INTER-RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SMALL ARMS CONTROL AND PEACE BUILDING ACTIVITIES IN COUNTRIES EMERGING FROM CONFLICT

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INTER-RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SMALL ARMS CONTROL AND PEACE BUILDING ACTIVITIES IN COUNTRIES EMERGING FROM CONFLICT

An Examination of the Inter-relationships between Programmes to Control Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Peace Building Activities in Countries Emerging from Violent Conflict

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Abstract

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Inter-relationships between Small Arms Control and Peace Building Activities in Countries Emerging from Conflict

Efforts to control small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the periods following violent conflict can have positive or negative impacts on peacebuilding efforts. Similarly, peacebuilding activities can both support or endanger efforts to place SALW under greater control. Despite the regular occurrence of SALW control and peacebuilding activities in the same time and space in post violent conflict contexts, there is insignificant analysis of how the two sets of activities interrelate, and how these interrelationships can be strengthened to improve the contribution that SALW control efforts make to peacebuilding, and vice-versa. The effects of interrelationships over time (contingency); in the same geographic space (complementarity) and the effects of public perceptions and social construction are particularly important and provide a framework for establishing these interrelationships through analysing a wide universe of cases of SALW control attempted in countries emerging from violent conflict, five mini-cases studies and a major analysis of interrelationships in Kosovo.

Keywords: small arms; light weapons; peacebuilding; conflict resolution; Kosovo
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Table of Contents
List of Figures ........................................................................................................ vi
Table of abbreviations................................................................................................ vii
Chapter 1: Introduction.......................................................................................... 1
  1.1 Introduction to conflict resolution and peacebuilding and its relationships with efforts to control SALW .............................................................. 2
  1.2 Research questions and hypothesis ................................................................ 6
    1.2.1 The effect of contingency on interrelationships ..................................... 10
    1.2.2 The effect of complementarity on interrelationships .......................... 11
    1.2.3 The effect of context on interrelationships ........................................ 12
  1.3 The research approach .................................................................................... 15
  1.4 Research Strategy .......................................................................................... 17
  1.5 Ethical considerations .................................................................................... 22
  1.6 Chapter structure .......................................................................................... 24
Chapter 2: SALW Reduction and Control and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding........ 26
  2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 26
  2.2 The field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding ......................................... 26
    2.2.1 Theories and models for describing conflict and conflict resolution responses ........................................................................................................ 30
    2.2.2 Conflict transformation and peacebuilding from below ...................... 37
    2.2.3 Transformative versus technical approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding ........................................................................................................... 40
    2.2.4 Post-war peacebuilding – post-conflict reconstruction ...................... 43
    2.2.5 An emerging framework for analysing and assessing post-conflict peacebuilding efforts ........................................................................................................ 46
  2.3 The control of SALW and its relationship to conflict resolution and peacebuilding ........................................................................................................ 51
    2.3.1 SALW, the UN and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects ........................................................................ 61
    2.3.3 SALW control as disarmament diplomacy and public policy ............... 66
    2.3.4 The development of activities to control SALW ................................... 68
    2.3.5 Post-war ‘disarmament’ and weapons control ....................................... 69
  2.4 The overarching research question, hypothesis and main sub-questions ....... 80
    2.4.1 Relevance of literatures reviewed and the contribution that this thesis aims to make to their development .............................................................. 83
  2.5 Research Strategy and Methodology ............................................................... 85
  2.6 Chapter conclusion ........................................................................................ 94
Chapter 3: Analysis of interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities in post-war environments..95

3.1 Introduction..........................................................................................................................95

3.1.1 Establishing the universe of efforts to control SALW in conflict affected countries ..........................................................................................................................97

3.2 Review of data sources of efforts to control SALW ..........................................................97

3.3 Initial analysis and compilation of the universe of SALW control efforts since 2001 ........................................................................................................................................104

3.4 Data sources for identifying incidences of conflict affected contexts........107

3.5 Initial analysis of nature of SALW control efforts undertaken in conflict affected contexts ...........................................................................................................................................115

3.6 The selection of cases ........................................................................................................123

3.7 Mini case studies ..............................................................................................................126

3.7.1 Efforts to control civilian held SALW in Sri Lanka following the Cease Fire Agreement in 2002 ........................................................................................................................126

3.7.2 SALW control efforts in the Western Balkans and their interrelationships with national and regional conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes..........................................................................................................................137

3.7.3 Peacebuilding and SALW control efforts in Sudan/Southern Sudan since 2005 ..........................................................................................................................................................146

3.7.4 Analysis of efforts to control SALW as disarmament exercises in northern Kenya and Karamoja in Uganda in 2006 ........................................................................................................................154

3.7.5 Analysis of efforts to control SALW and their relationships with peacebuilding frameworks and activities in Sierra Leone between 2001 and 2004 .................................................................................................................................162

3.8 Overall analysis of the universe of cases and the mini case-studies ........169

Chapter 4: The interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and activities to build peace in Kosovo: a case study ...............................................................175

4.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................175

4.2 Case study strategy and methodology............................................................................177

4.2.1 Case-study Boundaries .................................................................................................177

4.2.2 Outline of the research process and field visits.........................................................178

4.2.3 Description of data sources and data gathering techniques.................................181

4.3 Kosovo in the period leading up to, and following the end of violent conflict in 1999 ................................................................................................................................................185

4.3.1 The war, its effects and the international peace support operation .192

4.4 Peacebuilding in Kosovo.................................................................................................195

4.4.1 National-level peacebuilding frameworks and initiatives ..........................195

4.4.2 Additional important peacebuilding activities .........................................................200
List of Figures

Figure 1: Lund’s conflict bell curve from “The Life History of Conflict” (1996) ........31
Figure 2: Lederach’s Actors and Approaches Model ................................................................38
Figure 3: Definitions of SALW ...............................................................................................52
Figure 4: Geographic contexts of weapons management, 2001 to 2011 ..................109
Figure 5: Weapons management in conflict affected countries, 2001 to 2011 ....113
Figure 6: Map of Kosovo with major towns marked in Albanian and then Serbian 176
Figure 7: The role of the LDK in shaping Kosovo’s civil society ...........................190
Figure 8: Chronology of major peacebuilding efforts .........................................................206
Figure 9: Numbers of weapons and ammunition collected during voluntary
          surrender programmes since 1999 (adapted from Sokolova, Richards and
          Smith 2006: 9) ........................................................................................................216
Figure 10: Weapons seized or confiscated by the Kosovo police 2000-2011 ..........218
Figure 11: SALW and associated materiel seized by Kosovo Customs Service 2002-
            2006 ....................................................................................................................219
Figure 12: Chronology of activities to control SALW in Kosovo since 1999 ........220
### Table of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AVPR</td>
<td>Armed Violence Prevention and Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSOS</td>
<td>Building Stability Overseas Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Ceasefire Agreement [Sri Lanka]</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement [for Sudan]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>IANSA</td>
<td>International Action Network on Small Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDDRS</td>
<td>International Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDDRP</td>
<td>International Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme [Sudan]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAC [I &amp;II]</td>
<td>Illegal Small Arms Control programme [In Kosovo]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslav National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>NATO Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>KOSSAC</td>
<td>Kosovo Small Arms Control programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCAPISA</td>
<td>National Commission Against Proliferation of Illegal Small Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for European Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEESAC</td>
<td>South Eastern and Eastern Europe Small Arms Clearinghouse</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force in Bosnia Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDDA</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIDIR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPoA</td>
<td>United National Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The effects of uncontrolled small arms and light weapons (hereafter SALW) on intensifying and prolonging violent conflict are well documented. Following the end of war, SALW can continue to play a negative role as countries and communities struggle to recover and work towards peace. Since the end of the Cold War, efforts to control SALW more effectively have been attempted alongside a wide range of internationally-supported peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts. At the very local levels where peacebuilding activities are organised by residents and affected citizens, the availability and misuse of SALW is often an important issue that is either tackled directly, or desired as an outcome of other activities.

It is sometimes assumed that efforts to control SALW will automatically contribute to peacebuilding efforts: surely fewer weapons reduce the risk of a return to violence? However, experience has demonstrated that how SALW control activities are designed and organised, and how they are located within other post-war recovery and peacebuilding efforts is of great importance to the type and extent of the contribution they make. There is also a growing acknowledgement on the part of academics, policy makers and practitioners alike that misconceived SALW control efforts that do not enjoy the support of conflict-affected groups can damage the chances of peace and can reignite, or intensify, existing violence.

This thesis contributes to understanding how, and in what contexts, activities to control SALW can make a positive contribution to conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts. It does this through exploring the nature of interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding and through analysing how positive interrelationships can be maximised in post-violent conflict contexts.

This first chapter aims to introduce the focus of the thesis, its research strategy and analytical framework. It does this through (a) introducing the relevant literatures related to peacebuilding, conflict resolution and the control of SALW; (b) stating the overarching research question and hypothesis and establishing a framework of
further sub-questions which are used to focus and deepen analysis; (c) providing an overview of the research strategy and methodology, which includes an introduction to the universe of cases which are analysed in Chapter 3, and the main case study, which forms the basis of Chapter 4. It concludes by describing the contents of each of the subsequent chapters which together comprise this thesis.

1.1 Introduction to conflict resolution and peacebuilding and its relationships with efforts to control SALW

For many years academics and others have invested significant effort in studying violent conflict, its causes and effects (for instance, see Lund (1996); Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005) and Wallensteen (2007) for detailed introductions to the field of peacebuilding as an area of academic enquiry). In particular, the impact of conflict on development, human rights, governance and security and justice has been analysed in depth and this knowledge is increasingly being translated into the policies and programmes of those affected by, or working to resolve, violent conflict.

In this context, interest in violent conflict and attempts to prevent and resolve it has been given additional recent impetus as international organisations, governments and others have sought to understand violent conflict and its relationships with governance and economic, social and political development. Consequently international commitments now accept a strong correlation between the least developed countries and those that are affected by conflict (UNGA, 2005a: paragraph 114) and also that conflict-affected countries are much more likely to remain poor (DFID, 2009; EU, 2001; Council of the EU, 2007; Collier, Elliot, Hegre et al, 2003; Elhawary, Foresti and Pantuliano, 2010).

Further, in recent years there has been an increased focus by academics and policy makers on the relationships between violent conflict, insecurity and access to justice (Collier, 2009; Duffield, 2007). Indeed, this relationship is now central to the policies and approaches of some of the world’s most significant development agencies. For instance, the World Bank Human Development Report 2011 focussed

Since the mid-1990s, concomitant with this growing interest in the effects of violent conflict, there has been a significant increase in interest in the role of SALW, both in fuelling and sustaining violence, and in conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes. This interest was illustrated in the ‘Supplement to the Agenda for Peace’ issued by the United Nations Secretary General on the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations in January 1995, which included a call for action to address issues of ‘micro disarmament’ alongside statements promoting and supporting peacekeeping and preventative diplomacy (United Nations, 1995).

In the period from the 1990s to the present day, considerable effort has been invested in addressing questions relating to SALW and the various ways in which more effective control can have positive benefits for promoting peace, security and development.\(^1\) Despite this interest, there is no internationally-recognised single definition for what constitutes SALW. However, most academics and policy makers refer to that developed by the 1997 UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. This definition states simply that the category of small arms refers to conventional weapons that can be carried and operated by a single individual, while light weapons are those which can be carried or operated by a small unit of up to four persons (United Nations, 1997). The control of SALW is often regarded as the range of activities and actions which aim to reduce the impact of uncontrolled SALW possession and misuse.

\(^1\) See for instance Laurance and Meek (1996) for an early exposition of the emerging field of what they described as ‘Micro Disarmament’, and Greene and Marsh eds. (2011) for a contemporary examination of the use of SALW in violence and of the efforts of states to control them more effectively.
Consequently, numerous activities have been designed which target specific aspects of the control of SALW (see Chapter 2 for an analysis of the range of SALW control activities which are relevant to this thesis). For instance activities relating to official stocks of SALW include stockpile security and management; destruction of obsolete or surplus stocks and training of military, police and other security agencies in the handling of weapons in line with international commitments and best practice are often prioritised in post-conflict contexts. Similarly, considerable effort has been invested in controlling weapons held by civilians, which includes activities to collect and encourage the surrender of weapons by civilians following conflict, improving licensing systems to enhance control over weapons held legally by non-state groups and individuals and undertaking public education programmes with the aim of changing cultural attitudes and behaviours regarding SALW ownership and use.

The role of the transfer of weapons from one user to another, through state-sanctioned international imports or exports or between states or non-state groups and individuals through illegal transfers, has been well established as an area of interest for many years. Further, and importantly for the focus of this thesis, in the period following the cessation of violent conflict, numerous efforts have been made to encourage the disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants and to support their (re)integration into society, as well as in the reform of military and security institutions to enable them to become more appropriate to the challenges of establishing and maintaining peace.

The development of the strategies and activities to control SALW introduced above has both been informed by, and has influenced, the relevant academic and ‘grey’ literatures on the subject. At the international level, perhaps the most important initiative which sought to understand the relationships between SALW and a range of causes and consequences, including violent conflict and insecurity, remains the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (hereafter the UNPoA). Agreed in 2001, the UNPoA was informed by the work of academics including Laurence and Meek (1996) who claimed in their
research that understanding the relationships between the availability of SALW and the factors that drove their proliferation was critical to controlling them more effectively, particularly in post-war situations. It also built on and reinforced important work undertaken to elaborate the concept of ‘human security’, most notably described in the United Nations Human Development Report in 1994, which attempted to redefine security as a phenomena affecting individuals as well as states (UNDP, 1994).

The UNPoA also stimulated and reinforced a significant amount of new research and policy development which aimed to understand better the ‘cause and effect’ relationships and, in important cases, to make connections between academic research and policy development. These included understanding better the relationships between SALW, poverty and development (see Centre for International Cooperation and Security, 2004); SALW and armed violence (see Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011); SALW and other security-building activities (see Garcia, 2006; Centre for International Cooperation and Security, 2006); and SALW and gender (see United National Department for Disarmament Affairs, 2001, and Farr and Kiflemariam, 2002).

However, whilst there has undoubtedly been significant progress made to connect SALW control to a variety of important related issues, including aspects of conflict and violence, there has not to date been significant attention placed on the specific interrelationships that exist between efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding processes as they relate specifically to the periods following large-scale political violent conflict.

Similarly, the literature on conflict resolution and peacebuilding is well developed in terms of understanding the linkages between the different phases of conflict and a variety of strategies and activities that can address particular dimensions of the problem. For example, Ramsbotham et al have developed an ‘hourglass model’ (2005:12) which offers an analytical framework through which what they term as the ‘contingencies and complementarities’ that exist in conflict resolution activities
can be described. In a general sense, this model is useful as a basis for understanding how different aspects of SALW control could theoretically relate both spatially (complementarities) and temporally (contingencies) with activities that are more accepted as conflict resolution or peacebuilding contributions.

However, there has to date not been a concerted effort from the perspective of those working on peacebuilding or conflict resolution problems to thoroughly investigate the interrelationships between peacebuilding and SALW control. Likewise, whilst there is now a considerable literature which relates to the role of different actors in peacebuilding processes and the importance of local people in areas affected by conflict being an important part of transformational peacebuilding (for instance: Curle, 1994; Lederach, 1997; Boulding, 2000; Richmond, 2008; Donais, 2009), there has not been a substantial effort to explore how, and to what extent, these concepts could be extended to SALW control and the contribution that it could make to conflict transformation. This thesis aims to make a significant contribution to the literatures on both peacebuilding and SALW control by helping to develop understandings of the interrelationships between the two, and to offer an analytical framework within which they can be described and analysed in the future.

1.2 Research questions and hypothesis
To make a contribution to addressing the gaps in the literatures introduced above (and analysed in depth in Chapter 2), a research strategy was developed based on an overarching research question, a hypothesis and a series of more specific sub-questions which frame the research and subsequent analysis. These are introduced and explained in the following section, which begins with the overarching research question that this thesis seeks to address:

“What are the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and build peace in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict?”
This has been identified as the main research question as it combines a focus on both peacebuilding and SALW control as substantive themes and situates the analysis of how they interrelate within the context of the de-escalation of violent conflict. Each of these main elements (peacebuilding, SALW control and the conflict context) could be further defined or elaborated differently. For example, consideration was given to whether the broad field of peacebuilding should be refined to focus specifically on the concept of ‘peacebuilding from below’ given its interest in the role of affected populations in peace processes, or to interpreting peacebuilding efforts solely through the perspective of the concept of ‘liberal peace’ summarised by Paris (1997), given that this is often linked closely to international post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery interventions (Ramsbotham et al 2011:198). Similarly, thought was given as to whether SALW control efforts should be defined quite narrowly, focussing on the activities which are most associated with peacebuilding processes (such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) or with the participation of wide groups of the civilian population in line with an interest in public participation in peace processes (such as voluntary civilian disarmament programmes). Further, the temporal dimension of the question - ‘...emerging from periods of violent conflict’ - could be defined to focus specifically for instance on the immediate period following a ceasefire agreement, or indeed at a later stage when a political settlement is deemed to have been reached.

However, these whilst these options were considered, ultimately they were discarded. The decision to include a broad interpretation of peacebuilding and SALW control was taken to maximise the opportunities to analyse a wide variety of different interrelationships, including specifically those that are not necessarily intended or built into peacebuilding or SALW control programmes which are often based on specific interpretations of these terms. Similarly, a decision was made to take a fairly wide perspective on the phase or period of conflict which is analysed. The primary reason for this was a desire to reflect the author’s personal experience of conflict contexts in which one violent conflict (for instance the civil war in Sudan from 1983 -2005) can feature multiple conflict contexts displaying very different
levels of intensity and proximity to violence, and importantly that these contexts can change quickly within a single overarching conflict context (for instance in 2005, despite the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the President of Sudan and the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, whilst this brought to an end political violence in many parts of southern Sudan, other regions of the country were either not included in the peace process and did not enjoy its positive implications (for instance in Darfur), or where they were, their conflict trajectory was significantly different than in other places (for instance, whilst violent conflict in the equatorial states of southern Sudan reduced significantly, in Jonglei and Upper Nile states, violence has increased and reduced sporadically in subsequent years in some cases linked to implementation of the CPA and in others seemingly unrelated to the overarching political agreement).

Finally in terms of the development of the overarching research question, a decision was taken not to place a focus on the extent to which interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and build peace can be either positive or negative. It is the case – as is demonstrated in Chapter 3 – that peacebuilding efforts can have a positive or negative impact on efforts to control SALW, and conversely, that SALW control activities can both benefit and damage efforts to promote peace. This thesis aims to explore and analyse both the positive and negative effects of interrelationships, an aim which would have been limited if the main research question had been framed in terms for instance of the positive contribution specifically that SALW control activities can make to peacebuilding efforts.

Based on this overarching research question, a hypothesis was developed to help refine the research contribution, which begins with the recognition of the positive and negative potential of interrelationships. It then focuses on three specific variables, identified in the literatures reviewed in Chapter 2 which taken together, provide the framework through which the research and analysis for this thesis has been undertaken. These are the importance of contingency and complementarity in post-war peacebuilding activities (for instance see Ramsbotham et al 2005), the importance of the involvement of a wide range of actors in conflict transformation
(for instance, see Curle, 1994; Lederach, 1997; Richmond, 2008), and the importance of contextual factors in the perceptions and attitudes of those affected by SALW problems in post-war settings (Atwood and Jackman, 2000; Brauer and Muggah, 2006). Thus, the hypothesis is as follows:

**Efforts to control SALW can have a positive or negative effect on post-conflict peacebuilding; conversely their success can be damaged or enhanced by peacebuilding activities. The interrelationships that exist between SALW control and peacebuilding are both temporal and spatial and are conditioned by the extent to which affected populations are involved. Therefore, the role and influence of local people, and the extent to which complementarity and contingency is understood and acted upon, have a determining effect on the positive benefits of SALW control in post-conflict peacebuilding.**

This thesis makes a contribution to confirming the validity of this hypothesis, and in deepening understanding of the factors involved, in at least some relevant contexts. It does this by developing a framework through which interrelationships can be described and analysed. This is based on the three variables stated above, which affect the nature of interrelationships between peacebuilding and SALW control efforts (contingency, complementarity and context). To explore each of these variables, and to make a contribution to the overarching research question by attempting to confirm the validity of the hypothesis, a small number of specific sub-questions were identified. These are described below, with those relating to contingency introduced first, followed by those which seek to analyse complementarity, and finally by those which are primarily concerned with the effects of context on interrelationships.
1.2.1 The effect of contingency on interrelationships

At what stages of conflict de-escalation is the control of SALW relevant to peacebuilding efforts, and to what extent are SALW control activities located within existing phases of post-conflict peacebuilding?

Models for describing violent conflict often trace the escalation of tensions into violence and then various phases of de-escalation towards an absence of violence and then peace. Given that this thesis is particularly interested in what is commonly termed as the post-conflict or post-war period, understanding how SALW control and peacebuilding are relevant in the ‘de-escalation’ stage is central. Further, Ramsbotham et al (2005) and Chetail (2009) amongst others describe several, sometimes nested (Dugan, 1996; Lederach, 1997), phases of post-conflict peacebuilding. This thesis seeks to understand whether interrelationships are different in different phases and to what extent the effects of activities in one phase impact on those which follow.

How does the nature of SALW control activity change over different phases of post-conflict peacebuilding?

Ramsbotham et al (2005) have developed a model drawn from analysis of international peacebuilding efforts since the early 1970s which establishes a number of peacebuilding phases which begin with peacemaking (which focuses on ending violence) and move through the de-escalation stages to peacebuilding activities (which promote changes in attitudes and cultures). This model builds on early work by Galtung (1975) which described the main groups of conflict resolution activities (peacemaking to address cultural violence, peacekeeping to address direct violence, and peacebuilding to address structural violence). To date there has not been substantial work to identify which aspects of SALW control may be

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2 These vary in complexity from simple bell curves or wave diagrams through to nested conflict cycles. See Dudouet (2006) for a review and analysis of the different models used by academics and practitioners to describe conflict.
appropriate at different stages of post-conflict peacebuilding. This thesis aims to make a contribution to addressing this gap in the current literatures.

To what extent is the concept of nested paradigms appropriate to efforts to control SALW?

Dugan (1996) and Lederach (1997) were early proponents of the concept of nested approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. To date, whilst there is some evidence to suggest that a nested approach is beginning to be more commonplace in the design of programmes to tackle insecurity in post-war environments, there is no analysis of how the concept of nesting could be appropriate to efforts to control SALW, and indeed whether SALW control activities could be located within a nested approach to post-war peacebuilding.

1.2.2 The effect of complementarity on interrelationships

What are the relevant intra- and inter-sectoral relationships between efforts to control SALW and recognised post-conflict peacebuilding interventions?

Sector-specific or sector-wide approaches are championed by the UN, World Bank and a variety of governments, amongst others as a way of organising post-war recovery, peacebuilding and development support. In a given context, these often involve security, justice and governance ‘sectors’. SALW are sometimes located within one, often the security sector where they are co-located with support for defence reform, public security and policing. However, SALW control is also relevant to the development or reform of governance frameworks and capacity and to other sectors including public health. Similarly, peacebuilding activities can take place across a wide range of different sectors. This thesis explores whether and how interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts are affected by whether SALW is treated as a sector-specific or a cross-cutting theme.
1.2.3 The effect of context on interrelationships

How are different social groups involved in efforts to control SALW in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict – specifically what are the different roles played by those in the different tiers of Lederach’s Actors and Approaches To Peacebuilding model? (Lederach, 1997)

Lederach and others contend that the involvement of a wide cross-section of the population is important in moving beyond elite peace deals which often play critical roles in bringing violence to an end, but which don’t by themselves transform the underlying causes and drivers of conflict. This concept has not been applied to post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in the context of the effects that this might have on interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding. Chapters 3 and 4 in particular aim to analyse the participation of different groups of citizens in SALW control efforts to assess to what extent the nature of this involvement affects the potential for them to make a contribution to transformative peacebuilding.

What is the relationship between the involvement of different actors, specifically affected populations, and the role that SALW control plays in post-conflict peacebuilding, and how does this affect the contribution of SALW control towards longer term transformative peacebuilding?

This thesis analyses whether the transformative contribution of SALW control activities is affected by the extent or nature of the involvement of affected populations. This is important in terms of applying some of the principles of the concept of ‘peacebuilding from below’ (Curle, 1990; Boulding, 2000; Fisher and Zimina, 2008) to SALW control. These state that without the involvement of those most affected by conflict (or in this case the availability and misuse of SALW in post-war environments), the transformative potential of peacebuilding and conflict resolution activities will not be fully realised.
How does the range of actors involved and the nature of their involvement in SALW control efforts change over different phases of post-conflict peacebuilding?

It is argued that different groups of actors are involved to differing degrees in conflict de-escalation phases. For instance, Ramsbotham et al (2005) claim that the phases which are characterised by ceasefire arrangements and the deployment of peacekeepers often involve a relatively small number of people undertaking elite peace-bargaining. However, at later stages where reconciliation is more important, they state that a wider cross-section of the population is involved. This thesis analyses whether and to what extent this model is applicable to SALW control and whether the involvement of different groups of actors plays a role in the extent to which the transformative potential of SALW control activities is realised.

It would perhaps be possible to focus solely on one of these specific areas - each of which is important in better understanding how SALW control and peacebuilding efforts interrelate - and indeed much could be learned from a detailed examination of one particular dimension. For instance the role of public perceptions in target communities, and indeed the behaviours and beliefs of communities and individuals in terms of how they relate to SALW and to efforts to control them is a potentially significant area of enquiry. The role of SALW in shaping opinions regarding personal and community security and vulnerability to conflict can differ significantly from one community to another, and between individuals within a community; women typically feel more threatened by the perception that SALW are widely held than men, who may feel that weapons provide a means of defence and act as an important deterrent, even if in reality they may be relatively ineffectual in dealing either with short term threats or achieving long term peace and security. Conducting research in a significant number of contexts to attempt to understand the social, cultural and economic conditions which may be conducive to enhancing control over SALW, and those in which greater control of SALW may act positively on causes and drivers of conflict and insecurity from the perspective of target communities, could in itself represent a significant undertaking.
Likewise, a contribution could be made to establishing the linkages between efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding activities through focusing solely on the means by which the activities are undertaken. An approach which explores SALW control and peacebuilding methods could lend much to an understanding of the operational linkages which could be of significant value to those responsible for designing, managing and implementing programmes and projects (see for instance Ball and van de Goor (2013) for a comparable attempt to enhance the effectiveness of security sector reform programmes through focussing specifically on the process of reform rather than the achievement of pre-determined end goals).

However, a combined focus on the (positive and negative) interrelationships that are created and which exist over time (first group of sub-questions), the ways in which interrelationships are affected by other events taking place in the same temporal and geographic space (second group of sub-questions), and the ways in which different aspects of context (third group) generate and affect interrelationships is, in the opinion of the author, more valuable. In particular it helps to express the interrelationships in different but highly connected ways. For example, the way that, over time, communities experience peacebuilding and SALW control activities could shape their perceptions and behaviours and this could have a significant impact on the ways in which SALW are perceived, either as positive contributions to peace, or as necessary safeguards against the unintended consequences of peacebuilding activities.

Through assessing each of the groups of sub-questions in detail by examining a wide range of SALW control activities in different contexts and by exploring the case of Kosovo since the end of its civil war in 1999, this thesis deepens understandings of the interrelationships between SALW and peacebuilding efforts and analyses why this matters, both in terms of the success of SALW control activities as well as for wider peacebuilding efforts.
1.3 The research approach

This thesis follows a mixed methods approach which allows for the combination of elements of what Robson (2002:4-5) describes as flexible and fixed research strategies.

A key characteristic of the mixed methods approach is that it combines qualitative and quantitative data gathering and analysis. In the case of this research, a premium was placed on qualitative data; however the existence of good quality quantitative data which can be used to establish trends and issues and to triangulate the results of qualitative data analysis was particularly useful. Given the importance of understanding the role of contextual factors and the social construction of knowledge and understandings in establishing interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts, a case study component was also built into the overall research methodology. The case study is of particular importance in terms of deepening understanding of exactly how SALW control efforts and peacebuilding activities have interrelated in specific cases which demonstrate characteristics that may be generalizable to similar contexts elsewhere.

Within the overarching mixed methods approach, an important element has been the role of social construction. It is the author’s belief that the success or otherwise of efforts to control SALW and promote peace is heavily determined by the realities socially constructed by those involved. The process of developing knowledge through social interaction, which is central to taking a social constructionist approach to research (see for instance Burr, 1995:4-5), is particularly appropriate to the research topic explored in this thesis. In conflict- and post- conflict contexts, where interpretations of history and contemporary life are heavily determined by personal experience, and in a context where conflict has often driven different communities apart, creating further distance between different constructions of reality, understanding the existence of these differences and observing the ways in which they determine personal and community attitudes, is of central importance.
to establishing the types and nature of interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts.

A number of other research approaches were considered and eventually discounted prior to the selection of the mixed methods methodology. These included grounded theory, a pure case study approach and an action research methodology. Grounded theory was attractive for its applicability to qualitative data gathering and analysis, and for its utility in exploring human interactions and generating theories. It was discounted as although a significant element of the logic of this research is the development of theories, grounded theory was deemed less useful as an approach for testing and refining theories which combine conceptual as well as more practical, empirical research (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967). A pure case study approach would have been appropriate to a research study which focussed exclusively on specific cases of SALW control efforts. However, despite an important element of this research being the study of a specific case of SALW control and peacebuilding, significant other aspects of the research focus at the thematic level, drawing on concepts as well as experiences from a wide variety of different contexts.

Finally, an action research methodology was considered. This would have been an appropriate methodology for the research topic. It is certainly a real world problem, and it is hoped that the findings of this research will be of use to policy makers and others in responding to what is a critical element of designing more effective approaches to controlling SALW and promoting peace in post-conflict environments. However, whilst the author is committed to sharing the findings of the research with those involved as well as with those with a role in controlling SALW and peacebuilding, in reality it is unlikely that a significant enough commitment can be given to a longer term process of which this research is a component, to justify a claim that this follows a true action research approach.
1.4 Research Strategy
This thesis thus follows a clear research strategy: The overarching research question, hypothesis and sub-questions provide the parameters for the research. A mixed methods methodology has been selected as a guiding philosophy which through its flexible approach provides for the inclusion of a soft social constructionist perspective.

The strategy provides for initial analysis of a wide universe of cases where SALW control has been attempted in conflict-affected contexts. Emerging issues and trends are then explored in more detail and further analysed through five mini-case studies representing a wide range of different types of SALW control and peacebuilding activity and contexts in which they were attempted. The findings from these mini-case studies are then drawn together and analysed to identify initial theories for how peacebuilding and SALW control might interrelate and how these interrelationships are affected by complementarity, contingency and context. A detailed case study of peacebuilding and SALW control efforts in post-war Kosovo is then undertaken which builds on, tests and further elaborates these initial theories. Finally, the findings from each stage (the universe of cases, the mini-case studies and the main case study) are drawn together, further analysed, and conclusions are drawn which aim to establish and explain interrelationships and how they are affected by time, space and context. Each of these elements is introduced in greater detail below:

Establishing an analytical framework: A guiding analytical framework for this thesis was developed on the basis of reviewing existing literatures relevant to peacebuilding and efforts to control SALW. This framework, which was organised around the three variables contained in the thesis hypothesis, was then used to identify and analyse interrelationships between aspects of peacebuilding and SALW control.

Establishing a universe of cases: Initial analysis was undertaken through examining a wide variety of contexts in which SALW control efforts have taken place in the
context of emergence from periods of violent political conflict. Through analysing this universe of over 80 cases, initial findings are identified which suggest particular types of interrelationship and begin to demonstrate what their existence contributes to the success or otherwise of peacebuilding processes or SALW control efforts.

This initial phase of research places significant importance on quantitative data, drawing on existing published research. It analyses the extent to which SALW control efforts occur in contexts which are affected by violent conflict. Further it examines the range of different approaches to SALW control and the specific techniques that are employed, identifying which techniques are most significant from a quantitative perspective. The data that this initial analysis draws on includes instances in which SALW control efforts have taken place within a national-level SALW control framework during a period in which the countries concerned were experiencing periods of violent conflict, or were in the early stages of emergence from violent conflict.

The dataset is time-bound, beginning in 2001 when the UN Programme of Action on SALW was agreed. This is commonly understood to mark the beginning of a particular period in the development and implementation of efforts to control SALW, given it provided for the first time an international framework within which States, international agencies and non-government bodies agreed to act. It also provided the framework within which the most significant and internationally accepted research and analysis as to the effect of SALW control efforts have been undertaken. It concludes in 2012 when the research phase for this PhD was completed.

**Analysing mini-case studies to identify initial findings:** From the initial universe of cases, a small number of mini-case studies were identified for further and deeper analysis. These were: Efforts to control civilian held SALW in Sri Lanka following the Cease Fire Agreement in 2002; Internationally supported SALW control efforts in the Western Balkans and their interrelationships with national and regional
peacebuilding efforts; Efforts to implement an integrated approach to peacebuilding and SALW control in Sudan/Southern Sudan since 2005; Analysis of efforts to control SALW as disarmament exercises in northern Kenya and Karamoja in Uganda in 2006; Analysis of efforts to control SALW and their interrelationships with peacebuilding frameworks and activities in Sierra Leone between 2001 and 2004.

In each of these mini-case studies, the framework established in Chapter 2 guided the research and analysis. Each of the contexts selected were identified against a set of common criteria which are elaborated in depth in Chapter 3. Taken together they aim to cover a substantial range of different contexts and therefore to provide a broad scope of analysis and potentially to enhance the relevance of the findings to a wide range of other contexts. This analysis focuses primarily on qualitative data, drawing on published data and the author’s own experience, and is supported by a small number of interviews in each case. In this way, qualitative data is used to test, explore and deepen understandings emerging from the initial analysis of quantitative data contained in the universe of cases.

*Conducting an in-depth case study to test and refine emerging findings:* These findings, along with those arising from the initial analysis of the universe of cases are then tested and further elaborated and explored through a detailed case-study of peacebuilding and SALW control efforts in Kosovo in the period between 1999 and 2012.

Since the end of its violent conflict in 1999, Kosovo has experienced very significant international attempts to support peacebuilding and conflict resolution. These efforts have taken place at the same time as a wide range of different attempts to reduce legal and illicit SALW holdings and to promote greater control over remaining SALW. The international peacekeeping and peacebuilding approach to Kosovo had a strong security-building dimension from the outset. Post-war Kosovo has been a focus of a wide range of different research activities since 1999, which have included those which have analysed the nature and effectiveness of
peacebuilding efforts, and the role and effects of SALW in prosecuting the war and in the post-war transition towards Kosovo independence.

Kosovo was selected as a case study as it demonstrates certain characteristics that are important for the further development and elaboration of findings emerging from analysis of the universe of cases and the mini case studies. They included: an immediate post-conflict context which featured aspects of civil war and inter-state conflict; a context in which international intervention at different levels had played a significant role in the conflict and in post-conflict security and peacebuilding efforts; an environment which includes both rural and urban settings from which to conduct specific field research; and a context in which efforts to control SALW and promote peace have been attempted and where there have been acknowledged successes and failures.

Kosovo case study findings are generalizable to other contexts displaying similar characteristics, as well as providing the context in which a deeper analysis of interrelationships can be undertaken to test, refine and develop the findings emerging from the universe of cases and the smaller number of mini-case studies.

The Kosovo case study combines both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data is used predominantly to provide the initial analysis of the context (for instance, survey data on public attitudes to weapons and conflict, data on numbers of weapons seized and surrendered, national and local crime rates) which is then explored in greater depth through analysing qualitative data (including for example that drawn directly from interviews with those affected by SALW proliferation or violence and those participating in programmes to address them). The Kosovo case study combines document analysis (including analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data), interviews, focus group discussions and observation.

The geographic locations in Kosovo in which field research was conducted were selected from across the country. The case study methodology and selection
criteria are described in Chapter 4. However, in introductory terms, the criteria for selection included the following: a mix of urban and rural locations; the extent to which communities had been the subject of SALW control and other peacebuilding activities; the geographic location of the community within Kosovo, the ethnic representation of the community; the geographic and population size and distribution; and the awareness of community members as to the existence of SALW control and peacebuilding activities.

In the Kosovo case study, six focus groups were organised and facilitated according to a plan and guide schedule of questions prepared in advance. The focus groups discussions took place in Albanian, Bosnian or Serbian depending on the audience and were facilitated by one of two interpreters who have both worked extensively with the author previously. In addition to the focus group discussions, a significant number of structured and semi-structured interviews were held with community members as well as with representatives of local and national authorities and international agencies. In many cases where English was not spoken well, these interviews were conducted by the author but translated into either Albanian or Serbian depending on the context.

**Confirming key findings and drawing conclusions**: The findings drawn from the Kosovo case study are then explored and further developed in the context of those arising from the initial universe of cases and the small number of more detailed contexts. From this collective analysis, findings are then identified which have resonance across a wide range of different contexts, from which a series of conclusions are drawn as contributions to addressing the overarching research question and hypothesis. These are offered as contributions to both the literatures on the themes of peacebuilding and SALW control, and where relevant to country-specific literatures.
1.5 **Ethical considerations**

SALW control is often by its nature a sensitive issue. Much of the literature analysed during the research for this thesis is open source and some of it has been peer reviewed. Where this is the case, it is referenced clearly and appropriately. However many of the interviewees and focus group participants in the Kosovo case study in particular do not for obvious reasons want their remarks to be attributed explicitly in this document. In every case, interview logs were compiled by the author and all transcripts and records of meetings coded and anonymised. A code book is kept by the author in a secure place and has not been shared. In this way, where requested the identities of respondents remains confidential.

Given the nature of the issue, the sensitivity of the context and the positions held within their communities by many of the respondents in this research, considerable attention was paid to the ethical considerations when designing and conducting the research. In addition to issues related to confidentiality and anonymity described above, these included: obtaining permissions (from both formal and informal power holders and representatives – in each case with the village council, a body with considerable local standing but no formal authority in legal terms) for access, particularly in the locations visited as part of the Kosovo case study; conducting interviews and focus group discussions in a manner which was sensitive to cultural and social realities (using the right language and being aware of the gender, ethnicity and age of research assistants), particularly when conducting research at the community level; remaining vigilant as to the distorting affects that the presence of an outsider asking specific questions could have both on the opinions and perceptions of respondents, but also in altering the power balance within the communities; and ensuring that research participants were given the opportunity to comment on the author’s analysis.

In addition, the author’s prior knowledge and experience of the main themes covered in this thesis and of Kosovo in particular required attention from an ethical perspective. The author has visited Kosovo over forty times since early 2002 and has developed excellent relationships with a wide range of different actors.
performing different roles across society from ministers and senior military and police officials to local village representatives in communities in which he has worked. To a slightly lesser but nevertheless important degree, this is also the case for some of the contexts identified for detailed analysis in Chapter 3, including Sudan/South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Kenya and South Eastern Europe. This prior knowledge and experience is valuable for a variety of reasons including accessing data, obtaining permission and consent to discuss sensitive issues at the community levels as well as with relevant officials, and the ability to sift information to identify that which was of particular importance and interest. However, it was also very important to understand how the previous roles that the author has played may have had a distorting role in the research: Prior knowledge of the issues may have meant that due attention was not paid and analysis was based on assumptions rather than evidence; familiarity with certain actors and interlocutors may have meant that other important actors were not accessed or asked to contribute; and a willingness to please a colleague may have led to some respondents trying to provide the contributions that they thought the author might want to hear, regardless of their veracity.

Finally, to a large extent regardless of the previous role of the author, his presence in a given community will have played a role in the development and articulation of particular views and perspectives, an unavoidable reality for a researcher who believes in social construction as a means by which realities are created. At the commencement of the research planning, the author ensured that an ethics section of the research plan was included which identified potential ethical impacts and described mitigating or management strategies in each case. This was reviewed as the research progressed, and in combination with regular triangulation of data and progress reviews as research progressed, helped ensure that whilst ethical considerations were both recognised and addressed, they did not unexpectedly influence the direction or the outcomes of the research.
1.6 Chapter structure

Building on the research strategy introduced above, this final section of Chapter 1 summarises and further elaborates the thesis’ chapter structure.

Chapter 2 has three main elements. The first two sections locate the research focus for this thesis within the relevant academic literatures and current debates, principally those relating to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and then the control of small arms and light weapons. Specifically, it identifies where existing literatures make a contribution to understanding the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding activities in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict and where further work is required. In doing so it describes the contribution that this thesis will make to further elaborating existing understandings and literatures. The third section reviews existing methods and models for analysing SALW, conflict and peacebuilding, establishes the analytical framework that will be used to organise research, and as part of this elaborates in detail the main research questions which were introduced in Chapter 1.

Chapter 3 begins to elaborate understandings of how efforts to control SALW and build peace in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict interrelate. It begins this through reviewing quantitative data relating to a wide range of efforts to control SALW that has taken place in a variety of different contexts since 2001, before refining this universe to focus on countries in which SALW control has been attempted during a period of, or immediately following, violent conflict. Within this group, it describes the nature of the efforts to control SALW and identifies relevant trends and approaches. From this wider group, it then identifies a smaller number of contexts which are explored in some detail. The purpose of this analysis is, through examination of qualitative data, to develop understandings of how SALW control and peacebuilding efforts interrelated in each case. The chapter concludes by applying these understandings to the emerging model for describing them which was introduced in Chapter 2, and which is further tested and developed in Chapters 4 and 5. This chapter contributes to the literatures on the control of SALW and peacebuilding by mapping and analysing the trends and dimensions of SALW
control in countries emerging from violent, and describes the main interrelations
between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts in five different contexts.

Chapter 4 focuses on Kosovo as the major case study for this research. It
introduces the contemporary political, social and conflict context in Kosovo in the
period leading up to, and following the end of the 1999 war. This is followed by a
description and initial analysis of attempts to control SALW and efforts to build
peace in the post-war period. The case study research methodology and methods
are then described, including an introduction to, and initial analysis of, the different
research locations that together comprise the Kosovo case study. The findings from
the case study research are then discussed within the analytical framework, with a
particular focus on how the research findings relate to the main research questions.
This chapter makes an original contribution to the literature both on SALW and
peacebuilding, and to post-war contemporary Kosovo, as the first detailed analysis
of the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and build peace in a
country emerging from a period of violent conflict.

The final chapter reviews the substantive findings from Chapters Two, Three and
Four. Specifically, the findings from Chapters Three and Four are further analysed
and developed. There are two substantive aspects to this analysis: firstly, the
conceptual interrelations suggested in Chapter 2 are tested with findings both from
the Kosovo case study (Chapter 4) and the contents of the wide review of previous
depth of efforts to control SALW and build peace (Chapter 3). From this, a
narrative description of these interrelationships is offered as a substantive
contribution to answering the overarching research question; secondly a model for
describing this enhanced understanding is set out as a substantive contribution to
the literature for describing interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and
build peace in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict. Chapter 5
concludes by identifying areas in which further research could enhance the
conclusions of this thesis in the future.
Chapter 2: SALW Reduction and Control and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

2.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces and reviews the main literatures that are relevant to the overarching research question, hypothesis and sub-questions, and identifies the different areas in which it makes a contribution to existing knowledge. It is organised in three substantive sections. First, it reviews concepts and models relevant to conflict and conflict resolution and analyses concepts relevant to post-war peacebuilding and reconstruction, specifically those which: (a) attempt to combine a contingency-based approach with those that seek to understand the effects of complementarity and; (b) analyse the contributions that those affected by violent conflict can make to peacebuilding. Secondly, the field of small arms and efforts to control them is reviewed in detail, with particular attention paid to literatures which describe and analyse the relationships between the control of small arms and light weapons and related areas of security and peacebuilding. Finally, on the basis of this analysis, the overall research approach and strategy taken to addressing the central and related research questions identified in Chapter 1 is then described and justified.

2.2 The field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding

This thesis is primarily concerned with the interrelationships between efforts to control small arms and light weapons and promote peace in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict.

Different overarching terms are used to describe the concepts and process of tackling conflict. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall argue that in part these are a product of a debate between those who seek to transform conflict and those who seek to resolve it (2005:9). In simple terms, those who are primarily concerned with resolving conflict situate their work within the field of conflict resolution (for instance see Wallensteen, 2007:9) and those who are concerned with transformation of conflict (see Lederach, 1997: 20) who describe their contributions in terms of peacebuilding, reconciliation or conflict transformation.
Ramsbotham et al support the generic use of the term conflict resolution over other terms to describe the range of different ways of analysing conflict and designing responses to specific phases or characteristics. They do this from a practical as well as an intellectual perspective, stating that: “In our view it does not matter in the end what label is used as the umbrella term [...] so long as the field is coherent enough to contain the substance of what is being advocated in each case.” Further, they give three very practical reasons to support their claim: (1) that conflict resolution is the earliest term used to describe the field referred to first in 1957 in the establishment of the Journal of Conflict Resolution; (2) that it is the most commonly used term in academic publications in a survey from 1995 to 2004; and (3) that it is the most often used term amongst the general public and the media (Ramsbotham et al 2005:9).

There are important claims to other terminology. For example, Lederach prefers the term ‘peacebuilding’, understanding it as “…a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages which are needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships” (1997:20). Alternatively, Lund locates his work on preventative diplomacy within the overarching term of conflict prevention, which he sees as relevant both prior to, and following, the outbreak of violent conflict (1996:4).

In addition to relating to the nature of the activity undertaken by those involved, these terminologies are also rooted in the different theoretical and conceptual ideas and traditions that underpin and guide specific approaches to tackling conflict. One way of understanding these is in terms of a sliding scale with realists at one end and critical theorists and post-structuralists at the other. Realists believe that cosmopolitan or pluralist conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts are not appropriate for focussing on the key characteristics, structures and drivers of contemporary conflict, including terrorism and asymmetric warfare.

Realists understand that violent conflicts are centrally driven by structures and actors concerned with power, self-interest, and/or security dilemmas, and that they are thus not likely to be prevented, resolved or transformed by outsiders.
unless such ‘peacebuilders’ can substantially either impose their will (by deploying coercive power) or by otherwise materially affecting power balances and structures. Further, Realists believe that peacebuilding activities, including mediating political settlement, can sometimes prolong violence and suffering, whereas direct military intervention can bring war to a swifter conclusion. One aspect of this approach, for example, is reflected in Luttwak’s 1999 phrase ‘Give war a chance’. Authors including Mearsheimer (1995) and more recently, Rynning (2011) contend that a more direct approach to promoting self-interest, including allowing one side to win a war through military means and using hard as well as soft power, is an appropriate response to contemporary challenges of addressing violent conflict.

The realist approach differs significantly from those who follow a critical theorist perspective. Critical theorists contend that contemporary conflict and war is a product of, and generates responses by, those living on the periphery of a modern globalised world and that they demonstrate new and important social formations and interactions (Duffield, 1997). They believe that some differences and interests are irreconcilable and that a global perspective of oppression and exploitation is required within which positions should be taken in support of, or against, particular interests. As such, they oppose external interventions to promote changes in the behaviours or practices of those inhabiting this new paradigm, in effect believing them to be overly focussed on solving problems rather than addressing the fundamental issues which cause and sustain conflict in the first place. Authors often associated with a critical theorist perspective, including Richmond (2008) and Pugh, Cooper and Tanner (2008), claim that a failure of those involved in promoting conflict transformation is that they are in danger of co-option by those promoting a realist or neo liberal agenda.

Located between these two opposing perspectives are those taken by what Ramsbotham et al describe as the Pluralist/Cosmopolitan Heartland of Conflict Resolution (2011:396). However, in practice those working with a pluralist or cosmopolitan perspective are a ‘broad church’ and widely differ - sometimes markedly. Pluralist perspectives include a strong belief in principles of international
order and non-intervention norms associated with conflict settlement (Chandler, 2009), whereas on the other hand, cosmopolitan perspectives are described as aligned with the term conflict transformation (Jackson, 2000). Cosmopolitan conflict transformation accepts the concept of intervention, although sets itself apart from a realist perspective by claiming that when intervention occurs, it does so with the intention of promoting systemic and radical transformation. Roland Paris (1997), who with Timothy Sisk (Paris and Sisk, 2009) has played a leading role in debates around the ‘liberal peace’ or ‘New York Consensus’, which is based on “…transplanting western models of social, political and economic organisation into war shattered stages in order to control civil conflict” (Paris, 1997:56), is often associated with a cosmopolitan approach to conflict resolution.

This thesis generally adopts analytical frameworks drawn from a cosmopolitan approach to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, given the focus of the main research question and its interest in the nature and effect of international peacebuilding and SALW control efforts, in addition to those generated locally from within affected contexts. Further, whilst recognising the different interpretations of terms including conflict resolution, conflict settlement, transformation, and peacebuilding, for the purposes of this thesis, the author takes the terms conflict resolution and peacebuilding as overarching definitions of the field within which efforts to promote and build peace are located. As such, the terms conflict resolution and peacebuilding will be referred to throughout this chapter, and indeed the wider thesis, to describe the broader academic field within which specific research and literatures relating for instance to peacebuilding and specifically post-war peacebuilding are situated.


2.2.1 Theories and models for describing conflict and conflict resolution responses

In addition to recognising different terminologies at the outset, it is also important to recognise some of the most well-regarded concepts and models for analysing conflict and ways by which it might be addressed. Several of these models which are of particular relevance to the focus of this research are reviewed below.

However, one of the most well-known and regarded models for describing conflict and the actions that can be taken to address its different dimensions was proposed by Johan Galtung in 1969, and then developed further in 1975. Galtung is credited as playing an important catalytic role in the development of models for understanding conflict and peacebuilding, producing in the late 1960s a triangular model for describing the main components of conflict. This saw attitude, behaviour and contradiction, at its vertices (leading Dudouet (2006:39) to describe this as the ABC model of conflict transformation).

Writing almost forty years later, Wallensteen offers a slightly adapted model with incompatibility, action and actors as the three dimensions of the conflict triangle, replacing contradiction with incompatibility, and attitude and behaviour with actors and their actions. He does this to reflect the dilemmas arising from conflict between employers and employees in industrial relations and between sovereign states in international relations (2007:16), where actors and their actions play a central role in building conflict into a given system.

Galtung later developed his model to describe the types of violence involved in conflict which peace actors need to address (structural violence, direct violence and cultural violence), and the possible responses from a conflict resolution perspective. Thus structural violence arose from contradiction and required peace-building responses; cultural violence arises from conflict over attitudes and requires peace-making approaches; and direct violence occurs when conflict is expressed through behaviour and requires peace-keeping responses (Galtung, 1975).

In a further elaboration of the models described above, Galtung also popularised the terminology of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace, with negative peace being the
absence of direct violence and positive peace being a state in which cultural and structural violence have also been overcome (Galtung, 1969:2). This difference is critical to the debate around the relative merits of technical and transformative descriptions of peacebuilding and of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding which are reviewed later in this chapter (see Fisher and Zimina’s perspective on transformative and technical approaches to peacebuilding below and debates on the nature and effectiveness of ‘liberal’ peacebuilding involving Paris, Pugh, Richmond, Duffield and Mitchell (see above and below)).

In addition to efforts to describe why and how conflict occurs there has been significant effort invested in modelling the different stages, or phases, of a conflict and when and how particular types of response can be applied. Perhaps the most common approach is one that tries to understand conflict in a temporal sense, describing it as a series of events or actions which take place over a defined period of time. The simplest model for describing this is probably the conflict wave (Brahm, 2003, in Dudouet, 2006:6). This sees conflict escalating and then de-escalating over time, often demonstrated in graph form as a bell curve with time and intensity as the axis. Lederach (1997:43) describes this as a wave-like timeline, whereas Lund (1996:40) describes it as a smoothly curving bell in his version of the model “The Life History of Conflict”.

*Figure 1: Lund’s conflict bell curve from “The Life History of Conflict” (1996)*
Ramsbotham et al (2005:11) use this model to identify the different stages leading up to war on the escalation side of the up-curve, and then the gradual de-escalation following ceasefire. They label these different stages in ascending order as difference, contradiction, polarization, violence and ultimately war; and in descending order, ceasefire, agreement, normalization and reconciliation. This idea builds on earlier work by Mitchell (2005:13) in his model for describing the “Dynamics of Perpetuation, Exacerbation and Mitigation”, which identifies a series of ‘conflict exacerbating dynamics’ associated with the escalation phases of conflict - or the upside of the bell curve - and then for each exacerbating dynamic, identifies ‘conflict mitigation dynamics’. This model draws on a diagram offered by Curle (1971:186 in Dudouet, 2006:16) which set out the main stages of conflict: latent conflict; overt conflict; settlement; and finally sustainable peace.

This approach has been adapted to illustrate the different stages at which conflict resolution responses can be offered, and in doing so establishing conceptual contingencies between different actions as the conflicts develop, become violent and then recede. For example, Lund develops this concept to identify diplomatic efforts that can be undertaken at different stages in advance of the outbreak of violent conflict (Lund, 1996:38), and Ramsbotham et al suggest in their ‘Hourglass Model’ a relationship between different phases of conflict, their expressions and the conflict resolution responses that are required in each case (2005:12).

In addition to efforts to map and describe the different stages of conflict and their interrelationships, considerable effort has been invested in developing ideas and approaches for analysing violent conflict, focussing on generating and exacerbating factors as well as the intensity of conflict and its transition towards and away from violence. These have included Azar’s work on the concept of protracted social conflict which aimed to understand amongst other things the internal and external factors which generate sustained conflict and violence (see Azar 1990); identification of ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ as key generators of conflict (Berdal and Malone, 2000; Berdal, 2005; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009); and work to understand the characteristics of ‘weak’, ‘vulnerable’ or ‘failed states’ by Ghani and Lockhart (2008).
The importance of different levels of conflict and factors causing conflict has similarly become clearer over recent years, from the effects of regional dynamics and the impact of ‘overspill’ (Cederman et al, 2009) to the importance of understanding conflict systems that can include multiple dimensions such as local, national, regional and international factors (see Ropers 2008). These ideas and others including the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment methodology developed by the Berghof Foundation (Hoffman 2004) have been central to the development of methods for analysing conflict by major international and bilateral actors, including the World Bank’s Conflict Assessment Framework (Wam and Sardesai, 2005) which places strong emphasis on internal sectoral analysis and the UK Department for International Development Strategic Conflict Analysis (Goodhand, Vaux and Walker 2002) which has since been developed through the combination of conflict analysis with analysis of governance and statebuilding challenges into the Joint Assessment of Conflict and Stability (DFID, 2012).

What these authors and approaches have in common (in addition to their adaptation and use of aspects of the basic escalation and de-escalation model) is that there is a general awareness and acceptance of the reality that conflict is much more complex as a phenomenon that the bell curve or wave diagram suggests. Dudouet (2006:7) states that: “Even the most recent conflict resolution manuals rely heavily on the “conflict wave” model, while simultaneously acknowledging the impossibility of applying such idealised diagrams mechanically to the history of most protracted social conflicts”.

The idea that violent conflict is not linear and that it is both dynamic and can move between different stages over time has, as noted above, been represented as a cycle with various different levels of complexity attributed by different researchers. At its most basic level, the key characteristics identified in various interpretations of the conflict bell curve described above are placed in a simple cycle to demonstrate the potential for dynamic movement between different phases of conflict (Melander and Pigache, 2007:9). In more complex form, attempts are made to demonstrate the different pathways between stages of conflict which are determined by the timing, nature and success of conflict resolution efforts: Francis
(2002:55) attempts to map this as a flow diagram which identifies the different theoretical paths from latent conflict to settlement, resolution and conflict prevention; and Dudouet (2006:21) offers a model for adapting this diagram into a cycle format with the different pathways described as arrows moving across the cycle to describe the characteristics of conflict progression, which are harder to demonstrate, although often acknowledged in linear models.

Similar to the conflict wave model, the conflict cycle has been developed and adapted to illustrate not only the different phases or stages of conflict and their relationships with each other, but also the different forms of resolution effort which are appropriate at different stages or times. For instance, Ramsbotham et al (2005) apply Galtung’s analysis that peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding are important responses to different forms of violence which themselves are stimulated by attitudes, behaviours and contradictions to a conflict cycle. This provides a useful representation of the relationships between specific resolution responses and phases of conflict: peacekeeping is required when conflict is characterised by violence, whereas peacemaking is important in the transition from violence to negative peace, and peacebuilding to transform negative to positive peace.

The recognition that conflict and thus conflict resolution does not follow a predetermined path with a sequence of dynamics onto which conflict resolution activities can be easily mapped is central to Lederach’s concept of nested paradigms which attempt to address the reality that conflict is not one dimensional and that numerous conflicts may exist at different stages of their life cycle at the same time depending on the actors involved and the exact locations in which the conflict takes place (Lederach, 1997:55-85).

Lederach bases his approach on previous work undertaken by Dugan (1996:9-20 in Lederach, 1997:55) which she termed ‘A nested theory of conflict’ which emphasised the importance of complementarity between different elements of a conflict (in her model described as issues, relationships, sub systems, systems) through developing a temporal dimension which aimed to map specific types of
response over a time continuum from immediate action to prevent crisis which should be taken within the first 2-6 months of identification through to the design and implementation of activities to promote social change which could take place up to 20 years following the initial identification of the conflict.

This approach is different from the conflict wave or cycle in that it expressly tries to understand and demonstrate the complexity of multiple conflicts occurring within the same time and space. However it also places emphasis on the importance of contingency – ensuring that responses are appropriate to the characteristics of the conflict at the time, and that their outcomes build on each other as time progresses and transformations occur. This “Nested Paradigm: The Time Dimension to Peacebuilding” (1997:77) is then further developed into what Lederach terms his “Integrated Framework to Peacebuilding” (1997:80) in which he places Dugan’s conflict foci on one axis and the temporal dimension on the other, using the model to suggest that the different characteristics of conflict (rather than phases or stages as described in most conflict cycle models) can be addressed in different ways over time and space.

In doing so, Lederach places important emphasis on the interplay between complementarity and contingency which is developed substantially by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall in their Hourglass Model (2005:12). The model draws together some of the aspects of conflict analysis discussed earlier in this chapter, and offers an additional dimension which is important from the perspective of conflict resolution response, and thus central to this thesis.

In essence, the model contains three sets of categories: Galtung’s ideas on conflict containment, settlement and transformation; the stages of conflict often described as escalation and de-escalation in conflict wave models; and what the authors describe as ‘strategic responses’. Thus, at one end of the conflict spectrum, conflict transformation, difference and cultural peacebuilding can be found. With the increase in conflict intensity, the conflict phases move through contradiction, polarisation, violence and war (with correspondingly different strategic responses)
through to ceasefire, agreement, normalisation and reconciliation as conflict de-
escalates.

There have been prior efforts to map conflict concepts to escalation and de-
escalation ideas and to strategic responses (see the conflict cycle above). However
where the Hourglass Model makes an additional contribution is in the ideas that
suggest the hourglass shape, with a wide top and bottom tapering to a narrow
‘middle’. This is intended to represent the space for resolution efforts to take
place. Thus, at the early stages of conflict, or in the periods during which
normalisation begins, there is greater conceptual and operating space within which
collision resolution can be attempted. In contrast, during times when the conflict is
most intense, and most violent, the opportunities for positive action are severely
reduced. Ramsbotham et al (2005) argue that whilst this suggests that the
opportunities to act are greater in less intensely violent phases of conflict, this
places greater emphasis on the importance of understanding and maximising the
positive effects of complementarity between various actions and interventions.

The Hourglass Model is then complemented by further analysis by the authors
which seeks to map examples of tactical responses to the strategic responses that
they link to different stages of conflict (2005:14). This is particularly relevant to the
challenges of addressing the main questions of this thesis as, at this stage, they
begin to identify some aspects of security building which are appropriate at
different stages and, which although not described by Ramsbotham et al at any
level of depth, are very relevant to efforts to control SALW. For instance at the
ceasefire level of the escalation / de-escalation spectrum, peacekeeping is
identified as a strategic response and examples of tactical response include
disarmament, security sector reform, confidence-building and security-enhancing
measures and security in the community.

Ramsbotham et al argue that, on the de-escalation end of the spectrum, strategic
and tactical responses are not linear, are nested and therefore will take place at the
same time in particular contexts. Taken together, the acknowledgement of the
relationships between strategic and tactical responses over time and the
recognition of the importance of numerous related activities taking place in the same space, great emphasis is placed on the role of both contingency and complementarity in the successful application of conflict resolution efforts and specifically to the acts of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding in the de-escalation phases of conflict.

2.2.2 Conflict transformation and peacebuilding from below

Concepts of contingency and complementarity, and models for describing their role and how they interrelate, such as the Hourglass Model, are sometimes criticised for focussing heavily on intervention by outside actors or third parties. Critics of this approach suggest that whilst it might be possible for outside interveners to play a significant role in steps which bring violence to an end and begin the process of de-escalation, the importance of affected communities and populations at large to conflict transformation which moves from negative to positive peace is both crucial and not represented well in existing models and approaches.

During recent decades, partly in response to this critique, approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding have developed to encompass the term ‘peacebuilding from below’. This emerged from writers and practitioners including Boulding (2000), Curle (1994), and Lederach (1997). Curle was one of the early proponents of this approach. His experience of engaging directly with conflicts led him to believe that in addition to external and ‘objective’ support to mediation and peacemaking, it was critical that local capacities for peace were supported in ways which enabled them to build on what already existed and that this was essential for building long term and sustainable peace (Curle, 1994).

This concept was developed further by Lederach, including through the development of his model for describing ‘actors and approaches’ (see below) (1997: 39). This model, in the form of a triangle, identified at its apex elite power brokers including generals and national politicians, those with the highest profile and most powerful formal roles. In the middle section of the triangle were those with some official power and influence such as commanders, local politicians and others. And at the bottom, representing by far the most significant numbers of a given
population were those without significant power who were also those who were most likely to be most affected by violence and conflict, (significantly for this thesis, Lederach included frontline soldiers and combatants in this group). Lederach contended that engaging with all three levels of actors across the range of different peacebuilding and transformative actions was essential to long term transition towards positive peace. To do this required not just a rethinking of the activities performed by external actors, including grassroots facilitation and support, as well as objective high-level engagement with elite groups. It also required a rethinking of the sorts of activity by local people which might be promoted and supported by others.

*Figure 2: Lederach's Actors and Approaches Model*

Reynolds Levy (2004) developed this model further, producing a “Framework for Peacebuilding From Below” by categorising and identifying the different sorts of transformation which might take place and then applying them to Lederach’s vision of different levels of society engaging on different and complementary aspects of peacebuilding. In this model, the military and security dimensions of peacebuilding were identified and, at each level, specific military/security actors and actions were considered.
included. This deepened Lederach’s comprehensive but in some ways superficial
treatment of the different sorts of actors who would need to engage on different
levels on different issues for a successful approach to peacebuilding which
combines peacebuilding from below with engagement in elite peacemaking.
However, whilst conceptually this model helps to clarify the importance of the
engagement by different actors, it does not describe the significant challenges in
this approach working in practice.

As Gultung, Curle, and others including Osamba (2001), Oda (2007) and Fisher and
Zimina (2009) demonstrate, differences of opinion and interpretation of events and
history are often centrally important in conflict and conflict resolution efforts.
These can bring elite power holders and local people into direct competition
regarding visions of what positive peace might look like and the processes of
transformation which may be required to achieve them. In the context of the
model refined by Reynolds Levy, this would mean for instance at the elite level that
generals agree to a particular form of demobilisation which is appropriate to
requirements at the national level. But for former combatants who have returned
home and are faced with the challenges of reintegration and dealing with their new
status as heroes or indeed failures or criminals (depending on the conduct and
outcome of the conflict), their interpretation of the issues and their role in
peacebuilding may be significantly different, but critical to the success of any
transition. Understanding and addressing these differences and challenges is a
critical aspect of combining peacebuilding from below with the realities of elite
peacemaking.

The concept of conflict transformation and its distinctiveness from what they term
‘technical approaches to peacebuilding’ is analysed from a practitioner perspective
by Fisher and Zimina (2009) in their essay “Just wasting our time? Provocative
thoughts for peacebuilders”.

39
2.2.3 Transformative versus technical approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding

For Fisher and Zimina (2009), the differences between transformative and technical approaches to peacebuilding are both stark and critically important to their ultimate effects and impacts. They claim that much of the peacebuilding work undertaken by non-governmental organisations, governments and UN agencies is essentially technical in nature, that it attempts to address specific problems and:

“...often seem to amount in practice to nothing more than ‘patching’ – attempts to create the minimal stability that would allow the current world order, driven by market forces and geopolitical power constellations to step in.” (Fisher and Zimina in Schmelzle and Fischer 2009:19)

They argue that a failure to address ‘peace writ large’ (a term developed by Anderson, Chigas and Woodrow in their book Confronting War (2004)) prevents peacebuilding activity having a truly transformative effect on the societies in which it is undertaken. They claim that a combination of funding pressure, deference to governments, inter-agency competition and a lack of expertise and experience contribute to organisations taking a technical approach to peacebuilding which fails to address issues such as social justice and to focus on fundamental political and social change. This critique is supported by Newman and Richmond (2006) in their work looking at the impact of ‘spoilers’ on peace processes where they point to a failure of international peacebuilding efforts to focus on the highly political nature of peacebuilding in preference to technical approaches which focus on issues such as institutional development and anti-corruption.

Fisher and Zimina go on to offer a typology which describes the differences in the technical versus the transformative approach at the levels of goals, strategy, values and analysis. Further, they argue that the approaches described are not necessarily all incompatible, and can be strongly reinforcing. For instance at the level of overall purpose, they state that whilst a technical approach may be to “end a specific situation or open conflict”, a transformative approach at the same level might in
addition focus on influencing the “underlying structure and culture as an integrated element in building something better” (Fisher and Zimina, 2009:21).

In this model, there are clear echoes of Galtung’s ideas about negative and positive peace and the importance of moving from one to another as part of lasting peacebuilding. This connection between, on the one hand, negative peace and technical approaches and, on the other, positive peace and transformative approaches, is central to the argument that Fisher and Zimina make about the importance of those engaged in peacebuilding moving from one set of approaches to the other, and their claim that, to date, much peacebuilding work has failed to meet its potential.

This second theme was addressed previously by Lund (2003:21-40) in a stocktake of progress ten years after the publication of the Agenda for Peace, in which he offered a critique of progress which claimed that a failure to define peace clearly enough, the realities of donor requirements, political expediency and an implicit neo-liberal perspective which underpinned much of what was done under the rubric of peacebuilding, contributed to a situation in which the effects of peacebuilding activities on conflict transformation and positive peace were both often unclear and difficult to quantify.

Fisher and Zimina’s model draws on Lederach’s model for mapping actors and approaches to peacebuilding (1997:39) which describes the different categories of actors involved in peacebuilding in terms of their roles within society, the size of their capacity and the types of activity that tends to be associated with each group. The model, in the shape of a pyramid, with elite peacemakers at the apex and the majority of citizens at the bottom, suggests that the work which is done with those at the top of the pyramid is often technical in nature and is conditioned by a desire not to offend, to maintain presence as a ‘guest’ in a host country and to focus on issues which do not directly challenge the existing politics or power structures in a given context, whilst work which is undertaken with people at the lower level is often more transformative in nature.
Fisher and Zimina further argue that the work of existing peace practitioners can be located on a continuum from technical peacebuilding to transformational peacebuilding depending on the characteristics of the organisations involved, and that this also affects, and is affected by, the levels of society in which they work directly (2009:27). Thus, international agencies are characterised as working directly at the middle and only occasionally at the top and bottom levels of society and that they tend to work on the technical and mildly transformative end of the spectrum, whilst grassroots peacebuilding organisations tend to focus in more transformative ways, mostly at the community levels. The role of civil society organisations in peacebuilding efforts has been studied by Paffenholz and Spurk (2006) and Paffenholz (2010), which draws similar findings regarding the different roles that different groups play and the dangers as well as the potential benefits inherent in working with locally rooted and legitimate organisations and national and international civil society groups alike.

Fisher and Zimina’s typology for describing Technical and Transformative Approaches to Peacebuilding suggests that a tactical focus on different aspects of a peacebuilding effort with different audiences might be sensible. However they also argue that, at the higher levels of strategy and vision, being clear about the nature and goals of transformation is critical to avoid focussing solely on technical aspects, particularly at the elite levels of society, where political change is probably most required (2009:20).

Supporters of the concept of peacebuilding from below have levelled this critique (focus on technical reforms at elite levels of society) at activities commonly described as post-conflict reconstruction. The following section examines the development of ideas for undertaking peacebuilding activity in conflict reduction and de-escalation phases of violent conflict and reviews models which draw on the concepts of contingency and complementarity, conflict phases, nested paradigms and local ownership discussed earlier in this chapter.
2.2.4 Post-war peacebuilding – post-conflict reconstruction

The terminology and meanings of post-war or post-conflict peacebuilding, or reconstruction are both diffuse and contested. Whilst in some ways this gives credence to one of the criticisms of the endeavour – that it is amorphous and badly conceived (Chetail 2009:7), it is also perhaps unsurprising when the origin and contemporary history of the term is considered.

Ramsbotham et al (2005:185-188), for example, chart the development of post-conflict peacebuilding since the end of the second world war, when the victorious allies demobilised their defeated opponents, rebuilt social and economic infrastructure, installed governments and then gradually withdrew. The intervention of the Cold War prevented systematic international action supported by the UN or significant numbers of supportive states. However, as it came to an end, opportunities for intervening in countries affected by conflict arose once more. Independence for Namibia presented the first opportunity of its kind – and the UN was mandated to lead international support for a transition until elections had been held and powers transferred to national institutions. Ramsbotham et al argue that the UN-led model – featuring at its centre an enhanced peacekeeping mandate - pertained until the Dayton Agreements which brought to a close the war in Bosnia in 1995. From this point, partly as a response to the perceived failure of the UN and its institutions to respond to the scale of violence experienced in both Rwanda and Bosnia, the lead role for international interventions fell to ‘coalitions of the willing’, led by one or a small number of powerful states.

Chetail confirms this in his analysis of the development of post-conflict peacebuilding, in which he charts the development of the concept within the UN system (Chetail 2009:2-4). He identifies peacebuilding in the inclusion of the Agenda for Peace alongside the three other dimensions of conflict management - preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping as an essentially linear process, coming after peacemaking and peacekeeping with the overall intention of acting “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UN 1992: para 21).
The Supplement to the Agenda for Peace published in 2005 (UN, 2005a) contains both a restatement of support for the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding, but also emphases the need for integrated action, suggesting for the first time that ideas of complementarity as well as contingency (suggested in the earlier recognition of the linear progression of responses to conflict) had begun to influence thinking at the UN.

Tschirgi (2004) argues that from this point, the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding evolved from an approach which was essentially linear to one that was at least two dimensional – understanding the importance of both temporal and spatial coordination of activity. The 2005 World Summit, which established the UN Peacebuilding Commission to add institutional capacity within the UN system and to provide coordination between its various interested agencies emphasised “The need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace” (UN, 2005b:25).

The language of institutions is identified by Barnett et al (2007) as one of the complicating factors in developing common understandings of the purpose, function and content of post-conflict peacebuilding. They surveyed twenty-four governmental and non-governmental organisations to identify the language that they used to describe post-conflict peacebuilding. Perhaps unsurprisingly there was a great variety in both terminology and scope of issues and actions of those actors studied. Barnett claims that in part this is due to the mandates and institutionalised language of some of the major actors. For example, NATO uses the language of peace support operations and stabilisation which fit well with its military mandate and terminology, whereas the EU describes its involvement under the rubric of civilian crisis response, which sits well with the framing and language of its European Security and Defence Policy priorities.

A further factor in the contest and confusion over the language used to describe post-conflict peacebuilding is described by Chetail (2009:7). He claims that the political nature of such a concept places it centrally within ideological debates.
which go beyond the boundaries of post-conflict peacebuilding or reconstruction. He claims that it is an ideal battleground for “the larger and constant confrontation between different schools of thought in international relations: the realist and the neo-realist schools; the theory of dependence; constructivism; functionalism and neo-functionalism; and critical theories” (1999:7).

Writers including Pugh et al (2008) and Duffield (2007) who approach conflict resolution and peacebuilding from a critical theorist perspective represent positions which believe that post-conflict peacebuilding, and particularly the version which places emphasis on ‘reconstruction’ (see below) is a neo-liberal activity which seeks to replace the governance systems and processes and cultures of countries that are deemed to be undesirable with western ‘liberal democratic’ models. Further, Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009) have undertaken research in a variety of contexts which suggests that actions which have taken place with a justification of peacebuilding, reconstruction and recovery have in fact had little positive impact, and in some cases have increased the likelihood of a return to violence.

A further critique of the ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ concept is that the failure to take proper account of the needs of individuals and populations, and the cultural, economic and political histories in countries in which interventions are attempted, leads to misplaced analysis and initiatives which can further endanger the viability of the societies into which interventions are made (Chopra and Hohe 2004).

Ramsbotham et al identify eight criticisms of post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction that are offered from a conflict transformation perspective, some of the proponents of which view post-war peacebuilding efforts as little more than ending violence and imposing a state of negative peace before withdrawing. In addition to those introduced above they include the following: unease about the role of military undertaking what should be non-military tasks; criticism of the lack of a significant social-psychological dimension to interventions; a failure to promote ‘bottom-up initiatives; and the failure of outside interveners to be accountable to host populations.
2.2.5 An emerging framework for analysing and assessing post-conflict peacebuilding efforts

On the basis of the literatures reviewed above, this section begins to establish and elaborate the analytical framework that shapes the remaining chapters of this thesis. It develops the overarching research strategy introduced in Chapter 1 (which is further elaborated at the end of this Chapter) and draws on conflict resolution and peacebuilding principles and concepts including the idea of ‘peacebuilding from below’, Lederach’s ‘nested paradigms’ and the combination of complementarity and contingency developed by Ramsbotham et al in their Hourglass Model.

Whilst it acknowledges aspects of the philosophical critique offered by Pugh, Richmond, Duffield and other critical theorists of the role of outside intervention in violent conflict, it is based on a belief that the humanitarian imperative legitimises the involvement of outside agency and, as such, approaches conflict resolution and peacebuilding from a cosmopolitan perspective. In this way, the analytical framework introduced below is intended both as a method by which interrelationships between conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities and efforts to control SALW can be analysed, and as a means by which lessons can be learned as a contribution to more effective future interventions.

The starting point for the development of this analytical framework is the Hourglass Model developed by Ramsbotham et al (2005). This combines the temporal phases of an intervention with the different sectors in which intervention usually takes place. As discussed, the authors base this on a review of all post-war peacebuilding efforts between 1978 and 2004 in which they identify four important characteristics:

(1) interventions aim to build both negative and positive peace – that these tasks are interdependent (violence needs to stop before longer term transitions can take place) but also that they are sometimes in tension (the imperative to end violence might entail incorporation of unreformed militia into state security forces which might damage long term transition towards a professional army – or the need to
draw warlords into political discourse damages longer term political development and trust in political institutions);

(2) there is significant commonality in sectoral tasks;

(3) there is commonality of temporal phasing; and

(4) withdrawal is staged.

The two major variables which shape the Hourglass Model, which are particularly relevant to the analytical framework developed for this thesis and which are introduced in the hypothesis and sub-questions elaborated in Chapter 1, are complementarity and contingency.

In relation to complementarity, the Hourglass identifies five key sectors – security, rule of law, government, economy and society. These are closely in line with a similar sectoral approach taken by Lund in which he identifies five criteria for successful peacebuilding from his own review of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts since 1992. The area of difference is that Lund incorporates ‘rule of law’ into ‘government’ and replaces it with a focus on ‘accommodative political processes’ (Lund, 2003:26).

As regards contingency, Ramsbotham et al establish four cross-sectoral phases of peacebuilding which they label as intervention (phase 1), stabilisation (phase 2), normalisation (phase 3), and continuing transformation post-withdrawal (phase 4). They situate these phases within a nested paradigm (after Dugan and Lederach – see previous analysis earlier in this chapter), stating that the phases are not linear, and that progress is required for instance across the sectors in phase 2 before phase 1 ends. For each phase they identify both the common interventions by sector, but also collectively the range of different interventions across the different sectors by phase. They claim that in the first two phases following intervention, security and rule of law priorities are usually most pressing; but that as the phases of intervention develop, the importance of ‘government’ and then ultimately ‘society’ sectors is critical to both legitimacy in the eyes of those subject to
intervention, but also to long-term transformations to sustainable peace (or from negative to positive peace).

A nested approach to contingency and complementarity demonstrates the complexity of post-conflict peacebuilding characteristics. Of particular importance are the following: understanding the temporal dimensions of intervention in a sophisticated manner which looks beyond linear linkages and understands the ‘nested’ nature of different tasks that occur over time; the coordination and integration of tasks both within and across sectors; and the interplay between the temporal and spatial dimensions of the context. Further, it suggests that contributing to long-term sustainable peace requires engagement in multiple sectors over time, and being seen as legitimate by the host population – a task which becomes harder the further from violence the intervention becomes and the closer to issues of politics and society they get.

The critical role that contextual factors appear to play in conflict and conflict resolution is not captured significantly in the Hourglass Model. Indeed, it would not be adequately reflected in the development of an analytical framework which was based only on contingency and complementarity as its main variables. The interplay between internal and external conflict driving factors described by Azar, the existence of complex conflict systems analysed by Ropers and the analytical approaches contained in key conflict analysis tools, including Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment and Strategic Conflict Analysis, are all critical to a framework which seeks to understand the relationships between different dimensions of conflict and therefore to conflict resolution and peacebuilding responses.

Similarly, Lederach’s work on Actors and Approaches, the concept of Peacebuilding from Below and research to understand the role that civil society organisations play in peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes suggest that the inputs of a wide variety of actors from across the social spectrum are important in conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts.

In this light, a third variable needs to be introduced as a complement to contingency and complementarity. Thus ‘Context’ is included centrally in the
hypothesis and sub-questions for this thesis. Together, these three variables, context, complementarity and contingency represent a further development of and departure from existing frameworks and models. In the context of this thesis they comprise the main elements of the analytical framework within which the interrelationships between SALW control and conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities will be identified and explored. The framework described above appears to be applicable in terms of analysing the interrelationships between a broad multi-sector and multi-phased approach to peacebuilding and specific thematic issues or interventions. For example refugees and internally displaced people are often critical in conflict and conflict resolution efforts. Kaser (2007) analyses how IDPs/refugees relate to peace process and recovery from conflict. He suggests that refugees and IDPs can play both a positive and negative role in peacebuilding and identifies specific peacebuilding sectors that are particularly relevant to addressing IDP and refugee issues. These include security, justice, property rights, inclusion in political processes and livelihoods.

Further, Kaser claims that whilst specific sectors may be more critical than others in terms of direct relevance, the cross-cutting nature of IDP/refugee issues and challenges require that they are treated both in a sectoral and a more general multi-sectoral way if they are to be addressed fundamentally – and that strategies which focus on IDPs/refugees and their needs and roles, both in peacebuilding efforts but also in future visions for sustainable peace, provide strategic coherence even if in practice the implementation of projects and programmes are most likely to be located within specific sectors.

In concert with Ramsbotham et al, Kaser also identifies a temporal hierarchy in terms of those issues which need to be addressed in the early phases of conflict reduction in order to facilitate other aspects of peacebuilding. In the case of refugees and IDPs, he argues that the most important first phase priority is an improvement in basic security and protection – without which their return is unlikely. Finally, he claims that whilst certain activities undertaken during early phases may be implemented by a relatively narrow group of actors (security provided by government or international peacekeepers for instance), moving
beyond reducing violence towards conflict transformation requires the active participation of a much broader range of actors, including the local communities into which IDPs and refugees may return.

Similarly, the thematic issue of corruption would appear to be applicable to an analytical model framed around contingency, complementarity and context. Le Billon (2008) analysed how corruption has been tackled as part of ‘liberal’ peacebuilding activities between 1998 and 2006. He argues that the existence of corruption can be seen as a conflict generating factor, and conversely that efforts to reduce corruption can be an important part of conflict transformation strategies. He claims that anti-corruption activities can be undertaken either within specific sectoral interventions, or as a cross cutting approach. He acknowledges the importance of phasing activities to tackle corruption, arguing that in the early stages of conflict reduction and the establishment of political processes and basic security that corruption is likely to be present, and that tackling it head on at this stage could endanger these processes. He identifies a significant dilemma for those involved with peacebuilding efforts: addressing corruption is seen as a central element of liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding models; however it is often an embedded part of existing political and social processes which means that tackling it directly and centrally could damage the chances of wider conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts.

As is demonstrated in the following section, in common with other thematic issues, small arms and small arms control can be critical to post-conflict transitions. They are also relevant in different ways to all five of the sectors identified by Ramsbotham et al and Lund, both as specific sectoral interventions and as a cross-cutting issue which can be relevant to numerous sectors simultaneously. As such, there is significant potential for peacebuilding efforts to positively enhance the opportunities for, and success of, small arms control efforts; and likewise, for efforts to control small arms to have beneficial implications for other sectoral or phased priorities. Conversely, it is also the case that poorly conceived or executed small arms control activities can have a negative impact on other peacebuilding
efforts, and ineffective peacebuilding activities can negatively impact on the opportunities to bring small arms and light weapons under greater control.

2.3 The control of SALW and its relationship to conflict resolution and peacebuilding

The following section introduces the field of small arms control, identifying where appropriate the relationships between efforts to control small arms, peacebuilding in general and post-conflict peacebuilding specifically. This section is followed by a summary of the relevant literatures to which this thesis contributes knowledge and a discussion of the research approach and strategy, the hypothesis and key questions which frame the research and the overall methodology and methods employed.

Similar in some ways to the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the study of efforts to control small arms and light weapons (SALW) has developed considerably since the early 1990s (see table in Figure 3 below for a definition of what constitutes SALW). Prior to this, attempts had been made nationally as well as at the international level over many decades to control access to certain types of weapons, including SALW. For example, according to Karp (2006:12), the Brussels Act of 1890, Article 23 of the League of Nations Covenant of 1919, and the Treaty of St. Germain all attempted to control aspects of SALW; in the latter case, the internal control over weapons within state borders. However, whilst the origins of efforts to control SALW are far from new, the period since the end of the cold war has seen the greatest intensity of effort at the level of regional and international diplomacy, national implementation and in the efforts of academics and others to record, understand and assess both the nature of the problems posed by SALW and the various efforts to control them.

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3 As a further illustration, the control over access to weapons was an important aspect of maintaining state security during the period of British rule over the Indian subcontinent: The 1878 Arms Act was promulgated (and is still in force today unaltered in Bangladesh) with the express purpose of limiting the manufacture, import, export, sale and ownership of conventional arms (Benton and Smith 2007:78)
Since the 1990s numerous commitments have been agreed by states at the sub-regional, regional and international levels. However, despite this there is still no internationally recognized defining description of what constitutes SALW and even less so what constitutes SALW control. For the purposes of this research, the definition produced by the 1997 Report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms and 1999 Report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms is used. This made the distinction between small arms and light weapons which has been the basis of attempts to categorize and define this subset of the broader category of convention weapons since. The Panel defined SALW as:

(a) Small arms:

(i) Revolvers and self-loading pistols;
(ii) Rifles and carbines;
(iii) Sub-machine-guns;
(iv) Assault rifles;
(v) Light machine-guns;

(b) Light weapons:

(i) Heavy machine-guns;
(ii) Hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers;
(iii) Portable anti-aircraft guns;**
(iv) Portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles;**
(v) Portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems;**
(vi) Portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems;
(vii) Mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm;

(c) Ammunition and explosives:

(i) Cartridges (rounds) for small arms;
(ii) Shells and missiles for light weapons;
(iii) Mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-
During this period, research into efforts to control SALW has been characterized by research which examines the role of SALW in generating and in sustaining violent conflict (for example see Boutwell and Klare, 1999); methods and approaches for reducing the proliferation and misuse of SALW (for example see Laurance and Meek (1996); and exploration of the relationships between SALW and governance and wider public policy issues (for example see Greene, 1999). Much of this research has included a focus on the relationships between SALW and large-scale violent social conflict. This is of particular importance to this thesis, which locates its examination of the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and build peace within the de-escalation phases of conflict described by Lederach (1997), Lund (1996) and Ramsbotham et al (2005) amongst others.

However, researchers interested in issues relating to controlling SALW have also explored the role of SALW in criminal violence, both in post-war contexts and in societies that are affected by criminal violence but not by large-scale social and political conflict (see Cukier, 1998, 2002; Small Arms Survey, 2007; and Bartolucci and Kanneworff, 2012). Of these two criminal violence contexts, this thesis is primarily interested in the well-established relationships between criminal violence and large-scale social conflict (Godnick, Muggah and Waszink, 2002), and the role that violent conflict can have in facilitating the growth and development of violent criminal activity (Klare, 1999). However, whilst acknowledging its importance both as a research topic and a real world problem, it is less concerned with gun violence in non-large-scale social conflict settings and as such this area of the literature will not be examined in depth in this chapter.

Klare (1999) attempts to synthesise the main research undertaken on the topic of SALW and their role in conflict since 1994, following a meeting of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1994 which he claims was one of the first serious
efforts to look at “the increasingly lethal ramifications of the diffusion of small arms and light weapons to areas of conflict around the world” (Klare, 1999: xi)

He groups his analysis of this research into five areas as a series of lessons to be learned: (1) There is a close and symbiotic relationship between light weapons trafficking and contemporary forms of violent conflict; (2) The outbreak of ethnic and internal conflict in weak and divided societies produces an “internal arms race” that further drives the acquisition of small arms and light weapons; (3) The emergence of internal arms races and the outbreak of conflict in weak and divided societies is fostered by an immense worldwide abundance of small arms and light weapons; (4) Even relatively small quantities of light weapons can prove highly destabilising in vulnerable and fractured societies; (5) Light weapons flow to existing and potential belligerents through a wide variety of channels, both public and private, licit and illicit.

This analysis was a relatively early attempt to understand the dynamic role that SALW can have in conflict affected environments, where in addition to their direct function in being used to facilitate death and injury by conflicting parties, their presence can facilitate the development of criminal economies, stimulate trafficking in weapons and other tradable commodities, including people, and further blur distinctions between legal and illegal, public and private and formal and informal allocation of power and provision of security. Research to further understand these issues became a focus for the Small Arms Survey, part of the Graduate Institute for International Relations in Geneva (2001-2011); as well as for peace researchers tracking and analyzing violent conflict from a conflict resolution perspective (Wallensteen, 2007: 272).

During this period, and in the nascent stages of what became known as the UN SALW process, Greene (1999) emphasised the relationships between SALW and other issues, particularly the context in which they are a problem and where greater control is required to reduce their negative impacts. In particular, he introduced three areas which are especially pertinent for this research: arms and war; conflict prevention; and building peace. In the first of these sections he makes
four important statements, which drew on work by Karp et al (1999) but until this point had not been articulated often or clearly in the existing literature: (1) violent conflicts have a variety of different underlying causes which need to be understood well as an essential step in developing effective responses, including controlling SALW; (2) the regional and international dimension of conflict is of particular import for SALW control, specifically disarmament processes which can be neutralised by arms transfers across borders; (3) weak states have few mechanisms for good governance and non-violent management of conflict, meaning that conflict risks can be exacerbated by the availability of SALW; and (4) SALW can have an important economic, social or political value in conflict prone contexts which must be understood if efforts to control SALW are to be successful.

In the section on SALW and conflict prevention, Greene makes the substantive point that whilst the success of efforts to control SALW are likely to be determined by how well they are understood and located in the context of the different stages of conflict, SALW proliferation and misuse can also have significant impacts following the end of formal conflict. He cites the examples of Liberia and El Salvador where the numbers of people killed and seriously affected by SALW violence did not reduce significantly in the period following the formal end of hostilities. This is important for this study as it underscores the importance of SALW control in post-conflict contexts as a means of reducing their impacts, which may be different – criminal violence as opposed to battlefield deaths for instance – but which are no less destructive to the societies in which it takes place.

The third area of linkage covered in this paper is that between SALW and peacebuilding. Greene suggests that reducing the demand for SALW can play an important part in the process of building peace in post- and conflict affected-countries; but that peacebuilding can also be aided through the implementation of successful efforts to reduce weapons availability and misuse. This argument builds on that made by Laurence and Meek (1996) three years earlier, whilst adding a significant extra dimension. Laurence and Meek focussed specifically on aspects of SALW control (or micro-disarmament to use their terminology) that focus on SALW as the artefact or the instrument of violence, such as for instance disarmament of
former combatants or the collection of weapons from civilians. Greene makes the additional case of the importance of efforts that address the economic, social and cultural reasons for why people hold SALW, including understanding and addressing the cultures of firearms ownership which are particularly pertinent in certain contexts.

Taken as a whole, this paper has particular value in helping to shape the topic covered by this thesis; it is important in that it started to set out for perhaps the first time the relationships between SALW control and other related issues, including conflict and peacebuilding. However, whilst it introduces the main (inter)relationships, it does not explore them in great depth. Thus whilst the importance of taking overarching, coordinated approaches to addressing post-conflict peace- and security-building is expressed convincingly, more remained to be done to elaborate them in detail and test them against contexts in which SALW and peacebuilding activities have been attempted.

As the relationships between the availability of SALW and their proliferation and misuse became better understood, academics, policy makers and practitioners began to research ways in which they could be controlled more effectively. In simple terms, these efforts focused both on the supply (which includes weapons production, transfers of weapons - including of SALW - particularly into fragile or conflict affected contexts, and the safety and security of arms holdings), and the demand for weapons from those engaged in, or affected by, conflict.

In this first category of supply-side issues, research on arms production has focused in recent years on the challenges posed to existing controls on weapons movements and use as a consequence of the increased globalization of production. This has led both to a growth in the numbers of states with the capacity to produce their own weapons, and to a diffusion of production which can lead to a finished weapon comprising of components made in numerous different countries, sometimes through processes such as ‘licensed production’ which typically involves one company licensing another – sometimes as part of an agreement to sell weapons to the government of the country in which the licensed production takes
place. The Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI) publishes an annual yearbook which records changes and developments in international arms production capacity and is perceived internationally as an objective and well-regarded resource. Of particular interest to this thesis has been the increase in production capacity in fragile or conflict-affected states over recent decades (see Brauer (1991, 2000) or Brzoska (1989) for analysis of the globalization of production), and the emergence of significant new producing nations (see Bitzinger (2011) on changes to Chinese production capacity and Grimmett and Kerr (2012) for an overview of the changing dynamics of production in ‘emerging powers’, principally Brazil and China).

The literature on the nature and processes by which conventional weapons are transferred internationally is well developed. This includes that which focuses on the dynamics of arms transfer processes (see for instance Stohl et al (2012) for a contemporary review of small arms transfer processes and problems, Lumpe eds. (2000) on the dynamics of the conventional arms trade, and Wood and Peleman (1999) on the role of arms brokers and intermediaries in facilitating arms transfers to fragile and conflict affected contexts). Transfers from specific exporting destinations form an important sub-set of this literature (see for instance Lumpe (1999) on US arms transfer controls and Davis (2002) on the UK, France and Sweden. A further important category of supply-side literature is that given to efforts to regulate the regional and international production and transfer of weapons (see for instance Chalmers, Greene and Wulf (1994) on the development of the UN Register of Conventional Weapons), Bauer (2003) on EU controls on conventional arms transfers, and Da Silva (2010), Holtom and Bromley (2011) and Prizeman (2012) for analysis of efforts to agree an international arms trade treaty.

Finally, issues relating to the existence and management of arms holdings and stockpiles are examined in arms supply-side literatures. For example Wilkinson (2006) argues for enhanced national and international controls on the stockpiling of ammunition and other explosive ordnance and Bevan and Karp (2008) focus on the challenges of disposing of surplus stockpiled weaponry to prevent it falling into illicit ownership. In addition to primarily thematic research focusing on stockpile
issues, there have been numerous studies published which approach the issues from a regional or national perspective. For instance Tracey (2011) published research focusing specifically on challenges of stockpile security in Africa, Miller (2003) focused on stockpiles in Yemen, Pyadushkin (2003) on Russia and Jackson (2010) on Albania.

Collectively, these writers demonstrate significant understandings of the role of arms production, transfers and the challenges of managing and disposing of weapons stockpiles in stimulating and sustaining violent conflict, and as such, this work has relevance to the focus of this thesis. However, given the primary focus is on both the post-war period and on the control of weapons which already exist in a given context, it is not the primary concern. Therefore, whilst acknowledging the potential impacts of supply-side issues, this chapter does not review the literature on this subject in any significant detail. However, demand-side factors are extremely important and the relevant literature is reviewed in the section which follows.

In any context, there are numerous factors which drive the demand for SALW. These include the legitimate requirements of security and law enforcement agencies, self-defense, and ownership for sporting and recreational purposes. However, in fragile and conflict affected contexts, these demand factors are often distorted, with weapons procured by governments to enhance their abilities to impose a monopoly on the use of violence, to suppress dissent and enforce the rule of law; civilians taking up weapons for self-defence purposes where they feel that the State is not able or willing to protect them; and from opposition, insurgent and criminal groups that either contest the legitimacy of the State, or that wish to take advantage of weak government for essentially criminal ends.

Over recent years, the literature has developed significantly as it relates to understanding the demand for SALW in different contexts. Brauer and Muggah (2006) conclude that demand is driven by the interplay between ‘motivation’ and ‘means’, or willingness or ability. They claim that whilst ultimately it is almost always the individual that acquires the weapon, the motivation for doing so is
derived in part by social construction and is embedded in various social priorities and cultural norms (2006: 2). They describe means as either financial or other, such as organization or contacts; and motivation as a combination of private beliefs and attitudes, social relations and the larger scale cultural and historical environment.

This concept was taken up by the Small Arms Survey in its annual yearbook of 2006 in which the authors recommended that the design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of small arms reduction programmes must be demand sensitive – and further, that (a) successful reduction programmes are sensitive to the political and social context in which they took place, and (b) those that take a participatory approach appear to be most successful of all (Small Arms Survey 2006:142).

These findings built on and supported earlier research by Atwood and Jackman (2000) which argued that demand was stimulated by: poverty and economic inequality; lack of fundamental human rights; poor governance; malfunctioning post-conflict programmes such as DDR; and cultural attitudes and identify. The authors examined the role of communities in shaping attitudes towards demand and improving control, identifying that: (a) most successful community programmes are directed by the residents themselves; (b) communities must be able to identify their needs and community resources should wherever possible be used to meet these needs; (c) outside intervention should be based on local needs and ascertained via dialogue; (d) successful programmes are often directed at specific groups; (e) difficult groups should be involved and not sidestepped; and (f) that working with former combatants is beneficial and helps with peace promotion. Finally, and importantly for the focus of this thesis, they concluded that whilst some of the programmes directly targeted weapons, in others, they were seen as an exacerbating factor in wider problems relating to community conflict, insecurity and socio-political development; and further that addressing these problems often brought about a concomitant reduction in what Brauer and Muggah describe as the interplay between means and motivation, resulting in fewer weapons in a given context as a consequence (Atwood and Jackman, 2000:13-16).
The idea that if motivation in particular could be addressed then demand would be reduced, and fear of SALW and SALW violence could be reduced, was translated into programming efforts by the peacebuilding non-governmental organization, Saferworld in 2005. The initial focus of their activity was the Western Balkan countries of Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Macedonia. Each of these countries had been the subject of repeated and often unsuccessful efforts to control SALW in the aftermath of the various violent conflicts that had affected the region in the preceding decade (Chapter 3 of this thesis contains a review of these efforts). Saferworld worked with local organizations in each case to identify areas in which SALW violence and fear of violence was high and where there was circumstantial evidence that SALW availability and ownership was significant and potentially destabilizing. They developed a participatory engagement methodology which drew on the principals of participatory rural appraisal and worked over a period of at least 18 months in each case with local organizations to implement it.

The concept was that through working with communities, encouraging them to identify their safety and security problems, and then supporting their engagement with local government, security actors and others to jointly develop responses, this would address the immediate needs identified by communities, empower community members to interact with local power holders, and encourage joint working across family, clan or other lines for the collective benefit of the community. The overarching impact that the project sought to achieve was an increase in perceived and real security, derived from greater social cohesion and improved service provision. A valuable corollary in several cases, including in Kosovo was that as confidence and security improved, the community came forwards to hand in to the authorities weapons that they had acquired during the preceding period of violent conflict (Sokolova and Smith, 2006). The concept of community security, which Saferworld used to frame its work in the Balkans (which was then adapted and applied in numerous countries around the world, and influenced the thinking and programming of major international agencies including UNDP (see for instance McLean’s report from 2009 for UNDP which outlined an approach to Community Security and Social Cohesion which drew on a wide range
of community-based programmes which aimed to increase public security and through this, to improve community cohesion and resilience to future insecurity (McLean 2009), or Miller (2009) for a methodology published by UNIDIR for how to undertake community security programming) and governments including the United Kingdom), drew heavily on the more established and widely known concept of human security (UNDP, 1994; Krause, 2009).

2.3.1 SALW, the UN and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects

As this concept was developing internationally, the United National Secretary General’s Supplement to an Agenda for Peace was published, which sought to outline the “hard decisions” (A/50/60 - S/1995/1:1995; para 6) which the SG believed UN member states needed to make in order for the organisation to make a telling contribution to global peace and security in the light of the end of the cold war were broader than just the international interest in the concept of human security and the useful framing that it provided described above. This document included specific reference to SALW and their role in undermining peace and security.

In the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, the UN Secretary General stated that there were four main reasons why light weapons needed to be controlled more effectively: the proliferation that took place during the cold war period; internal conflicts, some of which were stimulated as part of the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the bilateral power struggle between the USSR and USA and their allies; increased competition for international markets; and criminal activity exacerbated by the collapse of governmental law and order (Laurence and Meek 1996:7). They go on to describe the UN Secretary General’s position paper as a call to action rather than an agenda or framework for action, and claim that this call was heeded both by interested governments and a galvanised community of policy makers and academics. In the remaining years of the decade, considerable effort was thus invested in trying to understand why precisely SALW was a problem and what exactly could be done to address it.
Uribe de Lozano (in Boutwell and Klare, 1999:161-173) writes that modern international attempts to tackle aspects of conventional weapons proliferation followed the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, which was held in 1978. This session looked at both the gradual reduction of conventional weapons and potential limitations on the transfers of such weapons. Following this, momentum built up during 1980s including in the 43rd session of the General Assembly in 1988 which focussed specifically on arms transfers for the first time (resolution 43/75).

She also claims that growing concern about the global spread of SALW and risks posed to peacekeepers was the rationale for GA resolution 50/70 B adopted at the 50th General Assembly in 1995, which focussed on SALW specifically and stimulated the work of Panel of Governmental Experts commissioned by the UN SG. The Panel began its work in 1996 and reported in 1997. The report covered several areas, including safeguarding stockpiles and surplus SALW disposal. It also recommended that the UN Secretary General consider organising an international conference to look at illicit SALW in all its aspects. A further resolution (52/38 J) authorised the Secretary General to make further progress on the issue including establishing a new GGE to review progress and discussion began in earnest on convening an international conference on the issue.

In the period leading up (and subsequent) to the agreement of the UNPoA in 2001, a group of academics and others played a significant role in trying to work through the dimensions of the SALW problem and to address specific policy recommendations for inclusion in the UNPoA and other international and regional agreements. Perhaps the two most significant interventions of this kind were the Small Arms Survey, a project of the Graduate School of International Relations in Geneva, and the Biting the Bullet Project, a collaboration between Bradford University and the peace and security non-governmental organisations Saferworld and International Alert. The Small Arms Survey made significant attempts, most notably in their annual yearbook, the first edition of which was prepared just prior
to the UN PoA conference in July 2001 (Small Arms Survey, 2001) to understand which the main producers of SALW were, the means by which SALW are transferred from one user to another, the impacts of SALW proliferation and misuse and surveyed the initiatives that had been taken to date to address the issue at the national, regional and international levels. The Biting the Bullet project published a series of 16 briefing papers which aimed to address all the significant areas of SALW control that the authors believed should be included in a final international agreement.  

Finally in 2001, following several years of discussion and further development of the concept of SALW control at the United Nations, as well as regionally in certain parts of the world, particularly in Europe and West Africa (where Mali had played a critical role in stimulating international interest in the issue following a request to the UN to support disarmament activities at the end of a period of intense civil war) the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (hereafter the UNPoA) was agreed by consensus at the UN Headquarters in New York.

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These included: Regional Initiatives and the UN 2001 Conference (Clegg, Greene, Meek et al, 2000); Stockpile Security and Reducing Surplus Weapons (Greene, 2001); The UN Firearms Protocol: Considerations for the UN 2001 Conference (O’Callaghan and Meek, 2000); Enhancing Traceability of Small Arms and Light Weapons flows: developing an international marking and tracing regime (Greene, 2001a); Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: enhancing controls on legal transfers (Clegg and Greene, 2000); Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Strengthening Domestic Regulations (Cukier, 2001); Controlling Arms Brokering and Transport Agents (Clegg and Crowley, 2000); Private Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms (Makki, Meek and Musah, 2001); Putting Children First: Building a Framework for Addressing the Impact of Small Arms on Children (Stohl, 2000); Reducing the stock of the Illicit Trade: Promoting Best Practice in Weapons Collection Programmes (Clegg, Faltas, McDonald, et al, 2001); Building comprehensive Controls on Small Arms Manufacturing, transfer and end-use (Crowley, Isbister and Meek, 2001); Implementing the UN Action Programme for Combatting the Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light weapons in All its Aspects (Clegg, Crowley, Greene et al, 2001).
The UN PoA is broad in its scope and ambitious in its intent. It sets out a range of commitments that states agreed to implement nationally as well as initiatives that should be taken regionally and internationally to support implementation (UN:A/CONF 192/15). Importantly for this thesis, the PoA contains significant references to related issues of peace and security, disarmament and development which suggest a level of recognition amongst drafters of the interrelated nature of SALW to a range of factors which drive insecurity, sustain conflict and undermine development. Specific references included an acknowledgement that SALW sustain conflict (page 5, para 5); and *inter-alia* commitments to destroy surplus and collected weapons (page 10, para 16), ensure stockpile security and management (page 10, para 17), promote confidence building through SALW control activities in conflict affected contexts (page 11, para 20), and implement effective DDR programmes (page 20, para 21). These aspects of SALW control had been practiced in different forms prior to the UNPoA being agreed. However, the UNPoA was the first time that they had been brought together as part of an international agreement which explicitly related them to reducing conflict and promoting security for individuals as well as states.

The agreement of the UNPoA at the end of July 2001 was a watershed moment for many of those interested in SALW control. Whilst some groups, particularly some international NGOs (Laurance and Stohl, 2002:26) condemned the contents and nature of the agreement as a failure, many others saw it as an imperfect but nevertheless important international focus for future action at all levels. The agreement of the UNPoA, the first significant international initiative of any sort relating to SALW in a fairly broad sense was due to the actions of many individuals and groups in many countries from around the world. However, in their different ways, both the Biting the Bullet and Small Arms Survey initiatives can claim to have had some influence over its final contents and over efforts since to transform what is essentially a series of political commitments into operational activities.

The Small Arms Survey has been published annually since 2001 and the Biting the Bullet Project continues to organise dialogue opportunities for policy makers and others on specific aspects of PoA implementation and publish reports on specific
aspects, most notably in recent years on the issue of the diversion of SALW to illicit end uses or end users (see for example Greene and Kirkham, 2009). Both initiatives have played an important role in monitoring the implementation of the UNPoA and in exploring the needs for further policy development.

The Biting the Bullet Project published three major reports of book length which sought to review progress made by states in implementing their UNPoA-and related commitments. They were organised thematically, covering the main topics included in the PoA: at the national level, the establishment of national coordinating agencies and points of contact, and legislative and administrative procedures relating to SALW transfers, illicit manufacture, possession and trade and relating to stockpiles, disarmament, weapons collection and destruction. They also contained significant sections focussing on reviewing implementation progress at the regional and national levels. However, important as they were to the development of understandings among policy makers, international and non-governmental organisations and others, they focussed strongly what they saw as the core elements of UNPoA implementation and closely associated the contents of their reports with the international SALW control priorities of the day. Consequently they did not look in any great depth at some of the issues which were included in the non-operative parts of the UNPoA, including crucially the relationships between SALW control and peacebuilding: Whilst their assessment of states performance in implementing their UNPoA commitments was often rigorous, quite how they related to other activities, including peacebuilding was not a significant focus.
2.3.3 SALW control as disarmament diplomacy and public policy

One of the major critiques of the UNPoA was that it didn’t recognise fully the public health and other impacts on society of SALW proliferation, and that consequently, SALW control remained an issue rooted in international relations and disarmament diplomacy rather than being addressed through public policy making responses. In this light, Krause (2007), building on earlier work by Laurance and Stohl (2002), makes a distinction between efforts to control SALW that relate to the well-established fields of international disarmament diplomacy, arms control and norm building, and what he describes as ‘public policy’ approaches, which place greater focus on addressing the causes and impacts of weapons proliferation and misuse. In this grouping he includes the importance of those attempting to control SALW engaging closely with communities focusing on issues including criminal justice, public health, development, humanitarian action and human rights (Krause 2007:8).

One of the main criteria he uses to make the distinction between these two categories and types of approach is the focus of the intervention: the first being essentially about multilateral diplomacy focussing on the SALW as an artefact to be controlled; and the second focussing on their causes and effects. He categorises these different areas as first and second generation control measures. Krause makes the case for greater focus on what he calls second generation issues which in his description have a stronger focus on demand-side factors, in opposition to first generation measures which historically have focussed more on supply issues. He sets out the main areas of SALW control that he considers should be located in the second generation set of measures: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), small arms and Security Sector Reform programmes (SSR), national regulation of civilian possession, and armed violence prevention and reduction (AVPR) programmes (Krause 2007:8).

For this thesis, completed in 2013, this distinction is no longer new, although at the time it was written, the increased focus on armed violence reduction programmes in particular was an important departure. During the first decade of the 2000s it is undoubtedly the case that a much greater focus was placed on demand side issues.
The development of the concept of armed violence reduction, framed internationally through the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, which responded to a perception that SALW control efforts had focussed on large scale violent conflict and post-conflict contexts over the impact of gun violence in contexts characterized by social and criminal violence is a case-in-point. The concerted effort by some governments and international NGOs to promote an armed violence reduction agenda advocated an inclusive public policy focussed approach to dealing with the causes and effects of armed violence rather than focussing on weapons as artefacts, as they argued had been the case previously. During this period, the interrelations between SALW control and other areas of security building such as DDR and SSR were established.

Whilst Krause undoubtedly captured some of the main trends in understandings of SALW and their relationship to security, public health, crime and other related areas, there is a significant gap in his paper which this thesis aims to contribute to addressing. The distinction between first and second generation SALW control is compelling. However, his second generation policy responses focus almost exclusively on instrumental, usually top-down, security-building measures; reforming militaries and police, dealing with former combatants following the end of formal conflict. There is arguably another - possibly third generation - set of approaches which could contribute to enhancing the control over SALW and reducing their impact on security, development, human rights and other related areas. This could include areas of positive peacebuilding ranging from political settlement of conflict to local-level peacebuilding activities. The research conducted for this thesis aims to explore the interrelations between SALW and a wide range of peacebuilding activities, including both the areas described by Krause (which can be designed as either security, confidence of peacebuilding interventions) and this third group of specific peacebuilding approaches.
2.3.4 The development of activities to control SALW

One of the earliest attempts to identify the different SALW control activities that could be undertaken in post-war contexts was produced by Laurence and Meek in 1996. This work is important both for understanding the issue of the control of SALW and its interrelationships with other issues, including security- and peace-building and peacekeeping and for beginning to develop technical approaches to SALW control. It is one of the defining texts of the period in the mid-1990s in which SALW began to receive serious attention from academics and policy makers alike. Rather than focussing primarily on the effects of SALW on conflict, Laurence attends to the ways in which disarmament could be affected and the positive benefits that this could accrue for communities affected by violence perpetrated by SALW.

Laurence and Meek provide an introduction to the issue, citing the end of the Cold War as a primary factor in the increased focus on SALW as a contributor to violent conflict. They provide a review of progress within the UN system to address SALW control challenges, introduce some of the tools that could be useful in practical disarmament activities and discuss what they describe as micro disarmament in practice (Laurance and Meek, 2006:19). It is this section which is of most relevance for this thesis. Laurance and Meek focus on three areas of particular importance: post-conflict peacebuilding; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; and SALW collection and reduction strategies.

The most significant point of relevance to this thesis made by the authors in this paper is that small arms control has obvious interrelationships with DDR programmes and specifically as it relates to the first ‘D’ – disarmament. They set out the reasons for why careful disarmament is essential as a micro-disarmament activity in post-conflict peacebuilding, including the importance of protecting stockpiles of collected weapons and of collecting all weapons in the possession of combatants. Writing 15 years after the original publication, these observations no longer seem new. However at the time, this was one of the first serious attempts to describe some of the relationships between SALW control and related areas of
what Ramsbotham et al call the security and law and order sectors in their model for analysing post-conflict peacebuilding.

Since the publication of this paper, a great deal has been written about different approaches, sectors and techniques for controlling SALW, which range from direct approaches such as DDR and SSR through to those which focus more on changing the socio-economic and political environment in contexts in which SALW are deemed a particular challenge. Of particular interest to this thesis are post-war disarmament and reform of the security sector:

2.3.5 Post-war ‘disarmament’ and weapons control

Ramsbotham et al (2005:14) include various disarmament related issues within their menu of tactical responses to the initial de-escalation phases included in their Hourglass Model. Muggah (2005) makes the distinction between disarmament efforts which target former combatants and those which primarily target civilians. He suggests that the two most developed responses to these different actors and their attendant needs are DDR for former combatants and Weapons Reduction programmes to address civilian owned weapons. From the literatures reviewed for this thesis it is possible to add a third dimension, Security Sector Reform.

2.3.5.1 Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration

Lamb (2008:3) charts the development of DDR as a concept, identifying roots in the first and second World Wars and further back to the Anglo-Boer wars in 1902. He concurs with Muggah’s assessment that DDR is in simple terms a process which aims to disarm former combatants and (re) introduce them into society, either as civilians or as part of military or security structures such as the army or police. Lamb describes the different initiatives that have been generated at the international level over recent years. He begins with the World Bank, which he claims was the dominant actor for many years. Muggah agrees with this assessment and claims that part of the reason why DDR programmes have failed to meet expectations is that that their disarmament dimension has often not received the attention that was required, in part at least as a consequence of the difficulties that the World Bank has had in terms of its mandate to engage on peacekeeping-
related issues or provide direct support for disarming former combatants (Muggah, 2005:244). The attempt by the UN to develop a comprehensive approach to DDR, the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) was important for several reasons, not least because it represented a recognition of the fact that DDR could not exist in a post-war space as a stand-alone activity, and highlighted the importance both of phasing, and of coordinating or integrating DDR activities with other peace- and security building activities taking place at the same time. Thus, and importantly for this thesis, the importance of contingency and complementarity discussed earlier in this chapter was recognised (Lamb 2008: 23).

This acknowledgement drew on previous work undertaken through the auspices of the Stockholm Initiative on DDR in 2005 and the development of a DDR best practices handbook in 2004. In both cases, the importance of linking to other programmes comprising what Muggah refers to as the post-conflict orthodoxy (2005:242) and understanding the critical issues of phasing was recognised. The DDR practical Field and Classroom Guide attempted to map the different stages of DDR against a time continuum with the disarmament and demobilisation phases taking place in the immediate post-war period following the signing of a peace agreement or accord (as part of what they termed Peace Enforcement Operations), with the remaining programme elements following later and connecting to wider development programming.

The issue of integration with other peace and security building activities in post-conflict settings, specifically security sector reform is taken up by Brzoska (2005:104). He claims that activities which are commonly associated with SSR, including police reform, rule of law and defence reform are seen as downstream priorities and not part of the immediate priorities of post-war contexts. Whilst recognising that this might be the case, he also makes the claim that better understanding the relationships that exist over time (contingencies) requires further research – pointing to the very real connection between the success of reinsertion/reintegration programmes and criminality and the relationships this has with police reform and other elements of SSR. However, despite the temporal connections made between actions, Brzoska does not assess the opportunities for
greater complementarity between elements of DDR and SSR offered by Lederach’s concept of nested paradigms which could envisage a range of security and peace building activities taking place at the same time where appropriate as well as sequenced over time to meet the requirements of a changing context.

The University of Bradford led a research project which culminated in 2008 which explored DDR and Human Security. The project assessed the coordination and integration challenges between DDR and other post-conflict security building activities, including SALW control (Greene and Urquhart, 2008) and SSR (Rynn and Greene, 2008). The project identified a range of ways in which coordination and integration could be improved to enhance outcomes for poor and vulnerable people. However they stopped short of recommending the level of integration which had been suggested by others, claiming instead that whilst integration might be possible between certain sets of activities and at particular levels of engagement, this was not always beneficial, and in these cases, closer coordination would be preferable.

Muggah provides a more critical assessment of the concept of DDR and the way in which it is implemented. He claimed four major challenges in trying to identify whether and to what extent DDR and, to a lesser extent, attempts to disarm civilians has been effective, and thus how valuable it is as part of wider approaches to post-war security- and peace- building: (1) that success is poorly defined and is often judged by the number of weapons that are collected rather than whether the programme had any substantive impact on the security of affected populations; (2) there is ambiguity as to what DDR programmes are actually for; (3) expectations are often mismanaged with donors and host populations and governments alike believing that they will have more wide-ranging and faster effects than in reality is possible; and (4), that funding allocated to DDR programmes is often grossly insufficient given the severe challenges implicit in the goals of DDR (Muggah, 2005:247/8).
2.3.5.2 Security Sector or System Reform

Perhaps the most commonly accepted interpretation of the concept of SSR is that developed by the OECD in its 2005 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance. They claim that there are three elements to successful reform of a given security system: firstly the development of a clear set of institutional arrangements for the provision of security which includes all relevant actors; secondly, action to strengthen governance of security institutions; and finally to build capable and professional security forces that are accountable to civil authorities. (OECD, 2007:13).

Bryden and Hanggi (2005) provide a useful overview of the origins of SSR and an early exploration of the issues, which have since developed as a significant body of literature. They claim that SSR as it is understood and implemented today developed as a concept and an activity for three main reasons, each of which can be traced back to the period following the end of the Cold War. The first relates to the desire on the part of Western states to develop relationships with the security institutions of the newly independent former Warsaw Pact countries. The second reason is the emphasis that development agencies, led by DFID in the UK, placed on the relationship between development and insecurity and the role that security actors and institutions could play both in creating the conditions in which development could take hold, but also the damage that insecurity could do in terms of undermining development efforts. Finally, they state that an increased interest in the post-Cold War period in what has become known as post-conflict reconstruction or peacebuilding brought with it an interest in the reform and development of security and justice actors as part of wider reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts (Bryden and Hanggi, 2005: 23-24).

Hanggi (2009:339) discusses the still-contentious understandings of the terms security ‘sector’ or ‘system’ reform. He claims that narrower interpretations of the concept which focus on security institutions and more specifically on their effectiveness in providing security are often described using the term Security
Sector Reform. Later interpretations which were framed increasingly in terms of the relationship between security and development were often described as Security System Reform. In recent years, this term has been challenged and a new terminology offered which describes interventions in terms of Security and Justice, placing emphasis on the outcomes (improvements in security and justice) rather than the organisations, institutions or reform activities (a better trained police force) that give rise to them. In its 2009 White Paper, the UK Government DFID committed to treating security and justice as basic services and subordinated SSR (security sector reform in this case) to this commitment. It also committed to prioritising improvements in security and justice in conflict affected environments, making the link explicit between security and justice outcomes, SSR as a contributory intervention and post-war peacebuilding (DFID, 2009:75). This commitment was further developed in 2011 with the publication of the UK Government’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS), which represents a cross-governmental commitment to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. BSOS placed increased emphasis on the importance of security and justice from a defence and diplomatic perspective as well as a development priority (Her Majesty’s Government 2011:12).

There has been a significant amount of research and analysis over recent years on the role that SSR can have in post-war peacebuilding efforts. One of the earlier contributions was produced by Cawthra and Luckham (2003), which emphasised the importance of accountability and oversight issues in SSR activities. Further, those with an interest in post-conflict peacebuilding frameworks (see for instance Schnabel (2002); Lund (2003); Tschirgi (2004); Chetail (2010); Ramsbotham et al (2011)) have identified SSR as both a sector intervention, a priority in early phases of post-war peacebuilding and a desired outcome of reform efforts.

In addition, and of importance to the focus of this thesis there have been efforts to understand the relationship between SSR and efforts to control small arms. For instance, Ebo (2005) analyses the role of SALW control in SSR activities in Liberia, and Albrecht and Jackson (2010) discuss SALW control in the context of an analysis of SSR efforts in Sierra Leone. Areas of activity which have both a SALW control
dimension and which could be included within an SSR framework, including DDR and military-defence reform have been examined from a range of different perspectives (see for instance Richards and Smith (2007) for the regulation of private security providers and its impacts on SALW control through SSR). The University of Bradford and Saferworld conducted research in 2008 on the opportunities for integration and coordination between SALW control and SSR activities in terms of their contributions to improving human security (Greene and Hiscock, 2008). However this research did not focus explicitly on immediate post-war environments or on the relationships between SALW control, SSR and peacebuilding activities. Therefore, to-date there has not been a significant analysis of the relationships between SALW control and SSR in post-war environments in terms of their interrelationships with peacebuilding activities.

Finally as regards SSR and its relationship to the hypothesis and analytical framework, is the literature relating to local ownership of SSR activities. The importance of the ownership by affected governments of the SSR activities taking place in their countries is recognised by the OCED, which states,

“Experience shows that reform processes will not succeed in the absence of commitment and ownership on the part of those undertaking reforms. Assistance should be designed to support partner governments and stakeholders as they move down a path of reform, rather than determining the path and leading them down it” (OECD, 2004).

Nathan (2007) took the principle of local ownership a step further in his book *No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform*. He argues that in addition to the ownership and active participation of governments in affected countries, SSR activities should also involve, and wherever possible enjoy the consent of the public. Further, and of particular relevance to the development of the analytical framework developed later in this chapter, he identifies three main contextual factors as a significant determinant of the success of a given SSR activity. These are (a) the nature of the political system; (b) the extent of political leadership; and (c) the capacity of
government and civil society institutions to both undertake and benefit from SSR efforts.

2.3.5.3 SALW control in post-conflict contexts

SALW control activities have been particularly prevalent in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict since 2001. In part this was in response to increased international engagement with the concept of liberal state-building, post-war reconstruction and stabilisation discussed earlier in this chapter. In part though it was also the logical extension of the interrelationships established by Klare, Greene, Krause, Laurance and others prior to 2001. These approaches to SALW control in post-war environments have been designed by various regional and international agencies and initiatives. This has been explored as part of previous work by the author of this thesis from the perspective of understanding the interrelationships between SALW and security building activities in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict. It drew on a desk review of countries that had experienced violent conflict and in which efforts to control SALW had been undertaken, identifying the main methods by which SALW control had been attempted and described their specific roles in a post-conflict context (Smith, 2010).

The research suggested that the priorities for SALW control in post-conflict contexts may differ from those at other times and described the types of SALW control which have been prioritised in post-conflict contexts, identifying where applicable its relationships with other aspects of security building and provision. The main elements can be summarised as follows:

- **SALW collection programmes**

  Muggah (2005:224) categorises civilian disarmament efforts as either ‘command’ driven or ‘voluntary’. Command-driven activities include search and seize operations and are usually located within peacekeeping operations, whereas voluntary activities tend to be based on collective or individual incentives. Voluntary disarmament has generated a significant amount of literature since the middle of the 1990s in part driven by the significant number of post-war
disarmament initiatives supported by the UN, its various agencies and a variety of regional and national bodies. This subject is discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis and as such is not reviewed in depth here. The following introduction is however useful to situate civilian disarmament within the wider range of post-conflict SALW control options.

High levels of weapons possession need not in itself be a problem (for instance, Canada and Switzerland have very high per capita levels of civilian weapons ownership but relatively little SALW violence) and as society becomes more peaceful, people may have less motivation to own or use weapons illegally. However, during the recovery period, when competition for power and resources is typically intense and the role of the state both contested and weak, those supporting SALW control programmes often prioritise attempts to reduce both the quantities of weapons in circulation and the motivations for using them.

Weapons collection can take many forms. For example, weapons owned by ‘official’ security actors such as the police or military can be collected and inventoried prior to being reallocated as part of demobilisation or defence reform programmes (see above). Another key target in immediate post-conflict contexts is weapons held by civilians who were not formal combatants (often termed ‘Weapons Collection’, ‘Weapons Surrender’ or ‘Civilian Weapons Control’). This has sometimes been linked to incentive schemes to encourage civilians to hand in weapons in exchange for either personal or community-based advantages. These vary from ‘buying back’ weapons from civilians, as attempted in Croatia (Greene, Bourne, Yankey et al, 2003), to weapons in exchange for the chance of personal material gain (such as weapons for lottery tickets in Macedonia, (Rynn, Taylor, Wood et al, 2005:97), to weapons in exchange for development programmes, as attempted in Albania (Faltas and Paes, 2003) and Kosovo (Sokolová, Richards and Smith, 2006:78). More recently, attempts to provide direct personal benefit combined with improvements in opportunities to access education and alternative livelihoods have been designed and analysed (see Weiss (2011) for a review of civilian disarmament in Liberia).
• **SALW destruction programmes**

Several regional and international agreements state that surplus weapons should be destroyed, particularly in post-war environments when control over stockpiles is often weak (see Karp (2009) on destruction of surplus SALW). However, states interpret the word ‘surplus’ in very different ways. Sometimes, weapons that are collected are indeed destroyed (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Sri Lanka have undertaken significant public weapons-destruction events as a demonstration of intent and to send signals to those still owning weapons illegally). In many cases, however, only unusable weapons are destroyed, while serviceable weapons are not considered ‘surplus’ but are incorporated into state stocks or considered available for domestic sale or export.

• **Cross-border and arms transfer control measures**

Wars are fuelled by the transfer of weapons into conflict-affected areas, both legally and illegally (see discussion on supply-side measures earlier in this chapter). An effective system of national and international controls is required to ensure that SALW transferred legally do not undermine security and to prevent illicit shipments of weapons into conflict zones. Just as importantly, however, following the end of violence the same weapons may be re-sold to criminals, insurgent groups and sometimes other governments, often within the same geographic region (See, for instance UNSC, 2001: para 21). Reducing illicit outflows of weapons is thus equally important to prevent future conflict in neighbouring countries as well as further afield. Achieving this is a complicated process which includes more effective border management and security and close cooperation between law-enforcement and intelligence agencies across borders (see for instance Seniora and Poitrevin (2010) for an analysis of measures to control SALW movements across land borders).

• **Legislative and regulatory measures**

In the period immediately following the end of violence, there may often be only a weak legal basis and little or no policy framework for a range of different activities focussed on promoting recovery and development. Governance in general is often
fragile, with poor institutional organisation and communication, further complicated by chronic under-resourcing and international agencies competing for the attention of local decision-makers. Without a clear legislative or regulatory basis, any form of SALW control is very challenging. Clarity on issues such as who has the right to bear arms; what sorts of weapons they can own; the circumstances in which they can be used; and the process by which unregistered or illegal weapons can be surrendered, is important for planning effective SALW control activities. In the first and second phases of the Ramsbotham et al post-conflict peacebuilding model, achieving this will be difficult. However it is an essential element of phase three (government) onwards and preparation for this should be undertaken as soon as possible (demonstrating the importance of the nested paradigm concept embedded in the model).

- **SALW Surveys**

SALW control programmes normally fail when they are not based on a clear understanding of both the nature of the problem and the potential benefits and drawbacks of the solutions on offer (SEESAC, 2006a). Surveys are a useful way of attempting to capture this information, and are increasingly used as a baseline against which progress and success can be judged. A small number of specialist non-governmental organisations and university research centres have developed a specialism in this area over recent years, undertaking survey work on behalf of national governments and international agencies, principally the UNDP (see for instance Holtom et al, 2005; Sokolová, Richards and Smith, 2006; Saferworld et al, 2007; Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, No 15, 2009). As this area has developed, methodologies have become increasingly sophisticated, often explicitly aiming to capture the relationships between weapons ownership and misuse, and related issues such as the capacity of the state to promote security and justice services for their populations (see for instance Saferworld et al, 2007).

- **SALW awareness and communications strategies**

Public education activities, which can support efforts to control SALW, are now commonplace. For instance, the international NGO Saferworld has supported
numerous ‘Ballot not Bullets’ campaigns in places in South Asia where SALW violence has traditionally played an important role during elections, such as Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Local and national organisations often run awareness campaigns, ranging from radio shows through to street actions and events (for further information about the role of awareness raising in SALW control see Coe and Smith, 2003; Rynn and Desvignes, 2003). Where progress has been made on awareness and communications, this has not been as evident in engaging populations in diagnosing problems and monitoring and holding to account those responsible for projects – a critical aspect of the ‘legitimacy’ required for conflict transformation.

- **Management of information**

Reliable information is often hard to come by in post-conflict environments. This is especially the case with sensitive issues such as weapons ownership and use. Furthermore, communications channels between those responsible for different aspects of SALW management are usually weak and sometimes non-existent. Improving the operational exchange of information, as well as the development of integrated policy is frequently a stated intention but in many cases is unsuccessful due to the extremely contested and confused nature of governance which often characterises post-war environments.

- **SALW stockpile management and security**

This includes activities such as securing stockpiles held by non-state combatant groups as well as by state security actors. In some contexts, facilities for stockpile security are limited: there are no written inventories of weapons or to whom they have been given; ammunition is often stored with weapons; and the stores in which weapons are kept are poorly secured, providing opportunities for both semi-official ‘losses’ and large-scale thefts by criminal or other armed groups (as happened during the collapse of the Soviet Union) (Greene, Bourne, Yankey *et al*, 2003:94). Post-conflict transitions usually involve resource shortages and often a significant reduction in defence expenditure; in such circumstances, stockpile management is not only about preventing theft, but just as importantly about preventing
explosions in poorly managed ammunition stocks (see for instance Greene, Holt and Wilkinson, 2005:8-10).

The major omission in the research described above is that it focussed exclusively on the relationships between SALW and SALW control and security building, with very limited focus placed on peacebuilding activities. So whilst it goes some way to helping to explore the relationships between efforts to control SALW and some of the factors (i.e. insecurity) which may underpin and drive violence and conflict, it does not provide evidence either of the ways in which SALW control can positively impact peace, or of how efforts to promote peace can or should interrelate with efforts to control SALW.

### 2.4 The overarching research question, hypothesis and main sub-questions

The following section draws together the different literatures discussed above and identifies their relevance to the hypothesis and main research questions below which frames this thesis, and which the research tests. It builds on and elaborates the overarching research question, hypothesis, sub-questions and research strategy introduced and justified in Chapter 1. It begins by locating the research questions and hypothesis within the literatures reviewed in this Chapter. It does this by identifying which of the literatures reviewed are of particular importance and relevance before demonstrating specifically the areas within which a research contribution will be made. The research strategy which was briefly introduced in Chapter 1 is then elaborated in the context of the relevant literatures before the research approach and methodology is further developed through reviewing literature relevant to the chosen mixed-methods approach and by describing and discussing the different research methods employed.

The overarching research question which this thesis seeks to contribute towards is:

*What are the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and build peace in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict?*
This question has been designed in an attempt to address a real problem: SALW control efforts often take place in the context of conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities in periods following violent conflict. However, the evidence (see Chapter 3) suggests that there is more that could be done to increase the positive effect of these programmes; further it suggests that in some cases, poorly conceived and implemented SALW control activities can have a negative impact on conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts. Similarly, it is the case that conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes that are seen as illegitimate, exclusionary or ineffective by those affected by conflict can damage the legitimacy and effect of SALW control programmes that take place over similar time and space.

Understanding more precisely and in more depth how conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts and SALW control activities interrelate is important in enhancing their positive contributions, both to their immediate aims and to wider peacebuilding and conflict transformation objectives. It is also very interesting from a wider thematic perspective to better understanding the interaction between programmes to address relatively specific sectoral issues and problems (such as IDP return, SALW control, and anti-corruption) and overall peace-building processes in post-conflict contexts.

The hypothesis that guides the research and analysis for this thesis has been developed to reflect the three main variables identified as of particular importance in the first major sections of this Chapter, as well as the authors experience of working on conflict prevention and SALW control issues. They are contingency, complementarity and context. The hypothesis is as follows:

Efforts to control SALW can have a positive or negative effect on post-conflict peacebuilding; conversely their success can be damaged or enhanced by peacebuilding activities. The interrelationships that exist between SALW control and peacebuilding are both temporal and spatial and are conditioned by the extent to which affected populations are involved. Therefore, the role and influence of local people, and the extent to which complementarity and contingency is
understood and acted upon have a determining effect on the positive benefits of SALW in post-conflict peacebuilding.

Whilst the overarching research question and hypothesis frames and provides the parameters for this research, an additional group of specific sub-questions have been developed which elaborate each of the three variables stated above. These questions are introduced and justified as part of the overall statement of the problem that this thesis aims to resolve in Chapter 1 and are as follows:

**Category 1: The effect of contingency on interrelationships**

- At what stages of de-escalation is the control of SALW relevant to peacebuilding efforts, and to what extent are SALW control activities located within existing phases of post-conflict peacebuilding?
- How does the nature of SALW control activity change over different phases of post-conflict peacebuilding?
- To what extent is the concept of nested paradigms appropriate to efforts to control SALW?

**Category 2: The effect of complementarity on interrelationships**

- What are the relevant intra- and inter-sectoral relationships between efforts to control SALW and recognised post-conflict peacebuilding interventions?

**Category 3: The effect of context and actors**

- How are different social groups involved in efforts to control SALW in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict – specifically what are the different roles played by those in the different tiers of Lederach’s Actors and Approaches To Peacebuilding model?
- What is the relationship between the involvement of different actors, specifically affected populations, and the role that SALW control plays in
post-conflict peacebuilding, and how does this affect the contribution of SALW control towards longer term transformative peacebuilding?

- How does the range of actors involved and the nature of their involvement in SALW control efforts change over different phases of post-conflict peacebuilding?

Taken together, the questions and hypothesis aim to make a significant contribution to literatures on conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and to the control of SALW in post-violent conflict contexts. They also aim to contribute to literatures on specific post-conflict settings, most particularly Kosovo, which as the major case-study, forms a significant part of the overall research strategy (the relevant geographically focussed literatures on Kosovo are reviewed and analysed in the early stages of Chapter 4). The section which follows draws together the most important elements of the literatures which are reviewed earlier in this chapter before describing the specific research contributions that this thesis will make.

2.4.1 Relevance of literatures reviewed and the contribution that this thesis aims to make to their development

Despite efforts to understand the role of SALW in conflict, and efforts to address SALW control as a contribution to security building through related interventions, there has to-date been insufficient attention afforded to the relationships between SALW and SALW control and peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict contexts. Whilst there has been some attempt to understand complementarity as regards to other security building activities (Greene and Hiscock, 2008; Smith, 2010), and there has been limited work to establish sequences of SALW control activity with a stand-alone goal of reducing SALW and their impact on conflict and security (SEESAC 2006a), existing models and frameworks for post-conflict peacebuilding do not explicitly attend to the role of SALW and SALW control.

This thesis aims to make a contribution to the literatures relevant to SALW control by establishing and exploring the ways in which SALW control interrelates with
peacebuilding models and approaches from the perspective of complementarity and contingency and context. This is highly relevant to the hypothesis in the sense that weapons play a significant role in conflict and therefore reducing numbers is likely to have a positive effect on both reducing the duration or intensity of conflict; and reducing the chances of it recurring as easily. It is also important in that SALW are perceived very differently by different groups depending on their perspectives of the wider conflict and that responding to the ways in which these understandings and perceptions are constructed is critical to the success of SALW control efforts.

In making a contribution both to conflict resolution and peacebuilding and SALW control literatures, this thesis builds on the existing post-conflict peacebuilding models (The Hourglass Model (Ramsbotham et al., 2005), Actors and Approaches (Lederach, 1997) and Nested Paradigms (Lederach, 1997)) identified above. It responds to the critique of contemporary post-conflict peacebuilding activities regarding the lack of involvement of different sections of societies and the awareness of the role of social construction in the ideas which form and drive factors which cause and sustain conflict and ownerships and use of SALW. The overarching framework within which the research for this thesis is conducted has three significant dimensions: Complementarity; contingency and context. As such, the contributions that this thesis makes to the literatures relevant to post–conflict peacebuilding and the control of SALW are as follows:

It applies the concepts of contingency and complementarity in post-conflict peacebuilding to the control of SALW. It develops the framework established by Ramsbotham et al to analyse the sectoral and phasal dimensions of interrelationships over time and space as they relate to SALW control efforts, both embedded within other sectoral programmes such as DDR, and as a cross-cutting issue which has relevance to the range of different post-conflict sectoral interventions.

It applies Lederach’s framework model for understanding actors and approaches to a post-conflict peacebuilding and SALW control setting, to test the assumptions
which underpin the model and its applicability to the specific subject of SALW control in particular in Kosovo but also through analysis of other mini-case studies contained in Chapter 3. Through this it will contribute to the literatures on both leadership within post-conflict peacebuilding and to that relating to transformative peacebuilding and ‘peacebuilding from below’ by analysing the role that affected populations can play in predominantly civilian-focussed SALW control efforts and the role that these efforts can play in longer-term transformational peacebuilding.

It contributes to the SALW literature by enhancing understandings of the interrelationships between peacebuilding activities in post-conflict environments and efforts to control SALW by assessing whether and to what extent peacebuilding efforts have positively or negatively affected the outcomes of SALW control activities.

Finally, it will contribute to the literatures which relate to post-conflict peacebuilding in the specific countries and regions explored in this thesis. In this context, the most substantial contribution will be to the literatures on Kosovo given that this research includes a significant case-study of the interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding in contemporary post-war Kosovo.

The research questions described earlier in this section were developed specifically to explore the contingency, complementarity and context framework articulated above. In the following section they are located within the overall research strategy, which discusses and further justifies and elaborates the research methodology and methods described in Chapter 1.

2.5 Research Strategy and Methodology

In seeking to address the overarching research question and contribute to validating the framing hypothesis, this thesis aims to make a contribution to the literatures reviewed above by exploring:

- how efforts to control SALW can be more effectively located within approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding;
• how peacebuilding efforts can contribute positively to SALW control goals; and
• how these approaches can be informed by a greater understanding of the construction of ideas and knowledge as regards to their role in society and in stimulating or reducing violent conflict

The research strategy described in Chapter 1 is guided by a mixed methods approach. This combines qualitative and quantitative data and includes a soft-social constructionist perspective.

This approach guides the implementation of a strategy which gradually builds up and deepens understandings of interrelationships between conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts and activities to control SALW. It does this through initially establishing and analysing a universe of cases in which SALW control has been attempted in conflict affected contexts to identify issues and trends with regards to the nature and type of SALW control attempted, and the interrelationships that might exist either between SALW control efforts, or SALW control and wider peacebuilding activities.

From this Universe five mini case-studies are identified and analysed in greater detail. The variables of contingency, complementarity and context are used to frame this work, which builds on initial analysis of the universe of cases. The case studies have been identified on the basis of criteria introduced in Chapter 1 and justified in greater depth in Chapter 3. Whilst care must be taken to ensure that the emerging findings arising from the analysis of these cases are not generalised inappropriately, they have been selected with clear boundaries that represent contexts and conditions which are of relevance to other conflict affected contexts in which SALW control efforts have been attempted.

The emerging findings are then tested and further elaborated through the main case-study undertaken for this thesis. Kosovo was selected as the most significant case-study for the reasons introduced in Chapter 1 and elaborated in Chapter 4.
The data arising from the Kosovo case study research are analysed using the complementarity, contingency and context framework, with particular attention paid to developing understandings in the areas framed by specific sub-questions in each case.

The findings resulting from the Kosovo case-study are then combined with those arising from the analysis of the universe of cases and the mini-case studies and collectively analysed using the contingency, complementarity and context framework. In addition however, attention is also paid to substantial findings which emerge from the analysis which either challenge the analytical framework or question is comprehensiveness. From these, conclusions are drawn which seek to provide specific responses to the detailed sub-questions and to validate - at least in some contexts - the hypothesis and through doing this, make a contribution both to tackling the overarching research question and to the relevant literatures and debates.

The mixed methods methodology selected for this research draws on a number of methodologies employed by researchers seeking to understand the different dimensions of the proliferation and misuse of SALW. A mixed-methods approach is also consistent with the methodologies used by peace researchers to understand the field of post-war intervention and peacebuilding, and specifically, the concept of ‘peacebuilding from’ below.

The mixed methods approach to research emerged from the debate between positivist and constructionist approaches and perspectives (see Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003; Denscombe, 2008; Creswell, 2009). Until the later part of the 20th Century, positivist approaches, which focussed predominantly on quantitative data sources, maintained a predominant role in social and behavioural research. This was challenged by the emergence of a constructionist world view which placed emphasis on qualitative data and which Eliot (1996) described as a perspective which places emphasis on the use of language to construct accounts or versions of the social world in which they exist. The mixed methods approach developed partly
as a consequence of these debates; where researchers with a strong interest in the utility of their work in addressing real world problems began to develop an approach which combined qualitative and quantitative data within an overarching pragmatist world view (Denscombe (2008:271) refers to this as the ‘Third Research Paradigm’).

The emphasis on combining qualitative and quantitative data sources with a particular focus on using different data sources to triangulate theories and findings has become a popular choice amongst social researchers. The benefits are that the results from one method can be used to deepen and inform those of another employed as part of the same mixed methods research design; that one method can be nested within another to deepen understandings; and that the process of combining different methods can have transformative benefits for the problems which the research seeks to address (Creswell, 2009:18).

Denscombe (2008:272) lists the defining characteristics of mixed methods approaches as they apply to research design, stating that: quantitative and qualitative methods should be combined within the same research project; a mixed methods research design should clearly specify the sequencing and priority that is given to the quantitative and qualitative elements of data collection and analysis; the importance of an explicit account of the manner in which the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the research relate to each other, with heightened emphasis on the manner in which triangulation is used; and that pragmatism is the philosophical underpinning for the research.

In adopting the mixed methods approach to this research, this thesis follows that of other researchers in this area, and which are associated with some important contributions. As much of the SALW literature that is relevant to this thesis is ‘grey’ in nature, the research methodologies employed by researchers are often not articulated explicitly. However, it is apparent that key aspects of the mixed methods approach described above are commonly used. Several of the most important studies produced by academic and policy researchers, often working
together, which have attempted to evaluate the breadth and depth of action to address SALW control issues internationally, have adopted methodologies which combine qualitative and quantitative data. The annual Small Arms Survey Yearbook (SAS: 2001-2011) or the occasional Biting the Bullet series (2003, 2005, 2006) combine the results of survey data with semi-structured and structured interviews, both of which are designed to access qualitative and quantitative data. Whilst the methodologies they use are not expressly identified, in general terms they can be seen as following an overall mixed methods approach, although the extent to which they combine quantitative and qualitative data and the methods used to gather and interpret the data are not explicit.

At the national and sub-national levels, significant effort has been invested in attempting to understand the nature of SALW control challenges as a contribution to supporting the development of policies and programmes. This research adopts methods which are directly relevant to this thesis. Often termed as ‘Surveys’, it typically combines household survey data, document review, semi-structured and structured interviews and focus group discussion and collect both quantitative and qualitative data (see for instance Holtom et al, 2005; Richards, Smith and Sokolova, 2006; Wepundi et al, 2012; Florquin and Pezard, 2007).

There are cases in which research into aspects of efforts to control SALW focus on a research methodology other than mixed methods. Quantitative data sets have been used for instance to establish the extent and nature of firearm injuries in certain contexts. For instance, the World Health Organisation has developed an approach which has been applied to Mozambique amongst other countries (WHO et al 2009) which reviews existing data produced by health authorities which records the numbers and extent of firearms deaths and injuries over a particular period of time. Likewise, research projects have been conducted which focus solely on quantitative surveys to obtain a snapshot of the perceptions of the population regarding the role and impact of SALW (see for instance Gilgen and Nowak, 2011). There are also examples of longitudinal surveys which seek to measure changes in public opinions over time regarding the role of SALW in society.
(see Hvidemose and Istrefi, 2009) which track changes in opinions, through comparing responses to questions over time, but which don’t employ qualitative data analysis methods such as discourse analysis which would allow for a more rigorous approach focussing on inter-subjectives closely relating to the construction of understandings of the relationships between SALW and peace, conflict and security between individuals and by communities.

However, given the questions and hypothesis which frame this thesis, and the experience which can be gained from existing attempts both to understand SALW proliferation and misuse, and peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict contexts, a sole quantitative approach has been rejected in favour of a selected combination of different research methodologies. In theory, these range from those which would provide a deep understanding of the interplay between issues and people in a particular context, which are informed by a constructionist world view (such as case study) to those which interpret patterns on a much wider and more generalizable scale which equate more closely to a positivist perspective (quantitative surveys and document review).

Whilst all these are relevant methodologies for responding to particular research requirements, the requirement of this thesis to identify a combination of generalizable quantitative and context-specific qualitative data with a focus on the construction of knowledge and understanding between and within communities requires that an approach which brings together different forms of data, and combines particular research methods reinforces the value in taking a mixed methods approach. As such, within the framework of a mixed methods methodology, the following research strategy was developed to guide the research contained in later chapters.

The overarching approach is multi-level (international; national; local) in that the research focuses on: a universe of data that explores the relationship between conflict, post-conflict peacebuilding and efforts to control SALW in over 80 countries; Kosovo as a national entity; and specific locations within Kosovo at the
sub-national level. The information sought at each of these levels is different in nature, scale and quality and requires a different blend of quantitative and qualitative data where initial theories and findings can be further developed through triangulation and nesting of one approach within another to deepen and further inform analysis. As such the ways in which data is gathered and analysed is significantly different at the international level (hereafter the macro-level), and nationally and sub-nationally in Kosovo (hereafter the micro-levels). It is also simultaneous in terms of the phasing of quantitative and qualitative data gathering and analysis at each level; rather than beginning for instance with qualitative and then triangulating with quantitative data, the research aims to access both sorts of data simultaneously in a nested approach which permits simultaneous triangulation, deepening and substantiation across different data sources over time.

At the macro-level, quantitative is prioritised over qualitative data: a group of 80 different examples of conflict affected contexts in which SALW control has been attempted form the overarching universe of cases. These are interrogated to develop understandings of the numbers of cases in which specific forms of SALW control has been attempted (for example the numbers of countries which have attempted to collect weapons voluntarily from its population, or the number of cases in which specific SALW control legislation or policies have been developed). The primary data sources are existing publications which have aggregated statistics arising from questionnaires sent to and completed by government and international agencies, and reports from the governments of the countries concerned through international information exchange frameworks, such as the process for reporting progress in implementing the UN Programme of Action on SALW (the quality of this data and their different sources is discussed in Chapter 3). These data are then cross-checked where appropriate with a small number of publications which analyse the returns from government and international agencies where data is unclear or where its quality is particularly poor. The method selected for data gathering and analysis at this macro-level is predominantly document review, with a small number of clarificatory or confirmatory interviews with
researchers or others who have been closely involved with researching the data described in the existing documentation as part of a process of triangulation.

At the micro-level (Kosovo as a country and locations within Kosovo), priority (although not phasing) is given to qualitative data, which aims to deepen the quantitative analysis undertaken at the macro level – and which is itself then triangulated with national and local level quantitative data. This is intended to help establish a detailed picture of the nature of attitudes and perceptions towards SALW, peace and conflict and to analyse both how these contribute to the construction of knowledge and understanding, and the nature of the response from policy makers and others. The research methods employed at the Kosovo national and sub-national levels are: document review and analysis; semi structured and unstructured interviews; focus group discussions; observation and discourse analysis. From each of these data sources both qualitative and quantitative data was obtained. At the national level the sequence of data analysis began with quantitative data drawn from national reports and existing surveys published by the Kosovo Government, local market research groups (specifically Index Kosova) and international research organisations (specifically Small Arms Survey and Saferworld). This established a national picture regarding the spread of SALW, public perceptions, the existence of SALW control and peacebuilding activities and the numbers of groups and other actors involved. This was then analysed further using qualitative data drawn from interviews and document analysis to deepen understandings of public attitudes and perceptions and the quality of SALW control and peacebuilding interventions.

At the sub-national levels in Kosovo the sequence in which the data was analysed began with qualitative analysis, with quantitative data used to triangulate and support initial analysis and findings. Thus, data obtained from focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews in specific locations within Kosovo were triangulated using the quantitative data contained within population surveys regarding people’s perceptions relating to peace, conflict and the role of SALW that
are contained in reports published in nationally and internationally commissioned market research.

Taken together, the research strategy can be seen to reflect the characteristics identified by Denscombe (2011): a pragmatist approach; the use of triangulation; the transformative potential; and the value of nesting. The research aims to contribute to addressing a real world problem and to directly support the development of ideas, approaches and activities which seek to enhance the effectiveness of both efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding in post-war contexts. It explicitly combines qualitative and quantitative data sources in a sequence which begins with an overarching quantitative assessment of the universe of cases of SALW control efforts in post-war contexts where initial findings are triangulated and deepened with qualitative data; a quantitative assessment of relevant data at the national level in Kosovo which is then deepened through nested qualitative data sources at the sub national level, which is finally triangulated with qualitative data to corroborate and confirm findings.

Thus, the questions which help frame the research and which were introduced in Chapter 1 and qualified above, which seek to address the three main dimensions of the analytical framework (the existence and characteristics of contingent, complementary and context-aware interrelationships) will be approached from a pragmatist world view and an overarching mixed-methods approach. This places emphasis on both qualitative and quantitative data sources, and emphasises the role of social construction in the development of understandings and knowledge within communities and between individuals, which is critical to understanding how SALW are understood in relation to understandings of peace and conflict and how this shapes the decisions and choices of those in post-conflict contexts.
2.6 Chapter conclusion

There are well established interrelationships between the availability and misuse of SALW and the intensity and duration of conflict. Similarly the role that violent conflict has in creating the conditions for SALW proliferation is significant. Public perceptions of the role played by SALW however differ, with SALW being seen as an item of value and both a threat and a means of protection. Since the end of the Cold War in particular, considerable international focus has been placed on attempts to control SALW in conflict affected and post-war environments. These have often taken place alongside, and sometimes as part of, peacebuilding efforts. Whilst the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding is well established, and well regarded models exist to explain the different stages of conflict, and of efforts to resolve it, to-date, there has been only limited research which seeks to understand the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding.

This thesis builds on existing research and analysis by providing a framework which draws on Ramsbotham et al (2005) which looks at the role of complementarity and contingency, and Lederach (1997) which analyses the role of different actors in peacebuilding, to establish an analytical framework with three variables: complementarity; contingency and context.

A mixed methods approach has demonstrated utility in SALW control and peacebuilding research and is employed in this thesis, enabling the analysis of quantitative and qualitative data. The research strategy, which identifies an initial universe of cases before analysing a small number of mini-case studies and then a detailed case study of post-war Kosovo, enables broad understandings of interrelationships to be elaborated and for these to be analysed in detail. In consequence, this thesis makes a contribution to literatures on SALW control, peacebuilding and conflict resolution. It also contributes to understandings of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo and to some extent, to the countries analysed through the mini-case studies in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3: Analysis of interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities in post-war environments

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to identify contexts in which efforts to control SALW and conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities have taken place contiguously and to analyse interrelationships through (i) quantitatively reviewing and analysing the universe of examples since 2001; and (ii) qualitatively analysing a selected subset of examples in greater detail where the dynamics of these interrelationships are particularly relevant to the focus of this thesis.

Thus, the contributions that this chapter will make to addressing the overall hypothesis and research questions are: (i) mapping significant examples in which SALW control and peacebuilding efforts have taken place in the same time and space since 2001; (ii) identifying the types of interrelationships that exist in these cases; (iii) analysing these interrelationships as they exist in specific contexts; (iv) applying the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2 and suggesting ways in which it can be refined and developed further; and (v) identifying additional questions for further research and for exploration and analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.

The research methods employed in this chapter collect and analyse qualitative and quantitative data in line with the overarching pragmatist and mixed methods approach described in Chapter 2. It begins with an assessment and analysis of a wide range of instances of contexts in which SALW and peacebuilding activities have been attempted. From this universe of data, five instances are identified for further analysis as mini case-studies. These have been selected on the basis of a set of criteria which include the nature of the conflict (including its intensity and duration and the role of outside interveners) the nature of the SALW control activity attempted, geographic coverage and scale. These criteria are developed and justified in more detail later in this chapter. This analysis is predominantly
qualitative in nature drawing on available literature (including programme and stakeholder documentation), the author’s experience as participant/observer and a small number of interviews with those involved. These five instances are analysed using the framework identified in Chapters 1 and 2 arising from a review of the relevant literatures on conflict resolution, peacebuilding and SALW control. The aims are to both test the assumptions emerging from this review, and to establish further questions that will form the basis of the analysis of SALW control and conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo contained in chapters 4 and 5.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the various data sets which describe efforts to control SALW since 2001. This is combined with data sources which identify countries experiencing violent conflict to establish a universe of cases of SALW control efforts in conflict affected contexts. This Universe is further developed through exploring the types of SALW control attempted and through providing an initial analysis of the interrelationships between the two variables. This is followed by a more detailed explanation of the criteria used for selection of mini case-studies. Each mini case-study is then analysed to identify the nature of the interrelationships between SALW control efforts and peacebuilding activities, with a particular focus on how activities interrelated over time and how they were effected by contextual factors (including the roles of different actors and the perceptions of those both targeted by SALW control and peacebuilding efforts, and those responsible for enacting them). The chapter concludes with (i) a further analysis to identify trends and cross-cutting issues (ii) a discussion of ways in which the research framework could be further refined and (iii) the articulation of emerging findings for further analysis and development in later chapters.
3.1.1 Establishing the universe of efforts to control SALW in conflict affected countries

There is no international and widely accepted database of efforts to control SALW, partly as new attempts are made on a regular basis and there is no body or agency with the authority to compile and review such a database; and partly because as discussed earlier, the definition of an activity to control SALW is broad and remains undefined by international standards. As such, the universe offered below does not necessarily include all instances of SALW control in conflict affected countries. Nevertheless it includes all examples reported by states to the UN as part of commitment to implement the UNPoA up to 2006 and then all further efforts identified by the author from a combination of personal professional experience, reviewing contemporary literature and a small number of interviews with practitioners and others. It is therefore at least adequately comprehensive.

3.2 Review of data sources of efforts to control SALW

Potential sources for identifying the range of SALW control efforts include both official and independent agencies. Officially, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs keeps a record of all states’ reports on implementation of the UN Programme of Action on SALW. These reports, often in the form of statements delivered at the biennial meetings of states to assess progress in implementation provide some data on both SALW control activities that have taken place under the supervision of the state concerned, as well as some data relating to the activities of donors and other supportive parties, including UN agencies in supporting these activities. However, this information is incomplete in several important areas: Only states that chose to report have done so; the quality of reporting varies widely with some states reporting only successes, others only changes to administrative arrangements; there is no verification process to assess whether these reports are accurate in what they portray; in most cases, but crucially not all, they only provide an overview of activity during a particular period of time and are not cumulative.

5 The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA), maintains a web-based Implementation Support System or ISS where records of State's implementation of the UN PoA and other related commitments are kept. [http://www.poa-iss.org/PoA/PoA.aspx](http://www.poa-iss.org/PoA/PoA.aspx). Accessed 5 August 2011.
Of the unofficial or officially sanctioned independent assessments, the main attempts to take a global approach to gathering and analysing data on efforts to control SALW are those produced by the Small Arms Survey, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). The Small Arms Survey publishes an annual yearbook. In each case, it focuses on a particular issue or issues (for instance the proliferation and misuse of firearms by criminal groups in urban areas in Latin America – see Small Arms Survey (2010). It also publishes an annual index focussing on one aspect of SALW control - transparency in the annual reports provided by states on the implementation of their commitments relating to transparency in the arms trade, called the Transparency Barometer (for an overview of the Small Arms Survey work in this area see Lazarevic, 2010).

Collectively, this effort provides valuable detailed information on specific contexts or dimensions of the SALW issue. But it does not lend itself easily to establishing an overall picture of the range and nature of efforts to control SALW both by states and by non-state groups. The UNIDIR publishes periodic assessments of the contents of states’ reports on implementation of the UNPoA. This is useful in that it draws together common themes reported on by states and attempts to provide some quantitative analysis on for instance the numbers of states reporting on any given year, or the number of coordination mechanisms in existence on the basis of the contents of reports submitted by those states which chose to do so. But there are also considerable weaknesses which include the fact that the analysis only reflects the information provided by states, which is often partial and incomplete for the reasons described above (for an overview of States reporting on implementation of the UNPoA prepared by UNIDIR see Cattaneo and Parker, 2008).

Perhaps the most useful independent assessment of the range and scale of efforts to control SALW is the work undertaken by the Biting the Bullet research team on behalf of IANSA; however as with other data sources, this also has weaknesses which should be recognised. IANSA published three book length reports, in 2003, 2005 and 2006, led by researchers from Bradford University (Greene, Bourne,
Yankee *et al*, 2003; Watson, Page, Godnick *et al*, 2005; Bourne, Godnick, Greene *et al*, 2006). In each case they attempted to provide both a qualitative and quantitative assessment of progress made by states in implementing their commitments to enhancing the control over SALW. The reports were timed to link in with UN meetings to review the progress made by states in implementing the UN PoA. However they covered a much broader range of commitments, including those at the international, regional and national levels. Whilst important for helping to identify the countries and examples of efforts to control SALW that are examined later in this chapter, there are two primary weaknesses with using the Biting the Bullet series as a single data source, without also considering other data.

Firstly, the reports focus significantly on efforts to control SALW that had been undertaken within the context of the implementation of the UN PoA. Whilst it is certainly the case that the UN PoA provides the broadest and most widely accepted international framework within which SALW control has been attempted, it maintains a focus on a specific international norm which creates the potential for some SALW control activities to be undertaken by States’ authorities and others which are not perceived as fitting within the framework set out by the UN PoA. In other words, the UN PoA and therefore the Biting the Bullet (and UNIDIR) publications which focus primarily on its implementation can only be seen as a proxy for a complete picture of all efforts to control SALW as this does not exist for the reasons described above (principally the wide variety of potential activities that can be claimed to include an element of SALW control, and the failure to-date of any individual or body, whether formal or informal, to collate and maintain an accurate data-set of all efforts to control SALW around the world).

The second significant weakness is that the Biting the Bullet series only provides a detailed assessment at a specific point in time. The last full assessment was undertaken in 2006, over five years ago at the time of writing this thesis. Since this time, there have been numerous other efforts made to control SALW in post-war and post-conflict settings which are relevant to the area of study. This presents a dilemma in that whilst the work produced by the Biting the Bullet team is the most
detailed, exhaustive and qualitative, it only provides data for a period of the time covered by the research conducted for this thesis and is thus by itself not sufficient to provide a data set from which countries for further study can be selected. The only other study which might have been appropriate as a single complement to the Biting the Bullet series (Cattaneo and Parker, 2008 (see above for a short description)) is also weakened by the fact that it covers only a slightly longer period of time; it is also a record only of States’ perspectives and as such is partial in its coverage. Therefore whilst it is an important source document in informing the establishment of a detailed picture of attempts to control SALW, it is not in itself the only other data source on which to draw. Therefore, in the absence of one single source, the author proposes a ‘Biting the Bullet Plus’ formula which combines the 2006 Biting the Bullet data with a combination of other published sources including those described above and the author’s own knowledge as a professional working closely on contemporary SALW control issues covering the years between 2006 and 2011.

Following the publication of the last relevant Biting the Bullet research in 2006 there have been numerous SALW efforts in a variety of different contexts. The following description is based on the personal experience of the author working as a researcher and practitioner in the fields of SALW control and peace building as well as through reviews of relevant recent project documents, reviews and evaluations and analysis of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs database. The framework for selection is (i) the country experienced large scale political violent conflict either immediately leading up to or subsequent to 2006; (ii) Efforts to control SALW took place between 2006 and 2011; (iii) SALW control efforts were initiated in the post-conflict period as part of broader processes of security or peace building. It is organised regionally with a short overview in each case followed by specific bullet-pointed descriptions of relevant activities.

In Asia, post-war disarmament exercises in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Aceh in Indonesia all involved SALW control activities, although they varied considerably in their nature and means of implementation. In Aceh for instance, disarmament was
mostly voluntary and non-coercive and was framed by a peace agreement between conflicting parties whereas in Sri Lanka, however, disarmament activities in the east of the country had significantly coercive characteristics. The war in Afghanistan and its regional dimensions and implications, particularly in Pakistan gave rise to a range of activities with a SALW control dimension, including DDR and civilian weapons management programmes.

The SALW control activities in Asia between 2006 and 2011 of most interest to this thesis are as follows:

- An attempt to disarm and demobilise former Maoist Army combatants in Nepal following the agreement of a peace deal between the Maoist leadership and the government in 2006. (See for example Rynn and Greene, 2008:11-12).

- Forced disarmament of former LTTE cadres in the East and North of Sri Lanka following the military victories of the government between 2008 and 2010, first in the east of the country and later in the north.⁶

- Numerous attempts to more effectively control SALW in Afghanistan, including coercive and voluntary surrender programmes. Voluntary programmes focussed in the early part of the ISAF engagement on incentives in exchange for small arms ammunition. (See for example Bhatia and Sedra (2008)).

- Numerous attempts by the government of Pakistan to disarm militants in various parts of the country, most recently in the Malaakand and Dir districts of the Khyber Puktoon-khwa province bordering Afghanistan.

- Ongoing efforts in Indonesia to encourage disarmament in the context of implementing the peace agreement which brought to an end violent conflict between the Indonesian Government and an armed secessionist movement in Aceh. (See for instance Beek (2007)).

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In the Horn and Great Lakes of Africa in particular, numerous SALW control activities have been attempted at national (for instance in Burundi) and sub-national levels (Sudan, Kenya, Uganda). Where countries had most recently experienced violent conflict these activities included DDR and other disarmament efforts. In western Africa the time that has elapsed since the most intense periods of violent conflict in the cases of Liberia or Sierra Leone has contributed to a stronger focus on developmental aspects of security sector reform within which elements of SALW control are located. The SALW control activities in Africa between 2006 and 2011 of most interest to this thesis are as follows:

- Various attempts from 2006 to the present (both coercive and more peaceful) to disarm civilians and reform parts of the former fighting forces in Sudan following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). These include formal DDR arrangements linked explicitly to the CPA, civilian disarmament efforts and defence transformation. (See for example Skinner (2012) and Preston and Smith (2008)).

- Efforts by the respective national governments in northern and eastern Uganda and northern, western and eastern Kenya to disarm pastoralists and others suspected of illegally possessing firearms in response to widespread low intensity conflict from 2006 until the present day. (See for example Wepundi et al (2011).)

- Ongoing efforts to reduce the impact of armed violence in Ethiopia, including through SSR.

- Ongoing efforts in the DRC to promote DDR and SSR, focussing on a range of different security actors as well as in specific parts of the country, including currently the east of the country. (See for example Scheye (2012).)

- A DDR- and SSR- process in Burundi which includes a substantial disarmament dimension. (See for example Florquin and Pezard (2007) and Ball and van de Goor (2011).)

- Ongoing SSR including efforts to control SALW in Sierra Leone. (See for example Albrecht and Jackson (2010).)
Ongoing DDR and SSR efforts in Liberia. (See for example Baker (2010).)

In Europe and Central Asia, with the exception of a small number of ongoing activities to reduce and manage weapons and ammunition stockpiles more effectively in former Warsaw Pact countries, the Western Balkans continued to provide the main focus for SALW control activities that had a strong demand-side and civilian focussed dimension. Whilst some small scale activities were attempted in Serbia and Croatia to address SALW violence in the context of armed violence reduction programmes, the most significant activities in a post-war context took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The SALW control activities in Europe and Central Asia between 2006 and 2011 of most interest to this thesis are as follows:

- Ongoing efforts to promote disarmament and SALW control by the Government of Kosovo. (See for example Hvindemose et al (2009).)
- Ongoing efforts to promote more effective SALW control integrated into police reform efforts in Bosnia Herzegovina. (See for example Merlingen (2009).)

In Brazil, Central America and in parts of the Caribbean in particular, periodic and targeted attempts were made to tackle SALW availability and misuse as part of efforts to reduce the impact of criminal violence. However, in Latin America and the Caribbean more generally, Colombia and Haiti represent the only major examples of efforts to control SALW in post war contexts between 2006 and 2011. They can be summarised as follows:

- Ongoing SALW seizure activity and limited destruction of seized weapons and those collected during locally specific amnesty periods by the Government of Colombia (Government of Colombia, 2008).
- Security-building activities with a SALW control dimension in Haiti in 2006 and subsequent sporadic efforts to address the impacts of SALW proliferation and misuse on public health and urban violence. (See Muggah and Krause (2009) for violence reduction research in Haiti; Kolbe et al (2010) for a
study of mortality and crime before and following the Haiti earthquake; and Pachon (2012) for a review of SSR expenditures in Haiti.)

3.3 Initial analysis and compilation of the universe of SALW control efforts since 2001

From this ‘Biting the Bullet Plus’ combination of data-sources, the following section provides an overall picture of the scope and scale of efforts to control SALW in the period between 2001 and 2011. Between 2001 and 2008, Cattaneo and Parker report that 148 different states provided reports on their implementation of the UN PoA (Cattaneo and Parker, 2008:xvii), itself a voluntary requirement of the PoA as a demonstration of State’s progress in its implementation. Similarly, the authors of the Biting the Bullet report in 2006 stated that 150 counties had identified a national point of contact (Bourne et al, 2006:31); which along with the commitment to report on progress can be seen as the very basic initial bureaucratic steps that States should take when taking action to control SALW within the context of implementing the UN PoA. Whilst impressive in the sense that it suggests that aspects of PoA implementation and therefore efforts to control SALW more generally is widespread, it does not provide a significant sense of the depth of the efforts undertaken by states and does not in itself suggest whether, and to what extent, very practical efforts were attempted that had the express purpose of controlling specific aspects of the problem of SALW proliferation and misuse. To achieve this, a more detailed examination of the data is required.

From the ‘Biting the Bullet Plus’ dataset, it is possible to establish which countries had demonstrated some progress with implementing their UN PoA commitments, and therefore could lay claim to having taken steps to control SALW. However, analysis of this sort would have one significant shortcoming: whilst it would include all those states that claimed to have taken the basic administrative steps it is unclear whether the various actors involved in these states had in actual fact undertaken any specific activities which directly aimed to control SALW more effectively. Further, it would not provide any analysis of the sort of activities which may have been attempted if indeed they had been. The challenge of moving
beyond the most basic indicators of activity was a challenge for the authors of the Biting the Bullet report in 2006. They attempted to disaggregate the different sorts of activity through establishing four categories of related activities which broadly followed the content of the UN PoA:

- **Foundations**

This group covered the administrative steps that states were committed to taking including establishing a national focal point and coordination agency and reporting progress with implementation on a regular basis. They found that 150 states had established focal points, and by 2006, 135 had reported progress in some form, although the quality and content of the reports varied very considerably (Bourne et al, 2006:31).

- **Laws and procedures**

This category included information on whether states had reviewed relevant legislation to ensure that it was appropriate for enabling the commitments contained in the UN PoA to be implemented effectively and if not, whether legislative changes were made. It also included information on whether states had an expressed national policy on SALW which would guide the design and implementation of specific activities. It reported that over 100 states have legislation of some sort covering aspects of SALW including regulating the import, export and possession of SALW (Bourne et al, 2006:31).

- **Weapons management**

This includes information on the sorts of practical activities that were undertaken by states which have a direct relationship to the control of SALW. These include the management of official stocks of SALW, disposal of surplus weapons, disarmament, and marking, record keeping and tracing of SALW and associated ammunition. The analysis of the data allowed the authors to establish that 30 states had reviewed their standards and procedures for the management and security of stocks since 2001 (Bourne et al, 2006:32) and 39 states had destroyed
some surplus stocks of SALW. Further, they concluded that between 2001 and 2006 62 states had conducted some form of disarmament including:

- 20 engaging in post-conflict DDR
- 32 engaging in voluntary weapons collection programmes
- 37 conducted amnesties
- 13 organised forcible disarmament programmes

- International cooperation and assistance

Activities by states were included where they either fostered cooperation regionally or internationally with other states or bodies or attempted cooperation with civil society organisations either locally nationally or internationally with a view to enhancing SALW control efforts. By 2006, 68 states had developed cooperation of some sort with civil society organisations and 26 states had provided some sort of donor support for activities aiming to increase the control over SALW (Bourne et al, 2006:33).

From these four categories, ‘Weapons Management’ is of very obvious importance to this study. Due to their practical nature, weapons management activities are those which are most likely to have a direct relationship with peace- and security-building efforts in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict. Specific aspects of the activities grouped under the other categories described above are also of importance, including for instance the existence of coordination mechanisms (the existence or otherwise and quality of coordination being a vital aspect of how efforts to control SALW relate to peace- and security-building).

However, for the purposes of this study, the states that have undertaken activities grouped under the category of ‘weapons management’ require further analysis to identify which have experienced periods of significant political violent conflict to enable the development of a single dataset which combines two variables (i) the experience of violent political conflict and (ii) efforts to control SALW.
3.4 Data sources for identifying incidences of conflict affected contexts

As with basic data on the range of SALW control efforts attempted, there is no common internationally recognised database recording either where violent conflicts have taken place or where they are ongoing from which to extract a definitive list. However, there are several initiatives which aim to monitor violent and armed conflict round the world. Each has a particular focus and purpose and all are relevant to this study. Perhaps the most authoritative and well established databases of armed and violent conflict are:

IISS Armed Conflict Database: The UK-based International Institute for Strategic Studies maintains a database called the Armed Conflict Database which claims to provide “…an authoritative online source of data and provides independent analysis on current and recent conflicts”. It contains information on a country-by-country basis and includes both factual information relating to the history, geography and demographics of counties affected by conflict as well as analysis on the nature of the violence, actors and the weaponry used. Use of the database is restricted to paying subscribers, which are often from the business sector using the information to measure corporate risk. The database is very comprehensive and covers a number of years, enabling users to establish some longitudinal information relating to conflicts over time.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program provides a long established database of information relating to armed violence. Located within the University of Uppsala in Sweden and overseen by Professor Peter Wallensteen, the Program has since 1976 collected information on armed conflicts since 1946. Its data is published annually in numerous formats including: States in Armed Conflict since 1987, in the SIPRI Yearbook since 1988, the Journal of Peace Research since 1993 and in the Human

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Security Reports since 2005. In addition to including data on the numbers of armed conflicts that occur in any given year, the database also provides data on related issues including numbers of ceasefires and peace agreements.

Project Ploughshares Armed Conflict Report: The Armed Conflict report is a research project based in Waterloo in Canada which maintains a database of active armed conflicts as a web-based resource. The report, which is published annually and updated on-line regularly aims to track and describe ongoing conflicts and provide information regarding conflict trends over time.

Taken together, the data-sets which underpin the three well developed resources introduced above provide the information required to establish the conflict status of the countries attempting to control SALW over the period from 2001 to 2011 described in the Biting the Bullet series, UNIDIR reports, other literatures and the author’s experiences as participant/observer in the earlier part of this chapter.

The table below sets out the range of geographic contexts in which weapons management has been attempted since 2001 and then identifies which of these were also either experiencing or immediately following a period of violent conflict. It draws heavily on the data included in the 2006 Biting the Bullet report (Bourne et al 2006: 56-66). This is then supplemented for the period between 2006 and 2011 from a broad range of sources, including published research and the authors own experience (see previous elaboration). The categorisation of countries according to whether they were experiencing violent conflict or its aftermath was made on the basis of information provided by the three different conflict mapping tools described above.

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8 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Database: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University
Accessed 5 August 2011  
9 For further detail see: http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/armed-conflicts-report-0. Accessed 5 August 2011
**Figure 4: Geographic contexts of weapons management, 2001 to 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country context in which SALW control attempted</th>
<th>Outline of type of activity</th>
<th>Violent conflict context?</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
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<td>Congo (Rep of)</td>
<td>DDR</td>
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<td>Destruction and DDR</td>
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<td>Destruction</td>
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<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>DDR, Forcible disarmament</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<td>Asia</td>
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<td>DDR, amnesty, forced disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>DDR, voluntary collection, forced disarmament</td>
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</table>
In total, at least 81 countries have experienced some form of weapons management between 2001 and 2011. Of these, 38 were either experiencing periods of violent conflict or had recently emerged; the table below identifies these 38 countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Solomon Islands</td>
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<td>Country context in which SALW control attempted</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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</table>
3.5 Initial analysis of nature of SALW control efforts undertaken in conflict affected contexts

This section provides a brief analysis of the data represented above. It does this by analysing the phasing of SALW control activities in relation to the existence of peace agreements or processes and the proximity from violent conflict, and by exploring the nature of how different activities were combined, or were organised within similar periods of time. It begins to identify issues and themes to be explored in more detail through the mini-case studies later in this chapter and through the Kosovo case-study contained in Chapter 4.

Of the 38 national instances of SALW control being attempted in conflict affected contexts, at least 21 involved efforts to undertake Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). This is likely to be quite accurate given the nature of the activity, and suggests in each case that the countries concerned were at the time undergoing a conflict de-escalation, possibly framed by, or involving, a peace agreement or ceasefire (for instance Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, Colombia and Indonesia). This suggests the existence of links between peace processes and DDR activities in which conscious efforts had been made by those involved to tackle particular aspects of SALW control as part of wider peacebuilding strategies. In these cases it may be possible to assume that potential interrelationships and the benefits that they may bring had been explored as part of planning and negotiating peace processes.

There are at least 25 instances of where SALW collection efforts were organised by government, in most cases with the support of external donors and others. This suggests a certain level of commitment on the part of the host government and the existence of conditions which were relatively conducive. It is possible for instance from the data to identify that many countries (for instance Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Serbia and Sri Lanka) in which voluntary SALW collection efforts took place and where DDR activities were not attempted at the same time were at that point at a more mature stage of conflict de-escalation.
It is not clear in all cases to what extent the different SALW collection activities were co-operative or coercive; whether coercive and non-coercive activities were attempted together; or indeed whether they were differentiated to reflect approaches to different groups or locations. However the relationship between SALW collection efforts and the later phases of conflict de-escalation does appear to be relatively strong.

This suggests that contingency does have a role in decision-making as regards specific SALW control activities worthy of further exploration: where DDR activities may often take place in the periods immediately following a ceasefire or peace agreement, over time as the conflict conditions permit, a civilian-focused and less coercive approach to SALW control may be attempted.

The destruction of SALW stocks took place in at least 21 cases, comprising a range of different conflict intensities and contexts. This suggests both a willingness of authorities to reduce total SALW stocks and the existence of a relatively permissive context. The data does not allow for a qualitative interpretation which would suggest to what extent destruction of SALW represented obsolete state stocks or those removed from the civilian population or indeed non-state armed groups. However, it is possible to note that destruction activity was regularly reported in the context of other SALW control activities, principally DDR (for instance in Angola, Macedonia, DRC, Guinea) and weapons collection (for instance in Nigeria, Niger, Croatia).

This suggests that destruction activity may be closely linked to other forms of SALW control which themselves may have a relationship with the nature of the conflict context at the time. In this case, there is at least some evidence indicating that decisions to undertake certain SALW control activities (DDR and voluntary weapons collection) are determined at least in part by temporal factors, and therefore their appropriateness and possibly their success or otherwise may be linked through contingency to previous activities earlier in the de-escalation period.
However other activities, specifically the destruction of SALW, can take place at different stages of post-war de-escalation and recovery but are closely linked to the existence of other SALW control efforts (for instance DDR or weapons collection). In this case, complementarity may be an important factor in decisions to undertake them, and therefore their interrelationships with overarching peacebuilding efforts may be influenced more by how they interact with other SALW control activities taking place in the same time and space, than by specific phases of post-war peacebuilding.

The importance of complementarity does appear to be significant: From the data it is striking to observe that there would appear to be very few examples of one aspect of SALW control being attempted in isolation. In all but three of the countries analysed, multiple SALW control activities were recorded to have taken place over a similar period of time. The data is not sufficiently detailed to determine whether in each case these activities were attempted sequentially over a short period of time or contiguously. However it suggests that multiple SALW control efforts are often attempted either together or in very close temporal proximity. Understanding how different SALW control activities taking place in a similar time or space relate and what their individual and collective interrelationships are with conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes appears to be important and worthy of deeper analysis.

It is clear that whilst it suggests some interesting emerging findings, this initial analysis has significant limitations which should be recognised. Firstly, the categories of SALW control were identified by the Biting the Bullet research team (Bourne et al. 2006) on the basis of the main themes contained in the UNPoA (and were used as the frame of analysis for including subsequent efforts to control SALW). The reports by States and independent research by others has been assessed by Bourne et al and whilst in many cases there is clarity and thus minimal room for uncertainty, in some cases there is likely to have been some ambiguity as to how a particular activity could be described (for instance a voluntary weapons collection process is likely to be accompanied by an amnesty period, however an
amnesty does not in and of itself equate to an organised voluntary weapons collection process). The decision by Bourne et al as to how they interpreted and thus recorded a particular activity should therefore be recognised as having a potential effect on the way in which the data that they published is interpreted.

Secondly, as stated above, the data does not allow for detailed enough analysis of how the different SALW control efforts interrelated either over time or space; nor does it permit analysis of the different actors involved in each case. This latter point is of critical importance to the overarching research question and framing hypothesis. Without a more detailed understanding of the conflict context within which SALW control activities were attempted, it is not possible to analyse and assess the role of individuals, communities and the social, political or security related factors which might influence their success or otherwise.

Thirdly, the data is organised using the nation-state as the main organising variable, which does not easily lend itself to an analysis of the regional and cross border dimensions of conflict or of the implications for SALW control nor of the role of locally generated conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts or SALW control activities.

Finally, whilst all the countries included in the dataset had experienced significant violent conflict either in the period leading up to 2001 or subsequently, and consequently almost inevitably will have experienced some form of conflict resolution and peacebuilding activity, whether supported by international actors or addressed exclusively from within their borders, there is no data included on the nature or extent of peacebuilding efforts. This information could be of significant interest in terms of analysing the phasal and sectoral interrelationships between SALW control efforts and peacebuilding activities.

For these reasons, it is important to provide a further and more in-depth and qualitative analysis of how SALW control activities interrelated with peacebuilding efforts. Using the six criteria described below, five mini case studies of SALW
control in conflict affected contexts were drawn from the dataset above and are analysed in greater depth in the following section. This builds on the initial quantitative analysis described above in line with the mixed methods approach set out in Chapters 1 and 2, which combines qualitative and quantitative data analysis in a way which allows for qualitative analysis to provide greater depth and to explore amongst other things, the construction of the contexts within which peacebuilding and SALW control efforts were attempted.

The intensity of violent conflict is important to the analytical framework set out in Chapter 2. It allows for analysis of how peacebuilding and SALW efforts may be affected by their proximity to active violence, and thus helps to explore the contention of Ramsbotham et al (2005) that interrelationships may be different through different post-conflict phases. It is also important in terms of helping to explore Lederach’s theories about the involvement of different actors in peacebuilding processes. This is particularly the case in terms of how these relate to Ramsbotham et al, and Fisher and Zimina’s argument that when violence is being brought to an end, it may be more likely (even appropriate) for outside interveners to play a more direct role alongside other elite peace-makers; whereas as violence recedes, communities and citizens must play a more active part if the transformation from the absence of violence to sustainable peace is to be achieved (See Lederach, 1996; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Fisher and Zimina, 2008).

Violent conflict can differ significantly in intensity, from periods of high intensity violence which might only last for a relatively short period of time in the context of a longer term conflict (such as specific periods of open warfare between two states) to longer term periods of lower intensity (such as ongoing rebellion in parts of a country against central rule). To some extent, the intensity of violence, as with its nature and causes, may influence the way in which SALW are accessed and used, and therefore could potentially determine the sorts of options available for SALW control. Conflict intensity could also have a relationship with what other security- or peace-building activities are attempted concurrently, and therefore will affect the sorts of interrelationships which exist with efforts to control SALW. Ensuring a
range of conflict intensity in the mini-case studies selected in therefore the first criterion for selection.

The second criterion focuses on the causes and drivers of the violent conflict. Violent conflict is often the expression of a complex and inter-related set of grievances and contests over political power, resources and ideas. The primary focus of this thesis is political conflict rather than social or criminal violence without wider dimensions of political competition or mobilisation. As such the examples identified for further analysis below are examples of efforts to control SALW in contexts in which periods of violent political conflict have reduced or come to an end. However within the scope of political conflict, there are many different drivers or causes of conflict, such as for instance, access to land and natural resources, an independence struggle against perceived oppressors or a rejection of the behaviour of institutions responsible for providing security and justice to the population at large. The second criterion is therefore establishing a range of different causes and drivers of violent conflict.

This criterion is central to the exploration of the research hypothesis and questions in that the role that security providers and indeed wider government is perceived to play in a conflict situation is likely to condition the speed and extent to which citizens are willing to engage with them in post-conflict peacebuilding or SALW control activities. If the government and its security actors are perceived by the majority of the population to be positive actors, or protectors, it could reasonably be expected that they will be more predisposed to responding positively to peacebuilding entreaties. If however, these actors are widely considered to be causes of the conflict then the opposite is likely to be true. One of the complexities in applying this criterion is that a government and its security agents are likely to be perceived differently by different groups, particularly when the conflict is between one or more groups in a given context.

The type of activity aimed at controlling SALW is an important third criterion. As the tables in Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate, efforts to control SALW can take many
different forms, from those which are embedded within other activities with an objective which includes, but which is slightly different to SALW control (such as DDR for instance), to those whose primary objective is to place SALW under greater control of a responsible authority, or place them beyond use completely (such as weapons collection and destruction). This is of close interest to the development of the research framework for this thesis: SALW can be viewed as a sectoral intervention, associating closely with either the ‘security’ or ‘rule of law’ sectors identified by Ramsbotham et al (2005). It can also be seen as a cross cutting issue where the weapon as an artefact has resonance across multiple sectors (see Greene 1999). This is important in terms of analysing the potential complementarities between SALW control and other activities located either within one or across several sectors. It is also important in analysing the contingent interrelationships which may exist between nests of different phases of activities.

To address the ‘context’ variable in the hypothesis, it is important to focus on the types of actors involved in peacebuilding or SALW control activities and as such this was identified as the fourth criterion. One of the defining characteristics of peacebuilding and SALW control efforts is who is involved and what roles they play. In most cases, a cursory analysis would suggest that the primary actors are a combination of local people, state institutions and often international agencies and donor countries (see Small Arms Survey 2001). This is highly consistent with Lederach’s Actors and Approaches model (see Lederach 1996).

However a deeper assessment is required to develop an understanding of how these actors are involved and precisely which actors within these general groupings play a role. For instance, within the group of ‘local people’, are local leaders, young people or women involved in the design and review of any efforts? Was the definition of SALW availability or misuse as a problem their definition and was any idea to attempt to control SALW theirs, or something that was suggested elsewhere first?
The nature of conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts was identified as an important fifth criterion in the selection of mini case-studies. In all post-war or post-conflict contexts in which SALW control has been attempted that the author has reviewed there are other efforts, either locally developed and undertaken or imposed from outside which aim to improve security or promote peace. However, the range and intensity of these activities will likely have an impact on efforts to control SALW, potentially both negatively and positively and it will certainly affect the types of interrelationships that exist between them. Analysing and understanding the nature and range of peacebuilding activities in a given context is essential for establishing complementarities and contingencies, both of which are critical components of the research framework set out in Chapter 2.

Finally, the scale and size of SALW efforts was identified as a sixth criterion for selecting mini case-studies. Attempts have been made to control SALW variously at the regional, national, provincial and very local levels. There have been attempts to tackle multiple dimensions of a SALW problem consecutively (sometimes aiming consciously to benefit from contingency) or as part of the same programme (sometimes aiming to make the most of opportunities presented by complementarity with other relevant programmes taking place in similar time and space) as well as efforts that focus on just one aspect in a specific location. The scale and size of SALW control efforts is likely to effect in some ways the types of inter-relationships which may exist in a given context (for instance a national-level approach which included changes to legislation may well interrelate strongly with efforts to promote good governance or the legislative aspects of security system reform, themselves often essential peacebuilding strategies). This criterion is important in that the scale of SALW efforts may be a factor in the extent to which efforts are made by planners to establish interrelationships from an early stage, and may thus play a role in determining to what extent contingencies and complementarities are designed ‘in’ to peacebuilding efforts.
3.6 The selection of cases

On the basis of the criteria established and discussed in the section above, five mini case-studies were selected:

- Efforts to control civilian held SALW in Sri Lanka following the Cease Fire Agreement in 2002;
- SALW control efforts in the Western Balkans and their interrelationships with national and regional conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes;
- Peacebuilding and SALW control efforts in Sudan/Southern Sudan since 2005;
- Analysis of efforts to control SALW as disarmament exercises in northern Kenya and Karamoja in Uganda in 2006;
- Analysis of efforts to control SALW and their relationships with peacebuilding frameworks and activities in Sierra Leone between 2001 and 2004.

Taken together, these cases reflect the criteria discussed above and represent two country-specific examples in which peacebuilding and SALW control efforts were undertaken in the context of recovery following civil war; one case of a context which began as a civil war and translated into a conflict between two independent states; a case of sub-national but cross-border responses to a regional conflict system; and one case which features a strong relationship between national and cross border conflicts and an internationally supported, regionally framed response.

The first country-specific mini case study is Sri Lanka. This is interesting as it presents a relatively unusual example of an attempt to promote voluntary civilian SALW control in a period following a ceasefire but in the absence of a negotiated political settlement (from 2003 to 2006). The SALW control efforts were government-led with relatively little involvement from international actors. They were however closely linked to the UNPoA and to PoA implementation and sought to address the fear of escalating armed crime through collecting and destroying civilian owned SALW.
Given the level of international focus it received and the effect of experiences of peacebuilding and SALW control on international approaches applied elsewhere in subsequent years, the Western Balkans as a sub-region and specifically the experience of regionally-framed peacebuilding and SALW control efforts on Bosnia Herzegovina was selected as the second mini case-study. The civil wars and other armed conflicts that affected the Western Balkans from the declaration of independence by Slovenia in 1992 to end of the war in Kosovo in 1999 were characterised *inter-alia* by the widespread proliferation of SALW across borders including within the civilian population and by a variety of national and regional peacebuilding efforts and activities. As a regional external multilateral power, the EU played a significant role, alongside various UN Missions and agencies, principally the UNDP in promoting SALW control as part of wider peace and reconstruction efforts from the late 1990s to the present day. As such, much of the practitioner-based experience and evidence used in the design of internationally supported SALW control programmes since has been shaped to varying degrees by activities in the Western Balkans.

Sudan-South Sudan is both recent and very relevant to the overarching research question and hypothesis for the following reasons. SALW control efforts were heavily linked to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 between the SPLA and the Government of Sudan. A range of different activities with a SALW control component, including DDR, community security promotion and civilian disarmament were designed in to the peacebuilding framework that set out how the two sides would manage their differences. The CPA was an attempt to bring to a close many decades of violent conflict in which millions of people were estimated to have died.

Sub-national efforts to undertake SALW control as part of conflict resolution and development efforts in northern Kenya and Uganda present an interesting combination of dynamics which are of strong relevance to the criteria for selecting mini case-studies. Sporadic civilian disarmament efforts in Kenya and Uganda have followed similar patterns, being both voluntary and coercive at different periods,
targeted largely at pastoralist groups, sometimes cross-border in their design and implementation and to a greater or lesser degree, always described under the rubric of bringing peace and development to otherwise restive remote parts of both countries. In both countries this disarmament efforts took place in contexts that were heavily conflicted and characterised by political as well as criminal violence. However in both cases, these conditions were relatively localised, occurring in national contexts in which large scale violence was not widespread across the countries concerned.

Finally, the fifth country-specific case is Sierra Leone. Its recovery from a long period of violent conflict is of interest for the following reasons: It was characterised by a weak state; the involvement of external regional and international actors; high levels of poverty affecting a large portion of the population; inequality, weak governance; and the existence of a rebel movement that sought to overthrow the government using SALW and armed violence. Sierra Leone has also been the target for extensive post-conflict peace- and security-building and development programmes since the end of the war. Finally and importantly for this thesis, since 1999 there have been several high profile programmes which have had a significant SALW control component, including DDR, a coercive weapons collection effort and a voluntary collection project.

Taken together the selected cases represent a wide range of different contexts, conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts and various SALW control activities and processes. They are broadly representative of the spread of SALW control efforts undertaken in conflict affected contexts set out in earlier in this chapter. They represent activity which has been led by national governments with significant international support, those that are more locally generated, those in which SALW control efforts were specifically intended as part of peacebuilding efforts and those where the relationships were much less explicit – and changed over time.

The following section analyses each of these cases in some detail, drawing out the nature of interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding and conflict
resolution efforts, and where appropriate, the effect on these interrelationships of contingency, complementarity and context.

3.7 **Mini case studies**

3.7.1 Efforts to control civilian held SALW in Sri Lanka following the Cease Fire Agreement in 2002

This mini case-study begins with an analysis of the context in which a cease-fire agreement was established in Sri Lanka and of its relationship with efforts to control SALW that began shortly after the cease-fire was agreed. It then describes and discusses the nature of the SALW control activities and identifies areas which were both positive and negative in terms of their success and contribution to wider peacebuilding efforts. The effects of contingency, complementarity and context on SALW control activities and their relationship to peacebuilding are analysed before concluding with analysis of the overall effects of attempts to control SALW in post-Cease-Fire Agreement Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka has for many years been a focus for researchers addressing conflict resolution and peacebuilding questions and the success or otherwise of peacebuilding efforts remain contested. Sri Lanka has been a testing ground for a variety of different tools and processes aimed at understanding conflict, which range from the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of development projects undertaken by Bush (1998) to the Strategic Conflict Analysis produced by Goodhand in 2001 and reflections on the role of Systematic Conflict Transformation by Ropers in 2008. Goodhand et al analyse the application of liberal peacebuilding approaches to Sri Lanka (2010) whilst Rupersinge (1996), Rajasingham-Senanayake (2005), Donnais (2009) and Venugopal (2009) all analyse specific elements, most notably economic reforms and reliance on economic, military and political elites to lead peace processes, in critical assessments of internationally supported peacebuilding efforts.

In 2002, the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) signed a Cease Fire Agreement (commonly referred to as the CFA) which was
according to Pavey and Smith (2009) a welcome respite for both sides from a conflict which neither was able to win. The ceasefire brought to an end over two decades of civil war between the separatist LTTE and the Colombo-based Government of Sri Lanka. By 2008 this agreement was in effect no longer in place, with the Government and LTTE rearming, training and exchanging fire, a period which culminated in 2009 with an intense assault on the LTTE and the areas under its control, first in the east of the country and later in the north which resulted in the military defeat of the LTTE, the death of its leaders, and huge damage inflicted on the civilian population caught up in the fighting. In the period between the ceasefire being agreed and the re-ignition of the conflict, several efforts were made to address some of the negative legacies of the earlier periods of conflict.

In the period following the CFA, there was a general recognition within Government that the proliferation of SALW had the potential to destabilise what was undoubtedly a more peaceful context. The sources of these weapons were not clear. However there were reports of significant numbers being looted from the battlefields in the north and east of the country and being sold on the black market by former combatants and civilians alike (see Smith 2003). In addition, it was estimated that around 60,000 Sri Lankan Army soldiers had deserted over recent years, some taking their weapons with them, and others taking looted weapons back to their home areas, largely in the south of the country and either selling them on or using them as virtually untraceable sources of weaponry for conducting illegal activities. Finally, it appeared clear that weapons obtained either with or without official sanction as part of attempts to provide personal security - including substantial numbers of weapons issued to politicians – had not always been issued in line with existing policy, accurate records had not been kept and weapons had not been recalled following the end of periods covered by individual licenses. Collectively, this problem of controlling SALW – both legally and illicitly took place in a wider context which was characterised by a significant movement of people around the country following the end of hostilities, a flourishing black market in the

10 NCAPISA Chairman’s speech at a side meeting of the Biennial Meeting of States to Review Progress in Implementation of the UNPoA, July 2005.
major urban centres, particularly parts of Colombo, and the ongoing weakness of many of the institutions of government, including the police as they struggled to transition from an active conflict to a fragile peace (Smith 2003).

The CFA did not explicitly contain references to DDR or other arms management related processes, which represented the beginning of what was hoped would be a peace process, rather than describing a comprehensive political settlement. Smith argues that the CFA was in effect a pause in the fighting whilst the protagonists assessed whether they were in position to engage in a peace process or resume fighting once they had rearmed and prepared for future combat, “For Sri Lanka, the most important political and constitutional questions had yet to be asked or answered” (Smith 2003:6). It did however provide a mandate for Sri Lankan government thinking about what a post-conflict defence and security sector might look like through establishing a Defence Review Committee which began to think about future force size and structure. Whilst referencing the challenge posed by SALW, the Committee did not specifically prioritise action to address it, or indeed related public security issues such as the role and effectiveness of the police.

Whilst the CFA was relatively silent with regards to the challenges of uncontrolled SALW, there was increasing public unease, generated in part by the perception that violent crime was increasing significantly and on the part of government officials. In recognition of this emerging problem, the UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, the Sri Lankan diplomat, Jyanta Danapalla helped to facilitate contact between the Government of Sri Lanka and the UN to request assistance through the Department of Disarmament Affairs and the Department of Political Affairs in New York. Following several scoping missions in 2002 and 2003, a programme of support, funded by the Japanese Government was established to help the Government of Sri Lanka address its SALW problems. The programme contained numerous components, including administrative arrangements such as the establishment of a national coordinating body charged with leading

11 Author’s interview with Sri Lankan government officials, 2003.
government efforts to control SALW and establishing baselines in terms of existing controls, dimensions of the perceived problem, and public perceptions and attitudes towards SALW. It also made provision for supporting specific forms of SALW control to be determined by the National Commission and/or the Ministry of Home Affairs, later subsumed within the Ministry of Defence following the transfer of power from President Kumaratunga to President Rajapaksa and his brother Gotabaya, the new defence Secretary in 2006 (Saferworld et al, 2008).

In the early years of its partnership with the UN, the government undertook numerous activities aimed at fulfilling its commitment to reducing illicit SALW in Sri Lanka. These included: establishing its National Commission which drew together officials from all relevant parts of government, as well as the police, army and customs and representatives from civil society; commissioning a survey of all the areas under the control of the Sri Lankan government of the nature of the problem; and supporting the development of civil society engagement on the issue, particularly in relation to generating public awareness of the potential negative consequences of illicit weapons ownership and misuse.

During this period, two attempts to collect illicit SALW were made, one for a month in 2004 and the second for a period of four months from October 2005 until January 2006. Both efforts were essentially similar; the government offered amnesty for those who held weapons illegally, providing them with the opportunity to either surrender the weapon or to re-register it if it had originally been registered and it still fell within the scope of existing legislation and procedures.

In the first instance, the campaign resulted in a small number of weapons being re-registered, many of these belonging to politicians and other public figures to whom they had been allocated during the previous conflict. It did not however result in any significant numbers of weapons surrendered outright by members of the public. Undeterred, in 2005/6 the Government announced its second amnesty

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12 For a detailed elaboration of SALW collection efforts and the wider activities of the NCAPISA see Saferworld et al (2008)
period. This time it differed from the previous effort in one major way; compensation was offered to those willing to surrender their arms at between 5,000-50,000 Sri Lankan rupees for a weapon and 50 rupees per round of ammunition. Whilst the official results of this second attempt have never been made public by the Government or National Commission, it is accepted by officials that it had no significant success – and in fact that the primary reason for the three periods of extension offered by the Government was in an attempt to generate momentum, hoping for a positive outcome, rather than a decision to sustain an existing success.\(^{13}\)

It is clear that the Sri Lankan experience of offering periods of amnesty during which illicit SALW could be surrendered was not a success. In the national survey of SALW control issues in the areas under government control introduced above, respondents to a household survey and focus group discussions suggested that the main reasons why the collection efforts had failed were a combination of fear of insecurity which remained amongst significant sections of the population; a mistrust of the police and other authorities that the offer of amnesty would be honoured if individuals came forwards; and a very low level of knowledge, both about existing SALW ownership rules and thus, knowledge about what was legal and illegal, and about the actual existence of an amnesty period (Saferworld \textit{et al}, 2008).

However, whilst the amnesty periods specifically did little to impact on the perceived SALW problem in Sri Lanka in the middle years of the decade, they were part of a wider programme of activities – introduced above – which taken together can be seen to have produced significant outputs, whilst not being evaluated effectively enough to judge whether in the end they had much actual impact. These included the public crushing of almost 35,000 confiscated weapons on July 8\textsuperscript{th} 2005 which were taken from police stations and other locations from around the country where they had been accumulating for many years, reducing a significant

\(^{13}\) Author’s discussion with NCAPISA Chairman, Colombo 2008.
future risk of pilferage and theft (Saferworld et al., 2008). The national Firearms Ordinance was also reviewed, tightening up controls on whom and for what reasons weapons could be licensed to individuals.\footnote{NCAPISA presentation on progress towards PoA implementation at the 2005 Biennial Meeting of States}

The National Commission Against the Proliferation of Small Arms (NCAPISA) was for a while one of the more operational official Commissions at work in Sri Lanka, at which genuine debate took place amongst officials from across government on challenging and sensitive questions relating to arms ownership and use. Civil society began to play a credible and effective role on aspects of SALW control, particularly those related to public awareness and education. In 2007 and into 2008, the political and security context in Sri Lanka began to change significantly and the space within which the NCAPISA and associated SALW control activities had been able to take place in contracted very significantly, leading to the withdrawal of funding from certain donors, including the UK Government, non-renewal of the Government’s programme relationship with the UN and an end to civil society involvement following a period of hostile government scrutiny and aggressive media attacks on leading figures. Conducting the research for this thesis over five years since the main SALW efforts took place in Sri Lanka, it is difficult to detect any lasting legacy in the country; civil society groups have disbanded and the leading figure is now dead; all the relevant officials in the Ministry of Defence have moved on or left government service; there are no government-led or donor-supported programmes seeking to encourage the voluntary surrender of weapons from outside the main areas in which the conflict took place in the east and north of the country; and, anecdotally in the absence of any official statistics or large scale surveys, the link between SALW use and criminality appears if anything to be on the increase across the country.

There has to-date been no attempt to systematically assess the benefits and drawbacks of the type of approach attempted in Sri Lanka, or to look specifically at the interrelationships between SALW control efforts and activities to promote...
peace. Perhaps the most comprehensive and authoritative study is the national small arms survey, researched on behalf of the government and published in 2008 (Saferworld et al, 2008). This highlights some of the challenges which may be of benefit in the future to similar efforts elsewhere.

An analysis of this document suggests that there was initially an explicit relationship between the desire to enhance control over SALW and the transition towards peace which was envisaged in the 2002 CFA. Whilst this was never developed in detail in either official government pronouncements, or in programme documents or reports, it is undoubtedly the case that senior figures in the government saw the pursuit of more effective SALW control as a contribution to peacebuilding.\footnote{Authors interviews and discussions with NCAPISA members in London and Colombo in 2008} However, despite being only one party to the peace agreement, there was no official contact with the LTTE, which controlled many of the areas that had seen the most intense fighting during the previous period of conflict. Without reciprocal activity it is doubtful how in reality SALW control on one side of the border in the context of a ceasefire between conflicting sides could in fact be described as a peacebuilding activity in the sense that it promoted conflict reduction between contesting views or institutions. Perhaps rather than contributing actively to finding peace between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, it instead aimed to promote a more peaceful society in the area under the control of the government through removing some of the tools by which violence and intimidation could be conducted.

The Sri Lankan experience between 2002 and 2008 is of particular interest to exploring and testing the hypothesis which frames this thesis. There were limited formal links (other than the recognition of the SALW problem and a commitment to defence reform which has certain sectoral and functional relationships) between the perceived SALW control problem and the Cease Fire Agreement. From this
perspective the interrelationships were either not well understood, or prioritised, or were deemed inappropriate for inclusion.  

At a more operational level within the area under the control of the Sri Lanka government, it is clear from the initial programme documents that the development of a programme of work to address SALW challenges was facilitated by the existence of the peace agreement and was seen by the government as a necessary effort to reduce one of the unwelcome effects of the conflict (the proliferation of weapons in the centre and south of the country and their increased use in the commission of violent and organised crime).

From the perspective of the effect of contingency and complementarity on the interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding activities the following observations can be made: Firstly, the SALW programme was seen as a cross-cutting and stand-alone issue. This statement is supported by the existence of a national commission drawing together a wide range of government departments to oversee the development and implementation of action. It was explicitly not subsumed within the nascent defence transformation process or efforts to support the development of the police and other public security bodies. It was therefore not a sector specific programme in the sense outlined by Ramsbotham et al (2005) or Lederach (1997). As such, there were no significant efforts to link the work of the NCAPISA with other security or justice sector interventions and thus there was no attempt to understand and maximise potential beneficial effects of contingency on interrelationships with other sector specific interventions.

Within the SALW programme itself, there were attempts to understand and act on the potentially beneficial effects of contingency. For instance, there was a sequential commitment to establish the NCAPISA first, commission the SALW

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16 Discussions between the author and researchers that closely followed the establishment of the CFA suggest that a political decision was taken by the Sri Lankan government not to include steps to address SALW problems given that it was an issue that they believed would only be addressed in the areas under the control of the Government, surmising that it would be seen as an act of unilateral disarmament by many, including the nationalist movement in the south of the country (led by the JVP political party)
survey to develop a better understanding of the problem, followed by the development of a national action plan to address the problems. However, this was undermined by decisions to undertake specific activities with little planning or notice, apparently on the whim of the Secretary of the Home Ministry who effectively chaired the NCAPISA.\textsuperscript{17}

Secondly, it appears that little attempt was made to understand or programme for the potential benefits of complementarity across sectors during the same phases of time. There were police reform and development efforts, reforms to the oversight committee system in parliament and ongoing defence reforms taking place at the same time, but there is no evidence to suggest that these were seen as particularly relevant by those planning and managing SALW control activities.

In terms of the range of actors involved in efforts to more effectively control SALW, Sri Lanka offers some interesting experiences. The decision to develop a SALW control programme was taken at the most senior levels of the government. The NCAPISA comprised secretary-level officials from all the key ministries of State. And operational decisions regarding collection methods, licensing systems and payment for voluntary surrender were all taken by a small number of senior officials, military, police and politicians. However, there were two places on the NCAPISA reserved for civil society groups. One of which was gifted to the chairman of an organisation that closely supported the government; the other was allocated to the representative of a community consultation process that involved local-level meetings in all 16 of Sri Lanka’s accessible districts at the time at which several hundred local people participated through identifying their SALW problems and selecting a representative who would sit on a national civil society steering group, and select their representative on the NCAPISA.

\textsuperscript{17} The author was closely involved in this programme for several years and attended a significant number of NCAPISA meetings. Decisions by the Secretary to initiate amnesty periods or to offer funds for surrendered weapons were not sanctioned by the NCAPISA and appeared to be the decision of the Secretary alone.
This local-level involvement later extended to a number of projects being developed by a national coalition of NGOs which became active on SALW issues. The South Asia Small Arms Network, Sri Lanka – part of a wider regional network with national chapters – funded a series of education and awareness activities developed by local community organisations and others. In this sense all the actor groups represented in Lederach’s Actors and Approaches triangle were represented.

The effects of this can be viewed in different ways depending on the perspective of the analyst. For someone who was heavily involved in all stages of the SALW control efforts in Sri Lanka at this time the following are of particular importance: the involvement of local people legitimised the NCAPISA civil society representative, allowing him to play a very active and forthright role in a body that was otherwise entirely dominated by government elites; the existence of the NGO network placed pressure on the government to sustain its interest and engagement, although at times this was a challenging relationship; the failure of the NCAPISA and the dropping of SALW control as a priority was a direct result of a change of government and a fairly radical change in posture towards the LTTE and the prospects of a military victory; the fact that the SALW control process survived as long as it did without a comprehensive political settlement or peace process is due at least in part to the levels of engagement of local people, evidenced by their participation in weapons collection and destruction activities, peace meetings and events locally and ongoing support for the national network after the NCAPISA ceased to operate.

It is possible to conclude from the analysis of this mini case-study that SALW control activities or objectives were not explicitly designed into the CFA. However, the political space and the opportunities for leverage both of and for the UN were created by the CFA and the wider commitment to reform on the part of the Sri Lankan government that it enabled.
The commitment to SALW control and the activities that were designed by the Government, UN and others were significant: high-level and high-profile government architecture was established to oversee and manage the SALW control programme, which included the allocation of government resources to staff and host a secretariat and national commission; relatively large numbers of weapons were collected and destroyed; and there was considerable public engagement including from people at very local levels who were not accustomed to being asked for their opinions on government policy.

These positive dimensions occurred in a country which appeared at the time to be emerging from decades of civil war. However in reality the SALW control efforts were taking place in a context in which no political settlement had been reached between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. As public attitudes and the government changed, the political perspective in Colombo hardened towards the LTTE and a decision was taken to deploy a much more aggressive strategy for breaking the deadlock on the basis of which the CFA had been agreed. Consequently, the space for SALW control initiatives and the legitimacy of the CFA as an enabling framework was severely undermined. The Sri Lankan experience is instructive for the reasons described above. It is also interesting as it underlines the political as well as technical nature of post-conflict settlement processes: It highlights the implications of a failure to move from an absence of violence towards positive peace and consequently to tackle SALW control as part of longer term transformational peacebuilding.
3.7.2 SALW control efforts in the Western Balkans and their interrelationships with national and regional conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes

This mini case-study analyses the relationships between the peace agreements which brought to an end the conflicts affecting Yugoslavia in the decade following the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and efforts to control SALW. It begins with a regional perspective including analysis of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the South Eastern Europe Small Arms Clearinghouse (SEESAC) which was mandated to provide support and capacity on SALW control issues as part of its implementation. This analysis is then deepened through studying SALW control efforts in Bosnia Herzegovina following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995.

The conflicts which affected the Western Balkans in the 1990s have been important in the development of literature on conflict resolution and peacebuilding as well as in the area of SALW proliferation and control. Paris (2002, 2004), and Chandler (2009), offer (from somewhat differing perspectives) analysis of the effects of the success and otherwise of international peacebuilding efforts. The role of the EU in the region and the effect of engagement in the Western Balkans on EU foreign and security policy are well documented (see for instance Belloni (2009) or Richmond et al (2011)). Further, the lessons and impact of peacebuilding in the Western Balkans on international policy are also well documented (see Miall, 2007).

Yugoslavia’s decade of conflict and violence included war between Croatia and Yugoslavia (1991-1995), civil war in Bosnia Herzegovina (1992-1995), a war of independence for Albanians living in Kosovo (1998-1999) and violence between Macedonian Albanians and Slavs, which ended in 2001 (see Glenny (2012: 634-662) for an introduction to, and analysis of, the wars of the former Yugoslavia and the peace agreements that brought them to an end).
In each case, specific peace agreements were brokered which framed post-war governance systems, established peacekeeping mandates for international forces and referred to the importance of improving and maintaining security, including aspects of SALW control. For example, the Dayton Accords signed by representatives from Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia provided the NATO IFOR and its successors with responsibility for ensuring security, which included the ability to seize illicit weapons through both coercive and peaceful means.\textsuperscript{18}

The implementation of these agreements was supported by a variety of international actors. Some such as the IFOR/SFOR mission in Bosnia, or KFOR/UNMIK in Kosovo were backed by UN Security Council Resolutions.\textsuperscript{19} Others, such as the role of the OSCE in Bosnia in promoting military-security confidence building, were mandated by the peace agreements themselves - in this case the Dayton Accords.\textsuperscript{20} They were also supported by a variety of regionally-focussed peacebuilding mechanisms, most notably, from 1999 onwards, by the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{21} The goal of the Stability Pact was to support the countries of South Eastern Europe:

“...in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region.”\textsuperscript{22}

The Stability Pact was initiated during the German Presidency of the EU, but also included a number of other nations, including the USA, Canada and Japan which supported its attempt to “...improve coordination on international assistance, while emphasising regional cooperation.” (ICG 2001:239). It was organised around four ‘working tables’; security, democracy, economy and regional affairs. In each case, countries of the Western Balkans were invited to develop Stabilisation and

\textsuperscript{18} Dayton Peace Accords Annex 1B
\textsuperscript{19} UNSC Resolution 1031 in the case of IFOR/SFOR and UNSC Resolution 1244 in the case of KFOR
\textsuperscript{20} Dayton Peace Accords Annex 1B
\textsuperscript{21} For an introduction to the background and history of the Stability Pact see http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/default.asp. Accessed 29/12/2012.

138
Association Agreements, which were intended to support reforms which would, over time, integrate them further within Euro-Atlantic systems and institutions. The third working table focussed on security and included a ‘sub-table’ on initiatives to improve the coordination of SALW. Stability Pact members agreed an Implementation Plan for SALW and identified the recently established South Eastern and Eastern Europe Small Arms Clearinghouse (SEESAC) as its implementing agency.

In this way, both through the conflict-specific peace agreements (for example, The Dayton Accords, or the Ohrid Agreement) and at the regional level through the Stability Pact, SALW problems and efforts to enhance their control were explicitly connected to international peacebuilding efforts. Thus, at the highest political levels, the relationship between SALW availability and misuse and conflict resolution and peacebuilding were recognised from an early stage.

Given the fluid nature of weapons movements across the region during the 1990s, with for instance, weapons looted in Albania in 1996 being trafficked to Albanian separatists in Kosovo and Macedonia in the years that followed, countries involved in the establishment of the Regional Implementation Plan claimed that in addition to action at the national level, regional action was also required. SEESAC was funded by a combination of the UNDP and EC and for its first years focussed on (a) facilitating contacts between governments at the regional level promoting cooperation and understanding on security and SALW control related issues and (b) supporting specific SALW control efforts in particular countries in line with national government requirements.

In 2003 SEESAC began to place significant effort on a systematic and process-based approach to SALW control across the region. It developed a series of regional Micro Disarmament Standards or RMDS covering all aspects of SALW control from

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24 See [www.seesac.org](http://www.seesac.org) for a list of the organisation’s objectives and activities. Accessed 29/12/2012
administrative and coordination tasks to information gathering and analysis and to specific SALW activities such as weapons collection, destruction and stockpile management. The RMDS were used to support SALW control activities at the regional and national level across the western and later eastern Balkans.\footnote{To access all RMDS published since 2003 see: \url{http://www.seesac.org/resources/standards-rmdsg/1/}. Accessed 30/12/2012}

This regional, directive, approach to SALW control, which often took place in the context of a wide range of other activities and reforms, sometimes focussing specifically on security- and peace- building is unusual and for this reason, it is interesting to explore the effects it had, both on SALW control as an intervention in post-conflict context, but also in terms of how it related to other activities taking place contiguously. The approach favoured by SEESAC at this time was linear in nature. It began with a mapping of the SALW problem in a given context, followed by the development of policy and an action plan with specific SALW control activities designed to meet specific goals in the plan. The mapping process was to be undertaken using a specific methodology developed jointly by SEESAC and the Geneva based Small Arms Survey.\footnote{Regional Micro Disarmament Standard G05.8. Available from: \url{http://www.seesac.org/uploads/rmdsg/RMDS-G_05.80RMDS_05.80_Survey_(Edition_4).pdf}. Accessed 29/12/2012} This brought together a variety of data gathering tools including a house-to-house survey questionnaire, focus group discussions and in depth interviews with ‘key informants’. The elements of the SALW plan, which was intended to be based on survey findings, were pre-determined; it should include goals on \textit{inter-alia} legislation, capacity building of state institutions, awareness-raising amongst the public, cooperation between government agencies and with neighbouring countries.

The activities that SEESAC and national UNDP offices supported included civilian weapons collection and community security building activities in Kosovo (see Sokolova, Richards and Smith (2006); and Bennett (2011)) and Macedonia (see Grillot 2004); destruction of surplus and collected SALW in Serbia (Taylor and Phillips 2004) and Bosnia Herzegovina (Paes \textit{et al}, 2004); training and other capacity...
building support for civil society groups (Desvignes, Rynn and Wilkinson 2003) and supporting local research on specific aspects of the small arms problematic, including trying to establish whether there was evidence of a gun culture in the Western Balkans (SEESAC 2006).

From the reviews undertaken of these various activities by the authors cited above, it appears that they had the following common characteristics. They were loosely linked (through the Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan) to national and regional peacebuilding goals, however activities were linked more explicitly to SALW control specific goals, such as increasing government capacity in the area, or reducing stocks of SALW rather than as contributions to higher level peacebuilding goals set out in either national or regional agreements. The activities were designed on the basis of survey findings however they were uniform in the sense that there were a range of activities that programmers were required to adapt to their particular context (Richards et al 2006). The implementation of the planned activities were usually planned in a sequential sense, with an understanding that particular activities were better suited to particular phases of the de-escalation process and that certain activities were required before others could be undertaken. Most SALW control programmes, particularly those led by UNDP (which was usually the partner of choice for SEESAC which itself was hosted and part funded by UNDP) appear to have been conceptualised as stand-alone or cross-cutting activities rather than being linked explicitly to a particular sector intervention. However it is unclear to what extent issues of complementarity or contingency were considered in terms of the effect that they may have had on the contributions that SALW control made to peacebuilding efforts and vice-versa. It is

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27 A template for governments to design National Action Plans was produced by SEESAC which set out the categories of objectives that should be included and recommended sequencing and management arrangements. The template can be downloaded from: http://www.seesac.org/resource.php?l1=69&l2=73 (accessed 30/03/2013)
28 For example, the author of this thesis worked closely with UNDP project teams from 2002 – 2007 in Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia and in each case SALW programmes were considered as both a stand-alone engagement with their own offices, staff, budgets, government coordinating departments, and cross-cutting, with considerable effort invested in the role of SALW in other related areas of reform and development, including for instance, police, border security, trafficking and public health.
also not clear from this initial analysis to what extent the context informed programming decisions and consequently the nature of the interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding activities. To explore these questions further, SALW control activities that took place in Bosnia Herzegovina, principally but not exclusively by UNDP between 2002 and 2005 are analysed below.

The Dayton Accords, which were signed in Paris in December 1995 by representatives from Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia brought to an end the war and set out amongst other things an administrative structure for Bosnia Herzegovina (Heinemann-Gruder and Pietz. 2003). Whilst being in-part focused on preventing a return to war, the Accords did not specify how SALW control related issues from civilian weapons control to the disarmament of former combatants would be achieved. They placed international authority for peacekeeping and peace-enforcement in the hands of NATO’s IFOR mission for the first year of Dayton implementation, after which under UNSC 1031 it passed to SFOR, (and then in 2004 to EUFOR) and responsibility for military confidence and security building, including the control of heavy weaponry under the authority of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

During the years of SFORs mandate, it undertook a range of different SALW control related efforts as part of what it termed Operation Harvest. This included voluntary civilian SALW surrender programmes and so called search and seize activities: By 2004, SFOR had collected and destroyed somewhere in the region of 40,000 SALW (Paes et al, 2004:37).

As with elsewhere in the Western Balkans, UNDP has played an active role in internationally supported efforts to enhance control over SALW in Bosnia. Paes et al (2004) reviewed the success of two consecutive UNDP SALW control programmes as part of an in-house review of UNDP’s SALW control programmes globally. They describe the two programmes, the first of which started in 2003 and the second in 2005. The programmes contained elements which were commonly employed across the region, and which were consistent with the approach advocated by
SEESAC (an initial SALW assessment followed by a programme of capacity building, legislative and policy development, and the collection and destruction of illicit SALW).

Neither programme was conceptualised as a contribution to peace-building per-se. However it is evident through their design and by the Paes et al (2004) assessment that it was intended that the programmes would make contributions to areas which are often included in post-war peacebuilding activities (see the diagram produced by Ramsbotham et al which describes the most oft-employed activities by sector and by phase of implementation (2005:199). For instance, a programme of awareness-raising in schools on the dangers posed by SALW and ammunition is consistent with landmine risk education often located within the ‘education’ sector. Further, one of the central objectives of the second programme which began in 2005, “To develop the capacity of the Bosnian Government to address the challenges of SALW” (Paes et al, 2004:40), is consistent with capacity building activities which are often located within support for the ‘governance’ sector.

However, despite these obvious linkages with other areas of support, it appears that the UNDP activities were not sector-specific in terms of where or how they were located within other peacebuilding or statebuilding initiatives. This is supported by the manner in which the UNDP undertook its government capacity building work: It suggested and supported the establishment of a SALW Coordination Board which drew together relevant government departments and agencies, much in keeping with the national commissions established in other countries. This suggests that UNDP-supported SALW control activities in Bosnia were intended as stand-alone and cross-cutting in nature, as indeed they were in Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia (see Rynn and Mariani 2006 for an analysis of SALW control efforts in the Western Balkans). This is further reinforced by the fact that activities to achieve the third main objective (“To reduce the number of illegal, privately owned SALW”) never took place as SFOR continued to maintain the lead on weapons collection issues as part of its mandate to ensure security in Bosnia.
In Paes et al (2004) analysis, in addition to listing the successes of the programme, they identified areas of the UNDP engagement which had not been as successful as hoped. Principle amongst these was (a) the loss of momentum, leadership and direction which ensued as a lack of coordination between the first and second programmes, which included key staff moving on as one programme finished and a gap ensued before the other began; and (b) the challenge to coherence and effectiveness of the second programme due to it being “designed as a set of separately identified components that different donors can fund within their funding year [which] makes planning very difficult” (Paes et al, 2004:48).

This raises important points which relate closely to the some of the challenges of post-war conflict resolution and peacebuilding analysed in Chapter 2. It would appear that the weak coordination between the first and second phases of SALW control led to a lack of momentum and confusion amongst government and other partners as the first phase concluded. It suggests that considerable benefit could have been accrued through applying Lederach’s concept of nesting phases of programming to ensure that the ‘follow on’ programme was designed before the first programme ended. Further, the second phase of programming was distinct from the first in that it was to a large extent based on SALW control issues being integrated into other sectoral interventions (such as the development of the Police) rather than treating it as a cross-cutting issue as was the case during the first phase. As was demonstrated in Chapter 2, there are benefits to both a sectoral and a cross-cutting approach. However whilst there are obvious challenges in terms of ensuring integration with sectoral interventions linked to a cross-cutting approach, a multi-sectoral engagement may require greater coordination, and in this case nesting the components of the second programme, as was the case with activities that took place in Kosovo around the same time (Sokolova, Richards and Smith 2006), may have been beneficial to the overall contribution that SALW control activities made to peacebuilding efforts.

Paes et al (2004) also highlight the importance of programmers understanding and responding to changes in the political context, and the importance of ownership of
SALW programmes by government and others ‘locally’. As regards the changing context, they claim that a defence transformation programme which was being undertaken at the same time as the second SALW control programme was being designed “has had enormous implications” which were not considered or factored into planning, and surmise that in future, “Project activities need to be realistic and relevant in a changing context”. Regarding local ownership, the authors suggest “…the buy-in of the beneficiary government is crucial... NGOs and other important actors also need to be engaged in these processes.” (Paes et al, 2004:48)

In addition to raising the obvious challenge of ensuring that programme conceptualisation, design and implementation is highly aware of the political context and is flexible enough to adapt to change when required, it also highlights the importance of understanding how complementarity can be important as a factor in determining how effective a stand-alone programme can be as a contribution to a wider set of objectives. The failure of the SALW programme to understand the implications of the defence reform programme (which included large quantities of SALW and ammunition being declared as surplus) led in part to its design being inadequate to the scale of the problem and therefore not as effective as could have been the case in terms of contributing to overall military and security sector reform as part of the implementation of the Dayton Accords.

The examples of SALW control efforts in the Western Balkans, and particularly in Bosnia are instructive for this thesis for the following reasons. They suggest the value in taking a nested approach to the planning and implementation of SALW control activities in terms of maximising the potential effectiveness of the programme, as well as being able to respond more effectively to changes in the external context. It also suggests that careful attention should be paid to potential challenges to coherence that arise from moving between phases from a stand-alone to a sector-specific approach to SALW control. Further, they imply that although a cross-cutting or stand-alone approach may be beneficial in terms of the contributions that a programme can make to multiple sectors, maintaining strong coordination with similar activities undertaken within specific sectors is important.
In conclusion, it reinforces the importance of contingency (the impact of the break between the two UNDP programmes), complementarity (the importance of coordination with other sector specific engagements), and context (the impact of the failure to fully understand and respond to changes in the political context or to achieve strong buy-in from government).

3.7.3 Peacebuilding and SALW control efforts in Sudan/Southern Sudan since 2005

This mini case-study begins by providing a brief overview of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. It then discusses the interrelationships between the CPA and SALW control efforts, including DDR and community security programmes and analyses the effect of these interrelationships on SALW control and peacebuilding objectives. It concludes by identifying relevant findings in terms of the effect of contingency, complementarity, context and other factors on these interventions.

Unlike some of the other mini-case studies analysed in this chapter, the literature on post-war peacebuilding in South Sudan in particular is less well developed. However, researchers have made important contributions through analysing Sudan/South Sudan in the period leading up to and following agreement of the CPA in the following areas: the role of the AU and other regional actors and the regional dimensions of conflict and peacebuilding are assessed by Murithi (2007) and Leff (2009) respectively; further, the potentially transformative effect of the violence on power and governance (Elnur, 2009) and the effect of post-intervention effect of international peacebuilders (Duffield, 2010) have been analysed from a critical perspective.

In 2005, the CPA was signed between President Bashir for the Government of Sudan and Dr John Garang, the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and Commander in Chief of the Sudan People’s Liberation army (SPLA) (See Brosche (2009) for a comprehensive review of the CPA). The CPA brought an official end to several decades of civil war between the Sudanese government
based in Khartoum and its allied militias and the SPLA, which sought greater autonomy for the South and acceptance of non-Arab and Muslim cultures across Sudan.

The CPA was a product of many months of negotiations between the two sides, supported by the UN and a group of seven engaged member states, including the US, UK, Italy, Norway and France. It provided a framework within which preparations for a longer-term peace could be conducted and focussed on a wide range of issues from military and security cooperation to power sharing arrangements within a Government of National Unity. It was intended initially as a five year agreement which would culminate in a national census, elections and a referendum on southern secession.\textsuperscript{29} It did not however provide a process for addressing some of the more sensitive unresolved conflict driving issues, including jurisdiction over the oil rich area of Abyei and over the states straddling the border between Southern Sudan and the rest of the country, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. Amongst its various elements, the CPA provided a commitment within which the first phase of a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme would be undertaken for former combatants on both the Government of Sudan and SPLA sides of the conflict. Crucially, it did not clearly address the issue of whether and how to disarm what became known as Other Armed Groups, or OAGs, groups which had played a role in the conflict but had not agreed to align formally with either side as part of the peace agreement.\textsuperscript{30}

The CPA commitment to DDR\textsuperscript{31} was developed at a time when the concept was popular amongst donor governments and UN agencies as a means to integrate former fighters into civilian life, but also widely challenged by those who were often critical of the success of DDR efforts over recent years (Muggah 2006). The DDR commitments in the CPA were designed at a time when the UN had just published

\textsuperscript{29} The elections and then referendum took place and Southern Sudan was finally created in 2011
\textsuperscript{31} CPA, Chapter VI: Security Arrangements, Annexure 1: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangement Implementation Modalities and Appendices, Part III: Demobilisation, Disarmament Reintegration and Reconciliation, pp118-121
its International Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) which aimed to take a broad approach to DDR, taking into account issues such as the security of host communities to which those being ‘inserted’ would be sent in the design and implementation of DDR programmes. When the various CPA commitments were translated into action plans, supported heavily in this case by the UNDP and UNDPKO through its Integrated DDR Unit, based in Khartoum, in the form of its Integrated DDR Programme (IDDRP), there were joint commitments both to beginning the process of disarming, demobilising and reintegrating qualifying former combatants, and to improving the security of communities across Sudan. At the government level, the IDDRP\(^{32}\) would be coordinated by a national DDR commission based in Khartoum and by separate southern and northern DDR commissions responsible for leading implementation in the south and north of the country respectively (Preston and Smith, 2008:7).

In the initial years following the signing of the CPA, there was much effort undertaken by international supporters, principally the UN but also NGOs and bilateral donors to encourage action on DDR through the three commissions. It became apparent however to those who followed the process closely\(^{33}\) that in reality, with final decisions outstanding on whether the country would eventually split into two or how the oil rich border areas would be divided, there was little real interest in disarming or demobilising personnel who could be critical to the direction of any future conflict.\(^{34}\) Thus, over time it became clear that for both the South and North, DDR would only be attempted for those which the two armies did not rely on and who in the case of the south in particular, they needed to remove from the army payroll to reduce expenditure. This translated into the language of Special Needs Groups; children (combatants and camp followers); disabled people; and then women, leaving the majority of ‘regular’ troops within the command

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\(^{33}\) The author of this thesis spent six months in South Sudan over several visits to South between 2006 and 2008 providing independent analysis of, and contributions to, SALW control efforts, including on different aspects of the DDR programme.

\(^{34}\) Author’s interviews with Southern DDR Commission members, UN staff and engaged international NGO personnel in Juba 2007/8.
structures of the SPLA and the National Army and readily deployable in times of trouble. By 2011 some progress had been made in terms of registering potential candidates and beginning the DDR process in the South of the country, although there remain significant challenges relating to the ‘reintegration’ aspects of the programme; principally how to reintegrate a person who has never previously been a part of a settled community into a community that don’t want them. (For a review of progress see Stone (2011).)

In the sense that a part of any DDR process - Sudan included - is to place under the control of the relevant authorities, weapons possessed by former combatants, there is a relationship between DDR activities and SALW control in the case of Sudan/Southern Sudan, and clearly by the fact of the IDDRP’s stated contribution to the CPA, between DDR and peacebuilding efforts. In Southern Sudan in particular, because the DDR programme focussed on particular groups who had already for the most part been disarmed, it is perhaps of less direct relevance to SALW control efforts than the second aspect of the broader DDR commitment arising from the CPA, which focuses specifically on the effect of SALW availability and misuse on community security.

As part of the UN’s commitment to an integrated approach to DDR, evidenced through its lead role in the development of the IDDRP introduced above, a commitment was made at the outset in translating CPA commitments into strategies and action plans to focussing on the security of communities across Sudan as well as on the importance of addressing the needs of former combatants. As the IDDRP was linked closely to the CPA, any approach to community security required action in the north as well as the south of the country. Thus, initially, the commitment to improving community security was located within the DDR commission structures, and was supported by the UNDDR Unit based in Khartoum. As such, it quickly became caught up in the inertia that affected the DDR Commissions, which were themselves political institutions (Preston and Smith, 2008).
In 2006, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) became increasingly worried about the numbers of people being killed and seriously affected by violence that was breaking out between different tribes and militias. The reasons for the violence were various, ranging from traditional hostilities between different groups linked to access to grazing land and water, through to battles between armed groups which had previously been allied to the SPLA but were now splintering off frustrated with the lack of material benefit that their allegiance brought.

Faced with what they saw as a growing problem, the GoSS deployed the SPLA to collect weapons from civilians and non-state groups in affected parts of the country. This was described by some, including the Vice President, Riak Machar Teny under the rubric of enhancing community security\textsuperscript{35}, although to others it was seen as an attempt by the GoSS to establish a monopoly on the use of violence in Southern Sudan— a concept which is not necessarily at odds with enhancing the security of affected communities. However intended, these efforts had a significant impact – thousands of people were killed during disarmament operations, partly by ill-disciplined SPLA cadres, but also as a consequence of those being targeted by disarmament campaigns fighting back against the SPLA; O’Brien (2009:11) records that in one operation alone in northern Jonglei State over 1,600 people were killed when they resisted SPLA disarmament activities.

The significant negative impacts of this activity gave rise to additional efforts on the part of some international actors, and individuals within government to establish a less coercive, and ultimately more successful, approach in the future. Consequently, the issue of Community Security and Arms Control became a specific area of work, detached from DDR and set apart from the responsibilities for DDR held by the Southern DDR Commission. Initially it was located within the purview of the Vice President, and later the Minister of the Interior. With the support of the UNDP and a small number of NGOs and supportive donor states, a Bureau for Community Security and Arms Control was established within the Ministry of

\textsuperscript{35} Author’s interviews with HE Riak Machar-Teny, Juba, 2007 and 2008.
Interior with executive responsibility for taking forwards work in the areas across the South of the country.\(^{36}\)

In 2008, through a Presidential Order the GoSS committed to another attempt to collect weapons in the hands of civilians and other non-state groups. Implementation was the responsibility of the Governors in each of the 10 states which make up Southern Sudan (Skinner 2012). In Jonglei, perhaps the state most affected by violence since the signing of the CPA, and the location of much of the forced and ultimately unsuccessful disarmament two years before the UN and others worked closely with the Bureau of Community Security and Arms Control and the State Governor to establish a programme of conflict sensitive development projects in exchange for weapons surrendered through non-violent means.

In the case of Southern Sudan in particular, there were clearly linkages between efforts to control SALW and other peace- and security-building and development activities. The genesis of the community security and arms control concept was linked to the formal peace agreement between the main warring parties and to a commitment to integrate former combatants into society. The early conflation of community security and small arms control in the initial Integrated DDR Programme, itself the main document intended to translate the CPA commitments into action clearly recognised the relationships between weapons and security at the community level; indeed it recognised that to some extent, the availability of arms was a source of security and protection for isolated communities at risk of cattle raiding or banditry and in the absence of rule of law and effective law enforcement.

At the operational levels however, in the initial efforts to disarm civilians, scant regard was paid to the interrelationships between SALW control and peace and

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security building. Arguably, these initial efforts, particularly those in Jonglei State actually increased insecurity. (For a detailed analysis of the impacts of disarmament activities in Jonglei see Garfield (2007).) The recognition of the failure of these initial attempts and the consequent willingness to commit to both undertaking SALW control efforts in a non-coercive way, to linking them explicitly to accessing forms of development, and to committing more seriously to the security-building aspects of the wider peace and security building agenda reflect well on the GoSS and the main supportive international partners.

There are however, many lessons to learn from efforts to control SALW in Southern Sudan since the CPA was signed in 2005. Some of these have been documented by the Small Arms Survey\textsuperscript{37} and Saferworld.\textsuperscript{38} For the purpose of this thesis, perhaps the most important lessons are as follows: Initially, there was an attempt in the early stages of planning to relate DDR with SALW control and broader efforts to enhance community security, and importantly to link SALW control to the implementation of the CPA, which suggests a clear analysis of the interrelationships between SALW control and conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts. However, this did not translate into early programming, which quickly became isolated both from other related peace and security building efforts taking place at a similar time and place, and thus failed to either build on or mitigate their potential effects.

Therefore whilst conceptually complementarity was important and a decision was taken to locate SALW control within a sectoral intervention to ensure that this complementarity was ‘built-in’ at an early stage, this conceptual clarity quickly dissipated.

Secondly, the lack of a legal basis on which SALW control efforts were undertaken created a context in which the local SPLA commanders or government officials were responsible on a case-by-case basis for deciding what was ‘legal’ ownership and what was not, undermining faith in the process and creating disparities in terms of

\textsuperscript{37} See the Human Security Baseline Assessment project available at www.smallarmssurvey.org

\textsuperscript{38} See Preston and Smith (2008); Skinner (2010)
who was disarmed and why, which had the potential at least to entrench and further create localised rivalries.

This demonstrates a failure to adopt a phased approach to SALW control efforts which would have allowed for initial legislative steps to have been taken prior to the disarmament process beginning and which could have contributed to SALW control having a more positive outcome, thereby strengthening the interrelationships between SALW control and broader peacebuilding processes.

Thirdly, the efforts to control SALW were not undertaken consecutively across the territory of Southern Sudan. Along state borders this mattered significantly; a tribe on one side of the border refused on numerous occasions to hand over their weapons as they saw no requirement for those on the other side of the border to do the same, creating an imbalance of local capacity and in the absence of effective state protection, potentially increasing the risk of attack.

This suggests that a lack of attention was paid to local motivations for owning weapons and a failure to engage vulnerable communities in SALW control efforts, leading them to damage rather than enhance opportunities to promote peace. Further, it reiterates the importance of contextual factors in determining the nature of the contribution that SALW control efforts can make to conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes.
3.7.4 Analysis of efforts to control SALW as disarmament exercises in northern Kenya and Karamoja in Uganda in 2006

This mini case-study examines and analyses disarmament and wider SALW control efforts in both northern Kenya and the Karamoja region of Uganda in the context of government-led efforts to promote peace and development in both contexts. It begins with a brief introduction to the contexts and to regional and national conflict prevention and SALW control agreements and policy frameworks. It then introduces the civilian focussed disarmament efforts as the major outputs from these frameworks before analysing to what extent interrelationships between SALW and peace and conflict initiatives and processes existed, and whether they were conditioned by factors including complementarity, contingency and context.

Kenya and Uganda are often included in regional analysis of conflict systems and peacebuilding activities. For instance, Menkhaus and Penderghast (1999) and Healy (2011) offer assessments of regional conflict trends affecting the Horn of Africa and of capacity of regional actors to play positive peacebuilding roles. The role of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda as well as sub-regionally has been analysed, particularly in relation to its effect on peace and security in the north of the country (for instance, see Allen and Vlassenroot 2010). Similarly, northern Kenya has been analysed in terms of the relationships between conflict and pastoralism (for example Menkhaus (2008) assesses the role of locally negotiated power sharing as an alternative to central government control). Finally, research has been conducted in both Uganda and Kenya to analyse the relationships between conflict and electoral and wider governance processes (see Dunning (2011) for Kenya and Blattman (2009) for Uganda). The regional dimensions, the role of, and impact on, pastoralist life and the complex power sharing and governance relationships between the centre and the northern territories of both Kenya and Uganda are all directly relevant to this mini-case study.
Although close in geographic terms and in the approaches of the governments concerned, the two examples have some important distinctions: Whilst Kenya and Uganda are both party to the Nairobi Protocol\(^{39}\) and have over recent years followed similar administrative steps in the organisation of Government and civil society work to support its implementation, the conflicts and the peace and recovery architecture that act as a chapeaux to consequent SALW efforts are to a large degree separate.\(^{40}\) However, the reason that they are analysed together in this study is that they share some interesting characteristics which are of importance to the focus of this thesis.

Firstly, in both cases, disarmament efforts since 2000 maintain similarities both in terms of the groups targeted (Turkana and Pokot in Kenya and Karamajong in Uganda) and in some common history in terms of efforts to control SALW during colonial times (Wepundi, NDung’U and Rynn, 2011). Secondly, whilst it was more explicit in the case of Uganda, both sets of disarmament activities were conceptualised as part of what the governments of Kenya and Uganda described as post-conflict development plans. In Uganda this was the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Plan which was designed as a response to the effects of the conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army and as a means by which the Government of Uganda could both increase its control over what had historically been a contested part of the country, and encourage a level of security and development in the region which had hitherto lagged significantly behind other parts of the country (Powel, 2010:6). In Kenya whilst not framed as explicitly, disarmament in the north of the country has become synonymous with attempts to address the highly weaponised pastoralist communities, who often share identity

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\(^{40}\) In Uganda this was the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Plan, a Government initiative supported by international basket funding and overseen by President Museveni’s wife, Janet. Official Government of Uganda information about the KIDDP can be found here: http://www.kiddp.org.ug/ (accessed 30/03/2013). In Kenya SALW control work in the northern Rift valley has been undertaken as part of the specific law enforcement operations discussed later in this section and under the auspices of the National Steering committee on Conflict Management and Peacebuilding. For a detailed overview of the different relevant policy commitments and institutional mechanisms see Wepundi et al (2012).
and land with those on the Uganda side of the shared border. In Kenya’s case, from a government perspective these efforts have been framed as ‘operations’ and have since 2005, included at least six different phases (Operation Dumisha Amani (2005); Operation Okota (2006); Operation Okoa Maisha (2008), Operation Chunga Mpaka (2008) and Operation Dumisha Armani II (2010)).

In addition to the targeted intra-national disarmament programmes introduced above, Kenya and Uganda are linked by their common involvement in a number of sub-regional agreements and processes and initiatives, as well as by a small number of bilateral initiatives. Regionally, both Kenya and Uganda have been active since the late 1990s in developing and supporting multilateral responses to the proliferation and misuse of SALW. These included action within the auspices of the East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation, and through the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development. In 2000 the Nairobi Declaration was agreed, committing states from the African Great Lakes and Horn of Africa (including Kenya and Uganda) to a series of measures to reduce SALW proliferation. Finally, in 2005, this Declaration was codified with the agreement of the regional Nairobi Protocol which established a series of legal commitments related to SALW control to which signatories were bound (See Wepundi and Ndung’U (2011) and Wepundi et al (2012) for an introduction to the regional agreements to which Uganda and Kenya are party).

The Nairobi Declaration and then Protocol committed states to a series of practical and policy steps to address various aspects of the SALW problematic. This included the establishment of national commissions to oversee the development and implementation of national SALW control policies and action plans. In both cases, commissions were established and national action plans (NAPs) developed following long and detailed research processes (described as mapping exercises) in which the nature of SALW problems were explored along with the government’s capacity to address them. In both cases, these mappings were conducted by a

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41 See Wepundi M, NDung’u, J and Rynn, S (2011) for a chronology of different SALW efforts in northern Kenya and Northern Uganda.
consortium of organisations led by NGOs Saferworld and SaferAfrica. Further in both cases, National Action Plans set out how the problems identified in the mapping exercises would be tackled, in each case establishing pilot SALW control projects and identifying local government and local police and military structures as the mechanisms of government through which implementation would take place.

Finally, in both Uganda and particularly in Kenya, the period covered both by the National Action Plans and other Nairobi Protocol commitments as well as the specific incidences of disarmament in the northern parts of each country, significant efforts were undertaken to develop and reform the police and other security actors. These included ongoing efforts in Kenya both before and following the post-election violence in 2008 to improve the performance and accountability of the police and in Uganda to restructure the Ugandan People’s Defence force (UPDF).

Within these overarching regional and international policy frameworks, disarmament efforts have been undertaken in both Kenya and Uganda since 2005. These are introduced and analysed below with a particular focus on (a) the interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts and (b) the effects of contingency, complementarity, context and other factors on these interrelationships.

In 2006 the Government of Kenya launched what was the largest disarmament exercise of its kind to date, covering seven districts in the country’s North Rift region. Operation Okota combined coercive and more voluntary approaches (some targets were given the option of surrendered weapons voluntarily – if they didn’t respond they were targeted for forcible disarmament). This initiative was directed by the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security and was

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implemented largely by the military. The action was coordinated with the Ugandan government which was at the time conducting similar exercises across the border.

In Uganda the concurrent phase of KIDDP implementation included a military-led disarmament campaign. This began as a voluntary process, but due to a lack of engagement from local communities, who still harboured negative experiences of previous violent disarmament campaigns, the operation quickly became much more coercive, with the military undertaking an approach consisting of “cordon, search and disarm” Wepundi, Ndungu and Rynn (2011:13).

In response to concerns regarding the effects of the disarmament campaign in Kenya, in June 2006, a conference of government officials, parliamentarians, foreign diplomatic representatives and NGOs identified areas in which the disarmament activities had had unexpected results. The report of the conference, “Developing a strategy to respond to the government of Kenya’s disarmament programme” (Saferworld and Amani Forum 2006) included five specific areas of concern.

An analysis of this document and interviews between the author of this thesis and community leaders, government officials and civil society representatives at the time suggests that of these areas, three in particular of highly relevant for this thesis. Firstly, disarmament was perceived by many of those involved as a collective community punishment: the military (the agency responsible for the disarmament campaign) were perceived as targeting entire communities rather than focussing on known or suspected criminals. This was supported by claims amongst pastoralist people that the requirement to round up their cattle was not as the military claimed, to identify rustled cattle and return them to their owners, but an opportunity for the military to confiscate them and profit from their sale at market, leading to resistance amongst cattle owners to cooperate and thus, increased tension between them and the military.
Secondly, due a fear – real or perceived – of likely unfair treatment by the military, it was claimed that many pastoralist men moved away from the North Rift as a consequence of the disarmament campaign, often to Uganda, leaving their families and possessions behind. The conference participants claimed that this had led to significant displacement and livelihood disruption. Thirdly, perceptions regarding the purpose of the disarmament campaign and who it was targeting varied considerably, with some communities claiming that they had been targeted specifically because of their identity. A primary cause for this confusion appears to have been that there was very little communication from the government or military, either locally or nationally in advance of the disarmament campaign beginning and no attempt to sensitize communities or to negotiate with them to obtain buy-in prior to operations beginning (Saferworld and Amani Forum 2006).

Other criticisms of the disarmament campaign were that it had no single strategy and was not organised within the context of a specific disarmament policy. As such it was not seen as a part of the existing Kenyan National Action Plan for the Control of Illicit SALW, which itself was being implemented in parts of the Kenyan Rift Valley or of the nascent National Small Arms Policy. In addition, the disarmament took place at a time when other Kenyan Government supported initiatives were ongoing that had a disarmament dimension to them, and which were seen to be more accepted by communities and possibly more successful as a result. This included a UNDP funded, Oxfam supported and government facilitated programme on “Violence Reduction in Pastoral Conflicts in Kenya” which sought to address arms reduction, attitudes towards arms, violence reduction and public (human security) in the context of development (see Leff (2009) for an analysis of pastoralist conflict issues and strategies and programmes to address them).

The Uganda and Kenya examples are both instructive when analysed using the framework developed in Chapter 2. In both cases the disarmament campaigns took place as part of efforts to increase peace and security, although they differed in the

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44 Author interviews with influential NGO (from Security Risk Information Centre (SRIC) and Africa Peace Forum (APFO)) leaders in 2006 in the context of the review of the Kenyan National Action Plan
sense that in Uganda it was closely connected to a broader peace and development framework which was imposed from the centre (the KIDDP), whereas in Kenya, the relationship between the intervention and the variety of different development initiatives and programmes that were operational at the time in the same geographic areas was much less explicit. In neither case however was either initiative linked to an explicit peace process or settlement which involved the range of different groups contesting power and authority, as is the case in other contexts examined in this chapter.

In terms of the existence of other SALW control initiatives, in both cases these were significant, most importantly in each case the process of implementing national commitments contained in the Nairobi Protocol. This presented good opportunities for the disarmament efforts to take advantage of interrelationships from both a contingency and complementarity perspective. However in both cases there were in practice minimal linkages, other than the involvement of the national commissions in each case having a role in the communication of the disarmament campaigns. In both cases it appears that the campaigns were initiated outside the government mechanisms responsible for coordinating SALW control activities, suggesting that they were also connected to different policy frameworks and priorities.

Despite this difference, in both cases, it is clear that ongoing SALW control efforts and the disarmament campaigns were explicitly linked to national development priorities, suggesting that SALW control in each of the forms covered in this mini case-study were seen as having a strong sector focus (development and security) rather than a stand-alone cross-sector focus. In this sense, the opportunities for benefiting from complementarity across different sets of activities implemented at similar times were not taken. Similarly, whilst it is clear that in the case of Kenya, the ongoing series of disarmament efforts had the potential to benefit from contingent interrelationships, from the perspective of those targeted (see analysis from the roundtable meeting above (Saferworld and Amani Forum 2006)) these were not clearly understood, nor were they acted upon.
In terms of the involvement of host communities in the disarmament activities, the coercive nature of the interventions and the reports from communities, including in Kenya those expressing their opinions at the Amani Forum meeting, were neither involved nor felt that the interventions had had any particularly positive effect (the impact of SALW control efforts in the Karamoja region of Uganda are analysed by Flew et al. (2010)). The interventions in both cases appear to be strongly led by the centre and rolled out at a local level with minimal involvement from the population. Analysed in the context of Lederach’s Actors and Approaches triangle, and through the lens of a Peacebuilding from Below approach described in Chapter 2, it is perhaps not surprising that the interventions failed to generate significant local ownership and indeed that the problems that they sought to address still pertain.

Given the available evidence it is possible to conclude that the interrelationships between peacebuilding efforts and the disarmament campaigns in Uganda and Kenya were not well understood or acted upon by the authorities in either case. This is partly due to the nature of the disarmament interventions and partly due to the nature of the post-conflict peacebuilding responses, which in both cases were neither significant nor comprehensive. Other attempts to tackle SALW control problems existed in both countries and had in some ways developed significant momentum. Likewise, in both cases, there were significant ongoing reform and development programmes targeting other security actors and processes (for instance defence reform in Uganda or police reform in Kenya).

However in neither case is it possible to identify a significant relationship between the disarmament efforts and these SALW control and security building initiatives. Opportunities presented themselves in terms of benefiting from the effects of contingency over different phases of engagement and complementarity across different sectors. But for reasons that are not explicit in the literature, or on the basis of the author’s regular engagement with both contexts since 2002, these potential benefits were not significantly explored or exploited.
The failure to generate support or engagement from local actors and the different actor groups at the national level in each case that were responsible for the disarmament and other SALW control initiatives suggest that the interrelationships which are required for the development of an effective policy and enabling environment within which transformational activities can be undertaken was not present. It also suggests that contextual factors including target communities perceptions of their own security and the contributory role of SALW in sustaining it and the interrelationships between community conflict, access to resources and representation did not significantly influence the development of SALW control initiatives.

Therefore, to conclude this mini case-study it appears that there was not a strong positive interrelationship between the overarching peace and development policy architecture and SALW control efforts. Opportunities to strengthen them through enhancing either their complementarity or through maximising the benefits of contingency and greater contextual awareness were not taken.

3.7.5 Analysis of efforts to control SALW and their relationships with peacebuilding frameworks and activities in Sierra Leone between 2001 and 2004

This mini-case study analyses the interrelationships between different phases of SALW control activity and between efforts to control SALW and wider peacebuilding activities in Sierra Leone in the initial years following the end of its civil war. It begins by setting SALW control efforts in the broader post-war peacebuilding context before introducing and reviewing the main SALW control initiatives which took place over this period of time. It then assesses the effect that contingency, complementarity, context and other factors had on interrelationships between peacebuilding and SALW efforts and between different phases of SALW control.

The Lome Peace agreement signed in July 1999 was critical in the de-escalation of the civil war which had affected Sierra Leone since 1991 when the Revolutionary
United Front, backed by Liberian President, Charles Taylor, launched a campaign to depose the government. Initially RUF fighters, which included mercenaries from Liberia and Burkina Faso, numbered around 300. However by 1998 when the conflict was at its height it is estimated that between 60,000 and 80,000 combatants were involved in the conflict in Sierra Leone out of a population of around 4.5 million. The peace agreement allowed for the deployment of a UN Peacekeeping force in October 1999 which by its height consisted of over 17,500 peacekeepers (Ginifer, 2005:10).

The roles that natural resources played in stimulating and sustaining the conflict in Sierra Leone is well documented and relevant to this case study (see for instance Maconachie and Binns (2007)). Similarly, post-conflict attempts to establish a system of transitional justice which was both appropriate to the nature of the crimes committed and to public attitudes is important as an element of the international presence in the country (for instance, see Cryer et al (2001)). Finally, in terms of wider literatures, of particular relevance to the success or otherwise of approaches to SALW control, is the role played by Chiefdoms and other local governance structures in post-conflict Sierra Leone (see Jackson (2007) and Fanthorpe (2006)).

The government of Sierra Leone, with support from the UNDP and others, launched a programme to reduce civilian SALW holdings and improve SALW management. The Arms for Development programme (AFD) was launched in 2002 and continued for several years, concluding in 2006. Its preparatory phase, which began in 2002, was titled the Community Arms Collection and Development Programme (CACDI), later transitioning into the longer term AFD programme. These programmes were reviewed by UNDP in 2006 as part of a wider review of support to efforts to control SALW. This review, authored by Ryan Nichols (Nichols 2006: 349-374) provides important background to this study, which is then elaborated through other literatures and the author’s personal professional experience.
The CACDII-AFD programme followed the relatively successful DDR Phase II programme, which was part of the Lome peace agreement and was led by the National Commission for DDR and supported by UNAMSIL. A previous DDR programme was attempted between September and December 1998 as part of an attempt by President Kabbah to produce a peace agreement on his return to Freetown from exile (Ginifer, 2005). This was not widely seen as a success in terms of the numbers of weapons collected; Berman records interviews with the deputy UK High Commissioner at the time and others who claimed that, “...most of the weapons turned in during the DDR programme were in appalling condition. Some of them were unworkable” (Berman 2000:24). This was followed by a DDR Phase III programme, again under the auspices of Lome which concluded in 2002, and combined with the initial CACD programme led to the collection and destruction of around 70,000 SALW (of which the CACD programme, which had very limited geographic coverage collected 9,662 weapons and over 35,000 pieces of ammunition) (Nicholls, 2006:351).

CACDII was established in 2002 as a follow-up programme and was supported by the UNDP. Nichols (2006: 352) reports that the initial motivations for undertaking the programme were fivefold (1) the continuing need to reduce SALW whilst adopting a less coercive approach than that followed previously with the original CACD programme, which combined community engagement with the involvement and leadership of national authorities; (2) explicitly linking SALW control to development challenges through incentivising the surrender of weapons through the provision of development benefits, and placing greater emphasis on capacity building of those involved in an attempt to promote longer term sustainability; (3) for UNDP to apply the lessons that it had learned in similar arms for development programmes in Albania and Cambodia amongst others; (4) the programme offered the opportunity to bring together experience and expertise within Sierra Leone, both from government and from international agencies that had worked on aspects of development, arms control and security over previous years; and finally (5) to explicitly link the intervention to broader peacebuilding and security-building efforts, which at the time was particularly pressing given the potential risk of
instability which could have been caused by the imminent drawdown of the UNAMSIL peacekeeping mission - it was perceived by UNDP at the time that “Continued disarmament, capacity building at government and community levels, and sensitisation to the importance of violence prevention...are of critical importance to the Sierra Leone’s peaceful future” (Nicholls 2006: 352).

CACDII, was framed around three objectives. Of these the most significant in terms of funding and other resource allocation, and arguably to the focus of this thesis was the implementation of pilot projects aiming at establishing the extent of SALW proliferation in Sierra Leone and the testing of pilot approaches. This began with a nation-wide SALW survey which involved interviews with former combatants, victims and a range of local actors (see Berman 2000). The project was overseen by a steering group which brought together a range of Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) actors, including the police, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the national DDR commission, national SALW commission and a variety of NGOs. The programme had four guiding concepts (Nicholls 2006) which included placing the arms collection responsibility with communities (whilst providing them with immunity from prosecution), decentralising the arms collection centres to bring them as close as possible to communities, providing development support to those areas (Chiefdoms) declared as ‘weapons free’, and finally a public education and awareness component which aimed to promote a culture of peace.

The AFD programme, which succeeded CACDII in June 2003, was explicitly intended as a further development and elaboration of the approach applied through its predecessor. According to Nichols however, it differed in one way which is of particular interest to this research, “The AFD was defined within an institutional and legal framework. Specifically, within national and international frameworks for peace-building in the Manu River Union and ECOWAS, including the 1999 Lome Accord, the Government of Sierra Leone National Recovery Strategy; the ECOWAS Moratorium on SALW, the UN Development Assistance Framework for Sierra Leone and the UNDP Interim Recovery Project” (Nichols, 2006:355). The Programme aimed to achieve three objectives; the reduction of the cross-border illicit trade of
SALW into Sierra Leone, the implementation of a community arms collection programme supported by development projects in return for the voluntary surrender of weapons, and capacity building of local and national organisations.

The following part of this mini case-study assesses the effects of CACD II and AFD programmes in terms of meeting their stated objectives and as a contribution to wider conflict reduction and peacebuilding efforts. It concludes with an analysis of the role of complementarity and contingency in particular as factors affecting how SALW and peacebuilding activities interrelate.

The effects of the AFD programme and its predecessor can be assessed as both positive and negative. Many of the weapons collected were old and in many cases in poor repair. Combining this with an assumption that part of the reason why it was hard to ascertain the extent of SALW related injury and crime during the programme design stage was that there were in fact relatively few incidences of SALW being used to kill and injure. This claim is substantiated by Ginifer (2005:11) who writes that whilst the country was by no means a gun-free state prior to the outbreak of conflict, “…it did not have a culture of armed violence where SALW were widely distributed or used within society”. On the more positive side, he claims that “…by far the greatest effect on communities has been the major increase in community cohesiveness, capacity building and awareness of the SALW issue which has taken place in the target Chiefdoms…Consequently they have benefited tremendously from a feeling of pride, ownership and empowerment often never experienced…” (2005:365).

However, whilst supporting the claim that community based activities were beneficial from the perspective of those who participated, Ginifer argues that those former combatants who had not benefited from DDR programmes and who were not targeted by the AFD and CACDII programmes in effect became further distant both from the communities that they had not integrated or reintegrated with and from the wider disarmament process, leading some to maintain ownership of their
weapons for sale into the criminal market, or to facilitate criminal activity (2005:34).

Whilst it is difficult to test and verify these claims without undertaking significant additional primary research, it is possible from the existing literature to identify and discuss some initial findings which are of particular interest to this thesis’ analytical framework. Firstly, in terms of the relationships between SALW control efforts and peacebuilding activities, the explicit link between the AFD programme and the overarching peace and recovery architecture is important and differs from other efforts examined in this chapter (for example the Sri Lanka civilian SALW control programme). In this light it is interesting to note that whilst this initial DDR programme which followed very closely to the formal end of the conflict was explicitly linked to the Lome Accords and was heavily supported by the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, the first phase of the SALW control programme, CACD was not, and in effect was a project led by the Sierra Leone police. Therefore, in terms of the phases of the post-conflict period, SALW control activity was closely linked to peace architecture in the very first and then later phases, but not as explicitly in the ‘middle’ phase between 2001 and 2003.

As regards the involvement of different groups of actors at different stages of the SALW control activities, in the CACDIll phase of work, it appears that significant effort was invested in bringing together a wide range of interested groups, particularly at the national level, and involving formal national actors. There was also considerable importance placed on the decentralisation of the implementation of the programme, placing responsibility for weapons collection for instance in the hands of local people. The role of the UNDP and other facilitators, both local and international appears to have played an important role in catalysing and energising the programme. The extent to which it appears that local people benefited from the programme in terms of their confidence and capacity is also important. Taken together, this suggests that there was significant involvement of a range of different actors across the spectrum included in Lederach’s model of Actors and Approaches. The nature of the benefits accrued by local people (confidence and
cohesion (Ginifer 2005)), suggests a transformative element to the success of the programme which is perhaps greater than the value of the collected weapons (especially given that it appears that weapons misuse was not a significant problem at the time). Therefore, this approach suggests that whilst the programme was connected to peacebuilding architecture, in reality the SALW issue was treated in CACDII (as opposed to CACD where it was clearly explicitly linked to other security sector interventions through its connection to policing capacity) as a stand-alone cross-cutting issue rather than one that was located solely within a single sector approach.

Finally, as regards the effects of contingency and complementarity on interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts, in terms of temporal relationships between CACDII and other SALW programmes it appears that there was a high degree of contingency. The DDR programme was closely followed by CACD which aimed to remove illicit weapons through police operations which were not extracted during the DDR process. CACDII attempted explicitly to take a more consensual approach and piloted a methodology which sought to promote the relationships between SALW control and development, which was then developed into a fully-fledged programme through AFD. It appears that a slightly more sophisticated nested approach was not taken however, with instead, one programme concluding before another began. However there are signs that the overall SALW control efforts benefitted from an element of nesting, in that CACDII designed the approach which was then taken up by AFD, and that CACDII was still operational at the pilot level at the same time that the AFD programme was being designed.

It is less clear however whether and to what extent the SALW control programme was linked to wider peacebuilding efforts in phases which took place either before or following their implementation. For example, there is no indication as to whether or how the outcomes of the CACD programme affected the development of future police development programmes, or indeed to what extent the reintegration challenges of the DDR programme were significant in the design of
the community-focused elements of the AFD programme which followed in later years. It is perfectly possible to develop conceptual links between these different issues and phases; however there is no evidence in the UNDP programme design documents for instance that these interrelationships were understood and applied in practice.

Likewise, given the cross-sectoral nature of the interventions, it is unclear to what extent the potential complementarities between SALW control efforts and other activities taken place during the same phases of post-conflict peace and security building activity were understood or acted upon. Whilst the UNDP claim that the lessons learned in terms of community engagement and capacity building informed future efforts (Nicholls 2006), there is no evidence to suggest that the improvements in confidence and capacity translated into complementary benefits for other programming priorities taking place at the same time. However, and probably more importantly, it can perhaps be assumed that if Nicholls is indeed accurate in his assessment that community confidence and capacity was enhanced, the benefits of this change will have been felt outside the parameters of the programme activities, and thus it could be assumed that they brought wider benefit to communities and to their recovery and transformation from conflict.

### 3.8 Overall analysis of the universe of cases and the mini case-studies

This section identifies initial findings which emerge from the analysis contained in this chapter as a whole. It concludes with a series of questions and requirements for further research which are explored in depth in Chapters 4 and 5. The analysis which is contained in this section focuses on what can be learned, both from the universe of SALW control efforts in conflict affected countries, and from the more detailed examination of the mini case studies focussing on Kenya and Uganda, the Western Balkans, Sudan/Southern Sudan, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. It does this through applying the framework for research and analysis set out at the end of Chapter 2.
At a conceptual level, given the significant numbers of incidents of SALW control being attempted in conflict affected countries, it is reasonable to assume that many involved in post-conflict policy making and programming believe there to be a positive relationship between reducing access to, and misuse of, SALW and promoting peace and security. From the research contained in this chapter it is clear that in certain instances this relationship is indeed positive: the public acts of disarmament in Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina were seen as demonstrations of a willingness to find peace; and the SALW control efforts in Sierra Leone were, despite not reducing SALW numbers significantly, generally viewed as positive in terms of the capacity- and confidence-building effects that they had on those involved.

However, in other contexts, the interrelationship between SALW control and peacebuilding is much less positive: the experience of post-CPA Southern Sudan perhaps illustrates this point most starkly; the coercive and selective nature of efforts to reduce civilian SALW holdings stimulated conflict between the government and specific tribes and exacerbated existing tensions between tribes sharing common borders and natural resources.

From the examples analysed in this chapter it would appear that both the planning and implementation phases of peacebuilding and SALW control efforts are critical to the nature of the interrelationships between the two. It is also apparent that the three main dimensions of the research framework established in Chapter 2 – the effects of complementarity, contingency and context - are important and deserve further analysis and development.

Regarding the effects of contingency on interrelationships, it is apparent from the universe of cases that there are numerous linkages between different efforts to control SALW. Further, it appears that at certain stages following periods of violent conflict, particular interventions occur more frequently than others, which might suggest that they are perceived to have a particular relevance to specific peacebuilding phases and conflict contexts. For instance, in Sudan in the
immediate period following the signing of the CPA, DDR was identified as a priority. In Bosnia Herzegovina however, where activities were taking place sometime after the end of the war, SALW were perceived as an integrated sectoral intervention linked to SSR and defence reform. Conversely, there appears to be at least one specific SALW control issue which does not seem to be particularly linked to a specific peacebuilding phase. In the case of weapons destruction, there seems to be a strong relationship with particular SALW control activities and therefore potentially with several different peacebuilding phases. This suggests that in this case, interrelationships between weapons destruction and other SALW control activities are particularly important from a complementarity perspective in terms of disposing of weapons collected or seized through disarmament processes, rather than locating destruction activities within particular peacebuilding sequences which aim to maximise the benefits of contingency.

Further, from analysis of the mini case-studies, it is clear that the extent to which these linkages are understood and acted upon is a significant determinant in the contribution that SALW control efforts make, both to their specific objectives but also to peacebuilding processes. For example, the ways in which the various SALW control efforts built on each other in Sierra Leone, with one project testing approaches and methods whilst another was being prepared to take over and deliver the project to scale is a good example of the benefits of a lightly nested approach to different phases of activity which ensured that the activities taken together over several phases probably benefited significantly from their contingent relationships. Conversely, the failure to understand the opportunities presented through maximising the beneficial effects of contingency in Sri Lanka, Kenya and Uganda appear to have hampered efforts to both enhance SALW control and its contribution to peacebuilding.

From the examples analysed in this chapter it appears that understanding and maximising the potential benefits of complementarity between different sets of activities taking place during the same temporal phases can be important to strengthen positive interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding
activities. It would appear from analysing the universe of cases, that often a number of different SALW activities take place either simultaneously or within a short period of time. The data also suggests that in certain cases particular types of SALW control activity takes place relatively frequently. For instance, civilian weapons collection often occurs at a similar time and space as DDR, suggesting that understanding and acting on potential complementarities is important. This is borne out to some extent by the close relationship between DDR and SALW control in both Sierra Leone and South Sudan.

However, it is unclear as to whether this suggests that programmes that are designed with complementarity built into them at the earliest stages are more appropriate than those in which opportunities are sought and exploited for benefiting from complementarity as a given programme develops. For example, in post-CPA Sudan there was a conscious effort to build complementarity into the peace process. However the complexity of the process and the highly political nature of all aspects of implementation meant that little of the pre-planned activity was in fact possible in reality. Contrasting this with the experience of stand-alone SALW control programmes in the Western Balkans where opportunities for closer coordination were sought out and where the benefits of complementarity for enhancing the positive interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding activities appear to be relatively significant suggests that in some instances at least, better coordination rather than integration may be more appropriate.

Finally, regarding the third element of the research framework – context – the analysis contained in this chapter suggests some interesting emerging findings for further research and analysis. Perhaps most pertinent, it would appear that the active involvement of the different actor groups identified by Lederach are of great importance to the existence of positive interrelationships between SALW control efforts and peacebuilding. For example, the lack of public consent for, let alone participation in, SALW control activities in Southern Sudan, Kenya and Uganda seem to have been critical to the role that these activities had in further stimulating conflict and tension. The active engagement of the public in an act of public
disarmament in Serbia following the assassination of the former Prime Minister Djindic provides an interesting example to further reinforce this point: When the public fully engaged with the public surrender of firearms in central Belgrade many thousands of weapons were surrendered, but perhaps the most significant effect of the act was to underline a popular desire to transition from a highly conflicted country to a more peaceful society.

In between these two examples which could be seen to sit on either end of a spectrum of public engagement in SALW control efforts and the consequent effect on interrelationships with peacebuilding is the experience of Sri Lanka. The public were actively consulted during the development of national strategies for addressing SALW control challenges and in many localities, communities played an active role in articulating their problems and supporting local level public education efforts. However this support did not translate into the surrender of weapons during any of the various amnesty periods established by the government. The reason for this appears to be relatively clear: whilst there was a willingness amongst the public to acknowledge the negative impact of SALW, and a desire for there to be greater peace, a lack of trust in the ability of the government to keep families safe from either the LTTE, predatory government security forces or from criminal activity discouraged participation in weapons surrender programmes.

This last point is important from the perspective of the contribution that SALW control efforts could have to transformative approaches to peace and conflict, and to operationalizing the concept of Peacebuilding from Below: The construction of reality by communities is heavily dependent on how they experience issues such as security, justice and peace and consequently how they view the role of SALW in society. Without a belief that they would be protected from threat by the state and in a context where conflict does not feel finished, it is highly unlikely that people would willingly disarm in significant numbers. Sierra Leone presents a positive example of how the involvement of citizens in SALW control activities can strengthen the interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding. Whilst the numbers of SALW surrendered during the AFD programme were limited, it is
interesting to note that reviewers identified the positive effect on the confidence and capacity of people involved as a major outcome of the project.

This chapter has helped to test the assumptions contained in the overarching research question, hypothesis and sub-questions which together frame this thesis. The universe of cases and the more detailed mini case-studies have allowed for an initial and broad analysis of the effects of contingency, complementarity and context on the interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding activities. However, it has important limitations. Firstly, it does not explore any case in enough depth to reach firm conclusions nor to explore the interplay between different questions. For example, it is not possible from the data analysed in this chapter to develop specific theories regarding the relative importance of the different variables of contingency complementarity and context: Neither is it possible to explore the effect of social construction and the role of local people and their perceptions in the extent to which SALW control efforts can positively interrelate with peacebuilding activities and processes.

The following Chapter seeks to explore these and other questions further and constitutes an in-depth analysis of how SALW and efforts to control them have interrelated with local and national level peacebuilding efforts since the end of the conflict between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Government of the Republic of Serbia in 1999.
Chapter 4: The interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and activities to build peace in Kosovo: a case study

4.1 Introduction

This Chapter analyses efforts to control SALW and build peace in Kosovo since violent conflict was brought to an end in 1999. As the major case-study it has been selected to deepen the exploration of the interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding activities. In doing so, it has an important role in the overall research strategy introduced in Chapter 1 and elaborated in Chapter 2: It tests and further develops the findings emerging from Chapter 3 using the analytical framework established on the basis of literatures reviewed in Chapter 2. In doing so it aims to make a significant contribution to addressing the overarching research question: What are the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and build peace in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict? Through this it contributes to proving the validity of the hypothesis (see below), both in the case of Kosovo and in at least some other contexts:

Efforts to control SALW can have a positive or negative effect on post-conflict peacebuilding; conversely their success can be damaged or enhanced by peacebuilding activities. The interrelationships that exist between SALW control and peacebuilding are both temporal and spatial and are conditioned by the extent to which affected populations are involved. Therefore the role and influence of local people, and the extent to which complementarity and contingency is understood and acted upon have a determining effect on the positive benefits of SALW control in post-conflict peacebuilding

The research sub-questions discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 are particularly relevant to this case-study and help to frame both the analysis of the Kosovo case but also to organise the comprehensive analysis of all the data examined during this research which is contained in Chapter 5. As such, the findings from this chapter will be
analysed further in the context of those emerging from Chapters 2 and 3 in particular when overall findings will be elaborated and conclusions drawn.

This chapter begins with a description of the specific case-study research strategy and methodology. An introduction to the different geographic research contexts selected is contained in Annex A. The conflict resolution and peacebuilding frameworks which were put in place in the post-conflict period are then introduced and analysed and specific peacebuilding activities which are of particular relevance to this case-study are identified. The role of SALW in the conflict and the SALW control challenges that existed in the post-war period are then reviewed and analysed. This is followed by two major sections. The first of these analyses the interrelationships between different peacebuilding activities and then between different SALW control efforts. The second further develops this through an analysis of the interrelationships between SALW and peacebuilding efforts using the Contingency, Complementarity and Context framework. The chapter concludes with the description of emerging findings which are then combined with those of earlier chapters in the thesis conclusions, which are described and analysed in Chapter 5.

*Figure 6: Map of Kosovo with major towns marked in Albanian and then Serbian*
4.2 Case study strategy and methodology

The Kosovo case-study follows a mixed-methods approach. It combines qualitative data drawn from interviews, focus group discussions, document analysis and observation with quantitative data taken from nation-wide household surveys conducted over recent years by credible research centres and market research companies.

As noted, it forms an important part of the overall research strategy, deepening and substantiating previous analysis and providing initial findings and conclusions for further analysis in Chapter 5. The strategy designed for this case-study is described in Chapter 2 and can be summarised as follows: an initial literature review examining peacebuilding processes and initiatives, and efforts to control SALW in Kosovo in the period following the end of the war in 1999, drawing on both quantitative and qualitative data; a series of in-depth local studies, featuring a combination of different - predominantly qualitative data-gathering methods; a wide range of interviews with those working at or analysing relevant macro-level peacebuilding and SALW control initiatives in Kosovo; an analysis of the ‘locally’ and ‘nationally’ obtained data using the analytical framework established in Chapter 2 and refined in Chapter 3.

The remainder of this section describes the boundaries of the case study; introduces the research process and field visits; and describes data sources and data gathering methods. It is then followed by an introduction to Kosovo in the period leading up to and following the end of the violent conflict in 1999.

4.2.1 Case-study Boundaries

The boundaries are geographic as well as temporal and thematic. Geographically the boundary follows the borders established by the constitution of Yugoslavia in 1974 (which covered five republics – Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, Macedonia – and three provinces – Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina). Although they are currently contested, they are still in place and form the borders of the newly independent Republic of Kosovo. Thematically the case study covers the issues of
small arms, efforts to control small arms and activities to support conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The definitions used to describe these activities are introduced in Chapter 2. The time period covered by this case study is from the lead up to the end of the armed conflict which took place in Kosovo in 1999 until the present day (2013), although the period between 1999 and the end of the executive mandate of the UN in 2007 is of greatest interest given that this covers the period immediately following the end of the war during which most conflict resolution and peacebuilding and SALW control efforts took place.

4.2.2 Outline of the research process and field visits

Field research in Kosovo was undertaken during four visits to the country in late 2010, early 2011, mid-2011 and early 2012. In each case, one week was spent in-country, both in Pristina and in a wide range of other cities, towns and villages. During the first visit an initial list of potential interviewees based predominantly in Pristina was developed and initial discussions took place with key interviewees involved in government in Kosovo. This was important for obtaining the consent of government officials to speak candidly and freely, and to mitigate any potential future challenges to the research from government officials or law enforcement agencies.

The second visit was used to achieve two tasks: to continue to develop the list of potential interviewees and to begin the process of selecting potential locations for local research including focus groups, observation and interviewees. During the visit an initial list of potential locations was developed and then each place was visited with a view to making a final selection on return to the UK. The criteria that were used to make the final selection are described below, but vital amongst them was obtaining the permission and consent from residents and local power holders to conduct the research. Thus, significant time was invested during this second visit in discussing the content and purpose of the research with those living in communities that had been identified as potential research locations. To aid this process, a description of the proposed research and the background of the researcher was prepared and translated into Albanian and Serbian and both sent to
local power holders in advance of a visit, and used as an aide to discussion during meetings with power holders and communities alike.

At the village level specifically, Kosovo still retains strong traditional power structures. Villages typically have village councils which comprise long-term residents, elders and those occupying positions of local importance, such as school teachers or businessmen. These structures are in some ways not representative of their communities, particularly in a demographic sense – there are for instance few women or young people - and the means by which a person becomes a part of the village council is not always clear. However, they remain an important part of how decisions are taken in Kosovo and are usually the most important decision-making forum at the village or community level. As such, their consent was critical to obtaining the authority to visit the village and conduct the research.

The role of the author and his prior experience in Kosovo in the selection process should also be acknowledged. As described in Chapter 1, the author has extensive experience of Kosovo gained through his professional work. He has visited Kosovo over 40 times during the past decade. This experience includes having visited all Kosovo’s municipalities at different times, and being actively involved with community projects in a number of different locations, as well as involvement in relevant policy-making processes. Some of the locations that were selected as detailed research locations for this study were places that the author had visited and in some cases, worked in over recent years. This has very positive dimension in that it was significantly easier to obtain permission and consent to undertake the research; there exists already a level of trust and willingness to speak candidly and openly without the need for long-term relationship building. But there is also a potential challenge in that familiarity could encourage the author to make suppositions and draw conclusions on the basis of prior knowledge or experience without applying the level of rigour required in academic enquiry. This was addressed initially through the recognition of the potential for this to happen, but then also through the development of a clear methodology and the preparation of detailed interview schedules and focus group guides, and through periodic checking
with local colleagues and other engaged individuals to be sure that process was being followed and understandings generated through the research were consistent.

On return to the UK following the second research visit, a near-definitive list of locations was developed. This was then used to plan the third visit during which the majority of the field work was undertaken. Upon arrival in Kosovo in early June 2011 it became clear that in one proposed location, a change would be required. Lubinje in Prizren municipality had been identified as a focus group location. Subsequent to discussions with the village council during the second visit it became clear that they thought it would be important to involve their ‘sister’ village in the discussions as their experiences of small arms and conflict were connected, but somewhat different. As a consequence, the near final draft prepared in the UK was revised whilst the author was in Kosovo to include a focus group discussion which drew together residents from two neighbouring villages rather than from just one as was initially intended.

During the third visit, five focus group discussions and 25 detailed interviews were undertaken over a period of 7 days. The focus group discussions took place in Albanian, Bosnian and Serbian and were translated by one of two interpreters. The author took extensive notes on the basis of these translations in addition to observing the body language and delivery style of participants. These notes were typed up in the evening of each day and facts and names checked with the interpreters whilst the information was still fresh. In a small number of cases, the interpreters contacted previous focus group participants or interviewees to clarify matters of fact following the end of the discussions. At the end of the research period, the author and the interpreters held a meeting to review progress, ensure that all available data had been collated and to identify areas that required further follow up in the future.

Following his return to the UK, the author prioritised analysing the data gathered during the visit over preparing other parts of this thesis to ensure that nothing was
lost with the passage of time. In February 2012 a further confirmatory research visit was undertaken. The priorities at this point were to hold some additional interviews with those who had fought as part of the KLA in 1999 and to interview a small number of representatives of relevant international organisations. In both cases, whilst some progress had been made during previous research visits, it was felt that more detailed data was required.

4.2.3 Description of data sources and data gathering techniques

Both quantitative and qualitative data were gathered from a variety of different sources. They are described in more detail below:

Qualitative data was gathered using three primary methods: structured and semi-structured interviews; focus group discussions; and document analysis. In addition, the author observed the actions and behaviours of interviewees and the general public as well as more physical aspects of the area of study, including handling small arms and light weapons; observing the national and international military presence and infrastructure intended to support security- and peace-building; and visiting a range a police and military establishment, local public facilities and specific locations which had been particularly affected by the conflict which had significant resonance for those interviewed.

Structured and semi structured interviews

Interviews were organised with a wide range of different individuals who have either been involved in planning SALW control activities, targeted by them, or who have observed or commented on these activities over the past ten years. Given that a primary focus of the case study was to understand how those affected by SALW possession and misuse and those targeted by efforts to control them perceived these efforts, a greater weighting was placed on interviews with them as opposed to commentators or planners from international organisations.

For illustrative purposes, the categories of interviewees included:
• Community members in towns and villages targeted by efforts to control SALW and to promote peace and reconciliation;
• Relevant government officials, both in service now and in key positions at the time of earlier attempts to control SALW;
• Civil society leaders, including NGOs, research institutes, community organisations and journalists.

Separate interview schedules were prepared for structured interviews with those involved in planning SALW control activities, for those targeted and for those who observed or commented on their development and implementation. These were used to guide interviews, although in each case the schedule was adapted to the specific experience and role of the interviewee. In addition a number of unstructured or semi-structured interviews were held on a more ad-hoc basis when opportunities allowed. These took place for instance with waiters in cafés, interpreters, friends and their family members and a small number of police and security and government officials who did not want to speak on the record or be interviewed in any formal sense.

Interviews took place in Pristina as well as in a number of other locations in Kosovo, including in northern Mitrovica, Gracanica, Debellder in Viti Municipality, Lubinje and Prizren in Prizren Municipality, Zubin Potok, Leposavic and Ferizaj.

Focus Group Discussions
Focus group discussions were organised to obtain the views and opinions of community members regarding the issue of small arms ownership, activities to control small arms and the security, political and economic context in which these activities took place. The locations were selected according to the following criteria:
• Different geographic areas of the country;
• Different ethnic makeup of communities;
• The extent to which the community was affected by the war and the nature of its involvement;
• The extent to which the community was targeted, either by efforts to control small arms or by activities to promote peace and reconciliation.

From these criteria, the following communities were selected as places in which to organise focus group discussions:
• Germova village in Viti Municipality
• Debellder village in Viti Municipality
• Ferizaj City in Ferizaj Municipality
• Lubinje villages in Prizren Municipality
• Gracanica.

In addition to the locations in which formal focus group discussions took place, a small number of other locations were visited where interviewees (both structured and semi-structured) took place. These were also selected on the basis of the criteria listed above, and taken together with the focus group locations represent large and small urban and rural areas, Kosovo’s different ethnic communities, a wide range of different geographic contexts, and a broad range of conflict impacts. These locations are as follows:
• Mitrovica
• Gjakova
• Peja
• Gjilan
• Pristina.

Interviewee and focus group participant profile
The precise make-up of focus groups and those identified as potential interviewees in each location differed from place to place, and depended significantly on the precise nature of how SALW related to peace, security, conflict and development. However, the participation of the following groups was sought in each case:
• Women
• Men
• Young people (from 16 years upwards)
• Elderly people
• People of Albanian, Serbian, Bosniac, Turkish and Macedonian ethnicity
• Students
• Local elites and professionals
• People employed in manual, agricultural or industrial roles
• Unemployed people of working age
• Stay at home mothers
• Relatively wealthy people
• Relatively poor people
• Small arms owning civilians including those who owned licenced and unlicensed weapons
• Community members who also worked for police and other security and law enforcement agencies
• Former KLA fighters who described themselves publicly as veterans
• Former KLA fighters who did not publicly acknowledge their previous relationship or role with the KLA
• Former members of the Yugoslav National Army
• Those who had participated in effort to control SALW or promote peace, and those who had not.
4.3 Kosovo in the period leading up to, and following the end of violent conflict in 1999

This section provides a brief background to, and analysis of, Kosovo’s history leading up to, during and following the war. This provides the background and context for the analysis of peacebuilding and SALW control processes and activities which is undertaken in the sections which follow.

Kosovo’s history is marked by periods of war, occupation, conquest, empire and violence. Its geographic location in the centre of the Balkan peninsula and at the juncture between Ottoman and central European empires and more recently between western Europe and the countries of the former Warsaw Pact undoubtedly shapes the social, political and economic landscape of the country today. A detailed analysis of these factors as they have developed over many decades is outside the scope of this thesis; readers are advised to consult Glenny (1992), Malcolm (1998), Vickers (1998), Ignatieff (2000), Judah (2000), IIK (2000), Mazower (2000) amongst others for in-depth historical analysis of Kosovo, its relations with its neighbours, and the wider Balkans region.

However, to provide suitable context in which Kosovo’s post-war period can be understood it is important to first outline the major events leading up to the outbreak of war and to describe the post-war settlement and subsequent reconstruction efforts within which the control of SALW and broader peacebuilding efforts were attempted. In the framing of the section below, three publications were of particular importance. Noel Malcolm’s 1998 book Kosovo, a Short History, and in particular Chapter 17 provides a detailed introduction to the period following the death of former Yugoslav President Tito, up to the NATO intervention in 1999. Tim Judah’s book, Kosovo: War and Revenge provides a detailed narrative of the conflict from the perspective of a writer and journalist who covered the war from inside Kosovo. The Kovoso Report, published by the International

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45 For a literary account of Kosovo’s role in history of the wider Balkan region from the Ottoman period to the present day, see Kadare, I (2000). Three Elegies for Kosovo. Vintage Books. London
Independent Commission on Kosovo in 2000 is perhaps the most authoritative account of what happened during the war.

Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia and a constituent part of the Federation of Yugoslavia under the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal republic of Yugoslavia (for a detailed analysis of the 1974 constitution and Kosovo’s status within it see Curtis (1990)). In the periods both before and after, Kosovo enjoyed a significant degree of independence. This changed however following the death in 1980 of Josip Broz Tito, the President of Yugoslavia, which was followed by a significant period of economic deterioration across the Federation. In Kosovo, following Tito’s death, the context quickly began to change, with a more ethno-nationalist approach to politics and the distribution of resources affecting the social and economic wellbeing of its citizens (IICK 2000:34-35).

These tensions came to a head on 11 March 1981 when students at Pristina University began a protest focusing on conditions at the University. What was essentially a local complaint against poor services began to grow following police action to arrest some of the protesters. The actions of the police soon brought other young people onto the streets to the point where there were reportedly between three and four thousand protesters in the centre of the city. The police arrested significant numbers of people and disbursed the rest with tear gas following a night of tense stand-off. This did not deter protesters however, who were joined by others over the ensuing weeks demanding not just improved facilities for the students, but also much more political change, including both unification of Kosovo with Albania and independence of Kosovo as a republic within the Yugoslav Federation (Malcolm 1998: 335).

By April 1981 demonstrations were much more significant, with students from other towns and cities joining their colleagues in Pristina. These protests were met by tanks on the streets of the city which in turn helped stimulate protests in many of the industrial towns and cities across Kosovo, including importantly Mitrovica and Ferizaj, Kosovo’s second and third cities respectively. A General State of
Emergency was declared and thousands of security personnel were drafted into the province from other parts of the Yugoslav Federation (IICK 2000:36).

These demonstrations had for the first time for many years, given Albanian citizens in Kosovo a voice to call for changes in the way they were governed and to economic and social conditions under which they lived. However, they also had a significant fall-out, both politically and socially. Over 500 officials from the Communist Party of Kosovo (mostly Albanians) were purged from the party, students were thrown out of university and those who held jobs in the state sectors and had been active were dismissed from their posts. Leaders in Belgrade linked the protests to what they saw as calls for unification with Albania, when in reality this was not at the time a commonly held desire.46

Malcolm notes that the protests and the subsequent efforts to put them down and stifle dissent brought Albanian and Serbian nationalism into sharp focus with accusations of Serbs and Montenegrins being pushed out of Kosovo on one hand, and accusations of Serbs and other Slavic people taking much higher numbers of state jobs than they were entitled to on the other (Malcolm 2008: 336). Malcolm argues that what in effect became a ‘Culture War’ began, particularly in Serbia. This was supported and stimulated by two significant events in the 1980s: the publication in 1995 by Dimitrije Bogdanovic, a well-known Serbian academic of ‘A book about Kosovo’, which accused Albanians of working to create an ethnically pure province; and the case of Djordje Martinovic, farmer and civilian army employee who publically accused his Albanian neighbours of raping him with a beer bottle, which gave rise to demonstrations and acts of revenge47 (Judah, 2000: 46-47).

46 The IICK argues that it was not until 1991 following the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence that Kosovo’s Albanian leaders began to demand independence rather than a republic within Yugoslavia (IICK 2000: 44)
47 The voracity of this claim has been questioned since it was first made. The role that the case had in stimulating Serbian nationalist sentiment is described in detail in Bracewell, W (2004).
As these tensions grew, a young member of the Serbian Central Committee, Slobodan Milosevic, began to play an increasingly active and engaged role in these debates, which centred around his perception that Serbia and Serbian culture was at risk as a consequence of the power and autonomy of Yugoslavia’s, provinces, including Kosovo. Milosevic’s most significant intervention to-date came in April 1987 when he deputised for the President of the Serbian Communist Party at a meeting of Serbian nationalists at Kosovo Polje, a site of central importance to many Serb’s sense of identity and nationhood. Milosevic made an impromptu speech, caught on television camera which included a phrase which would both help propel him to the highest levels of populist Serbian politics, and provide a rallying call to his supporters: “Comrades…you should stay here. This is your country, these are your houses, your fields, your gardens and your memories…Yugoslavia and Serbia are not going to give up Kosovo” (Judah 2000:52-53).

In 1987, Milosevic succeeded Ivan Stambolic to the Presidency of the Serbian League of Communists. In the two years that followed, he focussed on changes to the Serbian constitution to give Belgrade a direct role in all aspects of government in Kosovo. After much political turmoil, this was achieved in 1989 when the Provincial Assembly of Kosovo and the Serbian assembly agreed changes which, amongst other things, gave Belgrade direct control over policing, law and order and education policy – which was quickly adapted to require the use of Serbian as the official language in the province. These changes in effect ended Kosovo’s autonomy and gave rise to significant unrest with predictable responses from the government and security agencies (Ignatieff 2000:12).

The changes were further embedded in 1990 when the Serbian Assembly passed its Programme for the Realisation of Peace and Prosperity in Kosovo (Krieger, 48

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48 See Gottlieb, G (1994) for a description of the role of the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389 in Serbian and Albanian cultural histories where contested history claims either that the last Serbian Prince was defeated by Turkish armies whilst defending the southern geographical borders of Christianity, or where Serbian invaders were repulsed in their attempts to overrun Muslim lands that were already under Turkish rule.
This included provisions for new municipalities for Serbs, incentives for Serbs to settle in Kosovo and for Albanians to leave, and which annulled property transfers from Serbs to Albanians. This was quickly followed by the Law on the Activities of Organs of the Republic in Exceptional Circumstances, which led to closing down Albanian language media, the Kosovo Academy of Arts and Sciences and the sacking of thousands of Albanian state employees. Rejection of these changes by the Albanian members of the Kosovo Assembly led to the dissolution of the assembly and local government and to further wide scale expulsion of Albanians from their jobs.

At this point, an important response from Albanian elites and others began to be heard, which was to have far reaching effects, and which are of particular relevance to the focus of this thesis: Albanian politicians who had been stripped of their power and other influential people, including writers and thinkers began to meet in secret. They proposed the establishment of a ‘Republic of Kosovo’ (within the framework of the Yugoslav Federation) and organised a secret referendum and elections which returned a republic assembly and a shadow government-in-waiting. As the President of the Association of Writers in Kosovo, Dr Ibrahim Rugova became first the leader of the Democratic League Kosovo (LDK) and then the President of the Republic of Kosovo. One of key aims of the LDK and the government in exile was to deny the legitimacy of Serbian rule. This was done through establishing parallel institutions of state which began to deliver goods and services for Albanians in Kosovo funded through a system of voluntary donations and to refuse to negotiate directly with Belgrade without the presence of foreign countries, thus internationalising a conflict which Rugova saw as being between two independent entities (Judah 2000:66).

49 The IICK claims that as many as 87% of eligible voters took part in the referendum, with 99% voting in favour (IICK 2000:44)
In their paper *NGOs and Peacebuilding in Kosovo*, Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy (2003) contend that understanding how the delivery of services, including parallel systems of healthcare and education, which drew on traditional Albanian clan hierarchies and disbanded communist structures was organised is central to understanding some of the challenges of post-war peacebuilding and reconstruction in Kosovo. They claim that:

“The powerful hybrid role of the LDK - simultaneously a resistance movement, a civil society and a one-party state bureaucracy, is one source of the difficulty Kosovo has had establishing a pluralistic civil society in the post-settlement period.” (Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy 2003:3)

Further, the authors claim that the origins of contemporary Albanian civil society can be found in the movement led by the LDK. This gave rise to a range of different social and cultural associations and groups that played a significant role in the delivery of a wide range of services, including education and health. These organisations, which endured during the war were characterised in part by the fact that they existed and operated within the framework of the LDK and the wider self-determination movement. There was no space for internal dissent at this time, and consequently, whilst these organisations gained significant credibility amongst the wider population by virtue of the material benefits that they brought to an often impoverished community, they developed a culture of not questioning the political leadership of the LDK and were seen, and saw themselves, as a part of a political movement, partial in nature and partisan in perspective. The authors claim that this history and culture created real challenges, as well as opportunities in the post-war period during which international and local civil society organisations were identified as the prime delivery agents for peacebuilding and development work.
Despite the powerful role that Rugova had played in galvanising resistance to the Belgrade reforms of Kosovo’s governance, as Yugoslavia slipped further towards war in early 1991, calls for more direct and violent rejection of Belgrade began to gain more traction amongst some in Kosovo. In June 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, these calls became louder and harder to ignore, and Rugova’s position of non-violent opposition less popular. (Judah 2000:98). The desire to respond more robustly was heightened following the onset of war in Bosnia in 1992, when the focus by Bosnian Serb authorities on the ‘Islamic Threat’ gave greater emphasis to the religious and ethnic dimensions of simmering conflict in Kosovo (Malcolm 1998).

President Rugova was damaged by the outcome of conflict in Bosnia as it undermined his contention that the international community would in some way step in to prevent Serbian aggression and safeguard the rights of minority and religious communities across the Balkans. His position was further weakened in this regard by the fact that he could demonstrate little international condemnation for what was happening in Kosovo at the time, and little support for the LDK’s claims for greater autonomy or for its means of achieving it; during the wars in other parts of Yugoslavia, repression continued in Kosovo as institutions were closed down, arbitrary arrests increased and the settlement in Kosovo of Serbs from Croatia was actively encouraged. Rugova was caught between two sets of opinions: to some he was too fixed in his view that he should not negotiate with Belgrade outside an international process; whereas for others who believed that more direct action needed to be taken, he was seen as weak. From 1996, systematic acts of targeted violence against Serbs and Serbian institutions in Kosovo began to be observed, although initially it was not clear either to the LDK leadership or outsiders where the violence was being directed from. However, by 1997, this position had changed to the extent that representatives of the Kosovo Liberation army (KLA) were giving interviews from their base in Switzerland to journalists on the armed struggle that they were engaged in with the authorities in Belgrade and their proxies in Kosovo. This created significant tension between the LDK, for some time the most influential voice of the liberation movement and the more recently established and
much more violent KLA. This distrust and enmity came to a head between 1998 and the autumn of 1999 when KLA activists targeted LDK members including Rugova in the run up to the first municipal elections held following the end of the war, actions which led to the deaths of several LDK supporters. (ICG, 2001:89).

4.3.1 The war, its effects and the international peace support operation

The pressures that had been brought to bear in Kosovo, both from within and outside its borders came to a head on 24th March 1999, when the internationally sponsored negotiations at Rambouillet near Paris broke down without agreement and NATO began a 78 day mission of bombing and military action again Serbia and the government of Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade (see Ignatieff (2001) for a detailed account of the NATO action). This led to direct reprisals against Albanian and other civilian targets in Kosovo (see IICK 2000 for a widely accepted account of the immediate period in Kosovo following the end of the war).

The numbers of people displaced, killed and injured remains contested. However, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK) claims that well over 1 million people (out of a population at the time somewhere in the region of 2 million people) became either refugees or internally displaced (IICK, 2000:i). Figures for those killed during the conflict likewise vary, however a total of up to 10,000 people killed during the Serbian – Albanian violence (see for instance US State Department, 1999:3) and just over 500 killed as a direct impact of NATO bombing (Human Rights Watch, 2000) are generally seen as credible estimates.

Following the formal end of the conflict in June 1999, the UN quickly approved UN Security Council Resolution 1244 which sanctioned NATO action and granted the province substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration (UN, 1999). This paved the way for the arrival of the first of the over 40,000 strong Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR), which provided security across Kosovo throughout the period of the UN’s executive mandate. The agreement of UNSCR 1244 was followed by months of reprisal attacks against Serbs and other minorities perceived to have supported Belgrade during the war (IICK 2000:108); and by October 1999 it
was claimed that only about half the original population of Serbian citizens remained in the territory, most of whom lived in enclaves heavily protected by KFOR soldiers (Matveeva and Paes, 2003:21-30). The impact of years of conflict and neglect on Kosovo was considerable and the scale of the development and rehabilitation task ahead was significant: The World Bank and EU claimed that at least $2.4 billion would be needed over an initial four year period to tackle the most pressing needs, but that reconstruction and rehabilitation would take many years. A report by the UN Secretary General on Kosovo immediately following the retreat of the Serbian military describes the situation thus:

Empty streets. Shattered shops. No water. No work. Smoking ruins. Murders in the open streets. Dead bodies and piles of garbage. Not a newspaper to buy, not even a loaf of bread. Not a child in school. No fields safe to plough. Most of the livestock lost. No one in charge.\(^{50}\)

UNSCR 1244 mandated the establishment of a wide ranging UN peace support engagement in Kosovo. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) comprising NATO and other non-NATO contributing nations was responsible for the military-security aspects of the operation, including the disarmament and transformation of the KLA. The civilian aspects of the engagement were entrusted to the UN Mission in Kosovo, or UNMIK, which was headed by a highly empowered Special Representative of the Secretary General.

From the outset, this was the most ambitious UN mission ever planned, with executive responsibility for the administration of the territory until such a time that the provisional institutions of self-government set out in UNSC 1244 could take over responsibility for administration of governance themselves. From this point the international intervention in Kosovo became known as an example of attempts to promote the concept of liberal peace discussed in Chapter 2. Consequently the Kosovo experience is often viewed through the lens of debates around the ethics,

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efficacy and effects of liberal peacebuilding models. As regards the international intervention in Kosovo, prominent critics such as Richmond and Pugh have identified contradictions between concepts of democracy and empowerment assigned to liberal peacebuilding by its supporters and the imposition of particular governance systems in the absence of a political settlement (Franks and Richmond 2008) or economic models based on free market reforms that have the potential to increase the vulnerability of poor people and encourage the development of shadow economies (Pugh et al, 2009).

Whilst Franks and Richmond argue that Kosovo is a good example of the challenges of local co-option of international liberal peacebuilding objectives, Chandler (2004; 2010) and Heathershaw and Lambek (2008) identify Kosovo as an example of where local politics became detached from peacebuilding efforts, increasing the chances of co-option and reducing the relevance of peacebuilding efforts for local people. Narten (2008) uses Kosovo to illustrate his claim that the speed and nature of the transfer of local ownership is critical to sustainable peace, contending that delays in the case of Kosovo undermined the chances of reaching a political settlement.

These criticisms reflect more general concern with the concept of liberal peacebuilding and of the priorities and approaches which it promotes. Others, including former UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Soren Jessen-Petersen (2005), former special adviser to the first Kosovo SRSG, Bernard Kouchner (Yannis 2000), Scheye (2008) and Mason and King (2006) argue that whilst recognising the challenges inherent in the concept of liberal peace that the stabilisation of Kosovo was a qualified success, and that challenges of transitioning to sustainable peace were often programmatic (Scheye 2008), a reflection of changing international priorities (Mason and King 2006) or inevitable but unavoidable given the lack of a credible alternative (Visoka 2011; Petersen 2005).

Whilst all areas of government were within the mandate given to UNMIK, a significant priority was placed on areas closely related to conflict prevention and
peacebuilding. UNMIK was organised around a cluster of four ‘pillars’ (which are used by Franks, Richmond and Pugh to illustrate the extent of liberal peacebuilding ambitions and their contradictions – for instance, Pugh (2009) identifies Pillar 4 as an example of where an EU-led free market solution was proscribed within an overall approach that aimed to promote democracy and local decision making). For most of the time during which UNMIK was present in Kosovo, the four pillars, each with their own lead agency comprised the following:

- Pillar 1 focussed on the civil administration of the territory and was lead directly by the UN
- Pillar 2 focussed on police and justice, again under the direct leadership of the UN
- Pillar 3 covered democratisation and institution building, led by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
- Pillar four focussed on economic reconstruction and was led by the European Union.\(^\text{51}\)

### 4.4 Peacebuilding in Kosovo

#### 4.4.1 National-level peacebuilding frameworks and initiatives

The Head of the democratization and institution building pillar in the first years of the UN mission, Daan Everts, described how these pillars were intended to be reflected in the phasing of UNMIK engagement, setting out the five phases initially envisaged for the delivery of the UNMIK mandate, each of which has significant peacebuilding dimensions:

“The general strategy of UNMIK was envisaged in five integrated phases: in the first phase, the mission would set up administrative structures, deploy an international civilian police and provide emergency assistance to returning refugees. Throughout the second phase, the focus would be on the administration of social services and utilities and the consolidation of the rule of law. In the third phase, UNMIK would finalise preparations and conduct elections for a Kosovo Transitional Authority.

\(^{51}\) For a detailed analysis of the role of the different pillars as regards security provision and oversight, see Dugolli I and Peci L (2005: 10-20)
Thereafter UNMIK would help Kosovo’s elected representatives organise and set up provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous institutions. The concluding phase would depend on a final settlement of the status of Kosovo” (Everts 2001).

In their paper, *NGOs and Peacebuilding in Kosovo*, Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy explore each of these five phases in terms of the particular peacebuilding priorities and challenges posed in each case (2003:7). They categorise the five phases described by Everts into three broader peacebuilding phases: emergency, transition, and consolidation. These categories borrow heavily from the previous work of Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (for instance see Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005) and aim to describe how each of the phases of UNMIK’s pillar-approach relate to specific phases in their conflict cycle. In summary, they describe Everts’ phase 1 as the emergency phase in which humanitarian support and provision of basic security was of critical importance. The second and third phases are grouped together as the transition phase, which had a medium-term perspective and where greater emphasis was placed on institution-building and consolidating progress in areas of administration of law and order; the fourth and fifth phases of Everts’ description were described as the consolidation phase, where following elections, the nascent Kosovar institutions would play an ever greater role until the final status of Kosovo was agreed.52

The paper described above was prepared in 2003 and provides an introduction to the role of the UN, principally through UNMIK in providing peace support in post-war Kosovo. However, with the benefit of a longer perspective it would appear that Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy’s analysis was incomplete in one significant area. It underestimated the length of time that it has taken to date to address the challenges set out by UNMIK in its early months. It is now clear that the initial hopes that a transition could be undertaken within the timeframe initially envisaged were very wide of the mark. Explanations have ranged from the continued existence of ‘parallel structures’ of governance linked to Belgrade

52 These ‘peacebuilding phases’ and their relationship to specific aspects of the SALW control problematic are explored in detail in Chapter 5.
preventing Kosovo-Serb participation in a political process, which in effect removed the political dimension therefore preventing a transition (Visoka, 2011), to those who claim that the failure to transition quickly enough to local ownership disempowered the political process (Narten, 2008).

At the time of writing in spring 2013, a final resolution to the territorial claims over the territory of Kosovo appears as distant as ever despite some recent progress with EU brokered talks between the Serbian and Kosovo governments, and the levels of open hostility and enmity between the majority Kosovo Albanian Government in Pristina and many of those living in, or claiming to represent Kosovo Serbs in the northern municipalities bordering Serbia remain daunting. There are make-shift barricades across all roads into the north, manned by vigilantes and self-appointed community defence groups that prevent almost all transit from, and into, the rest of Kosovo.\(^{53}\) KFOR soldiers and Kosovo police have come under attack from these groups whilst attempting to exercise control over Kosovo’s northern borders, and discussions between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo over the terms on which the Republic of Kosovo, which claimed independence in 2009, will establish formal state-to-state relations with its northern neighbour have effectively ground to a halt without resolution.\(^{54}\)

Across the whole of Kosovo, while it is clear that substantial progress has been made to increase access to services, establish representative government, and implement a system of rule of law (ICG, 2012:i), there remains considerable conflict between Kosovo’s two major ethnic groups (identified by Vickers (1998) and Mertus (1999) as perhaps the key dimension of the conflict). In contexts which were affected less by the war and where there is a history of coexistence, on the surface at least, relations between groups are tolerable.\(^{55}\) In others, where the

\(^{53}\) Observed and experienced by the author on numerous occasions over recent years and particularly since the declaration of independence by the government in Pristina.

\(^{54}\) For an analysis of the current security situation in Kosovo see ICG (2012) Setting Kosovo Free: Remaining Challenges.

\(^{55}\) Field research for this thesis in Gjilan and Brezovica in 2011, which are both mixed areas which were relatively lightly affected by the war, observed local Serbian owned shops and cafés which had
effects of war are still close to the surface, tensions are more visible, and in the
majority Serb municipalities in the north of the country, where the mandate of
UNMIK or of the succeeding Kosovo Government has never been accepted, there is
open and very visible hostility which continues to manifest itself in acts of
violence.\textsuperscript{56}

In these contexts it is clear that many of the peacebuilding needs anticipated by
UNSC 1244, and elaborated by UNMIK and many others in the succeeding years
have not been met. There are many potential reasons for this\textsuperscript{57} which are
discussed above and are often framed in terms of the failure either of the liberal
model or of the failure to implement it effectively. However, one specific
contention made by the International Crisis Group in 2001 regarding the differing
sets of priorities for Kosovars and international powers is useful in that many of the
points made at the time focus to some significant extent on the relationships
between security, development and governance, all of which are of critical
importance to the focus of this thesis.

ICG argued that the priorities of the international community and Kosovo Albanian
decision makers were not always in alignment in the early phases of post-war
planning and operations. They state that for the international community, during
the period of its administration of Kosovo, and arguably to this day, its priority was
not the final status of the territory, but establishing security both domestically
and more importantly, regionally and internationally. However, for Albanians living in
Kosovo, whilst domestic security has always been desired, avoiding the rule of
Belgrade through achieving independence was of greater importance (ICG, 2001).

\textsuperscript{56} See for instance BBC online news article: Blast Kills 1 in Divided City of Mitrovica. 2nd July 2012. Retrieved 15/12/2012.
\textsuperscript{57} In a paper for the Kosovo Centre for Security Studies Kallabi and Ferati (2012) discuss these reasons. These range from the compromise between the US, UK and France on one side and Russia and China on the other regarding the future independence or otherwise of Kosovo, which led to the wording of UNCS Resolution 1244 not setting out explicitly what Kosovo’s final status would be or how it would be decided, and the failure of UNMIK and other international actors to place enough emphasis quickly enough on ensuring that nascent Kosovo government institutions were given the authority and encouragement to tackle challenging issues which still remain unaddressed.
This difference of perspective has arguably shaped the policy and programmatic priorities of the two actors to the present day: NATO continues in 2013 to have a significant military presence in Kosovo, which together with diplomatic and commercial activity, has helped to ensure that Kosovo’s problems do not spill over its borders significantly and that the process of recovery from violent conflict across the western Balkans has been sustained.

Although there were obvious exceptions such as the early and sustained commitment to DDR for KLA cadres (Barakat and Ozerdem 2005) and the effort involved in establishing the Kosovo Police Service (Bayley 2005; Wilson 2006), internal security was not prioritized to the same extent, particularly in the initial period following the end of the war. Whilst there have been significant efforts aimed at resolving outstanding conflicts with Serbia in particular, it is also clear that these have only really come to the fore in recent years, when arguably the threat of large scale violence triggered by ongoing tensions in Kosovo and between Kosovo and its neighbours has dissipated and once the opportunity had been lost to involve Kosovo Serbs in political processes (Heathershaw and Lambach, 2008) and avoid the ‘Albanianisation’ of Kosovo (Vickers, 1998).

In the early days of the UN mandate in Kosovo, despite the existence of the NATO force and UN Police with responsibility for peacekeeping and law enforcement, they were often seen to be ineffective in preventing or addressing violence, including that between Serbs and Albanians - specifically revenge attacks by Albanians on Serbs. This came into sharp relief in March 2004 when international actors took almost two days to respond effectively to widespread rioting and violence which led to the death of 19 people and widespread destruction of property (HRW 2004). The reasons for this are various but are likely to include the following: the lack of clarity regarding the future direction of Kosovo’s criminal justice sector at the time; and the existence of very weak institutions - if indeed they existed at all - meant that it was often hard to bring a case to a satisfactory conclusion (ICG, 2001: 87).
The inability of the international presence to impose rule of law as a consequence of its limited mandate, the requirement to work within internationally recognised human rights frameworks, and the paucity of local capacity to prosecute and punish offenders within a recognised system of rule of law meant that in many cases, those caught or suspected of carrying out acts of violence were warned and then released, with no obvious sanction for the activities that they had undertaken.\(^{58}\)

### 4.4.2 Additional important peacebuilding activities

In addition to the peacebuilding framework set out by UNSCR 1244 and the UN mission in Kosovo, in the initial years following the end of the war, there was a great profusion of activity that was either labelled as peace-building or which had a distinct peacebuilding dimension. This section describes and analyses these processes and interventions, categorising them for ease of analysis into three groups:

- Community-led activities
- Internationally led, locally-focussed activities
- Internationally led nationally-focussed activities.

It concludes with establishing a chronology of major peacebuilding processes and initiatives before turning to an analysis of SALW, their role in the conflict and efforts to place them under greater control since its end in 1999.

*Community-led activities.* A great many of these activities took place, particularly between 1999 and 2002 (see Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy 2003). They were typically locally focussed in nature and targeted social interactions between community groups within a defined geographic area. They were often internationally supported and included inter-ethnic sports events (such as those

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\(^{58}\) In interviews in 2006 for the SALW Survey of Kosovo, the author spoke to police commanders across Kosovo who reported that when they arrested someone for a crime, their best option for punishment was often to incarcerate the ‘guilty’ party for the maximum 3 day period that they could be held in police detention before being charged as there was very little likelihood that they would ever be prosecuted and face sentencing by the courts. This situation was much more pronounced in the northern municipalities where the Kosovo courts have no reach.
organised in Gjakova by the Kosovo International Centre\textsuperscript{59}), accompanied visits to local markets, joint business development and rehabilitation or establishment of local municipal facilities (such as those organised by local community activists in Obilic to establish a public radio station that broadcast in all the languages spoken in the municipality\textsuperscript{60}).

To an extent, these activities were driven by the requirements of donor organisations (Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy, 2003) which followed a model which suggested that if interactions between different groups of people could be facilitated, then relations would become normalised, and peaceful coexistence could be achieved. Where there does appear to be a difference in the focus of these community-led activities is where the funds were entirely locally derived. Where this was the case (for instance in Ferizaj where local organisations raised money from local businesses to renovate a public space\textsuperscript{61}), there was no specific dimension promoting peace between Albanian and Serbian communities (in this particular case, the local organisers in Ferizaj believed that they needed to contribute to increasing social cohesion amongst those who lived in Ferizaj – including a large returnee and IDP population – before the community would be able to address its differences with others\textsuperscript{62}). However, where an outside donor was involved, it was much more likely that an inter-ethnic dimension would be visible in the way the project was described (see for instance Belloni 2001; Franks and Richmond 2008).

Finally, in the last few years (since 2005), a new form of locally-led, community-focussed activities have been attempted which have a significant peacebuilding dimension. These have been attempted by a network of locally focussed community groups drawn together by the Forum for Civic Initiatives (initially based in Ferizaj, now headquartered in Pristina). The premise of the work was that local

\textsuperscript{59} Interview with Enver Kolokoci June 2011
\textsuperscript{60} Interview by the author in 2005 as part of an assessment of local activities aimed at promoting community safety
\textsuperscript{61} Interview with Ferdinand Nikola, June 2011
\textsuperscript{62} Interviews with Haki Abazi and Astrit Istrefi, Ferizaj December 2010
people should both identify their peace and security problems, and be responsible for developing and implementing responses. Undertaking this work over a period of months facilitated interactions between communities and individuals, built up relations between citizens and local service providers and improved both social cohesion and perceived and real security.63

Internationally-led locally focussed initiatives:

Local Public Safety Councils (LPSCs) were initially an OSCE initiative, which in many ways were similar to CSATS (see below) although they claim to focus at a more local-level that at that of the municipality. In 2010 there were 24 municipalities in which LPSCs were active. Like CSATS they were intended as a contribution to promoting community-based approaches to policing, drawing together local people and law enforcement agencies to identify and address common problems. The similarity of LPSCs and CSATs is a feature of the crowded terrain on which international agencies with an interest in supporting security building activities, particularly those with a peacebuilding component operate. CSATs were essentially a US government initiative, whereas LPSCs were OSCE-led. At the point at which they were established, the US Government and the UN Mission, which included the OSCE as the leaders of the pillar relating to policing were experiencing considerable differences of opinion regarding the speed of Kosovo’s transition and the scale of the UN operation.

Municipal Community Safety Councils have for most of Kosovo’s post-war period been a function of local municipal government. Established to bring together decision makers and local people to encourage participation and oversight of local decision making, they remain today an important conduit between local government and representatives of local communities.64

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63 See Helly, D (2006) for an overview of lessons learned through undertaking community security activities in Kosovo
Community Safety Action Teams (CSATS) were established as a joint programme by the OSCE and the US Department for Justice International Criminal Investigations Training Programme (ICITAP) in 2003 to complement work led by the OSCE which aimed to introduce community-based approaches to policing in Kosovo. Initially focusing on four municipalities, at its peak the programme covered over 20 municipalities. CSATs provided a forum for local people, decision makers, police and other law enforcement agencies to meet to identify and address security and safety related problems at the municipal level (OSCE 2007:5).

**Internationally led national initiatives:**

**Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR).** Launched officially in 2005, the ISSR was a major internationally supported attempt to map the existing security sector in Kosovo and identify its shape for the future. Funded largely by the UK government and working to the Office of Public Safety in the office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo the ISSR team was supported through UNDP, which seconded staff to help manage the delivery of the project. The ISSR published its final report in 2006 (Cleland-Welch et al. (eds) 2006).

Whilst it undoubtedly played a role in bringing together an understanding of the nature of the security sector as it existed at the time, and identifying some its needs for the future, the ISSR was not viewed as particularly insightful in its analysis or far reaching in its recommendations. In 2005, the present author co-wrote a review of the ISSR which sought to identify some of its weaknesses and suggest remedies for the future. These included a failure to comprehensively analyse existing security issues, policies and programmes or to take into account the political culture that existed in the country at the time, and identified flaws in the research methodology which included a rushed timescale, a lack of public consultation and a failure to include regional dynamics and actors (Rynn and Smith 2007).

**Standards for Status:** In 2002, in response to calls for a framework within which the final status of Kosovo would be agreed, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) for Kosovo, Michael Steiner developed what he called the
‘Standards before Status’ policy by which the new Kosovar institutions would be required to meet certain standards on a range of different areas of governance and development prior to any decision being made as to the eventual status of the territory (see Visoka 2011 for a detailed discussion of the development and implementation of the ‘Standards’).

What was initially a local policy was supported in 2003 by the international community through the mechanism of the Contact Group which had been established as part of the initial agreement at the UN to engage in Kosovo. These eight standards were further elaborated through a series of agreed benchmarks by which Kosovo’s development would be judged leading up to a decision in 2005 on Final Status should sufficient progress be made. To meet these goals, Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) created a series of working groups that met regularly to drive forwards progress on the Standards. In 2005, a UN-commissioned report by Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide assessed that further progress on the Standards would not be possible until Kosovo had clarity about its future status, and that the transfer of greater powers from the UN to the Provisional Institutions of Self Government was the only way in which this could be achieved (ICG 2001). The decision to develop benchmarks without a clear agreed sense of the direction and final goal in which development was intended to take Kosovo is discussed in detail in (Knol 2005), where he argues that:

The roadmap drawn up for Kosovo indicated mile markers, but no directions. The policy of ‘standards before status’ was framed in the context of an idea that has garnered increased academic following under the terms of ‘earned sovereignty’. Its operational elements seek to formulate indicators of good governance through which progress of a polis is measured; local institutions are then to be shepherded from one mile marker to the next, from the intermediate phase to the discussion of final status.
The Ahtisaari Roadmap: The inability of the ‘Standards’ framework to make significant progress towards a final status decision led the UN to commission a further report to examine and table specific proposals for a final settlement, which was led by Finnish diplomat, Marti Ahtisaari. His draft proposal, presented in 2007, was formally titled the Comprehensive Proposal for the Status of Kosovo Settlement. The draft which would in effect have granted Kosovo independence (although Ahtisaari was careful not to state this explicitly) included proposals on the following areas, all of which are of great interest from a peacebuilding perspective:

- Constitutional provisions
- Rights of Communities and their Members
- Decentralization of local government
- Justice system
- Religious and cultural heritage
- International debt
- Property and archives
- Kosovo security sector
- International Civilian Representative
- European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) Rule of Law mission
- International Military Presence (e.g., continuation of KFOR)
- Legislative agenda

Responses to the proposal were mixed: the Kosovo government stated that this was in effect a vote for independence; Serbia and Russia rejected the settlement proposal out of hand, and the US, UK and others strongly supported them. Initially there was an attempt to formulate a UN SC resolution which would have replaced 1244. However after several weeks of negotiation it was clear that Russia would not support proposals which gave Kosovo de-facto independence (see Perritt

66 For example, the draft Settlement would give Kosovo the right to apply for membership in international organizations, create a Kosovo Security Force and adopt national symbols.
(2009) for a detailed analysis of the Ahtisaari Plan and of the positions of major international actors).

Following this failure to achieve a Security Council backed outcome to the status question, on 17 February 2009, the Government of Kosovo declared independence from Serbia unilaterally, a move which was quickly condemned by Serbia, Russia and a number of EU countries and equally quickly supported by the US, UK, France, Germany and a number of other EU states. At the time of writing, Kosovo is recognized as an independent country by 86 UN member states.

Figure 8: Chronology of major peacebuilding efforts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Peacebuilding effort or activity</th>
<th>Comments and notes on content and contingency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>UN Resolution 1244</td>
<td>Deployment of UNMIK and KFOR. 1244 established the framework for all significant peace and state building activities since.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>First municipal elections held in Kosovo</td>
<td>Highly contentious and differing turn-outs with high Kosovo Albanian participation and very low Kosovo Serb involvement. Reinforced perceptions, particularly Serbs that the post-war settlement was biased in favour of majority rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Violent Conflict breaks out in Macedonia.</td>
<td>Conflict affects Kosovo’s border areas with Macedonia. Peace agreement reached. Ethnic Albanian groups surrender 4,000 weapons to NATO. Leads to negotiations over the borders between Serbia and Macedonia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Ibrahim Rugova elected President by Kosovo Assembly</td>
<td>Following compromise by different Albanian political parties, Rugova, who had led the LDK from the early 1990s when it operated parallel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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governance and service provision in Kosovo became Kosovo’s first post-war elected head of state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2003 | Standards for Kosovo presented by SRSG in December                   | 13 Standards covering a wide range of areas from functioning democratic institutions to the role and function of the Kosovo Protection Corps, which superseded the KLA and performed a civil contingency role in support of emergency services.  


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2004</th>
<th>Major riots</th>
<th>19 people killed and widespread violence across Kosovo. Acted as a wake-up call for international administrators and others that Final Status discussions had to be taken forwards and resolved.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Eide report on status progress published</td>
<td>UNSG Special Envoy to Kosovo Kai Eide reported that further progress on the Standards would not be possible until Kosovo had clarity about its future status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR)</td>
<td>Internationally supported and UK-led programme to assist the government in identifying its future security challenges and to begin the process of establishing a security sector that would be appropriate to the task. Includes SALW control dimension, with focus on importance of regulating weapons ownership as well as recommendations on wider institutional development and reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Contact Group calls for a</td>
<td>Discord in Security Council makes it impossible to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>EU Planning Team</td>
<td>EUPT established to identify how the EU could provide support in Kosovo in crisis management and transition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>UN Special Envoy Marti Ahtisaari publishes his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Published in February</td>
<td>Without explicitly calling for independence, the road map set out a path through which this would be reached, whilst recommending significant decentralisation of powers to which would allow areas dominated by Kosovo-Serbs significant local government powers. The proposal also recommended the transformation of the KPC into a Kosovo security force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>17 February. Kosovo Assembly adopt independence resolution. Decision referred to International Court of Justice by UN General Assembly in October which determined that declaration was not in breach of international law</td>
<td>EULEX becomes operational in Kosovo – the largest civilian EU mission to date. In August,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MoU signed with UNMIK for transfer of most of UNMIKs remaining functions

### 4.5 SALW and conflict in Kosovo

This section introduces and assesses the role of SALW in the lead up to and during the armed conflict of 1998-9. It then analyses the nature of the SALW control challenge in the post-war period and the efforts undertaken both nationally and locally to tackle it. This is then followed by an analysis of the effects of contingency and complementarity on efforts to control SALW, on peacebuilding efforts, and on the interrelationships between the two sets of activities.

"Albanians, turn over the weapons in time which you were forced to take up. We will turn them against those who want to harm us all.

We are demanding from the gangs of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army to hand over their arms unconditionally.

All those who turn over their guns, and have not bloodied their hands, will be free. Use this opportunity. Tomorrow it might be too late. Ruthless and rigorous measures will be taken against those who do not do so.”

Serbian State Radio 31 March 1999

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4.5.1 SALW in the period leading up to and during the war

There can be no doubt that the availability of SALW was a factor in the intensification of the existing social and political conflict between the Serbian dominated government of Yugoslavia on the one hand and the ethnic Albanian KLA and associated political movements on the other. Weapons were brought into Kosovo from Belgrade for distribution amongst the Serbian population (Ripley, 2000:22) and from Albania, Macedonia (Heinemann-Gruder and Paes, 2001:13), Croatia (Hedges, 1999:39) and from much further afield in contravention of a UN arms embargo (Bromley, 2007) for use by the KLA and others associated with self-defence and the ‘liberation’ of Kosovo. Although over ten years since the end of the conflict, there are still no accurate figures for the numbers of people killed, it is undoubtedly the case that SALW were used by both sides to intimidate and kill large numbers of civilians, as well as combatants.

Beyond this, the role of SALW in Kosovo’s recent history and contemporary life is more complex. Some observers claim that Kosovo, and Albanian culture within Kosovo specifically is infused with a ‘gun culture’. This claim is often substantiated with connections to the existence in some places of aspects of the ancient Albanian system of law called the Kanun, a set of rules and penalties by which Albanian clans have in the past maintained and organised their relations with each other. Following the collapse of the Albanian state in 1997, and consequently following the end of the rule of Kosovo by Belgrade in 1999 there were claims that in certain parts of Albania and Kosovo the Kanun was being reinstated by families who had no other effective means to resolve their disputes within a system of state administered rule of law. This issue, along with the wider topic of the existence or otherwise of a gun culture in the Balkans is explored in depth by Guenev et al in their publication The Rifle Has the Devil Inside (2006: 35). Guenev finds little evidence that this practice was widespread and less that it signifies a particular connection to guns and personal weapons more generally.

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He does though argue that following the incorporation of Kosovo into Serbia, (and subsequently Yugoslavia) following the Balkan wars of 1912/13 many Albanians in Kosovo considered themselves under occupation until the conclusion of the NATO intervention in 1999. He states that generations of people grew up in Kosovo who were used to seeing armed and uniformed men on the streets and knew that the presence of weapons signified power and authority (Guenev 2006: 35). However, until the establishment of the Kosovo Liberation Army in the late 1990s, and their policy of targeting Serbian institutions and representatives, there were very few recorded significant instances of weapons being used to further political views, or in the commission on wide spread social violence.

The availability of SALW in Kosovo was probably low in the decades preceding the 1990s, and those weapons that did exist were likely old, rudimentary and used for hunting and agricultural purposes. The most recent data available from prior to the war recording numbers of civilian registered weapons is from 1989. It shows that at the time, 65,540 weapons were registered to civilians in Kosovo – or an average of 4.1 per 100 residents, which was the lowest total recorded in any Yugoslav Republic or Province (Gorjanc, 2000; Table 2 in Khakee and Florquin, 2003:16). However, the increased tensions brought on by a combination of civil war in parts of Yugoslavia, increased suppression of ethnic Albanian Kosovars by Belgrade and the emergence of a resistance movement willing to take up arms against its perceived aggressors did lead to an increase in the numbers and types of weapons reaching Kosovo.

These weapons came from a variety of contexts. Many were transferred directly from Albania. Quite how they arrived is a matter of contention. The Prime Minister of Albania at the time of the collapse of the pyramid saving schemes which gave rise to wide spread looting of state weapons stockpiles in 2007 was Sali Berisha. A stated goal of Mr Berisha’s government at the time was the unification of Albanian populations in Western Macedonia and Kosovo with Albania (ICG 2001). Whilst he

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71 This claim was substantiated in interviews for this thesis, including an interview with a former Yugoslav army General who defected to the KLA in the run up to 1998 who claimed that for him the decision to enlist was taken to end ‘a hundred years of occupation’. Author interview, July 2011, Pristina.
maintained his silence for many years on the relationships between the stockpile collapses and transfers of weapons to Kosovo and possibly Macedonia, in recent years there have been claims that he was instrumental in the transfer of weapons into Kosovo prior to the outbreak of conflict between the Yugoslav national Army and the KLA. The numbers of weapons transferred are a matter of conjecture. The UNDP claimed in 2006 that based on estimates of numbers of looted weapons transited out of Albania into Kosovo by returning refugees, that it is possible that something of the order of 39,000 were brought into the territory (Holtom et al, 2005:41).

In addition, during the research for this thesis, the author was presented with compelling testimony by those involved which substantiated long-held claims that as the situation in Kosovo became more tense towards the end of the 1990s, Serbian and other Slavic minority people in Kosovo were armed by the Serbian Ministry of Public Order – ostensibly to protect themselves, and to help in the process in putting down any Albanian uprising (Ripley, 2000:22).

Finally, as the governance system in Kosovo broke down in the years prior to the conflict and as it took place, the role of organised crime became much more significant which included facilitating the movement of weapons into and through Kosovo. The pervasive nature of organised crime and its links with the KLA and its commanders in particular has given rise to much speculation over recent years. For instance, in 2010, the Swiss Senator, Dick Marty published a report on behalf of the Council of Europe which claimed that senior KLA commanders including the current

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73 Including by villagers in two different locations: one group of whom as Slavs were handed weapons by the MUP; and the second, an Albanian majority village that had uncovered and stolen weapons given to Serb members of their village before the war but which were left when they left the village fearing reprisals.

74 See for instance the profile of Lubijne in Annex A in which local Bosniak men describe being given weapons by Ministry of Public Order officials and then giving them back, believing that the risks involved in doing so were less significant than accepting the weapons and then being accused by Albanian residents in the post-war period of being Serb sympathisers.
Prime Minister of Kosovo and leader of the ruling PDK political party, Hashim Thaci had colluded in organ harvesting, gun running and other criminal acts during the war in Kosovo (Marty, 2010).

4.5.2 SALW in the post-war context and national-level attempts to control them

The first SALW control activities took place as part of the ceasefire agreement brokered by NATO in 1999 which saw the KLA committing to surrendering a large proportion of the weapons it possessed within the territory of Kosovo, and continue to this day, with the incorporation of SALW control into various national-level strategies and action plans (see Hvidemose, Istrefi, Marzouk et al (2009: 1-2) for an overview of major SALW control activities since 2009). During this period, a wide variety of different types of activity which aim to control SALW more effectively have been attempted. These include:

Surveys and assessments: The UNMIK/UNDP and others commissioned two surveys prior to the development of SALW control programmes. The first was undertaken in 2003 by researchers from the Small Arms Survey prior to the first UNDP programme, which was known as ISAC I. The second was conducted in 2006 by researchers from Saferworld in advance of the KOSSAC SALW control programme, which succeeded earlier programmes, ISAC I and ISAC II. The 2003 research summarised some of the main characteristics of the post-war SALW control problematic in Kosovo at the time as follows: (from Khakee and Florquin, 2003: vii-ix)

- “There are an estimated 330,000-460,000 civilian owned small arms in Kosovo today”
- “The most common weapons in circulation and pistols and assault rifles”
- “Small arms are owned and used by a wide variety of actors”
- “Attitudes towards security providers vary among Kosovans”
- “Kosovans do not appear to be as attached to their weapons as commonly believed”
“SALW are trafficked primarily from Serbia and Albania and the trade is relatively low in comparison with other Balkan states”

“Fatal and non-fatal firearms injuries have decreased since the latter half of 1999”

“Criminality, particularly crime involving SALW is prevalent in Kosovo”

“Firearm-related incidents tend to be rare in schools and colleges”

Of the statistics that were available at the time in the first years following the end of the conflict, most suggested that Kosovo was not an especially violent society. For instance, in 2001 UNMIK Police recorded 89 homicides (slightly higher than Slovenia and slightly fewer than Croatia), and 186 serious assaults (around half the number recorded in Macedonia or Slovenia). (Khakee and Florquin, 2003: 7). The weak state of the criminal justice system and the likely reticence of at least some of those affected to report crimes to either an international police force or to a largely mono-ethnic local police mean that these figures should be treated with caution. However, the perception that large numbers of weapons remained in the country, ostensibly as a result of illicit transfers during the war was of great concern to international policy makers and others.

Whilst by their nature it is difficult to assess accurately illicitly held SALW holdings, the Small Arms Survey did estimate between 330,000 – 460,000 civilian owned SALW in Kosovo in 2003 (Khakee and Florquin, 2003: viii). This number was later revised by UNDP following the second survey researched by the present author and others for Saferworld, which suggested that 400,000 weapons may have been held by civilians in Kosovo (Sokolova, Richards and Smith, 2006: iii). Given that official Kosovo Protection Core (KPC) holdings post-disarmament and transition from KLA to KPC were 2000, and registered weapons less than 50,000, any number close to the those estimated by Small Arms Survey or Saferworld in a population of around two million people just emerging from significant violent conflict could be seen as worrying to those with an interest in peacekeeping, peacebuilding and reconstruction.
Official disarmament of the KLA: This was undertaken in 1999 and resulted in the transfer of around 10,000 weapons (including over 8,500 SALW) to KFOR control from the Kosovo Liberation Army. This action was requested and supported by KFOR and other international actors but was undertaken voluntarily by KLA commanders. The action was very controversial amongst Kosovo Albanians and specifically KLA fighters who raised questions asking why the perceived victor in a war should disarm when the vanquished Serbian forces who were accused of initiating the violent conflict were not expected to undertake comprehensive disarmament\(^7\) (see analysis later in this chapter of the decision by the KLA to enter into a DDR process).

Search and seize operations aimed at removing weapons caches held by KLA, other armed groups and criminals: These were undertaken regularly by KFOR in the years immediately following the end of the war, although KFOR has never published information regarding the total numbers of weapons that it seized. Weapons were also seized from members of the public by UNMIK and Kosovo police, activities which are ongoing as part of KP activities targeting serious and organised crime. See table in Figure 10 below for an overview of seizures by the police since the end of the war.

Weapons amnesty periods targeting civilians and ex-fighters who owned weapons illegally. Initially these periods were organised by UNMIK/KFOR in the period immediately following the end of the conflict. Weapons surrender was not compensated. There were no direct financial incentives offered and surrendered weapons were destroyed by KFOR.

Incentive programmes to persuade civilians to surrender weapons. The UNMIK/UNDP-led attempt to persuade civilians to surrender weapons, initially in competition for development benefits and then in exchange for development took place in 2003 as part of the wider Internal Small Arms Control (ISAC) project. It was

\(^7\) See Heinemann-Gruder and Paes (2001), and interviews with former JNA and KLA Commanders July 2011 and March 2012
highly unsuccessful in terms of the numbers of weapons it removed from the
civilian population for reasons described elsewhere in this chapter, and has not
been repeated since.76

**Figure 9: Numbers of weapons and ammunition collected during voluntary
surrender programmes since 1999 (adapted from Sokolova, Richards and
Smith 2006: 9)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period and activity</th>
<th>Weapons collected</th>
<th>Rounds of ammunition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KLA disarmament (21/6/99-19/09/99)</td>
<td>9,978</td>
<td>Approx. 5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR Amnesty (2001)</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>Approx. 31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR Amnesty (2002)</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>Approx. 59,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP Weapons for Development (2003)</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,406</td>
<td>5,090,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Weapons registration programmes** to provide a framework within which certain
weapons could be held legally by certain groups. Establishing a system by which
certain types of weapons could be legalised for specific purposes formed a part of
several other SALW control activities. These included development of the Weapons
Authorisation Card (WAC) system and later transfer of licensing authority from the
police to the Ministry of the Interior (Sokolova, Richards and Smith 2006:69).

**Legislative and administrative changes** to clarify laws and procedures, and to
provide a basis for law enforcement. Under UNMIK, administrative orders and
procedures were promulgated which provided a legal basis for SALW ownership
and control efforts. Following transfer of law making competence to Kosovo’s
institutions, in 2009 the new Law on Weapons came into force (Gashi and Musliu
2012:5).

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Public education campaigns targeting specific aspects of SALW ownership and misuse. These were formally organised as part of the ISAC I and ISAC II programmes and have been undertaken on an ad-hoc basis at the local level by a variety of civil society organisations in recent years in response to local SALW-related problems.

Destruction of collected and surplus SALW and ammunition to prevent re-entry into society. KFOR regularly destroyed quantities of seized weaponry and ammunition, particularly in the early period following the end of the war. Unexploded ordnance, land-mines and other explosive material was also destroyed, either in-situ or taken to KFOR’s destruction sites in Obilic and Janjevo, where UNDP had provided funding to establish suitable disposal facilities (Sokolova, Richards and Smith 2006: 79).

Efforts to improve stockpile management and security to reduce the risk of pilferage. Following the stockpiling of KLA weaponry, the main concern facing the international administrators regarding the safety of SALW holdings at the time were the evidence rooms of police stations. When weapons were seized or collected by the police they were held at police stations pending their submission to court as evidence in a trial. Given the significant backlogs of cases and the consequent delays that these caused between the initial crime and the prosecution of those charged, these weapons often remained in police stations for several months and in some cases, years.\textsuperscript{77} The conditions in which they were held were often highly insecure: in rooms with doors that did not lock, with windows opening onto the street, on ground floor level; and in piles on the floor and on shelves, often with no secure markings to guarantee effective retrieval. Various international agencies, particularly in the initial years following the war the OSCE and UN Police, attempted to improve and secure evidence rooms as part of a programme of building police stations. However as late as 2006, the author visited the main police station evidence room in Mitrovica where large quantities of weapons were stored without

\textsuperscript{77} Interview with UNMIK Police Commander, and KPS Commander – Mitrovica North in 2006 as part of research for Sokolova, Richards and Smith (2006).
effective markings in a room with no secure door or lock and with a broken window open onto an alleyway to the side of the police station.\textsuperscript{78}

**Improved policing techniques** which aim to tackle crimes involving the use of SALW. A large quantity of support has been provided since the end of the war to support the establishment and then the effectiveness of the police in Kosovo. This was led by the OSCE for many years, although there was also considerable bilateral and other multilateral support. In some limited cases, improvements in policing were identified as elements of SALW control activities (see ISAC I for instance where a pillar of the project strategy was to enhance community-based policing capacity to improve local level crime prevention and investigation) (Willie, 2006). However, in most cases this relationship was not explicit.

Following intense capacity development in the three years immediately following the end of the war, and the transfer of responsibilities from International UN Police to the Kosovo Police Service, the numbers of weapons seized by the police remained fairly constant for much of the post-war period (see table in Figure 10 below) which might suggest that capacity to tackle crime in which SALW were used did not increase significantly. However the available statistics do not demonstrate whether this trend was consistent with total numbers of crimes recorded or investigated, or with any useful estimates as to whether the consistent seizure numbers represented more effective methods given an overall reduction in the number of weapons that could potentially be seized.

*Figure 10: Weapons seized or confiscated by the Kosovo police 2000-2011 (Gashi and Musliu, 2012)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>01</th>
<th>02</th>
<th>03</th>
<th>04</th>
<th>05</th>
<th>06</th>
<th>07</th>
<th>08</th>
<th>09</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conf.</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>1127</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1754</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>1613</td>
<td>1477</td>
<td>1613</td>
<td>1542</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{78} Author interview with Marko Milosevic, Police Commander for Mitrovica North in February 2006.
Enhanced border control which aims in part to reduce the movement of SALW and ammunition across international borders. Kosovo’s borders have remained areas of contention since the end of the war in 1999: A short period of violence erupted in the border areas between Kosovo and Macedonia in 1999 and 2001 (see section on Debellder); the border between Kosovo and Montenegro in the Peja region remained land-mined and contested until after Montenegrin Independence from Serbia; and conflict over the right to police the northern border with Serbia ended in wide-spread violence and a small number of deaths in late 2011.79

Whilst significant activities were undertaken in the early years following the end of the war to establish more effective border management and customs control, this did not yield large numbers of weapons seizures (see table in Figure 11 below), which may suggest either that relatively few weapons were being moved across Kosovo’s borders at the time, or that detection and interception was not effective.

**Figure 11:**  SALW and associated materiel seized by Kosovo Customs Service 2002-2006 (Adapted from Sokolova, Richards and Smith 2006: 16)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>141 SALW; 10,111 rounds of ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2 rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>No records kept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1 Pistol; 1138 rounds of ammunition; 63 lasers; 95 rifle scopes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>750 rounds; 3 gun sights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

79 See ‘Serb Police, Nato boost forces after Kosovo violence’ Reuters 28/7/2011.  
Retrieved 28/03/12
**Figure 12: Chronology of activities to control SALW in Kosovo since 1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 June 1999</td>
<td>Decommissioning of KLA weapons</td>
<td>Around 8,500 SALW plus 1,500 other weapons including RPGs and machine guns surrendered and secured by KFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 onwards</td>
<td>KFOR-led ‘Search and Seize’ operations</td>
<td>Precise numbers of weapons not published systematically by KFOR. However as an indication, even as late as 2004 it was estimated that KFOR was averaging over 4 weapons per seizure operation and in that year it has seized over 2,000 weapons and over 85,000 rounds of ammunition in more than 450 operations.(^{80}) And between January and April 2006 the average daily reported seizure figure for SALW was 5.4.(^{81})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 onwards</td>
<td>Ongoing police and border seizures</td>
<td>See Figure 11 for an indication of the numbers of weapons seized as part of border management operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May – 3 June 2001</td>
<td>KFOR-led general amnesty</td>
<td>777 weapons surrendered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March – 15 April</td>
<td>KFOR-led general amnesty</td>
<td>1249 weapons surrendered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2001 – December 2003</td>
<td>ISAC I</td>
<td>Included first SALW survey, institutional capacity building including support to community based policing, development of a weapons destruction facility for KFOR and support for the establishment of a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{80}\) Interview with Colonel Yves Kermorvant (French Army), Chief of Public Information Office, KFOR HQ, Pristina 17 Feb 2005 during research for SALW Survey of Kosovo (Sokolova, Richards and Smith 2006)

\(^{81}\) Sokolova, Richards and Smith (2006:10)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Programme/Action</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005 onwards</td>
<td>Community Security programming</td>
<td>Initiated by Saferworld and Forum for Civic Initiatives in Viti municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 onwards</td>
<td>Kosovo Small Arms Control Programme (KOSSAC)</td>
<td>Led by UNDP – a programme of activities targeting SALW control which included a SALW survey, the development of a national SALW control strategy for the government and new legislation and associated administrative orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Law on Weapons promulgated</td>
<td>Kosovo clarifies its legal position on a wide range of SALW control related issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 onwards</td>
<td>Community Security Action Plan, Schools Safety Strategy and Concept on Community-based Policing designed</td>
<td>Additional legislation and action plans instigated by the Government of Kosovo that make explicit reference to SALW control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.6  **Analysing contingency, complementarity and context**

This section applies and tests the framework emerging from Chapters Two and Three in particular for describing the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and activities to build peace in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict. It does this through analysing the effects of contingency, complementarity and context. It begins with an exploration of how these factors affect interrelationships between SALW control efforts and peacebuilding activities as sector-specific initiatives before analysing how they affect interrelationships between peacebuilding and SALW control together. It concludes by analysing how, using the case of Kosovo, the framework might be improved and enhanced and suggests further developments which will then be considered in Chapter 5.

4.6.1  **The significance of Contingency**

This section explores the following questions: How does the ordering of peacebuilding and SALW control affect their interrelationships, and effectiveness. And are there particular sequences where opportunities for positive interrelations exist.

It is first important to consider two different but highly related aspects of this dimension before analysing them together: contingencies that exist between different activities to control SALW and those which aim to build peace separately; and those which address SALW control and peacebuilding collectively. This section begins by exploring contingencies between SALW and peacebuilding activities separately before analysing them together.

4.6.1.1  **Analysis of effects of contingency on interrelationships between different SALW control activities**

There are two distinct aspects of contingency between SALW control efforts that require analysis: the effects of contingency on interrelationships between SALW control activities that were planned from a contingency perspective; and those that were not. This section analyses the role of contingency in planned activities first, then assesses its effects on unplanned activities. It is then followed by a section
which analyses the role of contingency on peacebuilding efforts before analysing how contingency affected the interrelationships between peacebuilding and SALW control activities.

**Effects of contingency on interrelationships between planned SALW control activities**

One of the characteristics of attempts to promote greater control over SALW in Kosovo is that they have been grouped into programmes of work which individually are intended to build a comprehensive approach to addressing a particular problem: these programmes have not however been consciously connected, thus reducing the opportunities for contingency to be a positive factor in overall SALW control efforts.

This programmatic approach is more visible from 2001 onwards following the transfer of responsibility for SALW control from the military KFOR operation to the civilian UN Mission. ISAC I (2001-2003) sought to combine different elements of a programme of SALW control activities in such a way that the activities would reinforce and support each other over time. For example, a new system of weapons authorisation and registration was designed, which was followed by a period of public education and awareness raising which was intended to draw public attention to the changes and to a forthcoming amnesty and weapons collection period during which people would be encouraged to register their weapons if they were of a permitted category, or surrender them in exchange for development projects if not. ISAC II focused significantly on maintaining support for weapons authorisation and supporting community-level developments in policing, building on the intended outcomes from ISAC I.

Similarly, the KOSSAC programme, which followed ISAC I and II began with a new survey of SALW in Kosovo from which a programme of administrative and legislative priorities were identified which would culminate in the promulgation of a new Law on Weapons which would for the first time, set out the legal arrangements for controlling SALW in Kosovo.
At this individual programmatic level it is clear that there was effort invested in thinking through potential contingencies and their benefits. However, in reality these were not often realised or maximised. For instance, in ISAC I a public education campaign that focused on a small number of municipalities and for less than two months prior to the weapons amnesty and collection was neither comprehensive, nor long enough in duration to prepare the ground for a nationwide weapons collection programme.\textsuperscript{82}

The main weakness however in how contingency was understood and consequently how it affected interrelationships between SALW efforts was that between the different programme approaches described above. There is no evidence to suggest that ISAC I aimed to learn from and build upon the previous KFOR-organised amnesty periods, and limited connection between ISAC I and ISAC II other than ISAC II was in part designed to spend the funds earmarked for community development grants during ISAC I, none of which were spent as no grants were allocated.

In the research for this thesis a number of reasons were offered and examined as to why these different programmes of SALW control activities didn’t seem to link or attempt to make the most of the potential benefits to be accrued through building on positive contingencies. These included the high turn-over of lead staff in international agencies, principally the UNDP, which meant that those who had been involved in one programme were no longer in Kosovo at the time of planning or executing subsequent programmes;\textsuperscript{83} the lack of willingness to review, evaluate and learn lessons as this might reflect badly on agencies, departments and individuals;\textsuperscript{84} and a pressure to move on and to initiate new activities aimed at bringing stability to Kosovo.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{82} Interview with civil society leader responsible for coordinating the public awareness campaign in Gjilan, July 2011.
\textsuperscript{83} Interview with ex-UNDP employee, July 2012.
\textsuperscript{84} NGO leader who participated in ISAC I and II, interview July 2011. Pristina.
\textsuperscript{85} Discussion with former senior UNMIK administrator. London. March 2012.
**Effects of contingency on interrelationships between unplanned SALW control activities**

In numerous interviews it was apparent that respondents conditioned their perspectives regarding opportunities for, and participation in, SALW control activities at least in part on the basis of their perception of the success or otherwise of previous efforts.\(^{86}\) This relationship was most obvious as regards civilian-focused weapons surrender or collection efforts, but it was still clear regarding administrative, policy and strategic dimensions as well.

The nature of the KFOR search-and-seize operations in 2000 and 2001 were identified by FGD respondents in Gracanica as a significant reason for why they decided not to participate in the 2001 and 2002 KFOR amnesties, or the 2003 UN-led weapons for development project.\(^{87}\) They reported a perception held at the time, which has still not entirely dissipated, that as Kosovo Serbs, they were targeted more aggressively and more regularly. They felt that their community had been put at a disadvantage in terms of its ability to defend itself as a consequence of more of its weapons being seized than they imagined was the case with Kosovo Albanian people living nearby. They also reported that the methods that were employed by KFOR were significant in shaping their willingness to trust, and engage with KFOR and that a lack of trust consequent to negative experiences of search-and-seize operations in part shaped their collective decision not to participate in the KFOR amnesty periods that followed.

"The way they acted was different and it made you feel different towards them. First came the Swedish KFOR and they were polite and had coffee, did their work and then left. Then came the others, [German KFOR] and they pushed themselves in, they broke furniture and shouted. We didn’t want to trust them or help them after that."\(^{88}\)

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\(^{86}\) Interviews *inter-alia* with community members in Germova, Djakova, Peja and Mitrovica, July 2011.

\(^{87}\) Contributions from Focus Group Discussion in Gracanica, March 2012.

\(^{88}\) Male FDG respondent, Gracanica.
In Germova these unplanned contingencies worked both positively and negatively. Initially, the villagers participated in the first KFOR amnesty and surrendered ammunition to US KFOR soldiers. They did this because they wanted to demonstrate good will to the KFOR contingent in their region. They felt that the response that they received from the Americans was courteous and helped them to establish a relationship which they reported made them feel more comfortable with the KFOR presence, which was at the time, highly visible. This positive experience helped them decide to participate in the UN weapons-for-development programme which followed in 2003. They expected a similar approach which they characterised as transparent, cooperative and clear. However, in interviews and FGDs for this thesis, they reported a very different experience. They surrendered a proportion of their weapons to the local municipal leaders, who acted as coordinators for the Programme.

The municipality, in common with all others in Kosovo, was not willing or able to persuade enough people to surrender weapons, and therefore missed the 200 SALW threshold over which development grants would be awarded. Consequently, the villagers lost their weapons, and failed to receive the compensation which they believed they were due for delivering on their side of the bargain:

“In our culture, if you say you will do something you should do it. It is your honour. We gave them weapons. They took them and gave us nothing in return. Afterwards we didn’t trust them.”

Germova is also interesting in that the nature as well as the operation of the 2003 UN collection effort had contingency-related implications. Despite not receiving what they saw as their reward for fulfilling their end of their bargain with the local municipality and UNDP, the ‘reward’ dimension of the activity appears to have conditioned the way in which the village leaders have approached the issue of SALW control subsequently: Whereas in the period

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89 Focus Group Discussion. Germova, July 2011.
90 Male FDG participant, Germova, July 2011.
immediately following the end of the war, they identified SALW surrender as a means by which they could demonstrate good faith to KFOR, whom they saw as potential protectors, and possible aggressors, in later years, they came to see their SALW as items of financial value that the UN thought important enough to try to exchange with them for financial benefit. This change of perception is borne out in the way in which the village leaders have approached subsequent SALW control initiatives.

Due to their involvement in important community security-building activities described elsewhere in this thesis, village leaders from Germova have had the opportunity to participate in various national-level conferences on SALW related issues organised both by the Government and by NGOs including the Forum for Civic Initiatives. In these fora, which have been regularly attended by the author, the village representatives frequently suggest that they have numbers of SALW that they would be keen to surrender to the authorities, but that as representatives of their people, the village council leaders would need to be able to demonstrate that they had converted the value that others had placed on these weapons into material benefit of some kind.

A leading Kosovar NGO Director who has worked closely with the community in Germova for several years claimed that what the villagers were trying to do was natural in a poor community in which there are not significant opportunities to generate money:

“You can’t blame them. They are representatives of their people – their families. It is important for them to be able to show that they have done their best and that they have come back with something. UNDP showed them that what they have is worth something. You can’t really blame them for wanting to cash in.”

The partial failure of the ISAC I and ISAC II projects had interesting implications for the way in which future SALW control activities were conceived. Since the

91 Male KII, Pristina, March 2012.
end of ISAC II the main national-level attempt to control SALW has been organised through the KOSSAC programme, itself a UNDP supported activity. KOSSAC has placed considerable effort on the policy and legislative agenda, and on the development of strategies and action plans for how SALW problems could be addressed through wider reforms to public policy and policing. Despite no formal detailed evaluation having been undertaken of ISAC I and II, it appears that their relative failure has played a role in the decision to focus on other aspects of the problematic.

There have been no nation-wide efforts to encourage surrender of weapons, and no attempt to link disarmament with financial or other material community benefit. Thus, whilst there is a lack of definitive evidence to demonstrate the effects of contingency on the interrelationships between different SALW control efforts, there is a compelling case for suggesting that the failure of one set of activities has clearly influenced future decision making regarding others. This is further supported by the fact that in 2011 the Ministry of Interior requested that UNDP prepare a draft law for an amnesty period to facilitate another period of voluntary surrender. This was done, but UNDP also recommended that three criteria should be met before a decision to go to an amnesty is made. These include a solution being found to the ongoing and seemingly intractable conflict situation in the north of the country, in effect, suggesting that an amnesty and voluntary collection period be ‘mothballed’ until a date some distance into the future.92

4.6.1.2 Contingencies between different aspects of peacebuilding

Contingencies between aspects of peacebuilding organised through NATO/KFOR and the UN are in many cases both clear and important in terms of the effects that a given set of activities had on later efforts.

92 Criteria described at a conference on SALW control challenges on 21 March 2011 in Pristina organised by the non-governmental Forum for Security and attended by the relevant MoI minister and officials and lead UNDP SALW control advisor at which the author described some of the emerging findings arising from research for this thesis.
Perhaps the first important contingencies are obvious between the transition from peace-making through military action coordinated through NATO, to peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts organised under the auspices of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The resolution sanctioned a wide ranging peace support operation that included international military, police and civilian aspects and which framed the transition from a combination of a primarily kinetic military operation and intense international diplomacy - both with the government in Belgrade but also with representatives of the KLA and other Albanian pro-Kosovo political groups and militias - to a civilian-led peacekeeping engagement. This decision was driven by a sense that the levels of violence that Kosovo had suffered in 1999 had been reduced and that there was increasingly little likelihood of it recurring, providing an effective peacebuilding and peacekeeping operation was established.

Thus the first transition between peace-making and peacekeeping took place effectively with the establishment of the UN/NATO hybrid Kosovo Force – KFOR in which the initial success of the NATO engagement in the eyes of many local people, as well as militarily in terms of its impact on the decisions taken in Belgrade to continue to prosecute the conflict acted as a positive contingency.

Further, as the international operation became established and the peacekeeping dimension of its engagement began to register success in preventing the re-ignition of violence on a wide scale, the international presence began to transition from an essentially humanitarian and peacekeeping role into what could be described as a more mixed, or multi-mandate operation (in line with intent set out by Eveerts (2001) – see earlier in this chapter). This placed important focus on aspects of longer-term peacebuilding in addition to maintaining a significant military peacekeeping presence (16,000 KFOR peace-keepers in a county of less than 2 million people in a small geographic area).

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This is perhaps referenced most easily by the reframing of the UN mission through the replacement of one of its initial foundation pillars which focussed explicitly on humanitarian provision to internally displaced people, returning refugees and other vulnerable groups with one which aimed specifically to build security and justice institutions as a contribution to long term peace and security in Kosovo (see also Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy’s translation of this new pillar structure into a phased approach to peacebuilding discussed previously). Given that the security and humanitarian situation in Kosovo had begun to stabilise by this time and the requirements and perspectives of local leaders and others began to move from humanitarian support to questions of longer-term governance, it is appropriate that this transition took place. The initial work on public security, law and order undertaken by KFOR transitioned to a combination of international police and nascent local police. And at this stage, it would appear that the transition was aided by the benefits of contingency over time, with the international presence being able to demonstrate a transition in authority and actors at a point where it still enjoyed a largely positive reputation with local populations.

As the Kosovo peace-support operation matured and as time passed since the formal end of the war, louder calls were made for the transfer of some of the reserved powers which had been held by the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative. This contributed to the establishment of nascent government institutions that were able to shadow the work of relevant international administrators, and over time to take on aspects of their work, with UNMIK retaining the right to veto certain sorts of decisions and activities. The decision internationally to proceed with these Provisional Institutions of Self Government, as they were officially known was in part at least an attempt to balance the demands - of the mostly Kosovo Albanian majority population - for greater control of the functions of government, with a strong reticence amongst numerous UN and EU member states not to in effect legitimise an independence process through giving the green light to the establishment of governance institutions common to an
independent and sovereign state. This decision was later described by SRSG Petersen as ‘one of UNMIKs greatest successes’ (Petersen 2005).

This uncomfortable arrangement was useful for a period in that it bought time for the UN Security Council and its Contact Group of actively involved states to try to reach agreement on what should follow. However, demands from local politicians in Pristina, civil society groups both from within and outside Kosovo, and importantly, key UN member states including the US ensured that this arrangement only had a limited period in which it was considered legitimate. In an attempt variously to provide a sense of direction and momentum, to maintain control over the transfer of power and to buy time, the UN SRSG at the time established a new process of Standards for Kosovo which set out a range of standards that the PISGs would need to meet before further transfers of power took place.

Because of the sensitivities involved in not establishing a de-facto independence process, these were difficult to quantify and so whilst there was considerable energy invested in attempting to make progress, by 2006 a sense of drift and dissatisfaction on the part of a range of different formal and informal, local and international actors required that a new plan would be required to frame the international peace–building operation in Kosovo. This duly arrived in the form of a report by former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari, which quickly became known as the Ahtisaari Roadmap.

Whilst it is clear that in terms of the international peace-support operation in Kosovo, there were attempts to identify and maximise the benefits of contingency, there are also examples of where contingency has been much less beneficial in terms of the implications of actions on longer-term peacebuilding. Perhaps the

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95 Franks and Richmond (2008) and Heathershaw and Lamback (2008) consider this symptomatic of the inability of international actors to protect the peacebuilding agenda and the means by which, in the absence of a political settlement, it became instrumentalised for concentrating majority Albanian political power and setting a trajectory towards independence.
most obvious examples of this are some of the decisions in the early period following the end of the war in the northern part of Kosovo.

The main northern city, Mitrovica straddles the River Ibar. For many generations this has been a mixed ethnic population, with large numbers of Kosovo Serbs living predominantly in the northern part of the city, along with several different minority communities including those of Roma and Bosniak descent and a small Kosovo Albanian population. The southern part of the city was populated mostly by Kosovo Albanians with a small number of those from minority communities, including Kosovo-Serbs. Following the formal end to the war, there was considerable and justifiable fear in some parts of the country that there would be attacks against Kosovo-Serb communities by Kosovo-Albanian groups seeking retribution for the violence that they themselves had suffered. This fear was particularly potent in Mitrovica given the symbolic position of the city and the mixed ethnic makeup.

In February 2000, in response to growing levels of violence, the KFOR Commander at the time who commanded the French-led Northern Sector decided that the best course of action to prevent further escalation would be to close the main bridge connecting south and north Mitrovica and to place KFOR soldiers on the bridge as a physical deterrent (Matveeva and Paes, 2003:26). This played a large part in the bridge becoming a symbolic barrier between north and south Mitrovica, between Serbs and Albanians and between northern Kosovo and the rest of the country.96 In short time, the bridge became a focus of protest, with shots, grenades and other missiles often reported, and with the ‘Bridge Watchers’ community-defence group established on the northern side of the River in view of the bridge which acted as a deterrent, an intelligence gathering operation and a quick responder to perceived or real incidents of aggression from the south side of the River (Matveeva and Paes, 2003:29). In 2013, the bridge remains probably the most potent symbol of difference in Kosovo, a place a regular protest, where barricades were established.

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96 Interviews with a former regional UNMIK administrator (March 2012); and a current senior OSCE official (July 2011).
in late 2011 which prevented the free movement of people, including international administrators between the north and the rest of Kosovo.\footnote{See BBC Serb Man Killed and Two Injured in Kosovo Violence. 10\textsuperscript{th} November 2011. \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15672555}. Retrieved 14/12/2012.}

There have been many peacebuilding attempts in the 13 years since the bridge was effectively closed to local people. These have all failed in one important sense: the physical boundary remains and the ‘northern problem’ (Gashi and Musliu, 2012:1) remains the greatest challenge to the territorial integrity of Kosovo and its greatest barrier to integration with its neighbours, the EU and UN. In this case, the opportunities offered by contingency which have been beneficial in other cases, have not been recognised. Rather, the effects of what was initially an attempt to make and keep peace have been to prevent peacebuilding in any significant sense in the years that have followed.

Outside the formal structures of government and international administration there have been a great number of peacebuilding activities in Kosovo. Some of the key characteristics of these activities are described earlier in this chapter.

As Llamazares and Levy (2003) have demonstrated, it is possible to categorise different forms of peacebuilding according to how they relate to different aspects of a conflict cycle as described in Chapter 2 (see Dudouet (2006) for a review of the origins and use of the conflict cycle concept), and these can be related to factors which are consistent with the Hourglass Model described by Ramsbotham \textit{et al} (2005:12). However, whilst it is possible retrospectively to construct these categories, at the point at which they were conceived there was much lower awareness of likely sequences or of the potential benefits to be derived from understanding opportunities for positive contingency. Consequently, in most cases, the benefits of contingency were not factored into planning, and have not often been recognised in terms of enhancing outcomes over time. There are several likely reasons arising from the research for this thesis for why this may be the case:
The challenges for local organisations working within the programming time-frames of donor organisations: Large amounts of money were spent in Kosovo by donor organisations on civil society and specifically NGO capacity building activities. In the early years following the end of the conflict there were many NGOs and other groups registered in Kosovo undertaking a wide range of different activities (see Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy 2003). A large proportion of these organisations and the activities that they raised funds to undertake had a peacebuilding dimension. The challenge faced by many however, which is a common characteristic of post-war funding, is that funding was often project-specific. This supported the delivery of specific activities but did not explicitly support core organisational functions such as funding, finance and administration, all of which are essential to organisational sustainability.  

A fundamental difference of perspective between local groups and their international supporters in terms of the sorts of activities that they should prioritise: A major focus of post-war support for peacebuilding activities was the promotion of inter-ethnic communication – or more precisely, communication between Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs. In the author’s experience, travelling to Kosovo on a very regular basis between 2002 and 2006, and working extensively with local NGOs and other civil society groups from around the country it was often a requirement of funders that local organisations demonstrate how their proposed activities would encourage inter-ethnic dialogue and exchange. It is clear that this lack of dialogue was, and indeed still is, a significant challenge for Kosovo in its attempts to move on from its period of war. But this explicit focus on ethnicity has been criticised by Kosovo-Serb and Kosovo-Albanian organisations alike during research for this thesis. Whilst their perspectives are sometimes subtly different, they have a similar narrative, in this case expressed by a former NGO leader from Ferizaj:

98 For a substantial analysis of civil society capacity building efforts and sector needs, see Sterland (2006).
99 FDGs in Ferizaj and Gracanica and interviews in Mitrovica, Pristina and Gjilane
“How can we be expected to find peace with the Serbs when we haven’t even found our own peace as Albanians.”

Further, the same interviewee stated:

“At the time at the end of war the internationals wanted us all to come together and for us to forgive the Serbs and join together. It was too soon, but it was also wrong. We can live side by side but it doesn’t mean we have to be together all the time, doing things together and being the same. We are not the same. We are Albanians and they are Serbs. This is our ethnicity – Serbs don’t want to be Albanians and we don’t want to be Serbs. We can live together in the same state, that’s fine but that’s political, not social.”

Despite there being little evidence to suggest that the benefits of activities building on, and reinforcing each other over time were widely understood or reflected in design or planning, there are nonetheless a small number of examples of where this is both the case, and was intended. For example, in 2006 a Kosovar organisation established a process that they termed community safety building.

The organisation in question, the Forum for Civic Initiatives, based at the time in Ferizaj – and supported for many years in different ways by the author of this thesis - developed an approach which they thought would increase in impact over time as the benefits from a given phase reinforced future activities to enhance both the scale and depth of projects. Beginning with one community in which approaches and methods were tested, over the succeeding years since 2006 the approach has been taken forwards directly by the Forum and its local community organisation networks in 10 different municipalities and has also formed the basis of advocacy targeting decision makers at the national level based in Pristina. This resulted in aspects of the methodology and the actors involved being included in national-level government strategies on issues including school safety, community-based policing and community safety. The benefits from contingency are clear: establishing pilot

100 Interview. Former NGO Director, Ferizaj, July 2011.
approaches in which progress can be demonstrated provided an excellent foundation on which further direct support for communities could be based, demonstrating that what worked in one place could also work at a greater level of scale, which in turn could be used as evidence of progress with which to engage and influence government decision makers.

4.6.1.3 Analysing the effects of contingency on interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding activities

This section analyses the effect of contingency on interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding activities. It draws on the analysis from previous sections, which examines how different SALW control and peacebuilding efforts have interrelated as sector specific activities. It begins by exploring how activities interrelate from a contingency perspective and identifies a small number of interrelationships which appear to be particularly significant. It then assesses the role of contingency, both at the national level in Kosovo and in two specific localities in which SALW control and peacebuilding have taken place during similar periods. Finally, it analyses the role of context in helping to shape, and understand the nature of interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding.

The effect of contingency on interrelationships
Contingency has played a significant role in determining the nature of interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo. From the data introduced and discussed in this chapter, the following aspects are of particular interest:

The relationship between a lack of willingness to disarm and a lack of clarity over the future status of Kosovo: At the macro-level, by far the most likely reason for individuals not surrendering their weapons in the initial years following the end of the war was the unresolved status of Kosovo and the implications that this had for the provision of security both nationally and locally.\textsuperscript{101} As time has progressed, and

\textsuperscript{101} For instance, in 2005, in response to a multiple-choice question in a national household survey which asked in which circumstances respondents would own a firearm, 76.8\% and 24.6\%
certainly following the declaration of independence in February 2008 this factor is less significant as a justification for weapons ownership – with the exception of those living in the north of Kosovo or in the majority Kosovo-Albanian areas in the border municipalities (Reeve, 2012:17). But in the early years, there was significant concern amongst many Albanians and others that Kosovo might not in the end be able to control its own destiny and that its future would be decided by international administrators or directly by the UN Security Council.

In this context, where initiatives such as the Standards for Kosovo were seen by many as a means by which independence could be held off, there were real fears both that the population may have to take up arms again in the future to protect itself, or that a decision would be made on the future of the country which would endanger the physical security of people at the community level. All this uncertainty regarding how the initial peace-making and peacekeeping would translate into a long term peace for Kosovo created an environment in which it was very unlikely that significant proportions of the population would decide to disarm.

The positive relationship between perceptions of KFOR and the effectiveness of amnesty periods in 2001 and 2002: At first glance, the amnesty periods do not appear to have been major successes in their own right in terms of the overall numbers of weapons that were surrendered. However, in comparison to efforts that followed and, with hindsight, the real difficulties of persuading a population to disarm in a context in which the future status of the country is effectively on hold, they were in reality positive and important contributions to reducing the overall numbers of weapons held in Kosovo at the time.

Following the end of the war in 1999, KFOR was seen by many as a positive contributor to peace and security. This pertains to Kosovo-Serbs as well as those of Albanian ethnicity who one might have imagined would have been inherently hostile to KFOR involvement following the decisive role of NATO in prosecuting and

respectively claimed that would be ‘To protect myself/family’ and ‘For fear of conflict/war’. (Richards, Sokolova and Smith 2006:56).
ending the war. However, in studies since 1999 KFOR has often been identified as the only international security provider which is trusted to any significant degree by the Serbian population in Kosovo – although this trust remains qualified and is significantly weaker than that held by the corresponding majority Albanian population.¹⁰²

This generally positive perception of KFOR contributed over time to a perception that it was both important to engage with KFOR to demonstrate willingness and openness to the agency most likely to provide protection in time of need, and that KFOR was an honest broker and would deliver on its commitments. Interviewees for this thesis claimed that the decision to participate in the amnesty periods was conditioned by their perceptions of the behaviour and role of KFOR previously.¹⁰³ In this context, contingency was an important factor in the development of a positive interrelationship between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts.

The relationship between frustration with the role and performance of the UN mission and the lack of participation in the UN-led ISAC I and II projects: Whilst it was initially welcomed, the UN mission in Kosovo quickly became the source of public dissatisfaction with the speed and direction that the territory was taking. Unjustly, in some cases, many of those living in Kosovo felt that UNMIK was directionless, bureaucratic and inefficient (Richards, Sokolova and Smith 2006:44-46). Many people didn’t trust it and believed that as an agency responsible ultimately to the UN Security Council, which featured at least one permanent member which was implacably opposed to Kosovo independence and was still at the time a major armorer and supporter of President Milosevic, it was inevitably a product of compromise that couldn’t provide the direction that the majority of the population supported.

¹⁰² See for instance Bennett (2011:7) for an analysis of nationwide attitudes towards security and security providers which claims that KFOR is the only international actor in Kosovo in which the Serbian population have any trust.
¹⁰³ FGD Germova July 2011 (see Germova section in Annex A).
More specifically, the reputations of the UN Police and Prosecutors, UNDP, UN Habitat and other agencies compared to KFOR were very poor. In this context, which played out at the local levels as much as nationally and in Pristina, the perceptions of UNMIK by many Kosovars had a strong effect on their willingness to trust and engage on sensitive topics with UNMIK and its representatives. It is clear from interviews and focus group discussions described elsewhere in this thesis that the ownership, use and potential surrender of weapons was one such topic. In this context, public perceptions of UNMIK, and at a local level, of UNDP in certain contexts (see Germova below) was significant in shaping attitudes towards the weapons collection plans contained in ISAC I. In this case, the effects of contingency were negative in terms of the opportunities of interrelationships between peacebuilding activities and SALW control efforts to promote and reinforce each other.

The effect of peacebuilding institutions in creating the context in which SALW control was attempted: The weakness of internationally-led attempts to enhance SALW control has not been tested through a thorough evaluation and this is a reality that runs through the Kosovo-related material in this thesis. However, from interviews with those involved and commentators active at the time, it appears that with the exception of KFOR, there was relatively little interest in the issue of SALW control above that relating to the collection of weapons from civilians.

The recent experiences of weapons collection in Albania and to some extent, Bosnia and Croatia may have played a role in the decision to focus on civilian weapons collection. But is does appear to be the case that at the time of ISAC I and II when a range of different initiatives were attempted which included, but were not limited to weapons collection, one of the factors that contributed to failure was the lack of clarity regarding the legislative and procedural arrangements covering SALW

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104 Kils in Gracanica, Germova and Gjakova, July 2011.
105 The UNDP, under the auspices of the Regional Stability Pact, organised weapons collection activities in numerous countries in the Western Balkans which drew heavily on a ‘weapons for development’ methodology that was developed in Albania in the late 1990’s. See Western Balkans study in Chapter 3 and Rynn et al (2004) for further detail.
control. For example in 2006, over 7 years following the establishment of international administration in Kosovo there were 54 pieces of law and administrative procedure that related to SALW control generally (Richards, Sokolova and Smith 2006: 62). Further, it was not until 2009 when the new Law on Weapons\textsuperscript{106} came into force that the legislative context was clarified in line with regional and international best practice (Gashi and Musliu, 2012: 9).

In research for a study that examined this in detail (Richards, Smith and Sokolova, 2006) it was clear that there was very little awareness on the part of administrators, let alone responsible departments of the Police (local or national) regarding the legislative basis for controlling SALW. The lack of clarity around who could own weapons, on what terms and how and for what they could be used (relating to civilians as well as other groups such as private security guards) was cited as a real factor in the confusion which surrounded the SALW control efforts. Why this is the case is unclear, although to the author working closely with UNMIK at the time, and in the view of some commentators, it appears that there was not sufficient focus on SALW as an issue prior to the development of ISAC-I and not enough preparation in the project’s early stages to ensure that the rules and procedures were clear. Subsequently the confusion at the centre was echoed in the targeted communities where people report that they did not know when and how they could surrender weapons, didn’t believe that they wouldn’t be prosecuted, did not understand the nature of the incentive programmes on offer or the role of different actors.\textsuperscript{107}

It appears that this lack of focus by the organisations responsible for leading peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo contributed to the development of a situation in which the institutions, as well as the public, were not prepared for SALW control efforts when they were initiated. In this example, the interrelationships between the functions of an institution responsible for peacebuilding and SALW control were not positive in the sense of the contingency linking one set of priorities and

\textsuperscript{106} Law on Weapons. Law number 03/L-143. Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo. 17 September 2009.

\textsuperscript{107} KII from Germova, Peja and Gracanica, July 2011 and February 2012.
approaches to a later decision to attempt a major national SALW control programme. However in so much as the failure to provide clarity as part of overall efforts to establish rule of law in Kosovo affected negatively the success of subsequent SALW control efforts, there was a contingent relationship, which in this case was negative.

The relationships between well-intentioned attempts to control SALW and their consequent impacts on security: To some of those who supported and played an active part in the 2001-2003 ISAC I programme, the failure to collect significant numbers of weapons during the amnesty period in 2003 was seen as slightly misleading in the way in which it shaped opinions and perspectives regarding the success or otherwise of the whole ISAC programme. They pointed to the fact that over 26,000 SALW had been brought under greater control by the government as a consequence of them being registered as part of the programme. However, closer inspection of the system for ‘legalising’ weapons suggests that the offer to bring weapons under greater control might in itself indirectly have helped to stimulate the transfer of additional weapons into the country.

The motivation behind the offer to legalise existing ownership was based on an assumption that there were large quantities of SALW in Kosovo and it supposes that not all of these weapons posed a direct threat to life or security, and that in many cases, individuals would be unwilling to surrender weapons, but might be persuaded to legalise them, thus bringing them under a great level of control than they would otherwise have been if they had remained in personal ownership without being either surrendered or registered.

As the registration programme was being designed the decision was taken not to require owners to be able to demonstrate where they got their weapons from

108 Interviews with the author during research for the SALW Survey of Kosovo (Sokolova, Richards and Smith 2006) and the SALW Monitor (Rynn et al 2004) by UNDP project staff and UNMIK officials.
initially.\textsuperscript{109} The primary reason for this was a belief that there would be a large number of people who had owned their weapons for long periods and knew where they originated, but that they wouldn’t be able to prove it. This was due to a combination of people’s personal papers often getting lost as they moved around the country to avoid the fighting; and the fact that when they had taken ownership of their weapons many years ago – possibly inherited from family members - there were no accompanying papers.\textsuperscript{110}

This decision brought a considerable element of doubt into the registration process: whose weapons were being registered; how long had they been in Kosovo; and what might they have been used for previously? In an interview for this thesis, a senior police officer at the time, who led the department responsible for conducting background checks into those seeking to own weapons legally, reported that a significant proportion of the weapons that were legalised through ISAC I were newly made and often expensive. Further, many of them were made in Turkey and in some cases Germany and Austria, and not in any of the countries of the former Yugoslavia. During the time before the war in 1999, weapons that people could own and access in Kosovo were made within Yugoslavia, mostly at the Zastava factories in Serbia: it was not possible to import weapons from other countries without enjoying significant privileges or having a particular use for them as part of the security apparatus at the time. Therefore, the interviewee claims, the registration process was used as a method through which significant numbers of weapons were brought into the country via the black market and then legalised, possibly after they had been used in the commission of violent crime, or to facilitate trafficking or other illicit activities.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{109} KII former senior police commander with responsibility for SALW licencing and tracking illicit weapons. Pristina July 2011.
\textsuperscript{110} This was substantiated by a male KII (Ferizaj, July 2011), who claimed that during the war his family fled first from Ferizaj to northern Albania and then to Macedonia where they stayed until after the war ended. They moved with what they could carry and many of their personal papers including birth and marriage certificates were lost. In this context he believed it highly likely that those who did have official papers for their weapons would have lost them as they moved.
\textsuperscript{111} Interview with former senior police officer responsible for background-checking firearms license applicants
Due to the lack of information recorded at the time of registration, and poor record keeping relating to current crime data, the information is not available which would be able to prove whether or not any of these weapons that seemingly had been brought into the country to take advantage of a weakness in the registration system have been used in crime. And so it is ultimately unclear how strong the interrelationship is between poorly executed but well intentioned SALW control efforts and negative impacts on peace and security.

However the premise underpinning the registration process, that people would not surrender weapons but they might register them, and the likelihood that some of the registered weapons were imported illegally (there was no legal means by which SALW could be imported into Kosovo at the time), suggest that at best, the registration process did little to place SALW under greater control, and that in reality it might have helped criminals to ‘clean’ weapons that had been used in armed violence.

4.6.2 Analysis of complementarity between efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding activities

This section examines how activities to enhance SALW control interact with peacebuilding efforts taking place in the same time and space. Consequently it is organised to focus on two areas that are of most importance to this thesis: interrelationships at the national-level; and those at the subnational and community levels. There is considerable overlap between these two dimensions and where this is important it has been identified below.

Examining local-level interrelationships across the whole of Kosovo is not possible within the constraints of this thesis. Therefore a small number of examples were chosen to provide depth in the analysis. These were selected on the basis of fulfilling a small number of criteria: contexts where a significant amount of peacebuilding and SALW control was attempted; representativeness of the context (rural/urban/geographic location/ethnic makeup); the existence of especially
interesting outcomes that in themselves demonstrate particular interrelationships. Using these criteria, two locations were selected – Germova and Debellder. Both contexts are introduced and justified as examples and analysed in section 4.3, which follows an initial exploration of interrelationships at the national level in the section below.

4.6.2.1 Description and analysis of complementarity at the national level

There are two distinct periods since the end of the war where major international peacebuilding efforts have occurred at the same time and in the same geographic space as activities to control SALW (see Figure 12 for a chronology of peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo since 1999). The first of these took place from 1999 until 2007 when UNMIK had executive responsibility for decisions relating to security and Kosovo-level governance. During this time, KFOR organised three weapons amnesty periods and undertook regular search and seize operations, the KLA (as it was at the time) disarmed many of its weapons, and the UNDP coordinated ISAC I and ISAC II, which are all described in detail earlier in this chapter and involved a wide range of local and international bodies and institutions. The second period was from 2007 onwards when the EU began to play a more central role during planning for, and then deployment of, the EULEX mission. During this time, the UNDP and others developed and supported the KOSSAC programme in partnership with various ministries and other bodies, most notably the Ministry of Interior. This section addresses these two periods in turn, drawing out where interrelationships existed and whether the outcomes of either were positively or negatively affected by their interrelationships.

Interrelationships differed over time during this period and between different actors. However, overall it is probably best characterised as largely positive in the early period and probably largely negative in the later. This contention is justified below:

Positive interrelationships: NATO and then its successor, KFOR, helped to provide a sense of security and of possible transitions to a more peaceful future. In this light,
limited but tangible progress was made with SALW control, including importantly reducing a little the numbers of illicit weapons in the country at the time\textsuperscript{112} and making progress with DDR (Barakat, 2005). The role of KFOR as enforcer of UNSCR 1244 and protector on one hand, and as the agency responsible for administering the initial amnesty periods on the other, made institutional operationalization of commitments to both peacebuilding and SALW control more manageable, with less of a requirement for consultation and inter-agency debate on competency issues. The perception of many of Kosovo’s residents that KFOR was to be trusted was very important in the limited success of SALW control programmes.

**Negative interrelationships:** The perception of UNMIK was not positive and its role in ISAC I in particular did not engender a sense of engagement by the public or Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Furthermore, the weaknesses of the programme were negative in terms of the impact that this in turn had on the perception of the ability of UNMIK to manage the delivery of projects and programmes.\textsuperscript{113} There were institutional problems relating to UNMIK and its pillar system and to the focus and success of different aspects of peace- and state-building, including the development of the police and courts system. But overall the most negative interrelationship was between the lack of clarity over the final status of Kosovo and the means by which it would get there, and creating the public and institutional confidence that would have created the conditions in which SALW numbers could be reduced and those that remained placed under greater control. This tension, which attended the UN Mission from its initial engagement in 1999 until its mandate was significantly reduced in 2006/7, was important in sustaining public attitudes to weapons possession.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{112} Whilst the UN-led voluntary collection efforts yielded few weapons, KFOR seized quantities of illicit weapons on a monthly basis.
\textsuperscript{113} KIs in Gracanica and Germova in July 2011 and discussions between the author and the former Head of SEESAC in 2005.
\textsuperscript{114} Several surveys including Richards, Sokolova and Smith (2006), Hvidemose, Istrefi and Marzouk (2009) and Bennett (2011) identify weak public trust in UNMIK and other international actors and dissatisfaction with the lack of direction over Kosovo’s future status and relationships with its neighbours.
Interrelationships at the national level from 2007

The arrival of the EULEX mission and the drawdown by UNMIK coincided with the most significant period of activity for the KOSSAC programme. This presented both opportunities and threats to the effectiveness of SALW control efforts. On the positive side, the change in international leadership was initially strongly supported by many Kosovars and helped to create an atmosphere in which renewed engagement and trust was possible, and was perceived by many in Kosovo as a stepping stone towards international recognition, which if forthcoming would have reduced one of the most significant barriers to disarmament across the country. The KOSSAC programme was still new and was located within the Ministry of Interior which itself was enjoying additional powers and responsibilities with many of UNMIK’s executive roles not taken on by EULEX. However on the negative side, the change in international leadership ran the risk of what lessons that had been learned from previous efforts being diluted and potentially lost. In reality, the picture was mixed and thus the outcomes of the interrelationships were mixed.

Positive aspects of interrelationships: On the positive side, KOSSAC was able to engage more systematically than previous efforts, from an initial understanding of the remaining problem to the selection of a set of activities which were both achievable and in line with the wishes of politicians and officials at the Ministry of Interior in particular.\footnote{KII, UNDP KOSSAC Programme Manager, Pristina February 2012.} Thus, a new Law on Weapons was promulgated, a SALW control strategy developed and SALW control integrated into the strategies and work programmes of a range of different national actors. The greater capacity at the Ministry was essential in facilitating much of the KOSSAC programme and for providing political leadership within government. The reduction in the scale of the international presence meant that coordination challenges were reduced, alongside debates over which agency had competence on specific issues. However, whilst these interrelationships were largely positive and should be acknowledged, it is also the case that during this period there was no specific activity to reduce SALW numbers; rather, the emphasis was placed on administrative arrangements and
capacity with the intention of reducing the impacts of illicit weapons rather than numbers of weapons per se.\textsuperscript{116}

**Negative aspects of interrelationships:** It is not clear that interrelationships were negative in terms of tangible SALW control efforts and specific peacebuilding activities. However, interviewees did claim that during this period more could have been done if there had been more political will on the part of government and a clearer sense on the part of EULEX in particular that addressing SALW problems was an important part of addressing wider security and justice issues.\textsuperscript{117} As EULEX developed in Kosovo its popularity began to fall in the eyes of many (Marzouk, 2007). This served to damage the perception of international actors performing a useful role, which was negative for the KOSSAC programme in the sense that whilst officially it was led by the Government, in reality the funding and at least some of the expertise came from the UNDP. Perhaps the most important mitigating factor in this case was that as there wasn’t a significant public education or awareness raising component to the programme at the time, there was very little public awareness of its existence.

**4.6.2.2 Analysis of interrelationships at specific periods and in particular places**

The two locations analysed below were identified using the criteria introduced earlier in this chapter to examine the extent and nature of local-level complementarities and interrelationships and were introduced in the section above which analysed the profiles of the selected research locations.

**Germova**

As described earlier, Germova has been the subject of various SALW control related activities and numerous peacebuilding efforts since 1999. It is therefore an interesting example from the perspective of the potential interrelationships that may exist between efforts to control SALW and build peace within the same periods


\textsuperscript{117} Kils, FIQ Director and Saferworld Programme Manager in Kosovo. Pristina, July 2011.
of time and space. There are two important periods during which it is useful to explore potential complementarities:

The immediate aftermath of the formal end to the war: At this time, villagers in Germova which was at this stage following the departure of Kosovo-Serb residents, mono-ethnic, were fearful about the potential for further attacks and at one point fired on an advancing group of soldiers, imaging that they were JNU forces returning to fight. These soldiers turned out to be American KFOR troops. Realising their error, and being keen to develop positive relations with the Americans they offered to disarm a portion of their weapons and surrender a quantity of ammunition. This was accepted and formed an important element of local-level relationship - and confidence - building which villagers claim helped them to begin the process of rebuilding their community. The act of surrendering SALW and through this act, placing them under greater control, contributed in a small and very local way to enhanced relationships and a greater confidence on the part of villagers to face the future. In this example interrelationships can be seen as beneficial to both SALW control and peacebuilding aims.118

The period surrounding the UNDP SALW collection in 2003: As with Debellder (see below), Germova was targeted by the UNDP SALW collection effort. However unlike Debellder, villages did surrender weapons, although this was done without enthusiasm, and as is demonstrated in the section focussing on contingency above, the experience of the community at this time negatively shaped their willingness to engage in subsequent SALW control or internationally-led peacebuilding activities.

At the same time that preparations were underway for the weapons collection activities, there were three substantial peace-building related efforts underway. The first were the ongoing attempts by the American KFOR contingent to promote good community relations and to respond to the security concerns of communities to help encourage transitions towards development and away from fears of

118 FGD Germova, July 2011.
renewed conflict. Relations between the villagers and KFOR remained positive and to a large degree, it appears from the responses provided by interviewees that their efforts were generally well received.\(^{119}\) An important element of the decision to participate in the SALW collection effort was in part shaped by positive previous experiences (see contingency section above) but also by the fact that KFOR in which the villagers had developed a level of trust since the end of the war were involved in supporting the collection. KFOR was involved in official communications regarding the SALW collection efforts, which included using its logo and branding on posters, leaflets and other communications products.

The second set of peacebuilding efforts centred on the efforts of UNDP and UN HABITAT. These agencies had responsibility within the UN Mission for supporting the renovation of houses damaged during the war in order to facilitate the return of IDPs and refugees. In the same period that the SALW collection programme was being discussed and communicated, UNDP and UN HABITAT began discussions with the villagers in Germova regarding the reconstruction of houses, including those previously occupied by Kosovo-Serbs as part of a process of encouraging their return. After much debate within the community, the residents of Germova agreed to this suggestion, judging that they would be willing for Serbian families to return if they were collectively able to benefit from the building works undertaken. To the residents, they believed that they had agreed a deal with the representatives of the UN agencies.

However, in the end, the work did not begin, Germova was not selected for a returns project and the villagers felt that they had been badly let down. In their minds, they had agreed to allow Kosovo-Serbs back into their village despite the fact that the war and its effects were still fresh in the mind and were ready to fulfil their side of the bargain.\(^{120}\)

\(^{119}\) FGD and KII, Germova, February 2010 and July 2011.

\(^{120}\) KII, male Germova village council member, February 2010.
The failure of the UN agencies to deliver on what the community saw as their commitment made them very distrustful of outsiders offering what one respondent described as ‘trades’. This perceived failure of the UN system was cited by focus group participants as a major factor in their reticence to participate in the planned UNDP-led SALW collection effort which took place in the same period and location.

Thirdly, significant resources were at the time being invested in the role and capacity of municipal government and in the provision of basic municipal services. In an echo of their decision to show good will to the KFOR contingent through partial disarmament, the villagers thought that participation in the SALW collection project would demonstrate their willingness to work with the municipal authorities and to build relationships which would result in enhanced cooperation and consequently bring greater benefit to the community.

In this example, the development of local government which was framed as part of the Kosovo-wide process of peace-building and recovery was a contributory factor in the decision to participate in the disarmament process. However, the failure of the municipality to collect enough weapons from neighbouring communities and trigger the release of development funds from UNDP was damaging to the standing of local leaders in Germova, and consequently to relations between Germova and the municipal authorities. The interrelationships between peacebuilding efforts and SALW control activities were clearly apparent at this time, with peacebuilding activities stimulating a willingness to disarm, but also with the failure of the weapons collection activities having an impact on the perception of the local peacebuilding activity.

As a post-script, when the author first visited Germova in 2005 (in the context of NGO programme development work), the village leaders were hostile towards what

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121 KII, male Germova village council member, July 2011.
122 FGD, Germova, July 2011.
123 FDG, Germova, July 2011.
124 KII Germova village council head, Pristina 2011.
they perceived to be another foreigner arriving in their village to ask questions and the leave with vague promises that they were sceptical would be fulfilled. Once relationships had been established they claimed that they had been abandoned by the municipal government, in part as a consequence of the fallout from the SALW collection process. They claimed that they were not provided with police patrols despite requests based on real safety fears, and did not receive basic services in line with those enjoyed by other villages in the municipality. Together these two factors suggest that the impact of the SALW collection effort and the peacebuilding activities that had taken place in the same time and space had been negative, at least in terms of the perception village leaders had of foreigners and in terms of the relationships between the village and its municipal leaders.  

Debellder  

Debellder was significantly affected not just by the conflict involving the KLA, the Yugoslav National Army, Serbian security forces and KFOR. It was also heavily affected by border conflicts with Macedonia and by the Albanian uprising in Macedonia in 2001. Tensions remain in Debellder, in large part due to the failure to-date to find a lasting solution to the problem of residents being able to access their lands which now lie across the border in Macedonia, and residual fears over landmines and other explosive remnants of war.

Immediately following the end of the KLA/JNA war, KLA fighters from the village who had enlisted and gone to fight in other parts of the country began to come home. Some of them participated in the KLA disarmament exercise, but many didn’t, preferring instead to take off their uniform, keep their weapons and return home to civilian life. Whilst the conflict had been active, landmines had been used in Debellder to prevent residents repairing telephone lines. Due to the remote nature of the village, some of those who remained behind armed themselves for self-defence purposes. In 1999 therefore, following the formal end

125 From regular meetings and interviews between the author and village council representatives in 2005 in Germova as part of research conducted in causes and effects of community insecurity in the village and surrounding area (Rynn and Smith 2005).
126 KIIs with former KLA fighters from Debellder in Viti town centre, July 2011.
of the war, there was a considerable quantity of SALW and associated ammunition and explosives in the village. Following the outbreak of conflict in Macedonia in 2001, the village was shelled repeatedly from Macedonia and properties were attacked, both by Macedonian forces, and by local residents, some of whom targeted Macedonian properties in the village. This further increased the amount of SALW and the tensions and fears which may have encouraged their use.

Efforts were undertaken to resolve the border dispute with Macedonia, which did end the violence and which has held to this day (Attree 2011:13). However to many in Debellder, the cessation of hostilities represents what Galtung (1969) referred to as a ‘negative peace’ which, whilst ensuring an absence of violence, has not created the context in which residents can look forwards to the future.

This is evidenced in the responses from interviewees who reported that the majority of people who lived in Debellder prior to the conflicts now live in the main municipal town of Viti in the valley, and that they are still fearful of the proximity of the village to the border. The village, an outlying part of Viti Municipality, has been subject to the governance arrangements that the rest of Kosovo has experienced since 1999, including the establishment of the Kosovo Police, the transformation of the KLA and the development of municipal government. However, villagers participating in the focus group discussions for this research claimed that they had not been significantly affected by these developments from a peacebuilding perspective as they rarely saw police patrols, didn’t suffer significantly from criminal violence and had minimal contact with the Municipal government. Therefore it was difficult to demonstrate that there were significant opportunities for complementarity between recent SALW control efforts and contemporary peacebuilding activities in Debellder specifically.

However, in the years following the end of the KLA/JNA conflict these opportunities were much more significant. During the early attempts by KFOR in 1999 and 2000

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127 KIs and FGD, Debellder and Viti Town, July 2011.
to remove weaponry from communities, local residents claim that they cooperated well with KFOR troops, who helped them to collect and dispose of unexploded ordinance and ammunition that they no longer required. Further, in the period following the end of the conflict in Macedonia’s borderlands between the Macedonian army and Albanian insurgent groups, KFOR played an important role in helping to remove unexploded shells and other material; one interviewee claimed:

“In the beginning they were helpful and came to see what we needed. They helped take away mines and shells. Then later they didn’t come any more and private companies came instead.”

In both cases, villagers report that these activities were seen positively and that they did help to reduce tensions and to encourage some people to return home. However, they also state that this support for controlling arms and ammunition did not facilitate a return to the existence that they had previously enjoyed. They claim that whilst it did make them more willing to consider picking up their previous occupations, and it did help them build trust in KFOR and other international forces, other factors were more powerful in their decision making regarding whether to return. These included the fear of attack if they crossed the border into Macedonia to use their lands; and the ongoing fear of attack and remaining UXO which prevented them from re-cultivating their lands on the Kosovo side of the border were cited as the most critical factors.

Therefore, whilst the activities of KFOR were complementary in terms of the changes in attitudes towards the international presence, and in villagers’ willingness to engage with the changes that were taking place within Kosovo, these complementarities were not strong enough to encourage a return to previous occupations and livelihoods, or to persuade residents to return to the village to live full-time. There are additional reasons for this, including the reality that during the conflict when many residents moved to the municipal capital and elsewhere they

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128 FGD Debellder, July 2011.
129 KII, Debellder, July 2011.
130 KII’s and FGD Debellder, 2011.
established new homes and livelihoods which were hard to give up as circumstances changed. However the significant remaining security issues outlined above were most explicitly and consistently raised by interviewees.¹³¹

Potential complementarities were more obvious however in the period leading up to the UNDP-organised SALW collection project embedded within the broader ISAC I programme. Viti was one of the Municipalities which were prioritised by the central Government in Pristina and considerable effort was invested by the UNDP and its agents in promoting the forthcoming activities. This took place at a time when significant investment was being made by the government and international agencies to promote peace and reconstruction, which included promoting the return of IDPs to their former villages, increasing the presence and activity of the nascent Kosovo Police Service (KPS), and supporting a range of municipal-level initiatives including the Local Public Safety Councils introduced earlier. However, despite Viti being prioritised and being one of the only Municipalities that collected any weapons, none were surrendered by residents of Debellder. The reasons given for this differ, but a dominant response during research for this thesis was that SALW owners were not convinced of the need to surrender their weapons:

“We had the weapons at home, sure. But we didn’t use them. Everyone has their reasons for why they had them. I had mine from the war and didn’t want to give it up. It reminded me of the previous times.”¹³²

For others, fear of further conflict or the perceived financial value of their weapons, were important factors in retaining and not surrendering them when they had the opportunity.¹³³ Even in a context in which peace-building efforts were underway within the territory of Kosovo, and where these were mostly viewed positively by communities, their existence did not have a significant influence on SALW control efforts at the time, and therefore potential complementarities were not realised in terms of facilitating positive outcomes.

¹³¹ KIIs and FGDs, July 2011.
¹³² Male Interviewee, Debellder, July 2011.
¹³³ FGD Gracanica, March 2012.
In both the initial phase in which KFOR demining efforts didn’t play a great role in facilitating significant transitions to peace, and in the latter case where the existence of positively perceived peacebuilding activities did not facilitate participation in SALW control efforts, it would appear that the potential interrelationships that exist within the dimension of shared time and space, were not from a positive perspective realised fully. However, from a negative perspective, these interrelationships were probably catalytic in shaping the behaviours of the various actors concerned.

4.6.3 Effects of Context on interrelationships

4.6.3.1 Introduction

The third dimension of the analytical framework for describing the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding activities focuses on the effects of the context in which the activities take place. In particular it assesses how different attitudes towards peace and conflict and the role that SALW and SALW control can play in either stimulating conflict or promoting peace affect how the two issues interrelate. Chapter 2 of this thesis identified Lederach’s Actors and Approaches model as important for describing the different contributions that can be made to transformative peacebuilding activities (Lederach 1997). The Model claims that the process of moving beyond an absence of violence and towards what Ramsbotham et al (2005) describe as ‘cultural peace’ requires the involvement of a wide group of actors, from elites who are involved in peace deals and agreements at the national level through to community members whose attitudes and behaviours require transformation in terms of how they deal with those with whom they have been in conflict. Fisher and Zimina use this model to substantiate a claim that often international actors and others involved in ‘professional’ peacebuilding work substantially with elites and less with communities, and that consequently the opportunities for activities to have a transformative effect are often missed (Fisher and Zimina, 2008).
This section begins with an analysis of different groups’ attitudes to conflict, peace and SALW, beginning with those at the bottom of Lederach’s Model (those who often play a transformative approach in peacebuilding). It then reviews other factors which might have a significant role to play in shaping the context in which SALW and peacebuilding efforts are attempted, and thus impact on how they interrelate. The framework used for this analysis draws on factors commonly used in conflict analysis models to categorise the different dimensions of the conflict that the analysis seeks to describe (conflict/security, political, economic, social, cultural and environmental factors).\footnote{134}

4.6.3.2 Community perspectives regarding peace and conflict

Interviewees offered two dominant perspectives regarding their views on conflict and peace in Kosovo, and it appears that these are linked closely to the age of respondents and, by implication, to how closely the individual experienced the period of violent conflict.

The first group of perspectives belonged to young people, who often stated that the war was something that happened before their time and was therefore, more a matter of folklore than something that they felt had a direct relation to them. Amongst this group, which did not seem to be affected significantly by ethnicity, two issues were most often raised. The first was Kosovo’s absence in the regional visa liberalisation regime which means that with the exception of Kosovars, nationals from western Balkan countries can move freely across their collective borders. To these people, this means that to travel anywhere apart from Albania, Kosovars need to have a visa. Visas are often hard to obtain and for countries that don’t recognise Kosovo, impossible. This gave rise in interviews with young people\footnote{135} to a view that they were prisoners in their own country and that until they were able to move they would never feel comfortable and peaceful in Kosovo.

\footnote{134} For example, the UK government has developed two models since 1997 which are now widely used: the Strategic Conflict Assessment and the Joint Assessment of Conflict and Stability. In both cases, contextual factors are grouped as above.

\footnote{135} FGD Ferizaj; KIIs Pristina and Peja.
The second, closely related issue was a fear of unemployment and a desire for opportunities to work or study, either in Kosovo or further afield. They stated that they felt there was nothing for them in the newly independent Kosovo, even though they often expressed themselves as Kosovars, or Albanians or Serbs with a strong attachment to their country. For these people, peace appears not to be a concept linked to fear of violence; rather one which is expressed in terms of the social, economic and cultural impact of restricted movement. For example, one young female respondent in the focus group discussion in Ferizaj stated:

“I speak English, I am well educated. I want to do something - to do a good job and make a contribution. But here you have to know the right people, and anyway if you want to leave, you can’t because it’s impossible to get a visa. We are stuck here and there’s nothing for us.”

The second group of perspectives which differed from the views expressed by government officials and other national figures who had personal experience of conflict were those offered by older people in villages and towns, which as with the views of young people, (although the reasons given were different) didn’t seem to be affected significantly by the ethnicity of the interviewee. Older people of Albanian ethnicity in this group felt that the relative physical security that they currently experience is in itself analogous to a state of peace. Their experience of the conflict that culminated in 1999 was much longer by virtue of their age than those who were active combatants as 1999 approached. The sentiment contained in the response of the village head in Germova was representative of views from other towns and villages. He said:

“Kosovars have been under occupation for a hundred years. We have never been able to make our own decisions and we were always fearful of others in our own country. Now we have our own government and can make our own decisions things are better. Things are not perfect, there are still many problems but it is totally

136 KIs with young men in Mitrovica who believed that their best chance of work was to leave Kosovo as soon as they could afford to.
137 Female FGD participant, Ferizaj, June 2011.
different. There is no chance of going back to conflict as the memories of what it was like before are still too strong to take that risk.”

This perspective is symptomatic of the concept of negative peace described in Chapter 2 whereby the absence of violence is taken as a proxy for real and lasting peace. This concept is criticised as representing a different state from that which is captured by the concept of positive peace (Galtung, 1969; Boulding, 1992; Lederach, 1997). However, in Germova, as elsewhere in Kosovo, these feelings that could be described as equating to an absence of violence were perceived positively by respondents. To them peace was characterised by a combination of an absence of violence and an absence of occupying forces, which taken together mitigated against thoughts of a return to conflict.

A return to widespread and large scale violence is not something that is anticipated by many Kosovars in the foreseeable future. The threats to peace are seen as linked to issues of work, education, freedom of movement and political expression rather than organised physical violence. As such, the perceived relationship between concepts of peace and routes to achieving it, and the availability of SALW is weaker now than in other post-conflict contexts examined in this thesis. This is to some extent conditioned by the length of time that has elapsed since the end of the war in 1999 and by the fact that enough seems to have been done to increase personal and community security to the point where economic, political and cultural issues are now more pressing for most people. Whereas in the early years following the end of the war, a return to violence was genuinely feared, and where the interrelationships between efforts to build peace and to promote more effective control over SALW were clearer and potentially more beneficial, they are now much less significant. For instance, responses to the question “do you think a

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138 Male FGD participant, Germova June 2011.
139 For instance, in its widely respected annual population survey, in 2011 Saferworld reported that when asked what their most serious safety and security issues were, over 36% cited traffic problems, greater than the 14.4% (30% in the Serb sample) who identified fear of crime as a serious crime. See Bennett (2011: 20-31).
140 For example in South Sudan (see Chapter 3) where reducing SALW availability was seen by many as synonymous with the development of the State and the transformation from war to peace.
recurrence of violent conflict is likely” asked by Saferworld in its annual tracker survey show a year-on-year change in perceptions, with 38.1% claiming it is in 2010 compared to 44.1% in 2009, 51% in 2008 (Bennett 2011:27).

Despite a generally widespread belief that the threat of violent conflict is receding, there are nonetheless at least two different groups of perspectives articulated by the public for what peace looks like in Kosovo. The physical boundary between these perspectives is the River Ibar which separates the northern third of Kosovo from the rest of the country. In the south, which is dominated by people of Albanian ethnicity but which also includes significant minority and mixed communities the perspectives that were most associated with the concept of peace included being able to move freely, freedom of association, having a national government in Pristina, the absence of predatory police and other local officials, and the freedom to complain about grievances without fear of recourse.

North of the Ibar, views of what constitutes peace were not radically different, although they were described in very different terms. For instance the ability to move freely was perceived as the ability to be able to drive around Kosovo without having to register vehicles with Kosovo number plates. Similarly, the importance of being able to select a government was articulated by many of those interviewed in Mitrovica as the ability for northern Kosovo to either achieve a form of independence from Kosovo or federation with Serbia.

The stark difference however between the views expressed by interviewees and focus group participants in northern and southern Kosovo was the temporal nature of perspectives. For many of those in the south, it was possible to look forwards into the future with optimism that the challenges that Kosovo still faces with regard to addressing the legacies of the conflict which culminated in the war at the turn of the century would be addressed:
“Yes we have problems. Yes there were bad times. But now we are in the right road. We can have relationships with our neighbours but exist by ourselves. Things will continue to improve. We are going forwards.” (Young female FDG participant, Ferizaj)

Whilst some respondents were more critical of government or international involvement than others most could see a future for Kosovo and its people that was better than is currently the case. This perspective was common to different ethnicities, ages, genders and income groups. For instance, the Chair of the Students’ Council in Ferizaj said:

“Making Kosovo successful is our duty. We all have to work for this, and then things will improve.”

In the north however, it was hard to identify a sense of how and when things might improve. The overwhelming view was that the best that could be hoped for was that there would be a few more jobs created and that the activities of the organised crime networks operating in Mitrovica and the northern municipalities would be curtailed. There was no sense in any of the interviews conducted in the north that a political solution was possible that would be of benefit to people of Serbian ethnicity in terms of their future within an independent Kosovo. Therefore whilst for the majority of those who participated in this survey in the south of the country, a vision of peace was both possible and positive as well as long term, for those residing in the north, the most positive image described was one of a negative peace in which the absence of violence was almost the most positive outcome that could be expected:

“We exist. Some times are better than others. We are waiting for something to change.”

(Woman NGO representative. December 2010)
4.6.3.3 Community-level attitudes to SALW

In each of the focus group areas respondents stated that SALW are perceived in different ways and that these perceptions change over time. It was not possible to observe a clear overall pattern to these perceptions. However from the results of the focus groups and interviews, there is evidence that in a contemporary context, the more physically insecure a particular community felt (Mitrovica being the most obvious example), the more strongly respondents felt about SALW, both positively and negatively. Whereas in communities that felt more at risk from other forms of insecurity (livelihood security being the most often cited example) the role of small arms and light weapons was not seen as such a significant factor in either undermining or guaranteeing security.

For example in Germova, the FDG participants related that during the lead-up to the war when they became aware of the Serbian community being provided with weapons from Belgrade, they became much more fearful of the impending conflict. However, when the Serbian families left the village leaving behind their weapons, the Albanian families quickly took possession of them as they saw them as a way of increasing their personal security. As time has passed and the threat from the Serbian army has diminished, the respondents all stated that weapons were no longer relevant to their lives. The lack of jobs for young people, the cost of basic supplies and the perceived corruption of the government was viewed as much more important than the physical security which might be enhanced through the ownership of a weapon.

In Lubinje however, the FDG participants felt strongly that the presence of weapons in their community during the war was more threatening than any benefit that they might have derived from their existence. The Bosniac majority in the community quickly returned their weapons to the Yugoslav ministry of public order officials who distributed them as they felt that owning them made them more vulnerable.141 Living in an isolated and small village they felt that the perception

141 Focus Group Discussion, Lubinje-Prizren, June 2011.
that they were aligned with the JNA that would have come from them accepting the weapons would have posed a greater threat than that which they thought they could address through weapons ownership.

In Gjakova and Peja in the west of the country where the fighting had been particularly hard, interviewees were of the opinion that weapons ownership was important during the conflict as a means of defence. One respondent in Gjakova felt strongly that the reason they had suffered during the conflict was that they were not well armed enough. He felt that there was still a threat from Serbia and believed strongly that increasing weapons ownership was important in preventing future attacks. This interviewee had opinions that were not typical of other interviews conducted across the country, but his views were repeated by others in Gjakova. He said:

“We definitely shouldn’t hand in any weapons. We need a lot more weapons if we are going to survive. We have learned to trust no-one to help us. We have always to be ready. We are surrounded. We need more weapons and more training. The American’s won’t be able to help us in the future, they have their own problems.”

Views as to the role of SALW in terms of their role in peace-making differed across the country. As stated above, in Lubinje respondents felt that the absence of weapons made their integration into a new country with an Albanian majority and themselves as a Slavic minority more manageable. However in Debellder, residents felt that the threat of violence from the other side of the border, which was derived from their experience of being shelled by the Macedonian army, was a block to reconciliation. They felt that they were part of a negative peace with Macedonia; there was no violence, but this was because they had in all but name given up their rights to their land.

In Germova, village leaders have from time to time offered to surrender portions of the weapons looted from Serbian families as a goodwill gesture in exchange for

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142 Key informant interview with Male NGO leader, Gjakova, June 2011.
development cooperation. They understand that the existence of SALW is a concern for others and that volunteering to surrender some of them will be seen as a willingness to move on from the conflict period. However, in Mitrovica, where SALW are much more readily visible and are used more often, the perception of their role is slightly different. Interviewees in northern Mitrovica in particular report that the continued ownership of SALW is an essential strategy for self- and family- protection.

The material value of SALW in cash poor cultures is an oft-cited factor in the reticence of owners to disarm and in the design of SALW control programmes.\textsuperscript{143} In Germova the willingness of the community to hand over weapons in exchange for development cooperation could be perceived as an example of the role that SALW can have as a tradable commodity. In the eyes of the local residents, they were promised an exchange and over seven years on they are willing still to deliver their part of the bargain they think they entered in to. They claim that the reason they have not yet surrendered their weapons is that the conditions have not been in place to allow them to do this without fear of prosecution. However, it is also clear that the senior members of the village council understand that to some international actors and Pristina politicians, the SALW that they have retain an important value. The village head is responsible to his residents and believes that at some point he will be able to trade the weapons for a development benefit of some sort for his people.\textsuperscript{144}

The results of the 2003 UNDP project are also interesting in understanding the value placed on SALW by their owners. Whilst the total numbers of weapons surrendered voluntarily through municipalities was extremely low (155), the numbers of weapons that were legalised through registration (26,000) was for many years held up as an indicator of success (Richards, Sokolova and Smith. 2006). To obtain a registration for a firearm, an individual had to surrender it to the police

\textsuperscript{143} Weapons in exchange for goods, services or cash are often justified by the perceived need to compensate owners for giving up an item of value.

\textsuperscript{144} KII Head of Germova Village Council, July 2011.
for inspection where, providing the weapon fitted into the categories of firearms permitted for civilian ownership, a ballistics fingerprint and the owner’s details were taken and the owner was issued with a Weapons Authorisation Card. They were not asked to provide any documentation regarding where the weapon came from. An ex-senior policeman responsible for aspects of weapons registration at the time claims that large numbers of weapons that were registered were new, and that the majority of them had been imported from Turkey.  

4.6.3.4 Perceptions of government officials and other national ‘elites’ regarding ‘peace’ and its relationship with SALW

For government officials interviewed for this study, the interrelationships between SALW and SALW control and peace and security were conditioned by (a) personal experience of the conflict; (b) the extent to which concepts of peace and security were linked to resolution on ongoing conflict in the north of the country, and to normalising relationships with Serbia; and (c) the extent to which individuals felt that Kosovo had moved beyond the likelihood of renewed armed conflict.

On the basis of our interviews, the personal experience of the war was regularly used to explain and justify positions and perspectives in interviews with government officials. For example, one senior official in the Office of Public Security, Law and Order stated that for him peace was the existence of self-government.  

This official had been an active member of the KLA in the lead up to and during the conflict in 1999. His perspective of what constitutes peace is strongly conditioned by the reasons for which he joined the KLA initially. He readily accepts that Kosovo faces many problems, but for him, the ability of Kosovars to manage their affairs, including their conflicts is a strong indicator of peace. This perspective is personal to the individual, however it was a sentiment often repeated by officials in informal and formal contexts during the research for this thesis.

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145 Key Informant Interview with former Kosovo Police official responsible for weapons licensing. Pristina, June 2011.
As regards what Muslieu (2011) describes as the ‘Northern Question’, there is no single document which sets out exactly what constitutes peace for the government of Kosovo. However, for the Prime Minister, his stated priority is recognition of Kosovo’s independent status by other countries. The biggest block to this in his eyes, is recognition on the part of the government of Serbia and a normalisation of relations between the two states. For instance, in an interview in September 2010 he stated:

“I think it’s time for Serbia to accept the reality and to take a historical decision to recognize the independence of Kosovo because it is the only solution for the better future for Kosovo and for the region, for stability and regional cooperation.”147

To understand the interrelationships between peacebuilding and SALW control efforts, it is important to consider how Government officials perceive the presence of SALW as a factor determining the role and functioning of the state. In this case it appears from interviews that it is not the SALW as a physical object that gives rise to concern. Rather, it is the actors and actions associated with weapons ownership which are seen as the threat to the effectiveness and reach of the state.

Respondents grouped this threat into two distinct areas: ownership, use and potential use of SALW by criminals and those associated with organised crime activities; and SALW held by individuals and groups in northern Kosovo in particular, which pose a direct threat to the ability of the Government to exercise control over its territory. The first group of concerns are common to most countries and as such it is not surprising that this dimension of the SALW control problem is present in Kosovo. The second however is of particular concern to government and international actors alike. The testimony of those involved in SALW control efforts and responsible for supporting public security, law and order suggests that weapons are readily available and on display in northern Kosovo and in particular in

northern Mitrovica. One senior Kosovo-Serb who has lived in northern Mitrovica since the end of the war working on a variety of peacebuilding initiatives recounted an experience that he had in 2010:

“We organised an event for Europe Day. It was a music festival and not at all political. In the evening a young guy came on the stage with a hand-grenade. He was also armed with a pistol. He told us to take the Europe flag down which was on the stage and replace it with a Serbian flag otherwise he would throw the grenade.”\(^{148}\)

Finally, the most common reason given in focus groups for why Kosovo will not return to war is that it has emerged from a period of violent conflict in which most people were significantly affected, and that it is not in the interests of anyone to precipitate a return to violence again in the future. The same people also often cited the perceived rise in violent crime, including shootings as a major threat to public safety, law and order. A local NGO leader on Peja reported to the author that the night before their planned meeting, a shooting had taken place:

“This very place last night, some of the big guys got arguing and shots were fired. One of them was killed and others were injured. This is very regular. Now we are here in the same place some few hours later and there’s nothing to show anything happened. For us it is normal.”\(^{149}\)

As such, they described the importance of more effective SALW control in the context of reducing armed crime and promoting more effective rule of law. Whilst in the past, international agencies in particular had promoted SALW control as a means by which peace could be attained and sustained as relates to the war between KLA, NATO and the Yugoslav security forces\(^{150}\), this was not necessarily a

\(^{148}\) Male, interview with the author, Mitrovica, June 2011.
\(^{149}\) Male, interview with the author, Hotel Mogador, Peja. June 2011.
\(^{150}\) In Kosovo previous national-level attempts led by a combination of the Government of Kosovo and the UN to control SALW have been based on an assumption that a reduction in the volumes of weapons will lead directly to a reduction in the likelihood of a further outbreak of violent conflict, and further that the process of surrendering weapons will have a positive peacebuilding and reconciliatory effect. The ISAC project aims were “…to sensitise the population to the small arms problem, remove illicit weapons from society, reduce the negative effects of small arms, foster
logic which held with members of the public in the interviews conducted for this thesis.

There are however important exceptions to this statement. For example, Kosovo-Serb respondents felt that the availability of SALW was both a reason not to disarm, and a driver of criminality. In Mitrovica, residents made it clear that they would not consider participating in a voluntary weapons collection process as they did not believe that the Albanian population would do the same in good faith. This reflected both a sense of disenfranchisement with the development of the State of Kosovo as well as a deep distrust of the Albanian majority in the southern part of the city.\footnote{Key informant interviews in Mitrovica, Zubin Potok and Leposavic, December 2010 and June 2011.}

4.6.3.5 Other contextual factors which affect the nature of interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding activities

In addition to the perceptions of the public and decision makers and influencers regarding SALW and their relationship to peace and conflict, there are a small number of other factors which arose from the case study research. Each of these factors closely relates to the perceptions discussed above and their effect on how communities and decision makers have conceived problems and responses. However, they are distinct and of value given the impact that these factors are likely to have on how the broader context interacts with SALW and peacebuilding challenges and opportunities.

Using the analytical framework often employed as part of conflict analyses (see for instance the UK Strategic Conflict Analysis or Joint Assessment of Conflict and Stability methodologies introduced in Chapter 2) the following are of particular importance to addressing the focus of this thesis.

\footnote{Popular participation in political decision making, while at the same time promoting development at the local level” (Kharkee and Florquin, 2003:3).}
**Economic factors:** Earlier in this section the change in how a particular community perceived the value of their weapons, from an initial focus on the goodwill that surrender could engender to one in which the financial value was recognised, and the way in which this shaped their attitudes towards SALW collection efforts, was described. In other locations, whilst the nature of this understanding was different, the economic dimension was similarly catalytic in how it affected interrelationships.

In Debbelder for instance, weapons were not surrendered by ex-KLA fighters at the end of the war when requested. One reason was that the individuals had had to purchase their own weapons when they joined up. At the time that disarmament was requested there was still considerable fear that conflict would reignite and that the soldiers would be required to return to combat in some form. They were concerned that if this were the case, they would have to buy new weapons. It was their perception that avoiding this cost was a significant factor in their decision not to disarm. Similarly, the initial cost of buying weapons, following a four day walk to Albania and back was a factor cited by a senior KLA commander for the difficulties that many former fighters had in surrendering them.

In interviews in several locations including Peja, Gracanica, and Pristina, respondents claimed that there was a significant relationship between the financial value of weapons and the importance of renewed efforts to control them. In Gracanica for instance, focus group participants stated that with the passage of time since the end of the war, owning weapons for personal protection was less a driver, and that consequently there was a greater danger that owners would consider selling to maximise the “return on their investments”.

Further, they believed that as the desire for people to purchase weapons for their own security or to join a defence force in the event of renewed conflict had

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152 Germova.
153 Key informant interview, Pristina, March 2012.
154 Male FDG participant, Gracanica, February 2012.
dissipated, and as there was no incentive provided to surrender weapons for some form of benefit by the State, sales into the criminal market were the only realistic option for someone interested in selling their weapon. For these FGD participants the changing dynamics driving ownership were a cause of real concern:

“Most of us have weapons. Most of them are in a field or something. We needed them before but not now. So they are not any danger to anyone. But if in these times people have to sell them to make some money to buy what they need then the criminals will buy them and they will become dangerous again.”  

**Security factors:** Perceptions of who the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ were in the conflict were often cited as helping to shape decisions regarding weapons surrender. Kosovo-Serb people in northern Mitrovica for instance stated that as the minority population who had suffered reprisals at the end of the war, they needed their weapons for personal protection as they had no trust in the State of Kosovo to extend them impartial and effective protection from violence.  

In Gjakova, one of the places most affected by the war, interviewees claimed that the threat from others would never fully recede and that as time passed the interest of current protectors would wane and this would place them in peril once again. For this reason they should use the opportunity of relative peace to arm themselves so that they are better prepared in future. These perceptions are important in that they suggest that for some, weapons and weapons ownership remain in one way at least closely connected to conflict, fear of conflict and peace.

Individual and community experiences of insecurity and conflict appear to condition how they perceive SALW to relate to peace and peace-building, and whether, and to what extent they would see SALW control activities as commensurate with building peace. In Gjakova for instance, interviewees were clear that attempts to reduce SALW ownership would be contrary to their visions for what peace might look like, and were explicit in stating that SALW activities would not be seen as a

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155 FGD participant, Gracanica.  
156 KII, Mitrovica, July 2011.  
157 KII, Gjakova, July 2011.
peacebuilding contribution, unless they took place at the regional level.\textsuperscript{158} Whereas, in Peja, interviewees thought that further SALW control activities could be beneficial to enhanced peace if they were undertaken in a way which was sympathetic to the citizens’ experience of conflict.\textsuperscript{159}

\textbf{Social factors:} Saferworld has conducted regular population surveys in Kosovo since 2006 which aim to record and analyse the perspectives of members of the public with regard to public security and SALW possession and use. As the distance from the war has grown, people have reported improved feelings of personal and national security. Concurrently, there has also been a similar change in the perspectives of respondents regarding their requirement to own or access weaponry. This trend suggests that there is an interrelationship between greater peace and a reduced interest in owning weapons for the purposes of protection; and conversely between perceptions of insecurity and the desire for weapons.

In recent years however, despite a reduction in the perceptions by members of the public who believe that renewed conflict with Kosovo’s neighbours is unlikely, there remains a significant proportion of the population who are fearful of local crime and its effects. This fear is supported by low levels of trust in security and justice providers and in the ability of politicians to provide solutions to political problems. But it is not attended by a significantly enhanced desire to own weapons specifically to address fear of crime.

It would appear from the available data that social factors, particularly fear of crime are not major drivers of SALW ownership. The clearest connection that people make between SALW and crime is with the criminals who are armed and who may traffic weapons along with other illegal goods and services.

\textbf{Political Factors:} The concepts of peace and SALW ownership and use have been part of the dominant political narratives in Kosovo for several decades. Since the

\textsuperscript{158} Op cit. \textsuperscript{159} KII, local community leader, Peja town, July 2011.
early 1990s when Kosovo’s position within Serbia and the wider Yugoslavia began to be challenged by the movement which became the LDK, this has been particularly evident. The demands for better service provision and greater autonomy within Yugoslavia, which later became an all-out independence and liberation movement were framed around a claim that with independence would come peace and development.

In the early and mid-1990s the dominant movement within Kosovo promoted a non-violent approach to reaching this goal. As the situation for Kosovo-Albanians deteriorated, calls for an approach predicated on violent resistance gained more traction, resulting in the mobilisation of the KLA. The KLA promoted its armed struggle in part through an effective use of symbolism, perhaps best demonstrated by the figure of the lone warrior carrying an AK47 to defend his people and of the mule trains that crossed back and forth into northern Albania to bring SALW and ammunition into Kosovo to supply the KLA fighters. Following the end of the war in 1999, the ex-KLA commanders became the leaders of several political parties, most powerful amongst them the PDK, the party of the current Prime Minister Hashim Thaci. The heroes of the revolution were commemorated in statues and memorials, often holding their weapons and the most poignant symbol of the armed resistance, Ardem Jeshari remains ever present in public life, with a photograph of him in uniform holding his AK47 over 20 meters high in the centre of Pristina.

Against this backdrop, contemporary politics in Kosovo remains heavily influenced by the legacy of armed conflict. For Kosovo-Albanians and some minorities, weapons and particularly SALW are explicitly linked with the struggle for independence, against oppression and for peace and development. The role of the KLA – now Kosovo Security Force (KSF) is still significant, veterans associations maintain a high profile in public life and politics continues to be dominated by those who were centrally involved in the conflict. This relationship is reinforced by the 160

160 The person depicted in this imagery is Ardem Jashari, a KLA commander who was killed during the war following the massacre of his family by Serbian internal security forces in the Drenica area of Kosovo – which is generally perceived to have been the heart of the KLA resistance.
continued political (and sometimes violent) conflict over the future of the north of the country.

The current government in Pristina is accused by some of focussing on the north to deflect attention away from what are seen as failed social and economic policies. The ‘northern problem’ (Musliu 2012) is seen by many Kosovo Albanians as unfinished business; only when this is resolved can the country finally find peace. The combination of political rhetoric, the iconography of the 1999 war and the relationships of current leaders to the conflict all contribute to a context where SALW are connected closely to the struggle for peace and the ownership of the legacy of 1999.

For Kosovo-Serbs, and particularly their political leaders, although the political goals are very different from their Kosovo-Albanian counterparts, the relationship between politics, struggle, peace and SALW is similar. Following the end of the war, large numbers of Serbs fled the country or were displaced into the northern municipalities where many remain today. Despite the origins of the conflict and the Kosovo-Albanian struggle for independence, many Kosovo-Serbs feel aggrieved at their current situation and feel under considerable threat from politicians in Pristina, who are considered weak, criminalised and predatory. Since the end of the war, Kosovo-Serbs in the northern municipalities have been led by politicians who take a hard and uncompromising line on the legitimacy of Pristina rule. This is combined with a narrative from politicians and other leading figures that self-protection is the only means by which Kosovo-Serbs can defend themselves and their cultures and traditions. In this context, SALW availability and ownership is seen by Kosovo-Serbs as part of their self-defence, a perception reinforced regularly by mainstream politics which asserts the need for struggle, self-defence and rejection of rule by Pristina.
Environmental factors: In at least two locations the link between weapons ownership and the natural environment was explicit (Germova and Peja\textsuperscript{161}). In regular surveys conducted by Saferworld since 2006, the most common aspect of the environmental context raised by members of the public are the perceived dangers posed by wild dogs. People living in rural areas in particular appear genuinely fearful of wild dogs as a threat both to public health generally and to children specifically.

The contemporary origins of this fear are unclear, however there are indicators: Prior to the war, many people particularly rural dwellers kept dogs for security and for their work (shepherds, farm dogs and hunting dogs). During the war, many of these animals were abandoned and those that survived often did so by scavenging around human settlements; they were able to breed and this gave rise to significant numbers of dogs living in packs around the peripheries of villages and towns. Villagers in Germova for instance identified the fear of, and dangers posed by, wild dogs as one of their most significant safety and security fears when asked in 2006.\textsuperscript{162} They claim that the movement of people away from the village and the decision taken by most remaining residents not to work their land due to a fear of attack caused by the conflict led to significant numbers of livestock dying. Further they claim that as a consequence of fighting in and around the village, people were killed and their bodies were not always recovered. The combination of livestock and human remains attracted wild dogs and wolves from the surrounding hills to the village in search of food. They believe that in addition to the real potential dangers of dogs attacking people, that the association that local people had with the presence of the animals had a strong psychological effect. Thus, as late as 2005, when asked what actions could be taken to address local security concerns,

\textsuperscript{161} FDG in Germova for this thesis (July 2011) and previous research by the author (see footnote below); KII’s in Peja, July 2011.
\textsuperscript{162} Rynn and Smith (2006).
the issue of controlling wild dogs was identified as one which could make a significant contribution to the development and recovery of the village.\textsuperscript{163}

The only other reference to the natural environment raised by interviewees was the remoteness of particular settlements and the fear that this caused in the past in relation to the ability of local people to protect themselves if they came under attack. The most remote parts of Kosovo include the mountainous border areas with Montenegro in the west, Albania in the south, Macedonia in the east and Serbia in the north and east. The distance from the municipal centre\textsuperscript{164}, the amount of time it would take for help to arrive\textsuperscript{165}, and the feeling that being out of sight equated with being out of the minds of local security providers\textsuperscript{166} were all identified in focus group discussions. However, these issues, whilst having an environmental dimension are also strongly related to security provision and governance and as such have been addressed in the social and political section above.

\textbf{Cultural factors:} In Kosovo, as with Albania and Albanian communities in western Macedonia and southern Serbia, academics and commentators have claimed that aspects of the Kanun system introduced in the early part of this chapter still prevail. The Kanun is not well understood outside the wider Albanian community and is sometimes characterised as a system of resolving disputes based on the principal of revenge. Whilst this is a very crude caricature, aspects can be interpreted as permitting forms of retaliatory action against the family of those who have transgressed accepted rules and behaviours. This helps in establishing a perspective amongst some that there is a gun culture in existence in Albanian society which promotes self-defence, and the ability of the male family members to protect their clan and take up arms as warriors when required to do so in defence of their people.

\textsuperscript{163} Interviews between the author and Germova village council, 2005-6 as part of initial research and programme design for a Community Safety project in Germova. See Sokolova and Smith (2006) for example of how wild dogs were raised as an issue of concern.

\textsuperscript{164} FGD Debelider, July 2012.

\textsuperscript{165} FGD Germova, July 2012.

\textsuperscript{166} FGD Lubinje, July 2012.
Research conducted for UNDP in 2007 found no evidence that there is in reality specifically a gun culture either in Kosovo, or amongst either Albanians or Serbs (Guenev et al 2007). The continued existence and presence of weapons in society was instead attributed to the legacy of the war, and the period leading up to it during which large numbers of weapons were brought into the country in readiness. This would appear to be supported by the findings from population surveys undertaken in Kosovo over recent years. When asked whether they would like to own to weapon and whether weapons made people safer, respondents regularly demonstrated both a disinclination to own weapons, and the recognition that ultimately ownership of a weapon is unlikely to have a material impact on personal security.
4.7 Chapter conclusions

In addition to the Kosovo-specific analysis and findings contained in this chapter, in applying the analytical framework developed in previous chapters to the case of Kosovo, a small number of significant themes which draw together the various aspects of the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and build peace in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict can be identified. These are described in the following section, and are analysed as they apply across the range of different contexts included in Chapter 3 of this thesis in Chapter 5.

The first of these themes has been described in the sections relating to contingency earlier in this chapter. It is clear in the case of Kosovo that the importance of contingency is striking; the ways in which perceptions of the role and function of international agencies as peace builders and SALW controllers was heavily determined by how over time the performance of these institutions was assessed by those with whom they interacted. There are two related dimensions to this issue: in addition to direct contingency between a given activity and that which followed, such as for instance between ISAC I and ISAC II, the cumulative impact of contingency over a period of time between numerous activities was particularly critical. This manifested itself specifically in the way in which the activities and those with a role in undertaking them were perceived, and thus the extent to which these activities were supported by the public and others.

Strongly related to the dimension of contingency, the length of time that had elapsed since the end of the war also seemed to be particularly important in terms of how contingency was perceived. People’s motivations for engaging with peacebuilding and SALW control activities changed significantly over time. In the initial period following the end of the war, whilst challenging in the sense that as first efforts they had to demonstrate a significant element of innovation, SALW control and to some extent, peacebuilding activities were not negatively affected by contingency to anywhere near the same extent to those which followed later.
Conversely, in later years, during which there was a greater requirement for planners and others to be cognisant of what had gone before, there was less of a requirement for innovation, partly as they were required to follow particular pathways as a consequence of the contingency of previous activities; for instance, following the failed 2003 attempt to collect SALW voluntarily, it was clear that there was very little appetite with the public and others to attempt similar activities in the near future, which in reality closed off one particular option for promoting SALW, and by implication directed those involved towards other areas of activity.

Finally as relates to contingency, it is clear in the case of Kosovo that changes in context played a major role in the way that contingencies were judged. For instance, the perceived failure of the UN Mission to enhance service delivery and provide clear direction with regards to Kosovo’s final status in 2003 changed the perception that it was both welcome generally and that it had a role to play in SALW control. Similarly, prior to the UN Mission handover to the EU in 2007 there was great anticipation that this would bring forwards faster European integration and progress towards independence. The EU had considerable political and social capital at this stage which could have been used to encourage specific aspects of peacebuilding, including SALW control. However, today, with the EULEX widely discredited, its role has significantly diminished, and where a small number of years ago it would have been a positive factor in people’s decisions to disarm, this is clearly no longer the case.

The second important theme - closely related to the effect of context on contingency described above - which emerges from the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 relates to the role of context as a significant determining factor in affecting interrelationships (as opposed to context affecting contingency which in turn affects interrelationships). It is clear from the research for this thesis that people’s attitudes to SALW ownership and use, and particularly their relationship to peace or conflict are affected by three important interrelated contextual factors: local conflict dynamics; major national issues of identity, sovereignty and security; and significant political, social or cultural events or symbols.
The precise nature of the way in which a given community has experienced conflict, and particularly violent conflict, is critical to how they understand SALW and their different roles in society – in peacebuilding terms as well as drivers and sustainers of violence and insecurity. This study shows in Gjakova and to some extent Peja, that the levels of violence during the period of KLA armed combat and the damage that was done to local communities and infrastructure was such that even today, 13 years after the end of the conflict, people believe that it is essential that they increase their access to SALW in an attempt to provide protection against future attack. In other places, for instance in Debellder or to some extent in Germova, where communities have been able to transition more successfully from the period of violent conflict, SALW are seen either as a trophy of a time past, or a tradable commodity. And in Mitrovica, and to some extent Gracanica, where the fear of renewed violence is strong and members of the community feel both threatened and angry, SALW are much more explicitly linked to the day-to-day realities and narratives of people’s lives which are heavily conditioned by real (In Mitrovica and Kosovo’s northern municipalities) and perceived (in the case of Gracanica) insecurity.

Linked to the experiences of conflict felt at the community level, in Kosovo it is clear that issues of nationality, sovereignty and security are also highly relevant to how SALW are perceived at all levels within society. There is significant evidence which demonstrates that for much of the last decade, despite or in some cases as a result of, the best efforts of national and international policy makers and planners, very few weapons were put under official control. During this period there was great confusion regarding the final status of Kosovo and this mattered both to the majority Albanian community and minority groups, specifically Kosovo Serbs. The lack of clarity and the perception that the international community was prevaricating and had lost direction caused considerable tension and unease which contributed to a sense that the conflict might not be over, that Kosovo’s ‘national’ security had not been safeguarded, and that renewed conflict could break out. Taken together these perceptions had a significant impact on the ability of Kosovars to look beyond immediate needs and requirements, and contributed towards many
people thinking short-term and conservatively in terms of their willingness to undertake peace-building activities, including potentially placing SALW under greater control.

Finally as relates to important contextual factors, the role of political, social and cultural events and icons is important in how people understand the interrelationships between controlling SALW and peace-building efforts. The sight of Adem Jashari standing rugged against a mountain backdrop, heavily bearded with AK47 in hand is a highly emotive image for many Kosovo-Albanians, particularly those who were directly affected by the war, demonstrating heroic resistance and bravery closely paralleling the statues and paintings of Skanderbaj, King of the Albanians, who fought off the advancing Ottoman armies hundreds of years previously. For Kosovo Serbs this iconography is disturbing, suggesting a connection to revolution and violence which brought about the current political dispensation which still gives rise to so much tension and upset today. The small arm as an artefact is an appendage to both Serbian and Albanian tradition and culture, which places importance on the role of male family members as providers (hunters) and protectors (soldiers). Finally, in the current post-war period, Albanians see small arms as a symbol of self-determination and struggle which they have reclaimed from the government of Slobodan Milosevic; during his time as Serbian President, weapons were associated by Albanians with oppression and cultural and ethnic violence. Thus the role of SALW in the cultures and social and political histories of both Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians is both significant and affective. It conditions and is conditioned by people’s interpretations of the war and the periods before and since, and as such the relationships between efforts to control SALW and promote peace specifically.

The third key theme relates to complementarity. It appears that the role of complementarity is important from a programme design and coordination perspective. For instance, recent efforts to improve the legal basis for controlling SALW has taken place at the same time as related efforts to enhance the legislative base in related areas including the trade in controlled goods and the activities of
private security providers. However, to the extent that local people often conflate all the different things that are happening in a given context (assessments to design SALW control activities and planning for house renovation in 2002/3 in Viti municipality for instance) which are undertaken by groups that have similar characteristics (in this case UN agencies with foreign staff who visit the village in white 4x4 vehicles and ask similar questions regarding village security and recovery from conflict), it is possible that they will make connections which might not be intended. And so the overall picture of an intervention formed by those it seeks to engage with seems highly important and at least as significant as interrelationships which might exist at a programme coordination or management level. Further, analysis of the Kosovo case suggests that whilst these overall complementarities might be important, they are perhaps not as important or critical as how interrelationships are shaped by, and formed through contingency and context.

The final theme which emerges from Chapter 4 relates directly to the role of public perceptions in determining the nature and extent of interrelationships. When SALW control efforts have been perceived negatively as part of a weak or negative intervention, they can be seen as unrelated to peacebuilding activities, or indeed as a negative contribution (for instance the 2003 SALW collection efforts). Likewise, poorly designed and implemented efforts to control SALW that aren’t firmly rooted in local context, traditions and behaviours can be counterproductive or even negative (for instance the methods chosen for how the 2003 collection was organised i.e. through politicians with no direct connection between those surrendering weapons and the benefits that followed). And as described in the paragraph above, the perceptions of members of those targeted by multiple initiatives taking place in the same period of time and space relating to a specific activity or initiative can both effect perceptions of others, and establish overall impressions of initiatives with similar characteristics which can be either positive or negative and consequently significantly affect the extent to which target communities engage with them, and ultimately their success.
The issue of public perception and the role of perceptions in shaping realities is complex in Kosovo. Whilst it is clear that the views of communities heavily shape their willingness to engage with peacebuilding and SALW control activities, care should be taken not to view perceptions as the only factor which drives the success or otherwise of these activities: the weakness of security and justice organisations within government, particularly the police, a very weak legal framework, the lack of direction regarding the final status of Kosovo, ongoing and very tangible insecurities evidenced by regular clashes in the northern municipalities and rising crime across the whole of the country, and the effects of contingency and complementarity have also been demonstrated to play important roles.

However, in Kosovo, where the injustices leading up to the war, its affects and aftermath are still so present in the public consciousness, and where there is such a strong narrative that claims that post-1999 international intervention has not engaged effectively with the needs and realities of communities, public perception and opinion does undoubtedly have a strong determining role and as such should be considered carefully in the conceptualisation and delivery of activities to promote peace or control SALW.

Acknowledging the critique of the international intervention in Kosovo and its relationship with the concept of liberal peacebuilding, and approaching the analysis of SALW and peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo from a cosmopolitan conflict resolution perspective, the analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo exist. Further, it demonstrates that they have been affected by contingency, complementarity and context. It has also revealed the significant role played by the effects of context on the extent to which SALW control and peacebuilding efforts are mutually beneficial. It has made a contribution to validating the hypothesis which frames this thesis. It has suggested that the framework of analysis which draws together models developed by Ramsbotham et al and Lederach amongst others has utility in combining concepts of transformational peacebuilding which focus on the wide participation of actors, with those which focus on the design and
management of initiatives and processes. However, whilst this chapter presents evidence regarding the interrelationships between SALW control efforts and peacebuilding activities in Kosovo, further analysis is required to assess the generalizability of its findings. Chapter 5 seeks to do this by drawing together and further analysing the findings emerging from this and previous chapters to present the overall conclusions which can be drawn from the research for this thesis.
Chapter 5: Findings and Conclusions

5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the findings and conclusions from the research conducted for this thesis. It follows the overarching research strategy, beginning with a summary and further analysis of the main findings, which are organised using the three categories of sub-questions set out in Chapter 2.

This is then followed by a presentation of the main conclusions. These relate both to the specific elements of the analytical framework (contingency, complementarity and context) as well as to cross-cutting themes and issues and to overall conclusions relating to the research approach and methods employed. The chapter, and thus this thesis, concludes with a discussion of areas in which further research could be conducted in order to test the conclusions and establish the boundaries of their applicability.

5.2 Summary of main findings
This section is organised around the three sets of sub-questions posed in Chapters 1 and 2 and the conceptual framework developed as this thesis has progressed. It draws together findings from Chapters 3 and 4 and provides the basis for the conclusions section which follows, which is organised using the same analytical framework. It begins with findings most relevant to the effects of contingency on interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding activities. This is followed by findings which relate to the effect of complementarity, and then by those which are relevant to the role of context on interrelationships. It concludes with a presentation of additional cross-cuttings findings which can be drawn from the research.

5.2.1 Category 1: The effect of contingency on SALW - Peacebuilding interrelationships
The questions posed in Chapters 1 and 2 that focus on contingency are as follows:

- At what stages of de-escalation is the control of SALW particularly relevant to peacebuilding efforts, and to what extent are SALW control activities located within existing phases of post-conflict peacebuilding?
How does the nature of SALW control activity change over different phases of post-conflict peacebuilding?

To what extent is the concept of nested paradigms appropriate to efforts to control SALW?

Ramsbotham et al (2005:198) identify four stages of de-escalation in what they term post-war reconstruction. These are used in the ‘hourglass model’ (introduced in Chapter 2) to categorise the different phases of conflict resolution activity which follow a ceasefire agreement. They label these stages as Intervention, Stabilisation, Normalisation and Continuing Transformation. They link each stage with a form of peacebuilding: Elite peacemaking and peacekeeping for the intervention phase; structural peacebuilding for the stabilisation phase; and cultural peacebuilding for the normalisation and continuing transformation phases. The categories used in this model are similar to others which work on the principle of conflict escalating and then deescalating over time. For instance, Dudouet (2006:15) uses the terms Conflict Settlement, Peace Implementation, Peace Consolidation and Peaceful Social Change; Lund (1996:38) uses Peacemaking, Peace Enforcement, Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.

It is apparent from the research of this thesis that aspects of SALW control have the potential to play an important role at each of these phases, although the nature of the activity, its objectives, the degree to which it is integrated or coordinated with other activities and the roles of those involved change over time. The section below takes each of the four phases described by Ramsbotham et al, and identifies the different SALW control activities which appear from the evidence to be most likely and appropriate.

**Intervention phase - characterised by peacekeeping and elite peacemaking**

At the point at which agreement to cease armed conflict takes place it is apparent that activities to control SALW can play an important part in peacebuilding. They can contribute to building confidence in peace processes through placing weapons under greater control, and when linked to other activities, such as disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration, taking combatants and potential ‘spoilers’ off the streets and out of the public view. Indeed, the evidence suggests that SALW control activities can be linked explicitly to early peacemaking activities, including the peace-agreements which framed peace processes in Sudan, Sierra Leone and Kosovo, and that these early links can have a significant impact on how later SALW control activities are designed and to the contributions that they are intended to make in later de-escalation phases.

The mini-case studies present interesting findings in this regard. In Macedonia, NATO-led disarmament and SALW collection activities were prioritised as part of security-building efforts in the immediate period following the Ohrid Agreement which brought to an end the armed violence between Albanian separatists and the Macedonian Government in 2001. These were successful in that they brought under control several thousand weapons that were held illegally. The activity also served an important purpose in that it demonstrated that the international presence in Macedonia was determined to act on its mandate and helped to cement the peace agreement in the short-term. However, as with the KLA disarmament activities immediately following the ceasefire in Kosovo (see below), the total numbers of weapons collected are thought to be only a portion of what was held. Both Macedonia and Kosovo demonstrate that in this early period SALW control is of considerable value in establishing a process and opening up opportunities for other peacebuilding activity; the collection of large quantities of surplus weapons, whilst clearly desirable, is not always realistic given the likely nature of the political context. Further, careful consideration should be given to the negative implications of efforts to reduce total holdings if the effects of doing so are to undermine public trust in the wider peace process or transition.

From other examples analysed for this thesis the beneficial contribution of SALW control to peacebuilding efforts in the periods immediately following the cessation of violence is less clear. For example, in Sudan despite the inclusion of DDR and SALW control in the CPA and its implementation plans, the international peacekeeping force which was authorised through the UN to supervise the
ceasefire agreement did little other than provide a deployable capacity given that it had no executive mandate or authorisation to engage proactively in peacebuilding activities related to SALW control. The DDR programme, whilst having a significant SALW control component, was not initially implemented. The only initiatives with a SALW control dimension which were operationalized at this time were a range of different activities which aimed to remove unexploded ordinance and to undertake limited demining. Whilst important, there is little evidence to suggest that this was significant in terms of large-scale peacebuilding efforts. However, whilst the benefits of the SALW control aspects of DDR are hard to quantify, it did establish a process through which political dialogue was established and sustained between different conflicting groups (through the work of the DDR coordination and management architecture for instance). This dialogue process helped to sustain confidence in the implementation of the wider peace plan and pave the way for the referendum on independence for the South which ultimately provided some clarity on the direction and outcomes of the overarching peace process.

In Kosovo, the ceasefire agreement was between NATO and the Serbian armed forces. The agreement included a commitment on behalf of NATO to ensure that the conflict within Kosovo would be brought under control and that Serbian lives would be protected. The agreement that NATO entered into with the KLA and political representatives of the Kosovo Albanian community included a commitment on the part of the KLA to large scale disarmament. This led to the permanent transfer of around 10,000 weapons to NATO control – with the KLA retaining a small capacity for ceremonial use under KFOR supervision. Whilst ex-KLA commanders recall how hard this was to do on a personal level, they maintain that this decision was important for at least two reasons. Firstly, this was part of the elite peace deal agreed with NATO which ensured a KFOR presence in the territory – seen at the time by many as an essential preventative measure against the return of Serbian/Yugoslav armed forces. Secondly, KLA commanders and others both in and outside government claim that what they saw as a unilateral disarmament was important for demonstrating to Kosovar citizens that the war had ended and the
territory had entered a new phase on the pathway to peace, development and most importantly, independence.

One of the important functions of the KFOR and UNMIK international policing presence was to protect the ceasefire agreement, protect civilians living within Kosovo from recurrence of violence and to establish basic security and law and order as a step towards the delivery of security and justice services by the state. For KFOR, this included finding and removing illegal weapons which remained from the conflict. To this end, it undertook regular ‘search and seize’ operations working on military intelligence and public ‘tip-off’s’. Kosovo’s borders were also managed by the international presence, which included regular seizures of weapons coming into and out of the country.

These activities appear for the most part to have been successful. It is almost certainly the case that significant quantities of KLA weaponry was not surrendered as it was stored outside Kosovo and therefore outside the jurisdiction of KFOR. It is also likely that the KFOR seizures only picked up a proportion of the illicit weapons and the investigation of weapons related crimes by UNMIK police dealt with only part of the problem. But in interviews and focus group discussions, these activities were routinely supported and praised as having helped improve basic security and demonstrate that Kosovo was on a new path towards peace. As such, the SALW control components of the DDR and seizure-related activities which aimed to impose basic security can be seen to have made a useful contribution to the early intervention phase, characterised by elite peacemaking (the ceasefire arrangements agreed with the KLA) and peacekeeping (the role of KFOR in enforcing the agreement).

Overall, this research finds that efforts to control SALW can constitute direct and important elements of peace agreements and early peacebuilding processes. They can take a variety of different forms, including being incorporated into DDR programmes and confidence and security building activities; as well as entry points for wider peace-building activities (e.g. security-sector community relations both
within this, and later phases). At this stage of de-escalation, greater control of SALW can be seen as both symbolic of trust between conflicting sides and of trust in a peace process. But it can also have a material benefit in terms of reducing tensions and the potential for further violence which may endanger both the public and the nascent peace processes through removing combatants and their weapons from the streets and placing them under greater control.

**Stabilisation phase characterised by structural peacebuilding activities**

Ramsbotham *et al* suggest that the goal of security building in the stabilisation phase is that "national forces [come] under home government control and [are] stronger than challengers" (2005:199). This is consistent with the objectives of stabilisation as described by others\(^{167}\), which focus *inter-alia* on establishing the organisations (for instance, the police) and institutions (for instance rule of law) required for effective government which enable the state to consolidate the use of force and to begin to deliver services to the population.

There is the potential for significant interrelationships between SALW control activities and other peacebuilding contributions at this phase in the recovery process. The act of establishing the rule of law and a monopoly on the use of force both require that SALW are brought under the control of authorities, and that their agents of all types use SALW in a manner which is legal and accountable as well as effective.

This is demonstrated through the Kosovo case study and several of the mini case-studies. In Kosovo, in addition to extending the ‘search and seize’ operations from the initial peacemaking to structural peacebuilding phases, considerable effort was invested in promoting SALW control as part of establishing and promoting the rule of law and the institutions responsible for its enforcement. For instance, a weapons authorisation scheme, a precursor to a national system for regulating firearms ownership and use, was established. This was done in part to begin to bring under

\(^{167}\) For example, see The UK Approach to Stabilisation: Stabilisation Unit Guidance Notes. Stabilisation Unit (2008).
greater control quantities of privately owned and illicit SALW, and partly as a way of demonstrating to the public that there was a means by which civilians could own weapons legally. Similarly, early efforts were made to promote the surrender by civilians of particular types of weapons which could not be registered and therefore legalised. This was attempted to encourage weapons reduction, but also through the means by which the programme was constructed, to promote community cohesion and municipal governance. The new police service, the KPS, focussed on tackling aspects of gun crime, and the police officers were instructed in firearms use in an effort to minimise both the occasions in which they were used and the manner in which they were discharged.

Evidence from the mini case-studies is similarly instructive in demonstrating interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and structural peacebuilding activities. For instance, in Sierra Leone efforts to improve policing took place within the same framework as SALW control activities. This approach has been followed in a number of different examples, including South Sudan or in Bosnia Herzegovina during the stabilisation phase in each case. In each, the responsibility for overseeing SALW control efforts was vested in newly created ministries of internal affairs, and in each, the police was the executive agency responsible for the implementation of resulting policies. It was also in each case part of a process of empowering ministries of internal affairs through wider programmes of institution building. These have included establishing national SALW control focal points or commissions responsible for developing and overseeing SALW control policy, developing the legislative basis including proscribing certain weapons, owners and uses, and enhancing police capacity to enforce laws and procedures.

To differing degrees, there have been attempts to involve a wider cross-section of the population in these institutional development activities. However they have met with mixed success. Some have made positive contributions in certain areas. For instance the involvement of community focussed actions in Sri Lanka helped the National Commission engage in a nationwide grass-roots consultation with affected communities, significantly enhancing local confidence and providing the
Commission with clear insights into the problem in different parts of the Country. Similarly in Kenya and Uganda, whilst ultimately the impact of the multi-actor National Focal Points on addressing SALW problems has been limited (see below), the involvement of wider groups of actors has had positive implications: Civilian law enforcement agencies were provided with a role in Uganda which reduced what was until then a closed and unaccountable military leadership of the issue; and in Kenya, local government, Wildlife Service and NGO involvement led to greater coordination between sectors, and later helped establish interesting and innovative community approaches to SALW control.

However, despite these at least partially positive examples, other attempts to involve a wider group of actors have been less successful. For instance, the establishment of national commissions to control SALW in contexts including Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone and Uganda has not had significant impact. Well intentioned attempts to include civil society groups in committees largely comprising national security actors has contributed to their failure to play a meaningful role in the development and oversight of SALW control policies and strategy. For instance, in Uganda, the mistrust felt towards the civil society representatives meant that in effect the national commission was side-lined and to this day plays no significant role on SALW control issues as they affect the post-conflict areas in the north of the country recovering from the armed conflict with the LRA and other armed groups. Where national commissions or focal points have included a wider cross-section of actors, this does not necessarily mean that a wider cross-section of the population was involved. In Sri Lanka for instance, the allocation of two positions on the Commission were taken up by one government NGO appointee and the representative from the largest national NGO in the country: in both cases these individuals came from an elite group in society with little day-to-day experience of the effects of SALW on ongoing conflict and violence in affected parts of the country.

Where SALW control activities have been attempted successfully as part of the stabilisation phase of peacebuilding efforts, this research suggests that they have
included a limited range of actors and have been beneficial to those directly involved. For instance, law enforcement activities to remove illicit SALW from the public and from criminal groups as part of the state beginning to monopolise use of force were welcomed by those involved in states in the Western Balkans and Sri Lanka, namely the police and other internal security actors.

Where SALW control has been attempted without significant clarity on the part of the Government and its agents, and where public consent has not been given, however implicitly, there have been significant and often damaging consequences. Perhaps most damagingly in the contexts examined for this thesis, this occurred in South Sudan: poorly planned and executed coercive civilian SALW collection programmes led to the deaths of around 6,000 people in the years following the signing of the CPA. The perception amongst the public that they would not be protected from others if they surrendered their weapons played a major part in this. Simultaneous efforts to promote a community-led approach which combined the surrender of SALW with explicit public commitments from the State Governor that protection would be provided, coupled with an incentive programme offering development benefits, led to significant numbers of weapons being surrendered voluntarily with no major violence ensuing. These events are similar, although on a larger scale to both northern Kenya and northern Uganda where coercive SALW control activities seen as part of the ‘stabilisation’ process of extending the reach of the state were widely rejected and many people (including government security officials) were killed.

It would appear from this research that SALW control activities in this ‘structural’ phase of peacebuilding can play an important role. They seem to be most successful in this regard when they are focussed on supporting the development of a given organisation and institution, particularly when it is set to benefit from the changes. However, where the consent of the public is required, or where the targets of the activity are those who do not stand to benefit immediately, then SALW control activities are higher risk and are more likely to have negative consequences if they are not carefully planned and implemented.
Normalisation, characterised by cultural peacebuilding

The benefits that have been accrued in broad peacebuilding terms from SALW control efforts in post-conflict contexts can relatively easily be seen in the ‘normalisation’ phase. Activities at this time often display similar characteristics which set them apart from SALW control efforts during other phases. The conditions in which these activities are undertaken are more permissive, the security context allows for greater public participation, the ‘state’ is often more capable of providing security and access to justice for its citizenry, and the threat of immediate widespread violence has receded. In these contexts, SALW control efforts can have multiple purposes including reducing quantities of available weaponry, demonstrating public trust in peace and political processes, and encouraging local-level confidence building between and within communities. Consequently, they often feature significant levels of public participation, are incentive-based rather than coercive and involve a broader range of government actors, including the police, local government, and departments of education and health as well as military and peacekeeping actors.

In Kosovo, these activities included public awareness campaigns encouraging SALW owners to register their weapons, warnings of the dangers of weapons being made accessible to children through poor storage at home and of the dangers of weapons being taken into schools, hospitals and other public institutions. Whilst wide-scale incentive programmes were not attempted again following earlier failures, considerable effort was invested by Kosovo institutions and international bodies in promoting municipal and community-based safety and security initiatives including establishing police/community forums and other public safety initiatives. In these cases, whilst the initiatives were not themselves framed around SALW control objectives, they were guided by a view that through encouraging local-level participation and accountability, the governance and effectiveness of local security actors, principally the police would be improved and the motivation for owning weapons would be reduced.
The mini case-studies are also instructive in helping to identify the interrelationships between SALW control efforts and ‘cultural’ peacebuilding activities. For example, incentivised voluntary SALW collection processes organised by governments in Macedonia, Bosnia and Sierra Leone yielded significant amounts of weapons in contrast to similarly incentivised efforts in earlier phases of de-escalation which were complemented, and in the case of Macedonia, replaced, by coercive ‘search and seize’ activities. Likewise, locally focused collection and disarmament activities led by local leaders in Kenya in particular tangibly reduced locally held weapons stocks and encouraged the reintegration of former armed groups back into their communities. In both state and locally organised cases, the success could be viewed as an indicator of an improving local conflict and security context in which personal weapons ownership was not perceived as central to personal security, and a willingness to place greater trust in authority and its ability to provide security and justice to the population. It may also be symptomatic of improved understandings and positive relationships between different competing ethnic or social groups.

These consent-based SALW control activities which have been attempted with varying degrees of success by national governments and UN agencies for a number of years have placed a significant premium on the role that SALW control can have on encouraging enhanced social interaction between effected populations. For example, in Kenya and Uganda, in contrast to national government-led coercive SALW control activities which damaged local faith in the state’s commitment to their safety and security, community-led efforts to control SALW through addressing the motivations and behaviours of those misusing weapons focussed explicitly on the benefits to be derived from reintegrating former fighters back into their communities through giving them positive roles to play in community life. In Bosnia Herzegovina and Sierra Leone during the normalisation phases of peacebuilding community development benefits, rather than coercive actions were used extensively to encourage the surrender of SALW
However, in the case of early efforts in the Western Balkans in particular (where the UNDP placed considerable focus in the late 1990’s and the early part of the first decade of 2000s), national, and to some extent, local government ownership was often weak and the successes that were achieved on a case-by-case basis often did not translate into national-level policies or ongoing commitments. For instance, despite ‘national action plans’ being developed in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia there is no evidence to suggest that these were ever reviewed by government or that government bodies were held to account for their implementation and results.

In addition to raising questions about the model of ‘national action plans’, the Western Balkans experience in this regard is interesting: it would appear that the lack of ownership nationally was significant – suggesting that in this case, there is little if any positive correlation between the degree of international control over local governance and national implementation.

The analysis of the data relating to the interrelationships between SALW control efforts and cultural peacebuilding activities in the normalisation phase of peacebuilding shows that the benefits of participatory and often local-level SALW control efforts can be significant in terms of improving local-level community cohesion, bringing the police and other parts of the state into closer cooperation with communities, and in terms of addressing local-level perceptions of insecurity and of the perceived relationships between SALW and security.

The case studies highlight the benefits which were accrued in Kosovo, Kenya and in Jonglei State in South Sudan in terms of changing attitudes and actions as regards SALW ownership. They also demonstrate how SALW control activities can link closely and beneficially with other security and peacebuilding efforts, including police development and reform and other SSR activities. However, it is unclear to what extent this positive contribution translates into more sustainable and wide-scale transformation. This is particularly the case in terms of the extent to which
stand-alone, locally driven, activities can be replicated nationally in a way which contributes to, and reinforces efforts to promote structural peacebuilding.

In none of the cases reviewed in this research is it clear that successful local initiatives were replicated successfully widely at a national level. In some places, Viti Municipality in Kosovo or Jonglei in South Sudan for instance, there is some evidence that local governance structures attempted to frame and facilitate implementation across wider areas under their jurisdiction. However it appears that where this was successful it was in areas of work directly under their control; district level meetings and events rather than community-based activity which required substantial local level engagement, trust and risk taking on the part of those involved.

**Continuing transformation**

This phase, sometimes characterised by the period following the withdrawal of a major international peacebuilding presence, occurs sometime after the end of large-scale violence and at a time following initial peacebuilding and state-building efforts.

It is clear from the evidence that efforts to control SALW do have a role in ongoing phases of peacebuilding. However as the threat of armed violence recedes, it would appear that SALW control initiatives are more effective when they are embedded within other areas of transformation and peacebuilding, including ongoing efforts to improve community security and to develop police and criminal justice capacity.

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168 Ramsbotham et al (2005) suggest that by this stage, international peacebuilding missions will have been handed over to national actors, and the Missions will have withdrawn. This distinction is not made however by Lederach (1997) or Lund (1996) whose models are intended to cover a wider range of contexts which might never feature a major international peacekeeping and peacebuilding effort. This more nuanced approach allows for the application of this model to contexts such as Uganda and Kenya where local actors or national government have always led peacebuilding and SALW control efforts, which international actors playing differing supporting roles.
This is perhaps because, at this stage, SALW are seen as less relevant to the direct security needs of the population than may be the case during earlier phases of peacebuilding. Consequently, as insecurity has to some extent been addressed, the symbolism attached to SALW by members of the public changes, as do the perceptions of threat associated with the availability of SALW: weapons may come to be seen as symbolic of a period of struggle rather than a necessary requirement for personal or community security, and the dangers posed by the use of weapons by organised crime groups and others may challenge previously held perceptions that widespread SALW ownership is a means by which security can be achieved.

Of the examples analysed for this thesis, Kosovo is perhaps currently in this phase of its de-escalation. As discussed in Chapter 4, Kosovo has over recent years been the location for the development of the concept of community security programmes. These have the explicit goal of improving social interaction at a community level, including interaction between local service providers and the wider population in order to improve local human security and to contribute to similar efforts at the regional and national levels. This concept has been proven to help create the conditions under which illegally held SALW may be surrendered by populations who feel that their security has improved and that they have enough oversight or control over its provision to place trust in others to provide it. This concept has been applied with some success in other Western Balkan contexts and is explored in terms of its positive contribution in the mini case-studies of Kenya, Uganda and Sierra Leone. However, this success is not apparent in the case of either South Sudan or Sri Lanka.

From this research it is possible to demonstrate that one of the reasons for these differing experiences is the conflict and peacebuilding context in which they took place. Kosovo and its neighbours, and the parts of Kenya and Uganda where

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169 In Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia community security building activities have been attempted with some success by a combination of local and central government, NGOs and international agencies (principally the UNDP). However, to date of the countries of the Western Balkans only the Government of Kosovo has developed a national Community Security Strategy which aims to apply the lessons of local level pilot projects across the country.
success is evident are currently in the later stages of de-escalation (‘normalisation and continuing transformation’ according to Ramsbotham et al, ‘Peaceful social change’ according to Dudouet, and ‘peacebuilding’ according to Lund). South Sudan in 2006-8 and Sri Lanka following the end of the war in 2010 were both contexts in which there was an absence of large-scale political conflict, but where there was little interaction between conflicting groups, very poor service provision for affected populations and no obvious peacebuilding ‘processes’ which were owned by all sides. This suggests that an approach which focuses heavily on community involvement and interaction as a means of stimulating enhanced SALW control can work particularly well under conditions where ‘enough’ peace has been built as a precursor to such an intervention.

5.2.2 Category 2: The effect of complementarity on interrelationships

The main question which framed the research for this aspect of the analytical framework was as follows:

- What are the relevant intra- and inter-sectoral relationships between efforts to control SALW and recognised post-conflict peacebuilding interventions?

This section presents the findings and further develops the analysis arising from the research for this thesis. It first examines inter-sectoral relationships and then proceeds to examine the roles that SALW control can have as a cross cutting issue. In both cases it is mindful of the positive and negative contributions that SALW control efforts can have on peacebuilding, as well as the positive and negative effects of peacebuilding activities on opportunities to improve SALW control.

It is clear from this research that SALW control efforts are often embedded within sectoral interventions. This appears to most often be the case in security sector interventions. These differ over different phases of de-escalation and peacebuilding activity. For example, in Kosovo, the initial international intervention and peacemaking phase included SALW control within an agreement for the KLA to undergo a DDR programme. During the stabilisation phase, SALW control was
located within efforts to impose the rule of law (search and seize of illicit weapons) as well as in the establishment of a new police service (improving policing standards and capacity, including non-lethal law enforcement techniques).

During these phases, with close proximity to active violence, the SALW control component of security sector programmes was quite significant. However, over time, it is possible to observe that ongoing security sector programmes focus more on accountability and oversight issues as well as ongoing organisational development, and rather less on either the impacts of uncontrolled SALW or the requirement to control them more effectively.

Further, as phases of peacebuilding move away from periods of violent conflict, there is strong evidence SALW control issues become more enveloped within other sector-specific activities. For instance, over recent years in Kosovo, efforts to control SALW have focussed on developing national legislation and policy as well as the capacity of government and public institutions to hold to account those responsible for their implementation. These activities fall more easily within an approach to improving ‘governance’ in Kosovo, sometimes described as a separate intervention sector by planners and programmers. In other contexts where SALW have had a significant impact on rising violent crime some time following the end of conflict, SALW control activities have focused on addressing the impacts of SALW violence on public health and in this case, are most easily located within health sector interventions.  

SALW control activities can also be designed as stand-alone efforts. In some cases these are intended to be separate from obvious sector interventions, whereas in

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170 The public health impacts of criminal violence have been the focus of activities often linked to the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (discussed in Chapter 2). A significant developing literature exists, much of which explores the issues in the context of Latin America where in some cases (for instance in El Salvador), it is estimated that more people have been killed in criminal violence following the end, than were killed during the war. It explores the relationships between SALW and criminal violence, including in post-war contexts. For an overview of the important issues in understanding and addressing this problem see Greene and Marsh (eds) (2012: 77-138).
others there appears to be is less intention in this decision. In both Uganda and Kenya, a decision was taken by the government not to incorporate national SALW control efforts within sectoral plans. In both cases, justice, rule of law and security sector initiatives were significant. They were led by the government in each case and supported by the World Bank and a wide range of bilateral donors. The activities undertaken under the rubric of the national action plans to control SALW would have fitted easily within these multi-sector strategies. However, in both cases the government made the decision that NAPs would not be linked to particular sector engagement arrangements. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but include a desire for SALW control activity to remain outside mainstream development efforts and therefore further from the abilities of donor bodies to influence directly, and a desire not to see SALW control efforts getting as enmeshed in the bureaucracy that hampered the sector-wide working groups and their activities.\textsuperscript{171} In South Sudan, the location of SALW within what was intended as a ‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement’ meant that by design it was not sector specific. However in reality, the different SALW control activities (for example, disarmament as part of DDR activities) were linked strongly to sector-based interventions (in this case, the reform of the SPLA).

Contexts in which SALW control efforts were stand-alone or cross-cutting by default rather than design include many of the universe of cases including Macedonia, Kenya and Sri Lanka. In the case of Sri Lanka the main reason for this appears to be that at the time at which SALW control was identified as a priority and steps began to be taken to address the problem, Sri Lanka was not the focus of a major peace support operation. There was no major UN Mission with the international and multilateral agencies which might be expected to be attendant. As such, the concept of ‘sector’ reforms or peacebuilding activities was not significant in Sri Lanka. This was probably in part a response to the fact that the ceasefire agreement which brought to an end the violence between the Government and the LTTE was never followed up by a ‘peace’ agreement which could have identified the

\textsuperscript{171} Interviews with former National Focal Point staff members in Kenya and Uganda in June 2009 and February 2011.
areas in which change would take place (and thus by implication may have identified particular sectors of government or policy for reform and development).

The extent to which SALW control problems, and thus efforts to tackle them, are embedded within a particular sector, or whether they are intended as stand-alone activities appears to some extent to be determined by two factors; how the problems are identified, and who actively leads the design of responses. The evidence suggests that if SALW problems are seen as central elements of a violent conflict, then it is likely that they will be addressed in some form in the elite peace-bargaining that brings the violence under control. For instance, many major peace agreements over recent years (Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Nepal and Libya) contain explicit reference to aspects of SALW control. In these cases, the agreements usually stipulate what is intended. The process of seeking donor support for peace agreements, and for organising national government capacity to implement them requires that systems and processes are established. These often take the form of thematic working groups, strategies, and action plans through which efforts are channelled.

However, in environments where there may be geographically specific violence in an otherwise relatively peaceful environment (in Kenya for instance where large scale violence is located in relatively specific parts of the country) or where a major internationally supported peacebuilding effort has not been initiated (Sri Lanka), there is less evidence that sector-specific approaches to SALW control have been prioritised.

Taken together, this research demonstrates that SALW can interrelate closely with peacebuilding activities both as a sector-specific and a cross-cutting intervention. The nature of a given peace agreement and the extent to which SALW are addressed within it is often instrumental in the way in which SALW control challenges are tackled. Similarly, the existence of security building programmes such as DDR in early phases and SSR at later stages plays an important role: Where SALW control is embedded within DDR it is intended specifically as an effort to
reduce numbers and access to weapons and therefore to make a direct contribution to security-building efforts. Where cross-cutting SALW programmes, which often take place at later stages, are successful it appears that this is in terms of the social cohesion that it promotes and the re-engagement of citizens with government, often through the police and other law enforcement agencies.

The second part of this section addresses the issue of nested approaches to SALW control as a contribution to peacebuilding activities. The research has shown that it is quite common for SALW control activities to have nested qualities. For example in the Sierra Leone case study, planning for the next phase of activity which was intended to build on previous efforts took place before the first activities concluded. This is the same in the Kosovo and Macedonia case studies, and to some extent, those of Kenya and Uganda. In each case it is clear that planners were aware of the value in initiatives overlapping, and that single engagements could aggregate with positive benefit if the methods and approach employed in one phase built on the lessons and successes arising from earlier phases.

However, the research demonstrates across the universe of cases that there is substantial variation in the extent to which SALW control activities have been consciously nested within peacebuilding efforts in the contexts examined for this thesis and where they have, how effective they have been. Sudan/South Sudan presents the most explicit example of conscious efforts to take a nested approach. The CPA implementation framework included an Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Plan, which included civilian SALW control activities, SSR and community security initiatives. These were sequenced over the five year period that the CPA covered and were linked to particular stages in the peace process. For instance, DDR was intended to take place at an early stage prior to national elections and a future referendum on Southern succession; community security-building activities were intended to take place before civilian SALW collection efforts in order to establish enough basic security to facilitate a successful voluntary collection programme.
However, the enormous security, governance and development challenges that Sudan faced at the time, meant that in practice it would not be possible to establish rule of law and basic security across the country within a five year period which would enable the population to cohere enough behind a nascent national government to make SALW surrender a viable proposition. Therefore, whilst the concept of nesting was important in the development of the CPA implementation framework, in reality, the implementation challenges prevented the potential benefits of nesting to be realised in terms of the contribution of SALW control to wider peacebuilding efforts in Sudan.\footnote{Preston and Smith (2008) review the IDDRP in Sudan and the challenges it faced in its implementation.}

5.2.3 Category 3: The effect of context and actors

The questions which frame the context dimension of the analytical framework are as follows:

- How are different social groups involved in efforts to control SALW in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict – specifically what are the different roles played by those in the different tiers of Lederach’s Actors and Approaches To Peacebuilding model?
- What is the relationship between the involvement of different actors, specifically affected populations, and the role that SALW control plays in post-conflict peacebuilding, and how does this affect the contribution of SALW control towards longer term transformative peacebuilding?
- How does the range of actors involved and the nature of their involvement in SALW control efforts change over different phases of post-conflict peacebuilding?

This section begins with a summary of findings which relate first to how different groups were involved in decisions relating to efforts to improve SALW control before exploring the relationships between the involvement of different actor groups and the contribution that SALW control makes to transformational
peacebuilding. It then assesses to what extent different actors tend to be involved in different phases of peacebuilding and SALW control.

From the examples analysed for this thesis it is apparent the Lederach’s Actors and Approaches Pyramid can be applied to efforts to control SALW as contributions to peacebuilding efforts. It is the case that most of the initiatives to control SALW reviewed in this research suggest that they were a product of decisions made by elites in the countries concerned – most often a combination of national government figures and senior officials from international agencies. This is in large part due to the fact that many post-war SALW control efforts in the countries analysed have been agreed as part of peace deals of one form or another (for example, the NATO/JNA agreement on Kosovo or the CPA in South Sudan). These ‘deals’ have been struck by a combination of senior government, commanders of military groups and external actors, and they are by their nature, top down in terms of how decisions are taken and then communicated.

Whilst it is perhaps unsurprising that initial decisions are taken by a limited number of elite peacemakers, it could be expected that others may be involved in planning for the implementation of these agreements as they relate to SALW control. The universe of cases demonstrates through the widespread establishment of national SALW commissions or focal points comprising both state and non-state actors that national implementation frameworks have involved wider groups than those involved in initial high level agreements and policy development. However, the extent to which these different actors represent a broadening of elite participation or the involvement of non-elite groups is not always clear. There is evidence that broader participation was sought in Sierra Leone as local Chiefdom leaders were consulted and incentivised to determine on a case by case basis how they would implement their part of the SALW collection activities agreed nationally. In Macedonia and Kosovo there was an attempt by those leading civilian SALW collection efforts nationally to encourage local municipal ownership of weapons collection activities. However in both cases, and particularly as relates to Kosovo,
this translated into resentment on the part of local municipal leaders that they were being asked to implement a policy that they didn’t necessarily agree to.

Whilst it is difficult to definitively establish the characteristics of elite led SALW control activities, the examples analysed in this thesis suggest that they include (a) reducing the immediate likelihood of a return to violence though reducing access to weapons by armed groups, and (b) helping the ‘state’ to achieve a monopoly of the use of force and begin to impose the rule of law. As such they suggest a focus on establishing an absence of violence which would provide the political space and time for longer term peacebuilding and recovery processes to be established.

There are some interesting, although limited examples of more locally generated SALW control efforts that have an intended peacebuilding dimension. The community security activities in Kosovo and elsewhere in the Western Balkans, Sierra Leone and Kenya discussed elsewhere are relevant in this case. Similarly, the Reformed Warriors Project and the Warrior Squad project in Uganda represent local efforts by communities – often led by the local elites – to tackle SALW control challenges. The characteristics of these initiatives are interesting, and contrast to some extent with those of national-level initiatives identified above. The methods were selected by local people rather than supplied from elsewhere, local leaders were responsible for overseeing their implementation and outside actors tended to fall into Lederach’s middle category of international NGOs, mid-ranking officials of international agencies and officials from local government, the police and other agencies. Perhaps most significantly though is how SALW appear to have been understood as part of these activities. In Kosovo and Kenya in particular, the act of surrendering a weapon was seen as much as a signal of a willingness to reconcile and to move away from conflict than as a direct threat to individual or collective security. In this sense they are perhaps seen as symbolic of a conflict transformation process, which is such a critical element of peace research and conflict theory discussed throughout this thesis.
The assertion by Rambotham et al (2005) that on security related issues a small number of actors may be involved in initial decisions and peace-deals, and that over time, more space may become available for a wider range of actors to participate also appears to apply to SALW control in post-war environments. Initial peace deals in Kosovo, Sudan or Sierra Leone for instance involved small numbers of people and it was at this point in each case that some decisions with a SALW control dimension were taken. But the implementation of these decisions require a broader range of actors, from local and mid-ranking officials to implementing agencies, law enforcement bodies, supportive NGOs and not least, the individuals and their communities who are the target of SALW control activities. It is also apparent from this research that in addition to a larger number of actors participating in initiatives over different phases of peacebuilding, the role played may also evolve over time. For example, in the years following initial peace-deals and recovery from war, the role of public health professionals in addressing criminal related gun violence, the role of legislators and oversight bodies in developing and overseeing legislation and policy can become more significant.  

5.3 Cross-cutting findings
In addition to findings which relate directly to the analytical framework (Complementarity, Contingency and Context) a number of additional cross-cutting findings emerge from this research.

5.3.1 The importance of interrelationships between SALW control and local ownership
The extent to which SALW control efforts are consistent with, or co-opted by, local interests is important in determining the extent of their success. This is further affected by the nature of local ownership. It would appear that linking with and supporting local national government ownership suggests a stronger relationship with state-building agendas, whereas links with affected communities and individuals are more closely linked to themes of social cohesion and development.

173 Krause (2007) and Laurence and Stohl (2002) chart some of the public policy and public health dimensions of SALW control in post war societies which demonstrates the different nature of the actors involved from the immediate post war peacebuilding phases where security actors and national and international elites play a much more dominant role.
Many commonly applied elements of SALW control activities are consistent with state-building activities (see Chapter 2; Chetail (2008); and Ghani and Lockhart 2008). They focus on increasing institutional capacity and capability and enhancing the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the population. This is attempted partly through demonstrating the ability to enforce the rule of law, and partly through the provision of services, including security and justice. For example, the focus on national commissions and coordination structures in at least 30 of the cases in which SALW control has been attempted in countries affected by, or emerging, from violent conflict are explicitly aimed at increasing state coherence and management of SALW control challenges; the focus of activities (enhancing institutional capacity through planning, strategy development, organisational structure and operational effectiveness of police and other law enforcement agencies) in Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Kosovo, Sri Lanka and the Western Balkans are consistent with institution building efforts; communications campaigns in Kosovo and Sri Lanka were closely aligned with attempts to promote government legitimacy; and arms reduction campaigns in Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan were primarily concerned with consolidating state monopoly on the use of lethal force.

Given their apparent primary focus on improving institutional effectiveness and control, reducing violence and promoting peace appears to be a second order intended effect. Often logic models or theories of change suggest that through increasing capacity, SALW violence or insecurity will be reduced. Nevertheless, the direct effect of these programmes is often felt at the organisational level rather than in terms of reductions in the scale of conflict or insecurity faced by citizens. For example, despite using the language of peace and development, in Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan, programmes were explicitly intended to increase the capability of state institutions and to degrade the capability of those who could pose a threat to their authority.

Therefore, where SALW control efforts appear to have been most effective it is in supporting governments to address areas in which they perceive weakness and which speak to their interests, or to those of specific institutions or organisations;
for example, establishing mechanisms for enhancing licencing civilian weapons in Sri Lanka or Kosovo, improving stockpile security and management across the Western Balkans and supporting government coordination bodies in numerous countries as part of the implementation of the UN SALW PoA.

In this context, there are two areas of activity that appear to have had least success. The first of these are efforts to persuade civilian populations to reduce their arms holdings voluntarily. Whilst Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan are perhaps extreme examples of the effects of failure, there are numerous other examples of voluntary civilian weapons collection efforts that have yielded few weapons; Kosovo, Sri Lanka and Sierra Leone are just three examples analysed in some depth in this thesis. There are exceptions to this, where it is apparent that citizens have constructed a narrative which encourages reduction in numbers of weapons (examples include in Serbia following the assassination of Prime Minister Djinjic and in the UK following the massacre of children at Dunblane primary school). However, in contexts where SALW are perceived to be beneficial for ongoing protection and security, and where the role of the state is either challenged, or clearly not capable of providing law and order and protection, there is much less evidence of success.

The second area in which success appears to be particularly elusive is in achieving greater oversight and accountability of those permitted to hold and use SALW, particularly for the protection of the population and maintenance of the rule of law. Whilst the functions of national commissions and policies are in theory valuable for accountability purposes, in reality, there are very few examples in which this has been achieved. Of the cases analysed here, perhaps Sierra Leone and to some extent Kosovo are the only examples in which accountability and transparency can be seen to have been enhanced on a significant scale through the implementation of SALW control programmes.

This poses an interesting challenge to the scale and nature of effect that SALW control activities can claim in terms of their contribution to peacebuilding in a given
context. Almost by definition, many of the contexts in which SALW control and peacebuilding is attempted are characterised by political contest and challenges to the legitimacy of the state. An approach which seeks primarily to support the state extend its reach and legitimacy by projecting its ability to monopolise force, whilst making a direct contribution to state-building, can also potentially have negative or unintended effects on conflict and thus on peacebuilding efforts. Greater monopoly over the use of force can have the effect of reducing armed contest and providing space for longer term settlements and transitions to be reached. But in effect, from the cases analysed for this thesis, it would appear that where they have been even moderately successful, whilst making a contribution to reducing violence, it is arguable whether they have made a significant contribution to positive or cultural peacebuilding.

The apparent effects and contributions of SALW control efforts which are integrated within elite, government-led agendas are not always consistent with those resulting from activities that are led by affected communities and individuals at more local levels. From the examples analysed here it would appear that locally driven SALW control efforts tend to focus more on process (transition in Sri Lanka, reconciliation in Kosovo, rehabilitation in northern Kenya and Uganda) and social output than on the existence or otherwise of weapons.

In Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka it appears that weapons were viewed more in a transactional sense than in terms of their cultural value or use in providing protection. Local communities were aware that engaging in SALW control activities would provide them with access to resources and in some cases, international support and solidarity. Interviews from communities which participated in SALW control programmes in Kosovo are interesting in this regard; people acknowledged the social and material benefits that their communities had accrued through participating in SALW control activities, and were willing to surrender weapons in exchange for access to other goods and services. But they also regularly reported that they had surrendered only a proportion of their weapons, and retained others (for a variety of reasons including to take advantage of future reduction efforts, for
protection, or as memorabilia). As such there is little evidence to suggest that a willingness to engage represented much more than good business or canny common sense. In contexts in which surveys have been carried out into attitudes towards SALW ownership before and following efforts to reduce civilian holdings (Kosovo being the most developed in this regard), it appears that however successful the activity had been, it did not substantially alter attitudes towards weapons either positively or negatively. However the research does suggest that where SALW control efforts have been seen as positive by communities that they have probably positively affected relations within these communities and that they have made a contribution towards reconciliation and to transformational peacebuilding.

This peacebuilding potential of locally relevant SALW control efforts which place emphasis on wider processes and on community capacities and resilience is in contrast to national, elite-level statebuilding activities which appear less transformational. However, even if this finding is further tested and proven, it is not clear to what extent internationally-supported activities could exist at local levels only. Perhaps national-level elite participation is critical to creating the space and acceptance required for local level activity to take place. Certainly this would appear to be the case in Kosovo where national level activities including those which brought together government officials, police and NGOs have played an important role in creating the confidence to allow locally led SALW control activities to take place. Further, the acknowledgement of SALW control challenges by national level actors helped incentivise local police and municipal leaders to respond to local community needs and requests for support.

5.3.2 The effect of public perceptions and social construction on interrelationships
The mini-case studies show that the role of perceptions regarding SALW in shaping how different groups regard the interrelationships between SALW and peace are important to the success or otherwise of SALW control efforts. For instance, the differences in the ways in which SALW were perceived in parts of South Sudan or in the pastoralist communities of northern Uganda and Kenya and by those in
government in each country were very significant; those at the level of central government saw SALW as an instrument of violence used by communities to resist the efforts of the state to exercise its control over the use of force. However, from the perspectives of the communities targeted by government disarmament campaigns, there was a perception held by many that weapons were required to protect themselves in the absence of effective security delivered by the state (see O’Brien (2009) for Sudan and Wepundi, NDung’U and Rynn (2011) for Kenya and Uganda).

Different perceptions as to the role that SALW play in a given context is a significant determining factor in whether people perceive SALW control efforts as having a peacebuilding function at all, or indeed whether they are perceived in an opposing sense as a necessary tool to provide security within which people can live in a degree of peace. Analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 of the ways in which SALW are viewed in particular societies, and the impacts that this has on how SALW control efforts are perceived in terms of their potential contribution to peace, is underpinned by the literatures reviewed in Chapter 2. In particular it is relevant to concepts of social construction (See Searle (1995) and Burr (1995)) and to the different roles that different actors can play in peacebuilding processes (Lederach (1997) and Fisher (2006)).

This research provides evidence to support this finding. For example, as regards the role of contingency in affecting interrelationships, in Kosovo, perceptions of SALW as providing a measure of protection and security in the immediate post-war period contributed to a collective village-level reticence towards participating in weapons reduction activities. The existence of these activities however and the incentives that were offered played a role in shaping collective perceptions as to the potential monetary value of SALW, which in turn contributed to decisions by weapons owners to hold back their participation in future activities until they had been
offered a ‘good price’. In Kenya and Uganda, whilst local-level activities demonstrate the value of weapons in peacemaking efforts, successive government-led disarmament campaigns reinforced perceptions that surrendering weapons enabled greater government control, and therefore sustained their opposition. In terms of the effect of complementarity, the inclusion of SALW control efforts in early security sector interventions can be viewed as a reflection of the perception of the roles of SALW in both enhancing – and threatening – security. In later stages of peacebuilding, where greater SALW control is anticipated as a consequence of community development or governance programmes, it suggests that SALW are perceived by owners and planners alike as less of a direct threat and more as a symbol of transition, and as a symptom rather than a cause of insecurity.

Given that many SALW control activities which have a civilian weapons reduction dimension are implemented at the local levels, the methods and approaches by which ‘target’ communities are identified and communicated with is important to how they are perceived. In Kenya, Uganda and Southern Sudan, communities were selected as they were perceived as a problem and targeted by the government authorities. In the Western Balkans, and in some instances in Sri Lanka a variety of different incentives were offered to those who participated; and in Sierra Leone, significant effort was invested in empowering local leaders to play significant roles in peacemaking and SALW control processes. The weaknesses in the ways in which various SALW control and peacebuilding activities are conceptualised and designed are identified in Chapter 2. These include the weaknesses of SALW and DDR programmes in engaging effectively with host or target populations (Muggah, 2006), and the importance of community involvement in incentive setting and local leadership (Ginifer, 2003).

The different ways in which SALW are perceived is important not just in terms of how owners and users may be incentivised to put them under greater control. These perceptions can also play an important role in shaping engagement with

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174 Author’s interviews with Germova village council leaders and Debellder residents, July 2011 – as discussed in chapter 4.
peacebuilding processes. This is valid in terms of the effects of both complementarity and contingency. For instance, Chapter 4 highlights the unwillingness of communities in Kosovo to engage with peacebuilding efforts as a consequence of poorly perceived earlier efforts to promote greater control over SALW. Similarly, in South Sudan, whilst poorly executed SALW control efforts led to groups arming and rejecting efforts to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in one particular state where weapons management was closely linked to peacebuilding and development efforts and managed through close community engagement, SALW provided a useful entry point into broader peacebuilding efforts.

5.3.3 The effect of common SALW control and peacebuilding outcomes on interrelationships

Finally, the extent to which SALW control and peacebuilding activities have common intended outcomes and if not, the extent to which differing desired outcomes are compatible also appears to be important in determining the nature of interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding activities.

In the context of Sudan/Southern Sudan, SALW control was identified as an important element of an overarching peace process, and was designed into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement from an early stage (Preston and Smith 2008). Similarly in the Western Balkans, efforts were made to address SALW control challenges as part of the regional stabilisation and recovery plan supported by the EU and others (Hirst, 2004). In Sri Lanka, SALW control efforts were not explicitly dealt with as part of the initial ceasefire arrangements (Smith, 2003): They were however perceived by policy makers as closely related to efforts to entrench opportunities for peace through addressing the likely impacts of SALW proliferation on criminal activity and violence. In each case however, whilst the symbiotic nature of the two sets of outcomes (fewer, better controlled SALW and greater progress towards peace) was well established in the minds of those responsible for policy in this area, in each case, civilian populations were less easily resolved to the practical implications (weapons amnesty periods were routinely ignored by most people in
Sri Lanka and the countries of the Western Balkans, with the exception perhaps of Serbia).

This analysis is supported by the relevant literatures analysed in Chapter 2: The concepts of cultural (Ramsbotham et al, 2005) or positive (Galtung, 1969) peace are taken to mean more than just an absence of violence and to signify positive changes in behaviours and attitudes. Laurence (1996), Greene (1999) and later Krause (2006) all claim that SALW control can have a positive impact both on removing the tools of violence and the speed with which it can be (de)escalated, but also identify the longer term contribution to peacebuilding that acts of disarmament can have on attitudes towards security and to others (see also Guenev (2006) for an analysis of the relationship between SALW and cultures of violence in the Western Balkans).
5.4 Conclusions

This section builds on the main findings described above. It states the conclusions of this research, both as they relate to the research questions and more broadly to the framing hypothesis.

The hypothesis that this thesis seeks to contribute to validating is as follows:

Efforts to control SALW can have a positive or negative effect on post-conflict peacebuilding; conversely their success can be damaged or enhanced by peacebuilding activities. The interrelationships that exist between SALW control and peacebuilding are both temporal and spatial and are conditioned by the extent to which affected populations are involved. Therefore, the role and influence of local people, and the extent to which complementarity and contingency is understood and acted upon have a determining effect on the positive benefits of SALW control in post conflict peacebuilding.

The overall conclusion is that efforts to reduce and more effectively control SALW can make an important contribution to conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts. This is easiest to identify in the early stages of peace-making and early recovery when reducing violence is of primary importance. In these cases, SALW control is often a direct and explicit goal, such as in DDR or amnesties and civilian weapons collection activities. They are often led by local police or military, usually with UN or other international support and funding and are framed either as stand-alone activities or as disarmament or arms management elements of other security and confidence building programmes. SALW control efforts also have the potential to contribute towards more transformative, positive or cultural peacebuilding. However in these cases, where social capital, reconciliation and community resilience are prioritised and highly valued, they are most effective as either processes or outcomes of processes involving wide ranges of actors and where they are relevant to local as well as national priorities.
It is also clear that efforts to control SALW can create or stimulate additional conflict and violence, and negatively affect peacebuilding efforts. The approaches and methods employed, the extent to which conflict affected groups are involved, and the awareness of local attitudes towards SALW and their role in perceptions and attitudes appear critical to the extent to which their contributions are positive or negative. These dimensions are explored further and conclusions drawn in the following sub-sections.

5.4.1 Contingency

The role of contingency in determining and effecting interrelationships between SALW control activities and peacebuilding efforts is significant. Contingency is an important factor in shaping the interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts and can have a significant impact on the success of either. The case of Kosovo clearly demonstrates the negative impact that previous SALW control activities had on public perceptions regarding future efforts. It also demonstrates the negative impact that prior peacebuilding efforts can have on future SALW control initiatives if they are perceived to be linked through those involved or the methods they use. These negative effects were observed in Sri Lanka, Kenya and Uganda and appear to play a more significant role than other factors, including the role of complementarity. (This suggests that whilst the hypothesis remains valid, a future reformulation could reflect a differentiation in the weighting given to different variables.) Conversely, in Sierra Leone the success of SALW control efforts, and the extent to which they were perceived to have had a transformational effect, were to some extent influenced by previous positively regarded interventions.

This conclusion contributes to and further develops previous analysis of SALW control efforts in Kosovo (Nichols 2006; Hvindemose et al 2008) which identify the cumulative effect of SALW control efforts but which do not identify the contingent relationships between SALW control efforts and previous- or future- peacebuilding activities: Kosovo demonstrates clearly that SALW control efforts, however well-conceived can be undermined by weaknesses in, or failure of, earlier peacebuilding
activities; and that similarly, SALW control can have a negative effect on future peacebuilding efforts.

**Effective initiatives to control SALW are possible in all phases of de-escalation and peacebuilding and can be successful in each.** The incorporation of SALW control into peace agreements and ceasefire arrangements in the form of decommissioning or DDR (for instance in Kosovo, Macedonia or South Sudan) can have an important peacemaking contribution. However the transformational benefits of these activities are usually only felt at later stages of the recovery process. This suggests that early thought should be given to linking different SALW control contributions to peacebuilding frameworks over multiple phases at an early stage. In this regard, the concept of nesting is important and could ease the transition between phases, allowing the successes or failures in one phase to positively influence planning for future phases before they begin.

This conclusion suggests that literature on peacebuilding and SALW control in Kosovo, the Western Balkans and Sudan/Southern Sudan could be further developed to reflect the impact of SALW control efforts on longer-term conflict transformation. For example, in Kosovo, there is existing analysis of the short-term contributions of early peacebuilding and conflict prevention frameworks. (L Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy (2003) identified and analysed major sectoral peacebuilding interventions – see Chapter 4). However, these were relatively short-term in that they focussed on the early phases following the end of violent conflict, and whilst providing an important framework for analysing these initial phases of activity, they were limited to – and therefore hindered by – the lifetime of international peacebuilding interventions. There has not to-date been an examination in Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia or Southern Sudan of the longer-term cumulative contribution of peacebuilding and SALW control efforts on their individual or collective aims.

*It is unclear whether activities that require wide-spread public involvement are possible at very early stages before trust is built and the public feels able to contract*
the state to provide security at the expense of their ability to do so. Where SALW control activities are perceived to have faced significant difficulties, they often involve attempts to persuade the civilian population to hand-in weapons, or even disarm, at a point in the de-escalation phase in which there is still widespread uncertainty and insecurity. In Kosovo, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Kenya and Uganda for instance, consensus-based civilian disarmament campaigns have returned few voluntarily surrendered SALW, even where incentive schemes have been employed. It is the case that in these very early phases following the cessation of violence, whilst it is possible for armed groups to take decisions from a position of organisational strength to take steps to reduce SALW, it is much harder for members of the public to take this decision in a context in which it is unclear who will provide them with the security which they desire if they surrender one of the only forms of protection they may have. Therefore it is possible to conclude that voluntary SALW control initiatives are more suited to later stages of de-escalation, particularly if they are intended as a positive contribution to peacebuilding and conflict transformation.

In Kosovo, local ownership and leadership are identified as being critical factors in the success or otherwise of peacebuilding efforts both by researchers taking a critical approach to assessing the role of the international peacebuilding effort, and those undertaking analysis from a more cosmopolitan perspective. For instance, Richmond et al (2008) includes the lack of local ownership and participation as part of a wider critique of the international approach to post war Kosovo; Bennett (2011) identifies it as a factor in the relative failure of SALW control activities. However, in both cases, the authors do not explicitly examine how and to what extent widespread public participation and ownership would be possible in a context in which there was no overarching peace agreement and where insecurity and uncertainty was widespread. This research concludes that in the absence of a settlement and in the early period following war, where weapons are closely associated with personal and community protection, non-coercive SALW control activities which aim to remove weapons from the civilian population are likely to be
unrealistic and that a widespread failure to collect significant numbers of weapons is likely.

Nesting SALW control activities within an overall SALW control strategy or within wider peacebuilding strategies can be beneficial but can also have negative consequences. The experience from Sudan illustrates the dilemma involved in fully integrating SALW control activities within a wider peacebuilding framework. Whilst the CPA and its attendant implementation plans was conceptually strong and enabled international actors to coordinate and plan their interventions, it also subordinated the SALW control dimensions to the overall peacebuilding goals (Alila 2007). When the political context in Sudan effectively brought aspects of CPA implementation to a halt, the SALW control dimensions were also significantly affected. Nesting requires a level of integration which is likely to be very beneficial within a stand-alone approach to SALW control, but which could mean SALW control activities becoming strongly linked to the success or otherwise of other initiatives if integrated within a wider peacebuilding agreement or framework.

To some degree, this latter point was also evident in Kosovo where initial DDR was successful where it was deemed to be in the interests of the KLA\textsuperscript{175}, but where civilian SALW control was not seen to be of sufficient benefit to the population to offset the perceived risks. Existing analysis of the international peacebuilding effort situates SALW control within the UNMIK framework (see Nicholls 2006), which was widely publically criticised by Kosovo Albanians in particular for not moving quickly enough towards independence, and not addressing the overall lack of a political settlement; whereas the DDR programme which helped bring to an end the armed KLA activities was tightly nested with NATO-led activity and diplomatic engagement.

\textsuperscript{175} Author’s interview with former NATO Commander Brig. (rtd) Dennis Blease, March 2013
5.4.2 Complementarity

The interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and build peace are determined by activities taking place within the same period of time. This can have very positive or negative affects depending on how other activities are perceived and undertaken. Further, this research concludes that the temporal dimension has considerable value in understanding interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding activities. The case of Kosovo demonstrates effectively the importance of other contextual factors, including the existence of other SALW control or peacebuilding activities on interrelationships and on their chances of success. The public in a given context will probably not discriminate much in how they perceive and respond to between different activities if they take place at the same time, appear to have similar objectives and involve the same or similar actors.

This conclusion contributes to existing literature on efforts to control SALW and build peace in several of the contexts analysed in this research: In Kenya, and Sudan/South Sudan whilst activities have been examined in terms of their contribution to the failure or otherwise of efforts to control SALW, to-date, they have not analysed the positive and negative potential for other activities taking place at similar times and places to affect attitudes towards SALW and efforts to control them.

The extent to which SALW control is designed into a peacebuilding intervention or vice-versa is not necessarily significant. There is little evidence to suggest that the potential benefits of complementarity should be built into the design of SALW control or peacebuilding activities in the early design phase.

In Sudan, where this was attempted, it was not successful, partly given the rapidly changing political and security context and the inability of the internationally supported peacebuilding framework to develop and adapt. Whereas in Kenya and Uganda where a conscious effort was made to distinguish SALW control activities from wider sectoral reforms, whilst it probably meant that activities were undertaken faster and with less oversight, they also remained marginal to overall
government policy and governance priorities. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that whilst structurally the interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding are affected by the extent to which they are integrated, the success of either is not significantly determined through this act alone.

This conclusion does not confirm existing analysis on Sudan which focuses on the weaknesses of the CPA and its implementation programmes (see for instance see Antwi-Boateng and O'Mahony, 2008) as reasons for the relative failure of its different elements. Further, the relatively weak relationship between the nature of SALW control efforts and peacebuilding demonstrated in this research confirm that the hypothesis for this research, whilst remaining valid for the cases analysed, could be refined further; it appears from this research that contingency is a more significant factor than complementarity in affecting interrelationships.

Therefore, **SALW control efforts can work as a sector-specific or a cross-cutting activity**: The important element is that activities are closely coordinated and care is taken in planning and implementation to ensure that (a) there is enough support from those who matter – targets, implementers, leaders - to give it momentum and sufficient political support; (b) the opportunities and benefits of complementarity are understood from the outset and that the impact of decisions regarding post-war peacebuilding priorities on the achievability of other objectives is fully understood (i.e. activities to create short-term security might make consensual SALW control more difficult or a decision to allow warlords to participate in the political process might damage confidence in ability of state to provide security).

**5.4.3 Context and conclusions relevant to the broader analytical framework**

*This research shows that widespread public consent and participation is more likely the further from violent conflict they occur:* If as suggested in the section above, voluntary public disarmament activities are more likely to be successful if they take place as part of normalisation/cultural peacebuilding activities, consideration should be given to how they are located within other reform and development efforts.
This research shows that it can often be beneficial for this form of SALW control to be embedded in programmes to improve public security and reduce crime, or to improve public health rather than as a stand-alone intervention. This reinforces a sectoral approach and to some extent supports the approaches taken in Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Sierra Leone where later-phase SALW control was embedded within wider-public security programmes.

However, if the objective of voluntary civilian disarmament is to generate or demonstrate public willingness to engage in conflict transformation then a stand-alone SALW control activity may be appropriate at an early stage. Post-war Sri Lanka and Serbia following the assassination of Prime Minister Djindic are both instructive in this regard where public, symbolic SALW control efforts generated significant public engagement and resulted in the collection of many thousands of SALW in each case. Further, in this context there is no evidence to suggest that this should take the form of a sectoral intervention: On the contrary, it might be more appropriate as a stand-alone and cross cutting activity given that confidence building measures are likely to have wide benefit and utility.

*It is unclear whether direct efforts to control SALW are the most appropriate or effective entry-point to achieving their stated goals:* From a state-building perspective, focussing specifically on SALW has obvious benefits. Weapons provide capability for those who oppose the government or are involved in serious criminal activity. Therefore addressing the misuse of SALW is important from the perspective of monopolising the use of force, and enforcing the rule of law. For these reasons, a focus on SALW as an instrument in the commission of violence and other criminal activity makes sense from a government perspective. Similarly, there is value in focussing on SALW control as an issue which brings together various parts of government to address a common problem from the perspective of increasing government coherence and coordination at both police and operational levels.
From a civilian perspective the potential benefits are less clear. This research has demonstrated that that participating in (often) internationally supported SALW control activities can be beneficial to communities in terms of the wider benefits that they generate. However the lack of success of many SALW control programmes which have focussed on voluntary civilian weapons collection suggests that the potential benefits that participation can generate are not seen to outweigh the risks. It is apparent that the extent and willingness of community participation in weapons reduction programmes is partly affected by the potential material benefits, but also strongly by other factors, such as the proximity to violence, levels of trust (or lack thereof) in the government to provide security, and judgements about the extent to which participation will mark a given community out as having taking sides in a context in which conflict is on-going or where it has only recently ended. Where programmes which have focussed on SALW specifically have been successful it is where the process of reduction has created opportunities for communities to increase their confidence, social capital and their access to other goods and services. This suggests that wider development, recovery or governance programmes which have an outcome related to reducing SALW availability and misuse may be more effective than programmes which focus explicitly on reducing numbers of weapons as their primary focus.

*Lederach’s Actors and Approaches Triangle is appropriate for application to SALW control activities:* SALW can make more or less substantial contributions to transformative peacebuilding, partly depending on when it takes place and partly on who is involved. An activity in the early phases of peacemaking such as initial stages of DDR can have a very important role in setting the tone and direction of future peacebuilding. But an activity which involves a wide range of people, which is planned by those affected and which seeks to address their needs has the potential to be more transformational. Community security building activities for example have this potential. However their nature makes them hard to plan and manage from a ‘national’ level and makes widespread implementation difficult. This conclusion is highly relevant to the cases examined during this research. For instance, in Kosovo, whilst a focus has been put on the importance of local
participation (Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy. 2003), or on the failures of internationally supported elite peacemaking (Richmond, 2008; Pugh, 2008) there has to-date not been a systematic analysis of the different actors involved in peacebuilding and SALW control efforts and the roles that they have played. In this regard, this research therefore makes a contribution to the development of the literature on SALW control and peacebuilding in Kosovo.

Although consent and broad participation is important for SALW control activities to have a transformational benefit, it is also important that elites and those in the middle of Lederach’s triangle area also involved. The role often played by elites in negotiating settlements and ceasefires almost always has a dimension of weapons control built in. For instance, DDR efforts in Kosovo and Sudan/South Sudan were intended to remove the ‘tools’ that could sustain violence in order to enable peace processes to develop. In both cases, these processes were relatively short in length and did not consider how potential benefits could make a longer term contribution to transformative peacebuilding efforts. It is therefore possible to conclude from this research that more could be done at this early stage to ensure that the actions that are taken to reduce or end violence also have their transformative potential considered and built-in from an early stage.

There are considerable risks to peacebuilding goals posed by the integration of SALW control within local elites’ political agendas

The political contest which is often at the heart of violent conflict, and which continues to significantly affect security until a political settlement is reached can result in considerable tension between elite groups and between elites and the wider population. Allowing SALW control activities to be co-opted by particular groups of elites has the potential to significantly undermine their potential peacebuilding contribution. Similarly, focussing exclusively on the participation of citizens from a particular location or representing particular ethnic, political or other affiliations increases the risks that activities will have differentiated outcomes; positive for some but negative for others. Attention should therefore be paid in the design and implementation of SALW control activities to the range of
different actors who should be involved to increase the chances of them playing a positive role in reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts.

*Broad based programmes that are closely integrated or coordinated with wider state and peacebuilding efforts are important in post war environments where differences in perceptions of SALW and their potential threats and benefits and the weakness of government institutions are often significant.*

The analysis contained in this thesis argues that where successful SALW reduction occurs, it is a product of numerous different programmes and activities making contributions. A web or network of controls might therefore be more effective than linear programmes which seek by themselves to achieve positive outcomes. Encouraging greater control of weapons in several coordinated ways might yield greatest results. For example, tackling SALW across multiple fronts might be possible through more effective policing, better civilian weapons licencing, public education, more restrictive sales and improvements in public health. None of these activities by themselves are likely to achieve significant success. But taken together they might mitigate against the weaknesses of a single approach.

*Cultural and social attitudes are important and whilst complementarity and contingency are important, a particular set of contextual conditions are required that provides the opportunities to focus on SALW control as part of peacebuilding efforts and to maximise the chances of success.*

The views and perceptions of those affected/involved regarding SALW control will have a major influence on whether and how they get involved in SALW control activities (see Sierra Leone, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan/South Sudan mini case-studies in Chapter 3). These attitudes and perceptions are shaped by a range of contextual factors including cultural attitudes to weapons, self-defence and security provision, social, political and economic factors. These can shape constructions of reality and play a fundamental role in how SALW and therefore SALW control is perceived in relation to peace and conflict.
This conclusion is highly relevant to the development of the research hypothesis. The role of public perceptions and of local people is acknowledged as a significant determining factor in terms of their positive benefits on the success of SALW control and peacebuilding activities. This could be further developed to explicitly reflect the potentially negative effects which can arise from a lack of contextual analysis and awareness, and a failure to understand and address public attitudes and perceptions regarding SALW as a central element of efforts to control them.

Finally, this section draws conclusions on the suitability of the research approach and methods employed.

A mixed-methods approach is appropriate to research in this area. Qualitative and quantitative data are both important, and whilst the emphasis is on qualitative data gathered from interviews, focus groups and documents, quantitative data, in particular those drawn from surveys on perceptions of security, crime and peace and conflict is important to triangulate and further deepen analysis.

Within the overarching mixed methods approach, incorporating a soft social constructionist perspective appears highly beneficial. It provides for a focus on social construction in the development of attitudes and perceptions which are particularly important for understanding the at times complex understandings that governments and affected communities alike have regarding the role of SALW in conflict and peacebuilding.

The staged progression of analysis beginning with the identification of a universe of cases, the identification and then analysis of a small number of mini case studies, followed by researching and analysing a major case study helps identify, and then develop and deepen analysis and arguments. For instance, analysis of the universe of cases helped establish the existence of contingency in at least some SALW control activities which was then explored through the mini cases. They demonstrated that these contingencies did in fact exist in the contexts analysed,
and suggested that they could have both negative and positive effects on peacebuilding efforts, depending largely on how they were perceived by local communities and elites alike. The Kosovo case study provided the opportunity to analyse this emerging finding in greater detail, establishing that not only did the nature of activities and their contingencies change through different phases of peacebuilding, but that attitudes and perceptions towards SALW and those who owned and used them changed too as the distance from violence lengthened.

The Further Research section which follows discusses the value of looking at other forms of armed violence and their interrelationships with peacebuilding efforts. If in future research, the parameters were indeed widened, then there would be value in a second major case study to accompany Kosovo to reflect the characteristics of the context being examined. However, within the context of this research, a single case study appears to be appropriate, allowing as it does, for a detailed analysis of the interrelationships between SALW control efforts and peacebuilding activities in a country emerging from a period of large scale political armed violence, and a further elaboration and development of theories emerging from a less detailed analysis of a wide universe of cases.

5.4.4 Further research
This thesis has analysed in most detail efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding activities in the context of the early stages of recovery from large-scale violent conflict. There are three further important dimensions of the problem that it will be important to address in further research in order to test the boundaries of the findings and conclusions arising.

Firstly, although this research has examined this to some extent, more systematic and in-depth examinations would be useful of the longer-term transitional issues which can come to the fore several years following the end of large-scale political conflict. As such, the phenomenon of widespread armed crime which is prevalent in some societies where criminal gangs and others achieve the partial take-over of weak states (such as in Central America) is not explored in detail. This omission was
intentional. However the experience of some countries in Central and South America which emerged from violent conflict some years ago but which are severely affected by violent crime facilitated by weapons proliferation is important in understanding the long term effects that uncontrolled SALW may have on the transformation of societies.

Secondly, contexts in which there is substantial armed violence, but where there has not been significant violent political conflict (for example, Brazil or South Africa) have not been a primary focus for this thesis, and have not been explored in detail. It would be useful to complement this research with similar work in countries which are not emerging from war. This thesis does bring insights on this issue. The Kenya example in Chapter 3 is partially appropriate to this area of enquiry, but the author contends that the governments of Kenya and Uganda were to all intents and purposes involved in a social/political conflict with armed groups in areas that were for the most out of their control. However, regardless of the view of the reader in this particular case, Kenya may only represent one example in a much wider universe of cases which do not analyse in any depth the role of SALW control activities in promoting peace in these contexts.

The third dimension where further research would be particularly desirable is how the interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts may be affected in country contexts which are both violent and peaceful at different times and in different locations. Kenya and Uganda are interesting examples of this phenomenon; others could include Nigeria, Pakistan and India. In these cases, localised peacebuilding efforts, which may be supported nationally or even internationally, will likely contain elements which are relevant to SALW and SALW control. Further, localised SALW control challenges may be addressed as part of national-level government policy and action in otherwise unaffected environments. The extent to which a mosaic of conflict intensity affects interrelationships and the ability of communities and government alike to build peace is important given the apparent reduction in inter-state conflicts and the upsurge of violent conflict within national boundaries.
Finally, further research could be important to test the boundaries of the contexts within which the conclusions are appropriate. Whilst a wide range of contexts was analysed in Chapter 3, Kosovo represents the main case study examined in this literature: Differing contexts, such as for instance, those in which the state has collapsed either in entirety (Somalia), or in part (Afghanistan or DRC) may yield different interrelationships and therefore different conclusions.
Annex A: Profiles of research locations

Germova

Germova is in Viti Municipality in the South East of Kosovo and straddles the main highway from Pristina to Skopje in Macedonia. It is a linear rural village with no adjoining neighbours. It contains around 2000 people, many of whom are unemployed or work in the agricultural sector. The main agricultural products are vegetables and grains which are grown by family concerns and then marketed elsewhere.

Until the war began in 1999, Germova was a mixed Albanian and Serbian village, with a majority Albanian population. Perhaps because of a combination of its proximity to the border and its strategic location on the Pristina/Skopje truck road Germova was affected significantly by the war. Albanian people in the village were attacked by a contingent of JNA soldiers stationed nearby, abductions and arrests were commonplace and JNA tanks and other heavy weaponry were used to intimidate. The Serbian community were also significantly affected – ultimately at least as much as their Albanian counterparts in that they were all compelled to leave the village during the war, relocating to areas with higher Serbian populations within Kosovo or to Serbia itself. When they departed, many they left weapons which had been distributed to them by Yugoslav Ministry of Interior Police in the late 1990s – officially for self-protection purposes, which were then taken over by the remaining Albanian population.

The residents of Germova were amongst the first Kosovars to come into contact with British and American soldiers as they pushed into Kosovo from Skopje to the east. In the confusion mistakes were made which the community feel might have prejudiced their interactions with KFOR following the end of the war. For example, local residents fired weapons they claim that they had looted from Serbian families in the village at US KFOR troops when they first saw them, imagining that they must have been Yugoslav army as they did not know that allied group troops were operating within the borders of Kosovo at the time. It is their contention that
subsequently in the immediate weeks following the end of the war when they would have been willing to disarm in return for security guarantees, their entreaties were unanswered.\footnote{Focus Group, Male, Germova, June 2011}

Germova has been the subject of a wide variety of security and peace building activities. These include efforts to control SALW led both by KFOR (which targeted Germova for search and seize operations in 2001) and then later, UNMIK/UNDP and a variety of peace-building efforts including a much vaunted but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to renovate houses belonging to Serbian families to encourage their return led by UN HABITAT and UNDP.

The focus group discussion took place in the side room of a café in Germova. It was convened in the early evening and was attended by 5 local residents who described themselves as the following: a housewife; the head of the village council; a former Director of Emergencies at the local municipal office, a former Director of Education in the municipal office, an unemployed father and a man working in the agricultural sector. The focus group lasted for almost two hours and took place in Albanian with English translation.

In addition to the focus group discussion, interviews took place with two key informants (two interviews each) which were conducted in Pristina during the second and third visits to Kosovo. Documents which described attempts to support improvements in community security published by the NGO Saferworld were examined. And the author visited Germova twice during research for this thesis, visiting sites that had been particularly affected by the conflict, as well as buildings and other infrastructure built since the war.
Debellder
Debellder is a village of approximately 400 people, also situated in the Viti Municipality. It is located in the far east of the country and comprises part of the mountainous border with Macedonia. It can only be reached by a single track road that leads several kilometres from Viti town on the plains below. The road that used to run from the village into Macedonia is now blocked and villages still fear that mines planted during the KLA/JNA war may still be present.

Debellder is particularly interesting as it was affected significantly by two of the wars of the late 1990s and early 2000s. During the KJA/JNU conflict, Debellder which was a mixed community transformed into one which was heavily Albanian dominated with a small number of Macedonian residents. As a strategic vantage point from which movement on the plains below could be tracked, the village was a particular target of the JNA; consequently phone and power lines were cut and communications routes were mined. Out of a relatively small adult male Albanian population, 14 men enlisted as KLA ‘regular’ fighters, moving across Kosovo to fight as required. In 2001, following the end of the conflict with Serbia, Debellder was again affected by conflict when the Albanian National Army was formed to challenge the government of Macedonia. During the conflict, Debellder was shelled by the Macedonian army and villagers were targeted from vantage points on the Macedonian side of the border. An agreement between the then presidents of Yugoslavia and Macedonia in 2001 attempted to establish the border between Kosovo and Macedonia. It stated that some land owned by villagers in Debellder was now part of Macedonia. Whilst the villagers still had title to the land, they would need to cross an international border into an area with which they had recently being in armed conflict to work it. With the existing direct road blocked and mined, access to their lands would be long and difficult. Since the agreement, villagers have not visited their property which has reduced the available income to residents, precipitating a drift in the population from the mountains into Viti Town some 40 minutes by car on the plain below.
Debellder has been subject to a wide variety of peace- and security-building efforts since 1999 by government and international actors alike as well as a target of UN and KFOR attempts to control SALW, including demining and efforts to promote civilian weapons surrender. Demining was undertaken by KFOR and then by private contractors. Being in one of the focus municipalities, Debellder was targeted by ISAC I, although residents chose not to surrender weapons. There were various reasons given for this ranging from a perceived need to keep them to protect their lands to claims that as ex-KLA fighters, they should maintain them in the event of a future need to mobilise again. Being as remote as it is, Debellder does not have a police station or office and so has not been affected significantly by security building efforts or peacebuilding activities organised through law enforcement institutions per se.

Two focus group discussions were organised with residents in Debellder. The first took place in the local café and involved 15 local residents, all of whom own land on the Macedonian side of the border. The second focus group took place several days later in Viti town and focussed very specifically on the issue of small arms and small arms control. There were four participants, all male, including the village head, a local teacher and two farmers. It was apparent that some, if not all the participants had been active KLA fighters.

In addition to the two focus groups, the author was taken on a tour of the village by four village representatives to see amongst other things: the border with Macedonia; the road which was reportedly shelled during the 2001 conflict and which residents believe is still mined; the telegraph wires which the villagers claimed were sabotaged by JNA forces in 1999 and mined to prevent repair; abandoned houses which were inhabited by Macedonians until the outbreak of conflict in 2001.
**Ferizaj**

Ferizaj is one of Kosovo’s main population centres, with over 150,000 residents. It is located in the centre of the country on the east/west highway between Macedonia and Montenegro and on the railway track that runs from Belgrade to Skopje via Mitrovica. The population in the centre of the city is now almost exclusively Albanian, although there are a number of small Serbian villages that are included within the City boundaries.

Ferizaj was affected significantly by the conflict with active fighting taking place around the city. Many families fled the city during the conflict with Albanians moving to Albania or Macedonia and Serbs to Serbian population centres nearby or to Serbia itself. Following the end of the war, there was a heavy KFOR presence stationed in the city, which amongst other things maintained a high profile and very visible role guarding an Orthodox church in the city centre. The city was the first major population centre reached by US and UK soldiers entering Kosovo from Macedonia and was the scene of active combat between NATO and JNA troops within the city boundaries.

Ferizaj is now a heavily populated area and is the main market and business town in its region. It suffers from high unemployment, a very high youth population and pockets of considerable poverty. Over recent years the phenomenon of youth violence, involving guns and knives, including at school has gained considerable attention from police, government and media across the country. Whilst in the early years following the war, there was considerable emphasis placed on peacebuilding activities between Albanians and Serbs which were organised by a range of different actors, the main focus of activities over recent years which have a security or peacebuilding dimension focus on issues related to promoting the rule of law, policing and access to justice.

Ferizaj is interesting for the fact that following the end of the war, there were significant local-level community led peacebuilding efforts undertaken by a group of local community organisations, businesses and war veterans. These included
renovating public spaces, opening a library, improving water and electricity supplies and improving road access. Paid for in part by contributions from local business leaders, these outputs of these activities can still be seen today (for instance, the author visited the public park and the library in June 2011), and are often cited by local people as examples of how the city attempted to recover and promote peace in the immediate post-war period.\footnote{Informal interview with Municipal Mayor and former KLA commander, Ferizaj, June 2011}

In recognition of this particular dimension of the small arms problem, the focus group in Ferizaj brought together young people from some of the city’s high schools. There were six participants, three four young women and two young men from 16-18 years of age. There have been various efforts over the last two years to address gun related violence in schools in Ferizaj, including a locally organised education campaign led by students titled ‘With wisdom not a Gun’ and a national government initiative under the auspices of a National Schools Safety strategy. The focus group discussion took place in a function room in the main hotel in Ferizaj and last for two hours.

In addition to the focus group discussion, a number of unstructured discussions took place with local residents, the mayor, a senior ex-KLA soldier and the head of the emergency planning department in the municipal office as part of a visit to the old KLA building, which was at the time of the authors visit, being transformed into a museum and gallery.

**Lubinje**

Lubinje is a mainly Bosniac village in the south of Kosovo in the municipality of Prizren in the border areas between Kosovo and the Albanian dominated eastern part of Macedonia around Tetovo and Gostivar. In addition to people of Bosniac origin, Lubinje – which comprises two sister villages split by a steep mountain valley – is a mixed community with Albanian and Serbian residents and a small number of people of Turkish and Roma origin. Lubinje, like Debellder is a very mountainous area and exists at over 1000 metres about sea level. During the war, the village was
affected, but in a markedly different way from others in which focus group discussions were organised. The Bosniac population were viewed by Belgrade in the period leading up to the war as allies and distinctly different from Albanian people. As such, as with Serbian families, they were armed by the Yugoslav interior police – partly for self-protection and partly as a prospective defence militia capable of engaging with the KLA if required. This arming of civilians by the state took place across Kosovo with non-Albanian populations. The distinguishing characteristic of the case of the residents of Lubinje is that they returned the weapons they were given. The interpretation of why this happened differs depending on the conversation and the discussants, but it contains a combination of two narratives: firstly that Bosniaks are peaceful people who had no argument with their Albanian contemporaries and therefore they returned the weapons from a principled position; the second is that they knew they were isolated and outnumbered, could see the way the conflict was likely to go and made the judgement call that the risk of being caught with the weapons in the event of an Albanian victory which would have marked them out as collaborators was greater than the risk of punishment by Serbian authorities for returning them immediately.

During the war, Lubinje wasn’t as affected significantly by fighting as in other parts of Kosovo. The villages’ isolation and their ethnic make-up probably contributed to this, but it also caused villagers problems: they were not able to access any fuel wood during the winters of 1999 and 2000 (their principal source of power), electricity was cut off and in the minds of FDG participants at least, they were not supported by the municipality in the first years of local government in the same way that their Albanian contemporaries were elsewhere. Whilst the war affected the people of Lubinje differently, as with all parts of Kosovo visited for the research for this thesis, local people had attempted to organise activities to promote peace – in this case at the community level involving people from a number of different ethnic backgrounds. In Lubinje these activities have included a twinning programme to link up with a village in Switzerland, and a locally highly regarded project to promote education and community cohesion through establishing a local football club.
The focus group discussion in Lubinje deviated from the original research plan in that the village council requested that residents from both villages attended. As such, although the author visited the village on two separate occasions – in December 2010 and June 2011 to set up and then hold interviews, the focus group discussion took place just north of Prizren. Fourteen people attended comprising men, women, residents from both villages, employed and unemployed, village heads, members of Community Safety Action Teams and young people. The discussion took place in Bosnian, Serbian and Albanian and was translated into English. Due to the complicated linguistic challenge of this particular meeting, two interpreters were used.

In addition to the focus group meeting and prior visit to Lubinje in December 2010 during which the author met with a group of eight local residents to discuss safety and security issues in a semi structured context, a separate interview was organised with the village head whilst he was visiting Pristina in late May 2011.

**Additional visits and meeting locations**

**Mitrovica**

Mitrovica is the locus of the remaining conflict in Kosovo today. The city straddles the Ibar River and is divided between the south of the city, which is inhabited by those of Albanian ethnicity and the north, which sustains the highest concentration of people of ethnic Serbian background in Kosovo. Northern Mitrovica, which also contains significant Roma and Bosniak populations is, along with three northern Municipalities, (Leposavic, Zvecan and Zubin Potok) largely cut off from the rest of the country. Whilst in principle it is possible to move between the north and the south – the author has done this many times for example – in reality it is extremely unusual for Albanian’s to visit the north or Serbs the south. The Pristina government has no control over administration or security in the north, which is provided, where it is at all, by a combination of ‘parallel structures’ funded by the government in Belgrade and international agencies such as the OSCE, KFOR and the EU mission in Kosovo – EULEX. One interviewee described the northern part of the
city as a pressure cooker – ‘no-one can get out, they have nothing to do except get angry’. Gun violence in northern Mitrovica is a regular event, often involving young people affiliated to particular political or business figures.\textsuperscript{178} Whilst in theory the Kosovo Police has a presence in the north, in practice it performs no useful function and so those involved in intimidation and violence have little fear of investigation of prosecution.

Whilst there are no credible current statistics covering issues such as unemployment, crime, and economic activity, Mitrovica appears to the engaged outsider to be experiencing an ongoing decline. For many young people the only opportunities are to be found either in Serbia or further afield in other countries. The absence of an accountable political class ensures that politics are heavily compromised by business affiliations, with a widely held perception amongst the public that the current elites benefit financially from the status quo and are therefore not incentivised to consider ways in which access to opportunities and services can be improved for the population of the northern part of the city. The author has particular experience of this part of the country and has visited many times. During 2010-11 he visited each of the northern municipalities, meeting representatives from parallel structures, civil society groups and in each case, the municipal Kosovo Police commander.

In addition to these meetings, during the author’s third research visit to Kosovo, he visited Mitrovica specifically to meet with NGO representatives and a specific official working for the OSCE, of Serbian nationality who was originally from Pristina and who has worked in northern Mitrovica since the end of the war. Discussions in Mitrovica were challenged by a heightened state of tension (the author’s visit coincided with the arrest of General Ratco Mladic in Serbia for alleged crimes against humanity committed in Bosnia in the mid 1990’s) as well as a more generalised suspicion of foreigners and importantly, of local people talking to them in public.

\textsuperscript{178} Interviews in Mitrovica and Pristina, December 2010 and June 2011
Mitrovica has been targeted by a wide variety of security and peacebuilding efforts since the end of the war in 1999. These have included activities which have also been undertaken in other parts of Kosovo, including attempts to establish security and justice institutions and improve access to justice for citizens. But they have also included a wide range of different activities which have sought to address perceptions that remaining tension is linked to the particular ethnic makeup of the northern part of the city and its relations with neighbouring Serbia. A small number of locally-based organisations, mostly in the northern part of the city have undertaken a wide range of activities over recent years from those that have a substantive public awareness-raising function or which seek to promote reconciliation to those that use livelihood promotion as a means of promoting peace. Many of the early peacebuilding efforts were assessed by Diana Chigas et al in 2006 as part of an examination of the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo in tackling violence following a specific outbreak of violence in 2004. Amongst the findings of the study, the authors claimed that peacebuilding activities to date had not had a significant impact on conflict prevention and that one of the key factors that contributed to this was that they had not often focussed on the main drivers of conflict (Chigas, D et al 2006; 133-146).

**Gjakova**
Gjakova is located in the south west of Kosovo near the Albanian border to the South and the Montenegrin border to the north-west. It is the main town in its region, and was a significant settlement during the Yugoslav period.

Gjakova was very badly affected by the 1999 war. It was seen as an Albanian stronghold, a recruitment point for fighters and as a transit destination for weapons by Belgrade. Consequently a large proportion of the Albanian population fled across the border to Albania during the war. KLA activity in Gjakova was significant and hard battles with many casualties took place in and around the town between the KLA and JNA forces that were able to move over the border from Montenegro with relative ease. Memories of the war in Gjakova remain strong and those
interviewed by the author had one unifying characteristic, they were the most hostile and aggressive towards people of Serbian ethnicity than anyone else interviewed by the author in the rest of the country.

**Gracanica**

Gracanica is a Serbian majority town, which was until recently located in the Pristina Municipality, however following the establishment of a number of new municipalities in 2009, Gracanica was granted Municipality status. As with many central Kosovan towns, it was heavily damaged by the conflict – both in terms of its population as well as its infrastructure. Gracanica is situated close to Kosovo’s only international airport and as such was affected by the competition for strategic locations between NATO and Russian Federation forces during the land engagement phase of the intervention, which led to the Russian military establishing a base outside the airport, where they remained for several years. Consequently, residents had little access to KFOR and to UNMIK-led peacebuilding efforts in the early period following the end of the war; some Gracanica residents report feeling left out of reconstruction efforts despite demonstrating a greater willingness to engage with the nascent Kosovo institutions than the majority of Serb-dominated areas in other parts of the country.  

Leaders in Gracanica have been active over recent years in promoting peace and security for their citizens, including establishing an active Municipal Community Safety Council. A local non-governmental organisation CSD, based in Gracanica has played an important role in the development of a Kosovo-wide civil society effort to promote activities to enhance community safety and security.

**Peja**

Peja is a significant town, the main population centre in the region dominated by the Rugova Mountains in the extreme west of the country which shares a border with Montenegro. In Peja, during the war, many people were killed and the city was badly damaged; Human Rights Watch for instance claim that over 80% of the

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179 Interview with LPC representative December 2010
buildings in the city were badly damaged by shell and mortar fire (Human Rights Watch 1999). The city was also affected again in March 2004 when the most significant violence since the end of the 1999 war took place following the killing of a Serbian boy in contested circumstances a few kilometres outside Pristina (for a detailed report on the violence and its affects see Schenker, H. 2006). The author visited Peja to interview the Director of the main civil society organisation in the region who for several years has been actively engaged on issues relating to controlling SALW and promoting community security and to observe the scene of a recent incidence of gun violence.

Gjilan
The town of Gjilan was not as badly affected by the war and its effects as some others in Kosovo in terms of human or infrastructural impact. It was and remains a mixed community and is by Kosovo standards fairly prosperous, being centrally located on Kosovo’s main road network. Gjilan was however, heavily affected by a localised earthquake on 24 April 2002 which led to landslides and closure of the main through road and very significant damage to local buildings and businesses. In addition to having its own story to tell of how it was affected by the conflict, Gjilan is interesting in that it was a local NGO from the town which was most active in participating in the two UNDP led attempts to control small arms, in 2003 and 2005. The Kosovo Centre for International Security was awarded a contract to run a public awareness and education campaign in advance of the 2003 weapons for development programme. It was known to UNDP prior to this contract being offered as it had undertaken significant local activities in years immediately following the end of the war to encourage interaction between young people of different nationalities – which included sports tournaments and social activities. Later in 2005 it was also awarded a contract to run public education campaigns in four municipalities as part of an additional UNDP SALW control focussed project which was funded through money left over from the 2003 effort that was not awarded to municipalities.

Pristina

Pristina, for many years the capital city of Kosovo is centrally located and plays the central role in the administrative, commercial and cultural life of Kosovo today. Prior to the war, it was a mixed community with many Serbs living alongside the majority Albanian population. Following the end of the war, the numbers of Kosovo-Serbian residents fell to just two people. This has changed as the war has become more distant and it is once again a more mixed community with ethnic Albanians and a small number of ethnic Serbs living alongside people from a wide range of different nationalities from the Balkan region and much further afield.

Pristina was the headquarters for UNMIK, the OSCE mission in Kosovo and those of most of the other international agencies that played a role supporting peacebuilding and SALW control efforts in the years following the end of the war. As well as being the most critical location in the country in terms of government and services, Pristina was also affected heavily by the war and is today the arguably the area of the country which is most affected by the impact of SALW proliferation and misuse. For instance, between 2000 and 2004, over 35% of all SALW seized by police were taken in Pristina (Kharkee and Florquin 2003:20) and between 2003 and 2005, of all firearm related injuries recorded by hospitals in Kosovo, Pristina Municipality counted for over 25% of the total, which was almost three times that of the nearest municipality (Sokolova, Richards and Smith 2006:19). The majority of the interviews with government officials, both ex- and serving, took place in Pristina, as did several of the interviews with NGOs working at the national level, and those working for international organisations, including UNDP and the OSCE. During the field visits to Kosovo, the author was based in Pristina, travelling out daily to different parts of the country. The main documents accessed for the research were obtained in Pristina and the author spent considerable time observing how government officials, and the police and ministry of internal affairs office of public safety in particular interacted with issues of safety, security and SALW control.
Over the course of the past ten years, the author has spent almost a year in Kosovo, spaced over 40 visits, much of which was based in Pristina. This has encouraged a good understanding of how the city has recovered and developed since the war, the ways in which Kosovar institutions have gradually replaced the once overwhelming international presence, and how the population has changed over time, both in ethnic make-up and other important demographics such as age and wealth.
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