GRASSROOTS COMMUNITY-BASED PEACEBUILDING

Critical narratives on peacebuilding and collaboration from the locality of Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists in Canada

(Volume 2 of 2)

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Chapter 7: Kenora Case Study

Introduction

Kenora, a hinterland city of 15,000 people in north-western Ontario was the site of a locally situated community-based process of peacebuilding (2005 to the present), called *Common Ground,* between two governments, one Indigenous (*The Grand Council of Treaty #3*) and the other, non-Indigenous (*the City of Kenora*).[1] Similar to a classic conflict resolution approach (Track 3) amongst key mid-level decision-makers, it was also a community-based peacebuilding process that involved a wide range of issues: economics, governance, collective rights, environmental sustainability, treaty, and inter-community relationships.[2]

[1] Representing two communities totalling 40,000 people, this case study primarily centred on a smaller group of 20-30 people who participated in the Common Ground process in Kenora. They were composed of City Councillors and staff from the City of Kenora together with officials and staff from the Grand Council of Treaty #3. One on side was the Grand Council of Treaty #3. It understood itself as the inherent, sovereign and national government representing the 25,000 Anishnabe people in the 55,000 square miles (14,245,000 hectares)[1] territory in northwest Ontario and parts of Manitoba.[1] It was the historical continuation of the pre-1873 Treaty Grand Council of Anishnabe.[1] Lead by its Grand Chief (*Ogichita*), it was a consensus-based government with representatives selected/elected annually from its 28 communities.
The City of Kenora (pop. 17,000) was within the Treaty #3 territory with 85% being predominantly Euro-Canadian and 15%-20% (?) of its population being Anishnabe.[1] Importantly, it was also the geographical hub for services, commerce and administration for 13 nearby Anishnaabe communities. The City was governed by an elected City Council of 6 Councillors and a Mayor with its responsibilities regulated by the Provincial government. Like other Ontario towns and cities, the Council has municipal responsibilities for planning, transportation (roads and public transit), public services (water, waste, recycling), community services (libraries, recreation centres, day care), fire and police service.

[2] The Common Ground process can be understood chronologically in five parts as: 1) the successor of the 2000 Common Ground Common Land process; 2) a series of informal conversations and negotiations within, and between, Treaty #3 Grand Council and the City of Kenora; 3) a formal workshop in March 2006 to discuss a partnership; 4) the creation and work of the Common Ground Working group to negotiate the actual joint entity to manage the land; and 5) the yet-to-be established wider community consultation/engagement process for using these lands.

In the context of over a past century of broader Canadian and local conflict at the community level, this place-based discourse, process and practice of community-based peacebuilding went well beyond the position of resistance into a grassroots form of transformative social change.

In the specific, it was a local process of formal negotiation (government-to-government), relationship building, and co-management of a particular area of land in a small Canadian town, Kenora. Land, figuratively and literally, (*Rats Portage, Old Fort and Tunnel Island)* within the city of Kenora itself became a catalyst for a transformative community-based peacebuilding; a process of re-fashioning relations of power asymmetries into *collaborations of equity*.

Both in local discourse and practice, Common Ground was a parallel process of decolonization and reconciliation between Anishnabe and Euro-Canadian (non-Indigenous) cultures locally.[3] On one side, it was a decolonizing process through the privileging and adoption of Indigenous worldviews, the ascension of Anishnabe narratives of the land, and the extension of Anishnabe ceremonies, pedagogy and leadership into the very practices of community development.

[3] I use different terminology in this case study than in the two other previous case studies. First, while the term "Indigenous peoples" is *au courant* at the international level, in the Kenora (and Grassy Narrows) case study I commonly interchange it for "Anishnabe" (Ojibway for "the people") as that was how people self-identified. Second, I have sometimes used the term "Euro-Canadian" in spite of Canada's diverse demographics because historically, and outside of major urban areas of contemporary immigration, Canada's majority population is of European descent: culturally, socially, and politically. In Kenora, like so many other places in Canada, the population (like my own family) was, for the most part, a 'settler culture' that occupied Indigenous lands in the 19th century (though sometimes coming in earlier waves in Ontario, Quebec and the Atlantic provinces). Further, while new immigrating populations to Canada are automatically positioned into this problematic communal space with Indigenous peoples, the key historical relationship and subsequent problems for Indigenous peoples were with the colonizing Euro-Canadian state and its settler populations.

At the same time, Common Ground was instigating a broader reconciliation between Anishnabe and Euro-Canadians in Kenora. Facilitated through its internal processes, values and practices, Common Ground was a partnership envisioned upon re-constructing an equitable partnership beyond asymmetrical relations of power. Based upon validating decolonizing counter-discourses of history, multiple and situated knowledges, and practices of joint decision-making, partnership (including reconciliation) was embedded in Common Ground as both a process and outcome.

In sum, it engaged with decolonization and reconciliation by seeking to create a shared sense of local space and mutual interests. Place-based Common Ground founded itself based on renewing treaty relations, doing so by an explicit integration of Anishnabe epistemology and ceremony, joint governance and decision-making, and a regional-local response to economic-political marginalization in a broader context of globalisation and under-development (metropole-hinterland thesis).[4] Such a place-based discourse and set of negotiated practices constituted an intersection of knowledges and partnership between 'cultures of difference' at the local level. In doing so, it challenged the contemporary conflict of structural violence, colonialism and asymmetrical relations of power while simultaneously striving to create common ground.[5]

[4] Op. Cit in footnote 299

[5] *Kenora* differed from other case studies in two fundamental ways. First, located at the level of community, it was a building of both an institutionalized government-to-government relationship and a community process. Second, unlike Cape Croker or Grassy Narrows, Kenora was an explicit quest to create a shared vision, process and management as part of long-term 'partnership' between peoples and 'cultures of difference'.

The Chapter argues that this case example of community-based peacebuilding needs to be understood as a *multiplex (multiple and complex)* and mutually reinforcing intersection of process, meanings and practices emanating from the local level.

In this multiplex framework, there were three corresponding components. First, Common Ground was layered in its process. It entailed group dialogue, ceremony, visioning (*appreciative inquiry*), negotiating an actual co-management entity and a future step of broader community-based engagement in the process. Second, deep within this Common Ground process was the honouring of epistemological alternatives, both in history and ceremony, in a way that levelled elements of asymmetrical power. Third, the use of personal/collective stories connected to the Land became a common space to initiate an "authentic" partnership based in reconciliation, and the potential harmonization of sustainable community relationships indelibly tied to the Land.

In general, the multiple intersections and discourses of locality pointed to the dynamic importance of five elements of community-based peacebuilding in Kenora. First, there were *initiating circumstances* understood as catalysts of change. This included economic vulnerability, a recognition of interdependence, the failure of past conflict resolution approaches, and the legacy of a previous truncated process of relationship building. Second, there were *synergistic factors* such as supportive processes/circumstances embodying the commonalities between communities and constructing parallel/coinciding interests. Third, Common Ground used *reinforcing practices* such as ceremonies embodying change and the re-positioning the epistemic of the marginalized/subaltern. Fourth, these factors and practices created

harmonizing possibilities defined *as* negotiating the future by a complex weaving of situated and interdependent collective values. Lastly, *transformative reconciliation* was manifested in the discursive reconfiguration of narratives and new practices of collective interaction.

The first section of this chapter analyses the broader and local historical context and basis behind the contemporary community process in Kenora. This is key for understanding the development of the asymmetrical relationships of power and the overall impoverishment and marginalization of Anishnabe peoples in Kenora and surrounding region from the signing of Treaty #3 in 1873 to the present.

Two, the background analysis continues with a focus on Kenora (2005 to the present) where a conjuncture of mutual interests brought Grand Council of Treaty #3 and the City of Kenora together in an evolving process surrounding Common Ground; the rebuilding of an Anishnabe and non-Indigenous partnership at the local level. To understand the particularity and contextualized basis of community-based peacebuilding, the discussion moves onwards to a detailing of factors and circumstances converging in the local context that set the stage for Common Ground

Third, the chapter maps the key building blocks and dynamics of this localized community-based process of peacebuilding. In particular, the conversation continues with an exploration and analysis of the Common Ground process itself, as understood by the participants in terms of constructing an evolving communal relationship, alternate narratives and spaces of possibility between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous communities at the local level.

Lastly, it concludes with a discussion of Kenora as exemplifying an integrated approach of community-based peacebuilding in terms of vision, process, meaning and practices, and it relevance to issues of locality, glocality, democracy, decolonization and its reconciliation.

Context

Understanding the depth and breadth of this protracted conflict between Anishnabe and Euro-Canadians in Kenora, and the context of present efforts at partnership (Common Ground), required contextualizing it within a history stretching back more than a century. Past discourses and practices narrated contemporary relationships between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous peoples in Kenora, be they economic, political, socio-cultural, and/or spiritual. The past, both at a macro and micro level, was germane for situating the significance of the current process of relationship building in Kenora between the City Council and the Grand Council of Treaty #3.

First, any envisioned partnership of equity originally sought between Anishnabe and the Crown (the Euro-Canadian state) through the signing of a treaty in 1873 became historically mired in the subsequent marginalization of the Anishnabe. Instead, structural violence and asymmetrical power was manifested in an evolving historical pattern of colonialism that impoverished Anishnabe communities through exclusion and subordination. [6]

[6] Relevant to this case study then is Chapter 4 on the Macro Context in Canada that surveyed the broad historical pattern of economic, political and cultural expansion and settlement in Canada as part of a global enterprise of British colonialism and later Canadian rule. It referred to a number of key events that highlighted the development of an asymmetrical power relationship by Europeans over Indigenous peoples; treaties, policies and governance such as the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the Indian Act of 1876, and Residential schools. Further, it is worth remembering the overall conflict was

defined by the structural violence experienced by Indigenous peoples in Canada, evidenced in appalling statistics on housing, health, income, unemployment, welfare, child poverty, suicide and homelessness.

The past in Kenora and the surrounding region centred around the development and consequences of the treaty relationship; the expectations and understandings held by the parties at the time of the Treaty #3 signing (1873) and the material consequences in the century following. Prior to 1873, the Anishnabe and European systems of governance "had operated quite comfortable beside each other for a two centuries" (KAA, personal communications, March 2008) based upon non-interference within each other's domain and respecting their own jurisdictional issues. Geographically dispersed into small communities and families/clans, the Anishnabe fished, hunted, trapped, and gathered on a seasonal basis in different parts of their territories. Further, their jurisdiction controlled access and operations within this territory including an area called *Lake of the Woods* where the key North American trading routes intersected and continued in any direction. Numbering around 15,000 people, the Ansihnabe had their own form of governance and leadership, extensive commercial relations, and had had a mutually beneficial trading relationship with Europeans for over 200 years.

The subordination of the Anishnabe began in 1869 when Canada acquired ownership over a massive expanse of lands in western and northern Canada (the North-western Territory and Rupert's Land). Canada bought the 1.5 million square miles (an area 10 times the size of then Canada) of privately-held land from the British-owned Hudson Bay Company for $1.5 million (300,000 Pound Stirling). The territory in north-western Ontario, the size of England (55,000 square miles), occupied by the Saultaux Ojibway (Anishnabe) was of pivotal strategic interest for the Canadian government as an essential route (roadway/waterway and later, railway) in order to access these western lands. Access to those recently acquired lands was part of a Government set of security, economic and political policies for creating a contiguous political confederation from the Atlantic to the Pacific coasts. The political project, underpinned by colonialism, had a number of elements including linking with British Columbia on the pacific coast, encouraging western settlement, expanding trade, establishing political-military control in Manitoba amongst the Métis, and preventing American annexation of any lands not firmly under Canadian Government control.

Hence, treaty negotiations were initiated with the (Saultaux) Anishabee in 1873 not only for access but for Canadian control over those lands that composed the Saultaux territory. A reading of historical documents strongly suggest the choice by Canada to negotiate was not so much a desire for a partnership as a recognition that the Anishnabe controlled this territory and that a military campaign would be a costly one.

On the other hand, there were broader contexts and sets of interests for the Anishnabe for having a more formal relationship/partnership with the Canadian Crown (the Queen). First, there was the recognition that Europeans were a powerful military force and having allies was always better than enemies. Second, they were absolutely cognizant of European competition and wars occurring in the North American context. The European impact within the North American context included the British-French Seven Year War (1756-1763), the American Revolution (1775-1783), the American Civil War (1861-65) and the increasing clash with Indigenous peoples and their allies (the Red River Rebellion in Manitoba in 1869-1870) as well as the 'Indian Wars' in the US during this same period. In this context, the Anishnabe would have been clearly aware of the economic devastation, starvation, and internal displacement for the Cree occurring in the American West due to the obliteration of the Buffalo economy and the crushing arrival of European settlers.

Third, there was wealth, knowledge and trade to be gained by having a formalized relationship with the Canadian Government: clear benefits were expected in terms of health, education, food security, mining/timber use, and cheaper access to costly technologies and scarce goods. In return, the Anishnabe expected to 'share' the land, continue government-to-government relations and maintain internal governance in much the same way as it had been.

Without going into the detailed negotiations (One can see the following sources for greater details on the negotiation process itself and its administration: Morris, Alexander (1880/1991). The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Territories including the Negotiations on which they were based. Markham, Ontario, CANADA: Fifth House Publishers; Treaties and Historical Research Centre, Self Government, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. Report by Daugherty, Wayne E. (1986). Treaty Research Report Treaty Three (1873). http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/trts/hti/t3/index_e.html) or of the Treaty (http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/trts/trty3_e.html), a formalized agreement (Treaty #3) was established in 1873. Western historians are not of one mind regarding the intentions and understandings underpinning the Treaty:

At the same time, at the community level, relations between Anishnabe and Euro-Canadian in Kenora over the decades –and even in the present- were not a singular story nor a simple dualism of good/bad. On a local and macro level, there continued to be a discernable degree of structural inequality as well as self-induced and externally-imposed segregation both in Canada and by extension, in Kenora. Kenora was not unique in that respect. There were segregated schools throughout Canada via the Residential School system until the 1960s, unequal status and political rights as per the Indian Act, ubiquitous racism and its impacts within employment, income, housing, health, and policing. Kenora, as a space and set of social relations, was not outside the history of colonialism, dispossession and marginalisation of Indigenous peoples in Canada.

On the other hand, Kenora was a town, like many others in Northern Ontario, composed of local and personal relationships: friendships, neighbours, school mates, inter-marriage and other social relations between Anishnabe and Euro-Canadians. Kenora included also positive cultures of relationality and place-based relationship building emanating in a hinterland environment of rural Canada's north.

Was this Treaty seen as a fusion of horizons or an eclipsing of autonomy and sovereignty? Was it understood as the beginning/continuance of a trusted relationship of equity and co-existence? Was the Treaty understood as a fixed and final contract? Was land actually 'ceded' or was it understood as 'shared'? Were there mixed and competing Canadian Government intentions towards the Anishnabe? Could anyone have predicted the scope of European settlement, resource exploitation, and political-economic displacement of the Anishnabe? Those questions are not completely incidental; the subsequent interpretations and actions have directed more than a century of asymmetrical exploitive relations beset by conflict.

Though existing on paper and in oral memory, the very spirit and intention of the treaty was understood (and is understood currently) within two very different worldviews. Consequently, the implementation and impacts of the treaty relationship undermined the prior approach of equity, autonomy, co-existence and partnership as significant promises/understandings made by the Canadian Government, both materially and in spirit, were broken, revoked, ignored or only partially fulfilled in the period subsequent. Further, an apartheid Canadian colonialism came into being through the still existent Indian Act of 1876. The consequences for the Anishnabe in Treaty 3 was a protracted conflict defined by the same structural inequalities, attempted cultural genocide, underdevelopment, and impoverishment as identified in broad statistical information noted in an earlier chapter on Indigenous peoples in Canada.

Understood within this context, the project and process of community-based peacebuilding in Kenora was all the more unique. While macro relations between Treaty #3 and the Canadian government remain fractured by ongoing neo-colonialism, the current process of community-based relationship-building and partnering in Kenora was understood as having its origins in *the spirit* of the 1873 Treaty 3; the development of mutually beneficial and equitable relationships between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous Canadians on land shared in common. Understood in that way, Common Ground was seen as a radical departure from the practices of the Canadian state, and constituted a conflict transformation approach located within local space, discourses and practices. [7]

Common Ground History (2005-present)

To understand the particularity and contextualized basis of community-based peacebuilding in Kenora, the discussion moves onwards to a detailing of factors and circumstances converging in the local context that set the stage for Common Ground.

As community-based peacebuilding, the Common Ground process of (2005 to the present) needs also to be understood within a localized history of events and challenges as well. The concept of partnerships between Euro-Canadians and Anishnabe in Kenora, be they economic, social or political, was not a strong feature

[7] The period of time most pertinent to this case study is from 2005 onwards when City of Kenora officials and Grand Council of Treaty #3 representatives (including three local Anishnabe communities) came together to form a partnership, Common Ground, regarding the joint management/ownership/sharing of some common land (Rat Portage and Tunnel Island). Rat Portage was called *Wauzhusk Onigum* (the Muskrat Portage). Tunnel Island was known as *Ka-izhe-ki-pi-chiin* ('a place to stay over').

in the period prior to 1999, in part reflecting the communal divide and segregation noted previously.

The lead-up to 2005 was permeated by racial tensions between Anishaabe and Euro-Canadian communities in Kenora, particularly in the aftermath of the murder of an Anishnabe man, a botched investigation marred by police misconduct[8] and continued (alleged) incidents of police racism towards Anishnabe street people.[9] Second, tensions were also heightened in Kenora's forestry-based economy in response to the logging blockade by the nearby community of *Grassy Narrows* as well as politically as a consequence of Grassy's supporters, the *Christian Peacemakers Team* in Kenora.[10] Conversely, the vastly disproportionate rate of Anishnabe unemployment, lack of sovereign control over their territories, and ubiquitous daily experiences of racism exacerbated a sense of distrust for many Anishnabe. Third, there were urban economic development issues that reinforced mistrust between communities. In 1999, the City of Kenora was seeking unilateral control and ownership over a parcel of land (Tunnel Island)[11] that was simultaneously claimed by nearby Anishnabe

[8] On October 4, 2000, an Anishnabe man, Max Kakegamic was found beaten to death on the streets of Kenora. Eight years later, his murder remains unsolved amidst a botched nepotistic police investigation. In July 2005, two Kenora police officers stood charged under the Police Services Act for suppressing evidence and other misconduct related to the case) that resulted in charge being stayed (dropped) against an accused in January, 2004. In April 2007, Max Kakegamic's family sued the Kenora Police Services Board as well as four police officers for $9.9 million in damages for "failures" in investigating the 2000 death of their son. Policing of Anishnabe was/is a contentious issues both on-reserve and off. From the perspective of Kenora's Anishinaabe residents, the Kakegamic case was often understood as indicative of racism both in the murder itself and the process of investigation. Stories abound in the Anishnabe communities of occurrences of routine harassment, intimidation or neglected by Kenora Police Services (KPS). Most of Kenora's street inhabitants are Anishinaabe and on any given day, they compose upwards of 90% of the people in the municipal jail.

[9] Kenora's Anishnabe *Coalition for Peace and Justice* was keeping track of incidents for a period.

[10] The CPT actions to develop greater awareness of racism in Kenora were not always very welcomed in the Euro-Canadian population in Kenora. Treated with suspicion by the City of Kenora Council, CPT's action of putting a sign ("Safe for whom?") below an official City of Kenora sign on its designation as a safe city, caused further animosity.

[11] The same Tunnel Island that later became a centrepiece of Common Ground.

communities.[12] The City's quest failed but the lack of collaboration with Anishnabe communities continued the pattern of exclusion.

On the other hand, in the same period (2000), Grand Council Treaty #3 then Grand Chief Leon Jordaine initiated a conference, *Common Land, Common Ground*, involving regional,Mayors, Reeves[13] and Anishnabe leaders from within the Treaty #3 territory. This was envisioned by Grand Chief Jordaine as a step towards dialoguing about mutual interests with regional politicians as part of building a common political and economic front to control their own regional development and in doing so, reinforce the role of the Grand Council as a national government. However, despite this visionary exercise from the Grand Council, a combination of other events and circumstances[14] led to a lack of follow through on the two initial meetings. Nevertheless, it was understood by some as a seminal act in partnership building that set the stage for later relationships.

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[12] Economically flourishing at the time in 1999, the City of Kenora was designated 'Forest Capital of Canada by the Canadian Forestry Association (CFA). The City made a concerted attempt to get Tunnel Island from Abitibi Consolidated for a park celebrating the forest. Three issues were at play. First, Abitibi Consolidated had acquired 'ownership' of this land in 1922 and had constructed several small power generating dams on the river to service their mill. Otherwise, it had not been further developed and hence the City's desire to gain ownership themselves. Second, the surrounding Anishnabe communities (Rat Portage, Dalles and Wash Bay) considered this island to be traditional territory used for millenniums as a place of trading, gathering and ceremony. Further, the land had been unjustly expropriated from them as the rail corridor was removed from availability as reserve land. The chiefs understood this at treaty so there was never a claim on this land, though at least one Anishnabe community made its opposition to any transfer of ownership (other than to themselves) known to Abitibi. This by its very nature meant a land claim process might be instituted, something the Company would have wanted to avoid. Third, the City-led process to develop Tunnel Island had had only token Anishnabe participation. This was reflected in City-paid consultants' reports that suggested various ideas for economic and social development but not options development in any collaborative process with Anishnabe communities. For a number of reasons (failed fundraising, potential land claims conflicts, corporate merger of Abitibi with Stone Consolidated), the City proposals for Tunnel Island languished.

[13] Reeves are the same as Mayors but for communities of a smaller size than incorporated towns.

[14] Such things as a political dispute with the federal Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Kenora Member of Parliament Bob Nault over changes to the Indian Act; Grand Council attention diverted to ambitious and demanding talks on self-determination with the Federal government; the dramatic cancelling of these talks and funding for staff to the Grand Council by the Federal government; and internal disputes with the Grand Council itself that further deflected attention.

The pendulum of Anishnabe and Euro-Canadian relationship building in Kenora took a significant swing towards cooperation from 2004-2006 in response to the appearance and control over two parcels of land. Historically, culturally and spiritually important, the re-discovery of Rat Portage[15] and the potntial re-acquisition of Tunnel Island were a conduit for relationship building between Treaty #3 (including the nearby three Anishnabe communities) and the City of Kenora.[16]

In the Summer/Fall of 2005, in separate meetings, discussions and public presentations, the parties (Grand Council of Treaty # and the City of Kenora) agreed to work together in an attempt to fashion a joint management scheme for the Rat Portage site.[17]

In the same period of Fall 2005, Abitibi Consolidated announced that it was closing its mill in Kenora for good. [18] The second largest landholder in the Kenora area, the

[15] I say "re-discovery" but some would say that the land 'revealed' itself. Either way, most people seemed to have forgotten the exact location subsequent to its disuse after the completion of the trans-Canada railway. Rat Portage (*Wauzhusk Onigum* (the Muskrat Portage) or Bigsby Rat Portage as it is known to European-Canadians) was, in fact, an essential portage (land crossing between two waterways) at the intersection of key waterways. Used historically as crossing point in commerce and trade by the Anishnabe prior to the arrival of Europeans, and later by both, it's exact location became 'lost' to public memory as waterways became replaced by rail and road. This space was literally the crossing point for travel north of the Great Lakes and, like Tunnel Island, was of deep significance and meaning for both Anishnabe and Euro-Canadians.

[16] The location of Bigsby's Rat Portage, located on the mainland across from Tunnel Island, was on land owned by the City of Kenora. It's exact site, lost from memory, was re-ascertained by Cuyler Cotton in Spring 2004 (a non-indigenous Kenora resident, historian and community facilitator) who, based on his previous work and relationships with local Anishnabe communities, privately informed the Grand Chief of Treaty #3 and the leaders from the three original Rat Portage communities. Recognizing its significance, challenges and possibility, the three communities agreed to work together and over the next 15 months of internal discussions also entertain the possibility of working alongside the City of Kenora. Subsequent to that decision, Cuyler Cotton acting with the permission of the three communities informally told City of Kenora representatives (Rory McMillan, Dennis Wallace and Len Compton) of the "rediscovery" of Bigsby Rat Portage and conveyed the willingness of the Rat Portage communities to discuss options

[17] A joint press conference (September 8, 2005) was held at the Rat Portage site announced that the City and Grand Council would be forming "a cooperative working group charged with the responsibility of guiding our governments in a mutually respectful, beneficial treatment of this place." www.ratportage.com

[18] Montreal-based Abitibi-Consolidated was one of the world's largest paper and forestry product companies with over 12,500 employees in three continents comprising sales of close to $5 Billion (CND) in 2006. Formed by the merger of Abitibi-Price and Stone-Consolidated (May, 1997), it ran one of the two paper mills in Kenora until December 2005 when it shut it down.

disposition of assets, including Tunnel Island, was being widely discussed. In an informal meeting[19]Abitibi agreed that if the City of Kenora and the Anishnabeg of Treaty #3 could create a land management partnership, Abitibi would add Tunnel Island to a package of lands that would be transferred without cost to such a partnership.[20]

The future of these two lands coincided and produced a synchronicity between Treaty #3 and the City of Kenora. In January-February 2006, Treaty #3 and the City of Kenora sponsored a facilitated meeting[21] to discuss joint management/ownership scheme for the Rat Portage site (and the possibility of Tunnel Island). In March 2006, a closed-door two-day Workshop was held[22] and a commitment to a 50/50 partnership was made on respecting and sharing the land. Subsequently, in November 2006, it was announced that Abitibi Consolidated had *formally* agreed to undertake the transference of more than 120 hectares (300 acres) of company-owned property on Tunnel Island to the *Common Ground Working Group*.[23]

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[19] The meeting was between Cuyler Cotton (later Facilitator of the Common Ground Workshop) and Abitibi Consolidate representative, Mike O'Flaherty.

[20] Abitibi Consolidated's decision to 'gift' the land back to the City, or for that matter, to the nearby Anishnabe communities, was a mixture of motives and interests. As explained from interviews with City Councillors and Abitibi officials, Abitibi wanted to restore/retain an element of community goodwill towards its northern Ontario operations. Offering the land was seen as good public relations in a period where 400 jobs at the Kenora mill were made redundant. Second, the land was of little commercial value to the Company because of the anticipated probability of a lengthy, expensive and controversial land claims process by local Anishnabe communities. Instead, the Company negotiated with the City to transfer ownership over most parts of Tunnel Island except the parts occupied by its hydro-generating plants wherein it would be given full property rights by de-linking its deed from Tunnel Island and hence, insulating itself not only from any land claim but retain the ability to sell land it could not have done previously.

[21] Facilitated by Cuyler Cotton.

[22] Entitled the *Joint Strategic Planning Workshop for Common Ground*, it involved 21 representatives from the City of Kenora, the Grand Council of Treaty #3 and Abitibi Consolidated Paper.

[23] Ibid. "According to the Memorandum of Understanding signed by city, First Nations and Abitibi officials, the land will be held in trust by the city for two years while the working group establishes a legal entity and a management structure to assume ownership of the land. No development will occur while city and First Nations working group representatives consider future possibilities for the historic, archaeological and culturally significant site." Source: "Abitibi transfers Tunnel Island to Common Ground Working Group." By Reg Clayton, *Kenora Miner and News* (Thursday November 09, 2006).

Currently, the *Common Ground Stewardship Group* is in the process of forming a trust for management of these lands, undertaking studies on the sites, following the lead of Anishnabe Elders on means to respect and honour the land, and developing a community-wide process to consult the respective communities in shaping the land-use plan. [24i]

On a broad level, it was remarkable that such a locally-based partnership could be formed given the 19th and 20th century history cited earlier, and the appearance of disparate community interests. Yet, here was an explicit local partnership creating a space to dialogue about the history of Anishnabe-European relations while reconstructing a relationship of equity and mutual benefit. Moreover, this was underpinned by a common vision and set of values to protect the land that recognized and adopted elements of a 'culture of difference': Anishnabe epistemology, interests and history.

Common Ground as community-based peacebuilding, therefore, involved structural change and transforming the dynamics of this past. It became a process of relationship building (peacebuilding) at the local level circumscribed by larger

[24] The Rat Portage Common Ground Conservation Organization, a 50-50 joint non-profit corporation was successfully established in late November of 2008, mere days before the deadline contained in the memorandum of understanding. Abitibi Consolidated confirmed their satisfaction with the legal partnership and the land has been transferred. The City continues to hold it in trust as both Kenora and Treaty #3 have both gone through complex internal processes to delegate their respective members to the corporate board. In addition, issues such as the inclusion of a dispute resolution mechanism in the corporate bylaws and considerations of protecting the Common Ground lands from the burden of taxation have preoccupied the energies of the corporation. Anishnaabe ceremonies have continued and spin-off initiatives that honour the partnership and treaty-based principles of Common Ground have expanded and strengthened. For instance, this fall, the business community in Kenora, in concert with the City and the Grand Council of Treaty #3 will be celebrating the anniversary of the signing of Treaty #3 with festivities and a number of demonstrations of appreciation for a continuing economic and political relationship. Stores will be changing their signage to include the Anishnaabe language. In the spring of 2010, Grand Council Treaty #3 and the City of Kenora are scheduled to co-host an unprecedented treaty-wide gathering of municipal and First Nation leadership to discuss matters of mutual interest and concern.

historical, national and global dynamics but that went beyond resistance to transformative change emanating from a grassroots level. Specifically, it was a local community peacebuilding process re-fashioning collaboration based on an evolving trust, sharing and retaking of control over their own development and community relations.

The development of this localized place-based peacebuilding can be understood through five key analytical building blocks (*initiating circumstance, synergistic factors, reinforcing practices, harmonizing possibilities* and *transformative reconciliation*). Combining specific geographies of knowledge, localities and cultures of difference, the still-evolving community-based peacebuilding process in Kenora alludes to an integrated and sustainable project of possibility between Anishnabe and non-Anishnabe communities.

Initiating circumstances

To continue, *Initiating circumstances* were such that economic and social vulnerability common (but not equal) to both communities, awoke a nascent recognition that despite the broad terrain of the local context and Anishnabe/non-Indigenous relationships delineated by the asymmetrical conflict of Canadian colonialism, the dynamics of local circumstances prevailed in initiating change. Second, the changing local economic, demographic, political circumstances converged and initiated a positive social recognition that past patterns of Anishnabe/non-Indigenous relations needed to be reworked for the mutual benefit of both communities. Understood in this way, the catalyst for the 'Common Ground'

process in Kenora was a convergence of both negative circumstances and positive reasons.

One key element of convergence between participants was the failure of past conflict resolution approaches that had sought absolute control over the land. A Treaty #3 Anishnabe figure spoke about this realisation in saying,

> Of course, we can always fight over the land and see who gets it the end. But then it hasn't worked. We have tried that for over a hundred years. And nobody wins at that. Nobody. You have to take a look at things realistically and say 'you know, nobody was going to win.
> (KBB: 59)

In a profound statement, an entirely different direction emerged that rejected the prior approach and suggested the basis for much of Common Ground; the need for a better relationship. A Treaty #3 representative articulated this stance.

> The land was there. Regulations are here and is nothing we can do about the regulations. But there is something we can do about how we build up the land. Maybe in doing that we can do something about the way that we feel about each other. We can continue fighting or we can try and live for something better'. (KBB: 59)

The recognition of an unproductive past approach to conflict combined with the sense of a common dilemma and vulnerability for both communities delineated by a

broader set of negative economic and political circumstance. Kenora and surrounding areas' economies were primarily based on forestry, tourism and mining. In late 2005, one the two major forestry companies (Abitibi Consolidated) announced the closure of its Kenora pulp and paper mill with the loss of almost 400 jobs, representing an enormous blow to employment, local business and city revenues.

Beyond the negative imperatives, there was an evolving realisation that there were common issues and challenges confronting both Anishnabe communities and the City of Kenora; ones that were all the more deleterious by the respective communities continuing to remain separated. This was identified by a Kenora City Councillor in terms of economic vulnerability and a search for opportunities for non-Indigenous and Anishnabe communities.

> I believe the community is at a very vulnerable position. And again just using the example of the closing of the mill and relationships and there's been some challenges in the other areas about police relationships, the recent case a couple years ago, and there's a need to look at some opportunities for the community, and in the end does this mean economic development opportunities for aboriginal and non-aboriginal people? Are there opportunities there?
> (KGG: 54)

Further, as the former Mayor of Kenora put it, the interdependence of communities became increasingly evident.

> [O]nly in the last few years has the nature of the economy in this region is changing and that there is that recognition that the communities that live here are mutually inter-dependent and there is now a reaching out that wasn't evident in previous events and occasions. (KFF: 37)

The two points above were echoed by one of the participants, himself, a former Deputy-Minister of Indian Affairs, who highlighted the deeper issues of treaty; that without agreements with Indigenous communities on resource development, all communities suffered.

> [S]mall communities in Northern Ontario have got to press Ontario to deal with the issues on land and resources and relationships with First Nations[25]. In the absence of those accords and agreements, we all pay a price. (KEE: 82)

The initiating circumstances of commonality also involved an increasing recognition by both City and Grand Council officials of their political and economic marginalization vis à vis the Federal and Provincial governments. As the former Mayor of Kenora put it regarding the upper levels of government,

> And during a lot of them discussions the one thing we [non-Indigenous Mayors, Reeves and Treaty #3] found that most of our issues with upper-

[25] Canadian term for Indigenous people.

> levels government were very similar and we have a lot more in common as communities than we realized. (KFF: 20)

On other hand, there was strategic value to collaboration as communities as they had more leverage to influence decisions and access funding, programmes and initiatives. A City Councillor emphasized this possibility saying,

> If we forge together, does that also provide the opportunity for both parties to negotiate more firmly with government for other initiatives and funding to access much needed programs in the communities? (KGG: 54)

This set of common circumstances and recognitions led the former Mayor of Kenora and the Grand Chief to conclude that contesting this marginalization and underdevelopment needed to be initiated at the local level.

> And we [the Mayor and the Grand Chief] would meet once or twice a year [2000-2004] and discuss issues of common interest and come to the reality that if anything was going to happen in building, relationship building it wasn't going to happen by the provincial or federal, that it had to be done at the local level. (KFF: 20)

Parallel to the negative circumstances, another convergence that assisted the development of the 'Common Ground' (2006) was an earlier similar process called *"Common Ground, Common Land"* initiated by then Treaty #3 Grand Chief Leon Jordaine in 2000. This broader vision of regional cooperation amongst Treaty #3

and non-Indigenous communities was part of a quest by the then Grand Chief to reinforce the political governance of the Treaty #3 government while collaborating with non-Indigenous communities on economic development (KMM). This was clearly understood by allies as the then Mayor of Kenora who himself was part of that earlier process.

> [S]o that was what was interesting about Treaty 3's approach, in a way. It's to say, 'you know we have some common interest with the federal government and the provincial government who actually aren't paying any attention to us. And that we actually need to restore governance, both within the territory, but also some sort of common governance within this larger region'. (KFF: 86)

Explicit in the Kenora Common Ground process was the theme of 'common', one that pervaded and instructed the previous project of regional relationship building in 2000. One of the Treaty #3 coordinators who had organized the earlier *Common Ground, Common Land initiative* (2000) and who was instrumental in the current Common Ground process, spoke of the number of common recognitions of interdependent needs and interests that occurred each community.

> In about 2000 all the leaders from the Treaty 3 area got together with municipal leaders, all the mayors and reeves got together along with the first nations community, leadership. They just talked about what's common and that the Treaty #3 area is really a common land, some of the obstacles that both parties faced that were pretty well common, the resources issue were

> pretty much common, the resources being depleted and moving down to other places were pretty much common. (KBB: 11)

It was also the catalyst of Treaty #3 in pointing out the nature of the Treaty as joint set of obligations and rights, applicable to both communities and reflective of non-Indigenous interests at the same time. It was a realisation that a collective agreement already existed and provided a level of convergence.[26]

> When people were pointed out that they [non-Indigenous] had treaty rights too, it took everybody by surprise; that you were part of the treaty and it hasn't been mentioned to you. You had rights to resources. (KBB: 103)

Finally, the initiating circumstances included the expanding dynamics of personal relationships between communities starting with the close relationship between the former Mayor of Kenora (Dave Canfield) and the former Grand Chiefs of Treaty #3 (Leon Jordaine and Arnold Gardner) and their respective governments. This informal and institutional relationships continued to expand into the current *Common Ground* project, in part, through cultural-gap bridge-makers/facilitators as Cuyler Cotton (non-Indigenous) and Adolphus Cameron (Anishnabe). The last two men formed a close team that provided a platform for cooperation and intellectual direction that underpinned much of the inner Common Ground process and

[26] Adolphus and Cuyler were key gatekeepers in terms of my own research. The research and interviews would not have happened without their (sometimes sceptical) endorsement. They oriented my understanding to the bigger picture and significance of Common Ground. This highlighted the non-linear nature of peacebuilding (Cf Diane Francis (2002)'cycles of conflict') wherein the later stage of 'harmonizing possibilities' actually enter into the discourse, materially and philosophically, as an initiating and converging catalyst.

philosophy.[27] The importance of individual bridge-makers in establishing a link of trust between communities and organisations cannot be underestimated.[28]

In sum, there were positive and negative convergences that *ripened*[29] the situation to support a process like 'Common Ground'. The negative external circumstances were a set of common economic vulnerabilities and political marginalisation, the ineffectiveness of past win-lose conflict approaches, and the myriad losses suffered by the continuance of the status quo. Positively, the potential benefits of acquiring common lands, dependent upon agreeing to joint management, was buttressed by the impact of the 2000 Common Ground, Common Land initiative and an emphasis on what was common between communities together with an increasing recognition of their communities as being mutually interdependent. In general, these intersections and discourses pointed out the importance of *initiating circumstances* (economic, political, cultural, structural and interpersonal) as setting the ground for a process of bettering communal relationships based on mutual benefits.

[27] Long-term residents of Kenora and roughly of the same age, Cuyler and Adolphus were classic organic intellectuals. Adolphus was a pivotal player on behalf of Treaty 3 engaging with Anishnabe Elders for guidance on the current process of Common Ground and providing a continuity in the Grand Council extending to the prior Common Ground, Common Land process of 2000. Cuyler was an independent community facilitator and writer both in Kenora and within various Anishnabe communities. A former human rights officer for the Provincial government and local historian, he, like Adolphus, could communicate and translate differing cultural worldviews. Cuyler was hired jointly by the Grand Council and the City of Kenora to facilitate the two-day Common Ground workshop.

[28] Similar to the case studies of *Grassy Narrows* and *Cape Croker*, the capacity of certain individuals and their inter-communal relationships/friendships provided a knowledge and understanding that were seminal in developing any sort of deeper contact between and within communities.

[29] Zartman (2001)

Synergistic factors

A second building block was the converging *synergy* and foci based on the desire of co-managing Tunnel Island in Kenora. The re-discovery of Rat Portage and the potential return of Tunnel Island to community control produced material conditions that acted as synergistic catalyst for a potential further collaboration.

Additionally, the Common Ground processes, in particular the two-day workshop constructed a consensus of collaboration and synergistic convergence of discourses, interests, visions and practices.[30] As explained earlier, its process and substance were symbiotically connected to the Land; the land was a literal location of Rat Portage and Tunnel Island as a site for co-management, as well as a metaphor/spiritual connector of profounder relationship-building between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous peoples.[31] Further, the very process contained elements of *reinforcing practices, harmonizing possibilities* and *transformative reconciliation* that in turn combined and produced an evolving/emerging local discourse and set of practices around partnership(s). [32]

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[30] The March 2006 two-day workshop involved 22 people: the Mayor and City Councillors, City staff, Treaty 3 Grand Chief, Treaty #3 staff, representatives from the surrounding three Indigenous communities, Abitibi Consolidated officials, and an Anishanabe Elder. The workshop, facilitated by Cuyler Cotton, used a group dialogue process to initiate common goals and an overlapping vision on a strategic plan for common lands.

[31] Similar to *Appreciative Inquiry*, the workshop sought to answer common questions rather than focus on historical issues of blame or divisive themes, thereby reinforcing future elements of *transformative reconciliation*.

[32] The workshop was structured by first asking people of their personal connections to the land and waters of the area (Lake of the Woods) with surprising results of a previously unvoiced common experience amongst people there. Second, it reinforced the nature of honouring different perspectives and their inclusion as a means of creating the most complete understanding (inclusive of situated identities) via a simple exercise on perceptions. Third, it had the group brainstorm on "*What is the legacy of the "Common Ground*"? and "*What stories can these lands and waters tell?*" that pointed the group-held view of its multiplicity of significance as well as containing the seeds of future epistemic repositioning, collective harmonizing and reconciliation by emphasizing its locations as a site of numerous important stories. Fourth, it focussed the group onto visioning through pondering *"What visible things will be going on in the next five years that will honour and celebrate*

The workshop reiterated the respective governments' previously accepted principles of "Stewardship and Partnership". It included an open-ended dialogue on the 1873 Treaty, the historical and contemporary significance of the specific land in question, and the meaning Land held for them as individuals. It continued with exploring consensus on next steps for dealing with Tunnel Island, understanding this effort as part of a broader process of relationship building, and embedding aspects of partnership by adopting a process underpinned by the use of Anishnabe ceremonies.[33]

The two-day workshop had a number of concrete outcomes in terms of repositioning Anishnabe worldviews on the land and establishing a nascent basis for relationship building, partnership and reconciliation. Respective public comments by the then Kenora Mayor Dave Canfield and Grand Chief Arnold Gardner, confirmed how the meeting produced a synergy of understanding, meaning and vision.

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the legacy of our common ground?", and then the inverse of obstacles that would impede implementing such visions. Explored later in this chapter, the workshop process was spontaneously joined by a respected Elder/ former Chief who re-emphasized Anishnabe worldviews (*reinforcing practice*) on the spiritual significance of the land and the necessity of a process that honoured its sacredness as a part of any evolving partnership.

The second day continued with a strategic focus on "*What specific things can be done over the next six months to a year to avoid our obstacles and move toward our vision?".* Beginning by articulating Anishnabe values ("Seeking spiritual guidance first. Do things right") and harmonizing possibilities of partnership ("Creating and Maintaining True, Respectful Partnership"), the group discussed what type of entity would be constructed to act as 'stewards' for the land. Beyond the legal and technical details of such a 'Trust' entity, the appropriate Steward Entity would not only be 50/50 but the process of its next steps would include Anishnabe Elders seeking guidance from the land itself. Lastly, the same Elder who had opened the Workshop with a traditional ceremony returned to ostensibly close the gathering. However, the Elder declined to close it, instead emphasizing the need for the relationship to stay open and grow stronger; another element of harmonizing possibilities and transformative reconciliation.

[33] Ibid.

> "Over two intensive days, we all gained a much deeper understanding of both the land and of each other." [34] (Dave Canfield)

> "This is the foundation of a true partnership."[35] (Arnold Gardner)

It also pointed to the synergistic importance of intertwining a discursive process of commonality with Anishnabe epistemologies. It reconvened the possibility of transforming the deeper conflict between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous communities through *practices of reconciliation*. As such, one of City of Kenora staff attendees understood the Grand Chief as saying this was a chance to rebuild the problematic past.

> …the *Ogichita* [the Grand Chief] was saying things like "well you know maybe this was meant to be, and maybe this is just a chance for all of us to start over, we really screwed it up, maybe this was it." And I think typically white guys would go "yeah right, we're not really into the-meant-to-be stuff!" But we sort of all bought into that at some level that. I don't know it's quite incredible. (KDD: 24)

Further, the workshop process created a broad common vision between the participants that superseded certain cultural obstacles and previous asymmetrical relations of power through utilizing a local discourse on the land and the sharing of voices (situated perspectives). One City participant summarized the aspects of this common vision.

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[34] Source: *Ground gained in common legacy lands discussion*, By *Kenora Miner and News* Staff, (Thursday March 16, 2006). www.ratportage.com
[35] Ibid.

> We thought we had a common vision in terms: it must be accessible, it must its story if it has important stories to tell, it has aboriginal and non-aboriginal history (KDD: 306)…But we all had an equal voice and we all had an important part to bring. And I think with a common goal or dream or vision which I think we share. (KDD: 429)

The Common Ground process, particularly the two-day workshop, was instrumental in creating a space for communal dialogue to develop a vision of commonality. The strategic choice of using the Land as a common denominator was the platform to begin identifying shared interests in a historically problematic relationship of power asymmetry. The potential of acquiring important lands (Tunnel Island) from Abitibi Consolidated coincided with a convergence of factors producing a synergy to explore a co-management partnership and developing a new collaborative relationship between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous governments at the local level.

Reinforcing Practices

Ceremony

Within and beyond the workshop, the Common Ground processes actively included Anishnabe-based ceremonies as an essential element. Understood as *reinforcing practices*, the Common Ground process used Anishnabe epistemology and ceremonies at each stage –something never done before in Kenora. This was highly significant in terms of re-working asymmetrical relations of power and harmonizing future possibilities; symbolically, culturally and politically. Given the historical

marginalization of Anishnabe lifeworlds (beliefs, experiences, narratives and practices), the ubiquitous use of and participation in ceremonies became an essential building block of equity and inclusion.

The ceremonies had many meanings but as examples in the process, it was the inclusion of Anishnabe cultural meanings both in terms of an actual process and as elements of a larger reconciliation that were significant. Ceremonies bridged cultural gaps, legitimized situated perspectives and reconfigured pedagogical methodologies. Ceremonies were material practices as well as a reshaping of [peacebuilding] discourses at the local level. They were a re-prioritization of worldviews. [36]

The non-Indigenous participation in ceremonies was seen as an acknowledgment of Anishnabe collective identity that reworked the historical marginalization. This was more than a discursive resistance to relations of power, more than a counter-hegemony; it was a re-insertion into the common public space and arena. Discursively, it brought back into being ways of Anishnabe understanding and knowing that had been excluded from informing the conflict and its transformation. Further, it re-fashioned relations of power in terms of leadership and process methodologies.

As such, process and change were symbiotically connected; it was not through some final outcome by which change was measured. Rather, transformation of the relationship was in the very process and the situated collective identities and local

[36] Worldview is equivalent to ontology (how the world is fundamentally and socially organized) and epistemology (the ways in which we know or claim to know things).

knowledges that supported it. Anishnabe ceremonies infused and reinforced numerous moments of relationship building as one staff person recounted about a City Councillor's participation.

> So XXX [City Councillor] was involved I know in some ceremonies that led up to that whole announcement about Rat Portage and then leading into the Mayor and the Ogichita doing in January, the press conference, then in March we had workshops, then we did an Elders ceremony with the Grand Council Elders at the Abitibi staff house. We had a feast, a spring feast and the drum was there….. And they [Elders] blessed the process and said "you know you're on the right track, this is good." (KDD: 299)

Further, as explained by a City Council (and Band member respectively), ceremonies were offered and received as part of the process that an included and legitimized situated perspectives of Anishnabe.

> And it's interesting that the group is receptive when the aboriginals representatives say, we have to have a ceremony, or we have to talk to the elders in our community before we go on but we have to do that on our own, there's no mistrust. It's understood, because whatever comes of that will be shared with the group. It can be shared. (KGG: 62)

Second, the re-prioritization of such a worldview also entailed different practices of leadership, pedagogy and relationship building. In this paradigm, the land itself was understood as an active participant and leader. Pedagogically, Elders were revered

teachers sharing understandings of the land while directing ceremonies to honour the land as well as rebuild relationships between the communities. To explain further, ceremonies were spoken about as emblematic of Anishnabe collective identity and worldview. As one former Anishnabeleader said, it was a relationship not a thing,

> And that is one main area that I focused on for the group to understand—the Mayors and their associates that were there -to understand how Anishnaabe is connected to Mother Earth. (KJJ: 14)

And ceremonies served as a basis to function and co-exist together, as symbolic acts that functioned to facilitate this relationship. As the same Anishnabe leader recounted,

> I understand that there were ceremonies done. Which is good. At least they are doing those things. Because it is so important that they have to do those things in order to function properly, to function together, to co-exist with each other. (KJJ: 18)

However, ceremonies were not symbolic acts in an Anishnabe perspective. They encompassed a spiritual worldview (ontological and epistemological) necessary for honouring and appeasing the land, as well as making connections between people. Again, an Elder and former Chief said,

> Yes, I think once people have a grasp on that area, on understanding what trees are, rocks everything, the air, the clouds, the water, the animals, the

> fish—everything like that once they start understanding that, everyone of those things—the bugs—no matter how small they are—each one has a spirit like we do. And to have that respect—that way. That connection has to happen. I think people will get along a lot better and easier. (KJJ: 31)

Similarly, the integration of Anishnabe epistemology preceded as well as informed the subsequent Common Ground process. Prior to the Common Ground workshop in March 2006, there was the encouragement of process by an understanding of symbols as not symbols but real messages. The Mayor of Kenora at the time recounted the finding of two Raptor wingtip feathers as indicating that the Anishnabe and non-indigenous leaders needed to work together.

> Cuyler was...was over in Cameron Bay where the actually crossroads were... and an eagle flew over and lost two feathers and he picked them feathers up, and went to an elder to find out what it meant and what he was told by the elder was; that these two feathers, one was to go to each leader….and one was to go to Arnold Gardiner of Ogichita and one was to go to me, and that's what it meant. (KFF: 34)

Underlying those above statements was a view heard simultaneously in the words of Anishnabe from *Grassy Narrows*; ceremonies were *reinforcing practices* of education and respect. The participation of non-Indigenous people in ceremonies was a pedagogical process concerning both the Land (and spirits) itself and what it meant to Anishnabe. At the same time, it re-positioned the Anishnabe worldview as central to constructing positive relationships with each other and with the Land.

As detailed elsewhere in the other case studies, one of the general centrepieces of both the conflict and community-based peacebuilding was the local space. Communal conflicts, such as those protracted ones such as Canada, were intrinsically tied to the land; the use and benefits of those resources that are asymmetrically controlled and unequally shared between peoples. Common Ground's emphasis on the land constituted an initial renegotiation of dispossession between peoples at the local level. Understood in this context, the positioning of Anishnabe ceremonies in the Common Ground process was to situate the Land, and peoples' relationships to the Land, as central feature of epistemic *harmonizing possibilities* and practices of *transformative reconciliation*.

Moreover, it was the joint comprehension of the land's significance that was deemed essential to the process of relationship-building between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous peoples. Intrinsically tied to the Land as a sacred space/spirit that knows, remembers and communicates, Anishnabe ceremonies were teachings about the Land; politically and culturally. One non-Indigenous participant said

> So yeah, it had that sort of religious feel right from the beginning…. There's a power to the land that has come over all of us… You know people talked about; in her [Mother Earth] own different approaches, talked about how sacred and important the land was. (KDD: 24)

A particular Anishnabe ceremony (the Turtle Ceremony) involved the Land as an entity speaking directly to the participants.[37] As one City Councillor said,

> I think that the land somehow is just fundamentally saying, there's an interest there so work together to resolve conflicts and to put the forum together to address those conflicts.
> (KGG: 49)

In the Common Ground process, the Land became a common denominator of convergence as well as a repositioning of Anishnabe episteme as instrumental for weaving a mutual narrative as cited by a City councillor,

> To me the tangible part of this, the common denominator is the land. It's not 'let's the city and the three first nations communities sit down and talk philosophically'. There's something tangible that's driving it, driving it and controlling it. (KGG: 148)

On the other hand, common though an emerging understanding might have been, one Treaty #3 representative summed up the disparate and converging views held by Anishnabe and non-Indigenous partners, in a certain degree engendered by necessity.

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[37] "Vernon Copenace (Charlie's son,) arranged for the Turtle Lodge ceremony. Elders from each of the three communities (two living, one who had passed on,) were present at the ceremony. Particular directions came from the lodge about what non-natives were to do in order to maintain a good relationship with the land and with each other. ('The white folks have to honour and feast the spirits of that place too',) The instructions were that it was my responsibility to see that this happened. The first ceremony was the one you turned up for. Adolphus translated everything. Vernon and the elder from the Dalles helped clarify. The elder from the Dalles, Alice Kelly, has been very attentive in checking to see if I am carrying out my responsibilities. I have been doing my clumsy best to follow these instructions." (Cuyler Cotton, personal communication, November 21, 2008).

> Some people call a real estate, the Anishnabe call it land. And especially this land that is sacred and all kinds of medicine in there. So that was what was found to be common-- the land and all the relationships about the land, and about each other. (KBB: 15)

The Common Ground process worked towards creating a common vision and inclusive epistemology by emphasising the recognition of collective identities and the prioritisation of Anishnabe worldview. The process components (dialogue, ceremony and negotiating a tangible project) explicitly referenced and supported local and Anishnabe knowledges that, in turn, entailed different practices of pedagogy, leadership, and relationship building.

The common denominator of the Land and an understanding of its significance based on an Anishnabe spiritual view gave underlying meaning and direction to the formation of relationship building and developing a partnership. This in turn opened the possibility of negotiating the future by a complex weaving of situated and independent collective values and narratives of reconciliation and partnership.

Trust

Similar to earlier case studies, trust was a foundation of sustainable partnership at the community level in Kenora. Trust, itself located at differently situated points within a local and macro web, was an ongoing component of relationship building and partnership in the Common Ground process. In this situation, reinforced by a tangible commitment of shared control over Tunnel Island, trust was a dialogue on the land combined with a process of ceremony. Put another way, trust was

engendered in ceremonial practices that reinforced harmonizing possibilities created within dialogue. At the same time, trust was more complex in that it also involved shedding secrets and silences about sacred Anishnabe spaces at the local level while contending with the larger structural issues of continued colonialism and subordinate governance.

The initiating dynamics of partnership in Kenora might be thought to have been premised from a *space of trust*. In fact, it began in this setting from a level of fear, apprehension and mistrust. Within the Common Ground process, trust was described as the movement from fear towards healthy mistrust and ultimately mutual trust. A Treaty #3 representative made reference to the initial stages of building relationships and a partnership by saying,

> There was a lot of apprehension about talking across the table. It wasn't built on trust. It was built on fear. It was built on apprehension. And it was built on mistrust. (KBB: 66)

And trust, like partnership, was ongoing and not a single linear moment. This was acknowledged by one the City of Kenora staff representatives who said,

> And you know it's a healthy distrust. I mean, why would they trust us?! (KDD: 488)

Built by dialogue, mutual sharing and visible progress, trust was an evolving understanding and commitment.[38]

> You can actually see the progress being made. And the progress between sitting together and planning and talking openly even though it might be some misunderstandings. But at the end of the day, coming to some better understandings about each other. ...what you say is trust and building on personal relations. (KBB: 67)

Hence, the development of any partnership, and process to encourage it, needed to address this situation of Anishnabe mistrust that had arisen through the lived experiences of asymmetrical decision-making, cultural marginalization, and the abeyance of the sacred by non-Indigenous. Such a process of trust and peacebuilding within a partnership was challenged to overcome larger, as well as very personal Anishnabe narratives on a number of fronts: the transgressions of non-Indigenous-directed capitalism towards the land, distrust of the Federal government in general, and the co-opting governance of the Indian Act. Further, the Anishnabe reticence to share further of such sacred places contained an inherent demand that any process of collaboration honour that aspect of the land. In this context, trust was an evolving practice and harmonization of possibilities, interpersonally and institutionally.

[38] Some referred this movement in terms of "mutual trust" (KFF: 51) (KEE: 25) and "strong trust" (KDD: 19).

Storytelling

Another facet of building trust and relationships at the community level involved recounting the respective individual and collective Anishnabe/Euro-Canadian histories pertaining to a shared space of Tunnel Island. The telling of stories connected to Tunnel Island was understood as a means of consultation and consensus building on any proposals for development of the land.

However, storytelling also had a much deeper level connected to partnership, reconciliation, identity, collective history, and reworking power. Socially constructed, different though universally identifiable, the recounting of personal, family and collective stories lived within a shared space was a political, intimate, and humanizing act. In fact, it was part of a collective inter-group dialogue between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous people from Kenora that used local space, local history and personal understandings to build a combined story of *transformative reconciliation.*

The group commitment from Common Ground process was to have an equal partnership in process, knowledge, and decision-making. As part of the process to date,[39] community stories and meanings started to become enshrined in local discourse as well as any future development of the land; a development, itself, designed to tell multiple local histories. In the case of Tunnel Island, the land had many histories and meanings, both of the land as a sentient entity itself as well as the separate and interactive human histories of the Anishnabe and Euro-Canadians.

[39] The Common Ground process is envisioned upon extending the process from within the smaller group process to date into community-wide consultations (beginning in 2009) concerning any development of Tunnel Island.

Narratives, or the telling of stories, were a means to surface, hear, compare, reflect and enable differences rather than ignore and marginalize them. In this way, local stories were used to tell the larger story of national relations between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous peoples –a self-generated critical pedagogy.

Telling the stories of peoples' experiences with Tunnel Island became an opportunity for collective transformation of communal connection and history. As elucidated by the Workshop facilitator, the Common Ground process was a transformative educational dialogue.

> The whole purpose of common ground—it is in the mission and that came out of the workshop—is to listen to the stories here. All of them. Honour them, listen to them, learn from them and carry them on. It is a shrine to everything that has happened there. That to me is the most important part of the thing.
> (KAA: 540)

> And how the land fits into that picture. So if you want to get a sense of who you are and how you relate to the world, and to each other-- this is a great learning place….so many opportunities for understanding connections.
> (KAA: 486)

Storytelling was understood, then, as a transformative critical pedagogy (and community-based peacebuilding) where people discover, name, share and act upon their own situated realities.

> ...people can understand the world from where ever they are. If you have the opportunity, then people can have 'ah-hah' moments. One interpretive walk through the Rat Portage Site can tell you about the CPR railroad and the implications for the marginalization of First Nations. . (KAA: 673)

Further, it was not a peacebuilding process derived from an externally imposed set of solutions that are either inappropriate or divisive in the local context. Rather, it was a community-level process that created a local discourse, narrated and reflected. The corollary was that such a community-based process was dependent upon local knowledge that spoke to the particularities of the peoples' experiences and by extension, engaged that knowledge to understand and potentially transform the conflict.

> That is so much better than having train loads of environmentalists you would have to deal with here trying to teach people: "This is how you should treat your neighbour." Rather, people can come to understand themselves about the planet and each other by telling your own story, by listening to their own stories. Which is a whole helluva lot better than someone coming in and telling them 'You are bad people and should fix yourselves. (KAA: 673)

Additionally, in the case of Kenora, storytelling was intimately connected to including the epistemology of Anishnabe Elders as part of the local knowledge and discourse. The telling of stories was similar to the issues of process and ceremony spoken of earlier in this chapter; rebuilding relationships between Anishnabe and

non-Indigenous communities by embedding them in the land. At the same time, it constituted a re-thinking of *modernist*[40] ideas of socio-economic development and environmental sustainability that posited the Land as a mere resource, not a partner itself.

> That is a really big idea that goes beyond culture and goes to the fundamentals of what it really means to live on this planet together. I think that is what the Elders are trying to tell us, or, -to listen to that place: of what the earth is trying to tell us. (KAA: 650)

Lastly, there was the contention that the historical asymmetry of power became fundamentally challenged by the creation a public space through its inclusive discourse of *lifeworlds.*

> If nothing else it is a place to start exploring that question [*of living on this planet together,]* and to begin a conversation. (KAA: 673). Just having that conversation levels everybody.(KAA: 660)

Storytelling of a shared community space became a collective pedagogical endeavour. It supported the development of an equal partnership by re-fashioning an understanding of the land as containing multiple stories. Fundamentally, the multiplicity of situated local knowledges and narratives contested asymmetrical historical relations of power between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous communities regarding Common Ground (Tunnel Island) that extended into relations of power.

[40] See Chapters 1-4. To recall, *modernity* was the intertwining of cultural, political and economic European colonial narratives of progress, later morphing into the post-colonial capitalist discourse and practices of 'free- trade' 'globalization'.

Reconciliation

Transforming relations of power was a pillar of reconciliation indelibly tied to discourses, processes and practices within Common Ground. The telling of stories through the land was a pivotal communicative act tied to community-based peacebuilding in the Kenora context. Reconciliation –a rarely expressed term in the interviews- was not so much an intellectually 'thought-through' being as place-based acts of building together through a sense of shared place and space.

Reconciliation as the acknowledging the past also included the contemporary integration of Anishnabe perspectives. Here, it became a means to connect, bond and build relationships between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous communities in Kenora, while also linking themselves to the Land as an entity with partner-rights.

> That is part of the legacy—part of the community consultation. That is the Truth and Reconciliation –that process of listening to stories, listening to the land. If you take the Anishnabe view which is that land carries all of those things; embodied in the land is the memory of everything that has happened there, it is incumbent upon everybody to listen to that; to get in touch with the grandfathers, the rocks; to get in touch with the spirit of the place, both in its magnificence and in its pain. It is the process of listening to the land—both cultures—that is going to be hugely important. That is a bonding experience. That is the relationship. (KAA: 540)

Equally important was *the imagination of the future* enveloped within a process that might have appeared politically and socially innocuous but in fact, disrupted

memories and history in the local space. It was the *surprise of difference* that challenged 'common sense'[41] power and induced narratives of empathy and pathos.

> What is exciting to me is that they [Common Ground participants and process] have made that commitment to do that, [*honour the stories,]* and the pieces are there. No, we do not have a Truth and Reconciliation commission set up right now but it is going to have to happen. You can't do planning for that type of thing [land use onTunnel Island] -500 acres—without community consultation. So there will be something akin to hearings [the envisioned community consultation hearings for input on the Tunnel Island planning] where the committee will go out and say 'what are your stories on this land? Tell us some of your stories. ... at the First Nations they're going to get life stories and death stories. They are going to find out where the graves are for the last 6000 years and they are not going to be able to listen to that without going 'holy shit!!'. (KAA: 541)

It was also a process of listening to stories based on experiences from both cultures that transformed 'truths'. Community-based space became a mirror of colonization (discursively, materially) but confronted from a place of equity as narrators.

> That is the process of truth and reconciliation. By hearing of stories-- that is the truth part. So people understand the truth of those actions, the truth of history: - to be able to go to a spot that is the physical evidence of the

[41] Gramsci's idea of 'common sense'.

> marginalization of people, and this is about as clear as you can get. (KAA: 793)

As such, it was not simply a story of asymmetry and colonialism. Rather, it was merging of historical inter-community narratives that demanded the weaving of identities into an intra-community partnership and reconciliation about sharing the future as partners.

> If you played out the history of that place, it is the history of colonization; it is a history marginalization and displacement. That is the history of this place. So forcing people to look at that history and doing it in a context where you have an equal partnership;this is not the First Nations who are telling the story, this is *us* as a community telling the story. So we all own it. (KAA: 566)

The idea of the 'future' and 'what's common' became central discourses to reconciliation and peacebuilding at the local level. For both Anishnabe and non-Indigenous communities it meant that a "little park" (KAA: 597) (Tunnel Island) potentially became a more profound symbol and act of partnership based on a different expression of relationships and held together by a common relationship to the land.

> Now we have to say 'that was then and this is now. Now we have a partnership that is a productive. Now we are going to share'. (KAA: 566)

Elements of Reconciliation

Common Ground partnership became defined in a number of ways as common discourses (local knowledges, space, histories) and practices (ceremonies, process, decision-making, reconciliation) of the past, present and future. However, these discourses and practices of reconciliation by definition raised the question of 'what was reconciliation and who needed it?' For both communities, it was a search for 'what's common'. A number of Anishnabe people spoke about their perspective that healing, building relationships and reconciliation were intrinsically linked together for both communities.

At the same time, it also meant different things in terms of the respective community requirements and responses. For the non-Indigenous communities, it implied the necessity of comprehending the perspective and historical experiences of Anishnabe neighbours, be it historical or current structural violence, and rebuilding a relationship as exemplified in the Common Ground working relationship. A City Councillor expressed this tension and hope.

> ...as a society I don't think the majority of the non-aboriginal society even understands the broader perspective. (KGG: 111...this is not a new relationship, we're rebuilding a relationship. So we recognize what has happened, the problems and the issues, and they're not ever going to go away, but we're talking about rebuilding a relationship here and trying to carry it forward, and acknowledging what has happened. That doesn't mean we're forgiven, or that doesn't mean they're gone or forgotten. (KGG: 107)

However, for some Anishnabe, the Common Ground process and reconciliation remained problematic without an explicit apology and recognition of the past harm directed at Anishnabeg.

> And second, I think it's odd that there was never no formal apology. There is no apology. And I questioned it a couple of times. I said, you know, you guys came in, and they did certain things, and basically took the land. It's like anything else that First Nations owned. They came in. They saw something there for themselves, a money maker or however you want to see it. And they came in, and they took it, and pushed the first nations people out of that area. (KNN: 6)

This was no small point. While the Common Ground project was understood in this work as a success of community-based peacebuilding, it was also a tenuous process with the potential for it to unwind and implode. In this vein, the same Chief (and the Council from one of three Anishnabe communities engaged in the actual process) expressed the outrage and lack of trust at a process that did not begin at the point of greatest pain or proffered compensation without regret.

> I don't agree with some of the things that Kenora is trying to do. And I don't buy the way Treaty III is handling it. …We're been slapped around, thrown in residential schools, there's all this ugly stuff, yet the government,… turns around and says, 'we might as well give you a billion dollars and we'll call it a day'. It goes deeper than that. Money will not fix what's inside here. It never will. There's a lot more to it than, you hand me a dollar bill and say let

> bygones be bygones. You can't do that to a people and you can't do that to the land. (KNN: 47)

Language and Genocide

The Chief's comments highlighted the complex and problematic nature of reconciliation. It also raised a broader issue concerning the use of explicit language to name the history of Indigenous people in Canada. Similar to *Cape Croker* involving debates amongst grassroots activists concerning the language and strategy of 'anti-racism', in Kenora there were unresolved issues concerning the process of reconciliation, and who was arguing for what. What became apparent in the Common Ground interviews was that non-Anishnabe reticence about using the word 'genocide' (or 'cultural genocide') to describe the past traumas faced by Indigenous peoples nationally or locally. Hence, at what point, if any, and in what way, does language such as genocide become a feature of the reconciliation? Was it necessary and for whom?

For non-Indigenous representatives in the Common Ground process and its subsequent working group, the word 'genocide' had not been explicitly used. One non-Indigenous person said, "No! No we haven't done the blame game thing" (KDD: 525), thereby implying that genocide was about blame. In the same moment, they added that the process was about the future as a community, not a focus on the past.

> "No, I'm just saying that we've acknowledge that we've done badly in relationship building and in trying to live together as a community. You know, and it's the Ogichita that said "maybe this is our chance to do it right

> this time." You know, so there's that sort of kind of sentiment but we haven't gone deeply into that kind of. (KDD: 531)

One of the main non-Indigenous architects of the Common Ground process viewed the word as a strategic choice; using it too quickly defeated one's purpose. At the same time,

> Is it why don't I use genocide? Or, you noted that I don't use genocide in my conversation—no, because it is kind of off-putting. Or, if your purpose is to change the world, it is not a very constructive term to be using if you want to generate understanding. Firing that word off in the first two seconds defeats your own purpose. So, I don't avoid the reality. Not only do I not avoid the reality that is a whole point. That is the point that the whole purpose of this thing [Common Ground] is for people to have a process to understand the reality; a huge reality of what the colonial system did. And if you can lead them dancing into that hell-- great, that is exactly what you want to do. (KAA: 720)

Similarly, some Anishnabe took a strategic view of the language ('colonialism, genocide and racism') as necessary as part of the acknowledgement of the history and the harm done as one person said, "From an Anishnabe perspective for sure! (KHH: 236). At the same time, s/he believed Anishnabe wanted to use these words, however, Anishnabe speakers were conscious of wanting to negotiate a relationship beyond language and that involved a more delicate dance. As s/he added,

> But we get pissed off also because we have strong feelings about certain things but we also realize that in a process of negotiating the relationship there has to be give and take and that's interesting. (KHH: 184)

The common strategy of temporarily avoiding one aspect of confrontation; explicitly naming the history as ‘genocide’, was underpinned by other superseding interests. In Common Ground, some suggested that the non-Indigenous vocabulary and framework would change over time based upon internalizing those previously silenced Anishnabe experiences. Pedagogically and politically speaking, it was hoped that words like ‘cultural genocide’ would become a later framework/concept to encapsulate the stories non-Indigenous had heard.(KAA: 733) As the workshop facilitator asserted,

> Yeah. Yeah. [On an interpretive walk] You can tell a story of JJJ and his family on old Fort Island, and a graveside of his sister, a dead person-- you can't avoid that kind of reality. You don't get around that very easily. There is real hard evidence and you can connect the dots [from colonialism] to dead kids. And if someone says "this is what we mean by cultural genocide"-- you can point to the grave of one victim of the cultural genocide. (KAA: 733)

Discursively and in practice, reconciliation was a multi-levelled concept. On one hand, it was about listening to differently situated stories in the hope of bridging the narrative gaps between Anishnabe and Euro-Canadians. Part of a transformative pedagogy to create a differently constructed connection with each other and the

Land, reconciliation utilized local knowledge to address macro issues of colonialism. However, it was also a contestation over language, naming history, and representation. Further still, it raised unresolved issues of where and how processes of collective healing and formal apologies fit into partnerships. Lastly, in practice, reconciliation was understood as relationship building, procedurally and substantively. Understood in varied ways, reconciliation was embodied in ceremonies and joint management underscored by the recognition and adoption of Anishnabe worldviews by non-Indigenous peoples. Alternatively, reconciliation (though rarely named as such in interviews) was an ongoing decolonizing process for Anishnabe of transforming structural (culturally, economic, direct) violence and exclusion, locally and nationally.

Reconciliation as practical

Ultimately, the purpose of the Common Grounds process was related to the contemporary goal of creating a partnership of equity between peoples for everyone's economic and political benefit. As a City Councillor said, it was a process of "community with community working towards a solution" (KGG: 145). In part that there are two approaches – a reconciliation/acknowledgement of the past on the one hand, and a contemporary partnership geared to collaborating on economic, social and political issues in common, on the other.

To return to the material context, Kenora as a shared space was faced with the kind of dramatic demographics that were happening in Indigenous on-reserve communities nationally where a majority of the population was under 18 years old. One non-Indigenous participant and former Assistant Deputy Minister spoke about

the 1998 Canadian Government *Statement of Regret*[42] saying that reconciliation was more a practical issue than conceptual. And that practical element was a concern over a social conflict that without economic opportunities would expand into a greater degree of social disarray.

> I guess my own approach is that the requirement for us collectively to more quickly address Aboriginal peoples' needs particularly such as time is of the essence. And I think that our approach, now for economic and social improvements, need to be grasped and moved on and there needs to be outcomes positive from those – time is very short. (KEE: 73)

Reconciliation was inherent to grassroots dialogue and partnering between Anishnabe and non-indigenous participants involved in Common Ground. An integration of differently situated knowledges, multiple place-based and counter narratives, reconciliation was not so much explicitly named as such. Rather, it was positioned within the construction of separate, parallel and common histories connected to the land; a shared place of renewed partnership between Anishnabe and Euro-Canadians in Kenora. Reconciliation was embodied in ceremonies and stories of place as communal dialogue that offered a potential platform for a bridging of the present and a re-envisioned future.

While Common Ground's place-based negotiation and partnership sought to create an alternative space for different histories of truth, it remained, nevertheless, a complex, evolving and problematic community-based dialogue. On the one hand,

[42] As referenced in Chapter 4, this 'Statement' in 1998 was an earlier attempt by the Canadian government to express some sort of acknowledgement for the horrors of the Residential School system. The Canadian Government finally offered an apology in 2008.

reconciliation was intrinsically linked to asymmetrical historical relations of power that differently situated Anishnabe lived experiences and narratives from those of Euro-Canadian settler culture. The epistemic challenges involved were readily detectable in Kenora as evidenced in the choices and usage (or not) of language to describe the historicity of cultural genocide.[43]

Yet, reconciliation was not only a contestation over collective representation and historical discursive truths in Kenora. Rather, it also involved the quest for reformed material practices of equity and partnership locally between Anishnabe and Euro-Canadians communities in the present. Here, too, historical and social asymmetrical relations of power were inherently present. While a concentrated process like Common Ground involved a strongly committed community elite, the extension of different practices to the larger Kenora and surrounding populations remained to be seen.

Community-based Peacebuilding

Lastly, to turn to the point of community-based peacebuilding, what makes this all unique here was its institutionalization at the local level between the City of Kenora and the Grand Council of Treaty #3. It became a process of relationship building (peacebuilding) at the local level yet circumscribed by much larger historical, national and global dynamics. It went beyond the idea of resistance to the transformative change and decolonization. Emanating from a community level and

[43] The issues of past Canadian State policies towards Indigenous peoples as (attempted) cultural genocide is a deeply contentious issue in Canada without consensus, particularly amongst non-Indigenous populations.

collective storytelling, it was a process of re-fashioning collaboration in communal conflicts.

Beginning from situated identities, Common Ground was an example of community-based peacebuilding, though called something quite different in the local context; partnership and relationship-building. The long-term conflict between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous had left both communities vulnerable with an unlikely 'win' by either side. A series of recognitions and convergences offered a choice between continuing to fight or to live for something better. An existent peace agreement [Treaty] between nations was being rebuilt people- to-people based upon sharing common land.

The Common Ground process was Anishnabe and non-Indigenous stories, histories and lived realities colliding, intersecting and potentially merging. As one key Treaty #3 representative said, "It was "people to people. It was about land and land. It was about language and language. About culture and culture. And the harmonization of treaty". (KBB: 87). Ceremonies were "a ceremonial statement of that connection" (KAA: 632) done "in the spirit and intent of relationship building". (KBB: 31).

The facilitator, a non-Indigenous person, summarized it in another way,

> What you got is the buying into an idea that says 'common ground, shared place'. 'And shared decision-making and shared-- this is not about tolerance. This is about respect and sharing. That is a sea change from the colonial think that has gone on up until now and is largely maintained by all the

> government agencies-- most of the government agencies. This is just ordinary people thinking differently--- and that is not local. An idea is the universal, a concept that can grow, take hold and grow in other contexts. And that is on both sides in the equation, too. (KAA: 760)

Underlying this process was a radical re-harmonization environmentally, spiritually, politically and economically occurring in a local space confronting the impacts of globalisation on its resource-based economy. Environmentally, it was based on a recognition that resources needed to be locally controlled and sustainably used for the benefit of this region. Spiritually, it was a re-casting of the land as spirit(s), as itself animated and alive, of having a will, and as a partner itself in a relationship of respect and reciprocity. Politically, it was an evolving process between communities at the grassroots/local level to reclaim governance and development. Socio-culturally, it was the revitalization/renewal/rebuilding of a largely problematic historical relationship between communities that aspired to move from conflict to partnership, from exclusion to common needs, from pain to gain.

Conclusion

The case study of Kenora and the Common Ground process was an example of place-based grassroots community-based peacebuilding. Common Ground was more than a reference to *Tunnel Island* - it was a metaphor for altering a segregation and protracted social conflict between communities. "Common Ground" was the name for a vision, discourse, process and set of practices informing community-based peacebuilding between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous peoples in Kenora.

"Common Ground", the process of negotiating a project of co-managing common land, reshaped local discourses of history and understandings of a piece of land that was more than a piece of land.

Common Ground was not a 'socially-engineered' top-down conflict resolution approaches based upon on some externally proscribed agenda. Rather, it exemplified the use of situated identities and local knowledges, highly contextual and experiential, as a platform for an alternative set of discourses and practices on peacebuilding. Moreover, those crossroads pointed to the importance of *initiating circumstances, synergistic factors, reinforcing practices, harmonizing possibilities* and *transformative reconciliation* as key elements in re-working protracted social conflict at the community level.

Within this, process and outcome were inseparably linked as a methodology to transform asymmetrical relations of power, both epistemologically and in practice. Propelled by the land (literally, metaphorically and spiritually), the Common Ground process was about creating an 'authentic partnership' of equity wherein the evolving group process itself was inseparable from the changes it envisioned. Premised upon a sharing of personal and collective stories to the land, it involved a facilitated dialogue process that, similar to *Appreciative Inquiry* methodologies, sought to focus on common issues (visions, experiences) rather than recriminations. Evidenced in the ongoing development of trust and partnership, the use of place, history, stories and ceremonies served to support a collaborative planning process and localized reconciliation. Within this, Common Ground involved a privileged re-positioning of Anishnabe worldviews and ceremonies as central to the process and inseparable

from outcome. The re-prioritization of such a worldview entailed different practices of pedagogy, leadership, and relationship building.

Second, the process had inherent elements of community reconciliation between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous peoples. It utilized storytelling of a place in a way that acknowledged the past harm on Anishnabe peoples whilst simultaneously honouring Anishnabe and non-Indigenous experiences, bridging the cultural gaps in understanding, and finding commonalities. Moreover, the inclusion and basis within ceremony was in itself as *an act* of reconciliation.

Reconciliation also involved reconciling with the Land.[44] Similar in some ways to *deep ecology* perspectives, Anishnabe relationships with the land were deeply spiritual and symbiotic. The land was alive, understood and literally spoke in ceremonies. As a result, there were proper ceremonies that had to be done to appease the past harm done to the Land and to honour the ongoing relationship.

Third, underlying this Common Ground process was a radical re-harmonization of collective values: environmental, spiritual, economic, political and socio-cultural. Perhaps best understood as a possibility, it was a *space of imagination* between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous peoples.

Further, the case study represented collaborative peace building at the community level that sought to tackle structural inequalities based on discovering common interests and mutual benefits within multiple and situated identities. The elements of

[44] This is a more complex point missed by the parochial universalism of many western-based peacebuilding theories located outside local contexts.

change were a multiplex combination of decolonization, constructing intimacy, finding commonalities, sharing a vision, and manifesting trust. In both discourse and practice, it imagined the alternate possibilities contained within a local process of peacebuilding.[45] Constituted upon local space, discourses and practices, Common Ground was a fundamentally different option and space than State-driven peacebuilding.

In such a way, Common Ground was explicitly understood by the people involved as a partnership between Anishnabe and the non-Indigenous community. It was a

[45] Additionally, unlike academic writings on peacebuilding, conflict resolution and reconciliation, the language and epistemology here of a community-based approach differed dramatically. The Kenora dialogues were very much community-centred; local space was privileged as the primary site of action informed by a shared life-time of common lived experiences. Broader, common but very local issues were the catalyst for action and established/establishing, long-term personal relations of trust were essential to the process.

Dissimilar to state-centred 'old school' academic peacebuilding discourses or even 'critical theory' security studies writings, the conflict/process in Kenora was framed and responded to simultaneously within very personal meanings and impacts upon their families and children (subsequent generations). These privatised meanings and motivations ran parallel to collective/common/public issues.

Further, 'Common Ground' was a locally-based process initiated independently, and in spite of, upper-level government indifference. It was an autonomous self-organizing community process including a critical-mass conglomerate of community intellectuals, skilled activists, influential decision-makers, and supportive local institutional bases of governance. Though the Federal state controls larger institutional and structural levers, pillars of larger social change were understood as being born(e) from the community level but arising from very different interests, motivations, and capacities. In short, change was deeply personal and a bottom-up process.

Finally, language at the community level inhabited a different vocabulary. State-centred academic conflict resolution/peacebuilding/security studies discourses talk in terms of "*Peacebuilding, peacemaking, reconciliation, conflict resolution, protracted social conflict, Tier 3 mediation, democratisation, civil society, human rights, basic needs, grassroots or community-based, collective identity, empowerment, enabling, solutions, programming and skills-training*". These terminologies were almost never mentioned in Kenora except the rare occasional when I introduced them. Discourse at the grassroots was framed by terms such as "*relationship building, mistrust/trust, sharing, common, ceremonies, stories, the Land, honour, respect and partnership*".

The link to Habermas' '*Lifeworld*' coincides with the Common Ground process of using the land as a platform upon which to narrate the lived world of its inhabitants. For Habermas, it is action as communicative action (people discussing differences and reaching common understandings) and communicative justice, the re-establishment of legitimacy in an unfinished project of democracy. If there was one question raised by participants with the Kenora case study, it was 'how to change a situation (transform a conflict) by engaging people in the community'? Given the situation of shared economic vulnerability and political marginalization within the larger national/global public arena and discourse, the process of Common Ground was an act of moving from a place of 'colonized' ("colonization of lifeworld by systems") to a place of participatory democracy and reconciliation (http://www.ucalgary.ca/~frank/habermas.html)

partnership concerning co-management of Tunnel Island, renewing treaty relations at the local level, and seeking common ground between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous in Kenora and regionally.

This process of partnership-building involved the development of a language, vision, counter-histories and common stories. Partnerships were not a pre-defined negotiated noun but rather an evolving verb in terms of community-based practices, possibilities and reconciliation. Specifically, it employed peacebuilding elements such as trust-building processes and practices, reconciliation as storytelling, and negotiating the use of language to name the colonial past. It was this combination that pointed to the significance of localized struggles as loci for social justice and peacebuilding.

Chapter 8: Case Studies comparison

Introduction

The case studies present the experiences of grassroots Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists in three different times and localities. They were an opportunity to explore the fundamentals of grassroots community-based peacebuilding through snapshots of conflicts: fishing and racism in Cape Croker in the mid-1990s; non-consensual and unsustainable clearcutting in Grassy Narrow's traditional territories in 2002; and local negotiations over common ground in Kenora in 2006. How did grassroots activists understand and narrate their experienced inter-group collaboration? What were the processes to devise common and diverse strategies? What were the impacts of their efforts on the respective local conflicts and larger social change?

This Chapter will compare the three case studies and those place-based grassroots narratives in terms of the challenges, limitations and successes of community-based peacebuilding.[46] The examination is not premised on simply identifying commonalities in order to generalize outwards towards abstract principles. The central point of grassroots community peacebuilding was its very contextual localized nature, its place-based geographies of knowledge, and it situated grassroots narratives.[47] Hence, each of the case studies and relevant narratives held both

[46] The open-ended nature of the grounded research methodology and dialogical method of conversational ('interviewing') resulted in grassroots narratives that followed similar and, at other times, very dissimilar themes, issues and foci (including my own ongoing cognition of themes).
[47] This point will be continued in the conclusion chapter regarding its relevance for peacebuilding literature and future research frameworks, ontologically and epistemologically.

mutual and different significance for understanding the dynamics and relevance of grassroots community-based peacebuilding.

To this end, the Chapter will do five things. First, it reviews each case study in terms of their specific contexts and particularities as enablers and disablers for grassroots community-based peacebuilding. Second, it explores and compares some of the challenges and limitations pertinent from each setting in terms of process, analysis and strategies. Third, the chapter examines the three case studies and narratives concerning key themes of negotiating knowledges, trust, and the role of self-generated critical pedagogy. Fourth, I compare Indigenous (Ansihnabe) activists to non-Indigenous activists narratives in terms of how conflicts were framed differently and the implications this had for partnerships. Fifth, throughout, I inject my own position as researcher and experience as an activist to analyze spaces and dynamics that were not necessarily articulated in the case study narratives but that I believe had relevance.

First, each case study was differentiated by specific contexts and particularities as well as simultaneously immersed in larger relations of power that had enabling and disabling ramifications for place-based grassroots community-based peacebuilding. Their similarities and differences highlighted the diversity of grassroots dialogues, geographies of knowledge and localized place-based practices of relationship building. The three case studies (*Cape Croker, Grassy Narrows and Kenora*) were all situated within larger and placed-based asymmetrical relations of power, structural violence, neo-colonialism, and globalization whilst also being unique and

highly contextual localities engaged in the creation of alternative peacebuilding possibilities from the bottom-up.

Broadly speaking, the case studies characterized different grassroots versions and visions of relationship building, alliance-making and partnership. Their respective approaches, processes, strategies and sustainability embodied a complex local negotiation of differently situated circumstances, discourses, analyses and practices. These multi-dimensional aspects of locality -- a combination of place-based histories, experiences, knowledges and webs of relationality – were particular geographies of power and possibilities, both constraining and enabling. It was the particularity of each locality, as tenuous/partial/temporary/porous zones of local autonomy and agency, that offered possibilities of hope for a differently structured future of inter-community collaboration and relationships of equity.

At the same time, those same particularities of locality were not unproblematic, homogeneous nor outside larger structural relations of power. Locality included heterogeneous discourses and divergent practices, as well as discordant community elements and opposition forces between and within the respective Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities/activists.

On one level, the heterogeneity of locality involved the complex task of engaging different ontological and epistemological discourses, practices and tensions between Indigenous and non-Indigenous grassroots activists as part of any relationship building, solidarity or partnership. Simultaneously, complicated larger collective identities were inherently embodied in the social construction of individual Indigenous and non-indigenous activists thereby inexorably situating themselves as

representative(s) and performers of those larger problematic community relations and asymmetrical relations of power.

On another level, such a place of heterogeneity also involved local opposition forces and diverse opinions within communities/organisations. Depending on the case study, grassroots community-based peacebuilding activists confronted a spectrum of community voices stretching from the openly hostile on one end, to an undecided and/or reticent middle, and finally a 'silent majority' at the other end to be mobilized.

Notwithstanding the constraint and synergy of heterogeneity within and between Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities, locality also involved grassroots activists performing a complex local negotiation of *glocality* wherein asymmetrical top-down globalizing relations of power/knowledge were contested, resisted, adapted, horizontalized, partially transformed and reversed in direction; from the bottom upwards. In that sense, grassroots community-based peacebuilding in the case studies was a counter-hegemonic act that moved beyond resistance into the realm of alternative relations of power. Understood as a reconfiguration of discursive practices and relations of power, peacebuilding was the ongoing voyage towards a place of difference and equality between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. This activity was the very heart of any project of decolonization and reconciliation.

Whereas locality was the term for place-based geographies of knowledge and situated practices within contested relations of power, grassroots community-based

peacebuilding in these case studies referred to the implicit and explicit negotiating of intersecting and situated 'cultures of difference' and collaboration. Underscored by a self-generated critical pedagogy of mutual learning, it was a bridge building of parallel knowledges and differently situated 'mindscapes'. Grassroots community-based peacebuilding in these case studies was a nascent but unfinished negotiation of knowledge, practice and power at the community level between Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists. Discourses (as epistemologies and concrete material practices) were both productive and reproductive of social relations and relations of power. In that sense, the case studies highlighted the nuances, challenges, limitations and successes of discursive and change practices enacted at the local level.

More specifically, the case studies exhibited the complex narratives and critical dialogues of activists as they sought to develop a different mode of relationality and place-based practices. As examples, Kenora, Cape Croker and Grassy Narrows had similarities and commonalities but also significant differences and particularities that impacted on the conditions, capacities and scope of grassroots community-based peacebuilding.

From my vantage point as an activist and researcher, it appeared to me that community-based peacebuilding in Kenora, like all sites of locality, had particular strengths, challenges, success and limitations with implications for community-based peacebuilding. Demographically, for example, Kenora was an interactive mixed community of Anishnabe and non-Indigenous peoples, unlike Cape Croker or Grassy Narrows. The sheer size of Anishnabe population numbers in northwestern Ontario (est. 15,000 pop.) had numerous advantageous social, economic and political

implications for peacebuilding than that experienced by the Chippewas of Nawash in southern Ontario who were essentially isolated demographically (est. 800-2000 pop).[48] Further, the Anishnabe position in Kenora in any peacebuilding, locally and regionally, was strengthened by the stature, resources and influence of the Grand Council of Treaty #3 as a national government encompassing 23 Anishnabe communities in northwestern Ontario.

Kenora, as a case study, was an unusual mixture of grassroots and institutional community-based peacebuilding. Unlike Cape Croker and Grassy Narrows (itself, part of Treaty #3) which focussed on non-state efforts and issues of direct action, Kenora was more institutional consensus-building. Underpinned by the negotiation of a formal project, *Tunnel Island*, it was relationship building understood as 'renewing' a longstanding partnership. Its facilitated group process, ceremonies and shared vision for the land created a different level of sustainable relationship building and potential reconciliation between communities. Concentrated in a local influential community elite, it was a unique place-based negotiation where community-based collaboration between the Grand Council of Treaty #3 and the City of Kenora was a site of visioning an explicit common future, and a repositioning of Anishnabe epistemologies to the centre of the process

Unlike Cape Croker's Owen Sound's opposition forces, community elite decision-makers in Kenora were actually initiating the peacebuilding. Unlike the influential

[48] Anishnabe communities composed were over 30% of the general population in northwestern (Kenora and Lake of the Woods region.) Ontario whereas Indigenous communities like Cape Croker (Chippewas of Nawash) in southern Ontario constituted far less than 1%. Remembering that the total Indigenous population in Canada is less than 3.5%, one can see the most recent Canadian statistics regarding demographics on www.census2006.ca (and more specifically at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-008-x/2009001/article/10864-eng.htm) where Ontario's First Nation population is 1.2% of the total Ontario population.

opposition of local elite in Owen Sound (Cape Croker case study), Kenora's non-Indigenous community elite was also engaged in a self-generated critical pedagogy *with* Anishnabe partners. Indeed, although Common Ground was narrated as simply evolving, I heard a very clear and highly coordinated contemporary group process involving Anishnabe and non-indigenous local elite that was geared towards finding commonalities (values, interests, concerns). The *Common Ground* workshop evolved into an explicit vision and discourse on partnerships and commonalities that had short, medium and long-term goals and specific outcomes based on a very concrete project (Tunnel Island) connecting the diverse interests.

Notwithstanding, there were deep divisions and experiences reflected in differently situated discourses in Kenora, beyond the Common Ground discourse, that presented challenges, if not limitations. In conversations I had with various Anishnabe in and around Kenora, I had a number of impressions that confronted and challenged the process of relationship building in Kenora. In particular, I heard quite different language and ubiquitous lived experiences of racism, mistrust and scepticism from Anishnabe people in Kenora and the surrounding region with whom I spoke. For example, policing in general, and in Kenora especially, was a particularly problematic issue for many Anishnabe.[49] Policing because of its immediate and daily impact on peoples' lives was an ongoing problematic point of conflict within and between communities that, in turn, impacted upon the larger envisioned terrain of the Common Ground process and agenda of relationship building. In the same

[49] Similar to other places in Canada, relationships between the police and Indigenous communities had often been highly problematic: a combination of racism, policing procedures, violence and poverty/homelessness that had resulted in a disproportionate laying of criminal charges levied upon Indigenous peoples. Despite changes in the Kenora Police Services made at the city level –and its later replacement by the Ontario Provincial Police for financial reasons—I continued to hear scepticism, disillusion and distrust towards policing from numerous Anishnabe perspectives.

way, I noticed a particular level of everyday social segregation, not so unusual in itself, but one that was challenging for community peacebuilding because of asymmetrical relations of power experienced by Anishnabe.

Notwithstanding the narratives of friendships and relationships between Anishnabe and Euro-Canadian Kenora citizens (a not unimportant point), place-based class and identity issues produced a much more complex set of groupings and perspectives than the case study research portrays. For example, my research in Kenora was ultimately informed by the perspectives of key Common Ground participants, many of whom were local Anishnabe and non-Indigenous community elite encircled as a particular small social grouping: university educated, employed and mobile. Yet, Kenora also had a large Euro-Canadian working class employed in the mining and forest industries but under increased economic duress.[50] It was also the regional hub for about a dozen nearby Anishnabe reserve communities.

Second, a community-based but government-sponsored process in Kenora was faced with extending its legitimacy beyond its own process. My impression (perhaps quite faulty) was that the Common Ground process was in many ways (at that moment in time) an avant-garde elite project that had yet to impact much beyond its own institutionality into the larger community.

Third, the City of Kenora and the Grand Council of Treaty #3 faced systemic problems of representative governance in a way I had seen elsewhere in the world from Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Toronto to Bradford (UK). By that I mean contemporary

[50] I did not extend my research into the exploring the larger communities attitudes towards Anishnabe and knowledge of Common Ground as that was not the focus of my research project.

ontologies of governance and democracy were increasingly being questioned (and not) within civil society generally and specifically contested within grassroots locations. On a more concrete level, the heterogeneity of locality and issues of governance meant that Anishnabe peoples outside of Kenora with whom I spoke had little connection and faith in the capacity of governing bodies, be it their own Band Councils, the Grand Council of Treaty #3 or the Kenora City Council. Consequently, initiatives like Common Ground (or even the innovate Grand Council of Treaty #3 *Resource Law)* were generally unknown, ignored, distrusted and/or not valued. Hence, community-based peacebuilding and its expansion had to confront the pre-existing situated experiences and 'geographies of knowledge' that had yet to hear of, or be convinced of Common Ground's relevance to their lives.

On the other hand, I heard a differently situated discourse from a local community elite in Kenora (Anishnabe and Euro-Canadian) that, though acknowledging problematic past issues, was more optimistic (relatively speaking) about future policing practices and the extension of the Common Ground networks into community relationship building in Kenora. Specifically, I heard on a number of occasions that Common Ground, as a project of partnering had the potential to become an initiating exemplar to address larger social histories, issues and relations of power between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous peoples both locally in Kenora and on the macro level more regionally.

Kenora then had a number of elements that added strength to the any relationship building, partnership and sustained collaboration between Anishnabe and non-Indigenous community activists and local institutions: local elite support, ongoing

webs of relationality, institutional resources, a facilitated process of consensus building, a vision of collaboration and concrete material project of common benefit.[51] On the other hand, it also had disparities, distrust and a community process that was not yet tested beyond its institutionalization.

Cape Croker and Grassy Narrows also had enabling and disabling dynamics (particular strengths, limitations, challenges and successes) in their respective contexts that impacted on grassroots community-based peacebuilding. In particular, there were a number of constraining elements that created a different type of struggle than in Kenora.

The level of local racism, the small but virulent local non-Indigenous opposition in Owen Sound and the provincial influence of OFAH within the OMNR meant that the Chippewas of Nawash (Cape Croker) and non-Indigenous supporters faced active constituencies of opposition. Grassy Narrows, on the other hand, was confronted with constituencies of opposition that were not so much local but instead, centred in the very dynamics of a small Anishnabe community's relative political disenfranchisement in the face of state-sanctioned corporate globalization of the forestry industry in northern Ontario.

Moreover, both Grassy Narrows and Cape Croker communities contended with limited financial resources, high unemployment, an Indian Act Band Council with

[51] Additionally, as narrated in the Cape Croker case study, the rural social landscape in smaller Ontario towns and cities, unlike large urban centres, were differently defined, less transient and organized within web-like local systems of relationality. Methodologically and analytically, this was a surprise for my own place-based perspectives given the difficulty in a place like Toronto of organizing a public debate or even local City Council consensus. As a result, I had not expected to see the high level of consensual institutionalized community discourse, as was the case in Kenora.

numerous other portfolios and social pressures to attend to, and like elsewhere in any community, its own internal community conflicts. In addition, both communities were somewhat isolated and geographically distant from any significant population centre (about 45 minutes to Owen Sound and 45 minutes to Kenora) and any network of supportive relationality therein.

Further, whereas Kenora was institutionalized peacebuilding based upon an explicit vision of partnership, Cape Croker and Grassy Narrows' non-Indigenous supporters were working more from a paradigm of political solidarity than joint interests, and set within limited resources and influences, and a general local situation typified more by crises (racist violence and clearcutting, respectively) than a relative calm.

Moreover, whereas Kenora was a relatively self-contained peacebuilding project, Grassy Narrows and Cape Croker faced a situation where pivotal elements of key decision-making and actors within the conflict lay external to their communities. On the other hand, Cape Croker and Grassy Narrows had access, by necessity, to a spectrum of non-Indigenous supporters that spanned far beyond their geographies with networks, skills, expertise and larger constituencies.

Taken together as place-based communities, Cape Croker and Grassy Narrows faced very different contexts, dynamics, resources and immediacy of conflict than Kenora. These particular contextual challenges and limitations had implications for each setting in terms of process, analysis, strategies and relationship building. Such an analysis of community-based and locally situated efforts potentially re-oriented my

thinking to more clearly appreciate the importance of communities as a site of both effort and transformational change in large-scale inter-group conflicts. [52]

In particular, relationship building as goal and process had different meanings and priorities in each of the respective case studies. In the case of Cape Croker, relationship building was more instrumental, short-term and overshadowed by a greater focus on community priorities, maximizing scarce resources and the immediate specificity of consolidating treaty-based and inherent fishing rights. Relationship building dissipated over time in Cape Croker as the immediate crisis of violence was contained and the Chippewas of Nawash focused on other strategic avenues such as negotiating with the OMNR and leveraging academic research and expertise. At the same time, key non-Indigenous activists, upon whom those initial relationships were premised, moved of the locality and/or organizations' priorities re-positioned themselves elsewhere.

The place-based dynamics of relationship building in Grassy Narrows, on the other hand, were driven by an active 18-month long logging blockade with numerous non-Indigenous grassroots activists spending time in and around the community itself during that period while subsequently remaining actively supportive afterwards. The

[52] Some key questions about strategies:

1. Construction: How are strategies formulated (process, criteria)? How are the strategies also reflective of limited choice or power?
2. What are their purposes? Who are they trying to persuade? What arena or landscape is being contested?
3. How does space or risk impact on the continuum of strategies that allies will adopt?
4. Analysis: What is the role of strategic analysis and how is it used? What is the importance of surveying the situation locally and understanding the broader general climate?
5. Impact and Evaluation: How do they impact on the conflict at the various levels and upon constituencies/actors? To what degree? How is this evaluated?
6. How do strategies change over time? At what point are they deemed to be no longer effective? What is the criteria? What is the response?

Grassy Narrows Anishnabe blockaders had a mixture of situated priorities regarding relationship building that were open-ended. As their narratives showed, there were cautious, but also welcoming, sentiments concerning the meaning of relationship building with non-Indigenous activists and organizations. That intersection of ongoing relations and open possibilities between numerous Anishnabe and non-Indigenous activists sustained themselves up to the present while also shifting focus of relationships to a more personal nature in some cases, and towards a greater public advocacy in others.

One of the noticeable features of sustainable relationship building resided in Kenora's differently situated place-based conflict where significant aspects of decision-making and control were located organizationally within the City Council of Kenora and the Grand Council of Treaty #3 rather than dependent upon external sources.

The institutionalization of the relationship building process in Kenora occurred on two levels that strengthened its ongoing sustainability and growth. First, the Common Ground process initiated relationship building and/or strengthened existent interpersonal relations as friends, colleagues and people connected in the same locality and sharing a common ground over most of a lifetime. Second, it was an *inter/intra-community negotiation* and consensus building that sought to knit together community and organizational priorities, both Anishnabe and non-Indigenous. Both elements of Kenora's situation added a strength and depth to sustainable relationship building that were not present in the same way in Cape Croker or Grassy Narrows.

These place-based circumstances and the situated priorities of grassroots community-based peacebuilding in each case study were an important part of enabling or disabling the depth and/or sustainability of relationship building between different Anishnabe and non-Indigenous activists.

In addition to the different values and priorities attached to relationship building, the challenges, limitations and successes for peacebuilding were connected to the processes of strategizing and the actual strategies employed. While emblematic of different and coinciding collective interests, the varying degrees of common strategizing demonstrated in the case studies between Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists helps explain both the growth and sustainability of any relationship building and trust-building on the one hand, and exemplifies the complex negotiating of diverse approaches and analyses at the grassroots on the other.

For example, the Cape Croker case study was typified by one non-Indigenous activist as "acute crisis-focussed peacebuilding". In this context, non-Indigenous supporters had two parallel sets of interests and strategies. On one side, groups like the Neighbours of Nawash, Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) and the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) sought to build platforms for the Chippewas of Nawash to articulate their own message to various non-Indigenous constituencies, as well as provide material (financial, equipment, skill sets) and campaign support (Fishbuys, OFAH meetings).

On the others side, such non-Indigenous support groups had their own quite separate approaches (bridge building) to the conflict, and different focuses centred on developing and/or reconciling their own constituencies. Combined with the Chippewas of Nawash priorities stated earlier (including political decolonization), there were few detailed narratives on co-strategizing in any of the Chippewas of Nawash or non-Indigenous supporters' narratives.[53] As noted in an earlier chapter (Cape Croker Case Study), there was not an explicit and consistent process to develop a common analysis nor identify overall common goals.[54] This lack of common agenda (or perhaps understood as different agendas and contexts) and analysis impacted on discussions concerning anti-racism initiatives as well as the minimal support (or conflict) engendered for MCC's Public Inquiry strategy. Both of those examples were sites of substantial tension between the Chippewas of Nawash and non-Indigenous supporters that in the longer run did not serve to strengthen trust between them. The consequence was a lack of a coherent collaborative effort and a set of relationships that lacked sustainability.

Grassy Narrows and Kenora were very different examples on processes of co-strategizing, self-generated critical pedagogy and relationship building. Grassy Narrows had a medium- term set of direct actions[55] centred on the logging blockade

[53] There were mentions of personal conversations occurring between activists but it was not an intrinsic part of any process designed to mutually shape strategies together. In conversations I had with people, strategizing was often defined by one group or the other and then consulting after to ensure there was not a major conflict as a result.

[54] The CAW, MCC, Neighbours and the Chippewas of Nawash Band council never met as a single body according to reminiscences I heard from the various activists. In fact, the key activists from MCC and the CAW did not meet until 2006 at a joint conference panel presentation I organized on Cape Croker.

[55] Direct Action is synonymous with civil disobedience, the act of publicly challenging an ongoing state or corporate practice or set of policies at the risk of being arrested. Blocking a entrance or transportation route, occupying an office, creatively and/or politically altering public property or architecture, disrupting a meeting, ripping up identity cards. In short, directly confronting or actively

and the reclamation and control over their traditional territories. Groups like Christian Peacemakers Team (CPT) were invited to participate and did, in fact, remain at that site for several years. During that time, strong interpersonal relationships developed and parallel frameworks of understanding increasing intersected as non-Indigenous allies engaged in Anishnabe ceremonies and cultural learnings. Not without moments of tension, grassroots activists from environmental NGOs like RainForest Action Network (RAN) and ForestEthics voyaged, at least as visitors, into Anishnabe mindscapes, analyses and practices. Further, as CPT's approach demonstrated, non-Indigenous activists actively sought to make coordinated decisions with the blockaders and community members of Grassy Narrows. The result of such learning, consultation and decision-making were processes of strategizing that were complimentary and intersecting rather than separate and counter-productive.

Kenora was different again in that all of the community members were themselves from the local environment, though admittedly, from sometimes starkly different epistemological locations. The Common Ground process was just that; a process to develop an explicit plan between the Anishnabe government and the City of Kenora to jointly manage common lands. However, it was an explicit process of co-strategizing concerning its values, vision, goals and continuing future linkages and partnership. Clearly, such processes of strategizing had to negotiate issues of historic and ongoing asymmetric relations of power. What differentiates the Kenora case study then, both in its scope and sustainability, was the prioritizing of Anishnabe ontologies and ceremonies as crucial elements of reversing the discursive

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withdrawing support from something through a non-violent process (though some will sanction property damage).

inequities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous. Moreover, the Common Ground process involved five building blocks (initiating circumstances, synergistic factors, reinforcing practices, harmonizing possibilities and transformative reconciliation) that constructed processes of common cause, mutual interests, joint strategies and reciprocal relationship building. Lastly, the above two features supported processes of co-strategizing and community peacebuilding that incorporated a self-generated critical pedagogy that, in turn, began to bridge specific geographies of knowledge, localities and cultures of difference.

Cape Croker, Grassy Narrows and Kenora also exhibited differently situated concepts and rationales behind strategies that were noteworthy for understanding the complexities facing place-based grassroots peacebuilding. Though not always achieving the aspired goals, such strategies and rationales offered a variety of approaches as well as narratives on the impact of organizational practices, resources, risks, and local space.

In this regard, Cape Croker was both one of the most complex case studies and yet, one of the most explicit on the rationales behind their diverse strategies and approaches to social change. For example, Neighbours of Nawash was an ad hoc informal community group whose strategy was to do what it could with very limited energy, time, and activist experience. One of the key directing concepts they had hoped for would have been assessing the impact of their actions as a way of defining strategies. But given the lack of immediate evidence, their strategies took place in a space of not knowing the impact of their actions. Hence, one of the key motivating

rationales became the ethical obligation to do something, no matter what, rather than nothing.

In the same way, "critical mass" was a key evaluative concept behind strategies in that the outcome of a good strategy would have been to expand community/constituency support to the point of being numerically significant to influence the conflict dynamics in some way or create pressure for structural change. More of an aspiration than a rationale, it was a middle step between means and outcome. First noted by narratives from Neighbours of Nawash, 'critical mass' was a central rationale behind most the grassroots activities in all three case studies. For example, in the case of Grassy Narrows, the primary agendas of ENGOs[56] campaigns were to disrupt, challenge and transform the larger public discourse around unsustainable and destructive clearcutting practices. Premised on ultimately pressuring and engaging corporate-government decision-makers, it required mobilizing a critical mass of popular support to assist its advocacy.[57]

Leadership and engaging constituents step-by-step was another rationale behind how strategies were created and assessed. This was a critical issue relating back to limitations of grassroots constituencies and subsequent tensions between activists; if a leader was too far ahead of their constituency (politically, analytically) then they ran the risk of not being able to deliver their constituencies as a promised force of support to other allies. This was the risk and thoughts encountered by MCC as their membership was not necessarily at a point where they would support actions other

[56] Environmental non-government organizations(ENGOs).
[57] Similarly, persuasion was articulated by certain community activists with the Chippewas of Nawash regarding the role of academic allies as being able to speak to broad non-local audiences. Yet, it was an unspoken assumption behind approaches other than physical force; that a key concept was peaceful transformation, education, and the capacity to increase public support in non-local terrains.

allies, like certain activists with the Chippewas of Nawash, would have preferred; buying the "illegal fish" or joining OFAH en masse.

Similarly, Neighbours of Nawash's had the concern that a formal "anti-racist' language and approach would not succeed, but instead prove more divisive, in their non-indigenous community of Owen Sound. This in turn harked back to a key concept of engaging constituents as a step-by-step process of enabling members to feel confident to take action based upon having become conversant with the issues (through information, education and dialogue forums) as part of community dialogue. The same approach was seen in Kenora concerning the use of an inclusive, evolving and contesting set of differently-situated stories concerning Tunnel Island. It was posited as a step-by-step critical pedagogy to reshape constituency and community discourses.

Equally importantly was the concept of 'disciplining the debate" within public discourse regarding what was permissible to say, when and where.[58] As articulated in Chapter Four, the Indigenous struggle for decolonization was confronting state-sanctioned corporate resource exploitation, abysmally slow processes of negotiating outstanding treaty issues, and disproportionately expensive litigation. State policies and practices, including the Indian Act, combined with a history of widespread social exclusion and racism to de-value the requests from Indigenous communities and peoples for an authentic relationship of equity.

[58] This was an interesting connection in terms to Foucault and Gramsci's works on 'regimes of truth', hegemony and organic intellectuals. While Foucault mainly centres on the structural mechanisms of discursive formulation and regulation, the idea of 'disciplining' the public discourses from the bottom-up (or from the subaltern as per Gramsci) received less attention in his work. Grassroots place-based discourses in these case studies are counter-hegemonic acts that functioned in terms of glocality that influenced the dialogue upwards.

In that context, the same grassroots advocacy strategies of building platforms and punctuating public dialogues with a counter-narrative paralleled this disciplining of the debate. This was most applicable in the Cape Croker instance where the Chippewas of Nawash and non-Indigenous grassroots activists sought to contain and counter the racist behaviour and public narratives expounded by local community elite. The same was also true for Grassy Narrows but in a much larger social arena where the national/provincial dialogue, though evolving, continued to minimize the issue of neo-colonialism and asymmetrical relations of power towards Indigenous peoples.

Key concepts and rationales for strategies were also tied to the concept of empowerment and a social change, though not explicitly spoken about in that term.[59] Empowering strategies primarily emphasized non-state ways of creating and enacting the potential for change. In a general sense, empowering strategies or actions were linked to ways of empowering other members of the community. For example, Neighbours of Nawash created a public bank account for the "silent majority" in Owen Sound to financially support the Chippewas of Nawash to help replace destroyed fishing equipment and boats. The Chippewas of Nawash hired a highly skilled non-indigenous community member to coordinate their communication in a way that clearly advocated and disseminated information representing the community's interests and voices, including numerous public talks by Cape Croker fishcatchers. Likewise, the Grassy Narrows blockade site became a

[59] I call it empowering because, it puts the potential for action and change within the hands of groups and communities (an unspoken assumption in the interviews), even if that is ultimately tied to some extent to legislative or legal change.

well-attended social space of community mobilization and cultural renaissance outside the narrow confines of the Indian Act-controlled 'reserve'. Similarly, Kenora's Common Ground process was a self-initiated process of inter-community engagement that envisioned an increasing use of local community narratives to tell stories of the land. Such a process was a literal geography of knowledge for subaltern Indigenous stories to be heard and a participatory community approach inversing historical discursive relations of power.

Empowerment also emphasized Indigenous communities and members acting from/in their own interests as a way of overcoming oppressive circumstances. This was evident in Cape Croker and Grassy Narrow community decision-making and actions that reflected the primacy of community interests. For example, the Chippewas of Nawash guarded their autonomous decision-making and increasingly defined their own voice and capacities through strategic use of researchers, lawyers and their own educated professional class. Further, given that alliance building in the context of limited resources was not the main priority for the Chippewas of Nawash, a different strategic choice was made to rely upon and invest in their community itself; to act from their own interests and capacities first.

Further, the table below begins to show how actions relate to concepts and way those work together to be empowering.

Table:

ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN (examples)	**KEY CONCEPTS AND RATIONALES**	**EMPOWERING STRATEGIES**

Building Platforms	Creating space for dialogue	
Bridging Communities	Developing points of consensus	Non-state methodologies
Fish buying	Creating critical mass of political support	Focus on community interests and capacities
Challenging OFAH	Disrupting opposition forces	Disseminating alternative information
Challenging medias bias and local news.	Disciplining public dialogue & Contesting the discourse of opposition forces	Moving primarily in self-defined interests
Public campaigns supported by ENGOs	Advocating alternative policies and persuading public opinion	Framing the conflict from situated perspectives Mobilizing community participation from bottom-up.
Fish Loaves Suppers & CAW Union education	Leadership and engaging constituents step-by-step persuasion	Explicitly challenging the structural violence and State imposed processes/regulations
Direct action (blockades)	Initiating community-directed action and reinforcing reliance, capacities and commitments	
Ceremonies	Developing trust and imparting cultural knowledge	
Storytelling	Supporting alternative discourses and framings of conflicts	
Common Ground Workshop	Listening, sharing, building mutual interests and co-strategizing an agenda for further action	
Research	Necessary expertise to support and inform community choices	

The difference and commonalities in the three case studies extended into the different approaches to evaluating strategies, actions and goals. [60] There seemed to be a general consensus in grassroots narratives that various actions had supportive impacts: sometimes short-term, other times long-term, sometimes on the issue itself, sometimes on the local social arena, sometimes on relationship building, sometimes on creating alternative space of possibility, sometimes on key decision-makings, and sometimes on the issue itself.

In general, the Chippewas of Nawash and Grassy Narrows blockaders followed the same premise in their public presentations across Ontario and elsewhere; political success was dependent upon mobilizing a critical mass of influential public opinion. Indeed, such a premise underpinned the hopes of education strategies in all of the case studies: CAW, MCC, CPT, RAN, and Amnesty international.

For example in Cape Croker, Neighbours of Nawash believed that public education may have helped local non-Indigenous inhabitants in Owen Sound to question that absoluteness of both the information they had had, encourage a critical re-appraisal of their views and potentially shift themselves into an active stance of support. Additionally, public forums were seen as an opportunity for non-Indigenous community members to gain access to the Chippewas of Nawash side of the story, explore potential common interests ("caring for the land"), and create an element of community dialogue that could assist in de-escalating the conflict. In the same way, the Chippewas of Nawash saw disseminating information was a way of potentially

[60] Impact and Evaluation: How do they impact on the conflict at the various levels and upon constituencies/actors? To what degree? How is this evaluated?

transforming the confused middle ground of public consensus allowing undecided non-Indigenous people in Owen Sound to develop an alternative understanding based on information from the Cape Croker side as well.

On the other hand, depending upon the local context, it was not clear for grassroots activists that their actions had a decisive or significant impact on the background hostilities, structural problems, government attitudes, or the entrenched element of local opposition. For example, at its most basic, the evaluations differed regarding the very criteria for measuring the success. For example, Grassy Narrows blockaders used a measurement of time stretching decades, and a unit of social change that believed in each individual making changes in themselves. Hence, their criteria for success was defined more by the actual process of acting than based upon an immediate results-based outcome. This was unlike non-Indigenous ENGOs who saw public education more instrumentally as part of a short-term political mobilization on behalf of a particular campaign objective. Here, maximum numbers of attendees, inflowing donations and concerted follow-up participation in campaign strategies were the key evaluation criteria.

Similarly, given the campaign goals of the Chippewas of Nawash, public talks and information were not solely for pedagogical long-term social change but rather immediate and concrete actions of support. In this way, raising the public profile of the Cape Croker's issues through the fish- buy', and the leveraging that support in order to further contest OMNR-dominated public dialogues, was considered to be an important outcome of the efforts.

As mentioned earlier, some grassroots activists suggested there was an impact on the local non-Indigenous community space of disciplining what people were saying and doing in public. Further, they suggested, such counter-discourses may well have had the effect of leveraging smaller community actions and changing the nature of contested public space. For example, Neighbours of Nawash pointed to the lack of second incident at the Owen Sound Market, and the capacity of Owen Sound community members to donate monies to the Neighbours of Nawash sponsored bank account, as an opportunity to "create an alternate space to stand in public" (Marilyn Struthers in Wallace et al., 2010).

On the other hand, perhaps most important was the feeling from Indigenous and non-indigenous activists in Cape Croker and Grassy Narrows that the strongest feature of supportive actions by non-Indigenous supporters was the psychological impact of lessening the sense of political and emotion isolation often experienced by Indigenous communities in the external environment.

Notwithstanding, there were a strong sense of ambiguity in grassroots narratives as to the measurable ameliorating impact of many actions and strategies. From the perspective of the Chippewas of Nawash, for example, the intransigence of the local Member of Provincial Parliament (MPP), the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters (OFAH) and the Owen Sound news media remained fundamentally unaltered; letter writing and advocacy with the Provincial government was seen as futile in swaying an "impervious government". Consequently, there was the sense that the greatest impact was not in the external non-Indigenous community but within the Cape Croker community itself. Similarly, Anishnabe blockaders in

Grassy Narrows, while emotionally and politically valuing external non-Indigenous support, were more focused upon their community's empowerment, healing and cultural/spiritual renaissance.[61]

Grassroots community-based peacebuilding was also indelibly tied to key themes of negotiating knowledges, trust, and the role of self-generated critical pedagogy as important components of changing asymmetrical relations of power.[62] Understood as relationship building at different social levels between communities in conflict, grassroots peacebuilding was a complex discursive negotiation of knowledges, practices and space between activists at the local level. The case studies presented differently-situated complex place-based versions and degrees of negotiation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous supporters.

As enumerated earlier, Cape Croker was a place-based conflict focussed on the Chippewas of Nawash achieving specific and immediate goals of containing local racist violence, countering local elite opposition forces and putting into force the judicial decision affirming its treaty fishing rights. In that context, non-Indigenous supporters were useful instruments to assist in achieving those goals. It did not set itself the task of building a sustainable set of relationships with non-Indigenous

[61] In part, the evaluation of impacts was tied to the place-based capacities and limitations regarding organizing beyond community borders. For example, the Anishnabe community of Grassy Narrows was 1200 miles away from the political government epicenter of Toronto and, like Cape Croker, available community resources were already engaged in more immediate place-based socio-economic issues on the 'reserve'.

[62] Some key questions on trust and process:

1. Is trust a process? Feeling?
2. What does it take to prove or create trust?
3. Did this trust make a difference in how they worked together?
4. Motives and (mis-)trust: Paul on churches?
5. Do partners understand what is the fundamental issue for some other partners?
6. Trust and Fear: locals inhabiting same space but not inter-communication?

supporters. Rather, their chief assignment was to be able to catch and sell fish without Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (OMNR) harassment, obstruction and intrusion into their treaty-affirmed resource rights. Further, the assessment of key Chippewa of Nawash activists was that a reliance on their community was central to any success, whereas non-Indigenous grassroots activists had limited utility because of their inability to deliver their constituency politically. Instead, scarce community resources were better spent on legal and research expertise that were directly applicable to fishing rights.

As a consequence of those given set of priorities, capacities and limitations, Cape Croker as one of three case studies, exhibited the least amount of negotiated knowledge, practice and space between Indigenous and non-Indigenous community activists. Though, the awareness of trust did not occupy the same place in specific non-Indigenous Cape Croker narratives as in other case studies, trust and relationship building was still a feature of grassroots activism between the Chippewas of Nawash and non-Indigenous supporters. For example, though non-Indigenous supporters' awareness of trust was never named explicitly as an important feature of Cape Croker's willingness to undertake partnerships, it was implied in the idea of having or developing a "relationship" (Neighbours) with Cape Croker, "solidarity" (CAW), and "trusting relationships across organisations" (MCC). Similar to the other two case studies then, trust was understood by non-Indigenous activists in Cape Croker as a component of relationships, process and practices, both within their respective non-Indigenous communities/constituencies, and with Indigenous communities with whom they were seeking to support.

Trust for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists in the other two case studies was not simply a feeling but rather it was a belief and knowledge that partners could be relied upon in terms of respect and commitment. Elements of trust were instrumental in ensuring that grassroots activists were able to confidently work together based on a secure knowledge of each others' values, motives, agendas, and capacities to support. Conversely, tensions concerning differences over strategies impacted on the level of trust, credibility and negotiation.

There were a number of fundamentals that were articulated concerning creating and/or proving trust. First, similar in all three case studies, the level of familiarity and any historical relationality between the respective Indigenous community activists and non-Indigenous supporters was an advantageous foundation for any further development of trust and relationship building. In the case of Kenora, this long-term place-based web-like relationality produced relationships that were already existent before Common Ground was initiated and that flourished more easily in the later period because of the daily contact and relationships local elite people had in a small city like Kenora. Cape Croker had similar relationships, personally and organisationally with the CAW, MCC and a key initiator of Neighbours of Nawash that preceded the fishing crisis by years.[63] In both Kenora and Cape Croker case studies, these initial relationships had been fostered, known and had laid a groundwork for working with each other more intensely later. Grassy Narrows was slightly different in that Grassy Narrows blockaders knew very few non-Indigenous activists beforehand and relationships were more casual except for

[63] In the case of Neighbours, it was working with the Band Council and women in the community. MCC had a relationship over the years through building houses on the reserve. The CAW had established a link to the community in terms of students visiting and having speakers from Cape Croker address their Education Centre.

their relationship with CPT where a number of CPT activists remained constantly at the logging blockade for 18 months.

On the other side, the level of trust, especially when Grassy Narrows and Cape Croker community activists were meeting new potential allies, meant that much time was spent on trying to figure out who those supporters were, what they wanted, and what they were prepared to do. For example, Grassy Narrows blockaders specifically spoke about the large number of non-Indigenous 'supporters' who unexpectedly arrived at the blockade and their caution concerning peoples' intentions. Further, in terms of outcomes and trust from the Chippewas of Nawash perspectives, many of those Neighbours of Nawash-sponsored Owen Sound church-basement meetings did not seem to result in a burgeoning number of non-Indigenous supporters. Hence, the Chippewas of Nawash subsequently became increasingly sceptical of that strategy and the human resources it required from to send already over-burdened community Cape Croker speakers to such events.

Second, irrespective of the length of time Indigenous community activists knew particular non-Indigenous supporters or NGOs, trusting each other's values and intentions, analysis and strategies, and capacity to take action was essential to relationship building and collaboration. In Cape Croker, trust towards non-Indigenous activists was articulated by a number of Chippewas of Nawash community activists as respect concerning "a crossover of values or objectives", a "social conscience", knowing what each other got out of it, and trust in the non-Indigenous activist's leadership and capacity to mobilize their constituencies. It was also based upon the feeling that a non-Indigenous supporter was already

"converted", empathetic, looking for social change to benefit Cape Croker/Indigenous peoples but also for non-Indigenous supporters to reciprocally "realize there is some benefit in it for them, too" (CDD: 64). The same concern over trust was true for Grassy Narrows blockaders in their narratives on trust, ceremonies and process, their non-Indigenous supporters' comments on solidarity as well as the Kenora Common Ground process which was premised on these varying ideas and goals of trust, relationship building and reciprocal commitment.

On the other hand, there were circumstances, actions and cultural obstacles that diminished trust as well as increased tensions and reluctance to work together at the grassroots. Specifically, a common level of reticent trust towards non-Indigenous communities by Indigenous activists was articulated in all three case studies. Trust was an issue of greater significance for Indigenous community activists in the first instance because of the historical asymmetry in social relations. Their narratives on the subject were reflective of numerous community daily lived experience of racism, exclusion, besiegement, unsympathetic or openly antagonistic behaviours in the surrounding local environment, as well as the wider situation of neo-colonial government relations, the disruptive impacts of residential schools run by Canadian churches, and the history of dispossession in Canada.

Further, in Cape Croker, for instance, there was significant distrust regarding the faith-based Christian groups such as national and local Church groups as well as Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) concerning their motivation and intentions (historical role in residential schools and the sincerity of their apology/remorse), strategies (building bridges), agenda (following own agenda and not Cape Croker's)

, analysis (not understanding the local context and what would work or not work), and the level of commitment and capacity (not delivering resources or constituents).

Moreover, extending any form of trust and relationship building was also hampered by distrust originating from non-Indigenous communities towards Indigenous communities. For example**,** from of the point of view of a number of Chippewas of Nawash activists, the antagonism of nearby non-Indigenous communities was based on unfounded fears arising from the mistaken belief of retribution by Cape Croker to displace non-Indigenous people if the Chippewas won their land claim. Further, that non-indigenous antagonism languished through the lack of familiarity, communication and interaction brought about by a self-generated social segregation by having never even visited Cape Croker in spite of its proximity.

In such a problematic environment, central to Indigenous activists' willingness to extend trust or relationships beyond short-term instrumentality was the commitment and the ability of non-Indigenous grassroots activists to bridge cultural mindscapes and differently situated practices. In Grassy Narrows and Kenora, the valuing, centrality and leadership role of Anishnabe ceremonies had a pivotal role in reworking of relations of power and respect between grassroots activists. Ceremonies provided a space for parallel knowledges between Indigenous and non-Indigenous systems of thought to intersect and be negotiated. On the one side, it was a space for cultural learning, personal sharing and self-reflective critical pedagogy as narrated by non-Indigenous activists. On the other side, it was an act of decolonization, healing and sharing in a self-defined space for Anishnabe activists and community members. Hence, in Kenora and Grassy Narrows, participation in

ceremonies were an essential acknowledgement of Anishnabe collective and locally situated knowledges (as specific geographies of knowledge and 'cultures of difference') that strengthened elements of a common understanding, discourse, and reworking of relations of power through practices of mutual trust, honouring of the land and inter-cultural sharing.

The important role of ceremonies in refashioning relations of power and epistemological perspectives points to the critical feature of ontological framings of conflict. In my experiences in Canada, Rwanda and Sri Lanka, one of the nexus of conflicts in general have been the asymmetrical relations of power informing and disciplining different interpretive frameworks and material practices. More specifically, how people describe and define the nature of the conflict involving non-indigenous and Indigenous peoples in Canada is central to any peacebuilding and strategies of conflict transformation.

Thus, in the three case studies, how were the conflicts differently and similarly framed by Indigenous and non-Indigenous grassroots activists? Were they framed as political conflict, cultural values or environment or racism? Or, were they a local set of relations of power or a configuration of colonialism, neo-colonialism and/or corporate globalization? Further, were they understood as a collective conflict between and/or within differently-situated identities, historical experiences and contemporary relations of power? Or, were they seen as sets of dysfunctional relationships between peoples, and an asymmetrical abdication of the spirit of treaty? In short, there were (and are) no finite responses to those questions: experientially,

discursively or theoretically. Rather, grassroots narratives exhibited numerous collective and subjective perspectives on framings.

Similar to what Smith (1999) and Said (1978) wrote in terms of the development of 19th century British imperialism and colonialism, one of the many responses framing various academic and grassroots narratives was to understand the conflicts, in part, as cultural ethnocentricity and/or racism of the Canadian State, its judicial system and its hegemonic imperial political discourse.

Second, without exception, Indigenous peoples narratives in the case studies (and in my general experience) framed the conflicts by referencing their respective Treaty, the unfulfilled and disregarded obligations by the Canadian state, colonial patterns of dispossession, and socio-political policies and practices of attempted cultural genocide. Additionally, as Chapter Four articulated, and spoken by nearly every Indigenous person I encountered, the conflict was also framed as an active system of laws and practices through the *Indian Act* that usurped self-determination, disciplined Indigenous identity, and demarcated and enforced restricted rights (Lawrence 2004; Anderson 2000).

Third, the already exorbitantly costly arena of legal contestation for Indigenous communities was additionally framed as imbued with racist relations of power; the colonialism of the Canadian State/Crown claim of unilateral sovereignty -- or at least the primacy of their epistemic standpoint via their courts and worldview. By extension, the conflict was also poised as an ongoing shirking by the Crown (the Canadian State and its fiduciary obligations) to observe court decisions regarding the

necessity of consulting with Indigenous communities regarding any development that would potentially adversely affect their community interests and territories.

Further, another feature of numerous Indigenous and non-indigenous activist perspectives framed the conflict as an intersection of class, 'race' and economics in Canada; a specific cultural group -- Indigenous peoples -- systemically marginalized within the larger dominant society were simultaneously situated as an underclass[64] (for example, Cape Croker with community unemployment around 60% and Grassy Narrows with upwards of 90%). The conflict of race and class further intersected with corporate economics of globalization and dysfunctional democracy that unequally partitioned the accumulation and distribution of wealth generated through natural resources.[65]

Still another framing understood the conflict as the control of local space through exclusion. The narratives in all three case studies mentioned the historic asymmetry and problematic place-based exclusion of Anishnabe peoples locally. For example, in the Chippewas of Nawash's experience in the Owen Sound Farmers Market, as their public visibility increased and Indigenous communities like Cape Croker entered into new space (public, political, economic, resource management) there were backlashes from the local non-indigenous peoples who appeared unwilling to accept a new set of inclusive relations.

[64] Otero (2004)
[65] Chapter 4 reviews the national statistics for Indigenous peoples in Canada. While there are obviously diverse class stratifications within Indigenous populations (First Nations (on and off-reserve), Metis, Inuit), the inequality of wealth is most discernable for 'on-reserve' First Nations communities, a particular ongoing legacy of the Indian Act.

Another perspective was to understand the conflict as a problem *within* the non-Indigenous community; a psychological one of fear and guilt. As articulated in Cape Croker narratives, the reluctance of non-Indigenous communities to engage with impacts of historical colonial practices upon Indigenous peoples arose from a fear of being displaced from their actual homes and property in the mistaken belief that Indigenous communities were seeking retribution.

Still further, on an altogether different front, the various configurations of conflict were framed in different temporal and qualitative moments. Depending on the particular narrative and analysis, there were various movements within a conflict's evolution. For example, in the Cape Croker study, conflict was spoken about as both a time and quality. Temporally, there were conflagration moments described as confrontational 'flashpoints" or "crises" around fisheries. A second standpoint identified conflict as contained, but only temporarily, in a legal coma (latent or "putting it to sleep") as it sat enmeshed within a court process. Third, there were narratives, as was the view concerning the Cape Croker co-management fishing agreement with OMNR that saw the particular conflict as having positively transformed some configuration of the conflict but where the fundamental roots and structures of neo-colonialism remained ongoing and unresolved

In sum, Indigenous and non-indigenous grassroots narratives framed the respective conflict(s) from a number of vantage points: as cultural epistemology (cultural identity, values and practices), racism (ethnocentrism), structural ethnocentrism (judicial processes), political (colonialism), economic (class and corporate

exploitation), psychological (non-indigenous fear and guilt), spatial (exclusion from local space), or Treaty rights (historical entitlements).

These different framings had implications for grassroots relationship building, trust, pedagogy, analysis and strategies. First, such framings immediately situated the conflict(s) and discourses within existent geographies of knowledge, cultures of difference and various configurations of relations of power. Second, such configurations of locality, power, discourse and practices, whether implicit or explicitly stated, were the complex terrain grassroots activists had to negotiate. Third, those differences, however framed, impacted on the development of grassroots relationships and strategies. As differently situated analytical standpoints, those framings informed and guided strategic goals and by extension, the different values attached to relationship building between Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists. Fourth, as well as constructing self-generated grids for developing and implementing strategies and processes, framings also inherently defined the criteria for evaluating their utility and success. Finally, set in the context of differing and intersecting values, understandings, goals and priorities, grassroots collaboration and relationship building was a negotiation of framings, relationality and trajectories of the future.

The grassroots narratives, discourse and practices pointed to the complex interaction of locality, geographies of knowledge, cultures of difference and relations of power. The three case studies' narratives and experiences, though highly contextual, suggested some lessons and insights for grassroots community-based peacebuilding in Canada, and elsewhere in general.

First, efforts at collaboration between Indigenous and non-Indigenous contained lessons concerning the importance of recognizing differently-situated group priorities and abilities, and using them as building blocks to construct sustainable relationships across collective identities. Further, the ability to successfully develop collaborative strategies and coordinated priorities was linked to an understanding of each other's context, capacity and willingness to undertake certain actions. Being explicit about identity, interests and location, both internal to the organization and between allies, provided, as it did in Kenora, a structure upon which to negotiate differences and visualize a continuum of strategic possibilities and roles.

At other times, it was important to recognize the diverse world views and values from which strategies arose, such as the deeply held values and approaches reflected in the Mennonite Central Committee's tactic of creating public dialogue through a *Citizen's Report*, or the centrality of concepts of "neighbourliness' and community relations held by Neighbours of Nawash. The case studies experiences indicated a spectrum of diverse strategies and options for participation extending from working in tandem where there are convergences such as *Common Ground* in Kenora; or differently in terms of tactics and priorities such as public forums in Owen Sound by Neighbours; to choosing to work separately as did the Chippewas of Nawash emphases on treaty research, claims and negotiations.

Additionally, the efforts at collaboration in the case studies highlighted lessons on accepting strategy as an evolving vehicle situated within both reactive and envisioned circumstances. Sometimes strategies were driven by unforeseen

circumstance wherein activities were *ad hoc* and spontaneously arose from a reaction to an intolerable situation as it did for the Neighbours of Nawash in the Farm Market, or for the Grassy Narrows blockaders' blockade. Other times, strategies were part of a concerted campaign as was the case of selling fish for Cape Croker or public campaigns by ENGOs on behalf of Grassy Narrows.

Fourth, combining the strengths of an ally's location, whether it be locally or externally-based, impacted on the overall effectiveness and appropriateness of strategies. This was demonstrated when the Neighbours of Nawash's public forums succeeded in engaging factions within a community where MCC's *Citizen's Report* did not. Conversely, the CAW could undertake buying 'illegal' fish thereby assisting the Chippewas of Nawash yet minimize any negative consequences organizationally and within its union membership.

Fifth, another lesson was informed by the view held by Cape Croker interviewees that certain entrenched oppositional views could not be changed no matter the strategy. Such a conclusion then entailed a re-thinking of how Indigenous communities' strategies and resources should be directed to seeking different Indigenous and non-Indigenous community partners who could be strategically influential in assisting the achievement of specific political or treaty rights.[66]

[66] Along the same vein, someone in Cape Croker suggested that while non-Indigenous supporters were important, it was perhaps more important to have a collaborative relationships with the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (OMNR) as they held legislative enforcement power, set out policies that directly affected Cape Croker and could, if they so desired, make daily life difficult for the community. Hence, stronger institutional ties could create a greater credibility for Cape Croker and its capacities to be responsible and legitimate managers of the fisheries.

Sixth, on the other hand, while it was true for the Chippewas of Nawash experience that directing efforts to engaging with elements of OFAH was not seen as a useful strategy, as Neighbours of Nawash articulated, there were potential linkages within a spectrum of heterogeneous opposition forces, confused middle and 'silent majority'.

Seventh, along the same lines, there were lessons about the diverse approaches to engaging with the behaviours and effects of racism towards Indigenous peoples. This appeared to be a clear place where community-based peacebuilding could have been strengthened by processes explicitly naming the varied grassroots positions on anti-racism and identifying the cultural and political frameworks held by partners. This in turn could have assisted organizations and communities to outline a typology and appropriate localized strategies of countering racism.

Additionally, one Chippewas of Nawash community activist reflected on the lessons from what they described as "first generation" relationship-building with non-Indigenous partners during the mid-1990s. For them, that experience contained the promise of how to do it better, in part, by identifying and pursuing mutual interests through an ongoing interactive dialogue between Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists.

However, given that terminology of 'first generation', what might a "second generation" set of strategies and community-based peacebuilding partnerships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous activist look like? If there was a next generation of partnerships, then what would those partnerships be equipped with in

terms of strategies? A former Cape Croker Band Council member articulated a number of analytical and strategic considerations.

First, the basis for strategizing needed to consider and understand the general political, social, economic and cultural climate: constitutional (certain aboriginal rights cases that aided the interpretation of rights and aboriginal personality); legal (enforcement of specific rights such as the Jones-Nadjiwon decision); socio-political (government policies of privatization, welfare cuts, and downsizing environment ministries, the role of arch-conservative political representative, the ramifications of the murder of Dudley George at Ipperwash); and the economic and cultural forces and impacts of globalization on the local space. In this sense, it was felt the 1990s was a pilot case of partnerships but that one that generally missed the target in terms of strategic analysis and how to make it work. There needed, they argued, to be "instruction to the landscape" that surveyed the cultural, ethical, environmental and constitutional terrain.

Second, the general nature of alliances or partnerships needed to be differently constructed in order to widen the issues of collaboration through an interest-based approach of identifying common interests on common issues with non-Indigenous community partners.[67] The strategy with partners would necessitate building relationships through finding mutual common interests as a way of engaging and coordinating action that benefits everyone. Specifically, Cape Croker's use of *Peace*

[67] The example given was shared interest in sustaining the environmental resources around fish conservation, water quality, and land use. The premise is that locally-based people are directly impacted by the ramifications, have concrete needs, and that strategies are more likely to succeed if they are relevant to the immediate locale.

Assemblies[68] could be seen as one example of such a *vision-building* forum between communities and allies as part of unpacking issues and clarifying common directions.

Another element of a second generation of relationship building and partnering would be a strategic process of Indigenous activists/communities providing support to non-Indigenous activists in the arena of public discourses. It was suggested that an interactive process of listening and responding to the questions/perceptions of non-Indigenous supporters/partners was key to identifying the advocacy and "informational needs" of non-Indigenous partners.[69]

Implicitly referring to the issue of equalizing power relations within peacebuilding partnerships through a means of reciprocity and mutual need, such an approach would entail reconfiguring the goal of partnership from one of solely focusing on the Treaty rights of Cape Croker, for example, to answering some of the other above lessons on creating ongoing, sustained, and broad-based engagements with non-Indigenous partners.

The discussion on 'second generation' strategies and grassroots partnerships also raised some difficult and differing perspectives on the capacity and willingness of

[68] Jimelda Johnston along with the other community members from Cape Croker, the Catholic Church, and non-Indigenous allies therein, held a number of large cross-cultural meetings to bring together Cape Croker residents and non-Indigenous people to listen and share views on the relationship.

[69] For example, part of that political climate in the Saugeen-Bruce Peninsula was a deep fear from non-Indigenous communities of being displaced from their properties and the impact on their jobs/economy if Cape Croker/Indigenous peoples' rights were recognized and restored. In that context, non-Indigenous supporters and partners were sometimes best positioned to respond to those dialogues within their own community but had "informational needs' that needed to be acknowledged and satisfied in order for those community activists to meaningful address fears in those non-Indigenous communities.

communities to undertake a more sustained engagement. In particular, such an analysis asked whether non-indigenous partners, Indigenous activists and Bands Councils were ready to embark on that approach.

One response argued that the lack of such a process currently, and the fluidity of internal organizational capacities, intellectually and technically for both Band Councils and community groups hindered the ability to construct such a strategic approach and campaign with each other.

At the same time, the very nature of a partnership's utility was called into question by another Chippewas of Nawash community member. Their assessment was that Cape Croker efforts needed to prioritize legal means as a way of achieving specific Indigenous/Cape Croker rights rather than any future focus on developing partnerships with non-influential non-Indigenous supporters.

On the other hand, a third response by a non-Indigenous activist closely associated with Cape Croker argued that that building relationships and/or constructing partnerships at the community level was vital in terms of processes of reconciliation (community to community), leveraging the power of grassroots forces, and using non-state mechanisms to addressing the issues of conflict, locally and nationally. As they said, "My recent experience with XXX [another land claim] and other issues, makes it clear to me that building of those relationships on a person-to-person, community to community basis outside of the framework of the legal of or state mechanism is as important as it's ever been" (CLL:11).

Hence, the discussion on 'second generation' partnerships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples raised questions not only about process and strategy but the very purpose and goals activists and communities were looking to achieve.[70] The three case studies pointed to a number of lessons in terms of community-based peacebuilding and constructing sustainable grassroots alliance-building for social justice. The themes of relationship building and priorities; local capacities and knowledge; strategies and processes of social change provided important conceptualizations and experiences on how to strengthen future practices between Indigenous and non-indigenous activists at the grassroots level in Canada.

Conclusion

In the context of ubiquitous conflicts, asymmetrical relations of power and social arenas of contestation, grassroots peacebuilding and relationships had numerous respective discourses and practices. Taken together, the three case studies' grassroots narratives, reflections and self-generated learnings exhibited diverse types of relationship building, spectrums of collaboration, different strategic options and situated epistemological landscapes.

In that sense, at least at the grassroots community level, peacebuilding might be better understood as multiple and evolving considerations about process, strategies, and relationships residing in differently-situated, place-based, cultural geographies of knowledge, intersections of class/identity and community/organizational priorities.

In contrast to State-focussed peacebuilding, institutional reconstruction and technologies of conflict resolution, grassroots community-based peacebuilding was not easily generalisable. Yet, in spite of being highly contextual and localized in nature, the case studies presented a series of narratives, discourses and practices that highlighted complex negotiations of power and possibilities of social change from the bottom-up. Just as there were diverse framings of conflict, so too were there different versions and visions informing grassroots practices of relationship building. Structured as it was by historical and contemporary asymmetrical relations of power, the conflict in Canada involving Indigenous and non-Indigenous people had numerous points of locality. The situated grassroots narratives exhibited commonalities and dissimilarities defined in the first instance by a larger Canadian context, and manifested in the second instance by specific place-based geographies of knowledge and modes of resistance.

Though each case study represented a brief moment in time and space, they all held significance in terms of exploring the challenges, successes and limitations of grassroots community-based peacebuilding. First, the circumstances in each locality were situated in particular ways that differently enabled, as well as differently hindered the extent of community peacebuilding efforts. Second, in conjunction with local conditions, self-defined priorities and community capacities, relationship building between Indigenous and non-Indigenous of grassroots activists held different meanings and possibilities. Third, the set of processes, analyses and strategies employed between Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists were reflective of various degrees of negotiated interests, understandings and trust.

Fourth, processes of self-generated critical pedagogy, particularly through ceremonies, were a means to alter asymmetrical relations of power by repositioning Indigenous geographies of knowledge to the forefront of negotiated decolonizing landscapes. Fifth, the framings of conflicts were themselves situated within relations of power, both discursively and materially. Sixth, neither finite or limited, grassroots community-based peacebuilding was an evolving reconstruction of relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists, and by extension, between communities. Seventh, precisely assessing the impacts of grassroots peacebuilding efforts and relationship building remained a challenge, depending as it did upon the evaluative criteria deployed, the available evidence and the situated position of the knower. Eighth, grassroots community-based peacebuilding was a differently-situated process of social change that repositioned the discourse, practices and agendas for building peace into alternative placed-based community spaces. Ninth, grassroots (and subaltern) narratives of hope, community empowerment and bottom-up perspectives were not without effect, rather, they formed an aspect of *glocality* and its reshaping of both locality and globality.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

As developed throughout the dissertation's chapters,[71] I combined a number of different and interconnected agendas with the overall goal being to strengthen and revitalize the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding research in six specific ways.

First, I critiqued the past and current peacebuilding literature in order to present its theoretical, methodological and substantive gaps and inadequacies. Second, I argued for a recognition of the interconnectedness of methodology, reflexivity and knowledge/power in general, and more specifically within the peacebuilding literature. Third, my theoretical and methodological framework constituted a distinctive exemplar for conflict resolution and peacebuilding that begins to ground our research questions, methodologies and discourses as situated knowledges within relations of power. Fourth, I argued academic peacebuilding discourses and

[71] Chapter One began with a theorization of power as a prerequisite for critiquing discourses and in this particular case, the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Chapter Two was a review and critique of the current discourses in the field ('Old school, Newer School and Newest School') and theorized an alternative stance known as 'grassroots community-based peacebuilding'. Chapter Three argued that research, researcher and reader were inherently political and subjectively and intersubjectively situated. Further, I outlined a performative auto-ethnographic version of a post-structural grounded theory, together with my ontological premises of power, as an epistemological justification and legitimizing of my analysis and situated knowledge. Chapter Four contextualized the post-colonial conflict in Canada in order to give a sense of the history and the contemporary challenges and issues faced by grassroots community-based peacebuilding in that setting. Chapter Five, the *Cape Croker* case study, focussed on the discourses and practices between Chippewas of Nawash and non-Indigenous supporters as they sought to develop strategies to support Indigenous fishing rights and counter local racist violence. Chapter Six, *Grassy Narrows,* involved a grassroots discourse of solidarity between Grassy Narrows community members and non-Indigenous activists touching on trust, respect, ceremonies and negotiating/fusing different cultural, spiritual, and epistemological positions as part of a campaign on behalf of decolonization and environmental issues. Chapter Seven, *Kenora,* was an example of a unique partnership between the Grand Council of Treaty #3 and the City of Kenora aiming to transform the past by acknowledging the issues of power and historical trauma, as well as seeking to create a sustainable future based on mutual interests as a community. Chapter Eight compared the three case studies and recounted the place-based examples and geographies of knowledge that offered bottom-up approaches and alternative lessons for the field of peacebuilding and conflict resolution based upon those grassroots discourses and practices.

practices are not neutral but inherently involved in larger social relations. As a consequent, an ethics of conflict resolution and peacebuilding requires a recognition that we are all, and always, political actors. Fifth, I presented the critical narratives from the locality of Indigenous and non-Indigenous grassroots activists in order to shift the spotlight of peacebuilding discourses and practices onto the transformative possibilities of grassroots community-based peace building. Sixth, I contended that the earlier transformative discourses and practices in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, as exemplified in someone like Adam Curle, had been denuded over time. I have argued that our approaches need to be re-invigorated through a resurfacing of social justice values and a partnership of praxis between academy and community.

This current chapter, Chapter Nine, summarizes the earlier critique of conflict resolution and peacebuilding literature and links it to the issues of research methodologies, relations of power and situated knowledges. I continue with a reformulated theorization of grassroots community peacebuilding as alternative geographies of knowledge, place-based practices and counter-narratives, important in themselves, and as part of a glocality of bottom-up transformative change. Third, I conclude with a call for a renewing of the field of Conflict resolution and Peacebuilding based on social justice and community-based praxis.

Arising from my own lived experiences and knowledge as a social justice activist-academic, my research aim was to create spaces and legitimacy for challenging 'regimes' and claims of truth', politically and epistemologically within the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. To do so, I used a theorization of relations of

power, drawn from Foucault, Said and Gramsci, to critique the reproductive and disciplinary nature of hegemonic discursive formations operating within contemporary conflict resolution and peacebuilding literature.

I argued that relations of power, as epistemic systems of thought (Foucault), functioned as 'regimes of truth' in such a way as to marginalize alternate possibilities of 'truths', as well as subordinate alternative, bottom-up narratives, knowledges and practices within peacebuilding discourses. Further, I repositioned Said's arguments on Orientalism into a critique of the conflict resolution discourses. I contended contemporary peacebuilding discourses, as a configuration of Euro-American (Western) subjective positionality, occupied a privileged epistemological position of superiority that in turn universalized its' representations, narratives and practices while subordinating and excluding alternate voices of 'the other'.

Much of conflict resolution and peacebuilding literature, as reviewed earlier, discursively functioned as an imperial and hegemonic system of thought that normalized and accredited its own structures, ideologies and practices . At the same time, those literatures was theoretically impaired in valuing the contestation of relations of power from outside its own paradigm. The consequence was a body of literature, methodologies and discourses in contemporary conflict resolution and peacebuilding that by its insular, exclusionary and positional superiority constituted a hegemonic system of epistemic violence.

From this framework of discursive relations of power and imperialism, I asserted that much of the conflict resolution and peacebuilding writings (most particularly

the Old School and Newer School) were (post-)positivist narratives deeply connected to established 'common sense' systems of thought, politically and culturally. Further, such writings were reflective of a moment in qualitative research methodology (Denzin) that portrayed its voices as an unproblematic universality rather than the particularized worldviews it embodies. Those discourses, embedded in western academia as a site of power/knowledge, have supported neo-liberal economic and political peacebuilding projects, one that paid scant attention to counter-narrative grassroots activists' discourses and practices, except possibly to co-opt them. Such neo-liberal analyses and practices of peacebuilding have been symptomatic of omissions and obfuscation regarding power, control, discourse and authority.

Indeed, much of the literature in the field inadequately engages with issues of power, both theoretically and methodologically. In particular, this has implications in terms of self-reflexivity, sites of peacebuilding and understandings social change.

The first discrepancy in the bulk of conflict resolution and peacebuilding literature is a lack of self-reflexivity that our own locations as researchers reflect particularized vantage points, and that our discourses and production of knowledge are indelibly situated within relations of power and regimes of truth. The nature of our own discourses, whether we acknowledge it or not, are unavoidably part of a contestation concerning the nature, means and direction of social change and the future configurations of power. Hence, positioned within discursive relations of power, conflict resolution and peacebuilding writers and discourses need to pay greater

attention to their own epistemological assumption and frameworks, both theoretically and methodologically.

Second, the too-often theoretically light conflict resolution and peacebuilding literatures understate the significance of grassroots community-based peacebuilding as a site of contestation and transformative change. There is a worrisome lack of ongoing attention to referencing and grounding our peacebuilding theories and discourses to grassroots community-based locations and practices. As a consequence, the relationship between lived experiences and theory formation becomes increasingly tenuous and decontextualized where, in fact, it needs to be firmly grounded in peoples' lives.

Third, the earlier radical political/social justice tradition within conflict resolution and peacebuilding literature has become submerged under the weight of neo-liberal state-centred paradigms and technical projectivization of peacebuilding. Consequently, the transformative potential of the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding too often slithers into discourses that are epistemological reproductions of relations of power rather than ones that think outside the ('tool kit') box. Hence, writers and practitioners need to vigorously re-engage with earlier social justice traditions and less with State-driven discourses.

The result, I contend generally, is a damaging disconnect between self-reflexive praxis and research methodologies, relations of power, our situated lived experiences, emancipatory pedagogies and social justice aspirations. In sum, the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding must more rigorously engage with its

own subjectivities and epistemologies, politics of social justice and the wider relations of power, knowledge/power and epistemic violence.

My response to the above state of affairs has been to narrate and construct various counter discourses on epistemology, methodology, relations of power and localized knowledges.

One way of doing this was to reinsert multiple voices and excluded locations back into contemporary discourses in the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. To this end, I have attempted to challenge hegemonic matrices of power by pointing to emancipatory discourses and peacebuilding practices at the local level.

I have asserted that grassroots community-based peacebuilding discourses and practices can be understood as contesting hegemonic relations of power. Appreciated in this way, the case studies of 'local' grassroots community-based building grassroots and their discourses are specific sites of confrontation with dominant epistemologies and relations of power. Actively resisting, re-constructing and transforming relations of power, their differently positioned experiences retain various degrees and elements of autonomous ontological perspectives and epistemic practices (economic, political, cultural, social, environmental, spiritual).

In a way quite different than much of the conflict resolution and peacebuilding literatures, 'local knowledges' are not instrumentally attached to state-centred actors, institutions and processes as instrumental appendages. Such place-based geographies of knowledge exist in parallel spaces as local domains containing their "own possibilities and conditions of knowledge" (Conway 2004). Differently

situated than either the State or conflict resolution academics, they (re)present a number of peacebuilding ontologies (local knowledges, multiple subjectivities, hybridities), locations of emancipatory politics and alternate possibilities for understanding/acting in the world. These place-based geographies of knowledge are all pertinent for adding depth and complexity to conflict resolution and peacebuilding ontologies within the under-appreciated civil society geographies.

Further, localized grassroots community-based peacebuilding are new social ('local') knowledges and ontologies of peacebuilding arising from activist and community practices. These grassroots peacebuilding ontologies of social mobilization and community empowerment are important sites for understanding the ways in which communities define and participate in social change and creating peace.

New social movements and grassroots community-based peacebuilding efforts reflect differing contexts concurrently developing new ways of knowing, ways of interpreting social realities and producing cultural "discourses and practices that are resources for alternative futures" (Conway 2004). Those "movement-based knowledges", particularly in the Canadian Indigenous/non-indigenous context, can be seen as reflecting the emergence of new theoretical and political frameworks that both adapt and reject European and North American traditions while simultaneously incorporating their own traditions and epistemologies (geographies of knowledge) in new approaches and hybridities.

At the same time, community-based struggles are occurring in a version of space as not solely local but one inherently situated within larger global dynamics. To this

affect, the nature of the conflicts are framed within global and local spaces that are mutually constituted; a global one of capitalism, ecological exploitation and undemocratic governance, together with local manifestations, implications and counter-responses. As a part of this, community struggles need to be understood as localized movements and multiple sites, "each with a specific genealogy" (Conway 2004:12) that incorporate a methodology of praxis and "the possibility of action premised on partial and provisional knowing".

An analysis of community-based and locally-situated efforts have the potential to re-vitalize conflict resolution and peacebuilding discourses to more clearly appreciate the importance of grassroots community-based peacebuilding as a site of transformational change. Hence, these grassroots examples are critical to informing discourses in the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding concerning structure, agency, locations, actors, processes, and strategies.

Concurrently, in understanding grassroots community-based peacebuilding as a key site of socio-cultural transformation, it also becomes significant place from which to problematize research methodologies. Absent too often in the conflict resolution and peacebuilding literature has been an engagement with current social science debates that go to the heart of research approaches and practices. On the one hand, such debates concern claims of truth, validity, critical self-reflexivity and issues of performativity. On the other hand they are fundamentally connected to power/knowledge, systems of thought, relations of power and ethics.

Historicizing academic qualitative research, I made use of Norman Denzin's eight 'moments' (typology and paradigms) of qualitative research to situate and discuss the ways in which various methodological approaches to research enact and (re)produce certain questions, processes and forms of knowledge. Denzin's (Denzin et al., 2008) depiction of the various 'moments' of social science methodologies are also relevant for discussing where the 'present-future' of conflict resolution and peacebuilding discourses needs to go: to explicitly engage and state the relations of power implicit in the production of knowledge; ground subsequent claims of truth as always situated in some way; and to enact social justice research methodologies.

Such a theoretical-methodological directive like Denzin's begins with a general contention that any and every research methodology has ontological and epistemological foundations**.** Further, it is informed by postmodernism and/or poststructuralist sensibilities -- themselves representing a shift in ontology, epistemology and, by implication, methodological practices away from key facets of modernity and its understanding of objectivity. Additionally, given the assertion that relations of power and systems of thought are ubiquitous, every discourse (and research) is then situated, interpretive and structured within beliefs and paradigms. Further, those paradigms are deeply connected into larger social practices and political contestations; researchers, research methodologies and research, contrary to some claims, are not neutral, 'objective' nor passive. Rather, they are always situated, socially constructed, and enact the world in various ways. As relations of power, discursively and in practice, research is a political enterprise.

The above argument has a number of important methodological and political implications for social science, conflict resolution and peacebuilding and my own research methodology that need to be stated.

First, conflict resolution and peacebuilding research and writing needs to grapple with the politics of self-reflexivity and situated knowing, as well as the status and location of its own research methodologies. As Oliver Richmond had argued earlier, (neo) positivist-realist narratives proclaim a universality of meaning and interpretation while neither making explicit nor reflecting upon their implicit and situated versions of the world they claim to portray. The consequence was a "hegemonic peace discourse", evident in neo-liberal policies and positivist research claims of truth. Those 'truth claims' had discursive and practical implications through their framings, analyses and proscriptions regarding any particular conflict. Similar to Edward Said's interconnection of imperial discourses, representations and practices, such hegemonic peace discourses, situated systems of thought and dispersed relations of power construct social relations and structures. In turn, they are manifested, reinforced, legitimized and exalted by through a myriad of normative practices.[72]

However, the problem is not that system of thought and relations of power exist per se, rather it is the subsequent production of asymmetrical relationships that offer a relatively privileged few the 'good life' and conversely consign the misery of human insecurity to the vast majority of peoples. Irrespective of individual or collective intentions, researchers, writers and methodologies are not immune from

[72] For example, as seen in Milton Keynes works on economics, Sigmund Freud's theories of the unconscious, or Samuel Huntington's atrocious writings on the 'clash' of civilisation, they have material effect on our daily lives, be it financial policies, health care or international relations.

participating in social relations nor is our work outside relations of power. Rather, we are performing and enacting power in various ways, be it ones that reaffirm established modes of being, contest them or do both. Herein lays the importance of the politics of self-reflexivity, situated knowing and research methodologies: do we speak our power as faceless gods or do we seek to openly articulate the world in its partialities? Do we adopt a place of positional superiority politically and culturally (however, well-intentioned or not) or do we strive to unmask and negotiate our particularities? To paraphrase Michel Foucault, we cannot escape our knowledge but we can point to its internally situated discourse in order to create possibilities of things being other than they are.

There is a second political, ethical and research methodology set of implications for conflict resolution and peacebuilding discourses. Specifically pertaining to inclusivity, equity and alternate possibilities, naming our knowledge as our own is to warrant the question as to whose knowledge beyond our situatedness is not being acknowledged by us. As the dissertation's three case studies exhibited, there were numerous counter-narratives, visions and practices emanating from the grassroots (subaltern). They embodied localities and cultures of difference other than those (not) referenced in much of the conflict resolution and peacebuilding literature.

Grassroots community-based peacebuilding between Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists/communities in Canada were examples of Vivianne Jabri's (2007) "politics of peace" with their diverse bottom-up peacebuilding ontologies, discourses and practices. Their situated framing of the conflicts, the Indigenous quest for decolonization, the negotiation of trust and the developing of partnership amongst

activists inherently sought to transform asymmetrical relations of power. These local place-based geographies of knowledge and practices hardly ever referred to the terminologies of 'peacebuilding' or 'reconciliation', yet they were actively constructing alternate possibilities, processes and strategies for socio-political change. In a Canadian context of neo-colonialism, structural and cultural violence and political marginalization manifested local and nationally, Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists were challenging and engaging themselves, each other, their respective communities, and macro relations of power and possibility.

As a grassroots social justice activist and occasional academic, my quest was to open up spaces within theory-practice for joint conversations between the researcher, the researched, and the reader. More truthfully, I have sought to create a different theoretical and methodological approach for studies in conflict resolution and peacebuilding that tried to include grassroots voices and narratives too often ignored or co-opted. My aim was not simply to make a unique contribution to the field but to re-insert a notion of social justice praxis back into our conflict resolution and peacebuilding discourses. More importantly, I undertook this research as an activist strategically located within a hierarchical system of 'knowledge' production known as academia. I have sought to provide an argument for legitimizing the power and knowledge of community-based actions and 'cultures of difference'. I did this both for our own critical reflection within academia, and for returning elements of the research back to those community activists from whence it came.

In keeping with the actions of grassroots activists in the case studies, I positioned this research as a form of self-generated critical pedagogy. On one level, it was

directed to challenging unreflexive research methodologies and forms of power/knowledge privileged in the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. On the other hand, it was an exploration of grassroots community-based peacebuilding understood as locally produced knowledges, discourses and practices. Both aspects were understood as self-generated critical pedagogies containing emancipatory processes and transformative possibilities. At the same time, they were 'readings of the world' that critically engaged with relations of power, dominant forms of knowledge, and social relations.

Further, critical pedagogy and grassroots community-based peacebuilding were performative practices; authenticating, creating and acting the world as understood within those experiences. Grassroots community-based activists and community members acted as 'specific' (Foucault) and 'organic' (Gramsci) intellectuals who in the process of struggling and collaborating, were contesting wider 'regimes of truth' and their local enactment. Their performances as avant guarde organic intellectuals/leaders have particular value for understanding the everyday knowledge, dialogical conversations and practices within, and between, Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists/communities. Further, their performances were constructing emancipatory possibilities towards an unfinished project of social justice in their personal and social lives. It was, as Norman Denzin (2008) called it, a politics of the future rooted in a political and ethical practice of understanding the present and working towards a more socially just future.

As part of this present-future, the research argued that the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding needed once again to re-engage with explicit dialogues on social

justice, postmodern sensibilities, (poststructuralism, postcolonialism, and feminism), critical pedagogy, alternative research methodologies, transformative practices (grassroots and Indigenous perspectives), praxis and activism. This is not an especially radical agenda to suggest as over 30 years ago Quaker activists and Peace Studies academics like Adam Curle were proposing the same engagement with relations of power from a social justice perspective.

In that regard, Curle outlined an approach to peace studies (research, teaching and practice) that was inter-disciplinary, politically active, critically imaginative and explicit that knowledge was never neutral. Transposed to the present, that same agenda of Curle's is still applicable. In the contemporary context, the methodological and analytical challenge for peacebuilding discourse is to surface the complexities, partialities and situated nature of our own ontological and epistemological paradigms and how it frames our debates and research. Beyond self-reflexivity, those debates entail recognizing the fluid, multiple and contradictory configurations of agency, resistance and social change within their vast geography of sites, structures and relations of power.

As the research case studies showed, the daily lives, experiences, understandings and actual practices of Indigenous/non-Indigenous activists and similar localities of subaltern geographies of knowledge offer places for evolving partnership and praxis. Meanwhile, the voices of numerous Indigenous writers and Indigenous peoples globally are a source of counter-narratives, alternative possibilities and hope for a different constructed future.

Behind this dissertation was the question of hope. What did the grassroots approaches model about respecting and reconcile diversities of culture and restoring communal relationships? Where were the strategies and partnerships that construct alternative paradigms, models and practices for relationships of hope and social transformation? How did these practices themselves constitute new ways of collaborative problem-solving based on equity, reciprocity and mutual benefit? How could large social conflicts be approached with inclusivity and social justice?

Inter-group conflicts, particularly in Canada involving Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, seem to be profoundly lurching from crisis to crisis. Community-based peacebuilding efforts of alliance-building and partnerships may well offer the basis for a larger social justice movement based on collaboration and reconciliation. Grassroots community-based peacebuilding models between Indigenous and non-Indigenous allies may yet become catalysts for a transformative approach to the conflict by building relationships from the bottom-up. There are no universal templates that can be transferred from one locality to another, yet there are experiences that can be shared and provide lessons in process, strategies and negotiating differences for other communities seeking to transform deeply rooted social conflicts. Reflecting on the experiences of past community-based efforts, strategies and successes can strengthen new approaches to sustaining alliances and broadening relationship-building between communities in conflict, locally and nationally.

In spite of that hope, we need to ask ourselves to what extent are we (Euro-American geographies, academics, western epistemologists) are trying to still control the

peacebuilding discourses, policies and practices? I have argued that part of the answer is reflected in the implicit assumptions of our writings and the 'common sense' discourses of 'interventions' and 'resolutions'. As I wrote earlier, much of the peacebuilding discourse appears to be a not-so subtle coinciding of our own situated 'ideals' with the maintenance of global systems of imperialism from which we personally and collectively benefit. Answers to the questions of 'whose order is to be preserved? And 'who makes that decision?' point to the continued existence of asymmetrical global relations of power.

In contrast, there are clusters of critical themes to engender the critical reflexivity required for a social justice approach to peacebuilding including measuring political change against the criteria of equity, inclusivity and community control; embracing the inseparability of environmental, economic, and governance issues as intrinsic to conflict and peace; and that social movements, participatory approaches and local levels are part of constructing an alternate glocality. As a result, I have argued that much of the literature and discourses in the field of Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding contain a problematic understanding of peacebuilding (theoretically, methodologically, culturally); one that absences the voices, participatory processes, and knowledge construction from the grassroots community level.

One of the key questions under-discussed in the literature is the relationship between local resistance and transformation and "how, and in what ways, does community-level peacebuilding struggles change the world? If transforming conflict and building sustainable peace depends upon a participatory and inclusive approach then our questions in the field should be re-phrased as 'how to understand contemporary

conflicts from the perspective of local communities?' and 'how can communities/activists effectively respond based upon a critical praxis of reflection and action?'. Thus, as academics, researchers, and practitioners, we need to reflexively ask ourselves, 'what is problematic about our theoretical methodologies, cultural approaches, and our aptitude to learn alongside local communities?'

I contend further that peace research and the field of conflict resolution faces a paradigm shift from outdated state-centred security paradigms that ignore "social and economic inequalities arising from an asymmetric, hierarchical relationship in the existing system". In its replacement are the emergence of alternate visions, theorizations and paradigms based upon making visible the many forms of violence including systems like colonialism. Hence, one way to re-conceptualize peacebuilding then is to radicalize its meaning by reframing it as a methodology of discursive inclusiveness and epistemological diversity; normative values of social justice, equality; critical pedagogies of; and practices of collective/community transformation of conflicts and social relations. One site, I contended, were the activities of grassroots peacebuilding.

Grassroots community-based peacebuilding can be understood methodologically as different and counter-narratives of knowledge-truth and as a project of theorizing from the 'bottom-up' below via praxis. As a concept and practice, it transforms the way conflict and relations of power are interpreted and understood discursively, analytically and in practice: people are actors, not passive problems waiting to be fixed; solutions and change are situated in local community-based perspectives and

processes. Grassroots community peacebuilding can be seen as an intrinsic process within the decolonization and self-determination of peoples and communities.

In terms of social change assumptions and discourse, grassroots narratives pointed to the importance of self-directed processes, diverse strategies, solidarity and reciprocity, and partnerships at the community level. Grassroots narratives on social change or peacebuilding also hold a variety of assumptions and ideas on the necessity, means, and effectiveness of trying to influence, lobby and develop relationships with different elements of government and state institutions. Views stretched from a general distrust and more oppositional approach to one with a institutionalize commitment to create improved relationships. It was also a place of situatedness with the history of Indigenous communities and Band Council relations with the Canadian Federal/Provincial governments being entirely different than, for example, non-Indigenous faith-based group not directly in conflict with the government.

Further, given that social groups and networks change over time in terms of the roles and influence they have politically and culturally, where are the new allies? Who are the new potential allies that Indigenous communities should build relationships with to the view of providing support when there are particular crises? Moreover, given the changing nature and self-empowerment of Indigenous communities raises the issue of leadership and collaboration with non-Indigenous groups. What does it mean for non-indigenous partners that the agency of setting direction (and the power of authority) is shifting to Indigenous communities themselves? How does this

connect to ideas about solidarity, the role of anti-racism, and the way in which the conflict is epistemically framed?

Dialogues on social change and large-scale conflicts must inevitably ask about the state of future relationships. The question arises as to what the various grassroots narratives had to say about the importance of a process of reconciliation and to what degree do people articulate any attainment of that at the local level. Though none of the grassroots narratives explicitly used this term, for the present, I define 'reconciliation" as the capacity of having forged a new relationship for the future based on tolerance and co-existence. Additionally useful is "restorative justice" as a process leading to reconciliation between the victim and offender, a process or response which provides an opportunity to address the impacts of harm caused while holding the person accountable in a way that is meaningful for the victim, community and offender. As one interviewee said "if you don't settle the business of the past, you can't really start to forge a better future" (CAA-38). Is this a component of community-based approaches and what does it look like? Are alliances in themselves a form of reconciliation? Are they an actual practice of reconciliation? Are they even perceived that way? Do they offer a model of working together or building relationships that is essentially a practice of reconciliation?

In partial response, the case studies questioned the assumption that any singular process will address all members/factions of a community, involve entire groups or identities, and whether reconciliation and transformation were inevitable, partial and/or even ongoing. Again the narrative debate is complex. In the Canadian

context, if reconciliation was envisioned with the State, there was an immediate problem concerning what that meant: compensation, self-government, apology; the current discursive limitations and State limitations concerning unilateral State sovereignty and historical responsibility for policies of attempted cultural genocide. On the other hand, reconciliation can be within a community as seen in the discourses from Neighbours in Owen Sound and the Common Ground process in Kenora. Further, if reconciliation is understood to be undoing structural inequalities and racism then if such a goal was to be preceded by a campaign of anti-racism (or historical reconciliation and responsibility), it becomes another debate as what groups, communities, organizations or sets of State institutions should take that role.

Finally, I left with the feeling that there is something still desperately wrong with the much of literature in the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Like crazed medieval rulers facing an inevitable insurrection, the era of Corporate-State-centred governance and Euro-American bourgeoise academia is flaying against a thunderstorm of localized resistance emanating from the most marginalized of peoples. Here, I mean both the surviving and resurging fifth column of organic intellectuals in metropole locales but more importantly, the reversal of positional authority initiated by colonized peoples and Indigenous Peoples. Such struggles from the margins include the nascent Indigenous process of collective decolonization of mind, imagination and life projects. What role will they play in slowly unwrapping the last 500 years of Western imperialism, its ideological epistemology of positivism and scientific progress, and techno-military dominance?

Further, the critiques of post-colonial theory and decolonizing methodologies have called into crisis the historical narrative of our tyrannical delusions. Western Feminist theories and methodologies and postmodernism cracked the imperial pretensions of a universalist (male) identity located in a sophisticated discourse of superiority and exclusivity. Indigenous writings have decentred the starting points from a singular set of interpretations located in Western cultural hegemony and moved them to a plurality of spaces, identities and practices lived in the former hinterland of oppressed memories of colonized communities and experiences.

As modern story tellers, academics writings in the global geography of the 'North' have, as Edward Said remarked, colluded with racism and dehumanizing practices of modern States in creating "knowledges" that are more propaganda than any objective truth. Taking a cue from Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Franz Fanon, Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak works that critically review the systems and discourses of imperial control and the production of knowledge as a commodity to be sold to buttress colonial globalization, we in academic seemed to have inspected, classified and evaluated all others except for ourselves. Self-criticism seems to have ended before our fingers hit the keys of our laptops.

Unlike the Blair Government's failed attempt at Terror Legislation (November 8, 2005) that would have interned terror suspects (obviously not themselves unfortunately) for 90 days, audaciously undoing several hundred years of human rights progress, the debate is more truly a discourse of history and economic exploitation, subjugation and continued imperialism. Tragically, it is a discussion we are trying so desperately to evade.

There are two points to be made. First, like the criticisms made in postcolonial theory, the question arises whether or not even this narrative (Rick Wallace and other academics) is but a continued manufacturing of imperial authority? Who are we to re-appropriate the voices and representations, the lived knowledges, memories and ways of being of Indigenous Peoples? Are we further disingenuously usurping their knowledges as somehow our own creation?

We can speak of a plurality of spaces, or multiple and fractured identities, of cultural and political resistance by the oppressed, we can even claim their knowledge under the paternalistic paradigm of popular knowledge, yet who is writing this message? And to whom is the message addressed? Are we avoiding our own implication in continued global colonialism by labelling our thinking as postmodern and postcolonial when, in fact, we haven't really begun to evaluate our own foundations of identity? As one Indigenous writer put it, 'postmodernism and a fragmented identity is nothing new for Indigenous peoples, we have been living it for over 500 years' (Smith 1999). Our thinking is like a book with a single chapter but missing the other twelve that precede it. Recalling Umberto Eco's novel, *"If on a Winter's Night a Stranger..."* that looks for the thread that purports to be the authentic story, we in academia want theories that are simple, true, and easily read as if to say, 'exile other's history and deliver us from the temptation of accountability and responsibility'.

Second, as with the superficial literature purporting to be about conflict resolution and peacebuilding, so too is the deceptive eloquence of war criminals leading nations

on crusades of ‘peace and democracy’. The reductionism of human needs theory, the positivism of the liberal individual a-cultural mediator, the myth of miscommunication and the need for rational persuasion is *pure bollocks* when contextualized within a wider lens of our war cry of terror towards the terrorized majority of the world who have been designated to the heap of poverty, theft and confinement.

Finally, to summarize: who is claiming authority in telling the contemporary story of conflict? How any of these narratives and stories can be told without reference to the expanding globalization of Western epistemologies, methodologies and politico-economic hegemony simply boggles any sane mind. Even to talk of community-based peacebuilding is perhaps a misnomer. Perhaps we have reduced social justice to justice for others without ourselves having to change and transform as part of that process.

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Appendix #1: Community Research Agreement (Treaty #3 example)

Community Research Agreement[73]

Between Rick Wallace and Treaty #3

(February 16, 2007):

Name of Ph.D. Student Researcher: Rick Wallace

Department of Peace Studies

University of Bradford

Bradford, West Yorkshire

BD7 1DP

UNITED KINGDOM

Supervisor: Professor Betts Fetherston

Phone: __011-44-1274-235-176

E-mail: a.b.fetherston@bradford.ac.uk

Fax: 011-44-1274-235-240

Contact Information and Address:

Rick Wallace

E-mail: rick_university@yahoo.ca

[73] Adapted from model drafted by Research Division, Inuit Tapiriiksat Kanatami

AND

Name of Community or

Organization:

_____

Name(s) of Contact Person:

_____

Address:

Research Project Named:

"Community-based Peacebuilding and Protracted Social Conflicts: Building Collaboration and Alliances between Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Partners in Canada."

Nature and Purpose of Research:

The purpose of the research is to look at understanding the relationship between Anishnabek peoples and non-Anishnabek grassroots organizations/activist that are involved in the struggle for social justice, supporting Anishnabek inherent rights, and developing new ways of creating positive relationships. In this case study, I will be exploring the experiences of Treaty #3 and the City of Kenora in developing the "Common Ground" agreement

The broad research aims to understand ways of strengthening positive relationships and solidarity at the community level between Anishnabek (First Nations) and non-Anishnabek (Euro-Canadian) allies and partners. It looks to listen and reflect the processes and experiences used to develop public and political support for Anishnabek peoples and their interests. Specifically, how this can be done with non-Anishnabek partners/allies through creating common understandings, collaborative partnerships and alliances, and agreements that are mutually beneficial, create trust, and establish a new relationship.

Conducting the Research

The student researcher, as named, and Treaty #3 agree to conduct the named research project with the following understanding:

The purpose of this research project, as discussed with and **understood by this Treaty #3** is:

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX *(To be written by Treaty #3)*

The scope of this research project (that is, what issues, events, or activities are to be involved, and the degree of participation by community residents), as discussed with and **understood by Treaty #3:**

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX *(To be written by Treaty #3)*

The methods to be used, as agreed by the student researcher and this community/organization are:

- In-person or telephone interviews with consenting individuals.
- Any written documents that Treaty #3 may choose to share with the Researcher.
- The use of written and informed consent before any interviewing. Informed consent of individual participants is to be obtained in these agreed upon ways:

    *Verbal and written information on the research project including the nature and purpose of the research; the method of conducting interviews; the Researcher's code of conduct; confidentiality and privacy; potential benefits of participating; uses of research.

    *Use and signing of a written consent form.

(Where applicable) Community training and participation, as agreed, is to include:

Information (data) collected during research is to be shared, distributed and stored in these agreed-upon ways:

Sharing:

The research will be shared with Treaty #3 by:

- Providing Treaty #3 with a written copy of the PhD dissertation.
- Providing a presentation to Treaty #3 on the dissertation.

Distribution:

The research becomes a public document freely distributed and accessible.

- Copies will be donated to the Band, Treaty Organization, schools, any relevant library.

- Public presentations will be made to the community and other avenues of public dissemination will be explored.

Storage:

- Further, for security reasons, the data will be stored on computer disks locked in a secure place.

The names of participants and the community are to be used or protected in these agreed upon ways:

Confidentiality and Privacy

- This means that participants have the right to withdraw at any point, to refuse to answer any question, the right to remain anonymous, and to the confidentiality of the data protected.
- People will not be quoted or identified by name unless they expressly choose to be.
- Copies of any transcribed interviews will be emailed directly to the individuals and they have the right at that point to clarify, alter or delete references to themselves at that time.

Ethical code of conduct

Rick Wallace: "I understand that people in the community are sensitive about these issues and still affected personally and communally by them. I am bound by both academic Ethical Codes of Conduct and personal ones. In brief, any participation is voluntary and based upon explicit consent. People are free to withdraw at any time. Should someone withdraw at any time during the interviews, I

will not use their information unless they give permission. Anything I attribute to people will be checked with them to ensure it accurately represents their views and voices, names and identifying features will be removed (unless otherwise requested). My own code is based upon building trust, equality and honesty, creating a participatory and collaborative approach, and the necessity of giving something meaningful back to the communities."

Project progress will be communicated to the community in these agreed upon ways:

- The Researcher, Rick Wallace, will email monthly updates to the contact person, as agreed upon, for the organization

Benefits

The student researcher wishes to use this research for their own benefit in these ways:

- Use of the research for completing a Ph.D. dissertation
- To learn how to be a stronger listener and partner in developing supportive relationships between communities.
- As a knowledge base to assist informing him in his future activities such as a teacher, trainer, or activist.

Benefits likely to be gained by Treaty #3 and the community through this research project are:

- Outline ways Treat #3, individuals, and community partners can work more effectively together in the future. Within the research process, people will have the opportunity to share, reflect and learn from past/present experiences in this process of working together.
- Sharing these ideas and experience will help bring new information to these relationships between Anishnabek and non-Anishnabek, and could potentially help build stronger networks of support.
- The final research may help add to elements for reflection that are helpful to both Treaty #3, individuals and partners.
- Acknowledgement of the deep thinking, reflection and courageous efforts by Treaty #3 and the City of Kenora.
- Provide inspiration to other Anishnabek and non-Anishnabek communities desiring to build positive relationships.

Commitments

Treaty #3's commitment to the student researcher is to: (To be written by Treaty #3)

- To provide supportive feedback on draft transcripts of interviews.
- To review draft findings and comment
- To develop a collaborative relationship that is mutually beneficial.
- To communicate any concerns or suggestions.

The student Researcher's commitment to the community/organization is to:

- To develop a collaborative relationship that is mutually beneficial
- To keep Treaty #3 informed of the progress of the research.
- To provide a written copy of the PhD dissertation
- To make a presentation to Treaty #3 on the dissertation
- To act in an ethical, honest and transparent manner, and consult with Treaty #3 regarding uses of the research.
- To respect the intellectual property rights of Treaty #3.
- To communicate any concerns or suggestions.

Protection of Intellectual Property

The student researcher and the community/organization agree to protect and use intellectual property in the following agreed upon ways:

- The intellectual property rights of the process, use, and knowledge is fully retained by Treaty #3.
- Full credit for the origins of the knowledge/experience will be acknowledged publicly by Rick in all circumstances.
- The intellectual property *of the dissertation* itself rests with the student researcher, as per the Ph.D. regulations of Bradford University.
- Any request for a presentation on the specific case of the Treaty #3 and the City of Kenora will be referred to them directly.

Uses of Research

The student researcher and the community/organization agree to that the following uses can be made of the research:

- To complete the PhD dissertation
- The PhD itself (and research therein) may also form the basis for published articles, conferences or potentially even a book at some later stage.
- The research may also be used for presentations back to the participating communities.
- And with the express permission of the organizations involved in the research, for any further information sharing with other interested communities/organizations about the topic of building positive relationships, particularly as it relates to conflict transformation and community-based peacebuilding.

Appendix #2: Information and Consent Form for Research

Information and Consent Form

Greetings. My name is *Rick Wallace* and I am a Euro-Canadian graduate student doing a doctoral research project at the *Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford*, in the United Kingdom. I am based in Toronto, and receive direct supervision from Professor Betts Fetherston in the Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University and guidance

The purpose of this letter is to provide you with information that you will need to understand what I am doing, and to decide whether or not you want to participate. Participation is completely voluntary, and should you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time.

****

Name of Research Study:

Community-based Peacebuilding: A Case Study of Collaboration between Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Activists and Communities.

Nature and Purpose of Research:

The purpose of the research is to look at understanding the relationship between First Nations peoples and grassroots organizations/activist that are involved in the struggle for social justice and supporting First Nations inherent rights.

The research aims to understand ways of strengthening positive relationships and solidarity at the community level between First Nations (like the Chippewas of Nawash) and non-native allies. Second, it looks to assist in evaluating the effectiveness of strategies used to develop public and political support for First Nations issues.

In this case study, I will be exploring the experiences of the *Chippewas of Nawash* and their non-native allies regarding fishing rights, burial grounds, water resources and nuclear dry storage from 1990-2005. Knowledge from this research will be used to complete my PhD dissertation, and outline ways First Nations and mainstream allies and community partners can work more effectively together in the future.

Doing an Interview:

Starting in March 2006 and continuing into September 2006, I will be asking to talk with people and interviewing them about their experiences and thoughts concerning the research topic. The interviews will be 46-90 minutes and could, if necessary, involve a limited number of follow-up interviews, questions or phone calls

During these individual interviews I will be asking you to:

1. Tell the story of your experience and thoughts about the issues of working at the community level with allies or partners
2. Share your successes and challenges
3. Explore the effectiveness of various strategies used to gain public/political support.

With your permission I will be taking notes and/or recording these interviews using an **audio recording** device. This helps me be accurate and allows me to directly engage with you rather than focus on taking notes. I will transcribe parts of the interviews and provide you with a written copy to review.

Academic code of conduct

I understand that people in the community are sensitive about these issues and still affected personally and communally by them. I am bound by both academic Ethical Codes of Conduct and personal ones. In brief, any participation is voluntary and based upon explicit consent. People are free to withdraw at any time. Should someone withdraw at any time during the interviews, I will not use their information unless they give permission. Anything I attribute to people will be checked with them to ensure it accurately represents their views and voices, names and identifying features will be removed (unless otherwise requested). My own code is based upon building trust, equality and honesty, creating a participatory and collaborative approach, and the necessity of giving something meaningful back to the communities.

Confidentiality and Privacy

This means that you have the right to withdraw at any point, to refuse to answer any question, the right to remain anonymous, and to the confidentiality of the data protected. You will not be quoted or identified by name unless you want to be. As mentioned, you will be given a the transcripts I transcribed, and you have the right to clarify, alter or delete references to yourself at that time. Further, for security reasons, the data will be stored on computer disks locked in a secure place.

Potential Benefits from participating:

You will have the opportunity to share your experiences and learn from past experiences.

Your ideas and experience will help bring new information to these relationships between First Nations and non-aboriginal partners, and could potentially help build stronger networks of support. The final research may help add to your thoughts in these areas.

Uses of Research

The research becomes a public document freely distributed and accessible. Copies will be donated to the school, library and archives for use of local residents. Public presentations will be made to the community and other avenues of public dissemination will be explored. The intellectual property of the dissertation itself rests with the student researcher, as per the Ph.D. regulations of Bradford University. The research may also form the basis for published articles, conferences or even a book. It is the intention to widely share this research findings with First Nations, Aboriginal organizations, social movement organizations, and academics.

Consent Form

****

Name of Research Study:

Community-based Peacebuilding: A Case Study of Collaboration between Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Activists and Communities.

I agree to be interviewed for this study in order to share my perspectives and experiences. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, and may refuse to answer any question.

I understand that my interview may be tape-recorded in order to ensure an accurate record of what I have said. The taped interview will be transcribed and analyzed on computer. My name and the information provided will be treated as strictly confidential and will be reviewed only by the researcher (Rick Wallace) and potentially, his Supevisor, Betts Fetherston, both bound by an oath of confidentiality. All interview tapes and written transcripts will be kept in a secure location under lock and key, and computer files will be strictly controlled by password. All data will be destroyed at the end of a five year period which is an academic norm.

I understand that I may be quoted in the materials that are produced from this study. All quotations will be used on an anonymous basis and with adequate provision to disguise my identity, unless I have been consulted and agree to have a specific quote used with my name identified.

I have read this explanation of the study, and agree to participate. I have been provided with a copy of this consent form.

_____

_____

Name – Please Print **Signature**

_____

_____

Mailing Address

_____

_____

E-mail **Phone**

_____

_____

Date **Witness**

Rick Wallace Contact information:

Tel: 1-416-516-1410

Email: rick_university@yahoo.ca

Appendix #3: Letter to Interviewees

Greetings to The Anishinaabe Nation in Treaty #3, the City of Kenora and everyone involved in the Common Ground Partnership.

My name is *Rick Wallace* and I am a Euro-Canadian graduate student doing a doctoral research project (PhD) at the *Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford*, in the United Kingdom. I am based in Toronto, and receive direct supervision from Professor Betts Fetherston in the Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University and guidance.

I would like to talk with each of you about your experiences concerning the process, strategy and lessons of working together and building the new partnership and relations between Treaty #3 and the City of Kenora.

This would be part of my PhD research on building collaboration, relationships and local alliances between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities in Canada. This is part of a larger question on building peace at the local level, or what I call community-based peacebuilding. The Common Ground Partnership is about that very issue and exploring the process and impacts could well serve as a model for other communities involved in similar relationships.

Some Useful Information:

Name of Research Study:

"Community-based Peacebuilding: A Case Study of Collaboration between Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Activists and Communities."

Nature and Purpose of Research:

The research aims to understand ways of strengthening positive relationships and social change at the community level between First Nations and non-native partners. Second, it looks to assist in evaluating the effectiveness of strategies used to develop public and political support for First Nations issues. My work is exploring political collaboration and the development of larger community-driven social movements across conflicting social relations, community boundaries, worldviews, and identities.

In the research I am asking:

1. 'How did these community partner, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal experience processes of engaging differences while establishing mutual priorities and collaborative processes for effective social and political action to address a particular issue?
2. How were they impacted and how does this inform how they will work together in the future?'

My research focuses on localized and indigenous methods of conflict transformation and how these practices of social change impact on creating new alliances and possibilities of collaboration. My dissertation explicitly engages voices from grassroots communities, their localized knowledges and processes in order to integrate and strengthen the analytical framework and practices for conflict transformation and social justice.

Benefits:

The hope is to create tangible community benefits for future work though identifying means to improve partnerships and alliances, and based upon evaluation of past efforts, strengthen the capacity to employ effective and proven conflict transformation/social change strategies. Knowledge from this research will be used to complete my PhD dissertation, and outline ways First Nations and mainstream allies and community partners can work more effectively together in the future.

My broad concern is that the impact of grass-roots community-based peacebuilding efforts, especially in the long conflict involving Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities in Canada, has not been well understood nor adequately researched. The result is a key component of peacebuilding that is both under-theorized, and whose practices are rarely document or evaluated.

Logistics:

Doing an Interview:

I'm up in Kenora for the month of February, 2007. I will be asking to talk with people and interviewing them about their experiences and thoughts concerning the

research topic. The interviews will be 60-90 minutes and could, if necessary, involve a limited number of follow-up interviews, questions or phone calls
During these individual interviews I will be asking you to:

4. Tell the story of your experience and thoughts about the issues of working at the community level with allies or partners
5. Share your successes and challenges
6. Explore the effectiveness of various strategies used to gain public/political support.

With your permission I will be taking notes and/or recording these interviews using an audio recording device. This helps me be accurate and allows me to directly engage with you rather than focus on taking notes. I will transcribe parts of the interviews and provide you with a written copy to review.

Academic code of conduct

I understand that people in the community are sensitive about these issues and still affected personally and communally by them. I am bound by both academic Ethical Codes of Conduct and personal ones. In brief, any participation is voluntary and based upon explicit consent. People are free to withdraw at any time. Should someone withdraw at any time during the interviews, I will not use their information unless they give permission. Anything I attribute to people will be checked with them to ensure it accurately represents their views and voices, names and identifying features will be removed (unless otherwise requested). My own code is based upon building trust, equality and honesty, creating a participatory and collaborative

approach, and the necessity of giving something meaningful back to the communities.

Confidentiality and Privacy

This means that you have the right to withdraw at any point, to refuse to answer any question, the right to remain anonymous, and to the confidentiality of the data protected. You will not be quoted or identified by name unless you want to be. As mentioned, you will be given a the transcripts I transcribed, and you have the right to clarify, alter or delete references to yourself at that time. Further, for security reasons, the data will be stored on computer disks locked in a secure place.

Potential Benefits from participating:

You will have the opportunity to share your experiences and learn from past experiences.

Your ideas and experience will help bring new information to these relationships between First Nations and non-aboriginal partners, and could potentially help build stronger networks of support. The final research may help add to your thoughts in these areas.

Uses of Research

The research becomes a public document freely distributed and accessible. Copies will be donated to the school, library and archives for use of local residents. Public presentations will be made to the community and other avenues of public dissemination will be explored. The intellectual property of the dissertation itself rests with the student researcher, as per the Ph.D. regulations of Bradford University.

The research may also form the basis for published articles, conferences or even a book. It is the intention to widely share this research findings with First Nations, Aboriginal organizations, social movement organizations, and academics.

Appendix #4: Consent for use of specific quotes from people I interviewed regarding the Grassy Narrows Case Study

March, 2008

Dear XXXX,

I've written the chapter for my thesis on Grassy Narrows as an example of grassroots work between Anishnabe blockaders and non-Indigenous activists such as CPT and RAN, etc.

I'm suggesting in the chapter that people at the local level are involved in trying to develop ways of working together that support Grassy. I call this "grassroots relationship building". The challenge for everyone is that the way we understand the world can be really different, especially that between Anishnabe and non-Anishnabe. And the history of genocide and colonialism means that Anishnabe and non-Anishnabe have had to deal with these experiences differently.

That means there is a whole bunch of power floating around and this had to be negotiated at the local level when blockaders and non-Anishnabe supporters are working together. Sometimes the way someone from Grassy understands the conflicts (as about everything: spirit, culture, history, family, survival) is quite different than someone from the south who sees it as more about trees. Or, how Grassy organizes is quite different in a number of ways than an organisation based in Vancouver or Toronto.

Basically, I'm saying that given the really lousy history of white people towards Anishnabe, it is a major challenge for everyone to develop relationships that are based on trust, equality and understanding. And I'm saying there are some examples of it working well in various ways (for instance, CPT on the blockade and the way they listened and acted), and sometimes challenges where it is not so great (for instance, 'can we have another meeting?' or hogging the media coverage)

Developing trust, solidarity and mutual learning is part of the process that happens in a situation like Grassy. It's a beginning and it becomes a good thing to reflect on how those experiences can help all of us work together better so we support Grassy in protecting Mother Earth and in growing as a strong community. Just to let you know, it took me 35 pages (16,000 words) to write that for my chapter.

YOUR TASK:

Below are some quotes I have used in my chapter. They are written without anyone's names and I took out obvious details and names that would immediately identify anyone.

Could you please look them over and give me your okay to use them?

.**Appendix #5:** Additional Information on the structural and cultural violence in Grassy Narrows

The material events are chronicled below:

First, the community experienced the reduction in their independent national status and autonomy due to the Canadian government's colonial implementation of the *Treaty of 1873*. The community's autonomy was further usurped by the *Indian Act of 1876* that further restricted and superseded much of the 1873 Treaty. As a consequence, sovereignty was displaced by an asymmetrical colonial and trusteeship relationship. Rather than the nation-to-nation status upon which the Treaty was originally negotiated, swathes of community life, economics, education and culture were regulated and enforced on the reserve.[74] This culminated in assimilation as an official government policy, and cultural genocide the practice through the infamous state-funded church-run Residential Schools that continued until the 1960s.

Second, economically, the Ontario Provincial Government[75] built hydro-electric dams upriver from Grassy Narrows without consultation or consideration of its effects. The community's economy, already subsistent, was severely impaired by

[74] Hunting, trapping, fishing and even wild rice harvesting become under provincial jurisdiction resulting in quotas, licenses and the abnegation of inherent and distinct treaty rights . Amnesty. Ibid, p.17,

[75] Ontario Hydro was the crown institution (arm-length government controlled institution) that was responsible for generating and supplying Ontario's energy needs.

the subsequent manipulation of water levels. The result was a structural increase in poverty through vastly diminished wild rice harvesting and trapping.[76]

Third, the macro practices of political and economic underdevelopment were followed by the community's physical displacement. Between 1961-1970, the community of Grassy Narrows was relocated by the Federal government onto a new site within the reserve.[77] The move was highly disruptive for the community with people moving from family-held clan lands to a European-style village wherein families were split-up, densely packed, and on soil too poor to garden.[78] This undermined social cohesion, exacerbated community conflicts and created further poverty.

Fourth, in 1970, the community's precarious physical and economic health was permanently undermined when the Provincial Government of Ontario acknowledged that the river and fish that ran through the reserve had been highly contaminated by the continuous release of untreated inorganic mercury from an upstream pulp and paper mill.[79] Commercial fisheries and tourism ground to a halt, [80] fish as an

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[76] It wasn't until the 1990s, 40 years later, that the Government agreed to compensate Grassy Narrows for the harm and damaged done.

[77] Ostensibly, the move was positioned as having increased access to promised health and education services. Though a voluntary move, the field research and other written research points to a feeling of being coerced to move in order to access government controlled basic services, such a promised elementary school instead of having their children disappear for months at a time in the infamous Residential Schools.[77]

[78] Toronto Star Newspaper, November 30, 2003. "Grassy Narrows: Still fighting to live". Reporter: Kate Harries.

[79] The Reed Pulp and Paper mill in Dryden, Ontario was found to have released more than 9 million metrics tons of mercury into the English and Wabigoon Rivers between 1962-1970. Len Manko. "The Grassy Narrows & Islington Band Mercury Disability Board: A Historical Report 1986-2001, A Condensed Version." Prepared for The Grassy Narrows and Wabaseemoong Independent Nations Mercury Disability Board. September 2006. p. 8.
http://www.mercurydisabilityboard.com/booklet.pdf.
Cited in Amnesty, p.19

economic dietary staple was severed, [81] and mercury poisoning became widespread with serious[82] and continued [83] unresolved health impacts. [84] There are 168 adults and 18 children (out of a previously mentioned 1200 population) at Grassy Narrows receiving some level of mercury compensation as of April, 2007.[85]

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[80]Crucially important economically in such an isolated environment, the commercial fishery was closed immediately and the tourism industry (guiding tourists from fishing camps, work at lodges) declined, spiking an already high unemployment

[81] The concentration of mercury through the food chain resulted in obvious advisories not to eat the fish, a traditional daily staple for many in an already desperately impoverished community. Many in the community considered itself to be traditionally self-sufficient prior to the changes wrought in the 1960s. So, the use of the word impoverished is intimately tied to the 'underdevelopment' of a previously sustainable way of life and community economics.

[82] Symptoms of mercury poisoning reported included shaking and loss of motor control (difficulty walking, loss of balance, tremors), memory loss, impaired speech, weakening eye sight and tunnel vision, miscarriages and congenital abnormalities, children with developmental disabilities. Cite either p.19 of Amnesty or find another source. Complications also include diabetes, thyroid problems and strokes.

[83] The health crisis remains embedded in continued high levels of both fish and human tissue mercury levels at Grassy Narrows Though there are declining levels of overall mercury levels in fish stocks according to the Ontario Ministry of the Environment (Walleye mercury concentrations declining from 2.69 ppm in 1972 to 0.91 in 2003 translating into an advisory of restricting the consumption above 0.45 ppm and absolute non-consumption above 1.57 ppm), a 2003 report by Dr. Masazumi Harada, an international expert on mercury poisoning, on Grassy Narrows showed that 45 of 57 people tested, or 80%, showed symptoms of mercury poisoning. At the same time, 19 people he had diagnosed as having mercury poisoning were rejected for compensation by the government-funded Mercury Settlement Board set up in 1986 as part of the Grassy Narrows (and White Dog First Nation, similarly affected) compensation agreement. Cited in Toronto Star Newspaper, November 30, 2003. "Grassy Narrows: Still fighting to live". Reporter: Kate Harries. A second independent study of the mercury levels in the river indicated that fish stock retained unsafe levels beyond government guidelines. Amnesty, p.22 citing Dr. Laurie Chan, et al. "'Our Waters, Our Fish, Our People': Mercury Contamination in Fish Resources of Two Treaty #3 Communities." Centre for Indigenous Peoples' Nutrition and Environment. 2004.

[84]However, there have been problematic disagreements over the extent of eligibility of individual claims for mercury poisoning compensation and the levels of monetary compensation. Compensation did not occur until 14 years later in 1984 when the federal government gave monies for economic and social development ($4.3 million CDN) and a later agreement in 1986 when a combination of the federal, provincial and subsequent owner of the pulp mill made a $16.67 payment in exchange for a final settlement of claims. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. "Fact Sheet: English-Wabigoon River Mercury Compensation." April 23, 2004. http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/info/ewr_e.html. And *Grassy Narrows and Islington Indian Bands Mercury Pollution Claims Settlement Act*. June 17, 1986 (c.23). Available at: http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cs/G-11.4/en. Cited in Amnesty, p.21

[85] Amnesty, p.21, citing updates figures provided by the Mercury Disability Board for April 30, 2007.

Appendix #6: Open Letter from Grassy Narrows First Nation Community

Synopsis of the letter (January 17, 2007)

(http://freegrassy.org/take_action/organize/moratorium/)

The Grassy Narrows First Nations Letter is summarized in the following way four points taken from their Open letter:

1. Global corporate economic imperatives and lack of local benefits.

   This clearcutting is being driven by multinational corporate profit-taking without benefit for the Grassy Narrows community. They contest the justification by Canadian-based Abitibi Consolidated and USA-based Weyerhauser that their operations are government-sanctioned, sustainable and benefit local economies. Instead, Grassy Narrows asserts that the corporate agenda is simply short-term exporting of profits and subsequent abandoning of the region, people and workers. They cite both the recent (2004?) closure of the nearby Abitibi paper mill in Kenora and the past track record of Weyerhauser in places ranging from Indonesia to British Columbia that left behind "a wake of closed mills, devastated communities and destroyed forests. By their very structure and law these companies are bound to think only of profit, and are accountable only to their distant shareholders." And as they added, "[W]e see none of these benefits."

2. Lack of community consent and the violation of indigenous rights.

   The corporate logging has been occurring "without our consent and over our objections". Further, the current Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (OMNR) forestry management plan and subsequent tendering for clearcutting contracts, through which the corporations refer as to as a sanctioned basis for their operations, "has excluded our concerns and does not accommodate our interests and long-standing grievances." This runs counter to their general constitutional guarantees, legal rights (international law and Canadian Supreme Court decisions) as indigenous peoples, and specific treaty rights under Treaty #3. In short, "[T]hese rights have been consistently violated."

3. Ecosystem destruction.

   Inherently tied to the issue of cultural survival listed below, they specifically cite the destruction of various family traplines through clearcutting as one obvious and measureable affect. However, the letter makes clear the general deleterious effects of the extensive clearcutting on fishing, hunting, trapping and harvesting and "our forests continue to vanish before our eyes on the backs of huge logging trucks."

4. Jeopardizing cultural survival.

"This clearcut logging has destroyed our trap-lines and threatens to eliminate our ability to practice our way of life, our culture, our economy, and our spirituality. *Our fundamental ability to traditionally harvest to feed and support our families, as we have for millennia, is being jeopardized*." (Italics original).

Appendix #7: Coding Nodes for Data Analysis

CODING NODES

Analysis and Understanding the

Political Context

Critical moments (historically or politically)

Analysis of overall issues

Colonialism

Historical Accounts

Framing the Conflict

Self Determination

Treaty

Community

Grassy Narrows

Treaty #3 Anishnabe

Cape Croker

Links with Communities

Power structures within Communities

Supportive acts by the community

Epistemology and Ways of knowing

Epistemology of Speaker

Evolution of their thinking

Ascribed Epistemology to opposition

Feelings

Land (relationship to)

Making sense of their group's philosophy

Spirituality

Culture

Gender

Identity and Collective Rights

Representation and Identity

Key Lessons (treaties, consultation)

Local Space

Narrating or Storytelling

Memory

Oral Traditions

Political language

Purpose of telling

Opposition

Backlash

Negative impacts upon a community

Opposition in communities & organisations

Opposition in Government Departments

Opposition in Politics (Elected)

Abitibi

Weyhauser

OFAH

Organisations (Internally)

Amnesty

Band Council

Blockaders

Boreal Forest Network

CPT

ForestEthics

Friends of Grassy

Internal Analysis and differentiated roles

Leadership

RAN

CAW

MCC

Neighbours of Nawash

Partners

Engagement of own constituencies

Coalitions and Coalition Fatigue

Developing Partnerships Amongst Partners

Motivations

Legal and Academic

Amnesty International

Band Council

Boreal Forest Network

CPT

Examples of other Alliances

ENGOs

FoG

Forest Ethics

Grassy Blockaders

RAN

NGOs

National Churches

Neighbours of Nawash

CAW

MCC

Partner Challenges and limitations

Partner strengths

Partners

Partners (learning together)

Partners talking of each other

Tensions with partners

Ideas and metaphors about partnerships or alliances

Peacebuilding and Relationship Building

Capacity Building

Community-based Peacebuilding (CBPB)

Conflict

Conflict Resolution Processes

Development and Consultation

Language as a strategy

Key Values and Concepts

Peace

Restorative Justice and Reconciliation

Social Change Theories

Solidarity (conceptual, definitions, views of)

Success

Supportive acts

Process

Disempowering

Empowering (Intra and inter group)

Participatory Approach

Process (Ceremonies, meetings)

Consulting and Decision-making

Negotiating

Questions asked in interviews

Rick's Questions

Interviewees Questions

Racism

Anti-racism as a strategy

Relationships

Key Actors

Invitations

Power in relationships

Relationship with Governments

Relationships with Industries

Relationships with Media

Relationship with Treaty #3

Sustainability

Invitations

Building mutual relationships

Impact of conflict (negative)

Impact of conflict (constructive)

Personal relationships

Cross Community Relations

Strategies

Actions Undertaken

Bridging and Platforms

Education

Empowering strategies or Actions

Evaluating goals and impacts of Strategy & Actions

Key concepts or rationales behind strategies

Outreach

Process of Strategizing

Recommendations & Alternate Strategies

Resources

Risks

Trust