

# Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools

## Afghanistan

*Principal authors,  
Jonathan Goodhand with Paul Bergne*



Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE



HM TREASURY

# **Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools**

**Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, PARC**

**& Associated Consultants**

**Country Case Study 2**

**Afghanistan Study**

**Principal Authors: Jonathan Goodhand with Paul Bergne**

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## **DISCLAIMER**

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author/s and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department for International Development nor of the other government departments who have assisted in managing this evaluation (Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, HM Treasury).

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## PREFACE

P1. The Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) are a joint Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Department for International Development (DFID) mechanism for funding and managing the UK's contribution towards violent conflict prevention and reduction. The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) covers sub-Saharan Africa while the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) covers the rest of the world. The CPPs were established by Her Majesty's Government (HMG) in April 2001, following a government-wide review of UK conflict prevention work in 2000. The rationale behind the CPPs is that by bringing together the interests, resources and expertise of FCO, MOD and DFID, greater effectiveness can be achieved. To this end, the CPPs share a joint Public Service Agreement (PSA) target, expressed as follows:

Improved effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction in potential sources of future conflict, where the UK can make a significant contribution.

P2. HMG commissioned the first evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools to inform the Spending Review 2004 (SR04). DFID has managed this evaluation through Evaluation Department in collaboration with an Evaluation Management Committee (EMC) that also included the Cabinet Office Defence and Overseas Secretariat (Chair), the Foci's United Nations Department, MOD's Directorate of Policy and Planning, DFID's Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department (CHAD) and DFID's Africa Conflict Team (now the Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit), situated in the Africa and Greater Horn Department (AGHD).

P3. The establishment of a cross-Whitehall Evaluation Management Committee was an innovative approach to managing an evaluation in DFID, and followed the ethos of the joint working of the CPPs. It allowed for extensive consultation between the various departments and conflict prevention teams. Many thanks are due to the various EMC members who contributed to the management of this evaluation. These include: Chris Chalmers, Benjamin Seoul and Anthea Dolman (Cabinet Office), Clare Barras and Stephen Evans (HMT), Joan Link, Evan Wallace and Karen Wolstenholme (FCO), Bernard Airborne and Malcolm Hood (AGHD), Tom Owen-Edmunds, Catherine Masterman and Ben le Roith (CHAD), Alicia Forsyth, Charlotte Brown, Campbell McCafferty (MOD).

P4. The study was managed by Mary Thompson, Iain Murray and Dale Poad (DFID Evaluation Department) in collaboration with the EMC. It was edited by Caryn Maclean

P5. The evaluation was undertaken by Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, the PARC & Associated Consultants. The Afghanistan Case study was carried out by Mr Jonathan Good hand with Mr Paul Bergne. The work was conducted through fieldwork in Afghanistan (Kabul and Malaria Shari) where the team conducted interviews with a range of officials including staff from UK Embassy, GCPP projects, the Mazar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and UN, Afghan Government and NGO officials. The fieldwork was supplemented by further interviews in London and a review of the relevant literature and project documents.

P6. The aim of the evaluation of the CPPs is to assess current government approaches to Conflict Prevention through the GCPP and the ACPP, and to provide an overview of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward. The purpose of evaluation generally is to examine the design, implementation and impact of selected programmes in order to learn lessons from them so that these can be applied to current and future work, and also to help strengthen HMG's accountability. It should be borne in mind that any programmes or projects examined are the product of their time, and that the policies they reflected and the procedures they followed have often changed in the light of HMG's developing knowledge.

P7. The Afghanistan Case Study is one of six studies undertaken within the framework of the evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools. In accordance with the Terms of Reference (ToRs) and the Inception Report, the Evaluation placed maximum emphasis on the macro level: the policy processes in Whitehall by which decisions on allocations are made and implemented by the CPPs. Considerable attention has also been placed on the meson level: the degree to which CPP policies and activities in a given conflict form part of a coherent package of direct interventions by the international community and local actors to the problems of particular large scale deadly conflicts or potential conflicts. The micro-level of analysis (review of specific projects) confines itself largely to the way in which projects impact on the meson and macro levels. The Evaluation has not analysed systematically whether specific projects funded by the CPPs have been well managed and whether they have achieved their specific project goals. Single projects have been analysed to the extent that they reflect on the macro and meson levels.

P8. The main findings of the evaluation, reflected in this Synthesis Report, are that the CPPs are doing significant work funding worthwhile activities that make positive contributions to effective conflict prevention, although it is far too early in the day to assess impact. The progress achieved through the CPP mechanisms is significant enough to justify their continuation. Overall, the consultants believe that worthwhile improvements could be achieved through;

- a. more consistent approaches to joint assessment and priority setting;
- b. more determined pursuit of coordinated international responses;
- c. and by allocation of more administrative resources and staff trained appropriately in the associated processes.

P9. The Afghanistan Case Study notes that the GCPP currently funds 13 projects in Afghanistan through the three strands to the Afghanistan Strategy. These are support to the security sector, dialogue and community information and good governance/rule of law. The report notes that whilst the Bonn Agreement provided a mechanism for creating an interim government for Afghanistan with the support of leading members of the international community, the security environment beyond Kabul remains unstable. In many parts of the country, particularly the south and east, it has deteriorated.

P10. Against the background the consultants' main findings are as follows:

- a. The portfolio of projects within the GCPP have the potential to meet a range of short to medium term needs within the security sector that could support the process of peace consolidation. However, the potential for synergies between individual projects has not been exploited and to an extent this means that the GCPP remains a collection of disparate activities that are 'less than the sum of their parts'.
- b. The UK is seen as an important actor in Afghanistan both in international and Afghan Government circles, though the GCPP itself is not seen to be a significant part of the influencing process. The GCPP acts mostly as a funding mechanism rather than a mobilizing or policy influencing mechanism. In political and financial terms the GCPP therefore represents only a small part of UK policy towards Afghanistan.
- c. The emphasis on SSR in Afghanistan has the potential to benefit greatly from the trilateral GCPP process. The three departments bring distinct comparative advantages—including DFID's approach to institution building and development issues, MOD's understanding of and links to military actors, and Foci's political leverage. However, there continue to be tensions between the three departments in terms of their understanding of conflict prevention and how they should work together.
- d. Whilst it could be argued that the GCPP represents extremely good value for money since there are no extra administrative costs for its operation, the consultants saw this as a false economy, arguing that the lack of capacity on the ground diminishes the potential impact and sustainability of GCPP work.

P11. The evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools is comprised of the following reports which can be found on the corresponding web-site links:

Synthesis Report	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sleone.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sleone.pdf</a>
Security Sector Reform, Nicole Ball	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647ssr.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647ssr.pdf</a>
United Nations, Pierre Robert & Andrew Mack	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647un.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647un.pdf</a>
Sudan, Emery Brusset	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sudan.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sudan.pdf</a>
Sierra Leone, Jeremy Ginifer & Kaye Oliver	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sleone.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sleone.pdf</a>
Afghanistan, Jonathan Goodhand & Paul Bergne	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647afghanistan.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647afghanistan.pdf</a>
Russia and the FSU, Greg Austin & Paul Bergne	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647russia.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647russia.pdf</a>
Portfolio Review, Greg Austin & Malcolm Chalmers	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647portfolio.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647portfolio.pdf</a>

Evaluation reports can be found at the DFID website:

<http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/>

Michael Hammond  
 Head of Evaluation Department  
 2 April 2004





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Bradford University  
Channel Research Ltd  
PARC & Associated Consultants



## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

AIA	Afghanistan Interim Authority
AIHRC	Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANBP	Afghanistan New Beginnings Project
AREU	Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit
ATA	Afghanistan Transitional Administration
BA	Bonn Agreement
CARE	CARE International
CIC	Centre on International Cooperation at New York University.
CND	Counter Narcotics Directorate
CP	Conflict Prevention
CPAU	Cooperation for Peace and Unity
CSI	Crime Scene Investigation
DAT	Defence Advisory Team
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GCPP	Global Conflict Prevention Pool
GPP	German Police Project
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
ICG	International Crisis Group
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IWPR	Institute for War and Peace Reporting
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
KEP	Kabul Entry Points
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOI	Ministry of the Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NDF	National Development Framework
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

NSA	National Security Advisor
NSD	National Security Directorate (Amaniyat)
NSC	National Security Council
ODA	Overseas Development Administration
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
ONS	Office of the National Security Advisor
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in the Europe
OTI	Office for Transition Initiatives
PCIA	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSA	Public Service Agreement
SCA	Strategic Conflict Assessment
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

S.1 The Afghanistan Strategy in the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) received Ministerial approval in June 2002, some eight months after the overthrow of the Taliban government in Kabul and six months after the Bonn Agreement (BA), which provided a mechanism for creating an interim government for Afghanistan with the support of leading members of the international community. The GCPP currently funds 13 projects in Afghanistan, costed in 2003 at 17 million. There are three strands to the Afghanistan Strategy:

- Support to the security sector (share of salaries and some equipment for the Afghanistan National Army, support to the National Security Council, police training, support for Kabul perimeter security and military headquarters security, support for the Counter Narcotics Directorate).
- Dialogue and Community Information (journalist training programme).
- Good Governance/Rule of Law (human rights commission and judicial reform commission).

## **Background**

S.2 Since the BA, there has been significant progress in some areas.<sup>1</sup> Yet there has been a failure to extend security beyond Kabul. The security environment in many parts of the country, particularly the south and east, has deteriorated. The main sources of insecurity are: anti-government forces in the form of neo-Taliban and al Qa'eda groups; regional spoilers; warlords and power holders at the central government and provincial levels; the growth of the drug economy; increased criminality and banditry. There will be no secure future for Afghanistan if the Afghanistan Transitional Administration (ATA) or a successor government is unable to extend security beyond Kabul.

S.3 Whether one assesses international efforts to build peace against the terms of the BA or wider international norms and standards, there have been significant shortcomings in international efforts to consolidate peace. There has been a major mismatch between the ambitions of the international community and their willingness to commit the requisite military, political and financial resources. However, an international consensus has emerged over the need to address the sources of insecurity and this is reflected in a growing focus on Security Sector Reform (SSR). Whilst there is a level of consensus about the long-term goal and the centrality of SSR there are still disagreements about how to proceed in the medium term. This is reflected in divided opinions about the role and utility of a possible 'Bonn 2'. Some argue for a 'National Conference' which would involve a fundamental stock-take and a rethinking of the approach and time frames negotiated in Bonn. Others believe that the road map outlined in Bonn remains valid and appropriate and far from questioning it there is a need to accelerate the process, to create the conditions to enable free and fair elections in June 2004. Linked to this is a debate about the most effective way to create security. An unhelpful dichotomy has developed between those advocating an extension of ISAF and those arguing for an increased number of Provincial

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<sup>1</sup> Including the new Afghan constitution, a new Afghan currency, customs and revenues reform, the construction and opening of new roads, the 'back to school' campaign etc.

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). It is against this background of a complex, incomplete and contested war to peace transition that the GCPP needs to be assessed.

### **Effect on Preventing New Conflicts and Containing Existing Ones**

S.4 It is too early to assess the cumulative and individual impacts of GCPP projects. However, a number of observations can be made about effects and effectiveness. Overall, the projects are essentially well managed by professionals with experience in their respective sectors, and have been adapted based on learning from the first year's implementation.

S.5 The Afghanistan strategy agreed by the three departments involved in the GCPP foresaw that SSR would be its 'kernel'. This makes good sense given the sources of insecurity in Afghanistan and the UK's comparative advantages in this area. The GCPP potentially plays a linking role between the short-term approaches often used by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defence (MOD) including preventative diplomacy and military intervention and long term structural approaches employed by the Department for International Development (DFID). It helps cover the programmatic gaps that appear in transitional contexts which agencies with more rigid mandates cannot cover. These tend to be high-risk, but high-opportunity areas that may be too politically sensitive for development donors to get involved in.

S.6 Overall it was felt that the portfolio of projects within the GCPP have the potential to meet a range of short to medium term needs within the security sector that could support the process of peace consolidation. However, the potential for synergies between individual projects has not been exploited and to an extent this means that the GCPP remains a collection of disparate activities that are 'less than the sum of their parts'. In common with other international interventions focusing on institution building there is a tension between 'pragmatism and perfectionism' and short term and long term goals. GCPP suffers from the same kinds of short-comings as the wider SSR process, in terms of the unevenness of its implementation and the unrealistic 'ideal type' models being applied. Projects on the whole also tend to be 'Kabul centric' and have limited outreach in the provinces. This risks exacerbating centre-periphery tensions. Unless these deficiencies are rectified the impact of the GCPP on the sources of insecurity in Afghanistan are likely to be limited.

S.7 HMG's most effective initiative in relation to conflict prevention is the Mazar PRT. Although beyond the remit of this evaluation, the PRT is playing a significant role in addressing conflict dynamics in the North. It is also an example of successful inter departmental collaboration which occurs outside the framework of the GCPP. The PRT may be an important source of lessons for the GCPP in terms of pooling comparative advantages and developing effective conflict prevention strategies.

### **Effect on International Arrangements**

S.8 The limitations of international responses have already been highlighted. There are concerns particularly among some of the UN and European actors that conflict prevention efforts have been refracted through a 'homeland security' lens leading to an asymmetrical focus on western security concerns rather than long term Afghan stability. Whilst the UK is

seen as an important actor in Afghanistan both in international and Afghan Government circles, the GCPP is not seen to be a significant part of the influencing process. For the most part the GCPP acts as a funding mechanism rather than a mobilizing or policy influencing mechanism. Therefore in political and financial terms the GCPP represents only a small part of UK policy towards Afghanistan. Its visibility and profile in the Afghan context appears to be rather low and this limits its capacity to influence wider international arrangements.

S.9 The GCPP is not viewed as an instrument for influencing the regional dynamics of the conflict. There appears to be scope to further explore the potential for developing strategies on a regional basis with international partners such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

S.10 The UK-led PRT appears to have had a much greater impact on the policy environment, having had a profound role in influencing thinking on security questions in the provinces. It has also catalysed debates around civil-military linkages.

### **Effect on Inter-Departmental Processes**

S.11 The emphasis on SSR in Afghanistan has the potential to benefit greatly from the trilateral GCPP process. The three departments bring distinct comparative advantages—including DFID’s approach to institution building and development issues, MOD’s understanding of and links to military actors, and Foci’s political leverage. However, there continue to be tensions between the three departments in terms of their understanding of conflict prevention and how they should work together. Currently the GCPP’s Afghanistan decision-making tends to be more integrated in London than in Afghanistan. A lack of capacity on the ground means that project appraisal, monitoring and evaluation and coordination processes in relation to conflict prevention are at best rudimentary.

### **Recommendations**

S.12 It is recommended that the GCPP be continued because (a) it is covering strategically important areas in relation to the sources of conflict in Afghanistan (b) the benefits of a joined up approach are clearly demonstrated by the PRT, all-be-it outside the pool mechanism. Recommending the continuation of the GCPP is based on the assumption that similar forms of positive collaboration can be developed more systematically through the pool mechanism.

S.13 **Analysis:** Mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that joined up analysis systematically informs GCPP strategy development and programming. Thought should be given to staff contracts, turnover and expertise to ensure institutional learning. Capacity should be developed in the area of conflict analysis.

### **S14 Strategic focus:**

- Continue to focus on SSR: Strengthen involvement in policing, building on emerging linkages with the Mazar PRT: Develop a portfolio of activities in the second strategy of reconciliation and media with a particular focus on civil society and citizen’s voice.

- Build synergies or horizontal links between projects by developing programme 'clusters'.
- Develop vertical linkages between projects by (a) 'rolling out' projects to the provincial and district levels (b) developing a regional approaches by for example strengthening links with the Pakistan and Central Asia CPPs.
- Many of the projects in the GCPP are attempting to address long term problems with short term funding and approaches. There is a need to re-think the one-year funding mechanism and current exit strategies.
- Within a clearer and stronger strategic approach it is important to keep a proportion of funding aside to be allocated for short-term quick impact conflict prevention activities.

**S.15 Strategic coordination and management:** for strategic coordination to actually happen, there needs to be a dedicated person on the ground. This would allow more devolved decision-making so that conflict prevention problems and solutions are identified and addressed by those close to the 'coal face'. A Kabul management committee should be set up involving the three departments who are responsible for screening project proposals jointly and reviewing overall progress on strategies and project clusters. This management committee might also consider an advisory group, which could bring in expertise from the Afghan and international community in the area of conflict analysis and conflict prevention.

**S.16 Project Selection:** more rigorous criteria should be developed for project identification and appraisal. This should include a more detailed problem statement, key assumptions, links to conflict prevention, CP-related targets, outputs and indicators etc.

**S.17 Monitoring and evaluation:** first, benchmarks need to exist and secondly they need to be more realistic and appropriate for the Afghan context. The time frames and the 'ideal-type models' promoted by a number of projects are inappropriate. There is a need to systematically monitor and mitigate the negative impacts of projects on conflict dynamics. Peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) tools should be introduced as a matter of course to monitor all GCPP work.

**S.18 Profile and partnerships:** The GCPP would be better able to 'leverage Bonn outcomes' if it were more joined up and more visible. The GCPP somewhat perversely is invisible in Afghanistan but viewed as 'cutting edge' and innovative on the international stage. If Her Majesty's Government (HMG) is serious about the GCPP being an instrument for mobilisation and policy development, as well as funding, more attention needs to be paid to developing its profile in-country and selling the virtues of a cross-departmental approach. HMG's most significant influence on international arrangements is likely to be as a knowledge leader and innovator, rather than simply a funder. Again this requires dedicated capacity on the ground. A number of partnerships could also be further developed to strengthen the outreach and impact of the GCPP. Particularly important are firstly links with non-governmental organisation (NGO) and civil society groups and secondly with the PRT which is likely to be the primary mechanism for strengthening the effects of the GCPP in the provinces.



**S.19 Capacity development:** all the above recommendations depend on having a dedicated person on the ground. Since DFID is about to employ a Conflict Advisor for Afghanistan, this person could perhaps be the obvious choice. They would be responsible for overseeing the strategic management of the GCPP, chairing the Kabul GCPP management committee meetings, advising project managers on the conflict prevention aspects of their work, developing new project ideas and mainstreaming conflict prevention approaches into the work of the three departments. It is also recommended that a separate budget line be created within the GCPP to cover administrative costs. Finally there also needs to be an investment made into training staff involved in the GCPP in basic issues related to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

## 1. BACKGROUND

### 1.1 Conflict Prevention and the Sources of Insecurity in Afghanistan

1. It is beyond the scope of this report to examine the roots causes and contemporary dynamics of the Afghan conflict in detail.<sup>2</sup> However given our focus on conflict prevention (CP), four points can be emphasized. First, conflict is rooted in long-term historical processes. The obvious implication for CP is the need to appreciate the historical continuities and adopt time frames accordingly. Second, the Afghan conflict is understood essentially as a crisis of governance and as Barnett Rubin<sup>3</sup> has noted, the chief 'post conflict' challenge is the building of Afghan institutions, owned by and accountable to the Afghan population. Third, conflict has been much more than a national power struggle. A regional conflict system has evolved connecting conflicts in Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Ferghana valley. This is a complex and extremely volatile multi-layered conflict system. CP strategies must therefore be developed within a regional as well as a national framework. Fourth, conflict is not just about break down—it creates winners as well as losers and powerful vested interests have developed around the continuation of instability in Afghanistan. CP activities should thus address the incentive systems and strategies of conflict spoilers.

2. There are currently a number of spoilers who are resisting efforts to consolidate the peace process. Key sources of instability are:

- Anti government forces in the form of neo Taliban and al Qa'eda groups, operating from the tribal areas of Pakistan and Eastern and Southern Afghanistan.
- 'War lords' and power brokers within and outside the current administration.
- Profiteers and drugs traders—the shadow economy and associated criminalisation of economic activities contribute to growing banditry and conflict over smuggling routes and the drugs trade.
- Regional powers—in spite of signing the 'Good Neighbourly Relations Agreement', December, 2002, regional powers are supporting their own proxy groups inside Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup>

3. These sources of instability intersect with one another. For instance the opium economy funds the activities of regional warlords and terrorist groups.<sup>5</sup> Regional actors support proxies inside Afghanistan. International interventions may inadvertently strengthen these connections—for instance heavy-handed drug eradication may bolster support for the Taliban. 'Extreme spoilers' may have no interest in the new political dispensation and can only be dealt with through coercion—al-Qa'eda and hard line elements within the Taliban may fall into this category. Other conflict stakeholders may have an interest in peace so long as they receive a share in its benefits—such groups may be co-opted politically or economically.

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<sup>2</sup> See for instance, Roy, O. (1990), Rubin, B. (1995), Rashid, A. (2000) & Maley, W (2003) for an analysis of the history of the Afghan conflict.

<sup>3</sup> Rubin, B. 'Afghanistan and Threats to Human Security' Social Science Research Council, [http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/rubin\\_text\\_only.htm](http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/rubin_text_only.htm)

<sup>4</sup> See Rubin & Armstrong, 2003

<sup>5</sup> For instance it has been reported recently that revenue streams generated by the drug economy in Badakshan have been captured and utilized by Hezb-I Islami.

4. The transition towards peace may generate new sources of instability including; conflicts over scarce resources due to population growth, an influx of returnees and demobilized soldiers; growing urban-rural tensions exacerbated by the aid 'bubble economy'; competition between different armed factions for the economic or political 'spoils of peace'—for example fighting between Ismael Khan and Gul Agha over lucrative trade routes<sup>6</sup> or violence between political factions in the run up to elections. The extent to which Afghanistan is more or less stable than it was in 2001 can be debated. US military and international forces are keeping a tenuous peace. But the regional powers and warlords are playing a waiting game—few have confidence that US commitment and the international sponsored government and reconstruction effort will last.<sup>7</sup>

5. CP in such a context is likely to be complex and multi-levelled. For the purpose of this report we adopt a broad definition of the term. We take it to mean both longer-term structural measures and shorter-term operational measures which aim to support the transition from war to peace and prevent the re-occurrence of violent conflict. Our focus here within the context of a Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) is on non-coercive approaches, although coercive interventions have an important role to play within the broader international response to the Afghan conflict.

## 1.2 International Engagement and Conflict Prevention

6. International engagement has historically been as much part of the problem as the solution to the conflict—foreign meddling fuelled the conflict, while international neglect played a role in the emergence of militant havens. The conflict also exposed severe limitations with the traditional diplomatic 'tool box'—top down, set piece mediation processes had limited impact on the incentive systems of free-wheeling elements who were only loosely controlled by their leaders.<sup>8</sup>

7. In the late 1990s there were some efforts to develop a more coherent and coordinated response in the form of the Strategic Framework process. But the lack of serious political and economic engagement hampered efforts to resolve the conflict. On the whole international efforts focused on containing the conflict and its effects.<sup>9</sup>

8. This changed after 9/11. In this latest phase of the Afghan conflict international actors have militarily supported one side and enforced a peace agreement. Afghans' perceptions of international actors have been shaped by over two decades of inconsistent and often intransigent intervention. Many are suspicious of western motives and few believe that international agencies are in this for the 'long haul'. Many—including the warlords—feel that the fast pace of transition leading to elections in June 2004 is part of an exit strategy on the part of the international community.

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<sup>6</sup> Johnson et al, 2003, p 7.

<sup>7</sup> Rubin and Armstrong, 2003, p 33.

<sup>8</sup> Fieldon & Goodhand, 2001.

<sup>9</sup> Although there were three UNSC resolutions between 1998 and 2000, which called on Afghanistan to surrender indicted terrorists and close terrorist camps, applied sanctions, including an arms embargo and supported missile strikes.

9. Therefore CP is not a technical exercise—it is an ineluctably political task. Intervention strategies may be driven as much by the politics of the intervenors as the politics of the conflict. Although there has been a multilateral approach to Afghanistan, the US retains a dominant position in the post-Taliban order. Their position appears to have changed over time—from a minimalist one of attempting to ensure that the country no longer harbours terrorists to the more ambitious objective of state building. At present it is unclear whether sufficient political and financial resources can be generated over time to achieve this objective. The effectiveness and impact of the GCPP can only be assessed with reference to wider political conditions.

### **1.3 UK Involvement in Afghanistan and the GCPP**

10. The UK's interest in the region was re-ignited during the 1990s due primarily to the expansion of the drug economy, growing refugee outflows and concerns over (primarily Taliban) human rights abuses. However, Her Majesty's Government's (HMG's) involvement was relatively modest up until 9/11 reflected for example in aid flows (approximately £8–10 million per year) and the limited Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) engagement with the region.<sup>10</sup>

11. Post 9/11 however, Afghanistan graduated from an area of humanitarian interest to being seen as an area of vital strategic concern. The main strategic interests of HMG in relation to Afghanistan are international terrorism, regional instability (links to Kashmir and the Ferghana Valley), small arms, drugs, refugee outflows, poverty, humanitarian concerns. It may also increasingly become an area of commercial opportunity for UK firms involved in reconstruction and private sector development.

12. Surprisingly when the GCPP was established in April, 2001 Afghanistan was not identified as one of the areas that the GCPP should cover. The Afghanistan GCPP strategy did not formally begin until June, 2002. For FY 2003/4 30 per cent of GCPP's programme spending went to Afghanistan.

### **1.4 Methodology for Evaluating GCPP**

13. This report is structured around five levels of evaluation. First in order to establish a benchmark for best CP practice in the Afghan context we provide an overview of the Bonn Agreement (BA) and its implementation. Second we examine the relevance and expected effects of GCPP in relation to the causes and dynamics of conflict. Third we examine the effects on international arrangements and organisations. This involves exploring the extent to which GCPP activities have promoted greater involvement and developed the capacities of international partners in CP activities. Fourth we analyse the effects of the GCPP on inter-departmental relationships, particularly on the question of whether it has led to greater coherence in CP practice. Fifth, we evaluate the extent to which the outputs of the pools represent good value for money. All this involves asking whether GCPP has added value to UK and international efforts to resolve and prevent violent conflict.

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<sup>10</sup> One FCO desk officer spent 70 per cent of their time on Afghanistan and one research analyst allocated only 5 per cent of their time on the country.

14. There are obvious methodological problems related to addressing these questions. Whilst it was beyond our remit to assess impacts (it is far too early to do this in any event), even the more limited questions of expected outputs and probable outcomes is problematic. Given the complex, multi-faceted nature of the international response, it is difficult to isolate and attribute project outcomes. Cause-effect chains cannot be traced in linear fashion. Moreover there are no real indicators or baseline to work with. These problems are accentuated in Afghanistan because of the problems with the availability, quality and reliability of data.<sup>11</sup>

15. These problems are compounded by the limited time that the evaluation team were able to spend doing field work in Afghanistan. The team spent only three days in Kabul and two days in Malaria Shari. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a range of officials including staff from UK Embassy, GCPP projects, the Mazar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and UN, Afghan Government and non-governmental organisation (NGO) officials (see Annex 4 for a list of interviewees). The field work was supplemented with further interviews in London and a review of the relevant literature and project documents.

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<sup>11</sup> Afghanistan dropped off the research map when the war started and even before the war data was limited and sketchy. Louis Dupree (1973), an American anthropologist, writing about Afghanistan in the 1970s stated that statistics are 'wild guesses based on inadequate data'. There are no aggregate statistics of any reliability at the national level and nor have there been any longitudinal studies at the district and sub district levels. Most data collection has been patchy, using different methodologies and has been primarily project related. This information deficit is a handicap to all agencies—both governmental and non governmental working in Afghanistan—for instance basic quantitative data on population statistics, numbers of armed forces etc to more qualitative information about livelihood strategies or political actors incentive systems etc.

## **2. BENCHMARKS FOR INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES: THE BONN AGREEMENT AND ITS LEGACY**

16. The international ‘blueprint’ for Afghanistan broadly follows the prevalent ‘post conflict’ model that emerged from international experience of state reconstruction in the 1990s.<sup>12</sup> This involves a triple transition (see Annex 2 for a more detailed analysis of international responses):

- A security transition: from war to peace.
- A political transition: from rogue or collapsed state to a legitimate democratic state.
- A socio-economic transition: from a war economy to a peace economy.

17. There is an emerging consensus on some of the underlying principles of international best practice in the realm of conflict prevention. The Brahimi report<sup>13</sup> argues that the key conditions for the success of complex peace operations are political support, rapid deployment with a robust force posture and a sound peace-building strategy. No amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force. Stedman<sup>14</sup> further argues that strategies must be appropriate for a given context. There is no reason to assume that actions and strategies which work in more benign conflict environment will work in a more demanding environment. The objectives must be commensurate with allocated resources and permissible strategies. Stedman’s study stresses the priority given to the sub goals of demobilisation and the demilitarisation of politics. Furthermore there are low cost opportunities in the area of civilian security which can be addressed through police and judicial reform. The prioritising of security and justice is highlighted in other studies.<sup>15</sup>

18. The reference point for CP ‘best practice’ has been the BA, since this defined the parameters of international engagement, setting out a clear road map for the war to peace transition. The ultimate measure of the GCPP, may be the extent to which it supports (or undermines) the BA. However, as we argue in the following section (see Annex 1 for a more detailed overview), the BA is a far from ideal measure of ‘best practice’—partly because of inherent flaws within the BA and partly due to how it has been implemented in practice.

19. The BA was not a conventional peace accord—rather than a settlement between ex belligerents it was an externally mediated agreement among victors in a war that appeared to have been won by the US. The main political tasks of the mission were not to verify and monitor a peace agreement but to negotiate its completion.<sup>16</sup> Many key issues were left

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<sup>12</sup> See Ottaway, M. ‘Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States’ in *Development and Change*, Vol 33, No 5, November 2002.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations ‘Report of the Panel of United Nations Peace Operations’ (Brahimi Report) 21 August, 2000

<sup>14</sup> Stedman, S., ‘Implementing Peace Agreement in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers’, International Peace Academy, May 2001.

<sup>15</sup> Caplan, R., ‘A New Trusteeship? The international administration of war-torn territories’ Adelphi Paper (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 341; ICISS (2001) ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.

<sup>16</sup> King’s College London, ‘Afghanistan Report’ in *A Review of Peace Operations. The Case for Change*.

unresolved in the BA, some of which are noted below. The international community promised a broad-based and democratic government but instead produced a change of regime through a military strategy which handed power to faction leaders. The Afghanistan Interim Authority (AIA) established by the BA had a narrow ethnic political base. The problem since has been attempting to expand this base, which those in power have been reluctant to do.

20. The UN mission was not established in a post conflict setting. Essentially it is a peace operation in a context of ongoing war and partial peace. Table 1 maps out some of the key axes of insecurity that were introduced in Section 1 and examples of remedial interventions:

**Table 1: Axes of insecurity and international responses**

<b>Actors</b>	<b>Interests</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Types of Interventions</b>
<b>Regional actors</b> E.g. Pakistan, India, Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan	Regional powers support proxies to further their security or economic interests. Pakistan for example has concerns that a stable Afghanistan will be pro-Indian. Russian support for Fahim to expand its sphere of influence in the North and likewise with Iranian support for Ismael Khan in the West.	Border incidents with Pakistan; Russian provision of arms to Fahim.	Good Neighbourly Relations Agreement; Tripartite Commission on border security.
<b>Neo-Taliban/al Qa'eda/Hekmatyar</b>	Total spoilers whose common interest is the failure of the peace process and the ending of an international presence.	Growing number of terrorist incidents including targeting of aid agencies; night letters; increased presence in Southeast.	Operation Enduring FreedomANA training; border police; counter narcotics
<b>Factionalism</b>	'Warlords'—both inside and outside the government. Differing interests, but all jockeying for power and building up their political and economic power bases.	Recent talks between Fahim, Rabbani and Sayyuf; clashes between Dostam and Mhd. Atta and between Ismael Khan and Gul Agha.	SSR—including MOD reforms; DDRCustoms and revenue reform; counter narcotics
<b>Criminality/Banditry</b>	Opportunistic and survivalist responses to the power vacuum.	Growth of narcotics trade; banditry on roads.	Police reform; judicial and penal reform; counter narcotics strategy; alternative livelihoods

21. The imminent elections have concentrated minds and forced domestic and international actors to take stock of progress made since November, 2001 in addressing the underlying sources of insecurity. Broadly the international community are split between those arguing for a fundamental rethink of the model and those arguing for an acceleration of the current approach. The former group (largely the UN and European powers) are pushing for a Bonn 2 which might involve a National Conference and a re-negotiation of the underlying principles and timeframes of Bonn 1. The later group (broadly the US and UK) argue that stalling the process now would be even more de-stabilizing and there is a need to 'fast forward' the political and reconstruction tracks.

22. Pragmatists argue that in the real world 'best practice' may be aspired to but it is rarely achieved, particularly in a context as challenging as Afghanistan. The BA may perhaps have been the best that was possible at the time. Moreover its strength in relation to conflict prevention 'best practice' is that it establishes clear lines of accountability for the international community—they are responsible for delivering their side of the bargain and can be held accountable to the commitments made in Bonn.

23. Whatever assessment criteria one uses—whether it is compliance with the terms of the BA or broader international standards set out in the Brahimi report for instance—there have been significant shortcomings in international efforts to consolidate peace. There has been a major mismatch between the ambitions of the international community and their willingness to commit the requisite military, political and financial resources. It has been in Ottaway's words a 'bargain basement' model. This is an attempt to rebuild a collapsed state according to a favourable model but with minimal resources.<sup>17</sup>

24. Although the UN has been given the lead role in implementing the BA, its success depends largely on the right kind of backing from the US. Without its military and political leverage the triple transition is unlikely to occur. Reflecting US priorities, international spending on Afghanistan has gone overwhelmingly to the fight against al Qa'eda and the Taliban (84 per cent) with 9 per cent for humanitarian assistance, 4 per cent for international security assistance (International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)) and only 3 per cent for reconstruction.<sup>18</sup> The US currently spends \$11 billion per year on its military mission in Afghanistan and only \$1 billion on reconstruction aid.<sup>19</sup> Clearly al Qa'eda and the Taliban are security threats that need to be addressed—because they are a threat to Afghan stability as well as wider international security. But a more comprehensive and joined up approach to security is required. This involves commitment and taking risks. As Rubin et al argue the policy choices boil down to a classic risk-benefit analysis—how much risk should the international community accept?<sup>20</sup>

25. There is a level of consensus that establishing security is the key challenge. This must be the foundation for any reconstruction and development process and it is in this area that the international community has perhaps been most at fault. Although one should

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<sup>17</sup> Ottaway, M. (2002) 'Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States' in Milliken, J (ed) 'State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction' *Development and Change*, Vol 33, No 5, November 2002.

<sup>18</sup> Rubin et al, 2003, p 12.

<sup>19</sup> Sedra, M., 2003, p 15.

<sup>20</sup> Rubin et al, 2003, p 16.



not underestimate the difficulties of the operating environment, opportunities have been missed by international actors. The failure to extend ISAF's mandate and the delays to reforms of the security sector may well be viewed as costly mistakes in the future.

26. As Rubin argues, Bonn does not consist of a stable or effective power sharing arrangement.<sup>21</sup> Its purpose was to reach an agreement on a process extending through June, 2004 which would enable the government to become more legitimate and effective. The government and UN have met all the formal timetables and benchmarks but the procedures have not been as effective as hoped in addressing imbalances within the government.<sup>22</sup> To an extent international actors are struggling with a flawed agreement that was hammered out in 10 days and a timetable that is not realistic given the operating environment. The timetable was partly because the US and others feared 'open-ended' international engagement. It means that to an extent the international community have committed themselves to a short term conflict management strategy which is primarily about getting Afghanistan to the elections. There is much less discussion about what happens after the elections. Many fear (and some domestic actors hope) that elections will be part of the international community's exit strategy.

27. As already highlighted, Afghanistan is part of a regional conflict system and yet the regional dimensions of the triple transition were missing from the BA and subsequent implementation strategies. The National Development Framework (NDF) for example did not mention regional cooperation and its trade strategy focused on markets in developed countries.<sup>23</sup> There is a need to think much more carefully about conflict prevention and management strategies at a regional level and strengthen regional forms of cooperation.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p 41.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Rubin and Armstrong, 2002, p 35.

<sup>24</sup> A countervailing opinion expressed by one interviewee was that regional players should be kept at 'arm's length' given their vested interests and a long history of meddling in Afghan affairs. In our view it is not possible to address the underlying causes and dynamics of the conflict without grasping the nettle of regional interests and agendas.

### **3. GCPP IN AFGHANISTAN: OVERVIEW**

28. As mentioned earlier the UK's involvement with Afghanistan prior to 9/11 was primarily through its humanitarian assistance programme. This has changed over the last two years and from being a relatively minor player, the UK is now viewed as one of the key international actors in Afghanistan. Senior political interest in Afghanistan is reflected in the significant military, political and development resources invested in the country. On the military side, the UK was an initial lead nation for the ISAF, makes a small contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), leads the Mazar PRT, and has military advisors in the Ministry of Defence (MOD), UN, US Embassy and Bagram. The UK is second only to the US in its military spread. At the Tokyo reconstruction conference the UK pledged £200 million over the next five years, along with a 20 per cent share of the European Commission pledge of Euro 200 million for 2002. Finally the UK is the lead nation for the drug eradication strategy and has allocated £70 million over three years with the aim of reducing poppy cultivation by 70 per cent over five years and eliminating it within 10 years. The bulk of the funding for this comes from outside the GCPP.

29. The spread and significance of UK involvement in the country, gives according to the Embassy the platform for 'leveraging Bonn outcomes'. The UK appears to have impressive political access to key domestic and international players. The GCPP is only one of a number of policy and funding tools employed by the UK to support peace consolidation. These include direct conflict management initiatives, for instance the Mazar PRT and the Ambassador's mediation role in the Security Committee to the North, indirect structural approaches which includes much of the Department for International Development's (DFID's) programme and the GCPP, and finally coercive interventions in the form of support to OEF. As the Ambassador noted: 'We've all come to understand that security is the main issue and it's stopping us from doing the things we want to do'. The Mazar PRT is a reflection of this—it is seen as the UK's 'flag ship' project and is the most visible and influential face of UK policy in Afghanistan. The GCPP appears to be viewed a supplementary CP instrument which has allowed the UK to pursue diplomacy more flexibly.

30. The GCPP currently funds 13 projects in Afghanistan, amounting to a total of 17 million. There are three strands to the Afghanistan Strategy (see Annex 2 for a detailed breakdown of projects and allocated budgets).

31. **Support to the Security Environment:** the prevention of conflict by enhancing the potential for the security sector to become a source of stability through helping to establish reformed security structures and organisations throughout the country to ensure security (state and individual), accountability and the rule of law. The aim should be to support the development of multi-ethnic and fully accountable security forces (army, police, border guards) which are paid by, and responsible to, the central authorities. Key projects are: National Security Council: ANA Equipment: International Police Training Mission: UK Police CSI Unit Team: DDR: Kabul Entry Points: ANA Palace Compound Upgrade: ANA National Army Salaries: UN Office for Drug and Crime Drug Enforcement: Counter Narcotics Directorate.

32. **Conflict Resolution and Prevention Dialogue:** the establishment of conditions that encourage dialogue on actual and potential conflict issues in order to improve the

conditions for a reduction in conflict and its causes. Key projects are: Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) Journalist Training Programme

33. **Good Governance/Rule of Law:** capacity building of key ministries and departments to ensure that policy decisions are made strategically and with a better understanding of conflict reduction/prevention issues. Key projects in this area are: Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission: Judicial Reform Commission

34. The total allocation for these projects is £18 million (although the due to a recent decision to make a further contribution the UK-led drug eradication programme the total now amounts to £25 million). Clearly the sums involved are relatively modest in relation to overall aid flows to Afghanistan (and other economic activities such as the drugs and smuggling economies). Therefore careful consideration has been given to policy entry points and funding gaps. Activities have been selected that can add value and have multiplier effects. Many of the projects are considered to be high-risk, but high-opportunity activities. A priority has been placed on the security sector and this is reflected in the proportion of funding allocated to this strand in the Afghanistan Strategy.

35. The Afghanistan Strategy is overseen by a Steering Group which includes: Head of Afghanistan unit (FCO), Special Representative for Afghanistan, Head of Sec (O) (MOD), representatives from DFID (various), representatives from Afghanistan Unit (Head of Pol-Mil Section and Head of Political Section), UND (including the FCO Police Adviser) and DICD. Cabinet Office and Treasury have also attended. The Steering Group aims to meet once per month though in practice it is less than this.

36. As already mentioned the GCPP was clearly not conceived of as a response mechanism to the larger crisis in Afghanistan as it was unfolding in 2001. Afghanistan was not prioritised as an area of concern within the pool. Given international concerns about Afghanistan at the time, as an exporter of terrorism and drugs and a source of regional instability—reflected in three separate United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions—this suggests that the GCPP was viewed as a marginal component of the UK's global CP strategy.

37. The GCPP in Afghanistan today does not perform the role that its name suggests—it might best be characterized as a supplementary peacebuilding fund. This is not necessarily a criticism of the GCPP, because as we argue below, it fulfils an important role. However in many respects it is a misnomer. It came into being as a 'post conflict' fund, to address medium to long term conflict issues in a fragile war to peace transition. It has certainly never been a leading edge in the UK's overall CP efforts and few if any of its projects play a short-term, direct conflict management role. The PRT, support for ISAF, preventative diplomacy in the North or even poppy eradication programmes might be more readily categorized as mainstream CP activities.

38. Instead the GCPP supports a collection of peacebuilding activities with a primary focus on the security sector. Going back to the sources of conflict highlighted earlier, the GCPP is likely to have the most direct impacts on the second and third areas of insecurity ie factionalism and criminalisation/shadow economy. The lack of a strong state with a

monopoly of force has been both a cause and a consequence of the Afghan conflict—the emergence of a viable and accountable security sector is a precondition for future stability. Factionalism and the shadow economy thrive in the space left by a failing or collapsed state. The GCPP is less likely to have a direct impact on the sources of insecurity emanating from regional spoilers or Taliban/al Qa’eda fighters<sup>25</sup>—although there may be indirect impacts since for example tackling drugs helps cut off the revenue streams of ‘total spoilers’, while addressing factionalism may lesson the propensity of neighbouring countries to interfere in Afghan affairs.

39. Overall the prioritisation of Security Sector Reform (SSR) makes a great deal of sense, given the UK’s expertise in this area, the evident needs on the ground and the obvious gaps in funding and analysis. In a sense it is the foundation for all other work and it is also an area in which donors are perhaps weakest conceptually and where there is a need for more ‘joined up’ thinking and policy. Whereas the PRT may be expected to have immediate and direct effects on conflict, most activities funded by the GCPP target changes in institutional arrangements which will have longer term effects—the obvious exception here is DDR, although as argued later, the sustainability of these effects depend on wider institutional change.

40. GCPP potentially plays a linking role between the short-term approaches often used by FCO and MOD including preventative diplomacy and military intervention and long term structural approaches employed by DFID. It operates within a similar sphere to the United State’s Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI), covering the programmatic gaps that appear in transitional contexts which agencies with more rigid mandates cannot cover. These tend to be high-risk, but high-opportunity areas that may be too politically sensitive for development donors to get involved in. For instance GCPP’s support for the Afghan National Army (ANA) would be considered to be outside DFID’s traditional domain of work. Such work may be highly intrusive and ventures into areas which may challenge sovereignty. It demands strong political analysis as well as technical knowledge.

41. Retaining a sharp focus on SSR makes a lot of sense. Rather than diversifying into new areas we would argue there is perhaps a need to sharpen the focus even further. At present the GCPP has projects in all five pillars of SSR and there may be a need to focus down more on particular areas where the UK can bring a particular comparative advantage and there are gaps in the current reform process. This will be examined further below.

42. Two final points can be made about the overall strategy. First, the strategic focus tends to be ‘Kabulcentric’ in the sense that the bulk of GCPP funding is channelled towards institutional strengthening activities at the central government level. Much less is being done at the provincial and district levels. Second, while the GCPP aims to address insecurity, its success paradoxically depends upon a certain level of stability. Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) ministers will not back reform processes or farmers switch from poppy or soldiers disarm while they are uncertain about their future. Their calculations are likely to be short-term and opportunistic. This suggests that if the GCPP’s strategy is to remain focused on medium to long-term peacebuilding it needs to be closely linked to a range of

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<sup>25</sup> Although GCPP’s support for the ANA has played a role in boosting its fighting capacity and its deployment on OEF missions.

initiatives that aim to impact on conflict dynamics in the short term—collaboration between the Mazar PRT and the GCPP is an obvious example of this happening in practice. More thought could be given as to how GCPP activities could be linked closely to ‘quick impact’ activities in the provinces.

### **3.1 Portfolio of Activities**

43. In funding terms, the focus of the GCPP has been on the ‘security environment’, the first pillar of the fund. Within this there was at least initially a strong focus on the military including ANA salaries, DDR, and various infrastructure projects such as Kabul check posts, army barracks, military equipment etc. Counter-narcotics and the military have received the lion’s share of pool funding. In the second year of the GCPP there has been more of a focus on policing (which falls within the first pillar) and the third pillar of ‘good governance’, with the National Security Council (NSC) being the main recipient of funding. An increased focus on policing makes good sense, given the cost efficiencies and the UK experience in this area. A national police force is quicker to train and cheaper to outfit than an army and will have a more immediate effect on internal security.

44. In the second pillar of ‘conflict prevention and prevention dialogue’ project activities are relatively sparse. This has included support for the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and proposed funding for election support. In general the GCPP focus has been towards the military rather than the civil side of SSR. Its bias has been towards the state rather than civil society and towards Kabul rather than the provinces. There may be strong arguments for this particularly in the first year when basic infrastructure and start up costs in Kabul have to be funded from somewhere. As one respondent commented ‘you have to have institutions before you can get impacts’. However, there may be strong arguments now for placing a greater focus on the policing and governance aspects of the GCPP. There may also be a need to develop a project cluster focusing on access and voice of civil society. While support for the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) cover this area to an extent, both have a limited outreach and links into civil society.

45. There has been no work on conflict prevention dialogue or community level mediation and conflict resolution. Given the multi levelled nature of conflict in Afghanistan and the connections between local level disputes over land, water etc and the wider conflict, this may be an area that needs to be explored further. For instance the International Crisis Group (ICG) have argued that in the context of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) greater attention needs to be placed on local reconciliation and mediation mechanisms.<sup>26</sup> It is these localized conflicts that commanders are able to exploit to mobilize fighters. A number of NGOs such as CPAU and NCA have worked on these kinds of questions for a number of years. Their experience might be harnessed to develop further the second pillar of the GCPP.

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<sup>26</sup> ICG (2003) b.

### **3.2 Project Implementation**

46. A number of lessons have been learned about the difficulties of project implementation in the Afghan context. As one interviewee noted: 'you cannot do it without good people on the ground'. There is only a limited pool of Afghan and relevant international expertise in the areas covered by the GCPP. Progress has been quicker in the area of hardware than in the software/institutional development type activities.

47. Overall, interviewees appeared to be cautiously optimistic about the initial effects of the GCPP. According to an internal UK review in July, 2003 the 'indications are that all the projects receiving GCPP funding are efficiently run and are contributing significantly to reducing the risk of conflict recurring and improving security and stability as intended. All have made as much progress as could reasonably be expected in the circumstances, given the short time many have been underway'.<sup>27</sup> However a number of constraining factors were identified in a mid-year review that have impeded implementation. These include: lack of basic infrastructure; delays due to the need to set up in country project management because of low standards of project proposals.<sup>28</sup>

48. Although it was beyond our remit to assess individual projects, we were generally of the view that projects were managed efficiently and were moving towards the planned outputs after initial delays in start-up. Project implementation arrangements are organisationally complex, often involving a range of different organisations and multiple lines of communication. For instance the NSC project involves the Defence Advisory Team (DAT) who provide technical support and oversight, Control Risks, the implementing agency and technical specialists, Crown Agents, the project contractors and the Embassy who monitor the project on the ground. For Control Risks this involves three sets of reporting relationships namely to DAT, Crown Agents and the Embassy. Projects have in the main been 'franchised out' to consultancy firms such as Control Risks and CENTREX or individual consultants employed by Crown Agents. The Embassy tend to have a quite an 'arms length' engagement with the projects and a number of project managers felt that they would benefit from greater contacts and support from the Kabul mission.

49. Project implementation has inevitably been affected by progress, or the lack of it, in other parts of the SSR process. One of the problems with a multi donor, multi-pillared approach is the unevenness of its implementation. A UN-led integrated approach to SSR might have been an alternative arrangement.<sup>29</sup> Delays in MOD reforms have held back the DDR process. Pilot projects have now been implemented in Kunduz and Gardez, which are to be followed by Kabul and Mazar. Moreover, ANA salaries from the pool were contingent on MOD reforms.<sup>30</sup> There has been a lack of progress in the area of the judiciary, partly because the Italians took a long time to decide what to do and partly because the base of information and analysis is so limited in this area.

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<sup>27</sup> FCO, 25 July 2003, p 2.

<sup>28</sup> FCO, 'Afghanistan GCPP Strategy: Mid Year Review', 30 September 2002.

<sup>29</sup> As advocated by Sedra, M. (2003).

<sup>30</sup> A total of \$7.5 million was disbursed to the UN Trust Fund for army salaries out of \$15 million in total. The rest is pending on US negotiations who control the ANA pay roll.

50. Progress in the area of police training has accelerated as a twin track approach has emerged in which the Germans conduct more extensive officer training in the Kabul Police Academy, while the Americans, with GCPP support conduct a quicker and more practically oriented training for patrolmen. Progress in the area of drugs eradication as a whole has been limited so far. Critics of the overall drugs strategy have argued that in the first year it created perverse incentives and also had negative political effects, particularly in the south east.<sup>31</sup> However, a number of interviewees felt that the UK-led drugs strategy was a positive success in the sense that it has influenced the US thinking on this issue—they are now prepared to look at this question in a more comprehensive and holistic way.

51. The AIHRC has made greater progress in its second year, but continues to suffer from being politically marginalized. To an extent the less politically sensitive areas within the AIHRC's remit have been supported, but much less has been done in the key area of transitional justice.

### **3.3 Coordination/Coherence**

52. Although the GCPP has a clear strategic focus, the foundations of this strategy consists of a disparate collection of projects that to an extent are less than the sum of their parts.<sup>32</sup> This is the result of external constraints—namely the difficult political environment and the lack of strategic coordination within the wider SSR process—and internal deficiencies, including the legacy of ad hoc project identification and the lack of strategic oversight in Kabul.<sup>33</sup>

53. Project managers have tended to work in isolation from one another. This means that opportunities to develop synergies between projects are lost and in some cases there may be duplication or contradictory policies. For instance, Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) pay trainee policemen salaries that are higher than the going rate, while the American training programme does not pay salaries. Although both are police training programmes which are even located in the same street, there are no formal links between the two projects. A project-based approach, managed by technical specialists runs the danger of compartmentalizing knowledge and getting caught up in the details of project management without reference to the bigger picture. In theory it should be the role of the GCPP manager in Kabul to make sure that connections and synergies are being developed and exploited.<sup>34</sup> In practice there is very little strategic management taking place. The main reason for this is sheer lack of time—the person responsible in Kabul for the GCPP is only able to allocate one quarter to one third of their time on pool-related work.

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<sup>31</sup> A senior American official in Kabul told the Guardian that current British efforts to temper Afghanistan's opium output had had 'absolutely no impact' on the amount of opium produced since the fall of the Taliban two years ago.

<sup>32</sup> In a letter from Ms J.A. Ashdown, United Nations Dept re: GCPP—Allocation for FY2002/3, dated 25 June 2002 it was stated: 'Ministers are concerned that there is still a culture of seeking funding for projects rather than well-thought through conflict prevention and resolution initiatives'.

<sup>33</sup> A range of tensions and potential dis-connects can be identified within the SSR process. For instance there are tensions between UK efforts to build the intelligence capacity of the NSC and CIA support for the NSD. Another example is the weak linkage between DDR and the army and police recruitment centres.

<sup>34</sup> Evidently the Germans have overall responsibility for ensuring coordination and coherence within the police sector, but this does not negate the need the GCPP to be more proactive in developing mutually supportive links between UK funded projects.

54. In some cases linkages are now being developed between projects, from the 'bottom-up' based on the experiences of project managers and consultants—for instance stronger coordination is now developing between institution building projects with NSC, Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) (both funded by GCPP) and the President's Office (funded by DFID).<sup>35</sup> However this is not happening systematically and much more could be done. For example the AIHRC has independently developed links with MOD and Ministry of the Interior (MOI)—conducting for instance human rights trainings with both ministries. However AIHRC still tends to be institutionally and politically marginalized. The tentative linkages that have been developing, could be reinforced and strengthened through the GCPP through for example its projects with the MOD (NSC, DDR) and MOI (CND, police training, CSI). A potential opportunity to further mainstream human rights issues into the SSR process is perhaps being missed. To an extent the problem of strategic coordination and coherence could be addressed relatively simply, through periodic meetings with project managers that focus on the strategic issues rather than the minutia of project implementation. Stronger prioritisation around 'project clusters' would also promote greater synergy between related projects.

### **3.4 Approaches, Time Frames & Exit Strategies**

55. Although there has been a great deal of talk about 'ownership' and a 'light footprint', the SSR process has been internationally-led and runs the danger of being an extremely intrusive social engineering approach to institutional change—something to which Afghans are extremely resistant given previous Soviet attempts to transform Afghan society from the top down. Mariana Ottaway's description of international practice in the area of 'post conflict' reconstruction is particularly apt in relation to Afghanistan:

'the international community devises a model, builds its component parts and hopes that after being forced to adhere to the model for long enough it will be accepted without supervision ... It is a procrustean approach as the model is given and the country is pushed and pulled to conform to it'.<sup>36</sup>

56. As the overall thrust of the GCPP is the creation of security sector institutions it is important to ask questions about the ownership, sequencing and speed of reforms. There is a danger as Ottaway highlights of developing an architect's model of the finished building—or an ideal type model for the Afghan security sector—without preparing a contractors plan for the sequencing of the various activities. How appropriate is the model, is there a clear road map for how one gets there and how realistic is the time frame?

57. As mentioned above, the BA had the effect of entrenching power. The challenge for SSR and the wider reform programme is how to create institutions which curb raw power

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<sup>35</sup> In this particular example it was noted in a review of ONS that there are still serious coordination problems to be overcome. First, the appointment within the President's Office of a Security Policy Advisor has the potential to overlap with the role of the NSA. Second, the control and command elements of the UK's counter narcotics programme has been lodged within the ONS. According to the review 'there have been several incidents of CND covert operations taking place under the 'badge' of the ONS; this has proved damaging to the legitimacy of the ONS as a policy and advisory body' (p 11). There are also concerns that the operational effectiveness of CND is being compromised by an 'inappropriate management chain'.

<sup>36</sup> Ottaway, 2003, p 1017.



and open up the political spaces for more representative and accountable forms of governance. Clearly this will not happen overnight. Neither can it be allowed to happen too slowly as dissatisfaction grows with the current constellation of power in Kabul. International experience suggests that the least promising contexts for genuine institution building are closed situations where one group already controls power.<sup>37</sup> This clearly characterizes 'post Taliban' Afghanistan.

58. Newly-created organisations like the NSC and the CND cannot generate the necessary authority and do not curb the raw power of the different political factions. Power is exercised through channels other than the formal bodies created by donors. Organisations have been created, but they have yet to be institutionalised. Whilst the organisational forms are new, the underlying political norms remain the same. Power is highly personalized, draws on informal networks and ultimately is based upon access to the means of violence.

59. The NSC Support Programme, initiated in September 2002, is a good example of the challenges. The rationale for the project was the recognition that the security sector required a lead body at the highest level of government within the ATA. This would provide Afghan ownership over security sector issues particularly the formulation of a single National Security Policy and management of SSR. An Office of National Security (ONS) was formed under the leadership of a National Security Advisor (NSA), Dr Rassoul. The GCPP funds a support programme to build institutional capacity within the ONS.

60. The initial set up phase lasted 12 months and phase II is expected to last between 3–5 years. According to a review of phase I, much has been achieved in terms of the basic ground work, including setting up the requisite infrastructure, passing the necessary legislation, recruiting key staff and the validation of key roles and objectives. However expectations about what it can deliver have perhaps been unrealistic given its embryonic nature. There has also been resistance from other ministries as the NSA attempts to exert its authority. The roots of the ONS are shallow and it remains vulnerable to shifts in the political environment. With elections around the corner, key figures such as Rassoul do not even know whether they will be in power at the end of next year. The very survival of the ONS could be at risk.<sup>38</sup> Although it exists as an organisation it has yet to be *institutionalised* and this will depend on the extent to which it can develop linkages with other domestic security actors and exercise policy oversight.

61. It was striking, how many times interviewees used terms like 'blank slate' or 'ground zero' arguing that the institution building process was being started from scratch. In the case of the CND, the old organisation, the State High Commission for Drugs was scrapped<sup>39</sup> and a new counter narcotics body established in its stead. To the outsider it appears that a great deal of time and resources are being invested in 'ideal type' organisations which are then left in splendid isolation, because they do not link into wider institutional arrangements—they do not have the raw power, the implementation capacity or the local legitimacy to make things happen. 'Best practices' are being transplanted from other

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<sup>37</sup> As for example was the case in Charles Taylor's 'post conflict' Liberia.

<sup>38</sup> 'Afghanistan Office of the National Security Advisor (ONS) UK Global Conflict Prevention Pool Support Programme', Review of Phase 1 Progress and Implementation Planning for Phase II (undated) p 9.

<sup>39</sup> Although remnants of the State High Commission for Drugs continue to exist in the provinces.

contexts, but these may not be perceived by local actors as the answer to their problems—one feels that the NSC and CND both have credibility problems in this respect. Many Afghans feel that there has been too much of a focus on structures and not enough upon outcomes. The problem is that what is good in the long run may not work in the short run—because power trumps institutions.

62. Reform processes clearly must be informed by an understanding of political dynamics and incentive systems. The prevalent idea that Afghanistan represents some kind of a *tabula rasa* does not aid this kind of analysis. Reforms in one area can lead to tensions elsewhere—strengthening the ONS for instance has led to tensions with other ministries. Reforms may also have inadvertent and counter productive side effects. For example one interviewee felt that support for the NSC had led to *less* transparent governance as decisions on national security were made by an untransparent inner cabinet.<sup>40</sup> Therefore reforms may have displacement effects - by addressing problems in one area, they create new ones elsewhere. Knowing how far and how quickly to push reforms is also important. MOD feel for example that they have been pushed to a greater extent than other ministries. The sensitivities involved are illustrated by the riots in which one person was killed, outside the MOD on 23 November by soldiers who had lost their jobs as a result of reforms. There is also the question of how the different pieces of the reform jigsaw fit together. Police trainees in the US training programme for example come to Kabul for their basic training but then go back to an unreformed police force in the provinces.

63. Whether the political conditions placed on aid provided through the GCPP have the desired impact depends not only on the internal consistency of the GCPP itself but also on the decisions of the wider international community. Conditionalities may be effective if the resources are of sufficient magnitude and are applied in a strategic, coherent and consistent manner. There are question marks in all these areas. First the magnitude of resources is modest in relation to other financial flows in the region. Second, conditions have been applied inconsistently—for instance US reform of the National Security Directorate (NSD) may undermine efforts to build the capacity of the NSC—and there have been problems over timing and time frames—for instance the delays in security sector reform. Afghans appear to be basing their political decisions on the assumption that international intervention will diminish. International and domestic actors are walking a tight rope in terms of how far and how quickly they can push reforms.

64. A consistent theme to emerge from the interviews was the need to adjust targets and benchmarks. The ‘big bang’ approach to institution building leads to unrealistic targets—and may place too great a burden on fragile structures and so become self defeating. There may inevitably be a trade off between what’s desirable and what’s possible or between ‘best practice’ and pragmatism. The initial primary challenge is to create mechanisms for generating power and authority—the American ‘quick and dirty’ basic training for policemen is a good example of responding to this requirement. The Mazar PRT may be another. However, the best short run solutions are not necessarily something that should be institutionalised—for instance arming warlords to fight al Qa’eda.

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<sup>40</sup> This so-called ‘kitchen cabinet’ is composed of 8 officials: NDS, MOI, MoFA, MOD, MoFin, NSA, CoS, Qannuni and the President. No minutes are taken for these meetings.

65. The lesson for institution building may appear to be the contradictory one of ‘speed up and slow down’—results need to be delivered quickly, but time frames should be extended. If the GCPP is to better occupy the transitional space between short term and structural conflict prevention this means developing more pragmatic approaches to institution building, while maintaining strong developmental principles. A one-year funding mechanism is inadequate given the kinds of problems the GCPP aims to address. There has been a strong emphasis on exit strategies within the GCPP, but in our view the time frames, at least for institution-building activities, are far too short. For instance financial support to NSC, CND and CSI incrementally decreases over a three-year period. This means that money will be disappearing at precisely the time when absorptive capacity has been developed. It is inconceivable that the Afghan Government will be able to fully fund such institutions within this time frame.

### **3.5 Analysis, Learning and Monitoring and Evaluation**

66. Currently there is little in the way of systematic monitoring and evaluation of projects, strands and the pool as a whole in relation to impacts on conflict. To an extent a ‘leap of faith’ is required to link individual projects with the wider public service agreement (PSA). Project managers were generally poor at relating what they are doing to the wider goal of conflict prevention. There was very little evidence of systematic thinking (and documentation) about positive or negative effects of projects on the conflict environment. As mentioned earlier, knowledge tends to be compartmentalized and consultants are brought in because they are technical specialists rather than regional experts. Few of them have prior experience of the context and because of the rapid turn-over of staff, few have time to learn about it.

67. Whereas international experience suggests that conflict prevention is about supporting strategies and processes rather than projects, the GCPP as it is currently set up encourages a blinkered, project-based approach. There are no systematic mechanisms for feeding lessons upwards and downwards about conflict prevention. Reporting tends to focus on information, rather than analysis, on outputs rather than outcomes, on the technical rather than the political.<sup>41</sup> To be fair to project managers, the lack of information and hard data in Afghanistan is a long-standing problem which inevitably makes planning and monitoring more difficult. Also politics may get in the way of good analysis. For instance DAT’s attempts in 2002 to get a comprehensive security sector review off the ground were blocked by the US.

68. It is clear that more thought needs to be given as to the type of information and analysis that is required to assess whether projects are successful or not in moving towards conflict prevention goals. There is currently no way of answering this question using current systems for tracking project performance. It is beyond the scope of this report to elucidate conflict prevention indicators for individual projects. But it is clear that the GCPP should be much more demanding in terms of project proposals showing a clear problem analysis which makes explicit links between interventions and the types and levels of conflict they are seeking to address. They should show more than a rudimentary understanding of the political dynamics and in particular an assessment of how the project may affect incentive systems—directly or indirectly, negatively or positively.

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<sup>41</sup> There are clearly exceptions to this. For example the ‘Review of Phase I’ of the ONS contained excellent political analysis. In general however we found a dearth of analysis and reporting on the GCPP.

69. Interestingly, the most impressive analysis of conflict dynamics and how external interventions impact upon them, came from the Mazar PRT. This was largely a function of their investment in this kind of analysis and being close to the ground. The recent agreement by Dostam and Atta to hand in their heavy weapons is illustrative of how good analysis of political dynamics and incentive systems, backed up with the appropriate sticks and carrots can deliver conflict prevention results.

#### **4. EFFECT ON PREVENTING NEW CONFLICTS AND CONTAINING EXISTING ONES**

70. In this section we examine possible effects of the GCPP on the sources of insecurity in Afghanistan. To what extent is the GCPP having an impact on the sources and dynamics of conflict? What is the net benefit of these interventions? How is the GCPP adding value to the UK's overall contribution to CP? Before addressing these wider questions about outcomes it is necessary to examine some of the specifics related to GCPP's strategies, implementation and outputs.

71. As already noted it is too early to assess impacts, but it will be difficult to do this in the future without a clear baseline. Although at the macro level one can 'tick boxes' in terms of which of the hurdles laid down by the Bonn process have been cleared, this tells us more about outputs than outcomes or overall impact. The same applies at the individual project level, where implementation schedules may have been met but their effects individually and collectively are difficult to assess with very limited baseline data.

72. The links to conflict prevention have only been stated in extremely broad terms in GCPP documentation. Evidently most conflicts are complex and multi-faceted. However international experience indicates that regional conflict complexes are the most difficult to resolve. In Afghanistan as mentioned above we are talking about multiple conflicts occurring at different levels. There could perhaps be greater clarity in the GCPP strategy about the unit and level of analysis ie which types of conflict and which levels are particular interventions targeting? The problems of attribution and causality are made more difficult by the fact that in Afghanistan it is often the invisible and informal political processes that are most important. Therefore informal chats over green tea may ultimately have more of a policy impact than a formal, time-bound project.

73. Another factor to keep in mind is the relatively modest level of resources allocated to the GCPP. There is therefore a need for realistic objectives and indicators. A final point to consider when doing a peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) is that the impacts are never of a binary—good-bad—or unidirectional nature—they are likely to be mixed and two-directional.<sup>42</sup> At this stage one can begin to map out some of the potential effects in terms of a benefit-harm analysis, but definitive conclusions are clearly not possible.

##### **4.1 Potential for Positive Effects**

74. There will be no GCPP conflict prevention 'pay off' unless the wider dynamics of insecurity are addressed. The effectiveness of the pool depends upon a minimum level of stability. To an extent the pool suffers from the same 'killer assumptions' that have underpinned the BA and the international response to Afghanistan. Essentially this has involved underestimating the deep-rooted nature of the sources of insecurity in Afghanistan and over-estimating the resolve of international actors to invest in robust peace-enforcement as recommended in the Brahimi report.

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<sup>42</sup> There is therefore a need to require project document to show both how interventions may affect conflict dynamics and how conflict dynamics are likely to affect project implementation. This in a sense is classic risk analysis. Evidence needs to be shown that the potentially negative effects of conflict on project activities have been thought through and there are mitigation strategies in place—sometimes called 'conflict proofing'.

75. A critical threshold now appears to have been reached in the Afghan conflict. The security trends are negative and there is the potential for the destructive dynamics of the regional conflict system to re-assert themselves. But there also appears to be for the first time a policy consensus within the international community on the need to address security in a more holistic way, most importantly with US-backing and financial support. Much hinges on whether security can be rolled out in the Southeast. A whole package of measures is contingent on this including reconstruction, counter narcotics, DDR and elections. In this kind of a scenario GCPP projects may play a positive peace consolidation role. Conversely, if negative trends continue they may actually play a conflict-fuelling role. The potential for positive or negative scenarios should be accounted for and factored into current and future activities of the pool.

76. Table 1 represents an attempt to map out some of the potentially positive impacts of the GCPP in relation to its three main strands.

77. There is a need to think about the *horizontal* (between strands or sectors) and *vertical* (between levels, i.e. macro to micro) coherence of projects within the pool.<sup>43</sup> While there appears to be a good balance and spread of activities horizontally the vertical links are less developed. The GCPP strategy has so far had a limited effect upon the most immediate and fundamental problem of the lack of security outside of Kabul. While clearly institution building has to happen at the centre, the concentration of resources and attention in Kabul risks exacerbating urban-rural tensions—something that contributed to the original outbreak of the conflict.

78. There may also be a need to look at activities beyond the national level. The UK drafted the Good Neighbourly Relations Agreement and is now pushing it as a vehicle through which regional tensions can be addressed. Generally regional objectives have been pursued at the political level and there has been limited support for regional initiatives through GCPP. There have been some attempts to explore links between the GCPP strategies for Afghanistan and Pakistan, while there has also been some regional cooperation on drugs and border police. There may however be potential to explore the potential for the GCPP to influence regional dynamics further. For instance, though politically sensitive there may be potential for the NSC to cooperate with neighbours in developing a national regional threat assessment.

## **4.2 Potential for Negative Effects**

79. There is a danger that GCPP work given its political sensitivity and the unstable environment may actually be conflict inducing and undermine the UK's wider objectives in Afghanistan. All interventions have distributional effects which should be monitored closely. The danger of the GCPP heightening core-periphery tensions has been mentioned. The tendency for assistance to go to places where the stability is greatest tends to increase disparities which may fuel grievances leading to conflict. Projects must be sensitised to these types of effects—for instance monitoring the profile of police trainees or the

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<sup>43</sup> For instance, an example of horizontal linkages would be a programming cluster around policing or human rights and citizen's voice. Vertical linkages involve working at different levels for example the regional, national, provincial and district levels, on for example counter-narcotics.

geographical distribution of resources. This is not to say that projects with the potential for negative side-effects should be avoided, but such 'externalities' should be recognized and accounted for. The following brief comments are offered as examples rather than an exhaustive list of potential negative effects.

80. Support for the military without strong conditionalities regarding reforms and accountability runs the risk of repeating an historical pattern of a coercive military apparatus built up through foreign funding. Corruption is a potential side effect of all forms of financial assistance—this may be conflict-producing if it undermines government legitimacy or enables conflict stakeholders to build up separate power bases.

81. DDR may itself be conflict-producing, at least in the short-term—it could create a local power vacuum that may be filled by other non state military actors; it may lead to increased competition for resources and livelihoods; it could lead to increased involvement in the opium economy. Election support; as already mentioned elections raise the political stakes and could lead to increased factional instability. Poppy eradication programmes are likely to be resisted. They may fuel grievances with the government, heighten inter-regional tensions and generate support for anti government forces.

82. Many of the above issues are not new to project managers. To an extent there is an intuitive awareness of project-conflict dynamics. But currently the GCPP does not employ a PCIA methodology to systematically monitor and assess the positive/negative interactions between interventions and the dynamics of peace and conflict.

**Table 1: Project Effects on Conflict Prevention/Peacebuilding**

<b>Projects</b>	<b>Type/level of conflict addressed</b>	<b>Potential CP impacts</b>
<b>Security</b> ANA salaries, military equipment	Lack of equipped, trained national army able to provide security which contributes to; lack of state legitimacy; interference by regional powers; incursions from non state military groups; increased incentives to join militias.	Contribution to building the capacity of a national army able to provide security.
DDR	Militias provide the only means of a livelihood for many young men (bottom up incentives) Commanders/war lords need fighter to control political and economic resources (top down incentives). Decentralized violence means that fighters are afraid to disarm.	Creation of alternative livelihoods for fighters. Increased security likely to attract additional funding for reconstruction and undermine the power of warlords.
Counter-narcotics	Drugs revenues; support private militias which undermine the control of central government; contribute to corruption, undermining government legitimacy; create regional instability.	Cutting off the revenue stream of 'spoilers' including Taliban, al Qaeda, warlords and drugs traders. Provision of stable, long-term livelihoods to fighters and farmers. Contribution to regional stability, because of the regional destabilizing effects of drugs economy.
Police/judiciary	Lack of protection for Afghan citizens. Culture of impunity. Vulnerability to criminal, predatory behaviour. Lack of institutions for dealing with disputes and grievances leading to resort to violence.	Law enforcement capability. Increased confidence in the state. Judicial framework. Creation of the processes and institutions to deal with conflict non-violently. Access to justice.
<b>Conflict resolution &amp; dialogue</b> AIHRC	Human rights abuses—individual and group. Gender based violence. Grievances about past abuses. Lack of reconciliation.	Strengthening accountability. Establishing mechanisms for transitional justice. Greater gender equity.
IWPR	Lack of civil society voice. Lack of information—vulnerable to manipulation by political entrepreneurs.	Creation of channels for political debate and alternative view points.
<b>Good governance/rule of law</b> NSC	Lack of democratic control of security forces, subject to the manipulation of 'conflict entrepreneurs'. Unstable security sector lacking strategic oversight and analysis of security risks.	Transparent, accountable security sector able to analyse and respond to security risks.



## **5. EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS**

83. As already mentioned the UK is regarded as significant player in the Afghan context because of its historic involvement with the country, the high-level political interest it has attracted and the spread of its involvement in the various facets of the international response. DFID's (previously Overseas Development Administration (ODA)) long-term involvement with the country is an important source of credibility. The UK has been viewed by domestic and international actors as a knowledgeable and enlightened donor, that over the years has helped shape policies and debates towards the country.<sup>44</sup> DFID is viewed as a 'responsible donor'. Like Norway a smaller but influential funder, it has in the main supported programmes through the government's trust funds, unlike US and Japan, the two largest donors who have tended to fund their own far more expensive organisations.<sup>45</sup> Overall, HMG has a diverse network of partnerships and working relationships with a range of international and domestic players. In this sense it is well positioned to 'punch above its weight'.

84. Apart from its direct impacts on conflict, the GCPP is supposed to have an indirect impact on CP by influencing wider international arrangements. One might examine this on two levels; first how GCPP has influenced international arrangements in relation to SSR given that this is its primary focus. Second, how the GCPP has effected wider international conflict prevention efforts—in other words the extent to which it has helped leverage positive post Bonn outcomes. Given the GCPP's relatively modest financial contribution one should be realistic about its potential to influence wider changes in the international system. But this does not negate the potential for strategic, 'smart' interventions that may have a disproportionate effect in terms of shaping better policy outcomes. The GCPP was conceived not only as a funding mechanism, and strategies were selected with a view to influencing international arrangements as well as meeting immediate needs. As one interviewee stated: 'Our mantra was, "make the international system work"'.

85. This question can be further broken down into the GCPP's impact on particular actors—including bi-lateral players such as the US or Germany and multi-lateral actors such as the UN or EU—and on particular sectors either within SSR such as drugs, policing, human rights etc or on wider CP policies. Certainly one of the intentions of the GCPP was to play a role in agenda setting and knowledge creation. There is also the question of whether the GCPP has contributed to overall policy coherence and coordination. We have already identified problems regarding the lack of coherence in the international response and the tensions between short-term and long-term approaches. To what extent did the GCPP recognize and respond to these problems?

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<sup>44</sup> For instance, during the mid- to late-1990s when most other donors provided only short-term humanitarian funding, DFID supported long-term developmental and organisational assistance to NGOs. CHAD were influential in a range of areas including mainstreaming human rights, peacebuilding and security and UN reform.

<sup>45</sup> Rubin et al, 2003, p 26.

## 5.1 Effects on Wider International Arrangements

86. Whether GCPP has had an impact on international arrangements has to be situated in relation to the question of the UK's role and leverage. What is the scope for the UK to influence international arrangements and what kinds of effects has the GCPP had upon whom? There is clearly a problem with attribution and the lack of a counterfactual.<sup>46</sup> Would the absence of the GCPP have made a significant difference to the way the international community 'does business' in Afghanistan?

87. Our assessment of the BA and its implementation in section 2, highlights the shortcomings of the international response. Drawing upon commonly agreed international standards of best practice<sup>47</sup>, or on the provisions of the BA itself, the international community has been found wanting. A narrow focus on the 'war on terrorism' undermined broader conflict prevention goals. The United States takes chief responsibility for setting this agenda. An Amnesty International report written in July 2003 was highly critical of the negative effects of acts and omissions by the USA, the UN and other international actors.<sup>48</sup>

88. This is not an isolated criticism, it is a consistent theme to have emerged from a range of other credible assessments and analyses.<sup>49</sup> If one accepts this analysis, two critical conflict prevention leverage points should have been prioritised (a) encouraging a re-balancing of US priorities—so that state building is not undermined by narrow coalition interests (b) an extension of ISAF forces beyond Kabul or failing this an extension of the 'ISAF effect' through other mechanisms so that security is provided in the provinces.

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<sup>46</sup> Policies towards Afghanistan are evidently influenced by a whole range of factors. For instance US policies have been driven by a range of domestic, international and institutional factors. Policies may also be fragmented, reflecting competing perspectives and interests, with the White House, Pentagon, CIA, DoD and USAID often adopting different policies at different times towards Afghanistan. There are a whole host of policy institutes and NGOs which dedicate much of their time and energy to influencing international policies towards Afghanistan, many focusing on conflict issues. These include advocacy bodies such as ACBAR, individual NGOs such as CARE International, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, ICG, think tanks and academic bodies such as AREU and CIC. Even dedicated advocacy agencies find it difficult to attribute particular policy changes to particular advocacy interventions.

<sup>47</sup> See for instance Brahimi 2000, Stedman 2001.

<sup>48</sup> Amnesty International (2003) 'Killing you is a very easy thing for us'. Human Rights Abuses in Southeast Afghanistan' Vol 15, No 05, July 2003, p 11: 'The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other international bodies, including some donors, deserve credit for identifying the short comings of the US-led coalition's strategies, but must also take responsibility for ultimately acquiescing and not being vocal enough in their complaints. The leadership of the UN mission in particular persistently attempted convince the United States of the need to expand ISAF beyond Kabul but the mission was slow to realize the scope of the problems created by the US support for warlord'. 'the situation today—widespread insecurity and human rights abuse—was not inevitable, nor was it the result of unstoppable social or political forces in Afghanistan. It is, in large part, the result of decisions, acts and omissions of the US government, the governments of other coalition members, and parts of the transitional government itself É the United States in particular bears much responsibility for the actions of those they have propelled to power, for failing to take steps against other abusive leaders, and for impeding attempts for force them to step aside'.

<sup>49</sup> See CARE/CIC, Human Rights Watch, ICG, CIC, UK International Development Committee (2003) etc.

89. On the first point, it is difficult to assess whether UK policies in general and the GCPP in particular have influenced emerging US strategies. Interviews have yielded mixed views, including, the sceptics—‘We were always playing second fiddle to the US’—the optimists who argue that the UK helped shape emerging policy on SSR and drugs, and the pragmatists: ‘There’s no point in going head on against our major ally when we’re bound to lose’.

90. The perception of the UK in Kabul is that they are taking a US rather than a European position. ‘They’re more of a coalition player than a European player’. The evaluation team is not able to make an informed assessment about the extent to which the UK has influenced US decision-making. It is clear that there has been a major shift in US thinking but this could be attributed to a range of things other than the quiet diplomacy of coalition partners.<sup>50</sup> Arguably if one concurs with the analysis in section 2, then for the UK to maximize its impact on CP, this would necessitate a more critical approach to the US and working more closely with the UN and Europeans. This might also involve a more critical reappraisal of the BA rather than pushing on with a flawed process and timetable.

91. There is a concern amongst some of the UN and European actors that conflict prevention efforts have been refracted through a ‘homeland security’ lens leading to an asymmetrical focus on western security concerns rather than long term Afghan stability. The focus on terrorism and narcotics are manifestations of this, reflected also in the spending patterns mentioned earlier.

92. On the second point, the UK was initially the lead nation for ISAF in Afghanistan. Although UK soldiers in command of ISAF at the time argued for an extension of their mandate, there was a lack of high level political support for this from the London or Washington.<sup>51</sup> In conflict prevention as in so much else, timing is everything and the failure to support a more robust peace operation allowed warlords to consolidate their position, the drugs economy to re-establish its foothold and the reconstruction process to be forestalled. Even though there is now a UN mandate to extend ISAF, NATO member states have been unwilling to provide the troops or resources to allow this to happen. From a conflict prevention perspective one might argue that the UK should have concentrated its efforts on lobbying for ISAF extension. However, there are strong pragmatic arguments for its current policy of focusing on PRTs—this is at least a proposal for improving security that the international community is willing to back. The debate on ISAF expansion-PRTs may be illustrative of the limits of UK influence—it lacks the leverage to play an agenda setting role, but can influence the direction of debates and policies once they have been set.

93. Does the GCPP have a conflict prevention policy-making role in its own right? One interviewee saw the GCPP as a means by which the UK could ‘punch above its weight’ in the policy arena: ‘It is key to the UK being seen as a major player ... it backs up philosophical discussions with hard money. It buys us influence far in excess of what it costs and beyond putting troops on the ground’.

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<sup>50</sup> Forthcoming US elections for example are clearly important.

<sup>51</sup> The ostensible reasons for ISAF’s limitation to Kabul and its environs were the Security Council Resolution and the status of forces agreement with the Afghan Government.

94. This however was not born out by the findings of the evaluation team. The GCPP is not a leading edge in UK CP policy towards Afghanistan. It is seen as a flexible funding mechanism which may add value to UK CP strategies that have been decided elsewhere. This is not necessarily a criticism—there may be a need for a reservoir of funds which can be used flexibly and creatively to address emerging CP issues. There are two potential problems with this arrangement as it currently stands. First the gap between the stated policy —the pool as a mechanism for developing shared strategies — and the actual practice—the pool as a CP ‘slush fund’—is likely to be unhelpful and potentially confusing both for those directly involved and for UK’s CP partners. Second, because it is viewed primarily as a pot of money there is always the danger that it will be ‘raided’ opportunistically. The money allocated to ANA salaries and the additional resources allocated to counter narcotics out of this year’s budgetary allocation are illustrative of this. In both cases it is not clear how this funding is related to a coherent CP strategy.<sup>52</sup>

95. The regional dimensions of conflict prevention are sometimes missing in debates about international arrangements. Regional organisations in Central/South Asia have always been weak compared to many other parts of the world. Brahimi introduced the ‘six plus two’ framework in 1996, recognizing the regional dimensions of the conflict and the need for neighbouring countries to support compatible peacebuilding strategies. HMG clearly recognizes the continuing importance of regional players having helped draft the Good Neighbourly Agreement. But the GCPP is not viewed as an instrument for influencing the regional dynamics of conflict. In our view there appears to be scope to explore the potential for developing stronger links between the Pakistan and Former Soviet Union (FSU) GCPP strategies to develop common projects in a range of areas including NSC, drugs, policing and civil society initiatives. With the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) having recently extended its field of operations to Afghanistan there may be potential here for developing collaborative arrangements on a regional basis.

96. Finally, the GCPP has developed few substantive relationships with NGOs, apart from IWPR. From a long-term conflict prevention perspective, it makes sense to prioritise relationships with the Afghan Government. However, for the GCPP to deliver real impacts in the short to medium term it must develop stronger partnerships with NGOs, who in reconstruction terms are essentially the main source of operational capacity in Afghanistan. They have a range of comparative advantages including; a history of involvement in the country, a strong institutional memory (compared to most other international actors) wide geographic coverage, good information systems and analysis based on contacts with Afghan communities (that is essential for early warning) and management and organisational capacities.

## **5.2 Effects on SSR**

97. Given the size and focus of GCPP, the area of international arrangements where it can most realistically be expected to have an impact is SSR. One can map a range of multi-lateral (UNAMA, UNODC, UNDP, UNOPS etc) and bi-lateral (US, Germans, Italians

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<sup>52</sup> Support for the ANA and counter-narcotics programmes may clearly promote CP objectives. However it is the evaluators view (and the view of a number of interviewees) that in these two cases, money was raided from the GCPP pot without sufficient evidence of a thought-through process showing the strategic links to CP.

and Japan) partnerships, in addition to links with government ministries, NGOs, coordination bodies and trust funds, all developed through GCPP projects. The UK is viewed as a knowledge leader that has engaged in innovative SSR work elsewhere. Finally GCPP support for the NSC is a flag ship project within the sector. It is at the centre of UK efforts to provide the G8 with a broad framework for addressing SSR requirements. Given this strong platform for influencing the SSR process to what extent has GCPP had a system-wide effect on SSR arrangements?

98. Some interviewees argued that the GCPP gave HMG the bargaining power to influence debates on SSR—‘it has bought us a seat at the table with US and Japan’. The combination of funding, its role as leader of one of the five SSR pillars, and its reputation as a knowledge leader in SSR have undoubtedly meant that HMG has been an influential player in the sector as whole. The UK have played an important role in advocating for a joined-up and holistic approach to SSR. This is reflected to an extent in SSR coordination mechanisms, trust fund arrangements and the division of labour and funding within the sector.

99. However, there are some basic realities to contend with which limit the impact of the GCPP. First, the US is the dominant player in this sector and in spite of the formal division of roles, its interests and vision of SSR have tended to be pre-eminent. Initially for instance the US approach to SSR was very much a military-led one. Subsequently they have recognized the need for a more comprehensive approach. To an extent this has meant an encroachment into the other four pillars including policing and counter narcotics. In some cases their interventions have had a positive impact, as for example their ‘fast track’ police training, but in others, for instance the CIA’s support to the NSD, the effects may be at best, mixed. Second, as mentioned earlier SSR has suffered from uneven implementation as reforms are applied at different speeds and often with different approaches, led by different lead donors. There is unevenness horizontally between the pillars and vertically between different levels. The linkages between the macro and micro levels have tended to be extremely weak with reforms at the centre often being unconnected with developments in the field. Third, inherent weaknesses within the GCPP limit its impact on the SSR process. It suffers from the lack of coherence that characterizes the wider SSR process. Also its leverage is diminished because it has no profile or visibility. There is no demonstration effect because other international actors are barely even aware of the GCPP’s existence or its underpinning philosophy of ‘joined up government’.<sup>53</sup> Finally, to influence international arrangements requires a significant investment in relationship building, which in turn depends on having capacity on the ground. This does not currently exist as there is no dedicated GCPP person to play this role.

### **5.3 Effects of the Mazar PRT**

100. HMG’s most significant impact on international arrangements currently appears to be through the Mazar PRT. Interestingly, the best example of joined up government involving the three departments falls outside the pool. The PRT is playing the kind of strategy

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<sup>53</sup> This is not about the profile of HMG. It is about the ability of the GCPP to maximize its impact upon international arrangements. If to all intents and purposes the GCPP is ‘invisible’ it is unlikely to demonstrate to other international actors the benefits of a coherent, ‘joined-up’ approach to CP.

development and policy-mobilizing role originally envisaged for the GCPP. It has an extremely high profile and is widely talked about as a success story and a model to be replicated throughout Afghanistan. In fact there is a risk of overselling it since the security problems in other parts of the country are very different from the ones in Mazar and responses will need to be similarly variegated. However, the PRT does yield important insights about the potential for international actors to address the sources of insecurity through a joined up approach. At a fairly micro level it demonstrate how the security, political and reconstruction tracks can be addressed simultaneously and in a way that is mutually reinforcing. It is also important to note that although British-led, the Mazar PRT is very much an international effort involving Danish and US personnel as well as Afghan Government support. Box 1 highlights some of the key issues raised by the PRT that have relevance to the GCPP.

101. As a model it appears to have been extremely successful. It has grown organically in response to specific security threats. Whether it is a model that would work in the rest of the country is doubtful. Political and security dynamics are different in the North from the South where there is a clear external threat. Evidently different contexts require different security regimes. Although the PRT has a government liaison officer, links to provincial and central government could be further strengthened and institutionalised. The PRT provides the GCPP with the security platform to scale up its impact in the provinces. This is already starting in the area of policing and a project cluster could be developed around this. The PRT has been successful as it has made the internal investment in developing analytical and operational capacities. It is built upon strong leadership and good inter-departmental collaboration. It is viewed as a flag ship project and there is a high level of political will to see that it works.

102. Building a strong link between GCPP and the PRTs may represent an opportunity to increase the relevance, profile and impact of the pool. There is clearly scope to develop a stronger articulation between Kabul-centred projects and the provinces. In the case of Mazar, this is beginning to happen in the area of policing and also the media (IWPR). This could be built upon and extended much further in the future. The risk of an excessive 'securitisation' of aid needs to be warded against, through for instance a clear delineation of roles and an information strategy. The stress should be placed on building complementarity more than coherence—in other words it is not about how reconstruction becomes instrumentalised by military actors, but how it can complement the wider goal of building human security. NGOs have legitimate concerns about this question and they are not being sufficiently addressed either in the field or in Kabul. In our view 'embedding' DFID and USAID within the PRT has heightened these concerns.

**Box 1: Responding to Insecurity:  
Mazar PRT & the Security Committee for the North**

There has been a long and complex history of inter-group politico-military competition in the North. Currently the principal combatants<sup>54</sup> are the militias of General Abdul Rashid Dostum and General Atta Muhammad. Although sometimes portrayed as ethnic or ideological sporadic outbreaks of fighting often involve struggles for control of economic resources such as Kud-o-Barq fertilizer factory and power plant, lucrative opium trafficking routes and customs posts.<sup>55</sup> There had previously been no mechanism in place to arbitrate disputes between the leadership of the militias. Two years ago discussions were held between UNAMA, the police and factions, leading to the establishment of the Security Committee for the North. This body has subsequently played an arbitration role, responding to outbreaks of violence by bringing together faction leaders to broker agreements. While the Committee has been relatively successful as a responsive mechanism for de-escalating inter-factional violence, it lacked the capacity to monitor and enforce agreements.

The initiation of the Mazar PRT has complemented and built upon existing security arrangements. For instance conflict escalation in October 2004 between Dostum and Atta led to a quick joint response from the Security Committee and PRT. In the end high-level negotiations involving UNAMA, Jalali, the Minister of the Interior, the UK Ambassador and Col. Dickie Davis, Commander of PRT were able to defuse the conflict. Continued pressure has induced the protagonists to agree to give up their heavy weapons and begin a DDR process. This is seen as an opportunity to neutralize the factions.

The PRT has adopted a low-key, low profile approach with a primary, though not exclusive focus on security. Its success to date has been based upon foundations of strong political analysis and a long term strategic approach. It maintains a light presence, with roughly 90 troops operating in an area the size of Scotland. The strategy has been to negotiate with the factions rather than act as a combat force. As one long-term aid worker commented: *The mere sight of uniforms helps provide security*. The ultimate goal is to create a stable environment which will attract further funding into the region, creating a virtuous spiral of increased security leading to more reconstruction, and consequently to growing confidence in the government and the wider peace process.

A small amount of GCPP funds have been used so far on police uniforms, materials and equipment. But it is planned to scale up the reconstruction component of the GCPP. A possible GCPP project for example is to renovate all the police stations for the North. A DFID PRT advisor and a USAID official are 'embedded' within PRT, and are tasked with identifying reconstruction projects that would help consolidate the peace process.

<sup>54</sup> Although there are five competing factions whose military capacity and support has waxed and waned over the years.

<sup>55</sup> Rubin et al, 2003, p 15.

## **6. EFFECT ON INTER-DEPARTMENTAL PROCESSES**

### **6.1 Strategic Coherence**

103. Central to the question of strategic coherence is that of leadership. How has it worked in practice with FCO as the lead agency? What has been the role of the Embassy in relation to the GCPP? We have begun to answer these questions in previous sections having highlighted the lack of capacity on the ground to provide strategic direction and coordination. This has contributed to the perception in some quarters that the FCO have provided a weak lead or a 'light touch' with regards to the GCPP.

104. There are clearly different organisational cultures and practices to contend with and the three departments have very different starting points when it comes to CP. DFID for example tends to adopt longer time frames than MOD and FCO and has a more highly developed approach to project appraisal, planning and managements. One DFID interviewee commented that 'FCO are more interested in "high politics"... and they are not using the money strategically'. To be fair, in our view it is about time and capacity rather than competence or focus —leadership needs to take place in Kabul but for this to happen resources and decision making powers need to be devolved. The GCPP has tended to be very London-led. One interviewee who had been based in Kabul before GCPP start-up said that there had been only minimal consultation about the project concept or its implementation during the start-up phase.

105. There is a legitimate question about whether FCO should be the lead agency in Afghanistan. Given DFID's longer on-the-ground experience and the nature of most of the GCPP projects—with their emphasis on institution building and longer-term structural conflict prevention—they may be the more obvious lead agency. Furthermore, they plan to employ a Conflict Advisor who could potentially fill the dedicated GCPP manager slot. Conversely there are also strong reasons for keeping an FCO lead and we are not advocating one or the other. However there may be a need to think more creatively and less rigidly about lead agencies within the GCPP. The leadership role could perhaps change according to context or conflict phase. For example Colonel Dickie Davis in relation to the Mazar PRT argued that leadership may change over time. The MOD's lead role is a reflection of the current security challenges. As these change MOD may adopt more of a supportive role in relation to FCO and DFID.

106. The PRT is the clearest example of how inter-departmental collaboration can work in practice, though in the main outside the framework of the pool. It works as already mentioned because there is strong leadership, tasks are clearly delineated and collaboration has developed from the field up, based on a response to commonly defined problems. The risk associated with a more top-down approach is that strategies are not defined in relation to problems on the ground. Transaction costs are increased because of the routinisation of collaboration and comparative advantages may be 'watered down' rather than pooled.

107. As one interviewee stated, 'Money drives cooperation'. Some felt that the pool plays a positive role by exposing the three departments to the critical scrutiny of each other. This in a sense encourages a form of horizontal accountability. This may happen in London but



less so in Kabul, where until recently there has been no MOD person to liaise with: *The Afghan strategy is joined up in London but less so in Afghanistan*. But there have been criticisms that at the strategic level in the UK meetings were often not attended by senior officials who had the requisite power to generate a critical mass behind initiatives. At the operational level coordination problems have already been mentioned, for example the lack of interaction between NSC, President's Office (which DFID are working with) and CND. Counter narcotics is another area where at times there has been a problematic relationship between DFID and FCO. Whereas the former has argued for longer-term approaches with an emphasis on governance and economic development, the latter has pressed for quick impact eradication and interdiction activities.

## 6.2 Project Management

108. The strategic direction for the GCPP is provided by London and ideas for projects tend to come from international partners, the Embassy or DFID in Kabul or DAT. The GCPP appears to have a limited impact upon how people in the field strategize or plan, other than it being a pot of money to which they can go to for projects that do not 'fit'. The appraisal process itself has been variously described as 'rather truncated' and 'not very robust'. Proposals are then fed up to the London committee where they are discussed. DFID in Kabul felt that it had not been engaged sufficiently in discussions before proposals were sent to London, though it was also mentioned that they currently lacked the capacity on the ground to engage adequately with the GCPP. The last London meeting was held on 2 July 2003 in which according to one interviewee, DFID were presented with three proposals none of which they had seen before.<sup>56</sup> In spite of the 'truncated' proposal process, there have some delays in expediting funding as for instance with money allocated for elections, which has taken several months to go through the system.

109. The criteria for project selection are fairly broad. There are differing opinions on whether there should be clear boundaries between what comes within the pool and what should remain with individual departments. For instance the boundaries between DFID's work in governance and GCPP's work in this sector are quite blurred. Fuzzy boundaries may be a positive thing in terms of responsiveness and flexibility. But there is perhaps a need to be more demanding in terms of a clear description of the problem and how this relates specifically to conflict prevention.

110. It is not clear how GCPP is itself adding value to the quality of the projects apart from those where DAT is able to make a strategic and technical input. Otherwise the relationship between GCPP and project partners is purely that of a funder. Project managers do meet regularly with the person responsible in Kabul, but there is a feeling that the level of contact is insufficient and the focus tends to be on immediate project concerns.

111. Many of the problems outlined in this section are capacity problems. This relates first to having additional human resources devoted to the GCPP, certainly in Kabul and perhaps also in London. Second it relates to the skills and competencies of staff. Very few of the staff involved in the GCPP have direct experience of conflict prevention or peacebuilding.

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<sup>56</sup> In general it should be noted that all proposals are sent around for discussion beforehand. If meeting participants have not seen proposals before they are not expected to make decisions on the spot.

In our view there needs to be at least one dedicated person with deep understanding and expertise in this area, while project managers should be exposed through training and awareness raising to some of the key 'state of the art' issues related to CP.

### **6.3 Analysis/Monitoring and Evaluation**

112. To what extent has the GCPP drawn upon and encouraged common analysis? During the early days of the crisis the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) held almost daily meetings. According to one interviewee, the relationship between MOD and FCO tended to be closer because of their focus on the immediate dynamics of the crisis, whereas DFID tends to focus on longer term trends and draw more upon commissioned research. In the context of GCPP, these different analytical approaches are potentially complementary. For instance actor-oriented, early warning frameworks may be useful for short-term conflict management, while tools used by DFID such as Strategic Conflict assessment (SCA) and 'drivers of change' analysis feed into medium to long-term planning. The PRT appears to successfully combine these different forms of analysis and feeds them directly into ongoing strategies and activities. Having MOD, FCO and DFID personnel on the ground may be a significant contributory factor and one the GCPP could learn from.

113. The problem of policy sometimes driving analysis was highlighted during the Taliban period, when there were pressures to paint the Taliban in a more negative light than was actually the case. The problem of the gap between policy and analysis was also highlighted in relation to the FCO Security Strategy Unit which had advised that UK staff should not be deployed in Kandahar. These perhaps understandable security concerns however limit the implementation and consequently impact of the counter narcotics programme.

114. Some frustration was expressed at the lack of progress in terms of learning and knowledge creation. This was seen to be partly a problem of high staff turnover and lack of specific skills. In FCO and DFID the internal dynamics and incentive systems encourage generalists—according to one interviewee specialists do not fit into the normal career path. And yet good analysis depends upon specialists with a deep background in a country or region.<sup>57</sup> As already mentioned, the best analysis in relation to CP was that coming out of the PRT.

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<sup>57</sup> It is worth noting in this regard the NSC have sub-contracted a National Threat Assessment analysis to an institution with limited, if any, track record in the country. This represents another example of technical expertise being prioritised over regional specialisation.

## **7. IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT**

115. According to Meeting Minutes of FCO and DFID Boards, July 10 there was a significant under-spend of the GCCP in FY 2002/3. This was partly due to slippage in setting up of ANA and the consequent failure to disburse funding for ANA salaries.

116. It can be argued that the GCCP represents extremely good value for money given the fact that there are no extra administrative costs for its operation. However, we would argue that this is a false economy. Ultimately the impact and sustainability of the GCCP is diminished as a result of lack of capacity on the ground. In order to build capacity one has to invest in one's own capacities and a budget line to cover this is, in our view, essential.

117. During the second year of the pool, there has been a greater focus on the police *vis a vis* the military. In many respects this represents a better value and higher return investment in relation to conflict prevention. The police are cheaper to equip and train than the military and are likely to have a direct effect on the internal sources of insecurity.

## 8. RECOMMENDATIONS

### 8.1 Should the Strategy be Continued and How Can it be Improved?

118. It is recommended that the GCPP be continued because (a) it is covering strategically important areas in relation to the sources of conflict in Afghanistan (b) the benefits of a joined up approach are clearly demonstrated by the PRT, all-be-it outside the pool mechanism. Recommending the continuation of the GCPP is based on the assumption that similar forms of positive collaboration can be developed more systematically through the pool mechanism. This evaluation has highlighted a number of important short-comings in the GCPP which have limited its coherence and consequently its impact. These will need to be addressed. The problem of lack of capacity has been a constant refrain in this report. Most of our recommendations below are dependent on investing in internal capacity development. If this does not take place, we are doubtful as to the overall value of continuing with the GCPP.

119. Recommendations should be considered against a background of the deficiencies highlighted in this report with international efforts to build peace in Afghanistan. The sources of conflict have been addressed selectively, with the war against terrorism, taking precedence over wider efforts to build structural stability in the region. There is growing support for a fundamental stock taking and a rethinking of the principles and time frames of the BA. Bonn may have trapped the international community into a short-term conflict management exercise which aims to get Afghanistan to elections, but with limited thought about the long term implications for conflict prevention. HMG and the GCPP need to think seriously about where they position themselves in relation to these debates.

120. **Analysis:** there is clearly high quality analysis going on and there are many well-informed people around. The problem is the lack of joined up analysis, which systematically feeds into the GCPP and informs strategy development and programming. Mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure this happens. Thought may need to be given to the length of staff contracts as high staff turnover undermines institutional learning. The same applies to the background and expertise of staff, perhaps thinking more carefully about the balance between technical and regional expertise. In relation to conflict analysis there is no substitute for deep regional expertise yet there are few people on the ground who have long-term Afghan or Central Asian experience.

121. Capacity should also be developed in the area of conflict analysis<sup>58</sup> which should feed systematically into existing projects and new project ideas. This may mean developing partnerships with a range of organisations already engaged in this kind of analysis (see below).

122. **Strategic focus:** a number of recommendations can be made to strengthen the focus of the GCPP, which tends to currently operate as a collection of projects that are less than the sum of their parts:

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<sup>58</sup> By this we mean a range of tools and approaches which are currently employed by DFID, MOD and FCO including SCA, early warning methodologies, drivers of change analysis etc. As already mentioned the PRT is the best example of how different forms of analysis can be systematically combined and translated into appropriate short- to medium-term responses.

- Overall the focus on SSR makes good sense given the sources of insecurity in Afghanistan and the UK's expertise in this area.
- There should be a more conscious effort to build synergies or horizontal links between projects. This can be done firstly by sharpening the focus of projects within individual strategies and secondly by developing programming or project clusters. For instance there is a project cluster around the area of policing and the links between these projects could be developed much further. The same applies to projects concerned with the NSC, CND and President's Office.
- Continuing and strengthening the focus on policing makes a lot of sense particularly at the provincial level, perhaps through PRTs.
- The GCPP is quite weak in its links with civil society and there may be potential to develop a programming cluster around the voice and access of civil society. Links could also be made here with the AIHRC.
- Very little is being done in the second strategy of reconciliation and mediation. There is potential to link in more with the work of NGOs that are already working in this area.
- This is also related to the need to develop vertical links between activities. As the GCPP operates more at the provincial and district levels, the need to engage in this kind of meson or micro-level work will become more pressing.
- There is also a need to think more about the 'upstream' linkages, particularly at the regional level. Most CP activities privilege the state and are not sufficiently attuned to the regional dimensions of the conflict. Links could be developed with the Pakistan and Central Asia CPPs. Regional collaboration could be further developed in a number of GCPP areas including the NSC or counter-narcotics.
- Many of the projects in the GCPP are attempting to address long term problems with short term funding and approaches. There is a need to re-think the one-year funding mechanism and the exit strategies which involve cutting off funding after three years for long-term institution building projects.
- Within a clearer and stronger strategic approach it is important to keep a proportion of funding aside to be allocated for short-term quick impact conflict prevention activities.

123. **Strategic coordination and management:** for strategic coordination to actually happen, there needs to be a dedicated person on the ground (see below). This would allow more devolved decision-making so that conflict prevention problems and solutions are identified and addressed by those close to the 'coal face'. There may be a need to consider the question of department lead. In our view there is no reason why leadership cannot vary according to the country and the phase of conflict. In many respects given DFID's longer term presence in the region and the nature of the projects in the GCPP there are arguments for a DFID lead.

124. In order to strengthen strategic management, there should be a Kabul management committee involving the three departments who are responsible for screening project proposals jointly and reviewing overall progress on strategies and project clusters.

125. This management committee might also consider an advisory group, which could bring in expertise from the Afghan and international community in the area of conflict analysis and conflict prevention. This could include organisations like ICG, OSCE, Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) and local and international NGOs.

126. **Project Selection:** more rigorous criteria should be developed for project identification and appraisal. This should include a more detailed problem statement, key assumptions, links to conflict prevention, CP-related targets, outputs and indicators etc. Again a dedicated person on the ground would be able to work more closely with potential project partners in developing thought-through proposals.

127. **Monitoring and evaluation:** first, benchmarks need to exist and secondly they need to be more realistic and appropriate for the Afghan context. The time frames and the 'ideal-type models' promoted by a number of projects are inappropriate and are bound to fail because the bar has been raised too high. There is also a need to systematically monitor and mitigate the negative impacts of projects on conflict dynamics. PCIA tools should be introduced as a matter of course to monitor all GCPP work.

128. **Profile and partnerships:** the Mazar PRT, in contrast to the GCPP has had a significant effect on international arrangements in relation to CP. The GCPP would be better able to 'leverage Bonn outcomes' if it were more joined up and more visible. The PRT has been very successful in 'marketing' its philosophy and approach in Afghanistan and internationally. The GCPP somewhat perversely is invisible in Afghanistan but viewed as 'cutting edge' and innovative on the international stage. If HMG is serious about the GCPP being an instrument for mobilisation and policy development, as well as funding, more attention needs to be paid to developing its profile in-country and selling the virtues of a cross-departmental approach. Clearly increasing its effectiveness is a precondition for doing this, but more serious time and resources also need to be invested in advocacy, and lobbying. HMG's most significant influence on international arrangements is likely to be as a knowledge leader and innovator, rather than simply a funder. Again it requires dedicated capacity on the ground to perform this role. A number of partnerships could also be further developed to strengthen the outreach and impact of the GCPP:

- Links with NGOs are limited and yet they have a range of capacities that are relevant to conflict prevention. A greater focus should be placed on strengthening links with NGOs and civil society groups and in so doing building the reach of the GCPP. Work with the IWPR is a start, but since the majority of the Afghan population cannot read much more could be done through other media, particularly the radio.
- Developing links with the PRTs is extremely important and is likely to be the primary mechanism for strengthening the effects of the GCPP in the provinces.

129. **Capacity development:** all of the above recommendations depend on having a dedicated person on the ground. Since DFID is about to employ a Conflict Advisor for Afghanistan, this person could perhaps be the obvious choice. They would be responsible for overseeing the strategic management of the GCPP, chairing the Kabul GCPP management committee meetings, advising project managers on the conflict prevention aspects of their work, developing new project ideas and mainstreaming conflict prevention

approaches into the work of the three departments. They would also need to play a role in disseminating ideas about CP and joined up approaches more widely within the international community. Whether all these roles can realistically be played by one person would need to be further discussed. Additional human resources may be required. It is also recommended that a separate budget line be created within the GCPP to cover administrative costs.

130. There also needs to be an investment made in training staff involved in the GCPP in basic issues related to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

## **8.2 Benchmarks, Targets Indicators**

131. Improved benchmarks, targets and indicators need to be considered which take into account evolving circumstances. The Afghan conflict is a 'moving target' and therefore conflict analysis and indicators need to be continually updated and adapted.

132. The PSA Target as it stands is too generalized and virtually anything can somehow be seen to contribute to this goal. More work is required to show the connections between projects, strategies and overall goals. While log frames have many weaknesses they are useful in showing a hierarchy of means –ends relationships and making explicit the assumptions behind project interventions. Whether it is log frames or some other planning tool, the GCPP needs to demand evidence of more rigorous thought processes which show that planners have explicitly considered the links to conflict dynamics and the potential positive and negative externalities of projects.

133. Benchmarks and monitoring and evaluation processes can be improved. We are not of the view that an overly complex approach with long lists of static indicators would be useful. We would recommend a PCIA tool which is light but robust, that is useful for the practitioner and provides quick and dirty information to feed into planning and programming.

## **ANNEX 1: BACKGROUND ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BONN AGREEMENT**

### **Security Transition**

The sources of insecurity are being addressed through a range of coercive and consent-based, military and civil, short-term and long-term measures. These include:

- War fighting (Operation Enduring Freedom).
- Peacekeeping (ISAF forces in Kabul).
- Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)s.
- Security Sector Reform (SSR).
- Preventative diplomacy.
- Political reform.
- Reconstruction programmes.

In this section we are concerned with the first four measures. The US led Operation Enduring Freedom involves some 11,000 troops. Their objective is to hunt down al Qa'eda and Taliban fighters who initially regrouped in the tribal areas of Pakistan following the downfall of the Taliban and have become increasingly confident in their attacks within Afghanistan. In pursuit of this objective the US armed and re-financed local power brokers who may not be supportive of the emergence of a central authority in the country. Even up until September of this year the US were said to be supporting warlords such as Commander Ludin in Gardez. Donald Rumsfeld's declaration of a shift of attention to 'stabilization and reconstruction activities', in May 2003, was made in a context of growing attacks on international and Afghan Government targets.<sup>59</sup>

Although the Brahmi report emphasized the importance of a 'robust force posture', the absence of peacekeeping forces outside the capital has hampered progress on all fronts—despite repeated appeals by the ATA and aid agencies to extend the ISAF mandate beyond Kabul. The original mandate of ISAF in the BA was to oversee the withdrawal of factional forces from Kabul and the expansion of ISAF forces in sufficient numbers to key locations outside of Kabul, but neither of these two things have happened.<sup>60</sup> With the transfer of ISAF control to NATO the way appeared to be open for an expansion of ISAF forces. However, contributing nations have been unwilling to provide the troops, logistical support and financial backing for this.<sup>61</sup> ISAF has been reluctant to take over command of the PRTs for similar reasons. Military planners say that if NATO took command of more PRTs

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<sup>59</sup> Since September 2002, armed attacks against the assistance community have gone up from one a month to one every two days (CARE/CIC, 2003, 'Good Intentions Will Not Pave the Road to Peace', Afghanistan Policy Brief, Care International, Centre on International Cooperation, September 15 2003).

<sup>60</sup> According to CARE/CIC from June–August 2002, the ratio of armed attacks outside of Kabul to inside the city was approximately 2:1. This year in the same period the ratio was 7:1. Outside of Kabul there is one PRT soldier for every 100,000 Afghans.

<sup>61</sup> While in Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia had more than one peacekeeper for every 100 people, in Afghanistan there is only one peacekeeper for 5,000 people.



it would have to deploy up to 3,000 additional soldiers and set up a forward operating base, perhaps in neighbouring Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan, to provide them with protection.<sup>62</sup>

A delegation from the UNSC in October reported that lack of security had 'affected the entire Afghan peace process,' seriously slowing reconstruction efforts and posing a 'direct challenge' to the UN-sponsored peace process. According to CARE/CIC one third of the country is now a 'no go' area for the UN. There is a growing conundrum in that as insecurity increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to implement measures that might address this insecurity. Fighters are unlikely to disarm if they feel threatened by other military groups once they have laid down their arms.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are seen by some as an answer to the security problem—four are currently operational in Gardez, Bamyan, Kunduz and Mazar and a total of 12 are planned. An obvious advantage of PRTs over other proposals is that someone is actually willing to do it.<sup>63</sup> The proposal for PRTs seems to be largely dictated by what donor countries are willing to do, rather than what is actually required on the ground. However it is too simplistic to frame the debate as a choice between PRTs or the expansion of ISAF. Force protection has to be tailored according to individual needs and contexts. The security needs in Afghanistan are unlikely to be met either by simply 'photocopying' ISAF throughout Afghanistan or by multiplying PRTs. The 'UK model' in Mazar with its primary focus on security, has been compared favourably to the American approach in which the military have been directly involved in reconstruction. An American-led PRT will be operational in Kandahar by the end of the year. Its performance will be carefully scrutinized. Whether it can become a platform for rolling out security and kick starting the reconstruction process in the south remains to be seen. We return to the debate on PRTs below through an examination of the Mazar PRT.

It is in the area of SSR<sup>64</sup> that the gap between the promise and the practice of the international community has perhaps been greatest (see for example UK Government. International Development Committee Report, 2003). Some argue that there is a fatal opposition between the war on terrorism and the state building efforts (see for instance CARE/CIC, Sept 2003 & ICG 2003a). The US agenda was at least initially driven by the Department of Defence and the Pentagon. This has led to a rather narrow and short-term perspective on SSR. It now appears that there is greater consensus amongst the donor countries on the purpose and importance of SSR. However, a multi-sectoral donor approach has proven to be problematic. The various elements of SSR are so interconnected that uneven progress generated by an imbalance in level of donor support can seriously obstruct progress.<sup>65</sup> This can be illustrated in the area of DDR. The BA itself contained no agreement

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<sup>62</sup> NATO is in dire need of 400 additional personnel to continue operations as planned. One official said ISAF urgently needs three counterintelligence teams, five human intelligence teams, as well as 14 helicopters -8 'utility' craft, 3 light and 3 attack helicopters (see 'RFE/RL Afghanistan Report,' 30 October 2003).

<sup>63</sup> Rubin, B., H. Humayn & A. Stoddard, 'Through the Fog of Peacebuilding: Evaluating the Reconstruction of Afghanistan' Centre on International Cooperation, 2003.

<sup>64</sup> The Afghan Security Sector Reform agenda was established at a donor meeting in Geneva in April, 2002. The SSR agenda has 5 pillars with responsibility for each pillar allocated to different donors: military reform (US), police reform (Germany), counter-narcotics (UK), Judicial reform (Italy), DDR (Japan).

<sup>65</sup> Sedra, M., 'Introduction' in Sedra, M. (ed), *Confronting Afghanistan's Security Dilemma. Reforming the Security Sector* (Bonn International Centre For Conversion, September, 2003) p 15.

on DDR or the composition of a new national army and these have to an extent remained a hostage to factional politics. One of the key blocking points for progress in the security sector has been reform of the MOD, which has been dominated by General Fahim and a panjshiri clique from the *shura-yi nazar*. Long awaited reforms of the Ministry of Defence upon which the start of the DDR process was conditioned were finally announced on 20 September 2003. But the reforms, though they involved the reshuffling of 20 positions still leave the *shura-yi nazar* with two of the top three positions (ICG, 2003b:1). Implementing DDR in an environment in which neither the international force nor the ATA can project their authority across the country has been and will continue to be problematic.

### **Political transition**

The BA sought to create a broad based and legitimate administration or at least set in motion a process that would allow this to happen. The BA represents an attempt to transcend the current fragile power relations through building institutions. However it understandably had to leave open many of the key political questions such as the nature of centre-regional relations. At the heart of the problem is the narrow power base of the ATA. Effectively there are two states—one around the central administration and a ‘shadow state’ around dominant power holders. If real, as opposed to symbolic power is to shift towards the central administration, firstly there is a need to develop a monopoly of force and secondly the fiscal basis for a state must be rapidly generated. Otherwise history risks repeating itself with the re-emergence of a weak rentier state dependent on external largesse.

Clearly the questions of coercion and finance are closely linked. The central government needs to generate domestic resources to fund its army and development programmes. Without a strong army to bring the warlords into line it cannot access domestic revenues. Of the \$500 million revenue generated from customs posts last year only \$80 million was transferred to Kabul. But some progress has been made by the Afghan Finance Ministry in applying pressure on regional commanders to surrender customs revenue and to work towards a more balanced budget.

Political reform processes are influenced by regional as well as domestic politics. Neighbouring and regional states have resumed interfering in Afghan affairs.<sup>66</sup> There are growing tensions with Pakistan whose selective cooperation in the ‘war on terror’ appears to involve clamping down on al Qa’eda operatives while turning a blind eye to neo-Taliban groups in the tribal areas.<sup>67</sup> Russia’s attempts to build its sphere of influence in the north and its support for Fahim run the risk of exacerbating the north-south fault line. Similarly Iran continues to cultivate relations with Ismael Khan, which plays into centre-periphery tensions. External interference therefore exploits and exacerbates factionalism and acts as a break on reform processes. For example Russia and India tend to be less supportive of reforms which are likely to disempower ‘their people’.

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<sup>66</sup> Rubin and Cornwall, 2002, p 34.

<sup>67</sup> Border clashes between Pakistani and Afghan armed forces led to the creation of the Tripartite Commission involving the two countries and the US to deal with border and security matters. So far it has met five times.

Whilst there have been internal attempts to generate legitimacy by broadening the political base of the ATA,<sup>68</sup> reforms have to a large extent been externally driven—leading to cosmetic changes which leave the underlying political dynamics unaddressed. A number of interviewees felt there was a need for a substantive re-appraisal of the approach adopted in Bonn—the combination of a ‘light foot print’, a short-time frame and ambitious reforms were never likely to work in a context like Afghanistan. The last two years it is further argued have enabled the incumbents to consolidate their positions, while doing little to develop their legitimacy. Growing insecurity, increased corruption<sup>69</sup>, and the lack of visible reconstruction contribute to disillusionment with the government and more worryingly with the political process itself.

There has been some criticism of the lack of provisions for local justice and reconciliation (ICG, Sept 2003) and the failure thus far to even begin to tackle the question of transitional justice. According to the ICG a blind spot of the international community has been the lack of a clear policy for tackling local conflict, despite the possibilities for reconciliation contained within the Bonn Agreement (ICG, 2003a, 12). There has been a focus on political machinations in Kabul and less so on local conflicts that commanders exploit to sustain their positions.

As we move towards the Constitutional Loya Jirga and proposed Presidential elections next year, the political stakes will be raised exponentially. Elections require basic security. International experience suggests that in areas of chronic political instability, elections are likely to be de-stabilizing and counter productive. Far from ameliorating violence they are likely to act as a trigger for intensified conflict. The UN began voter registration on 30 November 2003. On 4 December 2003 one Afghan UN worker was killed and 11 were wounded while conducting voter registration in western Farah province. It is currently impossible to access one third of the country for voter registration. While the US hopes that its \$1.6 billion aid package will enable Karzai to buy enough votes to win, a recent AREU report argues that those with the most power to intimidate such as Rabbani or Sayyaf, could well win the election. The paper goes on to argue that elections should be postponed: ‘Bonn will not be judged a success merely on its ability to adhere to a timeframe, but on whether it achieves its overall objectives’<sup>70</sup>

### **Socio-economic transition**

The broad parameters for the socio-economic transition were set out in the AIA’s National Development Framework. This provided a road map for reconstruction and development. However, the peace dividend has not been as visible or as significant as originally hoped. Insecurity has slowed reconstruction down and inflated the costs<sup>71</sup>. Unforeseen levels of refugee return, drought in 2002 and logistical and communications challenges have

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<sup>68</sup> Recently for instance there have been unconfirmed rumours of talks with ‘moderate Taliban’ groups.

<sup>69</sup> The recent ‘land grab’ scandal in which General Fahim illegally allocated land to government Ministers and supporters confirmed fears of growing corruption. Key leaders in the central government have formed alliances with networks of drugs traffickers, creating a political base out of a criminalized war economy (Rubin, Hamidzada and Stoddard, 2003, p 29). In March, 2003 Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani stated that without the right kind of international support Afghanistan could become a ‘narco-mafia state’.

<sup>70</sup> AREU, 2003, p 1.

<sup>71</sup> MCI, for example have had to cut back their activities in Kandahar from 25 to 6 districts.

contributed to a spiralling of costs. Even so the \$4.5 billion pledged by donors at the Tokyo 2002 conference, over a five year period was roughly half the estimated needs.<sup>72</sup> To date donors have given Afghanistan less than half its annual reconstruction needs and projecting into the future they have pledged less than 25 per cent of its reconstruction needs over the next four years (CARE/CIC, 2003:4). While international comparisons should be made with care, donors have been less generous towards Afghanistan than to many other 'post conflict' countries. Based on pledges made, per capita spending on Afghanistan is \$75 for the first year, compared to Kosovo \$288 and East Timor \$175.

Although Brahimi, based on lessons learned from East Timor, promised a 'light footprint' in terms of international presence, in practice there has been an extremely heavy footprint in Kabul and an extremely light—to the extent of being barely visible—footprint outside the capital. This has generated negative views towards the international community amongst the Afghan population. This is likely to have significant political effects particularly in the Pashtun south which feels excluded by the political settlement and has received very little in the way of reconstruction and development aid.

The opium economy is estimated to generate around \$1.2 billion p.a. which is probably of greater value than the total aid p.a. This is not only a source of revenue for warlords and profiteers but is also central to the survival of many poor rural households.

A report by the UK International Development Select Committee on humanitarian and rehabilitation efforts argued that:

- insufficient progress had been made by the international community to establish security;
- too much money has been spent on short-relief funding and not enough on longer term reconstruction and development;
- not enough attention had been paid to capacity building and in particular strengthening the institutions of the Afghan state. Donors have tended to take the 'easy option' of by-passing the state and working through NGOs. In fact the normal operations of the international system have 'de-capacitated' Afghan institutions by attracting capable Afghan administrators into the better paid jobs with aid agencies;
- there have been poor levels of coordination between the various international agencies.

Zalmay Khalilzad the new American Ambassador has talked about the need for 'more services and presence' in eastern and southern Afghanistan and the imperative to accelerate the reconstruction process. However the gap between policy rhetoric and current practice remains a large one. From the \$5.2 billion pledged by the donor community in the early months of the recovery, to date only \$945 million has been activated toward reconstruction activities on the ground.

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<sup>72</sup> A World Bank Preliminary Assessment in January 2002 estimated the reconstruction needs at \$10.2 billion

## **ANNEX 2: AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES**

### **National Security Council (NSC)**

The National Security Council, which was established in September 2002, is a new institution that previously had no legal standing but is quickly developing into a structured office of government with the role of setting National Security Policy and coordinating security sector policy. Tasks for the NSC are allocated by the President or the National Security Advisor, Dr Rassoul, who is growing in stature and establishing the parameters of his position. Leadership within the NSC is scarce, making it difficult to take this project forward. It is difficult to retain promising candidates since the NSC cannot hope to meet the expectations raised by salary levels paid by the international organisations. Some appointees, including a number made by the President, have simply not been up to the job. Procedures are now in place to deal with unsatisfactory performance, allowing appointees to be dismissed if they fail to pass a probationary period.

A major part of the NSC project is to refurbish a permanent building as its headquarters, and to construct a temporary office until renovations are complete.

### **ANA Equipment**

In 2002/3, the UK has provided £500,000 for the purchase of communication equipment and vehicles to help aid in the reconstruction the Afghan army and police force. Because of the 2001 conflict and ageing equipment, the ANA and police require an advanced communications system and new vehicles in order to ensure the stability and effectiveness of the security sector operation. Funding will also be used for equipment care capacity building and training (maintenance) to improve sustainability of UK equipment purchases.

### **International Police Training Mission**

The International Police Training Mission team began in April 2003 and consists of seven police advisors drawn from four nationalities, including two UK officers. The team has many years of experience and six of the seven worked together previously in Kosovo. The Mission is part of a \$27 million US police program to assist German-led police reform. The aim of the program is to develop a new cadre of Afghan police instructors, train existing officers in human rights, democratic policing and modern policing skills, and give basic training to new officers. The program involves the training of officers from each of the various provinces in Afghanistan. The UK has provided £160,000 for the 2002/3 budget term and has committed £100,000 for 2003/4.

### **Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration**

The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UNDP have undertaken an assessment of the current security situation in the country in order to devise and implement a plan for DDR. The UN has completed its survey, and a report will be issued in the near future. The achievements of security sector reform in Afghanistan will be largely determined by the successful demobilization and reintegration of an estimated 50-100 thousand

soldiers. Additionally, although some 700,000 carry arms in Afghanistan, the UN believes that approximately 100,000 former mujahideen and informal militias will also come forward for reintegration. The project also calls for the establishment of regional centres, recruitment and training of registration personnel, equipment, weapons collection/storage and destruction, provision of international monitors and support to reintegration activities. The UN's comprehensive plan for DDR has led to the creation of the Afghanistan New Beginnings Project (ANBP), which will get under way shortly. However, political impediments have so far prevented this from happening. The UK has contributed £2.2 million to the DDR program for the 2002/3 budget year through the GCPP; significant financial support is also being provided by Japan (the co-lead nation on this project), Canada, and the United States.

### **Kabul Entry Points**

There are five 'Kabul City Gates' or now known as Kabul Entry Points (KEP) to which the UK contributed £100,000 of GCPP funds in November 2002. Three are now fully equipped and two are still under construction but operational. The KEPs have replaced existing checkpoints on major roads to or from areas that are significant in terms of security and/or drugs trafficking. Along with standard vehicle checkpoints, they form the second belt of the Kabul security cordon. The Kabul city police districts form the inner belt and the military command centres in the mountains around Kabul form the outer belt. The KEPs are central to the Kabul security cordon concept, and are a powerful deterrent.

### **ANA Palace Compound Upgrade**

The UK donated £500,000 of GCPP funds in December 2002 towards refurbishment of the Presidential Palace Barracks. The funds went via the US Defence Security Cooperation Agency to the US Army Corps of Engineers, which is overseeing the work. The money was allocated for Phase II: works including kitchen and ablutions; heating the sleeping areas and shower/toilet areas; reinforcing flooring; and providing a 60KW backup generator. The barracks has vital roles to play in relation to ANA development and the security of the Afghan Head of State.

### **Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AHRC)**

The Afghan Human Rights Commission was established in November 2002, and is a joint effort by the UNAMA and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. This project has four focuses:

1. human rights education;
2. human rights for women;
3. institution building; and
4. general project support.

The aims of this program are two-fold. First, the AHRC will support conflict resolution and national reconciliation by enhancing women's participation and by educating members of both civil society and the security sector about rights and standards. Second, the AHRC

will support good governance programs, collaborating with the Judicial and Constitutional Commissions to ensure that human rights concerns and international standards are duly taken into account in the drafting of the new constitution and the legal reform process. Additionally, the AHRC will strive to enhance the participation of women in the institutional and political processes, as well as to ensure that the Constitution, legal reform process and the justice system are gender sensitive. The UK is assisting by providing funding £1 million for the 2003/4 budget term.

### **Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) Journalist Training Project**

The journalist training program is being led by IWPR, a renowned international NGO. This program aims to contribute to conflict prevention and the consolidation of democracy in Afghanistan in two ways:

1. by strengthening the media as a central pillar of independent civil society; and
2. by disseminating accurate reporting on social and political issues in Afghanistan.

Through a comprehensive series of workshops in journalistic skills and based on practical reporting tasks, training is being given to local journalists, including reporters, editors and managers of the state news agency (BIA), to improve its performance as a provider of independent, fact-based news to the country. Within the first five months of the program, the IWPR has developed and published its own Afghan Journalist Training Handbook, and has trained more than 150 new journalists. The GCPP has donated £101,481 for the 2003 budget and has committed £111,629 for 2004. The USAID has also committed \$75,000 to this project for 2003.

### **Afghan National Army (ANA) Salaries**

The Bonn Agreement provides for the establishment of an Afghan National Army, which is to be an accountable and transparent national force. Through the UN multi-donor trust fund, funds have been generated in order to pay ANA salaries. The ANA is a US-led project, and current reports indicate that the ANA will be composed of 60,000 army personnel, 12,000 boarder guards, and 6,000 air force personnel. £5 million have been paid in to the UN Trust Fund for Afghanistan. The utilization of this money has been delayed the US/Afghan impasse on the size and mission for the new army. Assuming a US/Afghan ANA agreement is reached a further £5 million will be paid this financial year.

### **UN Office on Drugs and Crime**

UNODC drug enforcement is a UN-led effort designed to assist the Afghan authorities to effectively counter the problem of drug trafficking. The UK has taken the lead in assisting the Afghan authorities to develop their counter-narcotics capacity. This project addresses weaknesses identified during two ODCCP drug law enforcement assessments to examine the existing drug law enforcement unit in Kabul, which forms part of the Crime Branch of the National Police Force under the Minister of Interior. Although delayed by changes in the Ministry of Interior in January, the project is currently progressing through Phase I: the provision of organisational advice, equipment and training to drug law enforcement units

in Kabul and key strategic provincial centres. Phase II of the project is closely linked with the ODCCP's capacity building project that aims at developing legal frameworks for drug control and crime prevention and at strengthening the State High Commission for Drug Control in Kabul and six provincial sub-offices. GCPP has agreed to donate US\$713,274 to the UNODC for 2002/3.

### **UK Police CSI Unit Team**

The UK has agreed to set up a CSI Unit in Kabul as part of its assistance to reform the Afghan Police Force within the overall GCPP strategy. Although the German Police Project (GPP) does not receive funding from the GCPP, the UK police CSI Unit team will work closely with the GPP when it arrives at the end of July 2003. The German police team is coordinating efforts to design basic training for officers who are first at a crime scene (in prevention of contamination of evidence, etc.). The provision of such a scarce resource will make a significant contribution in this field. The UK has contributed start-up funding of £1 million for FY 2003/4 and a total commitment of £6–7 million over 3 years.

### **Judicial Reform Commission**

The Bonn Agreement mandated that the Afghan Interim Authority form a Judicial Reform Commission, which was established on 2 November 2002. The aims of this program are to support the reconstruction of the justice system in Afghanistan in conformity with international standards and practices of justice; develop the role of women within the judicial system; increase the capacity for fair, effective and accessible administration of justice at all levels; and, thus, contribute to the development of an enabling environment for sustained rule of law. The UNDP and the Government of Italy are heading up this project, and to date have met some of the Commission's basic physical needs in terms of property, equipment and furnishings. The Commission has developed medium- and long-term plans and has prioritised activities and projects required for the judicial rehabilitation process. The UK has committed £1 million to this program for the 2003/4 budget term.

### **Counter Narcotics Directorate**

In January 2003, the CND was established by as an integral part of the National Security Council. However, the scale of the efforts involved in establishing this institution and the vital role it plays in terms of counter narcotics efforts (a main UK priority) lead to the establishment of a discreet CND project with its own GCPP funding line separate from the NSC project. The role of the CND is to oversee the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy and to coordinate and monitor drug control activities throughout the government, its budget and programs, leading to the overall elimination of the production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs in Afghanistan. The CND employs 52 permanent staff members whose salaries are paid from GCPP funds on a scale mirroring that of the NSC. The UK initially provided £97,000 for the program in 2002/3. For 2003/4, the UK's contribution will increase to £1.5 million.



**Programs that were proposed but not implemented:**

*BBC Media Reconstruction Program*

The BBC World Services Trust is tasked with the reconstruction of the Afghan media, has worked closely with the UN Department of Public Information to outline a five-year plan in reshaping the Afghan media. The first three months of the project, which began in January 2002, concentrated on strengthening existing structures particularly radio and laying the foundations for a more comprehensive reconstruction process in cooperation with Afghan authorities. The BBC has identified two main areas of reconstructing the media infrastructure. The first priority focuses on the purchase of new equipment and on providing training and capacity building. The second priority seeks to create a dialogue among Afghans through radio programmes concentrating on women's issues and the coordination of various media projects that incorporate educational and health programs.

**Main Activities of the Afghanistan Strategy FY2002/3**

	<b>DEPT</b>	<b>OPENING ALLOCATIONS CASH (£)</b>
		18,070,000
Afghan Army Salaries	FCO	10,000,000
Demobilisation Programme Assistance i) Scoping visit by DDR adviser ii) Phase 1 DDR assistance	DFID	2,000,000
Communications and other equipment	MOD	1,250,000
Assistance to Afghan Defence Ministry i) Refurbishment of Palace Barracks ii) Vehicles for Afghan National Army iii) DAT assessment mission	MOD	750,000
Assistance to Police i) Bursaries for Bramshill course ii) Reconstruction of police stations iii) Trainers and training modules iv) Afghan Criminal Investigation project v) Kabul City Gates	FCO	1,000,000
Counter-narcotics Support to Justice Sector	FCO 500,000	500,000
Conflict Resolutions/Prevention dialogue Human Rights IWPR Journalist training programme	FCO	
Good governance and Rule of Law i) Office of the National Security Adviser ONSA/CND Salaries	DFID	500,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>18,000,000</b>

### **ANNEX 3: LIST OF KEY DOCUMENTS AND OTHER WRITTEN MATERIALS CONSULTED**

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## **ANNEX 4: LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED**

### **Mazar-e-Sharif**

Carminboeuf, Claudia: ICRC, Mazar  
Davies, Col Dickie: PRT|Commander, Mazar  
Hill, Graham: IWPR, Mazar  
Kavanagh, Barry: DFID representative, Mazar  
Kohi, Muhammad Daud: Save the Children (US), Mazar  
Lawson-Smith, Jackie: FCO, Mazar  
Lipner, Michelle: UNAMA, Mazar  
Savioz, Regis: ICRC, Mazar  
Van der Weerd, Hans: ZOA, Mazar  
Zimmermann, Major: US Police

### **Kabul**

Arnault, Jean: UNAMA.  
Atmar, Haneef: Minister for Rural Affairs  
Aziz, Sultan: DDR  
Azoy, Dr Whitney: CND  
Babbington, Peter: DDR  
Barker, Paul: CARE International  
Batori, Carlo: Italian Embassy, Judicial Reform Programme  
Brooking, Steve: British Embassy  
Churcher, Bob: NSC  
Clayton, Mark: British Embassy  
Dearlove, John: NSC  
Dindar, Muhammad Naim: Ministry of Finance  
Hakim, Ahmad Fahim: Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission  
Hayes, Neville: Crime and Scene Investigation Training team  
Hogg, Richard: DFID  
John, Richard: Project Manager, CND  
Lisle, Col Ian: US Forces HQ, Kabul  
Ludin, Jawid: President's Office  
Millen, Paul: US patrolmen training programme  
Morrison, Fiona: British Embassy  
Nash, Ron: British Ambassador  
Parekh, Vikram: ICG  
Royesh, Aziz: MA'refat Educational Trust  
Ruttig, Thomas: European Union office, Kabul  
Stapleton, Barbara: ACBAR  
Wardle, Col Adrian: US Forces HQ, Kabul  
Watt, Chris: UK programme manager for CSI training  
Wilder, Andrew: AREU  
Yasini, Mir Wais: CND  
Zumhof, Peter :German police training team

**London**

Clark, James: FCO  
Davis, Daniel: DFID  
Evans, Rodney: DAT  
Freckleton, Anne: Cabinet Office  
Kemp, Alison: FCO  
Lee, Laurie: DFID  
Olley, Brian: FCO  
Parks, Ivan: DFID

## DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Department for International Development (DFID) is the UK Government department responsible for promoting sustainable development and reducing poverty. The central focus of the Government's policy, based on the 1997 and 2000 White Papers on International Development, is a commitment to the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals, to be achieved by 2015. These seek to:

- Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
- Achieve universal primary education
- Promote gender equality and empower women
- Reduce child mortality
- Improve maternal health
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- Ensure environmental sustainability
- Develop a global partnership for development

DFID's assistance is concentrated in the poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, but also contributes to poverty reduction and sustainable development in middle-income countries, including those in Latin America and Eastern Europe.

DFID works in partnership with governments committed to the Millennium Development Goals, with civil society, the private sector and the research community. It also works with multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, United Nations agencies, and the European Commission.

DFID has headquarters in London and East Kilbride, offices in many developing countries, and staff based in British embassies and high commissions around the world.

DFID's headquarters are located at:

1 Palace St  
London SW1E 5HE  
UK

and at:

DFID  
Abercrombie House  
Eaglesham Rd  
East Kilbride  
Glasgow G75 8EA  
UK

Switchboard: 020 7023 0000 Fax: 020 7023 0016

Website: [www.dfid.gov.uk](http://www.dfid.gov.uk)

Email: [enquiry@dfid.gov.uk](mailto:enquiry@dfid.gov.uk)

Public Enquiry Point: 0845 3004100

From overseas: +44 1355 84 3132

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