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**COIN: THE MISSING CURRENCY IN PEACE SUPPORT
OPERATIONS AND BEYOND?**

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ABSTRACT

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Keywords: Counterinsurgency, Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, Peace Support Operations, Intervention, Post-conflict Stabilisation, UN Military Missions

The United Nations has a long history of peacekeeping missions. These have evolved over time but since the end of the Cold War there has been rapid growth in those missions where the remit placed on the peacekeepers, both military and civilian, is more complex and demanding. In trying to define these missions and their mandates a wide range of terminology has been developed in an effort to describe the exact nature of the mission. Since many of these deployments take place into theatres where there is no peace to keep, or where a fragile peace reverts to a conflict situation such tight definitions often lead to the troops involved no longer having an appropriate mandate. More recently some of these larger missions constitute in fact interventions to impose peace. Attempts to find a 'peace' classification for such deployments often confuse the issue rather than bring clarity. In reality these missions are not peacekeeping at all. The almost forgotten doctrine, principles and practices of Counterinsurgency provide a better framework for defining these missions, the respective roles of the key players and the factors necessary to bring success.

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COIN¹: THE MISSING CURRENCY IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND BEYOND?

CHAPTER ONE

SETTING THE PROBLEM

Sadly, in the 50th year of UN peacekeeping operations, the perceived failures and costs of the UN mission in former Yugoslavia, and recent experiences in Somalia, have led to widespread disillusionment. Yet if the world loses faith in peacekeeping, and responses to the new world disorder are limited to the extremes of total war or total peace, the world will become a more dangerous place. Rather than lose faith in the whole peace process, we need to analyse the changed operational circumstances and try to determine new doctrines for the future.

General Sir Michael Rose, Commander UNPROFOR in Bosnia, 1994-5

How to bring an end to conflicts short of formal war and replace them with order and stability is a question which has occupied the international community increasingly since the end of the Cold War. The problem is not new. In itself this seems a fatuous comment - at best a banality - with which to begin such a work; however the fact remains that it is a problem, whether it concerns formal war between states or what have sometimes been called Small Wars², which has been around as long as one group has sought to impose a solution on another group. Even in what is commonly termed the ancient period the problem was hardly new. Examples include Alexander the Great's defeat of the Persian Empire and his subsequent attempts to hold together its component parts; the early and late Roman Republic and Empire; and the Mongol Empire of Ghengis Khan and his successors found difficulty not in conquest but in reconstruction of the conquered lands. Later history includes yet more examples from both East and West, whilst more recently the Age of European Imperial expansion yields further examples. It is not suggested that these earlier examples provide 'best practice' models but it does illustrate that the current period is in no way unique in facing such challenges. The greater problem is not war,

¹ The traditional military abbreviation for Counter Insurgency.

² Caldwell, C. E., *Small Wars*, London, HMSO, 1896.

difficult though that may be, it is the rebuilding afterwards which requires the greater skill. The more remarkable then that to date there are few examples of ‘getting it right’; the more remarkable then that so many of the same errors are made on each occasion. It can be well argued that the Allied philosophy and programme after the successful invasion of Europe in 1944 provides many examples of good practice; and considering the scale of the conflict and the complexity and scale of the post-conflict tasks, it was certainly an awesome achievement. Equally, however, examination of the planning for it also reveals that even here there were failings which seem to be characteristic of such endeavours. Robert Murphy, appointed political advisor on German affairs to General Eisenhower in September, 1944, recalled:

I was aware that an Anglo-American-Russian agency, called the European Advisory Commission, had been at work in London all through 1944 trying to decide how to administer Germany and I assumed at this late date a detailed occupation plan must be in readiness. Paris had been liberated on August 25, Allied armies were advancing from the west, Russian armies were closing in from the east and the surrender of Germany appeared imminent. To my astonishment, I learned in Washington that no American plan was ready yet because President Roosevelt had not made known his own views and the three departments of the government were wrangling among themselves about postwar Germany.³

When WWII ended the international community, conscious of the shortcomings of the League of Nations, established the United Nations (UN) in the hope that future conflicts could either be avoided altogether or at worst, brought back from violence to negotiation. The advent of the Cold War placed a cold hand on the more optimistic of these hopes but the consequent emergence of peacekeeping as a lesser option seemed to offer a way forward. Peacekeeping has evolved considerably in the intervening years and several clear stages in that process can be identified; these will be examined in Chapters Two and Four. The end of the Cold War paradoxically gave the UN the opportunity to function

³ Murphy, R., *Diplomat Among Warriors*, London, Collins, 1964, p.279.

more nearly as its founders had hoped, but also saw a significant increase in small wars, which the unreformed UN was incapable of either preventing or managing. This, in turn, led to a plethora of studies, reforms, attempts to redefine categories of UN missions, unrealistic expectations and occasions when regional organisations took the initiative, either with or without UN authorisation. Most recent and perhaps most contentious of the new types of mission are those designated Peace-Enforcement Missions. Whilst clinging to the word 'peace' in their title they are a tacit admission that they deploy into areas where there is no peace to keep. The term 'Peace Support Operations' (PSOs) is also finding favour, although as will be demonstrated, in actual fact it is more of an 'umbrella' term than a concise definition. The advent of global terrorism has brought in another dimension which further confuses the boundaries between traditional peacekeeping and normal war.

It will be argued that Peace Enforcement Missions and the immediate post-combat phase of interventions, create a type of operation which fits into neither of these categories but which closely resembles what used to be termed Counterinsurgency. It will be argued that study of this near-forgotten doctrine, its philosophies and methodologies provides the key to understanding the dynamics and requirements of today's complex and demanding missions. For reasons of space, missions other than peacekeeping will not be considered in detail; thus although post-conflict peace building (PCPB) missions enjoy a close relationship to peacekeeping operations and as will be shown, share many characteristics with COIN, it will be for others to examine that relationship.

It is partly the complexity of these recent missions which exposes the flaws inherent in present planning and practice, irrespective of the exact nature of the mission. For example, where the number of actors is large, the need for a clear mandate and constant

cooperation and coordination increases correspondingly; equally, the difficulties in achieving them are also greater and the consequences more severe and obvious if they are not achieved. The advent of vastly improved communications, technologically advanced phenomena such as the internet, mobile phones and 24-hour news channels means that these operations are also under close and constant scrutiny. This increase in the extent and immediacy of communications, coupled with an exponential growth in the number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other humanitarian organisations since the end of the Cold War, has meant that populations far from a trouble spot can be inflamed with a desire that something must be done. The consequent belief that, in certain circumstances, there is a moral duty to intervene has transformed intervention from an occasional ad hoc activity to a commonplace function of government.

Most recent PSOs and interventions have been preceded by careful and comprehensive planning, especially on the part of the military. Equally there is usually considerable political and diplomatic activity prior to military committal, both internally and with neighbours, allies and international organisations. However, there is often a lack of coordination between these three strands and their various departments at this stage. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that the immediate post-conflict phase has received much less attention and planning and seems sometimes to have caught the planners by surprise. Considering that the ostensible reasons for intervention have usually been well-thought through and rehearsed it is hard to understand why the process for securing a successful outcome following a successful initial phase has often received so little prior attention. There is an emerging body of opinion that the immediate post-conflict phase is critical in setting the scene for all subsequent activity and that the opportunity thus presented is relatively short. Recognising when this moment begins is more difficult. At

a practical level it is likely that certain key factors, conditions and rules will need to be considered as soon as military success has been achieved. These factors and conditions need to be anticipated and addressed even as the military campaign progresses. They concern governance; civil administration; utilities and essential services; provision of food, water and shelter; the establishment of law and order; re-establishment of commercial activity and provision of timely and accurate communication with the host community. The list is not exhaustive but will normally be underpinned by the assumption that involvement of the local community will begin as soon as possible - with a view to handing over to local control as soon as practicable. A further key factor will be the mandate under which the intervention has taken place and the legal obligations placed upon the intervention troops if they are classified as occupying powers.

One of the recurring mantras of the current UK government in recent years has been that of 'joined-up government' - the idea that policymaking and operational activities across the whole spectrum of government activity are consistent and mutually reinforcing.

Although the UK has probably been one of the more enlightened of states in this respect, some consider that departmental 'empires', rivalries, suspicions and conflicts of opinion are still much in evidence, fuelled by either the character of the politicians and senior civil servants running them or the realities of competition for finite resources. Some assert that there are more profound differences to be found in the ethos and mindset of certain departments; as for example, between the military dominated Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the humanitarian/development oriented Department for International Development (DFID) which takes the Millennium Development Goals as its guiding principles. Others note that the resources available to different departments are also unequal, with military budgets far exceeding those for development assistance, although

here it should be noted that such financial comparisons are perhaps overly simplistic as military budgets invariably have to include large personnel, equipment, materiel, research & development, procurement, training, equipment and establishment maintenance costs and even pensions.

There is evidence, to be considered later, that such potential barriers to mutual understanding and collaboration are being broken down, both at the highest policy level and on the ground, with both military and civilian personnel realising and acting upon the knowledge that there are useful lessons to learn from each other. Some feel however that frictions between 'officials' and NGOs, particularly but not exclusively in the case of the military, remain largely unresolved. It is here worth noting that, at a recent Wilton Park conference,⁴ it was asserted by practitioners from various backgrounds that in the immediate post-conflict phase, such frictions were more reported on than real. At the same conference it was discussed and agreed that one of the key elements which differentiated the military from other organisations was the pre-eminent emphasis by the military on long-range strategic- and contingency- planning and the constant training regime, including use of a wide range of exercises and other forms of training to test, evaluate and update military intervention scenarios. This regime encompassed the entire military hierarchy and was practised both in formations and in training establishments (another feature which differentiated the military from other departments). This is a methodology very different from most other institutions, and its implications and the ethos it engenders, should not be underestimated. There remains a feeling in some diplomatic quarters that the very act of contingency planning is an escalatory step and therefore exacerbates an already difficult situation - others go further and assert that it is

⁴ Wilton Park, Managing the Transition from International Military Intervention to Civilian Rule: Breaking the Conflict Cycle, WPSO3/18, 8-12 Dec 2003.

an admission of failure and therefore should not be undertaken until all other attempts to resolve a given situation have been exhausted; those holding such a view have in the past branded the military as 'hawkish' because of their preparations. However, such views side-step logic and organisational reality and find little favour with those who have practical field experience, whatever their background.

The fact remains though that such activities and the attendant ethos are much less developed - and practised - on the civilian side and this goes some way to explain why, in Iraq for example, the coalition partners were not able to cope effectively with the transition and Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) tasks with which they were faced. There had been a misconception that reconstruction and nation building would not be required on such a large scale and the detailed pre-planning for such a scenario had not therefore been undertaken. A similar situation exists in Afghanistan where troops have been committed in support of civilian peace building operations which have still not yet fully deployed and commenced operations.

This ability to develop and practice operations often allows the military element in PSOs to deploy faster, react more swiftly to events and to be more coordinated than civilian elements. Whilst this is militarily advantageous it can disrupt the synergy of the mission and be seen as arrogance by others, who are then apt to treat the military with suspicion. This suspicion is not completely unjustified since military planning has historically been motivated by a desire to move into a country, achieve the stated military objective through as much use of force as required to get the job done and then to leave as soon as possible. There remains a body of military opinion that holds to this view. Nor is it solely the military who have wished to 'get in and get out':

We widen our analysis to assess a cluster of other attempts at post-war reconstruction undertakennot necessarily after a formal peace settlement and not necessarily under the aegis of the United Nations. [What all these cases] have in common is that external interveners have played a leading role in post-war reconstruction, that they have declared their sole aim to be to stabilise the host country and lay the foundations for sustainable peace, and that they have then said they would withdraw. For this reason they might collectively be called 'intervention, reconstruction and withdrawal' (IRW) operations to distinguish them from other post-war peace building efforts.⁵

However in the more complex conflict situations with which the military are now faced the commitment is usually longer term; and in the case of occupation the obligations of the occupier are prescribed by international law. These additional activities with which the military must be familiar include the various levels of peacekeeping, humanitarian activities and the creation and nurturing of a politically and socially stable environment for development work. This requires skills which are not traditionally acquired or taught in the mainstream military environment but it does not mean that the military are unaware of them. An awareness of the importance of such skills has long been noted in military literature concerning both peacekeeping and counter-insurgency operations. The international community's difficulties in defining both the mission aim and the methods to be employed have led to the military having to address many of these issues in an ad hoc fashion during peacekeeping operations, simply because they are often the only official presence on the ground. This has often caused most difficulty and friction when it comes to defining and interpreting the rules of engagement. The frustration which this situation engenders has led many in the mainstream military to believe that peacekeeping is not an activity for combat-trained soldiers, a view sometimes shared by those working in the humanitarian field. PSOs in the 1990s have modified this opinion on both sides but there remains confusion over who should do what. Lately the view is emerging that some

⁵ Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., Miall, H., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, (2nd Ed), Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006, p.187.

civilian component should actually develop and deliver the programmes required, with the military concentrating on creating and maintaining the environment in which such programmes could flourish.

In this environment the military require a profound understanding of the political, socio-economic and cultural issues in the country or region concerned and closer collaboration than hitherto with national and international experts in these fields. Conversely such experts need to better understand military considerations if they are to gain the trust and cooperation of the military. Most experts are agreed that there should be a strategic plan that all those involved fully understand and which forms the framework for their respective planning and actions. However the reality is that the overall strategic plan may take so long to formulate and agree that considerable operational planning may have to begin before this stage is reached. It would be helpful if a universally accepted set of principles and guidelines existed which facilitated this procedure. The need for this and for greater routine coordination at the planning stage has been appreciated. As part of the reformation of the UN following the Brahimi Report, several new departments were established to cover these aspects, as will be shown in later chapters. A recent internal British Governmental paper⁶ stated that, whilst the UK has a well-developed doctrine for PSOs and that humanitarian assistance to meet life-saving needs is generally sufficient, it and the international community are less strong in meeting the civilian needs essential for stabilisation and recovery in the immediate aftermath of conflict where indigenous governance and service structures are absent. The authors concluded that the following weaknesses had emerged:

a) Poor planning for stabilisation and recovery after conflict in the international

⁶ 'Stability and Recovery After Conflict', Tri-lateral paper, draft prepared in DFID, London, January 2004. No further publishing details. Copy in author's possession.

community and HMG. New mechanisms are created in response to specific post-conflict situations, often long after military planning is underway. The time taken to develop and streamline these new mechanisms into existing structures is valuable time lost in planning for and responding to the needs of populations emerging from conflict. For example there was no clear policy development mechanism for HMG's civilian activities in Iraq until the creation of the Iraq Policy Unit in the FCO in February 2003 - almost 12 months after the start of UK military planning.

b) Limited capacity to jointly plan and implement solutions across a wide range of predominantly civilian activity required in the immediate post-conflict state. Institutionalised links between early civilian and military planning are also lacking. Accountability is also divided between HMG Departments with no shared responsibility for successes and failures.

c) A tendency to approach the post-conflict setting with a sequential mindset, ignoring the concurrent nature of short and longer-term needs of populations emerging from conflict. Donor countries and their implementing partners are often locked into compartmentalised ways of working - tackling areas of work in a piecemeal fashion and failing to recognize the links and overlap between areas and phases of work. In East Timor, for example, whilst the planning for humanitarian needs was generally adequate, the international community was caught unprepared for the rapid collapse of governance structures. Longer-term funding was largely channelled through an unwieldy Trust Fund mechanism which proved too slow to respond to the rapidly emerging institutional and governance challenges. In lieu of an appropriately responsive and flexible international solution, NGOs had to step in to the gap to set up parallel systems as proxy governmental service providers.

d) Failure to manage the flow of information effectively. For example, HMG's response to the post-conflict situation in Afghanistan in 2002/3 saw a number of Departments gathering information from UN agencies and NGOs in the early humanitarian and recovery phase and feeding their assessment and analysis independently to Ministers. This duplication of effort led to more confusion than clarity on the humanitarian and recovery needs of the Afghan population.

e) Shortage of relevant expertise. In contrast to the impressive development of international humanitarian capability in the past decade, little international progress has been made in developing a body of expertise with the capability to deploy and assist in the immediate post-conflict phase in the political, security and developmental sectors. Humanitarian specialists often handle issues of longer-term significance (such as governance), whilst governance experts await signs that a stable environment has been reached in which development activities can take root. Police with vast experience in training and organisation of a police force may be deployed, but unprepared for the unfamiliar environment, will return (often rather quickly) frustrated at how little has been achieved.

f) A mismatch between the expertise required and personnel available. It is not uncommon for individuals to find themselves deployed to situations for which they have neither the skills nor the experience. Availability and willingness to deploy can determine the selection of individuals, rather than their suitability for specifically defined tasks. No database of suitably experienced individuals exists to enhance the ability of

HMG to match people to tasks. Other databases exist, both in Whitehall and internationally, but there are few links between them and none with a specific post-conflict stabilisation and recovery focus.

g) A lack of generic HMG standard operating procedures (SOPs) for staff deployed to post-conflict situations. Whitehall personnel are likely to find themselves working alongside colleagues from other HMG Departments operating under very different deployment procedures. This includes contradictory procedures on staff security, the equipment that personnel deploy with, the payment they receive for working in an inhospitable environment, the day-to-day relationship with their home department, etc. Inter-departmental deployments according to different rules and regulations increases confusion. In Iraq, for example, DFID consultants and HMG personnel seconded to work with and alongside the military were governed by parallel and contradictory SOPs. This had serious implications for those staff in terms of confusion over security procedures in a particularly dangerous environment.

h) A shortage of mechanisms to enable lesson learning and systematised knowledge of past post-conflict interventions. There is no single organisation within HMG tasked with the evaluation of inter-departmental post-conflict efforts. Whilst no template solutions exist, there are common threads which are relevant to all post-conflict situations. Valuable knowledge and experience is lost with the natural turnover of staff and the opportunity to build organisational and institutional memory on which to draw in future post-conflicts situations is squandered.

As a first step to address some of these issues the British government had set up a small series of African and Global ‘Conflict Prevention Pools’ in 2001 to coordinate planning between the FCO, MOD and DFID but these had not been instituted to cater for something as complicated and resource intensive as PCR. This changed in 2004:

...it was only in the wake of the 2003 Iraq war that anything comparable has been created for post-war reconstruction - what is at the time of writing planned to be a forty-strong interdepartmental Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit. The intention is that the Unit, resourced through an independent budget, will provide the institutional continuity required to support a pool of some two hundred key personnel with expertise across the sectors relevant to post-war reconstruction ready to operationalize the UK’s contribution at short notice.⁷

A similar development in the US has led to the formation of a Joint Interagency Cooperation Group (JIACG), although it appears that the vast discrepancy in the funding and other resources of the Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development seem to have caused considerable difficulties in its operation.⁸ Whether

⁷ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall, *op cit*, p193.

⁸ *Ibid.*

either of these organisations will ultimately be successful in improving joint preparation, planning and philosophy remains to be seen. The current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan leaves room for doubt. In any case, they are designed to address the symptoms, not the causes of the overall lack of direction in PSOs and interventions. There is a lack of overarching doctrine and a persistence in trying to fit the existing terminology and methods into new situations. The perceived need to attach the word 'peace' to any and every type of operation is at the root of this syndrome. The understandable reluctance to accept that some operations will have to contain military elements which will have to engage in full combat operations to 'fight for peace' has led to sometimes ludicrous results:

'One proposal has been put forward for dealing with situations in Africa that require peacekeeping, which has been renamed the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Originally called the African Crisis Response Force, it was renamed because some found the use of the term 'force' to be objectionable as a name for a group to be used for peacekeeping.'⁹

To be arguing over such terminology concerning a continent which is trying to find ways of dealing with situations such as Rwanda, Somalia, Darfur, the Congo, Sierra Leone et al, shows such a distressing lack of understanding of what is at stake as to be almost an avoidance strategy. As mentioned earlier there is a category of operation which does encompass every aspect of the new, complex operations; embraces all the principles of PSOs; stresses political primacy; the need for complete cooperation between all agencies and gives the military a role which they and others can understand. Coincidentally, a study of COIN plainly demonstrates that the newly-fashionable term 'Asymmetric Warfare' is, in fact, as old as warfare itself. The aim of all combat operations has always been to contrive an asymmetric situation with the opponent and this is nowhere more so

⁹ Rupert, J., 'US Troops Teach Peacekeeping to Africans', Washington, *Washington Post*, September 26,

than in guerrilla warfare or insurgency. Chapters Three and Four will examine the history and development of COIN operations from the point of view of the three permanent members of the Security Council most active in peacekeeping, Britain, France and the US, to demonstrate the relevance of COIN and also to show that all three possess the background and experience to conduct these operations again. It is hoped to show in this work that there is merit in so doing. The question must remain however, whether the international community can countenance the resurrection of what some will perceive, erroneously, as a return to the Colonial era.

CHAPTER TWO

THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Whilst it may seem semantic to shy away initially from the term ‘peacekeeping’ it is important to emphasise that, in its strictest sense, it is inaccurate when applied to many operations carried out in the name of ‘peacekeeping’ - there being, on many occasions, no peace to keep. This is tacitly acknowledged both by the United Nations and by the international community, however in a perhaps understandable desire to avoid any official suggestion that the international community, or indeed individual states endorse the use of violence, there is a naïve and at times almost desperate impulse to attach the word ‘peace’ to any and every action which is undertaken. It for this reason above all that the term ‘peace enforcement’ came into use. The term ‘peace support operation’ (PSO) appears to have been first coined by the military in the late 90s:

Peace Support Operation was a term first used by the military to cover both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, but is now used more widely to embrace in addition those other peace-related operations which include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace-building and humanitarian assistance. The military doctrine in which the concept is defined was issued in 1998 as Joint Warfare Publication 3.05, and replaced the earlier concept of Wider Peacekeeping (issued in 1994).¹⁰

Whilst historians can argue strongly that forms of peacekeeping and peace-building are as old as warfare itself, a point already made and illustrated in the introduction to this paper, it is intended to consider in detail only those developments following the birth of the United Nations (UN) in June 1945. However it is sometimes argued that the roots of modern theory and practice of peacekeeping begin with the so-called ‘Concert of Europe’, which was agreed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, following the defeat of

¹⁰ Woodhouse, T. and Ramsbotham, O. (eds), *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, Abingdon, Frank

Napoleon I.

This system aimed to manage great power conflicts diplomatically and coordinate collective action in response to the irredentist threats posed by nationalist movements throughout Europe. The great powers did not intend to remove national competition or to abolish war, but rather to manage it in a way that preserved the status quo..... Nevertheless, the system did inaugurate an era of great power cooperation to manage international society and preserve the status quo.¹¹

Erwin Schmidl¹² identifies 11 examples of operations, both unilateral and international, taking place between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the outbreak of WWI which reflect some of the characteristics of modern PSOs. These range from various expeditions to contain or eliminate piracy - hardly new even then, since Mediterranean attempts to use international cooperation to suppress piracy go back at least to the Greeks, Carthaginians and Romans; periodic attempts to halt the trans-Atlantic slave trade and others including, intriguingly, Cyprus (1878-1914), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1878- 1908) and an international force in Albania (1913).

The year 1878 is significant in that it is argued by Bellamy, Williams and Griffin¹³ that the Congress of Berlin of that year provides evidence of emerging agreement about the new ethical principles first espoused in the American Declaration of Independence (1776) and 'copied' in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789). More dolefully, it may also be noted that the said Congress of Berlin was convened in part to address the worsening situation in the Balkans and with the intention set up the first Balkan protectorate.

Cass, 2005, p.71.

¹¹ Bellamy, A., Williams, P., and Griffin, S., *Understanding Peacekeeping*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, p.60.

¹² Schmidl, E.A. (ed), 'The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth Century', in *Peace Operations between Peace and War: Four Studies*, London, Frank Cass, 2000, pp.4-20.

¹³ *Ibid*, p.61.

Shaken by the cataclysmic events of WWI the international community set up the League of Nations. This broadened the earlier European concepts to embrace non-European nations and eventually comprised sixty-three members. The League, at least in principle, sought to move beyond the self-interest of the major powers to acknowledge collective security based on common ideas and values. US President, Woodrow Wilson's 'fourteen points' are commonly accepted as the basis for these common ideas. Kupchan and Kupchan¹⁴ conclude that collective security organisations must comprise three characteristics: certainty, utility and inclusivity. They further argue that the League of Nations missed the mark in all three. Certainly, in neither constitution nor practice, did the League achieve the alleged high ideals of its founder members; however, whilst deprived of its original high aims, it did undertake some operations which can be defined as being of a peacekeeping nature. In the aftermath of WWI it supervised the international administration of one of Germany's industrial heartlands, the Saar Basin, for which it was agreed that, after fifteen years, a plebiscite would be held to decide the area's long term future. As the time for the plebiscite approached the situation within Germany led the League's five man Commission to use its authority to call for and station an international force comprising troops from Britain, Italy, Holland and Sweden. This early example of a transition scenario allowed these troops to maintain law and order in the build up to the plebiscite and allowed the League to oversee a 'free and fair process' for the plebiscite itself. Two principles guided the deployment of this international force; the host country's consent was required and the international troops were allowed to use force in self-defence only - principles which were to survive the demise of the League of Nations. A further example of early transition peacekeeping is to be found in the

¹⁴ Kupchan C and Kupchan C, 'Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe', *International*

League's involvement in the arrangements for the port of Danzig. Following the withdrawal of the Temporary Allied Administration in 1920 the League assumed responsibility for Danzig, in that it was designated a 'Free' city and placed under the protection of the League. A High Commissioner was appointed with responsibility for developing a democratic constitution and to arbitrate disputes between the city and Poland. This early attempt to ensure smooth development and transition proved a failure as 'democratic' procedures led to the rise of a powerful pro-German party which dominated the city's administration.

The League also provides three successful early examples of an international organisation trying to fulfill the conflict-prevention role by acting as an international mediator, these being the Aaland Islands dispute; Albania; and the Greco-Bulgarian conflict. However further examples, including the Polish-Lithuanian dispute over Vilna and the Manchurian and Abyssinian invasions, revealed the significant weaknesses and limitations inherent in the League's structure and operation.

So, as demonstrated above, the League of Nations does contain the beginnings of modern theory and practice regarding intervention and transition supervision. Indeed some argue that the League's failings were directly instrumental in its beginning to develop the seeds of modern 'peacekeeping':

The League was an incomplete project that was neither genuinely inclusive nor allowed to pursue collective security in the way that its architects had originally intended. Despite, or arguably because of, these failings the League began to carve out a particular role for itself in mediation, the supervision of plebiscites and the organisation of transitional arrangements.¹⁵

Security, 16 (1) 1991, pp.25-31.

¹⁵ Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *op cit*, p. 70.

It is however under the League's successor organisation that the modern concept of peace support operations begins to be developed. The widespread alarm and revulsion at the devastation caused by the WWII which followed so quickly on the heels of the first, coupled with an admittedly rudimentary understanding that the advent of atomic weapons had changed the face of global politics forever, hastened the end of the already ailing and ineffective League of Nations. The actual process of formulating and establishing the United Nations lies outside the scope of this work. It is sufficient here to note that it was intended that some of the perceived major deficiencies of the League were to be remedied in the new organisation. Whilst all states were to be eligible for membership, there was to be an 'inner' council of permanent members, comprising the 'major' nations, each with the power of veto - the Security Council - whose actions at least in theory, would be overseen by all in the form of the General Assembly, whose members in turn would rotate through the Security Council as non-permanent members. A permanent hierarchical administration was also created - the Secretariat; and significantly, the UN Charter would provide improved teeth for interventionist action, in the shape of Chapter VII, which empowers the Security Council to '...take at any time such actions as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.'¹⁶

Ultimate power to intervene rests under Article 42 which states:

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international

¹⁶ Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 51.

peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.¹⁷

Provision was also made for the creation of a Military Staff Committee under Article 47 and for the establishing of an international military staff as a prelude for the use of international armed force. A further nuance is to be found in Chapter VIII which foresees a role for regional arrangements and partnerships in dealing with issues affecting international peace and security; indeed Article 53 specifically states that: ‘The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.’¹⁸

Once again however, reality was to intervene to limit the high aspirations of those who sought to found a new international order. The advent of the Cold War and the ideological enmity between East and West meant that the initial role envisaged for the Security Council was still born. It is germane to note that, whilst the primary goal of the UN was to be one of collective security and the maintenance of international peace and security, there is no mention of peacekeeping anywhere in the original charter. The process by which peacekeeping evolved begins in the early realisation that the UN as originally conceived could not operate.

Even though the Charter provided a theoretical framework for a system of collective security, the UN was unable to prevent conflict during the Cold War, the onset of which successfully destroyed the myth of Great Power unity. Having invested so much in the international body, however, Members sought a new role for the UN. Peacekeeping, therefore, emerged in response to the lack of Great Power co-operation and became successful, to a degree, in bringing at least some order to the international system if not total peace.¹⁹

The development of peacekeeping and its subsequent hybrids from the birth of the UN to

¹⁷ *Ibid*, Article 42 .

¹⁸ *Ibid*, Article 53.

¹⁹ Hill, SM., and Malik, SP., *Peacekeeping and the United Nations*, Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing

the present can be divided into five chronological phases, the first three of which take place during the Cold War period: 1947-56 (The Birth of UN Peacekeeping); 1956-74 (The Assertive Period); and 1974-87 (The Quiescent Period).²⁰

The post-Cold War period saw a rebirth of UN Peacekeeping; however, initial optimism and success were dealt a severe blow in the mid-nineties with the disasters of Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia. Thus the period can sub-divided into: 1988-93 (Renaissance and Expansion Period); and 1993 to the present-day (sometimes termed the Retrenchment or Contraction Period).

Understandably, during this entire period peacekeeping has evolved as theory and practice contributed to a greater body of research and experience and as the global geo-political system also changed. In their book, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, Bellamy, Williams and Griffin identify five different types of operations:

We suggest that five different types of operation can be identified, based on what each type is supposed to achieve. In other words, the primary distinction between the five types of peacekeeping operations lies in the desired ends they hope to achieve rather than the means that are employed to achieve them. The five different types of operations are:

Traditional peacekeeping: these operations are intended to promote liberal peace in its Westphalian sense, that is, to ensure liberal and peaceful relations between states. In practice, this means constructing the political space necessary for the belligerent states to reach an agreement. Traditional peacekeeping takes place in the space between a ceasefire agreement between states and the conclusion of a political settlement. Traditional peacekeepers do not propose or enforce particular political solutions. Rather, they try to build confidence between the belligerents in an attempt to facilitate political dialogue.

Managing Transition: these operations aim to facilitate and then implement a

Company Ltd, 1996, pp17-18.

²⁰ *Ibid*, p.24.

settlement agreed by the conflicting parties. They are deployed within (rather than between) states after the parties have agreed a ceasefire and a political settlement. These missions attempt to assist the implementation of an agreement already reached by the belligerent parties. They take place with the consent of the parties, but unlike traditional peacekeeping, they are concerned with the implementation of an agreed political settlement.

Wider Peacekeeping: these operations are intended to fulfill the aims of traditional peacekeeping, as well as certain additional tasks within an environment of ongoing conflict. They developed as an ad hoc response to the breakdown of ceasefires or political agreements that enabled the original deployment of a traditional or managing transition operation, combined with a belief on the part of the peacekeepers that they should continue to have some sort of role (often humanitarian) in the conflict area.

Peace Enforcement: the aim of these operations is to impose the will of the Security Council upon the parties to a particular conflict. Peace enforcement operations are the closest manifestation of the collective security role originally envisaged for the UN by the authors of its Charter.

Peace Support Operations: these operations are designed to help establish liberal-democratic peace in its post-Westphalian sense. That is, they aim to establish liberal-democratic societies within states as the most effective means of maintaining international peace and security. They combine robust military forces capable of limited peace enforcement tasks should a ceasefire breakdown, with a strong civilian component that includes civil administration, humanitarian elements and civilian policing. Peace-support operations attempt to enforce a political agreement, the substance of which has been dictated by the interveners and supports the establishment of liberal democracy.²¹

Acceptance of this list of definitions is not universal, nor is it perhaps strictly accurate since the term ‘wider peacekeeping’ is originally one developed by the British to describe the spectrum of operations between traditional peacekeeping and limited war and thus includes conflict prevention, disarmament of warring factions, military assistance, humanitarian relief, and control of movement. Equally, the term Peace Support Operations (PSO), is now more commonly used to describe all categories mentioned above. However, for general purposes of description the list will suffice. Such a list and the above outlined chronological categories could be seen to suggest a smooth and

²¹ Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, op cit, pp.5-6.

continuous progression in the development of theory and practice. The reality is not so, indeed many argue that peacekeeping has always been an ad hoc response to particular problems; those maintaining such a view hold that it is for this reason that the concept continues to defy simple categorisation.²²

The Birth of Peacekeeping 1947-56

The combination of optimism and determination to avoid future major conflicts which led to the setting up of the UN was soon tempered by the realisation that a cold war situation was developing. However, if the optimism faded swiftly the determination did not and the various observer missions which sprang up reflected the sincere desire to manage conflict. These three missions established the activities which came to represent the basic conditions of early peacekeeping; monitoring, observing, reporting and persuading. Two of the three, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), established in 1948 to monitor ceasefire lines between Israel and her neighbours and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) set up in 1949 similarly to monitor the ceasefire between India and Pakistan (but additionally to report on each side's compliance with the arms limitation agreement), were to last for decades and continue to this day. The third, which chronologically was the first to be established, was the United Nations Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB) set up in 1947; established primarily as a result of the conflict which sprang up in Greece between the Communist and non-Communist resistance fighters after WWII and then involving support from Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In view of the predictable Soviet use of the veto concerning this conflict and the lack of consent from all the parties involved the mission was a failure and ended in 1951. Thus it can be seen that these three early missions, albeit accidentally, set the pattern for UN peacekeeping - an

²² *Ibid*, p.4.

essentially non-violent role which had the consent of all the involved parties. As will be shown in the next chapter, these qualifying factors meant that many of the conflicts which began to break out in this period were therefore seen as inappropriate for UN peacekeeping missions and the more robust concepts of limited war, low intensity wars, small wars, Counter-insurgency (COIN) and Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (CRW) pre-occupied the minds of military planners and politicians. Conflicts such as the Korean War and the Suez crisis seemed to confirm the correctness of this pre-occupation even at the UN.

The North Korean invasion of South Korea and the breaching of the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950 led to the UN passing resolutions under the rules of Chapter VII. Resolution 82 defined North Korea's 'armed attack' as a 'breach of the peace' and called upon the 'authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel'. The second resolution, Resolution 83, was passed two days later and recommended that UN member states furnish South Korea with 'such assistance... as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area'. A week later the Security Council (SC) recommended that those participating make their contributions available to a unified command under the leadership of the USA; it further requested that the Americans nominate a US commander for the operation²³. Fifteen nations did so and the subsequent campaign drew in, officially, the Chinese and unofficially, the Russians, who covertly supplied pilots for the North Korean airforce. This robust UN action was only possible because, at the time, the Russians were boycotting the UN SC - a diplomatic mistake they did not repeat. When they did return their use of the veto prevented any further such robust resolutions; however the

²³ Bellamy, Williams, Griffin, op cit, p.152.

remainder of the UN SC were able to circumvent this in part by successfully appealing to the General Assembly to pass the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution, which asked members to hold forces in readiness for action even if not formally requested by the SC to do so. Ironically, it was this latter resolution which was used by the UN against Britain and France when they unilaterally intervened in the Suez crisis. The UN action in Korea was dynamic and in essence a completely military operation and in so far as it restored the border between the two Koreas to the 38th parallel, a successful example of collective security resulting in the enforcement of some form of peace - that it failed to harmonise, progress or resolve relations between North and South Korea showed the potential limitations of military intervention with regard to true conflict resolution.

The Suez crisis did demonstrate the UN potential for conflict resolution however. Two of the world's then-Super powers were successfully brought to book; and the concept of preventative diplomacy being developed and practised by the UN's outstanding Secretary-General, Dag Hammerskjöld, coupled with the deployment of the UN's first formal peacekeeping mission, seemed to demonstrate that the UN had the necessary capacity to perform the international role foreseen for it. UN Emergency Force 1 (UNEF1) was not originally perceived as setting a precedent for future operations since it was regarded more as a flexible and ad hoc response to the particular circumstances of the Suez crisis. However the principles Dag Hammerskjöld laid down for it did become the guiding principles for what has become known as traditional peacekeeping:

1. UNEF was dependent upon the consent of the parties for both its deployment and future operations.
2. It would not constitute an enforcement action.
3. Its military functions would be strictly limited.
4. It should not in any way seek to influence the politico-military power balance between the parties.

5. It should be temporary in duration.²⁴

The concept of preventative diplomacy was born in large part from the conviction that the conditions of the developing Cold War would prevent further large-scale collective security operations. The advent of nuclear weapons, coupled with the alarming behaviour of the US General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War may also have led many of the world's senior politicians to fear the possible consequences of setting such operations in motion. UNEF1 was a practical demonstration of what the UN could do in such circumstances and was also a step further than mere observer missions. In General Assembly Resolution 998 the Secretary-General was invited to report back on the feasibility of creating 'a United Nations Force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out'. When UNEF1 deployed in November 1956 and was broadly seen to have been successful - it would remain in place until 1967 when Egypt demanded its withdrawal. What Bellamy, Williams and Griffin describe as the 'holy trinity of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force'²⁵ would come to define most of the future UN peacekeeping operations. The Secretary-General's fifth condition, that such operations should be temporary in duration would remain problematic.

The Assertive Period, 1956-1974

The UN deployment to the Congo in 1960 represented an action which fell between that of Korea and UNEF1. Initially seen as an exercise in preventative diplomacy, it rapidly developed into one more closely resembling a collective security peace enforcement action and ultimately became one of attempting to manage transition. The piecemeal and

²⁴ Second Report of the Secretary-General on the Feasibility of a UN Emergency Force, 6 November 1956 (A/3302). Quoted in Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *op cit*, p.100.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p.100.

reactive way in which this occurred illustrated several of the innate weaknesses of the UN.

The United Nations Operation in the Congo, (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo, or ONUC), which took place in the Republic of the Congo (now Zaire) from July 1960 until June 1964, is by far the largest peacekeeping operation ever established by the United Nations in terms of the responsibilities it had to assume, the size of its area of operation and the man-power involved. It included, in addition to a peacekeeping force which comprised at its peak strength nearly 20,000 officers and men, an important Civilian Operations component. Originally mandated to provide the Congolese Government with the military and technical assistance it required following the collapse of many essential services and the military intervention by Belgian troops, ONUC became embroiled by force of circumstances in a chaotic internal situation of extreme complexity and had to assume certain responsibilities which beyond normal peacekeeping duties. The policy followed by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in the Congo brought him into direct conflict with the Soviet Union and serious disagreement with some other Powers. The operation cost the life of Hammarskjöld and led to grave political and financial crisis within the United Nations itself.²⁶

Even this bland summary by the UN's own Public Information Department contains sufficient to indicate the size of the confusion and disaster into which the UN found itself drawn. The Congo gained its independence from Belgium in June 1960 and within days the Congolese army mutinied and attacks took place against Belgian citizens still in the Congo. Rather than trust to the fledgling Congolese government the Belgians, as the departing colonial power, felt themselves justified in sending in paratroops ostensibly to secure the safety of their citizens. As this was happening two Congolese provinces, including the important and mineral-rich province of Katanga declared themselves to be independent from the Congo. Ignoring the latter events the UN declared that the Belgian action was an act of aggression and called upon them to withdraw; in the event thirty countries agreed to send troops to act as peacekeepers to supervise this withdrawal. ONUC was to oversee the withdrawal of Belgian troops and to assist the Congolese

²⁶ *The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, (2nd ed), United Nations Department of Public Information, DPI/1065 - 40500, 1990, p.215.

government to restore law and order - it was not to involve itself in internal matters such as the secession of Katanga. The leader of the Katangese government, Moise Tshombe, employed foreign mercenaries to lead and organise his local armed forces and the Russians supplied the Congolese government with military assistance and materiel. The Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, was then abducted and subsequently murdered by opposition politicians. Inevitably in such a confusing situation ONUC became further embroiled and the UN authorised the Commander to use force to 'prevent civil war'. ONUC had been neither organised nor equipped to carry out this new task and the initial attempts to use force in what was in effect a conventional, if limited, war were spectacularly unsuccessful, with both sides claiming that ONUC was no longer acting impartially. Disaster was only averted by deploying additional more suitably equipped and trained troops to the Congo and in February 1963, with the two secessionist provinces reintegrated into the Congo, ONUC was finally able to begin reducing troop numbers until, in late June 1964, military aspects of the mission were formally ended.

We had a good time laying into the UN troops....we killed a lot of Irish in one action ...but when we heard that Gurkhas were being deployed we thought, F**k that! the pay wasn't good enough to fight Gurkhas, so we took our weapons, trucks and the pay chest and went to join Nkrumah's bodyguard in Ghana.²⁷

In many ways the UN deployment in the Congo contained elements which would later cause problems for much later missions after the Cold War ended. It suffered from 'mission creep'; it was deployed to keep the peace where there was no peace; and most significantly, it was deployed into a multi-player intra-state conflict rather than into an inter-state one. More immediately it had two other effects; it caused an enduring financial crisis for the UN and the Secretary-General's powers would be more

²⁷ Statement made by a former Rhodesian mercenary to the author during the Dhofar campaign in March 1970.

constrained. Henceforth all missions were to be mandated for only six months at a time, to allow the Security Council to constantly oversee individual operations and to give the permanent members the opportunity to veto their continuation; and secondly, a separate budget for peacekeeping was to be created.²⁸

Whilst the concern generated by the UN experience in the Congo led to the avoidance of such complex and ambitious deployments it did not deter the UN from other missions of a smaller and less challenging nature. Indeed Marrack Goulding, one of the UN's most distinguished and experienced officials and a former Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, has described this period as the UN's 'golden age' during which time nine of the thirteen peacekeeping operations established during the Cold War were set up.²⁹ It was also during this period that the characteristics of peacekeeping which had emerged in a somewhat haphazard way came to be formalised into principles along the lines first outlined by Dag Hammerkjöld for UNEF, most notably deploying with the consent of the warring parties; and the non-use of force except in self-defence.³⁰

The operations in this period were of different dimensions and complexity and it is not intended here to examine each in detail. However it should be noted that the operation in West New Guinea, now called West Irian, whilst still adhering to the principle of consent, broke new ground in giving the UN complete authority over an area:

While in the Congo the use of force provided ONUC with its unique characteristics, under UNTEA (United Nations Temporary Executive Authority), for the first time in its history, the UN had complete authority over a vast territory under the jurisdiction of the Secretary-General. To facilitate this unprecedented level of authority the Secretary-General placed a UN Security Force (UNSF) at

²⁸ Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *op cit*, p.73.

²⁹ Goulding M. 'The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping', *International Affairs*, vol 69, No.3, July 1993, p.452 .

³⁰ Hill and Malik, *op cit*, p.33.

the disposal of UNTEA to maintain internal law and order. As such the functions of UNSF related directly to UNTEA in that it was set up to be the police arm of the Executive Authority.³¹

The deployment and conduct of UNTEA and UNSF are rightly seen as one of the UN's most successful operations. It is also fair to say that, within the more modest and narrow ambitions of the operations in this period, coupled with the vagaries of the Cold War, the bulk of the missions were successful in helping to create an environment in which attempts at conflict resolution could take place. That often such attempts did not take place or were unsuccessful meant that missions remained in place for far longer than originally intended. Some, such as UNFICYP, remain in place to this day and this has led to the criticism that the perceived permanence of UN missions permits the involved parties to maintain the status quo rather than seek to resolve the issue.

The last operational deployment for the UN in this period was that of the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II). It will be recalled that UNEF I had been withdrawn at Egyptian insistence in 1967 immediately prior to hostilities breaking out between that country and Israel. The war of 1973 which began with Egyptian and Syrian coordinated surprise attacks and ended with Israel victorious and in possession of more territory than before, prompted fears that a super power confrontation might result. The UN Security Council called for a cease-fire and on that being agreed it was necessary to move a UN task force in quickly to stop the fighting, prevent all forward movement from troops on both sides and ultimately to establish a buffer zone. A similar force, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) would be set up subsequently in early 1974 to perform a similar function on the Golan Heights, now a front line between Israel and Syria.

³¹ *Ibid*, p.41.

The Quiescent Period 1974-1987

Having begun UNDOF in June 1974 there followed a long fallow period during which the UN set up only one new mission, although as noted above, several previously-established missions continued to be renewed. The Cold War had turned colder, which constrained the decision-making of the UN SC, financial difficulties within the UN and a pervasive uncertainty concerning the efficacy of such missions amongst UN member states all led to a lack of enthusiasm for such operations. Perhaps only the fear that future confrontations in the Middle East along the Arab-Israeli fault-lines could lead to greater conflagrations prompted the establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In a spill-over from the Lebanese civil war, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) had become the dominant force in Southern Lebanon. On 11 March 1978 a PLO commando carried out a raid into Israel which resulted in the killing or injuring of over one hundred Israelis. In retaliation the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) invaded Lebanon in strength and occupied almost all of Southern Lebanon. At the request of the Lebanese government the UN deployed UNIFIL with the aims of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.³² Almost immediately the weaknesses in the UN mandate and the consequences for the deployed troops manifested themselves. The PLO, a non-state actor, refused to be bound by any agreements made with the Lebanese Government and the Israelis; further, within months of the force being deployed, the Lebanese Government lost control of its commander in the area and informed UNIFIL that:

The commanders of the 'de facto Lebanese forces' were now to be considered as

³² The Blue Helmets, *op cit*, p.112.

having no further authority whatsoever to act on behalf of the Lebanese Army, to negotiate with the UN, or to exercise any legal command in the area.³³

In effect therefore the UN was being asked to assist in an inter-state problem in which the major difficulties were caused by intra-state actors. Unsurprisingly, the dispatched force was neither mandated nor organised to deal with this situation. Both the PLO and the 'de facto forces' consistently refused to cooperate - and both engaged in hostilities against each other - and, on occasions, against UN troops. In frustration at the lack of success in controlling the PLO, the IDF also began to cross back into Lebanon to engage in military activities and in August 1980 and in July 1981 major hostilities broke out again. UNIFIL did have some success in negotiating to limit such crises; but in June 1982 the IDF reinvaded Southern Lebanon in strength. In such circumstances the UNIFIL mission was invalid and the troops were instructed to remain in their positions unless their survival was threatened; and to protect and assist the civil population as far as circumstances allowed. Effectively this meant that the mission had been transformed into one of humanitarian assistance and UNIFIL, whilst the UN maintained that the original aim would be resumed, began to work with UNICEF and the ICRC in a wide range of civil assistance projects. When, beginning in 1985, Israeli troops once again withdrew, elements of the original mission were re-activated. So, although UNIFIL undoubtedly did make a valid if limited contribution in the area, circumstances prevented it from ever achieving its original mandate.

UNIFIL revealed many of the problems which had prompted states to move away from using UN peacekeeping as a tool of collective security. High costs, financial shortfalls and the lack of consent from belligerents persuaded many member states that peacekeeping operations could only function effectively if all the conditions set at the time of UNEF I were in place.³⁴

³³ *Ibid*, p.123.

³⁴ Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *op cit*, p.73.

In terms of the evolution of peacekeeping, however, the issue of insertion between intra-state actors had re-emerged and the task of assisting other non-military organisations in humanitarian missions within a conflict zone had been added to the spectrum.

Renaissance and Expansion 1988-1993

With the ending of the Cold War, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and subsequently, the Soviet Union, the bipolar hegemony of Washington and Moscow in world affairs collapsed as well. The naïve and at times frankly ridiculous declarations that a new era of peace and harmony was dawning, bringing with it a ‘peace dividend’, were soon shown to be just that - naïve and ridiculous. Like a pressure cooker from which the clamps had been removed, struggles which had been either suppressed or ‘controlled’ by the two super powers began to blow. This ‘ill wind’ potentially blew in the favour of the UN, since the Security Council’s enduring problems caused by the rivals’ repeated use of the veto option lessened. The combination of an outbreak of ‘trouble spots’ and the Security Council’s increased freedom of action led to a new lease of life for the UN.

During this period the UN conducted more peacekeeping operations than it had undertaken in the preceding forty years, prompting Boutros-Ghali to remark that the UN now suffered from having too much rather than too little credibility. The UN was asked to do things that it had neither the experience nor resources to accomplish.³⁵

In the period 1988 to 1993 the UN mounted twenty new missions. Despite the changing world order most of these new missions were not initially seen as a new order of peacekeeping. In fact most could be classed as either ‘traditional peacekeeping’ or ‘managing transition’ operations. Only five did involve large-scale and complex

mandates which had to be executed in places where there was no peace to keep. These missions, such as those in Cambodia, Bosnia and Somalia, combined the need for peacekeeping with local peacemaking, humanitarian aid delivery programmes, state-building and at times, peace enforcement. Any international business corporation faced with such sweeping changes in the market place and its business activities would probably have thanked its existing senior personnel for their services and sent them off to a generous retirement in order to bring in new personnel possessed of more recent knowledge and flexibility in thinking. Such an option was not available to the UN even if it had wanted to use it. Only the Congo in the 1960s resembled the scope and demands of these new tasks and lacking any real institutional memory there was no guide or blueprint. The 17th Century politico-military philosopher, the Marischal de Saxe, opined that ‘When people don’t know what to do, they do what they know!’ and the UN and many of the member states cannot be blamed for trying to fit existing experience to the new dimension. Indeed, since there was also a developing feeling that the peacekeepers’ remit should be broadened to include what some have called the post-Westphalian conception of liberal-democratic peace, any thoughts that the UN was venturing into the unknown were not entirely unwelcome in some quarters. This increase in UN activity was accompanied by a similar, if not complementary, increase in the involvement of twenty-one states in non-UN peacekeeping missions. This development will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter Four.

Caught up in a wave of enthusiasm at being finally able to undertake the role for which it had been originally intended and buoyed up by the apparent success of the first few new missions, the UN failed to notice that the bulk of these missions deployed to situations

³⁵ *Ibid*, p.75.

where there was a mutual desire to seek peaceful solutions to the problem. Additionally, the almost trouble-free and successful action to liberate Kuwait, undertaken as an enforcement action under the terms of Chapter VII, not unnaturally, was taken to indicate that the UN had now reached a new level of capability. Consequently, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report back with his views on how UN peacekeeping capacity and capabilities could be expanded. Boutros-Ghali's report, entitled, *An Agenda for Peace*, was in the main optimistic, even suggesting that 'peace-enforcement units' be formed to impose a ceasefire where one did not exist. However he also noted that:

The nature of peace-keeping operations has evolved rapidly in recent years. The established principles and practices of peace-keeping have responded flexibly to new demands of recent years, and the basic conditions for success remain unchanged: a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of the member states to contribute the military and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate financial and logistic support. As the international climate has changed and peace-keeping operations are increasingly fielded to help implement settlements that have been negotiated by peace-makers, a new array of demands and problems has emerged regarding logistics, equipment, personnel and finance, all of which could be corrected if Member States so wished and were ready to make the necessary resources available....However a chasm has developed between the tasks entrusted to this Organisation and the financial means provided to it. The truth of the matter is that our vision cannot really extend to the prospect opening before us as long as our financing remains myopic.³⁶

The report was not incorrect but the tacit implication that only uncertainty over funding would limit the UN's future capability was a major flaw. Understanding the need for reform, the Secretariat was reorganised and a new and separate department was formed to plan, oversee and supervise peacekeeping. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was established in February 1992 and was to be headed by an Under-Secretary

³⁶ Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace*, New York, UN Department of Public Information, 1992, paras 50, 69.

General under whom there was to be an Office of Planning and Support consisting of a Planning Division, a Field Administration section and a Logistics Division. Thus a reorganised and confident UN prepared to face the next challenges. The Ancient Greeks had a saying that if you wished to make the Gods laugh you had only tell them of your plans for the future.

Even while Boutros-Ghali's report was being prepared the UN had embarked upon the first of the major new operations. The long-standing problems in Cambodia had eventually evolved into talks between the warring parties and as a result of the Paris Peace Accords, the UN was asked to assist in the transition between the entry into force of the Accords and the formation of a new government. This complex mission included the need to create the necessary environment in which to conduct free and fair elections; and to achieve this numerous administrative agencies, bodies and offices were placed under direct UN control. Additionally, special attention was to be given to foreign affairs, defence matters, finance, public security and information. Consequently when the United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNAMIC/UNTAC) deployed to Cambodia it consisted of seven components; these were military, police, civil administration, electoral, human rights, rehabilitation and repatriation. To avoid the accusation that Cambodia had become a UN trusteeship a Cambodian Supreme National Council was formed which 'delegated' powers to the UN mission. This ambitious project was still in the process of establishing itself on the ground when the crises in Former-Yugoslavia and Somalia began to erupt.

It is timely here to re-emphasise that these new crises did not occur in a vacuum. The UN was not only continuing with numerous long-standing missions, but other new missions

were also being created. For instance, as well as UNAMIC/UNTAC there were new or recently expanded missions on the Iraq/Kuwait border, El Salvador and Mozambique. In Former-Yugoslavia UN involvement began with an attempt to resolve the situation in Croatia by establishing three so-called United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs). In 1992 the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was created to ‘...help create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement in Former-Yugoslavia’.³⁷

For a variety of reasons UNPROFOR was not fully operational until June 1992, by which time events on the ground had moved on and the mandate was extended to include duties in other areas. This proved to be largely notional as the opposing factions had no intention of allowing the UN to thwart their ambitions - thus the condition requiring consent did not exist in reality. Withdrawals by the various main parties were largely negated by the formation of indigenous and ill-disciplined militias in the areas vacated. The recognition of Bosnia as an independent state by the European Community and the UN in early 1992 had effectively signaled the final disintegration of Yugoslavia and this precipitated open warfare between the conventional forces of the three main protagonists. Faced with this situation the lightly armed and armoured UNPROFOR was also reduced to performing humanitarian relief missions and attempting to negotiate what were often extremely short-term ceasefires to aid this process. In assisting in the delivery of aid to various locations UNPROFOR exposed itself to the accusation that impartiality - another condition of UN peacekeeping - had been lost.

In Somalia a similar humanitarian aid situation developed. However in Somalia there

³⁷ Berdal M, ‘UN Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia’, in ed. Darvel D, and Hayes B, *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, MacMillan Press, 1995, p.229.

was one significant difference. Faced with even fewer UN troops on the ground, aid agencies and eventually the UN itself were compelled to hire local private organisations to protect the aid convoys and depots - the UN alone ended up hiring some 10,000 local gunmen from various sources. These 'poachers turned gamekeepers' were of various standards of efficiency and trustworthiness but none conformed to UN standards of peacekeeping.

Both Bosnia and Somalia suffered from 'mission creep' as the UN and the main Member States tried to regain the initiative and both ended in disaster. In Bosnia, the almost unplanned declaration of Safe Areas, without the resources and mandate to do more than bluff to deter aggression, led to the unspeakable atrocity of Srebrenica; whilst in Somalia the deployment of US combat troops under the optimistically entitled Operation Restore Hope with a Chapter VII mandate, culminated in the abortive attempt in October 1993 to apprehend prominent supporters of one of the major warlords in Mogadishu. The resultant battle left upwards of several hundred Somalis dead and ninety-three US soldiers dead or wounded. As these events were unrolling the UN had taken on another mission which initially seemed uncontroversial and more traditionally within the proven competences of the UN but which was ultimately to prove disastrous. In 1993 the Rwandan government and the rebel Rwandese Patriotic Front had both asked the UN to assist in the ongoing peace negotiations. This mission too experienced some expansion, moving from an initial observer/monitoring mission to one which included elements of managing transition, without any increase in resource or capability.

1993 - to the present day

The reaction of the US and other contributors to the consequences of the raid in

Mogadishu and the ongoing difficulties in Bosnia meant that when Rwanda began to go from bad to worse, the international community was disinclined to increase its commitment there. On 6th April 1994 the aeroplane carrying President Habyarimana was shot down and an obviously pre-meditated and organised programme of mass-murder began. Early next morning, the house of the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, was surrounded and she too was murdered. Her ten-strong bodyguard of Belgian peacekeepers had tried to protect her but they were taken alive to a Rwandan army camp, where they were tortured, murdered and their corpses mutilated. Responding to the outrage felt by the general public in Belgium, the Belgian government immediately demanded the withdrawal of all its peacekeepers from the mission; on their return to Belgium, in front of the world's cameras, many of the Belgian peacekeepers threw their blue UN berets on the floor in disgust. Other nations ordered their troops to confine their activities to self-protection '...even if that meant standing by and watching as lightly armed drunken thugs hacked women and children to death.'³⁸ In terms of UN commitments the Member States were determined not to cross what was to become known as 'the Mogadishu Line', however, within a week of the genocide beginning over a thousand combat troops from France, Italy and Belgium, augmented by several hundred US Marines did fly in from Burundi and independently from the UN mission, evacuated expatriates from Kigali airfield. The few UN troops remaining and their commander, the Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, were left to watch the on-going slaughter in deepening despair. Dallaire wrote:

...standing knee-deep in mutilated bodies, surrounded by the guttural moans of dying people, looking into the eyes of children bleeding to death with their wounds burning in the sun and being invaded by maggots and flies. I found

³⁸ Shawcross, William, *Deliver Us From Evil, Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict*, London, Bloomsbury, 2000, p.115.

myself walking through villages where the only sign of life was a goat, or a chicken, or a songbird, as all the people were dead, their bodies being eaten by voracious packs of wild dogs...I felt the ghost of Gordon of Khartoum watching over me...Dying in Rwanda without sign or sight of relief was a reality we faced on a daily basis.³⁹

Terrible though it was, Rwanda's suffering and the UN's humiliation did not end there. The killing continued as the rebel forces fought their way closer to the capital and only when its capture was imminent in late June did the UN accept a French offer to send a task force under a Chapter VII mandate to intervene.

While the UN and the United States dithered (the latter refusing to invoke the Genocide Convention of 1948), France, the old colonial power with a long involvement in Francophone Rwanda's past, decided, belatedly to act. Operation Turquoise, launched on 23 June 1994, has been criticised as making a mockery of UN principles. While UNAMIR had been starved of resources which could have made a difference, labouring under the limited rules of UN Charter Chapter VI, France was given Chapter VII authorisation to use force...the Security Council vote was close - ten in favour and five abstentions, with France as a permanent member voting for its own intervention.⁴⁰

The tens of thousands of refugees who had fled the fighting and the massacres were housed in huge refugee camps, the size and scope of which overwhelmed the UNHCR's meagre resources. By mid-July it was estimated that over two million refugees were in various camps bordering Rwanda; cholera and other diseases broke out. An uncoordinated host of NGOs, from internationally respected professional organisations such as Medecines Sans Frontieres to unknown and even slightly 'shady' organisations, descended on the camps to offer various forms of help. However, by then 'true refugees' had become inextricably interlinked with former soldiers from both sides and criminal elements who sought to make the camps their new battleground with dreadful consequences for the entire region:

³⁹ *Ibid*, p.119.

⁴⁰ Bellamy, Christopher, *Knights in White Armour - The New Art of War and Peace*, London, Hutchinson,

...the failure of the international community to do anything but apply an inappropriate humanitarian poultice to the Rwandan refugee crisis in 1994, 1995 and 1996 led directly to a new and appalling refugee crisis in 1997 in which up to 200,000 people may have been killed, the war over Zaire, the replacement of a bad government there with one that sometimes appeared even worse and then the so-called Great War of Africa, which engulfed up to fourteen countries of Central Africa in 1998 and 1999.⁴¹

The mission in Bosnia would only be rescued by the deployment of a NATO force and elsewhere, in Africa, a similar franchise would be granted. The high hopes with which the UN had begun the decade were truly faded and a new round of introspection and reports would begin to establish how the UN could better respond to calls for assistance and intervention. These will be discussed in Chapter Four.

1996, p.107.

⁴¹ Shawcross, *op cit*, p124.

CHAPTER THREE

CASE STUDIES

Basically, the problem is a political one; to attempt to understand it in purely military terms is the most dangerous kind of oversimplification. Guerrillas are a symptom rather than a cause. Lasting success requires a viable political settlement and even operational success over a period of time demands a proper political framework for effective military action.⁴²

The majority of COIN campaigns carried out in the mid to late 20th Century occurred in the colonies and protectorates of the great European powers. As such they are often seen as ‘liberation’ campaigns rather than as insurgency operations. Whilst undoubtedly there was a significant liberation component it is a mistake to assume that they were therefore a ‘one-off’ moment of history. Closer examination of their dynamics shows most of them to have been classic insurgency scenarios which happen to have taken place during the period of decolonisation.

When the European powers re-assumed control of their colonies after WWII, particularly in the Far East, they returned to a vastly different situation to that which had pertained prior to the Japanese invasion and in many ways that situation resembled what would nowadays be termed ‘intervention’ scenarios. As the European powers had been driven out several years before, their return *was* effectively an intervention; the initial phases of that intervention were conducted against major conventional Japanese armed forces; and subsequent phases required the re-establishment of law and order, civil administration and (due to accelerated decolonisation) creation and support of a new national government. There are further parallels in that not all sections of the population supported the new proposed governments and there undoubtedly existed within those sections of the population armed groups already skilled in guerrilla operations and in

some cases with potentially powerful outside support. Some of these armed groups had been actively supported by the returning colonial powers during the war, with the short-term aim of disrupting the Japanese war effort and were now utilising the weapons and training they had received to further their aims for internal dominance. There were instances where the struggle against the Japanese had enabled such groups to establish control over areas to such an extent that they had set up alternative administrations of their own, which they were unwilling to surrender to either the returning powers or to a central administration controlled by rival groups.

It is not proposed to examine all these campaigns nor to analyse in detail every aspect of those examples selected below. However, it is intended to illustrate where these COIN campaigns resemble modern, UN-sanctioned interventions; identify methods which have application today; and, where appropriate, the strengths and weaknesses of the methods employed.

THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE

The Malayan Emergency, as it was termed, is the campaign most frequently studied and referred to when seeking successful examples of COIN. As such it is often held to contain the 'blueprint' for such operations. Whilst it is undoubtedly true that it was a success, there were particular peripheral circumstances which created the arena for that success, so it is necessary to differentiate between those methods and principles which have universal application and those which were particular to Malaya. It has been argued that failure to do this adversely affected the short-lived and flawed American attempt to apply the 'lessons of Malaya' to Vietnam. Some argue that memories of this ill-starred

⁴² Paret, P & Shy, J., (Eds), *Guerrillas in the Sixties*, New York, Praeger, 1962, pp71-72.

Vietnam experience still inhabit American military thinking today and thus lead to distrust of COIN principles amongst more conventionally-minded military officers.

When the British returned to Malaya in 1945 there was an interregnum between the surrender and expulsion of the Japanese and the return of sufficient British military force to dominate the country. As has been previously stated there were areas where indigenous guerrillas had already taken de facto control even whilst the Japanese were still present. The interregnum allowed such groups to expand their territory and even, by force of arms and frequently by use of terror, to 'liberate' further areas. The natural tendency to take punitive action against those seen to have collaborated with the Japanese, coupled with power struggles against rival groups and the inevitable post-war grey/black economy led to a generally lawless environment. In an essay written for the Fifth Annual Military History Symposium at the Royal Canadian Military College of Canada in March 1978, Anthony Short makes the point that 'In the period between August 1945 and June 1948 what is perhaps most consistently underestimated is the extent to which 'government' had not been re-established in Malaya'.⁴³

From the point of view of counter-insurgency Malaya presented several serious problems. The federated structure of the country with its independent Chief Ministers militated against the introduction of a coordinated strategy. Malaya was in fact a federation of nine semi-autonomous states and three British colonies. The population divided into 2, 427 800 Malays and 1, 884 500 Chinese (this figure being approximate since there were settlements of illegal immigrant Chinese squatting in various locations), a relatively small European population and a number of indigenous tribes living in the jungle. Significantly, as the police force had, or was seen to have, largely collaborated

with the Japanese, many of its officers had been dismissed, leaving only some 10,000 across all ranks for the whole country. Security Forces were initially employed mainly in static defence duties throughout the whole country.

The group which most successfully exploited this period was the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and it was this group, in the Spring of 1948, which took the decision to escalate its activities to the level of armed force. The colonial authority had attempted, unsuccessfully, to establish a political structure in the form of the Malayan Union and in proposing the alternative Federation of Malaya seemed to be having more success in improving the economy and social reconstruction. It may be, in accordance with de Tocqueville's well-known dictum⁴⁴, that it was this prospect of success which caused the MCP to move towards armed insurrection. As the MCP derived both its membership and its support, predominantly from amongst the Chinese this had the effect of creating a rift between Malay and Chinese elements of the population. This would have considerable benefits for the counter-insurgents in the subsequent campaign, in that almost immediately there was a discernible and obvious division between the two elements; the majority of the Malays, even those who had allied with the MCP in wanting to see independence in some form, now siding with the existing administration.

It must be allowed that the MCP, having taken the decision to move to armed struggle, was very slow and disorganised, launching no major actions and confining itself to briefly occupying isolated villages and murdering perceived opponents. There was thus no real attempt to mobilise support or take control. This was doubly unfortunate for them as the authorities had no real intelligence and failed entirely to predict the form and

⁴³ Haycock, R., *Regular Armies and Insurgencies*, London & Totowa, NJ, Croom Helm Ltd, 1979, p.54

⁴⁴ Alexis de Tocqueville, 18th Century political commentator. 'Revolutions are most likely to occur when things are improving, not when they are getting worse.'

timing of the insurrection. However, whilst critics have alleged that the colonial authority was taken by surprise and was indecisive, it can equally be argued that whilst indeed taken by surprise, they did not allow themselves to be panicked into overreaction. The situation was seen as sufficiently grave for operational command to pass from the High Commissioner to Malcolm McDonald, the Commissioner-General for South-East Asia. One of his first acts was to identify the importance of the vast rubber estates and set in motion the recruitment of Malay special constables for their defence. A second major decision was that wherever possible government and administration should continue as normal. The decision of the majority of the MCP leaders and their active supporters to voluntarily take themselves off into the jungle - and thus divorce themselves from any real urban support - seems in hindsight to have been a significant mistake. However, considering that they might have expected a heavier and more violent response from Britain it is perhaps understandable. It did at least guarantee them freedom for offensive action and there was little attempt to hunt them down; at least one of the reasons for this was that in terms of actual numbers and supplies they were almost the equal of the Security Forces and they were superior in intelligence gathering.

In 1950, having been augmented by recruits from amongst the Chinese population and having undertaken extensive training in their jungle hideouts the insurgents began a more offensive campaign. In the meantime the government had also not been idle. Despite looming events in Korea, the number of regular army units had been increased and two essential requirements for success had been identified. The first was that all government agencies must be working to an effective overall plan and secondly that, in order to reduce potential support for the insurgents, a way had to be found to secure the allegiance of the Malayan Chinese. The effective overall plan was devised by the Director of

Operations, a new post specifically created to coordinate civil and military aspects of the Emergency, as it was now called. The man selected to fill this appointment was a retired Lieutenant General called Sir Harold Briggs. The plan identified the security forces' aim as being to eliminate not only the armed guerrillas but also the Min Yuen, the guerrillas' support organisation. The most significant part of this plan was to relocate large numbers of the predominantly Chinese population into so-called New Villages away from the jungle fringes where they had, willingly or not, helped to support the insurgents. These villages were well-guarded but were also encouraged to set up their own defence force. They were not however intended to be an updated and more subtle form of concentration camp as is sometimes claimed by critics. As Briggs himself asserted: 'This is not the final objective but affords only that measure of protection and concentration which makes good administration practicable'.⁴⁵

His plan envisaged

...a combination of self-help and government aid designed to give the Chinese peasants more benefits from supporting the government than they could ever gain from the Communists. The new villages were to have running water, schools and clinics. Eventually, there was to be a local council and a home-guard unit, both staffed by inhabitants of the new village. The peasants were offered title to plots of land and citizenship in the Federation of Malaya.⁴⁶

The combination of legal possession of land and inclusion in the political process through the local councils ensured that there was a powerful incentive to remain within them. Ultimately there would be 500 such villages containing some five hundred thousand people; as time passed they would be further developed until the vast majority were not only guarded entirely by their own operational Home Guard sections but in many areas

⁴⁵ Briggs, Sir Harold, Director of Operations, Malay Directive No. 13: *Administration of Chinese Settlements*, 26 Feb 1951. (PRO, CO 1022/32).

⁴⁶ Mockaitis, Thomas, R., *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60*, Macmillan in assoc with King's College London, 1990, pp.115-116.

Chinese Liaison Officers had been created and functioned fully within the overall system of district officers. Perhaps the greatest testimony to the success of these new villages was that, when the Emergency was declared to be at an end less than ten of them were abandoned.

Original though Briggs undoubtedly was, the plan did not spring from him alone. It was rather the coming together of several decades of the British Army's experiences in conducting diverse irregular warfare campaigns from the mountains of the North West Frontier, through the veldt of South Africa, the fields and cities of Ireland and most recently Palestine. The central theme of the so-called Briggs Plan was the appreciation that counter-insurgency was not primarily a military effort. Briggs commented that:

The problem of clearing Communist bandits from Malaya was similar to that of eradicating malaria from a country. Flit guns and mosquito nets, in the form of military and police, though giving some very local security if continuously maintained, effected no permanent cure. Such a permanent cure entailed the closing of all the breeding areas.⁴⁷

The other major component of the Briggs' Plan therefore addressed the issue of civil-military cooperation. A comprehensive network of committees was established. These committees, set up at district, state and federal level, were designed to ensure regular liaison and cooperation between all senior individuals and agencies involved in counterinsurgency operations. The highest level of committee, the Federal Executive Committee, chaired by the High Commissioner himself, was responsible for all matters of policy and finance. The state-level committees, the State War Executive Committees (SWEC), appear to have been largely established to assuage the sensibilities and jealously guarded autonomy of the states Chief Ministers. However, it was the District

⁴⁷ Short, A, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, London, Frederick Muller, 1975, p. 242.

War Executive Committees (DWEC) which were the mainstay of the system. These committees, chaired by the District Officer, a civilian, consisted of the local military commander, normally a Lieutenant Colonel, the local police superintendent, the senior Royal Air Force officer, the home guard commander and several co-opted local community leaders. They were responsible for day-to-day conduct of operations within their area of responsibility and considerable freedom of action was delegated to them. Paralleling this committee structure was a system of intelligence committees responsible for intelligence-gathering and co-operation; and for establishing special military intelligence officers to function as a link between military units and the police Special Branch. These ideas did not yield instant success as welding the various security forces elements into one continuum was not universally popular and Briggs in any case did not have executive command over either police or Army - that lay with the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, a man who failed to energise the campaign. By the end of 1951, the Army, now augmented by long-range penetration SAS patrols, were locating and killing or capturing insurgents; however, insurgent losses were still being made good by new recruits to their cause. Realising the threat which the New Villages posed, the insurgents were concentrating their efforts on disrupting them and on attacking isolated police posts in the hope of discouraging police recruitment - at their peak committing over one hundred murders a month.

Attacks on police posts were only part of the police problem. At the beginning of the emergency, Colonel W. Gray had been appointed as Commissioner of Police. He was undoubtedly an able and conscientious operator, his previous appointment being Inspector-General of Police in Palestine. However, the police force there was organised on paramilitary lines and he had brought 500 of those policemen with him. He had used

some of these men to provide the backbone for a system of paramilitary police ‘jungle’ squads. This had the double disadvantage of both complicating cooperation and coordination with the Army, who saw the jungle as being more properly their ‘patch’, and of taking large numbers of police away from their more normal police role. The latter was the greater problem since it not only reduced the number available to man police stations, it also meant that conventional crime was less well policed; a by-product of which was that the everyday low-level intelligence that was seen as vital to assist security forces in their operations was sometimes lacking. Additionally, the former Palestinian police did not mix well with the Malay police and this created discord amongst the police ranks.⁴⁸

In answer to these problems Briggs was given greater executive powers in the Autumn of 1951 but then a series of events occurred which significantly altered the campaign. In October 1951, Sir Henry Gurney’s convoy was ambushed and he was assassinated. Briggs was already in ill-health and about to retire; in fact, he would be dead within a year. However, just before Gurney’s murder the Conservatives had been returned to power in Britain and Winston Churchill, as the new Prime Minister, adopted a more robust stand towards the Emergency. He sent over the Colonial Secretary Sir Oliver Lyttelton to Malaya to personally assess the situation. He was accompanied by his private secretary, Hugh Fraser MP. Fraser expressed the opinion that Malaya had:

...a caricature of a government not dissimilar to a cartoon of a constitutional monarch and of an unelected House of Commons attempting to administer through eleven suspicious Houses of Lords led by eleven more or less recalcitrant Lord Chancellors...Frustration results locally and at the centre’ [...] On the one hand, Kuala Lumpur, lacking the constant advice or experience of people in the field, tends to become academic, perfectionist and unpractical...whilst state governments, by compliant, obstruction, and jealousy of local privilege, distort

⁴⁸ Mockaitis, *op cit*, p.119.

and delay the execution of local policy.⁴⁹

Such an analogy could apply equally to several of the more recent intrastate conflicts which peacekeepers have been tasked to resolve. As a result of Lyttelton's visit, the Commissioner of Police and the Head of Special Branch were removed from office and the Director of Intelligence resigned. The British government seconded the Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police to replace the outgoing Colonel Gray. As the new Commissioner, Arthur Young replaced the 'Palestinian' model with a more conventional civilian police force. He established a Police Academy, set in motion a campaign to recruit Chinese officers and looked to establish a force which would not only assist in defeating insurgents but would be capable of maintaining law and order after the British had withdrawn. This latter was more revolutionary in 1951 than it would be regarded today.

To correct what was seen as lack of direction and unified command the British Government appointed General (later Field-Marshal) Sir Gerald Templer to replace the murdered High Commissioner. He was to hold the dual appointment of High Commissioner and Director of Operations and was to assume complete operational command over all armed forces assigned to operations in the federation and to be empowered to issue operational orders to the commanders of those forces without reference to the Commanders in Chief, Far East. This appointment was not popular with senior civil service officials who felt that a soldier would not understand the complexities and sensitivities of the situation. Indeed, Malcolm Macdonald, the Commissioner-General of Southeast Asia complained of the danger of 'military dictatorship'; but Templer had been Director of Military Government in Western

⁴⁹ Report by Hugh Fraser, 16 Jan 1952, (PRO), CO 122/22.

Germany and had a greater understanding of such issues than his critics allowed. At all events, on arrival, he concentrated more on the political side than the military aspect arguing that:

There were three priorities to be followed: first, a sound police force, second, improved intelligence organisation, and third, what he called telling people the truth. Apart from the galvanic energy which he supplied, Templer's administration was distinguished by the introduction of local elections, councils for the Chinese New Villages (ex squatter areas) which were an enormous advance in Chinese citizenship and the first openings for Chinese in the Malayan Civil Service.⁵⁰

In a parallel development, the British Government insisted that racial unity would be a prerequisite of independence. In the event, Templer made few changes to the Briggs Plan, a Colonial Office report written shortly after his arrival, noting:

The general picture is that a great deal has been done in the last three years (for instance, resettlement, the expansion of the police force, creation of a home guard, etc) but much of this work had to be done hastily and on an improvised basis. The emphasis now will probably be away from quantity towards quality, so that the government's instruments of policy can be properly shaped for the peculiar and in some ways unique tasks which face them in Malaya.⁵¹

Greater emphasis was placed on 'Hearts and Minds', particularly in the form of a co-ordinated campaign to persuade insurgents not only to surrender but also to work actively against their former comrades. This, combined with a much improved and effective intelligence-gathering operation which enabled better targeted use of security force resources, undoubtedly laid the foundation for ultimate success. Such actions progressively won the confidence of both the Malays and the Chinese. Anthony Short, in an essay entitled 'The Malayan Emergency' asserts that it was this confidence which was

⁵⁰ Haycock, R., *op cit*, p.62.

⁵¹ *Report on Situation in Malaya*, 15 Feb. 1952 (PRO), CO 1022/2.

critical:

Without it little intelligence would be forthcoming and although the apparatus for collecting intelligence might be perfected, for example, by the training of a sufficient number of Chinese detectives and seconded British Special Branch Officers, it could not take advantage of what was not there.

Ultimately, therefore, one might argue that it was this intangible quality which created the conditions for the defeat of the communist Chinese insurrection. When Chinese Home Guard sections were fully armed and entirely in control of the defence of their own New Villages, or when Commonwealth soldiers, in the mortal peril of ambush situations, were prepared to let the first shot be fired and the trap sprung by the accompanying surrendered guerrilla, these must be obviously rated as expressions of confidence. On the other hand, when one remembers that no attempt was made to use the thousands of weapons in the hands of the Malay Home Guards, Special Constables, police and soldiers for anything like a 'final solution' to the Chinese problem, this must also be seen as confidence; and when the Chinese, whether as Home Guards, political leaders, detectives or as a source of information, took their lives in their hands by supporting government, this too represented confidence.⁵²

That is not to say that the plans and methods of Briggs and Templer were without controversy. In addition to civil service disquiet at the concept of a military supremacy there were allegations of heavy handedness as when, in March 1952, near the town of Tanjong Malim, twelve government officials were killed in an ambush, Templer answered the reluctance of the townspeople to give information which might have led to the apprehending of the culprits, by imposing a 22-hour curfew, halving the rice ration and closing all the schools. This action led to the British newspaper, the Daily Herald leading with the headline, 'Hitler's Way is not our Way, Templer!' On 27th December, 1953, the President of the Malayan Chinese Association complained in a speech that Malaya had become '...in many respects a police state in which the power of the executive has been tremendously increased at the expense of the individual.'⁵³

⁵² Short, A, 'The Malayan Emergency', in Haycock, R., *op cit*, p. 63.

⁵³ Purcell, V., *Malaya, Communist or Free?*, Stanford, 1954, p. 8.

However when Templer left in 1954 the back of the insurgency had been broken, although it would not finally be declared to be at an end until 1960, even though Malaya was granted independence in 1957. Perhaps the real achievement in Malaya was cited by Thomas Mockaitis:

It [the British achievement] was not simply that the British mounted an effective counterinsurgency effort but that they created a durable political, economic and social infrastructure capable of defending and governing the country after they withdrew.⁵⁴

The British had appreciated from the beginning that the problem required a political solution which involved a military element rather than being a military one with a political element. Consequently, it was realised that it was vital to keep the bulk of the population if not loyal, then at least not motivated to support the insurgents - this was particularly so in the case of the Chinese portion of the population. In short, to deny the insurgent 'fish' the water in which to swim. As the insurgents were, at least initially, following Maoist principles, this was exactly the correct approach. The determination to keep things as normal as possible whilst at the same time establishing a system of unified civil/military command was also sound. Gerald Templer's decisions to introduce local elections in the new villages and ensure that Chinese had access to civil service jobs were vital to ensure that the minority felt involved. More generally, his three priorities stand the test of time in any similar situation: a sound police force (by which was meant one which was non-partisan, free of corruption and operating at all times within the law), an improved intelligence system and 'telling people the truth' constitute essential elements in any post-conflict peace building operation. The issue of confidence as defined earlier was perhaps the ultimate ingredient for success. The military aspects of the campaign

were also critical to success: operating in accordance with and subject to, the clearly-defined political aim; always operating within the admittedly rather more harsh legal constraints of the use of force which existed at the time, it could claim to have created the climate within which the political solution could be developed.

In nearly all of these operations the army was kept in its place and the air force, as an attacking force, was heavily circumscribed....Its place was properly defined as in support of civil power: the Ulster of today rather than the Ireland of 60 years ago. Its main function was to provide a framework for counter-guerrilla operations and when it was realised that troops seldom generate their own intelligence, the police force came into its own in this and other roles, as the principle arm of civil power...the assertion that the army, in practice as well as principle, had to act in support of civil power which meant that the civil administration was integrated with the police/service effort all the way up - and all the way down.⁵⁵

Finally, the British guarantee of independence ensured that those Malays who had originally fought the Japanese alongside the Communists and who also wanted to see the back of the British, felt no common cause with the insurgents. Although at least one observer noted the threat of British withdrawal actually induced many Chinese to support the Communists on the grounds that, without British support, the Malays would be unable to resist the well-organised Communist movement; they therefore decided to throw in their lot with the side which was going to win.⁵⁶

Undoubtedly the relative geographic isolation of Malaya also helped, for whilst potentially the Indonesians supported the Malays and Communist China supported the MCP, neither helped nor interfered in any significant material sense and the insurgents were forced to rely upon their own resources. This had a considerable impact, as the

⁵⁴ Mockaitis, T, *op cit*, p.124.

⁵⁵ Haycock, R., *op cit*, pp 66-67 .

⁵⁶ Lucien Pye to Adam Watson, British Embassy in Washington, 20 Jan 1953, (PRO), CO 1022/28.

insurgents were not themselves particularly well-equipped. In the main, they possessed only small arms and had a critical lack of explosives and the expertise to use them. In addition, their shortage of radio equipment hampered quick coordination and forced them to place too much emphasis on the use of couriers and written records - both of which could be captured by security forces. The above mentioned isolation, when combined with the internal isolation achieved through their own voluntary withdrawal to the jungle and the inspired British removal of the bulk of their potential supporters into the New Villages, meant that they could never move to the next stages of their plan to achieve dominance. This failure, provided the security forces maintained their will to continue operations, reduced the insurgents to little more than bandit gangs whose eventual demise, no matter how long it took, was largely inevitable. Equally, whilst the New Villages were critical to success, some have argued that it was only the unique situation which existed in Malaya at that time that allowed the concept to work so well. There was a clear division between Malay and Chinese; the largely rural Chinese, once moved into the New Villages, were given a standard of living and legal status higher than that which they had previously known and could thus be 'educated'.

Perhaps of equal importance, the British in the 1950s, as the colonial authority, were perceived to have more moral authority to operate freely than would be the case today and were therefore able to carry out such a policy unimpeded by significant criticism either at home or internationally. Nor should it be forgotten that the whole twelve year operation took place at a time when the media was relatively undeveloped and despite snapping at political ankles, generally 'knew their place'; NGOs were virtually non-existent; and the world was still emerging from WWII with the Cold War boundaries still being explored.

THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE

Like the British, the French had long possessed a colonial Empire and had also developed methods for combating and controlling insurrections and other disturbances. Perhaps surprisingly they had been the first to adopt an approach which was not primarily military. In the 1840s Marshal Bugeard had used the then-conventional ‘flying columns’ and punishment raids in defeating various uprisings in Algeria. However, later in the nineteenth century a change occurred. French colonial soldiers such as Joseph Gallieni and Herbert Lyautey developed a strategy which contained several characteristics of later twentieth century methods. In Indo-China, Madagascar and Morocco they replaced the Bugeard methods with a slow methodical expansion of administration hand-in-hand with a military presence. This progressive pacification was likened to the spread of an oil slick - *tache d’huile* - involving the systematic reorganisation of the local population who, it was considered, would be attracted to the administration by the range of facilities now afforded them.⁵⁷ This unconscious parody of the Roman Empire’s expansion into ‘barbarian’ territories also saw the Army as the representative and spearhead for the ‘civilising’ of the local population. So, whilst the policy envisaged the army retaining its military role to defeat any armed threat, it also emphasised the importance of social and political initiatives which placed upon the army the duty of establishing an infrastructure of control with such benefits as improved education, medicine and agriculture.⁵⁸ However unlike the British Army which, with the unique exception of the Curragh Mutiny, never allowed its more rounded duties overseas to influence its traditional non-political role at home, it can be argued that the French Army had the reverse effect.

⁵⁷ Beckett, Ian F. W. and Pimlott, John (Eds), *Armed Forces and Modern Counter-insurgency*, London, Croom Helm, 1985, p.4.

⁵⁸ *Ibid* p.47.

Indeed a warning sign had appeared as early as 1900, when Herbert Lyautey published an article suggesting that the Army should be the instrument for regenerating French society through an elite emerging from colonial operations 'which tests and proves itself in military service before leading the nation to new grandeur'.⁵⁹

With the end of the Second World War the French would become the first of the Great Powers to confront a new style of insurgent. Few, if any, previous exponents of insurgency-style warfare had possessed either the comprehensive vision or the committed revolutionary political ideology of Communist theorist-cum-practitioners such as Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Min or Vo Nguyen Giap. John Pimlott states baldly that the French have not enjoyed a great deal of success in counter-insurgency since 1945.⁶⁰ Whilst it is difficult to argue with the accuracy of this statement it would be wrong to imply from it that the French had neither realised that something had changed, nor sought to understand the change.

Despite the trauma and humiliation suffered through defeat and occupation at home, the French colonies and protectorates had been little affected by WWII. Indeed, in most cases in the name of the Vichy Government, French authority had been maintained; therefore the re-assumption of colonial authority seemed initially to indicate that not much had changed. The only possible indication of things to come occurring in May 1945, when celebrations to mark the end of the war in Europe developed into violent confrontations between Muslims and French settlers in Algeria. This was immediately suppressed in the old ruthless military style, utilising air strikes and even naval bombardment against

⁵⁹ *Ibid* p.4.

⁶⁰ *Ibid* p.46.

Muslim centres, followed by a series of summary executions of ringleaders and other participants.⁶¹ This brutal reaction helped to ensure that Algeria, not a colony but constitutionally a part of metropolitan France since 1848, remained quiescent for another nine years. This unfortunately may have led French political and military leaders to the soon to be disproved belief that the old ways were likely to remain the most effective. A similar revolt in Madagascar in 1947 was similarly ended with an estimated 60,000 civilian deaths.

These two actions, followed as they were with civilian programmes designed to ‘demonstrate’ the superiority and desirability of the colonial system to the local population, were superficially at least, classic ‘oil slick’ and it was undoubtedly with these two examples in mind that the French began to confront the developing problems in Indo-China. In 1862 the French had occupied the Eastern provinces of what was then called Cochin China, followed one year later with the assumption of control over the ‘protectorate’ of Cambodia. By 1867 they had seized control of the remainder of Cochin China and in 1883 they took both Annam and Tonkin, with Laos also becoming a protectorate in 1893. Whilst there had been some isolated rebellions from time to time there had been little subsequent resistance, although significantly, in Vietnam a communist party had been formed as early as 1930. As previously indicated, the fall of the French government in May 1940 led to the formation of the Vichy government with the colonial Indochinese administration technically retaining authority and even the military garrison remaining in place. However Japan, as a German ally, insisted on certain ‘privileges’ such as the closure of supply routes into Southern China and subsequently the stationing of Japanese troops in the area. Resistance to the Japanese

⁶¹ Horne, A., *A Savage War of Peace. Algeria 1954-1962*, London, Macmillan, 1977, pp.23-8.

was therefore an entirely indigenous affair, with the Vietnamese Communist Party becoming by force of organisation, backed up by force of arms, the controlling element. In May 1941 the various national groups formally amalgamated to become the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi - the League for the Independence of Vietnam - usually shortened to Viet Minh. By the end of the war, benefiting from material assistance supplied by the Americans, the Viet Minh possessed several permanent bases in northern Tonkin and enjoyed considerable popular support throughout the whole area. Their position was further enhanced when, in March 1945, the Japanese threw out the French administration, killing many and imprisoning the rest. When the Japanese surrendered later that year the Viet Minh were the sole organised authority in place. Ho Chi Minh, based in Hanoi, declared independence in the name of the Republic of Vietnam whilst other nationalist movements did the same in Saigon. In order to formally receive the Japanese surrender and to remove the Japanese from Vietnam, the British landed a full division in the South and brushed the newly-installed Vietnamese aside. Simultaneously, Nationalist Chinese forces occupied the North. By the beginning of the next year the French were back, having re-entered Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam up to the 16th parallel. There followed a brief honeymoon period during which the French and Ho Chi Minh seemed to cooperate to negotiate the withdrawal of the Nationalist Chinese. However the insincerity of French offers of partial independence were soon exposed as they pushed their troops further North and re-occupied old garrison strongholds. In December Ho Chi Minh attempted open conventional assault on several French installations. Predictably superior French organisation and firepower prevailed, thus seeming once again to confirm the efficacy of traditional pacification methods.

What the French missed however, was that for the Viet Minh, this ‘defeat’ was no defeat at all, merely a temporary and not entirely unexpected setback:

The Viet Minh, communist-inspired and strongly nationalistic, were disciplined and dedicated revolutionaries, following the pattern of politico-military action currently being perfected in China by Mao Tse-tung. Co-ordinated by a central politburo, the insurgents had already established an infrastructure of control in the rural areas of northern Vietnam, building up ‘safe bases’ to which they could retire and from which they could sustain a military campaign against the colonial authorities. The overall aim was to gain control of the state and this was to be achieved by mobilising the support of the people, wearing the French army down in an attritional guerrilla war and finally, winning a conventional battle which would clear the way to a political take over. Thus, when they failed, the Viet Minh suffered no more than a setback.⁶²

Considering that the threat was effectively neutralised the French left Ho Chi Minh and his formidable military commander, Vo Nguyen Giap, virtually undisturbed for almost three years. In late 1949, Mao Tse-tung sealed his victory in China and Chinese aid began to flow uninterrupted into northern Vietnam and the Viet Minh launched the long-planned next phase of their campaign. In a series of coordinated assaults they surprised and destroyed many small isolated French outposts and garrisons; simultaneously they carried out effective ambushes along the supply routes to larger bases. French intelligence was almost nil and they were caught on the horns of a dilemma. If they concentrated troops to attempt to disrupt the Viet Minh supply routes from China they lost the ability to support and reinforce their own sorely-tried bases; equally, failure to interdict the insurgent supply routes allowed the Viet Minh to build up their strength with impunity. Strategic and tactical ascendancy thus passed to the Viet Minh and French morale plummeted. Sensing this, Giap began to assault the larger French positions in 1950. In September of that year he captured one of the key French

⁶² Beckett and Pimlott, *op cit*, p.51.

positions at Dong Khe, forcing the French to evacuate the whole area. Constant attacks on the withdrawing French led them to commit an elite parachute battalion, which constituted the entire mobile reserve, in an effort to secure the withdrawal route. In a move which he would repeat on an even larger scale some years later, Giap surrounded and virtually destroyed it. Within a month the French had been driven out of North-east Vietnam, sustaining some 6000 casualties in the process.

This success caused the insurgents to overreach themselves, as Giap sought to take on the French in a conventional war with Hanoi as his objective. In an attempt to rescue the situation the French had committed substantial reinforcements and recognising the seriousness of the situation, had appointed General Jean de Lattre Tassigny as both Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief. However, unlike Templer in Malaya, Tassigny was given little autonomy by Paris to carry out the former function and so concentrated almost exclusively on his military role at the expense of his role as Governor-General. His successors fared even worse as the home government did not see fit to repeat the experiment of giving both positions to one person. However, by reorganising his forces into a combination of secure bases and strong mobile groups made up of paratroops, Marines and the Foreign Legion, both backed up by considerable armour, artillery and airpower, he did have the perfect antidote in place when the insurgents attacked in the Summer of 1951. The insurgents suffered some 1200 casualties in the resulting battles and withdrew once more into the northeast. This success had the unfortunate consequence of convincing the French once more that traditional 'pacification' methods remained the best strategy for defeating insurgency. This cycle of the Viet Minh driving the French back only to overreach themselves when they attempted to move to more conventional warfare was repeated under Tassigny's

successors. Since the French continued to underestimate the political dimension of the insurgent struggle their intelligence on Ho Chi Minh's intentions and methods remained woefully inadequate and their belief in the continued efficacy of superior technology and firepower led them to fight their war rather than the one which Giap was fighting.

The cycle was decisively ended in 1954. Encouraged by military successes, the French had established a large fortified position at Dien Bien Phu with the twin aims of both disrupting Viet Minh resupply and providing a secure base from which to conduct offensive operations deep into insurgent-held territory. On the surface this was (and is) a sound military COIN option, provided that such bases can be protected and re-supplied. When the Viet Minh attacked the base in strength the French fortified the whole valley in the belief that the Viet Minh would thus be lured into attacking it conventionally - the sort of battle the French thought they could win. However they had under-estimated the extent to which the Viet Minh had developed their conventional capability. Considering them to possess few heavy weapons they had neglected to secure the hills surrounding their own position. Giap occupied these and placed heavy artillery and anti-aircraft weapons on them; he was thus able to hold off French attempts at reinforcement and air support whilst at the same time bombarding the French main defences and launching massed ground assaults. His artillery bombardment began in January 1954 and in a long-prepared conventional siege operation he took and destroyed the entire French complex, culminating in the seizure of the central command bunker on the seventh of May. Over 7,000 French were killed, the bulk of them irreplaceable elite airborne troops and Foreign Legion, with a further 11,000 taken prisoner. This massive defeat coincided with a smaller reverse in Danang, during which the last strategic reserve troops had been committed and repulsed. Faced with no more immediate military options and

considerable popular dissatisfaction both in Vietnam and at home, the French government agreed to negotiate the withdrawal of all French troops from the area. By the end of the year Laos and Cambodia were independent states and Vietnam was divided along the 17th parallel into two administrations.

In terms of counter-insurgency the French displayed a number of critical weaknesses. First and foremost, there was no official recognition that the problem was primarily a political one, with the result that the French made little attempt to counter Viet Minh campaigns to gain popular support. What propaganda and information they did employ bore little relevance, based as it was on the assumption of a continued colonial presence. Significantly, they did nothing to counter Viet Minh propaganda exploitation of the French defeats both at home and in Indo-China during WWII. Second, when they did begin to discuss the possibilities of independence their negotiations lacked sincerity, particularly at the Paris talks of 1947-49. This was compounded subsequently when it also became apparent that even if genuine, there was neither the will nor military capability to ensure their implementation. Third, there was considerable political instability in France itself with frequent changes of government ensuring that there was little consistency in terms of strategic aims and policies. Fourth, coming so soon after the end of WWII, the whole Indo-China campaign was intensely unpopular in France; numerous politicians desperate for domestic support did little to ensure the commitment of adequate resources. For example, when Giap was launching large-scale attacks in 1950, the government ordered the reduction of French forces in Indo-China by 9,000 men. In addition, the substantial and vocal French Communist Party conducted an active campaign to discredit government actions. Fifth, French operational intelligence was woeful throughout, concentrating on trying to identify Viet Minh conventional

formations, ignoring both the guerrilla forces and the political infrastructure of the Communist Party and even failing to discover that those forces they were attempting to investigate possessed heavy artillery or an anti-aircraft capability. Sixth, unlike the British in Malaya, no attempt was made to tempt Viet Minh followers to desert, likewise no attempt was made to transform captured insurgents into counter-insurgents; there was no real attempt to create efficient Vietnamese regular forces and even the establishment of home guard village defence forces was discounted. Finally, the French military showed little inclination or aptitude to fight an unconventional war. Over-reliance on the efficacy of technology and firepower led them to fight the war they wanted to fight not the war the Viet Minh were fighting. That they should have begun the campaign with this philosophy is perhaps understandable but their subsequent reluctance to recognise the reality of the campaign on the ground was indefensible and ultimately catastrophic:

The majority of counter-insurgency campaigns have begun with guerrilla action against armed forces trained and equipped primarily for conventional roles and it is largely a matter of how fast such conventional forces can be persuaded to adopt a more flexible response.⁶³

It is the cardinal aim of an insurgency movement, by using guerrilla techniques, tactics and strategy, to render a superior army incapable of saving the state.⁶⁴

However, as stated earlier, it would be wrong to assume that the French had learnt nothing during the Indo-China campaign. There had been, in some quarters at least, a realisation that the insurgents relied upon considerable support from the local population and as early as 1946 there had been some limited but successful resettlement initiatives in the Cambodian border region. This was repeated in 1951 but its possible application elsewhere was not appreciated by the higher command. Similarly, there was some local

⁶³ *Ibid* p.9.

experimentation with operations designed to get into the jungle and defeat the insurgents on their own ground with their own tactics; however, such experiments were not developed. In addition to this, several thousand ambitious and able officers had served in this ultimately disastrous campaign and the sum of this cathartic experience led to a general re-appraisal of how to conduct such operations:

The scale of the defeat in Vietnam had profound effects upon the French Army, acting as a catalyst for the evolution of 'guerre revolutionnaire'. This had its origins among the officers who had fought in Indochina and especially among those who had been captured by the Viet Minh, learning at first hand the nature of the communist revolutionary process. Men such as Colonels Roger Trinquier and Charles Lacheroy (both of whom wrote articles and books in the mid-1950s, disseminating their views) approached their analysis of the defeat on the basis of two key premises. First, they believed that Indochina had been merely a part of a world-wide communist conspiracy and that the French Army had been acting, without either domestic or international backing, as the sole defender of the West and its values. Second, they realised that the threat in Indochina had not come from an ill-organised, poorly coordinated rebel movement, but from a highly-structured and fully integrated group of dedicated revolutionaries, intent on the overthrow of existing political structures using a unique mixture of psychological and military means.⁶⁵

Basing their conclusions on their own experiences and their study of Mao Tse Tung's revolutionary principles and practice they identified a series of phases for insurgent activity. This began with infiltration of the local population by political 'cadres', leading to the creation of a guerrilla infrastructure and alternative government system; which in turn, if successful, lead to a major offensive to seize political power. Central throughout this process was the need to secure the support of the population, international backing and the demoralisation of government forces. In classic military manner they went on to identify the weaknesses inherent in such a process. Its vulnerability during the initial stages, before deep-rooted support had been established within the population; its

⁶⁴ Haycock, *op cit*, p.9.

⁶⁵ Beckett and Pimlott, *op cit*, p.58.

dependence upon a logistic base of some sort, often in a neighbouring country; and its military inferiority during the evolutionary process.⁶⁶ In general terms such weaknesses are not dissimilar from those which characterise those who seek to exploit the immediate post-conflict phase in more modern scenarios. Having thus identified the weaknesses it was only logical to work out the most effective counter-measures.

It was essential, they argued, that governments maintain a careful watch over their people, particularly in remote areas, adopting policies of education, reform and firm military action to prevent or contain communist subversion. If this proved impossible - if, for example, the danger was not recognised until after subversion had begun - then even more drastic measures should be carried out without hesitation or hindrance, centre upon the need to cut the insurgents off from their sources of support among the people and beyond the borders of the state. Extensive resettlement of vulnerable groups within the population and the building of elaborate barriers along international frontiers were just two of the suggested policies, but it was stressed throughout that government support for such measures, however unpopular or repressive had to be absolute. The Army should never operate in a vacuum, as it had appeared to do in Indochina: it had to be fully supported by a domestic government which appreciated the danger and by international opinion, at least in the West, which understood the need for violence. In short, to defeat a politico-military conspiracy, the French had to be prepared to adopt a politico-military doctrine, based upon a strength of purpose equal to that of the communists.⁶⁷

It was natural, given their recent experience and the then-current world situation, that communist inspired insurgency was their preoccupation. It was therefore unfortunate that even as they were developing and honing these theories, the next COIN situation they would face was already in progress in Algeria. As noted above, brutal repression in 1945 had quelled earlier disturbances in Algeria in the short term. However, in November 1954 the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) carried out a series of minor bombing attacks against French settlers and property.

It would be wrong to imagine that the French Army entered the Algerian War in

⁶⁶ *Ibid* p.59.

⁶⁷ *Ibid* pp.59-60.

1954 with the theory of *guerre revolutionnaire* already worked out. Its evolution took time - most of the key articles and books did not appear until 1956-7 - and it was perhaps unfortunate that an emergency occurred before the process was complete. Inevitably, as many of the theorists were serving officers and involved in countering the new campaign, Algeria became a testing-ground in which policies were advocated before they had been fully analysed, or put into effect without the necessary political understanding or support. More importantly, Algeria did not fit the pattern of revolution so laboriously compiled, reflecting nationalist demands for independence rather than the latest stage in a global communist conspiracy. In such circumstances, *guerre revolutionnaire* had all the ingredients of a disaster.⁶⁸

Alistair Horne, in a short but powerful summary of the French army and its conduct of the Algerian struggle, expresses the opinion that the war was in fact a combination of seven separate wars, revolutions or struggles, all being fought on different planes but concurrently. Whilst this may seem somewhat pedantic it nevertheless provides a useful template with which to compare more modern Immediate Post-conflict scenarios:

- (1) The fighting war itself;
- (2) The political war for the 'middle-ground' in Algeria;
- (3) A civil war between Algerians;
- (4) A revolutionary struggle within the leadership of the Algerian FLN: Front de Liberation Nationale;
- (5) A struggle between the French Army in Algeria and the government in Paris, leading in the first place to the overthrow of the Fourth Republic and the advent of de Gaulle, and later to a full-scale revolt against de Gaulle himself;
- (6) A struggle between the Pied Noir settlers of Algeria and France, culminating in open warfare under the aegis of OAS: Organisation Armee Secrete; and finally, and perhaps most decisive:
- (7) The external war fought on the platforms of the outside world.⁶⁹

The seventh war identified by Horne was perhaps the first time such a struggle had been a decisive element in COIN situations and has become even more significant since with the advent of global communications and a less self-confident Western ideology. As Algeria was constitutionally as much a part of France as Brittany or the Dordogne, the French

⁶⁸ *Ibid* p.60.

Army was technically not intervening but was confronting an internal insurgency on its own turf; however, in view of Algeria's geographic, ethnic and cultural separation from mainland France, it possessed all the characteristics of an intervention - and in many ways was handled as such.

French involvement in Algeria began in 1830 when, following plans drawn up during the First Empire of Napoleon Bonaparte (and which incidentally would also be largely followed by the Allies in 1942), an expeditionary force landed, partly to exact settlement of a commercial debt and partly to distract attention from crises at home. In a step which would have dramatic consequences for all its successor administrations, the Second Empire declared Algeria to be an integral part of France in 1848. However the reality was that what was created had many similarities with a colony. Horne, in the already quoted essay, notes:

...predominately, a minority of approximately one million Europeans, nicknamed Pieds Noir - perhaps because metropolitan Frenchman scornfully considered their feet to have been burnt black by too much sun - who were surrounded by a sea of nine million Moslem indigenous Algerians. Demographically, the Algerian birthrate was exploding; economically, the gulf between Algerian and Pieds Noir expectations was widening, despite considerable French infusions of industry, capital and know-how. Politically, the Algerians had little more power than the Rhodesian blacks under Ian Smith; reforms initiated by Paris had been the old story of too-little-too-late, and usually torpedoed by the powerful, and conservative, Pieds Noir lobby. On the other hand, when the revolt began it was supported by only a minority of Algerians.⁷⁰

When the insurrection attempt did begin, with a series of badly coordinated bombing attempts in November 1954, it coincided with the withdrawal from Indo-China and it was condemned across the whole French political spectrum. Premier Mendes-France, despite

⁶⁹ Haycock, *op cit*, p.69.

having realised the futility of attempting to retain Indo-China - or perhaps because of it - declared that Algeria *was* France and his Minister of the Interior, to whom fell the responsibility to deal with the situation, stated more vigorously: 'the only possible declaration is war...for Algeria is France.'⁷¹ The name of the young Interior Minister was Francois Mitterand. Once again, the initial response was a formidable one involving prompt and overwhelming armed force augmented by less official, but equally violent, Pieds Noir local reprisals. This response was militarily successful in that it crushed the FLN and scattered its leadership. In an attempt to improve the situation the French now launched a major programme to reform local government, giving the Moslem population greater participation. These efforts were frustrated in many ways by the Pieds Noir but more significantly they ignored events which were having an impact on the Moslem Algerians. In the aftermath of the Second World War there was for the first time a growing feeling of pan-Arab nationalism across North Africa and the Middle East. This led both to external support being available to the remnants of the FLN and also to a wave of idealistic recruits internally. The move towards independence gathered further momentum when France granted Tunisia and Morocco independence in 1956.

When the FLN began their new offensive it was unashamedly based on guerilla warfare and terrorism. Lacking both the equipment and the trained volunteers to face the French military they concentrated on a combination of urban terrorism and rural intimidation. Initially this meant the murder of local policemen, Moslem dignitaries and the coercion of isolated village populations into giving support and recruits to the movement. However in August 1955, the FLN dramatically increased the tension by murdering 123

⁷⁰ *Ibid* p.71.

⁷¹ Horne, A, *op cit*, pp.98-9.

French settlers in Phillippeville. This had the double advantage of provoking both an official harsh military response and a vicious Pied Noir series of revenge atrocities against the Moslem population. Building on this reaction the FLN began a further wave of bombing and assassinations in the capital, Algiers. Still fatally persisting in seeing the first priority as being to defeat the FLN militarily, the French government effectively declared martial law in Algiers on the seventh of January 1957 and gave full powers to General Jacques Massu, Commander of the 10th Colonial Parachute Division, with orders to restore stability and destroy the FLN. It was an opportunity the veterans of Indo-China and the new theorists of *Guerre Revolutionnaire* were quick to seize:

It was the chance that the theorists of *Guerre Revolutionnaire*, many of whom were serving under Massu's command, had been waiting for. They began to try out their ideas, dangerously free from political control, without delay.⁷²

The subsequent campaign is graphically but accurately illustrated by the film 'The Battle for Algiers'. Saturation foot patrols, checkpoints and house-to-house searches imposed tight military control. An attempted General Strike was ruthlessly suppressed and a large number of arrests were made. These arrests were based upon the seizure of police files and the resultant suspects were handed over to a special interrogation squad whose methods included physical torture. In the short term this was very effective in identifying not only the insurgent leadership but also the infrastructure and much of the rank and file membership. In a parallel initiative, Colonel Robert Trinquier, another noted exponent of *Guerre Revolutionnaire*, set up a longer term and more covert information-gathering organisation, the *Dispositif de Protection Urbaine*; his detractors unkindly observed that this system of *quadrillage* seemed to owe a great deal to that which the Germans had used to control wartime Paris. This comprehensive network, set up with mathematical

⁷² Beckett and Pimlott, *op cit*, p.63.

precision, divided Algiers into a series of

...sectors, sub-sectors, blocks and buildings, each containing senior inhabitants (usually Moslem ex-soldiers still loyal to France) who would act as 'spies', reporting suspicious movements and keeping a general check on the activities of local people.⁷³

Within three months Algiers was subdued and the FLN dispersed with its leadership broken but the vicious French tactics had achieved the real aim of the insurgents for them - never again would the French be able to rely on the support, tacit or otherwise of the bulk of the Moslem population. By June the FLN had recovered enough to begin a fresh wave of bombing in Algiers and the dreaded Paras were brought back. General Massu had the same free hand as before and this time he and his officers were determined to finish the problem for good. They undoubtedly succeeded in defeating the FLN in Algiers, even locating and destroying its well-concealed and defended headquarters deep in the Casbah district; but once again their brutal efficiency ultimately aided the FLN in gaining support and recruits. This time however there was a wider dimension. The FLN had been extremely astute in gathering external sympathy for their cause.

In purely military terms, Massu's campaign could not be faulted. He had carried out his orders efficiently, freeing Algiers from the violence of terrorist activity and destroying the FLN urban network. But politically the campaign was a disaster for the French. As the full scale of the paras' actions became apparent - altogether 3000 Moslems, including the FLN leader Ben M'hidi, had died or 'disappeared' while in detention - and as reports of torture seeped out, many people began to express their revulsion at the methods employed. In Algeria all hopes of mobilising moderate Moslems onto the side of the French disappeared (as the FLN had intended); in France public opinion began to swing in favour of a political settlement which would eventually lead to Algerian independence; in the wider world France stood condemned for adopting policies which were, in the many eyes, little different to those of the Gestapo or SS. Army actions in Algeria were generally discredited, regardless of future events, for the 'Battle for Algiers' had driven a permanent wedge between the political and military aspects of

⁷³ *Ibid.* p.63.

counter-insurgency.⁷⁴

Even before the prize which the Battle for Algiers had handed to them the FLN had achieved considerable external success. The newly-independent states of Morocco and Tunisia provided both active support and shelter for the insurgents and other Arab countries likewise supported the FLN. It is also perhaps not generally realised that French enthusiasm for the ill-fated 1956 Suez debacle probably owed more to a wish to remove Nasser from the scene for his support to the Algerian rebels than it did to secure the canal. Nor was Suez the only French action which cost international goodwill and helped to raise the profile of the FLN on the world stage and in the United Nations. At about the same time, in an operation of undoubted skill and daring, French intelligence carried out a mid-air hijack of the plane carrying Ben Bella and the entire external leadership of FLN in international air space. Since these six men were by no means the most extreme members of FLN it cleared the way for more violent men to lead and questions which their capture and subsequent imprisonment occasioned internationally served to keep French conduct in Algeria embarrassingly in the world's attention.

Whilst both mainland France and the rest of the world focussed on Algiers, the French Army was actually waging a much more astute campaign in the Algerian countryside. Also based upon their Indo-China experience and a somewhat different analysis of *Guerre Revolutionnaire* the Army identified its first priority as achieving the isolation of the insurgents from the outside world. An ambitious scheme of physical barriers was constructed along the length of the borders with both Morocco and Tunisia. Since Tunisia posed the greater threat by hosting both the insurgent army-in-exile and its huge

⁷⁴ *Ibid* p.64.

supply base, the French constructed here the so-called Morice Line. Completed in September 1957, it consisted of a continuous electrified fence, augmented by minefields and constantly patrolled by both foot and mobile units, which in turn were supported by armour, aircraft and heliborne quick reaction units. Initial insurgent efforts to breach this proved so futile and costly that by April 1958 they had virtually abandoned any attempt to cross into Algeria by this route. Having thus cut off external support from this direction the French proceeded to resettle large numbers of the indigenous population in new strategic villages along the lines of the British strategy in Malaya. Unfortunately, whilst some psychological operations were undertaken to persuade the local population of the benefits of continued French administration, these were never fully developed and became instead more an attempt at comprehensive information gathering which, whilst moderately successful in that regard, did little to endear them to the native Algerians who had been uprooted. Altogether over a million persons were resettled into these 'regroupment camps' and due to the vast scale of the project and the speed with which it was carried out many of them proved unequal to the task. Accusations appeared in the French press that they resembled nothing so much as Nazi concentration camps - an allegation, which though exaggerated, was deeply damaging. This resettlement scheme fitted within an overall policy introduced by General Beaufre who divided the command into three types of zone, each of which was to be controlled by a differing level of severity. The areas which had been evacuated formed the *zones interdites* which were virtually free-fire zones in which the security forces were permitted to fire at anything which they thought suspicious. In addition, there was, at a tactical level in the countryside, a real awareness that both the military and the political arms of the insurgents had to be defeated. A combination of small political units and rapid highly-mobile military squads willing to take on the insurgents on their own terms and

territory led to some real successes. General Challe, the new Commander-in Chief, expanded on this innovation by instituting a series of large-scale sweeps with a well-equipped mobile reserve which could be rapidly redeployed once local forces had occupied the ground his sweep had cleared. This, combined with the sealing off of the external borders, was the most successful innovation of the entire campaign and came close to defeating the insurgency by the beginning of 1960. However, it was extremely manpower intensive. Vietnam had been lost with a ratio of 6:4, Challe ensured success with an ultimately unsustainable ratio of 16:1⁷⁵ The French government, in a reversal of their policy in Vietnam, had already sanctioned the use of conscripts and reservists and whilst this had provided badly needed manpower much of it was not trained to the standard required for counter-insurgency; moreover, their involvement and the inevitable casualties coupled with the thousands of letters home had increased negative awareness of the war at home in mainland France.

Alongside the above operations a secret, if somewhat robust, war was also waged with some success by the intelligence community; and whilst the ethics of assassinating German arms dealers who were supplying the insurgents with weapons might be thought questionable, a far more comprehensive programme planted double-agents in the insurgent movement. These agents spread so much doubt, mutual distrust and false information amongst the insurgents that several murderous and debilitating internal purges took place.

None of these operations, notwithstanding some successes, could alter the fact that the war was essentially lost following the battle for Algiers when there was no longer any

⁷⁵ Haycock, op cit, pp. 80-81.

prospect of widespread support from the Moslem population. There were also several other major developments in the war which are worthy of study but which will not be examined here. The state of politics and the economy at home in France which meant that a succession of administrations had come and gone - a process which de Gaulle described scathingly as an absurd ballet – meaning that, as in Vietnam, there was no clear and continued aim. This created a vacuum which was filled by increasingly politicised senior military officers, whose frustration built until they rebelled.

Taking upon itself not only the burden of the fighting, but also the severity, and sometimes the beastliness, of the repression, haunted by fear of another Indo-China...the army, more than any other body, felt a growing resentment against a political system which was the embodiment of irresolution.⁷⁶

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

Of all the members of the United Nations Security Council only the United States of America can claim to have come into existence through the actions of insurgents. When the American colonists began their armed struggle against the British in the late 18th Century they began with classic guerrilla tactics and even when their actions were so successful as to permit the establishment of regular forces capable of taking on the British Army in conventional battle, a significant part of the campaign continued in insurgent mode. Their actions included not only ambush and propaganda but also coercion and threats, progressing to brutal massacres against loyalists and the civilian population. Some of these insurgent tactics had already been learnt during the earlier wars against the French and several were adopted from the Native American Indians, themselves masters of such tactics. Colonel Henry Bouquet, a Swiss officer in British Service, and one of the

⁷⁶ Gaulle de, Charles, *Memoirs of Hope*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971 p.15.

chief theoreticians of Indian warfare noted that the Indians fought according to three main principles:

Firstly, they always remain scattered; secondly their chief offensive tactic was to try and surround their enemy; three they were always ready to give ground when harassed and to return when the pressure eased.⁷⁷

Units such as Rogers' Rangers and the later operations of individuals such as Thomas Sumter or Francis Marion, the so-called Swamp Fox, demonstrate the effectiveness achieved when guerrilla tactics are fitted to the specific terrain in which they operate. Marion was particularly successful in so enraging the British that they were provoked into untypically brutal reprisals which sent dispossessed and bereaved former neutrals and loyalists to join him in droves.

Such tactics had not been forgotten when, a hundred years later, the American Civil War began. Whilst the decisive part of the war was fought conventionally, the sheer scale of the territory involved meant that whole areas of several of the warring states, particularly those further West, never saw major military actions. Units designed for irregular warfare were initially raised by the economically weaker and numerically inferior Southern Confederacy. The most famous and successful of these being the Partisan Rangers of Colonel John Singleton Mosby. Working on the Western flanks of the conflict he described his aim as:

In general, my purpose was to threaten and harass the enemy on the border and in this way compel him to withdraw troops from his front to guard the line of the Potomac and Washington.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Ellis, J., *From the Barrel of a Gun*, London, Greenhill Books, 1995 p.63.

⁷⁸ Russell, CW., (ed), *The Memoirs of Colonel John S Mosby*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press,

Units such as Mosby's operated largely unconventionally and unsupervised but still generally within the overall aims of the conventional army; indeed the Confederacy passed the Partisan Ranger Act in April 1862, specifically to authorise the President, Jefferson Davis, to commission such units.

However in the rival states of Missouri and Kansas a much more chaotic situation was to prevail. There had already been clashes between the inhabitants of these two states before the outbreak of war, as Missouri was largely populated by inhabitants from the southern states whilst those in Kansas were predominately abolitionists, encouraged to settle there by Northern anti-slavery groups. A form of undeclared border warfare had begun here as early as 1854 and right up until 1860 the situation along the border was anarchic.⁷⁹ On the outbreak of war the Northern Unionist Army seized much of Missouri and installed their own administration. Initially, the southern Confederacy maintained a regular army presence in the area, aided by bands of volunteer irregulars. But by April of 1862 the regulars had been driven from the state. It was principally for this reason that Jefferson Davis required the above mentioned act in order to give the remaining volunteer units some legitimacy. Within months one Confederate General issued his own orders for the raising of further such units, describing their duties in the following manner:

'(1) For the more effectual annoyance of the enemy upon our rivers and in our mountains and woods all citizens in this district who are not subject to conscription are called upon to organise themselves into independent companies of mounted men, or infantry, as they prefer, arming and equipping themselves, and to serve in that part of the district to which they belong.

(2) When as many as ten men come together for this purpose they may organise by electing a captain, a sergeant, one corporal, and will at once commence operations against the enemy without waiting for special instructions. Their duty

1959, pp.149-50.

⁷⁹ Ellis, J., *op cit*, p.103.

will be to cut off Federal pickets, scouts, foraging parties, and trains, to kill pilots and others on gunboats and transports, attacking them by day and night and using the greatest vigour in their movements...All such organisations will be reported to this headquarters as soon as practicable. They will receive pay and allowances for subsistence and forage for the time actually in the field...'⁸⁰

The name of one of these irregular leaders is still well-known throughout the US today. William Clarke Quantrill is seen either as a heroic partisan or a murderous terrorist; in reality he seldom commanded more than a score of men directly, many of his original recruits leaving him to form autonomous bands of their own. However at the height of his activities he created fear and terror amongst Northern civilians and soldiers alike; and thus tied down Northern military assets which could have been better employed elsewhere. The activities of these irregulars deliberately exploited the fear which they created and undoubtedly many atrocities were committed by them. However, in terms of the war effort their contribution was significant; by the end of 1862 it was estimated that some 3-4,000 irregulars were holding down some 60,000 Union troops.⁸¹

In 1863 General Curtis described their activities as:

Guerrillas may be defined as troops not belonging to a regular army, consisting of volunteers, perhaps self-constituted, but generally raised by individuals authorised to do so...by their government. They ...take up arms or lay them down at intervals, and carry on a petty war chiefly by raids, extortion, destruction and massacre, and...cannot encumber themselves with many prisoners, and will, therefore, generally give no quarter. They are particularly dangerous because they easily evade pursuit, and, by laying down their arms, become insidious enemies, because they cannot otherwise subsist than by rapine, and almost always degenerate into simple robbers or brigands.⁸²

His words were prophetic as, after the war, several of these former guerrillas continued in their old ways, the famous outlaw Jesse James and his brothers being amongst them.

⁸⁰ Brownlee, RS., *Grey Ghosts of the Confederacy*, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1958, p78.

⁸¹ Ellis, J., *op cit*, p.104.

However during the war, in a desperate effort to defeat these irregulars, the Union Army resorted to ever-more draconian measures. These measures were largely unsuccessful, despite the imposition of Martial Law, the shooting of two confederate prisoners for every Northern soldier killed and introducing the policy of collective guilt on suspected communities. Evidence of their lack of success is revealed in a report of a Kansas newspaper in 1864:

What is the condition of the truly loyal people of the border counties of Missouri south of the river? Simply one of siege. Outside of the military posts and their immediate vicinity, no man of known and open loyalty can safely live for a moment. The loyal people are gathered in scattered towns and military posts, while to all practical intents and purposes the rebels hold possession of the county.⁸³

So desperate did the Northern authorities become that in mid-1863 General Ewing proposed deporting all guerrillas and their families and suspected supporters to Arkansas. This was followed some months later by the authorisation to remove all those sections of the population living more than one mile from army posts in the counties of Jackson, Cass, Bates and Vernon - a tacit admission from the North that they faced the hostility of the whole country rather than the actions of a few insurgents. In parallel with these measures the North first tolerated, then actively supported, the raising of similar irregular groups of their own from amongst the citizens of Kansas and abolitionists from Missouri. These bands, christened by their victims with the generic term 'Red legs' from the distinctive leather gaiters they wore, were if anything more rapacious and ill-disciplined than their southern opponents. A sub-war of savagery, barbarity and tit-for-tat revenge actions was fought out between these opposing guerrillas which, by the end of hostilities, had little to do with the original causes of the civil war.

⁸² Brownlee, RS., *op cit*, p.112

⁸³ *Ibid* pp.191-192.

Although briefly interrupted by the civil war, the Americans themselves waged another COIN war for many decades against the numerous North American Indian tribes whose presence ‘interfered’ with the remorseless westward expansion of the United States. Offered no realistic place or status in the ‘American dream’, frequently cheated and brushed aside when so-called permanent treaties were broken, a series of small wars resulted. A succession of tribal leaders, who often understood more of white American politics and methods than they were given credit for, took up arms in a struggle for their people and lands. Here is not the place to look at these insurgent actions in detail but the campaigns of the Apache under Cochise and Geronimo; the Sioux confederacy under Sitting Bull, the Seminoles led by Osceola and perhaps most poignantly, the Nez Perce under the inspired leadership of Chief Joseph - often called the Indian Napoleon, are instructive examples of insurgent struggles. Nor are they that remote in time, Chief Joseph dying only in September 1904, still trying through diplomatic means to secure the return of his tribe’s ancestral lands.⁸⁴

The aim of the above paragraphs is not to highlight in any significant way whatever specific lessons for the conduct of future COIN operations may be learnt from these examples, although several general principles can be discerned. Rather it is to show that the United States should, from within its own internal history, understand the principles, dynamics and pitfalls of counter-insurgency better than most. Sadly, notwithstanding the United States’ genuine resolve and commitment to the belief that other countries, especially the colonies of the European great powers should be free and democratic, more

⁸⁴ There are numerous books available on the various Indian wars but the following give excellent accounts. J M Gates, ‘Indians and Insurrectos: The US Army’s Experience with Insurgency’, *Parameters* XIII/I 183 pp.59-68; R M Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, New York, Macmillan, 1973; J P Tate (ed), *The American Military on the Frontier*, Washington, US Air Force, 1978.

recent interventions have often shown that these earlier experiences have failed to guide American planners and practitioners. Towards the close of the nineteenth century there were several insurgencies taking place in close proximity to the United States. Directly on the US Southern border, the Mexican government, having won independence from Spain as the result of a protracted guerrilla struggle in 1821, felt so threatened by the actions of erstwhile internal allies that, in 1863, it not only asked for French help but asked for an Emperor as well. The US, embroiled in its own civil war, was content merely to watch the Mexican struggle involving the French which ended in 1867 with the French withdrawing and the Emperor Maximilian being executed. The subsequent protracted internal struggle between various governments and insurgents such as Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata likewise attracted no official US involvement, although neither was there any significant effort made to stop volunteers and arms traders becoming involved. The Spanish meanwhile were combating insurgents in Cuba, Peru, the Philippines and Nicaragua.

Whilst ideologically opposed to Spanish domination, the US government generally avoided open hostilities or direct involvement. However, all the various attempted insurrections were closely monitored and at times unofficially assisted. In the Philippines, there had been a brief campaign in 1896 when a nationalist group calling themselves the Katipunan attempted to take over the country. Despite some initial successes against the Spanish army and auxiliary troops, they were defeated without too much difficulty and the Spanish promised some limited reforms and the principal Katipunan leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, went into voluntary exile on this understanding in 1897. In the following year however, events took a major change of direction when open hostilities broke out between the US and Spain. Admiral George Dewey trapped

and destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay and a US Army force under the command of Major General Wesley Merritt, following almost token resistance, captured the town and accepted the formal surrender of Spanish forces in the Philippines. Aguinaldo had returned at this time and as the commander of Filipino units assisting the Americans, declared himself President, believing that the Americans would not wish to interfere further. For a variety of reasons the US was not prepared to accept an independent state:

US President William McKinley decided to annex the archipelago for two principal reasons, one ideological, the other interest-based. He announced his decision to a group of missionaries, citing America's duty to 'educate the Filipinos and uplift them and Christianise them'. Like many, he believed the Filipinos were too backward to capably govern themselves. The practical consideration in an era of unbridled colonialism was that a weak, independent Philippines would be a tempting acquisition for other colonial powers.⁸⁵

In one sense, if in no other, the above illustrated American ignorance of the situation on the ground, as by this time the majority of Filipinos were already devout Catholics. At the subsequent Treaty of Paris the US 'purchased' the Philippines from the Spanish for \$20 million and Aguinaldo, who in the meantime had consolidated his control over the Philippines and no doubt reflecting the outrage and sense of betrayal felt by many Filipinos, attempted to drive out US forces from Manila in February 1899. By November of that year he was once again defeated militarily so, disbanding any remaining conventional forces, he returned to guerrilla operations. The Americans were no less outraged at what they saw as the ingratitude of the Filipino leaders, as they had seen themselves as mentors and benevolent landlords. As President McKinley said in December 1898:

It should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines....and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent

⁸⁵ Deady, Timothy K , Parameters, *US Army War College Quarterly*, Spring 2005, pp.53-68.

assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule ⁸⁶

Undoubtedly, if misguidedly, the Americans had seen themselves in this light. In their defence neither had other major powers seen them otherwise. Rudyard Kipling specifically wrote his poem 'The White Man's Burden' as friendly and comradely advice to the fledgling super power: *Take up the White Man's burden-/The savage wars of peace-/Fill full the mouth of famine/And bid the sickness cease;/And when your goal is nearest/The end for others sought/Watch Sloth and heathen Folly/Bring all your hope to nought.*⁸⁷

Yet the Americans seem not to have intended their presence in the Philippines to be that of permanent overlord but neither was their policy clearly defined even to themselves, let alone to the Filipinos:

Initially the US policy towards the Philippines was undetermined. McKinley directed Merritt to provide law and order while the islands were in US possession, without defining their eventual disposition. The President appointed a Philippine Commission to evaluate and report on the islands and recommend a disposition. The Chairman, Jacob Schurman, president of Cornell University, concluded the natives were not yet capable of self-government but should eventually become independent. The desired end-state was determined to be a stable, peaceful, democratic, independent Philippines allied to the United States. Key to this were preventing a power vacuum (which could lead to colonisation by another developed country), improving the country's education and infrastructure, and implementing and guiding the development of democracy. ⁸⁸

It was this Commission's report which had persuaded McKinley to annex the Philippines.

When one considers the geography of the Philippines it is perhaps not so surprising that neither the White House administration, nor the military had a clear strategic vision at

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, pp.53-68.

⁸⁷ The Works of Rudyard Kipling, The Wordsworth Poetry Library, Wordsworth Editions Ltd 1994, pp 323-324.

this stage. The Philippines archipelago consists of over 7,000 islands, even the major islands had few roads and there were numerous different languages spoken; it consisted of 74 designated provinces, 34 of which would see neither insurgents nor US troops throughout the campaign; and over half the total estimated population of 7.4 million lived on the largest island, Luzon. The US military commander was still in Paris at the peace talks with the Spanish when Aguinaldo attacked the Americans. It was his deputy, Major General Elwell Otis, who broke the poor attempt at conventional resistance and having done so, focused his pacification plan on civic action programs, targeting action at the municipal level.⁸⁹ When he came to the end of his tour of command in May of 1900 he believed the insurrection to be over. However, Aguinaldo had merely withdrawn to lick his wounds and wait for what he hoped would prove to be the American Achilles' heel.

Later in the Summer of 1900, Aguinaldo began to urge his followers to increase their attacks on Americans. His goal was to sour Americans on the war and ensure the victory of the anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan in the presidential election.⁹⁰

Astute as Aguinaldo was in his understanding of a modern democracy's dynamics, he had no real alternative strategy when McKinley, rather than Bryan, was re-elected. Safe in office for the next term, McKinley despatched Major General Arthur McArthur (the father of the WWII General McArthur) to 'pacify' the Philippines. McArthur declared Martial Law and invoked General Order 100 which had been passed in April 1863 to provide a code of conduct for operations against Confederate irregulars during the American Civil War. Amongst other provisions this subjected combatants not in

⁸⁸ Deady, Timothy K , *op cit*, pp.53-68.

⁸⁹ Linn, Brian McAllister , *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, Lawrence, University of Kansas Press 2000, p.185.

⁹⁰ Gates, John Morgan , *Schoolbooks and Krags - The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902*, Westport, Greenwood Press 1973, pp.162-163.

uniform, and their supporters, to execution.⁹¹ Despite supporting such harsh measures from to time the US administration did not abandon all policy to the tender mercies of the military. In June of 1900 McKinley had appointed a second commission under the chairmanship of William Howard Taft. The charter to this body ordered them to organise and implement the transition from military to civilian rule. As implemented, the policy transferred control of each province from the jurisdiction of the Office of the Military Governor to the commission once the province was pacified. When McArthur departed the command in July 1901, all administrative responsibility was transferred to the commission, with Brigadier Adna Chaffee taking command of the army. By this firm placing of the military under the direction of the civil administration the Americans finally achieved unified and coherent direction of the campaign. Taft also added Filipino members to the commission. He further organised local governments so the elected Filipino officials were under close American supervision⁹² and as a general principle, granted more autonomy to those officials as their experience increased. In a very farsighted programme Taft negotiated the purchase of some 4,000 acres of prime farmland from the Catholic church at a higher than market rate; this not only bought the goodwill of the church but more significantly, when resold in small packets to the Filipino peasants, gave them something the insurgents could not. In an move which the present US administration might have done well to consider when handing out reconstruction contracts in Iraq, he also persuaded Congress to pass legislation preventing American citizens and corporations from acquiring large-scale interests or landholdings in the Philippines. Taft thus avoided the Americans being embroiled in any accusations of ulterior motive or conflicts of interests; and convinced many Filipinos of

⁹¹ Deady, Timothy K , *op cit*, pp.53-68.

⁹² Barck Jr., Oscar Theodore and Blake, Nelson Manfred , *Since 1900: A History of the United States in Our Times*, New York, Mcmillan, , 1974, p.86.

the genuine intended benevolence of the Americans.⁹³

More attention was given towards both white propaganda and education; when the Americans arrived in the Philippines only some 40 percent of the population could speak any one extant language⁹⁴ so it was relatively easy to introduce English as a common language. This was done through the establishment of a network of schools, initially set up by the US Army and subsequently assisted by the employment of 1,000 American volunteers in a scheme which much resembled the later Peace Corps concept. This process reached its logical conclusion in the founding of a university in Manila.⁹⁵ The military, under McArthur, had begun this process both for altruistic motives but also from a sound appreciation of the operational need to be able to communicate with the local population. McArthur noted:

The practice of discarding uniforms enables the insurgents to appear and disappear within the American lines in the attitude of peaceful natives, absorbed in the dense mass of sympathetic people, speaking a dialect of which few men and no Americans have any knowledge.⁹⁶

In addition, in a perhaps unconscious echo of the Imperial Romans, the US Army began their campaign with a two-pronged programme of constructing an extensive road-building and communications network. In their own interests as well as those of the local population, they also instituted programmes to ensure clean drinking water coupled with sewage disposal and began to administer vaccines to combat diseases such as malaria, small pox, cholera and typhus. A testimony to the efficacy of such programmes can be found in the words of one of Anguinardo's senior fellow insurgents, Manuel

⁹³ Deady, Timothy K , *op cit*, pp.53-68.

⁹⁴ Gates, John Morgan , *op cit*, p.31.

⁹⁵ Deady, Timothy K , *op cit*, pp.53-68.

Quezon, who later himself became President of the Philippines: ‘Damn the Americans! Why don’t they tyrannize us more?’⁹⁷

None of the above would, in either the short or long term, have given the Americans victory without a robust and aggressive military campaign of first suppression and then elimination of the armed insurgents themselves. In parallel with their own increasing knowledge and abilities, they appreciated the need to build up an effective and loyal local police and military. This policy was partially driven by expediency when, in December 1900, McArthur was faced with losing the presence of large numbers of US ‘volunteer’ troops, whose term of service was due to expire. However, the policy was very successful with the local police becoming ‘...some of the most effective counterinsurgency forces the Army raised.’⁹⁸

The climax of this local police/military initiative occurred in March 1902, when a unit of the Philippine Scouts, led by American officers and acting on intelligence received, posed as insurgents and, infiltrating Anguinaldo’s headquarters, captured him. Although the campaign would not be declared to be at an end until the following year, the organised insurgency effectively ended with the capture of its coordinating genius. Despite this generally far-sighted and humane approach, there were occasions when insurgent brutality was matched by US military actions. General Order 100, whilst not considered in any way reprehensible in its day (indeed it was adopted subsequently by several European powers as a guideline for counter-insurgency) allowed punitive destruction of buildings and crops, arrest, deportation, confiscation of goods and property and summary execution of both civilian supporters and insurgents after surrender. In such a climate it

⁹⁶ Beals, C , *Great Guerrilla Warriors*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, , 1970, p.30.

⁹⁷ Boot, Max , *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, New York, Basic Books, , 2002, p.125.

⁹⁸ Linn, Brian McAllister , *op cit*, p.128.

is perhaps not surprising that there were incidents when counter-insurgent actions went too far. Incidents of torture and even murder by US troops were recorded and whilst not widespread, the participants were punished. A policy of dividing the larger islands into zones and moving the population into camps, which often bore more than a passing resemblance to North American Indian reservations and which were not always well administered, resulted in many civilian deaths, both through neglect of sound hygiene and the policy of shooting anyone found outside the protected zones. Towards the end of the campaign, a group of insurgents attacked and overran an American base at Balangiga on the Island of Samar; 48 of the 74 soldiers in the garrison were hacked to death with machetes. Brigadier General Jacob Smith led the resulting punitive action and allegedly told his men, 'I want no prisoners. I want you to kill and burn; the more you burn and kill the better it will please me'.⁹⁹

His troops responded so enthusiastically that Smith was Court-martialed, rare for an officer of General rank, convicted and cashiered. Notwithstanding the above incidents the Americans developed and delivered a remarkably humane and well-thought out strategy for their first truly overseas COIN operation. Coincidentally and ironically, it is also the first COIN campaign in which the insurgent leader specifically adopted a policy aimed at causing disaffection amongst the intervening nation's home population - a reflection both of his grasp of democratic society and perhaps also of the increasing power of the press. Thus it can be argued that the Americans 'won' the first modern COIN war.

Events over the next 40 years were to cause the US Army to forget, or perhaps more accurately unlearn, the lessons of the 1898-1903 Philippines' campaign. However,

⁹⁹ Agoncillo, T A , *A Short History of the Philippines*, Mentor Books, New York, 1969, p.143

during that operation, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) had begun to develop their own doctrine and tactics, seeing the opportunity to further develop a role independent of both the army and the navy:

In Santa Domingo the USMC developed a four-step programme which would remain the heart of the United States counter-insurgency doctrine for the next half-century:

1. Organize a native constabulary.
2. Use cordon and search tactics to round up potential guerrillas.
3. Use amnesties to bring guerrillas over to the government side.
4. Form teams of former guerrillas to harry their ex-comrades.¹⁰⁰

The USMC would put this doctrine into practice when, in 1926, the Americans intervened in Nicaragua to depose the liberal President Juan Sacasa and replace him with the conservative, Adolfo Diaz. Resistance to the Americans was led by Augusto Cesar Sandino - a name which would come back to haunt the Americans some 50 years later. Taking a leaf from the British Royal Air Force (RAF) the Americans employed aircraft to reconnoitre, strafe and bomb the guerrillas - a tactic to which the poorly-armed guerrillas had no answer. Although Sandino was able to prolong the struggle for some years and thereby force the US to send in many more troops, he was never able to wrest the initiative from them and when in 1933, local counter-insurgency troops trained by the USMC located his headquarters, he was captured and killed, the insurgency was effectively over.

WWII with its huge air, land and sea confrontations across Europe and in the Far East understandably caused US military thought to concentrate on major conventional tactics. The many resistance, partisan and insurgency movements partly-organised, sustained

¹⁰⁰ Thompson, Leroy , *Ragged War: The Story of Unconventional and Counter-revolutionary Warfare*,

and sometimes led by the US became the business of the intelligence agencies and the newly-created Special Operations Executive (SOE). This process of estrangement from 'normal' military operations was complemented by the formation of various special forces. Such forces inevitably attracted an assembly of unconventional characters who were regarded with suspicion by their mainstream colleagues; many senior officers considered such soldiers charlatans and their units as refuges for undesirable and disreputable misfits who besmirched the honourable nature of warfare. Although tolerated whilst the war continued, the US military establishment was not alone in disbanding or reducing such units as soon as the war ended. As the war also ended with the opening of a new era in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), heralded by the operational deployment of the atomic bomb, it is not surprising that COIN dropped below the American military horizon. Whilst the British and French found themselves confronted with insurgencies in their overseas territories, the Americans focused upon the Soviet Union, China and the threat of Communism. Korea both reinforced this pre-occupation and seemed to demonstrate that even if nuclear weapons were not to be used, mastery of conventional warfare would remain the key to success. Significantly, earlier US assistance to the nationalist forces of Chang Kai Shek in China had essentially been conventional in nature and the popular revolutionary theories and practices of Mao Tse Dong had largely been ignored or at best considered as merely the route to enable revolutionaries to build conventional forces for the final phase of the struggle - a conclusion which, in terms of Mao's doctrine, was not wholly inaccurate. As stated above, since the Communist Chinese sent conventional forces to support the North Koreans, there seemed no reason to revise this view. Curiously, there was though a true COIN sideshow which took place in the rugged terrain of the south-west of South Korea.

London, Arms and Armour Press, 1996, p.13.

Here US forces found themselves confronting North Korean guerrillas attempting to operate in classic Mao fashion. This experience led to the observation that the following should be borne in mind when engaged in such campaigns:

1. The nature, objectives, tactics and vulnerabilities of the enemy must be recognized.
2. A broad policy, combining military action conducted by adequate specially-trained forces under dynamic leadership employing political, economic and psychological measures designed to gain the support of the civilian population, and isolate and destroy the guerrillas, must be adopted.¹⁰¹

Additionally, it was emphasized that military operations were not enough to defeat insurgents. It was necessary that a combined, inter-agency governmental-level approach was essential to tackle all aspects of the civil-military equation. Tellingly, it was also asserted that success would not have been possible in this part of Korea without a thorough knowledge of the needs, customs and beliefs of the people.¹⁰²

Otherwise the nearest the US came to COIN operations in the immediate aftermath of WWII was in Greece and once again in the Philippines. In Greece the communists had comprised a considerable portion of the wartime resistance movement and at the war's end attempted to take over the country. To administer and monitor their considerable financial and logistical support the Americans attached a large liaison team - the Van Fleet Mission - to the Greek government and whilst this team was not actively involved in the successful defeat of the communists, it was in a position to observe at first hand the tactics and strategies of both sides. In the Philippines, during the Japanese occupation the Americans had supported and supplied, amongst other groups, the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon, the People's Army to Fight Against Japan - shortened to Hukbalapaps or mercifully often to just the Huks. Led by Louis Taruc they had been virtually taken

over by Communists cadres and by 1944 were in conflict with other resistance groups as often as they were with the Japanese. It was estimated that by the end of the war they constituted some 5,000 combatants, over 10,000 lightly-armed reserves and 35,000 active supporters¹⁰³. Despite not inconsiderable local support from the predominately rural peasant population and a doctrine very similar to that of Mao Tse Dong, the Huks waged an ill-organised and lacklustre campaign which began in 1946. One of their gravest errors was to underestimate the ability of other resistance groups to coalesce into a stable, popular and able government. This government was characterised by the person of Ramon Magsaysay, who became Secretary of National Defence in 1950 (and later President), at a time when the Huks did seem to be making headway.

Directing a campaign of his own devising Magsaysay first reorganised the Philippine army and stopped the hitherto brutal reprisal policy which was beginning to alienate even loyal citizens; secondly, he caused legislation to be passed which gave the Huks and their supporters what they had ostensibly been fighting for, on condition that they lay down their arms. An amnesty was declared and the communist slogan 'Land for the Landless' was subverted by an agrarian reform and resettlement programme under which any guerrilla who surrendered was given a plot of his own. Substantial rewards were offered for both surrendered arms and for information leading to the capture of insurgent leaders. In 1951 a genuinely free and honest election was held and subsequent social reforms further weakened the Huks' appeal. Concurrently, the reformed Philippine Army conducted a skilful campaign, patrolling against the guerrillas and their bases. By August 1951 an American fighting with the Huks commented:

There was a time when the forest was wholly ours, and when we lived in it as

¹⁰¹ Beebe Jr., John E, 'Beating the Guerrilla', *Military Review*, vol XXXV, December 1956, p.6.

¹⁰² Beckett, Ian FW and Pimlott, John , *op cit*, p.80.

¹⁰³ Ellis, J, *op cit*, p.205.

within a fortress, issuing forth a will to spread panic among our foes. Now the forest is like a breached wall, through which the government troops pour at will. There is no place in the forest where they cannot go, armed with their massive firepower, and we are the ones who step aside, take cover...we do not seek encounters now... Ammunition is hard to get and it is difficult to replace a gun that wears out....Ambushes, once a prime source of weapons, are hard to stage now, when the army moves on the highways in large convoys heavily armed . Enemy raids go on continually along the forest edge, striking at our district committees...In the barrios the army or the civilian guards have permanent barracks now and are always amongst the people. ¹⁰⁴

Undoubtedly Magsaysay's success owed much to the considerable financial assistance given by the US Government, estimated at some \$620 million, to bolster his government's economy; but he was also assisted by American officers in an advisory role. One of these senior advisors was Colonel (later Major-General) Edward Landsdale, who clearly understood the strengths and weaknesses of Mao's fish and water dynamic and the COIN principles necessary to defeat insurgents operating under it. Unfortunately, such officers were in a minority and their experience and deliberations received scant attention in conventional military circles.

It was with this conventional mindset that the US began its calamitous intervention in Vietnam. It is almost impossible to improve on the short account of the American conduct of their disastrous Vietnam war written by former USAF Colonel, Peter M Dunn, included in a comprehensive overview of the then-latest COIN strategies and techniques, published in 1985. He begins with the following summary:

When analysing America's Vietnam War, one is reminded of the fable of the six blind men and the elephant: all were partially right in their interpretations of what they had their hands on and all were wrong in that none was able to describe an animal he had never seen. In the United States, the Vietnam conflict has been variously described as a revolutionary/protracted war, a counter-insurgency, a conventional war or a limited war: all contain an element of truth, but none on its

¹⁰⁴ Ellis, J, *op cit*, p207.

own provides a complete picture. What is apparent is that it was never a straightforward process of insurgents versus security forces, and this makes any study of American counter-insurgency techniques extremely difficult.¹⁰⁵

The Geneva Accords which settled the French withdrawal from Indochina set up a Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) along the 17th Parallel gave the Viet Minh more territory than they had hoped for and buoyed up by this beginning they had expected great success in the elections which were also enshrined in the Accords. However when, in 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem became President of South Vietnam, he reneged on the promise to hold such elections. His official reason for doing so was that the elections in the North would not be free and fair; and whilst this may well genuinely have formed part of his reasoning, it is more likely that he feared that the many communists and nationalists in the South might swing even the election there against him. Over the next three years the North Vietnamese infiltrated many more activists and supporters into South Vietnam, so that in 1959 the communists felt strong enough to begin a second guerrilla war. Even before then there were US forces present, as advisors from US Army Special Forces (SF) had been sent in 1957 to train the South Vietnamese Rangers. In 1960 a further 100 'Green Berets' were sent to Laos to train hill tribesmen to fight against the communists. In 1961 President Kennedy ordered a USMC brigade to Thailand and the process later to be known as 'mission creep' had begun. Soon more American SF were sent to South Vietnam itself to assist in raising and training Montagnard tribesmen as Civilian Irregular Defence Groups (CIDGs); to complement and support the CIDG mobile strike forces were formed as reaction troops to reinforce threatened villages. In 1960 Sir Robert Thompson, one of the architects of British success in Malaya, arrived in Saigon as head of the British Advisory Mission. His suggested COIN plan, based on but not exactly duplicating the British experience, although accepted with enthusiasm by President Diem,

¹⁰⁵ Beckett, Ian FW and Pimlott, John , *op cit*, pp.77-111.

did not find favour with the American military chiefs. However the broad outline of the 'strategic hamlets' concept was accepted; implemented with some initial success (and continued as the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). But President Diem failed to grasp the rationale behind the concept and insisted in concentrating on areas which were already well-infiltrated by the Viet Cong, rather than accept Thompson's advice to begin in the Mekong Delta which was not yet under threat. Coupled with this major misappreciation of the concept, the higher echelons of the American military continued to see such actions, whether accepted as successful or not, as sideshows for special forces, rather than as central to the aim.

That is not to imply that the aim was clear. A study of US Command and Control throughout the Vietnam War is a study in chaos, internal conflict and muddle. Sir Robert Thompson commented after one of his many early visits to Washington that although the White House, the Pentagon, Congress, the State Department and any number of other agencies were all involved he was never sure who was in charge. A major post-war study noted in the same vein:

The war in Vietnam was unique in many respects, not least of which were the multiple and sometimes unorthodox command and control arrangements. At the peak of US involvement in late 1968, there were over 1.6 million South Vietnamese, US and other Free World military personnel concentrated in the 600,000 square miles of RVN; no single person or agency was in overall charge of them.¹⁰⁶

Vietnam was never seen as being of great strategic importance to the United States in itself; however failure to preserve it from communism was seen as essential to America's vital interests, in that it was regarded as a test of US willingness to honour its military

¹⁰⁶ BDM Corporation, *A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam*, vol VI Conduct of the War, Book 2 'Functional Analyses', Virginia, McLean, 1980, p.II-1.

commitments to its allies around the world. By 1964 when the strange incident of North Vietnamese gunboats allegedly attacking US warships occurred in the Tonkin Gulf, some 20,000 US military advisors were in South Vietnam honouring that commitment. In this moment of truth the choice was either to pull out or massively expand the presence and role of US troops. President Johnson famously said that ‘I am not going to be the President who saw South-East Asia go the way China went.’¹⁰⁷

He would later expand publicly on this in a speech at John Hopkins University in April 1965:

We will do everything necessary to reach that objective (that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way); and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.¹⁰⁸

The objective therefore was not to win but rather to convince the North Vietnamese and by association their Soviet and Chinese allies, that the price would be too high and thus victory unachievable. This essentially negative aim was of little use to the military Chiefs of Staff; it was anathema to the military mind to yield the initiative to the enemy and particularly so when it also gave primary responsibility to the South Vietnamese armed forces who they felt were proving to be so undependable. The Joint Chiefs felt that a more positive and ambitious objective was necessary, that of defeating the enemy both in North and South Vietnam. They urged the classic doctrine of rapid application of overwhelming military power through offensive action to defeat the enemy’s main conventional forces.¹⁰⁹ This ignored the fact that the US was not yet in a position to do any of this and seems now to be a classic example of Generals wanting to fight the battle they know they can win rather than the one which is actually facing them. The Joint

¹⁰⁷ Whicker, Tom, *JFK and LBJ: The Influence of Personality on Politics*, New York, Morrow, 1998, p208

¹⁰⁸ Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, vol 1, US Government Printing office, Washington, 1966, p.395.

Chiefs saw three equally important military tasks to be accomplished in Vietnam:

- (1) To cause the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) to cease its direction and support of the Viet Cong insurgency;*
- (2) To defeat the Viet Cong and to extend the Government of Vietnam's (GVN) control over all of South Vietnam; and*
- (3) To deter Communist China from direct intervention and to defeat such intervention if it should occur.*¹¹⁰

There is no mention here of the necessity to understand the culture and aims of the Vietnamese governments or peoples, no thought of 'Hearts and Minds'; of more consequence there seems to have been no thought given to what might constitute victory conditions for the North Vietnamese - or how they might seek to achieve them. Leroy Thompson, an acknowledged expert and practitioner in the fields of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, identified the following:

The Communists saw four principal routes to victory: 1. Failure of US will to win; 2. Failure of South Vietnamese will to win; 3. failure to develop an effective counter-insurgency strategy; 4. Failure of South Vietnam to build a stable popular government.¹¹¹

In other words, with the exception of route 3, the North Vietnamese had only to be more determined to stay the course than either the Americans and the South Vietnamese. In this mindset, defeats, no matter how costly, would make little difference as long as the will to succeed remained. Two of the above routes concern the South Vietnamese and it is surprising that the Americans, despite rhetoric to the contrary, did so little to ensure the development and stability of various South Vietnamese administrations. The original Diem regime was so corrupt and non-representative of its people that the Americans, even before deployment of major troops formations, had stood by when he was removed

¹⁰⁹ Haycock, *op cit*, p.86.

¹¹⁰ JCSM 652-65, 27 August 1965, Concept For Vietnam, quoted in US/Vietnam relations, 1945-1967, (US Government Printing Office, Washington 1971, IV C(6) (a), p.74.

¹¹¹ Thompson, Leroy , *op cit*, p.56.

by a military coup; indeed it can be argued that, by letting it be known beforehand that a change of government would not shake their commitment to South Vietnam, they actively sealed his fate. However the replacement was little better and neither did the US make much effort to improve it, preferring to distance themselves from such activities - an attitude which soon developed into a contempt for the Vietnamese in general and which it can be argued eventually spread down the chain of command to the most junior NCO.

Thus at the point where the momentous decision was taken to commit US forces to direct action, there was in Washington no clear direction, no agreed aim and a disparity between the political head and the military arm. This situation would continue for much of the campaign and whilst it can be argued that such situations had occurred before, there was a new complication which was a product of both an emerging style of government and improved communications. Peter Dunn comments on the 'amateurisation' by civilians in Washington, most without military or diplomatic experience or training, who dabbled to an unheard-of degree in every aspect of the war.¹¹² This plethora of experts and advisors were, even when well intentioned, more concerned with the political scene in Washington and the representatives of the media and other bodies with whom they met almost daily than they were with the situation on the ground. Improved communications allowed them to both feel the need to intervene in tactical decisions on the ground and to indulge that need. That is not to say that they carry the blame for the flawed conduct of the campaign but they were undoubtedly a major contributing factor in preventing the development and prosecution of a long-term and consistent strategy.

¹¹² Beckett & Pimlott, *op cit*, p.81.

The first land force combat formation to be committed to Vietnam was a further brigade of the USMC, in March 1965, with orders to secure the airbase at Danang with its supporting installations and facilities; central to its orders was the injunction: 'The US Marine Force will not, repeat will not, engage in day to day actions against the Viet Cong.'¹¹³

Within one month those orders had changed to permit more active participation:

The President approved a change of mission for all Marine battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.¹¹⁴

This separate deployment of the USMC was to have consequences for the whole campaign. As referred to above the USMC had already developed their own COIN doctrine and methodology - the ground principles of which were neither shared nor considered by the Army. By the nature of their initial mission to secure and protect the Danang airbase and its environs the Marines had to get to know and understand the Vietnamese communities and personalities living within those environs and working on the base itself. Since this accorded with their COIN principles they had no reluctance in doing so.

As the scale of US involvement grew the confusion in Washington was echoed in Vietnam. Even now with the benefit of both hindsight and the declassification of hitherto secret material it is almost impossible to give a simple description of the command and control mechanisms. Nominally, the US Ambassador to South Vietnam, Maxwell Taylor, was the senior US representative; however, as a former 4-star General, he was

¹¹³ JCSM 652-65, 27 August 1965, quoted in US-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, IV C(4) (a), p.1.

¹¹⁴ Johnson, Lyndon B , *The Vantage Point; Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-69*, New York, Holt,

perhaps oversensitive about not interfering with the Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and left military matters to General William Westmorland. Westmorland could not use his forces outside the country, a factor which was to have significant consequences later. The JCS wanted MACV to be a fully-integrated command directly subordinate to them whilst the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), an admiral, wanted it to be placed under his command. This situation was eventually resolved in his favour but in the intervening months of wrangling between the various service elements the State Department, still keen for the Ambassador to lead, involved themselves more and more in military affairs. For Westmorland the reality was that he now found himself serving two masters: CINCPAC and the Commander-in-Chief, US Army. He was not averse to deciding which of the two to communicate with first. The Danang USMC force commander was originally the designated naval component commander under command of MACV. However, as the naval presence grew, a Rear-Admiral was appointed Chief, Naval Advisory Group MACV, giving Westmorland two naval component commanders. Air missions were even more complicated:

Similarly, bombing operations in the theatre came under separate controls. CINCPAC controlled the bombing of North Vietnam, but certain tactical targets had to be approved by the White house. The MACV Commander controlled the bombing in the South and in Laos, but carrier aircraft were under 7th Fleet and CINCPAC, and B52s were under the Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command, headquartered in Nebraska. In the Northern Sector the USMC even controlled their own air wing, larger than an Air Force wing. Thus the Air Force Commander in Vietnam controlled but a fraction of the aircraft bombing Indochina.¹¹⁵

Westmorland himself opposed the idea of joint US/Vietnamese Command modelled on that employed previously with success in Korea, thus not only Vietnamese but also other

Rhinehart and Winston, , 1971, p.140-141.

Allied troops in theatre such as Koreans and Philipinos remained under autonomous commands. A total of nine advisory groups reported to MACV; the Air Force and Naval Advisors did report through their Service commanders to Westmorland but the Army advisors did not - Westmorland being an army General, they reported directly to him. In 1967 when, somewhat belatedly, the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) organisation was established this was placed under MACV and its head, Robert Kromer, designated Westmorland's Deputy for Pacification, although this did not deter him from sending drafts of directives he wanted imposing on Westmorland directly to Washington in the hope that they would in turn send them back down to Westmorland to be complied with. Inevitably Westmorland found out about this and relations between the two became somewhat strained! To further complicate the picture the many civilian agencies, CIA, AID et al, whilst nominally under either the Ambassador or MACV, maintained direct and independent communications with their individual Washington headquarters. A ludicrous example of what could happen in such circumstances occurred when a relatively junior Special Forces officer, in the middle of a tense situation in a remote camp in the Central Highlands, found himself being asked for a briefing by a member of the White House staff. In fairness, the potential problems of such ramshackle lines of command had been appreciated. President Johnson and his Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara, attempted to place the theatre under the single politico-military authority of the US Ambassador; however, Maxwell Taylor again declined to take responsibility for military decisions away from the Generals.

Almost to the end there was disagreement over how the US forces should be operating. Ambassador Taylor initially favoured a plan put forward by General Howard K Johnson:

¹¹⁵ Beckett & Pimlott, *op cit*, p.83.

The...role which has been suggested for US ground forces is the occupation and defence of key enclaves along the coast such as Quang Ngai, Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang. Such a disposition would have the advantage of placing our forces in areas of easy access and egress with minimum logistic problems associated with supply and maintenance. The presence of our troops would assure defence of these key areas and would relieve some GVN forces for deployment elsewhere. The troops would not be called upon to engage in Counter-insurgency operations except in their own local defence and hence would be exposed to minimum losses.¹¹⁶

This so-called 'enclave strategy' also had implicit within it the merit of permitting a relatively easy and assured exit strategy. However, as Taylor himself admitted, it was 'a rather inglorious static defence mission unappealing to them [the US forces] and unimpressive in the eyes of the Vietnamese.'¹¹⁷ General Westmorland foresaw an altogether more robust campaign in purely military terms, that of driving the enemy from the field: 'Explicit in my forty-four battalion proposal and President Johnson's approval of it was a proviso for free manoeuvre of American and allied units throughout South Vietnam. Thus the restrictive enclave strategy with which I have disagreed from the first was finally rejected.'¹¹⁸ Although it may not have seemed so clear at the time, this was a quantum leap further than President Johnson's plan to assist the South Vietnamese maintain themselves:

I am convinced that US troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the VC. The basic purpose of the additional deployments...is to give us a substantial and hard-hitting offensive capability on the ground.¹¹⁹

There is a line where justified and necessary confidence becomes hubris and hindsight

¹¹⁶ US-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, IV C(3),p.5.

¹¹⁷ Westmorland, General William C , *A Soldier Reports*, Garden City, Doubleday and Co, 1976, pp.129-130.

¹¹⁸ Westmorland, *op cit*, p.144.

¹¹⁹ MACV 19118, 070335Z, June 1965 - from MACV to CINCPAC

shows that Westmorland had crossed it. However he had got his way and on 28 July 1965 President Johnson approved the deployment of a thirty-five battalion strong force (a total of some 175,000 soldiers) to South Vietnam with a further eight battalions earmarked to follow as required. Even this considerable force was seen as only being sufficient to prevent the collapse of South Vietnam by defeating the Viet Cong in their then-present numbers and organisation. Thus, in a curious and indirect way, this outwardly aggressive and positive deployment yielded the strategic initiative still more to the North Vietnamese who, providing they retained the will to win, could escalate the conflict at their discretion. Since the Americans continued to underestimate and misunderstand the stakes for which the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were playing, they would continue to respond to this strategic initiative by sending more and more troops to Vietnam as they chased the chimera of defeating the enemy in the field.

Even looked at in purely conventional terms the American strategy was much less likely to achieve victory than Westmorland believed, for his war plan was essentially one of attrition and his ability to interdict enemy reinforcements and supply lines was severely limited:

‘The Viet Cong and regular North Vietnamese units were not vulnerable to US ground forces until they crossed the borders into South Vietnam. Likewise, enemy units in South Vietnam could escape pursuit and engagement by US units by crossing over the borders into Cambodia, Laos, or into the Demilitarised Zone. Thus the enemy could enter the battle when he wished and could withdraw from the battlefield when he chose. This made attrition very difficult.

Success in the war of attrition ... depended instead on how long the North Vietnamese were willing to feed the pipeline with men, equipment and supplies. The strategy granted advantages to the enemy that could not be overcome by US actions in the field. If the enemy was willing to pay the price, he could keep the US army tied up indefinitely. And as it turned out, he was willing to pay a very

high price.¹²⁰

The American belief in the supremacy of advanced technology and overwhelming use of airpower led them to believe that interdiction outside South Vietnam could be conducted successfully without recourse to ground forces, except in the limited use of special forces deep penetration patrols. It was partly this belief which led them to make what some assert was the biggest single mistake in the whole campaign; a mistake which effectively destined their efforts to failure before the real war on the ground was properly underway. In April 1962 Averill Harriman signed the Laos Agreement. This treaty guaranteed that there would be 'no foreign troops' in Laos. The Communists signed this knowing full well that they had no intention of honouring it but knowing also that the US, or at least the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, would ensure that the Americans, in deference to world opinion if for no other reason, would do so. If the North Vietnamese had not had this free run down through Laos the insurgency in Vietnam could well have been stopped at any time in the early 1960s. What is more, deprived of this freeway, the North Vietnamese would have had to meet US forces on ground far more favourable to the latter. Neither the US military nor the North Vietnamese were unaware of this and the route through Laos became known scornfully to both sides as the Averill Harriman Highway. B-52s were being used to bomb the Ho Chi Minh trail as early as 1965 and shortly afterwards attacks on SAM missiles sited in North Vietnam were authorised, as were attacks on the North Vietnamese railway networks. However accurate information on the real results of these high-level bombing raids was not always obtained and a series of practices developed which ultimately became downright falsifications. Reports of large-scale destruction of enemy trucks on re-supply trails were seldom authenticated by post-operational photography of burnt-out vehicles, although the technology was there to

¹²⁰ Haycock, *op cit*, p.92.

do so and some reports deliberately counted all attacks as hits even when misses were recorded.

On the ground increasingly large-scale all-arms operations became the norm. In these operations the Americans were capable of deploying an awesome and overwhelming display of firepower and manoeuvrability; and when they did trap enemy formations in such actions the results were very impressive. Even when it was the Americans who were taken by surprise they were still able to reverse the situation in their favour by such methods. The key word however, is 'when' as the kill ratio overall was often very low even for COIN operations. The British in Malaya had been all too well aware of the considerable number of operational hours statistically needed to account for even one terrorist. Two American news reports illustrate such situations:

More than 3,000 Government troops today slogged through flooded rice paddies....in a suspected communist stronghold 35 miles north-west of Saigon in one of the biggest and most fruitless operations of the Vietnamese war. The one Red the troops located wounded a (South) Vietnamese soldier with a shotgun and escaped. [...] One group of today's (21 April 1964) Government statistics indicated the frustration of this war. Government small-unit operations such as searches or probes by patrols reached a peak of 5,190 during the week. The spokesman said that no more than 70 of these actually had made contact.¹²¹

Small scale operations often fared little better; for 1968 it was noted:

In 1967-68, for example, less than one percent of the nearly two million reported small-unit operations resulted in contact with the enemy. Despite the fact that the number of US 'battalion days of operations' increased dramatically in 1968, the percentage of contacts with the enemy decreased to a remarkable degree' according to the CIA.¹²²

From this time, 1968, it is reasonable to see the US involvement in Vietnam as almost two separate campaigns. The one against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam and on its borders;

and the other against North Vietnam. The Tet offensive of early 1968 took the Americans and the South Vietnamese by surprise, both in its size and its ferocity. However, the VC were never seriously in a position of winning the engagement and ultimately suffered horrendous casualties. Some have claimed the North Vietnamese urged and conducted the Tet offensive with these casualties in mind, as part of their plan to ensure that the VC would not be in position to oppose North Vietnamese aims in South Vietnam after the Americans had left. Be that as it may, the VC never really recovered from this defeat and the Americans found themselves increasingly facing regular North Vietnamese troops, operating in COIN mode or as more-or-less conventional formations. When the Americans ultimately withdrew from Vietnam it was fashionable to claim that US forces had won the war militarily. Some American officers continue to hold this view, the rationale being that the North Vietnamese regular forces had been outfought conventionally. Hurtful though it may be to US military pride, the reverse is true. Despite undoubted technical superiority and the many times they inflicted swingeing defeats and casualties on the regular forces of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), the US military could not wrest the strategic initiative from them and it was not guerrillas but regular NVA tanks which broke into Saigon at the end.

Ironically, within South Vietnam, the Americans did come close to militarily winning the COIN war. As stated above, the premature Tet offensive had severely depleted the VC and they never really recovered from this reverse. Da Nang remained firmly in US hands to the end, due in no small measure to the different approach of the USMC. The CORDS pacification programme, despite relatively meagre funding yielded some good results, the most significant of which was the 'Phoenix' (Phuong Hoang) initiative; the parallel

¹²¹ Tabor, Robert , *op cit*, pp.80-81.

¹²² Beckett and Pimlott, *op cit*, p.87.

CIDG project also enjoyed some success until taken over and ‘killed’ by the US military; and a very useful joint intelligence structure was eventually built up between the US military and the South Vietnamese. Aspects of these programmes will be discussed elsewhere. However, critical to US defeat in Vietnam was the failure to grasp the nature and purpose of the war which was being fought. Even had the Americans been able to defeat both the insurgency within South Vietnam and the incursions - and ultimately invasion - from the North, they would still have failed through their inability to provide and support a popular and stable regime in South Vietnam:

There was little or no realisation of the revolutionary dynamics of the situation, the popular appeal of the Viet Cong, or the weakness of the half-formed, traditional military regimes in Saigon. There was little realisation that critical to security was the development of an honest and efficient South Vietnamese government committed to administering justice and to improving the welfare of its people.¹²³

The British COIN expert, Sir Robert Thompson, put it more strongly in a passage which also expresses what should perhaps be the essence of the role of the military in all post-conflict reconstruction:

Instead of the weaknesses within South Vietnam being eliminated they were being aggravated...It was never understood that nation building was the offensive construction programme designed to strengthen the government’s assets and eliminate its weaknesses, while the military operations were defensive and destructive, designed to hold the ring for the constructive programme and, in so doing, to weaken the enemy’s military assets.¹²⁴

Belatedly the Americans did realize that civil and military direction and programmes in IndoChina were uncoordinated and in May 1967, General Westmorland had been given overall direction of both. However, the previous situation had pertained for too long and

¹²³ Haycock, op cit, p.92.

whilst he had overall direction on the ground the various Washington agencies were unwilling or unable to surrender the direction of their operatives from afar. Morale amongst US forces in Vietnam plummeted - a result of the lack of cohesive direction from above, an awareness that withdrawal was becoming inevitable (so why risk the lives of yourself and your comrades), a growing divide between the 'regulars' and the increasing numbers of draftees and finally, the influence of nightly television coverage which, in some cases, showed parents their sons being wounded or killed before their eyes. The term 'fragging' came into the military lexicon, whereby soldiers threw grenades into their superior officers' and NCOs' accommodation as the ultimate sign of dissatisfaction. Drug-taking amongst soldiers rose to almost epidemic proportions - a reflection as much of the society from which the draftees came as from the tensions of service in Vietnam. The result of this was to further confirm in the minds of a whole generation of future generals that COIN was something which demeaned and ultimately corrupted a regular force. Such operations were best left to the dark and shifty world of diplomats, 'spooks' and Special Forces. A subsequent comment made by a high-ranking US Army officer graphically illustrates this view:

I will be damned if I will permit the US Army, its institutions, its doctrines, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war.¹²⁵

Following the humiliating withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 the American military establishment was deeply traumatized and in classic denial mode threw itself into developing its abilities in more conventional modes of warfare. The flexible and innovative concept of the Airland Battle evolved during this period and whilst it was designed specifically for conventional war, its integration of different weapons systems

¹²⁴ Thompson, Sir Robert GK, *No Exit From Vietnam*, London, Chatto and Windus, 1969, pp.146, 149.

¹²⁵ Cincinnatus (CB Currey), *Self-destruction: The Disintegration and Decay of the US Army During the*

and arms of service had their nativity in the Army/Airforces complex interactions against the VC and NVA. That nativity was not however acknowledged by an accompanying interest in COIN. The US Army Field Manual 100-5, the military ‘bible’ compiled after the Vietnam withdrawal, made no mention of COIN operations and neither did its subsequent revision in 1982. US Special Forces were the only ones now studying such operations and their role was primarily to be the guerrillas and to organise insurgencies, not to fight them.¹²⁶

At its peak in 1968 the US had committed almost 550,000 troops to the war in Vietnam, although this would be gradually reduced in subsequent years to 415,000 in 1970, 239,000 in 1971 and only 47,000 in 1972. In addition, the US were supporting (or being supported by, depending on one’s point of view) a well-equipped South Vietnamese armed forces comprising in excess of 350,000 men. Exact figures for the overall financial commitment are hard to calculate but American economic aid to the government of South Vietnam, exclusive of military aid, has been put at some \$241 million annually, with military aid being estimated at almost \$500 million; whilst by the end of 1967 the US annual rate of expenditure on its own military presence there was estimated to be close to \$30 billion.¹²⁷ US troop involvement lasted from early 1965 to 1975 . Such interventions, whether successful or not, are neither cheap nor of short duration. Their chances of success depend upon many factors but most critical is the nature and conduct of the ‘host’ government. As Henry Kissinger observed after the US withdrawal from Indo-China:

We have learned important lessons from the tragedy of Indo-China - most

Vietnam War, New York, WW Norton, , 1981, p.60.

¹²⁶ Beckett and Pimlott, *op cit*, p.105.

¹²⁷ Tabor, Robert , *op cit*, pp. 78-79.

importantly that outside effort can only supplement, but not create, local efforts and local will to resist...and there is no question that popular will and social justice are, in the last analysis, the essential underpinning of resistance to subversion and external challenge.¹²⁸

More recent US involvement in COIN operations, including those still ongoing, will be covered in the next chapter.

¹²⁸ Department of State Bulletin, vol 73, US Department of State, pp.3-4.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CONVERGENCE OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS WITH CLASSICAL COIN OPERATIONS

‘We trained hard - but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form into teams, we would be reorganised. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganising, and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralisation’

Attributed to Gaius Petronius Arbiter, AD66

As pointed out in the previous chapter, French experiences in Vietnam and Algeria led to an aversion to being involved in COIN operations. Where French forces have been deployed unilaterally into such scenarios their role has been restricted to short term military support to ‘stabilise’ the situation for the post-colonial host government; on other occasions the role has been even more severely restricted to that of assisting in the evacuation of neutral civilians from the region. During such operations French forces have been prepared to use force to enable them to successfully carry out their mission but with neither intent nor attempt to carry the fight to the insurgent. This does not mean that the French have in any way withdrawn from involvement with multilateral PSOs; as pointed out earlier, in addition to involvement in several UN Peacekeeping missions, they volunteered for a Chapter VII intervention in Rwanda. Nor indeed have they been absent from other types of international operations. For example, French troops were deployed in more conventional military actions in both the first Gulf War and in Kosovo. French readiness to take an active part in PSOs was described to the author by a senior French officer in Sarajevo as a willingness to pay a ‘blood tax’ to the United Nations for their permanent seat on the Security Council; and indeed their contribution has been significant in this regard with the French Foreign Legion, Marines and Gendarmerie particularly building up considerable expertise in both intervention tactics and the complexities of peacekeeping operations. However, such involvement and expertise

intentionally stops well short of the long-term, all-embracing and extensive campaign which would be required to defeat an insurgency.

For the Americans, following the French into Indo-China was to prove such a chastening experience that the United States' mainstream military appear to have resolved not to be involved in such operations again. Initially, only in the Special Forces and the Marine Corps was much thought given to developing doctrine and methodology for similar future deployments. However, out of this beginning an outline force structure and provision of a large number of specialists devoted to the study of fighting subversion and insurgency did emerge. In line with the traditional reluctance of successive American administrations to place their forces under the UN, or any other form of external command and control, the majority of operations which have been carried out until recently have been ones in which American 'specialists', either as advisors or as small Special Forces teams have been deployed, overtly or covertly, alongside the security forces of the host nation. This trend began to be revised at the end of the Cold War and in the aftermath of the first UN deployments to Bosnia. However, as discussed in the previous chapter the experience of Somalia gave considerable pause for thought. Despite this, the new draft of the Field Manual does devote a whole Volume of six chapters to Counterinsurgency and this will be examined in Chapter Five.

In the case of the British, a combination of the successful Malayan experience and the large number of colonies and protectorates still remaining under British administration, meant that successive governments and in turn, both the military and the Foreign Office, continued to devote time and energy to pursuing the development of COIN principles and practices as a viable methodology to defeat not only insurgencies but what was beginning

to be described as Counter-revolutionary Warfare (CRW). The three principles which had been evolving since the beginning of the Twentieth Century and which had been fused together so successfully in Malaya, continued to be the core of British thinking:

First, English common law dictated that disorders had to be suppressed with minimum force. Originally confined to civil unrest in Britain, the principle gradually expanded to include all forms of unrest from riot to revolution. Second, successful counter-insurgency depended on close cooperation between all branches of the civil government and military. The government had to devise a comprehensive strategy that attacked the causes of unrest at the same time as it combated the insurgents. The police and local administrators in each locale had to provide the military with timely intelligence. Only when they were supplied with accurate information could the security forces strike selectively enough to eliminate the insurgent guerrillas while respecting the principle of minimum force. Third, the military for its part had to dispense with conventional tactics and adopt a highly decentralised, small-unit approach to combating irregulars. Counterinsurgency requires extraordinary tactical flexibility. During the complex counterinsurgency campaigns of the post-war period the three principles were brought together into a comprehensive strategy. Prior to 1945, however, they remained diffuse assumptions shaping the conduct of operations, each principle evolving at a different pace, rather than clear tenets that could be easily taught.¹²⁹

Whilst the many COIN operations which the British conducted during this period differed in detail and tactics these three principles generally provided the bedrock upon which the overall strategy was assembled. The first of these ‘new’ approach operations began even as Templer was beginning to gain the upper hand in Malaya. In 1952 the Mau Mau emergency began in Kenya. Sprung from legitimate grievances felt by the Kikuyu tribe in the central province, it has been argued that it was more of ‘a serious and well-directed tribal conspiracy masquerading as a legitimate expression of nationalism’¹³⁰ than an organised and deliberate attempt at insurgency. Undoubtedly it was a confused and almost nihilistic campaign which was waged by the Mau Mau, who nonetheless styled themselves the Land and Freedom Army. Their brutal methods,

¹²⁹ Mockaitis, T, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60*, London , The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1990, pp. 13-14.

¹³⁰ Majdalany, Fred, *State of Emergency: The Full Story of the Mau Mau*, Boston, 1963: quoted in Mockaitis, *op cit*, p.125.

against fellow Africans and even other Kikuyu, as well as against the white settlers, ensured that they were never able to build a secure base amongst the black African population. Ironically, the British and local security forces often found their task complicated by extremist elements amongst the white settlers, who insisted in seeing every black African and especially members of the Kikuyu tribe as insurgents, an attitude virtually guaranteed to become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Thus in a limited way the Kenyan Emergency mirrored later peace-enforcement missions where the military found themselves between rival contestants. Upon declaration of the emergency, the incoming British Governor, Sir Evelyn Baring was granted the now almost obligatory extraordinary powers. Acting on the above three principles, Baring immediately set about establishing a system to ensure the necessary civil-military cooperation and identifying how best to formulate and conduct a hearts-and-minds campaign to retain the loyalty of the majority of the Kikuyu. This latter included, amongst other imperatives, the perceived need to win back and rehabilitate those who had already gone over to the Mau Mau. In this the experiences gained in Malaya were of direct assistance, although there was at first some resistance to this cross-fertilisation: the Colonial Office, in turning down a military request to have psychological warfare and ‘rehabilitation’ experts posted in from Malaya, expressing the view that:

We frankly cannot see how any outside ‘expert’ is going to help you on this.....nor do we believe any new organisation can provide a short cut or substitute for the necessarily arduous and slow task of winning the people over.
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Despite some false starts, a hearts-and-minds campaign did begin to bear fruit and whilst local conditions were different, a smaller version of the Malayan relocation programme

¹³¹ Sir Frederick Crawford to General Sir George Erskine, 26 Aug 1953 (PRO, CO 822/701).

was instituted which, by virtue of a speedily implemented land reform programme, ensured permanent resettlement rather than merely being an emergency security measure. The civil-military cooperation apparatus also modeled the Malayan experience closely, with joint committees at provincial, district and divisional levels. However the military force commander was not given a dual role as in Malaya, it being considered that the emergency was confined to too small an area to warrant such an appointment.

However, inevitably many of the military personnel had direct experience of Malaya and this experience was both employed and developed. This was nowhere more true than in the field of intelligence gathering:

The truly innovative aspect of counterinsurgency developed in Kenya occurred in the area of intelligence gathering. A directive of 26 March 1953 set up joint army operational-intelligence teams similar to the intelligence committees in Malaya. It was soon realized, however, that while such a system might facilitate the more rapid distribution of information once it was collected, it would not necessarily produce information itself. To aid in gathering information an 'operational element' of the special branch of the Kenya police was established. The operational element consisted of provincial and district military-intelligence officers, and from four to six field-intelligence officers (FIOs) in each district. The FIO was the key to the whole system. Each FIO was given a designated area in which to work. Within his area he was responsible for the collection of covert information. To garner this information the FIO had to become intimately acquainted with his area...He was to interrogate captured Mau Mau, to keep track of released detainees, and to elicit information on the passive wing of the Mau Mau. He was also to serve as a liaison between civil, police and military personnel. 'Unless the FIO knows and is liked by all the people he has to work with', FIOs were instructed 'he will find his work unnecessarily difficult'. He had to work not only with the security forces but with the local population, European, Asian and African. His primary task was to create a network of informers and agents.¹³²

The other major innovation was the brainchild of a young infantry officer, Frank Kitson, who was posted to Kenya as a Captain and who, as a District Military Intelligence Officer, was seconded to the Kenya police Special Branch. He realized that captured

¹³² Mockaitis, *op cit*, p.131.

Mau Mau were likely to respond to favourable treatment and not only give information but occasionally might also be inspired to fight against their former comrades. He took the process a stage further than in Malaya, organizing a group of such individuals into a so-called pseudo-gang who were then, suitably led, sent out into the bush to make contact with genuine gangs to either detain them if practicable, or if not, to obtain information from them. This project was so successful that Kitson was ordered to set up a training centre to form further pseudo-gangs. The fear and paranoia these gangs created amongst the genuine insurgents was out of all proportion to their actual numbers. In time, as trust in them grew, the pseudo-gangs were employed more offensively to hunt down and destroy the insurgent hard-core elements in the final stages of the emergency, which was declared at an end in 1955. Kitson went on to serve in other counterinsurgency operations and many of his ideas and tactics came to be incorporated into army doctrine.

As the Kenyan emergency was being successfully wound up the first signs of an insurgency were beginning to surface in Cyprus, which had been a British Crown colony since 1914. Cyprus had a majority Greek-Cypriot population and a significant minority Turkish-Cypriot population. Not surprisingly, the discord between Greece and Turkey - both now members of the newly-formed NATO - was mirrored in Cyprus. The Greek-Cypriots actively, if covertly, encouraged by the mainland Greek government, began to resurrect the dream of *Enosis* or union with Greece. Even if the British might have countenanced such a union the Turkish government would not have done so and it would have precipitated a most unwelcome crisis in NATO. However since the British had withdrawn from Egypt Cyprus represented the only base area large enough to maintain the large land/sea and air presence deemed necessary to protect British interests in the area:

Britain can no more consider relinquishing our sovereignty over Cyprus at the present time than over Gibraltar at the other end of the Mediterranean.....Britain's experience in Egypt has shown that bases without sovereignty cannot always be relied upon.¹³³

The twin leaders of the *Enosis* movement were Archbishop Makarios, head of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and a former Greek Army officer by the name of George Grivas. The latter was a Greek-Cypriot by birth and was both highly religious and extremely right wing, so much so that he had cooperated with the Germans in Greece to fight the communists. He had considerable expertise in guerrilla warfare and was thus likely to prove a difficult opponent if it came to an armed struggle. Initially however, the drive towards *Enosis* was vocal rather than violent so the British merely launched an information offensive which endeavoured to explain the British case and point out the economic and security benefits of remaining under British administration. These were rational arguments considering the likely Turkish reaction to *Enosis* and the fact that mainland Greece was hardly a sound economic model at this time. Undoubtedly many Greek-Cypriots understood them and some may even have been swayed by them but the appeal of union with Greece was a purely emotional one and there was little doubt that had they been given the chance of a referendum a sizeable majority would have voted for it. Such a vote would have precipitated a crisis within NATO so the British were on the horns of a dilemma: their information initiative was pitched to appeal to rational argument on an issue in which logic played no part and any hearts-and-minds campaign which might be mounted was likewise doomed to failure since they could not grant what the Greek-Cypriots most desired. This stalemate was broken by Grivas forming EOKA (the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) and beginning to smuggle arms and

explosives into Cyprus. On the first of April 1955 a series of bomb blasts occurred throughout the island and this was immediately followed by the intimidation and shooting of several Greek-Cypriot policemen. This galvanised the British into counterinsurgency mode and Field Marshal Sir John Harding was appointed to replace the civilian governor as head of both civil and military administration and in recognition of the strategic importance of Cyprus, informed that he was to work directly to the Prime Minister and not to the Colonial Office. In accordance with the three principles he introduced social and economic reforms ‘in order to demonstrate to the inhabitants that there is a good alternative to *Enosis*’.¹³⁴ In an attempt to split Makarios and Grivas he held lengthy discussions with the Archbishop and only when these failed did he declare a state of emergency.

Such a state of emergency allowed for mass detentions and collective punishments. But in a further development of British COIN philosophy the British government was disinclined to sanction the policy of collective punishment. The adverse media reaction to such measures in Malaya and Kenya undoubtedly played a part in this decision but even amongst the military and the Colonial Office there were those who doubted its efficacy:

It is an extralegal method of punishment and therefore perhaps a confession that the police and legal machine are not fully effective. It might punish a few innocent people along with the guilty, and might alienate other sections of Cypriots, in a way that strict enforcement of the law would not.¹³⁵

Harding was eventually granted permission to use collective punishment but only in

¹³³ British Information Services Statement on Cyprus, 19 Aug 1954 (PRO), CO926/179.

¹³⁴ The report of a visit by the Director of Military Intelligence to Cyprus, 26 Oct 1955 (PRO), WO 216/889.

extremis. In the event it was used sparingly, mainly as fines, curfews in specific locations, the closing of places of entertainment such as dance halls and cinemas and occasionally the closure of schools when incidents of stone-throwing and spitting youths became epidemic - comically, this had the effect of liberating yet more youths to join those already active on the streets so it was soon discontinued. The whole issue of collective punishment was in fact short-lived as it was ended as part of a truce in December 1956. The British were well aware that they had to find a constitutional alternative to *Enosis* if they were to be able to counter both the civil and the military aspects of the looming insurgency. However whilst they sought to find this alternative they began to assemble the apparatus they believed they would need to defeat the military side of the problem. The police and civil administration needed to be strengthened and improved as a matter of urgency, if only to free up the military to take a more active role in hunting down EOKA. The by-now standard committee structure comprising civil, military and police representatives was established and the police special branch and criminal investigation departments were strengthened and improved. Results were almost immediate, not the least of which was the capture of several documents written by Grivas himself. One of these outlined the strategy in which he admitted that he did not consider that he could defeat the British militarily but sought through a combination of terrorism and guerrilla warfare to create a situation which would force the British to withdraw. By carrying out attacks on British service personnel and other British nationals he hoped both that the British public would be convinced that remaining in Cyprus was not worth the cost and that by provoking the British into reprisals world opinion would be mobilized against them. He was also prepared to use terrorism to protect his organisation from desertions and informers and to force the population to

¹³⁵ Note for The Secretary of State, 21 Nov 1955 (PRO), CO 926/561.

cooperate with him¹³⁶. A further document revealed that he was aware that ‘the enemy has gained valuable intelligence about my organisation through my men talking after capture, informers amongst the civil population, and carelessness in abandoning personal equipment’. He further acknowledged that the military campaign against his guerrillas in the countryside was having its effect:

Recent successes by the enemy against my Andantes (Greek word for Rebel but applied to patriotic guerrilla fighters) and also against action groups in the towns, coupled with the knowledge that the death penalty will be enforced for acts of terrorism, has lowered EOKA’s morale.¹³⁷

The fact that the above document was dated by Grivas as 5 July and that they were captured, translated and distributed by the next day is testimony to the efficiency with which the British intelligence services were operating. The failure of Grivas’ rural operations led to him concentrating on urban assassinations. These were concentrated against soft targets such as off-duty soldiers and Greek-Cypriots thought to be collaborating with the authorities. However, this ultimately proved counter-productive as each such murder was publicised as an atrocity and as far more Greek-Cypriots were murdered than British, even his supporters became less enthusiastic.

The dilemma of finding an alternative to *Enosis* was solved fortuitously in 1956 when, in the aftermath of the disastrous British/French intervention at Suez, British foreign policy underwent a major shift. Accepting that the imperial role East of Suez was over, it was decided that an airborne presence in Cyprus would be sufficient. This gave the government the freedom to negotiate down from requiring the whole of Cyprus to accepting two sovereign base areas and granting independence to the remainder of the

¹³⁶ An Appreciation of the Situation by Digenis (the code name used by Grivas) on 5 Jul 1956, 6 Jul 1956 (PRO, CO 926/454).

island, providing power was shared with the Turkish minority. Initially this was rejected by Makarios, who was now exiled to the Seychelles. However in 1959 he accepted the terms and Grivas fled to mainland Greece where he was treated as a hero. As far as the British were concerned the insurgency had been successfully terminated, but relations between the Greek and Turkish populations have never been satisfactorily harmonised and subsequent events led to the UN becoming involved in one of its earliest peacekeeping missions - which is still ongoing. So it is arguable whether the British can claim to have wholly solved the problem. They did however defeat the insurgency and create a non-violent environment in which others could work towards a sustainable peace.

Elsewhere in the mid-50s, further east in the Sultanate of Oman, the British were briefly involved in an armed intervention to ensure the survival of the Sultan in a power struggle against a potential rival who had secured the loyalty of various hill tribes in the mountainous interior of that country. This 'insurrection' was put down relatively easily and without the world paying much attention. The only real significance of this intervention was that the Sultan then requested that the British continue to provide support by reorganising and to some extent providing the military staff both to administer and to command his fledgling armed forces. After the British withdrew from Aden in the mid-60s, an operation which was itself a combination of peacekeeping where there was no peace to keep and an unsuccessful attempt to leave behind in the Yemen a stable and democratic system, some of those who had fought against the British in the Radfan mountains sought to destabilise and detach the province of Dhofar from the Oman. This seemingly insignificant action was supported on the ground first by Russian military

¹³⁷ Both quoted in Mockaitis, *op cit*.

advisors and later in similar fashion by Chinese; and in a further example of realpolitik both Saudi Arabia and the Marxist government of the Yemen also gave support and encouragement to the Dhofari rebels. Although this attempted rebellion never really developed beyond the Dhofar province, by 1969 the rebels controlled much of the province and unquestionably had considerable freedom of movement and the active support of much of the indigenous population. This stalemate was broken in July 1970 when, in an action thought to have had the tacit (and some believe the active) support of the British government, elements of the Sultan's army broke into his Dhofar palace and deposed him in favour of his Sandhurst-trained son, Qaboos. Immediately after this event the campaign against the rebels was stepped up considerably with much enhanced British and Iranian support. In a text book COIN action the Sultan's British-led Armed Forces seized the initiative back from the rebels and in a combined political, economic and military operation began the process of winning back the local population. With the exception of some support troops and approximately 150 seconded officers and soldiers, few British units were directly involved, although there was a significant SAS presence on the ground. The then-Commanding Officer of 22 SAS put forward a 5-point plan

...highlighting the need for intelligence collection and collation, an 'information service' to disseminate the government point-of-view to the jebalis (the hill tribes who made up the bulk of the rebels in the field), medical aid to the Dhofari people, veterinary facilities for the jebali cattle (the principal economic resource), and a policy of directly involving Dhofaris in the fight for their province'¹³⁸

This practical and simply stated military plan was not intended to solve the overall situation but was merely designed to get the process underway; and it was the product of the experience of several generations of military operations in similar circumstances already discussed in the previous chapter.

¹³⁸ *Armed Forces & Modern Counter-Insurgency*, Edited by Ian FW Beckett and John Pimlott, Croom

These were the stop-gap measures to plug holes until the Omani Government could provide its own people to do these tasks. The short term aim was to bring immediate relief to the people. The medium term aim was to train Omanis to take over these measures and then hand over to them. The long term solution, however, was in the hands of the Omani Government, to better the lot of the Dhofari people by the development of resources and construction of roads, wells, schools, clinics, mosques - everything that goes to make up a modern state. Military operations must simply be a means to that end ¹³⁹

On a political level the new Sultan, in addition to initiating a complete and comprehensive modern central administration, set up a special Dhofar Development Council (DDC), chaired by his senior representative in Dhofar. Members of this council consisted of high-ranking military and police officers plus similarly ranking personnel from the relevant government departments and agencies. Brigadier John Akehurst, the British officer seconded to command the Sultan's Armed Forces in Dhofar described its activities and effect as follows:

The Committee met once a week, usually at the Wali's house and each member in turn reported events of the past week and the intentions for the next. Any policy matters were then discussed and decisions promulgated at once.....without fear of red tape. It made for successful management under wartime conditions at a time when Omani government departments were in their infancy and still unaccustomed to accepting responsibility for their decisions. ¹⁴⁰

On the 4th December 1975, Akehurst was able to send the Sultan the following signal:

I have the honour to inform your Majesty that Dhofar is now secure for civil development. ¹⁴¹

The word 'civil' is significant. The British military claimed only to have achieved a *military* victory. British military COIN operations have always stressed that this does not on its own guarantee lasting security. However to date, the Oman remains a success story

Helm, London & Sydney 1985, p32 and quoting from *SAS: Operation Dhofar*, Colonel Tony Jeapes, William Kimber, London, 1980. p.31.

¹³⁹ Jeapes, *SAS: Operation Oman*, William Kimber, London 1980. p.31.

¹⁴⁰ Akehurst, J, *We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman, 1965-1975*, Salisbury, Michael Russell, 1982. p.52.

and the Dhofar campaign is worthy of study by anyone wishing to understand the imperatives of COIN operations; and in its mechanics and principles, this operation provides a near-perfect blueprint for post-intervention stabilisation operations.

However, it must be admitted that it was an operation which, whilst international in so far as troops from Iran and Jordan were actively involved, attracted little if any international or media interest.

Undoubtedly one of the major reasons why not even the British media showed any interest was that just as the Dhofar campaign was being reorganised, another situation was developing much closer to home. In August 1969 British troops were deployed onto the streets of Northern Ireland, ostensibly in a short-term operation in aid of the civil power, although few if any, of the senior military figures of the time had any illusions that it would be short-term. Although constitutionally a part of the United Kingdom, the Ulster commitment was, for the British military, a COIN operation in all but name; and in the following decades the experience gained in Northern Ireland would add to, and significantly modify, the British Army's doctrine for both COIN and PSOs. Equally significantly, even in those areas where, at the height of 'The Troubles', the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) could not deploy, it was always stressed that the military were 'in support' of the civil powers, a policy known as Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP).

General Sir Frank Kitson

It was at this time that Frank Kitson (mentioned earlier in connection with both Malaya and Kenya) wrote two books which should be considered seminal works for students of both COIN and PSOs - although he is currently much neglected. Once considered the doyen amongst British military thinkers, General Sir Frank Kitson based his works on his

¹⁴¹ *Ibid* p.173.

experience as an infantry officer in a wide variety of theatres. The first of his books, *Low Intensity Operations* (subtitled, *Subversion, Insurgency and Peace-keeping*) was the product of a one year Defence Fellowship at Oxford University and was intended to

....draw attention to the steps which should be taken now in order to make the (British) army ready to deal with subversion, insurrection and peace-keeping operations during the second half of the 1970s.¹⁴²

The second called, somewhat quixotically, *Bunch of Five*, was intended as a follow-up to the first and its aim was

....to describe the events which led me to specific conclusions regarding the way in which counter-insurgency and peace-keeping operations should be conducted.¹⁴³

Additionally, he included those areas where he considered that his views and conclusions had developed since the first book. To this end Part V of the later book covered the way in which General Kitson now believed insurgency and subversion should be countered. Whilst these two books were written for the situation as it was seen some thirty years ago they contain much that is still highly relevant today.

In the first book and quoting from Julian Paget's earlier book¹⁴⁴ he notes that the British Army had taken part in thirty-four operations of one sort or another between 1945 and 1966. He further notes that of these only four could be described as Limited War; i.e. Korea, Suez, the move into Kuwait in 1961 and the Indonesian confrontation. In adding Northern Ireland and Anguilla to the list he observes that all the rest were concerned with countering insurgency or subversion - or with peacekeeping operations. At an early stage

¹⁴² Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, London, Faber and Faber, 1971. p.2.

¹⁴³ Frank Kitson, *Bunch of Five*, London, Faber and Faber, 1977. p.xi.

¹⁴⁴ Paget, Julian, *Counter-insurgency Campaigning*, London, Faber and Faber, 1967. p.180.

he recognizes and wrestles with the problems of terminology:

In writing on this subject one of the most difficult problems concerns the matter of terminology. The British Army gives separate definitions of Civil Disturbance, Insurgency, Guerilla Warfare, Subversion, Terrorism, Civil Disobedience, Communist Revolutionary Warfare, and Insurrection on the one hand and of Counter-insurgency, Internal Security, and Counter-Revolutionary Operations on the other. Elsewhere conflicts are variously described as Partisan, Irregular or Unconventional Wars, the people taking part in them have an even wider selection of labels attached to them.¹⁴⁵

Kitson decided that any attempt to re-define all the terms in detail would bring more confusion than enlightenment and wondered whether an all-embracing expression could not be found that would cover every form of conflict carried out by people other than those embodied in the legal armed forces of a country. In the end he concluded that it could not and he concentrated on the terms subversion and insurgency and defined them in terms he described as being 'in the modern practice' whilst conceding that both had already been accepted as applying to 'one part of the business'. As to the other terms he decided to '...leave the reader to interpret the other terms in the light of the text'.¹⁴⁶ As a young officer undergoing training in the late 60s (at one stage under General Kitson) and afterwards serving in Northern Ireland, Dhofar and Cyprus, I can testify to the plethora of terms and their lack of clear definition which abounded at the time. However, Kitson offered the following two definitions for subversion and insurgency:

Subversion then, will be held to mean all illegal measures short of the use of armed force taken by one section of the people of a country to overthrow those governing the country at the time, or force them to do things which they do not want to do. It can involve the use of political and economic pressure, strikes, protest marches, and propaganda, and can also include the use of small scale violence for the purpose of coercing recalcitrant members of the population into giving support. Insurgency will be held to cover the use of armed force by a section of the people against the government for the purposes mentioned above.....naturally subversion and insurgency can take place in the same country at the same time and either or both can be supported by a foreign country,

¹⁴⁵ Kitson, Frank, *Low Intensity Operations*, p.2.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid* pp. 2-3.

which may well provide the impetus. Between them these terms cover virtually every form of disturbance up to the threshold of conventional war.¹⁴⁷

It is instructive that Kitson chose to hold peacekeeping operations as separate from these:

One other term which merits a definition is peace-keeping which will be used in this study to mean preventing, by non-warlike methods, one group of people from fighting another group of people. Peace-keeping does not involve the activities of an army which formally attacks one or both parties to a dispute in order to halt it, because although this might be done with a view to re-establishing peace, the activity itself would be a warlike one and would be of a totally different nature to a peace-keeping operation.¹⁴⁸

Whilst accepting that General Kitson was writing at a time when the Cold War was at its height and international politics were conducted in a more 'robust' manner than is the fashion today there is a great deal in his two books which remains highly relevant - indeed the clarity of his observations probably owes much to the simpler times in which he was writing. He was certainly writing at a time before the growth of the 'peace industry' and the apparent prevailing reluctance to support such actions unless the word 'peace' can be woven somewhere into the description of the activity being conducted, regardless of whether peace can be said to exist or not. Equally, other differences affecting the situation today are the increased significance of NGOs, much improved communication possibilities and the consequent impact of the media, coupled with the phenomenon of global terrorism - although, with the exception of the latter, Kitson does not neglect their basic significance to the operations he describes. Neither should the above be taken to mean that Kitson dismisses peacekeeping from his lengthier deliberations. On the contrary, he devotes the whole of chapter eight of *Low Intensity Operations* to the subject. He does however continue to maintain the essential difference between the two, whilst also acknowledging the similarities. The implications of this

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid* p.3.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid* pp3-4.

distinction to the current situation will be examined later, but the following quotations should be noted at this stage:

Although peace-keeping is a fundamentally different occupation to the countering of insurgency, there is a surprising similarity in the outward forms of many of the techniques involved. On this account a certain amount of the preparation needed for fitting the army (the *raison d'être* for his writing *Low Intensity Operations*) to carry out the latter task is also relevant to the former and this is the main reason for including the former in this study. It is also important that those involved in countering subversion should realise that they are involved in this activity and not in peace-keeping, even when the outward forms are very much the same. It is not difficult to become confused in this respect, although it is unlikely that anyone genuinely involved in peace-keeping would consider himself to be taking part in a counter-subversion operation.¹⁴⁹

Counter-insurgency shares many characteristics and conditions, imperatives and dynamics with peace-keeping but the two are not the same.¹⁵⁰

For the purposes of this study it has been assumed that the former passage above regarding the relationship between peace-keeping and counter-subversion also applies to the relationship between peace-keeping and counter-insurgency. It will be argued that it is the failure to maintain these distinctions that is one of the main reasons why the interregnum existing in the immediate aftermath of conventional armed intervention has become such a confused and frustrating arena.

Before leaving Kitson for the moment two further points are worthy of mention. Firstly, he notes that the term 'peacekeeping' covers a wide variety of functions, not all of which include the use of military forces or military force and that even when a military peacekeeping force is involved there is a diverse and extensive range of activities which it may be called upon to undertake. He identifies one of the two main differences from all other operations as being:

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid* p.144.

...that a peace-keeping force acts on behalf of both parties to a dispute, at the invitation of them both and therefore must as far as possible carry out its task without having recourse to warlike action against either of them. It follows that the body sponsoring the force cannot be responsible for the government of either of the parties to the dispute, because if it were, it would not be in a position to act on behalf of the other one, nor would it be invited to do so: if the body is responsible for the government of one of the sides the operation becomes one of ordinary war, and if it is responsible for the government of both sides it becomes one of subversion, insurgency or civil war. The fundamental characteristics of peace-keeping operations arise very largely out of this factor.¹⁵¹

Interestingly, whilst the term had not yet come into vogue, the necessity for a peacekeeping force to be involved in and adept at conflict resolution was seen as fundamental to their success. Kitson's second factor is also worth quoting in full:

The other factor, and one which is closely related to the first, is that the terms of reference which govern the way in which the force operates are often far less precise than is desirable from a military point-of-view. There are two reasons for this. First, a sponsoring body such as the United Nations or the Organisation of American States consists of many separate countries each of which may have its own ideas as to exactly what the peace-keeping force should do according to how it views the rights and wrongs of the dispute. Second, the mandate has to be acceptable to both parties and therefore has to be formed in such a way as to give no advantage to either side. For both these reasons it is bound to be imprecise and full of holes so that all sorts of different interpretations can be placed on it by the two parties involved and all those contributing to the force.¹⁵²

Second, he observes that, at the time of writing, whilst in the British Army, counter-subversion and counter-insurgency training was at least attempted at every level, the same could not be said of peacekeeping. In his opinion only at the Staff College in Camberley did he consider that reasonable provision was made for covering the subject: and perhaps even more significantly he observes presciently that

It must be admitted that the United States scarcely touches on the subject in its teaching at any level, which is unfortunate because the time may come when it

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ *Ibid* p.146.

¹⁵² *Ibid* p.147.

will be obliged to employ soldiers in this role¹⁵³

Finally, he asserts that:

There is little doubt that only well prepared and highly disciplined troops will operate effectively in a peace-keeping role. The stress placed on officers and men alike is considerably greater than is popularly supposed to be the case. In fact it is probably true to say that the demands of peace-keeping constitute one of the greatest tests which a commander can experience and certainly one of the least agreeable.¹⁵⁴

It will therefore readily be seen from all the above that in the mind of one of the foremost and most highly-regarded military thinkers and practitioners of the 1970s and 1980s there was a deep understanding of the principles applicable to all types of operations in which the military might become involved. But that in the mind of this acknowledged expert, in those activities short of ‘normal’ war there was an absolute distinction between peacekeeping and the rest. It may be that adherence to Kitson’s strict separation would have enabled decision-makers, policy-makers, military planners and practitioners to avoid the morass of confusion which currently entangles and confuses both the immediate aftermath of successful military interventions and more broadly, the busier end of PSOs.

The Continuing Evolution Towards PSOs

As was discussed previously, the evolution of PSOs was not a smooth or measured process and it was only gradually that as peacekeeping became more complex that the concept developed. However, as has been shown, by the mid-90s it appeared that the UN’s ability to manage the more complex operations had been overestimated by both the Secretariat and the Member States. Following the debacles in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia the UN began a sincere process of analysing the most recent operations. A so-called Lessons Learnt Unit (LLU) was established within the DPKO and the General

¹⁵³ *Ibid* p.177.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid* p.161.

Assembly and the SC created several commissions to investigate what had gone wrong in Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica.

The first of these to report was the Commission of Inquiry into the attacks on UN troops in Somalia. Some of the findings were basic and fundamental to most multinational UN missions. It found, for example, that the different military contingents had no effective means of communicating with each other and that a slow and complex procedure was involved if one contingent required assistance from other contingents. It also noted that there was correspondingly little coordination at UN Headquarters level. Most UN peacekeepers and even most UN field officers would have held that such was the case in most missions - it was just that the circumstances of those missions had not caused such deficiencies to be so cruelly exposed. The Commission concluded by observing:

The United Nations should refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of states. If the United Nations decides nevertheless to undertake enforcement operations, the mandate should be limited to specific objectives and the use of force would be applied as the ultimate means after all peaceful remedies have been exhausted.¹⁵⁵

Whilst there were undoubtedly many within and without the UN who would wholeheartedly have agreed with the first part of that sentiment it was hardly a realistic option at the time. However the enthusiasm for all UN missions had lessened considerably. In 1987 there had been five peacekeeping operations underway, involving a total of 10,000 soldiers and a combined annual budget of \$233 million; by 1995 there were 17 such missions with some 75,000 soldiers deployed with an annual budget of \$3.6 billion.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵ Extract from UN Commission of Inquiry Report 1994.42. Quoted in Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *op cit*, p.167.

¹⁵⁶ Boutros-Ghali, B, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, New York, United Nations A/50/60, 1995.

A few statistics tell the tale of peacekeeping's shrinkage in recent years. Where there had been 82,000 blue helmets around the world in 1993, there were 70,000 in 1994. By 1995, there were 60,000 military and civilian personnel serving in 17 PKOs, at a total annual cost of \$3.5 billion. By the end of 1996, although there were still 16 PKOs underway, only 26,000 peacekeepers were involved and the annual cost was down to \$1.6 billion.¹⁵⁷

The Brahimi Report

Whilst activity on the ground lessened, 'thinking' activity increased significantly, within the UN, in military circles and within academia. UN activity was to culminate in the Brahimi Report. In the year 2000, the Secretary-General called a number of acknowledged experts together under the leadership of Lhakdar Brahimi to consider ways forward for the UN. When Brahimi presented his report in August 2000 it represented a watershed in the way the UN would henceforth attempt to define and conduct its missions. The extent to which this was so became more obvious as further missions were initiated, although such revision has not been universally agreed or accepted. In his opening paragraphs Brahimi stated:

Over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge, and it can do no better today. Without renewed commitment on the part of the Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial support, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign to it in the coming months and years. There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.... The Panel concurs that consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping. Experience shows, however, that in the context of intra-state/transnational conflicts, consent may be manipulated in many ways. Impartiality for United Nations operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter; where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil. No failure

¹⁵⁷ *The Year in Review 1996: UN Peace Missions*, UN Department of Public Affairs, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/yr96/peace96.htm>. Quoted in Jett, Denis C, *Why Peacekeeping Fails*, New York, Palgrave, 2001, p31.

did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.¹⁵⁸

The report further urged that, in future, Member States should adopt clearer mandates; improve DPKOs' capacity and capabilities; and create Integrated Mission Task Forces to bring together the key staff from the various mission components and to devise better and more timely logistic systems. It then made three key recommendations. First, that in future the military component of peacekeeping missions should be 'robust' enough to defend itself and the mission effectively - but, perhaps in deference to more concerned Member States, that it should still only use force in self-defence. Second, that in future the mandates should not outrun the resources made available. It recommended that the best way to avoid this gap was for the Security Council not to pass a resolution until it had secured the forces necessary to implement it. Such forces not being forthcoming, a less ambitious mandate should be devised. Third, that there should be greater consultation between the Security Council and troop-contributing countries; with a similarly greater consultation between the countries themselves.

Predictably, whilst the various departments of the UN and the Member States accepted the report in principle, some saw the thrust of the report to be one which would allow the developed world to better justify interference in the less-developed world. More significantly Members chose to interpret words such as 'robust', 'impartial' or 'self-defence' in different ways - not least because the Report itself, whilst referring to 'in self-defence only' also spoke of '...confronting the lingering forces of war and violence' - a wording which suggested offensive rather than defensive methods. However as stated, in the main, the Report was well received and broadly accorded with much of the

¹⁵⁸ Brahimi, L. et al (2000), *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, New York, General

new thinking which had been going on elsewhere.

Wider Peacekeeping

Whilst much of this new thinking was imaginative and offered useful and practical ways forward it was still haunted by the truth that would not speak its name - that where there was no peace any operation prefixed by the word 'peace' was a cosmetic misnomer. However, the intellectual jump to admit openly that in order to achieve peace in such circumstances it would be necessary to engage in traditional, if limited, combat operations, both as a prelude to peacekeeping and in some circumstances whilst peacekeeping activities were ongoing, was still too great for many. Initially, the British had begun to use the term 'wider peacekeeping' to apply to those operations which went beyond traditional peacekeeping tasks but stopped short of Chapter VII enforcement.

According to British military doctrine which bears the same name, it refers to 'operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict' (HMSO 1995: 2-1). The 'wider' of wider peacekeeping refers to 'the wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be volatile.'¹⁵⁹

This definition did go some way to justify operations in situations where there was little or no order on the ground and where none of the warring parties could be said to be in overall control of anything more than the ground they occupied - whether claiming to be a national government or not. In principle it also permitted the local UN commander to use occasional force with discretion to contain local incidents. Bellamy, Williams and

Assembly, A/55/305 S/2000/809, paras 1, 9.

Griffin identify six key characteristics of wider peacekeeping. First, they occur within a context of ongoing violence. Second, such operations tend to take place during ‘new wars’ rather than traditional inter-state conflicts. Third, the military in wider peacekeeping are given tasks beyond the scope of traditional peacekeeping, including the separation of forces, disarming belligerents, organizing and supervising elections, delivering humanitarian aid, protecting civilian UN personnel and those from other governmental and non-governmental organizations, guaranteeing freedom of movement, host state capacity building, monitoring ceasefires and enforcing no-fly zones. Fourth, wider peacekeeping operations witnessed the exponential growth of a civilian ‘humanitarian community’ with whom peacekeepers had to coordinate their activities. Fifth, such missions had to cope with frequently changing mandates. Sixth, there was a wide gap between means and ends.¹⁶⁰ Despite the above it can be argued that wider peacekeeping was merely trying to fit existing tools to new situations rather than looking to discover new tools and methods. Therefore the ‘holy trinity’ of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force, remained the underpinning conditions of wider peacekeeping. Consequently it was accepted that a wider peacekeeping mission which lost any of these three had crossed the so-called and much-feared Mogadishu Line, from which it was believed there could be no going back. If this new doctrine was confusing for the planners in the various national capitals and in the UN, it was even more confusing and frustrating for the deployed peacekeepers. General Sir Rupert Smith, universally acknowledged as one of the most capable and erudite of the UN force commanders at this time, observes in his book, *The Utility of Force*:

As Commander UNPROFOR in Bosnia in 1995 I spent a lot of time trying to

¹⁵⁹ Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *op cit*, pp.128-129.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid* pp.129-130.

explain to a range of senior figures in the UN and various capital cities precisely this issue: that keeping over 20,000 lightly armed troops in the midst of the warring parties was strategically unsustainable and tactically inept; that the presence alone amounts to little. Or, as I used to put it to my international stakeholders, you become a shield of one side and a hostage of the other.¹⁶¹

Inevitably the initial deployment causes all sides to pause to await developments; however with each individual incident a case book builds up and there comes a tipping point after which the intervening force loses credibility with all the warring parties, neither protecting the one, nor intimidating the other. If not rectified, either by progress in negotiations or by a change of mandate to one authorising greater use of force, this development is invariably disastrous, sooner or later, for the innocent people caught up in the struggles to which the peacekeepers have deployed. It was this which Kofi Annan was acknowledging when he wrote:

It is with the deepest regret and remorse that we have reviewed our own actions and decisions in the face of the assault on Srebrenica. Through error, misjudgement and an inability to recognise the scope of the evil confronting us, we failed to do our part to help save the people of Srebrenica from the Serb campaign of mass-murder.The tragedy of Srebrenica will haunt our memory for ever.¹⁶²

Peace Enforcement

Traditionally the term 'peace enforcement' had applied to missions carried out under Chapter VII. Actions so authorised could be either military or civilian, or a mixture of both, with economic sanctions being the most common non-military measures. That there was a middle ground or gap between Chapters VI and VII had long been recognized; in the UN's infancy Dag Hammerskjold had referred to peacekeeping missions falling under Chapter Six and a half. In practice the UN had tried to muddle

¹⁶¹ Smith, General Sir Rupert, *The Utility of Force, The Art of War in the Modern World*, London, Penguin Books Ltd, 2005, p.4.

¹⁶² Shawcross, William, *op cit*, p.155.

through by either attempting to modify Chapter VI missions upwards or place individual limits on Chapter VII enforcement actions. The consequences of these attempts have already been covered. As described above the British concept of Wider Peacekeeping was a further attempt to resolve this dilemma. In 1993 the Americans had also tried to find a doctrine which would embrace peacekeeping ideals but which would explain and permit more dynamic action. They began to develop the theory of ‘Aggravated Peacekeeping’ which was defined as:

Military combat missions conducted by UN authorised forces and designed to monitor and facilitate an existing truce agreement; initially begun as non-combat operations (exclusive of self-defence) and with the consent of all major belligerents, but which subsequently, due to any number of reasons, become combat operations where UN forces are authorised to use force not only for self-defence but for defence of their assigned missions.¹⁶³

Neither ‘Wider Peacekeeping’ nor ‘Aggravated Peacekeeping’ survived for very long. The British deciding in January 1995 to settle for two categories of operation - Peacekeeping and Enforcement - whilst the Americans in their *Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations*, used the term ‘enforcement’ to encompass those functions which the British had originally included in Wider Peacekeeping.¹⁶⁴ Two even more vague terms which briefly emerged in 2000 in an attempt to keep alive the concept of Wider Peacekeeping were Strategic Peacekeeping and Peacekeeping by Proxy - these gleams in the academic eye were to vanish without trace. A further short-lived attempt at definition was the use of the term ‘second generation’ peacekeeping, however, the shortcomings of this term were soon exposed:

In principle therefore, if an operation’s modus operandi goes beyond behaviour which is characteristic of peacekeeping, it cannot be a form of the latter, such as a

¹⁶³ Bellamy, Christopher, *Knights in White Armour - The New Art of War and Peace*, London, Hutchinson, 1996, p.155.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid* p.155.

second generation of it.¹⁶⁵

The UN had itself, on occasions, fallen back on the term ‘Expanded Peacekeeping’ and in early 1994, General Sir Michael Rose, the-then UNPROFOR Commander had used the term ‘Extended Peacekeeping’ in an attempt to give some coherence to the many demands being made on his mission.

UN ‘Authorised’ Missions

The UN still believed that, in some circumstances, the use of military force was a legitimate option for the UN in defence of the Charter’s principles, as stated by Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace*:

The option of taking military action ...is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security.¹⁶⁶

Notwithstanding the plethora of definitions, recent experiences seem to have led the Secretary-General to agree with some external experts in taking a more pragmatic view of the UN’s capacity and capabilities. This view held that, whilst traditional peacekeeping tasks - peace building in areas where conflict had ended and even those tasks described as ‘Protective Engagement’ - were within those capabilities, complex Peace Enforcement missions were probably not:

When the UN is in the direct chain-of-command the prospects for success seem to be generally limited only to consensual peacekeeping, whether traditional or multi-functional. Peace enforcement under UN control simply runs too much against the grain of what the organisation and its members can or are willing to support.¹⁶⁷

More bluntly, Chester Crocker observed that the UN attempt at Peace Enforcement in Somalia

¹⁶⁵ James, A, Is there a second generation of peacekeeping?, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 1, no.4, September- November, 1994, p.11.

¹⁶⁶ Boutros-Ghali, B, *An Agenda for Peace*, New York, UN Department of Public Information, 1992, para 43.

...shows that it cannot manage complex political-military operations when its own structure is an undisciplined and often chaotic set of rival fiefdoms that resist unified command and control in the field at both the military and civilian levels.¹⁶⁸

Delegation to lead nations or to regional organisations was not in itself new to the UN. Indeed the Organisation of American States (OAS) had, between 1948 and 1998, carried out some twenty five operations under such delegation. The end of the Cold War and the consequent rapid increase in the number of missions had led to other regional organisations being ‘franchised’. These included, amongst others, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organisation of African States (also OAS but which became the African Union (AU) in 2002) and in 1992-94, even an observer mission from the European Union (EU) to South Africa. However most of these delegated operations had been relatively small-scale, localised, and with limited aims. With increased demands that the UN fulfil its potential but faced with continuing budget problems and commitments which seemed to expand of their own volition and the inertia which seemed to cause attempts at reform to stall, the UN began to delegate on an increasing scale.

As has already been mentioned, in Rwanda the international community had sought belatedly to recover the situation by use of Chapter VII with France as the lead nation. In Bosnia a similar attempt was made but with a new twist. Recognizing its own limitations the UN ‘franchised’ or subcontracted the extension of the mission to NATO. In fact NATO had been involved almost since the beginning. The first UNPROFOR Headquarters which had deployed to Bosnia in mid 1992 was provided almost entirely

¹⁶⁷ Daniel, D, *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1995 .

¹⁶⁸ Crocker, C, ‘The Lessons of Somalia’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.74, no. 3, p5. Quoted in Hill and Malik, *op cit*, p.185.

from the NATO staff of the Northern Army Group in Germany (NORTHAG), less its German officers, whose government refused their deployment. By the simple expedient of exchanging their national berets for blue ones, the UN acquired for the first time in its history a multinational headquarters whose staff already knew each other personally and who were used to working together to a common doctrine and staff procedures. It is not intended to examine the subsequent development of the Bosnia operation in great detail; however, it is germane to note that whilst the UN retained overall control of the mission, the introduction of NATO and the ensuing hardening of the rules of engagement led to what amounted to limited war actions, including the use of airpower and heavy ground artillery.

The fall of Srebrenica, the subsequent fall of Zepa and the near collapse of Gorazde and Bihac prompted the Security Council to rethink its strategy. The British and French created and deployed a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) that had more robust rules of engagement. After consistent pressure from the US, on 30 August 1995 NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force. Supported with artillery from the RRF, Deliberate Force was a sustained air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs. This was the end of wider peacekeeping in Bosnia and the start of peace enforcement. Within four months the Bosnian war was over.¹⁶⁹

The problems of Bosnia were not over but in a reflection of Sir John Akehurst in Dhofar, the UN Commander in Bosnia could have signaled New York to declare that Bosnia was now secure for civil development. If the aim of Peace Enforcement is to return an area to one in which other forms peacekeeping can take place it could be said to have achieved that aim in Bosnia.

Arriving at PSOs

In the context of examining the convergence of peacekeeping with COIN three other recent UN operations are worthy of note at this stage:

Liberia: An armed insurrection against the legitimate government had begun in 1989. It was so successful that within twelve months the rebels controlled some 90% of the country and were within striking distance of the capital city. At this stage the government appealed to the UN for help. Somewhat tardily the Security Council did not respond until 1991; however ECOWAS did respond. In addition to calling for a ceasefire ECOWAS formed and deployed a Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)¹⁷⁰ of some 3,000 troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone. When the rebels moved to attack the capital they also attacked ECOMOG, which responded by counter-attacking and driving the rebels back, thus restoring a significant amount of territory to the government forces. ECOMOG had never been able to claim ‘consent’ since the rebels had never accepted their presence, but following their action in counter-attacking, there could be no claim to ‘impartiality’ either. ECOWAS had not sought Security Council authorisation for its initial deployment, although it had kept it informed of its actions, so when the Security Council did finally debate the issue it offered only cautious support for the ECOWAS action. However by the end of 1992, when the UN imposed an arms embargo to Liberia, it did commend ECOWAS for its endeavours. In 1993 the UN established and deployed its own Observer Mission to cooperate with ECOMOG on the ground - this signaled another first for the UN, albeit one soon to be repeated elsewhere with more success. The reason for the difficulty was that there was little coordination or consultation between the two missions. As ECOMOG was responsible for all enforcement actions and UNAMIL for monitoring compliance with the ceasefire, this lack of liaison severely affected both missions on occasions. This lack of ‘togetherness’ was obvious to both the opposing

¹⁶⁹ Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *op cit*, p.137.

¹⁷⁰ Description of this formation as a monitoring group is not entirely accurate, it was a mixed-arms force able to both defend itself and to carry out limited offensive operations - as it would soon demonstrate.

factions and the local population. Although the ECOWAS action did achieve a degree of stability by dampening down the conflict, the lack of any joint overall plan for the post-deployment phase, funding constraints and an unwillingness to stay on the ground for the time necessary to achieve complete stability reduced the mission's outcome.

Sierra Leone: Internal conflict had broken out in early 1991 and the UN had become involved in attempting to broker an end to the conflict and return Sierra Leone to civil rule. This activity also involved cooperation with ECOWAS and OAS. However, in 1997 violence broke out again with an attempted coup d'état to depose the President. Despite the only formal UN action being an arms and oil embargo, ECOMOG troops were used to defeat the attempt and restore the President to power. Consequently the UN established and deployed the United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). UNOMSIL was to monitor the new ceasefire, to supervise a disarmament programme and assist in restructuring and training the Government security forces. Two months later this mission was expanded into a larger mission, UNAMSIL, whose expanded tasks resembled elements of wider peacekeeping but also contained some limited commitments to peace enforcement. The mandate suffered from 'mission creep' and eventually amounted to being required to re-establish law and order throughout Sierra Leone. When violence began again the overstretched UN troops, many of whom were badly equipped, insufficiently trained and inadequately-led, were incapable of restoring order, even if all had interpreted their rules of engagement as required. Several incidents occurred in which peacekeepers were either killed or taken hostage. Since many of the local combatants were little more than criminal gangs, often high on alcohol and/or drugs, conventional negotiations had little or no effect. Attempts to get so-called commanders to control their so-called troops often proved counter-productive, as such

negotiations merely fuelled the egos of these commanders and encouraged them to further excesses. These activities continued with some losses on all sides until, in August 2000, a small group of lightly-equipped British troops were captured and held hostage by a group calling itself the West Side Boys. After initially allowing the UN mission (and an attached element of the British Metropolitan Police) to lead negotiations for their release, the British became concerned that the gang holding them was merely stalling and intended to move the hostages and sell them to a third party. In an operation planned and mounted from the United Kingdom it was decided to deploy highly-trained troops of the SAS, SBS and the Parachute Regiment in a helicopter-borne military assault to free the hostages. No concession was made to the UN mandate in what was a full-scale but surgical military insertion carried out with maximum speed and aggression. The assault was extremely successful in that it achieved complete surprise, incurred few British casualties and freed all the hostages unharmed - it is estimated that some 150 of the West Side Boys were killed or wounded and their leader was captured and handed over to the Sierra Leone government. Many members of this gang had been responsible for unspeakable atrocities over the preceding years but after this assault they ceased to exist as a force. The lesson was not lost on similar gangs and despite gloomy predictions that this use of full military force would precipitate an escalation of violent behavior by them, the opposite proved to be true. The short, sharp shock which this military operation caused proved to be the catalyst which provided fresh impetus to the UN mission. Other elements of the mission, especially that from the Indian Army, adopted a similarly hard line to threats and actual use of force against them and in this new climate the original aims of UNAMSIL could make progress. Again, the UN Commander could have echoed Sir John Akehurst – that the area was secure for civil development :

In Sierra Leone, Britain achieved proof of concept, a test case amplifying how

war-termination and peace enforcement can be successfully achieved. Sierra Leone had suffered over a decade of terrible trauma and pain at the hands of a wily, well-armed and entrenched group of rebels. Against all the odds, it has effectively been brought back into the community of nations. In May 2003, the head of the UN refugee agency was able to call post-war Sierra Leone 'an island of stability' in a largely chaotic region. 'There is an enormous difference now,' the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Ruud Lubbers, said of the country, 'and I commend Sierra Leone, as compared to twenty seven months ago, when it was a refugee-producing country.'¹⁷¹

There was another new dimension which surfaced to considerable effect during the Sierra Leone crisis - this was the re-emergence of mercenaries, although under the new and seemingly more respectable guise of Private Military Companies (PMCs). This development will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.

Kosovo: With the Serbian defeat there other elements of 'Greater Serbia' became restless and the situation in Kosovo seemed to indicate that it would be the next threat to peace in the region. (A similar fear in Macedonia appeared to have been satisfactorily contained, in 1993, by prompt UN action which was yet another first for the organisation, a preventative deployment mission. Sadly, initial optimism was not justified and in 2001 NATO and the OSCE became involved in preventing an escalation of the violence.) Ethnic tension in Kosovo had been increasing since the disintegration of Yugoslavia but it was only in 1998 that much attention was focused on the province. It is claimed that the Western nations' motivation to intervene stemmed from three principal concerns, which all originated from their experiences in Bosnia:

The first was the 'Bosnia syndrome'. As NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana put it 'one of the lessons of Bosnia was that acting earlier might have been less costly in the end'. Left unchecked Western leaders feared that Kosovo's crisis would escalate in a similar manner to the earlier Bosnian wars. The second was the 'refugee syndrome', whereby European states feared that conflict in Kosovo would generate a flood of Albanian refugees into Western Europe. The third was the 'Balkan wars syndrome', a belief that that the conflict in Kosovo would

¹⁷¹ Lewis, Damien, *Operation Certain Death*, London, The Random House Group Ltd, 2004, p.591.

expand into a regional imbroglio.¹⁷²

Russia and China initially used their vetoes to block NATO members' attempts to obtain a Chapter VII authorisation to use force to prevent Serbian ethnic cleansing in the province. Eventually, in 1998 approval under Chapter VII was agreed but the use of force was not. Despite this NATO went ahead and crossed into Kosovo with overwhelming military force which it did not hesitate to use - this included, controversially, the strategic bombing of targets in the Serbian capital in Belgrade, including, allegedly by accident, the Chinese Embassy. The Security Council had not authorised this but neither did it subsequently condemn it and when NATO declared the war phase over, the UN agreed to send a mission to cooperate with NATO in coordinating reconstruction in Kosovo. Thus, Kosovo highlights another

...paradoxical relationship between the UN and regional organisations. On the one hand, NATO claimed its use of force was legitimate despite the fact that it had not received explicit authorisation from the Security Council. This had the effect of questioning the Council's primacy on issues of international peace and security. On the other hand, NATO referred to Security Council Resolutions to justify its actions, tried to operate under a UN umbrella and claimed to be upholding the purposes and principles of the UN. This suggests that even powerful states prefer to act with UN authorization rather than without it. NATO's actions in Kosovo thus reignited the debate over one of the central challenges facing UN peacekeepers: whether, as Kofi Annan had asked in his opening speech to the 1999 General Assembly: 'should such a coalition of states' that 'did not receive prompt Council authorisation' should 'stand aside' and allow ethnic cleansing or genocide 'to unfold'.¹⁷³

The journey for the UN since the end of the Cold War has been a long and eventful one, which still continues as events in Afghanistan and Iraq amply demonstrate. However, it is possible to trace a skein of development from Traditional Peacekeeping to the more recent complex and multifaceted missions, which may or may not be led by other organisations. The range of tasks has consistently expanded and the willingness, not

¹⁷² Bellamy, A. J., *Kosovo and International Society*, London, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002, pp.100-2.

¹⁷³ Wheeler, Nicholas, J., *Saving Strangers*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p.294.

without controversy, to use force when it is perceived to be necessary has increased. The last three operations outlined above, whilst containing elements of several of the definitions also described above, do not fit neatly into any of them. Other recent missions, not examined here, have also involved the military component of missions taking on such tasks as maintaining and constructing infrastructure, assisting with institutional capacity building and cooperating with other agencies in community projects by supplying transport and manpower; tasks hitherto more normally associated with non-military peace-building activities or with transitional administration operations. A much broader, generic term was therefore needed, one which could encompass the earlier attempts to redefine peacekeeping. Bringing together the conclusions of the Brahimi Report and the recent experiences of those states most actively involved in such activities has led to the introduction of the term Peace Support Operations. It is generally agreed that three broad concepts underpin PSOs:

First, they should be robust and able to move with ease between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Consent, it is argued, is malleable and therefore peacekeepers should spend their time promoting it and managing it. Second, the peacekeepers should be given the means to achieve the mandate. This involves increasing the amount of consultation between the Security Council and troop-contributing states. Third, peace-support operations are explicitly concerned with establishing liberal societies. The military component is seen as one of several components and not necessarily the most significant one as it was in wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement.¹⁷⁴

The last of these three, whilst mostly accepted in principle, remains contentious in some quarters. A further possible flaw is that in attempting to encompass so many activities and possibilities, it does not help much on the ground, nor does it assist overmuch in planning or conducting future missions - as such it could be said to be a doctrine without much doctrinal thought.

Perhaps the most telling practical omission in the above is that there is no mention of the need for either a clear and agreed mandate or for a central coordinating authority, two imperatives which have been identified repeatedly as being critical to success:

One of the challenges...is keeping the political, military and economic elements of the implementation plan moving forward in a coherent and coordinated manner.¹⁷⁵

And:

It is essential to have an integrated mission plan covering political, humanitarian and military aspects, each dovetailed into and complementing the other.¹⁷⁶

In a different approach to defining PSOs Woodhouse and Ramsbotham suggest:

In PSOs, success will generally be related to the achievement of a number of pre-determined strategic objectives that form elements of the overall political end-state and should be stated in the operation's mandate. The nature of PSOs is such that these objectives will generally relate to the establishment of a secure, stable and self-sustaining environment for the local population. The achievement of a political end-state will be the defining criteria for the success of the entire operation, including the military mission. The achievement of security-related military objectives will usually be a precursor, or stepping stone on the way to attaining the political end-state specified in the operation's mandate.¹⁷⁷

Comparisons

It is striking that contemporary analyses from non-military specialists directly parallels COIN thinking from an earlier generation. In considering this 'harmonizing' of the above with COIN it is worthwhile to repeat the five essential principles defined by Sir Robert Thompson and given earlier in Chapter Three:

The Government under threat should have a clear political aim;
It should function in accordance with the law;
It should establish an overall plan in which political, social, economic, and military responses are carefully laid down;
It should give priority to defeating political subversion; and
It should ensure that its own base areas are secure before mounting a military

¹⁷⁴ Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *op cit*, pp.172-3.

¹⁷⁵ Hume, C, 'The Secretary-General's Representatives', *SAIS Review*, Summer-Fall, 1995, p.81.

¹⁷⁶ Extract from 'Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned From United Nations Operations in Somalia' Lessons Learnt Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, December 1995, para 18.

¹⁷⁷ Woodhouse, T., and Ramsbotham, O., *op cit*, p.78.

campaign.¹⁷⁸

Similarly, reiterating Sir Frank Kitson's four broad COIN principles:

The Government must set up a sound framework of coordinating machinery at every level for the direction of the campaign;
Arrangements for ensuring that the insurgents do not win the war for the minds of the people;
An intelligence organisation suited to the circumstances; and
A legal system adequate to the needs of the moment.¹⁷⁹

Both the above acknowledged experts stress political primacy in COIN operations, the fact that military successes in the field can only provide the opportunity for civil development to take place and that any COIN operation will be a long haul task - Thompson going so far as to suggest that, with luck, such operations could be concluded in ten years but that twenty years will be the norm. Allowing for the different international circumstances pertaining at the time in which they were writing and substituting the word 'mission' for 'Government', the similarities between the two sets of COIN principles and those urged for PSOs are obvious enough for even those suspicious of any military involvement in peacekeeping operations to consider the possible application of the theory and practice of COIN operations to the circumstances of modern PSOs, particularly those which begin with intervention. This is not to say that all classic COIN experience can simply be imposed or adopted today. The modern world is vastly different; increased globalisation, the expansion of the capabilities and influence of the media and the exponential proliferation of NGOs are just some of the developments which have taken place since the last successful classic COIN operations. There is another huge difference and it is one that has hampered the UN throughout its long journey: COIN continually stresses the need to use information as a primary weapon, to understand and communicate directly and effectively with the local population; and as

¹⁷⁸ Thompson, R., *Countering Communist Insurgency*, London, Chatto and Windus, 1966, pp.50-7.

¹⁷⁹ Kitson, Frank, *Bunch of Five*, London, Faber & Faber, 1977, pp.290-1.

intelligence to dominate the insurgents. Whilst the UN has begun to accept the need for both, particularly in Peace Enforcement operations, it is still uncomfortable with the military and diplomatic need to have an active intelligence-gathering facility for the latter function. The implications of these factors will be discussed in Chapter five.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SITUATION TODAY

‘Long is the way and hard, that out of Hell leads up to light!’

John Milton, *Paradise Lost*

Globalisation

The end of the Cold War and the increased globalization, political multipolarity and technological advances in communications have resulted in a world very different from that which existed when COIN doctrine was being developed and practiced. However, naïve talk of a ‘peace dividend’ was soon replaced by concerns over ‘failed states’ and the emerging spectre of global terrorism. As has been shown in the preceding chapters, the efforts of the international community, mainly through the medium of the UN, to contain or control the outbreaks of violent conflict which erupted into this Superpower vacuum began with a rapid expansion in the number and variety of UN missions. The new circumstances meant that these missions were no longer hampered by the constant Security Council power play and veto-throwing which had bedeviled previous peace missions. Consequently, the international community had higher expectations of success for these missions but an unreformed UN was neither structured nor culturally prepared for this new atmosphere and as has been discussed in previous chapters, was unable to deliver on these expectations. The complexities of the new missions, the steep learning curve and the sheer number of occasions when the UN was tempted or goaded to become involved meant that an increasing number of missions were ‘franchised’ out to already existing and newly-forming regional organisations. In addition to these regional organisations several other international organisations gained in significance and influence in consequence of the ending of the Cold War. Prominent amongst these were those which had constituted what is sometimes known as the ‘Bretton Woods’ system.

Set up in the aftermath of WWII in recognition of the increasing global nature of economics and commerce, it had attempted to find a constructive compromise between so-called 'free marketeers' and those who advocated a more social democratic system - this compromise has been termed 'embedded liberalism'. Although going through something of a crisis in the 1970s, its primary organisations have continued to play a prominent role in overseeing and regulating the global economy. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is one such example. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), especially the Group of Seven (G7), exercises what those outside it consider to be undue and self-interested influence. Perhaps not surprisingly, the majority of PKOs have taken place outside the OECD states¹⁸⁰ and this has increased the tension between members and non-members, as the number of new states has increased dramatically since the Cold War. Very many of these new states required considerable and varied assistance and coupled with the fact that many existing but poor states had lost the assistance which, for political and strategic reasons, they had received previously from the superpowers, with the result that the existing imperfect systems for supplying economic assistance and aid were overwhelmed. This situation obviously also affected the UN's own specialised agencies in this field, which had hitherto regarded themselves as being outside the field of peacekeeping.

With the end of the Cold War there was increasing recognition amongst international organizations of every kind that not only was there a definite link between poverty, inequality, debt and violent conflict (even where other, more immediate causes of conflict seemed to predominate), but that there was a need to adopt

¹⁸⁰ Bellamy, Williams, Griffin, *op cit*, p.17.

‘peace-friendly’ adjustment programmes as part of viable strategies of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The World Bank now looks to work in close partnership with other agencies which have major responsibilities for peacekeeping, as well as working with governments and civic associations at a much earlier stage than previously would have been the case. It also seeks more involvement in the processes of reconstruction, reconciliation and where appropriate, reintegration. It also introduced principles of involvement in post-conflict reconstruction. To that end the World Bank has set up a Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (CPRU) which, since 1997, has administered a Post-Conflict Fund (PCF). During the period 1998-2005 some 120 grants, totaling \$61.5 million were made through the PCF¹⁸¹. However the extent to which the World Bank, the IMF and the numerous international financial organisations help rather than hinder these processes is still hotly argued.

Transnational Corporations (TNCs)

Equally, the end of the Cold War, consequent globalisation and the growth of new states opened up irresistible opportunities for both international and national companies. Many of the new states were possessed of natural resources which they were unable to exploit efficiently but which were highly attractive to TNCs. Whilst from the perspective of long-term stable investment it was desirable to have a peaceful environment in these states, many TNCs were willing to take a risk in less stable environments. In practice this has sometimes meant that in failed states, deals have been struck in regions which are virtually autonomous and under the control of only one of the contesting parties. This has led to two highly significant developments. First, by entering into such deals TNCs are actively assisting the party which controls that area, whether that is the supposed

¹⁸¹ Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., Miall, H., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, (2nd ed), Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006, p.222.

government of the state or those rebelling against it. Second, in order to increase the security of the operation and their workforce the TNCs have, whether there is an international PSO in progress or not, employed private organisations to protect their interests. Since the revenues generated by the first factor enable the party involved to carry on the conflict more successfully with consequent hopes of ultimate victory this both prolongs the struggle and in some cases changes the direction of the struggle in that all sides seek to gain control of those areas where the resources are to be found. Such struggles have often been given the title of ‘resource wars’ or ‘conflict trade wars’.

TNCs...persist in conducting commercial activities that help sustain warlords or other belligerents in a conflict. Some corporations contribute to war economies and what is commonly called ‘conflict trade’.....Such trade has been important in conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, Liberia and Sierra Leone, and includes both export and import of goods to a war zone as well as extra-territorial trade undertaken by supporters of a warring faction.¹⁸²

However, as will be shown later, it is increasingly being acknowledged that they are also a potential major factor for good.

Private Military Companies (PMCs)

As alluded to above, TNCs have increasingly resorted to employing private security organisations to protect their interests and personnel. The involvement of private companies in conflicts is not a new development. As previously described the UN operation in the Congo was initially seriously jeopardised by the presence of well-trained and well-organised mercenaries; and on a varying scale such ‘soldiers of fortune’ continue to play a role in many African conflicts. However, since the 1990s, the growth of private companies involved in a variety of security aspects world-wide has grown rapidly. Some experts prefer to differentiate between PMCs and private security companies (PSCs), seeing PSCs as providing more passive security services such as

guarding installations and personnel, providing security training/advice to employees and providing security/risk assessments. To PMCs are ascribed the more active and controversial roles of training - and sometimes accompanying - military units for combat operations, the giving of strategic advice and sometimes actual combat operations. However in reality the gap between PSCs and PMCs is very small and not infrequently crossed. Undeniably the field has become a global industry, generating in 2001 on a rising trend, approximately \$20 billion a year.¹⁸³ Whilst purists may abhor the use of PMCs there is no doubt that they have on occasions been very successful, either in a support role to more 'legitimate' PSO operations or when acting independently. One such organisation was the South African-based company Executive Outcomes. This company was active in both Angola and Sierra Leone and even critics admit that its role was pivotal in both instances:

In 1993, Executive Outcomes (EO) was hired by Sonangol, an Angolan parastatal company, to secure the Soyo oilfield and the computerized pumping station owned by Chevron, Petrangol, Texaco and Elf-Fina-Gulf. This had been under attack since a 1992 UN-brokered peace agreement collapsed. A small force from EO backed by two Angolan battalions regained the oilfield early in 1993. EO then withdrew, leaving the Angolan battalions in place, but Soyo was subsequently recaptured by UNITA. In September that same year, the Angolan government agreed a more far-reaching contract with EO to conquer and defend diamond-mining areas in Cafunfo province and elsewhere, train their troops and to direct operations against UNITA. The contract, reportedly worth \$40 million, included a supply of arms as well as training. With the assistance and sometimes participation of EO personnel, Angolan government forces won a series of victories during 1994. The recapture of the diamond fields in Lunda Note in June 1994 is commonly seen as a turning point in the war, partly because it reduced UNITA's capacity to pay for its operations. In November 1994, UNITA signed a peace agreement in Lusaka, which included a provision for the withdrawal of foreign forces. Nevertheless, EO remained in Angola until December 1995 when it was withdrawn.....Although EO never had more than 500 men in Angola (indeed it often had far fewer), it is generally regarded as having tilted the military balance in Angola at a far lower cost, politically and fiscally, than could have been accomplished through direct aid to Angola's military. This in turn, facilitated the ceasefire and the Lusaka Peace Agreement. EO lost eleven

¹⁸² Bellamy, Williams, Griffin, *op cit*, p.190.

¹⁸³ Singer, P., 'Corporate Warriors', *International Security*, 26 (3), 2001, p.199.

personnel (with seven missing).¹⁸⁴

Not mentioned in the above quote is the fact that even if the UN had been able to put together a similar operation, both the cost and the time required to mount it would have been exponentially greater. In Sierra Leone between 1995 and January 1997 EO unarguably tilted the balance in favour of the government which the UN and the international community were supporting. Within four months of the EO operation being terminated and despite a considerable UN presence, the government was overthrown and the capital, Freetown, sacked by the rebel RUF. As detailed in Chapter Four the situation was only restored by ECOMOG troops ignoring the UN mission and undertaking direct military action against the RUF.

This is not to suggest that either the international community or the UN should subcontract to PMCs as a part of a PSO strategy. Indeed, the same British Green Paper quoted above outlines several reasons for questioning their use. These revolve around their accountability, their relationship to state sovereignty, their effectiveness in promoting or respecting human rights, whether they can address the underlying causes of conflict and political instability, whether they may not have a vested interest in the perpetuation of violent conflict and finally whether they can successfully be integrated into the structure of a UN or regional organisation's mission¹⁸⁵. These are legitimate concerns but with regard to the question of seeking to perpetuate violent conflict it may be observed that, so far, their record of concluding missions in a timely fashion bears favourable comparison with the UN's questionable track record. Whereas the UN may have reservations about using PMCs it no longer does so with regard to PSCs:

¹⁸⁴ House of Commons, *Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation*, London, The Stationery Office, Green Paper HC 577, 2002, p.11.

The UN has also already used a variety of PSCs in ancillary roles for logistics, air transport, de-mining and security consultation. UNAMSIL, for instance, has received logistical support from Pacific Architects and Engineers, DSL provides security for UN infrastructure and personnel in Kinshasa.¹⁸⁶

In addition, as will be demonstrated later, even humanitarian aid agencies and a variety of other NGOs are now turning to both PMCs and PSCs for assistance and protection. So, whether there are reservations regarding their use or not, such companies would appear to be a significant factor in conflict zones.

NGOs

As the hopes of a 'peace dividend' began to fade it became obvious that there were many parts of the globe where conflicts or potential conflicts were creating areas of great suffering and deprivation. Such instances were in addition to those areas where natural conditions or Cold War proxy wars had already created similar conditions. In such a situation it is not surprising that the number of aid agencies began to increase; during this growth period, a new type of NGO gained prominence. These NGOs saw themselves as providing a range of services beyond immediate material aid. These typically include, amongst others, conflict resolution, capacity-building and democracy-building; yet others specialise in perhaps only one aspect such as gender equality training. The field is now vast, with some humanitarian agencies having considerable budgets and personnel strengths, whilst others struggle along with contributions from street collections and a handful of volunteers. This growth has also provided the impetus for a new range of such organisations in the crisis areas themselves and these can often provide an invaluable and much needed, but often neglected, understanding of local conditions and perspectives. One of the problems this growth in the number and variety of all such agencies has been that of definition - what constitutes an NGO? Whilst the debate continues and there is no

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid*, pp.14-20.

universal consensus, for the purposes of this work that suggested by Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham will be used:

NGOS are defined as private, self-governing, non-profit institutions dedicated to alleviating human suffering, promoting education, economic development, health, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution, and encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.¹⁸⁷

As might be expected, the efficiency and efficacy of all these NGOs is extremely variable but there is no doubt they have made and continue to make, a significant contribution in those areas to which they deploy. This is recognised by both the UN and the international community. In 1999 the UN-affiliated Union of International Associations recognized over 14,500 different international NGOs¹⁸⁸, whereas by 2004:

NGOs concerned with humanitarianism, broadly conceived, and eligible within the UN system to receive external funding, number approximately 50,000 and are responsible for disbursing at least half of all humanitarian aid (excluding food aid) to the developing world.....Since the 1980s, governments have increasingly contracted NGOs to implement aid and development projects. Over 75 per cent of this aid is disbursed through the twenty largest American and European NGOs and networks, such as the International Council of Voluntary Agencies and Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies.¹⁸⁹

Sceptics point out that by giving money and materiel to NGOs the UN and governments can claim to be responding to faraway crises without becoming directly involved and without facing domestic criticism if the situation remains unresolved. Equally it is claimed that NGOs have sometimes skillfully used the media to appeal directly to a government's home population in order to pressure that government into becoming directly involved. NGOs are able to do this because they are often out on the ground and operating long before the moment when intervention is considered necessary. This prior

¹⁸⁶ Bellamy, Williams, Griffin, *op cit*, p.208.

¹⁸⁷ Woodhouse, T, and Ramsbotham, O., (ed) 2nd ed, 2005, *op cit*, p.124.

¹⁸⁸ Jett, Dennis, C., *op cit*, p.10.

involvement can cause friction when peacekeepers of whatever category are then deployed. There are several reasons for this but most arise because of a fundamental difference between the typical NGOs 'flat' or non-hierarchical organisational structure and the more formal structure which characterises more conventional organisations, whether civilian or military. Whilst it is with the latter that most friction traditionally occurs, organisations such as the UN and UNHCR often find dealing with NGOs equally difficult. Much of this difficulty stems from differing views over the concept of NGO 'neutrality'. NGOs quite rightly point out that they do not wish to be allied to any of the conflicting parties to a dispute and that only by insisting on this can they hope to help the victims of conflict and continue their operations in safety. By extension, some NGOs argue, this must also include avoiding any actions which might make it appear that they are a part of any PSO. Even when the organisation itself may adopt a broader view there have been instances when individual field workers have refused to cooperate. It must also be admitted that some NGOs even extend this non-cooperation policy to other aid agencies operating in the same area.¹⁹⁰ Those who criticise this interpretation of neutrality argue that simply by bringing food and other necessary supplies into a combat zone NGOs are complicit in the problem:

Humanitarian assistance has military implications because soldiers, be they government or rebel, will always eat before civilians. No armed group is going to go hungry while unarmed relief workers distribute food aid to noncombatants in an area under its control. The theft and sale of food also provides funds to sustain armies by providing the cash to buy arms, ammunition, and other essentials of war or simply to enrich the combatants.¹⁹¹

The combatants may not need to steal these things since the civilian population will give such items willingly to those they deem their defenders. In addition, the equipment the

¹⁸⁹ Duffield, M., *Global Governance and the New Wars*, London, Zed Books, 2001, pp.53-57.

¹⁹⁰ The author's own experiences as Deputy Head of Civil Affairs, HQ UNPROFOR, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992-93.

NGOs bring into theatre is often considered to be fair game for combatants who may lack such 'high-tech' items. In Liberia in 1996, fighters from a variety of organisations raided the premises of relief agencies and amongst other items seized over 500 vehicles and communications equipment valued at \$8 million. Other critics point out that by observing strict neutrality, NGOs bestow equal legitimacy on all the parties to the conflict - a policy which often conflicts with human rights issues. A further concern is expressed by human rights NGOs who criticise those NGOs who open and operate the refugee centres which inevitably develop where aid is available. Due to the speed with which these centres develop and the numbers which appear, it is impossible to differentiate between 'innocent' victims and the perpetrators of the very atrocities which have caused the population to flee in the first place. This was an issue with particularly tragic consequences in Rwanda. Single issue NGOs are also prone to ignore the general situation in their concern for the issues for which they were founded and funded; this attitude can often directly endanger the aims of the PSO and at best is guaranteed to cause irritation and friction.

NGOs, some of which have developed philosophical approaches to relief and development, guard their autonomy with such energy that they sometimes seem to be suggesting that autonomy is a form of strategy. It is not. In fact it is one reason why international responses to emergencies have been so chaotic.¹⁹²

All too often, in reality, this understandable desire to operate neutrally means that NGOs can only operate when, where and how those with the guns allow - this is particularly so in non-state or intra-state conflict. Sadly this even applies increasingly to NGOs with a venerable, proven and hitherto respected neutrality such as the International Red Cross. Ironically, in an attempt to continue to avoid contact with peacekeepers, many NGOs in

¹⁹¹ Jett, Dennis, C., *op cit*, p.135.

¹⁹² *Ibid*, p.143.

the more violent theatres have opted to hire armed bodyguards, either from PMCs or more dangerously, from local sources - more dangerously because in many cases the only armed personnel available are from one or other of the conflicting parties.

As was noted in the initial chapter however, many of these potential friction points are often minimised informally on the ground and are more feared than real. There are also signs that both the military and NGOs are beginning to realise that some level of cooperation is essential, although the level may differ from operation to operation:

Recently, attitudes on both sides have begun to change. Exposure to each other's strengths and capabilities has served to increase the military's respect for the innovation and dedication of NGOs, and to foster an appreciation among NGOs for the unsurpassed logistical capacity of the military. In recent years, militaries have sought to improve their coordination with NGOs by creating civil-military operations centres (CMOCs) or other coordinating mechanisms that allow military, NGO and international organisation personnel to meet and work together to advance mutual goals... They do not, however, serve as coordinating mechanisms, and they have a mixed record in bringing the three communities together.¹⁹³

The UN has also taken steps to improve the situation, for example in Sierra Leone, even going so far as to appoint a separate Special Representative specifically to help coordinate the efforts of the many NGOs involved there. However, the fact remains NGOs do not naturally see themselves as partners of either the UN or military elements which may be conducting PSOs and this attitude makes them a 'wild card' in any attempt to evolve a coherent and comprehensive strategy to address both the violence and hoped-for post-conflict stability. However there are occasions when NGOs have been the catalyst which has led to military intervention in the first place. Modern technology and the spread of 24 hour TV news channels have enabled NGOs to exploit the 'something must be done' syndrome to put pressure on governments and the UN to

deploy troops to protect the aid convoys. However, since the mentality and perceived low-level of competence of troops with a caravan guard role are often seen more as attractive targets than deterrents, this frequently leads to situations where ‘mission creep’ becomes almost inevitable.

Improvements in Modern Communications and Information Technology

Awareness of the utility of media communications is not new, neither is its use to influence third parties. As discussed in Chapter Three, as early as 1900, the Filipino insurgent, Emilio Aguinaldo had based his strategy of resistance to the Americans on the hope that he could influence the American electorate to vote out the President who had authorised US annexation of the Philippines. He failed but he did succeed in getting hitherto unprecedented coverage in the US media. General Grivas in Cyprus in the 1950s had realised he would be unable to defeat the British militarily so had sought through terrorism and guerilla warfare to cause both the British public and the wider world to demand that British troops be withdrawn - he too had failed. However by the time of the US involvement in Vietnam advances in technology had brought such situations, on a daily basis, into the living rooms of populations far away from the scene of the action, President Diem allegedly observing to the US Ambassador that the war would be won or lost on that front alone. The advent of 24 hour news channels has added yet another dimension. The pressures of competition, the need to seek and maintain advertising and therefore pursue high viewing figures have led to increased sensationalism of the news. A perception that viewing audiences have a low boredom threshold has led to a ‘sound bite’, highly visual but low on reasoned commentary style even when the reporter in question is actually on the scene:

The problem is that a reporter standing in the midst of a battlefield provides a

¹⁹³ Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, *op cit*, pp.133-4.

worm's eye view of events that is usually devoid of context, analysis, or opposing points of view. It is these images, however, that often determine how and when decisions are made.¹⁹⁴

The vocabulary used by reporters is often designed to heighten the drama of the visual images. Whole countries are now said to be 'rocked' by relatively minor incidents; cities 'reel' at a murder which happens to be the only one which has caught the headlines; senior police or emergency services officials are said to be 'devastated' by incidents which they must have witnessed many times in their careers; and 'talking heads' with no direct experience of the situation on the ground solemnly predict the most dire consequences for every incident or action. Since advances in technology now allow teams on the ground to report back live and in colour as an incident is unfolding, millions of households now see the reports even before the decision-makers. Thus, at a time when career politicians see themselves in need of constant favourable exposure in the media and thus court popular opinion above all else, it is not surprising that all branches of the media have become so powerful. Long-term or difficult decisions are often foregone in favour of short-term popular ones. This ability of the media to dictate the agenda is often known as the CNN factor. A former US Secretary-of-State commented:

We have yet to understand how profoundly the impact of CNN has changed things. The public hears of an event now in real time, before the State Department has time to think about it. Consequently, we find ourselves reacting before we've had time to think. This is now how we determine foreign policy - it's driven more by daily events reported on TV than it used to be.¹⁹⁵

Since the media interest and opinion can fluctuate at whim they can be for a particular course of action one day and against it the next:

US fortunes in Somalia serve for some commentators as the paradigmatic case of

¹⁹⁴ Jett, Dennis, C., *op cit*, p.56.

¹⁹⁵ Pearce, D., *Wary Partners - Diplomats and the Media*, Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1995, p.18.

real time's alleged 'push-me-pull-me' effects, television images catalysing intervention, and equally quixotically insisting on withdrawal. In the words of one US congressman, 'pictures of starving children, not policy objectives, got us into Somalia in 1992. Pictures of US casualties, not the completion of our objectives, led us to exit Somalia.'¹⁹⁶

A corresponding development in communications technology now allows politicians and officials many miles from the action to involve themselves in decision-making at every level, even down to individual units on the ground, without intermediate levels of command even being aware that such communication has occurred. This combination makes operations such as counter-insurgency and peacebuilding, both of which are by definition long-term, extremely difficult to conduct strategically.

The warring parties opposing such operations are also well aware of this factor and are often skilful in their manipulation of it. Attacks are timed to take place when and where the media are known to be present; some even being sophisticated enough to time the attack to be sure that it will make the main item on the peak daily news without giving the authorities time to decide how to react to it. This can be particularly devastating when people watching at home are actually able to see soldiers whom they know personally at risk and under attack. So-called insurgent leaders, suitably masked, will give exclusive interviews in which they claim to be defeating the intervening troops and speak of having hundreds of volunteers poised to commit further attacks. Such interviews are often transmitted with no attempt to discover if anything about the interview is authentic. It is a curious fact that hardened journalists who will give no credence whatever to government information will accept uncritically whatever is given to them by insurgents and warlords:

¹⁹⁶ Carruthers, Susan L., *The Media at War*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000, p.206.

Canadian Major General Lewis MacKenzie, at the end of his term as Commander of UNPROFOR in July 1992 regretted his inability to extract a cease-fire, because he could not 'keep the two sides from firing on their OWN POSITIONS [author's own emphasis] for the benefit of CNN'. Combatants' propensity to play up for the cameras may raise troubling ethical questions for reporters about what purpose reporting war serves and to whom, if anyone, they owe humanitarian obligations. The 'war tourist', after all, generally enjoys the luxury of being able to leave at any time. Others are less fortunate, and their plight may be aggravated by the mere presence of tourists casually visiting their war.¹⁹⁷

Two further recent developments are also highly significant. These are the internet and mobile phones. The former allows any organisation or individual to place their point of view before millions of observers without authentication or counter-argument; or to show violent images, such as the live execution of hostages, uncensored in order to sway faraway public opinion or encourage their own supporters. Mobile phones allow any individual to instantly transmit images, real or staged, to friends or the media; these can then be re-broadcast internationally. The rowdy scenes transmitted by mobile phone of Saddam Hussein's execution will no doubt have similar repercussions. These instances can have a significant effect on the progress of the mission but there is little or nothing those charged with command of the operation can do to prevent or counter them.

Warlords and 'Spoilers'

The fact that many of the more recent PSOs have deployed into situations where the conflict is intra-state rather than inter-state has already been discussed:

Between 1989 and 1994 there were a total of ninety-four armed conflicts occurring in sixty-four different locations. Of the 232 parties to these conflicts, sixty-eight were states while 164 were non-state actors. Although not all of these non-governmental actors directly participate in combat they are deeply involved in the management and conduct of violent conflicts around the globe.¹⁹⁸

Whilst several COIN operations were conducted against insurgents composed of rival

¹⁹⁷ Carruthers, Susan L., *op cit*, p.243.

¹⁹⁸ Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *op cit*, pp.189-190.

factions these factions normally had a common goal to which they broadly subscribed. In more recent conflict areas the number and diversity of armed factions has been much greater and it is more difficult to discern any common goal beyond a general desire to keep the conflict going. Peacekeepers from former-Yugoslavia to Africa and Afghanistan have faced warlords who have no desire to see any stability in their areas beyond that which themselves impose through violence. However since there is often no effective central government and other local actors may be reluctant to confront the warlords, it has resulted in peacekeepers, whose mission may not allow direct military action, being forced to deal with such individuals. This, in turn, increases the warlords' influence and credibility and makes the mission's aim even more difficult to achieve. If, as happened in 1993 in Somalia when twenty Pakistani peacekeepers were murdered by the warlord Aidid, the mission has to respond to intense provocation, it must either become a combatant in the conflict, thus abandoning neutrality, or negotiate with the warlord and risk sending a message that peacekeepers can be murdered with impunity. In Somalia, the attempt to attack Aidid ended in failure for the world's only Superpower; arguably a more damaging result than if he had been left alone. Even more recently the threat of global terrorism and the spread of violent Islamic fundamentalism has led to individuals and groups from outside the immediate conflict zone moving there in order to further their broader agenda. These groups are sometimes supported openly or clandestinely by states outside the conflict zone. Steven Stedman suggests that there are three categories of spoiler - limited, greedy and total. He further suggests that different tactics may be employed to counter them. The limited spoiler may be susceptible to inducements of one sort or another; socialization is a possible long-term option with the greedy spoiler; but with the total spoiler who views the conflict in all-or-nothing terms

the only option may be to defeat him by use of force.¹⁹⁹ The first two options can be seen as rewarding the spoiler and the latter option removes neutrality from the mission.

Implications For COIN operations

Globalisation, whilst creating a situation where there are no longer quiet parts of the globe in which COIN operations can be conducted away from outside interest and scrutiny, has also raised awareness that local flash-points and conflicts - potential or imminent - can no longer be ignored. Whilst this has led to the 'something must be done' syndrome there is now sufficient experience of such events that precipitate involvement is usually avoided. Thus, when military force is deployed it is usually now only after much discussion and on an understanding that the mandate must be both sensible and achievable. This does not mean that all eventualities will have been considered or even that the mandate will be appropriate to the current situation on the ground, but it does mean that there is greater acceptance of the need for the military to have a mandate which allows them to use force to a greater extent than was previously considered normal. The greater understanding and commitment of organisations such as the World Bank and OECD, whilst still not universally seen as beneficial, does ensure that the economic aspects of stabilisation and peace building are given both a higher profile and are possessed of potentially better funding. TNCs prefer a stable environment and as a general rule only deal direct with warlords and other such non-state actors when they perceive that PSOs are failing to deliver that environment. Adherence to COIN principles and practices in conflict or immediate post-conflict zones gives a better chance of success than more passive and restricted missions. TNCs are more likely therefore to support COIN operations, particularly if they are represented on the various levels of

¹⁹⁹ Stedman, Stephen John, Conflict Prevention as Strategic Interaction: The Spoiler Problem and the Case of Rwanda, in Peter Wallensteen (ed.), *Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past Record and Future*

committees, as they frequently were in classical COIN – vide the rubber plantations in Malaya. At the international level no lesser person than UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan acknowledged the contribution which the private sector could make towards development, stabilization and peace when, in 2000, he announced his scheme for a Global Compact:

‘With his Global Compact, launched in 2000, he spurs companies to devote themselves to development in co-operation with governments, UN organisations, trade unions and NGOs. This Global Compact has grown into a network with hundreds of participants from all the sectors Kofi Annan envisaged.’²⁰⁰

TNCs employ local people and also sub-contract to local firms of all sizes, so their potential influence runs deep and since the prime aim post-disturbance, or in an insurgency situation, is to restore and establish some semblance of normality. The provision of jobs, food and merchandise is vital to that process. At the local level there are often organizations such as Chambers of Commerce and Trade Unions which are frequently ignored by peacekeepers and NGOs. These organizations, even if initially moribund, possess great background knowledge and persons of potential influence. The TNCs do seek out such organizations and use that knowledge and influence:

‘In April 2004, the then German CEO of Siemens AG, Heinrich von Pierer, was invited to address the UN Security Council on the subject of business and peace. Von Pierer, a dedicated advocate of a combined effort by business and international agencies to bring peace in conflict-prone regions, also spoke of the involvement of Siemens in the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. In his speech to the UN he said; *Alone business could not change the world. But together with public partners, business could make decisive contributions in the struggle against violence, against anarchy and against terrorism – and for civilization, freedom and prosperity.*’²⁰¹

Challenges, Uppsala, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1998, pp. 67-86.

²⁰⁰ Bais, K. and Huijser, M., *The Profit of Peace, Corporate Responsibility in Conflict Regions*, Sheffield, Greenleaf Publishing Ltd., 2005, p 19

It would seem sensible therefore to include them in deliberations and planning wherever possible.

PMCs are less necessary in an environment where the level of security is better and where they are used are more likely to cooperate and be influenced by mission troops who are seen to be possessed of good information and capable of acting on it.

The greater number of both international NGOs and local NGOs is a new and complicating dimension. However, there are both signs and concrete examples of greater mutual understanding of each other's roles and practices, for example, a major international conference, held in 2002 and organised by the European Centre for Conflict Prevention which sought to evaluate recent experience and practices, noted in its summary that:

The transformation of the security sector is critical to the success of peace agreements and the fostering of structural stability so that societies can live in a safe and secure environment [...]

Problems

Security is essential to development - people must be safe and feel safe. This means that the threat of armed violence must be reduced; when people see better ways of achieving security, justice and progress they are less inclined to engage in armed violence [...]

Involvement of local communities

Local communities should be consulted and involved in police reform processes. Local partners are able to build trust and confidence between the police on the one hand and the communities they work in on the other hand.²⁰²

These are all high priorities in COIN but are seldom tackled in a joined-up manner, if at all, in peacekeeping missions. This increased mutual understanding will not entirely remove the friction points but it reduces them to being an extra dimension rather than a barrier. Additionally, the greater number of local NGOs increases the chances of good

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, p20

²⁰² Galama, A. and van Tongeren, P., *Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice: On Lessons Learnt, Evaluation Practices and Aid & Conflict*, Utrecht, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2002, p.38.

and timely information exchanges between the local population and the intervening mission. Since COIN also places a high priority on this process this too can only be an advantage.

Improvements in information and communications technology bring both advantages and disadvantages. As already mentioned, the advent of 24 hour news channels, the internet and mobile phones have meant that long-term strategies are subject to daily, often unbalanced and ill-informed analysis, which can sway public opinion, with the consequence that there is considerable pressure on the mission commanders to deliver short-term success which is often inappropriate or even damaging to the long-term objectives. The daily news broadcasts and commentaries may well prove to be the most significant difference between earlier successful COIN operations and those taking place today. Whether predominantly Western governments can develop the vision and determination to withstand and counter such daily pressure remains to be seen. If they cannot then no mission in such circumstances will be successful, whether COIN based or not. Conversely, if international organisations, governments and mission commanders can learn to utilise these new developments as adroitly as the warring parties have sometimes done, there is no reason why they should not increase the chances of mission support and success. On the ground, these new technologies also allow the mission commanders and their supporting governments to circumvent the spoilers and get their information and policies over to the local population directly.

Whilst warlords, in their contemporary manifestation, pose a more diverse threat than the insurgents and guerrillas faced in classical COIN operations, it is question of degree rather than a significant new factor. Similarly, there were always outside spoilers present

and active in those earlier campaigns. In the main, it is modern technology which has made both a more formidable threat. However, whilst this is true of most current deployments it may be that the situation is different in Iraq, where it is difficult to discern any real centre of gravity amongst the opposition yet.

More Recent PSOs

If one accepts that the broad definition of PSOs embraces most types of mission it appears that the international community, acting either directly or indirectly under the UN banner, has begun to take an interest in such missions again.

By 2001, the number of military and police personnel serving with UN peacekeeping missions...had risen to 47,800. By 2004 the number had risen again to more than 60,000 peacekeepers...deployed in sixteen missions. Of these sixteen, seven were new missions deployed between 1999 and 2004: in the DR Congo, Eritrea-Ethiopia, East Timor, Liberia, Burundi, Ivory Coast and Haiti. All of these are sizeable missions with complex mandates and authorised with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.²⁰³

In other words they represent the more robust, flexible and better equipped missions which the Brahimi Report had suggested were necessary and for which some have suggested the term 'third generation' peacekeeping.

Some of these more robust missions have in fact followed several traditional COIN principles, particularly, but not exclusively, those with British involvement. As described in Chapter Four KFOR, authorised under Chapter VII and provided and commanded by NATO, was responsible for military and security aspects, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was responsible for all legislative and executive powers, including the administration of the judiciary. These responsibilities included the

²⁰³ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall, *op cit*, p.149.

restoration of public services, creation and deployment of civilian police, development of an economic recovery plan and stable institutions for the promotion of democratic and autonomous self-government. This was to be achieved by dividing the task into four so-called pillars, each pillar having a separate lead organisation:

Pillar One consists of the civilian administration under UN direction; Pillar Two carries out humanitarian assistance led by UNHCR; Pillar Three is concerned with democratization and institution-building led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); and Pillar Four, led by the European Union, is charged with economic reconstruction.²⁰⁴

Whether UNMIK will ultimately prove to be successful remains to be seen but with the military being responsible for providing the secure environment within which the ‘Pillars’ can carry out their work and with all other necessary steps towards stabilisation and self-sufficiency being addressed concurrently within an overall plan, the core principles of COIN are being observed. Having each of the Pillars directed by a different international organisation is a complication but providing there is agreement on the overall aim and sufficient cooperation at all levels between the Pillars the difficulties in coordination should not prove insurmountable.

In Sierra Leone it was the British armed intervention to release the hostages which regained the initiative for the UN mission and ended the farce of ill-disciplined criminal gangs of spoilers being accorded a *de facto* legitimacy they never deserved. That this is acknowledged even by those academics who have spent their lives committed to the furtherance of peace is a sign of a new realism which opens the door for a re-examination of COIN doctrines and principles:

The British troops’ rescue of UNAMSIL, and their combined success in getting the peace process back on track, ultimately enabling ‘free and fair’ elections to

²⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p151.

return President Kabbah to power the following year, suggests the effectiveness of UK PSO doctrine in practice.²⁰⁵

In East Timor, Australia, acting as lead nation for and supported by contributions from the Association of South Eastern Nations (ASEAN), had provided the bulk of the troops. The International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) was there to support and protect the first UN mission and ensure a secure environment for the handover from that mission to the second; the cooperation and coordination in this deployment was particularly praised, as was the operational synergy achieved within the various national elements of INTERFET²⁰⁶. In all three missions, INTERFET, UNAMET and UNTAET there was much more consultation with local NGOs, which helped in the process of both gathering and disseminating information. The potential danger of friction over the considerable oil and mineral resources in the Timor Gap was also overcome by robust negotiation and a display of what the INTERFET Commander, Major-General Peter Cosgrove called a sufficiently powerful demonstration that severe penalties and sanctions would be imposed on violent parties.²⁰⁷

Conversely, in Rwanda the UN mission was weak and had a mandate wholly inadequate for the situation. A failure to appreciate the gravity of the situation on the ground and a political reluctance to declare 'genocide' led the French to launch an emergency evacuation operation which destroyed any illusion that the international community was united. In such circumstances even strengthening the UN mission's mandate and capabilities would not have been sufficient. However, had the initial deployment been

²⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p.153.

²⁰⁶ Ryan, A., 'The Strong Lead-nation Model in an ad hoc Coalition of the Willing: Operation Stabilise in East Timor', *International Peacekeeping*, 9 (1), 2002, pp.23-44.

²⁰⁷ Dee, M., "Coalitions of the Willing" and Humanitarian Intervention: Australia's Involvement with INTERFET', *International Peacekeeping*, 8 (3), p.14.

conducted under COIN conditions there is every chance that the situation would not have developed as it did.

There are other situations in which an awareness of COIN doctrine, principles and practices would have been beneficial. If the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein had been viewed as having changed from war to COIN, both the preplanning for the post-conflict phase and the actions to be taken after the war-phase was concluded would have been very different and the prospects of success greater. In view of the conditions and background pertaining on the ground in Afghanistan, to have regarded the deployment of troops as being one of peacekeeping in which no shots need be fired, verges on the criminally negligent. Had it been seen as a COIN operation from the start there would have been better military and civilian preparation and the heavy resistance from the Taliban would have been seen as an inevitable opening sequence rather than one which threatened to destabilise the whole mission. Perhaps equally crucially, the media and the home populations would also have less alarmed by the events which transpired.

Potential Difficulties

Aside from the above it must be admitted that there are other factors which might inhibit

New-COIN operations:

Intelligence: Mention has been made of traditional UN reluctance to countenance the employment of Intelligence units on PKOs. This reluctance has been slightly modified recently but it is still far from accepted that missions should routinely contain such units. The gathering, timely analysis and use of intelligence to understand the local conditions and to target insurgents and spoilers are fundamental to successful COIN operations. The underlying rationale to this high priority being that insurgents, like terrorists, are not so

much outfought as outthought. The UN decision to use the term 'information' when it means intelligence has further complicated the issue. Since COIN lays equal stress on keeping the local population informed and on-side, the so-called and often maligned 'Hearts and Minds' philosophy, there is a grave danger that these two functions, which should always be rigorously kept separate, could be seriously impaired if they are confused. This is further complicated by the fact that various branches within the UN still use the term 'information' in its original sense, to mean public information, and often see even that as being defensively orientated and limited to speaking to the press only when necessary. When in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1993, the author negotiated with a local radio station to have air time for HQ UNPROFOR, it generated considerable alarm in the UN mission headquarters in Zagreb, which rapidly spread back to New York and a serious warning that this would be seen as military propaganda and should be discouraged. An essential part of COIN operations has also been the active employment of Psychological Operations' personnel. Quite how the UN or other non-military organisations might react to such deployments remains an unknown factor.

Multinationality: COIN operations in the past, whilst they may have had some personnel from other nationalities attached, have seldom been fully international. Detachments from different national, cultural, service methodologies and levels of training have often posed considerable difficulties for PSOs:

Language issues aside, each national battalion brings with it its own particular cultural complex and set of assumptions, the distinctiveness of which is not erased by a UN uniform.....this may give rise to barriers to interaction, misunderstandings, prejudices, and unknowingly offensive behavior...Differing national interpretations of the mission mandates and application of rules of engagement (including the use of protective force).....encroach upon the effectiveness of the intervention. Command and control arrangements are often complicated by national differences in staff procedures, training, equipment and

language. Problems may arise when contingents are reluctant to be subordinated to another nation's command.²⁰⁸

Added to this must be the reality that national contingents will often relay orders back to their national government for approval before deciding to comply with them. When coupled with the increased tendency and possibility for national governments to micro-manage operations from afar, there must be doubt as to whether the complete coordination, flexibility and immediacy required for a classic COIN operation could be obtained. Whether 'New-COIN' could operate under these limitations also remains a largely unknown quantity, although there are encouraging signs that the need for greater cooperation and coordination are perceived as necessary.

A further concern in addition to differing procedures and competencies is that of corruption. Several UN and other regional organisations operations have been bedeviled by this problem. In the Balkans it was a particular embarrassment with Ukrainian and Russian troops:

Corruption among soldiers in the UN peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia always has been a problem, and troops from the former Soviet Bloc nations are said by military and UN officials to be the most active in black racketeering, running prostitution rings.....UN efforts to stamp out the malfeasance have generally been ineffectual, partly because Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has hampered investigations and partly because the culture of the \$1 billion-a-year UN operation in the Balkans has turned a blind eye to the problem.²⁰⁹

On many missions UN and OSCE Civilian Police detachments have themselves also been shown to be fallible, this being an especially significant problem as, in peace building, these detachments are often the interface between the peacekeepers and the

²⁰⁸ Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, *op cit*, pp.146-47.

²⁰⁹ Pomfret, G., 'Alleged Russian Corruption in Bosnia worries NATO', *International Herald Tribune*, November 7, 1995.

local population. In Liberia, ECOMOG, despite much good work, established such a reputation for corruption and theft that the locals joked that the letters stood for ‘Every Car Or Movable Object Gone’²¹⁰. Experts such as Kitson had always believed that peacekeeping missions were more prone to corruption, bribery and covert help by peacekeepers to one or other of the warring parties²¹¹; and another, General von Horn had devoted a whole chapter of his book to the dangers of corruption in a peacekeeping force.²¹² Both felt these problems to be lessened when, as in COIN, soldiers and their Commanders had a clearer and more defined aim, even though the overall task itself might be both more diverse and complex.

COIN requires that the overall aim be clear and shared by all. That aim is likely to be more wide ranging and flexible than any under which most peacekeepers have been used to operating. This may affect commanders as much as their troops in that there will no longer be clear lines to delineate what the mission troops can and cannot do in any given circumstance. This should be a considerable benefit but there have been incidents in the past which suggest that not all commanders will be able to adjust to such demands, as the following examples from the UN operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) indicate:

The armed contingents were supposed to ‘assume immediate responsibility for verifying and ensuring the security of strategic and trading routes, adopting the measures necessary for the purpose’. Some measures for ensuring the security of these routes were deemed less necessary than others. When a group of Italian troops patrolling the Biera Corridor came across an armed robbery in progress, they detained the thieves and turned them over to the police. The General in charge of ONUMOZ’s military contingent reprimanded them and told them they should have simply continued on their way and reported the incident when they next encountered the police.....This was not the only example of an excessively narrow definition of what soldiers were supposed to do. An officer

²¹⁰ Ludden, J., ‘West African Peacekeepers Falter in Strife-Torn Liberia’, *Christian Science Monitor*, May 22, 1996.

²¹¹ Kitson, F., *Low Intensity Operations*, pp.161-62.

²¹² von Horn C., *Soldiering for Peace*, Cassell, 1966, pp.98-114.

from one of the African contingents noted that the rules of engagement reduced his troops to noting the licence plate number and numbers of passengers in vehicles full of weapons that passed through their checkpoints.²¹³

Recent Developments in Military Doctrine

In 2004, in an attempt to define PSOs more concisely, the British MOD had constructed the following definition:

An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building and/or humanitarian operations.²¹⁴

The inclusion of nearly every type of ‘peace’ variant in the definition suggests the underlying difficulty in seeking closer definition - it is a ‘catch-all’ rather than a specific description. In reality, the British have consistently employed COIN principles in PSOs whenever the situation and mission mandate has permitted it and have sometimes shown considerable flexibility in stretching the mandate in this direction (not always without criticism) to achieve the mission aim. In fact COIN, itself, had been re-examined and updated as doctrine since Kitson’s day. This had occurred most recently in 1995, when the new Army Field Manual, vol. V, Operations Other Than War (1995) was published. Fittingly, it begins with a quote from General Sir Frank Kitson:

The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity.²¹⁵

This quotation is used to emphasise a statement of the fundamental principles of the

²¹³ Jett, Dennis, C., *op cit* p.84.

²¹⁴ UK MOD, *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (JWP 3.50) (2nd Ed), Shrivenham, Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, 2004, p.103.

²¹⁵ DGD7D 18/34/56 Army Code No. 71596 (Pts 1 and 2) Army Field Manual, vol V, Operations Other Than War, Section B: Counter Insurgency Operations, Part 2 The Conduct of Counter Insurgency

doctrine of counter-insurgency, to which the manual gives the title ‘A Matter of Balance’:

There has never been a purely military solution to revolution; political, social, economic and military measures all have a part to play in restoring the authority of a legitimate government. The security forces act in support of the civil authority in a milieu in which there is less certainty than in conventional war. The problem is that, working on insufficient information, at least in the early stages, decisions have to be made affecting every aspect of political, economic and social life in the country. These decisions have repercussions for the nation far beyond its borders, both in the diplomatic field and in the all-important sphere of public opinion.²¹⁶

The principles listed are themselves an update and amalgam of those of Thompson and Kitson, as outlined at the end of Chapter Four:

Political Primacy and Political Aim;
Coordinated Government Machinery;
Intelligence and Information; and
Separating the Insurgent from his Support
Neutralising the Insurgent
Longer Term Post-Insurgency Planning²¹⁷

In the course of emphasising that the above do not mean that the military aspects of such operations are of minor importance the manual uses another quotation attributed to Kitson:

There is no such thing as a wholly political solution either, short of surrender, because the very fact that a state of insurgency exists implies that violence is involved which will have to be countered to some extent at least by the use of force.²¹⁸

When members of the US Marine Corps deployed to Iraq it was reported that, to prepare for the post-conflict phase, they had consulted informally with British Army colleagues

Operations, London, 1995, p.3-1.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁷ *Ibid*, pp3-1 to 3-2.

²¹⁸ *Ibid* p.3-1.

about their experiences in Northern Ireland.²¹⁹ The Marines were also the only US forces to take with them a little book entitled ‘Small Wars Manual’ which had first been published in 1940 and reprinted in 1987.²²⁰ Startlingly, this appears to have been the only publication then available to advise on insurgency matters. However, as explained in Chapter Four, the US Army’s new Field Manual Interim (2004) does devote a whole volume of six chapters and ten annexes to counterinsurgency. The rationale for this is given as:

The stunning victory over Saddam Hussein’s army in 2003 validated US conventional TTP, but the ensuing aftermath of instability has caused review of lessons from the Army’s historical experience and those of other services and multinational partners. One of the key recurring lessons is that the United States cannot win other countries’ wars for them, but can certainly help legitimate foreign governments overcome attempts to overthrow them. US forces can assist a country confronted by an insurgency by providing a safe and secure environment at the local level and continuously building on the incremental success.....The impetus for this FMI came from the Iraq insurgency.....Consequently this FMI reviews what we know about counterinsurgency and explains the fundamentals of military operations in a counterinsurgency environment²²¹

The FMI gives the following definitions for insurgency and counterinsurgency:

‘An insurgency is organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict....It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. Political power is the central issue in an emergency.’²²²

...Counterinsurgency is those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency...It is an offensive approach involving all elements of national power; it can take place across a range of operations and spectrum of conflict. It supports and influences an Host Nation IDAD programme. It includes strategic and operational planning; intelligence development and analysis; training; materiel; technical and organisational assistance; advice; infrastructure development; tactical-level

²¹⁹ Baker, P., ‘Tactics Turn Unconventional; Commanders Draw Lessons of Belfast in Countering Attacks’ Washington, *Washington Post*, 30 March 2003.

²²⁰ Hoffman, Bruce, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*, Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2004, p.8.

²²¹ *United States Field Manual Instruction (Interim) 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations*, Fort Leavenworth, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2004, p vi. Available on Army Knowledge Online, www.us.army.mil.

²²² *Ibid*, p. 1-1.

operations; and many elements of PSYOPS. Generally the preferred methods of support are through assistance and development programs. Leaders must consider the roles of the military, intelligence, diplomatic, law-enforcement, information, finance and economic elements (MIDLIFE) in counterinsurgency.²²³

Resisting the obvious temptation to comment on the MIDLIFE abbreviation and its potential for journalistic frolics, the above shows that the US Army has grasped the full range of activities to be expected in counterinsurgency operations. Both here and subsequently throughout the FMI it is made clear the US counterinsurgency troops are acting in support of a legitimate Host Nation (HN) civil power and that the ultimate aim of the mission is political. Three subdivisions of support are envisaged, only one of which, the final one, involves combat operations. The first is termed Indirect Support; it emphasises the principles of HN self-sufficiency and aims to build strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities. The second division is termed Direct Support (not involving combat operations) and foresees US forces providing direct assistance to the HN civilian or its military and will include civil-military operations, intelligence and communications sharing and logistic support but not normally providing arms and equipment or training local military forces. The final division is Direct Support (involving combat operations) and involves the insertion of full US combat units into theatre; these are to be understood as temporary only until such time as the HN forces are able to regain initiative and control. Whilst this neglects to answer the obvious question of what is to happen if these HN forces do not exist or prove incapable of regaining control, it does establish the principle that US forces should not be seen as permanent or occupying forces. Elsewhere the FMI stresses that certain fundamental conditions must be established if a COIN operation is to be successful:

²²³ *Ibid*, p. vi.

A secure population;
Established local political institutions;
Contributing local government;
Neutralise Insurgent Capabilities; and
Information flow from local sources²²⁴

The imperatives which planners must take into account to achieve these are:

Facilitate establishment or re-establishment of a legitimate HN government;
Counterinsurgency requires perseverance;
Foster popular support for the HN and US governments;
Prepare to perform functions and conduct operations that are outside normal scope of training; and
Coordinate with US governmental departments and agencies, and with HN, non-governmental, and foreign agencies.²²⁵

Those unfamiliar with the normal operating procedures of the US Army may not realise that the last two imperatives are somewhat revolutionary, being normally considered the preserve of Special Forces or Civil Affairs teams.

It can be seen therefore that both the British and the US Armies have recently devoted considerable time to reviewing and updating COIN principles and procedures. Nor have the similarities between these New-COIN operations and those required for Peace Enforcement and other intervention operations gone unnoticed. Indeed it is perhaps instructive that some of the clearest definitions of the problems and possible solutions to such complex operations come not from the United Nations' many reports or from some eminent academic establishment, but from manuals designed for the ordinary soldier's knapsack. What seems to have been missed is that the critical period immediately after armed intervention has successfully achieved the more conventional military objectives is a COIN situation and could and should be planned for on that basis. Had the invasion of Iraq been planned for on that premise much of the resultant misfortune would at least have been expected - if not entirely avoided.

²²⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 2-2 to 2-3.

CONCLUSION

In the long journey since the birth of the United Nations the international community has sought to find better ways to prevent, avoid and end conflicts and wars. There have been undoubted successes along the route but the history and development of peacekeeping has been an uneven one. Since the ending of the Cold War the United Nations has had the potential to function as its founders had intended and, in consequence, there has been a marked growth in the type and number of peacekeeping missions. This has occasioned constant re-evaluation and re-organisation, accompanied by re-assessment of what resources and methods each type of mission needs. The world has not become less violent and in many cases so-called peacekeepers have been deployed to theatres where there is no peace to keep, with mandates which barely allow them to protect themselves, let alone the mission. The UN and in 'UN authorised' missions, other regional organisations have stumbled towards armed intervention but have not found the principles, guidelines or solutions necessary to maximise the prospects for success in such operations. The desire to keep the word 'peace' somewhere in the mission title has bedeviled and confused this process. This determination to avoid the truth that dare not speak its name has led to such terms as Peace-Enforcement Operations being used as if they were simply a development of traditional peacekeeping when they lack the principle of 'consent'; and by virtue of the fact that they are intended to leave a stable and viable government behind, cannot be impartial. Modern conditions such as increased globalisation, exponential growth in the number of NGOs and advances in modern technologies which have brought with them the internet and 24 hour news channels, have complicated these operations.

²²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 2-1.

Many reports have been written and much has been learnt but the key to finding what should define those operations at the hard end of peacekeeping when there is no peace to keep seems to elude them. The general conclusions here are that there should be a coherent and coordinated strategy embracing all aspects of military and non-military effort; the mission plan must be integrated and cover political, military and humanitarian aspects; the mandate must be clear but flexible enough to allow the military to move from traditional peacekeeping to peace-enforcement and back again as the situation dictates; in areas where there is still conflict the military task is to create the environment within which the other agencies can operate safely; there must be political primacy; all involved agencies must support the aim and liaise frequently with other agencies to ensure that their actions are harmonised; preferably there should be a joint military-civilian implementation staff; success will be deemed to have been achieved when the domestic situation is sufficiently stabilised to allow a safe transfer of power to the HN government, so that the outside military force can begin withdrawing from the area. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall summarise the requirement thus:

National armed forces under home government control stronger than challengers; sufficient indigenous capacity to maintain basic order impartially under the law; adequate democratic credentials of elected government with system seen to remain open to those dissatisfied with the initial result; a reasonably stable relationship between centre and regions; a formal economy yielding sufficient revenue for government to provide essential services (with continuing international assistance); economic capacity to absorb former combatants and progress in encouraging general belief in better future employment prospects; adequate success in managing conflicting priorities of peace and justice, protecting minority rights and fostering a reasonably independent yet responsible media²²⁶

The similarities between these requirements and those of COIN have been demonstrated

²²⁶ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall, *op cit*, p. 204.

in the previous chapter. To try and mould the umbrella term PSO into a concise set of principles and practices which can effect the above is unhelpful and only adds to the confusion. Better, it is suggested therefore, to remove the word 'peace' altogether from such operations and accept that they are counterinsurgency in its modern form and add New-COIN to the international community's and the UN's list of options, particularly when intervention is the reality. This would also have the advantage that the military role, although broad and flexible, would be clearly understood by both the military and the other involved agencies. If this suggestion is found to be a step too far, then let New-COIN become a new and separate category of PSO. Should even that prove too large a pill to swallow, then at least those who seek to find the answers should study both Classical COIN and New-COIN to extract from them those things which are relevant to today's more complex missions. However, COIN is not a panacea. COIN doctrine does not provide an infallible blueprint for success. It does perhaps provide guidelines towards a set of conditions, which if not present or quickly achieved, will guarantee failure. Chief among these are creation of a stable and effective host government; a supportive local population; an effective, impartial armed forces and police; and a restored economy, both local and national. Without these all COIN operations, PSOs and interventions are ultimately destined to fail. The military can provide the framework for these and buy the time for them to be achieved but it can not achieve them of itself.

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