3. Theory and Methodology

Introduction

In the first two chapters I outlined a number of approaches to understanding religion and its role in conflict and then showed how different understandings of secularity itself may affect the responses of secular peacemakers. This thesis will expand on the latter topic, on how secular actors understand both secularity and religion and how this affects their analysis of religion and conflict. In particular, I want to develop a strong-open perspective on secularity. Before I proceed on that project, however, it is necessary to explain in more detail my theoretical perspective and some of the methods born of it that I will apply in this thesis. I first tackle the idea of paradigms as a way of explaining why I choose the theoretical perspective I do. That perspective is broadly based on work of Ken Wilber, an American theorist, but here I will also add some insights I have gained from critical realism, a European school. I will also explore how those philosophical schools apply to the field of peace studies. Of particular interest for this thesis is the ongoing debate in conflict resolution theory as to the meaning and importance of culture. I will finish the chapter by describing some research methods that exemplify my theoretical perspective.

A theme that runs throughout this chapter is that of balance. For example, balance in theorizing: from a theoretical perspective, it is not enough to rely on a single conceptual model for all cases. No matter how complex it is, it will always fail to account for something. On the other hand, a generalist approach may have a broader explanatory reach but would be less able to find a way to explain discrete phenomena. Theoretical balance, then, seeks to maximize both breadth and depth. Another example is balance between theory and practice. Theory alone, while it may explain, can not affect, while action taken without deliberation may go awry. These two subjects and more are covered in this chapter. While the discussion herein does not directly address the idea

of balance, it should be fairly clear that rather than sticking to one side in any debate, I try to balance between them. This can be difficult, not so much theoretically as practically – it is easier to work with a single paradigm than many. The reason I do not do this comes from my understanding of what a paradigm is.

Theoretical Foundations

Maps and Paradigms

Paradigms generally explore and explain an issue, such as conflict, from a single perspective. As an example, I will analyze Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations thesis – while I could have used any number theories here, Huntington explicitly referred to his thesis as a paradigm. In *The Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington began by saying that he was offering a new paradigm to replace the bipolar Cold War model that, by early 1990s, was no longer sufficiently explanatory.[1] Huntington did note that his view was imperfect, but contended that it was better than other maps that were available at the time. These ranged from a simple but unrealistic monopolar globalization (one-world) model to a perhaps more realistic but unnecessarily complex polypolar chaos (every state and nation for itself) model. Huntington felt his multipolar (seven or eight civilizations) model fit nicely in between by balancing realism and simplicity.[2]

Huntington's use of the term "paradigm" was quite accurate in one important respect that many writers miss – he recognized that a paradigm offers practicable exemplars as well as an overarching view. "Practical technique" was an important part of the sense in which Thomas Kuhn originally used the term in his philosophy of science. However, many people took only the idea of "a broad theoretical view commonly accepted within a field" and left out the practical aspect. This misunderstanding was, in part, Kuhn's fault, as he used the term in both senses in his early work, although he later explicitly differentiated the narrow, practical sense (exemplar) and the broad, theoretical sense

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1   1. Huntington, Samuel P., 1996, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (London, UK: Touchstone), pp. 29-31.
2   Ibid., pp. 36-37.

(disciplinary matrix).[3] Unfortunately, this move was lost outside the philosophy of science and the single, ambiguous concept of paradigm has entered the common discourse. Using the term "paradigm" in its more refined sense, Huntington was not only proposing a way to understand the world, he was also putting forward a system to guide practicable action. Throughout *The Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington presented evidence that civilizational clash best explained contemporary events – here it is a paradigm in the broad, theoretical sense. Because the world is conflictual along civilizational lines, certain policies toward other civilizations would have the benefit of easing those conflicts – this is Huntington's theory as paradigm in the narrow, practical sense.

Huntington's view was compelling in that it accounted for a fair amount of evidence and provided succinct guidelines for response. However, social theories do not deal with insentient objects, as opposed to the natural sciences. A social theory interprets the actions of other people who, in turn, will interpret behaviors in return. This cycle means that social paradigms do not just explain a physical, objective world but also help create the mental, conceptual world in which one lives. If one believes that most people have a conflictual view of the world, by responding accordingly one may provoke the behavior one presupposes. For example, in discussing religion, if one presumes that truly religious people oppose all secular developments and because of this one does not include religious leaders in policymaking, one encourages those religious leaders who do reject secularity and discourage those who do not. When the cycle repeats, one again assumes religious intransigence, failing to recognize ways that one has encouraged the situation with a "self-fulfilling policy."[4]

Howard Zinn's metaphor comparing historians to mapmakers in *A People's History of the United States* can help illuminate this. The historian, like the mapmaker, must

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3   Hoyningen-Huene, Paul, 1993, Levine, Alexander T., trans., *Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 141-142.
4   My thanks to a fellow Bradford student, James Kirkcaldy, for this insightful phrase, one of many.

select which facts to include and which to omit, a necessary process in scaling down something as extensive as history or geography into a useful – and printable – form. The selection process varies depending on what sort of history or map one needs to create. Zinn contrasts historians and mapmakers in that the selection, and necessarily distortion, of the latter is technical and overt, whereas that of the former is ideological and covert. A mapmaker does not present a map as what really is, but rather notes the distortion necessary to create a projection. Historians, on the other hand, often present a history as a record what really happened, not noting that their histories must necessarily leave out many things to be readable.[5]

Likewise, Huntington had to leave out many human behaviors to create a workable map. This does not render Huntington's map completely false – indeed, it can be highly explanatory – but it does mean it is very partial. The same could be said for most maps – they are partially true. Zinn, in discussing his metaphor, notes that a good mapmaker will recognize the distortion inherent in a map and will be able to suggest an appropriate map for a given task. Thus, knowledge of not just one type of map but a familiarity with other types is necessary. In the same way, in social or historical theory one's being able to use many theories helps one avoid the problem of unintentionally shaping experience to a single set of presuppositions. One can use any given map in as far as it is accurate – one can recognize that many people do, indeed, think the world works like Huntington's clash and act accordingly – but move to another where necessary. This is particularly necessary in peacemaking because some responses to those who operate with a conflictual map may actually exacerbate the conflict.

In this thesis, I will outline a broad theoretical understanding of the many ways in which secularity can engage with religion. This is a metatheory, a theory of theories – a way to index secular maps of the role of religion in conflict. Is the index I propose a new paradigm? While I will challenge commonly accepted views, I will not propose a

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5 Zinn, Howard, 1996, *A People's History of the United States*, 2nd ed. (1st ed. 1980) (London, UK: Longman), p. 8.

new paradigm meant to replace other paradigms wholesale. I believe that it is more useful to try to open currently useful, if partial, paradigms to the inclusion of other views. By examining secularity, and in particular outlining the varied perspectives within it, I hope to do just that – open secular paradigms to alternate approaches to better understand the role of religion in the conflict. Where, before, certain secular perspectives were apt to ignore religion or essentialize it as inherently conflictual, by using an indexing system we can see how each perspective reveals one aspect of religion but hides others, and that a more inclusive view is necessary.

Integral Theory

The indexing system I use is rooted in Integral Theory, a school from the United States stemming largely but not wholly from the works of Ken Wilber. I will base my discussion of Integral Theory on two of Wilber's books, the extensive and detailed *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality* and the introductory and necessarily less in-depth *A Theory of Everything*.[6] This section will be less heavily footnoted than others because many of the concepts introduced here can be found throughout these two books, making citing individual ideas redundant. "A theory of everything" is an accurate description of Wilber's goal. Wilber is the sort of metatheorist I seek – he theorizes about theories, or, as he puts it, provides a "holistic indexing system" by which one can sort through competing worldviews.[7] To do this, he cites an extensive array of thinkers and paradigms. Indeed, he can get very detailed – *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality* runs to 550 pages of text and half as many of notes – which, while necessary when he is demonstrating the scope and utility of his system, is unnecessary when focusing on one subject. Instead, I use the framework he has created and only cite these other thinkers

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6 Wilber, Ken, 2000, *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality: The Spirit of Evolution*, 2nd ed. (1st 1995) (Boston, MA: Shambhala). Wilber, Ken, 2000, *A Theory of Everything: An Integral Vision for Business, Politics, Science, and Spirituality* (Boston, MA: Shambhala).
7 Wilber, *A Theory of Everything*, p. 108. In a note (p. 174), Wilber notes that it may be more appropriate to use holonic (I define "holon" later in this discussion), a term that avoids a tendency toward undifferentiated monism associated with holistic (as in being exclusively concerned with unified wholes), but given the popularity of the latter it is worth using.

when their work directly relates to this thesis.

As an aside, much of Wilber's work can only be described as spiritual, even mystical, in nature. For instance, the second half of *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality* tackles the Enlightenment approach to spiritual questions. In particular, it presents possibilities for further study along lines that inheritors of Enlightenment thought have usually eschewed as "otherworldly." I do not include such things here, not because I do not think they are true or real in a deep sense, but because they are different questions than those I seek to address. Because of this, I will not engage with a number of Integral works. Wilber has written nineteen books, many covering these topics, of which I cite two. There is, of course, a danger that I will miss developments in his thought, let alone in that of others in the field.[8] However, the more general framework outlined in these two works is sufficient for this thesis. I will look at the development of secularity and suggest ways in which secular peacemakers can fruitfully engage with religion, not explore spiritual or mystical paths.

The aspect of integral thought that makes it useful for creating an indexing system is what Wilber, citing Jean Gebser, calls its integral-aperspectival approach.[9] Put simply, to be integral is to integrate different perspectives, while to be aperspectival is to privilege none as final, as the perspective against which all others are measured. This is a rather delicate balance between the need for a depth of knowledge, able to present a coherent view of a subject, and a recognition that any such presentation is only one such, and that others are possible. Wilber's analysis stems from psychology, but for the purposes of this thesis it is not necessary to fully expand on the psychological aspects of this perspective. I believe "integral-aperspectival" as a system can be discussed apart from any given psychological theory in which it may be rooted.

The core of the integral framework itself is quite simple. Wilber has called it "all-

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8   To give an indication, the list of founding members of the Integral Institute's integral politics branch alone has thirty two names. See the Integral Institute website, <www.integralinstitute.org/> (as on 27 Jan. 2005).
9   Wilber, *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality*, pp. 192-193.

quadrant, all-level." To quadrants and levels, Wilber has at times added a number of

other terms, such as lines, waves, streams, states, and types. However, these words

generally serve to elucidate the overall picture rather than expand upon it, so I will not

cover them.[10] To be "all-quadrant" is to take into account the general perspectives one

can adopt in regarding the world. One can look at phenomena as individuals or as parts

of a collective, and one can look at their exterior, measurable forms or their interior

perceptions. *Quadrants* arise when one plots these two dualisms – individual–collective

and exterior–interior – on a graph, with the former along the vertical dimension and the

latter along the horizontal. The quadrants are thus exterior-individual (objective),

exterior-collective (interobjective), interior-individual (subjective), and interior-

collective (intersubjective). To illustrate these quadrants in theorizing human beings,

this entails taking into account the individual, tangible behaviors of people; the concrete

social structures that contextualize those behaviors; people's perceptions of these things;

and the cultural norms in which they are situated. In particular, the exterior–interior

dualism highlights the dual nature of a paradigm as both an interior (subjective) system

of thought linked to exterior (objective) practicable action.

To be "all-levels" is to keep in mind the different levels at which phenomena

operate. No phenomenon is a whole unto itself, nor solely a part of a larger whole.

Rather, things are "holons,"[11] both identifiable wholes (hol-) and parts (-on) of larger

wholes. This is different from the individual–collective dualism identified before. A

collective is a system of individuals at the same level – a whole is on a new level, is

more than the sum of its parts, and takes part in collectives at that level. For example,

humans as biological entities interact with other biological entities in ecosystems.

However, on another level, humans have capabilities unavailable to other biological

phenomena, such as complex language, and they exist in collective structures at that

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10 Quadrants and levels appear in Wilber's earlier work, here represented by *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality*, while the other terms follow as he expands on this framework in later works, as in *A Theory of Everything*.

11 Wilber borrowed the term from Arthur Koestler: Wilber, *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality*, p. 26.

level as well. The key is to look at all things as wholes and parts, and to value both aspects. A whole emerges from but is irreducible to its constituent parts, and in turn may be part of a higher, irreducible whole. Importantly, looking at things in this way one recognizes the importance of lower levels – that is, one ought to treat them as wholes, precisely (if paradoxically) because they are important parts of something larger. Wilber also differentiates between deep and surface structures, where a deep, universal structure – something that can emerge in a number of contexts – is expressed in different surface ways across those contexts.[12] Language, for instance, requires important deep structures in the brain, but languages also vary widely as they appear around the world.

Critical Realism

To this theoretical perspective I add a number of insights taken from critical realism. Critical realism draws largely on the work of Roy Bhaskar,[13] but, particularly in the last decade, a number of other writers have applied his work, especially to the social sciences. In the same way that I do not purport to be an integral theorist, I am not a critical realist – I am here adopting ideas I have taken from this school, not elaborating or defending it as such. That being said, one main reason I am using critical realism is the great number of similarities between the two schools. Indeed, some terms, such as emergence (which I briefly mentioned in discussing integral levels), are often used in the same way in both schools. A comparison between the two schools would be very fruitful, but to fully explore similarities would be the work of another thesis. Generally speaking, I use the integral theory quadrant-level concept to form the framework and aspects of critical realism to highlight concepts particularly relevant to social thought.

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12 Wilber, *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality*, p. 68.
13 For example: Bhaskar, Roy, 1997, *A Realist Theory of Science*, 2nd ed. (1st 1975) (London, UK: Verso); 1989, *Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy* (London, UK: Verso). Unfortunately, much of Bhaskar's academic work, such as *A Realist Theory of Science*, is written in nearly impenetrable "academese." His popularly-oriented *Reclaiming Reality*, however, is an eminently readable application of his theories to progressive politics. That he can produce engaging prose makes his choice not to do so in his specialist work all the more egregious.

Again, as with integral theory, there are also a number of aspects of critical realism I will not mention. While they may be interesting for a theoretical comparison between the systems or for other work, they do not apply to the argument in this thesis. Moreover, given that I will not be fully exploring the overlaps between these two systems, topics I discuss in one section may actually be covered, perhaps in different form, by the other theory. My selection does not imply that either theory has sole claim on a given insight, or even that one theory's analysis is better, only that this is the way that I understand these concepts.

I will first mention some key points of critical realism. I take these largely from Berth Danermark and others' *Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences*,[14] a good introduction to critical realism in the social sciences. Central to critical realism is ontological realism, which asserts that there is a world external to one's thoughts about it and, more importantly, to empirical observations. What one observes (in critical realist terms, the domain of the empirical) may not be all that happens in any given event (the domain of the actual), and during that event not all possible forces (in the domain of the real) may come into play. For example, an object at rest on a table is still influenced by the real force of gravity even if one does not observe it fall. Scientists, including social scientists, try to identify the real mechanisms at work in the world, rather than just tally empirical facts.

The reality thus observed is what critical realists term the intransitive dimension of knowledge. However, all knowledge is socially situated, is dependent on other forms of knowledge, and is thus transitive. This leads to what Danermark *et al.* identify as one of the things that makes critical realism "critical" – it is critical of universalist claims to knowledge.[15] This criticality is based on epistemological relativism, which holds that, given the transitive, situated nature of knowledge, no claim to truth can be held as

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14 Danermark, Berth; Ekström, Mats; Jakobsen, Liselotte; and Karlsson, Jan Ch., 2002, *Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences* (London, UK: Routledge).
15 Ibid., pp. 200-201.

definitive. Critical realists put forward a useful tool to balance the competing dictates of the intransitive and transitive domains, called judgmental rationalism. Although one's concepts are transitive and none is absolute, one can judge them. First, one can assess whether they make sense in themselves, which I call internal consistency. Second, one can judge them against the intransitive domain, to see which statements of truth better accord with the real. I call this external consistency.

Many critical realist authors have discussed the concept of metaphor, and I particularly value Paul Lewis's discussion in "Metaphor and Critical Realism." He says, "Metaphor is most appropriately characterized as the figure of speech that allows us to speak about one thing in terms of another."[16] Metaphor allows people to speak about something one does not understand in terms usually ascribed to something one does. By discussing the unknown in this way, one can literally "come to terms" with it so that one may discuss what otherwise would be a mystery. Expanding upon the idea of metaphor can illuminate the relationship between the interior and exterior halves of Wilber's four-quadrant map. One's interior conceptions, one's maps or paradigms, are metaphors. What one says about things can, at best, only signify something, rather than equal it. Here I may be extrapolating beyond the definition of metaphor Lewis and other critical realists use.[17] However, an understanding of metaphor allows for a stance critical of static social paradigms. While scientific investigation, a major aspect of secularity, can demonstrate a lot about the intransitive (Wilber's exterior) world, similar "empirical" paradigms of transitive, internal worldviews are dangerous. Understanding paradigms as metaphors alerts us to their socially situated nature, as well as highlighting the concept of epistemological relativism.

Another aspect of Bhaskar's thought that has been widely adapted by others is his transformational model of social action. In particular, Margaret Archer greatly

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16 Lewis, Paul, 1999, "Metaphor and Critical Realism," in: Fleetwood, Steve, ed., *Critical Realism in Economics: Development and Debate* (London, UK: Routledge): 83-101, p. 89.
17 See also Danermark, et al., *Explaining Society*, pp. 122-124.

expanded upon it in creating her morphogenetic theory.[18] In part, this theory is a response to various conflations of social structure and individual agency – reducing society to the sum of individual actions, reducing individual action to manifestations of the social system, or regarding the two as indistinguishable. Archer contends that, although aspects of the same subject, structure and agency have different properties and are irreducible to one another. In critical realist terms, both structure and agency have real effects that one can understand separately, although they affect one another. Archer highlights the importance of a time dimension for this analysis. Social structures in a sense preexist any given actor and impose real constraints on action. However, actors can choose whether to change (morpho-) or reproduce (-genesis) the social structure and thus action has a real impact on the structure. This new structure, in turn, affects and can be affected by future action.

These aspects of critical realism are quite helpful in elucidating the integral framework, particularly the relationship between the quadrants. Understanding ontological realism and epistemological relativism, especially as illustrated through the concept of metaphor, is very useful in locating the cognitive aspect of maps and paradigms in Wilber's internal, subjective quadrants. This is not to say that the integral internal–external and critical realist transitive–intransitive dualisms are the same. While a subjective experience is transitive, that people *have* subjective experiences is not – it occurs regardless of how one conceptualizes it. However, that each subjective experience *is* transitive – and, in particular, that all paradigms or maps are metaphors – is vital to remember. Critical realist morphogenetic theory, on the other hand, clarifies the relationship between the individual and collective dimensions of the integral framework, particularly by illustrating that they are not two separate realities but different aspects of experience.

18 See Archer, Margaret, 1995, *Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), and also the rest of her trilogy, *Culture and Agency*, 1989, and *Being Human: The Problem of Agency*, 2000, both by the same publisher. Bhaskar developed the transformational model in *Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom* (London, UK: Verso, 1993).

To conclude this necessarily brief survey of two complex theoretical systems, I must reiterate that it is not necessary to include every detail to create an integral or critical realist work. To do so invites what Wilber calls "the Wagnerian nightmare approach."[19] Rather than seek to analyze what one could call "all quadrants, all levels, all of the time," my purpose in introducing these theoretical systems is to deepen our understanding of strength and openness as they apply to secularity. Before I do this, however, I shall discuss peace studies as an academic discipline and as a normative endeavor.

Peace Studies

Normative Commitment

Adam Curle, in "The Scope and Dilemmas of Peace Studies," defines three tasks that are central to peace studies. The first task is to identify and analyze relationships that are destructive or disadvantageous to one or all parties concerned – unpeaceful relationships – and those that are not destructive or disadvantageous – peaceful relationships. The second task is to devise means to transform unpeaceful into peaceful relationships. This often necessitates raising awareness – bringing latent or repressed issues to the fore – and balancing power relations. Thus, peace thinking may encourage the destabilization of an orderly if unpeaceful state of affairs. Because of this, the third task of peace studies is to promote nonviolent means to pursue the first two tasks.[20] I find this explanation both robust and succinct. On one hand, it establishes the normative commitment of changing unpeaceful relationships into peaceful ones, which makes peace studies a distinct field. On the other hand, it does this without burdening one prematurely with specific definitions of what those relationships must look like or how to effect change, beyond the commitment to nonviolence.

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19 Wilber, Ken, 2004, "The Meaning of the Avant Garde," video of a talk hosted on *Integral Naked*, 12 Jan., <www.integralnaked.org/live/view_avant.aspx> (subscription required, as on 27 Jan. 2005). Wilber was specifically addressing the inclusion of too much in art, but the idea applies equally well here.

20 Curle, Adam, 1985, "The Scope and Dilemmas of Peace Studies," in: O'Connell, James and Curle, *Peace with Work to Do: The Academic Study of Peace* (Leamington Spa, UK: Berg): 9-28, pp. 17-20.

This normative commitment, particularly to the promotion of nonviolent methods, does emphasize certain forms of analysis and action over others. Here it is necessary to differentiate between conflict and violence. Conflict, as defined in the first chapter, is a common, even necessary occurrence when individuals and groups with different goals encounter one another. Violence, on the other hand, is an unfortunately common conflict resolution strategy where one party seeks to prevent the other from realizing its goals. If power is "the capacity to take autonomous action in the face of resistance from persons, groups, rules, or material conditions,"[21] violence disempowers – it violates the ability of others to live and act freely. This may include both direct violence of one person against another and structural violence impersonally imposed by an unfair social system. This distinction has been a central feature of the work of Johan Galtung.[22] Violence does not necessarily entail force – indeed, a socially disempowering but not overtly forceful situation is a classic example of structural violence. Given that any sort of violent action is destructive or disadvantageous to one side (and, on a deeper level, to all), a violent conflict is the same as an unpeaceful conflict as described by Curle.

Nonviolence, on the other hand, is a method of responding to conflict without seeking to disempower another. This is the root of Curle's peaceful relationships. I base my understanding of nonviolence on Gandhi's program of satyagraha – truth (*satya*) and force or power (*agraha*) – as described by Mark Juergensmeyer in *Fighting with Gandhi*.[23] In doing so, I do not mean to prescribe this as the only form of nonviolence available. However, Gandhi's example and Juergensmeyer's analysis best demonstrate my understanding of these issues. According to Juergensmeyer, Gandhi's method has three steps:

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21 Duffey, Tamara Lee, 1998, *Culture, Conflict Resolution, and Peacekeeping: An Analysis with Special Reference to the Operations in Somalia* (Ph.D., Bradford), p. 21.
22 First briefly mentioned in Galtung, Johan, 1964, "An Editorial," *Journal of Peace Research* 1(1): 1-14, and found in many places in his work since.
23 Juergensmeyer, Mark, 1984, *Fighting with Gandhi* (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row) (recently republished as: 2002, *Gandhi's Way: A Handbook of Conflict Resolution* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press)).

1) examine the principles of both sides to come to an agreement over which are valid and deserve to be part of the solution;
2) create a Gandhian alternative to what presently exists by sorting through all imaginable options until finding a resolution that enhances both points of view;
3) begin doing the alternative, and discard any previous notions about how to win the fight for one's own side.[24]

This, then, is a model for peace studies as Curle outlined it, particularly in that it includes the necessity of both thought and action.

Only Curle's first task is purely analytical. His second and third tasks focus on how to implement findings from the first. This illustrates what Paul Rogers and Oliver Ramsbotham identify as the historically "close relationship between theory and practice in peace research" in "Then and Now: Peace Research – Past and Future."[25] They assert that peace researchers have generally sought empirical confirmation of their theories and have often tried to directly contribute to policy formation rather than focus on academic success alone. Earlier in "The Scope and Dilemmas," Curle describes how he made the opposite move, from practice to theory. In his work as a peacemaker, he found that "a skillful negotiator might ease a particular situation, but the circumstances, the rivalries, the oppression, the scarcity of resources – which had given rise to it – remained."[26] Neither theory nor practice alone is truly efficacious. Rather, both are vital to the overall success of peace studies.

Curle's definition also leaves room, in the task of analysis, for a variety of approaches. Curle believes it is better to understand the interaction of factors that may pertain to conflict than to focus exclusively on one part. While working on education in Pakistan, he sought to work better with his colleagues, who included economists and engineers. He found that to do so he did not need to master each of their fields, but a basic understanding of their work allowed him to improve and expand his own to be complementary. This was an insight on which he would draw in setting up the

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24 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
25 Rogers, Paul, and Ramsbotham, Oliver, 1999, "Then and Now: Peace Research – Past and Future," *Political Studies* 47(4): 740-754, p. 742.
26 Curle, "The Scope and Dilemmas of Peace Studies," p. 16.

Department of Peace Studies of the University of Bradford.[27] On this subject, the 2001 annual report on research in the Department is worth quoting at length: "Peace research is a cooperative venture in which insights from different fields are combined, including politics, psychology, sociology, economics, and development studies. ... Adequate understanding must involve different levels of analysis, including individual, group, state, interstate, and global levels."[28] Peace studies is not a discipline as such but an interdisciplinary venture with peace as its focus.

There are many similarities between peace studies and the integral/critical realist philosophical foundation I described above. First among these is the relationship between satyagraha and the integral-aperspectival approach. In that satyagraha seeks to find a new alternative to an unpeaceful situation, it is integral; in that it does this by being open to input from any and all sides, it is aperspectival. Satyagraha provides a clear example of how an integral-aperspectival approach can inform not just theoretical but practical peacemaking. The theoretical approach also underscores the need for both theory and practice by highlighting the transitive and intransitive dimensions of knowledge – one must constantly retest the efficacy of the metaphors one uses in relating these two sides. Finally, the integral framework makes room for the various disciplines and that makes peace studies interdisciplinary. Some focus more on external, measurable aspects of peace (and, particularly, development) while other focus more on internal, cognitive aspects, as does this thesis. Some are more individual-oriented, while others take into account the various levels mentioned in the Departmental research report.

A Universal Norm?

However, a great deal of the theory of peace studies as an academic discipline comes out of a Western context. This has led some to question the validity of prescriptions so

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27 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
28 Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 2001, *Peace and Conflict Research at Bradford: Annual Report* (Bradford, UK: as author), p. 1.

derived to non-Western contexts. This is particularly apparent in the field of conflict resolution, a subset of peace studies. Among other general areas of constructive criticism that they note in their overview, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse call this "the culture question." For them, the task of adapting Western conflict resolution theories to non-Western contexts "has only just begun and is the most important single challenge facing the conflict resolution field today."[29] The advent of this question took its classic form in an exchange between John Burton and Dennis Sandole on one hand and Kevin Avruch and Peter Black on the other in two mid-1980s issues of *Negotiation Journal*. Burton and Sandole presented the outline of what they termed a generic theory of conflict resolution based on universal human needs.[30] Avruch and Black critiqued this, questioning the validity of a universalist theory and raising the issue of culture.[31] Responses followed.

Burton and Sandole argued that the study of conflict resolution had created a new understanding of human conflict behavior, and that this leads to a generic theory of conflict applicable at all social levels, from interpersonal to international, and to all people. This new understanding was based on a focus on the individual and his or her ability to resolve conflicts, rather than the necessity for authoritative control to create a stable society. This is exemplified in Burton's human needs theory, outlined in other works, which focuses on concrete human physical and psychological needs as the core issue of conflict. Burton's preferred method of resolving conflict is by a problem-solving approach in which conflicting parties meet to work out ways of meeting everyone's human needs. Avruch and Black highlighted the human needs and problem solving aspects of Burton's work in their critique. Avruch's and Black's main thrust,

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29 Miall, Hugh; Ramsbotham, Oliver; and Woodhouse, Tom, 1999, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management, and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts* (Cambridge, UK: Polity), p. 63.

30 Burton, John W., and Sandole, Dennis J.D., 1986, "Generic Theory: The Basis of Conflict Resolution," *Negotiation Journal* 3(1): 333-344.

31 Avruch, Kevin, and Black, Peter W., 1987, "A Generic Theory of Conflict Resolution: A Critique," *Negotiation Journal* 3(1): 87-96.

not applicable here, was at Burton's and Sandole's claim to have described a paradigm shift, which Avruch and Black denied. More important here, they also critiqued Burton's concept of universal human needs. Only at the very end of their paper, however, did they raise the question of culture, and then only to set it aside for a future paper. Burton and Sandole, however, took this as the primary issue to which they responded, reiterating that both biology and culture shape human needs.[32] Avruch and Black agreed, but questioned the analytical weight each factor was given, warning of the dangers of focusing on the universalizable at the expense of the particular.[33] This is the heart of the culture question – to what extent does culture shape conflict over more objective issues?

Avruch's and Black's paper on culture appeared a few years later.[34] They recognized that humanity is a complex subject – in some ways, people are all the same (often this is argued biologically), while in others each individual is unique. Avruch and Black place culture in the middle of this range, in that any individual shares his or her culture with some but not with all people. In studying this middle range, they avoid "thin" representations of culture as rule-system separate from the people that enact it or merely as custom. Instead, they promote the study of ethnoconflict theories, cultural common sense about human behavior and conflict and their corresponding ethnopraxes or methods of conflict resolution. To unify the terminology, I call these conflict ethnotheories and ethnopraxes.

For Avruch and Black, the study of how culture affects conflict can be cross-cultural (studying the conflict theory and practice of another culture), intercultural (between cultural groups), or transcultural (looking for theory and practice that may transcend culture). Thus, Avruch and Black include the possibility of universals, both in that

32 Burton, John W., and Sandole, Dennis J.D., 1987, "Expanding the Debate on Generic Theory of Conflict Resolution: A Response to a Critique," *Negotiation Journal* 3(1): 97-99.

33 Avruch, Kevin, and Black, Peter W., 1987, "... And Avruch and Black Reply," *Negotiation Journal* 3 (1): 99-100.

34 Avruch, Kevin, and Black, Peter W., 1991, "The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution," *Peace and Change* 16(1): 22-45.

culture is the middle of a range that includes universals and in that transcultural study is possible. However, their analytical emphasis is always on culture and how it may affect such universals. In the conclusion of Avruch's summary of the culture question, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, he makes it clear that the goal is not to attempt to gain detailed knowledge of every cultural context in which one may find oneself, as this is impossible. Rather, it is to open up thought and practice to the presence of culture and the fact that what may appear to be a workable conflict resolution method may be culturally limited. Such knowledge should also encourage local conflict resolvers to develop skills from within their own ethnotheory and -praxis.[35]

In *Preparing for Peace*, John Paul Lederach succinctly describes two alternative models that embody culturally universalist and relativist models of conflict resolution training.[36] The prescriptive approach treats the knowledge of the trainer as the correct model, one that should be passed along as-is. However, particularly in an intercultural setting, this can entail unintentionally prescribing methods that resonate only with the culture of the trainer. The elicitive approach, on the other hand, seeks to make explicit models of conflict resolution that are already part of the cultural knowledge of the people in the training group. Lederach realizes that there is a critical tension between these two poles, and stresses that the trainer must balance elicitation of local knowledge with providing other, often field-tested academic techniques for comparison and adaptation.

However, there may be an upper limit in how culturally sensitive people can be. As described in the first chapter, Mohammed Abu-Nimer found that a model of intercultural sensitivity that placed accepting the validity of the norms and ways of other cultures did not fully apply to interreligious groups.[37] While many people in Abu-

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35 Avruch, Kevin, 1998, *Culture and Conflict Resolution* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press), pp. 103-108.
36 Lederach, John Paul, 1995, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press), pp. 47-70.
37 Abu-Nimer, Mohammed, 2001, "Conflict Resolution, Culture, and Religion: Toward a Training Model of Interreligious Peacebuilding," *Journal of Peace Research* 38(6): 685–704.

Nimer's study could accept *that* other religions believed differently, given that religion addresses fundamental truths very few were willing to admit the validity *of* those belief systems. Thus, in most, if not all, cultures there are some beliefs, often rooted in religion, that are thus not prescribable. This becomes a particular quandary in that an elicitive approach may turn up ethno- (or religio-) theories and praxes that are not equally amenable to eliciting other points of view. This is not something Lederach covers in his analysis of the elicitive approach, although he is cognizant of such problems. Applying the integral-aperspectival framework outlined above points toward a resolution of this problem by allowing one to preserve more universal norms of peace studies while taking into account the culture question.

Synthesis and Methods

Philosophies, Norms, and Religions

Before tackling the culture question, though, I will quickly explain the general relationship between integral theory, critical realism, and peace studies. The integral framework works as an indexing system for maps of conflict. It can sort them by quadrant, separating internal versus external or individual versus group explanations, or by level, delineating biological, emotive, or cognitive aspects of conflict. Differentiating them so, one can choose a number of perspectives, or just one, to analyze a conflict, while still keeping the others in mind. Thus, one avoids becoming trapped – and trapping others – in just one. This interdisciplinary approach was central to Curle's definition of peace studies. This helps keep the normative commitment of peace studies in focus by not being bogged down in competing paradigms.

This understanding allows me to situate this thesis as a theoretical, or, indeed, metatheoretical piece, as the "overarching view" aspect of a paradigm or a critical realist metaphor. In particular, in it I can apply the general integral-aperspectival approach to peace studies. Peace studies must have a good theoretical base, which requires one to be integral – able to take into account as much data as possible – before one prescribes

peacemaking methods. However, as Curle also pointed out, theory must be linked to practice. Moreover, one must remain aware of the culture question – just how much of one's perspective is rooted in one point of view (be it culturally or academically defined)? Here, the aperspectival concept comes to the fore, in that it calls for a willingness to take on other points of view and recognize the limits of one's own. Again, I find this part of the approach highly inclined toward a nonviolent, Gandhian mode of peace thinking.

In this disciplinary context, this thesis will explore secular responses to religion and conflict from the normative perspective of peace studies, which is to criticize violent responses and to promote nonviolent ones. I apply the all-quadrant, all-level framework and its critical realist corollaries to secularity and religion in this way: the development of secularity was a broad change in European thought, expressed in individual and communal, conceptual and tangible forms – that is, an emergence of a new cognitive level expressed across the quadrants. However, this development occurred in a particular time and place and thus has a number of particular features one can confuse with its more broadly applicable aspects. The deep structures of secularity – rationality, for instance – can develop in religious contexts. Equating those structures with the surface manifestations of Western secularity is misleading. The various ways this has occurred have had different implications for secular approaches to religion and conflict.

As I have said before, my goal is to outline a *strong-open* secularity, and I have presented integral and critical realist thought to help with this task. Thus, I specifically link the concept of integral-aperspectival thought with strong-open thought. Strength is very much akin to the rigor of the integral approach, as informed by ontological realism. Openness relates to the inclusiveness of the critical and aperspectival mind. Linking these points helps clarify just what we are looking for from strong-open religion and secularity. This link also indicates that strength and openness are not solely a matter for religion but for philosophy. A useful way forward is not to push either an integral,

realist, strong approach or an aperspectival, critical, open one, but a combination of both in all modes of thought.

For example, one can consider the religious aspect of the culture question. There may be some aspects of a culture, notably its religion or worldview, that are not relative – people hold them to be true, period. This indicates hardness, as identified by Galtung. However, as my discussion has indicated, even hard religions can be strong and open. This allows for those who need to retain a measure of hardness – a hard structure can still be strong and open. Indeed, to take the metaphor further, while a hard, solid structure is fragile, a hard, open one is much stronger. After this chapter, I will predominantly use strong-open terminology in this thesis, particularly to emphasize the connection to the review of theory on religion and conflict. I may at times refer to integral theory or critical realism, but only to clarify strength and openness.

The different variants of secularity that I will cover in this thesis each accentuate different aspects of strength and openness. Briefly, secularism is neither strong nor open: a secularist maintains a hard shell of belief that secularity is both separate from and superior to religion. Liberal secularity is strong but not open: while secularization theory holds that secularity can include religious people, secular thought still takes precedence. Relativism is not strong, but is open: a relativist includes other belief systems without really engaging with them. The way forward is to encourage a development of a strong-open approach. Such an approach could emphasize certain elements of secularity, such as the insistence on rationally assessing evidence over strict revelation (a strong position). It would also assert that those elements are available to all religions – Western secular modernity is just one form that is in no way absolute (an open position). Things like rationality will always be grounded in tradition, so the forms developed in other contexts, while being rational, will also be unique.

While, as I mentioned, integral theory is amenable to spiritual concepts, it is not dependent on them, so I can use this theory while still bracketing certain subjects.

Indeed, I could apply this theory to any number of discourses of "secularity versus religion" – on rationality, individualism, or the existence of God. I am bracketing all of these things – or, more accurately, I am bracketing their discussion. I realize that these are important issues that need to be addressed in a general discussion about secularity, religion, and peacemaking. However, this is not the place to engage in that debate. Rather, I am studying the way the debate is framed by secular actors, because that has a huge impact on the way the debate will go. It is no use launching into a theological discussion without first establishing the sort of true mutual understanding a strong-open perspective allows. Moreover, in as much as I am applying a metatheory to the subject, this thesis is a metanalysis, not an exercise directed at any specific secular-religious debate.

Indicative Methods

While this is a theoretical work, I still must outline the sort of intellectual methods I will use. In my training in research methodology, I found that certain approaches to ethnography and discourse analysis were amenable to the theoretical perspective laid out above. However, both methods, particularly ethnography, are associated with fieldwork and a certain amount of quantitative data collection. My approach is to study secondary sources from history, political science, and other fields, analyzing theories of the interaction between religion and secularity. As such, I operate at least one remove from "the field." As such, the methods I describe here are only indicative of the approach I will take in the body of this thesis. I did not specifically use these methods on my work, although I will mention them in the final part of this thesis.

Paul Atkinson and Martyn Hammersley say that ethnography "involves explicit interpretation of the meanings and functions of human actions, the product of which mainly takes the form of verbal descriptions and explanation."[38] That is, an ethnography

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38 Atkinson, Paul, and Hammersley, Martyn, 1998, "Ethnography and Participant Observation," in: Denzin, Norman K., and Lincoln, Yvonna S., eds. *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage): 110-136, p. 111.

tries to describe the worldview of another. This is often the first step theorists of

religion and peace take – they attempt to describe the religious mindset. However,

Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln see current ethnography as being defined by a

conceptual crisis; how can a researcher truly represent the worldview of another, and

how can such a representation be separated from the purely fictional?[39] This echoes the

problem, highlighted in the discussion of metaphor, in relating conception to

observation, particularly of another's point of view.

Michael Agar provides an excellent answer to this problem. Ethnographies, he says,

mediate between worldviews. Specifically, they try to resolve situations where

something understood in one worldview makes no sense in another. Agar calls these

elements "strips," which can be anything – acts, processes, texts – that makes sense in

one worldview. In another, however, the strips confuse and cause a "breakdown." The

ethnographer addresses this breakdown and suggests a new "schema," a theoretical

perspective that explains in terms of the second worldview why the breakdown-causing

strip works in the first. By applying this schema to other strips, and by relating schema

to one another and applying these to yet more strips, the ethnographer can refine the

schema so that they explain more actions. In this way, one can build a description of

one worldview in terms that make sense to another.[40] In Agar's model, the ethnographer

is neither describing objectively, nor is he or she presenting an entirely subjective

account of, another group's worldview. Rather, ethnography is interpretation, which is

neither objective (or strictly representational) nor subjective (or fictional).

This is one of the key points at which I will look in investigating secular accounts of

religion – does the interpretation adequately explain the actions of the other group, or

are there still breakdown-causing strips? Have theoretical presumptions affected the

interpretation? Agar's strip/schema model allows us to approach these questions in a

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39 Denzin, Norman K., and Lincoln, Yvonna S., 1998, "Introduction: Entering the Field of Qualitative Research," in: Denzin and Lincoln, eds., *The Landscape of Qualitative Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage): 1-34.
40 Agar, Michael H., 1986, *Speaking of Ethnography* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage), esp. pp. 20-39.

strong-open way – no worldview is definitive, but they can be mutually intelligible through interpretation. However, note that in Agar's model one does not necessarily have to approve of a schema, provided it explains the breakdown-causing strip. This is particularly important in research on religion and peace – understanding that a group gives religious explanations for political actions, for example, does not mean that one has to approve of or accept them. One can, however, better voice disapproval if one understands why religious groups do so. Thus, strip/schema analysis explains how one can apply Lederach's elicitive approach without sacrificing prescriptive surety in one's own viewpoint. Elicitation is an attempt to understand so that one is better informed, not necessarily with the goal of complete acceptance.

One step beyond interpretation is communication. As I mentioned in the discussion of paradigms, the object of a social study is another person, not an inanimate thing. Thus, rather than trying to achieve a subjective understanding of objective reality, one is attempting to understand the subjective experience of another. In as much as the other person is probably doing the same, the project becomes an intersubjective dialog – one that can often go awry. Here, methods of discourse analysis are useful for looking at language and, as Mark Smith notes, more generally at social practices as forms of communication. One way of doing this is Jacques Derrida's deconstruction, wherein one gets deep into the meaning of texts to identify their organization around oppositions like true/false or same/other.[41] By describing this organization, one can see how certain concepts are privileged by their association with positive and opposition to negative terms within a text. This can reveal aspects of a group's internal discourse as well as illuminate communicative acts.

Other methods demonstrate the use of discourse analysis to understand the mechanisms of miscommunication between worldviews, which is of particular concern in studying communication between seculars and the religious. In looking at

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41 Smith, Mark J., 1998, *Social Science in Question* (London, UK: Sage).

intercultural communication, the interactional sociolinguist John Gumperz has

highlighted the importance of understanding others' ways of communicating. His

examples are of verbal interaction where such small things as differences in inflection

are key to correctly understanding someone's intent.[42] However, one can expand this

approach to include other forms of communication. An understanding of how people

construct meanings through actions, written texts, or other forms and how these affect

communication, particularly between worldviews, is quite beneficial. The possibility

for and methods of communication are other key aspects of secular accounts of religion

at which I will look. Do faulty interpretations of religious thought lead to a

misunderstanding of religious action? Actions based on such misunderstandings, in

turn, can be taken to mean unexpected things by religious groups. Just as eliciting

another's perspective need not entail approval, trying to understand communication

does not mean approving of the words or actions in question.

What Brian Fay calls a multicultural philosophy of social science supports this

overall approach. He believes that being the "traditional," detached ethnographer is

impossible; any attempt to understand others influences their understanding of

themselves and their understanding of the researcher. It is not enough, then, to observe.

Rather, taking into account these influences, one should not only seek to interpret other

worldviews, but also be able to comment upon why they are doing what they are

doing.[43] Being the ethnographer as interpreter, as in Agar's model, provides us with a

way to understand another's tradition, so one can see how what someone does may

make sense in that tradition. However, people are engaged in a number of discourses,

both within and outside our respective traditions. Discourse analysis allows people to

understand and separate these discourses and, particularly following Gumperz's work,

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42 Gumperz, John J., 1977, "Sociocultural Knowledge in Conversational Inference" in: Saville-Troike, Muriel, ed. *Linguistics and Anthropology*, Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics 1977 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press), excerpted in: Jaworski, Adam, and Coupland, Nikolas, eds., 1999, *The Discourse Reader* (London, UK: Routledge): 98-106.
43 Fay, Brian, 1996, *Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science: A Multicultural Approach* (Oxford, England: Blackwell).

see how what groups mean can be mistranslated across the divide. Such an approach is strong and open by allowing one to maintain one's own perspective while attempting to understand others'.

Conclusion

These methods are a practical expression of the theoretical balance I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. Rather than seeking one map or paradigm as did Huntington, I instead outlined an "index for maps" using Wilber's integral-aperspectival theory. I modified and expanded upon this with some insights from critical realism. Particularly if one works from Curle's definition of peace studies – that it is an interdisciplinary project with a normative commitment to nonviolence – such an index is vital. It both provides an integral approach with which to think about peace and exemplifies nonviolence in theoretical form by being aperspectivally inclusive. Moreover, it helps address the key point of the culture question, that any perspective will arise within and be affected by a given culture. Implicit within it is the knowledge that any index, no matter its universal intent, is itself born of a particular view. I linked this indexing approach to the strong-open model of religion developed in the first chapter, noting in particular the relationship between integral and strong as well as aperspectival and open. Indeed, although I will use the terminology of strong and open hereafter, one can easily insert integral and aperspectival.

Working with a strong-open model of the relationship between secularity and religion as my goal, in the next part of this thesis I will examine variants of secularity that do not reach that point. After a historical outline to place my definition of secularity in context, I will analyze weakly rigid and closed secularism, the stronger but still closed liberal model, and the weak though open relativist understanding of secularity. Each form of secularity encourages conflict behaviors, not all of them peaceful, in those who subscribe to them. Analyzing these and their effects on conflicts with a religious element will be a primary theme in the next part of the thesis. The final

part, building on lessons learned from the second, will outline what a strong-open

secularity would look like and provide contemporary possibilities for its application. In

doing so I hope to show how the current religion and conflict literature can expand to

include secularity while still using concepts previously developed. Somewhat more

obliquely I also hope to show how a strong open approach can help resolve problems in

other areas of peace studies, particularly regarding the culture question, although to do

this in full is not within the scope of this thesis. The next part of this thesis, however,

begins with a survey of the development of secularity from the fifteenth to the

nineteenth centuries.[*]

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[*] Not cited but useful in this chapter: Patomäki, Heikki, 2002, "From East to West: Emergent Global Philosophies – Beginnings of the End of Western Dominance?" *Theory, Culture, and Society* 19(3): 89-111; and Patomäki, 2003, "After International Relations: A Global Security Community," lecture at the University of Bradford, 13 Mar., based on: Patomäki, 2000, *After International Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)Construction of World Politics* (London, UK: Routledge).