African Union Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection

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PhD
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An Evaluation of the EU Strategy for Africa and the G8/Africa Joint Plan

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Abstract

Global demand for peacekeeping is growing, especially in Africa. The United Nations has traditionally been at the forefront of developing peacekeeping theory and practice, and remains the primary operational agency for peacekeeping in Africa. But increasing emphasis is being placed on the African Union to assume greater responsibility for peacekeeping on the continent. The AU is still comparatively new and is in the process of developing its peace and security architecture. Over the past decade, the international community has been supporting African peacekeeping, both to build AU capacity and to provide direct operational support. In 2005 the international community agreed a collective ‘responsibility to protect’ vulnerable civilians threatened by gross violations of their human rights. And civilian protection is increasingly included in the mandates of peacekeeping missions. Within the context of contemporary complex, multidimensional peacekeeping (‘peace support’), civilian protection is not an exclusive operational objective, but is rather one of a number of mandated tasks aimed at establishing more sustainable
security as part of a broader peacebuilding goal. The AU has embraced the responsibility to protect principle, adopting a constitutional commitment to protect the rights of vulnerable civilians, including through peacekeeping interventions if necessary. But how capable is the AU in practice to deliver effective peacekeeping to protect civilians? And how appropriate is international support to help realise this ambition?
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African Union Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection

An Evaluation of the EU Strategy for Africa and the G8/Africa Joint Plan

Chapter 1  Introduction

Hypothesis and Research Questions

This thesis hypothesises that the African Union can, with appropriate international support, develop over time peacekeeping capability that can contribute to the protection of civilians caught up in armed conflict.

In order to explore this hypothesis, this thesis poses three basic research questions:

1) how has peacekeeping incorporated increasing emphasis on protecting civilians in international peace and security policy?

2) is the African Union a competent agency to deliver peacekeeping operations?

3) can international partnership provide appropriate and sufficient support to the African Union to fulfil its peacekeeping commitment?
To explore these questions, this thesis looks at two international initiatives to support AU peacekeeping capability: the EU Strategy for Africa and the G8/Africa Joint Plan.

**Context**

Global demand for peacekeeping is growing. This is especially true in Africa. The United Nations has traditionally been at the forefront of developing peacekeeping theory and practice. The UN remains the primary operational agency for peacekeeping in Africa. But increasing emphasis is being placed on the African Union to assume greater responsibility for peacekeeping on the continent. Other international actors are also supporting AU and UN peacekeeping in Africa.

The AU is still comparatively new and is in the process of developing its peace and security architecture. It has relatively little experience of peacekeeping and is in the process of building capability to deploy missions. Over the past decade, the international community – notably the European Union and the G8 – has been supporting African peacekeeping, both to build AU capacity and to provide direct operational support. In Darfur, the AU and the UN have deployed the first example of a joint, ‘hybrid’ mission.

In 2005 the international community agreed a collective ‘responsibility to protect’ vulnerable civilians threatened by gross violations of their human
rights. And civilian protection is increasingly included in the mandates of peacekeeping missions. As Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor assert, “the link between the protection of civilians and peacekeeping mandates is central ... the safety and security of civilians is critical to the legitimacy and credibility of peacekeeping missions”.¹

Within the context of contemporary complex, multidimensional peacekeeping missions, civilian protection is not an exclusive operational objective, but is rather one of a number of mandated tasks aimed at establishing more sustainable security as part of a broader peacebuilding goal. Williams has noted that basing peace operation policies on a multilayered conception of protection would better safeguard civilians.² Holt and Taylor, meanwhile, note that the protection of civilians in the context of peacekeeping operation is “a critical component for a sustainable political peace”.³

The AU has embraced the responsibility to protect principle. Its Constitutive Act includes a commitment to protect the rights of vulnerable civilians, including through peacekeeping interventions if necessary.⁴ But how capable

is the AU in practice to deliver effective peacekeeping to protect civilians? And how appropriate is international support to help realise this ambition?

**Methodology and structure**

In order to respond to the research questions outlined above, this thesis reviews academic and other relevant literature, including official documentation. It also incorporates original, primary research material gathered by the author during field-work, through face-to-face, telephone and e-mail interviews and participatory activities with a range of international and African officials experts in Africa and internationally. In the process of my research I have travelled extensively in east, south and west Africa, speaking to officials in regional and continental bodies and national troop contributors. I have also conducted extensive visits to Brussels, EU capitals, and Washington and New York (UN) in the US. This forms the basis of the original academic contribution that this thesis seeks to make.

**Field research**

**European Union**

Field research into the EU Strategy for Africa, agreed by the European Council on 15 December 2005, was based around the author’s role as Specialist Adviser to an inquiry by the UK House of Lords EU Committee, Sub-
Committee C (foreign affairs, defence and development policy). The inquiry considered what more needed to be done to implement the Strategy and to ensure that the EU’s policies towards Africa are coherent and coordinated. The inquiry considered the future of the Strategy from different perspectives including the EU’s own action plan, the involvement of the AU and other regional organisations, and the role of international organisations and non-governmental organisations.

The inquiry developed a ‘call for evidence’, which listed a number of themes and questions that would underpin its research. Questions relating to security and peacekeeping capabilities are listed below:

- What more needs to be done to implement the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Africa Action Plan?
- How likely is the future deployment of Battlegroups and military and civilian crisis management missions in Africa?
- What is the balance between the EU’s military and civilian conflict prevention, management and resolution capacity?
- How can the EU most effectively support the development of the African Standby Force (ASF), in line with the Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the ASF, at both continental and sub-regional levels?

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• How will the anticipated EU-AU-UN interface in peace operations work out in practice? What will be their various operational roles? Is there an operational role for other bodies, such as NATO?
• What lessons can be learned from previous EU operational experiences in Africa?
• How can the EU work with the Peacebuilding Commission to improve conditions in fragile states?
• Given the post-conflict focus of the Peacebuilding Commission, what initiatives will the EU undertake to support African capacity to prevent conflicts?
• Should the EU focus its peacekeeping efforts on indirect support such as AU funding and the provision of expertise, or on playing a direct military role in peacekeeping missions?
• What further support does the AU require in order to play a significant role in peacekeeping in Africa?

During the inquiry, the author was involved in a number of interviews with experts. Interviews were held from April 2004 through June 2006 in London and Brussels. Interviewees included the following:

• Hilary Benn, former UK Secretary of State for International Development;
• Lord Triesman, former UK Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the FCO on the development of the EU’s Strategy;
• Javier Solana, then High Representative for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy;
• Robert Dewar, then UK Permanent Representative to the AU;
• Elmar Brok, Chair of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee;
• Representatives of the Belgian government;
• Myles Wickstead, former Head of the Secretariat for the Commission for Africa;
• Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute of Security Studies, South Africa;
• Alex Vines, then Head of the Africa Programme, Chatham House;
• James Mackie and colleagues, European Centre for Development Policy Management; and

G8

Field research to research the G8/Africa Joint Plan was based on a series of interviews with key practitioners and experts from the G8 and from Africa, undertaken by the author between April 2004 and April 2005. These took place as part of a Chatham House project led by the author, and funded by the UK Conflict Prevention Pools, which as intended to provide a strategic input to the implementation process following up commitments made in the
Joint Plan.⁶ Particular focus was given to potential outcomes that could be pursued during the UK’s Presidencies of the G8 and EU in 2005. Analysis has subsequently been updated with desk research and some additional interviews.

The objectives of this project were to:

- provide a strategic analysis of key challenges that need to be addressed by African and donor institutions and governments in implementing the Joint Plan; and
- identify specific activities relating to the implementation of the Joint Plan that could potentially be prioritised.

The project was carried out in two phases, as follows:

1. Consultation with donors to map out existing and planned peacekeeping support activities against the commitments made in the Joint Plan. This involved drawing on existing sources of information (surveys, questionnaires, research etc.) coupled with interviews with officials and experts.

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2. Discussing this ‘map’ of activities and priority areas with African partners, researching African perspectives on the way in which peacekeeping support is being delivered to build a constructive critique and recommendations for improvement. The project also explored potential for aligning African peacekeeping priorities with donor priorities, and identifying areas where these priorities are clearly different.

The methodology for this research was participatory. Research was primarily been carried out through a series of face-to-face, telephone and email interviews with officials from key G8 governments, the African Union, African regional organisations and African governments. This consultative work was further enhanced by two international meetings that were held as part of the project: 1) an off-the-record seminar with Ambassador Said Djinnit, then AU Peace and Security Commissioner, held at Chatham House in December 2004; and 2) an international workshop also at Chatham House in April 2005, which fleshed out options for increased action towards the implementation of the Joint Plan.

Research involved visits to key G8 actors and partners in London (FCO, DFID and MoD), Paris (Quay d’Orsay, Ministere de Defence, Agence France de Developpement), New York (DPKO), Washington (State Department and the Pentagon), and Brussels (EU Secretariat and EC) – as well as telephone and email exchanges with other G8 Member States: Canada, Japan, and Germany. Interviews were based on the following general questions:
1. What activities are your government currently undertaking towards the implementation of the *Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations*?

2. Are you planning any new activities in this area? If so, can you share information about these plans with us?

3. Have you carried out or commissioned any surveys of PSO\(^7\) capacity or capacity building programmes in Africa? If so, can you share these with us?

4. What areas of PSO capacity building or individual PSO capacity building projects do you think have been most successful? Why do you think that they have succeeded?

5. What areas of the Joint Plan are your government’s highest priority as an individual donor nation?

6. Which areas of the Joint plan do you think would be most promising for increased joint effort between African and G8 countries in general?

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\(^7\) Please note that the Joint Plan refers to ‘Peace Support Operations’ (PSOs). These are synonymous with complex peacekeeping, as defined in chapter 2. Where interviewees refer to PSOs, therefore, this should be understood as complex peacekeeping operations.
7. What are the key challenges that you think will need to be addressed in order for the *Joint Plan* to be successfully implemented.

8. What are your views on the AU/regional security architecture as presently foreseen as an effective conflict management system?

The author also travelled extensively in Africa, with visits to ECOWAS and the Nigerian military in Abuja; the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra; the Institute for Security Studies, the South African military – including the British military support team – in Pretoria; the African Union and various European and EU embassies in Addis Ababa; and IGAD and the British peacekeeping training team in Nairobi. The author also conducted a telephone interview with SADC in Gabarone, and met with UK regional conflict advisers in Abuja, Pretoria and Addis Ababa. Interviews with African partners were based on the following set of questions:

1. Have you carried out, commissioned or taken part in any surveys of peace and security capacity or capacity-building programmes in your country, region, or Africa as a whole? If so, could you share the outcomes of this work with us?

2. What activities are you involved in or planning towards the implementation of the *Joint Africa/G8 Plan*? If you are working with donor partners on these activities, who are they and what are they contributing to your efforts?
3. To what extent do the terms of the *Joint Plan* fit with your priorities for developing effective African peace and security architecture, including the ASF/standby brigades?

4. To what extent are the AU/RECs/donors coordinating their activities/plans for the establishment of African peace and security architecture and which areas would benefit most from further coordination? How can coordination be improved?

5. What are the key challenges/priorities that need to be addressed in the establishment and operationalisation of African peace and security architecture, including the ASF/standby brigades? How might cooperation between African and donor partners best be enhanced to address these?

6. What areas of PSO capacity-building or individual PSO capacity-building projects do you think have been most successful? Why do you think that they have succeeded?

7. What types of capacity-building support would you like to see donors prioritising and what other activities do you think the G8 should review or include in their programmes?
8. What are your views on the AU/regional security architecture as presently foreseen as an effective conflict management system? What are the key institutions/mechanisms needed to operationalise African peace and security architecture and what are the key steps and actions to implement this?

Many interviews were conducted on the basis of the Chatham House Rule. Two high-profile interviewees from the AU Peace and Security Commission who agreed to be named were Ambassador Said Djinnet and El Ghassim Wane, at that time the Commissioner and Director of Peace and Security, respectively. More recently (2009), the author interviewed the then Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and head of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), HE Nicolas Bwakira.

Structure of the thesis

Chapter 2 Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Africa

Chapter 2 develops an analysis of contemporary peacekeeping policy and practice in Africa. It traces key post-Cold War developments – relating to peacebuilding and peace enforcement, the impact of major operational failures in the mid-1990s and subsequent reform initiatives, and the trend
towards sharing the peacekeeping ‘burden’ beyond the UN. The chapter pays particular attention to civilian protection as an increasingly prominent peacekeeping function, from the acknowledgement of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect in New York in 2005, to the inclusion by the UN Security Council of civilian protection as core a mandated objective of peacekeeping missions. It includes an applied case study of peacekeeping civilian protection in the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

Chapter 3 The African Union

Chapter 3 reviews the status and development of the African Union peace and security architecture. It outlines the AU’s constitutional and institutional commitment to provide civilian protection and examines the development of the African Standby Force (ASF), including its regional components in the Regional Economic Communities in north, south, east, west and central Africa. AU peacekeeping capability is contextualised alongside UN peacekeeping in Africa, looking at the clarity of the AU/UN relationship, in particular the concept of a ‘layered response’ between the two institutions.

Chapter 4 The Africa-EU partnership

Chapters 4-7 focus on building AU peacekeeping capacity, looking first at EU and then on G8 engagement. Discussion of the EU-Africa partnership is based
around the EU’s ‘Strategy for Africa’: *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership*, which was adopted by the European Council in December 2005.\(^9\) Analysis of the EU-Africa partnership is based on the author’s fieldwork, as described above. It is divided into two chapters. Chapter 4 traces the history of the relationship, outlining its key structures, examining Europe’s capacity to deliver on its commitments to Africa and incorporating European collaboration with other multilateral institutions to support African peace and security.

**Chapter 5 EU Support for African Peacekeeping**

Chapter 5 looks specifically at EU support for African peacekeeping capability. It briefly outlines relevant strands of the Africa-EU partnership, including governance, democracy and human rights, but focuses in particular on peace and security. Chapter 5 reviews EU operational engagement in Africa, examining various mechanisms that the EU uses to promote peace and security on the continent, as well as exploring the potential role of EU Battlegroups, and EU coordination with other organisations. It applies analysis of EU operational engagement in an overview of EU actions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Chapter 5 then examines the African Peace Facility, the primary EU tool for supporting African peace and security and peacekeeping. It examines EU perspectives on capacity-building for the African Standby Force (ASF), as well as EU conflict prevention activities, post-conflict activities, and EU efforts to support the UN Peacebuilding

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\(^9\) Council of the European Union (2005), *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership*, Brussels 19 December, 15961/05.
Commission. Lastly, Chapter 5 assesses the effectiveness of efforts to realise the EU-Africa partnership in practice. This evaluation includes: initiatives to create a broad-based dialogue; the role of African governments and institutions, and African civil society; the AU’s capacity to deliver; the EU’s capacity to engage in dialogue with Africa; the significance of the second EU-Africa Summit; and the development of a joint EU-Africa strategy.

Chapter 6  
**G8-Africa Joint Plan: G8 and African perspectives**

Chapters 6 and 7 look at G8 support for African peacekeeping, based on the author’s field research, as described above. They assess the effectiveness and relevance of the *Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations* (the Joint Plan), agreed at the 2003 G8 Summit in Evian. Chapter 6 outlines the G8 process. It presents G8 perspectives on the implementation of the Joint Plan, covering a number of key areas of activity, including: G8 activities at continental and regional levels; operational support; promoting coordination with African partners and among G8 Member States; institutional capacity-building; training; G8 deployments; and logistical and equipment support. Chapter 6 then presents African perspectives on the implementation of the Joint Plan. Key areas of discussion focus on AU leadership of development of the African Peace and Security

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Architecture (APSA); AU/donor coordination; peacekeeping doctrine; the practicability of donor demands; assessing African peacekeeping capacity and major gaps; coordination among key African stakeholders; and African regional integration.

Chapter 7  G8-Africa Joint Plan: implementation

Chapter 7 outlines some key challenges and priorities for implementing the Joint Plan. These are grouped into the following categories: African strategic vision and leadership; the African Standby Force; African peace and security architecture (APSA); institutional human resources/strategic management capacity; coordinating donor support; African ownership of the capacity-building process; financing peacekeeping capacity-building; logistics; and training. Chapter 7 then outlines potential areas for agreed action between the G8 and Africa, to take forward implementation of the Joint Plan in practice. This section focuses on the following key areas of capacity-building for African peacekeeping: overview and context; donor coordination; the role of the UN; training and logistics; strategic management capacity; operationalising the African Standby Force; and supporting the breadth of the African peace and security architecture. This chapter examines the extent to which the rhetorical pledges made at G8 summits are delivered in practice.

Chapter 8  Case studies
Chapter 8 uses a series of case studies of African regional peacekeeping deployments in order to gauge how, in practice, African regional peacekeeping in partnership with the international community functions to deliver peacekeeping and civilian protection. African peacekeeping deployments in Burundi, Darfur, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia all have civilian protection components to their mandates and all aspire to follow-on UN missions, and so provide opportunities to evaluate the potential of layered AU/UN peacekeeping. The case studies assess how African deployments have attempted to cope with a range of challenges to providing civilian protection. Key themes from previous chapters are drawn out and applied, including: capability – capacity, mandate, training and doctrine; interaction between African regional peacekeeping and the international community. Political challenges for the AU include the willingness of Member States to commit troops and other essential resources, or to confront powerful Member States that are implicated in situations of gross human rights abuses.

Chapter 9 Conclusion

Chapter 9 assesses the effectiveness of international support to the nascent AU peacekeeping capability, in particular in relation to civilian protection. African peacekeepers are deployed to some the most challenging conditions imaginable, such as Somalia and Darfur. So it is not surprising that in situations where civilian protection is part of the mandate, as in Darfur, AU operations have struggled to deliver. But peacekeepers can sometimes help to
protect civilians even in very harsh environments. Research among civilians in DRC, for example, shows that they have felt safer in areas where UN or EU peacekeepers have been deployed. The AU, however, even with international support, is still some way off being capable of doing this. A key challenge for the AU’s relationship with its donor partners is to balance African ownership of its peace and security architecture with donor national interest to support its development.
2) Peacekeeping and civilian protection in Africa

Chapter two responds to the first of this thesis’ three core research questions:

- how has peacekeeping incorporated increasing emphasis on protecting civilians in international peace and security policy?

The chapter develops an analysis of contemporary peacekeeping policy and practice, with a focus on civilian protection in Africa. It traces key post-Cold War developments in complex peacekeeping: 11

- peacebuilding and peace enforcement;
- major operational failures in the md-1990s in Africa, including brief case studies of deployments to Somalia and Rwanda, and resultant efforts to reform peacekeeping; and
- efforts to share the peacekeeping ‘burden’ beyond the UN to include other agencies such as regional bodies, as global demand for peacekeeping has outstripped capacity.

The chapter pays particular attention to civilian protection as an increasingly prominent peacekeeping function, from the acknowledgement of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect in New York in 2005, to the inclusion by the

11 Variously referred to as multidimensional peacekeeping, second generation peacekeeping, peace support operations and peace operations, this thesis uses the term ‘complex peacekeeping’ to describe post-Cold War deployments.
UN Security Council of civilian protection as a mandated objective of peacekeeping missions. It includes an applied case study of peacekeeping and civilian protection in the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

**Complex peacekeeping**

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a massive expansion in UN peacekeeping, especially in Africa – albeit with a pronounced dip in the mid-1990s. Between 1999 and 2008 there was a 500 per cent rise in UN peace operations globally, more than 80 per cent of which were deployed to Africa.\(^{12}\)

During the Cold War era, UN peacekeeping missions were primarily ‘traditional’: deployed to situations of inter-state conflict to support a ceasefire or similar settlement agreed between two or more conflicting state parties. The end of the Cold War opened potential for expanded forms of intervention, including in civil wars. Complex peacekeeping developed in response to new operational challenges. It incorporates the two major operational functions of peacebuilding and peace enforcement.

A peacebuilding approach to peacekeeping seeks to go beyond conflict management, to address the root causes of war. It acknowledges links between peace and security, development, governance and human rights. Security and development interact in a number of ways: insecurity and

instability undermine long-term development, while a lack of development, poverty and inequality are themselves major causes of instability. At the same time, support for peace and stability, good governance and respect for human rights can act as drivers for sustainable development. By definition, the complexity of peacebuilding implies large, multidimensional operations that can deliver a wide range of tasks.

The UN’s *Report of the United Nations Panel on Peace Operations* (2000) described peacebuilding within the context of peacekeeping operations as follows:

> [A]ctivities to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peacebuilding includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.13

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Post-Cold War peacekeepers must also be prepared to face armed opposition, such as from criminal mafias, warlords and other ‘spoilers’ of peace processes, requiring a more robust operational approach under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including application of force – ie peace enforcement.14

During the 1990s a shared conceptualisation of the fundamental characteristics of peace enforcement emerged amongst major Western militaries involved in post-Cold War peacekeeping.15 Findlay describes peace enforcement as being aimed at guaranteeing the implementation of a peace agreement or arrangement, including compliance by the parties with its terms, through the ‘judicious’ application of incentives and disincentives. He adds that all military activities should form part of a comprehensive political and peacebuilding strategy.16

Fundamental principles of traditional peacekeeping – consent, impartiality and the non-use of force17 – have been seriously challenged when applied to complex operations, especially in relation to peace enforcement.

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17 These principles were codified in 1958 by the then former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in his 1958 ‘Summary Study,’ derived from the political and military experiences of UNEF I. This report was designed to identify ‘certain principles and rules which would provide an adaptable framework for later operations’ and was subsequently distilled into a general ‘definition’ of peacekeeping. See also Boutros-Ghali, B. (3 January 1995), Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, UN Doc: A/50/60 - S/1995/1, para 33.
Contemporary peacekeeping doctrine does not assume consent, but focuses on ‘building’ it, using ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ to control situations where there is a local breakdown of consent. Complex peacekeeping also demanded a clearer distinction between neutrality and impartiality, especially in instances of grave threats to human rights. In 1999 Kofi Annan asserted that "[I]mpartiality does not – and must not – mean neutrality in the face of evil". Complex peacekeepers have also stretched understanding of the principle of non-use of force except in self-defence beyond merely defending themselves, to defending the terms of their mandate, for example against armed ‘spoilers’ with a different strategic objective to that of the peacekeeping mission.

**Operational challenges: Somalia and Rwanda**

International enthusiasm for complex peacekeeping was dramatically reversed in the mid-1990s in response to severe operational challenges experienced in a number of missions. High profile and influential examples include various interventions in response to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. In Africa, two disastrous missions were particularly significant, in Somalia and Rwanda, which exposed political and capacity limitations of complex UN peacekeeping on the continent, and moulded its subsequent evolution.

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As Somalia was disintegrating into state collapse in the early 1990s, the stage appeared set for the international community to put its fast-evolving theories on complex peacekeeping into practice. A senior UN official at the time famously Somalia as a “laboratory for all types of peacekeeping”. The lack of a central Somali authority and the widespread violence throughout the country, exacerbated by severe drought, precipitated human suffering on an enormous scale. According to the UN, “[b]y 1992, almost 4.5 million people, more than half the total number in the country, were threatened with starvation, malnutrition and related disease”.

The second UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was deployed in May 1993, mandated with a maximum strength of 28,000 military and police personnel under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use ‘all necessary means’ to establish a secure environment for humanitarian assistance throughout the country, to revive national and regional institutions, and to establish civil administration. Following an attack on Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June 2003 by the forces of Somali faction leader General Mohamed Farah Aideed, US Rangers serving with UNOSOM launched an operation on 3 October aimed at capturing several of Aideed’s key aides. During the course of the operation, Somali militia shot down two US helicopters. Overall, eighteen US soldiers were killed and 75 were wounded. The effect of the notorious ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident on the

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attitude of US government was immediate and absolute: on 6 October, President Bill Clinton announced that US personnel would withdraw from Somalia by 31 March 1994. Without US support the mission struggled to survive, and by March 1995, UNOSOM had been withdrawn completely with its mission largely unaccomplished.

According to Wilkinson, the failure of the combat-capable UNOSOM was down to its inability to understand the peace enforcement doctrine. In response to Aideed’s ‘spoiling’ tactics, UNOSOM effectively adopted a war-footing, as peacekeepers came to regard Somalis as ‘enemies’ to be defeated. This jarred with the mission’s other mandated objectives, which ultimately were intended to support humanitarian and peacebuilding goals. Within a peacekeeping context, Wilkinson contends that force should have been used to coerce compliance by the parties with the terms of the peace agreement and the mandate of the operation, not to achieve military victory over an opponent.

The fallout from Somalia had a knock-on effect in New York, which was soon tragically felt in Rwanda when the Security Council to decided to withdraw UN peacekeepers despite increasing evidence of the scale of the disaster that was unfolding in the country.

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The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was deployed in October 1993 to support the Arusha Peace Accords of August that year. UNAMIR was originally essentially a traditional operation, mandated to oversee a ceasefire between the (mainly Hutu) Armed Forces of the Government of Rwanda, and the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). But at that time there were already indications suggesting the imminent disaster.\textsuperscript{25} as early as a week after the signing of Arusha, a UN report outlined massacres and many other serious human rights violations taking place in the country, and speculated whether the term ‘genocide’ was applicable.\textsuperscript{26}

However, this report was largely ignored by key actors within the UN system,\textsuperscript{27} as were subsequent warnings by UNAMIR itself of the need for a larger and more robust force to tackle the scale of human rights abuses taking place – including the infamous telegram sent to New York by UNAMIR Force Commander Brigadier-General Romeo Dallaire on 11 January 1994, which warned of Hutu plans to exterminate all Tutsi in the capital, Kigali. The reply from UN HQ in New York demanded caution, and forbade UNAMIR from taking any decisive action.\textsuperscript{28} On 21 April 1994 the Security Council voted to reduce UNAMIR from 2,500 to 450: effectively, a withdrawal.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{25} Melvern, L. (30 April 2001), \textit{The History of the Genocide and the Role of the West}, Talk given at the Africa Centre, London.
\textsuperscript{28} United Nations (16 December 1999).
\textsuperscript{29} Dallaire, R. A. and Poulin, B. (Spring 1995), 'UNAMIR Mission to Rwanda', \textit{Joint Forces Quarterly}. For a discussion of the reasons why the UN and its Member States decided
In May 1994, as the genocide was accelerating and the number of dead had already reached horrific proportions, the Security Council eventually agreed to approve a second, more larger mission – the 5,500-strong UNAMIR II – which was also provided with a more robust mandate.30

However, by 25 July, UNAMIR was still only 550-strong. By this time, there could be no doubt as to the scale of the disaster, as the UN itself was then warning that several hundreds of thousands had already been killed.31 Meanwhile, France’s belated intervention, Opération Turquoise, mandated by the Security Council in late June, arrived only after the Tutsi had regained military ascendancy.32

The UN’s failure to respond to the human rights and humanitarian disaster in Rwanda in 1994 spearheaded a more general withdrawal of UN Security Council support for peacekeeping over the rest of the decade: the overall number of uniformed personnel serving with UN operations dropped from over 78,000 in 1994, down to 31,000 the next year. By 1999, it had plummeted to 12,000.

Reform

A corollary of the UN’s experiences in Rwanda was to spur review and reform of UN peacekeeping. The Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, released by the UN in December 1999, highlighted fundamental problems in the UN system, including lack of preparedness for early and rapid deployment. In August 2000, The Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (the ‘Brahimi Report’) stressed the importance of clear and robust mandates for peacekeeping operations, including clearly defined tasks and performance, and of “a robust force posture and a sound peacebuilding strategy” as key conditions for success. It acknowledged the limitations of UN missions to use force (“the United Nations does not wage war”), asserting that this requirement “has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States”. In 2005, the Outcome Document of the UN World Summit stressed the need to mount “[peacekeeping] operations with adequate capacity to counter hostilities and fulfil effectively their mandates”, and urged the “development of proposals for enhanced rapidly deployable capacities to reinforce peacekeeping operations in crises”.

In 2008, the UN updated its thinking on peacekeeping through the release of the ‘Capstone Doctrine: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles

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35 United Nations (2005), World Summit Outcome, 16 September, New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, A/60/L.1
and Guidelines’. Capstone acknowledged UN peacekeeping operations required genuine commitment by the parties on the ground to resolve the conflict through a political process: without this, a peacekeeping mission risks becoming paralysed or drawn into the conflict. It further asserted that a mission’s mandate must be realistic, reflecting accurately the level of resources that contributing nations are able and willing to provide, in terms of finance, military and police personnel, and political support.

Other significant institutional developments at the UN have included the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 – which seeks to marshal the various resources at the disposal of the international community for post-conflict recovery and to propose integrated strategies for peacebuilding – and in 2007 to restructuring of the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) by establishing a separate Department for Field Support (DFS).

**Burden-sharing in Africa**

Driven by operational failures in the mid-1990s and the increasing costs and demands of complex peacekeeping, the UN has increasingly looked elsewhere for partners to share peacekeeping responsibilities. This has been an
important development in Africa, where most peacekeeping operations are deployed, but where strategic global interest is generally weakest.

The 2000 Brahimi report encouraged UN cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations, recognising that the breadth and scale of demands of complex peacekeeping imply a range of implementing different bodies and agencies. The 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document further recognised:

> the important contribution to peace and security by regional organizations as provided for under Chapter VIII of the Charter and the importance of forging predictable partnerships and arrangements between the United Nations and regional organizations, and noting in particular, given the special needs of Africa, the importance of a strong African Union.

In Africa, the phrase ‘African solutions to African problems’ has become synonymous with African regional bodies assuming increasing responsibility for African peace and security issues. Outside Africa, the success of the AU is seen as reliant on its ability to deliver effective security. Regionalisation in the African context brings major problems in relation to capacity, as Africa comprises among the poorest countries in the world. Many African countries

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40 UNGA (2005), *World Summit Outcome Document*, 24 October, A/RES/60/1, para 93.

have also traditionally held fast to principles of non-interference in each others’ affairs – at least until the establishment of the AU in 2002.

The UN has worked with a number of agencies in Africa, including regional organisations, ad-hoc coalitions of states, and bi-lateral partners. Latterly, the Security Council has authorised a “hybrid” peacekeeping operation in Darfur, in which UN and AU elements are deployed as part of the same operation, acting under joint leadership.42

The responsibility to protect

The principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P) emerged from a long-standing practice and debate of ‘humanitarian intervention’.43 Since the

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international state system was established in the mid-17th century, governments have repeatedly intervened in other sovereign states, often justified on humanitarian grounds. The end of the Cold War appeared to create a new set of possibilities for collaborative global security and humanitarian action: from the imposition of a no-fly zone over the Kurdish region in Northern Iraq in 1991, to the US-led international intervention in Somalia in 1992, to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999.

In 2001, the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) attempted to redefine the humanitarian intervention debate. It sought to reconceptualise sovereignty as conditional: autocratic leaders should not be able to invoke sovereignty as a licence to repress their own citizens, but rather that:

[S]overeign states have the primary responsibility for the protection of their people from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder, rape, starvation – but when they are unable and unwilling to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the wider community of states.

As Gareth Evans has described, R2P tries to

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46 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001), The Responsibility to Protect Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, VIII.
turn the whole weary debate about the ‘right to intervene’ on its head, and to recharacterise it not as an argument about the right of states to anything, but rather about their responsibility ... the relevant perspective being not that of prospective interveners but those needing support.47

The ICISS report has been controversial. For instance, Chandler challenges the ICISS claim to substitute rights with responsibility, asserting that it merely shifts entitlement to the individual human rights of the victim. These are then used trump sovereign rights, and so states’ rights of intervention are maintained, although now the onus of justification for intervention is shifted from the intervening states to the recipients.48

R2P suggests a range of responses – from the persuasive to the coercive – available to policymakers faced with situations of acute vulnerability for civilians. But military intervention remains the most contentious dimension of the R2P agenda, and the most relevant to complex peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The ICISS conceded that the norm of non-intervention must remain a cornerstone of international relations. But there are extreme situations when breaching it is deemed to be justified. Therefore, the ICISS

47 Evans, G (2006), *The Responsibility to Protect: from an idea to an international norm*, Speech to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 15 November, www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4515&1=1
devised six criteria to judge when military intervention is justified, largely
developed from Just War theory: right authority; just cause; right intention;
last resort; proportional means; and reasonable prospects.\textsuperscript{49}

The ICISS report has been highly influential, and R2P has found a steadily
growing international audience. The 2005 UN World Summit Outcome
Document took much of it on board, declaring that:

Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity... The international community, through the United Nations,
also has [this] responsibility... In this context, we are prepared to take
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a
case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional
organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate
and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{49} International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001),
\textit{The Responsibility to Protect} Ottawa: International Development Research
Centre, paras 4.10-4.43

\textsuperscript{50} United Nations (2005), \textit{World Summit Outcome Document}, 24
October, (A/RES/60/1), para 138.
However, the Outcome Document did not include ICISS’ criteria for intervention.51

**R2P in practice: civilian protection and UN peacekeeping**

Civilian protection is aimed at securing the immediate safety of vulnerable civilians. It can be seen as the ‘operational arm’ of R2P as it similarly focuses on individual (human) rather than collective security. Civilian protection has gained increased prominence and traction at the UN. Within the UN Secretariat, the Secretary-General began publishing reports specifically on “the protection of civilians in armed conflict” in 1999. The first report argued that civilian protection can be provided by international legal mechanisms and humanitarian action. But it also suggested that “the Security Council can promote the protection of civilians in conflict ... by peacekeeping or enforcement measures under Chapters VI, VII or VIII of the Charter”.52 The report listed a number of tasks that peacekeepers could carry out to support civilian protection, including the following:

- discouraging abuses of civilian populations;
- providing stability and fostering a political process of reconciliation;

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• supporting institution-building efforts, including in such areas as human rights and law enforcement
• protecting humanitarian workers;
• delivering humanitarian assistance;
• maintaining the security and neutrality of refugee camps, including separation of combatants and non-combatants;
• maintaining “safe zones” for the protection of civilian populations; and
• deterring and addressing abuses including through the arrest of war criminals.

The report supported the use of “humanitarian zones, security zones and safe corridors” to protect civilians as a “last resort,” provided the zones were demilitarised”.53 It further addressed the potential need for enforcement action to protect civilians, stating that:

In situations where the parties to the conflict commit systematic and widespread breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law, causing threats of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the Security Council should be prepared to intervene under Chapter VII of the Charter.... I recommend that the Security Council... [i]n the face of massive and ongoing abuses, consider the imposition of appropriate enforcement action.... The protection of civilians...is fundamental to the central mandate

of the Organization. The responsibility for the protection of civilians cannot be transferred to others.\textsuperscript{54}

In 2009, a report of the Secretary-General on the \textit{Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict} – which marked the tenth anniversary of the consideration by the Security Council of civilian protection as a thematic issue – emphasised “enhancing protection through more effective and better resourced United Nations peacekeeping and other relevant missions” as a core challenge.\textsuperscript{55}

The Brahimi Report also acknowledged the increasing trend in mandates for UN peacekeeping missions to identify the protection of civilians as a key operational objective. It welcomed:

\textit{“[T]he desire on the part of the Secretary-General to extend additional protection to civilians in armed conflicts and the actions of the Security Council to give United Nations peacekeepers explicit authority to protect civilians in conflict situations…. Indeed, peacekeepers – troops or police – who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorised to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles and, as stated in the report of the Independent Inquiry on Rwanda, consistent with the perception and

\textsuperscript{54} UN Security Council (1999), \textit{Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict}, 8 September, S/1999/957.

the expectation of protection created by [an operation’s] very presence”.56

Civilian protection has also been increasingly conspicuous on the Security Council’s agenda. The Council has approved a number of resolutions and presidential statements under that title and has held semi-annual open briefings on the subject. The Security Council first passed a resolution in September 1999 on “the protection of civilians”, which expressed its “willingness to respond to situations of armed conflict where civilians are being targeted or humanitarian assistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed, including through the consideration of appropriate measures at the Council’s disposal.”57 Resolution 1296 in April 2000 declared Council’s intention to provide peacekeeping operations with mandates and resources to protect civilians, and it also called on peacekeepers to consider the use of “temporary security zones for the protection of civilians and the delivery of assistance in situations characterised by the threat of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes against the civilian population”.58 Resolution 1296 established as a “threat to international peace and security”, “the deliberate targeting of civilian populations or other protected persons and the committing of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict”. And it began to use more explicit language to guide to

57 UN Security Council (1999), resolution 1265, 17 September, S/Res/1265.
58 UN Security Council (2000), resolution 1296, 19 April, S/Res/1296.
peacekeepers, calling on peacekeepers to ensure the security of refugee camps, and to prevent sexual violence. It further reaffirmed the Council’s practice of including provisions for the protection of civilians in peacekeeping mandates, proposing that “such mandates include clear guidelines as to what missions can and should do to achieve those goals,” and that measures to protect civilians be “given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources, including information and intelligence resources, in the implementation of the mandates”.59

Since 1999, the Security Council has also referred directly to civilian protection under Article VII of the UN Charter in resolutions approving the mandates of peacekeeping operations. For instance, resolution 1270 on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, included the following language:

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that in the discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG....

59 UN Security Council (2000), resolution 1296, 19 April, S/Res/1296.
UNSCR 1706 of August 2006 authorised the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to use “all necessary means... to protect civilians under threat of physical violence”.

Promoting civilian protection in practice is difficult and specialised. Peacekeepers are mostly equipped to address comparatively small-scale, localised forms of violence; they rely on a reasonable level of stability existing in the mission area, and are often neither configured nor resourced to challenge more intense levels of fighting, or to stabilise highly volatile conflict zones. In practice complex peacekeeping missions are neither designed nor deployed as pure civilian protection operations, and so civilian protection must compete with myriad other objectives and tasks. Also, peacekeeping mandates seldom clearly define civilian protection functions.

A major challenge relates to doctrine and training for peacekeeping operations: civilian protection implies specific tasks which peacekeepers need to be well prepared for. Military doctrine and training need to translate the concepts of civilian protection into effective military activities, such as protecting and demilitarising camps, establishing safe havens, forcibly disbanding and disarming militias, or intervening on behalf of threatened civilians. But existing French, British, American and NATO doctrines do not

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60 UNSC (2006), Resolution 1706, (S/2006/1706), para 12 (a).
include a detailed breakdown of the requirements of civilian protection. Nor is civilian protection a clear priority in most military training programmes internationally.

The UN is developing training on civilian protection that builds on traditional roles for peacekeepers to support human rights, the rule of law, and international humanitarian principles. But UN training modules do not address how countries should interpret mandates to protect civilians under imminent threat. And they do not instruct military forces in how to prepare for civilian protection missions.63

Berkman and Holt have criticised complex peacekeeping operations’ capacity to deliver on R2P and civilian protection. They outline the practical requirements for effective, non-consensual military intervention to safeguard civilians, arguing that a military intervention designed expressly to protect civilians from mass killing is qualitatively different from a peace operation tasked with protecting civilians from much lesser risks. As they put it, “[h]alting violent actors in their tracks might require operations more akin to combat and entail coercion to prevent harm to civilians”.64


Berkman and Holt note that such operations are unlikely to be led by the UN, which lacks the capacity or political stomach for these types of missions, and are more likely to be led by militarily competent states with sufficient capacity.

Despite the commitment of the world’s governments to R2P, Berkman and Holt see little evidence that the world’s militaries and their political masters are developing the necessary capacity, doctrine, training and rules of engagement for such missions. They suggest that addressing this shortfall should be a priority for Africans and the wider international community if they are serious about the responsibility to protect in Africa and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{65}

Berkman and Holt have distinguished four primary challenges to operationalising R2P for military peacekeepers, which are summarised below:\textsuperscript{66}

1. Military peacekeepers may have limited or unclear authority to act to protect civilians. Most peacekeepers are deployed with at least the presumed consent of the parties, and on the understanding that the host nation retains responsible for the protection of its citizens. In places like Darfur or DRC, the host government is often responsible for many of the


abuses against civilians. But few peacekeepers are given the authority of the Security Council to use ‘all means necessary’ to protect civilians.

2. Many states lack the willingness to contribute troops for operations that may use force to protect civilians.

3. Peacekeeping missions often lack capacity to act decisively. For instance, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) lacks the “size, equipment, mobility, funding, and coordination” to protect civilians in Darfur.

4. Military peacekeepers lack the operational guidance and military preparation for protection. Forces must need to be able to make tactical and strategic judgements regarding how to react to threats of abuse against civilians, such as whether to defeat abusive groups, whether to establish broad security in a specific area, or to promote long-term security once mass killing is brought to a halt.

Pouligny cites a number of situations during operations in Bosnia and Sierra Leone which have highlighted the “impotence of heavily-armed forces in the face of groups continuing war by other means, including organised crime and terrorism”. Deploying heavy weaponry for deterrent purposes can prove counter-productive, and can, in fact, alienate the local population. Heavily armoured tanks have little impact on snipers or militia, who may not be visible, but may still control the territory. For the local population, the contradiction between the deployment of heavy weaponry and the insecurity that they continue to suffer has serious consequences. It can have a doubly

negative impact on their perception of peacekeepers, as they are left to wonder: “if these strangers are not here to protect us, what hidden reason is there behind their presence?” This perception was prevalent among much of the population in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.\textsuperscript{68}

There are some situations where the restoration of order requires resort to armed force. But force must be used in the right way. This means appropriate training and equipment. But it also relates to the “actual conditions of recourse to armed force”.\textsuperscript{69} In the context of a complex peacekeeping operation comprising multiple national contingents:

“The large variety of actors and logics, their volatile behaviour (permanently passing from the confrontation register to that of cooperation or else that of dodging), the possibility that Blue Helmets may be in a position of having to protect human lives – all this makes it necessary to look at the possible use of force in a new way”.\textsuperscript{70}

Despite challenging the premise of the peace enforcement doctrine on the basis that any use of force by a peacekeeping mission risks it being seen as oppressive, Pouligny nevertheless supports the UN Secretary-General’s 1999

\textsuperscript{69} Pouligny, B (2006), Peace operations seen from below, UN missions and local people, London: C. Hurst & Co., p. 254.
\textsuperscript{70} Pouligny, B (2006), Peace operations seen from below, UN missions and local people, London: C. Hurst & Co., p. 254.
report on protecting civilians, and notes that UN troops require firmer rules of engagement for the purpose of protection.\textsuperscript{71}

**Protecting civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1999 presented a very difficult operational environment for peacekeeping. It is a huge territory: the size of Western Europe. The conflict has been very violent, with an estimated four million civilians killed as a result of violence since the war began in 1998. And the parties’ commitment to the July 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was tenuous at best.

In November 1999, the Security Council agreed to establish the UN Operation in the DRC (MONUC), with 5,500 peacekeepers supporting a broad range of tasks relating to human rights and humanitarian affairs. The MONUC mandate also included a specific Chapter VII commitment “to protect civilians under imminent threat”.\textsuperscript{72}

But MONUC was far too weak and poorly configured to attempt any meaningful civilian protection. MONUC peacekeepers were neither equipped nor trained for the task. There was no common understanding of mandate and rules of engagement for civilian protection, nor consistent willingness to


\textsuperscript{72} United Nations (2000b) Security Council Resolution 1291, 24 February, S/RES/1291
use force to protect those at risk. And interpretation of rules of engagement was left to individual political and military commanders of national contingents, leading to a highly erratic approach to civilian protection. In reality, MONUC continued to operate closer to a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, using force only in self-defence.\textsuperscript{73}

Many of MONUC’s problems were played out in the Ituri province in eastern DRC, which was the scene of some of the worst atrocities of the war. Massacres of civilians were a recurrent feature of violent clashes between Hema and Lendu ethnic militias in the region. Attacks on civilians were sometimes carried out in clear view of MONUC personnel. But MONUC’s response was to concentrate primarily on self-protection, and it largely abandoned its mandate to protect Congolese civilians.\textsuperscript{74}

In response to an appeal by the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, France agreed to deploy an international force under the auspices of the EU, within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Operation Artemis comprised 1,400 troops, deployed to promote security in the town of Bunia in Ituri, from July through to September 2003. Artemis adopted a very aggressive approach towards civilian protection. It used light armoured vehicles, observation helicopters, and French air support from Mirage 2000 fighter jets stationed in neighbouring Uganda. It was able to


establish itself quickly in Bunia, enforcing a weapons-free zone and responding rapidly and decisively to armed challenges to its authority. Artemis cut off shipments of arms into Bunia by monitoring airstrips and running vehicle patrols. Thousands of displaced people returned to Bunia between June and August 2003.  

As well as establishing humanitarian space within Bunia, Artemis enabled MONUC to build up in the region. Around 5,500 combat-capable UN troops were re-deployed to Ituri, supported by heavy armaments, armed personnel carriers and combat helicopters. This did not mean that MONUC was instantly transformed into an effective operation capable of stopping atrocities in Ituri. Serious MONUC military operations against Congolese militia in Ituri were still many months away.

How much the combined UN-EU presence in Bunia provided direct protection to civilians is difficult to gauge. In many instances, peacekeepers failed to prioritise civilians. On 7 August 2003, for instance, a scuffle broke out between MONUC peacekeepers and armed men from the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) guarding the home of UPC leader, Thomas Lubanga. French Artemis troops were immediately deployed alongside MONUC troops. Local

inhabitants stressed the contrast between the lack of concerted physical presence when their safety was threatened.\textsuperscript{76}

In mid-2005, by which time MONUC was the UN’s largest peace operation with around 16,500 troops, critics were complaining that the Security Council had still not learnt a key lesson from Sierra Leone: that MONUC needed the authority and the obligation to act \textit{pre-emptively} to oppose threats to civilians.\textsuperscript{77} More recently, its operations against Rwandan Hutu rebels, the remnants of the 1994 genocide, have been very limited and have had little effect.\textsuperscript{78}

But over time the reconfigured UN troops developed a clearer focus on civilian protection, including a preparedness to use force to guarantee it. UN forces in DRC have conducted highly assertive actions, including aggressive cordon-and-search operations, direct confrontation of armed groups threatening violence against civilians, the setting up of buffer zones between combatants and safe areas, patrols and overflights in unstable areas, and provision of humanitarian escorts.\textsuperscript{79}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{76} Pouligny, B (2006), Peace operations seen from below, UN missions and local people, London: C. Hurst & Co., p. 256.
\end{itemize}
In 2005, the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Best Practices Unit commissioned an external survey, undertaken by BERCI international, an independent Congolese research organisation, to assess *The Perception of the Population* in DRC to MONUC. BERCI dispatched teams of researchers to all 11 provincial capitals of the DRC in June and July 2005. This period was significant because June 2005 marked the end of the first period of political transition in DRC, and the start of preparations for national elections in 2006.

In eastern provinces, where MONUC has a more significant presence and which suffered most from violence, the population felt most strongly that the presence of MONUC made them “feel safer”:

- Katanga: 48% - yes – 28% - no
- Maniema: 74% - yes – 23% - no
- North Kivu: 50% - yes – 32% - no
- South Kivu: 41% - yes – 34% - no
- Orientale: 36% - yes – 33% - no

However, in the western provinces, the perception that the presence of MONUC made people feel safer was noticeably less.

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Conclusion

Chapter 2 has developed understanding of the evolution and requirements of civilian protection as a component of complex peacekeeping operations in Africa. Providing civilian protection in the tough operational environments of African crises requires significant and specialised capability: capacity, mandates, doctrine and training. The consequences of getting things wrong are well-documented. But even having these in place is no guarantee of effectiveness - although the Congolese opinion survey cited above suggests that the presence of peacekeepers can make populations feel safer in certain circumstances, when peacekeepers are deployed heavily in vulnerable locations.

A key function of Chapter 2 has to provide an analytical framework to underpin this thesis’ other two research questions:

• is the African Union a competent agency to deliver peacekeeping operations?

• can international partnership provide appropriate and sufficient support to the African Union to fulfil its peacekeeping commitment?

Chapter 2 has shown that, driven by operational developments in complex peacekeeping and by political influences both inside and outside Africa,
responsibility for the peacekeeping burden in Africa is attempting to shift away from New York towards Africa itself – primarily to the AU and Regional Economic Communities. It has further established that civilian protection is becoming an increasingly prominent mandated objective of peacekeeping operations, presenting serious operational challenges that peacekeepers on the ground have struggled to realise in practice. How capable is the AU of responding to these challenges? The AU is comparatively weak in terms of finances and resources for peacekeeping and must rely on external support as it develops its own capacity. The next chapters of this thesis look more specifically at the AU as a peacekeeping and civilian protection agency, and at the AU’s relationship with donor partners.
Chapter 3 outlines reviews the AU peace and security architecture (APSA). First, it outlines the AU’s normative and a constitutional commitment to deliver peacekeeping and civilian protection. The AU has stated that the transformation of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) represents a fundamental policy shift for African continental politics, from an attitude of ‘non-interference’ in the internal affairs of states, to one of ‘non-indifference’ in situations of gross human rights abuses and war crimes.\textsuperscript{82}

Second, chapter 3 describes the AU’s institutional commitment to provide peacekeeping and civilian protection. It concentrates primarily on the African Standby Force (ASF), the APSA’s operational arm for peacekeeping, outlining the fundamental structure of the ASF, the types of mission it is designed to undertake, and the evolution of its establishment.

Third, this chapter looks at the development of the regional components of the ASF – its ‘building blocks’. These are essentially based on the AU’s five Regional Economic Communities in north, south, east, west and central Africa, although clear regional demarcation has proved difficult to realise in practice. ASF regional brigades discussed here include: the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF); the SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG); the Eastern African Standby

Brigade (EASBRIG); the ECCAS Standby Force (EASF); and the North Africa standby force.

Fourth, this chapter looks at the clarity of the AU/UN relationship, in particular the concept of a ‘layered response’ between the two institutions. The UN is still by far the primary peacekeeping agency in Africa, and virtually all African regional peacekeeping missions are deployed with some form of UN operational involvement in mind. Especially in view of the scarcity of African capacity, it is very important that the development of an AU capability considers how this fits with that of the UN. This ties with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s vision of “an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work with relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable partnerships”.83 Two interconnected strands to AU/UN collaboration are discussed here: 1) the constitutional relationship; and 2) the operational partnership.

This chapter helps to clarify understanding of what sorts of gaps remain in the AU’s peacekeeping capability to deliver civilian protection. This provides the analytical foundation for subsequent chapters, which explore international support for African peacekeeping.

**The AU and civilian protection: constitutional commitment**

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Today, there is much discussion in Africa on issues of intervention, peacekeeping and civilian protection. At the rhetorical level, at least, much of the peace and security discourse in Africa focuses on upholding the rights and interests of the individual where these are threatened.

Many African policymakers are now much more sympathetic to the responsibility to protect (R2P) agenda, and to various forms of intervention to uphold its key principles. And the AU has consequently been developing institutional architecture that can support intervention for protection of civilians’ human rights, within the context of complex peacekeeping.

*Organisation of African Unity*

While the issue of intervention within a state’s borders was taboo at the UN until the end of the Cold War, it had been even more polemic in Africa, and did not feature formally in pan-African political discourse for another decade. Until the early 21st century and the demise of the OAU, African states’ maintained strict adherence to the principle of non-interference, respecting this maxim above and beyond any demands for intervention justified on any grounds.84 The legacy of the struggles of de-colonisation meant that African states were particularly sensitive to the issue of the inviolability of national boundaries. Fragile and contestable borders – a colonial legacy of arbitrarily demarcated of state borders – combined with widespread national fragility,

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generated serious concern amongst African leaders over internal political vulnerability and irredentism.

Disagreement the stability of individual states was evident in debates about the shape and function of the OAU at the time of its inauguration in May 1963. More radical African heads of state, like Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Julius Nyerere in (former) Tanganyika, and Gamel Abdel Nasser in Egypt were pressing for the OAU be tightly unified politically. Nyerere argued that the borders separating African states were “nonsensical”, since they had been decided by Europeans during the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the nineteenth century.85 However, more conservative leaders refused such a step, choosing instead to retain their existing levels of national independence, however tenuous. As a result, the OAU was not able significantly to exercise influence national policies, to monitor the internal behaviour of Member States, or to intervene to curb abuses of human rights.86

Non-interference was embodied constitutionally in Articles III (2 and 3) of the Charter of the OAU, by which Member States declared their adherence to “non-interference in the internal affairs of States”, and their commitment to “[r]espect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence”. Accompanying the principle of non-interference was the implicit assumption that an incumbent government

must retain legitimate authority, irrespective of that state’s domestic situation. Thus, the OAU was also constitutionally bound to uphold the existing status quo within states, notwithstanding the specifics of individual circumstances.

The dearth of African interventions was less conspicuous during the Cold War era, where African conflicts took place within the broader context of bi-polar geopolitics, and where international discourse on conflict management tended to focus on inter-state violence. Where African intervention did take place, legitimisation of it tended to be implicit rather than explicit. For instance, although most African leaders privately approved of President Julius Nyerere’s Tanzanian intervention to remove Idi Amin Dada from power in Uganda, Presidents Jaafar Nimeiri of Sudan and Olesegun Obasanjo of Nigeria nevertheless publicly criticised Nyerere at the OAU summit in July 1979.87

However, after the end of the Cold War the hugely destabilising impact of conflict in Africa became increasingly apparent. Combined with the failure of the international community to respond to African crises effectively, this progressively chipped away at African states’ absolute respect for non-interference. Early examples of post-Cold War intervention include the ECOMOG peacekeeping initiatives in both Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, and OAU recognition of Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia. In December 1996, then Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere explicitly described the

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embargo placed on Burundi by its neighbouring states that year as representing a shift in the enduring African principle of non-interference.\textsuperscript{88}

A number of mechanisms were set up by the OAU during the 1990s, to try to expand its capability for intervention. In 1993, it established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (MCPMR). Mwagiru states that this development “made ... progress in stepping in where the ‘old’ OAU would have feared to tread, namely into situations of internal conflict”.\textsuperscript{89} MCPMR’s primary emphasis was on preventive or peacemaking initiatives. The OAU continued to stress it would look to the UN for more muscular intervention,\textsuperscript{90} and Mwagiru stresses that “the reasons why some member states objected to peacekeeping [...] is because it would interfere in ‘sensitive’ internal matters”.\textsuperscript{91}

In practice, however, the MCPMR made little obvious headway. A Central Organ, comprising selected OAU Member States, was set up to direct MCPMR activities, and its membership displayed a familiarly conservative attitude. Also, MCPMR still surrendered absolute authority to Article 3(2) of the OAU


\textsuperscript{91} Mwagiru, 1996, \textit{The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Management of Internal Conflict in Africa}, International Studies, Vol. 33, No.1 note 55.
Charter, legally restricting its ability to work in situations of internal conflict.92

Nevertheless, the MCPMR provided a basic model on which later to base some of the more progressive peace and security structures of the AU. Indeed, the significance of the MCPMR was officially recognised at the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Lusaka, Zambia, from 9 to 11 July 2001, at which African leaders decided to:

"[I]ncorporate the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution as one of the organs of the Union, in accordance with Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and, in the regard, requested the [OAU] Secretary-General to undertake a review of the structures, procedures and working methods of the Central Organ".93

Notwithstanding the shortcomings of MCPMR, the 1990s offered some indications of a more interventionist OAU stance. For instance, Yoroms and Aning suggest that the 1997 OAU summit in Harare sent strong signals that the OAU was developing institutional norms denouncing the violent overthrow of democratically elected governments, which they interpret as an indication of

“revolutionary’ change from [the OAU’s] traditional posture: from placid non-interference in the internal affairs of member states - even in the face of the most repugnant atrocities by some African governments - to principled resolute defence of democracy”.94

The gradual erosion of the norm of sovereignty that began in the early 1990s in Africa can be seen as forming part of an on-going deliberative process among major African states and leaders. This process was more pronounced in some regions, specifically in West Africa where the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened in Liberia in 1990, purportedly on humanitarian grounds. ECOWAS subsequently formalised this new ‘right of intervention’ in its Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of 1999.95

African Union

The shift in African attitudes to intervention was ratified officially with the establishment of the AU in 2002.96 While the OAU was seen as a club for heads of state, the founding documents of the AU placed a new emphasis on

96 ECOWAS in West Africa pre-empted the AU. Its 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security authorises the organisation to “intervene to alleviate the suffering of the populations and restore life to normalcy in the event of crises, conflict and disaster.” Economic Community of West African States (1999), Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (Lomé: ECOWAS, 10 December, Chapter V. ECOWAS is discussed in more detail below.
the rights of Africa’s peoples – rights that were not necessarily trumped by the claims of national sovereignty. The AU is, therefore, focused on the interests of local populations and communities, at least constitutionally.

Indeed, constitutionally, the AU has gone further than any other institution in challenging the inviolability of sovereignty. Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act establishes the Union’s right “to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.97 The Constitutive Act also allows for consensual intervention, i.e. when requested by Member States to restore peace and security, under Article 4 (j).

Ben Kioko, senior legal advisor to the AU, has noted that: “Article 4(h) was adopted with the sole purpose of enabling the African Union to resolve conflicts more effectively on the continent”.98 The Constitutive Act establishes a parallel mechanism to the UN Security Council. It is empowering institutionally, as it provides an explicit legal basis for the AU to launch humanitarian interventions. The existence of these mechanisms is also acknowledged in the UN definition of the responsibility to protect.99

Ambassador Said Djinnit, former AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, notes that the founding of the AU represented a shift away from the OAU’s policy of non-interference, to a new policy of ‘non-indifference’. He states that this transformation mirrors the ideas of conditional sovereignty and the ‘responsibility to protect’ that were developed in the ICISS report in 2001. Djinnet believes that both Africans and non-Africans are responding to the same failures, not least the monumental failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994. It is also noteworthy that some sub-Saharan African states, including Rwanda and South Africa, were particularly supportive of the responsibility to protect language that appeared in the UN Summit Outcome Document agreed at the UN World Summit in 2005, and that they lobbied intensively for its incorporation.

The AU’s constitutional commitment to intervention promotes elements of the responsibility to protect/civilian protection agenda, as well as some of the core objectives of complex peacekeeping. The AU’s peace and security architecture (APSA) is discussed in more detail below. But here, it is useful to outline selected constitutional elements of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is the primary organ within the APSA.

The PSC was established in 2002 as a

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100 Baranyi, S and Mepham, D, Enhancing capacities to protect civilians and build sustainable peace in Africa, Symposium Report, ISS/ippr, March 2006.
“standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts ... a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”.102

The PSC takes broad view of security. According to Article 3 (a) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, a primary objective of the Council is to “promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development”.103

The preamble of the Protocol notes that the PSC is intended to implement the decisions taken in the areas of “conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction”.104

Among the key principles of the PSC is the "right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave

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circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”, in agreement with Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act.105

The Protocol further articulates how the objectives of Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act can be operationalised, and here we see a clear correlation between intervention to protect people’s human rights and complex peacekeeping. Article 6 of the Protocol lists as one of the key the functions of the PSC the deployment of “peace support operations and intervention, pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act”.106 The Protocol further commits the AU to establish an African Standby Force (ASF), “in order to enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act”.107 And it further states that the ASF shall comprise “multidisciplinary contingents”, including “civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice”.108

Also, a May 2003 policy paper by African Chiefs of Defence Staff recognised the multidimensional aspects of African conflict. It called for a multi-disciplinary peacekeeping capability encompassing NGOs, humanitarian

assistance, human rights, gender, political and legal dimensions of peace operations, as well as the civilian police and security sector components.\textsuperscript{109}

**The AU institutional commitment to protect civilians**

Constitutionally and normatively, therefore, the AU appears committed to support the ‘local’ interests of vulnerable African civilians, at least in terms of their fundamental human rights, when these are threatened. But to what extent are the AU’s peace and security structures supporting this ambition in reality? This section looks at the potential of the AU peace and security architecture (APSA) as an effective mechanism for peacekeeping and civilian protection.

The departure point for the APSA is the AU Constitutive Act, adopted in 2000 and endorsed at the inaugural AU meeting in South Africa in July 2002.

**Box 1 The Organs of the African Union\textsuperscript{110}**

The **Assembly** is the supreme organ of the AU, comprising heads of state and government or accredited representatives of AU member states. The Assembly’s functions include: determining the common policies of the AU; considering requests for membership and establishing any organ of the AU;


\textsuperscript{110} House of Lords European Union Committee (2006), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, 34\textsuperscript{th} Report of Session 2005-6, 7 July, p. 24.
adopting the AU budget; and directing the Executive Council on the management of conflicts and other emergencies.

The **Executive Council** is responsible to the Assembly and is composed of ministers or authorities designated by the governments of member states.

The **Permanent Representatives Committee** is responsible for preparing the work of the Executive Council. It is composed of permanent representatives of AU member states.

The principle AU organ for peace and security is the **Peace and Security Council** (PSC), which is designed to serve as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union entered into force on 26 December 2003. Article 5 of the Protocol defines the Council’s composition: 15 elected Members; 10 to serve for two years; and 5 for three years. Article 5(2) of the AU Constitutive Act defines other bodies to support the work of the PSC, including a Panel of the Wise (POW), a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF), a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) and a Military Staffs Committee (MSC).
The Pan-African Parliament is intended to promote the participation of African peoples in governance, development and economic integration at the continental level.

The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) performs an advisory function. It is composed of different social and professional groups of AU Member States.

A Court of Justice of the AU is to be established, to be merged with the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

The AU Financial Institutions comprise the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank.

The Commission plays a central role in the day-to-day management of the AU, elaborating draft common positions of the AU, preparing strategic plans and studies for the consideration of the Executive Council, and co-ordinating AU programmes and policies with those of the RECs. The Commission comprises the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson, eight Commissioners and additional staff members. Each Commissioner is responsible for a portfolio, arranged as follows:

Peace and security—conflict prevention, management and resolution, and combating terrorism;
Political affairs—human rights, democracy, good governance, electoral institutions, civil society, humanitarian affairs, refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons;

Infrastructure and energy—energy, transport, communications, infrastructure and tourism;

Social affairs—health, children, drug control, population, migration, labour and employment, sports and culture;

Human resources, science and technology—education, information technology communication, youth, human resources, science and technology;

Trade and industry—trade, industry, customs and immigration matters;

Rural economy and agriculture—rural economy, agriculture and food security, livestock, environment, water and natural resources and desertification; and

Economic affairs—economic integration, monetary affairs, private sector development, investment and resource mobilisation.

As outlined in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act, maintaining continental peace and security is a primary aim of the AU – although by no means the sole
objective. The AU Commission (the Commission) is divided into eight portfolios, including a Directorate for Peace and Security, currently led by Ambassador Saïd Djinnit (Algeria). Various AU bodies are in the process of being set up to implement the organisation’s peace and security ambitions. The principle AU organ for peace and security is the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

The PSC is designed to serve as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The PSC Protocol was inaugurated in December 2003 and Article 5 of the Protocol defines the Council’s composition: 15 elected Members; 10 to serve for two years; and 5 for three years. Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act defines other bodies to support the work of the PSC as well as the Commission, including a Panel of the Wise (POW), a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF), a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) and the Military Staffs Committee (MSC):

- The POW is to comprise five highly respected African personalities for three year periods, appointed by the Assembly according to regional representation.
- The CEWS is to advise the PSC on potential conflicts and recommend appropriate responses. It will comprise a Situation Centre, linked to similar bodies in the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), as well as the United Nations (UN) and other international bodies.
• The ASF is to comprise standby multidisciplinary contingents from the five
RECs, with civilian and military components stationed in their countries of
origin and ready for rapid deployment. Meetings of African Chiefs of
Defence Staff and Defence Ministers through 2003/4 have been
developing the terms of the ASF.
• In February 2004, African leaders adopted a Solemn Declaration on the
CADSP which commits AU Member States (MSs) develop a common
understanding of defence and security issues.
• The MSC comprises the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the PSC membership to
advise assist the Council in military and security matters.

Box 2 Structure of the African Standby Force

Mandate

The African Standby Force shall, inter alia, perform functions in the following
areas:

a. observation and monitoring missions;

b. other types of peace support missions;

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c. intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;

d. preventive deployment in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or States, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement.;

e. peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization;

f. humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and

g. any other functions as may be mandated by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly.

In undertaking these functions, the African Standby Force shall, where appropriate, cooperate with the United Nations and its Agencies, other relevant international organizations and regional organizations, as well as with national authorities and NGOs.
The detailed tasks of the African Standby Force and its modus operandi for each authorized mission shall be considered and approved by the Peace and Security Council upon recommendation of the Commission.

**Chain of Command**

For each operation undertaken by the African Standby Force, the Chairperson of the Commission shall appoint a Special Representative and a Force Commander, whose detailed roles and functions shall be spelt out in appropriate directives, in accordance with the Peace Support Standing Operating Procedures.

The Special Representative shall, through appropriate channels, report to the Chairperson of the Commission. The Force Commander shall report to the Special Representative. Contingent Commanders shall report to the Force Commander, while the civilian components shall report to the Special Representative.

**Military Staff Committee**

There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Peace and Security Council in all questions relating to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa.
The Military Staff Committee shall be composed of Senior Military Officers of the Members of the Peace and Security Council. Any Member State not represented on the Military Staff Committee may be invited by the Committee to participate in its deliberations when it is so required for the efficient discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities.

The Military Staff Committee shall meet as often as required to deliberate on matters referred to it by the Peace and Security Council.

The Military Staff Committee may also meet at the level of the Chief of Defence Staff of the Members of the Peace and Security Council to discuss questions relating to the military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa. The Chiefs of Defence Staff shall submit to the Chairperson of the Commission recommendations on how to enhance Africa’s peace support capacities.

The Chairperson of the Commission shall take all appropriate steps for the convening of and follow-up of the meetings of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of Members of the Peace and Security Council.

**Training**
The Commission shall provide guidelines for the training of the civilian and military personnel of national standby contingents at both operational and tactical levels. Training on International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, with particular emphasis on the rights of women and children, shall be an integral part of the training of such personnel.

To that end, the Commission shall expedite the development and circulation of appropriate Standing Operating Procedures to inter-alia:

a. support standardization of training doctrines, manuals and programmes for national and regional schools of excellence;

b. coordinate the African Standby Force training courses, command and staff exercises, as well as field training exercises.

The Commission shall, in collaboration with the United Nations, undertake periodic assessment of African peace support capacities.

The Commission shall, in consultation with the United Nations Secretariat, assist in the co-ordination of external initiatives in support of the African Standby Force capacity-building in training, logistics, equipment, communications and funding.

Role of Member States
In addition to their responsibilities as stipulated under the present Protocol:

a. troop contributing countries States shall immediately, upon request by the Commission, following an authorization by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly, release the standby contingents with the necessary equipment for the operations envisaged under Article 9 (3) of the present Protocol;

b. Member States shall commit themselves to make available to the Union all forms of assistance and support required for the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the Continent, including rights of passage through their territories.

The ASF design was developed on the basis of six possible mission scenarios (see Table 1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AU/Regional military advice to a political mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission.</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peacebuilding).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AU Peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AU intervention, e.g. in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ASF mission scenarios distinguish between “complex, multidimensional peacekeeping missions”, and “intervention” in situations of genocide. But to date there have been no international military interventions in Africa with the primary purpose of civilian protection. And the AU is a long way from developing such capacity. AU policy suggests that a scenario 6 intervention should be able to deploy in 14 days. This can only be achieved by forces that are “ready, assembled, fully equipped and exercised with transport available on immediate call and with logistic supplies pre-packed and ready for delivery by air”. But the ASF is both multinational and standby in character. Multinational forces are more difficult to train and operate, and are slower to deploy. Only forces based on a lead nation are disposed to sufficient high readiness for a scenario 6 intervention.

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Indeed, although the original ASF rationale was ‘never to allow another genocide like Rwanda’, today it is largely accepted that the AU should deploy in advance of the UN, such as in Darfur and in Somalia. Most practitioners acknowledge that ASF forces will be deployed into a situation as part of the “peacemaking process at an earlier stage than UN forces would be allowed to engage”. Thus, the primary function of the ASF is to help to “create the conditions on the ground that could lead to a comprehensive peace agreement and the deployment of UN forces”. Precedents for this division of labour have been set in Burundi (with the AU and UN), and with ECOWAS and the UN in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. Transition to a UN mission has, therefore, effectively become an exit strategy for ASF operations.\textsuperscript{114}

The final ASF concept provided for five standby brigade level forces in each AU Regional Economic Community (REC). These would be supported by civilian police (CivPol) and other capacities. Ultimately, the ASF will comprise standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components based in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment.

The ASF is to be established in two phases, although the timelines have lapsed from their initial design, and are likely to lapse still further:

Phase 1) Up to 30 June 2006: establish a strategic/continental level management capacity for scenarios 1-3, while the regions would complement the AU by establishing forces up to brigade level strength for scenario 4.

Phase 2) By 30 June 2010: develop full scenario 5 and 6 capacities at continental level.

Development of the ASF requires the establishment of effective management and planning systems at the AU headquarters, sub-regional and national levels. At the continental level, the AU Commission is expected to develop a Multidimensional Strategic Level Management Capability and a 15-person Planning Element (PLANELM), which goal of developing standard operating procedures (SOPs), doctrine, a continental command and communication system, a continental training concept, a continental standby system.115

Serafini questions whether the ASF will be able to achieve effective peace enforcement. Weaknesses include poor logistical support for mission preparation, deployment and execution, a weak organisational structure lacking unity of command, and under-trained and inexperienced personnel.116

As at March 2008, commentators assert that it is highly unlikely that the AU will be able to meet more than nominal targets set out above, unless AU

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Member States devote far greater capacity to the ASF, and demonstrate much greater leadership and action at AU level.\textsuperscript{117}

In late 2006, the AU Commission of the AU was able to report progress on the development of much of the ‘baseline documentation’ for the ASF, relating to doctrine, the logistic concept, guidelines for training and evaluation, C3IS and various ASF SOPs (note that this does not mean that all were completed). Progress continued more slowly in 2007, when the ASF tools and concept of operations were consolidated, capabilities for deployment in the period up to 2010 were identified, and progress was made to develop ASF civilian dimensions.

\textbf{Africa Standy Force regional brigades}

\textit{ECOWAS}

ECOWAS’ original main objective was to promote regional integration in economic, social and cultural activities. The peace and security dimension evolved later as it became clear that regional instability was a severe impediment to achieving this ambition.\textsuperscript{118}


\textsuperscript{118} Ramsbotham, A, Bah, A, and Calder, F, ‘Enhancing African peace and security capacity: a useful role for the UK and the G8?’, International Affairs, 81.2 p.71
The supreme ECOWAS institution is the Authority of Heads of State and Government of Member States (the Authority). It is responsible for the general direction of ECOWAS and leads on all actions to realise the organisation’s objectives. Below the Authority sits the ECOWAS Council of Ministers (the Council), which consists of Member States, Ministers of ECOWAS Affairs and other relevant Ministers, with responsibility for the development of the Community.

The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, based in Abuja, Nigeria, manages the overall running of the organisation and the implementation of Authority decisions. The Executive Secretary, elected for four-year terms, has four deputies, responsible for different thematic Departments. The Current Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and Security is General Cheick Oumar Diarra. At the 1999 ECOWAS Summit, a Protocol for the Establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace and Security was agreed. The institutions of the Mechanism include the Authority, the Executive Secretariat and a Mediation and Security Council comprising 10 Member States. The Mediation and Security Council supervises four additional ECOWAS organs:

- The Defence and Security Commission.
- The Council of Elders.
- The Early Warning Observation and Monitoring Centre.
- The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).
The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) comprises a number of elements. The ESF brigade (ECOBREG) will be 5,000-strong, which will be ready to deploy within 90 days. There will also be an ESF task force: a 2,750-strong rapid deployment force, at 30 days’ readiness, based on Nigeria as lead nation. The ESF already has a task force chief of staff, has established a task force HQ in Abuja and has an operational PLANELM. Its concept of operations, doctrine and SOPs are also complete.119

SADC

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the primary southern African regional body. It was formally instituted in the early 1990s, having developed from a more informal regional process began with the establishment of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC) in the early 1980s. SADC’s main aims are to promote development and economic growth, alleviate poverty and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration. The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (the Organ) is responsible for promoting regional peace and security. It reports to the SADC Summit and is headed by a Troika, comprising a Chair, as well as the Incoming and Outgoing Chairs.120

A major SADC priority is promoting confidence-building measures that can support regional integration. Regional exercises/mechanisms in peace and security capacity building can help this process and so encourage regional cooperation more broadly. Political issues that challenge integration among SADC Member States, as a result of legacies of the apartheid era and so on, are still dominant within the region and progress is being made to counter them. In the meantime, regional politics are very sensitive. Regional decisions tend not be made official until political problems have been resolved to avoid upsetting the delicate political regional balance. Well-directed donor support, with an emphasis on SADC leadership (from both the Secretariat and Member States), flexibility and a pragmatic approach to realities on the ground, can help to facilitate confidence-building among SADC Member States.121

In July 2004, modalities for the establishment of a SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) were approved by SADC Chiefs of Defence Staff and Police Chiefs. But SADCBRIG was not inaugurated officially until August 2007. As at March 2008, the SADCBRIG PLANELM was operational, based with the SADC secretariat in Gabarone. The Brigade HQ was also established, as were pledged forces and elements, although neither civilian components nor details of a logistic concept and depot had yet been finalised, although doctrine, operational guidelines, SOPs and logistic concept had been completed.122

IGAD

Unlike other sub-regions such as West Africa with ECOWAS and Southern Africa with SADC, Eastern Africa does not have an equivalent Regional Economic Community (REC) that brings together all member states from the sub-region. The East African Community (EAC) comprising Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, one of the oldest and most viable regional organisations in the area, is limited by its narrow membership; while COMESA stretches from North to Southern Africa. Consequently, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which, consists of several countries from the Horn to East Africa is viewed as the most appropriate forum for dealing with regional issues of peace and security.123

The severe droughts and other natural disasters that plagued the sub-region starting from the mid-1970s to 1984, led to the establishment in 1986 of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD). Based on the realities that informed its creation, IGADD’s mandate was to primarily address issues of drought and other ecological challenges that confronted Member States. However, with persistent conflicts, in March 1996 IGADD Member States agreed to establish the Intern-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with a broader mandate to allow IGAD to venture into the complex and often fractious dynamics of politics and security in the sub-region.

The newly established organisation identified three core areas as its priorities: conflict prevention, management and resolution and humanitarian affairs; infrastructure development; and food security and environmental protection.\textsuperscript{124}

Since there was no suitable regional arrangement, progress in establishing the Eastern African standby force has been delayed. IGAD was eventually mandated to coordinate the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) in 2004. However, non-IGAD Eastern African states protested, and the council of ministers approved the establishment of an independent EASBRIG Coordination Mechanism’ (EASBRICOM) to assume coordination of EASBRIG. After lengthy negotiations, it was agreed to co-locate EASBRICOM with the EASBRIG PLANELM in Nairobi. Today, membership of the Eastern Africa Standby Force includes Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Burundi has requested to leave the central African region and join Eastern Africa. But Madagascar, Mauritius and Tanzania, which had previously been members, are now operative in Southern Africa, while Eritrea is currently not engaged with EASBRICOM. EASBRICOM has proposed that the Eastern African standby force will be structured within a regional peace and security mechanism. It is proposed that this will provide political oversight and strategic decision-making relevant

\textsuperscript{124} Ramsbotham, A, Bah, A, and Calder, F, 'Enhancing African peace and security capacity: a useful role for the UK and the G8?', International Affairs, 81.2 pp.72-73.
to multidimensional, complex peacekeeping missions, in accordance with article 16 of the protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC of the AU.\textsuperscript{125}

\textit{Central Africa}

The membership of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) overlaps with the membership of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). Central Africa has struggled to produce a meaningful response to the severe peace and security problems within its region.\textsuperscript{126} ECCAS comprises 11 member states, namely Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and São Tomé et Príncipe.

Substantive progress in developing the ECCAS Standby Force (EASF) began in 2006. Rwanda was part of the EASF from the beginning, and Burundi has also applied to join. Angola and the DRC are members of both the central and southern standby forces. ECCAS has approved a structure for the regional HQ and the EASF PLANELM. However, realising the EASF in practice still faces many technical challenges, specifically a severe lack of resources in the secretariat and over-reliance on external support.\textsuperscript{127}


\textsuperscript{126} House of Lords European Union Committee (2006), \textit{The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership}, 34\textsuperscript{th} Report of Session 2005-6, 7 July, p.28.

North Africa

On 17 February 1989 at the Maghred Summit held in Marrakech, Morocco, the five Heads of State signed the Treaty establishing the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). AMU Member States comprise Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The AMU has not met at the level of heads of state since April 1994, hamstrung by the dispute over the status of Western Sahara.\(^{128}\) Libya was eventually nominated as the regional coordinator, and North Africa has established the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) to develop the North Africa standby force. This includes Egypt, which is not a member of AMU. The brigade headquarters is to be located in Libya, and the PLANELM in Egypt.\(^{129}\)

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was adopted at the July 2001 OAU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia,\(^{130}\) although it has subsequently been subsumed within the framework of the AU. As the name suggests, the main focus of NEPAD is on issues of development, and it is designed to present a comprehensive and integrated development plan for Africa, addressing major African social, economic and political concerns. NEPAD

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\(^{128}\) House of Lords European Union Committee (2006), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, 34\(^{th}\) Report of Session 2005-6, 7 July, p.28.


represents a commitment by African leaders to African people and the international community to achieve sustainable growth and to promote Africa’s integration into the global economy. But NEPAD also cites peace, security, democracy and good governance as preconditions for sustainable development and promotes a system of voluntary peer review and adherence to codes and standards of conduct. NEPAD is also seen as a key partner by many external agencies seeking to support Africa. It is worth, therefore, summarising NEPAD’s key features briefly here, including its relationship with the AU.

African heads of state attending the 38th (and final) Summit of the OAU in Durban in July 2002 agreed a NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Good Governance. The Durban meeting also approved the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

Box 3 NEPAD Structures

NEPAD is a programme of the AU intended to meet its development aims. The highest authority of the NEPAD implementation process is the AU Summit. NEPAD’s Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSIC) comprises three states for every REC and reports to the AU Summit on an

annual basis. The Steering Committee of NEPAD comprises the personal representatives of the NEPAD heads of state and government and oversees projects and programme development. The NEPAD secretariat coordinates implementation of projects and programmes approved by the HSIC.

The NEPAD strategic framework document arises from a mandate given to the five initiating heads of state (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa) by the OAU to develop an integrated socio-economic development framework for Africa. The 37th Summit of the OAU in July 2001 formally adopted the strategic framework document.

NEPAD’S key priority areas for action are:

- operationalising the African Peer Review Mechanism;
- facilitating and supporting implementation of the short-term regional infrastructure programmes covering Transport Energy, Water and Sanitation;
- facilitating implementation of the food security and agricultural development program in all sub-regions;
- facilitating the preparation of a coordinated African position on market access, debt relief and ODA reforms; and
- monitoring and intervening as appropriate to ensure that the MDGs in the areas of health and education are met.
There are a number of challenges facing NEPAD: its internal organisation, financing, institutional capacity and relation to African people have all been cited as problematic. However, its biggest challenge is that of expectations. The UN regards NEPAD as the framework for achieving the MDGs, whilst the EU Strategy for Africa itself emphasises the importance of NEPAD in its section on governance. One of the EU’s challenges will be to assist in building the capacity of NEPAD to meet these challenges.

**Box 4 The Institutional Relationship between the AU and NEPAD**

At the first NEPAD Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue, held in South Africa on 22–23 October 2004, opening statements made by Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal underlined the importance of a close relationship between NEPAD and the AU, emphasising that NEPAD is the socio-economic development programme of the AU.133

The plan to integrate NEPAD into the AU as a specialised agency in 2006 demonstrates the desire that the two institutions should work closely together as complementary pan-African institutions to promote peace and security, good governance and development in Africa.

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Promoting good governance is a guiding principle for both institutions. AU resources that can support its governance function include a political mandate as part of the AU Constitutive Act; the role of the RECs as regional building blocks for the work of the AU; and dedicated organs that incorporate input from citizens, such as ECOSOCC and the Pan-African Parliament. NEPAD’s primary mechanism for promoting good governance is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

However, there has been some tension between the AU and NEPAD. Critics have observed that the divergent approaches adopted by officials from each institution in presenting initiatives to African governments and civil society groups have given an impression that the AU and NEPAD are competing for supremacy in promoting democratisation and economic integration in Africa. The decision to integrate NEPAD formally into the AU by 2006 should help to mitigate rivalry between the two institutions.

Myles Wickstead, former Head of the Secretariat for the Commission for Africa, has noted some tension between NEPAD based in South Africa and the AU based in Addis Ababa over what should be the key priorities to support the overall development of Africa. Bob Dewar, the United Kingdom’s Permanent Representative to the AU, acknowledged this friction, but drew attention to

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135 The African Union and NEPAD, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa: http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/?id=202
136 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 78, 2 February.
commitments made at the Khartoum AU Summit to integrate NEPAD fully into the AU over the next two to three years.\textsuperscript{137}

\textbf{Clarity of the AU/UN relationship and layered response}

Cilliers states that building the peacekeeping capacity of the AU does not represent building an alternative to UN peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{138} Rather, what needs to be built was what Kofi Annan’s \textit{In Larger Freedom} report referred to as an interlocking system of peacekeeping,\textsuperscript{139} in which the AU can help establish a comprehensive ceasefire and can then handover to a UN mission. The UN then represents the exit strategy for AU peacekeeping operations. However, the practicalities of fitting diverse peacekeeping components together remain a key challenge. At this point it is useful to review two interconnected strands to AU/UN collaboration, first the constitutional and normative relationship, and second the operational partnership.

The constitutional relationship between the AU and the UN is a key determinant of the legality and legitimacy of peacekeeping deployments in Africa. The AU has, to date, emphasised the importance of operating within the terms of the UN Charter, and under the over-arching authority of the UN Security Council. It seems likely that the constitutional relationship will

\textsuperscript{137} House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 343, 30 March.
\textsuperscript{138} House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 122, 8 February.
persevere on these terms for the foreseeable future, as the AU remains to a large extent operationally reliant on the UN.

Were the AU to develop a more self-sufficient peacekeeping capability, however, or to develop stronger operational links with other external partners, Addis Ababa’s determination to seek prior UN approval would be likely to be less dependable. At this point, the recommendation of the UN High-Level Panel on threats, Challenges and Change might become more material, which advises that: “Authorization from the Security Council should in all cases be sought for regional peace operations, recognizing that in some urgent situations that authorization may be sought after such operations have commenced”.

The emergence of African sub-regional bodies with independent intervention capacity adds another dimension to this question; indeed, ECOWAS previously intervened in Liberia in the early 1990s without the approval of the UN Security Council. How the relationship between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council develops is of key significance here.

Regarding the AU/UN operational partnership, UNDPKO states that the design of the African Standby Force (ASF) looks promising for good cooperation with

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It sees the concept of the ASF as consistent with the lessons of the Brahimi Report, as it focuses on developing coherent brigade groups. EASBRIG (the ASF component for East Africa, as described in more detail above) is designed to be ready for the ASF and UN operations; ECOWAS is developing capacity along similar conceptual lines.

However, DPKO warns that the operational demands on AU peacekeeping capabilities are overwhelming and unsustainable. As the major peacekeeping agency in Africa, with an increasing large field presence on the continent, the UN stresses the need for clarification of the roles of the UN and the AU. This extends to improving the relationship between the UN and the AU/RECs at the political/constitutional level in terms of legitimacy and legality, as well as to enhancing the partnership at the technical/military level.

A lesson of UN operational experiences that is useful for African bodies as they develop their capacity is the need for a flexible response capability: a range of other actors have filled gaps that have emerged from constraints on UN rapid response capacity. The UN states that the ASF concept has so far failed to consider explicitly scenarios where the ASF might be an interim force, for instance for only 120 days before being subsumed within a UN operation. This is close to actual current operational practice. Definite thinking on these lines would greatly facilitate and clarify operational planning for the ASF.

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giving a finite timeline for Africans regarding logistics and so on, and a much clearer exit strategy.

DPKO stresses the need for greater clarity of what is meant by ‘African ownership’, in relation to the full spectrum of operational peacekeeping responsibilities, and the scale of demand for peacekeeping in Africa. An AU ‘all or nothing’ attitude that rejects hybrid operations and a realistic division of labour is not helpful given operational realities. The AU/UN mission in Darfur suggests progress in this area, although negotiations over the details of this mission were difficult and drawn out.

The UN further suggests that AU operations seem most likely to be ‘bridging’ missions, which would subsequently be ‘re-hatted’ as UN deployments. It urged that there should be more candid and clearer thinking on the mechanics and implications of this. Clarity is also needed over what capacity is being built for; for instance, the UN has the only access to multidimensional post-conflict capacity in Africa. Attempts by the AU to replicate this risks spreading its net too wide, rather than building functioning capacity in selected key areas.

The UN suggests that the function of the ASF should be clarified in relation to the UN and other actors. Key themes include the use of force and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and multidimensional peacebuilding responses and
prioritising components of AU/African PSO capacity-building. Best practice lessons could be learned from ECOWAS/UN experiences in West Africa.

DPKO recommends that consideration should be given to relevant recommendations in relevant reports by the UN Secretary-General, such as *In Larger Freedom, Enhancing African Peacekeeping Capabilities*, and the UN High-level Panel Report. Key recommendations identified by DPKO include extending UN assessed contributions to pay for AU operations; and exploring what lessons can be shared/learned between the ASF and UN Standby Arrangements System, for instance over interoperability.

The UN has sought to share standardisation of generic training modules through seminars such as the senior management and UN Training Assistance Team seminars. DPKO suggests that it could also assist in training HQ staff officers from the AU and regions through the following practices:

- rapid deployment and planning exercises conducted by DPKO;
- arranging exchange programmes for AUC staff in New York; and
- conducting training programmes for middle-level African police managers from African countries with a view to preparing them for managerial and policy-making positions in peacekeeping operations.

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Conclusion

There have been major advances in strengthening AU peacekeeping capability, including to protect civilians. The blueprint for the African Standby Force (ASF) supports the development of a complex, multidimensional peacekeeping capability. The AU peace and security architecture (APSA) stresses the importance of a robust capability to protect the human rights of the individual, where those are threatened by gross abuse.

But a number of key challenges remain. AU Member States must be prepared to support the AU institutionally and politically, including authorising and resourcing missions in situations where the security of African civilians is under threat. A major challenge relates to capacity. Resources are severely limited in Africa and there is a long way to go to develop a functioning African peace and security capability. Experts have suggested that building the AU into a credible and solid institution is a 15 to 20-year project, and the AU has failed in its ambition to have the ASF operational by 2010.143

A pattern has emerged for African regional peacekeeping, whereby the AU and ECOWAS have both played useful and effective roles as ‘bridging’ forces in advance of the deployment of UN missions.144 This corresponds with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s vision of an interlocking system of

144 This is discussed in more detail in chapter 11
peacekeeping capacities, in which different international agencies provide various components for peace operations, playing to their relative strengths.145

But this pattern is not built into the design and construction of the APSA. At present, the plan for the APSA is very comprehensive, covering almost all aspects of a complex peacekeeping capability. This is ambitious, and risks the net being spread too wide. Building the peacekeeping capacity of the AU does necessarily not mean building an alternative to the UN, but could be planned around more specific and specialised components relevant to Kofi Annan’s interlocking system.

Another key question relates to the extent to which the ASF will pinpoint the specific requirements of civilian protection. Previous chapters have highlighted the importance of mandates, training and doctrine, to link peacekeepers’ objectives and actions to the requirements of civilian protection. ASF doctrine and training are still under discussion. But these are dynamic and evolving concepts and practices, and the requirements of civilian protection can be built in to them as they are developed.

Critics have accused some international partners of the AU have seized on the ASF concept “to such a degree that it sometimes undermines African

ownership”. Seconded officers from donor countries sometimes outnumber African compatriots. Embedded international ‘advisors’ often control much larger resources than the African commanders they nominally report to, are paid much larger salaries and can play a decisive role through their direct access to even larger national purses. As Cilliers warns,

“it is ... not uncommon to find middle ranking expatriate officers from European countries effectively in control of key aspects of ASF preparations, and exerting considerable influence on the concepts, standards and decisions taken at every level”.

Meanwhile, the AU’s chronic lack of capacity means that it will remain dependent on external partners for a long time to come. Since the AU is so reliant on external support both to build its indigenous peace and security capacity, and to deploy peacekeeping operations, how the relationship between the AU and its external partners is designed and managed is extremely significant.

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Discussion of the EU-Africa partnership focuses on the EU’s ‘Strategy for Africa’: *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership*, which was adopted by the European Council in December 2005. The Strategy maps the key areas in which the EU could support African efforts to build a “peaceful, democratic and prosperous future”.

The Strategy seeks to promote “African ownership and responsibility”, by working with African countries to achieve mutually agreed goals, rather than by imposing European values on them. These goals are outlined under six headings: Peace and Security; Human Rights and Governance; Development Assistance; Sustainable Economic Growth, Regional Integration and Trade; Investing in People; and The Future: an EU Partnership with Africa. The Strategy stresses the importance of developing a comprehensive strategy “encompassing security, development and human rights” and it highlights the importance of working with civil society in order to promote and protect human rights.

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148 Council of the European Union (2005), *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership*, Brussels 19 December, 15961/05.
149 Council of the European Union (2005), *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership*, Brussels 19 December, 15961/05, para 1.
150 Council of the European Union (2005), *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership*, Brussels 19 December, 15961/05, para 3.
152 General Affairs and External Relations Council (2005), *Council Conclusions*, Brussels 22 November, Council of the European Union 14172/05.
For structural clarity, analysis of the EU-Africa partnership is divided into two chapters. Chapter 4 traces the history of the relationship, outlining its key structures, and it examines Europe’s capacity to deliver on its commitments to Africa. Chapter 5 then looks more specifically at EU support for African peacekeeping. It reviews various structures and processes through which the EU is seeking to provide support to African peace and security activities and structures, and it assesses the effectiveness of efforts to realise these in practice. These chapters appraise the capacity of the EU Strategy for Africa to develop a functioning peacekeeping relationship between the EU and Africa.

Chapters 4 and 5 are based largely on extensive, face to face interviews with a number of European and African experts in London and Brussels – as outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis. This chapter analyses a number of key components of the EU-Africa relationship. First, this chapter reviews the history of European and EU relations with Africa. This analysis incorporates European collaboration with other multilateral institutions – including the UN, International Financial Institutions, and the G8 and the Africa Partnership Forum. This section of the chapter then examines the specific development of the EU-Africa Partnership, including: the background to the Partnership; the EU’s interlocutors in Africa; and the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (Cotonou Agreement). Finally, this section looks at the latest manifestation of EU-Africa relations: the development of the Strategy for Africa, including its joint implementation matrix, as well as monitoring and review.
Second, this chapter assesses Europe’s capacity to deliver on the commitments it has made to support African peace and security, focusing primarily on coordination and coherence. It looks at policy coherence. And it examines institutional divisions within the EU, including within the Commission; within the Commission’s external representation; between the Commission and the Council Secretariat; and Coordination with – and between – Member States. It examines regulatory and financial divisions; the different cooperation agreements; and the financing structure.

**European and EU relations with Africa**

EU policy seeks to adopt an integrated approach to preventing conflict in Africa, drawing on all the instruments at its disposal: development, trade, economic, diplomatic, political and military. The EU’s focus is ‘organisation to organisation’; i.e. continental/regional, rather than bilateral.\(^{154}\)

2005 can be seen, internationally, as the ‘year of Africa’. Five years after the adoption of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),\(^{155}\) Africa was falling behind in its efforts to climb out of poverty, in comparison with Europe, Asia and the Americas. In 2004, Africa enjoyed its highest regional growth for almost a decade. But its overall economy failed to achieve the 7% growth

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\(^{155}\) See Box XX.
seen as necessary to achieve the first MDG of halving poverty by 2015.\textsuperscript{156} The Commission for Africa Report, the G8 and UN World Summit sought to raise Africa up the international political agenda. The EU, under the UK Presidency during the second half of 2005, played a significant role in boosting Africa’s international political profile.

The then Secretary of State for Development, Hilary Benn, stressed the importance of delivering on commitments made to support Africa: “It is about political commitment, and I cannot remember in my life when the world and UK politics has talked more about Africa. The question now is how do we turn that commitment into practical expressions of support”.\textsuperscript{157} Jakkie Cilliers stressed that the EU’s ‘Strategy for Africa’ (the Strategy) should form the basis of a strategic partnership between Europe and Africa, and saw it as “an extremely welcome development”.\textsuperscript{158}

The geographic proximity of Africa and Europe has ensured a close relationship between the two continents for many centuries, even if this relationship has been highly volatile. Significant trade links between the two continents existed long before the systematic colonisation of Africa in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, and there has also been a history of the exchange of cultural ideas and developments. Colonialism imposed European dominance on Africa, but also cemented mutual relations between specific states, for instance in the

\textsuperscript{157} House of Lords (2005), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 49, 29 November.
\textsuperscript{158} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 122, 8 February.
use of common languages such as English and French. State independence movements in the mid-20th century did not deter several Western European countries, such as Belgium, France and the United Kingdom, from maintaining close links with their former colonies.

European trade and investment has remained highly significant to Africa. The EU is the main trading partner for almost all African countries.¹⁵⁹ And the majority of investment in Africa originates from Europe, led by investors from France, the Netherlands and the UK. Along with South Africa and the United States, these countries account for more than 50% of inflows of foreign direct investment into Africa in 2004.¹⁶⁰ Economic links imply that European governments and businesses have a direct interest in promoting sustainable development, not least in regard to investment in infrastructure and governance initiatives, which help to create a stable investment climate.

But European interest in African development is not exclusively based on economics. There is increasing acknowledgement that Europe’s security interests linked closely related to those of its neighbours. For example, the EU Security Strategy asserts that Europe now faces threats which are diverse, hidden and unpredictable, including terrorism, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/index_en.htm
Historical ties between Europe and Africa, combined with trade links and shared security interests, have encouraged a political preparedness to work together. The Strategy reflects this willingness. But the levels of aid donated by the EU Member States provides a more concrete demonstration: together, EU Member States provide around 55% of global overseas development assistance (ODA). This is noticeably larger than either the US or Japan, the next two largest contributors.

**The role of the EU**

Although some European countries have longstanding relations with Africa, not all EU Member States agree that Africa is an external relations priority. EU-Africa relations have been fragmented, in terms both of policy formation and of implementation, and the Strategy seeks to tackle this fragmentation.

The EU has established links with Africa through the Yaoundé Convention, and through the Lomé Convention, as well as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Conventions dating back to 1963 established the framework for relations between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states.

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164 The first Yaoundé Convention between the Associated African and Malagasy States (AAMS) and the EEC of the six original Member States was signed in 1963.
165 The first Lomé Convention between the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the EC was signed in 1975.
166 This agreement between north African and Middle East countries and the EU was signed in 1995.
– since 2000 this framework has taken the form of the Cotonou Agreement).\textsuperscript{167} The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was agreed in 1995 and lays out the political, economic and social relations between the EU and southern Mediterranean partners. It relates to African countries north of the Sahara, as well as other Middle Eastern states.\textsuperscript{168} Both agreements incorporate trade and political dimensions, including promoting good governance. The potential for tension between the two frameworks, and the implications of this a complementary partnership between the EU and Africa, are considered in more detail below. The EU has, more recently, been developing links with African regional and continental organisations, notably the African Union.

\textit{EU cooperation with other multilateral institutions}\textsuperscript{169}

\textit{The United Nations}

The UN is the overarching multilateral organisation for promoting international peace and security, and the European Security Strategy seeks to strengthen the UN in order to equip it to fulfil its responsibilities and act effectively.\textsuperscript{170} The EU contributes to the UN in two especially significant ways: first, together EU Member States pay 38\% of the UN’s regular budget, 40\% of its

\textsuperscript{167} For the full text of the Agreement see: ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/cotonou/pdf/agr01_en.pdf#zoom=100
\textsuperscript{168} The 10 non-EU members of the Partnership are: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
\textsuperscript{169} EU cooperation with the G8 is examined in Chapter XX.
peacekeeping budget and approximately 50% of voluntary contributions to UN funds and programmes;\textsuperscript{171} second, the EU is a key supporter of UN peacekeeping and crisis management capabilities.\textsuperscript{172}

The UN World Summit in September 2005 sought to develop an action plan for promoting international security and for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs – see Box 5). The World Summit Outcome Document (the Summit Outcome) reaffirmed the Member States’ commitment to addressing the special needs of Africa, including encouraging the initiatives of the African Union to prevent, mediate and resolve conflicts.\textsuperscript{173} However, some observers complained that the Summit Outcome contained few concrete commitments of relevance to Africa, apart from the following: an agreement to establish a Peacebuilding Commission; recognition of the principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’; and the reform of the Human Rights Commission.\textsuperscript{174} All of these have potential to have a beneficial impact on conflict and instability in Africa.\textsuperscript{175}

\textbf{Box 5 The Eight Millennium Development Goals}

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\textsuperscript{171} House of Lords (2005-6), \textit{European Union Committee}, 11th Report (HL 35), paras 17-18. \\
\textsuperscript{172} House of Lords (2005-6), \textit{European Union Committee}, 11th Report (HL 35), paras 19-21. \\
\textsuperscript{173} United Nations (2005), General Assembly, 65th Session, resolutions adopted, paragraph 68, published 24 October: \url{http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement} \\
\textsuperscript{175} House of Lords (2006), \textit{The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership}, European Union Committee, 34th Report of Session 2005–06, July 2006, p. 15. \\
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1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental stability
8. Develop a global partnership for development

Box 6 Principal UN Agencies Working in Africa

*Specialised Agencies*: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN (FAO); International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); World Health Organisation (WHO).


*Programmes and Funds*: Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS); UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); UN Development Programme (UNDP); UN Population Fund (UNFPA); Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF); UN...
Institutions governing the global economy

Although not of direct relevance to promoting African peace and security, Africa’s economic development is linked to continental stability and links between development and conflict are well established (see below). Institutions governing the global economy have a significant impact on African economic development. Endowments provided by the World Bank are important sources of income for many African states. World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules govern African states’ capacity to manage their imports and exports. And even the OECD is committed to promoting global market economies, which has an impact on Africa. The EU acts as a trading bloc in the WTO, with the potential to take Africa’s development needs into consideration when deciding its trade policies. The institutions governing the global economy are summarised in Box 8.

Box 7 Institutions Governing the Global Economy

The International Finance Institutions

The IFIs are owned by Member States. They provide multilateral funding to support development projects and to help resolve difficulties caused by
international indebtedness. The most prominent are the ‘Bretton Woods’ institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

The IMF comprises 184 Member States. It was set up to promote international monetary cooperation, to encourage economic growth and to supply temporary financial assistance to help ease countries’ balance of payments adjustments.176

The World Bank also comprises 184 Member States. It supplies low-interest loans, interest-free credit and grants to developing countries for education, health, infrastructure and other purposes.177

Several regional banks support development in Africa. The African Development Bank provided US$53 billion between 1967 and 2004. On 19 April 2006 it announced that it had approved debt cancellation for 33 African countries equal to US$8.54 billion.178

Export credit agencies (ECAs) are state-based public agencies, which provide loans, guarantees and credit to domestic private corporations to do business abroad, especially in the developing world.

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176 See the IMF website for more details: http://www.imf.org.
178 See the African Development Bank website for details: http://www.afdb.org.
The World Trade Organisation

The WTO controls international trade rules between countries. Its main stated aim is to remove trade barriers by using multilateral agreements.\textsuperscript{179} The Sixth Ministerial Conference of the WTO, held in Hong Kong in December 2005, stressed the importance of development in the on-going round of negotiations adopted at Doha, and so was of especial significance to African states.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

The OECD includes 30 member countries with a common commitment to democratic government and market economics. It works with 70 other countries and with civil society to promote good governance in the economy, public services and corporate activity. Its cooperation with non-members is mainly with transition and emerging economies, but includes some developing countries.\textsuperscript{180}

The Commission for Africa

The Commission for Africa was launched in February 2004 by the then UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair. It comprised 17 Commissioners from the public and private sectors across Africa and Europe. The Commission’s Report was

\textsuperscript{179} See the WTO website for more details: http://wto.org
\textsuperscript{180} See the OECD website for more details: http://oecd.org.
published on 11 March 2005. The Commission for Africa Report covered key areas of governance, peace and security, investing in people, poverty reduction, trade and resources. It stressed the importance of the different areas being treated as a coherent package. Many of the report’s recommendations were adopted by the EU, the G8, which agreed to increase resources, and the UN, which secured further commitments from the international community, including on the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Building the EU-Africa Partnership

Background to EU-Africa Relations

The first EU-Africa Summit took place in Cairo in April 2000. This was the first time that Africa as a whole engaged in dialogue with the EU, and it sought to develop the regional groupings of the ACP and the Barcelona into a coherent, strategic, pan-African partnership. The EU portrayed this regional integration as a significant advance towards integrating Africa into the global economy.

The Summit adopted the ‘Cairo Plan of Action’, which defined the key goals of Africa-EU dialogue as follows:

- to strengthen political, economic and socio-cultural EU-Africa relations;

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• to eradicate poverty and attain the Millennium Development Goals in Africa, as well as to implement commitments made in international conferences; and

• to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Africa.

A second Summit, originally due to be held in Lisbon in April 2003, was suspended indefinitely due to discord over the position of Zimbabwe. European Member States denied President Robert Mugabe entry into Europe on the basis of Zimbabwe’s human rights record, and urged African States to support their embargo. But African heads of state maintained their commitment to pan-African solidarity and insisted that all African states must be represented at the Summit. The conditions surrounding the holding of the second Summit in 2007 are examined later in this chapter.

In 2003, the EC produced a Communication entitled ‘The EU-Africa Dialogue’, which explored options to continue the dialogue outside the EU-Africa Summit process.\footnote{European Commission (2003), Communication from the Commission to the Council: The EU-Africa dialogue, [COM(2003) 316 final], http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2003/com2003_0316en01.pdf} It described mechanisms for more flexible dialogue between Africa and Europe, outlining possible means for reinforcing institutional linkages between the EU and the AU as follows:

• at senior official level;

• in bi-regional working parties;
• between the AU and the EU Heads of Mission based in Addis Ababa;
• between the Brussels-based African Heads of Mission; and
• between the AU/EU Commissions.

The Communication acknowledged the problems associated with different agreements between the EU and the various parts of Africa, for instance Cotonou and the Barcelona process, in particular hampering European responses to pan-African or regional initiatives. It agreed that Europe should “consider practical measures that would build bridges between the different agreements”.184

Two Ministerial Troika meetings preceded the EU-Africa Dialogue, in October 2001 and December 2001,185 both of which assumed a second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2003. Subsequent troika meetings reiterated the need for a solution to the Zimbabwe problem, but for several years avoided relying on a second Summit taking place, instead focusing on substantive issues such as peace and security, governance, regional integration and development.186

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185 Council of the European Union (2001)m, Communiqué: Africa-Europe Ministerial Conference, 11 October, 12762/01; Final Communiqué: Africa-Europe Ministerial Meeting 28 November 2002, Ouagadougou. For both the EU and the AU, the Troika is a body comprising the President of the Commission, the President of the Council and a high-ranking member of the Secretariat (in the EU’s case this is Javier Solana, the High Representative for the CFSP).
186 Final Communiqué: EU-Africa Dialogue Ministerial Troika Meeting 10 November 2003, Rome; Communiqué of the EU-Africa Ministerial 1 April 2004, Dublin; Communiqué: Africa-Europe Dialogue 4 December 2004, Addis Ababa; European Union-Africa Union Ministerial Meeting Final Communiqué 11 April 2005, Luxembourg; links to these documents can be found at: http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/oauintl.htm The latest two meetings
The Ministerial Troika meetings were the highest level of dialogue between the EU and the AU until the Second Summit, but there has also been a significant level of cooperation at lower levels, as envisaged in the Commission’s earlier Communication. The Commission itself has been the leading proponent of this cooperation holding regular meetings with counterparts within the AU Commission, at the level of both Commissioners themselves and officials. Tim Cole, former Head of the Pan Africa Policy Unit FCO, believed that “an interesting synergy” had arisen between the two Commissions regarding the developmental support which each was giving to the other. Informal discussions with the UK Permanent Representation in Brussels confirmed the significance of the relationship between the two.

Dialogue at all levels has sought to ensure that EU policy towards Africa has been developed in consultation with Africans, particularly with the AU. This has been intended to enhance European understanding of the challenges facing Africa, and to increase African awareness of the support which the EU is able to offer. However, James Mackie of the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECPDM), suggested that the Commission-to-Commission dialogue has been by far the most effective, adding that there...

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187 Representatives of the Commission confirmed this during informal discussions in Brussels, March 2006.
188 House of Lords (2004), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 1, 29 April.
remained room for improvement in communication between the two Parliaments, and amongst civil society.\textsuperscript{190}

\textit{The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (Cotonou Agreement)}

The Cotonou Agreement stresses the significance of political dialogue, of peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution, of respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, of good governance, and of a participatory approach to ensure the involvement of civil society and links between ACP and EU actors. Dialogue under the Agreement takes place principally through the ACP Summits, which are the highest organ of the ACP Group’s institutional structure and are responsible for defining the ACP’s primary policy guidelines instructing the Council of Ministers on their implementation. Summits are held annually, each hosted by a different member country.

Cotonou provides for three joint institutions for EU-ACP cooperation. First, the Council of Ministers which meets annually and is responsible for initiating political dialogue, adopting political guidelines and taking decisions required for the implementation of the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement. Second, the Committee of Ambassadors which comprises a permanent representative of each EU Member State, a Commission representative and a head of mission

\textsuperscript{190} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 77, 2 February.
for each ACP state and is designed to assist the Council of Ministers. Third, the Joint Parliamentary Assembly which acts in an advisory capacity.

*Developing the Strategy for Africa*

In June 2005, the European Council called on the Council of Ministers to create a long-term global strategy for Africa. This was to derive from the UN World Summit Outcome commitments, and was intended to be adopted by the European Council in December 2005.191 The Council embraced “the increase in dialogue and cooperation between the EU and all the African Countries, made possible by the affirmation of the African Union (AU) as the political framework able to put forwards African responses to the challenges of development,” and sought “to continue supporting the development of the African continent in compliance with the principles of equality and African ownership”.192

The Commission then produced a Communication entitled ‘EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa’s Development’.193 This prioritised Africa’s development needs, focusing on the MDGs. But it acknowledged peace and security, as well as good and effective governance, as a pre-requisites for achieving the MDGs.

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The Commission considered three approaches for coordinating EU policies within the EU-Africa strategy:

1. Retaining the existing approach, where individual Member States and the Commission develop and implement their own policies and strategies towards all African sectors, countries and organisations.

2. Adopting a centralised policy, which would need common guidelines for all EU Member States and the Commission in all areas; and

3. A balanced approach between a total integration of aid policies and the absence of strategic coordination.

The Commission considered that the third option would yield the most positive results in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and consistency: the first approach implied that the EU-Africa policy would remain fragmented or create duplications; the second approach risked failing to reach unanimous agreement in such detail for all sectors concerned, and losing specific value added to the process by key players in specific sectors or regions.

Following on from the Commission Communication, the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, produced a paper focusing on the peace and
security aspects of the global strategy for Africa, highlighting the contribution that the EU’s CFSP and ESDP could make.¹⁹⁴

In November 2005, the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) concluded that a comprehensive Strategy “encompassing security, development and human rights which covers all African countries” should be presented to the December European Council.¹⁹⁵ It detailed the commitments to be found in the eventual Strategy, categorising them under the following: headings peace and security; human rights; governance; economic growth and regional integration and trade; environment; development assistance; investing in people; migration; and follow-up.

In the second half of 2005, the UK held the EU Presidency and so was tasked with preparing the eventual Strategy. During this preparation period, the then UK Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn, argued that the Strategy was:

“based on some very important principles: playing to the strengths of individual Member States, recognising that the Commission has got things that it does particularly well, but what it does in individual

¹⁹⁵ General Affairs and External Relations Council (2005), *Council Conclusions*, Brussels 22 November, Council of the European Union 14172/05.
countries is going to depend on circumstances so there needs to be flexibility”.

Developing the joint implementation matrix

On 2 December 2005, the fifth Ministerial Meeting of the African and EU Troïkas met in Bamako. Ministers attending the meeting welcomed the draft EU Strategy for Africa and agreed to develop an action plan for its implantation. Senior European officials were mandated to submit recommendations for such an action plan to the next Ministerial Troika. African officials also presented a monitoring matrix for overseeing the dialogue, and it was further agreed to look into developing a joint matrix at the next meeting.

Following the adoption of the EU Strategy at the December 2005 European Council, a Joint Implementation Matrix of Commitments arising from the Africa-EU dialogue was presented to an AU-EU experts’ meeting in Addis Ababa on 13-14 February 2006. The Matrix covers issues of peace and security, governance, trade and integration and key development issues. It takes a tabular form, assessing what efforts the AU and EU have made to implement commitments and what progress has been made, and identifying ways forward.

196 House of Lords (2005), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 48, 29 November.
According to Bob Dewar, the Matrix reflects the new, joint way that Africa and the EU are trying to work together. The Matrix is detailed in terms of specific actions to achieve implementation, and it represents the first time commitments by both Africa and the EU have been laid out together, rather than having separate EU and African programmes for action. It was negotiated between the Troikas in Addis Ababa, as well as through the wider Brussels machinery.\footnote{House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 355, 30 March.}

The joint implementation matrix was endorsed at the EU-African Troika meeting in Vienna on 8 May.\footnote{Council of the European Union (2006), \textit{Final Communiqué: EU-Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting}, 8 May, Vienna, 9333/06.} The Strategy committed the EU to "review progress on its implementation at the December 2006 European Council, and at least every two years thereafter". It pledged that Ministers of EU Member States "will discuss and oversee the development of detailed delivery and monitoring plans for this purpose, based on timelines and indicators proposed jointly by the Commission and Council Secretariat".\footnote{Council of the European Union (2005), \textit{The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership}, Brussels, 19 December 15961/05, paragraph 9(a).} Representatives of the Belgian government stated their preference for an annual review as a much better framework for ensuring effective implementation.\footnote{House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 211, 21 March.} The joint implementation matrix could also be used as a framework for developing a schedule for implementation, to specify precisely who is doing what in the EU.
in terms of implementing the Strategy, and when the work of the different bodies and institutions will be delivered.\textsuperscript{202}

The meeting in Vienna on 8 May requested that the Troika Ambassadors present progress reports on the matrix at the bi-annual Troika meetings, with their first meeting on the matrix scheduled for June 2006. The EU further committed itself to incorporate into the matrix information on EU Member States' bilateral aid activities at pan-African level. Observers suggested that this would help to determine how bilateral aid can be used to fulfil the commitments made in the EU Strategy, and to help present a clearer view of the overall funding situation.\textsuperscript{203}

**The EU’s capacity to deliver**

This section assesses the EU’s capacity to deliver on the commitments it has made to support African peace and security. It focuses primarily on coordination and coherence, reviewing the following issues: policy coherence for development; institutional divisions within the EU and the Commission; the Commission’s external representation; the Commission and the Council Secretariat; coordination with – and between – Member States; regulatory and financial divisions; the different cooperation agreements; and the financing structure.


The EU is an intergovernmental organisation in which the European Community institutions and the Member States convene together. The EU’s Strategy for Africa requires action to be taken by the Commission, the Council and the Member States individually. Although there are constitutional and practical limits to what each of these institutions can achieve, it is evident that a significant degree of coordination is necessary for the goals of the Strategy to be achieved. This section examines tensions within the Strategy, and between actors that are tasked with implementing it.

Policy Coherence

The Strategy for Africa is based on the concept that its various components will converge to promote sustainable development. Peace and security, governance and human rights are advocated as desirable in themselves. But they are also promoted as the basis for building a stable economy. For instance, the Strategy asserts that the EU will enhance support for post conflict reconstruction as a means of securing enduring stability and development. But the question nevertheless remains: behind the rhetoric, are EU policies genuinely coherent?

On paper, the Strategy appears to be a valuable example of an attempt by the EU to coordinate its various policies in development, security and economic growth, in order to achieve the MDGs. However, critics suggest that
it fails to specify how this level of coherence will actually come about in practice.²⁰⁴

The Treaty of the European Union (TEU) commits the EU to ensuring that its external activities are coherent.²⁰⁵ In the run up to the UN World Summit in September 2005, the European Commission delivered a Communication spelling out how it intended to ensure policy coherence for development.²⁰⁶ On 24 May 2006, the Council welcomed the Communication and agreed to take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all of its policies that are might affect developing countries.²⁰⁷

_Institutional Divisions within the EU_

It is not always clear who is responsible for the implementation of particular EU policies. And the Strategy for Africa does not specify the means by which its aims should be achieved. Action needs to be taken by the Commission, the Council and individual Member States. The following section examines how capable these various institutions are of implementing the Strategy, in view of both internal divisions, and of the complex relations between them.

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²⁰⁵ Treaty of the European Union, Article 3.


Two Directorates-General within the Commission hold primary responsibility for implementing the EU Strategy for Africa. DG Development, headed by Commissioner Louis Michel, has responsibility for the sections of the Strategy related to development assistance and humanitarian aid. DG External Relations (RELEX), under Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, has a broader responsibility for the external relations components of the Strategy. The division is effectively geographical: DG Development retains responsibility for sub-Saharan (ACP) countries; RELEX retains responsibility for the European Neighbourhood Policy and relations with countries north of the Sahara.

Some themes cross DGs within the Strategy, thereby making policy coherence even more difficult. Although a major theme of the Strategy is governance, it lacks detail as to what the EU is trying to promote in terms of good governance. Without coordinating mechanisms between the different DGs, countries north and south of the Sahara may be required to prioritise different reforms. Consultation with African partners could help to minimise this. The EU could ensure that basic governance reforms are applied throughout Africa by agreeing standards with the AU and with NEPAD.208 A range of mechanisms have been developed by the Commission to promote policy coherence.209

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209 The Inter-Service Quality Support Group, country teams, policy coherence working groups, and impact assessment process.
The EU’s Strategy for Africa demands significant cooperation between the Commission and the Council – including both the Member States and the Secretariat. There is significant scepticism about the relationship between the two.\textsuperscript{210} The Council Secretariat is headed by the High Representative, Javier Solana, and has responsibility for implementing parts of the Strategy relating to the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). As a result, peace and security is largely overseen by the Member States. But it is not clear where responsibility lies for some other parts of the Strategy, such as governance, as both the Commission and the Council have competence and will be able to act under the Strategy.

The Joint Implementation Matrix could be a useful forum for clarifying the division of responsibilities for implementing the Strategy. It could specify in relation to each commitment who exactly within the EU is responsible for its implementation, and where there is joint responsibility between the Commission and the Council, it could elaborate details as to what action each institution will take.\textsuperscript{211}

\textit{Coordination with and between Member States}


There is potential for significant division between the Commission and the Member States. Many of the Strategy's headings incorporate considerable scope for contradictory actions to be taken by the EU institutions and the Member States. For example, peacekeeping missions fall under the ESDP, but they could continue to be organised unilaterally by countries such as France and the UK.

Member States have individual policies on development and foreign affairs. Some Member States have special relationships with specific African countries, which can lead to preferential policies with examples of poor governance, and even human rights abuses, being overlooked. Agreeing the Strategy implied a political ‘buy-in’ to it by the Member States. But some states have a much greater involvement in Africa than others. The UK and France, in particular, are seen as being "key Member States" in playing an active role in Africa.\textsuperscript{212}

\textit{Regulatory and Financial Divisions}

Although setting a common vision for the whole of Africa, the Strategy does not directly address the institutional and financial mechanisms which remain in their existing form. Will these mechanisms prevent the pan-African dimension of the Strategy being realised?

\textsuperscript{212} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 85, 2 February.
The Different Cooperation Agreements

Relations between the EU and African countries are regulated by either the Cotonou Agreement (sub-Saharan Africa), the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA – South Africa) or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and European Neighbourhood Policy (North African countries). The existence of these different agreements poses a number of challenges. First, they all have different sources of funding, which makes it hard to determine where funding will come from for the Strategy as a whole. Second, the agreements establish different dialogue partners. This reduces the probability of achieving a coherent view from African states on the continent's needs. Third, the agreements are aimed at regions with differing levels of economic development and with different priorities. This is not necessarily a significant problem in itself, as it would be important to tailor policy towards different countries and regions within Africa whether these agreements existed or not. And the policy areas of the different cooperation agreements are similar. Sustainable economic growth, human rights and democracy are prioritised in all three agreements, and these same themes are found within the Strategy for Africa.

But perhaps the biggest challenge posed by the Cotonou Agreement and Euro-Med Partnership/ENP is that they include non-African states. Middle East states within Euro-Med have security concerns which focus on that particular region. And states within the ACP group are unified by their desire to promote
policy coherence for development; it has a combined negotiating power which would be reduced were Brussels to begin to treat the six regions within it as separate elements. Given the Strategy's emphasis on listening to African partners, observers have suggested that African members of the Euro-Med and ACP Partnerships should decide whether those agreements need to be revised in order to promote an effective EU-Africa partnership.²¹³

The Financing Structure

Since both the Strategy for Africa and the EU’s Future Financial Perspectives were both agreed at the December 2005 European Council, it is not surprising that the Strategy contains little in the way of specific financial commitments, since it was not when it was being drafted where the necessary funds would be found.

As is discussed in more detail below, the Africa-EU strategic Partnership, agreed at the second EU-Africa Summit in 2007, attempted to be more specific, listing a number of sources of funding under various priority areas for action. For instance, Peace and Security Priority 1, to “Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security”, promises to source funding from the following:

- AU Peace Fund;

• Appropriate financing sources in accordance with their respective scope and their relevance to objectives and activities concerned, their specificity and eligibility criteria, such as 10th EDF, Africa Peace Facility (APF), the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), Instrument for Stability (IfS), CFSP-Budget;
• Bilateral contributions from EU Member States and African states.

This is a potentially useful development. However, there is no mention of how much each source is expected to contribute, nor which funding body will finance each particular activity under the relevant heading, such as “[raising] awareness through campaigning involving African and European NGOs on mainstreaming human rights, gender issues, and children affected by armed conflict”\textsuperscript{214}. This lack of clarity still demonstrates uncertainty about the extent to which the EU is really prepared to deliver on the commitments made in the Strategy.

The EU has made significant commitments of aid to Africa, and there should be sufficient funding available for implementation of the Strategy. Yet it would appear that even the Joint Implementation Matrix agreed at the 5 May 2006 ministerial Troika meeting did not allocate these funds. This section examines where the money to implement the Strategy will come from.

The European Development Fund (EDF) is seen by many as the main source of funding for the Strategy for Africa.\textsuperscript{215} The European Development Fund (EDF) is the primary financing instrument of the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement. It exists outside the main EU budget.\textsuperscript{216} Member States fund it through direct contributions, and they make all substantive decisions as to the overall amount of the EDFs, timeframes etc. The EDF is managed by the European Commission on behalf of the Member States, subject to provisions of the Cotonou Agreement which sets out the roles, responsibilities and implementation procedures which the EU and ACP must adhere to. The 10th EDF was agreed for 2008-2013 with an allocation of €22.682 billion. Germany, France and the UK are the largest shareholders, providing 20.5%, 19.5% and 14.82% of the total, respectively. The Africa Peace facility is financed through the EDF.

Financing the Strategy from the EDF risks undermining the Strategy’s pan-African approach. In particular, it is questionable why dialogue initiatives and capacity-building for the African Union should come exclusively from the EDF, when additional instruments are available to the EU for financing of external relations.\textsuperscript{217}


\textsuperscript{216} The Commission has proposed for some time that the EDF should be budgetised. The UK Government, along with some other Member States, is firmly against this proposal. The 10th EDF was once again outside the main EC budget, but contains a provision allowing for budgetisation during the period of the 10th EDF (2008-2013) should the Member States agree. \textit{Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be adopted by the Community within the ACP-EC Council of Ministers.}

The MEDA programme is the principal source of funding for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Between 1995 to 2003, MEDA committed €5,458 million in cooperation programmes, projects and other supporting activities, with the regional activities making up approximately 15% of this budget.218

The other significant financial instrument is the European Investment Bank, which has lent €14 billion for developing activities in the Euro-Mediterranean Partners since 1974. Apart from these specific funds, several other financial instruments exist which the Commission can use in relation to Africa. Some of these, such as MEDA, are geographical, while others are thematic, including spending on humanitarian relief, crisis management and development.219

As part of the new Financial Perspectives, the Commission suggested a series of six new financial instruments to simplify the budget funding structure.220 These were designed in part to establish a clearer distinction between the political and security policies included within the ENPI and the stability instrument, and development policy located within the Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument. But there is still a clear developmental component to the neighbourhood policy which will be financed

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220 The new simplified structure would entail having just six different instruments, each related to broad geographical or policy areas, as follows: Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA); European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI); Development Co-operation and Economic Co-operation Instrument (DCECI); Stability Instrument (SI); Humanitarian Aid Instrument (HAI); Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA). There are also proposals to have a separate instrument for Human Rights and Democracy and to split the DCECI into two separate instruments in order to ensure greater focus on the development needs of poorer countries.
through the ENPI and which will apply to a number of African countries. The Commission’s new simplified structure would not, therefore, allow for oversight of development funding within the EC budget through one single instrument. Commentators suggest that this places a considerable emphasis on the need for transparency.\textsuperscript{221}

In addition to the budget for external relations, funding is also allocated to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to which Member States contribute according to a specific formula. CFSP funding is used especially for civilian and military missions under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). These are becoming increasingly significant in Africa. According to the Athena funding mechanism, Member States pay their own costs for any personnel whom they contribute.\textsuperscript{222} The Athena mechanism was set up in 2004 to administer the common costs for military operations.

The CFSP budget is comparatively small. There is considerable demand for it to be spent on strategically significant regions such as the Western Balkans, limiting the extent to which it can be spent on African programmes. Furthermore, CFSP decisions are taken by the Council individually, and so there is limited scope for their inclusion within the Joint Implementation


\textsuperscript{222} Council of the European Union (2004), \textit{Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications}. Under this mechanism the Member States and, where appropriate, third countries contribute to a centrally administered budget.
Matrix, which requires those consulting with African partners to decide upon future commitments.

The last, but perhaps most significant, source of funding for the Strategy will be through bilateral development assistance provided by the Member States. It is beyond the competence of the Commission to commit Member States’ funds, and Member State funding does not have to cohere with EC funding. It is also not clear how individual Member State funding could be used for pan-African initiatives such as building the capacity of the African Standby Force (APF).²²³

**Conclusion**

The EU’s relationship with Africa and the AU is longstanding and comprehensive. Today, both Brussels and Addis Ababa largely understand the partnership as being mutually beneficial, are broadly keen to extend and deepen it, through such mechanisms as the EU Strategy for Africa and its more recent evolution, the Africa-EU Partnership. The Strategy provides a useful political commitment by the EU to consolidate its relationship with Africa.

There are some existing structural issues that undermine smooth relations. Poor internal European coordination remains a serious stumbling block across

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a range of areas, which has not been addressed effectively to date. The fact that Brussels sees Africa as administratively separate north and south of the Sahara continues to be problematic, especially when the Strategy is a plan “for the whole of the EU for the whole of Africa”.\textsuperscript{224} Moreover, internal EU relationships – between the Commission, the Council and the Member States, and within all three of these bodies – often overlap and compete.

\textsuperscript{224} Council of the European Union (2005), \textit{The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership}, Brussels 19 December, 15961/05, para 1.
Chapter 5 looks at EU support for African peace and security capability, in particular peacekeeping and civilian protection. The first section looks at EU support for the promotion of good governance and human rights, including through Cotonou, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU Governance Initiative, and EU monitoring missions. Section two reviews EU operational involvement in Africa. It examines various mechanisms that the EU uses to promote peace and security on the continent, including within the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. This section then explores the potential role of EU Battlegroups as the EU’s primary operational arm for supporting peacekeeping in Africa, as well as EU coordination with other organisations. Finally, this section examines EU actions in practice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in order to contextualise EU operational activity within an applied analytical framework.

The third section of this chapter then examines the African Peace Facility, the primary EU tool for supporting African peace and security and peacekeeping. It explores EU perspectives on capacity-building for the African Standby Force (ASF), as well as EU conflict prevention activities, post-conflict activities, and EU efforts to support the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Lastly, this section
outlines EU perspectives on potential tensions between direct operational support and capacity-building.

The fourth and final section of this chapter assesses the effectiveness of efforts to realise the EU-Africa Partnership in practice. This evaluation includes: initiatives to create a broad-based dialogue; the role of African governments and institutions, and African Civil society; the AU’s capacity to deliver; the EU’s capacity to engage in dialogue with Africa; the significance of the second EU-Africa Summit; and the development of a joint EU-Africa strategy.

Human rights and governance

The EU Strategy for Africa commits the EU to: "Work with the African Union (AU), sub-regional organisations and African countries to predict, prevent and mediate conflict, including by addressing its root causes, and to keep the peace in their own continent."\textsuperscript{225}

More specifically, the Strategy commits the EU to:

- promote and protect human rights, to help to end impunity, including through the International Criminal Court, and to promote fundamental
freedoms and respect for the rule of law, including through capacity-building for judicial systems, national Human Rights Commissions and civil society organisations;

• support good governance programmes at country level and to help build the capacity of the AU and RECs in this regard;
• enhance African efforts to monitor and improve governance, including through support for NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); and
• support the fight against corruption, human trafficking, illegal drugs and organised crime and promote transparency.226

The promotion of good governance is primarily the responsibility of African states. However, African institutions such as the AU, NEPAD and the RECs have an important role in assisting and overseeing this process, and the EU is well placed to provide support at national, sub-regional and continental levels.

The promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance has been one of the eight priority themes of the EU-Africa dialogue, which has supported relevant African institutions, such as the emerging African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. Much of the EU's assistance for enhancing African governance capacity has taken place within the context of

the APRM, while European initiatives in this area have been supported by the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDH).227

**Human rights**

Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union states that the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. The EU Strategy for Africa pledges: to promote and protect human rights, including the rights of women, children and other vulnerable groups; to help end impunity, including through the International Criminal Court; and to promote fundamental freedoms and respect for the rule of law in Africa, including through capacity-building for judicial systems, national Human Rights Commissions and civil society organisations.228

A number of African institutions directly related to the promotion of human rights are in various stages of formation, such as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the AU Court of Justice. In July 2004, the AU Assembly decided that these two institutions should be integrated into one Court.229

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227 European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights Website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/eidhr/index_en.htm
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has been operational since the 1980s and has recently shown some encouraging developments. The Commission is mandated to ensure the promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights throughout the African continent. It comprises eleven members elected by the AU Assembly for six-year renewable terms. It is headquartered in Banjul, the Gambia.

On 5 December 2005, at its 38th session, the Commission adopted resolution condemning the human rights situation in and calling on the government of Zimbabwe to act urgently to improve the situation. At its Khartoum Summit in January 2006, the AU failed to endorse the resolution, but gave Zimbabwe three months to respond.

The issue of human rights is highly sensitive in Africa, and African responses to gross abuses of human rights still tend to be more ‘behind the scenes’ than overt. The African preference not to make public denunciations in relation to gross human rights abuses has had decidedly mixed results. The failure to reach consensus within the AU over the situation in Zimbabwe is very challenging for the continent, as reflected and in the fact that the AU’s weak response lay at the heart of complications to agree a second EU-Africa Summit.

On the other hand, the Commission’s response to the situation in Zimbabwe is more hopeful because – despite the initially half-hearted reaction from Addis
Ababa – the Commission does have buy-in from the AU and has demonstrated the robustness to issue a harsh declaration against Harare that more central mechanisms of the AU have so far not been able to do.\textsuperscript{230}

\textit{Governance}

The EU Strategy for Africa pledges to support good governance programmes in Africa at state level and to help build the capacity of the AU, sub-regional and national institutions.\textsuperscript{231}

The promotion of good governance is seen as a key factor in achieving progress in development in Africa, and many AU Member States face severe governance challenges. Alex Vines, Head of the Africa Programme for Chatham House, asserted that governance remains at the heart of many problems in Africa, and he described the ‘governance deficit’ as a challenge that remains a consistent theme on the continent. Alex Vines stated that the establishment of accountable, better managed government structures would have a significant impact on poverty alleviation, and he stressed that the EU can make a significant difference in this area.\textsuperscript{232}

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\textsuperscript{230} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 129, 9 February.
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\textsuperscript{232} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 144, 9 February.
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At the same time, Africa has taken significant strides to improve governance, as a number of powerful African leaders have championed good governance as a key continental policy objective. The European Commission’s October 2003 Communication on governance and development further acknowledged the significance of the contribution of new African institutions, in particular the AU and NEPAD.233

Defining good governance

There are a number of fundamental conceptual and practical problems hampering efforts to improve governance in Africa. In the first instance, there is a lack of consensus over a definition of what it specifically involves. For instance, major differences exist in approaches to governance between Africa and Europe. Jakkie Cilliers, Director of the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, stated that Africans tend to focus on the need to build capacity to be able to take the governance and human rights agenda forward, whereas Europeans see progress on good governance, human rights and democracy as prerequisites for development.234

Alex Vines considered that ‘[t]here is no African view on good governance’, stating that some African countries have a similar understanding to the UK’s view of what might constitute good governance, whereas for others, support

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234 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 106, 9 February.
for good governance is largely symbolic, used primarily for the benefit of donors.235

The lack of a clear, internationally agreed, definition of good governance complicates how the EU could, in practice, determine criteria for conditionality based on governance that would be broadly recognised and accepted. Cotonou provides clarification of the essence of good governance, describing it as

“the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development. It entails clear decision-making procedures at the level of public authorities, transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the management and distribution of resources and capacity building for elaborating and implementing measures aiming in particular at preventing and combating corruption”.236

Nick Grono, Vice-President for Advocacy and Operations, International Crisis Group, pointed out that many African states such as South Africa already have excellent records on governance, while NEPAD outlines a clear understanding of governance standards that African countries should be

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235 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 140, 9 February.
236 Partnership agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, Article 9.3, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/pdf/agr01_en.pdf#zoom=100
aiming for. They also emphasised practical problems in implementing governance reforms in Africa as the fundamental challenge.237

African and European consensus on what constitutes good governance, within the context of a broader international understanding, would facilitate initiatives to enhance governance in Africa.

_African Peer Review Mechanism_

International efforts to support the promotion of good governance in Africa have, in recent years, focused on supporting the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The EU Strategy for Africa, for instance, commits EU Member States to enhance “African efforts to monitor and improve governance, including through supporting the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)”.238

The APRM provides a mechanism through which the AU can take responsibility for coordinating support for good governance and, as such, provides a key institutional mechanism to promote African-owned dialogue on issues of governance and human rights at the pan-African level.

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The APRM was agreed at the 8 July 2002 OAU Summit in Durban, South Africa\textsuperscript{239} and is open to all AU Member States. Membership is voluntary and is contingent upon signing up to the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance,\textsuperscript{240} as well as on agreement to participate in periodic peer reviews. Members of the APRM further concede to follow agreed parameters for good governance.

Both NEPAD and the APRM set high standards for African states to aspire to, and peer example by influential African reformist leaders is an important African-led model for progress in governance in Africa.

The significance of the APRM was highlighted by Myles Wickstead, Former Head of the Secretariat for the Commission for Africa, who anticipated that the international community would increasingly support those countries participating in the APRM that either receive a clean bill of health or are determined to take action to remedy identified challenges.\textsuperscript{241}

A key challenge as the APRM process develops relates to the practical implementation of its ideals. Implementation of reforms recommended by the APRM serve as an important indicator of African states’ commitment to good governance.


\textsuperscript{241} House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 83, 2 February.
governance. This is particularly relevant to EU support for the APRM, as European development assistance for Africa is based on principles of partnership and trust.  

Representatives of the Belgian government supported this view, urging that the EU encourage the APRM process through the provision of programmes and support for countries participating in the APRM process, both as part of the reporting process and in terms of support for the implementation of recommendations made.

Referring to implementation challenges, however, Jakkie Cillers conceded the difficulties for the APRM in delivering tangible results, but downplayed the significance of implementation, highlighting rather the ‘subtext’ of the APRM as symbolic of a genuine African commitment to promoting good governance on the continent.

A positive indication of the practicability of the APRM as a mechanism to promote good governance in Africa has been the release of its first two peer review reports, relating to Ghana and Rwanda. Also, twenty-six countries had signed up to the APRM as at May 2007. The fact that the APRM is supported

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242 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 366, 30 March.
243 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 227, 21 March.
244 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 121, 8 February.
by powerful African leaders is also a significant indication of its potential to play a positive governance role.

However, obstacles to the successful establishment of the APRM should not be underestimated. Many African countries face very severe governance problems, in a number of cases exacerbated by instability, which presents a very heavy workload for the APRM. At the same time, the APRM is a new institution which is still finding its way, and also is severely lacking in resources.

Another major challenge for the APRM is the fact that the governance issues that it seeks to address remain highly politically sensitive in Africa, and, despite the support that it enjoys from influential African leaders, a significant number of African countries remain extremely wary of allowing the APRM to become too powerful. Garnering support from AU Member States for the promotion of good governance as part of the AU’s mandate, where the AU can hold Member States to account for their actions within the APRM framework, remains a serious challenge and requires considerable support from Europe.

Participation in the APRM is voluntary, which developed at least in part from a need to balance the political sensitivity of peer review with Africans’ genuine desire to improve governance. Questions emerging from the voluntary basis
of the APRM illustrate tensions between its potential effectiveness and the challenges that confront it.

The voluntary basis of participation in the APRM is key to its effectiveness. In practical terms, many observers have stressed that the fact that African governments are free to decide whether or not to join the APRM was the first guarantee of their willingness to cooperate with the review process.245

A particular challenge relates to EU support for the APRM. On the one hand, tying European aid too directly to African participation in the APRM risks undermining African ownership of an indigenous African process. This would weaken its credibility and encourage dissension from those African countries that are opposed to the APRM process as being too intrusive. It would also help to persuade African states to join the APRM primarily as a means to receive aid, with little or no genuine commitment to the review process.

At the same time, European states have a responsibility to ensure that their taxpayers’ money is used to promote good governance in African countries and is not abused. Therefore, EU seeks to establish its engagement with the APRM on the basis of partnership and mutual accountability, where EU assistance is made available to support African states’ own programmes to promote good governance through the APRM within EU principles, or is held back for states that are not fulfilling their obligations.

245 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Questions 121, 121, 130, 199, 226, 353, 8 February, 9 February, 20 March, 21 March, 30 March.
Cotonou and the European Neighbourhood Policy

Existing European processes for engagement in Africa provide useful frameworks for European support for the promotion of good governance, primarily the Cotonou Agreement the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

The Cotonou Agreement commits states parties to engage in political dialogue, including regular assessments, in particular through the framework of the ‘essential elements’ and ‘fundamental elements’ of the Agreement. Essential elements relate to issues of human rights and the rule of law. In a concession to ACP countries' opposition to the incorporation of good governance as an essential element, it was deemed a ‘fundamental’ element. The distinction between fundamental and essential is significant in that the latter's violation could lead to the suspension of cooperation, whilst the former cannot. However, the real value of the essential and fundamental elements is in providing a framework for dialogue and cooperation on these issues.

The vague position of governance within Cotonou provides a potential source of confusion. Although dialogue is important, corrective measures (including sanctions as a last resort) can more effectively be applied under the terms of the essential elements. Furthermore, the EU’s record in promoting governance is not yet established, and EU Member States have not always found it easy
to reach agreement on specific cases, given differences of practice, of principles and of geo-strategic interest.

The ENP builds on the Barcelona Process. It was developed in the context of the enlargement of the EU in 2004, within the policy framework of a privileged relationship between the EU and its neighbours, and the development of a mutual commitment to common values of democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development.

The ENP seeks to strengthen political dialogue between partners to make the relationship more effective. Issues for enhanced dialogue will be identified in bilateral Action Plans agreed between the EU and partner countries which set out an agenda for political and economic reforms. A 24 November 2005 progress report on the ENP further suggested the establishment for the first time of sub-committees to launch regular discussions on democracy, human rights and governance.\(^{246}\) The EC has also established a Governance Facility as an instrument within the ENP framework specifically to encourage progress on governance reform.

Major differences between African states’ governance records and approaches represent a serious challenge for efforts to support good governance in Africa.

and require a case-by-case approach. Alex Vines cited the scale of variability of conception and capacity of governance across north African countries as a major weakness undermining the effectiveness of the ENP, which has tended to assume a commonality which does not, in fact, exist.\textsuperscript{247}

\textit{EU Governance Initiative}

Ministers attending the EU-Africa Ministerial meeting in Bamako, Mali on 2 December 2005 endorsed the proposal for an EU Governance Initiative aimed at supporting the reforms triggered by the APRM process. The EU Strategy for Africa committed Member States to support the Governance Initiative.

\textit{EU Monitoring Missions in Africa}

Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union clearly states that the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law are fundamental European values.

Support for election processes has become a key component of the EU’s external relations policy. The EU is in a strong position to contribute to election monitoring through its global outreach.

\textsuperscript{247} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 140, 9 February.
In 2005, the EU Election Monitoring Missions (EOMs) were deployed to a number of African countries, including Guinea Bissau, Burundi, Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**The role of the AU in promoting governance**

The AU is an essential enabling mechanism for revitalising governance in Africa, and it has made a number of constitutional commitments to promote good governance on the continent. Implementation instruments in this regard include: the Durban Declaration on Elections, Democracy and Governance; the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance; the Protocol on the Rights of Women; the Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of government; and the African Common Position on the review of the MDGs.

As well as NEPAD and the APRM, AU resources that can support its governance function include: a clear political mandate within the AU Constitutive Act; the RECs and specific organs that can facilitate the engagement of African citizens, such as ECOSOCC and the Pan African Parliament.

Togo provides a specific example of the AU's progress in promoting governance. In response to the unconstitutional changeover of power in Togo

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following the death of President Étienne Eyadéma in February 2005, AU pressure proved highly influential in persuading the Togolese authorities to hold presidential elections – although the results of these elections themselves proved controversial.

The AU has, however, had a mixed record in responding to those challenges. The then UK Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn, asserted that the AU’s response to developments in Togo has been encouraging, while its responses to the situations in Ethiopia, Uganda and Zimbabwe have been less so.\textsuperscript{249}

Weak institutional and financial capabilities remain major impediments to the AU’s capacity to implement, monitor and evaluate its governance function in practice. The failure of the AU to demonstrate a consistent approach to governance issues is also a major challenge.

The issue of the AU Presidency for 2006 illustrates both the AU’s weaknesses and its potential strengths regarding governance. The Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU took place in Khartoum from 23-24 January 2006 and it is customary for the hosts of the AU Summit to assume the Chairship. The AU was able to demonstrate the political strength to suspend Khartoum from assuming the Chairship of the AU, in view of concerns over the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. However, Sudan’s presidency was only

\textsuperscript{249} House of Lords (2005), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Questions 64, 29 November.
suspended for a year, while the interim Chairship was assumed by the Republic of Congo, the human rights record of which is not exemplary. In 2007, Khartoum was again denied the presidency.

Alex Vines saw the Congolese solution as a reasonable compromise under the circumstances.\footnote{House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 143, 9 February.} Jakkie Cillers stressed that, although an imperfect solution, the fact that African heads of state had been able to engineer Sudan’s Presidency represented a major step forward and a remarkable shift from what would have been possible five or six years previously.\footnote{House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 109, 8 February.}

It is important that Africa-wide governance standards are developed which are compatible with international standards. However, the impetus has to come from Africa. The Secretary of State stressed the notion of partnership in supporting good governance in Africa, asserting that “we are serious about our commitment to help finance development being matched by commitment on the part of our partners to good governance, to peace and security, to uphold human rights”.\footnote{House of Lords (2005), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 60, 29 November.}

African ownership of capacity-building for governance is essential, as attempts to export European governance standards risk undermining the value of the exercise. In order to promote sustainable programmes for good governance, a framework of partnership should be developed which provides for sustainable support to Africa's development initiatives.

\textsuperscript{250} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 143, 9 February.
\textsuperscript{251} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 109, 8 February.
\textsuperscript{252} House of Lords (2005), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 60, 29 November.
governance in Africa, therefore, it is vital that external assistance focuses on support for the development of African national, sub-regional and continental mechanisms and structures.

The role of national governments

A number of powerful and influential reformist African leaders have shown strong leadership in supporting the development of the AU's governance role. South Africa is the foremost example of such leadership, but other countries, such as Rwanda and Nigeria, have also demonstrated a commitment to democracy, the rule of law and accountability.

National governments do not only have a role within their own countries, however. It is possible for good practices to be shared, especially amongst neighbours. This process could be expanded through APRM or REC mechanisms which would enable closer cooperation between state governments without undue interference of one state directly in the affairs of another.

The role of parliamentarians

The role of national parliamentarians in the promotion of good governance must not be underestimated since it is in their interests to ensure accountability and transparency within their own state governments.
However, in young democracies there can be a lot of suspicion amongst different political parties, so it is often difficult to get cross-party consensus on holding government to account. EU and Member State parliamentarians can assist by speaking directly to African parliamentarians about their role and experiences.

A strong oversight role also depends on adequate access to information. There is a need to develop an information and communication strategy, possibly through NEPAD, to address the problem of how African parliamentarians can make informed decisions.

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) also has an important part to play in this process. It opened in 2004, under the auspices of the AU and through the particular encouragement of Thabo Mbeki, to promote democracy throughout Africa. It has 256 members – five from each member state – and an annual budget of £12.5 million.

However, the Pan-African Parliament has faced possible potential bankruptcy due to lack of funds.\textsuperscript{253} Many Member States fail to pay their dues at all, or on time, including some of Africa’s wealthiest states such as Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and South Africa. Further problems include the fact that its representatives are unelected and that there appears to be a notable lack of political will in following through on commitments made.

Though the EU cannot address these problems directly, it should be willing to support the Pan-African Parliament as part of its encouragement of democracy within Africa.

The role of civil society

The EU Strategy for Africa stresses the involvement of civil society organisations in promoting human rights and good governance in Africa.254

James Mackie, Director of The European Centre for Development Policy Management, noted that civil society has been involved in discussions on the EU Strategy for Africa, and that the EU has been supporting programmes to build capacity for this. They described how civil society groups are increasingly being involved in mainstream discussions on development and cooperation with Europe. In this context, Europe refers to ‘non-state actors’, encompassing the private sector in this definition. However, civil society groups have been disparate in terms of focusing on the Strategy and the most dialogue has been between the AU and European Commissions.255 Myles Wickstead believed that African civil society was likely to feel largely excluded from consultations on the Strategy. (Q?)256

255 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 177, 20 March.
256 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 78, 2 February.
Interviewees stressed the importance of engaging with African civil society. BOND and Saferworld were sceptical of the prospects for dialogue with African civil society, considering that it was unlikely that such dialogue would be influential in the implementation of the Strategy.\(^{257}\) Myles Wickstead agreed that it was important to explore ways to deepen the dialogue with African civil society.\(^{258}\)

**Peace and security**

EU involvement in peace and security in Africa predates the EU Strategy for Africa. EU involvement in African peace and security is partly a response to the desire of certain EU Member States to avoid charges of colonial interference. It is partly a response to the lack of capacity of most EU Member States individually to deal with Africa’s internal conflicts.

France in particular has, over the past decade, been reducing its direct presence in Africa. Though it has more troops in Africa than any other outside nation (14,700 at the end of 2005),\(^{259}\) the country is hesitant to act unilaterally, as demonstrated recently by its involvement in the DCR only through the EU, and its presence in Ivory Coast alongside UN forces and under UN mandate. In October 2005 newspaper reports cited the French


Minister of Defence talking of a Paris-Brussels-London axis,\textsuperscript{260} whilst the French Foreign Minister has been quoted as saying that France would no longer be "the gendarme of Africa".\textsuperscript{261} Given the unwillingness of Member States to act unilaterally, it is particularly important to implementation of the EU Strategy that the EU fulfils its commitments under the peacekeeping and security chapter.

The European Development Fund (EDF) and the EU’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) come within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement and have been supporting a broad range of peacebuilding activities in Africa, including mediation, negotiation and reconciliation efforts, and initiatives for demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants and child soldiers. The EU Council Secretariat provides support for building African peace and security capacity, operating within and on the basis of its coordinating mandate for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

On 3 March 2005, the Council of the European Union agreed the Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa.\textsuperscript{262} The Common Position supports the notion of 'African solutions to

\textsuperscript{260} www.financialexpress-bd.com/print.asp?newsid+9479
African problems’ that has been promoted by NEPAD and the AU, noting that Africans maintain primary responsibility for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. It acknowledges that the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa have been the subject of dialogue with the OAU and, subsequently, the AU, and that the AU and African sub-regional organisations constitute the central actors in the achieving these aims.

_Battlegroups_

In 2004, the EU decided to enhance its rapid reaction capabilities by agreeing to establish 13 Battlegroups. A Battlegroup is based on a battalion-sized force of 1,500 troops, formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of EU Member States. Each Battlegroup is to be associated with a Force Headquarters and pre-identified transport and logistics elements. It is intended that decisions to launch an operation are to be taken within five days of the approval by the Council. In response to a crisis or to an urgent request by the UN, the EU envisages developing the capacity to undertake simultaneously two Battlegroup-size operations sustainable for a maximal period of 120 days, with forces on the ground no later than ten days after the EU decision to launch the operation. Full operational capability was initially scheduled to be reached in 2007.

The ‘Battlegroups’ concept is, at present, the primary operational tool for EU military interventions. They are designed to be compatible with UN Chapter VII mandates, and will, in most instances, be deployed in response to a request from the UN. They are intended to be capable of robust peace enforcement on a limited scale, such as local suppression of hostilities, separation of parties and prevention of atrocities. The EU plans to be able to undertake two concurrent single Battlegroup-size rapid response operations simultaneously.263

On paper, Battlegroups appear to be highly relevant to rapid military interventions for humanitarian protection purposes in Africa. The Strategy pledges to deploy operations ‘involving EU Battlegroups’ to promote African peace and security.264 However, Battlegroups have not been configured for the specific tasks of civilian protection, and no framework nations or multinational coalition members have made clear commitments to deploy them to crises in Africa.

Discussions between the EU and NATO have reached broad agreement that Battlegroups will be mutually reinforcing with the larger NATO Response Force (NRF). Standards, practical methods and procedures for Battlegroups are designed to be compatible with those defined within the NRF, so that

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263 Hoon G (2005), Letter to the Chair of the Lords EU Committee, 19 February, available at: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/16/16100.htm
264 Council of the European Union (2005), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, Brussels 19 December, 15961/05.
there should be considerable potential for synergy between the two initiatives.\textsuperscript{265}

\textit{EU coordination with other organisations}

The EU Strategy for Africa notes “the importance of working more closely with Africans in multilateral fora, and in co-ordination with multilateral partners”.\textsuperscript{266} The EU has for some time been developing its relationship with the UN, and with NATO, both of which have been active operationally in Africa—although UN engagement has been on a much greater scale and over a much longer period of time than either the EU or NATO. The EU also has relationships with a number of bilateral partners.

In September 2003, the EU and the UN agreed a Joint Declaration on EU-UN co-operation in Crisis Management, which identified tracks to implement EU commitment to support the UN. A joint consultative mechanism (the Steering Committee) was subsequently established at working level and regular meetings have been held between staffs from both organisations. Two main practical mechanisms for cooperation have been identified: the provision of national military capabilities in the framework of a UN operation; or an EU operation in answer to a request from the UN.

\textsuperscript{265} Hoon G (2005), \textit{Letter to the Chair of the Lords EU Committee}, 19 February, available at: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/16/16100.htm

\textsuperscript{266} Council of the European Union (2005), \textit{The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership}, Brussels, 19 December, 15961/05, paragraph 9(b).
On 16 December 2002, the EU and NATO agreed a joint declaration for closer cooperation in the areas of crisis management and conflict prevention, outlining political principles for EU-NATO cooperation and giving the EU assured access to NATO’s planning and logistics capabilities. The Berlin plus agreement of March 2003 strengthened the institutional dimension of the relationship, allowing the EU to use NATO structures, mechanisms and assets to carry out military operations. The EU has liaison cells in place at NATO’s Supreme Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) headquarters in Brussels. Attempts at EU-NATO cooperation in Darfur have revealed difficulties in managing the relationship in practice, however as disagreement between the institutions over who should lead airlift assistance to AMIS led to delays.

EU actions in the DRC

The EU has also increasingly been developing an operational capacity to support African peace and security on the ground. The first autonomous EU-led military operation outside Europe was deployed within the framework of the ESDP to the Ituri region in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in summer 2003 to support the UN peacekeeping mission in the country (MONUC).

The EU’s Operation Artemis was discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis, specifically in relation to its support for MONUC. But it is helpful very briefly to revisit some key points of the Artemis mission here. A key function of Artemis
was to provide civilian protection in Bunia during its deployment between July and September 2003. Artemis was able to help establish humanitarian space within Bunia, and it facilitated the reinforcement of MONUC in the region, so that MONUC was better equipped to safeguard vulnerable civilians. But it is unclear the extent to which Artemis serving local needs and interests, and Artemis troops were accused of prioritising the security of international peacekeepers and Congolese politicians above that of local civilians. Nevertheless, a public opinion survey in DRC suggested that vulnerable local populations felt safer in areas were there was a strong international peacekeeping presence.

In late 2004, the EU agreed to launch a 30-strong Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL KINSHASA) to assist the DRC’s establishment of an Integrated Police Unit (IPU). Following an official request by the DRC government, the EU decided to establish an EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the DRC (EUSEC - R.D. CONGO). The mission was launched on 8 June 2005 to cover a period of 12 months. The mission provides advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law.
In April 2006, the EU agreed to deploy a small military operation to DRC to support the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC). The proposal had been delayed due to Member States not being willing to provide sufficient troops for the mission: Germany had agreed to lead the operation but had spent a number of weeks in negotiations to ensure the provision of additional troops. Delays also occurred in waiting for UN Security Council authorization for the deployment. The UK will provide a minimal contribution of personnel to the mission, but will provide an estimated €2.9 million financial support.

The EU operation involved the deployment of an advanced element to Kinshasa of 400-450 military personnel and the availability of a battalion-sized ‘on-call’ force ‘over the horizon’ outside the country, but quickly deployable.

It provided support to MONUC during elections in the DRC, although it was not deployed to act as a substitute for MONUC, nor to operate in areas where MONUC already had sufficient resources. The mission was withdrawn four months after the date of the first round of elections in the DRC.

The African Peace Facility

The primary European institutional mechanism for supporting African peace and security is the African Peace Facility (APF). The Strategy for Africa
pledges to "strengthen the Africa Peace Facility with substantial, long-term, flexible, sustainable funding".268

The APF evolved from a request made at the AU Heads of State Summit in Maputo, Mozambique, in July 2003,269 asking that the EU explore modalities for setting up a Peace Support Operation Facility (PSOF) to fund peace support and peacekeeping operations conducted under the authority of the AU, thereby enhancing the AU’s capacity to carry out its role in promoting continental peace, security and stability.

The APF was established in 2004, representing a €250 million commitment from the European Development Fund (EDF) to support African-led peace operations and to enhance the institutional peace and security capacity at the AU and in sub-regional organisations. The APF has been built around three core principles of African ownership, solidarity and partnership between Africa and Europe and is one of the most concrete aspects of EU AU cooperation.

The Strategy for Africa pledges to 'strengthen the Africa Peace Facility with substantial, long-term, flexible, sustainable funding.'270

268 Council of the European Union (2005), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, Brussels, 19 December 15961/05, paragraph 4(a).
The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), at its meeting of 10 April 2006, agreed that the APF would continue to be funded from the 10th EDF for three years from 2008, amounting to €300 million for the three year period of the EDF. In addition, it was agreed that the Commission should propose a short-term replenishment for 2006-2007 of up to €50 million to pay for the extension of EU support for AMIS. The GAERC agreed to review the APF in 2010 in relation to sources of funding and modalities for the facility.

The APF is financed from resources allocated to African ACP countries under existing cooperation agreements with the EU, initially supplemented by an equivalent amount of unallocated EDF resources. Funding the APF through the EDF allows the AU greater control over spending than if funds came from the CFSP/ESDP, or the EU budget instruments. This arrangement supports the AU principle of ownership.

The APF strategy is based around dual objectives of supporting African peacekeeping operations, and building African institutional capacity to run efficient operations itself. Of the €250 million APF budget, €35 million is ring-fenced for long-term capacity-building, as distinct from €215 million for operational support. The funds can be accessed by the AU after a request has been endorsed by the EU Council at the working group level. RECs can also access APF funding, with the condition in principle that the AU approves the REC’s request.
A significant amount of APF funds have gone to support AMIS. As at May 2006, €162 million had been spent on the mission. The 10 April 2006 GAERC further agreed that the Commission should propose a short-term replenishment for 2006-2007 of up to €50 million to pay for the extension of EU support for AMIS.

The terms and conditions of the APF state that peace operations supported by it must be consistent with UN principles and objectives, and that endorsement in the broadest sense should be sought from UN institutions in accordance with the UN Charter; in this context peace enforcement operations require a UN mandate. The legal basis for the APF derives from Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement. The fact that the APF is drawn from European development funding places restrictions on what type of support it can provide. Notably, the APF cannot fund direct military assistance, but rather has to concentrate on personnel and logistical needs. Analysts have suggested that this complicates the AU’s capacity to use the APF effectively to support peacekeeping operations.²⁷¹

Javier Solana saw the APF as creative because its financial design meant that it used money that already belonged to the countries of the region, representing a deal between donors and recipients. He stressed the significance of the flexibility of the fund, stating that that it was important

that the money was available quickly in response to demand, since the value of late money is greatly reduced.\textsuperscript{272}

Representatives of the Belgian government supported keeping APF funding within EDF, in order to avoid diverting resources away from the under-funded CFSP, and to ensure that the EC remains fully involved in the process, thereby maintaining a coherent approach between the different European institutions and the EU Member States.\textsuperscript{273} Observers also have also stated that the CFSP budget is too small to support the minimum level of funding required for an effective APF.\textsuperscript{274}

James Mackie maintained that it is important to establish a number of key principles for continued EU financial support to African-led peace support operations, including: ownership, sustainability, longer-term funding, predictability and the value of an integrated approach.\textsuperscript{275}

Assessments of the effectiveness of the APF have broadly been very positive. Jakkie Cilliers stated that the APF has made a remarkable contribution to building peace in Africa, adding that the AU had not previously embarked on anything of the scale of the Darfur operation, and that the only reason why it

\textsuperscript{272} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 162, 14 March.
\textsuperscript{273} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 225, 30 March.
\textsuperscript{274} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Questions 162 & 225, 30 March.
\textsuperscript{275} House of Lords (2006), \textit{The EU and Africa: towards a strategic partnership: written evidence}, p. 88.
was able to mount a relatively credible mission in the region was because of EU support, in particular.276

Capacity-building and the African Standby Force

The EU Strategy for Africa states that the EU will "help develop African [peace and security] capabilities, such as the AU's African Standby Force, and will build on existing activities by Member States to provide training and advisory, technical, planning and logistical support".277

Ministers attending the 8 May 2006 EU-Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting in Vienna welcomed progress made by the AU and sub-regional organisations in developing the African peace and security architecture. Ministers underlined the importance of capacity-building, and expressed their appreciation for the progress made in the establishment of the African Stand-by Force (ASF) and the co-operation between the AU and the EU and other donors.

The EU informed the meeting that it was in the process of elaborating a framework for support to Africa's conflict prevention, management and resolution (CPMR) capabilities. Before being finalised, this framework was to be discussed with the AU and the relevant sub-regional organisations.

Ministers attending the meeting acknowledged the necessity to harmonise any

276 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 110, 2 February.
277 The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership Council of the European Union, Brussels, 19 December 2005 15961/05, paragraph 4(a).
support by the international community for regional training centres and
centres of excellence for the ASF, and also the importance of continuing to
support the African Centre on the Study and Research for Terrorism.

Notwithstanding the progress made in developing the AU's CPMR capacity,
the severe problems experienced by the AU in deploying AMIS underscore the
major capacity-building shortfalls that the AU faces across the breadth of its
peace and security architecture.\textsuperscript{278}

Witnesses suggested that building the AU into a credible and solid institution
is a 15 to 20-year project. NicK Grono was sceptical of the AU's ability to have
the ASF operational by 2010, which leaves a lack of capacity to intervene in
conflicts like the DRC and Darfur in the meantime, as demonstrated by the
"re-hatting" of AMIS to a UN mission in autumn 2006.\textsuperscript{279}

Human resource shortfalls are a particular problem in African institutions and
they continue seriously to undermine African strategic management capacity
at the continental and sub-regional levels, hampering both African ownership
of capacity-building processes and African capability to absorb donor
assistance.

\textsuperscript{278} Ramsbotam, A, Bah, A, and Clader, C (2005), \textit{The Implementation of the Joint Africa/G8
Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations joint
report}, Chatham House, April.

\textsuperscript{279} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 269, 21
March.
Javier Solana’s 21 November 2005 *Contribution to the EU Strategy for Africa* noted that a lesson to be learned from supporting AMIS has been the challenge of working with an institution like the AU which is only at the beginning of its capacity-building process. Solana urged, therefore, that capacity-building for the AU and sub-regional organisations be put at the heart of EU policy in Africa, including in relation both to military and civilian capacity-building and decision-making, mediation, early warning and planning in Headquarters.280

AU member states’ attitudes to capacity-building at the AU have been mixed. A number of influential African leaders are strongly committed to achieving major progress in establishing an effective AU. However, a significant number of African countries are wary of the implications of the development of a powerful institution.

A number of interviewees suggested that long-term donor commitments to support institutional capacity-building with minimal conditions would deliver the most sustainable progress in this area. They saw developing the capability and credibility of the African Commission as a particularly important component of the capacity-building process, as well as identification by the

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AU of areas in which it can add most value in relation to the activities of other African institutions.\textsuperscript{281}

Support for building the AU's peace and security capacity is key component of the EU's engagement with Africa. Although it is important to support capacity-building across the breadth of the AU's CPMR capability, development of the ASF is a particularly significant facet of the capacity-building process, as the ASF is a fundamental implementing mechanism for the whole African peace and security architecture.

Despite the scepticism noted above of the AU's ability to have the ASF fully operational in the near future, AMIS has demonstrated the important peacekeeping role that the AU can play in Africa, as part of the broader international architecture. AMIS has been significant both in terms of its capacity to support stability in Darfur, but also in its role as a catalyst for encouraging external support.

A key challenge in developing the ASF is to pinpoint its precise function in relation to the broader international peace and security architecture, including the respective operational roles of the EU and the UN. The Millennium Review Summit recognised the contribution to peace and security by regional organisations and the importance of establishing predictable partnerships and

arrangements between the UN and regional regional bodies, highlighting the importance of a strong African Union.

Careful analysis of exactly how and where the ASF can add most value to an integrated system of peacekeeping will help to maximise the effectiveness of the capacity-building process. The transferral of AMIS to a UN operation and other examples of African missions being "re-hatted" as blue helmet operations indicate the relevance of thinking about the ASF in a wider context.

Jakkie Cilliers stated that building the peacekeeping capacity of the AU does not represent building an alternative to UN peacekeeping. Rather, what needs to be built was what Kofi Annan’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change referred to as an interlocking system of peacekeeping, in which the AU can help establish a comprehensive ceasefire and can then handover to a UN mission; in this way, the UN represents the exit strategy for AU peacekeeping operations. However, the practicalities of fitting diverse peacekeeping components together remain a key challenge.

Conflict prevention

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Peace and Security Directorate of the AU Commission both have a mandate for conflict prevention. The primary AU conflict prevention instruments are the Panel of
the Wise (POW) and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). When fully functional, POW comprises five highly respected African personalities for three year periods, appointed by the AU Assembly according to regional representation. The POW meets regularly to assist the PSC in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent, particularly focusing on preventive actions.

The CEWS will advise the PSC on potential conflicts and recommend appropriate responses. It will comprise a Situation Centre, linked to similar bodies in the RECs, as well as the UN and other international bodies.

The RECs also have a preventive function. For instance, the 1999 ECOWAS Summit agreed a Protocol for the Establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace and Security. The institutions of the Mechanism include the ECOWAS Authority; the Executive Secretariat; and a Mediation and Security Council.

Civil society has a major role to play in conflict prevention in Africa. Saferworld argued that the EU should ensure effective civil society participation in human security-related projects funded by the Commission for the period 2007-2013, and in projects in all African country and regional strategy papers. Saferworld complained that the APF and the donor community placed too much emphasis on peacekeeping and intervention, at the expense of preventive measures, peacebuilding and human security.
Saferworld further urged stronger support for non-military efforts to prevent conflicts in Africa.\textsuperscript{282}

Jakkie Cilliers also stressed that the types of resources that the AU could offer favoured prioritising support for its conflict prevention capacity, whereas the APF primarily concentrates on intervention and reconstruction. However, he added that conflict prevention is about issues of governance, democracy and human rights, which are also the most difficult areas for a politically weak organisation like AU and African countries to address, because they deal with sensitive issues of sovereignty and interference in the domestic affairs of African countries.\textsuperscript{283} Interviewees further argued that a significant percentage of the APF should be devoted to capacity-building, technical assistance and preventive action.

Despite the obstacles, conflict prevention remains an area where the AU can add real value to peace and security in Africa. And the EU is well placed to provide institutional support to build the AU's preventive capacity and can promote capacity-building programmes that support the preventive components of the African peace and security architecture, paying particular attention to civilian and police elements.

\textsuperscript{283} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 106, 8 February.
Tension between direct operational support and capacity-building

The EU Strategy for Africa pledges to "help develop African capabilities" and to provide direct support to African Union, sub-regional or UN efforts to promote peace and stability through Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) activities, and military and civilian crisis management missions, including potential deployment of EU Battlegroups."284

Balancing the provision of direct, operational support with support for building African capacity presents a challenge for the EU. AMIS illustrates the tensions between these two priorities, as the scale of the AU's operational commitments in Darfur has tended to overwhelm the organisation and its efforts to develop its institutional capacity. At the same time, however, the comparative effectiveness of AMIS has been seen by many donor partners as indicative of the AU's competence as the primary African agency.

The European Centre for Development Policy Management stressed that, for the EU, it should not be a question of choosing between operational support or capacity-building, but rather simultaneously balancing the two. It added that there is still some way to go before there was a synergy between indirect

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284 Council of the European Union (2005), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, Brussels, 19 December 15961/05, paragraph 4(a).
support and direct support, provided by the EU through the APF and through the CFSP/ESDP, as well through bilateral assistance.\(^{285}\)

Interviewees identified institutional capacity-building for human resources at the AU and sub-regional organisations as the weaker of the two policy priorities of the APF. Nick Grono stressed that the AU's lack of capacity underlined the importance of EU and Western operational support for African interventions where appropriate.\(^{286}\)

As with EU efforts to help build the ASF, so EU direct operational support should acknowledge other peacekeeping elements within a broader system, and should work to develop a more coherent international structure. Better ways are needed to integrate the comparative advantages of the different organisations involved in peace and security activities in Africa. The AU might have a greater capacity to provide troops, for instance, but it has less capability in terms of logistics or in civilian expertise than the EU. The EU could also provide rapid response, while NATO can support logistical aspects and no-fly zone enforcement. The UN is still the lead player in deploying multidimensional peacebuilding operations.

One area identified in which the EU could play a more active role was in supporting security sector reform in Africa. Nick Grono stressed that tackling

the root causes of conflict needs to involve addressing the security apparatus of countries affected by instability, which requires direct involvement in security sector reform. This embraces a variety of issues which the EU supports strongly, including in relation to the rule of law, but also incorporates other essential areas where the EU has traditionally been more wary of involvement, such as supporting the development of effective, responsive military chains of command.287

Post-conflict activities and EU efforts to support the Peacebuilding Commission

Post-conflict reconstruction in states emerging from war and instability involves a major input of resources and finances. Peacebuilding missions are multidimensional and complex, requiring the involvement of a wide range of actors over an extended period of time.

Effective peacebuilding presents a huge challenge for the AU, which will continue to require considerable interaction and assistance in this area, from the EU, the UN and elsewhere. This in turn presents major challenges of coordination, and of sustaining international political interest in the longer-term.

287 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 337, 21 March.
The High-Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change identified a key institutional gap at the UN in responding to the challenges of peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{288} In response to a recommendation by the Panel, in December 2005 the UN General Assembly and Security Council formally established the new UN Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC), as agreed by heads of State attending the Millennium Review Summit.\textsuperscript{289} As discussed in previous chapters, the Peacebuilding Commission is intended to marshal resources and offer advice on post-conflict recovery, bringing together UN capacities in conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, human rights, the rule of law, humanitarian aid, reconstruction and long-term development. It is further hoped that the Commission will help to maintain international political interest over longer periods in relation to peacebuilding operations.

Javier Solana's October 2005 Contribution to the EU Strategy for Africa recommended that EU policy towards Africa should be solidly based on UN principles and should aim for a trilateral partnership between the EU, the UN, and the AU in Africa, with the UN Peacebuilding Commission becoming an important tool in this respect.\textsuperscript{290}

\textbf{Realising the EU-Africa Partnership}

This section assesses the effectiveness of efforts to realise the EU-Africa Partnership in practice. This includes: initiatives to create a broad-based dialogue; the role of African governments and institutions, and African Civil society; the AU’s capacity to deliver; the EU’s capacity to engage in dialogue with Africa; the significance of the second EU-Africa Summit; and the development of a joint EU-Africa strategy.

The EU Strategy for Africa commits the EU to developing the Strategy "in partnership with the African Union, NEPAD and other African partners, respecting the principles of African ownership, the importance of working more closely with African in multilateral fora, and in co-ordination with multilateral partners".\textsuperscript{291}

These principles can all be undermined by the various major challenges: the need for better coordination; rationalisation of institutions; and lack weak institutional capacity, on both the European and African sides.

\textit{Creating a broad-based dialogue}

Implementation of the EU Strategy for Africa through the use of dialogue raises the question of with whom this dialogue should be held. A number of possible dialogue partners for the EU are discernible: these range from the

\textsuperscript{291} Council of the European Union (2005), \textit{The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership}, Brussels, 19 December 2005 15961/05, paragraph 9(a).
pan-African institutions such as the AU and NEPAD, the RECs, individual state
governments, and civil society.

Myles Wickstead argued that whilst there had been "a mindset change that
has happened over the last year or two where the international community
has now determined to support what Africa puts forward" there remain
"different layers of what Africa wants".292

One of the most important challenges for the EU is the split between the
countries north and south of the Sahara. In terms of developing a pan-African
approach, the pan-African institutions, in particular the AU and NEPAD will be
the primary partners for the EU. Lord Triesman argued that these were
"critical institutions that are developing across Africa which take no account of
[the regional] division whatsoever".293

National level implementation is also important to the EU Strategy but many
African states are weak and have limited capacity. Chatham House suggested
that the EU should work closely with anchor countries in African who can be
champions in their respective regions on issues such as good governance,
conflict resolution, democracy and economic intervention.294

292 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 78, 2
February.
293 House of Lords (2005), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 53, 29
November.
294 House of Lords (2006), The EU and Africa: towards a strategic partnership: written
evidence, pp 94 & 66
The EU's capacity to engage in dialogue with Africa

The EU Strategy for Africa identifies the African Union as the principal institution for EU engagement with Africa.\textsuperscript{295} This places a major responsibility on the AU and its capacity to deliver. The competence of the AU is discussed in detail elsewhere in this thesis. Here, we look specifically at the AU in terms of engagement with the EU, in particular in reference to the Strategy for Africa.

At a general level, it is important to recognise the inherent tension between African ownership and EU support for capacity-building. The International Crisis Group stated that it is not possible to have African ownership without African capability, and that developing African capability requires extensive support.\textsuperscript{296}

The EU needs to provide support for breadth of the AU's responsibilities, including financial assistance and technical expertise. However, the EU must be careful not to swamp the AU with European personnel, as this undermines African ownership, and fails to acknowledge and incorporate African expertise.

Given the size and funding of the EU, it is fair to assume sufficient capacity for dialogue. Certainly there is no shortage of officials in Brussels willing to

\textsuperscript{295} Council of the European Union (2005), \textit{The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership}, Brussels, 19 December 15961/05, paragraph 9(b).

\textsuperscript{296} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 270, 21 March.
talk to the AU. But, given the limited capacity of the AU, it is important that the EU is fully represented in Addis Ababa, in order that it can engage in dialogue regularly and consistently. Bob Dewar stated that there is a very large diplomatic community based in Addis Ababa because it is the principal point of contact with Africa for many countries and that a significant part of the work of those on the ground in Addis is on the pan-African agenda.\textsuperscript{297}

EU and Member States representation in Africa takes three forms:

- Commission delegations;
- Special Representatives acting under the High Representative Javier Solana; and
- national diplomatic services.

Commission delegations have been subject to criticism. The delegations have potential to play an important role in ensuring that programmes and strategies are coherent with those of the partner countries. However, Elmar Brok, Chairman of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, argued that delegations were weak, under-resourced, poorly qualified and lacking diplomatic training. He argued that secondment to national diplomatic service would help to strengthen the delegations and increase their knowledge and skills.\textsuperscript{298}

Bob Dewar was more optimistic in his assessment of the delegation based in Addis, stating that he had been impressed by the officials based there: "I

\textsuperscript{297} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 346, 30 March.

\textsuperscript{298} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 247, 21 March.
have felt that they have spent a lot of time and good effort in their engagement”. However, even he conceded that "there is an issue in terms of the skill base for the evolving Strategy" amongst Commission staff.

He also noted the need for increased coordination in individual African countries between the delegations and Member State missions. The United Kingdom mission in Addis has benefited from having a regional conflict advisor and a specialist specifically for engagement with the AU. This is a level of expertise not held by the Commission delegation. He stressed that there was, accordingly, a real benefit to be had through sharing expertise and working together with the Commission in a joined-up way:

"It is important that we do take harmonisation seriously ... There could be scope for sharing of experiences between African Union missions should one have more experience in one domain than another and that is the way to go”.

The Head of Cabinet to Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, in evidence given to the House of Commons International Development Committee, acknowledged that the Commission still needs to work on the institutional relationship

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299 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 351, 30 March.
300 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 351, 30 March.
301 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 351, 30 March.
302 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 351, 30 March.
between the EU foreign policy machinery and national diplomatic services. President Barroso and Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner were both very keen to develop a more ambitious two-way exchange programme involving staff in the delegations and staff working in national diplomatic services.\footnote{International Development Committee, Oral Evidence (2005-2006) \textit{EU Development Co-operation and External Relations Policy} (HC 745), Q 28.}

Finally, interviewees stressed "the utter lack of coordination" between the Commission delegations and the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs).\footnote{House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 271, 21 March.} The International Crisis Group, in a report on Afghanistan, for example, had found that there were no regular meetings in Kabul between the EUSR and the delegation based there.\footnote{Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union’s Role International Crisis Group, Asia Report N° 107, 30 November 2005} Having drawn attention to it in their report weekly meetings are now being held. They considered that this situation was common in those places with a Special Representative.\footnote{House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 351, 30 March.}

The development of a joint EU-Africa strategy would clearly benefit from political buy-in at the highest level: i.e. endorsement from a second EU-Africa Summit to follow the Cairo Summit in 2000. In 2006, the United Kingdom was very clear on the prospects for holding a second summit. Lord Triesman acknowledged the desirability of such a summit, but stated that, "so long as that summit is going to be held in Europe and so long as the African Union as a whole is prepared to support Robert Mugabe's attendance representing
Zimbabwe then it will not happen”.\textsuperscript{307} He added that, although not all EU Member States supported this position completely, the EU nevertheless remained cohesive on the issue and the EU would continue to pursue dialogue through the ministerial Troika meetings in the meantime.\textsuperscript{308}

Representatives of the Belgian government were more sceptical of the capacity of the Troika meetings to deliver progress on the Strategy, asserting that the gap since the first summit was beginning to takes its toll on the relationship between the EU and Africa. They added that, while dialogue at ministerial and lower levels has its place, as long as there is no event that marks the moment where the Strategy commitments are evaluated by both partners at the highest level, it will be very difficult to proceed.\textsuperscript{309}

The AU-EU Ministerial Meeting at Bamako, Mali, on 5 December 2005 made commitments to explore creative ideas to bring about the holding of an Africa-EU Summit as envisaged in the Cairo Plan of Action, and mandated senior officials to submit concrete proposals for consideration at the subsequent ministerial Troika meeting in Vienna on 8 May 2006. The outcome of the second Summit in Lisbon in 2007 is discussed below.

\textit{The development of a joint EU-Africa strategy}

\textsuperscript{307} House of Lords (2005), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 62, 29 November.

\textsuperscript{308} House of Lords (2005), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 62, 29 November.

\textsuperscript{309} House of Lords (2006), \textit{Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses}, Question 230, 21 March.
Aligning EU policies with African objectives has the potential to make a major impact on the effective implementation of the EU Strategy for Africa: the "underlying philosophy" of the Strategy stresses "African ownership and responsibility". The ultimate objective of this rationale is the development of a genuine joint EU-Africa strategy.

Bob Dewar pointed out that there was consultation with Africans on the drafts of the EU Strategy. He stressed that the Strategy is an EU initiative, but that it was welcomed in Africa. However, he added that Africans were likely to have views which they would want to put forward if there were ever to be a truly joint EU-Africa strategy.

At the 8 May EU-African Troika meeting in Vienna, the two sides reiterated the agreement reached in Bamako to transform the EU Strategy for Africa into a joint strategy. They agreed that this should be "a focused, political document, setting out a vision of EU African relations in the decade ahead, and building on a dialogue that should be flexible, deeper, more frequent and include new areas of common interest". The joint strategy will be

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structured in four clusters: peace and security, human rights and governance, trade and integration and development.

The matrix is useful in specifying particular steps towards implementation of the Strategy, but it does not specify how much will be spent on each step, nor does it address the larger issue of rationalisation of European and African institutions and instruments. Whilst many of the Strategy's aims can be met without such rationalisation, ultimately a joint EU-Africa strategy, as envisaged by the ministerial Troikas, will require that this question be properly addressed.

*EU-Africa Summit*

In December 2007, an EU-Africa Summit was eventually held in Lisbon, during the Portuguese EU presidency. The Summit agreed a *Joint EU-Africa Strategy*, as well as an Action Plan for 2008-2010.

*The Africa-EU strategic partnership: a Joint Africa-EU Strategy* (the Partnership) recognises a shared vision between Africa and the AU, based on a Euro-African consensus on values, common interests and common strategic objectives. It declares that the partnership would be guided by the fundamental principles of the unity of Africa, the interdependence between Africa and Europe, ownership and joint responsibility, and respect for human
rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, as well as the right to development.\textsuperscript{314}

The Partnership has four main, stated objectives, summarised as follows:

1. To reinforce and elevate the Africa-EU political partnership to address issues of common concern.

2. To strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialisation, and regional and continental integration in Africa, and to ensure that all the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are met in all African countries by the year of 2015.

3. To jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism, with strong, representative and legitimate institutions, and the reform of the United Nations (UN) system and of other key international institutions.

4. To facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centred partnership, Africa and the EU will empower non-state actors and create conditions to enable them to play an active role in development, democracy building, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction processes.\textsuperscript{315}


The strategic framework outlines specific strategies that need to be enacted in the following areas: (a) peace and security, (b) governance and human rights, (c) trade and regional integration and (d) key development issues.\(^{316}\)

Of particular interest here are the objectives of peace and security, as well as of governance and human rights. The Partnership recognises the need to promote holistic approaches to security, encompassing conflict prevention and peacebuilding, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, linked to governance and sustainable development, with a view to addressing the root causes of conflicts. It acknowledges the importance of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and stresses that the EU and its Member States can provide increased support for AU efforts to operationalise the APSA.

The Partnership reiterates the significance of African ownership, but points out the significance of key EU policy, such as the November 2006 Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts.\(^{317}\)

In relation to governance and human rights, the Partnership highlights the promotion of democratic governance and human rights as a central feature of the Africa-EU dialogue and partnership. In the context of situations of conflict, the Partnership further asserted that Africa and the EU will hold a dialogue on


\(^{317}\) European Council (2006), *Council Conclusions on Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts*, 2760th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 13 November
the concept of ‘situations of fragility’, in order to develop a common understanding and agreement on steps that could be taken.

Regarding human rights, the Partnership declares that Africa and the EU will work together to protect and promote the human rights of all people in Africa and Europe, as well as on a global level in international fora such as the UN Human Rights Council, to promote human rights and international humanitarian law and for the effective implementation of international and regional human rights instruments.

EU support for good governance will build on the approach followed to integrate governance in the EDF programming, under the Governance Initiative. In order to support the APRM process and the implementation of the Charter, and the pan-African governance architecture more broadly, the EU pledged to establish an instrument that takes into account the positive experience with the African Peace Facility.

The Lisbon Summit also agreed an Action Plan (2008-2010) for the implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. This sets out key partnerships and priority actions, including, among other things, the following:

Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security

• Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security;
• Full operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture;
• Predictable Funding for African-led Peace Support Operations.

Africa-EU Partnership on Democratic Governance and Human Rights

• Enhance dialogue at global level and in international fora;
• Promote the African Peer Review Mechanism and support the African Charter on democracy, Elections and Governance;
• Strengthen cooperation in the area of cultural goods.

In order to promote effective implementation of the Action Plan, it pledged to establish appropriate institutional architecture and implementation modalities. These include, among other things, commitments to: establish more frequent contacts between African and EU political leaders; back-up bi-annual Troika meetings of Foreign Ministers with sectoral Ministerial meetings; organise the annual meetings between the College of Commissioners of the European and AU Commissions; invite representatives from European and African civil societies to express themselves ahead of Ministerial Troika meetings; set up planning and priority setting mechanism for future Action Plans; and convene a third EU Africa Summit at the end of 2010, in Africa.
The EU agreed to open an EU Delegation exclusively dedicated to the AU; and to review options to better align policies, instruments and procedures to the need to treat Africa as one. The AU agreed to enhance the role of the African Union and its Commission in policy formulation and implementation; and to simplify the framework for regional integration in articulation with Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and rationalise EPAs, RECs and Sub-Regional Organisations within the Banjul framework;

The action plan further incorporated various ‘fiches’ which detail the rationale, the objectives, the expected outcomes, the anticipated activities and the possible actors and financial resources of each of the Africa-EU priority actions.319

On peace and security, these ‘fiches’ list three areas for priority action: 1) enhancing dialogue on challenges to peace and security; 2) operationalising APSA; and 3) predictable funding for Africa-led peacekeeping operations

On democratic governance and human rights; priorities include: 1) enhancing dialogue at global level and in international fora; 2) promoting the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and supporting the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; and 3) strengthening cooperation in the area of cultural goods.

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Conclusion

The EU is a major peace and security partner of the AU. The EU supports key principles of human rights and a broad understanding of peace and security, both within its own principles and guidelines, and as part of its various commitments to Africa. EU operational engagement in Africa has supported military intervention to uphold human rights and human security, for example in its deployments to DRC. Although the case studies of EU involvement in DRC, presented both in this chapter and in Chapter 3, expose the difficulties and challenges that this engagement encountered.

It is fair to acknowledge the contribution that the EU has made to African peace and security. Some commentators suggest that the only reason why the AU was able to mount a relatively credible mission in Darfur was because of the support of the EU, and in particular the Africa Peace Facility.320 And the design of the APF is widely understood as having provided a very good way of maintaining African ownership of external support.

But, there have been major difficulties in realising a functioning relationship that responds to African interests and needs. Despite the success of the APF, at a general level, an inherent tension remains between African ownership and EU support for capacity-building, not least due to the paradoxical situation that genuine African ownership implies sufficient African capability to

320 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 110, 2 February.
manage external support. Moreover, the reality of local, community involvement is not impressive. There was little civil society engagement in the design of the Strategy itself, and the Strategy has little to say about how to incorporate the needs and wishes of local communities into peace and security initiatives in Africa.

A number of practical and political problems undermine development of a functioning relationship between the EU and Africa. Agreeing unified policy between the two remains difficult, both within Europe and between Europe and Africa. This can be the case at the most fundamental levels, such as disagreement over the definition of what good governance actually means, let alone what actions should be the prioritised in trying to promote it.

Financing is a major hurdle. The Africa-EU Joint Partnership highlighted the importance of “predictable funding for Africa-led peacekeeping operations”. But there are a myriad of European funding sources relevant to African peace and security, often with unclear allocations of which stream pays for what activity, and who, ultimately, is responsible for providing the money.

Finally, the relationship is far from fully functional politically. It took seven years to convene the second EU-Africa summit, four years longer than intended, due to political disagreements in Europe over the attendance of Zimbabwe. And even then, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown refused to attend, thereby diluting the political strength of the agreements reached in
Lisbon. Furthermore, political commitment to back up promises with actions is far from guaranteed. The EU Battlegroups concept appears tailor-made to support UN or AU peacekeeping operations in Africa. But to date, none has been deployed, and it remains unclear how operational they are in reality, despite being well past the deadline to achieve full operationality.
The next two chapters look at G8 support for African peacekeeping. Specifically, they assess the effectiveness and relevance of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations (the Joint Plan), agreed at the 2003 G8 Summit in Evian. Chapter 6 focuses on G8 and African perspectives on the Joint Plan. Chapter 7 then examines key priorities and challenges to its implementation, and it outlines potential areas for agreement and action, with a particular focus on the UK Presidency of the G8 in 2005/6.

The analysis in these chapters is based on a series of interviews with key practitioners and experts from the G8 and Africa, undertaken by the author between April 2004 and April 2005. These took place as part of a project intended to provide a strategic input to the implementation process that has been following up commitments made in the Joint Plan. Methodology for this field work is described in Chapter 1 of this thesis.

In order to assess the effectiveness of the Joint Plan, chapter 6 first outlines the G8 process: how the G8 came to be involved in supporting African peace
and security; what steps led up to agreement on the Joint Plan; and what are the Joint Plan’s key elements.

Second, Chapter 6 presents G8 perspectives on the implementation of the Joint Plan. Analysis is based on feedback gathered by the author during interviews with officials from the Canadian government, the French government, the German government, the Japanese government, the UK government and the US Government: including: G8 activities at continental and regional levels; operational support; promoting coordination with African partners and among G8 Member States; institutional capacity-building; training; G8 deployments; and logistical and equipment support.

Third, Chapter 6 presents African perspectives on the implementation of the Joint Plan. These include input gathered by the author from face to face interviews during field research in west, south and east Africa and Addis Ababa, including the African Union; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Again, opinions from academics and practitioners are also incorporated. Key areas of discussion focus on AU leadership of development of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); AU/donor coordination meetings; peacekeeping doctrine; the practicability of donor demands; assessing African peacekeeping

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322 The Arab-Maghreb Union is not included, as, like Italy, its involvement in the Joint Plan was comparatively small at the time the Chatham House/UNA-UK/ISS project research was carried out.
capacity, and the major gaps; coordination among key African stakeholders; and African regional integration.

**G8 involvement in the capacity-building process: the Joint Plan**

The G8’s enthusiasm for enhancing African peace and security capacity has derived from a number of factors, in particular the following:

- Africans’ increasing determination to develop indigenous peace and security capacity;
- increasing demand for peacekeeping in Africa;
- belief that African responses to African crises may be more acceptable and appropriate than external responses;
- bad operational experiences for non-African states in African peacekeeping operations in the 1990s.\(^{323}\)

International support for developing African peace and security and peacekeeping capacity coincided with the UN Security Council’s disengagement from pursuing a peacekeeping role globally in the mid-1990s: there was a drop in numbers of troops, military observers and police serving with UN operations from 69,900 to 29,100 from 1995/1996. Factors contributing to this decline included: operational setbacks between 1993 and

1995 in Somalia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia, and financial and political considerations for states contributing personnel and other resources to expensive and high-risk missions, often deployed to areas of moot strategic interest.324

Initiatives to build African peace and security capacity have continued to evolve. The involvement of the G8 in the process in reflects the expanding number of non-African stakeholders that are interested in developing African capacity. But the growing presence of UN missions in Africa suggests that over ten years of International support for capacity-building programmes in Africa have had a comparatively moderate effect, while the capability of African regional organisations capacity to deploy and sustain peacekeeping operations remains limited.

Official G8 involvement in capacity-building for African peace and security began in 2001 (see Table 2).

Table 2 G8 support for African peace and security capacity-building

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Presidency</th>
<th>Summit</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>Genoa Plan for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Kananaskis</td>
<td>Action Plan for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Evian</td>
<td>Joint Plana</td>
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G8 and African leaders attending the Evian summit in 2003 released the Implementation Report by Africa Personal Representatives to Leaders on the G8 Africa Action Plan;\textsuperscript{325} the G8 Africa Action Plan had been concluded at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis the previous year.\textsuperscript{326} The Joint Plan is the annex to the Evian Implementation Report, and it provides a detailed programme of objectives for Africa and its partners across the entire range of the African peace and security architecture.

The designers of the Joint Plan intended it to provide a focus for the cooperative efforts of external partners in supporting African capacity-building initiatives. It confirmed the formal recognition by the G8 of the potential advantages of partnership with NEPAD and the AU in developing African peace and security architecture.


peace and security capacity, including for the deployment of peacekeeping operations. An essential objective of the Joint Plan is “to mobilise technical and financial assistance so that, by 2010, African partners are able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent, and undertake peace support operations in accordance with the United Nations Charter”.327

The Joint Plan identifies the following elements as essential to shaping a strategic plan to realise the longer-term vision for African peacekeeping capabilities:328

- determining capabilities to meet African goals;
- assessing capabilities within African states, and deciding which of those capabilities would be available for African peacekeeping operations; and
- determining the remaining gaps or weaknesses requiring focused attention.

The Joint Plan further identifies building blocks to creating an enhanced African peacekeeping capacity.329 These provide helpful reference points to assess their continuing relevance to African peace and security challenges, to current developments in appropriate conflict resolution and management

328 Joint Plan, para. 3.1
329 Joint Plan, para. 5.1-2
responses, and to practical options to develop African peacekeeping capacity.

These building blocks are:

- establishing multidimensional standby brigade capabilities, including civilian components, at the AU and regional level by 2010;
- developing capacity to provide humanitarian, security and reconstruction support in the context of complex peacekeeping operations;
- establishing a continental early warning network;
- developing continental and regional institutional capacity for conflict prevention;
- establishing priority regional logistics depots;
- standardising doctrines and other civilian and military training materials;
- enhancing capacity of regional peace training centres;
- undertaking regional joint exercises;
- existing peacekeeping initiatives in Africa; and
- consensus-building in the OECD Development Assistance Committee to free up aid for peacekeeping-related activities.

Existing international initiatives provided considerable activity in this area on which to build, and the Joint Plan demonstrated a political commitment to make progress in enhancing African peacekeeping capacity. However, a number of problems have hampered the practical follow-up to this process, to explore concrete ways of implementing the aspirations of the Joint Plan, not
least confusion both among and between G8 and African partners regarding where and how to proceed mutually and effectively.

Attempts have previously been made to enhance G8/Africa coordination, notably the Africa Partnership Forum (APF). The APF was established in response to the formation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001, when leaders of the G8 agreed to set up a committee of high-level personal representatives to work with the NEPAD steering committee. The personal representatives were tasked with developing a Plan of Action in support of NEPAD, which resulted in the G8 Action Plan which was presented at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis in 200X. The committee developed into the APF.

APF membership comprises the G8 countries as well as 11 other states that make significant development assistance contributions to Africa, including the Nordic countries and the Netherlands. Together, these countries account for some 98% of ODA to Africa. The President of the European Commission is also a member, while the APF further includes personal representatives of the heads of five key international institutions: the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank, the WTO and the UN. Finally, it also incorporates the African members of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), as well as the heads of the AU recognised Regional Economic Communities, the Head of the African Development Bank and the heads of state or government of Africa’s principal industrialised development partners.
The APF provides a forum for dialogue and monitoring policy issues, strategy and priorities to support African development. A key stated objective of the APF aims is to set up a Joint Action Plan that brings together the commitments made by African states and their development partners to tackle the continent’s development needs. The terms of reference of the APF decree that it should not establish any new bureaucracy or institutions; nor should it duplicate the work of other fora.

Research suggests that the APF has an unwieldy agenda, and, combined with the fact that it has no follow up mechanism between meetings, its focus risks being blurred and, hence, its effectiveness impaired. It also lacks sectoral coordination (i.e. for governance, peace and security, etc.). Its remit is strictly restricted to strategic thinking and the information sharing, and it is not mandated to deliver on the various commitments made by its partners, only monitor and review them. All of these factors hamper its effectiveness as a coordinating mechanism.

G8 perspectives on implementing the Joint Plan

The following section outlines G8 perspectives on implementing the Joint Plan. Analysis is based on feedback from officials from the Canadian

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government, the French government, the German government, the Japanese
government, the UK government and the US Government. Field research
methodology involved face-to-face interviews with key officials, as well as on
telephone and e-mail interviews, and it included meetings in Paris, London
and Washington. Key areas of activity covered include the following: G8
activities at continental and regional levels; operational support; promoting
coordination with African partners and among G8 Member States; institutional
capacity-building; training; G8 deployments; and logistical and equipment
support. Interviews with donors were based on the following set of eight
questions, which were forwarded to interviewees prior to interviews, although
there was often considerable scope for wider discussion:

9. What activities are your government currently undertaking towards the
implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African
Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations?

10. Are you planning any new activities in this area? If so, can you share
information about these plans with us?

333 The joint Chatham House/UNA-UK/ISS project (see note XX above) also interviewed
officials from the United Nations, and from the European Union and the European
Council, during visits to New York and to Brussels. However, data from these
interviews has been incorporated into the UN and EU chapters of this thesis,
respectively.

334 Interviews were primarily undertaken under the ‘Chatham House’ rule, whereby quotes
and information are non-attributable. A list of interviewees in included in Annex XX,
although some wished to remain anonymous. Information in this section is accurate
as of April 2005. Nevertheless, this provides a useful ‘snapshot’ of the types of
assistance that works- or does not - as the project was intended to deliver. Updates
of processes and activities are included when and where relevant.
11. Have you carried out or commissioned any surveys of PSO\textsuperscript{335} capacity or capacity building programmes in Africa? If so, can you share these with us?

12. What areas of PSO capacity building or individual PSO capacity building projects do you think have been most successful? Why do you think that they have succeeded?

13. What areas of the Joint Plan are your government’s highest priority as an individual donor nation?

14. Which areas of the Joint Plan do you think would be most promising for increased joint effort between African and G8 countries in general?

15. What are the key challenges that you think will need to be addressed in order for the Joint Plan to be successfully implemented.

16. What are your views on the AU/regional security architecture as presently foreseen as an effective conflict management system?

\textsuperscript{335} Please note that the Joint Plan refers to ‘Peace Support Operations’ (PSOs). These are synonymous with complex peacekeeping, as defined in chapter 2. Where interviewees refer to PSOs, therefore, this should be understood as complex peacekeeping operations.
The Canadian government and the implementation of the Joint Plan

Peacekeeping is an important aspect of Canada’s national heritage, a significant component of its foreign policy and of its contribution to the multilateral security system. Canadian peacekeeping policy is informed by fifty years of experience in UN peacekeeping operations. Canadian involvement in international peace support operations has expanded beyond the primarily military traditional peacekeeping deployments of the Cold War, in response to the involvement in complex emergencies.337

Canada’s Africa policy supports a new vision for Africa led by NEPAD. Canada has taken a leading role in supporting that vision with the $500-million Canada Fund for Africa (CFA).338 This fund is part of the Canadian contribution to the G8 Africa Action Plan (AAP) approved in June 2002 at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis. Both the APP and CFA are built on the priorities identified in NEPAD and recognise the right of Africans to take control and ownership of their own path to development. The CFA complements ongoing programmes of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and

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is a key element in the Agency's bilateral cooperation programme in Africa, which will total more than C$6 billion over the five years up to 2010.

Ottawa states that both of the part Canadian funded Regional Centres of Excellence (RCEs) at Koulikoro and Accra in West Africa made rapid progress in meeting the needs of peacekeeping training. Canada was looking into expanding training opportunities for the humanitarian and civilian police clients in peacekeeping, beyond the emphasis on military training at the time of interview. Progress at the RCEs reflects a strong donor technical and managerial presence. Although, this comes with a cost in the relatively slow transfer of real ownership to African leadership at either Koulikoro or Accra.

*Activities that the Canadian government has undertaken to support delivery of the Joint Plan*

Canada was providing C$4 million support for capacity-building at the AU, and was also supporting the AU to enhance its conflict management capacities in a C$4 million project enabling a rapid response team of military observers to Burundi and the creation of a Special AU Representative for the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Canada was also providing C$1.0 million through CIDA to assist the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to investigate human rights abuses in Darfur.
Canada provided C$15 million for West Africa Peace and Security Initiative (PSI), which includes:

- C$4.5 million to strengthen the ECOWAS peacekeeping and conflict management capabilities by supporting eight professional staff for a mission planning cell; four African staff for a small arms unit; an ECOWAS scholarship fund enabling ECOWAS Member States to send participants to peacekeeping training courses; and a contribution to the ECOWAS peace fund on the completion of an appropriate management system.

- C$3.0 million to the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in partnership with the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre to deliver courses and train African trainers.

- Two PSI projects aimed at helping combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in West Africa, including a regional SALW program and an arms for development program managed by UNDP Sierra Leone and supported by other donors, such as the UK, the Netherlands and Norway.

- PSI is planning an expanded civilian police (CIVPOL) training program in association with KAIPTC and the Mali-based *Ecole de formation au maintien de la paix de Koulikoro*.

*Operational support*
Canada has supported peace consolidation in DRC, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Angola in areas such as CIVPOL, the Sierra Leone Special Court and Truth Commission, DDRR and land-mine clearance. Approximate 2004/05 assessed commitments to UN peacekeeping in Africa included to UNMIL ($9.0 million); to UNOCI ($8.4 million); and to ONUB ($4.3 million). (Total Canadian contribution to UN peacekeeping in 03/04 was $78 million; the estimate for 04/05 was $196 million, reflecting the surge in demand).

Other contributions

In response to the G8 Action Plan on expanding global peacekeeping capabilities, Canada was proposing to focus on the African security framework by:

- Supporting the development of an ECOWAS peacekeeping standing force.
- Deepening support for African peacekeeping training through RCEs and staff colleges.
- Contributing to G8 peacekeeping logistics arrangements, and
- Extending further support to the AU in the development of its security framework through training and technical assistance as appropriate.

Support was proposed at C$50 million over five years. Canada is an active participant in coordination meetings among African and donor partners to implement relevant plans on peacekeeping, including Washington 7-8 October
The French government and the implementation of the Joint Plan\textsuperscript{340}

France’s African peace and security policy is based around two fundamental principles:\textsuperscript{341}

- An understanding that the on-going proliferation of armed conflicts in Africa produces a disproportionate need for conflict management mechanisms on the continent.
- A response to Africa’s increasing willingness to develop its own conflict management capabilities. French policy is not to disengage from Africa, but rather to develop Franco-African joint crisis-management approaches. French policy for Africa pursues the combined aims of supporting both African regional peace and security initiatives, and cooperative responses to African peace and security issues, among Europeans/donors and between Europeans/donors and Africans.


\textsuperscript{340} Unless otherwise stated, all material is based on face-to-face interviews with representatives of the French government, Ministère de la Défense (MINDEF), Paris, October 2004.

The main channel for implementing this policy is France’s *Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix* (RECAMP) programme. RECAMP has been developed since 1997 as a mechanism to establish an open partnership to strengthen African peacekeeping capacity, in terms of training, equipment and exercises. At present RECAMP activities include annual manoeuvres, field exercises and seminars.

Paris described the Joint Plan as a high priority for France. Paris was instrumental in the development of the Joint Plan, from the G8 Summit in Kananaskis in 2002 through to Evian in 2003. Although G8 declarations are not binding, France interprets the Joint Plan as a formal commitment. However, more generally it is in French interests that the G8 process remains somewhat informal, as all French policy relating to African peacekeeping has the EU as its first reference point.

French policy does not support ‘going in alone’. France believes that European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in Africa should be developed within the context of the relevant regional body and regional deployment. Whereas the ESDP Operation Artemis, which operated alongside the UN mission (MONUC) in eastern DR Congo, included no African troops, French Licorne forces operating alongside the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire included Africans and emphasised cooperation and collaboration within the region. Licorne forces operate under a mandate from the UN Security Council.
Activities that the French government has undertaken to support delivery of the Joint Plan

RECAMP lies at the heart of French peace and security engagement in Africa and includes elements of doctrine and programmatic activities. Paris asserts that RECAMP is highly integrated and involves education, field training and equipment support, including for use operationally. It is directed by the Ministère de la Défense (MINDEF), alongside the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE), and it aims to bring together civilian and military leaders and policy makers from all the various regions of Africa. RECAMP has been developed to reflect African-specific needs and has evolved to complement AU peace and security policy and support the development of the ASF. It was originally designed to support African peace and security at the regional level, which remains its main purpose.

Coordination

French approaches to promoting coordination work at three levels, as follows:342

- Political level RECAMP aims to support the development of regional mechanisms for strategic surveillance, warning and analysis in order to

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enhance African regional bodies and Member States consultation and political decisionmaking capacity.

- **Politico-military level** RECAMP seeks to support the development of conflict prevention and conflict management capacity in African regional structures. There is a joint emphasis on capacity to prepare and capacity to command conflict prevention and management activity.

- **Military level** RECAMP training courses enhance the capacity for African forces to work cooperatively by teaching standard peacekeeping skills. This activity has taken place in relation to various RECs.

**French internal coordination**

The French were in the process of considering how to improve their internal coordination. Paris set up a ‘think tank’, established by the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE), which was exploring ways to enhance coordination between relevant departments, including: the MAE; the Ministères de la Défence (MINDEF) and de la Justice; and the Agence Française de Développement. This was taking place within the context of a French government paper examining the links between conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution. Pierre-André Wiltzer was appointed as minister dealing with conflict issues and French input into enhancing peacekeeping capacity globally, operating cross-departmentally. He was mandated by the Prime Minister and is attached to the MAE.
Institutional capacity-building

France was providing ongoing support to the development of the AU’s institutional capacity to deliver its peace and security mandate. This support included the provision of an Attaché de Défense (AD) in Addis Ababa; assistance with the development of the ASF - given by MINDEF through its Plan des Operations Conjointes (POC) for the AU; and the provision of training for AU staff at the Institute des Haute Etude de la Défense Nationale (IHEDN). In addition, France hosted a donor meeting on the African clearinghouse in May 2004.

France was also committed to supporting the development of institutional peacekeeping capacity in the African regional bodies. In addition to the regional RECAMP work in training and operational activities France provides the following regional support:

- In Western Africa France posted an AD Accrédité and an Assistant Militaire Technique (AMT) to ECOWAS.
- In Eastern Africa France posted an AD Accrédité to Djibouti who is supporting the development of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG).
- In Central Africa France posted an AD Accrédité to GABON to provides support to the Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC/ECCAS).
• In Southern Africa, France was developing plans to deploy a regional conflict adviser to work alongside the UK Regional Conflict Adviser (see below).

Training

RECAMP training activities involve both initial and advanced training.\textsuperscript{343} RECAMP training is intended for personnel that have already received a basic training. The training is conducted in connection with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

RECAMP training is given at both individual and collective level. Individual training is carried out in France at institutes including IHEDN and the Paris College Interarmées de Défense (CID); and in Africa at training institutes that the French have supported which include the Command and Staff colleges in Koulikoro (Mali) or Libreville (Gabon) and the peacekeeping school in Zambakro (Côte d’Ivoire).\textsuperscript{344} For example, the latter runs three courses for three different levels of officers: multinational brigade HQ staff officers, battalion HQ staff officers and observer officers. It offers 15 to 20 places per year per course. All instructors and trainees are African, with instructors required to complete a specific DPKO course. Collective training is given by French Détachements D’instruction Opérationnelle (DIOs) or by technical


\textsuperscript{344} Formerly located in Zambakro (Côte d’Ivoire), intended to be relocated in Bamako in 2006.
training detachments (DITs). Advanced Training Programmes are organised in two-year cycles comprising three components:

1. A major cycle for one sub-Saharan region (e.g. ECOWAS, ECCAS, IGAD, SADC).
2. Intermediate cycles in the other three regions.
3. Ad-hoc exercises outside the cycle.

Advanced training is organised jointly by France and an African country, and is carried out at regional level. It is intended to provide pre-trained units with additional training to facilitate their operation in a multinational environment. All training is exclusively related to peacekeeping.

*Major cycles* are focused at the strategic level on inter-operational activities and are aimed at training an entire chain of command for a peacekeeping operation. Planning for exercises begins with an induction conference at the regional HQ, stressing their regional dimension. For example, RECAMP IV (ECOWAS) began in June 2003 with a politico-military seminar in Abuja to prepare an Initial Planning Directive (IDP); the operational concept was then planned at a strategic conference in June 2004; exercise BENIN 2004 was then planned for December 2004.

*Intermediate cycles* can take place every two years in regions where no major exercise is happening. They are supported by pre-positioned French troops.
For example, exercise NICUSY 2004 (Mozambique, June 2004) was organised by the armed forces of the southern zone of the Indian Ocean and the Mozambican military authorities and involved around 11 southern African countries, plus Portugal and France.

*Out of cycle exercises* These enable France to respond to initiatives from African and non-African countries, such as Gabon’s Exercise BIYONGHO.

*Operational support*

RECAMP supports individual UN or African peace operations in the following ways: *Force generation* – RECAMP expertise assists in the generation of the force and equipment from RECAMP depots in Cape Verde, Gabon and even directly from France. RECAMP can support operational projection movements, as well as their operational readiness through French DIOs.

*Mission support*

Mission support can involve: diplomatic support; military support for information exchange or planning, assisting operational command structures, stationing officers/liaison detachments with contingents; and deploying a non-African force. *Co-deployment* – French Licorne forces operating in Cote d’Ivoire are more acceptable in theatre because they are operating alongside ECOWAS, where France provides robust, Chapter VII response capacity within
this partnership. ECOWAS forces learn important lessons from deployment with French partners relating to essential operational skills including assembly, command and supply. Licorne forces are also formally embedded within ECOWAS structures.

**Deployments**

As at April 2005, French support for African peacekeeping operations included the following deployments:

- **Côte d’Ivoire** – France has provided 4,000 troops as part of Operation Licorne which has supported the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) and followed by the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI); DIO and support equipment for Togolese troops serving with MICECI (note, MICECI has been integrated into MINUCI, under Senegalese command).

- **Liberia** – France has provided one military liaison officer with the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

- **DRC** – France has provided prepositioning forces, DIO, civil policing and equipment support for Senegalese forces serving with ECOMICI and the UN Organisation Mission in DR Congo (MONUC).

- **Burundi** – Two French DIOs supporting Ethiopian forces serving with the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB).
• CAR – A three person DIO team, preposition forces and equipment support has been provided to the Force de la CEMAC (deployed in the Central African Republic).

Logistics and equipment

France has equipment pre-positioned to support African peacekeeping battalions at three locations: Dakar, Djibouti and Libreville. RECAMP battalions are organised according to UN battalion criteria, comprising 608 personnel and 109 vehicles, as follows:

• 1 HQ and HQ company (154 personnel)
• 3 peacekeeping companies (3 x 123 personnel)
• 1 humanitarian transport company (85 personnel)

French forces provide command assets (signals), individual equipment (combat-dress and individual weapons) and vehicles. Dakar also has 1 field hospital with a capacity of 100 beds.

The German Government and the implementation of the Joint Plan

Germany’s contribution to peacekeeping initiatives in Africa seeks to coincide with the priorities of NEPAD, and the implementation of the G8 Africa Action

Unless otherwise stated, all material is based on e-mail interviews with representatives of the German government, September 2004.
Plan (AAP). German offers of peace and security partnership focus on strengthening African capability to prevent and manage armed conflict, particularly by enhancing the security institutions of regional organisations and the African Union (AU).

The German government attaches high importance to enhancing African crisis prevention and resolution capabilities, in view of the persistence of armed conflict on the continent, which is obstructing development in the countries and regions concerned.\footnote{Peter Linder (2004), \textit{Relations between Germany and Africa}, Speech by the German Ambassador at the Command & Staff College in Accra, 27 July 2004, www.accra.diplo.de/en/botschaft/archiv/speech_270704a.html} German policy stresses strengthening the long-term capability of African political actors to prevent and resolve armed conflict without diminishing the global responsibility of the international community of states under the leadership of the UN Security Council for peacekeeping and peacemaking. The German government realises these aims through its Equipment Aid Programme. It supports the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra.

\textit{Activities that the German government has undertaken to support delivery of the Joint Plan}

DEU was providing assistance in setting up the KAIPTC. A German staff officer was serving at the KAIPTC as a CIMIC instructor. DEU was supporting the UK
Peace Support Training Centre (PSCT), and was participating at the RECAMP IV Exercises.

Logistics and equipment

Germany was considering combining military equipment aid projects with CIMIC courses for African officers. Berlin also considered Germany’s military equipment aid and military educational aid as ‘flanking’ measures.

The Japanese Government and the implementation of the Joint Plan

Japan’s Africa peace and security policy stems from an understanding that global stability and prosperity in the 21st century is impossible without resolving problems in Africa. This rationale lies behind the Japanese Government’s initiative, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), launched in 1993. Through the TICAD process, Japan supports Africa, through the AU and NEPAD initiatives. Japan’s TICAD process emphasises the consolidation of peace as a prerequisite for development. Japan asserted that the fact that the AU is now actively engaging in more peace-related activities than ever before opens a distinct opportunity to realise peace in Africa. Japan would continue to support African efforts. For example, Japan was paying approximately 20% of the total cost of UN

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347 Unless otherwise stated, all material is based on e-mail interviews with representatives of the Japanese government, September 2004.
peacekeeping activities in Africa, and it would continue to assist Africa’s efforts for consolidating peace, such as through disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) and landmine clearance activities in various regions of Africa.

Activities that the Japanese Government has undertaken towards the delivery of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan

Japanese efforts to support the Joint Plan included the following:

- In line with ‘related activities’ stipulated in the Joint Plan, Japan has supported peace consolidation in DR Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola in areas such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and land-mine clearance. Japan also provided more than $40 million to UNHCR for its assistance for refugees and displaced persons in Africa (2004).
- In 2003 Japan contributed $315 million to the UN peace operations in Africa.
- Japan has been cooperating with the AU and ECOWAS in their peacemaking activities and peace conference processes.
- In line with commitments made at Sea Island to support global capacity-building for peacekeeping, the Japanese government was planning to support KAIPTC by cooperating in holding seminars as well as capacity-building measures.
The UK Government and the implementation of the Joint Plan

The UK’s peace and security policy for Africa stresses African ‘ownership’ of local solutions to violent conflict, highlighting the need for Africa to address shortcomings in its regional security structures and conflict prevention mechanisms. It states that the international system, under the leadership of the UN and driven by the political and financial muscle of the G8, can help facilitate African processes. The UK also believes that the evolving EU relationship with the AU and sub-regional organisations has an important role to play in supporting African peacekeeping.

The UK welcomes the progress made by the AU in developing an African peace and security architecture as a means to enable Africans to take on responsibility for conflict prevention and conflict management. UK policy asserts that traditional forms of peacekeeping and diplomacy have proved ineffective in Africa. Therefore, the focus at the time of writing was on building African capacity for a broad range of peacekeeping activities, ranging from preventive measures to peace enforcement. Conflict management and peacebuilding form the core of UK Africa policy. This is reflected in the

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349 Unless otherwise stated, information is based on a series of interviews with officials from the UK Foreign Office (Pan Africa Policy Unit), MOD and DFID, in London and in Africa, between April 2004-April 2005.
establishment of the cross-departmental Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), comprising the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The ACPP is designed to maximise the impact of conflict prevention work undertaken by these three departments.

The UK’s conflict prevention strategy for Africa has developed from experiences in mediation, peacekeeping and peacekeeping training, and Security Sector Review (SSR). The UK emphasises coordinating its conflict prevention activities in Africa with donor partners in the EU, the G8 and the World Bank, and with African partners. The UK currently has prioritised Africa during its G8 and EU Presidencies in 2005. The report of the Commission for Africa, which was launched by the UK Prime Minister in 2004 to allow “a fresh look” at African needs, was seen as a key input to this process.

Activities that the UK has undertaken to support delivery of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan

The UK was providing ongoing support to the development of the AU’s institutional capacity to deliver its peace and security mandate. The UK continues to promote G8+ peacekeeping donor contact groups in key peacekeeping capitals such as Abuja, Addis, Nairobi and Pretoria. The UK has

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352 Unless otherwise stated, all material is based on face-to-face interviews with representatives of the UK government, August 2004 and February 2005.
also been encouraging the convening of a donor coordination conference by the AU.

The UK’s institutional support to ECOWAS, IGAD and limited support for SADC aims to enable these regional bodies to coordinate better with the AU and donors. The UK believes coordination with the US and France (the P3) works particularly well, notably in the context of ECOWAS.

The UK has participated in donor clearinghouse meetings on African peace and security capacity-building in France in May and Washington in October 2004.

The ACPP is the main vehicle to ensure effective cross-government coordination and it successfully helps facilitating a more strategic and comprehensive approach to addressing conflict in SSA.

Institutional capacity-building

The UK was supporting the development of a Strategic Management Capacity at the AU and a functional PSC. Through the EU, the UK was continuing to assist the AU develop the institutional capacity needed to support the PSC. The UK Defence Attaché based in Addis Ababa (DA Addis) advises the AU on military affairs while the UK’s RCA for the Horn of Africa (also based in Addis) was the key point of contact for wider UK assistance to the AU.
He provides advice to the AU where required. A DFID/FCO-funded post from June 2005 was to focus on AU and ECA institution-building.

**West Africa** both the UK RCA (based in Abuja) and UK Liaison Officer to ECOWAS support the development of the ECOWAS Secretariat, including its military planning capacity. The UK was providing £2m for course development and recruitment of key regional staff for the ECOWAS Regional Standby Brigade (ECOBRIX) and a P3-backed UK team from Permanent Joint HQ (PJHQ) had been assisting in its development. There were also plans to fund a research project on the broader requirements of ECOBRIG, in particular at the pol-mil strategic level which KAIPTC will be asked to carry out.

**East Africa** RCA (Addis) supports capacity-building in East Africa. The UK was also supporting the development of the East Africa Regional Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). The UK was funding the establishment of the EASBRIG planning element (PLANELM) and the International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) in Nairobi.

**Southern Africa** The RCA for Southern Africa (Pretoria) supports capacity-building for SADC. This support is linked to implementing the Strategic Indicative Plan for the SADC Organ (SIPO). A more comprehensive SADC peace and security assistance package was under consideration.
Central Africa

The RCA for Central Africa (Nairobi) provides advice and support for peacekeeping in the Great Lakes Region.

UK Defence Attaches (DAs) provide military advice and support in-country in the following capitals:

- West Africa – Abuja, Accra and Freetown.
- Central Africa – Kinshasa and Luanda.

Training

West Africa the British Military Advisory Training Team (West Africa) (BMATT-WA), based in Accra, was supporting the development of Ghanaian Armed Forces (GAF). It was also supporting the Ghanaian Command and Staff College (GAFCSC) and KAIPTC over regional peacekeeping capacity-building. The UK was sponsoring a Training Needs Analysis for ECOBRIG. The UK has also contributed to the French RECAMP IV command post training exercise in West Africa and made a financial contribution to the Bamako Tactical Training School (Mali). IMATT Sierra Leone is a special case where the UK provides training for the entire Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces as well as advice on security sector reform.
Eastern Africa the British Peace Support Team (East Africa) (BPST-EA), based in Nairobi, was coordinating UK military assistance to armed forces in Eastern Africa to contribute to SSR and to increase peacekeeping capacity. In this context, it was also supporting the Peace Support Training Centre based in Nairobi (minor infrastructure projects and courses sponsoring).

Southern Africa BPST (SA) carries out peacekeeping training with South African National Defence Forces (SANDF) to further build peacekeeping capacity in SANDF, so that they are better prepared and trained for peacekeeping in DR Congo, Burundi and so on. It also provides some infrastructure projects for peacekeeping training schools. In addition, a number of UK short term training teams (STTT) are deployed each year to SSA and a variety of UK-based strategic training courses are regularly sponsored (Sandhurst, RCDS etc).

Doctrine

The UK and France have offered the AU assistance in the development of an agreed, common African peacekeeping doctrine, to support interoperability between national contingents as part of the operationalisation of the ASF.

Operational Support
The UK was providing the following to ongoing African peacekeeping operations:

- **Côte d’Ivoire** – Financial support to the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI), including an up to £2m support package for the GAF deployment;
- **Liberia** – Three staff officers to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) HQ who are involved in planning, operations and intelligence and £2m to support the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL);
- **Sierra Leone** – 22 staff and observers to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) HQ;
- **Sudan** – Two Colonels supporting the south Sudan peace process; and two advance posts deployed to support planning for potential UN Monitoring Mission in Sudan;
- **DRCongo** – Five staff to the UN Mission in the DR Congo (MONUC) HQ and £1m support for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) deployment to MONUC;
- **Burundi** – Equipment and £3.6m assistance for the deployment of a Mozambican contingent to the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB).

*Police Cooperation, Training and Instruction*
The UK was supporting a range of activities aimed at developing civil policing capacity across Africa. These include:

- ‘Train-the-trainer’ courses aimed at bringing about more consistent standards of training for civilian police officers for deployment to UN missions. Police personnel from the following African countries were trained (in Africa) in 2003: Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Gambia, Cameroon, Botswana, South Africa, Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. Two courses are planned in Africa in 2005 (Kenya – January, Ghana – February/March), but it is yet to be confirmed which African countries will send participants.

- Continuation courses in the UK trained personnel from the following countries in 2003: Ghana, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Botswana, Zambia, Gambia, Cameroon and South Africa.

- Additional support is provided in Kenya, through training courses for Kenyan police officers and development of Kenyan trainers.

- Ten UK police officers are serving in Sierra Leone, training and mentoring the local police force to bring them up to international standards.

The US Government and the implementation of the Joint Plan


354 Unless otherwise stated, information in this section is based on a series of interviews with officials from the US State Department and the Pentagon, in Washington and in Addis Ababa, between June and September 2004.
American officials stressed that the ‘war-on-terror’ had increased US emphasis on building stability as a means of undermining havens/breeding grounds for terrorists. This included areas otherwise perceived as non-strategic, such as Africa. Major causes of instability in Africa identified by the US included diamonds, drugs and terrorism, as well as issues such as poverty and poor governance. Africa is the region most in need of support for overall development and peacekeeping capacity. US focus was on supporting indigenous African peacekeeping capacity, rather than direct US operational involvement. The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) is the primary US mechanism to help build African peace and security capacity. It was launched in spring 2002 to support peace operations and humanitarian assistance capabilities among selected African armies, providing peacekeeping training, technical assistance, mentoring and field equipment. Its aims are to train African militaries to provide the backbone of African peacekeeping operations. ACOTA evolved from the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), which was launched in early 1997. The ACRI had replaced the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), which had been launched in 1996.355

The African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) had emerged in the context of the Burundi crisis in 1996. The ACRF aimed to set up an African force within six months, for which Washington suggested it might have provided airlift and

The ACRF never got beyond the conceptual stage, due, amongst other things, to opposition to the ACRF rationale from both Africa and Europe. It was, therefore, soon repackaged as the ACRI, reflecting a shift in focus away from developing a force to developing a capacity. Under ACRI, which cost around $15 million a year, national contingents would get training and equipment for traditional peacekeeping (i.e. without an enforcement capacity). Stress was placed on promoting sustainable African capacity. An emphasis on African countries keeping operational control of their national units helped persuade eight countries to sign up for ACRI programmes at battalion and brigade levels. But dissatisfaction remained among recipients and in the US: recipients perceived ACRI reflected US interests more than their own; and the Pentagon was unhappy that the State Department’s selection criteria did not always match recipients’ willingness to contribute troops for peacekeeping operations.

In response to the capture of peacekeepers deployed to Sierra Leone in May 2000, Washington developed a subsequent capacity-building initiative: Operation Focus Relief (OFR). OFR was substantially different from ACRI, in that it would supply lethal equipment. It also aimed to tackle some of the problems associated with ACRI, not least a shared understanding with

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356 The plan was undermined by difficulties, including African states’ perceptions of a lack of consultation with them, combined with a failure to acknowledge the potential of regional bodies such as the now defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU).


recipient countries (Ghana, Senegal and Nigeria) that their troops would be deployed to the Sierra Leone operation using materiel provided by OFR.359

In spring 2002, the Bush administration replaced the ACRI with ACOTA. This was intended to provide training for selected African countries in peacekeeping operations, as well as regular military tactics and some logistic support. ACOTA commands commensurate funding levels to ACRI, and it retains many of its components. But Washington has asserted that the programme has been adapted in some fundamental areas:

• supplying support packages tailored for recipient needs;
• using the ‘train-the-trainer’ concept to establish sustainability; and
• incorporating support for building peace enforcement capacity (although this has largely been restricted to training).

Under ACOTA, the US revised the ACRI concept in some fundamental areas including:

• Supplying support packages, tailored for recipients’ requirements;
• Using the ‘train-the-trainer’ concept to set up long-term sustainability; and
• Helping build peace enforcement capacity.

The ACOTA program was incorporated within the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a US programme to develop peacekeeping capacity globally, which was adopted by the G8 at Sea Island in 2004. GPOI support for Africa includes training and equipping units as part of the ACOTA program, maintaining equipment for deploying peacekeeping units, and enhancing the ability of the headquarters staffs from the AU, ECOWAS and other sub-regional organisations to plan for and carry out peacekeeping missions, as appropriate.

Activities the US is undertaking towards the delivery of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan

In 2004, the ACOTA budget was around $15 million, and this was intended to be increased under GPOI in 2005 and for the remainder of the five-year initiative. In addition, the US pledged to dedicate resources towards enhancing the HQ element of the AU and ECOWAS and other sub-regional organisations, as appropriate. Furthermore, GPOI funds would also be used to enable the US to procure and cache equipment that would be available for deploying peacekeeping units. Specific activities that the US is currently undertaking towards the delivery of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan include the following:

Institutional capacity-building
A US adviser was embedded at ECOWAS HQ in Abuja, helping to enhance its strategic management capacity through staff assistance work and training. The US was also assisting ECOWAS communications, which, at the time of writing, continued to rely on telephone and fax. Washington has been in the process of establishing 24 hour electronic communications between Abuja, connecting ECOWAS PAD staff and national MODs, including all Member States except Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and Burkina Faso. Washington was also intending to extend its to video-conferencing, as well as a deployment package, for use in operations. Operationalising the ECOWAS system has experienced problems, but efforts were being made to overcome these. Washington had also expressed its willingness to assist with AU/regional 24 hour connectivity.

**Coordination**

The US stated it had hosted a donors’ clearinghouse meeting, to exchange information on efforts to enhance African peace and security. This took place from 7 – 8 October 2004 in Washington, and involved representatives of all G8 Member States, the AU, ECOWAS, the EU, the UN and NATO. The US government recalled that the clearinghouse concept was a G8 commitment. As a result of the meeting, the US volunteered to set up a website where all G8 members could list their activities to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities.
Training

ACOTA remains the main US mechanism to train African peacekeepers. ACOTA works primarily bilaterally. However, ACOTA does conduct multinational exercises that involve several countries and the US is working to incorporate ECOWAS and the AU into these activities.

The US government stressed that involvement in ACOTA implies a considerable resource commitment from host militaries, organisationally and in terms of resources. Washington stated that African militaries engaging with ACOTA need to dedicate battalion staff for two-and-a-half months and a whole battalion for one month. Hosts have to pay subsistence and other costs for participants.

Three-phase training cycle

In order to accommodate different standards of training within participating militaries, ACOTA training for battalion staff takes place in three phases:

1) Basic training for the officer cadre among the whole battalion.
2) The cadre assists US trainers to train a second battalion.
3) The cadre trains a third battalion under US supervision. The 3-phased ACOTA training cycle caters for three battalions and one training cadre.

The US government states that this method has proved highly effective,
ensuring that the officer cadre is familiar with all aspects of necessary training skills and that three battalions are also trained in the process.

Following up the battalion-staff level training, entire battalions are involved in ACOTA field training exercises. ACOTA’s emphasis on ‘train-the-trainer’ is intended to support sustainable capacity-building within the context of African ownership of The process. ACOTA assistance focuses on skills for peacekeeping, which also reflects African desires. A major focus is on how to work together operating in multinational forces, such as in a UN mission.

The ACOTA sustainability ethos was intended to be extended to equipment support. The type of training offered by ACOTA carries certain equipment requirements. Equipment packages supplied through ACOTA to African trainers can only be used for training purposes, in order to prevent training equipment being diverted for operations and so on and thereby maintaining longevity of training capacity among ACOTA partners.

ACOTA is designed it to be flexible to respond to hosts’ requirements regarding specific needs, focusing tailored programmes to whatever level is required according to need.

*International Military Education and Training (IMET)*
IMET programmes concentrate on academic training and contain considerable peacekeeping relevance, notably courses on human rights and civil-military relations. The IMET program provides training to more than 1,500 military officers from over forty African countries both in the host country and at US military colleges.

*Operational support*

As at spring 2005, the US government was involved in a number of operational support initiatives in Africa. These are summarised below:

**Sudan** – The US provided crisis assistance to the AU over Darfur. Four ACOTA-trained battalions were deployed with the AU Missions in Sudan (AMIS 1 and II). The US provided considerable funding for AMIS operational costs.

**Burundi** – The US provided assistance, such as supporting the deployment of the Ethiopia contingent, to the AU mission in Burundi.

**Ethiopia/Eritrea** – The US supplied six military observers deployed with the UN Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea.

**Liberia/Cote d’Ivoire** – The US provided 81 military observer and troop personnel serving with the UN Mission in Liberia; the US also supplied start-up
and other assistance to the ECOWAS Missions in Liberia (ECOMICI) and Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI).

Logistics and equipment

The US was supporting AU logistics depots, which have been used operationally in Burundi and Darfur.

In West Africa, the US was supporting the development of depots in Freetown and in Mali, for use by ECOWAS in the regional context. These initiatives were started in response to a 1999 ECOWAS initiative seeking the establishment of two logistics depots.

G8-Africa Joint Plan: African perspectives

So far this chapter has described what the G8 says it is doing to implement the Joint Plan. The key questions is, how does this work from an African perspective. In the last section of this chapter I present the results of my field investigation with key African partners.
Interviews with African partners were based on the following set of eight questions, although face-to-face interviews allowed considerable scope for further discussion.\footnote{Interviews were primarily undertaken under the ‘Chatham House’ rule, whereby quotes and information are non-attributable. A list of interviewees is included in Annex XX, although some wished to remain anonymous. Information in this section is accurate as of April 2005.}

9. Have you carried out, commissioned or taken part in any surveys of peace and security capacity or capacity-building programmes in your country, region, or Africa as a whole? If so, could you share the outcomes of this work with us?

10. What activities are you involved in or planning towards the implementation of the \textit{Joint Africa/G8 Plan}? If you are working with donor partners on these activities, who are they and what are they contributing to your efforts?

11. To what extent do the terms of the \textit{Joint Plan} fit with your priorities for developing effective African peace and security architecture, including the ASF/standby brigades?

12. To what extent are the AU/RECs/donors coordinating their activities/plans for the establishment of African peace and security architecture and which areas would benefit most from further coordination? How can coordination be improved?
13. What are the key challenges/priorities that need to be addressed in the establishment and operationalisation of African peace and security architecture, including the ASF/standby brigades? How might cooperation between African and donor partners best be enhanced to address these?

14. What areas of PSO capacity-building or individual PSO capacity-building projects do you think have been most successful? Why do you think that they have succeeded?

15. What types of capacity-building support would you like to see donors prioritising and what other activities do you think the G8 should review or include in their programmes?

16. What are your views on the AU/regional security architecture as presently foreseen as an effective conflict management system? What are the key institutions/mechanisms needed to operationalise African peace and security architecture and what are the key steps and actions to implement this?
The African Union and the implementation of the Joint Plan\textsuperscript{361}

The AU was beginning to carry out its own recruitment using a new approach which delivers significant improvements over the OAU system. However, Addis Ababa identified a need for a database of African peacekeeping expertise to facilitate recruitment. The expertise is out there, but it is not always easy to find it.

\textit{Doctrine}

Some work cooperative work was being undertaken with donors to develop doctrine. For example Lt-Col Jenkins (UK) was working with the AU Secretariat on this issue.

\textit{Unrealistic donor demands}

The AU stated that donors need to have patience towards the evolving African Peace and Security Architecture. Africans will make mistakes and lessons are not learned overnight; the EU and UN continue to make mistakes too. The AU believes that it often does a better job than people acknowledge and than other bodies could manage. It thinks that donors should have more

\textsuperscript{361} Unless otherwise stated, information in this section is based on a series of interviews with officials from the AU, undertaken in Addis Ababa and in London, between September and December 2004.
confidence in Africans, and should remember that donors’ record of involvement in African crises has not been that good.

G8 process

The AU asserted that the G8 has the potential to be an important partner in the development of the AU peace and security architecture, but that it should not be the sole centre of gravity for donor engagement, as this risks alienating other key stakeholders in the process. The AU considered the Joint Plan to be a useful agreement. The AU felt there were discontinuities within the G8 process and commitments. It cited the Sea Island Summit outcomes, which pledge to train 75,000 troops without mentioning any of the logistical support that will be needed to sustain current operations. When the AU pointed this out at the October 2004 clearinghouse meeting in Washington, donors simply moved the discussion on to training and did not respond substantively. Addis Ababa also felt that some donors see things from the perspective of their own priorities, which leads them to see peace and security in Africa as a policing issue to prevent migration of Africans to the north. The AU acknowledged that both Africans and the G8 have to fulfil their parts of the deal and there are problems on both sides.

AU leadership
The AU stated that there was a growing understanding of the need to change unequal African/donor partnerships. Respect and trust for AU leadership was recognised by many donor representatives resident in Africa, but this was slower to filter through to respective capitals. The AU felt that it had no choice but to seek donor partnerships (although there are serious African contributions, such as South African support for the Burundi peace process). The AU was pressing for a more rationalised donor/AU programme. The capacity-building process has meant that donors and Africans necessarily have to address coordination problems. But the AU acknowledged that it could not, in the meantime, turn down specific bilateral donor initiatives while that process moves forward. The AU could get overwhelmed by uncoordinated donor efforts, and so it was seeking to develop a framework within which to promote coordination. There was little meaningful dialogue prior to the Darfur crisis, when donors tended to impose their wishes on the AU. For instance, it took donors more than a year to accept the Africans’ preference of five regional brigades to make up the African Standby Force, rather than a single, continental brigade, which donors favoured. Operational engagement in Darfur has brought donors in Addis together through the establishment of initiatives such as the Partners’ Technical Support Group (PTSG), in which donor planners work with the AU to coordinate their activities.

*The role of the UN*
The AU did not see itself as a ‘sub-contractor’ to the UN. It recalled UN failures in the past, which have been drivers in promoting indigenous capacity-building. But, the AU explicitly operates within the terms of international law and the UN Charter.

The Economic Community of West African States and the implementation of the Joint Plan

ECOWAS carried out surveys of available regional peace and security capabilities as part of assessments of its capacity to respond to crises in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 and Liberia in 2003. Subsequently, the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra has also carried out lessons learned exercises from experiences of those deployments. However, lessons learned are often not properly digested and the results not implemented. The lessons learned process is hampered by a lack of clear conceptual understanding of issues of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and general peacekeeping activities. Consequently, a need was identified for a study to clarify priorities and specific areas of focus. Such a study would help the AU and RECs articulate their needs clearly.

ECOWAS Mission Planning and Management Cell (MPMC)

362 Unless otherwise stated, information in this section is based on a series of interviews with officials from ECOWAS, undertaken in Abuja, in September 2004.
As part of its continued efforts to develop and strengthen its planning capacity at the Secretariat, ECOWAS established the MPMC to plan future ECOWAS peacekeeping. The Cell comprised ten military officers seconded from ECOWAS Member States. Nine officers were responsible for planning, whilst one officer was responsible for on-going operations. Plans were underway to restructure the Cell to ensure that an adequate number of officers were placed in charge of peacekeeping issues. In fulfilment of its objective, the MPMC would visit all countries that had pledged troops to the ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG) to assess their level of readiness and logistical status. It will also be responsible for marrying up troop pledges to create sustainable and cohesive units.

The MPMC was further responsible for the development of an ECOWAS doctrine and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The MPMC was being funded by the government of Canada, who responded to a request for support from ECOWAS, which had been voiced at a recent ECOWAS/donor meeting. Canada committed three years funding for the establishment and operations of the MPMC. In addition to Canada, the P3 had officials seconded to the ECOWAS secretariat working closely with the MPMC.

*Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC)*

The MPMC was working closely with ECOWAS Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) – the current ECOWAS early warning system. For ease of
communication, ECOWAS was organised into four regions with zonal bureaus located in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; Cotonou, Benin; Monrovia, Liberia; and Banjul, The Gambia. The zonal bureaus were reporting directly to the OMC at the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria.

*Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)*

The KAIPTC was engaged with donorsdevelopment partners such as the UK, Germany, Canada, France and the US to consolidate peace and security related programmes and activities in West Africa. For example, the physical infrastructure of the KAIPTC was funded by the German government, while the course package was drawn up with substantial input from the UK government and the Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre in Canada. A decision had recently been taken by the government of the Netherlands to provide 1.2 million to help the KAIPTC complete its building activities in respect of accommodation block and a mess facility.

*G8 role*

ECOWAS felt that G8 ambitions in Africa broadly matched ECOWAS’ original priorities of promoting regional economic development. It stated that the general thrust of the G8 Africa Action Plan was in line with ECOWAS ideals, citing the following examples:
• training African peacekeeping forces; ECOWAS referred to ACOTA and RECAMP as good examples, while the KAIPTC is specifically mentioned in the Joint Plan;
• regulating the activities of arms brokers and traffickers;
• developing and adopting guidelines to prevent the illegal supply of arms to Africa;
• supporting efforts to eliminate and remove anti-personnel mines;
• working with government and civil society to address the linkage between armed conflict and the exploitation of natural resources; and
• encouraging more effective coordination and co-operation among donors and international institutions in support of peace-building and conflict prevention efforts (including DDR programmes).

However, ECOWAS pointed out that its efforts to develop an effective peace and security architecture predate both the Joint Plan and AU’s call for the establishment of the ASF/standby Brigades, including both the ECOWAS Protocol on Conflict Resolution and the supplementary Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy. ECOWAS believed that it is important for new initiatives to build on existing structures, rather than seeking to impose new approaches, and that these should be geared towards strengthening ECOWAS’ capacity as an implementing partner of the AU.

African Coordination
ECOWAS was incorporating the AU’s plans for the establishment of the ASF into its own processes for setting up ECOBRIG. It acknowledged that the AU PSC and the UN Security Council retained primary responsibility for authorising interventions. However, formal links between AU and ECOWAS planning were weak, although ECOWAS was in the process of concluding a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the AU to help clarify and formalise interactions. At the regional level there was a history of poor communication between respective national governments and the RECs. However, regular meetings of the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission (DSC) were improving coordination for peace and security. In West Africa, operational experience in ECOWAS deployments in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire had facilitated regional cooperation among ECOWAS Member States, who have had to work together out of necessity. Support for these missions had also expedited donor coordination, including helping break down anglophone/francophone political divisions which in the past had impeded progress in West Africa.

Key Challenges

ECOWAS identified a need to develop its organisational structure in a way that is acceptable to all its Member States, and to operationalise its security architecture. It felt that finance was weak, including pay or allowances for the peacekeeping troops and difficulties with honouring of pledges. There was a need for more effective involvement of the civil sector and the civil police in
peacebuilding aspects of peace initiatives. Key challenges identified by the ECOWAS Secretariat included the following:

- defining the operational requirement of ECOBRIG;
- assessing the military capabilities of Member States in terms of equipment and logistics;
- determining the requirements for logistics infrastructure in respect of the depots in Mali and Sierra Leone;
- developing SOPs and training requirements for ECOBRIG;
- determining requirements for the standardization of equipment for maintenance purposes; and
- developing doctrine to support the ECOBRIG

Comprehensive donor support

ECOWAS believed that donor support activities were not always thought through sufficiently thoroughly. For example, the US supplied Ghana with the sophisticated Janus computerised training simulation system. However, there were no trained operators in Accra and the system had not been used very much. This was problematic beyond a waste of resources, as donors resented that assistance was not being used, which discouraged further donor engagement.
The Southern African Development Community and the implementation of the Joint Plan

SADC stated that it was important that its strategic vision matched actual resources available. This required strategic planning, and it would help ensuring ‘value for money’ from the capacity-building process. The SADC administration in Gabarone felt some tension between itself and some key SADC Member States. It stressed that building SADC institutional capacity complemented the organic growth of what was actually happening, and that it was not there to replace Member States’ capacity. South Africa was Chair of the SADC Organ in 2004/5, and was focusing primarily on the pan-African level, rather than the regional level. It was concentrating its efforts on the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), and the implementation/operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Agenda (APSA).

Peace and security context

There were no extant conflicts in the SADC region, so SADC felt that the focus should be less directed to developing military response capacity. However, much work was needed in post-conflict reconstruction, for instance to support the reintegration aspects of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes.

Unless otherwise stated, information in this section is based on a series of interviews with officials from SADC, undertaken Pretoria in September 2004.
**African Standby Force (ASF)**

SADC’s priority in establishing its arm of the ASF was to set up a Planning Element (PLANELM) and to assess regional capability. This would enable the allotment of responsibilities to various stakeholders in line with expertise and comparative advantages and disadvantages.

**Broad approach to security**

SADC policy acknowledged the inherent links between security and political integration in the southern region. SADC and its Member States recognised this well, and SADC asserted that it was no coincidence that the SADC Protocol relates to politics, defence and security.

**Practicalities of SADC regional politics**

The way that the Organ has developed reflects how SADC responds to, and evolves within, practicable possibilities in the region. SADC stated that if Member States saw things functioning at the regional level, this would encourage regional integration. Each phase of the capacity-building process needs to work to build confidence among stakeholders.

**G8 role**
SADC was urging the G8 to consider moving away from focusing on easy, short-term projects to more long-term and sustainable development programmes, including paying more attention to post-conflict reconstruction and development. It also suggested that the G8 broaden engagement with African states. Increasing the number of African participants at G8 Summits would counter accusations by AU Member States who perceived themselves as marginalised from the process of G8 bias. At the time of writing, SADC was not seriously engaged with the G8 on the implementation of the Joint Plan.

SADC stated that G8 priorities were not harmonised with those of their African partners. For instance, there was a growing perception of a clash of approaches in dealing with conflicts on the continent. SADC stated that, while the AU generally favoured political/diplomatic responses, donor partners often pushed the military/interventionist approach. In the regional context, a notable example was South Africa’s preference for ‘quiet diplomacy’ in dealing with Zimbabwe, in contrast with the more confrontational approaches of some external partners.

*Conceptual understanding of capacity-building*

SADC identified a need for a clear conceptual understanding of ‘capabilities’ and ‘capacitybuilding’. At the time, this was confused, particularly regarding emergency response versus long-term institutional capacity. SADC urged G8 members and Africans to articulate and discuss their understanding of these
concepts. This process would be assisted by examination of the nature of African conflicts, focusing on experiences such as from disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) programmes, which have tendency to relapse after several years. A clear understanding of why some post-conflict societies fall back into violent conflict would inform future responses to conflicts. It would also be useful to get a clearer picture of the policies and forces driving particular peace processes.

**Regional integration**

SADC was in the process of taking its internal capacity-building process forwards, was waiting to inform donor partners at the appropriate time of what sort of assistance was required, and how this assistance should be delivered. SADC suggested that donor partners could at that point (i.e. when it was most useful for SADC) offer and negotiate how to accommodate these requirements: SADC was willing to negotiate with partners regarding the various aspects of the peace and security architecture, but only when it was ready. For instance, SADC was at the time working to build strategic headquarters for peacekeeping. SADC Member States had supplied seed funding for this, but partner cooperation was needed. Other regions were moving ahead with peace and security capacity-building much more visibly than SADC, which discouraged partner interest in supporting SADC. SADC believed it should publicise its particular approach and circumstances better,
as well as the work that it was doing to maintain momentum and support as it made progress in its own way and at its own pace.

**Strategic Implementation Plan for the SADC Organ (SIPO)**

In line with the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security, SADC was setting up the institutional framework for implementing that Protocol through the Strategic Implementation Plan for the SADC Organ (SIPO). SIPO spells out the Organ’s activities and the vision of institutional structures at the regional level. A Politics, Defence and Security Department was set up but has yet to be manned. A priority here has been harmonising activities with the AU.

**SADCBRIG**

SADC was seeking to implement plans for its regional standby brigade, SADCBRIG. Plans for SADCBRIG were at the time being visualised in Gabarone, including a timetable for implementation. It was anticipated that the structure of SADCBRIG would be approved at the SADC Summit in Botswana. UPDATE

**Regional confidence-building**
SADC identified the most pressing regional challenge for Southern Africa as to maintain the process of confidence-building, in order to facilitate regional integration. Cooperation in SADC over political, defence and security issues was comparatively new, and SADC had little experience of ‘pooling sovereignty’ for regional integration, or of investing funding and other resources into practical activities in this area and translating that into actual output. SADC identified a need for concrete, demonstrable progress to highlight SADC Member States’ commitment to take things forward regionally.

However, SADC cited a number of problems which created tension between partners and was impeding progress. These included: differences in political outlooks and values; a failure to match resources with needs; ‘tied’ donor assistance; and a tendency for SADC to agree to things it does not really need in order merely to receive support.

SADC stated that cooperation was much better at the level of Heads of State and Government than further down the chain. Improvements in this area would expedite progress more broadly. SADC suggested bringing mid-level commanders together for interoperability exercises, as these would be the people deployed in actual operations. This would help build confidence among Member States. Tangible improvements in performance as would then encourage a strategic shift to regional interoperability.
Training

SADC urged greater efforts to increase intra- and inter-regional training programs. This could be done through the exchange of command staff officers to allow for ‘cross-pollination’. SADC stated that the EU Common Position on Zimbabwe remained a political and legal constraint on engagement by EU Member States in Southern Africa training initiatives, such as the Regional Peace Training Centre.

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and the implementation of the Joint Plan\textsuperscript{364}

IGAD generally lacks the military muscle for robust military intervention. In 2004, IGAD’s involvement in peace and security was largely limited to diplomacy – although in March 2003 IGAD agreed to establish a Verification and Monitoring Team (VFM) to monitor the continuing cessation of hostilities between the SPLA/M and the government of Sudan.

IGAD was involved in Somali Peace Process since 1991, and it assisted in the establishment of the interim government of Somalia, currently based in Nairobi, Kenya. IGAD also played a mediation role in the peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the southern-based rebel group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). Following the AU’s call

\textsuperscript{364} Unless otherwise stated, information in this section is based on a series of interviews with officials from IGAD, undertaken in Nairobi in September 2004.
for the establishment of the ASF, Eastern African states have entrusted IGAD with the interim responsibility of coordinating efforts towards the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG).

*The Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) Strategic Vision*

IGAD was designated ‘interim coordinator for the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). IGAD’s office of Political and Humanitarian Affairs with its Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution unit has coordinated all efforts for the establishment of the EASBRIG. IGAD’s role has been challenged, largely due largely to the fact not all Member States of EASBRIG are members of IGAD. However, with no other REC to take on the responsibility of a coordinator, IGAD was broadly accepted as the best compromise. In spite of differences and existing political tensions between Member States of the EASBRIG, they see the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts as a matter of urgency that can only be handled at the subregional level, hence the concerted efforts to establish the regional brigade. The draft MoU states the objective of EASBRIG as “...to carry out in a timely manner the functions of maintenance of peace and security as mandated the Peace Security Council of the African Union in accordance with the constitutive Act of the African Union.”

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365 For more information on the organs of the EASBRIG see the "Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG),” Kigali, Rwanda, 9-10th September, 2004.
The Eastern African region has been beset by numerous conflicts, ranging from wars of secession to other complex intra-state conflicts. Most conflicts in the area have a regional dimension, leading to the tensions and suspicion that exists between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan and Uganda, Sudan and Eritrea, Sudan and Rwanda, among others. Consequently, the Eastern Africa region saw the establishment and operationalisation of EASBRIG as an important step in not only preventing, resolving and managing conflicts, but also as a confidence-building measure. EASBRIG stated that joint training programs envisaged under EASBRIG would go a long way in building confidence between Member States, which would then contribute to strengthening efforts at preventive diplomacy.

**EASBRIG**

IGAD Member States had taken significant steps towards the establishment of EASBRIG. After a series of ministerial, military and technical meetings, the region adopted a Draft Policy Framework, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and a budget for EASBRIG. Moreover, it reached agreement on the establishment and location of the following organs: the
Brigade Headquarters, the Planning Element (PLANELM) and the Logistics Base (LOGBASE). 366

The Brigade HQ

The Eastern Africa region agreed to establish a Brigade HQ to be located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, separate from the regional PLANELM in Nairobi, Kenya. A number of observers stated that this separation was a political compromise, so that Kenya would not be seen as too dominant, and thta this was not helpful in terms of developing a functioning, regional military capacity. The head of the Brigade HQ would be a military officer of the rank of a Brigadier or its equivalent, and for the first year was to be provided by the host nation. Thereafter the appointment would be made on a rotational basis. Military and civilian personnel, on secondment from Member States, would staff the Brigade HQ. Among other things, the Brigade HQ would serve as a command headquarters for force preparation and operational command of the EASBRIG. It would also operate as a secretariat to the Committee of Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defence Staff.

The Planning Element (PLANELM)

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366 For more information on the organs of the EASBRIG see the "Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG),” Kigali, Rwanda, 9-10th September, 2004.
Member States agreed to locate the PLANELM at Karen, Nairobi. It was to be headed by a military officer of the rank of a Colonel. As with the Brigade HQ, the head of the PLANELM would be provided by the host nation during the first year, reverting subsequently to a defined rotational formula. The main function of the PLANELM was to serve as a full-time multinational planning headquarters. All planning would be carried out within the framework of the ASF and the UN Standby Arrangement System. To strengthen its planning capacity, the PLANELM would enter into agreements with national and other centres of excellence in the sub-region and elsewhere.

*The Logistic Base*

In the interest of an effective command and control of the regional logistic resources, the Logistic Base (LogBase) would initially be co-located with the Brigade HQ in Addis Ababa, with outposts in Member States depending on the situation. Like the PLANELM, the LogBase was to be headed by a Colonel, with a similar rotating leadership. The main function of the LogBase was to act as the central depot for maintaining, storage and management of the logistical assets of EASBRIG. In addition, it will “coordinate all activities involving logistics of the EASBRIG, including but not limited to performing functions mandated by the African Union and/or the United Nations managing external assistance”.367

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367 For more information on the organs of the EASBRIG see the “Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG),” Kigali, Rwanda, 9-10th September, 2004.
Early Warning

IGAD’s existing early warning system was originally designed in relation to drought and other ecological disasters. However, efforts were under way to develop a robust early warning mechanism, which would provide advance warning about impeding conflicts. The Eastern African region was the establishment of regional early warning mechanisms as a major part of the overall plan for the establishment and operationalisation of the ASF.

Donor Coordination

IGAD stated that donor coordination was irregular. The UK, though its Peace Support Training Program (BPST) based in Karen, Kenya, was supporting, among other things, training and financing for the construction of the PLANELM. However, these efforts were not coordinated with those of other donor countries. For instance, Germany through its Technical Development Programme GTZ has provided IGAD with financial support for the convening and hiring of consultants for all EASBRIG meetings. Assistance from the US and France was provided primarily on a bilateral basis.

Conclusion
The analysis above suggests that both the G8 and its African partners believe that the Joint Plan has potential to deliver a functioning African peacekeeping capacity, and both are working to implement it effectively. The Joint Plan supports relevant components of the African peace and security architecture, including the ASF, and its peace enforcement and peacebuilding functions.

But there are also some major gaps. In practical terms, a number of key areas for action to enhance implementation are apparent, including strategic management capacity; donor coordination; operationalising the African standby force; and training and logistics. There are also clearly difficulties with African ownership, as well as a distinct lack of emphasis on local communities and civil society.

Chapter 7 will respond to these action areas in more detail, highlighting key challenges and priorities areas for action, and then outlining potential areas for agreement to take the implementation process forward.
This chapter presents further results and research regarding implementation of the G8-Africa Joint Plan, including from the author’s interviews with key African and G8 representatives, as well as from a two-day international workshop organised by the author at Chatham House in London in 2005, which brought together key governmental and non-governmental stakeholders from Africa, G8 countries, as well as the UN and the EU.

Chapter 7 first outlines key challenges and priorities for the implementation of the Joint Plan. These can be grouped into the following categories: African strategic vision and leadership; the African Standby Force; African peace and security architecture (APSA); institutional human resources/strategic management capacity; coordinating donor support; African ownership of the capacity-building process; financing peacekeeping capacity-building; logistics; and training.

The chapter then outlines priority areas for increased Africa-G8 cooperation, including the following: institutional human resources and strategic management capacity; improving donor coordination; operationalising the ASF; training; and logistics.

The third section of the chapter presents the outcome of the Chatham House Conference organised by the author on potential areas for agreement and
action for implementation of the Joint Plan. The workshop covered key areas in the African PSO capacity-building process.

**Challenges**

*African strategic vision and leadership*

The AU stressed the importance of enhancing capacity for the breadth of the continental peacekeeping capacity. This stretched from the AU PSC, through to the ASF – including police and civilian capacity. It incorporated the CEWS, and extends down to basic infrastructure such as effective budgeting and accounting systems.

A number of African stakeholders stressed that donor support should be approached as a long-term and sustainable project and should be multidimensional. It should take into account regional and national resources as the building-blocks of the system within the overall framework of the AU. More broadly still, efforts to enhance African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) should be seen within the broader context of promoting African development, emphasising links between peacekeeping capacity-enhancement and the NEPAD process. The AU should not become solely a peace and security institution, although many stakeholders agreed that

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368 Research for this section is taken from a two-day international workshop held on 13-14 April 2005 at Chatham House in London. The workshop brought together key governmental and non-governmental stakeholders from Africa, G8 countries, as well as the UN and the EU. A list of participants is contained in Annex XX.
peacekeeping capacity-enhancement was a key starting point for other aspects of development, and was a measure of African commitment to transformation.

The AU identified the ASF as the key implementing mechanism for the whole African peace and security architecture, impacting upon conflict prevention (through preventive deterrence) and management. At the same time, a number of stakeholders warned against over-emphasising military capacity as the most visible component of peacekeeping, as this risked distorting the continental architecture to rely too heavily on emergency response, at the expense of non-military preventive measures. These could be less costly in financial and human terms, and played to existing African strengths in mediation. The US in particular highlighted the importance of constabulary forces to respond to civil disorder as part of African peacekeeping, and it was supporting the Italian initiative to establish an international Centre of Excellence to provide carabinieri/gendarmerie training and skills for peacekeeping, as highlighted at the Sea Island Summit.

Donors generally agreed that their support for capacity-building should come in response to the AU’s own strategic vision, based on coordinated discussion with the AU Commission (AUC). They also declared that the AU Commission for Peace and Security maintained a good, broad vision of the ultimate shape of the African peace and security architecture, and had good awareness of the primary challenges involved in developing this. However, a number of
stakeholders warned that the AU lacked the capability to translate its vision into well-defined, specific, and phased steps which were implementable, and around which donors could coordinate their assistance. The multiplicity of donor agendas within Africa further complicated this lack of clarity, which was undermining African ownership of the capacity-building process, and also presented a major problem for donors who were seeking to increase their assistance, and to channel it to areas of greatest need.

The African Standby Force

The AU highlighted the need to maintain flexibility for the ASF, in order to enable it to respond to emerging developments in regional capacity. Many African stakeholders stressed that attempts to impose a rigid continental structure from Addis Ababa were not practicable, and also failed to acknowledge existing realities. To be able to respond to African crises in the short- and long- term, the AU asserted that the ASF needed to develop capacity that was both rapidly deployable, and was sustainable. The US stressed the importance of clarifying the necessary operational components to deploy African peace operations, relating to forces that could be deployed, sustained and rotated. At the time, financial structures to support this capability did not exist in any African region.

Flexibility of partnership in theatre
Many stakeholders suggested that universal standards needed to be developed for the ASF, taking into account the fact that the ASF is likely to operate as a bridging force for UN deployments. This implied that both the AU’s and the RECs’ peace and security architecture should be developed in line with UN standards, and should be designed to cooperate with the UN, especially in relation to doctrine and rules of engagement, in order to promote interoperability and complementarity among the various components of the architecture. Another layer could be added if EU Battlegroups develop a major African role.

Planning element (PLANELM)

A key priority identified for the development of the ASF was the establishment of PLANELMs for the AU and the RECs. The PLANELM at the AUC is aimed at ensuring interoperability between the various elements of the ASF through the development of coherent doctrine, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and terms of reference and a pool of expertise, as well as to manage peacekeepings deployed by the AU. The AU PLANELM would form the core of the system, incorporating liaison officers from the RECs to coordinate regionally. REC PLANELMs will need similar links, perhaps through the appointment of a focal point for the ASF with whom the AU can liaise.

The AU consultant on the ASF had developed Terms of Reference for the ASF, but these could not be shared with the RECs without the establishment of the
AU PLANELM. The AU is timetabling for recruitment but may face delays. The AU believed that delays in setting up the AU PLANELM have compounded problems regarding interoperability of the regional brigades. At that moment West and Eastern African regions are far advanced in the process of establishing the structures and mechanisms needed for the operationalization of the brigades, including developing doctrine and SOPs for the ASF. However, lack of human and other resources limited AU leadership in these areas. The process of concluding a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the AU and the RECs would serve as a defining framework for AU/REC relationships. Thinking about next steps after the signing of the MoU needs to be developed.

*Regional Standby Brigades*

Coordination between the AU and Regional Standby Brigades (RSBs) remained a problem. Many donors expressed concern that existing regional African bodies do not tally well with the RECs, as defined by the AU, owing to the overlap of regional organisations in some parts of the continent. One notable exception was the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Some African and donor stakeholders asserted that each region was developing its own brigade according to its perceived needs and priorities, and were concerned about the long-term implications of this. Levels of development of the various RSBs differed enormously, with the West and Eastern African regions significantly ahead of the others, and even of the AU
itself, while North Africa was disengaged from the ASF process, primarily for internal regional political reasons; and little regional capacity existed at all in central Africa. This lack of cohesion could undermine interoperability among the various RSBs and their respective roles within the overarching continental ASF structure, unless timely measures were taken to gain comparable speeds in all the regions. The UK stressed that such tensions were further complicated by donor support favouring regional over continental development for some regions, warning that retroactive attempts to impose continental standards and command and control onto existing RECs sometime in the future would be difficult.

The AU stressed that judgements about which was the most appropriate body to act operationally must be made on a case-by-case basis in response to specific political circumstances. RECs did not always present the best option in their region politically. For example, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was not effective or suitable to the Ethiopian/Eritrean crisis and to Darfur, where the AU acted instead. However, ECOWAS was proving effective in West Africa, after initial regional disputes in the 1990s.

*ECOWAS Regional Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG)*

West Africa had the most developed operational peacekeeping capacity, which makes the cost/benefit equation for ECOWAS of operating with the AU more difficult to analyse. However, ECOWAS could provide an operational
example of how a viable regional organisation can be integrated into the system.

*Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG)*

Problems of regional coherence were visible in Eastern Africa, where IGAD’s coordinating role for EASBRIG has been difficult because not all Member States of EASBRIG are members of IGAD. A firm commitment to the AU by EASBRIG was comparatively easy, as IGAD was not developing capacity to run its own operations. It was following the model used by the Multinational Standby Force High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), looking to the AU or the UN to provide strategic HQ.369

*Southern African Standby Brigade (SASBRIG)*

SADC had been criticised for lagging with issues of implementation of its peace and security agendas, including in relation to the establishment of its RSB. SADC asserted that it is developing machinery, including for SASBRIG, but that regional political sensitivities restrict its capacity to publicise its activities.

*African peace and security architecture (APSA)*

369 For further information on SHIRBRIG, go to: www.shirbrig.dk/index.htm
The Panel of the Wise (POW) was the key AU institution for preventive diplomacy. It was intended to be agile. The choice of its composition was deemed to be very important, as its members’ independence and integrity would be its key strength.

*Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Response*

The AU stressed that CEWS needed expertise, equipment and linkages with relevant regional and international bodies in order to become fully functional. SADC expressed concerns over the nature and methods of collecting information for early warning. This was linked to a lack of consensus on whether early warning should be dealt with in the public domain or as a military/intelligence, which was cited as a highly sensitive issue. This lack of clarity risked breeding suspicion and apprehension by African Member States, which stifles efforts to operationalize early warning systems. A number of stakeholders believed greater clarity would encourage donor understanding and support for early warning. SADC had adopted the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Model for collecting and analysing information, which is deemed to be more compatible and politically-acceptable as it is used by the UN and other international organisations.

*Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP)*
The CADSP provides a framework to review all components of the African peace and security architecture and presents a consolidated basis for the AU to engage with donor partners.

Institutional human resources/strategic management capacity

Overcoming chronic limitations in institutional human resource and strategic management capacity was seen as a major priority for building effective African peacekeeping capacity, as well as for operationalising the relevant architecture. This was true at both AU and regional levels. For instance, the AU PSC has a huge mandate but limited capacity within the Conflict Management Directorate, which includes the old Secretariat for the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Central Organ. These limitations could have a far-reaching impact across many areas of African peacekeeping capability, undermining African leadership of the capacity-building process and African capacity to absorb donor assistance.

Operational capacity

Human resource problems extended to operational capacity for peacekeeping. The US identified a number of problems in HQ-level planning at the AU in relation to peacekeeping capacity, including mission and mandate; working with contributors of troops and other resources; force structure; force generation; dealing with donors; and working with opposing forces (or
warring factions). More specifically, Washington emphasised serious staffing gaps in African military capacity for peacekeeping above the tactical level, pointing out that, in 2005, only four people were running AU operations at the Commission for Peace and Security. The AU highlighted that until recently there was only one regular staff member in the Field Operations Unit (FOU) at the AUC who was occupied with the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). The US stated that ECOWAS deployments in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia have revealed the organisation to be overwhelmed and out of its depth regarding strategic management capacity, and lacking the relevant expertise for major multinational deployment. The US also suggested that donor assistance in response to the Darfur crisis was overwhelming the AU.

*Balancing crisis response with strategic capacity-building for peacekeeping*

All stakeholders stressed that the mismatch between existing African peacekeeping capabilities and contingency demands represented a major challenge for the peacekeeping capacity-building process, diverting nearly all the energy of African institutions to emergency response. The vast majority of the AU’s limited institutional human resources were being absorbed by the Darfur deployment; during an ECOWAS operation, capacity at HQ in Abuja to develop the organisation’s political infrastructure was similarly stretched. The EU was concerned that new AU personnel sponsored by Brussels would only be used for emergency response and would not contribute to capacity-
building in the long-term. Additional funding was needed to support a more independent crisis response capacity.

**Donor technical assistance**

Several stakeholders argued that providing donor expertise to fill capacity gaps was not helpful in the longer-term as it did not help build African capacity, implied African incompetence, and failed to take into account existing African expertise. African stakeholders stressed that donor technical assistance should be more strongly focused on sourcing African expertise and, over the longer term, training Africans to fill these roles according to areas of greatest need.

**Financing for human resources**

Funding was clearly key for recruitment, although a number of stakeholders expressed concern that African Member States tended not to place sufficient prestige on appointments to their regional and continental institutions. The AU highlighted delays in their recruitment process due to key management gaps at the AUC. Some of these delays were also linked with accounting and other demands placed on the AU by donors. The EU pointed out a gap between overall costs and assessed contributions in relation to AUC financing for additional personnel. The planned expansion of AUC staff from 300 to 600 carried an accompanying budget growth from $43m to $165m per annum for
2005. Only $63m of the $165m was earmarked to come from assessed contributions, leading to questions about how to bridge the remaining budget gap.

Institutional management structures

The US highlighted the significance for donors of developing African recipients’ capacity for transparent management funds and other resources. Washington argued that budget management should be a key feature of training and other support to facilitate donor accounting of assistance and as a means of enhancing recipient management capacity more generally. This was true at continental, regional and national levels. At the regional level, France stated that ECOWAS has had some success in communicating clearly how human resources would be used and would add value, but a lack of clear management structure in other RECs has been a barrier to providing support.

Coordinating donor support

Improving donor coordination with African partners was seen by many as a major priority. Initiatives to coordinate donor assistance should be African-led, in order to ensure donor assistance was responding to African priorities. Poor donor coordination risked duplication and competition between strategies and activities and exacerbates accounting demands for African bodies. On the other hand, effective coordination promoted cohesion, understanding,
genuine dialogue and cooperation. The multiplication of donor partners had increased transaction costs for the AU and RECs. The AU believed that systematic donor coordination did not imply the imposition of a single rigid system, but did require a clear framework that donors could commit to. The emphasis should be on flexibility to account for existing donor support initiatives, as well as cohesion to maximise effectiveness. Many donors stressed coordination in favour of joint donor initiatives, which risked being cumbersome, expensive and inefficient. Washington stressed that national constraints such as budget timelines and conditionalities placed on assistance undermine coordination among donors.

G8 coordination

Many African stakeholders complained of a lack of coherence among G8 Member States in the follow-up process for implementation of the Joint Plan. A major problem for G8 engagement was the lack either of G8 machinery through which to implement its policies, or of a formal relationship between the AU and the G8 as a group. In practice, support came mostly from individual G8 states, sometimes in partnership with other, major non-G8 donors with a longer history of engagement in Africa, including the Scandinavians and the Canadians, the Netherlands and Germany. The EU pointed out that there was no G8 focal point for coordination in Addis Ababa. Many non-G8 stakeholders believed that the G8’s dependency on its presidency to define its agenda undermined developing a cohesive, long-term
G8 approach. For instance, the US expanded the African peacekeeping capacity-building process to the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) at Sea Island in 2004, and this did not mention the ASF.

Some key players in Africa remained largely unaware of the Joint Plan; SADC stated that it was not directly engaged with the G8 in its implementation. Others saw the Joint Plan as a ‘pledge’ or wish-list, rather than an actionable plan, stressing that it needed to be synchronised with other African initiatives such as the ASF and its constituent brigades. The KAIPTC stated that it had no direct engagement with the G8 process, despite being mentioned in the communiqué of the 2004 G8 meeting in Sea Island. SADC warned that limited African participation at G8 meetings risks accusations by other AU member states of G8 bias, undermining pan-African cohesion.

Operational coordination

The US stressed that ad hoc operational relationships between donor partners and African bodies were undermining effective deployment and that the donor network responding to a crisis needed to be established as early as possible. For instance, when seeking to deploy a mission, a body like ECOWAS may deal simultaneously with ten different donors, all with different agendas and requirements.
Coordinated donor training initiatives

The US stated that significant coordination between donor training initiatives, such as ACOTA, RECAMP or UK programmes, had not been achieved to date, primarily due to practical obstacles such as the US being constitutionally barred from supporting certain functions, such as construction. ACOTA had been trying to involve other players but somewhat peripherally.

African ownership of the capacity-building process

The AU complained of a tendency for some donors to support capacity-building from the perspective of their own priorities. It stated that much donor assistance still tended to be directive, reflecting donor agendas rather than African priorities, and African aspirations can be overwhelmed by donor objectives. The AU cited the following examples of discrepancies matching donor support with AU needs and priorities:

- donors were originally resistant to accepting African preferences for the ASF to comprise five regional brigades, rather than a single continental brigade;
- AU requests for assistance in establishing a satellite telephone system were met instead with vehicle-mounted communication system, which has proved inappropriate; and
• in Darfur, the US hired Pacific Architects Engineering (PAE) to provide logistical support to AMIS without consulting the AU.

Some African and donor stakeholders stated that, at present, the various donor meetings – such as the ‘P3+ mechanism’ (France, the UK and the US and other significant donors) or clearinghouse meetings, such as in Washington in October 2004 – failed to interact adequately with representatives of African institutions and governments. Rather, they merely aggregated donor opinions and activities. The AU complained that its attempts to highlight the need for logistical support at the 2004 Washington clearinghouse meeting were ignored by donors.

On the other hand, some donors complained that African institutions were not proactive in facilitating African/donor interaction, and that African institutions were often slow in responding to proposals for interaction initiatives. Furthermore, the US believed that African institutions can be politically oversensitive, placing too much emphasis on being seen to do things their own way and not accepting advice and assistance that may be appropriate and of practical importance.

*Financing peacekeeping capacity-building*

African states’ inability to finance their own institutions was undermining both African leadership of the capacity-building process, and donor confidence in
African institutions and relevant initiatives. Donor budgets to support African capacity-building were often accompanied by conditionalities, and were small in comparison to the scale of the task. African stakeholders stressed that this placed an even greater emphasis on the need for African identification of priorities, vis-à-vis the need for external partners to scale up and channel assistance to areas of greatest need.

The UK believed that African partners tended to focus too much on funding, which can divert attention from other key capacity-building issues such as building political will, developing relationships with one another and with donors, institutional capacity-building, transparency, and training.

*Operational financing*

Neither the AU nor RECs had the capacity to provide funding for Member State contributions to African peacekeeping. AU commitments to establish a funding mechanism had not yet been realised. A number of donors complained that the heavy reliance of African peacekeeping on donor financial support exacerbated perceptions that African bodies lack sufficient will to develop more stable internal funding, such as through the establishment of standard payment structures. Debate was on-going as to whether African peacekeeping missions should be funded through assessed contributions and which countries should pay contributions. Incentives to contribute troops and other resources were undermined if contributors are expected to meet their
own costs. UN missions pay more for troop contributions, discouraging participation in African missions, but UN policy proscribes providing resources, including paying salaries, in support of non-UN peacekeeping. The US also stated that its support for operational financing is complicated by limitations in the availability and flexibility of funding.

**Logistics**

The lack of basic logistic equipment available for African peacekeeping was identified as a major gap in African peacekeeping capacity, including shortages in strategic deployment/airlift, tactical manoeuvring and maintenance, with a particular shortfall regarding transportation/deployability and communications.

**Strategic airlift**

ECOWAS highlighted strategic airlift as vital for effective deployment. Africans stated that they required at minimum guaranteed access to, and shared control over, logistical resources, if not actual ownership of assets. Progress in enhancing logistic capacity was complicated by a lack of consensus as to whether to develop indigenous African capacity or to outsource it.

**Logistics depots**
The UN highlighted major problems with the conditions that donors attach to logistical support. For instance, France retained primary control of RECAMP depots. Other G8 countries will only deal in certain types of equipment, such as German and EU restrictions over equipment that can be used aggressively. Washington highlighted poor maintenance of equipment by African recipients, due to lack of appropriate skills, training and infrastructure.

Training

Many African stakeholders complained that donors continued to focus on training as a priority for enhancing African peacekeeping capacity, ignoring broader requirements for logistics support and so on. Training assistance was seen as useful, but must be well-directed and linked operationally to effective peacekeeping deployment.

ECOWAS stressed that training programmes should focus at both tactical and operational levels to produce quality personnel for peacekeeping. It argued that Regional Centres of Excellence (RCEs) should be supported in their training at these levels. Given the numbers of troops from certain key countries involved in peacekeeping in the region, attention should also be given to tactical and operational training at the national level to complement RCEs’ efforts. This would help to tailor training programmes to the specific needs of the country in question. It would also help to narrow gaps between agreements being made at the political and strategic level and their tactical
implementation on the ground, countering the current top-down approach to policy in the region. Cooperation between RCEs and national training programmes would promote effective training programmes through delegation and coordination of various training activities.

Training feedback/lessons learned

ECOWAS identified lack of feedback as a major challenge for training. No systematic efforts have been made to assess the efficacy of donor training programmes, in particular their impact on beneficiaries. Major contributors of troops were often left out of training programmes, which tended to be driven by the narrow national interest of the donor partner. Lessons learned were often not properly digested and the results not implemented. This was largely as a result of the lack of mainstreaming peacekeeping into the framework of the AU system, coupled with a lack of institutional capacity and expertise to follow-up on a conceptual understanding of issues of peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities.

Training exercises

SADC recommended bringing mid-level commanders together for interoperability exercises, as they would be the people deployed in actual operations. This would help to build confidence among Member States – a particular priority in Southern Africa but important across the board. Tangible
improvements in performance as a result would encourage a strategic shift to interoperability at the regional level. SADC also stressed efforts to increase intra- and inter-regional training programs. This could be done through the exchange of command staff officers to allow for cross-pollination.

*Long-term donor commitment*

A number of stakeholders stressed that the process of building effective peacekeeping capacity would take time for the AU. Institutions such as the UN and EU have spent years developing their capacities, and improvements are ongoing. The French government urged donors to recognise that African peacekeeping capacity would need extensive donor support for at least ten years, notably for enforcement activities, including for long-term capacity-building and for short-term operational assistance. Contrary to some peoples’ assumptions, stakeholders were eager to point out that African peacekeeping capacity does not offer a quick exit strategy from engagement in Africa for the donor community.

*Doctrine*

Expeditious development of an AU peacekeeping doctrine was cited as a priority by many stakeholders, in conjunction with coordinated progress at regional levels. Several interviewees also stressed the importance of doctrinal coherence and cooperation with the UN. The UK government emphasised that
the AU needed access to existing national and multinational doctrine as a starting point for the development of genuine African peacekeeping doctrine that meets African specificities. London also warned that some donors were promoting contradictory approaches to peacekeeping doctrine in training and other support, while the AU and RECs might also be developing separate and conflicting doctrines. The UK further warned that inconsistent doctrines risked undermining both interoperability for African peacekeeping, and the development of a clear and unified understanding of operational objectives, strategy and tactics.

Tangible results in capacity-building

A number of donors stressed the importance of achieving tangible results in capacity-building, in terms of long-term institutional capacity and operationally such as in Darfur. This would help to build and maintain momentum, and to promote donor confidence in the AU’s capacity to deliver. Many donors saw the AU’s performance in Darfur as a yardstick for the potential of operational crisis response capability. However, both African and donor partners warned of risks involving in over-emphasising tangible results, such as unrealistic operational demands and timetable for the AU response in Darfur. Failure to deliver could undermine donor support for longer-term capacity-building.
Priority areas for increased cooperation

Five main areas for increased cooperation between the G8 and Africa were identified during project issues. These are outlined briefly below. Priority areas for future cooperation are then discussed in more detail in the final section of this chapter.

• institutional human resources and strategic management capacity;
• improving donor coordination;
• operationalising the ASF;
• training; and
• logistics.

The rest of this section details stakeholder recommendations for further action in each of these areas.

Institutional human resources/strategic management capacity

Given the chronic understaffing of African peace and security institutions, combined with severe operational pressures, many African and donor stakeholders accepted the need for some external technical expertise to support African capacity, in the short-term at least. However, there it was acknowledged that there is a need to build on existing examples to develop a new approach to the provision of external expertise – one which reinforces
African leadership and strengthens African capacity. Possible options here included loaning experts directly to major African contributors of troops, who would then be directly answerable to host country governments. The US suggested that American assistance could be expanded more systematically through ACOTA by placing contractors and advisers on the ground to build capacity at the staff level. However, even though a loan system was considered a good compromise by many stakeholders, a number of African partner remained steadfastly opposed to any international expatriate presence within their institutions.

Donor support for African technical expertise

The US stated that ECOWAS, in consultation with the Canadians and the P3, had taken steps to develop its professional staff, empowered with the technical capacity and mandate to work on a range of issues on a regional basis. To facilitate this, the Canadians were sponsoring West African personnel to operate in Abuja, to work both on current operations, as well as on longer-term capacity-building. Such developments provided good lessons for collective progress in institutional capacity-building in other regions and at the AU.

Donor coordination
A Technical Assistance Group was established to support operational engagement in Darfur and to improve coordination among donors in Addis Ababa. Structures for partners to support the AU were established early on, based on two complementary tracks:

*Track 1) political*: this had smoothed relations between donors and the AU, as well as across the different political dimensions for different players involved. Donor partners realised they needed to cooperate to avoid overloading the AU with questions.

*Track 2) technical (planning/logistics)*: progress on the political side had had a knock-on effect, helping to facilitate progress on technical cooperation regarding planning for the deployment. The AU found it hard to articulate its practical needs. Donor planners would advise the AU, who would then fine tune that advice. Donors responded to various requests, such as for helmets, airlift and so on. The EU states that this has improved understanding of the need for more AU staff to act as donor counterparts.

Many stakeholders suggested that similar mechanisms could be systematised to function more strategically, covering a wider spectrum of short- and longer-term capacity-building issues. It might also be possible to combine this approach with a more strategic AU/donor coordination group.
**ECOWAS/donor coordination meetings**

ECOWAS provided a useful model for coherent African-led donor coordination that could be replicated in other regions and at the continental level. Regular ECOWAS/donor coordination meetings, such as in Abuja in November 2004, were seen as effective in providing an opportunity for ECOWAS to present its requirements to donors, and for donors to select areas which they could support. This provided a forum for coordinated donor activity, in-line with ECOWAS priorities. Support for further development of ECOWAS’ capacity to provide an audit of expenditures and other financial management, as well as an ‘Executive Secretary’s Report’ on activities and priorities, could further improve this process.

**An AU/donor contact group**

Some African stakeholders suggested that an AU-donor contact group be established, in order to discuss the African peace and security architecture. This could facilitate coherent and effective implementation of capacity-building. African/donor discussion fora which focused on specific issues of peace and security, and which restricted the number of donor points of contact for African institutions, had proved effective in facilitating coordination. Any new contact group should be African-led and would need to take into account the various donor groupings already involved in supporting African peacekeeping capacity-building, including the G8 and the EU.
Some donors recommended expanding this idea further, to develop a pan-
African clearinghouse, led by the RECs and the AU, which would help African
institutions to present to donors clearer political statements of their
requirements. The UK highlighted the establishment of G8+ Contact Groups in
key peacekeeping capitals, as well as the Washington clearinghouse meeting
(October 2004) as good starting points to enhance donor coordination.
London planned to expand the scope of contact groups and to convene a
further clearinghouse meeting in the course of 2005.

Database of donor activities

African and donor stakeholders recommended the establishment of a user-
friendly database of donor activities to improve coordination and enable a
more African-led approach to African peacekeeping capacity-building. The US
suggested developing matrices of various activities to support African
capacity-building among G8 Member States, in partnership with the UN and
other donors, including looking into developing benchmarking standards and
effectiveness.

The US military’s European Command (EUCOM) had initiated an Africa
clearinghouse to provide a multilateral donor forum in which information on
security assistance and cooperation programmes for Africa can be exchanged.
The US, Canada and European states were regularly represented at these
meetings and, more recently, there had been African institutional representation from the AU and ECOWAS.

_African Standby Force_

Early developments in establishing the ECOBRIG and EASBRIG Planning Elements (PLANELMs) were widely seen as promising. Canada provided support to ECOWAS, while the UK supported construction of the PLANELM at Karen in Nairobi, which is near to British training support facilities for Kenya/East Africa. These efforts were helping to promote regional integration and cohesion across a range of activities, and link training with real operational needs. In relation to the EASBRIG PLANELM, the longstanding military relationship between the UK and Kenya was viewed as useful, in helping to enhance mutual trust and cooperation, and in promoting long-term donor support. Canada has offered to help establish a PLANELM and Brigade HQ for the AU.

The SHIRBRIG Africa Capacity Building Project was exploring possibilities for sending a SHIRBRIG PLANELM team to the newly established AU or REC PLANELMs to assist in writing standard operating procedures (SOPs), staff working procedures, collective training, team building and so on. It was also considering providing assistance in writing peacekeeping doctrine, guidelines for employment and deployment. There is further consideration of an activity called ‘contact training’, which would bring the whole PLANEM of the AU or a
REC to SHIRBRIG HQ in Hoevelte, Denmark, for two months period of cooperative work, including a Command Post Exercise to demonstrate how SHIRBRIG collective training is planned and executed.

*Improving AU/REC cooperation*

Many stakeholders saw the establishment of a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the AU and RECs as an important milestone to improving coordination, not least over the ASF. The AU stressed the advantages of flexibility in the continental ASF structure, which was based around subsidiarity/division of labour according to which institution is most capable/appropriate for different situations. The best illustrations of the potential role of the AU in peacekeeping could be drawn from what was happening on the ground in Burundi (AMIB), Sudan (AMIS I and II), and possibly soon in Somalia. Here, the AU have led the interventions as the most appropriate institution, but with strong regional support. The AU and some of the regions felt that donor concerns over the ASF, in relation to regional inconsistencies or regions developing standby capacities at different speeds or in different formats, were exaggerated. These issues could represent challenges, but these could be overcome through a flexible approach responding to evolving realities on the ground.

*Donor/African co-deployment*
France highlighted the benefits of co-deployment of donor and African peacekeeping personnel: the ESDP Operation *Artemis* operated alongside the UN mission (MONUC) in eastern DRCongo. But it did not include African troops. Conversely, French *Licornes* forces operating alongside the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire incorporated African peacekeepers, and they emphasised cooperation and collaboration within the region.

*Logistics*

The US pointed to the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) and the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as introducing a new operational concept of minimum essential lists of logistic resources required for a mission, for instance relating to weapons, as a means to avoid large numbers of ill-equipped troops arriving in theatre. The US further suggested that regional logistics depots could help in assessing what *materiel* is already available regionally and moving resources to where they are needed. UK offers to finance a study on the logistics requirements of the AU/ASF had so far been turned down by the AU.

*Training*

Many stakeholders emphasised the significance of ‘train-the-trainer’ packages to develop sustainable training packages.
Regional Centres of Excellence

There was strong support for developing Regional Centres of Excellence (RCEs) for peacekeeping training, which were seen to have been very effective mechanisms for emphasising regional aspects of training and regional interoperability; channelling donor support and coordinating various training initiatives regionally; and linking training with operational demands.

National-level training

At the national level, Nigeria believed that current engagement with the UK at its Jaji training centre had been very effective, and could inform similar programmes elsewhere. To respond to Nigeria’s concerns that demands for peacekeepers were outweighing the capability of RCEs to provide training, the UK was supporting development of the Nigerian Infantry School in Jaji. British policy supported Nigerian priorities, which the UK was helping to ‘fine tune’, thereby maintaining Nigerian ownership, and also responding to genuine training requirements relating to relevant operational shortcomings.

AU task teams

To counter problems balancing emergency response with strategic capacity-building for peacekeeping, the AU suggested that a task team be set up at the AU to deal with emerging crises, which would allow the AU PLANELM to
focus on long-term planning and the operationalising the ASF. This model could also apply to regions such as West Africa, which experienced similar operational pressures to Addis Ababa. In the long term, planning capacity at the strategic level would need to be sufficient to deal simultaneously with emerging conflicts.

Mediation

The AU has a strong mediation focus. In the past, peace agreements have been achieved in Africa using external mediation. More recently, this process has been internalised. Implementation of peace agreements has proved more difficult through lack of peacekeeping capability to support them. African Heads of State and diplomats had been leading African mediation efforts. They are not professional mediators, but figures like Nelson Mandela have unique skills and powers to ‘impose peace’ during negotiations. However, more formalised institutional machinery to support such efforts – including personnel trained in mediation skills – could greatly facilitate mediation capacity.

Support for the PSC

The AU stressed that ratification of the PSC Protocol by all AU Member States would formalise their commitment to abide by its terms and so strengthen its legitimacy as the starting point for the AU peace and security architecture.
African funding

Some donors suggested that the AU establish a voluntary sliding scale of financial contributions, with richer AU Member States paying more. The AU was trying to move towards this, with countries like South Africa and Nigeria pledging substantial amounts.

Potential areas for agreed action to implement the Joint Plan as determined at a Chatham House Conference organised by the author

The final section of this chapter presents a summary potential areas for agreement and action for implementation of the Joint Plan.\textsuperscript{370} Research for this section is taken from a two-day international workshop held on 13-14 April 2005 at Chatham House in London. The workshop brought together key governmental and non-governmental stakeholders from Africa, G8 countries, as well as the UN and the EU. The workshop covered key areas in the African PSO capacity-building process:

- overview and context
- donor coordination
- training and logistics

\textsuperscript{370} Research for this section is taken from a two-day international workshop held on 13-14 April 2005 at Chatham House in London. The workshop brought together key governmental and non-governmental stakeholders from Africa, G8 countries, as well as the UN and the EU. A list of participants is contained in Annex XX.
• strategic management capacity
• operationalising the African Standby Force; and
• supporting the breadth of the African Peace and Security Architecture

The findings of the workshop are summarised below.

**Overview and context**

Participants felt that peacekeeping should be seen as a key implementing tool for African development more broadly. African leadership of the capacity-building process was seen as essential to developing sustainable and effective PSO architecture, as Africans have the greatest interest and expertise in the area, and external efforts through the UN cannot tackle all African peace and security issues.

Limited but tangible successes were already discernible in African capabilities for conflict prevention and crisis response – but a key gap remains in relation to post-conflict situations/peacebuilding.

**Key challenges for G8/donors**

• providing long-term funding, which is difficult for donors in view of their domestic constituencies. Donor coordination around African-identified priorities.
**Key challenges for Africans**

- encouraging African member states’ support to develop the AU into truly supranational body, with continental and international legitimacy; and
- providing clarity for priorities in PSO capacity-building – and resisting donor pressure for activities that contradict African priorities or existing capacity.

**Chances of success**

There was broad consensus behind AU policy and leadership as a good basis for building effective African PSO capacity. The G8 was seen to be delivering successfully on some of its pledges, and its engagement in the capacity-building process was largely seen as useful and welcome. But impetus needed to be given to new initiatives to cover key gaps, including operationalising the ASF, tackling root causes of conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding activities in multidimensional operations.

**Donor coordination**

Participants felt that enhancing donor coordination should stem from some fundamental questions:
• *What is donor coordination for?* Donor coordination should provide ‘space’ for the AU and RECs to present their plans to donors, ensuring that donor partners can hear what the AU and RECs need. Donors also need to understand political drivers at regional and continental levels.

• *What is it that needs to be coordinated?* G8/donor action in support of the development of the ASF and other AU/REC priorities.

• *How deep should coordination be?* Coordination extends from information-sharing to allocating tasks very specifically. There needs to be clarity of what is meant/intended. Implementing political decisions of the G8 is hampered by its lack of relevant machinery. Delivery occurs by G8 members working bilaterally or through other groupings. This complicates African communication with the G8 on PSO issues. Donor coordination needs to move beyond the G8 to include the breadth of key actors involved in the capacity-building process. There is a disconnect between different donor/African dialogues, demanding a more systematic approach.

*Priorities for enhancing donor coordination*

At the strategic level, participants suggested that establishing a core group of pro-active G8 states that would exist beyond G8 presidencies (and incorporating other major donors such as the EU and the UN), building on the example of G8/Africa Task Team established after the Kananaskis G8 summit in 2003.
A willing G8 Member State could volunteer to retain the G8 Africa peace and security portfolio under successive presidencies (say for a maximum of three years, or for the life of commitments made under the AU/G8 PSO annual meetings hosted by the AU).

The ASF roadmap and proposed workshops provide a very valuable basis for coordination around specific, AU-identified issues. Models of AU/donor coordination should draw on the successful examples used for Darfur.

Training

Political will was seen as a major driver for African peacekeeping capacity, and so there needed to be focus on achieving African support at the national level. But little effort was being put into training needs assessments and the AU/RECs do not have the capacity to provide clarity in this area. Much training is wasted as it does not properly address needs.

The 'train-the-trainer' concept needed to be thought through to be effective, as it presupposes that national infrastructure is in place to enable participants to train in their host countries, which is seldom the case.

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Priorities for progress

- Priority should be given to needs analysis of training requirements for RECs and the continent as a whole, using this as a basis for donor support.
- Centres of excellence were seen as a very useful part of the training architecture, but they cannot match training demand alone and need to work in parallel with national capacities.
- Support for infrastructure development for pre-deployment training.
- Weaknesses of train-the-trainer programmes needed domestic support systems to be developed.
- It was seen as necessary to ensure that troop-contributing countries could meet UN minimum standards before AU or REC deployment (this was a training and logistics issue, including equipment).

Logistics

Developing effective African logistics support for the ASF needed to decide on the most useful starting point, from the continental level or dealing with RECs separately. A sub-regional approach risked being expensive, not least by encouraging duplication. Commonality of stocks and equipment with access for RECs would foster interoperability and flexibility.
There was also confusion over the level of reliance on outsourcing logistics to the commercial sector. Donor consensus on this is not easy, as it needs to accommodate African control of logistics resources and a capacity to respond to African requests.

*Priorities for progress*

Key priorities for progress in logistics for African peacekeeping were identified, as follows:

- The need for a decision about whether to address logistics centrally or regionally was identified as a priority for progress. Availability of resources was likely to drive towards delivering on a centralised, AU basis.
- Commercial solutions should be promoted at the moment for logistics, with efforts shifting towards developing African capacity to contribute to this over long-term.
- Strategic lift – a hybrid solution based around commercial provision is the most useful way forward.
- Standardised logistics capacity should be developed as part of the establishment of the ASF.

*Strategic management capacity*
There had been some significant staffing gains at certain African institutions, such as the Canadian-funded mission support capability at ECOWAS. However, these were seen as limited and unstructured. African institutions’ continuing failure to secure African financial support and reliance on donor funding remains a major problem for sustained funding/development and African ownership. Donors were having to shift focus from training African troops for participation in UN PSO, to developing indigenous African capacity across a much broader range of issues, including human resource/strategic management capacity.

**Priorities for progress**

A number of key priorities for progress in African strategic management capacity were identified, and are outlined below:

- Recognise the importance of strategic management capacity for African leadership and the breadth of capacity-building issues.
- Work in partnership with the AU/RECs towards a clearer understanding of the kind of strategic management needed, including:
  - Planning;
  - Command and control infrastructure;
  - Budgeting/accounting;
  - Contract management;
  - Expertise re: interfacing with multidimensional missions;
– Conflict prevention.

• Support an increased focus on identifying and using African expertise, for example through a pool/database and through developing clear training career structure focused on providing staff to AU/RECs.

• Consider the impact of pay rates on recruiting expertise – i.e. UN vs. AU.

• Support the development of a culture of management and devolved responsibility. AU capacity to budget, manage and account for funds transparently will be important for donor confidence going forward.

• Delivering the ASF will require significant increases in funding from donors. The AU needs a stable, long-term and flexible funding mechanism. The G8 should consider how to develop this, drawing on lessons from the EU Peace Facility funding model, particularly relating to Africans’ ability to draw on funds without bilateral conditionalities.

• Create self-sustaining initiatives supporting human resources, such as through expanding the Canadian/ECOWAS mission planning and management cell model to incorporate matching financing from African sources.

• Provide better strategic analysis as a means of developing agreed language on the aspects of strategic management capacity between Africans/donors. This will support development of a consensual approach to ways forward.

• Address human resource deficiencies further down the chain; i.e. developing competent militaries/police MANAGEMENT capacities as the building-blocks of ‘what to manage strategically’.
The ASF was seen as the key implementing mechanism for the AU peacekeeping architecture. The need to define the operational parameters of the ASF was seen as important – e.g. through the five ASF workshops agreed as part of the Roadmap for Operationalisation of the African Standby Force. Donors should support and welcome these.

The roadmap was seen as a useful step in the operationalisation process – but there was still a lot of work to be done, not least in relation to sequencing; for instance, militarily speaking, doctrine needed to be developed before major thinking can be done about what type of training was required.

The first priority was seen as the establishment and operationalisation of the Planning Element (PLANELM) at AU HQ. This was seen as important, as the PLANELM was intended to act as the nucleus of the ASF, for instance by standardising doctrine. The PLANELM also facilitates coordination and interoperability with RECs, requiring support for PLANELM development in RECs.

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Problems relate to donor funding for the AU and regional brigades: favouring one over another according to donor perspectives distorts development of the ASF continentally, according to African-identified priorities.

*Priorities for progress*

Support for urgent development of the PLANELMs at the AU and RECs should be a key priority for the G8 and other donors. This needed a long-term commitment and clear thinking of precisely how donors can support it.

Staff from UN DPKO could be seconded to the AU PLANELM to assist in its establishment.

Establishing a military advisor to the AU Chair would help raise the political profile of the issues involved in operationalising the ASF.

It was seen as important that strategic resources such as centres of excellence were distributed evenly through regions, although it was also important to recognise that some regions have less ‘absorptive’ capacity.

Scenario VI (forced entry) deployments, within the AU’s terminology of types of operation, were seen as beyond the capability of the RECs and the AU. In relation to the development of the ASF, it was seen as important recognise
the importance of lead nations for robust deployments and to develop their capacities in addition to RECs and AU.

Donors could establish a more centralised donor funding facility enabling the AU/RECs more control over division of resources, taking into consideration regional demands and so on.

*Supporting the breadth of the African peace and security architecture*

Beyond the military sphere, the African peace and security architecture – comprising the Continental Early Warning System, conflict prevention/mediation and the Panel of the Wise, the non-military aspects of the ASF, the Common African Defence and Security Policy and the Peace and Security Council – needed to be considered and supported in order to build a balanced and effective continental system. Support should be given in line with existing strengths and realities of African capabilities, within the breadth of other actors in the international system.

There was confusion and scepticism about the focus and value of early warning systems, regarding what is precisely meant by early warning. A lot of information was already available in various fora. Mediation/conflict prevention is a traditional area of expertise for the AU/Africa. However, little attention had been paid to the Panel of the Wise in terms of capacity-building. Progress in this area should be closely coordinated with the UN, exploiting
synergies in peace processes and linking African processes with broader geopolitical developments.

There needed to be more concentration on civilian aspects of the ASF, relating to integrated multidimensional operations. The AU cannot offer multidimensional capacity, but needs capacity/expertise to link effectively with the UN system. For peacebuilding, the AU can offer a strong political role in developing peace processes.

Priorities for progress

It was seen as important to contextualise support for the AU within the wider African development agenda. PSO capacity-building is a useful starting point, but should not exclude AU member states not involved in PSO from the broader process. A major part of the AU’s strength as an agency for conflict prevention and resolution in Africa lies in its political legitimacy, across the continent and internationally. Other priorities identified included the following:

- Devise more systematic mechanisms for developing existing capacities for conflict prevention and management.
- Involve the breadth of key stakeholders in conflict prevention processes from an early stage.
- Re-balance focus towards civilian elements of the African PSO architecture – recognising the importance of *inter-alia* preventative diplomacy.
• Develop minimum substantive civilian mission components, including:

– Public information;
– Intelligence;
– ‘Softer’ components of post-conflict reconstruction e.g. customs officers; and
– Mission support e.g. logistics, admin.

Development of CEWS should focus on the AU’s analytical capacity to convert information into policy recommendations, using existing networks of information in RECs and civil society. A clearer understanding of what role ASF civilian police would play needed to be developed.

**Conclusion**

The analysis above suggests four key areas for action to enhance implementation of the Joint Plan: strategic management capacity; donor coordination; operationalising the African stand-by force; and training and logistics. These action areas are summarised below:

1) **Strategic management capacity**

The chronic human resource shortfalls in African institutions seriously weaken African strategic management capacity at the AU and in the RECs. These
limitations have had a far-reaching impact across many areas of African peacekeeping capability, undermining African ownership of the capacity-building process and Africans’ ability to absorb donor assistance. Operational commitments such as in Darfur have stretched the already thin AU capabilities still further, and have diverted resources away from long-term institutional development. Support for institutional human and other resources is, therefore, a major priority. Providing donor expertise to fill capacity gaps does not provide a long-term solution, and is politically hazardous, as it risks giving the appearance of ignoring existing African expertise and failing to build African capacity.

Long-term donor commitments to support institutional capacity-building with minimal conditionalities are better suited to deliver more sustainable progress. African Member States also need to provide greater and more systematic support towards assuming full ownership of the process over time. However, in view of the scale of the human resources problem, coupled with the urgency of demands, some external technical expertise is essential in the short-term. There is a need to develop a new approach to the provision of external expertise – one which reinforces African leadership and strengthens African capacity.

2) Donor coordination
Poor donor coordination undermines the development of strategic approaches and multiplies transaction costs for the AU and other recipients. Effective coordination promotes cohesion, understanding, genuine dialogue, and cooperation. A lack of G8 coherence is a serious impediment in following-up the Joint Plan. Also, the fact that there is no G8 institutional machinery through which to implement its policies, or that no there is no formal relationship between the G8 and the AU, is also an obstacle to coherent implementation. G8 focus is governed by its presidency, which undermines its capacity for long-term strategic engagement. The Russian Presidency in 2006, for instance, did not place a high priority on Africa.

However, operational engagement in Darfur has brought donors together effectively at the AU in Addis Ababa. Structures for donor dialogue with the AU have been built to meet political and technical needs and have been working effectively. These mechanisms could be used as models for a more systematic approach, to function strategically over a broad spectrum of short- and longer-term capacity-building issues.

3) Operationalising the African Standby Force

Building operational planning capacity is a key component to operationlising the ASF. Establishing planning elements (PLANELMs) at the AU and in the regions is seen as key to this process. The AU PLANELM can ensure interoperability between the various elements of the ASF, not least the
Regional Standby Brigades (RSBs), for example by developing coherent doctrine. The AU PLANELM forms the core of the system, liaising with regional counterparts.

Some promising lessons can be learned from early developments in establishing the PLANELM for Eastern Africa in Nairobi. The UK supported construction of the PLANELM, which is near to British training support facilities for Kenya/East Africa. These efforts help to promote regional integration and cohesion across a range of activities, and link training with real operational needs.

4) Training/logistics

A common complaint among African stakeholders is donors’ over-emphasis on training at the expense of logistical support. Training is important, but is not effective without the necessary equipment. Key logistical shortages relate to strategic deployment/airlift, tactical manoeuvring and maintenance, and communications. Logistics is an essential operational skill and developing this capability was identified as a major priority.

Regional Centres of Excellence (RCEs) such as the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra provide good models for improving PSO training, particularly in regard to emphasising regional aspects of training and
regional interoperability; channelling donor support; coordinating various training initiatives regionally; and linking training with operational demands.

The G8/Africa research presented above focuses heavily on practical problems to delivering a functioning African peacekeeping capability, and how the capacity-building process should function.

A clear understanding of what the APSA should be trying to achieve can guide what sort of capability should be being developed. Current plans for the APSA appear extremely ambitious in their goal of developing a comprehensive capability across the complex peacekeeping spectrum, from peace enforcement through peacebuilding. Clearer thinking is needed to pinpoint where African capability can add most value within a wider, interlocking international peacekeeping. For example, a pattern seems to be emerging whereby African regional interventions serve as advance operations ahead of a larger UN deployment. Building capability specifically for this might be a much more achievable goal.

Both donors and African partners stress the importance of African ownership of its own peace and security architecture, this ambition has proved difficult to sustain in practice. Donors generally agree that their support for capacity-building should come in response to the AU’s own strategic vision. But the AU has found it hard to translate its wishes into viable plans, around which donors can coordinate their assistance. Meanwhile, the myriad of donor
initiatives are often both conflicting and self-serving, further undermining the AU’s ability to direct proceedings.

Furthermore, the research above shows a distinct lack of emphasis on local communities and civil society. The Joint Plan is designed to support Africa’s peace and security capability. And so it can only work within the parameters of the structures of the AU, and the African peace and security architecture more broadly: it cannot impose solutions onto Africa. As we saw in chapter 6, the APSA places considerable emphasis on individual human rights. But previous chapters have shown that, for this aspiration to become meaningful, mechanisms must be built which can systematically incorporate local voices into the design and implementation of peacekeeping missions. Both the G8 and Africa need to find ways to work together to pursue this objective.
Chapter 8 uses case studies of African peacekeeping deployments to draw together and apply the findings of previous chapters, and to examine how well African regional peacekeeping has functioned, including to deliver civilian protection, with support from the international community. A pattern was established in earlier chapters for contemporary African peacekeeping, whereby vanguard African deployments have preceded larger, UN operations. This paradigm has assumed a number of configurations, and key examples of these are discussed below, in relation to deployments in Burundi, Darfur, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia. The case studies of African regional deployments in this chapter therefore include discussion of the follow-on UN missions, to develop a more comprehensive evaluation of the potential of this joint model.

Key themes discussed in this chapter include: capability, including capacity, mandate, training and doctrine; interaction between African regional peacekeeping and the international community; and African interests.

The case studies assess the respective missions’ effectiveness in protecting vulnerable civilians. Civilian protection has not been the primary operational objective these deployments, but has been a specifically mandated aim in most cases.
Structurally, the case studies are divided between ‘regional’ and ‘continental’ deployments. Regional deployments are relevant to the regional brigades that will make up the ‘building blocks’ of the African Standby Force (ASF). In this instance, we look at ECOWAS deployments in Liberia and Sierra Leone, since, of the five regional brigades that underpin the ASF structure, only ECOWAS in West Africa has significant operational experience in peacekeeping.

Continental deployments focus on the AU’s first three peacekeeping missions, in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia.

**Regional deployments**

*Sierra Leone*

ECOWAS intervened in Sierra Leone in the 1990s. Its record in Sierra Leone in terms of civilian protection was mixed. But it was not entirely bad. And ECOWAS’ mission in Sierra Leone paved the way for, and also formed a core component of, the subsequent deployment of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). UNAMSIL was at the forefront of the revival of UN peacekeeping in the late 1990s, and Wilkinson has suggested that UNAMSIL represented a ‘test-case’ for peacekeeping, following the problems of the 1990s.\(^ {373} \) Civilian protection was one of the many tasks included in the UNAMSIL mandate. The mission undoubtedly improved civilians’ security in Sierra Leone, at least in the medium-term. But the extent to which it provided direct protection to

vulnerable civilians, or contributed to peacebuilding in the longer term is less clear.

The conflict in Sierra Leone dated from March 1991, when fighters from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched an offensive from the east of the country, near to the Liberian border, in an attempt to overthrow the government in Freetown. In 1996, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected in democratic elections. But instability and a coup d'état preceded this and, following the elections, the country continued to be beset by violence, including additional attempts to seize power by force. The civil war had left half the country’s 4.5 million people displaced, and had led to the loss of over 50,000 lives. Tens of thousands more were victims of amputations and rape.

ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

ECOWAS dispatched troops to reinforce the Sierra Leone government forces soon after war broke out in 1991. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was largely restricted to the capital, Freetown, and Sierra Leone’s second largest town, Bo. Despite its geographical limitations, during the early and mid-1990s many Sierra Leoneans expressed greater confidence in the protection offered by ECOMOG than in that offered by government soldiers.

However, ECOMOG’s reputation diminished after 1998. There were increasing allegations of ECOMOG troops being involved in illegal diamond-mining and other forms of banditry – hence the local nickname for the force, ‘Every Car and Moving Object Gone’. There were even claims that ECOMOG personnel were involved in brokering illicit deals with the RUF. ECOMOG’s standing was also dented by its failure to halt the advance on Freetown of rebel RUF fighters in late 1998, or to prevent the RUF’s devastating assault on the capital in January 1999. Finally, ECOMOG forces were also accused of committing abuses themselves, in particular against civilians who were deemed to have collaborated with the RUF. During fighting between the junta and ECOMOG troops, tactics employed by Nigerian soldiers serving with ECOMOG included bombarding the junta’s military HQ from the sea, and some shells hit civilian settlements. Also, the junta undertook air strikes on civilians, and subsequently blamed them on the Nigerians.\footnote{Keen, D (2002), \textit{Sierra Leone’s War in Regional Context: Lessons from Interventions}, LSE Human Security Series, www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityReport/WestAfricaPaper.pdf}

On June 1998, the UN Security Council agreed to establish the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). The mission was mandated to monitor
and advise efforts to disarm combatants and to restructure Sierra Leone’s security forces. Unarmed UNOMSIL teams documented reports of on-going atrocities and human rights abuses committed against civilians, under the protection of ECOMOG. However, violence continued and Sierra Leonean rebels gained control of more than half the country. Following the capture of Freetown by rebels in January 1998, ECOMOG troops retook the capital and again installed the civilian government later that same month, although many thousands of rebels fighters remained at large in the surrounding countryside.\(^{376}\)

**United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone**

In July 1999, negotiations between the government and rebels finally led to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, which promised an end to fighting and the formation of a government of unity.\(^{377}\) In October 1999, Security Council resolution 1270 authorised the replacement of the small UNOMSIL observer mission with a larger peacekeeping operation, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).\(^{378}\) It was to comprise 6,000 personnel, and it was mandated to oversee implementation of Lomé. Its mandate include a number

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\(^{377}\) Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (July 1999), Article v, para 2.

\(^{378}\) The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had already undertaken interventions in Liberia between 1990 and 1998 and in Sierra Leone from 1997 to 1998. While the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) did help to end Liberia’s civil war, and contributed to the stabilisation of Sierra Leone, the impact of these interventions on protecting civilians was poor. Sustainable peace processes in each country required further interventions by the UN and other states; Mepham D, and Ramsbotham A, (2007), *Safeguarding Civilians: Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect in Africa*, London: ippr, p.3.
of specific tasks, such as helping to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate armed groups into civil society, monitoring adherence to the ceasefire, and, ultimately, to support elections in the country and help to establish peace and security.

But continuing violence subsequently convinced the Security Council to expand the UNAMSIL mandate three times, up to an eventual strength of 17,500 troops, making it the largest UN operation at the time. The mission was also authorised, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to “take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”.

The Lomé agreement contained some major flaws, which helped to fuel ongoing violence. These included amnesty for serious human rights abusers. Lomé also offered powerful government positions to senior RUF figures, including its leader Foday Sankoh, who were widely regarded as the main perpetrators of gross human rights violations committed during the war. Indeed the UN, in witnessing the agreement, had insisted on the inclusion of a proviso refusing to recognise the amnesty in relation to crimes of genocide,

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crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.\textsuperscript{381}

The RUF regularly breached the ceasefire, continued to violate human rights and resisted the demobilisation process. Meanwhile, UNAMSIL showed itself to be incapable of fulfilling its mandated objectives. In May 2000, when the force was around 11,000 strong, 500 peacekeepers were captured and taken prisoner. Wilkinson asks why 11,000 UN troops under a Chapter VII mandate were not able to maintain a secure environment in Sierra Leone. He contends that UNAMSIL ignored some basic military principles of combat, such as a common doctrine, standard operating procedures, joint and combined operational planning, and common training standards and experience. At the time of the abductions, UNAMSIL was a disparate group of more than 30 national contingents, with no coherent operational infrastructure, and which were deploying to Sierra Leone in a highly unstructured fashion. Amongst the various contingents serving with UNAMSIL, no common doctrine or approach existed to deliver peace enforcement effectively, and many contingents were neither trained nor equipped for the demands of using force.\textsuperscript{382}

The British government decided to dispatch around 1,000 soldiers to support UNAMSIL, and their involvement arguably saved the mission. In a short space of time, they provided effective opposition to the RUF, halted its military

\textsuperscript{381} BBC Newsonline (8 July 1999), \textit{UN Warning to Sierra Leone}.

advances, secured the release of the hostages and got the peace process back on track. British military intervention helped to reinforce the government’s authority, and it destroyed any prospect of the RUF taking control of the country. The action was successful in maintaining the elected government of President Kabbah, stopping large-scale human rights abuses and preventing Sierra Leone from descending once again into full-scale civil war.\textsuperscript{383}

Ultimately, UNAMSIL was able to deploy throughout the country. It succeeded in disarming 75,000 ex-fighters, and a reasonably stable peace was established. UNAMSIL then played an important role in helping to extend government authority and the rule of law to all parts of the country.\textsuperscript{384} On 18 January 2002 President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah officially announced the end of the war. A symbolic burning of weapons in Freetown on the same day marked the successful completion of the UN-supervised disarmament process, in which over 45,000 fighters gave up their weapons. Elections in May 2002 were decreed by the international community to have been ‘free and fair.’ UNAMSIL helped to train Sierra Leoneans in human rights, and it was supported the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to try those most responsible for war crimes.

But Sierra Leone remained fragile, more effort was needed to tackle the root causes of conflict and cultivate a culture of human rights in the country: the economy was highly dependent on external funding; a disproportionate share of income from diamond mining continued to bypass the government and ended up in private hands. And, despite reintegration programmes, thousands of former fighters and disaffected youths were unemployed. The UN Security Council established the UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) to help consolidate peace in Sierra Leone. It was mandated to help the government strengthen human rights, galvanise development, improve transparency and hold elections in 2007.\textsuperscript{385}

ECOMOG and UNAMSIL peacekeepers had limited success in protecting vulnerable civilians in Sierra Leone. ECOMOG enjoyed some initial success. But, ultimately its reputation was severely tarnished by abusive behaviour by some of its own personnel. And UNAMSIL was only ever expected to provide “at most” a temporary “protective umbrella” for some civilians in isolated situations.\textsuperscript{386} Moreover, the extent to which UNAMSIL has been able to contribute to significant peacebuilding in a more comprehensive sense has also been questioned.\textsuperscript{387} But a DPKO-sponsored public opinion survey in Sierra Leone in 2005 surveyed 900 people from all age groups across Sierra

Leone’s 14 districts, showing that nearly 100 per cent agreed that the security situation had improved with the presence of UNAMSIL.\footnote{DPKO (2005), \textit{Public Opinion Survey of UNAMSIL’s Work in Sierra Leone}, \url{www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/UNAMSIL-Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20Full%20Report%20(19%20July%202005).pdf}}

**Liberia**

In the early 1990s ECOWAS intervened in the conflict in Liberia. Some West African troops in Liberia involved in this first ECOWAS intervention in Liberia committed widespread abuses of human rights. But a second ECOWAS mission in Liberia in 2003 proved more effective. In late 2003, ECOWAS agreed to deploy a 3,500-strong operation to oversee implementation of the recently agreed peace agreement in Liberia. Like the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), described in more detail below, the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) was to act as a vanguard mission ahead of a larger, UN operation, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Unlike AMIB, however, transition from a regional, African mission to a UN operation was explicitly agreed from the start, as stipulated in UN Security Council resolution 1509 (2003).\footnote{UNMIL, UNMIL homepage, \url{http://unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=military}}

The armed conflict in Liberia had resulted in serious human rights abuses, including arbitrary killings, disappearances, torture, sexual violence against women, girls and young boys, arbitrary arrests and detention, forced conscription of child soldiers, systematic displacement, and indiscriminate
targeting of civilians. An estimated 250,000 people lost their lives in war-related circumstances in Liberia since 1989, and at least at least half of these were civilian non-combatants. There were eyewitness accounts of massacres of civilians and of mass graves. Liberian society was heavily militarised during the conflict, with a proliferation of militia groups emerging.\textsuperscript{390}

\textit{ECOWAS Mission in Liberia}

ECOMIL was mandated to establish zones of separation between warring parties, to secure an agreed ceasefire line and to create conditions for the arrival of UNMIL. ECOMIL comprised contingents from Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo. The deployment of the first elements of ECOMIL began on 4 August. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) provided support for the initial deployment of ECOMIL, and the US government also provided support for ECOMIL, and also positioned a task force of over 2,000 marines off the coast of Liberia.\textsuperscript{391}

ECOMIL contingents were subsequently ‘re-hatted’ and reassigned to UNMIL in October 2003. ECOMIL contingents with the appropriate level of capability constituted a brigade within UNMIL that operated in the Monrovia area. ECOMIL troops that did not meet the required level of capability were deemed to be potentially vulnerable to attack, and as such a threat the overall

\textsuperscript{390} UNMIL, UNMIL homepage, http://unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=military
effectiveness of the UN force. Where necessary, these troops were repatriated and replaced by better-equipped forces.

Civilian protection was not a mandated task for ECOMIL peacekeepers. And observers have stressed that ECOMIL lacked capacity to provide a serious deterrent to human rights abusers, as civilians were still subject to murder, rape, forced recruitment, looting and forced displacement at the hands of rebel groups and government militias during its deployment.392

But ECOMIL certainly helped to create a more secure environment for Liberian civilians in the longer term, not least by stabilising the situation in Liberia sufficiently to hand over operational responsibilities to the UN. Since then, UNMIL has overseen a number of initiatives designed to build more durable security in Liberia. UNMIL played a major role in conducting a credible, transparent, free and fair national election, and on 23 November 2005, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was declared Liberia’s President, and the first ever elected female head of state in Africa. Between November 2004 and April 2006, 321,747 internally displaced persons returned home, while over 300,000 refugees have returned home since October 2004. UNMIL has also supported security sector reform, and as at 1 June 2006, 2,468 police trainees had been recruited, of which 1,712 have already graduated from the Police Service Training Academy.393

393 UNMIL (2008), UNMIL website, www.unmil.org/
Continental deployments

Burundi

In April 2003, the AU deployed its first peace operation. The South African-led AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) comprised around 2,500 peacekeepers. Acute instability plagued Burundi since it gained independence from Belgium in 1962, and the conflict was marked by periodic presidential assassinations and brutal inter-communal pogroms. In one particularly violent incident, during fighting between Hutus and Tutsis in the north of the country in 1988, around 20,000 Hutus were killed and another 60,000 fled into neighbouring Rwanda. Violence intensified dramatically in 1994, after the main Hutu party, the Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA), withdrew from the government in protest at political power being ceded to Tutsis.

African Union Mission in Burundi

The South African Defence Force (SADF) provided most of the troops for AMIB, although these were supplemented by contributions from Mozambique and Ethiopia. AMIB was mandated to observe a loose ceasefire agreed between the main parties to the conflict, to assist in the demobilisation of combatants, and to protect vulnerable civilians at risk of violence. Mamadou

Bah was appointed AU special representative in Burundi. Included among AMIB’s responsibilities were to protect politicians participating in the transitional government, to establish secure demobilisation centres in order to launch the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, and to help establish conditions to facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

AMIB was deployed on the implicit assumption that it would be succeeded by a UN mission. Therefore, a significant part of its role was to establish conditions that would allow for a UN peace operation to enter the Burundi.\textsuperscript{395} Resource and capacity constraints and ongoing insecurity meant that AMIB was only partly successful in implementing its mandate.\textsuperscript{396} That said, the mission did help to stabilise the situation in Burundi, and it played a useful ‘bridging’ role, facilitating the deployment of the larger and better-resourced UN mission in 2004.

\textit{United Nations involvement in Burundi}

as well as the appropriate civilian personnel. It was authorised under Chapter VII of the UN charter to: monitor the implementation of ceasefire agreements and investigating violations; oversee disarmament and demobilisation of combatants; monitor the illegal flow of arms across the national borders; help to create humanitarian space; and assist with the electoral process. In July 2005, elections were held in Burundi for the first time in 12 years, which were broadly seen as free and fair. In December that year, ONUB began a gradual withdrawal from Burundi, which went on for the following 12 months before the peacekeeping mission handed over to an integrated UN office in the country: the Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (BINUB).

Peacekeeping operations are only one part in a range of factors that influence events in a conflict. Jackson stresses that Burundi’s “tentative” return to peace and democracy is the culmination of a decade-long process, whose success is the result of a number of factors. First, key Burundian political parties were willing to strike unprecedented compromises. Second, in the latter part of the crisis, there was exceptionally determined sustained regional engagement in the peace process, namely pressure from the Organisation of African Unity/African Union (AU) and its membership, and particularly South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. This was supplemented by pressure and support from the EU, from Canada and from the US. Third, local and

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international NGOs provided energetic diplomacy behind-the-scenes. But Jackson adds that AMIB and ONUB played their parts, as "Burundi’s success is ... the outcome of a sustained process in which domestic, regional and international/multilateral actors were called upon to interact in complex and complementary ways".\footnote{United Nations, DPKO, (2006), \textit{The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)} – political and strategic lessons learned, UNDPKO independent external study, July, www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/ONUB%20Lessons%20Learned.pdf}

Overall, AMIB helped to create conditions under which peace could be built. By the end of its mission, AMIB had succeeded in establishing relative peace to most provinces in Burundi, with the exception of the region outside Bujumbura where armed resistance, in the form of the \textit{Forces Nationales de Libération} (FNL), remained a problem. AMIB was therefore engaged in peacebuilding through helping to allay violent conflict, and through trying to lay the foundations for reconciliation and reconstruction.

Resource and capacity constraints and ongoing insecurity meant that AMIB was only partly successful in implementing its mandate to observe the ceasefire, initiate the demobilisation of combatants and protect civilians at risk.\footnote{Baranyi, S and Powell, K (2005),\textit{Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect in Africa}, NSI Policy Brief, www.nsi-ins.ca/english/pdf/responsibility_protect_africa.pdf} But throughout its period of operation, AMIB helped to de-escalate a potentially volatile situation, and in February 2004 a UN evaluation team concluded that conditions were appropriate for establishing a UN
peacekeeping operation in the country.\textsuperscript{401} It also did a reasonably effective job in stabilising the situation in Burundi, and it played a useful ‘bridging’ role, facilitating the deployment of the larger and better-resourced UN mission in 2004. ONUB oversaw elections.

**Darfur**

The conflict in Darfur has a long history. For decades there have been tensions over land and grazing rights between the primarily nomadic Arabs, and farmers from the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa communities. But the roots of recent crisis can be traced to a meeting in July 2001 between a group of Zaghawa and Fur, at which they pledged to cooperate to defend their villages against government attacks.\textsuperscript{402}

Tensions escalated dramatically in April 2003 when two rebel groups in the region, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), mounted an attack on a military garrison at al-Fashir, provoking a brutal and disproportionate response from the Sudanese government and its allies. The al-Fashir raid can be seen as a turning point both militarily and psychologically. It was from this point onwards that the conflict escalated dramatically, with a huge increase in Sudanese government attacks on rebel groups in Darfur.


Between 2003 and 2007, more than 200,000 people were killed in Darfur and more than two and a half million displaced. And nearly four million people were dependent on humanitarian aid for food, shelter and health care. All parties were implicated in committing serious human rights abuses, including some of the rebel groups, and few showed convincing interest in resolving the conflict diplomatically. Many commentators suggest that primary responsibility for the human tragedy in Darfur rests with the Sudanese government and the government-backed militia, known as the Janjaweed.

The Janjaweed have committed ethnic cleansing and forced displacement by bombing, burning and looting villages. Women and girls have been particularly vulnerable to violence and abuse, with large numbers of them becoming victims of sexual attacks when going out of their villages to get water or firewood or when taking goods to local markets. The livelihoods of millions more Darfurians have been destroyed. Fighting has also impacted on Sudan’s neighbours. For example, many hundreds of thousands of Darfurians have sought safety in Chad, although many of these remain vulnerable to attacks from Sudanese forces across the border.

The response to the situation in Darfur has largely been led from within Africa over the first years of the crisis, particularly through the efforts of the AU. AU

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403 Joschka, J (2007), The EU must act in Darfur, The Guardian, 29 April
initiatives took two main paths: Addis Ababa’s role in mediating ceasefire talks and peace negotiations; and 2) the deployment of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS).

\textit{AU Mediation}

President Idriss Deby in neighbouring Chad led initial mediation efforts in Darfur. However, in early 2004 the AU assumed the lead in negotiations in N’djamena, the capital of Chad, supported by the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. These negotiations produced the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in April that year, which was fortified in late May by an agreement to establish a Ceasefire Commission, and by the deployment of AU observers to Darfur.

The AU was deeply involved in trying to facilitate peace talks between the various parties, through a series of negotiations between the Sudan Government and rebel groups. The seventh round of these AU-led talks culminated in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja, Nigeria, in early 2006. This was signed on 5 May by the Government of Sudan, but only by one of the rebel groups, Minni Minnawi’s faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA/MM). The negotiation process was undermined by obstructive approaches by both the government and the rebels. In addition, international
support for the talks was sometimes counter-productive, particularly the setting of an arbitrary deadline to conclude the DPA.405

It was hoped that the DPA would lead to the cessation of hostilities and the creation of a lasting peace. But the opposite happened, as security deteriorated sharply. Factions of the rebel groups that refused to sign the DPA formed a new National Redemption Front (NRF), and subsequently escalated attacks. The Sudanese government launched major military counter-offensives in an apparent attempt to secure a decisive military victory in Darfur. The SLA/MM has sometimes acted as a paramilitary wing of the Sudanese army, but more recently it has been involved in clashes with Sudanese government forces. And the worsening security has inevitably had a commensurately negative impact on the humanitarian situation.406

\textit{AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS)}

The AU had only just negotiated the transfer of its African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to the UN in May 2004, when it agreed to deploy monitors to Darfur. The eruption of the Darfur conflict in 2003 was a major challenge for the AU, which was, at that time, absorbed in building its new basics of its new peace and security architecture.407 The AU lacked the military and financial capability

\begin{footnotesize}
406 International Crisis Group (2006) \textit{Getting the UN into Darfur}, Africa Policy Briefing No 43, Nairobi/Brussels, 12 October
\end{footnotesize}
to deliver and sustain effective peacekeeping forces in tough environments like Darfur. In terms of intergovernmental organisations, only NATO has shown itself capable of delivering this kind of capacity.408

The AU at first authorised the deployment of a small force of 60 military observers, protected by 310 troops. Peacekeepers serving with the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) were originally deployed under a ‘Chapter VI’ type observation mandate, to oversee the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. But it was soon obvious that the agreement was a sham, not least because Khartoum pursed its military objectives in Darfur through the *Janjaweed*, often with overt support from government forces.409

Deteriorating security persuaded the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) to strengthen the AMIS mandate and force. AMIS was expanded to include 2,341 military personnel and 815 civilian police, and then 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police, during meetings on 20 October 2004 and subsequently on 28 April 2005. Under its enhanced mandate, AMIS was tasked with overseeing compliance with the ceasefire agreement and related accords, with helping to establish a secure environment for humanitarian assistance, and with a limited role in protecting civilians under imminent threat.

The AU secretariat had initially been very clear on what would be needed to contain the violence in Darfur and to protect vulnerable civilians. In July 2004, Alpha Oumar Konare, the Chair of the AU Commission, asked the AU to develop a plan for a full peacekeeping force, mandated to disarm the \textit{Janjaweed} by force. But Baldo describes how two political realities restricted AU deployment to Darfur. First, any deployment would need to be agreed by the Sudanese government in Khartoum. This gave a \textit{de facto} veto to the ruling National Congress Party over the terms of the mission. Second, the AU did not have sufficient capacity to carry out this task on its own, and it needed both financial and technical support. This was not a surprise. In January 2005 an AU official asserted that the organisation was like ‘a house under construction’, with ‘no roof yet’; he stated that “people are asking us for protection from the rain and we are not yet ready”\textsuperscript{410}.

\textit{Darfur Integrated Taskforce (DITF)}

The AU was reliant on substantial support from western donors, both in the form of financial assistance, and technical assistance, especially in the area of logistics. In terms of finance, the EU African Peace Facility provided 50\% of funding for AMIS.\textsuperscript{411} The AU was well aware of the shortcomings of its capability to manage AMIS, and it established a dedicated capacity at AU HQ


to direct and support the mission. The primary rationale of the DITF was to link political and military issues relating to the AU’s response to the Darfur crisis, and to ensure coordination between planning and implementation elements within the AU, specifically between HQ in Addis and AMIS.

But the DITF was also a key hub through which to coordinate international engagement with AMIS. Within the DITF structure, two subsidiary bodies were established to facilitate assistance. 1) The Liaison Group (LG), chaired by the head of the DITF; this was supported by senior AU military, police, and political affairs officers, and was attended by representatives of the EU, the US, some EU Member States, and the UN. 2) The Partners Technical Support Group (PTSG), chaired by a senior member of the EU delegation in Addis Ababa; this was attended by representatives of the embassies of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the US and NATO.

International contributions to AMIS included the following:

• EU: vehicles, communication equipment, pay and allowances, experts (CIVPOL) and maps;
• UN: UN Assistance Support Cell in Addis Ababa, staff training, and MAPEX; 412

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• NATO: strategic air lift, staff training at strategic/operational levels, MAPEX under UN auspices, tactical air lift, information analysis training, capacity building for Peace Support Operations division (PSOD), after AMIS transition to the UN mission, basic operational equipment;

• US: construction and maintenance of camp facilities, observers;

• Canada: 105 armoured personnel carriers (APC’s), ammunition, ground fuel, 25 helicopters, experts, maps

• Norway: communication equipment, CIVPOL accommodation at IDP camps;

• Netherlands: communication equipment.

**AMIS’ effectiveness**

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted in his September 2006 report to the Security Council on Darfur that AMIS’ efforts brought “some limited relief from the worst excesses of this vicious war”.414 There was a tangible reduction of violence and civilian safety in areas where AMIS was deployed, such as in Kebkabiyah (North Darfur) in late 2004, and in Labado and Graida (both in South Darfur) in early 2005. AMIS also helped to open up humanitarian up space for what would become one of the biggest relief operations in the world, which included 14,000 aid workers.415

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413 The Map Exercise (MAPEX) is a low-cost training exercise portraying military situations on maps and overlays.


But, with fewer than 7,000 troops at its peak, who were poorly equipped and lacking a credible mandate, AMIS could not provide significant civilian protection to the people of Darfur. There was also a political failure by the AU to acknowledge that the Sudanese government had clearly failed to uphold its responsibility to neutralise the *Janjaweed* militia and to protect its citizens, and that it was a primary perpetrator of atrocities against civilian in Darfur.\(^{416}\)

Insecurity continued to worsen in Darfur through 2005 and into 2006, and AMIS’ structural weaknesses became increasingly obvious, as the force was incapable of tackling ceasefire violations by all parties. The poorly configured DPA exacerbated instability still further. AMIS did little to counter this. During the first few weeks after the signing of the DPA, AMIS failed to implement the provisions of the DPA that came under its mandate, which did considerable damage to the credibility of the force later on.\(^{417}\)

The logistical challenges of operating in Darfur without the consent of the government meant that, even if the AU had demonstrated the political determination to confront Khartoum, which it did not, the AU could not have mounted a sufficiently proactive mission. But international donors were not prepared to finance an expanded AU mission. A stronger mandate would have made direct confrontation with Khartoum much more likely, creating a serious


risk of ‘mission creep’. And it would have required many more troops, with the attendant risk of demands for troop contributions from donor countries if AMIS became involved in serious combat with Sudanese forces. Instead, the efforts of the AU and key donors focused on achieving a final peace agreement. This required maintaining the cooperation of Khartoum, in order to maintain its presence at the negotiating table.418

The wider international response

The international community for a long time could not muster concerted support for a peacekeeping intervention in Darfur. The US and UK were heavily committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, while most European states demonstrated a preference for diplomatic solutions and were also focused on NATO’s commitment in Afghanistan. Other governments, such as China, staunchly defended Sudanese sovereignty and their own rights to access Sudanese oil, while yet others, particularly the Arab League, denied the Sudanese government’s responsibility for war crimes in Darfur and described the situation there as a civil war.419

However, as mounting evidence of atrocities in Darfur continued to emerge in 2004, it became increasingly difficult for the international community to avoid acting. A report by the Secretary-General’s High-Level Mission to Darfur in

early May 2004 described candidly the scale of the humanitarian crisis and the culpability of the main players. The first UN Security Council resolution specifically on Darfur, resolution 1556 of 30 July 2004, endorsed the presence of AMIS. Successive resolutions placed various demands and threatened penalties on the parties to the conflict. They called on all parties to allow humanitarian access, to cooperate with AU mediation initiatives, and to uphold commitments to the ceasefire and other political agreements.

In April 2006, the Security Council also voted to place targeted sanctions on four Sudanese individuals – a former Sudanese military commander, a Janjaweed militia leader and two rebel commanders. These included travel bans and the freezing of foreign bank accounts and other assets. Since May 2006, UN resolutions have also required non-signatories to sign up to the DPA. Threats by the Security Council in response to non-compliance have included financial, military and other sanctions, as well as referral of suspects of major war crimes to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

**UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur**

Since the UN World Summit in September 2005, the international debate over Darfur has increasingly been framed within the context of the responsibility to protect (R2P) agenda. In a speech given in London in January 2006, Kofi Annan declared that the UN Summit’s commitment to R2P would only be meaningful if the Security Council was prepared to act “swiftly and decisively,
to halt the killing, rape and ethnic cleansing to which people in Darfur are still being subjected”.420

The UN Security Council began to focus on the idea of a transition from the struggling AMIS to a much larger and more capable UN mission. The AU PSC endorsed this idea in May 2006. In August 2006, the UN also finally approved it. Security Council resolution 1706 agreed to deploy a peacekeeping force of more than 17,000 troops and up to 3,300 civilian police officers to Darfur, to try to halt the spiralling violence.421 UN Resolution 1706 proposed to expand the mandate of UNMIS to cover Darfur as well. The UN force was mandated to take over the role of AMIS by no later than 31 December 2006. However, no one in New York or in key international capitals was prepared to deploy UN forces without Khartoum’s consent, which the government of Sudan showed no interest in providing.

But the deployment of a UN operation to Darfur has always conditional on Khartoum’s consent to it. The Security Council has repeatedly made it clear that it would not deploy any peacekeeping force that is not acceptable to Khartoum. Meanwhile, a UN-led intervention in Darfur without the against the wishes of the Sudanese government is beyond the UN’s capabilities, and it is also an anathema to many in the UN system. But Terrie asserts that the extent to which the Sudanese government would fully comply or cooperate

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with a UN presence deployed to Darfur with Khartoum’s acquiescence is also extremely doubtful.422

The Sudanese government claimed that the deployment of a UN mission would be a violation of its sovereignty and would be tantamount to a declaration of war. But commentators suggested that this claim was disingenuous, as international troops serving with the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) were already stationed in the south of the country, deployed with Khartoum’s acquiescence to underpin the 9 January 2005 North-South peace agreement. Commentators have also maintained that Khartoum’s opposition was based on fears that a UN force would be more effective in countering its military actions in Darfur, and that a UN presence on the ground, backed by the Security Council, might lead to key figures in the Sudanese government being indicted for war crimes before the International Criminal Court.423

AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

On 16 November 2006, Kofi Annan and the AU convened a high-level consultation on the situation in Darfur in Addis Ababa. This brought together the Chair of the AU Commission, the five Permanent Members of the Security Council and a number of African countries, including Sudan. Following the meeting, the UN announced a major a breakthrough in negotiations: that

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Sudan had agreed to a strengthened AU force (as an interim measure), to a re-energised peace process and to the deployment of UN peacekeepers in Darfur, in the context of an AU/UN ‘hybrid mission’. This was a new concept for UN-regional peacekeeping, which would require unified AU-UN leadership. It would provide a number of operational advantages, including UN funding for the mission, capabilities and troops which might not be available among AU Member States, and day-to-day backstopping support and guidance from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

There was considerable confusion about what was actually agreed at the meeting. Immediately after the UN’s announcement, the Sudanese government denied such an interpretation of the outcome of the meeting. In fact, in November 2006 Khartoum increased attacks in Darfur. As a result, the humanitarian situation worsened, causing number of relief organisations to announce their withdrawal from Darfur.424

International pressure and on-going negotiations eventually led to more explicit agreement on the deployment of a joint AU/UN force, which was officially authorised in July 2007 under UN Security Council resolution 1769. The AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was provided with a maximum strength of 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, as well as a civilian component, including up to

3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each. Resolution 1769 authorised UNAMID, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to take the necessary action support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, to prevent the disruption of its implementation, and to protect civilians – although all of this was “without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan”.425

By February 2008, UNAMID comprised 9,212 uniformed personnel, including 7,467 military personnel, 1,605 police officers, and one formed police unit, as well as 1,312 civilians. At this time, UNAMID’s military component had been strengthening its activities in the mission area, in order to increase its visibility. It was now conducting several hundred patrols throughout Darfur every month, and it had tripled the number of patrols and convoy escorts in Western Darfur, in response to a recent rise in violence in the area. Additional measures were being reviewed to reinforce the Western sector, although there were serious logistical constraints hampering further expansion of the activities of the military component. The Force Commander increased contacts with the parties, in order to facilitate UNAMID’s assessment of their movements, intent and capabilities, and also to build the parties’ confidence in UNAMID’s impartiality. UNAMID was further continuing to work with the government, JEM and SLM/A-Abdul Wahid to facilitate safe passage to secure locations for vulnerable civilians.426

Challenges to the effectiveness of UNAMID

A number of factors were hampering the generation of the UNAMID force. In February 2008, the UN reported that the effective deployment of UNAMID battalions was dependent on donor countries providing support to countries contributing troops to the mission, in terms of equipment, training and capability. The priority in building-up UNAMID at this stage was to enhance the capacity of former AMIS troops re-assigned to UNAMID, which were due to deploy in the following quarter. There was also a lack of offers to provide UNAMID with utility helicopters, light tactical helicopters, aerial reconnaissance aircraft, and logistics and transport units. Furthermore, a number of police-contributing countries were not prepared for expeditious deployment. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations therefore planned to send assessment missions to those countries in order to identify shortfalls in equipment and other areas that were hindering deployment.427

UNAMID also faced numerous logistical challenges. The availability of transit accommodation to facilitate incoming units was highly erratic, and the failure of the Sudanese government to provide UNAMID with the land it required to set up its HQ in Western Darfur was also a hindrance. The transition from the AMIS to the UNAMID supply system was experiencing logistical difficulties,

including ageing equipment inherited from AMIS. Early 2008 had not completed the deployment of UN communications equipment and systems, and UNAMID was, in the meantime, sending some operational messages via commercial Internet. No countries had yet made additional pledges for aviation and transportation units, and UNAMID still lacked one heavy and one medium ground transport unit, three military utility aviation units (18 helicopters in total), as well as additional attack helicopters.\textsuperscript{428}

On 18 October 2010 the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, reported to the Security Council on progress made towards implementing the mandate of UNAMID, covering the period since 14 January.\textsuperscript{429}

\textit{Violence in internally displaced persons camps}

In late July 2010, violence broke out at Kalma camp in which four people were killed. Three people were also killed during unrest at Hamadiya camp near Zalingei. Security at Kalma camp continued to deteriorate resulting in at least 35 fatalities, as well as the displacement from the camp of some 25,000 IDPs to Nyala and surrounding villages. Several thousand ‘displaced IDPs’ from Nyala camp sought refuge at the nearby UNAMID community policing centre. Humanitarian workers and UNAMID personnel were eventually allowed access to the camp in mid-August. The violence illustrated the growing


problem of weapons and armed elements inside IDP camps. UNAMID initiated
 talks with IDP leaders, while the authorities in Southern Darfur also
 announced their intention to relocate Kalma camp to nearby Beleil. The
government conceded that relocation would have to be voluntary and
disarmament efforts non-coercive.

UNAMID reinforced its presence and conducted 24/7 patrols in the camp
during the crisis, as well as daily engagements by UNAMID integrated civilian
teams with camp leaders and other residents. Similar events occurred in
Hamadiya camp near Zalengei. Tensions between pro- and anti-Doha IDPs
reflect an ongoing power struggle within the camps.

*Security, governance, human rights and the humanitarian situation*

Security remained fragile and unpredictable during this period, including
intermittent fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and rebels;
inter-tribal violence; unrest in some IDP camps; attacks and abductions of
humanitarian and UNAMID personnel; and criminality. However, incidents of
carjacking and abductions of UN personnel decreased due to tighter
mitigation measures put in place by UNAMID.

The SAF forced JEM elements out of areas in Southern Darfur that had been
the scene of fighting in April and May. JEM elements had relocated in the far
north of Northern Darfur, around the Libya-Chad border. There were fewer
armed confrontations between parties to the conflict. JEM forces clashed with SAF in July as SAF tried to prevent it from taking up positions in the south. Clashes were also recorded between SLA-Abdul Wahid forces and SAF.

In September an unidentified armed group reportedly in uniform attacked the village of Tabarat in Northern Darfur. Eyewitnesses identified the attackers as Arab tribesmen. They killed 37 and injured 35, targeting men. Around 3,000 people were displaced to Tawilla, around 30 km away. Khartoum restored order and established a commission to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators.

Tribal clashes, notably between the Misseriya and Rezeigat over land and access to migration routes in the Kass area, were the major cause of death in August, claiming the lives of 157 people. Inter-tribal clashes over water resources and cattle thefts continued to flare up, although local agreements appeared to be holding in some areas.

There were 26 incidents of restrictions of UNAMID or UN agency movements, the majority by the government. Humanitarian access was denied in some villages. UNAMID forces were attacked several times and seven peacekeepers were injured. Criminals targeting UNAMID and humanitarian personnel remained a concern, although the overall crime rate involving the UN, associated personnel and IDPs in areas patrolled by UNAMID dropped by 20 per cent. UNAMID military personnel conducted 3,411 routine patrols, 637
short-range patrols, 324 long-range patrols, 1,001 night patrols, 184 humanitarian escorts and 691 logistics/administrative patrols, in IDP camps, towns and villages across Darfur. UNAMID police undertook 524 firewood and farming patrols, 2,818 patrols outside villages, towns and IDP camps, and 1,140 medium and long-range patrols.

UNAMID police had recruited 5,580 community policing volunteers, of whom 2,414 had been trained and were active in IDP camps and communities throughout Darfur. A total of 99 zone safety coordinators were also recruited to implementing the policies of the community safety committees established in a number of IDP camps.

UNAMID delivered numerous training sessions for Sudanese government police and military personnel, including on sexual and gender-based violence, human rights and criminal investigation methods. UNAMID documented 73 incidents of human rights violations and abuses, affecting a total of 122 victims of diverse forms of violations including sexual and gender-based violence and violation of the rights to life, personal security, physical integrity and freedom of movement, and the right to a fair trial. UNAMID continued to engage in dialogue with SAF and armed opposition movements aimed at establishing action plans to end recruitment and the use of child soldiers.

*Progress against UNAMID benchmarks*
The Secretary-General assessed progress against a number of benchmarks set out in annex II of his report of 16 November 2009.\textsuperscript{430} He noted limited progress towards the first benchmark of a comprehensive political solution through implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement or subsequent agreements. The second benchmark referred to UNAMID’s contribution to restoring a stable and secure environment throughout Darfur. Restrictions on movement had hampered UNAMID’s ability to respond to incidents of tension or conflict, particularly between the SAF and rebels. There were also restrictions on the movement of humanitarian convoys to Kalma camp in July and August. Nevertheless, UNAMID military and police patrols, and the community policing volunteer initiative, helped to promote stability.

Modest progress was made against some areas of benchmark three, relating to the rule of law, governance and human rights, and assisting state institutions. UNAMID child protection officers were working with rebels and the government to stop the recruitment of child soldiers. The Prison Advisory Unit gained greater access to and improved conditions in some prisons. UNAMID was also providing human rights training to corrections officials. However, a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme for Darfur had not been established.

Stabilising the humanitarian situation and facilitating humanitarian access – benchmark four – had achieved only limited progress, undermined by

incidents of conflict, more stringent security management measures implemented by humanitarian organizations in response to attacks and abductions, and access restrictions. UNAMID continued to speak to the government about lifting restrictions on movement and access. UNAMID had recently set up joint verification and security mechanisms with the UN country team and the government.

UNAMID deployment and operations

As of 30 September 2010, UNAMID civilian personnel strength stood at 4,261 – 77 per cent of the approved strength of 5,516 – comprising 1,105 international staff, 2,688 national staff and 468 UN volunteers. The Secretary-General noted continuing problems recruiting and retaining staff due to harsh living conditions and unpredictable security. Two hundred and seven potential candidates had declined offers of appointment since January 2008, while 315 had left the mission.

UNAMID military strength stood at 17,199 – 87 per cent of the authorized strength of 19,555. There were 2,280 UNAMID individual police officers – 74 per cent of the mandated strength of 3,772. Following the arrival of a Senegalese formed police unit in August, 14 of the projected 19 formed police units were currently deployed, with three units projected to arrive in November-December 2010. Total formed police unit personnel strength stood at 1,949 – 73 per cent of the authorized strength of 2,660.
Between 1 July and 17 September, Khartoum issued 769 new entry visas to UNAMID personnel – an improvement on previous months, and as of 19 September, 200 visa applications were pending approval.

Representatives of the Sudanese government, the AU and UNAMID met in New York for the ninth Tripartite Coordination Mechanism meeting on UNAMID in September. The meeting included discussions on humanitarian access to IDPs, the granting of a radio frequency for UNAMID radio, and the allocation of land for construction of community policing centres and team sites.

Some UNAMID contingents were still critically under-equipped and did not meet the UN desired serviceability and self-sustainment standards as required under the approved contingent-owned equipment manual.

Somalia

* African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) *

On 27 February 2007, UN Security Council Resolution 1744 authorised the AU to establish a Chapter VII mission to promote security in southern Somalia.\(^{431}\) The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is mandated with a maximum strength

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of approximately 8,000 peacekeepers. It is tasked with: assisting the free movement, safe passage and protection of the parties involved with the dialogue and reconciliation process in Somalia; supporting implementation of Somalia’s National Security and Stabilisation Plan; and helping foster the necessary security conditions for humanitarian assistance.

But AMISOM’s mandate promises much more than its military component could hope to deliver effectively. Civilian protection is not one of its mandated tasks. More fundamentally, there are real questions about whether the AU will be able to generate the force in the first place. AMISOM anticipates handing over to a UN force after a year. And Resolution 1744 authorised a technical assessment mission to explore modalities for a follow-on UN operation. However, there was certainly no explicit commitment from the UN to effect such a transfer. And, as the next case study will demonstrate, the political and practical problems experienced in delivering the transfer of AMIS to a UN or a hybrid force do not set a hopeful precedent.432

In March 2008, the UN suggested that political developments in Somalia provided a more benign environment for proactive engagement by the UN in the country.433 Somalia’s new Prime Minister, Yusuf Nur Hassan Hussein, appointed a streamlined government early in 2008, largely comprising professionals recommended by the National Reconciliation Congress. The

international community, including the UN, broadly welcomed this development. In January 2008, Prime Minister Hussein announced the appointment of a new Cabinet.

But, the more favourable political situation did not bring a significant improvement in security, as violence, severe human rights violations, and the grim humanitarian condition of the Somali people continued throughout the country. The north was relatively stable, compared to southern and central areas. In the north, the border dispute between ‘Somaliland’ and ‘Puntland’ remained a major security concern. In southern and central Somalia, anti-government elements, including the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), continued to conduct frequent insurgency operations, in particular targeting Ethiopian Armed Forces and the forces of the Transitional Federal Government, police stations and government authorities. In Mogadishu, there were regular attacks by anti-government elements, as well as an increase in counter-operations by the Ethiopian Army and the government. Field guns and mortars were regularly being used in heavily populated areas, leading to considerable loss of civilian life and displacement.

Insecurity in Somalia was complicated by regional and international factors. The proliferation of Somali refugees in a number of countries led to ties between some regional states and diaspora groups with various elements within Somalia. The proliferation of arms, the use of Somalia as a base for proxy wars and the continuing threat of piracy were also destabilising factors.
International terrorist groups were also reportedly seeking haven in the Hiraan and Juba districts, which were believed to be the stronghold of UIC extremist elements.

Violations of human rights were continuing unabated in Mogadishu, with civilians bearing the brunt of indiscriminate shelling and shootings. Civil society, especially journalists and human rights activists, were being specifically targeted, and public servants were also subjected to political assassination.434

By early 2008, AMISOM was providing security at the airport and seaport as well as the presidential palace in Mogadishu. The arrival of 850 Burundian troops had bolstered the strength of AMISOM, up to 2,613-strong. The existing AMISOM mandate was based on a strength of 8,000 personnel, comprising nine infantry battalions, a 270-strong police component and 300 integrated civilian and military staff for the Mission HQ. At his time, only three battalions had been deployed. The fourth was not expected to be fully deployed until the end of May.

There were on-going discussions over the deployment of additional troops from Nigeria and Ghana. Financial, logistical and force generation constraints continued to hamper the efforts of the AU to realise AMISOM’s full strength. Financial support for AMISOM was being provided by the EU, China, the

League of Arab States and the UK. The US was supporting the Ugandan contingent on a bilateral basis, and the US and NATO pledged to provide airlift facilities. Nigeria pledged a contribution of $2 million. A UN team of military and civilian experts was deployed to Addis Ababa to support AMISOM planning and implementation capacity.

United Nations Support Package for AMISOM

A meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2008 extended the AMISOM mandate for an additional six months. But on 20 February 2008, the Chair of the AU, Alpha Oumar Konaré, wrote to the UN Secretary-General requesting a UN financial, logistical and technical support package for AMISOM, totalling some $817,500,000, in order to help it realise its full strength [see below].

The AU acknowledged that existing AU support arrangements were not attractive to potential future troop-contributing countries. The UN had previously helped to mobilise bilateral assistance for the Burundian and Ugandan contingents already deployed to AMISOM. But troop contributions that had been pledged from Ghana and from Nigeria were not likely to be deployed without a more robust and guaranteed mission support package.

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The AU appealed for support in the following areas:

Logistics support

1. Constructing AMISOM’s mission HQ;
2. Establishing a main logistics base outside Somalia and a forward logistics base in Mogadishu;
3. Fuel and ration contracts;
4. Enhanced communication systems;
5. Establishing a transit camp near Mogadishu airport;
6. Communication equipment, armoured vehicles and accommodation infrastructure for the AU police component;
7. Transportation of AMISOM troops/equipment to Mogadishu from respective troop-contributing countries; and
8. One dedicated fixed wing aircraft for transportation of personnel.

Budget estimates at March 2008 totalled $885,174,163. At that time, there was a deficit of $817,500,000, as follows:

- Mission headquarters HQ salaries and associated costs: $23,000,000
- Construction of mission HQ: $30,300,000

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The AU acknowledged that its existing administration was not resourced to cope with the operational tempo needed to meet peacekeeping on such a large scale, and so it appealed to the UN to help with mission support. Specifically, the AU requested UN staff on loan in the areas of Chief of Mission support, procurement, budget, finance, internal audit oversight, contingent-owned equipment, contract management, and a security adviser to the Head of Mission. The AU asserted that lessons learned from the AMIS experience should be translated into best practice that assured accountability and transparency.
In January 2008, the UN sent an assessment mission to Somalia, led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The mission developed four contingency plans for a possible UN peacekeeping operation, based on four separate scenarios, which could occur sequentially:

**Scenario 1** The government would continue to pursue political dialogue with the opposition, security would remain fragile, and there would be no significant increase in AMISOM strength. In this scenario, UN political and programmatic support to Somalia could be enhanced by relocating UN staff from Nairobi to Somalia.

**Scenario 2** 60 to 70 per cent of Somali actors would agree to support political dialogue; security arrangements would be made that enable a stronger UN presence in Mogadishu. In this scenario, the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) HQ would be relocated to Mogadishu in order to strengthen UN political support to the peace process. Appropriate security arrangements would be needed to support this initiative, to protect personnel and physical infrastructure and to support mediation efforts with Somali actors.

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Scenario 3 The principal factions would initiate a code of conduct on the use of arms, and agreement would be reached on a gradual withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. A stabilisation force (estimated at 8,000 strong, together with police officers) would be deployed to facilitate the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, to preclude a security vacuum and to stimulate to the political dialogue.

Scenario 4 Political and security agreements would be consolidated, including clear support for a UN peacekeeping mission, and the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. Deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission for Somalia would be contingent on political agreements and security commitments, which would need to include provisions on power-sharing, laying-down arms, respect for human rights, facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the development of governing institutions. The force would need to comprise 15 to 21 infantry battalions: up to 27,000 military personnel, with a possible police component of up to 1,500 officers.

On 11 May 2010 the UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on developments in Somalia since 8 January 2010.439

Security in Somalia remained volatile, including attacks by armed groups against the TFG and AMISOM in Mogadishu. AMISOM troops foiled an attempted suicide attack on their base in Mogadishu in April. A December

2009 – January 2010 food security and nutrition assessment by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) concluded that a widespread humanitarian crisis still existed in Somalia, with 3.2 million (43 per cent) of Somalis requiring humanitarian assistance and livelihood support, including 1.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Security concerns and inaccessibility were hampering relief efforts.

Increased violence in southern and central Somalia in the first three months of 2010 had devastating consequences for civilians. More than 110,000 people were displaced during this period, bringing the total number of persons displaced by the conflict to 1.4 million. Civilians were increasingly caught in crossfire violence between insurgents and government forces in Mogadishu, with the Mayor of Mogadishu urging them to flee the city in March. In southern and central Somalia civilians also continued to be threatened and abused by armed group elements, including stoning, amputations, floggings and other corporal punishments. Recruitment of children by various parties had increased in the previous year.

Donor funding provided for the reimbursement of all categories of contingent-owned equipment for the period ending 23 March 2010. But those funds were by now exhausted and it remained unclear how the next contingent-owned equipment reimbursements, due in June, would be financed.
Using airlift provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Uganda deployed a fourth battalion in mid-March bringing AMISOM troop strength to 6,120. A 40-strong Burundian support team also deployed to AMISOM. Forty of the authorized 270 AMISOM civilian police officers were deployed, from Burundi, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia. On 28 March seven police officers arrived in Mogadishu to launch training programmes for the Somali police.

During this period, the TFG was developing a national security and stabilization plan, intended to ensure coherence in developing the security and justice sectors. As this process continued, on-going activities to reform the security sector included: building the Somali National Security Forces through a six-month training curriculum; a predeployment course to new recruits prior to their incorporation into the National Security Forces, supported by AMISOM and the UN; police training; and building the capacity of the Ministry of Intelligence.

Predeployment training to Somali forces had enabled 2,800 Somali troops to form into seven mixed clan battalions of approximately 450 each. AMISOM, UNPOS and UNDP were helping the Somali Police Force with training, technical assistance, stipends, non-lethal equipment, and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure. By the end of March 2,950 police were registered with the Somali Police Force.
Conclusion

African peacekeeping capability is severely constrained by chronic capacity and financial shortfalls. African peacekeeping deployments are, therefore, reliant on the assistance of the international community. Previous chapters have outlined how donor countries have supported the development of the AU peace and security architecture. And the case study of the Darfur deployment above shows how external partners have helped to sustain AU peacekeeping efforts in theatre. The EU African Peace Facility provided essential financial support, without which AMIS would not have been able to operate at all. And a functioning operational relationship was established between the AU and its international partners, through the Darfur Integrated Taskforce (DITF) and other fora. But, despite some limited initial success, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) struggled to provide any meaningful protection for civilians in Darfur.

Capacity problems are closely linked to political challenges for the AU. Previous discussions on AU capacity-building highlighted the struggles that the AU has had in trying to build political recognition and support from its Member States. In operational terms, this translates into a lack of commitment to provide personnel and other resources for specific missions. In Somalia, few African countries have been prepared to commit troops to bring AMISOM up to its full strength – although, the AU concedes that troop contributors are unlikely to be encouraged by the weakness of the support
package on offer. And in Darfur, many of AMIS’ problems have related to the weakness of its mandate to protect civilians, and this has stemmed in large part to the failure of the AU and its Member States to challenge Khartoum’s culpability in human rights atrocities in the region. Conversely, in Burundi, sustained regional engagement in the peace process, and in particular pressure from the OAU/AU was a key determinant in pushing forward the peace process.

But UN peacekeeping has its own problems, although on a much different scale to the AU. In Darfur, for example, the UNAMID mandate still concedes Khartoum’s responsibility regarding civilian protection, which achieving final agreement and deployment of the UN component of the mission has taken several years. And it is questionable the extent to which even a full-strength UNAMID can contain the conflict. Most of the AMIS troops that are being re-hatted for the hybrid mission come from African nations committed to peacekeeping, with commensurately trained and focused military forces. But the belligerents in Darfur are well organised, equipped and motivated, and critics have suggested countering them effectively will require a much more capable and committed force than UNAMID.\textsuperscript{440} Compared to AMIS, a fully-functional hybrid force would be able to deploy more peacekeepers to more locations in Darfur. This would present greater protection from imminent threat to larger numbers of civilians. But it will not be able to confront and neutralise the numerous forces and proxies in Darfur, who will carry on

fighting and attacking civilians in areas where there is no UN physical presence.

The AU needs to retain ownership of its peace and security capability. This has proved difficult in relation to capacity-building. But it is also an issue operationally. For example, logistic support provided to AMIS in Darfur by the US to supply accommodation, transport, and communications was contracted to private American companies, specifically DynCorp Corporation and Pacific Architects & Engineers (PAE).441 With such deals worth tens of millions of dollars being awarded to companies from the country supplying the finance, political hackles are raised in Addis Ababa questioning Washington’s true motivation for engaging with the AU.

441 Chatterjee, P (2004), Darfur Diplomacy: Enter the Contractors, CorpWatch, 21 October, www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11598
9 Conclusion

How capable is the AU in practice to deliver effective peacekeeping to protect civilians? And how appropriate is international support to help realise this ambition?

Given the AU’s relative peacekeeping infancy and its capacity and other operational constraints, a key focus of this thesis has been the quality, extent and suitability of international support for the AU, both to build African peacekeeping capability, and to provide operational support to African missions. The UN remains the primary peacekeeping agency in Africa. And at present African and UN peacekeeping are operationally ‘layered’, with African deployments looking to hand over to UN missions as their exit strategy – albeit with very mixed results.

This thesis has focused on two particular international initiatives which have been designed specifically to support African peacekeeping, namely: 1) The European Union Strategy for Africa; and 2) The Joint G8/Africa Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations. This thesis identified African ‘ownership’ of its peace and security architecture as a key component of a viable African peacekeeping capability.

In order to investigate this topic, this thesis has asked three inter-related research questions:
1. how has peacekeeping incorporated increasing emphasis on protecting civilians in international peace and security policy?

2. is the African Union a competent agency to deliver peacekeeping operations?

3. can international partnership provide appropriate and sufficient support to the African Union to fulfil its peacekeeping commitment?

Chapter 2 established complex peacekeeping, peace enforcement, burden-sharing and the increasing trend to include civilian protection as a primary operational objective as the basis upon which to assess the AU’s peacekeeping capability. Civilian protection requires specialist peacekeeping capability. Specific tools are also needed, such as relevant doctrine and training, and there are constitutional and political obligations on implementing agencies, to respond to serious threats to individual human rights, and to provide peacekeeping deployments with appropriate mandates and resources for civilian protection responsibilities.

Chapter 3 showed that AU peace and security architecture (APSA) seeks to develop a robust capability that can protect the human rights of the individual, not least through the African Standby Force (ASF). But a number of challenges remain if the AU is to become fully functional. Key AU Member
States must be prepared to support the AU institutionally and politically, including authorising and resourcing missions in situations where the security of African civilians is under threat. Capacity is a major problem for the AU. A pattern has emerged for African regional deployments to play advance, vanguard roles ahead of the deployment of UN missions. But this model has yet to be built explicitly into the design and construction of ASF. The APSA should play to its strengths, developing specific and specialised elements that can fit into a global ‘interlocking system of peacekeeping capabilities’. Capacity-building programmes for the ASF should focus on the particular functions of the AU relative to operational partners active in Africa, to maximise the effectiveness both of African capability, and of international efforts to build AU capacity.

Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 focused on the last of this thesis’ research questions, which asked whether international assistance can provide appropriate and sufficient support to the AU. These chapters examined first EU and then G8 engagement with Africa.

The EU and Africa describe their partnership as mutually beneficial. But there are some basic structural challenges that complicate Africa-EU relations. The EU deals with Africa as two administratively distinct blocs north and south of the Sahara. This undermines the AU’s efforts to establish continental cohesion. And there is poor European coordination across a range of areas, as internal EU relationships – between the Commission, the Council and the
Member States, and within all three of these bodies – often overlap or compete. The establishment of the new European External Action Service (EAS) risks adding yet another layer of complexity.

In peace and security terms, the EU has been a significant partner for Africa. The EU has made a major financial contribution to a functioning African peacekeeping capacity, not least through the Africa Peace Facility, which has supported AU capacity-building and has provided significant operational support, such as for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The EU has also been a staunch operational peacekeeping partner in Africa, notably its various deployments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. But operational support has to date been *ad hoc*. The EU Battlegroups concept as an attempt to systematise operational support appears tailor-made to support UN or AU peacekeeping deployments in Africa. Battlegroups were supposed to be fully operational in 2006. But, at the time of writing, none have been deployed, and it is still not clear how operational they are likely to become. The EU’s African Peace Facility has designed its terms and conditions to ensure a high degree of African ownership, so that, within a set of strict guidelines, Africa can largely prescribe where, when and on what European money is disbursed.

Practical and political problems to a improving cooperation between the EU and Africa include agreeing unified policies, streamlining European funding sources, and developing forums in which a functioning dialogue can take place between the two continents at all levels. The problems with convening
the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon, and the struggles of the two partners to agree a workable solution to who should attend, has been a major hindrance to achieving a truly joint partnership.

Ahead 2010 of the 2010 EU-Africa Summit in Tripoli, an international conference on ‘Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing the New Africa-EU Partnership’, concluded that “[w]hile the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) have collaborated on traditional forms of hard security they need to look at issues of human security and address underlying causes of conflict”.442

The overall conclusion of the conference on the current state of affairs mirrors the findings of my research:

“The complexity of African states and security threats in Africa must be properly appreciated if their responses are to be effective, yet there is still a tendency in some quarters to view Africa though a single lens. Much focus is given to how Europe can help Africa but there are important lessons for Europe to take from Africa. In some respects the AU has made greater progress than the EU in establishing continent wide security structures, and as one speaker remarked it was only in 1993 that Kenyan troops were serving and dying in Sarajevo to help stabilise Europe.

The divergence between the rhetoric of an equal partnership between Africa and the EU and the reality is something that should be recognised. There have been positive developments since the 2000 summit in Cairo, where many African leaders felt they were simply taking part in a photo-opportunity with their European counterparts. The Joint Africa Europe Strategy (JAES) is a sign of this more serious commitment to collaboration. However while the relationship remains dominated by the donor recipient dynamic the question of ownership will remain extremely difficult. This theme arose on multiple occasions during the conference and is something that the upcoming summit should be aware of.

... The motivations for European engagement in Africa are further reaching than rhetoric in public statements would suggest. EU missions to DRC in 2003 and Chad in 2007 had as much to do with proving the relevance of Europe as a global player capable of projecting influence as with desires to help states affected by conflict.

Much progress had been achieved in improving peace and security in Africa given limited time and resources. However there was recognition of much work still to be done. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is able to raise 80% of its budget internally and is seen as the most effective regional body in addressing Peace
and Security. It is only when Africa is itself able to pay for missions that there can be true independence of action. Ownership of peace and security initiatives will likewise only exist when states are paying for them themselves. The AU values the EU contribution to support its peace and security efforts but as long as funding is not predictable, sustainable and flexible the AU and regional organisations are likely to be less than fully effective. Achieving a more equal partnership will be greatly facilitated by more sustainable funding arrangements.

Coherence between different actors was also highlighted as something that needed attention. Multiple SSR missions in DRC for example do not in the end help reform if they are not properly coordinated.

The Africa-Europe relationship does not exist in a vacuum and nor is it the only relationship that each continent has. On the side of Europe, Afghanistan is absorbing military resources and political focus and in the light of budget restrictions and defence cuts it seems that at least in the short term the appetite for direct European engagement on land in Africa will be limited. The AU has a longstanding relationship with the United Nations and the AU is seeking a means to benefit from UN assessed contributions for missions it carries out under UN mandate, however the Security Council is reluctant to consider this proposal. The conference heard how increasingly China is having to calibrate its approach with African concerns around governance and human rights.
The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa play a central role in the implementation of peace and security initiatives on the continent. There is an evolving and generally improving relationship between the RECs and the African Union although between RECs there is some way to go. In many regions leadership is provided by stronger more capable states and often times this has been very fruitful although there can be political problems when neighbours seek to impose ideas on each other. It is also important to note the difference in progress by various regional bodies. This is especially true concerning North Africa which despite greater financial and military resources lags far behind other regions in the development of their regional security mechanisms. Some participants attributed this lack of engagement to the fact that North Africa aligns its priorities north to Europe or east towards the Middle East. In this context engagement with the rest of Africa is primarily useful when blocks of votes are necessary.

The conference underlined the paramount importance of understanding the political context if peace and security initiatives are to be successful. This is true at the level of EU-Africa continental relations as well as at the operational level of individual AU, REC, EU or UN missions. Without a clear understanding of the political context efforts are unlikely to be successful. Peace and Security do not exist in isolation from issues of governance and human rights and the evolving
African Governance Architecture seeks to address some of these underlying causes of conflict and will be as important as the kinetic instruments in ensuring widening and lasting peace”.

Chapters 6 and 7 examined G8 support for African peacekeeping. Specifically, they assessed the effectiveness and relevance of the *Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations* (the Joint Plan), agreed at the 2003 G8 Summit in Evian. Research for this thesis exposed some major gaps in the Joint Plan. In practical terms, serious shortfalls are evident in relation to strategic management capacity, donor coordination, operationalising the African Stand-by Force, and training and logistics. These are highly significant to building a core peacekeeping capacity.

The Joint Plan also stresses the importance of African ownership, and both international and African partners are keen to reiterate their commitment to this objective. But the AU’s lack of capacity to articulate its needs to the G8 coherently, and an often over-zealous and uncoordinated approach by some G8 partners, have made this ambition difficult to achieve in practice.

Capacity challenges and political challenges are closely linked, and the AU has often struggled to attract personnel, funding and other essential resources for its missions from its own Member States. For example, in 2008, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was well over 5,000 troops short of its
mandated strength of 8,000, and it was hampered by numerous logistic challenges. AMISOM was also, absurdly, nearly $818,000,000 short of its budget of $885,000,000. Political difficulties were also a major hindrance in Darfur. The weakness of the AMIS mandate to protect civilians was in large part a political issue, resulting from the inability of AU Member States to challenge Khartoum’s culpability in human rights atrocities in the region. As a result, the AMIS mandate left primary responsibility for civilians security in Darfur to the Sudanese government.

African deployments in Burundi, Darfur, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia reviewed in Chapter 8 revealed a pattern by which ‘vanguard’ African deployments precede larger, UN operations, and the case studies presented in this chapter suggested this as a potentially workable operational model. African missions clearly lack resources, but in specific circumstances, namely in less challenging operational environments, they have been able to create suitable conditions to enable a follow-on UN mission. The inadequacies of African peacekeeping capacity is brought into sharp relief by the case studies. The Darfur study showed how international partners were necessary to sustain the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in theatre, including financial support from the EU African Peace Facility, without which AMIS would not have been able to operate at all. And a functioning operational relationship was established between the AU and its international partners, through the Darfur Integrated Taskforce (DITF) and other forums. Despite some limited initial
success, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) struggled to provide any meaningful protection for civilians in Darfur.

While transfer to a UN mission is a key objective of African regional deployments, UN peacekeeping has its own problems – not least in relation to civilian protection. The AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) replaced AMIS in July 2007. But three years later in July 2010, Human Rights Watch complained that “fighting and rights abuses across Darfur show clearly that the war is far from over and that the UN needs to do more to protect civilians”.443 At the UN, many of the largest contributors of peacekeeping personnel are developing countries. These often lack modern logistic capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, communications and mobility that can greatly enhance the effectiveness of a mission. Moreover, peacekeepers’ effectiveness is often down to the attitude of a particular individual or a national contingent, and it relates to what sorts of tasks they are prepared to undertake to enhance the security of civilians.

Peacekeeping mandates are, by definition, multilateral and, consequently, they often represent a political compromise. Inevitably, therefore, they contain concessions and ambiguities that frame a mission’s mandate, and are a clumsy basis on which to establish a military mission. Much is left to the interpretation of political and military commanders on the ground. This structure can deliver highly varied results, with a commensurate impact on

443 Human Rights Watch (2010), UN: Strengthen Civilian Protection in Darfur, July 19
the perception of security amongst the local population. This approach is not conducive to high-intensity enforcement operations.444

The nascent AU peace and security architecture presents a promising basis for a functioning continental peacekeeping capability, which can help protect vulnerable civilians. But it needs much clearer focus in terms of the type of capacity it is building, and where that capacity fits within the wider global peacekeeping capability. This implies honest and lucid planning among international partners about the type of support it gives. Key AU Member States also need to afford the AU the political respect and the physical resources it needs if they want it to become truly functional. This is essential to maintain international interest and support. For their part, international and donor partners need to provide consistent and appropriate backing, and balance their own interests priorities and concerns against the needs of African ownership.

**Final thoughts**

In an interview with the author in 2009,445 the then Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and head of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), HE Nicolas Bwakira, asserted that, as a subsidiary organ of the AU Commission (AUC), AMISOM was:

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“bound by the AU Constitutive Act of July 2000, which sets among its objectives the protection of African civilians, including Somalis. AMISOM’s ethos is also consistent with the AU’s principle of ‘non-indifference’. When able to, our forces have continued to provide human security for ordinary Somalis.”

Bwakira described how the overall AU strategy in Somalia originates from the need to implement the mandate from the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is backed up by UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to support peace in Somalia. The Special Representative acknowledged that, although AMISOM was at the time still a long way short of full capacity, this did not reflect badly on the commitment of AU member states and the AU’s international partners. He maintained that there could be “no question of the commitment of AU member states in seeing a lasting peace in Somalia”.

Bwakira suggested that the existing crisis in Somalia showed that both the AU and the UN were able to work in partnership successfully to address conflicts in Africa, and that the AMISOM model in Somalia has the capacity to strengthen the working relationship with the UN in other ongoing regional conflicts. On the subject of AMISOM’s experiences as an indicator of the

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development of the AU’s peace and security capability in the longer term, the Special Representative described the mission as a strong statement that there should be no doubt about the AU’s commitment to peace and security in Africa. While acknowledging that Somalia remained a challenge, he asserted that AMISOM was able and capable of delivering a lasting peace to Somalia. He also stated that AMISOM’s Somalia model also showed ordinary Africans that future conflicts will be primarily resolved within an African context.

The Special Representative goes on to claim that AMISOM is already up to this task. This thesis has shown why few would agree with him. It suggests that AU peacekeeping for civilian protection is not impossible. But there is still a long way to go. Capacity constraints, lack of troops, poor intelligence capability and financial concerns have all conspired to undermine AMISOM’s effectiveness. The thesis demonstrates how international partnership can best help remedy this so that the Special Representative’s rhetoric becomes reality. In December 2011, the AU was still seeking major support for AMISOM from the UN, requesting the Security Council to consider authorizing funding from the assessed budget, to AMISOM, of the required mission support including the enhanced personnel,
force enablers and multipliers, contingent-owned equipment, as well as allowances for the troops and formed police units.\textsuperscript{448}

This thesis hypothesised that the African Union can, with appropriate international support, develop over time effective peacekeeping capability that can contribute to the protection of civilians caught up in armed conflict. It has shown that while peacekeeping as a discipline is not currently well aligned to uphold civilian protection as a primary mandated operational function, nevertheless in certain circumstances vulnerable civilians have felt more secure in the presence of international peacekeepers.

The African Union is institutionally weak and lacks fundamental capability. While AU peacekeepers have often struggled to deliver, they have deployed to some of the harshest and most challenging environments. This thesis has suggested that AU peace and security architecture is broadly adjusted to develop a functioning peacekeeping capability that can support civilian protection; and that much international support is well-intentioned, and some is well delivered.

But African ownership remains a key challenge – for the AU itself as well as its donor partners – that must be continually prioritised and appraised if AU peacekeeping is going to develop a functioning capability to protect civilians.

It is certainly the case that, at present, the African Union cannot be seen as a default ‘solution’ to African conflict ‘problems’ in which civilians’ security is fundamentally challenged.
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