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Human Security Assemblages: 
Transformations and Governmental 
Rationalities in Canada and Japan

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Human Security Assemblages: Transformations and Governmental Rationalities in Canada and Japan

ABSTRACT

The thesis examines Canadian and Japanese human security assemblages. It aims to delve below stereotypical imageries “representing” these human security articulations. The concept of “human security” is not a starting point, but a result of elements, processes, structures and mechanisms which need to be investigated in order to reveal insights about a given articulation of human security. Each human security assemblage is composed of messy discourses and practices which are loosely related and sometimes even disconnected. Academics have frequently avoided studying the messiness of political discourses and practices and their mutual dependencies or their lack thereof. By contrast, this thesis ascertains what has lain beneath Canadian and Japanese spatio-temporal articulation of human security and establishes the kinds of structural terrain which have enabled, shaped, or blocked the unfolding of certain versions of human security. The pivotal contention of the thesis is that Canadian and Japanese articulations of human security have been different because they have grown from completely different domestic economies of power governing the relationship between the state apparatus and the non-profit and voluntary sector. While the Canadian human security assemblage has been shaped by transformations in the country’s advanced liberal model of government, the Japanese has been shaped by the continuities of Japan’s bureaucratic authoritarianism. A novel approach is employed for the related process-tracing: a general series linking structural conditions with actual articulations of the human security projects, and their further development, including analysis of their unintended consequences.

Keywords

Human security; assemblage, governmental rationality; Canada; Japan; government-NGOs interactions; Foucault; Deleuze
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Also, I would like to make a note on Japanese names which appear in the thesis. I have followed the Japanese order for names, giving surnames first, followed by the personal name as this is the Japanese preference when presenting their names for foreign consumption.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theorisation as Conceptual Practice, Experimentation and Assemblages</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhizomatic and Arborescent Models of Assemblage</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Rationalities and Economies of Power</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmentalised Human Security Assemblages</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2: IMAGERIES OF HUMAN SECURITY</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Imagery of Canadian Human Security</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientalist Imagery of Japanese Human Security</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Critical Meta-Analysis of the Imageries</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3: CANADIAN CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Transformations as Conditions of Possibility</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign- and Security-Policy Conditions of Possibility</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in Political Rationalities</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shift in the Security Dispositif.</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 4: THE LANDMINE CASE AS A RHIZOMATIC ASSEMBLAGE</strong></td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echoes of the 19th Century Humanitarian Disarmament</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada in the Vanguard of International Norm Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Micropractices and Technologies of Power</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 5: HYBRIDISED HUMAN SECURITY ASSEMBLAGE</strong></td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Militarisation and Sovereign Biopolitics</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Neutralisation and Counter-Terrorism Domestication</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-liberalised “Humanitarianism” and Proliferation of Risk Management</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 6: STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS FOR JAPANESE CONTINUITY</strong></td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Orthodoxies as Conditions for Fundamental Continuity</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign- and Security-Policy Orthodoxies as Moulding Conditions</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developments in the Domestic Economy of Power</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Mercantile Developmentalist Governmentality as Foreign- and Security Policy</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 7: JAPANESE HUMAN SECURITY AS CONTINUING POLITICS OF CONVERGENCE</strong></td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Comprehensive National Security” as the Master Convergence</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Construction of the Japanese Human Security Programme</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Programme to Assemblage: Japanese Colonisation of Human Security through the United Nations</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 8: DOMOPOLITICAL ASSEMBLAGE OF JAPANESE
HUMAN SECURITY……………………………………………………………………… 298

Convergence and Domopolitics as Complementary
Diagrams of Power…………………………………………………………………… 301

Delivering Post-Conflict Peace:
Human Security Replaces the Military War Machine…………………………… 304

Producing Human (In)security:
Building Their Homes, Denying Their Entrance…………………………………… 313

Domopolitical Administration of NGOs:
From Kōbe to Afghanistan and Beyond……………………………………………… 326

CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………… 339

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………… 353

INTERVIEWS………………………………………………………………………… 388
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures

Figure 1. The Iron Triangle of Hegemonic Discourse…………………………………………………………………………………..……..……..……………….…..………………94

Figure 2. Canada’s Power/Knowledge Nexus in Human Security………………. 117

Figure 3. Japanese Arborescent Penetration of UNTFHS Application Procedure…………………………………………………………………………………………………….…..……………….…..…………286

Figure 4. Global Spread of the Japanese Human Security Assemblage…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………295

Tables

Table 1. Linking Data Analysis to Phases of Research and Research Questions…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………11

Table 2. NVS and the Government’s Priorities: Comparing and Contrasting the Two Reports……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….106

Table 3. Canadian Foreign and Security Policy: Formalisation of Non-Parallel Assemblages…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………131

Table 4. Funding of Landmines-Related Programmes: The Shift from DND to CIDA …………………………………………………..……………….…..……………….…..………………158

Table 5. Removing ‘Militarists’ from the Office, 1945-1948………………..……………….…..……………….…..………………218

Table 6. Japanese Foreign and Security Policy: Formalisation of Non-Parallel Assemblages…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………254
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

APLs – Anti-Personnel Landmines
ATA – Anti-Terrorism Act (Canada)
CanFSP – Canadian Foreign and Security Policy
CanHS – Canadian Human Security
CCIC – Canadian Council for International Cooperation
CIDA – Canadian International Development Agency
CLB – Cabinet Legislation Bureau (Japan)
DFAIT – Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
DND – Department of National Defence (Canada)
DPJ – Democratic Party of Japan
IANSA – International Action Network on Small Arms
ICBL – International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICISS – International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross
IPS – International Policy Statement (Canada)
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
JapFSP – Japanese Foreign and Security Policy
JapHS – Japanese Human Security
JDA – Japan Defence Agency
JICA – Japan International Cooperation Agency
LP – Liberal Party of Canada
LDP – Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
LENPA – Learning Network on Program-Based Approaches
MAC – Mines Action Canada
METI – Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan)
MITI – Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan)
MOF – Ministry of Finance (Japan)
MOFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)
NATO – the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGOs – Non-Governmental Organisations
NPOs – Non-Profit Organisations
NPSIA – Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
NVS – Non-profit and Voluntary Sector
OCHA – U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA – Official Development Aid
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom
PBA – Program-Based Approach (Canada)
PM – Prime Minister
R2P – Responsibility to Protect
RBM – Results-Based Management (Canada)
SDF – Self-Defense Forces (Japan)
U.N. – the United Nations
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNTFHS – United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security
U.S. – the United States
USSR – the Soviet Union
WW2 – The Second World War
INTRODUCTION

This thesis critically investigates articulations of human security and argues that there has been the lack of studies which would attempt to interconnect empirical and conceptual side of this issue area. By its proponents, human security has been celebrated as a novel and progressive approach to security (Burgess 2007; Kaldor 2007; McGrew and Poku 2007; Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007; MacLean, Black and Shaw 2006; Alkire 2004; Hubert 2004; Newman 2001; Thakur 1999). Its ontological focus on individuals and communities has been seen as a radical departure from the previously dominant understanding of security through the notion of national security. The shift from the state as the referent object of security to the insertion of the individual to the same position has been praised as proof of the latter’s political empowerment. In a much more emancipated and liberalised world, the replacement – or at least sidelining – of Realpolitik by the liberal conception of security on which human security has rested was said to demonstrate the new possibilities of the international political order (Glasius and Kaldor 2006; Axworthy 2004; Mack 2004; Ogata and Cels 2003; McRae and Hubert 2001; Newman and Richmond 2001). The United Nations, intergovernmental organisations and even some (more enlightened) nation-states have seized on the opportunity and have begun speaking about and practising human security. Many of these activities have been linked to the phenomenon of the so-called “global civil society” (Kaldor 2003; Matthew, McDonald and Rutherford 2006; McRae 2001; Paris 2001). The rise of human security to prominence has been said to confirm the relevance of evolutionary progress in international society. It has been believed that the gradual universalisation of human security has been a fait accompli in the post-Cold War
world dominated by liberal values. An ever increasing degree of existing political transparency (Florini 2003, 2007), coupled with reconstitutions of political authority and its simultaneous transfer upwards, downwards and to the sides (Tuchman 1989) have been seen as the best guarantors of human security.

The fact that human security as an idea, discourse and practice has been followed by a series of humanitarian developments in global norm-making has been used to vindicate its political and paradigmatic importance. The widening of intellectual as well as policy-making horizons has been perceived as an indicator of structural power unleashed by human security. Normative humanitarian campaigns of all sorts have been used as examples of the so-called “new humanitarianism”, the crux of human security (Forsythe 2010; Cattaneo 2007; Maclean 2006; Waschuk 2001). Campaigns to ban antipersonnel landmines, cluster munitions, the use of child soldiers, and a campaign to establish the International Criminal Court have been among those most frequently used to prove the practical effects of human security as a security paradigm. Also, it has been maintained that human security has diverted more attention and resources to issues of human development and public health (Elbe 2010; Roberts 2009; Iqbal 2006; Chen, Leaning and Narasimhan 2003; Poku 2001; Thomas 2001; Sen 2000). Even more, human security has become one of the key concepts circulated in the field of post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building (Richmond 2010a,b; Bryden and Hänggi 2005; Richmond 2003; Shaw 1996; de Soto and del Castillo 1994). On a more general plane, developments in human security have been equalled by the humanisation of world politics (Hudson 2009; MacFarlane and Foong Khong 2006). Much has been said about human security being associated with “new diplomacy”, “new ethical foreign policy”, “new codes of conduct”, “new political partnerships”, and “new political possibilities and responsibilities”. Human
security has been seen as a precondition for entering into a post-modern (Cooper 2000, 2004) or Kantian (Glasius and Kaldor 2006) model of regional and global governance in which sovereignty is replaced, or at least compromised, by the domestic liberal responsibility of states, helped in this task by new international and regional political platforms and transnationally-stretched non-governmental organisations.

Not all observers of world politics, however, have been impressed and, as a result, have warned against being too enthusiastic about human security. A great deal of criticism has been directed towards the concept of human security, its nature and political feasibility. Theoretically, human security has been challenged for the alleged naivety of claims regarding the possibility of an ontological shift in the referent object of security. Although human security could mean a limited change in world politics, these scholars have argued, the very fact that nation-states have been the principal human security providers has shown the limits of its transformative effects (Buzan 2004; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998; Buzan 1997). Human security has also been put in doubt by what could be termed “friendly criticism”. At the conceptual level, it has been pointed out that human security has been too ambiguous and vague, and has been in desperate need of precision and narrowing down (Glasius 2008; Krause 2004; Owen 2004; Paris 2001; King and Murray 2001; Bajpai 2000). As far as the practical impact of human security goes, the limits have been seen in its excessive reliance on political interests and funding (Hynek 2008; Suhrke 1999), as well as the preoccupation of its promoters with using the paradigm to overcome a “branding deficit” (Grayson 2004; Hynek 2007). Additionally, some scholars have maintained that human security has become successfully co-opted by international institutions and has merely served to reinforce the dominant political
structures of international politics (Turner, Cooper and Pugh 2010; Chandler 2009a, 2008a, 2007; McCormack 2008). Human security has thus been employed to transform various societies and polities to fit Western liberal norms and expectations (Chandler and Hynek 2010; Chandler 2010a; Shani 2010; Richmond 2009; Shani, Satō, Pasha 2007; Pupavac 2005; Duffield 2001, 2007).

As counterintuitive as it seems, there has been a certain number of preoccupations and fallacies that proponents of human security have shared with critics of the paradigm. These can be discerned in the nature of the debate between the two sets of commentators (cf. a special section of the Security Dialogue on human security from 2004). In this thesis, I disagree with these preoccupations, consider them of limited heuristic utility, and, consequently, approach human security differently, in a novel way. I argue that the most productive starting point for an examination of human security is the complete avoidance of sedimented clichés regarding it, of widespread and accepted truths, as well as divisions and related political identities. In fact, all these are considered examples of lazy reasoning about human security by the author, in many cases verging on superficiality. What is surprising in this context is an almost complete lack of studies which would link in a systematic and robust way critically-oriented theoretical knowledge with a rich empirical examination of human security. Since the debate between advocates and opponents of human security has not contained this type of analysis, one needs to abandon this intellectual space and approach human security from a different perspective. Deleuze (1988) and Foucault's (1982) discussions of the history of forms and contents, the archive, is relevant here. To paraphrase them, rather than studying in the human security archive, one needs to study the human security archive.
To begin with, human security is not portrayed and subsequently studied in a normative fashion in this thesis. The author refuses to take a position through which he would either say that human security has been a progressive enterprise, or a failed set of discourses and practices. This is done not in order to mask his opinion about human security. Rather, it has been motivated by the author’s belief that human security cannot be appraised meaningfully in its “lump sum”, as it has never existed in this singular form. One can speak of certain articulations – discourses and practices of human security, thereby distinguishing among different, and often disparate, human securities. In addition, one needs to stay intellectually alert and not be lured either into an uncritical appreciation or refusal of human security which has too often dominated the discourse, mostly in an implicit form. Such a non-normative take should not, however, be confused with a quest for objectivity to which the author resigns right away. Indeed, such a starting point carries with it a number of significant ontological, epistemological and methodological consequences, all revolving around the question of “how to approach human security?”, rather than “what kind of approach has human security taken?” As a result, this thesis neither approaches human security normatively, nor as a fixed, theoretically predetermined field.

Using human security as proof of the universal predominance of a liberal political order and ever more inclusive and democratic global governance is seen as an utterly unproductive starting point. This would to conduct a tautological exercise resting on the incorrect assumption that human security possessed such-and-such (mostly liberal) qualities which would then be empirically searched for. Also, to speak theoretically about human security as an instance of a liberal or constructivist theory and pit it against (neo)realism or neo-Marxism is of zero value here.
Pigeonholing human security as a liberal approach to security and a seeming alternative to realist national security has been one of the peaks of intellectually impoverished debates between proponents and critics of human security. Also, too much of a discursive focus on the viability of the individual in its role as a referent object of security, which has been presented as one of the central contests between adherents and critics, has been a theoretical flop and a blind alley. Additionally, the fact that the policy-making discourse on human security and the related academic discourse have been inextricably linked cannot be used as a sound basis for saying that policy-making has been imbued with liberal and/or constructivist assumptions. Nevertheless, what can be said is the opposite: the existing academic treatment of human security has intellectually been a derivative of existing policy-making rhetoric on human security. This “configuration of dependence” has been considered by the author the main obstacle for independent and critically-oriented reflection on human security. In fact, this configuration has hindered, rather than advanced, our theoretical comprehension of human security. Policy-making discourses on human security therefore need to become what they are: empirical material for a critical analysis, and not the “guidelines” informing and structuring academic analyses.

Thus, the compound “human security” is not a starting point for the author, but a result of a number of elements, processes, structures and mechanisms which need to be put under the microscope in order to reveal important insights about a given articulation of human security. As a result, the main motivation of this thesis is to ascertain what has been behind and underneath a certain spatio-temporal articulation of human security, to find out what kind of structural terrain has enabled, shaped, or blocked a certain version of human security to unfold, for what political reasons, and with what political implications and consequences. It is for this reason
that every articulation of human security is understood as an *assemblage composed of heterogeneous elements and mechanisms of power*.

Every human security assemblage is composed of messy discourses and practices which are often loosely related and from time to time can be completely unrelated. More often than not, academics have been afraid of studying the messiness of political reality, of discourses and practices and their mutual dependencies or their lack thereof. The Cartesian foundation of social science has meant that the existing material and ideational messiness needs to be turned into a representational idiom and passively projected as a certain kind of synoptic imagery. What has been perceived in these instances as messy disorder, lack of a clear-cut development which would rest on a linear and predictable logic or set of assumptions, therefore had to be tidied and straightened up in order to be presentable as a deliberate project, a historical inevitability. In the presented thesis, it is held that one needs to go beyond this representational idiom, and that the best way to do so is to examine articulations of human security in their non-(or pre-)representational quality: in a *performative idiom* (Pickering 1995: 7). The author’s aim in this thesis is therefore to understand articulations of human security within a performative idiom.

The move towards such a non-representational idiom implies a certain strategy in thinking about human security. Four moves are introduced in the author’s attempt to cut below stereotypical representations of human security: first, the use of two single case studies examined through the strategy of problematisation; second, the deployment of an original general series which links (i) structural conditions of a given articulation of human security with (ii) its actual articulation, and (iii) its further, up-to-date developments which also include an analysis of its unintended consequences; third, linking various functional fields which have not been previously
studied together; and fourth, the refusal of horizontal levels of analysis and moving beyond the artificial domestic/international divide.

The central part of the first move consists in the selection of two case studies which are put under the microscope: Canadian and Japanese human security (CanHS and JapHS). They have been chosen for two reasons: in the initial, abductive phase of the research, it has been ascertained that the Canadian and Japanese human security articulations have been quite different, because the reasons for their articulations and structural planes upon which they have unfolded have also been completely different. Additionally, the analysis undertaken here will show that existing representations of both of these articulations have been misleading and specimens of lazy reasoning based on several (empty) signifiers put together into synoptic imagery. This is seen as problematic for two of the most elaborate articulations of human security. Thus, the first move consists in the preference for a diachronically-based strategy of problematisation of these human securities which was originally advanced by the late Michel Foucault (1985).

The strategy of problematisation consists of a genealogical and an archaeological method and is concerned with analysing connections between “intra-discursive dependencies” (relationships between the elements within discourses), “inter-discursive dependencies” (relations between broader discursive formations), and “extra-discursive dependencies” (i.e. the interplay between extra-discursive practices and discourses). While the synchronical element is indeed also present in the thesis, the main direction is a parallel analysis of the two case studies, rather than a direct comparison. Thus, the basic interpretation of Canadian and Japanese human securities is not based on a comparative method resting on the selected pool of shared criteria, but of two interpretive case studies. A direct comparison of these two
articulations is deemed unsuitable for a number of reasons: different criteria have been relevant in each of the case studies, different political motivations and rationalities have been at play, differently operating political and bureaucratic regimes have greased dissimilar state apparatuses, different historical periods have shaped structural terrains on which human securities have been articulated (in the case of Japan, the period starting in the 19th Century; in the case of Canada the period starting in the 1960s), and different economies of power have shaped the form of the two articulations.

While political orders are here understood through the interplay between continuity and change in/of governmental rationalities and their overall assemblages, types of knowledge are expressed through systems of security discourse. Indeed, political orders and types of knowledge are mutually constituted, or co-produced. The research question has been formulated as:

**How can the articulations of Canadian human security and Japanese human security be best explained?**

In order to answer this it has been essential to formulate two sub-questions that lead to productive analytical particularisation:

*How can one meaningfully understand the impact of domestic economy of power on the two human security articulations?*

*What have been the implications of interplay between domestic economies of power and foreign- and security-policy orientations for the two countries’ articulations of human security?*
In addressing these questions, one needs to begin with a critical assessment of heuristic potential concerning the common understanding of the two countries’ articulations of human security. Furthermore, it is necessary to contextualise the characteristics of Canadian human security and Japanese human security by an analysis of their structural conditions of possibility. Also, more recent contingent developments of the two countries’ articulations of human security and their underpinning mechanisms of power need to be examined. Indeed, one of the key directions for the research is the discussion of the differences between the two assemblages and their associated political implications.

It is in the nature of my inquiry that the methodology of discourse analysis will be used. This project is informed by Phillips and Hardy (2002: 3-5), who regard it as ‘a methodology rather than just a method’. This take on discourse analysis is fully in line with Wittgenstein’s (1953: 133) assertion that there is not a single universally employed method of discourse analysis, but a number of different techniques or strategies of research, each of which has to be specifically crafted to fit with a particular piece of research. This thesis focuses on a series of text-discourse-context, also known as the 3D approach (Fairclough 1992). It is precisely this three-dimensional investigation of the relationships between texts, discourses and contexts that puts discourse analysis into the position of the most suitable methodology. This thesis thus embraces a perspective which maintains that discourse is not mere linguistics: Ideas are material insofar as they have material effects (Duvall, Weldes and Laffey 1999; Althusser 1971).
Table 1. Linking Data Analysis to Phases of Research and Research Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Source of Data</th>
<th>Methods of Discourse Analysis (DA)</th>
<th>Style of DA</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st: abduction and initial analysis</td>
<td>Academic texts, governmental documents</td>
<td>Thematic analysis</td>
<td>Conceptual/actor-related analysis</td>
<td>1, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd: mid-phase analysis</td>
<td>Qualitative Interviews; Sampled Academic Texts</td>
<td>Institutional analysis; Linguistic analysis</td>
<td>Socially- and Texturally-oriented Structural Analysis</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd: final interpretive analysis</td>
<td>Findings from the above sources, higher order categories</td>
<td>Foucauldian and Deleuze-Guattarian (Meta)analysis by problematisation</td>
<td>Interpretive Post-Structuralism</td>
<td>3, 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second move consists in a novel approach to human securities through a general series linking their structural conditions with their actual articulation and their further, up-to-date developments which also include an analysis of their unintended consequences. One needs to bear in mind, however, that the development of human security within this series is of a contingent nature. One can imagine this as a pre-structured field of action through which a flow attempts to run arbitrarily, but is actually channelled in certain directions and not others due to existing features of the structural terrain. Structures and flows, therefore, produce contingent developments which are not, however, chaotic. To the best knowledge of the author, there has been no existing study which would systematically link an examined articulation of human security back to its structural terrain, and also use this link to interpret its most recent (and often surprising) developments. The biggest fault of the existing literature on human security has been precisely the lack of attention to this general series. As far as structural conditions of human security are concerned, a specific framework has been developed by the author to allow for such an analysis. There exist domestic structural conditions and foreign-and-security-policy structural conditions, and it is the domestic structural conditions which have been the most important for the creation of a structural terrain on which a certain human security project could be articulated.

Not all domestic structural developments have been equally important for the later articulation of human security. It is argued that the most important have been concerned with economies of power governing the relationship between the state apparatus and the non-profit and voluntary sector. Public management, which is concerned with setting and maintaining a certain regime of economy of power, is thus one of the key fields for the presented thesis. Economies of power can undergo a
series of major transformations, as the case of CanHS demonstrates. These can be framed as structural conditions of emergence/possibility. In different cases, economies of power have been very stable, as the example of JapHS shows. In that case, one can speak of structural conditions, or moulds, maintaining fundamental continuity. To analyse a human security project through economies of power means the avoidance of a popular yet erroneous understanding of the relationship between governments and non-governmental sectors through a zero-sum prism. Such an image portrays globalised civil society as the key agent of change which pressurises states to achieve normative change, with the result that state sovereignty and power erode. The problem with this analysis is that it does not pay attention to government-performed structural moves which either enable (Canada) or hinder (Japan) the activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

A viable articulation of human security also necessitates the transfer of certain ideas, discourses and practices concerned with the domestic economy of power into a given country’s foreign-and-security-policy. Without this transfer and the interaction of domestic structural conditions with foreign-and-security-policy conditions, no human security articulation would be possible. The two sets of structural conditions work together, in a synergic fashion. This is due to the fact that there has been a relationship between the role of individuals and NGOs, as in the domestic socio-political order (either as subjects or objects) and the quality of a referent object of a given country’s security discourse and practices.

In respect of CanHS, the following is argued in the thesis: a series of government-initiated domestic transformations of the country’s non-profit and voluntary sector between the 1960s and the 2000s has led to the transfer of responsibility from the government to the third sector. Thus, Canadian NGOs
became responsible subjects working on a variety of domestic and international issues and delivering public goods. When this process was linked to old liberal currents of humanitarian disarmament in the 1990s, domestic and foreign-and-security policy structural conditions synergically created a humanitarian landscape upon which CanHS could be articulated. It has been within this humanitarian terrain that a number of specific human security initiatives could be promoted and campaigned for. The working of two sets of structural conditions can also explain how it has subsequently been possible for the Canadian government to neo-liberalise human security to an unprecedented degree. The mechanism has been very simple – the transfer of a domestic, already neo-liberalised, model of service delivery to one specific realm of Canadian foreign-and-security policy (CanFSP): the country’s international activities related to the implementation of human security. This can also explain the depoliticisation and subsequent negation of CanHS.

As far as JapHS is concerned, the following is maintained in this thesis with regard to interactions between two sets of structural conditions and the country’s articulation of human security: the 19th Century domestic transformation was the most significant period with far-reaching consequences for Japan’s socio-political order. This period set the basic domestic contours which have been in place ever since. They have survived the wartime period of Japan as well as Japan’s economic miracle and the end of the Cold War. That the nature of Japan’s domestic order, which has been controlled by probably the most powerful bureaucracy in the world, has meant that the domestic non-profit and voluntary sector has never been made responsible in a similar fashion to the Canadian one. The domestic model of bureaucratic control was transposed after WW2 into Japanese foreign-and-security policy (JapFSP) through its articulation of the Yoshida Doctrine, and later the
Fukuda Doctrine. They were initially aimed at the promotion of techno-economic, foreign-political interests, and national-security interests (humanitarian interests were added much later and in a limited way). Since there has been no domestic transfer of responsibility to the country’s non-profit and voluntary sector and since NGOs have been treated by the state apparatus as passive objects rather than active subjects, they could not become the principle subjects, or carriers, of JapHS. It was the state apparatus and Japanese bureaucrats within it who articulated human security and have tightly controlled its nature and governance structure ever since. Therefore, JapHS has been delivered mainly by the state apparatus and has represented a continuation of the country’s carefully crafted and deployed comprehensive national security.

The above sketches of the structural effects of two sets of conditions on the countries’ divergent articulations of human security are important for one to realise that a direct comparison of Canadian and Japanese human security programmes would be an unproductive way of going about an analysis of the two countries’ human securities. To reduce the immense richness of the two experiences to the observation that the Canadian approach to human security is narrow vs. the observation that the Japanese approach is broad, as the existing literature does, is to resign genuine understanding of what is behind and underneath these articulations. What is more, however, it would also mean to resign a robust analysis of the (contingent) development of a given country’s human security from the initial articulation to its up-to-date shape. The same external events, such as the Kosovo Air Campaign of 1999 and the events of 9/11, have had a significant impact on the two countries’ human security programmes. A number of similar measures have been incorporated into the countries’ human security programmes: attempts to hybridise
human security; push into the same post-conflict spaces (e.g. Afghanistan), etc. Yet the ways in which the Canadian and Japanese state apparatus have dealt with these challenges have been different. They certainly cannot be explained by the narrow vs. broad cliché about the two countries’ human security programmes. Nevertheless, these ways can be interpreted by a strategy which resorts to linking together structural conditions, actual articulations of human security programmes, and their unintended consequences. As will become clear, the explanatory potential of this general series is powerful enough to account for the forms and directions of unintended consequences of the two countries’ human security programmes.

The third move which is advanced in the presented thesis consists in linking various functional fields which have not been previously brought together in the existing literature on human security. It is maintained that the mainstream’s lack of attention to the interactions among these fields, something one could term disciplinary compartmentalisation, has been one of the cardinal reasons which have hampered a theoretically-informed and empirically rich understanding of various articulations of human security. In addressing the question of which functional fields have been relevant for discourses and practices of human security, the mainstream literature has typically suggested three: the development field; the security field; and the foreign-policy field. While these fields have indeed been important for articulations and the development of human security, they have usually been treated separately. In respect of the development field, human security has been understood as the securitisation of development, with different normative stances of authors working in this field (Matthew, Barnett and McDonald 2009; Pugh, Cooper and Turner 2009; McGrew and Poku 2007; Duffield 2001, 2007). With regard to the security field, human security has been said to represent an alternative to national
security, and the debate has been concerned with processes of broadening and deepening security and the issue of the viability of human security within this field (Kett 2007; Liotta 2002; Paris 2001; Krause and Williams 1996; Sørensen 1996). As for the foreign-political field, human security has been seen as a progressive kind of diplomatic conduct (Williams, Goose and Wareham 2008; Behringer 2005; MacFarlane and Foong Khong 2006; McRae and Hubert 2001; Hubert 2000).

The performative strategy of problematisation which attempts to interlink various functional fields related to human security needs to do two things: to transcend the field-based perspective, and to broaden the analytical focus well beyond the above three fields in searching for a fully-fledged understanding of a certain articulation of human security. Human security programmes and assemblages do not care about the boundaries of functional fields: they are trans-boundary by default. They functionally integrate the domestic and the international to form the “intermestic”. A productive analytical grid thus needs to be trans-disciplinary and integrate various functional fields in a seamless fashion.

To study human security from the perspective of a certain field, especially a single one, is seen as deeply problematic. An analysis of, for instance, CanHS from the perspective of the development field, or of JapHS through the prism of the foreign-policy field, would not be able to deliver the same theoretic-empirical depth of comprehension as a framework which studies a given human security assemblage in different fields and focuses on its spread, echoes, mutations, common mechanisms, etc. With regard to broadening the analytical focus, the three fields are not sufficient as they all contain human security in its role as a result of certain structural forces and processes. Therefore, they need to be complemented by other functional fields, most importantly the economic field and its part in studying public
management and related socio-political transformations. An analysis of political processes starting in the field of public management and rippling through the field of foreign-and-security policy (which already integrates two usually disconnected functional fields) is believed to be one of the most important functional connections with regard to an analysis of human securities.

The fourth move, which is seen as absolutely vital for a robust interpretation of any version of human security, is aimed at transcending the domestic/international divide. This move is thus concerned with overcoming what can be labelled a geographical, scale-related division. It is argued that the interconnection of the domestic and the international/global needs to be performed in the second and third part of the general series linking structural conditions with an actual articulation of human security, and its further, up-to-date developments, which also include the unintended consequences of that articulation. In other words, domestic and foreign-and-security-policy structural conditions are studied separately as two sets of conditions. This is because the former set is ontologically prior to the second, though it is indeed shaped by the latter. Apart from these conditions, human security needs to be studied both inside of a given country, as it is initially articulated there on a certain structural terrain, and outside of it, as it subsequently cuts across national boundaries and is integrated into a given country’s foreign-and-security policy. Once again, human securities are trans-boundary by default, this time in a geographical sense. In this context, the thesis embraces Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s work on spatiality and assemblages.

It is precisely the moment when a certain articulation of human security crosses the border, in the direction from the domestic space to the international/global space, that one can begin with its examination as a trans-
boundary assemblage of human security. Although this thesis demonstrates that there are different types of human security assemblage which differ in terms of the political rationalities on which they are based, in diagrams of power as well as agencies which operate within them, in modes of their control, they share their trans-boundary character. In both examined case studies, human security was initially articulated as a governmental programme. However, once it has been inserted among tools of statecraft and deployed outside of Canada and Japan respectively, governmental programs have been transformed into trans-boundary assemblages of human security. Indeed, human security assemblages differ in the degree of their heterogeneity. Some are quite homogeneous and others are more heterogeneous. Also, they can (and often do) become more heterogeneous over time. An examination of the most recent configurations of both analysed human security assemblages demonstrates precisely this development. Once these assemblages stretch globally, they incorporate new elements, utilise new mechanisms of power, and penetrate and even colonise new spaces. They face new challenges and, depending on the structural conditions from which they grow, deal with them in certain ways and not others.

The following briefly outlines the structure of the thesis. Chapter 1 introduces a conceptual framework within which the research is situated. The relevant work of Michel Foucault and that of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari is examined and related to the thesis. While their scholarships have so far been used separately within the burgeoning field of Critical Security Studies (especially the work of Foucault) to which the thesis also aims to contribute, their integration has been avoided in the existing literature. Not only is this surprising given the affinities between the two, but
their integration is seen as a particularly productive starting point for the researched topic.

Chapter 2 starts by raising the issue of the representation of Canadian and Japanese human security in the mainstream narrative. This is the only chapter which is linked to the representational idiom of human security as it deconstructs projected synoptic imageries of the two human security “approaches”. In each representation, several key discursive signifiers are recognised and investigated. It is argued that the synoptic imagery in each of the two cases has been put together by these signifiers. Although the signifiers have been detached from the political practice, so one can speak of “empty signifiers”, they have simultaneously played the crucial role of discursive policing, permitting certain pictures of human security and suppressing others. Thus, they have set and guarded the ontological boundaries of mainstream knowledge of the two countries’ articulations of human security.

The thesis continues with three chapters dealing with CanHS and three chapters analysing JapHS. The logic which sets the order and focus of three chapters for each human security case is the logic of the general series linking their structural conditions (the first of the three chapters for each case study) with their actual articulation (the second of the three chapters for each case study) and their further, up-to-date developments, which also includes an analysis of their unintended consequences (the third of the three chapters for each case study).

Chapter 3 of the thesis examines the structural conditions of emergence which have enabled the articulation of CanHS programme. The country’s human security is approached as an example of a rhizomatic assemblage characterised by its horizontality and open-endedness. The chapter is divided into two halves: the first part provides an empirical analysis of domestic structural conditions and foreign-
and-security-policy structural conditions respectively. The second half of the chapter theorises the structural conditions and their effects. It will identify the key characteristics and mechanisms of power through which this assemblage has been regulated.

Continuing in the examination of Canadian general series related to its human security, Chapter 4 examines the actual emergence of CanHS assemblage and its development. It will be maintained and shown empirically that the country’s early human security was inextricably linked to the campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines. One of the key arguments put forward in this chapter is that the articulation of human security and the country’s key contribution to the landmine case reinforced each other to produce a viable human security programme. Both the articulation of human security and the landmine case will be linked to the structural terrain which was itself constituted as a result of the two sets of structural conditions.

Consequently, Chapter 5 studies the usually overlooked unintended consequences of CanHS. The attention is particularly directed to growing heterogeneity and hybridity of the country’s human security assemblage. The chapter will show that linking human security with external military action and the reterritorialisation of this hybridised assemblage in/over Kosovo and in Afghanistan has been an important reminder that human security and national security have never been mutually exclusive alternatives. What follows is an investigation of another unintended consequence related to CanHS: its “domestication” – i.e. its appropriation for domestic political purposes, specifically the legitimisation of domestic counter-terrorism legislation. Finally, an increase in governmental attempts to capture NGOs working in this issue area into a disciplinary, arborified governmental regime is analysed.
Chapter six examines Japan’s domestic and foreign-and-security-policy structural conditions which have shaped the terrain on which human security has been articulated. The chapter will maintain that the key to comprehension of both sets of conditions is the notion of fundamental continuity of the socio-political order, which has never been liberal in the Japanese case. With regard to domestic conditions of continuity, Japanese structural conditions are identified to be the basis of a strictly hierarchical and totalised arborescent system, tightly controlled by the country’s bureaucracy. Japanese deeply non-liberal, imperial rationality of government is discussed in this context. As for foreign-and-security-policy structural conditions, the key argument will be the following: while the Japanese macro-fascism was defeated in WW2, Japanese post-WW2 economic miracle, enabled by the country’s foreign-and-security-policies of the Yoshida Doctrine, rested on bureaucratic expertise and practices connected to the wartime administration of Japanese colonies, most importantly of its puppet state of Manchukuo. The emergence of a neo-mercantile developmentalist rationality of government, which has been in place ever since, is critically examined in this context.

Chapter 7 analyses the emergence and development of JapHS and links it to the structural conditions analysed in the previous chapter. The key argument of this chapter is that JapHS needs to be understood as the continuation of what is termed the “master convergence” of techno-economic, foreign-political, and national-security interests. In terms of Japanese official security labels, JapHS has thus been the continuation of the country’s “comprehensive national security”. The key mechanism studied in this section is how the official development aid (ODA) convergence machine has penetrated the bureaucratic programme of human security. It is shown that the replacement of comprehensive national security and the
introduction of human security have been performed mainly for reasons of enhancing the country’s international position and a demonstration of its proximity to the United Nations. Two human security tracks are probed in this context: a neo-mercantile techno-economic track; and a humanitarian track. It will be argued and demonstrated empirically that the mainstream literature suggesting that either humanitarianism or mercantilism has become the driving principle of the country’s human security is wrong, in that it fails to appreciate the omni-directional master convergence behind the country’s human security programme. The last section of this chapter focuses on the expansion of JapHS programme into a trans-boundary, institutionally-hybridised human security assemblage. This expansion is investigated in terms of the issue of Japan’s global colonisation of human security through the country’s related activities in the United Nations.

Chapter 8 of the presented thesis deals with the domopolitics of human security, examining the relationship between the inside of a state and its outside, and associated mechanisms attempting to regulate this relationship. The key configuration which is analysed in this regard is the relationship between citizenship, state and territory. As will become clear, keeping the distinction between warm words of home and the danger of the chaotic outside has been one of the main political functions of JapHS. The following section studies the extension of Japanese national-security interests through the country’s human security assemblage into post-conflict spaces. As a part of this investigation, the nature of the contemporary administration of Japanese NGOs will be examined.

What follows is a conclusion which offers limited generalisation of the research findings. In particular, it distils some lessons concerning the differences between CanHS and JapHS and sources of their continuing divergence.
Subsequently, the usefulness of the used approach is discussed. The question is subdivided into three areas: its usefulness for the two analysed case studies; for other political entities involved in human security; and for other issues. For each of these areas, positive heuristics is outlined. The thesis concludes with the issue of the role/position of the state in globalised IR and how one can understand it in light of the findings contained in the thesis.
CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Chapter 1 introduces a conceptual framework within which the research is situated. On a meta-theoretical plane, the framework attempts to integrate the work of Michel Foucault with that of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. The integration of the two scholarships on the conceptual level and the consequent application of this converged framework follow Foucault and Deleuze/Guattari’s belief in “theorisation as conceptual practice” and the need for scholarly experimentation. Chapter 1 discusses and links key concepts of these authors. These concepts are used to interpret the Canadian and Japanese human security assemblages in the following chapters. As for the conceptual contribution of Deleuze and Guattari, they developed the most intriguing conceptualisation of assemblages in social science and philosophy to date. Their discussion of two types of assemblages – arborescent and rhizomatic assemblages – is absolutely crucial for this research and fits perfectly with the two case studies. They are crucial for a comprehension of how a given articulation of human security – both discursive and material – is constituted, maintained and hybridised as an assemblage. Foucault’s contribution through his “analytics of government” is then vital for an examination of political rationalities which have shaped and regulated these human security assemblages. The key concepts of such analytics are outlined and related to an analysis of socio-political orders and economies of power which have sustained these orders. Finally, the chapter discusses “governmentalised human security assemblages” which are, conceptually, a result of the ontological convergence of Foucauldian and Deleuze-Guattarian analytical grids.
Theorisation as Conceptual Practice, Experimentation and Assemblages

This chapter introduces a conceptual framework that will in turn serve the role of an interpretive grid through which empirical material can be read. A *conceptual* framework is preferred to *theoretical* framework because the aim of the thesis is neither to apply a pre-made theory nor to propose a new theory on the basis of an ultimate generalisation of findings. A post-structural theoretical approach – rather than a substantive theory – guides this thesis. This approach will draw insights from the work of two key figures of French post-structuralism: Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault. Despite the fact that their research interests and modes of thinking overlapped significantly, their works are still read, interpreted, and applied separately. Contrary to that, and despite the fact that their scholarly overlap has never been complete (Hand 1988: vi-ix), their key concepts are juxtaposed and interlinked to explain the two human security assemblages.

There are a number of points at which Foucault and Deleuze converge, the latter both in his sole role of an author as well as a co-author of books with Félix Guattari, a post-structuralist psychoanalyst. At the most general plane, they share a view concerning the role of theory and its relationship with practice. As Deleuze (Deleuze and Foucault 1977: 205) points out in his discussion with Foucault, practice has neither been a consequence or application of theory nor the opposite: its inspiration. Rather, resembling the relationship between Foucault and Deleuze, the relationship between theory and practice has been more incomplete and fragmentary, as theory is ‘always local and related to a limited field’ (Ibid: 205). Deleuze uses the metaphor of a theory having wall-related qualities in that it encounters obstacles and blockages; as for practice, it is portrayed as a necessary tool ‘for piercing this wall’
(Ibid: 206). Foucault not only concurs with this depiction, but goes further and maintains that ‘theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice’ (Ibid: 208). Although never perfect in its ability to synthesise – or rather totalise – fully, theory is seen by both thinkers as a ‘box of tools’ used in order to expose power where it is most unexpected and invisible (Ibid: 208). Thus, the kind of tools used always depends on a specific problem that one plans to examine, which is also the case of this thesis.

To understand theory as practice, one needs to ask an additional question: what kind of practice? As Deleuze (1987: 19) suggests, writing is more than anything else an orientation. It consists ‘in developing a compass’ and can be understood as ‘the art of conceptual and perceptual colouring’ (Lorraine 2005: 207). The process of theorising – rather than the application of a ready-made, totalising theory – is an important part of an overall conceptual framework formation. It can be argued that while theorisation is the practice of writing, the writing itself relies on conceptual colouring: the tool-box-like quality of theorising both Deleuze and Foucault speak of emerges with the invention and development of concepts which are subsequently put to use. As Deleuze and Guattari point out,

[t]here are no simple concepts. Every concept has components and is defined by them. It therefore has a combination [chiffre]. It is a multiplicity, although not every multiplicity is conceptual. There is no concept with only one component .... Every concept has an irregular contour defined by the sum of its components, which is why … we find the idea of the concept being a matter of articulation, of cutting and cross-cutting. The concept is a whole because it totalises its components, but it
is a fragmentary whole. Only on this condition can it escape the mental chaos constantly threatening it, stalking it, trying to reabsorb it (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 15-16).

The process of working through concepts is the basis of the Deleuze-Guattarian method of experimentation. The nature of decoding the two human security assemblages is indeed experimental practice. Through experimentation, one not only attempts to elucidate how one of Deleuze and Guattari’s key concepts – assemblages (see below) – works, but also how they can be dismantled and recreated in this process. Experimentation is simultaneously theoretical and practical, confirming the notion of theory as practice: it has the ambition to both conceptually interpret as well as to understand functional workings. The important part of the method of experimentation is that it takes seriously the interconnections between orders of assembled conditions and the resulting tendencies, thereby examining ‘what it does and what is done with it’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 180). Experimentation is thinking anew, always concerned with ‘the new, remarkable, and interesting that replace the appearance of truth and are more demanding than it is’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 110). Similarly to Foucault’s (1977a: 139-164) discussion of genealogy, Deleuze also pits experimentation against history. One the one hand, experimentation needs history as the latter represents ‘the set of almost negative conditions that make possible the experimentation of something that escapes history’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 111). This is significant for this thesis because the historical and genealogical tropes of Canadian and Japanese assemblages are always different as they have completely different analytical grids behind them.

As the next chapter shows, to rely on “official history” is unproductive insofar as it
presents historical processes and conditions in linear synoptic imagery which never withstands the empirical check. On the other hand, despite the fact that ‘history isn’t experimentation’, it is sorely needed since without it ‘the experiments would remain indeterminate, divorced from any particular [historical] conditions’ (Deleuze 1995: 106). In this sense, while the method of experimentation is not a historiographic method, it does not mean that it is ahistorical.

With direct implications for the method of experimentation, Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 361-374) distinguish between two different conceptions of science: what they term Royal Science as opposed to nomad science. As the following chapters demonstrate, one of the key differences between Canadian and Japanese human security assemblages has consisted in the type of knowledge production about human security and the distinction between “Royal” vs. “nomad” science helps to account for this difference. Royal Science is performed through royal scientists who play the role of master gatekeepers in stabilising and fettering theory for the purposes of the State. The objective of their activity is to ensure a legislative primacy of this type of scientific conduct – usually by portraying nomad science as prescientific or parascientific, with the aim of reinforcing the role of the State (Ibid: 367). According to Deleuze and Guattari, Royal Science operates deskilling aimed at the reproduction or execution of the plans proposed by the “intellectuals”, who really are technocratic bureaucrats (Ibid: 393). Contrary to that, nomadic science is not concerned with “axiomatics” and reproduction (of bureaucratic rules, laws, political purpose of the State, etc.): rather, it follows the application of the method of experimentation and the “problematics” of contingent developments associated with it (Ibid: 372-374). Nomad scientists embrace heterodoxy and try to avoid the stabilisation of their
knowledge. A prima facie example of nomadic science is provided by Deleuze when he reflected on the similarities between his and Guattari’s work and that of Foucault:

We had no taste for abstractions, Unity, Totality, Reason, Subject. We set ourselves the task of analyzing mixed forms, arrangements, what Foucault called apparatuses. We set out to follow and disentangle lines rather than work back to points … We looked for foci of unification, nodes of totalization, and processes of subjectification in arrangements … We weren’t looking for origins, even lost or deleted ones, … but for new things being formed (Deleuze 1995: 86)

Despite the fact that Deleuze and Guattari argue that there have been two different conceptions of science, they too maintain that ‘ontologically, [one can see] a single field of interaction’ within which Royal Science attempts to appropriate nomad science and the latter ‘continuously cut[ting] the contents of royal science loose’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 367). Thus, their interaction is marked by capture and flight.

The ability to flee is closely related to the notion of freedom in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. For a start, they do not understand the concept of freedom through the humanistic or liberal quality which can be attributed to atomised individuals, as Western liberal political philosophy does. In fact, humans are understood as unstable, a ‘constantly changing assemblage of forces, an epiphenomenon arising from chance confluences of languages, organisms, societies, expectations, laws and so on’ (Stagoll 1995: 22). In both Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between a human living
organism (a whole body with an identity and an end) and their preferred understanding of humans as human machines which are constituted and sustained by their connections (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 458). Similarly, they do not understand freedom as something unambiguously positive. Rather, they are interested in the ontology of connections, i.e. how connections develop through the interactions of different lines, how they transform and mutate, and cease to exist. It is precisely the possibility of a mutation, especially when the positive turns into the negative, which precludes Deleuze and Guattari from normatively embracing freedom as a desired value.

In this context, they argue that individual and collective entities are composed of three types of lines. First are molar lines, which correspond to rigidly segmented and coded forms found in bureaucratic and legal apparatuses (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 203, 218, 224). These are associated with the State-dominated politics of molarisation. Deleuze and Guattari link molarity to the so-called striated space which is homogenised and disciplinary and is instituted by the State apparatus (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 373, 384). Second, molecular lines form an in-between category which is more fluid and organised around flows and quanta. They allow individuals and collective entities to develop in ways that are not fully controlled by the surrounding (striated) space. Thus, entities can partially flee the territory of the State and operate, though in a solely local manner, in interstices between organised segments, with the result of their partial deterritorialisation and decoding. The molecular serves as the basis of micropolitics and contributes to the harmonisation of previously dissimilar forms (business, finance, non-profit sector, bureaucracy) in the current neo-liberal capitalism:
Capitalism has always had as its “utopia” the capacity to function without the State … [F]or Deleuze and Guattari this is not because State apparatuses have disappeared (clearly they have not); rather the rigid demarcation between State and society is no longer tenable. Society and State now constitute one all-encompassing reality, and all capital has become social capital. Hence, the generation of social cooperation, undertaken primarily by the service and informational industries in the advanced economies, has become a crucial one for capitalism. In a situation of this kind, a molar politics … becomes increasingly irrelevant (Surin 1995: 162, emphasis added).

An important, or one should rather say constitutive, part in capitalist micropolitics is desire. Deleuze and Guattari’s take on desire is the opposite from the psychoanalytic conception, which argues that desire is defined by an insatiable lack regulated by the Oedipal law (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 26-28). Rather, they understand desire as a positive social force and introduce the key notion of desiring-production in this context. Desiring-production is important for molecular lines. The authors discuss the links between two mutually reinforcing processes: that of desiring-production, i.e. the investment of psychical energy into the production of what is taken as reality, and of social-production, which does the same through corporeal energy, i.e. labour (Ibid: 10-11):

[T]he desire constrained by the orders of capital is deterritorialised or folded back into the social field. When this happens the liberated desire integrates into itself the flows and components of the Socius or social
field to form a “desiring machine”. The heart of micropolitics is the construction of these new desiring machines: without a politics to facilitate this construction there can be no productive desire, only endless repetition of the non-different (Surin 1995: 163).

Third are *lines of flight*, which form the most transformational type of line, as they rupture the other two (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 202-230). Deleuze describes them as the strangest lines and characterises them as ‘if something carried us away, across our segments, but also across our thresholds, towards a destination which is unknown’ (Deleuze 1987: 125). In these lines, all segmentarity collapses and deterritorialisation takes place. As a result, the striated space is replaced by a different kind of space – smooth place, though the authors emphasise that ‘the two spaces in fact exist only in mixture’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 474). That the three lines with the related two spaces coexist together can be seen in the example of the Holy Roman Empire: while the Empire itself embodies molar segmentarity (striated space), it too includes molecular micropolitics exemplified by migrant barbarians who move along the barbaricum fringe of the Empire and are sometimes reterritorialised by integration into indigenous communities; finally, there are nomads who escape along lines of flight all attempts to get captured into a State-like territory and promote deterritorialisation wherever they move in the steppes (smooth space) (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 222-223). Importantly, in the end of their exploration of smooth space and its relations with striated space, Deleuze and Guattari warn against putting freedom on a normative pedestal through one’s preference for smooth space: ‘smooth spaces are not in themselves liberatory. But the
struggle is changed or displaced in them … Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 500; also, cf. Deleuze 1995: 33).

The three types of lines outlined are important for human security assemblages, particularly in how these assemblages have been governmentally/bureaucratically regulated. As the respective chapters on Canadian and Japanese human security assemblages show, the predominance of molar lines (Japan) as opposed to molecular lines and lines of flight (Canada) has structured human security discourses and practices existing in each of the assemblages. According to Deleuze and Guattari, assemblages are ‘complexes of [these] lines’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 505) and each assemblage is said to be territorial, though it too includes lines of deterritorialisation (Ibid: 503-4). As will be shown later in the thesis, to grasp the shape of Japanese human security, its (partial) deterritorialisation through the U.N. and bilateral ODA convergence machine needs to be investigated. As for Canadian human security assemblage, it will be shown how it became deterritorialised through the insertion of Canadian NGOs into the assemblage. Assemblages can be conceptualised alongside a horizontal axis and a vertical axis: horizontally, there are content-based *machinic assemblages of effectuation* composed of things, bodies, actions and passions, and expression-based *collective assemblages of enunciation* which comprise regimes of utterances and signs (Ibid: 88). These are ‘two non-parallel formalizations’ of assemblages and their relationship, and the importance of distinguishing – at least formally – between them is given by the fact that ‘one never does what one says [and, equally,] one never says what one does’ (Deleuze 2006: 53). This is not because one would like to lie, but rather due to one’s practice of ‘assembling signs and bodies as heterogeneous components of the same machine’ (Ibid: 53). Then, on a vertical axis, assemblages
have two sides: a territorial or reterritorialised side and cutting edges of deterritorialisation which carry it away (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 88). The used example of reterritorialisation of human security assemblage in this thesis are attempts of the Canadian government to use human security for domestic counter-terrorism purposes as well as Canada and Japan’s state-building activities in Afghanistan.

As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, ‘[i]t is necessary to ascertain the content and the expression of each assemblage, to evaluate their real distinction, their reciprocal presupposition, their piecemeal insertion’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 504). Additionally, one needs to examine assemblages alongside their vertical axis. This is because each concrete assemblage is penetrated by abstract machines (or what Foucault calls a generalisable “diagram” of power, such as panopticism), and these machines draw cutting edges of decoding and deterritorialisation, thereby opening the territorial assemblage onto assemblages of another type (Ibid: 510). For both human security assemblages under microscope, generalisable diagrams will be identified and discussed. How two specific assemblages relate to the abstract machine can be seen through two alloplastic and anthropomorphic examples: the State apparatus and the war machine (Ibid: 513). With regard to the concrete assemblage of the State apparatus, it ‘realizes the [abstract] machine of overcoding of a society … [I]t is the abstract machine which organizes the dominant utterances and the established order of a society … [as well as] the homogenization of different segments, their convertibility’ (Deleuze 1987: 129, emphasis added). When the example of Bentham’s panopticism is used, the abstract machine of panopticism is responsible for the convergence of the discourse of delinquency and disciplinary techniques, together forming a social assemblage which Foucault called carceral
dispositif (Deleuze 1988: 37). A less molar and more molecular example of an abstract machine that has penetrated (at least some) State apparatuses is the axiomatic machine of global capital. Its exceptionality stems from the fact that, unlike other types of abstract machines, it does not operate through coding flows, but rather through their decoding. Where recoding would take place in non-capitalist societies, the recapturing of decoded flows is replaced by the process of axiomatisation, i.e. by introducing a law of general equivalence in the form of monetary value (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 222-239). How the Canadian human security assemblage has been driven by axiomatic abstract machine of capital (financial capital/funding turned into social capital), and with what implications will be tackled in Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis. Similarly, Chapters 7 and 8 will shed light on the reasons and effects of the Japanese human security assemblage shunning axiomatic abstract machine of capital.

Apart from the State apparatus, the war machine can also be identified. The war machine was originally invented by nomads and ‘does not itself have war for its object, but necessarily adopts it as its object when it allows itself to be appropriated by the State apparatus’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 513, emphasis in original). Also, not only is the war machine distinct from the State apparatus, but it is also exterior to it (Ibid: 351). The war machine occupies (and operates in) an open, smooth space and deterritorialises both the enemy by destroying its territory from the inside and as well as oneself by moving somewhere else, by the line of flight (Ibid: 353). The State does not have its own war machine: it can only appropriate it in the form of a military institution and ‘this explains the mistrust States have toward their military institutions, in that the military institution inherits an extrinsic war machine’ (Ibid: 355). This is also reflected in von Clausewitz’s notion of absolute war in which
States appropriate the war machine according to their political needs and ‘in relation to which they are more or less good “conductors”’ (Ibid: 355). Unlike the State apparatus, which is always concrete, the war machine can thus range from a concrete assemblage (especially when it is exterior to the State in its nomadic quality) to something much closer to the abstract machine (when it mutates and penetrates the State) (Patton 2001: 1296). In order to differentiate between different levels of concreteness/abstraction and functions of the war machine, Patton (2000: 119) suggests distinguishing between the war machine in its concrete form as ‘assemblages of mutation and transformation’, as opposed to ‘a metamorphosis machine’ in its absolute-machinic form. Such a distinction is crucial for this thesis as it will allow a distinction made between the Canadian and Japanese war machines, which is crucial for the articulation of the two countries’ human security projects.

**Rhizomatic and Arborescent Models of Assemblage**

Of great relevance for this thesis, Deleuze and Guattari develop and propose two basic models of an assemblage in their seminal work, *A Thousand Plateaus*: the model of a *rhizome* and the model of a *tree*. Thus, one can speak of rhizomatic and arborescent assemblages. These two models are used as two main conceptual categories to understand Canadian and Japanese human security assemblages. As this section and the following chapters make clear, there is often significant development within each of these categories. However conceptually different rhizomes and trees are, they are dynamic concepts, not static ones, and rhizomes and trees in human security are no exception. Two very different qualities are revealed during their
discussion of the characteristics of rhizomes and trees respectively. What are their features? How different are they really? What are the implications for one’s investigation of different assemblages? The following section will address these questions and, in doing so, prepare the conceptual ground for the subsequent analysis of the two human security assemblages contained in the following chapters.

In botany, *rhizomes* are understood as underground, horizontal stems which are capable of producing the shoot of a new plant. As Deleuze and Guattari point out, rhizomes are totally different from the roots and radicles that trees have. While inspired by a botanical image, Deleuze and Guattari work with expanded conceptualisation of rhizomes. The rhizome is a model whose elements no longer possess a fixed linear (molar) order (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 91). Deleuze and Guattari suggest that a certain number of constitutive principles characterise a rhizome, and these are helpful in comprehending rhizomatic qualities. They aim at turning the Cartesian dogma of the unique and rational subject on its head and will be discussed in the following lines. First, there are principles of connection and heterogeneity. Connectivity is given by any part of a rhizome being able to connect to anything other. Crucially, rhizomatic lines, once connected, never converge entirely to form a totalised whole: ‘[t]ransversal communications between different lines scramble the genealogical trees’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 11). Additionally, not every trait of a rhizome must be linked to a linguistic feature: ‘semiotic chains of every nature are connected to very diverse modes of coding (biological, political, economic, etc.)’ (Ibid: 7). As the authors point out, while collective assemblages of enunciation operate directly within machinic assemblages of effectuation, it is not impossible to encounter a complete rupture between regimes of signs and their objects. A rhizome functions as bonding stuff: it ‘ceaselessly establishes connections
between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to arts, sciences, and social struggles’ (Ibid: 7). Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 7) criticise de Saussure and Chomsky’s linguistic model of a tree for being totalising and homogenising. Instead, they argue that semiotic chains are always heterogeneous, as they are neither intended for/produced by a universal linguistic community (‘there is no ideal speaker-listener’) nor do they contain any linguistic universals: ‘there is no language in itself, … only a throng of dialects, patois, slang, and specialized languages’ (Ibid: 7).

Another important principle of a rhizome is multiplicity. Multiplicity relates both to regimes of signs as well as to the objects they code: ‘[t]here is no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant language within a political multiplicity’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 7). Rhizomatic multiplicities are always decentred: they have neither any relationship to subjects and objects (which are themselves assemblages) nor to points or positions which do not define a rhizome (what matters are lines). Drawing on Bergson, Deleuze argues that rhizomes always correspond to qualitative multiplicities (changes in kind), whereas arborescent (quasi-) multiplicities are always quantitative, or numerical, i.e. multiplicities that divide by differences in degrees and do not involve changes in kind (Deleuze 1988: 38). As Deleuze and Guattari put it, ‘[t]he point is that a rhizome or multiplicity never allows itself to be overcoded, never has available a supplementary dimension over and above its number of lines, that is, over and above the multiplicity of numbers attached to those lines’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 9).

The next rhizomatic quality is related to its ability to start anew: the principle of asignifying rupture. Ruptures are asignifying due to the fact that they do not bring about a definite separation between structures or a separation across a given structure
which would be represented as permanent (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 9). The notion of asignifying rupture is of crucial importance to CanHS assemblage, from its early emergence to its relatively recent (approximately last 10 years) hybridisations and modifications. Rhizomes simply aren’t, as they are not defined by a dichotomy between being and its representation in the form of an identity: ‘rhizome, a molecular segmentarity that does not permit itself to be overcoded by a signifier like the cutting machine, or even to be attributed to a given figure’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 201) Instead, they are becoming different and present themselves anew: ‘the rhizome, the opposite of arborescence; breaks away from arborescence. Becoming is an antimemory’ (Ibid: 294, emphasis in original). This is a reflection of Deleuze-Guattarian criticism of classical Western metaphysics and its dominant dual conception of being/identity which is here replaced by the pivotal notion of becoming: [b]ecoming is a rhizome, not a classificatory or genealogical tree’ (Ibid: 239). Then, asignification is based on actual connections, momentary forces and actions and time-based accumulations of assembled elements and semantic regimes. While rhizomes get captured and, as a result, contain lines of segmentarity which serve the basis of stratification, territorialisation, organisation and signification, they, too, always feature lines of flight through which they escape and deterritorialise:

[t]here is a rupture in the rhizome whenever segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, yet there is still a danger that you will reencounter organisations that restratify everything, formations that restore power to a signifier, attributions that reconstitute a subject (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 9).
Lastly, there are rhizomatic principles of cartography and decalcomania. Unlike the model of a tree which is based on tracing and reproduction and ‘injects redundancies and propagates them’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 13), the rhizome is ‘a map and not tracing … [In this, it] is an anti-genealogy’ (Ibid: 11-12, emphasis added). Thus, these two rhizomatic principles are experimentally oriented as the map does not have a passive, reproductive quality but it is itself constructive. It is a part of the rhizome in that it ensures multiple entryways and allows for the interconnections between and among different fields: ‘[t]he map is … detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted, … [or] reworked by an individual, group, or social formation’ (Ibid: 12). The map is therefore not understood by Deleuze and Guattari as an image but as something that has to do with performance. However, attempts to arborify the rhizome, to territorialise it, need to be resituated on the map. The authors advise that one needs to ‘show at what point in the rhizome there form phenomena of massification, bureaucracy, leadership, fascization, etc., which lines nevertheless survive’ (Ibid: 14). Such attempts to arborify the rhizome will be discussed in light of an increasing activity of the Canadian government to capture the country’s NGOs and use them as a part of its disciplinary Result-Based Management.

The second model of an assemblage which Deleuze and Guattari elaborate is the model of a tree with its arborescent quality. To begin with, the tree model of assemblage ‘assume[s] a strong principal unity’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 5). It can expand; however, this is not done through the principle of qualitative multiplicity, but through the means of a pivotal taproot supporting (yet, simultaneously, limiting) the secondary roots. This is the most rigid and centralised form of the discussed model: a root-cosmos (Ibid: 7). Then, there is a more modern
and dispersed version of the tree model: a fascicular radicle. It is the model of fascicular radicle which will help to elucidate the bureaucratic regulation of human security in Japan. Despite the fact that the fascicular radicle shows signs of multiplicity, Deleuze and Guattari warn that it is a false one as ‘its ostensibly non-hierarchical presentation or statement in fact only admits of a totally hierarchical solution’ (Ibid: 17). This radicle-system either does not have any taproot or its tip has been destroyed: ‘an immediate, indefinite [false] multiplicity of secondary roots grafts onto it and undergoes a flourishing development’ (Ibid: 5).

[T]he fascicular system does not really break with dualism, with the complementarity between a subject and an object, a natural reality and a spiritual reality: unity is consistently thwarted and obstructed in the object, while a new type of unity triumphs in the subject. The world has lost its pivot; the subject … accedes to a higher unity, of ambivalence or overdetermination, in an always supplementary dimension to that of its object (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:6)

Thus, the root-system and the radicle-system are genuinely similar as two manifestations of the arborescent form in that they both operate through plotting points, and not lines, thereby fixing an order: ‘[w]hat constitutes arborescence is the submission of the line to the point’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 293). Relations between points and elements of an arborescent model are interior to and inherent within the assemblage. Since the arborescent schema is centred on points rather than lines, becoming (different) is precluded. This is due to the fact that a line of becoming is ‘not defined by points it connects, or by points that compose it; on the
contrary, it passes *between* points’ (Ibid: 293, emphasis in original). As a result, the
tree model shows minimal movement beyond formal channels, and if there is some at
all, it is always internal to the assemblage rather than exploratory or connective. It
will be argued and shown that the nature of JapHS, both as a bureaucratic
programme and a transnationally stretched assemblage has always remained within
these formal channels, preventing genuine multiplicity to emerge.

Arborescent systems are hierarchical systems with centres of
significance and subjectification, central automata like organised
memories. In the corresponding models, an element only receives
information from a higher unit, and only receives a subjective affection
along pre-established paths … The mixed semiotic of significance and
subjectification has an exceptional need to be protected from any
intrusion from the outside. In fact, there must be no exterior: no nomad
machine …, with [its] combinations of heterogeneous substances of
expression (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 16, 179)

Consequently, arborescent assemblages are unable to feature – to say nothing
about their ability to stimulate – desires. The implications of this finding will be
shown during the discussion of the Japanese human security assemblage, especially
in answering the question why Japanese NGOs have been so much dependent on the
rhizomatic bureaucratic apparatus for their activities. Since it was previously shown
that desiring-production is linked to molecular micropolitics and not to molarity, it is
completely incompatible with the arborescent model: ‘[w]henever desire climbs a
tree, internal repercussions trip it up and it falls to its death; the rhizome, on the other
hand, acts on desire by external, productive outgrowths’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 14). Indeed, this has direct repercussions for the inability of an arborescent assemblage to decode flows and turn significant proportions of capital into social capital, as has been the case of the largely deterritorialised, neo-liberal rhizomatic assemblage. Correspondingly, arborescent assemblages are territorial or reterritorialised systems which operate in striated spaces full of segmentarity and stratification: ‘the sedentary assemblages and State apparatuses effect a capture of the phylum, put the traits of expression into a form or a code, … plug the lines of flight, subordinate the technological operation to the work model’ (Ibid: 415). The result of the related processes is the formation of ‘the structure of Power’ (Ibid: 17) at the level of the machinic assemblage of effectuation and the reproduction of an image of the tree at the level of the collective assemblage of enunciation. Since the tree is said to be filiation, as opposed to the rhizome which is a unique alliance, ‘[t]here is always something genealogical about a tree’ (Ibid: 8).

Finally, the two discussed models of assemblage – a rhizomatic assemblage and an arborescent assemblage – need to be understood in their pure forms as ideal types as they can, and in practice often do, intermingle. Especially CanHS assemblage has seen this development. As Deleuze and Guattari argue,

[t]here exist tree or root structures in rhizomes; conversely, a tree branch or root division may begin to burgeon into a rhizome. The coordinates are determined not by theoretical analyses implying universals but by a pragmatics composing multiplicities or aggregates of intensities … To be rhizomorphous is to produce stems and filaments
that seem to be roots, or better yet connect with them by penetrating the trunk, but put them to strange new uses (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:15).

Thus, one can investigate processes through which a rhizome gets arborified (arborification of a rhizome) as well as a tree rhizomatised (rhizomatisation of arborescence): ‘[i]t is a question of a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing, and of a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again’ (Ibid: 20). One of the results, a mixed form, is a rhizome-root assemblage which can have a different degree and a different kind of deterritorialisation. As Deleuze and Guattari (1986) point out, it is often impossible to separate the creation of an arborescent, paranoid bureaucracy from the construction of little rhizo-machines.

Political Rationalities and Economies of Power

The following section further enriches and extends the analytics of government which will be used in the following chapters to interpret the empirical contours of the two different human security assemblages and their dissimilar structural conditions of emergence. In the first step, three types of power are discerned, and key terms are introduced and their interrelations outlined. Second, the development of the relationship between civil society and government as discussed by Foucault and Deleuze is included, since this is one of the key issues in the examination of human security assemblages both in Japan and Canada and is directly related to various economies of power and their differences between Canada and Japan. Although
Foucault himself studied related connections as part of his project of the genealogy of liberalism in Western societies – and this thesis will show that Japanese human security (JapHS) has definitely not rested on Western liberal premises – the key terms, concepts, and developments are still helpful, especially after they become linked to Deleuze and Guattari’s work on assemblages and their variants. Additionally, the foundation of the 19th Century modern Japan on Prussian and German socio-economic theories is something that connects Foucault’s scholarship with the focus of this thesis, and, as will become clear, it is this connection that is crucial to fully understand the structural terrain on which JapHS was unravelled. Similarly, Foucault’s analysis of 20th Century mutations of liberalism, especially after WW2, is particularly pertinent to Canada’s case. Indeed, the interpretations in this thesis will thus be inspired by the outlined conceptual principles, rather than obtained through the application of a pre-existing, ready-made theoretical grid. As a starting point, it is crucial to point out that the link between assemblages, discussed in the previous section, and political rationalities and economies of power which are tackled below consists in shared ideas about what power is and how to study it. As Foucault argues,

[p]ower must, I think, be analysed as something that circulates, or rather as something that functions only when it is part of a chain … Power functions. Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and exercise this power (Foucault 2003: 29).
Indeed, as the above quote suggests, power passes through assemblages, though different models of assemblage and different lines would see a different type of circulation. What follows is an outline of Foucault’s triangle which is delimited by three complementary types of power – i.e. sovereign power, disciplinary power, and biopower. In *Discipline and Punish*, as well as in *The Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault discusses at length the most traditional form, sovereign power, which relies on extraordinary violence for it to work. One can say that it rules by death, rather than through the administration of life at the micro-level (disciplinary power) and macro-level (biopower). Sovereign power is the epitome of a juridical conception of power: it is centralised and embodied by the state, or the king, and people in their role as subjects abide by the laws. In the event that someone dares to desecrate a law, that criminal is publicly executed and the execution is passionate, violent and repressive (Foucault 1995: 7). Apart from performing sovereignty practically, the intention during the execution is to create fear and discourage further crimes within that sovereign territory (Foucault 1995: 9). As the thesis shows, sovereign power has still been important for ways in which human security has been practised and debated. Canada’s experience discussed in Chapter 5 points to its (ab)use for domestic counter-terrorism legislation as well as its deployment for external military action over Kosovo.

Later, forms of punishment evolved to become more efficient and less public and violent in nature. Foucault attributes the emergence of this new type of power, for which he coins the term *disciplinary power*, to the establishment of industrial capitalism: ‘[t]his nonsovereign power … [i]s one of bourgeois society’s great inventions’ (Foucault 2003: 36). Disciplinary power, therefore, represents an economic conception of power with a very different economy of power when
compared to sovereign power. As Foucault shows, it is not a coincidence that liberalism, humanism and disciplinary society emerged around the same time. Also, like Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault correctly retains his scepticism towards celebratory historical images of liberal humanism through the identification of its origins. Specifically, he shows how the discursive emphasis on humanism served the role of a political cover for a newly emerged and more efficient economy of power:

The true objective … was … to set up a new economy of power to punish, to assure its better distribution, to render it more regular, effective, constant and detailed in its effects … not to punish less, but to punish better … It is this “economic rationality” that must calculate the penalty … “Humanity” is the respectable name given to this economy and its meticulous calculation (Foucault 1995: 80, emphasis added).

Foucault located the emergence of disciplinary power in the 18th and 19th Centuries; the height of its traditional form was said to be at the outset of the 20th Century. As Deleuze argues, disciplinary technology of power initiates the ‘organization of vast spaces of enclosure. The individual never ceases passing from one closed environment to another, each having its own laws’ (Deleuze 1992a: 3). Examples of these molar spaces of enclosure include the key societal institutions of that period: the family, the school, the barracks, the factory, every so often the hospital, and, possibly, the prison, ‘the preeminent instance of the enclosed environment’ (Ibid: 3). As the analysis of Japanese and Canadian assemblage suggests, disciplinary power has still been very important in governing NGOs active in the field of human security. As the respective parts of the thesis also show, there have been different
types of disciplinary power deployed by both countries and the difference can be attributed to the diagram of governmental rationality, including the suppression vs. stimulation of societal desires.

The third type of power which Foucault identifies and subsequently analyses is biopower. Biopower emerged already in the 18th Century as a function of Polizeiwissenschaft (science of police) with the aim of increasing the power of the state, making good use of its forces and procuring the happiness of its subjects (Foucault 2007: 366). Foucault puts the beginning of biopower and the birth of its general field of interest – i.e. biopolitics, with its aim to improve the health of the population – in relation with its economic logic (originally mercantilism, and later the first forms of liberalism, see below) which saw it as ‘a source of enrichment and in which everyone recognised an essential component of the force of states’ (Foucault 2007: 367). Indeed, biopower – both in its pure form and in combination with two other types of power – has been crucial to understand diagrammatics of power existing in Canadian and Japanese human security assemblages. As will become clear, these three types of power are important not only separately, but also in combination. Although there have been tendencies to suggest that sovereign power was replaced by disciplinary power and that was in turn replaced by biopower, such an understanding is wrong: it is within the triangle formed by these conceptions that one can make sense of political practices. Therefore, the difference between Canadian and Japanese human security assemblages of enunciation and effectuation does not lie in whether or not a given type of power has been present in a given assemblage (all three types of power have been present in each of the assemblages), but rather how they have been intertwined and what has been the economy of power behind this process.
In order to study human security assemblages, further conceptualisation of economy of power is in order. One can distinguish between five concepts which can be further used to strengthen the analytics of government. These are: political rationalities, governmental programmes, technologies of power, individual techniques and regimes of truth. While the relationship between the first four concepts can be characterised as the move from the broadest (political rationality) to the most specific (techniques), the fifth then plays the special role of keeping such a system going. The concepts help one to comprehend the structures of relationships among subjects, between subjects and governments, and governments themselves. As far as political rationalities are concerned, they serve the role of a wide context and can be understood as broader discourses of rule that structure socio-political orders, and it is within this grid that subjects are constituted. As Foucault (1988: 161) maintains, ‘it is possible to analyze political rationality, as it is possible to analyze any scientific rationality … [T]his political rationality is linked with other forms of rationality’. There is neither a pre-existing subject nor a pre-existing “reality”, as this is constructed as a plane with calculable subjects, being a historically derived condition of possibility for a particular political rationality to prevail. Political rationalities serve in turn the role of a context for more specific governmental programmes, described as ‘explicit, planned attempts to reform or transform regimes of practices …. [which] often take the form of a link between theoretical knowledge and practical concerns and objectives’ (Dean 1999: 211). One of the most important features of any governmental programme is its regulatory function:

Official practices, therefore, are not only redeployed as strategies of resistance (and thus always dangerously mired within the logic of
bureaucratic power), but they are also not limited to “the state”.
Practices of bureaucratic hierarchicalism and proceduralism spread
from state institutions into “non-state” realms … This dispersal of the
… regulation and government throughout society also illustrates the
governmentalization of society (Sharma and Gupta 2006: 17).

Examples of such governmental programmes have been precisely the Government of Canada and the Government of JapHS projects.

In order to be implemented, governmental programmes require technologies
of power to be employed. Modern technologies of power are generally said to consist
of ‘diverse and heterogeneous means, mechanisms and instruments through which
[practical] governing is accomplished’ (Dean 1999: 212). They can be imagined as
means of transport allowing one to accomplish what has been planned for. Each of
these technologies comprises a number of specific techniques. If technologies are
portrayed as general means of transport, techniques can then be thought of as specific
vehicles that one uses to get to a planned destination. As in real life travelling, one
needs quite often to use various combinations of techniques-as-vehicles in order to
be able to successfully complete a given task.

Finally, we have regimes of truth. Their immediate function is to justify
decisions made and actions taken. Nevertheless, by linking the decisions and actions
into a wider grid of political rationality, they effectively legitimise these political
rationalities in their entirety. Regimes of truth can be comprehended as chief
maintenance mechanisms: On the one hand, they pretend to be universally valid,
objectively arrived at, and spatio-temporally invariable “truths”; on the other, they
are indeed formed by the very same political orders of discourse they seek to legitimise. In Foucault’s own words,

[t]ruth isn’t outside power … Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned (Foucault 1980: 131).

It has been precisely the production of a certain type of truth, or Royal knowledge, about human security that has ensured that Canadian and Japanese HS assemblages of enunciation have looked fairly coherent. That is the reason why one cannot rely on the official discourse concerning a given human security project and needs to cut below it and link enunciations in human security assemblages of human security effectuation. The point is not in seeing whether they match (they never do due to their non-parallel formalisation), but rather how to account for a certain type of their mismatch.

The remainder of this section will introduce Foucault’s sketches of the relationship between the state and civil society. This development is highly pertinent for the following chapters as both human security assemblages have seen certain types of inclusion of civil society. Simultaneously, Canadian and Japanese human security assemblages have significantly differed in terms of how NGOs have been perceived by the state apparatus and how and for what purposes they have been inserted into human security implementation. Specifically, it will be shown how Foucault’s sketches of liberalism and neo-liberalism serve an important role in the
background for apprehending recent, often contradictory, processes which have taken place within the field of Canadian human security. Foucault’s only detailed discussion of neo-liberalism can be found in his Collège de France lectures of 1979, published for the first time in English in June 2008. They are further complemented by Foucault and Gordon’s insightful chapters contained in The Foucault Effect (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991). Although Foucault remained as neutral in his analysis of liberalism and its neo-versions as he could, one can sense his fascination with related political rationalities. His growing disillusionment with the welfare state was certainly a stimulus: Unlike a (neo-)liberal order, welfarism never possessed its own distinctive art of governing (Foucault 2008: 93-94). Foucault starts his analysis in the 16th Century, recognising an early modern governmentality defined as an autonomous rationality based on *raison d’état* and the science of police (Foucault 1991: 87-104).

Foucault (2008: 51-74) continues his study with an investigation of governmental naturalism, which itself cannot be considered a mere doctrine as it critiques state reason and argues for limited government, restraint, and the improvement of state reason by ‘displaying to it the intrinsic bounds of its power to know’ (Gordon 1991: 14). It was Adam Smith, the representative of the new liberal art of government, who pointed out the impossibility of economic sovereignty, with the result that the previously firm bond between *raison d’état* and the science of police dissolved and was replaced by governmental rationality derived from economics, the approach that became epitomised by the label *laissez-faire* (Foucault 2008: 20, 61, 284-286). Subsequently, Foucault draws one’s attention to emerging inter-penetration between the structure of private and public order, resulting in the beginning of a more statist liberal perspective: ‘the private domain [is regarded] as a
“virtual” public space …. It is … the historical point from which it becomes
decreasingly possible to think of civil society as an autonomous order which
confronts and experiences the state as an alien, incursive force’ (Gordon 1991: 33-
34). The above sketches show how laissez-faire liberalism, with a sharp division
between autonomous and spontaneous civil society and the minimal state, faded out
as an idea and practice. Instead, liberalism transmutated into a pluralised
interconnected system of government with a blurring division between state and
society, i.e. the political contract penetrating Canadian human security. In Gordon’s
words,

> [a]mong these processes might be numbered the initiating roles of
private individuals and organizations in the exploring and defining of
new governmental tasks; …. the cross-fertilizing interplay between
different agencies and expertises, public and private alike; … the
different forms of delegation represented by the “quangos”, .. and the
renewed mobilization of voluntary sector … [T]he interface between
state and society [can be portrayed] in the form of something like a
second-order market of governmental goods and services. It becomes
the ambition of neo-liberalism to implicate the individual citizen, as
player and partner, into this market game (Gordon 1991: 36).

Foucault did not understand modern neo-liberal governmentality as a neo-laissez-
faire order as is sometimes wrongly believed, but as a rationality that is
simultaneously *individualising* and *totalising*. In his 1979 lectures, Foucault
discussed different versions of neo-liberalism, focusing particularly on German post-
war neo-liberalism (the Freiburg School of Ordo-liberals) and U.S. neo-liberalism (the Chicago school) which evolved as a much more radical version from the former. The Ordo-liberals were concerned with the social market economy and held an anti-naturalistic notion of the market and of competition, as well as a constructivist concept of law and of juridical institutions. This School essentially believed in the active role of the state in constituting the market and spurring competition, although it firmly refused any direct state interventionism into the realm of the economy. It is then no surprise that proponents held that the economic order should be an object of indirect political regulation and social intervention (Foucault 2008: 101-128). Put differently, the Ordo-liberals generally aimed at creating a social framework within which enterprise and entrepreneurial activity would take place, complemented by the so-called Vitalpolitik concerned with the reproduction and re-activation of cultural and moral values that would be able to challenge free economic play (Foucault 2008: 148).

According to Foucault, neo-liberals of the Chicago School tried to redress the problem of indirect state activism by eliminating it altogether. The key strategy in this was their systematic expansion of the economic form into all other areas, including the social sphere, with the result of reducing any remaining differences between the economic and the social. This process is diagnosed to begin in the early 1990s in Canada, with transfer into the field of human security after 1997. Therefore, unlike the Ordo-liberals justifying the social being conducted in the name of the economic, the Chicago School neo-liberals advocated a global re-inscription of the social sphere as a form of the economic domain (Foucault 2008: 215-238). Gordon summarises the arrival at Chicago School neo-liberalism as follows:
this operation works by a progressive enlargement of the territory of economic theory by a series of redefinitions of its object … Now it is proposed that economics concerns the study of … *all rational conduct.* … But the great departure here from eighteen-century precedent is that, whereas *homo economicus* originally meant that subject the springs of whose activity must remain forever untouchable by government, the American neo-liberal *homo economicus* is *manipulable man*, man who is perpetually responsive to modifications in his environment (Gordon 1991: 43, emphasis in original).

As the analysis of Canadian and Japanese human security assemblages contained in the following chapter will suggest, one of the key differences between the two assemblages consists in the deployed economies of power. As far as Canadian case is concerned, the crucial structural part that has the potential to explain the development of the human security assemblage is directly connected to a shift from welfare liberalism to the neo-liberalism of the Chicago School, a shift which began in the 1970s and had its peak in the 1990s. As for Japanese case, the economy of power which was introduced during the second part of the 19th Century, and which was derived from Prussian/German socio-economic theories, will play a crucial explanatory role in the shape and development of JapHS assemblage. In order to be able to perform the actual empirical analyses, the final section of this chapter takes on the task of being able to perform the actual empirical analyses, the final section of this chapter tackles – and argues in favour of – the ontological convergence of Foucauldian and Deleuze-Guattarian scholarship which is seen as an important step allowing for theoretical interpretation.
Governmentalised Human Security Assemblages

The human security assemblages investigated in this thesis present a can-of-worms issue area which challenges existing intellectual perspectives that can be used to unpack them. This is especially pertinent to the qualities of these assemblages which allow them to stretch and function internationally/globally and yet be anchored in domestic socio-political terrains which rest on different economies of power and have different structural origins, geneses and features. To study human security assemblages means to successfully transcend prevailing artificial divisions of two kinds: functional, and those related to scale. These divisions are visible both in terms of practical blinds spots as well as disciplinary blind spots.

As far as an attempt to integrate functional divisions and redress the accompanying blind spots is concerned, one needs to understand and consequently interpret how these assemblages work. This is a tricky question for a number of reasons, but the most important obstacle that needs to be overcome in this context is to investigate how different functional areas deal with continuity and change in and of economies of power, and what echoes can one discern between and among these functional areas, both synchronically and diachronically. The areas of domestic economy, public policy and management, and foreign and security policy are three functional spheres that are seen as crucial in investigating human security assemblages. The cardinal mistake which has been made too often was to investigate human security articulations as problems of international/global security. In fact, they are not: indeed, they are manifestations within this domain, but, simultaneously, these manifestations are linked to processes and currents which exist in completely different spheres of human activity. To treat human security assemblages solely as a
security problem leads to the superficial findings and knowledge we have been surrounded by.

Instead, one needs to start by analysing the role of the individual in society, including its accompanying continuities and/or transformations, as well as by examining the relationship between (civil) society and the government. This can reveal a lot in terms of the characteristics germane to the domestic economy (i.e. what economic/political rationality has been at play and with what effects). This is complemented by an analysis of technologies of power that a given polity and society has deployed in a number of issue areas, to investigate the level of consistency in their application, how different the reaction has been in different domains, and, again, what the effects have been; this is a task for scholarship that deals with public policy and management, both in domestic politics and in governing and managing the production and delivery of global public goods. Finally, the field of foreign and security policy as the area in which human security programmes are explicitly articulated is not insulated from these processes. For instance, it is not just a historical fluke or coincidence that the individual appears in a certain historical period as both an active subject/citizen in the society and, concurrently, emerges as a referent object in need of protection in the security discourse. Or, conversely, that the individual is not constituted as an active subject in the society and, as a result, the focus of human security is not then on bodily harm. To sum it up, in order to see these kinds of connections, and to make them visible, one needs to look for echoes among functional areas that have hitherto been studied separately. This is needed for both CanHS and JapHS, though the functional links have been different in these cases.
Then there are artificial divisions related to political scale which need to be integrated. This set of divisions is often combined with functional divisions discussed in the previous paragraph, and further hinders the analysis. A practical example of a division related to political scales is often related to the question of how to deal with a phenomenon – such as the emergence of a national articulation of human security assemblage – which is both domestic and international/global. Such a practical blind spot can be a result of disciplinary contingency – here, the division between political science/public policy/foreign-policy analysis and IR/global security. It is quite obvious that ontological preferences concerning political scale, or a primary level of analysis, will be different for political science and global security. That means that often, although not always, certain political scales are deemed much more important than others as far as an analysis of a given issue is concerned. In a number of issues, this make sense as they are, for instance, purely domestic with no significant international dimension. However, there are certain issues which are, so to speak, more demanding and require one to examine the problem at different scales in order to understand related dynamics. There are good reasons to believe that human security assemblages are a prima facie example of such a topic. Not only do they integrate different functional areas which are studied by different disciplines, but they also integrate different scales. These scales are geographical in the sense that one can speak about local dynamics, national processes, international development, and/or world-wide effects, all related to the very same issue. But, geography is not necessarily Euclidian, as it is often not defined by the absolute coordinates of x,y,z. For instance, discourses (as well as their resulting material effects) have their own topography, thereby having a geographical quality.
To study human security assemblages means that one abandons the fetishism of political scales (defined on the basis of physical geography) and an accompanying invention of IR: the levels of analysis. Originally devised by Waltz (1979) and Singer (1961), they have been a popular analytical tool ever since. Frameworks such as global governance, multilayered diplomacy, or multi-level polity rested on them or, at least, have been ontologically inspired by them. The idea they all share is that i) levels of analysis can be differentiated according to linearly cascaded geographical and/or political scales; ii) they are horizontal; and iii) they can represent a more complex phenomenon better than other tools or frameworks, as they literally “slice up” a given issue. All these features are problematic at best for a piece of research which deals with human security assemblages. First, they cut seamlessly across scales and therefore a framework trying to study these assemblages through a series of horizontal investigations is not particularly productive. Also, the idea that one can linearly scale up certain political processes and assume their ontological similarity, for example, from the domestic political environment to the global environment, as approaches like global governance or global governmentality do (albeit differently), is deeply troubling. Assemblages do not evolve and operate in a linear and completely predictable fashion. Indeed, one can make some generalisations about certain tendencies, but since there is always contingency in historical development, these generalisations will always be limited at most.

Although political assemblages – including those examined in this thesis – are often global in terms of their reach and workings, they have domestic origins. In other words, they grow from a certain economic, social, and political context. Indeed, the domestic itself is often shaped by the international/global, but, nevertheless, as this thesis shows, the role of specific and unique domestic factors has been greater
than the global-governance school, and even the global governmentality approach, has suggested. More activities in the globalised sphere, going beyond interactions between and among states, does not necessarily signify the erosion of state apparatuses and the power they induce and channel. Rather, this works according to the opposite logic: greater room for manoeuvre often means that at least some states can multiply their political aims, both functionally and geographically. As the thesis shows, this has been both the case of Canada and Japan. Thus, one needs to resist the siren songs of analysts who call for bracketing domestic processes as unimportant, with the result of putting too much emphasis on international or global practices. Above all, this thesis will demonstrate through the convergence of Deleuze and Guattari with Foucault that the side effect of this type of thinking – i.e. that the role of governments is eroding – is not only completely unsubstantiated, but outright wrong. The epitome of this thinking within the studied issue area is Price (1998), who explains that in his focus on the landmine case, global processes of adapting the norm to ban antipersonnel landmines through moral entrepreneurship and emulation have ‘overtaken the more idiosyncratic workings of domestic politics’ (Price 1998: 617). The motivation for the theoretical convergence is precisely the opposite: to show how the idiosyncratic workings of domestic politics have shaped, in profound ways, related international and global processes.

The thesis investigates governmentalised assemblages. The convergence of Deleuze and Guattari and Foucault’s work, which were introduced above, is seen as a productive way to overcome the snarls of functional and scale-related divisions. The reason is not to come up with an elegant or even parsimonious theory, but to be appropriately equipped for studying the issue area of human security assemblages which are developing, growing, and shrinking vertically, transversally, as well as
horizontally. They can move omnidirectionally, though this not always the case. The convergence of the Deleuze-Guattarian and Foucauldian analytical grids is seen as a suitable solution to the intellectual problem of how to integrate an analysis of domestic structural terrains with an examination of globalised discourses and practices which, once plugged together, form human security assemblages. This is the moment when the convergence of Deleuze and Guattari with Foucault becomes prominent.

In concrete terms, the convergence is particularly important when it comes to an analysis of domestic structural settings and related processes of governmentalisation. This allows one to see how different functional areas become interconnected through political rationalities and governmental technologies, and to appreciate the mechanisms of power through which these functional interconnections are rendered possible. One of the crucial moments in which the integration of Deleuze and Guattari and Foucault’s conceptual toolbox is needed is when one tries to answer the question concerning what conditions of possibility or, to the contrary, conditions of orthodoxy have shaped the process of governmentalisation. Indeed, governmentalised assemblages are permeated with different types of power, and it is in their combination that one can study an economy of power of a certain issue area: here, of human security. It is at this structural level that one needs to examine how various economies of power lead to certain tendencies and developments, within the same issue area and between different fields of action. For instance, it is important to study whether – and if so, how – capital in a human security assemblage has been converted into social capital. This will in turn reveal important insights into the type of relationship (and its dynamics) between the state apparatus and non-state entities. Also, structural conditions under which a human security assemblage becomes
governmentalised can help one to understand the process of deterritorialisation of this assemblage, such as through the insertion of NGOs, and/or its reterritorialisation, such as through the work of diplomatic delegations or the introduction of disciplinary managerial techniques. What is more, the following chapters will show that a single assemblage can be deterritorialised and reterritorialised at the same time at its different sites.

Finally, the use of metaphorical models of assemblages is seen as the key to understanding Canadian and Japanese human security. As was previously pointed out, the arborescent and rhizomatic models are in their pure forms ideal types. At the same time, these models are important in that they allow one to see how dissimilar the basic structural and functional logics of these two assemblages can be. As far as Canadian human security assemblage is concerned, the next three chapters will conceptualise it as a rhizomatic assemblage. This will allow one to see how a neo-liberal economic-turned-political rationality penetrated CanHS. The related governmental programme, its technologies, and the overall economy of power upon which it rested, has indeed been completely different when compared with Japanese case. With regard to JapHS, the thesis will show that it has completely different origins, motivations and structural conditions under which it has developed. Since no desiring-production similar to Canada’s has been present, no lines of flight opened up and the striated molar place has dominated the development of this assemblage. The economy of power in JapHS has not been neo-liberal, as in the Canadian case, but imperial. Unlike neo-liberal political rationality with its emphasis on the transfer of responsibility and the mantra of effective and efficient control, the rationality of ‘the imperial state … [has been oriented at] capturing everything it can’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 436). Thus it is chiefly for these reasons that JapHS will be analysed.
as an epitome of *arborescent assemblage*. Simultaneously, Japanese case will be a very important corrective to the belief that there has been an emerging global and universalised neo-liberal political rationality. Last but not least, the contingent development of Canadian case shows that neo-liberal rationality is less stable than usually thought.
CHAPTER 2

IMAGERIES OF HUMAN SECURITY

This chapter deconstructs the representations of Canadian human security (CanHS) and Japanese human security (JapHS) in the mainstream narrative. For the representation of CanHS, three central signifiers are analysed: the portrayal of Canada as a country with a “Middle Power” tradition; the centrality of a “David vs. Goliath” discourse concerning the relationship between global civil society and state governments in what has been said to be the flagship of CanHS – the campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines; and, finally, Canadian governmental discourse on the need to replicate and spill the lessons of the landmine case into other cases, i.e. a signifier of a more “ambitious human security”. As for the representation of JapHS, there are also three central signifiers examined: the representation of Japan as a “pacifist Civilian Power”; the portrayal of “human security” as a “progressive foreign policy”; and, finally, the juxtaposition of “universal political values” and “Asian cultural values” as the unique factor determining the nature of JapHS. What follows is a critical meta-analysis of the two synoptic imageries. The orthodoxies deconstructed here differ from the conceptual framework presented in the previous chapter in the following ways: they represent CanHS and JapHS in the way which is not supported by a systematic analysis and adequate conceptualisation; they attempt to characterise CanHS and JapHS according to available governmental document which are used to structure one’s understanding of these human security articulations; and, finally, the orthodoxies prevent to study human security articulations in a non-cliché, process-oriented way which pays attention to contingent
development and messiness of human security-related discourses and practices. Thus, the mainstream imageries of CanHS and JapHS simulate – rather than analyse - human security. It is in this context that they must become what they are: empirical material rather than main conceptual categories.

Normative Imagery of Canadian Human Security

The following part deconstructs a synoptic imagery related to the Canadian human security. In concrete terms, it examines three key discursive signifiers through which policy-makers and academics have been able to create and reproduce a certain image of CanHS. It is shown that the mainstream image of CanHS has been built upon the popular and well-sedimented discourse on Canada being a middle power with progressive societal-turned-political values. As the section makes clear, it has been through this connection that the “Canadian ownership” of the campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines has been explained. Subsequently, the image of Canada as a middle power which is able to cooperate with NGOs and champion “new humanitarianism” (landmines) has been used to legitimise further expansion of the country’s human security portfolio.

Canadian Middlepowerhood as the Central Signifier

Existing analyses of CanHS policies emphasise the country’s sedimented tradition as a middle power which has served an important role in the post-Cold War diplomatic
conduct, the so-called “new diplomacy” (Chapnick 2005; McRae and Hubert 2001; Ungerer 2000). How can one understand the notion of Canadian middlepowerhood and what has been its relevance for CanHS? The answers to these questions are connected to the discursive prominence of middlepowerhood and new diplomacy in the context of analyses of CanHS. The association of Canada with the category of middle power has a long and interesting history. The notion came into being as WW2 was coming to an end: it was a Canadian diplomat, Hume Wrong, who introduced the functionalist principle which stressed active internationalism and the belief in U.N.-based multilateral practices to Canadian diplomatic statecraft:

Functionalism was the organizing principle behind the government’s approach to representation in international organizations. The fundamental idea was that decision-making responsibility had to be shared and that it should be shared by those who were most capable of making a contribution. The government had indicated its willingness to take on greater responsibilities. In return it wanted recognition and influence (Keating 1993: 28-29; also cf. Cooper 1995: 1-13).

The notion was subsequently incorporated by the then Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, into his own concept of middle power (Chapnick 2005: 3). In 1945, the Canadian government unsuccessfully sought to insert a reference to a special category of middle power into the U.N. Charter at the San Francisco Conference. Despite the absence of formal recognition, the category of middle power became the bedrock of the Canadian Golden Age in foreign and security policy (1945-1957) (Chapnick 1999: 73-82).
During the Cold War and throughout the 1990s, the traditional image of Canadian middlepowerhood was linked to Canada being the peacekeeper *par excellence*. The imagery of the so-called “Golden Age” of Canadian foreign and security policy (CanFSP) was constituted *ex post* (cf. DFAIT 2005). During the period which this label denotes – the mid-1940s to the 1960s – commentaries on the Golden Age were few and far between. The event which has famously been associated and linked with the Golden Age was the solution to the Suez Crisis of 1956. The following account of the event is now common: it was Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson who, with the U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, devised the idea of neutral peacekeeping and consequently won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. The prize, according to this account, gave the idea of Canadian peacekeeping a lot of attention and it was embraced by the Canadian public. The early 1960s represent a time when a major transformation within the discourse on CanFSP took place. Henceforth, it would be peacekeeping as constituting the core of middlepowerhood that would be invoked in the discourse on CanFSP, symbolised by the only statue to peacekeeping in the world, located in Ottawa.

Middle-power peacekeeping came to represent the key foreign-political activity in the discourse on CanFSP, and as peacekeeper *par excellence* Canada almost automatically participated in every single peacekeeping mission the U.N. could devise until the 1990s. References to the Canadian middlepowerhood were readily being used to demonstrate the allegedly objective existence of Canadian societal values and their consequent projection onto the realm of CanFSP. Jack Granatstein described the discourse on peacekeeping well when he said: ‘The Yanks fought wars, Canadians said, [...] while Johnny Canuck kept the peace. [...]
Peacekeeping was so popular [...] primarily because it was something we could do and the Americans could not’ (Granatstein 1996: 350, 352). In addition to creating a Canadian “island” of difference in North America, it also grouped Canada with other middle powers, such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Australia and the Netherlands. The discourse on Canadian peacekeeping and middlepowerhood remained visible, both within and outside Canada, and it carried an appealing, but also slightly simplistic and perhaps even naïve message: Canada became an active and leading player in the discipline of peacekeeping because as a multicultural, federal society, Canada had something to offer the world – namely its experience and expertise in accommodating ethnic and regional differences. Yet, at the time of the Suez Crisis, there were no signs of such an inside-out explanation. On the contrary, the majority of Canadians at that time opposed the Canadian reaction to the Suez Crisis and regarded it as a betrayal of Great Britain, its ally and imperial partner. In the 1958 federal election, the Nobel Laureate-led Liberal Party was badly routed, and Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservatives would form the largest ever majority government in Canadian history.

CanFSP has had as its distinguishing feature a notable discrepancy between political discourse, which has given the impression of linear and continuous progress, often achieved by references to the Golden Age and middle power, and practical policy-making as conducted by each Canadian government since WW2 onwards. It is the discursive continuity that has helped to form the perception of Canada as a country with a distinctive foreign and security policy, imbued with a normative ideal of middlepowerhood. The suggested discrepancy between the linearity of discourse and the variability of policy-making concerning CanFSP is an important finding with respect to the approach one can choose to examine middlepowerhood. Initially, it
highlights the futility of examining Canadian involvement in world politics against the normative ideal of a middlepowerhood that is immutable in time. However, it also suggests that the dismissal of the category of middle power altogether is not a productive approach either, since middlepowerhood has played an important legitimising function in the introduction of the country’s various practices – most recently the new diplomacy based on advanced liberal governmental rationality – thereby preserving the semblance of continuous and linear development. Thus, the approach used in this chapter avoids both the pitfalls of the normative-idealist view of middlepowerhood, as well as the temptation to reject it altogether. Middlepowerhood can be understood as a political category constructed by relatively autonomous decision-making circles immediately after WW2 (Pratt 1983-4), with its importance stemming from positive endorsements by both the Canadian public and international society. The category of middle power is thus considered an *empty container* which has been refilled again and again, hence Cox’s (1989: 827) assertion that ‘the middle power is a role in search of an actor’.

After the return to the government in 1993, the Liberal Party of Canada refilled the empty container of middlepowerhood by discursively linking it to CanHS. The country’s post-Cold War human security policies were put on a par with the country’s (mainly Cold-War) peacekeeping tradition. The chief advocate of CanHS and the related “new diplomacy”, the former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, readily referred to alleged similarities between his diplomatic conduct and the diplomatic practices of Lester Pearson, the main protagonist of the “Golden Age”. Human security joined peacekeeping in defining Canada’s middlepowerhood. Indeed, anyone familiar with the nature of Canadian neo-liberal governmental rationality and diplomacy as its carrier in world politics
will immediately reject such a parallel. Pearson’s diplomacy drew its strength from its exclusivity and secrecy, whereas Axworthy’s was exactly the opposite: media-oriented, with radical public speeches, and definite openness as well as the involvement of non-governmental actors in both domestic-consultation processes and international negotiations (Cooper 2000: 9-10). In line with the suggestion that a self-constructed status matters, it does appear that the category of middle power has in the Canadian case served a useful, albeit contingent, function, as a kind of discursive cement between completely disparate political practices associated with very different governmentalities. Axworthy’s intention was, in fact, to use the category of middle power, which had been highly popular among the Canadian public and the international community, as a legitimising factor for a radically new exercise of human security, what he preferred to call soft-power style “new diplomacy”. As Axworthy’s former ministerial colleague pointed out, however, his publicly ventilated opinions often stood in contrast to his more conservative views expressed during governmental meetings (personal interview with a former Minister in the Chrétien government, April 19, 2006, Ottawa).

**Civil Society “Wins” the Landmine Case**

The democratisation of CanFSP has been seen as one of the cornerstones of Canadian exercise of post-Cold War soft power (Axworthy 1997; Axworthy and Taylor 1998; and, for critical assessments, Nossal 1995; Neufeld 1999; Hampson and Oliver 1998). The idea of expanding the foreign and security policy-making process and making it more accountable to citizens dates back to 1993, with its first
manifestations already discernible as early as 1985. According to the mainstream understanding, this argument reflects Canada’s deep liberal internationalist commitment: citizens express their political preferences regarding CanFSP, the government translates them into a set of coherent policies, and it implements them internationally together with NGOs. According to Axworthy (1997), the entire democratisation life-cycle of CanFSP, including the use of NGOs as carriers of certain aspects of it, can be considered as a way of projecting Canadian soft power. Axworthy does not forget to emphasise that an application of the inside-out logic of soft-power projection was only made possible by the implosion of the Soviet Union and by an escape from the ‘grip of superpower rivalry’ (Ibid: 183). It is here that the reference to the notion of middle power is made: in Axworthy’s opinion, one can speak of middle-power diplomacy. The soft-power projection of Canadian influence is seen as the latest manifestation of Canadian well-recognised middle-power status, and a call for Canada to renew her golden internationalist past. The key role in solidifying a discursive connection between Mike Pearson’s golden era middlepowerism and Axworthy’s soft-powerism has been played by the Canadian mass media (e.g., Gwyn 2000).

The principal case for demonstrating the empirical possibilities of Canadian soft power has almost invariably been the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines (APLs). Eventually codified by the so-called Ottawa Convention, the campaign successfully resulted in their complete ban in 1997. Instead of recycling the mainstream discourse on the projection of soft power by both the Canadian government and Canada-based NGOs, a discursive analysis of the literature on the landmine case is in order. Accounts of the landmine case can be found at three levels of discourse: (i) accounts by direct participants/observers; (ii) academic reflections
on the landmine case; and (iii) accounts linking the landmine case to the literature on global civil society. In regard to the first level, these narratives originate predominantly from NGO personnel and, to a lesser extent, from governmental officials and scholars. These accounts acquired a Biblical status, largely due to an anthology entitled *To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines* (1998), edited by Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin. In their chapter, Stephen Goose and Jody Williams, formerly the Co-ordinator of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL, a transnational advocacy network composed of hundreds of NGOs) and Nobel Laureate for Peace, argue that the landmine case is said to represent ‘the compelling story behind the global humanitarian crisis and the “David vs. Goliath” nature of NGOs taking on governments and militaries to ban a weapon used by armies for decades’ (Williams and Goose 1998: 23). When we look outside the volume, other existing narratives from participants/observers confirm this understanding (Williams and Goose 2004; Williams 2000; Clegg 1999). In addition, this was the context in which Williams portrayed the ICBL as a ‘new kind of superpower’ in her Nobel Prize speech (Williams 1997), as it makes use of soft-power strategies such as information technology and partnerships with middle powers, most notably Canada.

Academic reflections on the landmine case and its lessons are numerous, with the studies by Price (1999) and Matthew and Rutherford (2003) being the most theoretically developed. Price begins his analysis by highlighting his interest in showing what role transnational non-state actors play in security-related issues. These actors produce international norms that shape and redefine state interests. Soft-power characteristics are placed high on the list of the factors that helped the ICBL to change the behaviour of states. In concrete terms, Price stresses the role of
technological change. He explains that the use of the Internet allowed pressure to be exercised steadily by the ICBL network, eventually leading to its gaining access to the policy-making process (Price 1999: 626). Matthew and Rutherford’s analysis also examines the global nature of the movement to ban AP mines. They use Rosenau’s *Turbulence in World Politics* as the theoretical plane upon which to unfold their argument. In this study, Rosenau (1990: 5) makes the distinction between ‘the two worlds of politics’, i.e., the world of transnational politics and the world of states, which were separated by macro global structures. Matthew and Rutherford (2003: 32) use this conceptualisation as their point of departure and argue that the landmine case ‘could be read as an example of the increasing dominance of the nonstate realm.’ They add that ‘[eventually] the nonstate realm would emerge victorious’ (ibid.: 40–52). In this light, assertions made by other academics, such as Brem and Rutherford (2001: 171), who maintain that NGOs played a ‘critical role . . . in instigating and facilitating the landmine ban’, or by Warkentin and Mingst (2000: 246), who depict the landmine case as a ‘victory’ of global civil society, are not surprising.

The above two levels of accounts are closely linked to the global civil society literature. Besides Rosenau, one of the most influential global civil society-oriented scholars on the landmine discourse has been Paul Wapner, who maintains that global civil society ‘is constituted by . . . transnational social movements . . . [and] such organizations clearly transcend the self-regarding character of states. . . . [F]or this reason, normative thinkers consider many of them promising agents of progressive social change’ (Wapner 2000: 14). It is no surprise, then, that Wapner imposes ideas from his global civil society scholarship on the landmine case to substantiate his abstract claims and back them up empirically. He uses already-existing participant
accounts to reaffirm that the Ottawa Convention ‘would never have been considered, let alone signed, if it had not been for the ICBL and other active NGOs’, and that the landmine issue is ‘a paradigmatic case for studying the role and effectiveness’ of global civil society (Wapner 2004: 252).

Towards A More Ambitious Human Security

The use of soft power by the Canadian government in the Ottawa Process is usually connected with a broader paradigm of human security. The reasons are obvious: people-centred security dovetailed well with the concept of anti-personnel landmines as a humanitarian issue in which the suffering individual assumed the central position. Indeed, the early formulation of human security, both in the U.N. context and in the Canadian context, meant that issues traditionally viewed as military problems could be successfully reframed as humanitarian problems (UNDP 1994; DFAIT 1995). What is more, the fact that the human security agenda was used in Canadian decision-making circles as an important facet of CanFSP identity showed how closely the notions of soft power, middle power, and human security have been interlinked. According to Roland Paris:

the idea of human security is the glue that holds together a jumbled coalition of “middle power” states, development agencies, and NGOs—all of which seek to shift attention and resources from conventional security issues and toward goals that have traditionally fallen under the rubric of international development. (Paris 2001: 88)
The distinction between middle powers as *followers* during the Cold War and middle powers as *leaders* after it has been used to explain why the Canadian government embarked on more ambitious foreign and human security policy initiatives only after the end of the Cold War (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal 1991). The use of human security as a diplomatic and political agenda, within which the Canadian government has forged partnerships with both like-minded states and NGOs, can therefore be considered an ostensible example of what Andrew Cooper (1997) calls niche diplomacy. Indeed, Cooper’s theoretical analysis of niche diplomacy and Axworthy’s practical conduct of soft-power diplomacy are connected precisely by the niche of human security.

While the importance of the Canadian government’s early articulation of human security for the success of the landmine ban has been widely discussed, comparatively little has been said about the reverse dynamics, that is, about the impact of the Ottawa Process on the re-articulation of the human security paradigm. On the one hand, the human security agenda played the role of a structural condition for the landmine problem to become a political issue. In this process, landmines were reframed: the idea of landmines as a military problem was replaced by the idea of landmines as a humanitarian issue. A careful analysis, however, reveals that as much as the landmine case required human security for its success, human security simultaneously needed the landmines issue for its own political life. This is particularly evident when the period immediately following the successful legal codification of the landmine ban in 1997 is scrutinised. One specific effect of this success on the nature of CanHS has been the narrowing of a hitherto quite broad paradigm (Bosold and von Bredow 2006). The result, known as the Canadian
approach to human security, or the Canadian school of human security, bears clear
signs of the landmine case: ‘Human security means freedom from pervasive threats
to people’s . . . safety or lives . . . [H]uman security encompasses a spectrum of
approaches to . . . protect civilians . . . and to ensure security for . . . populations’
(DFAIT 2000: 2). In addition, the issue of small arms and light weapons, the very
topic chosen by Lloyd Axworthy and subsequently embraced by the Canadian
government to build on the success of the landmine ban, further narrowed the
Canadian approach.

It would be a mistake, nevertheless, to consider the government-initiated
process of narrowing the human security agenda as a weakening of the agenda. On
the contrary, the narrowing was accompanied by a simultaneous increase in
governmental ambition as far as future plans for human security were concerned.
This was manifested through two closely interconnected processes. In the first
process, a far more systematic approach was introduced that made a number of
previously marginalised and insulated issues the central part of the country’s newly
delimited official human security agenda, expanding it in the process. Aside from the
issue of landmines, these issues were especially the regulation of small arms and
light weapons, stopping the use of children in armed conflicts, attempts to reinforce
the application of international humanitarian and human rights law, a plan to
establish the International Criminal Court, the campaign to stop the exploitation of
children, activities related to processes of conflict prevention, and, finally, the fight
against transnational crime (Human Security Network 1999). The one common
feature of all the listed topics is their intimate relationship to the protection of the
physical security of individuals, i.e., the freedom-from-fear side of the human
security paradigm.
In the second process, the successful codification of the landmine ban also led to the institutional consolidation of human security. This institutionalisation began in 1998, when Canada signed the Lysoen Declaration with Norway, in which they pledged to work together on issues related to freedom from fear. A year later, the bilateral Declaration was broadened to include other like-minded countries, with the effect of establishing the Human Security Network. The link between the two processes and the notion of morally-directed soft power can be seen in a speech delivered by the then assistant deputy minister of DFAIT, Paul Heinbecker:

In *Foreign Policy* in the Fall of 1990, Joseph Nye defined “soft power” as getting other countries to want what you want. It is “co-optive power” in contrast to “command power”. Just as human security complements national security, soft power complements hard or military power. In Nye’s analysis, ideals matter, as does success. . . . If we want to promote tolerance and reconciliation, it helps to be a democratic, bilingual, multicultural country. If we want to co-opt other governments to our norm-setting humanitarian agenda, it helps to have a solid record of multilateralism. . . . We need to work with other countries and maximize each others’ resources. In this regard, we are currently testing a couple of strategies. The first is to establish close working partnerships with a few other countries that share our outlook. . . . We also plan to work cooperatively with NGOs. The validity of a human security agenda and the credibility of a government–NGO coalition were boosted by the success of the Ottawa process to ban landmines (Heinbecker 1998).
It was seen as common sense in the landmine case to suggest that the issue has revived the fortunes of and the prospects for CanHS. As a part of this narrative, the Ottawa Process to ban landmines has played the role of a bridge between the discourse on CanHS and the discourse on human/NGO empowerment. In respect to the latter, the key claim was that as the power of global civil society has significantly increased after the end of the Cold War and citizens concerned about and involved in humanitarian issues have become politically empowered. This trend has been explained by the combination of the reconceptualisation of security (national security being replaced by human security) and the successful campaign to ban landmines. Accordingly, the power of states was said to have eroded unless their political elites realised the potential of their co-operation with NGOs (e.g., Canada as a middle power). As the presented thesis shows, a different story remains to be told, however, and other lessons can be drawn from the landmine case and CanHS. In concrete terms, the production of a heroic discourse derived from the campaign to ban landmines has detached both the human security agenda itself and its academic reflections from existing empirical evidence.

**Orientalist Imagery of Japanese Human Security**

*If I want to imagine a fictive nation, I can give it an invented name, treat it declaratively as a novelist object ... I can also – though in no way claiming to represent or to analyze reality itself (these being the major gestures of Western discourse) – isolate somewhere in the world (faraway) a certain number of features, ... and out of these features deliberately form a system. It is this system which I shall call: Japan.*

Roland Barthes (1982)
The following section examines the imagery of Japanese human security (JapHS). It begins with an analysis of the context upon which the human security discourse has been erected. In concrete terms, the question concerning what kind of state Japan has been, as well as the question of what kind of foreign and security this country has practiced, need to be investigated before one can engage with the actual representation of JapHS. The key image is this regard is Japan’s portrayal as a pacifist civilian power. Like the category of middle power in Canada’s case, Japanese civilian power resting on post-WW2 pacifism has repeatedly been used as an explanation of the country’s interest in human security and its elevation to one of the key linchpins of Japanese foreign and security policy. As this section demonstrates, the alleged unique juxtaposition of universal (liberal) values and particular “Asian” values has been used to explain the distinct character of JapHS.

*Japanese Civilian Power and Pacifism as the Central Signifier*

The following section examines the imagery of Japanese human security (JapHS). It begins with an analysis of the context upon which the human security discourse has been erected. In concrete terms, the question concerning what kind of state Japan has been, as well as the question of what kind of foreign and security this country has practiced, need to be investigated before one can engage with the actual representation of JapHS. Like the notion of middlepowerhood in Canadian case, common understandings of Japanese position in the international system have also been linked to a certain category of the state: civilian power. In his highly influential article published in *Foreign Affairs*, Hanns Maull (1990) portrayed Japan, alongside
Germany, as a specimen of the state category he labelled “new civilian powers”. They were said to possess transformational potential with regard to their impact on the structure of the international system (Mau1990, cf. Cox 1989). As far as Japan is concerned, Mau1 argued that the key features of Japan emerging as a civilian power consisted in a dual process of the United States’ ability to contain Japanese military expansionism by tying both countries to a U.S.-led alliance, and Japan’s own orientation to economic – rather than military – cooperation and the country’s active diplomatic representation in supranational structures (Mau1990: 91-106).

Japanese civilian powerhood has been understood as a product of a certain type of normative development. This development has included, apart from the country’s embracement of embedded liberalism upon which the post-WW2 international economic order has rested (Hays 2009: 15; Ruggie 1982: 394, 410), Japan’s post-WW2 pacifism. Probably the most influential accounts of the origin and nature of Japanese anti-militarism have been produced by Thomas Berger (1993, 1998) and Peter Katzenstein (1996, 2008). As one would expect from culturally-oriented IR constructivists (cf. Farrell 2002: 49), both authors have based their arguments on the importance of ideas rooted in Japanese society and democratic institutions. Berger (1993) speaks about Japanese “culture of antimilitarism” and borrows more than a title from a U.S. cultural anthropologist, Ruth Benedict (1946), who worked on the cultural profile of Japanese society during WW2. Similarly, Katzenstein (2008: 71) stresses Japanese domestic culture of consensus, with a ‘deeply ingrained pacifism’ in its role of normative constraints. The pacifist/anti-militarist collective identity has been seen as a prerequisite for Japan to be considered a civilian power. This is seen in Berger (1998: x) when he asserts that the
preference for economic power over military power is given by Japan’s strong antimilitary sentiment.

The 1945 U.S. nuclear attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki which ended WW2 is almost universally recognised as the key event leading to the creation of Japanese civilian and anti-militarist statehood, ushering in a brand new, liberal-democratic era for Japan (Miyashita 2008: 25). The role of guarantor of Japanese civilian statehood resides with Japan’s post-WW2 constitution and especially its Article 9. It is in this article that war as the means of settling international disputes is rejected. As Hook and McCormack maintain, the presence of constitutional restraints has produced what they call “state pacifism”:

Japan [became] a “peace state”: a state which deploys only non-violent resources in order to realize its interests. Article 9 was thus translated into an alternative to reliance on the US-Japan Security Treaty … The constitution became the normative source for political action seeking to realize a “peace state” and to constrain policy-makers intent upon restoring legitimacy to the military as an instrument of state policy (Hook and McCormack 2001: 21).

While pacifism has been an important part of the Japanese civilian power identity, the latter has been more flexible. One of the advantages of Japanese civilian powerhood has been the broad domestic appeal of this specific collective identity. It has been pointed out that support has not been derived solely from Pacifists, but also from Centrists and Pragmatic Multilateralists, though their support for Japan as a Civilian Power has varied (Klien 2002: 179-180).
One of the most widely recognised features of Japanese civilian-power identity has been the country’s increasing preoccupation with universal humanitarian and socio-economic concerns. As Inogushi and Jain (2000: xiv) have maintained, this trend has been the effect of Japanese ability to go beyond what they called karaoke diplomacy, i.e. the previous practice singing to the background music of the U.S. policy line. Japan’s willingness to financially contribute to tackling the most pressing global issues has cemented the international perception of Japan as one of the key promoters of human development, human rights, and other democratic values, as well as economic liberalism. Concerning these two roles which the Japanese political, bureaucratic and diplomatic elites produced in the 1970s in light of the country’s increasing economic clout and have cultivated ever since, Macleod’s observation deserves to be quoted at length as it is representative of thinking about Japan on the basis of the country’s image projection:

The notion of leader in global cooperation expresses the permanent Japanese desire to be recognized as a Western industrial country, with a claim to rank equal to that of a great power, albeit a non-military one … In assuming this role, Japan would adopt a strictly non-military approach to tackling such transnational issues as the environment, terrorism, and drugs, and would undertake to promote “international cooperation” (Macleod 1997: 97-98; emphasis in original).

Indeed, as Maull (1990) made clear and many have repeated, civilian powers need to be diplomatically active in multilateral forums. For Japan, this has meant constructive participation in global and regional clubs (cf. Ashizawa 2008; Inoguchi
and Bacon 2006; Lee 2006; Newman 2004; Okawara and Katzenstein 2001; Midford 2000; Fukushima 1999; Edström 1999; Chai 1997). Since the country’s admission to the United Nations in 1956, this has been the key platform for Japan’s international cooperation in a number of issue areas, including participation in peacekeeping operations; arms-control, disarmament and non-proliferation agenda; poverty reduction; and post-conflict reconstruction (MOFA 2004). After the end of the Cold War, Japan has been seen as increasingly involved in the production of international norms and institutional mechanisms which have rested on the liberal vision of the international order (Newman 2004: 277). Simultaneously, as the same governmental pamphlet makes clear, Japanese activities in the U.N. system have not been divorced from the country’s efforts to institutionally reform the U.N. Security Council and subsequently secure a permanent seat on this body (Drifte 1999). It would be too simplistic, however, to argue that the former has been carried out in order to get the latter. Japan’s significant contribution to addressing various global issues within the U.N. has been recognised internationally and Japan has been perceived as a key contributor to world peace in a broad sense.

**Human Security as Progressive Foreign Policy**

The official articulation of JapHS has been hailed as a progressive foreign policy. Academic commentators have emphasised the importance of the personal involvement of Japanese PMs in this process, especially of Murayama Tomiichi, who introduced the concept during his U.N. speech in October 1995, and of the late Obuchi Keizō, who subsequently elevated it to the cornerstone of Japanese foreign
policy during his 1998 Hanoi speech (cf. Edström 2003: 212-214; Soeya 2004: 5-7). As Tanaka (2000: 81f) has argued in this context, Obuchi’s speech ‘was highly significant in the way it provided a single framework for all the diplomatic endeavors that preceded it’. Since 1999, human security has been present in Japan’s annual diplomatic bluebooks. As the 2001 Diplomatic Bluebook held, by ‘[p]ositioning human security as the cornerstone of international cooperation in the 21st century, Japan is working to make the new century a human-centered century’ (MOFA 2001c; emphasis added). The proximity between academic analyses and official documents can be observed in the same ministerial document which maintained that ‘Prime Minister Obuchi clearly located human security in Japanese foreign policy by emphasizing the importance of this perspective’ (Ibid). Moreover, an account given by Takemi Keizo, a Japanese politician and scholar who was close to Obuchi, reveals how human security was linked to Japanese “pacifist foreign policy”:

Pacifism in Japan evolved into a highly ideological one-country pacifism … What is now required of Japan is the formulation and projection of a new future-oriented pacifism that enhances and promotes Japan’s standing as a responsible member of the international community … This is a task … based on the pillar of human security (Takemi 2002: 47; emphasis added).

The insertion of human security as an idea into Japanese foreign policy and making it one of its key pillars has been associated with the U.N. developments of human security. Turning human security into one of the Japanese key foreign-political principles has been seen as the end of the country’s chequebook diplomacy
(Gilson 2000). Although the human security-related efforts of the Japanese government have been portrayed by the majority of authors writing on the topic as progressive, normatively/ideationally-driven and even ‘fresh’ (Tanaka 2000: 81), they have not forgotten to point out that the Japanese human security-as-foreign-policy has been the result of the country’s reaction to the U.N. articulation of human security which originally appeared in the UNDP Report of 1994. Thus, it is Calder’s thesis of Japan as a “reactive state” (Calder 1988), i.e. a state that formulates policies and launches initiatives as a reaction to external developments and pressures, that fits well with commentators’ depictions of the real origin of JapHS (Bosold and Werthes 2005: 93; Gilson and Purvis 2003: 198). How the Japanese diplomatic elite has identified with the concept of human security can be seen from a speech given by the Japanese ambassador for human security in 2006, in which he asserted that ‘human security as a human-centred approach to global issues is close to Japanese thinking’ (quoted in Brysk 2009: 148).

Also, the articulation of Japanese human security has been connected with structural transformations brought about by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new types of complex humanitarian emergencies (Soeya 2004; Edström 2003: 210-211; Hook et al. 2001: 224). JapHS has been said to be concerned with development and humanitarianism, and not with national security (Edström 2003: 220). For this reason, it has been perceived as a set of ideas and tools to improve the lives of individuals and communities. The mainstream understanding of JapHS has been that it has rested on humanitarian and non-military solutions and has not been primarily shaped by political motives. This alleged neutrality has been hailed as one of its advantages over Western-centred articulations of human security, such as Canada's (Acharya 2001). One of the most oft-used examples of the well-

One of the central areas in which JapHS has been depicted as progressive foreign policy has been the cooperation between the Japanese government and Japanese NGOs. The mainstream narrative concerning the nature of JapHS suggests that the Japanese government began with the cultivation of its interaction with NGOs during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. It has been pointed out that although the government was initially quite rigid in this area, the post-1998 period, which has been based on a new regulative framework, has been the time of NGO empowerment and emancipation (Ford 2003; Kuroda 2003: 230-234; Gilson and Purvis 2003: 202-205). In the words of Hook et al. (2001: 289), the ‘activities [of NGOs] … have come to embody the type of human security stance that the Japanese government is trying to promote.’ Apart from the empowerment of NGOs through a new legal framework, another factor has been mentioned in this context: the importance of international norms on reconstitution of the relationship between the Japanese government and NGOs. Kim Reimann (2006, 2009; also, cf. Thakur 2000: 249) and Hirata Keiko (2008) have maintained that the quantitative rise of Japanese NGOs and their qualitative emancipation have been part of the worldwide growth of NGOs, and
the key influence here has been Japan’s domestic emulation of international norms concerning the need to empower NGOs. Reimann and Hirata have thus relied on a top-down explanation which seems to confirm Calder’s thesis that Japan is a “reactive state”. As a result of this externally-borne pressure (*gaiatsu*), Reimann (2001) has argued that Japanese NGOs have become socialised in liberal norms underpinning the contemporary international society.

*“Universal Values” and “Asian Values” Juxtaposed*

One of the key discursive elements in the mainstream narrative on JapHS has concerned discussion of socio-political values on which JapHS has allegedly been built. There have been two parallel discourses related to this issue: a universal/liberal-values discourse and an Asian-values discourse. Since they have been interwoven at times and yet each has remained distinct, one can speak of their juxtaposition. Once again, the close relationship between official enunciations and academic analyses can be discerned and the presence of the two discourses can be found at both levels.

As far as the link between JapHS and universal values is concerned, it has mainly been manifested through the notion of human rights. As Ogata Sadako, at that time serving as the Co-Chair of the U.N. Commission on Human Security (she became the Director of JICA a few months later), observed in this context,

> At the center of human security are *human rights*. And they are *universal values* regardless of culture and civilization based on human
rights that all have to recognize and have to have hold. Putting human
rights in the human security agenda - not only political human rights but
also economic, social and cultural rights - would bring more security to
people (Ogata 2003).

Additionally, in the context of spelling out the priorities of the Government of Japan
for United Nations reform, it was argued under the “human rights” banner that
‘Japan strongly hopes that the concept of human security …. will be further
embraced at U.N. forums as a universal value’ (MOFA 2006a). By virtue of making
the connection between human rights and human security, the Japanese government
has managed to insert itself into what Macleod (1997: 97-98; emphasis in original)
has called ‘the role of defender of a universal value system’. As Macleod explains,
‘Japan now claims not only that it shares what it considers to be the universal values
of the post-Cold War era, but that it has a leading role to play in defending them’
(Ibid: 97-98). Japan’s universalistic discourse on human security, inspired by the
language of the U.N. Charter, has been projected mainly to the United Nations,
where the Japanese government has used it to cement its “good offices”.

Simultaneously, the official and academic discourses on JapHS have been
imbued with the notion of “Asian values”. While the universalistic discourse has
rested on the notion of (liberal) human rights, the Asian-values discourse has been
the epitome of a culturalist explanation that tries to scientifically account for a certain
type of practice (here human security). The juxtaposition of these two discourses
within the field of human security has been maintained, though there have been
various attempts to integrate them (Hyun-Seok 2000; Villacorta 2000; Hassan 1995).
When discussing the concept of “Asian human security”, Tow and Trood (2000: 26-
have asserted that Asian cultures tend to favour communitarianism over individualist liberalism, and that this can be explained by Sino-Confucianism, on which these societies are grounded. As the reference to Asia in an adjective form suggests, the basic distinction made has been between “East Versus West”, to borrow Acharya’s (2001) title of his article tackling human security. Acharya (2001: 449) warns against making ‘a familiar schism between Western liberalism and “Asian Values”’, and goes on to argue that there has really been a different cleavage: between direct (physical) violence and structural violence. Similarly, Sucharithanarugse (2000) has spoken about the process of “Asianising human security” and maintained that the backbone of such a paradigm is ‘security that “cares”’ (Ibid: 51).

JapHS has been considered a representative of the so-called Asian paradigm of Human Security. The mainstream narrative makes a crucial distinction between a “broad approach” and a “narrow approach” to human security (McCormack 2008; Owen 2008; Duffield 2007: 120; Muggah and Krause 2006: 113; Bosold and Werthes 2005; Gasper 2005; Evans 2004; U.N. Commission on Human Security 2003; Abdus Sabur 2003: 40; Paris 2001; Chen 1995). The distinction has been derived from the UNDP Report of 1994 and also reflects Acharya’s above division. The UNDP Report of 1994 pointed out that human security features two freedoms: freedom from fear, and freedom from want. While the former was said to be concerned with direct, or physical, violence, the latter has been preoccupied with removing structural violence and has been much more focused on the emancipation and empowerment of individuals and communities (UNDP 1994: Chapter 2; for the original distinction between direct violence and structural violence, cf. Galtung 1969). This perceived division has been widely accepted and has determined the way
in which politicians and academics have understood human security and its modalities. What is more, an analysis of the discourse on JapHS leaves no doubts about the country’s human security being comprehended as the *prima facie* example of the broad, freedom-from-want approach to human security. On the other hand, Canada has been understood as a champion of the narrow, freedom-from-fear approach. Thus, a senior MOFA official remarked that

> [t]here are two basic aspects to human security - *freedom from fear* and *

*freedom from want*. Some countries seem to focus solely on the first aspect. For these countries, human security provides a conceptual basis for taking actions to preserve the life and dignity of individuals in conflict situations ... In *Japan’s view*, however, human security is a *much broader* concept. We believe that freedom from want is no less critical than freedom from fear. So long as its objectives are to ensure the survival and dignity of individuals as human beings, it is necessary to go *beyond* thinking of human security solely in terms of protecting human life in conflict situations (MOFA 2000a; emphasis added)

When it comes to the explanation of *why* each of these countries has embraced a different half of the original UNDP conception of human security, one’s attention is directed to the fact that, unlike Canada, Japan has been able to draw on universal and Asian values. If the work of mainstream commentators has not been enough to convince most as to the legitimacy of this distinction, one other example has also been used to underpin and confirm the basic distinction between Canadian and Japanese approaches to human security, namely that of *humanitarian*
The idea to codify humanitarian intervention was championed by the Canadian Government after the 1999 NATO military air-campaign against Serbia (for a critical examination, see Chapter five of this thesis), and the formulation of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (ICISS 2001) doctrine in which this process resulted, has been seen as an important diplomatic moment for Western liberalism. Furthermore, it has been common knowledge that Japanese articulations of human security have long been against humanitarian intervention (Badescu and Weiss 2010; Remacle 2008; Evans 2004), chiefly due to the inconsistency with more peaceful and accommodating “Asian values” on which it has rested.

A Critical Meta-Analysis of the Imageries

As the above analysis of existing levels of accounts concerning the landmine case as the basis of CanHS demonstrated, a number of features permeate and are replicated throughout the identified three levels. Among those, the issues of (i) the ICBL as a manifestation of global civil society, and (ii) the dualistic ontology of the state vs. global civil society will be tackled in turn, as these have served the role of discursive nodes around which narratives at all three levels have been produced.

To begin with, the notion of global civil society itself cannot be taken for granted. Even advocates of this concept can define it as ‘fuzzy and contested’ at best (Giddens 2001: iii; Edwards 2000:14 fn. 2; for a systematic critique, cf. Chandler 2009b). Largely romantic ideas about the ICBL being the epitome of global civil society, i.e. a truly democratic, inclusive, and geographically ubiquitous entity, have been challenged from different perspectives (cf. Chapnick 2003; Beier 2003;
Brinkert 2003; Beier and Crosby 1998; Tomlin 1998). This section will, however, argue that the more pressing problem of existing accounts has been the image of a dualistic ontology expressed through the notion of the two worlds, i.e. that political power is reputedly being transferred from the eroding system of nation-states to global civil society. The relationship between nation-states and non-governmental actors in these narratives thus resembles a zero-sum game in which the gain of one side automatically means a loss for the other. The vocabularies of David vs. Goliath, military state interests vs. humanitarian global civil society, and the widespread belief that the landmine case has primarily been about the victory of global civil society over states, are all but particular examples of Rosenau and Wapner’s metaphors based on the ideas of rivalry (the transfer of power) and irreconcilability (tension between the two worlds). The following analyses the problematic belief that the global social movement has been the single cause for the ban. It will also scrutinise the role of social science in reinforcing such a belief.

In regard to the cause argument, the landmine case has been produced at all three levels from the social movement perspective. One of the consequences of this take on the issue is that it predetermines the referent point (NGOs/global civil society) as well as the chronology and time span of mainstream explanatory frameworks (1992-1997). Thus, participant/observer accounts did not serve only as a data pool for more theoretically informed studies, but, in fact, they steered the latter’s attention to the role of NGOs/global civil society in this campaign and to a timeline starting in the early 1990s with the formation of the ICBL by six NGOs as the decisive point in the landmine case. Additionally, these result-oriented and linear accounts usually stop in 1997 when the Treaty was concluded, deducing the alleged victory of global civil society from the successful legal codification of the ban. They
neither carried a diachronic analysis which would reveal historically preceding attempts of the peace movement (e.g. the activities of peace activists surrounding 19th Century arms-control conferences, or ICRC and Amnesty International’s attempts to ban APLs in the 1970s as a result of the Vietnam War-related experience), nor a synchronic analysis looking at different issues, such as small arms and light weapons, as these have directly contradicted the notion of global civil society being a norm entrepreneur (this issue was identified by several states that also later sponsored the launch of IANSA, a transnational advocacy network active on the issue). Finally, the emphasis of virtually all accounts on the global nature of the campaign contributes to the lack of focus on the microdynamics of the state/NGO nexus. As a result, zero attention is paid to the institutional context of the landmine case. No explanation gets behind the reproduction of the mantra about the enormous pressure the ICBL exercised to change states’ foreign and security policies.

*Figure 1. The Iron Triangle of Hegemonic Discourse*
Indeed, features of the mainstream discourse on the landmine case and attempts to simulate the quality of the entire human security field on the basis of such characteristics have cardinal implications for the way we understand social science, here represented by the three levels of accounts. In concrete terms, it cannot be perceived as a bias-free and neutral field of knowledge which merely systematises and theorises the landmine case experience from objectively gathered data, but rather as a field in which power and knowledge intersect and reinforce each other. The power of social scientific enterprises as truth politics acquires a performative quality in that it refutes a widespread belief in social science neutrally analysing the landmine case. The material effects of the performativity of social science are visible in its active framing of the landmine case as a case of global civil society winning out over states and the subsequent connection to the field of human security. As a result, the distinction between theory and practice is blurred, and despite analytical frameworks at all three levels of accounts pretending to work in a representational idiom, they in fact serve the role of a performative idiom. As an example, the power of a victorious discourse functions simultaneously as the machinery for immunisation, in that it produces an infinite mass of commentaries on the victory of global civil society, which in turn prevents any critical voices from being heard, and as the machinery for incitement, in that it incites the public and NGOs to challenge (allegedly obsolete and undemocratic) governments in similar issues framed as human security issues (cf. Williams and Goose 2004).

As the analysis of the imagery of JapHS documented, the existence of synoptic imagery has not been unique to CanHS. In fact, Orientalist imagery-making concerning JapHS has been strong, too, and the resulting synoptic imagery of JapHS well-entrenched. The mainstream representation of JapHS has been based on
Orientalist-humanitarian imagery. While the imagery has been captured in the existing narratives and images, these narratives have been unable to reveal the complex structures on which JapHS has been erected, as well as the series of which it has been composed. In the Japanese case more than in the Canadian, the imagery has been cast in terms of Occident vs. Orient, i.e. hinging on cultural differences and taking imagined geographies to help with the construction of this imagery. As Barthes points out in his analysis of Japan, fittingly titled *Empire of Signs*, ‘Orient and Occident cannot be taken here as “realities” to be compared and contrasted historically, philosophically, culturally, politically. I am not lovingly gazing towards an Oriental essence’ (Barthes 1982: 3). Japan as the Empire of signs and empty signifiers is thus a fantasy. The previously analysed representation of JapHS is an example of such a fantasised representation. In concrete terms, JapHS has been pitted against multiple Others: against the West in a broad sense (imagined binary geographies); against “old great-power hegemons” (the identity of a civilian power); against national/state security dominated by military power (supposedly absent in Japanese case); against CanHS allegedly “representing” the narrow approach to human security (an imagery of two clear-cut, distinct, and directly comparable approaches); and against itself historically (i.e. democratisation/emancipation of politics against the Japanese wartime experience).

As a part of its mainstream understanding, JapHS has been examined as a policy-making enterprise *par excellence*. The “official history” of JapHS is full of references to “the key” political speeches and documents, with the importance of the UNDP Report of 1994 being considered totemic among them. It is intriguing to observe the obsession with certain “essences” which have supposedly shaped, or even constituted, JapHS. This obsession can be found at the policy-making level and
also at the academic level. The way in which this obsession has structured almost all academic debates concerning JapHS testifies to the popularity of the multiple Self vs. Other divide in these accounts. The imagery of JapHS is founded on political identities, personal as well as collective. As the previous chapter demonstrated, to rely on identities and representations is, analytically, suffocating advancement. Not only have Orientalist narratives of JapHS driven both policy-making and academic discourses on JapHS, but, in addition to that, they have been so close to each other that one can almost think of a single discourse in which the academic part has been a derivative of the policy-making discourse. In a power/knowledge configuration of JapHS, each relies on the other.

Such a situation is not a problem in itself; rather, the problem quickly emerges when the debate is centred on the question of the structural plane upon which JapHS has unfolded, both historically and in the contemporary era. Heuristically speaking, the conventional understanding of JapHS has considerably reduced the ability to assess the notion and practice critically, especially to appreciate its potential and limits in both empirical and theoretical terms. Thinking through policy-making categories that are often cast in a binary language of opposites (e.g. narrow/broad; hard/soft; human/national) is not a particularly productive starting point, though these categories, and especially their political function, deserve to be analysed too. Existing culturally- and normatively-based explanations of JapHS have suffered from at least three cardinal deficiencies: the homogenisation of alleged “Asian” experience and the related depiction of Japan as (i) a representative of the Asian continent; (ii) representations of “Japanese culture” in a primordial and essentialist way; and (iii) a complete analytical separation of “domestic factors” vs.
“external pressure” and of different functional fields, most notably of economic policy, military security and foreign and security policy.

On the other hand, almost no scholars have systematically focused on the importance of domestic bureaucratic processes in the articulation of JapHS, including the link between the notion of comprehensive security coined during the Cold War (1980s) and post-Cold War human security (for a partial exception, cf. Hughes 2004; Satō 2007). What is more, ideational continuity between the political function of comprehensive security and human security has been outright refused (cf. Acharya 2001).

It is for these reasons that the presented analysis concerning JapHS – as well as CanHS - needs to start from a different theoretical perspective and needs to link together hitherto separated functional areas and historical processes. In stark contrast to the framework argued in the previous chapter and applied in the rest of the thesis, the orthodox meta-narratives of human security ignore the power plays of historical structuration. Without an understanding of the historical bureaucratic and political processes at work, the orthodox interpretations have emphasised self-image, creating nothing but conceptual and empirical hindrances.
CHAPTER 3

CANADIAN CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY

This chapter of the thesis examines the structural conditions of emergence which have enabled the articulation of CanHS programme. The country’s human security is approached as an example of a rhizomatic assemblage characterised by its horizontality and open-endedness. The chapter is divided into an empirical part and a theoretical part: the first half provides an empirical analysis of domestic structural conditions and foreign-and-security-policy structural conditions respectively. With regard to the set of conditions, government-initiated transformations of domestic economies of power regulating the relationship between Canadian non-profit and voluntary sector and the country’s government are studied in detail. As far as the second set of conditions is concerned, the related section focuses on procedural and substantive changes to CanFSP. It will be argued that the synergy produced by the interacting sets of conditions constituted the humanitarian terrain on which human security could subsequently emerge and be cultivated by NGOs. The second half of the chapter theorises the structural conditions and their effects. It will identify the key characteristics and mechanisms of power through which this assemblage has been regulated. With regard to the theorisation of domestic conditions of emergence, it will be shown how the government successfully created an advanced liberal funding regime to which it inserted the country’s non-profit and voluntary sector. Practical implications, namely the reconstitution of Canadian non-profit and voluntary sector into an efficient and effective performance machine of service delivery, are analysed in this section. As for the theorisation of foreign-and-security-
policy conditions of emergence, it will be argued that the country’s post-1993 foreign- and security-policy was a specimen of a governmental programme which marked a shift in Canadian security configuration. It will be shown that although the original motivation for the launch of human security was material (budgetary cuts), the development moved well beyond this motive and the country’s foreign- and security-policy contained an early radical, transformative potential.

**Domestic Transformations as Conditions of Possibility**

From a genealogical perspective, the linear location of the origins of the human security agenda in general, and of the landmine case in particular, in governmental attempts to engage the public misses the point. The same is true for interpreting the subsequent unfolding of events into a more narrow freedom-from-fear doctrine as a natural and logical development. It is crucial to dig deeper and search for structural conditions that allowed the human security agenda to emerge. As far as enabling structural conditions for Canadian human security (CanHS) and the landmine campaign as its most important case are concerned, this means going back as early as the 1960s. The most important enabling structural condition for the human security field were repeated, government-initiated, transformations of Canadian non-profit and voluntary sector in the late 1960/early 1970s (the first crisis of welfare liberalism) and the late 1980s/early 1990s (the second crisis of welfare liberalism). As will become clear, they resulted in both a quantitative increase in NGOs as well as in a qualitative trend of delegating more social responsibility to them. The analysis contained below suggests that repeated structural transformations of the non-profit
and voluntary sector (NVS) have been brought about by a mixture of specific and unique factors. This development will be identified as the key for the conceptualisation of structural conditions as parts of a rhizomatic, open-ended system.

To begin with, very little has been said about structural transformations of the NVS in Canada. This is baffling considering how much structural effect these transformations have had on the emergence of human security, including the landmine case and its subsequent development. The puzzlement is twofold: quantitative and qualitative. In respect of the qualitative issue, the fact that there have been no systematic analyses of the NVS in the context of the security domain is surprising, due to the volume of funding channelled to the NVS (which, importantly, includes international development NGOs) by the Canadian government. From a strictly economic perspective, the relative size of the Canadian NVS is enormous. It is the second largest in the world), receiving $110 billion a year from the government, which makes up around 51% of total NVS revenue (Canadian Council on Social Development 2006; Hall et al. 2005). With regard to the qualitative dimension, there have not been any studies that have tried to emphasise the importance of the domestic economic transformations of Canadian NVS for the field of human security. The link between the realm of economy and security has not been studied, and this fact has significantly hindered any systematic attempts to understand the deeper fabrics from which human security emerged and upon which it has unfolded.

This section analyses transformations of the non-profit and voluntary sector (NVS) since the late 1960s. As will be shown, the 1960s can be considered as the starting point for the open-ended development which has led to the current
infrastructure of CanHS. The empirical part of this section looking into these transformations has been informed by the critically-oriented new public management literature (Miller and Fox 2006; Wood, Roper and Dibben 2004; Osborne 2001; Lynn 2006; Osborne and Gaebler 1993). Studied transformations in Canadian NVS and their impact on the field of human security have contributed to the constitution of the so-called managerial state, in which crucial characteristics of advanced liberalism can be seen. In the words of Saint-Martin, new managerialism

is not simply a matter of minor transformations in management style. This is a political change of governance itself and to the relationship between state and citizenry, as the state tries to become more responsive by opening up its functions to competition in order to make it easier for citizens, redefined as “clients”, to express their preferences and make choices in a market-like fashion … Its essence lies in the belief that there is something called “management” which is generic, a purely instrumental activity, embodying a set of principles that can be applied to both the public and private sectors … The main guiding principles are the pursuit of efficiency, effectiveness, and value for money (Saint-Martin 2000: 1; also, cf. Farnham and Horton 1996; Hughes 1994; Enteman 1993).

It is argued that in remaking the NVS, the government has, apart from initiating substantive and procedural changes in Canadian foreign and security policy which are tackled in the next section, played the decisive role in preparing the structural terrain upon which advocates of the ban concerning antipersonnel landmines later launched their successful campaign. Also, the related transformations have been
crucial for the nature of CanHS field more generally (especially after 1997), which has experienced a robust connection to new managerial ideas and an advanced liberal economic model. The argument of this section is straightforward: had it not been for the government re-examining and re-imagining its role in the maintenance of the socio-political order, or more specifically, in the provision of public goods in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s and 1980s, it is hardly conceivable that the number of NGOs would have grown as it did, including the dramatic expansion of their role in society.

The most profound reason behind these transformations lies in the worn-out Keynesian welfare liberalism which came to an impasse during the 1970s. This period – which can be termed the first crisis of welfare liberalism in Canada – led to the transformation of the NVS. It should be pointed out that, unlike Canada’s second crisis of welfare liberalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many of the symptoms of the first crisis were not confined to Canada but were shared by many Western industrialised states, most notably the US, the UK, and the Netherlands (Gidron, Krammer and Salamon 1992; Putnam 1996). The notion of the state as a universal caretaker of the population and its needs was increasingly under fire from two sides. First, there was growing disillusionment with the government in economic matters, especially its ability to generate and distribute wealth. Second, economic difficulties were coupled with an increase in citizen activism, mainly rights-based movements largely funded by the government which had an interest in collaboration with them (Brock and Banting 2003; Brock 2001; Jenson and Phillips 1996: 118-119).

From the late 1960s, policy-makers began to recognise and fully appreciate the potential of the NVS. One of the first examples of governmental attempts to formally engage the NVS can be found in the 1967 amended version of the Income
Tax Act, making the registration of charitable organisations compulsory. As a part of this change, these organisations had to report annually on their activities (Monahan 2000: 11). Specifically in regard to international development NGOs, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) established the non-governmental division within its Partnership Branch in 1968. As Katherine Scott explains, ‘[d]uring these early days of CIDA involvement, funding for NGOs was provided on a “responsive basis”’ (Scott 2003: 58 fn. 3). An even more systematic method to examine the ways of improving the relationship between the Canadian government and NVS was adopted through the creation of the National Advisory Council on Voluntary Action by the Secretary of State in 1974. The Council’s recommendations were presented in the form of a report in 1977 (Andreychuck et al. 1977). Governmental efforts to reframe the role of the NVS and the government’s reliance on NVS in a number of social areas are testified to by the exponential growth of funding for the NVS (Gidron, Krammer and Salamon 1992). What made the Canadian government unique from a comparative perspective was the extent of funding channelled to highly political advocacy organisations (Scott 2003: 14), i.e. the development that allowed for emergence of NGOs campaigning in favour of antipersonnel landmines ban.

It was not until the 1990s that the federal government restored dialogue with the NVS, this time in the context of the second crisis of welfare liberalism. As will become clear, this process was important for the later reconstitution of the role of Canada-based international development/human security NGOs. The main aim was to upset the status quo, and more precisely to engage the NVS more, for less money, as the federal budget was in deficit and severe funding cutbacks were imposed (Hall and Reed 1998: 1-20). The 14% of the government budget then spent on supporting
registered charities was too easy a target not to be slashed (Juillet et al. 2001: 24). It was therefore not a great surprise that the Department of Finance under Paul Martin reviewed the system of funding for the NVS in 1994, cutting funds by $300 million within a year (Miller 1999: 76). What followed was the principal review of the NVS, with input from both the NVS and governmental sides. The former, represented by the thirteen national umbrella organisations, established the Voluntary Sector Roundtable (VSR) in 1995; its Panel on Accountability and Governance for the Voluntary Sector (PAGVS) produced a report in 1999 (PAGVS 1999). The relationship has been portrayed as follows:

The Canadian federal government faced a difficult policy problem. It wanted to make greater use of voluntary sector organizations to deliver government programs … A first question for government was whom in the voluntary sector to engage … In 1995, a dozen leaders of national voluntary sector organizations had come together informally to set up a Voluntary Sector Roundtable. Although these leaders did not have a clearly defined accountability relationship to the organizations and citizens they purported to represent, the government decided to deal with this group because it was the only single organization that contained the leaders of the sector. With that, the stage was set for the government and the voluntary sector to embark upon a process of consultation and collaboration to address the problems they faced (Good 2003: 122).

Interestingly, the government did not respond directly to these efforts from the NVS, but invited their representatives to participate in building a new type of
NVS-government relationship within its newly-established Voluntary Sector Task Force supervised by the Privy Council Office (Brock and Banting 2003: 8). These interactions also resulted in the issuing of a Joint Tables Report (Government of Canada/Voluntary Sector Initiative 1999). The comparison and contrast of the two reports’ foci and priorities is summarised in Table 2:

Table 2. NVS and the Government’s Priorities:
Comparing and Contrasting the Two Reports

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<tr>
<td>democracy promotion</td>
<td>(The government in dialogue with NVS)</td>
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<td>building social trust and social capital</td>
<td>the establishment of a working plan</td>
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<td>the government needs to recognise the sector’s diversity</td>
<td>a road map to restructure the relationship</td>
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<td>the government needs to respect the sector’s desire for autonomy</td>
<td>strengthening NVS capacity-building</td>
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<td>the government needs to provide NVS a voice within the Cabinet</td>
<td>improvement of the regulatory framework</td>
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<td>different reporting standards for smaller and larger organisations</td>
<td>better administrative relationships and training opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more flexible requirements for advocacy</td>
<td>clearer guidelines regarding financial matters and funding and accountability enhancement</td>
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<td>the improvement of skills and technology management in NVS</td>
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In the wake of the two reports, the government and NVS jointly launched the five-
year, $94.6 million Government of Canada/Voluntary Sector Initiative (VSI) in 2000.
The aim was to translate the recommendations of the two reports into legislation. By
2009, An Accord between the Government and the Voluntary Sector (2001) and two
codes of good practice (Joint Accord Table of the Voluntary Sector Initiative
2002a,b), focusing respectively on policy dialogue and funding, had been approved.
When the mandate of the VSI expired in 2005, the government set up the Task Force
on Community Investment, which issued a report in 2006 clearly embracing and
further elaborating the agenda and language of the previous Joint Tables Report of
1999. The recommendations in the PAGVS report have been marginalised and this
demonstrates how the government was able to impose the agenda onto the NVS, thus
being in charge of structuring practices of NGOs.

Available governmental documents which deal with CIDA’s relationship
with international development NGOs show how quickly and without reservations
general governmental priorities have been introduced into the field of human
security/development:

In June 2007, CIDA launched its Transformation for Results Initiative that
seeks to place CIDA among the world’s most effective and accountable
bilateral development agencies. In a major step towards implementing the
Government’s aid effectiveness agenda and delivering better development
results, CIDA is modifying its management structure. This new structure
will ensure that CIDA uses the world’s best development knowledge and
innovative thinking; improves the efficiency and coherence of its
programming with more consistent processes, better coordination across
all delivery channels, and increased opportunities to develop thematic programming across countries and continents; integrates rigorous strategic planning, state-of-the-art evaluations and independent assessments, and enhanced public communication of development results; and enhances opportunities for employees to develop their skills and to demonstrate their leadership potential (OECD 2008: 17).

The full implications and unintended consequences of the transformation of Canadian NVS generally, and of NGOs active in the field of human security/international development in particular, are examined in Chapter 5. Attention will be directed at the globalisation of Canadian advanced liberal managerial model.

Foreign- and Security-Policy Conditions of Possibility

In order to find out what kinds of mechanisms were at play between the government and Canada-based NGOs within the field of human security and international development, one needs to shift the analysis from the global level to micropractices and narratives produced around them. The advantage of a practice-oriented investigation is that it allows one to cut through a thick and impenetrable layer of celebratory discourses that have significantly hindered the process of shedding new light on the issue at hand. Following Deleuze and Guattari, one can say that the powerful discursive series of (i) middle power, (ii) (global) civil society vs. states
(Canada), and (iii) more ambitious human security (which was critically investigated in Chapter 2) can be conceived as an example of a powerful assemblage of enunciation. Importantly, although an assemblage of enunciation does not usually match an assemblage of effectuation, i.e. something the authors call a non-parallel formalisation (one never does what one says and vice versa), it has still become an established truth. In fact, a wide gap has appeared between what has been said about transformations in CanFSP and what can be said about it, both empirically and theoretically.

The following analyses the second key transformation that significantly contributed to the creation of a fecund substratum for CanHS and allowed the landmine case to emerge, namely procedural and substantive changes in Canadian Foreign and Security Policy (CanFSP). The key opening of the previously rigid substance and procedure of CanFSP came between 1992 and 1995 and was closely linked to the return of the Liberal Party (LP) to government in 1993, after spending nine consecutive years in opposition. However, it will also be shown that the initial stage of CanFSP transformations began as early as the mid-1980s during the Progressive Conservative government, and that the initial ideational shift was subsequently catalysed by material factors, specifically by the budgetary cuts of the early 1990s.

The first wave of governmental attempts to incorporate new actors dates back to the mid-1980s and was associated with Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative government. Back in the 1980s, the Peace Movement was a vociferous and heterogeneous predecessor of future specialised NGOs, a conglomerate of anti-Reagan, left-wing pacifists, environmentalists and religious leaders who were all trying to “democratise” CanFSP. Its appeal was based on a simple and ideologically-
imbued message which was often extreme in its demand and thus politically unfeasible (Bland and Maloney 2004: 108). The effort of Mulroney’s government to internalise the voices of such “counter-experts” preoccupied with rights enhancement was identified with the rise of populism in CanFSP (cf. Page 1994). While the Foreign Ministry under Joe Clark tried to co-opt – some would even argue silence – the Peace Movement by consulting them, funding their “research” and making them members of various governmental committees, the Department of National Defence (DND) and the DND-funded Conference of Defence Associations initially ignored them and later made a successful effort to discredit them by repeated challenges in public meetings and in the media (Bland and Maloney 2004: 108-109). One of the effects of the above development was governmental pressure on the Peace Movement to professionalise. As a result of this trend, a number of specialised NGOs, such as Project Ploughshares, which later played an important role in the landmine case, were founded.

By the time of the 1993 general election, around which the second wave of governmental attempts to engage new actors took place, the Peace Movement had to a large extent already been dispersed and had begun to be replaced by NGOs connected to – and financially dependent upon – formal channels. Earlier efforts by the Progressive Conservatives to tame NGOs by bringing them closer to government were further intensified in the Liberals’ electoral campaign, founded on the notion of radical change in CanFSP. The clear mandate obtained by the Liberals after its landslide victory in the elections marked the key and perhaps permanent change in the procedure and substance of CanFSP. The Liberals’ vision was detailed in their election programme, Creating Opportunities (also known as the “Red Book”). The Liberals promised a shift in CanFSP, both in terms of procedure and substance, by
stating that ‘Canadians are asking for a commitment from government to listen to their views, and to respect their needs by ensuring that no false distinction is made between domestic and foreign policy’ (Liberal Party of Canada 1993a: 104-6). Assuring the public that CanFSP would become “more democratic”, Axworthy and Stewart argued that ‘[t]here must be more involvement by our NGOs … in defining our role in the globe’ (Liberal Party of Canada 1993b, emphasis added). A crucial part linked to the opening of the security discourse on substantive change was acknowledged in the expressed need to have ‘a broader definition of national and international security’ (Liberal Party of Canada 1993a: 105-6).

After assuming power, the LP immediately began to implement its promises. The first changes were procedural, beginning with the organisation of the National Forum on International Relations in March 1994 and with the establishment of two parliamentary committees in charge of the CanFSP review process: the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons (SJC) was to review Canadian defence policy in February 1994, and the SJC to review Canadian foreign policy in March 1994. Minister of National Defence Collenette summarised the process as follows:

I co-chaired, with my colleagues the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of International Trade, a National Forum on Canada's International Relations. Together, we established a process that allowed the Foreign Policy Review and Defence Policy Review to proceed in harmony … The Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy travelled across the country listening to the views of ordinary citizens, defence
experts, disarmament advocates and non-governmental organizations. It sought the advice of our allies (Government of Canada 1994).

Not only was the process characterised by the unprecedented involvement of NGOs, it also marked a shift in the governmental perception of the role of those NGOs. While earlier Conservative governments consulted them in their dual effort to tame them and at the same time boost its popularity among voters, the Liberals saw NGO engagement as an opportunity to transfer the burden of responsibility from the government to NGOs in a fiscally difficult period. This was clearly visible in the PM’s speech to the National Forum in which he maintained that:

NGO's are often very good at what they do - often better than governments - whether it is delivering aid or assistance, or saving endangered species and habitats, or working to promote a greater public awareness of international issues … No one government can do it all (Chrétien 1995).

The fact that domestic, defence, and foreign policies were merged together by the LP facilitated the involvement of NGOs. Moreover, since political responsibility for the National Forum lay with the DFAIT and the PM’s Office, it was hardly surprising that defence policy was in its importance subordinate to foreign policy. With regard to an ideational input of present stakeholders, three different conceptual frameworks on the transformation of CanFSP were presented (Bland and Maloney 2004: 124-129). First, a normative view was advocated by the DND-funded CDA,
arguing that despite new priorities and objectives, no radical change in capabilities should be made. CDA also disagreed with the link between defence and foreign policies. In the environment of LP striving for radical change, this proposal was destined for outright rejection. Second, a specific end-use view was defended by the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), an umbrella of 125 international development NGOs, which insisted on a moral foreign policy with human rights and economic justice as priorities. With regard to military capabilities, these were seen as redundant and their use was to be circumscribed to peacekeeping missions. CCIC’s substantive impact before the SJC's was, however, limited due to their inability to get beyond a naive (foreign policy) and superficial (defence policy) message. As Stairs put it, ‘[CCIC member NGOs] were lumped into a single, stereotyped category … the texture was lost, and with it an opportunity to buttress a powerful moral case with vivid displays of emotionally appealing evidence’ (Stairs 1995: 98). Consequently, the most prominence was achieved by the Canada 21 Council with a pragmatic view. This non-governmental body, specifically founded to set the agenda for the reviews, comprised elite of twenty former politicians, journalists and business leaders, further supported by a number of academic consultants. It repeated the LP’s argument regarding the downgrading of Canadian Forces, a more important role for NGOs, the merger of the policies into CanFSP, and the making of no distinction between defence and international security – thus the emphasis was laid on the notion of common security:

In the new era of globalization and growing interdependence, the distinction between foreign and domestic policy has little meaning. What happens beyond our borders significantly affects what we can do at home,
and what we do at home determines what we can do abroad. We require an international setting that is consistent with our fundamental values, for only in a civil world can we maintain and secure a civil community at home. Our security is common (Canada 21 2004: 11-12, emphasis in the original).

The above analysis of CanFSP changes demonstrates that while the policy-formulation function of NGOs was quite weak, especially in the presence of influential and media-savvy Canada 21 with its ready access to the PM, NGOs began to be seen as indispensable agents of delivery and implementation of governmental policies.

Apart from the use of Canadian NGOs for practical implementation of international development/human security, the government also resorted to a strategy of degovernmentalisation of human security expertise and subcontracted university research centres. Two such centres deserve to be mentioned: the Human Security Centre at the Liu Institute for Global Issues of the University of British Columbia in Vancouver and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) of Carleton University in Ottawa.

In respect of the first, the institute was founded in 1999 by Ivan Head, one of the founders of the above-mentioned Canada 21 Council, formerly a special advisor on foreign policy to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and President of Canada’s International Development Research Centre. The direct link to the Canadian political elite was forged by the appointment of Lloyd Axworthy as Director and Chief Executive Officer of the Liu Institute in 2001. In this light, it was no surprise that Axworthy, as a political proponent of human security, brought to the institute Andy
Mack, who became the director of a newly created Human Security Centre at the Liu Institute. He was responsible for the annual publication of the widely read and popular (especially for policy-makers) *Human Security Report*. That was before governmental funding for the centre was cut in light of the different political priorities of Harper’s Conservatives; the project was subsequently relocated to the Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, where the centre exists to this day. Mack’s experience with political elites has stretched beyond Canada. Between 1998 and 2001, Mack spent two and half years in the executive office of the then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Indeed, Mack’s proximity to national and international decision-making circles buttressed well with the Liu Institute’s mission statement, which reads as follows: ‘[T]he Institute takes an interdisciplinary problem-solving approach to explore new ideas and ways of learning to catalyze innovative thinking and positive societal change’ (Liu Institute 2007: not numbered, emphasis added). Therefore, Mack was the ideal person for DFAIT, at least as far as the provision of problem-solving and empirical knowledge about human security for the government was concerned.

As for the NPSIA at Carleton University, its relationship with the government when the Liberals were in power was threefold. First, human security was elevated to one of the key research agendas of the School, as the academic production of a number of scholars working there suggests. The most important example is Fen Osler Hampson, Director of the NPSIA since 2002, who previously served there as associate director from 1996 to 2001. As several interviewees at DFAIT confirmed, Hampson was one of the key experts on human security who briefed the government on related political strategies and policies and wielded significant influence on how DFAIT’s human security policies were formulated. An exceptionally close
relationship can also be seen in the book that attempts to map the “official” history of the landmine ban: *To Walk Without Fear* (1998), edited by Brian Tomlin, Maxwell Cameron and Robert Lawson. Tomlin is another scholar at NPSIA who has written on human security, as well as Cameron, who taught and conducted research there between 1989 and 1999. The third editor, Robert Lawson, has been a DFAIT official responsible for communication with NGOs during the landmine campaign, and was later senior policy advisor in the Peace-building and Human Security Division of DFAIT. Finally, the link between NPSIA and DFAIT was consummated by the creation of an academic course on human security at Carleton University which was jointly taught by two key DFAIT personnel professionally dealing with human security: Don Hubert and George Lawson. As acknowledged by Robert Lawson, the objective was to make sure that students are exposed to human security ideas, and when they graduate from the university they can be offered a related job at the DFAIT (personal interview with a Senior Policy Advisor, DFAIT, Ottawa, April 20, 2006).
The two examples demonstrate the replacement of nomad science by Royal Science, two concepts outlined and discussed in Chapter 1. While the knowledge produced by international development NGOs has been an example of nomad science, the way in which knowledge-production was subcontracted to an “expert” community confirms the conversion of intellectuals into technocratic bureaucrats. As Deleuze and Guattari have maintained,
The State does not give power \textit{(pouvoir)} to the intellectuals or conceptual innovators; on the contrary, it makes them a strictly dependent organ with an autonomy that is only imagined yet is sufficient to divest those whose job it becomes simply to reproduce or implement of all of their power \textit{(puissance)} (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 368).

The way in which the Canadian government subcontracted the expert community and supported its research both by funding and governmental authority indeed has implications for the question of the relationship between knowledge and power. While NGOs became important partners for the government due to their ability to mobilise the public and deliver public goods, research institutions were indispensable for the DFAIT, and the Canadian government in general, for their ability to legitimise the existence of a new governmental portfolio of human security. Indeed, scientific knowledge, and more so a policy-oriented scientific knowledge, is a form of power. As Foucault (1980) argues, their relationship is cyclical insofar as one type of power can produce a certain kind of knowledge, which can in turn be translated into another power. Simultaneously, the existence of this power/knowledge nexus means that they are mutually constitutive: one cannot exist without the other. The fact that the Liberal government defined and had control over what type of human security it wanted to see produced also suggests that the line between governmental ideas and knowledge about human security and “scientific” knowledge produced by the research institutes became blurred. ‘To connect knowledge and power is to deny of science that it meets an ancient ideal, that of knowledge as contemplation’ (Sismondo 1996: 146).
Changes in Political Rationalities

The reconstitution of the role of Canadian NGOs involved in international development/human security after the 1990s possesses features of advanced liberal political rationality. I should make clear that I treat the nouns “neo-liberalism” and “advanced liberalism” in this chapter as two alternatives when referring to the same category of a phenomenon: images of political rationality. Despite the fact that sometimes the difference between the terms “neo-liberal” and “advanced liberal” was said to be the difference between political ideology and political rationality (Rose 1996), such a distinction is problematic due to the fact that ‘without analyses of the “messy actualities”, … those working within this analytic run the risk of precisely the problem they wish to avoid – that of producing generalised accounts of historical epoch’ (Larner 2000: 14). My understanding of advanced liberal government is then in line with Dean, who maintains that

[advanced liberal government] designate[s] the broader realm of the various assemblages of rationalities, technologies and agencies that constitute the characteristic ways of governing in contemporary liberal democracies. Such a distinction enables us to consider how neo-liberal rationalities exist in complex interrelations with neo-conservatism and populist, anti-governmental reaction, as well as with debates on morality and community (Dean 1999: 149-150; emphasis added).
Political rationalities are embedded in broader discourses of rule which structure socio-political orders, and it is within this grid that subjects are constituted. There is neither a pre-existing subject, as ‘[m]an is not fitted for society by nature, but discipline’ (Hobbes, quoted in Burchell 1999: 506), nor a pre-existing “reality”, as this is constructed as a plane with calculable subjects, being a historically derived condition of possibility for a particular assemblage to prevail. While the following lines show how the moulding of Canadian NGOs into advanced liberal rationality of government has taken place more generally, chapter five will then relate this process specifically to CanHS and will in particular pay attention to governmental attempts to arborify the rhizomatic CanHS assemblage.

As the empirical section on transformations of the NVS in Canada demonstrated, economic changes have played a significant role in re-imagining the ontology of the NVS with governmental expectations of its functions as the central point. This section employs Foucauldean analytics to interpret these findings. First, there is indeed a legitimate question of what the power of the economy in changing the NVS was, and thus indirectly shaping the structural terrain for the landmine case. According to Foucault (1977b: 25), such a question is misplaced, as the power of the economy is secondary to the notion of an economy of power. One can argue that NVS power must have first been constituted before it could have been effectively utilised (exploited) and labelled as the third pillar of CanFSP by the government. I tend to think of the word bio-energy as the notion capturing the difference between governmentalities. In respect to the discussed case, the government has managed to release and harness different volumes of societal energy at different historical moments through the series of ontological reconstitutions of the NVS. Unlike a common-sense understanding of liberalism (welfare, advanced) as a political
ideology, Foucauldean analytics thus allow one to look at liberalism in a much broader sense, i.e. as a political rationality, or governmentality, which elevates what was thought to be an economic policy or political ideology to the status of rationality. As Foucault himself maintains, ‘the art of exercising power in the form of the economy – is to have as its main objective that which we are today accustomed to call “the economy”’ (Foucault 1991:92).

A critical reading of NVS transformations will allow one to see what Foucault meant by the dual quality of freedom. There have been three moments (1960s/70s, 1980s/1990s, 1990s/2000s) in which the government decided to involve the NVS in a dialogue with the aim of responsibility transfer. As Scott puts it, ‘[i]t was a short step from governments reinventing themselves to demand that non-profit and voluntary organizations should likewise reinvent themselves’ (Scott 2003: 46).

This process can be, and in fact has been, read as the empowerment of the NVS, since bodies and brains were enabled to act and new possibilities for subjects opened up. Such a perspective is, however, seen as problematic – at least with respect to the two latter historic moments in which the collaboratively responsive government-NVS relationship was reversed. The flawed nature of such linear-optimistic understandings is revealed by their total neglect of the “dark side” of freedom. In concrete terms, the fact that the NVS has simultaneously been restrained as it has been subjected to a certain set of calculative techniques forming a disciplinary regime suggests that there is more to freedom than its emancipatory appeal:

[f]or sure, we can say – and I don’t think it would be false, it cannot be false – that this ideology of freedom really was one of the conditions of development of modern or, if you like, capitalist forms of the economy …
I said somewhere that we could not understand the establishment of liberal ideologies and a liberal politics in the eighteenth century without keeping in mind that the same eighteenth century, which made such a strong demand for freedoms, had all the same ballasted these freedoms with a disciplinary technique that, taking children, soldiers, and workers where they were, considerably restricted freedom (Foucault 2007: 48-49; emphasis added).

As Foucault adds, ‘[s]o when I say “liberal” I am not pointing to a form of governmentality which would leave more white spaces of freedom’ (Foucault 2008: 63; emphasis added). Foucault’s reflection on the liberal “ideology of freedom” is crucial for an analysis of the visible manifestations of modalities of liberal rationality of government, here the advanced liberal governmental rationality in Canada. In concrete terms, Canada’s deeper advanced liberal government will be examined through its visible manifestations in the form of a new funding regime. I will call this regime simply the advanced liberal funding regime. The first feature of this regime that deserves to be mentioned is its twofold constitutive nature. First, the imposition of the advanced liberal funding regime diminished the previously-existing richness of governmental-NVS interactions, with the result that the regime became the guardian defining ontological possibilities in this relationship. Subsequently, subjects/NVS have been constituted within this newly constructed “reality” as an effective and efficient calculating machine.

The most important feature of the new regime has been the departure from core funding to project funding with no support for maintenance costs. This phenomenon has been clearly demonstrated by the ongoing abandonment of transfer payments in the form of grants, which are not subject to audit, and their replacement
by so-called “contributions”. Contributions represent a conditioned and audited type of payment and NVS organisations are required to compete for them, either individually or in coalitions. One consequence of the advanced liberal funding regime has been the homogenisation of the NVS – a trend visible through the emergence of two cleavages: (i) small vs. large organisations; and (ii) advocacy vs. service delivery organisations. The advanced liberal funding regime has heavily favoured the latter in each cleavage. Indeed, not only NGOs had to adapt to this regime, but significant transformations in organisational forms have been visible in governmental agencies themselves. One such effect has been the corporatisation – rather than the privatisation – of Canadian agencies, with its aim of bringing a more “businesslike” approach to public service delivery (Bilodeau, Laurin, Vining 2007: 120-121; for different implications of corporatisation vs. privatisation of governmental agencies, cf. Shirley 1999). In the words of Teo,

> [c]orporatization is considered to be a structural reform process, which changes the operational conditions of public sector organizations in order to place them on a commercial basis in a competitive environment. At the same time, it allows the government, as owner, to intervene by providing broad direction in key performance targets (including financial and non-financial) and community service obligations . . . Corporatized public sector organizations are required to adopt a strategic perspective to the management of scarce resources (Teo 2000: 558).

The key instrument for the government to ensure effective spending of its payments has become the reliance on risk management. The centralities of risk
assessment and risk management in monitoring the use of governmental contributions, as done simultaneously by both governmental officers and NVS organisations, have been unique to Canada. The effectiveness of projects carried out by NVS organisations has thus been measured strictly in terms of “risk” and “benefit” and the balance between the two. Available information suggests that government officers spend around 80% of their time on financial risk management-related activities; the remaining 20% of their time is devoted to all other matters, such as the assessment of applications, managing and monitoring ongoing grants (non-financial risks), developing new strategies, etc. (Canadian Council on Social Development 2006: 33). Despite the fact that even the Auditor General (2006: 179-204; 2005: 182) has recognised problems associated with this one-size-fits-all approach focused on risk management – namely the regime being rigid, over-regulatory, not meeting departmental and NVS needs, and presenting a financial and administrative burden to both sides – nothing indicates that any overhaul is being planned.

The features of the advanced liberal funding regime provide an interesting picture of the underlying advanced liberalism. Specifically, the qualities of the advanced liberal funding regime support the notion of advanced liberal government as a rhizomatic assemblage of various elements and rationalities, as specified by Deleuze and Guattari. This concept has more explanatory power than accounts arguing that the current socio-political order is solely based on a neo-liberal governmental rationality. The latter accounts need to be dismissed when confronted with empirical facts. As this section proposed, although a neo-liberal notion of governing society at a distance has been present, so were attempts by the government to command and control the NVS through various regulatory techniques. These can
be considered attempts to arborify an otherwise rhizomatic assemblage, to make some of its connections more rigid and hierarchical (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 506). That the Canadian government’s governing of other societies at a distance (decentralisation) and commanding and controlling Canadian NGOs through which it governs these societies are not mutually exclusive facets can be seen from the following statement in which they become hybridised:

CIDA is committed officially to *decentralize its field operations* over the next five years, as noted in recent government announcements. In line with Budget 2007, CIDA will focus aid in countries and increase its staff in the field to improve responsiveness and make better choices on the ground. CIDA is building decentralized field options that will accommodate local conditions and capacities, work with existing infrastructure, and minimize cost implications … CIDA has created a *specific unit dealing with corporate aid effectiveness* issues, as a source of expertise, advice and leadership. It collaborates with a network of analysts and program staff in other branches who serve as the focal point on aid effectiveness, facilitating the implementation of aid effectiveness principles and plans within CIDA’s policies and programming (OECD 2008: 18-19; emphasis added).

As a result, a distinction between the transfer of responsibility and the transfer of autonomy from the government to the NVS needs to be made. In light of the above analysis, it is somewhat perplexing that a number of recent studies (see below) which have used the governmentality approach portray neo-liberalism in a
much too simplified fashion when compared with Foucault’s original conceptualisation. Not only does such a portrayal ignore neo-liberal nuances, but it also presents a significant obstacle in terms of further positive heuristics in this area. In order to expose this problem, I will focus on the issue that is central to my own analysis of the peace machine of new humanitarianism, i.e. the relationship between responsibility and the autonomy of NGOs from the government in this field.

The existing literature contains the assertion that as the government in advanced liberal countries transfers to an ever-greater extent the actual government (mainly the provision of public goods) to various external/quasi-external actors and agencies, NGOs become more and more responsible and autonomous. Sending and Neumann (2006: 651) thus, for instance, argue that ‘civil society is redefined from a passive object of government to be acted upon into an entity that is both an object and a subject of government’ (Sending and Neumann 2006: 651). They make a distinction between NGOs being ‘passive objects’ during the Cold War as opposed to becoming ‘free and autonomous subjects’ in the post-Cold War era (Ibid: 667, 669). These authors (Ibid: 663), as well as O’Connor and Ilcan (2005: 6), specifically for Canada, suggest that responsibility and autonomy go hand-in-hand. This assertion is, however, flawed on two fronts: Conceptually, such an argument does not take notice of Foucault’s important observation regarding the *totalising* dimension of neo-liberalism as discussed earlier; empirically, the research here indicates that such an assertion is problematic at best since more responsibility for NGOs has in fact been accompanied by less autonomy for them. A greater transfer of responsibility means less autonomy for the NVS, as the government perceived the NVS to an ever greater extent as an inextricable part of their network. Such a view is also supported by the increase in NVS organisations reporting to governmental specialists and project
sponsors rather than to target populations and communities. That NGOs’ increase in accountability to the Canadian government in its role of the principal funding actor has been of a systemic nature can be seen from a politically popular “principle-agent” approach, which is based on an ethically and legally asymmetric relationship between the two sides. It focuses on

how principals can hold agents accountable for performance that meets the principals’ expectations … The normative assumption in this formulation is that it is the principal’s purposes that ought to be faithfully realized through the partnership, not the agent’s. Defections from the principal’s purposes in the interests of the agent threaten both the moral integrity and efficiency of the relationship. The practical challenge is to devise incentive schemes (structures of accountability) that reliably motivate the agent to advance the principal’s interests (Brown and Moore 2001: 572).

To speak, therefore, simply of an increase in accountability is problematic, as the question ‘to whom to be accountable and under what conditions?’ is usually ignored.

Canada’s performance regime, which has been inextricably linked to the country’s advanced liberal rationality of government, is an interesting example of how the state apparatus can become permeated by the micropolitics of deterritorialised and decoded flows of capitalism. The important feature characterising the molecular nature of this configuration has been the ability of the Canadian government to transform capital in the conventional sense (funding) into social capital (NVS’ performance). This has indeed been linked to a set of desires
brought about by the advanced liberal state, which was itself constituted in the process of the penetration of state apparatus by originally deterritorialised capitalism. In words of Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 458), capitalism gets reterritorialised and ‘[i]t is within the framework of the nation-State, or of national subjectivities, that processes of subjectification and the corresponding subjections are manifested’. In this case, the reterritorialisation of governmental funding and its transformation into social capital has been linked to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of desiring-production which was discussed in Chapter 1. As a result, the constitution of individuals as desiring-machines wanting to take on their shoulders tasks previously associated with the function of the state apparatus has been a specific politics of desiring-machines production. Indeed, the analysed development is an example of mutually reinforcing social-production and desiring-production. The actual deployment of social capital has thus been connected to a mental revolution during which newly constituted individuals who formed what Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 506) call ‘human machines’ “found” their new desires in Canada during the 1990s. Finally, as the above analysis showed, rhizomatic assemblage in its pure form only exists as a model. The reality has been much messier, and Canada’s rhizomatic, advanced liberal assemblage of government with its arborescent knots has been no exception.

**Shift in the Security Dispositif**

The meetings and public hearings, the establishment of special committees, the invitation of various stakeholders to present their views on these platforms, the
rethinking of key concepts, and the actual conduct of policy reviews which occurred in the field of CanFSP between 1992 and 1995 can be understood as historically contingent elements together forming a governmental programme. Dean defined such programmes as ‘explicit, planned attempts to reform or transform regimes of practices …. [which] often take the form of a link between theoretical knowledge and practical concerns and objectives’ (Dean 1999: 211). Although governmental programmes are sometimes thought of as systematic and ideal-typical perfect knowledges (cf. Miller and Rose 1990), this analysis aligns itself with Foucault’s original conceptualisation, which does not differentiate between the envisioned objectives of a programme and its actual implementation and effects. As Foucault (1995) showed, the history of political rationalities is full of “failures” of governmental programmes. These are not, however, failures proper, but a natural consequence of the encounter of the envisioned aims of a programme with a particularly constructed reality. An instructive example provided by Foucault addresses the failure of the prison system, which produced delinquency as its unintended effect. As Foucault suggests, however, there is always the possibility for a failure to be interpreted in positive terms:

From about the 1830s onward, one finds an immediate re-utilisation of this unintended, negative effect within a new strategy which came in some sense to occupy this empty space, or transform the negative into a positive. The delinquent milieu came to be re-utilised for diverse political and economic ends … This is what I call the strategic completion (remplissement) of the apparatus (Foucault 1980: 196).
Every programme contains from its very inception internal inconsistencies, room for resistance and the promise of unintended effects, all of which cannot be seen so much as dysfunctional as simply contributing to the character of these programmes, thereby blurring the line between theoretical plans and reality.

The fact that governmental programmes often bring together heterogeneous elements and mechanisms which are ordered by different logics and principles often results in the transformation of a governmental programme into an assemblage transcending the governmental basis of an original programme. If such an assemblage is not totally controlled by the government and develops in unexpected directions, one can speak of the presence of rhizomatic developments in which molecular lines are present and play an important role sustaining the multiplicity. As suggested by Deleuze and Guattari, one can distinguish between discursive assemblages, i.e. collective assemblages of enunciation, and extra-discursive assemblages of practices, i.e. machinic assemblages of effectuation. This distinction can be made both for rhizomatic and arborescent types of assemblages. As far as the relationship between assemblages of enunciation and assemblages of effectuation is concerned, Deleuze (2006: 53) maintains that they operate in a non-parallel way, one not mirroring the other. Also, they can be formalised in this fashion. The Table 3 contains such a formalisation for CanFSP and captures the situation between 1993 and 2006 when the Liberal Party of Canada governed the country.
Table 3. Canadian Foreign and Security Policy:

Formalisation of Non-Parallel Assemblages

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<th>Formalisation of Non-Parallel Assemblages</th>
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<tr>
<td>assemblage of enunciation</td>
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<tr>
<td>(merger of foreign-policy and security-policy)</td>
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<td>assemblage of effectuation</td>
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Similarly to Foucault, I contend that the transformation of CanFSP, originally envisaged as a means of masking draconian budgetary cuts in related areas, produced as its unintended consequence a shift in security dispositif, or apparatus. Foucault defines a dispositif as

the system of relations that can be established between … elements

[such as] discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements,
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions (Foucault 1980: 194).

As Deleuze aptly adds, each dispositif ‘has its way of structuring light, the way in which it falls, blurs and disperses, distributing the visible and the invisible, giving birth to objects which are dependent on it for their existence, and causing them to disappear’ (Deleuze 1992b: 160).

An examination of the security dispositif can be conducted in terms of relations of knowledge (discourse), power, and subjectivity (Foucault 1980: 196-7). The shift in the security dispositif will therefore be investigated (i) through changes in the referent object of the security problématique; and (ii) through wider changes in the field of security. Regarding the former, the configuration of visibility in the security discourse changed and the nation-state in its role as a referent object was overshadowed by the individual/population. This shift is clearly visible in the 1995 governmental White Paper on foreign policy, which holds that

More and more, the concept of security is focussing on the economic, social and political needs of the individual .... [A] sound development program must be people-centred, with a focus on human development … All of this demands a broadening of the focus of security policy from its narrow orientation of managing state-to-state relationships, to one that recognizes the importance of the individual and society for our shared security … [i.e.] human security (DFAIT 1995; emphasis added).
It is maintained that the nature of the shift from the discourse on national security to that of human security – or to paraphrase Deleuze, the politics of restructuring light (the shining individual/population vs. the unilluminated state) – was largely informed by the reconstitution of the role of the individual in society, as manifested by the transferral of responsibility to the NVS. Specifically, an intimate relationship between the constitution of an active subject/citizen in the society and the emergence of the individual in need of protection as the referent point in the security discourse can be discerned. By virtue of this relationship, one can argue that the human body, which was previously seen purely as an efficient-and-effective performance machine as institutionalised in the advanced liberal funding regime, also began to be perceived as a vulnerable organism as far as the people-centred CanFSP was concerned. Importantly, Foucault elucidates the differentiation between a population as a species being at the end of a political action and people (as a ‘multiplicity of individuals’) who are instrumental in achieving the former:

[w]e have two levels of phenomena therefore. Not a level of the collective and a level of the individual, for after all it is not just an individual who will die, or at any rate suffer … But we will have an absolutely fundamental caesura between a level that is pertinent for the government’s economic-political action, and this is the level of the population, and a different level, which will be that of the series, the multiplicity of individuals, who will not be pertinent, or rather who will only be pertinent to the extent that, properly managed, maintained, and encouraged, it will make possible what one wants to obtain at the level that is pertinent. The
It can be said that while anatomo-politics disciplined the individual-as-a-machine, in both body and mind, bio-politics approached it through life-sciences, regulating it at the level of population (Foucault 1978: 139-144). In line with Foucault, bio-politics can be conceived of as the point of the strategic coordination between economy, population and government, with the aim of extracting from the population what I term “bio-energy”. This is to be accomplished through the use of biopower, which includes ‘numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations … [i.e.] techniques that govern and administer … human life’ (Foucault 1978: 140, 143). The essential characteristic of biopower is its capillarity: Once it is exercised, it works through the minds of subjects with the aim of introducing certain attitudes and behavioural patterns. As Foucault (2003: 29) maintains, ‘power passes through individuals. It is not applied to them.’

Additionally, the change was not circumscribed to the referent object but spilled over to the more general security discourse: The light went out from the old geopolitical discourse full of threats of death and of focus on the protection of state sovereignty and spotlighted the problematics of life around which a new, human security discourse was constructed. Foucault himself understands bio-politics as ‘nothing less than the entry of life into history, that is … into the order of knowledge and power’ (Foucault 1978: 141). The key moment during the extension of the change of the referent object to the change of the security discourse, i.e. the move in which the bio-political, human security oriented dispositif was completed, was the narrowing of the latter’s attention to the protection of human life rather than the
protection of people themselves. This is clear from the Government of Canada’s human security doctrine *Freedom from Fear*, which reads as follows:

> [h]uman security means freedom from pervasive threats to people’s … safety or lives … [H]uman security encompasses a spectrum of approaches to prevent and resolve violent conflicts, to protect civilians … and to ensure security for … populations (DFAIT 2000: 2).

Canadian emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of human security through the merger of anatomo-politics and biopolitics is, however, not accepted by several other countries in which human security has been practised. In the human security field, the Freedom-from-Fear approach is often contrasted to the Japanese Freedom-from-Want school, which is often said to be an antithesis to the Canadian approach, and which expands the agenda by stressing the importance of human empowerment and socio-economic development (Sucharithanarugse 2000: 49-61). While the distinction between narrow vs. broad is unproductive, the chapters of this thesis which tackle Japanese case demonstrate that the transferral of responsibility to subjects in society and the emergence of the idea of human life in need of protection, i.e. the bodies-as-machines/protecting-bare-lives nexus, are mutually constituted. As will become clear, unlike Canada, Japanese human security has not gone through a similar transformation of political rationalities with large transferrals of responsibility to subjects, and therefore also has not focused on the protection of bare lives in their human security dispositifs.
CHAPTER 4

THE LANDMINE CASE AS A RHIZOMATIC ASSEMBLAGE

This chapter analyses the emergence of Canadian human security (CanHS) assemblage and its development. It will be shown empirically that the country’s early human security was inextricably linked to the campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines. One of the key arguments put forward in this chapter is that the articulation of human security and the country’s key contribution to the landmine case reinforced each other to produce a viable human security programme. Both the articulation of human security and the landmine case will be linked to the humanitarian terrain which was itself constituted as a result of the two sets of structural conditions analysed in the previous chapter. As the chapter demonstrates, it was these conditions which allowed for the appropriation of the 19th Century tradition of humanitarian disarmament by Canadian governmental officials. As a result, a hiatus of one hundred years between the humanitarian conferences in St. Petersburg and The Hague and the post-Cold War landmine campaign was closed in this development. This resurfacing, as well as the following campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines, is considered the most rhizomatic and radical moment in the development of CanHS assemblage. After contribution of the Canadian government and NGOs to the related international norm-making is analysed, attention will be directed to the most important development: domestic micropractices. One cannot meaningfully understand the landmine case and the emergence of CanHS without an analysis of these micropractices as they have shaped the nature of international norm-making, as well as the ways in which the
produced norm has been observed. The chapter continues with an analysis of deployed technologies of power and investigates the results of the merger of two poles – an economic pole of anatomo-politics and a security pole of biopolitics. This merger is understood as the end of a radical, fully rhizomatised assemblage of CanHS imbued with what Foucault calls “the positive side of freedom”. It is argued that the transformation of human security NGOs from political advocates into the tools of service delivery within a neo-liberal, new-contractualist regime is connected to the rise of the negative side of freedom.

**Echoes of the 19th Century Humanitarian Disarmament**

The following section shows that an increase in humanitarianism after the end of the Cold War and the role of NGOs in this process cannot be considered an unprecedented phenomenon. If one speaks about new humanitarianism, then attention must be directed to the 19th Century. New humanitarianism of the 19th Century emerged in connection with the rise of liberalism and the emergence of new types of actors: non-state actors (Boli and Thomas 1999). What both 19th Century humanitarianism and post-Cold War humanitarianism have in common is precisely their strong attachment to liberalism – a classical liberal rationality of government with regard to the former, and a neo-liberal political rationality of government in respect of the latter. It was for this reason that related conceptual issues were discussed in Chapter 1, which outlined the conceptual framework for the presented thesis. In both of these instances, humanitarian action was discursively built around the notion of a suffering individual.
The legitimisation of humanitarian disarmament campaigns suggests that humanitarian actions were framed in terms of human security enunciations. In the case of the 19th Century, without an accompanying explicit political doctrine and without a distinct economic model attached to it; in the case of a campaign to ban landmines, this was part of an explicitly formulated human security doctrine: the freedom-from-fear doctrine. However important this difference can be, common characteristics shared by both versions of humanitarianisms are visible too, including the discursive transfer from the former to the latter, as the following lines suggest. Indeed, in line with the above conceptual debate concerning the development of the liberal rationality of government, one cannot really expect the post-Cold War humanitarianism to merely replicate experiences from the 19th Century. As the following analysis will demonstrate, on the contrary, a number of characteristics are different due to historical and political contingencies, proof of an open-ended rhizomatic development, that have shaped the economy, security, and politics in between. For this study, the crucial issue is that of normative resonance between the humanitarianisms and the central role of non-state actors in their articulation, a fact enabled by modalities of (neo)liberal order. In both cases, one can speak of a shift in a security dispositif, or apparatus. As shown in the preceding chapter, there is an intimate link between the constitution of active subjects in the security field (here NGOs) and the emergence of the suffering individual as an object, or a referent point, of security.

Although the campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines (APL campaign) has been celebrated as an important part of an unprecedented phenomenon that was itself brought about by the new macro-structural organisation of world politics after the end of the Cold War in the majority of existing studies (Goose and Williams 2004;
Matthew 2004; Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin 1998; Price 1998), such an image cannot withstand a confrontation with empirical evidence. Contrary to this popular belief, the APL campaign in fact included similar dynamics to 19th Century humanitarian campaigns concerned with disarmament. Specifically, the types of actors involved, the organisation of campaigns, styles of argumentation and issue-framing, as well as the legal outputs of these campaigns, are not all that different. On the one hand, such a perspective is in line with Foucault’s observations regarding the similarities between the classical liberal rationality of government in the 19th Century and neo-liberal rationality. This does not support, on the other hand, the fashionable though flawed assertions made by Wapner (2000, 2004) and others regarding the unprecedented transformation of current world politics, allegedly caused by an increase of NGOs and information technologies. Among campaigns that were founded on liberal rationalities of government, one can mention the campaign for women’s suffrage, though it is humanitarian disarmament campaigns which are central for this section.

Humanitarian disarmament of the 19th Century was a distinctly liberal idea and practice. In this respect, key events of the 19th Century were the St Petersburg Conference of 1868 and, most importantly, the First Hague Conference of 1899. The legal output of the former was the St Petersburg Declaration, and its rationale was explained on the grounds of the need to establish a link between the progress of civilisation and alleviating, as much as possible, the horrors of war. For example, it banned all projectiles of a weight below 400 grammes which were either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances (Declaration of St Petersburg 1868). As for the latter, its legal output in the area of humanitarian disarmament comprised three declarations. These banned any use of expanding bullets (so-called
“dum dum bullets”), asphyxiating or deleterious gases, and the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons (Goldblat 2002: 19). One of the common traits of the St Petersburg Conference of 1868, the Hague Conference of 1899, and the Ottawa Conference of 1997 is the fact that all three were convened as a result of the successful efforts of political norm entrepreneurs (Rutherford 1999). In concrete terms, the 19th Century conferences were connected to the Russian Tsar Nicholas II, while the Ottawa Conference was organised by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy. Despite the fact that Nicholas II, unlike Lloyd Axworthy, cannot be considered a proponent of liberal order as such (though he introduced at least some measures in this direction), he played an important role in promoting the idea of non-state actors campaigning for humanitarian disarmament, and it was also due to his efforts that they (i.e. non-state campaigners and the free press) were allowed close scrutiny of the conferences’ negotiations (Best 1991: 10).

Non-state actors took advantage of this climate and shaped the views of politicians, both directly and also indirectly through the printed media (Tuchman 1996: Chapter 5). That their argumentation aimed at the creation of new human security-based legal norms reveals the essence of what Foucault (1991) calls the transformation of the individual into an active political subject. Disarmament was promoted as a part of a human security frame instead of the national-security frame. As Foucault (1991: 87-104) notes, liberal rationality of government does not concern purely economic matters; rather, it engulfs the entire functional mechanism of the exercise of political sovereignty. In this light, it is not surprising that the President of the First Plenary Session during the Hague Conference of 1899 mentioned the liberal purpose of maintaining harmony and a reduction of the horrors of war as the basic reason why diplomatic delegations gathered in the Hague. Similarly, the Dutch
government, which hosted and co-financed the conference, appealed in its conference invitation to states to do their utmost to secure peace and disarmament (Rutherford 1999: 36, 42).

The reason for banning certain types of weapons that were deemed odious was to reduce the suffering of individuals: in the 19th Century campaigns mainly that of soldiers, and in the APL campaign chiefly that of civilians. One hundred years later, the imagery of the suffering individual served as the basis for Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy. He discursively linked his own human security project to the Hague Conference:

I cannot think of a subject more important at the dawn of the next millennium than that of civilians in war ... In 1899, the Hague Conference on Peace set an agenda. In 1999, the world needs a new agenda - one that puts people at the heart of foreign policy. The impetus for the generation involved in the first Hague Conference was a desire to make the act of war itself more humane, establishing rules to protect combatants at a time when civilians were largely bystanders ... In World War I, 5 percent of casualties were civilians: today that figure is closer to 80 percent. In 1999, civilians are direct targets of war, and live on its battlefields ... The point is that the onus is on our generation - 100 years after the Hague Conference - to respond to these new realities. We need to change the discourse of diplomacy. And we need to change its practice. Fundamentally, we need to make human security at least as important as state privilege (Axworthy 1999: not numbered).
Liberal rationality of government can be discerned in the 19th Century campaigns concerned with humanitarian disarmament in several directions. First of all, it is visible in its related knowledge production. Knowledge was generated by non-state actors and subsequently used to target governments that were present at the conferences. Apart from that, liberal rationality of government was also visible through the promotion of humanitarian knowledge in the printed media, with the aim of pressurising the governments and holding them accountable. More and more, governments had to pay attention to public opinion in liberalising polities and were under pressure from non-state opinion makers, organisations promoting humanitarian ideals and peace, associations of lawyers and teachers, and so on.

Without doubt, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) can be considered one of the most important actors of that time (and also later for the APL campaign) for the generation of a new type of humanitarian knowledge in the field of security (Finnemore 1999). The organisation was founded by a Swiss citizen, Henry Dunant, as a reaction to his immediate experience of the Battle of Solferino (1859). Subsequently, Dunant wrote a book containing his memories of the battle and sent it out to all important non-governmental actors, governments and military personnel alike. In 1863, the ICRC invited governments, international lawyers, and representatives of international pacifist and peace federation movements for a conference to discuss principles of international humanitarian law. These principles were later inserted to the Geneva Conventions (Lavoyer and Maresca 1999). The proposals discussed and humanitarian-oriented knowledge about security were successfully linked to disarmament efforts. The uniting element was precisely the suffering individual as a cornerstone of humanitarian disarmament and human security.
As far as non-state actors are concerned, other important players, apart from the ICRC, were mainly associations promoting peace and humanitarian disarmament from a pacifist perspective. The decision to organise the two 19th Century conferences is usually explained in the existing literature as a result of the intensive lobbying activities of Dr. Darby, the Secretary of the Peace Society of London, Bertha von Suttner, co-founder of the Austrian Peace Society and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate (Goldblat 2002; Abrams 1962), and Ivan Bloch, a writer born in what is now Poland, who systematically examined the political and economic consequences of modern industrial warfare and had a great personal influence on Tsar Nicholas II. Nicholas II used his diplomatic position to allow a number of these opinion-makers to attend the Hague Conference of 1899 and disseminate their work. Immediate access of non-state actors to the conference, including their presence in the corridors of buildings in which negotiations were held, as well as the significant space they were given in the media to share their opinions and demands (Eyffinger 1999), is what the British historian Alfred Zimmern summarised under the rubric of so-called open diplomacy:

At the Hague the Diplomats, the Lawyers and the Humanitarians or Pacifists – the latter term came to be used shortly after this date – come together for the first time. It was the dress rehearsal of Open Diplomacy. The Diplomats did not relish it (Zimmern 1936: 103, cited in Caron 2000: 14).

What is more, a people-centred liberal rationality of government in the field of humanitarian disarmament was also embodied in the so-called Martens Clause
during the First Hague Conference of 1899. This clause established the protection of civilians and soldiers in cases that were not explicitly covered by the Laws and Customs of War in the Land. The key argument of the Martens Clause was the importance of *public conscience*. Importantly, the clause was also inserted into the Ottawa Treaty of 1997, which banned APLs. Although with a one hundred year hiatus, both humanitarian processes rested on an analogous, liberal conception of normative change with human security legitimisation.

Liberal humanitarian action can generally be understood as a specific type of the Deleuze-Guattarian war machine. Since Deleuze and Guattari argue that the war machine is of a different series than the state apparatus and that it does not need to have war, in the conventional sense, for its object, this specific type of war machine will be called after its main preoccupation: *peace machine*. The activities and nature of the peace machine of a given era has always been contingent on the current modality of the liberal order. As the examination of the 19th Century humanitarian action showed, the peace machine of that period was largely deterritorialised and its molecular lines were primarily stretched in a transnational fashion. Additionally, the ability of the then-existing state apparatuses to capture the peace machine was limited, and while the latter’s emergence was indeed allowed by a surrounding liberal political terrain, the peace machine operated in quite an independent fashion. One reason for this was given by the fact that its activities did not rely on funding originating in the state apparatus. Open-ended development marked by the ability of the peace machine to plug directly into different political series, such as humanitarian disarmament conferences and related diplomatic processes, can all be considered as examples of a horizontally-stretched rhizomatic assemblage defined by its key
features: connectivity and multiplicity. This quality has been present both in the 19th Century humanitarian disarmament and the APL campaign.

The process of the chronological reterritorialisation of 19th Century humanitarian action and its re-emergence as a part of post-Cold War humanitarianism is an interesting example of interactions between the state apparatus and the peace machine. The central agency of the peace machine has been, once again, humanitarian non-state actors. Nevertheless, thinking about the relationship between NGOs and the state apparatus in a zero-sum fashion would lead to an erroneous picture. That is due to the fact that the re-emergence of the peace machine as a nomadic phenomenon after the end of the Cold War was indeed enabled by certain structural configurations and related practices of the state apparatus. What is especially noteworthy is the way in which the nomadic peace machine began to reterritorialise as a part of the state apparatus. Consequently, one can say that while the re-emergence of the peace machine was allowed by a certain set of rhizomatic connections, such as linking 19th Century humanitarianism with post-Cold War humanitarian disarmament, reterritorialisation as a part of the state apparatus, i.e. the development concerning the attempts of this apparatus to capture the peace machine and appropriate it by plugging its lines of flight, has been an example of efforts to arborify the link between the state apparatus and the peace machine. The dangers of this diagram of power are clearly detected by Deleuze and Guattari when they maintain that ‘[d]oubtless, we see operations of rigidification and centralisation take shape here and there’, and add that when these operations are successful, it ‘is the birth of a centralized power with an arborescent system to discipline the outgrowths of the primitive rhizome’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 211). This is what Ferguson
(1990: 274) has called (referring power relations through the bureaucratic circuit) ‘cinch[ing] them all together into a knot’.

At first sight, one could think that the above understanding of the peace machine standing at the centre of liberal humanitarian action is in line with existing conceptualisations of liberal peace and liberal war. The most elaborate such conceptualisation directly related to human security has been offered by Mark Duffield. Duffield writes about new liberal wars which are no longer concerned with inter-state physical violence, as was the case in traditional realist wars, but, instead, focus on fighting underdevelopment as a source of international insecurity. Duffield argues that in this type of “liberal warfare”, Western states deploy biopower and biopolitical techniques of global governmentality (Duffield, 2001, 2007: 16; also, cf. Dillon and Reid 2009). While Duffield correctly discerns a new diagram of power, or to use a Deleuze-Guattarian term, abstract machine, he fails to provide a genealogical series through which its diachronical affinities could become clear. Duffield’s “new liberal wars”, which he debates in relation to the post-Cold War predominance of liberal order, are in fact not so new. Although he works in a Foucauldian framework, the parallels between the 19th Century and late 20th Century/early 21st Century and related reterritorialisations of humanitarian action are not recognised. This indeed has a detrimental effect on the overall understanding of the related diagrammatics of power. In this regard, one can concur with Chandler, who argues that ‘Duffield, in effect, reads biopower ahistorically, as a fait à compli, suggesting that the only alternative is to assert that we are all victims of governmentalism’ (Chandler 2008b). It is for this reason that an outline of the rhizomatic map concerning the development of multiplicity in liberal humanitarian action is needed. An analysis of the APL campaign will provide precisely such a map.
The campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines is considered the most important instance of post-Cold War disarmament efforts which were framed around the notion of human security. It is widely believed that one of the defining features of post-Cold War disarmament was the *global character* of associated political processes. The implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War as such were identified in the literature as the key events at the global scale that allowed the ignition of humanitarian disarmament practices (Axworthy 1997: 183). Structural transformations of global politics were then seen as an enabler for like-minded states, such as Canada, to reconstitute their specific collective identities. Human security and humanitarian disarmament was considered a suitable field for this reconstitution. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, processes which took place at the global level and the actual international dynamics of the landmine case have invariably been seen as the primary factors which led to the total ban of APLs. While the predominant focus of academic explanations at the global level was criticised in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis and will be shown to be the *result* of several domestic microprocesses in the last section of this chapter, this is not to say – as this section shows – that international/global developments did not play a role in the legal codification of the ban. In the words of Andrew Latham,

[H]uman security clearly differs from the traditional “statist” security discourse that has prevailed through most of the modern era. The reason for this is that, for states like Canada, the rhetoric of security is now powerfully informed by the discourses and *global cultural scripts*
associated with the standard of civilization entailed in the newly ascendant post-Cold War geo-political discourse …. Simply put, these states, once they had come to recognize themselves in the new post-Cold War geo-political narrative, necessarily (if reflexively) enacted the “institutional script” entailed by that narrative … [T]he evolution of a new narratively derived global cultural script in the aftermath of the Cold War was crucially important in that it established the discursive terrain upon which states, NGOs, and other norm entrepreneurs were subsequently able to campaign for a ban on APMs (Latham 2001: 173-174; emphasis added).

In the early 1990s, the landmine crisis attracted media attention after being neglected during the 1980s. The shift was due largely to ICRC surgeons and NGOs participating in medical assistance programmes and de-mining operations (Hubert 2000: 7; McGrath and Stover 1991; Cahill 1995). The origins of the transnational advocacy campaign is usually traced back to November 1991, when the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) and a German NGO, Medico International (ME), hired a renowned NGO activist, Jody Williams, to organise a global advocacy campaign to ban landmines. By the end of 1995, more than 350 NGOs were involved in a coalition that became known as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) (English 1998: 122). The ICBL and the ICRC were typical lead actors, each of them with a different legitimacy base and character. The former can be understood as a broad transnational advocacy network (Keck and Sikkink 1998), or what Ethan Nadelmann (1990) describes as transnational moral entrepreneurs who engage in moral proselytism, while the latter could be viewed as a humanitarian-oriented
epistemic community (and a *sui generis* entity due to its primary subjectivity in international public law) since it possessed both principled and causal beliefs as well as a political project. Whereas the ICRC has been seen as a specimen of traditional humanitarianism, the ICBL has served as an example of the so-called “new humanitarianism”. The juxtaposition of organisations which represent traditional and novel takes on humanitarian action in a single case certainly poses a challenge to the artificial distinction between the characteristics of the “old humanitarianism” and the “new humanitarianism”. The alleged difference has been delimited by Fiona Fox in the following way:

> [n]ew humanitarianism is “principled”, “human-rights based” and politically sensitive. Above all it is new. It marks a break from the past and a rejection of the traditional principles that guided humanitarianism through the last century. New humanitarians reject the political naivety of the past, assess the long-term political impact of relief and are prepared to see humanitarian aid used as a tool to achieve human rights and political goals (Fox 2002: 275).

Indeed, the landmine case suggests that even the ICRC as a *sui generis* humanitarian organisation practicing traditional, neutral humanitarianism could deviate from its core principles and become a politically involved actor which actively promoted the complete ban of APLs. This happened for the first time in the long history of ICRC. As a matter of fact, the ICRC became one of the key actors on which the entire campaign relied as far as the process of reframing APLs was concerned. The key dynamic was the strategic social construction of the landmines.
issue. Social movement scholars call this process cognitive framing, or frame alignment (Snow et al. 1986; Klandermans 1997), and this practice can be understood as a prima facie example of how a rhizomatic assemblage of enunciation comes about. The process of framing narrowed the issue down to all antipersonnel landmines, including self-neutralising devices, while anti-tank mines were excluded. The ICBL was subsequently a strategic promoter of a total-ban master frame. The key success consisted in presenting the issue as humanitarian, rather than military. Phrases such as “landmine production cost is as little as $3 dollars apiece”; “for every 100,000 mines removed, another 2 million are being laid”; “it would take 4,300 years to remove all the landmines”; “500 people per week are killed or maimed by landmines, the majority of them civilians”; and “children mistake mines for playthings”, all represented examples of the shift in the landmines discourse and the strategic construction of a humanitarian frame.

To bring about the change in perception of APLs, the issue first needed to be desecuritised. Subsequently, it was reframed and resecuritised by the ICBL and the ICRC as a norm prohibiting bodily harm to innocent bystanders (humanitarian frame). This process can be comprehended as a heterodox development in which nomadic NGOs managed to subvert the original Royal-Scientific military frame and replace it with the humanitarian frame which was originally a minor-scientific position. In these processes of desecuritisation and resecuritisation, a crucial role was played by the mass media, and especially a visual role. Graphic images of maimed people were shocking enough to mobilise the public worldwide. It is noteworthy that the category of “innocent bystanders” did not equal the category of “civilians”, since it discursively excluded elderly and male civilians. “Innocent bystanders” were represented in media enunciations as women and children, even though they did not
form the greatest proportion of casualties. Also, by leaving the military frame behind, “soldiers” were no longer a part of the discourse: they found themselves placed outside of the discourse. The above exclusions need to be emphasised in order to realise that any assemblage of enunciation – including the rhizomatic, which is deemed socio-politically desirable and normatively progressive – contains a system of constraints and exclusions (Foucault 1982: 48-78). To think about rhizomatic formations in a universally “do-gooder” category is an unproductive cul-de-sac.

Since 1992, the ICBL focused on lobbying the governments of critical states with the purpose of securing their support. The category of critical states comprised a group of like-minded states which imposed unilateral moratoria on the export, sale and transfer of landmines and, in some cases, even eliminated their stockpiles. The group included Canada, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, Norway and Switzerland. Canada was an informal leader of the group. The following lines examine the transition from the successful construction of a cognitive frame calling for a complete ban of APLs to the norm cascade. In order to outline the contours of international normative development, Finnemore and Sikkink’s three-stage model is used for this purpose. Although the model in itself cannot explain deeper domestic structural transformations that enabled the landmine case to take place, its salience consists in its ability to make sense of the international development of the issue. In other words, while the model is not suitable for elucidation of how the issue emerged in the first place, it is helpful in that it shows both how the issue and its central norm was embraced internationally, and why there was a total ban at the end of the process. It will be shown that the first phase consists in norm promotion. The transition from the first to the second stage of the norm life-cycle is centred round the idea of a tipping point or the threshold of a normative change. This occurs after norm
entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass of states to become norm leaders and adopt new norms. The fact that the norm of the non-use of antipersonnel landmines cascaded through the international system can be understood as the result of peer pressure exerted upon other states by the pro-ban states. This process was synergically reinforced by the ongoing ICBL campaign focused on lobbying and approaching the mass media. By May 1996, the number of states supporting the ban significantly increased from an initial 8 to 60. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 901) argue, this stage is characterised by a dynamic of imitation as the norm leaders attempt to socialise other states to become norm followers in an active process of international socialisation.

The socialisation of other states by human security proponents can critically be read as the “Self’s” attempt to impose a hegemonic discourse (the humanitarian assemblage of enunciation, in the beginning a minor position) upon the “Other”, where the latter is deemed to be any state trying to block the proposed norm. The objective of pro-ban states was to ensure that all states would embark upon what was discursively referred to as a civilised society of states. As empirical evidence suggests, the equal sign that is usually put between pro-ban attempts and the democratic conduct of politics needs to be rejected. Based on my own interviews with Canadian governmental officials and NGOs active in the campaign, as well as on existing research (cf. Beier 2003: 795-808), even practices within the ICBL were not as transparent and democratic as its rhetoric would suggest. The agenda was imposed from the Western “Centre”, and a majority of non-governmental actors in mine-affected areas (the “Periphery”) were excluded from equal participation. This serves as an important reminder of the perils connected to the flawed romanticisation of the role of social movements and NGOs (cf. Walker and Mendlovitz 1987).
ethical dimension can thus be understood rather as a strategic construction, as it gave the group of pro-ban states and the ICBL a powerful advantage over other actors. In concrete terms, it enabled manipulation with public opinion by using a system of stigmatisation which included targeting, and naming and shaming.

Third stage of international development concerning the norm banning APLs was characterised by norm internalisation. In May 1996, Canada, a non-formal leader of the group of like-minded states, presented a proposal for an alternative negotiation format concerning landmines. The importance of the proposal lay in the fact that it enabled the signing of a convention by the pro-ban states without the threat of being blocked by the other states’ veto. The Ottawa conference which took place in October 1996 was the first meeting outside of the U.N. System, and was aptly entitled *Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmine.* The decisive moment of the conference was a concluding speech of the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, who called upon the international community to return to Ottawa to sign the ban on landmines by the end of 1997. The Ottawa Process culminated during the second Ottawa conference, which took place in December 1997. At the end of this meeting, full 122 states signed the Ottawa Convention, in spite of the refusal of three major actors, the United States, Russia and China, to do so.

The actual Convention banning APLs certainly makes for an interesting *biopolitical* reading. The Convention rhizomatically re-assembled together three fields which had been kept separate since the late 19th Century/early 20th Century: the fields of arms-control/disarmament, economic and human development, and human security. The Preamble of the Convention stipulates that the State Parties are
[d]etermined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction … [They believe it is] necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction … [They wish] to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims (Convention 1997).

The merger of these fields, as well as the unprecedented pooling of responsibility among States (the legal owners of the obligation), intergovernmental organisations and NGOs (the main carriers of the obligation), has resulted in the rise of advanced liberal humanitarianism to political and legal prominence. It has been within this configuration that entire populations have become the objects of intervention:

[s]tressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines … [there have been identified] the measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all [affected] areas (Convention 1997; emphasis added).

This rhizomatically assembled legal enunciation is fully in line with Foucault’s observation concerning the relationship between the population as the object of
intervention and the series of individuals (in this case mainly NGO personnel) being the instruments, or subjects, of this intervention:

within the system of knowledge-power, within the economic technology and management, there is this break between the pertinent level of the population and the level that is not pertinent, or that is simply instrumental. The final objective is the population. The population is pertinent as the objective, and individuals, the series of individuals, are no longer pertinent as the objective, but simply as the instrument, relay, or condition for obtaining something at the level of the population (Foucault 2007: 42; emphasis added)

Thus, even an international, legally-binding Convention contains a mixture of previously analysed old humanitarian lines (public conscience, a reassembled series of certain functional fields) and novel elements (transfer of service delivery onto NGOs).

As the next section demonstrates, the successful conclusion of the Ottawa Convention which banned antipersonnel landmines in 1997 was, from a diachronical vantage point, in fact the beginning of an era that would henceforth connect previously separated realms: the realm of (domestic) public-service delivery and the realm of (international) security/development. Canadian oft-neglected domestic development in the landmine case therefore suggests very clearly that landmines have been reframed, from a security/development issue to an issue modelled on public-goods provision that was previously used mainly for domestic issues. It will be demonstrated that while the pre-1997 phase of the issue was largely about the
securitisation of assembled enunciations, the post-1997 phase was dominated by the
desecuritisation of assembled effectuations.

**Domestic Micropractices and Technologies of Power**

This section provides an account of domestic micropractices which played an
important role in the landmine case emerging as an issue in Canada. This dynamic
was enabled by the synergy of the two types of structural transformations analysed in
Chapter 3 of this thesis: transformations of Canadian non-profit and voluntary sector,
and procedural and substantive changes in Canadian foreign and security policy.
Since this chapter does not aspire to provide a descriptive chronology of the
landmine process, but a critical investigation of hitherto unconnected links and
processes, an examination of domestic micropractices and its theorisation inspired by
Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari comes after an outline of the internationalisation
of the campaign, despite the fact that the former chronologically preceded the latter.
Thus, the confluence of economic and political forces outlined in Chapter 3 served as
structural terrain for the landmine case to emerge and significantly contributed to
bringing about the international ban of landmines. This is fully in line with Deleuze
and Guattari’s (1987: 327, 549) assertion that one should not begin with a focus on
behaviour studied in terms of linear relations. In fact, as Ansell-Pearson (1999: 175)
holds in this context, one needs to go beyond behaviour, moving ‘in the direction of
the “assemblage”, in which any system of local operations are coordinated and a
global result is actualized (“synchronised”) without a central agency’. As he adds,
'[a] useful way to think of this is in terms of an “autocatalytic set”’ (Ibid: 176).
Contrary to popular belief, it was the Canadian government that changed the perception of who was to be accepted as a political stakeholder and later a delivery agent (NGOs), and who was a political partner and later a service consumer (the government). Put differently, although the NGO community played an important role in the construction of landmines as a humanitarian issue and supplied governmental officials with detailed knowledge (nomadic science) from the field about the humanitarian effects of this category of weapons, this development would not have been possible had the government not previously taken decisions to include NGOs in the formal political channels with the aim of making them responsible agents in the financially severe climate, and widened and deepened the general understanding of security. Much of what is contained in this section is based on a series of personal interviews with officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and NGO personnel conducted by the author in 2006 and 2007. This pool is further complemented by other existing sources of information, including some previously neglected data. Additionally, domestic micropractices are theorised through the combination of Foucauldian and Deleuze-Guattarian analytics of government and critically-oriented public management literature.

The following lines show that it was simply not the case that the Mines Action Canada (hereinafter referred to as MAC), a Canadian NGO umbrella participating in the ICBL, a wider transnational advocacy network, identified the issue and taught the Canadian government about humanitarian problems related to the use of landmines. In fact, the government had already started to fund awareness-raising activities concerning landmines in 1989, i.e. three years before the ICBL was founded, as a part of training for Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Government of Canada 1998: 5). Moreover, the Canadian government has funded mine clearance
programmes since 1992, with Iraq and Kuwait being the first recipient countries (Ibid: 5). The issue of whether the government or NGOs began these activities first is, nevertheless, only secondary to another, more interesting question of how the issue acquired its humanitarian character. Again, without denying the importance of MAC/ICBL, the impetus which allowed this network to successfully reframe the issue from a military to a humanitarian logic, through the use of visual strategies mobilising the public, was provided by a previous governmental decision to transfer the landmines file from the defence portfolio at the Department of National Defence (DND) to that of foreign affairs (DFAIT) and international development (CIDA). This decision corresponded with the coming to power of the Liberals in 1993, an event accompanied by a complete overhaul of Canadian foreign and security policy (CanFSP). The notion of human security was introduced for the first time, and defence policy was made subordinate to foreign policy. This key moment is captured in Table 4, which contains its financial manifestation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>DND</th>
<th>CIDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>$2,500,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>$900,000</td>
<td>$2,455,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$700,000</td>
<td>$3,690,149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ICBL 1999
The file was not yet at this stage, however, entirely transferred, as the military war machine of the Department of National Defence still kept its supervision over official governmental policy on landmines. The MAC/ICBL campaign took a completely new twist when new policy entrepreneurs were appointed by the Liberal government to the Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division within DFAIT’s International Security Bureau. These were most notably Ralph Lysyshyn, Jill Sinclair, and Mark Gwozdecky, who was later replaced by Robert Lawson. Not only were these individuals receptive to the humanitarian dimension of the issue, but they were also strong advocates of the Liberals’ notion of close collaboration with NGOs. This was one of the key moves in the entire landmine dynamic, as a powerful bureaucratic coalition of the state apparatus (MOFA and CIDA) and nomadic peace machine was forged and pitted against the military war machine of DND which had previously monopolised the landmines file. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, ‘[o]ne of the fundamental problems of the State is to appropriate this war machine that is foreign to it and make it a piece in its apparatus, in the form of a stable military institution’ and acknowledge that ‘the State has always encountered major difficulties in this’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 230).

In the Canadian case much more than in the Japanese one, it can be argued that the country’s military war machine has been a stable part of the state apparatus; it had been appropriated by the state apparatus long ago. Therefore, the bureaucratic wrestle for control over the landmines file cannot be understood in state apparatus vs. military war machine terms, but rather in terms of a human security-oriented part of the state apparatus (MOFA/CIDA) supported by the peace machine of NGOs vs. the military-part of the state apparatus (DND). As nearly all interviewees confirmed, there was a regular dialogue between DFAIT and NGOs during this period, and
Sinclair and Lawson were identified as the most active government officials in this respect. This group of policy entrepreneurs urged the then Minister of Foreign Affairs André Ouellet to push his DND counterpart David Collenette to announce a Canadian moratorium on the export of landmines. Ouellet went even further than his subordinates, and when being interviewed by a CBC reporter about the issue, he declared that landmines ‘should be banned not only in Canada but everywhere in the world’ (Thompson 1995: A12). When Lawson learned about this statement, he immediately faxed the transcript to MAC/ICBL, which in turn flooded Ouellet’s office with congratulatory fax and phone messages. As a result of DFAIT-induced dual pressure, DND finally gave in and agreed to an export moratorium in November 1995. The transfer of the entire file to DFAIT was completed in January 1996 when Lloyd Axworthy, who was a strong proponent of the radical shift in CanFSP and replaced Ouellet in his ministerial position, officially announced DFAIT’s support for the complete ban.

Common knowledge, constructed mainly by Jody Williams, director of ICBL, suggests that the ICBL persuaded pro-ban states at the U.N. conference on Certain Conventional Weapons, in which the issue of landmines was originally negotiated to leave the U.N. for an alternative process. As an internal DFAIT memo from March 1996 (DFAIT 1996) shows, however, the government had already anticipated that the U.N. CCW Review Conference would remain deadlocked and made preparations for this development. The memo contained the seeds of what later became known as the Ottawa Process: it recommended a meeting of pro-ban states outside the U.N. system, which would come up with a road map to ban landmines (DFAIT 1996). While Williams and Goose of ICBL were consulted, DFAIT refused their demand to invite only clearly pro-ban states, which it considered too stringent.
At the conclusion of the CCW Conference, Lawson, who was authorised in the memo to invite pro-ban states and undecided states, announced that Canada would host this meeting in October 1996. The Canadian government decided to give ICBL its own seat and some MAC personnel were included in the governmental delegation (personal interview with a Senior Official, DFAIT, Ottawa, April 26, 2006). Williams’ repeated verbal attacks on delegates with observer status (undecided states) suggest that ICBL acted as an uncompromising and overtly political participant. Personal interviews with DFAIT officials confirmed this was a deliberate strategy of the Canadian government, i.e. to ‘put its message across without dirtying one’s hands’, as one DFAIT senior policy advisor put it (personal interview with a Senior Policy Advisor, DFAIT, Ottawa, April 12, 2006). There were two outcomes of the Ottawa meeting: Firstly, Sinclair and Lawson of DFAIT, together with Williams and Goose of ICBL, drafted the Chairman’s Agenda for Action, which was simply presented to, rather than negotiated with, other participants; secondly, Lysyshyn and Sinclair prepared the content for Minister Axworthy’s surprising speech in which he pledged all participants to come to Ottawa in a year’s time to sign a treaty which would completely ban landmines. The aforementioned DFAIT officials informed the ICRC and ICBL about the contents; and after Axworthy read his unexpected speech, Sommaruga, the then Director of the Red Cross, and Williams of ICBL delivered their pre-arranged speeches of support (Tomlin 1998: 20).

Axworthy’s speech started the so-called Ottawa process, which consisted of a set of meetings sponsored by self-selected like-minded states and which featured NGOs subsumed under ICBL. As one of the interviewed senior policy advisors at DFAIT put it, ‘we had CDN $2 million to run the Ottawa Process and we used it
very specifically for funding conferences and meetings’ (personal interview with a Senior Policy Advisor, DFAIT, Ottawa, April 20, 2006). The process was concluded by the Ottawa Conference in December 1997, where the previously negotiated and drafted treaty, the Ottawa Convention, was signed by 122 governments. Since then the Canadian government has donated more than $170 million to support anti-mine-related activities. A significant portion has been specifically directed towards education programmes, victim assistance and research and development into de-mining technologies. Government funding has been channelled through the Canadian Landmine Fund, which was between 1998 and 2003 jointly administered by CIDA ($50 million), DFAIT ($32.5 million), DND ($13.6 million), and Industry Canada ($3.9 million). The Fund was replenished in 2003 with an additional $72 million for the period 2004-2008. The impact of massive government funding on the nature and practices of MAC/ICBL is theorised below.

The following lines address the question of how governmental technologies were used in the landmine case to put the more general advanced liberal government and CanFSP programme into effect. As the analysis demonstrates, while the landmine case began as a fully rhizomatised assemblage, both at the level of enunciation and the level of effectuation, its post-1997 development suggests that the early radical potential was neutralised at the latter level. It is for this reason that one can speak of a rhizomatic assemblage on the wane and the rise of a hybrid, *rhizome/fascicular-radicle assemblage*. As Chapter 1 made clear, rhizomatic and arborescent models of assemblage can – and often do – in practice intertwine and hybridise. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari,
[t]here exist tree or root structures in rhizomes; conversely, a tree branch or root division may begin to burgeon into a rhizome. The coordinates are determined not by theoretical analyses implying universals but by a pragmatics composing multiplicities or aggregates of intensities … To be rhizomorphous is to produce stems and filaments that seem to be roots, or better yet connect with them by penetrating the trunk, but put them to strange new uses (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 15).

The evidence shows that the transformation of a rhizomatic assemblage of effectuation into a rhizome/fascicular-radicle kind has been marked by the transformation of dominant technologies of power. In this context, one can invoke Foucault’s assertion that it would be a mistake to comprehend liberal government simply as government through freedom, since ‘this freedom, both ideology and technique of government, should in fact be understood within the mutations and transformations of technologies of power’ (Foucault 2007: 48-49; emphasis added). And as Foucault adds, ‘[m]ore precisely and particularly, freedom is nothing else but the correlative of the deployment of apparatuses of security’ (Ibid: 48-49). In concrete terms, two technologies of power can be discerned in the development of the landmine case: the technology of citizenship/involvement and the technology of new contractualism. The former term is used by Barbara Cruikshank (1993, 1994, and 1999) and Anne Yeatman (1994, 1998) who understand it as a set of techniques to increase actors’ self-esteem, which in turn leads to their empowerment. The aim of the technology of citizenship/involvement is thus to involve actors in consultations and negotiations, to give them a voice.
In regard to the landmine case, a technology of citizenship/involvement can be traced back to the period between 1994 and 1997, beginning with the Canadian NGOs’ nomadic peace machine seizing on the issue of landmines and ending with the conclusion of the Ottawa Convention. It was during this period that the umbrella group Mines Action Canada (MAC), including, for instance, Physicians for Global Survival, Oxfam Canada and Project Ploughshares, started to supply the Canadian government with practically-oriented knowledge (then the minor science) about landmines, gathered through their activities in mine-affected countries. Interviews conducted by the author suggest that MAC seized the opportunity to use the consultations as a forum for educating DFAIT officials about the practical impact of APLs, and that these activities resonated well with the wider governmental human security programme (personal interview with Robin Collins, Ottawa, April 17, 2006). These meetings served the role of contact lines between MAC and the government and as the zone of socialisation and information exchange (personal interview with Debbie Grisdale, Ottawa, April 19, 2006). NGOs learned to interact with DFAIT personnel in a formal setting and a new relationship and a new understanding of the issue emerged. On the other hand, governmental help to “find” MAC’s voice brought along occasional disagreements between the sides, so the period of technology of citizenship/involvement was also a highly political phase.

The development of the landmines issue after the conclusion of the Ottawa Convention suggests a stark shift in the technology of power and an accompanying transformation of the related assemblage of effectuation. The employment of the technology of new contractualism generally brings regulation at an entirely new level, representing an ‘overall shift in the nature of liberalism’ (Hindess 1997: 29). Unlike in the technology of citizenship/involvement, advanced liberal government is
no longer exercised through the political involvement of citizens, but through the politics of extra-juridical and quasi-juridical proliferation of contract (Dean 1999: 167-168). Particular techniques within the technology of new contractualism suggest a close link between the technology of new contractualism and the previously analysed advanced liberal funding regime. This is because the deployment of the liberal technology of new contractualism leads to the depoliticisation of NGOs. They are essentially transformed from participating political stakeholders into responsible service-delivery agents, or arms of the state. As an interviewed NGO person put it, ‘in this environment, you begin to be afraid of political campaigning’ (personal interview with an NGO campaigner, Ottawa, April 20, 2006). Once established and intersubjectively accepted, it is very difficult to challenge the technology of new contractualism, as all potential criticisms become simply a means for rearranging and expanding the logic of the contract. This is made possible by the detachment of policy-making from service delivery during the shift from the technology of citizenship/involvement, with a prevailing horizontal accountability, to the top-down technology of new contractualism, with vertical accountabilities in which the main aim is to ensure an equal opportunity for NGOs to compete for contracts (Yeatman 1998).

As far as the landmine case is concerned, the introduction of the technology of new contractualism brought about the transformation of the relationship between the Canadian state apparatus and the peace machine. Specifically, during the process in which the government reconstituted the ontology of this nexus, the state no longer aspired to be MAC/ICBL’s political partner for negotiations, but the consumer of their practices. Consequently, the government also reinvented the position of NGOs, from being political actors producing original humanitarian knowledge about
landmines, used for teaching the government about the scope of this scourge and for awareness-raising among the public, to being agents of delivery receiving massive government funding upon which they increasingly depended. The reaction of the NGO community to this change has been aptly summarised by Paul Hannon, Executive Director of MAC:

We had to learn, as NGOs, how to work properly … you cannot do those things in the way it used to be organised, you know, like an anti-nuclear protest [during the Cold War]. You cannot do it with a mimeograph and a few things on a poster … you cannot be ideological about these things, you have to go practical. And that is why you sometimes use business models; you learn how to run an organisation. That is the most efficient way how to do it … You bring in people who are different from you, with different expertise, so good functioning NGO boards have lawyers on them, there are fundraisers, business people, human resources experts … We have learned that through painful ways, you have to do it, that was a part of our sophistication (personal interview, Ottawa, April 27, 2006).

The point in which the landmine case differs from other issue areas is that the above shift cannot be associated with the contracting-out of formerly public services, as the problématique of landmines had not originally been a public sector issue, but a security one. This explains why the introduction of the technology of new contractualism and the advanced liberal funding regime penetrated the landmine case only after 1997, while it had been already under way and fully unfolded in other areas of Canadian socio-political life.
The landmine case first needed to be reframed from being a defence issue serving to protect Canadian sovereignty to being a human security/international development issue within the CanFSP governmental programme. Subsequently, the issue was relocated from the security field to the public-sector field. Only then could the concerned managerial techniques be introduced. Nothing less than a series of complete and repeated re-pluggings of the landmine issue to different assemblages of enunciation and effectuation occurred in this process. As Deleuze and Guattari hint, ‘it is … important to try the other, reverse but nonsymmetrical operation. Plug the tracings back into the map, connect the roots or trees back up with a rhizome’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 14). Thus, the following can be inferred: first, from a national-security assemblage controlled by the military war machine (an arborescent assemblage) to a human security assemblage which resulted in the complete ban of antipersonnel landmines in 1997 (a fully rhizomatic assemblage); and, subsequently, from the early, fully rhizomatic human security assemblage to a later human security assemblage which has been governed according to the model of public management previously used in Canadian domestic social policy (a hybrid, rhizomatic/fascicular-radicle assemblage). What happened, then, has been the desecuritisation and “domestication-at-a-distance” of the international development/human security agenda. The landmine assemblage has, therefore, effectively enabled the extension of the public service-delivery model well beyond the national confines and its multiple reterritorialisation in different geographical areas and among different populations. It is in this regard that Foucault 1978: 143) speaks about the ‘proliferation of political technologies’ associated with transfers of experience between different fields of practice.
One of Foucault’s (1978: 141) most important arguments in this context concerns the transformation of the rudiments of anatomo- and bio-politics, originally contained within the field of economic processes, into governmental technologies present at all levels of society and used by various institutions. A similar development can be observed in the landmine case. I specifically maintain that the bodies-as-machines/protecting-populations nexus was completed in the context of the landmine case by the shift from a technology of citizenship/involvement without an advanced liberal funding regime to the systematic application of the technology of new contractualism. The landmine case-related Canadian social body thus emerged through the full integration of security and economic poles, i.e. linking human security practice with an economic model that specified the relationship between the peace machine and the state apparatus. This body can thus be understood as a result of juridical government and the art of neo-liberal economics together targeting international development NGOs. Put differently, the social body was constituted as a reality of transactions between the government and those NGOs. According to Deleuze and Guattari,

[a] new type of unity triumphs in the subject. The world has lost its pivot; the subject … accedes to a higher unity, of ambivalence or overdetermination, in an always supplementary dimension to that of its object (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 6).

The notion of social body as a diffused assemblage of effectuations and people/organisations through which the landmine case has been unfolding after 1997 is important for two reasons. Firstly, it overcomes a binary of rulers vs. ruled in the
relationship between the state apparatus and the peace machine. Secondly, once the relationship was reimagined in a more functionally connected way, the process of the ongoing depoliticisation of NGOs could be consummated. After the Canadian social body was completed through the regular use of the technology of new contractualism, the energy previously invested in ideological/political struggles between the actors began to be seen as a waste of resources. Enunciations concerning efficient and effective performance have become the fundamental ordering principle.

Finally, advanced liberal government and, more specifically, the technology of new contractualism have in the post-1997 landmine case been expressed through the establishment of the field of visibility, which can simultaneously be conceived of as a technique of performance, since all actors use it to report on their activities. According to Dean (1999: 30), visibility is a necessary condition for the operation of a particular technology, as it renders possible the exchange of knowledge and experience through the use of tables, graphs and statistics. This role has been served in the landmine case by the ICBL’s Landmine Monitor, an internet-based clearing house run by ICBL. The Landmine Monitor was founded in 1998, and MAC has been an important editorial board member. Additionally, the Landmine Monitor has been substantially funded by the Government of Canada and features a global reporting network, a set of annual reports, CD-ROMs, fact sheets and country reports (ICBL 2007). As the Landmine Monitor website states, ‘Canada helped to conceptualise the Landmine Monitor system [and] … in addition to financial grants the federal government also provided logistical and in-kind support for Landmine Monitor meetings held in Canada’ (ICBL 2000). This web-based project therefore epitomises how governments have transferred responsibility to NGOs with regard to monitoring and reporting on states’ compliance with the Ottawa Convention.
CHAPTER 5

HYBRIDISED HUMAN SECURITY ASSEMBLAGE

This chapter analyses the usually overlooked unintended consequences of Canadian human security (CanHS). Two trends are discerned in this light: the growing heterogeneity and hybridity of the country’s human security assemblage, and an increase in governmental attempts to capture NGOs which form a peace machine in this issue area into a disciplinary, arborified governmental regime. As far as the first trend is concerned, the chapter demonstrates how the hybridisation of the country’s human security assemblage has been produced by plugging the Canadian military war machine into this assemblage. Linking human security with external military action and the reterritorialisation of this hybridised assemblage in and over Kosovo and in Afghanistan serves as an important reminder that human security and national security have never been mutually exclusive alternatives. Rather, human security has been sustained by national security while, simultaneously, national security – and sometimes even the use of military force – has been legitimised by human security. Humanitarian intervention is thus conceptualised as an example of “sovereign biopolitics”. It will be shown how Canadian hybridised human security assemblage has subsequently been neutralised and negated both by domestic political calculation and by the country’s push into post-conflict spaces. It will be argued that in Afghanistan, the concept of peace-building replaced human security in its role as the central notion. What follows is an investigation of another unintended consequence related to CanHS: its “domestication” – i.e. the appropriation for domestic political purposes, specifically for the legitimisation of domestic counter-terrorism legislation.
The discussion will include a reflection on the shift from a centripetal apparatus of security into a centrifugal apparatus. In regard to the second trend, governmental capturing of security-oriented NGOs through the imposition of an ever-more disciplinary regime signals the end of the previously predominant rhizomatic governance of human security. The Canadian government (literally) managed to arborify the human security assemblage. The dark side of liberal freedom in a rhizomatic security assemblage is revealed through an analysis of so-called Results-Based Management (RBM) which has led to the proliferation of risk management in CanHS assemblage. This “neo-liberalised humanitarianism” testifies that assemblages can turn into different formations over time and that different mechanisms of power and elements can be plugged into them.

**External Militarisation and Sovereign Biopolitics**

The following section shows how and under what circumstances the Canadian government has appropriated the notion of human security, or more specifically its freedom-from-fear doctrine, for *external military action*. It will serve as an interesting example demonstrating how the human security-oriented part of the state apparatus can appropriate the military war machine and use it for pushing its political interests (for a discussion, cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 421-422). Specifically, this section will discuss the actual plugging of the military war machine into CanHS assemblage, including a reflection on the consequences of this hybridised assemblage. The developments analysed below reveal the limits of the human security assemblage being understood in transformative, or emancipatory, terms.
Similarly, it demonstrates that the popular understanding of human security as an alternative to national security has always been flawed. On the basis of the empirical evidence, in fact, one can argue the opposite, i.e. that human security became a very powerful vehicle for national security. That this has not been a mere coincidence can be seen from a series of events which are examined in this context: the Kosovo intervention and subsequent legal codification of the idea of humanitarian intervention, as well as the Canadian participation in Operation Enduring Freedom and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. It will be argued that, first, the division of soft power and hard power has become untenable, not only practically but also conceptually; and, second, even more profoundly, previous governmental attempts to distinguish between the paradigm of national security (considered obsolete) and human security (understood in progressive terms) have in practice been abandoned. In Deleuze-Guattarian terms, nothing less than a merger of two security assemblages – national security and human security – has taken place.

The 1999 Kosovo air campaign, which was carried out by NATO and in which Canada played an important role, represented the key event in the hybridisation of human and national security, both in terms of enunciations and effectuations. In concrete terms, the Canadian government, frustrated by repeatedly foiled attempts to address the question of how to stop the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic committing atrocities against the ethnically Albanian population of Serbia, decided to resort to use force and played a crucial role in the war by contributing military aircraft and troops. The actual Operation Allied Force began on March 24, 1999, and lasted until June 9, 1999, when NATO forces militarily defeated Milosevic. While the military operation was under way, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia indicted Milosevic for crimes against humanity. Although without the U.N. Security Council backing and thus usually considered illegal, the NATO action was justified on humanitarian grounds. This can be seen from the conclusions of the Kosovo Commission, chaired by Richard Goldstone, which argued that the intervention was ‘illegal but legitimate’ (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000: 4).

The link between human rights and human security was the crucial discursive node in the justification of the action and resorting to military means was presented as the only option. In the words of the then NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana,

> [a]ll efforts to achieve a negotiated, political solution to the Kosovo crisis having failed, no alternative is open but to take military action … Our objective is to prevent more human suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo … We have a moral duty to do so (NATO Press Release 1999).

Similarly, as Paul Heinbecker, then assistant deputy minister for Global and Security policy at the Canadian DFAIT argued, ‘[h]uman security is not a pacifist doctrine. NATO, including Canada, did not stop Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo by dropping diplomatic notes on him’ (Heinbecker 2007: 10-11). Heinbecker’s statement and empirical evidence of the hybridisation of CanHS look all the more interesting when two dynamics are taken into account: First, Canadian participation in the NATO bombing of Serbia was the only post-WW2 instance of Canadian support for a mission without U.N. Security Council backing. Second, the actual use of military force blended with the human rights/human security discourse represented a huge
deviation from the Canadian official strategy to win a rotating seat in the U.N. Security Council in 1998. In the words of Marten,

It is generally agreed that Canada won the competition for one of the rotating seats in the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) in 1998 largely because of its peacekeeping legacy, a theme that was emphasised in Canada’s campaign strategy for the seat. Former Minister of External Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy worked to carve out a particular role for Canada in the United Nations as a defender of what he called “human security,” as opposed to state security, using the term “soft power” to describe Canada’s strategic goal (Marten 2006: 179).

Be that as it may, it is not the task of this thesis to determine the extent to which it was militarily necessary to use force against Milosevic or to normatively assess the references to moral duty. At the same time, the hybridisation of enunciations and effectuations is worthy of interrogation. This is done from a different angle, namely through the lens of the relationship between biopower and sovereign power. It is precisely the connection between the two types of power, rather than their opposition, that has underpinned a newly hybridised notion of security.

The formalisation of Canadian hybridised enunciations and effectuations related to the country’s military involvement in the 1999 NATO Air Campaign contains elements of Clausewitz’s flow of absolute war, which is also discussed by Deleuze and Guattari. Clausewitz argues that while “real war” describes the empirical deployment of war by modern state apparatuses as a means to achieve political ends, “absolute war” is a more complex mixture of violence, reason, and
chance (von Clausewitz 1993: 101). Chance in absolute war can be understood as a rhizomatic offshoot, ‘the drawing of a creative line of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 422), since ‘creative spirit is free to roam within it’ (von Clausewitz 1993: 101). The part of war which escaped from the actual military campaign – i.e. war which ‘remain[s] an abstraction, an Idea, something real and nonactual’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 420) – has become central in the further development of the human security assemblage. In the wake of the Kosovo Air Campaign, human security was directly connected to this war-as-an-idea, with the result that human security and national security assemblages became further hybridised, practically to a point of merger.

The next phase of this hybridisation began almost as soon as the Kosovo war ended, and was characterised by attempts to reframe humanitarian intervention and make the resulting product permanent through the introduction of a new international norm. This has marked the transformation of the creative line of flight into a Canada-led attempt to codify this hybridisation. For this purpose, the Canadian government decided to use the very forum which had previously refused to embrace humanitarian intervention in Kosovo: the United Nations. That was largely given by the fact that the then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan was sympathetic to the idea. He wrote an influential article for a British weekly *The Economist* on September 18, 1999, in which he argued that

The Kosovo conflict and its outcome have prompted a debate of worldwide importance. And to each side in this debate difficult questions can be posed. To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council
mandate, one might say: leave Kosovo aside for a moment, and think about Rwanda … To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era when states and groups of states can take military action outside the established mechanisms for enforcing international law, one might equally ask: Is there not a danger of such interventions undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system created after the second world war, and of setting dangerous precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion to decide who might invoke these precedents and in what circumstances? (Annan 1999).

Lloyd Axworthy, the then Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, saw Annan’s statement as suitable grounds for launching Canada’s own diplomatic project in this direction, in the form of the establishment of the so-called independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Composed of scholars and former politicians, Canada had a strong presence in the Commission, with two members out of twelve (Gisèle Côté-Harper and Michael Ignatieff) having ideological and personal ties to the Canadian government of that time. The final product of the ad hoc Commission was presented in 2001 in the form of an ICISS Report, The Responsibility to Protect (R2P). In Axworthy’s own words, ‘what happened is that the notion of “human security” has morphed into a new concept called “responsibility to protect”’ (Axworthy 2005: 19). The R2P quickly became one of the main agendas for the DFAIT as a whole (personal interview with a Senior DFAIT Official, Grainau, Germany, February 17, 2007).

While the popular reading of the R2P Report has emphasised the right of humanitarian intervention, mainly because of the (slightly misleading) first sentence
of the Report which holds that ‘[t]his report is about the so-called “right of humanitarian intervention”’ (ICISS 2001: vii), the discursive gambit was in fact much more sophisticated and interesting. Arguably, the R2P represents a shift away from the classical liberal discourse based on the notion of an a priori right to intervene. That is for two reasons: first, such an understanding had been unacceptable to the majority of developing countries which have been suspicious of any attempts by liberal states (often, though not always, ex-colonial powers themselves) to claim such a right in light of their colonial experiences; and second, an a priori right to intervene on humanitarian grounds was traditionally based on patches of liberal principles contained in the U.N. Charter which did not prove to be strong enough to take priority over realist principles (especially articles 2.4 and 2.7) present in the same document. It was the latter principles which have dominated whenever the interpretation of the U.N. Charter was performed by the Security Council. The most interesting move of the R2P Report, and the one that inextricably ties up together sovereign power and biopower, has been the Report’s transfer of responsibility to take care of the population to the very state within which that population lives. In the words of the R2P Report,

sovereignty as responsibility has become the minimum content of good international citizenship … There is no transfer or dilution of state sovereignty. But there is a necessary re-characterization involved: from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties … Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility, in a way that is being increasingly recognized in state practice, has a threefold significance. First, it implies that the state authorities are
responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN. And thirdly, it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission. The case for thinking of sovereignty in these terms is strengthened by the ever-increasing impact of international human rights norms, and the increasing impact in international discourse of the concept of human security (ICISS 2001: 8, 13; emphasis in original).

(Re)Interpretation of sovereignty in the R2P Report suggests that a novel diagram combining sovereign power and biopower in unprecedented ways is under way. I will call this diagram sovereign biopolitics. On the basis of the above R2P’s discursive shift, one needs to reject the widespread though flawed idea that biopower somehow replaces sovereign power with the ascendance of the 21st Century (cf. Hardt and Negri 2000), as well as the idea that sovereign power is always repressive and its main preoccupation is with the right to kill and/or with the introduction of exceptions to the liberal order (cf. Agamben 1998). One of the problems with current attempts to theorise the relationship between sovereignty and biopolitics has been the fact that IR Foucauldeans have read Foucault through Agamben (for a compelling critique, cf. Alt 2010 and Chandler 2010b). These “Fou-gambenites” have distorted Foucault’s thinking on the subject and do not pay sufficient attention to Foucault’s observation concerning the demonic nature of the modern state, which is depicted as the ‘confluence of the murderous power of the sovereign’s sword and the productive,
vitalist power of biopolitics’ (Prozorov 2007: 107). Thus, according to Foucault, ‘the modern state is a monstrous unison of the executioner and the physician’ (Foucault 1988: 71). As the R2P Report suggests, not only are sovereign power and biopower complementary, they are actually mutually constitutive of each other.

Additionally, Foucault once remarked that sovereignty is the ‘underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence’ (Foucault 1978: 137). The Report and its central R2P norm confirm this oft-neglected observation and, also show that an informal principle of subsidiarity at the international level, i.e. a bottom-up strategy of political problem-solving, is at play. The R2P diagram of sovereign biopolitics can be depicted in the following way: The first-order biopolitical responsibility resides with a state apparatus controlling a given country and it is this government’s duty to protect the lives of citizens and enhance their welfare. Sovereign power exercised at the national level thus ensures that biopower can be applied ‘at the level of life itself’ (Foucault 1978: 141-142), thereby serving as a kind of guarantor. If sovereign power at this level fails to underpin biopolitical conduct, either due to the inability, or unwillingness, of the national government, the second-order biopolitical responsibility is invoked. It resides with international donors and an international network of neo-liberalised NGOs which form the service-delivery peace machine: this aspect is tackled at some detail in the second half of this chapter, which examines inside-out logic of the Canadian governmentality of risk-management proliferation.

As far as third-order biopolitical responsibility is concerned, this resides with the international society of states and the U.N. Security Council (mandate-provision) and is reserved for ‘extreme cases only’ (ICISS 2001: 31-35). Biopolitics and sovereignty become deeply entangled at this level. Their relationship that is implied
by the norm of R2P can be characterised as the two-tier aggregation of selected sovereign power, with the first tier being the permanent five in the Security Council, and the second tier being comprised of the non-permanent members of the body. It ensures that the biopolitical care of the population in a given state is re-established by the international community and the U.N. Security Council. An interesting situation occurs if a P5 country decides to threaten to use, or actually does use, its veto to block third-order biopolitical responsibility attempts. Then, the Security Council is trapped in a situation in which two different logics of sovereignty are used: the traditional logic through which a blocking country indirectly supports the right to kill (i.e. allows atrocities to continue), and a novel logic through which supporting countries try to guarantee an individual’s right to continued existence. To sum up, not only does the third-order biopolitical responsibility rely on the aggregation of sovereign power, but, furthermore, it cannot be separated from the use of force and military means. Canadian successful efforts to codify sovereignty as responsibility therefore presupposed a militarily-framed sovereign biopolitics.

**Afghan Neutralisation and Counter-Terrorism Domestication**

As Axworthy’s (2005) reflections, as well as existing theoretical accounts (cf. Doucet and Larrinaga 2008), maintain, the Responsibility to Protect and human security became one. The key task of the following section is to find out to what extent this argument is empirically and theoretically substantiated, and whether or not there has remained any human security outside of the realm of R2P. In this context, I will argue and demonstrate that there have been some unexpected and
usually overlooked developments in CanHS assemblage, apart from its hybridisation through the incorporation of R2P. Consequently, the key question posed is how new lines of human security have been assembled and subsequently used to promote certain types of policies. Linear expectations concerning the development of CanHS assemblage after successful efforts to codify the idea of R2P into a legal norm would suggest that the Canadian government became one of the main proponents of the norm’s practical application to situations for which it was designed, such as the genocide in Sudan’s Darfur province. Contrary to these expectations, nevertheless, Canadian governments – both the pre-2006 Liberals and the post-2006 Conservatives – have avoided any attempts to invoke human security and the R2P norm in this context and, instead, used human security for very different purposes, namely as a response to the events of 9/11. In concrete terms, human security has been redirected to and reterritorialised in two other areas: internationally, in Canada’s state-building/peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan, and, domestically, in the country’s fight against terrorism after 9/11. These will be dealt with in turn.

From many sides the cardinal shift in the use of human security by Canadian state apparatus was seen in the aftermath of the events of 9/11. For a start, the understanding of 9/11 embraced in this thesis is fully in line with Puar’s, who depicted it in the following way:

September 11, when invoked, is done so cautiously, as an event in the Deleuzian sense, privileging lines of flight, an assemblage of spatial and temporal intensities, coming together, dispersing, reconverging. The event-ness of September 11 refuses the binary of watershed moment and turning point of radical change, versus intensification of more of the
same, tethered between its status as a “history-making moment” and a “history-vanishing moment” (Puar 2007: xviii).

Although Canadian reaction has been seen as natural, there was, however, nothing inevitable about the way in which the Canadian state apparatus responded to the attacks. As the lines below demonstrate, a historicising reification of the event needs to be rejected. This is chiefly due to the fact that CanHS assemblage has been connected to these events, contrary to this view, in a productive fashion, with new transmutations and uses being the result. These lines will suggest ways in which CanHS assemblage, a repeatedly arborified rhizome but still a rhizome nonetheless (imperfect as much as messy practices and discourses are), has dealt with the 9/11 encounter.

Without any doubt, Canadian most important international response was that the country joined the U.S.-led coalition of the willing which went to Afghanistan to find and bring to justice the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, leaders of Al-Qaeda and of the Taliban government harbouring them. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), planned for these purposes and legitimised by Article V of the Washington Treaty, has been a militarily robust, peace-enforcement style international campaign against terrorism, sometimes also labelled an international stabilisation campaign. The main participation of the Canadian Forces in the OEF is known as Operation APOLLO, which started on October 7, 2001, and was supported by U.N. Resolution No. 1368 a 1373 (DND 2004). Existing governmental documents suggest that the notion of human security was not used for legitimisation of the OEF. The events of 9/11 were discursively presented by the Canadian government as the radical moment of change;
the cause for sidelining the country’s human security programme. In the words of one high-ranking official at DFAIT,

it was the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent U.S. pressure on Canada to step up her counter-terrorism activities - rather than the lack of funding or anything else, that suddenly reduced the importance of human security in governmental strategies. It was a dramatic U-turn in many respects (personal interview with a Senior Official, DFAIT, Ottawa, April 26, 2006).

Additionally, Canadian participation in Afghanistan has been assessed as the blatant abandonment of human security in favour of military power: ‘[i]t is illustrative that the pioneer of human security, Canada, faced with the kind of resistance in Afghanistan has moved back to traditional hard power approaches’ (den Boer and de Wilde 2008: 247). This understanding, however, misses the point, both on conceptual and empirical grounds. Conceptually, the dyad of human security/soft power and national security/hard power was already challenged in the previous section, which showed the hybridisation of human security and theorised it as a specimen of sovereign biopolitics. Empirically, den Boer and de Wilde’s claim is not supported by existing evidence. Rather, the opposite has happened. The initial use of Canadian military force in Afghanistan on grounds of (inter)national security legitimisation saw no mention of human security. The limits of purely military OEF were seen quite early, and this has been one of the reasons that NATO decided to launch its own mission in Afghanistan: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Unlike the OEF delimited negatively (i.e. to find and kill Al-Qaeda
associates and Taliban leaders), ISAF mission was introduced as a positively oriented mission with the objective of reconstructing Afghanistan. The centrepiece of ISAF mission was a series of nationally-run provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), each having a military part and a civilian part. PRTs can thus be considered examples of reterritorialised sovereign biopolitics.

The unintended consequences of the application of already hybridised human security to the context of Canadian efforts to reconstruct parts of Afghanistan are spelled out below. The Canadian government integrated its forces into NATO ISAF structures at the beginning of 2003. In July 2003, the Canadian government launched Operation ATHENA as a part of NATO ISAF mission. After its initial security functions (2003-2004) related to the protection of members of Loya Djirga (Afghanistan’s traditional assembly of tribal and elderly leaders), Operation ATHENA was relocated to Afghanistan’s Kandahar Province in 2005, one of the two most dangerous provinces in Afghanistan. The event after which Canadian discursive reliance on human security stopped was not, as usually thought (cf. Bradbury and Owen 2009), the general elections in 2006 won by Harper’s Conservatives. The termination came a year earlier and took on a much more subtle form. The key document in this respect was the Government of Canada’s International Policy Statement (IPS) of 2005. This is all more surprising when one considers that the document was never officially embraced, either by the Liberals, who lost the elections in the meantime, or by the Conservatives, who did not want to be seen as continuing the policies of the previous government, especially at the level of enunciations.
What is more, the IPS did not abruptly abandon traditional human security discourse: rather, it gradually neutralised it. This can be seen in the introductory part of the IPS titled Foreword from the Prime Minister which still argued that

Canada is committed to extending human rights and human security throughout the world … [S]overeign frontiers [cannot] serve as an excuse for tolerating actions that contravene human security or contribute to global instability. One truth is undeniable: security in the 21st Century is a common interest, and a shared responsibility (The Government of Canada 2005: 11, 20; emphasis added).

With the use of the phrase “human security”, PM Martin’s main objective was political, namely to calm a restless public and governmental officials, as well as Canadian international development/human security community. He indicated that he would embrace and extend the policies of his predecessor, Jean Chrétien, during whose years in power all important initiatives germane to human security took place. References to human security were also contained in specific parts of the IPS on development and diplomacy. In the part on diplomacy, human security was identified as one of four priorities of the DFAIT (The Government of Canada 2005: 9) and the issue area for ‘renewing Canadian leadership’ (The Government of Canada 2005: 14). Human security as the political priority and DFAIT’s call for a renewal of leadership in this area did not, however, correspond to the overall priorities of the Canadian government and the PM himself. These were, instead, support for the establishment of ‘a new Peacebuilding Commission, a Human Rights Council, and an internationally agreed definition of terrorism’ (The Government of Canada 2005: 14).
Instead of the use of previously proved (and hybridised) human security for post-conflict situations, of which Afghanistan has been identified as the most pressing, IPS came up with the idea of the so-called three-dimensional (3D) approach. It consisted of undertaking *Defence* efforts to strengthen security and stability, pursuing *Diplomacy* to enhance prospects for nation-building and reconstruction, and making certain that *Development* contributions are brought to bear in a coordinated and effective way (The Government of Canada 2005: 5; emphasis in original).

As the above quote suggests, the 3D approach was discursively linked in the IPS to the notion of nation-building/peace-building, with the result of reducing the practical enunciative function of human security. Despite the fact that human security received significant exposure in the IPS, it was never invoked there in a practically relevant way for processes of post-conflict reconstruction. The IPS was the last governmental document of such importance in which the notion appeared. Although the existing academic literature emphasises a close relationship between the concepts of peace-building and human security (e.g. Conteh-Morgan 2005; Cockell 2000), the IPS *neutralised*, rather than reinforced, the salience of human security. The most important reason for this was that Canadian top priority became its NATO commitment in Afghanistan, i.e. the country’s involvement in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. In regard to Canadian involvement in Afghanistan, the human security assemblage has transmutated into a hybridised peace-building assemblage. Peace-building has been seen as a better discursive
candidate than human security for several reasons. Indeed, one of the reasons for the Canadian government to elevate the prominence of peace-building was its diplomatic efforts to establish the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission. The second reason was motivated by the Liberal government’s greater ability to conceal a number of domestically unpopular measures which the government could not readily link to human security but was able to present as a part of inclusive peace-building efforts (e.g. peace-enforcement tools). Additionally, all other nations which have participated in Afghanistan’s reconstruction have used similar discourses on peace-building to legitimise their efforts, and it made sense for Canada to stick with internationally accepted discourse. This was despite the fact that there have been different assemblages of effectuations behind similarly constructed enunciations (for an example of such difference, see Chapter 8 of this thesis on Japan).

What is more, the peace-building assemblage has enabled the government to introduce measurable short-to-medium-term goals with available funding for the DFAIT-supervised Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), into which Canadian peace machine has been plugged. NGOs which were invited to participate in the 3D peace-building approach have launched the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, later renamed to Peacebuild (David Lord, personal interview by author, Ottawa, April 18, 2006). According to the official website,

Peacebuild is unique as a civil society mechanism for dialogue with government departments and international stakeholders on issues related to violent conflict. It bridges and enriches non-governmental and governmental dialogue and interaction to strengthen Canadian policy
options and practice. Specifically, Peacebuild's activities aim to: 1. Increase interaction among and between civil society actors and government involved in peacebuilding activities; 2. Contribute to knowledge generation and sharing within Canada and globally; 3. Increase cooperation in joint programming at all levels; and 4. Increase overall effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions (Peacebuild 2009: not numbered).

The discursive re-casting of human security as peace-building/nation-building and government-initiated transformations of the peace machine’s focus through shifting priorities for available funding has meant that the logic of issue areas around which CanHS was previously structured was replaced by the logic of missions, most notably the reconstruction mission in Afghanistan. This can be seen from a governmental statement delivered by Peter Van Loan, the then Minister of International Trade, who maintained that introducing the Global Peace and Security Fund is crucial to support peace processes and mediation efforts, develop transitional justice and reconciliation initiatives, build peace enforcement and peace operations capabilities, promote civilian protection strategies in humanitarian contexts, and reduce the impact of landmines, small arms and light weapons (Van Loan 2010: not numbered).

Thus, when the conservatives under the leadership of Stephen Harper won the 2006 election, they did not need to do much in terms of purging the human security assemblage at the enunciative level. By that time, the Liberals had already shifted
attention and used the discourse on peace-building, not on human security, to promote a certain type of hybridised security policy; the Afghan commitment of the Liberals had merely been extended by Harper’s Conservatives (Davis 2009). At the level of effectuations, Canadian hybridised security assemblage has become governed and directed by the reactive logic of out-of-area missions.

The neutralisation of human security and thus the practical end of its use for external events, involvements and actions did not mean, however, the complete burying of the concept by the Canadian government. As the following lines demonstrate, the notion of human security was invoked in the post-9/11 domestic context of debates concerning counter-terrorism measures. The then still popular notion of human security was blatantly appropriated by the Liberal government for the justification of Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), which was issued immediately after the 9/11 attacks. The ATA was passed and enacted on December 18, 2001, as Bill C-36. In his essay, Thinking Outside the Box: Foundational Principles for a Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy, Irwin Cotler, Professor of Law at McGill University, who subsequently became Canadian Minister of Justice, argued that the ATA should be assessed against a ‘converging and inclusive domestic and international perspective anchored in the notion of human security – itself a people-centred rather than state-centred approach’ (Cotler 2001: 112). Cotler continued by arguing that

the configurative analysis of this Bill in terms of national security versus civil liberties may be as misleading as inappropriate. The better approach from a conceptual and foundational point of view is to regard the legislation as human security legislation, which seeks to protect both
national security – or the security of democracy if not democracy itself – and civil liberties. As the United Nations puts it, terrorism constitutes a fundamental assault on human rights and, as such, a threat to international peace and security, while counter-terrorism law involves the protection of the most fundamental rights, the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person, as well as the collective right to peace (Cotler 2001: 112-113; emphasis added).

Cotler represented a minority yet influential position promoting the idea that the emergency legislation should be made permanent. He pointed out that the reasons which led him to such a conclusion had to do with ATA being ‘legacy legislation [that] is likely to be with us for a long time’ (Ibid: 129).

The use of human security for a highly controversial bill which significantly extended the powers of the Canadian state apparatus and was similar in terms of its draconic powers to the U.S. Patriot Act (as a matter of fact, the former was modelled after the latter), is surprising to many, especially when one realises that ATA expanded the security and surveillance powers of the Canadian government, allowed secret trials as well as pre-emptive detentions of individuals suspected of planning a terrorist act for up to 72 hours (Wispinski 2006). In words of Kent Roach,

Canada used human security as an animating theme for its domestic security policy at a time where some have observed its declining influence in Canadian foreign policy … The Canadian government’s use of the term “human security” domestically has demonstrated its ambiguity. It was used immediately after 9/11 to help justify the hard power of expanding
the criminal law and police powers in an attempt to apprehend and punish terrorists (Roach 2010: 221).

The notion of human security as a discursive backbone for the ATA was left behind by the Public Safety Act of 2004, which came into force on April 4, 2005, and the release of the national security document titled *Securing an Open Society*. This was the moment of enunciative de-plugging of ATA from the already domesticated CanHS assemblage. The shift in the governmental attitude went from the emphasis on the domestic criminalisation of terrorism, as seen in the ATA, to the embrace of an “‘all-risk” approach concerned with emergency preparedness for natural disasters and pandemics as well as with the dangers of terrorism’ (Roach 2010: 221). In 2003, the government established a specific department, Public Safety Canada, whose objective was to provide ‘emergency management, national security, crime prevention and corrections policy’ (Public Safety Canada 2010: not numbered). Although different from the hard-power approach represented by ATA, the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, founded in 2003, legitimised its existence very similarly:

The Government of Canada, as part of its National Security Policy, is building a fully integrated security system, to enable Canada to respond more effectively to existing and emerging threats to its national security. The necessity for an integrated security system has become increasingly evident in recent years, most dramatically demonstrated by the events of September 11, 2001, and the numerous and widespread terrorist attacks since then (Canadian Security Intelligence Service 2008: not numbered).
The shift from the original contents of ATA to the all-risk approach can be understood through processes of conceptual broadening. Specifically, one can observe the creation of an open-ended, modular rhizomatic system which is capable of making many unprecedented links and quick, integrated responses to many and diverse types of threat. This shift brings with it a number of theoretical points. Importantly, some of them can be examined through Foucault’s conceptualisation contained in *Territory, Security and Population*. In this book, Foucault tries to develop an understanding of the difference between discipline and apparatuses of security on the basis of a *centripetal* vs. *centrifugal* divide. He argues that ‘[d]iscipline is essentially centripetal … [It] functions to the extent that it isolates a space, that it determines a segment. Discipline concentrates, focuses, and encloses’ (Foucault 2007: 44). This understanding of discipline is fully in line with Deleuze-Guattarian discussion of processes of arborification, through which socio-political order is imposed by the state apparatus. As Foucault maintains, ‘[o]rder is what remains when everything that is prohibited has in fact been prevented’ (Ibid: 46). The initial response of the Canadian government to 9/11 by the enactment of ATA can thus be interpreted as such a disciplinary, arborifying move: ‘[t]he first action of discipline is in fact to circumscribe a space in which its power and the mechanisms of its power will function fully and without limit’ (Ibid: 44-45). The spread of wiretapping, copying U.S. homeland defence measures by the Canadian government, as well as the introduction of the Smart Border Declaration, a rapidly signed bilateral deal on December 12, 2001, between Canada and the United States, all serve as examples of exceptional circumscription of national space and a heightened discipline of citizens.
The end of ATA-induced exceptionalism to domestic liberal rule can be seen both in the introduction of the all-risk approach as well as the expiration of some of the most controversial provisions, specifically preventive arrests and investigative hearings, on March 1, 2007. This marks a shift from the domestic counter-terrorism discipline to the introduction of seamless contingency planning. The all-risk approach is a *prima facie* example of an *apparatus of security*: ‘the apparatuses of security … have the constant tendency to expand; they are centrifugal’ (Foucault 2007: 44-45). This continuous expansion and integration of hitherto isolated components has taken place after the introduction of the Public Safety Act and the Securing an Open Society document. Pipelines, electricity grids, airports, dangerous chemicals, to name but a few, were added to emergency preparedness plans (Roach 2010: 221). This confirms Foucault’s observation that ‘[n]ew elements are constantly being integrated [into an apparatus of security]: production, psychology, behaviour, the ways of doing things’ (Foucault 2007: 45). As Foucault adds, ‘security therefore involves organising, or anyway allowing the development of ever-wider circuits’ (Ibid: 45).

The enactment of ATA with its original focus represented a knee-jerk response to the U.S.A.’s own response – a kind of linear, naturalist and arborescent meta-response, rather than a creative response to 9/11 which would contain lines of flight. The all-risk “correction” was then, more then anything else, an adjustment in line with the overall advanced liberal rationality of government. This move going back to the rhizomatic principles can be understood as a manifestation of resilience in Canadian advanced liberal rationality of government. As Foucault holds,
The apparatus of security … “lets things happen.” Not that everything is left alone, but *laissez-faire* is indispensable … [T]he apparatus of security … is not taking the point of view of what prevented or the point of view of what is obligatory, but standing back sufficiently so that one can grasp the point at which things are taking place, whether or not they are desirable. This means trying to grasp them at the level of their nature, or let’s say – this world not having the meaning we now give it – grasping them at the level of their effective reality … [T]his fundamental principle that political technique must never get away from the interplay of reality within itself is profoundly linked to the general principle of what is called liberalism (Foucault 2007: 45-48).

Paradoxically in light of its prominence in the process of legitimising the ATA, human security has never been invoked in relation to the all-risk approach and integrated contingency planning, though it certainly lies in closer proximity to discursive characteristics of the concept. This is exactly the proof of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the non-parallel formalisation of assemblages of enunciation and effectuation: one rarely, if ever, does what one says.

The above examination of neutralisation of human security thought its re-plugging to peace-building, as well as its surprising appropriation for completely different purposes, namely to domestically enact highly controversial counter-terrorism legislation after 9/11, only confirms that human security has served as an empty container which has been suppressed, re-plugged, refilled and reterritorialised again and again, for different purposes in different contexts. Both the case of the external neutralisation of human security and its counter-terrorism domestication
suggest that CanHS assemblage, however hybridised and arborified, still possessed rhizomatic qualities. Deleuze’s discussion of “concrete multiplicities” can be invoked in this context. As he reminded us, it is always within a given multiplicity where all processes occur: ‘unifications, subjectifications, rationalizations, centralizations’ (Deleuze 1995: 146). And as he concluded, ‘Unity is precisely what’s missing from [rhizomatic] multiplicity’ (Ibid: 146).

**Neo-liberalised “Humanitarianism” and Proliferation of Risk Management**

The final section of this chapter examines the ongoing neo-liberalisation of Canadian humanitarian practice. It serves as an example of how a rhizomatic assemblage can be arborified for some time. When speaking of concrete multiplicities, Deleuze maintains that processes which take place within them ‘often amount to an impasse or closing off that prevents the multiplicity’s growth, the extension and unfolding of its lines, the production of something new’ (Deleuze 1995: 146). That rhizomes can be arborified and lines of flight plugged can be seen from related Deleuze’s reflection on his joint work with Félix Guattari, which was concerned with rhizomatic and arborescent assemblages:

> Processes are becomings, and aren’t judged by some final result but by the way they proceed … That’s why we contrasted rhizomes with trees – trees, or rather arborescent processes, being temporary limits that block rhizomes and their transformations for a while (Deleuze 1995: 146)
It is in the context of this observation that neo-liberal humanitarianism will be investigated. Although the notion of human security has neither been explicitly used by the late Liberals nor by the recent conservative government, it is interesting to pay attention to continuations and transformations of policies that were once considered central to CanHS assemblage. Specifically, I will show how NGOs involved in Canadian peace machine have been required by the state apparatus to “think locally” before being able to “act globally”. Not only will attention be paid to globalising processes of the governmentatisation of security and the systemic spread of norms and governmental elements that often bring along isomorphism and homogeneity but, crucially, to micro-processes which will reveal a local governmental assemblage lying behind the emergence of the predominant global governmentality. The importance of this investigation of micro-level processes in an advanced liberal state lies precisely in the fact that it complements similarly-oriented studies that have largely focused on the other end, i.e. on the practical impact of these practices on targeted ‘Southern’ countries (cf. Duffield 2001, 2007; Ebrahim 2004; Edkins 2000; Ferguson 1990). When juxtaposed, something like a governmental rationality “life-cycle” in the field of humanitarianism emerges.

Moreover, this section tackles control strategies present in “global” governance, through which the practices of NGOs engaged in global humanitarianism have been securitised. I deliberately speak of control strategies rather than disciplinary strategies for reasons explained in the previous section: while disciplinary strategies are of centripetal nature, control strategies are connected to rhizomatic centrifugal apparatuses of security. A contextually key notion of “societies of control” has been coined and developed by Deleuze, who explains the
difference between a disciplinary society and a society of control in the following way:

disciplinary societies initiate the organization of vast spaces of enclosure. The individual never ceases passing from one closed environment to another, each having its own laws ... Enclosures are moulds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point ... The operation of markets is now the instrument of social control and forms the impudent breed of our masters. Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long duration, infinite and discontinuous (Deleuze 1992: 3-6).

As will become clear, Canada’s most recent humanitarian practice has been defined by centrifugally-oriented features, thereby bearing a resemblance to the notion of society of control. The key element I will investigate in the globalisation of Canadian neo-liberalised humanitarian practice is Results-Based Management (RBM) with its principal technique of risk assessment.

It will be demonstrated that the main function of RBM and risk assessment has been to create a certain kind of docile subject – Canadian NGOs within the country’s peace machine, to spread governmental values and rationality abroad. In this process, the issue area of humanitarianism and its accompanying governance have become securitised, with only such and such NGOs being able to obtain
governmental funding. As a result, the originally NGO-driven governance of humanitarianism that used to be the epitome of plurality and inclusiveness has been transformed into a beacon of control and exclusiveness. Once again, the importance of emphasising the totalising dimension of neo-liberalism becomes clear in the light of unfolding processes of governance securitisation through totalising control. It will be in this context that Canada’s shift from earlier government support of highly political advocacy organisations to the nearly-complete depoliticisation of their recent successors will be discussed. Finally, the analysis of Canadian RBM and risk assessment shows that Canadian humanitarianism has been extended into a globally-operating, advanced liberal security assemblage. Here, the link between the securitised governance of humanitarianism and the globalising proliferation of risk assessment will be crucial for complete comprehension.

The recent peace machine of Canadian humanitarianism has derived its general logic from a political rationality that can be conceived of through the metaphor of advanced liberal assemblage. In Chapters 3 and 4, I showed how this assemblage, framed within the governmental programme of human security, has relied on the technology of new contractualism in the translation of its broad rationality into the daily practices of NGOs, with the advanced liberal funding regime being one of its most visible manifestations. In this section, consequently, I examine the key technique of risk assessment, through which CIDA as the central part of the Canadian state apparatus in the issue area of humanitarianism has been governing not only Canadian NGOs but also foreign NGOs involved in the peace machine of humanitarian practice. The importance of such an investigation is twofold: First, it allows one to see how CIDA has been able to devise novel ways of control through which it has regulated NGOs working in this issue area; and second,
this section gets into the centre of a discussion of how a local assemblage becomes securitised and subsequently evolves into a globalised political rationality.

The key instrument for the government to ensure effective spending of its payments has become its embracement of Results-Based Management (RBM). RBM was officially introduced for the first time in the CIDA Policy Statement of 1996, stating that ‘the RBM approach will assist CIDA in its efforts towards continuous improvement in results-orientation, focus, efficiency and accountability’ (CIDA Policy Statement 1996: not numbered). In an updated guide to the concepts and principles, CIDA defines RBM as

a means to improve management effectiveness and accountability by involving key stakeholders in defining realistic expected results, assessing risk, monitoring progress toward the achievement of expected results, integrating lessons learned into management decisions and reporting on performance … A result is a describable or measurable change in state that is derived from a cause and effect relationship. There are two key elements of this definition: 1) the importance of measuring change; and 2) the importance of causality as the logical basis for managing change … For example: “if” the developmental outputs are achieved as expected, “then” we should achieve the outcomes, and; “if” the outcomes are achieved as expected, “then” we should achieve the impact (CIDA 2006: not numbered).

In the above definition, a number of notions have been reduced in terms of the richness of their commonsensical meanings: The notion of accountability was thus
delimited to accountability for results (CIDA 1998), and reasons for the inclusion of stakeholders into the project plan were subsequently limited to the need to expand the information base, to establish clear roles and responsibilities, and to create an environment in which individuals and organisations accept that their accountability is about delivering results (CIDA 2006).

Canadian RBM has had the technique of risk assessment at its centre of gravity. As existing comparative studies suggest, the centralities of risk assessment and management of fiduciary risk in monitoring the use of government contributions, as done by governmental officers, have been unique to Canada (cf. Lavergne and Alba 2003). There are two interesting issues that have usually been neglected in existing analyses: the selectiveness in applying risk assessment strategies; and the difference made between internal, or operational, risks and external risks. As for selective application, while the CIDA Business Process Road Map Overview of 2008 makes risk assessment mandatory for ‘a Canadian firm, NGO, foreign organization or INGO’ entering into an *agreement* (either a contribution or a grant) with CIDA, in the case of projects with a budget over $200,000, performed by the a specialised Financial Risk Assessment Unit within CIDA, arrangements (either a contribution or a grant) with ‘an international governmental organization’ such as the U.N. or the World Bank are not being subjected to risk assessment at all (CIDA 2008: 44). Why the NGOs are lumped together with companies making profits and implicitly seen as problematic in terms of their possible misspending of governmental funding, as opposed to the risk-assessment “amnesty” of the U.N. or World Bank, is explained nowhere and even an interviewed senior CIDA official did not know how to explain it (personal interview with a Senior Official, CIDA, Gatineau, Canada, September 20, 2007). In regard to the second, one would expect that different types of risks will
be treated differently according to their specific features and nature. Nevertheless, the only difference between internal and external risks is made on the basis of their possible manageability:

[although] internal factors … could jeopardise the success of an initiative, e.g., program/project complexity, ineffective technical advisors, poor communication among delivery partners … [, and] they should also be monitored, they pose less of a threat than the external factors, since they are more easily brought within the manageable control (CIDA 2006).

As previously discussed, the advanced liberal assemblage with its neo-liberal core principles comprises individualising as well as totalising dimensions. Whereas the former is manifested in the transfer of accountability for results to both Canadian NGOs and “Southern” NGOs, the latter has stood behind the imposition of reporting and performance standards on the NGOs or the maintenance of risk assessment “in-house”, performed by CIDA staff, both in the field and at headquarters. Sometimes, the individualising and totalising dimensions of Canadian humanitarian practice have taken the form of a hybrid regime, as in the case of NGOs performance self-assessment:

there are also certain implications of moving towards a greater emphasis on performance self-assessment. For performance measurement to work as it was intended, CIDA managers need to exhibit an increased confidence and trust in program/project delivery partners/executing agencies. This will require a flexible “hands-off” approach to management, as stakeholders are
empowered with more of the responsibility for performance measurement than they would have with a traditional evaluation approach. Partners may also need to develop new skills and tools in order to take responsibility for performance measurement …. The enlightened manager should be able to answer the following question with evidence-based performance information: “Are we achieving the developmental results expected by the targeted beneficiaries at a reasonable cost”? (CIDA 2006: not numbered).

The examination of both dimensions is cardinal for one’s comprehension of how a locally set humanitarian assemblage evolves into a globalised humanitarian assemblage with a globally operating rationality of government, and how the formed “global humanitarian assemblage” gets securitised. Systemic diffusion of expertise in an increasingly dominant type of RBM – the so-called program-based management – can be used as an example of a process leading to “soft” globalisation of Canadian advanced liberal humanitarian assemblage. In 2002, CIDA announced a partial replacement of the previously dominant project-based approach by the program-based approach (PBA), with the latter aiming at ‘comprehensive and coordinated planning in a given sector or thematic area of intervention’ (Lavergne and Alba 2003: 2). This move can be interpreted as the unification of previously scattered patches of advanced liberal projects implemented through the technology of new contractualism and its subsequent reterritorialisation at the level of a global-governmental programme.

The key centre of related knowledge production (the ‘securitisation centre’) has been the Analysis and Research Division of CIDA’s Policy Branch. In order to make sure different donors used the same approach towards “Third World”
countries, experts from the Division have formed the Learning Network on Program-Based Approaches (LENPA), which brings together specialists from development agencies around the world. The international epistemic community forming this network held its first Forum on Accountability and Risk Management in Ottawa in 2002 and the network’s internet clearinghouse has been hosted by CIDA. Its motto ‘Your knowledge matters: Share it!’ is, nevertheless, baffling in light of the website being password-protected and this author’s repeated inability to register for access, although the visitor is offered such an option (I was asked to describe the reason for wanting to register in the form, so I realistically outlined the presented research project). This is a clear indicator of dissonance between the enunciative emphasis on the democratisation of Canadian international development policy, and practical attempts to securitise access to it. Despite one’s lack of access to the clearinghouse, the CIDA-led global network has been very influential both in its attempts to harmonise donors’ risk-assessment techniques, as well as to socialise recipient governments into LENPA standards for program-based management (cf. LENPA Synthesis Report 2005).

Apart from the above mechanism of the systemic spread of assembled expertise, there have been deployed two other securitising mechanisms through which CIDA’s local humanitarian assemblage has become globalised and through which the peace machine’s participation has been conditioned. These strategies of “humanitarian colonisation” have typically used a combination of direct pressure exercised by CIDA on recipient governments and the Canadian peace machine, as well as of indirect pressure on Canadian peace machine’s “Southern” non-governmental partners. As far as peer pressure is concerned, a high level of existing
aid dependence has been used as a pressure mechanism on recipient countries to accept CIDA’s management strategies:

One of the first questions to be asked is whether a PBA is most appropriate under particular circumstances. The first condition of appropriateness is whether there is any interest in the approach on the part of the host partner. Because PBAs involve a fair to high degree of donor involvement in host-country programming and budgeting, they imply a certain loss of sovereignty for the host country at that level. As a result, the host country is unlikely to find this an acceptable approach unless it is highly aid dependent. This is why PBAs are much more widely-used in Africa and aid-dependent Asian countries such as Vietnam and Bangladesh (Lavergne and Alba 2003: 21).

The key role of a securitising interface between CIDA and recipient governments/“Southern” NGOs has been played by the Canadian peace machine itself. Not only have the activities of Canadian NGOs been securitised by CIDA’s control-management approach, but the same NGOs have been used for the transmission of colonising PBA onto their “Southern” counterparts:

Canadians have engaged with Southern partners … for decades, and have enjoyed the support of CIDA’s Partnership Branch for these purposes. The question is how such relationships are called to evolve in the context of the policy shift in favour of PBAs. Two possible scenarios present themselves. One is for Canadian partners to engage with Southern
counterparts to reinforce the role that civil society can play in PBAs in their own countries. The other is for Canadian NGOs themselves to adopt PBAs with respect to their Southern counterparts. Many Canadian NGOs have experience of this sort already (Lavergne and Alba 2003: 47).

Also, CIDA’s indirect pressure on Canadian NGOs’ “Southern” non-governmental partners is another example here. This has been visible from the process of structuring and assessing joint NGO proposals for funding (called “Canadian-Southern NGO partnerships”) in certain ways and not others. In general, CIDA has favoured this type of partnership over individual applications. Additionally, the actual application form has had a regulatory effect on “Southern” NGOs in such partnerships, since it requires “western-standard” details about them, and at the same time actively involves them in advanced liberal procedures (personal interview with a Senior Official, CIDA, Gatineau, Canada, September 21, 2007).

Risk identification and assessment have played an important role in this exercise as seen from the application guidance: ‘[f]or each challenge or risk identified, please describe the strategies (if any) that you and your developing-country partner organization will use to overcome or mitigate these challenges and risks’ (CIDA 2006: 19). The Audit of CIDA’s Financial Risk Assessment Function of 2005, however, revealed the gap between CIDA’s Financial Risk Assessment Unit (FRAU) expectations and the difficulty for “Southern” NGOs to comply with risk assessment procedures in operational environments – a situation that has in turn led to a selective application of FRAU’s risk-assessment related recommendations:
Some FRAU recommendations are rarely applied by client branches, mainly because officers find them difficult (if not impossible) to apply in CIDA’s operational environment. Thus, for example, FRAU regularly recommends obtaining irrevocable letters of credit from not-for-profit organizations that pose potential financial risks. The officers we met, and the files we reviewed, indicate that, in the vast majority of cases, organizations concerned are unable to obtain such letters. In these cases, CIDA must apply compensatory mitigation measures (CIDA 2005: 18).

The use of RBM has not been exclusive to CIDA only. As the following lines show, DFAIT has been one of the proliferators as well. Despite the discursive shift from “human security” to “human rights” and “democratic development” performed by Harper’s Conservatives (Davis 2009), some of the former human security programmes have been kept in place and just renamed. This has been the case with a DFAIT programme that was once the pride of the Canadian Liberal government: Human Security Program. In 2007, the programme was renamed to the Glen Berry Program for Peace and Security, after Glyn R. Berry, a senior Canadian diplomat who was killed in a terrorist attack in Afghanistan in January 2006. The programme bears significant characteristics of a neo-liberal humanitarian exercise, and the guidelines for NGOs wanting to apply for funding are instructive in this respect. The programme has been injected with a heavy dose of RBM. On the main page, one of the first FAQs mentioned is: ‘I am not sure I have completed the Results-based Performance Framework document properly, as I do not have a background in results-based management. How do I ensure I include the right information here?’
That the programme has been completely neo-liberalised and the applicant has no other option than to learn about RBM and begin to think in its categories and logic can be seen from the DFAIT’s answer to the above question:

The results-based performance framework is an important tool to help assess a project's contribution to Program objectives and anticipated outcomes, and to measure project results. Please consult the RBPF [i.e. Results-Based Performance Framework] Instructions Sheet and RBPF Definitions Sheet to familiarize yourself with the objectives and language of the RBPF. Program officers are also available to answer questions and provide assistance in this area. Contact the Glyn Berry Program using the contact information provided above, and a program officer will be in touch with you (DFAIT 2009: not numbered).

The Results-Based Performance Framework Instructions Sheet has increased the pervasiveness of neo-liberal RBM in Canadian humanitarian/international development policies to an unprecedented level. To sum up, more time will surely be needed in order to say with some authority whether or not the recent, deeply entrenched government/NGO security assemblage is reversible or not. Although it seems all too improbable, one needs to bear in mind the following Foucault dictum: ‘where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power’ (Foucault 1978: 95).
CHAPTER 6

STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS FOR JAPANESE CONTINUITY

This is the first of the three chapters examining Japanese human security (JapHS). The chapter examines domestic and foreign-and-security-policy structural conditions which have shaped the terrain on which human security has much later been articulated. With regard to the first set of conditions, the key arguments made in this chapter are the following: first, it is argued that the key to one’s comprehension of both sets of conditions is the notion of fundamental continuity of the socio-political order, which has never been liberal in the Japanese case. Second, it is maintained that the nature of this order was particularly shaped by domestic economic, political and social developments between 1868 and 1912 (the Meiji Period) and, in addition to that, by Japanese wartime experience (1931-1945). Third, the unparalleled extent of bureaucratic oversight is recognised as the key structural factor in both sets of structural conditions and helps to shed light on the nature (and limits) of much later articulations of human security. The creation of a powerful domestic ideology aimed at the justification of bureaucratic methods and organisation is discussed in this context. With regard to the foreign-and-security-policy set of structural conditions, it will be held that they were linked to the notion of Japanese grand strategy in international politics. The expression “enrich the country, strengthen the military” (fukoku kyōhei) was the driver of JapFSP until 1945. However, it is demonstrated that the end of WW2 did not mark the major rupture, as the mainstream narrative suggests: rather, it represents a moment of continuity in which Japanese militarism, embodied in the doctrine of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, was replaced
by the mercantilism of the Yoshida Doctrine. While the means changed, the logic of
strengthening the state remained the same.

Both sets of conditions are theorised accordingly. With regard to domestic
conditions of continuity, Japanese structural conditions are identified to be the basis
of a strictly hierarchical and totalised arborescent system, tightly controlled by the
country’s bureaucracy. Japanese deeply non-liberal, imperial rationality of
government is discussed in this context, and its theoretical and practical links to the
organismic socio-economic theories of Bismarck’s Prussia (and later Germany) are
highlighted. It will be shown how the consolidation of domestic power proceeded
through the simultaneous deployment of three types of power: sovereign power,
disciplinary power, and biopower. A distinction between arborescent discipline and
rhizomatic discipline informed by Deleuze’s work will be discussed. As far as the
theorisation of foreign-and-security-policy structural conditions is concerned, the
establishment of Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo is analysed as the external
consolidation of Japan through the deployment of an imperial rationality of
government, which later transmutated into a suicidal, military-based fascist
rationality of government. The crucial theorisation here is derived from the work of
Deleuze and Guattari and concerns two concepts: the takeover of the state-apparatus
by the military war machine, and the distinction between micro-fascism and macro-
fascism. The key argument will be the following: while the Japanese macro-fascism
was defeated in WW2, Japanese post-WW2 economic miracle, enabled by the
country’s foreign-and-security-policies of the Yoshida Doctrine, rested on
bureaucratic expertise and practices connected to the wartime administration of
Japanese colonies, most importantly of its puppet state of Manchukuo. The
emergence of a neo-mercantile developmentalist rationality of government, which
has been in place ever since, is put under the microscope. The analysis will follow Foucault’s key observation that mercantilism is not a mere economic doctrine, but a form of government. The non-liberal, developmentalist nature of Japanese “capitalism” and foreign-and-security-policy will be revealed in the discussion concerning the post-WW2 replacement of the military war machine by the commercial war machine. Deleuze and Guattari’s insights related to the possible relationships between the war machine and the state apparatus will be incorporated. The chapter will conclude with an outline of the formalisation of non-parallel assemblages concerning JapFSP.

**Domestic Orthodoxies as Conditions for Fundamental Continuity**

The following empirical section analyses domestic orthodoxies in Japan in their role of structural conditions for maintaining a continuous socio-political order. To study the nature of these orthodoxies is seen as crucial inasmuch as it allows one to understand why the Japanese government has not relied on NGOs in the field of human security to the same degree as its Canadian counterpart. In fact, the analysis will demonstrate that the domestic structural terrain on which Japanese human security has much later unfolded is completely different from the Canadian case. Importantly, such an investigation enables one to comprehend much deeper differences between the Japanese and Canadian human security cases, in that it searches for the origins of these differences at the structural plane out of which human security programmes emerged, albeit for completely dissimilar reasons. This represents a much more viable advancement than the usually preferred yet deeply
flawed direct comparison of the two human security programmes. This part examines the strong bureaucratic continuity. As a part of this examination, this section will outline the role of bureaucracy in shaping the nature of a Japanese economic model and in overseeing and interpreting the legal framework within which Japanese non-profit and voluntary organisations, including the ones active in human security, had to operate until the relatively recent past. Simultaneously, the treatment of each of these instances will challenge the dominant mainstream view concerning their relationship. What is more, an analytical juxtaposition of social-control bureaucracy and economic bureaucracy will allow one to see how the realms of bureaucratic administration, economic development, and government-NGO nexus have formed the basis for the maintenance of the Japanese socio-political order.

The evolution of the Japanese socio-political order is often said to be defined by three major historical ruptures: from the Tokugawa shogunate (known as bakufu, 1600-1868) to the Meiji restoration in 1868; from the Meiji oligarchy (1868-1912) to the abduction of the state by Japanese military officials (the late 1920s), and, finally, from the military regime to a post-1945 democratic period as a result of the defeat of Japan in WW2. There are good reasons to adhere to this view. The Tokugawa shogunate was itself a result of the decisive battle of Sekigahara in 1600, which terminated three centuries of civil war. The creation of the shogunate was the first systematic attempt to form a politically and militarily unified political entity, despite the fact that the Tokugawa bakufu only stretched across one quarter of Japanese territory. Its political organisation was based on a complex system of feudal fiefs controlled by inside vassals (blood-related shimpan daimyō and fudai daimyō) who supplied the bakufu ruling elite and helped the shogun to balance the outside vassals (tozama daimyō) (Totman 1980; Deal 2007: 13; Sansom 1961: 78-95). The shift
from Tokugawa shogunate to the Meiji oligarchy has largely been understood as a dramatic change and was traditionally explained by a foreign intervention in 1853, in which the USA demanded (though with limited success) from the Japanese ruling elite the provision of refuelling facility for the U.S. ships (Rosenbluth and Thies 2010: 33). A foreign witness of the transformation described it in the following way: ‘To have lived through the transition stage of modern Japan makes a man feel prematurely old; for here he is in modern times … and yet he can himself distinctly remember the Middle Ages’ (Chamberlain [1891] 1971: 1).

The beginning of the Meiji period saw imperial rule restored as the Emperor Meiji assumed his post (1868-1912), though political power moved from the Tokugawa shogun to the Meiji oligarchs (tozama samurais), rather than to the Emperor who possessed formal sovereignty but was not supposed to rule. The oligarchs were responsible for the Emperor’s restoration and initiated an overall transformation of Japan aimed at catching up with the West. The first generation of oligarchs was successful in creating a strong nation state: they set up new political and legislative bodies, made the political system more inclusive, launched new taxation and administrative reforms, and crafted a distinct foreign and security policy in which the defeat of Russia in 1905 signified Japanese international ascendance (Mason and Caiger 1997: 257-269). Since the beginning of the 20th Century, the original oligarchic consensus started to dissipate, and this trend was not even reversed under Emperor Taishō’s rule (1912-1926), during which Japan experienced limited liberalisation, especially through the increasing importance of the Japanese parliament, the Diet, and through the emergence of political parties. Although the emergence of the latter has sometimes been understood as a sign of democratisation, one needs to keep in mind that they were sponsored by big companies and their real
task was to balance the mighty Japanese bureaucracy and military (van Wolferen 1989: 38, 369; Carlton 1992: 72-74; for a critical analysis of the Taishō “democracy”, cf. Silberman, Harootunian and Bernstein 1999). As hopes for democratic consensus definitely disappeared in the late 1920s, political power was gradually assumed by the military, though the Army and Navy remained divided (Schencking 2005: 96-98). The symbolic turning point was the Manchurian Incident of 1931 which paved the way for the Japanese military regime to invade China’s Manchuria, and establish there a puppet state of Manchukuo (Duara 2003). Indeed, the path of Japanese military fanaticism led from Manchukuo to Pearl Harbour, and was only eventually stopped by the U.S. nuclear attack against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which was understood as a milestone ushering in a brand-new, peaceful era for Japan.

Although one could hardly imagine greater political shifts than those outlined above, the following lines will show that the Japanese domestic socio-political order has simultaneously been characterised by its fundamental, albeit counter-intuitive continuity. Crucially, it is this continuity that can shed light on the matrix of domestic structural terrain which has subsequently shaped the field of international development and human security. The continuity which has stretched across a few centuries has been manifested through the evolution of bureaucratic oversight of social, economic and political domains. Thus, the origins of many practices and methods associated with the contemporary central bureaucracy in Japan date back to the Tokugawa bureaucracy of the 17th and 18th centuries. The basic practice of this period which still informs bureaucratic decision-making today was the pre-decision negotiation (nemawashi) aimed at ‘eliminating conflicts first’ (Muramatsu and Naschold 1997: 23). Additionally, the Tokugawa shogunate also introduced the
Ringisei decision-making system, which is still being used in Japanese ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (Fukui 1977: 3-36). The Ringisei can be defined as a system whereby administrative plans and decisions are made through the circulation of a document called ringisho. This is drafted in the first instance by an official of low rank. It is then circulated among other officials in the ministry or agency concerned who are required to affix their seals if they agree with the policy proposed. By complex and circuitous paths the document gradually works its way up to higher and higher administrators, and finally reaches the minister or top executive official. When he approves the ringisho, the decision is made (Tsuji 1970: 457-458; emphasis in original).

As a result, it would be a flawed oversimplification to understand the Ringisei as decision-making by consensus, or a linear bottom-up process, as has sometimes been argued (cf. Kovačić 1994: 71; Sethi 1975: 51-55). Rather, its strategy consists in ensuring politicians’ procedural and substantial dependence on bureaucrats with policy formulation and, simultaneously, the impossibility of politicians circumventing the bureaucrats. After all, it was the administrators and not politicians who introduced the method during the Tokugawa bakufu.

While the Meiji Restoration led to the emergence of new power-holders, also among bureaucrats (Silberman 1993: 159-162), as well as to massive ideational borrowing from the West (though of the form rather than the content, cf. Westney 1987: 9-32), one needs to resist the temptation to mechanistically explain these
processes in terms of a complete political transformation and Westernisation respectively. As Silberman (1978: 385) argued in a seminal study, ‘the Japanese did not experience “a variety of political systems” but rather experienced a continuity of bureaucratic authoritarian politics in which the seeming transformations were changes in style that were primarily functions of bureaucratic development’. Based on this view, one will immediately see how bureaucratic continuity played a constitutive role in the definition of Japanese post-1868 development. While Western ideas were introduced and circulated, the Meiji bureaucrats engaged in the practice of thought guidance (shisō zendō), putting themselves into the position of final interpretive arbiters (van Wolferen 1989: 364). One of the results of these politico-bureaucratic deliberative efforts to avoid revolutionary attitudes has been an increasing bureaucratic conservatism of the Meiji era (Pyle 1998: 121-128). In order to achieve their national goals and, at the same time, to control the development of the society, the Meiji oligarchs appropriated the conservative reform framework of Prussian/German organismic political-economic theories, especially the thinking of Lorenz von Stein and Rudolf von Gneist. In this framework,

it was the necessary role of the socially conscious monarch and his bureaucracy to stand neutral above class interests and to act in the interest of the whole … It became an idée fixe of bureaucratic conservatism that the people should be brought into the governing process, not as a natural innate right but, rather, to achieve a national unity (Pyle 1998: 123-124).

Bureaucratic administration that led over time to a complete depoliticisation of social, political and economic domains was accompanied by the creation of a
powerful ideology aiming to justify bureaucratic methods and organisation used. The Meiji oligarchs drew on the rich Tokugawa legacy from which they distilled a grand doctrine of submission based on the idea of national polity (kokutai) and national learning (kokugaku). This doctrine later influenced both pre-WW2 and post-WW2 nationalist thinking in Japan. The Kokugaku scholars ‘were the first to introduce the modern notion of a Japanese uniqueness and superiority traceable to the original innocence and purity of the race’ (van Wolfers 1989: 252). How the “tradition” of Kokugaku was broadened to incorporate German theories of a strong state can be seen from the invention of supposedly unique industrial paternalism through the Factory Law debate (1896-1911). Japanese modernising elites started to emphasise the nation’s unique, traditional practices of management in the 1890s. Ronald Dore (1969) analysed a series of debates among bureaucrats, business leaders and politicians that were centred on the question of whether Japan needed a special law to improve factory conditions. Originally, the businessmen refused the proposal by referring to beautiful customs (bifu) of obedience and loyalty from the workers, matched by sympathy from above. Bureaucrats strongly disagreed and viewed this paternalism as a waning trend and a cover-up for increasing owners’ profits. Soeda Juichi, a high-ranking Ministry of Finance official and a backer of the law, argued in 1896 that

[w]e cannot find security in the fact that our nation’s people are rich in compassion. If the state does not take some slight role in employer-employee relations, there will be no way to protect the interests of the employed, and as a result there will be increasing cases of social illness, disturbance and struggle … If we leave things as they are today, we will
see a process producing extreme social illness much like the one that befell England … We will have unavoidable problems ending in social evils such as strikes … My fervent hope is that we can solve this problem before it develops and save ourselves from the disease of the advanced countries (Soeda 1896, cited in Gordon 1998: 22).

Although it was not surprising that the bureaucracy won the battle, its final position interestingly converged with the position of business. Thus, Soeda adjusted his view in 1907, to an extent allowing him to maintain that ‘[t]he old, beautiful customs existing in Japan are concepts of mutual love and respect from employer and employee. This *master-servant relationship is not an evil feudal remnant but a benefit gained from feudalism*’ (Soeda 1907, cited in Gordon 1998: 22-23, emphasis added). The result has been that the bureaucracy, business and intellectuals ‘had accepted the idea that Japan possessed a unique tradition of paternalistic management of labor … reinforced by law’ (Gordon 1998: 23). In doing so, it presaged how the bureaucracy in Japan would manoeuvre in the future: the nexus between the bureaucracy and business ‘has shaped the discourse on the public good in such a way that it is extremely difficult to discern the existence of a public sphere standing between the two’ (Hardacre 1991: 219). As Gordon (1998: 30-36) goes on to show, this approach dominated both the debate during Japanese economic miracle of the 1960s as well as one during the lost decade of the 1990s.

As far as domestic bureaucratic control was concerned, the defeat of Japan in WW2 did not represent a rupture which would end bureaucratic authoritarianism, but contrary to that, pre-1945 bureaucrats and authoritarian institutions were crucial for shaping contemporary Japan. This was given by the fact that the Americans in charge
left the bureaucratic system intact as they ‘assumed that bureaucrats everywhere behaved as they did in the USA, that is to say, as apolitical technicians’ (van Wolferen 1989: 348). As Baerwald (1959: 80) shows, a mere 0.9 percent of bureaucrats were purged:

*Table 5. Removing ‘Militarists’ from the Office, 1945-1948*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Elite</td>
<td>167,035</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Elite</td>
<td>1,809</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Elite</td>
<td>34,892</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultranationalistic Elite</td>
<td>3,438</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Elite</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Media Elite</td>
<td>1,216</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>210,288</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Baerwald 1959: 80

Although those purged were to remain outside of office permanently according to the Postdam Declaration, the majority were “depurged” after no more than five years, as the discursive frame which was originally centred on political reform was replaced by one emphasising economic recovery (Janssens 1995: 409). The personal continuity between a group of reform bureaucrats of economic control in the interwar and war years who occupied the then Ministry of Munitions and a group of post-WW2 economic bureaucrats who were largely responsible for the Japanese economic
“miracle” in an already renamed Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has convincingly been charted by Chalmers Johnson (1982). Johnson (1982: 40-47, 172-177) shows how the U.S. occupation maintained and even strengthened the wartime economic bureaucrats who were responsible for innovative policies that promoted strategic industries while drastically regulating small and medium enterprises. He coined the influential term developmental state for Japan, and associates it with the German Historical School, which is also known as the School of Economic Nationalism, or neo-mercantilism (Ibid: 17). Japan is understood as a ‘plan-rational’ type of state which was late to industrialise and itself took on developmental functions through the ‘invigoration of the bureaucracy, giving it a strong esprit’ (Johnson 1982: 19, 321). Analogously, Sheldon Garon (1984) traces the bureaucratic continuity between the pre- and post-1945 bureaucrats of social control who ‘sought to reduce sources of social unrest that arose from unrestrained economic relations and inadequate living and working conditions’ (Sheldon 1984: 442), thus further administering the concerns already displayed during the Factory Law debate analysed above.

Japanese bureaucracy of social control has heavily regulated the country’s non-profit and voluntary sector, from the beginning of the Meiji Restoration all the way to governing NGOs involved in JapHS (the latter will be analysed in the two following chapters). For a start, the Meiji Restoration of 1868 reduced the amounts attached to non-profit activities popular during the Tokugawa era (Deguchi 2000: 18-19), especially aid to victims of natural disasters and famine (Yamaoka 1998: 22), and thus rendered the public sphere rather thin. As Garon shows, the previously discussed increase in Meiji conservatism led to the following trend in the relationship between the state and the non-profit and voluntary sector:
The rise of new social forces did not necessarily occur in opposition to the state. By 1900, civil society and the state were considerably more intertwined than they had been during the first three decades of the Meiji period. In retrospect, the civil society of those earlier decades strikes us as anomalous in its autonomy and it's often spirited to the government. Thereafter, most societal groups preferred to work with the state to realize their objectives, while state officials increasingly sought to mobilize society for the purposes of governance (Garon 2003: 48).

Although Western liberal ideas and autonomy of individuals from the state were discussed, “civil society” itself was not a topic for discussion’ (Garon 2003: 43). Not only has Japan been the strictest of all advanced industrial countries in regulating the incorporation of non-profit organisations (NPOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as they must acquire the status of legal person (hōjin) to have legal standing, but on the country, too, experienced a very long period of at least 130 years (1868-1998) during which the non-profit sector was administered within the same disciplinary legal framework. Despite the fact that freedom of association was guaranteed by the Meiji Constitution, the key document that dramatically reduced the chances of non-profit and voluntary organisations to obtain the legal status was the Civil Code of 1898. In concrete terms, its draconian take consisted in the requirement that an organisation be in line with the notion of ‘public interest’ (kōeki) (Article 34, quoted in Schwartz 2003: 10). Consequently, the final interpretive (and to a great degree arbitrary) decision whether or not a given organisation was in line with the public interest was made at social-control bureaucrats’ discretion and ‘activity for the
benefit of specific groups was ipso facto regarded as for private interest … this interpretation narrowed over time’ (Schwartz 2003: 11). The word kō, as Yoshida reminds us, has dual meaning: ‘It denotes “government” and “ruling authority” as well as “public”. In fact, the former connotation is stronger than the latter … [even today’ (Yoshida 1999: 24). Limited change took place only in the aftermath of the Kobe Earthquake of 1995 and the subsequent passage of the NPO Law (officially the Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities) in 1998. The details will be discussed in Chapter 8.

Finally, this profound bureaucratic continuity and the strict framework regulating the involvement of NGOs in their provision of public goods, both domestically and internationally, have led more than one author to argue that Japan has been an authoritarian bureaucratic state:

In the everyday business of governing Japan, groups of officials … wield a great deal of power, definitely more than they are theoretically authorised to exercise. They restrain, control and provide spurs for the economy. They make nearly all laws – which, if not everything, is quite something in terms of measurable power. These laws are almost always rubber-stamped by the Diet, and the bureaucrats typically proceed to use them as means to achieve their own cherished aims. Their informal powers, moreover, give them even greater control over the realms of social activity for which they are formally responsible. This informal power, because it is not exposed to debate about its merits, is very open-ended (van Wolferen 1989: 33; cf. Garon 1984; Johnson 1982; Najita 1974).
As far as JapHS is concerned, Chapter 8 confirms the features of bureaucratic control discussed here. Thus, despite the fact that Japan has displayed all the standard institutions and political infrastructure associated with free-market liberal democracy, the informal and extralegal nature of the system simply suggests that Japan cannot be categorised on the basis of the presence of formal categories, but rather needs to be studied according its real workings. One of the features is a rigged party system with a predominant party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). LDP cannot be considered a political party in a conventional Western sense. This is due to the fact that it has been constituted around cliques (habatsu) of politicians who have acted as brokers between administrators of budgets and local interest (Curtis 1999; van Wolferen 1989: 28-29). The same can be said about the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which has recently (in 2009) won elections and replaced LDP as a governing party after LDP spent nearly 54 years in power. DPJ was founded in 1998 and merged with the Liberal Party, itself a party formed after the split from the LDP by several important politicians. While the influential British conservative weekly, The Economist, ecstatically celebrated the DPJ’s electoral victory in the summer of 2009 as a seismic regime change (seiken kotai) with immense implications for the country, it performed a U-turn after a mere eight months and argued that the celebratory voices ‘were too optimistic. A black dog of a depression has settled back over the country’s politics. In opposition, the LDP has unravelled with impressive speed … For the DPJ government opposition’s ineptitude has not mattered, so capable it has proved at self-destruction’ (The Economist 2010: 54). While a number of Western Japanologists have almost invariably spread the notion of a party-predominant bureaucracy subordinate system (toko kantei), the most recent development suggest that the dissenting opinions pointing to the opposite –
bureaucrats high, politicians low (kanko seitei) – were right, once again (Bowen 2003: 51). This is an important reminder that a given articulation of human security does not need to rest on liberal democratic model of government.

Foreign- and Security-Policy Orthodoxies as Moulding Conditions

The next empirical part investigates the foreign- and security-policy context which has structurally moulded the formulation of the JapHS programme. As will become clear, to consider and analytically include these orthodoxies is essential for one’s full appreciation of the position of the human security programme in the more general terrain of Japanese foreign and security policy (JapFSP). Thus, while the previously discussed domestic orthodoxies are able to explain the bureaucracy-centred approach which has also been used in the issue area of human security and rather limited and heavily regulated the role of NGOs in its formulation and implementation, the foreign- and security-policy orthodoxies can elucidate the nature of the human security programme as a useful, multipurpose international-political tool for the Japanese government. As the structural orthodoxies outlined in this section reconfirm, to directly compare the Japanese and Canadian human security programmes without contextualisation vis-à-vis their constitutive domestic and foreign/security political terrains would be unproductive, as that would completely exclude different reasons for the launch of the programmes, as well as the different political calculations behind them. Additionally, one of the cardinal arguments of this section will be that hard-security policies, development/soft-security policies and international-trade policies cannot be treated separately, as has almost always been
the case in the existing literature. Only once they are studied together can one realise that human security as a programme was created at the site of their confluence. In the end, it will be striking to see to what extent these three distinct realms have actually converged to play their role in the construction of Japanese unified and continuous foreign- and security-political order.

As Richard Samuels (2007; also see Okazaki 1986) has convincingly argued, since the Meiji Restoration onwards, Japanese international-political activities have been based on a series of political consensuses. This view, itself resting on the notion of continuously evolving Japanese grand strategy, has rather stood against the mainstream interpretation of Japanese foreign- and security-political practices (e.g. Ogata 1988). The key obstacle for analysts to appreciate both the synchronical and diachronical consistency of Japan having a grand strategy has been given by the fact that at no point has it has contained one direction or dimension which would be dominant: ‘For some, postwar Japanese strategy is incoherent for the same reason prewar strategy was – Japan is chasing too many hares at once’ (Samuels 2007: 1). Thus, speaking about the pre-war era, Iriye (1997: 67) argued that this policy represented an incompatible set of priorities among what he saw as diverse strategies: the development of Manchuria, soaring defence budgets, the removal of the Soviet threat, military plans to fight the United States, and so on. As Samuels (2007: 1) argues, the same perception has been replicated in respect of the post-war JapFSP: ‘A foreign policy that is simultaneously UN-centred, Asia-oriented, autonomous, and consistent with the goals of the bilateral alliance with the United States ends up as porridge’ (Samuels 2007: 1). Rather than explicitly united, each of these grand strategies – the Meiji consensus of the late 19th Century and beginning of the 20th Century, the Konoye’ imperial New Order of the 1930s-1945, the Cold War
Yoshida doctrine, and the emerging seeds of a post-Cold War consensus – has in fact been *multi-directional*, without the main dimension. The lack of one dominant direction has in turn been wrongly assumed to signify Japanese inability to create a grand strategy.

As far as the Meiji consensus is concerned, it was forged around the aim of building a modern and united country which would prosper economically and was powerful in military terms, as the expression “enrich the country, strengthen the military” (fukoku kyōhei) suggests (Johnson 1982: 20). This was to be achieved by Japanese internationalisation standing in opposition to the previously dominant Tokugawa isolation of Japan (sakoku) and by the redress of the unequal treaties (also known as the Ansei Five-Power Treaties) which were forced on Japan in 1858 (cf. Auslin 2004). A massive Japanese military build-up, modelled after the Prussian army, was used for offensive purposes as the Meiji leaders believed that a strong empire needed to expand geographically. The early war successes against China (1894-1895), the acquisition of Taiwan, its influence over Korea (which led to its eventual annexation in 1910), the formation of a military alliance with the United Kingdom (1902), as well as the defeat of Russia (1904-1905), demonstrated Japanese potential (Benson and Matsumura 2001: 56-68). The wars were fought as a part of the 1890 grand strategic doctrine devised by Yamagata Aritomo, a field marshal, War Minister, and two-times PM of Japan, that etched a “line of sovereignty” (shokunsen) around the Japanese homeland and a “line of interest” (riekisen) extending into neighbouring areas (Samuels 2007: 16). Consequently, Japanese diplomatic recognition as a great power was symbolically completed at Versailles after the end of WW1, where Japan was invited as one of the Big Five victors (Dickinson 2001: 9; Hata 1988).
Domestic development during the Taishō period and the rise of inter-war idealism in the international system meant that the Meiji consensus started to dissipate around the question of whether to prioritise international diplomatic order or Japan’s Asian ambitions in order to achieve maximum power and influence (Peattie 1988: 233). This was despite the fact that ‘parts of the original consensus – particularly those concerning industrial development and technology – would be the foundations for policy choices for generations’ (Samuels 2007: 17, emphasis added). A series of ideological battles were waged between liberal internationalists, who preferred the conduct of foreign policy through economic diplomacy (keizai gaikō), and nativists/Asianists, who based their views on national essence (kokusui) and “heaven-given” right to colonise the Asian region (for a superb analysis of the related positions, cf. Samuels 2007: 18-26). The second camp won and throughout the 1930s,

various tributaries in Japan’s national discourse were flowing into a single mighty river. Liberals and leftists who once dismissed the ranting nativists and Asianists now indulged in the same emotional worship of the nation … The leader of this new consensus was not a soldier and was never a liberal. Prince Konoye Fumimaro was the only politician in the 1930s related by blood to the imperial family … Konoye remained in the public eye for more than two decades, appealing to pan-Asian idealism while remaining a shrewd realist, convinced that in international affairs only power mattered (Samuels 2007: 26-27, emphasis added).
The consensus formed by Konoye together with economic bureaucrats and the military first became erected around the New Order in East Asia (1938), which was in 1940 expanded into the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. This was not a mere area from which Japan would take strategic resources, as their ambition was greater than that, namely the guidance of the external relations of the relevant countries and military defence of them (Beasley 2000: 201). The termination of this policy came with Japanese surrender in 1945. In the words of Samuels (2007: 28), ‘once the mission failed – and for at least the next half century – the very idea of the state’s use of force would be off the table, [though] the ghost of Yamagata Aritomo would continue for generations’.

As a part of U.S thinking on how to draw a thick line between the pre-war and post-war period, General McArthur’s headquarters (GHQ) pressured the Japanese government to adopt a new constitution. After McArthur strongly refused the initial Japanese draft and produced a draft of revisions (the so-called McArthur’s notes), the constitution was quickly written by the U.S. lawyers; it was promulgated in November 1946 and came into effect in May 1947 (Ito 1992: 135-149). Recent research (Constitutional Revision in Japan Research Project 2010: 1; Togo 2005: 39; for an early dissenting view, cf. McNelly 1959: 179-180) suggests that a fundamentally pacifist discourse incorporated into the Constitution of Japan did not solely come from McArthur, as it was also based on the preferences of the then PM, Shidehara Kijyuuro. As far as the Japanese Imperial system was concerned, that was upheld in the Constitution. The most important part of the Japanese Constitution for the purposes of the presented analysis is its Article 9, incorporated in Chapter II (Renunciation of War) of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized (The Constitution of Japan 1947: not numbered).

The importance of Article 9 has been multiplied by the fact that since the Constitution came into effect, it has served the role of a legal filter through which JapFSP has been conducted.

Nevertheless, Article 9 has not denied Japan its right to self-defence. Apart from the legal establishment of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) by the Diet in 1954 and the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954, which established the legal basis for shipments of military equipment and technology to Japan, two important treaties were signed in San Francisco in 1951: a bilateral Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, and a multilateral Treaty of Peace between Japan and forty-nine countries. The Security Treaty gave the United States the right to station troops in Japan and to use them for the maintenance of regional as well as Japanese internal security (Reed 1983: 6-7). It was not a mutual defence agreement as is sometimes argued, since it neither contained any provisions for joint consultation/action, nor did it explicitly contain the U.S. security guarantees in case Japan was attacked (Weinstein 1971: 44-45). An interesting feature of the Treaty was that it was signed as ‘a provisional arrangement … in the expectation that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct
and indirect aggression’ (Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan 1951: Preamble). The Treaty was tumultuously revised in 1959 and the process resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan in 1960 (Fukui 1988: 158). This time, the Treaty contained explicit security guarantees and mutuality (Weinstein 1971: 90-91), and completed the fundamentals of Japanese post-WW2 security which has rested on what historian John Dower (1993: 3) calls the San Francisco System. However, as Dower also pointed out, one can already see its origins in the so-called reverse course through which the USA abandoned the priority of Japan’s democratisation and bureaucratic and political transformation in favour of its economic reconstruction, chiefly due to the country’s strategic need to have Japan in the anticommunist bloc (Ibid: 3).

It was precisely economic reconstruction as Japan’s key national goal that has formed, together with the San Francisco System, the so-called Yoshida doctrine, named after PM Yoshida Shigeru. It placed its emphasis on the country’s economic development while simultaneously keeping a low diplomatic profile. The country was able to invest all resources available to the resurrection of its economy because it behaved as a security free rider, deliberately relying on the USA to provide (and pay for) Japanese security. ‘Yoshida and his political successors deepened their alliance with bureaucrats … [and] restyled the recently imperial power as an island trading nation. Mercantilism replaced militarism’ (Samuels 2006: 112-113). As Pyle maintained, Japan’s profound orientation toward economic development and political passivity was less a result of wartime trauma or the restraints of a pacifist constitution than ‘the product of a carefully constructed and brilliantly implemented foreign policy’ (Pyle 1988: 452). The proof of Pyle’s above point, as well as the acknowledgement of the link between the security and economic dimensions of
Yoshida’s grand strategy, was revealed a comment from Yoshida, in which he asserted that

the day [for rearmament] will come naturally when our livelihood recovers … [L]et the Americans handle [our security] until then. It is indeed our Heaven-bestowed good fortune that the Constitution bans arms. If the Americans complain, the Constitution gives us a perfect justification. The politicians who want to amend it are fools (cited in Tetsuya 1991: 118).

Institutionalisation of the Yoshida doctrine was a rather gradual process, and rested on teaching the political Left to accept the U.S. military alliance and the right to live with Article 9: ‘Yoshida mainstream successors expelled ultranationalists, pacified the revisionists, and watched as the pacifists revised their own position … A new consensus would be achieved around a Japan that would be a “non-nuclear, lightly armed, economic superpower”’ (Samuels 2007: 35). The 1970s represented an important watershed for Japan as its neo-mercantile, international-economic policy started to record a substantial surplus (Kosaka 1977: 211). Japanese bureaucratic and political elites, as well as Japanese businesses, engaged in the state-centered, developmentalist discourse which had its peak during the 1980s and was dismissive of a U.S.-promoted version of neo-liberal economic order (Lee 2008: 3-4). In their study, Heginbotham and Samuels (1998) persuasively argued that post-WW2 JapFSP has been founded on mercantile realism in which ‘national economic power can be enhanced through industrial and trade policies designed to create comparative advantage in critical high-technology sectors’ (Ibid: 190).
realism thus recognises ‘technoeconomic security interests ... and when trade-offs must be made, [they] may be pursued at the expense of political-military interests’ (Ibid: 171, emphasis added).

How Japanese techno-economic interests practically prevailed over military ones can be seen from the regional security situation of the 1970s and 1980s. As the next chapter shows, it was this complex security constellation – and the solution Japan found – that had a decisive impact on the formulation of the country’s comprehensive security (the end of the 1970s) which was later re-conceptualised into human security (the mid 1990s). The most important dynamics of the 1970s and 1980s related to the “second Cold War”, in which the USSR-led bloc gained the upper hand in Northeast Asia’s balance of power, and Japanese politicians and defence planning bureaucrats came under considerable U.S. pressure to do more militarily in light of the latter’s fear of Japan becoming ‘a de facto power vacuum inviting a military intervention by the Soviet Union’ (Kawasaki 2001: 230). Two consistent responses followed: an immediate response, expressed by the formulation of the Basic Defense Force Concept, and a more long-term oriented response which was manifested in the creation of a comprehensive security strategy. Both will be dealt with in the next chapter.

Developments in the Domestic Economy of Power

The fundamental structure of Japanese continuity concerning its socio-political order is a riddle. Foucault himself was perplexed by this when he visited Japan and was asked to give his opinion on the country and to speak about his interests in Japan.
When asked by a priest in a Buddhist temple during a personal intellectual exchange about his interest in Japan, Foucault replied in the following way:

What interests me is the Western history of rationality and its limit. On this point, Japan poses a problem that we can’t avoid, and it’s an illustration of this problem. Because Japan is an enigma, very difficult to decode. That doesn’t mean to say that it is that which opposes itself to Western reality. In reality, that rationality constructs colonies everywhere else, whereas Japan is far from building one, it is, on the contrary, colonised by Japan (Foucault [1978] reprinted and quoted in Carrette 1999: 110; emphasis added).

When attempting to theorise Japanese domestic continuity and its basis through Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari’s work, one does indeed run the risk of being accused of applying a framework that has been constructed to study Western rationality. In light of existing narratives which emphasise Japan’s insulated and unique history and its nativist tradition, such a take resembles a bold plunge. Nevertheless, there are three good reasons to believe that Foucauldian and Deleuze-Guattarian interpretive grids can be used to analyse Japan. First, Japan has seen massive economic and political borrowing from the West, and although one certainly cannot speak of the Westernisation of Japan, it can be argued that modernisation of Japan has been achieved through the application of Western models. Second, as the following interpretation demonstrates, the socio-political development of Meiji Japan, which is seen as crucial structural terrain for the later development of JapHS, can be synchronised with the facts of European development, especially
Prussian/German organismic theories which Foucault discusses in their blocking capacity of the emergence of certain versions of liberalism. Third, the popular yet flawed cultural explanation of Japanese political life needs to be replaced by its opposite, a political analysis of invented Japanese tradition. In this regard, the collection that was put together by Stephen Vlastos (1998), and which employs a critical historical approach developed by Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger (1983; cf. Shils 1981), has shown that much of Japanese “tradition” is in fact a modern invention. As Vlastos (1998: 1-2) argues, in issues as far from one another such as sumo, a supposedly “ancient” national sport, the allegedly “weak legal consciousness” of the Japanese, or the previously discussed Japanese-style (“warm-hearted”) of management, one can see that all were artificial inventions of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. Specifically commenting on the last issue, Vlastos points out that “warm-hearted” management was ‘invented by capitalists seeking to fend off government regulation … Some [of its practices] were even borrowed from abroad’ (Vlastos 1998: 2). Since the Meiji period, the Japanese socio-political order has relied on imported models, most notably Prussian and German organismic theories. While they lost appeal elsewhere a long time ago, one can still see their structural presence in Japan, as the field of human security tackled in the following two chapters confirms.

To say that Japan borrowed heavily from abroad, however, does not mean that Japan and Canada share an equal affinity to the Western rationality of government. They are indeed different, and some of these differences are profound enough to understand them as countries with arborescent and rhizomatic systems respectively. Here, Foucault is right: modern Japan has not built its own rationality of government which would be completely different from Western countries. Rather, it
has twisted the original logic of Western rationality and appropriated its elements for its own purposes. Therefore, to paraphrase Foucault, this Western rationality has not colonised Japan, as has been the case in a number of other countries, including Canada, but has itself been colonised by Japan. The following lines try to theoretically reflect on why and how this has been the case. As will become clear, to answer the “why” question, we must look to Japan’s late and runaway modernisation of a previously insulated and decentralised territory. As for the how question, the key to a full appreciation here concerns the role and importance of Japanese bureaucratic elites in this process. Despite the fact that the structural conditions for Japanese domestic continuity were an artificial invention of the Meiji Restoration, they have had no less power to shape things than if they had been a product of several hundred years of development. On the contrary, attempts to hide the artificiality of the project have resulted in its enormous strength and continuity.

The difference between, on the one hand, a governmental rationality being colonised by a certain political project and, on the other hand, a governmental rationality colonising and creating such projects, marks the difference between the Japanese arborescent assemblage and the Canadian rhizomatic assemblage. Concerning Japan, one can speak about imperial rationality of government.

Imperial governmentality is generally oriented towards capturing everything it can (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 436), and its three key characteristics are strong state-centricity, interventionism, and the administration of things. To call this rationality “imperial” is neither primarily motivated by the fact that Japan has had Emperors, nor by Hardt and Negri’s (problematic) reading of Deleuze and Guattari in their book, Empire (2000). In fact, these are the opposite extremes: on the one hand, there is the image of the Emperor who embodies Japan’s unity (and who was himself
the re-invention of the Meiji Restoration); on the other, there is Hardt and Negri’s Empire which is seen as a globally present, post-national and self-organising phenomenon without any Head. In analysing globally operating political assemblages which indeed grow from different sets of domestic structural conditions, one needs to take seriously Foucault’s claim that the state is ‘embodied in a number of precise ways of governing with their correlative institutions’ (Foucault 2008: 5). Foucault is certainly right that ‘there is no integration of the state in the Empire’. Nevertheless, this observation needs to be reversed with regard to Japan, with interesting implications for one’s understanding of this country: the integration of an artificially produced version of Empire in the Japanese state during the Meiji period.

The difference between the imperial rationality of government and the neoliberal rationality of government is a difference between the molar and the molecular, or between striated and smooth spaces. As Howard correctly maintains, ‘[t]he problems of power produced by the overcoding of space are only exacerbated by the tendency of striated space to prevent, retard, and reverse the flows of smooth space’ (Howard 1998: 114). Anyone trying to make sense of Japanese socio-political order needs to analyse the political origins of Japanese uniqueness ( kokutai), political control over it, and the regime of truth created around it, mainly by the Meiji oligarchy. One of the crucial repackagings of Western ideas into what became “the Japanese traditional way” of social legislation took place at the beginning of the 20th Century and was connected with a Home Ministry bureaucrat and politician, Tokonami Takejirō, a skilled inventor of nativist traditions. What stands out in his attempt to distinguish between what he terms “vertical unions” and “horizontal social cooperation” is how close he gets to the differentiation between arborescent and rhizomatic models. As he warned,
we should not thoughtlessly imitate the examples of foreign nations … [since in contrast to the Western countries] we have special ideals based on the conditions of our country … [In the West] the boundary between capitalist and worker is a broad line, drawn horizontally to separate the higher and lower strata … [whereas Japan possessed] a spirit of cooperation and harmony that pervades the unit of work in a vertical fashion (quoted in Garon 1990: 50-54; emphasis added).

The difference between the horizontality and verticality of the above “traditions” does not necessarily tell the observer anything about the level of egalitarianism or social stratification; that misses the point. Instead, what it reveals is the degree to which one can totalise control over a certain group of subjects. While Western capitalism released the bond between the worker and capital precisely because of the lack of belief in unique, nativist traditions, with the result of allowing subjects to pursue their desires in a rhizomatic fashion and turning significant proportions of capital into social capital (for instance, in Canada), the Japanese insistence on supposedly primordial traditions has not only reinforced the verticality of its socio-political model, but created it in the first place (cf. Mitsuru 1998).

In line with the findings contained in the related empirical section, the Japanese imperial rationality of government had its intellectual origin in the organismic theories of Bismarck’s Prussia and later Germany. Foucault discusses Bismarckian governmentality as a 19th Century obstacle to the emergence of Ordoliberalism, and his portrayal serves well to tease out its key characteristics:
for a unified German nation to exist, it must not only be protected against the outside by a protectionist policy, in addition, internally, everything that could compromise national unity must be brought under control, suppressed, and generally speaking the proletariat, as a threat to the unity of the nation and state, must be effectively reintegrated within a social and political consensus (Foucault 2008: 108).

The Japanese imperial rationality of government which emerged with the Meiji Restoration was extremely similar to the Prussian/German rationality, due in part to the fact that a number of German experts were invited by the Meiji government to Japan to implement their theories (Pyle 1974). The only made-in-Japan addition, though absolutely cardinal in terms of its effects, was the incorporation of the invented uniqueness of Japanese culture and national polity (kokutai). As Pyle maintains, the Bismarck-derived conservative approach to Japanese industrial society ‘had taken roots in the bureaucracy … It was influenced, as well, by the conservative belief that Japanese society was indeed different and should be unique’ (Pyle 1998: 135). This has been known as the combination of “Japanese spirit and Western knowledge” (wakon yōsai). One such example is represented by an attempt to infuse the (still effective) Civil Code of 1898 which heavily drew on the German Civil Code of that time (Mukai and Toshitani 1967) with the “virtuous ways and beautiful customs” of old Japan. A special legislative commission in charge of this process was also set up. Bizarrely, the commission could not come up with a single mark of tradition: ‘deciding on what concretely constituted traditional virtue … turned out to be more difficult than anticipated’ because ‘the commission could not agree on changes in even one substantive provision’ (Upham 1998: 58).
The Meiji motto “enrich the country, strengthen the military” (*fukoku kyōhei*), a pivotal taproot of Japanese political assemblage, represents a suitable point of entry for theorisation of the Japanese domestic socio-political order and its profound continuity, including its impact on JapHS. However stable the logic contained in this motto, it has been linked at different times to different discourses and ever-shifting assemblages of enunciations. The key problem for the Meiji oligarchy was how to centralise Japan as a previously fragmented and insulated territory and a latecomer to modernisation. The key means through which they could achieve this objective was consolidation of their power, and this is where they relied on Prussian/German experience. Consolidation of the oligarchs’ power featured all three types of power discussed in Chapter 1: sovereign power, disciplinary power and biopower. As far as *sovereign power* was concerned, it operated both internally and externally. In respect of internal sovereignty, the Meiji oligarchs continued with the centralising attempts already initiated under the Tokugawa shogunate. What was new, however, were practices and discursive justifications centred on external sovereignty, through the notion of catching up with the West in order to secure its position as a strong state. That was the reason why the Meiji era witnesses the creation of centralised and permanent military service, which discursively made it into the motto. The Japanese industrial-military-political complex was born.

While the external consolidation of the state apparatus through the appropriation of the war machine is the subject of the next section, the Meiji oligarchs, too, realised that the motto could not be fulfilled without the domestic consolidation of the state. Indeed, the two were inextricably intertwined as parts of the same assemblage. What was needed for the external consolidation was, apart from a well-equipped and trained army, bureaucratic reinforcement of key domestic
political institutions, known as “bureaucratic government” (kanryō seiji) or “clique government” (hanbatsu seiji) (Duus and Scheiner 1998: 168). While the Taishō period (1912-1926) opened up the political space to a certain degree and thus represented an example of molar micropolitics, it did not, however, open the line of flight, as the smooth space occupied by the liberals was created within the bureaucratic striated space. Consequently, the two spaces became hybridised and were ordered by the striated logic:

[t]he democratic liberals had no quarrel with the state, or the idea of loyalty to the state, but only with the way that “bureaucratic government” demanded the loyalty – by docile obedience. They envisaged a political society made up of involved citizens, not passive subjects (Ibid: 169; emphasis added).

Domestic consolidation of state apparatus through its bureaucratisation modelled on organismic theories marked the emergence of a new, non-sovereign power: disciplinary power. Disciplinary power was exercised in enclosed spaces such as families (the Japanese house system and family ethics), schools (the educational system), factories (managerial practices), and in the police and military (professional drill and self-sacrifice). The function of disciplinary power, which was an important part of the organismic political-economic theories used, was to synthesise and coercively link the subject with the apparatus of production. As Foucault reminds us, ‘[t]he regulation imposed by [disciplinary] power is at the same time the law of construction of the operation’ (Foucault 1977: 153). The previous quote also hints at how disciplinary power is linked to sovereign power. The
systematic attempts of Japanese bureaucrats to create a set of enclosed spaces which they could regulate was nicely captured in PM Katsura’s reflection, which dates from 1908, in which he argued that ‘we must rely on education to nurture the people’s values; and we must devise a social policy that will assist their industry, provide them work, help the aged and infirm’ (quoted in Pyle 1998: 135). The overall objective was to make sure that Japanese society would not go through the same instability as its Western counterparts. The regulative legal side of disciplinary power, Foucault notes, was installed through the launch of a series of specific laws, ranging from factory legislation, regulation to protect the interests of tenants, poor relief laws, compulsory workers’ insurance, credit aid to small farmers, and progressive tax policies (Ibid: 133).

Deleuze’s distinction between what could be termed arborescent discipline, which serves as the basis of disciplinary societies such as Japan, as opposed to more rhizomatic discipline, which is present in societies of control, i.e. societies with more dispersed and de-institutionalised disciplinary power, is important in this respect:

The different internments of spaces of enclosure through which the individual passes are independent variables: each time one is supposed to start from zero, and although a common language for all these places exists, it is analogical. One the other hand, the different control mechanisms are inseparable variations, forming a system of variable geometry … Enclosures are moulds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point … The disciplinary man was a
discontinuous producer of energy, but the man of control is undulatory,
in orbit, in a continuous network (Deleuze 1992: 3-6; emphasis in
original).

Indeed, as part of the objective to constitute Japan as a strong nation-state, socio-
political and economic order relied on biological reproduction. The deployment of
biopower as a means of implementing Japanese biopolitical regulation thus
completes the triangular theorisation of what kinds of power were used to create an
arborescent statehood. In Japanese case, the introduction of biopolitics has not led to
at least partial deterritorialisation of the state apparatus, as has been the experience of
the majority of states. This has been given by the fact that biopolitics has not
penetrated disciplinary and sovereign powers, but, on the contrary, has been
colonised by them to further reinforce the centralisation of the state apparatus. As we
have seen, the Japanese economic mode was derived from Bismarck’s
Prussia/Germany and has never contained genuinely liberal characteristics. That is
the reason why Foucault’s observation that biopolitics has been a product of the
general (liberal) regime of economic truth distinct from raison d’état (Foucault 2007:
21-22) cannot be applied to Japan. As Deleuze maintains, unlike ‘a rhizomatic realm
of possibility effecting the potentialization of the possible, … arborescent possibility
… marks a closure, an impotence’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 190). The closure
consisted in the use of biopolitics for the strengthening of a non-liberal socio-
economic order regulated by the bureaucracy. In her book on the political economy
of reproduction in Japan, Takeda Hiroko (2005) convincingly shows how the Meiji
motto “enrich the country, strengthen the military” (fukoku kyōhei) politicised the
reproductive issues of pre-war Japan. The fields of modern medicine, hygiene, and
education were supported in order to increase the quality and length of biological life in Japanese society:

Under the *fukoku kyōhei* policy, the Japanese government also realised the importance of the implementation of policies facilitating ‘good’ biological reproduction, simply because without ‘good’ biological reproduction, neither ‘good’ soldiers nor ‘good’ mothers were available … Here, biological, economic and socio-political reproductions were firmly linked, and these three dimensions of reproduction were posited as crucial parts of the *fukoku kyōhei* policy of the Meiji government (Takeda 2005: 39).

Thus, the role of women in the society had nothing to do with the liberal ideology, as it was from the very outset determined by the “needs” of the state apparatus. They were not to become emancipated in order to be equal to men, but to become good mothers so they could procreate and raise good children who would then be able to fulfil the *fukoku kyōhei* dogma (Ibid: 35-37). The later discussion of contemporary bureaucratic practices concerning the regulation of Japanese NGOs involved in human security (Chapters 7 and 8) only confirms the continuation of this trend.
Neo-Mercantile Developmentalist Governmentality as Foreign- and Security Policy

The theorisation of foreign- and security-policy structural conditions through which the Japanese arborescence has been maintained is the subject of this section. It complements the theorisation of domestic structural conditions for which the formative period was the second half of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century. As will become clear, the most important period for theorisation concerning the geographical and functional externalisation of the Japanese arborescent scheme was the period beginning with the military bureaucracy taking over the Japanese state. As demonstrated, its various elements re-emerged after the end of WW2 to further shape the nature of JapFSP, including the JapHS governmental programme. The theorised development serves as an important corrective to conventional and greatly superficial understandings of structural roots, motivations, and limits of JapHS. Indeed, to argue that there has been a direct relationship between the pre-war bureaucratic politics, war-time military regime and the shape and nature of JapFSP after WW2 is not only counterintuitive, but can stir a certain degree of controversy, especially in light of the constant attempts of the Japanese government and many Western Japanologists to portray these three periods through an imagery of clean ruptures. Similarly, the same can be said about the indirect importance of these developments for the later emergence of JapHS. Nevertheless, as the empirical section demonstrated and will be affirmed here through the means of theorisation, the connection between the pre-WW2/WW2/post-WW2 JapFSP served, together with the constitution of domestic bureaucratisation
with its emphasis on the country’s cultural uniqueness, the role of the co-constitutive structural terrain upon which JapHS has later been launched.

Japanese arborescent diagram of power, expressed through the motto “enrich the country, strengthen the military” (fukoku kyōhei), can also be observed at the beginning of the creation of JapFSP moulds. While the militarisation of Japan began already in the 19th Century, the point which symbolised this trend was certainly the establishment of Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, in what had previously been Chinese Manchuria. Not only did this event signify the externally produced consolidation of Japan through the deployment of imperial rationality of government but it, too, represented the moment in which the war machine took control of the state apparatus. Regarding the former, the non-parallel formalisation of assembled practices and collective enunciations which Deleuze speaks about (‘one never does what one says [and, equally,] one never says what one does’, Deleuze 2006: 53) was at the heart of the colonisation of Manchuria:

Over the course of the 1930s Manchurian colonisation became a social movement, a governmental program, and an icon of the imperial idea. Emerging from a broad-based popular effort to resolve problems of social conflict and poverty in the countryside, the Manchurian colonization program aimed to solve those problems through the resettlement of 5 million poor tenant farmers … Before the program was interrupted by Japan’s defeat in 1945, more than 300,000 people made the voyage physically, and unmeasurable travelled to the frontier in journeys of their imagination. The success of movement depended in
large part on the construction of a heroic narrative of colonization

(Young 1998: 95).

While the collective assemblage of enunciation concerning the Manchurian colonisation rested on the production of an imperial myth which contained elements of flight, deterritorialisation, a symbolic regime of authenticity, and the notion of becoming (at least partially) different, the material machinic assemblage consisted in the reproduction of molar arborescence of Japanese bureaucratic discipline and exclusionary reterritorialisation of Japan’s sovereignty aimed at the creation of pan-Asian autarkic sphere.

As far as the latter is concerned, Japan’s administration of Manchukuo marked the transformation of the imperial rationality of government, which rested on the bureaucracy of social control, into a suicidal, military-based fascist rationality of government. This was not a rupture, a hiatus separating two unrelated governmental rationalities: rather, it was a transmutation which captured certain features of the first governmentality and transposed them into the second. In order to appreciate this transmutation, an interpretation of fascism and of the penetration of the state apparatus by the war machine is in order. As will become clear, they are interconnected, and it is a psycho-medical metaphor of a suicide-cancer nexus that can help to shed light on the fascist rationality of government which evolved from its imperial predecessor. Importantly, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) distinguish between micro-fascism and macro-fascism. Micro-fascism unfolds on a cancerous social formation and its characteristics are not rigidity, but suppleness, duplication and homogeneity. Micro-fascism is important as it enables one to prepare the terrain for a power takeover by stimulating micro-organisations which enable ‘an unequaled,
irreplaceable ability to penetrate every cell of society, in other words, a molecular and supple segmentarity, flows capable of suffusing every kind of cell’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 214). Japan’s domestic bureaucratisation of the state apparatus with the accompanying deployment of disciplinary power and biopower created a micro-fascist plane within which different forms of fascism could take place, as micro-fascism is diverse in its manifestations: ‘[r]ural fascism and city or neighborhood fascism, youth fascism and war veteran’s fascism, fascism of the Left and fascism of the Right, fascism of the couple, family, school and office’ (Ibid: 214). Thus, previously constituted domestic bureaucratisation played the role of conditions of possibility for subsequent Japan’s transmutation into a suicide state.

The bridge between micro-fascism and macro-fascism is the *war machine*. One can speak about macro-fascism ‘when a *war machine* is installed in each [micro-black] hole’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 214). The war machine is of a different origin than the state apparatus. Their assemblages can, however, become interpenetrated under certain structural conditions, and if and when this happens, macro-fascism is constituted:

One of the fundamental problems of the State is to appropriate this war machine that is foreign to it and make it a piece in its apparatus, in the form of a *stable military institution*; and the State has always encountered major difficulties in this. It is precisely when the war machine has reached the point that it has no other object but war, it is when it *substitutes destruction for mutation*, that it frees the most catastrophic charge … War, it must be said, is only the abominable residue of the war machine, either after it has allowed itself to be
appropriated by the State apparatus, or even worse, has constructed itself a State apparatus capable only of destruction. When this happens, the war machine no longer draws mutant lines of flight, but a pure, cold line of abolition (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 230).

Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 230) argue that only a fascist state contains both micro-fascism and macro-fascism: ‘every fascism is defined by a micro-black hole that stands on its own and communicates with the others, before resonating in a great, generalized central black hole’ (Ibid: 214). Totalitarian states, for example Stalinist Soviet Union, did not involve the configuration of the state apparatus and the war machine: ‘[f]or totalitarianism is a State affair: it essentially concerns the relation between the State as a localized assemblage and the abstract machine of overcoding it effectuates’ (Ibid: 230). Also, fascism is seen as more dangerous in its logic than totalitarianism: ‘What makes fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement: a cancerous body rather than a totalitarian organism’ (Ibid: 214). As a cancerous body is defined in terms of molecular mutation, it does not posses the features of totalitarian rigid segmentarity, but is defined in terms of supple segmentarity. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari, ‘in fascism, the State is far less totalitarian than it is suicidal … Once triggered, its mechanism cannot stop at peace’ (Ibid: 230; emphasis in original).

As already suggested, Japan deployed a fascist rationality of government after the Manchurian Incident of 1931-1933. This was made possible when the already existing micro-fascism, in the form of a bureaucracy of social control and economic bureaucracy, combined with the war machine through which the military bureaucracy penetrated the state apparatus, to produce macro-fascism. While fascist
Japan was an example of the war machine appropriated by the state apparatus, Manchukuo itself was the pure war machine which itself constructed a (puppet) state apparatus. Fascist governmentality was at its height when the Manchukuo governmental programme was further geographically expanded, thereby overcoding ever larger portions of territory: first, in 1938, into the New Order in East Asia, and in 1940 into the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. As Young explains,

> [t]he integrated industrial and trading unit formed with the Japan-Manchuria bloc economy was extended first to first to include North China, then the rest of China, and finally Southeast Asia in a self-sufficient yen bloc (Young 1999: 50).

The Economic New Order was created by economic bureaucrats and their aim was to ‘replace messy competition and profit-seeking with the “rational” control of industry. They believed industry should serve the “public” goals of the state, not the private goals of capital’ (Gordon 2003: 212). During mobilisation for total war, Japanese fascist governmentality saw biopolitics, which had previously regulated human life at the level of population, mutate into an administration of things regulating death. Thus, a National General Mobilization Law which was enacted in 1938 contained a series comprising national emergency and mobilisation, further entrenchment of bureaucratic government, and control of material and human resources. The capture was nearly complete and lines of flight plugged. It took the U.S. nuclear attack to defeat the destructive Japanese war machine and with it, the Japanese macro-fascism.

While Japan’s macro-fascism was defeated with the end of WW2, post-war Japanese social, political and economic order still saw the same, pre-war molarity.
and supply segmentarity at the micro-level. As the previous empirical section suggested, not only did social, political and economic elites not change, they were now at the heart of the Japanese “miracle”. The purge only targeted the military war machine, and this was the only significant difference. Commenting on the characteristics of the post-war collective assemblage of enunciation, Najita and Harootunian observed that

a total military defeat of Japan … remove[d] “war” itself as a central object in the discourse … Without the militancy of the pre-war years, however, much of the earlier discourse spilled over into the postwar period as issues of compelling and immediate concern. It was almost as if the earlier discourse had not quite yet completed an agenda that was interrupted by the war and that the cessation of hostilities then offered as an occasion to return to unfinished business. The implication was that nothing really changed, yet the physical and social landscape everywhere announced ruin and tragedy … [W]hat would eventually emerge in the rubble was an even more rational arrangement of power


JapFSP between 1945 and the 1980s was deliberately depoliticised (though not non-political, see below) and mainly defined in terms of the country’s international economic performance. The principle means of the post-WW2 effectuation of the Japanese miracle consisted in the deployment of a neo-mercantile developmentalist rationality of government. How the U.S. occupation paradoxically strengthened the personal continuity between the reform bureaucrats of economic control, almost all
of whom had previously been inserted into and responsible for administering Manchukuo, and post-WW2 economic bureaucrats has been skilfully charted by Johnson (1982). Regarding the rationality of government which informed their practices, Johnson coins the influential term developmental state for Japan, and associates it with the German Historical School, also known as the School of Economic Nationalism, or neo-mercantilism (Johnson 1982: 17). Japan is understood as a ‘plan-rational’ type of state which was late to industrialise and itself took on developmental functions through the ‘invigorat[ion of] the bureaucracy, giving it a strong esprit’ (Johnson 1982: 19, 321).

To say that the developmentalist rationality of government operating through neo-mercantile organisation was an economic and non-political governmentality would be a mistake. The putative depoliticisation was in fact a smart strategy through which Japan could afford a “cheap ride” and of which the Yoshida Doctrine became the epitome. As Foucault reminds us,

mercantilism … is … a form of government … [and] not an economic doctrine; it is something much more than and very different from an economic doctrine. It is a particular organization of production and commercial circuits according to the principle that: first, the state must enrich itself through monetary accumulation; second, it must strengthen itself by increasing population; and third, it must exist and maintain itself in a state of permanent competition with foreign powers (Foucault 2008: 5).
There was strong continuity between the earlier imperial rationality of government and the neo-mercantile developmentalist rationality of government. This continuity coalesced around the first half of the Meiji motto, i.e. the notion of “country enrichment” (fukoku) which both governmentalities shared. The difference was in the second part of that motto, namely that the post-war developmentalist rationality of government could not strengthen the military (kyōhei) for that purpose. The pursuit of war was thus replaced by the country’s emphasis on industrial growth. While the statist discourse changed, in that it dropped its central nod to war, the justification of “why we are doing what we are doing?” remained the same: cultural uniqueness. Thus, ‘the arguments of cultural exceptionalism … [were] harnessed to represent the spiritual basis … of a large-scale technological order capable of unprecedented productive power’ (Najita and Harootunian 1998: 267).

Furthermore, it would be a mistake to believe that the war machine disappeared altogether with the emergence of the neo-mercantile developmentalist governmentality. On the contrary, the whole set of developmentalist technologies of power were constituted on a plane of hybridised state apparatus/war machine assemblage. The post-WW2 war machine was, however, different from the previous military war machine for at least two reasons. First, it did not have war as its object. This was given by the fact that this time it was not the military bureaucracy which would penetrate the state apparatus, but, on the contrary, the economic bureaucrats who appropriated the war machine for their politico-economic aims. Consequently, this is the reason why one can speak of the consolidation of the state apparatus through the use of the commercial war machine (for the term, cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 15). Second, the commercial war machine did not have physical destruction as its paramount objective, as the military war machine did, but has been
more productive. This has been the case despite the fact that one could argue that the Japanese commercial war machine, which has been informed by neo-mercantile principles, has also been preoccupied, at least to a certain degree, with the destruction of foreign (commercial) competition.

When looked at from the outside, the Japanese foreign policy based on the pursuit of economic objectives has resembled other capitalist states. Nevertheless, when analysed from the vantage point of an assemblage linking domestic structural moulds with the international presence of the country, one quickly realises that Japanese external “capitalism” has grown from domestic neo-mercantile developmentalist governmentality. In this light, what could otherwise be considered capitalism cannot really be understood in these terms. In fact, Japan’s seemingly decoded capitalism has been nothing other than a partially deterritorialised continuation of the arborescent assemblage of the state apparatus. Only selected large corporate complexes have been supported by the government and the economic bureaucracy. Corporate complexes themselves have been composed of corporate groups and subcontracted cooperating companies, and can be defined as ‘collections of huge enterprises (i.e. corporate groups) from different industries that have been assembled into loose complexes’ (Shimotani 1997: 11). This hierarchical and closed organisation has been unique to Japan and has a tradition reaching back to the Meiji period. It is because Japanese corporate complexes have developed from pre-war and inter-war zaibatsu, i.e. the small clique of businessmen and retired bureaucrats who owned and directed virtually all of Japanese industry (Suzuki 1997: 59). Japanese developmentalism has been of a completely different series than capitalism, as it has not been driven by a desiring-production machine which would operate through decoded flows and genuinely deterritorialised networks. Rather, the state apparatus
managed to create and uphold a striated space through the deployment of a deterritorialised commercial war machine outside of the country’s borders. Correspondingly, the commercial war machine has not been decoded, but overcoded:

As converter and capturer, the State does not just relativize movement, it reimparts absolute movement. It does not just go from the smooth to the striated, it reconstitutes smooth space; it reimparts smooth in the wake of the striated. It is true that this new nomadism accompanies a worldwide war machine whose organization exceeds the State apparatuses and passes into energy, military-industrial, and multinational complexes. We say this as a reminder that smooth space and the form of exteriority do not have an irresistible revolutionary calling but change meaning drastically depending on the interactions they are part of and the concrete conditions of their exercise or establishment (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 387; emphasis added).

Finally, the way in which the neo-mercantile developmentalist governmentality has steered attention away from Japan’s pursuit of defence and international security objectives is crucial for understanding the complex picture of foreign- and security-policy nexus (JapFSP). As the previous analysis suggested, the field of foreign policy has seen the Japanese government and bureaucracy being activist in constantly supporting large corporate complexes. Contrary to this, the field of Japanese defence and international security has been portrayed through restraint; the most visible manifestation has been the country’s filtering of international security reality through the constitutional Article 9. Although such a constellation could suggest a complete
separation of these two fields, the opposite has been the case. In fact, nowhere has the non-parallel relationship between assemblages of effectuation and enunciation been as remarkable as in the Japanese nexus between its international politico-economic interests and international-security interests.

Table 6. Japanese Foreign and Security Policy:

Formalisation of Non-Parallel Assemblages

| assemblage of enunciation (analytical separation of economic and security policies) | Japanese foreign policy: internationalism based on anti-militarist culture (“capitalist” economy and diplomacy as means) | Japanese Security Policy: international restraint filtered through the Article 9; pacifism as the key principle |
| assemblage of effectuation | Hybrid JapFSP: neo-mercantile developmentalist governmentality linking commercial war machine and the country’s security interests |

While the assemblage of enunciation concerning JapFSP has successfully represented Japanese foreign policy and Japanese security and defence policy as two unrelated fields, they have in fact been hybridised as a part of the field of JapFSP governed by a neo-mercantile developmentalist governmentality linking the internationally-oriented commercial war machine and the country’s (mainly regional) security and defence interests. In the words of Samuels (2006: 121-122),
the balance between Japan’s security insurance and economic optimization strikes at a *defining characteristic of Japan’s grand strategy: the analytic separation of military and mercantile components*. Japan not only hedges against U.S. abandonment by courting entrapment, but it simultaneously hedges against predation by courting protectionism … As long as Japan properly attends to its security relationship with the United States, it could balance against U.S. and European economic power while simultaneously balancing against Chinese military power. This suggests a *two-track strategy* for Japan to escape the alliance dilemma of abandonment and entanglement.

Paradoxical as it seems, the area of human security has been one of the most important reminders that Japanese neo-mercantile governmentality survived unscathed the end of the Cold War and has reconstituted itself by the establishment and penetration of “new” fields. While the crucial part of this governmentality – the commercial war machine – has led to the so-called normalisation of post-WW2 Japan, its structural roots originated in a non-liberal series. Thus, while Canada’s rhizomatic peace machine, which has attempted to harness bio-energy of NGOs for international development aims, has been governed by advanced liberal governmentality, the crux of Japan’s neo-mercantile governmentality rested on a state-centred developmentalist logic which has been the result of Japanese lingering political arborescence. As the next two chapters show, JapHS needs to be comprehended as an issue area which has grown from the combination of *non-liberal*
domestic and foreign- and security-policy structural moulds analysed in this chapter. In this light, the conventional separation and understanding of Japanese security and defence policy through the combination of U.S. pressure (allegedly the key international factor), the country’s dominant anti-militarist culture (supposedly the key domestic factor), and of Japanese economic policy as a display of Western capitalism has been the crucial reason preventing contextually-sensitive scholarly assessments of JapHS.

This chapter examined the nature of structural continuity, both in domestic bureaucracy and Japanese foreign-political activities related to strengthening the country’s position in the international system. It showed that while the post-WW2 situation has seen the continuation of the original Meiji attempts to enrich the country, military means have been replaced by Japanese emphasis on techno-economic interests. As the chapter demonstrated, it was for the realisation of these interests that Japanese formidable commercial war machine linking security and economic interests was deployed.
CHAPTER 7

JAPANESE HUMAN SECURITY AS CONTINUING
POLITICS OF CONVERGENCE

This chapter analyses the emergence and development of JapHS and links it to the structural conditions analysed in the previous chapter. The key argument of this chapter is that JapHS needs to be understood as the continuation of what is termed the “master convergence” of techno-economic, foreign-political, and national-security interests. In terms of Japanese official security labels, JapHS has thus been the continuation of the country’s “comprehensive national security”. The chapter begins with an examination of this predecessor and its main characteristics. There are two key arguments made in this section: first, conventional discussions of Japanese “comprehensive security” are misleading, as they do not pay attention to the political function of the master converge, and especially to its national-security dimension, which is contained in the Japanese term (“comprehensive national security”) but usually omitted in related analyses as it does not fit the mainstream (liberal) representations of comprehensive security; second, while comprehensive national security has been known for official development aid (ODA) distributed in its name, there have been important specifics connected to the Japanese ODA. They concern especially its origin in war reparations (i.e. Japan’s legal necessity to pay) and the close connection between the country’s ODA machine and commercial war machine, i.e. ODA based on a neo-mercantile developmentalist rationality of government. The rise of Japanese ODA convergence machine is discussed in the context of the Fukuda Doctrine. In addition, this section analyses the link between comprehensive national
security and the country’s re-emerging military war machine during the 1980s, as well as the partial re-plugging of the ODA convergence machine (business → NGOs) during the 1990s due to Japanese perennial economic travails, commonly known as the “lost decade”. An institutional analysis of arborescent bureaucracy controlling all three types of interest linked to comprehensive national security and ODA convergence machine is included.

The chapter continues with an examination of the actual articulation of JapHS. First, bureaucratic construction of the country’s human security programme is investigated. The key mechanism studied in this section is how the ODA convergence machine has penetrated the bureaucratic programme of human security. It is shown that the replacement of comprehensive national security and the introduction of human security have been performed mainly for reasons of enhancing the country’s international position and a demonstration of its proximity to the United Nations (Japanese “good offices” in the U.N.). However radical this move looks, the basic mechanism has been transposed from comprehensive national security. It will be argued and shown that the role of a guarantor of this strategic continuity has been played by the ODA convergence machine. Two human security tracks are probed in this context: a neo-mercantile techno-economic track; and a humanitarian track. It will be argued and demonstrated empirically that the mainstream literature suggesting that either humanitarianism or mercantilism has become the driving principle of the country’s human security is wrong, in that it fails to appreciate the omni-directional master convergence behind the country’s human security programme. The last section of this chapter focuses on the expansion of JapHS programme into a trans-boundary, institutionally-hybridised human security assemblage. This expansion is investigated in terms of the issue of Japan’s global
colonisation of human security through the country’s related activities in the United Nations. The diagram of power which encapsulates the human security connection between the Japanese bureaucracy and the U.N. will be shown to be circular in nature. The power/knowledge/legitimacy circulation will be used as an analytical lens for this investigation. Two examples of the Japan/U.N. hybridised human security which allowed for a shift from a governmental programme into a partially deterritorialised assemblage are discussed: the U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security; and the U.N. Commission on Human Security.

“Comprehensive National Security” as the Master Convergence

JapHS has been inextricably linked to the country’s official development aid (ODA). The following section begins with an analysis of Japanese ODA, especially in its role as the government’s main non-military tool. The importance of ODA is indicated by the fact that it integrated together three fields which have later and jointly shaped JapHS: foreign policy, techno-economic policy, and national security. As far as Japanese ODA is concerned, its uniqueness stemmed from the fact that it originated in war reparations the country was obliged to pay in the aftermath of its defeat in WW2. A full thirteen Asian countries were eligible for reparation payments and the amount paid by Japan between its beginning in 1954 and its end in 1977 reached almost $2 billion (Lancaster 2007: 112). Diplomatically, the war reparations were intended to help Japan reduce the identity deficit from which the country suffered, mainly the regional perception of Japan as an untrustworthy “sheep in wolf’s clothing”, to use a term used by Ohtomo (2003). Therefore, the related assemblage of
enunciation was formed around the government’s discursive emphasis on reconciliation and atonement for WW2 horrors. Nevertheless, as the assemblage of effectuation suggests, diplomatic and foreign-political objectives were complemented by connecting the issue area of war reparations to the Japanese commercial war machine. Not only is this evident from the division of reparations into damages proper ($1.152 billion) and loans ($0.737), but also from the techno-economic strategy the Japanese government selected for its regional commercial expansion:

As the initial policy taken up by the Japanese government, the reparations settlement became a catalyst for Japan’s economic intrusion into the region …. [H]owever, … the reparations benefited Japan more than they did the recipient nations, for the bulk of the reparation payment was dominated by commodity and service grants, and therefore Japan could develop markets for its exports. Similarly, to those who had abandoned the right to demand reparations, Japan agreed to pay quasi-reparations in the form of non-repayable economic and technical cooperation (Sudō 2002: 2; emphasis added).

The processing and institutional organisation of war reparations directly influenced the way in which the Japanese bureaucracy later administered its ODA. The techno-economic purpose ODA would serve as well as a Japanese “request-based approach” through which a formal request of a government wish to receive Japanese aid would propose a project for Japanese funding (Lancaster 2007: 112). How the Japanese neo-mercantile developmentalist rationality of government informed the request-
based approach can be seen from the way in which Japanese corporations scoured the South East Asian region, looking for suitable projects they would then “propose” to local government for a formal “request”. As Lancaster (2007: 112) points out, ‘[t]hose same Japanese firms would later implement the projects once they were approved by Tokyo’.

During the 1970s the objectives of Japanese foreign aid became diversified. Specifically, the previously dominant techno-economic interests of the Japanese state apparatus in its aid programmes were newly complemented by an increasing use of development aid for foreign-political and national-security purposes. While techno-economic objectives have never ceased to play a prominent role in Japan’s ODA (Tuman and Strand 2005), i.e. the fact multiplied by the oil crises, it was the complex politico-security matrix of the 1970s which produced pressure on Japan to broaden the purpose of aid. With regard to foreign-political objectives, they were largely given by the persistent regional unpopularity of Japan. The war legacy of the military imperialist hegemon was replaced by a widespread perception of continuation of that hegemony through means of the commercial war machine. Floating notions such as Japan’s “economic imperialism” and the country being an “aggressive economic animal” were not a rarity (Mendl 2001: 129; Hara 1998: 235). The “sheep in wolf’s clothing” problem was laid bare in a series of anti-Japanese protests throughout Southeast Asia which culminated in ASEAN’s refusal to invite the then PM Miki Takeo to its first meting in 1976. As for Japanese national-security interests, the country’s diplomatic problems combined with a partial reconstitution of the balance of power in East Asia. This was mainly due to U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and its opening to China under U.S. President Nixon. Subsequently, the USSR made a series of attempts to increase its influence in the region. This situation produced
considerable pressure on Japan to do more in the region, both militarily and politically.

Faced with this difficult situation, the Japanese bureaucratic elite and military strategists managed to respond creatively, thereby not buckling under pressure. Two consistent responses followed: an immediate response, expressed by the formulation of the *Basic Defence Force Concept*, and a more long-term oriented response which was manifested in the enunciation of the Fukuda Doctrine and the introduction of *comprehensive security*. As far as the *Basic Defence Force Concept* (1975) is concerned, it rested on five realist assumptions: 1. that the global security environment would remain stable; 2. the SDF could be used for essential defence tasks; 3. Japan had enough intelligence and surveillance capabilities to deal with limited aggression; 4. if necessary, the SDF could be rapidly reinforced; and 5. Japan needed to avoid establishing an independent military capability which would upset or increase the regional security dilemma (Samuels 2007: 2). Then, the next step for Japanese bureaucrats was the key task of connecting national-security interests to techno-economic and foreign-political objectives.

The master convergence came in the form of the Fukuda doctrine of 1977, named after the then PM Fukuda Takeo. The doctrine was articulated in Manila, the Philippines, during PM Fukuda’s state visit of the ASEAN member states. Fukuda reiterated – in a diplomatic way – the contours of the Basic Defence Force Concept by emphasising that Japan was committed to peace and did not and would not in the future aspire to become a military power. Additionally, Fukuda expressed his readiness to build a positive relationship towards the ASEAN and spoke openly about the Japanese economic penetration of the region and its related identity problem:
Diplomacy towards Southeast Asia until now was contact through money and goods. It was not contact based on the policy of good friends acting for mutual benefit. Even when viewed from our country, there was the impression of economic aggression and arrogant manners, and it was a situation which was symbolized by the expression economic animal (Fukuda 1977, quoted in Sudō 1992: 158).

Fukuda’s bureaucrats realised that a good foreign-political strategy is equally important as techno-economic and national-security interests. Or, to put it differently, if Japan was to secure these interests, the only viable way was through a careful repackaging to make them palatable to the rest of the region. Consequently, the bureaucrats skilfully connected the Japanese need to burnish its regional attractiveness with the fact that Japan completed its payments of war reparations in 1977. The result of this connection combined with Fukuda’s announcement that Japan would double its ODA, or, more precisely, its “economic cooperation” programmes within three years (Lancaster 2007: 117). In respect of the national-security objectives of ODA, these could be seen in the beginning as channelling “geo-strategic aid” to countries of geopolitical importance (Yasutumo 1986; for a concept, cf. Riddell 2007: 102). What is more, the significant increase in ODA allowed Japan to deflect U.S. pressure to increase its military share of burden in the region.

Thus, the difference the 1970s made in Japanese foreign- and security-policy generally, and in the field of ODA specifically, mainly consisted in the construction of a new, politically attractive assemblage of enunciation in which the Fukuda
Doctrine, together with a series of subsequent governmental pledges, played the central role. The doubling of ODA was mainly allowed by the completion of war-reparation programmes: while previous reparations were delimited negatively (i.e. to pay for the regional damage Japan had caused), ODA was presented positively, i.e. Japan voluntarily reaching other regional powers (“friends”) and helping to develop them. Nevertheless, since the continued bureaucratic emphasis was laid on infrastructure-based projects and “economic cooperation”, one can speak of yet another example of the non-parallel formalisation of assembled practices and collective enunciations. It was the territory of ODA which was captured and colonised by Fukuda’s bureaucrats and strategic planners and within which the convergence of national security, techno-economy and foreign policy was performed. As a result, Japanese ODA convergence machine was created. In many respects, this machine resembled the commercial war machine which was analysed in the previous chapter (and after which the former was modelled). Furthermore, Japan’s ODA has been an example of a partially deterritorialised convergence machine which has been tightly administered by the Japanese arborescent bureaucracy.

Indeed, making the master convergence of techno-economy, foreign-policy and national-security in the field of ODA stable and durable required a suitable concept which would guarantee its continuation in the form of an apolitical, bureaucratically controlled life. For this reason, comprehensive national security (sōgō anzen hoshō) was coined as the central, unifying concept in the late 1970s. An expert report, commissioned in 1978 and submitted to the government in 1980, recommended six concrete policies: enhanced military cooperation with the United States; strengthening Japanese defence capabilities; convincing the USSR that Japan was neither week nor threatening; greater emphasis on energy security; ensuring food
security; and, finally, working on contingency plans related to large-scale disasters such as earthquakes (Hoadley 2006: 16). Japanese bureaucrats managed to think creatively about how to best subordinate military interests to techno-economic ones. Simultaneously, they learned how to present the latter in an attractive diplomatic way: ‘Since the inception of the concept of “comprehensive national security,” Japan’s “foreign aid policy” emerged as a catchword of its diplomacy’ (Sudō 1992: 81). Indeed, this was a suitable and attractive wrap for the neo-mercantile-realist strategy Japan pursued.

The creation of comprehensive security played an important role for overcoming Japan’s identity as a “security denier”, and allowed Japan to continue with the pursuit of its national-security strategy through a sophisticated, multidimensional concept:

The crowning achievement of Yoshida’s successors was their institutionalization of “comprehensive security” … as the intellectual basis for Japan’s national security … An extraordinary concentration of intellectual talent …. delivered a soft power, “comprehensive security” doctrine. [The experts] drew on the Meiji idea of “rich nation, strong army” but infused it with liberal internationalism … All that Prime Minister Yoshida had originally conceived for postwar Japan would be brought under a single intellectual banner (Samuels 2007: 56-57).

Arguably, one could comprehend the insertion of comprehensive security into the Japanese national-security apparatus as the securitisation of Japanese ODA.
Although this process was almost certainly present in the development of Japanese ODA, the configuration which comprehensive security produced – both in terms of enunciation and effectuation – was broader and qualitative more diverse than such narrow understanding. Confirmation of this can be observed during the 1980s, when comprehensive security played the central role in the Japanese national security strategy and, despite the fact that it was replaced by the concept of human security in the 1990s, the configuration which comprehensive security created has been in place until the present day.

The main political function of Japanese *comprehensive security* was to keep in check (and divert attention away from) controversial military processes which were an important part of the country’s national security in the 1980s, and to construct a benign, soft-power image of Japan as a liberal internationalist country, mainly by the deployment of a Fukuda-style ODA convergence machine. In fact, the 1980s witnessed *the rise of two different machines which intertwined in the assemblage of comprehensive security*: the ODA convergence machine and the (re-emerging) military war machine. While the former was used by the bureaucracy of the state apparatus to secure Japanese techno-economic interests and, since the 1990s, humanitarian aims as well, the latter developed on the fringe of discursive interest, and quite autonomously from the state apparatus. Nowhere can one see the interconnection between the two machines with greater clarity than during PM Nakasone Yasuhiro’s government (1982-1987). In many respects, Nakasone, who had previously served as the Director General of the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) and was the promoter of many values dear to the military war machine, can be considered the boldest PM Japan has seen up until now. He initiated a series of domestic reforms; reinvigorated Japanese nationalism (he started his controversial
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, where A-class war criminals have been buried, in 1985); and improved Japan’s relations with the USSR while, simultaneously, closely cooperating with the then U.S. president Ronald Reagan. Nakasone was a frequent user of comprehensive security to divert attention from his plans to boost domestic military build-up as a part of his plan of “autonomous defence”. As the centrepiece of his military plan, he proposed the domestic techno-nationalist production of weapons systems (kokusanka) which he had already lobbied for as JDA’s Director in 1970 (Samuels 2007: 57; Friedman and Samuels 1993: 256-260). Especially in light of China beginning to worry about the prospect of Japan’s military rise, Nakasone directed the Japanese ODA convergence machine to China. The result was China’s reception of ¥820 billion (roughly $7.6 billion) during the 1980s to support internal reforms in the country (Hughes 2004: 155).

The bureaucracy of Japanese state apparatus was petrified by the vision of the full re-emergence of the military war machine and its possible penetration and control over the state apparatus. In order to keep the military war machine in check, the state apparatus devised some measures to contain it. Samuels’ analysis of civilian bureaucratic control over the Japanese military war machine through the institution of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) is an instructive example in this respect. Since its restoration in 1952, the role of the CLB, to which powerful ministries would earmark their best lawyers, has been to legally tame the Japanese military war machine. The CLB served as the ultimate civilian bureaucratic insurance against the military, standing de facto above the courts. It has been dealing with the interpretation of issues related to Japanese national security, ranging from what constitutes the use of military force; whether Japanese troops can be sent abroad; the constitutionality of governmental visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and so on (Samuels
2007: 49). The reason for the CLB not to produce its own career bureaucrats (a unique oddity in the Japanese bureaucracy) but to rely on the arrival of the best career officers from other ministries, is the belief of the arborescent state apparatus that the most effective way to contain the military war machine is through a coherent, united approach (tōitsu kenkai). As a result, the CLB has acquired the status of ‘a governmental agency within a governmental agency’, being ‘more powerful than the ministries that formally colonize the defence bureaucracy and … than the politicians who formally monitor it’ (Ibid: 50-51).

Indeed, the convergence of techno-economy, national security, and foreign policy was not without unintended consequences. One such consequence was the alienation of many Japanese citizens and NGOs. The process of divergence through which certain segments of Japanese civil society decided to flee from the state system of arborescent capture began to gain momentum during the 1960s and 1970s. There were two reasons for the flight: First, civil disagreement with the revision and extension of U.S.-Japan security arrangements discussed in the previous chapter; and second, although quite late, the emergence of humanitarian NGOs specialising in emergency relief in wake of a series of humanitarian crises in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand (personal interview with a Program Director of a Japanese emergency relief NGO, Tokyo, October 5, 2010). In respect of these NGOs, they felt they could not work under the system of Japanese segmentary bureaucratic control (personal interview with a Special Advisor to a Japanese humanitarian NGO, Tokyo, September 30, 2008). As Smillie and Helmich (1993: 181) put it, international development NGOs, usually categorised by the government as “informal entities” (minashi hōjin), ‘live in an almost twilight world, with few tools at their disposal for permanent institutionalisation or serious professionalization’. Since their emergence,
Japanese bureaucrats and politicians alike have thought about these NGOs as radicals (personal interview with a Program Officer, Development Partnership Division, JICA, Tokyo, September 26, 2008; personal Interview with a Program Officer, Non-Governmental Organisations Cooperation Division, MOFA, Tokyo, September 26, 2008; personal interview with a Japanese free-lance humanitarian campaigner, Tokyo, October 7, 2010). When asked about the nature of their alleged “radicalism”, one bureaucrat argued that NGOs’ “misbehaviour” consisted in “trying to do things only the government is allowed to do … [, thus] challenging the government” (personal interview with a Program Officer, Development Partnership Division, JICA, Tokyo, September 26, 2008). This parallel system of the state apparatus controlling the ODA convergence machine and using it for various purposes, and usually small and depoliticised NGOs focusing on emergency relief and technical international development, lasted until the end of the 1980s.

The beginning of the 1990s saw the partial re-plugging of the ODA convergence machine as a part of the wider economic challenge to the Japanese state apparatus and its commercial war machine. As the growing bubble of Japan’s overheated economy burst and the country entered the period of the so-called “lost decade” (Saxonhouse and Stern 2004; Tipton 2002: Chapter 13), the Japanese bureaucrats realised they needed to involve NGOs to a greater degree in ODA implementation (less so in the related programming). Thus, the Japanese bureaucracy attempted to capture NGOs through the initiation of new schemes and inserting them into the country’s ODA convergence machine. This regarded especially the inclusion of “younger” NGOs which were more malleable to the needs of Japanese bureaucracy and willing to collaborate with the state apparatus (personal interview with a Senior Official, MOFA, Tokyo, September 25, 2008). When faced with
financial constraints, the Japanese ministries and governmental agencies participating in the ODA programming and implementation (mainly MOFA, MITI/METI, MOF, and after becoming autonomous from MOFA in 2003, JICA) introduced new government-NGOs schemes. MOFA quickly became the most active ministry in this respect. It launched two such programmes in 1989: the NGOs Subsidies Scheme, and the Small-Scale Grassroots Grants Program (personal interview with a Program Officer, Development Partnership Division, JICA, Tokyo, September 26, 2008). Correspondingly, the volume of subsidies and grants for international development NGOs increased almost threefold, from around $3.7 million in 1989 to 10 million in 1998. This was despite the fact that the overall volume of Japanese aid stagnated during the same period (Lancaster 2007: 115, 122; Katō 2002: 114). Under these conditions, some NGOs accepted the segmentary logic of the system and effectively became partially deterritorialised agents of the state apparatus in the field of international development. Their subsequent incorporation into the governmental programme of human security is tackled in the next chapter.

The reconstitution of Japanese ODA convergence machine has neither been a direct result of societal pressure nor the effect of international (mainly U.S.) pressure (gaiatsu). The popular perception that the Japanese government was challenged by its citizens, subsequently lost its battle and, as a result, the Japanese developmental rationality of government began to crumble (cf. Hirata 2002a,b; Pekannen 2004), is theoretically and empirically unconvincing at best and wrong at worst. Theoretically, Hirata made the same mistakes which were identified and discussed in the Canadian case: ontological separation of the state apparatus from civil society (he too draws on a deeply problematic binary image introduced by James Rosenau); portraying their interaction in a zero-sum fashion (an increase in NGO prominence leads to the
erosion of state power); and an insufficient selection of a timeframe (post-1998 developments deserves more attention). Equally, as the findings of a series of this author’s personal interviews with MOFA and JICA officials conducted in 2008 and 2010 and a complementary study of Katada (2002) suggest, the reconstitution of the ODA convergence machine has been less the product of gaiatsu (cf. Lancaster 2007: 252 fn.20) than of domestic bureaucratic politics.

Instead, the early insertion of NGOs into the Japanese ODA convergence machine has been an interesting example of how the Japanese arborescent bureaucracy reacted to economic travails within the field of international development and what mechanisms it has used to compensate for a partial loss of performance. The “lost decade”, which was further exacerbated by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, reinforced, rather than produced, the two-track ODA convergence machine. MOFA’s effort to insert NGOs into the ODA convergence machine was driven by the fact that the previously dominating, METI-controlled commercial war machine was ailing. Since then, the geo-strategically-oriented development machine administered by the METI and channelled mainly to Asia, especially the Southeast Asian countries, has been juxtaposed with MOFA’s ODA convergence machine, in which the humanitarian motivation rose in prominence. Thus, although the nature of the ODA convergence machine has been shaped by unfavourable economic developments, the dual-track configuration on which it has rested had predated the two economic/financial crises, and can be attributed precisely to the master convergence of techno-economy, national security and foreign policy which started with the Fukuda Doctrine and comprehensive security.
Bureaucratic Construction of the Japanese Human Security Programme

The first governmental remarks referring to JapHS date back to 1998 when the late PM of Japan, Obuchi Keizo, used the phrase for the first time. On the occasion of *An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow*, Obuchi outlined his understanding of human security as follows:

> While the phrase “human security” is a relatively new one, I understand that it is the key which *comprehensively covers* all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of *human beings* … *We* must seek new strategies for *economic development* which attach importance to human security with a view to enhancing the long term development (MOFA 1998a, emphasis added).

Fourteen days later, when delivering his policy speech at the Lecture Program in Hanoi, Vietnam, Obuchi (MOFA 1998b) furthered his previous definition of human security in two specific directions. First, he portrayed it as a much-needed response to the Asian economic crisis and similar future crises; second, the Asian regional dimension was recognised as crucial, and APEC and ASEAN were two regional multilateral platforms that were explicitly mentioned in this context. Additionally, Obuchi used this opportunity to express Japan’s intention to establish the Human Security Fund, under the auspices of the U.N.

There could be no doubts about the continuation of Japanese comprehensive national security configuration through a new assemblage of enunciation: human security replaced comprehensive security. It did not take long for the Japanese
bureaucracy to insert the notion of human security among the country’s key diplomatic and foreign political principles. This formally happened at the U.N. Millennium Summit in September 2000, where the then PM Mori Yoshiro elevated human security to ‘one of the pillars of [Japanese] diplomacy’ (MOFA 2000b: not numbered). What is more, apart from a specification of Japanese funding plans for the already functioning U.N. Human Security Fund, Mori also outlined the country’s intention to establish what he called ‘an international committee on human security, with the participation of world renowned opinion leaders … to further develop and deepen the concept of this human-centred approach’ (MOFA 2000b: not numbered). Further developments suggest that the political and bureaucratic elite focused on two parallel strategies to politically promote the concept of human security. This dual strategy focused on the organisation of international symposia on human security held in Japan, as well as on the incorporation of the term “human security” into the political speeches of top governmental officials. With regard to the former, the first symposium on the link between development and human security took place in June 1999, followed by further symposia on human security organised in July 2000, on human security and terrorism in December 2001, on human security and international threats in February 2003, human security and national security held in March 2004, an anniversary symposium (on the 50th anniversary of Japan’s admission to the U.N.) on human security, a symposium on human security and communicable diseases held in May 2008, and, finally three symposia held between 2009-2010 on the implementation and theory of human security, the emergence of the concept and its history and future (MOFA 2010). Clearly, the above chronology shows which topics have been deemed important at a given time and also serves as an indicator of the elasticity, and comprehensiveness, of JapHS. The three final
symposia also demonstrate how the Japanese government and bureaucracy have lately run out of substantive ideas related to human security. As for the latter strategy, the use of the term has been seen as a diplomatic “must”: an analysis of political speeches demonstrates that it has been regularly used by Japanese governmental officials since 1998 in their speeches.

As available governmental documents and a set of this author’s personal interviews with governmental officials indicate, JapHS has from the very beginning heavily relied on the U.N.’s conceptualisation of human security. This is neither to say that it originated in the U.N. nor that purposes for the use of human security have not changed over time. Indeed, the publication of the U.N. Human Development Report of 1994 is invariably identified as the constitutive point of influence as far as the formulation of JapHS is concerned. The affinity can be found in the discursive embracement of the U.N.’s broad approach to human security. In the actual wording of the Report, ‘the search for human security lies in development … We must seek a new paradigm of sustainable human development that can satisfy the expanding frontiers of this human security’ (UNDP Report 1994: 1, 3). The UNDP Report (its Chapter 2) explicitly lists seven categories that form the human security paradigm: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. Despite the degree of conceptual transfer from the U.N. to Japan, it would be flawed, however, to consider the early formulation of JapHS as a direct result of a mechanistic transposition of the concept from the U.N. Rather, JapHS has been constructed in order to continue with the domestically-crafted comprehensive national security policy. In regard to the significance of the UNDP Report of 1994 in this context, it has possessed a twofold political importance for JapHS: it played the role of political legitimiser and
bureaucratic mobiliser. Arguably, the embracement of the U.N.’s human security by Japanese bureaucrats and politicians occurred due to its ability to further reproduce the master convergence of techno-economy, foreign policy and national security in an internationally attractive garb.

In particular, the Japanese appreciation of the human security definition in the UNDP Report of 1994 stemmed from two of its own earlier focuses: comprehensive security and international development. In respect of comprehensive security, its beginning can be traced back to the publication of the Comprehensive Security Strategy Report of 1980, commissioned by then PM Ohira Masayoshi. The report used similar categories as the later UNDP report, namely economic security, food security, security against earthquakes, and energy security. Interestingly, the Comprehensive Security Strategy Report of 1980 was largely inward-oriented, i.e. primarily designed to address the question of Japanese domestic security (Sato 2007: 85). Apart from the traditional focus on the US-Japanese security pact, comprehensive national security was newly defined in this report in non-military terms (Soeya 1998: 225). This was in order to fend off the emerging military war machine. During the conducted interviews aimed at a discussion of JapHS, practically all interviewed governmental officials at MOFA and JICA referred to comprehensive security rather than to JapHS. In respect of international development, largely understood through a combination of techno-economic and humanitarian objectives, the carrier of continuity between comprehensive security and JapHS has been the ODA convergence machine. In fact, the JapHS governmental programme has been penetrated and animated by the ODA convergence machine.
The near complete penetration of JapHS programme by the ODA convergence machine can be seen from fuzziness concerning the official explanation of their interconnection. Several high-ranking officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) who were interviewed by the author took the view of human security being the key concept which ODA has been a part of. This stands in contradiction to some existing governmental documents which prioritise ODA and define JapHS, on the contrary, as ‘part of Japan’s ODA’ (JICA 2008a: 2). A conducted comparison of interviews, governmental documents, and political speeches indicates that the relationship has been more functional. Specifically, the importance of JapHS in its relationship to the ODA convergence machine seems to consist in the justification and legitimisation of the latter’s expansion and colonisation of new issue areas. Confirmation of this can be found in several important official documents. First, Japan’s ODA White Paper of 2002, which in its Part I. Trends in Japan’s ODA in a Rapidly Changing World, maintains that ‘[b]ased on the concept of human security, Japan actively extends ODA in such areas as refugees and internally displaced persons, land mines, education, health and medical care, and gender equality’ (MOFA 2002a). When Japan’s ODA Charter was revised in August 2003, human security was elevated into one of its ‘basic policies’ (MOFA 2007a).

As far as the key components of JapHS are concerned, unpublished governmental material (MOFA 2008a) discusses the current conceptual delimitation of JapHS by the Japanese bureaucracy. According to the document, the concept of JapHS rests on three key components: threat recognition, purpose, and approach. In respect of the threats, they are defined negatively as those that cannot be dealt with by the employment of the traditional concept of state security. An interesting feature
which confirms the argument about the continuation of master convergence is a residual definition of JapHS and its functional complementarity to the Japanese national security. The issues specifically mentioned in this context comprise a motley bundle which confirms the convergence: terrorism, infectious diseases, poverty and environmental degradation. Subsequently, the purpose is described in emancipatory terms as ‘realizing a society in which people can live with dignity’ (Ibid.: 4). In the document as well as in the conducted interviews, a great emphasis is laid on self-reliance and the empowerment of targeted communities through various local capacity-building measures. In order to facilitate self-reliance, a three-point approach is proposed. Its listed key qualities are its bottom-up strategy, its comprehensiveness, its multi-sectoral nature, and cooperation and coordination among various stakeholders, specifically central and local governments, international organisations and NGOs. The document also specifies how the JapHS programme should be promoted and spread internationally. Two efforts are recognised in this context: the promotion of JapHS in the U.N. and bilateral and regional fora; and the implementation of various economic-development and humanitarian projects (Ibid.: 4).

The human security oriented ODA convergence machine has been bureaucratically controlled by three ministries and two implementing agencies. Specifically, the ODA convergence machine has operated through two human security tracks: a neo-mercantile techno-economic track administered by MOF and METI and implemented by JBIC; and a humanitarian track, administered by MOFA and implemented by JICA. When the two tracks are understood together, one can see how multi-directional master convergence of comprehensive national security has
continued through the deployment of the ODA convergence machine under the
discursive rubrics of human security.

Regarding the first track, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) has used human
security discourse in the context of loan provision, both through its own
implementing body – the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), which
was created in 1999 through a merger of the Export-Import Bank of Japan and the
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, and thorough multilateral International
Financial Institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and
regional development banks. The belief here is the same as in the 1980s and at the
beginning of the 1990s: IFIs will help Japan to spread its economic model (Wade
1996). Therefore, the MOF has been an important carrier of techno-economic
interests wrapped in a human security discourse. Specifically, human security has
been used to justify the stabilisation of the economies of developing countries during
the recent financial crisis (MOF 2008).

Apart from the MOF, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry has also
used human security to justify its neo-mercantilist objectives. The METI was created
in 2001 when its predecessor, MITI, was merged with the Economic Planning
Agency. METI’s neo-mercantile practices, framed in human security terms, relied
mainly on the continuous use of Japanese commercial war machine with its aim to
‘solidify the hierarchy of the regional production network’ (Katada 2002: 335).
Unlike the MOF, which has operated globally, the techno-economic focus of METI
has been oriented regionally. As ministerial documents show, METI has linked
human security together with APEC regional economic integration and growth
strategy (METI 2010). Although some authors maintain that the techno-economic
basis of Japanese ODA convergence machine – and thus of JapHS – has been on the
wane (cf. Hook and Zhang 1998; Palanovics 2006: 370; for an opposing, though equally problematic view, cf. Trinidad 2007), the available evidence provides a different picture. As Katada has empirically demonstrated, as a result of the lost decade and the Asian crisis in particular, ‘the retying of financial assistance and the involvement of the private sector in foreign aid policy for Asia became cornerstones of Japan’s ODA policy’ (Katada 2002: 333, emphasis added). It was in this context that the OECD urged Japan in 2003 to ensure that the economic interests of Japan do not override the original development goals outlined by OECD (2003). This nudge was later refused by the then Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aso Taro, who argued that ‘when nation-states provide assistance to other countries, the essential fact should not be forgotten that we implement ODA for our own benefit in the end’ (Aso 2006: not numbered).

The second human security track of Japanese ODA convergence machine has been administered by MOFA and implemented by JICA. Since the 1990s, this track has been increasingly oriented towards humanitarian issues and connected to the U.N. In the late 1990s, MOFA’s bureaucratic importance in the construction of a human security governmental programme became central. Apart from its ‘intellectual leadership in human security’, as an interviewed MOFA official portrayed it (personal interview with a Senior Official, Humanitarian Assistance Division, MOFA, Tokyo, October 1, 2008), MOFA was put in charge of the coordination of development aid and also had JICA, an implementing agency, under its jurisdiction until the latter became autonomous in 2003. Nevertheless, as an interview with a senior MOFA official who was instrumental in raising the human security profile within MOFA in the late 1990s suggests, human security was not rooted at MOFA in the beginning and its importance is still not universally accepted within the ministry.
As this official put it, early proponents of human security at MOFA ‘had to fight a battle to promote [the concept] within the ministry’ (personal interview with a Senior Official, Global Issues Division, MOFA, Tokyo, October 1, 2008). According to another interviewed MOFA official, there have been three groups of critics within MOFA: conservative hardliners who refuse human security on ideological grounds; traditionalists who stick with comprehensive security; and moderates who argue that the concept can be useful but is badly delimited (personal interview with a Senior Official, MOFA, Tokyo, September 25, 2008).

Although MOFA is still very important in the second human security track of the ODA convergence machine, it lost some clout after JICA became a fully independent governmental agency in 2003. JICA has been the main implementing body for humanitarian-oriented development aid. As conducted interviews with JICA officials show and as the next section confirms, JICA has successfully tried to increase its human security influence and has begun to be interested in activities traditionally reserved for MOFA, especially the conceptual and policy formulation of human security. This process coincided with the appointment of Ms. Ogata, formerly serving as the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the Co-Chair of the U.N. Commission on Human Security, to the position of President of JICA in October 2003. As one JICA official put it, ‘the human security wind came to JICA with Ogata’ (personal interview with a Program Officer, Development Partnership Division, JICA, Tokyo, September 26, 2008). The bureaucracies of MOFA and JICA have been able to use human security more autonomously for their operations than the MOF/METI track. This can be seen in the fact that they have not relied on influential domestic constituencies – mainly the commercial war machine – to the same degree. This has allowed them to pick and choose the external human security
elements that fitted with their perceived bureaucratic views and block those deemed inappropriate for Japanese “needs”. Consequently, they could justify their choices by referring to *gaiatsu*, represented in this context mainly by the U.N. and OECD. The next section demonstrates how the second track of human security has been instrumental in the transformation of the human security programme into a globally stretched JapHS assemblage.

Not only has convergence occurred within each of the human security tracks, but could also be observed *between these tracks*. As a result, one can speak of the grand human security convergence, or neo-mercantilist/humanitarian synthesis, of JapHS. This is in some ways a surprising statement, since the usual explanation of the relationship between neo-mercantilist and humanitarian interests in the field of ODA/human security has been of institutional rivalry and turf wars. While there have indeed been routine clashes among all the involved ministries, this cannot be taken as proof of their inability to strategically converge. As several conducted interviews at MOFA and JICA suggested, the clashes have been more over budgetary issues, i.e. which ministry gets what portion of the ODA-related budget, than about inter-ministerial challenges through which one ministry would question the legitimacy of interests promoted by other ministries and governmental agencies. Clashes between the MOF (the key ministry in the budgetary exercise) and the METI, i.e. two representatives of neo-mercantile objectives, have not been less frequent than MOF clashes with MOFA and JICA, two humanitarian-track representatives.

What is more, there has been a formal institution in which the grand neo-mercantilist/humanitarian synthesis of JapHS governmental programme could be seen in its most conspicuous form. The institution in question is Japan’s Overseas Economic Cooperation Council, set up in April 2006. In this governmental decision-
making body, Japan’s PM, Foreign Affairs Minister, Finance Minister, and the Economy, Trade and Industry Minister meet on regular basis to debate key topics for the country’s ‘overseas economic cooperation – official development assistance and state financing abroad - “in a flexible and substantial manner”’ to ensure its “strategic and efficient” implementation’ (Abe 2006; quoted in The Japan Times 2006a: not numbered). Subsequently, the body recommended that JICA would take over the aid loan division of JBIC, making the convergence possible through institutional consolidation (The Japan Times 2006b). As the nature of the issues discussed in twenty-two meetings of the Council up to date show (Overseas Economic Cooperation Council 2009), the body has played the key role in managing the convergence in JapHS programme.

**From Programme to Assemblage: Japanese Colonisation of Human Security through the United Nations**

The previous section was revealing in how the construction of JapHS was primarily motivated by Japanese bureaucratic efforts to continue with the master convergence of comprehensive national security under a new, popular, and up-to-date banner. Also, the analysis suggested that the banner itself had been conceptually borrowed from the U.N. The following section focuses on Japanese colonisation of human security in the U.N.. It will be argued that in this process, Japanese governmental programme has transformed into a globally-stretched human security assemblage. Once the governmental programme of human security was linked to the ODA convergence machine, it has acquired an assemblage quality: new lines have been
opened up and it has started to spread regionally and globally. During this process, one can discern the colonisation of new territories, the incorporation of new elements, and the attraction of new agencies and entities interested in human security. This has been the main characteristic of this new assemblage, what Foucault (1982: Chapter 2) would call its ‘enunciative function’, here manifested in the transformation of an outdated assemblage of comprehensive security into an assemblage of human security. Importantly, this transformation has occurred within the segmentary arborescent territory and has not significantly altered the domestically-produced configuration of Japanese master convergence. However, this is not surprising when one considers that the continuation of Japanese master convergence has been the main political function of JapHS assemblage. While the transformation has been followed by the partial deterritorialisation of JapHS, presented empirical findings clearly show that the Japanese bureaucracy has managed to inscribe its arborescence into U.N territory. It was upon this territory that an assembled Japan-U.N. human security hybrid has consequently unfolded. Simultaneously, the following examination also traces the process by means of which the Japanese bureaucracy has conceptually borrowed from the U.N. in order to strengthen its comprehensive national security strategy and make it more attractive through a U.N.-derived, human security discourse.

As was argued in Chapter 1, to study assemblages requires abandonment of the conventional, levels-of-analysis approach. Therefore, instead of conducting such an analysis through a two-level game (the Japanese national level and the U.N. level), the power/knowledge/legitimacy circulation between the Japanese bureaucracy and the U.N. serves as the basic analytical framework for this investigation. The related analytics needs to take into account: (i) the attribution of
innovation; (ii) the analysis of contradictions; (iii) comparative descriptions; (iv) the mapping of transformations; and (v) the conditions of exercise (Foucault 1982: 155, 229). This will reveal that a special relationship between Japan and the U.N. has stood at the heart of the institutionally hybridised assemblage of JapHS. In this light, it is not surprising that one of the constitutive documents concerning human security, the U.N. Secretary-General’s Report *In Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security and Human Rights for All* (2005), has been consistently singled out and celebrated in Japanese official documents as a *prima facie* example of the close working relationship between the Japanese government and the U.N. In the following lines, two particular examples of a hybridised Japan/U.N. human security assemblage are examined. These are the *U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security*; and the *U.N. Commission on Human Security*. It has been through these U.N.-based institutional sites that the Japanese state apparatus has been able to control, promote and further spread its human security programme and to convert it into a partially deterritorialised arborescent assemblage.

From its establishment in 1999 to 2008, Japan was the only donor to (and the animating state apparatus behind) the U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS). While Slovenia and Sweden have recently joined the UNTFHS as donors, the position of Japan as the country which founded the UNTFHS has remained as important as ever, both financially and in terms of its influence. As an interviewed Japanese official confirmed, this expansion has changed the dominant position of Japan in the UNTFHS very little (personal interview with a Senior Japanese Representative to the U.N., Tokyo, September 18, 2008). Japanese efforts to establish the UNTFHS within the U.N. goes back to then-PM Obuchi’s Hanoi Speech of 1998. In March 1999, the idea of the UNTFHS materialised with an initial
contribution of ¥500 million (roughly $4.7 million) from the Japanese government. One of the indicators of the level of Japanese dedication to use the UNTFHS as a principal platform for its strong ODA convergence machine is the figure of ¥39 billion (roughly $347 million) spent on human security projects in the period between 1999 and 2009 (MOFA 2009: 8).

The ability of Japanese bureaucrats to colonise U.N. territory and implant the features of the country’s segmentary arborescence to this space can be seen from the way the UNTFHS has been administered. The UNTFHS procedure is based on existing Guidelines for the UNTFHS (currently 4th revised version) which were agreed between the Government of Japan and the U.N. Secretariat. While a number of agencies participate in the application procedures of the UNTFHS – the Government of Japan (GOJ), the Human Security Unit (HSU) of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the Executive Office of the U.N. Secretary-General (EOSG) – the position of Japan has been the most dominant, and one could even argue that it is superior to other agencies. The bureaucratic dominance of Japan in administering the UNTFHS has not only come from the governmental bureaucracy back in Japan, but the HSU as well, and more generally the OCHA have seen a number of Japanese bureaucrats being earmarked there. As an interviewed governmental official at MOFA acknowledged, the fact that some Japanese bureaucrats have worked as U.N. specialists on human security has effectively meant that the Japanese bureaucratic elite has been able to regulate UNTFHS activities from more places than just Tokyo (personal interview with a Senior Japanese Representative to the U.N., Tokyo, September 18, 2008). Japanese arborescent bureaucracy has been able to control the U.N.-based human security assemblage of effectuation through its vetoes, making it subordinate to its own
assemblage and preferences. As the figure shows, Japanese bureaucrats can either exercise the veto privilege in a preliminary review phase or before the final disbursement can be made by the U.N.

*Figure 3. Japanese Arborescent Penetration of UNTFHS*

*Application Procedure*

Source: MOFA 2007b: 6
What is more, the Japanese bureaucracy has been able to determine the regional focus of development aid channelled through the UNTFHS, and thus to replicate the regional priorities of its bilateral ODA. It even inserted an enabling clause into a formal document which regulates related decisions: ‘donors may express their geographical and sectoral priorities and interests when funding projects’ (MOFA 2009: 9). In concrete terms, the regional distribution of Japanese development aid disbursed through the UNTFHS between 1999 and 2009 shows two priority regions: apart from the traditional region of Asia (especially Southeast Asia) to which Japan has channelled $76 million, the importance of Africa (especially Sub-Saharan Africa) has steeply risen in the last five years: the region has even overtaken Asia, with the reception of $101 million (MOFA 2009: 11). The official explanation of why the Japanese government has significantly increased attention on Africa has mainly rested on the need to increase the humanitarian aspect of Japanese development aid. While this reason can be confirmed when the nature of supported projects in Africa is analysed (cf. MOFA 2009: 19-20), several interviewed officials at MOFA and JICA also listed the diplomatic importance of African countries for Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, as well as the country’s efforts to balance Chinese development activities on this continent. The humanitarian focus has been, at least partially, driven by the fact that ‘the “East Asian Model” [based on] synergy of ODA, trade and private sector investment’ could not be used for Africa due to ‘the distance, unfamiliarity and real or perceived poor infrastructure’ (Akiyama and Nakao 2005: 27).

Japanese multilateral ODA convergence machine operating through the UNTFHS has not avoided the penetration of politically problematic countries. On the contrary, it has been very successful in these states. A number of supported projects
can be found in countries such as Myanmar, China, Kosovo (Japan recognised Kosovo as an independent country in February 2008), Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zimbabwe. One notable exception to this trend has been North Korea, where no human security-related projects have been introduced. Japanese ability to work in politically problematic territories has been demonstrated by its depoliticised approach to human security and development. As a number of interviewed MOFA officials pointed out, the discursive emphasis on human security has been welcomed as a particularly suitable replacement for Western liberal discourses on human rights, which are deeply unpopular in Asia and Africa. What is more, while Japanese official documents have spoken of the importance of democratisation in development work (also in the contexts of the states listed above), this signifier has too been understood in a completely non-political way. An interviewed senior official at MOFA called it ‘indirect regime change policy’, to contrast it with U.S. liberal interventionist (i.e. direct) regime change policy (personal interview with a Senior Official, Global Issues, MOFA, Tokyo, October 1, 2008). Similarly, when asked about practical examples of Japan’s democratisation efforts, an interviewed JICA official listed strengthening a given government’s democratic capabilities through invitations for its parliamentarians to the Japanese Parliament (the Diet), setting-up information-sharing systems, and performing statistical functions (personal interview with a Program Officer, Development Issues Division, JICA, Tokyo, September 26, 2008).

The establishment and political use of the U.N. Commission on Human Security represents the second example of a hybridised Japan/U.N. human security assemblage. The decision to establish a commission on human security within the U.N. system was made as a typical elite decision when then the U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan joined forces with the then U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Ogata Sadako. Once again, it is difficult to separate the Japanese initiative from the U.N. Initiative, as the first announcement of the plan to establish the U.N. Commission on Human Security took place in Tokyo in January 2001. It was only then that the official U.N. announcement was made in New York. Ogata and Amartya Sen, the Nobel-Prize-winning economist, became co-chairs of the Commission. Annan’s personal interest in, and significant institutional support for, the Commission stemmed from his belief that the platform would contribute to the further promotion and eventual realisation of the U.N. Millennium Development Goals. The following lines will show how Ogata seized the opportunity to increase the proximity between JapHS and U.N human security, thus further reinforcing the already existing Jap/U.N. human security assemblage. This was achieved through the colonisation of intellectual space germane to human security within the U.N. and the subsequent Ogata-performed power/knowledge transfer from the U.N. to Japan. The latter reterritorialisation was rendered possible by Ogata’s next professional move to become the President of JICA.

The U.N. Commission on Human Security was set up with three key goals: 1. to promote public understanding, engagement, and support of human security and its underlying imperatives; 2. to develop the concept of human security as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation; and 3. to propose a concrete programme of action to address critical and pervasive threats to human security (MOFA 2001a). It this respect, since the basic tasks were the promotion, conceptual development and policy formulation of Japan/U.N. human security, the Commission was made complementary to the UNTFHS focus on programme implementation. The findings and recommendations of the Commission were
contained in its final report, *Human Security Now* (U.N. Commission on Human Security 2003), which was presented to the U.N. Secretary-General in May 2008. A careful analysis of the report allows one to see a strong relationship between discourse and institutional power. The report reveals the extent to which power and knowledge are co-productive, or co-constitutive. As Foucault maintains, ‘there is not knowledge [*connaissance*] on one side and society on the other, or science and the State, but the basic forms of “power-knowledge”’ (Foucault 2006: 17). That said, the circular reasoning about power and knowledge is particularly useful here, as the U.N. institutions are the sites of semiotic power as much as U.N. discourses are sites of institutional power. In this context, Ikeda has correctly pointed out that

Establishing IICs [i.e. International Independent Commissions] is now becoming a popular practice … Their members usually participate as a private person rather than state officials … Generally speaking, the outcomes from the IICs are reports. They clarify situations and problems they are tackling, provide intellectual frameworks and explore the issues, examine possible policy measures, and finally present … recommendations … Yet such recommendations in fact work more than mere advice. First of all, together with knowledge that helps to socially construct the issue, they become practical prescriptions for constructed problems. And second, they sometimes take a form of either policy guidelines, code of conducts, [or] guiding principles (Ikeda 2009: 200-201).
The report merges two discourses originating in the field of international development to produce a seemingly unified human security assemblage of enunciation. Though similar in their origins, the discourses are different enough to be treated as separate strands for analytical purposes. The first can be labelled a welfare-economics discourse, with Amartya Sen being the animating force behind it. The argument that ‘[p]olitical liberalization and democratization opens new opportunities but also new fault lines, such as political and economic instabilities and conflicts within states’ (U.N. Commission on Human Security 2003: 2) epitomises Sen’s anti-individualist (not to be confused with anti-individual) and anti-globalist political opinions. The second strand of discourse deployed in the Human Security Now Report also originates in the field of development, namely in the aforementioned UNDP Report of 1994. It uses the UNDP Report’s dual definition of human security as freedom from fear and freedom from want in maintaining that ‘[h]uman security naturally connects several kinds of freedom – such as freedom from want and freedom from fear’ (U.N. Commission on Human Security 2003: 10). The prime reason for embracing this dual characterisation is political. One must not forget that it was the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan who kept the dual phrase of freedom from fear and freedom from want alive through the Millennium Development Goals project and his accompanying speeches (e.g. his speech at the 2000 Millennium Summit). The Human Security Now Report deepens this notion by further debating how protection strategies (portrayed as top-down and delivered by states and IOs) and empowerment strategies (portrayed as bottom-up) ensure the promotion of the two freedoms.

What follows is a discussion of how the newly forged Japan/U.N. human security assemblage has spread further, this time from U.N. territory into the
Japanese bureaucratic context. The human security assemblage of enunciation produced in the *Human Security Now Report* has served the role of the main source of influence for the conceptual “refinement” of JapHS. The analysis below suggests that popular thinking about JapHS as a “broad school of human security” based on the notion of freedom from want, as opposed to the Canadian “narrow school of human security”, resting on freedom from fear, is both intellectually unproductive and empirically flawed. When Ogata became President of JICA, she made sure the enunciation assemblage she had previously helped to construct through the release of the *U.N. Human Security Now Report* would be plugged into the JapHS conceptualisation. This new assemblage has contained both central signifiers of U.N. human security: freedom from want and freedom from fear. Putting JapHS conceptually in line with the *Human Security Now Report* meant assembling together some of the original JapHS features with the new U.N. concept outlined in the Report. While the newly assembled JapHS contains considerable continuities, particularly the emphasis on development and the use of the ODA convergence machine, the case for the juxtaposition of freedom from fear and freedom from want in the context of Japanese governmental documents is made for the first time.

After the discussion of Ogata moving from the U.N to JICA, it is no surprise that the new human security assemblage of enunciation has penetrated official JICA documents. Thus, JICA’s *Human Security Approach: Features and Case Studies*, from May 2008, begins with pointing out that ‘JICA’s incorporation of Human Security [is based on] the “First Phase of JICA’s Reform Plan,” announced in March 2004’ (JICA 2008a: 2). The official Japanese definition of human security in the same document lays bare the mechanistic conceptual transfer from the U.N.. When answering a self-posed question of what is human security, the above document
maintains that ‘Human Security refers to the safeguarding of people’s freedom from fear and want, ensuring that they can live in safety and dignity’ (JICA 2008a: 2; emphasis added). Ensuring that the source of this claim is known, the document continues as follows: ‘[a]ccording to the Final Report (2003) of the Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by Ogata Sadako and Amartya Sen, Human Security means “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment”’ (JICA 2008a: 2). Interestingly, U.N./JICA’s human security assemblage soon penetrated MOFA, which in its 2005 ODA Review also defined human security in terms of “fears” and “wants” (MOFA 2007a; emphases in original). Nevertheless, neither MOFA nor JICA have been able to move beyond references to intellectually impoverishing empty signifiers of freedom from fear and freedom from want. From a bureaucratic vantage point, there has been no need to: the discursive use of the two freedoms has sufficed to reinforce the hybridity of U.N./JapHS assemblage, thereby showing that the Japanese bureaucracy has been at the vanguard of the international conceptual development of human security. Simultaneously, it has further reinforced the interpenetration of JapHS assemblage with the country’s ODA convergence machine. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 88) remark, ‘[i]t is obvious that statements do not represent machines’.

Ogata personally, and the JICA bureaucracy in institutional terms, became the main regulator of the forged Japan/U.N. human security assemblage. Ogata’s ability to increase JICA’s bureaucratic clout has indeed been enabled by her previous U.N. posts as well as by her close personal relationships with just about every key policy-maker and expert working in this field. An interesting moment during which one can observe the deployment of Japanese bureaucratic arborescence consisting in capture rather than flight, occurred after the Commission on Human Security
published its report and was expected to end its activities. Instead of dismantling the Commission, Ogata successfully lobbied for its transformation into the *Advisory Board on Human Security* in September 2003. The aim of the Ogata-chaired Board (Amartya Sen has not been a member of this body) was described as to ‘advise the U.N. Secretary General on ways to carry out the recommendations of the report and utilise the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security’ (MOFA 2007c). Thus, Ogata and JICA have been able to translate their enunciative power derived from the Human Security Report into control over UNTFHS effectuation. What is more, the Advisory Board has been very successful in geographically spreading the Japan/U.N. human security assemblage, in which the Report-derived enunciation and the Fund-related effectuation were systematically connected for the first time. It is precisely in this aim that the Advisory Board is linked to a Japan-initiated and Japan-dominated platform called the *Friends of Human Security*. 
From documentary and interview analysis at least two reasons can be adduced that have contributed to Japan’s foundation of the Friends of Human Security. The first was to make permanent the Japan/U.N. hybrid human security assemblage. The Advisory Board chaired by JICA’s President Ogata has captured and occupied the space separating the inside of the U.N. apparatus (the Advisory Board itself being inside) from its outside, where the Japan-led and New York-based Friends of Human Security has been located. Japanese colonisation of the
inside/outside complex of U.N. human security space has indeed put the Japanese state apparatus and its human security/ODA convergence machine into a strong diplomatic position vis-à-vis other countries. The best demonstration of Japan’s increasing human security clout has been a sharp increase in the interest other countries have taken in the Friends of Human Security. While the first meeting of this platform (October 2006) was attended by 24 countries and the second meeting (April 2007) by 35 countries, the third meeting (November 2007) recorded 48 attending countries, and a meeting which took place in May 2008 registered no fewer than 86 attending countries (personal interview with a Senior Japanese Representative to the U.N., Tokyo, September 18, 2008). The second, albeit more subtle, reason for the Japanese government convening the Friends of Human Security has been to counterbalance the influence of a similar platform, the Human Security Network, which has been a semi-formal club of countries led by Canada and Norway. Japan’s successful occupation of the human security space in and around the U.N. resulted in the effective neutralisation of Canada and Norway’s possible attempts to move the Human Security Network closer to the U.N. That there has been significant rivalry between the two platforms has been confirmed both by interviewed Japanese and Canadian officials. Consequently, this has been one of the reasons (though not the only one) why the Human Security Network has been ailing and never fulfilled its potential.

This chapter demonstrated how the domains of foreign policy, techno-economy and national security, i.e. fields which are usually treated in isolation from one another, interrelated to produce, first, a comprehensive national security and, later, human security. With no lesser importance, the role of Japanese official development aid (ODA) as a connector and enabler in this process was examined.
This advancement provided the necessary context for the consequent characterisation of JapHS assemblage. As became clear, JapHS cannot be meaningfully studied without the analysis of structural terrain on which it was launched as a specific governmental programme in the second half of the 1990s. The key mechanism studied in this chapter was how the ODA convergence machine penetrated the bureaucratic programme of human security. It showed that the replacement of comprehensive national security and the introduction of human security were performed mainly for reasons of enhancing the country’s international position and a demonstration of its proximity to the United Nations (Japanese “good offices” in the U.N.). Two human security tracks were probed in this context: a neo-mercantile techno-economic track; and a humanitarian track. The last section of this chapter focused on the expansion of JapHS programme into a trans-boundary, institutionally-hybridised human security assemblage. This expansion was investigated in terms of the issue of Japanese global colonisation of human security through the country’s related activities in the U.N., namely the country’s involvement in the U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security; and the U.N. Commission on Human Security.
CHAPTER 8

DOMOPOLITICAL ASSEMBLAGE OF JAPANESE HUMAN SECURITY

The final chapter of the presented thesis – Chapter 8 – deals with the domopolitics of human security. The notion of domopolitics was introduced by William Walters, a Foucauldian sociologist and political scientist, to study the relationship between the inside of a state and its outside, and associated mechanisms attempting to regulate this relationship. Indeed, security appears as a prominent field of action in this regard, and JapHS has been the epitome of domopolitical diagrammatics. The key configuration which is analysed in this regard is the relationship between citizenship, state and territory. As will become clear, keeping the distinction between warm words of home and the danger of the chaotic outside has been one of the main political functions of JapHS. The chapter begins with a discussion of two complementary diagrams of power: convergence and domopolitics. As the chapter demonstrates, these two diagrams have shaped in profound ways the nature of JapHS assemblage. The following section studies the extension of Japanese national-security interests through the country’s human security assemblage into post-conflict spaces. It is argued and shown that Japan’s push into post-conflict spaces has hinged on two modalities: a direct modality in which the state apparatus operates directly in these spaces; and second, an indirect modality in which the state apparatus operates in these spaces through official – or Royal – Japanese NGOs which it has tightly controlled and regulated.
In respect of the first modality, it is argued that an increasing push of Japanese state apparatus into post-conflict spaces has not been associated with what the existing literature recognises as an incrementally linear process of “normalisation” of Japan. Rather, the findings of the conducted analysis suggest that the Japanese presence in post-conflict spaces has seen the rise and fall of the military war machine and its replacement by the converged human security/ODA assemblage. In concrete terms, this section shows how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) managed to neutralise the link between terrorism and the military war machine by its own appropriation through the merger of the (already converged) human security/ODA assemblage with the notion of peace-building. Additionally, the first modality is analysed through domopolitical diagrammatics of power, which allows for a simultaneous analysis of Japanese external production of human security and the country’s internal production of danger and human insecurity. The example on which this diagrammatics rests is the issue of Afghan refugees in Afghanistan and Japan. This analysis reveals a configuration which can be called a simulation of liberal human security at best. It is argued and empirically demonstrated that while Japan has been replicating a liberal discourse and practices related to the treatment of refugees in Afghanistan, its measures deployed against those Afghan refugees who tried to immigrate to Japan have been an example of the non-liberal, arborescent nature of the Japanese bureaucracy of social control. Thus, the key revelation is that post-conflict reconstruction carried out by Japan, framed in terms of human security/peace-building, has been linked to the country’s rigid anti-immigration posture through sharing the same counter-terrorism domopolitics of national security. Also, as will become clear, the two have been functionally closely interconnected: “rebuilding
their distant homes has meant that they haven’t sought their homes where our home is”.

The final section of Chapter 8 tackles the indirect modality through which the Japanese state apparatus has been delivering human security. It claims that the nature of the contemporary administration of Japanese NGOs has been formed on the ruins of Kōbe, hit by the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995. Also, unlike the existing literature which suggests that the post-1995 development of the relationship between the state apparatus and the non-profit and voluntary sector has seen a significant emancipation and empowerment of the latter, the opposite is actually the case. In concrete terms, it is maintained that the post-1995 configuration of the relationship, which is specifically examined through the impact of new legislature on human security oriented NGOs, has seen the extension of a juridico-bureaucratic regime of control. It has been through this expansion of the state’s capture that the connection between the domopolitical “care and protection” of NGOs by Japanese bureaucracy and arborified, expanded developmentalist rationality of control has been made. In this context, an important observation of Walters, that domopolitics is at odds with liberal political economy, is furthered. It is used precisely to explain why Japanese NGOs have been “protected” by Japanese bureaucracy, rather than forced to become competitive, effective and efficient performance machines, as their Canadian counterparts have. What follows is an examination of an arborescent intermediary which the Japanese bureaucracy established to regulate NGOs: the Japan Platform. It will be argued and shown that Japanese bureaucracy of MOFA has devised a unique way of producing “Royal NGOs” oriented towards human security delivery in post-conflict spaces. Thus, the Japan Platform will be discussed in its capacity of the centre of contemporary human security convergence in Japan.
The previous chapter examined the continuation of Japanese master convergence through the appropriation of the concept of human security. It dealt with one specific type of penetration, namely that of the Japanese human security (JapHS) governmental programme by the ODA convergence machine. What followed was an investigation of the result of this penetration, the hybridised Japan/U.N. arborescent assemblage. This was one specific example of a penetration of a concrete programme/assemblage by an abstract machine, i.e. the type of interconnection studied by Deleuze and Guattari. As was already pointed out in Chapter 1, penetrations performed by an abstract machine also interested Foucault (Deleuze and Foucault 1977: 205), who called it the ‘diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form’, and gave panopticism as one such specimen. One point that the previous chapter demonstrated was the transformation of the JapHS programme into a JapHS arborescent assemblage. This transformation concerned the multidirectional spread of elements of JapHS, and the abstract machine of ODA convergence played an instrumental role in this transformation. How the resulting diagram of social assemblage, a blend of a previously existing governmental programme with an abstract machine, is qualitatively different from a governmental programme in its pure form can be seen in Rajchman’s specification of a diagram:

By diagram, Deleuze thought Foucault had something original in mind – something Deleuze would call “an abstract machine.” It was a diagram of something at work in many different institutions and situations, spread out in several countries, working in a manner not
given in the map of social policies and prescriptions, planned as such by no one (Rajchman 1999: 47; emphasis in original).

On the basis of the above delimitation, it can be argued that the resulting configuration analysed in the previous chapter was a generalisable diagram of convergence, merging techno-economic, foreign-political, and humanitarian interests. The entire convergence was greased by the ODA abstract machine, which relied on the combination of sovereign and disciplinary power and allowed for the partial deterritorialisation of Japanese segmentary arborescent codes, as well as for their subsequent reterritorialisation in and around the U.N.

This chapter poses a simple question: has one’s understanding of the JapHS assemblage been exhausted by an analysis of the above diagrammatical convergence? And if not, what remains to be investigated, and in what kind of diagram of power? As Deleuze (1988: 35; emphasis added) maintained in his interpretation of Foucault’s work, ‘[e]very society has its diagram(s)’. This chapter confirms the possibility Deleuze suggests on a general plane, i.e. being able to operate through more than a single diagram of power in a given field of action. It will be shown that the Japanese bureaucracy managed to create a complementary diagram of power through which the JapHS assemblage has been deployed and spread. In concrete terms, the chapter explores a parallel penetration of JapHS assemblage which has rested on another facet of Japanese arborescent diagram of power: domopolitics.

Innovative research on domopolitical diagrams of power has been conducted by William Walters (2004), who also coined the neologism “domopolitics”. Domopolitics is defined by Walters (2004: 240-241; emphasis added) as ‘an analytic’
of government which maps the contemporary ‘reconfiguring of the relations between citizenship, state, and territory … and the kinds of rationalities, subjectivities, knowledges and spatialities that it sets in motion’. In particular, it examines the efforts to rationalise ‘a series of security measures in the name of a particular understanding of home’ (Ibid: 241). Walters argues that domopolitics operates through a completely different diagram of power than (neo-)liberal political economy. In fact, they are in many respects opposing poles: ‘[w]hereas political economy is descended from the will to govern the state as a household, domopolitics aspires to govern the state like a home’ (Walters 2004: 237; emphasis added). Unlike neo-liberal political economy which has, in turn, served as the basis of a neo-liberal rationality of government and has been preoccupied with increasing subjects’ efficiency and effectiveness, domopolitics traces its origins to the Latin word domus, meaning home or house. Domopolitics has ‘powerful affinities with family, intimacy, place: the home as hearth, a refuge or a sanctuary in a heartless world’ (Ibid: 241). Furthermore, domopolitics uses mixed, binary tactics of ‘warm words’ of home and ‘the danger words of a chaotic outside’ (Ibid: 241). One can thus say that domopolitics is diagrammatically concerned with running the state as a warm home, not an efficient household: ‘[c]onsequently, domopolitics and liberal political economy exist in tension with one another’ (Walters 2004: 237).

Japan’s domopolitics – investigated in this chapter – is concerned with a different yet complementary type of convergence. Specifically, its diagram of power has at its centre the extension of Japanese national-security interests into (post-)conflict environments. Two modalities of this extension are investigated: first, a modality in which the state apparatus operates directly through its enunciations and effectuations in such environments; and, second, a modality in which the Japanese
state apparatus governs indirectly through the administration of Japanese NGOs working in post-conflict environments. Indeed, both modalities feature an emphasis on the difference between the safe home and a dangerous outside. They too show a significant difference between the Canadian advanced liberal diagram and the Japanese domopolitical diagram of power. Whilst the former has penetrated, in its capacity of a decoding abstract machine, a largely rhizomatic human security assemblage (though with numerous governmental attempts to arborify it), the latter is a clear example of an overcoding arborescent state apparatus which has controlled a partially deterritorialised (and subsequently reterritorialised) human security assemblage. Thus, domopolitics is always arborifying in its diagrammatical configuration.

Delivering Post-Conflict Peace: Human Security Replaces the Military War Machine

This section analyses Japan’s security push into (post-)conflict spaces. It portrays an interesting example of the parallel working of Japanese military war machine and the converged, machinic human security/ODA assemblage. While often operating in the same spaces, the dominant feature of their encounters has been their inability to converge. Thus, the following investigation of Japanese production of post-conflict peace provides an important corrective to the allegedly universal model of liberal peace-building. In the Japanese case more than in any other, the profound separation of its military war machine from the state apparatus has been responsible for the country’s inability to bridge peacekeeping and peace-enforcement practices with
peace-building ones. As will become clear, while the first two have been controlled by the military war machine, the latter has been run by bureaucrats of the state apparatus. As a result, Japan has lacked any form of civic-military cooperation, and, in fact, has not needed one, as their delivery of post-conflict peace has not rested on a neo-liberal political economy of Western peace-building aimed at efficiency maximisation and the privatisation of security, but on domopolitical diagrammatics. In order to demonstrate these points empirically, Japanese parallel presence in and around Afghanistan will be investigated. Before that, the necessary context connecting the analysis contained below with two preceding chapters is provided.

Although the beginning of Japanese security push into (post-)conflict spaces has often been linked to the post-Cold War, U.S.-initiated gaiatsu (Singh 2010; Rawnsley 2006; Fukuyama and Oh 1993), certain factors complicate the issue, and the time frame actually predated 1989. The initial suggestion that Japan should consider participation in peace support operations came from the then U.N Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in 1961 and was subsequently rejected by the Japanese government. The reaction of Matsudaira Koto, who was Japan’s Ambassador to the U.N. at that time, reveals that the Japanese position was diplomatically hard to defend in light of the country’s previous expression of a strong U.N.-centred policy (Heinrich, Shibata and Soeya 1999: 9-16). The push was reactivated at the outset of the 1980s and a distinctly domestic dynamics stood behind it. In 1980, the Japanese government embraced CLB’s interpretation that the use of Self-Defence Forces (SDF) for U.N. peacekeeping operations was in line with the Constitution, provided a given mission did not require the use of force (Zisk 2001: 21-25). Japanese dispatches of civilian personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations began in 1988.
As the previous chapter pointed out, the 1980s under PM Nakasone (1982-1987) was the period during which two different machines – the ODA convergence machine and the re-emerging military war machine – intertwined to form the assemblage of comprehensive security. In 1982, the government established an advisory panel, which included Ogata Sadako, to analyse Japanese peacekeeping options. The final report made a strong normative case for Japan’s participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations in non-military fields such as infrastructure enhancement, medical assistance and monitoring, and patrol activities (Ishizuka 2006: 5). Although the comprehensive security assemblage and the 1982 report gave a semblance of unity of intentions, they in fact contained two different sets of objectives. While Nakasone and other revisionist politicians, and especially military bureaucrats, considered U.N. peacekeeping particularly suitable for Japan’s silent return to military normalcy, liberal internationalists such as Ogata hoped for a burnished image of Japan as a middle power with “good offices” in the U.N. The result was a convergence of convenience, in which the uniting element bringing together the state apparatus and the military war machine was not only the wish to see Japan rising in terms of its international status, but also the neutralisation of domestic pacifist opposition. Until the end of the Cold War, the CLB played an important role in giving the state apparatus the upper hand over the military war machine within this convergence of convenience. This balance of power remained in place until the outbreak of the Gulf War, triggered by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

Japan’s negative experience related to the Gulf Crisis represented a chance for their military war machine to increase its future involvement in peacekeeping. Although Japan (hesitantly) sent minesweepers to the Gulf and financially contributed an unprecedented $13 billion to the operation and the following
reconstruction, the Japanese government did not live up to international expectations and was fiercely criticised by the international community for not sending military personnel (Kurosawa 1998: 204). Consequently, the then U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, urged Japan to reconsider the nature of its involvement in similar future crises, arguing that ‘[y]our “checkbook diplomacy” …is clearly too narrow’ (Baker 1991; quoted in Mann 1991). The reaction came in the form of the International Peace Cooperation Bill which was approved by the Diet in June 1992 and entered into force as the so-called “PKO” Law. From then on, the SDF were able to participate in any U.N. peacekeeping operation. SDF have been involved, amongst others, in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Rwanda, and East Timor (Ishizuka 2005).

It is important to emphasise, however, that the boost for Japanese military machine came from the outside, namely from bureaucrats of the state apparatus and Japanese politicians. As an interviewed high-ranking MOFA official who was instrumental both in drafting the PKO Bill and later in promoting human security put it,

the fact that the Kuwaitis didn’t officially list – and didn’t even thank – Japan as a contributor to the resolution of the Gulf Crisis and the biggest donor came as a complete and totally unexpected shock to the Japanese government. This symbolism was much more important for us than [the U.S.] gaiatsu. The reason for the Kuwaitis not to list Japan was simple: Japan did not send any combat troops there … This clearly showed to us that the chequebook diplomacy did not – and could not – work alone in such moments. As a result, MOFA people and our
politicians realised that they needed to reach out across the aisle to JDA [Japan Defence Agency] to change things together. A powerful bureaucratic coalition emerged and lobbied for the PKO Bill and expansion of Japan’s peacekeeping commitment (personal interview with a Senior Official, Global Issues, MOFA, Tokyo, October 1, 2008).

One of the unintended consequences of the convergence of convenience between the disappointed bureaucrats and neo-revisionist politicians on the one hand and the military war machine on the other has been a continuous erosion of CLB’s interpretive power. As Samuels maintains in this context,

[t]he CLB would not have been sidelined quite so effectively …. had it not openly blocked the dispatch of Japanese Self Defense Forces to the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991. That battle over overseas dispatch and the legitimate use of force was both the high point of CLB power and the beginning of its demise. Japan’s most conservative political leaders have never forgotten the constraints imposed by CLB interpretations, nor have they ever forgiven the CLB for playing upon divisions in the conservative camp and inserting itself so directly into the political debate (Samuels 2004: not numbered; also cf. Stackpole 2002: 80).

On the basis of the above, one could think that the 9/11 terrorist attacks could have further strengthened the role of Japanese military war machine. With the convergence of convenience in place and the interpretive influence of the CLB
reduced, the war machine could have been seen in a favourable position to further penetrate the state apparatus.

However, as the analysis contained below suggests, 9/11 rather signified the suppression of the military war machine. The cardinal reason for this was the ability of the state bureaucracy to capitalise on domestic political turmoil related to the debate surrounding the deployment of the military war machine in Afghanistan and Iraq. In concrete terms, the bureaucracy of MOFA and JICA managed to neutralise the link between terrorism and the military war machine by its own appropriation through the merger of the (already converged) ODA/human security assemblage with the notion of peace-building. The result is clear: making the connection to peace-building has enabled the ODA/human security assemblage to reterritorialise in post-conflict spaces and colonise them. In terms of Japanese production of international peace, the effects of 9/11 have consisted in the emergence of a new diagram of power: a domopolitics of human security/ODA assemblage. By and large, the country’s participation in peace enforcement has been replaced by its embrace of peace-building. As the initial discussion in this chapter demonstrated, a domopolitical diagrammatics of power is complementary to diagrams of convergence. In the Japanese case, domopolitics related to the country’s production of peace has been flourishing on existing convergences: initially on the heterogeneous convergence of convenience with two different formations intertwined, and, when this convergence was sidelined, on the ODA/human security/peace-building convergence.

The quick dispatch of three warships by the Japan Maritime SDF to the Indian Ocean in support of the U.S.-led coalition-of-willing-style Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) signalled a bold start for the Japanese military war
machine in the post-9/11 security environment. Although not precisely “keeping its feet on the ground”, Japanese dispatch to the Indian Ocean, especially when compared to previous dispatches of minesweepers, represented significant theatre involvement. It followed the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill which was overwhelmingly approved in the Diet two weeks earlier (Southgate 2003: 1599-1601). This piece of law gave the SDF a mandate to provide non-combat support to U.S. military forces as a part of the wider “war on terror”. The activities allowed under this bill, and consistent with the revised 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation, were fuel supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical services, communications, billeting, and decontamination (Government of Japan 2001a,b). The domopolitical language emotively connected historically-layered “warm words” of home (the evolution of the U.S.-Japan “partnership bond”) and “the danger words of a chaotic outside” (terrorism originating in Afghanistan), with the seemingly logical result of a military solution to Afghanistan’s problems, as can be seen from a 2002 speech made by the then PM Koizumi Junichiro:

Next year will be the 150th anniversary of Commodore Perry’s arrival in Japan, which ended 250 years of Japanese seclusion … Since then, our relationship has gone through a number of trials … Tomorrow I will attend a memorial ceremony in honor of the victims of the terrorist attacks of September 11th … September 11th destroyed families, and it destroyed our assumptions about how the world operated. It thrust before us basic issues of how to protect our values, our citizens and our civilized society … We enacted legislation that allowed us to dispatch Japanese self-defense planes for airlift support and self-defense ships to
refuel U.S. and U.K. vessels … The battlefield of Afghanistan must be turned into a nation. That is the daunting task we face (MOFA 2002d).

As a result of such domopolitical language, and in sharp contrast to previously pacifist public attitudes, approximately half of Japanese respondents who were asked what they thought was the most important issue for the SDF answered by stating counter-terrorism activities (Ishizuka 2006: 7).

Another parallel dispatch of the Japanese military war machine took place after PM Koizumi made a commitment to U.S. President Bush to send the SDF to Iraq in May 2003. Koizumi, in line with his conviction that the Constitution needed to be revised to allow for Japan’s greater involvement in international conflict management, seconded a number of officials from JDA to his Cabinet Office (Samuels 2007: 75). Arguably, this was a constitutive moment for the later transformation of JDA into the fully-fledged Ministry of Defence under PM Abe Shinzō. Japanese involvement in Iraq was controversial in its uniqueness for at least three reasons. First, the operation had no mandate from the U.N. Security Council and its legality and legitimacy have been put in doubt; second, Koizumi established an “Iraq Response Office” just days after Bush’s final ultimatum to Saddam Hussein; and finally, constitutionality of the Japanese involvement was questioned, among other reasons, for refuelling U.S. aircraft which bombed cities in Iraq and for having SDF on the ground (a 550-strong Ground SDF), though they were not involved in combat (Ishizuka 2006: 16; Hughes 2004: 5). In many respects, Iraq was the peak of Japanese military war machine, as it managed to temporarily take control of Japanese security policy regarding Iraq, largely at the expense of the MOFA. An interesting point to mention in this context was the degree to which the Japanese military war
machine defined post-conflict peace-building in Iraq. As suggested by the nature of the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance, on the basis of which Japan was engaged in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military war machine was significantly engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction work, i.e. the field traditionally reserved for MOFA and METI.

Paradoxically as it seems, the Afghan and Iraqi experiences have led to the weakening, and not to the reinforcement, of the Japanese military war machine. As far as Iraq is concerned, the Japan Self-Defence Forces Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group, a largely humanitarian, battalion-sized contingent, was withdrawn (mainly due to repeated attacks against the Group and Japan’s inability to systematically deal with them) and disbanded in July 2006, a mere two years after its initial deployment. With regard to its mission in the Indian Ocean, Japan’s refuelling participation in the peace-enforcement OEF in Afghanistan peaked in 2002, and by 2008, when the operation was cancelled, decreased twenty-fold in terms of the volume of fuel delivered (Ferguson 2009). In January 2010, Japanese PM Hatoyama Yukio ordered the SDF to return from the Indian Ocean (Fackler 2010). The surprisingly quick disassemble of the Japanese military war machine engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq seems baffling. How are we to understand the military war machine’s inability to capitalise on this unprecedented opportunity and relatively sound public support in the beginning? Indeed, restrictive rules of engagement, regional resistance to a “militarily normalised” Japan, as well as a domestic shift in public opinion and more vociferous political opposition which secured the blocking majority in the House of Councillors, the upper chamber of the Diet, all combined to play the key role in the withdrawal.
While 9/11 and the U.S.-led incursion into Iraq briefly boosted the Japanese military war machine, the real winner of Japanese push into (post-)conflict spaces has been the bureaucracy controlling the human security/ODA assemblage. The key move through which the bureaucracy of JICA and MOFA managed to make a decisive push into (post-)conflict spaces was the merger of the (already converged) ODA/human security assemblage with the notion of peace-building. Through securitisation, the latter allowed MOFA and JICA to become the key players in post-conflict peace-building. The central front of this merger was post-9/11 Afghanistan, with the result of gradually neutralising the “monopoly” of military war machine on counter-terrorism enunciations and effectuations. Also, JICA and MOFA’s decision to underscore the importance of Afghanistan’s nation-building also meant that the newly-created human security/ODA/peace-building branch of arborescent JapHS assemblage had successfully appropriated the domopolitical language previously used by Japanese politicians and the military war machine. Rebuilding the house of Afghanistan in order to suppress breeding grounds for terrorists became one of the biggest tasks for JICA and MOFA. The next section examines how JICA achieved this merger, and other motives for this domopolitical push into the post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan.

**Producing Human (In)security: Building Their Homes, Denying Their Entrance**

The key argument of this section is that the domopolitics of JapHS has been an example *par excellence* of the parallel bureaucratic production of human security and human insecurity. It is maintained that one cannot understand a complete
domopolitical diagram of power through an examination of its international side (Japan’s state/home-building exercise), but must be complemented by an analysis of its domestic side. As the latter has been completely ignored in the existing literature so far, the domopolitical diagram of human security has remained hidden. Only when the two sides are analytically juxtaposed does the intermestic (international-domestic) domopolitical diagram appear in its entirety. Consequently, the diagram shows that the domopolitics of JapHS has not rested on liberal premises, but national-security arborescence. In this case, national security has not been defined in military or economic terms, but in domopolitical terms concerning the relationship between citizenship, state, and territory. The argument that the Japanese production of human (in)security has not rested on liberal political economy at all and has only tactically and selectively referred to liberal values, is informed by the lack of circulation of human security between the country’s inside and outside. The fact that the inside and the outside have been strictly separated, both in discourses and practices, suggests a non-liberal domopolitical configuration. This management of reality is known in Japan as the dichotomy between honne and tatemae: whereas the former is concerned with the ways in which things are presented, the latter relates to genuine motives. As Hori (2004: 11) reminds us, ‘the use of tatemae seems to represent communication that is meant to be superficial, unproductive and irresponsible’.

As will become clear, JICA and MOFA’s nation-building efforts in Afghanistan have not led to changes in profoundly non-liberal immigration practices in Japan. On the contrary, they have reinforced the existing distinction between an “our homes vs. their homes” domopolitical diagrammatics, through a bureaucratic emphasis on keeping the borders (selectively) closed. Therefore, one of the social
consequences of the involvement of the Japanese state apparatus in the post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan has been the pre-emption of any immigration from Afghanistan to Japan. However, as Walters reminds us, domopolitics features a positive and a negative aspect:

[domopolitics is] a will to domesticate the forces which threaten the sanctity of home. Domopolitics is not reducible to the Fortress impulse of building walls, strengthening the locks, updating the alarm system. It contains within itself this second tendency which takes it outwards, beyond the home, beyond even its own “backyard” and quite often into its neighbours’ homes, ghettos, jungles, bases, slums. Once domopolitics extends its reach, once it begins to take the region or even the globe as its strategic field of intervention, then the homeland becomes the home front, one amongst many sites in a multifaceted struggle (Walters 2004: 242; emphasis in the original).

While Afghanistan is used to illustrate Japanese domopolitics of human security in this section, the same configuration can be seen in other nation-building attempts of Japan within the Asia-Pacific region. It is through an analysis of domopolitical enunciations and effectuations that one can see how the molar arborescence pervading JapHS assemblage has prevented the (literal) opening of lines of flight.

The first signs of the emergence of Japanese domopolitics of human security appeared at the beginning of 2002. As the previous section demonstrated, this was a period dominated by what one could call military-style domopolitics, nourished by PM Koizumi and the neo-revisionists around him, as well as by Japanese military
war machine. Outside of the centre of visibility, however, JICA and MOFA’s early attempts to neutralise and subsequently appropriate the monopoly to domopolitical language could be discerned. Ogata Sadako played an important role in this development, being a U.N./Japan human security assemblage gatekeeper and its guarantor. While she was still co-chairing the U.N. Commission on Human Security, she was also appointed Special Representative of the Prime Minister of Japan on Afghanistan Assistance, and co-chaired the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, held in Tokyo in January 2002. A few months later, the Government of Japan introduced Japanese Regional Comprehensive Development Assistance to Afghanistan, known as the Ogata Initiative. The aim of the Initiative was defined as to ‘grop[e] to the desirable modality of comprehensive development for the reconstruction, and to achieve seamless transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery and reconstruction assistance’ (MOFA 2002b). When Ogata was put in charge of JICA in 2003, she used the conceptual grounding previously introduced by her and argued for a shift from short-term humanitarian relief to recovery and reconstruction assistance – that is, peace-building.

MOFA and JICA managed to conceptually merge human security and peace-building, thereby allowing for a controlled plug of the human security/ODA assemblage into the territory of (post-)conflict Afghanistan. In 2003, Japanese ODA Charter was revised to incorporate human security as one of its basic policies. As Ishizuka (2006: 13-14) points out, the post-2003 Japanese ODA/human security policy has been put in line with the U.N.-derived concept of peace-building. Sugishita Tsuneo of JICA goes even further to argue that the ‘revised ODA Charter in 2003 raised peace-building as a purpose of ODA’ (Sugishita 2007; emphasis
added). In terms of enunciations, while the 2006 annual volume of Japanese diplomatic bluebook still highlighted human security as a key *diplomatic* perspective (MOFA 2006b: 183-184), the 2008 annual volume emphasised peace-building and spoke of human security as a part of *post-conflict reconstruction* (MOFA 2008b). Interestingly, one of the three identified functions of Japanese peace-building, apart from its contribution to U.N. peacekeeping operations (as a matter of fact, a conceptual *non sequitur*) and to intellectual and human resource development, was ‘the provision of Official Development Assistance (ODA)’ (MOFA 2008b). The degree of a conceptual merger can also be seen in the MOFA document, *Japan’s Efforts on Peacebuilding*, from March 2007, which argues that ‘the importance of the perspective of human security in peace-building’ lies in the fact that ‘the nation is often in ruins and the state security services are often unable to function properly’ (MOFA 2007d: 12, emphases added).

In complementing bureaucratic attempts to plug its human security/ODA assemblage into post-conflict spaces through its merger with peace-building, the MOFA and JICA have also gradually appropriated the counter-terrorism agenda. A mere three months after 9/11 occurred, the MOFA – again with the personal participation of Ogata – organised an international symposium on ‘Human Security and Terrorism’, which was dramatically subtitled ‘From Afghanistan to the Future of the World’. An early attempt to create a single series of human security/ODA/post-conflict peace-building/counter-terrorism can already be seen in the final report from the symposium which maintained that ‘the history of Afghanistan illustrates the consequences of a lack of human security’, and continued with the assertion that ‘the reconstruction of Afghanistan should be regarded not only as a *response to terrorism*, but also as the *construction* of Afghanistan as a *nation* with a long-term
vision’ (MOFA 2001b, emphasis added). That human security/ODA/peace-building needs to be used to stop the growth of terrorism has been singled out by the Afghanistan Study Group Japan in its 2008 report revisiting Japanese experience: ‘[i]mproving human security … in [local] communities to make them resistant to terrorism is the most effective way to counter terrorism’ (ASGJ 2008: 2). That JICA and MOFA have been successful in appropriating the link between (post-) conflict spaces and counter-terrorism, thereby neutralising the previous domination of the agenda by the military war machine, can be found in the above-mentioned report, which emphasised that

[a]n army is not a tool to directly provide security to people in communities. What is happening in reality is that communities themselves are being destroyed as military operations combat terrorists mixed amongst communities, resulting in further alienation of the people (Ibid: 2).

Thus, by 2008 there was already a widespread opinion that the deployment of the military war machine was not particularly suitable for dealing with the counter-terrorism agenda, with the result that the JICA and MOFA completed took control of this portfolio.

In many respects, JICA and MOFA’s near-monopolisation of the counter-terrorism agenda through merging its human security/ODA assemblage with peace-building has meant a return to and expansion of the bureaucrats’ favourite politics of convergence. After $500 million was pledged for rebuilding Afghanistan’s government and infrastructure in 2002, JICA and MOFA have mainly focused on the
implementation of two complementary programmes: the Ogata Initiative and Japanese DDR agenda (“disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration”), assisted by the UNDP. As far as the Ogata Initiative is concerned, the focus here has been on the resettlement and reintegration of returning refugees and internally displaced persons, i.e. the agenda Ogata had previously been in charge of as the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. That the plight of Afghan refugees in Afghanistan has been taken seriously can be seen from Japanese report on the peace-building process:

[a]t present the focus of support for refugees and displaced persons is shifting from relief projects to resettlement support. Deciding at the individual level whether such a person can return home now, investigating what is necessary for this purpose, and providing the required assistance is an enormous task (MOFA 2002c).

The DDR ‘New Beginnings Program’ complementarily attempted to reintegrate former combatants, and more recently has shifted its attention to demining activities and the disbandment of illegal armed groups (MOFA 200d: 7). The major return to chequebook diplomacy took place in November 2009, when the government announced that it was committing a massive $5 billion to Japanese (post-)conflict reconstruction (Kambayashi 2009). This move has correctly been perceived as dropping the flag for Japanese military war machine which was preparing to be withdrawn from the Indian Ocean (Yon 2009).

However, JICA and MOFA’s involvement in post-conflict peace-building as a way of fighting terrorism complemented convergence with a domopolitical diagrammatics of power. The result of this combination has been, perhaps
surprisingly, what one could term *domopolitical divergence*: the parallel production of human security and human insecurity. Specifically, domopolitical divergence has been defined by the juxtaposition of a relative, if modest, increase in security for those Afghanis who stayed in Afghanistan, and who have seen their communities rebuilt with the help of JICA, against heightened insecurity for those who have attempted to leave the country behind and have tried to re-start their lives in Japan, an imagined refuge. As the following lines suggest, an examination of Japanese nation-building efforts in post-conflict spaces without a complementary analysis of the country’s immigration policies prevents the emergence of a full domopolitical diagram of human (in)security.

Japanese post-conflict reconstruction has been linked to the country’s rigid anti-immigration posture through sharing the same counter-terrorism domopolitics of national security. As far as the assemblage of enunciation is concerned, the basic link has been the binary domopolitical language of “safe home” (Japan) vs. “dangerous terrorist havens” (Afghanistan).

This language has, however, shifted, in that it has now made a direct connection between these two opposites:

Looking at the situation of terrorism in the world, significant progress has been made … However, … there is concern over an increasing number of *home grown terrorists*. These circumstances prove that the threat of international terrorism still remains very serious. This is the same also in South East Asia, and the threat of terrorism persistently exists … Japan believes that, to protect people and states from such
terror, we need to enhance counter-terrorism measures and capability (MOFA 2007e).

According to this development, the configuration of related effectuations has also changed, and the link has been sustained through the use of the ODA for both peace-building in Afghanistan aimed at removing the root-causes of terrorism and, unexpectedly, for immigration control and Japanese counter-terrorism agenda:

[a]part from the ratification [of international counter-terrorism conventions and protocols], Japan has also used ODA programs to enhance its capacity building assistance for countering terrorism to the countries in need in the areas such as law-enforcement, port security, aviation security, immigration, customs and CBRN [i.e. chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear; note by the author] terrorism. Japan has provided expert training or granted necessary equipment and facilities in these areas (MOFA 2007e).

Japanese counter-terrorism agenda, partially funded from ODA sources, has served well the aims of Japanese bureaucracy of social control to further entrench the country’s tough and utterly non-liberal immigration regime of a “closed country”. Unlike Japanese exemplary care for refugees in Afghanistan as a part of the peace-building process, the treatment of those who fled Afghanistan and headed for Japan by the Immigration Office has been shocking. Japan began accepting refugees only in 1982 when it ratified, after a full 30 years of legal evasiveness, the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and enacted the Immigration Control
and Refugee Recognition Law. The ratification has, nevertheless, changed little in terms of the presence of a “closed country” immigration regime. As Isozaki Yumi, a Japanese journalist concerned with this issue points out,

Japan’s refugee policy … is based on the principle that “we may send money out, but we will not let people in.” Ever since Japan signed the International Convention on Refugees … it has managed through skilful use of *honne* (true sentiment) and *tatemae* (outward stance) to avoid confronting the refugee problem (Isozaki 2002).

Presumably Ogata Sadako, still in her previous job of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, was well aware of the asylum rules and also knew from experience that flouting them after Bosnia had become the norm. Indeed, her own U.N. Refugee Agency (UNHCR) had promoted “in country” solutions to refugees: turning them into internally displaced persons. This marks the shift within the UNHCR from ‘reactive, exile-oriented and refugee specific’ activities to ‘proactive, home-land oriented and holistic’ practises of recent times (UNHCR 2000: 4; cf. Lui 2002). In short, UNHCR has developed its own “comprehensive” domopolitics which can be seen as complementary to the Japanese one.

While available data are scattered and fragmentary (the Ministry of Justice’s Immigration Office claims that it does not record all related statistics), since 1982 Japan accepted a mere 508 refugees from the 7,292 applications submitted (Knight 2009). More than half of all applicants were from Afghanistan, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Turkey (Kurds), i.e. from countries with a long history of infringements on the human rights of citizens (Ito 2007). Moreover, to compare
Japan with Canada, while Canada has one applicant for every 1,000 citizens and has led the G8 in per capita asylum seekers, Japan has been by far the greatest outlier among the most economically developed countries, with a ratio of one applicant for every 75,000 citizens (O’Neil 2010; Knight 2009). This tendency can be seen in the starkly different approaches of both countries to asylum seekers (Canadian multiculturalism vs. Japanese ethnically-based nation-state). Even before 9/11, Japanese Ministry of Justice routinely refused to grant immigrant status to political asylum seekers from Afghanistan. In one case, its decision to throw out refugee status applications filed by nine Afghan asylum seekers caused international outrage, as they had been blamed for failing to present evidence that they have been victims of political persecution by the Taliban regime (Mainichi Daily News 2001). This approach, contradicting an earlier UNHCR recommendation that one’s ability to provide compelling evidence for experienced sufferings ought not to be used as a determining factor to decide on a refugee, was blatantly ignored. One of the asylum seekers attempted suicide after he was told by an immigration bureaucrat: ‘I don’t believe a word you are saying’ (quoted in Mainichi Daily News 2001).

Post-9/11 domopolitical enunciations and effectuations further widened the gap between the treatment of Afghan refugees in Afghanistan and Japan. Afghan asylum seekers and refugees in Japan have started to be portrayed as a potential security threat (dangerous terrorists) rather than as economic asylum seekers. The Tokyo Immigration Bureau, for instance, detained a number of Afghan asylum seekers immediately after 9/11 as part of a wider wave of raids against illegal immigrants from Afghanistan and other Muslim countries (Isozaki 2002). As Kawakami Sonoko of Amnesty International Japan maintained in this context, ‘[t]errorism looks like an excuse to revive to the old system for monitoring
foreigners. We worry that the real point of these measures is just to keep foreigners out of Japan’ (Sonoko, quoted in Fackler 2007). Similarly, Doi Kanae, a lawyer representing Afghan asylum seekers, pointed out the difference between Japanese treatment of Afghan refugees in Afghanistan and Japan:

> the Japanese government is saying it is going to provide a large amount of financial assistance for Afghan reconstruction. But inside this country, it is providing new threats to those who are applying for refugee status, having fled from the Taliban (Doi, quoted in The Japan Times 2002).

In order to counter the sharp increase of Afghan asylum seekers to Japan, Japanese bureaucrats of social control joined forces with MOFA and JICA, and through the use of the ODA/human security machine have invested heavily in the regional strategy of reintegrating Afghan refugees back to Afghanistan (MOFA 2001d). One of the objectives has indeed been the prevention of their eventual coming to Japan to seek refuge there.

The previous discussion of the domopolitics of human (in)security demonstrated that Japanese ODA, an arborescent abstract machine, has increasingly permeated Japanese immigration bureaucratic machine. Therefore, from an individual-security point of view, it has been simultaneously concerned with a contradictory production of human security and human insecurity. Whereas it has aimed at improving human conditions and security as an animating machine behind peace-building in Afghanistan, it concurrently produced human insecurity for Afghan asylum seekers trying to start new lives in Japan. As Deleuze and Guattari
maintain, diverging multiplicities of molar machines can still form and ‘operat[e] in the same assemblage’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 34; emphasis in original). Therefore, one can argue that the domopolitical assemblage of human (in)security has comprised two contradictory and yet domopolitically linked series. Their reversed pairing is particularly interesting: a warm/benign human security/ODA/peace-building series directed at the reconstruction of an “Afghanistan full of dangerous terrorist havens”, and an utterly hostile series aimed against humanitarian and political refugees fleeing from Afghanistan and their desperate effort to get into “free Japan – a hearth”. It is in this perverse pairing that the Japanese bureaucracy cares about where refugees are located, rather than about refugees as such, and that one can see the extent of what Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 34) call ‘a great paranoid bureaucratic machine’. The most interesting account of bureaucratic segmentarity which diagrammatically fits with the configuration of the two seemingly contradictory series analysed above is captured in Deleuze and Guattari’s depiction of the bureaucratic world of Franz Kafka:

Each time that power presents itself as a transcendental authority, as a paranoid law of the despot, it imposes …. a discontinuous repartition of blocks, with spaces between each one … [T]hese blocks, instead of distributing themselves around a circle …, align themselves on a hallway or a corridor: each one thereby forms a segment, which is more or less distant, on this unlimited straight line. But that doesn’t yet bring about a sufficient change … And, in fact, if it is true that each block-segment has an opening or a door onto the line of the hallway—one that is usually quite far from the door or the opening of the following
It is also true that all the blocks have back doors that are contiguous. This isn't only a “mental” topography: two diametrically opposed points bizarrely reveal themselves to be in contact (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 72-73).

Analysing both series together in this section thus laid bare the arborescent contours of the segmentary and compartmentalised bureaucracy of Japanese state apparatus, most notably its complete lack of rhizomatic circulation of security between the inside and outside of the country. As a result, JapHS as a liberal, rights-based and universalised enterprise does not exist.

### Domopolitical Administration of NGOs: From Kōbe to Afghanistan and Beyond

However surprising it may seem, Japan’s recent bureaucratic diagram of domopolitical administration of NGOs came into being 20 kilometres away from Kōbe, Japan, on Tuesday, January 17, 1995, at 5:46 Japanese Standard Time. It was at this time that the Kōbe Greater Area was struck by the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, also known as the Kōbe Earthquake. With a severity of 7.2 on the Richter scale, 6,430 people were killed and over 300,000 made homeless, and its economic costs were estimated at $100 billion. Such magnitude had not seen in Japan (itself rather seismically active) since 1923, when the Great Kanto hit Tokyo and Kanagawa Prefectures (Schwartz 2003: 14). This contingency, and especially the much flawed response of the Japanese bureaucracy to this challenge, which effectively turned a natural catastrophe into a man-made disaster, has been identified
as the key turning point in the emancipation of Japanese NGOs vis-à-vis the bureaucracy of state apparatus. As Yamamoto (1999: 98) maintained, ‘the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake clearly was a major turning point in the development of civil society in Japan’. Similarly, Özerdem and Jacoby (2006: 29) have argued that ‘today, the earthquake represents, for many, a rupture in the traditionally passive structure of Japanese civil organisation’.

The three key questions for this section, then, are to what extent the Kōbe Earthquake really influenced the subsequent development of the relationship between civil society (and more specifically NGOs) and the bureaucracy of Japanese state apparatus; whether the impact has really been accompanied by the emancipation of Japanese NGOs vis-à-vis this bureaucracy; and, finally, what have been the reverberations in terms of the bureaucratic administration of Japanese NGOs active in delivering human security in post-conflict spaces? In response to the questions posed, several points will be argued in this context: First, the following sections attempt to establish a clear and novel connection between the three questions; second, it will be held that the main transformation of the relationship between Japanese NGOs and the state bureaucracy after the Kōbe Earthquake has consisted in the creation of a new juridical technology of power through the enactment of the 1998 NPO Law; third, and counter-intuitively, although the impact of the catastrophe on NGO-bureaucracy relationships has been tremendous, as the literature suggests, the legal corollary of the contingency has been much the opposite, namely the expansion of the state apparatus’ mechanism of capture; and finally, extending juridico-bureaucratic arborescence to the administration of NGOs active in human security has been one of the facets of JapHS domopolitics analysed in this chapter.

To conclude, the section will analyse the connection between the domopolitical “care
and protection” of NGOs by Japanese bureaucracy and the arborified, expanded developmentalist rationality of control.

The slow and inefficient official reaction to the Kōbe Earthquake revealed the extent of Japanese bureaucratic arborescence and compartmentalisation. While this has been puzzling for foreign specialists in crisis management as ‘Japan’s disaster management systems have often been taken as a best practice example by many around the world’ (Özerdem and Jacoby 2006: 29), systematic observers of Japan were less surprised, since they factored in Japanese traditional reliance on an institutionalised complex of bureaucratic rituals (Furukawa 2000; Farrell 1999), including the practice of ringisho discussed in Chapter 6. As recalled by Iokobe, a civil society expert with personal experience of the Kōbe Earthquake,

> [w]hen it was reported from Ministry of Finance sources that the government would not provide relief assistance from public funds for individual quake victims for fear of conflicting with the letter of the law, we shuddered at the unchanged horror of officials who considered it their responsibility to the state to put the logic of the bureaucracy above the lives of citizens (Iokibe 1999: 90; emphasis added).

The stolid reaction of the state apparatus stood in stark contrast to the empathetic and caring reaction of Japanese citizens. The volume of civil volunteerism was unprecedented, as approximately 1.3 million citizens made for the affected area and spontaneously engaged in relief efforts.

Moreover, the Kōbe Earthquake laid bare the nature of what Pekkanen (2006) has called Japan’s “dual civil society”, further separating officially recognised NGOs
the so-called incorporated non-profit corporations (NPOs) which were slow in their reaction, as they had to wait for bureaucratic approval of their actions – and those that were unincorporated. An example of bureaucratic arborescence at play has been provided by Deguchi (1999: 12), who mentions how the MOFA warned a social group applying for permission “to help the children of the world” not to engage in any activities in Kōbe on the grounds that “children of the world” referred to children overseas. On the other hand, the quick and effective response of non-incorporated groups burnished their anti-government image which they inherited from their predecessors: citizens’ movement of the 1960s and the 1970s (Ibid: 15). An increase in the attention the mass media has paid to the non-profit and voluntary sector as a whole after the Kōbe Earthquake, as well as NGOs’ growth in numbers, has invariably been seen as the Japanese part of what Lester Salamon et al. (1999) have called a ‘global associational revolution’. Even the official term “NPO”, i.e. a specified non-profit and voluntary corporation (tokutei hieiri katsudō hōjin), entered mainstream usage as a result of the Kōbe Earthquake experience (Ogawa 2009: 2).

Allegedly, the effect of civil society’s reaction to the Kōbe Earthquake has been the pluralisation and emancipation of that civil society (cf. Schwartz 2003; Anheier and Kendall 2001; Bestor 1999; Wanner 1998). The immediate fallout seems to confirm this view. The government came under increasing pressure from non-incorporated groups which introduced a series of demands and were backed by a favourable mass media. In Pekkanen’s words, ‘[a]lthough the earthquake’s epicentre was northern Awaji Island, near Kōbe in Western Japan, the aftershocks rumbled through Japanese politics until 1998’ (Pekkanen 2006: 133). He gives a detailed account of the socio-political negotiations which resulted in the overhaul of the Japanese legislative framework, through which the state apparatus has regulated the
non-profit and voluntary sector. Pekkanen’s (Ibid: 137-152) discussion captures the processes which resulted in the passage of the 1998 NPO Law, thus replacing the hitherto central Civil Code of 1898. As becomes clear throughout his analysis, the bureaucrats of social control managed to have a say over the drafting of the bill, as well as over the nature of their supervision and sanctions of Japanese NGOs. While Pekkanen (Ibid: 55-57) points to a significant increase in the number of non-profit and voluntary groups being officially recognised after 1998, he too acknowledges that there has been mixed evidence related to widespread anticipations concerning the implementation of the law.

Although the 1998 NPO Law led to an increase in officially recognised NGOs in Japan, it would be naïve to think that this trend has been universally linked to their emancipation. In fact, the enactment of the NPO law has marked the expansion of bureaucratic reach, as more NGOs became part of the “official” non-profit and voluntary sector, and the accompanying creation of a new juridico-bureaucratic technology of power. In the previous chapter, it was argued that the wider incorporation of NGOs to provide service delivery – both domestically and internationally – has been linked to the changing economic fortunes of Japan, which has just passed the second “lost” decade. As a result, NGOs, rather than governmental agents, became important providers of public goods. As Yamamoto remarked,

NPOs have been particularly effective in areas where government bureaucracy does not have sufficient flexibility or resources to respond effectively. As social needs and values became more diverse and the
government budget became more constrained, the space for NPOs widened (Yamamoto 1999: 101).

While the initial impetus was economic, the fact that the new juridico-bureaucratic technology of power regulating NGOs has been informed by a developmentalist rationality of government has meant that there has not been an emphasis on rendering NGOs effective and efficient performance machines. What follows is an analysis of their insertion into the human security assemblage and the reterritorialisation of their practices in post-conflict spaces.

The incorporation of Japanese NGOs into the human security/ODA/peace-building assemblage has not been driven by a neo-liberal political economy, but by domopolitical diagrammatics. At the centre of the domopolitical administration of Japanese NGOs by the country’s bureaucracy resides the image of the traditional family system (ie). What ie shares with domus is the emotional and physical bond to people and places implied by the notion of “home” (Jeremy and Robinson 1989: xi). While this system, resting on strong patriarchal control and inequality among its members, was officially abolished in 1947 and replaced by a more “democratic” family system, one can discern it at the heart of the post-1998 juridico-bureaucratic technology of power. Although some scholars have rejected its value for analysing contemporary socio-political practices (cf. Moeran 1981: 42), this author’s experience based on discussing the relationship both with bureaucrats and NGO personnel (see below) convinced him of its heuristic utility in depicting the key characteristics of the relationship. Similarly, a number of social anthropologists have used the concept of ie to make sense of contemporary social groups (cf. Hendry 1998).
Indeed, the most important step in the creation of an ie-based domopolitical technology of power has been the legal capture of NGOs, by luring them to the (previously denied) advantages of becoming officially recognised NPOs. As Ogawa argued in this context,

the concept of the NPO was strategically introduced to the society in a very timely - and, in a sense, tactical - manner. The NPO, or the third sector, was officially instituted in Japanese society, gaining popular support. NPO generation has been recommended amid a rosy discourse in line with the associational revolution (Ogawa 2009: 172).

The strategic aim of the 1998 NPO Law has therefore been the production of Royal NPOs. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between the Royal (reinforcing the state apparatus) vs. the Nomadic (avoiding/fleeing from the state apparatus) discussed in Chapter 1, many NGOs working in human security related areas have welcomed the new legal framework and become Royal NPOs, stabilised and fettered for the purposes of the state apparatus. Nevertheless, a significant proportion of NGOs have been wary of the Japanese bureaucracy and have continued their nomadic existence as “informal entities” (minashi hōjin) outside of the system of bureaucratic “support”. Thus, the Japanese duality in the non-profit and voluntary sector has remained in place. The post-1998, domopolitically-oriented, juridico-bureaucratic technology of power, which will be analysed in the remainder of this section, in the issue area of post-conflict human security/peace-building has experienced two effects recognised by Pekkanen at a more general level:
‘independent civil society groups have found it hard to grow large, and large groups have found it hard to remain independent’ (Pekkanen 2006: 160).

The bureaucracy of MOFA and JICA devised a unique way of producing royal NPOs oriented at human security delivery in post-conflict spaces. For this purpose, it has created an arborescent intermediary: the Japan Platform. The Japan Platform can be understood as the centre of contemporary human security convergence: between techno-economic interests represented by the participating business sector and humanitarian interests embodied by MOFA and humanitarian/development-oriented NGOs; between the state apparatus and the officially recognised non-profit and voluntary sector; between the (already converged) inside and its outside, with the U.N., various IOs, and selected foreign INGOs representing the latter; and, finally, between man-made emergencies (dealt with through peace-building) and natural disasters (solved through emergency aid).

The Japan Platform has played a dual role: first, being recognised as a specified non-profit corporation (tokutei hieiri katsudō hōjin) (Japan Platform 2000a: 1); and, second, serving as the hub for humanitarian and/or development NGOs. With regard to the latter, it has featured, within its NGO Unit, thirty-two units (as of August 2010), including five Japanese NPOs and INGOs listed by JICA (2008b: 31-32) among the top twenty in budget size: World Vision Japan, Peace Winds Japan, Shanti Volunteer Association, the Association for Aid and Relief (AAR), and Japan Emergency NGOs (JEN). Various types of humanitarian and/or development NGOs have become part of the same arborescent scheme: originally independent NGOs with a history of fleeing from bureaucratic reach, such as AAR; INGOs which have been able to obtain the status of a specified non-profit corporation in Japan after the
NPO Law was enacted in 1998, such as World Vision Japan; and, finally, recently established Japanese NGOs such as Peace Winds Japan.

Complementarily, the Japan Platform has served as one of the centres through which the Japanese bureaucracy has projected human security domopolitics. It can be understood as a specimen of domopolitics which has had different parts of the globe as its strategic field of intervention (mainly Southeast Asia and Africa). Domopolitical effectuations and enunciations of the Japanese bureaucracy have been concerned with “care and protection” of “our small and vulnerable NGOs” through the insertion of the Japan Platform into the relationship. Although the geographical spread of activities of each of the NPOs associated with the Japan Platform has been diverse, more often than not, they have followed governmental priorities concerning the sites of these human security/peace-building interventions. Kosovo (in 1999) was one of the constitutive moments, as the Japan Platform was founded in this context:

In Kosovo, a massacre of ethnic Albanians aggravated [the situation] …. Right after the incident, several Japanese NGOs started to examine the possibility of refugee assistance in Kosovo … The examination revealed, however, that Japanese NGOs were not able to implement effective aid activities independently; since the respective NGOs had neither sufficient financial foundation nor staff-members with considerable on-the-job experience to implement aid independently … Taking into account the lessons learned … , a new framework, a “Japan Platform” conception was formulated. The objects of the framework is that NGOs, business community, and a government agency (Foreign Ministry) work together … with a tripartite cooperation system, based
Consequently, the MOFA has used the Japan Platform to ‘improve the quality of humanitarian aid conducted by Japanese NGOs’ (Japan Platform 2000a). One of the most prioritised recent “home fronts” has been Afghanistan and Iraq. As the MOFA (2007d: 8) material points out, Japanese NGOs belonging to the Japan Platform have carried out emergency and reconstruction aid projects in these countries.

The most revealing of this author’s interviews concerning the workings of the Japan Platform was conducted with Osa Yukie, Chairperson of the Japan Platform’s NGO Unit and Chairperson of AAR Japan, in 2008. Her dual function, as well as her scholarly knowledge of human security (she is the holder of the first doctorate from the University of Tokyo’s human security programme), put her in a unique position for assessing of the relationship between the bureaucracy and the non-profit and voluntary sector. She explained to the author how the original tripartite cooperation system between the MOFA, businesses, and NPOs has been tipped in favour of the MOFA’s interests. This has been shown in MOFA’s ability to tightly control NPOs associated with the Japan Platform, as well as in the fact that JapHS push to post-conflict spaces has not particularly suited the interests of the country’s business sector. In the words of Osa (2008), while companies have been ‘happy to fund emergency relief operations, they have tried to avoid post-conflict reconstructions of places like Afghanistan or Sudan due to their political and economic sensitivity’ (personal interview by author, Tokyo, September 25, 2008). While originally an NGO specialising in emergency relief, AAR Japan has started to take on a peace-building agenda, thanks to governmental funding, and one recent example of this has
been AAR’s demining activities in Afghanistan. According to Osa, the same has been true of the Japan Platform: while it was founded for the provision of emergency assistance, it has become much more ambitious in post-conflict peace-building over time. The degree to which the bureaucracy has been able to set the agenda for NGOs can be seen from our discussion of the issue of small arms and light weapons, and the use of human security more generally. Osa explained AAR’s position in the following way:

we took an interest in small arms and light weapons only once and this was in connection with the government’s request to organise a conference on this topic. It’s often like this. Also, you use the human security language only when you need governmental funding. Human security discourse is for the government and IOs. We [i.e. AAR] don’t need to be told what human security is about (personal interview by author, Tokyo, September 25, 2008).

The extent of domopolitical diagrammatics governing NPOs associated with the Japan Platform has been exposed through interviews conducted by the author with MOFA and JICA bureaucrats and NGO personnel in 2008 and 2010. There are several striking features related to the ie-based domopolitics. When speaking about the MOFA and JICA bureaucrats, NGO personnel often came up with references to the “father being in charge of things”; similarly, when the author discussed NGOs with bureaucrats, they would very often refer to NGOs as “troublesome children who need to be supervised” and, also, several pointed out the link between women and the non-profit and voluntary sector (‘if a woman wants to work, it’s a suitable job for
her’, as one interviewed JICA bureaucrat put it (personal interview with a Program Officer, Development Issues Division, JICA, Tokyo, September 26, 2008). Clearly, there was a perceived – and accepted – asymmetry in the relationship on both sides. Additionally, when interviewed bureaucrats were asked by the author why the officially recognised NPOs are so tightly controlled in their human security/peace-building work, the usual answer was the inability of the non-profit and voluntary sector to take care of itself, and to succeed in the hostile environment outside of Japan. In the words of one interviewed JICA official,

firstly, we must teach NGOs that human security is important for their work. Secondly, our job is to decide where NGOs will be active. While some NGOs disagree now, they won’t in the future because it’s very important for JICA … Thirdly, NGOs participating in peace-building must be supervised and protected by us as they are feeble, and they cannot directly compare and compete with big and strong Western NGOs, that’s our task to protect them. Also, we need to make sure that we promote Japanese NGOs so they can be on a par with foreign NGOs like Oxfam, CARE or World Vision (personal interview with a Program Officer, Development Partnership Division, JICA, Tokyo, September 26, 2008).

As the previous analysis suggested, the domopolitics of JapHS, ensured by the deployment of a juridico-bureaucratic technology of power, rested on the protection/care of NGOs by the country’s bureaucracy and has thus been an example of the technology of the Other. This is in stark contrast to technologies of the self
discerned in the rhizomatic CanHS assemblage which have underpinned a neo-liberal
governmentality and involved ‘a certain number of operations on [subjects’] own
bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform
themselves’ (Foucault 1988: 18). In the Japanese case, NGOs haven’t internalised the
wishes of the government, as have their Canadian counterparts. The Japanese NGOs
have not needed to, as it has been the role of Japanese bureaucracy to determine the
nature, extent, and destinations of their involvement. Thus, the discussion is not
really about Japan’s catching up with the West, but about a completely different
rationality of government and diagrams of power: the Japanese developmentalist
technology of care of the Other vs. the Canadian advanced liberal technologies of the
self. Thus, the domopolitical “care and protection” of NGOs involved in human
security/peace-building interventions by the Japanese arborescent bureaucracy has
been unique to that country.
CONCLUSION

This thesis demonstrated that human security articulations, both in their material and discursive forms, need to be studied contextually. That meant beginning with the analysis of structural conditions which had allowed the emergence of a certain type of human security articulation, and to continue with the examination of those human security articulations, including their subsequent institutionalisations and governmentalisations. Additionally, the thesis paid attention to the unintended consequences of human security articulations, and sometimes even their failures, i.e. developments that the “promoters” or “champions” of such human security programmes could not, or did not, foresee.

The main purpose of the thesis was to analyse the messiness of enunciations and effectuations related to human security. In this task, attempts were made to discern existing patterns of economy of power underpinning different articulations of human security. This advance could be seen in line with Foucault’s (1982) preoccupation with “regularity in dispersion”. This approach was deemed suitable for rejecting the belief in a centralised exercise of power. Indeed, one can think about different types of messiness: internal inconsistencies at the level of discourse, inconsistencies between practices and discourses related to the same articulation of human security, non-linear and non-parallel developments of human security effectuations and enunciations, and the different diagrams of power through which various elements related to a certain articulation of human security are bound together. As the conceptual framework introduced in Chapter 1 and its application for the interpretation of selected empirical configurations of human security suggested, political and socio-economic messiness is, however, not chaos, and
cannot be comprehended as “anything goes”. This was the reason why the notion of an assemblage was invoked, its different types explained and deployed to account for developments in the issue area of human security.

As the analysis showed, the two investigated entities – Canada and Japan – which championed human security as discourse and practice have experienced different human security articulations. This was mainly due to the fact that the assemblages they formed brought together various functional fields and integrated them differently. Of course, the difference stemmed from Canada’s and Japan’s divergent political motivations, interest and calculations behind their human security programmes. But with at least equal importance, the difference was influenced by the kind of economic, social and political terrains upon which these articulations could have emerged in the first place. One can think about this process as a human security flow comprising various discursive and functional elements and being shaped and oriented (often to more than a single direction) by quite perennial structures. One could be tempted to call it “structured contingency”, i.e. the constellation of forces allowing both for continuity and change. Regularly dispersed messiness of human security through a governmentalised assemblage is the result of this development.

This thesis was motivated by author’s dissatisfaction with the common understanding of the two studied human security articulations through the related sets of synoptic imageries. In addition to elaborating a new conceptual framework, this was seen as another crucial move in making sense of selected articulations of human security. Thus, this thesis tried to go beyond widespread instances of lazy reasoning concerning CanHS and JapHS. In this project, it attempted to break free from sedimented clichés, accepted “truths” and alleged divisions which for too long shaped the conventional comprehension of human security articulations. The thesis
took inspiration in Foucault’s suggestion of what the role of an academic is and, conversely, what it is not:

The work of an intellectual is not to mould the political will of others; it is, through the analyses that he does in his own field, to re-examine evidence and assumptions, to shake up habitual ways of working and thinking, to dissipate conventional familiarities, to re-evaluate rules and institutions (Foucault 1989: 305-306).

As the analysis in this thesis suggested, a re-examination of empirical evidence and underlying assumptions was in order, and there have been many surprising findings when they are compared to “common knowledge”.

In this conclusion, three issues will be discussed in turn: lessons which can be distilled from the presented empirical and conceptual analysis; the usefulness of the deployed approach; and, finally, the implications for the role of the state in globalised international relations. Before the reader’s attention will be directed towards the first issue, it needs to be pointed out that this author’s understanding of a synthesis concerning the lessons learned from the thesis is informed by limited generalisations (Daniel and Smith 2010; Price and Reus-Smit 1998). As Price and Reus-Smit argued,

Critical theorists have long decried the search for law-like generalizations about the nature of international politics, arguing that such quests privilege certain accounts of international life over others, reify social actors and institutions, and deny historical contingency and cultural particularity …
Yet they have not shied away from offering more contingent generalizations about aspects of world politics. Drawing on their analyses of historical processes, cultural practices, intersubjective meanings and norm formulation they have proffered generalizations about the nature and dynamics of international change, institutional development and moral community (Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 273-274; emphasis added)

It is precisely for the reasons spelled out by Price and Reus-Smit that the “contingent generalisations” approach is being embraced here.

With regard to distilled lessons, the basic finding regarding the discussion of the similarity and differences between CanHS and JapHS suggests the great importance of domestic structural settings for articulations of human security programmes. Domestic economies of power manifested through socioeconomic and political rationalities of government play a constitutive role in how a given functional field is regulated. Both CanHS and JapHS saw the incorporation of implementation models to their human security programmes which were based on previously existing domestic models of service delivery. This trend of “domestication-at-a-distance” of the two countries’ human security programmes can be generalised as follows: as far as the regulation of human security practices is concerned, it is based on an existing model of service delivery inside each country. Additionally, each model of service delivery is the result of a certain type of economy of power which contains elements of sovereign power, disciplinary power, and biopower.

The thesis showed that while all three types of power were present in the examined cases, their relative weight and the ways in which they were integrated varied significantly. The diagram of power concerning CanHS had originally been
based on rhizomatically structured biopolitics. After the codification of the landmine ban in 1997, it was arborified through an increase in the role of sovereign power (especially for external military action legitimised by human security) and disciplinary power (regulation of Canadian NGOs). In the Japanese case, biopolitics was always rather marginal in the mix, though it increased after 2003 when Ogata Sadako got appointed as the president of JICA, and the most important type of power was sovereign power. Additionally, sovereign power was inextricably tied to disciplinary power in the Japanese case, much more than in Canada’s, in which they were rather loosely intertwined. This was due to the fact that sources of Japanese economic, social and political continuity stemmed from disciplinary, molar structural conditions of social control and the deployment of a neo-mercantile developmentalist rationality of government.

Thus, one could infer from the analysis that unlike Canadian society, Japanese society was never the society of control in the Deleuzian sense, i.e. a society with more dispersed and de-institutionalised disciplinary power. That was the reason why NGOs were (allowed by the government to be) much more active in Canada than in Japan. Canadian NGOs experienced significant transfers of responsibility to them from the government, and this transfer rested on the discourse of neo-liberal efficiency and effectiveness. The NGOs learned to act as responsible agents in this environment, and their social capital was backed up by governmental fiscal capital (the latter was translated into the former in this process). It was the process of desiring-production and NGOs’ “discovered” desires (i.e. to deliver humanitarian public goods of a certain kind by certain means) as a positive social force that was driving Canadian human security activities. It was for this reason that biopolitics was always important in the Canadian case and neither disciplinary power
nor sovereign power ever overshadowed it entirely. Once the domestic service model was successfully plugged into the CanHS assemblage after the ban of antipersonnel landmines, it marked the arborification of the assemblage. This process did not, however, lead to the molar neutralisation of the biopolitical element, but rather to the interpenetration between biopolitics and disciplinary power.

The strong emphasis of advanced liberal rationality of government on desiring-production and transformation of financial capital into social capital effectively prevented (an already arborified) rhizomatic assemblage of CanHS to slip into a fully arborescent assemblage of the Japanese type. Likewise, the opposite configuration, namely the complete lack of desiring-production and of a neo-liberal emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency, prevented the Japanese HS assemblage from developing into a more rhizomatised form. Indeed, the fact that the Japanese bureaucracy regulating the country’s human security assemblage was always the force setting the agenda, determining how human security would be carried out, by whom and under what conditions, contributed to the country’s inability to see more transfer of responsibility from the bureaucracy to Japanese NGOs. Instead, as Chapter 7 showed, the Japanese government and bureaucracy preferred to conduct human security through the U.N., where it successfully gained control over how human security was understood, practiced and spoken about. The governmental discourse on the empowerment of Japanese NGOs was nothing more than a discursive attempt to “simulate” the Western liberal model of human security. The simulation itself was largely a result of systemic international pressure on Japan to bring its human security policies in line with the “standard of (liberal and thus civilised) international society”. In many respects, this simulated borrowing from the
West with regard to human security was a similar, superficial process to the “borrowing” from the West after the Meiji Restoration of 1868.

While domestic structural conditions played the crucial role in shaping how the Canadian and Japanese governments respectively regulated the delivery of human security programmes, including the role of NGOs in this process, the analysis of foreign- and security-political orientations of these two countries was indispensable for addressing the question of the position of human security programmes within the countries’ foreign- and security-policies. Governmental emphases on such and such international agendas, which were subsequently framed as parts of governmental “human security” programmes, were linked to these international orientations. In the Canadian case, the original articulation of human security in the early 1990s marked a radical shift from the country’s hitherto dominant national security. Indeed, the important precondition for this re-articulation of security was budgetary cuts which were strategically used by the Liberal Party to promote and justify a different outline of the country’s security. Material factors and changes in the social episteme went hand in glove. As for the Japanese case, the articulation of human security was not a radical move at all. Contrary to that, one can see an evolutionary logic behind this process, namely the repackaging of “comprehensive national security” as “human security”. This purpose was to keep popular, broadened (though not deepened) security content while going with the international progressive flow in terms of the new label.

Thus, one can see that unlike CanHS which was produced, though only at the beginning, as a genuine alternative to national security (their later hybridisation though external military involvements was discussed in Chapter 5), Japanese human security was always consistent with the country’s national security. Whereas
Canada’s national security was exclusively framed in military terms before 1993 (the year when the Liberals got back into power), Japanese bureaucrats, security experts and politicians managed to keep a broad version of national security (hence the “national comprehensive security” label) through the articulation of the Yoshida Doctrine and the Fukuda Doctrine. As Chapters 7 and 8 made clear, the popular understanding that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution was the determinant limiting Japanese foreign- and security-policy practices is imprecise at best and misleading at worst. In fact, as the thesis demonstrated, it was the skilful (yet contingent and varying) strategic use of the Japanese Constitution by politicians and bureaucrats which could account for the nature of JapFSP and the nature of JapHS within it.

The role of Japanese ODA was seen as cardinal in the process of transforming Japanese comprehensive national security to the country’s human security. Additionally, Japanese ODA was interpreted as a convergence machine par excellence, juxtaposing techno-economic interests, national-security interests and (more recently) humanitarian interests. The ODA convergence machine - both in its bilateral and multilateral form - therefore shaped the nature of JapHS assemblage. By contrast, CanHS was never strategically used to promote the country’s techno-economic and/or national-security interests. Its main objective was the promotion of humanitarianism through politically-motivated normative change (the early phase) and gradually depoliticised service delivery (post-1997 phase, after 2006 even without human security enunciations). Institutionally, CIDA was the key governmental agency for human security implementation and was supported by the Foreign Affairs part of DFAIT. There was always distance from and incredulity towards the International Trade part of DFAIT, as far as Canadian human security
was concerned. Where the two countries were at least partially converging was the production of knowledge about human security. While Canada originally relied on nomadic sources of knowledge (field knowledge of NGOs), it gradually subcontracted large portions of the agenda to Royal think-tanks and universities which were tightly linked to the government, and the resulting product mirrored that. With regard to Japan, knowledge production concerning human security was always produced by ministerial bureaucrats and was even more “Royal” in its form and substance. The imposition of bureaucratic “knowledge” of Japanese NGOs demonstrated the degree of molarisation of intellectual space.

As the chapters on Canadian and Japanese human security showed, there were a few instances on the basis of which one could be tempted to argue that CanHS and JapHS were converging. Most notably, both countries linked human security to their response to the events of 9/11, both countries used human security for their external military involvements and also for post-conflict reconstruction of various spaces, most notably Afghanistan. However, the analysis showed that CanHS and JapHS were not gradually converging. The places of, and reasons for, their convergence are secondary to their divergences: whereas their convergences were always temporary and limited and were produced by international pressures/demands (9/11, contributions to multilateral post-conflict reconstructions), their divergences were much deeper and more permanent. That was due to the fact that the latter were the result of domestic and foreign- and security-policy-related economies of power.

To generalise the source of divergence between CanHS and JapHS, one needs to direct attention to the relationship between a particular articulation of human security and the nature of a particular socio-political and economic order. While
CanHS assemblage was penetrated and driven by advanced liberal governmentality, JapHS assemblage was animated by the deeply non-liberal, neo-mercantile developmentalist governmentality with elements of humanitarianism. This finding goes directly against the common perception that human security is always a liberal project. The Japanese case puts limits on this understanding and was a clear proof that even non-liberal countries (in terms of effectuations, not necessarily in terms of enunciations through which the Japanese bureaucrats and politicians skilfully created the semblance of liberalism) can practice and promote human security programmes. JapHS was always a problematic case for analysts investigating human security, a kind of enigma which seemed to deviate somehow from the “Western liberal” standard of human security. However, as the thesis demonstrated, the sources of difference were not the effects of “Asian cultural values” (if only there was such a thing) and other superficial, Orientalist images, but different structural economies of power combined with certain strategic calculations related to the use of human security. This is, to the extent that a limited, contingent generalisation allows it, seen as the profound reason for the further continuation of divergences between CanHS and JapHS.

The following section tackles the question regarding the usefulness of the approach. The question can be subdivided into three areas: its usefulness for the two analysed case studies; for other political entities involved in human security; and for other issues. In respect of the first area, the usefulness of the approach linking structural conditions of emergence with actual articulations of human security and their unintended consequences was demonstrated in the thesis. The thesis systematically shed light on the two cases and significantly contributed to an original perspective on CanHS and JapHS. It did not approach the existing synoptic imageries
as a starting point for investigation, but rather as the obstacle hindering positive
heuristics in respect of knowledge production about CanHS and JapHS. As was made
clear, one would have never been able to understand and appreciate the richness of
processes, socio-political perceptions, material factors and strategic calculations
behind the two human security articulations had it not been for the inclusion of
structural terrain into the analysis. The often-practised reliance on government
documents in terms of structuring an understanding of a specific human security
articulation was seen as a part of the problem, rather than its solution. Similarly, the
examination of unintended consequences of the two human security programmes
showed the degree of contingency present in CanHS assemblage and JapHS
assemblage.

Nevertheless, the utility of the developed approach is not by any means
restricted to CanHS and JapHS. With regard to human security articulations, the very
same approach can be deployed in order to analyse the human security projects of a
number of other political entities actively involved in this issue area. It lends itself to
analysis of human security programmes such as those practised by Norway, the
Netherlands, Slovenia, Mali and Thailand. Since the approach allows for an analysis
of different types of structural processes, historical periods pertinent to the
articulation of human security programmes, and motivations/interests, different types
of state can be examined: Western liberal states; states undergoing political
transition/consolidation; or developing, non-liberal states. Also, the approach could
be used (with modifications) for an analysis of human security programmes
promoted by international organisations, such as the EU or the U.N.

The applicability of the approach does not stop with human security. The
approach can be applied productively in other issue areas. There have been many
other topics in which the mainstream understanding has been heavily shaped by official documents and derived academic discourses. The developed approach ensures independent scholarly judgement as well as strong links between empirical analysis and the related theoretical conceptualisation when it comes to several other themes. To mention but a few topics, various countries’ involvement in peacebuilding projects, human development issues, counter-terrorism activities, or public health issues could be appropriately investigated through this approach. All the above issues and a number of others would benefit from a deployed approach which would allow hitherto isolated functional fields to be brought together to provide a richer understanding of those themes. In respect of theoretical conceptualisation, the interconnection of the Foucauldian and Deleuze-Guattarian analytical grids would certainly appear to be a valuable move. To study these issues through their economies of power, rationalities of government and political assemblages that are being formed as a result would indeed pose a challenge to the mainstream view.

Finally, there is the issue of the role/position of the state in globalised IR. The thesis clearly demonstrated that to speak about globalised politics is not to speak about eroding the power of states. Two different cases were chosen for the analysis: a Western, advanced liberal state (Canada) and a highly modernised and developed, non-liberal state (Japan). While the bureaucrats and politicians in these two countries used very different means to govern and regulate certain domains (here human security), both cases represented a powerful corrective to the still popular idea regarding states “losing” their power. Neither the transferral of responsibility (Canada) nor the colonisation of new political spaces (Japan) could be equated with the “loss” of state power. Since political power circulates and is not possessed, one
cannot lose it. New typifications and diagrams of power were exposed in the thesis and the contained empirical and conceptual analysis suggested how modalities of power can be sustained or transformed. What is more, one needs to bear in mind that not all exercises of power are greatly visible. Some of them are subtle in terms of manifestations, or can take place without the formal supervision of the government. Even when the governmental bureaucracy heavily regulates the issue area of human security, it can be done under the opposite discursive banner so one needs to examine the non-parallel formalisation of enunciations and effectuations.

The institutional makeup of states can indeed change. However, the thesis also indicated that states as a basic form of political organisation of global space were extremely resilient in terms of their strategic adaptation to changes in the global environment. More often than not, this was done precisely to ensure the opposite: the keep specific and unique domestic settings in place. In terms of enunciations, both Canada and Japan and their human security assemblages went with international trends and language. However, in terms of effectuations, their domestic settings were very strong structural factors which shaped the nature of the two respective human security assemblages. Furthermore, the findings contained in this thesis also pointed out the importance of distinguishing between the globalised rationality of government, and the global rationality of government. Both cases suggested that rationalities of government start as domestic phenomena before they become transboundary phenomena and sometimes grow into fully globalised phenomena. They hinted that it is always important to pay attention to how a domestic rationality of government can grow and modify in terms of its substance as well as scale. This is where the productive use of the notion of an assemblage could be visible. The spread of political programmes is being reduced, both functionally and geographically,
through messy formations that were understood as assemblages. This is where a pluralistic vision of globalised international relations was conspicuously present: practices and discourses harnessed by state apparatuses being interlinked with deterritorialised, transnational processes. There is no such a thing as a global rationality of government understood through levels of analysis. Rather, there are globalised rationalities of government comprehended through formations which are called assemblages. State apparatuses are, and for a long time will continue to be, key agencies in the formation, cultivation and spread of these assemblages.
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