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WHY HAS THE ARAB LEAGUE FAILED AS A REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANISATION?

An analysis of the Arab League’s conditions of emergence, characteristics and the internal and external challenges that defined and redefined its regional security role

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ABSTRACT

This study presents a detailed examination of the Arab League’s history, development, structure and roles in an effort to understand the cause of its failure as a regional security organisation. The research’s point of departure is a questioning of the nature and scope of this failure in terms of the interplay between the conditions under which it was formed and the many actors and dynamics that had a long term-impact on the prospects for the League. To this end, the study looks at the League’s conditions of emergence and Arab-Arab relations with the focus on Arab national security as the main concept determining its security role. The research synthesises methods of analysis from the existing literature and schools of thought so as to identify where and why failure and success occurred in relation to international relations theories, the security and international organisations literature, and comparable international models. The development and conditions affecting the League as discussed in the research demonstrate that none of the existing broad theories or approaches can fully explain the League’s failure; however, the constructivist approach, although never before applied in this context, is shown to offer the most relevant approach for explaining this organisation and its unique parameters. The research also examines the role played by the Arab League in regional peacekeeping and conflict prevention in the context of Arab national security, with Palestine as a case study.
DEDICATION

To the spirit of Mr Jamil Habbas, an honourable and generous man
To my children Yasser and Jennah, may this work help direct you in life better than it did me
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing this acknowledgment is particularly difficult considering the length of time it took me to complete this research. Over the past ten years, I met many people who inspired me, argued with me, shared their knowledge with me and helped me directly or indirectly to complete this work. I am keen not to forget anyone who contributed to the completion of this work and I ask forgiveness from those whom I did forget.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACC Arab Cooperation Council
ACRS Arms Control & Regional Security
ALECSO Arab League Educational, Cultural & Scientific Organization
AMU Arab Maghreb Union
APSS Arab Peace & Security Sector
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU African Union
CBO Central Boycott Office
COMESA Common Market for Eastern & Southern Africa
CSCE Commission on Security & Cooperation in Europe
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
IMF International Monitory Fund
IO International Organisations
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAS Organisation of American States
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OSCE Organisation for Security & Cooperation in Europe
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PNA Palestinian National Authority
PSC Peace and Security Council
RSO Regional Security Organisation
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC Southern African Development Community
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
UAR United Arab Republic
UN United Nations
UNAMID African Union - United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNSC United Nations Security Council
WTO World Trade Organisation
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

Conceptual foundations

1. Arab League ‘failures’ or ‘failure’?

The history of the Arab League as detailed in the opening chapters of this dissertation presents a strong prima facie case that it has indeed failed, in several respects. After all, the sheer nature, number and scale of its un-enacted resolutions, unimplemented initiatives and inability to reach consensus on quite fundamental matters easily suggest failure in a fundamental, institutional sense.

But it would be all too easy to assess the Arab League as a regional security organisation as though it was directly comparable with NATO or ASEAN. Although active or recent conflict and political turbulence often facilitate the creation and consolidation of regional security organisations, the particular historical circumstances which preceded the creation of the Arab League – colonial legacies, oil politics, the regional and international dimensions of the Israel-Palestine conflict, revolutions and (more recently) two international wars which entailed Western military forces – have been particularly volatile and all but unceasing. And as this dissertation details, the business of Arab state-making has run in tandem with the Arab League’s attempt to create a viable regional security organisation, even as the larger world was re-creating a post-1945 international system (and in recent decades, under intense globalising pressures.)
So one might ask whether the sum of the Arab League’s many failures are more than the sum of the parts (the same question can be directed at the United Nations.) However, the focus of this dissertation is not to answer the question: ‘The Arab League: Dead or Alive?’ but to research the underlying causes for its difficulties, which shifts the analytical focus from trying to quantify failure toward an investigation which asks, ‘Failure – but of what kind?’

The argument of this dissertation is that the underlying source of the Arab League’s inability to function successfully as a regional security organisation is that it is incommensurate with the much wider and deeper aspirations for an encompassing and effective Arab national security. So although in principle the Arab League could have consolidated Arab national security in politically coherent organisational form, it has instead made visible the gap between the creation of an institutionalised regional politics and the disparate but closely connected political aspirations of Arab peoples. The argument is not at all reductionist: as the text illustrates in detail, there have been numerous obstacles to Arab League effectiveness – some particular to the Arab region, but many of them variations on familiar themes: Arab inter-state rivalry (and war); for some of its member states, external pressures and practical necessity in making an accommodation with Israel; an undiminished impetus to seek and conclude bi-lateral agreements outside the Arab region – including arms deals which amplify and consolidate ‘national security’ of an exclusive character and lock some of those states into military hardware dependency; and autocratic governments in which state security and regime preservation become difficult to distinguish. Against that list, the inability of the Arab League to realise Arab
national security might appear little more than a matter of historical curiosity, but the events from 2011 gathered under the term ‘Arab Spring’ suggest otherwise: that the ideals informing Arab national security retain considerable appeal, strength and durability; and that they can take surprising turns.

Yet ‘Arab national security’ as the term is employed throughout this dissertation does not have a high profile, either within the Arab League (despite the terms of its Charter), or in the academic literature on regionalism and regional security. (For example, there are no books published in English with the phrase ‘Arab national security’ in the title, although there are studies devoted to national security in the Arab world.¹) There are a number of reasons for this. First, as described in Chapter 3, the geographical, historical and cultural particulars of the Arab nation are unique within the compass of studies on regions and regionalism. In a number of crucial aspects, the uniqueness of the Arab nation has been side-lined relative to the more conventional features of Arab state behaviours – and to other regional organisations which have more in common with each other than any of them has with the Arab League.

Second, Western perspectives on IR are predominant; and Cold War intellectual legacies persist and overshadow other theoretical approaches that can be more relevant in explaining regional and sub-regional politics and security dynamics by incorporating sub-state level of analysis. There is a growing recognition of the importance of non-state actors and the presence of dynamics that do not generally feature within established IR theories, with

¹ For example, Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble and Rex Brynen (eds), The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World (Basingstoke: Palgarve, 1992).
Constructivism making the most headway. But although Constructivism holds the most promise in this regard, there has been scant literature applying its insights to regionalism and regional security (see ‘Methodology’ below).

Third, the under-development of the ‘Arab national security’ concept in Western literature and the paucity of effort devoted to exploring its applicability to regionalism and to the Arab League as an international organisation has the effect of abstracting the Arab League from the social, political and cultural dynamics which brought about its establishment and which continue to pose political challenges of a sort not faced by other regional organisations. This has the effect of diminishing the underlying character of the League’s political challenges nearly to vanishing point; and to subject analysis of its failures largely to their surface features. For the purposes of researching this dissertation, this meant that much importance resided in fieldwork for gathering first-hand information on the concept – a matter made very challenging due to the absence of consensus at elite levels within Arab states (as well as within the Arab League itself), on what the concept meant and/or how to realise it.

This dissertation locates the failures - and perhaps, the failure, writ large - of the Arab League less in irreconcilable differences or political wrangling between Arab states (that is, in the kinds of differences which beset all regional organisations), but more in the fact that the Arab League and Arab national security are (or have been to date) incommensurate. That is why one chapter (Chapter Two) is devoted to key concepts – regions and regionalism; state
security and regional security - and why Chapter Three then applies these terms to the history of the Arab League.

2. The Arab national security concept

In the International Relations literature, ‘nation’ and ‘state’ are distinct concepts; and at least from the onset of the Cold War, the term ‘national security’ came to be understood as a range of interests and issues that were essentially exclusive, state-centric, largely military in character and in strategic terms, often survivalist (Yergin, 1977). More broadly, ‘national security’ signalled political and practical preparedness to defend the state from outside interference in its internal affairs. But the word ‘national’ as used in this dissertation as part of ‘Arab national security’ does not pertain solely to the states that currently and/or historically comprise the lands in which Arab populations are predominant. In addition, ‘Arab national security’ also entails ideas and ideals of an Arab nation. In short, ‘Arab national security’ encompasses both Arab states and the idea of an Arab nation. These two conceptions are not merely complementary; in fact, although they are conceptually distinct, they are not entirely free-standing and could even be said to be mutually constitutive. Historically, Arab nationalism, or pan-Arabism, in the early decades of the twentieth century displayed both facets of Arab national security.

The concept of Arab national security emerged as a natural companion to the rise of Arab nationalism, or pan-Arabism, in the early decades of the twentieth century (Findlay, 1994; Doran, 1999). Prior to 1945, Arab national security had been perceived by Arab publics as security for the Arab nation in the context of
sovereignty, independence and control over its resources while being able to determine its own destiny without external intervention. This approach was the prominent understanding since most of the Arab world had been under some form of foreign control or colonisation.

With the creation of modern states in the Arab world and as more Arab countries began to gain independence as sovereign states, the need for defining security become more pressing. Arab states and elites were engaged with state sovereignty and security at the same time as being confronted with the wider Arab public notion of the unity of the Arab nation in one unit as an ultimate goal. In this context, and while many Arab countries were still under colonial rule, the Arab League was established and, according to its charter, as an Arab organisation for Arab states but with a particular focus on the realisation of the interests and security of the Arab nation.

Arab researchers on Arab national security define it as the ability of the Arab states in all of the Arab lands to defend themselves and their sovereignty, achievements, rights and values from external threats through cooperation between all the Arab regimes and states (Hawwāt, 2002). According to this definition, Arab national security becomes a form of collective security among sovereign states that are bound by cultural and ethnic ties and are faced with common threats since they share a special interdependent relationship where a threat to one affects the rest. This differs from the more ideological and less structural concepts of pan-Arabism or Arab nationalism in the sense that the cooperation in this case is between units (i.e. states). Arab national security, therefore, is the framework for achieving the security of a
nation divided across sovereign states and not the bond that brings them
together in a form of cooperation. Moreover, it is due to the interest of each Arab
state in achieving a higher level of security on state and regional levels that
leads them to choose to participate in this framework called Arab national
security. Yet, it is also due to this particular state vs. regional security interest
that Arab states seem unable to translate Arab national security into tangible
results. The assumptions that Arab states have no internal contradictions
between their national interests and the broader Arab collective interest
(theoretically represented by Arab League policies) is one of the main reasons
why an Arab national security strategy has not been formally agreed upon yet.

This manifested itself, most strikingly, in the delay between the establishment of
the Arab League and the agreement on an official body in charge of Arab
national security affairs. The League’s council (at the summit level) is the body
authorised to address and formulate strategies for Arab national security. This
authorisation was officially added to the charter of the League in 2000 and was
followed by the establishment of various divisions and sub-organs/sections
within the League that are responsible for policy development and research into
this issue of security. The time gap reflects two concerns: first, the importance
and sensitivity of Arab national security because it involves cross-state
cooperation and coordination in areas of sovereignty, which is something the
founders of the League were keen to protect, as evident in the charter’s
language and focus; second, although the Arab national security concept dates
from the early twentieth century, it remained without a dedicated institutional
framework until the very end of the twentieth century. While Arab joint action
and collective military and economic cooperation (which are integral components of the concept) were adequately researched, discussed and institutionalised, the absence of a clear and formal conceptual framework, coupled with the difference perceived by Arab states between their own interests in tension with their remit to realise Arab national security, made the achievements on military and economic levels minimal and short-lived.

Methodology

1. **Theoretical perspective: Constructivism**

As employed in this dissertation, the term ‘Arab national security’ is clearly constructivist, at least in the sense that its origins are social, socio-cultural, socio-economic and undirected, or informal; because it preceded the Arab League; and because the League has neither subsumed nor consolidated it. That is, Arab national security comprises perceptions, linkages, commonalities, patterns of exchange, cultural continuities across national boundaries, shared beliefs and ideas and ideals which have been shaped by – and in turn, have shaped – historical forces and events. Arab national security is ‘constructed’ in the same sense that Benedict Anderson described national communities as ‘imagined’ (Anderson, 1983). What gives Arab national security its poignancy and provides the rationale for this research is that the Arab nation – ‘imagined’ or ‘constructed’ though it is – exists in tensioned relationships with the various states that encompass it, and with the Arab League, which was intended to give it institutional expression. Yet historically and analytically, only the larger and overtly political manifestations of Arab national security receive widespread and
detailed attention – pan-Arabism; and more recently, the ‘Arab Spring’.

The social origins of the disjuncture between Arab national security and modern political structures (Arab nations, the Arab League; the international system) find concise expression in an early work in the Constructivist literature: “We construct worlds we know in a world we do not” (Onuf, 1989, p.38). Although a great deal of the Constructivist literature is devoted to contention within the field of International Relations theory, Constructivism is not a unified ‘school’ of International Relations, but an orientation which, in the words of Alexander Wendt, is opposed to “the materialist view, of which neorealism is one expression, that material forces per se determine international life and the rational choice-theoretic view that interaction does not change identities and interests” (Wendt, 1995, p.81). That is why some of the richest and most interesting Constructivist research concerns the development, condition and adoption of international norms, which requires looking beyond the high abstractions of International Relations theory, toward a much broader range of sub-state actors and dynamics (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Without denying the imperatives of ‘high politics’, the Constructivist perspective brings to our consideration of states and the international system a less stark characterisation of relational qualities, a less materialist and determinist understanding of state interests and an exploration of the role of social facts and norms in shaping international life (Kubalkova, Onuf, and Kowert, 1998; Hopf, 1998; Zehfuss, 2002).

By its systematic introduction of non-state actors and dynamics into a
consideration of inter-state relations, Constructivism opens up a number of possible new research avenues, both within and outside its already-established compass. Unfortunately, these have as yet found very little expression outside of the IR theory arena.\(^2\) Even Salem’s work (Salem, 2008) is essentially theoretical rather than political and historical; and it is more concerned with the standing of Constructivism relative to Realism as an explanatory framework. It might be asked whether Sociology is a more appropriate disciplinary approach for understanding the long-standing and complex social, cultural, linguistic, religious and other elements that have facilitated and continue to sustain Arab national security. But without discounting the purchase of Sociology on any of those particulars, it is the construction and the shared understanding of Arab national security that is the subject of this work. In other words, it is a political construct – embedded within, but quite distinct from other Arabic commonalities.

The Constructivist orientation of this work is by no means exclusive: in particular, Realism, Neorealism and Liberalism are all invoked both for their theoretical perspective and explanatory purchase in respect of the structural and behavioural features of the international system and inter-state relations. It is not a contention of this work that these theories lack explanatory power, but that for the purpose of acknowledging and analysing Arab national security as the animating idea and ideal beneath the history of the Arab League, they lack the necessary “reach”. The under-development of Constructivism for this purpose (detailed immediately below) does not invalidate the adoption of a Constructivist perspective in this work, but it does clearly signal this undertaking

as an important research implication.

The research on this dissertation quickly uncovered the fact that there is no developed theory of international relations or regional organisations which is configured to analyse the Arab League in terms other than their own explanatory reach, the conformity of the Arab League to the expectations and constraints of international relations (and regional organisations in particular) or in terms of accounting for specific failures which are largely performative. It became clear that a Constructivist perspective was most suitable for this research, but with the obvious drawback that there is not a body of readily applicable Constructivist literature devoted to the Arab League, to Arab national security or to the kinds of sub-state dynamics that provide its substance and meaning.

In addition to the preliminary literature review and continuous monitoring of published work related to the topic of this study, the researcher conducted an assiduous search over many weeks to try to locate appropriate Constructivist literature, but to little avail, as detailed below:

The following databases were used for locating literature on Constructivism and Constructivist perspectives on both regional security and the Arab League, employing key words and variants in a full range of combinations.

a) EBSCO:
   1. international Political Science Abstracts
2. **Field work interviews**

The access to informants relied on the researcher's personal and professional contacts and nominations by interviewees. This was only possible due to the researcher's background as a participant in Arms Control and Regional Security conferences and as a civil servant for the Palestinian National Authority. The notes and records of the interviews were only taken after acquiring consent by using an audio recording device in order to guarantee the accuracy of the

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A notable exception was: Salem, A.A., 2008. *International Relations Theories and Organizations: Realism, Constructivism, and Collective Security in the League of Arab States*, VDM Verlag Dr. Muller Aktiengesellschaft & Co. KG.; however, see the remark in the text, above.

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3
collected data and for later stages of analysis. The researcher also took written notes on paper while conducting the interviews.

Using the Critical Incident Method (Bryman 2003, p.130), the researcher asked the respondents to describe critical events and crises in the history of the Arab League. This approach was intended to allow the respondents, as observers and members of the League, to elaborate on their personal experience of such events. The data collected through this method provided guidance to where the Arab League managed or failed to be an active player in resolving regional problems.

Conducting semi-structured interviews while using the Critical Incident Method allowed the researcher to ask the respondents to elaborate on what they perceived to be the most important factors affecting the role of the League while obtaining a deeper insight into how the organisation has functioned in times of crisis. The data collected during the interviews provide a basis for measuring the performance of the Arab League against the literature comparison of the criteria for success and failure are synthesised from the examination of theory and the RSO paradigm in the coming first four chapters.

With regard to the ethics of the interviewer-interviewee relationship, it was vitally important that the investigated be fully aware of the capacity, source of funding, and the aim of the research they were being involved in, particularly due to the sensitivity of the issues and as most of them held formal or sensitive positions in
their countries. Therefore, to ensure cognition (May 1993), the interviewees were made fully aware of why they were being interviewed, what their role was, what type of data was expected from them and the reason behind conducting the interview. This was achieved by providing the interviewees with a document explaining the nature and subject of the research as well as how the collected data would be used and the source of funding. Enough time was allowed for each interviewee to fully read and understand the purpose of the research and the researcher also adopted a neutral approach during the interviews and refrained from imposing opinions or giving the impression that he favoured a specific position by avoiding leading or directive questions or questions that carried moral values. As May suggests, “The interviewer and interviewee … need to establish an inter-subjective understanding. At the same time the pursuit of objectivity requires a ‘distance’ in order to judge the situation” (1993, p.96).

The order of questions was also a key aspect of the interview process. Due to choosing semi-structured interviews as the method, the researcher had the advantage of ordering or reordering the questions so that a friendly, non-challenging and natural atmosphere could be established during interviews. In addition, the interviewer remained aware of the importance of motivating the interviewee by demonstrating the value of their opinion (May 1993) as their cooperation was found to be important for a successful interview. Lastly, terminological sensitivity was of the utmost importance during the interviews because of some of the participants’ use of different terms to describe the same events or locations in the Middle East. Therefore, it was vital that the researcher
took this issue in consideration during interviews to alleviate chances of hostility or being perceived as biased by the informants. This was overcome by selecting vocabulary that was neutral and therefore acceptable to the interviewees especially with official capacity.

Interviews provided unique insight and perspective that contributed to the originality of the research. Data collected during interviews were used throughout this study in a number of ways. First, interviews were directly quoted to support or highlight points. Second, various interviews were referred to collectively when arguing or supporting key points. This approach reflected consensus among interviewees on the relevance or importance of various issues, which occurred often during the fieldwork phase. Referring to multiple interviews in this manner was used as a way of emphasising the importance of issues as well as to reflect the type of priorities and perceptions shared among experts on the Arab League.

**Practical difficulties**

Access to formal Arab League documents was one of the main complications and obstacles that confronted this research. This was due to two factors: first, many documents were only available in Arabic with unofficial translations through third party resources and, second, was the lack of an efficient and comprehensive online document database from the Arab League. The Arab League website has been the initial destination for information and documents for this research since 2003. However, the website has been inaccessible as a result of being under construction for lengthy periods. When the site was
functioning, it was still being updated with documents and resources which made it an incomplete source of information. This remained an issue until the phase of the fieldwork in 2007 during which time, there was the opportunity to gain access to the League’s library in person and borrow resources from officials who work at the League and related research centres. The data collected during the fieldwork helped to fill the gap in formal documents. However, it did not fully resolve the problem of the formal translation of Arab League documents. This last problem was resolved by using the United Nations website database. The Arab League, similar to many other international organisations, submits a formal version of most of its documents to the UN. Although these non-Arabic versions are not available from the Arab League website and library, they remain accessible, as formal translations, from the UN website.

A related difficulty was faced when reviewing published literature on Arab national security and the Arab League as a security organisation. Arab writers have been occupied with this issue for a long time, as this research will demonstrate, however, the number of non-journalistic and critical publications that addressed the concepts of Arab national security and regional security role for the Arab League was limited. Non-academic publications were easily available; however, published Arabic research has mostly focused on the specifics of security like, water security, external threats, Israel and not the concepts mentioned above. This resulted in a small number of resources qualifying as relevant resources to this research.
Another problem that this research confronted was the limited willingness of Arab League officials to be quoted or referred to. Most of these officials were willing to share information and opinions for the research as long as they were assured that their opinions would not be recorded and that they would not be mentioned in the research. This attitude and such decisions meant that the research had a huge amount of data that could not be used directly. However, this also resulted in an honest and informative discussion with officials that greatly informed the perspective of the research and helped guide the direction it took. Using triangulation, the research managed to utilise this insight and knowledge to verify the validity of these opinions through other sources.
CHAPTER ONE
CHAPTER ONE

THE ARAB LEAGUE: CONDITIONS OF EMERGENCE

At the turn of the new millennium, the League of Arab States concluded 55 years of existence. Commonly known as the Arab League, it was formed in 1945 in an attempt to give public and political expression to the Arab nations. Its establishment marked the beginning of an Arabic regional system with a distinctive nationalistic alignment.

One of the dissertation’s main arguments is that despite Arab public aspirations concerning regional identity, collective security and economic-political development, the Arab League itself, as a regional organisation, remains substantially short of its potential strengths and capacities.

In order to evaluate the efficacy, strengths and future possibilities of the Arab League as a regional organisation to fulfil contemporary Arab public aspirations, it is important to gain a better historical understanding of how the Arab League came into existence and the challenges and issues it had to face from its inception. This chapter will look at the early stages of the Arab League and track the process and circumstances of its development from the Alexandria Protocol (1944) to its final charter (1945). This focus will include examining 1) the local, regional and national circumstances during the establishment of the League; 2) the position of the main international powers; and 3) Arab nationalism as the ideology and political agenda behind the idea of Arab unity.
The idea of Arab unity in its modern form dates back to the mid-19th century when the greater part of the Arab world was still in the grip of the Ottoman Empire. The Arab nationalist movement (Dawisha, 2003; Pfaff, 1970; Aliboni, 1993) drew its inspiration from a long history across a massive stretch of land from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. Although the nature of states that existed throughout the Arab world was mostly rival and competing Caliphates and Emirates,

*the concept of an Arab nation bound by the ties of race, religion, language and culture had, and still has, an enormous emotional appeal, and during the First World War it provided the dynamic for the successful revolt against the Turks, sponsored by Britain and France and led by the Hashemite dynasty of Arabia.*

(Major, 1963, p.551)

Nevertheless, the Arab world was divided into areas under French and British mandates by the League of Nations in the 1920s, post World War I. In the case of Palestine, the British mandate in Palestine was dramatically influenced by the earlier *Balfour Declaration (1917)* and its commitment to supporting a 'national home' for European Jews. Elsewhere, as Major (1962: 551) wrote, “What were to become the republics of Syria and Lebanon passed under French influence, and the emirate of Transjordan and the Kingdom of Iraq to Britain’s Hashemite⁴ protégés”, while Egypt and Sudan stayed firmly under British control. Arabia

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⁴ The Hashemites are descendants of the Arab clan of Quraysh which used to rule Mecca during the time of Prophet Mohamed (PBUH). The Hashemites were leaders of Mecca and other parts of the Arabian Peninsula until Al-Saud family pushed them out in the process of establishing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Hashemite family became the royal family of Jordan and were the rulers of Iraq for a brief period in the 20th century.
itself was seized shortly afterwards from the Hashemites by the Saudi family, triggering one of the most important rivalries in modern Arab history between the two families (Saudis and Hashemite) and later, kingdoms. North Africa, Algeria and Tunisia remained French colonies; Morocco stood divided between France and Spain, and Libya was confirmed as an Italian colony (Major, 1963; Ovendale, 2004). This British-French control remained intact until the Second World War but the idea of setting up an Arab organisation to facilitate unity between Arab countries did not crystallize until an easing of control allowed practical steps towards unity to move forward. The dynamics inhibiting Arab political unity included a number of national, regional and international circumstances. On the domestic level, Arab hopes for the unification of the few areas remaining under Turkish-Ottoman control in 1914, temporarily encouraged by Britain during World War I, were frustrated by the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 which divided the Arab lands into twenty-five separate entities, mostly under British and French control.

Notwithstanding, Arabic identity (Findlay, 1994; Yahya, 2010), as an underlying commonality in geographical, linguistic and historical terms, was the cornerstone for Arabic unification. As a political ideal, The Arab League’s development was in part driven by an ideology of a shared identity and a common past and future; it was based not on a geographical framework, but on

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5 The Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920, was a peace treaty between the central powers during World War I and the Ottoman Empire after World War I. The treaty was signed by the Ottoman Government. However, it was rejected by the Turkish republican movement, and never came into effect. That movement, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, used the treaty as the occasion to declare itself the rightful government of Turkey, replacing the monarchy based in Istanbul (Constantinople) with a republic based in Ankara. In accordance with the wartime Sykes-Picot Agreement, Mesopotamia and Palestine were assigned under mandate to the tutelage of the United Kingdom; Lebanon and an enlarged Syria to that of France.
'civilizational' or ethnic commonality. However, some of its 22 members – Sudan, for example – include sizeable populations that were not Arab; and in the case of Morocco, Algeria and Libya, other ethnic groups like the Berber represented a considerable percentage of the population (Cawthra, 2007). National movements and the activities of resistance groups grew against European colonial powers during the Second World War which resulted in an increasing number of states gaining their independence as well as a growing need for political stability – a phase during which Egypt was a key player.

The need for unity gained particular importance in the face of the rising Zionist movement, which is a political movement that aimed to establish a national home for the Jews in Palestine (Malamat and Ben-Sasson, 1976). The issue of a Zionist threat to Palestine and the continuity of Jewish migration to Palestine in the 1930s and 1940s in particular, constituted a major threat to regional Arab countries as explained later in this chapter and in Chapter Seven. On the other hand, the increased level of interaction with the West during the colonisation era until the 1940s led to the introduction of new types of political thought and their related trends, the most significant being the notion of nationalism (Arab League, 2006; Dawisha, 2003). In addition, an increase in the movement of goods and people within the Arab world established an economic basis for unity alongside the already existing spiritual, cultural and religious foundation (Dawisha, 2003; Doran, 1999; Findlay, 1994; Hourani, 1947; Kienle, 1995; Sadiki, 2004; Sayegh, 1958; Salem, 2008).
At the same time, however, political-military developments diverted various regional states from trying to develop Arab unity. For example, with regards to Turkey, its defeat in the First World War, the fear of communism and a shift towards the West became the parameters for its internal and external policies. Further, Turkey’s annexation of Iskenderun province from Syria in 1939 (Peretz, 1994) and its failure to seize Mosul from Iraq helped isolate it from both the Arab and Islamic worlds. So it was also for Iran, which shared Turkey’s fear of communism and was also facing foreign control of its natural resources (Arab League, 2005).

In the international arena, the transition period post-1945 witnessed a strong strategic interest from the United States of America in the regions around the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China, resulting in the Arab region being temporarily left under French and British control. Under force of circumstances at that time, The British adopted a new approach. “During both World Wars, plans for the creation of a unified Arab state or Arab federation were actively (although largely instrumentally, as in the case of the 1916 Arab Revolt) supported by the British” (Pinfari, 2009, p.2). In particular, during World War II, the idea of Arab unity was given new momentum by Britain (Booth, 2007) because the “defeat of French forces in Syria and Lebanon and the growing power and prestige of the Axis states in the Middle East led Britain, the only Allied power remaining in the area, to increasingly regard Pan-Arabism as a means of securing Arab cooperation in the Allied war effort” (Zacher, 1979:162). For instance, on 29th May 1941, the British foreign minister, Anthony Eden (cited in Taylor 1982:21), declared that the British government
thought it both natural and right that inter-Arab ties be strengthened and that Britain would “give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval”. The reaction of the Arab capitals was mixed at that moment: the Jordanians welcomed the British position as it supported Prince Abdullah’s plans for the unity of Greater Syria; the Saudis were doubtful and cautious; the Yemenis ignored it; Iraq, Syria and Lebanon were not enthusiastic about it; and Egypt called for an Egyptian-Sudanese unity (i.e. unity of the Nile Valley) (Abdul-Hadi, 2009).

However, British foreign policy in the Arab region was also driven by an attempt to gain favour over France in the Arab world. To this end, Britain supported the establishment of the Arab League and this support was reaffirmed when Eden spoke to the British House of Commons on 24th February 1943, welcoming any Arab initiative that aimed to achieve economic, cultural and political unity (Abdul-Hadi, 2009; Major, 1963), but with emphasis on the initiative coming from the Arabs themselves.

This combination of local, regional and international factors provided major Arab states with an opportunity to formulate initial frameworks of regional unity – a unity which, in that context, meant independent states overcoming competing interests so as to reach a formula that would accommodate visions of what Arab unity might mean and what such an organisation’s role might be. One such initiative was proposed by General Nuri al-Sa’id of Iraq in early 1943 which constituted the first concrete plan for Arab unity. Nuri Sa’id’s vision, which is outlined in his Blue Book of 1943 (Abdul-Hadi, 2009), was motivated by the
realisation that an Arab solution was needed for the emerging problematic Palestine situation (Karsh, 2006; Zacher, 1979). Interestingly, Al-Sa’id’s initiative included special arrangements for the protection of the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, the religious pluralism of Jerusalem and the Christian population in Lebanon (Major, 1963; Zacher, 1979), which signifies how central the issue of Palestine was to Arab thinking at that time, even before clear and formal unification was achieved.

Central to Sa’id’s proposal was the unification of the Fertile Crescent states – Transjordan, Syria and Palestine – and their federation with Iraq to form an Arab League that would be opened up to other additional Arab states. However, Arab countries first needed to overcome the polarity that divided them into “a Hashemite bloc consisting of Transjordan and Iraq and an anti-Hashemite bloc consisting of Saudi Arabia” (Shalim, 2001:82). The cause of this rivalry, distrust and dissension—which impacted on the creation and politics of the Arab League itself, --- was rooted in the creation of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. King Abd Al-Aziz Ibn Saud had seized Mecca and the Kingdom of Arabia from the Hashemite family. The Hashemite family, Sharif, descended from King Hussein of Jordan (legitimised by direct lineage from the Prophet Mohamed) regarded Abd Al-Aziz as a usurper but political necessity at the time compelled them to negotiate with Abd Al-Azziz.

Saudi King Abd Al-Aziz, in turn, regarded the Hashemite as people likely to reclaim the throne of Arabia if ever they got the chance, and therefore adopted a policy of opposing initiatives likely to increase Hashemite political influence
and power. To this point, Sa’id’s previously mentioned initiative on a confederation of states had raised Egyptian and Saudi fears that the Hashemite rulers were seeking to dominate large areas of the Arab world.

This pervasive mutual distrust, fear and rivalry was to have profound consequences for the very structure, power and coherence of the Arab League as a regional institution. In particular, it meant that during the negotiations over the development of the Arab League, a confederation of all the Arab states was proposed without the sacrifice of any particular state’s sovereignty. This was to have enormous consequences for its future development and capacity to create a workable confederation.

This fragmentation, combined with the distance of Egypt from general Arab concerns and the bitter rivalry between the Hashemite dynasties of Iraq and Transjordan and the Al-Saud of Saudi Arabia, posed insuperable impediments to Arab unity in the interwar years

(Zacher: 161)

Moreover, other complex rivalries extended throughout the region with debilitating effects. As Major (Major, 1963, p.553) wrote, “Egypt, as the most populous, was determined to avoid the creation of a powerful new rival in the north. For their part the Saudi dynasty refused to admit any advantage to the family it had only recently chased out of the Arabian peninsula” and therefore was determined to prevent the creation of a strong Hashemite kingdom on its northern boarders. Further, “Syria and the Lebanon both objected to the possibility of having to give up their republican oligarchies, and for the Christian
Arab community in the Lebanon there was the additional fear of being swamped in a large Muslim state” (Major, 1963, p.553). Meanwhile, the centrality of the Palestinian situation surfaced as another inhibition to a strong Arab confederation but one whose importance took on an international geo-political significance for British colonial power. Britain, while supporting the claims of Syria and Lebanon against the French and interested in seeing a greater Egyptian role in Arab affairs based on Prime Minister Eden’s vision, could not yet commit itself on the issue of Palestine with regard to recognising Arab concerns (Ovendale, 2004; Major, 1963). This is one of the reasons why “the majority of Arab opinion, grouped around Egyptian Prime Minister Nahhas Pasha,⁶ preferred to concentrate on the secondary aspects of the Nuri-Abdullah proposal for an Arab League” (Major, 1963, p.553).

The above stated considerations, factors and rivalries among the Arab leaders clearly influenced the direction in which this Arab unity was heading. The British position on Palestine, as well as the fear from a larger Hashemite northern block (Major, 1963, p.553) were instrumental reasons for going towards the Arab League route instead of a more formal, stronger Arab confederation. In short, the interests of powerful third parties and enmity between regional members were the two key factors affecting the shaping of the Arab League as a regional organisation from its very beginning.

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⁶ Prime Minister of Egypt in 1928, 1930, between 1936 and 1937, from 1942 until 1944, and finally between 1950 and 1952.
Practical steps towards unity

Egyptian Prime Minister Nahhas Pasha invited Iraqi General Nuri Sa’id⁷ to Cairo in July 1943 to officially discuss the issue of Arab unity, the need for which they both agreed in principle. However, they differed in their priorities and on leadership issues. While Nuri Sa’id opted for Syrian-Iraqi unity first, Nahhas Pasha wanted a prominent position for Egypt in the formation of any Arab unity (Abdul-Hadi, 2009). In September 1943, Egypt initiated bilateral negotiations with each of the neighbouring states of Jordan, Iraq and Syria. These discussions resulted in three alternative propositions being reached about the nature of the future Arab League (Arab League, 2005; Major, 1963; Abdul-Hadi, 2009; Little, 1956). The first plan was for the creation of Greater Syria under the leadership of Prince Abdullah Ben Hussein of (Trans) Jordan. This had the support of Al-Sa’id of Iraq who saw this as a step towards an eventual Fertile Crescent confederation. The second approach proposed the establishment of a unified entity from the Fertile Crescent under the leadership of Iraq; while the third plan aimed to establish a broader entity by including Egypt, Syria and Yemen, in addition to the Fertile Crescent countries. While the second plan called for a unity working for cooperation and coordination between Arabic states while preserving the independence of those states, the third was divided between two visions based on the nature of the union: one vision calling for a federation or confederation, the other for a type of unity where one leading country would have a higher authority over member states. Although at that

⁷ Nuri Sa’id was an Iraqi politician during the British Mandate and during the Kingdom of Iraq. He served in various key cabinet positions, and served seven terms as Prime Minister of Iraq.
point, the rivalry between the Hashemite and non-Hashemite blocs was the main factor influencing the future of Arab unity, “most of the Arab governments viewed the organization as a means to undermine both plans for the unification of the Fertile Crescent states and the proposed Jewish state in Palestine. The creation of a viable intra-regional security system was not their first priority” (Zacher, 1979, p.163). This division resulted in a stalemate that pushed the whole project back a full year and was indicative of the barriers Arab unity and regional security were to face in the future.

During meetings that lasted for eight continuous sessions between 25\textsuperscript{th} September and 7\textsuperscript{th} October 1944, the discussions disregarded the first two trends and excluded the idea of a central authority due to the fear that this might undermine the sovereignty of the states. Syria alone supported full Arab unification but, unlike Iraq, favoured a republican form of government. Transjordan supported a union of itself with Palestine and Syria, to be ruled by King Abdullah, as a counterbalance between Iraq and Egypt, whereas Lebanon leaned towards a looser federation of sovereign states that would allow the protection of its religious minorities. Yemen and Saudi Arabia opposed the Hashemite plans but did not present any specific alternatives (Zacher, 1979; Major, 1963; Arab League, 2005; Hourani, 1947). Thus, it was the third option which had the agreement of all parties; an Arab union whose collective decisions were only binding upon any states that had specifically agreed to them.
Nevertheless, this led to Mustafa El-Nahhas of Egypt calling the Arab governments to conduct formal preparations and start drafting suggestions for the new unity. The subsequent Arab conference, held in Alexandria in October 1944 (Arab League, 2005) produced the Alexandria Protocol, which established the Arab League in March 1945 (Appendix II.a). The Alexandria Protocol, while indicating a level of support for the concept of an Arab confederation of sovereign states was also seriously impeded by a new Arab political elite who had just recently acquired authority and independence in a decolonising context.

**Alexandria Protocol**

The Alexandria Protocol hinted at the chance for ultimately reaching Arab unity but anticipated a loose coalition of states limiting itself to initiatives regarding economy, culture and society (Zacher, 1979). The Protocol established the League of Arab States as comprising independent Arab countries that accept accession to it, while forming a council in which all the member states of the Arab League would be equal (ibid.). The role of the Council was detailed as adhering to the implementation of inter-member states’ agreements and periodic meetings so as to enhance and solidify relations between them and coordination between political plans. This was in an effort to realise the required cooperation between them while maintaining their independence and sovereignty against any aggression or interference in the domestic affairs of the Arab countries. Thus, the Council represented a pillar for cooperation on
security among Arab states while also remaining sensitive to the underlying national/elite interests and regional rivalries.

Importantly for regional security, however, as stated in the Protocol’s (1944) first article, resolutions adopted by the Arab League Council were binding on the assenting parties, except for cases of differences between two League Member States who would then refer the matter to the Council to settle conflicts between them (Protocol, 1944, Article 1). Explicit, then, to the development of regional security was the Council’s role as an accepted forum for conflict resolution and settlement among member states. Further, the Alexandria Protocol prohibited the use of force to settle conflicts between two League member states; and the Council become a dispute resolution mechanism in such cases of serious conflict, since the resolutions adopted by the Arab League Council would be binding and enforceable. Therefore, the Protocol was the first mechanism for resolving disputes within a security community among the Arab states.

Indicative of the centrality of foreign policy to regional unity, the Protocol made it equally illegal to follow a foreign policy that would adversely harm the policies followed by the League of the Arab States or any of its Member States. Further, the Protocol also included, similar to Al-Said’s proposal, two resolutions relating to Lebanon and Palestine that signified how those situations were of on-going importance to the wider political and security agenda within the emerging Arab context.
With regard to Lebanon, the Protocol stressed the urgent need to respect Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty. Arab States were also to support the cause of Arab Palestinians by realising their legitimate rights of self-determination and decolonization. Palestine and the negative impact of Britain’s Mandate upon regional security were considered important elements in the Arab countries’ system “without prejudice to the Arab rights and without causing any damage to peace and independence of Arab countries” (Article 5, Alexandria Protocol).

Only six months after the Alexandria Protocol was signed, it was replaced by the Charter of the Arab League in 1945. The move away from the Protocol to the Charter reflected a number of disagreements and diverging priorities within the Arab world and its politics. Whereas the Protocol was a document “infused with the spirit of popular pan-Arabism which envisaged the League as only the first step towards a fuller unity and which had even advocated a common foreign policy” (Major, 1963, p.554), it nevertheless triggered a fundamental contestation within the then Arab political elite over the character of the League.

*On the one hand, there were the middle-aged leaders of the Revolt such as Nuri, ‘. . . mainly members of leading families in large towns, educated usually in Turkish schools but sometimes in the West, trained in the Ottoman administration or army, and their minds formed by pan-Islamism’ [The Times, August 12, 1946]. On the other hand there were the generation which came to maturity in the Second World War, ’ the politically literate minority, who had*
The years that followed witnessed the success of the younger generation in controlling and steering the direction of Arab politics. This becomes apparent when comparing the League of Arab States Charter to the Alexandria Protocol from which the Charter derived.

**Charter of the Arab League**

As (Hourani, 1947, p.132) wrote, “Between the publication of the Alexandria Protocol and the creation of the Arab League, governmental and constitutional changes took place in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan.” The League of Arab States Charter was ratified on 22nd March 1945 by all the six respective Arab countries’ representatives apart from Saudi Arabia’s and Yemen’s, who signed at later date. The Arab League’s Charter consisted of a Preamble, 20 Articles and three Appendices. The Preamble indicated that the relevant countries had adopted the Charter with the aim of consolidating close Arab ties and interrelationships within a framework of respect, independence and sovereignty that would serve and realise Pan-Arab interests. Thus, the Charter could be considered as a kind of harmonisation between the regional and national tendencies which was reflected in the League, as mentioned earlier, by
considering it an organisation based on voluntary cooperation between the Member States and based on equality and mutual respect. This was in order to realise the major goal of independence which was, in essence, the underpinning objective of all previous proposals and initiatives. Besides this, the League was presented as an inter-governmental organisation and not as a supranational authority to be given authority over its member states. Of the three Appendices, the first dealt with Palestine; the Council’s choice of a representative for Palestine to take part in its acts until the state gained independence. The second Appendix tackled cooperation with the non-independent Arab countries, which – at the that time – were not full Member States in the Arab League Council; and the third Appendix related to the assignment of the First Secretary General of the League of Arab States for a period of two years.

The Charter materialised at a moment of political accord and general aspiration. In other words, the Arab League was not established by the rise of a dominating regional power that imposed its will on others, but was rather the result of debate and a number of balances between the concerned State parties and their political leaderships. Intrinsic to this were the general principles of sovereignty and equality that formed the basis for such aspects within the Charter as decisions by unanimous vote, the development of a joint security order and a process of peaceful settlement of conflicts.

Article 10 of the Charter stated that “The permanent seat of the League of Arab States shall be Cairo” even though the Council could meet at any other
designated place. This principle and the rule that the Secretary General should be from the same country as the country of the headquarters reflected the Egyptian influence and caused political unrest when Egypt was expelled from the League as a result of signing a peace agreement with Israel in 1979 (Sela, 1998). In spite of the debate generated by this principle, it is still practised at the date of this research. The choice of a charismatic and popular Egyptian personality like Amr Moussa in 2001 to fill the seat of Secretary General helped to prevent this debate from reaching the point of unresolved disagreement among members of the league.

All in all, the Charter followed the guidelines set by the *Alexandria Protocol*. It established a Council on which all states had equal voting power, yet it emphasised functional rather than political cooperation; and it stressed the priority of protecting the security and independence of the Arab states. The ideal of Arab unity was acknowledged, but this clearly had little relevance to the immediate future. As for inter-Arab relations, the Charter placed unquestionable primacy on the preservation of the status quo. The declared aim of the signatories was to “support and stabilise the ties linking League members” and to do so “upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty” of each member (Arab League Charter Preamble 1945).

The Charter and the previous Protocol differed in a number of ways that reflect the evolving contested visions and negotiated outcomes in the Arab region. For example, the Charter places a greater emphasis on national security and sovereignty with a pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change
established systems of government and to avoid the use of force in resolving their disputes. Although both the Charter and the Protocol emphasised the peaceful resolution of disputes without resorting to force, the Protocol had no such clauses emphasising state national security and sovereignty. Furthermore, Article 3 of the Protocol states that member states will look towards increasing unity through cooperation dependent upon the circumstances of each individual state but not within a formal regional structure. Further, the Charter differed from the Protocol in the explicit omission of the guarantee of Lebanon’s independence based upon the view that the Charter itself contained sufficient guarantees of the sovereignty of all member states (Hourani, 1947).

Despite this stress on protecting state sovereignty and preventing intervention, the Charter did not grant the new organisation a great deal of power to promote these norms. Although the Council was given the power to initiate mediatory or arbitral missions by a majority vote, excluding the parties to a dispute, its decisions in the case of an actual or threatened armed conflict required the unanimous consent of all League members, apart from the aggressing state. The effect of this stipulation was that a resolution could not be passed against an aggressing state unless it was completely without allies in the Arab world. Moreover, even if a resolution was passed against a state, the Charter cautioned that it would not be binding if “it concerned a state’s independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity” (Arab League Charter, 1945: Article 5). Since any conflict involving war or a threat of war could likely be viewed in this light by the parties, the League’s decisions on inter-Arab conflicts were not considered to be legally binding. (Sayegh, 1958, p. 123) pointed to this fundamental
weakness in the organisation’s security and decision-making provisions when he wrote:

In creating the League, the individual Arab states created an association or an alliance, not a union; they withheld from the organisation representing that association both inherent and derivative power; and they bound themselves in advance by no commitment to implement whatever decisions they might approve during the discussions.

Despite the many factors that should have increased cooperation between the members of the Arab League, the organisation has since been unable to draft a Charter with a clear, defined foreign policy, unlike for instance the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement. The Charter was written in a loose manner to accommodate the narrow interests of Member States and to avoid restrictions or pressures on their freedom of action and sovereignty. This was especially reflected in the abandonment of the Alexandria Protocol, which had forbidden the endorsement of any foreign policy detrimental to the Arab League or any of its Member States. The Charter gave absolute freedom for member states to enter any agreements or treaties as long as the resulting commitments were not binding on other Member States (Soliman, 2005).

From Unity to Independence
The Protocol, which had been intended to be an instrument to encourage and assist the eventual formal unity of the Arab states, had been transformed into an alternative frame focusing on the sovereign integrity of each member. Ever since, Article 5 of the Charter has been the subject of conflicting interpretations within the League between those anxious to see that no section of the Arab world expands its power inside the region, and those who believe that the League is intended to encourage union. A close reading of the Protocol and the Charter reflects that the latter incorporated numerous checks to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of Arab states over any formal union.

Little (1956) argues that Alexandria Protocol reflected the state of the region and the spirit of unity that surrounded its wording. The Protocol declared that the decisions of the League Council shall be binding on the Member States. It further declared that “every state will be free to conclude with any other member state of the League, or other powers, agreements which do not contradict the text or spirit of the present dispositions” (Article 1). The signatory states were “anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab countries and to direct them toward their welfare of the Arab world” (Protocol Preamble). Although the League was formed “in response to public opinion in all Arab countries” (Protocol Preamble), the Charter jettisoned many of the underlying notions of an eventual union and instead highlighted the independence and sovereignty of the Member States with a promise to defend each state against aggression.
This change in spirit becomes increasingly apparent in the opening two sentences of the Preamble to Charter. “Desirous” it begins, “of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab states; and anxious to support and stabilise those ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of those states…”. In the six months between the Protocol and the Charter, the “ties” have ceased to “bind” the Arab states; they only “link” them. According to the Charter, the League is now intended to “support and stabilise” –not “strengthen and consolidate”- those ties, within the framework of existing sovereignties of the states. Importantly, priority has been given to the protection of the member states against internal transformations before the protection of these states against aggression from outside. In the Charter itself, a new provision, Article 8, states that each member state “shall respect the systems of government established in other member states and regard them as exclusive concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government”. The article which entitles member states to establish “closer bonds” in article 9 has a secondary condition which specifically entitles other member states to decide that they are not bound by the treaties or agreements - presumably “the closer bonds” of other member states. Further, Article 7 binds states only to those decisions of the Council for which they have voted; in other words, the majority decisions of the Council become only an expression of opinion of certain members. And even the measures to be taken to repulse aggression shall only be determined “by unanimous decision” (Little, 1956, p.140). These changes reflect a dramatically changed spirit of intent with the maintenance of domestic power and governing elites taking priority over cooperation and unity.
The Charter of the Arab League also reflected the policies of Egypt and Saudi Arabia in a way that would obstruct Iraq and Transjordan’s aims to unite the Arab states of geographic Syria and beyond. Though the League was instigated by idealism and the public popularity of unity, its actual development was simultaneously reflective of the fundamental conflict between the Hashemite states of Transjordan on one side, and of Saudi Arabia and other states on the other side.

Yet the League had found its most powerful instigator in Nuri Pasha Al-Said of Iraq, who perceived it as an organisation to encourage some ‘fusion’ of existing Arab states. Egypt, being the mediator and the host of the negotiations, played an instrumental role in transforming the Protocol into the League’s Charter through its influence. However, this too was not just based on idealism: “It was the fear of pan-Arabism and its increasing popularity that caused Egyptian leaders to take a leading role in crafting the Alexandria Protocol of October 1944 and in establishing the League of Arab States in March 1945” (Barnett, 1993, p.287).

Arab Nationalism

In the wider context of Arab nationalism, the Arab League represented a moderate success for the Arab union project. There were three main schools of thought concerned with the nature and future of the Arab League in relation to the broader pan-Arab project. The first perceived the preservation of the
sovereignty of Member States as a step away from unity and into political division. The second school of thought argued that a broader and closer union was needed and that states should give up some of their sovereignty in favour of this union. The last school of thought, which was the largest, perceived the inclusion of all independent Arab states in the League as a positive and gradual step towards unity (Arab League, 2005; Abdel-Salam, 2007; Fahmy, 2007; Burdett, 1995). For this third school, the consequential international status gained through this broader membership would have enough benefits to compensate for the disadvantages highlighted by the other two schools of thought.

The League as established represented a step forward for the moderate Arab nationalists who viewed an immediate confederation of Arab states in a single entity as a political impossibility at that juncture, given the parochial interests of new governing elites in maintaining domestic rule.

The League was also a victory for secular liberalism in Arab political circles and reflected the displacement of any pan-Islamic movement within the ascension of Arab nationalism (Hourani, 1947) and into the mainstream of Arab politics. On the other hand, the Arab nationalist aspiration for unity never ceased to exist, but clearly the ideal of national identity had superseded pan-Arab unity and confederation. As reflected in various parliamentary debates, the Arab League was repeatedly referred to not as the "League of Arab States" (Jama’at al-dowal al-arabiyya), which was its official name, but as the "League of Arab Nations" (Jama’at al-umam arabiyya) (Kienle, 1995, p.62).
Challenges Facing the League at Birth

In short, the League was established with embedded limitations as a result of extra-regional influence (i.e. Britain and France), Arab disagreements and enmity between the two main Arab blocs. The League faced a number of challenges and was required to address a number of immediate diverging interests and developing problems even before its inception - namely, the historical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Jordan; a weak charter both functionally and ideologically; the ascension of internal socio-political stability over wider notions of equality and unity; the liberation of the Arab states then still under European colonialism; and finally, the issue of Palestine under the British Mandate and Zionist immigration.

For example, the Al-Saud-Hashemite rivalry overshadowed almost every action of the League. In essence, this meant that the League could only unite in reaction to external factors. The result of this lack of unity manifested itself in a weaker League seemingly incapable of addressing the existing political and security challenges both in the region and internationally. By measuring the achievements and shortcomings of the League against its decisions and words, “the effect of this rivalry between the Hashemite and Saudi Arabia becomes clearer” (Little, 1956, p.141) as will be further discussed when examining the changes in inter-Arab alliances.
Further, the Charter did not give the new organisation powers or tools to help realise the principles it was meant to achieve. In particular, the decision-making process inhibited the League’s ability to intervene in conflicts among its members since such intervention in armed conflict required the unanimous consent of all League members, apart from the aggressing state, which was practically impossible. In addition, the emphasis on preserving member states’ sovereignty was translated into the Charter without a clear or defined foreign policy. Hence, the weakness of the League was consistently damaging to the interests of security in the Arab region. Lastly, condemnation of French colonial policy might have sustained nationalist morale, as indeed did opposition to the British in Egypt and Iraq, but this was not enough to ensure the prioritisation of a collective foreign policy or an agenda for formal unity.

The League had also had to confront a number of interlinked and related problems related to nationalism and Palestine. These included the nationalist movement demand for the independence of Egypt, Iraq and other Arab lands; also, there was the question of the Jews in Palestine which also concerned Britain and affected Arab relations with the Western powers in general. Nuri Al-Said had advised the preliminary Commission of the Arab League in 1944 to leave the national issues aside and concentrate on preventing the loss of Palestine to the Jews. The League elected to fight on all fronts at once by addressing the issues of Palestine, Lebanon and colonial control of Arab countries. Consequently, it became increasingly difficult to agree on a unified foreign policy and gain external support from either the British or the French on the issue of Palestine.
Inter-Arab Alliances and their Impact on the Arab League

It is also important to note the impact that inter-Arab alliances had on the establishment of the Arab League process. The development of the Arab League and its process was influenced by a small number of Arab states (namely, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan), and the anti-Hashemite elements within the League. Of the seven votes in the League Council, Iraq and Jordan were a minority, while Syria and Saudi Arabia usually agreed with Egypt; and either Lebanon or Yemen, or both, could be expected to agree with the majority opinion (Zacher, 1979; Little, 1956). However, a number of unstable military regimes in Syria during 1949 changed the situation. This period witnessed a fluctuation in the strength of Syrian-Iraqi ties depending on the increase or decrease of Syrian traders’ influence on Damascus (Little, 1956). The Hashemite-Anti-Hashemite rivalry and Arab nationalism provided the ideological and political terms of debate with respect to the League’s shape, authority, duties, and goals. Pro-Hashemites fought Egyptian influence; and the new generation of Arab socialists and nationalists together with other pro-Egyptians increasingly feared Iraqi influence. Consequently, each side cultivated its ties with its respective Iraqi or Egyptian allies and/or depending upon the configuration, any available Arab ally.

The League’s formation and the regional politics of the time were troubled by the aspirations of individual states and international colonial attempts at
supremacy. For example, the Hashemite influence in Iraq was neither unproblematic nor unchallenged. Indicative of these intersecting dynamics of international-national alliances, the Hashemite regime in Iraq had since 1930 an economic and political treaty with colonial Britain, \(^8\) that had little appeal to Arab nationalists such as those in neighbouring Syria. Hence, for those seeking Arab unity and collective security, Iraq increasingly turned from a pole of attraction into a regional threat, in spite of being part of the Arab nation. Further, from the early 1950s, the international interference in the Arab world deepened via the various American and European plans for the military defence of the Middle East, culminating in the Baghdad Pact of 1955. This served to reinforce Arab perception of Iraq as a threat or western proxy rather than an Arab ally.

**Baghdad Pact**

In the 1950s, the United States was still keen to extend its economic-military alliances into the Middle East to fill a power vacuum left by the end of British and French era of formal colonialism.

\[ A \text{ framework for a collective security pact became established in 1954, with Pakistan playing a pivotal role. At this time delicate negotiations were taking place among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan,} \]

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\(^8\) The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was a treaty of alliance between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the British Mandate-controlled administration of the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq. The treaty was between the governments of George V of the United Kingdom and Faisal I of Iraq. High Commissioner Francis Humphrys signed for the United Kingdom and Prime Minister Nuri as-Said signed for Iraq. The 1930 treaty was based upon an earlier Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 but took into account Iraq’s increased importance to British interests given new oil finds made in 1927.
and Britain regarding the creation of an alliance system with U.S. support. The Baghdad Pact was the result of this tactful negotiation. The United States agreed to provide military assistance to member states.

(Thomas, 2001, p. 70)

Though the Americans had larger imperial plans, especially concerning securing access to oil, the Baghdad Pact took place also in the context of various Arab states looking for regional hegemony. Ironically, the idea behind the Baghdad Pact emerged from Cairo as a countermeasure to the increasing Iraqi influence in Syria. It had been discussed in the Palace of King Farouq of Egypt with the aim of obstructing a defensive alliance between Iraq and Syria. While Iraqi leaders did not like it, they could not reject it as they perceived it to be a defensive bulwark against Russia and Israel (Little, 1956; Galvani, 1972).

After the Egyptian Revolution in 1952, Arab nationalism and its consequent neutralist and independent agendas resulted in a review of Egypt’s approach to the Arab League and regional security. Egypt and Syria, in particular, were unhappy with the extension of the American Cold War coalition into the region. In this context, the timing of the US-Iraq Baghdad Pact guaranteed Arab nationalist opposition to it; and at the same time revolutions in both Egypt and Syria during the 1950s gave stronger momentum to Arab nationalism.

The Arab League considered Iraq’s decision to participate in the Baghdad Pact as a betrayal of Arab solidarity, so the Arab League established a military wing
in response. Egypt and Saudi Arabia managed to capitalise on General Nasser of Egypt’s reputation and charisma to persuade Jordan to oppose the Baghdad Pact (Little, 1956; Aliboni, 1993; Dawisha, 2003; Joffé, 1983). In doing so, the American-Hashemite plans to develop a larger pro-American alliance beyond Iraq by expanding west to include Lebanon and others was stymied. Iraq was left isolated in its policy to develop and build an Arab defensive system based on alignment with superpowers, while Egypt and Saudi Arabia insisted that Iraq publicly stop pursuing the expansion of the Baghdad Pact as a policy.

The outcome of this stand-off was the adoption of an independent defence system by the Arab League in the 1950s as the means for Arab security, in which Iraq joined the rest of the Arab world in a regional ‘neutralist’ (Zacher 1979), security framework. The United States and Britain’s response to the rejection of their Middle Eastern security project came in the form of punishment of Egypt by suspending their loan to the High Dam project (Little, 1956). This Arab position towards Iraq “was very similar to the position taken by Arab states toward Egypt as a result of the Camp David peace accords between Cairo and Tel Aviv. After a regicide in Iraq a more neutralist government came to power. The Baghdad Pact became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)” 9 (Thomas, 2001, p.70).

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9 The Central Treaty Organization (also referred to as CENTO, original name was Middle East Treaty Organization or METO, also known as the Baghdad Pact) was adopted in 1955 by Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, as well as the United Kingdom. Although American pressure, along with promises of military and economic largesse, were key in the negotiations leading to the agreement, the United States chose not to initially participate as to avoid alienating Arab states with which it was still attempting to cultivate friendly relations. Some (particularly nationalist radicals) saw the Pact as an attempt by the British to retain influence in the Middle East as a substitute for the loss of their empire in India. In 1958 the United States joined the military committee of the alliance. It is generally viewed as one of the least successful of the Cold War alliances. The organisation’s headquarters was initially located in Baghdad, Iraq.
In addition to the previous schemes, “the Syrian government faced a number of plots to destabilise it in 1956 and 1957 that were also supported by the Europeans and Americans” (Kienle, 1995, p.67). The 1957 plot coincided with Turkish troop concentrations on the Syrian border. The rise of the Syrian Communist Party and unconditional support for Zionist Israel continued to provide a pretext for American intervention under the *Eisenhower Doctrine*, (Kienle, 1995). As a consequence, Syria, Iraq and Jordan were the centre of attention of the post-world war victors.

**Shifts in Arab states’ Alignments**

Inter-Arab relations, conflicts and rivalries among the Arab states influenced the Arab League and the regional relations in general. Almost since its inception, closer political unity among Arab League members was hampered by a division between pro-Western member countries and neutralist or pro-Soviet ones. These shifting alliances and inter-Arab hostility and rivalry from the establishment of the Arab League until the late 1970s has been examined by Zacher (1979), who summarised the inter-Arab coalition configuration as shown in Table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Period 1: 1946-Mid-1954</th>
<th>Period 2: Mid-1954-56</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hashemite</td>
<td>Nonaligned</td>
<td>Hashemite</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Libya (joined 1953)</td>
<td>Transjordan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria (1946-August 1949, 1950-54)</td>
<td>Syria (August-December 1949)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Positive Neutralists</td>
<td>Nonaligned</td>
<td>Pro-West</td>
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<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Radical Neutralists</td>
<td>Nonaligned</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan (joined 1956)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria (Syria and Egypt formed UAR from February 1958 until September 1961)</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jordan (1956)</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>4a: August 1958- September 1961</td>
<td>Radical Neutralists</td>
<td>Nonaligned</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Lebanon (joined 1958)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Sudan (joined 1958)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UAR (Syria and Egypt)</td>
<td>Kuwait (joined 1961)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4b: September 1961- Mid-1966</td>
<td>Radical Neutralists</td>
<td>Non-aligned</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Lebanon (1961-63)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Sudan (1961-63)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UAR (Egypt)</td>
<td>Kuwait (1961-63)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5: Mid-1966-April 1967</td>
<td>Radical Neutralists</td>
<td>Nonaligned</td>
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<td>UAR (Egypt)</td>
<td>Lebanon (1961-63)</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Sudan (1961-63)</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
<td>Kuwait (1961-63)</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>6: August 1967-70</td>
<td>Radical Rejectionists</td>
<td>Radical Accommodationists</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>UAR (Egypt)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Sudan (1969-70)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Libya (September 1969-july 1970)</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
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<td></td>
<td>South Yemen (joined 1968)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Libya (August-September 1970)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7a: 1971-73</td>
<td>Rejectionists</td>
<td>Accommodationists</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
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<td></td>
<td>South Yemen</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bahrain (joined 1971)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oman (joined 1971)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Period 7b: 1974-77

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Rejectionists</th>
<th>Moderate Rejectionists</th>
<th>Accommodationists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Syria</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>South Yemen</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia (joined 1975)</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>Qatar</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mauritania (joined 1973)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Djibouti (joined 1977)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Inter-Arab Coalition Configuration 1946-77 (Zacher, 1979: 168-169)

The above table acts as an effective historical contextual guide to shifting Arab alliances and relations. For example, as mentioned earlier, during and after the establishment of the Arab League and until the mid-1950s, inter-Arab relations were dominated by the rivalry between the Hashemite and Anti-Hashemite blocs. In 1954, Hashemite expansion lost importance and the Bagdad Pact influenced inter-Arab relations and resulted in creating a new bloc in the Arab world: the pro-Western bloc. A positive neutralist bloc emerged to counter the Western influence and focus on Arab nationalism and unity among Arab countries. While the Arab League rejected the Bagdad Pact and considered it ‘a stab in the back’ to Arab unity, the Neutralist bloc focused on strengthening its military cooperation. The Suez War in 1956 helped to undermine the pro-Western bloc and give the neutralist bloc wider support under an Egyptian
leadership. However, since 1954, there has always been a pro-Western bloc in the Arab world.

When socialism began to gain momentum in the Arab world under Egyptian leadership in the 1950s, it entered into a short period of radical vs. non-radical rivalry. According to Zacher (1979), Saudi Arabia and Jordan moved away from Egyptian leadership and established their own ties with the West. This rivalry took the form of different unions, such as when Egypt and Syria established the United Arab Republic (UAR); and Iraq and Jordan, on the other hand, set up a looser federation in the form of the Arab Federation, which came to an end when General Qasser overthrew the government in Iraq and took power (Galvani, 1972). Even though this meant the Egyptian-led group gained influence, it did not last long as Iraq entered a state of political unrest.

The period between 1958 and mid-1966 was characterized by a non-radical grouping, two to three competing radical centres and a non-aligned grouping. Between the radical states, there was often more hostility between them than with the non-radicals, as Egypt, Iraq and Syria each attempted to establish themselves as the only source of ideological leadership for the Arab Revolution. Kienle (1995) believes that if Syria had been a nation-state where state and nation coincided, it would have entered into a coalition with Egypt rather than a unity in the form of the United Arab Republic. Egypt's size along with a higher degree of self-confidence than Syria, in part linked to the country's size and strength, allowed Egyptians to shape unity arrangements in their own more than in their partners' favour. Rivalry between Egypt, Syria and Iraq shifted from
one to another due to ideological and political reasons and the UAR between Egypt and Syria came to an end with relations between the two regimes becoming more hostile (Major, 1963). In addition, Syria and Iraq were led by Ba’ath parties that were competing with each other (Moussalli, 2000).

In 1964, tension between Arab countries paused to address a potential confrontation with Israel as it declared plans to divert the water of the River Jordan (Gat, 2005). Yet due to Egyptian, Saudi and Jordanian involvement in the Yemeni Civil War, Syria was left with little support against Israel. Nevertheless, between mid-1966 and April 1967, the old rivalry between radical and conservative camps re-emerged and Egypt and Syria overcame some of their differences and the Saudi-Jordanian axis became stronger. Tension then rose between Egypt and Jordan because the former criticised the latter for not giving enough support against Israel and because Egypt was backing the Palestinian Liberation Organisation which at the time was undermining the Hashemite influence in Jordan.

As Zacher (1973: 133) writes, “Thus, by mid-1966 two Arab camps had again taken shape, divided by political ideology, external ties, and their professions of loyalty to certain vague Arab ideals and the destruction of Israel”. The Arab defeat in the June 1967 war with Israel meant that the bi-polarisation among Arab countries paused again. After this, the inter-Arab coalition was characterised by the choice of policy to pursue vis-à-vis Israel. The Arab states were divided into a group that rejected any compromise with Israel which was led by Syria, and another two groups that were willing to accept some sort of
compromise. One of the latter two groups was led by Egypt which was still keen on maintaining credibility in the Arab world as an Arab nationalist power, while the other was eager to maintain good ties with the West and was unhappy with the way in which Palestinian groups had conducted their affairs since the build-up of Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) forces around historical Palestine started to cause unrest in the host countries.

During 1971-77, there was the movement of Syria to a middle position between the two poles, although it did not become as willing as Egypt to accept a compromise with Israel. Yet more extreme positions were taken by Iraq, Libya, Algeria and Yemen. In fact, most of the Arab countries shifted their stance to establish more ties with the West; and the Egyptian shift towards a settlement with Israel had a grave impact on the Arab League. It meant that the headquarters was moved to Tunisia, Egypt became isolated and Arab policy unification with regard to Israel faced a huge setback.

During the 1980s sub-regional alliances were established (Ramazani 1988; Charbrier 1994).\(^\text{10}\) Saudi Arabia became the centre of power in the gulf region and Morocco was working to enhance its position to become the centre of power in North Africa. These shifts in the balance of power were possible since Egypt was isolated, Iraq was heavily engaged with its war with Iran and Syria got involved in the Lebanese Civil War and its politics (Maddy-Weitzman, 1991). The League ultimately supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), but was

\(^{10}\) The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 and the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989.
divided over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In 1993, it issued a statement condemning all forms of terrorism.

The theme of Pan-Arabism was the unique characteristic of the Arab state system, but it decreased gradually from 1967 through the 1980s, and a state system based on sovereignty of states replaced it (Dawisha, 2003). The Arab regional system had been fragmented, which allowed for other sub-regional organisations like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to emerge with a relatively strong say with its financial power, and also Egypt, with its military power. Iraqi and Syrian attempts to decrease Arab leadership from Egypt were hindered by the war with Iran and developments in Lebanon. Yet although Egypt's peace agreement with Israel meant that the West stopped challenging Egypt, it also meant that Egypt became isolated from the Arab League and its members and, therefore, it lost its strong leadership in the Arab world. ‘The Arab cause of Palestine’ was utilized by major Arab states in pursuit of leadership, but after Egypt’s peace with Israel, no Arab state was willing to fight against Israel for the sake of Palestinians. Therefore, neither the Arab League's nor individual Arab states' efforts to solve regional conflicts has been effective. The effectiveness of the Arab League as a security and conflict resolution organisation will be addressed in chapters four, five and six.

Conclusion
From early in its inception, the divisions between the Arab League members were several and diverse. Popular expectations and demands from the new Arab institutions and leaderships were not translated into a political agenda in the League of Arab States Charter. In addition, while the debate between Arab nationalism’s different visions was active, the path to unity was short-lived in the brief lifespan of the Alexandria Protocol. The independence and sovereignty of each Arab state became paramount and superseded other agendas and priorities as emphasised in this Charter. The encompassing regional and international environment in the Middle East during the 1940s allowed the Arab League project to move forward, yet imposed limitations on its mandate and members. The British position on Palestine’s participation in the new organisation and Arab states’ own disagreements about its representation was a case in point. Moreover, in the immediate post-WWII world, the majority of the Arab world was still under foreign colonial control and, therefore, was unable to be part of the League’s inception process. Thus, the League represented the minority, though an influential few, of the Arab world when the Charter was signed.

The divisions among the Arab countries were also significant. The Hashemite rivalry, although the central political rift, overshadowed other ideological, nationalistic and ideological differences many of which continued for decades after the creation of the League. As Major states, “Hashemite efforts to forge ‘Greater Syria’ and establish influence in Palestine were blocked by the vigilant Egyptians, usually with backing from Saudi Arabia and the Lebanon. Cairo, on the other hand, was able to muster support for its own aims, such as the “unity
of the Nile Valley” (Major, 1963, p.554). The Charter of the Arab League and its functionality was affected by the limitations imposed due to these divisions. The direct, tangible effect of such limitations was the nature of the security role that the League was allowed to practice according to its Charter. While the aims were loosely defined as explained earlier, the League was not allowed to address several regional issues and conflicts because such intervention would have violated its limited mandate which was explicit about protecting the Arab states’ independence and sovereignty. Such limitations were an accumulated effect of the atmosphere of mutual fear that resulted from the Hashemite rivalry and other divisions.

The security gap left by the League allowed for other organisations, alliances and projects to attempt to provide an alternative security safety net that was only possible due to the susceptibility of some Arab states to external influence as was the case with the Baghdad Pact. The United Arab Republic (UAR) was an example of a regional security solution to a local specific problem (Israel). In addition, following the withdrawal of Syria from the UAR in 1961, another attempt at political union was made, this time involving only Syria, Egypt and Iraq. The union failed with no practical results. Nevertheless, regional alliances within the Arab League were a regular affair and were, to a large extent, defined on the basis of foreign policy and affiliation to ideologies non-indigenous to the Middle East and were not formed on religious terms. For instance, the GCC and the Maghreb Union were two sub-regional organisations that were established largely on the basis of security concerns. However, they each addressed some immediate local security threats. In the case of the GCC, it was the Iran-Iraq
War of the 1980s that motivated members to fill the security gap in their region without waiting for the Arab League to overcome its limitations. Another of the problems that the League as an organisation carried from the start was inherited in its system of membership; specifically, its uncalculated expansion “without clearly defined economic targets or establishing specific and coordinated plans for economic harmonisation” (Kalaycioglu, 1996:2) and without the communication abilities that are available today.

Because the Charter had limitations and could not meet the high expectations of the Arab public, this was a cause for public frustration, which in turn imposed limitations on the move toward wider unity and a coherent security structure; while the regional balance of power played another role in restraining the League. “What was so frustrating about the Middle Eastern power equation, however, was its tendency to cancel out every action which did not happen to coincide with the political interests of either Cairo or a substantial group of its opponents. The net result, all too often, was paralysis” (Major, 1963, p.554). Although this paralysis could also have been a result of the Hashemite rivalry in the early years of the League, the challenges that faced the League in the 1980s and 1990s, and later during the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the many Israeli wars on Lebanon, proved that the League was vulnerable to changes in the balance of power and was highly influenced by its host country. All these symptoms can be traced back to its Charter. On the level of its dispute-solving mechanism, the Charter stipulated that all inter-Arab disputes should be referred to the League’s Council for arbitration and peaceful settlement. Yet, according to Article Five of the Charter, implementation of the
League's decisions and mediation were not obligatory, thus leaving it in a weak position. Even the common Arab Defence Treaty of 1950 did not bring about any real change and the involvement of the League in the settlement of its members' disputes, which is still optional to a great extent and conditional upon the approval of the parties concerned (Rigal, 1993). These limitations are interlinked with the concepts of national and regional security as well as the regional security dynamics of the Middle East in general and, therefore, these will be the focus of the discussion in the following chapter.
CHAPTER TWO

THEORIES OF REGIONALISM, SECURITY AND REGIONAL SECURITY

This chapter reviews the existing concepts and theories in the International Relations literature and other key resources on regional security, with a view to identifying theoretical perspectives pertinent to an understanding of the Arab League which will clarify where this research is positioned and what tools will be used to answer the main question ‘Why has the Arab League failed as a regional security organisation?’ This is in addition to gaining a better understanding of and clarifying the identification of national and state security in
the Arab world. Thus, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first will address the concepts of ‘region’ and ‘regionalism’ and the second will discuss the concept of security along with the differences between state and national security. In the third section, theories of regional security and the tools of analysis they provide will be investigated and debated. The last section will discuss alternative levels of analysis, approaches and theories that are relevant to this research; and the conclusion will summarise the findings.

Region and Regionalism

During any discussion on Regional Security Organisations (RSOs), the issue of definition involves questions of what comprises regional security and a regional organisation; and under what conditions a regional organisation transforms into an RSO. While these questions will be answered later in this chapter, it is important to define regional security in this early phase in order to alleviate misconception or confusion.

Both of the terms ‘region’ and ‘regionalism’ are ambiguous and subjective. A common question in this field is: what qualities of a geographical region give it the relational qualities of regionalism? Before this can be answered, the notions of the region and regionalism must be explored. Although geographical proximity and/or contiguousness do not fully clarify the definition or explain how regional dynamics operate, they do help to distinguish a regional entity from other forms of international or global forms of organisations (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995, p.38). Even well-developed regional dynamics of various kinds –
captured in the term ‘regionalisation’ (see below) – do not require formal, political consolidation. As Hettne suggests:

The current wave of ‘new’ regionalism has [generally] been discussed mainly with regard to its impact on the patterns of trade and global welfare. This is in spite of the fact that it is often defined by its comprehensiveness and multidimensionality, ranging from regional responses to shared ecological threats to security crises.

(Hettne, 1999, p.1)

The problem of defining regions and regionalism attracted a substantial amount of academic attention in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but the results yielded few clear conclusions (Press-Barnathan, 2005, p.283; Karacasulu and Uzgoren, 2007).

Regions (or sub-regions) can be defined in many different ways: through geographic propinquity or intensity of interactions, such as trade; through internal or external recognition and formal declaration as such; politically; historically; or culturally and in terms of ‘civilizational areas’. Some regions are even defined in terms of river basins or shared seas or mountain ranges.

(Cawthra, 2007, p.23)
Similarly, regionalism was often analysed in terms of the degree of social cohesiveness (ethnicity, race, language, religion, culture, history, consciousness of a common heritage); economic cohesiveness (trade patterns, economic complementarity), political cohesiveness (regime type, ideology); and organisational cohesiveness (existence of formal regional institutions) (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995). In addition, Hveen points to the confusion over regionalism and regionalisation, differentiating them thus:

*The occurrence of increased economic (and social) interaction within a region should be referred to as regionalization. Regionalism may certainly cause regionalization, but not always. Regionalism should thus be analytically distinguished from regionalization.*  
(Hveen, 1999, p.87)

Particular attention has also been given to the idea of regional interdependence, but attempts (such as those by Bruce Russert, 1967) to define and outline regions ‘scientifically’ produced few clear results. David Grigg’s (1965) examination of the logic behind regional systems was based on the similarity between how these systems are defined and on classification as a process. This approach produced a wide range of factors and conditions to consider when defining regional systems but did not produce clear methods or any specific methodology. It is the existence of this wide range of factors implicated in the growth of regionalism that support Fawcett’s conclusion that there are no ‘natural’ regions and that the definition of ‘region’ and indicators of ‘regionness’ vary according to the particular problem or question under investigation.
Thus, the term ‘regionalism’ is used to cover a wide spectrum of factors and characteristics which make it hard to define with a single concept that embraces all these different dimensions. For example, within the existing literature one can find a very different approach to regional security in American and European literature. “The former focuses on defining the existence or nature of [...] regional security arrangements, and pays relatively little attention to the process of regionalisation, or to regionalisation as a form of policy choice. The latter, on the other hand, focuses mainly on the dynamic nature of regional security. Its orientation - as opposed to the rationalist, state-centred American approach - is much more historical, constructivist and at times also postmodern” (Press-Barnathan, 2005, p.283; Karacasulu and Uzgoren, 2007).

The bulk of the literature on regionalism, however, breaks down the concept into five different processes that provide a clearer understanding of its meaning. The first is ‘regionalisation’ which is used in the literature in reference to social integration within a specified but not necessarily politically discrete area and patterns of indirect and informal interaction socially and economically within it. This is what writers on regionalism have described as informal integration (Schulz, 2001; Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995) and what some contemporary analysts refer to as ‘soft regionalism’ (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995, p.39). This concept puts emphasis on economic processes that are not based on formal groups or states and that go beyond borders to the degree that the processes lead to economic interdependence. The second is ‘regional awareness and identity’ which for many commentators have become central to the analysis of
contemporary regionalism; Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver are among them. The third process is ‘regional interstate cooperation’ where a great deal of regionalist activity involves the negotiation and construction of interstate or intergovernmental agreements or regimes. Such co-operation can be formal or informal and high levels of institutionalisation are no guarantee of effectiveness, nor of political importance (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995). The fourth is ‘state-promoted regional integration’ and even though this holds numerous similarities with regional cooperation, the main difference is that integration involves governmental decisions for the facilitation of movement and exchange among states. Lastly, ‘regional cohesion’ relates to the likelihood of the preceding four processes bringing about the materialization of a regional unit that is politically consolidated and formalised. For International Relations purposes, cohesion is the key element that draws attention to regionalism. As Fawcett states, cohesion can be understood in two senses: (i) when the region plays a defining role in the relations between the states (and other regional and external players); and (ii) when a regional structure is formed to organise and coordinate regional policy on a range of issues (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995, p.44). Hurrell emphasises the importance of regional policy by defining regionalism as “a set of policies by one or more states designed to promote the emergence of a cohesive regional unit, which dominates the pattern of relations between the states of that region and the rest of the world, and which forms the organizing basis for policy within the region across a range of issues” (Hurrell, 1992, p.123).
As well as the measured yet comprehensive approach above, the definition of a ‘region’ is less complex in the security literature. In security terms, the existence of a region means that a “distinct, significant subsystem of security relations is present amongst a group of states that share geographical proximity” (Buzan, 1991, p.20). This definition is more focused on giving extended importance to geographical proximity and regarding it as the main factor that facilitates the establishment of systemic relations among the members of a particular region. In fact, Buzan and Wæver (2004,) disagree with Lake and Morgan’s view that “geographical proximity is not a necessary condition for a state to be a member of a [security] complex’ [suggesting that] this not only destroys the meaning of levels, but also voids the concept of region” (Lake and Morgan, 1997, p.349; Buzan and Wæver, 2004, p.80).

Through synthesising the elements from the above discussion, a more informed and inclusive understanding of ‘region’ and ‘regionalism’ can be reached. Thus, for the purposes of this work, a ‘region’ pertains to any geographical area, proximate if not contiguous, in which patterns of relations, identified interests and routine social, cultural, political and/or economic relations are readily discerned, both from within and without. ‘Regionalism’ is defined here as the process whereby countries in geographical proximity engage, formally and informally, in cooperative practices that lead to integrationist policies resulting from high level interdependency.

Security and National Security
A variety of security issues and interests, varying according to the actors and the geo-political, geo-strategic and historical factors in play - have long featured in regionalisation; and for many scholars of regionalism, security - and in particular, national security - is the driving force and appropriate focus of such studies. Given the predominance of Realism in International Relations theory, this is not altogether surprising. For example, Press (2005) defines regionalisation on a narrow, state-centred basis and focuses on an institutional perspective and on a traditional conception of what constitutes a security issue (Press-Barnathan, 2005, p.283). But the predominance of Realism notwithstanding, the concept of security and thinking about its applicability has changed considerably throughout the twentieth century (and particularly since the end of the Cold War) to incorporate more contemporary and non-traditional elements, to become a more subjective and broad concept (Collins, 2006; Buzan and Hansen, 2009). With the evolution of International Security Studies (ISS), an increased number of security perspectives have taken shape and gained a larger foothold in both practical and academic security paradigms. According to Buzan and Hansen (2009), each of these paradigms varies slightly with respect to the referent object, its epistemology and its view on politics. They go on to identify five driving forces behind the evolution and diversity of ISS. First are great power politics and how the relations between superpowers and their interests drive research and focus. Second is the technological imperative. Missile technology, space programmes, new discoveries in weapons and defensive systems have a major impact on classifying and reclassifying threats and, therefore, also on the meaning of security. The third driving force is events. Historical events and how they interplay and affect
relations, when examined from a constructivist perspective, do influence actors and policy makers. Fourth is the *internal dynamics of academic debates*; this driving force has a complicated relationship with the International Relations paradigm as well as within discussions within the larger social science domain itself. Finally, the fifth driving force is *institutionalization* which further emphasizes the importance of the debate that happens within academic discussions. However, this final point is affected by the network and relationships between institutions supporting and funding research in ISS (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, pp.50–61). For the purpose of this research, the first three driving forces identified by Buzan and Hansen are considered to be of direct relevance to both understanding how the concept of security has evolved and can change within a security system (being a state or a region), and explaining the shifts that can happen in the security thinking of member states of a regional organisation like the Arab League.

Table 2 provides a succinct overview of the topic over several decades with an emphasis on the different approaches scholars have taken in understanding and, ultimately, defining security.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Definitions of Security</th>
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<tr>
<td>‘Security itself is a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of the war that should occur.’</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values it if wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by a victory in such a war.’</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Walter Lippman, Cited in Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>Giacomo Luciani, <em>The economic content of security</em>, Journal of Public Policy, 8/2 (1989), p. 151</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard H. Ullman, <em>Redefining security</em>, International Security, 8/1 (1983), p. 133</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arnold Wolfers, <em>Discord and collaboration</em> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohammed Ayoob, <em>The Third World Security Predicament</em> (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ken Booth, <em>Security and emancipation</em>, Review of International Studies, 17/4 (October 1991), p. 319</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter Hough, <em>Understanding Global Security</em> (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 9</td>
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</table>
These scholars’ definitions of security clarify the fact that war and the threat of force are not the only components of the security equation. The absence of threats and the overcoming of dangers are also key elements to perceptions of security. Disease, crime, environmental catastrophes and water shortages are other dangers that contribute to the feeling of security or lack of it. More recently, terrorism has also become a key factor in security studies. In line with this broader understanding of security to incorporate indirect sources of threat, Kolodziej (2005) refers to the nonviolent and cooperative dimension of security through overcoming threats by non-coercive means. In summary, in order for any subject (individual or group) to feel secure, they need to be free from the fear of threat or danger and possess the ability to overcome potential threats or dangers either through their own resources or through a process of cooperative persuasion.

What is notable in the recent broadening of the conception of security is the degree to which the setting the parameters of ‘vital’ security issues and gauging threat levels are no longer entirely an elite exercise, conducted by governments at some remove from their populations. Increasingly, popular perceptions of security threats – environmental quality is a case in point – can and do have a bearing on government threat assessments. Hence the growing importance of constructivist perspectives in ISS (and as we shall see, their relevance to understanding the Arab League.)
Constructivist approaches to security

During the course of the 20th century and particularly after the end of the Cold War, an increasing number of topics and issues became the subject of security analysis for states and scholars alike; and, as noted above, for populations at large. More approaches to security have emerged and older work revisited, much of it in the light of constructivist insights and challenges.

Constructivism highlights the importance of culture, beliefs, norms, ideas and identity to counterbalance the focus on the material objects of security (Karacasulu and Uzgoren, 2007). This approach broadens and deepens the analysis of state behaviour since it incorporates both positivist and post-positivist epistemologies. Without denying the importance of states and the international system, and while remaining focused on military security, constructivist approaches include groups and collectives other than the state. The Constructivist approach also adopts sociological post-positivist methodologies and has come to prominence, at least in the West, since 1990. More broadly, the Copenhagen School is concerned with widening the nature and kinds of threat and their referent objects, especially societal and identity security, albeit at the regional level of interaction. The Copenhagen school offers a constructivist counterpoint to the materialist analyses of security and has become one of the most influential IR ‘schools’ in Europe (Collins, 2006).
Constructivist approaches share features with other intellectual endeavours, movements and schools which are similarly concerned with ‘unpacking’ the concept of state security. Critical Security Studies emphasises the human security dimension of state security through a post-positivist methodology. It is a branch of critical theory in International Relations with emancipation as a key concept. Feminist security studies is less a ‘school’ and more a descriptor which covers a variety of approaches which are broadly concerned with the ways in which the practice and study of security (and international relations more generally) is gendered, with numerous, specific issues often linked to the systematic disenfranchisement, disempowerment and exploitation of women and girls frequently highlighted. In addition, well-known studies examine the ways in which embedded conceptions of state security reveal the link between militarism and masculinity (Collins, 2006).

Concerted efforts to highlight the concept of human security are closely related to both peace research and critical security studies. Human security is concerned to establish human beings as the primary referent object of security and therefore presents a strong critique of state centrism. In doing so, the human security approach reclassifies issues like poverty, under-development, hunger and limitations on human potential as central in any meaningfully inclusive conception of security. Human security also acknowledges the linkages between disarmament and arms controls issues, human rights and development (Bouchard, 2008).
Peace Research in many respects poses a direct contrast to Strategic Studies in its aim to reduce and eliminate the use of force in international relations through its critique of militarized and securitized characterizations of relations; and by advocating human security alongside state and national security. Peace Research is now well established (Friedrichs, 2004) and modern Peace Studies is concerned with “the underlying causes of conflicts. It remains an interdisciplinary field that embraces multilevel analysis and is both analytical and normative” (Collins, 2006, p.45).

Post-colonial security studies argue that the study of the non-Western world requires security theories that recognise colonial history as well as understanding the specifics of state formation in the third world.¹¹ Poststructuralist security studies support this claim by arguing that both state sovereignty and state security are the products of political practices. It perceives the state-centric security approach as a limitation on possibilities for other referent objects of security. This approach has been gaining acceptance among modern security researchers, principally after the increasing influence of non-state actors post-9/11 (Buzan and Hansen, 2009).

Finally, Strategic Studies classically defines security in political and military terms with attention given to military dynamics. It has a strongly material approach with a tendency to adopt a state-centric and normative position as a given in discussions on state security. Neorealism also has strong links to

strategic studies by adopting state centric, materialist, power-political and objective assumptions about the nature of international relations (Keohane, 1993, 1986; Buzan and Hansen, 2009).

This review of the various concepts of state and national security and how they differ in their focus and perception of the relationship between the referent-object of security will help in unifying the terminology used while addressing national and regional security (as well as regional security organisations) in later chapters.

The State

‘State’ is often used synonymously with ‘government’ although of the latter is not free-standing from a bounded territory and a polity of sufficient stability and coherence both to require and enable government of a kind and on a scale that is recognized by other states. Associated with this term is ‘sovereignty’ which is a legal concept specifying the rights (and increasingly, the obligations) to rule over designated territory and which demarcates the idea of internal affairs and the principle of non-interference by other states - what is commonly referred to as ‘sovereign integrity.’ “A more complex concept is the idea of ‘nation’ which carries the notion of shared identity which may or may not be based on the values of the dominant group” (San, 1999, p.5). For this reason, there are nations within even politically stable states (Native Americans within the United States and Canada, for example); and stateless nations (the Kurds, for example.) In state-centric views on International Relations, the assumption is
that states are the primary actors in the international system and that they are both the referent object of desired security and also the providers of it. However, the contrast between state and nation raises the linkages between external and internal security.

Since the Second World War, the development of the state national security concept took two directions in relation to largely Western understandings of security – and increasingly over time, security for developing countries. According to Ayoob (1995) security has three dimensions. First, it is externally orientated; in other words, it is the security of the state against potential external threats that are usually military in nature. This could be due to the limited understanding of the concept during both World Wars and due to the nature of the international system that followed during the Cold War. Secondly, he proposes that the Western approach has positive links with systemic security: and, thirdly, that security of the state corresponds with alliance security (ibid.).

The developments after the Second World War strengthened these latter two dimensions. This is because the evolution of the modern state system and the role played by individual states as active participants in the system were the foundations for its legitimacy. During the Cold War, a division between the superpowers established the link between security and alliances, which supports the Buzan & Hansen (2009) analysis of the role of superpowers as forces driving security concepts. Mak (1998) expands on this through highlighting the connection between national security and international order, stating that the Western notion of security applies to immunity from outside
threats. However, this notion presumes the existence of a strong, cohesive state whereas a more logical extension of the Western concept of state-centric security has been to view security in terms of the world order. In other words, international security is regarded as the maintenance of a world system of law and order with individual states expected to subjugate their individual, narrow interests to collective or common interests (including provision to deal with systemic threats, which is the basis of the collective security provisions of the United Nations). Thus, for Mak, the Western approach to international/regional security and cooperation tends to be systemic in character - an approach which is explained later in this chapter.

In contrast, security for the developing world [or as Ayoob refers to it “the Third World Countries” (1995)] is more domestic and politically oriented, although this does not mean that other realms of security are isolated or that concerns for military security are absent. “When developments in other realms ranging from the economic to the ecological threaten to have immediate political consequences or are perceived as being able to threaten states’ boundaries, political institutions, or governing regimes” (Ayoob, 1995, p.82), they are considered as part of the state’s security threats. In other words, the concept of national security in developing countries is primarily defined in political terms in relation to the challenges to the survival and effectiveness of states and their regimes. These two approaches both have the state as the object in need of security, but they are quite distinct in terms of how they regard the relational particulars.
Throughout the modern history of International Relations, states have been the main and central actors. Scholars and schools of thought have analysed states’ roles, behaviours and motivations in the international system, usually on a foundation of the recognition of ‘anarchy’ – that is, the absence of world government or the existence of any supranational body that could control states’ actions. Although the fact of anarchy is not contested, IR theorists differ considerably on the degree to which anarchy is seen as a determining feature of state interaction and their search for security. (Wendt, 1992; Morgan, 1997; Lake and Morgan, 1997; Buzan, 1991; Ayoob, 1995; Williams, 2005; Keohane, 1986; Griffiths, 1992; Salem, 2008)

Realism offers a state-centric account of the world, and therefore, Realism takes the state to be central to international relations (Brown, 2007, p.63). Realists believe that anarchy shapes a distinct politics among states which leads to insecurity. The international system limitations and constraints drive states towards pursuing more security on a cost-benefit basis, which leads ultimately to a security dilemma. Neoclassical realists adopt a less stark position, believing that domestic factors within states mediate the impact of systemic factors (Snyder, 1999; Williams, 2007, 2005; Weber, 2005; Vasquez, 1998; Salmon, 2008; Salem, 2008). On the other hand, the Liberalist perspective is more flexible about the impact of anarchy on states’ behaviour. Liberals believe that states are more likely to cooperate through active relations of interdependence within a community in pursuit of their security. State behaviour tends to be more influenced by the character of the state and its political system on all levels of international relations. Whilst the Liberalist
approach is more optimistic about security than the Realist, the latter remains the dominant approach in the practice of international politics (Snyder, 1999; Williams, 2007, 2005; Weber, 2005; Vasquez, 1998; Salmon, 2008; Salem, 2008) and in the academic study of International Relations.

Although Realist and Neoliberal scholars are divided on the issue of structure versus process, they have three things in common. Wendt (1999) claims that all these theorists agree that (1) states are the dominant actors in international politics; (2) rationalism is the theoretical disposition through which they explain international state interactions; and (3) security is defined in “self-interested” terms (Weber, 2005, p.61). For constructivists, however, state interaction reflects a learning process in which action shapes, and is shaped by, identities, interests and values over time. In contrast to other theoretical approaches, social constructivism explores the diffusion and regulative influence of international norms; it seeks, in other words, to link fundamental institutional structures at the international level with state identity and interests (Griffiths, 1992, 2008, 2009). Constructivism actually emphasises the fact that the international system consists of social relationships as well as material capabilities.

In summary, the state in an anarchic international system is a referent object of security and the provider of it. The more a society is homogenous within the state, the closer the concepts of state security and national security match; that is, the relationship between state, nation and society is a key factor for determining whose security is being achieved. When external intervention in a
state’s internal affairs is high, the distinction between external and internal security becomes blurry. The combination of these factors and dynamics between the state, its political systems, the society and external influences is particularly relevant since this research is focusing on a region where states vary in their strengths and weaknesses as well as in their political systems. Some of these political systems widen the gap between society and nation, or between the ruling elite and the public. This will be further elaborated on and explored under the section addressing Arab National Security.

**Regional Security Theories**

Having reviewed the concepts of state, nation and security, and established the principal schools of thought stands on security and International Relations, this section will focus on the interactions among states within a regional context, in particular, how states cooperate and interact to achieve their desired security objectives. These interactions are affected by factors like interdependency, amity-enmity factors, and geographical, historical and cultural factors, which in some cases take the shape of a security community or a security regime (San, 1999).

1. **Security Interdependence**

Interdependence is a central concept in understanding state behaviour at the regional and international levels. It is closely interlinked with other concepts, such as regional resilience, amity-enmity and security complex theory. Snyder
(1999) believes that states look to their immediate neighbours as potential sources of threat or protection and, by focusing on these neighbours they seek to devise rules and norms for how members in a particular region grouping should act. Rather than at the global or local level, the regional level is where most of the successful post-1945 security arrangements have been achieved. It is also the level where the mechanisms and precedents for solutions to various individual or shared security conundrums, real or potential may already exist. Good examples of this are the European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

In contrast to this ‘outside-in’ approach, Realist, Liberal and Constructivist theories see a close link between regionalism and regional (as opposed to global) interdependence. The first two view regionalism as a functional response by states to the problems created by regional interdependence and stress the critical role of institutions in fostering and developing regional cohesion. The third lays greater emphasis on the relationship between material interdependence and understandings of identity and community (Hurrell, 1995).

As an explanatory framework for analysing interdependence, Neo-functionalism has played a central, although much criticized role, especially in the development of theories of European integration. Neo-functionalists argued that high and rising levels of interdependence would set in motion an on-going process of co-operation that would lead eventually to political integration. Supranational institutions were seen as the most effective means of solving common problems, beginning with technical and non-controversial issues, but
‘spilling over’ into the realm of high politics and leading to a redefinition of group identity around the regional unit (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995, p.59).

Neo-liberal institutionalism has been the most influential theoretical approach in recent studies on international co-operation and represents a highly plausible and generalizable theory for understanding the revival of regionalism. Institutionalists base their analysis on a number of core arguments. In the first place, increasing levels of interdependence generate more demand for international cooperation. Institutions are viewed as purposively generated solutions to different kinds of collective action problems. As Keohane puts it:

_Institutionalists do not elevate international regimes to mythical positions of authority over states: on the contrary, such regimes are established by states to achieve their purposes. Facing dilemmas of coordination and collaboration under conditions of interdependence, governments demand international institutions to enable them to achieve their interests through limited collective action._

(1993, p.274)

In contrast, Constructivist theories focus on regional awareness and regional identity, on the shared sense of belonging to a particular regional community, and on what has been termed “cognitive regionalism”. “They stress the extent to which regional cohesion depends on a sustained and durable sense of community based on mutual responsiveness, trust, and high levels of what might be called ‘cognitive interdependence’” (Fawcett 1995, p.61-64). On the
one hand, neo-liberals believe that growing economic interdependence will lead to greater peace and security, despite the existence of different political systems and inter-state tensions (Mak, 1998) – with the EU and ASEAN as successful examples of this. On the other hand, the neo-Realist perspective is that a balance of power based on combining the military capabilities of a region’s states will increase that region’s resilience and increase interdependence among its members by enhancing their collective security. Buzan (in Snyder, 1999) argues that the relational structure of security makes it impossible to understand the national security patterns of a state without a firm understanding of the pattern of regional security interdependence within which it exists. Thus, because each region is unique in its characteristics, it follows that it has its own unique pattern of interdependence among its states. If this is the case, then interdependence cannot be understood apart from other concepts like regional resilience, amity-enmity and security complex theory. Therefore, interdependence will be addressed again in relation to the concepts of amity-enmity and resilience in the following sections.

2. Amity-Enmity

Amity can be defined as “relationships ranging from genuine friendship to expectations of protection or support”, and enmity as “relationships set by suspicion and fear” (Buzan, 1991, p.188). On this basis, regional security subsystems can be seen in terms of patterns of amity and enmity that can either be substantially confined within some particular geographical area or not limited by geographical boundaries. According to Buzan (1991), patterns of amity-enmity can arise from various issues not limited to power relations; and
interdependence is established through both rivalry and shared interests within a security complex. Buzan goes on to relate formations of security complexes to two factors, anarchy and geography, stating that “The political structure of anarchy confronts all states with the security dilemma, but the otherwise seamless web of security interdependence is powerfully mediated by the effects of geography” (Buzan, 1991, p.191). He also argues that the reality of security complexes lies more in the individual lines of amity, enmity and indifference between states, than in the notion of a self-aware subsystem. Like a balance of power, a security complex can exist and function regardless of whether or not the actors involved recognise it (Buzan, 1991). Amity/enmity relationship over-awareness of the whole complicates the process of identifying security complexes in scientific terms. The individual lines of security concern can be traced by observing how states’ fears shape their foreign policy and military behaviour. Wæver (2004) suggests that within any given complex, there exists a spectrum of rational possibilities described by the degrees of amity and enmity that define security interdependence. At the two extremes of the spectrum are chaos and the security community. In chaos, all relations are defined by enmity, each actor being the enemy of all the others. One step up from chaos is what Vayrynen (1984) calls ‘regional conflict formations’ in which conflictual relations dominate, but amity is also possible. Opposite from chaos is the security community, in which disputes among all the members are resolved to such an extent that none fears, or prepares for either political assault or military attack from any of the others (Buzan, 1991). In other words, levels or degrees of amity and enmity determine the possible or existing regional security structure in a region. Based on this, security organisations could be perceived
as a group of states cooperating to manage their disputes and avoiding war by seeking to mute the security dilemma both through their own actions and through their assumptions about the behaviour of others.

3. Security Complex Theory

In this section, Buzan and Wæver’s (2004) work on security complex theory will be reviewed to see how security dilemmas and intra-regional security dynamics influence regionalism. Their work focuses on defining security relations within a complex of states that have geographical proximity and networks of relations reaching a status of interdependence. According to classical theory, a security complex is defined as “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan, Wilde and Waever, 1997, p.12). Based on this definition, the dynamics and structure of a security complex are generated by the states within that complex – by their security perceptions of, and interactions with, each other. Individual security complexes are durable but not permanent features of the international system.

Founded on the same variables and principles of the classical theory, modern security complex theory states that:

*Security interdependence is markedly more intense among the units inside such complexes than with units outside them. Security complexes are about the relative intensities of security relations that*
lead to distinctive regional patterns shaped by both the distribution of power and relations of amity and enmity.

(Buzan 1998, p.201)

And it defines a security complex as:

A set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another. The formative dynamics and structure of a security complex are generally generated by the units within it - by their security perceptions of, and interactions with, each other. But they may also arise from collective securitizations of outside pressures arising from the operation of complex metasystems, such as the planetary environment or the global economy.

(Buzan, 1998:201)

Since the complex is created from a group of states, their dynamic interactions allow or prevent external powers from interfering in their region. When the level of interdependence and amity that exists among a given complex is high, chances of external interference are considerably reduced. In this case, the region is experiencing one of two structural processes: maintenance of the status quo or international transformation. The former means the essential structure of the local complex – its distribution of power and patterns of amity/enmity remains fundamentally stable. This outcome does not mean no
change takes place, but rather that the changes that occur tend, ultimately, either to support or not seriously to undermine the structure. But “The international transformation of a local complex occurs when its essential structure changes within the context of its existing outer boundary” (Buzan, Wilde and Waever, 1997, p.13). Such change can come about as a result of regional political integration, shifts in the distribution of power, or major alternations in the pattern of amity and enmity. Within a region, when the level of interdependence is low and enmity is high, the chances of external interference increase. In this alternative case, the region is going through one of the following structural processes. First, *external transformation* occurs when the essential structure of a complex is altered by either the expansion or contraction of its existing outer boundary. Minor adjustments to the boundary may not significantly affect the essential structure. Addition or deletion of major states, however, is certain to have a substantial impact on both the distribution of power and the pattern of amity and enmity as the unit of analysis is the state. Second is *overlay*, which happens when one or more external powers moves directly into the regional complex with the effect of influencing the indigenous security dynamics (Buzan, Wilde and Waever, 1997, pp.13–14). These four broad structural processes (*maintenance of the status quo* and *international transformation* as a result of high levels of interdependence or amity- *external transformation* and *overlay* as a result of low levels of interdependence or increased enmity) provide guidelines for when a regional grouping is capable of handling its problems and implementing its mandate by reference to three factors: level of interdependence, amity-enmity relations and degree of external interference.
Regional Security Complex Levels of Analysis

Regional Security Complex (RSC) theory provides tools for analysis and research. It can structure empirical studies while theory-based scenarios can also be established. Moreover, RSC theory has measurable factors, such as geographical proximity, the level of state’s power, mechanisms of penetration (i.e. alignments) and security interdependency (Buzan 2003, p.45). In other words, the most well-established function for RSC theory is as a framework for organising empirical studies of regional security. This is done on four levels of analysis; first, domestically in the states of the region, and particularly looking at their domestically generated vulnerabilities. The specific vulnerabilities of a state define the kind of security fears it has and sometimes make another state or group of states a structural threat even if they have no hostile intentions. Another level is the state-to-state relations (which generate the region as such). The third level is interactions with neighbouring regions. This is supposed to be relatively limited given that the complex is defined principally by its internal interactions. However, if major changes in the pattern of security interdependence that define complexes are underway, this level can become significant, and in situations of gross asymmetries a complex without global powers that neighbours one with a global power can have strong interregional links in one direction. The final level of analysis is the role of global powers in the region (Buzan & Wæver, 2003).

There are two other levels of analysis that should not be overlooked in this discussion: systemic and domestic levels. Each has been adopted by several
schools of thought which have produced interesting views on how regional groupings and organisational dynamics operate.

4. Systemic Theories

At the systemic level of international politics, “the state is a unit of analysis. This approach suggests that states are essentially similar in nature to utility maximisers” (Maoz, Landau and Malz, 2004, p.76). Indeed, their behaviour is partly a result of the system’s structure. Interestingly, the systemic level of analysis is closely associated with the Realist school of International Relations, at least in its focus on the state as the principal unit of analysis. Briefly, neo-Realists assume conflict, not cooperation, is the natural relationship among states. In an anarchic environment, each state is driven by its desire for power and security. Other factors that influence state behaviour include having several major political actors in the system and their relative strength. According to neo-Realism, regional cooperation has often seemed to pose a direct challenge to Realism. The appearance of regional organisations in what was commonly viewed as an inherently conflictual world dominated by the struggle for power was widely seen in the 1950s as an anomaly that Realism was incapable of explaining (Hurrell, 1995). Indeed, much of the early work on regionalism and regional integration can be seen as an attempt to shed light on this apparent anomaly. Yet, neo-Realism came up with several important insights about regionalism. For the neo-Realist, the politics of regionalism and the emergence of regionalist alignments have much in common with the politics of alliance formation (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995, p.47).
As Wallace (1995) argues, the ending of the Cold War has made it easier to understand the extent to which the dramatic shift within Europe in the 1940s and early 1950s from war competition to regional co-operation and then to the promotion of regional integration depended on a very particular set of geopolitical circumstances. These circumstances include the collapse of the colonial empires; the immense physical destruction and psychological exhaustion of the thirty-year European civil war; the perception of a burgeoning threat from the Soviet Union; the long-predicted transformation in the scale of power and the emergence of a new class of superpowers (with whom the traditional nation states of Western Europe acting alone could no longer hope to compete); and the powerful pressure from the USA to move towards greater regional cooperation (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995). All of these circumstances seem to be more to do with external factors and influence rather than factors indigenous to Europe.

[Neo-realists] stress the extent to which European integration was embedded within a transatlantic security framework. This meant that the immensely difficult tasks of political military cooperation and security could be left to one side. The acceptance of security dependence was therefore one of the essential compromises on which European cooperation and integration was built. In other words, economic cooperation in Europe was bound by security compromises and therefore, examining the relationship between economic and security is a one key for understanding the difficulties facing regional organisations.
During the Cold War, both superpowers favoured those regionalist arrangements that reinforced the strength of their respective alliance systems or provided support for important clients (ibid., p.49). Even though things have changed since the end of the Cold War, neo-realists believe that this pattern will continue through the domination of superpowers over the global economy or through their interference in regional dynamics. On the other hand, neo-realists have been criticized as they express “little about the character of regional cooperation once established and the ways in which the habits of sustained cooperation may involve institutional structures very different from the traditional idea of a coalition, alliance, or traditional international organization. The workings of such institutions may lead to a new definition of self-interest, and perhaps to new conceptions of ‘self’. “Neo-realism also says very little about the impact of domestic factors. It talks a great deal about states as self-interested actors competing in an anarchical world but leaves the identity of the ‘self’ and the nature of the interests unexplained, or simply assumed” (Hurrell, 1995:53). This critique appeared in the 1970s in the writings of Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane (1986; 1993) and Edward Morse (1971; 1976).

While both neo-liberals and neo-realists share the view that the state is a rational, unitary actor, they differ in their perspectives about the nature of states and their interests. Neo-liberals like Robert Keohane, Milton Friedman and David Harvey believe that states are driven by their interest in wealth and are concerned with absolute, not relative, gains. Spiegel further explains that neo-
liberals believe that cooperation is possible and will emerge when states calculate that it is in their best interest. Another important distinction between the perspectives is that neo-liberals emphasise the important role institutions can play in negotiations and in reaching peace (Mearsheimer, 1994). While neo-realists believe institutions are just an extension of a state’s interest, neo-liberals claim that institutions are important because they lower transaction costs, change preferences, and induce cooperation (Mearsheimer, 1994; Spiegel, 2003). “Neo-liberal institutionalists concentrate on issues of international political economy (IPE) and the environment; realists are more prone to study international security and the causes, conduct, and consequences of wars” (Jervis, 1999, p.45). In comparing this level of analysis with Security Complex Theory, it becomes clear that is inclusive of these different approaches of ‘systemic’ analysis.

5. Domestic

The domestic level of analysis focuses on a variety of forces which can influence state behaviour. Steven Spiegel examined this level of analysis extensively and concluded that the factors that can impact on foreign policy at the domestic level include “regime type (democratic versus authoritarian versus totalitarian), electoral politics, bureaucracy, political culture, public opinion and interest groups” (Spiegel, 2003, p.78). Public attitudes and opinions can exert pressure on leaders by demonstrating the costs they might incur if they take a particular action. In authoritarian regimes, leaders may not have to worry about the effect of their decisions at the polls, but disapproval may be more costly than just losing an election (Spiegel, 2003).
Such an emphasis is not new. In defining regions, scholars of a wide range of orientations have often highlighted the importance of commonalities of ethnicity, race, language, religion, culture, history and consciousness of a common heritage. Writers such as Deutsch have stressed the importance of “the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making” in the emergence of security communities; and neo-functionalists believed that the dynamics of the ‘spillover’ depend on certain domestic prerequisites - above all, the pluralist nature of modern industrialized societies and the particular role played by elites in redefining interests on a broader than national basis (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995). Domestic theory is related to modern regionalism through its links to state coherence, democratisation and convergence theories. These relevancies are explained as follows:

*Regionalism and state coherence*

If regionalism opens an avenue to states as a way of going beyond stark self-help, then the issue of coherence among state members is essential to facilitate such transition. “The possibilities of regional cooperation and integration are likely to depend very heavily on the coherence and viability of the states and state structures within a given region” (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995, p.67).

*Regime type and democratization:* this relationship has been closely developed around the assumption that democracies do not go to war with each other and that they do make a difference in state to state relations. In other words, the
behaviour of liberal states and how they interact even across geographical regions and how that behaviour has changed from rivalry to cooperation is the focus. The relation to modern regionalism is through the assumption that cooperation within a specific region of liberal/democratic states is likely to result in peace. Deutsch supports this assumption and believes “that states would become gradually more confident in each other and thus a regional state-based order would stabilise in a non-war mode” (Buzan and Wæver, 2004, p.375).

**Convergence theories:** these understand the dynamics of regional co-operation and especially regional economic integration in terms of converging domestic policy preferences among regional states. Domestic policy convergence has undoubtedly been an important factor in the resurgence of regionalism, especially the widespread shift in the developing world towards market-liberal policies that stress trade liberalization and export expansion (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995, p.70).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has engaged with theoretical debates on the definition and nature of regionalism and security to learn that there is much to be gained from such exercise. It became clearer that the understanding of regionalism, regional organisations and the dynamics that create and sustain them have changed since the end of the Cold War and that a modern understanding of contemporary regionalism is developing. The levels of analysis that we have
engaged with and the way they interact is essential for analysing regional organisations.

There are several approaches to regional security and for evaluating regional security organisations as the means by which security could be achieved. Regional cooperation achieving regional resilience is dependent on levels of interdependency and amity-enmity within a given region to qualify as a regional security complex.

Levels of interdependence and amity or enmity within a region dictate the type of regional structural process that will occur. There are four structural processes that can result from these variations which are maintenance of the status quo, international transformation, external transformation and finally overlay. Which of these processes exist in the Middle Eastern region will explain the type of challenges that confronted the Arab League as a regional security organisation. Furthermore, identifying the structural process that the League was and is working within is vital for deciding if the League successes or failures on the regional level were a result of this structural process or due to other factors.

Various theories and researchers identified levels for analysing regional security. RSC is well established in organising empirical studies of regional security as well as organising the research into levels. These levels are; interactions with neighbouring regions, state-to-state relations, domestically, role of global power as well as the systemic and domestic levels of analysis that are of particular use in less cohesive regions.
The different levels at which security policy can be pursued include establishing a relationship between regional security structures, whether they are limited or comprehensive in scope, and whether extra-regional actors and dynamics feature strongly. While the trend toward regionalisation is often seen as one of the characteristic features of contemporary world politics, so is globalisation (Krause and Williams, 1997). The crucial test of a regional organisation is in the way it is configured to deal with conflicts so as to avoid its disintegration or collapse. Thus, the very survival of an organisation is a key indicator of whether it has successfully managed or resolved regional conflicts (Anthony, 2005), although survival does not necessarily guarantee robustness or even medium-term viability. Such successes and failures are bound by the degrees of social, economic and political coherence within the regional members and also the mechanisms created and deployed to address challenges to regional security.
CHAPTER THREE
CHAPTER THREE

ARAB NATIONAL SECURITY

After exploring security, regionalism and regional security in Chapter Two, Chapter Three focuses on the concept of Arab national security. The roots and history of Arab national security and its development will be traced here and two main questions will be addressed during the discourse. The first is the question of where Arab national security falls among the various approaches to security examined in Chapter Two. The second is the question of how Arab national security affects the Arab League’s work, especially in terms of how it is reflected in its structure and guides its regional dynamics.

As elsewhere in the Arab world, the term *nation* is often wrongly used as a synonym for the term *state* but each of these terms has a different and distinct meaning. The term *nation-state* is also often cited to mean sovereign nation but there are currently very few genuine nation-states in the international system (Walby, 2003). In 1972, scholar Walker Connor calculated that out of 132 states, only 12 could be said to be genuinely homogeneous with a further 25 states having a population in which around 90 per cent were from one ethnic grouping. Whilst these figures are somewhat out-dated, the result of a similar study at the start of the twenty-first century, if repeated in a world of 194 states, would probably have had a similar outcome.
The concept of the nation-state encompasses the nationalist idea of a marriage between the nation and the state (Salmon, 2008). However, as Sayigh states:

*Western observers have tended to reject the idea that there is a single Arab nation, and to see this as the artificial creation of pan-Arabist ideology. Yet it is a matter of fact that the vast areas that form the 'Arab world' were in effect united for centuries under Islamic and Ottoman rule.*

(Sayigh, 1991, p.488)

This forgotten and not entirely historical continuity remains influential in a number of the Arab states’ political rhetoric and still inspires Arab-nationalist movements to the current time. The chains of public revolutions that started with Tunisia and extended to Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and Libya in early 2011 illustrate the influence of this geographical continuity on Arab states.

Based on geographical proximity and shared history, in principle, Arab national security could be considered a type of regional security that is no different from other regional groupings around the world. However, it is a form of security that pertains to a nation which is divided into many states (Hawwāt, 2002). This is a case unique to the Arab nation and due to this uniqueness, it is important to use the term *state security* for each of these states separately and the term *Arab national security* for the unique Arab case.
As discussed in Chapter One, “The creation of a viable intraregional security system” was not the Arab states’ first priority during the early phase of the Arab League’s establishment process (Zacher, 1979, p.163). Although the Alexandria Protocol reflected a brief focus on Arab national security and included the first mechanism for resolving disputes within a security community among the Arab states, the charter was more concerned with independence and sovereignty than collective security, as explained in Chapter One. Therefore, the distinction between state security and Arab national security was clear for the Arab League founders. In short, state security was closely linked to sovereignty and territorial integrity. Moreover, in a region where states are ruled by royal families and tribal systems, state security easily becomes synonymous with regime security. For example, the Saudi behaviour within the Arab League in its early days, and their opposition to proposals and initiatives laid down by the Hashemites, was motivated by their fear of compromising their authority within the Arab Peninsula due to the potential rise in the Hashemites’ agenda and their popularity (Little, 1956).

During the Cold War, the external view of Middle Eastern and Arab regional stability was an external one that derived from the Western concept of security. Oil prices, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the prevention of a regional Islamist hegemony and keeping the communists out were the determinants for how secure the Middle East was (Bilgin, 2004). In accordance with this external approach to regional security, two externally-driven security schemes were attempted. The first was the East Defence Organisation (1951) and the second was Baghdad Pact (1955). While both of these schemes were short-lived,
scenarios of external intervention in the Arab world regional security system continued to take many shapes. The longest and most persistent was the continued political and military support for Israel throughout the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

However, before further reviewing the forms and types of intervention in the Arab world’s security perceptions, it is important to focus more on the meanings and types of security within the Arab area.

The Arab League and Arab National Security

The term *Arab national security* did not occupy its place in political speech when the League was born in the 1940s. Military and security affairs did not have a place in the League’s charter even though immigration, citizenship, passports, criminal exchange and sentence execution were addressed (Hawwāt, 2002). As soon as the League was created, it had to address the events of the French occupation of Syria and Lebanon in May 1945 which was just two months after its establishment (League of Nations Archives, 2002). In 1948, seven Arab states entered into a war in Palestine which was the first war based on an Arab League resolution (Karsh, 2002). Meanwhile, awareness about national security started to formulate through Palestine’s public struggle against the Zionist project.

Developments in the Palestinian problem formed the greatest challenges to contribute to the need for a more developed concept of Arab national security.
This need resulted in the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty that entered into force legally on 22nd August 1952. The treaty is divided into a joint defence concept and economical aspects. Based on this separation, the Economic Council was established independently from the Joint Defence Council. It could be understood that the Arab national security concept was drawn from within the League’s Charter and the Joint Defence Treaty, but it was limited to military defence (Hawwāt, 2002). The national security concept started to develop outside its military context during the eleventh summit that was held in November 1980 (Appendix 3). The concept became more comprehensive with the development of concrete strategies, especially economic and social plans. The first of these, the Economic Development Covenant – which was also agreed upon during the eleventh summit – established that economic work forms the pillar for security. The second document (Arab Joint Economical Work Strategies) established that among the main goals is collective security which includes intellectual, military, food and technological security.

The Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty included significant changes to the voting system when compared to the Arab League charter. Arab states surrendered some aspects of sovereignty as part of this treaty. Specifically, the two thirds majority replaced the unanimity condition as stated in the charter. The aim of the treaty was to compensate for the absence of national security from the charter (Keilany, 2004; Abdel-Salam, 2007). The treaty included the principle of collective solidarity in defence. For achieving this
objective, the treaty established three bodies: Joint Defence Council, the Military Consultation Body, and the Permanent Military Committee (League of Arab States, 1950; Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of the Arab League, 1952). These bodies were an addition to the military secretariat which constitutes part of the League’s secretariat.

In an attempt to lay down a new charter for the League that could achieve both national security and collective security strategies, the League aspired to develop a national security concept through parallel and comparative debate between political security and military security. Arab national security remained a concept swinging between nationalism and statehood within the inter-governmental regional institution (the Arab League). However, the aspirations of the League were supplanted by the Arab states limiting the League’s authority and prioritising sovereignty and their individual powers as national states (Hawwāt, 2002).

After Amr Moussa became the Secretary General of the Arab League in 2001, he established the Arab Peace & Security Sector (APSS) within the League in July 2002 (Arab League, 2010). This sector was the main Arab League body responsible for revitalising Arab national security through organising meetings and workshops to discuss its changing meaning. Establishing mechanisms and creating strategies for addressing the challenges to Arab national security was another task as well as coordination among all members. After identifying the growing need for focus on Arab peace and security issues, some of the tasks of
the sector were transferred to the APSS which is now the main body within the League that is specialised in security matters (Arab League, 2010).

1. Arab Peace & Security Council

Officially, the APSC was established as a response from the Arab states to the growing need to solve problems and conflicts that threatened the peace and security among them. The idea for establishing this council was proposed by the Secretary General in January 2005 (Arab League, 2010; Al-Mashat, 2007; Abd-elsalam, 2007; Abdel-Salam, 2007). The issue was then submitted to the summit in Algeria in March the same year and steps were taken towards making the APSC a reality. Eventually the APSC was officially established in November 2005 and its duties and responsibilities, although many and diverse, remain within the parameters of research, advice, suggestion and follow-up. The Council does not have executive powers or the authority to intervene directly in any disputes or conflicts that arise among the members of the Arab League (Abdel-Salam, 2007; Interview No. 1, 2007; Arab National Security Sector, 2007).

The APSC was a second step after the establishment of the APSS which was established as a general directorate for military affairs until 2002 when it was transformed to become the Arab National Security Sector (Arab National Security Sector, 2007). Although the peace and security system in the Arab League was established during the Khartoum Summit in 2006, the number of ratifications for the agreed upon system to enter into force was not reached until March 2007 (Arab League, 2010; Arab National Security Sector, 2007).
Although Arab peacekeeping forces established in the year 2000 represented a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, its agreement was not ratified by the states who signed it (Interview No. 1, 2007) – despite the fact that the APSC and Arab National Security Sector are currently the two official bodies within the Arab League - and thus within the Arab regional political system - that are authorised to develop and formulate a concept for Arab national security and manage peacekeeping efforts. During interviews with Arab League officials and officials from APSS and the Arab National Security Sector, it became clear that these two bodies are yet to be fully active. As a result, although the mandate for APSS presents a viable conflict prevention and conflict management system that could overcome the shortcomings of the previous Arab joint defence system, these two bodies have inherited the same limitations that have crippled the Arab League in general, and joint Arab action in particular: the lack of will to act and the fact that actions taken must be unanimous. The divisions among the member-states of the Arab League are the base of the problem as well as the obstacle preventing the League from being able to intervene and solve conflicts.

Another problem inhibiting the League’s ability to intervene and establish rigorous Arab peacekeeping forces is the lack of effective financial support due to the League’s insufficient budget (Sobeih, 2007; Abu-Taleb, 2003; Abdel-Salam, 2007; Al-Mashat, 2007; Alittihad, 2010; Al-Hayat, 2008; Zawya, 2010) to enable its bodies to carry out their necessary roles: humanitarian aid, relief, and peacekeeping.
Though Al-Mashat (2007) believes that the aim of the new APSS establishment indicates the prioritising of Arab national security issues, the same systemic problems remain within the existing regional framework. The establishment of regional groupings like the Gulf Cooperation Council and North African Union and the Arab Union have weakened the Arab League’s security role.

More substantially, regional security challenges as well as political arrangements have changed. For instance, peace agreements have been signed between Arab states and Israel and therefore, Israel is no longer the official source of threat to Arab national security. On the other hand, after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the security equation was radically changed. The Arab states have started to depend on the USA and the West in defending themselves with respect to internal regional conflicts and therefore, the Arab League initiatives and role in achieving Arab national security have been vastly diminished.

The Middle East is suffering from several problems that cause instability and impact on the development of a regional security system (Buzan and Wæver, 2004; Maoz, 1997a; Al-Mashat, 2007; Sobeih, 2007; Abdel-Salam, 2007). Among the obvious general destabilizing factors in complicating regional stability are the presence of foreign military forces and the Israeli occupation of a number of Arab states’ territories. More specifically, the repeated Israeli attacks on Lebanon, the American occupation of Iraq and the expanding Iranian political influence in specific Arab affairs all contribute negatively to any possibility of achieving regional stability. In addition, the failure of the Arab
League to implement its most important security initiative of declaring the Middle East region free from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) serves to underline the divisive and problematic situation of achieving regional collective security.

2. **Arab national security as an alternative to regional security**

Before initiating the Arab League, regional security in the whole of the Arab region was based on the concept of Arab national security at the public level. Furthermore, it did not die out with the League’s establishment. When referring to official documents like the Joint Defence Treaty of 1950 and the Arab Solidarity Covenant of 1965 as well as the declaration of the Arab summit in Khartoum in 2006, we realise that the notion of Arab national security has remained alive on the Arab agenda. The main problem with this concept is that it has been more wishful thinking that is detached from the realpolitik of the region and lack of political will and/or the inability to develop regional consensus. Every state had its own interpretation of Arab national security that it tried to make other parties adhere to. The Arab League established some mechanisms for regional security, such as the Joint Defence Treaty and joint leadership but its implementation lacked the leadership, will and unity and needed to bring the Treaty into force. For instance, when war took place in 1991 in Kuwait, the parties to the Joint Defence Treaty disagreed upon both its meanings and obligations, thereby rendering it ineffective (Al-Mashat, 2007; Abdel-Salam, 2007; Maddy-Weitzman, 1991; Sayigh, 1991). The concept of Arab national security as mediated by the Arab League thus appears to be based upon a distorted understanding of the current political and military
regional alliances and dynamics that are driving alternative regional security arrangements other than through the Arab League.

A second problem with Arab national security is that it is a defensive concept that formulates an Arab-Arab alliance to deal with external threats against Arab countries but does not propose collective security against ‘rogue’ behaviour by an Arab state. Instead, internal regional aggressions or interferences are dealt with on an ad hoc basis rather than structurally and systematically. Moreover, though the concept of Arab security evolved to include aspects of collective security, cooperative security and comprehensive security (Abdel-Salam, 2007) as well as non-military dimensions, such as food security, energy security and economic security (Aljarad, N.D.; Al-Mashat, 2007; Abdel-Salam, 2007; Hawwāt, 2002), none of these broader security aspirations were of sufficient urgency or importance for concerted implementation.

As a consequence of the above factors, Arab national security faced its most serious challenge in 1991 when an Arab state (Iraq) invaded another Arab state (Kuwait) (Sayigh, 1991; Maddy-Weitzman, 1991). This created a grave problem for the Arab mentality and raised the questions: how would such a problem be dealt with using the traditional Arab League approach and how could the Arab national security concept be utilised for this case? The inability of the Arab countries to answer the key debates on Arab national security and the Arab League’s peacekeeping role resulted in a divided response to the Iraq-Kuwait war and the demise of the concept as impractical.
The Arab League tried to create another formal concept in 1993 (Abdel-Salam, 2007; Sobeih, 2007) wherein each country was asked to confidentially present its own project for an Arab national security concept. The outcome of that study was not encouraging as each vision was perceived to be weak and did not reflect the new regional reality outlined above. Each presentation was based on narrow, ideological and state-security perceptions that only rehashed the old concept of Arab national security (Abdel-Salam, 2007; Interview No 2, 2007; Interview No. 1, 2007). In this context, Turkey and Iran were perceived as potential sources of threat as well as Israel. Cooperative security and Arab national security were not addressed as functional concepts - in terms of being realistic by reducing expectations and commitments from the Arab states and approaching defensive cooperation through military training, air defence systems and aspects of non-offensive cooperation. Arab national security was not approached in a controlled manner which therefore also affected the approach to regional security.

In this second attempt the continued conflict between the Arab national security concept and a regional security concept in the Middle East had several aspects. The first aspect was that Arab national security - an already existing, dominant concept - was not presented properly on a strategic basis nor introduced as a future realisable concept. Second, the conceptual framework remained defensive in nature and therefore did not help in overcoming rising challenges from within in addition to the numerous crises at the time. Every time it has been revisited (1993, 2001 and in 2007), the old/traditional concept of Arab
regional security has been reproduced based on collective political pillars and the national security of individual Arab states rather than strategic ones.

A good example of this political foundation for security is the case of the GCC countries. Qatar, Bahrain, UAE and Saudi Arabia’s security is based on external guarantors (Al-Mashat, 2007; Maoz, 1997b) thereby inhibiting their willingness to participate in a vigorous indigenous process of developing a regional security system. Moreover, their participation in any such process could be understood to expose their own security vulnerabilities and their inability to protect themselves would become clearer to other regional partners. In such a scenario, not only would they have to rely on traditional military powers in the region (Egypt, Iraq and Syria), to achieve a workable regional security system but such a process might potentially undermine the GCC countries’ perceived regional role.

As a result, regional security discourse has come to mean that the Arab League is an institution working in a region, not in an ‘Arab’ world or an ‘Arab’ area – and therefore not defined by a sense of collective identity. Hence, unlike other regional organisations elsewhere in the world, the Arab League and the regional area that it operates within only fulfils three out of the five processes of regionalism, as defined in Chapter Two, and absents the process of ‘state promoted regional integration’ and ‘regional cohesion’.

In addition to the problematic conceptual framework and regional processes of integration, the Arab world faces a difficulty in self-defining the region geographically. Based on the regional and regionalisation discussion in
Chapter Two, other regions could be defined geographically; there are geographical parameters for Europe, Latin America and South East Asia and Africa, for instance. Even though there are some problems in defining North Africa since some of its nations’ interests and issues also fall within the Middle East, it is understood that the main Africa is sub-Saharan Africa (Buzan and Wæver, 2004; Duignan et al., 1981; Mwagiru, 2004).

The Middle East /Arab World continues to face a serious problem in terms of its own geographical parameters as it is indefinable partially due to the dominant Arab identity that stretches from Oman to Morocco. Throughout history it was defined based on strategic foundations, even as it has expanded and contracted, since external definitions of the region vary widely in geography and designation. For instance, the American definition of the Greater Middle East expands it to include the area from Afghanistan to Morocco.12 Other external Ministries of Foreign Affairs still work on the idea of ‘Near East’ with some isolating North Africa from the Middle East as is common in Europe, or extending its geography as far as South Asia. Therefore, when identifying the ‘Middle East’ region that the Arab League works within, there is a problem of definition: What does it mean? What type of region exists in this vast area that those countries should work within?

Another geographical problem of definition arose due to the expansion of the Arab League beyond the traditional parameters of the common Arab countries

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12 George W. Bush Administration launched the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) as "a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East" in November 2003.
when the Union of the Comoros joined the League in 1993. This expansion of the role and responsibilities of the League outside the common Arab world highlighted this geographical problem even further since a security role played by the League off the eastern coast of Africa is an extra-regional role.

There was an effort during the 1990s within the ACRS to define an operational regional concept for arms control concerns which included the Arab countries as well as Iran and Israel (Steinberg, 2002; Yaffe, 2002). Turkey and Pakistan were excluded near the end of the ACRS meetings in order to define regional parameters for this specific purpose (Abdel-Salam, 2007). This was the beginning of the Arab states’ acceptance of the concept of regionalism and the idea of working on an arms control project that includes Iran and Israel together.

However, the Arab League and its project to establish a WMD-free zone in the Middle East was already an existing Arab project for arms control and non-proliferation. The Arab states did not work in any of their meetings on the idea of including other regional parties and therefore when the Arab League talked about arms control, it was talking about an Arab project for the region (Abdel-Salam, 2007; Interview No. 1, 2007). This is the initial Arab League problem while dealing with regional security in terms of arms control, continental ballistic missiles (CBMs) and other related issues: its inability to define its own geography and identity.

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13 Union of the Comoros is an archipelago island nation in the Indian Ocean, located off the eastern coast of Africa.
In the same vein of defining the region in which the League aspired to realise these arms control projects, the question arose: Is the Arab League dealing with the regional parties or not? On the one hand, it is not collaborating with Israel while a considerable number of the problems being addressed involve Israel. In spite of its official hostility status with Israel, the Arab League became more flexible concerning achieving its regional projects, such as the WMD-free zone. Indications on this flexibility were clear in the summits of 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, where the League adopted the idea of observatory membership (Abdel-Salam, 2007; Sobeih, 2007; Al-Mashat, 2007). These observers are not member countries per se but neighbouring countries. For example, the summits invited representatives from Turkey and Iran to the 2007 Riyadh summit. Therefore, Arab countries started talking about notions of partnership and the Arab League allowed these observers and guests to make interjections. This was new for the Arab League in terms of flexibility when it came to the previously-adopted regional parameters that would allow the Arab League to work on the regional level.

The second flexible aspect was the Arab peace initiative. For the first time, in Beirut 2002, the Arab peace initiative proposed an Arab-Israeli solution and not a Palestinian-Israeli solution or a solution between Israel and its neighbouring countries. For the first time, two Arab ministers\textsuperscript{14} visited Israel in July 2007 as representatives of the Arab League. It is true that these representatives were from the same countries that already had peace agreements with Israel, but it is said that there were also Qatari-Israeli communications, Saudi-Israeli communications and definitely Moroccan-Israeli communications, as well as

\textsuperscript{14} The Egyptian and Jordanian ministers of foreign affairs
Omani and official Tunisian-Israeli communications (Al-Eissawi, 2006). Therefore, the ground was prepared for the Arab League to talk under an Arab umbrella in the form of an Arab Peace Initiative. If accepted by Israel, such an initiative would have allowed for reclassifying the issue of Israel within Arab national security, thus opening up the door for less restricted regional cooperation.

The very concepts of Arab national security and regional security remain conflicted and largely disconnected. The nature of the major political and security issues at play in the region currently inhibit the conceptual merging of the two centres of security. A clear example of this is the status of Israel within the region; a national security threat for some, a regional threat for others but whose status/threat level varies and as a result - as do the strategies and policies of Arab countries. Another development that forced the rethinking of both concepts was the challenge to the Arab political and security system by the American-British-led invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, the proposal of a new broader Middle East by the Bush administration in 2003 meant that such progress on regional security as could be claimed became less relevant (Ottaway et al., 2008). Therefore, the region entered into a true state of ‘overlay’, with the result that regional security dynamics have ceased to function even after it recovered from the previous similar phase that followed the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi forces in 1991.

The regional and international effects on Arab national security cannot be denied. While the state security of each Arab state is inseparable from Arab
national security (since the latter is interlinked and interdependent with the former), the surrounding regional and international changes affect both. The increased attention given to economic security after the end of the Cold War (Collins, 2006, p.205) meant a focus shift from defensive security towards the improvement of living conditions and control over national resources in the Arab world, in realisation of principles agreed upon in Amman summit in 1980. The modern concept of security, as reviewed in Chapter Two, demonstrates the expansion of security to include much more than defensive and military capabilities. Development, social and economic progress are additional dimensions for national security that increase the importance of regional cooperation and, therefore, regional interdependence.

3. Problems facing Arab national security

The concept of Arab national security is facing continued confusion in its definition and coherent forms of expression. The source of this confusion is the nature of the commonalities that bind the Arab states and the drive behind the need for such a concept. The concept of Arab national security was born after the ‘Nakba’ (Arabic for ‘Day of the Catastrophe’) (Rogan and Shlaim, 2001; Abdel-Salam, 2007; Aljarad, N.D.) in Palestine 1948 due to the defeat of Arab armies and the signing of truce agreements between Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan from one side, and Israel on the other side. “These agreements represented the first Arab recognition of Israel’s existence” (Hawwāt, 2002, p.350). In the 1950s and 1960s, the Arab national security concept found expression in the Egyptian-Syrian unity project which became its biggest achievement. The defeat of Syria, Jordan and Egypt in 1967 put a hold on that
project and forced it to be limited to dealing with the aftermath of defeat. The course of the 1973 war was a direct outcome of a joint Egyptian-Syrian coordination. In spite of this bilateral approach, the war was responsible for the formulation of a comprehensive and active concept of Arab security.

As mentioned earlier, Israel and the Zionist project were the main threat and the biggest perceived obstacle confronting Arab national security. However, Israel's status changed with the initiation of negotiations with Egypt after the 1973 war. After the second Gulf War 1990-1991, Israel moved out of the circle of threats to Arab national security and towards the regional cooperation circle at least with a number of Arab states like Jordan and Egypt and some GCC countries. The fear of repeated Arab aggression on another Arab state (like the case between Iraq and Kuwait) became the biggest threat to concern and threaten the Arab states (Hawwāt, 2002; Abdel-Salam, 2007; Al-Mashat, 2007).

[The League] managed to play a security role in some Arab issues. One of these issues was Iraq-Kuwait conflict in 1962. Also, these issues include the conflict with Israel. However, the Arab League faced weakness mainly after 1990-1991 due to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. That led to the disintegration of the Arab world, weakening of the Arab League, in addition to the increased feeling of smaller states that they are threatened by bigger states in the Arab League.

(Khalil, 2007)
This disintegration or fragmentation of the Arab world after the Iraq-Kuwait war took the form of a retreat into sub-regional groupings that had already existed (like the GCC\textsuperscript{15} which was established in 1981) or were newly formed like the Arab Maghreb Union\textsuperscript{16} (1989) and the Arab Cooperation Council\textsuperscript{17} which did not last long (1989-1991). These groupings’ official goal was to prevent aggression among their members and promote economic cooperation in accordance with their various agreed charters. For example, the GCC was formed in 1981 by six Arab Gulf states to promote cooperation and integration in economic social and cultural affairs, and on foreign and security policies. The main motivation for the GCC was to develop a shield against the threat of the Iran-Iraq war and when that conflict came to an end, this fragile grouping lost its direction and appeal (Kalaycioglu, 1996). The creation of ‘Al-Jazeera Shield’ forces (among GCC members) did not happen as planned and the Damascus Declaration foundered in disagreement (Abdel-Salam, 2007; Limited, 2003).

In addition to the aforementioned problems of regional definition, conflict between the Arab national security and regional security concepts, and external military intervention, there are other problems preventing the realisation of Arab national security. The existing diversity in political, social and economic systems between the Arab states presents a serious challenge. Further, the growth of

\textsuperscript{15} The Council comprises of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

\textsuperscript{16} The union is a Pan-Arab trade agreement aiming for economic and political unity in Northern Africa. The idea for an economic union of the Maghreb began with the independence of Tunisia and Morocco in 1958. It was not until thirty years later, though, that five Maghreb states - Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia - met for the first Maghreb summit. The following year, in 1989, the agreement was formally signed in Marrakesh. The Arab-Maghreb Union treaty was signed between Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia and Libya. There is a rotating chairmanship, which is held in turn by each nation.

\textsuperscript{17} The Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) was founded in February 1989 by North Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt.
fundamental human rights issues and their impact on minority rights has meant that achieving Arab national security has become more difficult. At the same time, the defence capabilities and military hardware of each Arab state are still imported (SIPRI, 2009; Holtom et al., 2011) resulting in a dependent and inferior military position in the face of American policy of maintaining an Israeli strategic military advantage in comparison with the Arab defensive collective (Mosler and Catley, 2000). Overall, these various factors create obstacles in political decision making for every Arab state and increase the possibility of external intervention in regional affairs.

External intervention in the Middle East has been a constant factor affecting its integration, development and ultimately the unity of the Arab states. This intervention can be traced back to the early phase of the Arab League's inception in the form of the British and French political and military presence in the region. As discussed in Chapter One, Britain's position on the Arab League itself was a positive factor in its establishment. On the other hand, ironically, the British position on Palestine (Major, 1963) was a negative aspect in the formation of an Arab national security doctrine (Al-Mashat, 2007; Hamza, 2007). It further increased the animosity towards Abdullah of Jordan, the League (Shlaim, 1990) and ultimately contributed to making the issue of Palestine one of the most complicated regional security problems facing the League and its members.

The ideological and political shift in the allegiance of Arab states was not in isolation from external influences and factors. Superpowers intervened in the
region in various forms. The region gained significance both as a source of natural resources and strategic importance due to extensive dependence on the Suez Canal, and as a key geo-political strategic site for competing ideologies and political systems during the 20th century. As a result of this increased importance, external intervention also gained momentum. While the British promotion of the Arab League itself could be considered an external attempt at shaping a regional security system, the course the League took during its formation limited the severity of this intervention due to many factors including public pressure, the emphasis on a non-alliance approach and the growing urgency surrounding Palestine and decolonisation of the Arab world. Since a realisation of the importance of formulating an Arab national security concept was not present at the point of the League’s formation, the concept did not benefit much from the Arab public pressure that was calling for unity.

The various forms of external influence in the region have both hindered the development of Arab national security and magnified the public desire for it. Most Arab experts (Abd-elsalam, 2007; Abu-Taleb, 2003; Ali, 1996; Al-Kanaani, 2002; Al-Mashat, 2007; Dawisha, 2003; Hawwāt, 2002; Hourani, 1947; Khadduri, 1957; Khalidi, 1995; Khalil, 2007; Little, 1956; Major, 1963; Pinfari, 2009; Sayigh, 1991), including those interviewed during this research, agree that Arab national security’s biggest weakness is in the lack of political will by the Arab leadership and disagreements among them on defining the threats facing the Arab nation.
In fact, the wave of public demonstrations that transformed into revolutions sweeping the Arab states from 2011 have shown clearly that internal stability is considered the paramount priority for a ruling national regime rather than wider collective regional security. On the other hand, during the recent Libyan revolution overthrowing the 42 years regime of Gaddafi, the Arab League first requested an internationally-driven no-fly zone over Libya to protect civilians (Guardian, 2011) which formed another example where the Arab organisation provided legitimacy for military operations against one of its members.

The 2011 revolutions and uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria and other members of the League have further highlighted the importance of clarifying conceptions of security. Although the causes and contexts of public movement against the regimes vary from one Arab state to another, the underlying commonality around why these states have failed is essentially the same: failure to guarantee the human security of their people. According to Hawwāt (2002) and Aljarad (Aljarad, N.D.), Arab national security is facing a number of internal challenges: social justice, suspension of intellectual and political freedom, external debt, unemployment, not being self-sufficient in food production, water shortages (Haddadin, 2002; Abu-Taleb, 2003), border disputes that affect trust (Rigal, 1993), being technologically inferior and, lastly, inflation.

4. Arab national security requirements

So far, the focus of this chapter has been identifying the problems, conflicting interests and challenges facing Arab national security as a concept, and as a
regional project. Yet, the concept and the project remain on the agenda of the Arab League, alive in Arab literature and demanded by the Arab public. Yet is Arab national security a mere emotional ideal or does it have real roots and foundations to be constructed upon?

On the one side, Al-Mashat (2007) stresses that the thematic conditions for reaching a strategic and comprehensive concept of Arab national security are absent. While he recognises the benefit and importance of such a concept, he argues that the contemporary thinking of Arab leaders and the current regional circumstances are obstacles preventing the development of the concept (Al-Mashat, 2007). In fact, although Arab national security has occupied the hearts and minds of politicians and academics in the Arab world for a long time, such elite discourses have yet to find practical expression that states can implement, not to mention accept and adopt. In this manner of contradictory intentions and action, the Baghdad summit of 1990 focused on the required measures for repelling threats to Arab national security and supported Iraq’s right to acquire modern military technology, yet ironically, Baghdad itself became the capital that caused the largest rifts in Arab national security joint efforts by invading Kuwait a short while after that very summit. On the other hand, Arab summit leaders reaffirmed - for the first time since 1964 - the religious and political importance of Jerusalem (Hawwāt, 2002; Arab League, 1990).

Notwithstanding, Arab researchers, authors and officials (Abd-elsalam, 2007; Abdel-Salam, 2007; Abu-Taleb, 2003, 2004; Ali, 1996; Aljarad, N.D.; Al-Mashat, 2007; Arab League, 1990; Dawisha, 2003; Galal, 1994; Hamza, 2007; Harb,
have repeatedly debated the core requirements for viable Arab national security. A synthesis of that discussion points to a number of requirements needed for Arab national security to develop in an effective way.

First, there is the need to guarantee economic and political independence of the Arab states from external influence. In order to achieve such independence on a regional level through an Arab regional organisation like the Arab League, subscribing to the broad concept of Arab national security becomes a prerequisite. However, the experience since the second Gulf war in Kuwait 1991 has shown that certain Arab states, like the GCC countries, prefer dependence on external sources for security rather than compromising their own security and clout through wider regional cooperation as discussed earlier. This preference reflects negatively on the possibility of achieving interdependence at a regional level since such an approach necessarily means compromises in state sovereignty. This presents a fundamental challenge to Arab National security as currently defined - in narrow terms of single states.

Second, there is an extension of the process of political reforms and human rights (See the UN International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights—ICCPR) currently occurring within the Arab world. This expands security to the realm of human security and a project beyond State-sanctioned ownership.
Third, there is the need to achieve social security, for which the foundation is economic, social and cultural rights (See the UN International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—ICESCR). Arab countries have tended to underperform in the field of reform and legislation when it comes to social security (International Labour Office, 2010). This requirement has gained importance after being neglected by the majority of the Arab states before the Arab spring of revolutions. In that sense, there is the need to guarantee economic and social rights for states and individuals equally within a regional system.

Fourth, and finally, there is the necessity for the presence of political will to achieve Arab security. This political will can be measured through the amount of state resources, economic and military capabilities that are allocated for building pan-Arab national security and joint cooperation projects.

**Conclusion**

During the course of this chapter, Arab national security as a concept and a project has been examined. Arab national security was referred to during the Arab League’s inception; however, it was not until 1952 that the members of the League took the first steps toward laying the foundation for the development of this concept and their collective security in the form of the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty. Although there were references prior to this 1952 agreement to the concept of national security and the threats to Arab interests and independence, such references were in relation to specific issues,
such as Palestine. Indeed, the Zionist threat to Palestine at the time can also be analysed as part of the wider goal of liberating Arab countries under colonisation, as referred to in Article 2 of the charter, or as an issue of particular importance to the neighbouring countries like Egypt upon whom the threat had a direct impact.

As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Arab League includes in its membership most of the countries in the region while excluding Turkey, Iran and Israel who, collectively or individually, are in dispute with some of the League’s members. It is the relationships between different Arab countries and these three regional powers that have shifted and changed with significant consequences throughout the course of the Arab League’s life. These changes have been a cause for disagreement on the definition of Arab national security among the League members and have put the concept on hold more than once.

In 1994 and 1998, the regional security concept was revisited in the Middle East by the Arab League. Each state presented its own description of national security in an attempt to formulate a regional security system. However, there is still no official Arab League document on this matter (Al-Mashat, 2007; Abdel-Salam, 2007; Interview No 2, 2007; Interview No. 1, 2007; Abu-Taleb, 2003). The absence of a practical and acceptable Arab national security concept has meant that other perceptions of interest have supplanted it. Thus the arrival of ‘imported security’ – that is, rich Arab states deciding to buy security with oil revenues - which is a model that developed rapidly after the second Gulf war and is currently hindering the role of the Arab League in formulating the national
security concept. The result is that rich Arab states are no longer in need for the Arab League.

Also, and more importantly, there are no joint Arab military forces (Al-Mashat, 2007). In fact, addressing joint action, joint security or joint cooperation in security matters while there are no joint forces within the framework of the Arab League is the greatest challenge that the League’s division for national security is facing (Interview No 2, 2007; Interview No. 1, 2007). The old unified military command that was established in 1964 no longer exists. The only existing model is a weak symbolic force for the Gulf States under the name ‘Aljazeera Shield’. Dependency on the United States and the West has been increasing as a result to the Arab League’s inability to adopt unified positions regarding various issues, and not only security issues but also political and economic issues.

After reviewing and summarising the challenges facing the development of Arab national security in this chapter, it is important to note that according to regional security complex theory (Buzan, Wilde and Waever, 1997; Buzan and Wæver, 2004), the presence of overlay or weak states in a region prevents regional security dynamics from functioning (Buzan and Wæver, 2004), and it has become evident that both cases (overlay and weak states) exist in the Arab world (Al-Mashat, 2007). This link is often overlooked by non-Arab observers while analysing regional security in the Arab world. Conversely, contemporary Arab states’ national interests do not extend outside their borders; rather their interests are regime-based, personal and rarely collective.
Second, the stationing and actions of American military forces present in the region represent a continued history of external intervention, problematic security dependency, polarizing alliances and divisive policy objectives that impede the development of a wider Arab security approach, be it economic, cultural, political or military. A case in point is the 1991 American invasion of Iraq and their use by of Arab territory and resources to launch the attack. Al-Mashat (2007), Khalil (2007) and Keilany (2004) believe that one of the aims of this American invasion was the destruction of the ‘Eastern frontier’ that protects Arab national security by neutralising Iraq’s military capabilities; thereby making particular Arab states even more dependent upon American security agreements. Second, the American invasion of Iraq also removed a powerful strategic threat to Israel and strengthened the American-Israeli geo-political security arrangement in ways that further undermined Arab national security.

Founded on the major challenge of the Zionist invasion of Palestine, the Arab League was the initial realisation and development of the concept of Arab national security and structures needed for it. This gradual formalization of the concept was legislated in the form of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty and its military annexes. The council of the League accepted it in 1950 although the debate within the League as well as within Arab politics did not formulate a precise definition of Arab national security at that point. Instead, Arab political literature included concepts such as joint Arab defence and joint defence treaty. The term Arab national security did not surface until 1980 (Keilany, 2004) at the eleventh Arab summit. The summit’s economic
documents addressed the establishment of development and economic joint projects as a step towards the implementation of mutual cooperation principles and in particular, to eventual agreement on political-military mechanisms against regional aggression. However, until that point at the 11th Summit, there had been no mechanisms or dynamics to realise these principles or prepare the member states for instances of aggression.

Although the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty was signed to ensure a higher level of cooperation against external threats (Pinfari, 2009, p.4), it became seen as an unprecedented change to the Arab League Charter. Specifically, the two-thirds majority replaced the unanimous condition as stated in the charter and in doing so, Arab states potentially surrendered some aspects of their sovereign authority as part of this treaty. The treaty was signed in 1950 and was later signed by every new member to the League. It then entered into force in 1953 (Arab League, 2010) with the aim of compensating for the absence of national security from the charter (Keilany, 2004; Abdel-Salam, 2007) and it included the principle of *collective solidarity in defence*. It is possible to conclude from this that the concept of Arab national security was originally limited to military defence both in the charter and in the joint defence treaty. Therefore, an important challenge confronting Arab national security was transforming and expanding the concept to include the many aspects of Arab civil life and not encompassed by military and defence purposes.

The concept of Arab national security was consolidated – and, arguable, greatly narrowed - during the Nakba of Palestine in 1948 and since the 1950s, Arab
national security as a concept and the institutions created for its realisation continued to face problems and obstacles in every phase of its development. The historical, regional competitions and disagreements that were present then have accompanied the concept of national security since. In fact, in 1981, a study revealed that 80 per cent of the resolutions taken within the League were actually unanimous (Hawwāt, 2002). But most of these resolutions were not implemented (Abdel-Salam, 2007; Al-Mashat, 2007). While one could argue that there was early agreement on the importance of unified leadership in the Arab region, conflicting state interests and agendas, together with the imperatives of internal regime stability prevented the implementation of larger Arab national security decisions.

During the 1950s and 1960s, elements of the Arab national security concept were formulated and produced results. The most important outcome during that era was Egyptian-Syrian unity in the form of the United Arab Republic (UAR).\(^{18}\) While this particular example will be examined later in Chapters Five and Six, it is important to say that the end of the union and the war of 1967 with Israel put a stop to further development of the concept. Instead, the concept was limited to addressing the consequences of the defeat (Abdel-Salam, 2007) and removing the “effects of aggression” (Arab League regular summit in Sudan, 2007).

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\(^{18}\) UAR was established in February 1958 until 1961 between Egypt and Syria when a group of political and military leaders in Syria proposed a merger of the two states to Egyptian president Nasser. Pan-Arab sentiment was very strong in Syria, and Nasser was a popular hero throughout the Arab world following the Suez Crisis of 1956. There was thus considerable popular support in Syria for union with Nasser’s Egypt. This union was interpreted as a threat to Jordan and Iraq’s Hashemite’s rule and tension between these entities raised to almost a military confrontation in early July 1958 when plots against the governments of King Hussein in Jordan and King Faisal in Iraq were uncovered. The union collapsed as a result of a coup-d’état in Syria. During the life time of the UAR, the United Arab States was established. It was a much looser confederation, established between the UAR and North Yemen and lasted from 1958 to 1961.
1967) on the Arab states. In taking this shift in course, the concept contradicted some of the core principles the League members agreed on in relation to Palestine. This will be elaborated on in the Chapter Seven.

Finally, in its report on Arab security in July 1993, the Arab League formulated a comprehensive definition for Arab national security that was never adopted (Al-Mashat 2007, Al-Mashat 2007; Interview No. 1 2007; Hamza 2007; Sobeih 2007). According to that definition, Arab national security is:

> the Arab nation’s ability to defend its security and rights while maintaining its independence and sovereignty over its land. In addition to developing the Arab capabilities in all political, economic, cultural and social fields through relying on its diplomatic and military capacity in consideration of the national security requirements of each state and the local, regional and international variables that affect Arab national security.

(Keilany, 2004, p.118)

This along-waited definition remains an informal take on the concept since it has never been endorsed or adopted. This definition addresses many of the elements that were discussed earlier in this chapter as components for building defensive capabilities in the broader sense of the term. The political, economic, cultural and social aspects of interdependence make this definition more in line with the modern approaches to security discussed in Chapter Two. However, this definition falls short at attempting to overcome one of the limitations that
hindered the work and development of Arab joint action, that is, its emphasis on the prioritization of the requirements of individual states before other levels. Nevertheless, in the definition above lies the foundation for a viable form of collective security.

The following chapter will investigate other international and regional organisations as models from which elements of success and failure can be synthesised.
CHAPTER FOUR
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REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY

The concepts region, regionalism, security and Arab national security were explored in previous sections. This chapter will investigate regional organisations through the examination of a number of regions in detail. This examination will focus on theoretical approaches to regional security, with the aim of establishing a connection between regional security as a concept and RSOs as a means of realising it.

Regional organisations are variously defined, often on the basis of the geographical proximity of their members. Such definitions are subject to the difficulty of delimiting geographic regions, for there is no general agreement on any natural divisions into which the world may be clearly and conveniently divided. Therefore, while geography may be one factor that aids in determining the regional character of international organisations, the lack of physical proximity between members and/or the failure of a regional organisation to conform to a neat, generally recognisable, geographic area will not be decisive in defining certain organisations as regional organisations as was discussed earlier in defining a region.

The United States, for example, is a member of several organisations of regional status that reach almost every point of the world, thus identifying the United States with the North Atlantic, the Americas and Southeast Asia.
However, none of the organisations involved conforms to any natural geographic region. The North Atlantic area poses the question of whether an ocean represents a unifying factor or a barrier for determining a region; the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) throws further doubt on conformity to regional parameters. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), by including Russia and the United States as well as Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, circles the globe and extends to the borders of Iran, Afghanistan and India. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was for the protection of Southeast Asian countries, but it was dominated by non-Asian states like Australia, France and New Zealand, which formed a majority of its membership (Rüland, 2005). The membership of the Organisation of American States (OAS) includes all states within North, South, and Central America, but geographers have never viewed both continents as a single, well-defined region (Bennett, 2002).

Certain practical questions also arise concerning the effectiveness and capacities of RSOs. For instance, is there a relationship between the number of members a regional organisation has and its ability to function effectively? Further, is there a correlation between the sphere of influence of a regional organisation and its effectiveness? Although it is difficult to find empirical data to answer either question and since regional organisations tend to expand with time, regionalists such as Yalem (1962), Hueglin (1982) and Fawcett (1995, 2004) maintain that such relations exist.
Some organisations (such as the Arab League), have been built on the basis of common 'civilizational' values, while in others (such as Southern Common Market ‘MERCOSUR’), a common commitment to democratic political values appears to have played an important role (Peña, 1997). However, other organisations (ASEAN, for example; possibly also Economic Community of West African States ‘ECOWAS’) have survived, even thrived, despite very different political values and systems in their member states (Cawthra, 2007). Despite such a variance in defining characteristics, many regional organisations in general have been established with the primary aim of maintaining peace and resolving conflicts or containing conflicts to avoid further escalation (Bennett, 2002; Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995; Yalem, 1962; Buzan and Hansen, 2009). In fact, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, regional organisations were already regarded as possible building blocks of peace and for some, as possible ‘Islands of Peace’ (Cawthra, 2007; Keohane, 1986). Prior to this period, the potential role of regional organisations for the settlement of disputes was also recognised by the United Nations at the end of the Second World War. At the 1945 San Francisco Conference for the drafting of the United Nation’s Charter, a vigorous debate over the merits of universalism versus regionalism took place (Schreuer, 1995). While the debate ensured the superiority and priority of the United Nations organisation over any regional organisations, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter nevertheless envisaged ‘regional arrangements or agencies’ which would deal with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action (Anthony, 2005: 15). Chapter VIII of the Charter of the UN is quite explicit about the security functions of regional organisations:
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority

(art. 53.1)

and:

Members of the United Nations … shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council

(art. 52.2)

(United Nations, 1995)

While the superpower-led regional security organisations, such as South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), faltered in the Third World, more multi-purpose regional groups managed to secure a place within the UN system as legitimate mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes between states, including ASEAN, GCC and the Economic Community of West Asian States (ECOWAS), (Acharya, 1999), thereby confirming regional organisations as an important first destination as far as peaceful resolution of conflicts is concerned. Yet it should also be highlighted that international obligations apply that subordinate regional organisations to UN authorisation regarding the use of non-peaceful means to resolve conflicts. As UN Chapter VII, Article 53.1 states, “No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies
without the authorization of the Security Council". Despite concerns that regional organisations might compete with and weaken the authority of the UN, the ‘universalists’ (led by the ‘great powers’ invested with Security Council veto power) agreed to a compromise in order to ensure that regional organisations remain subject to a UN-led security framework (Breslin, 2002). This gave regional organisations a role as the first point of contact in managing regional conflicts as long as they remained subject to the norms of the UN-based collective security framework including respecting the fundamental principle of state sovereignty (Acharya, 1999). Thus, regional organisations became primarily responsible for addressing peace and conflict on a regional level within the newly established international system.

Regionalists make three main assertions as to the relevance and superiority of their theoretical stances on regionalism but those claims are undermined by certain assumptions. A number make a two-fold argument that there is a natural tendency towards regionalism (Sherk, 2007; Tan, 1999; Yalem, 1962; Hueglin, 1986; Schulz, 2001; McMillan, 2003) that is based on a commonality if not homogeneity of interests, traditions and values among neighbouring states and that the likelihood of successful economic and political cooperation/integration is more likely to be negotiated if such a processes only involve a smaller number of states (Salem, 2008).

Some regional theorists also claim that issues like conflict, imbalances of power and local threats would be better accommodated among regional members who
have a better understanding of their local problems than external interveners (San, 1999; Lawson, 2009; Hettne, 1999; Haas and Rowe, 1973). However, there are many cases where regional groupings have failed on these matters. The record of RSOs has not always been impressive in dealing with regional conflicts, particularly in light of the relatively unsuccessful role played in conflicts such as the European institutions and the Balkans, the Arab League and Middle Eastern wars, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU – although after 2002 it became the African Union ‘AU’) in Somalia.

On the other hand, extra-regional influences have played a role in the development of regional security organisations (Krause, 1997). A case in point is the external politics of the Cold War, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s that greatly influenced the development of regional organisations such as Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), ASEAN, ECOWAS and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). This is particularly the case regarding the wave of institution building among ‘developing’ countries with an underlying focus on security as a response to the US-USSR bi-polar world that heavily dominated regional security affairs (Fawcett, 2008).

Such examples of external influence or developing nation subordination do not invalidate regionalist arguments per se but rather raise the importance of understanding the extent to which regional organisation dynamics are deeply influenced by external (international) factors as well as intra-regional factors.
Moreover, defining the relationship between international organisations and regional organisations is a key element in knowing what regional organisations can and should do. Regionalists’ assumptions emphasize the ability of regional organisations to prevent conflicts and resolve them as a way of judging how successful they are.

*The Cold War politics prevented the development of what could have been a potentially close relationship between the UN and regional organisations when the major enemies the United States and the former Soviet Union excluded the Security Council from being involved in regional conflicts in which they were respectively involved. For example: when the cases of Guatemala of 1954, the Cuban complaint against the United States in 1962, and that of Panama in 1965 were brought up in the Security Council, the United States insisted successfully that these matters belonged under the purview of the … OAS and not in the Security Council. Similarly, the former USSR denied the Security Council’s competence in dealing with the suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The former Soviet Union insisted that these matters were the concern of the socialist community bound by the Warsaw Pact* (Anthony 2005, p.16)

These Cold War politics, events and conflicts had the consequence of not only raising the issue of credibility and autonomy of regional organisations but also resulted in loading regional organisations with complex conflicts that they were
not often ready to deal with. As Anthony states, “It did not take long for some regional organisations to realize that regional conflicts, some of them inter-state, were far too complex for them to resolve among themselves. In some cases, it became even more complex when non-members were involved” (Anthony 2005:16).

However, not all RSOs were established with the particular role of maintaining peace and resolving or containing conflicts embedded in their mandate. Unlike other regions of the developing world where regional organisations (such as the OAU, the OAS and the Arab League) emerged with a role in the passive resolution of conflicts, Southeast Asia did not develop an indigenous mechanism for conflict control until much later when the communist and anti-communist divide within the region was at its peak in the 1970s (Anthony, 2005). Indeed, the creation of ASEAN had been preceded by a number of unsuccessful and short-lived experiments with regionalism, each of them overwhelmed by prevailing intra-regional tensions (Acharya 1993).

Despite their varying circumstances and mandates, the commonality between RSOs, however, is that they were established to accommodate their member states’ national interests, prevent external intervention and coordinate security interdependency and cooperation as a means of preventing the escalation of conflict between them.

While Bennett (2002) defines a regional organisation as a segment of the world bound together by a common set of objectives and ties (geographical, social,
cultural, economic or political) and possessing a formal structure provided for informal intergovernmental agreements, it is clear from the points above that resolving conflicts and maintaining peace was regarded as an important element of regional organisations, at least from the signing of the UN Charter. Even if a regional organisation’s mandate does not explicitly address the resolution of regional conflicts, regional organisations are often eventually confronted with such tasks. The diversity inherent in each regional organisation – the result of a unique blend of these geographical, social, cultural, economic and political ties – means that regional organisations will vary in their approach and mechanisms for addressing peace and conflict. Since each conflict is also unique in its complexity and every regional organisation is unique in its capacities and approach, identifying what common elements and/or factors help regional organisations deal with conflict is crucial question in order to enable us to discern measures for success or failure of such organisations.

Exploring the role regional organisations play in security and how regional organisations as argued by various important theorists and major schools of thought will guide the identification of the common elements and factors of regional organisation that this research is seeking to identify.

**Realist views**

According to the classical realist perspective (Williams, 2007; Collins, 2006), international organisations are not independent in their politics in the
international arena. Realists maintain that states remain the main actors in international politics and do not believe that either international organisations or non-state actors have a significant role to play. Instead, they emphasise the severe limitations faced in altering international political behaviour based “not only on the anarchical structure of the international system but also on a human nature that itself is flawed and otherwise imperfect” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1996, p.65). Even Claude (1971, 246) recognised that international organisations themselves cannot alter international politics, and their attempts to do so are “a useless and perhaps even a mischievous tampering with what a third of reasonable men should simply accept”. Just eight years later, Waltz (1979, p.110-112) claimed that international organisations act with a view to maintaining themselves as organisations as a priority. He argued further that international organisations distort states’ attention away from focusing on the problems they face and toward managing them with “a maximum agreement for the sake of maintaining unity” (ibid). Waltz (1979) also argued that organisations that succeed in increasing the security of their members do so at the expense of their states’ freedom because “states, like people, are insecure in proportion to the extent of their freedom” (Salem, 2008, p.28). Waltz, however, believes that international organisations are controlled by, and do not control, their members especially when important issues are at stake.

In the realist paradigm, international organisations “are composed of sovereign, independent, or autonomous states that determine what these international organisations will do” (Viotti and Kauppi, 1987, p.32). The success of such organisations in playing the role they are designed to play is dependent on the
complex political and diplomatic calculations and alliances between the member states (Salem, 2008). Since not all member states are equal, the route taken by international organisations is usually determined by its most influential members. If a hegemon is absent, then realists expect the organisation to serve the interests of the most powerful coalition of states (Haftel and Thompson, 2006). For instance, the OAS is referred to by realists as an example of an organisation with a hegemon (USA) while the EU is an example of the powerful coalition. Cawthra explores this in more detail:

Is the presence of a regional hegemon, both able and willing to exercise its military and economic muscle, a desirable or even a necessary condition for the evolution of regional organisations? Neo-realists would tend to argue that it is; others regard this as a negative feature. The answer to this may be context-specific. It might also be the case that at different stages, or under certain conditions, hegemony may either accelerate or retard organisational development. Whatever the case, it is a critical issue in many regional organisations.

(Cawthra, 2007)

Since members of international organisations are not equal, "except in the juridical sense that they are all sovereign states" (Feld, Jordan and Hurwitz, 1994, p.206), these organisations act as arenas where powerful states attempt to expand their hegemony over other members such as in the Organisation of American States. If no single state is able to dominate, realists expect the international organisation to reflect the interests of the most powerful coalition
as is the case of the European Union and the predominant influence of France, Germany and Great Britain in determining the direction of EU actions (Haftel and Thompson, 2006). If international organisations fail to fulfil this condition, then they do not act or at least have limited influence and effectiveness. This means that “serving the interests of the most powerful member or coalition of members is a necessary condition for an international organisation to act” (Salem, 2008, p.29).

While the previous proposition mainly concerns large and inclusive international organisations, it also applies to regional organisations. For example, the Latin American members of the OAS were able on occasion to reject United States proposals, even on occasions when the United States used considerable influence and resources to pass resolutions (Salem, 2008). However, the OAS was immobile in many cases without the United States’ consent, which wielded “close to an absolute veto on OAS decisions” (Slater, 1965, p.40). Slater went a step further when he suggested that “collective actions in the Western Hemisphere are argued to have been essentially unilateral United States actions, given a symbolic multilateral character and legitimacy by the endorsement of the Latin American members of the OAS” (Slater, 1965, p.37).

Realists also identify the relationship between regional powers and powers of international standing and how such connections can result in the mutual promotion of the other’s interests (Salem, 2008). If regions maintain a balance of power within themselves, then states need to continually balance against
threats of other regional powers, as well as external threats. “Morgenthau's concern with the balance of power and alliances where national power considerations have an impact on all forms of global behaviour, alliances and the balance of power” (Vasquez, 1998, p.54) extends to peace and war. This helps to explain the reason why states enter into alliances and pacts on regional as well as global levels in order to achieve a balance against threats. For instance, global powers utilise regional players to promote their specific geopolitical agendas on a regional level using the influence they have within such regional organisations. This can result in a dynamic that forces regional organisations to act in the interest of not only the powerful members within, but also in the interest of global allies of these members or coalitions, if the regional organisation is to be effective and functional (Salem, 2008, p.36).

This realist view has been challenged by the Neoliberal Institutionalists such as Robert Keohane (1993, 2002) and Joseph Nye (1988) on several levels, although they agree with the realists on the state-centrist approach. Keohane (1993) agrees that states are the main actors in international politics and that an international organisation's main function is to facilitate cooperation among its member states. To this end, he predicts that states will participate in these organisations as long as “the institutions enable states to achieve valued objectives unattainable through unilateral or bilateral means” (Keohane, 1993, p.274). On the other hand:

*Neo liberal institutionalism's early focus on international regimes was indeed likely to rid it of states-centrism because, in the regime theory, norms and principles occupy so a central position that only changes*
in them are considered changes of the regime itself (Krasner, 1982:3) in other words, norms and principles, not only state power, were theorised as potentially causative factors in international politics.

(Salem, 2008, p.39)

According to Abbott and Snidal (1998), neoliberal institutionalists remain state-centric since they continue to assert (1) that states are the main actors in the international arena; (2) that the independence and autonomy of international organisations remains bound by state interests and power; and (3) that states control the processes through which international organisations shape values and interests. In short, the realist and neoliberal institutionalist frameworks “approach international organisations as instruments in a world of sovereign states seeking to maximise their interests and power” (Krasner, 1982, p.7).

Notwithstanding, “both the object of strategic choice and constraint on states’ behaviour is an idea that has been neglected in much of the debate between realists and neoliberal institutionalists” (Martin and Simmons, 1998, p.729). Similarly, it is difficult to generalise, as do the Realist and Neo-Liberal approaches, that all international organisations are both cause and effect. Thus, a closer examination of each organisation’s historical and sociological background needs to be explored in order to further interrogate their dynamics and the claims of the above theoretical frameworks.
Constructivist theories of international relations

A different approach to the dynamics and meaning of international organisations can be encountered in Constructivist theories of international relations. Constructivists focus on social relations and their consolidated forms at the level of international politics, such as identities, norms and values, in determining and shaping the interests of individual states and the international system. As Salem explains, “Constructivists approach international politics from a more sociological perspective than the microeconomic foundation of realism and neoliberal institutionalism” (Salem, 2008, p.42). While the latter treat states as rational and their identities and interests as exogenously and historically given (Wendt 1992, pp.391–392), Constructivist approaches examine the core of actor interests and preferences, and treat them as socially constructed and learned through non-instrumental communication and persuasion (Checkel 2001, p.559).

As a consequence, modern constructivists’ theories are less state-centric. Their treatment of state foreign policy is distinctive by attributing to people an active role in constructing reality - in contrast to the modernist stress on their roles as mere agents (Kubalkova 2001b, p.61). The post-modernist Constructivists focus on people acting on the behalf of states and governments (Kubalkova 2001a, p.18); and in broad terms, Post-modernists rarely address international organisations because they view reality "in terms of relationships, not in terms of reified entities" (Pettman 2000, p.10). Instead, they talk of state-making instead of the state in order to stress that the state, and indeed all actors, are
never “finished” and are actually in a permanent process of making and remaking (ibid. p.23). Therefore, as Salem suggests, “a potential contribution of post-modernism to the study of international organisations would be an emphasis on their remaking, especially in critical moments such as international crises” (Salem 2008, p.45); and Constructivism has already opened up fresh perspectives on international organisations.

**Institutional constructivist views on international organisations**

“According to constructivists, international institutions have both regulative and constitutive functions” (Griffiths 2009, p.123). Regulative norms set basic rules for standards of conduct by prescribing or proscribing certain behaviours. Constitutive norms define behaviour and assign meanings to that behaviour (Griffiths 2009, p.123). Sociological institutional constructivists like Barnett and Finnemore (1998, 2004) and Haas (2002) argue that international organisations are constrained by states since the latter have independent agendas of their own. They argue that there are five potential types of relationships that can develop between autonomous international organisations and member states: international organisations may 1) exercise autonomy to further state interests; 2) act where states are indifferent; 3) fail to act and therefore fail to carry out state demands; 4) act in ways that run against state interests; and 5) change the broader normative environment and states’ perceptions of their own preferences to one that is closer to the organisations’ preference (Salem 2008, p.49). The default assumption of these theorists is that the influence of a powerful state or coalition within an international organisation is not necessarily or entirely the driver behind the direction of the organisation, which leaves open
the question of what or who directs the organisation in the absence of a powerful internal player? According to Salem (2008), there are three possible answers to this question as follows.

*International organisations as consensual communities*

The first possibility is that an international organisation undertakes actions by the consensus of all its members because it is established to act in their common interests, upon their collective will, and as representative or an embodiment of them as a community (Abbott & Snidal 1998). This consensual community argument is especially plausible if international organisations represent collective identities or security communities and enjoy a certain parity of power (Adler & M. N. Barnett 1998; Salem 2008). International organisations may be supported “not for what they do but for what they are – for what they represent symbolically and the values they embody” (M. Barnett & Finnemore 1999, p.703). This leads to the assumption that an international organisation may only act with the consent of all its members and in their interests.

This consensual community argument does not contradict Realism since it is possible for consensus to be built around the will of a powerful member who can use resources and influence to create this consensus (Salem 2008). But under these conditions, the consensual community approach fails to escape the dynamics of power politics and state-centrism. Furthermore, for regional organisations where consensus is mainly reached by heads of state, infrequent meetings can undermine their ability to function. For instance, in the Arab
Maghreb Union (AMU), the Presidential Summit is the sole decision-making body and therefore cooperation “relies upon the ability of the heads of state to meet regularly in order to build the architecture of a regional organization” (Mortimer 1999, p.178). Waever argues that “as regional organisations progress towards security communities, interactions may become increasingly 'desecuritised'; i.e. there may be 'a progressive marginalisation of mutual security concerns in favour of other issues’” (Adler & M. N. Barnett 1998, pp.414–415; Cawthra 2007).

*International organisations as bureaucracies*

A second explanation argues that although the bureaucracy within an organisation is not the final decision-making unit, a well-developed bureaucracy can shape its priorities and direction. International bureaucracies usually direct their respective organisations to serve not only their members’ but also their own interests, which are “varied, often in flux, debated, and worked out through and their actions between the staff of the bureaucracy and the world in which they are embedded” (Barnett & Finnemore 1999, p.706-7). The issue of delegation must also be considered because the delegation of authority to a bureaucracy (to make and implement rules) or to a third-party dispute settlement mechanism (to resolve conflicts) has been identified as a key element of an institution’s degree of legalisation (Abbott & Snidal 2000). More specifically, the ability of bureaucrats to shape the activities of international organisations is best demonstrated by Secretary Generals who use the special privileges of their titular position to initiate processes, propose specific actions,
actively intervene in resolving conflict, or, further, exploit certain attributes that enhance their own power vis-à-vis other actors, including member states which may attempt to control their organisations (Salem 2008).

**International organisations as driven by norms and principles**

A third possible “driver” lies with Regime theorists, neo-liberal Institutionalists (Mearsheimer 1994-95, Krasner 1982; Keohane 1984; Legro 1997) and sociological institutional constructivists who characterise institutional norms as “shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by community factors” (Finnemore 1996, p.22). However, they emphasise that norms are social constructs and are not trans-historically given (Salem 2008, p.54). Realists, on the other hand, dismiss norms as casual factors because, they argue, norms are meaningless rhetoric, epiphenomenal to power politics, and only instruments of foreign policy decision makers (Salem 2008, p.54). Krasner, for example, claims that “rulers may honour norms perhaps only in talk to secure resources, but when material and domestic political interests are at stake, rulers will typically allow the utilitarian logic of consequences to trump the logic of appropriateness” (Herrmann & Shannon 2001, p.628).

Although sociological institutional constructivists admit that states sometimes use norms as a means to an end (Barnett 1998), they insist that this practice is evidence of the existence and potency of international norms as an influential factor in international politics. Only when norms are in place, Finnemore argues, may conforming to them bring all kinds of material benefits which opens the
gates for predicting states and organisations behaviour as well as the possibility of influencing it.

In contrast, institutional constructivists argue that an international organisation’s actions must be based on its institutionalised and agreed-upon norms and principles, yet empirical evidence to support this suggestion in the literature is not abundant. Nevertheless, Salem (2008) argues that it is unlikely that an organisation or group of its members would totally fail to base one of its decisions on any of its principles considering that any international organisation’s founding principles and practice norms are wide and rich, and part of its ideological cover. For example, the Arab League was required by its two most powerful members, Egypt and Iraq, in the mid-1950s to resolve their competing interpretation of the Arab League’s norms and take a clear position in their dispute regarding the Baghdad pact. The justification behind the Baghdad pact organisation was to confront an allegedly imminent, and arguably emerging, threat of Soviet expansionism in the Middle East (M. Barnett 1996, pp.413–422). Egypt eventually prevailed in this dispute as the Arab League adopted Egypt’s position and condemned that of Iraq and the Baghdad Pact. The Arab League’s position was allegedly based on the then-dominant principle of prohibition of all forms of security alliance between Arab and non-Arab states, especially Western states supporting Israel (Zacher 1979, p.174; Salem 2008). The case illustrates the importance of norm adherence.

**Expansion of International Organisations**

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Beyond the works of constructivists and realists, the theory of functionalism has been the most elaborate and ambitious attempt made to predict and understand the growth of international institutions, and accommodate their normative implications (Brown 2007). However, explaining the past and predicting the growth of international organisations is not the main purpose of functionalism. It is rather an “account of the conditions of peace that emerged in the 1940s as a reaction to state-centric approaches to peace such as federalism and collective security” (Brown 2007, p.131). Contrary to federalism, which is a system based on democratic rules and institutions in which the power to govern is shared between national and provincial/state governments, collective security respects the sovereignty of states while imposing legal obligations on their behaviour. However, states can still choose the extent to which they respect or disregard legal constraints when it suits them. But because Federalism makes it more difficult for states to behave in such a way, they are less inclined to federate.

Another approach to functionalism can be attributed to Mitrany when he argued that a ‘working peace system’ could only be constructed from the bottom up, by encouraging forms of cooperation which bypassed the issue of formal sovereignty but instead gradually reduced the capacity of states to actually act as sovereigns. Two formulae here summarize the argument: ‘form follows function’ and ‘peace in parts’ (Nye 1971). ‘Form follows function’ collapses a number of propositions. First, cooperation will only work if it is focused on particular and specific activities (‘functions’) which are currently performed by states but which would be performed more effectively in some wider context. Second, the form which such cooperation
takes should be determined by the nature of the function in question
– thus, for some functions a global institution will be appropriate.

(Brown 2007, pp.132–133)

Accordingly, the fixtures and variables that shape functionality and drive international organisations’ policy and direction are the result of state interests, the influence of powerful states, established norms and principles within the community, bureaucracies and the importance of consensus to the members. As a result, it appears that form and function – as well as performance – are crucially shaped if not determined by these factors.

Although realists and neo-liberals give more importance to the state and the state-centric approach in their analyses than the constructivists, the constructivist analysis on what drives international organisations does not dispute the importance of states as presented by realists and neo-liberals. The Constructivist point is not to challenge the centrality of states but to investigate the extent and quality of their relations – with the full range of non-state actors and dynamics seen as important elements in shaping their outlook, interests and behaviour. For Constructivists, anarchy is only one factor conditioning of state behaviour – it is not an exclusive arena.

In addition to the above schools of thought with their objects of reference, actors and dynamics within international organisations, scholars and researchers have examined international organisations though their impact on
their areas of influence and their achievements with regard to regional stability and the mechanisms for achieving these aims. One of these approaches is Comparative Analysis, discussed below.

**Comparative Framework**

Comparative analysis has been widely used to measure regional organisations’ success, influence and impact. Three broad categories are the result of comparative analysis in this area (Haacke, 2009). These categories are: 1) Accounts of regional war and peace (Adler and Barnett 1998; Buzan and Wæver 2003; Miller 2007); 2) works of institutional comparison (Acharya and Johnston 2007; Solingen 2008; Duffield 2006); and 3) largely empirical surveys of how regional arrangements deal with security and conflict issues (Lake and Morgan 1997; Diehl and Lepgold 2003).

The first and third categories rely on empirical data in analysing stability within a region and the role of the regional organisation in achieving it. The second category focuses on the nature and type of organisations and how the decision-making process is conducted.

Lawson’s work moves one step forward from Buzan and Wæver’s (2004) work on regional security complex and regional security, towards providing a more focused and structured mechanism for measuring success at the level of regional organisations. The type, characteristics and inner dynamics of
organisations are the key for Lawson’s analysis (2009). Lawson suggests four dimensions of analysis in order to evaluate regionalist projects: first, the degree of institutional authority in issue areas; second, the type of decision-making rules (majority vote versus unanimous vote); third, type of incentive structure; and fourth, the degree to which regional institutions provide a foundation for heightened economic interdependence.

In the first dimension, Lawson suggests distinguishing three types of regionalist projects: multilateral institutions exercising authority over one, two or more than two issue areas. As for the incentive structure, he suggests distinguishing regionalist projects to two types. The two types differ based on their incorporation of collective security pacts and/or Free Trade Areas. In the fourth dimension, the existence of programs that encourage the growth of partnerships in which returns can be measured and disruption of the same would prove equally costly to member-states (Harders & Legrenzi 2008, p.4).

Cooperation as an integral component for success

Thus far, there has been a general consensus among schools of thought and researchers that the felt need for cooperation is a vital element behind the promotion of regionalism as well as a factor for their success. If regionalists are correct in believing that the possibilities for cooperation are greater among a smaller number of states, and if realists are correct in predictions that states will participate in these organisations as long as “the institutions enable states to
achieve valued objectives unattainable through unilateral or bilateral means” (Keohane 1993, p.274), then it can be concluded that there is a tendency for states to limit the size of the organisations they are members of in order to maximise their gains. However, it is certain that regional organisations expand with time whether by accepting new members, as in the cases of ASEAN and the Arab League, or as a result of the reshaping of the political map of their regions, in the case of the EU, or as a result of both factors. This could mean that over time states become less inclined to cooperate within expanding regional constructs.

In this context, the functional approach to regional organisations comes to the fore, through adding the ‘bottom up’ dimension to encourage cooperation and by focusing on specific areas of cooperation as Brown (2007) argues. On the other hand, according to Harders and Legrenzi (Harders & Legrenzi 2008), various schools of thought within International Relations attribute any lack of regional cooperation to the complexity of factors involved: geographical proximity, degree of social, cultural and religious homogeneity as well as political, economic and military interaction.

Attributing a lack of cooperation to historical factors depends on the theoretical assumptions of the particular school of thought being examined. The Neo-Realist approach to dependency theories, for example, analyses interests

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19 Dependency theorists assert that developing countries were not always ‘poor’, but became impoverished through colonial domination and forced incorporation into the world economy by expansionist ‘first-world’ powers. Dependency theory opposed a universal theory of stages of growth; not all countries would go through the same stages. Although Marxian-inspired, supporters of dependency theory have lost faith that capitalism would develop the forces of
through the power asymmetry between states on regional and international levels. Neo-liberals, Institutionalis

tists and constructivists focus more on regional and domestic autonomy which is more region-specific since it derives from such matters as social and political system weakness, political versus economic elite agendas, and specific national versus regional interests (Harders & Legrenzi 2008).

As discussed elsewhere, each region is unique in its history, characteristics, patterns of interdependence and power relations between its states. This uniqueness manifests itself through the spectrum of initiatives possible and not possible, through community or collective security arrangements. To this end, a unique regional organisation with an interesting approach to regional stability is ASEAN. One approach to understand ASEAN's internal dynamics and values is through its principles of *national and regional resilience*.

**ASEAN: national and regional resilience**

At an initial glance, there would seem to be little that would draw the countries of ASEAN together organisationally. Even the original members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) were extremely diverse in size, culture, ethnic composition, colonial history, religion, and political system (military rule, authoritarian rule, and democracy). Moreover, the Organisation's diversity has increased as it has expanded to include countries such as Brunei, production and class contradictions in the developing world in the same way as it did in the rest (Topik 1998).
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. However, something the founding states had in common was that they were faced with communist insurgencies and believed that their regimes were threatened (Cawthra 2007).

The principle of national and regional resilience is one of the special characteristics of ASEAN and was adopted as a primary objective for regional co-operation at the first ASEAN summit in Bali in 1976 (Acharya 1993). The concept of national and regional resilience helps to explain the relationship between individual states and their region, and within ASEAN. In a circle of cause and effect, national resilience is regarded as a pre-requisite for regional resilience. In summary, the resilience concept comprises

The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region as an essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience.

(Anwar 2000, p.82)

The main characteristic of national resilience is that it is inward-looking and mainly directed to the nation itself. In other words, its objective is the achievement of its own national identity and character through self-reliance. Yet, Anwar (2000) believes that this principle is not taken to mean that the nation should take on an attitude of isolationism or narrow nationalism, but that the inward-looking characteristics along with the maintenance of international relations should externally project a healthy competitiveness. Another characteristic is that it
Does not support power politics or the confrontation of strength. 

Power politics is mainly built upon physical power, while National Resilience exploits other capabilities and assets of a nation such as its moral power. National resilience stresses the importance of consultations and mutual respect among nations and among states while avoiding confrontation and antagonism.

(Anwar 2000, p.85)

The key issue in this discussion is how national resilience could be transferred or scaled up to the regional level within the ASEAN area as a source of encouraging mutual respect and suppressing confrontation, which are ASEAN’s main characteristics. While international cooperation on regional security has certain limitations, the experience of ASEAN has shown that it can play a dual role of increasing stability through regional conflict resolution and increasing security through diminishing the presence or threat of external interference. “The withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia during 1988-9, the rundown of the Soviet naval deployment in Vietnam between 1989 and 1991, the comprehensive international political settlement of the Cambodian dispute in Paris in 1991, and the ending of the US military presence in the Philippines in 1992” (Hwang 2003, p.161) are all cases in point.

Although international cooperation is certainly significant, the domestic dimension of security is nonetheless of paramount importance for a successful regional organisation. The need for domestic order, stability and growth, and for
regime security are still primary driving forces for regions with developing countries as primary units (Mak 1998). Ghazali Shafie, the former Foreign Minister of Malaysia between 1981 to 1984, strengthened commitment to regional cohesiveness when he referred to regional resilience as “the ability of each state in the region to be fully committed to their organised inter-relatedness and interdependence as the first principle of foreign policy” (Anwar 2000). This political connection was further elaborated and expanded by Khoman, Special Envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand in 1972, when he argued that regional resilience is the dynamic condition of a group of nations in a region which includes tenacity, sturdiness and endurance, enabling the development of each nation’s national resilience in the spirit of regional solidarity, cooperation and loyalty, capable of coping with all threats and challenges coming from within as well as from without, that directly or indirectly, endanger the existence, the national life and the struggle of those nations and at the same time endanger the interest of the region as a whole (Anwar 2000). Considering the nature of the political systems within ASEAN, this cooperation and stability would not have been possible if it was not for the norms that drove ASEAN as an institution. ASEAN practice is summarised by Cawthra (2007) in the following principles: strict non-intervention in member states’ internal affairs (although informal, private discussions may take place); informal decision-making by consensus after (mostly) closed-door discussions; reliance on national institutions rather than building a strong centralised bureaucracy; and 'compartmentalising', postponing or simply ignoring difficult or divisive issues.
Therefore, it seems that the regional resilience of ASEAN is composed of four main elements. First, the national resilience of each member state is considered a vital element of regional resilience because it is recognised as an integral part of the collective contribution of all members, which secures the viability of the region as a whole. Second, the level of interaction among member states is conditioned by the cohesiveness of the parties and their attitude of accommodation. This interaction is necessary to enable the region to withstand pressure and after a crisis, eventually rebound to its original state. Third, the degree of commitment of each member state to the region is an important ingredient for regional resilience. Clearly, the greater the degree of commitment of each country, the higher the level of resilience the region can achieve. And finally, adaptive capability is the ability and capacity of the region to adapt itself and respond according to the changing environment (Anwar 2000). These four elements represent the milestones for regional resilience.

Over the course of its development, ASEAN has become quite institutionalised and more involved in a wide range of issues, including security. While the original communist threat has largely evaporated, this has not led to the organisation's decline; instead, the benefits of regional cooperation have become so evident that it is highly unlikely that there will be any turning back (Cawthra et al. 2007).

However, ASEAN's weaknesses have been exposed through its failure to adequately address the major challenges that it faced in the 1990s. As an organisation, ASEAN effectively began 'interfering' in the internal affairs of
regional states as long ago as 1997, when it delayed Cambodia's admission for two years – under strong Western pressure. After the Hun Sen coup in 1997 in Cambodia, ASEAN needed to find a way of balancing its traditional respect for sovereignty with effective intervention strategies for upholding human rights and promoting democratic practices (Cawthra 2007). Although it established the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) with the aim of enhancing ASEAN's ability to deal as a bloc with strong external powers and build confidence in the region, “ASEAN has not developed comprehensive multilateral institutions to deal with security issues” (Cawthra et al. 2007, p.32).

This particular challenge of constructing respect for sovereignty with effective regional intervention strategies is a problem not unique to ASEAN but shared with other regional organisations. One can argue that national and regional resilience principles – and their practical limitations - are also manifested in other regions and organisations but in different forms and under other names. With this in mind, the following section will expand on the principles of autonomy and independence and how central they were to the formation and development of other regional organisations that have been in similar dilemmas to that of ASEAN.

**Autonomy and independence**

The surge of new states during the second half of the 20th Century has seen a corollary increase in regionalisation.
The newer entrants to the international system found in regionalism an important foreign policy tool, this was primarily to protect their sovereignty and autonomy from great power meddling. Regionalism was also viewed by the Third World states as a means of collective economic and political self-reliance

(Acharya 1999, p.21)

In this vein, the OAU (now AU) and the Arab League have functioned more as "the instrument of national independence rather than of regional integration" (Acharya 1999, p.21). This made autonomy and independence two main criteria for measuring the success or failure of these regional organisations, at least for member states who held those particular priorities.

During the second half of the Cold War, regional organisations like the OAS, the OAU and the Arab League were in a state of decline while sub-regional organisations emerged as new frameworks for security cooperation (Fawcett 2008; Acharya 1999). These included GCC, the Economic Community of West Asian States (ECOWAS), and the Contadora Group in South America, which was launched in the early 1980s. Like their larger predecessors, these groupings were oriented toward a conflict-control role. Some of them, especially ASEAN, made an important contribution to peace-making in regional conflicts, but these groupings also remained bound by the principle of sovereignty and non-interference.
The principle of non-interference was instrumental to the success of both ASEAN and the GCC in ensuring collective regime security, even during the processes of polarisation that have dominated their respective regions during conflict. In the case of the GCC, the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran constituted a regional polarisation while the confrontation between ASEAN itself and Vietnam presented the same polarising dynamics for many ASEAN members (Acharya 1999; Amer 1999).

Therefore, independence, autonomy and non-intervention were not only driving factors for countries to join new regional organisations but were also the drive for the same states to get reorganised on a sub-regional level in their pursuit of these principles. When independence, autonomy and non-intervention are deemed essential for states to maintain, how does securing them reflect back on the regional organisation they are members of?

If institutional independence is “the authority to act with a degree of autonomy” (Abbott & Snidal 1998, p.9), and if there is truth in Dahl’s suggestion that independence “in a political sense is to be not under the control of another” (Haftel & Thompson 2006, pp.255–256), then in reality, international and regional organisations, as discussed earlier in this chapter, are subject to various forces and influences, both internal and external, that shape the quality and degree of their independence and autonomy. In particular, Superpowers, regional powers, powerful members or alliances as well as organisations’ own bureaucracies are all capable of pulling international organisations away from
full or consistent independence, neutrality or non-intervention. However, international institutions with significant delegated authority have the power to set agendas and shape policies through the exercise of discretion (Pollack 2003) and to impose “sovereignty costs” on states in certain situations (Haftel & Thompson 2006, pp.256–257).

The limitations imposed on international and regional organisations by powerful states also affect these very states’ freedom to act since they prefer to work within international organisations to amplify their own power and promote their policies. In accordance with realist theory, such countries also usually have viable unilateral and bilateral options. Therefore, a higher degree of institutional independence within international organisations means higher political costs to powerful states seeking to promote their agendas via this route. Weaker states, on the other hand, are more inclined to work with and through independent IOs to counteract the influence of more powerful states (Smith 2000). The actions of many regional powers support the realist position in the sense that these regional powers will take measures to prevent what could be a threat to their sovereignty and influence from an increasingly independent organisation that they are members of.

The fear that supranational institutions will encroach on sovereignty has resulted in Argentina and Brazil opposing a Uruguayan proposal for a supranational court to rule on trade disputes. South Africa and India display similar tendencies in SACU and SAARC, respectively. Thus, greater power asymmetry between the members of an IO should be associated with lower IO independence.
The increase in regionalisation and subsequently in political collaboration, economic co-operation and integration, and security co-operation since the end of the Cold War “is different in quality as well as quantity from the efforts that preceded it” (Cawthra 2007). Cawthra goes on to summarise the characteristics of this ‘new regionalism’ as he describes it as a multi-dimensionalism or multi-functionalism, combining economic, political, social, cultural, and security aspects, and thus going beyond the ‘traditional’ forms of cooperation. It is driven by a combination of economic or security imperatives, as well as by ecological and other developmental objectives. Such a ‘new regionalism’ involves not only states, but a wide variety of institutions, organisations and movements, and to some extent is driven from the bottom-up. It is outward-looking or ‘open’ in that it seeks to integrate organisations’ member states into the global political economy rather than erecting tariff barriers. It varies widely in the extent of institutionalisation, with some organisations deliberately avoiding the construction of bureaucracies (Cawthra 2007).

Although one needs to recall that each regional organisation is unique in its character and environment, it is important to look at the construction of regional organisations with security functions and how this construction affects their orientation and the definition of their roles. Based on this uniqueness in character but similarity in expectations and perceived roles, can regional organisations maintain the international role allocated to them for becoming building blocks for peace? In the modern world of multilateral relations and
globalisation, what do advantages regional organisations have over traditional military alliances? These questions will be the focus of the coming final section of this chapter before the conclusion.

**Multilateralism, globalisation and regionalism**

In answering the questions above, past debates on regionalism have often revolved around whether regional organisations were building blocks for the construction of the global collective security system (the UN and its attendant organisations) or stumbling blocks in that process. On the one hand, military alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact appeared to inhibit the building of a global collective security system while, on the other, regional organisations such as the OAU were given and executed an important peace maintenance role under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Cawthra 2007). However, since the 11th September 2001 attack on the United States, the UN collective security system was placed under tremendous pressure by the rise of the US militarism and the pre-emptive strike policy and the inclination of the Bush administration towards unilateralism (Robert Drinan 2003), which appears little diminished under the Obama administration. The role of regional organisations in this context of American security concerns has become highly contested especially when regional organisations have proven incapable of preventing or dealing with severe violations to their own regional security role as a result of this US unilateralism and regional intervention. The American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the American military operations in Yemen, Somalia during the 1990s
and 2000s and elsewhere are clear examples of this inability of regional organisations to remain independent of American threats to regional security.

If a regional organisation is established in accordance with Buzan’s security complex theory, meaning “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan 1991, p.190), such security interactions and proximity will have a real impact on the regional organisation’s functions, cooperation and common values which, positively, “may eventually lead to the construction of a 'security community’” (Adler & M. N. Barnett 1998; Cawthra 2007).

However, security cooperation takes many forms. The principle of military alliances such as NATO is an ideal form of security cooperation where states choose to combine their military capabilities against an external threat. This type of military alliance requires the sharing of information, resources and bases which cannot be realised without an institutional framework to facilitate them.

Another form of security cooperation is the defence treaty which tends to be less institutionalised when compared to established structures of cooperation of an organisation like NATO. A non-aggression pact, where states agree not to go to war and commit to finding non-aggressive means for solving their differences, is another form that is usually linked to defence treaties and does not require an institutional framework. In this regard, and apart from the drives
behind it, NATO is a clear example of how successful a military alliance can be once an institutional framework is in place. NATO countries belong to several regions, do not share a common historical background, culture or language, yet have managed to achieve the aims of their alliance and begin to reproduce it since the end of the Cold War (Acharya 1999; Hendrickson 1999).

In contrast to NATO, the GCC is an example of states coming together on the basis of shared threat perceptions and regime insecurities. As Cawthra (2007) reports, “the GCC states have entered into a mutual defence pact, established a small multinational regional defence unit, carried out joint military exercises, and worked towards setting up a common air defence mechanism” (Cawthra et al., 2007; 34). Nevertheless, although the GCC members possess many of the factors that can promote a functioning and capable organisation, they have been unable to confront many of the security challenges that have come their way and have had to rely time after time on external sources of security (Cawthra 2007; Abdel-Salam 2007; Al-Eissawi 2006). Although there are other factors that have contributed to this outcome, the absence of a real institutionalisation of security within the GCC has not helped in overcoming these challenges. However, it is difficult to reach a generalisation on the real value and impact of institutional security frameworks from the above discussion or the available research (Cawthra 2007). Yet the changing nature of regionalism and the global balance of power make regional organisations seem not only a response to global changes but also an integral component of globalisation.
Conclusion

During the course of this chapter, there has been a re-examination of the concepts of region and regionalism and how these concepts influence the character and efficacy of international institutions, in general, and in regional organisations in particular. The theories and frameworks of the realist, constructivist, institutionalist, and neoliberal views on regional organisations and state behaviour within these organisations have argued a number of key points while also adopting certain debatable assumptions concerning the present state of international relations.

While there are numerous and diverse elements that contribute to each unique organisational character, there are obvious commonalities among these regional institutions. First, the potential role of regional organisations for the settlement of disputes was recognised by the UN at the end of WWII and this role was reflected in the UN charter. Second, regional organisations and their members cannot escape the dynamics of sovereignty and the limitations this principle poses to integration. Third, external intervention is an issue that all regional organisations have had to address at some point, with the consequence of both limiting and initiating wider security arrangements. In short, the commonality between RSOs is that they were established to accommodate their member states’ national interests, prevent external intervention and coordinate security interdependency cooperation as a means for preventing the escalation of conflict among them. However, “None of the three main forms of regional organisation in the post-war period (superpower-
led regional alliances, regional conflict control organisations, and regional economic groupings) was able to escape the sovereignty trap” (Acharya 1999) and with it, the inhibiting dynamics of strong integration that accompanied it.

What has also become apparent through this chapter is that the division of the world into regions is not as clear as the UN Charter might have envisaged. This has been shown to be further complicated by the development of sub-regional organisations, especially in Africa, where the regional organisation, the AU, is overshadowed by a number of sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS. The GCC and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) are two more examples of sub-regional organisations reshaping the parameters of cooperation within regional organisations. The establishment of sub-regional organisations has been explained by realists on the basis of state-to-state interaction that sees greater security within smaller frameworks of interests.

In terms of the national resilience principle representing the core of ASEAN’s success in cooperation, principles such as autonomy and independence or the maintenance of individual state sovereignty were shown to be the core reasons why regional organisations were on the rise during the late twentieth century. The changing nature of regionalism into a multi-dimensional and multi-functional combination of economic, political, social, cultural and security aspects, and thus going beyond the ‘traditional’ forms of cooperation has resulted in greater inter-state integration and less individual state independence. The principle of non-interference was also established in this chapter as a stabilising and
confidence-building factor initially within some regional organisations. Often, however, principle and practice do not always meet as the given cases of ASEAN; in Africa and North America prove. ASEAN’s history, however, demonstrates that an Arab League approach that is based on non-military cooperation while taking advantage of the many commonalities among the Arab states has more potential for stability and security than top-down alternative adopted by the League.

Although regional institutions can be credited with limited success in keeping conflicts localised and isolated from superpower intervention, they largely failed in dealing with regional intra-state conflicts in which sovereignty issues were salient (Acharya 1999) and the greatest obstacle to intervention.

This chapter also illustrated how regional organisations have contributed to a global collective security system through developing institutional security arrangements that encompassed a broader range of security concerns beyond the military. It demonstrated how this contribution is enhanced the more a regional organisation conforms to the security complex theory, and while there are three generally recognised types of security cooperation (military alliances, defence treaties and non-aggression pacts), the first type is the least constructive to a global collective security system though perhaps seen as an ideal form of security cooperation.
In fact, combining a military alliance with an institutional framework was shown to maximise the efficacy and impact of the alliance on its members even across regions. In addition, the principal drive behind regional security co-operation was identified as the shared perception of regime threat and the common interest among regimes – be they democratic or not – in supporting each other against sources of threat to internal and external security (Cawthra 2007). While certain factors like the intervention of major powers in regional conflicts and lack of effectiveness in dealing with conflicts had been major obstacles in preventing some regional organisations from effectively carrying out their functions in managing conflicts, particularly during the Cold War, this chapter nevertheless provided enough evidence to show that some regional organisations have been reasonably successful in their particular experience, one of these organisations being ASEAN.

While Hewitt and Wilkenfeld’s (1996) research showed that the more democratic states were involved in a crisis, the less severe the violence was that followed, such findings have become highly questionable since the aftermath of the American-led Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003. Dixon (1993) found that the role of IOs in resolving conflict was much the same for both democracies and non-democracies. Furthermore, Raymond (1994, 1996) found that democracies are more likely to accept binding third party arbitration but the outcomes were not more successful for democracies (Chernoff 2005). These findings suggest that the type of government and political systems involved in regional and international organisations is
secondary in impact of organisational dynamics when compared to the principles of balance of power, national interest and external intervention.

All in all, size matters, but it is not clear how. Arguments have been put forward that small organisations with four or five members cannot deal with conflicts between two members because the others are collectively too weak; AMU is a good example. Alternatively, it has been argued that small organisations can build confidence and common values, like in the case of MERCOSUR, and that very large ones encompass too many political disagreements to succeed (the Arab League or COMESA\textsuperscript{20}). From this, what can be concluded with some certainty is that small organisations (e.g. SAARC and AMU) will not be able to withstand dynamic conflicts without international support and large regional organisations inherit elements and limitations from the dominant international system (e.g. Cold War or Unipolarity) that can influence its ability to independently solve a regional dispute.

\textsuperscript{20} Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CHAPTER FIVE
CHAPTER FIVE

THE SUCCESS OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AS AN RSO

Chapter Five will focus on the positive aspects of the Arab League - where it satisfied the conditions that apply generally to regional organisations as informed by the previous chapters; and in what particulars it fulfilled its own remit and initiatives. The first area to be examined is the League’s record in managing regional disputes and producing peaceful outcomes.

The research here is informed by the findings from the previous chapters. The historical and structural review of the League in Chapters One and Three has already identified some of the League’s limitations and internal tensions. Hashemite rivalry, the decolonisation of many Arab countries and ideological differences among Arab states were all limitations that affected the Arab League’s ability to play the security role expected of it by the Arab public, and
the role envisaged for regional organisations by the UN Charter and manifested in the Alexandria Protocol. These factors, as seen in Chapter One, have allowed other sub-regional security arrangements to surface and challenge Arab League pre-eminence. While Chapter Two looked at other regional security organisations and the structural processes that affect the Arab League, it also showed how a regional organisation is tested through its ability to handle conflicts (Anthony 2005). Chapter Three focused on Arab national and regional security, its development and how it was manifested through the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty. That particular treaty was preceded by earlier Arab dialogues on the concept of national security and the threats to Arab interests and independence; and to the status of Palestine. However, such dialogues were challenged by a complex matrix of divisions within and between Arab states in the areas of state formation (weak state development and overlay), wealth (rich versus poor states), governance (monarchies versus republics), territorial and border disputes and historical geo-political rivalries. Such differences were all contributing factors to the divergent concepts of national security and the sluggish progress of developing and implementing any envisioned regional military and security cooperation treaties.

Chapter Four, examined the general nature of regional security organisations and their relation to states and other international organisations, and how such interaction and relations influence the success or failure of the security role of regional organisations. Given the premise that military and security cooperation are potential areas of regional collaboration, comparative analysis is useful for measuring their success through such factors as the degree of institutional
authority, type of decision making rules, type of incentive structure and the whether these forms of cooperation provide a foundation for heightened economic interdependence.

Conflict levels and settlement

Regarding conflict levels and settlement, the early stages of the League’s existence showed a heightened awareness of developing conflicts (Palestine and Lebanon), threats to national and regional security (in Lebanon and Syria) and the realisation of the role intended for the League where stability and peace are concerned. Pinfari (2009) reviewed various studies and research on this specific topic. Table 3 below summarises the result of Pinfari’s findings and provides insights into the performance of the League. Table 3 reviews conflicts, in which the League was involved, the nature of its involvement, and whether, and in what ways, the conflict was resolved due to the League’s involvement or other factors. Two important cases in Pinfari’s research are the Iraq-Kuwait conflict (1990) and the Lebanese civil war. They are key examples considering that both have been recurring issues where the League intervened repeatedly but with mixed results depending on the general state of the region and the level of cooperation among the Leagues’ members.

The data provided in Table 3 demonstrates that the League mediated in 19 out of 56 conflicts or crises that emerged in the region between 1945 and 2008, or in 34 per cent of cases. The League’s record is initially less than bright since it achieved full success on only five occasions (9 per cent). However, after re-
examination, the picture provided by the data is mixed, for at least two reasons. First, the proportion of *direct contributions* identified by this data essentially coincides with the figure suggested by Awad (1994) which is 8 per cent; yet if cases in which the League has *contributed to success* are included, the rate of success would appear substantially higher (21 per cent), and possibly higher than the rate of success attributed to other organisations like the OAU (19 per cent), according to Zacher (cited in Pinfari 2009, p.10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intervention: Yemen Arab Republic vs. Yahya Family (1948)</th>
<th>Type: Civil / Ethnic wars</th>
<th>Result: Fact-finding committee</th>
<th>Comments: Mission</th>
<th>Outcome: Failure</th>
<th>Further implication: One-sided victory; a conciliatory meeting planned in Jeddah is cancelled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Intervention: Jordan – annexation of West Bank (1950)</td>
<td>Type: Political or diplomatic crisis</td>
<td>Result: Resolutions followed by informal conciliation</td>
<td>Comments: Council / Committee</td>
<td>Outcome: Primary cause of success</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Intervention: Sudan-Egypt dispute: Hala‘ib Triangle / Wadi Halfa (1958)</td>
<td>Type: Border wars</td>
<td>Result: Attempt of mediation requested by Sudan (20/2/1958)</td>
<td>Comments: SG</td>
<td>Outcome?: Importance of the referral</td>
<td>Further implication: Immediately after the referral the dispute is frozen because of Sudanese elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Intervention: Kuwait-Iraq dispute / Kuwait independence (1961-63)</td>
<td>Type: Border wars</td>
<td>Result: Council resolution (20/7/1961) followed by peacekeeping operation (10/9/1961-19/2/1962)</td>
<td>Comments: Committee / Council / Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Outcome: Primary cause of success</td>
<td>Further implication: The crisis is solved, although the dislocation of British troops also</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Further Implication</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Syria-UAR dispute: UAR dissolution (1961)</td>
<td>Political or diplomatic crisis</td>
<td>Agreement on repatriation of armed forces (2/11/1961)</td>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Primary cause of success</td>
<td>The agreement (although a partial one) is struck, crisis frozen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Yemen civil war (1962-1969)</td>
<td>Civil / Ethnic wars</td>
<td>Council resolution (19/9/1963) and fact-finding mission (25/9-Oct 1963)</td>
<td>Council / SG</td>
<td>Contributed to success</td>
<td>Crisis frozen, but AL largely bypassed by crucial discussions, and hostilities re-start in December 1964 - after that, the AL made no intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Algeria-Morocco: Tindouf/Sand war (1963-64)</td>
<td>Border wars</td>
<td>Council resolution (20/10/1963) and mediation mission (22-27/10/1963)</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Contributed to success</td>
<td>Bamako agreement signed (30/10/1963) but at OAU meeting and with Haile Selassie's mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>First North-South Yemen border war (1971-72)</td>
<td>Border wars</td>
<td>Council resolution (4/10/1972) and mediation</td>
<td>Committee / SG</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>First North-South Yemen border war (1971-72)</td>
<td>Border wars</td>
<td>Mediation mission (4-13/10/1972)</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Primary cause of success</td>
<td>Cease-fire and agreement to negotiate agreement at AL headquarters; agreement struck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Oman-South Yemen (Dhofar) war (1970-76)</td>
<td>Border wars</td>
<td>Attempt of conciliation (May 1974)</td>
<td>Mission / SG</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>PDRY refuses to receive it claiming that it was not involved in the dispute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Kuwait-Iraq war (1973)</td>
<td>Border wars</td>
<td>Mediation mission (22/3/1973)</td>
<td>Mission / SG</td>
<td>Contributed to success</td>
<td>Iraq withdraws, but main causal factors were the pressure and threats by Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Second Lebanese civil war (1975-90)</td>
<td>Civil / Ethnic wars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Further Implication</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Council resolution (9/6/1976); mediation mission; symbolic 'Arab Security Force'</td>
<td>Council / Committee / SG</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>The ceasefire (16/4/1976) does not hold; the symbolic force had no power to intervene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Second Lebanese civil war (1975-90)</td>
<td>Civil / Ethnic wars</td>
<td>Upgrade of the 'Symbolic Arab Security Force' to 'Arab Deterrent Force' (18/10/1976-9/9/1982)</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Contributed to success</td>
<td>Syria downscale military activities, and short term successes in harvesting weapons; yet ineffective in countering the escalation in the south</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>North-South Yemen border war (1979)</td>
<td>Border wars</td>
<td>Kuwait agreement (29/3/1979)</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Primary cause of success</td>
<td>Lasting commitment to implement 1972 agreement, also resulting in unification talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Second Lebanese civil war (1975-90)</td>
<td>Civil / Ethnic wars</td>
<td>Peace plan proposal (26/4/1989) and mediation mission</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>The ceasefire holds for few days, then is re-affirmed (11/5) but almost immediately fails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Second Lebanese civil war (1975-90)</td>
<td>Civil / Ethnic wars</td>
<td>Taif agreement (23/10/1989)</td>
<td>Summit / Mission</td>
<td>Primary cause of success</td>
<td>A lasting agreement is reached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait -Gulf war (1990-91)</td>
<td>Inter-state wars</td>
<td>Cairo resolution (6/8/1990); military force sent to Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Council / Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Largely a symbolic move; failure to tackle the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Yemen vs. South Yemen (1994)</td>
<td>Civil / Ethnic wars</td>
<td>Mediation mission (13/5/1994)</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>No impact on the war, which finishes with the military recapture of Aden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Lebanon presidential crisis (2007-08)</td>
<td>Political or diplomatic crisis</td>
<td>Mediation plan (6/1/2008)</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Primary cause of success</td>
<td>Michel Suleiman is elected; the crisis ends</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: “Interventions of the Arab League (1945-2008)” (Pinfari 2009, p.21-22)
The perception that the League has been a ‘failed organisation’ with respect to the prevention/resolution of conflicts disregards certain circumstances and cases of the League’s success. Table 3 demonstrates that in the period between 1948 and 2008, the League operated as mediator in 60 per cent (12 out of 20) of the ‘minor’ conflicts (i.e. which resulted in fewer than 1,000 deaths) or political crises that involved at least one League member, at least contributing to the resolution of the conflict or dispute in 45 per cent of them (9 out of 20) and being the primary cause of their resolution in five instances (25 per cent).

The above data goes some way to demonstrating that the League has actually been a relatively active player in lessening and managing local crises, and has had some success in preventing their escalation into major wars. According to Pinfari (2009), four non-mutually exclusive factors seem to be associated with the occasional successes of the League. These factors are, first, intervention in the core area; second, intervention in ideological disputes; third, cooperation with UN and regional organisations, fourth, mediation missions and the involvement of the League’s Secretary General.

Further analysis of Table 3 shows that with the exception of the mediation during the Algeria-Morocco Tindouf war in 1963, the League’s interventions have taken place in conflicts in which at least one of the states that attended the 1944 Alexandria conference was involved. These figures suggest that despite
its reach beyond its area of influence, throughout its history the League has focused on mediating and controlling conflicts in the Fertile Crescent and in the Arabian Peninsula, with nineteen of conflicts involving Arab League intervention (79 per cent) involving Lebanon, Yemen and/or Iraq.

Pinfari (2009) believes that the reason behind this focus on the Fertile Crescent and Arabian Peninsula or ‘core sub-region’, as he describes it, is the perception that the League is the guarantor of previous agreements that were mediated by the League. Given the recurrence of crises in Lebanon and Yemen at almost regular intervals since the late 1940s, the ‘continuity’ factor helps to explain the involvement and relative success of the League during the North-South Yemen war in 1979, when it succeeded in reaffirming the League-supervised agreement that ended the previous border war in 1972. The role played by the League in devising the new balance of power among the Lebanese communities outlined by the 1989 Taif Agreement also favoured the League’s direct (and successful) involvement when a new crisis within the Lebanese political system erupted in 2007, following a series of unrests, protests and failed political negotiations on government formation.

Due to the established role of the Arab League as the guarantor for non-intervention in regional affairs among members and protecting their sovereignty and independence, another form of inter-temporal continuity exists—this time honouring the League’s pledge to safeguard the independence of smaller Arab states. This role manifested itself repeatedly in the case of defending the independence and integrity of Kuwait against Iraq although the success of the
League’s 1962 military intervention (Pinfari 2009; Al-Mashat 2007; Abdel-Salam 2007; Khalil 2007) was “helped diplomatically and militarily by the United Kingdom” (Pinfari 2009, p.13). This case has reinforced the perception of the League as guarantor of the integrity of the smaller states in the region, and created the ground for successive (although only partially effective) involvement in the 1973 and 1990 crises.

The League was a key player in other long-term issues and conflicts involving the region as a whole that were more of an ideological nature. The independence of Palestine and Arab unification are the most prominent examples of this involvement. The independence of Palestine was not only related to the Zionist/Israeli threat but was also a matter to be solved with neighbouring Arab countries. As Hassouna (1975) explains, “[w]hen Jordan formally annexed the West Bank on 24 April 1950, the League’s political committee helped hammer out a formal (and largely symbolic) compromise with the Jordanian authorities, who would rule the West Bank but only ‘until a final settlement of the Palestine question was reached’” (p.40).

The Arab League was also successful in brokering an agreement for the dispute over the secession of Syria from UAR in 1961. “[A]lthough it failed in mediating between the parties when the dispute resurfaced in 1962. On this occasion, however, the parties initially accepted the League’s mediation and even requested to hold the meetings in open session, so that they could be followed by Arab media” (ibid, p.169). Similarly, another positive and successful intervention was the 1962 case when the Arab forces almost intervened against
Iraq when it tried to occupy Kuwait. That intervention helped resolve the issue without bloodshed or war.

Still further, another example was that of the Arab deterrence forces in Lebanon after the Lebanese civil war to help maintain peace. The Arab League managed to mobilise a consensus of Arab members behind Syrian and Egyptian deterrence forces. Later, these forces were replaced by Syrian ‘peacekeeping’ forces (which led to a different issue that will be addressed in chapter six as an example of failed League intervention). However, the resolution was to send Arab deterrence forces to Lebanon and this action was carried out. That was a positive development in the course of the Lebanese civil war at the time.

These involvements by the League prove that it had provided a mediation forum for inter-Arab disputes of a political and ideological nature thereby preventing their eruption into local armed conflicts (Pinfari 2009); and it was also able to organise military action with impressive resolve. However, this success did not continue for long. In the late 1960s, the Arab League began to weaken as the concept of Arab unity faded and a more limited view of patriotism took hold in Egypt and other countries in the Gulf. This weakness and disintegration increased when President Sadat of Egypt visited Israel and Iraq tried to supplant Egypt’s leadership role within the League. Khalil suggests that Iraq was not successful in this because Arab League members were, in general, always wary of Sadam Hussain’s larger geo-political ambitions (2007).
mistrust, for which the case of Iraq is perhaps the most obvious, is not isolated. Divisions within the League were a regular affair as will be discussed below.

**Divisions among members**

As explained in Chapters One and Three, the Arab League’s development and conduct were influenced by inter-Arab divisions from its early days. The Hashemite-Saudi rivalry had an impact on the focus, policy and direction of the League from the beginning by dividing the Arab members into competing blocs. Furthermore, as Alkanaani states:

> the regional and domestic individuality following their independence, regimes in the Gulf and other Arab states concentrated on identifying the local individuality through utilising themselves, their natural resources and monitoring the army, security, foreign relations or education. As a result, the local individuality has been confirmed.

(Al-Kanaani 2002, p.24)

Chapter One showed how alliances shifted between Arab states from the 1940s until the 1970s based on ideological and political grounds. However, the most significant negative dividing factor that affected the Arab League’s ability to positively play its security role was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (Al-Mashat 2007; Abdel-Salam 2007; Khalil 2007; Haseeb 2008). For decades to
come, Iraq’s invasion, subjugation and attempted incorporation of Kuwait as Iraq’s ‘19th province’ would be a dividing line in modern Arab politics. This is because the invasion took place at a time when ideological differences in the Arab world were beginning to disappear (Hawwāt 2002; Hamza 2007; Al-Mashat 2007; Abdel-Salam 2007) with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of communism, and replaced with the forces of economic globalisation that, in one sense, began setting the scene for the long-desired Arab economic regional cooperation (Maddy-Weitzman 1991).

The invasion had severe consequences for Arab state relations, the most serious of which was the longer-term American military occupation of Iraq from 2003 onwards. The regional implications of that crisis are still witnessed in the Arab world as it reshaped inter-Arab alliances as well as Arab states’ relations with other regional and international parties.

However, the same divisions and Iraqi-Kuwaiti border issues were the cause for a number of successful Arab League mediations and interventions. The most notable and successful case was in 1962 as mentioned previously. Nevertheless, when examining the Arab League’s performance in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait, two judgments are possible. The invasion could be classified as both success and failure of the security role of the Arab League depending on the perspective. On the one hand, it was a success as the Arab League played a role in eventually getting Iraq out of Kuwait (Rigal 1993; Hawwāt 2002; Pinfari 2009), although providing the ground for an international military alliance to do so. On the other hand, the Arab League failed to contain
the situation on its own. The Arab League’s members’ early initiatives to prevent an escalation of the crisis failed. Eventually, the League-established mechanism for conflict resolution and collective security also failed to deliver a regional solution without resorting to external help from the United States and its military partners.

These examples of long-term divisions, border conflicts and ideological differences affected the Arab League’s approach to regional mediation processes. Amr Moussa based his approach to the Arab League’s role on the principle of mediation. Accordingly, the Arab League’s engagement role starts with initiatives, such as the ‘initiative for clearing the air’ (Al-Mashat 2007; Abdel-Salam 2007; Interview No. 1 2007; Interview No 2 2007) in the year 2000. A previous attempt using this approach was the Arab Solidarity Charter in 1965. Both initiatives relied on the acceptance of the premise of common interests and Arab unity as ideological foundations for any processes of conflict resolution. The same applies to the approach in addressing Arab states as a whole (Al-Mashat 2007; Sobeih 2007; Abdel-Salam 2007).

A general perception among observers is that the overwhelming majority of the conflicts between Arab states are border disputes, the remaining number of conflicts being of an unspecific political nature (Abdel-Salam 2007). This particularly small, yet complex, group of conflicts requires unique approaches to mediation and resolution. The approach adopted by the League since 2000 was based on a belief that conflict resolution begins by organising the house from the inside – that is, at the domestic level in order to deal with regional
issues such as Palestine, the UAE islands, Turkey, Chad and Ethiopia (Abdel-Halim 2007; Abdel-Salam 2007; Ahmed 2007; Al-Mashat 2007; Hawwāt 2002; Interview No. 1 2007; Interview No 2 2007).

Although the divisions within the League have fluctuated in severity over the years, the cooperative and mediation ability of the League remained possible and was successful in more instances than the OAU, for example. Yet the Egyptian peace agreement with Israel in 1979 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 constituted the worst periods of Arab division and inability of the League to exercise its role as a true regional security organisation. In 2000, the League entered into a new phase based on the ‘clearing the air’ approach which in itself functioned as a division control mechanism. This approach, in addition to the relatively good record of success in mediation, seemingly augments the League’s capacity to play a more positive role as a regional security organisation.

**External influence**

Overlay (Buzan & Wæver 2004) is as an external intervention condition, which was explained in Chapter Two; and extra-regional forces have been proven to complicate security in the Arab world and challenge the Arab League’s ability to act (Abdel-Salam 2007; Abu-Taleb 2003; Khalil 2007; Al-Mashat 2007; Hamza 2007). In this context, it is important to re-evaluate the foreign presence in Arab states as it weakens the political integrity of the Arab League even though a
number of League member countries find it useful. This leads to the question, why, despite the existence of the Arab League, do some Arab countries locate their security interests in arrangements with foreign states? Al-Mashat (2007) believes that Arab states do not oppose establishing military Arab cooperation, but due to previous historical experiences (e.g., Iraqi occupation of Kuwait) and weak coordination among Arab states, states like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia accepted external offers from the United States to safeguard their national security.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the forces of globalisation and burgeoning multinational corporate presence became increasingly present in the Arab region, adding yet another challenge (Delmas-Marty n.d.) to the Arab League.

“The model of globalisation implemented in the Third World, at times by force, like in Iraq, or by economic pressure, like in Egypt or Indonesia, or by its adoption in rich countries, like the oil producing states” (Abdul-Ilah Albayaty et al. 2011) caused a further decline of Arab unity in practice and on the official agenda of the Arab states, with the most evident consequence being the replacement of cooperative thinking and limited government accountability with civil repression and military dominance. The Tunisian uprising in 2011, for instance, is not unrelated to the issues of globalization (i.e. failed nationalisation policies), and the failure of the globalisation model (Abdul-Ilah Albayaty et al. 2011) exacerbating economic inequalities and unaccountable governance.
While the history of external intervention in the security affairs of the Arab nation and the Arab League has been covered earlier in Chapters Two and Three, it is important to recall that external influences can be broken into three types: overlay, military alliances and challenging the Arab League’s regional role. An early attempt to institutionalise external intervention through military alliance was the Baghdad Pact in the 1950s. At that point, the United States was keen on extending its alliance system into the Middle East to fill a power vacuum left by the British and French.

A framework for a collective security pact became established in 1954, with Pakistan playing a pivotal role. At this time delicate negotiations were taking place among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain regarding the creation of an alliance system with U.S. support. The Baghdad Pact was the result of this tactful negotiation. The United States agreed to provide military assistance to member states.

(Thomas 2001, p.70)

Egypt and Syria became unhappy with the extension of the American Cold War coalition into the region and the timing of the Baghdad Pact guaranteed Arab nationalist opposition to this development. The Arab League considered Iraq’s decision to participate in the Baghdad Pact a betrayal of Arab solidarity, so the League established a military wing in response. Consequently, Iraq became
isolated from the Arab world as a result of participating in this American-led security pact.

This posture was very similar to the position taken by Arab states toward Egypt as a result of the Camp David peace accords between Cairo and Tel Aviv. After a regicide in Iraq a more neutralist government came to power. The Baghdad Pact became the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO)\(^{21}\)

\[(ibid.)\]

**Efficient regional security arrangements**

Another area where the League performed relatively well is the area of regional security arrangements. The adverb ‘relatively’ is used here to emphasise the fact that there were non-indigenous regional security arrangements within the Middle East, and among the members of the League before the creation of the Arab League. The League began establishing and creating frameworks, both economic and military, in order to improve the collective security of the Arab

\(^{21}\) The Central Treaty Organization (also referred to as CENTO, original name was Middle East Treaty Organization or METO, also known as the Baghdad Pact) was adopted in 1955 by Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, as well as the United Kingdom. Although American pressure, along with promises of military and economic largesse, were key in the negotiations leading to the agreement, the United States chose not to initially participate as to avoid alienating Arab states with which it was still attempting to cultivate friendly relations. Some (particularly nationalist radicals) saw the Pact as an attempt by the British to retain influence in the Middle East as a substitute for the loss of their empire in India. In 1958 the United States joined the military committee of the alliance. It is generally viewed as one of the least successful of the Cold War alliances. Organizations headquarters was initially located in Baghdad, Iraq.
states. These frameworks and bodies will be elaborated in the following paragraphs.

The process of establishing new frameworks from scratch happened in phases. The League started by pursuing its main goal of supporting non-independent Arab states in achieving their independence. In 1945, the League supported Syria and Lebanon in their disputes with France and also demanded an independent Libya. It had already announced, pre-1948, its opposition to the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine and subsequently demanded that Palestine as a whole be made independent with the majority of its population Arab. These projects and steps were part of the greater strategy to achieve regional independence and autonomy as a pillar for further structures.

Among other examples was the League’s support for Tunisia in its conflict with France in 1961 and for Egypt in the immediate post-WWII period. The importance of the Arab League to Egypt increased significantly after the failure of the negotiations with the British in 1946. Sidqi Pasha himself had not been blind to the value of the organisation as a tool for pressuring the British. While the Egyptian strategy implied the relegation of the Arab League to a secondary status in Egyptian foreign affairs, the League proved useful to Egypt as a mechanism for forcing a pro-Egyptian line among Arab capitals (Doran, 1999). This pragmatic Egyptian approach allowed for engagement by the League in what were then Egypt’s most important regional affairs and its external

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22 Sidqi Pasha was an Egyptian politician who served as Prime Minister of Egypt from 1930 to 1933 and again in 1946.
relations. In essence, Egypt, then a powerful regional state, was acting in accordance with the realist views as explained by Haftel and Thompson (2006) in Chapter Four.

At an international level, the ‘Tripartite Declaration’ issued by the United States, France and Britain in 1950 was explicitly aimed at subjecting the Arab-Israeli conflict to the priorities of the Cold War conflict (Shlaim 2004). This was to be realised by incorporating Israel with the Arab countries to function under a Middle East Organisation. The Arab states confronted these external pressures by crystallising a strategic national identity for Arab countries, under the parameters of a national system to be supported by a sustained security structure of a different nature to the regional system proposed by the Tripartite Declaration. In other words, this declaration represented the first formal attempt at creating an alternative security structure to the League on the regional level.

In this context, there arose an issue of conforming to the United Nations Charter in relation to the international peace and security concept as stipulated in Articles 52, 53 and 54 in Chapter Eight of the section relating to ‘Regional Organisations’. Thereupon the Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty between the Arab states was signed in 1950 with the focus being on the enhancement of joint defence, by demanding the peaceful inter-settlement of disputes between the concerned parties in their relations with other member countries. It also stated the impermissibility of these countries to conclude international agreements incompatible with the treaty, to act in an inconsistent manner with other countries or be violation with the treaty’s objectives. It is
worth noting that these supplementary principles have enriched the Charter by establishing a conceptual framework for the mechanisms that would consolidate Arab national security. The Treaty was a significant step towards creating an institutional framework for regional security.

Furthermore, the Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty established four bodies to pursue aspects of the implementation of the treaty and issues relating to collective security. As mentioned earlier, one of these bodies was the Joint Defence Council comprising Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence in the contracting countries or whoever represented them. Another was a Military Committee comprising representatives and the general staff of the contracting countries' armies so as to co-ordinate joint defence plans. The third body was the Military Consultative Board comprising the Chiefs of Staff of the contracting countries' armies so as to supervise the united military committee, which was to be presided over by the country with the most ammunition and army forces, as long as there was no unanimous Arab governmental approval for choosing another country. The fourth was the Economic Council (renamed Economic and Social Council in 1980).

In addition to security and military coordination, the Treaty also tackled economic security for the reinforcement and evaluation of Arab economic relations. In fact, since its establishment the League has attached great importance to economic matters as one of the Joint Arab Action items as stated in the Economic and Social Council related resolution (Hudson 1998), stressing the facilitation and development of Arab commercial exchange in 1953, while
also ratifying the Arab Economic Unity Agreement in 1957 followed by a resolution for the establishment of the Common Arab Market in 1964. More recently, in 2005, an Arab Parliament was established with its members drawn from each member nation's parliament. The issues the parliament may discuss, however, are still restricted to the social, economic and cultural spheres (Arab League 2006).

Besides the establishment of military, economic and later legislative cooperation frameworks, the League expanded its efforts to facilitate cooperation to all aspects of state-to-state relations. However, among the most important activities of the Arab League have been its attempts to coordinate Arab economic life; efforts towards this aim include the Arab Telecommunications Union in 1953, the Arab Postal Union in 1954 and the Arab Development Bank in 1959 (later known as the Arab Financial Organisation).

In addition, the Arab Common Market, which was established in 1965, is open to all Arab League members. The common market agreement provides for the aspired abolition of customs duties on natural resources and agricultural products, free movement of capital and labour among member countries and coordination of economic development (Arab League, 2006). All these agreements, institutions and frameworks were realised through Arab League bodies and the parameters of the joint Arab cooperation framework that was established by it. Such diversity demonstrates that the concept of regional security and cooperation evolved to reflect the developments in security thinking and the characteristics of regional organisations as discussed in Chapters Two
and Four; specifically, the ability of regional organisations to create security arrangements.

After a mixed performance in the 1950s and early 1960s during which the League played an active role in ensuring the independence of Kuwait but was incapable of influencing the course of the first Lebanese Civil War, a further informal component of the League’s operational structure was added by President Nasser, who inaugurated in 1964 the practice of ‘summit conferences’ for the Arab Heads of State. These summits, held every one to two years, created a new forum for policy coordination in the Arab world, but also further marginalised the role of the main institutional bodies of the League (Pinfari 2009) since most important decisions were delayed until the date of the summits.

The changes in Arab League’s structure and procedures as well as the incorporation of more agreements and summit declarations did have an impact on the security approach of the League through the adoption of institutional peace and security frameworks rather than the traditional defence pacts. However, supporting Arab states in obtaining their independence and the increased degree of intervention in conflicts had a greater direct impact on the security role of the League. This security role was manifested clearly in the form of Arab peacekeeping. The following section will focus more closely on the peacekeeping arrangements that were established by the League.
Peacekeeping and deterrent forces

When examining the Arab League’s attempt to create a mechanism for peacekeeping, one of the most memorable instances is the Arab Deterrent Force in the case of Lebanon. Pogany (1987) believes that the Arab Deterrent Force may reasonably be considered a genuine ‘peacekeeping’ force and ‘appropriate’ regional action in accordance with Article 52 of the UN Charter.

The Lebanon example is in contrast to the earlier Arab League intervention in Kuwait in early 1960s at a time of the threatened Iraqi invasion, which Pogany considers to have been an act of collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Pogany’s main reason for this opinion is the fact that British forces were relocated as part of the intervention which contributed to the general aim of decolonisation. The point is made that the very confused nature of the situation in the Lebanon, and the very large scale of foreign involvement, makes it difficult to regard the involvement of the Arab Deterrent Force as an ‘intervention’ in a ‘civil war’. Pogany also believes that the Arab Deterrent Force in the Lebanon from late 1976 should be viewed as “a lawful measure, to assist the restoration of Lebanese unity and sovereignty, and thereby arrest a serious threat to regional peace” (Pogany 1987, p.222).

It is worth recalling at this point that the issue of Lebanon and its status was one of the main issues addressed during the League’s formation where it was considered an issue of Arab national security. Therefore, Pogany’s previous
conclusion seems reasonable especially in the light of the large role of external powers and forces in the Lebanese tragedy. There remains, however, the much larger question of the failure of peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon. While “the Arab Deterrent Force failed to resolve the grievances that led to Lebanon’s civil war” (Pogany 1987, p.222), the Arab mediation efforts through the Riyadh and Cairo Summit Conferences played a key role in bringing an end to the conflict through the Taif Agreement in 1989.

There were other instances where the Arab League attempted to engage in a peacekeeping role regionally. A more recent example is the Arab League’s initiative to intervene in Darfur in 2006 (Anon 2006). The modern Arab League peacekeeping approach dates back to the year 2000. In 2000, there was a formal attempt to re-establish an Arab peacekeeping force as part of the agreed mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution that was reached in 2000. The aim was to develop a mechanism to support/enforce this mechanism, as well as management and resolution among Arab states. However, that agreement was not ratified by the states who signed it.

This agreement in 2000 was part of the changes leading to the consolidation of the Arab Peace and Security Council (APSS) to become one of the Arab League’s newer bodies once Amr Moussa came to office. However, the League’s role through the APSS was generally political since other aspects of the APSS were never enforced (Abdel-Salam 2007; Al-Mashat 2007) and it remained a consultancy with no power of enforcement (Interview No. 1 2007; Interview No 2 2007).
Mediation was regularly conducted at the lead of Amr Moussa and only based on the recommendations of the Arab Ministers of Foreign Affairs Council. Therefore, the idea of creating a council of wise and influential Arab personalities emerged to support in the process of mediation. This Council was inspired by the Arabic cultural principle of respecting one’s elders (Interview No. 1 2007). However, the council of the wise became more an ad hoc gathering, assembled in response to conflicts and dissolved afterwards. The latest council was formed on 4th February 2011 in response to the Egyptian revolution of 25th January of the same year. As per Article 7 of the APSS Charter, a Council was formed to intervene in conflicts and disputes with the members selected by the Council’s Secretary.

Set against the Arab League’s establishment of the APSS in 2006, the African Union’s Peace & Security Council (PSC) entered into force in December 2003 and began taking an active role in conflicts like Somalia, Darfur and South Sudan (Husam 2007; Abd-elsalam 2007; Mwagiru 2004; Interview No. 1 2007). The African Union framework for peace and security is noteworthy because it allowed some members of the Arab League an alternative mechanism to the one established by the APSS.

Simultaneously, sub-regional organisations of the GCC and AMU where the GCC has its own deterrence forces have meant a transition of the sub-regional mechanism for peacekeeping into a broader one on a regional level, putting APSS in competition with these sub-regional mechanisms. This has presented
a complicated challenge, given the general regional atmosphere of mistrust and the troublesome presence of foreign troops in the region.

While the peace and security mechanisms were institutionalised in the latter stages of the Arab League, economic cooperation was a different matter. The League began working on establishing economic cooperation since its establishment with various levels of success. The following section will explore the progress of economic cooperation and unity since it constitutes an integral part of regional security and organisational success.

**Arab economic unity**

Arab countries have long recognised that the realisation of their goals of regional cooperation should be closely related to their progress and cooperation in the economic arena. Article 8 of the Arab Joint Defence Agreement and the Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1950 stipulated the establishment of an Arab Economic Council. The Council was committed to raising suggestions pertinent to improving security, providing welfare systems for the Arab people, seeking to raise the standard of living, developing Arab economics, exploiting their various natural resources, facilitating the exchange of their national agricultural and industrial products, and coordinating economic activities at large (Al-Kanaani 2002).
Unfortunately, some of the Arab countries that ratified that agreement decided to ban exports and imports to or from other member countries of the Agreement. Still other countries insisted on giving truck drivers permission for a single trip only to cross their territories. These strict precautions have also been resorted to as part of ‘local’ security, as they have claimed (NAPC 2003, p.17).

A case in point of economic integration difficulties is when some Arab countries applied strict economic and political restrictions on Egypt after its peace agreement with Israel in the late 1970s. Another example is the imposed restrictions on foreign ownership and labour by the GCC countries throughout the twentieth century (Belkacem & Limam 2002). Taxes were also imposed on trucks under the pretext of ‘monitoring’ or other explanations. Some Arab countries forced some trucks to transport local commodities after discharging their cargoes (local use), while others made the trucks passing through discharge their cargoes on the border and reload on local trucks for transport (Al-Kanaani 2002; NAPC 2003). For these and other reasons, the Arab economic agreements did not achieve any large or enduring practical outcomes, such as human and capital movement, residency, work and other economic activities such as property ownership (Al-Kanaani 2002).

By the end of the 1980s, a number of other factors were at work on the regional level. The durability of multiple, independent Arab states had been proven, but the continuous confrontation with Israel and Iran had produced a kind of collective exhaustion, and the end of the Cold War promised to have a major strategic impact on the Middle East. Moreover, pressing domestic needs in the
face of falling oil-generated revenues, unsteady development, rapidly increasing populations, and growing fundamentalist movements all seemed to necessitate a re-ordering of Arab political agenda which would place a premium on economic development and inter-state cooperation.

In addition, the European economic union further reinforced the notion that if the Arab world was to avoid being further marginalised in the international system, it needed to create new cooperative structures to remain competitive. To this end, two new regional blocs were created in 1989. The first, the four-member Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), was composed of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and North Yemen, and marked the formalisation of the war-time (Iraq-Iran War) Egyptian-Iraqi alliance. The second was the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), composed of the five Arab states of North Africa which are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania. The six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) composed of Saudi Arabia and the smaller Arab principalities along the Gulf had already been created in 1981. Thus, with the addition of the two new groups, 15 of the 22 members of the Arab League were now parties to more compact regional organisations based on geographical proximity, mutual affinities, and common economic and political interests, and therefore were better equipped and more motivated than the unwieldy and historically ineffective Arab League to promote economic and political coordination (Maddy-Weitzman 1991).

Conclusion
Using the tools of analysis that have been synthesised from the four previous chapters, this chapter examined how effective and successful the Arab League has been as a regional security organisation. The League’s performance in conflict prevention and resolution, its security arrangements and framework, its peacekeeping record, promotion of economic cooperation and ability to shield its members from external influence and overlay were all factors of analysis that were covered during the course of the chapter.

It would be true to say that the League has been successful in meeting the expectations and fulfilling the role expected of it in certain areas, at least on a number of occasions. However, based on the analysis and the periods covered, it is not possible to claim that the League was a continuous, or even formidable, success. For example, the Arab League Charter addressed means of confronting any possible attack that might erupt between two member states, stating:

*In case of aggression or threat of aggression by one state against a member state, the state that has been attacked or threatened with aggression may demand the immediate convocation of the council* (Article 6)

Yet the League seemed to be less successful in intervening when one of the parties involved in the conflict was not a member. This essentially meant that
the League has not been able to conduct its regional security role on various issues and on many occasions.

The framework established by the League for conflict resolution, mediation and prevention was important in enhancing the security and stability of its members since it carried the weight of the collective Arab members that was useful in confronting the violating state. However, many League resolutions were not enforceable or binding in certain circumstances which limited the effectiveness of the League’s mechanism.

As explained earlier, the Council, as well as the summit of the Arab League, are the bodies with the authority to decide the measures to be taken to confront an armed attack on a member state, though resolutions must be unanimously agreed upon to be passed or they will only be binding to those who voted to pass them. However, when debating and voting on issue related to hostilities among two members, the aggressor is excluded from the consensus needed to pass a resolution, as per Article 6. Meanwhile, Article 7 affirms that unanimous decisions taken by the Council are binding to all member states of the League, while majority decisions are binding only to those states that voted for them. This last stipulation raised legal controversy following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and led to discussions over the condition of consensus and its amendment to agreement by majority. It would seem that the drafters of the Charter failed to prepare for the possibility that a member state could come under attack from another state that was also a member of the Arab League. It is worth noting in this regard that the Joint Defence Treaty
states that resolutions agreed upon by at least two-thirds of the members of the Defence Council are binding to all signatories (Article 6 cited in Soliman, 2005). Ironically, Kuwait opposed the amendment proposed by the Charter Revision Committee in February 1975, insisting on unanimous support for the passing of resolutions, which led to the abandonment of the proposition.

As the Arab League was established on the basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of all Arab countries, the Charter excludes the organisation's involvement in any disputes relating to independence and sovereignty, which consequently include border disputes. Yet, although a solution to this problem is available - as Article 5 allows for mediation in conflicts involving any of its members that might lead to war - experience shows that the Arab countries prefer bilateral solutions over settlement through the League. Examples of this include the border disputes between Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (1913-1974), between Bahrain and Qatar (1818-1992) and between Saudi Arabia and Yemen (1913-1992) (Schofield 1992; Al-Mashat 2007). Therefore, “The Arab League’s weakness regarding inter-Arab border problems can be directly attributed to the inadequacy of its legal framework for settlement, in addition to the high sensitivity of matters concerning borders” (Rigal 1993). Interestingly, the main body authorised to address disputes that involve sovereignty of member states is the Arab Court of Justice unless the Charter is changed and as long as members choose to raise their cases before it. In other words, there is no compulsory and binding process for the resolution of border disputes, but through mediation channelled through various informal, and more lately formal, creations (namely the creation of the council of wise and
influential Arab personalities.) has at least kept open avenues of alternative dispute resolution.

Even with these clear shortcomings within the Charter,

*Most of the breaches of the peace that have occurred have been settled satisfactorily. The Lebanese crisis of 1958 was eventually settled within the Arab League family. In 1961 the League’s handling of the Kuwait incident was efficient and expeditious. Most other internal threats have been settled amicably and usually by means of arbitration and mediation, and often by the direct intervention of the League’s secretary-General.*

(McCoubrey 2000, p.198)

Indeed, the League’s successful performance in preventing external intervention and fragmentation through external military alliances throughout the course of the Cold War cannot be denied. The Charter and need for consensus within the League on matters of military arrangements and security prevented the creation of the Baghdad Pact from compromising its role. However, the creation of sub-regional organisations among its members has served two purposes: first, it has allowed for the weak states to maintain an active role through a smaller grouping of states like the GCC; and second, it has facilitated the resolution of local problems on a sub-regional level.
It must be noted that during the fieldwork conducted by the researcher, interviewees were consistent in their answers when asked about the main examples of success in the Arab League’s regional security role. Abdel-Halim (2007), Al-Mashat (2007) and Abdel-Salam (2007), as well as others, were also clear in considering the Arab League intervention in the Iraq-Kuwait dispute of 1961 an example of a successful Arab collective security role.

*The most successful intervention for the Arab League is that of 1961 between Kuwait and Iraq. When Abdel-Karim Qassem threatened Kuwait and Arab Deterrence forces went there.*

(Abdel-Salam, 2007)

*an example of the positive cases is in 1962, the Arab forces almost intervened against Iraq when it tried to occupy Kuwait in 1962 without bloodshed or war.*

(Al-Mashat, 2007)

However, there has been serious doubt about the effectiveness of the mediation approach as well as the prospects of success for the APSS as long as the concept of Arab National Security remains undefined and not agreed upon. If the definition of the region is that adopted by the Arab League, then the region where the League intervenes is the Arab region, either between that region’s members or between the region’s members and other parties. This is the League’s approach to security that, whether for the purpose of deterrence or to defend Arab countries. When Abdel-Karim Qassem threatened Kuwait and the Arab Deterrent Forces went there, scholars of that issue have put question
marks against some aspects of that intervention, such as its late arrival and performance. However, the general opinion is that it was one of the successful interventions for the Arab League. Another example is the Khartoum Summit decisions of September 1967 which are considered to be successful support for Arab countries that had territories occupied by Israel. At that Summit, funds were allocated to Arab states that had territories lost to Israel, reconciliation was achieved between some countries like Egypt and Saudi-Arabia. Within this framework, some achievements constituted elements of Arab National Security that were realised through the Arab League. Dividing roles between confrontation states and supporting states that provided financial aid was an indirect joint defence approach. The second successful intervention that is connected to the Arab summit is the Cairo Summit concerning the Palestinian-Jordanian problem in 1970. At this Summit, a cease fire was reached. Even if the charismatic nature of Nasser’s leadership played a role in making this summit a success (Al-Mashat 2007), it was the Arab League that was the facilitator for the cease fire.

In 1976, after the League decided to send the Arab Deterrent Forces led by Syria to Lebanon in an attempt to control violence, the ADF withdrew with the exception of the Syrian forces which remained. Although this intervention can be viewed as a successful Arab collective peacekeeping operation at the start, the disengagement was not successful and arguably contributed to creating problems later. Was that a successful Arab League intervention or one that delayed crises? Or was it in essence a Syrian intervention? We can see
similarity with coalition forces led by the US. American forces, even with a UN resolution, remain American forces.

Arab security cooperation continued during the 1970s. In the October war of 1973, there was much symbolic support and real aid from Algeria to Egypt in terms of arms and oil. Saudi Arabia also provided support by reducing the price of oil to Egypt as well as imposing an embargo on countries supporting Israel. This was a success for Arab efforts in the October war when measured by previous Arab performance in conflict situations. However, there was no Arab success in terms of creating an army and entering a confrontation. Yet, these can still be considered examples of Arab security success. There has also been general agreement among researches (Barnett & Solingen 2007; Galal 1994; Pinfari 2009; Soliman 2005), experts (Abdel-Salam 2007; Al-Mashat 2007; Hamza 2007; Interview No 2 2007; Interview No. 1 2007; Khalil 2007) and the members of the Arab League that were interviewed during research that the problem is not in the laws but in the lack of tools to enforce them. The divisions among the members are the basis of the problem and the obstacles preventing the League from being able to intervene and solve conflicts. Thus, the main problem is the lack of real political support, in addition to the fact that the League’s budget is small and insufficient for playing all the necessary roles: humanitarian aid, relief and peacekeeping force. These elements, obstacles and limitations will be the focus of Chapter Six, but not before agreeing with Pinfari (2009) that the Arab League appears to be the institutional arrangement that has so far contributed most clearly to conflict resolution in the Middle East.
CHAPTER SIX

THE LIMITATIONS AND FAILURES OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AS A RSO

In Chapter Five the factors and determinants of regional organisations’ success that were synthesised from the first four chapters were tested. Chapter Five focused on the positive aspects of the Arab League’s performance as an RSO. In contrast, Chapter Six will re-examine these synthesised factors and determinants but with a focus on the negative aspects in the Arab League's
performance with a view to identifying where and when the League failed as a RSO.

The bulk of data and analysis collected during the fieldwork has informed this part of the thesis more than any other section or chapter. This collection and analysis of data from interviewees indicates the complexity and diversity of the issues, factors and events that have contributed to the limitations and failures of the League. In order not to lose the focus during this chapter, the analysis will use the same tools of analysis that were synthesised from Chapters One to Four, as well as make reference to the perspectives of various schools of thought on the Arab League itself. This will start with an examination of the League’s performance in controlling conflict levels and conflict settlement in the region.

Theoretical explanations for League’s performance

Traditional realists have explained the shortcomings in the League’s performance as a consequence “of the influence of hegemons, mainly Nasser’s Egypt, which monopolised the work of the League or of the presence of a range of opposing coalitions and interests in the region” (Pinfari 2009, p.7). However, it is clear from this dissertation’s previous examination that since the early days of the League, Egypt (pre-Nasser) was trying to use its regional importance and weight to promote its policies as the Arab ones. In addition, the Hashemite-Saudi rivalry cannot be overlooked as an important factor in shaping the nature
and orientation of the League. Zacher’s (1979) work shows that empirical analysis supports the claim that “more than any other region, the Arab world has been characterised by shifting patterns of dissension and competition” (p.167). He elaborates that between 1946 and 1977, the Arab world witnessed at least nine different configurations of opposing blocs; this being due to local strategic and dynastic disagreements (in particular the Hashemite/anti-Hashemite rivalry), the development of the ‘nonaligned movement’ where many Arab states became members, and Cold War rivalries.

An interesting argument has developed in recent years that challenge the state-centric analytical approach. Barnett and Solingen (2007) base their alternative approach on the social constructivist perspective and suggest that “the Arab League was not the consequence of a paralysis or ‘failure of design’, but rather that the League was deliberately ‘designed to fail’” (p.181). They argue that the soft power foundations of the League (i.e. Arab nationalism, shared identity) is more of a rhetoric that served only the legitimisation of the regimes, while all along there was a growing fear of unity since it could have a negative impact on sovereignty of the member states (Barnett & Solingen 2007). Pinfari echoed and clarified this point by suggesting that:

In this sense, the ambiguous approach of Arab countries towards the role of the League in the region would reflect a deeper ambiguity in the bases for the legitimacy of Arab countries, which draw their strength both from local ‘civic nationalisms’ (wataniya) and from
claiming allegiance to the wider Arab identity in the form of a ‘transnational nationalism’ (qawmiya).

(Pinfari 2009, p.7)

Conflict levels and settlement

Since 1945, the Middle East has not been immune to war, violence and instabilities. The first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s and the second Gulf War of 1990 represent only a few high-profile examples. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 had severe consequences on Arab states’ relations, the most serious of which was the occupation of Iraq in 2003 (Al-Mashat 2007; Abdel-Salam 2007; Khalil 2007; Hamza 2007). The regional implications of that crisis are still witnessed in the Arab world because it reshaped inter-Arab alliances as well as Arab states’ relations with other regional and international parties.

Some authors suggest that the League exhibits a humble example of regional cooperation (Hassouna 1975; Galal 1994; Rigal 1993; Soliman 2005; Lindholm Schulz & Schulz 2005; Hamza 2007; Abdel-Salam 2007; Hamza 2007; Abdul-Hadi 2009); while others like Pinfari (2009) and Mashat (2007) consider it a failed one. The historical evidence in Chapter 5 - Table 3 documents that the League often failed to prevent conflict and was often not successful in mediation and conflict resolution. Although the role of the League in responding to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 could be classified as either a success or a
failure depending on the perspective, in this context it is clear that the Arab League failed to contain the situation; that the Arab League’s member initiatives to prevent an escalation of the crisis failed; and that eventually, the League-established mechanism for conflict resolution and collective security failed to deliver a regional solution without resorting to external help.

This failure as well as the low level of political, military and economic cooperation contributed to the creation of sub-regional organisations like the GCC as mentioned in Chapter one. “After the GCC was associated with some limited yet ‘surprising’ results in mediating local conflicts and in generating joint defence projects, the performance of the League was judged even more severely” (Pinfari 2009, p.1). Pinfari’s (2009) analysis also suggests that the League was hesitant to mediate in civil conflicts when major regional powers were involved yet it has also been less successful in most inter-state wars because, as discussed in Chapter Five, one of the major parties of the conflict was a non-member state.

A small number of major crises in which the League was heavily involved have been neglected from Zacher’s analysis without explanation. These include the crisis over Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank in 1950 and Syria’s secession from the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1961. Yet the fact that the “League met with success in only six of seventy-seven conflictual situations it attempted to settle between 1945 and 1981 is also often used to compensate for the absence of recent comparative studies” (Barnett & Solingen 2007, p.214). The above figure and analysis was reached without empirical evidence to support it; and, it shows the limited and erratic nature of data available. Therefore, it is
necessary to return to the data and provide an updated and comprehensive review of the conflict resolution attempts of the League since its foundation. Pinfari (2009) covered and accounted for regional conflicts and Arab League interventions accurately in his identification of the gaps in previous research up to 2008. His research also helped establish a conceptual approach for analysing the role and effectiveness of the League in mediation and conflict resolution by examining the role of other sub-regional organisations (namely the GCC) in mediation, as well as defining the criteria that determine how to classify an intervention as a ‘success’. To resolve the latter element of the approach, Pinfari adopted Kleiboer’s inclusive definition of ‘international mediation’ as “a form of conflict management in which a third party assists two or more contending parties to find a solution without resorting to force” (Kleiboer 1996, p.360). This definition, however, is flexible in setting the parameters of success since it is based on assistance in conflict management, which leaves a wide margin for interpretation. Pinfari’s approach clarified the ambiguities by tightening his parameters to include only mediation roles that included discussion within the League, the adoption of a resolution and following it through with tangible effort to implement it. When these steps were adopted, followed by a resolution of the conflict, the League is regarded as having been the primary actor. However, if the resolution of the conflict was a result of an extra intervention by a third party, in addition to the League’s previous role, and then the intervention is considered as having contributed to the success.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Intervention Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel-Gaza war</td>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Fighting continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel-Lebanon</td>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Fighting continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese nomadic conflicts</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td>On-going</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Conflicts in the Middle East 2008-2011

Table Key: IS: Inter-state wars; CW: civil / ethnic wars; CR: political or diplomatic crisis / low intensity wars.

Based on the information in Tables 3 and 4, it seems that the League’s performance was not consistent in all forms of conflict. Previous discussions in Chapters Four and Five revealed that the League was less inclined to intervene in conflicts that involved certain major Arab countries like Saudi-Arabia and Syria, and that it has been subject to balance of power considerations, especially in its early years. Furthermore, the League was not willing to intervene in the internal and local matters of Arab members; nor in most border disputes. All these limitations and exclusions left very little room for the Arab League to function as an organisation that provides security and stability among its members. It was not until 2010 and 2011 that the League began to play a role in internal conflicts and border disputes between its members. Clear cases are the Arab League decisions and mediation efforts in the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan in 2010, and the revolutions in Tunisia, Libya and Syria in 2011.

An area where the Arab League’s record is particularly disappointing is civil wars. This can be attributed to the principle of ‘respect for independence and sovereignty’ in the Arab League Charter. In fact, the League has “intervened as

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23 Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North
mediator in only five of the 22 major civil wars that occurred in the Middle East since 1945” (Pinfari 2009, p.10). On closer inspection, there seems to be a pattern of hesitancy and indecisiveness by the League when addressing civil wars within the region. “The Council, for instance, approved unanimously a draft resolution on 4 April 1958 to address the crisis that generated the first Lebanese civil war, and yet failed to develop a formal resolution because the Lebanese delegation withdrew its support two days later” (Pinfari 2009, p.10). Similar patterns were evident in the way the Arab League handled the Yemeni civil war in 1964, the second Lebanese civil war in 1975 and the various Arab public revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya and Syria in 2011. A common action in all these conflicts was for the council or the summit to call on involved parties to “exercise restraint and wisdom” (Pinfari 2009, p.10). Various civil wars within Sudan, of which the conflict in Darfur and the South Sudan where the most prominent, exhibit this pattern of indecisiveness by the League. The League was not a mediator or a main broker to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 between the central government of Sudan and the south, and although the League authorised Qatar to engage as a mediator in the Darfur peace process in September 2008, it was the last participant after the AU, UNAMID, and the United States had all supported Sudan’s peace strategy in August 2010.

Pinfari (2009) explains this pattern of indecisiveness through the internal vetoes within the League itself, while Zacher’s model explains the pattern with the ‘failure of design’ model. Both can be perceived as different ways of saying the same thing. Other experts such as Abdel-Salam (2007), Al-Mashat (2007) and
Khalil (2007) relate this behaviour to a lack of political will. Some of the officials that were interviewed during this research blamed the lack of resources as a factor limiting the League’s ability to intervene in all conflicts. However, all of these explanations of the League’s failure fall short of explaining this indecisiveness. Furthermore, this pattern of indecisiveness appears to become clearer when a major regional power is involved in the conflict, since it is capable of inflicting pressure on the organisation that limits its ability to respond. In addition, the League often chooses to play a secondary role once talks between parties in conflict begin. For instance, Pinfari cites Hassouna’s comments about the League’s role in the Yemeni civil war which included the admission that since 1963 the League had ceased to intervene, saying that this:

> reflected the League’s viewpoint that, once bilateral talks between the parties concerned had been initiated during the League summit conference and further promoted by the personal mediation of some Heads of Member States, these endeavours had a better chance than a re-intervention by the League.  

(Hassouna cited in Pinfari 2009)

Such an approach meant that the League has limited its influence and involvement in mediation and peace processes to the early phase of initiating it only.

**Collective security and inter-state wars**
Further examination of Tables 3 and 4 shows that since its creation, the League involvement in inter-state conflicts and civil wars is less than a fifth of those that caused more than 1000 deaths (7 out of 36) (Pinfari 2009). An explanation for this modest achievement can be explained by the design of the Arab League first as a conflict resolution organisation that is committed to solving conflict among its members; and second to its role coordinating and building defensive efforts between Arab states in the face of external threats since the signing of the 1950 Arab Collective Security Pact. The most consistent intervention made was by the League as a coordinator and supporter of Arab defensive efforts was with respect to Israel, which falls under the collective security pact. In fact, the League’s behaviour in major inter-state wars has played the main role in building the perception of it as a failed regional organisation although its performance in mediation did not produce better results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>COW</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yemen Arab Republic vs. Yahya Family (1948)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Palestine war (1948-49)</td>
<td>IS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Syria-Iraq (1949)</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>Jordan – annexation of West Bank (1950)</strong></td>
<td>CR</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Franco-Tunisian conflict (1952-54)</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia-Oman dispute: Buraimi Oasis (1952-55)</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Moroccan Independence (1953-56)</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Franco-Algerian war (1954-1962)</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Baghdad pact crisis (1955)</td>
<td>CR</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sinai War (1956)</td>
<td>IS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>*Sudan-Egypt dispute: Hala'ib Triangle / Wadi Halfa (1958)</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>*First Lebanese civil war (1958)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Tunisia-UAR crisis: Ben Youssef asylum (1958)</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Jordan-UAR crisis (1958)</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Syria-Iraq: Mosul revolt (1959)</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Conflict Description</td>
<td>Resolution/Outcome</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Iraq vs. Shammar Tribe &amp; Pro-Western Officers (1959)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>**Kuwait-Iraq dispute / Kuwait independence (1961-63)</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Tunisia-France dispute (1961)</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>*Syria-UAR dispute: UAR dissolution (1961)</td>
<td>CR</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Iraq vs. Kurds (1961-1963)</td>
<td>CW</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Algeria vs. Former Rebel Leaders (1962-63)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>*Yemen civil war (1962-1969)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Sudan vs. Anya Nya (1963-72)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>*Algeria-Morocco: Tindouf/Sand war (1963-64)</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Six Day War (1967)</td>
<td>IS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>South Yemeni civil strife (1969-72)</td>
<td>/CW/</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Israel-Egypt / Attrition war (1969-70)</td>
<td>IS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Jordan vs. Palestinians (1970)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Oman-South Yemen (Dhofar) war (1970-76)</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>**First North-South Yemen border war (1971-72)</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>*Kuwait-Iraq war (1973)</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Yom Kippur War (1973)</td>
<td>IS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Iraq vs. Kurds (1974-75)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Syria-Iraq: Euphrates dispute (1975)</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>*Second Lebanese civil war (1975-90)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Western Saharan conflict (1975-83)</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Egypt-Libya - border war (1977)</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>**North-South Yemen border war (1979)</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Iran-Iraq war (1980-88)</td>
<td>IS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982)</td>
<td>IS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Sudan vs. SPLA-Garang Faction (1983)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Iraq vs. Kurds &amp; Shiites (1985-93)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Yemen People’s Republic vs. Leftist Factions (1986)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Somalia civil war (1988-)</td>
<td>/CW/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait - Gulf war (1990-91)</td>
<td>IS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Turkey vs. Kurds (1991)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Algeria vs. Islamic Rebels (1992)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Yemen vs. South Yemen (1994)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Iraq vs. KDP Kurds (1996)</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>51</td>
<td>Comoros crisis (1997)</td>
<td>CR</td>
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</tr>
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<td>52</td>
<td>Darfur crisis (2001-)</td>
<td>/CW/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Third Gulf war (2003-)</td>
<td>/IS/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Israel-Lebanon war (2006)</td>
<td>/IS/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>**Lebanon presidential crisis (2007-08)</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5: “Conflicts in the Middle East and interventions of the Arab League (1945-2008)”**
An interesting case that combines various elements of League intervention, mediation and supportive conduct is the case of the Israeli war in Lebanon in 2006. This particular case is interesting since Lebanon was an area of civil war that the League has intervened in repeatedly with relative success. In addition, it is interesting because it involves Israel, an external threat that the League has a clear mandate and code of conduct to refer to in the case of crisis. However, analysis of the Arab League’s behaviour on this occasion only supports the argument of indecisiveness. While Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia described Hezbollah’s operation as an ‘unstudied adventure’ (رضي 6002) that did nothing to help the Arab cause; and Yemen, despite not expressing a clear view, called for an emergency Arab summit to review the situation. The stances of individual countries changed as the crisis continued. Egypt, for example, which expressed its initial dismay at the actions of Hezbollah at the close of an Egyptian-Jordanian summit on 14 July 2006, had clearly amended its position by the next day when, during a meeting of Arab foreign ministers held at the Arab League headquarters, it supported a resolution then passed by the Arab Ministerial Council that placed blame for the crisis solely on Israel (Rashed 2006). On at least two occasions, the Arab League admitted its inability to deal with the war (El-Anani 2006). Furthermore, Arab foreign ministers wanted to refer the war to the UN Security Council simply because they could not take a
unified stance on the matter. The Arab League also failed to hold an emergency summit to discuss the war. A system designed to protect its members from foreign threats apparently ceased to function (El-Anani 2006). Indeed, when looking at the specific pattern of intervention on the occasion of the major civil wars that have affected the region, what emerges is the significant indecisiveness of the League’s formal and informal bodies, in particular in the early stages of their development (Pinfari 2009, p.10).

**Divisions among members**

In 1977, there was the start of the division between Egypt and the rest of League’s members. Egypt adopted a different strategy in the Arab-Israeli conflict which created a huge problem for and division among the Arab states, and the Arab League responded with a shield policy against Egypt. The first Gulf war between Iraq and Iran was not related to an Arab League strategy of collective action but to the balance of power. In that context the interests of the League were secondary to those of individual members within it. Some Arab states supported Iraq due to balance of power considerations, but there were other Arab countries supporting Iran. Syria, considered “the beating heart of the Arabism” (Hinnebusch 2002, p.140), supported Iran, as did the Libyans. Similarly, in Lebanon, during the siege of Arafat in Sidon, Libya and Syria were against Arafat. This was the direct result of the Arab balance of power considerations (Abdel-Salam 2007; El-Anani 2006).
In terms of the goals and objectives of the League and its ability to meet them, the view has been expressed that the League “boasts ambitious goals and a powerful symbolic association to a widespread transnational ideology; and yet, as the hands of its crucial organs are tied by the unanimity rule, its agenda is little more than the lowest common denominator of the desires of its member states” (Seabury and Pease cited in Pinfari 2009, p.6). Zacher (1979) believes that the League members showed gradual reluctance to relinquish or transfer powers to a new regional organisation of supra-national character. This placed the Arab unity project in conflict with the Arab states forces favouring their individual sovereign interests.

Experts (Abdel-Salam 2007; Al-Mashat 2007; Khalil 2007), diplomats and researchers (Maddy-Weitzman 1991; Greenwood 1991; Javad 2003) agree that by the end of the 1980s, relations between Arab states reached a level of unprecedented equilibrium that could have been translated into a real Arab security project. The eight-year long Iraq-Iran war put key Arab states like Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco in a single alliance. This alliance also allowed Egypt to play a role outside the wall of isolation that was built around it after signing an agreement with Israel which entirely lacked Arab legitimacy. This alliance opened the way for Egypt to be reintegrated into the Arab League and for the headquarters of the League to return from Tunisia to Cairo. Egypt's full return was celebrated at the 1989 Casablanca Arab summit conference (Maddy-Weitzman 1991). However, this improvement in Arab relations did not continue for long due to the divisions and old rivalries that resurfaced after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a significant
transformation point in the history of Arab relations, the Arab League’s history as well as the regional security setup. Its negative impact on Arab national security was clearly demonstrated in Chapter Three. In relation to the Arab League’s success and failure, the impact of this Iraqi invasion of Kuwait will be expanded upon in more detail below.

**Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990**

In Chapter Five, this issue was touched upon and it was mentioned that the League’s response could be classified as both a success and failure with regard to its security role. As a result of the 1991 Iraq war, the Arab world became a real multi-polar region “with the unabashed defence of national prerogatives a principle overriding all others” (Maddy-Weitzman 1991, p.17). These divisions took the form of two camps with two opinions on how to proceed when the Arab League voted on what course of action to take against Iraq during the emergency summit held in Cairo in August 1990. The then-Egyptian President Mubarak and his GCC allies were pushing for two concrete steps to emerge from the summit (Maddy-Weitzman 1991). The first was the dispatch by Arab governments of armed forces to the region and the deployment of an Arab peacekeeping force along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border after an Iraqi withdrawal, similar to what happened in 1961. The second envisaged step was to legitimise and endorse a Saudi Arabian invitation to American forces to enter the Kingdom. The Egyptian-GCC strategy at the summit was to submit a prepared resolution to that effect and bring it to a vote as quickly as possible.
The issue was subject to great debate and disagreement between the two main blocs (Hamza 2007; Al-Mashat 2007; Maddy-Weitzman 1991).

The counter bloc tried to stop the Egyptian-led resolution and proposed an alternative course of action: sending a committee to Baghdad for talks with Saddam. “Egypt-Syria-GCC group considered it a non-starter without a prior Iraqi commitment to the status quo ante and thus would not even allow the idea of a mission to Baghdad to be discussed” (Maddy-Weitzman 1991, p.11). Furthermore, the Egyptians pushed for Arab League Resolution 195 in spite of the lack of consensus and so triggered a procedural and constitutional problem since such a resolution needed consensus to be passed because it involved the presence of foreign forces in Arab territories, which falls under the Arab League's Joint Defence Pact of 1950. The fundamental interests invoked by security crises can and sometimes do supersede the constraints of constitution, human rights and international law, which is why in declared security emergencies a constitution is sometimes suspended, if only temporarily. Emergencies demand the imposition of emergency action: however, when it came to alliances and agreements, Arab states did not find a real alternative to adopt that was based on the Arab League Charter (Abdel-Salam 2007). This in itself constitutes a serious failure since after almost five decades the League has not been able to provide an option that fulfils the security needs of its members. As Maddy-Weitzman states:
The 12 states favouring resolution 195 were: Egypt, the six GCC states, Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia, and Djibouti. Three participants voted against-Iraq, Libya and the PLO (which on the following day changed its vote to one of abstention); Algeria and Yemen abstained, and Jordan, Sudan and Mauritania expressed reservations. Tunisia had already expressed its position by not attending. Never before in the 46-year history of the Arab League had such a controversial resolution been adopted in the face of active or passive opposition by almost half of the member states.

(Maddy-Weitzman 1991, p.11)

As a result of these divisions, disagreements and the effect of the long-term presence of foreign forces in Arab territories as well as the transformation of security and military thinking in a number of Arab states on the subject of state security and Arab national security (as demonstrated in Chapter Three), the Arab League’s weakness increased. Although Saddam’s “withdrawal from Kuwait and the partial destruction of his armed forces both restored the territorial status quo and insured the continued survival of the Gulf Arab states. … Saddam's continued survival linger[ed] on as a cause of concern and explains Kuwait's preference for a continued Western military presence” (Maddy-Weitzman 1991, p.17).

1990 was not the first or only point where key Arab states have adopted positions that have had a negative impact on joint Arab cooperation and the Arab League’s effectiveness. For example, Egypt and Jordan disengaged from
the Arab confrontation with Israel when they signed agreements with it (Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1996). The Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement presented more than a mere political contradiction. It also constituted a contradiction on legal and ethical levels in terms of the commitments and obligations of Arab states under the Charter of the League. The Charter had bound its member states engaged in agreements and treaties to interpret them in a non-contradictory manner to the Charter. So when Egypt signed an agreement with Israel, the issue of priority in commitments was raised. The matter of priority and choice was cast in terms of commitment either towards Arab states or towards Israel if the commitments appeared to contradict each other. Of course, Egyptian interpretations leaned towards the Arab commitments. If Israel attacked an Arab state, Egypt was not obliged to support Israel and could confront it in accordance with the Arab League Charter. Therefore, the interpretation was clear with regard to supporting Israel and hence, according to Egypt, there was no contradiction. In addition, these agreements were peace agreements and not defence treaties or alliances with Israel, and they included some security arrangements and commitments to non-aggression but did not bind their parties with defensive alliances. Yet in reality the Arab defence treaties became irrelevant in practice due to the conflict of interests for the states that signed agreements with Israel and their need to uphold those commitments. This is in addition to the position adopted by the Arab states and their choice not to invoke the mutual defence clause when Israel attacked Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2006 and 2008-2009. The implications and circumstances of these particular conflicts will be further explored in Chapter Seven.
The Arab League’s weakness increased after 1990 especially after the decline of the role it could play in Middle East affairs due to the division that followed the Iraqi invasion. These events and disagreements, in addition to the ideological and political shifts that have happened within the Arab world since 1945 as shown in Table 1 – Chapter One, have directly contributed to the limitations and inability of the League to promptly respond to conflicts and security concerns. Nonetheless, these divisions have not been the sole reason behind the low level of cooperation. Promoting cooperation among Arab states is actually an integral component of the League’s mission and objective because it is also the path to the aspired unity described in the Charter.

**Arab regional cooperation**

Harders and Legrenzi (2008) explored the reasons behind the lack of Arab regional cooperation, accounts of which have varied according to underlying theoretical assumptions. Since Neorealist analysis is focused on power balance and asymmetries between the states of the region and international players, internal splits, conflicts and lack of regional institution building are considered a product of external superpower intervention, asymmetric economic integration with Europe and the US, and balance of power politics (Binder cited in Harders & Legrenzi 2008). In contrast, Liberals, Institutionalists and Constructivists are more concerned with regional autonomy and dynamics and tend to analyse regional policies from this perspective. Fawcett (2005) and Nonnemann (2005) explain the lack of cooperation on this basis by attributing it to “the special
nature of the region’s security dilemma which operates on interrelated levels and is closely linked to the relative weakness of Middle Eastern States” (Fawcett 2005, p.177). These schools of thought and scholars argue that the national interests of Arab states preceded regional cooperation interests and therefore have limited institutional development and reform. Furthermore, “the lack of reform-oriented regionalist elites and the contradictory policy orientations of business elites (industrial versus commercial) weaken potential actors of change” (Aarts cited in Harders & Legrenzi 2008, p.36).

The aftermaths of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 continue (Al-Mashat 2007; Abdel-Salam 2007; Khalil 2007) and the lack of cooperation has remained. When Amr Moussa, who is considered to be a charismatic and energetic personality, took the role of Secretary General of the League in June 2001, he engaged in a process of assessment in terms of the League’s performance in dealing with conflicts and Arab disputes, which came to include cooperation in confronting terrorism. The League’s role in this issue was successful and its council for Ministers of Interior was one of its most successful. This level of cooperation was not through the Arab League as an institution of summits but rather as a regional body capable of coordinating action between dedicated ministries of its member states. This council’s performance has been very good and is known to be one of the most successful Arab councils (Abdel-Salam 2007). However, there was another huge failure in 2003 in dealing with the issue of the invasion of Iraq by the United States and Britain. That invasion was a huge shock to the Arab states (Abdel-Salam 2007; Khalil 2007; Al-Mashat 2007; Sobeih 2007; Hamza 2007). The Arab collective
could not stop the war even while allies to the US, nor could they prevent American forces being launched from their territories since American military bases were starting to spread in the period before the war in the Gulf area.

It is possible to draw four conclusions from the above discussion and developments. First, the divisions among the Arab states are various in nature, duration and severity. Second, these divisions have had a negative influence on the joint Arab cooperation efforts as well as on the role of the Arab League itself. Third, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 not only divided the region into two blocs or alliances, but also had serious repercussions for the League’s security structure since it opened the door for a legitimate foreign military presence and ultimately rendered defence treaties between Arab states less relevant. Fourth, peace agreements between Arab states and Israel triggered a moral and legal debate, as well as a conflict in interests and commitments in terms of priorities towards the Arab structure versus bilateral commitments. In this context, it is important to further understand how external influence in the region affected the Arab League especially since 1990 when compared to previous influence during the Cold War, for example. The following section will further elaborate on this.

**External influence**

The Middle East was an arena of conflicting influence between the US and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War as discussed in Chapter One. This
arena exhibits many forms of external influence including institutional alternatives to the Arab League like the Baghdad Pact as mentioned earlier. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and presence of American forces in many Arab countries after 1991, the region “was almost an exclusive bailiwick for American diplomacy” (Maddy-Weitzman 1991, p.15). Although the Arab League managed to play a role in getting Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991, it also legitimised the foreign military presence, especially the American and Western military presence during the liberation of Kuwait. Without the agreed-upon decision within the Arab League in 1990, there would not have been an excuse for any Western state to be present on Arab land. This has instigated a state of overlay in the region and placed the indigenous regional security dynamics in a state of dis-function (Buzan & Wæver 2004). A clear example of this was the transformation of the security thinking by the GCC countries to rely on extra-regional powers for their own security instead of revitalising the security dimension of the League or build security capabilities within the GCC itself (Sayigh 1991; Al-Mashat 2007; Abdel-Salam 2007; Pinfari 2009). This state of overlay continued later as a result of Western attempts to establish direct security ties with some regional countries in the form of arms deals (for example the GCC countries announced a 20-billion USD arms deal with the United states in 2008) (Tuttle 2008) thus justifying external security guaranties and protection. Another development that enforced external intervention in the region was the 9/11 attacks and the ‘War on Terror’ that followed. The current NATO involvement began in 1994 when the alliance launched the ‘Mediterranean Dialogue’ with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia as a means of better understanding the security concerns
of those countries. Indeed, NATO is currently playing an increasing role in the Arabian Gulf area, in Libya and off the shores of Lebanon as a result of the existing agreements between some states and NATO. It is worth noting that NATO did not want a role in the Middle East but the USA exerted enormous pressure on NATO members to engage in the Gulf area (Khalil 2007).

Although the League was capable of providing a security structure and framework for defence and cooperation among its members post-Cold War, state national security interests shifted away from the Arab organisation after 1990. The state of overlay, foreign military presence and the continued divisions among the members allowed for increasing external influence in Arab security affairs. These developments constitute a serious failure on the part of the League to fill its role as a regional security organisation. The absence of an agreed upon definition of Arab National Security, as discussed in Chapter Three, can be interpreted as a result from this Arab League failure. Following on this discussion, logically the next section will focus on key regional security arrangements and agreements that were reached under the League.

**Efficient regional security arrangements**

Security- and military-related agreements and mechanisms established within the League include the Joint Arab Defence Treaty, Arab Ministers of Interior Council, Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism and Arab Peace & Security Council. These formations were approved to help resolve disputes
between member states and enhance their security and cooperation. However, they lack tools for implementation (Khalil 2007; Al-Mashat 2007), even though the treaties aimed to guarantee political regimes’ security from terrorist organisations, money laundering, drugs trafficking and political opposition. According to experts such as Khalil (2007), Al-Mashat (2007), Hawwāt (2002) and Spiegel (2003), Arab regional security was not the central focus of the implementation of these treaties, because they did not address threats related to Arab regional security, i.e. external threats to the region or threats from within. As concluded from Chapters Two and Three, Arab regional security is not limited to military issues but extends to the political and economic arenas.

With the transformation of the Middle East region beyond the historical and cultural foundations that the League was established on, the Arab League is now required to play an occupational role rather than a nationalistic one. It is occupational in the sense that it provides its members with a measurable function and service. Although the number of states has increased to 22 members, some of the new members are not related to the Arab world geographically, like the Comoros islands or Somalia. Nevertheless, the region did not change fundamentally and the source of threat is still the same, i.e. Israel, but external influence has increased in the form of the American and Western military presence. The main change in the region is the decrease in agreements on common interest since the Arab states give priority to national interests over regional ones, which seem consistent with the principles of protecting independence in the charter of the League, yet they adopt the regional dimension as a symbolic one rather than in functional terms. This is the
opposite of Europe where the functional approach is adopted as a means for political merger. After achieving a high degree of economic integration, they began working on the political integration (Choy & Barrell 2003).

When comparing the Arab League with other regional organisations, it can be seen that the Arab world failed in both economic and political integration (McKay et al. 2005). In South East Asia, ASEAN is an active regional organisation; Latin America has OAS which is an active and functioning organisation and COMESA which has also been successful in integration when compared to the Arab world. Every Arab state aspires to establishing a free trade area with the United States - and Oman and Jordan have indeed established it - whereas the UAE is negotiating it, while Egypt is in the process of establishing it.

Another factor that has affected integration is leadership. The perceived status of a country gives prestige to its leaders. Therefore, every Arab leader is keen for his country to have a patriotic and distinctive identity as well as an Arab identity. This was an observation touched upon by the interviewees (Al-Mashat 2007; Abdel-Salam 2007) and experts during the fieldwork. There seems to be a common consent among them that Arab leaders are keen for their countries to have a distinctive identity beside the Arab identity. This does not mean an absence of symbols of Arab identity like the Arab League’s building, Charter, Secretary General and Arab states representatives in Cairo. There is also the Arab culture organisation that plays an important role. Nonetheless, there are many restrictions on, for example, the movement of Arab labour and Arab
investments. A clear example of the slow progress of integration is the remaining visa restrictions between Arab states. Only the GCC countries have institutionalised free travel among them. Between Egypt and Malaysia there are no visas, but between Egypt and all Arab countries a visa is required. In contrast, between Morocco and Arab countries there are no visa requirements. These are the important issues for Arab citizens (Al-Mashat 2007). In fact, according to the Henley Visa Restrictions Index, Arab countries rank at the bottom of countries without visa restrictions on their citizens (McGinley 2010).

The role of the Secretary General as a facilitator and coordinator of League cooperation projects and policies is difficult. For example, Amr Moussa was active but repeatedly criticised whenever he tried to take actions based on the Arab League initiatives. When he went to Iraq in 2003, he was criticised by Arab states (Abu-Taleb 2004). When the Gulf States proposed a Gulf free of WMDs, they criticised him (Moran 2005; Al-Mashat 2007). He encountered enormous problems with the Arab parties due to his attempts to activate the League’s role. This was activation in terms of creating a role for the Arab League that was bigger than at least some Arab states wanted for it. The League’s advocates have been trying to prove that it is important, and capable of playing a role, to the point of saving it as a viable organisation. (El-Anani 2006; Khalil 2007; Abdel-Salam 2007). Unlike ASEAN which has some institutional authority, none of the Arab states has transferred authority to the League. For example, the Secretary General of the Arab League has the status of an ambassador and not a minister. When he sits down with Arab Ministers of Foreign Affairs, they precede him in status.
The League’s authority is limited by its Charter and what its members allow and delegate to it because the League contains sharp divisions among its members. There is also a division between the extremists and the moderates that affects its performance. Amr Moussa tried to end the long-running political crisis in Lebanon (AP 2006) in 2006 but was not successful due to the intervention of others like Iran (Abd-elsalam 2007; Abu-Taleb 2004). He tried again in Iraq and it did not work there as well because the issue is more complex than the League and the Arab states’ abilities (Shehab 2007). The same is true of the case of Sudan. Moussa also attempted to transform the League during the early days of his term and again during the Sirte Summit in 2010, to something similar to the EU. Moussa’s aim was to create real delegates with real powers and mandates but the financial issue did not allow such initiative to become reality. The Arab League’s budget might be $30m, but there are no public records of it, and the organisation does not get it fully (Abdel-Salam 2007).

In an attempt to modernise the League as a regional organisation that goes beyond intra-Arab affairs, the idea of observatory membership was proposed in 2006 (Abdel-Salam 2007; Sobeih 2007). It started as a suggestion to invite other organisations and states to attend the League’s meetings and was later incorporated into institutional practice. This particular step coincided with improving relations between the Arab League as an institution and other international organisation such as the AU and OAS which raised concerns about the role played by external parties in Arab and regional affairs. However,
this same step enhanced the role of the League itself as conduit for cooperation with other international bodies.

**Regional arrangements efficiency**

Since the American-British invasion of Iraq in 2003, the issue of Iraq stability has been dealt with within the alternative framework of its surrounding neighbours. There have been conferences for the neighbouring countries of Iraq which include Arab states as well as non-Arab states, like Turkey and Iran. Interestingly, this framework is not an Arab one but is in fact a regional one. Another modification to the regional system happened in the form of the Saudi peace initiative that was proposed in 2002 at the Beirut summit of the Arab League, which opened the door for dealing with Israel. The observatory membership is indirectly increasing external interaction with the League and constitutes another modification to regional arrangements. Sudan as a problem is being dealt with within an African and international framework. That and other regional issues have ceased to be Arab affairs. The reasons behind this are many. Conflicts within the Arab states involve regional parties and there are regional interventions inside Arab countries. Lebanon is a clear example of long-term regional intervention. Since 2003, Iraq became another clear example of such regional intervention with Iran and Turkey playing increasing roles in various areas of the country. The perceived nature of the Arab state itself has changed in two cases. Firstly, Iraq is no longer an Arab state in the long-standing Arab sense of the word since it has come to be regarded internationally as a multi-ethnic state (Bapir 2010); and secondly, Sudan has
become a country of minorities and not an Arab state in the sense perceived before. Ultimately, this resulted in the separation of Sudan and the birth of the new Republic of South Sudan in 2011. Other Arab countries have also begun to witness change in their nature. There are factors today that are changing the region and the Arab world from within and the Arab Spring of 2011 is both an example of this change and perhaps one of the outcomes.

With the admission of Union of the Comoros in 1993 the Arab League comprised 22 countries, but this did not represent the region as a whole and this was the initial difference between the League and other organisations. The League’s membership was limited to states that met the cultural and ethnic criteria for admission and the concept of flexible observatory membership was not yet adopted. The League had a problem in that it dealt with conflicts between its members and external parties more than it dealt with conflicts among its own members and it did not establish a judicial system until 2006 in the form of the Arab Court of Justice. However, this did not function and its jurisdiction was not enforced, although its creation was mentioned in Article 19 of the League’s Charter (Thani 1999). The Arab Court of Justice was proposed in 1945 as part of various reform projects in 1959, 1965, 1979 and in the 1990s in an attempt to provide a regional and Arab alternative instead of countries heading to the International Court of Justice or conducting international arbitration (Thani 1999). Qatar and Bahrain went outside the League’s framework to resolve their dispute, as did Yemen and Eritrea, the latter being the first country to be invited to join the League which refused.
Peacekeeping and deterrence forces

The League’s peacekeeping role has been facing practical difficulties and challenges due to the complexity of regional conflicts and civil wars and the rise of the role played by non-state groups. For example, during the 2007 conflict in Lebanon, the League discussed the possibility of sending Syrian, Egyptian and Saudi forces to maintain peace and order (Badran 2006; Khalil 2007; Abdel-Salam 2007). However, the League did not allow this to happen considering the past experience of deploying Syrian forces in Lebanon under the Arab umbrella. There was also discussion on sending Egyptian forces to Iraq (Abul-Gheit 2005) after the American invasion in 2003. All the Arab states refused to send forces there since it would have practically meant getting involved in a Sunni-Shiite confrontation where the forces would eventually be perceived to take one of the two sides (Khalil 2007). The latest Arab League initiative in this context was met by rejection. In October 2006, the Arab countries launched a new effort to help Sudan by offering peacekeepers to be deployed in Darfur region. However, Sudan rejected the initial proposal with the justification that a UN-led peacekeeping force was preferred, regardless of its nationality makeup (Anon 2006).

In the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011, another possibility for Arab League peacekeeping opened up in Bahrain. However, Bahrain and the GCC countries took the initiative of addressing the issue within the framework of the GCC by deploying the Aljazeera Shield forces to maintain peace and order rather than involving the League in the matter. This is another example of the
decentralisation of roles where the GCC is gaining more autonomy from the League on Gulf matters. It also confirms how sensitive the issue of popular uprising is for the GCC countries. However, this presented an opportunity for the GCC to expand its role and military capabilities by declaring the increase in the ‘Shield’ forces from 40,000 to 100,000 by the end of 2011 (Shenaz Kermali 2011).

The record of the Arab League is often compared, directly or indirectly, with the performance of the GCC, which is regularly mentioned as one of the most accomplished among the sub-regional organisations in the Middle East since 1945 (Lawson 1999; Tripp 1995). According to Twinam (1991), the gradual progress towards cooperation while focusing on economic aspects is key to GCC success. Twinam elaborates further on this success saying that it “reflects the cautious and sensible way in which member states eased towards cooperation, carefully establishing a consensus and putting some important building blocks of joint economic ventures in place before the council’s creation (1991, p.108). Lawson (1999) interprets Twinam’s conclusion to mean that the “GCC founders had ‘learned the lesson’ of the Arab League in opting for a gradual, functionalist process of regime building, which initially relied on economic and security cooperation but which has also laid ‘a fragile foundation for a greater degree of unity among its six member states” (Lawson 1999, p.7 cited in Pinfari 2009). The above discussion shows a rise in the potential for success of the GCC and shrinking in the role played by the League in the Gulf area generally and in peacekeeping in particular.
Conclusion

This chapter highlighted and discussed the shortcomings and limitations of the Arab League. A brief theoretical discussion reaffirmed that the explanations and positions of schools of thought, as discussed in Chapter Four, on the reasons for regional organisations failure are evident in the League. Arab League theoretical analysts relate the League’s failure to the presence of regional hegemons, the presence of a range of opposing coalitions and interests within it and the shifting patterns of alliance and competition among its members. These models occurred at different times in the Arab world. For instance, Egypt was a regional hegemon during Nasser’s time, while Saudi-Arabia led the GCC countries as a bloc of interest during the 1980s and early 1990s. The Saudi-Hashemite rivalry constituted a form of alliance while in the last two decades the Arab world was dominated by a new pattern of interest dividing it into ‘moderates’ and ‘rejectionists’. Table 1 which was explored in Chapter One elaborates further on these changes and patterns to confirm our conclusion of the negative impact they had on the Arab League.

Following on from Chapter Five, there was analysis of the Arab League’s ability to settle and influence conflict levels as a tool for assessing its success. While Chapter Five presented examples where the League was successful in conflict resolution and settlement, Chapter Six provided more evidence and data to suggest that this positive influence of the League on conflict levels has been on the decline since the late 1970s. The League’s performance was not consistent in all forms of conflicts because it was not willing to intervene either in the
internal and local matters of Arab members or in most border disputes. The series of contradictory positions adopted by the League in relation to the Arab Spring in 2011 and their slow response to developments and inability to contain the conflicts in Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, are further examples of this diminishing influence. There has also been an identified pattern of hesitancy and indecisiveness by the League when addressing civil wars due to internal vetoes within it.

As an extension to this low level of achievement and intervention, the League has not been successful in promoting a collective security framework. Although the confrontation with Israel helped unify joint military coordination efforts until the early 1970s, the League failed to maintain a similar level of coordination and cooperation in other conflicts with Israel and third parties after the 1973 war and since Egypt signed the Camp David peace agreement with Israel. Indecisiveness has been pinpointed as the key characteristic of the way the League has handled collective security and conflict intervention.

Another factor that contributed to the indecisive behaviour of the League is the divisions among its members. Divisions among member states have also been shown to have contributed greatly to the League’s failure as a regional security organisation. The most substantial division happened over Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Such crises would have had less impact on the Arab political system if the agreements signed within the Arab League were vitalised. The divisions got worse during the 1990s due to the fact that the system lacked a corrective mechanism.
Before the Cairo emergency summit of 1990, it was important to take decisions unanimously but this meant that the smallest member could stop any decision. When talking about the Arab League, it is important to remember that there are states with external ties that believe that their security and protection is better guaranteed through these ties more than with the Arab League. Such links and interests increase external influence in Arab affairs indirectly. The dependency of small powers on superpowers can explain their refusal of a security role from regional Arab powers. For example, Bahrain is a small state in area and population. When it sought protection, normally under the established Arab defence agreements, that protection would come from a fellow Arab state. However, since Bahrain, Kuwait and to a great extent Saudi-Arabia now depend on the US for their security; they do not want to improve their national security through cooperation with any other Arab state. This example could be applied widely. Arab leaderships are more concerned with internal issues than regional security. This case is supported by the realist’s observation of regional organisation dynamics where regional and international power connections result in the mutual promotion of each other’s interests as discussed in Chapter Four. The reluctance to depend on other Arab states for security as discussed earlier is considered to be ill-founded for practical reasons, namely the consequences that they would face if an Arab state invades another Arab state – taking into account the hindsight gained in consideration of what happened to Iraq as a result of its invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
The frequent shifts and changes in alliances throughout the League’s history prove that there is no Arab state with enough power or status to lead the formation of Arab regional security. In other words, the most significant weakness of the League is the lack of an executive tool to achieve regional security (Abdel-Salam 2007). The League also lacks an executive mechanism for implementing what is accepted and there is absence of a security body. In the past, there was the Joint Defence Council but it is not there today.

The above divisions, limitations and failures did not result in the breakdown of the League, however. From the 1948 catastrophe to the 1967 disaster, the Arab system managed to function somehow. It even survived the dilemma of the 1978 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The Iraq-Iran war did not seem to shake the system to the roots as one might have expected but helped to create sub-regional grouping like the GCC. As such sub-regional organisations were established to address some specific local political and security challenges (such as the Iraq-Iran war), focus shifted away from the Arab League as the regional forum for debate and discussion. Now, when collective security is mentioned in the region, two institutions are generally cited - the Arab League and the GCC - yet neither of them can be regarded as institutions designed specifically for security. The GCC is still not able to resolve the dispute between the United Arab Emirates and Iran, and failed to resolve the Qatar-Bahrain border dispute. “Most importantly, they are unable to create a firm basis of confidence in their members or to enhance their members’ formal commitment to these institutions. The reluctance of regional actors to commit formally to common security institutions is easily observable” (Aras 2000, p.6). Although
the GCC and the Arab League provide platforms for debate on security-, military- and conflict-related matters, the two organisations lack the tools and mandates to engage in conflict resolution. As McCoubrey states, “The Arab League proved unable to act as an effective regional agency and, in so far as the Arab-Israeli crisis was one of the spurs to its creation, it definitely failed as a forum for resolution or even military alliance” (2000, p.197).

This chapter’s discussion also showed that external influence has increased greatly in the Arab world and the Middle East since 1990. The presence of foreign forces within the regional system and not outside, as was the case before 1990, continues to cause disruption to regional dynamics and limits the League’s ability to function. Sudan’s refusal of Arab peacekeeping forces and the prioritisation of a regional framework in Iraq since 2003 are clear examples of these limits. Furthermore, the peace agreements that have been made between a number of the Arab states and Israel have contributed to the division and conflict in interests among states (Al-Mashat 2007) which led to the classification of Arab countries into either moderates or rejectionists. This conflict in interests extends to evaluating the value of the league itself as a security organisation. There was consensus among people who were interviewed during the fieldwork that the first obstacle facing the League is that member states of the League do not feel that it can be beneficial in achieving their security (Hawwāt 2002; Abdel-Salam 2007; Al-Mashat 2007; Hamza 2007; Khalil 2007). This is due to these states looking outwards to external powers to protect them and also because these states are afraid of other Arab states’ ambitions. The Arab states focus on their own internal affairs rather than Arab
and regional issues provide relative independency from the Arab and regional environment. Arab leaders’ eagerness to preserve their countries’ status precedes regional systems contributes to this inward approach with extra-regional support.

Sobeih (2007) believes that one of the main obstacles facing the Arab League is the Israeli occupation of Arab territories and the American bias towards Israel that is greatly weakening the League. Although the official Arab position with the United States is friendly and although the United States is invited to observe Arab League meetings, the US is a crucial element in the imbalanced equation regarding Israel. If the American position on Israel changed, a solution could be reached on the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the double standard approach and the failure of consecutive American administrations to achieve a breakthrough for peace in the region is creating a serious problem for Arab affairs and is weakening the League’s role and standing (Sobeih 2007). Sobeih also believes that the limited scope of individual Arab states’ interests and the lack of coordination is a problem for joint regional projects. Various social and economic challenges like unemployment, illiteracy and education have not been adequately addressed due to these problems. This limited scope means that the League is not a regional security organisation in the modern meaning of the term.

The Arab League in the recent period has been facing issues of survival that could have destroyed it. Between 2003 and 2007, Arab summits were highly challenged in maintaining a frequency of meetings and good level of
representation. The Secretary General of the Arab League had to request each Arab state provide an answer to the question of how to activate the Arab League through papers and specific projects. They were feeling that the League was cracking on all levels, especially after the 2003 war which resulted in much fragmentation in the League and made it face an existential problem. Some Arab states like Libya proposed replacing the Arab League with another body with a different charter that could be called the Arab States Union or the Arab Union. Other parties proposed opening up the membership of the League, and Israel proposed the Middle East League. The Israeli idea came first in year 2000 and in Shimon Persiz’s book ‘The New Middle East’ (Peres & Naor 1993). Public opinion faces a huge trust problem in the League as well (El-Anani 2006; Galal 1994; Hourani 1947; Al-Mashat 2007). This particular change in vision and structure of the region and the rise of a regional Israeli role, partnership and importance is closely linked to one of the core issues on the Arab League’s agenda that is Palestine. The next chapter will focus in detail on the Arab League’s changing approach on Palestine and the various policies that were adopted to resolve it by the League both as collective and as individual members and how the issue of Palestine affected the League itself.
CHAPTER SEVEN
CHAPTER SEVEN

PALESTINE: AN EVERLASTING REGIONAL SECURITY PROBLEM

The issue of Palestine (as a national, Arab, religious and colonial problem) has been at the centre of much international and regional attention since before the establishment of the Arab League. Palestine has been the arena for many turning points in the region’s colonial history and also for Arab nationalism. The developments in the League of Nations and Britain’s 1922 White Paper that redefined the very nature of Palestine, the Arab revolt in 1936 and the First Arab-Israeli war in 1948 are some of these early turning points where Palestine and Palestinians were pivotal. During the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, a number of early Arab conferences took place in Jerusalem, Nablus and Ramallah (Al-Mashat 2007; Hamza 2007; Abdul-Hadi 2009). These conferences seemed to offer the prospect of Arab unity but were never fully realised. The rise in importance of the Palestinian issue, Zionist immigration and British colonisation all pushed the then Arab states to talk about establishing a League.

This chapter will focus in detail on the issue of Palestine, its value and importance to the Arab League and how it contributed to the development and performance of the League as a regional security organisation. The Palestinian issue was chosen as the case study for the following reasons: first, it is the longest on-going conflict in the region today; second, the Arab League has been
involved in this issue since its early days and until the conclusion of this research; third, there is the interconnection and mutual effect between the Arab League and the issue of Palestine on each other’s development; fourth, the issue of Palestine is unique as an intractable conflict (Handelman 2011) that has gone through various phases including war, low-intensity conflict, regional conflict, civil disobedience, negotiations and internationalisation. The issue of Palestine is one of the main reasons why the League’s performance as a regional security organisation is in question. By analysing the way the League handled this particular conflict, the aim here is to gain a better understanding of the challenges that have prevented the League from succeeding in this conflict in particular, and other conflicts in general.

Throughout the course of this thesis, the issue of Palestine has been repeatedly referred to. In Chapter One, there was a review of how the problem of Palestine constituted one of the main concerns and security issues during and before the establishment of the League itself, and how the British position opposing an independent Palestine membership as a founder of the organisation delayed the establishment of the League. Furthermore, Chapter One confirmed that Palestine has been a vital factor in various Arab rivalries and unification plans for the Fertile Crescent and Transjordan. This importance was reflected in the League focus on Palestine in the Alexandria Protocol and the Charter of the League.
While reviewing Arab national security in Chapter Three, how Palestine contributed to the formulation of Arab national security was highlighted through the Palestinian public struggle against the Zionist project. Developments in the “Palestinian problem” formed the greatest challenges that contributed to the need for Arab national security in the first half of the twentieth century. Chapter Three also demonstrated that the British position on Palestine (Major 1963) was a negative element in the formation of an Arab national security doctrine (Al-Mashat 2007; Hamza 2007) since it further increased the League’s animosity towards King Abdullah of Jordan (Shlaim 1990) and ultimately contributed to making the issue of Palestine one of the most complicated regional security problems facing the League and its members. Finally, Palestine has remained an active issue on the League’s agenda throughout its history as Chapters Five and Six have shown and as will be elaborated upon in this chapter. The most pertinent question that needs to be asked here is: at what point did Palestine become an Arab issue?

The Hussein-McMahon correspondence concluded with Arabs understanding it as ensuring post-war independence and the unity of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire including Palestine (Gendzier 1975; Hamza 2007). These understandings reiterated a British promise of Arab independence after 1916 but were never fulfilled. In this context, Palestine came to be understood by Arabs as an integral component of the Arab-British vision of the Middle East that was not yet completed, yet it was becoming increasingly replaced with a

24 A series of letters between the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein bin Ali, and British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, discussed the future of the Middle East’s Arab countries. In one letter McMahon stated that Palestine was to be included in the Arab state, although the borders of Palestine were disputed.
British-French alternative vision, where Palestine was the potential fulfilment of a Zionist project. Increasingly within the Arab world, the independence of Palestine was not simply a right or the desire of its own indigenous population, but an intrinsic part of the rising Arab nationalist project.

Barnett (1998), however, argues that Palestine became an Arab issue as early as 1936 with the Great Palestinian Revolt of 1936. Events in Palestine thereafter contributed to the establishment of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) (Shlaim 1990) which claimed the right to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people. The involvement and participation of Palestine in the establishment of the League was covered in Chapter One, as mentioned above; however, it is important to examine at this stage the issue of Palestinian representation and acceptance in Arab politics since this issue has influenced both the League and the Palestinian issue repeatedly. Therefore, Palestinian representation will be the focus of the following section.

**Palestinian Representation**

Palestinian representation has always been a major component in the development of the Palestinian issue. This is evident in the way it has been perceived internationally and how the Arab League has decided on its policy and approach towards it, as will be discussed here. As early as 1944, the issue of who represents the Palestinians was causing division among the Arabs. Palestinian parties were represented by Musa Al-Alami at the Alexandria
Conference of 1944 because the Arab leaders did not welcome the Grand Mufti of Palestine Haj Amin Al-Hussein (Abdul-Hadi 2009; Shlaim 1990). Al-Alami was on good terms with the Egyptians and the Iraqis which helped in softening the British refusal for Palestinian representation at the conference. Although Al-Alami did not sign the Charter, as he was not representing a recognised government, Palestine was given full status and a vote in the Arab League. The Alexandria Protocol gave emphasis to the issue of Palestine which was considered an important element in the Arab countries' system “without prejudice to Arab rights and without causing any damage to peace and independence of Arab countries” (Article 5, Alexandria Protocol). Arab states were to support the cause of Arab Palestinians by realising their legitimate rights; and they made their position clear in calling for an immediate halt of Jewish immigration to Palestine and the preservation of Arab land. This summarises the Arab position on Palestine at that point, but the developments on the ground with regard to the Zionist project and the changes in Palestinian representation over time have continued to show that the League members have not been able to transform their position into a practical policy. Within the Arab League,

there was no consensus on the future of Palestine. Most members, at least at the declaratory level, stood for an uncompromising policy in the fight against Zionism. They denounced the United Nations partition plan of 29 November 1947 as illegal, impracticable, and unjust

(Shlaim 1990, p.38)
The debate within Arab circles on who can represent the Palestinians and the Palestinian issue itself had two main contenders. The first was Hajj Amin al-Husayni who represented a national programme for an independent and sovereign Palestinian state across the whole of Palestine. The second was King Abdullah of Transjordan whose undeclared aims were to partition Palestine with the Zionists and to annex the Arab part to his own kingdom (Shlaim 1990).

However, the League went a different route and chose not to support the side of either two ‘representatives’. The alternative was the Arab Higher Committee (AHC). When the AHC was re-established in 1946 after nine years of absence, “it was not [re-established] by the various Palestinian political parties themselves, as had been the case when it was founded in 1936, but by a decision of the Arab League” (Shlaim 1990, p.37). The AHC’s lack of political resources and influence limited its ability to implement an independence project or policy. As a result, the League became the main arena for determining Arab policy on Palestine.

Although the establishment of the AHC could have constituted the first step towards creating a national Palestinian leadership or government, the League was not interested in dealing with the potential Palestinian leaders who would have emerged. After Britain declared its intention to withdraw from Palestine in 1947, “the AHC appealed to the Arab League for support in setting up a Palestinian government” (Shlaim 1990, p.38), but the League members were reluctant to support a government that would be headed by the Mufti, or to entrust him with the leadership of the Arab war effort in Palestine. At two Arab League meetings in “Aley, Lebanon, in October 1947 and in Cairo in December
1947, the Mufti pleaded passionately for the establishment of a shadow government under the aegis of the AHC” (Shlaim 1990, p.38), but with no success.

Parallel to this, King Abdullah began challenging the role of the AHC and increasingly used the Arab Legion\footnote{The Arab Legion was the regular army of Transjordan and then Jordan in the early part of the 20th century} to make himself the master of Arab Palestine. However, “his claim that the Transjordanian delegates rather than the AHC represented the Palestinians inside the Arab League antagonised the other member states, especially Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia” (Shlaim 1990, p.40). This Arab preference and choice of who can and who should represent the Palestinians was interlinked with other Arab relations, divisions and rivalries as will be further explained later in this chapter. However, the actions of the League contributed to the absence of a unified Palestinian government or leadership before the 1948 catastrophe.

This situation eventually led to Egypt becoming responsible for Gaza, and Jordan for the West Bank until the PLO was created and accepted as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in 1964. Nevertheless, the PLO itself was not immune to the Arab League’s influence as will be discussed later on. For example, in 1949-1950, the Arab League’s Political Committee supported the Palestinians’ decision to establish a government in Gaza and welcomed its representative to attend officially all meetings of the League. At the same time, the Committee expressed its reservations about Jordan’s plan to annex or forcibly unite with the West Bank, stressing that Jordanian rule was only
temporary - that is, pending the Palestinians’ exercise of their right to self-determination (Abdul-Hadi 2009).

**Palestine Liberation Organisation**

The first Arab League summit in Cairo in January 1964 was called for by President Nasser of Egypt. The two challenges facing the Arab world at that time were the Israeli intention to divert the flow of the Jordan River and the fate of the Palestinians. During the deliberations, the League decided to establish a military umbrella, headed up by an Egyptian general (Ali Amr), with the task to reorganise the Arab armies and enforce their defence of Arab territories and counter Israeli threats. Regarding the Palestine question, the Arab League decided to establish the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), then headed by Ahmad Shuqeiri, with the goal of mobilizing and uniting Palestinians in their struggle for their lands and rights. Thus, following the Arab summit in Cairo, the Palestinian National Council convened in Jerusalem on 28 May 1964 (Anon n.d.) and at the end of that meeting the PLO was founded. The first executive committee was formed on 9 August with Ahmad Shuqeiri as its leader. The emergence of PLO gave the Palestinians an organisation recognised by other Arab states, and eventually by non-Arab states, as their sole and legitimate representative. Beginning in 1964, therefore, the PLO played an increasingly prominent role in shaping inter-Arab dynamics and the debate about the desired regional order (Barnett 1998, p.11). In this context, the League was vital in reshaping Palestinian representation and consequentially the international approach to the issue. In addition, bringing all the Palestinian factions and
groups together under the new PLO umbrella allowed for better coordination and communication between the Palestinians and the Arab world.

The League intervened again in favour of the PLO in 1970 when the PLO and King Hussain of Jordan entered into an armed confrontation. Inspired by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Arab League succeeded in putting an end to this bloody military confrontation between the PLO and the Jordanians, and at a later stage helped achieving a series of agreements between the PLO and Lebanon (Abdul-Hadi 2009). These interventions by the League were influential in determining where the PLO and Palestinian armed forces were to function during the 1960s and 70s.

During the 1970s, the League’s approach changed. In the international arena, the situation altered after Yasser Arafat’s speech before the UN in 1974. The Arab League worked to allow the PLO into the UN and, later on, as Palestine but not as the Palestinian state (Sobeih 2007; Hamza 2007). At the Rabat Summit in 1974, despite Jordan’s refusal, the PLO was recognised by the Arab League as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and “immediately after that, the UN agreed to grant the PLO a place as a permanent observer at the General Assembly. This was a very important point in the history of the Palestinian issue” (Al-Mashat, 2007). Since then, the PLO has become the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people with the aim to stop any Arab country from claiming to be the representative of the Palestinian people (Al-Mashat 2007; Hamza 2007; Masri 2010).
The League’s support for the PLO has taken many forms and has varied across its different phases. The recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in 1974 (Shlaim 2005; Sobeih 2007; Arab League 2010) was a step taken to promote Palestinian autonomy over Palestinian matters and the League has supported the PLO, and later the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), both politically and financially - for instance, establishing the Aqsa and Al-Quds funds to provide monthly financial support for the PNA to compensate for the Israeli and international restrictions that could have resulted in its dismantling. Furthermore, Palestine participates in all of the meetings of the committees and working groups of the League. These meetings cover many topics including economics, finance, electricity, social affairs, justice and housing, and are a forum in which Palestine can present its problems.

The influence of the Arab League over Palestinian affairs and policies was reduced during the 1990s which witnessed the peak of the peace process. This was contributed to by regional and international involvement and dialogue in the form of direct and indirect negotiations with/between the Palestinians and Israelis.

The parliamentary election in 2006 and internal Palestinian disagreements since 2007 have caused considerable damage to the value of the PLO and the issues of Palestinian representation and legitimacy (Masri 2010). Mashat (2007) believes that neither the Arab League nor any other Arab state has been capable of playing a role on those fronts as there are problems that can only be solved internally among Palestinians. Consecutive Arab League and Arab
states initiatives have attempted to bridge the gap between Palestinian factions since Hamas won the elections in 2006, and to put an end to the political and military division since Hamas took over Gaza in 2007. However, the results of these initiatives were both short-lived and quite minimal. The Palestinian unity government that was the result of the Saudi mediation was also fleeting and the Egyptian efforts to bring Fatah, Hamas and other Palestinian factions to sign the 'Egyptian paper' that should have brought an end to the division and brought forth what became commonly known as ‘the Palestinian reconciliation’ was not successful.

In fact, reconciliation was achieved in 2011 and only as a result of the dramatic changes that swept across the Arab World in the Arab Spring\(^\text{26}\). The change of the political leadership in Egypt, the conditional support for Hamas in Syria and the uncertainty of the position in Iran, as well as the strong demand from the Palestinian public (Vasconcelos 2011; Black 2011; Omer-Man 2011) all resulted in a realisation among Palestinian factions that reconciliation was and is indeed a strategic Palestinian interest. Therefore, the reconciliation agreement was signed on 4\(^{th}\) May 2011 and this opened the doors for further Palestinian-led actions and policies that emphasised the ability of the Palestinians to lead the way in determining Arab League policy on the issue of Palestine. The most significant example of this was the Palestinian step to gain recognition as a state within international institutions, such as the UN, in the last quarter of 2011. The League’s council met on 12\(^{th}\) September 2011 and agreed to support the
Palestinian call for recognition while leaving the strategic decision and the
timing to the Palestinian leadership to decide upon.

The progress of the League’s influence on and relation to consecutive
Palestinian leaderships and factions indicates that the issue of Palestinian
representation is becoming less susceptible to influence by the League since
the Palestinian institutions have been recognised internationally as part of the
increased international support for the Palestinian state-building efforts within
the peace process. Closely linked to the Arab influence on Palestinian
representation is the impact of intra-Arab relations and the division on the issue
as a whole. Arab relations and disputes have affected the way the issue of
Palestine has been perceived and what priority it occupied on the Arab agenda
at different times. These relations and impacts will be the focus of the following
section.

Arab relations and divisions

The issue of Palestine, the PLO and other Palestinian factions and groups have
become integrated into the existing inter-Arab rivalries, disputes and relations.
Since the beginning of the Saudi-Hashemite rivalry, Saudi Arabia was resolved
to stop any Hashemite agenda from materialising for reasons discussed in
Chapter One. Part of the Hashemite agenda was the unification of the Fertile
Crescent which included parts of Palestine. Such an agenda was not in line with
Egyptian-Saudi interests and so it was challenged. In 1950, Jordan announced
its annexation of the West Bank, a move that was welcomed by Britain but not
by the League who put to an end to it with the decision of the League's council of 12\textsuperscript{th} June 1950 (Abdel-Salam 2007). The decision stated that the:

\begin{quote}
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan declares that the annexation of the Palestinian section to it has been necessitated by practical needs and that Jordan will keep this territory in (custody) until the day when it is included in a final settlement when the rest of Palestine is liberated. Jordan will accept whatever the rest of the Arab League states decide regarding it.
\end{quote}

(AbdulHadi 1995)

The League reconfirmed this disengagement during the Rabat conference when it recognised the PLO as the representative for the Palestinian people (AbdulHadi 1995; Masri 2010).

With regard to the UN Partition Plan for Palestine of 1947, the Arab League held a series of meetings concluding in the decision to invite Arab armies to enter Palestine in order to defend its territory and people. The League’s military incoherence has had a serious impact on the trajectory of the Palestinian issue since the military confrontation in 1948. The Arab collective defeat in the war with Israel in 1948 showed that there was a complete absence of military co-ordination. Furthermore, Egypt and Transjordan worked openly against each other both before and during the fighting. The fate of Palestine as well as the map and territorial claims were determined in relation to the outcome. The Egyptian-Transjordanian competition intensified when the latter annexed the
West Bank and Egypt made a determined effort to expel Jordan from the League but failed (Major 1963).

*The defeat of the Egyptian army in 1948 and the occupation of most of Palestine by the Jewish and Zionist groups was a disaster in political terms to the Arab collective. Nevertheless, the Egyptian government did manage to attain at least one of the major goals that it had originally set for itself, that is to prevent the establishment of a Tel Aviv-Amman axis. The war brought political, economic, and demographic changes to Jordan that made King Abdullah more subservient to the Arab League than ever before.*

(Arab League 2006)

Little (1956) has reflected on the Charter in terms of how the division within the League was written into the Charter; and how this caused direct disagreements between states who were trying to promote unity and Arab nationalism from one side and those who were advocating national sovereignty and non-intervention as the principle for relations (as explained in Chapters One and Three).

*For example, the opposition to Musa Bey al-Alami, a sincere and intelligent Arab leader who had been put in charge of the Arab Offices in Jerusalem and abroad, was motivated to a large extent on behalf of the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. Whereas*
Musa al-Alami was on good terms with Iraq, Hajj Amin was hated by Iraq for his part in fomenting the Rashid Ali revolt of 1941.

(Little 1956, p.142)

Furthermore, the differences between Egypt and Saudi Arabia with Iraq were manifested through the adoption of conflicting policies to maintain the differences between Hajj Amin and Musa Bey.

Examining the relationship between Arab state formation and the issue of Palestine, Brynen (1991) argues that many of the Arab states' decisions and approaches to Palestine were influenced by their awareness of the importance of Palestine in their own internal politics and how such impacts affected the formation and development of their own political systems. In a June 1988 speech to the Arab League, King Hussain of Jordan noted that

state affiliation is a newly emergent phenomenon.... If today prevailing thinking tends towards allegiance to the state, with a state identity occupying a dear place in the [young generation's] hearts, they should not be hard on their forbears and ours

(Brynen 1991, p.619)

With this, the King attempted to justify past Jordanian annexation of the West Bank in terms of the unionist and pan-Arabist sentiments of an older generation. Equally, he also signalled the apparent ascendancy of this raison d'état in Arab politics, whilst prefiguring his own efforts to insulate and consolidate the
Jordanian state through disengagement. It has been suggested that historic patterns of state formation in the Arab world, and contemporary processes of state consolidation, have played an important role in shaping state responses to the Palestine issue (Brynen 1991, p.619). Brynen also recognised as early as 1991 that the internal social and ideological effects on Arab states of the issue of Palestine were in decline. This decline led to less political impact and therefore a lower priority of the issue on the Arab agenda. The peace agreements signed between Israel and Egypt and Jordan can further explain the decline of the issue of Palestine in the latter two states. However, the weak Arab response to the 1982 war in Lebanon between Israel and the PLO, for example, supports the above explanation since this - as well as the events of the first Palestinian intifada of 1987 - did not cause any serious political changes within the Arab states.

Following the 1967 war, Egypt and Jordan caused a division in the Arab League by accepting UN Resolution 242, which was strongly rejected by Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the PLO. This event represents a division in the perception of the conflict as well as the importance of UN resolutions and international institutions. However, unity in vision was achieved in 1969 when the Arab League held its famous summit in Khartoum where the Arab consensus was not to accept the defeat of the 1967 June war. The resolution passed at the summit confirmed this agreement stating their aim:

\[T\]o unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which
have been occupied since the aggression of June 5. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab States abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country.

(League of Arab States 1967)

A major crisis within the Arab League occurred when Egypt went alone and signed a separate peace treaty with Israel at Camp David in 1979. As a consequence, at the summit in Baghdad, the Arab League decided to suspend Egypt's membership and to move their headquarters from Egypt to Tunisia. In addition, it was the first time that a non-Egyptian was appointed as the General Secretary of the League. Shazili Qulaibi of Tunisia succeeded former Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad and became the first and only non-Egyptian to hold the post. The suspension resulted in the neutralisation of the largest Arab country from having a direct contribution to the already agreed-upon Arab policy towards Israel and the Palestinian issue. Consecutive confrontations with Israel during the 1980s and 1990 involved an Egyptian role as mediator only. In the 1980s, especially with regard to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the forced departure of the PLO seeking exile in Tunisia, no Arab country or the Arab League interfered. Arab states released statements supporting the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples but did nothing to actively defend Lebanese territory or preserve its unity. This was the first clear example of the limited effect the issue of Palestine and the conflict with Israel would have on internal Arab systems.
The withdrawal of Egypt from the joint Arab efforts resulted in new types of alliances for the PLO. In February 1985, the PLO and Jordan signed the famous accord that stated their intention to work together towards the establishment of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation (Abdul-Hadi 2009). Arab reactions varied between the Syrian rejection, Saudi Arabia’s reservation and no comments on the part of the others. However, this alliance and vision did not last long. Due to the eruption of the first Palestinian intifada, the issue of Palestine returned to Arab League’s agenda. This was a serious shift because the Amman summit in November 1987 was unique in its disregard of the Palestine issue. At the Amman summit, the Arab League called for economic cooperation, reconciliation between Iraq and Syria, invited Egypt to return to the League and, for the first time and unexpectedly, completely ignored the PLO and the Palestinian agenda.

A month later, however, with the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada in December 1987, all Arab countries without exception expressed their strong support for and solidarity with the Palestinian cause. In the following year, Arab leaders encouraged Jordan to declare its disengagement from the West Bank (AbdulHadi 1995). This was officially declared in King Hussein’s speech that was referred to earlier in this chapter. Nevertheless, the Arab countries’ position on the peace initiatives of the PLO and their interest in entering into political negotiations with Israel was one of disapproval (Abdul-Hadi 2009). At the 1990 Baghdad summit, the declaration confirmed the negative effects of the Israeli occupation, Jewish migration into Palestine
and the external US role in threatening the Arab national security and Arab independence. The summit placed the support for the first Palestinian intifada and for Palestinian rights at the heart of its agenda. This position remained the dominant and formal position until the launch of the peace process at the Madrid conference of 1991.

The Madrid peace process came in the period following the forced Iraqi removal from Kuwait by an international coalition led by the USA. As discussed extensively in Chapters five and six, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the damage done to joint Arab efforts, Arab national security and the direct involvement of external forces in the region both politically and militarily resulted in serious changes to the League’s influence and regional dynamics. The Madrid peace process was launched in this new context and during a period of weakness of the League. The events preceding the Madrid talks had increased and deepened the role of external parties not only in regional security, as discussed before, but also on the Palestinian issue and how the Arab League handled it. Therefore, the peace process and external influence will be focused upon next.

**External influence**

The history of external intervention in PLO and Israel-related issues is nothing new. Haikal’s (1996) book on secret negotiations between Israel and the Arabs gives an insight into how alliances have been functioning within the Arab world.
For example, the incident of the brief Syrian invasion of Jordan in 1970 to support the PLO was seen by the USA through the prism of the Cold War. The USA prepared extensively to intervene on behalf of Jordan in confronting this Soviet bloc intervention in Jordan which made Syria withdraw within three days of combat (Mobley 2009). Furthermore, in the early 1980s during the Lebanese civil war, an alliance was formed between some Lebanese groups and militias and Israel against other Lebanese parties and PLO forces. This phase of the Israeli involvement in Lebanon showed that the Israeli-Palestinian issue was not only influencing Arab policy and relations but also the structure and internal stability of Arab states as well. The continued presence of over four hundred and fifty thousand Palestinian refugees in Lebanon27 is an example of the long term effect the issue had on Lebanon.

The role of the Arab League was less effective when the USA invited various Arab states to participate in the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference in 1991, based on negotiations (on both bilateral and multilateral tracks) and on the ‘land-for-peace’ formula. The Arab League was not invited, not even as an observer (Abdul-Hadi 2009; Al-Mashat 2007). That particular peace process is a significant phase in the history of Palestinian issue and deserves to be examined further. The following section will focus on the peace process in relation to the League and intra-Arab relations.

Peace process

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27 UNRWA figures as of 1 January 2011
“The peace concluded between Egypt and Israel was highly controversial within the Arab League and dangerously soured relations between Cairo and Damascus in particular” (McCoubrey 2000, p.197). This is because, as discussed in Chapter Six, the peace agreements between Israel and Arab parties presented a challenge to Arab policy and consensus on Palestine. Egypt's membership was suspended from 1979 to 1989 because of its treaty with Israel and the aforementioned move of the League's headquarters to Tunis. In 1988, the League endorsed the PLO's plan for a negotiated settlement with Israel and, in 1991 Cairo once again became its headquarters. In 2002 and for the first time, the League offered Israel the normalisation of relations with Arab countries (this was also known as the Saudi Initiative) if it met certain conditions, but many of the conditions were not acceptable to Israel. While this initiative may be considered a strategic shift in the Arab League's position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, especially when compared to the actions taken against Egypt for signing a peace agreement with Israel, the initiative itself was a result of a number of factors that were related to inter-Arab politics and the failure to agree on a unified policy towards Israel.

Arab states had their own reasons for engaging with the peace process other than finding a solution to the conflict. The American efforts leading up to the Madrid conference were being positively received since no regional party wanted to be perceived as the obstacle for peace. However:

*Syria was extremely ambivalent about an Arab-Israeli initiative and spent much time weighing its options. Since 1974, the Arab-Israeli status quo (regarding the Golan Heights and the Palestinian*
question) had allowed Hafiz al-Assad to win legitimacy as the steadfast standard bearer of the Arab cause against Israel, to consolidate Syria's pre-eminence in Lebanon and to keep his country in a perpetually mobilized, and therefore politically quiescent, state.

(Maddy-Weitzman 1991, p.15)

Egypt, on the other hand, did not want to continue being the only Arab country with a formal peace agreement with Israel and, therefore, was particularly interested in a successful peace conference leading to similar agreements with other Arab countries. In this respect, Egypt’s Mubarak played an active role in bringing Israelis and Palestinians together through acting as a host for meetings. Such a role also helped to improve the Egyptian regional position and consequently its international relations, “but Egypt's leverage on the other Arab parties and Israel remained limited” (Maddy-Weitzman 1991, p.16).

The PLO, with Arafat in particular, was still suffering the consequences of the position it had adopted on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Its relations with the GCC countries were greatly damaged and its financial resources were limited, and at that point, the Palestinian population in the occupied territories had been under three and half years of intifada and was ready for political progress (Hamza 2007).

*The PLO sought to rebuild bridges to the Saudis, Egyptians and Syrians. The increasingly precarious state of Arafat's loyalists in*
southern Lebanon vis-a-vis the Syrian-backed central government and pro-Syrian militias made a Syrian-Arafat understanding essential, but unlikely. The PLO thus needed to renew ties with Egypt and Saudi Arabia which could act as a counter-weight to Syrian pressure.

(Maddy-Weitzman 1991, p.16)

As a step to facilitate an exit out of the situation, the PLO agreed to indirect participation in the Madrid conference by being part of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. In that context, participation in the peace process served as more than a solution to the longest conflict in the region. Each country had its own political and national agenda, accompanied by the decrease of the Arab League’s role which meant that there were no consequences for putting aside the agreed-upon position on Israel and the Palestinian issue. This situation further served to limit the role played by the League to the mere issuing of statements when a crisis emerged and participating in the funding of limited projects in the newly controlled Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza.

The Saudi role has increased since the second intifada eruption in 2000, and reflected a shift in the Arab League approach reflecting the change in the balance of power as Egypt’s regional role began to decrease. The Arab Peace Initiative in 2002 represented a formal Arab position and a clear path toward the end of the conflict, and it was adopted in the Beirut summit (2002) as mentioned earlier. The Arab Peace Initiative was also a serious shift from the traditional
League position of opposition towards recognition of Israel as a regional partner and the involvement of Saudi-Arabia which had been reluctant to get directly involved, at least politically, in the past. Another significant example of the Saudi involvement was in 2007 when Riyadh hosted the first ever Arab summit to be held in a GCC country. The regular 19th Summit produced many important resolutions in relation to joint Arab cooperation, Arab National Security and Palestine. Regarding Palestine, the summit re-introduced the Arab Initiative of 2002 as the League’s position on a resolution (Resolution 367) to the conflict. The summit also endorsed and supported the Palestinian unity government (Resolution 368) (League of Arab States 2007) between Fatah and Hamas, which was also a result of a Saudi initiative, known as the Mecca Accord28.

The League’s ability to influence the course and events of the peace process was limited due to the factors reviewed above and, prior to 2002 and the Saudi initiative, the Arab approach to peace in the region had been based on the principle of ‘land for peace’. However, there was no clear strategy or path for implementing this principle since the peace process was divided into a number of bilateral tracks of negotiations that were mediated by extra-regional parties such as the US and Norway.

In addition to all these changes and shifts in approach and position, one strategy remained unchanged, at least to those who did not enter into the forum.

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28 After months of intermittent talks, on 8th February 2007 Fatah and Hamas signed an agreement to form a national unity government aimed at ending both the spasm of violence and the international aid embargo that followed the formation of the initial Hamas-led government. The accord was signed by PA President and Fatah leader Mahmud Abbas and Hamas political leader Khalid Mish’al in Mecca.
for peace with Israel, which is the Arab policy of boycott. This presented the most agreed-upon non-military strategy for confronting Israel since the early days of the League. While the effectiveness of the policy is in doubt (Abdel-Salam 2007; Fershtman & Gandal 1998), the institutional side of the policy represented a serious concern to Israel and the USA (Weiss 2006). Since the policy of boycott and the level of implementation highlight the changes in policy and shifts within Arab consensus, the boycott policy will be discussed in the following section.

**The Arab boycott of Israel**

One of the early strategies adopted by the Arab League was the strategy of boycott. In 1945 the League began implementing a policy of boycott of goods and services in the British mandate of Palestine that related to Zionist companies and organisations. In 1948, following the war and the establishment of Israel, the boycott was formalised against the new state of Israel and broadened to include non-Israelis who maintained economic relations with Israel or who were perceived to support it. The boycott was administered by the Damascus-based Central Boycott Office (CBO), a specialized bureau of the Arab League (Weiss, 2006). The Arab boycott of Israel and companies dealing with it was one of the very first actions taken by the Arab League that influenced inter-Arab relations and policy formulation within it.

Although the structure of the boycott remains unchanged, enforcement varies greatly from one Arab state to another. Some member governments of the Arab League, like Syria, have consistently maintained that only the Arab League as a
whole can revoke the boycott. Other members, especially those that entered into agreements with Israel as well as the GCC countries during the peace process, support national discretion on adherence to the boycott, and a number of states have taken steps to dismantle their adherence to some aspects of it. For instance, in September 1994, the GCC announced that it would end its adherence to the secondary and tertiary aspects of the Arab League boycott of Israel which would mean eliminating a significant trade barrier to US firms (Weiss, 2006). In March 1996, the GCC reiterated this commitment to end the secondary and tertiary boycotts, and recognised the total dismantling of the Arab boycott of Israel as a necessary step in advancing the peace process and promoting regional cooperation.

In June 1996, Israel opened a representative office in Oman and later that year an Omani trade office was opened in Israel. “Oman, the first Gulf state to take such a step, has seen considerable growth in its trade relations with Israel” (Al-Eissawi 2001, p.32). In addition, Bahrain announced on 19th September 2005 its intention to cancel its economic sanctions against Israel. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia pledged in a bilateral trade agreement with the USA that it would abide by the regulations of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on trading with all WTO members, including Israel. In this regard, Israel's ambassador to the WTO, Itzhak Levanon, said on 15th November 2005 that Saudi Arabia had provided sufficient guarantees that it would abide by WTO rules related to open trade with all members. This development, which served to push many WTO member states to ratify Saudi membership, also opened the door for Israeli trade with other Arab and Islamic countries.
As a result, the GCC states were forced to deal with the Palestinian issue from a different perspective in order to disprove the claims of the Western media that they are a source of extremism and intolerance since the events of 9/11 (Hamza 2007). In particular, the Gulf States were urged to distance themselves from groups viewed by Washington as terrorist organisations, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Al-Essawi 2006). The Gulf response coincided with the Israeli reoccupation of the Palestinian West Bank in 2003 in the form of a Saudi initiative to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the Arabs’ normalising relations with Israel in return for a complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem (Ghatas 2007). During the Beirut Arab summit of 2002, this initiative received widespread Arab support to become a specifically Arab initiative. In this context, ending the formal boycott and normalising relations with Israel represented, from the Arab point of view, a significant component of their vision for comprehensive settlement.

The general stance of GCC countries towards the normalisation of relations with Israel has been characterised as a contradiction between the official and popular positions. While some Gulf governments have relaxed their economic embargo of Israel, public opinion is largely against such moves. In Bahrain, for instance, the parliament rejected on 11th October 2005 a decision by the government to lift the ban on the entry of Israeli products to the country and in addition passed a law to re-open an office to monitor the entry of Israeli products into local markets (Weiss 2006). In Kuwait, angry reactions followed the publication in the Al-Rai Al-Aam newspaper on 18th August 2005 of a

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statement made by the Israeli foreign minister concerning the possibility of the normalisation of relations between Israel and Kuwait, and the visit of a number of Kuwaiti businessmen to his country. This resulted in some members of the Kuwaiti national council demanding that these businessmen be stripped of their Kuwaiti nationality (Al-Eissawi 2006).

Lack of coordination and non-adherence to the collective will on the issue of boycott was a common occurrence within the League. Qatar, for example, invited Israel to the Doha economic conference in 1997 despite Gulf and other Arab opposition. Despite not having formal diplomatic ties with the Israel, Qatar has maintained covert and informal relations with Israel (Cooper 2011). It also refused to respond to a recommendation made at the emergency Arab Summit of October 2000 in Cairo which called on Arab countries to revise their communications with Israel (Al-Eissawi 2001). Furthermore, when Oman and Tunisia shut down their Israeli trade offices, Qatar refused to follow suit, claiming that the summit resolutions were not binding (Al-Eissawi 2006; Cooper 2011).

More seriously, the Qatari foreign minister’s pledge to sit down and talk with Israel – announced before the Council on Foreign Relations in September 2005 – not only contradicts the Saudi peace plan endorsed by the 2002 Beirut Arab Summit, but has been seen by some as an attempt to derail the initiative (Al-Essawi, 2006). One argument that was used to explain such conduct was the absence of any requirement to adhere to these policies from countries that have
signed agreements with Israel, and that the policy of boycott should be implemented comprehensively or lose its meaning.

These developments and conflicting positions made the Arab boycott of Israel irrelevant on the ground. In September 2005, the Israeli foreign minister, Silvan Shalom, told the UN General Assembly that “The iron wall that has defined Israel’s relations with most of the Arab and Muslim world for generations is coming down” (Al-Eissawi 2006). This was a speech that focused on the progress of the normalisation process between his country and the Arab and Islamic world, and he also stated that he had met with ten foreign ministers from Arab and Islamic countries, including Gulf states, noting that this development would have been “unthinkable even two years ago” (ibid.).

**Conclusion**

This chapter reviewed the issue of Palestine in relation to the Arab League and Arab policies. The chapter reconfirmed the findings from Chapter One in relation to the importance and centrality of the Palestinian issue to Arab politics and Arab national security. It also explored the matter of Palestinian representation and how the League interfered in its development as well as how individual Arab state preferences vis-à-vis Palestinian representation had an impact on the Arab approach to the problem as a whole. Arab preferences and dislikes were shown to be instrumental in determining what form of authority and government to support, or not, in Palestine. In addition, it became clear that the Arab dislike of Hajj-Amin as a leader prevented the development of an
institutional Palestinian government and the declaration of a Palestinian independent entity, although the Palestinians took the first steps towards that themselves. The establishment of the PLO and recognising it as the representative of the Palestinian people was also evidenced to have influenced Arab approach towards the issue.

Through reviewing Arab relations and divisions, it became clear that inter-Arab relations and rivalries dominated the debate on the Palestinian issue from the early days of the League. Little’s (1956) reflection on the Charter of the League and the causes behind the abandonment of the Alexandria protocol, unity and Arab nationalism in favour of the sovereignty and independence also showed how the shift in the League’s direction affected how the League handled the issue of Palestine as well. The fact that only a small number of Arab countries were not under occupation and that the League was rather an understudies’ union representing what is possible and not what is needed (Sobeih 2007), explains the abandonment of the Alexandria Protocol and the adoption of the Charter as shown in Chapter One. This also helps explain the disastrous performance of the League in its first military test in 1948. The most significant crack in what was previously a unified official position was caused by disagreements on the recognition of UN resolutions and the value of international organisations as well as the decision by Egypt to enter into political processes with Israel outside the Arab collective.

The League’s approach has been a mixture of pro-active initiatives and reactions to events. Various Israeli actions have helped trigger responses from
the Arab League members throughout the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, prompted by Israel’s plans to divert the waters of the Jordan River in 1953, the Arab states created the Jordan Waters Organisation, which was to coordinate Jordanian, Egyptian, Syrian and Lebanese policies on this matter (Hudes 1999). They also set up a joint command under the Commander-in-chief of the UAR’s military forces, although it “proved unsuccessful in implementing a united strategy for the liberation of Palestine” (Arab League 2006). Further to the coordination of Arab positions towards international causes, the First Arab Conference which was held in Cairo in 1964, after Israel’s redirection of the River Jordan, adopted a resolution stating the annual convention of Summit Conferences. Indirectly, the realisation of the importance of joint action strategy towards Israel was also part of the reasoning behind elevating the level of coordination to heads of states and restructuring decision-making institutions within the League.

Having established that the Arab League’s role in regional security is weak, the Palestinian issue has become more complicated due to regional, international and internal Palestinian factors that the League has not been able to counterbalance. Evidently, due to further divisions among the Palestinians themselves, the League has become less capable of playing an operational, strategic and independent role or implementing its resolutions. Arab initiatives and policies are less effective on the ground (Al-Mashat, 2007) and the League’s approach to the Palestinian issue has changed in response to and as a result of certain circumstances and international factors. The Arab performance has
actually been bound by the international formula (Sobeih, 2007; Al-Mashat, 2007; Hamza, 2007), especially since the launch of the Madrid peace process.

Sobeih (2007) believes that one of the main obstacles facing the Arab League is the Israeli occupation of Arab territories and the American bias toward Israel that is greatly weakening the League. “The US provides economic, security, military and political support to Israel. This policy is the biggest obstacle facing the development of the Arab position” (Sobeih, 2007). While relations with the USA have improved, and although the USA is invited to observe Arab League meetings, it remains committed to maintaining an Israeli military supremacy in the region and political impunity in international forums. A shift in the American approach to Israel would allow a solution to be reached for the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the double standard approach and the failure of consecutive American administrations to make a breakthrough for peace in the region is creating a serious problem for Arab affairs and weakening the League’s role and position (Sobeih 2007; Sewelam 2007). In the context of external intervention and according to many Arab experts and officials, since 9/11 the USA’s declaration of a ubiquitous war on terror generated little support in the rest of the non-Western world, the most obvious explanation for the League’s ineffectiveness can be summarized in one word: Israel (Sobeih 2007; Hamza 2007; Nafaa 2007). This can explain the increased pressure on Arab countries to normalise relations with Israel and the GCC disposition towards concluding its implementation of the boycott policies since, as explained by Weiss (2006), the Gulf states were highlighted as the source of radical Islam. In doing so, many Arab states seemed to be abandoning their commitment to reaching
consent on issues related to Israel which had ramification on the function and effectiveness of the League when it comes to Arab cooperation and coordination.

The defenders of the League argue that the Arab states tried to support Palestine and expressed solidarity towards the Palestinians as much as they could in the face of international challenges (Sobeih 2007; Al-Mashat 2007). In a step to guarantee that the issue of Palestinian refugees is not dissolved, “the league adopted from the start a principle of no citizenship for Palestinians and created a special sector for Palestine within the league. It also appointed a permanent Palestinian Assistant Secretary General” (Al-Mashat, 2007).

The League has also made significant contributions to the on-going debate on regional security in the Middle East. I believe that security in the region can only be achieved through the honest and mutual implementation of the Arab Peace Initiative. This had already been unanimously adopted during the Beirut summit in March 2002, and supported universally. It called for the withdrawal of the Israeli occupying forces, the establishment of a Palestinian State, and a fair settlement of the question of refugees, as well as the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the establishment of relations of peace.

Amr Moussa, the League of Arab States, August 2002
The above statement summarises the League’s continuing position on Palestine today. Although Arab states have always reaffirmed the value of Palestine to Arab interests and their opposition to dividing historical Palestine, the Arab-Israeli conflict has tended to influence Arab politics not only vis-à-vis Israel, but also towards each other. For instance, 1948 witnessed the first Arab-Israeli military confrontation and while the outcome was not in favour of Arab national security, the defeat increased the need for Arab national security as discussed in Chapter One, and in military and political sense, the drive towards maintaining a unified Arab front.

The interdependency between the Arab League and the issue of Palestine is linked by Brynen (1991) to the degree to which the issue affects Arab regimes and internal Arab policies. Brynen argues that the policies of Arab regimes towards the Palestinian issue have been substantially shaped by historical patterns of state formation, and by the gradual consolidation of the Arab state system. This has served to ‘harden’ the Arab territorial state, creating conditions under which Arab states are increasingly (if only partially) insulated from the transnational effects of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. However, the anti-Israeli sentiment in the Islamic and Arab worlds can also be explained as a way for reactionary governments to divert popular rage away from their own domestic political and financial problems as the events of 2011 in Syria suggest (Byman 2011).
Finally, based on the above discussion and the League’s performance and inability to resolve its most central conflict and security concern, it is possible to conclude that “the Arab League [has] proved unable to act as an effective regional agency and, insofar as the Arab-Israeli crisis was one of the spurs to its creation, it [has] definitely failed as a forum for resolution or even military alliance” (McCoubrey 2000, p.197).
CONCLUSION

Narrative summary

The purpose of this research has been to critically review the role and performance of the Arab League as a regional security organisation in order to evaluate the reasons, contexts and dynamics of its failure to develop fully as a Regional Security Organisation (RSO).

This study was a critical examination of the history, conditions of emergence and internal dynamics of the League set within inter-Arab relations. The
theoretical parameters were set through reviewing what was offered by the literature and existing research in relation to the concepts of regionalism, regional security and regional organisation. From here, the study sought to evaluate the Arab League's failure by evaluating its performance against the conditions for success and failure against measures in the pertinent literatures and by means of comparative analysis.

The study was divided into seven chapters. Each chapter focused on a specific thematic area. Chapter One researched the conditions and influences leading to the emergence and development of the Arab League as a regional security organisation. Chapter One demonstrated that despite Arab public aspirations concerning regional identity, collective security and economic-political development, the Arab League itself, as regional organisation, remains substantially short of its potential strengths and capacities. Chapter One also demonstrated that Arabic identity (Findlay 1994; Yahya 2010), as an underlying commonality in geographical, linguistic and historical terms, was the cornerstone for Arabic unification. The Arab League's development was in part driven by the ideology of a shared identity and a common past and future; and it was based not on a geographical framework, but on a 'civilizational' or ethnic commonality that masked the presence of diverse issues and conflict in the region.

Chapter One showed how inter-Arab relations played an important role in the creation and development of the League even before its formal establishment in 1945. The polarising, underlying rivalry of Anti-Hashemite and Hashemite blocs
within the region impacted the creation and politics of the Arab League and had profound consequences for the very structure, power and coherence of the Arab League as a regional institution. Meanwhile, the centrality of the Palestinian situation surfaced as another impediment to a strong Arab confederation as well as taking on an international geo-political significance that continued to engage British colonial power in the region.

The historical review and the examination of the League’s conditions of emergence showed that the League faced a number of challenges even before its inception, including immediate diverging interests and developing problems. These included the historical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Jordan; a weak Charter both functionally and ideologically; the ascension of internal socio-political stability over wider notions of equality and unit; prioritisation of the liberation of the Arab states then still under European colonialism; and finally, the issue of Palestine under the British Mandate and threatened with Zionist immigration.

Chapter Two engaged with theoretical debates on the definition and nature of regionalism and security, including the development of evaluative criteria on how a regional organisation is tested through its ability to handle conflicts (Anthony 2005). This research pointed to the levels of interdependency and amity-enmity within a given region not only determinants of the success or failure of a regional organisation but also as factors which fundamentally shape the structure and performance of such organisations. Various theories and empirical research in the literature have identified levels for analysing regional
security, including interactions with neighbouring regions; state-to-state relations; domestic politics; and the role of larger global powers within the region.

A key point that emerged through Chapter Two through a comparison between Realist, Liberal, and Constructivist approach of analysis is the relevance of the constructivist approach to developing a clear understanding of the concept ‘Arab national security’ since such concept is a reflection of a constructed or imagined identity. As an increasing portion of the Arab League’s energies became devoted to various aspects of national security (with an emphasis on its military aspects), the full meaning of ‘Arab national security’ as identified in this dissertation has become obscured, both historically and presently. It was a key purpose of this work to restore the full meaning of Arab national security to analyses of the Arab League – and more broadly.

Chapter Three focused on Arab national security, its development and how it was manifested through the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty. There were references prior to this agreement to the concept of national security and the threats to Arab interests and independence; such references were in relation to specific issues, such as Palestine and Lebanon. Research confirmed that Arab states do not agree on a single definition of national security. The divisions among Arab states between rich countries and poor ones, monarchs and republics, border disputes and historical rivalries have all been contributing factors to the slow progress of the implementation of military and security cooperation treaties. The presence of weak states and overlay are
also reasons for this slow cooperation. Although there are existing bodies within
the League that are a result of joint initiatives and agreements to realise the
concept of Arab National Security like APSS and Arab National Security Sector,
these two bodies have inherited the same limitations that have crippled the Arab
League in general, and joint Arab action in particular; specifically, the lack of will
to act and the fact that actions taken had to be unanimous.

In spite of the on-going presence of challenges to Arab national security and
joint cooperation from the 1940s (such as the issue of Palestine, national
sovereignty, and independence from external interference), the approach to
Arab national security has not evolved fast enough to accommodate the
changing reality of the region itself and Arab states’ individual needs for their
own state national security.

Moreover, the enlargement of the League to include states on the Atlantic coast
of Africa (Mauritania) as well as the Indian Ocean (Comoros) necessitated that
the League incorporate the security concerns of those members in various sub-
regions as part of any attempt to establish a feasible strategy for the realisation
of Arab national security. In terms of conflict resolution, new states came with
more issues, conflicts and border disputes that the League needed to address.
Yet this seemingly evident problem remains submerged since the general
conceptual approach of regional security was based on the constructed concept
of Arab national security itself.
In sum, the expansion in scope and responsibilities was not accompanied with adequate mechanisms for realising them. An example on this is the delay in recognising the need for a summit system until 1960s. While the League was required to have a position on more conflicts and play a role in their resolution, such as western Sahara conflict, the UAE-Iran islands dispute and various issues in Sudan and Somalia, the League remained heavily engaged in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, but proved largely incapable of resolving other major conflicts at the heart of the Arab world. In the end, it suffered institutional exhaustion.

The concept of Arab national security as understood in its broadest and historically most enduring sense was largely subsumed (or perhaps, bypassed) by the Arab League’s regional political and military alliances and dynamics which have absorbed the largest part of its energies and directed its efforts and cooperation toward the traditional definition of state threat perceptions.

A second problem with Arab national security, as it developed under the auspices of the Arab League, is that it is a defensive concept that formulates an Arab-Arab alliance to deal with external threats to Arab countries and does not propose collective security. A dramatic shift in the direction of Arab national security happened in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The fear of repeated Arab aggression on another Arab state became the biggest concern for many of the League’s member states (Hawwāt 2002; Abdel-Salam 2007; Al-Mashat 2007) and therefore extra-regional powers became new guarantors for their national security, which contradicts the structure and orientation of the League.
Further, Arab national security is facing a number of internal challenges: border disputes, popular social justice aspirations, restrictions and suspension of intellectual and political freedom, increased external debt, inflation, unemployment, food insecurity, water shortage, and a lack of technological competitiveness and innovation, (Rigal 1993; Haddadin 2002; Abu-Taleb 2003) – that is, many of the pillars of any truly comprehensive Arab national security. Taken together, the absence of a practical and acceptable Arab national security concept and mechanisms to formalise and pursue it has meant that other concepts and arrangements – particularly those which concern national security – have largely displaced it.

In Chapter Four, the research examined the nature of regional security organisations and their relation to states and other international organisations, and how such interactions and relations influence the success or failure of the security role of these organisations. Because the degree of regional cooperation is higher among a smaller number of states, there is a tendency for states to limit the size of the organisations they are members of in order to maximise their gains. This explains the evolution of sub-regional organisations within the Arab world, in order to compensate for the difficulties facing cooperation on the broader scale of the League - or as a response to specific challenges that affect a smaller number of states (the GCC and the Iran-Iraq war in 1980).
The examination of regional organisations showed that their role is an integral part of the international system since recognised as such by the UN after WWII. However, the dynamics of sovereignty and external intervention pose limitations on the security role of regional organisations. Furthermore, the development of sub-regional organisations, according to the Realists, has overshadowed the role of regional organisations by allowing a smaller number of states an alternative framework for security cooperation. In this respect, the Arab League has witnessed the development of several sub-regional organisations such as the GCC and the AMU. The Realist analysis provides a practical explanation of the decreasing security role of the League since it did not escape the effects of the dynamics of state-to-state interaction, the anarchical structure of the international system and the impetus to state self-preservation through focusing on maintaining unity instead of confronting issues. Realist theory explains the intervention of external powers as a result of the asymmetrical promotion of interests of dominant international powers over weaker regional blocs. This perspective offers a convincing account of the continuous presence of the dominant American power in the 1990s in the Arabian Gulf in particular, and the Middle East in general.

Sub-regional organisations such as the GCC and AMU provide frameworks for economic cooperation. However, when examining frameworks for conflict prevention and resolution only the GCC poses the features that impact the activities of the Arab League. The presence of Saudi-Arabia in GCC as a powerful regional power, GCC intervention shield forces, and the presence of a GCC common rival in Iran, all are factors that helped the GCC in becoming
more independent from the League. At the same time, there are various factors that influence the development and effectiveness of regional (Arab league) and sub-regional (GCC) organisations. These include ideological and ethnic, rivalries and differing political systems that impact on the type of membership in these organisations. These factors also affect the security mandate of these organisations as well as their ability to practise conflict prevention and resolution. The League is a pan-Arab organisation that exists in a region that is not purely Arab and extends to reach far beyond its ability to influence.

Realists, Neoliberals and Constructivists do not dispute the centrality and importance of the state but they differ on the importance of international organisations and their ability to add anything of substance to states’ interests and their interactions with other states. While the Constructivists argue that there are three types of organisations (consensual communities, bureaucracy, and an organisation driven by norms and principles), the dissertation’s research and review of Arab relations, transformations of the League’s structure and changes in policy, show that the Arab League is not a neat fit with any single one of these three types. The League is no longer a consensual community since the principle of unanimity was broken in Cairo summit of 1990 and since most resolutions are only binding to those who voted for them. The League has also abandoned many of its core principles in relation to external intervention, by inviting foreign forces to operate on Arab territories in 1990 and in 2011 in the case of Libya. The Arab stance on Israel is another example of dramatic shift from the principles of liberating Arab territories and protecting sovereignty that have been at the heart of the League since the 1940s. Furthermore, the
Arab spring of 2011 showed that many of the Arab regimes were functioning contrary to the principle of human rights without this previously becoming an issue on the League’s agenda. It is difficult to claim that the League remains an example of an organisation driven by norms and principles (and certainly not by a generous and inclusive understanding of ‘Arab national security’) and the Arab league is no less likely to be subject to bureaucratic interests and inertia than any other regional organisation.

Chapter four also showed that failure to deal with regional intra-state conflicts, where sovereignty is an issue, is common among regional organisations. However, regional organisations had limited success in controlling superpower intervention in regional conflicts and in becoming part of a global collective security system that differs from military alliances, but which remains a central, unfulfilled aspiration of the United Nations.

Chapter Five examined in what ways and in which cases the Arab League could be regarded as a success. While the Charter of the League provided a clear mechanism for supporting a member state that is being threatened by an external party, a similar mechanism was not established to resolve conflicts among two or more member states. In addition, although the framework established by the League for conflict resolution, mediation and prevention was important in enhancing the security and stability of its members (since it carried the weight of the collective Arab members versus the violating state), enforcement was still an issue which limited the effectiveness of the League’s mechanism. Again, the principle of unanimity was a limitation that affected the
League’s ability to intervene in conflicts. The Charter also excludes the organisation’s involvement in any disputes relating to independence and sovereignty, which consequently includes border disputes. These limitations meant that the margin for success for the League in its peace and security roles has been limited. This was reflected in the modest number of successful interventions where according to Barnett and Solingen (2007), the League met with success in only six out of the 77 conflict situations that it intervened in between 1945 and 1981. On the other hand, the League maintained its role related to preventing external intervention and fragmentation through external military alliances throughout the course of the Cold War.

Chapter Six highlighted the shortcomings and limitations of the Arab League in conflict prevention and resolution. Although the confrontation with Israel helped unify joint military coordination efforts until the early 1970s, the research provided evidence and data to suggest that the positive influence of the League on conflict levels has been on the decline since the late 1970s. It also reconfirmed that the League’s performance was not consistent in all forms of conflicts because it was not willing to intervene either in the internal and local matters of Arab members or in most border disputes. There has also been an identified pattern of hesitancy and indecisiveness by the League when addressing civil wars due to internal voting system that favours unanimity. Divisions among member states have also been shown to have contributed greatly to the League’s failure as a regional security organisation. The most substantial division happened over Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
The increase in external intervention since early 1990s and the dependency of militarily weak Arab states on external powers for security can explain the refusal of those Arab states to allow a greater security role for the Arab League. Indeed, the frequent shifts and changes in alliances throughout the League’s history prove that there is no Arab state with enough power or status to lead the formation of Arab regional security, even in the narrowest terms. In other words, the most significant evidence of League weakness is “the lack of an executive authority and mechanisms to achieve regional security” (Nafaa, 2007). The presence of foreign forces within the regional system and not outside, as was the case before 1990, continues to cause disruption to regional dynamics and limits the League’s ability to function.

Chapter Seven examined the issue of Palestine, the effect it had on the League and its regional security approach on the one hand, and the impact of Palestinian representation on the League’s approach and policy on the other. Through reviewing Arab relations and divisions, it became clear that inter-Arab relations and rivalries dominated the debate on the Palestinian issue from the early days of the League.

The League’s approach to the Palestinian issue, a combination of both reactive and proactive actions, has changed in response to, and as a result of changing circumstances, including international the roles of non-Arab states. As Brynen (1991) argued, the interdependency between the Arab League and the issue of Palestine is linked by the degree to which the issue affects Arab regimes and
internal Arab policies. However, ultimately, Chapter Seven showed that the
League is becoming less capable of influencing the course of its development.
This is not due to the lack of attempts or initiatives, but as a consequence of the
accumulative limitations and divisions that have affected the League itself.

There is no institutionalised system within the Arab League for contributing to
conflict resolution. Intervention in regional conflicts and the limitations on how
resolutions are reached and become binding, has meant that political interests
and regional influence of member states are the main determinants for when
and how the League intervenes in conflicts. Nevertheless, the League remains
the most active contributor to regional conflict resolution in the Middle East in
general and the Arab world, in particular. The Arab League has gradually
imposed itself as guarantor of power sharing and political settlements following
the Lebanese and Yemeni civil wars; has successfully mediated political crises
connected to the ideological roots of pan-Arabism; and features what is possibly
the single most authoritative role in the region – the League’s Secretary General
– for brokering agreements between Arab states and in international institutional
settings, including the UN Security Council. Indeed, in certain crisis and
circumstances, the League succeeded in controlling or averting conflicts in
Kuwait, Yemen, and Lebanon - although it later failed in these same areas
when the circumstances changed and when external intervention increased.

Each of the seven chapters has identified a number of factors behind the Arab
League’s failure that engage with the contemporary question posed by Barnett
and Solingen (2007) when they wrote, “Today the academic discussion on the
League is no longer centred on whether or not the League can be considered as a ‘failed’ organisation, but rather on establishing what accounts for its failure – a ‘failure of design’ as opposed to having been ‘designed to fail’" (Barnett and Solingen 2007 cited in: Pinfari 2009, p.1).

The Arab league: a failure of design – or designed to fail?

The outcome of this research cannot accommodate, let alone answer the stark, either/or nature of that question. The dissertation’s stance on the failure of the Arab League to develop into an effective regional security organisation is unequivocal: it is clear that shifting historical, political, ideological, international and national factors have all played a role in the League’s failure. The research uncovered no evidence of bad faith on the part of the framers of the Alexandria Protocol or the Charter of the Arab League – that is, even allowing for the powerful rivalries of the time, the historical record demonstrates a shared understanding of Arab national security and a desire to secure, consolidate and strengthen it. But the historical circumstances, the persistence of colonialism into the post-WWII period; growing international interest in the region’s oil resources; the advent of the Cold War; and the Zionist project in Palestine were not propitious. Most fundamentally, a regional organisation comprised of modern states first required that its members be firmly established and consolidated as states - enjoying the qualities of sovereign independence, with secure borders and free of external interference. In other words, from the outset, the Arab League was faced with the challenge of securing the conditions for a regional security organisation. Even in the absence of the very
considerable fractures and rivalries that beset the region at that time, the Arab League was in part envisaged as a means of securing the basis on which a true regional security organisation could be built. So it was not ‘designed to fail’ – but perhaps, designed in circumstances that were never likely to secure the best energies of its members in pursuing a regional agenda. As this research has illustrated, ‘Arab national security’ in its historic, transnational and cultural and civilizational senses has largely been lost to an Arab national security that is rarely more than the sum of its ‘national security’ parts. How well has the League functioned in terms of peace and security is quite fundamental to its viability as a RSO, both at the start and presently, but it was conceived as something much larger and more encompassing. It was not ‘designed to fail.’

But was the Arab League a ‘failure of design’? There was certainly one failure (or at least a flaw) in the design of the Charter – the requirement for unanimity. A familiarity with the history of the League of Nations – still well within living memory at the time that the Charter was drafted should has served as a stark warning of the limitations this imposes; nevertheless, Arab states are not unique in their sensitivity about agreeing other states or international organisations to impose their decisions; and the voting system of the United Nations, for all its flaws, was facilitated by the Allied victory and their relative power at the end of WWII.

The research presented evidence that the Arab League was less a failure of design and more a failure of combinations of regional circumstances; the prioritisation of individual state national security interests (themselves often
arising from weak state formation, historical legacies and autocratic governments); and international actors and dynamics outside of its control.

There were a number of pivotal moments in its history that not only presented the League with serious challenge, but more crucially undermined its role as a regional security organisation. These points include the 1948 war with Israel, the 1967 defeat against Israel, the rise in Arab nationalism during the 1960s, the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and American-British Invasion of Iraq in 2003. Each of these moments has exposed an area of weakness in the Arab system, both systemic and relational. For example, in 1991, Iraq threatened to bomb Israel if Iraq was attacked and therefore a Syrian-Egyptian problem emerged. What if Iraq bombed Israel with missiles and Israel responded? Who would the Arab states stand with in such confrontation? The debate reached a point where Arab states could not be responsible for the consequences of the Iraqi decision; and nor were they obliged to uphold a defence principle to a threat that had been initiated by an Arab state. Iraq did bomb Israel with 39 missiles (Lorch 2003) but Israel did not respond in order not to jeopardise the Arab-American alliance. There was a huge American pressure on Israel to refrain from responding in exchange for security guarantees and military aid (Abdel-Salam 2007). These events further contributed to the imbalance in power between the Arab states and Israel while presenting the US as a party capable of reigning-in Israel at the time of need and therefore as a credible player in Middle Eastern security affairs. Thus, there began a new phase of legitimate military presence from the US that sparked a
lengthy period of external intervention in the regional security set-up that affected the already weak Arab regional system.

Although the Arab League was established over 60 years ago, its main objective, to achieve economic and political unity among Arab states, still remains distant due to a succession of problems and differences. The League of Arab States is one of the oldest regional organisations to date. The charter and agreements between its members cover almost all aspects of coordination and cooperation in social, economic, political and security fields. There are existing agreements to regulate taxation, trade, immigration, tourism, industry and combating terrorism in addition to a joint defence treaty. The Charter of the League has a mechanism for solving disputes among its members. The League includes, in its membership, most of the countries in the region while excluding Turkey, Iran and Israel with whom the Arab states are, collectively or individually, in dispute with. But when set against this impressive agenda, the League’s record has been remarkably narrow in scope as well as only intermittently successful in performance:

*With the Arabs living in a state of conflict, the desired union has not made much progress, despite its benefits being much greater than those of disintegration. The majority of agreements concluded in the defence, economic and political domains remain agreements on paper only*

(Galal, 1994)
It is clear that the Arab League has not been successful in striking a balance between respecting members’ domestic sovereignty and the organisational ability to create effective intervention strategies for upholding human rights and promoting democratic practices in any of those same countries. In this regard, it has faced a similar troublesome challenge to that of ASEAN in negotiating acceptable group principles of sovereignty and human rights.

That said, the future of the Arab regional system depends greatly on its ability to manage four main elements. First, is the ability to coordinate and manage relations between the member states of this system. This remains daunting because previous levels of success directly affect the desire of participating states to remain and utilise the system. Second, the Arab League’s ability to confront security threats, particularly between its members, while protecting the common interests that bring the members together remains an active and particularly thorny problem even now, with the violence that has accompanied the “Arab Spring”. Third is the ability of the system’s institutions to work with the international community through collective policies that create joint interests. Fourth is the imperative to revisit and seriously develop the concept of Arab national security. This is an increasingly urgent matter due to the events of the “Arab Spring” and the shared, regional circumstances and impulses which has driven it.

However, in the Arab world and the Middle East in general, the pattern of amity-enmity changes frequently among members of the League thereby adding ongoing elements of uncertainty, instability and fluid conflicts of interest.
Therefore, the costs, particularly the political and military ones, in investing in such a regional system become increasingly problematic for states due to the unstable nature of state-state relationships in the region. As discussed in Chapters Five and Six, this can explain the reluctance of GCC countries to look towards the Arab League system for security in the post-1991 war in Kuwait and their decisions, instead, to rely upon an external security guarantor (USA) as a safer and more dependable option.

On the other hand, in the Middle East, conflict formations and the penetration of great-power interests have prevented the emergence of substantive regional organisations (Cawthra 2007). Since before the establishment of the Arab League external intervention has presented a constant challenge to the regional security thinking, system and institutions of the Middle East. European colonial rule was the obvious form of external intervention in the region in the 1940s, and in such a way that Britain and France, as they were the main players in Arab affairs at the time, were able to influence the process and timing of the League’s establishment.

Beyond formal colonial rule, other forms of external interventions followed the creation of the League. On the one hand, the British-American Baghdad Pact was a western attempt to establish an alternative to a potentially independent Arab security system. On the other, the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 was an external approach to guaranteeing British control over Suez Canal while adding a further element to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Still further, the
continuous American and European support of Israel through political, financial and military aid has been another form of external intervention in the region’s conflict. Similarly, the American military presence in many GCC countries and the use of these bases in attacking Iraq in 2003 also constitute a direct form of overlay. In sum, external intervention has had a deleterious effect on the regional system in general and in particular on the Arab League’s ability to establish regional systems of cooperation and security.

In this context, a focus on the Arab national security concept became (and remained) narrow, even as it became more important. At the same time, the issue of internal instability within particular countries have significant regional repercussions and has further exacerbated by the League’s inability to successfully intervene. For instance, the civil war in Lebanon during the 1970s and 1980 is an example of state instability affecting the region and the Arab security system as it was again in the aftermath of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri\(^{29}\), in 2005. Moreover, in the present, the so-called revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain and Syria during 2011 and 2012, or the plausible internal partition of Iraq and/or Yemen, affect the very nature of the regional security system if/when they become realities. Seemingly unsolvable within the individual state context, those conflicts and internal upheavals carry with them dramatic regional consequences. While the Arab League was relatively more effective in conflict resolution until the early 1980s, its record and ability to mediate conflicts has been in decline ever since.

\(^{29}\)Rafiq Hariri was the Prime Minister of Lebanon until 2004. He was assassinated in 2005 by an explosion.
Meanwhile, the long and deeply-held idea and ideal of Arab national security languishes as it is caught between the conflicting impulses of national and regional security (and often prey to the imperatives of regime preservation):

The politics of Arab nationalism and a shared identity led Arab states to embrace the rhetoric of Arab unity in order to legitimize their regimes, and to fear Arab unity in practice because it would impose greater restrictions on their sovereignty.


After WWII, Arab unity and Arab nationalism were quickly replaced by alternative forms of nationalisms by the newly created Arab states. While the Arab public called for unity, the elite continue to support and further the emerging identities of the newly independent states.

King Abdullah might scheme sincerely for unity with Syria, but the price was his greater glory. And Iraq might scheme for union with Jordan and/or Syria; but only under the crown of Iraq. In these conditions, the Arab League was about as much in the direction of unity as could be expected at that time

(Little 1956, p.144)

As a result, and
As part of a diverse and multi-polar system, each Arab country will follow its own course. But each will also be closely watched throughout the rest of the Arab world. Saddam Husain’s audacious behaviour demonstrated that actions by one Arab state still carry important consequences for all the others. Inter-Arab alliances will thus continue to be formed, dissolved and reformed according to the momentary exigencies of national self-interest.

(Maddy-Weitzman 1991, p.18)

The present call for GCC countries to move forward toward a more formal union is a clear example of how contemporary affairs and challenges influence the timing and spectrum of willingness to cooperate and form alliances. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia announced this initiative during the GCC summit in Riyadh on 20th December 2011 (Carey 2011). The meeting addressed current and future challenges facing the GCC countries like Iran, developments in Arab countries affected by the ‘Arab Spring’ and the means of supporting Jordan and Morocco as applicants to the GCC (Al Arabiya with Agencies 2011). Although unions are not a new phenomenon in the Arab world (UAR and AMU are two examples), the proposed Saudi initiative is limited to countries that have various elements in common, including being monarchic, tribal and oil-dependent societies. Seeming anomalies to the proposed criteria, Jordan and Morocco are acceptable candidate as both are monarchic states that will not present a shock to the existing system of government of GCC states. In contrast to AMU and UAR, the Saudi-proposed union is based on an existing and functioning economic, military, security and immigration cooperation frameworks that gives this initiative real prospects for success. However, the Saudi initiative has not
dictated the actual form of the union and has left the timeframe for reaching it open.

Considering that this GCC expansion and proposed union is a result of a realisation on the part of its members for the need to confront immediate and future challenges through pro-active structures, there is a political will for change that was absent from all major Arab collective work in the past. In addition, the GCC union, if successful, could present a real alternative to the Arab League’s institutions at least in the Gulf area. This can be seen as a natural outcome of the policy adopted by the GCC countries since 1991 to find alternative means for guaranteeing their security outside of an Arab collective framework. It is also an indication that Saudi Arabia, as the regional power, is moving forward to solidify its leadership outside the Arab League.

Considering the constantly changing dynamics of Arab relations, cooperation among independent Arab states, if based on mutual interests, is the only possibility pan-Arabism has for continuing at this juncture. Although it did not succeed and ultimately collapsed, the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) as a model based interest-based principles showed that when cooperation is so based it can lead to unity.

In light of the discontents and aspirations driving the “Arab Spring”, strengthening the Arab League role among Arab states need to focus on cultural and intellectual dimensions as well as labour movement and human rights based on existing interests. Undoubtedly demanding much work, this
approach might yet prove dramatically more successful since the League has been more effective on this front in the past compared to the political front (Al-Mashat 2007). “The main Arab states that have the will and ability to revitalise the Arab League are Egypt and Saudi Arabia” (Interview No. 1 2007).

At the same time, a diverse set of internal-external interests will likely play an increasingly important role in shaping what regional powers want from the League. For example, Egypt’s National security paradigm now extends itself to the Gulf States (Abdel-Halim 2007; Hawwāt 2002; Muṣṭafá & al-ʻAẓīm 2003) because of the large numbers of Egyptian workers and its economic interests in these states that it perceives a need to secure. In this context, Egyptian interests coincide with a more robust Arab League capacity. On the other hand, non-Arab external actors like Israel have an interest in weakening the development of any integrated regional Arab security system. Further, “American interests in Iraq also work against any attempts to establish an Arab regional security system unless such a system was subordinate to American agendas and interests” (Khalil 2007).

According to officials and experts that have been interviewed during this research, the American strategy in the Middle East has had three main goals since 9/11. The first is to guarantee Israel’s security and its qualitative supremacy over all the Arab states; the second is to guarantee the flow of oil to the west and the third is fighting terrorism and fundamentalism (Abdel-Halim 2007; Abdel-Salam 2007; Ahmed 2007; Al-Mashat 2007; Assad 2007; Fahmy
2007; Interview No. 1 2007; Khalil 2007). This perception of the US policy is common in the Arab world and among Arab leaders.

Although the main thrust of external interventions since the 1990s have been US-led and continued through military and political physical presence, NATO’s role, as a grander coalition of interveners, in Iraq since 2003 introduced another dimension of external actors with an expanding agenda. For instance, the war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 introduced a NATO role that has been on the increase ever since. Further, NATO’s involvement in Libya in 2011 and the potential role it can play in other conflicts shows a change in the nature of external military presence, particularly the re-introduction of European militaries into the region. “The current situation where the western states are pushing the NATO to play a role in the Gulf area as a result to the existing agreements between some states and NATO in addition to the arms deals between western countries, especially the USA, with these countries. NATO did not want a role in the Middle East but the USA exerted enormous pressure on NATO to engage in the Gulf area” (Khalil, 2007). For better or worse, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, representing a potential framework for security cooperation was initiated in 1994 and currently involves itself and six Arab countries; Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as Israel.

At the same time, the US presence in the region is being reshaped by its withdrawal from Iraq and as yet unfinished cleavages of the Arab Spring. In this context, alternative American security roles in the region are being developed in
ways that will displace or minimize existing Arab League security agreements. The Arab League's inability to create an indigenous security framework and shield its members from alternative regional security frameworks means that regional powers such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia will seek means for enforcing their policies and interests outside the League. The Saudi call for GCC countries’ unity can be explained on this basis.

An indirect cause for the League's inability to create the regional framework is due to the fact that for a long time, the threat perception of the Arab states was focused on Israel. This helped to maintain attention on the issue of Palestine throughout the 1950s, 1960s and, until the PLO was fully established as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian cause. The League also managed to project a common position and even expelled Egypt, which broke this unified Arab position after it signed the Camp David Accords. This League’s action, however, only showed further that its approach was more reactive than anything proactive.

Beyond Israel, the League was even less successful in conflict resolutions among its members and virtually powerless to intervene in border disputes. This was particularly true when such disputes involved any of the larger regional powers as in the case of Egypt’s border dispute with Sudan or the Saudi border dispute with Qatar. The League was also unable to present a common front against external military interventions as was the case in the US-led attack on Iraq in March 2003. This inability to produce common positions was yet another of the crippling forces undermining any of the League’s projects.
Despite its weaknesses, the Arab system has had moments of efficiency that have mostly related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. One of those moments was in 1996, when Egypt called for a summit after Israel's extreme Right-wing took office. Another moment was in 2000, when a summit was held in support of the second Palestinian Intifada. Yet at both those pivotal moments the divisions among Arab states were too deep to allow for any larger reformation process to develop. The Arab political strategy of the League has changed, especially towards Israel; it has not been replaced with any overarching vision that has the backing of the League members. The Saudi Peace initiative of 2003 does not qualify as a strategy since it lacks the tools and mechanisms for implementation.

From the 1948 catastrophe to the 1967 disaster, the Arab security system managed to function somehow. It even survived the dilemma/debacle of the 1978 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Unexpectedly, the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s did not seem to shake the system to the roots but actually helped to create a sub-regional grouping (the GCC). The first serious divisions explicitly emerged over Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. As those divisions worsened during the 1990s the security system lacked a corrective mechanism as prior agreements with the Arab League were left to languish instead of being revitalised (Al-Mashat 2007; Rashed 2006).
Indeed, the gap between what was established by the 1945 Arab League Charter and how the League functions in the present on day-to-day basis reflects that lack of revitalisation. On a structural level, the summit system was not present in the charter. However, today it is one of the key systems for conflict resolution. On the other hand, many of the conflict resolution procedures as outlined in Article 5 of the charter, in relation to the role of the council in conflict settlement and resolution, remain unimplemented. Still, it raises the question concerning the means and process of restructuring the League’s institutional structures. As Pinfari wrote,

_While the symbolic and ideological value of the 1945 Pact is undeniable, a reform of the League’s institutional structure can and must take place in the near future. … it should address the functional overlap between bodies such as the Council, the Political Committee and the Summit meetings, and formally reinforce the powers of the Secretariat – which, in particular when the position of Secretary General is held by charismatic and respected figures, has proven to be a dynamic and effective body in mediating regional crises._

(Pinfari 2009, p.17-18)

When compared to other international organisations one realise that the League did not develop its own unique principle for stability as ASEAN developed the resilience principle. The League did not reinvent itself and restructure its institutions as the African Union did. The Arab League was not able to forge a
military alliance similar to NATO since the concept of Arab national security was not clearly defined and since rivalries existed among aging members. Hence, the League has failed where other regional organisations excelled: principles, structures and security.

In summary, the League of Arab States was an attempt to reflect and accommodate a popular and nationalistic pan-Arab ideology at the level of civil society – Arab national security as the term has been employed here – while preserving the newly acquired power of national elites, achieved via the post-World War II. This Arab League formula, in the form of a flexible and non-obligatory cooperation system, coupled with the diverse political challenges facing the League since its inception, has meant high expectations with few results. The failure of the Arab League to reintroduce and modernise itself to generate a common Arab national security approach allowed for external intervention and influence to further undermine its potential roles and limit its effectiveness. Sub-regional organisations and alliances are examples of how Arab League members did seek to overcome the limitation of the League’s system in pursuit of their own state interests. Failure to recognise the diversity and polarity within and between Arab states from the beginning, caused rifts and divisions among members that hindered the League’s development and effectiveness in conflict resolution. In addition, the League has fallen victim to the corrupt, despotic, and parochial aims held by many of the League’s elite rulers. In reality, one has to ask the question, ‘whose security was the League trying to protect?’
Contribution to knowledge

Today, academic discussion about the League is no longer centred on whether or not it can be considered a ‘failure’, but rather on establishing what accounts for its failure – a ‘failure of design’ or having been ‘designed to fail’. Is it therefore fair to say that the League has “failed” to the extent that it can no longer function as a viable regional security organisation or can it still recover from its numerous performance failures? In spite of the complexities in the League’s history and the problems and limitations that were reviewed in this study, the League remains an existing international organisation that tries to get involved and influence its region. The Arab League positions from the revolutions in Libya, Egypt and Syria during 2011 and 2012 are an example of the League’s resilience and adaptation to the changes in regional dynamics and power.

However, the Middle East has long been viewed as a region that “best fits the realist view of international politics” (Nye 2000 in Bilgin 2004, p.25). In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the USA, some awareness of the need to adopt a fresh approach to security in the Middle East began to rise. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990; the stalling Arab–Israeli peace process since the late 1990s as well as the escalating violence between Israelis and Palestinians; the US-led war on Iraq in 2003; and the seeming lack of enthusiasm for addressing the problem of regional insecurity, especially when compared to the other regionalisation processes and increasing regionalisation of security relations in other parts of the world, do indeed suggest that the Middle East is a place...
where traditional conceptions and practices of security retain their purchase. Realists remain the most prominent advocates that states are the key actors in international politics and that governments are their representatives. This understanding excludes many of the recent developments in the region as insignificant to the international system and falls short of incorporating non-state actors and dynamics, but other approaches help to fill this gap. These approaches include Neo-realist, Constructivist and Liberal as discussed in Chapters Two, Three and Four. Most importantly, the concept Arab national security is a construct that is susceptible to changes and developments at the cultural, economic, social levels and therefore, cannot be fully explained through a realist lens only or narrowly defined by the elite. In this context, the constructivist perspective is particularly important for the purpose of this research since it offers a broader and more comprehensive approach to non-state security issues, actors, arenas and dynamics which are so pertinent to the Arab region – particularly in respect of the recent and on-going ‘Arab Spring’.

As this research highlighted, the problems and shortcomings of the League are deeply imbedded in its system, relations between its members, but most importantly, in defining and accepting key concepts like Arab regional security a point reinforced by the respondents in the field research. Since this concept can only be fully understood through the lens of an inclusive and comprehensive approach like constructivism, its development at the level of regional security and regional organisations would be a welcome addition to the International Relations Literature.
The contribution to knowledge and originality of this dissertation has three dimensions: first, explaining the transformation of the Arab League’s security role in the Middle East since its establishment in a comprehensive way that fills an existing gap in the literature. Second, by providing an examination of the regional security paradigm in relation to the regional security organisations literature to synthesise tools of analysis for regional security organisations’ success. One of those theories is ‘Regional Security Complex Theory’ (RSCT) (Buzan et al. 1997) which looks at regions and powers; yet, the theory limits its analysis to a classification of states based on their power and interdependence. RSCT perceives regional organisations as an outcome of interdependence and common interest without looking at how these organisations reshape interests and interdependence within a region complex. The originality in this context is the use of the Arab League as a subject of analysis under this theory. Through this, a contribution is made to regional security literature and to the political and security analysis of the Middle East.

In summary, the League of Arab States was an attempt to reflect and accommodate a popular and nationalistic pan-Arab ideology while preserving recently achieved state independence in the form of a flexible and non-obligatory cooperation system. This formula, coupled with the very considerable challenges facing the League since its inception, meant high expectations with poor results, at a level and with a consistency to warrant the “failure” judgment. But that still leaves open the question of whether the Arab League failed largely in operational terms, or whether it’s also obvious political failings make it a failed
organisation. The failure of the Arab League to revitalise and modernise itself to generate a common Arab national security agenda is partly responsible for external intervention and influence, which further undermines its role and limits its effectiveness. Sub-regional organisations and alliances are examples of how Arab League members sought to overcome the limitations of the League’s system in pursuit of their own state interests. The failure to recognise the diversity and polarity within and between Arab states from the beginning caused rifts and divisions among members that hindered the League’s political development and its operational effectiveness in conflict resolution. However, the frustrated, popular aspirations for what is now an Arab security suffused with twenty-first century ideals is unlikely to dissipate regardless of the direction and fate of the Arab League – and that is perhaps the most profound meaning of the ‘Arab Spring’, widely and rightly acknowledged as “Arab” and not merely a cluster of citizen revolts. None of the sub-regional security bodies is capable of answering the urgency and depth of these calls, even though this is what the Arab League was originally designed to undertake. Thus, the future role of the Arab League will have to be determined, as it was in its creation, by popular momentum such as that one generated by the ‘Arab Spring’.
APPENDIX

APPENDIX I.a

Consent to Participation in Research

Research Project title: Reasons behind success or failure of the Arab League

Researcher: Fady Abusidu
Aim of project: Identifying factors behind success or Failure of the Arab League

Organisation where research is conducted: University of Bradford

Funding sources for research project: Self Financed

Name of Participant:

Title:

Organisation:

I hereby consent to the given information being used in the above mentioned research project:

Yes [ ] No [ ]

I hereby consent to being quoted by name:

Yes [ ] No [ ]

I consent to having the interview recorded for the purpose of use in research and for the researcher’s records only:

Yes [ ] No [ ]

Signature of Interviewee:

Date of Interview:

APPENDIX I.b

List of interviewees

- Major General (ret.) Dr. Mohamed Kadry Said, Military & Technology Advisor, Al-Ahram Centre for Political & Strategic Studies, Cairo, Egypt
  Interviewed on 15th February 2005

- Major General (ret.) Dr. Ahmed Abdel-Halim, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs (ECFA)
  Interviewed on 15th August 2007

- Ambassador Hassan Issa Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomats Club
Interviewed on 15th August 2007

- Bassel Salah Mostafa Ahmed, Second Secretary, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  Interviewed on 16th August 2007

- Abdel-Monem Said Aly, Director, Al-Ahram Centre for Political & Strategic Studies, Cairo, Egypt
  Interviewed on 22nd August 2007

- Dr. Mohamed Abdel Salam, Head of the Regional Security & Arms Control Program – Senior Researcher, Military Research Unit (ACPSS), Al-Ahram Centre for Political & Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Foundation, Cairo, Egypt
  Interviewed on 22nd August 2007

- Mr. Taha Khalil, Director, El-Horyia Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, Egypt
  Interviewed on 26th August 2007

- MG (Ret.) Salah-Eldin Selim Mohamed, National Centre for Middle East Studies, Cairo, Egypt
  Interviewed on 28th August 2007

- Dr. Mohamed Nabhan Sewelam, National Centre for Middle East Studies, Cairo, Egypt
  Interviewed on 29th August 2007

- Dr. Hassan Nafaa, Chairman, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Economics & Political Science, Cairo University
  Interviewed on 29th August 2007

- Dr. Mohamed Hamza, Director, Middle East Forums, Cairo, Egypt
  Interviewed on 29th August 2007

- Dr. Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat, Director, Center for Political Research & Studies, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University
  Interviewed on 29th August 2007

- Dr. Mohamed Shaker, Director, Egyptian Centre for Foreign Relations, Cairo, Egypt
  Interviewed on 7th September 2007

- H.E. Mohamed M. Sobeih, Assistant Secretary General, League of Arab States, Cairo, Egypt
  Interviewed on 9th September 2007

- Dr. Wael Assad, Assistant to Arab League Secretary General, League of Arab States, Cairo, Egypt
  Interviewed on 9th September 2007

- Dr. Tarek Fahmy, Expert, National Centre for Middle East Studies, Cairo, Egypt
  Interviewed on 10th September 2007

- MG (Ret.) Mahmoud Khalaf, Advisor, National Centre for Middle East Studies, Cairo, Egypt
Interviewed on 10th September 2007

Interviewees who did not consent to being quoted by name:

- Interview 1, at the Arab Peace & Security Council, League of Arab States, Cairo, Egypt  
  Interviewed on 21st August 2007

- Interview 2, at the Sector of Pan Security, Arab Peace & Security Council, League of Arab States, Cairo, Egypt  
  Interviewed on 21st August 2007

- Interview 3, at the League of Arab States, Syrian mission to the Arab League  
  Interviewed on 3rd September 2007

- Interview 4, at the League of Arab States, Kuwait mission to the Arab League  
  Interviewed on 4th September 2007

- Interview 5, at the League of Arab States, Palestinian mission to the Arab League  
  Interviewed on 4th September 2007

- Interview 6, at the League of Arab States, Qatari mission to the Arab League  
  Interviewed on 4th September 2007

- Interview 7, at the League of Arab States, Egyptian mission to the Arab League  
  Interviewed on 5th September 2007

- Interview 8, at the League of Arab States, Algerian mission to the Arab League  
  Interviewed on 5th September 2007

APPENDIX II.a

The Alexandria Protocol

Official communique of the Pan-Arab Preliminary Conference as translated by the American Legation, Cairo and collated with the Arabic text published in al-Ahram (Cairo), Oct. 8, 1944, p. 3.

The undersigned, chiefs and members of Arab delegations at the Preliminary Committee of the General Arab Conference, viz:
The President of Preliminary Committee
H.E. Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs; head of the Egyptian delegation;

Syrian Delegation
H.E. Sa'dallah al-Jabiri, Syrian Prime Minister and head of the Syrian delegation;
H.E. Jamil Mardam Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
H.E. Dr. Nagib al-Armanazi, Secretary General of the Presidency of the Syrian Republic;
H.E. M. Sabri al-'Asali, deputy of Damascus;

Trans-Jordanian Delegation
H.E. Tawliq Abu al-Huda Pasha, Trans-Jordanian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, head of the Trans-Jordanian delegation;
H.E Sulayman al-Sukkar Bey, Financial Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Iraqi Delegation
H.E. Hamdi al-Bahjaji, Iraqi Prime Minister and head of the Iraqi delegation;
H.E. Arshad al-'Umari, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
H.E. Nuri al-Sa'id, former Iraqi Prime Minister;
H. E. Tahein al-'Askari, Iraqi Minister Plenipotentiary in Egypt;

Lebanese Delegation
H.E. Riyad al-Sulh Bey, Lebanese Prime Minister and head of the Lebanese delegation;
H.E. Salim Taqla Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
H.E. Musa Mubarak, Chief of the Presidential Cabinet;

Egyptian Delegation
H.E. Nagib al-Hilali Pasha, Minister of Education;
H.E. Muhammad Sabri Aub-'Alam Pasha, Minister of Justice;
H.E. Muhammad Salah-al-din Bey, Under Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Anxious to strengthen and consolidate the tied bind all Arab countries and to direct them toward tare of the Arab world, to improve its conditions its future, and realize its hopes and aspirations.

And in response to Arab public opinion in countries,

Have met at Alexandria from Shawwal 8, 1363 (September 25, 1944) to Shawwal 20, 1363 (October 7, 1944) in the form a Preliminary Committee of the General Arab Conference, and have agreed as follows:

1. **League of Arab States**

A League will be formed of the independent Arab States which consent to join the League. It will have a council which will be known as the "Council of the League of Arab States" in which all participating states will be represented on an equal footing.

The object of the League will be to control the execution of the agreements which the above states will conclude; to hold periodic meetings which will strengthen the relations between those states; to coordinate their political plans so as to insure their cooperation, and protect their independence and sovereignty against every aggression by suitable means; and to supervise in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.

The decisions of the Council will be binding on those who have accepted them except in cases where a disagreement arises between two member states of the League in which the two parties shall refer their dispute to the Council for solution. In this case the decision of the Council of the League will be binding.

In no case will resort to force to settle a dispute between any two member states of the League be allowed. But every state shall be free to conclude with any other member state of the League, or other powers, special agreements which do not contradict the text or the present dispositions.

In no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be prejudicial to the policy of the League or an individual member state be allowed.

The Council will intervene in every dispute which may lead to war between a member state of the League and any other member state or power, so as to reconcile them.

A subcommittee will be formed of the members of the Preliminary Committee to prepare a draft of the statutes of the Council of the League and to examine the political questions which may be the object of agreement among Arab States.

2 **Cooperation in Economic, Cultural, Social, and Other Matters**
A. The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee shall closely cooperate in the following matters:

(1) Economic and financial matters, i.e., commercial exchange, customs, currency, agriculture, and industry.

(2) Communications, i.e., railways, roads, aviation, negation, posts and telegraphs.

(3) Cultural matters.

(4) Questions of nationality, passports, visas, execution of Judgments, extradition of criminals, etc.

(5) Social questions.

(6) Questions of public health.

B. A subcommittee of experts for each of the above subjects will be formed in which the states which have participated in the Preliminary Committee will be represented. This subcommittee will prepare draft regulations on cooperation in the above matters, describing the extent and means of that collaboration.

C. A committee for coordination and editing will be firmed whose object will be to control the work of the diverse subcommittees, to coordinate that part of the work which is accomplished, and to prepare drafts of agreements which will be submitted to the various governments.

D. Then all the subcommittees have accomplished their work. The Preliminary Committee will meet to examine the work of the subcommittees as a preliminary step toward the holding of the General Arab Conference.

3 Consolidation of These Ties In the Future

While expressing its satisfaction at such a happy step, the Committee hopes that Arab States will be able in the future to consolidate that step by other steps, especially if post-war world events should result in institutions which will bind various Powers more closely together.

4 Special Resolution Concerning Lebanon

The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee emphasize their respect of the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its present frontiers, which the governments of the above States have already recognized in consequence of Lebanon's adoption of an independent policy, which the Government of that country announced in its program of October 7, 1943, unanimously approved by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies.
5 Special Resolution Concerning Palestine

A. The Committee is of the opinion that Palestine constitutes an important part of the Arab World and that the rights of the Arabs in Palestine cannot be touched without prejudice to peace and stability in the Arab World.

The Committee also is of the opinion that the pledges binding the British Government and providing for the cessation of Jewish immigration, the preservation of Arab lands, and the achievement of independence for Palestine are permanent Arab rights whose prompt implementation would constitute a step toward the desired goal and toward the stabilization of peace and security.

The Committee declares its support of the cause of the Arabs of Palestine and its willingness to work for the achievement of their legitimate aims and the safeguarding of their Just rights.

The Committee also declares that it is second to none in regretting the woes which have been inflicted upon the Jews of Europe by European dictatorial states. But the question of these Jews should not be confused with Zionism, for there can be no greater injustice and aggression than solving the problem of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, i.e., by inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Palestine of various religions and denominations.

B. The special proposal concerning the participation of the Arab Governments and peoples in the "Arab National Fund" to safeguard the lands of the Arabs of Palestine shall be referred to the committee of financial and economic affairs to examine it from all its angles and to submit the result of that examination to the Preliminary Committee in its next meeting.

In faith of which this protocol has been signed at Faruq I University at Alexandria on Saturday, Shawwal 20, 1363 (October 7, 1944).
APPENDIX II.b

The Council of the League of Arab States at Summit Level

19th Ordinary Session
Riyadh, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
28-29 March 2007

League of Arab States

LAS Secretariat General
LAS Council Division
LAS Council Affairs Directorate

Resolutions

The Council of the League of Arab States at Summit Level
19th Ordinary Session
Riyadh, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
28-29 March 2007

Political Issues

The Palestinian issue and developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict

Activation of the Arab Peace Initiative
The Council of the League of Arab States at summit level,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on Joint Arab Action and final report of the Follow-up Committee for the Implementation of Resolutions and Commitments,
Recalling Summit resolution 221 (Beirut, 28 March 2002) which launched the Arab Peace Initiative,

Reaffirming the Arab commitment to a just and comprehensive peace as a strategic choice, that the peace process is a comprehensive, indivisible process, that a just and
comprehensive peace in the region can only be achieved by full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian and Arab lands, including the occupied Syrian Arab Golan, to the line of 4 June 1967 and the lands still under occupation in southern Lebanon, and by reaching a just solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees agreed in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 194 (1948), the rejection of all forms of resettlement and affirmation of the establishment of a sovereign and independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital,

Having reviewed the Arab and international efforts to revive the peace process,

Resolves

1. To affirm the commitment of all the Arab States to all the elements of the Arab Peace Initiative adopted at the Beirut Summit (2002), based on the resolutions and principles of international legitimacy, to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and bring about a just and comprehensive peace which will achieve security for all States in the region and enable the Palestinian people to establish an independent state with East Jerusalem as its capital;

2. To reaffirm the call to the Israeli Government and all Israelis to accept the Arab Peace Initiative and seize the opportunity afforded to restart serious, direct peace negotiations on all trajectories;

3. To charge the Arab ministerial committee on the Arab Peace Initiative to continue its efforts and to form working teams to carry out the necessary liaison with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Member States of the Security Council, the Quartet and parties concerned with the peace process in order to restart the process, mobilize support for this initiative and commence serious negotiations on the basis of agreed terms of reference namely, the relevant United Nations resolutions, the principle of land for peace and the impermissibility of acquiring the territory of others by force;

4. To charge the Council of the League of Arab States at ministerial level with continuing to assess the situation regarding the effectiveness of current peace efforts and to formulate further measures in the light of this assessment.

(Summit resolution 367, 19th ordinary session – 29 March 2007)
Support for the Palestinian Government of National Unity

The Council of the League of Arab States at summit level,

Having studied the memorandum of the Secretariat-General and the report of the Secretary-General on Joint Arab Action,

Recalling that the Arab States have resolved to follow a clear strategy based upon the Arab Peace Initiative,

Taking note of the commitment of the Palestinian Government of National Unity to the resolutions of Arab Summits,

In the light of the discussions of the ministerial meeting preparatory to the Riyadh Summit,

Resolves

1. To affirm full support for the Mecca Agreement reached under the generous auspices of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, to express the utmost appreciation for the efforts of brotherly Arab States, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference which contributed to reaching the agreement which produced a government of national unity, and to call for the support of all Arab States for the Palestinian President and Government – the Government of National Unity – to enable it to meet the needs and achieve the national interests and goals of the Palestinian people;

2. That the Arab States support the Palestinian National Authority and Palestinian Government of National Unity and reject any dealings with the blockade imposed upon the Palestinian people, in all its manifestations;

3. To appeal to States and international organizations for this blockade to be lifted immediately, to support and recognize the Palestinian Government of National Unity and deal with it without discrimination and for Member States to carry out the necessary liaison with the relevant international parties;
4. To condemn the political, economic and military blockade, all Israeli aggression and the measures it has taken which have led to heavy loss of life and property, to make Israel, as the occupying power, bear the responsibility for compensating the Palestinian people for all these losses and to put pressure on Israel to release the tax funds due to the Palestinian National Authority;

5. To call upon the international community to resume support for the Palestinian National Authority and the Palestinian people, respect their democratic choice and affirm the responsibility of international parties to support the Palestinian people and national economy to meet the development and aid needs in the occupied Palestinian territories and keep pace with the economic and social challenges facing the Palestinian National Authority.

(Summit resolution 368, 19th ordinary session – 29 March 2007)
STATUTES OF
THE
ARAB PEACE AND SECURITY
COUNCIL
(Unofficial Translation)

For More Information & Inquires:

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The Council of the League of Arab States, meeting at Summit level, having reviewed:

- The memorandum of the General Secretariat,
- The report of the Secretary General on Joint Arab action,
- Resolution No. (6479) of the extraordinary session of the League's Council meeting at ministerial level on 13th January 2005 regarding development of the system of joint Arab action.
- Taking into consideration provisions of articles (5), (6) and (8) of the Charter of the League of Arab States; articles (2) and (50) of the Charter of the United Nations; and articles (1), (2) and (3) of the treaty on Joint defense and economic cooperation among member states of the League,
- Recalling its resolution No. (294) issued by the Algiers Summit on 23 March 2005,
- Reaffirming the importance of preserving security and territorial integrity of member states, maintaining security and stability in the Arab region, strengthening relations and settling any disputes that may arise among them through peaceful means,
- Considering the need to establish an Arab Peace and Security Council as a specialized agency within the system of joint Arab action,

DECIDES

1- To approve the establishment of the Arab Peace and Security Council and its attached Statutes. The present Statutes will replace the “League of Arab States Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution between the Arab States”.

2- To invite all member countries to promptly complete ratification procedures according to their respective constitutional regulations

(Res. 331 - 5 – 18 – 29.3.2006)

STATUTES OF THE
ARAB PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

Article I

The following definitions shall designate the entities mentioned in the present statutes:
The Charter: The Charter of the League of Arab States.

The League: The League of Arab States

The Statutes: The statutes of the Arab Peace and Security Council.


Member States: Member States of the League of Arab States.

Secretary General: The Secretary General of the League of Arab States.

General Secretariat: The General Secretariat of the League of Arab States.

Article II

An Arab Peace and Security Council is established under the supervision of the League's Council to replace the “League of Arab States Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management & Resolution between the Arab States”.

Article III

The objectives of the Council are as follows:

a) The prevention of conflicts that may arise between Arab states, their management and settlement should they occur.

b) To follow-up and study developments affecting Arab national security and to submit recommendations thereon to the League's Council.

Article IV

A- The Council will be composed of five member states represented at the Foreign Ministers level as follows:

1- The country currently chairing the League's Council at ministerial level.

2- The two countries having chaired the two previous sessions of League’s Council at ministerial level.

3- The two countries due to chair the two following sessions of the League's Council at ministerial level.

B- The Council will be chaired by the Foreign Minister of the country currently chairing the ordinary session of the League's Council.

C- The Council meets at the level of Foreign Ministers, and may meet at the level of representatives.

D- The Secretary General shall participate in the Council meetings.
E- The Council may invite bodies, experts, or whoever it may deem necessary to attend its meetings.

Article V

1- If the Chairperson of the Council, or any of its members is party to the conflict the following procedures will be applied:

• The Chairperson of the next session will chair the Council meeting.

• The members who are party to the conflict will be replaced by the Chairperson(s) of sessions following the next two who are already represented on the Council.

2- Parties to the conflict shall be invited to the Council meetings to submit their views. The Council may avail itself of the assistance of any member country to discharge its duties as the case may require.

3- The Council meets twice a year at ministerial level prior to the meetings of the League's Council or, whenever necessary, at the request of any member state of the League, of its Chairperson or of the Secretary General.

Article VI

In accordance with the Charter of the League of Arab States and with the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of all member states the Council will undertake the following duties:

1- Prepare strategies for the preservation of Arab Peace and Security.

2- Propose appropriate measures to be taken collectively in case of aggression, or threat of aggression against an Arab country in accordance with the provisions of article 6 of the Charter, as well as in the case an Arab country attacking another Arab country or threatening to attack it.

3- Reinforce Arab preventive action capabilities by developing an early warning system and exerting good offices, conciliation and mediation efforts to improve the situation and remove sources of tension with a view to preventing any future dispute.

4- Strengthen cooperation to confront transnational threats and dangers such as organized crime and terrorism.

5- Support post-conflict efforts to restore peace, facilitate reconstruction and prevent the eruption of renewed conflicts.

6- Submit proposals for the establishment of an Arab peace-keeping force whenever necessary.
7- Facilitate humanitarian action and participate in the elimination of effects of disasters, crises and conflicts.

8- Coordinate and cooperate with international and regional organizations to reinforce peace, security and stability in the Arab region and settle disputes between Arab and non-Arab countries.

9- In case of aggravation of a conflict the Council, in addition to the measures it proposes to contain it, may request to hold an extraordinary session of the League's Council to take appropriate decisions thereon.

10- To submit to the first meeting of League's Council, or to its extra-ordinary session as the case may be, a report on the issue together with its recommendations and proposals for the preservation of peace and security in the Arab world, the disengagement between parties, and the settlement of all related issues; as well as the results of negotiations, good offices, conciliation and mediation efforts that took place.

Article VII

The organs of the Council will be as follows:

a- Data Bank: The Secretary General will establish, within available resources of the General Secretariat, a data bank to collect information provided by member countries and regional and international organizations to help the Council assess situations and fulfill its duties.

b- Early Warning System: The Secretary General will undertake preparatory work for the establishment of an early warning system. He will be assisted by a group of experts from amongst the staff of the General Secretariat who will regularly analyse available data and information, monitor various elements that may lead to the eruption of conflicts and submit assessment reports thereon to the Council in order to take appropriate action to prevent them.

c- Board Of Wise Personalities: The Council shall establish a Board of wise personalities composed of prominent Arab personalities enjoying appreciation and respect. The Chairperson of the Council and the Secretary General will designate, from amongst Board members, those who may undertake mediation, conciliation and good offices missions with conflicting parties. The rules of procedure will determine selection modalities of Board members.

The Chairperson of the Council, in coordination with the Secretary General, may charge one or more members of the Board to visit conflict areas at the request and with the approval of the concerned country, to investigate the situation and assess prevailing conditions and submit proposals and recommendations that may facilitate the work of the Council.
Article VIII

a- The League's Council will determine issues to be decided upon by the Council and those for which it will submit recommendations to the League's Council for adoption.

b- The League's Council may charge the Council to take the necessary action to restore security in tension areas, including dispatching of civil or military observer missions to these areas with specific mandate.

Article IX

With a view to organizing its work and forming its organs the Council will draw up its own rules of procedure which will be approved by the League's Council meeting at ministerial level. The Council’s recommendations will be taken according to the voting mechanism defined in the Charter.

Article X

a- The Secretary General, under the supervision of the Council, will take necessary measures and initiatives to implement the recommendations of the Council, aiming at conflict prevention, management and resolution.

b- The Council will be financed from the budget of the General Secretariat.

Article XI

The General Secretariat will act as Technical Secretariat for the Council.

Article XII

The Secretary General, at the request of League's Council meeting at ministerial level, shall inform the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of the U.N. Security Council of the action taken by the Council.

Article XIII

The present statutes will be open for signature as soon as it is adopted. It will be then submitted to member states for ratification or adherence according to their constitutional procedures.

Article XIV

The present statutes may be amended with the approval of two-thirds of the member states. The amendment enters into force after one month from the date instruments of ratification are deposited by one-third of the member states.

Article XV
The present statutes will enter into force after fifteen days from the date instruments of ratification of seven member states are deposited with the General Secretariat. For the other countries it will enter into force after one month from the date their instruments of ratification or adherence are deposited with the General Secretariat.

* All member states signed the present statutes at the closing session of the Council of the League of Arab States meeting at Summit level (18 The ordinary session) in Khartoum on 29 March 2006.


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