Inkingi website, entitled “Is the U.S. Government Funding a Silent Genocide in Rwanda?” The article’s author, the party spokesperson, argued that the real goal of the program was to compel all Hutu men to undergo a vasectomy, in order to annihilate the Hutu race. The author represented Hutus as being ethnically different, and thus in need of international protection. His conclusion that the vasectomy program constituted genocide against the Hutu population was based on the UN Convention against Genocide, which includes the following criteria: “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.” The author concluded: “what’s taking place since 2006 is actually a silent genocide targeting the Hutu community.”

Another online identity wrote several CMCs making similar statements, such as “Vasectomy in Rwanda or legalization of genocide against Hutu majority?” and “The eugenic acts actually practiced in Rwanda are ones in which the intended result is the Hutu ethnic member’s loss of the ability to reproduce,” and “Unlawful acts of tubal ligation, vasectomy, and other such medical procedures are already used by the Tutsi-led minority ethnic government and not yet reported to the public opinion. In all circumstances, these non medical acts are primarily used to exterminate undesirables through forced sterilization.”

**Creating International Coalitions as Partners in Genocide Denial**

Throughout the ethnographic immersion several CMCs were posted by Western organizations and online identities, many of which engaged in genocide denial and historical revisionism for what appeared to be self-serving purposes, including the often extensive praise received by members of the Hutu diaspora (e.g., including receipt of humanitarian awards, CMCs praising their expertise and intelligence), as well as for the promotion of their careers.

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70 As with other online identities Westerners who engaged online under their real names were not included in the study, thus the information contained in this section on international allies is limited in order to remain in compliance with the ethical guidelines adopted in this study.
through the promotion of Western allies’ career-related events, speaking engagements, and publications. Such Western online identities were primarily academics, Western human rights activists, and self-described online journalists (or human rights activists who advocated through online journalism). Although some online identities responded negatively to Western advocacy (i.e., referencing Africa not needing Western rescuers), most applauded such efforts to negate the Tutsi genocide narrative. Oftentimes, it appeared as though the online identities were in fact recruiting Westerners by engaging them in dialogue (e.g., online requests to join various online groups), and promoting their activities within the network.

The online identities included in the study engaged the international community in a variety of ways, including sending the Western identities e-vites to online and offline events, as well as inviting them to speak at Hutu commemorations, debates, and various speaking events, often hosted at universities and churches. Westerners were also asked to partner in charity fund-raising events, and in the creation of NGOs. Academics were often asked by online identities to host Hutu diaspora groups as speakers at university events. Additionally, academics, human rights activists and Rwandan diaspora online identities often worked in concert to organize anti-Kagame demonstrations where genocide denials were disseminated.

**Anti-Kagame Propaganda**

As referenced earlier, a significant portion of the CMCs posted on SNSs evaluated in this study focused on Paul Kagame, the current president of Rwanda. The CMCs not only vehemently attacked his leadership of Rwanda, but were also quite personal in nature, holding him directly responsible for the challenges the country and region face (historically and currently), and personally blaming him for the deaths of up to six million Hutus. Additionally, many CMCs attacked the president's wife and children.

Very few of the CMCs included in the study involved productive discussions on a political level, but when an online identity did attempt to engage in higher level discussions the dialogue quickly escalated to
derogatory and inflammatory language, such as name-calling, as well as the posting of “doctored” photographs, and offensive cartoons featuring Kagame engaging in various compromising and egregious activities. The data revealed numerous CMCs in the form of postings of linked news articles, shared statuses on SNSs, and originally generated textual artifacts in the form of online news articles and blogs, often involving derogatory and highly critical allegations against the president. The dissemination of such CMCs appeared to fall within two categories, 1) the dissemination of anti-Kagame propaganda within the network through the posting of CMCs on SNSs; and 2) the dissemination of anti-Kagame propaganda outside of the network, primarily through off-line demonstrations protesting the president’s appearances outside of Rwanda, as well as lobbying the international community against President Kagame.

Anti-Kagame Propaganda Disseminated within the Virtual Network

The data revealed a considerable amount of anti-Kagame propaganda disseminated throughout the virtual network, using a range SNSs, such as Facebook, Twitter, and online newspapers. The in-network activities involved both the general dissemination of derogatory photographs and commentary, as well as in-network mobilization for off-line activity. In the latter instance, anti-Kagame propaganda also included the posting of photographs and commentary published online and used in offline activities.

In most CMCs containing anti-Kagame propaganda, the president was consistently called derogatory names such as “War Criminal,” “Genocidaire,” “The Butcher of Kigali,” “Pilato”71, “Killer Kagame,” “Antichrist of Rwanda,” and “Murder Kagame.” Additionally, numerous cultural and textual artifacts made comparisons between Kagame and Hitler, both in more formal articles analyzing political dynamics, as well as informal CMCs, photographs and cartoons. In fact, Kagame was frequently referred to as the “Hitler of Africa.” Additionally, a significant portion of online communication centered on making

71 A nickname for Pontius Pilote
fun of Kagame, through the posting of derogatory photographs that were clearly doctored, as well as cartoons designed to be offensive. For instance, one photograph that was disseminated widely throughout the virtual network, and often used as a profile photo for anti-Kagame groups, depicted a photograph of Kagame that made it appear as though he was Adolph Hitler, wearing a Nazi uniform and making a Nazi salute. The caption on many of the Hitler photographs read “Heil Kagame!”

Doctored photographs of President Kagame often accompanied CMCs accusing him of being a serial murderer. For example, several photographs that were disseminated quite widely throughout the virtual network depicted Kagame with blood dripping down his face and vampire teeth, or with wild red eyes and rather mangled and jagged teeth. Photographs of President Kagame inserted into online articles of a serious political nature were often extremely unflattering, featuring Kagame with squinting eyes and an exaggerated frown. Although not overtly doctored, they appeared to have been digitally enhanced to make facial lines more pronounced.

Examples of offensive cartoons include one with President Kagame bare-chested, wearing only boxer shorts made from a USA flag, and the words: “Its only me Kagame that has killed 6 million” inside a speech bubble coming from his mouth, contained the caption: “The Cold Blooded Killer of Congolese.” Another cartoon was posted in the midst of numerous online discussions about the president being invited to the U.S. to be a keynote speaker and award recipient at a university commencement. The cartoon featured the president wearing academic regalia and holding a scroll, with an exaggerated grimace, and the caption: “Criminal Awards.”

Many online identities appeared to be quite proficient at using online photo enhancing programs enabling professional-looking photo enhancements and scenario creations. For instance, one photograph that was widely disseminated depicted a distorted and unflattering photograph of President Kagame’s face superimposed on a Time Magazine cover with the caption “THE CHANGE WE NEED?” and the sub-caption: “Heil Kagame Welcome
Back to the 30’s.” Numerous photographs superimposed Kagame’s face onto the Kony 2012 campaign poster. One such CMC included the caption: “Join our hands together to make the true Kony 2012 be seen, the world should know who is the true Kony, and here he is…” Another photograph/cartoon seemed to incorporate a variety of these themes by featuring a doctored photograph of Kagame’s face in the middle of a “spray” of machine guns made to appear as wings. The commentary included the following:

I PAUL KAGAME AS A WAR CRIMINAL I WAS BORN A KILLER I PROVE IT BY THE 6 MILLION PEOPLE I HAVE KILLED SO FAR. THANK GOD FOR MY BROTHER FROM ANOTHER MOTHER BILL CLINTON WHO BLESSED ME WITH ALL THESE GUNS TO KILL AND DESTROY INNOCENT PEOPLE AND FOR YOUR INFORMATION I DON’T CARE IF YOU ALL DIE AND I CAN KILL ANYONE ANYTIME!!! [Photo] ALL-TIME NUMBER ONE KILLER NUMBER ONE WORLD KILLER TIPS: IF YOU WANT TO TAKE MY TITLE SAY NO TO JUSTICE SAY NO TO DEMOCRACY, NEVER GIVE PEOPLE FREEDOM JAIL ANYONE WHO DOES NOT AGREE WITH YOUR PLANS NEVER LISTEN TO ANYONE. JUST KILL OPPOSITION LEADERS JOURNALISTS, SHUT DOWN MEDIAS, AND FINALLY TO ENJOY WHAT I AM ENJOYING GET BIG DEALS WITH BIG PEOPLE LIKE BILL CLINTON, TONY BLAIR DO SMALL JOB LIKE WHAT I DID IN DRC CONGO BY KILLING 6 MILION AND GIVING THEM A HIGHWAY TO THE BLOOD MINERALS THEY NEED…. THANK YOU ALL.


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72 This photograph was erroneously labeled as Dominique Ntawukuriryayo, the former sub-prefect of a city in southern Rwanda convicted for genocide crimes in 2010 by the ICTR.
killed millions of RWANDANS,” Paul Kagame “MURDERER 2004…shot
Habyarimana plane & Killed him & Ntaryamira of Burundi.” This CMC was
posted with a status that stated: “RWANDAN LEADERS, HEROS,
BETRAYOERS, AND MURDERS IN THIS PICTURE” (see Appendix Q for
examples of derogatory photographs of President Kagame).

Textual artifacts incorporating anti-Kagame propaganda often
accompanied the linking of online news articles involving past and/or current
affairs of a political nature. At times the articles were generated from the
mainstream media (e.g., BBC, Reuters, etc.), but often the articles were
authored by online identities from within the virtual network. These linked
articles were often posted with editorializing comments that were highly critical
of the president and the RPF. For instance, an article that was authored by an
opposition group and widely disseminated throughout the virtual network
focused on changes made within the Rwandan government (shifting of official
posts, etc.). The status comment included by the poster stated: “That fool of
Tutsi has not finished talking about him [sic], the man of blood, who kills
without regret, he knows: that kills by sword, perished by the sword…Your day
will come….,” Another example of text-based propaganda included the linking
of an online article published on BBC UK online announcing that President
Kagame would be on live on the air answering questions on a special edition
of the BBC radio show “Africa Have Your Say.” The widely disseminated CMC
included a link to the story with a CMC stating: “The super killer will be on
Africa have your say, can anyone ask him where he buried the Hutus he killed
in TingiTingi?” This CMC also serves as an example of how President
Kagame is consistently held personally responsible for virtually all cited
atrocities against the Hutus, rather than being held responsible in a collective
sense.

Another particularly noteworthy pattern revealed in the data was the
nature of language and choice of words used within the virtual network
compared to dialogue directed to those outside the network (i.e., Westerners).
This pattern related to tone as well as to how President Kagame was
referenced. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, language used internally within the virtual network in the course of political engagement was often rife with aggressive language and informal tone. When communication was directed outside of the network to Western audiences, the tone of CMCs was often very formal, and included language rooted in themes of democracy, human rights and reconciliation. This pattern was particularly the case when the focus of the CMC was President Kagame. For instance, the online identities consistently used the title “President Kagame” when directing their comments toward Western audiences, and “General Kagame,” when their comments were directed toward those within the virtual network. 73

**Anti-Kagame Propaganda Disseminated Outside of the Network:**

*Mobilizing and Lobbying*

A considerable amount of anti-Kagame propaganda was generated in the process of mobilizing for demonstrations, and lobbying Western audiences. Although the mobilizing to act against Kagame occurred for the most part within the virtual network, the lobbying engaged in by the online identities consistently engaged members outside the network with the goal of changing public opinion within host countries, as well as lobbying the international community to take action against President Kagame in some manner.

With regard to anti-Kagame demonstrations, the data revealed that a demonstration protesting the appearance of President Kagame was held on the majority of occasions that the president visited a host country where diaspora resided. The online identities consistently engaged in online and offline activities that appeared to be focused on lobbying those outside the network for the purposes of disrupting Kagame’s travels in some manner. In fact, during the ethnographic immersion there were at least 26 online mobilization events where the online identities included in the study used SNSs to mobilize those in the network, as well as those in the general public,

73 There were some deviations from this pattern, particularly with CMCs that were directed to both
to lobby the host government and/or inviting organization to cancel Kagame’s visit. Mobilizing efforts also involved engaging those outside the network to attend demonstrations protesting the president’s appearance at an international venue. The most likely candidates to attend these protests were Western university students (see Appendix R for examples of anti-Kagame demonstrations organized online identities using SNSs).

Examples of some events that the online identities attempted to disrupt include various UN meetings, including Security Council meetings in New York, and the MDG progress meetings in Spain in 2012, official meetings with other Heads of State and government dignitaries in the U.S. and Europe, diaspora events such as the annual “Rwanda Day” events, and speeches at universities in the United States and Europe. The data revealed that online identities would post “e-vites” on a range of SNSs, including Facebook announcing a peaceful protest, as well as posting urgent “calls to action” pleading with those inside and outside the network to barrage hosting governments and organizations (e.g., the UN, politicians in the hosting country, the hosting university, etc.) with emails, phone calls and faxes condemning their agreement to host a “war criminal” and “Genocidaire.” Often such information was accompanied by inflammatory information explored earlier in this chapter, such as gruesome photographs of severed limbs with claims that President Kagame was responsible for genocides in Rwanda and the Congo. Facebook was often used as the mobilizing site where online identities would mobilize and disseminate information, including reporting back on their progress. Captions included in anti-Kagame material were often quite inflammatory and appeared to be designed to frighten hosting organizations, such as the following CMC: “Experts warn that if War Criminal Kagame is hosted at [...] violence will break out.”

When the president was invited to speak at a university commencement, for instance, the online identities would often lobby the university’s professors, appealing to their commitment to human rights. In
some instances, online identities even posted names and contact information of university personnel online, as well as a script with an urgent appeal for others to continue the lobbying until they were successful in pressuring the university to cancel Kagame’s appearance. The data also revealed that after a protest demonstration SNSs were used to disseminate CMCs describing the success of the demonstrations, and the damage it caused to the president. CMCs included textual descriptions, linked articles, photographs and YouTube videos of the demonstration. These descriptions often included commentary, at times exaggerated, describing the large turnouts at the demonstrations and low turnouts at the hosted event (see Appendix S for examples of mobilizing and lobbying focused on anti-Kagame demonstrations).

Overall the ethnographic analysis of the data revealed clear but overlapping themes that demonstrated various ways in which political activities were facilitated online by Rwandan diaspora residing in Western countries, with a particular focus on the Rwandan conflict between Hutus and Tutsis. An analysis of these results and a discussion of their contextual position within existing literature on CGD political engagement in homeland affairs and conflict will be explored in Chapter 7.
CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

There exists a relatively well-developed knowledge base within the literature on diaspora in general (see Cohen, 1996 and Safran, 1991, 1999, 2010), as well as on diaspora populations within contemporary contexts, both including a now-established literature devoted to the CGD typology (see Collier and Hoeffler, 2000, 2002; Demmers, 2005; Horst, 2008; Lyons, 2004; Mohamoud, 2005). The literature devoted to diaspora as external actors in homeland conflict, while newer, is growing rapidly, particularly in light of the recent increase in armed civil conflict in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (SIPRI, 1993, 2008). Although research focusing on collective diaspora political activities in homeland affairs has garnered considerable recent attention among scholars (see Brinkerhoff, 2009, 2012; Cheran, 2003; Cohen, 1996; Demmers, 2005; Horst, 2008; Lyons, 2004, 2006ab; Mohamoud, 2005; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Vertovec, 2005; Wayland, 2004), research focusing on the nature of CGD use of ICTs (particularly social media and networking sites) within virtual transnational networks, while gaining increased interest, remains largely unexplored as a distinct area of focus.

This study set out to answer several questions about Rwandan CGD, including whether the attitudes and activities of those diaspora members engaging politically in homeland affairs conform to the current literatures on diaspora. This study also addressed questions about the how Rwandan CGD use the Internet for political purposes, particularly social media, including how their virtual networks and communities are structured and utilized for the purposes of political engagement, mobilization and action. Additionally, this study set out to explore any significant differences between internal and external narratives—In other words, were there differences in perceptions, attitudes, methods and narratives when diaspora members were communicating amongst each other compared to when they were engaging those outside of their network, particularly Western audiences. Finally, while focused far more on process than effect, this study set out to explore the
nature of what diaspora members hoped to achieve (purported and actual aims) as a result of their political engagement in homeland conflict, with a particular focus on the impact diaspora online political engagement had on the conflict cycle in the home country of Rwanda, and surrounding regions.

Several conceptual models on CGD activities and motivations to act have been developed, and these conceptual models continue to evolve as more case studies are carried out on a range of diaspora populations. Currently, there is a growing consensus among diaspora scholars that diaspora communities, particularly those generated from conflict, are becoming powerful external actors in conflict, a dynamic that is being significantly facilitated by the forces of globalization, particularly the Internet. According to the conceptual models developed by scholars such as Lyons, Brinkerhoff, Demmers and Østergaard-Nielson, CGDs have a strong tendency to view their homelands in mythical terms, and are often motivated to return home in order to restore their homelands to their prior conditions. These conceptual models, (as well as other theories in diaspora typologies) posit that CGD are often motivated to act in large part due to the nature of their forced dispersal, including trauma they may have endured both during the conflict, and during their rapid and often violent departure. Thus, the conditions that influence how diaspora feel about their homelands and consequently motivate them to engage in homeland dynamics are in large part influenced by the violence they experienced, and in some cases perpetrated, individually as well as collectively.

The themes that emerged through the ethnographic analysis of the data revealed that the Rwandan CGD that engaged in cyberactivism, particularly in relation to homeland conflict, were overwhelmingly Hutu. Although the failure to locate any Tutsi-dominated SNSs focusing on homeland conflict on a political level was initially unexpected, several scholars have intimated that it is the CGD members who are forced to migrate due to conflict, and who are aligned against their home country governments who are most likely to engage in homeland conflict on a political level. With regard to Rwanda, the
primary political party is the RPF, which despite attempts to become ethnically integrated, remains Tutsi dominated, at least with regard to its leadership. Thus, it would make sense that the CGD members who would be engaged in homeland conflict using the Internet would be Hutus. Additionally, it may be possible that Tutsi CGD are also engaged in the use of social media, but at the present time are engaging primarily on a social and humanitarian level.

Generally, the CMCs included in this study demonstrated attitudes, perceptions and activities that were highly consistent with contemporary diaspora conceptual models and typologies, particularly those put forth by Lyons, Brinkerhoff, Demmers and Østergaard-Nielson. For instance, as explored earlier, Lyons’ conceptual model posits that it is the homeland conflict that drives CGD identity, their relationship with homeland, as well as their transnational political practices. Lyons’ model also asserts that ethnonationalist diaspora generated from conflict are distinguished from other migrant groups by the cause of their migration; the nature of their relationship with their homeland influenced by the violent nature of their forced dispersal; their relationship with their host country; and their tendency to develop transnational networks used to reinforce their identity, as well as for a platform for political engagement.

The CMCs posted on various SNSs of the Rwandan CGD included in the study displayed an orientation toward homeland that was quite similar to Lyons’ typology including the tendency to conceptualize Rwanda in romanticized and nostalgic terms, amply demonstrated in terms used to describe their former homeland, as well as the cultural artifacts posted reflecting pre-genocide Rwanda. The dynamics of an imagined homeland and the myth of return appear to have been made stronger by the ethnonationalist nature of the historic conflict in Rwanda, as well as the fact that the diaspora identities included in the study were Hutu, since a diligent search of SNSs facilitated by both ethnic groups was unsuccessful. Lyons (2004) also noted how CGD were less likely to use SNSs for everyday issues, such as acculturation, and more likely to use SNSs to focus on the original conflict in
the territory of their homeland. This was certainly true for the Rwandan diaspora included in the study in that the majority of CMCs posted in their virtual network were focused on the 1990 to 1994 civil war in Rwanda, as well as subsequent conflicts emanating out of the civil spilling into then Zaire.

**Themes Related to Identity as A Hutu in Exile**

The Rwandan diaspora’s conceptualizations of their former Rwanda appeared largely influenced by their identity as members of the Hutu ethnic group, including their collective belief in the false Belgian narrative that Hutus were the original inhabitants of Rwanda, and that Tutsis were foreign invaders (the Hamitic Myth). Ethnonationalism also appeared to strongly influence the identity formation and expression of those diaspora engaging in online activities within the virtual network. Additionally, a strong theme that emerged in the analysis of the data demonstrated what Brinkerhoff (2008) refers to as “victim diaspora,” where a diaspora group develops a collective perception that they were the victims in the original conflict, which then serves as motivation to act. In fact, the manner in which ethnonationalist identity manifested within the Hutu diaspora population included in the study appeared to be highly influenced by the pre-genocide propaganda campaign, which was in large part based on numerous false narratives about Rwanda’s historic and recent past, including the nature of Hutu-Tutsi relations, the perceived history of Hutu victimhood (at the hands of Tutsis, as well as the international community), as well as a deeply rooted conceptualization of the positive character of Hutus, which was often juxtaposed with the negative character of Tutsis.

CMCs that demonstrated strong themes of identity also revealed that the Hutu diaspora included in the study defended and even guarded their ethnic identity rather fiercely, and perceived most attempts to present well documented and widely accepted narratives about the controversial nature of the Hutu/Tutsi ethnic group dichotomy, as threats to their Hutu identity. What was interesting to note, and what contributes significantly to the knowledge base on diasporic identity expression, was the pattern noted in diaspora narratives directed toward external audiences that espoused far more
conciliatory attitudes, particularly toward Tutsis in general, whereas intra-diasporic narratives demonstrated far more rigid and uncompromising attitudes, particularly relating to any dynamic that was perceived to dilute or threaten Hutu identity, such as the Rwandan government’s decision to no longer include ethnic membership on national identity cards.

The collective identity expressed in the Rwandan diaspora included in the study also revealed strong elements of in-group/out-group dynamics described by Bradatan, Popon and Melton (2010). These demarcations were based on the perception that they were co-ethnics (Hutu), thus as Smith (1991) noted, in general terms, all Hutus were “bound by historical forces, both with regard to national identity as well as a perceived historical culture, involving culturally-based myths believed to be rooted in pre-modern ethnic identities.” As explored earlier, according to Bradatan, Popon and Melton (2010) social identity is strengthened when group membership is difficult to attain, such as when membership is based on a belief in common ethnic ancestry. Thus groups based on shared ethnic membership tend to have rigid boundaries making joining difficult since there is a requirement of being “bonded by blood” (Conner, 1997). Not only was this perception strongly expressed throughout the data, but it was interesting to note that alliances with Tutsis (as was the case with a newer political opposition group claiming to be inclusive) were tenuous at best, with numerous references made to fearing that the Tutsis in exile who at were at odds with the current government of Rwanda, and who had joined forces with Hutu opposition groups, were at their core self-serving and would ultimately abandon and betray Hutus when they all returned to Rwanda.

The in-group/out-group dynamic was also expressed when Hutus challenged traditional narratives espoused by the group. Hutus who veered off course in their ideology were commonly called traitors and at time subjected to online bullying, while Tutsis were consistently cast as outsiders, and treated collectively as threats, as well as other out-group dehumanizing characterizations, such as being referred to as crickets (Inyenzi), and “RPF
moles” – a dynamic that Bain, Kashima, & Haslam (2006) referred to as infrahumanization. And while CMCs directed toward international allies and Western audiences generally demonstrated attitudes of openness, flexibility, and compromise, with an overriding commitment to peace, internal dialogues demonstrated very strong in-group/out-group dynamics inherent in groups based on ethnonationalism. These dynamics also were consistent with Lyons’ (2005) and Demmers’ (2005) assertions that a lessening of group boundaries, a requirement for authentic compromise and reconciliation would be threatening to CGD’s sense of identity, particularly when the collective identity is based on a historic sense of victimhood.

Overall, in the case of Rwanda, it appears that the typology of conflict-generated diaspora not only applies quite strongly, but that Rwanda’s strong history of ethnonationalism and violence culminating in genocide appears to have increased the intensity of the diasporic dynamics noted in the literature. Thus the motivations and transnational activities of the Rwandan diaspora included in the study must be considered within the context of the extended propaganda campaign and genocide against the Tutsi.

**Themes Related to Diaspora Political Engagement in Virtual Transnational Networks**

The data clearly revealed that Rwandan diaspora members included in the study operated within large, seemingly cohesive and well-organized transnational networks, both in online and offline domains. The data also revealed that those Rwandan diaspora included in the study were prolific users of the Internet, particularly with regard to maximizing the functionality of SNSs for the purposes of political engagement. In most respects, the data revealed that the Rwandan CGD expressed attitudes and engaged in activities in ways that were consistent with the literature on similar populations, particularly the literature focusing on ways in which diaspora relate to their respective homelands. For instance, several scholars noted how the Internet is increasingly the medium of choice for migrant and ethnic populations, particularly for the purposes of mobilization and recruitment for a range of
political activities and social movements (Akin, 2011; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Demmers, 2007; Fullilove, 2008; Lyons, 2004, 2006a, 2006b; Østergaard-Nielson, 2006, Vertovec, 2005). Further, as explored in previous chapters, several scholars noted how CGD relate to their homelands in ways that are tangibly different from other migrants groups (such as voluntary/economic migrants) (Lyons, 2004, 2007; Mohamoud, 2005).

The extent to which the Rwandan diaspora included in the study utilized the Internet for political purposes supports these assertions, particularly with regard to the emergent theme of how the Hutu online identities used SNSs to relate to their homeland politically. For instance, the high rate at which the online identities were able to network with each other, how they networked their various SNSs, as well as the way in which the network facilitated political activities in online and offline spheres demonstrated a high level of sophistication with technology, as well as with how SNSs function. In fact, it was clear that many of the diaspora identities were aware of new functions offered by the various SNSs, as soon as they were offered, particularly those functions that increased the reach and power of their online communication.

The nature of the Rwandan CGDs’ transnational political engagement mirrored those found in case studies conducted on other diaspora groups generated from ethnonationalist conflict. This was particularly the case with Mohamoud’s (2005) and Lyon’s (2004) work on ways that diaspora may contribute to conflict in the home country by engaging in political activities focusing on destabilizing the home country, by means such as lobbying the international community to act against the homeland, or funding rebel groups still engaging in regional fighting against the homeland government (Collier and Hoefler, 2000, 2002; Demmers, 2005; Horst, 2008; Mohamoud, 2005; Lyons, 2004).

Although the data did not reveal a direct connection between diasporic fundraising and rebel support, several indirect connections were revealed, including some diaspora identities representing or linked to Hutu political opposition groups supporting the FDLR, which raised funds through non-
political charities purporting to support humanitarian causes in Africa. Additionally, the Rwandan diaspora’s use of the Internet to facilitate their transnational political engagement included mobilizing others to their cause, disseminating information (including propaganda against the current Rwandan government), supporting rival political groups, and acting as a political wing of a rebel group, most notably in this case, the FDLR (see Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; Demmers, 2007; Lyons, 2004; Mohamoud, 2005).

As explored earlier, several diaspora scholars, including Wayland (2004) have noted how diaspora often become involved in home country dynamics on a political level by forming ties with co-ethnics across the globe, and seeing the support of “international allies” in their collective activities. A significant component of diaspora political engagement according to the literature involved political lobbying (cyberactivism) for diaspora causes, which in the case of CGD fighting against the new home country government, most often involved lobbying the host country against the home country (Lyons and Uçarer, 1998; Mohamoud, 2005, Smith, 2007). Although the Rwandan diaspora included in the study used the Internet for a range of purposes (including social interaction, providing social support, and reminiscing), one of the most frequent online activities involved aggressive and persistent lobbying against the Rwandan government, by taking advantage of political opportunity structures of their host countries, particularly the United States, in order to influence foreign policy (see Brinkerhoff, 2009; Baser and Swain, 2009 and Shain, 1994, 2002).

Despite differences in the nature of their conflicts and migration experiences, the Rwandan CGD exhibited strikingly similar characteristics in both motivations and activities as Østergaard-Nielsen’s study of conflict-generated Kurdish refugees, Bernal’s (2006) study of conflict-generated Eritrean diaspora, and Lyons’ study of conflict-generated Ethiopian diaspora. For instance, as explored earlier, the Ethiopian diaspora in Lyons’ study used blogs, newsgroups, and websites to lobby the U.S. government demanding that they act against the new ruling government of Ethiopia. Additionally, they
used the Internet to facilitate well-coordinated and simultaneous lobbying efforts of international organizations, such as NGOs, the European Union and the UN (Lyons, 2005, 2007). Consistent with Bernal’s (2006) study of Eritrean diaspora, nearly all lobbying and cyberactivism engaged in by the Rwandan diaspora included in the study were aimed at impacting international perceptions of the Rwandan government, particularly President Kagame, with the goal of influencing the international community to reduce support for Rwanda. For instance, the Rwandan diaspora used the Internet to disseminate negative propaganda about the Rwandan government, as well as Tutsis in general, including allegations of past and present human rights violations. Some of these accusations were clearly exaggerated, such as the claims that the Rwandan government was committing genocide against Hutus through the “No Scalpel Vasectomy Program.” Other aims of Rwandan diaspora cyberactivism included demands that the international community reduced aid if Rwanda didn’t comply with a host of Hutu diaspora demands, including engaging in talks with the FDLR. Lobbying also included demands that government leaders refuse to meet with Kagame, and inviting organization “disinvite” Kagame from speaking engagements. In fact, a key goal of the diaspora cyberactivism appeared to be to humiliate President Kagame at almost any cost.

Political lobbying and cyberactivism by the Rwandan diaspora occurred both “in the Net,” and “through the Net” with real world activities being facilitated and/or bolstered by online activities (Morris & Langman, 2002). Examples of “in the Net” activities included using SNSs to facilitate online petitions, email-writing campaigns, and the dissemination of propaganda against the current Rwandan government. Examples of “through the Net” activities included using the Internet to mobilize, recruit and facilitate real world activism such as attending anti-Kagame demonstrations, and meeting with U.S. State Department officials, U.S. legislators, and UN delegates, in a manner similar to the findings of Lyons (2007) and Vertovec (2005).
The data also revealed several instances of the Internet being used for what Carty and Onyett (2006) describe as swarming, (see Chapter Three), where the Internet is used to virtually mobilize multiple online groups that appear at live demonstrations, making it appear as though the demonstrations are spontaneous, when in actuality, they are organized through the Internet. The data also revealed incidences of swarming by “smart mobs,” where mobilization occurs among complete strangers, and results in aggressive attempts to overwhelm a subject in order to compel compliance of some type. The Rwandan diaspora’s proficient ability to use the Internet to mobilize others to action on a global basis, including complete strangers, both within the broader Hutu diaspora community, as well as within the “Western world” was quite important, particularly in light of Rheingold’s (2002) observation that the mobilization of complete strangers who are spread widely geographically renders the social movement almost impossible to ‘decapitate.” As explored earlier, Rheingold cites the example of how smart mobs successfully ousted the Philippine president after multiple mass demonstrations were organized solely via text messaging.

The data in the current study revealed a similar dynamic of “swarming” by “smart mobs,” particularly in relation to online identities’ significant negative focus on President Kagame. As referenced in previous sections, President Kagame was the target of the majority of CMCs, whether within the context of defending Hutu identity, political mobilization and lobbying, or genocide denial and historical revisionism. For example, a significant amount of energy appeared to be invested in harassing, bullying and humiliating the current Rwandan president, through prolific dissemination of negative propaganda about him, facilitation of anti-Kagame demonstrations, as well as lobbying the international community to act against the president in some manner. The latter activity often included the targeting and even bullying of individuals within the international community who invited the president to speak, or who gave the president an award of some kind. The data demonstrated multiple incidences of diaspora online identities mobilizing others to “swarm” Kagame’s
hosts in a manner that was clearly intended to intimidate them into withdrawing their support and/or invitation. Also as previously referenced, the online identities often posted reports of their successes, including claims of foreign dignitaries who had allegedly succumbed to the campaign of harassment by refusing to meet with President Kagame. Although one might argue that such tactics are warranted if in fact a foreign leader is a ruthless dictator (as alleged by the Rwandan online identities) without an empirical study designed to evaluate the level of influence the relentless dissemination of false propaganda about a foreign leader and/or government has on the development of public perceptions, it is impossible to assess whether such tactics are, in the words of Østergaard-Nielsen (2006) the actions of altruistic freedom fighters, or of irresponsible long distance nationalists.

The online political activities of the Rwandan CGD were also quite similar to Egyptians’ use of online platforms in the recent overthrow of the Mubarak regime, particularly with regard to how Facebook and Twitter were used. For instance, the Tahrir Project found that Facebook and Twitter were used to disseminate news, to increase international awareness, to mobilize and recruit supporters, to coordinate protests, to inspire political activism, and to expose human rights violations. The Egyptians’ use of Facebook and Twitter had the singular goal of ousting Mubarak; and the Rwandan CGD included in the study have the key, if not the singular goal of ousting President Kagame. As noted in the previous chapter, while a traditional content analysis was not conducted in the present study, the activity level of online identities relative to the greater Rwandan CGD population may indicate that the former are “power posters” within the Hutu-dominated diaspora who engaged and mobilized a broader number of diaspora members, which is consistent with the findings in the Tahrir Project, which found that the majority of “tweets” were initiated by about 200 “power users,” the majority of whom resided within the diaspora in Western countries. An interesting finding that strengthens this comparison was that the Rwandan CGD online identities often discussed overthrows of foreign leaders in their online discussions, such as the
overthrow of Mubarak and Moammar Gadhafi of Libya, and attempted to garner similar support while mimicking grassroots tactics.

**Political Activities Framed as Humanitarian**

It was also interesting to note that the Rwandan diaspora included in the study frequently framed their political activities as humanitarian efforts, and often fought the designation of their activities as being political in nature. Leaders of political opposition groups often referred to their organizations as “humanitarian organizations,” and even registered many in the U.S. as non-political charities, despite their overt political nature. This dynamic was also demonstrated in the Rwandan diaspora’s prolific use of terms pertaining to human rights as names of their online identities and online and offline organizations, including terms such as “freedom,” “justice,” “democracy,” “rights,” and “equality.” Many of the CMCs clearly demonstrated diaspora members’ awareness that this was the language of the West, and would likely increase the chance of creating international alliances. This practice among the Rwandan diaspora included in the study is consistent with Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004), and Lyons’ (2004, 2007) assertions that diaspora political activities are often masked as a fight for human rights, and as a commitment to the development of democracy in the home country, when they actually have another agenda.

Additionally, the Rwandan diaspora identities’ exaggerated claims of human rights violations (past and present) by the RPF appeared at times contrived and opportunistic, in that virtually every noted action on the part of the Rwandan government, including programs that received international praise, was the subject of harsh criticism among those diaspora identities engaging in the virtual network. Other claims of human rights violations appeared sincere, albeit often rooted in the pre-genocide propaganda campaign that scapegoated Tutsis prolifically. This practice is also consistent with Lyons’ (2007) description of how CGD often exaggerate claims of human rights violations of homeland governments because their information is outdated since they are often disconnected with the current activities in their
homeland, leading to most of their information being based on rumor. As explored previously, Lyons (2007) also describes how CGDs’ tendency to tell and retell stories of their trauma experienced during the homeland conflict freezes images of the past “making it difficult to incorporate new information that may be from “untrusted” sources” (p. 533). This may very well be the case with the diaspora identities included in the study since the majority of them self identified that they had fled Rwanda either when the RPF took control in July of 1994, or shortly thereafter.

Overall, the Rwandan diaspora included in this study used the Internet prolifically to disseminate negative propaganda about the Rwandan government, with a primary focus on President Kagame. These activities clearly had an impact on the Rwandan government, evidenced by the diaspora identities’ prolific posting of CMCs featuring their various successes. Although there was a likely certain amount of boasting and embellishment included in these CMCs, a considerable amount appeared to for the most part to accurately portray the ways in which the Rwandan government was consistently put on the defense, particularly by many mainstream media outlets and human rights organizations that allied with the diaspora identities and organizations included in the study.

Use of Online Photographic Displays

A sub-theme that was noted in the ethnographic analysis related to how the Rwandan diaspora used online photographs for a variety of purposes. Although this sub-theme was explored in the results section within the context of identity, particularly with regard to Hutu diaspora’s identity as victims, for the purposes of the discussion, it is important to explore this dynamic somewhat more broadly, particularly since the use of photographs was interrelated with several other themes, including imagined homeland, lobbying and cyberactivism, the dissemination of propaganda, genocide denial and historical revisionism and anti-Kagame propaganda. In Axel’s (2004) study on the Sikh diaspora he noted that photographs were posted online as a way of expressing feelings about their displacement, particularly as a “self-identified
A similar dynamic was noted in the present study with the Rwandan diaspora using photographic displays as a way of reflecting their status as a displaced and victimized ethnic group. Axel noted how the Sikh diaspora posted a map of their imagined homeland of “Khalistan,” a yet-to-be realized nation-state of the Sikhs. Similarly, Lyons noted how Ethiopians posted a map of their historic country that included Eritrea; and in the present study the Hutu diaspora also posted maps illustrating the pre-1994 Rwanda, with the old names of provinces prior to the current government changes.

Axel also noted how the Sikh diaspora posted collections of photographs depicting their victimization and genocide by Indian government officials, including photographs of victims being tortured and even murdered. This practice is strikingly similar to the many photographs posted in the Hutu diaspora’s virtual network of Hutu refugees purported to have been tortured and murdered by the current RPF government. The posting of such photographs online may be an important human rights tool to create awareness among broader audiences that may not be aware of the atrocities committed against a targeted population, and they may also serve as important avenues for expressing collective grief, by allowing survivors to memorialize their dead.

What was unique about the Rwandan diaspora in the current study though, was that the majority of photographs were false depictions. The majority of photographs posted by the online identities included in the study of Hutus killed by Tutsis were actually of Tutsis killed by Hutus during the genocide, or photographs of other massacres elsewhere in Africa, such as in Nigeria. The relevance of this finding is significant in that it begs the question of whether the practice of copying and pasting any photograph lifted from any website is deemed somehow justified since the victim diaspora so firmly believe that the massacres did occur, but photographic evidence cannot be located (thus finding any photograph is deemed necessary). Or alternatively, this practice may represent a new form of denial, in this case genocide denial,
where the perpetrators claim to be the victims, by “stealing” photographs as well as narratives. Regardless, it is a dynamic worthy of further exploration, particularly in light of new online search technologies (e.g., Google Image search), not available until recently.

**Use of Online Newspapers for Political Purposes**

Another way that the Rwandan CGD engaged in online activities in ways similar to other CGD groups, was in how online newspapers were used, as well as the nature of the online articles. In Skjerdal’s (2011) case study of nine Ethiopian online newspapers he found that political activism was often masked as journalism. Noting that the online newspapers did not meet journalistic standards for objectivity, Skjerdal found that the website’s articles were “presented as regular news bulletins in politicized wrapping” (p. 236). He also found that the majority of online articles were extremely negative toward the Ethiopian government.

The Ethiopian CGD online newspapers included in Skjerdal’s study, and the online newspapers included in the present study, are again, strikingly similar in a number of ways. For instance, the Ethiopian online journalists consistently referred to the Ethiopian prime minister as a “dictator,” “tyrant,” and “genocidal dictator,” which are among the very same terms that the Rwandan CGD used to refer to President Kagame. Also strikingly similar was how the Ethiopian prime minister was depicted in photographs, with horns, vampire teeth, and a long forked snake tongue, while President Kagame was also depicted in photographs and cartoons with horns, vampire teeth, and an array of other distortions intended to reflect his “evil” nature.

Another similarity between the Rwandan online identities and the Ethiopian diaspora was the way in which online journalists and newspapers were facilitated (as well as by whom). For instance, many of the online journalists operating in the Ethiopian and Rwandan CGDs had connections to political opposition groups or former politicians allied with the former regime. Additionally, both the Ethiopian and the Rwandan online newspapers facilitated by CGD allied with the former regimes displayed a lack of objectivity.
and a high level of political bias in reporting, as well as in their analysis of current events. In both cases, public participation was limited to those online identities that expressed like-minded perspectives, and journalistic independence appeared limited to perceptions and attitudes that were embraced by the political opposition parties opposed to the current governments. Hirji’s (2006) content analysis of an interactive online newspaper facilitated by Muslim diaspora living in Canada also revealed similarities to the online newspapers facilitated by Rwandan CGD, including the practice of diaspora partnering with mainstream human rights organizations working for “social justice,” the inclusion of a significant amount of commentary, editorials, and action alerts, and the superficial appearance of covering a multitude of topics, while primarily focusing on a narrow set of political issues, including the original conflict.

In the case of Rwanda, many of the online newspapers espoused narratives that were very consistent with the pre-genocide propaganda campaign, reflecting strong anti-Tutsi sentiments and were essentially used to disseminate extremely negative propaganda against the Rwandan government, with a particular focus on President Kagame. Skjerdal concluded that “given the political character of the Ethiopian diaspora websites … the immediate impression would be that the editors are primarily motivated by political activism rather than journalistic professionalism” (p. 738), which is a conclusion that clearly applies to the Rwandan diaspora online newspapers as well.

**Genocide Denial and Historical Revisionism**

One of the most significant and noteworthy findings of this study relates to how social media and social networking was used by Rwandan CGD opposed to the current Rwandan government as a way of denying and historically revising the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis. As discussed in the prior chapter, virtually all of the CMCs included in the study contained strong elements of genocide denial and/or historical revisionism. In fact, this theme was highly interrelated with the other themes that emerged in the analysis, but
remained distinct due to the very explicit ways in which social media were used to deny and/or historically revise the facts and circumstances surrounding the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi.

Differences between internal and external narratives with regard to genocide denial were significant, in that more overt denials were reserved for internal consumption, particularly those CMCs that included derogatory statements about Tutsis, such as making fun of crying Tutsis at a genocide memorial, or the membership in a public, but difficult to find Facebook group memorializing Theoneste Bagosora, the architect of the genocide. For instance, diaspora identities that lobbied Western audiences by espousing a commitment to peace and reconciliation did not disclose that they were members of the Theoneste Bagosora Facebook page, that they embraced Hutu Power ideology, or that they actively supported and/or sympathized with the FDLR. More sophisticated forms of genocide denial that included strong elements of historical revisionism were expressed more consistently with outsiders, such as Western audiences. For instance, versions of genocide denial and historical revision that were boldly expressed within the network were often suggested as alternate theories during lobbying efforts (e.g., placing the word genocide in quotations, rather than making a joke about a Tutsi survivor).

Many of the narratives espoused within the context of denying the genocide are highly consistent with the pre-genocide propaganda war, including the belief that all Tutsis were the enemy (not distinguishing between civilian Tutsis and the RPF), that Tutsis would never accept power sharing with Hutus, the belief that Hutus should rule the country because they were the majority, and the belief that Hutus were the rightful inhabitants of Rwanda, whereas Tutsis were foreign invaders (see Des Forges, 1999). Additionally, while a significant portion of genocide denial and historical revisionism was expressed in writing in the form of textual artifacts contained in a range of CMCs, genocide denial occurred in more subtle ways as well. For instance, an argument could be made that joining an online group that exists to promote
Parmehutu ideology, expressing support for an online memorial page for a former regime member, posting an online prayer asking God for protection and support of the FDLR (the remnant militia responsible for the genocide), and the conscription of photographs of Tutsis slaughtered by Hutus and displaying them online claiming the reverse, are also forms of genocide denial and historical revisionism via the Internet.

Charny’s classification system of genocide denial explored in Chapter 4 is an effective way to examine the genocide denial and historical revisionism expressed by the diaspora identities included in the study through their various SNSs. As explored in Chapter 4, Charny categorizes genocide denial into five classifications, including denial and revisionism by genocidaires (“Malevolent Bigotry”), denial by non-perpetrators for self-serving purposes, such as for the advancement of one’s career and realpolitik (“Self-serving Opportunism”), denials by non-perpetrators who cannot accept that human beings could be so evils as to commit genocide (“Innocent Denials/Innocent Disavowals of Violence”), denials leveled by academics and legal scholars who engage in debates on the legal and academic definitions of genocide for its own sake, often absent any real acknowledgement or awareness of that their scholarly debates involve real atrocities that were exacted against real people (“Definitionalism”), and denials leveled by people who are either indifferent toward the targeted group, or who have become desensitized to the horrors of past genocides due to time and the human tendency to trivialize (“Nationalistic Hubris and Human Shallowness”).

The genocide denials and historical revisionism that occurred within the virtual network included in the study fit within all of these categories, with the majority being consistent with Charny’s first, second and fourth categories. In fact, the majority of the CMCs containing content that denied and/or historically revised the circumstances surrounding the 1994 genocide were consistent with Charny’s first category, involving post-genocide denials and revisionism leveled by perpetrators or those allied and/or sympathetic to them. Although determining whether diaspora members leveling such denials were
genocidaires was beyond the scope of this study, there were numerous indications that diaspora identities engaging in the most prolific genocide denial and historical revisionism were quite sympathetic toward the genocidaires, and often stated so in their CMCs. Charny refers to a genocidaires attempt to attach some honorable meaning to the genocide, as *genocide terrorism*. Genocide terrorism can include framing the killings as authentic attempts to resist occupation and defend one’s homeland, which was a prominent rationalization used by those in the virtual network. This dynamic may also explain the rationale behind many of these same diaspora identities joining groups and engaging in online activities that elevated members of the former regime to hero status. After all, they were not genocidaires, but were heroes, attempting to save an ancestral homeland from falling into the hands of foreign invaders.

Charny also notes how genocidaires often decry post-genocide counter-attacks against them “as if it cancels the record of their genocidal actions” (p. 16). This practice describes the dynamic revealed in the study, where a significant proportion of diaspora identities consistently denounced, decried and commemorated perceived victims of extrajudicial and retaliatory killings of Hutus attempting to flee Rwanda shortly after the genocide ended, as well as those killed in military strikes against militarized Hutu refugee camps. What was particularly striking in this collective outcry of Hutu diaspora denouncing the post-genocide killings of Hutus in the DRC was that any attempt to contextualize post-genocide killings of Hutus within the context of the Tutsi genocide was largely absent. In other words, in the midst of complaints that the international community did not “start the clock” on the killings in Rwanda early enough (a reference to the belief that the killings began in October 1990, not April 6, 1994), the diaspora online identities
skipped right over the slaughter of 800,000 to 1 million Tutsis, focusing instead on the strikes against Hutus subsequent to the genocide.\textsuperscript{74}

There were also numerous incidents demonstrated in the data of genocidaires and their sympathizers engaging in what Charny describes as denials by perpetrators during genocide trials, professions of the outright innocence of the leaders of a genocide, denials that the genocide was intentional, and denials of any personal involvement in the genocide, as well as portraying genocidaires as victims, rather than perpetrators. For instance, in the letter and personal testimony of Georges Rutaganda, the Vice President of the Interahamwe, and chief organizer of Interahamwe forces, he not only forcefully and passionately defended himself and the Interahamwe in general, but he also cast the Interahamwe as victims of an international conspiracy to scapegoat the Interahamwe (and himself) as villains, when in fact they were “heroes.”

The diaspora online identities engaging in genocide denial and historical revisionism also fit what Charny described as efforts to politicize denials and historical revisions by attempting to gain the cooperation and assistance of the international community, such as democratic nations and the UN, which would lend a level of legitimacy of their denials. Rutaganda’s letter is again an example of this tactic, as are the other open letters to international figures and dignitaries, including present and former government leaders, UN officials and religious leaders. For instance, several authors wrote open letters that altered historical evidence by claiming President Kagame’s responsibility for shooting down former President Habyarimana’s plane was irrefutable and historical fact, when in fact it is not, as well as claiming that the RPF had infiltrated the Interahamwe, as evidence that the Tutsis committed genocide against themselves.

An additional example of portraying Tutsis as the perpetrators of the genocide were the prolific and overwhelming number of CMCs that attributed

\textsuperscript{74} It is not the intention of this author to trivialize any potential human rights violations against innocent Hutus, including Hutu refugees in the DRC who were and are caught between warring parties, nor is it
the genocide almost single-handedly to President Kagame. The CMCs revealed an elaborate and confusing collection of narratives in which historical truth was mixed with misrepresentations, portraying Habyarimana and his MRND as innocent, and Kagame and his RPF as responsible. This type of denial was perpetuated consistently through online textual artifacts (testimony, news articles, analysis articles, and status posts), as well as through cultural artifacts (photographs and cartoons).

Genocide denial and historical revisionism was also noted in the data fitting within Charny’s second and fourth categories, Self-Serving Opportunism and Definitionalism. Charny cites that these deniers are often the most dangerous, because they appear well intentioned and give legitimacy to the genocidaires’ causes. In the case of Rwanda, it appeared that Western allies espousing similar genocide narratives as the Rwandan CGD online identities worked in concert with the online identities included in the study. Further analysis was not pursued in this study in order to remain in compliance with the ethical guidelines used in this study, which prohibited the collection of data and from real identities– and approach that may have warranted the application of the human subject model.

Charny notes that while this type of genocide denial is quite dangerous, “peace-seeking people, including a considerable number of bona fide academics […] found in all Western countries” who engage in genocide denial and historical revisionism for self-promoting purposes related to their careers often do not intend to purposely engage in genocide denial (p. 16). He further describes these Western allies as generally “upright citizens who identify themselves with the search for truth and justice” yet who partner with deniers “because of conscious and unconscious economic or political interests served by their cooperative stances” (p. 17). The pattern of Westerners denying the Rwandan genocide for self-serving purposes by parroting the denials of “genocidaires and their sympathizers” is also reflective of Collier and Hoeffler’s earlier reference to Westerners being perceived by rebel groups as “useful

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the intention of this author to justify any retaliatory killings of Hutus by Tutsi armed forces.
idiots,” particularly those Westerners sympathetic to causes framed in human rights terms. Despite indications that this dynamic occurred, as stated in the Results section, further exploration into the nature of potential Western allies’ posts was avoided due to ethical parameters barring the inclusion of data from real identities, which would have required informed consent.

**The Impact Diaspora Political Engagement Using Social Media on the Conflict Cycle**

Several diaspora and new war scholars have explored the real and potential impact of diaspora political engagement in homeland affairs, including whether such engagement has the potential to contribute to peace or conflict. As explored in an earlier chapter, many diaspora groupings have made significant positive contributions to peace-building efforts in their homelands by serving as a conduit and liaison to warring parties, as well as by transferring knowledge gained from living in an open democracy to their home countries (Abdile, 2010; Baser & Swain, 2008; Brinkerhoff, 2006; Kent, 2005; Mohamoud, & Osman, 2008; Zunzer, 2005). Other scholars have cautioned that diaspora are powerful external actors that make peace more difficult, particularly if they possess hardline, extremist, and uncompromising attitudes (Lyons, 2004, 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006; Ramsbothem, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). Although few scholars adopted an “either/or” stance on whether CGDs have the capacity to contribute to peace (i.e., they are either “peace makers” or “peace wreckers”), numerous scholars have noted the tendency for certain diaspora groups, particularly those generated by conflict, to be motivated to keep the conflict going due to a range of collective dynamics that render compromise and authentic reconciliation threatening (Bercovitch, 2007; Lyons, 2004, 2007, Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006).

The roles played by diaspora in conflict, and the nature of the impact diaspora engagement may have is dependent upon several factors, including the size of the diaspora (relative to the in-country population), the collective strength of the diaspora, as well as their ability to organize politically (Bercovitch, 2007), the political opportunity structures available in the host
country (Smith & Stares, 2007), the level of their self-perceived victim status (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006), the consequences for diaspora if the conflict were resolved (Lyons, 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006), and the nature of the activities in which diaspora engage.

Several scholars have described the types of activities diaspora may engage in that would be more likely to result in contributions to peace, as well as those activities that are more likely to exacerbate conflict (see Bercovitch, 2007 and Mohamoud, 2005). A general consensus among diaspora scholars has evolved and holds that diaspora engaging constructively through humanitarian and social activities, will be more likely to contribute to peace-building and processes (Bercovitch, 2007; Cochrane, 2007; Cochrane, Baser & Swain, 2009; Mohamoud, 2005), whereas diaspora who engage politically in homeland affairs, will be more likely to contribute negatively, increasing the likelihood of increased conflict in the home country, as well as rendering homeland conflict more protracted. This is particularly true when CGD engage in political activities using virtual transnational networks based on an ethnonationalist agenda, with the goal of destabilizing the home country government (Anderson, 1992; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2007; Ignatieff, 2001, Kaldor, et al., 2003; Lyons, 2004).

This study focused on a distinct group of Hutu CGD who actively engaged in Rwandan politics through the development of virtual transnational networks comprised of a wide array of social media and social networking sites. The data revealed that the motivations that appeared to drive the online diaspora identities to engage politically, as well as the nature of their activities were highly consistent with other case studies on CGD political engagement. What is particularly important about the results of this study is the dramatic disparity between the diaspora’s external narrative, which was for the most part focused on peace, democracy and ethnic reconciliation, as compared to their internal narrative, which primarily demonstrated anger, rigidity, dehumanization of President Kagame, the entire Tutsi population, and an ardent refusal to cooperate with the current government of Rwanda. Thus it
was demonstrated repeatedly in the data that the online identities in the study would not deny their true intentions to another Hutu diaspora identity, but would deny their true intentions and agenda (and frequently did) to Western audiences. In fact, the online identities included in this study were quite adept at using language that would appeal to Westerners committed to the ideals of democracy, social justice and human rights, yet considerable effort was expended to mask their true intentions, and activities, particularly in relation to their collective stance on the genocide, their identification with Hutu Power ideology, and their unrelenting support for the FDLR.

Based upon the consensus of the literature, in terms of the most likely impact that diaspora political engagement in homeland affairs would have on the conflict cycle, it seems likely that the actions of the Rwandan CGD represented by the online identities included in the study are contributing to the ethnonationalist conflict in Rwanda in a negative way, and are not contributing constructively to peace-building efforts, ethnic reconciliation and democratic processes, as many of the online identities claimed. As is also consistent with the literature, the Rwandan CGD’s prolific use of the Internet to engage politically increases their reach and power, often rendering them a powerful external actor with access to technology and resources largely unavailable in Rwanda. Additionally, the fact that Rwanda experienced not solely a civil war, but genocide likely renders any dynamics related to motivations, role and impact of diaspora political engagement (particularly among Hutu diaspora allied with the former regime) far more complex.

**Contributions to the Literature And Limitations of the Study**

**CGD Online Activities and Dynamics**

Evans (2010) and Hine (2000) assert that the transferability of the results of virtual ethnographies to other “research environments without affecting the quality of [the] research” must be done with caution as transferability is dependent on context, which can vary widely from one CGD community to the next. Acknowledging the importance of taking this cautious
approach, it can be asserted that this study has made several contributions to knowledge related to ways in which CGD engage in homeland conflict on a political level, as well as ways in which social media is used for political purposes. Specifically, contributions have been made to the growing body of knowledge focusing on ways in which CGDs use the Internet to engage in political activities focusing on homeland conflict. For instance, this study revealed additional ways in which virtual transnational networks develop; ways in which they are used; and how social media and social networking sites are facilitated, particularly for the purposes of political engagement in homeland conflict. In fact, the level of sophistication and power wielded by CGD through social media is remarkable. Whether one considers these activities “virtual war,” or the savvy public relations campaign of opposing parties, the results of this study demonstrate just how much the Internet has changed the ways that protracted conflicts are variously perpetuated, enlarged and amplified. Perhaps there is no better indication of just how much the Internet has influenced conflict processes than the case of the M23, the newest rebel militia group operating in the DRC, which has a Twitter account, a Facebook page, an online blog and an online newspaper. Through these SNSs, the M23 is able to circumvent traditional conflict resolution processes and make its case directly to the public through the dissemination of status updates, photographs, videos and conflict analyses. Although these CMCs were discovered after data collection was completed, and also could not be confirmed as being facilitated from the diaspora (thus the SNSs may not have been appropriate data sources for the purposes of this study), they certainly illustrate the “new” in “new war” studies.

Using a Multidisciplinary Approach

Additional contributions were made in the area of diaspora studies by linking several bodies of knowledge (ethnonationalism, new wars, collective identity development, forced migration, social media studies, cyberactivism, genocide denial) with diasporic studies. By using a multidisciplinary approach to explore CDG dynamics, a broader picture of diasporic processes was
developed, which can significantly contribute to a better understanding of how protracted ethnonationalist armed civil conflict resulting in violent and forced migration, impacts transmigrant identity development in such a way that influences the perceptions, motivations and actions of a group of people who often feel a collective sense of alienation, isolation and victimhood. Another key contribution made relates to ways in which diaspora may contribute to genocide denial and historical revisionism using social media and social networking sites. Although there has been a considerable amount of research on several factors involved in genocide denial, to date, a diligent search of the literature yielded no research on the role CGD play in the denial of genocide committed by co-ethnics against an opposing ethnic group.

The goal of this study is not to scapegoat the entire Hutu diaspora for the ongoing challenges facing the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Rather, a primary goal of this study is to further explore ways that Rwandan CGD engage politically in homeland conflict, particularly during the age of globalization, with the ultimate hope of finding ways that ethnonationalist conflict can be reduced. In order to achieve this goal, a greater understanding of the motivations, methods and aims of CGD who are inclined to keep the conflict going must be gained, so that enduring peace, based on authentic reconciliation can be attained whenever possible. Otherwise the international community risks inadvertently exacerbating conflict by failing to understand that ethnonationalist conflicts are so enduring, that the ideologies that often fuel intergroup hatred and resentment often increase in exile, while effectively being masked by a veil of democracy. In the case of Rwanda, Demmers’ (2002) characterization of diaspora “long-distance interference with conflict in the homeland” representing a continuation of the original conflict on a virtual level, appears to apply quite well (p. 94).

Research Methodologies and Internet Research Ethics

Contributions have also been made in the area of research methodologies, by contributing to the development of virtual ethnography as a research method. This includes contributions that were made in the areas of
data collection strategies, data storage, and analysis, as well as methods for exploring SNS functionality, how CMCs can be pushed to “go viral,” and new ways in which virtual transnational networks can be mapped. These are important contributions, particularly in light of recent technological advances in the area of social media, and have significant implications for the area of IRE. For instance, this study highlighted numerous ways in which current ethical guidelines regarding Internet research were inadequate in addressing the wide ranges of ways that SNSs were being used. This was particularly the case in the area of the public/private debate, as well as when the human subject model should be applied.

Despite a commitment to adhere to the various SNSs’ TOSs and IRE guidelines this author was consistently faced with ethical quandaries not anticipated in the existing literature on IRE, or in SNS TOSs. For example, the integration functionality available with most SNSs that permits a user to post a CMC on several SNSs simultaneously made determining whether a personal identity was detached from a cultural artifact quite challenging. This was particularly true when a single online identity owned several integrated SNS accounts (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, blogs) and used a different screen name with each SNS (which was often the case). In other words, when a user posted a CMC on an SNS that was integrated with several other SNSs, the CMC appeared on all SNSs under the user’s different screen names, some of which may be variants of the user’s real name, and some of which may be pseudonyms. Thus, with increased integration functionality, “personal identity” and “cultural artifact” became blurred (if not merged), and determining whether to apply a human subject model became even more challenging.

Increased integration functionality also rendered many SNSs’ TOSs essentially useless in the sense that it was frequently impossible to determine what TOS would take precedent over the others when a user had the ability to post a CMC on several SNSs simultaneously. This action was not possible even one year ago when a user had to initiate a CMC on one SNS and then share it on others, but recent technological advances have integrated the
various SNSs into the same platform meaning that CMCs are published to SNSs simultaneously through integration functions contained in the user’s mobile device (e.g., smart phone, tablet, etc.).

In addition, the integration and merging of multiple SNSs often results in content from various SNSs being published on a single Web page, which has implications for data collection. For instance, several Internet researchers, particularly those engaging in virtual ethnography recommend collecting data through the taking of screen shots, which takes a photograph (PNG) of the researcher’s computer screen. While this is an effective way of capturing snippets of an online community, with technology that allows for the integration and merging of several SNSs, it is likely that the screen shot will contain both private and public content. Consider for example a public online newspaper that has networking capabilities allowing online identities to post responses to an article. Prior to SNS integration, the poster would be required to register with the online newspaper and create an online identity prior to posting a CMC. Yet with SNS integration capabilities, online identities can post using their Facebook, LinkedIn or Twitter accounts, thus CMCs posted by personal identities will likely be included on the same screen as public cultural artifacts. In the present study, a decision was made to “crop” screen shots so that only public content was included, and due to the possibility of a merging of personal and public identities, a decision was made to redact screen names whenever such caution was deemed appropriate.

The results of this study also revealed that many online identities utilized SNSs in ways that were inconsistent with the SNS developers’ expectations, and/or SNSs’ TOSs. For example, an individual Facebook profile designed for personal use was often used as a public online newspaper or blog by the online identities included in the study, which allowed for the cultural production of artifacts intended for public consumption at no cost to the user (compared to the often high cost of establishing and facilitating a public website). If an Internet researcher considered CMCs posted in this manner as private (“text as authors”), simply because the users found an
ingenious way to publish material for free, the researcher risks engaging in what Basset and O’Riordan (2002) caution against—diminishing the cultural capital of those engaging in cultural production through Internet technologies” by being “over-protective of virtual material in an attempt to protect online users’ ethical rights to privacy” (p. 244). As Basset and O’Riordan (2002) assert, such over protectiveness risks the marginalization of online identities, thus while some might not like the views the Rwandan CGD included in the study are espousing, they have to right to have their collective voices heard.

As noted in Chapter 5, the current literature on IRE recognizes the complexities involved in Internet research which is why several IRE experts recommend that ethical decisions must be made contextually, based on the nature of the research, the specific methods being used in the study, the level of sensitivity of the topics being discussed and the perceived expectations of privacy of online participants (Ess & AoIR Ethics Working Committee, 2002; Eysenbach & Till, 2001). This study will assist in the further development of ethical guidelines by increasing awareness of emerging complexities related to increased functionality and merging of SNSs that will render ethical decisions more informed.

Limitations of the Study

There were several limitations of this study that are important to acknowledge. One limitation of this study relates to the issue of language, and the challenges in obtaining reliable translations, as well as translating a sufficient amount of the data in order to capture a balanced picture of the CMC content. Translating CMCs in the present study presented a challenge due to the isolated use of Kinyarwanda. Although this challenge was addressed through the engagement of two certified translators, the potential for bias remained significant due to a shortage of translators certified in Kinyarwanda. Although great effort was taken to ensure an accurate translation of the data, accuracy may have increased had one of the translators been a member of the Hutu ethnic group. Also, since translating all CMCs written in Kinyarwanda
was cost prohibitive, there was more data in English and French used than Kinyarwanda.

Another limitation relates to the way the research questions were framed, by structuring the focus of the research in such a way as to inadvertently exclude members of the Tutsi CGD. Focusing only on those Rwandan CDG who engaged politically in homeland conflict may have targeted specifically Hutu CGD since as Lyons and others have noted, the CGD members who are the most likely to engage in conflict, are those co-ethnics who are from the losing side of a civil war, which in the case of Rwanda, are the Hutus. While this dynamic does not preclude the possibility of Tutsi political engagement, as many CGDs engage in homeland politics when the homeland government is dominated by co-ethnics (e.g., Israel), the fact that the current president of Rwanda is a member of the Tutsi ethnic group may influence Tutsis within the diaspora to engage in homeland affairs in more social and humanitarian ways, because they may not feel a need to engage politically.

Additionally, while the results of this study may suggest that Hutu CGD are more likely to engage in conflict on a political level that Tutsis, this suggestion may not present a full picture of CGD dynamics, as Hutus are likely over-represented in the diaspora due to the nature of the conflict in Rwanda. In order to gain a more complete picture of all actors involved in Rwandan ethnonationalist conflict, it would be necessary to expand the focus of the study beyond Western-based CGD communities.

A possible additional explanation of why only Hutu CGD appeared to engage politically in homeland conflict on a virtual level, may relate to the protracted nature of the conflict in Rwanda, which was extremely violent, resulting in genocide. The heightened level of violence, coupled with the extended pregenocide propaganda campaign may have enhanced the CGDs’ propensity to focus on the conflict. If this theory has any merit, then it makes sense that more Hutu CGD would be engaged politically in homeland conflict, which may in turn render Tutsis silent, since Tutsi CGD may perceive that to
engage politically in open online forums puts them at risk of future ethnic violence. This theory is particularly noteworthy in light of the findings that many of the ideologies expressed by the Hutu CGD online identities mirrored those from the pre-genocide propaganda campaign. Designing future studies more broadly in order to capture a wider range of diasporic processes may shed light on these dynamics, particularly within the Rwandan context.

Using additional methodologies beyond virtual ethnography in future studies may also assist in ascertaining the breadth of who the Hutu CGDs in this study actually represent. For instance, the Hutu CGD online identities may be the voice of all Hutus everywhere, as many proclaimed, or they may only represent a small fraction of the entire Hutu diaspora, and an even smaller fraction of Hutus in Rwanda. Expanding the focus of future studies to include additional methodologies that can tap into real world realities may provide a more accurate and complete picture of the heterogeneous nature of the Hutu CDG, by seeking out less vocal members.

Finally, the potential existence of additional important themes were noted, but further exploration was barred by the ethical standards adopted in this study, prohibiting the collection of data from real identities without applying the human subject model. An example of this is the nature of international alliances formed between the diaspora online identities and online identities that were members of international communities, such as Western academics and human rights organizations. Since many of those in the latter group were engaging online using their real identities, their data was not included in the study, even if their SNSs were public. The reason for this decision is explored in Chapter 5 in the section on ethical considerations, and relates to the current debate on what constitutes public versus private CMCs. As described in Chapter 5, a decision was made by this author to collect data from sources that are clearly intended for public consumption, and are text as object, not text as authors, thus the human subject model was not applied. Any data regarding the existence of international allies was drawn from content included in the publications of diaspora online identities included in the study, and not
from the CMCs of any international identities outside of the Rwandan diaspora. This presents as a limitation in the sense that when balancing the right of online identities to have their CMCs remain private (for the purposes of research) with the right of researchers to examine public CMCs, researchers are wise to take a cautious approach, at least until the development of ethical guidelines can keep pace with technological advances.

**Future Studies**

This study opens up several opportunities for future studies that would allow for more in-depth explorations into a variety of areas, including ways in which CGD engage in genocide denial using the Internet, cross-comparative studies that explore whether other CGDs use social media and social networking sites in similar ways, both with regard to the development of transnational networks, as well as with regard to political engagement in homeland conflict. Additionally, studies that examine the role of gender in online political engagement in homeland conflict extending Al Ali’s study on the role of women in the diaspora in homeland peace processes would contribute to greater understanding in ways that diaspora can contribute to peace building and ethnic reconciliation. Studies that focus on the effect that CGDs’ political activities and involvement in homeland conflict have on opposing ethnic groups, particularly survivors of genocide would contribute to bodies of knowledge in diaspora studies as well as genocide studies. Finally, future studies using virtual ethnography that include a broader range of methods, such as online interviews with human subjects, would yield interesting information, even if it was perceived that covert agendas may influence the veracity of any disclosures. Including online surveys and interviews of human subjects (which would require the application of the human subject model, including ethical review and informed consent) would also allow for a more in-depth examination into the range, nature and impact of alliances between CGD and members of the international community.

The area of diaspora studies, particularly CGD involvement in homeland conflict will no doubt continue to grow, especially as violent
ethnonationalist armed civil conflict remains an enduring part of contemporary globalized society. Gaining greater understanding into the “who,” “what,” “why” “where” “how” of ethnonationalist armed civil conflict, particularly the development of a greater understanding of the power of external actors, such as diaspora, serves as a vital component of developing effective methods for securing authentic and lasting peace.
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Appendix A: Historic Timeline of Events in Rwanda

1959 – Hutu “Social Revolution” puts “Hutu Power”

1959 – 1990 – extreme marginalization and oppression of Tutsi who remained in the Rwanda. Cyclic anti-Tutsi pogroms, arbitrary incarcerations, lead to mass forced migration, under President Habyarimana mono-party rule, the fundamentalist Hutu party; the MRND. The “Hutu Power” ideology is systematically nurtured in schools and all sectors of life in Rwanda.

October 1990 – RPF invasion (RPF was essentially made by second generation Tutsis refugees, but it was led by a Hutu. They were also a significant number of Hutus within its Ranks.)

October 1990 to July 1992 – Civil War
July 1992 – August 1993: Arusha Peace Negotiations - Deployment of UN peacekeeping mission. Romeo Dallaire – Commander of UN Peace Keeping mission cites numerous examples of "Hutu Power" (hardliners within Habyarimana regime) sabotaging peace deal/powersharing scheme

Jan 1994 to April 1994 – Dallaire seeks UN authorization to intervene in order to prevent genocide preparations. Specific evidence of preparations are provided but ignored by UN HQ and the International Community.

April 6 1994 – President Habyarimana returning from Arusha where he signed peace accord and plane is shot down, most likely, by Hutu extremists (who immediately blame RPF)

April 9, 1994 – Roadblocks are up within hours. Interahamwe (armed militias) reports to all communes to disseminate machetes and massacres begin. Within 24 hours, Hutu moderates including the Prime Minister Agatha Uwilingiyimana, and the President of the Supreme Court Joseph Kavaruganda are killed, leaving full power within the hands of the ‘Hutu Power’ extremists who unleash genocide through out the country

April 6, 1994 to July 4, 1994 – Genocide – over 1 million Tutsis (and some moderate Hutus) are slaughtered

July 4, 1994 – RPF defeats genocidal forces and takes power, forming a Government of National Unity with five opposition parties.

June/July 1994 – Defeated army (FAR) and militias (Interahamwe) flee to neighboring Congo (then Zaire), pushing ahead of them more than 2.1 people, primarily Hutu, into a gigantic forced exodus. Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, a leading Hutu-Power ideologist boasted from Goma (Eastern Zaire) that "even
if the RPF has won a military victory, it will not have the power. We have the population!"

Late 1994 – Ex-FAR and Interahamwe joined to form Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR)

April 4, 1995: meeting with Hutu Genocidaires in refugee camps in the DR Congo to form RDR (Rally for the Return of Refugee and Democracy in Rwanda) – goal is to regain power in Rwanda by force – refer to RDR as “National Army in Exile” in communiqé. Government of Rwanda repeatedly warns it will send its troops into Congo if nothing is done to neutralize the rearming genocidal forces or move them away from its borders.

Late 1996 – Rwanda troops invade Congo, dismantle the border camps, leading to the return to Rwanda of up to 700,000 refugees. Others move further into Congo.

1997 – ALiR creates paramilitary wing: Party for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALIR)

1998 – Rally for the Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda (RDR) changes name to Republican Rally for Democracy in Rwanda (RDR) (after meeting in Paris)

1998 – Three Hutu military opposition groups create coalition called UFDR – three groups are: FRD (Resistance Forces for Democracy), RDR and Initiative Group for Reconciliation (IGR)

1998 – 2000 – Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza represents RDR in Netherlands and Ignace MURWANASHYAKA was selected to represent RDR in Germany

April 2000 – Victoire Ingabire releases statement under FDU-Inkingi name but with same address used for RDR

May 2000 – FDLR created - First congress elects Ignace Murwanashyaka president (now arrested on genocide charges) and Jean Marie-Vianney Higiro elected 1st Vice President (Higiro was former government employee but was evacuated on April 9, 1994 by US. His sisters did not flee and were involved in genocide. Both living in New Hampshire and have charges against them: Prudence Kantengwa and Béatrice Munyenyezi (married to militia convicted by ICTR).

August 19, 2000 – “Third Congress” of RDR - Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza elected president of RDR
September 30, 2000 – ALiR merges with another Hutu rebel group in DRC and forms Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) now the primary “remnant” of the original Hutu power group.

March 2001 – RDR releases statement pledging to use arms to regain power in Rwanda

January 14, 2002 – ADR (RDA)-Isangano formed by top former Hutu Power politicians in Belgium.

March 22, 2003 – “Fourth Congress” of RDR– Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza remains president of RDR

September 2003 – FOCA was developed as separate formal armed branch of FDLR

September 12, 2004 Jean Marie-Vianney Higiro leaves FDLR with treasurer, Félicien Kanyamibwa and forms “Rally for Unity and Democracy’ RUD-URUNANA. Higaro currently is professor in Massachusetts. Kanyamibwa (not in Rwanda during the genocide), is now Executive Sec. of RUD and lives in New Jersey

October 4, 2005 UN demand that FDLR stop fighting Rwanda and leave Congo

April 29, 2006 – UFDR changes name to FDU-Inkingi (United Democratic Forces of Rwanda) Victoire Ingabire remains President

December 2008 – December 2009 – Joint Rwandan and Congo offensive against FDLR

January 2010 – to August 2010 – Hutu opposition groups wage offensive to attempt win of election.

August 6, 2010 – Presidential Elections in Rwanda
Appendix B: “Hutu 10 Commandments”

(Original located here: http://www.rwandafire.com/Kangura/pdf/k06,23,26,28,33,40,41,46,59.pdf)

1. Every Hutu male should know that Tutsi women, wherever they may be, are working in the pay of their Tutsi ethnic group. Consequently, shall be deemed a traitor:
   - Any Hutu male who marries a Tutsi woman;
   - Any Hutu male who keeps a Tutsi concubine;
   - Any Hutu male who makes a Tutsi woman his secretary or protégée.

2. Every Hutu male must know that our Hutu daughters are more dignified and conscientious in their role of woman, wife or mother. Are they not pretty, good secretaries and more honest!

3. Hutu women, be vigilant and bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to their senses.

4. Every Hutu male must know that all Tutsi are dishonest in their business dealings. They are only seeking their ethnic supremacy. “Time will tell.” Shall be considered a traitor, any Hutu male:
   - who enters into a business partnership with Tutsis;
   - who invests his money or State money in a Tutsi company;
   - who lends to, or borrows from, a Tutsi;
   - who grants business favors to Tutsis (granting of important licenses, bank loans, building plots, public tenders…) is a traitor.

5. Strategic positions in the political, administrative, economic, military and security domain should, to a large extent, be entrusted to Hutus.

6. In the education sector (pupils, students, teachers) must be in the majority Hutu.

7. The Rwandan Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. That is the lesson we learned from the October 1990 war. No soldier must marry a Tutsi woman.

8. Hutus must cease having pity for the Tutsi.

9. The Hutu male, wherever he may be, must be united, in solidarity and be concerned about the fate of their Hutu brothers:
   - The Hutu at home and abroad must constantly seek friends and allies for the Hutu Cause, beginning with our Bantu brothers;
   - They must constantly counteract Tutsi propaganda;
   - The Hutu must be firm and vigilant towards their common Tutsi enemy.

10. The 1959 social revolution, the 1961 referendum and the Hutu ideology must be taught to Hutus at all levels. Every Hutu must propagate the present ideology widely. Any Hutu who persecutes his Hutu brother for having read, disseminated and taught this ideology shall be deemed a traitor.
Appendix C: Editorial: A Cockroach (Inyenzi) Cannot Bring Forth a Butterfly

(Original located here starting on p. 78: http://www.rwandafile.com/Kangura/pdf/k40.pdf)

Genetic scientists tell us that intra-Tutsi marriages are responsible for their minority status (wherever they are found). Can you imagine people from the same family getting married to each other and procreating! However, they should know that if they are not careful, this segregation could lead to their total disappearance from this world. If such were the case (and such will be the case), they should not take it out on anyone, for they will be solely responsible. Would it then be the Hutus who eliminated firms with Machetes? In fact, they propagate everywhere that their minority status was the work of the Hutus who eliminated them with machetes. It’s like Landuald Ndasingwa, Minister in the Nsengiyaremye Government, who deceives the people and the international community that his disability resulted from beatings he received during his arrest among the accomplices. But, everyone knows that he was born disable. Disability is not a sin. It should be understood that this phenomenon is not peculiar to the Hutus. Even the nobles can become disabled, for God does not discriminate.

From the outset, we said that a cockroach cannot bring forth a butterfly, and that is true. A cockroach brings forth a cockroach. I do not agree with those who state the contrary. The history of Rwanda tells us that the Tutsi has remained the same and has never changed. His treachery and wickedness are intact in our country’s history. Administratively, the Tutsi regime has been marked by two factors: their women and cows. These two truths have kept the Hutus in bondage for 400 years. Following their overthrow during the 1959 social revolution, the Tutsis have never given up. They are doing everything possible to restore their regime by using their vamps and money, which has replaced the cow. In the past, the latter was a symbol of riches.

We are not wrong to say that an Inyenzi brings forth another Inyenzi. And in fact, can a distinction be made between the Inyenzi that attacked Rwanda in October 1990 and those of the 1960s? They are all related since some are the grand children of others. Their wickedness is identical. All the attacks were meant to restore the feudal-monarchy regime. The atrocities that the Inyenzi of today are perpetrating against the population are identical to those they perpetrated in the past, namely killings, plundering, rape of young girls and women… etc.

The simple fact that the Tutsi is called a snake in our language is enough and indeed says a lot. He is smooth-tongued and seductive and, yet, he is extremely wicked. The Tutsi is permanently vindictive. He does not express his feelings. He even smiles when he is in great pain. In our language, the Tutsi bears the name cockroach (Inyenzi), because under cover of darkness, he camouflages himself to commit crimes. The word cockroach again
reminds us of a very poisonous snake. It is therefore not accidental that the Tutsi chose to be called that way. Whoever wants to understand should understand. Indeed, the cockroach cannot bring forth a butterfly. At close examination, the Tutsi treachery of today is not at all different from that of the years gone by. The history of Rwanda which bears witness teaches us that the Tutsis had enslaved the Hutus for a long time by using their women and cows. Following their overthrow in 1959, they again used their vamps and money (cows in the past) to subject the Hutus once again to slavery. The first Republic managed to stay afloat thanks, in particular, to late Grégoire Kayibanda who knew the Tutsi treachery very well. For its part, the second Republic fell at its inception into the Inyenzi-Tutsi trap. The Tutsis mainly blinded the Hutus who held important posts in the government. The latter assured them that there would be “peace” and “unity” in which, they, themselves, did not believe. For a long time, the Tutsis married their vamps to them. While the Hutus were engaged in community development activities, the Tutsis were preparing the attack to regain power.

When the Hutus arrived, Rwigema and his colleagues had already crossed Kagitumba, and there was talk about a surprise-attack. Had not been for the bravery of our army, Rwanda would have been captured without resistance. While Tutsi vamps sent to sleep, distracted the influential Hutus in this country, the Tunis were pursuing university studies and, today, they are medical doctors, professors, lawyers, religious leaders… they monopolize the entire business sector of the country. What is more, the Hutus are tearing each other apart, in the full glare of the Tutsis, under the pretext that some are Abakiga and the others Abanyenduga, or that the some are Interahamwe and the others Inkuba, C.D.R. or Abakombozi. If the Hutus are not careful, spin-offs from their 1959 revolution may go over to the Tutsis.

And even during this time of multi-party politics, the Tutsis continue to mislead the Hutus. The Tutsi would tell you that he is an M.R.N.D. member whereas he fights it by urging its Hutu members to kill each other and to destroy each other’s homes. The Tutsi would tell you that he is an M.R.N.D. member whereas he not forgotten that this party overthrew the Tutsi regime in 1959. The Tutsi will fight the Hutu party, the C.D.R., under the guise that it segregates. How can the C.D.R. do this whereas the Hutus are the same? And yet, they say nothing about the P.L. composed exclusively of the Tutsis, except the Hutus it recruits to serve as a front. When the Tutsis formed their parties (P.L., R.P.F.), they never could have imagined that the Hutus would have their own party, the C.D.R., which tells them the truth. A Tutsi can declare that he is Tutsi but when the Hutus does likewise he is considered a segregationist! The Tutsi has laws governing him, but the Hutu who declares that he has 10 commandments that he must observe to defend himself, he is considered a killer. And the Hutus who say that no cockroach can bring forth a butterfly are considered as segregationists.
Appendix D: “I am Not Concerned, I am a CDR’s Member”

(Original is located here on page 10: http://trim.unictr.org/webdrawer/rec/37586/view/[MEDIA]%20-%20NAHIMANA%20ET%20AL%20-%20STIPULATION%20B~ENSE%20REGARDING%20PROPOSED%20ADMISSION%20OF%20TRANSLATIONS%20ARTICLESEXCERPTS%20FROM%20KANGURA.PDF)

1. You the Hutu who took back your property in 1959 after Inyenzi had fled from Rwanda, leave your property as the Arusha agreements say. “I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.”
2. Rwandese citizen, get ready to be ruled by the force of whip and to give taxes in order to enrich the Inyenzi as the Arusha agreement says it. “I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.”
3. Soldier, member of the Rwandese army, give out your arm and go to cultivate the marsh as the Arusha agreements say it. “I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.”
4. Rwandese tradesman, you who are always worried, get ready to pay more taxes to enable the government comprising Inyenzi to pay the loans taken in order to buy arms to attack the majority mass as the Arusha agreement say it. “I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.”
5. Hutu Minister, leave Kigali and go to work in Byumba where the Inkotanyi can capture you as the Arusha agreement say it. “I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.”
6. Rwandese who goes by taxi, get ready to go on filling the Inyenzi’s pockets, you see that their relatives are constantly raising their prices before they come, now that they are coming, forty will be multiplied by four. “I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.”
7. Civil servant, give out your office, and give the place to the Inyenzi as the Arusha agreements say it. “I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.”
8. All the Hutus, get ready to be treated by the Inyenzi who do not look at injections full of AIDS, because the Arusha agreements gave them the Health (the ministry of health.) “I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.”
9. Hutu who is still asleep even if you are intelligent, get ready to be liquidated by Inyenzi as the Inyenzi Museveni has done in Uganda. “I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.”
10. You innocent people, get ready to lose your peace as the Arusha agreements say it. “We are not concerned. We are CDR’s members”
Appendix E: Example of how an SMSs Conflicting Geographic information

Note: Although this page is open (signified by the globe), some information was purposely masked, including a portion of the profile name (a pseudonym). The profile photo is Malcolm X, a famous U.S. black activist.
Appendix F: Example of Integrated SMSs

[Image with a Twitter avatar and the name Free-Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza]

Free-Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza
April 13 via Twitter
Appendix G: Examples of ‘Share’ icons
Pre-genocide province names represented on map of Rwanda
Appendix I: Examples of Homeland Romanticized Images
Appendix J: Examples of online Memorial Pages
Appendix K: Example of Imagined Homeland
Appendix L: Example of Online Identity Fundraising using Linked Charity

THAT WHO KEEPS SILENT IN THE MIDST OF TYRANY IS AS GUILTY OF OPPRESSION AS THE TYRANT HIMSELF. Please use the following link: https://donate.html to DONATE to the struggle for democracy in Rwanda.

is an Internet Forum aiming at furthering the activities of the , Inc. We expect postings of only the highest quality, appropriate to the ongoing struggle for Freedom, Democracy and Justice in Rwanda, rather than personal messages.
Appendix M: Examples of CMCs used for the Dissemination of Information and Propaganda
Extradition of Leon Mugesera: The Rwandan community is outraged

8. January | By Christian Muhare | Category: Opinion

"Leon Mugesera will die tortured." It is with these words that the President of the Rwandan Congress of Canada, Emmanuel Nkizimana, has outraged the deportation of Leon Mugesera to Rwanda to be tried for "torture in genocide."

Indeed, the Rwandan exile community is outraged by Canada’s decision to deport Mugesera to his ‘worst enemy.’ She fears that extradited to Rwanda, Mugesera, exiled in Canada since 1993, is not entitled to a fair trial.

Thus FDU-Inkingi opposition parties, the Rwandan Congress of Canada and the Mugesera family have each in turn pleaded against extradition that Rwandan and hold a trial for a former Professor at the Pedagogical Institute National Rwanda under the law on universal jurisdiction.

FDU-INKINGI have expressed "regrets that a democratic country like Canada to extradite him to Rwanda where an individual weighs the serious injury of endangering life."

The entire article can be found at:
http://www.jambonews.net/actualites/20120108-extradition-de-leon-mugesera-la-communaute-rwandaise-s%E2%80%99indigne/
Appendix N: Examples of Online Political Lobbying

Rwanda: Rally for Democracy in Washington, DC
By Democracy For Rwanda Now! - Tuesday, November 2, 2010

MEDIA ADVISORY

For more info, contact:
Foundation for Freedom and Democracy in Rwanda,
Initiative for Democracy and Development,

THE US RWANDAN DIASPORA AND FRIENDS OF RWANDA DEMAND END TO IMPUNITY IN AFRICAN GREAT LAKES REGION AND UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF ALL PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE...

December 22, 2012

Please sign this petition

http://www.avaaz.org/en/petition/Prevent_the_invocation_of_the_Cessation_Cause_for_Rwandan_refugees/?fYeolbb

Prevent the cessation of refugee status for Rwandans fearing return
www.avaaz.org

In July 2013, UNHCR plans to invoke the Cessation Clause for Rwandan refugees who fled events occurring in the country
Appendix O: Examples of Genocide Denial

MARKETING YA MAGUFA (16 photos)
FPR INKOTANYI has been using our Parents Remains as the main income for the War criminals Party, Mostly Kagame. If I may ask can anyone point out among the skulls which one belong to a HUTU, TUTSI or TWA? hagire ubwira uti kariya gahanga n... See More

“Fighting between government troops and armed insurrectionists is not genocide. It is civil war.... It is wrong to characterise every violence as genocide or imminent genocide so as to use it as a pretext for the undermining of the sovereignty of states.”

Share · November 8 at 11:23pm · 
US Government and FPR Inkotanyi Triggered 1994 Rwanda Genocide

The US was behind the Rwandan Genocide: Rwanda: Installing a US Protectorate in Central Africa by Michel Chossudovsky
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/C...

Who was punished for Killing HUTU people? why did the justice not act for both parts? so dont tell people to shut up, the simple question Murwana Shyaka asked you was Who did Habyarimana Juvenal Kill? do you have proves or names?

July 12 at 4:45pm

October 6, 2012

INDEED, 1994 WAS THE REIGN OF ANTICHIST IN RWANDA ... AND THIS ONE CAME FROM THE NORTHERN PART OF IKIRIINGA MUHABUURA!
Appendix P: Examples of Propaganda Disseminated involving False Photos

Photograph identified as the slaughter of Hutu refugees slaughtered at Kibeho camp in 1996, widely disseminated throughout the virtual network, and used at anti-Kagame demonstrations.

Original photograph of Acholi tribe in Pagak, Uganda slaughtered by the LRA in 2005.
Photograph posted online identity in SMS photo album with caption indicating Hutu child killed in Tingitingi refugee camp.

Other choreographers of mass murder.

Corinne Dufka, of the NGO Human Rights Watch, draws a contrast between the approach of the Rwandan government and that in Sierra Leone. During the 10-year civil war in Sierra Leone, which ended in 2000, countless atrocities were committed. She agrees that "the profound culture of impunity" that had existed in Sierra Leone needed to be tackled, but does not agree that the correct way to achieve that is by prosecuting every member of the lower ranks: "It is the choreographers of the whole process who most need to be made accountable for their actions."

Sierra Leone also relied to some extent on traditional methods, but only to address the crimes of the lower-level perpetrators. "For years after the war, there were informal procedures going on in communities throughout Sierra Leone in which people would admit their guilt and be cleansed before being accepted back into the community."

However, as Dufka points out, the situations cannot be compared in one fundamental respect: "In Sierra Leone 85 percent of those fighting with the rebel forces had been forcefully abducted. There is a fine line between victim and perpetrator in those circumstances."

Original photograph of Tutsi children killed during the 1994 Rwanda genocide, taken by Human Rights photographer Corinne Dufka.
Photograph posted by online identity on SMS with caption indicating that bodies were Hutus killed by President Kagame.

Original image (video) on PBS website is a documentary of the Rwandan genocide entitled 'Confronting Evil'. The bodies are identified in the film as Tutsis killed during the 1994 genocide.
Appendix Q: Examples of Derogatory Photographs of Paul Kagame
Rwandan opposition in it togetherness (IC) must realize that the key to take Lucifer/Diabolos/Kagame out of power is not through Europe or America anymore but Tanzania!! Open your eyes and see it... See More
Appendix R: Examples of anti-Kagame Demonstrations organized via SMSs
Appendix S: Examples of Online Mobilization and anti-Kagame Lobbying