A CONSTRUCTIVIST ACCOUNT OF PAKISTAN’S POLITICAL PRACTICE IN
THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11

The normalisation of Pakistan’s participation in the ‘war on terror’

Nazya FIAZ

Submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Peace Studies
University of Bradford

2010
ABSTRACT

Nazya Fiaz

A CONSTRUCTIVIST ACCOUNT OF PAKISTAN’S POLITICAL PRACTICE IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11

The normalisation of Pakistan’s participation in the ‘war on terror’

Keywords: Pakistan - 9/11 - war on terror - constructivism - critical realist depth ontology - political discourse - social structure - causal agency - state practice

This research is concerned with Pakistan’s participation in the US-led ‘war on terror’ in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. The study seeks to explain how Pakistan’s state practice in the aftermath of 9/11 was normalised and made possible. In explaining the state practice, the study draws on a constructivist conceptual framework; which is further enhanced by incorporating key theoretical insights from critical realism.

In the first instance, the study proposes that Pakistan’s participation in the ‘war on terror’, seen as a set of actions and practices, was an outcome of a specific domestic political discourse. This discourse enabled and legitimised the state’s alliance with the US and its abandonment of the Taliban regime. Secondly, the study is concerned with explaining why the particular discourse emerged in the shape and form that it did. In this context, the argument is that a depth ‘critical realist’ ontological inquiry can reveal underlying and enduring global and domestic social structural contexts, and traces of agential influence as connected to the discourse.

Consequently, this study conceptualises Pakistan’s actions in the context of the ‘war on terror’ as emerging from a multi-causal complex in which discourse, structure and agency are complicit.

The study represents a departure from realist readings that emphasise a mono-causal relationship between the US and Pakistan. Instead, this research uses a synthesis of critical realism and constructivism to add a fresh perspective in terms of how we may conceptualise Pakistan’s political practice in this instance.
# Table of Contents

**Abstract**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Illustrations</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 1:

**Introduction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 The Research Setting</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Research Questions and Hypothesis</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Research Design</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Organisation of Thesis</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Limitations of the Thesis</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Exploring Self-Reflexivity</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 Conclusion</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 2:

**Conceptual Trends in IR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Introduction</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Realism</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Liberalism</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Marxism</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Constructivism</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Conclusion</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3:

Pakistan: A Historical Review

3.1 Introduction 47
3.2 The creation of Pakistan: Territorial partition and internal division 49
3.3 Constructing nationalism: Employing Islam 56
3.4 Constructing nationalism: The hostile (Indian) Other 60
3.5 Political turbulence: Oscillating between military rule and Democracy 66
3.6 Pakistan’s military elite 69
3.7 The absence of an Islamic revolution in Pakistan 71
3.8 A decade of isolation from the international community 73
3.9 The Taliban connection 76
3.10 Pakistan’s response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 81
3.11 Pakistan: A critical appraisal of the literature 82

Chapter 4:

Locating the Theoretical Intervention

4.1 Introduction 95
4.2 Social constructionism – key assumptions 103
4.3 Early challenges to notions of language 107
4.4 Language as performative practice 110
4.5 Macro social constructionism 112
4.6 Conceptualising discourse as knowledge 113
4.7 Discursive formations 115
4.8 The regulatory power of discourse 116
4.9 Constructing the individual and collective Self 119
4.10 Exploring subject positions 125
4.11 The emergence of knowledge: Foucault’s genealogy 126
4.12 Human agency: Author or actor? 130
4.13 Critical realist critique of poststructuralism 135
4.14 A stratified ontological framework 138
4.15 Critical realism and non-Humean causality 141
4.16 Causality in the social sciences 146
4.17 How can critical realism enhance a constructivist analysis? 150
4.18 Putting critical realism to work in IR 166
4.19 Untangling ‘critical’ realism from Realism and constructivism 172
4.20 What’s wrong with discourse analysis? 176
4.21 The methodological implications of the theory 179
4.22 Selecting material as data 181
4.23 Strategies of data analysis 184
4.24 Generative mechanisms and the role of scientific inference 190
4.25 Abduction 195
4.26 Retroduction 197
4.27 Using abstraction as a methodological tool 198

Chapter 5:

Discursive Analysis 202-257

5.1 Introduction 202
5.2 Primary data material: Issues of access and availability 205
5.3 The war comes to Pakistan 208
5.4 Discursive strategy: Interpreting threat 210
5.5 Discursive strategy: Assigning meaning through religious analogy and ideology 218
5.6 Discursive strategy: Positioning Musharraf 223
5.7 Discursive strategy: Constructing rationality and responsibility 231
5.8 Discursive constructions and political engagement with India 247
5.9 Conclusion: The normalisation of Pakistan’s political practice 251

Chapter 6:

Exploring Ontological Depth 258-298

6.1 Introduction 258
6.2 The grounding of discourse analysis 260
6.3 The nature of US global power: A structural condition 262
6.4 Exploring causality: Ontological structure and political discourse in Pakistan 266
6.5 Depth Ontology: An exploration of domestic structures 278
6.6 Human agency as causal variable 288
6.7 Conclusion 295
Chapter 7:

Pakistan and the ‘war on terror’ – 
Conceptualising the enactment of political practice

7.1 Introduction 299
7.2 The main findings of the study 302
7.3 Summary of thesis outcomes 309
7.4 Final conclusions 310

Glossary
Abbreviations

Appendix I
Appendix II
Bibliography
List of Illustrations

Figures

1. A Stratified Social Ontology 139
2. The Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) 160
3. Analytical Cycles 162

Tables

1. Individual Events and General Structures 194
Acknowledgements

I wish to begin by thanking my PhD supervisors Prof. Shaun Gregory and Dr Sarah Perrigo for their guidance, support and encouragement during the research process.

The completion of my PhD has been a long journey and much has happened and changed in the intervening time. However, despite the passion for my work it is inevitable that many times ‘life’ unexpectedly evolves in a direction that is incompatible with prioritising a research thesis. And so, amidst earthquakes, babies, writers block, computers crashing, families - indeed all the other priorities in a persons life at any one point in time – there have undoubtedly been times during which my ‘thesis’ has not been the number one priority. Therefore, I am elated to be finally writing this section of the thesis having managed to complete a task that seemed so daunting at the beginning. On a personal level the process of research has been a very steep learning curve and in hindsight I wish I knew at the very beginning what I know now in terms of research process and skills. Nevertheless, completing my PhD has been an invaluable training experience and I feel ‘equipped’ in terms of the skills and mindset required to engage with further work.

It is important that I acknowledge the support of a select few who have played an important role in my life and ensured that I have got to where I am in a sane state of mind. I wish to extend a heartfelt thanks to my best friends Ruby, Fozia and Amaara who in their vivacious way forced me to come out of ‘my shell’. Thank you for being my friends, confidants and not forgetting the regular dose of parties, laughter and
flippancy meted out. My gratitude is also extended to Gishoo our ‘mini mullah’. His constant humour, friendly sarcasm, kindness and interesting perspective on life kept me smiling and provided much understanding of my place in the ‘bigger picture’. I also wish to thank all five of my sisters but especially Shazia, Fakhra, and Naima for their support, respect and their unconditional company. I love being a big sister. I also wish to express my appreciation to Tazeem and Shahid for happily enduring my frequent visits.

In addition, these acknowledgments would be incomplete without mention of my husband who thinking of my PhD as a ‘class 6 project’ couldn’t fathom why I was unable to complete it in single 6-month intensive study-period. Nevertheless he had faith in my ability to complete. Thank you for your encouragement, flexibility and of course the provision of much needed funds. I wish to also thank my children, Umar, Aminah, Rabia and Dawud for enduring my long hours on the computer, frequent absent mindedness and their consistent question of ‘are you done yet?’.

Lastly, it is important to for me to acknowledge that the years before starting my PhD were crucial for my subsequent development. I wish to therefore thank my English teacher at school Mrs Barbara Crompton, who encouraged my writing and played a special role in my life for many years afterwards. Further, I am thankful to Maggie Rutter who provided much needed friendship, support and advice during the intensive year I spent at Bradford College. I wish to thank Dr Morris Szeftel at the University of Leeds whose excellent module on the ‘Politics of India’ first aroused in me, an academic interest in South Asia, and who subsequently supported my decision to pursue research. Lastly, I owe a debt to the late Dr Carolyn Baylies who
encouraged me to begin a PhD and who provided much needed discussion and guidance during the early process.
Introduction

1.1 The Research Setting

On September 11, 2001, the United States was subjected to a ferocious terrorist attack on Washington DC and New York. In the years since these attacks it has become clear that September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11) had far-reaching consequences for world politics. In the first instance it signalled a decisive upgrading in US concerns regarding its national security and global ideological dominance. Furthermore, what is remarkable about this event is the way in which the ensuing commencement of the US-led global ‘war on terror’ was backed by an international coalition focussed in its opposition to the alleged instigators of the attacks i.e. the al-Qaeda network and their Taliban hosts (Ali 2008). Countries constituting the ‘Muslim world’ also vociferously condemned the attacks on the US and backed the ‘war on terror’ including Pakistan. However, in contrast to other countries in the international community or even the ‘Muslim world’ the US-led ‘war on terror’ posed an enormous predicament for Pakistan. Indeed ‘the war’ was something that was to effectively transpire in its own backyard, and not somewhere distant and far from sight. Although US action was to focus on Afghanistan it is important to understand that Pakistan being an immediate neighbour has had a long-standing and close relationship with its neighbour; this relationship often oscillating between solidarity and aversion. Furthermore, it soon became clear that the US sought the co-operation of Pakistan in order to launch its military operation in Afghanistan, and consequently Pakistan became a key player in the international coalition against al-
Qaeda and the Taliban. On its part, the practice of becoming a ‘key player’ in the US-led ‘war on terror’ entailed significant policy reversals and shifts in Pakistan’s political discourse. Although the terrorist attacks on the US were condemned in Pakistan; nevertheless jumping from this condemnation to the concrete practice of co-operating with the US military strikes and presence in the region was not as straightforward as some analysts imply (see for e.g. Hadar 2002, Jones and Shaikh 2006, Schaffer 2008). However, before this argument is developed further it would be useful to proceed to a general review of how the wider literature approaches the subject-area of 9/11 and where this study is located within the field.

There is no doubt that since 9/11 had such far-reaching consequences for world politics this prompted a plethora of literature and interest in the subject-area. Specifically within the academic literature the diversity of topics focussing on 9/11 range from evaluating the morality and legality of the ‘war on terror’, the alleged operation of American global imperialism, the continued threat of Islamic terrorism, an interest in qualitative studies of the Taliban, and how 9/11 reproduces the discursive and material power of the US. What is remarkable about the bulk of this literature however is that much of this is centred on the analysis of America and the operation of its global power. If Pakistan does feature in the analysis then its state behaviour is unquestionably conceptualised in the context of US power. In contrast, this study differs from the current literature in that although its interest is also broadly concerned with the events in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks; its principal unit of analysis however is Pakistan within this quagmire. This interest stems primarily from the fact that although Pakistan became a hub of activity right from the onset of the US-led ‘war on terror’; there is a marked lack of depth and variety in the
This monotony will be discussed below, but for the moment, it is important to note that Pakistan became involved in a range of political practices and reversals of official policy in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. These political actions involved such things as the reversal of support for the Taliban and Pakistan’s simultaneous co-operation with the US in its military strikes within Afghan territory. In becoming a front-line state in the ‘war on terror’ Pakistan’s state practice was geared towards fulfilling the necessary political action required of this subject-position. It is important to understand that from the perspective of this study political action is embedded in and often preceded by an enabling and constraining discourse which regulates the action. Thus, this study is most interested in understanding how Pakistan’s becoming a front-line state in the ‘war on terror’ was justified and normalised in the domestic sphere. This study thus offers an alternative account of why and how Pakistan became a front-line state by investigating the underlying discourses and structural contexts which propelled and facilitated political action. The changes in official policy and practice on the part of Pakistan form the central problematic of this study, and I am interested in why and how Pakistan was able to initiate and follow through with a public rethink in terms of foreign alliances and state policy. In short the question I ask is: how does a state bring about political practices that require a significant degree of reversal in long-standing official policy?

One of the most dominant trends within the current literature has been to adopt a broadly neo-realist-inspired framework of analysis in accounting for official state practice in relation to Pakistan. What I mean is that, the analysis is often implicitly based on the notion that the external environment or the ‘international system’
impinges on patterns of Pakistan’s state behaviour implying a deterministic logic. Specifically, I refer here to those studies that posit an unproblematic mono-casual and deterministic relationship between the United States as a world hegemon and Pakistan’s political practice. In these accounts, Pakistan’s political practice in the 9/11 period is unproblematically ‘produced’ directly by an external environment in which the US is powerful. Indeed the vast bulk of the literature on Pakistan’s policy in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks simply reduces the ensuing policy and practice to the effects of a US superpower.

The central argument of this study is that such mono-causal or reductionist accounts bring a misleading parsimony to a complex social reality. Whilst the existence of the US as a superpower is not denied here, nor its power to ‘effect’, nevertheless I want to argue that there is greater complexity involved in terms of the production of Pakistan’s policy and practice in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This study is concerned with exploring how the concrete realisation of a particular set of political actions involving Pakistan’s alliance with the US, and a reversal of support for the Taliban was made possible. Rather than tackling this question from a purely structuralist position, this thesis addresses the question from a specific theoretical approach which postulates that the concrete realisation of any political reality or large-scale public consensus requires discursive legitimisation. This theoretical approach, or what is widely known as social constructionism\(^1\) considers discourse as

\(^1\) Within the wider social scientific literature, a general distinction is made between constructionism and constructivism. For instance Burr (2003), Wetherall et al. (2001a, 2001b), Willig (1999), Cromby and Nightingale (1999) postulate that the essential difference between constructionism and constructivism is twofold: in the extent to which the individual agent is seen as in control of the construction process i.e. that the source of the construction is the person and the extent to which our constructions are products of social forces (structural and interactional). Thus, constructivist writings within the wider body of social scientific literature are more likely to view agency as actively
powerfully productive of all social reality; it draws analytical attention to the
deconstruction of discourse in order to ascertain how it enables and constrains the emergence of concrete thought and practice. The basic premise of a social constructionist theory is the idea that language is political in that it is constitutive of social reality and the site for the production and reproduction of both individual and collective subjectivity and identity. Within this framework of understanding, national identity as a concept is constituted in the social realm through discursive practices. This view is similar to the anti-essentialist theorisations of Benedict Anderson (1983) for whom national identity or ‘nation-ness….are cultural artefacts of a particular kind’, Anderson contends that ultimately nations are, ‘imagined communities’ unconnected to actual primordial considerations. Further still, identity is connected to outcomes or social practices. Thus the proposition is that national identity understood as a discursive phenomenon is dynamic and productive of national policy and engaged in social constructions coupled with the notion that each person perceives the world differently and creates their own ‘meanings’ from the events around them (see Von Glaserfeld 1995 for a classic constructivist position). Importantly since construction is located at the level of agency; therefore constructivists limit their analysis to the person. Discursive psychology for instance limits its discourse analysis to the immediate context within which the interaction takes place and focuses analytical attention on the way in which participants actively choose interpretative repertoires to build meaning (see Potter 1996, Potter and Wetherell 1987). In contrast, social constructionism (or what is termed as a ‘macro’ constructionist position by Burr 2003)focusses less attention on active agency and affords little power to that agency instead locating the construction or meaning-making process as an outcome of external social forces (both linguistic and structural). In this sense Foucault’s writings concerning the regulatory powers of discursive structures and their impact on a docile agency may be seen in this mould.

Within the IR literature however, approaches taking this latter position have been varyingly termed as ‘poststructuralist’ positions. Furthermore, rather confusingly the term ‘constructivism’ as employed within the field of IR implies something altogether different when juxtaposed to its use in the wider social sciences. Constructivism as employed within IR is defined as a critical approach that incorporates analytical attention on the dialect between language/discourse, agency, and structure in the production of world politics (see: Onuf 1989, Wendt 1999, Adler 1997, Reus-Smit 2009). Constructivists in IR are keen to distinguish themselves from approaches that analytically and theoretically prioritise discourse and language in the production of social life without a simultaneous inclusion of agency and structure in analysis. Writers who analytically prioritise discourse in IR studies (such as Campbell 1992, Doty 1993, 1996, Ashley 1989) are often lumped together and described as ‘poststructuralists’ within the wider IR literature. Poststructuralist approaches in IR are thus defined as those critical perspectives that deal with interpretation and representation in international politics and distinguished from constructivists (Onuf 1989, Wendt 1992).
practice (see Hansen 2006). The present study draws on such a social constructionist theory\(^2\) in conceptualising state practice in Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11.

Within the wider literature, many IR analysts have begun to take up a broad social constructionist theoretical framework to explain patterns of state behaviour. This broad critical theoretical framework has been used by some writers to analyse specific patterns of state practice, most notably those of the US (See Doty 1993, Campbell 1992, and Jackson 2005). In particular, Jackson (2005) has employed a broadly social constructionist approach to analysing the way in which specific discursive constructions within domestic political space in the US imposed ‘meaning’ to the extent that US military action in the aftermath of 9/11 was normalised and legitimised. Jackson’s main contention is that large scale social consensus, such as going to war, requires much discursive work in order to enable the practice\(^3\). However, in terms of the available IR literature on Pakistan it is notable that analysts have not really taken up such a critical linguistic or discursive

\[\text{______________________________}\]

\(^2\) In lieu of the comments in footnote 1, it is thus necessary to clearly clarify the working definition of each term as employed within this study. In the first instance, the study will employ the umbrella term ‘social constructionism’ to refer to the broader critical theory that brings to attention the centrality of discourse and representation to the production of social life in general. Secondly, references to ‘constructivism’ refers to that body of work in IR which although significantly inspired by the broader theory discussed above; nevertheless varying combines a focus on discourse with an appreciation of the role of agency and structure in theorizations of the political world. Lastly, following the dominant trend within the current IR literature the term ‘poststructuralism’ refers to those varied approaches (which include perspectives such as post-colonialism, feminism, Foucauldian analysis and the like) which notably exclude a substantial analysis of agency and material structures in their theorizations. It must be noted that those termed ‘poststructuralists’ may not position themselves under this label; nevertheless it is notable that most IR studies describe a variety of approaches as poststructuralist if their primary role is to deconstruct discourse in world politics without a focus on material and social structure and the role of an active agency.

\(^3\) To a far lesser extent Collet and Najem’s (2005) paper also looks at how a specific discourse articulated by the Bush administration in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks was productive of the categories of ‘them’ and ‘us’.
analysis of Pakistan’s policy and practice either prior to, or indeed, following 9/11⁴. It is precisely this gap in the literature that this study will help to fill in seeking to contribute by bringing more depth, nuance and understanding; particularly in terms of how Pakistan’s political elite was able to construct a wide-scale consensus in relation to reversing support for the Taliban and a simultaneous co-operation with the US.

Before proceeding to discussing the hypothesis and the research questions guiding this study, it is important to qualify that the particular strand of social constructionism adhered to in this project is, best described as, ‘constructivism’. Although I flesh out this approach in more detail in chapter four, it is important to immediately note that, some perspectives⁵ drawing on a broader critical theory of discourse, and particularly those termed as poststructuralist perspectives⁶ in the wider IR literature imply a strong relativism i.e. that all social reality is seen as singularly connected to discourse. The extent of this relativism is such that it leads to a reductionist account of social reality much like the economic reductionism of classic Marxism. In this sense, both realism and poststructuralism within the field of international relations share a similarity in that, in different ways, they each posit the validity of singular variables as causally connected to an emergent political reality i.e. either the external environment or discourse as the single determining link.

⁴ See footnote 8.
⁵ Social constructionist approaches that prioritise discourse as the single most important factor productive of social life are also referred to in the broader IR literature as ‘poststructuralist’ perspectives (see Dunne et al. 2007). This study makes a distinction between poststructuralism and the constructivist approach taken by this study. Refer to footnotes 1 and 2.
⁶ Refer to footnotes 1 and 2.
producing state practice\textsuperscript{7}. Whilst this study does not seek to negate these approaches to explaining state behaviour, the issue here is the lack of analytical depth. In many ways, these frameworks of understanding are rigid and encourage theoretical closure since they fail to incorporate other variables that may also impact how a specific political reality is produced. For instance, poststructuralist approaches often fail to comprehensively appreciate wider social and material contexts as having a causal impact on social constructions. In a similar way, realist approaches tend to ignore the way in which discourse has an impact on behavioural outcomes. However, it is conceded that some level of theoretical closure is common to all theoretical approaches. Nevertheless, the argument here is that a constructivist paradigm drawing on critical realist insights produces a theoretical framework that is better placed in terms of explaining the production of a complex social reality such as Pakistan’s political space in the aftermath of 9/11; particularly since it is able to incorporate a multi-causal analysis. This framework moves away from the reductionism inherent in many poststructuralist approaches. The specifics of this theoretical approach will be thoroughly discussed in a later chapter.

1.2 Research Questions and Hypothesis

Where this study differs from previous explanatory attempts is the specific way it engages with explaining why and how political practice in Pakistan emerged in the shape that it did. As noted, the investigation is broadly influenced by social

\textsuperscript{7} A second common feature of both trends is their adherence to empirical realism i.e. only that which is observable is ‘real’ and significant. Although strictly speaking poststructuralism moves away from empiricist understandings of knowledge; nevertheless its critical approach is often empirical using archives, textual data, content analysis, and the like as evidence in understanding the relationship between language and knowledge/power. The theoretical approach adopted by this study draws insight from critical realist thought for whom empiricism, though important, is nevertheless not an overriding criterion for determining how social reality is produced.
constructionist theory which postulates the notion that language and more generally ‘discourse’ creates the conditions for practice. Thus, the proposition is that Pakistan’s political practice in the post-9/11 period was produced by a specific political discourse that normalised particular practices. This in itself is a different way of exploring Pakistan’s foreign and domestic policy space\(^8\). It is necessary to therefore, clearly establish that in this respect this study conceives all social practice including Pakistan’s political practice as being enabled and constrained by circulating discourses. However, explaining political practice as an outcome of specific discourses provides a partial answer to the question of what produces political action. As suggested, stopping analysis at this point would draw reductionist conclusions. Instead whilst this study concedes that discourses are critically productive and constitute political practice thus warranting analytical attention; there is also an acknowledgement, that discourses are themselves embedded in specific antecedent social structures. This implies that we cannot conceptualise discourse as ‘free-floating’ or emerging from a vacuum of nothingness, but instead their specific shape and form is deeply connected to their contexts of emergence. In furthering this enquiry into what drives, shapes and produces political practice this study is drawn to a critical realist theoretical approach; which is able to incorporate and allow for a multi-causal explanatory framework by drawing attention to the productive powers of deeply embedded social structures. The overall theoretical framework advanced here is one in which the constructivist paradigm is further enhanced by incorporating critical realist theoretical insights which will allow for a rigorous investigation into

\(^8\) The only work to date that examines ‘discourses’ as its principal unit of analysis is that of Haider Nizamani (2000). Nizamani offers a limited attempt at a ‘discourse analysis’ of nuclear narratives in Pakistan in order to show how dominant discursive categories and concepts ‘framed’ understandings and world-views in through which the active pursuit of nuclear weapons by Pakistan was normalised within the political elite and the public domain. As far as I am aware, Nizamani’s work, though limited, is the only contribution to-date that offers a deconstruction of state discourse in Pakistan.
the production of Pakistan’s political practice in the aftermath of 9/11. In short, this study is interested in how such a political reality was made possible. It would be useful here to refer to the underlying hypothesis guiding the project:

**Pakistan’s co-operation with the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 was co-constituted by underlying social structures and political discourse in Pakistan.**

Let us first briefly examine what this hypothesis is NOT saying in order to bring into sharper focus what it IS saying. Firstly, the hypothesis does not indicate that Pakistan’s political practice was a direct result of US dictates, and secondly the hypothesis does not specify that a deconstruction of political discursive space holds the ‘key’ to explaining why specific political action was realised. Instead, the emphasis is on both ‘discourses’ and ‘structures’. Within the social sciences, the structure/agency (discourse) debate is extensive and contentious; it is not possible to rehearse this in the present introductory chapter; rather, the way that this study conceptualises the dialect between structure/agency (discourse) will be addressed more thoroughly in chapter four. However, in this respect it is important to establish that the hypothesis emerges from a specific theoretical orientation, as is evident in the twin focus the hypothesis proposes, and which will be subject to a full scrutiny.

However, for the moment we should note that in the first instance there is emphasis on a close exploration of political discursive space. Discourse⁹ in this sense, is seen

---

⁹ In the context of this study the use of the term ‘discourse’ is restricted to primarily linguistic acts and is closer to the way in which the term is used within constructivist approaches in IR. This restriction is analytically useful in that it allows for a separation to be made between language/discourse and concrete practice. In this context discourse is conceptualized as something
as ‘productive’ in an enabling and constraining fashion so that world-views\(^{10}\) put forward are seen as inextricably linked to action outcomes. The specific discursive space to be focussed on is, Pakistan’s political discourse in the aftermath of 9/11. This study conceptualises political practices such as a rebuffing of the Taliban, the Pakistan-US alliance and even the political engagement with India as an effect of discourse. In short, the thesis examines how the discourses’ ‘regime of truth’ normalises and legitimises these practices. Secondly, the hypothesis identifies further ‘variables’ involved in the production of Pakistan’s political practice, namely the role of structure and agency. In important ways, this is the point at which the current study parts ways with a wholly poststructuralist analysis, and seeks to incorporate an appreciation of the extent of the role of extra-discursive\(^{11}\) social structures in the enactment of Pakistan’s political reality. The hypothesis signals an appreciation of wider social contexts thus drawing attention to the impingement of deeply embedded social structures on discursive space. Overall, the hypothesis postulates that discourse is productive of political action; however, simultaneously it is important to analyse the extent to which social contexts, such as the specific domestic power set-

which creates the conditions for practice. This restricted use of the term ‘discourse’ may be compared to and distinguished from the broader Foucauldian use in which discourse is used to refer to both linguistic acts and actual practices. Despite this distinction from Foucault’s use of the term ‘discourse’, it is important to note that the study draws significant inspiration from Foucault’s work on the regulatory and productive powers of discourses and the need to interrogate discourse.

\(^{10}\) The term ‘world-view’ is defined here as referring to a distinct way of thinking about and understanding the world around us. A world-view is itself based on specific beliefs which affect the way in which aspects of the social world are perceived and given meaning.

\(^{11}\) In the context of this study the term ‘extra-discursive’ is used to refer to material, social and discursive structures that pre-exist any one person’s entry into the world. The term ‘extra-discursive’ is used to clarify that although some structures may to a large extent be discursive constructs i.e. in that they are constructed, reproduced and maintained by discourse (such as the structures of capitalism, patriarchy, realism) nevertheless, once set-up, they impinge by enabling and constraining further social constructions. In essence they represent antecedent and pre-existing contexts (even if they rely on discourse for their existence). This understanding does not imply that the ‘structure’ in question is non-discursive or not dependent on discourse rather in the context of this study ‘extra-discursive’ structures refers to those structures (discursive and material) that pre-exist, are relatively enduring and may be unobservable; nevertheless the structures have ‘power effects’ in terms of influence on relative discursive constructions. It is useful to analytically conceptualise these structures as ‘extra-discursive’ in order to study the extent of their impact and influence on contemporary social constructions.
up or a global hierarchy, impacts in terms of limiting the array of discursive choices that can be made. This position does not reject the power and significance of discourse but is indicative of an approach that recognises the idea that discourse is not free-flowing or unhindered. Rather, social contexts and structures are powerfully productive in terms of allowing and limiting the array of choices available.

The research questions flowing from this hypothesis are listed below:

- How does the official political language construct the Pakistani Self in the aftermath of 9/11? Is there an identifiable discourse?
- What is the impact of discursive constructions in terms of the subject-position it offers to the Self?
- What are the extra-discursive conditions that need to exist in order for this discourse to emerge in its present form?
- How do underlying structural conditions affect the kind of political constructions that are able to emerge?
- How do these constructions affect political space?

This enquiry begins by placing at ‘centre stage’ Pakistan’s official practice in the aftermath of 9/11. The principal argument proceeds along the lines that the practice was not unproblematic but is linked to specific discursive formations and is simultaneously ‘effected’ by deep social structures. In a nutshell, the objective of this research is to identify ‘what’ produces the concrete political practice we witness. In this respect, the main academic contribution of this project relates to advancing the
literature on Pakistan’s official state practice; on a second note, in a more limited fashion, the thesis also seeks to contribute to the broader study of state practice in world politics. In particular, the study helps to fill an important gap in the current literature on Pakistan, which tends to be dominated implicitly and explicitly by a realist framework of analysis. The vast body of literature on Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy, and practice takes unproblematically the idea that Pakistan (like all other states) is suspended in an external anarchical world environment in which a global power hierarchy determines patterns of behaviour. Whilst the purpose here is certainly not to propose the irrelevance of such realist theories and the studies they spawn; it is necessary to point out that the dominance of one theoretical approach has the effect that it brings into focus only some aspects of a specific socio-political reality. However, such limitation is not exclusive to realism indeed all theoretical approaches are ultimately limited in one way or the other owing to their specific ontological and epistemological positions. Nevertheless, the point here is that the frequent application of realism as the dominant framework of understanding in the Pakistani context has resulted in stifling variety and new avenues both in exploration and explanation. The purpose of this thesis is not to engage in proposing an alternative theoretical approach on par with realism, but to add to the existing literature, by adopting a theoretical framework that is able to bring into focus those aspects and facets of the enactment of Pakistan’s behaviour in the aftermath of 9/11 that have, to-date, been overlooked by analysts.

Concisely then and in order to offer a plausible answer to the question, ‘how was Pakistan’s practice and political action made possible?’ the theoretical orientation advanced here explores discourse on the one hand. On the other hand, its critical
realist focus simultaneously incorporates an identification of depth ontological structures that are also implicated in the production of all political practice. The theoretical approach of this study to Pakistan’s state practice following 9/11 is a novel way of examining the subject-matter, and consequently will bring to the fore aspects and nuances involved in the unfolding of social practice. It is significant to establish at the outset that, this particular theoretical approach and its application in this study of Pakistan’s political practice is the over-riding and distinctive feature of this thesis. The underlying justification of the study is precisely this: that the particular theoretical application or the theoretical lens employed here in the study of Pakistan in the post 9/11 era has the ability to deepen our understanding of Pakistan’s behaviour in the time-period under scrutiny. This study engages with various causal connections such as discourse, agency, and unobservable social structures which are conceived here as ‘productive’ in relation to state practice. The underlying argument of this thesis is that discursive constructions emerging from specific social contexts and structures opened space within Pakistan’s domestic sphere to allow for the kind of political manoeuvre witnessed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

1.2 Research Design

It would be useful at this point to briefly discuss the overall research design adopted by this study, in order to thoroughly explore the hypothesis. In the first instance, it is notable that a significant part of this project involves the deconstruction of a particular discursive space. An important question in this regard relates to methodology since ‘discourse analysis’ is a rather messy, unbounded and limitless
affair. The discussion here will begin by concisely detailing how this project views its engagement with a discourse analysis inquiry. In a research project, such as this one, there is the question of whether ‘data’ should include only official texts or whether the net should be cast much wider to include media texts or opposition discourse? Moreover how many separate texts should one analyse? Indeed, the entire research process comprises of such choices and therefore it is important to think through the kind of research design that will best address the research inquiry. Although making choices between multiple options necessarily limits analysis nevertheless, it is a necessary component of focused research.

In terms of exploring the realisation of Pakistan’s political practice and policy in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, I work with a selective discursive data-set which consists of unedited texts officially articulated by the government of Pakistan. Since discursive material is limitless it is important to clearly set such benchmarks in terms of the specific discursive material one intends to explore, and why this space is given precedence over alternative discursive material. Consequently keeping in mind the hypothesis and research question this study will focus exclusively on official political discourse in Pakistan. The primary justification for the exclusive focus on official texts is premised on the realisation that political leaders in Pakistan have historically enjoyed significant social power in terms of the proliferation of representations in Pakistani society. On the whole, decision-making

---

12 It is important to note that in the eight years following the 9/11 attacks President Pervaiz Musharraf remained the head of state in Pakistan. Musharraf was also one of the most vocal supporters of the ‘war on terror’. Consequently Pakistan’s political discourse in the aftermath of 9/11 and in the ensuing eight years was dominated by Musharraf and therefore it is inevitable that the discursive data-set is somewhat tilted (though not exclusively) towards an analysis of Musharraf’s speeches and statements. However, it is essential to establish that this has not been a deliberate strategy but merely reflects the source of the discursive articulation in Pakistani politics in the aftermath of 9/11.
power and the power to ‘frame’ issues in Pakistan has been concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite which has for many reasons been dominated by a political elite having military links; in Pakistan it is the military which holds real political power and the power to construct representations. Since political discourse, or elite discourse in Pakistan, is the key player in relation to the ‘construction of social reality’ exploring this discourse is necessary to this study. It is useful in this context to conceptualise the political elite in Pakistan as comprising an ‘epistemic community’\textsuperscript{13}. It could be argued, that members of Pakistan’s ruling elite share a common style of thinking (an episteme) by virtue of their association with the military institution\textsuperscript{14}. Of course, Pakistan’s military evolved into an epistemic community owing to peculiar and specific conditions most prominently the existence of a deep sense of insecurity that infested the Pakistani state after its birth in 1947. Historically then, political elites have been critical to defining and representing both the Self and the Other(s) in Pakistan and thus structuring political practice. However, Pakistan’s epistemic community is more than a depository of knowledge since it wields significant social power\textsuperscript{15}. The consequence being that the military’s ‘regime of truth’ has historically dominated social space resulting in a Gramscian hegemony in which particular narratives, representations and world-views are privileged over alternative representations. Indeed political elites have historically enjoyed more or less complete monopolisation of communicative events and allowed little space for

\textsuperscript{13} Peter M. Haas in ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Cooperation’ in International Organisation (1992) 46.1:1-36 describes an epistemic community as a network of professionals/experts whose members share similar beliefs and have faith in the ‘verity and applicability of particular forms of knowledge or specific truths – a though collective – a sociological group with a common style of thinking’.  

\textsuperscript{14} See discussion in 6.2 and particularly pp: 280-81.

\textsuperscript{15} Van Dijk’s (2001) Critical Discourse Analysis’ approach defines social power as resting on access to wealth, privilege or income coupled with special access to various forms or contexts of discourse. In terms of access to wealth Siddiqua (2005) in a recent book ‘Military Inc.’ documents the military’s intimate links to and, vested interests in Pakistan’s economy. Access to such wealth and income is an important source of social power.
the articulation of counter-discourses to be heard. Until relatively recently, Pakistan had only one state run television channel and limited access to the internet; arguably in such an environment where alternative discourses are silenced and marginalised it becomes comparatively easier for a powerful epistemic community to legitimise particular knowledge claims and representations. However, this is not to suggest that oppositional and counter-discourses are non-existent, rather the decision to analyse official discourse was a conscious step signalling that although counter-discourses existed during the time-frame under consideration; nevertheless the ‘airtime’ they received was limited. Instead, a hegemonic official discourse was aggressively and pervasively articulated within Pakistan.

Having identified the discursive space to be investigated, there are further questions related to style of engagement which can either be textual in its orientation or more Foucauldian inspired. Keeping in mind the research questions, it is necessary to qualify that this project is far less interested in a textual analysis or the nature and sequencing of activities in talk; instead the analysis is far more interested in modes of representation reflecting a Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis. This approach focuses on situating language beyond immediate and local contexts by locating it in a broader field of text allowing for an appreciation of concepts such as ideology and power differences. Moreover, a Foucauldian discourse analysis also draws attention to the notion of subject-positions offered by constructions; thus which world-views do particular constructions allow, promote and legitimise, and

---

16 For an excellent historical study of Pakistan’s school curricula and the kind of representations articulated, see Saigol (2005).
17 Textual analysis is more common in the field of discursive psychology. However a textual method has also been adopted by Fairclough, N (2003) ‘Analysing Discourse: textual analysis for social research’, Routledge, London. Fairclough analyses the politics of ‘new Labour’ in British politics.
subsequently which subject-positions are constrained and disallowed. These questions and explorations are essential in terms of subsequent analysis which seeks to account for Pakistan’s political practice.

Limiting analysis to official political discourse does not imply a reduction in the quantity of potential data material rather, official sources produce an abundance of discursive data. In order to address this issue, and to ensure that a systematic and valid method of engagement with discursive themes in the data is enabled, this study takes its lead from a grounded theory method. A grounded theory approach suggests that the researcher should cease to analyse only when new data consistently does not offer anything new in relation to what has already been identified. This seems a convincing and analytically rigorous approach to take and ensures the fulfilment of quality and validity requirements. Moreover, it is important clarify at the outset that despite taking a deconstructive approach to discourse it is not possible, given the confines of this limited study, to extensively quote and explicitly analyse all of the texts consulted throughout this study. The approach to discourse is broadly Foucauldian and therefore the study analyses a variety of texts from official sources to build a general picture of what is being represented and to confirm or discard emergent themes. The nature of discourse study is such that often a large number of texts are examined in order to understand the overall representations being articulated. However, in practicality the entirety of these texts cannot be included within the thesis. Therefore, although a wide range of texts have been consulted to ensure that relevant themes in the political discourse have been identified; it is important to note that it is not possible to relate here the entirety of the data. Furthermore, this study makes no claim to being able to collect all possible data
material; nevertheless, the material selected will cover enough to provide the dominant narratives and relevant examples for specific points made in the study.

Having identified discursive constructions in Pakistan’s political discourse, this study does not offer a historical genealogy along the lines of Foucault in terms of exploring the discursive histories of the concepts identified in the data. Foucault (1961, 1977) for instance, conducted genealogies of the concept of madness and the prison system. Instead, the critical realist theoretical position of this research gives analytical primacy\(^{18}\) to an exploration of the ‘depth ontology’ underlying the identifiable discourse (Delanty 2005). This means that a considerable part of the study will employ a transcendental argumentation\(^{19}\) to conceptualise social structures and contexts, which although not immediately given in experience, may still be connected to the constitution of political reality and subsequent political practice in Pakistan\(^{20}\). From a critical realist point of view, the discourse is embedded within depth structures and mechanisms. This twofold exploration will provide for a more plausible explanatory account of Pakistan’s political practice after 2001.

Consequently, the overall design of this research project is more geared towards provided a ‘snapshot’ of political reality in Pakistan as opposed to providing a historical-comparative account that traces qualitative changes over a longer period of

\(^{18}\) It must be noted that a critical realist position does not explicitly reject the usefulness of Foucauldian genealogies rather its analytical primacy lies elsewhere.

\(^{19}\) A transcendental argumentation goes beyond the empirical observable realm and seeks to clarify the basic prerequisites or conditions for social action. The term ‘conditions’ refers to those circumstances without which the action cannot exist further this may involve theorisations of unobservable structures and mechanisms. A transcendental philosophy is strongly opposed by the empiricism which maintains the notion that valid knowledge is only that which is immediately observed or experienced. Bhaskar’s critical realism is extremely critical of this empiricist argument which reduces ‘knowledge’ to only that which is directly given in observation. For a very readable introduction to transcendental argumentation see Danermark et al. (2002:96-98)

\(^{20}\) The precise critical realist methodology employed to identify often (unobservable) social structures will be detailed in chapter four.
time. This study of ‘one moment’ has the advantage that it focuses the entire analysis on exploring this moment of intense political concern.

1.4 Organisation of thesis

This research project has been designed to fully explore the hypothesis and related research questions. The thesis is organised in the following way: following this introductory chapter, the study will proceed to a two-stage review of the relevant literature in order to provide background contextualisation in relation to the theory and the subject-area of this thesis. In the first instance, chapter two will examine the dominant theoretical frameworks employed within the field of international relations in order to place into sharper focus the specific approach of this study. Similarly chapter three will seek to provide a background contextualisation of the ‘problem-field’ by considering the main historical contours of Pakistan’s political discourse coupled with a general analysis of the wider environment of Pakistan’s existence. In this context, the review seeks to also make a critical appraisal of the current literature as it relates to Pakistan in the post-9/11 era and simultaneously clarify the gaps in current knowledge. Chapter four is very extensive and covers the theoretical and conceptual frameworks from which this study emerges and which provide the ‘steering force’ in terms of guiding and informing the entire research process. In this respect the discussion will begin by examining the philosophical approach of social constructionism proceeding to a clarification of the ways in which the social constructionist theory stance taken by this thesis is qualified. The central argument
will focus on a number of key critical realist insights that conceptualise the stratified nature of reality and consequently can offer a more holistic social explanation.

Chapter five consists of a discursive analysis of Pakistan’s official political discourse. The discursive chapter is concerned with a fine-tuned reading of textual data and an identification of themes that are repeatedly emphasised, and the discursive strategies employed to reinforce these themes. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the specific constructions and representations constitutive of Pakistan’s political discourse in the aftermath of 9/11, and to discern how this space is linked to the normalisation and legitimisation of political practices during this time-period. The main argument of this chapter will focus on evidencing the connections between discourse and the possibilities of political practice. Having deconstructed Pakistan’s political discourse in relation to 9/11 chapter six, taking its inspiration from critical realism, will seek to analytically embed the discourse within a critical realist stratified ontology. The main objective of this chapter is to further enhance the explanatory power of the analysis by identifying those relevant domestic and international social structures and social contexts that allow for the emergence of the specific political discourse identified. This chapter is important since it indicates a distance from linguistic realism by proposing that extra-discursive factors are also implicated in social constructions.

In chapter seven the discussion draws together the various arguments and threads to advance a clearly coherent position in accounting for Pakistan’s political practice following 9/11. In particular, the study will argue that a multi-causal framework of
analysis as adopted by this research is better able to explain patterns of state behaviour. This concluding chapter will concisely reiterate the subject of each chapter culminating in a restatement of the main findings of the thesis and a number of recommendations for further research.

1.5 Limitations of the thesis

It is important to stress that this study forms a small part of a much larger subject-area. Although this research is located within a definite and wider subject-area i.e. the ‘war on terrorism’ it however deals with one isolated facet: the discursive normalisation of Pakistan’s political practice. This specificity has both strengths and limitations. In the first instance, given the confines of time and space, it is impossible to thoroughly investigate all aspects of such a wide-ranging subject-area. Given the various actors that are related to the ‘war on terror’ (the US, Pakistan, the Taliban, India and the rest of the coalition effort); the various dimensions that can be explored in the context of the relationship between the actors themselves and their relationship to the ‘war on terror’, it is difficult to see how a study like this could incorporate a consideration of all these actors. Secondly, the theoretical framework underlying the study, acting as a lens, draws attention to particular objects and subjects whilst constraining a consideration of other variables; this means that it limits our attention to a consideration of only those aspects it considers as significant. The theoretical framework that underscores this study highlights the relevance of discourse and social context to the construction of political realities thus overlooking other ways of perceiving the construction of political reality i.e. as resulting from the universality
of anarchic relations or Marxist relations of production, or the result of a deliberate extension of US imperial power and so on. Thus, it is important to note that the theory underlying this study limits our focus to specific variables and therefore constrains the exploration of alternative aspects. Moreover, even within the specific theoretical framework there have been further limitations. For instance, it has not been possible to discuss at length the discursive construction of US-Pakistan relations or engage in a genealogical account of the construction of the Pakistani Self, or examine the material and ideational role that India plays in the enactment of Pakistan’s political practice vis-à-vis the ‘war on terror’.

However, rather than viewing these limitations of time, space and theory as unhelpful it is useful to consider these limitations as enablers in the sense that they have enabled a clear delineation of a small and defined aspect of Pakistan and the ‘war on terror’. These limitations enable an in-depth, intensive and sharply focused exploration allowing for a deeper and more sustained engagement with a particular facet of the wider subject-area. Thus, this project can tell us something specific about the way in which Pakistan’s political discourse enabled and constrained political action in the aftermath of 9/11. Furthermore, this project has something useful to say in relation to how this discourse is itself rooted in local and global social contexts that impinge on the possibilities of discursive constructions. It offers a different way of looking at what ‘causes’ things to happen in the realm of world politics. This specificity of the project is its major strength in the sense that it engages intently with a specific aspect i.e. Pakistan’s political discourse in the context of the ‘war on terrorism’ and is able to demonstrate the links between this discourse and political practice.
The findings of this study are specific to Pakistan and thus cannot be more widely
generalised since this study is essentially an intensive study of a particular time-
period and a specific socio-political context. This intensity means that the project
cannot claim to be extensive and it would be incorrect to claim that the findings of
this project are widely applicable. Secondly the data-set itself is limited in the sense
that it only analyses official political discourse articulated by official Pakistani
sources. The reasons for considering this specific data-set have been outlined earlier.
However this also means that other sources of political discourse within Pakistan
such as media discourses and civil society discourses have not been considered. It is
useful to add that, during the time-period under consideration media discourses and
civil society discourses were largely curbed and censored. For instance, large-scale
media liberalisation only occurred after 2002 whereas Pakistan has a relatively
undeveloped civil society.

One of the major strengths of this thesis is that, in many ways, it is an attempt to
bridge the gap between a purely structural explanation of a state’s pattern of
behaviour and an alternative analysis that provides a purely discursive account of the
same behaviour. In looking to both the extra-discursive and discursive theory and in
evaluating which concepts within these paradigms can contribute to furthering the
investigation the analysis of this study has resulted in a useful synthesis of both
approaches. However finally, it is also important to concede that the research focus,
conceptual framework, the analysis, and the interpretation of the findings throughout
the research project are biased in the sense that they relate to my own theoretical assumptions regarding the nature of political reality.

1.6 Exploring self-reflexivity

The nature of social investigation is such that it is very difficult to assume that the researcher can be detached or separated from the research. Rather inadvertently the role and identity of the researcher extends from the choice of research area through to the analysis, interpretation and overall ‘knowledge’ claims. Since such involvement of the researcher is an inextricable component of the research process consequently it should not be construed negatively as bias but as a position to be acknowledged. This notion of adopting a policy of openness within the research process is commonly referred to as reflexivity. In the words of Cromby and Nightingale (1999:228),

reflexivity requires an awareness of the researcher’s contribution to the construction of meanings throughout the research process, and an acknowledgment of the impossibility of remaining ‘outside of’ of one’s subject matter while conducting research…[Reflexivity then, urges us to] explore the ways in which a researcher’s involvement with a particular study influences, acts upon and informs such research.
In this light we may view reflexivity as an important component of transparent research. Furthermore Willig (2001) notes that we can distinguish two types of reflexivity: personal reflexivity and epistemological reflexivity; the latter referring to transparency relating to the conceptual paradigm employed in the research process. In terms of engaging with epistemological reflexivity it is notable that the research questions, hypothesis and findings are defined and limited by the underlying theoretical assumptions, design and method of analysis. However, issues of personal reflexivity which ‘involves reflecting upon the way in which our own values, experiences, interests, beliefs, political commitments, wider aims in life and social identities have shaped the research’ (Willig 2001:10) have not, as yet, been addressed. Since the acknowledgment of personal reflexivity as an important part of transparency it is essential to briefly attempt to understand and acknowledge the way in which the authors own presence and actions may be considered as influencing the research process. It is important to note at the outset that this is not an exhaustive reflexive account rather I address the main features of how I understand the research process to have been inadvertently impacted by my presence.

In the first instance, I wish to acknowledge that my interest in the broader subject-area is connected to my own British-Pakistani identity which has been strengthened by the frequent visits and interaction I have had with Pakistan throughout my life. This background shaped the decision to focus my research on Pakistan in the context of the US-led ‘war on terror’ and contributed to an awareness of perceived biases in many explanatory accounts within the current literature. Often I felt that many studies in prioritising the United States as their unit of analysis ignored or, at best, offered partial and parsimonious accounts of the role of Pakistan in the ‘war on
terror’. What I mean by this is that the literature predominately dealt with questions around ‘whether Pakistan was doing enough’ (for the US), assessing whether Pakistan is a friend or foe (of the US), how Pakistan’s internal governance, values and belief systems compare to their US counterparts and so on. While there is nothing inherently wrong with these analyses rather these are insightful contributions; the issue however is the dominance they enjoy within the broader subject-area. Indeed, there is a certain repetition in approach to the subject-area in that the starting point is, more often than not, the US. The decision to focus on Pakistan from a different theoretical perspective that emphasised qualitative richness and more depth engagement with the enactment of Pakistan’s political action is, to be seen as emerging from this personal background.

Further, in terms of the analysis and interpretation it is important to note that this has certainly not entailed a deliberate decision in terms of applying bias or ‘taking sides’. Rather the overriding criterion has been to ground the analysis and interpretation within the data. For instance in the discursive analysis I examined the political discourse as a whole noting themes as they emerged in the data without engaging in ‘picking and choosing’ which discursive themes I would highlight. In finality, I also wish to concede that on a personal level I find problematic notions of transcendent ‘truth’ and ‘universality’; instead I view the contingent and political nature of most ‘truth’ claims both at a personal subjective level and extending much wider to the international system. Although these ideas also underpin the particular theoretical approach of this study nevertheless, I wish to note that a general scepticism with ‘truth’ is something that unconsciously underscores my interpretive stance. How this impacts the research process can be evaluated in the sense that I do not take a strong
position on evaluating the truth/falsity of US or Pakistani political representations, for instance in relation to the Taliban. ‘Truth’ is, first and foremost political and serves specific functions in enabling and constraining thought and action. It is this aspect of the subject-area that interests me most, how truth claims through representation and interpretation structure political actions, thus I am most concerned with productivity as opposed to evaluating the ‘truthfulness’ of the ‘truth claim’.

1.7 Conclusion

The main focus of this study remains on problematising Pakistan’s political practice related to the reversal of support for the Taliban, and its co-operation with the US in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The study seeks a depth explanation rather than a simplistic reduction of Pakistan practice as an outcome of US dictates. A focus on why and how state practice is produced will provide useful insights into the complexity involved in constituting political action. In this respect, the study argues that Pakistan’s political practice after 9/11 emerged owing to the proliferation of specific discursive structures which normalised and legitimised reversals of official policy. However, in further theorising the production of practice through the medium of discourse, the study proceeds to note that discursive structures cannot plausibly be conceptualised as free-floating or emerging from a vacuum. Instead, in important ways, this study connects Pakistan’s political discourse to specific extra-discursive social contexts and social structures. The argument is that these structures impinge on the kind of discourse that is able to emerge in Pakistan’s political space. This study aims to provide a more holistic and plausible consideration of the production of
political practice by identifying a complex of causal determinants. Moreover, it is important to clearly articulate at the outset that this study does not engage with questions of morality or legality in relation to the ‘war on terror’ and the ensuing political actions and practices. The principal focus is not on deliberating whether the ‘war on terror’ is good or bad; rather the principal objective of the deconstruction of discourse that takes place within this study is to uncover the discursive strategies employed to advance a specific representation. This disengagement with ascertaining ‘truth’ reflects a Foucauldian scepticism concerning the existence of ‘a truth’ as opposed to its distortions. The remit of the study is to examine how and why political practice is produced in the way that it is, and as it is relevant to this case-study; the analysis will therefore be geared towards this end.
Conceptual Trends in IR

2.1 Introduction

The world is a complex place and the use of theory is to make some sense of what is taking place. Theory is an important component of the substance and direction of research in world politics and is distinguished by the insistence that we have to focus on certain specific factors within this complex world. This means that different theories of world politics draw attention to and engage with different factors; the underlying justification being that a study of these particular factors can help us adequately describe, explain or predict the most important aspects of world politics such as wars and aggression. In effect, an IR theory can be described as a set of ideas about how the world of global politics works and what we need to study in order to understand that world. Within the field of international relations, there are broadly four major theoretical approaches in the study of global politics: realism, liberalism, Marxism and constructivism; with each of these insisting that its body of ideas is best suited to understanding and explaining how certain aspects of world politics operates. The remit of this chapter is to concisely introduce and briefly review the ideas and concepts most important to these different schools of thought. The purpose being to broadly clarify the location of the theoretical approach taken by this research project vis-à-vis the most dominant theoretical trends within the field of International Relations (IR). This overview has relevance throughout this project particularly since the theoretical approach and conceptual apparatus employed by this study will

\[21\] This is not intended to be an exhaustive list but indicative of the broad theoretical trends in IR thought.
periodically be juxtaposed with the dominant theoretical trends I discuss here in order to demarcate commonality and difference of approach and concept. Therefore, a relevant contextualisation of the dominant theoretical trends within IR is important.

2.2 Realism

Realism is by far the most dominant theoretical framework employed with the field of IR and has a number of varying strands. However, what is common to the various realisms is a specific structuralism that emphasises the causal impact of universal and static anarchic structures of the international system. Whilst realism has a long history tracing back to Thucydides and Tsun Tzu; it is the theorist Kenneth Waltz (1959, 1979) who played a central role in modern realist theorisations of the state and international space. A number of key assumptions can be identified as underpinning the various realist approaches in IR. In the first instance, a realist theory assumes the anarchic nature of the world system with anarchy here being defined as the absence of an authoritative world government. Waltz argued that in the absence of a ‘central enforcer’ the world existed in a state of perpetual anarchy with this being the immediate context within which nation-states are located. As a result of these ‘pre-given’ and ‘natural’ conditions of existence the assumption is that

---

22 Owing to limited time and space the study will not provide a comprehensive overview of the all the variants of realist thought in IR. Rather the aim here is to provide a short overview of dominant schools of thought in IR. Consequently the study will only consider a select sample of realist theorists.

23 An interesting account of structural constraints on US security policy is offered by Brooks and Wohlfforth (2008) who, after considering the scope and extent of global structural constraints on the US, proceed to conclude that these ‘constraints’ are ineffective in lieu of the overwhelming material preponderance of the US. See also Walt, S. (2005) who, within a broadly realist framework, argues that the continuation of US material and ideological hegemony in world politics needs increased buffeting through the exercise of ‘soft’ power in order to inhibit global opposition.
individual states are in constant competition with one another and therefore actrationally in their own self-interest in order to secure state survival. For instance, Mearsheimer (2001:2) notes that ‘even though the Soviet threat has disappeared, the United States still maintains about one hundred thousand troops in Europe and roughly the same number in Northeast Asia’. In this conception since anarchy is a ‘natural’ and unavoidable feature of the international system, it feeds state insecurity making it difficult for states to trust one another (Keohane and Martin 1995)24. Moreover, in order to ensure survival in an anarchic system realist theorists advocate that states are consistently engaged in amassing resources/power (economic, population, military power) and that relations between states are primarily determined by these relative levels of power (Gilpin 1989, Walt 2005). The practice of war is always on the horizon in the realist mindset; nevertheless, the assumption is that certain mechanisms, notably a balance-of-power, may help to limit inter-state conflict (Waltz 1979). One of the key differences between classical realism and the neo-realism of theorists such as Waltz is the extent to which they draw upon theories of human nature. Indeed, classical realism puts human nature (the urge to dominate) at the centre of its explanation i.e. that human’s are predisposed to conflict and that this is reflected in the anarchic system. On the other hand, neo-realists also referred to as structural realists tend to argue that the pressures of anarchy (the structure of the system) are what shape behavioural patterns of states.

We may thus conclude that in the realist conception states are homogenous entities having a similar purpose in that they are focussed on state survival in an anarchic

24 Theorists focusing on the idea that mistrust in the international system is universal and independent of the accumulation of power are often referred to as ‘offensive’ realists in the literature. For a good overview of this subject see Kydd, A H. (2005).
system. Inter-state belligerency is seen as a natural phenomenon that may be controlled to some extent by a balance-of-power. This conceptual framework means that realist-inspired studies are often positivist and focus analytical attention on how the international anarchic structure and levels of power between states determine patterns of state behaviour.

2.3 Liberalism

Compared to the realist world-view of perpetual anarchy as the significant defining feature of world politics liberalism tends to be more optimistic, holding the notion that state preferences as opposed to state capabilities are the primary determinant of behaviour in world politics. Although liberals broadly accept the structural condition of anarchy; nevertheless, they contend that this does not mean that co-operation is impossible. Rather, since states are interdependent and engage in interaction in fields of culture and economic exchange liberalism contends that there exist a wide range of opportunities for inter-state co-operation and consequently peaceful relations between nation-states is not an unachievable goal as realism would imply (Milner and Moravcsik 2009). Contemporary liberals or neo-liberals are likely to focus on researching international organisations and the growing interdependence of states or the process’ of globalisation as a causal phenomena connected to increased inter-state co-operation thus reducing conflict between them. Often the research agenda of neo-liberals is dominated by the debate about liberal states and in explaining why relations between states tend to be peaceful. More specifically, there is a focus on proposing liberal democracy as the ideal-type of governance geared to advancing co-
operative intra and inter-state relations. Liberalism advances the notion that liberal democracies rarely make war against each other with this thesis widely referred to in the literature as the ‘democratic peace theory’ (see for e.g. Rummel 199525, Ray. 1998, Russett 1993). Critics however, contend that although liberal states have created a ‘separate peace’ amongst themselves nevertheless they are aggressive as any other state in their relationship to non-liberal and authoritarian governments (Doyle 1995). Other commentators, most notably Rosato (2003), suggest that (democratic) states interpret a rival states ‘regime type’ depending on their own security and economic concerns26.

At the same time, many are sceptical of the universalising mission of liberalism that involves the universalisation of principles of democracy, capitalism and secularism which tend to undermine the tradition and values of non-western cultures. Chan (2002) for instance although broadly an adherent of the expansion of democracy, questions the assumption of the universal application of liberal (western) institutional structures. In this context Chan (2002) notes that economic development in countries such as Japan and newly industrialising Asian countries has taken place despite the state and society being far less liberal.

Liberalism may be distinguished from realism in the sense that realist theory does not conceive a type of government (democratic) as explaining the apparent peace between democratic states. In contrast, realists posit structural reasons for the

25 Rummel’s site available at: www.hawaii.edu/powerkills offers extensive literature on his ideas in relation to the ‘democratic peace theory’.
26 For instance Rosato (2003) in assessing the theory that democracies rarely wage war provides an interesting list of ‘American cold-war interventions against democracies’ in his article.
apparent ‘peace’ as opposed to the type of government in place; the realist emphasis is on the notion that, despite the co-operation, democratic states will still be working to defend against the ‘threat’ of other states.

2.4 Marxism

On the other hand Marxism provides an alternative way of looking at world politics and has, like realism and liberalism, been a dominant theoretical inspiration for much of the analysis in international relations. Broadly speaking, Marxism as extrapolated into the field of IR considers economic forces as the most significant determining factor in terms of identity, interest and behaviour. In this context it is perhaps the Marxist inspired work of Immanuel Wallerstein (2004) and particularly his notion of the world-systems theory (WST) that has been most popular within the field of international relations. The world-systems theory seeks to uncover an underlying ‘truth’ namely that events in the world (wars, treaties, international aid, foreign investment and all forms of interstate interaction) are ultimately embedded within the ‘world-system’ which is organized according to the logic of global capitalism. Within this framework such things as states and ethnic groups are a product of the world-system and behaviour of entities is determined by their position within that system. In particular the scholarship in this tradition draws attention to ‘exploitation’ in terms of the reliance of Western capitalism on the ‘underdevelopment’ and ‘peripheralization’ of the Third World. The argument from this approach is that the material exploitation defines the nature of global relations between states. Wallerstein’s work has been critiqued for its reductionist connotations in that its
principal proposition is the idea that economic relations are the defining meta-narrative for understanding the world. In response to this Wallerstein’s later work (1991) also introduced the notion of ‘geo-culture’ which emphasizes the role of hegemonic ideologies in maintaining and reproducing a dominant world order in which capitalism is the defining force.

A particularly useful offshoot of such Marxist thinking within IR is the notion of cultural and ideological ‘hegemony’ as being productive of consensus in the international realm. The notion of hegemony has it origins in the historical materialism of Karl Marx who argued that the ruling-classes were intimately involved in the proliferation of a ‘false consciousness’ in order to represent the interests of the ruling-class as universal interests. Marx argued that this ‘false consciousness, played a pivotal role in eliciting consensual participation of the proletariat in capitalist modes of production. This concept was developed further by the Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1971) who introduced the notion of ‘cultural hegemony’, which referred to the manufacturing of consent through non-coercive means. More specifically, Gramsci defined ‘hegemony’ as that social process through which the leading group of a society transformed its own interests and values into ‘common sense’ for all members of the society. Extrapolating Gramsci’s concept of hegemony into IR, Robert Cox (1981) argued that global hegemony is a form of dominance which refers to consensual order as opposed to conventional IR theory which reduces hegemony to brute economic and military capabilities of states.\footnote{The notion of geo-culture is clearly inspired from the Marxist notion of ‘false consciousnesses’.}

\footnote{This approach can be seen as a development of Marxist thought. Writers such as Cox move away from the notion of an unchanging objective reality or immutable social laws. Moreover, the main}
eliciting influence or control over state behaviour without the employment of force. Indeed, it often refers to the way in which a ruling group is involved in the production of ways of thinking or world-views that exclude other ways of reasoning. In an important sense, hegemony can be distinguished from other concepts such as colonisation which signal direct, official and often forceful and violent control of foreign territories. Willing consensus is a key idea associated with notions of hegemony.

The concept of ‘hegemony’ can be a useful tool in offering more nuanced accounts of the operation of power in international space particularly in relation to building consensus. For instance, many writers have taken up the position that the contemporary world is dominated by a neo-liberal ideology principally spearheaded by the United States and which has specific conceptualisations of how space within an ideal society is organised and its governance. What is particularly useful is the way in which some writes have taken up this notion of a dominant cultural hegemony espoused by the US in order to understand how it interacts with local political elites giving way to consensus (see for e.g. Colas 2007: chapter 3). In examining the concrete operationalisation of a ‘hegemonic cultural ideology’ within IR, Falah and Flint (2004:1382) for instance have argued that this involves the defining and disseminating of a specific vision or model of society and civilisation – a vision which they bundle together under the term ‘prime modernity’. They explain this operationalisation,

concept of concern is the enactment of consensual hegemony with the emancipatory goal to liberate humanity from ‘oppressive’ structures by uncovering their non-neutrality and politicized relation with power. A conjunction of ‘social forces’, ideas and states contribute to unequal power relations in the world economy.
[prime modernity refers to] the products innovated by the hegemonic power are seen to represent the modern lifestyle – increasing their desirability. In addition, these products are consumed in a manner that defines what is seen as a modern lifestyle. Furthermore the products are produced in new and efficient ways that are seen as the most modern work-practices. The work practices and lifestyles of prime modernity combine to promote particular relations of production, gender and racial division of labour, and differential access to private and public goods as modern too. In combination, these aspects of modernity combine to form particular cultural landscapes that are not only the products of these processes but also advertise their supposed benefits. Finally what it means to be modern and its presumed benefits are broadcast for the world to see….disseminated through the mediums of television and cinema.

The authors suggest that this modern lifestyle or the ‘prime modernity’ is championed as an ideal and which works to create a wholesale Gramscian consensus regarding the goals of the rest of the world. The goal thus is to consume and emulate the products and way of life of the hegemonic power. In terms of promoting a neo-liberal ideology, the key point to note here is that the emphasis is laid on consensus as opposed to brute force. Within the literature, it is acknowledged that the pervasiveness of this kind of cultural hegemony is much more sustainable for the hegemonic power as opposed to employing coercive political and military institutions to elicit consensus although these means to achieve compliance are not ruled out. In this construction, the US relies a great deal on the dissemination and promotion of a universal prime modernity as an ideal to be emulated by the rest of the world. As Falah and Flint (2004:1380) further note,
the ideological basis of the hegemonic power’s rule lies in its ability to maintain cultural universality. In other words hegemonic cultural power rests upon the assumption that the prime modernity is desired by all, beneficial to all and attainable by all. Resistance to the prime modernity by any state is a chink in the armour of universality, inevitability and belief in the ability and desire of all to arrange their societies along the model of the hegemonic state.

The US enjoys an unparalleled global cultural hegemony in that it is able to efficiently disseminate and promote its particular values of civilisation, morality, development, progress, modernity and governance. Moreover, some theorists have argued that these specific values are concerned with the organisation of domestic space within states in order to aid the smooth operation of capitalist structures of power, which ultimately benefit the US (Colas 2007). In the context of the ‘war on terrorism’ Falah and Flint (2004:1385) suggest that the US building upon the notion of itself as the definition of what is modern and universally desirable was similarly able to develop a notion of US moral concern at whose core was the benefit of all humankind rather than an expression of inter-state politics. This moral concern with terrorists and ‘rogue’ states was not solely a US enterprise; rather US values were equated and synonymous with global values benefiting all humanity. Thus by claiming to be speaking for ‘all’ the US was able to articulate the notion of a ‘just’ war. Within this literature if hegemony is understood as an ‘opinion moulding activity’ then the task of IR is to consider how a specific exploitative capitalist world order is buttressed by the proliferation of specific values, inter-subjective meanings, ideology, institutional and moral contexts.
2.5 Constructivism

In more recent years, the ‘discursive turn’ in the wider social sciences brought forth approaches which found particularly problematic the notion that the social world was an unchanging and stable realm. Instead, these varied perspectives highlighted the relevance of ideational factors in the constitution of social reality and gave analytical priority to ideas, norms, rules and discourses that were seen to shape and construct the social world (see Onuf 1989, Hopf 1998, Wendt). In particular, Alexander Wendt’s (1992) article ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’ laid the theoretical groundwork for the subsequent challenging of realist theorisations in the field of IR. Approaches inspired by this ‘discursive turn’ problematized dominant Waltzian conceptualisations of the state and the anarchic nature of the world system and instead emphasised the role of discourses and representation in the construction of social phenomena such as the ‘state’, ‘war’, ‘the international’.

These approaches posed a challenge to the dominance of realist theories of an unchanging and pre-given nature in relation to world politics. In particular, it was argued that the ‘international’ cannot be conceived as a pre-given anarchic space in which states are suspended or that state behaviour can be explained solely with reference to reductionist theories of self-help. The argument by those inspired by the broader theory of social construction was that states are primarily discursive entities as opposed to ‘naturally’ occurring phenomena and their existence relied heavily on
the articulation of dichotomies between the Self and the outside Other (Hansen 2006)\textsuperscript{29}. In her seminal work on the notion of ‘intertextuality’, Julia Krestiva (1980) explored this very relationship between texts arguing that a text can never be completely divorced from a wider textual web to the extent that a specific text or discourse can only be ‘read’ against a background of other texts we have encountered. Krestiva thus postulated the intertextuality of all texts opposing the notion that any text can be conceptualized as a stand-alone entity; her focus on the generation of meaning can help us conceptualise more clearly how discourses are ‘plugged’ into each other and helps us theorise their simultaneous effects on each other. As Ashley (1989:280-281) argues,

\begin{quote}
no subject, no object, no system, no structure of \textit{le texte general} can be adequately comprehended as an already completed text that is fixed, finally bounded, and homogenous in its meaning. No aspect of history, no matter how unambiguous or self-evident it may seem, can be regarded as a central and orginary production, self-sufficient and complete in the meanings it contains and engenders. Comprehended in its historicity, each aspect of history must be comprehended as an \textit{intertext}.
\end{quote}

What this means is that, the constitution of the ‘state’, its definition and roles, the way it ‘should’ behave domestically and at the international level is not a pre-given set of rules but that we should understand the state as a product of discourse and that

\textsuperscript{29} Indeed the notion that the state as an entity only knows who it is by discursively marking out and distinguishing the outside Other. Hansen (2006) suggests the outside Other does not necessarily constitute an aggressive hostile Other but that ‘otherness’ may be constructed through less aggressive distinctions.
this specific discourse or text of who and what the state is, is itself an intertextual product bearing traces of other texts both contemporary and historical (Shapiro 1989). It is in this fashion that ‘international social reality’ is conceived as emerging from discourses, which are ‘plugged’ into each other and, which work to define ‘states’ as legally legitimate units, their roles in the global ‘system’ and the kind of relations and interactions that must exist between them (Kurki 2008).

Approaches prioritising discourse in the study of the object of world politics have produced some interesting incursions in IR thought. Campbell (1992) in his book ‘Writing Security’ situates US foreign policy as an identity constituting practice that plays a pivotal role in the reproduction of an American territorial, ideological Self. Similarly Doty (1996:92) in her study of US counterinsurgency policies in the Philippines during the 1950s notes the way in which the US was constructed as a ‘speaking, writing, knowledgeable subject....an initiator of action, a formulator of policy, an assessor of situations and a definer of problems’. For Doty, the array of ideas, attributes and values cohered to build a world-view of oneself which ‘in turn constructed a cultural code within which foreign policy was discussed, organised and implemented (Doty 1996:92). Doty provides an excellent study of subject positioning and its political consequences30. Further, one of the key areas that has seen

---

30 It is notable that although the discursive construction of the US in terms of (re)producing relations of global power has received much scholarly attention there is comparatively little literature within the IR field examining how ‘Others’ come to accept or resist US discursive positioning. Much of the discursive theorizing within IR tends to focus on how various Others are perceived, constructed, represented by the West. A similar focus is not extended to discursive studies of how those making up the ‘West’ are perceived and represented by ‘Others’ and the political consequences of these constructions. Post-colonialist literature in comparison has engaged far more in this sense in that investigations have focussed on indigenous discourses and voices and tended to not to only give primacy to studies of the colonizing hegemonic discourse.
constructionist re-theorising has taken place in understanding the end of the Cold War (see Koslowski and Kratochwil 1995).

The influence of the ‘discursive turn’ has been wide-ranging with theorists drawing on social constructionist theories to draw attention to the role of language and discourse in the production of the object of IR. Post-colonial writers for instance, have been concerned with notions of ideological and cultural hegemony and have been critical of an IR field that is inattentive to ‘the ways in which power is constituted and produced, or the role of history, ideology, and culture in shaping state power or practices in international relations’ (Chowdhry and Nair 2002:4). In particular, post-colonial writings examine how discursive representations of race and ethnicity subtly underwrite the exercise of global power. Similarly, in the collection of essays edited by Katzenstein (1996) the authors consider the role of national identity and ‘cultural elements’ as a determinant of national military and security policy.

However, it is important to mention here that within IR there are two dominant trends in the use of discursive theories. In the first instance, the IR literature terms those writers (such as Campbell 1992, Doty 1993) who tend to study discourse and representation without a significant analysis of material/social structures and the role of agency as, ‘poststructuralists’. Arguably these incursions in IR thought tend to be reductionist in their consideration of the relationship between discourse and political life. On a second note, theorists that incorporate agency and the role of social or/and material structure in their discursive analysis are more often termed constructivists.
Poststructuralist approaches in IR have been criticized by constructivists in general and by those taking more of a material stance in terms of accounting for world politics. Arif Dirlik for instance, argues that postcolonial literature by taking Foucauldian and post-structuralist positions and being preoccupied with discursive regimes and representations, ignore the (real and causal) material inequalities between the First and Third worlds. Dirlik (1997 in Chowdhry and Nair 2002:22 ) writes,

The denial to capitalism of “foundational status” is also revealing of culturalism in the postcolonial argument that has important ideological consequences. This involves the issue of Eurocentrism. Without capitalism as the foundation for European power and the motive force for its globalization, Eurocentrism would have been just another ethnocentrism (comparable to any other ethnocentrism from the Chinese and the Indian to the most trivial tribal solipsism). An exclusive focus on Eurocentrism as a cultural or ideological problem, which blurs the power relationships that dynamized it and endowed it with hegemonic persuasiveness, fails to explain why this particular ethnocentrism was able to define modern global history, and itself as the universal aspiration and end of that history, in contrast to the regionalism or localism of other ethnocentrisms.
It is apparent that Dirlik’s concern relates to the broader tension within IR theorizing concerning the validity of either a materialist explanation of world politics or the validity of a discursive explanation. Although Chowdhry and Nair (2002) have suggested adopting a stance that is sensitive to both modes of conceptualisation this is not backed up by the delineation of a concrete theoretical approach incorporating both variables i.e. representational themes and material conditions. While constructivist approaches in IR do pay analytical attention to the role of wider structures and agency in their discursive theorizations of world politics; nevertheless, it can be argued that the precise dialect and interplay between discourse, structure and agency is under-theorised by constructivists. It is here, in terms of providing a more robust conceptual and theoretical framework, that a critical realist ontological framework is useful. Indeed the position of this study is that critical realist theoretical insights into the relationship between discourse, structure and agency and in particular Bhaskar’s (1989) TMSA model offers a concrete and robust theoretical position from which constructivist studies can begin to consider both material and discursive structures underlying the construction of a postcolonial social reality. This would mean that the contemporary post-colonial world, in which the North articulates power (understood both in terms of material power and consensual hegemony) vis-à-vis the South, is conceptualized as emerging from a complex of material and ideational ontological structures underlying the world.

31 See section 4.17, for a comprehensive discussion of how Bhaskar’s TMSA model is useful in terms of conceptualizing the relationship of discourse, structure and agency in the production of social life.
2.6 Conclusion

The theoretical approaches distinguished above reflect the broad divisions between different explanatory frameworks dominating thinking in the field of international relations. The short overview in this chapter does not exhaust the range of conceptual frameworks being employed within the field of IR but is merely indicative of the main strands of thought. There are a number of other ‘critical’ approaches to IR which have not been explored here, including feminist and critical security studies, which in their own way draw attention to different nuances in their attempts to understand and explain world politics. Nevertheless despite its conciseness, the brief overview of this chapter has an important purpose in terms of the overall thesis in that it will help to clarify and clearly locate where the theoretical orientation and inspiration of this specific research project lies. In chapter four, the study will delineate the theoretical approach of this study and may be contrasted vis-à-vis the dominant conceptual trends outlined here.
3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to enable a critical appraisal of the existing literature on Pakistan in the context of the war on terror, and to analyse how this subject area has been broached by analysts. This chapter will seek to show how the wider literature on Pakistan in the years after the commencement of the US-led ‘war on terror’ is consistent in the sense that a ‘standard’ method of analysis is employed to ‘view’ and analyse Pakistan’s relationship with the US-led ‘war on terror’. This realist lens provides a wealth of key information nevertheless the issue is not with the conceptual framework itself but with the frequency of the employment of this ‘lens’ to the extent that it becomes pervasive amongst analysts of the ‘war on terror’ and undermines the development of other approaches to the subject-area.

Arguably, there is a monopoly of studies inspired in a realist mould and a simultaneous dearth of analysts who employ a different way of looking at the same problem-field. In contrast to this existing body of work, it is important to note that, this study starts from an altogether different starting point in that its theoretical vision is focussed on the role and causal potentialities of discourse, and underlying social structures and mechanisms in effecting political action in Pakistan. Arguably then, whilst many of the existing studies on Pakistan and its relationship to the ‘war on
terror’ are interesting they often stem from a realist framework of understanding in which discourse as a causal factor is overlooked. This chapter has an important objective in that it will refer to these studies whilst simultaneously identifying gaps in this literature. Consequently, this process will enable a clarification in terms of how this study seeks to contribute in an original way. This means that an important and implicit component of this appraisal is to locate the distinctiveness of this study vis-à-vis already published work.

However, before engaging with the literature that is immediately relevant to the subject-matter of this study it is useful to begin by providing a general historical contextualisation of Pakistan. Although such a discussion involves a historical account that stretches back to Pakistan’s creation in 1947; nevertheless, this contextualisation is critically important in terms of providing a necessary background understanding of the subject-area. On the other hand, owing to confines of time and space the discussion here does not provide a definitive or comprehensive historical account but should be seen as a preliminary reading of the main contours of Pakistan’s history. Further, it is also useful to note that since this study originates from an interest in the social construction of political reality; therefore the discussion will broadly pay attention to the kind of narratives and discourses underlying Pakistan’s historical political practice. As the chapter moves towards the time-period immediately prior to 2001 and in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the discussion will simultaneously move from descriptive to more analytical through incorporating a critical review of the relevant literature. In particular, the discussion will clearly

---

demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the current literature, and in the final analysis will clarify how this project contributes to the subject-area in an original and insightful way.

3.2 The creation of Pakistan: Territorial partition and internal division:

During the latter years of colonial rule in India (1920-47), and especially when it became apparent that India was soon be granted independence from the British Raj; a civil movement spearheaded by the leader of the All India Muslim League, Mohammed Ali Jinnah\(^{33}\) (hereafter Jinnah), began to demand the division of the union of India into two separate and sovereign territories. The basis of such a demand was the belief in the ‘two-nation theory’ the notion that undivided India was home to two different peoples: the Hindus and the Muslims. It was argued that each of these peoples constituted a nation and therefore the logic was that they each deserved a separate state to realize their differing national and cultural aspirations thus promoting the division of India into two (Hindu, Muslim) sovereign states. Moreover, implicit within this idea was the notion that, without a separate state, freedom from the colonists would simply result in a ‘changing of masters’ from British to Hindu for the Muslim minority. It was widely argued that Muslim culture and identity would be come under threat in such a scenario; since Muslims would feel threatened by an overwhelmingly Hindu majority that would overshadow and marginalise a distinct Muslim identity. Further, the preservation of Muslim culture could only be guaranteed within a Muslim state.

\(^{33}\) Mohammed Ali Jinnah is also referred to in the literature as ‘Quaid-e-Azam’ or the ‘great leader, see glossary.
On the other hand, the secular *All India Congress Party* rejected outright the legitimacy of the ‘two-nation’ theory, as espoused by the Muslim League, instead insisting that Muslims and Hindus constituted one people having lived side by side for centuries prior to the arrival of the British and refused to accept the notion that the union of India required division. Arguably, Muslim separatism in undivided India did not have spontaneous origins rather Jaffrelot (2002) highlights the elitist origins of Muslim separatism in undivided India that later culminated in becoming a populist movement for the creation of Pakistan. Jaffrelot (2002) suggests that, nationalist Muslim sentiment in India had not occurred spontaneously amongst the masses, but was in fact a cultivated Indian aristocrat phenomena owing to the peculiar position the Muslim aristocrat found himself in during colonial India. The argument here is that during the British Raj the elite Muslims of the United Provinces (presently Uttar Pradesh) had, following the uprising in 1857, become the target of much British discrimination. Owing to this discrimination the Muslim elite became increasingly fearful of a radical shift in the advantageous status quo and began a slow but sure process of Muslim mobilisation in order to safeguard their class interests (see also Alavi 1983). For these reasons, Jaffrelot (2002) argues that Muslim nationalism cannot be conceived as grass-root phenomena but more of a cultivated sentiment. Such beginnings of Muslim separatism in the sub-continent are particularly important here since they can help in explaining why having achieved the territory of ‘Pakistan’, the Muslim population comprising the new state were unable to attain national cohesiveness and whose reverberations are eminent to this day.
In a contradictory fashion, although the civil movement for the creation of Pakistan used identity markers, such as the Urdu language and Islam, to mobilise and consolidate the grouping; however, at the same time the movement did not primarily focus on creating a *theological* state. This orientation, which failed to explicitly emphasise an Islamic character to the Pakistan movement was the main bone of contention for religious parties and organizations who were subsequently bitterly opposed to the leadership of the All India Muslim League and eventually to the idea of Pakistan. The absence of religious parties from the Pakistan struggle seemed to confirm the notion that Pakistan was to become a modern nation-state and not a theocracy. Jinnah himself though having intermittently employed religious symbols during the campaign for Pakistan was reluctant to associate explicit religious ideology with Pakistan. In fact, the shortcomings of employing Muslim communalist rhetoric were exposed at Partition when (Hindu and Muslim) communities engaged in widespread and horrific bloodshed of each other (see for e.g. Khan 2007, Pandey 2002, Talbot 2007).

However, Jinnah presented an ambiguous position over the role of Islam in the national narrative and soon after Partition he explicitly seemed to backtrack on associating Pakistan exclusively with an Islamic narrative. Shaikh (2009:82) notes that ‘having mobilised Islam’s vote-winning potential, [Jinnah] now sought to curb its destructive power by confining religion to the private sphere’. For instance, during his first presidential address to the new Constituent Assembly in August 1947 clearly outlined his conception of a secular Pakistani identity:
I cannot emphasise it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in the course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community – because even as regards to Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Sunnis, Shias and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmans, Vashnanva, Khatris, also Bengalees, Madrasis, and so on – will vanish. Indeed if you ask me this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain the freedom and independence and but for this, we would have been free people long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 400 million souls in subjection.

You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the state.

Now, I think that we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in the course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state (Jinnah, August 14th, 1947).
It is clear that Jinnah had not intended for the new country to be a theocracy and indeed his numerous statements are testament to this persuasion\(^\text{34}\). Nevertheless, it was perhaps naïve to assume that having discursively emphasised to a group of people their similarities in terms of their Islamic faith and consequently the idea that they constituted and deserved a separate territory, to then argue that religion was not to be a significant part of state identity\(^\text{35}\). Ziring’s (1997:98) perspective on this is that Jinnah had devoted all his energies towards convincing the British Raj that a sovereign Muslim state within the subcontinent was desirable and entirely feasible. However, he further notes that,

\[\text{neither Jinnah nor any of his immediate circle was moved to lay out on paper the blueprint for the state they intended to create… [T]here is nothing in the archives to even hint that someone was responsible for defining the nature and structure of the state, its purposes and functions, its powers and limitations.}\]

There seems to have been little preparation in terms of thinking and working on the Pakistan idea apart from wrestling it from the clutches of the Congress and the British. Having accomplished the task of partition in August of 1947, the leaders of

\(^{34}\) Although Jinnah did employ some level of religious rhetoric during the movement for Pakistan nevertheless he must be seen as having more secular leanings. His numerous speeches for instance indicate this disposition for e.g. see: Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (1989). *Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Speeches and Statements as Governor-General of Pakistan 1947-48*. Furthermore, on a personal level, he had been educated in the West and his wife belonged to the Parisi religious community of Bombay.

\(^{35}\) Shaikh (2009:43 - 44) for instance, has argued that Jinnah in using the notion of universal Islam to defeat tribal, racial and linguistic affiliations Jinnah pre-empted any understanding of the Pakistan as a sovereign political community.
the new state were wholly ‘unprepared for the ensuing responsibility that is, giving form and substance to what had been created’ (Ziring 1997:148).

The result of this gaping oversight was evident almost immediately when internal rebellions challenging the legitimacy and writ of the state began to emerge in various parts of the new country. On its western front for instance, the local leader of the North-Western Frontier Province (hereafter NWFP) Abdul Ghaffar Khan was unable to conceal his hostility to Pakistan and Mohammed Ali Jinnah and had refused to swear allegiance to Pakistan. Ziring (1997:85) notes that Ghaffar and his ‘Red Shirts’ organisation with a separate ‘Pakhtunistan’ in mind had laboured long before the formation of the Pakistan Movement to dislodge the British from the region…[A]nd just at the moment of realising their quest, their goal was snatched from their grasp by a relatively distinct Muslim League’. Moreover, in the same region Afghanistan openly refused to accept the dividing Durand line between it and Pakistan’s North-Western Frontier Province terming the border ‘imaginary’. Additionally in the geographically distant eastern wing of Pakistan (presently Bangladesh) a rebellion focussing on the imposition of Urdu as a national language demanded that the Bengali language be placed alongside Urdu as a national language (see Zaheer 1995). Jinnah however, was adamant that a common language was imperative to national unity36 – such an insistence however did not convince many of those in East Pakistan who viewed this as an imposition of Western Pakistan. In addition to unrest in the NWFP and Pakistan’s eastern wing the Muslim League leaders in Pakistan’s largest and relatively more prosperous province of Punjab also began showing strong

36 In March 1948, Jinnah told a public meeting in Dhaka that, ‘the state language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu….anyone who tries to mislead you is really an enemy of Pakistan’ (Dil 2000:82).
opposition to any central government which seemed to leave Punjab in a weak
position in relation to East Pakistan. In particular, this opposition was focussed on
the distribution of seats in the National Assembly, and since the majority of
Pakistani’s lived in the eastern wing a purely representative National Assembly
would mean that Bengal would enjoy more seats. The leaders in Punjab saw this as
relegating the status of their province and opposed any such plans.

It is relevant here to note that a ‘nation’ as differentiated from a ‘state’ requires a
strong sense of the Self as a separate entity (Anderson 1983). However, given that
the peoples habituating the territory of Pakistan were ethnically, linguistically and
often culturally dissimilar it is difficult to understand how Jinnah conceived that the
peoples of Pakistan would unproblematically become integrated. The population
consisted of a wide variety of ethnic and linguistic groups and sub-groups, which
have very little in common besides being Muslim. Moreover, apart from the two
official languages Urdu and English there were six or seven important regional
languages, Punjabi, Balochi, Sindhi, Pashto, Sairaiki, Bengali and perhaps a dozen
smaller local languages. Moreover, as Ziring (1997:201) notes,

[T]ribalism remained the defining feature of life in the Pathan and Baloch
areas, and even the people of the settled regions were inclined to follow local
personalities with habits and virtues much like their own’ even in Sindh and
Punjab biradari…caste, zamindar and wadera dominated the lives of the
population.
Pakistan, at its inception was thus an amalgam of diverse and disparate peoples. Since many of the peoples comprising the new ‘nation’ had long traditions of local rule; relinquishing local power to a central authority soon became a bitter pill to swallow.

3.3 Constructing nationalism: Employing Islam

Amidst the domestic chaos following the partition event, calls for an integrated Pakistani nation fell on deaf ears simply because there was very little that bound the population together. In the absence of a sense of nationalism, there was a dire need to integrate the diverse ethnic groups into a national community. Further, whilst this was a huge task in itself it was however, compounded by the untimely and early death of Jinnah whose towering personality held considerable sway over the populace. Pakistan’s lack of national identity was acute and Ziring (1997:184) notes those at the helm of national affairs quickly came to realise and were forced to acknowledge that,

[Jinnah’s] vision was too limited for the circumstances prevailing within the nation. In the end Pakistan’s sudden appearance as an independent state did not leave time to secure the meaning of nationhood among a far-flung, disparate, and largely uneducated population. The survival of the state rested on the belief that the central purpose of the nation was a common religious experience.
It is in this context that we need to view the ascendance of Islam as the primary identity of Pakistan, and which was clearly incorporated in the Objectives resolution of 1949\textsuperscript{37} which provided the blueprint for the future Pakistani constitution (see Khan 2001). The overt references to the official purpose and aim of the state being to build a ‘truly Islamic society’ was met with indignation by minority communities, who argued that such association between Pakistan and Islam went against the grain of Jinnah’s assertions. The ensuing disagreements led to the resignation of Pakistan’s Hindu Labour Minister and a close associate of Jinnah, J. N. Mandal\textsuperscript{38}. The incorporation of Islam in the Objectives Resolution was critical in that it paved the way for a later more vigorous association between religion and Pakistan. In the early years following partition, the political discourse in Pakistan began a focussed mission of emphasising the Islamic identity of the population and explicitly linking Islam with the purpose of the state.

From the very beginning there is no doubt that the project of constructing a Pakistani national identity involved the representation of India and Pakistan as binary opposites of each other. The political narrative espoused Pakistan as the smaller, Islamic nation threatened by the much larger, expansionist Hindu India who, on being dismembered by the creation of Pakistan, was unable to reconcile itself to the

\textsuperscript{37} The ‘Aims and Objectives of the Constitution’ popularly known as the Objectives Resolution laid the foundations for the future constitution of Pakistan and was important in the sense that it indicated the broad outline of the political philosophy of the government of Pakistan. For the full text of the Resolution see: The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, V. Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1964, p2.

\textsuperscript{38} Before his resignation over the content of the Objectives Resolution Mandal made an eloquent speech in defense of his views which can be seen as representative of the minorities in Pakistan. See: The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 9\textsuperscript{th} March 1949. Vol. V-1949, pp.2 -7.
division and hence sought to re-absorb Pakistan (Racine 2002). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the degree to which the Indian Other is ‘othered’ within Pakistan’s political discourse is comparatively less forceful than the intensity that was to follow in later years. Despite the bitterness of partition, Pakistan’s political discourse does not, from the outset, represent India as an overwhelmingly hostile entity. While there is a need to mark out and define Pakistan as different and separate from India; a reading of Pakistan’s political discourse clearly suggests that the political discourse, on the whole, does so without excessive pondering and preoccupation with India. Up and till the 1960s the political discourse does not suggest an aggressively negative portrayal of the Indian Other with Pakistani leaders more likely to focus on socio-economic development urging people to unite and work towards national development in addition to drawing on Islamic sentiments to build commonality. Furthermore, although the two-nation theory clearly advocated a communal division between the Hindus and Muslims presuming that each community was a homogenous entity nevertheless, it did not explicitly promote aggressively negative constructions of the Hindu Other or place it in a lower hierarchical position as compared to the Muslim Self. Arguably, the two-nation theory advocated distinct difference and not categories of the superior Self versus the

39 See for instance Racine, (2002) who argues that Pakistan has been unable to escape a preoccupation with India and thus has failed to construct a national identity independent of this ‘India syndrome’.


41 I argue that the negativity of the rhetoric involved in representing the Indian Other as inferior and alien in Pakistan’s political discourse intensified during and after the 1960s. For instance, if we compare representations of India in Pakistan’s political discourse from 1947 – up until the early 1960s with the political discourse from 1964 onwards, there is a marked difference in the frequency and negative portrayal of Hindu India in latter years. The argument here is that whilst such a theme has been more or less a permanent feature of Pakistan’s political discourse nevertheless, there is a marked difference in terms of the frequency with which it is employed after the mid-1960s.

42 See: Government of Pakistan, 1957.
inferior Other. Indeed for Jinnah, Pakistan’s creation signalled the preservation of Muslim heritage and culture in South Asia and the only requirement of Pakistani citizens was that they should demonstrate ‘unflinching loyalty to the State’ (Jinnah, October 11th, 1947).

However, this is not to say that there is a wholesale indifference to presenting the outside Other as hostile; in fact, Pakistan’s political discourse had always, to varying extents, employed anti-India sentiments to bolster it’s self image. The proposition is however, that there is marked difference in the intensity in which the Other is ‘othered’. Nevertheless, it became increasingly clear that an Islamic ideology on its own was proving to be unsuccessful in ensuring the construction of a ‘nation’. For instance, even ten years after partition internal rebellion both in the eastern and western wings of Pakistan had not subsided, but had become increasingly vociferous.

In October 1958 for instance, The Khan of Kalat, Mir Mohammed Yar Khan removing the Pakistani flag from the Miri fort in Baluchistan, hoisted his own ancestral flag in its place effectively signalling a break with the central government by inferring independence of his realm. Although this rebellion was quashed by the Pakistan army and followed by a military coup it did demonstrate the precarious condition of Pakistani nationalism. The new state leader, General Ayub, decided that a Pakistani national identity would take time to evolve and that in the meantime Pakistan was not ready for parliamentary politics but required martial law to bring stability and national survival (Ayub Khan 1967). In addition to domestic rebellions in its western unit the situation in Pakistan’s eastern wing became even more precarious during the 1960s with widespread riots. It became clear that an Islamic ideology was on its own failing to bind the population into a common nation. Faced
with such circumstances and an the apparent failure of Islam in providing national cohesion political leaders now increasingly relied on more vociferous representations of the Other as a hostile, inferior, expansionist and monolithically Hindu oppressor. A reading of the political discourse suggests a reorientation of focus amongst Pakistani leaders, and the argument here is that such representations are certainly not a natural outcome of inter-state relations rather this kind of a representation had a political function in its attempt to unite a Pakistani nation against a oppressive Hindu Other. Moreover, a discourse focussing on threat and security also worked to legitimise and pave the way for a strengthening of the military institution.

3.4 Constructing nationalism: The hostile (Indian) Other

It would be incomplete to leave out an analysis of the role that the populist leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (hereafter Z.A. Bhutto) played in establishing particular discursive practices in Pakistan’s political discourse. Bhutto’s rise in politics signalled a shift in the political discourse of Pakistan. Bhutto’s voluminous speeches and statements⁴³ are often intensely preoccupied with marking out and defining the Indian Other and indeed he initiates a far more intimate reliance of Pakistani nationalism on anti-India representations and particularly the perceived threat from India. This focus on Bhutto however does not suggest that he was the chief architect of the changing political discourse. Foucault for instance in his discussion of the origin of historical events and moments is extremely sceptical of such suggestions that historical events or ideas can have a singular point of origin. Instead, Foucault

argued that the emergence of ideas or representations was a momentary effect of the
play of dominations – that different ideas are always vying to become dominant and
that if one idea becomes dominant it is neither right nor wrong but as a result of its
momentary success in becoming dominant. For Foucault,

the accidents, the minute deviations…the errors, the false appraisals, and the
faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and
have value for us; it…discover[s] that truth or being do not lie at the root of
what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents (Foucault,
1977 in Smart 1985:56)\textsuperscript{44}.

However, the ascendance of Bhutto to helm of national affairs signalled a break with
past understandings and constructions of the Self and Other and it is really at this
point we find Pakistan’s political discourse beginning to construct the Other as
inferior and belligerent. Discursive practices thus in addition to vehemently drawing
on a nationalist Islamic narrative also begin to draw on a representation of the Other
as an intensely hostile, abnormal, aggressive, expansionist and a monolithically
Hindu entity who is by default opposed to the smaller Islamic state of Pakistan. An
analysis of the political discourse reveals a narrative that relies heavily on such
binary constructions. The Other is devoid of heterogeneity and defined primarily on
the basis of religious affiliation. General Ayub for instance argued that,

\textsuperscript{44}Though arguably this focus on ‘accidents’ is something a critical realist perspective would reject
since realist ontology suggests the existence of underlying mechanisms and structures which make it
more likely that certain representations emerge.
the Indian attitude can be explained in pathological terms. The Indian leaders have a deep hatred for Muslims…. [and] from the beginning India was determined to make things difficult for us (Ayub Khan, 1967 in Nizamani 2000:73)

Much of the discursive practices reveal a strong tendency to equate an ‘Indian mentality’ with that of a ‘Hindu mentality’. Moreover, heterogeneity is denied because if there is a ‘deep hatred for Muslims’ then India must be homogenously Hindu. This idea of the Hindu despising all that is Islamic is a recurrent theme reproduced at different institutional sites and a narrative that has remained consistent throughout much of Pakistan’s history. This kind of political rhetoric that emerged in Pakistan can only be understood if one takes into account the prevailing context in which the discourse is embedded. Domestically Pakistan faced arduous conditions in terms of national integration. East Pakistan in particular was a sticking point and an issue which challenged the very foundations upon which Pakistan was created. Given the unrest in Bengal it had perhaps become clear that Islam on its own could not sufficiently bind the Pakistani people under the banner of nation and nationalism, and it is within this context that negative constructions of the Other begin to assert their power. The political discourse begins to focus on the outside Other as the cause of domestic problems and dissent in the Bengal is portrayed as of Indian making in order to weaken Islamic Pakistan. The subsequent truncation of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh was much more than a military success on the part of India, indeed the loss of East Pakistan was a significant psychological blow to Pakistan especially since it gave strength to India’s vocal insistence that the ‘two-nation’ ideology had weak and false foundations. In Pakistan, the political discourse viewed
the loss not as an outcome of the shaky foundations of the two-nation theory but as a vengeful attack by India in its determination to demonstrate the invalidity of the theory and thus the existence of Pakistan. The separation of East Pakistan was represented as a deliberate and vengeful attack on Pakistan’s existence and a demonstration of the notion that India has not fully reconciled itself to the event of partition.

Although there is a wealth of historical data available that can explicitly demonstrate this point Z. A. Bhutto 1969 ‘The Myth of Independence’ provides an excellent synopsis of the kind of political representations cultivated by the discourse and gives a ‘feel’ for the kind of characterisations associated with the Other. An extract from this text is cited below.

A life-long observation has convinced me that there is a streak of insanity in the Hindu’s and that nobody will arrive at correct appraisement of Hindu private and public behaviour on the supposition that they have a normal personality. This madness lurks within their ordinary workday self like a monomania, and the nature of the alienation can even be defined in the psychiatrist’s terms- it is partly dementia praecox, and partly paranoia. In all Hindu activities, especially in the public sphere, can be detected clear signs of either a feebleness of mental faculties or a pervasion of them.... (Bhutto 1969:126-128).
through the period of Muslim domination, the Hindu exhibited an intense pride of race and culture, which developed into violent xenophobia. All the fear and hatred associated with the Malech – the unclean and uncivilised foreigner – were invoked in the struggle against the Muslim alien. Even when the Muslims sought compromise…they could not be accepted as equals because the faith of Islam was a challenge to the fundamental concept of the Hindu dogma.…fed on centuries of hatred, their sense of injury received at Muslim hands reinforced by religious dogma, all Hindu movements have conceived the assimilation of the Muslim minority as part of their political agenda; differing only as to their method.…Gandhi’s methods were more subtle. He frequently spoke of Muslims as blood-brothers and held out innumerable assurance that their rights would be safeguarded; but whenever called upon to define their rights and share of political power in an independent India, he invariably evaded a clear answer (Bhutto 1969:126-128).

The Hindu is endlessly demonised and vilified as being ‘evil’ in much of the official discourse and the extract above demonstrates the kind of characterisations cultivated. Firstly, the Hindu ‘Other’ is regularly assigned to the category ‘madness’ or ‘psychologically ill’; this is a powerful way of dismissing and belittling the Other’s political world-view and statements as a product of a diseased mind. Indeed here there is reference to the way in which such a characterisation holds the authority of ‘truth’ since this conclusion has been arrived at following a ‘life-long observation’. This is a repetitive theme which provides the basis from which the category ‘Other’ is further developed. Another significant and pervasive construction of the Hindu ‘Other’ is that the prime motivation is an intense hatred of Islam and therefore this
'Other’ cannot be put in the category of rationally calculating political actor. This depiction of motivation serves two purposes in that one the one hand it de-legitimises the ‘Others’ actions since they are not about ideology or foreign policy but about irrational hatred and on the other hand this characterisation highlights the difference between ‘them’ and ‘us’ i.e. ‘us’ being the diametric opposite of ‘irrational’. So that even when we propose rational actions such as compromise ‘...[the Muslims] could not be accepted as equals because the faith of Islam was a challenge to the fundamental concept of the Hindu dogma’.\(^{45}\) The Hindu religion itself is characterised as the foundation which promotes irrationality and madness leading to intense hatred and the wider implication here is that as long as they attach themselves to their religion Hindu’s will by default display such tendencies, note ‘all Hindu movements have conceived the assimilation of the Muslim minority’.

Such dichotomising and binary discursive categorisations are a pervasive historical feature with characterisations seeking to essentialise, dehumanise and demonise the Hindu Other thus institutionalising an environment in which intense dehumanisation of the Other is normalised. There is no doubt that such narratives serve precise political functions in that they moralise the opposition to the Other by transforming it as a conflict between good and evil, After all, as Der Derian (2002) cited by Jackson (2005:60) notes, ‘[P]eople go to war because of how they see, perceive, picture, imagine, and speak of others; that is, how they construct the difference of others as well as the sameness of themselves through representation’. Secondly, the

\(^{45}\) The narrative of the superiority of Islam over Hinduism was bolstered by a pervasive narrative which firmly projects onto the collective memory the proposition that Muslim rule in subcontinent as represented by the Mughal empire (1550-1857) as the regions greatest period of rule and prosperity.
construction is clearly part of a representational project in which not only are boundaries drawn between ‘them’ and ‘us’ but qualities of each are also affirmed. Differences are discursively interpreted as radical constructions of otherness; however, it is also important to note that such national narratives focusing on difference and the articulation of a security discourse have been critical in terms of constructing the Pakistani nation, conceived here as are all other nations, imagined communities.

3.5 Political turbulence: Oscillating between military rule and democracy

General Zia-Ul-Haq came to power through the overthrowing of Z. A. Bhutto who, although a popular prime minister, had been accused of rigging the 1977 elections. Opposition parties, including the religious right, came out on to streets in protest against Bhutto calling for the army to step in. Z. A. Bhutto was subsequently hanged by General Zia coupled with a number of other punitive measures such as the quashing of all political opposition, a crackdown on public protest and draconian media censorship. What is significant about Zia’s tenure is that the extent to which an Islamic ideology was employed to enable and legitimise the state apparatus. Siddiqua (2007:84) notes that the, alliance with the religious parties and propagation of Islamic culture were meant to establish the military hegemony over the civil society. The creation of the office of ‘nazim-e-salaat’ (controller of prayers), and the introduction of
Sharia law and Islamic banking in the mid 1980s, were some of the tools used to fight the secular image of Bhutto’s party. These measures gave the military dictatorship a symbolic legitimacy.

Whilst the twin themes of an Indian other and an Islamic identity are constant within the discourse and occur simultaneously it is possible to argue that there is a qualitative difference between the discursive economies of Bhutto and Zia. Whilst Bhutto focussed on a more pronounced emphasis of a hostile Indian Other in order to consolidate the national self; the political discourse following the 1977 coup although continuing to focus on the Indian Other also began a renewed and aggressive use of Islamic discourse⁴⁶.

In the backdrop of the Iranian Islamic revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan General Zia set out on an explicit programme to systematically Islamize Pakistani social structures and institutions. Pakistan was introduced to a zealous Islamisation involving, amongst other measures, the establishment of the clergy as an arm of the state and the establishment of hundred’s of madrassas financed mainly by the conservative Saudi government to educate the poor. In this context it is now widely established that these madrassas were also, at the time, a

⁴⁶ While it is clear that Zia-Ul-Haq was involved in bringing a more pronounced Islamic character to Pakistan’s political discourse and indeed the wider literature documents how Zia-Ul-Haq employed Islamic justification for his policy choices. Indeed an extended discursive analysis of the Zia-Ul-Haq years would certainly reveal the discursive strategies used to enable and constrain world-views however, what is less studied is why this happened, why did Zia-Ul-Haq employ Islamic terminology? I am inclined to argue that while there is a clear political function of the language, General Zia was also religiously inclined man, and as Stephen Cohen (1984) has argued, so is much of the army. Most of its recruits tend to be drawn from the lower and middle classes who Cohen argues are more likely to be religiously inclined than Pakistan’s elites. A critical realist perspective on studying the discursive realm is more geared to exploring such questions around why this discourse as opposed to other alternatives.
source of ‘legitimate’ Islamic mujahideen who were in the game of assisting US strategic interests in ousting the Soviets from Afghanistan. It would be correct to say that large sums of money originating from the CIA and Saudi Arabia were involved in promoting a particular kind of combative Islam. For Nizamani (2000:100), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 enabled an increased potency to Pakistan’s security narrative through the invoking of ‘images of a Pakistan sandwiched between hegemonic Hindu India and expansionist communist Russia’ and specifically through this narrative General Zia was able to take political actions such as the delaying of elections. The argument was that national security had precedence over the electoral process and General Zia ultimately declared in September 1979 that, ‘the security and solidarity of the country and the protection of Islamic ideology in any case was much more important than plunging the national into the electoral exercise’\(^47\). In essence then, the representation of Pakistan as sandwiched between two threats enabled the political discourse to articulate the electoral process as an opposite of Pakistan’s security (Nizamani 2000). Moreover, this notion of danger also legitimised defence expenditure indeed General Zia told the Pakistani population to, ‘not grudge defence allocations…as no price is too big for national independence’\(^48\). For Nizamani (2000) the pursuit of nuclear technology was buttressed by this security discourse within the within the wider political culture. Islamic imagery was frequently deployed to justify state action and policy ranging from authoritarian regimes, allocation of funds for the military and acquisition of nuclear technology. Indeed any major policy change or pursuit often intimately fused the policy with Islamic discourse to justify it. The nuclear narrative for instance employed Islam in the sense that it justified and legitimised Pakistan’s nuclear acquisition and capability

\(^47\) Dawn, September 27, 1979.
\(^48\) Dawn, August 11\(^{th}\), 1988.
by representing it as an Islamic shield against those opposed to Islam. Similarly, Pakistan’s decision to co-operate with the US in Afghanistan during the 1980s drew on notions of an ‘Islamic jihad’ to legitimise the alliance. However, as the analysis demonstrated the secession of the Eastern half of Pakistan in 1971 dealt a serious blow to the role of Islam as a unifying factor for the country and following this the political elite in Pakistan began to articulate a more nuanced emphasis on the role and purpose of India vis-à-vis Pakistan. Indeed the widespread political articulation of the negative and inferior representation of the Indian Other began to emerge more aggressively following the break-up of Pakistan in 1971.

3.6 Pakistan’s military elite

The kind of narratives and recurrent themes in Pakistan’s political discourse converging around a ‘security’ theme\(^49\) had a particular effect on the organisation of political space in that they enabled the entrenchment of the military institution in Pakistan’s political process (Askari-Rizvi 2000, Cheema 2002, Cohen 1984, Nawaz 2008). Consequently, successive military regimes were legitimately able to undermine the growth of civilian political institutions by putting the military institution in a favourable position with regard to policy formulation (Waseem 2002).

\(^49\) David Campbell (1992) has argued that security discourses actually *constitute* the state, what he means by this is: that the state as a distinguishable entity only know who and what it is through articulating external threats and radical Other/s which is tremendously important for maintaining the internal/external, foreign/domestic, Self/Other boundaries that define the limits of the national group. Such a proposition does not deny the importance of security rather it draws analytical attention to the notion that in order for something or someone to become a question of security it needs to be first constructed as such in the political discourse or in Ole Waever’s terminology it needs to be *securitized*. From a social constructionist perspective it is important to embed the concept of security within its historical and discursive specificity.
There was a deep sense of insecurity that infested the Pakistani state after its birth in 1947 and the armed forces as the guardian of the state compensated for this insecurity. From a discourse analysis perspective any kind of hegemony requires discursive articulation or a ‘regime of truth’ which justifies and legitimises social dominance. In this respect, Pakistan’s security discourse whilst focussed on articulating ‘threat’ ensured the social dominance of the military establishment and their ascendance into an epistemic community described by Haas (1992) as a network of elites that play a central role in defining state identity, purpose and policy. Moreover, this special status afforded to the military establishment by the pervasive security discourse had the effect that the military was able to enjoy enormous social power in terms of defining and ‘framing’ national issues.

However, more than being promoted to being a depository of knowledge Siddiqua (2007:248) in her analysis of Pakistan’s military economy has argued that the military institution, over time, graduated from drawing limited resources from an annual defence allocation into a ‘burgeoning economic enterprise’. Siddiqua documents the entrenchment of the armed forces in Pakistan’s economy to the extent that the country’s main assets and companies were subsequently concentrated in the hands of a small minority of senior army officials. This economic power established the military as a substantially autonomous institution which was deeply interested in Pakistan’s political process since it has a huge stake in maintaining the advantageous status quo. In exploring the dominance of an epistemic community Haas (1992:27) further observes that the power of an epistemic community can be compounded by its ‘political infiltration…into governing institutions which [then] lays the groundwork for a broader acceptance of the community’s beliefs and ideas about the
proper construction of social reality’. Arguably then the military’s interference in
Pakistan’s political process and the its hindrance to the development of civil and
political institutions makes sense if the aim is to ensure the military’s social and
economic power in Pakistan, and therefore it follows that a discourse focussing on
security and threat is best suited to maintaining and justifying such dominance. The
suggestion here is that, as Pakistan’s military became more and more involved in
building an economic empire it also began to rely much more on articulating binary
categorisations in order for institutional survival. Access to modes of communication
is thus an extremely important power resource since it allowed the military to
articulate a discourse that elevated the institution to a position whereby any critique
of it was represented as synonymous with treachery. Indeed this representation of the
role of the military in Pakistan is so strong and ingrained that even today critique is
often guarded.

3.7 The absence of an Islamic revolution in Pakistan

However, what is peculiar in this context is that despite Pakistan’s intimate and
perhaps necessary reliance on an Islamic inspiration; arguably, Pakistan as a nation-
state has historically never resorted to religious revolution along the lines of Iran nor
has any fanatically religious political world-view ever gained substantial ground
politically. The Pakistani social fabric is largely moderate in religious terms.
LaFrance (2002), accounts for this by drawing on a historical analysis noting that
Islam was propagated in the sub-continent through Sufis whose teachings focussed
on tolerance and co-existence. The Sufist mode of disseminating Islam heavily
involved music and was certainly not combative. Sufis are highly revered in Pakistan and during the annual ‘urs’ or death anniversary of any Sufi, people in large numbers throng to sufi shrines throughout the country. Secondly, LaFrance argues that by and large the ruling elite of Pakistan including the founder of Pakistan Mohammed Ali Jinnah have belonged to the Aligarh school of thought characterised by their openness to modern scientific and technological developments. Indeed even the Jamaat-i-Islami, the largest religious political party in Pakistan ascribe to the Aligarh school of thought. Thirdly, Jaffrelot (2002) suggests that Muslim nationalism, as a historical phenomena, in the Sub-continent cannot be traced to any primordial essence; instead elite Muslims of united India fearing shifts in the status quo which seemed to disadvantage them began a process of deliberate Muslim mobilisation using identity markers such as Islam and the Urdu language. For Jaffrelot, Muslim nationalism in the sub-continent never had deep roots and was territorially confined to Northern India. This observation is particularly relevant since it seems to explain, albeit in part, the reason why an Islamic identity was not a natural or deeply embedded identity marker for Pakistan’s population. The secession of Pakistan’s

---

50 Those adhering to Wahhibism, an ultra-conservative and orthodox Sunni sect predominately associated with Muslims in Saudi Arabia reject and even declare as ‘non-Muslims’ those who revere saints and Sufi’s as traditionally done in Pakistan. It is relevant that Persian Gulf oil wealth has been involved in propagating the spread of Wahhibist idea’s in the Muslim world and particularly in Pakistan.

51 Aligarh Muslim University was set by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan following the Indian war of independence in 1857. The purpose of this institution was to disseminate the English language and ‘western sciences’ to the community. The establishment of the university is significant since at the time there was intense opposition to the British Raj in India and their replacement of the Persian language with English as the official language of the courts of law. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan however, was of the view that proficiency in the English language and a modern education were critical if the Muslim community was to improve their standing in colonial India. Over the years the Aligarh Muslim University gave rise to a new educated class of Muslim who were not only active in the political system of the British Raj but also served as a catalyst for change in the subcontinent culminating in the independence of India from the British. The Aligarh school of thought was known for its openness to modern scientific and technological education and western thought in general. Some of its notable alumni include Mohammed Ali Jinnah (founder of Pakistan), Sheikh Abdullah (Prime minister and chief minister of Indian Kashmir), Khawaja Nazimuddin (former prime minister of Pakistan).
eastern wing clearly demonstrated the limits of an Islamic ideology as the sole binder of the ‘nation’.

3.8 A decade of isolation from the international community

Although the death of General Zia-Ul-Haq in an airplane crash brought an abrupt end to direct military rule in Pakistan and ushered in the election of 1988 nevertheless it would be incorrect to suggest that this signalled the end of military interference; rather, the method of political infiltration became indirect but no less pervasive (Cohen 2005). From 1988 to 1999 Pakistan was, on the surface, ruled by democratically elected governments although the political situation remained intensely unstable owing to fact that during these ten years alone Pakistanis witnessed eight different prime ministers. Arguably the main reason for such a high turnover can be laid at the door of the military who as Siddiqua (2007:91) notes was the, ‘the ultimate arbiter’ and ‘tweaked the political system every two years, especially when it saw the civilian regime challenging the defence establishment’s authority, or it perceived a sustentative threat to the polity’. However, significant to our analysis here, is that there is a consistency in terms of the themes dominating the political discursive space. In the run up to the 1988 elections for instance, Nawaz Sharif leader of the newly formed political party IJI52 vociferously and explicitly accused the leadership of the opposing political party the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) of colluding with Jewish and Hindu lobbies with the object of being to install a

52 Islami Jahoori Ittehad translates as :Islamic Democratic Alliance.
government in Islamabad that suited their ‘designs’\(^53\). Historically Pakistan’s political discourse despite witnessing a tirade of different statesmen and women had remained consistent in one sense in that India and Islam have remained dominant themes throughout varying only in terms of emphasis at different historical conjectures.

However, on the international front during the 1990s, Pakistan became increasingly isolated and towards the end of the decade Pakistan was being termed a pariah state. The reason for this isolation was twofold, in the first instance, this related to Pakistan’s particular relationship with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan; Pakistan, in addition to Saudi Arabia had been one of the only states in the world to recognise the Taliban. The reasons for this support were less concerned with a recognition of the ‘legitimacy’ of the Taliban and had more to do with Pakistan’s interest in having a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan. It is important to contextualise such a strategy, in the fact that Pakistan is located in a ‘dangerous neighbourhood’ bordering India on the east, China on the North and Afghanistan and Iran on the west. As result of the perception of potential threats on all sides, Pakistan has always been interested in having a friendly government in Kabul and has repeatedly gotten involved in Afghanistan to ensure such a scenario. However, the chaos that engulfed Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal and subsequent US rebuffing led to Pakistan’s decision to take the militant Islamic student movement, the Taliban under its wing (see for e.g. Roy 2002, Mir 2009)). Pakistan’s inter-services Intelligence Agency (ISI) guided, armed and helped recruit new members and provided them with training and battle plans that they used to take over most of Afghanistan in the

\(^{53}\) Dawn, November 2\(^{nd}\) 1988.
1990s. Furthermore, it is also pertinent to note that following the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan the US effectively ditched Pakistan since it was no longer of any strategic use to the US. Only a year after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the US imposed various US economic and military sanctions on Pakistan the first of which was the Pressler Amendment of 1990 relating to non-proliferation.54 Moreover, India’s growing economic might and leverage prompted the US to begin repairing some of the damage done to US-India relations during the cold-war standoff. In such a scenario, Pakistan was adamant in ensuring that a pro-Pakistan government was in place in Kabul.

Secondly, Pakistan’s nuclear tests in the spring of 1998, which had followed those of India’s in the same month, prompted international condemnation and further US sanctions. During the following summer, Osama Bin Laden was implicated in the terrorist attacks on US embassies in Dar-e-Salaam and Nairobi such events further tarnished the image of Pakistan since the Taliban confessed to being the protectors of the Saudi millionaire and since Pakistan recognised the Taliban regime then this implicitly implied that they also supported the attacks (see Shaikh 2009:198). The Taliban, by this stage, had become notorious on the world stage and in addition to the accusation of harbouring Islamic militant groups their discriminatory policies targeting women became the subject of much international condemnation.55 Finally, Musharraf’s coup of October 1999 contributed to international isolation and prompted the expulsion from the Commonwealth and yet again more sanctions. The extent to which Pakistan had become a ‘pariah’ can be gauged from the fact that in

2000 Bill Clinton on his visit to India, which was significant in the sense that it was the first in twenty-two years, spent five days in India and then immediately flying to Pakistan spent a total of 5 hours in the country. Thus Pakistan during the 1990s and into the new millennium underwent a kind of international scrutiny and condemnation not experienced before, and which was primarily driven by its association with the Taliban regime coupled with its murky role in nuclear acquisition and proliferation.

3.9 The Taliban connection

It is important to immediately clarify that Pakistan’s policy of support for the fanatical regime had less to do with the Taliban’s alleged ‘Islamic’ credentials and had more to do with a long-standing Pakistani policy to provide ‘strategic depth’ on its western border. If we recall, Pakistan is flanked by a hostile neighbour on its eastern front in the form of India. Pakistan’s insecurity dilemma vis-à-vis India has played a central role throughout its existence to the extent that Pakistani leaders have always been interested in securing support from the state on its western side i.e. Afghanistan. Of course, if Pakistan is continually engaged in belligerency with India the last thing it needs is conflict with Afghanistan on its western borders. As a result, Afghanistan has been continually courted by Pakistan albeit rather unsuccessfully. This is because from the very beginning of Pakistan’s inception Afghan leaders had refused to accept the legality of the Durand line or the demarcation of Pakistan’s
borders with Afghanistan and which was sponsored by the British Raj in 1947. Such was the intensity of feeling that Afghanistan was the only state in the world to oppose Pakistan’s admission into the United Nations in 1947 on the basis that it refused to recognise the territorial agreements reached with the British.

Pakistan and Afghanistan are inextricably linked, and share an immense border of 2430 km with the Afghan provinces of Badakhshan, Nurestan, Kona, Nangarhar, Patika, Zabul, Khandhar, Helamand and Nimruz adjacent to the Pakistani border; which cuts through sandy deserts in the south to rugged and difficult mountain terrain in the North. Both sides of this border is populated by ethnic Pakhtun’s who having tribal and family connections have historically moved back and forth without much regard for state boundaries. Following Pakistan’s creation, Kabul began a sustained effort to extend support to Pakhtun and Baloch nationalists inside of Pakistan and supported calls for the creation of a new state called ‘Pakhunistan’. For Pakistani leaders, Kabul’s covert and overt foreign policy objective was abhorrent considering its own efforts at integrating Pakistan’s population into one unit. Arguably, this remained a consistent Afghan policy and in his speech at the UN in 1972 Afghanistan’s foreign minister reiterated this when he argued that the ‘inclusion of NWFP and Balochistan in Pakistan in 1947 constituted a violation of Pakhtuns’ right of self-determination, and areas which were never part of undivided India were included in the new state’ (Jillani 2001:378-9). Flanked by a much stronger and hostile India on its eastern border, Pakistan consequently became increasingly interested in the installation of a ‘friendly’ government in Kabul in order

---

56 The border between the Afghanistan and British India was agreed to in 1893. This agreement took place between the Emir of Afghanistan Abdul Rehman Khan and the British Government of India.  
57 Also referred to as ‘Pashtun’s’ in the literature.
to defuse potential threat from Afghanistan; which led directly to attempts to influence Afghan internal affairs. This is really the gist of Pakistan’s involvement and interest in Afghanistan.

Despite Pakistan’s attempts at courting Afghanistan, the Afghan government instead sought to develop friendly and cordial relations with India, and consequently these developments caused much alarm for Pakistan. During the Cold War, India had unofficially aligned itself with the Soviet bloc whilst Pakistan on its part was the bulwark of the US in the region; however, what became even more alarming was the communist character emerging in Afghan politics. Since the communists were pro-India, such a turn of events in Afghanistan was unsavoury for the leaders of Pakistan. Indeed, in April of 1978 the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) successfully staged a Communist coup overthrowing president Daud’s government who was by no means pro-Pakistan but had begun to make friendly gestures. It has been estimated that at least 350 Soviet ‘advisors’ were present in Afghanistan at the time to ensure a swift and unproblematic Communist ‘revolution’ (Jillani 2001). This state of Afghan affairs was problematic for Pakistan because of India’s alignment with the Communist bloc and the Soviet pro-Indian policy in general. Consequently, Pakistan’s policy of influence resorted to supporting dissident Islamic elements within Afghanistan who opposed the ruling communist government.
The Soviet invasion\textsuperscript{58} of Afghanistan in 1979 proved critical in the bolstering of support for Islamic dissidents when the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) calculated that it had an ally in the form of the Muslim dissidents who could be used by the US to avert Soviet expansion in the region. Consequently, the CIA began to pour huge funds into the recruitment, training and arming of these Islamic mujahideen (soldiers). These funds were covertly channelled through Pakistan, and its Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) decided which group of mujahideen were to receive the bulk of US funds\textsuperscript{59}. This strategy was acceptable to Pakistan since it afforded the Pakistani state significant influence in Afghanistan. Thus, over the period of 10 years, Pakistan’s ISI worked in close collaboration with the Afghan mujahideen to avert Soviet expansion, and this ultimately led to the cultivation of close links between the ISI and the Mujahideen. In 1989, following the Soviet withdrawal the US having served its interests in the region also made a quick retreat leaving behind Afghanistan, which was by now, a wretchedly poor and unstable country ‘armed to the teeth with the most sophisticated weapons and torn apart by warlords’ (Musharraf 2006). With reference to the role of the ‘allies’, which included Pakistan, the United States and Saudi Arabia Musharraf (2006:208) notes that,

we helped create the mujahideen, fired them with religious zeal in seminaries, armed them, paid them, fed them, and sent then to a jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. We did not stop to think how we would divert them to productive life after the jihad was won.

\textsuperscript{58} The Soviet invasion was designed to support the Communist government in Afghanistan who had sought help from the Soviets against the Islamic Mujahideen resistance.

Consequently, and very soon after the end of the Cold War, Afghanistan spiralled into a brutal civil conflict between competing warlords. Pakistan had its own problems, not least the influx of 4.5 million Afghan refugees that had poured into the country during the Soviet invasion, but also the huge influx of arms and illegal drugs into the country. Moreover, its continued belligerent engagement with India meant that a pro-Pakistan Afghan leadership remained a vital source of strategic depth in the eyes of the Pakistani establishment, well into the 1990s. During this time, for Pakistan, the Taliban (literally translated as ‘the students’) posed to be the best pro-Pakistan group who would not stoke Pakhtun and Baloch ethno-nationalist sentiment in Pakistan and secondly would not dispute the Durand line. Thus in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the official policy of Pakistan had been to support the ascendancy of the Taliban in Afghanistan as opposed to the Tajik dominated and Indian-backed Northern Alliance. The Taliban regime propagating its own bizarre interpretation of Islam was subjected to extreme criticism from the international community prompting its non-recognition in the international arena. However, it is important to note that Pakistan’s Afghan policy largely emerged in the context of its insecurity dilemma vis-à-vis India. As such, its support for the Islamic mujahideen and subsequently the Taliban must be seen as a strategic interest rather than an ideological commitment.
3.10 Pakistan’s response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11

In September of 2001, and in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States, Pakistan decided to allow the US the use of airbases in Jacobabad in Sindh province and Shamsi in Balochistan to be used by American forces as recovery facilities during military strikes. By early October news reports noted that ‘a small contingent of US forces has already arrived at these facilities and arrangements were underway to make them operational’\(^{60}\). Officially, these airbases were to only provide ‘logistical support’ rather than be employed as bases from which to launch military strikes inside Afghanistan. Instead, American and British warships lying off of Pakistan’s coast were used to launch aircraft and missiles over Pakistani airspace and into Afghanistan (Synnott 2009). Pakistan’s military and other agencies also played an important role in providing intelligence and support to US forces inside Afghanistan and along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in terms of military targeting. Over the preceding years, while the West had disengaged with Afghanistan following the expulsion of the Soviets in 1989 Pakistan’s ISI, on the other hand, had continually been involved in the region. Consequently, the ISI had considerable expertise extending not only to names of militants and their organisations but also a deep understanding of the political power play among groups and their various factions (ibid). This information and insight was vital to the US operation in the region. Pakistan further co-operated with the US in terms of capturing hundreds of al-Qaeda members, associates and facilitators and handing them over to the US.

This joint military co-operation with the US was a direct result of Pakistan’s decision to join the international coalition against al-Qaeda and their Afghan-based Taliban hosts, but more significantly it signalled a decisive and abrupt shift in Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy discourses. This is because in the period prior to the terrorist attacks on American soil, the Pakistani government had remained one of the strongest allies of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and had helped the group consolidate power from the mid-1990s onwards. Although this foreign policy invited much criticism from the international community; nevertheless, Pakistan could not be convinced to abandon support. Of course, supporting the Taliban was justified domestically along the lines of an argument that posited that although the Taliban were perhaps fanatical and over zealous; nevertheless they remained ‘Muslim’. What is interesting however, in this context is the abruptness with which official policy discourse was altered in the aftermath of September 2001, and the subsequent opening up of Pakistan airspace and airbases to US military operations. This point will be taken up further in the thesis; the argument will suggest that much discursive work was required in order to legitimise and justify such an abrupt policy reversal.

3.11 Pakistan: A critical appraisal of the literature

As the introduction to this research project indicated there has, following the commencement of the US-led ‘war on terror’, been an explosion of literature examining an array of issues ranging from varying notions of an extension of US
imperialism\textsuperscript{61}, to concerns regarding the possibilities of an Islamist takeover of Pakistan’s nuclear technology\textsuperscript{62}. Much has been written about various facets concerning Pakistan and its relationship to the ‘war on terror’. It is possible to arbitrarily divide this literature broadly into three groups each of which, in important ways, highlights different nuances of the ‘problem-field’ depending on the specific approach taken to the subject-area. In the first instance, and by far the most abundant is the broadly realist-inspired literature which implicitly and exclusively comprehends Pakistan’s relationship to the war on terror wholly within a uni-polar word environment. Many writers in this mould explain Pakistan’s willingness to join the international coalition against Al-Qaeda and their Taliban hosts as a direct outcome of a ‘carrots and stick’ scenario in which the US holds the stick. Hilary Synnott (2009:63) for instance writes that, ‘Musharraf, who having “war-gamed” the possibility of having the US as an adversary, immediately came up with the only possible response: to join the coalition in the so-called ‘global war on terror’. Similarly, Jones and Shaikh (2006:2) write that, ‘Musharraf made a snap decision: Washington would get what it wanted’. Ali (2008:146) goes even further writing that,

\textsuperscript{61} See for instance, Chomsky (2007:87), Sotiris and Spyros (2008), Rockmore (2004), Stokes (2005). See also Igantieff, M. Professor of Human Rights Policy at the Kennedy School of Government who, writing in 2002, in the \textit{New York Times} and referring to US operations in Afghanistan writes that: ‘Yet the Special Forces aren’t social workers. They are an imperial detachment, advancing American power and interests in Central Asia. Call it peace-keeping or nation-building, call it what you like—imperial policing is what is going on in Mazar. In fact, America’s entire war on terror is an exercise in imperialism. But what else can you call America’s legions of soldiers, spooks and Special Forces straddling the globe?’ Alternatively other writers conceptualise America as a ‘reluctant’ power and welcome US ‘benign’ imperialism – see for instance Mallaby (2002).

Armitage handed the ISI boss a seven-point list of U.S. requirements from Pakistan for waging the coming war in Afghanistan. Without even looking closely at the printed sheet, Mahmud Ahmad put it in his pocket and said he accepted everything.

Here, the analysis hinges on a simple observation concerning the primacy of the US in the international system and resultant behaviour of states as being in line with the realist conception of ‘state survival’. Whilst many writers tend to exclude a broader acknowledgement of the global coalition that sprung into existence following 9/11; some analysts add more ‘context’ to this oversimplification. For instance, Rizvi (2004) notes that many western states, in addition to China as well as Russia, were in favour of US measures to counteract terrorism; moreover, the UN General Assembly itself condemning the terrorist attack on US soil called upon members to join the global effort. It is within this context that Rizvi (2004:24) explains Pakistan’s decision arguing that, “[Pakistan] sensing the mood of the international community” as well as the UN General Assembly resolutions decided that inclusion in a coalition partnership would help protect Pakistan’s major strategic interests.

Although Hillary Synnott’s analysis is geared towards providing a prescriptive model, or an action plan to those in the West whose interests are tied up with Pakistan; nevertheless, he provides a particularly comprehensive overview of the volatile situation in Pakistan and particularly the dilemmas it faces. This is a

---

63 Ali (2008:195) writes an interesting account of Pakistan’s dependence on America. He argues that the US used its position as a ‘paymaster’ to ensure policy in Pakistan is always orientated towards US interests and notes that early on ‘the new rules of Pakistan developed an early communal awareness that to survive they had to rent their country...there was only one possible buyer’ [the US].
refreshing and holistic analysis describing the historical and political background to
the current turmoil, and challenges faced by Pakistan. Synott’s contribution can be
contrasted to other writers who seem increasingly concerned with elucidating
Pakistan’s ‘genuineness’ in terms of commitment to the coalition effort. Hadar
(2002:1) for instance is principally concerned with ‘truth’ evaluations leading to the
conclusion that: Pakistan is an insincere US ally in the sense that it is ‘not doing
enough’. Hadar, in focusing on monetary funds provided by the US to fight its war
in the region argues that,

Americans should not be required to “reward” Pakistan for taking steps that are
in its own interest, such as reforming its political and economic system, ending
anti-American and anti-Semitic propaganda, arresting terrorists or reducing
tensions with India….By permitting Islamabad to “wag” Washington and
squeeze rewards from it, Washington has helped to prop up one of the world’s
most anti-American states.

This line of reasoning is US-centric, and unlike Synnott fails to take into account the
nuances of the historic relationship between the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan.64
However, such academic incursions into evaluating ‘truth’ and ‘genuineness’ reflects
a general pattern in the post-9/11 US-Pakistan relationship where, for instance, the
head of US spying operations John Negroponte65 claimed that (despite provision of
US funds) al-Qaeda were strengthening their foothold in Pakistan. On the Pakistani

64 See also, ‘Pakistan: Friend or foe?’ in Los Angeles Times September 5th 2006 available at
65 See BBC report Friday 12th January 2007,
side, rejecting these comments, Pakistan’s foreign office spokeswomen insisted that ‘Pakistan does not provide a secure hideout to al-Qaeda or any terrorist group…in fact the only country that has been instrumental in breaking the back of al-Qaeda is Pakistan’ (ibid). Although Hadar’s analysis represents a particularly blunt and crude way of approaching Pakistan’s relationship with the US and its ‘war on terror’ it is notable that many more ‘polite’ analyses tend to also focus their energies on precisely this issue which involves quantitatively investigating ‘outputs’ in relation to ‘funds given’.

Further still, other writers and academics are concerned with positing analyses that relay immense threat of either an Islamist takeover of Pakistan or an immanent threat of ‘state failure’. Kfir (2007) for instance argues that, ‘Pakistan is a weak state, bordering on failure…the longer Pakistan remains in this vulnerable position, the more powerful the Islamists will become’. In this context, often there is the suggestion that given this threat of ‘failure’ the notion of nuclear acquisition by terrorist groups is realisable. Consequently, many analysts engage with exploring the reliability of the protections and other safety measures Pakistan has in place in order to ensure that its nuclear technology is not transferred either through collaboration or through a (possible) takeover by terrorist groups. Still, others have disregarded such concerns (Khan 2009:13) and the idea of an Islamist take-over (Synott 2009b). Writing in 2006, and before Musharraf’s ousting from power, Grare (2006:1) argued that the risk of a Islamist takeover in Pakistan was a myth to ensure institutional supremacy of the army; he writes that, ‘what the West perceives as a threat to the regime in Pakistan are manifestations of the Pakistani Army’s tactics to maintain political control’.
Often this idea of an ‘Islamist takeover’ within the literature is often premised on the somewhat implicit notion that Pakistani’s are inherently anti-American and are open to an Islamist government. Arguably, such a notion blurs important context in the sense that it fails to recognise or emphasise that Pakistani’s on the whole are not ideologically anti-American but rather the anti-American sentiment has a solid foundation in Pakistan.

As Ali (2008: preface, x) has noted, one of the reason for the deep hostility to the US in Pakistan ‘has little to do with religion, but is based on the knowledge that Washington has backed every military dictator that has squatted on top of the country’. It is important therefore, to qualify Pakistan’s broader anti-Americanism and separate it from the kind of anti-Americanism of Jihadi militant organisations. Arguably, while Pakistan’s anti-Americanism can be seen to be a consequence of the often exploitative relationship between the US and Pakistan. Jihadi militant’s on the other hand posit anti-Americanism on the basis of how the US deals with the wider global Muslim ummah. So while Pakistan’s popular anti-Americanism tends to have national boundaries; Jihadi organisations often justify anti-Americanism on the basis of US (non)intervention in areas such as Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, Afghanistan and the like. This position however is very rarely alluded to in the literature, and most analysts conform to one of the core narratives of the wider discourse on ‘Islamic terrorism’, in that it is, ‘motivated largely by religious or ‘sacred’ causes rather than political or ideological concerns’ Jackson (2007:405).
In this context it is also important to note that, for the militant jihadi mindset ordinary Muslims within Pakistan by ‘co-operating’ with the Pakistani authorities in allowing US presence in the region are also lumped together with the American ‘Other’ and are therefore legitimate targets for violence. For instance, Rashid (2009:93 italics added) notes that the ‘Taliban and their supporters present the Muslim world and the West with a new style of Islamic extremism, *which rejects all accommodation* with Muslim moderation and the West’. This ideological mindset of the militant jihadi is thus opposed to the West in general and must be separated from the Pakistan’s popular anti-Americanism which is fuelled by its historical experience in dealing with the US. In this context, Ali (2008: preface, xi) writes that, given the hopelessness and inescapable bondage that afflicts Pakistan ‘the surprise is that more of them don’t turn to extremist religious groups, but they have generally remained stubbornly aloof from all that, which is highlighted in every election’. In light of the way that the US has historically conducted itself in the region in terms of its exit after the fall of the Soviets, and its involvement in procuring regime changes in Pakistan; there is a deep-seated distrust in Pakistan which cannot disappear overnight simply because the US and Pakistan are now collaborating in the ‘war on terror’. For instance, retired Lieutenant-general Talat Masood writes that,

Anti-Americanism continues unabated…it is not confined to fringe elements alone but is spreading in the mainstream. A few recently retired military officers and politicians have gone as far as accusing the US for abetting and supporting acts of terror that have engulfed the country. This is despite the fact that President Obama and the administration had made serious efforts clearing
up misunderstandings and reducing the inherent tensions not only with Pakistan but with the Muslim world in general\textsuperscript{66}.

Masood further notes that the ‘legacy of betrayal is so strong and deep-rooted that the US will have to work very hard to overcome the prevailing suspicions’ (ibid). Often, western literature refuses an appreciation of such historical contexts and any manner of pundits and writers generalise Pakistani’s as ‘anti-American’. Whilst there is much focus on Pakistan’s behaviour and commitment in the post 9/11 environment; it is useful to note the comments of Ahmed Rashid who questions the ‘commitment’ of the US arguing that, ‘the US will abandon the region anyway after 2011 and will prioritise its domestic issues\textsuperscript{67}'. Indeed, this US strategy has already been alluded to by the Obama administration.

In addition to these realist-inspired analyses, there is a second body of work that is very useful in the context of providing much needed detail in terms of rendering a chronological history of the events and interactions leading up to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. One of the distinct features of this body of literature is that it tends not to be wholly geared towards an analysis of how and where Pakistan features in relation to western and principally US interests in ‘winning’ the ‘war on terror’. Employing a linear methodology, these studies discuss issues around Pakistan’s relationship with the US prior to 9/11, its estrangement from the international community, Pakistan’s involvement with al-Qaeda and other Taliban-linked jihadi groups. In terms of the

\textsuperscript{66} Talat Masood, ‘Anti-Americanism’ in The News December 14\textsuperscript{th} 2009.
\textsuperscript{67} Ahmad Rashid in, ‘US pressure is certainly there, but so are sweeteners such as…’ in The News on Sunday December 13\textsuperscript{th} 2009.
period after 9/11, currently one of the most extensive works has been authored by Ahmed Rashid who in his 2008 book: ‘Descent into Chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security’ aptly chronicles the events and interactions between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States in the aftermath of 9/11. Rashid focuses on uncovering and detailing such things as interactions between the CIA and the ISI, and why the coalition forces have failed in breaking a resurgent Taliban. Within this body of work, the literature engages in a more qualitative way with in-depth explorations of the Taliban and Islamic militancy in the context of South Asia. In particular, Amir Mir’s book: ‘Talibanization of Pakistan from 9/11 to 26/11’ and Ahmed Rashid’s title: ‘Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia’ provide a comprehensive illumination of not only the rise of militant groups in the region, but also a detailed account of the inner workings and dynamics of the Taliban and related militant groups. In contrast to the kind of studies alluded to in the section above which focus on state-level interactions, Mir and Rashid’s expositions provide much needed qualitative accounts. These studies are particularly useful in that they engender a deeper engagement connecting with discussions around why the Taliban were able to gain a foothold in Afghanistan and neighbouring border areas in Pakistan, and why and how the Pakistani state became involved with these militant groups. Furthermore, there are insights into such things

---

68 In addition to these chronological accounts another interesting literature focuses on the lack of a robust national identity that clearly defines the role and purpose of Islam in Pakistan. The assumption of this literature is that this absence allowed for uncensored spread of militant forms of Islam in Pakistan. Shaikh (2009) for instance has contended that Pakistan’s ambivalence and uncertainty concerning the role of Islam in its national identity pre-empted a wide-scale national consensus of what it means to ‘be Pakistani’. Shaikh’s contention is that this encouraged the unhindered spread of political Islam and implicitly the state’s association with the Taliban. Other writers such as Nasr (2005) and Racine (2002) have also been concerned with exploring the notion of national identity in Pakistan and have drawn attention to the notion that Pakistan’s identity stands in a negative relationship to India to the extent that it is constituted by the ‘India syndrome’. For these writers Pakistan’s national policy rather than being a consequence of national interests, has instead been dictated by this ambivalent and fragile identity. In this context Talbot (2005) suggests that the development of a national identity in the Pakistani context has been greatly hindered by the
as the organisation of the Taliban, internal dynamics, ethnic moorings, ideology and methods of indoctrination. Studies like these have brought to the fore issues such as the failure of the state to regulate madrassas in Pakistan coupled with an inadequate public schooling system. Hussain (2007), for instance, has argued that the dramatic expansion in the number of madrassas over the past 30 years has provided a fertile recruiting ground for militant Islamic groups to the extent that there are now an estimated 13,000 madrassas in Pakistan with approximately 1.7 million enrolled in them.

Finally, there is a third kind of literature relating to the ‘war on terror’ which tends to take as its principal subject-matter the United States and engages with the subject in one of two ways. Either there is a focus on explaining events, military and political practices in the aftermath of 9/11 in the context of a US ‘grand strategy’ to ensure global primacy. These discussions often posit Pakistan as a passive recipient of American empire and the thrust of the exploration remains on an implicit recognition and approval of the notion that the US-led war on terror is an extension of US imperialism in the world. For instance, Boyle (2008:192) in concentrating on measuring the efficiency of US interventions in the global war on terror advises that if the US-led war on terror is to continue then, ‘American policymakers need to think critically about its purpose and how it should be located within American grand strategy’. In contrast, another kind of approach that focuses on the ‘war on terror’ emphasises its relationship to securing US economic primacy in the world (for e.g.

authoritarian legacy of colonial rule which he argues, gave way to successive dictatorial rulers. For Talbot participatory politics could have strengthened the development of an independent Pakistani identity. This literature is interesting in the sense that it provides a more historically nuanced account of why political Islam was able to flourish in Pakistan.
Colas 2007). Some of this literature, which tends to have Marxist undercurrents in terms of its focus on economics and capitalist relations of power, is reviewed in chapter six. In relation to literature that takes it subject matter the United States in the context of the ‘war on terror’ some writers, most notably Richard Jackson (2005), arguably take a social constructivist approach to their analysis. The concern here again is less with Pakistan and more in terms of how the US-led discourse on the ‘war on terror’ normalised and legitimised political and military action and inaction on the part of the US in the post 9/11 time-frame. Employing a discourse analysis, Jackson contends that the emergence and proliferation of a specific ‘regime of truth’ emanating from the Bush administration ensured that certain a certain foreign policy and associated actions such as military deployment in Afghanistan were construed as inevitable. Importantly, Jackson focuses on the productive power of discourse in terms of enabling and constraining political action.

Inevitably, since the subject-area of Pakistan and its relationship with the US-led ‘war on terror’ is so wide-ranging and abundant the review of the literature can but be limited in a modest project such as this one. For instance, there is a wide range of literature available concerning Pakistan’s nuclear status, and though briefly considering this issue I have however, deliberately not sought to develop this theme in order to keep the literature review focussed and relevant to the research subject69. Nevertheless, I have addressed the main contours of the debate as they relate to the specific subject-matter of this thesis. The objective of the discussion has been to

---

make immediately discernable the originality of this research project in relation to
the previously published work in that something of this nature and focus has not been
previously undertaken. This study will take a broadly constructivist perspective on
the ‘war on terror’ and in this sense it follows in the footsteps of Jackson (2005) who
makes a similar enquiry into the construction of the ‘war on terror’ in the US. This
theoretical approach to the case-study offers a fresh perspective in that the thesis will
not deliberate on accounting for such things as ‘truths’ as do other studies; rather, its
focus is altogether different and concerns the productivity of a specific discourse in
terms of generating practice. In taking such a theoretical approach, the study pays
attention and operationalises analytical categories ignored by other studies;
consequently bringing to the fore a different way of looking at the problem-field. For
instance, the literature is often geared towards providing a quantitative analysis
analysing the cost-benefit scenario of such things as the amount of funds given by
the US to Pakistan and the concrete practice of Pakistan in relation to pursuing al-
Qaeda and the Taliban. Within this context, much of the deliberations focus on
attempting to ascertain whether Pakistan is a ‘genuine’ partner\textsuperscript{70} in terms of curbing
terrorist activity within its territory. Other accounts offer a historical guide and focus
on delineating how the Taliban and al-Qaeda are a product of the political and
military manoeuvrings of the US and Pakistan albeit different authors ascribe more
or less responsibility on either the US or Pakistan depending on ‘which side of the
fence the analyst is on’. However, as the review of the literature has revealed there is
a dearth of studies in this area that operationalise ‘discourse’ as a way of
understanding the progression of the ‘war on terror’. It is here that this study hopes to
contribute in a meaningful way by highlighting how discourse and representation

\textsuperscript{70} Of course very little of the current literature analyses or questions the ‘genuineness’ of the United
States in relation to the ‘war on terror’. This debate is often limited within Pakistan’s public
discourse.
played a critical role in the enactment of the political practice in Pakistan. Since the particular method of engagement with the subject-area has not been taken up previously in relation to Pakistan and the ‘war on terror’; the next chapter will deliberate on a comprehensive delineation of the theoretical and methodological underpinnings and implications for this study. Having discussed the theory and method of engagement with the thesis topic the following chapters will then proceed to an application in terms of rendering a concrete analysis.
4

Locating the theoretical intervention

4.1 Introduction

Discourse is always already situated in a material world... This means that we simply cannot construct the world any old way we chose, and if we persistently attempt to do so we are ultimately more likely to come to the attention of psychiatric services.71

This project takes as its subject matter state policy and practice, and more specifically the political practice of Pakistan in the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Whilst the dominant conceptual framework within which this event has been framed tends to be realist-inspired this study however seeks to re-theorise Pakistan’s co-operation with the US in the ‘war on terror’ by drawing on an alternative body of thought. Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is to clearly articulate the theoretical approach and the associated methodology taken by this project to investigate why and how Pakistan was able to co-operate with the US-led ‘war on terror’. Such a clarification is necessary in order to ascertain why this study prioritises texts or more generally discourse as the primary unit of analysis within this project. This chapter plays an important role in providing a theoretical contextualisation of the whole research project since the

71 Cromby and Nightingale (1999:9).
theory underlying the project plays a critical role right from the formulation of the research questions through to the interpretations and conclusions drawn.

As chapter two explained, the dominant realist mode of thinking in IR conceives world politics as embedded in an essentialist and static anarchic environment. In this conception, socio-political reality is pre-given and independent of agential influence. This implies that inter and intra-state interaction for instance is already conditioned by the ‘truth’ or inevitability of anarchic relations. It is from this realist perspective that much of the analysis of Pakistan’s participation in the US-led ‘war on terror’ is interpreted by current analyses. Conversely, this study takes a different perspective on the production of political reality by highlighting the constructed nature of reality as opposed to it being something that already exists ‘out there’. This means that belligerent inter-state relations for instance, are not conceptualised as inevitable or ‘natural’ as realists would imply, rather belligerency must be understood as a discursively constructed political practice. From this perspective, Pakistan’s political action in terms of participation in the ‘war on terror’ must also be seen as an action embedded and produced by specific discursive constructions.

In the first instance then, a broad social constructionist theory takes as its starting point the acceptance that social reality is constructed through a system of similar (though not necessarily identical) statements which conform to the same basic world-view or representation of the object i.e. a discourse. This means that a discourse beyond its analysing, describing and classifying qualities produces the world by privileging particular narratives relating to an object over and above alternative
narratives or representations related to the same object. A discourse as a narrative or representation then has the power to present as entirely legitimate and logical the incurring of limitations on certain ways of thinking or ‘being’ in the world (knowledge-power nexus). Moreover a theoretical commitment towards examining productivity leads onto an analysis of how structuring of meaning is connected to practice.

It is essential to clarify that this project makes a basic commitment to a social constructionist theoretical framework concerning the construction of political reality as it relates to the specific area of concern i.e. Pakistan’s co-operation in the ‘war on terror’. What this means is that this study views Pakistan’s co-operation as something that was enabled and normalised by a productive discourse. However, on the other hand it is important to also clarify that that this project adopts a qualified social constructionist approach which is much closer to constructivist approaches in IR and distinguished from poststructuralist and other similar critical perspectives in IR which reduce world politics to the operation of discourse. Although the specificity of the qualified stance taken by this study will be discussed in more detail as the chapter progresses; however, it is important, at this point, to briefly discern the salient contours of social constructionism as a body of thought. The main proposition of social constructionism is the idea that social reality is neither static nor universal but contingent and intimately connected to prevailing discourses or ‘knowledges’. Apart from this basic commonality, there is a multiplicity of strands

---

72 Refer to footnotes 1 and 2.
73 Social constructionism is the broader critical theory that informs both poststructuralist and constructivist thought in IR. It is therefore useful to first consider the broader philosophical underpinnings of this perspective before distinguishing the differences between poststructuralism and constructivism.
within social constructionist thought differing on such things as epistemology and methodology. In terms of ontological moorings, some strands of social constructionism (discursive psychology, discourse analysis, Foucauldian analysis, content analysis and poststructuralism in general) adhere to an understanding of ontology that dictates the centrality of discourse/text to an ensuing social reality. Arguably, this is a reductionist account in that social reality is reduced to the operation of texts alone. Some theorists have been vehemently opposed to conceptualising and considering an extra-discursive realm (for instance Edwards et al. 1995). It is, at this juncture that this study differs in its conception of the way in which political reality is socially constructed. Whilst an extended discussion cannot be engaged in these introductory paragraphs it is necessary to clearly clarify that although this study considers discourse as powerfully productive nevertheless there is ‘theoretical space’ within the specific perspective underlying this study which allows and encourages a conceptualisation of the influences of wider extra-discursive features of the world on our social constructions. Importantly, this position is taken without signalling the deprecation of linguistic spaces. Within the field of international relations, such an approach to social construction which appreciates, acknowledges and analytically incorporates the extra-discursive realm may be described as constructivism reflecting its distance to the linguistic reductionism postulated by poststructuralist approaches. Furthermore, in seeking to enhance constructivism this study draws much inspiration from the work of Roy Bhaskar (1978, 1979, 1989), whose ideas on ‘critical realism’ have been pivotal in

---

74 Refer to footnote 11.
75 A more radical variant of social constructionism (termed as a poststructuralist approach in IR literature) is represented by Edwards, D., Ashmore, M. and Potter, J., (1995). These writers whilst entertaining the ontology of the extra-discursive refuse to accept that this ontology can be theorized about since language, text or discourse is the only way knowledge is constructed. We cannot have direct access to ‘ontology’ since all knowledge of it is representation.
76 Refer to footnote 1.
bringing back the notion of ‘cause’ in the social sciences and are useful in terms of combining a discursive study with an analysis of structural constraints. Bhaskar’s work encourages analysis to uncover the underlying social mechanisms, processes and structures that afford, shape and give rise to our experiences, social events and social reality in general. Although Bhaskar is not directly concerned with discourse and its links to the construction of political reality nevertheless his work is particularly useful in embedding discourse in its historical, social, political and economic contexts and discerning the links between these structures and the possibilities of discourse.

The primary remit of this chapter is to clarify the theory underlying this study. Theory is significant since it has influenced and inspired the entire research process from the formulation of the hypothesis to the data collection and analysis. This chapter will discuss how political reality is conceived here as co-constituted by the discursive and extra-discursive coupled with a consideration of the theories relied upon in order to advance such an argument. The discussion is organised in a way that emphasises the relevance and significance of a theory that advances the centrality of discourse and representation to social life. On the other hand, this chapter will also seek to critique the reductionism of poststructuralist/social constructionist approaches. The main concern of this chapter is to advance a theoretical position that incorporates an analysis of the discursive and the extra-discursive in accounting for the emergence of social reality. In short then, the chapter seeks to advance a theoretical framework that incorporates IR constructivism with critical realism arguing that this resulting paradigm is better positioned to explain the emergence of Pakistan’s political reality in the post 9/11 time period.
This chapter begins with an extensive discussion of how early linguistic theorists such as Saussure and Austin radically problematised the notion that language was a neutral medium of expression. The discussion will focus on addressing the way in which these early theorists conceptualised the emergence of social reality by intimately implicating language and more broadly discourse in the emergence of social reality. This discussion will then flow into an examination of the work of Michel Foucault whose studies of concepts such as ‘madness’ and ‘sexuality’ have been instrumental in demonstrating how ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ are contemporary and contingent as opposed to being universal phenomenon. In particular, Foucault was concerned with discerning the myriad ways in which a particular discourse becomes productive through the operation of regulatory power (see for instance Foucault 1977). Foucault’s work has much to offer in helping us theorize how a discourse regulates through enabling and constraining individual and collective thought and action. This exploration will then link in to a more complex debate around the social construction of the Self (both individual and collective) in order to demonstrate the ways in which, and the extent to which, discourses construct subjectivity from individual personhood to group identity. Within this discussion there is implicitly a rejection of essentialist and realist readings around how humans/groups/nations ‘naturally’ behave or the idea that certain behaviours are intrinsic, innate or ‘natural’ to either the person or the nation-state. In examining the discursive emergence of the ‘Self’ the chapter will also begin to address how the ‘Other’ is simultaneously constructed through specific discursive strategies deployed to differentiate and ‘mark out’ the ‘other’. In particular the discussion focuses on how the ‘Self’ relies on the representation of an outside Other. In proceeding towards
a critical analysis of social constructionism, the chapter will draw attention to one of the central tensions concerning the theorizations of the power of discourse. The discussion will note that although Foucault’s work has undoubtedly been groundbreaking nevertheless it affords little, if any, conception of human agency as a deliberate agent. Rather, the extent of discourse is that it is conceived as all-embracing and all-powerful in terms of constructing subjectivity and all aspects of social reality. For writers such as Hall (2001), Foucault’s work though important is problematic in its inherent tendency to move away from the rational, reasoning individual of modernity and a move towards a picture of human agency as existing as a mere mouthpiece of discourses.

Taking a critical stance towards poststructuralist approaches, the chapter will seek to qualify the discursive stance of this study by relating some of the key critical realist critiques of the strong relativism and reductionism of poststructuralist analyses. In order to explain the critical realist critique of relativism77 the discussion will begin by reviewing the critical realist ontology which will help to clarify how and where Bhaskar locates discourse in his ontological framework. The chapter will focus on the notion of ‘cause’ within this ontology and draw on the work of Milja Kurki (2006, 2007, 2008) who takes Bhaskar’s work forward by clarifying how social science can draw on a non-Humean causal framework. The purpose of this review is to discern how we may conceptualise links or ‘cause’ between the extra-discursive

---

77 This critique of relativism is not a denial that ‘knowledge’ is relative and contingent to the time, space and culture within which the knowledge emerges. Rather critical realism critiques the reluctance of some poststructuralist accounts to incorporate analysis of the effects of existing structures (discursive and material) on our relative social constructions. The argument thus is that knowledge is relative but some things can be pre-existing. In this account then reducing the production of social life wholly to circulating discourses without also considering the enduring social structures which make the particular ‘knowledge’ possible is a flawed approach. Refer also to footnote 11.
and the discursive. The ontological realism put forward by critical realism is at the heart of this approach and the chapter will seek to elaborate how social reality is conceptualised as stratified within this approach. Thus, while discourse and language are seen here as vitally important to the construction of social reality; however, a critical realist stratified ontology also conceptualizes the existence of observable and unobservable ‘depth ontological structures’ which are generative and causally connected to the kind of social constructions that emerge.

Finally, in order to provide for a transparent research endeavour the chapter engages in clarifying the methodological framework that will be employed in conducting the data analysis in this thesis. In the first instance the discussion notes that methodologically the discourse analysis draws on the guidelines and procedures suggested by Ian Parker (1992) and Carla Willig (1999, 2001). Although Parker and Willig offer a useful ‘blueprint’ to conducting a broadly Foucauldian discourse analysis in the context of a critical realist ontology nevertheless it is noteworthy that they fail to offer similar procedural suggestions in analysing the extra-discursive contexts implied in a realist ontological framework. Therefore, in terms of the method employed in a critical realist examination of the extra-discursive I draw on a variety of writers of which the most important are: Danermark et al. (2002) and Sayer (1992), who offer concrete suggestions and method in terms of conceptualising and analysing critical realist social structures and mechanisms. The purpose of the concluding sections of this chapter is to present a clear methodological framework which will be employed by the project in conducting its data analysis.
4.2 Social constructionism – key assumptions

Whilst there are differences in the various approaches to social construction i.e. poststructuralism, constructivism; there is nevertheless, a commonality within these approaches in that they all represent a body of thought that has radically challenged the traditional foundations upon which scientific knowledge is built. Before proceeding to the main discussion of this chapter it would be useful to list, at the outset, some of the basic assumptions common to all strands of social constructionism. Burr (2003) suggests four key assumptions:

- *A Critical stance towards taken for granted knowledge*

Social constructionism asks us to stand back and critically question our knowledge of the world. It rejects a positivist, empiricist orientation, or the idea that our observations unproblematically reveal the world to us. Social constructionism is deconstructionist in that it seeks to uncover and explain the way knowledge and truth are produced through social processes. This means that the categories and concepts we use to divide up our world and experiences become problematic and the focus of study. Social constructionism encourages us to challenge and seek out the way in which these categories emerge.

---

78 Note, that social constructionism refers to the broader critical theory that brings to the fore the importance of language and representation in social life. In this sense both poststructuralism and constructivism draw on this broader critical theory. Refer to footnote 1 and 2 for more clarification.

79 Vivenne Burr’s (2003) book ‘Social Constructionism’ is a key text in terms of its exposition of the critical approach that the broader social theory of social constructionism engenders. In particular it is also useful in terms of delineating the subtle differences between the various approaches to social construction.
Historical and cultural specificity

Social constructionism also postulates that the way in which we understand the world, the concepts and categories we use to divide up our experience of the world are culturally and historically specific. Such a proposition immediately throws into question the idea that there are universal truth claims and knowledge. Foucault’s work for instance demonstrated how the category ‘madness’ emerged in the 19th century. Foucault demonstrated the historical variability of truth-claims related to mental illnesses arguing that the meaning of ‘madness’ was specific to the time and place in which the category emerged, and that prevailing economic and social arrangements played a critical role in constituting knowledge. Such notions of truth and knowledge as being relative suggests that the way in which we divide up, conceive and categorise our world is not necessarily better or any nearer the ‘truth’, but that such conceptions are relative to our historical location and culture and that alternative ways of dividing up the world are possible.

The idea of ‘illness’ for example is not a fixed and universal entity but variable across time and space and highly dependent on the norms and values of a particular social group. The meaning of the concept ‘illness’ thus fluctuates and Burr (2003) cites a study in which working class women described themselves as healthy if they were able to go about their daily activities and viewed ‘women’s problems’ as other common ailments as part of their daily life. These women only referred to serious conditions as illness. In contemporary western society, premenstrual syndrome
(PMT) for instance is a recent addition to medical conditions. PMT has existed since women have been around but it is only now that we categorise and group together certain symptoms as PMT. Thus, what counts as illness in one society was seen as merely ‘women’s problems’ in an earlier historical period. As Burr (2003:40) notes, defining illness and disease is not simply a matter of identifying the presence of pathology. It is a deeply social matter involving the interpretation of our experiences within our particular cultural context of assumptions, norms and values as well as the economic structure of our society.

- Knowledge is sustained by social processes

For social constructionism, our knowledge of the world is constructed through human interaction and does not occur as result of objective observation of the world. Language is performative, and linguistic studies show how people construct versions of objects and subjects in their talk. The primary role of language is seen as active and constructive as opposed to the traditional view that assume its neutrality and passivity.
Knowledge and social action go together

For social constructionism, different constructions of truth and knowledge invite a different kind of action from human beings. Prevailing knowledge has implications for what we can and cannot do. Foucault in particular looked at the ways in which dominant knowledge and truth claims operated within society to regulate, control and punish. Discourse allows certain ways of thinking, talking and constructing knowledge about a subject whilst simultaneously ruling out, limiting and restricting alternative ways of relating to a subject (Hall 2001). Burr (2003) gives the example of alcoholism, and suggests that in the past, alcoholics were seen as drunkards responsible for their condition and were often segregated and kept in workhouses; whereas now alcoholism is seen as a disease and addiction and the response has changed to therapy and empathy. Constructions of the world therefore sustain some patterns of social action and exclude others.

The social constructionist idea is that knowledge and truth are not entities already ‘out there’ having an existence outside of and, prior to human existence. Instead, truth and knowledge is constituted amongst people through interaction is indeed a radical challenge to traditional ontological and epistemological claims. Such a stance immediately brings with it a focus on human interaction and more specifically language since it is at the heart of the human interaction process.
4.3 Early challenges to notions of language neutrality

It would be useful to look at the way in which early linguistics began to question the neutrality of language simply and ‘naturally’ reflecting pre-given categories and ‘meanings’. Instead, early linguistic theorists began to argue that language was very much alive and performative, and powerfully constructive of social reality, having real consequences in the world. Prominent linguists such as Saussure, Austin and Wittgenstein (Kress 2001, Potter 2001) were intimately involved in this early re-theorising of language away from ideas around its supposed neutrality. Interestingly Marx, although not directly concerned with the power of language, also postulated the notion of a ‘false consciousness’ amongst the working class – a consciousness deliberately created and maintained by the capitalist bourgeois to maintain their class interests. There is arguably, in Marx’s theory, an implied notion of language as powerful in terms of structuring consciousness. However, it was the French linguist Ferdinand De Saussure who began to explore more systematically the characteristics of language and to some extent what speakers do in terms of performativity in language (Kress 2001). The notion that language is powerful is a radical argument to make and it is important here to clarify this position by way of demonstration.

It is useful to draw on the work of Saussure who played an instrumental role in demonstrating how language was pivotal in structuring meaning. Saussure suggested that a language is made up of signs such as: cat, dog, friendship, marriage and so on. These signs, for Saussure, have two parts to them, the ‘signified’ or the item of
thought or mental image and the ‘signifier’ the sound used to refer to the mental image. Together, these two parts combine to produce a sign, which Saussure argued was an arbitrary combination. Drawing on Saussure then, it is possible to argue that a ‘cat’ or a ‘spoon’ have a concrete existence in relation to other signs such as ‘friendship’ however they are also signs in that they are concepts. When we use the words ‘cat’ or ‘spoon’ for instance, we are referring to the concept, the meaning that these terms hold for us. Without meaning, a ‘spoon’ is just a piece of steel and a ‘cat’ an animal. In English speaking cultures the signifier C-A-T produces the mental image of a domesticated, furry four-legged animal and it is as a result of convention that speakers of the same language have agreed to (and learned) that this word evokes a certain image. Saussure suggested that we divide and categorize our experiences of the world into cats, dogs, marriage, and that these categorizations are not intrinsic but arbitrary. For instance, if we think of a map of London with a grid on it we can discern that London is the signified (the concept – London); furthermore, the grid on the map divides and categorizes London into areas. The area postcodes such as ‘EC1’ are thus signifiers; they are words that refer to the mental image of the division. The division of the map is arbitrary and there could have been other possible ways to divide it up (or not).

Saussure also postulated that the signs, or the names that we give to object/experiences do not in themselves have any intrinsic meaning, but that the concept or sign such as ‘dog’ ‘only has meaning by reference to its difference from other concepts such as ‘cat’ or ‘table’. Indeed, all languages seem to have an underlying architectural feature in that almost every adjective, noun and verb has a binary opposite for instance, good/evil, native/foreigner, west/east, strong/weak,
believer/atheist and so on. There is, as Jackson (2005:21) notes, a ‘natural inequality between terms, where one is lacking something the opposite embodies’. In order to comprehend the term ‘good’ we need to also have an understanding of the features and characteristics associated with its opposite term ‘evil’ or ‘bad’. More importantly, Saussure challenged the notion that language and meaning of things was something that emerged transparently reflecting ‘truths’. Rather, the contention was that a language made up of signs already exists and pre-dates any one person’s entry into the world. The implication of this pre-existence is that in the process of learning to talk we have no choice but to understand ourselves and our world in terms of the concepts and categories that already exist. In Burr’s words (2003:53),

This is what Saussure’s structuralism is saying, then: language does not reflect a pre-existing social reality, but constitutes and brings a framework to that reality for us. It is the structure of language, the system of signifiers and signifieds and their meanings as constituted in the differences between them, which carves up our conceptual space for us.

Saussure was instrumental in showing how language determined the lines along which we divided up our experiences and our world. However, Saussure also maintained that once a signifier became connected to a signified, the meaning of the sign became enduring. This proposition, regarding the stability of meaning however has been challenged by later writers, who are often referred to as post-structuralists.
4.4 Language as a performative practice

The previous section explains how Saussurean linguistics were a key influence in problematizing the idea of language as faithfully transparent in conveying reality. Although Saussure did not examine fully the performative aspects of language these ideas were later explored by Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Austin (Potter 2001) who, in the tradition of Saussure, also began to question popular notions around language as unquestioningly reflecting reality and language as an abstract referential system. Wittgenstein vehemently criticized the idea that meaning originated and resided in a private psychological space called ‘the mind’, and instead emphasized the public nature of meaning making in language (ibid). Similarly, Austin was fundamentally concerned with the flaws in philosophical conceptions of language as an abstract system and suggested that an utterance could be both descriptive and performative. Speech act theory, developed by Austin, sought to draw focus away from the idea that language was merely descriptive. Austin postulated that utterances were significant because of their *performativity*. When we say that language is social action or that it is performative what we mean is that it does things; it constructs and has consequences.

Discursive psychologists and ethnomethodology as developed by Harold Garfinkel are also less concerned with how language structures human experience and more focused on investigating situated language in use. Both these approaches and other perspectives that draw upon them, such as conversation analysis, explore the performative and action orientation of language and the way that ‘accounts are built
in interactions to suit particular purposes – fashioning identities, justifying our actions, blaming others and so on’ (Burr 2003:62). To give a simple example, if we are to believe that language is an unambiguous pathway connected to beliefs and actual events then we would presume that people’s account of the same event would, for instance, be consistent. However, any examination of language shows that a person’s account varies depending on its function. Potter and Wetherell (2001:199) give an example that,

if we take two descriptions of a particular individual, we will expect them to vary in accordance with the feelings of the person doing the describing. If you like the person you may….describe particularly likeable characteristics out of the many available. Someone who dislikes that person may emphasize very different characteristics.

We find that people use language to construct a version of social reality and ‘reality’ as described or constructed at that moment comes into existence. The debate over truth and falsity of accounts is suspended and the focus instead is on the construction process itself.


4.5 Macro social constructionism

For the moment we have been looking at approaches which drawing on the alternative framework proposed by a broad social constructionist theory focus their theoretical attention on situated language in use in human interaction, and the relationship between function and construction. Within this ‘micro’ social constructionist approach (Burr 2003), the individual articulating the text is seen as actively choosing linguistic resources upon which to draw, in constructing social reality. This approach is often referred to as a textually linguistic approach, and concentrates on interaction within a local context. However, a textual focus represents one way of engaging with discursive analysis; whereas another approach referred to as ‘macro’ social constructionism (Burr 2003) or a Foucauldian approach takes an altogether different view of the production of texts. Although both perspectives often use ‘discourse analysis’ to refer to their empirical study of utterance and spoken text there is a significant difference in their focus and thus ‘discourse analysis’ takes on a different meaning in each case. The main difference between the macro approach and what Burr (2003) calls micro social constructionism is that while both approaches support the idea that language constructs rather than represents, the micro approach tends to emphasize the freedom of individuals in constructing accounts. A macro social constructionist approach however suggests that the construction process is intimately related to institutional practices and social structures, and that this connection is so strong that it is incorrect to isolate talk from these broader contextual influences. The operation of power is at the heart of this...

---

80 Macro approaches in social construction tend to emphasise the powerful regulatory effects of discourse as singularly productive of social life (Burr 2003). Within IR these approaches are referred to under the rubric ‘poststructuralism’.
approach and often the freedom of individuals is marginalised in comparison to the power of institutional discourses. Importantly though, as Burr (2003) suggests, micro and macro strands of social constructionism should not be seen as mutually exclusive and there is no reason why they should not be used together. In this sense the sort of ‘critical discourse analysis’ (CDA) approach suggested by Fairclough (2001, 2003) seems to represent a synergy of both approaches. However, for the purposes of clarity it is useful to differentiate the features of the two perspectives (micro and macro) in this chapter. In particular, macro social constructionism is referred to in the literature under a number of rubrics: deconstructionism, poststructuralism and ‘Foucauldian’ on account of the instrumental influence of the work of Michel Foucault. The present study is also broadly located within the ‘macro’ spectrum. It is useful therefore to examine the way in which Foucault discussed and defined discourses since the vast majority of approaches from poststructuralism to constructivism draw on Foucault’s ideas around the powers of discourse.

4.6 Conceptualising discourses as knowledge

Foucault’s concept of discourse is broad and incorporates linguistic acts as well as social practices i.e. discourse is practice. For Foucault, discourses refer to the way in which a topic or issue is ‘spoken of’ through mediums such as texts, speech, writing, practice and, which come together to build a picture or representation of the topic. For this approach, discourse is understood to not consist of merely one statement, one text, one action or one source. Rather, Foucault argues that the same discourse will appear across a range of texts and as forms of conduct at a number of different
institutional sites within society (Foucault 1973), and in this sense it is a way of thinking or the state of knowledge at any given time. There are, at any given instance, multiple discourses around any one subject each striving to legitimize its representation as the ‘truth’. A dominant discourse can permeate society to such an extent that what the discourse stipulates is often referred to as ‘common sense’. Furthermore, a discourse can manifest itself in ‘texts – in speech, say a conversation or interview, in written material such as novels, newspaper articles or letters, in visual images like magazine advertisements or films, or even in the meanings encoded in the clothes someone wears or the way they do their hair’ (Burr 2003:66). However, in terms of the working definition of ‘discourse’ as it is conceived in this study it is important to clarify the distinction between Foucault’s use of the term and the more restricted use employed here. Whilst a Foucauldian concept of discourse is broad and includes language and social practices, conversely this study uses discourse in a more restricted way in that it limits its use of the term ‘discourse’ to refer to linguistic acts only. This working definition of ‘discourse’ is useful from the perspective of this study since it allows discourse to be conceptualised as a condition that enables actions and practice. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the restricted use of the term ‘discourse’ within this study has been prompted primarily to aid the ease of analysis of discourse and social structures. This restricted use of ‘discourse’ does not imply that discourse and practice are two different things rather, as the discussion below will show, I concur with Foucault that discourse is inextricably bound up with social practice.

Refer to footnote 9.
4.7 Discursive formations

One of the central themes in Foucault’s work is the idea that discourses regulate knowledge to the extent that ‘what we call knowledge then simply refers to the particular construction or version of a phenomenon that has received the stamp of truth in our society’ (Burr 2003:68). This means that ‘knowledge’ is not permanent or universal but that what counts as knowledge or common sense differs from one period to another. Burr (ibid) for instance suggests that,

contemporary western societies it is commonplace for the version of natural events provided by science and medicine to be given greater credence than those offered by religion, magic or superstition and to be given the stamp of truth.

This is a different ‘knowledge’ to what has gone before. In the past, the version of truth provided by religion or superstition held sway and dictated and regulated what could and could not be done, just as scientific and medicinal discourse does in contemporary society. Discourse is therefore a powerful force in determining our realities or ‘truths’ and an analysis focussing on the deconstructing a discourse is a powerful and political act.
Foucault often referred to the state of knowledge at any given time as the prevailing ‘regime of truth’ or the ‘episteme’ of a specific historical period. Within this episteme, whenever and wherever texts, practices, images or indeed any other form of conduct occurring at different institutional sites within a society seem to bear resemblance to each other, when there seems a cohesion between them, when they refer to the same object, share the same style and support the same underlying message; when there is a commonality in the representation then the different manifestations are said to belong to the same discursive formation. Texts are seen as specific products of a particular discursive formation. Foucault for instance, argued that the object ‘madness’ appears within a definite discursive formation, and that it was ‘constituted by all that was said, in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its development, indicated its various correlations, judged it, and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were to be taken as its own’\(^8\) (Foucault 1972:32).

\section*{4.8 The regulatory power of discourse}

For Foucault, knowledge is intimately bound up with power. Knowledge has real effects in the world because it brings with it the power to regulate, control and punish. Different knowledge constructions invite different responses. Burr (2003:68) gives an example that ‘behaviour which a few hundred years ago would have been taken as evidence of possession by evil spirits is today though of as a mental illness’;

\footnote{For critical realists and constructivists alike this overwhelming Foucauldian focus on discursive structures alone is problematic particularly when in terms of the theoretical closure it implies in conceptualizing ‘other’ structures such as material, natural and enduring social structures.}
the result in this alternative knowledge construction is that it invites a different response and based on current ‘knowledge’ it therefore becomes legitimate to ‘treat’ the mental illness and illegitimate to ‘exorcise evil spirits’. The point here is that the power to act in certain ways, to make claims on anything depends on the prevailing ‘knowledge’ in society. What can or cannot be depicted and talked about and who can and cannot say certain things will give us a clue as to whose and which discourses are dominant at a particular historical point in time and in a particular location, and whose discourses are subordinated or marginalised. Discourses determine what counts as knowledge and truth and what does not, whose voices and world-views are privileged, and whose are disregarded and silenced.

There is however, an altogether different conception of power within the Foucauldian paradigm. In contrast to traditional models of power, Foucault does not view power as being located in a single source, but as a diffuse product located in all the practices that adhere and abide by the constraining and enabling aspects of a particular discursive regime. Interestingly, Foucault proposed that the exercise of force does not indicate power; instead what it means is that the discourse is failing in terms of postulating its truth validity therefore resulting in resistance requiring force. Resorting to force is rather to be taken as an indication of the lack of power (Burr 2003:69).

Power as a diffuse product means that it permeates and operates at all levels of social existence. Marxist feminist writers, though not necessarily taking a Foucauldian inspiration, have demonstrated the extent to which the discourse of patriarchy
pervades both private and public spheres of existence. In terms of inducing cultural order, Marxist feminists argue that the powerful discourses of marriage and the family are critical in terms of creating, maintaining and legitimizing a certain way of living one’s life; so that when women prepare food, do the laundry and so on, as unpaid workers they contribute to the maintenance of the capitalist system. In this sense, their actions uphold a regime of truth and, power is exercised through the discourse which persuades women to willingly provide services. Foucault calls this the ‘micro-physics of power’, or the idea that power is rooted in forms of local behaviour (Hall 2001). The suggestion here is that whenever a worker ‘clocks in’ for work or a child sits in a classroom the discourse is at work in the social practice. Discourses are thus intimately tied to social practices.

However, Foucault also suggested that often discourse exercised regulatory power in an almost invisible way in that those being regulated were often unaware of this. In fact Foucault suggests that the more invisible the operation of power the more likely it is to be successful. Although Marxist ideas around the power of ideology in inducing a ‘false consciousness’ seem somewhat similar to some of Foucault’s conceptions of power, and its operation; Foucault was specific in rejecting the class reductionism in classical Marxist theories. Marxism tends to ‘contrast the ‘distortions’ of bourgeois knowledge, against its own claims to ‘truth’ (Hall 2001:76), Foucault of course, rejects the notion of any form of thought as an absolute truth.
4.9 Constructing the individual and collective Self

A theory that postulates the centrality of wider discourses to social life rejects notions of the individual as having prior internal structures and characteristics, commonly referred to as ‘human nature’, which manifest themselves in the person’s personality and attitudes guiding and influencing thought and practice. In rejecting such essentialist views postulating personhood as something that is biologically determined, the broader theory of social constructionism instead locates the creation of the ‘self’ firmly in the social realm. For this reason, terms such as ‘attitude’ and ‘personality’ connoting biological determinism are avoided in social constructionist literature and instead the term ‘identity’ is often employed which tends to signify a more social basis to the construction of the Self.

Language arbitrarily categorises, divides up things and concepts so that when we identify a ‘weed’ or a ‘flower’ we are not detecting an essential feature but are doing so because differentiating in this way has meaning for us. We are then giving the ‘flower’ or ‘weed’ an identity, the point is that ‘it is you that is doing the identifying, and the identity you confer has more to do with your purposes than the nature of the thing itself’ (Burr 2003:106). In a similar way, social constructionism suggests that all identities (both individual and collective) are fashioned out of culturally available discourses and that there is no innate, identity or nature within us. Certainly, Foucault’s radical historicization of the ‘subject’ also viewed the ‘self’ and ‘other’ as having no existence or continuity in terms of an identity instead positioning the subject as a produce of discourse (Foucault 1961, 1977). In terms of individual
identity, the conception here is that there exist in the world discourses of age, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, class, occupation and so on which precede the individual’s entrance into the world, and that rather than innate psychic structures it is these discourses that shape our understandings of what it means to be black, or a child, or an atheist, or a criminal. Each discourse is seen to weave together to produce the ‘self’ with discourses having implications for each other.

Our understanding of who we are as individuals is then determined to large extent by the prevailing discourses which paint a picture of what it means to occupy a certain position. For instance, prevailing western discourses around ‘old age’ tend to postulate reduced physical and mental capacities and a loss of power and status with increasing age. These understandings or ‘knowledge’ of old age has implications for other discourses such as those of occupation and sexuality. However, an alternative picture of increasing age, which is not so popular, could be one that emphasises old age as a time of wisdom, tranquillity and respect. In both versions, the ‘meaning’ of ‘old age’ is different thus inviting different expectations, status and interaction. Similarly, the version of youth one can live out depends upon the content of the youth discourse available to the individual. The discourse of youth as a time of non-conformity and identity crisis available to some individuals is perhaps not so relevant or available to young people in parts of the world experiencing poverty; young people here may draw on an alternative discourse of youth which emphases financial and familial responsibility. Feminists also demonstrate the myriad ways in which the discourse of patriarchy stipulates to women and the rest of society the caring and maternal characteristics it sees as natural to women. The point is that one’s personhood, ones understanding of whom one is, always stands in relation to
available texts or narratives; identity is socially bestowed and an amalgam of current ‘truths’ about what it means to occupy a certain position.

The construction of the individual or the collective ‘Self’ necessarily involves a process of drawing boundaries of what is ‘in’ and what is ‘out’, what is allowed and appropriate and what is disallowed and inappropriate. Thus, what is seen as disallowed, inappropriate and so on constitutes the ‘external other’. The constitution of this ‘other’ is essential to the constitution and reinforcement of the identity of the self. Discourses of ‘mothering’ for instance define the kind of behaviour associated with a mother such as ‘nurturing’, ‘emotional’, or ‘self-sacrificing’; arguably, the discourse regulates the behaviour of a the mother defining how she ‘should’ feel and how she ‘should’ behave. Simultaneously, the discourse in drawing such boundaries and defining acceptable and appropriate behaviour necessarily entails a differentiation from inappropriate feelings and behaviour for a mother. In short then, the process of consolidating the ‘Self’, whether that constitutes a mother or a doctor or a nation-state, always involves a simultaneous process of defining the ‘outside other’ indeed that which the ‘Self’ is not.

This idea of ‘what is in and what is out’ transported to the macro-level of group identity works in much the same way (Campbell 1992, Hansen 2006). Group identity is often thought of as ‘recognition of some common origin, or shared characteristics with another group or person, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation’ (Hall 1996:2). Arguably, this ‘foundation’ however is itself constructed to mitigate differences. Though group
identity often seeks to invoke a common historical past, group identities are actually about,

using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being: not ‘who we are’ or ‘where we came from’, so much as what we might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves (Hall 1996:4).

National narratives, stories, and myths conceived here as discourses are the basic substance through which conceptions of national identity and purpose are fashioned; however, these meanings are never fixed or absolute owing to the inherently unstable nature of language and discourse. Although a particular discourse or way of representing can become hegemonic nevertheless discourse are unstable grids requiring discursive work to articulate and rearticulate their version of ‘knowledge’ or ‘regime of truth’. As Doty (1996:6) explains,

[a discourse’s] exterior limits are constituted by other discourses that are themselves open, inherently unstable, and always in the process of being articulated. This understanding of discourse implies an overlapping quality to different discourses. Any fixing of a discourse and the identities that are constructed by it can only be of a partial nature. It is the overflowing and incomplete nature of discourse that opens up spaces for change, discontinuity and variation.
National narratives therefore cannot be conceptualised in terms of their absoluteness but need to be thought of as continually unfolding processes that structure meanings to the effect that these ultimately structure political practices. Particular discourses and the way in which they represent can enable, encourage and legitimise a particular set of political practices and this is where the real power of discourse lies. This means that ‘nations’ do not represent ‘natural’ boundaries but are arbitrary divisions which involve a frequent articulation of the discourse of difference. Discourses of sameness and difference are particularly evident during times of war when binary categories such as good/evil, innocent/guilty come into forceful play in order to constitute who constitutes the ‘group’ and who is constructed as existing outside of it. Moreover, we may also look to Edward Said’s (1978) varied works on ‘Orientalism’ which drew on the ideas of Foucault to emphasise the relationship between power and knowledge in the construction of the Orient. The main argument here is that the Orient (the East) was constructed as an oppositional and negative term to Occident (the ‘West’). Said’s literary review of European writings sought to lay bare the relations of power between the coloniser and colonised, which emerged implicitly in texts proposing to depict a true representation of the Orient. Said suggested that colonialism was justified through the perpetuation of images representing the Orient as a mirror image of the West as inferior and alien concluding that this establishment of difference and exclusion is often the result of the operation of power rather than the consequence of some real differences. What is left ‘out’ or the constitutive outside is central to the process of consolidating what is inside. As Hall (1996:4-5 italics in original) further notes ‘it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what
has been called the constitutive outside that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term can be constructed’. This means that in a Foucauldian perspective, just as individual subjectivity emerges from prevailing discourses in a similar way group identity is also a product of a specific historical period and discursive formation negating the view that it is a natural distinction.

Although this issue of discursive categorisations of ‘them’ and ‘us’ as it relates to this particular study will taken up later in the study it is useful however to note that many recent studies have focused on the language of the US led ‘war on terror’ (Jackson 2005, Collet and Najem 2005). These more recent works provide a stark example of the way in which discursive strategies are used to conceptualise and construct polarisation between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Collet and Najem (2005) for instance, show how polarisation is constructed through the use of pairs of antonyms i.e. words opposite in meanings to construct the ‘us’-group the American people as ‘a great people’, ‘a great nation’, the ‘brightest beacon’, ‘strong, powerful and daring’. Collet and Najem (2005) demonstrate that these positive signs are juxtaposed to the negative construction of the ‘terrorist other' which function to depersonalise and dehumanise. In the contemporary communication age, such representations are able to quickly amass public legitimacy by acting on collective consciousness of recipients.
4.10 Exploring subject – positions

The construction of a subject by a specific discourse is referred to, in the literature, as a ‘subject-position’. Again, if we begin with the example of subject-positioning on an individual personal level the idea of subject-positions is that the discourse addresses the individual as a particular person, as a woman, a child, a criminal, a patient etc. When we accept the way we are being addressed, or the category we are being assigned we then become the person that the discourse refers to. Taking up a subject-position has far-reaching implications for individual subjectivity and experience in that they make available certain ways-of-seeing and certain ways-of-being in the world. In an influential paper Louis Althusser (1971), talked about the way that ideology creates or constructs ‘subjects’ by drawing people into particular positions or identities through ascribing characteristics, skills and attributes necessary for their social placement. Althusser called this process of being hailed or called up by a discourse as *interpellation*, arguing that we are positioned by discourse as particular kinds of individuals; our subjective experience is dependent on the positions we occupy. Taking up a position such as, ‘female’, or ‘father’ or ‘patriot’ means that we then come to experience life from these perspectives. Our subjectivity is affected to such an extent that ‘once we take up a subject position in discourse, we have available to us a particular, limited set of concepts, images, metaphors, ways of speaking, self-narratives and so on that we take on as our own’ (Burr 2003:119). Similarly, Hall (1996:6) views ‘identity’ as a (sometimes temporary) attachment to a subject position, a ‘chaining of the subject into the flow of the discourse’. The concept of subject-positions or positioning allows us to ask
questions about the relationship between discourse and subjectivity and how that relationship impacts individual and collective social practice.

We may extrapolate the concept of subject-positions more widely in order to argue that larger collectives such as nations and states may also be interpellated or ‘hailed’ into certain ways-of-seeing to the extent that ‘national experience’ emerges from the subject-position. As noted above, Said’s work is concerned with precisely this i.e. how a dominant discourse is able to position the western Self and impact subsequent interaction with the Other. Similarly, the work of Jackson (2005) and Doty (1993, 1996), although not explicitly referring to the concept of subject-positioning also seem to underscore how internalising a subject position which constructs the US as good, truthful and so on is effectual in terms of national experiences and subsequent action.

4.11 The emergence of knowledge: Foucault’s genealogy

Since discourses in Foucault’s view are pivotal in the construction of social reality, he offered a method of historical analysis that seeks to uncover, identify and trace discourses and their productivity. Foucault’s ‘genealogical’ approach to historical analysis, though not strictly a method, is particularly useful in terms of providing an overall framework; an approach or a lens through which the analyst can approach history and trace the development and effects of discourse. Foucault’s main concern was the operation of power in society, and the pivotal role of discourses in the
production of knowledge and power. The intricately intermeshed triad of discourse/power/knowledge remains the central theme throughout his works. Moreover, Foucault parted ways with the methodology of traditional historical analysis and instead looked to a ‘genealogical’ analysis to trace the development of knowledge’s and their power effects. In examining historical events, a genealogy differs from traditional historical analysis in two important ways in that its focus is the analysis of historical ‘descent’ and ‘emergence’. Foucault’s genealogy drawing on the work of Nietzsche challenged traditional ideas around the beginnings or origins of historical events. The genealogical focus of ‘descent’ disperses unity to reveal the multiplicity of events which lie behind historical beginnings. Foucault had major reservations around traditional notions of historical beginnings, or the idea that historical events, ideas, movements had a singular point of origin or a unity in their emergence. Foucault reveals the dispersion and disparity behind so-called ‘origins’ of events,

the accidents, the minute deviations…the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us;, it…discover[s] that truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents (Foucault 1977, in Smart 1985:56).

A genealogy disturbs the continuity marking a traditional historical analysis in order to uncover the instability, complexity and contingency around historical events. Secondly, in its focus on ‘emergence’ of an episteme or a world-view a genealogy
conceptualises such emergence not as a culmination of events but as a ‘particular momentary manifestation of the hazardous play of dominations’ (Smart 1985:57). Foucault conceived history as a constant struggle of dominations, a struggle between forces with ‘emergence’ as being merely transitory and fleeting. This schema has no place for the constituting individual since there is no one responsible for the emergence; it is, as Smart further notes, ‘an effect of the play of dominations’. A genealogical lens thus reveals no inevitability at work in history; indeed, Foucault argued that ‘no necessity determined that mad people would be regarded as mentally ill, that criminals should be imprisoned, or that the causes of illness were to be sought through the individual examination of bodies’ (Foucault, 1977 in Smart 1985:58). Foucault’s genealogy then focuses on this ‘play of dominations’, it seeks to reveal the complexity of factors, the procedures, practices and institutions which give rise to the establishment of an event. Within this framework there is no place for conceptions of destiny or the intentions of a constituting individual or any other regulative mechanism; instead, emergence of events owes to conflicts, chance and error, relations of power and their unintended consequences. This is radically different from traditional ways of researching history as a stable, uninterrupted continuity of human progress. Interestingly, Foucault does not conceive humanity as ‘progressing’ from war and combat to a more humane system of the rule of law, but as from one domination to another (Smart 1985). These ‘fleeting dominations’ Foucault talks of, are made possible through the constitutive quality of discourses and indeed we examined in the previous chapter how discourses make knowledge claims to such an extent that the picture they paint is often so normalised that it is usually referred to as ‘common sense’. Discourse analysis is thus vital in the genealogical framework since it problematises ‘common knowledge’ and seeks to
deconstruct by asking where and how that ‘knowledge’ emerged and with what power effects. It thus seeks to uncover how a particular domination or a system of thought comes to be seen as ‘knowledge’.

It is important however, to note that there is no precise methodology to genealogy; Foucault intentionally failed to prescribe methodology. Arguably, if he had ‘prescribed’, as in a systematised way, in which one must go about doing genealogy in order for it to be authentic then such a prescription would have fallen foul of his own critique of truth. On this point, O’Farrell (2005) notes that Foucault himself suggested that his work functions best as a tool box rather than a coherent system requiring a wholesale application. In the absence of method then, a genealogical analysis can be best conceived of as a lens through which one understands and conceives of historical events. There is thus no ‘one way’ of doing genealogy and as Foucault suggests analysts can draw on his ideas for instance, his ideas around the operation of power. The absence of method however, does not mean that analysts claiming their work to be genealogy inspired have free rein rather, any work that claims to be genealogical needs to accrue a focus on understanding history in the way that Foucault’s genealogy does - as a constant struggle between dominations with discourse as the pivotal factor in creating reality. In common with poststructuralism in general, genealogy does not seek a definitive account and endeavours to avoid the substitution of one ‘truth’ for another.

83 This study however, differs from Foucault in the sense that it also draws on critical realist theories in its understanding of how the ‘social’ is constituted in effect it also gives credence to the notion of the extra-discursive as playing a significant role. Though O’Farrell has suggested that Foucault does not specifically deny the existence of a material reality.
A genealogical historical analysis focuses its emphasis and concern on the development of discourse/knowledge and the power effects of these. Its analysis of history takes as its starting point the discourse as the most important object as opposed to traditional analysis whose starting point is usually a historical event/movement. By employing a genealogical lens and focussing on discourses the aim is to explore how discursive constructions construct the object, the ‘other’, we are therefore not looking for a particular historical event/movement as being the ‘source’ in terms of defining the ‘self’ and ‘other’. The aim is to trace the development of a discourse, to contextualise it, and to explore the effects of the constructions. However, it is important to note that this study is not an ‘application’ of Foucault’s genealogy; there is no precise template for application. Instead, the study draws on Foucault’s work around genealogy and borrows for instance, his ideas for instance to discuss how power operates in society through discourse.

4.12 Human Agency - Author or Actor?

The previous sections have highlighted the various ways that discourses can be implicated in the construction of legitimate knowledge and the exercise of power. There are two significant themes that clearly emerge form Foucault’s theorisations of discourse firstly, the power of discourse is such that it implicitly denies individual authorship, and secondly this conception of the power of discourse tends to be reductionist. Arguably then, Foucault may be described as a poststructuralist. For

For instance in the historical analysis of the hostility between India and Pakistan a Foucauldian genealogical analysis would not conceptualize the partition event of 1947 as the ultimate ‘source’ of hostility rather a genealogical analysis would seek to trace the historical development of hostile representations.
instance in his approach personhood as well as all other aspects of social reality are reduced to the operation of discourses reflecting an anti-realist philosophy. Foucault’s main argument is that social objects and subjects are, first and foremost, rooted in the prevailing discursive cultures. This anti-modernist view takes away power from the individual and instead locates it within the discourse. Foucault radically challenged the reasoning, rational individual of modernity suggesting instead that the human subject operates within the limits of a particular regime of truth and is subject to the constraining and enabling elements of discursive formations. Foucault proposed that it is discourse that produces knowledge and meaning and that human subjects almost act like mouthpieces by submitting to the rules and conventions outlined by a discourse. For Foucault, the subject,

can become the bearer of the kind of knowledge which discourse produces. It can become the object through which power is relayed but it cannot stand outside power/knowledge as its source and author (Hall 2001:79-80).

Foucault (1977) suggests that the ‘person’ is subjected and ultimately produced through the discourse; what he meant by this was that discourse constructs ‘subject-positions’, which are of course specific, to particular discursive regimes and historical periods. But the point Foucault is making is that, the discourse produces the desired attributes, characteristics etc. for the ‘mad man’ or the ‘criminal’ or the ‘father’ and so on. These figures ‘personify the particular forms of knowledge

85 Perhaps the best illustration of the way in which ‘subjects’ are constructed through knowledge can be seen in Discipline and Punish (1977) which consists of Foucault’s study of the emergence of the prison system in western societies.
which the discourse produces….[and] have the attributes we would expect as these are defined by the discourse’ (Hall 2001:80). Such a Foucauldian understanding of personal agency is often seen as sounding the ‘death of the subject’ (see Caldwell 2007, Edkins 1999, chapter 2).

Although as Hall (1996) notes, such a poststructuralist position though explaining the construction of subject positions within discursive formations is inadequate in explaining why certain positions are occupied by some individuals and not others. There is the danger here that we understand subject positions as boxes, which individuals occupy in an unproblematic fashion. The idea that discourses and ideologies ‘summon the subject’ into position is an overarching perhaps totalitarian notion possibly leading to an ‘overestimation of the efficacy of disciplinary power and to an impoverished understanding of the individual which cannot account for experiences that fall outside the realm of the “docile” body’ (McNay 1994 in Hall 1996:12). In their book: ‘Ideological Dilemmas’, Billig et al. (1998) sought to probelmatize the idea that prevailing ideologies in a society were in any way a coherent and integrated system. Instead, their argument was that, ideologies are essentially dilemmatic in nature offering two opposing sides to the thinking recipient so that a dominant ideology of individualism for instance already contains within it the idea of collectivism. The individual here is perceived as a rhetorician; a debater and someone open to exploring contrary implications of ideas (Burr 2003) as opposed to Foucault’s ‘docile’ body (Edkins 1999, chapter 3).
Discursive psychologists have also tried to move away from notions of ideology as wholly imposing on the passive individual. Davis and Harre (2001) for instance focus on the way that individuals shape their own subjectivity; their focus is on exploring local interaction and on the active way in which individuals choose and take up certain positions whilst offering alternative positions to other people within the interaction. The view here is that the person engages actively in choosing subject positions and the discourse does produce the individual but that individuals also manipulate discourse to suit their purposes. Perspectives focusing more on linguistic performativity and other aspects of situated language in use tend to over-emphasise the power of individuals in terms of constructing versions of social reality through their talk and by choosing to employ particular interpretative repertoires or linguistic resources as opposed to other available resources. Such approaches tend to look at the way individuals deliberately make use of some interpretative repertoires and dominant discourses to frame their own experience whilst avoiding other discourses, and perhaps offering those alternative positions to other people. The human subject, for discursive psychologists, is seen as ‘active’ and not a mere puppet in the hands of discourse, since at any one time there exist any number of discourses to choose from. Davis and Harre’s approach reserves the ‘individuality of the person; one’s personal history and unique life experiences will influence the extent to which we want to occupy and feel able to occupy particular positions within interactions’ (Burr 2003:114).

In contrast, a theoretical approach which views individuals as merely puppets of a discourse takes us far away from modernity’s ‘rational’ individual leaving very little space to conceptualise how bodies take up discourses. In this context, Foucault’s
portrayal of the ‘docile body’ just waiting to be taken up by a subject-position has been heavily criticized. Interestingly though, Burr (2003) does suggest that Foucault’s notion of the micro-physics of power affords ‘power’ to each and every individual; since that power is exercised each and every time the individual confirms the message of prevailing discourses through social practice. Indeed Foucault viewed resistance as part and parcel of every dominant discourse suggesting that dominant discourses were never entirely secure in their claims to truth and resistance existed at some level wherever a dominant discourse prevailed. After all, as Burr (2003:80) notes, if the notion that ‘a woman’s place is in the home were really secure in its position as prevailing truth, there would be no need to keep asserting it’. Nevertheless, Foucault’s social analysis does not directly engage with questions around the relationship between human agency and discourse; his approach tending to posit discourse as all-pervasive and singularly significant.

Those taking a more critical realist approach to social construction also find poststructuralism’s docile body, and Cromby and Nightingale (1999:10-11) argue that,

[I]n continually either ignoring the body or treating it as a mere metaphor or text, social constructionism obscures and downplays the significance of its functional, physiological, hormonal, anatomical and phenomenological aspects… [if all] aspects of all bodies must be so similar, so malleable before discourse, that they may as well not be there: if the body can be anything, it might as well be nothing.
Such criticism emanates from critical realism’s deep scepticism of poststructuralist theories, which can lead to mono-causal explanations of a complex social reality. However, critical realism’s main contention with approaches emanating from a broadly poststructuralist vein is their anti-realist\textsuperscript{86} stance. Instead, critical realists stress the relevance and penetration of the extra-discursive on the discursive realm and are critical of poststructuralism’s failure to consider and acknowledge the impact of extra-discursive structures and mechanisms. The kind of constructivism that a critical realist philosophy engenders is sceptical of the discursive reductionism that poststructuralist approaches encourage. The discussion below will now seek to consider the critical realist critique of poststructuralism and discuss how critical realist insights can provide for a more wholesome constructivist analysis.

4.13 Critical realist critique of poststructuralism

Much of poststructuralism is informed by an epistemological position that views sceptically the notion that an independent, external or extra-discursive reality can be accessed and finds particularly problematic the idea that an external, objective dimension of reality is somehow reflected in our talk. Such a philosophical stance postulates that a material reality composed of natural events and structures cannot have any intrinsic value in and of itself; we do not in other words un-problematically experience an objective ‘reality’, instead, we can only come to experience a material

\textsuperscript{86} Poststructuralists do not deny the existence of a external, independent reality for instance, rather their argument is that ‘reality’ cannot be grasped or accessed outside of our texts and discourse.
reality through our talk and representation of it. Although the specific existence of an external reality is not denied, such as the existence of natural and physical structures of the world, the argument is that the only way we can apprehend these structures is through language since meaning and value is established through discourse. Laclau and Mouffe (1985 in Burr 2003:89) sum up this point of view,

the fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’ depends upon the structuring of a discursive field.

What this means is that such things as the existence of God, or the truth/falsity of a statement are seen as relative to the individual, social group or culture within which the particular concept is located, therefore countering all claims to universalism or universal truths. Indeed, ‘truths’ for relativism are not the result of an external objective reality but the function of locally and historically contingent values, norms, social practices and beliefs. Thus for poststructuralism, ‘there is no truth to be found outside of the language in which such ‘truths’ arise (that is, no extra-discursive things, processes or reality in which such truths may be grounded)’ (Cromby and Nightingale 1999:208). The argument thus runs that, if we cannot directly ‘know’ a material reality outside of our talk of it – it is incorrect to acknowledge or theorise
about it. Consequently, scientific inquiry should not concern itself with ‘a pointless and futile search for the factual, but with an exploration of the textual and linguistic ways in which we describe and construct our world’ (Nightingale and Cromby 1999:212). A critique of this poststructuralist approach is that it encourages theoretical closure in that its social inquiry posits discourse and language as the only significant frameworks of analysis. It can be argued that this epistemology affords a groundless constructionism, one that is delinked from the historical, material and social conditions of its emergence, as Nightingale and Cromby (1999:215 italics in original) explain,

[I]n short, a discourse analysis explicitly grounded in relativism can be seen as a useful tool in certain circumstances, but is method that will ultimately fail to describe or explain anything other than the locally contingent aims of particular instances of talk. It is a useful method in certain circumstances, but even within these circumstances can never afford more than a partial, textually contingent analysis of the particular functional aims of a particular piece of talk.

Although many poststructuralists have defended an epistemological relativism (Edwards et al. 1995), it is perhaps critical realism that has posed the most significant challenge to an unrestrained commitment to epistemological relativism within poststructuralist approaches, and the notion that discursive theorizing is sufficient in adequately explaining complex social realities. Nightingale and Cromby (1999:9-10) note that a realization that,
our world is socially constructed need not force us to adopt a promiscuous and unbridled relativism [instead rather than attempting to universalise relativism] we should…embark upon the far more difficult and dangerous task of attempting to forge a coherent and grounded social constructionism that explains the world, in all its extra-discursive intransigence and mess.

The central critique of critical realism focuses on epistemological relativism’s inconsideration toward material conditions of existence which critical realism theorizes as effecting our social constructions.

4.14 A stratified ontological framework

Critical realism is best described as a general philosophy of science with its development most commonly associated with the work of Roy Bhaskar (1978, 1979, 1989). The basic contention of this approach to science is that an external world exists and is independent of our representations of it. Social reality is not conceived as a one dimensional phenomena; rather, what is critical to this approach is its conception of social reality as stratified and layered. Bhaskar divides social reality into three distinct layers, which have to be distinguished in order for us to understand how things work. The three levels being, the ‘real’ /‘deep’, the ‘actual’ and the ‘empirical’ as the figure below demonstrates.
A stratified social reality

Empirical: perceptions, impressions, sensation

Actual: events, state of affairs (conditions)

Deep/Real: structures, mechanism, powers/liabilities

Figure 1: A Stratified Social Ontology

A critical realist stratified ontology is constituted by a ‘deep’ or ‘real’ level of reality’, which consists of the intransitive dimensions of the world. At the basic level, critical realism makes a distinction between *intransitive* dimensions of knowledge referring to those objects such as physical processes, structures or social structures that exist at the deep level of reality and which may, but are often not, observable. Bhaskar (1978:22), contends that intransitive objects are not dependent on human observations or our knowledge of them, ‘they are the real things and structures, mechanisms and processes, events and possibilities of the world; and for the most part they are quite independent of us’. Thus in the absence of our knowledge about
these intransitive objects of the world they would however, be unaffected. Bhaskar (1978:22) writes,

the tide would still turn and metals conduct electricity…without a Newton or a Drude to produce our knowledge of them. The Wiedemann-Franz law would continue to hold although there would be no-one to formulate, experimentally establish or deduce it.

The contention is that although these aspects of the world exist on a level in which they appear in discourse they are however not conceptualised as being reducible to it. The argument is that they exist regardless of how we represent or ascribe meaning to them. For Bhaskar (1978:250) ‘descriptions belong to the world of society and of men [sic]; objects belong to the world of nature. We express [our understanding of] nature in thought’. This deeper dimension of social reality is distinguished from the ‘actual’ level of reality, which is that realm of reality that is triggered by the activities of mechanisms and structures existing in the real/deep level. This is the reality that happens when the ‘real’ is activated; examples could include the death of a public figure or an increase in crime rates. Finally, the empirical strata of social reality refers to the transitive realm and refers to the discourses and theories that are socially produced about the intransitive objects. The empirical level of reality consists of observable events that are manifested in experience and discourse. This is not to say that critical realism rejects epistemological relativism in totality; rather, it embraces such a framework but in the same instance it combines it with an ontological realism or an insistence for depth ontological inquiry. In this sense, an
underlying reality provides the conditions of possibility both for actual events and perceived phenomena. The insistence on something that is ‘real’ in the world is not new rather as Bhaskar (1989:2) argues ‘all philosophies, cognitive discourses and practical activities presuppose a realism - in the sense of some ontology or general account of the world- of one kind or another’. All approaches whether linguistic or empirical presuppose a form of realism albeit in these cases being a focus on ‘surface’, in other words, a consideration of ‘real’ as only those things that appear on the surface in terms of either observed regularity patterns or identifiable discourses.

For a critical realist social investigation a study of the upper levels of reality (the empirical level) is warranted however, at the same time it is very important to recognise the stratified nature of reality and tease apart the different ontological layers in order to arrive at a more comprehensive and plausible social analysis. Bhaskar (1978:58-62) is highly critical of the practice of anthropocentrism or the collapsing of the three levels of reality into one ‘flat’ reality. For Bhaskar, this is a flawed approach to social reality because of the way in which it ties ‘existence’ to its being experienced or being spoken.

### 4.15 Critical realism and non-Humean causality

Further, if what we are saying is that the deeper levels of social reality consists of mechanisms, processes and structures that ‘effect’ the upper levels of reality observable in the empirical domain then, in essence, we are putting forward a model of causality. This means that we hypothesis that deeper levels of social reality are

---

87 Empirical and linguistic.
causally connected to their empirical manifestations. Indeed, this is exactly the line that critical realism adopts, and in this connection it puts forward a conception of causal analysis that is non-Humean in the sense that it does not rely on empiricism or the notion of regularity as the main criteria for determining cause in the social sciences. It is useful to consider the close association between causal analysis and empiricism in order to demonstrate how a critical realism radically re-conceptualises causation within the social sciences by detaching cause from an exclusive association with an empiricist philosophy. Empiricism’s close attachment to the concept of causal analysis can be traced to David Hume’s eighteenth century philosophy which, in critiquing metaphysics, argued that reliable and valid knowledge could only be based on direct, observable empirical events rather than human speculation and perception. The basis of attributing ‘cause’ was the observance of ‘constant conjunction’ of events so that anything that did not fulfil such criteria could not be deemed as ‘causing’. The Humean philosophy of causation became extremely influential not only within the natural sciences but also in the social sciences. Behaviourist social scientists for instance aggressively associated ‘cause’ with observable regularities. Milja Kurki (2007:194) notes, that the influence of the Humean concept of cause is such that although many social scientists accept the legitimacy of qualitative methods and data, ‘yet most social scientists are still adamant that only careful observation of regularities (even if ‘localised’ regularities) can give us an adequate understanding of human action and society’. This meant that many types of data such as qualitative and historical data and methods such as discourse analysis tend to be side-lined mainly because they are unable to fulfil the obsession with empirical regularity.

---

Critical realism however, advances a radically anti-Humean understanding of causation and this is because it’s stratified ontology postulates the existence of an often unobservable deeper level of reality consisting of underlying structures, powers and tendencies that provide the conditions of possibility for actual observable events, regularities and experienced phenomena. The critical point here is that although the underlying deeper level of reality is not observable nevertheless it is conceptualised as generative or in other words potentially ‘causing’. Criticising an empiricist insistence that entities need to be observable in order to qualify as ‘real’ Bhaskar (1978:179-180) argues that,

if an entity cannot be perceived…does this mean that it cannot be known to exist..?..entities may be known to exist indirectly, viz. through the perception of their effects. The paradigm here is the case of the detection of radio-active material by a Geiger counter, of electricity by an electroscope, of a magnetic field by a compass needle…(.). It should be stressed that in the detection case that something does exist producing the effect is not in question. Nor is the fact that it exists and acts independently of its detection. To say ‘electricity is what electricity does’ is to collapse powers to their exercise. Electricity is not what electricity does; but what it can do. The mode of reasoning employed in inferring the existence of causal agents through the ostension\(^{89}\) of their effects in thus perfectly proper.

---

\(^{89}\) Ostension – conveying the meaning of a term by pointing out examples, for example defining ‘red’ by pointing out red objects, apples, roses etc.
In Bhaskar’s conception of causality, ‘causes’ can be unobservable and hence causal analysis cannot be dependent on perception alone; critical realism challenges the assumption that causal analysis is singularly dependent on empirical observation of regular patterns. Bhaskar (1978:12) has argued that while empirical regularity may be indicative of causal structures nevertheless regularity per se is not deemed necessary nor significant for establishing a causal explanation. Critical realism, as Kurki (2007:365) suggests, seeks ‘not to describe observed patterns, but to give an account of the underlying causal powers that explain why the patterns of facts we observe exist’. In this sense, a critique of a rigid empiricist framework of analysis is that social investigations, as a result, can be intently focussed on identifying observed regularities and correlations but are unable to explain important ‘depth’ questions relating to why event-regularities occur.

A critical realist conceptual framework relates ‘causal powers’ to the object’s nature or its liabilities and characteristic ways of acting. Sayer (1992:105) explains,

a plane can fly by virtue of its aerodynamic form, engines etc.; gunpowder can explode by virtue of its unstable chemical structure; multinational firms can sell their products dear and buy their labour cheap by virtue of operating in several countries… whether these powers/tendencies are realised in the actual and empirical domains is irrelevant to the question of their existence in the real; structures and mechanisms have causal powers whether these are empirically actualised or not; indeed non-realisation cannot signify non-existence.
On this view then, as Sayer (1992:105) notes, ‘a causal claim is not about a regularity between separate things or events but about what an object is like and what it can do and only derivatively what it will do in any particular situation’. Critical realism is concerned with the properties of structures, mechanisms and processes, in effect, their potentialities. The intransitive dimension of the world is thus not reducible to events or patterns, and it is: structures, powers and tendencies that are designated in causal laws. Critical realism postulates a disjunction between an object’s possession of causal power and liabilities and its actual realisation, thus rejecting a notion of Humean constant conjunctions. Sayer (1992: 107 italics in original) explains,

Whether a causal power or liability is actually activated or suffered on any occasion depends on conditions whose presence and configuration are contingent. Whether a person actually works might depend on whether there is a job for him/her. Whether gunpowder ever does explode depends on it being in the right conditions – in the presence of a spark, etc. so although causal powers exist necessarily by virtue of the nature of the objects which possess them, it is contingent whether they are ever activated or exercised…the relationship between causal powers or mechanisms and their effects is therefore not fixed, but contingent; indeed causal powers exist independently of their effects.

Critical realism thus disentangles causality from an empiricist philosophy and its entailing mechanistic ‘when A then B’ criterion, and causes are loosely defined as
‘all those things that bring about, produce, direct or contribute to states of affairs or changes in the world’ (Kurki 2006:202). To ask for the cause of something is to ask, ‘what makes it happen’, what ‘produces’, ‘generates’, ‘creates’, or ‘determines’ it, or more weakly, what ‘enables’ or ‘leads to’ it (Sayer 1992:104).

4.16 Causality in the social sciences

Since the notion of ‘cause’ is a key concept with critical realist theorising, it would be useful to briefly discuss how this notion has been conceptualised within postpositivist IR writings. Kurki (2008) argues that the notion of ‘causation’ has unnecessarily become a problematic idea within IR owing to an inadvertent acceptance of a Humean causal model as the only account of ‘how things are caused’. Within the positivist method, observable regularities between two or more variables in the context of an objective, mind-independent external reality denote causal relations between the variables. This account of establishing causality between variables has been directly influenced by Humean ontological assumptions. Causal models have thus traditionally been associated with positivist science, and as a consequence many postpositivists including poststructuralists and constructivists have on the whole been sceptical and dismissive of employing casual terminology in their social accounts. Indeed, one of the key elements of the poststructuralist critique of positivism is its adherence to the notion that correlations of variables are sufficient in establishing ‘cause’ in the social world. Instead, poststructuralists draw attention to the way in which the ‘variables’ (such as a specific social action) that positivism studies are not unproblematic rather they are constituted by meanings,
interpretations, norms and discourses. The postpositivist critique of positivism entails a general rebuffing of the notion of ‘cause’ in the social sciences particularly linear and narrow conceptions of cause. Kurki (2008:124-125) radically challenges this position arguing that such opposition to ‘cause’ is flawed she explains,

This is because when they [postpositivists] reject causal analysis, they reject it on the basis of having accepted, often inadvertently, core Humean assumptions regarding the nature of causation. The inability of more radical reflectivists, as well as of most constructivists, to conceptualise causation beyond the assumption of Humeanism has some important consequences. It leads to a paradoxical legitimisation of the Humean empiricist conception of causation in IR, as well as certain theoretically reductionist tendencies. Also, it leads to blindness towards non-Humean causal assumptions: the reflectivists and constructivists make a number of claims that seem common-sensically causal, yet cannot be understood as causal because of the dominance of the Humean conception of what it means to talk about causes.

Kurki points out that, in rejecting the concept of causation in the social sciences postpositivists inadvertently accept that a Humean model of causal relations is the only valid way to engage with ‘causes’. This is not to say however that constructivists have not (implicitly) engaged with some kind of ‘causality’. Although critical strands of IR have engaged with the discursive contexts within which the international objects they study are located; there is however, a strong reluctance in employing causality terminology in such expositions. Jackson (2007:396) for instance, in
examining the post 2001 US discourse, in terms of its construction of the ‘terrorist’, argues that he adopts a ‘interpretive logic rather than a causal logic’; similarly Campbell (1992:4) in his study of the discursive links between discourse and the outbreak of war in Bosnia during the 1990s suggests that his position is opposed to ‘cataloguing, calculating and specifying “real causes”’. For poststructuralists in particular, the suggestion that discursive constructions are affected or ‘caused’ by extra-discursive factors is abhorrent. Interestingly however, Kurki (2006:198-199) notes that many critical theorists in IR already implicitly engage in causal analysis citing Robert Cox’s work in particular Kurki argues that,

Cox’s account of world politics seems to be based on careful outlining of ‘forces’ - material, ideational, and institutional – that ‘produce’ and ‘shape’ the world order and agents’ actions within it. However, Cox describes the layered and interacting structural forces, not as causes, but as ‘pressures and constraints’. It could be argued that to the extent that this terminology implies a ‘productive’ meaning, and is drawn upon to explain ‘why’ things happen in certain ways rather than other, Cox is making ‘common-sensically’ or implicitly causal claims.

The problem here, in terms of the refusal to explicitly engage with causality models, is for Kurki (2006) an understanding of causality exclusively in Humean terms i.e. the notion that empirical regularity is the bedrock of causal relations and that causality can only be understood in terms of mechanistic ‘when A then B’ terms.
Interestingly, Kurki’s work offers a useful ‘genealogy’ of how ‘cause’ as a concept came to be understood exclusively in Humean terms.

Such association between ‘cause’ and empiricism is even more problematic from a critical realist perspective especially since this approach posits a clear distinction between different layers of reality and advocates not only the existence of a ‘real’, unobservable level of reality, but proposes that analysts need to theorise about this deeper level of reality in order to account for surface events. The existence of ‘generative’ structures within the deeper levels of reality is a key concept within critical realism and which is connected to social patterns and trends on the observable level of reality. In essence then, the argument that critical realism makes is one of ‘causality’ i.e. that generative mechanisms are causal in the social world albeit not in the Humean-empiricist sense. Thus from a critical realist perspective, a cause does not need to be actualised in the empirical domain (or that which we can directly observe); this is because regularity is not theorized as a necessary condition of ascribing ‘cause’. Rather, critical realism works with the notion that a structure can possess causal powers, even though these may never be actualised. Causality is not necessarily related to regularity. For Kurki (2008:170),

[the] separation of real causes from their empirical facets allows the critical realists to escape the distinctly Humean problem of studying mere observables, which has severely limited the appeal of causal explanations in the social world. With the help of the philosophically realist account of causation, the critical realists can learn to recognise the casual role of unobservables – such as
ideas, rules, discourses – that social sciences have tended to frame as non-causal.

Kurki argues for the reclaiming of causality for the social sciences and developing a more broader non-positivist theory of cause in which empirical regularity and the natural science experiment focusing on a mechanistic ‘if A then B’ criteria is not the only way to establish causal relations.

Theoretically then, the notion of ‘causality’ is central to a critical realist orientation since unobservable generative structures existing in the ‘deep’ levels of reality are conceptualised as shaping and conditioning to some extent discourses, representations, norms and on. Since deeper levels of reality are not directly observable, and may often only be accessed or theorized about through conceptual abstractions and transcendental argumentation, it is clear then, that empiricism cannot fit in here. However, this does not mean that the causality as a concept need be abandoned indeed as Kurki has demonstrated in compelling fashion a non-Humean model of causality ‘works’ with critical realism.

4.17 How can critical realism enhance a constructivist analysis?

In order to clarify the theoretical position here particularly in terms of how critical realism can contribute to a more plausible and comprehensive social investigation it
is important to discuss more thoroughly the potential contribution of critical realism to a constructivist analysis\(^{90}\). As the discussion above explored, critical realism concentrates on the potentialities or the properties of generative mechanisms in the real domain; the aim of science not being deductive in the sense that constant conjunctions are sought out but ‘science’ aiming to identify and explain the powers, structures and tendencies that afford the course of events (or the actual and empirical layers of reality). However, this is only one side of the critical realist equation because the ontological realism postulating the possibility of causality is combined with the kind of epistemological relativist arguments discussed in previous sections especially concerning the sociology of knowledge or the idea that all beliefs are socially produced through discourse and hence are potentially fallible. However, this is a qualified view since from a critical realist perspective socially produced knowledge is ‘knowledge of an independently existing reality, knowledge is not totally arbitrary and some claims about the nature of this reality may provide better accounts than others’ (Patomaki and Wight 2000:224). Bhaskar’s critical realism can be seen to be combining epistemological relativism with an ontological realism paving the way for more holistic and plausible explanations of the social world.

Bhaskar (1978:24) notes,

\[\text{[An]}\text{ adequate philosophy of science must be capable of sustaining and reconciling both aspects of science; that is, of showing how science is a transitive process, dependent upon ancedental knowledge and the efficient}\]

\(^{90}\) It is useful to note here that although constructivism in IR acknowledges the roles of agency and structure within a discursive explanation of the objects of IR, there is a lack in theoretical grounding in terms of how one is to conceptualise the dialect between discourse, structure and agency. In this respect critical realism offers an important theoretical grounding and methodology to constructivist thought.
activity of men, has intransitive objects which depend upon neither. That is, it must be capable of sustaining both (1) the social character of science and (2) the independence from science of the objects of scientific thought.

It is useful to note that although constructivist perspectives within the field of international relations conceptualise a dialect between discourse, structure and agency in the production of world politics, it is notable that the dialect itself is arguably under-theorised within IR. It is here, in terms of offering a robust theoretical framework, within which to conceptualise the dialect between structure, agency and discourse in the production of world politics that critical realism is most useful. In order to bring into sharper focus the potential contribution of critical realism to constructivist investigations it would be useful to draw on the structure-agency debate within the social sciences in order to demonstrate how critical realism theorises the production of social life and can be differentiated from poststructuralist approaches and materialist positions. This discussion will seek to demonstrate how critical realism offers a useful synthesis of both approaches in considering the production of social reality and how it can further enhance a constructivist approach.

The structure-agency debate is extremely contentious with two differing and somewhat polarized camps each positing their arguments as authentic on the debate of whether structure or alternatively, human agency is at the heart of social life. On one end of the spectrum is a materialist reductionist argument which postulates that structures have a real existence and are comparable to real, material things, and that such overarching paradigms are the prime drivers shaping social reality. In this
context, Althusser’s (1971) exclusive focus on the power of ‘ideological state apparatus’ may be described as a discursive reductionist argument, and is similar in many ways to the material reductionism of Marx. What is critical to these approaches is the way in which their social analyses’ is devoid of human agency, and social reality is reduced to being a result of social structures. The ‘death of the subject’ as implied in much of Foucault’s work is similar since there is an absence of the human subject in constructing social reality whilst discourse is afforded a pre-eminent position within this framework. Such focus on the regulatory powers of discourse can also be described as a linguistically reductionist account of social reality. On the other hand, and at the other end of the spectrum there is another kind of reductionism taking place, which we may refer to as agency reduction. For this approach, a rational, intentional human agency acts in light of how s/he interprets the world and these actions together make up a social structure (such as society) however, the critical point here is that such an agency is not conceptualised as being influenced in any meaningful way by social structure. Social reality, in this conception, is the result of uninfluenced intentional human action and interaction. What is critical to both these accounts of social reality is that they reduce social reality to either human agency or discursive/material structures.

In an attempt to create a synthesis between these opposing camps the theory of structuration, developed by Anthony Giddens (1984), proposes that structure and agency are actually two sides of the same coin, and that a dichotomy does not exist between the two; rather, they are mutually inseparable. There is a continuous dialect conceived here between people and society, people create society and society creates people in a circular fashion so that structure and agency are so fundamentally
intertwined that it is impossible to analytically separate the two. Although Giddens theory of structuration attempts to reconcile opposing camps; from the critical realist perspective there is a fundamental flaw in Giddens fusion of the concepts of structure and agency. Archer (1995), has argued that while individualism is committed to the error of voluntarism through ignoring the pre-existence of society, and the collectivist to the error of reification through ignoring the activity dependence of society; Giddens ‘central conflation’ on the other hand by fusing together both structure and agency ultimately works to deprive both structure and agency of their relative autonomy and causal powers thus in effect it commits both errors.

It is useful to explore a little further why Archer (ibid), who taking a critical realist stance, criticizes Gidden’s conception of the dialect between agency and structure. The critical realist starting point in terms of addressing the structure-agency debate is the recognition that structure and agency though intimately related are nevertheless separate things. This is an important qualification. Bhaskar clarifies this conception of the relation between structure and agency through the development of the Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) which seeks to engage with this debate. For a start, structures pre-exist and provide the raw material or the conditions for human action. This is not to suggest that agents are simply bearers of structure, but to argue that since individuals are ‘thrown’ into a pre-existing social context it is important for scientific inquiry to explore the way in which structures enable and constrain social activity (Joseph 2007). As Danemark et al. (2002:180) note,
one cannot say that individuals create society out of nothing – we may instead regard them as reproducing or transforming it. If social structures already exist, actions can only modify them – and the whole set of actions maintains or changes them.

In this vein then, we can argue that social and physical arrangements such as poverty, capitalist working conditions, power relations in the international arena, religious institutions, state systems, and so forth, though many initially socially constructed, once set up varyingly impinge by placing limitations on further constructions. Parker (1992:36) contemplates whether we can deny that capitalism as an over-arching system provides the raw material from which we structure our understanding of the world and our life experiences? He notes that,

industrial workers are physically located for much of their time together with others, and certain types of collective action make sense. In patriarchal societies in the West, women are physically located in homes for much of the time and certain types of collective action do not make sense. In a world organized by structures of imperialism, victims outside and inside the industrial centres can only act, accept, or resist, in particular ways.

Along the same lines, Willig (1999:45) argues that ‘underlying, relatively enduring structures, such as biochemical, economic or social structures’ provide the raw material or the context within which we structure our understanding of the world.
The existence of these structures and the events that they produce means that some ways of making sense of them, some constructions, are more likely than others. This is not to be seen as a reductionist relationship in that material conditions determine our constructions, but that such certain conditions ‘afford’ some constructions more readily than others’ (Willig 1999). Furthermore, discourses, norms and representations that make up social structures also give rise to materially embodied social relations. The argument is that a social structure (such as capitalism, the family, the international system) is made up of rules and discourses which define social positions and social relations. However, a social structure cannot be reduced to a definition that emphasises mere ‘rule-following’ rather, social structures (on the basis of the rules, discourse) also creates material conditions that enable and constrain agents. Such a conceptualisation of the properties of a structure allows the researcher to make an analytical distinction between enabling and constraining discourses within social structures and the enabling and constraining properties of material conditions of existence. Indeed, both are conceptualised as co-causal. For example, the (hierarchical) family structure (with its base in historical discourses and representation) gives rise to, or creates the requisite material conditions within which the parent is enabled to allow or withhold finance in relation to the young adult who is also part of the family. This material condition then constrains the young adult in terms of his/her social action. Similarly, the structure of patriarchy is such that in addition to being a concept-dependent phenomena it also creates the material conditions (through the organisation of space for instance) by which it becomes ‘easier’ or ‘natural’ for women to be excluded from the workplace. In this way, social structures and the social positions and social relations they give rise to are materially embodied (in that they materially ‘effect’). This view is in contrast to
some poststructuralists that tend to reduce social life or social structures to ‘ways of thinking’ (norms, rules, discourses); instead critical realists draw attention to the ‘pre-existence and the material embodiment and properties of social relations’ (Kurki 2008:212).

Thus, causal powers of structures are distinct from the activity of agents even if they cannot exist without agential activity. Patomaki and Wight (2000:231) write that,

> All social reproduction and/or transformation takes place under conditions and relations inherited from the past. These conditions and relations represent the already established character of social forms that have been reproduced and/or transformed in the past and which confront new generations of individuals as obdurate structural contexts which constitute actors and action-possibilities as well as inspire, encourage, and reward certain forms of behaviour and dishearten, discourage, and punish others. As such, these structural contexts entail relations of power and authority, which constitute and influence social activity in these settings and the wider contexts within which these settings are embedded.

Whilst structure is a pre-requisite of human action; nevertheless, structures cannot endure automatically; rather they can only do so when people reproduce them. For Bhaskar, reproduction of structure is rarely intentional, for instance, when two people marry they do not seek to ‘intentionally’ reproduce the nuclear family
similarly, people do not go to work to ‘intentionally’ reproduce the capitalist economy; rather these are the unintentional consequences of intentional activities. In this conception, although agential action both intentional and rule-governed is critical to the emergence and reproduction of social structures nevertheless individual action can only be understood in the context of a pre-existing social structural context.

Arguably, although Bhaskar’s critical realism lacks some conceptual clarification in terms of fully theorising the role and scope of agency in social structures nevertheless, his ideas provide for, and allow for an appreciation of agential power within social theorisations. In this context, Joseph (2007:358) writes that,

while structures depend upon human actions for their reproduction, these actions are already conditioned by the structures in a way which the actors are seldom aware of. This is not to say that agents do not act consciously, but their conscious actions generally are at a surface level rather than a deep one…consequently, agents act consciously within practices, the effect of which is the unconscious or unintended reproduction of deeper (ontologically distinct) social structures.

Bhaskar (1979) has sought to clarify his conception of the relationship between agent and structure through the development of a ‘Transformational Model of Social Activity’ (TMSA) he summarises his basic conception,
people do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and is a necessary
condition for their activity. Rather, society must be regarded as an ensemble of
structures, practices and conventions which individuals reproduce or transform,
but which would not exist unless they did so. Society does not exist
independently of human activity (the error of reification). But it is not the
product of it (the error of voluntarism). ...Society, then, provides the necessary
conditions for intentional human action, and intentional human action is a
necessary condition for it. Society is only present in human action, but human
action always expresses and utilizes some or other social form.

The TMSA model proposes that although social structures and individuals are
contingent upon each other in that they are mutually constitutive\textsuperscript{91} nevertheless they
are ‘different kind of things’ (Bhaskar 1979:33). Social structure provides the basis
or the conditions for agential action in the first place whilst at the same time social
structure is re(produced) by the agent. Despite an intimate relation however, social
structure is not conceptualized as reducible to individual action – structure is
conceptualized as enabling and constraining patterns of organization which the
individual reproduces often unintentionally through their activities (work marriage).
Bhaskar’s conception of the interaction between structure and agency is
demonstrated in the figure below.

\textsuperscript{91} As does Giddens ‘theory of structuration’.\
However, if the argument is that society ‘stands to individuals, then, as something that they never make, but that exists only in virtue of their activity (Bhaskar 1979:34)’

"then one may ask where and how in Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) does human agency operate? We have established that structures in the critical realist conception are imbued with irreducible causal powers however, it is important that we also recount that critical realism certainly does not reduce agency to structure; instead from a critical realist approach, human agency possesses its own distinct properties and powers which interact with structure but are not reducible to it. Sayer (1992:105) argues that, ‘people have the causal powers of being able to work (‘labour power’), speak, reason, walk, reproduce, etc., and a host

---

92 Individuals do not create society as they please (the error of voluntarism), nor does society completely determine the individual (the error of reifying social structures).

93 Despite the contention that structure precedes agency.
of causal liabilities, such as susceptibility to group pressure, extremes of temperature, etc.’ Moreover, causal powers are sometimes also derived from social positions that the individual may occupy in a social structure an example here could be the doctor-patient relation in which the doctor’s power is not derived from his or her characteristics as an individual but from the social position he or she occupies in the social structure.

In this connection Archer (1995) building on Bhaskar’s conception of the interplay between structure-agency places the TMSA model in a time dimension which can help to further clarify the critical realist position and particularly how agency fits into the equation here.
Analytical cycles in the interplay between social structure and agency

Structure

(1) 

T1

Interaction

(2) 

T2   T3

Structural elaboration

(3) 

T4

(T1)

Figure 3: Analytical cycles

Source: Archer 1995:76

94 Although Archer’s (1995) depiction of the interplay between social structure and agency takes the shape of a string nevertheless, as Danemark et al. (2002:182) note, Figure 3 may be seen as a cycle rather than a string, in the sense that the reproduced or transformed structure (the elaboration) becomes the condition underlying the next interaction (T1), and so the cycle continues.
For Archer (1995), in a linear time sequence the concept of structure (T1) comes first and has the power to enable and constrain human action. Secondly, within these enabling and constraining conditions human action and interaction takes place (T2 -T3). Finally, in the third phase and as a result of human action the process of transformation and reproduction of the structure occur (T4). The resulting structure which has been either reproduced or transformed (Archer’s term for this is ‘structural elaboration’) then becomes the subsequent conditioning structure of the next human interaction (T1), and so the cycle continues. For Archer, social reality is emergent over time and resulting from the interplay between structure and agency. In this conception, structure and agency are not reducible to each other, but possess different properties and powers. The interplay between them means that they can potentially impact and transform each other and the resultant social reality is emergent over time. It is important to note that these are analytical distinctions and are not directly observable. One of Archer’s central critique of Giddens (1984) is that, the act of conflating these distinctions cannot allow for a study of the interaction between the phases that produce social life. For Danermark et al. (2002:182),

the most productive contribution to social practice that social science can make…. is the examination of social structures, their powers and liabilities, mechanisms and tendencies, so that people, groups and organisations may consider them in their interaction and so – if they wish- strive to change or eliminate existing social structures and to establish new ones.

95 Note that reproduction and transformation of structures owing to human agency is not immediately visible, in the sense that it occurs at the moment of the actual action rather it becomes apparent that the structure has changed after some time has elapsed.
The main difference between a critical realist approach to structure-agency and that proposed by Giddens (1984) is that the latter collapses the analytical distinction between the two, to the extent that neither agent nor structure can be analytically or methodologically separable. This conflation of structure and agency is problematic. Firstly, in failing to recognize the ontologically distinct characteristics of structure and agency the interplay of the two is ignored; secondly, this approach does not conceptualise that structural constraints predate intersubjective interaction and so cannot account for the causal emergence of institutional, normative and discursive factors that precede agential interaction. On the other hand, a critical realist approach maintains that the two (structure and agency) though belonging to the same process nevertheless, occupy distinctly different and separable strata. The critical realist insistence on maintaining a dichotomy between the two is based on the idea that both structure and agency each possess separate powers and properties (which cannot be reduced to the other) so that while structure precedes agency nevertheless agency has the causal power and liability to reproduce and transform structure. Giddens theory of structuration, while commendable for its attempts to reconcile the opposing camps of material and agency reductionism respectively nevertheless is flawed in proposing a conflation between the two dimensions of social reality.

However, Bhaskar’s critical realism has also been criticised for the kind of analytical status it ascribes to the appreciation of social structures in the constitution of social reality. Critics point out that Bhaskar’s stance tends to move the focus away from the way in which structure is ultimately dependent on agents and their intentionality;
nevertheless, Bhaskar’s insistence on the utility of the notion of social structures is convincing. On the first hand, this conceptualisation of social structure encapsulates the way in which human agency cannot be conceived as existing independently of social context but is in fact deeply related to existing social forms, and secondly Bhaskar’s conceptualisation of social structure emphasises the way in which structures condition and cause through material organisation and ideational structures.

The causal powers of social structures can be conceptualised as possessing both material and formal causal powers over agents. Firstly, formal causes captures the sense ‘in which agents are constrained and enabled by ideas, rules, norms and discourses (ways of thinking)…formal causes are crucial in understanding social structures and their causal powers’ (Kurki 2008:228). Secondly, social structures also possess material causal powers such as the organisation of social space or the hierarchy of differing social positions; indeed, such things as a particular social position is not just the result of a discourse but also an outcome of material organisation. Kurki (2008:229) uses the example of the social structure of capitalism to further demonstrate the way in which social structures are causal through formal and material properties.

The internal relations between capital and wage labour depend on shared understandings of meanings. They also depend on rules that define how agents should act and rule-following practices of agents. However, the shared meanings and rules give rise to material social relations and, crucially, to
material constraints and enablement’s on agents within structures (for example, minimum wages, capital/property ownership, distribution of profits)….a worker by virtue of his [sic] position in the structure has different material resources at his disposal than the property owning capitalist.

In this way, social positions and roles cannot be reduced to the notion of ‘rule-following’ or as a mere consequence of adherence to a ‘discourse’ rather the notion here is that concepts and discourses also give rise to materially embodied social relations. Social structures also have material causal powers. This is an important qualification especially as it relates to those strands of poststructuralism that posit the sole ownership of discourse in the production of social reality. Nevertheless, the critical realist concept of social structure is notoriously complex and has received the attention of much academic scrutiny indeed as Kurki (2008) further notes, even Bhaskar’s work can be criticised for lacking in conceptual clarity in fully elaborating on the concept of structure. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the conceptualisation of social structure advanced by critical realism is flawed; instead, it can be argued that the acceptance of the causal nature of social structures opens up a model of explanation of the social world that can incorporate multi-causality.

4.18 Putting Critical realism to work in IR

Before concluding this section and moving to a discussion of the concrete methodology employed by this study it would be useful to concisely address how a
critical realist theoretical approach can be useful for a study, like this one, that is broadly located with the field of international relations. At the outset it is important to note that critical realism is not a theory of world politics in fact it says very little, if at all, about the study of the international. Rather, critical realism is foremost a philosophy of science or a meta-theoretical position on the nature of social scientific investigation. Its ontological and epistemological claims, that is, its questions about the nature of reality, and how we gain knowledge of it clearly have methodological implications. As Kurki (2007:377) notes,

it is not an IR theory in the classical sense and does not aim to make a specific kind of empirical contribution to understanding of world politics. Yet, meta-theoretical interventions, while not directly empirical, are not inconsequential in IR rather meta-theoretical interventions affect the kind of conceptual models one formulates, the kinds of reflection one engages in and the kind of methodological and evidential grounds one considers important and legitimate.

In relation to this study, a critical realist philosophy would encourage the exploration of political discourse and an examination of how through the use of discursive practices a particular social reality is constructed. However, an ontological position postulating the stratified nature of social reality would also then necessitate an exploration of the depth ontology in order to determine the links and connection between depth structures and a surface-level political discourse. Indeed, a reductionist discourse analysis can but provide a partial social analysis since it is

96 See Wight (2006) and Patomaki (2002) for a useful overview of employing a scientific realist framework in International Relations.
analysis of the ‘surface’ only. As Willig (1999) notes, poststructuralist studies should
move beyond a description of ‘regimes of truth’ by beginning to account for their origin and maintenance. Arguably, this can be done through a project that begins by providing a detailed and comprehensive description of discourses available to individuals or groups, and how these discourses are deployed, and with what effect. Importantly, such an analysis should be followed with a comprehensive analysis of the socio-economic and historical conditions giving rise to or making possible the constructions under scrutiny.

Although poststructuralist theories have made important inroads into the study of international relations nevertheless the dominant paradigm of understanding in IR continues to be provided by realism, and the work of Kenneth Waltz. Realism is an explicit theory of world politics and its main propositions suggest that the international system is ordered through the universal principle of anarchy. In this sense, realism explains all patterns of state behaviour in light of the theory of anarchy. The idea is that in the absence of a central enforcer states are continually involved in their own self-interest and survival, and try to balance and strengthen themselves in face of external threats by accumulating resources and power whether that is in the shape of military assets, population or economic primacy. Critical realism does not offer an alternative account of world politics to rival realist theory; it does however provide a different way of looking at things. Firstly owing to its ontological position, critical realism cannot subscribe to a parsimonious account of world politics that posits a theoretical reductionism such as that put forward by realism i.e. the notion that a particular structure of anarchy can explain in full patterns of state behaviour. Secondly, whilst realism is more likely to ignore the role
of discourses in the production of world politics critical realism acknowledges the significance of discourse and language in relation to the construction of social reality. Thirdly, critical realism finds problematic the essentialist notions underlying realism particularly as they relate to the unchanging and universal nature of the theory of anarchy. Moreover, a focus on ‘depth ontology’ means that critical realism does not subscribe to the notion that empiricism is the only way to engage with cause-effect relations in the social world. On the other hand, realism tends to give primacy to the empirical regularity model as basis of valid causality between two or more variables. As such then, critical realism is not a critique of realist theories of world politics rather it is an ontological and epistemological exposition that differs from the positivist philosophy underlying realism and therefore this gives way to a different way of looking at world politics.

In order to further clarify how a critical realist approach can provide a useful way of examining the objects of IR, we may refer to a recent study that employs such a framework of analysis. Gruffydd-Jones’ (2008) study is marked by it opposition to relying on an exclusively empirical science and instead she uses methods of conceptual abstraction in order to account for the persistence of the North-South divide. Gruffydd-Jones’ argument begins with an examination of the long global history of colonialism with the crux of her argument being that this exploitative history is significant even today because of the way in which it structured social relations of power. The suggestion is that this relational structuring of social power is

---

97 Currently there is a marked lack of literature employing a critical realist philosophy within the field of IR indeed many IR theorists discuss the potential effects of CR philosophy rather than provide concrete examples where it has been applied.
enduring to this day and forms an unobservable and underlying structure affecting the contemporary world.

In a compelling fashion, Gruffydd-Jones suggests that the historical distribution of property and economic power (justified by a historically racist discourse) had the material effect in that it produced and entrenched racialised structures of global social power. The argument is that the social structure was initially discursively constructed giving rise to and justifying inequality along racialised lines. However, the social structure in defining social positions and relations subsequently became an ‘extra-discursive’ ontological structure (a pre-existing structural condition). Thus, despite the modern world now seemingly transcending a racist discourse; nevertheless, the configuration of social relations which emerged from specific colonial and imperial histories is such, that global inequality, continues to be concentrated in the South. Although the rules of the contemporary international economic system are not explicitly racialised, ‘yet they build on and entrench an already racialised structural distribution of property and economic power locally, and globally, which is the product of the long history of global racialised dispossession’ (Gruffydd-Jones 2008:924). In a similar fashion, Wight (2003:719) in analysing the Macpherson report calls for a focus on the ‘actual structural configurations’ complicit in the production of outcomes rather than a focus on individuals. Thus it possible to suggest that an enduring configuration of relations of power may be conceived as a social structure and that it is causally productive in that the underlying structure is prone to giving rise to a particular material reality (Joseph 2007:351).

---

98 The Macpherson Report of 1999 developed the notion of institutional racism in the police force in the UK.
Such conclusions are firmly located within a realist ‘depth’ ontology in which causal powers are located in the unobservable dimension of the ‘real’ (real, causal social structures). In terms of the analysis above, these underlying ‘conditions of possibility’ can help explain the incidence of global inequality.

In contrast, had the analysis drawn exclusively on an empiricist philosophy the conclusions would have been different. For instance, a commitment to empiricism would have spawned an exclusive focus on observed phenomena such as incidences of overt individual discrimination, or racism occurring in local and global institutional discourses and rules. However, as Gruffydd-Jones rightly notes, in the modern world order racism of such kind is officially rejected and global institutions are formally committed to racial equality and universal human rights. An empirical study focussing only on regularities and occurrence would draw different conclusions most likely negating the idea that global inequality operates along racialised lines on the basis that an observed, regularity does not exist. We may thus categorise some of the poststructuralist writings within IR in this mould in that they largely focus on discursive dimensions of international reality (see for e.g. Milliken 1999, Campbell 1992, Doty, 1993, Chowdhry and Nair 2002). For instance, in Doty’s (1993) purely discursive study of the links between the modern world order and racialised identities we find that Doty limits her analysis to the discursive construction of those racialised identities examining how these then give rise to ‘embodied practices’. Importantly, her analysis does not go beyond discursive dimensions and does not seek to address questions accounting for why such
constructions arise in the first place. Although ‘critical race theorists’ have worked to expose the ways in which institutional racism is routinely reproduced by apparently neutral and non-racist institutions however, again much of the scholarship here tends to stay within the bounds of discursive theory so that everything is conceived as reducible to discourse. This seems a problematic contention, in that the logical implication of this is that, once it is agreed, that racism is wrong and this, is internalized and normalized, then there is nothing more to say. Such conclusions are arrived at owing to the conceptualization of a flat social ontology i.e. empirical and linguistic, the notion that reality is only that which can be observed, or alternatively only that which is constructed in discourse.

4.19 Untangling ‘critical’ realism from Realism and poststructuralism

Although this study subscribes to a critical realist philosophy it is crucial to note that critical realism is, first and foremost, a meta-theoretical position on the nature of social scientific investigation, and its primary focus is on questions of ontology and epistemology underpinning social scientific research. This means that critical realism is certainly not a theory of international relations on par with political realism. Rather, the common theme between the two is the belief that an independent reality exists ‘out there’ (Delanty 2005). However, political realism makes a stronger case for the necessity of empirical regularity as the basis of social scientific investigation and secondly it provides for a meta-narrative in terms of an unchanging, pre-given universal reality underlying political process. In contrast, a ‘philosophically realistic’

position cannot profess to be a theory of international relations in the same way as realism in that it does not provide an overall meta-narrative of political life. Nevertheless, it broadly challenges the sufficiency of the notion of ‘empirical-regularity’, and also implicitly the political realist position concerning the universality of a particular narrative. Whilst critical realism does not offer a specific theory of international relations, its conceptualisation of the nature of ‘reality’ and how we gain knowledge of it have some methodological implications for social inquiry. What critical realism brings to the study of IR is a philosophical argument concerning the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the various theories and approaches taken in IR. The most notable feature of critical realism is the strong ontological stance it takes, and consequently offers new ways to engage with the subject of international relations (Patomaki 2002).

We can further distinguish a critical realist theory from poststructuralism. It is notable that whilst a discursive reorientation in IR has been a welcome step in terms of re-theorisations of the social world, nonetheless the flip side of this has been a case of ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’, in that many of these analyses concentrate entirely on exploring the political implications of specific representation and discourse. Theoretically and methodologically prioritising the discursive realm inevitably leads to the conclusion that all social events and processes are discursive effects. Although the existence of an external, independent reality is not denied by poststructuralist accounts nevertheless, the notion is that this ‘reality’ cannot be directly accessed and can only be understood through the medium of text. Thus, a focus on texts and how these represent and interpret ‘reality’ becomes the primary mode of analysis. Further, if something ‘real’ does exist – something that is extra-
discursive – the poststructuralist notion is that it does not warrant inspection since it is not empirically observable in discourse. The fundamental principle underlying this kind of approach is the subscription to a flat ontology to which philosophical realism is deeply opposed. While poststructuralists are credited with broadening world political inquiry by bringing into focus the ways in which various texts shape all levels of political life nevertheless, from a critical realist perspective the poststructuralists and indeed the constructivists (sometimes unwittingly) remain wedded to a problematic empiricist discourse. For Hume, anything beyond the realm of human perception and experience could not be said to exist because we have no basis to justify its existence, that all we can know is what we can observe and feel firsthand this is commonly known as taking an empirically realist stance. At the heart of this account is the recording of observable constant conjunctions between isolated variables (within IR these would be such variables as patterns of state behaviour, or the distribution of resources amongst and within state entities). Traditional IR scholarship, in line with the social sciences in general, became strongly influenced by empiricism to the extent that it based much of its analyses of world politics on observable and regular quantifiable (causal) variables such as patterns of state behaviour or the quantification of material resources.

So, while poststructuralist and some constructivist approaches have critiqued the positivist base upon which traditional IR scholarship is based (quantification); from a critical realist perspective, constructivists and poststructuralists have not adequately engaged with a critique of empirical assumptions of positivism. Instead, they have focussed their arguments on demonstrating why and how the assumption of the applicability of the positivist scientific method across the sciences is flawed. The
consequence of this has been that both approaches have unproblematically taken up an empirically realist position (reality is only that which is observable). The argument is that the disagreement with the positivists has been over epistemological matters (how we can gain valid knowledge) and have not reflected on the ontology of positivism. Patomaki and Wight (2000:219) have argued ‘the postpositivist reaction to positivism is embedded within the same background discourse and is derived from a long philosophical tradition of anti-/scepticism’. This is, for critical realists, where the real problem lies; since critical realism posits a stratified layered reality this cannot fit into a social science that only studies surface effects or that level of reality that is immediately observable to us. For critical realism, the study of patterns, events, discourses, interpretations, norms is but one side of the equation and thus they find problematic the poststructuralist stance i.e. the idea that all beliefs and knowledge are exclusively socially produced and hence potentially fallible (so that no one account is better than another)\textsuperscript{100} . In this respect, the poststructuralists can be accused of engaging in theoretical reductionism. Critically, from a critical realist philosophy,

the intersubjective merely represents one important and necessary part of the social. Yet, important as intersubjective meanings and relations are, they do not exhaust the social world…intersubjective relations typically represent only the immediate appearance of the social relations that constitute society, even if they are also necessary for the (re)production of all social relations (Patomaki and Wight 2000:225).

\textsuperscript{100} In contrast critical realism in its acceptance of an external independent reality suggests that it is possible to discern the plausibility of competing social accounts since some will necessarily be more accurate in their description of the structures and mechanisms in the ‘real’.
In a nutshell then, critical realism’s position on the nature of reality is not empirically realist whereas much of poststructuralism and constructivism within IR, despite theor critique of positivist science, takes up the empirically realist ontology of positivism thus denying depth explanations. For Kurki (2008), poststructuralists in particular, in only inquiring into the norms, discourses and representations that constitute the world are ultimately engage in a theoretical reductionism since they assume that ideas, norms, discourses are the primary motivating force with these being conceptualised as ‘divorced’ or ‘independent’ of the material forces and context within which they occur. The following section will clarify why a discourse analysis on its own and informed by an epistemological relativism (the idea that ‘reality’ is all exclusively produced through discourse and is always contingent) is conceived as lacking in depth explanation.

4.20 What’s wrong with discourse analysis?

Chapter five of this study will engage with the discursive constructions clearly identifiable within Pakistan political discourse. Whilst such an engagement is essential to this study, I hope that by now it has become clear why such a focus, from the philosophical position taken here, is in itself insufficient in terms of providing a robust and comprehensive social explanation. It is clear, as the name suggests, that studies drawing on discourse analysis tend to focus primarily and exclusively on surface linguistic regularities which make up a ‘regime of truth’. Whilst this focus is unparalleled in terms of examining the regulatory effects of discourse nevertheless
such an approach cannot quite explain *why* constructions are the way they are, *why* are some ways of constructing more readily available than others? A purely discursive approach can be limited since it fails to address questions related to *why* some (and not other) constructions and discourses become embedded though often within a purely discursive project this question is dealt with along lines that seek to link a particular hegemonic discourse to structures of power in society. A purely discursive analysis can tell us through Foucauldian inspired genealogical studies how certain ways of representation and construction emerge and they can also help us understand the regulatory effects of discourse structures. The limitation however, is that a relativist philosophy cannot allow for an investigation that seeks to look further than that which is observed on the surface of society since it does not allow for an investigation of overarching often unobservable structures within which discursive economies are embedded. Even if structures, are acknowledged (such as the structures of patriarchy or capitalism), then there is a reluctance to explicitly conceptualise these, as causal and generative; again much of this reluctance has to do with the dominance of the Humean causal model dominant within the social sciences\(^\text{101}\).

Whilst social explanations are at best always partial nevertheless, the argument is that a linguistic realist investigation such as a discourse analysis can be enhanced through combining it with a depth ontological inquiry, such as that advocated by a philosophical realism which seeks to identify why the object (the discourse) exists in

\(^{101}\) Kurki (2008) however, has argued that many constructivist social scientists already engage with the notion of ‘cause’ when they refer to something as constitutive, or affecting, shaping in other words bringing any sort of change to another phenomena. However, the bulk of this work refuses to explicitly employ causal terminology to account for this ‘shaping’ of social phenomena (see for e.g. Campbell 1992) owing to their misguided assumptions that ‘causality’ can only be associated with a empiricist-deterministic model.
its present form. A philosophical realist approach or ‘critical realism’, as it is often referred to in the wider social scientific literature, seeks to go beyond descriptions of ‘regimes of truth’ by also accounting for the origin and maintenance of the constructions identified. It has much to offer here in terms of guiding the project towards an appreciation of the historical, material, economic, social, ideological structures in which discourses are embedded. More importantly however, this approach can allow such an appreciation without dismissing social explanations that focus on the discursive. Indeed, critical realism subscribes to epistemological relativism insofar as it acknowledges that all forms of knowledge are mediated by language and discourse Bhaskar (1978:249) asserts that ‘epistemological relativism, in this sense, is the handmaiden of ontological realism and must be accepted’. At the heart of philosophical/critical realism is the notion of a stratified ontology102 in which the observable domain is distinguished from the unobservable dimension which is just as ‘real’ despite it not being directly perceived. What this means is that a discourse study engaged in analysing the upper (observable) level of reality would also need to explore links with a depth ‘reality’ thus giving way to a more holistic and comprehensive constructivist account of world politics. At the heart of a critical realist philosophy is the notion that although our descriptions are always socially embedded in that they pre-exist us, and despite the fact that we continue to experience along discursive lines nevertheless this does not mean that we can deny the ‘real’ that our are descriptions are of or make reference to103. For Bhaskar, it is important that we clearly theorize a distinction between the transitive and intransitive dimensions of the world regardless of how interconnected they may be. It is

---

102 Refer to 4.14 for an elaboration of critical realism’s notion of a stratified ontology.
103 Importantly, this means that all accounts of the social are not equal (as opposed to a poststructuralist position in which no one social explanation can be said to be inferior to another). From the approach advanced here some accounts better reference underlying realities than other accounts.
important to note at this point that the argument here should not be seen as a negation of discourse analysis *per se*, but an insistence that critical realism offers important insights that are able to enhance a discursive study.

### 4.21 Methodological implications of the theory

This research is concerned with exploring a specific discursive space during a particular time-period. The objective of this exploration is to identify the kind of representations being offered, the strategies deployed to legitimise representations, other discourses being drawn upon, the subject positions offered by the discourse and the extent to which these positions constrain and enable political thought and action. This is a broadly constructivist project and it is important to distance it from those poststructuralist strands that posit discourse as the only significant variable in terms of explaining the social world. In this sense, a critical realist perspective offers a paradigm within which it is possible to theorise the discursive construction of social reality without an associated theoretical closure. The stratified ontological framework of critical realism allows the analyst to engage more thoroughly with discourse by allowing for an exploration of the emergence of specific discourses. The discussion in this chapter has focussed on these theoretical underpinnings of the current study since they permeate the research in its entirety from the kind of questions it asks, to the kind of data analysis conducted right through to the conclusions made.
Having laid this theoretical foundation the discussion will now proceed towards an exploration of how such a theoretical stance will inform the concrete methodological process associated with this study. In the first instance, the discussion engages with the methodology of discourse analysis undertaken in this study. Notably this exposition will focus less on theory and will be related more to the practical aspects of conducting a discourse analysis, and in this regard it will offer a step-by-step approach to the kind of analysis conducted here. Secondly, the ensuing discussion will also account for the critical realist methodology adopted in chapter six of the study. Whilst a discourse analysis focuses on empirical regularities that are clearly evident in the language, a critical realist analysis involves a move into a deeper level of reality where structures and generative mechanisms are often unobservable. Thus, empiricism and regularity are not assumed here to be criteria for determining existence at the ‘deep’ level of reality. This means that critical realism theorises about unobservable phenomena and consequently a particular mode of scientific inference namely abduction and retroduction becomes more important than other ways of inferring scientific claims. Methodologically then, the analyst needs to engage with ‘conceptual abstraction’ or engaging, in a thought process, with abstract phenomena and hypothesising the connections between the abstract realm and the concrete, empirical reality before us. In this context, Danermark et al. (2002) provide some very useful strategies of engaging with conceptual abstraction within a critical realist framework and their argument is that we should begin the process by asking some simple questions such as ‘How is this particular political discourse possible?’ This methodology involves ‘thought operations’ that move beyond the empirical, because at the heart of this account is the idea that knowledge of a deeper social reality can only be gained only if we proceed beyond what is empirically observable
‘by asking questions about and developing concepts of the more fundamental, transfactual conditions for the events and phenomena under study’ (Danermark et al. 2002:96). Following the discussion on the methodology of ‘discourse analysis’ employed here, the latter sections will engage with the precise methodology of critical realism in a more thorough manner.

4.22 Selecting material as data

This study consults a wide variety of text in order to arrive at conclusions. This is different from a textual approach to discourse which is marked by the lack of variety in the range of its data primarily because it involves a focuses on grammatical and linguistic nuances in a piece of text. Analysts working in this tradition commonly tend to focus their study more on the performativity of language - what people do with their talk and writing, and relevant ‘data’ is perceived as only that which occurs inside the interaction, event or discourse itself. On the other hand, taking its lead from Foucault, this study perceives potentially useful material as being more diffuse and not necessarily as only occurring within the interaction event. Analysts in this tradition suggest that a particular interaction, event or text must not be studied in isolation, but requires contextualising in order for the event/text to be fully understood. The focus here is on the discursive resources drawn upon to construct objects. Wetherell et al. (2001a:389) rather eloquently note that,
If we think of cloth or fabric, what is clear is that the threads are woven through the whole. If we take a pen and make a circle on a piece of cloth then we have certainly created a boundary – inside the circle and outside the circle – but if we follow the thread from inside the circle our boundary becomes rather irrelevant since the thread continues through the pen marks and onwards. In a similar way, as analysts we can easily select a bit of talk from a tape recording and in this way create an object of study rather as we drew a circle on the cloth but if we are interested in modes of representation, identity or patterns in social interaction is it adequate to restrict our study to this one piece of social life alone?

Selection of material for a discourse analysis study is therefore theory-laden and depends on what the analysts is trying to find. Moreover, drawing on Foucault, relevant context and potentially useful data is defined in broad terms (albeit restricted to linguistic acts) however this is not to suggest that ‘anything goes’ indeed selection of material will be extremely focused and certainly such a methodology is required since the kind of material discourse analysts study is abundant and continually being spoken/written/published and so on. However, the point here is that theoretically there is no closure in terms of relevant context for this study.

Potential data for a discourse analysis study can include any symbolic system possessing meaning for people indeed as Parker (1992:6-7) notes,
Speech, writing, non-verbal behaviour, Braille, Morse code, semaphore, runes, advertisements, fashion systems, stained glass, architecture, tarot cards and bus tickets are all forms of text… All of the world, when it has become a world understood by us and so given meaning by us, can be described as being textual.

However, considering the time, resources and concise nature of the current project this study will only explore written and spoken texts. These texts may take the form of policy documents, speeches, pamphlets, legislative proceedings, televised addresses and other media sources and so on. Data will be obtained from various sources including national archives and libraries holding policy documentation. Moreover, selection of data material aims to be focused – texts are limitless and it is important for this study that selection of material to be used as data stays close to the purpose of the study. The study will therefore be setting two selection criteria, the first criteria being that data for the project belongs to the category ‘political’. The definition of a ‘political discourse’ for the purposes of this study is text emanating from political leaders and parties in Pakistan whether that takes the form of actual speech or written material and over the period of Pakistan’s existence. The second basis or criteria for selection of material is that the focus of the material relates to the purpose of the project, after all, there is little use in analysing or considering material that relates to say Pakistan’s economic relationship with Ukraine for instance. Material requires focused selection before it can be considered as data, with selection being guided by the analysts theoretical assumptions as well as the focus and purpose of the project.
The study will use Parker’s (1992) suggestions in relation to identifying a discourse within the data material\(^{104}\). In his book: ‘Discourse Dynamics’, Parker offers a useful guide to distinguishing discourses, firstly he notes that discourses are realised in texts, with text here being defined in broad terms and including verbal and non-verbal aspects, indeed anything in the world that has meaning for us is considered a text. Secondly, Parker (1992:11) defines discourse as a ‘system of statements which construct an object, the notion is that the statements cohere to produce a shared meaning.

4.23 Strategies of data analysis

Discourse analysis does not offer a set of methodological procedures which, when applied result in a ‘discourse analysis’. Rather, discourse analysis is more of a theoretical approach conceptualising language as constructive and functional. The ‘method’ of discourse analysis, if any, is that the analyst ‘reads’ the data with a different lens seeking not to ask what a particular text tells us about the authors viewpoint but instead asking ‘what is this text doing?’ For instance, Foucault does not offer a precise method for genealogy – we are simply asked to approach the data with different theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, some writers (Carabine 2001, Parker 1992, Willig 1999, 2001) offer useful guidelines to the novice researcher and the study will be drawing on these suggestions to provide a structure and ordered analysis of the data. It would be useful to briefly consider these ‘procedural steps’ to

\(^{104}\) See Appendix II.
the discourse analysis conducted at various points within this research project. I draw here on the various stages of discourse analysis suggested by Willig (2001).105

**Stage 1:** identifying discursive constructions (looking for all the different ways in which the object is referred to in a text).

This step consists of conducting a general scan of the material collected so far to get a sense of the themes and representations being put forward. Analysis here consists of identifying themes, categories and ‘objects’ of the discourse. At this stage, the aim is to identify ‘discursive constructions’ in the data – i.e. which phenomena the language brings into being. Willig (2001) suggests identifying all the different ways in which the discursive object is constructed in the text, practically what this means is that we must highlight all references to the discursive object. Moreover, it is important that we do not only look for keywords indeed both explicit and implicit references need to be included. As Willig notes (2001:109 italics in original),

> [O]ur search for constructions of the discursive object is guided by shared meaning rather than lexical comparability. [T]he fact that a text does *not* contain a direct reference to the discursive object can tell us a lot about the way in which the object is constructed.

---

105 Willig’s suggestions are not definitive. Willig offers six stages of analysis including one that explores the effects of discourse on subjectivity – in light of the purpose of this study, I have omitted this stage from my analysis.
This initial step can be seen as similar to the practice of coding in general qualitative data analysis however, the critical difference between a general qualitative data coding process and a constructivist analysis is the different level of emphasis given to the nature of language – a constructivist inspired analysis attributes far more meaning and depth to texts and digs deeper as opposed to a tendency to take texts at their face value. On a practical note, it is important that the analyst allows themes to emerge from the data as opposed to pre-defined categories being imposed on the data.

**Stage 2:** locating discourses (deciding what kind of picture of the object is being painted by the different discursive constructions).

Having identified discursive objects the next stage of analysis focuses on exploring the differences between constructions of the same discursive object. It is possible that one text at various points draws on differing, wider discourses to construct the same object. We are here looking to locate how a variety of discourses are called upon to produce a particular discourse and the discursive object. Parker (1992) views discourses as drawing institutional support from each other – this step explores the interrelationship between different discourses.

**Stage 3:** action orientation (what is being done or achieved by these constructions, what effects they have for speakers or readers)
This stage involves looking closely at what is achieved by constructing the object in a particular way? what is the function of the discourse? What is gained by the representation and how are constructions related to other construction in the surrounding text? Willig (2001:94 italics in original) suggests initially reading a text without any attempt at analysis this is because ‘such a reading allows us to experience as a reader some of the discursive effects…reading a text before analysing it allows is to become aware of what a text is doing’.

**Stage 4:** positioning (identifying the subject positions made available by the discourses)

Having identified various constructions of the discursive object within the text, and having located them within wider discourses, we now take a closer look at the subject-positions which they offer. A discourse constructs subjects as well as objects. We have been looking at the concept of subject-positions, and it is here that we begin to explore the positions that the discourse makes available. Willig (2001:111) notes that [S]ubject positions are different from roles in that they offer discursive locations from which to speak and act rather than prescribing a particular part to be acted out’. Firstly, the analyst needs to examine how the text addresses us, what role are we having to adopt to hear the message of the text (Parker 1992). Secondly, what speaking rights does the subject-position entail, enable and restrict.

**Stage 5:** Absences and Silences (what is not spoken of and why)
**Stage 6:** Inter-textuality (Identify the extent to which representations draw on other available discourses)

**Stage 7:** practice (identifying the possibilities for action made available by subject positions)

This stage is concerned with the relationship between discourse and practice. For Willig (2001:111), this requires ‘a systematic exploration of the ways in which discursive constructions and the subject positions contained within them open up or close down opportunities for action’. Practices are conceptualised as reinforcing discourses. For instance Parker (1992:17) notes that for Foucault, discourses and practices were really the same thing in that ‘material practices are always invested with meaning…. [and] speaking or writing is a “practice”’ so that whenever a material practice is performed as a result of discourse stipulation then, in effect, such an act simultaneously reinforces the validity of the discourse. In looking at how discourses are linked to institutions, Parker (1992) notes that medical discourse exists in abundance and supports medical institutions however, we should also see practices such as the speech act when in consultation with a doctor, the feeling of an abdomen, the giving of an injection, the cutting of a body as *discursive practices* reinforcing, reproducing, supporting, legitimising the material basis of an institution.

**Stage 8:** Contextualisation
Of course, discourses and discursive constructions are embedded in particular historical periods and have a dialectical relationship with other social structures. For Foucault, discourse is intimately related to social structure and analysis is incomplete without a thorough grounding of discursive constructions in their socio-historical and political contexts – indeed some level of genealogical analysis is required. This stage of analysis focuses on precisely this – contextualising our analysis as far as possible. Our themes will need to be immersed in their contexts and, indeed this study maintains that ‘meanings’ can only be grasped once they are immersed in their relevant contexts. The study will therefore also devote substantial analysis to contextualisation.

The eight stages in the analysis of discourse outlined and illustrated in the preceding sections will help us to approach a text and to investigate the ways in which it constructs objects and subjects, how such constructions impact practice and their possible institutional links. It is important to note that the stages of analysis are not separate and discrete and will not be followed as though they are a recipe to ‘doing’ discourse analysis. In practice, the stages are inter-related and analysis sometimes will occur simultaneously and at other times occur separately.

In finality, it is useful to note that in terms of ceasing the analysis of texts the study takes its lead from a grounded theory approach which stipulates that analysis should cease whenever additional data does not give rise to new information and is simply contributing to that which has already been identified.
4.24 Generative mechanisms and the role of scientific inference

The discussion will now seek to explore the methodological implications of a theoretical commitment to the notion of a stratified ontology. Since engaging with depth ontological structures is one of the cornerstones of critical realism, it is important here to clarify how this study proposes to proceed with this engagement. Although critical realism is ultimately a philosophy of science and does not proscribe a specific working method or research procedure nevertheless, as with all philosophies, its ontological and epistemological stance has methodological implications. The insistence on an appreciation of depth ontology for instance encourages the analyst to investigate this ‘depth’ within an explanatory research project. However, the ‘problem’ here as it were is that ontological depth or critical realism’s domain of the ‘real’ is conceptualized as being unobservable. Although as we have established earlier in this chapter, such an attribution does not suggest the negation of the existence of depth ontological structures however, it does have methodological implications in that it tends to bring to the fore and make more relevant to the research project particular models of scientific inference106.

Inference107 is closely associated with scientific practices viz correlations and interpretation of data. To cite a simple example, palaeontologists make inferences as to what creatures called dinosaurs looked like by examining skeletal structures, in

106 Indeed transcendental argumentation is at the core of critical realism’s examination of ontological depth.
107 Inference is defined as, ‘a cognitive process in virtue of which a conclusion is drawn from a set of premises. It is meant to capture both the psychological process of drawing conclusions and the logical or formal rules that entitle or (justify) the subject to draw conclusions from certain premises’ (Hartwig 2007:256).
fact, it is possible to argue that most ‘known’ scientific facts are inferences since it would be impossible to fully gather all material on a subject. Inference, is critical for science and involves reasoning and drawing conclusions, it is as Danemark et al. (2002:78) note, ‘a way of reasoning towards an answer to questions such as: What does this mean? What follows from this? What must exist for this to be possible?’

For many working in the critical realist field, the methodological tool that is best suited to dealing with abstract and unobservable ontological structures is scientific inference based on abduction and retrodiction; these types of inference are distinguished from the more popular models of scientific inference (deduction and induction). Moreover, since chapter six will also employ abduction and retrodiction in further exploring the dialect between social action/discourse/(realist)ontology it is important here to clarify these modes of scientific inference and distinguish them from the popular methods of deduction and induction respectively. Briefly, in deductive arguments the conclusions follow in a strictly logical way from the given premises to the extent that the conclusions drawn must be true if the premises are true. Deductive reasoning is marked by a strict adherence to logical reasoning which can be seen both as a strength and a weakness. On the one hand, deduction provides strict rules for what are logically valid conclusions based on given premises whilst on the other hand this strict logical procedure can be seen as limiting in that it cannot allow conclusions to move or infer anything beyond that which is contained in the premise in the first place, deduction is not content-increasing.
On the second hand, inference based on the induction model can be differentiated from deduction by virtue of its conclusions not necessarily following the premise. Often practically this means that a smaller sample is taken, observations made, and from which conclusions and generalizations are drawn, an example here being the study of a smaller sample population and then extrapolating findings to a whole population. The grounded theory approach is the most well-known research design that takes at its heart an inductive approach to science. Of course the weakness here in comparison to deduction is that such extrapolating inferences suffer from *uncertainty* in that ‘conclusions do not logically follow from the premises, and that by inductive generalizations we speak about something beyond what we can observe here and now’\(^\text{108}\)\((\text{Danermark et al. 2002:87})\). In effect, the method of extrapolating moves beyond that which is concretely observable. However the issue here (for critical realism), is that induction draws conclusions about the larger picture from a smaller sample but it does this without leaving the empirical level and as such is closely related to empirical science. Danermark et al. (ibid) note that ‘induction gives no guidance as to how, from something observable, we can reach knowledge of underlying structures and mechanisms; it is limited to conclusions of empirical generalizations and regularities’. This inability of both paradigms to strongly infer something beyond that which is observable is a major bone of contention; for a critical realist ontology the ‘objects of science are not primarily empirical regularities, but structures and mechanisms’ (ibid) ‘On the realist view’, Sayer (1992:158) argues,

\(^{108}\) This is called the internal limitation of induction.
Nature’s uniformity – to which many scientists have appealed – derives not from the ‘accidental’ regularities of sequences of contingently related things but from the internal relations, structures and ways-of-acting of things themselves.

The point of this discussion is to prepare ground for the proposition of a different mode of scientific inference, a way of reasoning, a thought operation that allows the analyst to infer knowledge of mechanisms and structures which are conceptualized as generating and affording empirical regularities. These mechanisms and structures they may not always be observable in such a manner i.e. empiricism is not the yardstick used to dis/affirm existence. A critical realist meta-theory that emphasises the difference between observable and unobservable domain of structures and mechanisms strongly requires a mode of inference that can accommodate this ontological typology and here, induction and deduction are limited because their frameworks are unable to conceptualise anything beyond that given in the premises (deduction) or are limited in terms of analysis to only that which is manifested in the empirical domain (induction). As Danermark et al. (2002) note, the objects of social scientific study can be described both as individual phenomena and as manifestations of social structures which are directly unobservable. In the table below this observation can be clarified.
Table 1: Individual events and general structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual events/phenomena</th>
<th>General structures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men and women who communicate at a place of work, in the home or at a political meeting</td>
<td>Gender structures, internal relationships described in terms of gender theories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils and teachers meeting in a classroom</td>
<td>Norms and rule making school a specific institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The manifest context of a text</td>
<td>Implicit ideological meanings of the text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A building as a physical object</td>
<td>The power structures that certain buildings can be regarded as embodying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A funeral, people greeting each other, or a morning meeting in a newsroom</td>
<td>Rituals creating social cohesion by means of internal relations and mechanisms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Danermark et al. (2002:88).

The question here is, as Danermark et al. (2002:88-89) put it,

how do we actually make the assumption that individual events may be part of a general, more universal context or structure...?
discover that certain behaviour is a manifestation of a normative structure?

How can a media researcher, who first sees a news item as a concrete description of an event, in the next instance see that what is manifested in the news text is part of an ideological structure?

Inductive and deductive models of inference are unable to address such questions because attempting to answer and explore such questions involves ‘discovering, or drawing conclusions from, circumstances and structures that are not given in individual empirical data’ (Danemark et al. 2002:89). Critical realism thus looks towards alternatives models of scientific inference and explanation namely abduction and particularly retroduction as appropriate tools that can help explore the objects of social science.

4.25 Abduction

Abduction can best be described as a theoretical re-description i.e. to observe, describe, interpret and explain the phenomena from a new/different angle. As Danemark et al. (2002:91) note social science is abound with many redescriptions of such kind:

Marx recontextualised the history of man and society from a materialist conception of history….Durkheim re-contextualised suicide as a phenomena
by regarding it as a social fact…. Giddens re-contextualises anorexia as a manifestation of what he denotes reflexive identity, which has become characteristic of post-modern society.

The essence of abduction is this re-contextualisation/re-description. Firstly, as a mode of inference it is different from deduction in that the conclusions are not bound to follow from the given premises and secondly abductive logic is different from induction in that empirical occurrence does not necessarily form the basis of conclusions. An abductive logic allows the analyst to discover new dimensions of reality by freeing him/her from frameworks that confine conclusions.

(I)t provides a type of knowledge that cannot be acquired either through deduction or inductive generalizations…abduction becomes a manner of acquiring knowledge of how various phenomena can be part of and explained in relation to structures, internal relations and contexts which are not directly observable. Such structures cannot be derived wither inductively or deductively (Danermark et al. 2002:92).

Abduction can be described as inference to the best explanation (Hartwig 2007). The skills required here involve a creative reasoning ability on the part of the analyst109, the ability to visualize something in a different way as ‘something else’ thus

109 In contrast to deduction which requires skills of strictly logical reasoning and induction which calls for mastery of statistical analysis.
encouraging the introduction of new ideas and equally importantly questioning the plausibility and explanatory power of existing theories.

4.26 Retroduction

A retroductive research method is the primary tool employed by critical realist in the critical realist model of social explanation. The core of retroduction is transcendental argument\textsuperscript{110} or the inference from effects to explanatory structures (from effects to causes). Retroduction involves a ‘move backwards’ within the realist stratified ontology, meaning that we move from the level of the (observable) phenomena to a different ‘deeper’ level of reality in order to explain the phenomena by means of causal mechanisms. The idea here is to identify and clarify the basic conditions or prerequisites for existence of such phenomena as a social relationship or a person’s action with the fundamental question being ‘how is any phenomenon, like an action or a social organization possible? If we call the phenomena X, we may formulate our question thus: \textit{What properties must exist for X to exist and to be what X is?}’ (Danermark et al. 2002:96). A retroductive mode of reasoning asks ‘what does the existence of this object (in this form) presuppose? Can it exist on its own as such? If not what else must be present? What is it about the object that makes it do such and such? (Sayer 1992: 91). In terms of a working procedure, the analyst needs to make a theoretical reconstruction of the necessary conditions that must exist for X to be what it is with such reasoning differing from induction and deduction in that it is used to discover the premises of an argument from its conclusion and so involves working

\textsuperscript{110} See footnote 19.
back from observations to an explanation. This research strategy is used to generate hypothetical models of structures and mechanisms that are assumed to produce the empirical phenomena.

4.27 Using abstraction as a methodological tool

Whilst retroduction beckons a move from an empirical reality towards a deeper level of reality it also true that the objects of social science are clearly different from those in the natural sciences. In the social sciences, variables cannot physically be isolated and studied separately; consequently the natural science experiment is often wholly unsuitable. Having said this however, in order to explain an object or phenomena the social analyst needs to have the means through which different mechanisms, processes can be identified which together culminate to produce the events. For many critical realists, the equivalent to the natural science experiment in the social sciences is conceptual abstraction. Danermark et al. (2002:42) define abstraction in the following way,

An abstract concept, or an abstraction, is something which is formed when we – albeit- in thought separate or isolate a particular aspect of a concrete object or phenomena; and what we abstract from is all the other aspects possessed by concrete phenomena.
Conceptual abstraction is based on the understanding that all phenomena both social and natural possess certain properties and powers that are indispensable to the object’s existence. The task of abstractions is to ‘distinguish incidental from essential characteristics’ (Sayer 1992:88). For Sayer, the purpose of such thought experiments is to analytically conceptualise what it is, about the object, that makes it what it is; in other words which constitutive parts are indispensable and which ones are incidental. For a critical realist approach, abstractions are critical in terms of connecting and explaining the relationship between deeper levels of reality and the ‘actual’ reality given in observation and experience. Clearly then, this provides the theory underpinning the usefulness of abstraction to social investigation however in terms of the practical method associated with abstraction we may draw on Sayer (1992) who offers a method of abstraction that may assist the researcher in his/her logic of discovering and identifying depth ontological structures and mechanisms. Sayer’s methodology is based on the realization that the objects of social science are relational and thus the task is to distinguish between relations of different types. Between relations that are internal/ necessary i.e. that an object is existence-dependent on its relation to another object distinguished from those relations that are external/contingent (contingent here referring to two objects that can exist independently of each other).

Sayer (1992), suggests that the analyst broadly distinguishes between substantial relations and formal relations by identifying those relations that are substantial i.e. that they are important and establish the mutual existence of the objects in question indeed the idea that one could not exist without the other such as the landlord tenant relationship or the slave and master, teacher and pupil connections. This type of
relation needs to separated from formal relations which refer to those connections that exist, but are not important to the object of the study. An example in this context being, that if both landlord and tenant are of a similar ethnicity or a teacher and pupil live in the same neighbourhood then this is a formal connection between the two and one that may not bear any significance to the landlord/tenant, teacher/pupil social relation. For Sayer, another useful distinction to be made within substantial relations is identifying internal or necessary relations from those that are contingent or external. We will draw here on Danermark et al. (2002) to explain this method, taking the example of the landlord-tenant relationship an internal relation is defined as that which mutually causes each other’s existence so that each cannot exist without its relation to the other i.e. without a tenant there is no landlord. On the other hand, external connections are such that the landlord may be stingy and mismanage the property or alternatively may be generous and undertake regular repairs, whichever the situation the point here is that this relation or characteristic is outside the landlord-tenant relation; this characteristic is not constitutive of the landlord-tenant relation. On the other hand, the existence of a property on the other hand is constitutive of the relationship so that if there did not exist a house/flat then the landlord-tenant relation would cease. Moreover, asymmetrical relation refers to the notion that objects though substantially related the case may be that one may exist without the other but not vice versa for instance, houses and flats can exist without landlords but not vice versa.

The specific critical realist inspired methodology to be employed here will focus precisely on the kind of conceptual abstraction discussed in the above sections. Moreover, although the critical realist analysis draws on the work of Sayer (1992)
however, to a much larger extent, the methodological guidelines I work with are inspired by the work of Danermark et al. (2000) who provide an excellent account of the methodology that can be operationalized in a project such as this one.

Having identified an empirically evident political discourse in Pakistan during the time period under study, the study will then proceed to engage in a critical realist analysis of the object of this study. In practical and methodological terms, this will involve taking the object i.e. the political discourse identified in chapter five as the starting point and placing it within a stratified ontological framework. This would mean that the political discourse is identified as existing on the surface or upper levels of social reality i.e. the empirical domain and the analysis would then need to consider the emergence of this discourse as causally connected to the depth ontology. This understanding is premised on the notion that empirical regularities such as a political discourse is not unconnected or emergent from a void but rather it emerges from underlying realities. Such an exploration forms the gist of chapter six with the analysis commencing with questions such as ‘why does this particular political discourse or discursive constructions emerge?’, ‘what structural conditions must exist in order for the political discourse to be what it is?’, ‘what are the underlying causal structures connected to this political discourse?’ It is important thus to note that the philosophy and methodology of critical realism outlined here will be employed to discern the depth ontological structures connected to and implicated in the shaping and influencing of Pakistan political discourse in the post 9/11 time frame. By engaging in more depth with our object of analysis, a far more nuanced and deeper understanding of Pakistan’s political discourse can be arrived at.
Discursive Analysis

5.1 Introduction

The identity stories that construct actors as one or another type of person – man versus woman, national citizen versus nomad, one versus another ethnicity, and so on – provide the foundations for historical and contemporary forms of antagonism, violence and interpretive contention over the meaning of actions...they are part of the reigning structure of intelligibility. \(^{111}\)

The purpose of this chapter is an exploration of political discursive space in Pakistan following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in order to investigate the kind of constructions being articulated. This chapter is an important part of the overall thesis since it identifies recurrent themes and discursive constructions and provides the basis for later theorizations around the relationship between this discourse and the actual political practice of Pakistan in the aftermath of terrorist attacks of 9/11. From the perspective here, a deconstruction of Pakistan’s political discourse during this period should reveal that the political discourse created the space or the conditions for the kind of political practice that emerged following 2001. Discourses are able to exercise power through their ability to enable and constrain world-views thus normalising some kinds of action and practice whilst constraining alternative action. It is for this reason that discourses are said to be constitutive of social reality.

Consequently, all social practice may be explained in terms of the discourse that supports or normalises such action. If this is our starting point, then any explanation of political practice requires an exploration of the discursive space from which the practice emerges.

Within the field of IR, a focus on discursive space was most notably first tabled by the likes of Wendt (1992) Shapiro (1989) and Onuf (1989). Since then, many writers have taken to exploring the relationship between discourse and state policy and practice. David Campbell (1992) for instance, engages in an extensive study of the construction of the national American Self and its impact on the construction of American foreign policy. Similarly, Doty (1993) examines the way in which the US Self is constructed and how this specific construction structured US political practice in the Philippines during the 1950s, subsequently reproducing US dominance.

Adopting a similar line of argument, Weldes (1996) explains how US interest in the Cuban missile scenario can be conceptualised as constructed in that the representation of the US ‘Self’ as a ‘world leader’ functioned to mandate and legitimize an activist US response to the missile deployment which was defined as a ‘crisis’ scenario. For Weldes (1996), the ‘crisis’ narrative marginalised alternative ways of understanding the situation whilst simultaneously producing and reproducing a particular US identity. What is common to these investigations is the notion that the identity of the ‘national’ or ‘state’ Self is the key component of discursive articulations which consequently impact the direction of state policy and practice. Most notably, the conclusion that these and other writers (for e.g. Hansen 2006) draw is that the identity of the national Self coupled with the way in which boundaries are drawn between this national Self and the outside (foreign) ‘Other’
impacts or conditions behaviour patterns. If the construction of the national Self within a country’s political discursive space is linked, in important ways, to subsequent political practice; it follows, that this research project, in its attempt to explain and contextualise the concrete political practice of Pakistan following 9/11 needs to investigate the way in which the Pakistani national Self is articulated within the political discourse. Furthermore, it must link the constructions identified to the possibilities of in/action.

The intent of this chapter is thus to conduct a systematic and structured discursive examination of Pakistan’s political discourse in order to identify the kind of representations constructed and how the promoting of such narratives subsequently affects surrounding representations and discursive constructions. In consequence, this analysis will theorise the potential effects such representations have on concrete political practice in terms of enabling and constraining action. For instance, in the aftermath of 9/11 practices such as Pakistan’s willingness to engage with its Indian adversary or its disowning of the Taliban were arguably big domestic policy shifts however they were only made possible or enabled by a political discourse that legitimised such moves.

\[112\] It is notable that analysts working on ‘strategic culture analysis’ also highlight how strategic culture is implicated in the formation of foreign and security policies though there is reluctance to explicitly adopt a social constructionist theory.
5.2 Primary data-material: Issues of access and availability

The time-period under consideration relates to the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 suicide attacks in the US, and therefore all data material used in this chapter has been sourced from this specific time-frame. Analysis is based on official speeches, interviews, statements, parliamentary debates and other text written and spoken by figures belonging to the political leadership of the country. Notably the data material consists exclusively of official political text since the aim of this study is to examine how official discourse effects political practice. This focus on official texts does not suggest that counter-discourses are non-existent or have no interaction with official discourses rather the decision to limit analysis to official discourse is guided by the recognition that official discourse is a powerful medium in a country like Pakistan where official narratives and representations have historically been dominant113. Moreover, a concentration on official narratives also makes way for a more bounded and feasible discursive examination.

The data selection method was based on a number of considerations some of which were, relevance: the content of the text in that it explicitly elaborated on significant representations of the Self/Other. Secondly, data was specifically sourced from the relevant time-frame. Thirdly, consideration was given to the critical nature of the text; for instance, Musharraf’s national address on September 19th, 2001, which occurred soon after the attacks on the US was a critically relevant speech and therefore has received considerable analysis within this chapter. In general, national

113 See: sub-heading 1.3 “Research Design” and also sub-heading 3.6 “Pakistan’s Military Elite”.
addresses are important since they reach a wide audience\textsuperscript{114}, as are those directed at other important audiences (for instance the UN or other foreign audience). In this sense then selection of data-material was conscious and systematic as opposed to haphazard.

Material was accessed from various sources including Pakistan’s state-run television network (PTV), the National Archives and the departmental library of the National Assembly in Islamabad. Surprisingly, the internet was particularly useful in data collection which often listed full text, unedited voice recordings or transcripts of speeches delivered by Pakistan’s political leadership\textsuperscript{115}. Within Pakistan, perhaps the most useful website has been the presidential website of General Musharraf which contains a substantially large volume of speeches and interviews made by the former president during his eight year long tenure\textsuperscript{116}. It is important to clarify that during the time-period under investigation General Pervaiz Musharraf remained in political power throughout and therefore there is an inevitable bias in the data-set. This has not been intentional but basically reflects the bias inherent in the available data nevertheless, this chapter has tried to include within the data-set a variety of different sources. The documents analysed were partly in English whilst those that were in Urdu were translated into English by the author. Further, no attempt has been made

\textsuperscript{114} In lieu of the high illiteracy rates prevalent in Pakistan - speeches such as national addresses reach a much wider domestic audience.

\textsuperscript{115} There have been many websites that have been particularly useful in terms of providing full-length, unedited transcripts. Many of these have been news sites (e.g. the BBC, CNN). Others have consisted of think tanks and institutions where members of the Pakistani leadership have spoken (e.g. www.cfr.org (council on foreign relations), www.usip.org, www.fas.org). When the text has been sourced from the internet I have paid particular attention to ensuring that the text is unedited by comparing it with alternative sources.

\textsuperscript{116} The website: www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk was particularly useful. Following Musharraf’s removal from power in 2008 the website listing his speeches was removed. However, it recently became available to view again at a new address: www.generalpervaizmusharraf.com.
to correct any errors present in the primary texts instead preferring to present the text in its original unedited form.

It is important to discuss access issues since retrieval of data was problematic due a number of reasons. Firstly, in light of the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan access to government buildings became extremely restricted indeed even accessing the public ‘National Library of Pakistan’ became an uphill task with many of the surrounding road networks blocked to ensure maximum security to the nearby parliament buildings. Coupled with this, it was also found that, Pakistan libraries and other institutes have a very poor cataloguing-system so that locating data proved more time consuming than anticipated. Much of the primary data material (policy documents and other government literature) available in government libraries and departments tended to be of the historical variety in that it could not be classified as belonging to the immediate time-period and therefore, for my purposes, was irrelevant. Unfortunately, there seemed a significant time lapse before primary data-material became available in institutes and libraries; this being a wholly different experience compared to the UK where government data, speech, policy is readily available to view even online\textsuperscript{117}. These difficulties, in terms of access and availability, had not been anticipated.

At this point, it is also important to note that whilst a wide range of relevant textual material has been consulted and analysed, it is however impracticable within the

\textsuperscript{117} For instance, official speeches and statements are easily available from the Downing street website: http://www.pm.gov.uk. Similarly the White House website http://www.whitehouse.gov also lists textual data.
confines of this chapter to present the entirety of all the texts consulted. Instead, a selection of textual data is available in Appendix I and is indicative of the kind of data that has been analysed in this project. Although this study does not claim to have collected all relevant material nevertheless the material selected covers enough to provide the contours of the dominant narratives and provide relevant examples for the specific points made in this chapter. A grounded theory approach was employed in terms of assessing when analysis and consultation of further texts should cease i.e. when additional textual material repeatedly ceased to offer any new discursive constructions. It must also be noted that the discursive themes identified in this chapter were not isolated incidents but occurred frequently throughout the political discourse and across a range of texts and authors.

5.3 The war comes to Pakistan

September 11th 2001 had been, as Musharraf notes in his autobiography (2006), an uneventful day in Pakistan, that is, until early in the evening when live coverage of the terrorist attacks beamed directly into television screens across the country. As has been widely documented, following the terrorist attacks the United States implicated the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation as masterminding the attacks on the US and vociferously argued that the terrorist outfit, hosted by the Taliban regime, was located in the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The analysis will focus on a number of themes, Firstly, the way in which the events of September 11, 2001 were interpreted and represented within Pakistan, and secondly the kind of subject-positions made possible by the discourse and an exploration of the impact of
representations in terms of the world-view/s it constrained and enabled. Finally, how this representation (of events) worked to legitimise and normalise the concrete practice of Pakistan’s rejection of the (Islamic) Taliban and its simultaneous co-operation with the US. The argument here is that the suicide attacks in New York and Washington DC were represented by the political discourse as a direct threat to the very survival of Pakistan.

It is important to note that Pakistan had officially been one of the only nations in the world to recognise and support the Taliban government in Afghanistan. However, immediately following the attacks Pakistan conducted an abrupt U-turn in relation to its foreign policy by withdrawing its vociferous support for the Taliban and instead the state sought to co-operate with the US on its ‘war on terrorism’, which principally involved a war against the Al-Qaeda terrorist organisation and their Taliban hosts in Afghanistan. This was a critical shift for a number of reasons. Firstly, Pakistan has historically been associated with conservative Islamic causes, and although the Islamic character of Pakistan has been a contested, it has nevertheless, been a consistent feature of national identity. In this context, it important note that this also entailed the notion of an Islamic brotherhood or ‘Ummah’ which is an important part of the ideology of Islam. Prior to 9/11 Pakistan’s support of the Taliban in Afghanistan had, within public discourse, been widely constructed as an extension of Muslim brotherhood. Secondly, US-Pakistan relations immediately prior to the terrorist attacks had been increasingly strained; apart from US economic and military sanctions following Pakistan’s nuclear tests the installation of the military regime in 1999 had met with disapproval and condemnation by the US and the West in general. The non-delivery of F-16 fighter
jets by the United States, despite Pakistan having paid for them, was a particularly sore point that was widely discussed within Pakistan. In this context, then it is extremely interesting to ascertain the way in which official political constructions and narratives were able to more or less successfully reorient Pakistan’s foreign policy with popular backing.\textsuperscript{118}

5.4 Discursive Strategy: Interpreting threat

The first official high-level Pakistani communication following the attacks in New York took the shape of President Musharraf’s address to the Pakistani nation on September 19\textsuperscript{th}, 2001. This speech is of critical importance in the sense that it set the tone of Pakistan’s official stance on the terrorist attacks in New York on September 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2001, and gave a clear indication of policies to follow. Moreover, if keeping in mind the kind of social context within which this text is embedded then it becomes far more interesting to discern how the text attempts to weave a reorientation of Pakistan’s foreign policy goals, and also how it begins to justify and legitimise co-operation with the US which implicitly entails an abandoning of the Taliban. The broader aim of the text is an attempt to build a national consensus in relation to co-operating with the US. What is significant about this particular text is the way in which it interprets and represents the suicide attacks in New York as being meaningful for Pakistan in a particular way. The text itself is long and drawn out and is located in full in Appendix I of this study however, only the most important

\textsuperscript{118} The suggestion here is not that the discourse we are exploring here is entirely hegemonic rather counter-discourses are always present and persistent nevertheless the argument here is that the world-view that enabled the reorientation of Pakistan’s foreign relations was successful in that it did not counter wide-scale refusal or violent outrage.
extracts are reproduced below and have been selected on the basis of their clear connotations and representation.

Having conceded within the speech that ‘this act of terrorism has raised a wave of deep grief, anger and retaliation in the United States’, the main concern of the text is to then interpret the meaning of the attacks but more specifically what they mean for Pakistan. Musharraf states that,

Pakistan is facing a very critical situation and I believe that after 1971, this is the most critical period. The decision we take today can have far-reaching and wide-ranging consequences. The crisis is formidable and unprecedented. If we make wrong decisions in this crisis, it can lead to the very worse consequences. On the other hand, if we take right decisions, its results will be good. The negative consequences can endanger Pakistan's integrity and solidarity. Our critical concerns, our important concerns can come under threat. When I say critical concerns, I mean our strategic assets and the cause of Kashmir.\(^{119}\) If these come under threat it would be a worse situation for us.

---

\(^{119}\) Pakistan has a long-standing conflict with India over the territory of Kashmir located in the North of both countries. Both countries claim the territory of Kashmir and have fought two wars over it as well as having been engaged in continuous low-intensity warfare during peacetime. The conflict stems from 1947 when the British Raj divided India into two sovereign states and offered princely states within the Union to either opt to stay with India or incorporate themselves with Pakistan. A good introduction to the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir is provided by: Schofield, V. (2000). *Kashmir in Conflict*. London: I B Tauris.
Clearly, the text begins by articulating a crisis situation and the critical nature of the dilemma that Pakistan finds itself in. Immediately, the language taps into a persistent and powerful over-arching meta-narrative that has historically ‘framed’ much of Pakistan’s official ‘world-view’. The notion of Pakistan as ‘under threat’ is a very powerful narrative that has been consistently employed within the political discourse and concerns the country’s long running struggle to survive in an anarchic world system. The historical analogy evoked in this text i.e. ‘I believe that after 1971, this is the most critical period’, is extremely powerful in terms of providing a ‘reading’ and locating the nature of the current context to the audience. The events of 1971 are popularly viewed as a shameful incident in the nation’s history when arch-rival India successfully managed to dismember Pakistan by supporting the secession of East Pakistan leading to the creation of Bangladesh. By comparing the current context to events in the past the discourse seeks to make comprehensible the crisis of the present. Arguably, the purpose of employing this comparison within the text is to infer the notion that Pakistan is under a similar or even worse kind of threat, ‘the negative consequences can endanger Pakistan’s integrity and solidarity’ i.e. dismemberment similar to the 1971 episode. This strategy works to inject fear and urgency of the situation and the need to focus on making the ‘right decision’.

Musharraf goes onto argue that a, ‘right decision’ will bring far more than simply state survival suggesting that, ‘we can re-emerge politically as a responsible and dignified nation and all our difficulties can be minimized…….

However, what is of critical importance here is the way in which the narrative begins to locate and identify the source of the ‘threat’ to Pakistan in the context of the crisis
situation articulated earlier. Despite the US being in a mood for retaliation and the unfortunate location of the Taliban in Pakistan’s vicinity the text suggests that the real threat lies elsewhere indeed ‘threat’ is conceptualized as emanating from a more familiar enemy. Thus very early on in his address, Musharraf makes a clear argument that India is poised to damage Pakistan:

….Let us now take a look at the designs of our neighboring country. They offered all their military facilities to the United States. They have offered without hesitation, all their facilities, all their bases and full logistic support. They want to enter into any alliance with the United States and get Pakistan declared a terrorist state. They want to harm our strategic assets and the Kashmir cause. Not only this, recently certain countries met in Dushanbe. India was one of them. Indian representative was there.

What do the Indians want? they do not have common borders with Afghanistan anywhere. It is totally isolated from Afghanistan. In my view, it would not be surprising, that the Indians want to ensure that if and when the government in Afghanistan changes, it shall be an anti-Pakistan government. It is very important that while the entire world is talking about this horrible terrorist attack, our neighboring country instead of talking peace and cooperation, was trying hard to harm Pakistan and defame Islam. If you watch their television, you will find them dishing out propaganda against Pakistan, day in and day out. I would like to tell India "Lay Off".
Pakistan's armed forces and every Pakistani citizen is ready to offer any sacrifice in order to defend Pakistan and secure its strategic assets. Make no mistake and entertain no misunderstanding. At this very moment our Air Force is at high alert; and they are ready for "Do or die" Missions My countrymen! In such a situation, a wrong decision can lead to unbearable losses….

The threat of annihilation at the hands of the India adversary has historically been a hegemonic discursive theme in the political discourse of Pakistan. It is important to remember that this speech appeared at a critical historical juncture and its purpose is essentially to prepare ground for an official U-turn on policy as regards to the Taliban. Without evaluating the ‘truth’ in this statement i.e. whether India was poised to take advantage of the situation to the determinant of Pakistan’s interests, it is important to draw attention to the rhetorical significance of a discursive strategy that highlights malevolent intentions vis-à-vis Pakistan i.e. ‘they want to enter into any alliance with the US and get Pakistan declared a terrorist state’. In this context, the language draws on older familiar arguments that generate popular mobilisation. There is no doubt that the theme of a belligerent India is deeply embedded in the national psyche and consequently it is much easier to popularly comprehend and refer to. Indeed in Pakistan the image of the enemy Indian Other is able to generate acute mobilisation and popular consensus\(^{120}\). The text thus draws on a popular national narrative that focuses on India’s underlying desire to isolate Pakistan from

\(^{120}\) The extremity of the sentiment is widely acknowledged. It was for instance acceptable and applauded when Z. A. Bhutto declared (on discovering that India possessed nuclear technology) that Pakistani’s would eat grass if they had to but would find the money to fund a nuclear bomb.
the world polity and India’s co-operative actions towards the US are construed in this light. The text suggests that the principal basis for the Indian co-operative stance in relation to offering the US, ‘all their (military) facilities, all their bases and full logistic support’, is to isolate Pakistan, in short the real motive is not the ‘war on terrorism’ but a concern to isolate Pakistan from the world polity as a pariah. Moreover, we find a brief reference to Pakistan’s armed forces arguably this is a peculiar addition in a national address whose main concern is to discuss the aftermath of the suicide attacks in the US. This does not seem as peculiar if we are to understand that the primary purpose of the text is to represent Pakistan at a threatening historical juncture. The reference to ‘Indian designs’ in close proximity to the observation that Pakistan’s armed forces are ‘ready and waiting’, works to strengthen the idea that Pakistan is facing a credible and immanent threat from India.

Arguably, the Indian threat is the main thread implicitly running throughout Musharraf’s address to the nation in September 2001. In closing his speech, Musharraf makes a final explicit reference, ‘we have to frustrate the evil designs of our enemies and safeguard national interests’, and immediately in the vicinity of this declaration proceeds to reiterate that Pakistan is an Islamic country. Arguably then, this arrangement of ideas works to evoke a historically prevalent Hindu/Muslim, good/evil narrative. Further, the understanding that although the US is ready to retaliate, the ‘real’ threat to Pakistan lies from its immediate neighbour reoccurs occasionally within the discourse. Pakistan’s foreign secretary for instance in 2004 continued to draw on this theme arguing that:
the September 11 terrorist attacks provided India with a heaven sent opportunity to drive a wedge Pakistan and the West and to use anti-terrorism as another important tool of its foreign policy. It lost no time in pointing out that the US and the West were under attack from the same forces that India was fighting in Kashmir. It tried to gloss over the basic distinction between an armed struggle for the right of self-determination and acts of terrorists. India would have found many sympathetic ears has it not been for Pakistan’s assiduous efforts to readjust its policy on Afghanistan and support the world community’s war on terror. (Kasuri 2004)\textsuperscript{121}.

It is important to understand that a discourse whose overall propose is to legitimize a radical shift in constructions is unlikely to be successful unless it employs discursive strategies that ‘plug in’ to other more popular discursive themes that are particular to the local society. Doty (1993:303) for instance, notes that,

the reception as meaningful of statements revolving around policy situations depends on how well they fit into the general system of representation in a given society...[statements] must make sense and fit with what the general public takes as “reality”.

What this means is that interpretations and meanings ascribed cannot be doled out on a whim, but that in order for them to be credibly meaningful they must fit into the

\textsuperscript{121} Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri speaking at the National Defense College in Islamabad on ‘India’s foreign policy – Pakistan’s view point’ on 23th May, 2004.
existing system of representation. In this sense, Doty suggests that analysts in ‘reading’ texts pay particular attention to presuppositions\textsuperscript{122} underlying statements. The particular interpretation and representation alluded to in the above extracts are only meaningful within the context of a popular background knowledge which infers a struggle between Pakistani state survival and the (Indian) forces of destruction.

In this context however it is important to note that, it is principally Musharraf’s speech of September 19\textsuperscript{th}, 2001 that is most vocal in its association of ‘threat’ from India in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. The analysis below will demonstrate that as the political discourse begins to focus more on constructing and emphasizing Pakistan’s sincerity and maturity vis-à-vis an often implicit juxtaposing with India, a direct threat from India in the aftermath of 9/11 is less vocally constructed. In later sections, the discussion will argue that the positive construction of the Pakistani Self constrains the discursive construction of the Indian Other as inherently ‘evil’ or inherently poised to damage Pakistan. Furthermore, the discursive focus also tends to move in the direction of constructing the Taliban and other extremist organizations as the primary threat to the Pakistani state. However, the initial construction of an immediate threat from India in terms of its possible alliance with the US is an important feature in that it allowed the Pakistani state to initiate concrete political action that entailed an alliance with the US. The almost immediate assurance to the US of the use of a limited number of Pakistan’s airbases and other logistical support for instance was a concrete political action that the discourse paved the way for.

\textsuperscript{122} A presupposition is an implicit assumption about the world or background belief relating to an utterance whose truth is taken for granted.
5.5 Discursive Strategy: Assigning ‘meaning’ through religious analogy and ideology

Pakistan has long identified itself with an Islamic ideology which has served a range of different purposes from attempting to build a cohesive nationalism, to building consensus for state policies on Kashmir, to justifying martial law and to legitimize war with (Hindu) India. However, it is notable that prior to the suicide attacks the regime of Musharraf had not really relied on ‘Islam’ to justify its policies; rather, the military coup was justified on the basis that it would promote ‘good governance’ and economic prosperity. What is remarkable then is the extent to which an Islamic discourse begins to enter the political arena in order to explain, justify and normalize state responses in the aftermath of the suicide attacks in the US. For instance, the abrupt U-turn in relation to the Taliban was a big undertaking not lost on the leadership in Pakistan. There is no doubt that a political narrative that shunned the Taliban would require considerable discursive work, especially since previous to this Pakistan continually supported the regime on the basis that it was ‘Muslim’. However, a close examination of the political language reveals that strategy did not entail an immediate shunning and rejection of the Taliban, rather the suggestion of abandonment is initially implicit. For instance, note that in Musharraf’s September 19th, 2001 speech he signals a concern for the Taliban’s safety and continuation:
I and my government are much more worried about Afghanistan and Taliban. I have done everything for Afghanistan and Taliban when the entire world is against them. I have met about twenty to twenty-five world leaders and talked to each of them in favour of the Taliban. I have told them that sanctions should not be imposed on Afghanistan and that we should engage them. Even in this situation, we are trying our best to cooperate with them. I sent Director General ISI with my personal letter to Mullah Umar. He returned after spending two days there. I have informed Mullah Umar about the gravity of the situation. We are trying our best to come out of this critical situation without any damage to Afghanistan and Taliban.

This lack of an overt condemnation may be compared to Musharraf’s later statements (2005a) where he, in referring to Taliban sympathizers, argues that, ‘it is our responsibility to take Islam out of the claws of these [sic] ignorant and take it towards its true essence’. Similarly, Mushahid Hussain Syed (2004b) implicitly supports this representation by covertly juxtaposing good, moderate Muslims with the radical (Islamic) Other suggesting ‘by and large our people are good and moderate Muslims and good human beings...their natural instincts reject extremism...there is a popular revulsion to extremism’. Thus, rather than an immediate abandonment of the Taliban following 9/11, it can be observed that the discourse is more likely to pursue the theme of rejecting the Taliban as related to either Pakistan or Islam much later in the time frame. Further, the particular speaking powers assigned to Musharraf enable him to initiate a critique of the Taliban. This theme will be developed later in the discussion.
Rather than an explicit critique of the Taliban, Musharraf’s speech of September 19th, 2001 moves to a discursive emphasis in which it begins to (re)construct the centrality of Islam to Pakistan, thus implicitly taking away its exclusive association with the Taliban. On a second note, the related notion of ‘hikmat’\(^{123}\) or sound judgment in difficult circumstances is emphasized. Both these themes are important because they are subsequently extensively reproduced throughout the political discourse. Musharraf (2001) argues,

> At this moment, it is not the question of bravery or cowardice. We are all very brave. My own response in such situations is usually of daring. But bravery without rational judgment is tantamount to stupidity. There is no clash between bravery and sound judgment. *Allah Almighty says in the holy Quran, "The one bestowed with ‘hikmat’ has a huge blessing.* We have to take recourse to sanity. We have to save our nation from damage. We have to build up; our national respect. Pakistan comes first, everything else comes later.

Some scholars and religious leaders are inclined towards taking emotional decisions. I would like to remind them the events of the first six years of the history of Islam. The Islamic calendar started from migration. *The significance of migration is manifested from the fact that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) went from Makkah to Madina. He (PBUH) migrated to safeguard Islam.* What was

\(^{123}\) The original Urdu term is used here and in English roughly relates to wisdom, far sightedness and rational judgment based on Islam.
migration? God forbid, was it an act of cowardice? The Holy Prophet (PBUH) signed the charter of Madinah (Meesaq-e-Madinah) with the Jewish tribes.....

At this critical juncture, we have to frustrate the evil designs of our enemies and safeguard national interests. *Pakistan is considered a fortress of Islam. God forbid, if this fortress is harmed in any way it would cause damage to the cause of Islam*...

….In the end before I take your leave, I would like to end with the prayer of Hazrat Musa¹²⁴ as given in Sura-e-Taha. (Musharraf 2001).

It is important to consider that Pakistan’s support of the Afghan Taliban government had popularly been represented as support for a brotherly ‘Islamic’ government. The implication then is that a change of policy towards the Taliban is a rejection of Islam. The discourse however, in beginning to explain, legitimise and justify such a reversal in policy used two specific discursive strategies. Firstly, the language and tone adopted within the text clearly signals towards close natural association between Islam and Pakistan. The representation of Pakistan as the fort of Islam fuses the two in such a way that Pakistan is constructed as synonymous with Islam, *‘Pakistan is considered a fortress of Islam. God forbid, if this fortress is harmed in any way it would cause damage to the cause of Islam’*. Such a personification of Pakistan with Islam suggests that any danger to Pakistan should be interpreted as damage to Islam;

¹²⁴ Moses.
this is why the text argues that ‘Pakistan comes first’. On this level, the emphasis seeks to reclaim Islam for Pakistan whilst simultaneously there is an implicit de-linking of Islam’s exclusive association with the Taliban.

On a second level, this emphasis on the fusion of Pakistan and Islam is coupled with an emphasis on the exercise of ‘hikmat’ and what constitutes a ‘right’ decision. The question of ‘what constitutes a right decision’ is dealt with by making an explicit comparison to an important event in Islamic history, which focuses on the migration of the Prophet. In evoking such an analogy, the discourse seeks to accord the present situation with the same significance, but more importantly it seeks to construct a similarity between the shift in state policy and the Prophet’s decision to migrate. The implication here is that a policy seemingly emanating from a position of weakness, as was the Prophet’s, was actually inspired by ‘hikmat’ and was therefore ultimately justified since it secured the survival of Islam. The use of this analogy, concerning the exercise of ‘hikmat’, conveys to the audience the notion that if Pakistan sides with the Taliban it would put Islam/Pakistan at danger. Consequently, this rhetorical strategy implies that the Pakistani state’s disassociation with the Taliban on the grounds of ‘exercising hikmat’ is justified and an exercise of ‘hikmat’. The analogy associates the present scenario with a past scenario suggesting that ‘the lesson is that when there is a crisis situation, the path of wisdom is better than the path of emotions. Therefore, we have to take a strategic decision’. However, Musharraf goes on to argue that a ‘strategic decision’ or exercising ‘hikmat’ does not

---

125 Following persecution the Prophet migrated from his home in Makkah, Saudi Arabia to live in Medina, Saudi Arabia where he was free to practice Islam. This event, though at the time envisaged as a defeat and as an indication that Islam would cease to exist, is seen today by Muslims as an act guided by wisdom since the migration ended persecution and secured the future of Islam in the Middle East from where it then able to spread.
imply an abandoning of Islam, ‘there is no question of weakness of faith or cowardice’; rather the text implies that by disassociating itself from the Taliban, Pakistan can ensure the continued survival of Islam in the sub continent. This is a dominant theme reiterated persistently throughout the discourse and occurs at different sites at different times indeed even in 2006 President Musharraf argued that,

reconciliation does not mean giving in or surrendering. In the present geopolitical scenario and the present condition of the Ummah\(^{126}\), the path of confrontation is closed for us because if we take that we will end ourselves. 

*When Prophet Mohammed migrated from Mecca he was avoiding confrontation from the position of weakness.* (Musharraf 2006b)

The use of extended religious analogy within political texts may seem strange nevertheless the discursive strategy serves a specific purpose in that it locates meaning for the wider domestic constituency by implying similarity between past and present circumstances.

5.6 Discursive strategy: Positioning Musharraf

It is important to understand that the discursive emphasis on exercising ‘hikmat’ is a key strategy of the discourse to justify state policy and practice. Moreover, whilst religious analogies are frequently drawn upon to locate the *meaning of the present,*

\(^{126}\) Muslim brotherhood.
an additional feature of the language is the way in which the language implicitly affords Pakistan’s political leadership and specifically Musharraf as being the embodiment of ‘hikmat’. The narrative positions and constructs the political leadership and specifically Musharraf as being imbued with an almost divine capacity to protect the fort of Islam. We begin to see such a construction in the very first instance following September 11th, 2001 when Musharraf in explaining and justifying the decision to co-operate with the US and withdraw support from the Taliban implicitly presents this as an exercise of ‘hikmat’ on his part: ‘Allah Almighty says in the holy Quran, The one bestowed with ‘hikmat’ has a huge blessing’ (Musharraf, September 19th, 2001). The main purpose of this focus on ‘hikmat’ is to strengthen the notion that state policy although appearing distasteful on the surface is in actuality inspired by the exercise of ‘hikmat’. It is notable that here is reference to the Prophet’s exercise of ‘hikmat’, and in the same text the implication that a similar exercise of ‘hikmat’ can be attributed to Musharraf. Musharraf is seen to challenge the Mullah’s and other’s who feel that they are the ‘custodians of Islam’,

....I tell these people who have become the custodians of Islam or who think they understand Islam better, that it is Almighty Allah who gives honour or authority to anybody. This is our faith that Almighty Allah gives honour to whosoever He wants and snatches (sic) honour from whosoever He wants. If this is our faith then Allah Almighty has brought me to this position. This position, this authority, has been bestowed by Allah and as long as I hold this authority and whatever work I am doing, all Pakistani’s should have confidence...because this is our faith (Musharraf 2002a).
This is a remarkable depiction of Musharraf especially considering that Musharraf’s military coup of October 1999 made no such religious inferences. Instead, justifiers of the coup made scant, if any, use of Islamic symbolism and myths claiming that Islam necessitated a military takeover instead the coup was wholly represented in terms of ‘good governance’ and in opposition to the ‘bad governance’ of the civilian rulers who had brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy (see Musharraf, October 17th, 1999. Musharraf, December, 15th, 1999, Sattar, November 8th, 1999. Musharraf, August 2nd, 2001). However, now we find that the narrative suggests that Musharraf is, a kind of, divinely guided leader possessing wisdom. Moreover, Musharraf’s claim to this special position is attributed to the fact that he is a ‘Syed’ as he elaborates below,

I want to make it clear that I am not in the conceit of being ‘Alim’\textsuperscript{127} but none should doubt upon my Islamic identity. I am a Syed\textsuperscript{128} and God has conferred upon me an honour which a few have had. The doors of the Khana Kaba\textsuperscript{129} are opened whenever I visit there. I happened to enter Khana Kaba six times. Once the inner door of Khana Kaba called ‘Tuba’ was opened for me. I mounted the roof of Kaba and raised the slogan of ‘Allah-u-Akbar’ from a place where Hazrat Bilal\textsuperscript{130} happened to say his ‘Azan’\textsuperscript{131}. The door of ‘Roza Rasool’ is opened for me on my visit to Medina. Therefore none should criticize or question on my Muslim identity.... (Musharraf 2005g)

\textsuperscript{127} Islamic scholar.  
\textsuperscript{128} Syed’s are attributed to be direct descendents of the Prophet.  
\textsuperscript{129} Holy building in Makkah, Saudi Arabia.  
\textsuperscript{130} Bilal is attributed with being the first Muslim to deliver the first Azan (see below).  
\textsuperscript{131} The call to prayer delivered from minarets.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the kind of picture being presented here, and more importantly its functions, it is important to note that the key proponent of this language or narrative is Musharraf himself. Indeed, across the discourse, members of the ruling elite were likely to describe Musharraf as indispensable and an exceptional and wise leader. For instance,

> The President is a brilliant asset for this country who has toiled unreservedly to steer the country through these difficult times and towards prosperity. We will continue to benefit from his wisdom (National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates)\(^{132}\)

Nevertheless, it is principally Musharraf who assigns himself with religious association. In the texts cited above, Musharraf challenges and places himself on par with Alims (Islamic scholars) by emphasising that he is a descendent of the Prophet and implicitly that God in some way ‘handpicked’ him for the job of steering Pakistan. It is interesting to note his assertion that ‘Allah Almighty has brought me to this position’, the discourse seems to attributes far more to Musharraf than the practice of ‘hikmat’. Musharraf’s ‘special position’ is strengthened by the use of other minor emphasis such as the reference to the ‘special access’ he was afforded to holy buildings in Makkah, Saudi Arabia. This construction of Musharraf as ‘chosen by God’ is fitting if one recalls that the discourse had increasingly and vociferously

proceeded to fuse Islam and Pakistan together and begun to represent an opposition to the Taliban in terms of good versus bad or authentic Islam versus unauthentic. The issue here is less to do with whether people took Musharraf seriously (in terms of the construction of Musharraf as a demi-god) rather, the point to be noted here in terms of discursive function is that the construction of Musharraf as a special Muslim leader positioned him in a way that afforded him particular speaking rights. Milliken (1999:229 emphasis in original) notes, `discourses define subjects authorized to speak and act (e.g. foreign policy officials, defence intellectuals, development experts). Arguably, the specific discursive location of Musharraf had the effect that it assigned social power enabling him with the authority to differentiate and to mark out that which is not Islamic. This is certainly conceptualised as an important speaking right which he had not enjoyed prior to such a construction.

The data reveals a ‘replacement’ for the Taliban and the discourse slowly but surely begins to present Musharraf as a legitimate representative of Islam as opposed to the Taliban thus serving an important political function in terms of countering and challenging the Taliban’s image as the sole representatives of Islam. If one takes a closer look at the political discourse, we can find that there is not an immediate disqualification or condemnation of the Taliban. Instead, the focus is on the Pakistani Self and ramifications for the Self in the context of 9/11 attacks. Importantly at this point, Musharraf had not been constructed as an overtly ‘Islamic’ leader and thus subsequently does not enjoy the accompanying speaking rights; it is only after his construction as a ‘Muslim’ within the political discourse that he begins to differentiate, mark out the Islamic Self from the radical Islamic Other.
The particular discursive construction identified here enabled Musharraf to define and distinguish the radical Islamic Other from the Self, the authority to determine what constitutes a ‘right’ decision and enabled Musharraf the authority to define and frame the most pertinent ‘issues’ for Pakistan. Such representations fulfilled important political functions in that they allowed Musharraf to distance state policy and action from their association with the US ‘war on terror’, and instead the discursive strategy was to moralise state policy by representing it as Pakistan’s conflict between ‘real’ Islam and a ‘distorted’ Islam. Pakistan’s political leadership is constructed as engaged in a conflict that is simply a struggle between good and the thwarted/evil.

In further consolidating the particular political construction of Musharraf, the discourse draws attention to Musharraf’s ‘achievements’, particularly in relation to his idea’s of ‘enlightened moderation’. In many ways, this narrative harks back or tends to implicitly draw on national myths related to the ‘good old days’, the national narrative which posits that Islam led the world towards human advancement and compares this with the present scenario in which Musharraf is leading Muslim Pakistan towards respect and recognition in the international arena. Domestically, in order to reinforce the legitimacy of the construction of Musharraf as a Muslim as an innovator and a saviour, the discourse emphasises him as someone who has attained international acclaim and respect.
Of course, Musharraf since the military coup has always been represented as indispensable to the country however, whereas this indispensability was initially couched in terms of saving the country from economic decline later constructions focus on the portrayal of Musharraf as a kind of modern Muslim caliph or leader.

In my view we have the potential to lead the world, the Islamic Ummah and the region towards peace and betterment. We should play our role to enhance the glory of the country. This world is common heritage and we should make it a better place for our future generation….keeping in view the role of Pakistan in the Ummah and the world I presented the strategy of ‘enlightened moderation’ to the Ummah. It is a two pronged strategy. On prong implies that Muslims reject terrorism and extremism and raise their voice against it and side by side we have to concentrate on socio-economic progress so that the Ummah can move forward. The second prong demands that the West and US help find a just resolution of the all the political issues confronting the Muslim Ummah….I am pleased that the strategy of Enlightened Moderation has been approved in the last OIC meeting….I proposed the formulation of a new department of Islamic thought which should be comprised of educated Islamic scholars who can convey the true Islamic spirit to the Ummah and the world. I am trying to lead the Ummah in this direction for their betterment. We have achieved international stature and standing in the Ummah, our economy is stabilised. (Musharraf 2005d)
The notion is that all sane, rational and more importantly Muslim peoples accept Musharraf’s ideas, and implicitly the practices which flow from such ideas. The reference to the OIC\(^{133}\) certainly suggests that the Muslim world is with Musharraf. Musharraf suggests that he is trying to, ‘lead the Ummah in this direction for their betterment’, in effect constructing himself as a Caliph of sorts, who is not just leading Pakistan but the entire Muslim world. The key point here is that this specific construction is evident across the data material and is consistent in terms of the underlying message it construes i.e. that of Musharraf as a statesman capable of ‘leading’, and in this case the Muslim world. Mushahid Hussain Sayed, in his opening remarks to an OIC seminar session reiterating such representations states that,

President Musharraf enunciated a vision for the Muslim world that is rooted in our religion; enlightenment with moderation as the path forward for the Muslim ummah for the 21\(^{st}\) century (Sayed, 2004a).\(^{134}\)

In terms of a domestic audience, the discourse is much more likely to emphasise notions of ‘Islamic wisdom’ and Musharraf’s Islamic credentials as a modern Muslim caliph. The postulation here is not that people necessarily agreed with this construction rather, that the political function of this construction was that it allowed Musharraf take this further so that he could then argue that the Taliban were un-Islamic.

\(^{133}\) Organisation of Islamic Countries.

\(^{134}\) Opening remarks by Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at the OIC seminar in Islamabad 1-2 June, 2004.
5.7 Discursive Strategy: Constructing rationality and responsibility

In addition to the construction of Musharraf as a divine leader, the discourse is also notably concerned with emphasising Pakistan as a rational and responsible state actor. The suggestion here is that Pakistan’s political discourse, in its strategy to construct the Self as rational, juxtaposes and differentiates its own ‘rationality’ from both an Indian irrationality and an extremist Taliban/Al-Qaeda irrationality. An implicit and explicit discursive construction of irrational outside Others politically functions to stabilise and make more pronounced the rational attributes assigned to oneself. Similarly, the representation of Pakistan as responsible is attributed by juxtaposing and drawing attention to the opposite behaviours assigned to outside Others namely, the US and India. While it is clear that state actors rarely, if at all, deliberately represent themselves as irrational or irresponsible however, often actors are willing to construct outside Others as irrational with the function being to reinforce, construct and strengthen the picture of oneself as good, responsible, rational and so on.

An analysis of Pakistan’s post September 11th, 2001 political discourse clearly indicates an intense preoccupation with discursive practices that represent Pakistan as a rational and responsible state actor. Such a representation, of course, counters the way in which global powers especially the US had begun to represent the Pakistan throughout the 1990s, a representation which legitimised various political practices amongst which were the imposition of US sanctions and the gradual
warming of Indo-US relations. However, it is also important to note that Pakistani political discourse prior to 2001 was already indicating a keenness to distance itself from an association with ‘rogue’ state. Musharraf’s entrance into the political foray in the late 1990s, dressed in his western attire and sporting his pet poodles, promised to avert national bankruptcy and repair Pakistan’s image as an international pariah.

The analysis below will explore identifiable Others within the discourse who are implicitly and explicitly often constructed as irrational and/or irresponsible, this picture or representation of the Other/s is placed alongside or juxtaposed to a representation of the Self implicitly inferring the opposite positive qualities i.e. dependability, responsibility, sincerity and so on. The argument here is that the function of the discourse is to stabilise and make more meaningful the idea of the Self as possessing positive attributes. The discussion below will consider three Others, the radical Islamic Other, India and finally the US.

In the first instance, the discursive strategy employed within the discourse seeks to juxtapose a rational Pakistan with an irrational Taliban Other, and an authentic Islam with an unauthentic Islam. In the speech cited below for instance, Musharraf emphasises the historical opposition of ‘conservatives’ to Pakistan and thus implicitly Islam. In seeking to represent their ideology as farcical, misguided and irrational, attention is drawn to the opposition of ‘conservatives’ to exemplary things such as the printing of the Quran and the declaration of the father of the nation Mohammed Ali Jinnah as an infidel as clear proofs which qualify the conservatives as existing outside of the sane, moral, Islamic, Pakistani community. Indeed,
Phoney/militant Islam is constructed as irrational and treacherous and since those adhering to ‘conservative’ Islam\(^\text{135}\) were opposed to Pakistan, the discourse propositions that this means that they are opposed to Islam itself since Pakistan is synonymous with Islam. Musharraf argued,

(Islam) emphasizes on ‘Haqooq-ul-abad\(^\text{136}\) rather than ‘Haqooq-ul-Ullah\(^\text{137}\)’. Islam leads us towards ‘Ilm\(^\text{138}\), contemplation, thought, review, Ijtehad and Ijmah. It teaches us peace, progress, prosperity, enlightenment and moderation. *The extremists and fundamentalists ignore the moderate and high principles of the religion.* They want to impose terrorist and extremist Islam...

Now it is our responsibility to take Islam out of the claws of these ignorant and take it towards its true essence...I want to take us back into history...Muslims launched their freedom struggle which concluded in their defeat after some time Sir Syed launched his Aligarh movement so that Muslims could get a modern education, a ‘fatwa’ was issued against him by the same conservatives to declare him infidel. History is witness to the fact that those who were from this Aligarh movement launched the Pakistan movement and formulated the Muslim league in 1906. They finally carved out Pakistan. Then printing presses were introduced in the sub-Continent but the conservatives banned presses. They announced the punishment of execution for anyone who printed a copy of

\(^\text{135}\) Clearly Musharraf is implicitly drawing similarities between the historical conservatives and the modern-day Taliban.

\(^\text{136}\) Rights of the people.

\(^\text{137}\) Rights of Allah.

\(^\text{138}\) Knowledge.
the Quran. There was the ideology of Iqbal and...Quaid... but again they issued Fatwa’s against Iqbal and branded Quaid an infidel. Pakistan came into being despite their opposition (Musharraf 2005a).

The discourse is then working to differentiate between real Muslims, like Musharraf, and those ‘conservatives’ who historically opposed all that is good and rational i.e. the creation of Pakistan, the printing of the Quran and so on. If these things are opposed i.e. the printing of the Quran then the only logical conclusion to draw is that those labelled ‘conservatives’ must be irrational and sham Muslims since no sane, rational Muslim would oppose such things. Much of the official language concerning extremists such as the Taliban tends to disassociate Pakistan and its citizens from the radical Islamic Other. Just as Musharraf locates the ‘conservatives’ as outside of the body politic Senator Mushahid referring to sectarian violence of the 1990s argues that,

[sectarian violence] was a blowback from the geopolitics of the 1980s. I’m referring to the West-funded Afghan Jihad, the CIA gave $2.1 billion during 1979-1989, the training of 200,000 Afghan Mujahideen and over 20,000 Arab volunteers including Osama Bin Laden…unfortunately the state either winked at or looked the other way during most of this period and the result was the growth of this Frankenstein monster of terror and extremism that is today the single most important security threat to Pakistan and its people….(Sayed 2004b).
Here, there is resonance with the earlier text in that the radical Islamic Other is represented as a foreign non-Pakistani Other, in particular note the way in which the foreign credentials are identified i.e. that it (the radical Islamic Other) was a US creation and consisted of Afghans and Arabs. The irrationality of the radical Islamic Other can therefore not be associated with Pakistan as Mushahid further notes:

by and large our people are good and moderate Muslims and good human beings. Let them be this way. Their natural instincts reject extremism…there is a popular revulsion to extremism (ibid).

The performative aspect of above theme is that its main function is to emphasise and differentiate Pakistan’s moderate and authentic Islam from an unauthentic and militant version of Islam, constructed, above all, as a foreign entity. Senator Mushahid’s exposition for instance works to consistently associate Islamic militancy with ‘foreignness’ and a disassociation from a domestic Pakistani constituency. Moreover, at the domestic level this strategy counteracts the notion that the state is in opposition to Islam or the notion that militant Islam is synonymous with Pakistan; instead, such versions of Islam are attributed to the ‘foreign’, ‘alien’ inferior’ realm and therefore justifies the state’s military action against it. Secondly, at the international level the differentiation allows Pakistan to be included in the United State’s ‘us’ group. If the political discourse represents Pakistan as in opposition to a foreign unauthentic Islam then it naturalises Pakistan co-operation with the US against this common opponent. This explicit articulation of a radical Islamic Other as an opponent of Pakistan is a construction within the political discourse that is
relatively new furthermore it marks a shift in terms of a historically discursive trend that tended to focus exclusively on Pakistan’s homogenous Islam with the Hindu-ness of the Indian Other.

The representations identified here fulfil important political functions in that they distance state policy and action from their association with the US ‘war on terror’; instead, the discursive strategy is to moralise state policy by representing it as Pakistan’s conflict between ‘real’ Islam and a ‘distorted’ Islam. Pakistan’s political leadership is constructed as engaged in a conflict that is simply a struggle between good and the thwarted/evil. One of the primary purposes of this representation is to mark out and distinguish the enemy ‘Other’, and it is through placing this ‘Other’ in opposition to the ‘fort of Islam’, and therefore Islam itself, that this function is discursively achieved. The discursive construction of the phoney Islamic Other justifies and legitimises military action against them and collusion with the US.

On a second level, and in addition to the juxtaposing between the Self and the radicalised Islamic Other, there is a further discursive strategy employed to strengthen the construction of the Self as rational and a responsible political entity. This is done principally through the discursive juxtaposing of the Self with the representation of an irrational and irresponsible Indian Other. It is possible to discern such a construction from the way in which official text, across the board, tends to emphasise specific actions, reactions, policies of the Self and juxtapose these implicitly and explicitly with its Indian counterpart. In the midst of the 2001-02
stand-off between India and Pakistan following the attacks on the Indian parliament, Indian irrationality is clearly articulated:

…the whole world knows there are many acts of terrorism in Pakistan also. There was an attack on our church in which many foreign nationals were killed….but we did not blame India for these attacks, we did not increase tension….I would like to say that all these (Indian) allegations with aggressive overtones show highly irresponsible behaviour on the part of the Indian leadership. This increases the heat of war and creates war hysteria. This is unacceptable to us. Now look at our attitude. Despite such provocations we have exercised restraint and adopted a wise and sane policy. But this should never be constituted as weakness. (Musharraf 2002b)

The narrative here is explicit in terms of assigning recklessness to India whilst simultaneously highlighting a seemingly mature and measured Pakistani response. This theme of Indian provocation is quite consistent throughout the discourse and is often used to strengthen the picture of the Self as level-headed\footnote{See Chapter three for an interesting comparison with the way in which Indian irrationally has been constructed historically.}, since it refuses to be provoked into engaging in accusations and threats - implicitly implying moral superiority – note, ‘we have exercised restraint and adopted a wise and sane policy’. By claiming restraint and wisdom in the face of provocation, the opposing negative characteristics are naturally attributed to the Indian Other. This juxtaposing between rational/irrational is articulated strongly to international audiences as Musharraf’s speech below demonstrates,
the peace process *initiated by Pakistan* with India over the last two years …the
initiation of this process was preceded by an unprecedented confrontation;
India had mobilised more than one million troops along our borders in 2002,
while we obviously responded in kind….Pakistan consistently advocated the
de-escalation, dialogue and conflict resolution….I therefore welcomed the
hand of friendship extended by former Prime Minister of India Mr.
Vajpayee.’…. ‘the ceasefire on the line of control was announced in November
2003 by Pakistan, we took the initiative and responded by India’….given
sincerity, flexibility and courage on all sides….the objective (of peace) is
within reach (Musharraf 2006c).

Although this text is located from a time-period when India-Pakistan relations were
at an all time high the narrative continues to draw attention to alleged Indian
rashness. By noting that, India mobilised ‘*more than* one million troops along
Pakistan’s borders in 2002’ an absurdity is implied in this very action whilst
simultaneously the suggestion that we ‘obviously’ responded suggests that it was
entirely understandable and clear to anyone in the right state of mind that a response
to such provocation was justified. Moreover, simply by referring to characteristics
such as quality of ‘leadership, sincerity, flexibility and courage’ in close proximity to
the construction of Pakistan as responsible and rational brings to mind, or naturalises,
the binary opposites of these terms. This theme of Indian provocation is recurrent
particularly in texts articulated to foreign audiences Pakistan’s Foreign Minister
reiterates this point,
Our relations with India have come along way from the tense period in 2001 and 2002 when India amassed its troops along the Pakistani border. Today the situation is much more stable as a result of the offer for ceasefire along the LoC made by President Musharraf in November 2003…….our nuclear capability must be viewed in the context of India’s pursuit of the nuclear option and our security concerns…our strategic capabilities have been developed in self-defence following the Indian nuclear test of 1974 that disrupted the security balance… (Kasuri 2007)\textsuperscript{140}

Kasuri reproduces the dominant themes of provocation when he notes that, India amassed its troops in 2001 on Pakistan’s borders. An important point is that this discursive emphasis excludes the context in which troops were amassed i.e. that India accused Pakistan of being involved in the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. Kasuri quickly moves on to highlight that the situation is presently much better owing to Pakistan’s initiative of offering a ceasefire. Later in the text, Kasuri again retouches on the theme of Indian provocation by referring to Pakistan’s nuclear technology as been triggered in self-defence as a result of Indian nuclear test. Read as a whole, the kind of construction proposed here points towards a notion of India as aggressive and provocative whilst at the same time Pakistan is reasoned and mature. Furthermore, it is notable that the idea of Pakistan as an ‘initiator’ (of peace) and an advocator of ‘de-escalation, dialogue and conflict resolution’ is stressed. The underlying implication is that since the Self exhibits these qualities they provide a

basis for, and allow for, the Indian Other to offer a ‘hand of friendship’ in the first place. The credit for the offer of a ‘hand of friendship’ is, thus implicitly accorded to the Self. Whilst the representation acknowledges India as an essential partner in peace, it tends to represent this partner as at some level unwilling and as dragging its heels in terms of moving forward. For instance, Foreign Minister Kasuri in an interview with the APP news agency referring to ‘progress’ between India and Pakistan in terms of bilateral relations states that he hoped that:

India will also accept Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali’s proposal to restore train links suggesting that ‘I am happy the things have improved but there is a need to go further’ (Kasuri 2003)\textsuperscript{141}

In contrast to the kind of representation afforded to India, Pakistan by contrast, is constructed as a leader; in particular, note the way in which ‘train links’ are proposed by Pakistan and await an Indian response. Similarly, Farooq Sattar in the meeting of the senate foreign relations committee and an EU delegation while noting that he along with other members visited India to stress to the government there that Pakistan desired peace states that Indian prime minister ‘Manmohan Singh reciprocated in very categorical words that he also has a vision that this region, one day, will become an economic bloc’ (see Foreign Office Yearbook 2006-2007: Government of Pakistan)\textsuperscript{142}. Often there is an emphasis on how Pakistan offered or

\textsuperscript{141} Foreign Minister Kasuri in an interview with the APP News Agency in Islamabad on June 6th 2003 – Sourced from ‘Foreign Affairs Pakistan’ journal published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, Government of Pakistan. Please note that the grammatical errors are present in the original text.

\textsuperscript{142} Farooq Sattar is a member of the National Assembly. See Government of Pakistan (2007).
suggested a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) or attempted to break the deadlock and so on while the Indian Other is more or less a passive party in that it responds or reciprocates Pakistan’s stimuli. Such a representation implicitly implies India’s reluctance at some level to engage with Pakistan and thus affords Pakistan a moral high-ground.

Finally, the construction of the Self as reasonable and sincere is additionally consolidated by emphasis in language which draws attention to an apparent disparity between a conscientious and dependable Pakistan and a somewhat insincere and irresponsible US entity especially in the context of the aftermath of the Cold War. Consider the following textual articulations taken from a selection of different sources which emphasise and naturalise Pakistan’s sincerity and dependability:

Pakistan took a strategic decision based on the principles of humanity and national interest to join the international coalition....Pakistan has played a critical role as a front line state in the war against terrorism’ (Address by Pakistani High Commissioner to New Dehli, 2004) 143

this decision was based on Pakistan outrage over the terrorist action resulting in colossal loss of innocent lives, its abhorrence of terrorism of which Pakistan itself has been a major victim; its principled approach to foreign policy and a dispassionate assessment of its national interest. With the wisdom of hindsight

143 Address by Pakistan’s High Commissioner to India at the Centre for Policy Research 6th March 2004.
it can now be said with certainty that there was no better alternative…it was not the case, as some observers have alleged, the magic of a telephone call that Pakistan decided to join the United States in the war on terrorism after the terrible events of 9/11. This decision was entirely in line with the principles that Pakistan believed in, the values that Pakistan subscribed to and the policies that Pakistan had pursued in the past (Kasuri 2004)\textsuperscript{144}.

A common thread running through the discourse is a theme focussing on naturalizing responsibility as an intimate or instinctive attribute of the Pakistani state. The argument been articulated is that the decision to align Pakistan with the US was not a result of a ‘magic phone call’, but emanated from Pakistan’s ‘natural’ disposition regarding the opposition to terrorism. Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar for instance, writing in a local newspaper argues that,

Pakistan government’s decision to fight terrorism has a pre-eminent national rationale. That the policy happens to coincide with the needs also of the world community which has witnessed horrifying acts of terrorism can only reinforce its logic….to join the global fight against terrorism does not imply endorsement of Bush administration’s policies\textsuperscript{145}.

\textsuperscript{144} Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri addressing the Heritage Foundation 22\textsuperscript{nd} May 2004.
\textsuperscript{145} ‘Fight terrorism for us not US; A comment by former foreign minister Abdul Sattar as appeared in the ‘Daily Pakistan Observer’ on 18\textsuperscript{th} April 2007. Sourced from ‘Foreign Affairs Pakistan’ Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On a similar note, Farooq Sattar debating in the National Assembly maintains that ‘we need to rid ourselves of this perception that Pakistan is simply responding to America or NATO or the international community’s dictates’. Despite this concerted effort by official sources to ‘own’ the US-led ‘war on terror’ there is much contention and during the extensive discussions on foreign policy in the National Assembly many opposed the ‘war on terror’. A reading of these debates reveals that much of the opposition to the US-led ‘war on terror’ does not automatically mean that the Taliban is applauded rather the opposition focuses on a dishonest and untrustworthy US partner. For instance, Ahmad Alam Anwar argues that, after 9/11 the decision of our President was well intentioned, I think it was a desire on his part to help Pakistan what he perceived to be in the interest of Pakistan’ security and development…(but since then)…the response that we have had from American has been negative. And they have betrayed us (and) they have not reciprocated in the right spirit (on account of belittling Pakistan’s effort and using economic assistance in a carrot and stick manner).

Furthermore, even where total opposition to the US-led ‘war on terror’ is not articulated there is a specific representation that is advanced that brings into discursive focus the notion of the US as insincere. In terms of the political functionality the discursive construction of the ‘natural’ disposition of Pakistan as...
responsible, sincere and principled discussed previously is given further weight by contrasting it with the kind of representation of the US alluded to above. Often within the discourse, both observations are placed in close proximity to each other in order to support the contention of a genuine Self. Former foreign minister Abdul Sattar further noting Pakistan’s earnestness to deal with terrorism promptly proceeds to point out that while Pakistan cannot deny illegal border crossings:148

But it can and must continue to explain the fact the problem in the context of the nightmare legacy bequeathed to us by the liberation struggle in Afghanistan. We still have millions of Afghan refugees in our country and it is difficult to identify insurgents amongst them. Also, foreign jihadis who were bought by the American CIA to fight the Soviets were later left in the border areas….Pakistan is not lacking in will to contribute to its solution (Sattar 2007)149

Again, militant Islam is represented as something that is wholly foreign, note the reference to Afghan refugees and other foreign ‘jihadis’ brought into Pakistan by the CIA. This discursive emphasis is placed in close proximity to the representation of Pakistan as being ‘abandoned’ by a US clearly implying that the United States having ‘used’ Pakistan to quash communist Soviet forces in Afghanistan discarded the region. Both these themes, i.e. the militant as foreign and the US as comparatively irresponsible and selfish, work together to naturalise the overall representation of Pakistan as moderate and a responsible world actor. Indeed these

148 Sattar refers to illegal border crossings by the Taliban from Afghanistan into Pakistan.
149 Abdul Sattar (former Foreign Minister) in Pakistan Observer 18th April, 2007.
are recurrent themes in the data material and some of the most vociferous articulations with regard to emphasising a potential dishonest US partner were articulated by Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed who often discussed the US in the context of the Cold War. It must be reiterated, that the ‘truth’ value’ of statements is not the issue here rather I am more concerned with the political functionality of the articulations and in this sense how the construction or textual emphasis on a somewhat insincere US partner works to reinforce the vision of the Pakistani Self as reliable.

as far as terrorism is concerned the track record of Pakistan has been very strong, very consistent and probably no other country after nine eleven has done more and sacrificed more in terms of supporting the campaign against terrorism and this also goes back to the years of the cold war when Pakistan was supposed to be a front line state in the issue of rolling back Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan and when our American and British friends were partners in what I call the joint jihad against Soviet Union and Pakistan played that role, we were committed to that and there is a strong feeling in Pakistan that after the liberation of Afghanistan or the roll back of the Red Army, we were left in the lurch. Afghanistan was left in the lurch and the West, Britain included, the US, just walked away from the region and we were left to carry the baby with the bath water and what you are seeing today is the blowback, the consequences, the after math of that Jihad and for 12 years from 1989-2001, the international community, the Western world, Britain, European Union, USA, just forgot about the region, forgot about Pakistan and they also
gave us a parting kick in the form of sanctions….(Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2004).\textsuperscript{150}

If the construction of identity is understood as a dynamic process produced through the activity of discourses, conceptualised as a set of discursive practices that share a similarity in terms of the underlying messages they implicitly and explicitly articulate, then the above textual emphases are critically important in terms of how they implicitly construct Pakistan’s identity. For instance, senator Mushahid focuses intently on recalling the role of the United States during a particular time-period, in effect, this discursive emphasis works towards reinforcing a positive representation of Pakistan whilst simultaneously bringing the intentions and characteristics of the US into question. Taken as whole, the representation of Pakistan as a responsible and mature world actor is principally achieved through a discursive juxtaposition between the Self and significant Other’s who are in different ways negatively differentiated from the Pakistani Self. In many instances, the strategy is to simply recall the perceived intentions and actions of Other’s in order to naturalise the opposite (positive) intentions and actions with the Self. Pakistan’s political discourse is thus strongly focused on the articulation of a Self that is a leader, an innovator, a pursuant of peace.

5.8 Discursive constructions and political engagement with India

On the other hand, it is also possible to discern that the political discourse under investigation can also be linked to significant shifts in other areas of political practice. Pakistan has historically had an extremely strained relationship with India with the extent of polarisation being such that despite sharing significant similarities in language and culture the two populations had little interaction owing to the draconian travel restrictions and the blanket negative, derogatory and hostile stereotyping of the respective Other. However, what is significant from the perspective of this study is the way in which the nature of engagement between Pakistan and India improved dramatically during the time-period under discussion in this study. The nature of engagement involved such things as visits of sports teams, a steady stream of visiting movie stars, musicians, journalists, high school and college students and peace activists. In Pakistan, pirated copies of Indian movies have a huge and growing market although on the official level Indian movies have been banned since 1965 however, in May of 2006 for the first time in 41 years the government of Pakistan allowed the showing and legal distribution of an Indian film. On the official level, Indian Prime Minister and Pakistan’s President Musharraf began direct talks on January 5th, 2004 heralding a series of high-level direct contact and dialogue between the two rival states, these bilateral composite dialogues were regular, surviving changes in government in India and focussed on dialogue around contentious issues such as CBMs, the Siachin glacier, the building of dams, terrorism, drug trafficking and economic and commercial co-operation. Moreover, there were indications that Pakistan was willing to move away from entrenched
positions such as its official stance on Kashmir. Musharraf for instance, conceded in an interview in 2003 that,

we are for UN resolutions, however now we have left that aside. If we want to resolve this issue, both sides need to talk to each other with flexibility, coming beyond stated positions, meeting halfway somewhere…we are prepared to rise to the occasion, Indian has to be flexible also…\textsuperscript{151}

Musharraf’s assertions regarding the possibility of abandoning UN resolutions in relation to the disputed territory of Kashmir was met with some outrage within Pakistan but arguably, criticism was limited and cannot be seen as something that really disturbed the entire population. Some analysts would argue that the improved exchange between the two countries was propelled by the vested interests of the United States, who was concerned with ensuring Pakistan’s full commitment to its western border. The implication here is the understanding that belligerency with India would not be beneficial to the US since it could jeopardise Pakistan’s full military commitment to the ‘war on terror’. However, whilst such a focus is entirely legitimate nevertheless, the approach here is that language and discourse creates the possibilities for political practice. From the theoretical perspective of this study, language is political and productive to the extent that it is constitutive of what is brought into being – practice thus relies on the discourse which either works to enable or constrain social practice. The argument thus runs that inter-state conflicts are significantly fuelled by the institutionalisation of difference and exclusion.

\textsuperscript{151} Reuters News Agency – December 18\textsuperscript{th}, 2003.
articulated through binary and dichotomous ways of speaking. From this position then, changes in a discourse would then signal or enable shifts in practices. This way of tackling the thawing of Indo-Pakistan relations is less concerned with who propelled the discourse and more concerned with how language creates the conditions for policy transformations. The contention here is that specific discursive constructions of the national Self which hinged on representations of the Self as rational, innovative and responsible had the effect that they created a space within which it became possible to talk about Pakistan initiating dialogue and exchange with India.

Consequently, what is being proposed is that Pakistan’s political discourse in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 2001 focussed around a representation or worldview in which the subject-position that Pakistan was afforded emphasised a ‘Self’ that was inherently peaceful and genuine. Ironically, in many ways this representation was often built through a direct juxtaposing of the opposite qualities which were discursively assigned to the Indian other. In this context, the subject-position that Pakistan took up meant that it opened political space by making it feasible for a more enhanced political manoeuvre. Notably however, the data analysis revealed that Pakistan’s willingness to engage with the Indian Other emerges principally from a reconstruction of who and what the Pakistani Self is, rather than a wholesale reconstruction of the Indian Other. Despite individual references, such as Musharraf’s assertions of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as ‘sincere’ and ‘positive’ (Musharraf 2006e, 2006g) these are qualities generally lacking in the representation of India. Pakistan’s political discourse is primarily focused on the articulation of a Self that is a leader, an innovator, a
pursuant of peace and whilst the discourse acknowledges India as an essential partner in peace it tends to represent this partner as at some level unwilling and as dragging its heels in terms of moving forward. Pakistan, by contrast, is constructed as a leader, and often there is an emphasis on how Pakistan offered or suggested a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) or attempted to break the deadlock and so on while the Indian Other is more or less a passive party in that it responds to Pakistan’s stimuli. Such a representation implicitly implies India’s reluctance at some level to engage with Pakistan and in many ways affords Pakistan a moral high ground.

Whilst this project is not primarily concerned with how Pakistan’s engagement with India was enabled by the ‘knowledge’ that the discourse created however, the section above seeks to strengthen the principle argument put forward here: namely the idea that language and discourse is productive of social practice. These ideas extrapolated to the field of IR means that the organising principle of this project has been the constitutive significance of representation in formulating and debating domestic and foreign policy. Indeed Hansen (2006:6) notes that

foreign policies need to ascribe meaning to the situation and to construct the objects within it, and in doing so they articulate and draw upon specific identities of other states, regions, peoples, and institutions as well as on the identity of a national, regional or institutional Self.
5.9 Conclusion: The normalisation of Pakistan’s political practice

A constructivist theoretical starting point is the basic justification for the analysis conducted in this chapter. The idea here is that specific and identifiable discourses contribute to the normalisation of particular government policy and practice. In this sense, a starting for this chapter has been Doty’s (1993:303 italics in original) observation that,

policy makers also function within a discursive space that imposes meaning on their world and thus creates reality…an approach that focuses on discursive practices as a unit of analysis can get at how this ‘reality’ is produced and maintained and how it makes various practices possible.

The overall objective of this chapter has been to uncover the knowledge’s or state practices normalised by a specific political discourse in Pakistan. This kind of examination is adept at revealing the assumptions, beliefs and values underlying specific texts, and the histories and embedded meanings of the analogies, and how these are constitutive of the ensuing political practice.

The analysis in this chapter revealed that the events of September 11, 2001 were ‘read’ as posing an extraordinary threat to the survival of Pakistan. Despite the rhetoric emanating from the US, the threat to Pakistan is located as emanating from
the India Other. The chapter argued that this ‘reading’ fits neatly into the historical meta-narrative that assigns a belligerent, vengeful Indian adversary. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the US, the representation of a hostile India played an important role in terms of contextualisation and locating meaning of contemporary events. More specifically, this discursive strategy conveyed a sense of immediate and immense threat to the vast masses of Pakistan primarily because a threat from a hostile India is far easier to relate to and enjoys a historical location in the Pakistani psyche. The suggestion here is not that a ‘threat’ from India was deliberately constructed rather the analysis demonstrates that the employment of this discursive strategy was important in terms of ‘setting the scene’ or defining meaning. This attaching of ‘meaning’ was further strengthened by the unabashed use of historical analogies to build ‘meanings’ through connecting and associating the predicament of Pakistan in the 9/11 environment to specific historical and popular narratives (the secession of East Pakistan in 1971 and the migration of the Prophet). Thus, the political language and the associations employed between the past and present work to enforce a particular reading. Conversely, other meanings/ readings were entirely possible.

Furthermore as the analysis subsequently noted, having narrated extraordinary threat, the political language then moved to re-infusing more vehemently, to a domestic audience at least, an Islamic ideology with the purpose of the state. This discursive strategy had a political purpose in that it functioned to ‘reclaim’ Islam for Pakistan as opposed to the Taliban exclusiveness in terms of being the sole representatives of Islam. The language fused together Islam and Pakistan; in doing so it also began to differentiate between a Talibanised unauthentic Islam and an
authentic version of Islam\textsuperscript{152}. The fissure of Islam into these two polarised and separate camps within the political discourse can be viewed as a phenomenon emergent following 2001 and had the effect that it allowed the state to continue to employ Islam as a significant tool for mobilisation as well providing the national Self with an identity from which Other/s could be differentiated. Within this representation, Musharraf is constructed as possessing the special capacity to exercise ‘hikmat’, which was effective, in that it afforded him Islamic legitimacy and particular speaking rights. The argument made here is that this discursive construction of Musharraf as a legitimate speaker was an important strategy because it authorized him to distinguish between authentic and unauthentic Islam.

It is possible to discern that within the corpus of data following 2001, there is a notable infrequency in terms of an explicit reference to pitting Hindu India against Islam\textsuperscript{153}. In times of heightened tension however for example, during the standoff between the India and Pakistan following the December 2001 attacks on the Indian parliament\textsuperscript{154} the discourse is more overt in terms of constructing the Other as irrational. Nevertheless, it is notable that there seems a break with the past in that representation practices tend not to employ highly derogative imagery to construct the Indian Other, and secondly there is less reliance on a narrative that defines the Other in terms of its Hindu identity. This strategy can be associated with the surrounding discursive emphases on Pakistan’s ‘maturity’ and its role as a ‘responsible state actor’. An argument can be made that such a favourable

\textsuperscript{152} A rational, peaceful, authentic Pakistani Islam juxtaposed to a negative, irrational, barbarian unauthentic imitation of Islam.

\textsuperscript{153} Though this narrative does implicitly surface within the discourse.

\textsuperscript{154} India blamed Pakistani state involvement in the attacks on the Indian parliament in December 2001. This conflictual situation led to the both countries amassing their respective armed forces on the borders.
representation of Pakistan closes down the possibilities for an explicit construction of the Indian Other as inherently ‘evil’ or ‘inferior’. Indeed it would contradict the kind of positive characteristics the discourse assigns the Pakistani Self especially at the international level.

This is not to suggest that India is not represented as a hostile Other rather, this representation is achieved through a discursive strategy that links multiple positive characteristics with the Self and in the process naturalizes the binary opposite characteristics to the Other. The representation of India as provocative and irrational is central to the efficient discursive construction of Pakistan as possessing the opposing qualities. Such a discursive strategy is frequently employed at the international level where the emphasis is less on outright condemnations or accusations, but takes the form of more subtle references and indications towards Pakistan’s sensibility. It is useful to compare this discourse to the way in which the Indian adversary has been historically represented there seems a clear qualitative difference between the two.\textsuperscript{155}

But what to make of the varied constructions identified in our analysis? It is important here to remember that the basic assumption behind this analysis has been that representations have consequences. The particular ‘interpretive optic’ within which issues are placed has consequences in terms of the kind of government policy and direction that can be formulated (Hansen 2006:6). The argument here is that the constructions identified in the data cohered to form a particular conception of the

\textsuperscript{155} Refer to chapter three, for a discussion of how India has traditionally been represented in Pakistan’s discourse.
Self and the meaning of events. In Althusser’s (1971) terminology, the discourse was productive in the sense that it ‘interpellated’ a particular subject; alternatively Foucault would term this production of subjects and objects as an act of ‘positioning’. Thus the specific constructions identified in the data altogether cohered to create a space within which it was possible to envisage a necessary alliance with the US in its ‘war on terror’ and enabled actions on the part of the Pakistani state related to the Taliban and providing support to US actions in the region. The representation of immediate threat to state security vis-à-vis a traditional and open Indian enemy worked to pre-empt and close down opportunity to discuss the possible alternatives to an alliance with the US. Furthermore, the discursive re-articulation of the role of Islam for Pakistan was consequential in that it worked to legitimise Pakistan’s concrete co-operation with the US against the unauthentic Taliban. Indeed, it justifies such political action. On a similar note, the construction of Musharraf as genuine, Islamic and wise was also consequential in that it afforded him the authority to initiate political action.

Thus the argument here is that there was a concerted discursive effort by officials within Pakistan’s elite, most principally President Musharraf, to construct a representation in which Pakistan’s broad co-operation with the US was normalised or construed as the ‘best option’. The language examined in this chapter was productive in structuring thought and perspective within public discourse and ultimately enabled the associated political action. It is notable that the relative lack of public mobilisation against US actions in the region had much to do with the way in which the political discourse framed subjects such as the unauthenticity of the Taliban,
Pakistan’s relationship with Islam vis-à-vis Taliban Islam, the role of India in the context of 9/11 and so on. These constructions were consequential for action. Secondly, part of the lack of popular mobilisation against the US or Pakistan’s alliance with the US has to do with the relative lack of readily available public information regarding the extent of the US-Pakistan co-operation. The state monopolisation of the media meant that the official version of events and the meanings attached to them were supported and reinforced. The role of the media is very important in terms of information and explanation, and therefore access to this resource is a valuable form of social power\textsuperscript{156}. In this instance then, the state censorship of the media in Pakistan may also be seen as complicit in the success of the discursive representations. Thirdly, since Pakistan’s military elite has historically been represented as the ultimate guardians of the state and a legitimate depository of knowledge (an epistemic community) then it follows that the information being articulated is more likely to be accepted than if it had come from any other source.

However it is important to note that the constructions identified in this chapter cannot have spontaneously emerged from a vacuum of ‘nothingness’ and although linked to historical narratives this however, does not explain their specific emergence. This study argues that the discourse identified here is connected to specific extra-discursive conditions which afford the emergence of the discourse in its specific shape and form. The overall task of this study is to explain how Pakistan’s political practice was made possible and an identification of the variables involved in the production of this practice. Political practice is enabled and constrained by the

\textsuperscript{156} Van Dijk (2001) in particular discusses the power of media in his approach to ‘critical discourse analysis’. 
‘knowledge’ that discourses advance at any point in time. In this sense, this chapter forms an important part of such an investigation nevertheless, it provides a partial explanation to the question of ‘production’. This understanding represents a general scepticism of reductionist conclusions that posit discourse as the only variable involved in the determining of political realities. Rather, the argument of this study is that there exist specific underlying structural conditions that function in terms of facilitating the particular representations identified within Pakistan’s political discourse. These extra-discursive conditions exist outside of discourse even though they may have initially been discursively constructed – for instance social structures. The argument thus runs that, some social structures or social conditions are enduring to the extent that they become antecedent to discourse and impinge by affording some ways of understanding the world. These social structures and conditions are therefore ‘productive’ in relation to discourse. Thus if we conceptualise ‘productivity’ of underlying contexts then it becomes necessary to also investigate how these social structures are productive in relation to the political reality under investigation here. An exploration of the underlying contexts which afford the emergence of particular discourses deepens our understanding of how and why specific political action is realised. It is to this task that we turn to in the following chapter with an aim to provide a more wholesome and plausible explanation of the issue of the production of political practice.
Pakistan’s political discourse: Exploring ontological depth

6.1 Introduction

*Intransitive structures do not directly determine outcomes; rather they possess tendencies, or potentialities, which may or may not be realised.*

The previous chapter demonstrated how Pakistan’s official political discourse was linked, in important ways, to the normalisation of a world-view in which Pakistan’s co-operation in the US-led ‘war on terror’ is justified and legitimised. The analysis was premised on the philosophical assumption that political action and practice is produced by the kind of political discourse underlying it. The purpose of this chapter however is to take the analysis of chapter five forward by identifying the extra-discursive social structures and social contexts that may also be seen as ‘productive’. The basic theme of this chapter is the notion that underlying social contexts within which discourses are embedded act in an enabling or constraining way by limiting the discursive choices that can potentially be made. This assumption is grounded in the notion that underlying and relatively enduring structures such as economic, biochemical or social structures provide the ‘raw material’, or the context within which we structure our understanding of the world (Willig 1999). This study does not put forward a deterministic argument of the relation between local and global

---

157 Willig (1999:45).
social structures and Pakistan’s political practice; rather, the line of reasoning pursued here acknowledges an acceptance that these conditions do impinge and are constitutive of political practice. Since social contexts and structures are consequential for discursive choices then, in order to adequately comprehend political reality, it is important to also identify those contexts that impinge on the emergence and maintenance of discursive constructions.

If we accept the impingement of enduring social structures on the construction of political reality, then it becomes necessary to identify these structures and to theorise their potential causality. In this sense then, a discourse analysis on its own becomes insufficient in terms of rigorously exploring the hypothesis because it refuses to engage with anything outside of ‘discourse’ or text. Simply put, from a wholly poststructuralist perspective, Pakistan’s political practice following 9/11 is ultimately and exclusively produced by the discourse identified in the previous chapter. Ontologically and epistemologically, there is a rigidity here which cannot be overcome and which hinders a full exploration of the political practice. Whilst it is conceded that this study draws much insight from poststructuralist insights into the production of social life nevertheless, it simultaneously acknowledges the existence of extra-discursive structural constraints on discourses. Importantly, this line of argument does not take regulatory power away from discourse; rather, it signals a deeper engagement with the production of political reality by taking into consideration those contexts/social structures that shape and impact a discourse. The theoretical justification for this analysis lies in a critical realist approach to social construction, discussed extensively in chapter four, and will not be rehearsed here. The objective of this chapter is to apply a critical realist lens to the subject-matter by
identifying those social contexts and structures without whose existence Pakistan’s discourse would cease to exist in its current form. In other words, this chapter taking as its principal focal point Pakistan’s co-operation with the United States and its policy practice of reversing support for the Taliban seeks to uncover those social structures that ‘afford’ or ‘facilitate’ the emergence of the discourse underlying these political practices. This analysis is a continued exploration of the hypothesis which focuses its attention on explaining why and how Pakistan’s political practice was produced.

6.2 The grounding of discourse analysis

The remit here is to ground the surface linguistic exploration (discourse analysis) conducted in the previous chapter within a stratified ontological framework, as opposed to a relativist-conflated ontology. This analysis stems from a philosophically realist position which posits the existence of extra-discursive and often unobservable structures underlying the social world. What this implies is that a focus on empirical regularities (such as regular discursive constructions) is important but not sufficient in explaining the way the world works\(^{158}\). From this approach, discourse has a pivotal mediating and productive role in constructing the social world nevertheless, this

\(^{158}\text{Although poststructuralist approaches do not adhere to a strict empiricism nevertheless in practicality their methodology often belies a strong empiricist approach. This is because poststructuralism posits that our understanding of an external, independent material ‘reality’ is only made possible through the medium of text and discourse. This means that observable texts are the only way to engage with an external reality. In essence then it is the epistemology of positivism that has been challenged by poststructuralists (the applicability of the scientific method) and not the flat ontology of positivism. In contrast a critical realism is intently focussed on questions of ontology positing a more robust distance from positivism’s empiricism by putting forward a stratified ontology and the possibility of transcendental argumentation in conceptualising questions of ontology.}
understanding is embedded in the notion that, ontological structures underlying the social world are ‘generative’ to the extent that they give rise to particular social constructions. However, it is important to note that this approach must not be confused with a structuralist/materialist stance for which the social world is wholly reducible to the operation of underlying structures. Rather, critical realism also acknowledges the causal powers of other variables i.e. the role of human agency\textsuperscript{159} and discursive formations in its theorisations of the production of political reality. In short, a critical realist philosophy refuses to engage with theoretical reductionism of either the crude materialist kind or one that denies the operation of structures.

In terms of the thought process driving the analysis of this chapter, the main task involves taking Pakistan’s political discourse and asking: how is this specific representation possible?; what are the fundamentally constitutive conditions that make this discourse possible? The following sections will proceed to the examination of the extra-discursive social structures and contexts that potentially impinge on Pakistan’s political discourse. The aim here is to demonstrate the connections between wider structures and a localised discourse. The chapter begins by first considering the way in which power is structured in the wider global context and how this ‘ontological structure’ bears down on the discourse in question. Secondly, the chapter will focus on identifying the domestic conditions within Pakistan that are connected to the emergence of the discourse. In both explorations, the analysis will determine that these underlying contexts are important ‘conditions of existence’, in the sense that, in the absence of these underlying contexts the discourse would cease

\textsuperscript{159} Refer to Chapter four, for an extended discussion of Bhaskar’s TMSA model which theorises the dialectical relationship between agency and structure.
to exist in its current shape and form. In this way the chapter will argue that these wider social contexts are connected to the political discourse under scrutiny and ultimately the ensuing political practice taken by Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11. Before concluding this chapter, the analysis will also theorise how the role of human agency specifically the role of President Musharraf was also ‘productive’ in terms of guiding the direction and substance of Pakistan’s political discourse. The analysis in the previous chapter for instance clearly identifies Musharraf as one of the most vocal proponents in terms of pushing forward the specific world-views considered in the chapter five. Consequently, in the context of this study this observation makes it necessary to explain more thoroughly how the role of human agency is theorised in terms of the production of political action specific to this particular case-study. Analytically then, the thesis moves in the direction of a multi-causal explanation in terms of the production of the specific political reality and political action in Pakistan by identifying social structures, human agency and discourse in this production.

6.3 The nature US global power: a structural condition?

It is useful to begin the analysis here with an explicit recognition that contemporary world politics or the international system is distinguished by the entrenchment of structures of global power that tilt in the favour of the US. This is a relatively enduring and underlying social structure and context of contemporary world politics, and possesses ‘productive’ or causal powers. These ideas will be addressed by first identifying the specific properties of this social context by examining the nature and operation of US power in contemporary world politics. The academic debate around
the nature and operation of US power is substantial and subject to much debate
consequently, it would be impracticable to misleadingly assume that the entirety of
this debate can be addressed within this chapter. However, I do wish to engage in a
limited exchange by attending to the main contours of a US global structure of
power. In latter sections, the debate focuses more precisely on how this underlying
context must be seen as causally connected to the emergence of world-views in
Pakistan during the time-frame under investigation.

Within the wider literature many writers locate US global power as a specific
outcome of its leading position in the capitalist global economy and theorise close
links between the notion of modern imperial power and the system of capitalism.160
Much of the scholarship explains US behavioural patterns within a framework that
emphasises US concern in maintaining its primary position in the global market.
Colas (2007) for instance, argues that the US is consistently engaged with developing
capitalist markets across the world with the aim to maintaining US dominance in the
global market economy. Similarly, Saull (2008:310) suggests that the explicit longer-
term strategy of the US is the,

maintenance of its military-geopolitical preponderance over other major
powers and any potential rival or coalition of rivals, and its continued
leadership and dominance within the international capitalist economy, such that
the United States...secures disproportionate economic (and other) benefits

Discourse of empire: the US ‘empire’, globalization and international relations. Third World
from the organization and operation of this system’. To this end then ‘policy instruments – economic, military, ideological and cultural – [are] deployed to realize its strategic objectives.

For Saull, these strategic objectives have remained the same since 1945 to the extent that enduring patterns of hierarchy and dominance have emerged. In a similar vein, and although not concerned exclusively with the United States, Gruffydd-Jones (2008) also draws attention to the history of colonization which structured the global distribution of property and power to the extent that it entrenched enduring social relations and structures that favour countries located in the northern hemisphere.

However, this is not to suggest that unequal levels of social power have an exclusively material base. Instead and importantly, sets of discursive practices justify, sustain and reproduce this social power. Poststructuralist writers such as Edward Said (1979) have been concerned with the deconstruction of international discourses and lay emphasis on the political nature of (international) discursive regimes of truth. Leong (2003) for instance, working within a discursive framework focuses on demonstrating the links between an older colonial discourse and contemporary discourses shaping international space. Leong’s (2002:3) analysis focuses on a US power and he argues that the ‘creation of the terms, ‘superpower’ or ‘great power’, euphemistically allows a substitution for imperial power, suggesting a country’s structural possession of power while remaining vague about its use and avoiding the moral aversion to a concept like imperialism’. Leong’s work vociferously engages with demonstrating ‘disguised and subversive’ forms of
American domination in the international system arguing that the division between an imperial past and the contemporary ‘progressive’ international order is false. Leong’s argument is focused in many ways on suggesting the continuity of imperial structures of power, he writes, that ‘if these places [Third World] were once primitive and uncivilized, they are now variously represented as impoverished, war-torn, or subjected to despotic rule’ (Leong 2003:3). Thus, we may say that there is a material/power hierarchy within the international system which is productive or consequential. Further, this material base of power is in many ways buttressed and reproduced by a set of discursive practices which often obscure the histories associated with the development of unequal power relations.

Traditionally imperialism as a concept has been associated with territorial conquest and expansion although Saull (2008) suggests a reworking of this definition so that it is more attentive to the transnational nature of contemporary structures of power. Saull argues that an imperial relation can be defined as a particular authority relationship between two state entities so that if we assume that hierarchy and dominance figure at one end of the spectrum of social relations then the other end is characterized by political relations defined by equality and autonomy. In this definition, imperialism refers to social relations characterized by hierarchy and dominance. For many then, empire or imperial relations in the contemporary world has less to do with a notion of territorial empire and more resonance with ‘empire’ as defined by the particular organization of political space within ‘sovereign’ states. The notion here is that that the modern US ‘empire’ is more concerned with the organisation of ‘space’ within seemingly ‘sovereign’ states, so that such space is organized in a way that benefits the reproduction of global power. Consequently,
rather than territorial expansion, modern forms of imperialism are more concerned with a drive towards social expansion across borders to create ‘a more hegemonic or politically coordinated form of governance’ in order to better realize the reproduction of global structures of American power (Saull 2008:310). Despite the dissolution of empire as a wholly territorial phenomenon, nevertheless notions of exploitation and domination are retained, but now conceptualized in a more transnational and hegemonic sense (peripheral states are still exploited for the benefit of the core). But if direct force, coercion and territorial conquest are not the defining characteristics of the modern imperial structures of power then how might one conceptualise the operation of imperial social relations? Saull argues that, on the ground, American global power and its lead position in the capitalist economy is sustained by local political elites within sovereign states who he refers to as ‘local intermediaries’. These intermediaries allow and legitimise particular local arrangements that reproduce global structures of power. For instance, adopting US inspired economic and political arrangements (economic liberalism, democracy) in local circumstances means that in response the imperial power ‘permits varyingly – but significant - degrees of internal political autonomy for those states associated with the American imperium’ (Saull 2008:315).

6.4 Exploring causality: Ontological structure and political discourse in Pakistan

Arguably then, we may conceptualise the reproduction of US power as having both material and discursive facets. As the above argument proposes, its material
reproduction involves the maintenance of its lead capitalist position through the organizing of political space within states in the international system. This impingement is enabled by a discourse normalizing the universality of American values. It is widely known that the US has consistently been involved in ‘regime changes’ in all corners of the globe to ensure that US interests, principally economic interests are not jeopardized by the installation of hostile governments. In Pakistan for instance, the military establishment has historically enjoyed favour from the US, principally because it has been the dominant decision-maker in the local context. These ‘favours’ have involved large sums of US funds to develop and accessorize the military to fight America’s war’s in the region. In the face of Soviet expansionism for instance, the US was concerned to maintain its economic hegemony and thus fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan may be seen as part of a long-term strategy aimed to ensure the US as the lead capitalist economy. However, the relationship between the US and Pakistan’s military establishment has been a case of mutual interests since Pakistan especially during the long Cold war years gained not only funds but also a strong potential bulwark against a much bigger Indian enemy. In this regard however, it is important to draw attention to the potential causality of this global structure of power in which the US is materially powerful i.e. that this social structure exists and is potentially productive. On the whole, the operation of power is ‘soft’ or achieved through a Gramscian hegemony in which unequal economic and political relations are largely achieved through consent and without overt coercion. Joseph Nye in particular has developed the notion of ‘soft’ power as a means of exercising hegemony. In Nye’s conception ‘soft’ power can be achieved through diplomacy and the dissemination of information which seeks to dominate the global debate and discourse on cultural values, acceptable ideologies and commonly
accepted human values. However, where ‘soft’ power seemingly fails to elicit consensual compliance then the US is not averse to using ‘hard’ power characterized by threat and the use of military force, economic pressure and sanctions. In this context, and citing Maier, Saull (2008:312) argues that, ‘we might regard hegemony as a state of “potential empire” where attempts to increase autonomy in peripheral zones are likely to trigger imperial responses exposing the iron fist of empire’ (Saull 2008:312). Examples to this effect could include the imposition of US sanctions during the 1990s when Pakistan continued with its pursuance of nuclear weapons technology, the explosion of nuclear devices in May 1998\(^{161}\), and finally the military take-over in Pakistan on October 12\(^{th}\), 1999 (Askari-Rizvi 2004). The potentiality of the ‘iron fist’ was more explicitly and forcefully articulated in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks when the United States made clear that it was prepared to bomb Pakistan ‘back to the Stone-Age’\(^{162}\) (Musharraf 2006:201) i.e. either exhibit voluntarily compliance or experience the full force of ‘potential empire’.

From a critical realist theoretical perspective, the purpose of the discussion above is to argue that the powers and properties of the favourable social position occupied by

\(^{161}\) Which had occurred in response to similar explosion by India earlier in the same month.

\(^{162}\) Musharraf (2006:201) writes in his autobiography that US deputy secretary of State Richard Armitage ‘in what has to be the most undiplomatic statement ever made, Armitage added to what Colin Powell had said to me and told the director general not only that we had to decide whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but that if we chose the terrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age. This was a shockingly bare-faced threat, but it was obvious that the United States had decided to hit back, and hit back hard.’ It must be noted that Richard Armitage later denied employing this phrase and, consequently it would be wrong to formally associate ‘bombing back to the Stone-Age’ with official US policy towards Pakistan. Meanwhile, ‘Bush was sure that those words would not have been used’ (Ali 2008:145). Nevertheless, the point is not to evaluate ‘truth’ in terms of whether the exact phrase was used by Armitage rather the issue is with the underlying representation or message being articulated. Other more ‘polite’ words/phrases could equally be used to that effect.
the US are relational\textsuperscript{163} and inherent whether they are exercised or not\textsuperscript{164}. The point here is that, there is potential for their explicit manifestation and this in itself must be conceptualized as a constraining structure within which Pakistan is embedded. What this means is that, though on the surface formal political authority of states such as Pakistan exists nevertheless it must be acknowledged that in most cases this is buttressed by the sheer economic inequality within and between states. This is a structural condition from which states in the international system cannot escape; indeed it is an underlying context that is generative and causal in relation to ‘what get constructed’. A social position has the potential to ‘effect’, to shape, to direct – it is an inherent characteristic of the position - rather than the state/individual that occupies the position. From this perspective then, analysing the causal effects of the social position of the US as it relates to Pakistan’s political discourse is an important step in terms of clarifying why the object appears in its current form. So for instance, the emergence of a specific discourse can only really be comprehended when the analysis takes into account this wider social context within which the emergence of the discourse is necessarily embedded. This appreciation discards the poststructuralist approach to the construction of social reality as being divorced from the impingement of enduring and pre-existing social and material structures and contexts.

\textsuperscript{163} Social power is something that is gained not in isolation but in a relationship with other entities, we can thus say that social power is inherently relational. For instance, the social power of the global North is only realised when it is juxtaposed to the South.

\textsuperscript{164} Strictly speaking within Bhaskar’s critical realism, it is the social position that is powerful and not the individual (i.e. the US) who occupies the position. Although social positions are occupied by individuals or in our case state entities it is important to note that the power or causality they are associated with is an attribute of the social position and not the individual or entity. Sayer (1992) for instance, referring to housing tenure argues that it is the social position of the landlord that causes him/her to be paid rent and not the qualities of the individual per se. In a similar way, Danermark et al. (2002:54) note that ‘investors ‘profit-power’ is not primarily based on personal qualities but on the social relation between capital and wage labour; men’s social surplus value compared to that of women is not based on certain male and female characteristics respectively, but is rendered possible due to social and patriarchal gender relations’.
This discussion will not dwell too long or take issue with the material conditions that afford US global dominance nor the intricacies of the discursive (re)production of this dominance. Rather the objective is to explore the relationship between this global structure of power conceptualised in the discussion above as an ontological structure and its connections with the emergence of the specific political discourse which buttressed Pakistan’s political practice. The dominant theme that emerges from the analysis here is that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the United States was distinctly and vociferously involved in the proliferation of a specific world-view or representation that assigned meaning and interpretation to the terrorist attacks. This representation involved the projection of the attacks on US soil as an attack on the ‘entire world’, and the ensuing discussion will demonstrate how the US drew on notions of ‘civilisation’ and ‘truth’ to develop this theme. However, it is important to note that this ability to ensure the wide-scale dominance of a hegemonic representation of the events of 9/11 is only possible owing to the socially powerful position alluded to earlier. The dissemination of information in the aftermath of 9/11 was largely initiated and originated from the US. If we accept that the social power of the US is an enduring and important underlying structural context of contemporary world politics, having both material and discursive facets, then it is important to explore how that power was operationalised or how its ‘causality’ operated and was effectual in relation to Pakistan’s political discourse and practice.

In relating the connection between the operation of US power and Pakistan’s discourse and practice, the analysis focuses principally on a specific narrative widely referred to as the text of ‘the war on terrorism’ articulated by the US and which
effectively defined and produced international subjects and objects. The argument here is that, the ontological structure operated ‘causality’ through a hegemonic discourse that was essentially productive. A distinctive feature of this discourse was the way in which it constructed subjects, at the international level, along the oppositional and hierarchical dimensions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. In this conception, the US was discursively located at the pinnacle of the ‘good’ spectrum. Following the terrorist attacks of 2001, the Bush administration drew on an amalgam of orientalist\(^{165}\) and ethnocentric\(^{166}\) narratives which assume a superiority/inferiority binary categorisation between the North/South, East/West, first world/third world. This meant that the terrorist attacks, were interpreted as of supreme significance and intimately connected to the oppositional notions of good/evil, in effect erasing the history and context within which the terrorist attacks took place. Thus, the dominant representation rests on articulating that this is an attack on the whole world and all that is good and truthful and that this is a war of the ‘civilised’ against the ‘uncivilised’. It would be useful to examine the now famous assertion of President Bush ‘you are either with us or with the terrorists’ in his speech delivered to the Joint Session of the Congress,

\(^{165}\) Said uses the word ‘orientalism’ to refer to a set of discursive practices employed within Western Anglo-European cultures to construct the ‘orient’ (the east) as an inferior other of the occident (the west) – such discursive practices then justifying and legitimizing occidental control over the region of the world categorized as orient. In this context Jackson (2007) has argued that the contemporary discourse of Islamic terrorism, as articulated by ‘terrorism experts’ unproblematically draws extensively on a long tradition of orientalist scholarship and a tradition of hostile cultural stereotyping of Muslims. Jackson (2007:398-399) contends that these ‘experts’ have close links to US policy making circles and therefore this specific discourse is politically influential in that it denaturalises responses associated with negotiation, appeasement or compromise.

\(^{166}\) Jackson (2005:chapter 2) notes that we may see the response to 9/11 as ethnocentric, in the sense that, the tragedy occurring in the US on September 2001 was interpreted as ‘supremely catastrophic, the day everything changed, the pinnacle’ – arguably the Hiroshima explosion of 1945 was far more horrific’. 
…And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.

Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. [Applause] From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime…this is the world’s fight. This is civilisations fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom….the civilised world is rallying to America’s side.¹⁶⁷

Studying a large corpus of speech data, Collet and Najem (2005) argue that the US narrative following the September 11th attacks constructs two ‘us-groups’. In the first instance, this consists mainly of America and the American people presented as ‘a great people’, ‘we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world’ and ‘no-one will keep that light from shining’¹⁶⁸. In the second instance, there is another ‘us-group’ comprising of ‘friends’ and allies who embrace American values and are willing to defend these against terrorism’. As Jackson (2005:48) notes, much of these constructions are couched within a larger meta-narrative that posits the notion of civilisation versus barbarianism. This framework, or ‘grid of intelligibility’ having a far longer history in the American psyche and forming part of the basic foundational myths of America namely in which the ‘white Christian civilization is opposed by a “savage” racial enemy’ i.e. the indigenous Indian peoples of America (Jackson 2005). When Ambassador Baker argued that this was, ‘an attack not just on the United States but on enlightened civilised societies everywhere. It was a strike

against those values that separate us from animal – compassion, tolerance, mercy.\textsuperscript{169} The narrative again reinforces the notion that if you are not with the US then you must necessarily occupy the barbarian group. Disturbingly, Jackson (2005:49) notes the way in which the discourse was productive in that it normalised and legitimised (for some) the abuse of prisoners. In constructing the ‘other’ in such crude terms as ‘barbarian’, ‘animal’, ‘savage’, ‘cruel’, ‘evil’

an important real-world effect of this language is to create the conditions for abuse and torture against terrorist suspects: if they are animals, barbarians and savages then they have no ‘human’ qualities and no ‘human’ rights and can be treated as animals without regret and pity. The image of the naked prisoner being dragged on a leash is the elemental realisation of this discursively constructed relationship – the civilised American soldier subduing the savage barbarian.

The Bush administration thus engaged in an intensely prolific project to fix the meanings of the events – the principal narrative posited that the terrorist attacks were simply and uncategorically a demonstration of evil (them) versus good (us) and were embedded within an overarching meta-narrative of civilisation versus barbarianism (ibid). Within this narrative then, and as President Bush put it, ‘either you are with us or with the terrorists’ the clear implication is that: either you are good, innocent, rational, and if you are ‘not with us’ then you must necessarily occupy the binary opposite of \textit{good, innocent and rational}. Arguably, in engaging in such a discursive

\textsuperscript{169} Baker, 23\textsuperscript{rd} September 2001.
proposition the US reproduced its own global ascendancy however equally importantly, it produced two subjects ‘us’ and ‘them’ and nations were asked to occupy either position. One of the most powerful articulations of this came from Bush’s State of the Union address where he mentions the ‘axis of evil’, which he uses to refer to the assumed alliances between those states defined as ‘rogue’ by the US and the terrorists that were involved in the attacks on the US. Bush states that,

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. Thy could provide arms to terrorists giving them the means to match their hatred….I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons. \(^{170}\)

As Jackson (2005) quite rightly notes, US discourse makes terrorists and ‘rogue states’ synonymous, they are in effect discursively discussed as one and the same thing. The implication being that those states that diverge from the dominant US interpretation and narration of events must occupy the ‘them’ group and were then by default ‘rogue’ and necessarily terrorists. Consequently, the narrative leaves very little room for alternative constructions and subject-positions. \(^{171}\)


\(^{171}\) It is difficult here owing to the confines of this study to fully present more examples and evidence of such constructions within the US narrative however Collet and Najam (2005) taking a content-
Arguably then, the singular most productive capacity of the ‘war on terror’ narrative was precisely this delineation of this either ‘us’ or ‘them’ groupings and its explicit invitation for states to vociferously define their subject-position in relation to these categories. On its part, Pakistan by taking up the specific position of ‘US ally’ is thus not taking up the category ‘bad’, ‘evil’, ‘irresponsible’, ‘irrational’, ‘belligerent’ as defined by a hegemonic world-view. Of course, implicitly and occasionally explicitly, underlying the occupancy of the subject-position ‘US ally’ is the potential threat of US force which has been conceptualised as a structural condition of the wider environment in which Pakistan is embedded and which does not require explicit articulation. The point is that, this potentiality exists whether it is manifested in experience or not, implying that the political discourse cannot be conceptualised as outside of this antecedent social structure and must be embedded in such contexts. Initially this potentiality of the deployment US force is implicit in the political articulations evident particularly in the attention given to making the ‘right decision’ in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. As Musharraf argued, ‘if we make wrong decisions in this crisis, it can lead to the very worse consequences. On the other hand, if we take right decisions, its results will be good. The negative consequences can endanger Pakistan's integrity and solidarity'\textsuperscript{172}. However, notably as the ‘war on terror’ dragged on the political discourse in Pakistan began to rely less on articulating an implicit threat from the US as connected to its ‘co-operative’ political practices and instead began to rely on discursive strategies that emphasized Pakistan’s ownership and stake in the war against the Taliban. In this conception, the

\textsuperscript{172} Musharraf, September 19, 2001.
interests of Pakistan and the United States happened to simply coincide, thus justifying Pakistan’s military strategy.

Furthermore, the discursive construction of the Taliban as the most significant Other in relation to the Pakistani Self was again something that emerged from the way that the US was involved in signifying the irrationality and barbarity of the Taliban. The Pakistani construction of the Taliban as the significant hostile Other, in the latter years of the continuing ‘war on terror’, is directly linked to the impingement of the entrenched structures of global power. In particular, this is noteworthy simply because this discursive articulation began to draw attention away from Pakistan’s principal Other i.e. India who has historically occupied the position of principal Other in Pakistan’s discourse. Domestically, the Taliban are gradually seen to be constructed within the discourse very much in line with the Bush administration’s conception of the ‘them’ group consisting of the irrational. If we look to the political discourse and the kind of discursive choices that were made, the specific meanings attached to the 9/11 events and the way in which Pakistan’s role in international space was envisaged, it is difficult to concede that these interpretations, meanings and discourse could have emerged from a vacuum. The contention of this chapter is that this analysis of the political discourse needs also to take into account the extra-discursive preconditions that accommodate the discourse in its specific form, in other words, the analysis needs an appreciation of those conditions without which the discourse would cease to exist. These extra-discursive structures are seen as effective or liable in terms of generating particular constructions whilst making it more difficult for alternative constructions thus ultimately conditioning the emergence of a
particular social world. In this sense, Pakistan’s political practices such as the
granting of airspace to the US, or the establishment of a number of US bases within
Pakistani territory flows directly from this kind of subject-positioning alluded to
earlier. If Pakistan is not a terrorist or ‘rogue’ state then the logical conclusion of the
dominant narrative is that Pakistan would engage in ‘joint co-operation’ with the US
in the ‘war on terror’.

However, it is important to note that the preceding discussion should not be seen as
indicative of a cause-effect relationship in that US dictates are unproblematically and
automatically realised or affected in relation to Pakistan. The ‘cause-effect’ is an
inadequate model to employ in the social sciences where ‘causes’ are often multiple
and intertwined rather, the argument is that the US as a possessor of global social
power based on it relational position vis-à-vis other states has the potentiality to
shape events/processes. If we recall, Bhaskar has argued for a focus on the powers
and properties of ontological objects rather than an exclusive focus on their actual
(empirical) manifestation. The critical realist notion of ‘potentiality’ implies a
different relationship between a power and an effect than does a regularity-
deterministic ‘cause-effect’ model. The inadequacy of a strict application of the
cause-effect model is demonstrated if we consider, that during much of the 1990s,
Pakistan faced growing US criticism for its support of the Taliban government in
Afghanistan. Nevertheless, and despite US opposition, Pakistan continued its
commitment to the Taliban regime despite the adverse reputation it invited.
Potentiality is thus seen here as just that - potentiality- and should not be confused
with cause-effect.
6.5 Depth ontology: An exploration of domestic structures

In further engaging with a depth ontological inquiry it is important to identify specific domestic conditions within Pakistan as casually relevant to the emergence of the particular discursive constructions witnessed in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. Again, it is important to reiterate that the objective here is to take the political discourse as the starting point and then ‘move backwards’ in the sense that the analysis theorises the conditions that sustain and facilitate the discourse. This step paves the way for a more holistic and rigorous social explanation by accounting for why the discourse emerges as it does. These ‘conditions of existence’ are seen as causal, since the argument is, that in their absence the discourse would cease to exist in its current form. In the discussion to follow, the argument is that a specific cultural context or a general system of representation thriving within Pakistan must be seen as an important prerequisite to the operation of the discourse. What is meant by this is that a peculiar ‘grid of intelligibility’, whose principal and historical focus has been on articulating security threats forms a pervasive feature of Pakistani society and can be theorised as a necessary underlying structural context in relation to our object of analysis. Secondly, the specific power structure namely the centralisation of socio-economic power within Pakistan provides the material conditions within which discursive constructions articulated by the political elite are largely unchallenged and affords the basis for their sustenance. This can be seen, in part, as a material
unfolding of ideational constructs\textsuperscript{173}. The sections below will seek to advance this argument and clarify the way in which these domestic contexts are causally connected to the emergence of specific constructions in the political discourse.

In the first instance, this study proposes that in order for (political) constructions to make sense, in order for them to be relevant to the public recipients it is clear that they need (or make an attempt at least) to fit into the prevailing general system of representation or an existing cultural context\textsuperscript{174}. This point is highlighted in order to emphasise that it is not possible to abruptly discursively construct an object such as a ‘threat’ without there being a prior cultural understanding of ‘what’ constitutes a threat and from which expected corner. In Pakistan’s case, the most striking historical feature has been the state’s focus on articulating threat from neighbouring India. As an earlier chapter sought to explain, much of this was done through a discourse that represented the Self as Islamic and inherently good as opposed to the dirty, alien, irrational Hindu Other. What is significant here is the extent and pervasiveness of this ‘regime of truth’ which normalised the notion that all internal crises’ were a result of Indian meddling in Pakistan’s affairs. The Indian adversary was represented as being innately possessed with a perpetual desire to either completely annihilate Pakistan or to ‘break it from within’ through fanning internal dissent. Consequently, Pakistan’s ruling elites displayed extreme sensitivity to any kind of internal discord regardless of its nature or the demands of the dissidents\textsuperscript{175}.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{173} If we recall critical realism does not subscribe to the theoretical reductionism that a wholly ideational approach to reality supposes.
\item \textsuperscript{174} I define cultural context as the totality of meanings, ideas, beliefs, knowledge that are shared by a group of people at a particular historical location.
\item \textsuperscript{175} The fallout of this policy of quashing internal dissent and branding it a product of Indian designs to destabilise Pakistan is clearly evident in the relatively recent and serious internal rebellions taking place in the Baluchistan province.
\end{itemize}
Of course, this is not to suggest that these constructions or representations emerged from a void. There were issues and crisis’ between India and Pakistan, the never-ending Kashmir dispute for instance, the role of India in the secession of East Pakistan, the dispute over river waters, the three open wars of 1947-48, 1965 and 1971, and not forgetting the Kargil episode of 1999. From a critical realist perspective, a discourse such as this one is afforded by specific extra-discursive conditions and as such can never be entirely isolated or divorced from the wider structural contexts within which it is embedded. Of course this view immediately negates the notion that war, threat or conflict are exclusively ideational or discursive constructs rather, there are real referents in terms of ‘ontological conditions’ that propel particular narratives\textsuperscript{176}. However, the discussion will not take issue here with the conditions that afforded the emergence of these specific historical representations rather, attention is drawn to the persistence and pervasiveness of this ‘grid of intelligibility’ and its unprecedented dominance within Pakistani society\textsuperscript{177}.

This security narrative enjoyed dominance at all levels of Pakistani society and most importantly permeated the world-view of Pakistan’s ruling elites who can be described as belonging to an ‘epistemic community’ (Haas 1992). A focus on political elites is warranted because in a highly centralised country like Pakistan the business of the state is largely determined by political elites who, on the whole, manoeuvre with limited public input into government policies (Waseem 2002). Within Pakistan, the pervasiveness of the ‘regime of truth’ institutionalising ‘threat’

\textsuperscript{176} For instance, depth ontological structures accounting for the emergence of narratives could be the geo-strategic location of Pakistan, the lack of national unity, the lack of democratic outlets of expression, the belligerency of India and so on.

\textsuperscript{177} I use the term ‘unprecedented’ to indicate that following Pakistan’s media liberalization in 2002 debate and counter-discourses are given more ‘airtime’.
amongst the political elite means that they can be described as belonging to a specific epistemic community. Interestingly, within the IR literature such links between dominant modes of understanding amongst power elites and the political practices that arise from such contexts have to some extent been explored by scholars working with the notion of a ‘strategic culture’. The scholarship in this area seeks to explain continuity and change in national security policies as well as predict future political practice by deconstructing a state’s ‘strategic culture’. A strategic culture in this conception is loosely defined as the sum total of such things as collective ideas, beliefs, fears, ambitions, aims and traditions within which elite decision-making is located. More specifically, those involved in the study of strategic culture aim to provide an alternative framework that can explain (and predict) why certain policy options (and not others) are pursued by states particularly when realist assumptions would infer and assume an alternative policy perusal. Some key elements of Pakistan’s strategic culture can be listed below:\textsuperscript{178}

- Opposition to Indian hegemony. Pakistani political and military elites are unified in their opposition to Indian hegemony as a basis for a peaceful and durable regional order.

- Primacy of defence requirements. Regardless of whether the Pakistan government was run by civilians or the military defence has always been the country’s top budgetary priority. Although Pakistan continues to experience intense poverty, poor infrastructure, a weak educational system, and nearly non-existent social services, defence expenditures run very high.

\textsuperscript{178} This is not an exhaustive list. This abridged version has been sourced from Lavoy (2005).
Identification with conservative Islamic causes. The emphasis on Muslim nationalism that brought Pakistan into being continues to play an important role in shaping its national identity and foreign relations.

The argument of strategic culture analysts is that these ‘variables’ cohere to form a strategic culture or context which then acts as a lens through which policy decisions are made. Specifically, the postulation is that a strategic culture enables and constrains the thought and action of power elites through the provision of a limited range of choices. Although strategic culture analysts are primarily concerned with national security policies, their analyses are interesting particularly because they implicitly point towards the causal powers of strategic cultures. In this sense, an argument can be made that an embedded strategic culture or set of beliefs and values held amongst Pakistan’s power elites provides a prism or a lens through which a particular ‘world’ is visible. Indeed, this is a world in which the prime threat and danger comes from India, to the extent that all other threats are overshadowed. The pervasiveness of this world-view amongst power elites is such that domestic policy and foreign policy is enacted in light of this strategic culture. Moreover, it explains the continuity in Pakistan’s foreign policy despite regime changes.

This pervasive and all-encompassing system of representation is a significant underlying contextual feature of Pakistan’s political life. It is significant because, although it is an essentially discursive phenomena, albeit having its own ontological structures that facilitate its emergence, nevertheless its historical endurance signifies that it needs conceptualising as an extra-discursive and ontological structural context.
If we now recall the kind of discursive constructions identified in the data set it becomes clear that these tend to tap into this historically and over-arching meta-narrative already prevalent at all levels of Pakistani society. For instance, the representation of exceptional threat from India in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks draws on a prior populist understanding of the ‘Indian enemy’ as awaiting an opportunity to destroy Pakistan; this harks back to the national narrative which insists that India has never been able to reconcile itself with the rationale for partition\textsuperscript{179}. A threat from India is easy to identify with, for the vast majority of Pakistanis, and often evokes strong sentiments, and it is a result of the existence of such pervasive cultural understandings that the notion of ‘exceptional threat’ is able to thrive. Arguably, if we hypothesis the absence of such a cultural context in Pakistan’s case, then it is difficult to discern how the official discourse would have articulated exceptional threat, and moreover whether it would be taken on by the populace. It is not a coincidence that Musharraf’s September 19\textsuperscript{th} speech and subsequent official articulations draw in the ‘India threat’ in order to locate meaning. In short, since a specific pervasive cultural understanding exists which suggests that Pakistan is constantly threatened by a deceitful enemy, then it becomes relatively easier to unexpectedly (as occurred following September 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2001) draw on such a notion of threat. The point here is that, the potency of the dominant normative structure within Pakistan and the idea that this a precondition for the understanding and success of our object of analysis ‘the discourse’ is premised on the existence of such a cultural context within which the meanings articulated are easily grasped.

\textsuperscript{179} This populist belief accrued significant legitimacy during the latter 1980s and throughout the 1990s when the right-wing BJP began to dominate Indian politics. The BJP openly questioned partition and has been accused of inciting violence against Indian Muslims. The Babri mosque incidence for instance occurred during their tenure. The rise of this Hindutva politics in India then confirms the representation of the Hindu Other as an open enemy of Muslims.
One of the material consequences of the ‘regime of truth’ has been the centralisation of political power within Pakistan in the hands of the military establishment. In short, from the very beginning, the prevailing system of representation justified and normalised the inclusion of the military in national decision-making. This early entrenchment of the armed forces in the state machinery consequently resulted in the weak and halted development of civilian institutions and a simultaneous strengthening and development of the military institution within Pakistan (Talbot 2007). The security discourse alluded to earlier was the principal justification for the entrenchment and pervasiveness of the army in Pakistan’s socio-political life additionally seeking to galvanise national integration. However, the entrenchment of the army in political life and the consequential non-development of civilian and political institutions cannot be seen as a wholly deliberated or calculated phenomenon. Siddiqua (2007)\(^{180}\) for instance, has suggested that post-colonial Pakistan inherited from the British Raj a strong civil bureaucracy since the Raj principally controlled undivided India through a powerful state bureaucracy. However, a pertinent point is that this arrangement continued even after independence in 1947 to the detriment of political institutions within Pakistan. The continuance of this setup had the effect that it afforded real power to the civil bureaucracy in post-colonial Pakistan whilst reducing political parties to the role of mere brokers and thus stunting their growth. Drawing on Alavi’s Marxist analysis, Siddiqua (1983 in Siddiqua 2007:67) suggests that in this paradigm the state or the civil bureaucracy acted in the interests of three dominant classes: the landed-feudal

class, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Further, the military’s stakes became ‘intertwined with those of these three groups making it imperative for the military and other groups to protect each other’s interests’, and Siddiqua’s work extensively documents the extent of the military’s economy. Over the course of time, the military’s relevance to the state became increasingly legitimised on the back of a specific regime of truth, and the state bureaucracy came to rely on the military in order to protect vested interests. In short, the ascendance of the military in Pakistan cannot parsimoniously be attributed to calculated self-interest; rather this entrenchment into Pakistan’s political process needs to be assessed within a multi-causal framework which can appreciate such factors as the role of a strong state bureaucracy in the non-development of political institutions, the fragmented nature of Pakistan’s political leadership and the operation and productivity of Indo-centric security discourses.

As the military institution became more and more involved in building a vested economic empire, its institutional survival began to rely much more on articulating binary India/Pakistan categorisations. Siddiqua (2007:23) argues that,

the external threat from India is used to justify greater investment in defence rather than socioeconomic development, so there is an absence of active protest against the military’s infiltration into the society and economy. Over the years, national security has developed into a dogma almost on par with religious ideology….there is barely any institutional protest against the armed forces primacy.
Moreover, whenever the military took over the state machinery representative institutions and public organisations were kept out of operation for long periods of time resulting in their stagnation, and a further entrenchment of the army into the political process. Further, a monopolisation of communication mediums became an important power resource allowing the wide circulation of a discourse that elevated the military establishment to a position where any critique was represented as synonymous with treachery. This narrative is so strong and ingrained, that arguably even today critique of the military institution is often guarded. Thus, privileged access to communicative events can be seen in this context as vital to maintaining the hegemony of a particular world-view. However, this is not to suggest a denial of the context within which these representations flourish i.e. it does not deny a ‘belligerent’ India for instance, but suggests that in the midst of alternative representations Pakistan’s military institution is more likely to interpret and frame the issue in a way that corresponds with its world-view. People, as the critical discourse analyst Van Dijk\textsuperscript{181} notes, are more likely to ‘tend to accept beliefs, knowledge and opinions from what they see as authoritative, trustworthy or credible sources, such as scholars, experts, professionals, or reliable media’. In Pakistan, the power to ‘frame’ issues has historically been concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite who have strong links with the military and for whom articulating the ‘India threat’ is bankable.

\textsuperscript{181}Van Dijk (2001:357).
It is widely acknowledged that civilian governments have rarely if ever, had a free rein in terms of formulating policy. Whilst on the surface civilian governments have been elected to power, nonetheless real political power lay with the military whose size, expansion, funds, forays into the political landscape and general social dominance in Pakistan is afforded by this regime of truth. The centralisation of political power in the hands of the military is clearly alluded to by Musharraf in his autobiography who rather tellingly concedes the context within which the decision to co-operate with the US was made following the terrorist attacks on the US on 11th September. Musharraf himself unwittingly alludes power in Pakistan is a ‘one-man show’, and that one man is the Chief of the army staff:

having made my decision I took it to the cabinet. As expected there was some concern from the ministers that they had not been consulted. Doubts were also expressed at the corps commanders meeting that followed. In both meetings I went over my analysis in detail and explained how and why I had come to this decision. I answered every question until all doubts were removed and everyone was aboard. I then went on national radio and television on September 19 to explain my decision to the people. As I had thought, the reaction was limited and controllable (Musharraf 2006:206).

Since the army wields much of the political power in Pakistan and civilian governments have always been accountable and sought the permission of army chiefs, it could be suggested that Musharraf’s decision to alter Pakistan’s rhetoric and policy goals were easier to initiate for a serving Chief of Army Staff (see Ali
2008:147, Jones and Shaikh 2006). After all, Musharraf does not need to seek permission of the army – since he is the army. Arguably, given the nature of power structures in Pakistan it is difficult to see how a civilian government in such a short space of time would have been able to initiate substantial discursive shifts in policy as regards the Taliban for instance. The argument here is that this domestic structure i.e. the centralisation of political power means that there is little debate and little public deliberation; civil society is relatively underdeveloped in Pakistan, and this is a condition of possibility that is causally connected to the emergence of the political discourse. For instance, when Musharraf in his keynote speech of September 19th articulated exceptional threat there is little space available for the articulation of debate or counter-representations. This does not mean that counter-discourse does not exist but that the socio-political dominance of the military establishment is such that their voices are the ones that are heard. The suggestion here is that the existence of the discourse relies heavily on the way power is structured within Pakistan to the advantage of the military.

6.6 Human agency as a causal variable

This project’s focus on the production of Pakistan’s political practice and the preceding discussion on extra-discursive elements impacting the construction of political reality and ensuing practice does not indicate a subscription to a crude materialist argument. If we recall, a materialist or structuralist argument posits the reductionist notion that socio-political reality can be wholly explained in terms of the

\[182\] Perhaps a democratic set-up would have posed more of a challenge to the dominance of a specific interpretation such as the one of ‘exceptional threat’.
effects of social structures. Indeed, in this conception the role of human agency and discourse are omitted in the analysis. However, the broader ontological and epistemological grounding of this study opposes reductionism of this sort instead preferring to theorise the many causal connections involved in the production of a specific political reality. In furthering our investigation of how and why Pakistan’s political discourse emerged in the shape and form it did, the discussion will now draw analytical attention to the transformatory role of human agency as it is relevant to this specific case-study. The discussion below will implicate President Musharraf as playing a key role in relation to the production and direction of Pakistan’s political discourse and the specific discursive constructions contained within it. However, for the moment it would be useful to briefly recall the theory underlying the inclusion of human agency in our analysis here.

Chapter four noted that Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) affords human agency distinct causal powers and properties. Although this conception of human agency does not reduce agents to being mere bearers of structure nevertheless it does insist that we define clearly what the structural possibilities and limits of human action are. Bhaskar proposes that agency has less power to ‘create’ something anew in society but possess the ability to reproduce and transform society. However, it is Margaret Archer (1995, 1998), who develops this idea in a more meaningful way by placing the notion of human agency within a time dimension. The gist of Archer’s argument is that societal transformation generated by human agency is often not immediately visible owing to its piecemeal nature but is evident over a longer period of time in the sense that it transforms the social
structure\textsuperscript{183}. Critical realism does not reduce ‘social reality’ to agency, structure or discourse but posits the relevance of all three albeit in different ways.

In investigating the production of Pakistan political reality in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks we may draw connections between a critical realist theory positing the potential causal powers of human agency and the role of President Musharraf in shaping the emergence of the political discourse and practice. To this end, we may look to the work of Lavoy (2005) who working from a broadly neo-realist position has something useful to say in terms of the potentially critical role that human agency can play. The purpose of Lavoy’s paper is a critical comparison of the suitability of different frameworks of analysis when applied to Pakistan’s pattern of behaviour. His analysis, focuses on considering the explanatory power of neo-realism and strategic culture analysis in explaining (1) Pakistan’s decision to pursue nuclear weapon and (2) its decision to withdraw support to the Taliban and more generally to co-operate with the US following September 11\textsuperscript{th} 2001. Lavoy’s main contention is that while both realist and strategic analysis models are useful in explaining Pakistan’s behaviour, they are limited in some ways because they do not have ‘space’ to theorise the potential impact an individual key elite can have on state policy. In demonstrating this thesis, and with reference to the first proposition, Lavoy argues that a realist model suggests that since states are consistently involved in a balance-of-power scenario. Applied to Pakistan in the 1960s the conclusion should be: that Pakistan should have initiated a crash program to develop nuclear weapons as soon as it learned that archrival India had, following China’s nuclear test of 1964, initiated a nuclear plan of its own. Alternatively, a strategic culture analysis would

\textsuperscript{183} See Chapter four for a development of these ideas.
posit that since Pakistan’s political elites were pro-western and enjoyed a close relationship with the US, they would continue to rely on conventional weapons and enhance a close strategic relationship with the US to meet their security needs. Lavoy argues that whilst both models are useful nevertheless, an analytical model that focuses on ‘strategic elites’ has more explanatory power in terms of accounting for why Pakistan decided to go nuclear in 1972 and not earlier. As Nizamani (2000:72) notes, it was Bhutto, leader of a truncated Pakistan from 1972 to 1977, who methodically turned this dormant issue into a symbol of national identity’. Bhutto was able to transform the prevailing strategic culture to the extent that initiating a nuclear program was normalised (see also Ali 2008:108-9). At some level here, a specific political elite or human agency is ascribed distinct causal powers (see also Nizamani 2000: chapter 4).

This perspective is developed further in Lavoy’s assessment of Pakistan’s decision to co-operate with the US ‘war on terror’. Again, beginning with an application of a realist perspective Lavoy argues this model would suggest that Pakistan would do whatever was necessary to balance against India following the terrorist attacks, thus suggesting an immediate and unproblematic alliance with the US. On the other hand, a strategic culture analysis would propose an alternative behaviour pattern since it would give more weight to the beliefs and desires of domestic constituencies such as Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) who were pro-Taliban. While both models are insightful, Lavoy argues that a focus on the transformative powers of strategic elites would however, bring to the fore the notion that Pakistan’s policy decision would depend to some extent on the strategic beliefs of the country’s leader. For Lavoy, President Musharraf was the decisive leader of the strategic elite who
was instrumental in cultivating a national consensus in terms of official policy and practice in the aftermath of the 11th September attacks on the US. To ignore this instrumental role of agency is to give rise to a poorer analysis. What I want to emphasise here is that Lavoy’s incursion recognises and emphasises the critical role that individual elites can potentially play in identifying, framing and responding to scenarios. These decision-making elites are described as ‘strategic myth makers’ by Lavoy who suggests that they operate within the constraints of both the realist world order and their place within it and the limitations and constraints imposed by their nation’s particular political priorities, national cultural norms and existing strategic culture. For Lavoy (2005:2), key political elites,

operate within the constraints of both the international environment and their nation’s political culture, but they are not helpless prisoners of these two confining structures; they have some degree of freedom to reorient and expand the internal and external boundaries of their behaviour.

Lavoy suggests that ruling elites have the ability to cultivate governmental, if not national consensuses providing that:

- the substantive content of the strategic myth and its compatibility with existing cultural norms and political priorities;

---

184 This is not to suggest that the kind of narrative put forward by Musharraf went unchallenged rather I want to suggest that dissent was neither powerful nor extensive.
• the ability of the myth maker to legitimise and popularise his or her beliefs among fellow elites and then to persuade national leaders to act on these beliefs; and finally

• the process whereby institutional actors integrate the popularised strategic myths into their own organisational identities and mission.

Although Lavoy’s account lacks theoretical grounding, it is useful in the sense that it draws attention to the transformative powers of an agency embedded in antecedent social structures. Arguably, this fits neatly into the critical realist notion of agency possessing powers that are irreducible to the structures within which the agent is located.

The discursive analysis in chapter five suggested that Pakistan’s political discourse following the terrorist attacks was extraordinary in the sense that in a relatively short space of time it proposed major policy shifts especially related to the rejection of the Taliban and a simultaneous co-operation with the US. Indeed, in order to reorient policy the discursive analysis revealed that much of political discourse in the wake of the 9/11 attacks employed specific discursive strategies such as the positioning of Musharraf as an embodiment of religious wisdom and the representation of an immanent Indian threat. However, what is relevant here is that Musharraf played a central role in articulating such representations and subsequently the legitimacy of modifying national policy. In this context, Musharraf played a transformative role in terms of being able to successfully structure national policy. Of course, the limits of the transformative role of agency must be understood as embedded in the kind of
underlying structural conditions alluded to in this chapter i.e. the persistence of national insecurity vis-à-vis India, the primacy of the military institution as the bearers of knowledge, the unequal social position of Pakistan and the ‘rules’ underlying international society. As Danermark et al. (2002:180) argue,

if social structures already exist, actions can only modify them – and the whole set of actions maintains or changes them. While social structures cannot be reduced to individuals, the former are a prerequisite for any human action – social structures enable actions but they also set limits to what actions are possible.

What is being put forward here is a position that acknowledges the role of agency, in this case President Musharraf, in the production of a world-view in which Pakistan’s participation in the ‘war on terror’ was legitimised. Consequently, this thesis moves away from a Foucauldian position which tends to theorise agency as a mere mouthpiece of discourse; rather, the suggestion here is that agency is active and causal. Thus, what is suggested here is that the role of Musharraf must not be theorised as inevitable rather some degree of freedom is accorded in terms of Musharraf actively choosing to respond in a particular way to the post-9/11 scenario. Thus, conceptualised in this way, we may also consider Musharraf as a ‘condition of possibility’ in the sense that he is intimately connected to the articulation of the discourse and discursive constructions identified in the previous chapter. Put another way, in the absence of Musharraf as a key political elite, possessing particular strategic beliefs and values as opposed to alternative beliefs we may conclude that
Pakistan’s political reality and action may have taken a different form and direction. In this context, it is now possible to allude that this thesis considers the production of ‘political reality’ as causally connected to and as an outcome of the interaction of a multiplicity of factors.

6.7 Conclusion

The task of a critical realist social science is to explore depth contexts and mechanisms in order to provide for a more holistic social investigation in relation to why the political constructions take the form that they do. The analysis in this chapter signals a much deeper engagement with our object of analysis by seeking to explore some of the underlying structural conditions that are theorized as ‘generative’ or ‘causal’ in relation to Pakistan’s political discourse. The principal argument running throughout this chapter has been the notion that these embedded and enduring extra-discursive conditions and social structures must be conceived as ‘conditions of possibility’ in that they facilitate the discourse and are necessary for the existence of the discourse itself. Consequently, Pakistan’s political discourse is related to these external conditions because they impinge by providing the ‘raw material’ in relation to what kind of political reality can emerge. For instance, the recognition of the entrenched structures of global power tilted in the favour of the United States is an important consideration primarily because it is a causal structure. The chapter addressed the effects of the social position of the US, and particularly how this specific social position constrains and enables discursive constructions within the discourse. The way in which US power was operationalised or in other
words, the method of its impingement on Pakistan’s political discourse took the shape of a specific narrative which sought to define, normalise and legitimise the exercise of a ‘war on terror’. This narrative ‘framed’ or interpreted events and subjects in a way that was clearly binary and simplistic in terms of juxtaposing good/evil and truth/falsity. The exploration revealed that the discursive strategy of binary categorisations of ‘them’ and ‘us’ left very little space for the production of alternative subjects, and the argument here is that the US narrative presented stark subject-positions to Pakistan. Furthermore, it was also noted that the taking up of a subject-position (a particular world-view) on the part of Pakistan necessarily entailed accompanying rights and duties, thus impacting thought and practice. The significance of the US narrative was that in positioning international subjects it can then be conceived as causally connected to the themes identified in Pakistan’s discursive space during the time-period under scrutiny here. In essence then, the discussion identified a global social-structural context in which the US is dominant as an underlying ‘generative structure’ connected to Pakistan’s political discourse.

Secondly, the chapter identified the particular domestic context within Pakistan as a prerequisite or an essential underlying condition necessary to the emergence and maintenance of the political discourse. The main argument was that dominant cultural forms of thought or the overall ideological context within which Pakistan is embedded sets the ‘ground rules’ in term of the subsequent discursive constructions allowed and widely understood. If we are to understand social structure as relatively enduring patterns of relationships or norms that have the power to potentially shape, generate, give rise to, or cause particular practices then arguably, the ‘regime of truth’ which normalises the institutionalisation of threat in Pakistan can be conceived
in terms of an enduring social structure. Further, the entrenchment of the military
establishment in Pakistan’s political process has led to the centralisation of political
power in the hands of the military. The analysis suggested that this domestic power
structure which is characterised by its relative absence of democratic institutions is
an important underlying condition that facilitates the emergence of a unified political
discourse focussed on articulating threat from India and the notion that the military
and specifically Musharraf is a legitimate Islamic leader. The argument was that the
centralisation of power is important in the context of the proliferation of a hegemonic
discourse.

Furthermore, in addition to connecting local and global entrenched social structures
to the emergence of a political discourse in Pakistan that normalised co-operation
with the US, the chapter also sought to theorise the links between Musharraf and the
emergence of the discourse. In this regard, the argument was that Musharraf as a key
member of Pakistan’ political elite played an important role in giving direction to the
ensuing political discourse following 9/11. The chapter drew on Lavoy (2005) who
in his analysis of Musharraf’s role in the aftermath of 9/11 raises some interesting
points in relation to the role of agency. This line of reasoning reflects Bhaskar’s
insistence that although social structures are antecedent to human agency
nevertheless agency possesses power to transform. The chapter applied this
theoretical conception to the current case-study noting that, in this sense, the
discourse in Pakistan was influenced or impacted by a key political elite. In finality,
it is important to note that the analysis of this chapter is not divorced from the
identification of discursive constructions made in the previous chapter; instead it is
intimately connected, because this chapter explains the surfacing of these discursive
constructions by grounding them in their contexts of emergence. Having elaborated the theoretical underpinnings and a related application and analysis of the case-study in the previous chapters, the discussion in the next chapter will now proceed to incorporating these various strands together into a coherent position on the production of Pakistan’s state behaviour in the aftermath of 9/11.
Pakistan and the ‘war on terror’ – Conceptualising the enactment of political practice

7.1 Introduction

The central problematic of this thesis proposed that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the Pakistani policy of rejecting the Taliban and a simultaneous cooperation with the US was not unproblematic. In explaining Pakistan’s political practice, this study has relied on a conceptual framework that incorporates an appreciation of discourse, structure and agency. This theoretical orientation has been an important underlying aspect of this study in terms of the way it bears down on questions of ontology and epistemology. This is an important consideration since the relevance of theory is such that it acts like a pair of coloured sunglasses allowing the wearer to see only those salient features relevant to the theory. For instance, the theoretical framework adopted here, in contrast to realism, tends not to emphasise that valid scientific knowledge is only that which is gained through an empiricist regularity-deterministic science or the notion that world politics is governed by universal laws. As noted in chapter four, the approach of this study prioritises the role of discourse in the immediate construction of political reality coupled with a non-empiricist transcendental philosophy\(^{185}\) that investigates conditions of existence. This conceptual framework identifies and brings into focus salient features that are often ignored and overlooked by other theoretical approaches. Although theory is an

\(^{185}\) See Footnote 19 for a definition of a transcendental philosophy.
important component of research nevertheless, this study must not be seen as an authentic reading or application of constructivist or critical realist theory in explaining Pakistan’s political practice. Rather, the starting point has been: how best can we explain Pakistan’s political practice in the aftermath of 9/11. Instead of a neat application of a particular theory the approach to theory has been premised on the question of how useful a particular conceptual framework is in terms of helping to answer the query. In taking this avenue of engagement, it was found that a poststructuralist conceptual framework though offering important insights was lacking in terms of a plausible explanatory framework. In relation to this study-project, this meant that it seemed inadequate to explain Pakistan’s political actions entirely in terms of it being produced by an enabling discourse. Rather, the argument here has been that a discursive study combined with an appreciation of social structural contexts and agential influences is a more holistic way of engaging with explanations in world politics. Although poststructuralism is credited with bringing to attention the social construction of the objects of IR however, its underlying philosophy and the methodology it engenders is ultimately textually reductionist in that its account of political reality often reduces that reality to the operation of texts alone. In critiquing the theoretical closure of many discourse studies Joseph (2007:353) argues,

But there must be something there in the first place to be constructed or articulated. It is no good simply saying that nuclear weapons are socially constructed or discursively articulated and that prior to this construction or

186 Arguably in response to the over-determination of ‘structure’ in neorealist and neoliberal theory, poststructuralism has moved too much in the opposite ideational direction.
articulation they are meaningless physical things (i.e. that it is only through discourse they become meaningful). This merely raises a further question – what is it about the physical or material properties of something that allows it to lend itself to particular forms of social constructions or discursive articulations? Not just anything can be articulated as a nuclear weapon; it has to have certain material properties. Social construction might explain why a missile is regarded positively as something that provides security (as opposed to being a weapon of mass destruction), but the physical properties of something, far from being meaningless outside discursive articulation, are the very things that make social construction possible. Social construction might make certain meanings possible, but material conditions make social construction possible. While social construction is irreducible to material conditions and it has its own powers and dynamics, this should not stop us from recognising the way that these conditions both enable and constrain it.

Consequently, moving away from the textual reductionism of poststructuralism this research project sought to employ the conceptual frameworks of both constructivism and critical realism in order to conduct a rigorous exploration. Having conducted much of the analysis and discussion previously, the purpose of this chapter is to draw all the various themes together in order to put forward a coherent position in terms of how this study conceptualises Pakistan’s political practice in the aftermath of 9/11.
7.2 The main findings of the study

The main theme of this research project is the notion that Pakistan’s political practice and policy vis-à-vis the Taliban and the US in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 was enabled by a political discourse that proliferated a world-view in which certain political practices were normalised. On the domestic front, the policy and practice was problematic on a number of fronts. Firstly, there is the issue of ethnic ties between Pakistan’s Pakhtun’s and those of Afghanistan which makes Pakistan’s co-operation with the US military strikes targeting Pakhtun’s across the border contentious. As noted, the state has historically been involved in the deliberate cultivation of Pakistan’s national identity as varyingly Islamic and closely connected to notions of brotherhood or a Muslim ‘ummah’. Of course as this thesis has sought to explain, much of this state cultivation of Islam as a common heritage was aimed at bolstering national integration through distinguishing a definite Self from an outside and principally Hindu Other. Consequently, this amplification of the distinction between the Self/Other legitimised the political intrusion and centre-stage position of the military institution in Pakistan. This focus on Pakistan’s national identity as primarily Islamic meant that such an ideology had the spill-over effect in that prioritising the notion of the Muslim ‘Ummah’ created the space or ‘naturalised’ Pakistan forging links with other Muslim countries and Muslim causes around the world. Alongside this, Pakistan’s combined effort with the Afghan resistance to oust the Soviets further strengthened a pan-Islamic heritage. This partly explains why up and until September 11, 2001 Pakistan’s official domestic and foreign policy discourse emphasised the legitimacy of the ‘brotherly’ Taliban regime. Thus, although Pakistan has never really enjoyed cordial relations with Afghanistan for a
sustained period of time nevertheless withdrawing support from the Taliban and co-operating with the US in its incursions into Afghan territory signalled a radical shift in policy. Importantly, on the surface such a policy seemingly represents Pakistan’s alliance with a non-Muslim state to target a fellow Muslim state. In this light then, whatever Pakistan’s personal relationship with Afghanistan a military alliance with the US becomes problematic in the public eye.

The discourse analysis in chapter five demonstrated how Pakistan’s political discourse was consistently involved in constructing ‘extraordinary threat. Within the conceptual framework of this study, Pakistan’s political discourse is conceived as a ‘production site’ that is causally connected to the possibilities of the ensuing and emergent political action and practice. In exploring this ‘production site’, the analysis revealed that the domestic political narrative relied to a significant extent on religious analogies and a deep-seated historical narrative as an overall framework of understanding. This interpretation meant that the entire events i.e. the terrorist attacks on the US had placed Pakistan (the fortress of Islam) in a precarious position owing to its support of the (Islamic) Taliban. Moreover, the old (Hindu) Indian enemy was now poised in terms of achieving its long-standing ambition to annihilate Pakistan; the narrative posited that these exceptional circumstances required inspiration from religious history. Co-operation with the international coalition and especially the US was represented as a decision inspired by the kind of ‘religious wisdom’ that instigated the ‘hijrah’ or the migration of Muslims. In this context, the religious analogy served to focus on legitimating cooperation with the US by drawing similarities between such action and the Prophet’s decision to migrate. As Musharraf argued, this was not be interpreted as a ‘surrender’ to foreign dictates and simple
compliance in attacking a Muslim group (the Taliban), but ultimately an action that would ensure survival and success in the context of a hostile Indian neighbour. This was a powerful narrative primarily because Pakistan’s official identity and popular narratives have historically placed much emphasis on the country’s Islamic character.

The main contention of this study is that there was a definite political discourse in operation within Pakistan’s discursive space which posited particular representations. These representation and interpretations signified a world-view in which Pakistan was facing extraordinary threat from India and which signalled towards legitimising Pakistan’s co-operation with the US in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. It is in this context that we must view Pakistan’s political actions in terms of becoming a frontline state in the war on terrorism, and associated political actions such as the permission to use Pakistani airspace and airbases, the provision of logistical support, the frequent close interaction between US and Pakistan political elites and allowing the presence of US troops on Pakistani soil. It is significant to note that despite the Western media’s insistence that mass agitation was imminent, in reality there was a relative lack of domestic opposition to the new policy of US-Pakistan military co-operation. As many writers have observed (Synnott 2009, Lavoy 2005), the reaction was generally muted and soon fizzled out. Nevertheless, whilst the majority of the mainstream political parties supported the government’s decision in joining the international coalition, the country’s Islamic groups were outraged. Although strikes and demonstrations involving the burning of the American flag and other street demonstrations were organised by the opposing Islamist groups nevertheless, these were limited in number and impact with most of the population refusing to engage in mass protest against the government’s decision. This lack of popular mobilisation
against Pakistan’s policy in the aftermath of 9/11 reflects the pervasiveness, proliferation and indeed success of a hegemonic interpretation and representation. President Musharraf enjoyed ‘widespread if grudging popularity’ even in the beginning of 2007 (Schaffer 2008:9). What this means is that, on the whole, Musharraf’s domestic popularity remained intact even years after the initiation of the ‘war on terror. Musharraf’s standing only declining rapidly towards the end of 2007 when he decided to sack the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Although it is not possible to claim that the political discourse was overwhelmingly successful in positing the legitimisation of these actions187 nevertheless, it provided for a broad, if grudging, domestic consensus relating to Pakistan’s role in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. This analysis concurred with Foucault’s idea that discourse is a practice i.e. the notion that there is no opposition between discourse and practice. This implies that engaging in a discourse is ‘doing something’ – it is not ineffectual but a form of social action and therefore consequential.

In seeking to understand why Pakistan’s political discourse was prone to certain discursive representations as opposed to their alternatives, the study engaged with a transcendental philosophy as put forward by Bhaskar (1978, 1989). The objective of a transcendental argumentation is a consideration of those ‘conditions’ and/or contexts which are intrinsically connected to the emergence of a social phenomena. In this context, Joseph (2007:354) notes that a transcendental stance raises questions such as ‘why things get constructed in the way they do’, ‘why some constructions are more powerful than others?’ ‘what the conditions of possibility for social

187 As Foucault notes a discourse is rarely ever truly and overwhelmingly hegemonic rather there are always challenges to its hegemony in the shape of alternative constructions, representations and world-views.
construction are?’ As we explored, one way of conducting such an analysis is to think about whether the social object, in our case a specific discourse, would exist in the form that it does in the absence of specific contingent conditions. This analysis, the bulk of which is posited in chapter six, revealed that a number of social contexts were significantly connected to the emergent political discourse in Pakistan. While the discursive findings posit a causal relation between discourse and practice, the critical realist retroductive analysis also posited causality between social structure and Pakistan’s political discourse. Sayer (2000:11) encapsulates the causal nature of depth social structures (conditions of possibility) in the following way,

the real is the realm of objects, their structures and powers. Whether they be physical, like minerals, or social, like bureaucracies, they have certain structures and causal powers, that is, capacities to behave in particular ways, and causal liabilities or passive powers, that is, specific susceptibilities to certain kinds of change.

In engaging with the causality of social structure as it relates to the research focus, the analysis identified a number of salient features. The insistence was that specific underlying social contexts such as the pervasiveness of the ‘India threat’, the centralisation of domestic political power and the unequal global social relations between the US and Pakistan are causally connected to Pakistan’s ‘production site’. Rather than conceptualising this relationship between context and discourse in a rigid cause-effect manner, the argument was that the social context provides a strong onus, a strong potentiality in terms of shaping discursive constructions. Considering the
domestic context, the chapter also drew on Lavoy’s (2005) argument where he suggests the effectual role that political elites can play in the production of socio-political life at the national level. The argument was that this understanding of the production of socio-political life afforded agency some level of power moving away from Foucault’s notion of the passive individual. This conception of agency affords transformatory power to individual political elites who are nevertheless, constrained by contingent social contexts and contingent cultural epistemes. In this context, Archer’s (1995) conception of the production of social life as existing within a time dimension is particularly useful in conceptualising the production of political reality in Pakistan’s case. If we recall, Archer (1995) drawing on the work of Bhaskar proposes that in a linear time sequence the concept of structural constraints comes first and has the power to enable and constrain human action\(^{188}\) thus chapter six argued that Musharraf was constrained by prevailing material and discursive structures. However, within these constraining conditions human action and interaction can re-produce and/or transform these structures. The resulting structure, which has been either reproduced or transformed, then becomes the subsequent conditioning structure of the next human interaction, and so the cycle continues. In this way, socio-political reality is emergent over time resulting from the interplay between structure and agency. This conception of structure-agency in affording qualified human authorship goes some way in addressing Foucault’s ‘death of the subject’. Thus the argument was that the role of Musharraf in terms of being able to build a broad national consensus in terms of the particular interpretation and meanings attached to events may be seen as a demonstration of the ‘power’ of agency in effecting change. Of course, Musharraf was constrained by existing

\(^{188}\) See figure 3.
structural contexts (cultural and material) but also enabled by these very contexts. For instance, the particular structure of power within Pakistan in the favour of the military establishment resulted in President Musharraf ‘wearing two hats’ in terms of his twin positions as both Chief of the Army Staff and the President which facilitated the dominance of the official political interpretation of events.

A consideration of the social contexts within which discourses are embedded, or considering the potential role of agential transformation does not signal a demoting of discursive analysis or constructivism. Rather, discourse and language are important because they provide the immediate ‘raw material’ from which political reality is constructed. Nevertheless, relevant social contexts matter precisely because they play a role in shaping an emergent political discourse in Pakistan and therefore cannot be divorced from the analysis of political discourse. Underlying structures and conditioners are not conceived as ‘rigidly determining’ but more fluidly as underlying conditional factors which facilitate, afford, shape or give direction to an emergent ‘reality’. This does not imply a crude materialist/structuralist argument; rather it can be seen as a kind of ‘middle ground’ between poststructuralist approaches\textsuperscript{189} and crude materialism\textsuperscript{190}. The thesis here concurs with Sayer (1992:98) when he notes that,

\textbf{while there are serious occupational hazards in any study of social structure, the proper response is not to abandon structural analysis, for this would give}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{189}]{Approaches which tend to imply that political practice is wholly reducible to circulating discourses.}
\item[\textsuperscript{190}]{The notion that political practice is wholly reducible to structural constraints.}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
actor’s accounts a false privilege and open the doors to ‘voluntarism’, that is, the view that what happens is purely a function of the unconstrained human will.

7.3 Summary of thesis outcomes

The primary purpose of this study has been to gain an insight into the complexity involved in the enactment of potentially contentious political practice. More specifically, the study began by observing that although Pakistan became a ‘front-line state’ following 9/11, and apart from Afghanistan, has been one the countries most affected by the on-going ‘war on terror’ nevertheless, little is known specifically about how Pakistan was able to build national consensus in relation to its participation in the ‘war on terror’. The findings of this study will help to fill this gap in the literature. In particular, by employing a broadly constructivist conceptual framework, this study has sought to identify specific discursive structures within the political discourse and has argued that these ‘framings’ or epistemes are implicated in building national consensus in the context of Pakistan’s participation in the ‘war on terror’. Thus in the first instance, this study proposes a relationship between Pakistan’s political discourse and ensuing political practice.

In further investigating this relationship between discourse and practice, the thesis sought to embed or contextualise the discourse in contingent social structures. Thus in the second instance, this study proposed a relationship between an emergent
political discourse, whose primary purpose was building national consensus, and the external and extra-discursive conditions of its emergence. This thesis here is that a constructivist conceptual framework incorporating insights from a critical realist theory provides a more holistic and plausible account of how and why Pakistan’s political discourse was able to effectively build wide-scale consensus in relation to participation in the ‘war on terror’. The focus on these relationships between discourse and practice and social contexts and discourse indicates towards the dialectical and multi-causal nature of an emergent political reality and represents a holistic way of engaging with world politics.

7.4 Final conclusions

On 12 September 2001, President Pervez Musharraf was candidly given an ultimatum by the US government, ‘you are either with us or against us’ (Musharraf 2006a:201). Soon after, Pakistan’s leadership decided to officially join the global coalition against the al-Qaeda and the Taliban. But as Musharraf (2006a:203-204) notes in his autobiography, ‘what of the domestic reaction? The mullah’s would certainly oppose joining the United States and would come out into the streets. There would be an adverse reaction too in the North-West Frontier province bordering Afghanistan’. Despite such apprehensions, Synnott (2009:66) notes that in the ensuing months, in contrast to overdrawn reports by some analysts ‘the public reaction in Pakistan to the Afghan campaign was generally muted’. It is precisely this ‘muted public reaction,’ that has most interested the current study. In approaching this subject-area this research project has argued that the politicised character of the
dominant narratives in the domestic political space played a critical role in being able to secure a wide-scale consensus concerning the inevitability of Pakistan’s participation in the ‘war on terror’.

The central argument of this thesis has been that a specific political rhetoric and discourse was employed by Pakistan’s leadership to interpret the meaning of events, and to justify and normalise Pakistan’s coalition with the US. In arriving at such a conclusion, the study engaged in exploring the dominant interpretations, representations and narratives articulated by the political discourse in order to attach meanings to the events of 9/11. The analysis was based mostly on important official speeches, interviews, public addresses and other government data. Although this study makes no claim of having collected all possible material nevertheless, the selected texts were a representative sample of many more official texts concerning Pakistan and the ‘war on terror’. Furthermore, as noted elsewhere191, there is an inevitable bias in the selected texts however, this has been redressed by trying to include as many different speakers as possible within the data-set. In the analysis of the data, the study found that the underlying narratives and representations concerning Pakistan and the ‘war on terror’ remained consistent between different texts and authors. However, in furthering the inquiry into the connections between discourse and political practice the project also identified the wider structural contexts within which Pakistan’s political discourse is embedded. The argument is that, rather than the political discourse spontaneously emerging from a ‘vacuum of nothingness’, there are extra-discursive contexts which are causally connected to the discourse under scrutiny.

191 Refer to footnote 12.
Although this study pertains to the general area of the ‘war on terror’ however, it contributes specifically in relation to a small aspect of this wider field of academic interest. Many studies within the wider literature have examined the role of Pakistan in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Much of this existing literature was reviewed in chapter three, and in this context it was argued that a distinguishable feature in relation to the existing body of work was its geo-political focus in terms of explaining Pakistan’s predicaments and dilemmas both before and after 9/11. In contrast to this, the current study represents a departure in terms of its emphasis. It is notable that within the existing body of work there is very little examination, if any, of the role of language and discourse in constituting Pakistan’s practice. Much of the existing literature is often principally concerned with ascertaining ‘truths’ or an authentic ‘version of events’, and often the focus is geared towards exploring Pakistan’s ‘genuineness’ or ‘commitment’ vis-à-vis the United States and the ‘war on terror’. Consequently, a key task of this project has been to help redress the imbalance by examining the way in which a specific political discourse is constitutive of socio-political consensus and state practice within Pakistan. The thesis has thus drawn attention to the politicised character of the dominant narratives and argued that these narratives enabled and legitimised a particular set of political actions geared towards Pakistan’s alliance with the US in the ‘war on terror’.

While other studies engage with the moral, political and diplomatic dimensions of Pakistan’s political practice, this study re-conceptualises the same practice through an examination of representational practices. As Shapiro (1989:13-14) notes, ‘to
textualise a domain of analysis is to recognise, first of all, that any “reality” is mediated by a mode of representation and, second that representations are not descriptions of a world of facticity, but are ways of making facticity’. Nevertheless, despite the difference in emphasis the primary purpose of this project has not been to negate or disqualify the findings and arguments of the current literature, rather the main objective has been to contribute to the debate by drawing on an alternative theoretical framework in order to deepen our understanding and knowledge of how political practice is realised. Thus, it is important to understand that the main contribution of this research is the way in which it brings into analytical focus those nuances which are often overlooked by broadly realist-inspired studies.

In finality, it is important to clarify that this project represents but an opening towards new ways of dealing with world politics and in this context this study throws up many more openings for possible further research. For instance, further research could explore the role of the 2002 electronic media liberalisation in Pakistan and the way in which this has opened up space for political discussion and heightened political consciousness. Prior to 2002, the media in Pakistan was closely censored and thus it was relatively easier for an elite discourse to become embedded without any challenge. In this context, a further research project may explore the way in which this media discourses impacts other public discourses related to national identity, the role of Islam in Pakistan, Pakistan’s relationship with the ‘war on terror’, relations with India and the US and so on. In particular, the dialect between these discourses and government policy is an interesting way to engage with this subject-field. Moreover, although this project engaged, albeit in a limited fashion, with the way in which the US interpellated or positioned Pakistan and other
international subjects in the aftermath of 9/11, such an investigation could be extended further into a much more substantial project exploring discursive positioning and related impacts in terms of domestic political practice. Further still, this thesis opens up additional questions for investigation especially with regard to the nature and concrete role that social relations and enduring social structures (both ideational and material) play in world politics. In this context, further research could identify and explore social structures, at the domestic and international levels, and the dialect between the two in terms of impacting discursive space and ultimately political practice.

Much, then, remains to be done.
Glossary

**Azan**  
The call to prayer delivered from minarets

**Birdari**  
Family kinship - much like a caste system

**Caliph**  
Islamic leader – the term is usually used to refer to a leader that as global resonance

**Hajj**  
pilgrimage to Makkah and one of the five pillars of Islam. The others being the affirmation of the oneness of God and the acceptance of Muhammad as His Prophet, the observance of five daily prayers, observing the fast and the payment of zakat (charity).

**Hijrat**  
migration marking the Prophet Muhammad’s journey from Makkah to Medina in 622 AD

**Hikmat**  
Farsightedness and wisdom derived from Islam

**Ijtihad**  
Individual judgement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Ijtima</em></td>
<td>Congregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ilm</em></td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huqooq-ul-abad</td>
<td>Rights of the people, or rights of the wider community over the individual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huqood-ul-Allah</td>
<td>Rights of God, or rights of Allah over the individual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Jihad</em></td>
<td>Struggle; holy war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Jihadi</em></td>
<td>Individual or group dedicated to Islamic holy war (jihad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Kabah</em></td>
<td>Islam’s holiest site in Makkah, Saudi Arabia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Madrassa</em></td>
<td>Quranic school or religious seminary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mujahideen</em></td>
<td>Soldier of Islam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Raj British sovereignty over undivided India

Sufi spiritual mentor who preaches Islamic values through example and non-violence. Music and poetry is a marked feature.

Sufism A mystical branch of Islam.

Sharia Islamic law

Syed Widely accepted as direct descendents of the Prophet Muhammed

Ulema (sing. Alim) the body of formally trained Muslim theologians
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Ummah</strong></th>
<th>the global Islamic community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wadera</strong></td>
<td>A term used to refer to a local ‘elder’ who wields significant power owing the ownership of vast tracts of land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zamindar</strong></td>
<td>Landowner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>Bharitia- Janata- Party (Indian Peoples Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJI</td>
<td>Islamic Jumhoori Ittehad (Islamic democratic Alliance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter-services Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jammat-e-Islami (Islamic society)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMA</td>
<td>Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (United Council of Action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North-West Frontier Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan Peoples Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDPA</td>
<td>Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX I\textsuperscript{192}

Text of the speech of President General Pervez Musharraf

September 19\textsuperscript{th} 2001

"My dear countrymen, Asslam-o-Alaikum:

The situation confronting the nation today and the international crisis have impelled me to take the nation into confidence. First of all, I would like to express heartfelt sympathies to the United States for the thousands of valuable lives lost in the United States due to horrendous acts of terrorism.

We are all the more grieved because in this incident people from about 45 countries from all over the world lost their lives. People of all ages old, children, women and people from all and every religion lost their lives. Many Pakistanis also lost their lives. These people were capable Pakistanis who had gone to improve their lives. On this loss of lives I express my sympathies with those families. I pray to Allah to rest their souls in peace.

This act of terrorism has raised a wave of deep grief, anger and retaliation in the United States. Their first target from day one is Osama bin Laden's movement Al-

\textsuperscript{192} Owing to the confines of space associated with this research project it has not been possible to include in this appendix a larger variety of texts employed by this study. Furthermore, it is also important to note that most of the speeches, interviews, debates etc. consulted in the compilation of the analysis are often very long and contain much reiteration and sometimes a discussion of topics not relevant to this study. Consequently in reproducing some selected texts in this appendix it is useful to note that these have been abridged to ensure relevance.
Qaida about which they say that it is their first target. The second target are Taliban and that is because Taliban have given refuge to Osama and his network. This has been their demand for many years. They have been demanding their extradition and presentation before the international court of justice. Taliban have been rejecting this.

The third target is a long war against terrorism at the international level. The thing to ponder is that in these three targets nobody is talking about war against Islam or the people of Afghanistan. Pakistan is being, asked to support this campaign. What is this support? Generally speaking, these are three important things in which America is asking for our help. First is intelligence and information exchange, second support is the use of our airspace and the third is that they are asking for logistic support from us.

I would like to tell you now that they do not have any operational plan right now. Therefore we do not have any details on this count but we know that whatever are the United States’ intentions they have the support of the UN Security Council and the General Assembly in the form of a resolution. This is a resolution for war against terrorism and this is a resolution for punishing those people who support terrorism. Islamic countries have supported this resolution. This is the situation as it prevailed in the outside world.
Now I would like to inform you about the internal situation. Pakistan is facing a very critical situation and I believe that after 1971, this is the most critical period. The decision we take today can have far-reaching and wide-ranging consequences. The crisis is formidable and unprecedented. If we take wrong decisions in this crisis, it can lead to worst consequences. On the other hand, if we take right decisions, its results will be good. The negative consequences can endanger Pakistan's integrity and solidarity. Our critical concerns, our important concerns can come under threat. When I say critical concerns, I mean our strategic assets and the cause of Kashmir. If these come under threat it would be a worse situation for us.

On the other hand, we can re-emerge politically as a responsible and dignified nation and all our difficulties can be minimized. I have considered all these factors and held consultations with those who hold different opinions. I met the corps commanders, National Security Council and the Federal Cabinet. I interacted with the media. I invited the religious scholars and held discussions with them. I met politicians. I also invited intellectuals. I will be meeting with the tribal chiefs and Kashmiri leaders tomorrow. This is the same process of consultation that I held earlier. I noted that there was difference of opinion but an overwhelming majority favours patience, prudence and wisdom. Some of them, I think about ten percent favoured sentimental approach.

Let us now take a look at the designs of our neighbouring country. They offered all their military facilities to the United States. They have offered without hesitation, all
their facilities, all their bases and full logistic support. They want to enter into any alliance with the United States and get Pakistan declared a terrorist state. They want to harm our strategic assets and the Kashmir cause. Not only this, recently certain countries met in Dushanbe. India was one of them. Indian representative was there. What do the Indians want? they do not have common borders with Afghanistan anywhere. It is totally isolated from Afghanistan. In my view, it would not be surprising, that the Indians want to ensure that if and when the government in Afghanistan changes, it shall be an anti-Pakistan government.

It is very important that while the entire world is talking about this horrible terrorist attack, our neighbouring country instead of talking peace and cooperation, was trying hard to harm Pakistan and defame Islam. If you watch their television, you will find them dishing out propaganda against Pakistan, day in and day out. I would like to tell India "Lay Off".

Pakistan's armed forces and every Pakistani citizen is ready to offer any sacrifice in order to defend Pakistan and secure its strategic assets. Make no mistake and entertain no misunderstanding. At this very moment our Air Force is at high alert; and they are ready for "Do or die" Missions My countrymen! In such a situation, a wrong decision can lead to unbearable losses.

What are our critical concerns and priorities? These are four;

1. First of all is the security of the country and external threat.
2. Second is our economy and its revival.
3. Third are our strategic nuclear and missile assets.
4. And Kashmir cause.

The four are our critical concerns. Any wrong judgment on our part can damage all our interests. While taking a decision, we have to keep in mind all these factors. The decision should reflect supremacy of righteousness and it should be in conformity with Islam. Whatever we are doing, it is according to Islam and it upholds the principle of righteousness. I would like to say that decisions about the national interests should be made with wisdom and rational judgement.

At this moment, it is not the question of bravery or cowardice. We are all very brave. My own response in such situations is usually of daring. But bravery without rational judgment is tantamount to stupidity. There is no clash between bravery and sound judgment. Allah Almighty says in the holy Quran, "The one bestowed with sagacity is the one who get a big favour from Allah". We have to take recourse to sanity. We have to save our nation from damage. We have to build up; our national respect. "Pakistan comes first, everything else comes later".

Some scholars and religious leaders are inclined towards taking emotional decisions. I would like to remind them the events of the first six years of the history of Islam. The Islamic calendar started from migration. The significance of migration is manifested from the fact that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) went from Makkah to Madina. He (PBUH) migrated to safeguard Islam. What was migration? God forbid,
was it an act of cowardice? The Holy Prophet (PBUH) signed the charter of Madinah (Meesaq-e-Madinah) with the Jewish tribes. It was an act of sagacity.

This treaty remained effective for six years. Three battles were fought with non-believers of Makkah during this period - the battle of Badr, Uhad and Khandaq. The Muslims emerged victorious in these battles with the non-believers of Makkah because the Jews had signed a treaty with the Muslims. After six years, the Jews were visibly disturbed with the progress of Islam, which was getting stronger and stronger. They conspired to forge covert relations with the non-believers of Makkah. Realising the danger, the Holy Prophet (PBUH) signed the treaty of Hudaibiya with the Makkhans who had been imposing wars on Islam. This was a no war pact. I would like to draw your attention to one significant point of this pact. The last portion of the pact was required to be signed by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) as Muhammad Rasool Allah. The non-believers contested that they did not recognize Muhammad (PBUH) as the Prophet of Allah. They demanded to erase these words from the text of the treaty. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) agreed but Hazrat Umar (R.A) protested against it. He got emotional and asked the Holy Prophet (PBUH) if he was not the messenger of God (God forbid) and whether the Muslims were not on the right path while signing the treaty.

The Holy Prophet (PBUH) advised Hazrat Umar (R.A) not to be led by emotions as the dictates of national thinking demanded signing of the treaty at that time. He (PBUH) said, this was advantageous to Islam and as years would pass by you would
come to know of its benefits. "This is exactly what happened. Six months later in the battle of Khyber, Muslims, by the grace of Allah, again became victorious. It should be remembered that this became possible because Makkans could not attack because of the treaty. On 8 Hijra by the grace of Allah glory of Islam spread to Makkah.

What is the lesson for us in this? The lesson is that when there is a crisis situation, the path of Hikmat (wisdom) is better than the path of emotions. Therefore, we have to take a strategic decision. There is no question of weakness of faith or cowardice. For Pakistan, life can be sacrificed and I am sure every Pakistani will give his life for Pakistan. I have fought two wars. I have seen dangers. I faced them and by the grace of Allah never committed a cowardly act.

But at this time one should not bring harm to the country. We cannot make the future of a hundred and forty million people bleak. Even otherwise it is said in Shariah that if there are two difficulties at a time and a selection has to be made it is better to opt for the lesser one. Some of our friends seem to be much worried about Afghanistan.

I must tell them that I and my government are much more worried about Afghanistan and Taliban. I have done everything for Afghanistan and Taliban when the entire world is against them. I have met about twenty to twenty five world leaders and talked to each of them in favour of the Taliban. I have told them that sanctions should not be imposed on Afghanistan and that we should engage them.
I have been repeating this stance before all leaders but I am sorry to say that none of our friends accepted this.

Even in this situation, we are trying our best to cooperate with them. I sent Director General ISI with my personal letter to Mullah Umar. He returned after spending two days there. I have informed Mullah Umar about the gravity of the situation. We are trying our best to come out of this critical situation without any damage to Afghanistan and Taliban.

This is my earnest endeavour and with the blessings of Allah I will continue to seek such a way out. We are telling the Americans too that they should be patient. Whatever their plans, they should be cautious and balanced: We are asking them to come up with whatever evidence they have against Osama bin Laden; What I would like to know is how do we save Afghanistan and Taliban. And how do we ensure that they suffer minimum losses: I am sure that you will favour that we do so and bring some improvement by working with the nations of the world. At this juncture, I am worried about Pakistan only.

I am the Supreme Commander of Pakistan and I give top priority to the defence of Pakistan, defence of any other country comes later. We want to take decisions in the interest of Pakistan. I know that the majority of the people favour our decisions. I also know that some elements are trying to take unfair advantage of the situation and
promote their personal agenda and advance the interests of their parties. They are poised to create dissentions and damage the country.

There is no reason why this minority should be allowed to hold the sane majority as a hostage. I appeal to all Pakistanis to display unity and solidarity and foil the nefarious designs of such elements who intend to harm the interests of the country.

At this critical juncture, we have to frustrate the evil designs of our enemies and safeguard national interests. Pakistan is considered a fortress of Islam. God forbid, if this fortress is harmed in any way it would cause damage to the cause of Islam. My dear countrymen, Have trust in me the way you reposed trust in me before going to Agra. I did not disappoint the nation there.

We have not compromised on national honour and integrity and I shall not disappoint you on this occasion either. This is firm pledge to you. In the end before I take your leave, I would like to end with the prayer of Hazrat Musa (A.S)( Prophet Moses) as given in Sura-e-Taha: "May Allah open my chest, make my task easier, untie my tongue so that they may comprehend my intent".

May Allah be with us in our endeavours.

" PAKISTAN PAINDABAD "
My dear countrymen! It has been long since I addressed you last.

A number of developments and incidents have taken place in our region, around the globe and the Muslim world.

An internally we are passing through a delicate phase in our history. I think at this stage the nation needs unity and understanding the issues in their proper perspective. So I thought it a proper time to address you. I would like to review briefly the regional and international situation and the state of affairs in the Muslim world.

We need to talk about the world because we or for that matter any other country does not exist in a vacuum. We have to have contacts and maintain relations with the world. We have to develop trade and economic ties with the members of the international community. I believe that without maintaining relations with other countries, no country can achieved development and progress.

If we look at the world we see it passing through turbulence. Bomb blasts and suicide bombings are taking place. A number of innocent lives are being lost all around.
Upon examination we will find that these are the Muslims who are perpetuators and these are the Muslims again who are suffering. This is our misfortune. It is all the more regrettable that whenever such incidents of terrorism occur our country directly or indirectly gets linked to these acts of terrorism. Either the accused may have lived here, passed through our country or travelled to Afghanistan through our territory. This is a matter of grave concern and sadness for me. I see these incidents as tarnishing the image of Islam in the world and the world is beginning to see Islam as sanctioning intolerance, extremism and terrorism. I refute this kind of thinking and strive to project Islam in its true perspective as a religion which gives messages of peace and brotherhood.

......

So how can we move forward in such a scenario? I would like to mention to madrassah that the world Ilm (knowledge) has been used 800 hundred times in the Holy Quran. After the world ‘Allah’, this is the most frequent used word. Ilm is also worldly Ilm. So we should teach our children both religious and worldly knowledge so that the graduating students may join the mainstream of national life.

Pakistan’s future and destiny are linked with the Muslim Ummah…we are also and Islamic country. Not only that but Pakistan is the only ideological country carved out for the Muslims of the region. Therefore, we are the most important past of the
Muslim world. In addition to that Pakistan is playing a lead role in the fight against extremism and terrorism.

Dozens of Mujahideed organisations have mushroomed in cities which recruit people openly, train them, collect donations and publish and distribute jihadi literature. This practice has been going on for the last 25 years and has played havoc with our society. Political elements exploit situations for their own political interests. I want to ask these terrorists and extremists of their objectives they want to achieve from such activities. Do they aim for the glory of Islam? Do they think their actions will glorify Islam. Rather they will get nothing out of their misdeed and terrorism. It is their misunderstanding. I will bring the destruction of the Muslim.

Now I want to ask something from my dear countrymen. Do you want Pakistan to play some role in bringing betterment in the world, the Islamic Ummah and this region? Do we have the potential?

In my view we have the potential to lead the world, the Islamic Ummah and region towards peace and betterment. We should play our role to enhance the glory of the country. This world is a common heritage and we should make it a better place for
our future generations. We should help the Ummah to resolve its political issues and play a role in improving the socio-economic situation.

Keeping in view the role of Pakistan in the Ummah and the world, I presented the strategy of “Enlightened Moderation” to the Ummaha and the world. It is a two-pronged strategy. One prong implies that Muslims reject terrorism and extremism and raise their voices against it. Side by side we should concentrate on the socio-economic progress of the public so that the Ummah can move forward. The second prong demands that the world and the US find a just resolution to the political issues which are being confronted by the Muslim Ummah…In my view this strategy would be a success.

I am pleased that the strategy of Enlightened Moderation has been approved in the last OIC (organisation of Islamic Countries) meeting…I proposed the formulation of a new department of Islamic thought which should comprise of true Islamic representation and educated scholars to convey the true Islamic spirit to the Ummah

…. We have achieved an international stature, a standing in the wider Ummah and our economy has stabilised…
Opening remarks by Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed at the meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.


I think we have a full House now and as I mentioned early that there is an opening statement from my side, which will set the perspective as we see it from Pakistan. In this I'll mention that probably no country and I think this is important to understand the perception here that as far as terrorism is concerned the track record of Pakistan has been very strong, very consistent and probably no country after nine eleven has done more and sacrificed more in terms of supporting the campaign against terrorism and this also goes back to the years of the cold war when Pakistan was supposed to be a front line state on the issue of rolling back Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan and when our American and British friends were partners in what I call the joint jihad against Soviet Union and Pakistan played that role, we were committed to that and there is a strong feeling in Pakistan that after the liberation of Afghanistan or the roll back of the Red Army, we were left in the lurch. Afghanistan was left in the lurch and the West, Britain included, the US, just walked away from the region and we were left to carry the baby with the bath water and what you are seeing today is the blow back, the consequences, the aftermath of that jihad and for 12 years from 1989 to 2001 the International community, the Western World, Britain, European Union, USA, just forgot about the region, forgot about Pakistan and they also gave us a parting kick in the form of sanctions, other punitive measures and they forgot about our contributions that we had made. Any way, we contributed to the victory for the
West in the cold war, the break up of the Soviet Union, the collapse of communism in Europe and so there is a certain suspicion among Pakistanis although we have a close rapport these days with the west that whether this relationship is resilient, whether it is going to belong term or whether it is simply tactical that it is linked with the certain situation and when the situation on the ground changes, the western interest change because we know, especially our American friends, they have short memories and shifting alliances. In the current scenario, Pakistan's leadership took a very wise and decisive action after 9/11. I call it course correction it was needed. We helped the West in removing the Taliban leadership and we felt that Pakistan should be part of the mainstream. Pakistan became partner rather than a pariah of the west in that situation and as you know that over 500 leaders of Al-Qaida were captured by Pakistani Intelligence and Security Forces and handed over to the United States. So, Pakistan has demonstrated its commitment to the campaign against terrorism and also we have seen that we maintained this commitment despite pressures on Pakistan from its eastern front - the Indians and the Indians were breathing down our neck for 10 months as you know through 2002 there was a stand off, one million troops facing each other but we remained on track. Now, in the current scenario we have certain concerns notwithstanding a strong commitment because this commitment is not because just the international community wants it or the international geo-political scenario is changed but it is also because it is in our own national interest. Pakistan itself is a victim of terrorism. What happened in Karachi day before yesterday testifies to that. The attempts on President Musharraf's life two in a ten days' time during the Christmas period of 2003, testify to that. But he has maintained the course, we have maintained the course, the Government is determined to maintain the course. However, we have certain concerns and I would like to point out those
concerns as Pakistanis and as Muslims and I think it is important that our friends in England, in the UK understand those concerns because these are concerns, which are widespread and which reflect, I would say, by and large an overwhelming section of public opinion in Pakistan.
APPENDIX II

Criteria for Distinguishing Discourses


A discourse is realised in texts
Discourse analysis begins with a text in which discourses can be identified

A discourse is about objects
To which object does the discourse refer? In describing those objects, treat the discourse if these objects as itself an object

A discourse contains subject
A discourse makes available a space for particular types of self to step in; it addresses the reader in a particular way

A discourse is a coherent system of meanings
People employ culturally available understandings as to what constitutes a coherent pattern or topic. The next step is that of mapping out the world or ontology the discourse presents or implies

A discourse relates to other discourses
In any text, it is likely that more than one discourse can be identified. The two discourses may be in a dialogue, set as opposites or muddled together. Attempt to
set possible contrasting discourse against each other and look at the way they construct different object or the same object in different ways.

_A discourse is historically located_

Discourses are located in time and history. Methodologically, a further step would therefore be to look at how and where discourse emerged.

_Discourse support (or are linked to) institutions_

Discourses are seen not as free-floating but as bound up with existing institutional structures (e.g. the state, the medical profession, business etc)

_Discourses reproduce power-relations_

Dominant discourse privilege particular versions of social reality and hence certain ways of being over others. Analytically, one could suggest which categories of person gain and lose from the employment of the discourse, and hence suggest who would want to promote and who to resist the use of the discourse.

_Discourses have ideological effects_

Analytically, Parker suggests analysts show how discourses connect with other discourses which justify oppression, and also how these discourses facilitate the telling by dominant groups of the narratives, which use the past to justify the present.
Bibliography

Books and articles


Hall, S., (2001) ‘Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse’ in Wetherell, M.,
Taylor, S., Yates, S. ed. In **Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader.** London:


Cambridge: Polity.


Hussain, Z. (2007). **Frontline Pakistan: The struggle with militant Islam.** London:
I B Tauris.


Available at:


Krestiva, J. (1980). Desire in language: A semiotic approach to literature and art


Khan, Mohammed Riaz, Foreign Secretary, speaking at the National Defense College in Islamabad on ‘India’s foreign policy – Pakistan’s view point’ on 25th May, 2004. Sourced from ‘Foreign Affairs Pakistan’ published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan.


Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri, Foreign Minister addressing the Heritage Foundation 22nd May 2004.

Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri, Foreign Minister, speaking at the National Defence College in Islamabad on ‘India’s foreign policy – Pakistan’s view point’ on 23th May, 2004. Sourced from Foreign Affairs Pakistan’ journal published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, Government of Pakistan.


Musharraf, P., President, Address to the Nation on December 15th 1999.
Musharraf, P., President, Address to the Nation on September 19th, 2001.

Musharraf, P., President, Address to the Joint Session of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Legislative Assembly and the Kashmir Council in Muzaffarabad on February 5th, 2002a.

Musharraf, P., President, Address to the Nation on May 27th, 2002b.


Musharraf, P. Speech to the 58th annual session of the UN General Assembly on September 15th, 2003b.

Musharraf, P., President, Address to the SAARC Conference in Islamabad, January 4th 2004.

Musharraf, P., President, Address to the Nation on July 21st, 2005a.
Musharraf, P., President, Address to the High-level Plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, September 14th, 2005b.

Musharraf, P., President, Speech at the Seerat conference in Islamabad on April 12th, 2006b.

Musharraf, P., President, Address. Speech at the ‘Global Discourse on Kashmir’ conference in Brussels on September 14th 2006c.

Musharraf P., President, Address to the Nation August 14th 2006d.


Musharraf, P., President, Address to the 61st session of the UN General Assembly September 19th 2006f.

Musharraf, P., President, Speaking at the ‘Question answer session at George Washington University’ USA on September 24th 2006g.
Sattar, Abdul, Former Foreign Minister writing in the *Daily Pakistan Observer*


Address by Pakistan’s High Commissioner to India at the Centre for Policy Research 6th March 2004.